The subject of reform within the United Nations Security Council locates itself as part of a larger academic discourse involving the concept of democratization within international organizations. This paper posits a little discussed strategy for reforming the veto system which calls for an override mechanism, or “vetoing the veto” (hereafter referred to as the ‘double-veto’). This proposal has its genesis in the “double majority voting” proposal of Major Keith L. Sellen, included in his thesis The United Nations Security Council Veto in the New World Order and presented to the United States Army in April 1992. From research undertaken thus far, the double-veto is an original formulation which argues for a system of vetoing unpopular vetoes in the Security Council, but with a re-vote that requires supportive votes from two Permanent Five members themselves.
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