SEARCHING FOR THE CIVIC STATE:

NATIONALISM IN POST-SOVIET UKRAINE

by

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Searching for the Civic State: Nationalism in Post-Soviet Ukraine

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ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the development of Ukrainian nationalism in the post-Soviet era. The central argument of this thesis is that Ukrainian nationalism as it is expressed today does not necessarily fall into the "bad, eastern, ethnic" nationalism that is traditionally associated with Eastern Europe. This malcomprehension of Ukrainian nationalism has resulted in the virtual neglect of this important country in the post-Soviet era. In terms of nationalism, Ukraine has managed to avoid the worst of ethnic cleansing while providing for the forms of inclusion that make a civic state. In the search for a civic state, Ukraine has been more successful than most post-Soviet and, indeed, post-Communist states. Ukraine's present problems of corruption, authoritarian tendencies and a parasitic oligarchy are among the more important problems facing the state today.

DEDICATION

For my parents, Sandy and Michele.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ARC	Autonomous Republic of Crimea
ASSR	Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CPU	Communist Party of Ukraine
EU	European Union
FSU	Former Soviet Union
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEP	New Economic Policy
NIS	Newly Independent State(s)
OUN	Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists
PfP	Partnership for Peace
Rukh	People's Movement in Support of Perestroika
SSR	Soviet Socialist Republic
UHG	Ukrainian Helsinki Group
UkSSR	Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
UN	United Nations
UNR	Ukrainian People's Republic
UPA	Ukrainian Insurgent Army
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UWPU	Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Union
UWU	Ukrainian Writers' Union
WWII	World War II

INTRODUCTION

In 1991, the Soviet Union disintegrated in a relatively non-violent manner. The successor states to the USSR have faced several serious and difficult challenges. One of the most serious challenges encountered by these new entities was how to develop a new sense of nationhood that would legitimate and provide cohesion for each of the new political entities. This thesis examines the dramatic and complex story of the challenge of identity formation and state building as it unfolded in post-Soviet Ukraine.

Debates concerning the challenges that nationalism presents to transitional states often centre on ethnic versus civic nationalism. These two categories are frequently regarded as polar opposites, i.e. that civic identity and ethnic identity (and civic states and ethnic states) are ideal types with no middle ground to accommodate the variegated nature of identity, of popular consciousness and the official perspective of states.[1] Ukraine's[2] experience in the Soviet Union presents a good example of the problem and tension between ethnic and civic identities. This thesis will attempt to elaborate on Ukrainian perspectives concerning nationalism and national identity. Hopefully, the discussion will also assist in clarifying various issues surrounding nationalism in the post-Soviet region and addressing some of the inadequacies of existing theories as they pertain to states in transition.

The intent of the analysis in this thesis is threefold. First, to explore the evolution of twentieth century Ukrainian nationalism, particular emphasis will be placed on a strong sense of the absence of statehood in modern Ukrainian identity. For example, the thesis will raise the question of how this weak sense of statehood has affected Ukrainian identity in the post-Soviet period. The second part of the thesis will focus on the

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[1] The various types of nationalism are discussed in Chapter 1.

[2] Throughout this thesis, "the Ukraine" is used to describe the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (UkSSR). "Ukraine" is used to describe the post-Soviet state.

development of Ukrainian nationalism in the Soviet Union. For example, raising the question, "How did the Soviet experience alter the expression of Ukrainian nationalism in the first decade of independence?" Finally, the effects of contemporary Ukrainian nationalism in the post-Soviet period on efforts at state-building will be discussed, addressing the question, "Has Ukraine balanced traditional identities with more modern ones, and if so, how?" The central argument is that Ukrainian nationalism is best viewed as a combined evolutionary and developmental[3] process that has been influenced by both the absence of modern statehood and the experience of Soviet rule. These two forces have combined to create the preconditions that allowed a more civic state to emerge in post-Soviet Ukraine than what might otherwise be expected in Eastern Europe. The result to date has been a form of nationalism that allows for the expression of both primordial and modern forms of identity.

1. The Case Study: Ukraine in Perspective

"Ukraine" (*Ukrainiya*) means borderland. Historically, Ukraine's place is determined by its central position at the crossroads of east and west, north and south. As a borderland area, the region was repeatedly exposed to the competing cultures of both Europe and Asia. Today, in the first years of the twenty-first century, Ukraine's place in the world will be determined, in part by history and in part by its particular form of nationalism and national identity that has evolved in the country. Whether Ukraine reflects on its position at the crossroads of the world depends in large measure on whether or not the country's ability to consolidate a national identity can provide cohesion to its population.

The *chernozem* – the dark fertile soil that Ukraine is historically famous for – that encompasses approximately two-thirds of Ukraine's territory[4], Ukrainian lands are known to be the breadbasket of Europe. Because of this rich, fertile landscape, Ukrainian

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[3] The term "evolutionary" refers to the so-called "natural development" of nationalism, whereas the term "developmental" refers to the institutionalization of nationhood (see Chapter 1) and the externally imposed notions of citizenship and belonging to the nation.

[4] Orest Subtelny, <u>Ukraine: A History</u> 3rd Edition. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000: 3.

lands have been subject to the whims and desires of one empire or another throughout the modern era and into the twentieth century.[5] To some extent, periods of foreign rule allowed Ukrainians to retain a national identity by providing a division between "self" (Ukrainians) and "other" (foreign rulers). This has sometimes resulted in a negative definition of "Ukrainian," i.e. they are defined by who they are not, for example that they are not Russian. Today in post-Soviet Ukraine, Ukrainians continue to struggle for a positive identity. They have been struggling to define who and what they *are* rather than solely what they are *not*.

Geographically, Ukraine's importance can be viewed both on the international and European levels. Internationally, Ukraine is a "vital swing state." It is on the cusp of east and west and "has to steer carefully between the twin myths of its essentially European or East Slavic destiny."[6] In the east, there is more affinity with the Slavic identity,[7] whereas in the west of Ukraine, ties to Central Europe are considerably stronger. How Ukraine has managed these multiple identities is important to international and European stability, as well as to the creation of a strong and prosperous Ukraine.

The concept, "Ukraine on the crossroads of Europe and Asia,"[8] has several implications for both Russia and Europe. It is sometimes worrisome for Russia because it implies that anything east of Ukraine is Asian, or at best Eurasian. Moreover, the loss of Ukraine drastically limited Russia's possibilities for rebuilding its empire, particularly in the face of a declining Russian birth rate and a rising Asian birth rate. Finally, without a Ukrainian ally to its west, Russia would be even more exposed in any protracted

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[5] Hitler was coveting the same territory sought by earlier dictators and those attempting to expand their influence, such as Napoleon, the Habsburgs and the Romanovs.
[6] Andrew Wilson, The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation, 2nd Edition. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002: 317.
[7] It is worth noting that the roughly twenty-two per cent ethnic Russian population lives primarily in the east. Identities seem to be more overlapping and flexible in this area than in the western region.
[8] CIA World Factbook. Ukraine. http://www.cia.gov/factbook. Date Accessed: February 13, 2003.

conflicts on its western flank.[9] In this role, Ukraine is a geostrategic pivot. The existence of Ukraine "as an independent country helps to transform Russia. Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an European Empire."[10] Thus, Ukraine's inclusion in Europe can be seen as a short-range threat by Russia. At the same time, Ukraine's inclusion in the West means the expansion of European interests, identity and stability, which may be perceived by Russians as beneficial over the long term.

In comparative European terms, Ukraine's physical land mass and demographics are roughly the same as France.[11] This makes Ukraine a potential "heavyweight" in an expanded European Union (EU), in terms of politics, economics and military security. By balancing multiple identities, Ukraine can fulfil its stabilizing role by enhancing communication, understanding and security between east and west.

Geopolitically, Ukraine can represent a stabilizing, or destabilizing, influence for Europe in general. Zbigniew Brzezinski includes Ukraine in the critical core of Europe's stability, and therefore an important country for inclusion into the special Franco-German-Polish relationship. This expanded "political collaboration engaging some 230 million people could evolve into a partnership enhancing Europe's geostrategic depth" by 2010.[12] Ultimately however, Ukraine's inclusion in Europe is contingent on the development of a strong, stable and prosperous state that can balance multiple identities and competing interests both within its borders and in its international relations.

2. Overview of the Thesis

This thesis is divided into three sections. Part I will discuss the theoretical problems surrounding traditional debates on nationalism as they apply to present-day

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[9] Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives. London: Basic Books, 1997: 92. The ongoing conflict in Chechnia is an example of this.
[10] Brzezinski, 1997: 46. Brzezinski (p. 41) identifies a geopolitical pivot as a state "whose importance is derived not from [its] power and motivation but rather from [its] sensitive location and from the consequences of their potentially vulnerable condition for the behaviour of geostrategic players."
[11] CIA World Factbook. Ukraine's landmass as of January 2002 was 603 700 square kilometres; that of France was 547 030 square kilometres. Ukraine was the largest new state created out of the collapsed Soviet Union.
[12] Brzezinski, 1997: 85

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Ukraine. This section will focus on the ethnic-civic dichotomy and the problems of applying it to Ukraine. In due course, the thesis will seek to build on Gellner's temporalization and regionalization of nationalism.[13] The Gellner-inspired framework is detailed in the last section of Chapter 1.

Part II discusses pre-independent Ukrainians, that is, citizens living in Ukraine before 1991. Chapter 2 discusses the national problem in the pre-Soviet period with an emphasis on the traditional threefold division of the Slavic ethnic group (Russians, Byelorussians, Ukrainians). A subsection of Chapter 2 will also address the period from the Bolshevik Revolution to the Second World War. That subsection will suggest that certain events often used as examples of Ukrainian nationalism have resulted in Ukraine's incorporation into "bad eastern nationalism," completely disregarding western Ukrainians' ties to Europe. The establishment of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (UkSSR) as a formally recognized "sovereign" state following World War II marked the first time an entity known as "the Ukraine" was constructed. This thesis will argue that the borders established under Soviet Federalism would provide the internal bases for independence in 1991.

Chapter 3 discusses the period from the Second World War to independence in 1991. The main argument will consist of two parts. First, while Soviet nationality policy did constrain expressions of national*ism*, the idea of national*ity* was nevertheless enhanced. The idea of "Ukrainian" existed alongside the idea of "the Soviet citizen." Soviet maltreatment of the Ukraine in terms of environment, politics and social aspects reinforced a negative conception of Ukrainian identity. An additional part of the argument is that while the idea of Soviet citizenship was largely defunct in 1989, the legacy of Soviet nationality policy provided a conception of the self-definition of Ukrainian identity.

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[13] Ernest Gellner, Nationalism. New York: New York University Press, 1997. Specifically Chapters 6 and 7.

Part III presents the core of the thesis and will discuss the evolution of Ukrainian nationalism throughout the post-Soviet era. Chapter 4 argues that Leonid Kravchuk's attempts at state building, while developing a notion of national consciousness were constrained by his inability to provide a more substantive basis for Ukrainian citizenship. The result was a "Ukraine for Ukrainians" attitude that was sufficient in differentiating the country from Russia, but was insufficient for Kravchuk's re-election in 1994. Indeed, the 1994 elections marked the beginnings of a shift away from a form of ethnic nationalism towards a more civically oriented form of nationalism that emphasizes ties to the territory rather than to ethnicity.

Chapter 5 focuses on the transformation of national values under Leonid Kuchma, arguing that there were both internal and external reasons for a shift towards more pragmatic values. In fact, Kuchma's success lies in the 1996 Constitution, which allowed for the expression of multiple identities in a civic forum.

Chapter 6 will discuss the internal dilemmas of Ukrainian nationalism. The first part of this section explores potential scenarios associated with a civic Ukrainian state. The second part of the chapter argues that the potential danger of aggression towards minorities has decreased, mainly due to the inclusive language of the 1996 Constitution. This unique constitutional design has created the groundwork for alleviating serious minority problems and for uniting multiple identities into a civic state. The final part of Chapter 6 discusses whether or not the experience of Ukrainian state and nation building provides a model for post-Soviet nationalism.

The successful integration of the population into a civically-oriented state has been useful to Ukraine in meeting the challenges of the twenty-first century. The conclusion will address Ukraine's inclusion in the Euro-Atlantic region in order to achieve a higher degree of national security and European stability in the twenty-first century.

CHAPTER 1: THE THEORETICAL DILEMMAS OF NATIONALISM

1. Theoretical Traditions and Recent Issues

Traditionally, discussions about nationalism have centred on a primordial-modern dichotomy that, unfortunately, often fails to meet the challenge of explaining and understanding nationalism. The overall result of this weakness in theory is a simple division between "civic" and "ethnic" nationalism; ideal types that are rarely, if ever, sufficient to explain complex reality.

For primordialists, nations are depicted as "based upon a natural, organic community, which defines the identity of its members, who feel an innate and emotionally powerful attachment to it."[14] Such theories argue that nations are natural and therefore necessary as organizing principles in the world. These approaches direct attention to the "intimate links between ethnicity and kinship, and ethnicity and territory, and have revealed the ways in which they can generate powerful sentiments of collective belonging."[15] This level of analysis is sufficient so long as the ethnic element of the nation is congruent with the political state. But after modern multicultural states emerged, the notion of the ethnic state often became those seen as countries or political units that repressed their minorities; civic states either included minorities or, at least, did not overtly oppress them. Today, most of the post-Soviet states are multi-ethnic. With some notable exceptions (Moldova, the Caucasus, Tajikistan), nationalism in the post-Soviet region has been largely peaceful. Given the complexity of post-Soviet development, the classical civic state-ethnic state dichotomy is no longer appropriate to

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[14] David Brown, Contemporary Nationalism: Civic, Ethnocultural and Multicultural Politics. London: Routledge, 2000: 6.
[15] Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism. London: Routledge, 1998: 223.

fully explain and understand why nationalism in some states is peaceful, and in others it is violent.

Contrary to the primordial paradigm, the modernist paradigm embodies the notion that "nations and nationalism are derived from the processes of modernization."[16] According to the modernist paradigm, nationalism is part of the process whereby elites "have mobilized and united populations in novel ways to cope with modern conditions and modern political imperatives."[17] The result is a form of nationalism that is often labelled "civic."

In general terms, civic nationalism "maintains that the nation should be composed of all those...who subscribe to the nation's political creed." The nation is seen as "a community of equal, rights-bearing citizens, united in patriotic attachment to a shared set of political practices and values."[18] In other words, individuals are members of the state by virtue of living under the rule of law. Such an analysis portrays civic nationalism as reinforcing ideas about substantive democracy. Understood in this manner, it is highly improbable to create a civic form of nationalism in an authoritarian state.

While civic nationalism seems to fit the modernist paradigm, ethnic nationalism seems to correspond more to the primordial paradigm. Ethnic forms of nationalism create identities associated with lineage or bloodlines. When ethnic nationalism is attempted in a modern state, and there is "no cohesion, regimes are necessarily impelled toward maintaining unity by force, rather than by consent."[19] Individuals are members of the state by ancestry and history, by chance and not by choice. In multiethnic states, ethnic nationalism can often politically polarize the population. The "quick fix" to such

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[16] Smith, 1998: 224.

[17] Smith, 1998: 224.

[18] Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism. Toronto: Penguin Books, 1993: 6.

[19] Ignatieff, 1993: 7-8. Ignatieff equates civic nationalism with democracy, and ethnic nationalism with authoritarianism. This thesis argues that this is not necessarily the case – that a civic identity can exist alongside an ethnic "nationality" with a fair degree of harmony.

polarization is an authoritarian state and a charismatic leader who claims he or she can encourage or force individuals to be loyal to a secular power.

There are numerous problems with this classical civic-ethnic dichotomy. In particular, the dichotomy assumes that a civic form of nationalism can only exist in a democratic state, and that authoritarian states are destined to suffer from ethnic nationalism. This fails to explain the Soviet Union where, for nearly half a century, the ideal of the Soviet citizen served to provide an ostensibly non-ethnic focus for membership. As the USSR succumbed to the economic imperatives of the Cold War, it became unable to adequately meet the needs and demands of its population, and as a result, facilitated a return to national *ethnic* identity among many of its leaders and citizens.

The inability to adequately explain and understand contemporary nationalism has brought forth new issues that challenge traditional explanations. The exploration of these issues has come mainly from post-modernist perspectives and constructivist perspectives.

In developing an alternative approach to nationalism, post-modernists attempt to "seek out and discover contestation, flux and fragmentation."[20] Thus, the post-modern perspective allows the researcher to question traditional sources of knowledge and labels that have served to differentiate individuals in the past. Rather than being fixed, identity is viewed as fluid and accommodates ongoing political, social and cultural changes. Neither the traditional paradigms nor post-modernist approaches appear able to adequately explain post-Soviet nationalism. The main inadequacy of the former is in defining identity as fixed in time and place. Post-modernist perspectives fail in that they do not reflect today's reality.[21]

While post-modern approaches allow for the integration of individual perspectives concerning nationalism, they are dismissive of so-called "grand narratives."

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[20] Smith, 1998: 218.
[21] Smith, 1998: 218. Smith criticizes post-modern approaches because they turn "away from any grand narrative at the very moment when ethno-nationalism is resurgent and when the national state and national identity have once again become central to arguments about the direction of politics and society."

A grand narrative is an all-encompassing explanation of a phenomenon, in this case nationalism. In dismissing these grand narratives, post-modern approaches fail to acknowledge that all of the individual narratives derive their meanings from one or another of the grand narratives. An individual narrative would include elements of how individuals see themselves. The problem is that these individual narratives are ultimately tied to the grand narratives, i.e. – the individual narratives have meaning only in the context of the grand narratives. In essence, both traditional and post-modern thinking do not adequately deal with all of the major elements of identity formation. Thus, they fall short of providing a comprehensive understanding of contemporary nationalism, particularly as it pertains to transitional states. In order to fully understand the development of nationalism, it is necessary to fill the void between the two perspectives. The so-called "middle ground" – constructivist approaches – can provide analysis and understanding of multiple identities in a civic state. This "in-between" space can also provide an arena for dialogue between the traditional paradigms and post-modern approaches.

Constructivist approaches attempt to fill the middle ground between traditional and post-modern thought. By and large, constructivist approaches attempt to include aspects of the other approaches mentioned above. Constructivist approaches may be more appropriate than traditional theories of nationalism for the post-Soviet region because they take into account the consequences of Soviet socio-political legacies, as well as the ways newer challenges from the globalized environment influence transitional states. Drawing upon a sociological perspective, constructivist approaches are able to comprehensively address many of the aspects traditionally treated as separate issues by the classical and post-modern approaches to nationalism. Ultimately, contemporary national identity and contemporary expressions of nationalism are formed by the confluence of these forces.

For example, David Brown claims that

Constructivist approaches suggest that national identity is constructed on the basis of institutional or ideological frameworks which offer simple and

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indeed simplistic formulas of identity and diagnoses of contemporary problems to otherwise confused or insecure individuals.[22]

While institutions and ideology both influence nationalism today, it is unlikely that such formulations of identity are as basic or as simplistic, as Professor Brown seems to believe. Brown does not readily acknowledge that the various constructivist approaches provide a channel of communication for traditional and post-modern analyses. Thus, Brown suggests that constructivist approaches do not offer the opportunity to reconcile the various perspectives of nationalism that range from strategic to ethnic interests. Constructivist perspectives may facilitate understanding of the state and nationalism as a duality rather than as a dichotomy, i.e. that nationalism and the state are interrelated and mutually constitutive of each other.

For Ukraine, a region that has suffered the various throes of nation and state building, the key has been, and remains how, to reconcile a 300-year history of statelessness with the statehood experience of the Soviet Union. Contemporary Ukrainian identity has elements of continuity as well as fluidity and a constructivist approach provides the analyst with the basis for considering both of these aspects as they pertain to identity formation. The form of constructivism used in this thesis will demonstrate that agents create structures (institutions, policies, culture and so on) that reflect the values of a nation at its point of creation. Over time, these structures come to define who the members of the nation are. At the same time, agents define and constitute the very structures they make. In short, the political culture of the nation or state is central to defining expressions of nationalism.[23]

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[22] Brown, 2000: 20. For other constructivist perspectives on nationalism, see Margaret Moore, The Ethics of Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001: 9-14.

[23] James Busumtwi-Sam, "Sustainable Peace and Development in Africa" in Studies in Comparative International Development. 37(3) Fall 2002: 98. Busumtwi-Sam indicates that, "The key to collective identity…lies not necessarily in who the people are in a primordial sense, but in the significance attached to particular modes of social differentiation, the political meanings assigned to identities and the historical and institutional contexts within which they are constructed. Who is counted as a member of a political group and how/when she or he is counted is highly dependent on political context.

In essence, a constructivist approach to nationalism allows the researcher to consider many of the variegated roots of identity and nationalism. While Brown's take on constructivism is rather limited, he offers a graphical representation that is quite useful in terms of explaining the functions and uses of constructivist approaches:

Figure 1[24] Constructivist Approach to Explaining Nationalism and National Identity

Constructivist

Political Myth   Sociological/Ideological Myth

Primordialist   Modernist
Ethnicity   Situationalist
Instinct   Interest
                                                                 Rational Perception

Identity

Fixed   Fluid

Constructivist analysis allows for a dynamic and multi-dimensional perspective for studying nationalism. From the graphic above, the reader can ascertain that not only do constructivist approaches occupy the middle ground in theory, they also allow for a limited consideration of aspects of both traditional and post-modern perspectives without falling the trap of cultural relativity. By examining the political history of Ukraine and Ukrainians through a constructivist lens, the many variables that gave birth to post-Soviet

[24] Adapted from Brown, 2000: 5.

identity can be determined as a basis for better explaining and understanding post-Soviet state- and nation-building. Certain alternatives, such as Liah Greenfeld's analysis of French nationalism and Brown's concept ethno-cultural nationalism may be more useful for placing Ukrainian nationalism in a constructivist framework.

Greenfeld describes French nationalism as "an ambivalent case (its nationalism was collectivistic, yet civic)."[25] For Greenfeld, the story of French nationalism,

> Offers the possibility of observing the successive evolution of several unique identities within the same political entity, highlighting the specific nature of national identity. It also demonstrates the possible influences of pre-national identities on nationalism.[26]

Similar to the case of early France, Ukrainian national identity is variegated and evolutionary. Furthermore, Ukrainian national identity is affected by a variety of factors. National identity is not only determined by domestic or internal factors, but by external factors as well. Pre-modern and contemporary factors also have an important role to play in the formation of national identity. Greenfeld's conception of French nationalism, allows for the consideration of all of these factors. Specifically, French national identity "was woven from threads which came from disparate sources and brought together independent – and sometimes contradictory – traditions and interests."[27] Ukraine's experiences as a nation without a state and as a federally subordinate republic have similarities to early France in the sense that contemporary national identity is formed by the influence of both internal and external, ancient and modern forces.

As well, "French nationalism was born out of the grievances and frustrations of the most privileged groups of the society."[28] Likewise, Ukraine's most privileged groups – the political elite or *nomenklatura* – were among the first to attempt "national

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[25] Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992: 14. By using the word "collectivistic" rather than "collectivist" Greenfeld indicates that there is some choice and a level of grassroots agreement rather than an authoritarian collectivism imposed from above.

[26] Greenfeld, 1992: 23.

[27] Greenfeld, 1992: 186.

[28] Greenfeld, 1992: 186.

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communism" – Ukraine's first steps to independence in 1991. Whereas the French elite nationalized patriotism as a means of resolving their crisis, the Ukrainian elite nationalized communism as a way to maintain their privileged status.

When Greenfeld's analysis is combined with Ernest Gellner's concept of the temporalization of nationalism (see below), it is possible to understand the evolution of a state from disarray to some sort of order. One can also see that it is possible to have a civic state in which there is a dominant ethnic-linguistic group. In such a case, nationalism is not merely internal to the state, but evolves and develops over time due to the confluence of internal and external forces. This form of nationalism may be termed ethnocultural nationalism.

Ethnocultural nationalism with its civic facets, still has many of the attributes of ethnic nationalism, but in practice, is more inclusive in nature. It allows people who were not born into the community to acquire the attributes that make them members of the state. This "process of assimilation implies the corresponding acquisition of belief in the common history and ancestry of the adoptive community."[29] Therefore, ethnocultural nationalism is not typically destined to end in violence, although it may in some cases. For example, if a minority group is completely prohibited from expressing its culture, and is also overtly oppressed through policy and legislation, nationalism may turn violent. However, a more passive form of ethnocultural nationalism may have a more dominant majority culture publicly, but outside of politics minorities are able to practice and express their cultures, e.g. in terms of language and religion.

Nationalism in post-Soviet Ukraine is neither multicultural[30] nor completely ethnic in nature. However there is a dominant culture that has slowly changed to meet

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[29] Brown, 2000: 128.
[30] See Brown, 2000: 127-134. Multiculturalism is not generally accepted as a form of nationalism, however multicultural policies are generally put in place in order to incorporate traditional identities into a civic state. Although this sounds similar to this interpretation of ethnocultural nationalism, it is somewhat different. This definition of ethnocultural nationalism calls for some assimilation of minorities in terms of working language and the political institutions that make up the state rather than integration of traditional identities and language into the state.

the needs of a newly independent state (NIS) containing multiple identities. In order to explain and understand this blended form of nationalism a new framework for analysis is necessary. Neither the primordial, nor the modernist paradigms on their own are able to completely explain nationalism in those NIS, particularly where both civic and ethnic forms of identity have existed alongside each other with a minimum of violent uprising.

2. Temporalizing Nationalism

By incorporating Gellner's temporalization and regionalization of nationalism into a constructivist framework, a more thorough understanding of post-Soviet Ukrainian nationalism may be possible.

In chapters 6 and 7 of his last book, Nationalism, Ernest Gellner describes his theory of nationalism.[31] The first part of his theory is deemed the "Stages of Transition" which details the changing nature of European nationalism from the Concert of Europe to the end of the Soviet period, that is, 1815 to 1991. The second part of the theory regionalizes nationalism, arguing that as one moves from west to east across Europe, nationalism becomes progressively more ethnically centred. Gellner's theory offers some illuminating insights and a more profound understanding of Ukraine's overall experience with post-Soviet nationalism.

For the imperial heads of state who controlled the Concert of Europe, "nationalism did not raise its head and it did not presume to challenge the verdicts of Europe's betters."[32] The only issue of real concern for the citizens of Eastern Europe was whether their new rulers were more or less oppressive than their former rulers.[33] Throughout the period of the Concert, the primary concern for the rulers was a territorial balance of power: parts of one empire could be traded for parts of another.

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[31] Gellner, 1997: 37-58.

[32] Gellner, 1997:39. The leaders of the Concert of Europe included Prince von Metternich of Austria, Robert Stewart (Lord Castlereagh) of Great Britain and Charles Maurice de Talleyrand of France – a key figure in restoring the Bourbon dynasty.

[33] Gellner, 1997: 39-40.

By attempting to maintain a territorial balance of power – and exchanging one culture for another – the rulers were setting the boundaries for the second stage of nationalism: irredentism. Gellner focuses the impact of irredentism on religion, i.e. – when overlords of one faith ruled over individuals of another faith that could turn to an established state for support. Despite their attempts to accommodate competing interests, the Ottoman and Habsburg empires sowed the seeds of their own demise with their inability to control nationalistic uprisings that, by 1914, had become routine.[34]

Following the Great War, stage 3 was embodied in Wilson's 14 Points. "The Age of Versailles" promoted the idea of self-determination for all peoples. Wilson's definition of self-determination involved "the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities, and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak."[35] For the peoples of Eastern Europe the principle of self-determination has proved difficult to achieve in practice.[36] This is mainly because cultural, territorial and ethnic cleavages are often blurry and crisscross each other. Since the Second World War, this has been exacerbated by the Soviet Union, which attempted to impose a purely political and ideological identity in place of traditional identities, while still continuing to use nationality as a differentiating factor. This contributed to the reality of an authoritarian state and ignored the principle of self-determination for nations. In an age where self-determination was the norm, Ukrainians were subordinated to the Soviet Union and the idea of the Soviet Citizen.

