Shaping the Framework of Capital Markets Regulation: Political Institutions and Securities Regulation in Australia and Canada

This project examines the relationship between capital markets and political institutions. I use Australia and Canada as case studies. The main hypothesis I advance is that the framework of securities regulation must “fit” into a society’s broader institutional context. A regulatory system that is not well adapted to its institutional surroundings risks becoming implausible. I also argue that one of the key conditions for capital markets to be regulated in a centralized way is the presence of institutions that allow national policy makers to overcome resistance from regional authorities. This condition is present in Australia, but not in Canada. Other developments in Australia, such as large-scale corporate scandals, facilitated the centralization of capital markets regulation.Political institutions descended from the British Westminster Parliamentary system govern both Australia and Canada. However, the framework through which each country regulates capital markets presents a sharp contrast: while Australia has a single national regulatory agency, in Canada each province retains jurisdiction over securities regulation. Analysis of this contrast provides evidence to support this project’s hypotheses.Regulating capital markets can have important effects on a society’s financial and economic development. Political authorities, whether national or regional, are generally keen to exercise this power in order to prevent market failures that can impede economic development and frustrate the implementation of a government’s economic agenda.