Husserlian phenomenology and its methodological significance

This thesis covers three major aspects of Husserl's phenomenology that may be particularly of interest to psychologists. I discuss Husserl's critique of naturalism and specifically his critique of naturalistic psychology. In so doing, I consider Husserl's historical investigation that focuses on the development of naturalism since early modernity. I also introduce Husserl's construction of transcendental philosophy that aims to overcome the problem imposed by naturalism. Then, I explore Husserl's analysis of intentionality viewed as the essential character of consciousness. Both the pretranscendental and the transcendental conceptions of intentionality are discussed in order to demonstrate the methodological status of phenomenological reduction. Finally, I explicate and examine Husserl's different approaches of reduction, the process of eidetic analysis, and the relationship between psychology and phenomenology. I argue that phenomenology can not only contribute to empirical psychological investigations but also help form a critical attitude about psychology in general and its underlying philosophical presuppositions.