One problem with Gellner's analysis is that the temporal progression of nationalism requires that stage 4 (ethnic cleansing), be completed before any attenuation of national feeling occurs. This stage took place in Central Europe in the mid-twentieth century and again in Eastern Europe in the 1990s. Gellner speculates that while established states had several centuries of consolidation, new states might be in a hurry to

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[34] Gellner, 1997: 41-43.
[35] University of San Diego Department of History. "Fourteen Points Speech by Woodrow Wilson, January 8, 1918." http://history.acusd.edu/gen/text/ww1/fourteen points.html." Date Accessed July 13, 2003.
[36] Gellner, 1997: 44.

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catch up and be unable or unwilling to go through the "long, slow process of dissolution and forgetting of differences"[37] that is required in order to establish a civic state. They may be more likely to fall into ethnic cleansing in order to facilitate consolidation.

Gellner's final stage of nationalism is the "Attenuation of National Feeling."[38] Industrialization is a key feature of this stage. Industrialization allows for semantic understanding between people by providing a context that allows for the sharing of ideas and skills: "different words come to stand for the same concepts."[39] What this means is that people who work and live together can come to understand each other despite speaking different languages, because they "will not sacrifice their security and comfort for the sake of provoking violent conflict."[40] This statement has many consequences for present-day Ukraine.

The experience of the Soviet Union provided Ukraine with a substantial degree of industrialization. Contemporary Ukraine has the basic foundations necessary to develop capitalist industry and also the civic state that generally develops along with it. From Gellner's theoretical perspective, this idea would indicate that there is a high degree of understanding between the various social sectors of Ukrainian society: individuals of various ethnic and linguistic backgrounds have worked together for years and have developed the semantic understanding necessary in order to avoid ethnic conflict. In turn, this has an effect on the way nationalism is expressed and what form it takes.

3. Regionalizing Nationalism

In the second part of his theoretical framework, Gellner proposes a civic state-ethnic state spectrum that can be observed as one moves from West to East across Europe (See Appendix A). His central hypothesis is that the higher the degree of political and cultural cohesion in the state, the greater the probability that a civic state will emerge.

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[37] Gellner, 1997: 46.
[38] Gellner, 1997: 47.
[39] Gellner, 1997: 47.
[40] Gellner, 1997: 48.

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The Euro-Atlantic region (Zone 1) is likely to be the most peaceful and civically oriented due to the fact that state and culture in such societies "were living together in a kind of customary marriage for ages" before "the internal logic of modern society decreed that the couple were meant for each other."[41] For example, after 1648 no real changes were needed in England, because of that country's high degree of cultural and political cohesion. For the English, their political institutions were an acceptable reflection of their culture

Zone 2 encompasses Central Europe and is marked by cultural cohesion and political fragmentation.[42] Gellner is careful to note that in this region, violent and ethnic forms of nationalism were *choices*, not inevitabilities, i.e. – a state can be built that is reflective of this cultural cohesion. In neighbouring Zone 3 (Eastern Europe) nationalism is necessarily violent due to both political and cultural fragmentation.[43] In that particular region, the lack of both a dominant culture and a state resulted in ethnicity being, at once, both the only meaningful binding and dividing factor between individuals. Disagreements over cultural dominance and the means by which a state can be established result in violence.

For the purposes of this thesis, Gellner's analysis of the next zone, Zone 4, is the most pertinent. Zone 4 is the region "which has passed through the period of Bolshevism."[44] In Zone 4, the cultural element of the state was ultimately subordinated to the political element. Gellner's final question is: "now that the intervening force of Communism has disappeared, will the 'natural' development [of nationalism] resume and will it slot itself in at stage 3, 4 or 5?"[45]

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[41] Gellner, 1997: 51.
[42] Gellner, 1997: 53. As such, the focus was on unification in the German and Italian provinces.
[43] Gellner, 1997: 54-56. Gellner cites Plamenatz's essay, "Two Types of Nationalism" which implies that west of Trieste, nationalism could be benign, but east of there, it was likely to be horrible. The end point Gellner is trying to make is that the horrors of fascism and Nazism were optional; further east in the former Yugoslavia, and presumably beyond, these same horrors were inevitable.
[44] Gellner, 1997: 56.
[45] Gellner, 1997: 57.

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While Gellner acknowledges that the influence of "Bolshevism" must be addressed in studies of post-Soviet nationalism, he does not consider whether or not it would be desirable for the "natural development" of nationalism to resume, i.e. – going through the stage of ethnic cleansing outlined above. Ethnic cleansing, at a minimum, means the deportation of minorities; in some cases it can devolve into a more volatile form that does not maintain peace and security. Given the experience of the former Yugoslavia throughout the 1990s, it may be more desirable in terms of regional stability if the post-Soviet republics find a non-ethnic way to define the post-Soviet "self." This requires, in the first instance, a non-ethnic identification of the "other."

For a new state like Ukraine, it is impossible to completely ignore the socio-political and economic legacies of the Soviet Union. The possibility of Ukraine continuing to pass through Gellner's stages of nationalism really implies that, Ukraine after being frozen in the Soviet mould will undergo a regression to a pattern of ethnic and integral nationalism that started earlier in the twentieth century (see Chapter 2). For Ukraine, according to Gellner, the continued natural development of nationalism would necessitate going through the stage of ethnic cleansing before national feeling would become attenuated. Fortunately, since 1991, ethnic cleansing has not occurred, and hopefully does not seem likely to occur in the near future. Obviously, not every country inevitably will move through Gellner's theoretical framework of national metamorphosis.

4. A Nation Without a State

Ukraine's main dilemma on the cusp of independence was to build an inclusive state and a national identity where one did not exist before. Most Western approaches to Ukrainian nationalism have focused on "the need to react to and explain the failure to achieve statehood" when opportunities arose.[46] In such analyses, matters of national identity are sometimes limited to ethnic and linguistic conceptions of belonging. The result is that in many such approaches, there is a frequent neglect of the more variegated

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[46] Andrew Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997: 1.

aspects of Ukrainian nationalism.[47] State-centric theories of nationalism are limited, particularly in Ukraine where citizens imagine themselves a nation, but have been without a state throughout the modern period. Perhaps partially due to the arbitrary east-west divide[48] that runs through Ukraine, such approaches frequently treat contemporary Ukrainian society as polarized, and is therefore incapable of constructing an inclusive national identity.

The above-mentioned difficulties are the main reasons for the view presented by Dr. Andrew Wilson for the belief that Ukrainian society is historically polarized. The conventional arbitrary line dividing Ukraine between east and west runs directly through the country, with ethnicity also being divided along east-west lines. The majority of the ethnic Russian population lives in the eastern part of Ukraine; the ethnic Ukrainians reside in the western part. In addition to these groupings on the basis of ethnicity is also a socio-politically defined group that is important in understanding the Ukrainian case: Russified Ukrainians. These Russified Ukrainians embody elements of both the "Little Russian" identity as well as contemporary independent Ukrainian identity. They are likely to

> Challenge the discourse of 'colonialism' and 'Russification' and to resist
> attempts to characterize past (and future) relations with Russia in purely
> negative terms, as, in order to assert their own identity, it is important to
> stress that their crossover into Russian cultural space has been voluntary.[49]

In making their challenge to traditional discourses, Russified Ukrainians may be representative of the fluidity necessary to make a national identity that is acceptable to all facets of the Ukrainian population.

What Wilson tends to neglect in his 1997 work, are the many ways contemporary Ukrainian nationalism has been shaped by the experience of the Soviet Union. Just as

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[47] Wilson, 1997 xii. Specifically, the 1917 to 1920 attempt at statehood is often cited.

[48] Wilson, 1997: 1.

[49] Graham Smith, Vivien Law, Andrew Wilson, Annette Bohr, and Edward Allworth, Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands: The Politics of National Identities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998: 134.

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ancient history cannot be ignored, twentieth century history and the experience of totalitarianism cannot be ignored.

As a result of historical development, before and during Soviet power, there has been a political incorporation into present-day Ukraine of the ethnic Russian population. Like many Western states, Ukraine is attempting to build unity out of diversity. This diversity has historical, ethnic and political aspects that contribute to the new identity of Ukraine.

Contemporary Ukrainian nationalism is more complex and indeed, confusing, than national development in other countries. While Ukrainian citizens have embraced independence, political consciousness in the new state is also deeply affected by the Soviet experience. For example, Ukraine has instituted its own holidays, but at the same time it has retained some holidays and aspects of the Soviet empire. The result is a plethora of holidays[50] that allows for the expression of the country's complex identity. By recognizing both old and new holidays, citizen inclusion in the state is increased. In turn, this reduces potential political alienation and violence that can occur in a multi-ethnic state.

Official recognition of various holidays indicates that Ukrainian elites have been cognizant of the various identities held by their constituents. By acknowledging the various historical experiences as part of current symbolism and celebration in Ukraine the country's political leadership has assisted multi-ethnic cohabitation, while maintaining at least the forms of democracy.

5. Ukrainian Nationalist Dilemmas and the Civic-Ethnic Dichotomy

The unique situation of Ukraine – a nation without a state – necessitates new ways of thinking about nations and nationalism. Specifically, in understanding twentieth century and post-Soviet Ukrainian nationalism, one must consider nationalism without

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[50] See Wilson, 1997: 221-223.

necessarily thinking about states. What remains is to understand the Ukrainian nation as historically different from the state of Ukraine.

According to Rogers Brubaker, the major problem with most theories of nationalism is that nations are understood as substantive, *a priori* existing entities. The main question is not whether nations exist, but how they came to be so.[51] Nationalism is essentially what nations do to create themselves.

According to Brubaker, the realist treatment of nations as substantive entities results in the adoption of the *nation* as a category of analysis. In fact, it may be more accurate to use the concept "nation" as a category of practice. In turn this realist approach to nations may reify the "conception of nations as real communities – and it makes this conception central to the [realist] theory of nationalism."[52]

In order to discuss nationalism without nations, Brubaker differentiates nationhood from both nation and nationalism by adding the concept of *nationness*. Nationhood is a political and social process that has been institutionalized within and among states;[53] the state defines the nation and vice versa. Brubaker's treatment of nationness as separate from nationalism is central to the analysis in this thesis. For example, the Soviet regime institutionalized "territorial nationhood and ethnic nationality as fundamental social categories."[54] Once the Soviet regime collapsed, the most important question became: now that the Soviet regime is gone, which is stronger – the primordial, ethnic sense of belonging and exclusion in the USSR, or the institutionalization of a political identity?

Rather than using "nation" in the realist manner described above, it may be more accurate to use it as a category of practice. In this case, "nation" refers to a "substantial,

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[51] Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996: 13.
[52] Brubaker, 1996: 15.
[53] Brubaker, 1996: 16.
[54] Brubaker, 1996: 17.

enduring collectivity."[55] Nationhood is an "institutionalized cultural and political form."[56] Brubaker equates nationhood with statehood. On the other hand, nations can exist without having a state. "Ukrainian" was used as a category of practice for centuries before having a state-like entity that could be called "Ukraine."

In order to get from "nation" to "nationhood," Brubaker introduces the concept *nationness*: an event, or a cluster of linked events, not an evolutionary or developing process.[57] When the Soviet Union crumbled in 1991, the nascent successor states experienced nationness.

Nationalism, in Brubaker's analysis, can then be seen as members of a collectivity, experiencing an event or events that allow them to institutionalize cultural and political forms that, in turn, allow them to protect the collectivity. In the modern era, this has taken the form of the sovereign state. Whether the form of nationalism is civic or ethnic depends on, among other things, the congruence of state and culture in the collectivity.

Adding "nationness" to the ideas surrounding nations and nationalism helps explain the emergence of new states following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Where nationalism was often considered to be a largely internal process for older states, successor states to the Soviet Union must consider the external influence of the USSR in order to develop national identities that will lead to a stable state. In the USSR, nationhood and nationality were fundamentally different from statehood and citizenship.[58] The concept "nationness" helps explain the sudden emergence of new states (an event) among groups that have been nations (in practice) for centuries without achieving nationhood until quite recently.

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[55] Brubaker, 1996: 21.
[56] Brubaker, 1996: 21.
[57] Brubaker, 1996: 28-19.
[58] Brubaker, 1996:23.See Chapter 3 below. At this point, it is sufficient to not that at the same time that the USSR attempted to institutionalize the idea of "the Soviet Citizen" and subordinate all vestiges of nationalism to this idea, nationality was used as a category of differentiation. Nationhood and nationality were distinct from statehood and citizenship.

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In this manner, nationness can be seen as the act of institutionalizing the nation, i.e. – when individuals who consider themselves a nation come together in the belief that they should live together in a sovereign state. For the NIS, this process has both internal and external components and draws upon the Soviet experience as well as pre-Soviet history.

As a nation without a state for most of the modern era, Ukraine is faced, not only with state-building, but nation-building and the economic and environmental issues faced by long-established states as well. The dilemmas facing post-Soviet Ukraine are the same as for many established states: to build unity out of diversity.[59] The rich diversity of theoretical writing and conceptual categories discussed in this chapter are valuable and will be used in the following chapters to explore Ukraine's post-Soviet nation- and state-building experiences.

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[59] See Andrew Wilson, The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation 2nd Edition. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999, "Preface."

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CHAPTER 2: THE NATIONAL PROBLEM IN THE PRE-SOVIET AND EARLY SOVIET PERIOD

Introduction

Although the concept of a Ukrainian nation has a long historical basis, the "emergence of an independent Ukrainian state in 1991 came as a great surprise in the chancelleries, universities and boardrooms of the West." This development was unanticipated in part due to the deep ethnic, linguistic, regional and religious cleavages that divide Ukrainians.[60] The relatively late emergence of the state of Ukraine has resulted in an emphasis on state building: a conscious concentration on creating the apparatuses and institutions of the state. The legitimization of many, if not all, of these institutions is impeded by the Soviet legacy.

For the Ukrainians, nation building and identity formation have historically taken a negative form, i.e. – Ukrainians are defined by what they are not: they are not Russian. While the establishment of the state of Ukraine differentiated Ukraine from Russia, the question now is whether this negative identity is sufficient to bind the nation to the post-1991 successor state.

Two different uses of the concept "nation" are presented here. The first is a category of practice; the second is a "concept that belongs to political and cultural imagination."[61] While these two uses are seemingly in opposition to each other, it can be argued that the nation must be imagined before it can be put into practice.

Both the practice and the idea of the Ukrainian nation are confused when looking at myths of origin. The history and historiography of Ukraine and its people are ones where "myths of institutional, societal or cultural continuity are used to link together

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[60] Wilson, 2002: xi. This is nothing new, for either the west, or the newly independent states (NIS).
[61] Wilson, 2002: xi.

otherwise disparate links in the national chain of descent."[62] This implies a type of continuity in Ukrainian state-building practices. However, the importance of any particular stage is often exaggerated. The assumption of continuity is sometimes rooted in erroneous leaps in judgment by certain scholars and politicians.[63]

The Ukrainians to 1917: The Historical Context

Prior to the state of Ukraine that emerged in 1991,[64] more institutionally organized peoples than the Ukrainians ruled the territory now known as Ukraine. Prior to the Bolshevik Revolution, ethnic Ukrainians "were a people who had not yet crystallized national consciousness and whose emergence into nationhood seemed like a distant goal."[65] As a result of foreign rule and several territorial divisions throughout the centuries, the Ukrainians had lagged behind in terms of national development. Historically, Ukrainian lands can be seen as a conglomeration of various geographical territories each with their own history.[66]

Although Ukrainian history may seem rather discontinuous in terms of state development, the important consideration for this analysis is that Ukrainians envision themselves as fundamentally different from other branches of the Slavic ethnic group, in terms of culture, language and development.

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[62] Smith et. al., 1998: 24-32.

[63] See, for e.g. Taras Kuzio, "Nationalism in Ukraine: Towards a New Theoretical and Comparative Framework," in Journal of Political Ideologies 7(2) 2002: 143. Specifically, "civic nationalism in Ukraine is also in the process of re-definition after attaining its objective as an independent state. In an independent state Ukrainian nationalism is still in the process of developing a broader definition of itself...that is both a 'doctrine of modernization' and an 'ideology of national solidarity.'" See also, pp. 146 to 151.

[64] The interval 1989 to 1991 is given instead of a firm date in order to indicate that Ukrainian independence and state development was a relatively long process. Independence was gained in increments, not all at once.

[65] Bohdan Krawchenko, Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine. Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1985: 1.

[66] Bohdan Nahaylo, The Ukrainian Resurgence. London: Hurst & Company, 1999: 1.

1. Pre-1917: Great Russians, White Russians and Little Russians

a. Kievan Rus' and Interpretations of History

Generally, there are two main interpretations of early Ukrainian history. The first is that history can be traced back in a relatively comprehensive manner for several thousand years. Ukrainians are aboriginal to the area now referred to as Ukraine.[67] In theoretical terms, the concept of "Ukrainian" is perennial or even primordial[68] in nature. This so-called "Ukrainophile argument"[69] embodies the idea that Ukrainians have always been distinct from other Slavic peoples. Contemporary arguments along this line seek to refute the Russophile argument that Ukrainians are "Little Russians" and should be included in a "greater Russia."[70]

Another argument maintains that the term "Ukrainian" should not actually be used until late in the nineteenth century, and then only conditionally in the western portion of Ukrainian lands. This argument takes a decisively modernist approach to Ukrainian nationalism. Within this argument is a firm identification of an "other" that has delayed the development of Ukrainian statehood, i.e. the prohibition of the acquisition and distribution of goods and benefits that would otherwise come from Ukrainians having a state of their own.

Regardless of the perspective adopted by the observer, there is general consensus that the Ukrainians, like the Russians and Byelorussians, have some affiliated ties to the proto-state of Rus' in the ninth century. Various interpretations of this proto-state exist. Bohdan Nahaylo calls Kyivan Rus' "a vast and powerful realm," in which Kyiv was at the centre of diverse territories and principalities that are the "heartland of present day-

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[67] As will be discussed later, this implies a territorial attachment that may help define what it means to be Ukrainian.

[68] See Mark von Hagen, "Does Ukraine Have a History?" in Slavic Review 54 Fall 1995: 658-673 and accompanying discussions.

[69] Smith et. al., 1998, Chapter 2.

[70] Smith et. al., 1998: 31.

Ukraine."[71] Accordingly, there may be some accuracy in addressing Rus' as a "relatively united early Ukrainian state" that would eventually give birth to Russians and Byelorussians.[72] The combination of a common system of customary law – the *Ruska Pravda* – with other elements of unity that have greater appeal to modernity that indicate the presence of this earlier proto-state, i.e. a common name, common enemies, a sense of territorial unity and belonging and elements of a common culture,[73] provides a basis for ties to Kievan Rus'. However, it must be noted that this argument does not provide a case for the alleged supremacy of the "Ukrainian" part of the Slavic family.

Wilson argues that Rus' remained highly decentralized and patrimonial. There was no real ethnic national consciousness. Links between individuals were tribal in character.[74] Like the rest of pre-modern Europe, national feeling did not exist insofar as people were consciously "Ukrainian." Individuals worked and lived together to ensure survival and to prevent their lives and holdings from being overrun by the invader of the day. Like other principalities of the pre-modern period, Ukrainians were a rather loose agglomeration of people – a "union of monarchs" and "a federal entity at best."[75]

Today, the correct interpretation of ancient history seems to be of minor importance. Neither argument is sufficient to explain the present situation in the region today, i.e. – there are three groupings of people who see themselves as fundamentally different from each other in terms of their development, languages and cultures.[76] The important element of these myths is the latent energy behind them that gives individuals a

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[71] Nahaylo, 1999: 1. Kiev did seem to serve as a cultural centre between Scandinavia and Constantinople.
[72] Wilson, 2002: 2. The contention on the Ukrainian side is that Russians are offshoots of the original Rus' whereas they embody what it means to be Rus'.
[73] Wilson, 2002: 7.
[74] Wilson, 1997: 2.
[75] Wilson, 2002: 8.
[76] Wilson, 2002: 2. See also, Nadia Diuk and Adiran Karatnycky, New Nations Rising: The Fall of the Soviets and the Challenge of Independence. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1993. Specifically, in chapter three they indicate that Kiev has a special importance to eastern Orthodoxy as "the cradle of Orthodox Christian civilization." (p. 71).

common background to cling to. Efficiently harnessing this energy to achieve a national sentiment is ultimately up to the leaders of contemporary Ukraine.

In order to fully attenuate national feeling, contemporary Ukrainian leaders may have more luck by concentrating on the Cossack period and the nineteenth century. Far more significant impacts on Ukrainian nationalism can be seen in concept of the cult of suffering.

b. Cult of Suffering: Polish-Lithuanian Rule and Cossack Resurgence

By the fourteenth century, most Ukrainian lands had been partitioned among several states. In the West, the Poles seized Galicia in the 1340s while Lithuania took Volhynia and Kiev. At this point the beginnings of negative Ukrainian identity, as well as the parallel beginnings of a territorial and religious between eastern and western Ukrainian lands began to emerge. Individuals on Ukrainian lands began to feel distinct from their overlords, enhancing a negative identity.

Under Lithuanian rule, "the Old Rus' nobility retained many of their privileges and the Orthodox Ukrainians were left largely undisturbed in their beliefs."[77] In 1569, control of Ukrainian lands passed completely to Poland. Forced to adapt to Polish ways, the old elite negotiated with the Poles to form the Uniate Church – Slavonic in liturgy and Orthodox in rite, but under Papal control. This allowed the elite to preserve Slavonic rites while avoiding outright Catholicization.[78]

At the same time, oppression by the Poles may have given rise to a cult of suffering amongst "Little Russians." There is no doubt that this period helped initiate a negative form of self-identification for the Ukrainians. While it was still unclear what and who they were, differential treatment by the Poles indicated they were at least "not Polish." While this helps establish some form of identity, the Cossack period provides some vestiges of statehood for contemporary Ukraine.

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[77] Wilson, 1997: 4.
[78] Wilson, 1997: 4.

According to Dr. Frank Sysyn[79] the Cossack myth fills certain needs for contemporary Ukrainians when it comes to thinking about themselves in such terms. Specifically, the Cossacks fill political, cultural and social needs by establishing a baseline for Ukrainian political, social and intellectual organization.[80]

As well as giving rise to a proto-national identity the Cossack legacy also gives rise to faintly proto-democratic tendencies. The Cossacks elected their own leaders, called *hetman* to lead them. In 1648, hetman Bohdan Khmelnystky led an uprising against the Poles to establish a semi-independent Cossack state.[81] As a direct result of this experience, the Ukrainians were ready for the "age of nationalism."[82]

Over time, Khmelnytsky became unable to maintain the independent Hetmanate without external assistance. In order to retain some form of independence, he concluded the Treaty of Periaslav with the Russian Tsar in 1654. Although Khmelnytsky hoped the Tsar would uphold the independence of his state, the Tsar also came to terms with the Poles, and in Ukrainian historiography, betrayed the Hetman and his people.[83] Again, there is disagreement on how history has been understood. The Ukrainians view Periaslav as an agreement among equals, whereas the Russians tend to view it as a treaty of unification in the spirit of pan-Slavism.[84]

Cossack history may give some weight to the idea of a Ukrainian state and some forms of rule – including early democratic tendencies – that may be of some use in building a contemporary national identity. At the same time, the Tsar's betrayal of Khmelnytsky can be seen as one of the bases of the cult of suffering present throughout

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[79] Frank Sysyn, "The Reemergence of the Ukrainian Nation and Cossack Mythology" in Social Research Winter 1999 58(4). Retrieved from EBSCO Database March 8, 2002: 1-3.

[80] Sysyn, 1999: 2. Specifically, the traditions of the "hetmanate and the Zaporozhian Sich" the Cossacks and their leaders as well as the "literary and artistic traditions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centures" provided Ukrainians with a socio-cultural model to follow.

[81] Wilson, 1997: 5 and Nahaylo, 1999: 3.

[82] Although there is some argument that the Ukrainians would not experience this until the twentieth century

[83] Nahaylo, 1999: 2-3.

[84] See Wilson, 1997: 6-7.

Ukrainian historiography. Later events in the twentieth century and throughout the Soviet period continually reinforced this cult of suffering among Ukrainians.

c. Of Romanovs and Habsburgs

By the late eighteenth century, most Ukrainian lands had been partitioned between the Romanovs and the Habsburgs. The two Ukrainian halves experienced significantly different rule under each empire.

Nahaylo argues that the Romanovs imposed strict policies of Russification, centralization and serfdom,[85] thus further weakening Ukrainian identity. On the other hand, Wilson argues that these changes merely allowed for fluidity in identity.[86] Either way, the Russian experience did have an effect on the nascent Ukrainian identity. The tsar's overall actions against the promoters of Ukrainian statehood and Ukrainians in general, through imprisoning, executing or denouncing them as separatists, as well as banning the use of the Ukrainian language, has been drawn upon by elites to cement the conception of the cult of suffering and a distinct, non-Russian identity.

While Romanov rule was oppressive, Habsburg rule in the west was relatively tolerant. There was more freedom of expression and more opportunities for early nationalists to network. The Habsburgs were generally supportive of the Ukrainians, so long as they worked with them, and against their enemies, particularly the Poles.[87]

By 1917, geographic and religious divisions were firmly entrenched in the Ukraine. The Orthodox east was generally less developed than the Uniate west. As well, the Tsar's policies were not advantageous to the creation of a strong civil society that could initiate the impetus for a Ukrainian state. In the west, the more lenient Habsburg policies led to a burgeoning civil society that has provided the basis for many expressions of nationalism of the twentieth century.

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[85] Nahaylo, 1999: 6.
[86] Nahaylo, 1999: 100.
[87] Wilson, 1997: 11.

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In terms of national identity and the emergence of Ukraine in 1991, this analysis leads to a minimum definition of "Ukrainian." By and large it is safe to say that Ukrainians share certain ideas about their territory and ethnic proximity to other peoples. Generally, the following statements are accepted as accurate. Ukrainians are aboriginal to a geographic area surrounding Kiev; they have some links to other Eastern Slavic peoples and they have a history of oppression and statelessness in the modern era, with intermittent organizational tendencies that carry proto-state and perhaps proto-democratic forms. Perhaps the most important element is the fact that there is a geographic split in Ukraine between east and west that likely impeded the development of a modern state. It was not until the nineteenth century that any idea of a national Ukrainian consciousness could be ascertained, and then only in a negative sense.

2. From the Bolshevik Revolution to 1945: The New Pre-Communism

a. The Ukrainian People's Republic and the Bolshevik Revolution

While colonial experiences of the pre-modern and modern eras have allowed Ukrainians to differentiate themselves from other peoples, the experience of the USSR intensified the east versus west split in Ukrainian attitudes about themselves and how others are perceived.

With the fall of the Romanovs in 1917, the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) was established at Kiev. The ensuing civil war in Russia spread to Ukrainian lands, and the populists were unable to keep control. By mid-December 1917, the Ukrainian Soviet Republic was created in the east. Between Soviet control in the east and the recreation of Poland in the west, Ukrainian lands remained divided.[88]

There are several reasons for the failure of the UNR. First, had the "Ukrainian Revolution" had come earlier (i.e. – at the same time as German and Italian unification),

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[88] Viktor Kozlov, The Peoples of the Soviet Union. Bloomington: Hutchison Education 1988: 31-32. Although the Ukrainians were also demanding statehood, the recreation of Poland did not allow for this, further cementing negative identity and allowing for the resurgence of integral nationalism amongst the Ukrainians. Since Germany had the same opinion of restored Poland, it is possible that shared sentiment led to an alliance between the Ukrainians and the Germans in the Second World War.

a successful national Ukrainian state might have been established. Perhaps more importantly, however, centuries of division among various empires had left a divided population. While a Ukrainian nation had been imagined for a long time, there was ultimately no middle class to establish links between the other social groups to create a successful Ukrainian Revolution.[89] There was a large gap between the intelligentsia and the peasantry. This key element in creating successful social revolutions, the intelligentsia viewed

> Anyone who didn't know or use the literary Ukrainian language, belong to the Ukrainian national parties...[was] also not a Ukrainian; in the understanding of these people the Ukrainian world ended outside the ranks of the Social Federalist, Social Revolutionary and Social Democratic Forces and was limited to a few hundred or a few thousand intelligentsia grouped in these parties.[90]

Lack of unity between the new leadership (the intelligentsia) and the majority of the population (the peasantry) made maintaining an independent Ukrainian state difficult. In alienating the majority of the population, the UNR missed a real chance at independent statehood.

