Procedural policy instrument choice dynamics between political delegitimation and advisory committee creation: Evidence from the United States federal agriculture and transportation policy sectors 1997-2004

The procedural instrument choice model purports to set out an empirical theory intended to predict specific instrument choices emerging from the legitimation problems facing governments. However, the value of this theoretical approach can only be judged through empirical testing, and in terms of its practical value, by an assessment of its predictive utility in the policy process. Using time series data from the United States federal agriculture and transportation sectors, particular attention is given to the creation of the federal advisory committees, and whether the hypothesized delegitimation patterns empirically prevail prior to the creation of these committees. This analysis demonstrates the existence of conflicting empirical evidence undermining the model's postulates regarding the theoretic linkages between political delegitimation patterns facing the U.S. government and its advisory committee creations. The evidence gathered in the American case suggests that several key assumptions behind the model must be altered to account for these findings.