Neoclassical realism and the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis revisited

The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis remains one of the most war-like confrontations between Beijing and Washington since the 1960s. Existing studies of the crisis, which have predominantly relied on domestic instability, strategic deterrence, and nationalism, are problematic, because they all assume a linear escalatory behavior of Beijing. China started with a rather accommodative posture, which later became more hostile toward Washington. How can we explain this two-step crisis behavior? Within the "Type I" neoclassical realist framework, the present paper borrows insights from the policy paradigm change model to elucidate this behavioral change. It argues that while Jiang's previous policy experiences resulted in a similar accommodative response in the leadup to the crisis, when two necessary conditions became fulfilled by mid-July, Beijing's posture changed: the lengthening of decision time and a relatively equal power relationship between the military and Jiang, that is, the erosion of Jiang's earlier supremacy over the military.