By nurturing the intelligentsia's alienation of the peasants the Bolsheviks were able to establish a growing base of support in Ukrainian lands. Trotsky stated that the Bolsheviks were prepared "to support Ukrainian Soviets in their struggles against the bourgeois policy of the leaders of the present Central Rada."[91] This base of support was further expanded by external factors: war and economic collapse.

The 1917 to 1920 attempt at statehood can be seen as a late echo of nineteenth century Western populist assumptions as well as reverberations of President Wilson's thoughts on national self-determination. The UNR's main problem was its lack of

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[89] Wilson, 2002: 122.

[90] Dmytro Doroshenko, Minister of Foreign Affairs 1918 quoted in Wilson, 2002: 123-4.

[91] Quoted in Alfred L.P. Dennis, "Soviet Russia and Federated Russia" in Political Science Quarterly 38(4) December 1923: 532.

legitimacy and its inability to hold a general election as planned in January 1918.[92] Had the UNR achieved some legitimacy among those it claimed to represent, it may have been better able to protect the nascent state. Not only would this protection have a formal component (the creation of an army), but would also have had a more substantive element. Specifically, legitimacy would help develop loyalty towards the state. Ultimately, the UNR was a victim of the lethal combination of its position in history, its own interstate conflicts and the lack of a galvanizing figurehead or movement.

Turmoil surrounding Ukrainian lands towards the end of and after World War I made for a difficult period in which to establish new states. In Russia, the Kerensky government refused to negotiate an end to the war. The Russians were fighting both a civil war and an international war. For the embryonic Ukrainian state, the weakness of the provisional government and the Bolshevik coup of October 1918 radicalized the UNR. In order to preserve any last vestiges of statehood, the UNR issued a series of universals or declarations of independence from June 1917 to early 1918.

b. Declarations of Independence and the Rise of Skoropadsky

The First Universal of June 24, 1917 was a "decree of autonomy" which was opposed by the provisional government in Petrograd.[93] The Kerensky government only recognized the UNR's authority in the five *guberniya* of Kiev, Chernihiv, Poltava, Poldillia and Volhynia.[94] This compromise would only last a few months following the October/November 1917 revolution. In order to forestall Bolshevik influence in Ukrainian lands, the Congress (*Rada*) issued a Second Universal at approximately the same time "declaring in the present emergency the temporary independence of the Ukraine as a component part of a future Russian federation."[95] As the victor in the

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[92] Wilson, 2000: 122-3. These election plans were disrupted by invaders from both east and west, neither of whom were interested in a ballot box.

[93] Dennis, 1923: 531.

[94] Wilson, 2002: 123.

[95] Dennis, 1923: 531.

Kerensky-Bolshevik dispute was unclear, this statement was likely created to appease either party.

By December 1917, the East-West split in Ukraine was politically apparent. The more moderate, Western element existed at Kiev. This group felt Ukrainians had more ties with the West and tried to promote some level of democracy. At the same time, a new Ukrainian Soviet supported by Petrograd, was established in Kharkov.[96]

While the east had some external support from the newly established Bolsheviks, the West was left to fend for itself. The universal of January 1918 proclaimed Ukrainian independence. The new state would occupy the original five *guberniyas* plus the eastern territorial divisions.[97] However, the Bolshevik foothold in the east resulted in the *Rada's* inability to control that area. With the remaining western lands of Galicia, Bukovnya and Transcarpathia under control of the declining Austro-Hungarian Empire, the *Rada* had few regions it was actually able to control.

Unable to maintain control, the Central *Rada* turned west in order to have any hope of survival. In February 1918, they appealed for German assistance, and by the end of April a "Hetmanate" under General Skoropadsky had replaced the Rada.

Skoropadsky's brief tenure as *hetman* is the subject of much recent debate. According to Wilson[98] Skoropadsky was a triple stooge: acting for conservative landowners, German occupiers and anti-Bolshevik Whites. Concurrently, Skoropadsky made important inroads in giving formal legitimacy to Ukrainian nationalism and even offering some reasonably solid prospects for Ukrainian statehood in a troubled time.[99] He not only created Ukrainian educational and military institutions, but also established

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[96] Dennis, 1923: 532.

[97] Wilson, 2002: 123. The Eastern territorial divisions in this declaration included Kharkov, Katernoslav, Kherson and Taurida.

[98] 2002: 126. This was not a Hetmanate in the Cossack sense; whereas Khmelnytsky had been elected, Skoropadsky was appointed by the Germans

[99] Paul du Quenoy, "The Skoropads'ky Hetmanate and the Ukrainian National Idea" in The Ukrainian Quarterly. 56(3) Fall 2000: 245.

relations with other countries[100] in an effort to achieve some level of international recognition. In some respects, Skoropadsky was successful in creating a non-ethnic Ukrainian identity by reinforcing loyalty to traditional Ukrainian territory rather than the Ukrainian nation.[101] Thus, Skoropadsky was able to start converting Ukrainian nationalism to a more civic form. This included promoting an early form of administration in the government that follows many contemporary western forms, specifically having a merit- and experience-based public administration. In short, there is some counter-evidence to Wilson's claim that Skoropadsky was a stooge for various factions.[102]

c. Interwar Ukraine

By 1922, the fate of interwar Ukraine was established. There was a fourfold division of Ukrainian lands. Galicia and Volhynia went to Poland; Transcarpathia was attached to the new Czechoslovakia; Bukovnya went to Romania and the eastern *guberniya* became the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR).

In the 1920s, "western Ukrainians built on the incipient ethnonationalism of the 1890s and 1900s to develop a version of Ukrainian national identity that sought to stand alone between the twin evils of Polish and Russian nationalism."[103] Although some vestiges of civic nationalist ideas were present, in the 1920s ethno-nationalism seemed to hold the key to establishing a Ukrainian state. Absorption of the eastern territorial divisions into the new Bolshevik state[104] enhanced the socio-political gap between Eastern and Western Ukraine. This resulted in the tenuous place of Ukraine and political thought throughout most of the twentieth century: "the future of Ukrainian political thought may lie only in the development of a local self-administration within the limits of

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[100] Du Quenoy, 2000: 254.

[101] Wilson, 2002: 126-127.

[102] Du Quenoy, 2000: 254-255 and 269-271.

[103] Wilson, 2002, 129.

[104] Dennis, 1923: 535.

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a large (and possibly loose) federation."[105] With few exceptions, interwar Ukrainians were culturally and linguistically oppressed, regardless of what form their overlords took. The failure of attempted statehood from 1917 to 1920 was a hard blow to Ukrainian nationalism.

i. Three Factors Determining the Fate of Interwar Ukraine

The failure to establish a Ukrainian state in the early interwar period was ultimately due to three interrelated factors, all of which were largely beyond the control of the Ukrainians. The first even was the war that had been raging since 1914, where Ukrainian lands had been the site of many battlegrounds. In turn, the war led to the second event: the final collapse of the Eastern and Central European Empires. In Russia, increasing civil unrest grew as a reaction to wartime shortages and the inability of the Tsar to appeal to Russians in opposition to Lenin's promises of "peace, land and bread." This civil unrest and the Tsar's shortcomings as a leader eventually led to the fall of the Romanovs. In Central Europe, the collapse of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires left a series of ethnically divided nascent states that all desired to be *nation-states*. This region includes part of modern-day Ukraine.[106]

Division between various empires had several consequences for Ukrainians. First, they had no institutional infrastructure of their own to provide cohesion for a state. Furthermore, the separate experiences of East and West in two different empires had altered the variety of nationalism that each side now espoused. These different experiences also meant divergence of opinion on the best means to build a state. Depending on the form and nature of the institutions Ukrainians might create as well as the degree of solidarity or discord between east and west, Ukrainian nationalism could take either a more civic, or a more ethnic form.

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[105] Dennis, 1923: 538.

[106] Combined with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, this area has become Gellner's Zone 3 where ethnic and religious boundaries crosscut each other resulting in violent nationalism. Ukraine was initially put in this group, and for 1919, it may be somewhat accurate.

For the purpose of this thesis, the most important event that determined the place of interwar Ukraine was the rise of the Bolsheviks. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (UkSSR) was proclaimed in December 1920 and was converted to a federal union with Russia in 1922 to 1923. All of these events took place under conditions of great uncertainty and rapid change with no time to adapt to the new socio-political reality[107] of self-determination and democratization.

At this juncture in history, the door was thrown wide open to the possibility of authoritarian leadership to provide some level of stability. This stability would be provided within the Ukraine during the era of Soviet expansion from the 1930s to the 1950s.

In the early interwar period, the myth of the other, as a basis for Ukrainian identity became a focal point of contention between Russophiles and Ukrainophiles. The former are "totally unwilling to concede any of the building blocks of a separate Ukrainian...identity," yet Ukrainophile "historiography provides a framework for justifying separate development and for characterizing Russia's...actions as 'imperial.'"[108] The idea that Russia, and later on the USSR, were colonizers of Ukrainian lands was especially popular from the 1930s onward as Soviet power was consolidated.

In the early 1920s, the Ukraine had some semblance of independence despite its inclusion in the USSR. Independence flourished mainly in foreign policy, except where "questions which are of common political and economic interest to all Soviet Republics"[109] arose. When Stalin came to power the nature of the union would change in a largely negative manner. One of the main events that has, and continues to, reinforce a non-Russian identity is the engineered famine of 1932 to 1933.

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[107] Hugh P. Vowles, Ukraine and its People, London: W&R Chambers, Ltd., 1939: 140-141.
[108] Smith et. al. 1998, 46-47.
[109] Dennis, 1923: 543.

ii. 1932-1933: Famine or Genocide?[110]

Despite the fertility of Ukrainian lands, there was a famine of horrific proportions in 1932 to 1933. Although "Ukraine experienced periods of severe hunger and starvation caused by natural disasters and foreign invasions, what differentiates the Great Famine of 1932 to 1933 from other famines is its nature and its scope."[111] There are generally two explanations given for this famine, both of which can be used to have strengthened the negative formulation of Ukrainian national identity.

The first explanation for the famine is that Stalin deliberately starved Ukrainian farmers and peasants, through collectivization and the "ruthless imposition of excessive grain quotas."[112] Both collectivization and the quotas were vehemently opposed by Ukrainian *Kulaks*. The counter-argument emanates from the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU), which indicates that

> Leaders of the separatist movement living abroad sent instructions to their associates living in Ukraine to the effect that everything possible must be done to make the position of the peasants worse and details were supplied of measures calculated to prevent the collective farms from functioning properly.[113]

Professor Mazepa, an exile associated with the revolution "makes it quite clear that the widespread failure of the crops...was due to deliberate sabotage instigated by separatist leaders."[114] Regardless of the perspective adopted, the result was that some seven million Ukrainians died in 1932 to 1933.

It is probable that both interpretations of the famine contain elements of truth. Ukrainian *Kulaks* opposed collectivization partially because they enjoyed their elevated

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[110] Some six to seven million Ukrainians died in the famine.

[111] Oleh W. Gerus, "The Great Ukrainian Famine-Genocide." University of Manitoba Centre for Ukrainian Studies. http://www.umanitoba.ca/centres/ukrainian_canadian. Date Accessed: October 3, 2001. Speech given at the unveiling of a monument to the victims of the Ukrainian famine-genocide.

[112] Nahaylo, 1999:13.

[113] Vowles, 1939: 183.

[114] Vowles. 1939: 183-184

standards of living. Faced with collectivization and the reduction of this standard, they may have deliberately sabotaged crops to avoid paying Stalin's quotas. This placed an undue stress on the remaining crops and farmers to supply the quotas Stalin demanded. At the same time, Stalin was trying to consolidate his power in the USSR, of which Ukraine was an integral part, and had no qualms about using extreme measures to accomplish this. Ukrainian perception of the famine as a Soviet attempt "to break the very backbone of their nation"[115] holds more than a kernel of truth within it.

In terms of nationalism and identity, the famine merely served to reinforce Ukrainians' separate identity *vis-à-vis* Russia. Treatment as a colony ready to be exploited served to alter the "Little Russian" identity by enhancing the sense of inferiority felt by Ukrainians. In World War II (WWII) frustration with this identity would once again drive West Ukrainian nationalists to the German side. At the end of the war, Ukrainians' inability to organize and consolidate institutions on their own merit allowed for the full integration of Ukraine into the Soviet Union.

d. Ukraine in the Second World War

In 1929, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) was formed. The OUN declared itself to be based on the principles of "social voluntarism, the idealism of the deed, and the power of the nation in the state and the dictatorship of the nation."[116] The OUN provided a militant opposition to the Poles through their integral nationalism.[117] The experience of the OUN as an organization espousing integral

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[115] Nahaylo, 1999: 13. On June 19 2003, the Canadian Senate adopted a unanimous motion to "recognize the Ukrainian Famine/Genocide of 1932-33." The motion calls on the Government of Canada "to recognize the Ukrainian Famine/Genocide of 1932-33 and to condemn any attempt to deny or distort this historical truth as being anything less than genocide." The motion furthermore wants the designation of the fourth Saturday in November as a day of remembrance – the same as the Ukrainian Presidential decree of November 26, 1998 (Ukrainian Canadian Congress Press Release: June 19th 2003. Unanimous Resolution of the Senate of Canada concerning the Ukrainian Famine/Genocide of 1932-33. http://www.ucc.ca. Date Accessed: July 10, 2003.

[116] Wilson, 2002: 131.

[117] Nahaylo, 1999: 13.

nationalist tendencies appears to have been generalized as an explanation of Ukrainian nationalism throughout history and in the post-war era.

Although analysts have discarded this framework for understanding Ukrainian nationalism, it may be accurate to say that in 1929, this was a reasonable definition of Ukrainian nationalism. In a physically divided country, there are few more convenient ways to unite a population than to ascertain a firm identification of the other and attempt to remove this "other" from one's territory. In the interwar and WWII timeframes, the identification of Ukrainians' "other" was done so on an ethnic basis. The "other" often becomes a scapegoat for ills of the nation in question. It was this attitude that would drive the OUN towards the Nazis, who, by and large espoused the same views.

i. The Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact

For the OUN the Nazis provided a strong, non-Russian counterpart to Ukrainian identity. Ultimately, the OUN would turn to the German side in the hopes that Ukraine could thereby avoid outright assimilation into the USSR. Specifically, the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact had many Ukrainians worried that complete absorption into the USSR would be the end result of the agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union. The OUN relied on Germany for protection from the Soviet Union, hoping that Hitler's fond recollections of Ukraine and the Urals in Mein Kampf would be sufficient to protect Ukraine from complete absorption[118] into the USSR.

In addition to the division of Poland, which included a large Ukrainian population, the pact also gave the Red Army the right to occupy White Russia and Galicia.[119] In 1940, the Soviets incorporated Ukrainian territories held by Romania. Ukrainians were subsequently subdued through a combination of Ukrainization (to attract them) and Sovietization, i.e. – deportations and political repression, (to scare them). When Operation Barbarossa – the German invasion of the USSR – began in 1941,

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[118] John A. Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, 3rd Edition. Englewood: Ukrainian Academic Press, 1990: 17; W.E.D. Allen, The Ukraine: A History, New York: Russell & Russell, Inc., 1963: 330.
[119] Allen, 1963: 387.

members of the OUN quickly announced Ukrainian statehood. The Nazis quickly responded by brutally eliminating these nationalists,[120] who at that moment were not working in a manner that corresponded to Berlin's goals.

The OUN was, therefore, stuck between the proverbial rock and hard place. To the West was the German regime – a fascist, oppressive and ethnically intolerant regime that offered no better alternative to the Soviet one on the Eastern side of Ukraine. As the main representative body of Ukrainians during the 1940s, the OUN is often used as the only real example of Ukrainian nationalism. In practice, the OUN's behaviour was often ultra-nationalistic and quite intolerant, sometimes even mirroring Nazi policy and practice.[121] As a result, Ukrainian nationalism of the OUN is often perceived as integral and collectivistic.

Under the OUN integral nationalism was fairly vibrant in Ukraine throughout the 1930s and 1940s. The organization was "particularly active in eliminating its real and perceived opponents" and using terrorism to forward its own version of nationalism.[122] In 1939 the leader of the OUN, Andrii Melnyk adopted a Nazi "blood and iron" solution to the issue of Ukrainian statehood: "Ukraine for Ukrainians. We will not leave one inch of Ukrainian land in the hands of enemies and foreigners.... Only blood and iron will decide between us and our enemies."[123] Melnyk believed that close ties to Germany had to be maintained in order to stabilize a Ukrainian state. Melnyk drowned out the voice of his opposition, Stepan Bandera who desired more ties between an independent Ukraine and both the Allies as well as the Germans. The differences between the two OUN leaders factionalized the organization, dealing a severe blow to the nationalist cause.[124]

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[120] Nahaylo, 1999: 14.

[121] Tadeusz Pitrowski, Ukrainian Integral Nationalism: Chronological Assessment and Bibliography. Toronto: Alliance of the Polish Eastern Provinces, 1997: 31-33. Specifically, the OUN provided the "ideological basis for the removal of the non-Ukrainian population from Eastern Poland in the 1940s through systematic ethnic cleansing." (p.11)

[122] Pitrowski, 1997: 12-13.

[123] Pitrowski, 1997: 17.

[124] Subtelny, 2000: 459.

In 1941, the OUN formed expeditionary groups from the Western Ukrainian territories to follow the Germans into Russia. As Operation Barbarossa began to fail in Russia, the OUN allied with the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) to keep up the struggle against Soviet encroachment on Ukrainian territory.[125] The OUN-UPA was eventually eliminated by the Red Army when the Germans continued their retreat.[126] The end result was the one the OUN feared: Ukrainian lands would be completely assimilated into the USSR.

During the wartime period, the OUN was an example of integral nationalism. The main problem during the second half of the twentieth century is that the OUN became of the most publicized and controversial examples of Ukrainian nationalism. Due to the record of the OUN, the nature of Ukrainian nationalism in *general* is commonly identified as being ethnic in nature. However, the OUN is only one example of Ukrainian nationalism; it would be incorrect to tar the entire spectrum of Ukrainian nationalism with the rather unsavoury record of the OUN.

Conversely, an important part of Ukrainian nationalism has been overlooked. Ukraine's experience in the Soviet Union as a major republic whose citizens developed a sense of national consciousness is very important in understanding post-Soviet Ukrainian nationalism and its expression. Over time, integral/ethnic Ukrainian nationalism was tempered with other, internal and external social and political factors.

3. The International Status of the UkSSR: 1945 to 1989

In his 1999 work, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, Stephen Krasner identifies several types of sovereignty. For the purposes of analyzing the status of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (UkSSR) during the Cold War, international legal sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty are the most relevant. International legal sovereignty is best

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[125] Pitrowski, 1997 21, 28-35.

[126] See Pitrowski, 1997: 80-83. The OUN did persist in an international form, helped along by diaspora. Durin the post-Soviet era a commission was set up to establish the truth of the OUN-UPA insurgence and alliance with the Nazis during WWII.

viewed as the formal attributes of statehood – territory, population, government and recognition; factors which define the state. Westphalian is sovereignty better viewed in terms of more substantive attributes, specifically the ideas of independence and non-intervention; it explains the abilities and limitations of the state.

International legal sovereignty "has been concerned with establishing the status of a political entity in the international arena."[127] International legal sovereignty then, is vested in international law, rules and norms that are sometimes applied inconsistently. Recognition of a state might be automatic (as was seen with the rapid recognition of the post-Soviet successor states in 1991) or it may be used as a political weapon.[128] Recognition is important in that it provides a more secure status in the courts of other states, thus providing states, and sometimes state-like entities, with the material and legal resources necessary to participate in the international arena. Notwithstanding, as we shall see below, international legal sovereignty does not mean that a state is completely independent, or in Krasner's words, that a state has Westphalian sovereignty. Krasner's main point is that international legal sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty do not necessarily go hand in hand; the case of UkSSR is a strong example of this.

Westphalian sovereignty is "an institutional arrangement for organizing political life" based on the principles of territoriality and independence.[129] For the titular republics of the USSR, this type of sovereignty was achieved. However, the more substantive elements behind Westphalian sovereignty were ultimately constrained by the constitutions of the Union.

The UkSSR represents a problem for traditional theories of sovereignty and statehood. Throughout the twentieth century the Ukraine was recognized as an independent entity at the international level, although the more substantive elements of statehood were not readily apparent. Nominally sovereign, the UkSSR possessed few of

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[127] Stephen D. Krasner, <u>Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy</u>. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999: 14.
[128] Krasner, 1999: 15.
[129] Krasner, 1999: 20-21.

the substantive attributes usually associated with sovereignty, specifically political autonomy (i.e. – self-governance) and non-interference. As early as 1922, the treaty setting up the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics vested sovereign power in the Congress of the Union and the Executive Committee.[130] Under this treaty, self-determination became, in fact, centralization and the "entire doctrine of nationality [was] openly swept aside before the authority of Moscow."[131] From the start, all economic, political and national decisions were to be made from the centre and Moscow's representatives in the republic, regardless of the fact that the regions had their own governing councils. According to the treaty

> The congresses of the Soviets and their executive committees have the right to control the activity of the local Soviets...; and the regional and provincial congresses and their executive committees have in addition the right to overrule the decisions of the Soviets and their districts, giving notice in important cases to the central Soviet authority.[132]

This idea, as applied to the state, became an important part of "democratic centralism." The concept ostensibly combined central leadership with local initiative and creative activity , giving the responsibility to institutions and members of the elite for this work. Centrality was vested in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Democracy was vested in the other Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs), which were in reality subordinate to both the centre and the party.

Although the Ukraine did not have internal sovereignty, it had a degree of international legal sovereignty throughout the twentieth century. According to Krasner, "the basic norm of international legal sovereignty is that recognition is extended to territorial entities that are formally independent." While they may not be autonomous,[133] recognition has taken the form of participation in international organizations.

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[130] Dennis, 1923: 549.

[131] Dennis, 1923: 550. The internal elites were under the direct control of the centre. See Chapter 3, especially the section on Soviet Nationality Policy

[132] Marxists.org Internet Archive. RSFSR Constitution, Chapter 12. http://www.marxists.org/history/ussr/const. Date Accessed: October 5, 2001.

[133] Krasner, 1999: 69.

Specifically, a seat at the United Nations (UN) General Assembly is often considered the highest standard of international legal sovereignty. As one of the original fifty-one members of the UN, the Ukraine's *de jure* sovereignty was established. In reality, the Ukraine was subordinate to the CPSU.

From the discussion above, it is clear that there is a fundamental disagreement between the two types of sovereignty as those concepts pertain to the UkSSR. There are several reasons as to why international legal sovereignty was granted in 1945 even though the UkSSR was not fully autonomous.

First, Stalin utilized the international recognition of the Ukraine in order to maintain the façade that the Soviet Union was not a new imperial power. As well, international recognition may have provided a mental "security blanket" for Moscow, as it attempted to build a bulwark against encroaching capitalism and the traditional threats from the West. In order to invade Russian territory, Western states would have to violate the sovereignty of at least one other state, in this case, the Ukraine.

For western states, UN recognition of the Ukraine was more than likely a strategic move to reassure a new nuclear power,[134] who had gone through a very difficult war and whose future motives were unclear at best. While recognition violated the ideal of Westphalian sovereignty, it provided a degree of reassurance to Russia. For the Ukraine's communist elite, recognition provided the kind of legitimacy for their Soviet "Ukrainian" state.

With the separate recognition of the Ukraine as a formal state, the Soviet Union was effectively given three votes at the UN General Assembly,[135] in addition to its permanent seat on the Security Council. While this may have provided a means for keeping the Cold War "cold," it indirectly would also provide the impetus for the emergence of an independent Ukraine in forty-six years later. The Ukraine's evolution towards statehood in 1991 was a product of the combination of its international legal

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[134] Krasner, 1999: 71.

[135] The third vote was given to Belarus – another aberration in international legal sovereignty.

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status, Soviet nationality policy and eventually the policies of *perestroika* and *glasnost* (see Chapter 3).

A Note on the Russian-Ukrainian Relationship

For the Soviet Union, natural resources, population and geopolitical place made the Ukraine "second among equals." Within the USSR, the Ukrainian ethnic group was second only to the Russian group. [136] The Ukraine's strategic position made it imperative for "Moscow Centre" to cultivate a Ukrainian patriotism that was completely loyal to the Soviet Union. In the post-World War II (WWII) period, Stalin's old, brutal methodology was no longer a recipe for maintaining the cohesion of the USSR. At the same time, some degree of cohesion is necessary. Post-WWII Soviet nationality policy and the ideal of *sovetskii narod* – the Soviet people – would provide the central ingredients of that recipe or model of multiethnicity.

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[136] Borys Lewytzkyj, Politics and Society in Soviet Ukraine, 1953-1980. Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1985: 5.

CHAPTER 3: NATIONALISM AND NATIONALITY POLICY IN FLUX: THE LATE STALINIST AND POST-STALINIST STAGES

Introduction

There is no question that Soviet rule proved highly detrimental to the Ukraine during most of the post-WWII period. For post-Soviet Ukraine, decades of authoritarian rule, coupled with hundreds of years of statelessness created the challenge of forging a new state, and with it, an inclusive national identity.

Soviet nationality policy is one of the primary factors affecting the development of this national identity in post-Soviet Ukraine. In theory, Soviet nationality policy downgraded the idea of separate nations existing in perpetuity; in practice, the components of that policy – as it evolved over the decades – served to enhance the idea of nationality, and also provided an institutional basis for differentiation between Russians and non-Russians. Indeed, for many Ukrainians, Soviet nationality policy was often their first experience of awareness of their national identity. By extension, it can be argued that without Soviet nationality policy, most Ukrainians would not realize that being Ukrainian meant more than simply being junior Slavic brethren of the Russian majority in the USSR, or "Little Russians."

The duality of Soviet citizenship actually allowed for the idea of "citizenship" to develop without automatically being attached to nationality. By creating a form of membership that emphasized the political and economic aspects of membership in a state, rather than ethnic ties to a nation, the idea of *sovetskii narod* directly supported the development of a civic form of nationalism in post-Soviet Ukraine. The problem with the concept of the "Soviet people" was that, at the end of the day, the Russian nationality, in fact, was privileged over other nationalities.

1. Soviet Nationality Policy: Economics and Nationality

a. Lenin's Nationality Policy

The ultimate goal of Soviet nationality policy was to create secular ties to the state through socialist ideology. In practice, Soviet nationality policy sought to:

> Discourage nationalism, to maintain a firm grip on centralized power and to avoid the interethnic violence that racked other multiethnic states. At the same time, however, it ruled a federation structured along ethnic lines. Thus, despite their totalitarian-authoritarian nature, past Soviet regimes had to choose whether and how to accommodate the economic and political claims of the nationalities.[137]

Maintaining a firm grip on power was a considerable accomplishment for the pre-Gorbachev regimes. By far, the Soviet Union was the largest multiethnic federation of the twentieth century, with fifteen "national" republics and numerous other ethnic minorities. Within the Soviet Union, political federation took the profile "national in form – socialist in content."[138] This formulation meant that the national republics could promote national identity through "harmless" cultural expressions, so long as the tenets of socialism were upheld. From the perspective of Moscow this formulation correctly addressed the "national question." The problems of self-determination and autonomy were solved because "national integration (internationalization) was taking place voluntarily."[139]

This "national in form – socialist in content" formula became problematic when contrasted to Marx's version of communism. Marx virtually ignored nationality in his theories. This gap created a serious problem for the Bolsheviks when applying Marxism to Russia. The Soviet Marxists defined the nation as an "historical category, belonging to

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[137] Rachel Denber, ed. The Soviet Nationality Reader: The Disintegration in Context. Boulder: Westview Press, 1992: 1.

