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Executive Compensation Concentration and Institutional Ownership Power

Date created
2015-12
Authors/Contributors
Author: Li, Wei
Abstract
In this paper, we examine whether institutional shareholders prefer concentrated or dispersed executive compensation structure. To address this question, we study the relationship between executive compensation concentration and institutional ownership power because institutional investors can influence executive compensation more when they have more power. We measure institutional ownership power using institutional ownership level and institutional ownership concentration. We find a significant negative relationship between executive compensation concentration and institutional ownership power.
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You are free to copy, distribute and transmit this work under the following conditions: You must give attribution to the work (but not in any way that suggests that the author endorses you or your use of the work); You may not use this work for commercial purposes.
Scholarly level
Peer reviewed?
No
Language
English
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Li, Wei and Guo, Tingting_Final Draft.pdf 1.03 MB

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