[138] A formulation developed by V.I. Lenin in conjunction with the New Economic Plan (NEP) approximately 1917 to 1924.

[139] Denber, 1992: 5.

a definite epoch, the epoch of the rise of capitalism."[140] According to Marx and Lenin, capitalism would eventually give way to communism, so as "to abolish the present division of mankind into small states and all-national isolation" eventually causing competing states to merge.[141]

Lenin's nationality policy was often contradictory in its premises. On the one hand, the principle of self-determination was upheld as part of the revolutionary process. On the other hand, Lenin called for the "duty of every working class to prefer the working class of a neighbouring nation to the bourgeoisie of its own."[142] Lenin's emphasis was on proletarian internationalism. This bond among working-class forces in each state was meant to cross-cut the attraction of national identity.

The fundamental contradiction between working-class loyalty to a working-class state and proletarian internationalism had consequences for socialism in practice. Specifically, it begs the question of how a cohesive population can be created within a state, while moving away from the traditional ties that bind people together. This answer would come from Stalin's "socialism in one country."

b. Language and Symbolism in the USSR

Stalin's concept of "socialism in one country" was in reality, socialism in many multiethnic countries, and in the case of the USSR, in the constituent republics.[143] By creating a synthetic, overarching identity – the Soviet Citizen – Stalin hoped to eradicate all national differences between the republics.[144] Through the use of symbols and the

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[140] Stalin, quoted in Robert Conquest, The Nation Killers: The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities. New York: MacMillan, 1970: 112.

[141] Lenin, in Conquest, 1970: 113. This echoes the idea of the state "withering away." It is clear that, to some degree, Lenin recognized that national identity would be problematic for the development of Communism.

[142] H. Seton Watson "Soviet Nationality Policy" in The Russian Review 15(1) January 1956: 3.

[143] See Alexander Motyl "'Sovietology in One Country' or Comparative Nationality Studies" in Slavic Review 48(1) Spring 1989: 83-88.

[144] Whereas in the West, "nationality" and "citizenship" are used interchangeably, in the former Soviet Union, the two terms had quite different meanings. In the USSR, an individual was both Soviet, by virtue of living in the Union, and also Ukrainian, by virtue of heritage.

emphasis on socialism, the USSR hoped to achieve a united state that transcended nationality. Unfortunately, Soviet nationality policy did the opposite and laid the seeds for destruction of the union by using nationality as a category to differentiate populations.

States, particularly multiethnic states, require more than just evocative symbols to provide cohesion among the diverse groups which make up their population. For the USSR, the *sovetskii narod* provided a framework for citizenship. The Soviet citizen was created and maintained through two important forces. The first was a common language of mobility and industry; this became Russian almost by default.[145] The second was the use of elite cadres at the republic level, created for the purpose of maintaining order within the republics to prevent nationalist uprisings from occurring.

In the multiethnic USSR, Russian served as the language that allowed mobility and career advancement throughout the Union.[146] The result was that Russian became both a symbol of unity, and also a symbol of oppression to the majority of non-Russians in the Union. For example, over time higher education became increasingly Russified.[147] In the Ukraine, such Russification spread to many levels. The following table indicates that in most regions of the Ukraine, the percentage of those who identified Ukrainian as their first language decreased substantially over approximately a ten-year period:

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[145] Not only did the revolution start in Russia, but a slim majority of the population of the USSR was ethnically Russian and central government was based in Russia's capital city.

[146] William M. Mandel, Soviet, But Not Russian: The 'Other' Peoples of the Soviet Union. Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1985: 22-23.

[147] According to Krawchenko (1985: 198) "The language question is of course important for a nation in its struggle for continued viability. But the language issue also plays the role of a *symbol* in the important conflict between competing social groups, in particular, elites."

Table 1 Mother-Tongue Identification of Ukrainians According To Region, 1959-70[148]

	Total Ukrainian Population				
	1959		*1970*		
	Total number giving Ukrainian as mother tongue	As % of Ukrainian population	Total number giving Ukrainian as mother tongue	As % of total Ukrainian population	% Change in total number giving Ukrainian as mother tongue
Donbass	3 109 400	82.2	3 011 218	73.4	-3.2
Dnipro	4 287 975	93.3	4 336 179	91.0	11.1
North East	4 287 975	93.4	4 322 541	91.2	1.0
Central-West	9 551 603	96.3	10 034 019	96.1	5.1
West	6 726 710	99.0	7 649 257	99.1	13.7
South	2 493 731	86.5	2 904 146	82.2	16.5
Ukraine total	30 072 351	93.5	32 257 360	91.4	7.3

As the data in Table 1 shows, culture and negative conceptions of identity were not sufficient for individuals to keep Ukrainian as their mother tongue. Over time, it can be seen that mother-tongue identity is "a dynamic process influenced by both social and political developments."[149] As well, this mother-tongue identity need not go hand in hand with other forms of identity, e.g. – just because one speaks Russian as a first language does not mean that one is Russian. The adoption of Russian as a first language may have been a strategic calculation for ambitious Ukrainians who wanted to take part in the upward mobility offered by fluency in Russian.

As a result of living and working in Russian throughout the bulk of the twentieth century, by 1997 forty-four per cent of the population of Ukraine considered themselves Russophones; forty-one per cent considered themselves Ukrainophone. Ethnic Russians

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[148] See Krawchenko, 1985: 193-194. Specifically, "in the intercensal period the proportion of the Ukrainian population that gave Ukrainian as their native language declined from 93.5 to 91.4 per cent." The table indicates that in rural areas, first-language identification remained relatively stable, but in urban areas there was a tendency towards a weakening of this identity: "in 1970, 942 000 more Ukrainians gave Russian as their native language when compared to 1959. Two-thirds of that increase was accounted for by Donbass (forty-three per cent) and the South (nineteen per cent)." The "total number giving Ukrainian as mother tongue" columns represent numerical changes; the others represent proportional changes (as a proportion of the population of the time). The last column represents the percentage change in hard numbers from 1959 to 1970 calculated by the following formula [(t2 – t1) / t1] x 100 Where t2 is the total number in 1970 and t1 is the total number in 1959.
[149] Krawchenko, 1985: 194.

were not introduced to Ukrainian in the same formal manner that Ukrainians were introduced to Russian.[150] Upward mobility was tied to the Russian language, compelling most ambitious non-Russians to learn the language in order to participate in political and economic processes. By 1990, 66.2 per cent of all students in secondary schools were being educated in Russian; at the post-secondary level, 57.1 per cent were receiving education in that language.[151] The average or typical Soviet citizen developed into an individual who was not necessarily ethnic Russian (only fifty-one percent of the population of the USSR was in 1989), but could probably speak, or at least understand, the Russian language.

Russification had both positive and negative effects for post-Soviet Ukraine. While Russification provided for Union-wide communication and a degree of cohesion among the population, it also reinforced the cult of suffering by giving Russian culture a privileged position over Ukrainian culture. The main problem for Moscow, at least in theory, was how to create a civic identity, a Soviet identity, and ensure that such an identity was primary, and that the ethnic or national tie was secondary. The structure of Soviet nationality policy might have worked in theory, but in practice the implementation of that policy eventually sowed the seeds of Union collapse.

c. The Design and Implementation of Soviet Nationality Policy

A half-century of centrally controlled nationality policy that can be divided into three dimensions would create both the institutions and the sentiments, albeit, not intentionally, that would allow the republics to gain control of their own national development.[152] The first aspect involves the manner in which new elite personnel were recruited in each republic from the titular national group. This new cadre was "assigned

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[150] Wilson, 2002: 219-220. Wilson has further comments to make about the abilities of Russians to speak Ukrainian. Even though some fourteen per cent of the population consider themselves bilingual, "it is a safe bet that when many Russians claim an ability to speak Ukrainian, they are most likely to be belittling its status and worth, assuming that it is so like Russian, or a mere dialect of Russian, that they possess a natural competence." (p. 220).

[151] Anatoly Khazanov, After the USSR: Ethnicity, Nationalism and Politics in the Commonwealth of Independent States. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995: 249

[152] Philip Roeder, "Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization," in Denber, ed. 1992: 149-151.

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a monopoly over mobilizational resources within the ethnic community."[153] The elite personnel would determine if, when, and how the republic's citizens would be treated politically. In the short term, this policy achieved interethnic peace and stability. Over the long term of the post-WWII Soviet period, however, the consequences of Moscow's nationality policy and its promoters would be one of the factors leading to the fall of the USSR.[154]

The second dimension of Soviet nationality policy involved providing an incentive structure for ethnic groups in the constituent republics of the USSR that would deter the "expression of unsanctioned, particularly primordial ethnic agendas."[155] In turn, this policy allowed the elite cadres to directly control the "markers that the distinguished the nationality."[156] In other words, the elite dealing with nationality policy were gatekeepers who controlled the nationalities' access to resources from Moscow. This control allowed elites to shape popular perceptions of the centre. The end result was a form of co-dependency: the centre became dependent on the republican cadres to deter national uprisings; the cadres were dependent on the centre to maintain their privileged standard of living, as well as their power. In order to maintain control, the centre had to ensure that rewards were "tightly tied to the norms and goals of the Soviet developmental strategy."[157] So long as the local elites promoted central "socialist" policy, they would retain their standard of living. By tying privileges to their jobs, the centre ensured the cooperation of the local elites; should they move outside central policy, it would be unlikely that the elites could regain the same status and benefits they received from the centre.

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[153] Roeder, in Denber, ed. 1992: 149.

[154] Until the mid to late 1980s, mobilization referred to the mobilization of the nationalities in response to the necessities of Socialism and Communism – generally a passive exercise in the tradition of bread and circuses. After this point, mobilization refers to national mobilization – an active exercise reminiscent of nineteenth century national revival.

[155] Roeder, in Denber, ed. 1992: 150.

[156] Roeder in Denber, ed, 1992: 151. These markers include language and cultural expression, although national control of the former seems to have been largely usurped by Russification.

[157] Roeder in Denber, ed, 1992: 152.

The third dimension was to give these elite republican cadres the responsibility for "impeding the emergence of alternative ethnic entrepreneurs outside official institutions."[158] Through affirmative action programs, incentives were given to members of the titular nation, while the same benefits were not provided to non-titular minorities.[159] Access to resources and privileges were tied to official institutions.[160]

The previously mentioned nationality policy and use of elite cadres assured some level of stability[161] in the USSR over the short term. However, continued survival of the Soviet Union was contingent on two interrelated factors: the incentive structure offered to loyal citizens and the population's expectation that their life was improving. However, as the process of industrialization slowed down and rewards diminished, demands were not met and the incentive structure also failed. Republican cadre support for the centre remained strong so long as their members were differentiated from the population in terms of social status and access to resources. Once the centre became unable to provide this, the cadres turned to their relatively few republic-level resources.

Ultimately, Soviet nationality policy sowed the seeds of the demise of the USSR. Although the use of national cadres allowed for central control of republic level nationalism, over time these cadres would use their position and resources to develop a certain level of legitimacy within the republic population. Ironically, Communist officials in each republic grew closer to their political base the more that the strength of the Communist centre eroded. It is also worth noting that most resources devolved from the centre via the republican cadres. By providing access to these resources – which were diminishing in quantity – the cadres could claim that they were working in the best interests of the populations they came from. By controlling access to resources, the republican cadres often began to nurture negative perceptions of the centre within their

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[158] Roeder in Denber, ed, 1992: 150.

[159] The exception to this rule in practice was the ethnic Russian group.

[160] Roeder in Denber, ed., 1992: 153.

[161] A note on word usage: in this case, "stability" is used to denote lack of change, rather than an ability to adapt to change.

local populations. Gorbachev's arrival in power (1985) and the advent of *perestroika* in 1986 provided republican elites with an entirely new situation that would soon enhance their personal independence as well as that of their republics.

2. The Nationalism-Perestroika Nexus, Part I: The Resurgence of National Consciousness

a. Background: Ukrainian Nationalism in the Late Cold War Period

Throughout the post-Stalin period, the republican elite in Ukraine increasingly exploited of any latent sentiments of Ukrainian nationalism.[162] During this period, local elites were content to support the centre because of their social status. In the 1960s, however, a challenge to the structure of the Soviet Union came from the Ukrainian intelligentsia (*shistdesiatnyky*) and in a manner that would make a lasting impression on the character of Ukrainian nationalism.

In the 1960s, the *shistdesiatnyky* became a core group leading the search for Ukrainian values.[163] These artists served as a focal point for Ukrainian dissent and exemplified a shift to a more civic form of nationalism, and as such can be clearly distinguished from earlier nationalist intellectuals. The *shistdesiatnyky* operated within the cultural sphere and "consciously sought to protect themselves by working within the Soviet Constitution, hoping the authorities could be shamed into living up to their own legal standards."[164] The *shisdesiatnyky* were attempting to give real meaning to the formal provisions of the Soviet Constitution, and encourage the rule of law. This is not to say that all radical nationalist groups were now absent from the scene, but most of the

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[162] See for example, Nahaylo,1999, Chapter 2: Ukraine in the post-Stalin Period."

[163] Nahaylo, 1999: 23. By the 1960s the OUN-UPA had been more or less completely purged. In Western Ukraine, the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Union (UWPU) took over the role of national representation.

[164] Wilson, 1997: 54.

old-style nationalists had now passed from view.[165] Mutual agreement on the means of achieving self-determination, if not the final product itself,[166] was important, in their eyes, for stability and the continuation of a relatively peaceful situation.

Throughout the Cold War Ukrainian integral nationalism began to be tempered by the *shisdesiatnyky* and the imprisonment of the leaders of overt nationalist organizations. Because of these factors transforming nationalism, in 1976 the Ukrainian Helsinki Group (UHG) was created with the idea that "the Helsinki Accords should 'become the basis of relations between the individual and the state.'"[167] Initially constrained by Soviet policy, the UHG's interests and abilities to mobilize the population changed drastically following Chernobyl and *perestroika*.

b. The Arrival of Gorbachev

Mikhail Gorbachev's accession to the position of General Secretary of the CPSU in March 1985 marked the beginning of a fundamental change in the ways the USSR functioned, both in terms of its all-Union and international politics. Internally, the confluence of Soviet nationality policy and the four pillars of *perestroika*[168] introduced new national imperatives into the communist system. These imperatives brought the stagnation of the USSR to the forefront.

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[165] Especially in the restalinization period under Brezhnev. According to Wilson (1997: 57) these individuals would come back following the collapse of the Soviet Union and be "granted a privileged position because of the moral authority acquired as a result of their suffering often causing considerable resentment amongst the younger generation of activists who cut their teeth in student politics in the 1980s."

[166] In any state, democratic or otherwise, agreement on goals is not necessary for political stability (defined as the ability to adapt peacefully to change). There need, generally only be agreement on the means to achieving these goals.

[167] Wilson, 1997, 57. The Helsinki Accords of 1975 established basic liberal individual rights. For more information on the accords, see Civnet http://www.civnet.org.

[168] These are democratization, *glasnost*, political renewal and economic modernization. *Perestroika* should be viewed as the four pillars working together to build a new basis of support for an evolving USSR – something Gorbachev knew needed to be done in order to save communism and the Soviet Union. Together these four elements would provide the restructuring necessary in order for the USSR to remain competitive in world affairs. Additionally, Gorbachev hoped to allow the less-developed near-abroad to catch up with the more developed regions and republics.

While Gorbachev did attempt to address the issues that would stabilize the international situation, he did not acknowledge that the nationality question had been left largely unanswered by Soviet nationality policy. Because of this, he failed to recognize that any one of the four pillars of *perestroika* automatically introduced individuals to other ideas and forms of identity than those that had sustained the USSR for half a century. Gorbachev was beginning a process that would unintentionally lead to the collapse of the USSR. Ironically, although Gorbachev did not put great emphasis on the national question initially, it was this factor that ultimately destroyed his dream of rescuing Communism in the Soviet Union.[169]

i. Borderland and Centre: Ukrainian Perceptions of the New Central Leadership

While the policy of *perestroika* acknowledged that there was unfair and unequal treatment between and among Soviet citizens,[170] the early years of Gorbachev's rule saw the continuation of the old Soviet program that downplayed nationality and nationalism in favour of Soviet citizenship. For Ukrainians, Gorbachev was no better than his predecessors. While the new Soviet leader continued to believe that the nationality problem had been satisfactorily answered, his early speeches were interpreted in the Ukraine as demonstrating both Russian nationalism and Great Russian chauvinism. This perception would have detrimental effects on maintaining the USSR, although Gorbachev initially failed to recognize this.[171]

In the Ukraine, this perceived Russocentrism tainted perceptions of Gorbachev. This perception was established early on in Gorbachev's reign. Gorbachev's May 8, 1985 speech commemorating the Second World War praised "the great Russian people"

[169] See Alexander Motyl, "The Sobering of Gorbachev: Nationality, Restructuring and the West" in Denber, ed., 1992: 573-596.
[170] See "Speech by CPSU General-Secretary Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev to the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee – 27 January 1987" in Charles F. Furtado and Andrea Chandler, eds., Perestroika in the Soviet Republics: Documents on the National Question. Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1992: 13-16.
[171] The entire basis of socialism and communism (Marxist theory) is that politics and economics are two sides of the same coin – one cannot exist without the other, with the result that politics is merely concentrated economics and *vice versa*. When the two issues are so closely linked, it is impossible to separate other issues – in this case nationality and nationalism – from them.

and Stalin for their roles in winning the war.[172] In June of the same year, Gorbachev made a "slip of the tongue" while giving a public interview in Kiev, and twice referred to the USSR as "Russia" – a gaff broadcast on Soviet television. Gorbachev's public appearances immediately after he came to power did not increase his legitimacy among the non-Russian parts of the Soviet Union. Early on, it seemed that Russocentrism was still the order of the day, and the promises of *perestroika* were hollow at best.[173]

The promises of *perestroika* in the Ukraine were even weaker when Gorbachev failed to replace its leader, Volodymyr Shcherbytsky. As one of the younger members of the CPSU, Gorbachev seemed to look up to Shcherbytsky as an elder statesman.[174] It is likely that Gorbachev kept Shcherbytsky in place in order to keep a degree of control over the Ukraine while small degrees of liberalization were put into place.[175]

ii. Nationalism under Perestroika: The Ukrainian Case

Combined with the legacies of nationality policy, the four pillars of *perestroika* had unforeseeable consequences for the USSR. For the Ukraine in particular, the promises of *perestroika,* and certainly its implementation failed to appease the population. Part of the problem was that Gorbachev had only very vague ideas of how to handle the national question, calling for "the familiar prescription of stricter labour discipline and firmer action against corruption." Moreover, Gorbachev seemed to accept

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[172] Motyl in Denber, ed., 1992: 580.

[173] Democratization had consequences in the future for Gorbachev's political survival in terms of his legitimacy. It was a lack of legitimacy that would lead to the August coup and Ukraine's eventual declarations of sovereignty and then independence.

[174] Nahaylo, 1999: 54. Shcherbytsky had been brought in to "normalize" the Ukraine after his predecessor, Shelest, took too many liberties under Brezhnev.

[175] For all of Gorbachev's russocentrism and chauvinism, he did acknowledge to some degree the importance of the Ukraine to the Union: producing a "disproportionately large share" of metallurgical equipment, electric machines, motors, turbines, power transformers and so on, as well as a large amount of what could be called "consumer goods" – bicycles, washing machines, refrigerators, ceramics and so on. As well, the Ukraine's military contribution to the security of the USSR cannot be ignored. For more detail, see Chapter 1 of Alexander Motyl's Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993). According to Nahalyo (1999: 226-227) Gorbachev admitted to keeping Shcherbytsky on in order to ensure the success of *perestroika* in the Ukraine, fearing that if it did not succeed there, it would not succeed anywhere else in the USSR.

a certain amount of Russian nationalism, and was perceived in the Ukraine of being guilty himself of the chauvinism he claimed to oppose. Any changes in the centre's policy still revolved around economic imperatives; any mention of national relations were expressed in terms of a greater economic good.[176]

Despite his orthodox Soviet upbringing, Gorbachev realized that the only way to address the economic problems in the USSR was through limited economic liberalization. In order for economic liberalization to be successful other forms of liberalization, were also necessary. Specifically, the advent of *glasnost* would allow the elite and the educated levels of society to move beyond fear of repression, and increase their demands for reforms that were far greater than Gorbachev was willing to entertain.[177]

While the educated and the elite could take advantage of the political and economic reforms, for much of society, *perestroika* was viewed in terms of whether they were personally improving their lot, and whether their ethnic group was benefiting. With more openness, individuals could demand language rights and civil liberties. Quite often, these rights were perceived as meaningful only if they applied to one's ethnic group as a whole.

In the Ukraine, *perestroika* proceeded at an agonizingly slow pace, a fact that was not lost on ethnic Ukrainians and which contributed to increased group solidarity. After the explosion at Chernobyl in 1986, overt opposition to Moscow's policies took a turn from ethnic types of nationalism to what might be called territorial nationalism.[178]

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[176] Bohdan Nahalyo and Victor Swoboda, <u>Soviet Disunion: A History of the Nationalities Problem in the USSR</u>. New York: The Free Press, 1990: 231-236. Specifically there were three groups of national relations: the consolidation and development of the multinational Soviet state, with intolerance towards all manifestation of localism and narrow-mindedness; national economic imperatives with an emphasis on the rational use of resources and the proper contribution of republics and autonomous units to the good of the integral countrywide economic complex and finally, the development of the Soviet people's single culture, socialist in content, diverse in national forms and internationalist in spirit. These national relations seem fundamentally contradictory.

[177] Khazanov, 1995: 22-24.

[178] See Nahaylo, 1999, Chapter 4.

The explosion at Chernobyl had huge consequences for both Ukrainian nationalism and the fate of the USSR. Internally, it was perceived as a fundamentally Ukrainian issue. For stringent nationalists, Chernobyl offered the opportunity to bring the utter bankruptcy of the Union to the forefront.

At the federal level, Chernobyl showed the truth of Gorbachev's limited reforms, specifically *glasnost*. Although the accident occurred on April 26, 1986, it was only three days later that Moscow admitted there had been some sort of malfunction at the reactor (and then only after international pressure was applied).[179] Full emergency measures were not put into place until May 8 and 9; the extent of the accident was not fully admitted until mid-May.

While the Chernobyl disaster shocked the world, for many Ukrainians it also meant a chance to link nationalism to the territory rather than simply to their ethnicity. Such a linkage would eventually result in a bid for more autonomy. The disaster also exposed the incompetence at Moscow. As a result, Shcherbytsky's allegiance to Moscow over the issue[180] only served to enhance the illegitimacy of the Communist regime. Although not an immediate cause for the rise in Ukrainian nationalism, Chernobyl was to prove a catalyst for a Ukrainian resurgence in the arts, the acceleration of *perestroika* and ultimately, the collapse of the USSR.

Chernobyl forced Gorbachev to take *perestroika* seriously. Unlike other events that had been confined to the Soviet Union and were therefore easier to contain, the nuclear fallout from Chernobyl turned the environmental and social costs of Soviet policies into a far-reaching global disaster. The disaster put international pressure on Moscow to own up to its policies and to actually act within the spirit of *glasnost*.

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[179] Nahaylo, 1999: 59.

[180] See for e.g. Nahaylo, 1999: 60. Shcherbytsky allowed the usual May Day celebrations to go on in Kiev, despite the knowledge that radiation levels were several million times too high; hundreds of children were exposed to this radiation. This, more than anything represents the moral bankruptcy of the regime, both in Kiev and Moscow. According to David Marples, the fallout exceeded the bomb at Hiroshima ninety fold. The difference was that at Chernobyl, the fallout remained heavily concentrated around the site (Ukraine Under Perestroika: Ecology, economics and the Workers' Revolt. Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1991: 26).

In response to this pressure, *glasnost* and *perestroika* began to focus on crimes from the Stalin era,[181] allowing a new brand of Ukrainian nationalists to discuss Chernobyl as par of a much larger vision. The disaster became "identified with the duplicity and failure…the complete bankruptcy of the Soviet system as a whole."[182]

The combination of the Chernobyl disaster and Gorbachev's new programs seems to have strengthened national fervour in Ukraine. Ukrainians were not only tired of being derivative international actors, but were tired of being "Little Russians" as well. At a speech before the 9th Congress of the Ukrainian Writers Union (UWU), the prominent member of the *shistdesiatnyky*, Ivan Drach made an explosive speech, arguing that Soviet rule had been a cultural Chernobyl for Ukrainians: "under Soviet rule, Ukraine had been subjected to a policy of virtual ethnocide and forcible Russification, cultural engineering and repression."[183]

Chernobyl gave rise to environmental movements, the most notable of which was Zelenyi Svit, which combined with the UHG in part to create the All-Ukrainian Movement for Perestroika (*Rukh*). Eventually, *Rukh* would become a catchall movement to unite people of various backgrounds in order to establish an independent state.

c. Chernobyl and the Green Movement: The Four Pillars of Perestroika in Action

The awakening of Ukrainian nationalism occurred in 1988 to 1989 as informal groups began to make contact with the *shistdesiatnyky*. These groups were still nominally under the control of the CPU, which "decided to try to co-opt and control more moderate elements in the opposition by accepting the formation of cultural 'front' organizations." Over time, CPU control weakened as these organizations became

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[181] Leslie Holmes, Post Communism: An Introduction. Durham: Duke University Press, 1997: 107. Gorbachev's programs can be seen as a continuation of Khrushchev's ideas of the 1950s and 1960s, especially denouncing the crimes of Stalinism (e.g. – Khrushchev's "Secret Speech").

[182] Nahaylo, 1999: 61. Journalists and writers began to talk of a linguistic and cultural Chernobyl. Although this may have been exaggerated, in the aftermath of the nuclear disaster it served to remind Ukrainians that it was not only their land that was in danger; their very culture and identity were in the same precarious position.

[183] Nahaylo, 1999: 62.

"channels for the penetration of nationalist values into the official sphere rather than the other way around."[184]

For Ukraine, nationalist resurgence rested on the existence of a strong, modern, urban intelligentsia, which had the skills and desire to associate and develop the idea of a Ukrainian nation.[185] Through their writings, work, and speeches such members of the intellegentsia hearkened back to "the good old days" of Ukrainian integral nationalism that would appeal to the peasantry, a group that was seriously affected by environmental damage. Not only did Chernobyl serve as proof that Ukraine could no longer exist as an alleged colony of Moscow, but the intelligentsia could also use it to help mobilize others who would not normally respond to the issues surrounding a "cultural Chernobyl" or a "spiritual Chernobyl." This time, in contrast to earlier episodes such as 1917, the intelligentsia was much more successful in terms of mobilizing peasant support. By emphasizing Chernobyl's effects on the ecology, the nationalist intelligentsia was able to garner peasant support for an independent Ukraine.

The ecological catastrophe emanating from Chernobyl's meltdown would affect most of the population in terms of economics, health and general welfare, and was particularly devastating to those living in the surrounding areas. Additionally, it is reasonable to surmise that those most attached to the land – peasants, farmers, etc. – would be more likely to react to an ecological catastrophe. Not only was their livelihood destroyed, but the very land many rural Ukrainians had lived on since "time immemorial" was destroyed as well.[186]

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[184] Wilson, 1997: 62.

[185] See Taras Kuzio, Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence, 2nd Edition. London: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 2000: 214-15.

[186] Wilson (in Smith et. al., 1998: 28), argues that the "Ukrainophile myth of origin is that 'the Ukrainian people are autochtonous (aboriginal) on their native land." Once the land was so directly and devastatingly affected, it is likely that the intelligentsia could begin harnessing the latent perennial nationalism that is often associated with workers of the land. The myth of the other would be a useful starting point as the separate ethnic identity of Ukrainians could be contrasted to Russian aggressors.

The "Ukrainization" of Chernobyl was important for national identity formation in the republic. The accident affected all facets of life and brought the illegitimacy and incompetency of the Soviet regime into very sharp relief, by allowing for non-official versions of past atrocities to be shared more broadly and openly among citizens of the republic. Over time, such negative memories became perceived as authentic representations of the always rocky relationship between centre and periphery. This consensus of meaning bred solidarity among the Ukrainian population. Eventually, the identity of early post-Soviet Ukraine was shaped, "first and foremost by cataclysmic historical circumstances"[187] in this case, Chernobyl.

Initial opposition to Soviet rule took a territorial form through the rise of green movements. This allowed all individuals who lived on the soil of the Ukraine participate, regardless of ethnic origin. *Zeleyni Svit* was among the first movements to harness this new spirit.

Originally designed by the CPU to fulfil a perceived need within the ecological movement sparked by Chernobyl, membership in *Zelenyi Svit* grew rapidly and quickly became an umbrella group for a wide range of activists. *Zelenyi Svit* allowed Ukrainian nationalists to raise other issues in the context of what was, ostensibly, an ecological movement, uniting environmentalists with anti-nuclear movements. In November 1988, a 10 000 strong demonstration in Kiev forced *Zeleyni Svit* to change due to demands of the protesters for the formation of a popular front.[188] In December 1988, the UWU took the initiative to "draw up a draft program for a Ukrainian popular movement in support of restructuring" with the UHU helping mobilize in the Western part of Ukraine.[189] In 1989, *Rukh* was created.

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[187] For more detail on the theory behind this, see Catherine Wanner, "Historical Naratives, Personal Narratives; Ethnographic Perspectives on Nationness in Post-Soviet Ukraine" in The Harriman Review 9(1-2): 11-15.
[188] Wilson, 1997: 63.
[189] Kuzio, 2000: 85.

3. The Nationalism-Perestroika Nexus, Part II: From Sovereignty to Independence

a. The Rise of Rukh[190]

The CPU initially opposed *Rukh*, ostensibly because it was a "reactionary bearer of ethnic nationalism" meaning that once in power it would "support policies that sponsored the forced Ukrainization of national minorities."[191] According to the CPU, *Rukh*'s policies were likely to intensify the ethno-geographic split within Ukraine and would be likely to frighten off ethnic Russians and Russified Ukrainians. For the CPU, therefore, *Rukh* would undermine ethnic bonds in what was still Soviet Ukraine. Actually, *Rukh* espoused quite a broad of "Ukrainian nationality." *Rukh* was "against ignoring the national interests of Russians or representatives of other nationalities which live on the republic's territory," and was also in favour of language rights as they pertain to education, theatre and the press.[192]

At the end of the day however, intra-*Rukh* politics was the main challenge faced by the organization. Lack of agreement within *Rukh* on its goals and the means to achieve them ultimately split the organization internally.

Although Rukh espoused, by and large a moderate program, there was a split between the centrists and more radical elements. For the former, the moderate line

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[190] In Ukrainian, *Rukh* simply means movement. In this context it is the common version for the People's Movement in Support of Perestroika.

[191] Charles F. Furtado. "Nationalism and Foreign Policy in Ukraine," in Political Science Quarterly 109(1) 1994: 93. It could be argued that even if "forced Ukrainization" had occurred, this was no worse than the seventy years of Soviet rule that had resulted in Russification of much of the population. According to Andrew Wilson, (in Smith et. al., 1998 Chapter 6) approximately forty per cent of the population are Ukrainophone Ukrainians, thirty-three to thirty-four per cent Russophone Ukrainians and twenty to twenty-one percent ethnic Russians. This means during the Soviet period, some thirty percent of ethnic Ukrainians were Russified. Further study is necessary on the importance of language to unity in Ukraine, however one can postulate that Ukrainian identity is by and large, fluid and therefore more amenable to civic forms of nationalism than many of its neighbours. While in other states, differences in language have created social cleavages, even in democratically consolidated states, it is possible that in terms of transitional states, especially ones that postulate a history of European ideas, differences in language are not so difficult to overcome. It is this "swing group" – Russophone Ukrainians – that will in part, determine the course of Ukraine's nationalism.

[192] Furtado, 1994: 93.

absolutely essential.[193] The centrist faction may have thought that a moderate tone would be more conducive to uniting Ukraine and more appealing to the various ethno-linguistic divisions within the UkSSR. The more radical element was united under the leadership of Ivan Drach, who toed the moderate line only under pressure from the CPU.[194] Eventually infighting and fragmentation would spell the end of *Rukh's* effectiveness as a political force.

Rukh's initial weakness on the political front, however, was that it could not break into the Eastern and more rural areas of the Ukraine. In the March 1990 elections "*Rukh* won almost every seat in Galicia and performed strongly in Volhynia, Kiev and other urban areas of central Ukraine, but picked up only a handful of seats in the southeast"[195] where the communist party had made a relatively strong showing.

Unlike its predecessors, *Rukh* was not confined to being a cultural front organization. It rapidly became a political party – not only a movement – that was the only real opposition to the CPU in the 1990 elections.

b. Sovereignty

In March 1990, elections for the Supreme Council (*Verkhovna Rada*) of the Ukraine took place, and opposition deputies were elected in every seat where the preliminary election rules allowed them. These initial election rules were set up to maintain a government run by the CPU. However, even this minimum degree of freedom allowed the *Rada* to proclaim a Declaration of Sovereignty. The Declaration – which *Rukh* supported – allowed for the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, and *only* that body to speak for the Ukrainian people.

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[193] Wilson, 1997: 66.

[194] Wilson 1997: 66.

[195] Wilson, 2002: 159- 160. One of *Rukh's* most notable accomplishments was to build a human chain running from Lvov to Kiev in January 1990 to symbolize national unity. It is worth noting that the chain went no further, symbolically ignoring the dominant ethnic Russian population and Russophone Ukrainian population in the east and south. In the West, the homeland of Ukrainian integral nationalism, Rukh was gaining popularity, eclipsing even the UHU.

Defining "the Ukrainian people" in the Declaration would prove rather difficult for several reasons. If "the Ukrainian people" is defined solely in terms of ethnicity, then one-fifth of the population that is ethnic Russian is automatically excluded. If the Supreme Council wanted to exercise authority over the UkSSR's complete territory and presumably population as well, it would not be able to do so if one-fifth of the population was alienated through an ethnic identification of "Ukrainian people."[196] It might be posited, for e.g. that an ethnic identification may alienate some Russified Ukrainians who think of themselves as Russian.

The existence of minority groups in Ukraine would require the primacy of a civic attachment to the state if Ukraine was to be successful in nation- and state-building. Any vestiges of ethnic nationalism at the time the Declaration was proclaimed, already seem to have been tempered by the territorialization of nationalism that had occurred in the republic. Generally it seems safe to say that

> The Declaration boosted national dignity and pride, strengthened the sense of a broader Ukrainian republican identity and citizenship, and while signalling a decisive break with the imperial and authoritarian past, also opened the way forward to a more promising future, however interpreted.[197]

c. Referendum, The August Coup and Independence

By 1990 the CPU split between Leonid Kravchuk and his archrival Stanislav Hurenko. Hurenko thought Kravchuk was too willing to consort with nationalists whereas Kravchuk had accused Hurenko of being obsessed with Moscow politics and soft on a declaration of sovereignty. In 1991, the leadership split became public when the two antagonists disagreed on Gorbachev's referendum designed to maintain the cohesion of the USSR. Kravchuk was in favour of a more confederal relationship with Moscow

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[196] This issue would be addressed in the 1996 Constitution.
[197] Nahaylo, 1999: 299.

centre, whereas Hurenko wanted a "sovereign, socialist Ukraine in a renewed Union."[198]
In essence, Hurenko had politically adopted a more pro-Moscow policy.

In the March 1991 all-union "Gorbachev" referendum, Kravchuk added a second
question on the ballot that was somewhat adversarial to the centre's emphasis on union
cohesion. The original question read:

> Do you consider it necessary to preserve the USSR as a renewed
> federation of equal, sovereign republics in which human rights and the
> freedom of all nationalities will be truly guaranteed?[199]

The Kravchuk-amended question read:

> Do you agree that Ukraine should be part of a Union of sovereign states on
> the basis of the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine?[200]

The results for both questions attracted considerable support: 70.5 per cent for the
Gorbachev question and 80.2 per cent for the Kravchuk query. From a different
reference point, the vote against Gorbachev was only about 29.5 per cent.[201]

While the two questions were quite similar, citizens generally interpreted them in
different ways. By inserting the second question, Kravchuk was able to politically
advance his position. Not only was he perceived as a nationalist in favour of independent
statehood for Ukraine, but also he had essentially usurped the opposition's opinion that a
(re)new(ed) union was best for all concerned.

The catalyst that shifted the focus from talking about sovereignty to talking about
independence was the August 19 1991 coup against Gorbachev in Moscow. In the
Ukraine, Kravchuk assumed a wait-and-see attitude *vis-à-vis* Boris Yeltsin's overt
assumption of democratic leadership during the coup. On August 23 the Supreme *Rada*

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[198] For more detail see Wilson, 1997: 106-109.

[199] Wilson, 2002: 164.

[200] Wilson 2002: 165.

[201] Wilson, 1997: 126-127. This disagreement may be due, in part, to the vague and sometimes
contradictory language of the Declaration.

announced Ukrainian independence by stipulating that Ukraine would essentially be associated with Russia in an economic partnership. Ukraine's new policy regarding economic sovereignty required collaboration between national communist and democrats in the new *Rada*.

The August coup provided the impetus for a formal declaration of Ukraine's independence in December 1991. In issuing the declaration, Kravchuk appealed to historical events such as Chernobyl, Ukraine's negative position as a result of Russification and the Soviet-inspired famine that afflicted Ukraine in 1932 to 1933.[202] In this manner Kravchuk was able to garner Western Ukraine's support. Following the coup, however, communists and democrats alike would be able to mobilize support for independence throughout the UkSSR. The vote for independence, along with the Presidential election in December 1991, as one writer put it, was not done by the Ukrainian nation "but the inhabitants of Ukraine, who may, in time come to constitute a genuine nation."[203] While there may have not been a strong feeling of being "Ukrainian" there was at least a strong feeling of anti-Sovietism.[204] Most areas of Ukraine voted for independence with a strong majority, even the areas which, for ethnic reasons would not hypothetically have done so.

Table 2 Ukraine's Vote For Freedom 1 December 1991[205]

Name of Region	Percentage in Favour
Zakarpattia	92.59
Lviv	97.46
Ivano-Frankivske	95.81
Chernivtsi	92.78
Volyn	96.32
Ternopil	98.67
Rivne	95.96
Khmelnytsky	96.30
Zhytomyr	95.06

[202] Paul D'Anieri, Robert Kravchuk and Taras Kuzio, Politics and Society in Ukraine. Boulder: Westview Press, 1999: 29.

[203] D'Anieri et. al., 28. Presumably the term "nation" is taken to mean a membership with a civic national identity as this statement takes into account Ukrainians, ethnic Russians and "Russified Ukrainians" and also presumably includes the area of the Crimea to the south.

[204] The 1991 elections and the vote for independence are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.

[205] Adapted from Subtelny, 2000: 584.

Name of Region	Percentage in Favour
Vinnytsia	95.43
Odessa	85.38
Kiev	95.52
Cherkasy	96.03
Kirovohrad	93.88
Mikolayiv	89.45
Chernihiv	93.74
Sumy	92.61
Poltava	94.93
Dnipropetrovske	90.86
Kherson	90.13
Zaporizhzhia	80.74
Kharkiv	75.83
Donetske	76.85
Luhanske	83.86
Crimean ASSR	54.19
Average	**90.02**
Kiev City	92.87
Sevastopil (Sebastopol) City	57.07

Compared with Gorbachev's March referendum, the vote for independence drastically increased on average. This indicates that while Russians in Ukraine did not necessarily feel "Ukrainian" they were not entirely sure of their identity as Russians either – instead they retained a residual Soviet identity. Due to the social and political illegitimacy of the central government and the party, in combination with the inability of the system to provide an adequate standard of living, most people likely believed that there was something wrong with the Soviet system and structure. Among these groups who questioned the legitimacy or effectiveness of the USSR, there was little question of these groups' loyalty to the emerging Ukrainian state.

On Christmas Eve, 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev finally ended his effort to reinvigorate the USSR. Ukraine and other former Soviet republics now emerged as successor states. In the Ukrainian case, a form of territorial identity was relatively well-established, although notions of ethnic identity were rather fluid among the citizens of the new state entity. Ukraine's Soviet history had come to an end, but the nature of Ukrainian identity was still in evolution and it was still unclear whether national consciousness in the new state would be civic in character or would be more of a traditional ethnic cast.

CHAPTER 4: THE FIRST YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE 1991-1994

Introduction

Early post-Soviet leadership in Ukraine was faced with the dual task of state- and nation-building. The politics of state-building require that there be a rapprochement among ethnic Ukrainians, local Russians and Russian speakers. The politics of nation-building required, in contrast, "the highlighting of contrasts between the titular ethnic group and all things Russian." Building an inclusive civic state that accommodates both titular members of the state, i.e. – ethnic Ukrainians – and the new Russian minority required a common identity that would allow for distinguishing Ukrainian culture from Russian culture,[206] while encouraging individuals of various ethnic backgrounds to continue to work and live together. The initial challenges of building a nation and a national identity were considerable. Identity boundaries continued to be in persistent flux and have a multitude of political, cultural, historical and strategic overtones.

In addition to the challenges of nation- and state-building, Kravchuk's immediate task was to establish and consolidate the formal aspects of democracy. This task would prove to be more difficult than western scholars and politicians had anticipated. While Kravchuk did attempt to adopt some forms of democracy, he was ultimately unable to build a strong common identity to provide cohesion for the population of Ukraine. This failure, in combination with ongoing political and economic mismanagement made Kravchuk as the first President of independent Ukraine a transitional figure. He did, however, maintain the peace and oversee the first tumultuous years of transition.

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[206] Pal Kolso, "Nation-Building in the Former USSR" in <u>Journal of Democracy</u> 7(1) 1996: 125.

1. The New Leadership and the New State: "Democracy" and the National Identity

a. Kravchuk's Politics: Democracy and Ukrainization

Early national identity formation in independent Ukraine cannot be traced to the influence of a single element or charismatic personality that unified Ukrainians. The geographic divide in Ukraine is an appropriate place to cast initial attention to the fragmentation of this national identity. This is because of associated historical and political circumstances linked to the differences between the east and west in the Ukraine. Like western states that still struggle with competing identity allegiances, Ukraine continued to deal with this competition at the same time that "new" leaders were trying to consolidate democracy. The polity of Ukraine was missing some basic elements in the first years of independence.[207]

Kravchuk's most notable achievement was ensuring a peaceful collapse of communist power and, also the adoption of formally democratic institutions. Unfortunately, after the demise of Communist power in Ukraine, Kravchuk was, for the most part, unable to shift gears from concentrating on the USSR's state collapse to engineering nation creation.[208] Economic and political reform took a secondary status to maintaining stability during the early post-Soviet stage of Ukrainian independence.

In established Western states, the concept "stability" is often used to denote a peaceful adaptation to change, rather than no change at all. In its consolidated form, democracy is often seen as having the necessary flexibility and evolutionary properties to maintain stability. Kravchuk was caught midway between the old Soviet system and the new liberal system. As a product of the Soviet system, it is arguable that Kravchuk was largely concerned with his own power and personal position. This meant maintaining the status quo, which resulted in ignoring the more substantive issues behind transition. In 1991 Kravchuk was successful in portraying himself as a centrist, calling for statehood

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[207] Taras Kuzio. Ukraine: State and Nation Building. London: Routledge, 1998: 145-149.
[208] Kuzio, 1998: 38-39.

and attempting to appease various parts of the population. Ostensibly, Kravchuk believed that the desire for statehood would become reality, so long as it was supported by real forces. For Kravchuk, this meant establishing presidential representatives in the oblasts.[209] The experience of authoritarianism and his role in the old system led Kravchuk to believe that he would only be successful in establishing a state so long as he had representatives in each of the oblasts that could manage to acquire and enforce support for statehood on his behalf.

In order to cement the "real force support" for statehood, Kravchuk attempted to "establish his representatives as the highest authorities in the oblasts," (*oblasti*) in order to consolidate Presidential power.[210] Although there are federal representatives in the various regions of most established democracies, they are not often the highest authorities within the region itself. In view of the Soviet legacy, Kravchuk's move to put his representatives in the *oblasts* who would acquire and maintain support for statehood can be seen as a way to reestablish a strong, central government. This was initially of serious concern to the Russian minority, especially in light of Kravchuk's policy of Ukrainization.

The 1989 Language Law established Ukrainian as the official state language.[211] Upon his accession to the presidency, Kravchuk conducted all state-related business in the Ukrainian language in order to elevate it from the status of second-class language. By the end of Kravchuk's presidency in 1994, Ukrainian had replaced Russian as the media for official communication.[212] For the Russian minority their place as the dominant class and culture had been usurped. Moreover, the Ukrainization of politics and society provided fertile soil for the Russian minority's fear of becoming second-class citizens themselves.

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[209] In Kuzio, 1998: 39. Specifically, Kravchuk said that "if there are forces that resolutely support statehood in an *oblast*...then a presidential representative has someone to rely on."
[210] Subtelny, 2000: 611.
[211] Leokadia Drobizheva, Rose Gottemoeller, Catherine McArdle Kellher and Lee Walker, eds. Ethnic Conflict in the Post-Soviet World. New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1996: 114.
[212] Drobizheva et. al., 1996: 115.

The close links between politics, economics and nationality in the Soviet period in combination with pre-Soviet history produced major consequences for Ukrainian national identity following independence. In 1991, Kravchuk inherited a proto-state divided not only between east and west, but between two ethnic groups as well. The southeast exhibited a preference for West European traditions of civic/territorial statehood, i.e. creating the state, then the nation. While this preference lays emphasis on the idea of common laws, institutions, and inclusive and equal citizenship, it requires relatively strong institutions to forge a nation with clear-cut borders.[213] Although the ideal of the Soviet citizen and the territorialization of nationalism that began with Chernobyl, may have helped by associating civic ties to the state, the lack of agreement on international borders made it difficult for Kravchuk and his entourage to create an inclusive identity. Without agreement on boundaries,[214] it proved difficult to ascertain where Ukraine ended and Russia began. The boundary problem also limited clarity with respect to the boundaries of identity. The question was whether or not the 1991 borders were Ukraine's "natural" borders or were merely institutional legacies inherited from the Soviet era.

Moreover, the states, which Ukraine was trying to emulate in terms of nation- and state-building generally possessed uniform educational systems that could help, provide cohesion to the population and reinforce political culture. Many Western states, when they were at the same stage of development as contemporary Ukraine, had relatively

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[213] Taras Kuzio, Robert Kravchuk and Paul D'Anieri. State and Institution Building in Ukraine. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999: 222.

[214] Although Ukraine's boundaries are mostly de facto, Ukraine has been unable to ratify the 1997 border treaty with Belarus and the Sea of Azov is still disputed with Russia, although land boundaries have been agreed upon (see CIA World Factbook). Although an agreement on the border was signed in January, some "technicalities" still had to be settled by experts. (Pravda "Russia and Ukraine Sign Agreement on State Border" http://www.english.pravda.ru. January 28, 2004). On October 22 2003, there was a show of force from Ukrainian border guards on the island of Tuzla in the Kerch Strait when "the Russians were coming, with their bulldozers and trucks full of dirt, bringin an invading sea wall through the Azov Sea ever closer to Ukrainian shores." (Seth Mydans, "For Ukraine and Russia, a Tempest in a Strait" The New York Times http://www.nytimes.com October 23, 2003). The bulldozers and dirt in question were meant to finish off a land bridge between the Taman Peninsula and the island. While Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov claimed that it was to build a "dam" for "ecological and economic reasons" the move was interpreted by Kyiv as a move by Moscow to start an occupation of Ukrainian territory (Tom Warner, "Russia and Ukraine in Strait Ownership Dispute," The Financial Times http://www.ft.com. October 23, 2003.

homogenous populations and were thus able to set a uniform system of education in place.[215] Newly independent Ukraine was faced with the formidable challenge of a large Russian minority and a large proportion of Russified Ukrainians. This made instituting a uniform educational system an extremely difficult endeavour. Some of Ukraine's borders remain in dispute, and the immediate post-Soviet era required the management of a bilingual cleavage in the population between those who identify Ukrainian as their first language and those who identify Russian as their first language. Although Ukrainization was talking place, the leaders of newly independent Ukraine had no choice but to accommodate the Russian-speaking population, or risk destroying the state at its birth.

Moreover, west-central Ukraine had inherited Central European ideas of the nation. In such cases, the nation goes in search of the state.[216] Additionally, West Ukraine's experience in the relatively liberal Habsburg Empire allowed for the development of a civil society, in addition to the development of Ukrainian culture. Ukraine was not the only emergent state in 1991 that had a bifurcated political culture, but the situation became a serious impediment to democratic consolidation and building a national identity.

Statehood is best viewed as evolutionary whether it begins with the state, or with the nation. Once a state is established, whether it is ethnic or civic in basic nature, movement towards establishing a civic state based on allegiance to territory and state institutions can occur.[217] Like many western states, Ukraine is neither purely ethnic, nor purely civic, but has elements of both in its historical development. Indeed, Kravchuk's ultimate shortcomings as Ukraine's first President was not in terms of state- or nation-

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[215] Many of these states were also not subject to ideas such as self-determination as this idea only evolved following the First World War.

[216] For example, in the German provinces, it is arguable that the German nation focused on unification in order build a state that was reflective of German culture.

[217] Kuzio et. al. 1999: 223. This is reminiscent of Brown's ethnocultural nationalism mentioned in the introduction; membership in the nation can therefore be acquired. This is not to say that institutions are static; rather that they change in response to political culture, whether the leaders of the state like it or not.

building, but in terms of managing the more pragmatic concerns of the population, specifically, the economy.

b. The New National Minority

The close links between nationality, politics and Ukrainization, contributed to a sense of alienation within the Russian population in the first years of independence. Kravchuk's policy of Ukrainization combined with the relatively strong civil society and the new "business" class, all were factors that supported the new post-Soviet regime. However, the result of this linkage led many Russians to believe that they were not allowed to participate in the process of privatization[218] and the new business environment. The end result of Ukrainization in the business sphere was that economics became ethnicized to a large degree, and economic development was not the secular (i.e. – non-ethnic) element of state building it might have been.

Ethnic Russians voted for Ukraine's independence in 1991 with the belief that they would be better off in an independent state, rather than in a political system that was collapsing and depleting the territory of Ukraine of important resources. However, frustration over a loss of prestige coupled with the continuing economic crisis and increased uncertainty forced ethnic Russians to look for a new social and political identity.[219]

For Russians, the change from being a privileged class to a national minority occurred with the replacement of Russian by Ukrainian as the language of upward mobility. Russians who did not speak Ukrainian suddenly found themselves at a loss in the new state. The government's rationale for the use of Ukrainian as a single official language, was that the legal ability to use Russian in public functions would have detrimental effects on Ukrainian unity. Russians would have legal recourse neither to learn, nor to teach their children Ukrainian. The Russian population also faced the danger of becoming marginalized "in such vital areas as politics and sciences where the

[218] Kuzio, 1998: 59.
[219] Drobizheva et. al., 1996: 113.

state language is Ukrainian."[220] Although initial support for Ukrainization was relatively strong, this support was concentrated in a narrow base amongst the intelligentsia and in Western Ukraine. In the east and south, support for Ukrainization and indeed, President Kravchuk, waned in the face of ongoing economic catastrophe, corruption, and political and economic incompetence. This corruption was, in part, due to the fact that the regime's leadership was, in reality, the former *apparatchiki* of the CPSU. As such, they had little interest in implementing policies and reforms unless they received some extra perks.[221]

c. Prospects and Limitations of the New National Identity

Throughout the post-Soviet period, Ukrainian national identity has been fragmented, often resulting in an emphasis on a form of identity that has often proved negative. For a great many citizens, Ukrainian national identity was essentially comprised of being not Russian. Kuzio (1998) identifies at least four potential bases for identity in independent Ukraine: Soviet, Little Russian, a pre-modern identity defined in terms of simply in terms of "otherness" (contrasting themselves from other groups), and that of conscious Ukrainian identity.[222]

The degree of separation between these various bases of identity is somewhat fuzzy. In fact, these four bases of identity may be better viewed as parts of a whole, which, when manifest, may become aspects of a cohesive national identity. For Ukrainians, the concept of Little Russian during the Soviet period had hardly changed: they went from junior partner to almost second-class citizens. Meanwhile, on the

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[220] Drobizheva, 1998: 115.

[221] Subtelny, 2000: 606. As part of the Soviet legacy, politicians were used to receiving kickbacks from the centre. It is acceptable to presume that they would continue to expect this in the new state. Whether they got extra benefits is another matter altogether. Indeed, in 2001, Ukraine was ranked eighty-third of ninety-one countries on Transparency International's corruption perceptions index (Transparency International Canada, "Corruption Index," http://www.transparency.ca. June 27, 2001. Date Accessed: August 15, 2003) as opposed to sixty-nine of eighty-five in 1998. By comparison, Russia ranked seventy-nine in 2001 and seventy-six in 1998. In 2003, Ukraine dropped to 106.

[222] Kuzio, 1998: 152-153.

Russian side, Ukrainians viewed as Little Russians simply meant they were ripe for integration into the Russian ethnic grouping.[223]

Moreover, the notion of a conscious Ukrainian identity as an independent element in the post-Soviet period was itself questionable. The basis of this new identity was quite mixed; parts in the Soviet cultural legacy and a portion in an increasingly internationalized and globalized world.[224] Therefore, the new Ukrainian identity had ties to many earlier sources of identity. It is sufficient to say that there are a variety of historically interlinked forces that came to influence contemporary Ukrainian national identity. To some extent, this results in a fluid identity that had the potential to adapt to new circumstances.

At the same time, adopting any one of these bases as primary to contemporary Ukrainian identity limits the potential for that identity to provide population cohesion. For example, the concept of Ukrainian identity as derived from not being Russian, automatically excludes approximately one-fifth of the population and large parts of the territory.[225] As well, such an identity does not allow for effective state and institution building. When one identity is privileged over others, the state is not a reflection of the entire population, thus limiting the potential for the formation of a truly civic identity. In this case, the state becomes exclusive: either a small part of the population can participate *or* a substantial chunk of the population is excluded unless they willingly acculturate or are forcibly assimilated into the dominant population. In the case of Ukraine, institutions and state structure may be adopted simply because they are not Soviet or not Russian, and not because they are representative institutions serving the people of Ukraine.

A new Ukrainian identity may not be sufficient to bind the population if it is primarily non-inclusive. In response to a 1994 poll asking the question "What do you

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[223] Kuzio, 1998: 155.

[224] Kuzio, 1998: 164.

[225] The majority of the population of the Crimea, for example is ethnically Russian. Additionally, the region is the traditional home of the Tatars, who, since independence have been returning.

consider to be your homeland?" a significant percentage of individuals answered
"Ukraine."

Table 3 "What Do You Consider to Be Your Homeland? (%)[226]

	Northeast	East	South	Donbas	Crimea	Total
Ukraine	35	55	48	23	3	34
CIS	10	5	5	9	4	7
USSR	21	17	23	34	37	27
Russia	2	1	0	2	14	3
Region	26	17	16	25	40	23
Europe	1	2	2	1	1	1
Don't know	5	3	7	6	2	5

The majority of citizens feel that their homeland is not Russia (only three per cent
of the population answered positively to this). However there is some indication of a
potential regional political consciousness. Twenty-seven per cent of those surveyed feel
some affinity to the Soviet Union, and twenty-three percent feel some affiliation with the
region. There is some degree of political consciousness in terms of a regional identity.
In turn, this opinion indicates some ties to territory, rather than ethnicity. Moreover, the
affinity to Ukraine proper may emanate from a sense of indigenousness to the region (see
Chapter 6). By combining regional affiliation with a sense of loyalty to the new state, a
new territorial identity may be created.

2. Resurgence of the New Ethnic Nationalism: Ideas of Self and Other

a. State Building and Nation Building

Conceptually, the processes of state-building can be separated from those of
nation-building. State-building requires the creation of state institutions, e.g.: offices of
leadership, laws, and constitutions. Nation-building requires the development of a
universal sentiment of belonging, i.e. – a national identity. However in post-Soviet
Ukraine, the processes of state- and nation-building are largely inseparable because
Ukraine is strikingly deficient in the attributes that are generally taken to define a nation,

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[226] From Kuzio, 1998: 153.

for example, a common language, shared mass culture and ideology, history, economy, and legal rights and duties.[227] These deficiencies must be addressed before any cohesive state identity can be created.

Nation-building in Ukraine stagnated at what D'Anieri et. al. call the third stage of nation-building. In the first years of independence, following the first stage, fragmentation, and the second stage, a shifting in identity, there was a stagnation at the third stage, aggregation, that is the creation of a new independent identity. During the Kravchuk era, deepening economic crisis created a form of nostalgia for the relatively stable Soviet period.[228] The popular focus on more pragmatic concerns tended to undermine the ethnic side of an emerging new identity.

The historic separation between eastern and western Ukraine provided a unique challenge for Kravchuk. For Kravchuk, nationalism was, at best, a multi-edged tool to be utilized in order to appeal to the variegated identities within Ukraine. At the same time, Kravchuk hoped to maintain the *nomenklatura*'s hold over the country. Historically, western Ukrainian intellectuals – mainly non-Russians – pushed for a unitary state, fearing that too much pluralism would seriously threaten the cohesion of the fledgling state. Comparatively, eastern Ukraine's industrialized workers – mainly Russians or those living close to Russia – feared that liberalization would threaten their economic situation and erode their social benefits. This combination of grievances and concerns created the perfect niche for Kravchuk. As a champion of statehood, Kravchuk craftily built a coalition in the newly independent country. Kravchuk was very adept at using the new "democratic structures" to advance his own goals. As a defender of social justice, he held considerable appeal for the eastern part of the country. Kravchuk was able to create a state while providing limited liberal reforms. Unfortunately the end result was

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[227] D'Anieri et. al., 1999:49-50.
[228] D'Anieri et. al., 1999: 51.

stagnation in economic policy and, therefore, a weak state.[229] Kravchuk's reputation as ardent nationalist who succeeded in achieving a stronger state is therefore somewhat erroneous. He may be better depicted as a shrewd politician who was able to use the situation in 1991 to his own benefit.

Overwhelming support for Kravchuk in the 1991 election indicates that Ukrainian nationalism had considerable support and was not an intolerant brand of nationalist mobilization. In fact, the primary "national value" of the day was probably state creation and state building, i.e. – a desire for independence and autonomy.[230] While this value of loyalty to territory does not preclude the possibility of ethnic violence, it certainly diminishes the possibility. The key to any sort of overt nationalism is mobilization and the key to this mobilization is the capacity and desire to prioritize one sentiment over all other concerns. In some NIS, nationalist mobilization has taken an extreme form of ethno-nationalism.

In Ukraine, there are various economic and social factors that influence the degree and nature of nationalist activity. The first factor is that "as a rule, desperately poor people do not rebel" as they are too busy trying to survive to be concerned with uprisings or demonstrations.[231] The ongoing economic difficulties in Ukraine (see below) gave little opportunity for individuals to rise up. Overall, people were less concerned with ethnic identification than day-to-day survival.

The second factor influencing Ukrainian nationalism is the atomized character of the population. Where strong civil ties do not exist, there are few opportunities for the transformation of groups of disgruntled individuals into a political force.[232] Although there was a relatively vibrant civil society in Western Ukraine, it did not extend to the

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[229] Ilya Priezel. "Ukraine's Lagging Efforts in Building National Institutions and the Potential Impact on National Security," in The Harriman Review 10(3) Winter 1997: 31-32. Priezel argues that a weak state is in the interests of the old *nomenklatura* as a lack of effective institutions allows them to maintain their elevated social status vis-à-vis the public.

[230] This indicates a potential territorialization of nationalism.

[231] Alexander J. Motyl. "Making Sense of Ukraine" in The Harriman Review 10(3) Winter 1997: 4.

[232] Motyl, 1997: 4.

eastern regions, effectively leaving out half of Ukraine's present territory and a substantial part of the population. Moreover, the rift in *Rukh* and the alliance of the national democrats with Kravchuk effectively eliminated the bases for the development of a national civil society.

The final factor affecting Ukraine's nationalism factor concerns the speed of the transition and the economic deterioration of the country: "people rarely rebel when the conditions of life deteriorate slowly and steadily" – rebellion occurs with rapid change, not slow collapse.[233] The relatively slow disintegration of the Soviet Union and Kravchuk's "go slow" policy gave the citizenry time to adapt to the new situation. Specifically, the euphoria of newly created statehood initially blunted the worst aspects of the economic collapse. For Kravchuk, the main problem continued to be a fragmented national identity. He attempted to appeal to the average Ukrainian by portraying himself as an ordinary citizen. But consolidation of a single Ukrainian identity would prove to be far more difficult than anticipated.

b. Identity in Transition

While the various factors mentioned thus far contributed to Ukraine's peaceful transition, a truly "national" identity has been hard to establish for these same reasons. Although Ukraine's initial transition has been relatively peaceful, the establishment of a national identity has yet to occur. However, given the high degree of semantic understanding between Ukrainians and Russians, this identity may be easier to come by than for other NIS in Eastern Europe.

Modern society is marked by "anonymity, mobility and atomization."[234] In Ukraine this atomization has occurred largely due to historical experience, resulting in a plethora of national identities all striving for expression. In the Soviet era, anonymity and mobility were guaranteed – so long as individuals did not try to disrupt Moscow's plans, and so long as Russian was sufficiently learned to achieve upward mobility. What

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[233] Motyl, 1997: 4.
[234] Gellner, 1998: 28.

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binds the multiethnic population of contemporary Ukraine is semantic understanding. Having worked and lived together for centuries (some would argue millennia), Ukrainians and Russians have developed semantic understanding in the face of linguistic difference. Semantic agreement can override linguistic difference by providing a context-free area in which to communicate. While this was originally confined to the elite level, [235] it is plausible that in Ukraine, the Soviet experience created a broader basis for semantic understanding despite linguistic diversity. In turn, this process increased the awareness that all members of the new state are important to its success regardless of the various ethnic backgrounds of individuals.

According to Motyl this understanding goes beyond semantics and crosses the language barrier. This "friendship of peoples" encourages respect from Ukrainians to Russians and *vice versa*. However, in order for this dual respect and the peaceful development of a Ukrainian state to continue, a non-ethnic reidentification of "Ukrainian" is necessary.[236]

By and large, Ukrainians are a tolerant, patient and, some would argue, passive people.[237] By placing the emphasis of identity on the future independence of the state rather than the past of ethnic re-identification, Kravchuk was able to de-ethnicize the new identity,[238] and lay the foundations for an inclusive identity that considers all ethnic groups in the country.

The consolidation of a national identity may lie in the international arena. Myths of origin quite aptly place Ukraine on the crossroads of east and west, north and south. In the post-Soviet era, one possibility for a national identity lies in contemporary geopolitics. It may be possible for Ukrainians to

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[235] Gellner, 1998: 28-30.

[236] Motyl, 1993: 91.

[237] In the Soviet era, the Ukrainian diaspora pushed strongly for an independent Ukraine. The diaspora is the not-so-passive branch of the Ukrainian people.

[238] Volodymyr Kulyk, "The Search for Post-Soviet Identity in Ukraine and Russia and its Influence on the Relations Between the Two States" in The Harriman Review 9(1-2) Spring 1996: 12.

Create a unique role for themselves: as intermediaries, as bridges between two ostensibly 'alien' worlds, those of European 'civilization' and of 'nomadic' Russian 'barbarism.' Such a self-perception has the good fortune not only of differentiating Ukraine from Russia, but also of providing Ukraine with an indispensable role in reconciling east and west.[239]

However, this geopolitically inspired role is difficult to reconcile when centuries of statelessness are combined with a fragmented internal identity. Indeed, Kravchuk was unable to fully unite Ukraine during his only term as president. It remains to be seen whether Ukraine will be able to complete a national identity based on its geopolitical position.

3. From Kravchuk to Kuchma: The 1994 Elections

Ultimately, Kravchuk's success lies in the peaceful transition of Ukraine from a communist and authoritarian regional entity to a proto-capitalist and proto-democratic, internationally recognized, state. Ukraine is regarded by much of the international community as a relatively important part of an expanding European security system. However, Kravchuk's early efforts to "return to Europe" faded over time. His failure to establish a constitution and manage the economic crisis led to a shift in voting patterns that illustrates the economic and cultural divisions in Ukraine.

a. Evaluating Kravchuk

By portraying himself as a centrist in 1991 Kravchuk became independent Ukraine's first president, and was able to defeat more nationalist candidates. His words, "there is a Ukrainian state. There exists a people of Ukraine. And they must be defended,"[240] were domestically perceived as inclusive in nature. Using "people of Ukraine" rather than "Ukrainian people" put the emphasis on the name of the state rather than the ethnic population, in turn de-ethnicizing his campaign and his ideas about the

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[239] Motyl, 1993: 89. Ukraine is the "borderland" that divides east and west, north and south.

[240] Motyl, 1993: 153. Had these words come from Rukh leader, Chornovil, they would have been perceived as exclusionary and nationalistic in nature.

new Ukrainian state. By appealing to a sense of territory rather than ethnicity, Kravchuk appealed to large segments of the population, including undecided voters. The fact that the initial emphasis was on state creation enhanced Kravchuk's success, leaving his only other major challenge the problem of how to give the existing institutions a degree of legitimacy.

Kravchuk's successes were mainly in the area of establishing the foundations for a state. The elections in the new country required that close attention be given to the institutions inherited from the Soviet era. By engaging the opposition in dialogue and allowing them to participate in parliamentary commissions, Kravchuk established the formal bases for democracy. His incremental approach to democratization allowed for only the formal functioning of the new institutions.[241] At the same time, however, the more substantive issues associated with democracy were impeded by corruption, a divided elite, and the unresolved question of the division of powers.

The early years of independence witnessed the emergence of a three-fold split in the new elite. Some of the *nomenklatura* in the CPU/CPSU were replaced with younger and better-educated *apparatchiki*.[242] Although they were still part of the old system, it is probable they were better able to adapt to the new situation, as they had experienced *perestroika*, and the changeover in power while still being somewhat at an impressionable age and were perhaps more open to new ideas than the *nomenklatura*.

In due course, the much less numerous national democrats became allied with these new "national communists." Together, these two forces might have been able to shake the old ties of absolute obedience to Moscow and adherence to party doctrine.[243] However this potential was sabotaged by the emergence of a third group that would continue to cause problems throughout the post-Soviet period.

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[241] Bohdan Krawchenko, "Ukraine: the Politics of Independence" in Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras, eds., Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993: 82-83.
[242] Subtelny, 2000: 610.
[243] Subtelny, 2000: 610.

This third group that emerged was the new "business class," which became, essentially, a new oligarchy. Having acquired their money and status illegally (see below), involvement in politics was attractive to these oligarchs because it protected them from punishment for wrongdoing.[244] The challenge for the oligarchs was to influence the "new" politicians in much the same way as old officials had been in the Soviet period. The relationship between politics and business had the danger of fostering criminality. Kravchuk's failure to effectively deal with this was detrimental to the new politics.[245]

In terms of politics, Kravchuk made several mistakes. The mistake with the most repercussions was his failure to deal with the question of the division of powers between the executive and legislative branches of government. Whereas in the Soviet period, power arrangements had been hierarchical and clear, the absence of clear guidelines for the various branches of government in the new environment led to clashes between President and Parliament. Although the *Rada* had initially promoted sovereignty and independence, and had created the very office that Kravchuk assumed,[246] the legislature was unable to come to an agreement on a constitution, because no majority could be found in the *Rada* for dealing with this important matter. The *Rada*'s ineffectiveness allowed the corruption of the old system to persist throughout Kravchuk's reign.

The *Rada's* ineffectiveness is partially due to the fragmentation of the Ukrainian party system. The importance of parties was partly undermined due to early election laws that allowed factories and civil organizations the same power as official parties to nominate candidates for office. In turn, the deputies were alienated from the population because of the failures of governance.

In established democracies, one or two parties often occupy the centre of the spectrum; in Ukraine, the centre developed into "numerous small parties that were formed to serve the interests of the" former nomenklatura. The experience of *Rukh* –

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[244] Subtelny, 2000: 610.
[245] Subtelny, 2000: 610.
[246] Subtelny, 2000: 611.

transformed from an interest group, to a political party, to a fragmented opposition – illustrates the ineffectiveness of the early Ukrainian political system.[247] For Kravchuk, the key to creating effective governance was to reinforce presidential power, which operated entirely separately from legislative power. This ambiguous division of powers did not allow for effective governance in the early post-Soviet era.

Ultimately, Kravchuk's success as first post-Soviet era leader stems from his ability to harness and use various versions of nationalist rhetoric at the moment when it was most useful to him. Motyl[248] attributes this to his years as CPU minister of propaganda. Fully cognizant of the former Soviet system's language and structure, and now in a new environment when symbols were meaningless and terminology had lost both context and meaning, Kravchuk was able to be very effective politically.

> Many years of staging Communist verbal pyrotechniques were particularly well-suited to guide him through the political and linguistic maze that had developed since 1987. Kravchuk could make sense of the emerging reality because he was so well equipped for reading the signals that were emanating from all sectors of the polity and society. He could comprehend all signals because he had spent ten years of his life developing the signals of communism and combating those of nationalism.[249]

The switch from Communist rhetoric to nationalist rhetoric was significantly easier for Kravchuk than for most of the early post-Soviet leaders. Moreover, the peaceful transition is partially due to the fact that as a former party member as well as being from Western Ukraine, Kravchuk knew two important things. First, he knew that the nationality problem had not been solved by Soviet nationality policy. Second, he knew that nationalism was a potentially powerful force that could help with both state creation and his accession to the presidency. However, this focus on nation- and state-building made him neglect the ongoing and worsening economic crisis. In the 1994

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[247] Subtelny, 2000: 612-615.
[248] Motyl, 1993: 158-159.
[249] Motyl, 1993: 158.

elections Kravchuk was forced to use measures other than focusing on nascent statehood in order to find another base of support.

Kravchuk's neglect of the increasingly desperate economic situation stem from his fears that economic reforms would have a potentially destabilizing effect on society. He and his ministers reverted to Soviet-style economic management, providing subsidies and loans to inefficient factories. In turn, these factories ran up huge deficits and contributed to massive inflation. By 1992 inflation was at 1210 per cent; by 1993 this had skyrocketed to 4735 per cent.[250] On another scale, this can be interpreted as prices skyrocketing 10 000 percent, due to a decrease in production and rising unemployment. In the process, the savings of millions of people were wiped out.[251]

At the same time, the economic crisis created opportunities for the old *nomenklatura*. By laundering the money from loans, they were able to acquire and hoard millions of dollars. Other practices included acquiring raw materials from Ukraine at relatively low prices, then selling them on world markets for several times the original purchase prices. These practices not only alienated the population of the political system, but also opened the door to more corruption within the government. After all, it was in the best interests of the new oligarchs to influence leading politicians, no matter what method was necessary.

In the final analysis, Kravchuk's term as President was not much different from other transitional figures. His job was to oversee the first trying years of transition.[252] Indeed, his job was made even more difficult because he had to build a state in a veritable vacuum. His ensuing failure to manage the economy, and also his lack of a political vision, which might construct a new state, failed to provide the population with reassurance that short-term sacrifices would bring long-term gains. Perhaps most

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[250] Oleh Havrylyshyn, "Ukraine: Looking East, Looking West" in The Harriman Review 10(3) Winter 1997: 20.
[251] Subtelny, 2000: 620-621; Wilson, 2002: 253-255.
[252] Kuzio, 1998: 42

importantly, he lacked a vision of what a future Ukraine would look like.[253] His inability to progress from champion of independence to a national leader, combined with the severe economic crisis led to Kravchuk's defeat in 1994, and his replacement by Leonid Kuchma.

b. The Promise of Kuchma

Kravchuk's rule would produce a significant problem for Ukraine's second President: a lack of trust in the leaders of society, including politicians, party leaders, the army and businessmen.

Table 4 Preelection Levels of Trust in Politicians and Public Institutions 1994[254]

Subject	Absolute	Somewhat	A Little	None	Hard to Say
Government	2	6	26	59	7
President Kravchuk	4	8	24	58	6
V. Chornovil (*Rukh* Leader)	4	7	18	58	13
Local Power Leaders	3	7	25	54	13
Directors of state enterprises	4	11	27	38	20
Political Parties	2	6	20	46	26
Army	20	27	22	20	11

Of all of these groups and individuals, only trust in the army is distributed in a relatively even manner across categories. The incumbent President and the leader of the opposition are clearly not trusted, quite possibly due to their inability to provide effective governance and inept economic management.

Increasingly unable to control the state and to fulfil his promises of 1991, Kravchuk fell back on nationalist rhetoric as a campaign tactic, in turn alienating a substantial part of the population. Kuchma campaigned on a platform of economic

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[253] Kuzio, 1998: 54. Kravchuk's vision of Ukraine was limited to the establishment of an independent state.
[254] See Paul Kubicek. Unbroken Ties: The State, Interest Associations and Corporatism in Post-Soviet Ukraine. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000: 46.

reform, criticizing Kravchuk for his lack of attention to the situation. After taking power, Kuchma announced a series of broad reforms: privatization of state property, elimination of subsidies to unprofitable companies, liberalization of prices, a reduction of social expenditures and stabilization of the currency.[255]

Throughout the 1994 campaign, both Kravchuk and Kuchma remained committed to an independent Ukraine. The difference between them was in the nature of the independent state. Kravchuk glorified the past – a mythic concept of a Ukrainian state. Kuchma addressed the more pragmatic concerns of citizens, specifically the economic crisis. He emphasized the importance of adherence to a democratic state held together by a functioning economy. By promoting such civic values and looking to the future rather than the past, he created an inclusive platform, promising to work "in the interests of all Ukrainians and not just separate regions...to the benefit of an independent and sovereign Ukraine."[256] Kravchuk's emphasis of "otherness" (identifying Ukrainians as "not-Russians") marked him an ethnic nationalist. In contrast, Kuchma's embodiment of civic virtues and commitment to the secular economic sector painted him as a civic statesman.

Kuchma himself is a Russified Ukrainian who actually learned the Ukrainian language in preparation for the election. Indeed, he tried to cultivate the image of a typical Ukrainian, embodying both historical and transitional identities, and providing hope for a future identity. When asked why he was not fluent in Ukrainian, he answered that it was a problem he shares with a great number of Ukrainians.[257] On the one hand, in addressing the situation as a "problem," Kuchma implies that he recognizes the importance of Ukrainization. On the other hand, Kuchma was representative of a substantial chunk of the population. By showing he is willing and able to learn Ukrainian, as well as speaking Russian as a mother tongue, he is able to as act a potential medium of communication for the two most important groups in contemporary Ukraine. By indicating that he shares a problem with a large number of other Ukrainians, he

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[255] Subtelny, 2000: 621. In 1993, Kuchma had resigned as Prime Minister in protest of the lack of reform.
[256] Taras Kuzio. Ukraine Under Kuchma. London: MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1997: 44-45.
[257] Kuzio, 1997: 50.

portrays himself not just as a hopeful President, but also as a typical Ukrainian trying to survive transition.

Despite Kuchma's attempt at becoming a typical Ukrainian citizen, the 1994 Presidential elections indicate that he was largely unsuccessful in appealing to the entire population. Kravchuk won every oblast to the west of Poltava; Kuchma won those constituencies to the east of that point, which is a major political dividing line in the country. Although economics may have played a major role in the election of 1994, the split is largely along ethno-geographic lines.[258]

Table 5 1994 Presidential Election in Ukraine – Result by Oblast[259]

Oblast	Leonid Kuchma votes	Leonid Kuchma Percent	Leonid Kravchuk Votes	Leonid Kravchuk Percent
Kyyiv	359 271	35.58	603 139	59.74
Sevastopol	189 972	91.98	13 502	6.54
Vinnytc'ka	440 079	42.32	564 856	54.32
Volyns'ka	83 971	13.96	504 908	83.93
Dnipro-Petrovs'ka	1 314 798	67.81	576 169	29.72
Donrtc'ka	2 006 617	79.00	469 677	18.49
Zakarpats'ka	136 787	24.21	382 683	70.52
Zaporiz'ka	706 536	70.70	268 135	26.83
Zhytomyrs'ka	345 392	41.56	462 336	55.64
Ivano-Frankivs'ka	35 481	3.86	867 658	94.46
Kirovohrads'ka	315 967	49.72	290 473	45.71
Kryms'ka	1 041 671	89.70	103 119	8.88
Kyyevs'ka	363 462	38.38	552 225	58.31
L'vivs'ka	71 746	3.90	1 727 052	93.77
Luhans'ka	1 290 372	88.00	148 225	10.11
Mykolayivs'ka	330 841	52.80	279 806	44.66
Odes'ka	802 683	66.80	351 189	29.23
Poltavs'ka	387 760	39.16	371 943	37.44
Rivnens'ka	71 961	11.04	568 823	87.25
Sums'ka	519 940	67.75	221 920	28.92
Ternopil's'ka	29 646	3.75	749 499	94.8
Kharkivs'ka	1 078 813	71.01	394 244	25.95
Khersons'ka	401 741	64.64	199 361	32.08
Khmel'nytc'ka	346 454	39.27	504 841	57.23
Cherkas'ka	380 666	45.72	422 846	50.78
Chernivetc'ka	176 342	35.27	309 176	61.84
Chernihivs'ka	588 081	72.33	203 796	25.07

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[258] Wilson, 2002: 193. Recall that the ethnic and geographic splits in Ukraine parallel each other.

[259] Retrieved from Brama Gateway Ukraine. http://www.brama.com. Date accessed: July 21, 2003.

The 1994 voting patterns are indicative of a change in values throughout Ukraine. The west – the "hotbed of nationalism" – voted for Leonid Kravchuk. The east, where the majority of the Russian population lives, voted for Leonid Kuchma. The *oblasts* on the border of Central Europe, especially L'vivs'ka, Ternopil's'ka, Rivnens'ka and Zakarpats'ka voted overwhelmingly for Kravchuk. Likewise, places like Sevastopol (in the Crimea), Zaporiz'ka and Luhans'ka voted for Kuchma. Interestingly, places in the geographic centre of Ukraine – Poltavs'ka and Cherkas'ka – were split in their decision.

Such fragmented voting patterns indicate a further problem: Ukraine lacks a truly national identity. This has continued to be one of Kuchma's problems since assuming power in 1994.[260]

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[260] It is ultimately difficult to ascertain whether or not it was a fragmented national identity or economics that split the Presidential vote in 1994; the two cleavages run roughly parallel to each other. What is certain is that, by 1994, there was still no truly national identity in Ukraine.

CHAPTER 5:
THE TRANSFORMATION OF NATIONAL VALUES

1. The Evolution of Nationalism

a. Introduction: The Transformation of National Values

Throughout the post-Soviet period, Ukrainian "national values" changed significantly. Increasingly, they aligned with the political environment, and also with the rapidly deteriorating economic environment. From 1991 to 1993 the emphasis on state- and nation-building was the primary political value. Linked to this value was the importance of maintaining stability at all costs. During this period, the combination of these values allowed for a peaceful transition to a proto-democratic state. However, as time progressed, the citizens of Ukraine began to have more pragmatic concerns than state building. Specifically, the primary concern became the ongoing economic crisis. In the midst of hyperinflation, political energies began to be concentrated on restabilizing the economy. Nationalism was even further de-ethnicized because of the secular focus on economics.

At the same time, it must be recalled that national values in Ukraine are not based solely on the recent events of independence and economic crisis. Kuzio identifies three additional sources for contemporary national values in Ukraine: Ukrainian pre-Soviet traditions; world values in philosophy, political science, culture and economic thought based on liberal democratic traditions; and certain elements of Soviet life that have not been debunked,[261] such as the idea of the Soviet citizen, which allow nationality and citizenship to complement each other.

This means that the development of a new national identity for Ukrainians would need to incorporate at least two of these bases of identity. In the first place, political

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[261]Kuzio, 1998: 65

leaders must focus on the legacy of the Soviet citizen, i.e. – embracing the idea that citizenship and nationality can be detached, yet complementary. In the future, focus on the international aspects that might also help Ukraine fulfil its potential role as a bridge between East and West will help Ukraine build a national identity.[262] Somehow, Ukraine must reconcile ancient, Soviet era, and independent values into a new identity. The new Ukrainian identity therefore has internal and external aspects. To some extent, these various aspects are mutually reinforcing.

b. The Transformation of National Values: The Internal Dimensions

Of Kuzio's list, the pre-Soviet traditions and Soviet life are the internal aspects of identity that affect the transformation of national values. In terms of the former, the key premise of pre-Soviet traditions is that Ukrainians are "aboriginal on their native land."[263] While pre-modern history that incorporates the idea of Rus' as a proto-Ukrainian state is contested, the fact is that most proponents of Ukrainian statehood, including the first post-Soviet administration, have all used the concept of what might be called native claim to build support for a modern Ukrainian state.[264] Modern Ukrainian history, however, is one of recurrent division and oppression. As such, there is a conspicuous absence of modern institutions that may be identified as "Ukrainian." The pre-modern era, on its own, is therefore limited in providing a national identity for contemporary Ukraine. By and large, there is generally only a distinct impression of "otherness."[265]

While the 1917 to 1920 attempt at Ukrainian statehood was indeed ethnically oriented (as per the spirit of the day), the 1991 experience was fundamentally different from this previous attempt to establish a Ukrainian state. In 1917, Ukrainians set out to

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[262] Kuzio's three sources closely parallel Anderson's paradoxes of nationalism: the objective modernity of nations vs. their subjective antiquity; the formal universality of nationality as a socio-cultural concept vs. the irremediable particularity of its concrete manifestations; and the political power of nationalisms vs. their philosophical poverty and incoherence. (Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. London: Verso, 1983: 5).

[263] Smith et. al., 1998: 28.

[264] This is important because Rus' is claimed by both Russians and Ukrainians. This may allow for a more civic state as both groups may have some aboriginal claim to the territory.

[265] Kuzio, 1997: 10.

create their own state and institutions, but proved unable to stand their ground against external forces. The 1917 attempt sought to build uniquely "Ukrainian" institutions and was started internally by nationalists who believed Ukrainians – defined in terms of ethnicity – should have a state of their own.

In contrast, the main task in 1991 was to "legitimate institutions inherited from the Soviet era rather than to identify the national character of a stateless people."[266] The only institutions available at the time of independence were those inherited from the Soviet period. At a very basic level, the Soviet experience may have saved post-Soviet Ukraine from devolving into the kind of ethnic nationalism seen elsewhere in Eastern Europe. At a minimum, the Soviet experience provided a formal representative assembly (the Supreme Council or *Verkhovna Rada*) and a somewhat inclusive form of citizenship (the Soviet Citizen). Throughout *perestroika* and especially during the Kravchuk era, the *Verkhovna Rada* became more representative, although its substantive function was still impeded by corruption and an excess of pluralism. In terms of citizenship, the 1992 "Law of Ukraine on the Citizenship of Ukraine" provided citizenship to all inhabitants of Ukraine "permanently residing within the territory of Ukraine at the moment of declaration of independence."[267] This law has provided the formal foundations for the territorialization of identity and moving towards a transformation to civic values[268] by invalidating any claims to citizenship based purely on ethnic linkages.

The crux of the matter was that the new Ukraine could ill afford the burgeoning of an ethnic ideology for two reasons. First, one-fifth of the population is ethnically Russian,[269] and those citizens would be deeply offended. Second, an ethnic identification might exclude another substantial portion of the population – the Russified Ukrainians –

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[266] Smith et. al., 1998: 33.

[267] INFOUkes. "The Law of Ukraine on Citizenship of Ukraine." http://www.infoukes.com. Date Accessed: July 18, 2003.

[268] Kulyk, 1996: 21.

[269] Kulyk, 1996: 20.

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who would likely be resistant to a singular identity.[270] The definition of citizenship in the 1992 law bound the population to territory, rather than solely to ethnicity. This allowed for a nascent national consciousness that was civic in nature. Strengthening civic ties to the territory involved not only legitimizing former Soviet institutions but also territorializing the ideas of "Ukrainian" and the "other." Specifically, the "other" became Russia, rather than Russians. In turn, the elites were able to rely on the old ideas that allowed a separation between nationality and citizenship. Specifically, so long as a civic citizenship was primary, nationality could exist in a secondary status.

c. External Factors: Ukraine's Experiments with International Relations

It has been assumed that Ukraine's world position after independence will be based in part on the population and elites' abilities to internalize world values entrenched in the ideas of liberal democracy and market capitalism. Although the UkSSR had nominal control over foreign policy, ultimately Kyiv's international role was subordinate to Moscow's foreign policy. Following the disintegration of the USSR, Ukraine was forced to simultaneously create its own international relations with both Russia and the West.

i. Looking East: Legacies of Totalitarianism and Empire

The achievement of Ukrainian independence was a major geopolitical event, even though the international community was slow to recognize it as such. An absence of statehood in the modern era led many members of the Soviet elite to believe that Ukrainian independence in 1991 was a passing phenomenon that did not warrant much attention. Furthermore, since Ukraine was such a fragmented society, many analysts pointed to the possibility of ethnic and nationalist violence that would cause the new state to collapse.[271] Whether Ukraine's independence is of a passing nature or not, the fact of

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[270] There are, of course, numerous other ethnic groups in contemporary Ukraine that would also be excluded by such a definition.

[271] Subtelny, 2000: 598. See the introduction of this thesis for the effects of the creation of Ukraine on Russia.

the matter is that in 1991, a new state was created that redefined the geopolitical space of Eastern Europe and the border of Eurasia. Because of a long, intertwined history, both Russia and Ukraine were forced to deal with each other, especially in the economic sphere.

Under Kuchma, economic cooperation with Russia was viewed as an urgent requirement in light of the interdependent economy inherited from the Soviet period and also due to the economic crisis in the region.[272] In this case, economic pragmatism usurped the idealism of state creation. While economic cooperation was necessary, for Ukraine there was an additional fear that impeded the normalization of relations with Russia: that Ukraine would be reassimilated into another Russian-run entity.

Part of this fear on the part of members of the Ukrainian elite had to do with disagreement over Ukraine's eastern border. Symbolically, borders delineate one state from another. In the west the idea of the nation-state uses borders to delineate one nation from another. By and large these modern borders were created through confrontation between and among nations.[273] This is a problem for Ukraine, as this theory would seem to indicate that some form of confrontation is necessary for the creation of firm borders. The theory furthermore insinuates that some sort of active initiative on the part of the colony to break away from the colonizer is necessary to create a new state. However in the case of Ukraine, the combination of *perestroika* and the subsequent collapse (a passive exercise) of the Soviet Union, meant that Ukraine actually had relatively little to do with the advent of its own independence:

> The swift and generally peaceful collapse of the USSR denied Ukraine the kind of formative experience which would enable it to create submerged institutions, ready to fill the vacuum left behind by a retreating colonial power.[274]

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[272] Kuzio, 1997: 183.

[273] Roman Szporluk, "Ukraine: From an Imperial Periphery to a Sovereign State" in Daedalus 12(3) Summer, 1997: 89.

[274] Priezel, 1997: 31.

In addition to adopting Soviet institutions, Ukraine merely took the borders of the UkSSR as its own new international boundaries.

On the eastern flank, Russian nationalists who still see Ukraine as part of a greater Slavic nation dispute the new international boundaries. For them, Ukraine is no more than an imagined community that should not be fixed in a particular geographic space.[275] This likely means that in its relations with Russia, Ukraine has no choice in its new international identity; Ukraine is Russia's borderland to the west. For Ukrainian nationalists and supporters of an independent state, Ukraine is not part of Russia simply because it is *not* Russia. At the same time the emphasis in terms of state- and nation-building was on territorial independence and sovereignty. While these ideas serve to differentiate Ukraine from Russia, they do not necessarily assuage Ukrainian fears of reassimilation into a Russian-run entity.

ii. Looking West: NATO, the United States and Europe

Following independence in 1991, a new nuclear power was suddenly created. Given the potential new security issues, the solution to this problem was to create a functioning relationship between Ukraine, the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). For Ukraine, such a partnership was important to ensure territorial security and integrity, particularly against potential Russian aggression. For NATO and other western powers, the main concern was nuclear proliferation. Economic crisis, combined with a huge nuclear arsenal it desperately wanted to abandon may have provided an incentive for Ukraine to purportedly sell materials to "rogue states."

To prevent the sales of nuclear materials to rogue states, Russia, Ukraine and the United States signed the Trilateral Treaty. Under this agreement, Ukraine would ship its arms to Russia for destruction in return for American guarantees on its territorial integrity and security, as well as substantial economic aid. Kuchma's election in 1994 and the promise of reforms further strengthened rapprochement with the West. By Kuchma's

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[275] Wilson, 2002: 281.

second term, Ukraine had emerged as an important consideration in American geostrategy.[276] Entrance into NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) program further reconciled Ukraine and the west. However, despite Ukraine's full membership in international organizations and partnership with NATO, the "return to Europe" has been hindered by domestic concerns. Corruption, economic crisis and a lack of consolidation of international norms in exchange and trade have reduced the European desire to integrate Ukraine. For security reasons, however, Ukraine cannot be left alone between Russia and the West.

What this means is that in terms of security, Ukraine is a geostrategic pivot – a key to the balance of power in Eurasia and Europe. Because its existence determines Russia's access to the west, and also western behaviour towards Russia, Ukraine's national identity may be best anchored in international perception of the country. As discussed above Ukraine's international role would be that of a bridge between east and west. This can be accomplished if elites draw on the variegated cultures and identities of Ukraine as a model for communication and cooperation.

2. The 1996 Constitution and Regional Minority Management

a. The Crimea: A Brief History

Originally a semi-autonomous republic of the USSR, the Crimea lost any vestiges of independence in 1944 after a massive deportation of the region's majority Tatar population (who claim to be indigenous to the peninsula). In 1954, Crimea was annexed to the UkSSR as a "token of the indissoluble bond between" Russians and Ukrainians. The leader of the USSR at the time, Nikita Khrushchev, cited the peninsula's economic dependence on Ukraine, its territorial proximity and cultural ties as official reasons for the transfer.[277]

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[276] Subtelny, 2000: 600-601. See also Brzezinski.
[277] Nahaylo, 1999: 20.

There are several interrelated problems regarding the annexation of the Crimea to the Ukraine. Based on the idea of national self-determination, Russia did not have a right to give the Crimea away and Ukraine did not have the right to accept it. According to this idea of national self-determination, only the indigenous Tatar population had the right to choose the future of the region. The Crimean Peninsula is geographically closer to Ukraine, and as such the transfer made economic sense from Moscow's point of view. However, the deportation ten years earlier of the native Tatar population caused economic chaos on the peninsula; Kiev's budget had to make up the losses. Moreover, following the deportation in 1944, many ethnic Russians migrated to the area with the result that, by 1959, 860 000 Russians lived in the region as compared to 260 000 Ukrainians.[278] In the post-Soviet era, this situation would be a potential problem for independent Ukraine. The combination of Russian migration and Soviet nationality policy that privileged ethnic Russians, allowed this ethnic group to rise to prestigious positions in local government. In the post-Soviet era, challenges to this status would provide ethnic Russians in the region with a reason to become politically mobilized. As such, the region would become a potential threat to the unity of independent Ukraine.

The Crimea is unique in post-Soviet Ukraine because it is the only region with an ethnic Russian majority. In combination with the idea of "national" self-determination, this fact is significant because it leads to the generally accepted idea that the region should be independent, or at least autonomous.[279] By extension, it can be argued that of all the regions in Ukraine, the Crimea, potentially, is the most likely to attempt separation or degenerate into ethnic violence. However, neither of these theoretical potentialities has yet come to pass. Initially, the Crimean ASSR declared sovereignty as part of Ukraine in 1991. When the leaders of the region attempted to declare independence from

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[278] Subtelny, 2000: 499-500.
[279] Kuzio et. al., 1999: 303-304.

Ukraine in May 1992, Kyiv responded by formally giving the Crimea more regional power.[280]

The 1992 Law "On the Delineation of Power Between the Organs of State Rule of Ukraine and the Republic of Crimea" was a stop-gap measure to prevent secession. It established dual citizenship for the inhabitants of the peninsula, as well as granting them property rights for land and control over resources of the territory.[281] Potentially, such powers substantially increased the susceptibility of Crimeans to political mobilization by their leaders. However, Kyiv believed that, for the time being expanded regional powers were necessary in order to contain any potential ethno-political mobilization.

The establishment of an autonomous Crimean Republic recognizes the questionable legitimacy of the peninsula's annexation to the UkSSR in 1954. A legacy of the Soviet era, Kyiv had no choice but to deal with peninsula as a semi-independent entity if there was to be a true break from the past. Moreover, such measures as those enunciated in the 1992 law, indicate a desire to avoid any potential separatism through policy and negotiation rather than force and, hopefully, oppression

Politically, the Crimea represents a problem in terms for Ukraine's territorial integrity, and also raises the difficulty of the setting of precedents for the potential secession of other regions from the state. Should Kyiv become unable to control its territory, other regional powers, specifically Russia, could see this as an opportunity for expanding political control in the former Soviet space. Indeed, the loss of Crimea would be too politically costly for Ukraine, and might actually pose a serious threat to maintaining statehood.

The loss of the Crimean Peninsula also has huge economic costs for Ukraine. The loss of access to the Black Sea would be far too costly for Kyiv. The Black Sea is Ukraine's lifeblood, providing access to the Mediterranean Sea and the wider world. Furthermore, the port city of Sevastopol is integral to trade with Europe and the rest of

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[280] Kuzio et. al. 1999: 310-312.
[281] Kuzio et. al. 1999: 311

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the west.[282] For a variety of reasons, then, it is in Kyiv's best interests to appease the population of the peninsula.

b. Crimea in the New Constitution

Although the 1992 law created a semi-independent Crimea, its position in Ukraine would not be finalized until the adoption of a Constitution in 1996. While the peninsula was formally named the Autonomous Republic of the Crimea (ARC), the Constitution also defines the region's relations with Kyiv, and has the potential to turn the Crimea into little more than a colonial region of Ukraine.

For example, Article 137 of the Constitution allows for "normative regulation" of the region's natural resources, social and public services, cultural activities and tourism by the local government. However, if the President of Ukraine is of the opinion that the "normative regulations" of the ARC are outside the guidelines of the Constitution, he can suspend these powers at the same time that an appeal is put before the Constitutional Court.[283] Although the Court is supposed to serve as a check on unconstitutional actions, the President can suspend the ARC's powers and therefore its autonomous rights *before* the court makes a decision on whether or not the "normative regulations" in question are constitutional. Given the current President, Leonid Kuchma's, increasingly authoritarian tendencies, he may use this tool to consolidate his own power.

All the regional rights of the ARC are delegated from Kyiv downwards to the legislature (the *Verkhovna Rada*) of the ARC. This indicates that from Kyiv's point of view, at least there is a fear of secession. By allowing Presidential veto power over the *Rada* of the ARC, secession is technically prevented because the President may take away, at virtually any given time, the powers and rights that make the ARC autonomous.

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[282] Wilson, 2002: 282-284.
[283] Central Election Commission of Ukraine. Constitution of Ukraine, http://www.cvk.urkpack.net. Date Accessed: October 31, 2001. Given Kuchma's authoritarian tendencies he may choose to exercise this power more often than it should be.

For most Crimeans, the fear was that the new Constitution would not take the ARC's unique circumstances into consideration, specifically the unique linguistic makeup of the region. Article 10 of the Constitution indicates that "the state language of Ukraine is the Ukrainian language" and makes no allowance for the official use of other languages.[284] For the Crimea, with its majority ethnic Russian population, and also a substantial returning Tatar population, the Ukrainian language does not have the cultural dominance it has in other regions. Having the sole official state language as Ukrainian is therefore inappropriate for the region. While such measures may seem to provide for state cohesion from Kyiv's perspective, in a region as unique as the Crimea, such centralized measures may provide fertile soil for the growth of ethnic mobilization, and even irredentism. Although there is a constitutional provision that permits the learning of international languages, Ukraine's "return to Europe" indicates that languages such as English, French and German will be promoted over Russian. At the worst, the official exclusion of Russian-speaking individuals can result in alienation, ethno-political mobilization and irredentism.

Moreover, the Constitution and other laws on Crimean elections allow Kyiv to dictate how elections will be managed. The current system is majoritarian in nature and has no stipulations for representation of the indigenous Tatar population. Although the repatriated Tatar population now makes up about twelve per cent of the regional population, there is no representation of this group in the local legislature.[285]

Thus, overall the Constitution does not really guarantee genuine autonomy for Crimea. Crimean deputies must tread softly when implementing legislation in their region. This might mean that legislation will not be completely answerable to the needs and desires of the regional population. Over the long term, Kyiv may assume even more

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[284] Central Election Commission of Ukraine. Constitution of Ukraine. Specifically, Article 10.

[285] Natalya Belitser, "The Constitutional Process in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in the Context of Interethnic Relations and Conflict Settlement." International Committee for Crimea. http://www.iccrimea.org. Date accessed: July 28, 2003. Despite repatriation, some 90 000 Tatars had yet to acquire Ukrainian citizenship, making them ineligible to vote or run for office. This may have something to do with the stipulation that Ukrainian must be learned in order to gain citizenship.

control of the Crimea, potentially resulting in the political mobilization of Russians and Tatars.[286] To date, however, such mobilization has not occurred.

3. East and West: Identity and the Appeals of Authoritarianism

Throughout this thesis, it has been argued that, like many much older states, Ukraine suffers from excessive regionalization and a fractured identity, due to a variety of competing historical and contemporary factors. In the post-Soviet era, there has also been an overarching desire for stability to avoid the turbulence of decolonization experienced by other states. The economic crisis changed this primary value and brought a different focus to state-building: stabilizing and refocusing the economy. Since Kuchma has come to power, he has revealed increasingly authoritarian tendencies, ostensibly to control the crisis.

a. Democratic Forms and Minority Rights

The early years of independence saw the establishment of formal democratic institutions. In combination with the Soviet legacy, an absence of minority mobilization led to a formal and substantive neglect of minority rights in the early years of independence. The Soviet legacy is important in post-Soviet Ukraine's minority management. Above all, it is apparent that nationality has taken a secondary status to citizenship.

In 1992, the *Rada* adopted a liberal law on minorities, granting "equal political, social, economic and cultural rights to all citizens 'regardless of their ethnic origin, and supported the development of [minority] national self-consciousness and self-expression.'"[287] The law has also allowed citizens of Ukraine "the right to freely *choose* or revive their nationality"[288] [emphasis added]. Such policies indicate the formalization

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[286] The Constitution allows the President to step in when he feels that the unity of Ukraine is being threatened. In a unique region, such as Crimea, such actions may facilitate ethno-political mobilization if residents feel they are under threat.

[287] Kuzio, 1998: 94.

[288] Dominique Arel, "Interpreting 'Nationality' and 'Language' in the 2001 Ukrainian Census" in Post-Soviet Affairs 18(3) 2002: 224.

of two interrelated ideas. First, that nationality is separate from and subordinate to, citizenship. Second, the idea that nationality may be chosen rather than assigned indicates a preference for civic attachments to the state. While citizenship is given by the state, nationality is a choice. The fact that only citizenship appears on contemporary passports indicates that Ukraine has, at least, the formal aspects of a civic state. The secondary status of nationality to citizenship has actually helped the minority situation in Ukraine. For example, the fact that, although the economic crisis might have provided fuel for ethnic fires, the more pragmatic concern of economic stabilization – a question for all citizens – took precedence over any sort of ethno-cultural ties. Thus, all citizens of Ukraine, regardless of their diverse ethnic backgrounds, were equally affected by the crisis. For minorities, day-to-day survival took precedence over ethnic identification.

It is apparent that a fluid, or perhaps strategic form of identity that prioritizes civic attachments to the state over ties to the nation is present in Ukraine. This occurs both in terms of the formal aspects (outlined above) and the more substantive elements of national identity. These more substantive elements of identity are revealed by the decreasing ethnic Russian identification throughout the post-Soviet period.

The 1989 Soviet census revealed a twenty-two per cent ethnic Russian population; by 1998 this statistic had been cut in half, to 10.89 per cent. Additionally, between 1989 and 1994 the proportion of Ukrainian (nationality) women giving birth increased from 74.6 per cent to 77.4 per cent. Likewise, female Russians giving birth decreased from 20.8 per cent to seventeen per cent.[289] Kuzio argues that this drop is due to the fact that in the post-Soviet period, adopting a Ukrainian identity was more advantageous than its Russian counterpart.[290] Having occupied a privileged place in the Soviet Union by virtue of their nationality, Russians may have internalized the strategic aspect of identity to such an extent, that nationality is of secondary concern to acquiring increasingly scarce resources accessible through citizenship. Such beliefs may reinforce

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[289] Arel, 2002: 237.
[290] Kuzio, 1998: 96.

civic and territorial ties to the state rather than ethnic ties to the nation. Such civic and territorial ties may facilitate democratic consolidation.

Since 1996, the territorialization of identity and nationalism has been politically reinforced. Deputies elected after this time are required to take of oath of loyalty to Ukraine. Of those deputies required to take the oath in 1998, only fifteen per cent refused; ninety per cent of this dissenting group were from the Communist faction representing the Donbas and the Crimea.[291] There are several potential explanations for this refusal. First, there has always been a strong link between the Communist Party and disloyalty to a separate, and independent, Ukrainian state. Second, the Donbas and the Crimea are typically specific regions of dissent. Moreover, it would be erroneous to generalize local views to all of south-eastern Ukraine. Finally, an analysis of the deputies serving from 1994 to 1998 who took the oath showed that there was no direct link with support for dual state languages, reunion with Russia or full CIS membership. Many deputies who supported these notions still swore the oath of loyalty to the state of Ukraine.[292] This indicates a potentially fluid and flexible identity that may contain local peculiarities while still maintaining loyalty to the state of Ukraine. Politically, the nature of Ukrainian identity may be fluid/strategic enough to support democracy and minority rights in the future. Regional differences have existed peacefully alongside each other throughout the post-Soviet period, regardless of the particular pattern of ethnic dominance of the regions.

With the exception of Crimea, there are few indications that politics and society in Ukraine suffer from major ethnic cleavages. At the very least, the government and the inhabitants of Ukraine have more pragmatic concerns (e.g. – the economy and security) than experiencing what "it means" to be Russian, Ukrainian, Tatar and so on. On the surface, the present Ukrainian state is a civic one. Although it may be erroneous to classify Ukraine as a "nationalizing state," it is certainly possible to have a civically-

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[291] Kuzio, 1998: 99.

[292] Kuzio, 1998:99. Of course, in a "formerly authoritarian" state, deputies raised in the old system may be attempting to balance their own needs and desires (and social status) with the idea of an independent state.

oriented state with some ethnic bases (see Chapter 6). In fact, it is arguable that most, if not all, civic states have some forms of identification that are not exclusively non-ethnic. The dominant ethnic group often determines political culture, which in turn guides the establishment of institutions as well as official state languages. The result may be that minorities perceive government policies as assimilation tactics[293] unless their needs and concerns as a distinct group are met.

The core laws of defining citizenship in Ukraine (i.e. – the Law of Citizenship and the Constitution) signal a clear preference for building a nation-state based on Western European models. Citizenship was granted to "all citizens of the former USSR permanently residing within the territory of Ukraine at the moment of declaration of independence of Ukraine" regardless of "race, colour of their skin, political, religious or other beliefs."[294] Moreover, the Law on Citizenship has few, if any, ethnic undertones. Article 6 gives grounds for citizenship first by birth, i.e. – citizenship is derived from the parents, and second by territorial origin,[295] i.e. – *jus soli*. Because all permanent inhabitants of Ukraine were given citizenship on the eve of independence, citizenship is largely civic in nature: it is granted regardless of ethnic background.

Law requires that the Ukrainian language be learned sufficiently to communicate with state institutions. While this may indicate a cultural determinant of citizenship, it must also be recalled that all states require a framework for communication. It is not unusual for a state to adopt the language of the titular nation for this purpose.[296] If language is considered to be a core indicator of ethnicity, this means that the European model of state- and nation-building necessarily contains both civic and ethnic

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[293] See Kuzio et al., 1999: 228.

[294] "INFOUkes. "The Law of Ukraine on Citizenship of Ukraine."

[295] "INFOUkes. "The Law of Ukraine on Citizenship of Ukraine."

[296] Few Western states have recognized official use of more than one language. Canada, with it constitutional recognition of French as second official language, and Switzerland where individuals can communicate in French, German or Italian come to mind as examples. It should be noted that citizenship in these states is automatically non-ethnic. For e.g. – the term "Canadian" has few, if any, ethnic undertones; the term "Ukrainian" on the other hand, has much older, and more ethnic connotations.

elements.[297] In such states, however, the civic elements of citizenship are primary while the ethnic ones are secondary.

However, the adoption of the language of the titular majority may concern some members of the minority. Unless they learn the majority language, there is always the very real possibility that members of the minority will be excluded, or exclude themselves from, public life because they cannot communicate with state institutions. In such cases, the opposite action – integration – may be viewed as assimilation designed to remove the cultural elements that distinguish the minority from the titular nation. In order to address these fears, the 1996 Constitution has a specific section dealing minorities and linguistic rights.

Article 10 of the Constitution defends "the unfettered development, use and protection of Russian, [and] other languages of national minorities."[298] Article 11 provides for "the development of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious attributes of all indigenous peoples and national minorities of Ukraine."[299] While this protects minority cultures, specifically the Russian national minority, it does not provide for communication with official institutions in languages other than Ukrainian. Politically, this allows for a potentially exclusionary Ukrainian state; there would be little accountability of officials to the non-Ukrainian speaking population.

Moreover, the Russian national minority may not be satisfied with being "just another minority." After having occupied a central and privileged position throughout the Soviet period, many Russians may feel distinct, not only from ethnic Ukrainians, but from other minorities as well. Given the absence of the rule of law, this national minority may eventually develop fears of assimilation or even retaliation from the titular nation – especially when they cannot hold government institutions accountable. While there are

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[297] Kuzio et. al., 1999: 229.
[298] Central Election Commission of Ukraine. Constitution of Ukraine.
[299] Central Election Commission of Ukraine. Constitution of Ukraine.

formal measures for minority protection, there is actually very little to stop officials from violating the letter of the law.

b. The Corruption of Democratic Tendencies

Since his re-election in 1999, Leonid Kuchma has been exhibiting increasingly authoritarian tendencies. Instead of controlling corruption within the elite, Kuchma has managed to strengthen the oligarchy, whose interests continue to dominate politics and economics.

Since the creation of independent Ukraine, one of the main political problems has been rampant corruption at all levels of government. Although the 1996 Constitution gave vast powers to the President, Kuchma could not unilaterally change the basic law of Ukraine, nor could it be changed by referendum alone, although he would attempt to do this. On January 15, 2000, Kuchma set an April 16 date for a referendum that would increase his powers, and provide an impetus for constitutional change. Kuchma wanted to be perceived (again) as a true representative of the people. By scheduling a referendum, he not only indicated that the citizens of Ukraine would have a say in how to amend the Constitution, he also ensured his role as representative of the people *vis-à-vis* a powerless and incompetent legislature that opposed the referendum. At the end of the day, however, the *Rada* would support Kuchma, likely in the fear of losing their jobs.

For Kuchma the referendum was, officially, "an attempt to resolve the power struggle between executive and legislative branches."[300] This referendum consisted of six questions[301] that, if approved by both the public and the *Rada*, would allow Kuchma to resolve two interrelated, repetitive problems in the legislature: the inability to adopt

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[300] "Constitutional Watch: Ukraine" East European Constituional Review 9(3) Summer 2000. http://www.law.nyu.edu/eecr. Retrieved December 28, 2002.
[301] See Appendix C. Note that this is the initial draft of the questions and that the first and last were ruled unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court and, therefore, removed from the final ballot.

major pieces of legislation, and the inability to form a majority government.[302] While the resolution of these problems would prevent rule by Presidential decree, a positive vote on the referendum would drastically increase Kuchma's powers. As such, the referendum was deemed by external analysts as a legal shift back to soft authoritarianism.

The initial draft of the referendum questions resulted in two being deemed unconstitutional. In the Constitutional Court's reasoning, asking people if they wanted a new constitution without first asking for a change in the existing one was casting "doubt on the force of the basic law and may lead to a weakening of the foundations of the Constitutional system."[303]

However, the remaining questions would still allow for vast increases in the President's already substantial powers. Observers have characterized the Court's decision as problematical and political: "the four questions that were put to the public can just as effectively amend the Constitution as the disallowed questions.... The Court simply struck down the two most troubling questions."[304]

According to Andrew Wilson, shifting allegiances within parliament are quite common in Ukraine and other post-Soviet states. Lack of a majority in the *Rada* gives rise to "convenience parties."[305] Because no one party can form a lasting or effective government, there is little reason for deputies to stick together in their original parties when their interests are better served by forming new coalitions within an already-elected legislature. As real representation declines, constituents become progressively more alienated from the political process. As the situation snowballs, individuals may turn

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[302]This last problem is most likely due to, first, the fact that there are many parties in Ukraine, and second that once parties are in parliament, they tend to fragment and form convenience parties that ultimately work to serve the deputies in question.

[303] "Constitutional Watch" East European Constitutional Review 9(1/2) Winter/Spring 2000. http://www.law.nyu.edu/eecr. Retrieved December 28, 2002

[304]"Constitutional Watch" East European Constitutional Review 9(1/2).

[305]Quoted in Andrew Wilson, "Ukraine's New Virtual Politics." East European Constitutional Review 10(2/3) Spring/Summer 2001: 63.

back to traditional media of support, i.e. – what may be seen is a resurgence in ethnic reidentification, and in the case of Ukraine, also a shift towards soft authoritarianism.

Despite his authoritarian bent, Kuchma has proven much more successful than his predecessor, Leonid Kravchuk, in uniting the population into a nascent national identity. The bases for this identity will be discussed in the following chapter. Ultimately, Ukraine was on its way to uniting its population under one identity in the late post-Soviet period; the impediments to this identity continue to be the absence of genuine democratic consolidation and the rule of law. At the same time, Kuchma has done a relatively good job of combining traditional and modern forms of identity in a way that has alleviated the most extreme and volatile forms of nationalism.

CHAPTER 6: INTERNAL DILEMMAS OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM

Introduction

Although Ukraine has a strong formal basis for a civic state, the development of this state is not yet complete. The continuing development of a civically oriented Ukraine is likely to stagnate if democratic norms are not consolidated. This chapter discusses various types of civic states, arguing that all so-called "civic states" have some basis in ethnicity. While these ethno-cultural bases may endanger minorities in a new state, until very recently in Ukraine there have been a variety of internal and external factors that have decreased the potential of minority oppression and assimilation. The overarching pragmatic approach to state- and nation-building that puts allegiance to the state and its territory first, has allayed the fear of aggression, both of and towards minorities. Ukraine's comparatively exemplary minority management in the post-Soviet period might be used as a model for building a civic state and coping with nationalism in other post-Soviet state-units.

1. Scenarios of the Civic State: Theory, History and Ukraine

a. Identity in Ukraine: Debunking the Civic State

Kuzio identifies four dominant ethno-cultural identities in Ukraine: Soviet, Little Russian, pre-modern and conscious Ukrainian.[306] Rather than perceiving these bases of identity as separate, this thesis views them as mutually reinforcing and, to some extent, parts of a new, whole national identity. At the end of the post-Soviet period, the conscious Ukrainian identity was still circumscribed by ideas of not (being) Russian, and not (being) Soviet or being Little Russian. Because of the dual influences of Soviet

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[306] Kuzio, 1998: 153. The pre-modern identity is merely a sense of "otherness," e.g. – that pre-modern inhabitants of the region were not Polish, not-Lithuanian and not Russian.

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nationality policy and a pre-modern history of statelessness, a new national identity may
be best formed by amalgamating these various bases of identity into one that reinforces
the conscious Ukrainian identity.

According to Rogers Brubaker,[307] there are two primary ways in which a state can
build a national identity. The first way is to be "nationalizing state;" the second is to
build a state based on liberal democratic norms that accommodate group minority rights.
The term "nationalizing state" has ethnic undertones, implying that state development
starts with the nation, defined in terms of ethnicity. "Building a state" implies the
opposite – evolution from state to civic nation (rather than an ethnic nation), in the spirit
of Gellner's Euro-Atlantic nationalism. Eventually, building a nation may take the form
of a hybrid model:

> The state is understood as a national, but not a nationalizing, state;
> members of minority groups are guaranteed not only equal rights as
> citizens…but also certain specific minority rights, notably in the domains
> of language and education.[308]

These linguistic and educational group rights protect the minority from complete
assimilation into the national state, while providing members of the minority with access
to state resources by virtue of their citizenship. In essence, ethnic or national
identification is understood to be distinct from citizenship.[309]

Brubaker defines a nationalizing state as one "conceived by dominant elites as
nation-state, as states of and for particular nations, yet as 'incomplete' or 'unrealized'
nation-states, as insufficiently 'national' in a variety of senses."[310] For post-colonial
states in the former USSR, nationalism was territorial in that it was anticolonial. In these
situations, "its has been nearly impossible to equate, even approximately, an

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[307] See Brubaker, 1996: Chapter 3.

[308] Brubaker, 1996: 105.

[309] In many consolidated democracies, this form of identity has taken a "hyphenated" form, e.g. – Indo-Canadian, African-American, Irish-American and so on. While this implies some ties to one's heritage, the primary emphasis is still on citizenship; that is, ties to the state are privileged over ties to heritage.

[310] Brubaker, 1996: 79.

ethnocultural group with a potentially sovereign 'nation.'"[311] In terms of building a national identity in post-Soviet Ukraine, post-colonial nationalism has taken a peaceful form, in part because of the movement from an institutionally defined territory (a state or state-like entity) towards a nation (a collectivity of belonging).

In other fledgling states, ethnicity "is understood and experienced as constitutive of nationhood, not as opposed to it."[312] This indicates a propensity for developing an ethnically-oriented national identity first, then the state. This situation may increase the possibility of interethnic violence, particularly in multiethnic post-Communist states. Although such violence was experienced in some Central Asian NIS, by and large, the legacy of some aspects of Soviet nationality policy and good leadership was strong enough to prevent wide-scale violence among the major players of the Slavic region. Soviet nationality policy played a large part in the disintegration of the USSR by institutionalizing the territorial and ethnic borders of the republics that succeeded the USSR. This changed the issue of state-building in a fundamental and positive way. Rather than concentrating on "national self-determination" of various ethnic groups within a state-like entity, the struggle for independence was among "institutionally constituted national elites,"[313] who likely had other, more rational and self-interested concerns. Indeed, it is Soviet national leadership management, which led to a largely peaceful collapse of totalitarian power in 1991, due to this institutionalization of territory and the subordination of ethno-cultural identity to the idea of citizenship.

At the same time, it is arguable that most states are nationalizing to some degree, particularly when it comes to language and political culture. For the post-Soviet states, and indeed, most other states, the question is not whether a state will be nationalizing, but *how* it will nationalize.[314] Specifically, will they become nationalizing states in the spirit

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[311] Brubaker, 1996: 81.
[312] Brubaker 1996: 82.
[313] Brubaker 1996: 25; Smith et. al., 1998: 77.
[314] Brubaker, 1996: 106.

of Gellner's Eastern European ethno-nationalism, or a national state based on liberal, Euro-Atlantic legacies?

Arguably, Ukraine's willingness to create an inclusive form of citizenship from the outset indicates that the goal was to put a claim on territory, rather than ethnicity. Some degree of homogenization of the population was necessary to ensure the continued independence of the new state. However, in the case of Ukraine homogenization has not necessarily meant the complete assimilation of minorities into a national or nationalizing state. Instead, Kyiv's policies served to "homogenize" the population in terms of the individual's relationship to the state and its institutions. This allowed for the accommodation of minority rights that allow individuals to experience other cultures. To the end of homogenizing the population's relationship with the state, Ukraine has followed the traditions of Euro-Atlantic states, which

> Promote to varying degrees public (societal) cultures that are based upon the language, history, symbols, religion and culture of the core, titular nation(s). The majority of states are multinational in their composition and 'cannot survive unless the various national groups have an allegiance to the larger political community.'[315]

By and large, few "civic" states are actually homogenous in terms of the ethnic background of their populations. In the case of civic states, homogeneity implies a coherent and equal relationship to the state. As such, the term "civic state" might be best applied to a state that has (a) an inclusive citizenship policy, e.g. – *jus soli* as opposed to *jus sanguinis*; (b) subordinates ties to nationality defined in terms of ethnicity, to ties to the state and its institutions, and (c) has some recognition of cultures other than the titular majority in its laws. Formally, Ukraine meets all of these criteria. Where it may not be successful is in the substantive issues behind "inclusion" and "recognition."

Because civic states and ethnic states are traditionally perceived as dichotomous, there are large gaps in theorizing about state formation and political culture as those

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[315] Taras Kuzio, " 'Nationalising States' or Nation-Building: A Critical Review of the Theoretical Literature and Empirical Evidence," in Nations and Nationalism 7(2): 2001a: 145-146.

theories pertain to transitology. It may be more accurate to view the degree of "civicness" or "ethnic-ness" as a spectrum, rather than as a dichotomy. Where a state falls in this spectrum depends on political culture, and the type of state model that is being followed.[316]

Figure 2[317] Civic and Ethnic Nationalism

The above diagram indicates that while mono-ethnic states may have an easier time of developing a civic state, defined in terms of democracy and inclusive citizenship, developing the same type of state in multi-ethnic regions is not impossible. This is particularly the case if a hybrid model of state construction that takes both individual and minority group rights into consideration is applied. In short, varying degrees and forms of "civicness" are possible. Ukraine, for example, may be formally put in the plural liberal category as it is an unconsolidated democracy with some recognition of minority rights.[318]

Ukraine's formal basis for a civic state is entrenched in the 1996 Constitution.[319] Strengthening civic ties to the state requires giving more substance to constitutionally-entrenched minority rights, so that members of the minority can be included in the day-to day functioning of the state.

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[316] Brubaker (1996: 104-106) lists three models of state-creation. The civic state (of and for all of its citizens), the multinational state (of and for two or more core nations) and a "hybrid model of minority rights." Of course, the ideal civic state rarely exists in practice, but often takes a hybrid form.

[317] Adapted from Kuzio, 2001a: 149. Kuzio disputes the ethnic state-civic state dichotomy in his treatment of nationalizing states. His categories are useful in a constructivist format in order to expand the debate surrounding state- and nation-building as it applies to transitology

[318] Kuzio, 2001a: 149. In reality, Ukraine may be better classified as a plural non-liberal state.

[319] See Chapter 5 and Appendix B for a discussion on the 1996 Constitution.

b. The Russian (Speaking) Population

As a substantial segment of Ukraine's citizenry speaks Russian as a first language, and because Russian is the dominant language in many urban, as well as the Eastern regions of, Ukraine, Kyiv has no choice but to accomodate some minority linguistic rights if it wishes to continue the state-building process peacefully. Currently, the main issue is that Ukrainian is the single official language. This potentially alienates a substantial part of the population that speaks Russian as a first, and sometimes only, language.[320] The recognition of Russian as a second official language would certainly increase governmental accountability to this part of the population, thus strengthening ties to state institutions rather than ethnicity.

Over the short term, such a bilingual policy may temporarily increase apprehension in ethnic Ukrainians that espouse a pejorative "Little Russian" identity, because a former oppressor once again has more access to political power. However over the long term, such a policy could promote a politically conscious minority that may increase the degree of democratic consolidation in Ukraine. A two official languages policy may be necessary in order to integrate the parts of the population that are not Ukrainian-speaking, but at the same time feel some affinity to the territory of Ukraine. In combination with the territorialization of identity, the recognition of Russian as a second official language may consolidate a truly national identity and assist with democratic consolidation.

Recognition of Russian as a second official language would be beneficial to Ukraine, in part, because many Russians in Ukraine do not feel as if they are foreigners to the territory. In a 1991 survey, ninety per cent of the Russian population in Crimea and eighty-nine percent in Eastern Ukraine agreed with the following statement: "I do not consider myself a foreigner [*chuzim*] on the territory of this republic."[321] Overall,

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[320] See for e.g., Olexiy Orlovych, "Making Sense of the Language Issue." Kyiv Post. November 20, 2003. http://www.kyivpost.com. Date Accessed November 21, 2003. Orlovych calls for Russian to be made an official language of Ukraine because it is "an indigenous Ukrainian language."
[321] Smith et. al., 1998: 130.

regardless of ethnic background or region of habitation, there is a sense of indigenousness to the territory of Ukraine. For example,

> The Crimean 'Congress of Russian People' declared in 1996 that 'the Russian people has lived continuously on the territory of the modern state of Ukraine and in Crimea since the time of Kievan Rus' and cannot consider itself a newcomer or an occupying people.[322]

If this is the case, then Russians in Ukraine have always considered themselves an integral part of Ukrainian history. As such, they are integral to the continued independence of Ukraine. Although other states have competing groups that *fight* internally over territory, in Ukraine there is a long history of two different branches of the Slavic ethnic group *sharing* the same territory. Harnessing this history of cooperation would be greatly facilitated by the recognition of Russian as a second official language, as it would help consolidate allegiance to the new state.

Simply put, the citizens of Ukraine have moved beyond an ethnic and linguistic definition of the nation to a definition of "Ukrainian" based on allegiance to territory. Moreover, such sentiments of indigenousness as the ones discussed above, indicate that people who have lived for centuries or millenia on the territory of contemporary Ukraine tend to have an affinity for the territory, rather than an affinity to their nation or ethnic group. As in many older states today, language as a defining characteristic of culture may be less important than belonging to the state or territory

Walker Connor argues that although language may be a determining factor of nation prior to acquiring statehood, once external recognition of the nation as defined by a state is obtained, language becomes less important as a defining characteristic of a people, because there are now official boundaries that delineate one people from another. Throughout history, Ukrainians fought for the right to use their language in all facets of life; now that a state of Ukraine exists, Ukrainians have a structure to protect their

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[322] Smith et. al, 1998: 129.

culture.[323] Language is no longer the single defining characteristic of the Ukrainian nation. For now, at least, an individual is a citizen of Ukraine, not by virtue of language or culture, but because of the territorialization of citizenship and nationalism.

The next evolution for the state and the people of Ukraine may be in the recognition of Russian as a second official language. Such recognition would decrease real and potential political alienation by increasing the accountability of the government to all facets of the population. By reducing the degree of political alienation, the danger of agression towards and by national minorities is also decreased.

2. The Danger of Aggression?

The most politically relevant minority in Ukraine is the ethnic Russian population. Originally thought to be in danger in terms of language, culture and individual security, Ukraine's management of a new national minority has been comparatively exemplary throughout the post-Soviet period. The main problem for this new state is that a "national collective self consciousness requires...a minimum perception of 'others' beyone one's recognized borders."[324] With a substantial Russian-speaking population, combined with ethnic and geographic proximity to Russia, it has been difficult but necessary for Ukraine to distance its national identity from its much larger and historically dominant eastern neighbour.[325] Rather than defining the "other" in terms of ethnicity (e.g. – Russians), in the post-Soviet era, Ukraine seems to have chosen territory as a basic definition of the other (e.g. – Russia).

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[323] Roman Szporluk, <u>Russia, Ukraine and the Breakup of the Soviet Union</u>. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2000: 341. Specifically, Connor indicates that "In their desire to assert their uniqueness, members of a group are apt to make rallying points of their more tangible and distinguishing institutions. Thus, the Ukrainians as a method of asserting their non-Russian identity wage their campaign for national survival largely in terms of their right to employ the Ukrainian...tongue in all oral and written manners. But would not the Ukrainian nation (that is, a popular consciousness of being Ukrainian) be likely to persist even if the language were toally replaced by Russian, just as the Irish nation has persisted after the virtual diappearnace of Gaelic, despite pre-1920 slogans that described Gaelic and Irish identity as inseparable?"
[324] Taras Kuzio, "Identity and Nation-Building in Ukraine," in <u>Ethnicities</u> 1(3) 2001b: 349.
[325] Kuzio, et. al., 1999: 231. Specifically, "Ukraine could not strive to 'rejoin Europe,' implement reform, and build a modern civic nation while accepting that it was also a Little Russia."

As a group, Russians in Ukraine have most of the elements of a national

minority.[326] In the event that their needs as a group are not met, there is the possibility

of ethnic mobilization on a political level. However, this idea presumes that Russians in

Ukraine are an integrated group that has a cohesive set of common interests as Russians

in Ukraine. The reality seems to be quite the opposite; Russians as a minority group

seem to be just as atomized as the rest of the population. Specifically, the only area

where any sort of secession was even contemplated was in the Crimea, where Russians

had the background necessary for political mobilization (see Chapter 5)

Overall, the structure of identity in Ukraine has shifted to a Ukrainian identity,

presumably of a civic nature.

Table 6[327] To What Population Do You Attribute Yourself? (%)

	Ukrainian	Russians	Others	Total
Ukraine	56.9	28.3	29.2	48.3
CIS	5.3	10.4	8.0	6.7
USSR	15.5	33.0	27.4	20.5
Region	13.2	15.9	23.9	14.5
Russia	1.0	5.3	1.8	2.0
Europe	2.3	2.1	2.6	2.3
Don't Know	5.8	6.1	7.1	5.7

The above table indicates that there is a territorial aspect to identity in Ukraine.

Only 5.3 per cent of ethnic Russians and two per cent of the entire population consider

Russia their home. The struggle for identity among ethnic Russians seems to be largely

between Soviet and Ukrainian identities (thirty-three per cent and 28.3 per cent

respectively). This translates to 20.5 per cent of the total population feeling some affinity

to a Soviet identity and an overwhelming 48.3 per cent having a Ukrainian identity. As

such, a new Ukrainian identity may best be served by certain aspects of regional-

historical identities. This means the idea that citizenship and nationality can be separated

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[326] Brubaker (1996: 61) defines a national minority as a "dynamic political stance" with three characteristic elements. The first element is the public claim to membership of an ethnocultural nation different from the numerically or politically dominant ethno-cultural nation. The second element is the demand for state recognition of this distinct ethnocultural nationality. The final element is the assertion on the basis of this ethnocultural nationality of certain collective cultural or political rights.

[327] From Kuzio et. al., 1999: 230

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from each other, effectively de-ethnicizing citizenship. Citizenship is tied to territory; nationality is tied to culture, and sometimes language. It is undeniable that contemporary national identity in Ukraine is deeply influenced by these various historical forces.

In Ukraine, there are four political groups that have adopted separate forms of nationalism. The right-wing group considers all Russians, domestic and foreign, as the "other" whereas the left-wing group identifies itself against the West. The centre-right group promotes inclusivity, but at the same time sees all of tsarist and Soviet history as negative.[328] Any one of these groups can potentially put Russians in Ukraine into a secondary class. These three groups share the idea of Ukraine being fundamentally different from either Russia or the West. For these groups, this differentiation is based primarily on ethnicity. In short, Ukraine is different simply because it is neither Russia, nor the West.

The final group is much more centred in the political spectrum and provides the best potential to reconcile the four aforementioned bases of identity. This group consists of former Soviet functionaries who are, by and large, Russian speaking and tend to define Russia as a territorial "other" rather than an ethno-cultural "other."[329] History is seen as a mixed bag of benefits and deficiencies,[330] that, when combined, can contribute to a conscious, civically-oriented Ukrainian identity.

By and large, however, Ukraine continues to be defined against, and between, Russia and the West. A truly national identity is difficult to create when the elite are fragmented in their beliefs about history and the defining characteristics of Ukraine. Of the four groups described above, the last one provides the best opportunities to enhance the civic spirit of the state of Ukraine. Rather than emphasizing a cult of suffering, this perspective attempts to balance negative and positive aspects of history, and as such, fits quite well into the constructivist framework discussed at the beginning of this thesis.

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[328] Kuzio, 2001b: 354, 361.

[329] Kuzio, 2001b: 361.

[330] As will be discussed below, the current President Leonid Kuchma, has adopted this perspective and as such has been able to build a more inclusive state than his predecessor.

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By defining itself against Russia (and not Russians), Ukraine defines itself territorially; such a definition is relevant to contemporary Ukrainian identity. Today's Ukrainians are members of the state because they live on the territory of Ukraine, not because they are ethnic Ukrainians. By taking history as an amalgamation of mixed experiences, contemporary Ukraine should be able to develop a cohesive national identity that accomades the variegated identities of its citizenry.

3. Ukraine as a Model for Post-Soviet Nationalism?

a. Ukraine in Perspective

Ukraine is somewhat unique among the post-Soviet states. Unlike many of its neighbours, there is a conspicuous absence of statehood in the modern era. As a result, Ukrainian history is not the history of Ukraine, but the history of Ukrainians, written largely by foreign historians. By and large, these historians have used a framework developed by imperial historians in the Tsarist Russian Empire. This perspective portrays Ukrainians as Little Russians, and, to some extent, denies them the right to statehood.[331] As such, traditional historiography of the Ukrainian people limits the development of an independent Ukrainian identity, at least among those ethnic Ukrainians who consider themselves members of the collectivity by virtue of *jus sanguinis*.

At the same time, the post-Soviet experience of Ukrainian nationalism is not one of ethnic nationalism. Traditional histories of Ukrainians therefore ignore other aspects of Ukrainian proto-statehood discussed earlier in this thesis, assuming that, like other ethnically-defined collectivities with a history of statelessness that suddenly acquire a state, they are destined to experience the worst expressions of ethnic nationalism.

The key to Ukraine's peaceful post-Soviet period in terms of nationalism is the territorialization of identity. This was achieved by the two post-Soviet presidents who

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[331] Taras Kuzio, "Historiography and National Identity Among the Eastern Slavs: Towards a New Framework," in National Identities 3(2) 2001c: 111-113.

virtually abandoned any sort of ethnic definitions of Ukraine throughout their mandates. For Ukraine's first President, Leonid Kravchuk, the key was to build the institutions of the state and assert control over the territory of Ukraine inherited from the Soviet era, thereby emphasizing the state and sovereignty rather than ethnic reidentification. This perspective builds on the Soviet institutionalization of the state and ethnicity, leading to a territorially-based form of state-building. From the start, the emphasis was on territory, not ethnicity. For Leonid Kuchma, the consolidation of a state would be made much easier by filling in the legal gaps and providing the citizens of Ukraine with a historiography that emphasized their variegated historical experiences.

By and large, the bases of contemporary Ukraine's independence are external to the state. External influences, such as the bequeathing of independence to Ukraine by "Moscow-centre," the relatively slow and evolutionary drift into sovereignty throughout *perestroika*, and the USSR's dissolution have supported a peaceful transition to independent statehood. Whereas violent forms of nationalism seem to require sudden elite and popular changes, relatively slow changes and external forces, as in the case of Ukraine, allowed for the citizenry to adapt, rather than react, to the changing situation. Rather than having a revolution to overthrow an imperial power, the roots for Ukraine's independence were more or less engineered from the centre.

b. Ukraine as a Model? Expanding the Case

In terms of analyzing post-colonial nationalism, the experience of Ukraine may offer some valuable insights. Specifically, Ukraine's experience with so-called "jackdaw nationalism" [332] under Kuchma may help in expanding the debate of nationalism to include external forces acting upon the state to help consolidate its independence.

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[332] See Wilson, 2002: 221-222. It is no accident that Wilson picked this type of bird to characterize Ukrainian nationalism. Jackdaws, or starlings as they are known in North America, are diminutive members of the crow family. They are known for stealing the eggs of other birds and eating them. They do not usually build their own nests, but prefer to use the old nests of other birds where they lay their eggs and hatch them. Often beaten in arguments with their larger cousins, they nest in colonies for protection and often squabble among themselves.

The usage of the jackdaw to characterize post-Soviet Ukrainian nationalism indicates a propensity for both borrowing from older traditions and adapting to sudden statehood. A brief comparison of the first two post-Soviet Presidents in terms of their individual concepts of Ukraine will serve to illustrate the idea of jackdaw nationalism.

Leonid Kravchuk preferred a unilinear treatment of Ukrainian history. This perspective of history depicts Rus' as a proto-Ukrainian state, and adds those traditions of more integral nationalism that started under Habsburg rule in the West.[333] For Kravchuk, the history of Ukrainian oppression by foreign rule was central to the establishment of the state and a national identity. As such, Kravchuk's sense of Ukrainian history follows traditional, foreign approaches to Ukrainian historiography. It also provides strength to the cult of suffering prevalent throughout most of western Ukrainian history. Such a view impeded his ability to envision a future state of Ukraine because one had not existed in the past.

Leonid Kuchma, on the other hand, prefers a much more eclectic approach to contemporary Ukrainian nationalism. His form of nationalism exemplifies Wilson's concept "jackdaw nationalism." Overall, Kuchma has made some effort to create an inclusive national identity based on "the best bits of Soviet Ukrainian history...combined with the best bits of the Ukrainophile version, shorn of awkward elements like the Purges or the [nationalistic] OUN to create a 'single national idea.'"[334]

By preserving "the best bits" of pre-Soviet and Soviet history as well as giving fresh life to Ukrainian holidays,[335] Kuchma has managed to lay the foundations for an inclusive state identity. Through the celebration of multiple facets of identity, all parts of the population – ethnic Ukrainians, ethnic Russians and Russified Ukrainians alike – can feel like they are an integral part of the state without losing ties to other parts of their identity. By ignoring certain difficult historical events, nationalism takes a benign form,

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[333] Wilson, 2002: 221-222. It is worth noting that Kravchuk is from Volhynia in the west. This no doubt played a role in his choice of nationalism.

[334] Wilson, 2002: 222.

[335] Wilson, 2002: 223.

shorn of all the traditional animosities faced by various peoples within the state so that they can focus on the problems of the day. Finally, Kuchma's attempts to improve relations with Russia, turned an ethnic other into a territorial other. By emphasizing the more pragmatic concerns of both nations within Ukraine, e.g. – the economy, the territorialization of Ukrainian nationalism was achieved. What remains today, near the end of 2003, is to define what it means to be Ukrainian in and of itself and not solely in comparison to Russia or the West.

As an example of a peaceful form of post-Soviet nationalism, the experience of post-Soviet Ukraine might be generalized using using the following key points. Necessary conditions for a benign form of post-Soviet nationalism may include the following:

- The territorialization of identity, in order that "the other" is not excluded from state citizenship;

- Official recognition of minority cultures;

- Prioritizing territory over ethnicity and emphasizing inclusive state laws and institutions that allow for the development of the civic nation.

The confluence of these conditions, perhaps in combination with others that are beyond the scope of this thesis may eventually lead to the development of an "eastern" Euro-Atlantic region in terms of European nationalism. Like those states on the edge of the Atlantic Ocean, the states in this region would have a high degree of cohesion between state and culture.

CONCLUSION: UKRAINE AS A EURO-ATLANTIC REGION?

Europe ends where Western Christianity ends and Islam and Orthodoxy begin.[336]

Huntington's 1996 Clash of Civilizations presumes a fundamental incompatibility between Western Christendom on the one hand, and Eastern Orthodoxy on the other. Ukraine, having both a history of Orthodoxy and Christianity is therefore situated on a "civilizational fault line," and as such is torn between the twin forces of a long history and the future of joining the West.

On the one hand, the pull of history may yet force contemporary Ukraine into an Orthodox civilizational space. Conversely, Christianity in the Western part of Ukraine may facilitate Ukraine's integration into the west.[337]

However, most worrisome for Ukraine is Huntington's idea that, "the fault lines between civilizations are replacing political and ideological boundaries of the Cold War as the flashpoints for crisis and bloodshed."[338] Therefore, if it is accepted that such a civilizational fault line runs through Ukraine, then according to Huntington's theory, Ukraine is likely to be such a flashpoint. Huntington ignores the half-century of Soviet rule that has seemingly tempered the instability of this fault line.

In twelve years of independence, Ukraine has not proved to be such a flashpoint, and, hopefully, will not reach that stage in the future. Traditionally seen as a bulwark between east and west, it may be more appropriate for contemporary Ukraine to be seen as a bridge, facilitating trade and communication between two historically competing "civilizations." By accepting this role, Ukraine can become the stabilizing influence needed in both Europe and Eurasia.

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[336] Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996: 158.

[337] Specifically, Huntington (1996:160) indicates that the identification with Western Christendom provides a clear criterion for the admission of new members to Western organizations.

[338] Samuel P. Huntington. "The Clash of Civilizations?" in Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993 72(3): 29.

However, there is a substantial amount of work needed before Ukraine can fulfil these roles. Internally, state institutions and government must be strengthened in terms of power and accountability. Externally, effective dialogue between Kyiv, the West and Russia must be initiated in order to build trust and understanding that will assure the continued independence of Ukraine.

1. Current Internal Dilemmas of Ukraine

To date, Ukraine has been relatively effective at managing the potential problems that nationalism produced for other NIS in the post-Soviet period. This is in part, due to the legacy of Soviet nationality policy, and also in part due to ongoing political and economic concerns of the country. In fact, it may be proposed that these problems further decreased the propensity for ethnic nationalism. Regardless of ethnic background, all citizens of Ukraine were affected by economic and political problems. Overall, the various governments of Ukraine have proved unable to effectively manage the economy and improve accountability for its citizens. Nationalist concerns have taken a backseat to these issues until recently. Two recent events are of concern in respect to nationalism and politics. Specifically, the language issue is not yet resolved, and the economic situation does not seem to be getting better.

In terms of increasing accountability, particularly for non-Ukrainian speaking minorities, the current government seems to have taken a step sideways, if not backwards. A new law recently adopted by the legislature requires that all advertising be exclusively in Ukrainian.[339] This law may enhance nationalist fervour between and among both Ukrainian and Russian speakers. Russian speakers as a target audience will likely be excluded from advertising, and therefore business. Moreover, such a law is not appropriate for predominantly Russian-speaking regions (e.g. – Donetsk and Crimea)

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[339] Askold Krushelnycky, "Ukraine: Russian Speakers say Ukrainian Lawmakers Aren't Getting the Message Behind Advertising Law." Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. October 24, 2003. http://www.rferl.org. Date Accessed November 25, 2003. See also "New Ukrainian Advertising Law Expected to Sow Problems." Adlaw By Request. October 27, 2003. http://www. adlawbyrequest.com. Date Accessed November 29, 2003.

where the majority of the population relies on Russian-language publications to learn about both consumer products and the issues of the day.

Additionally, the new law may also have an influence on Ukraine's "return to Europe," and membership in other western organizations. Not only does the law seem discriminatory towards Ukraine's minorities, it also puts restrictions on Ukraine's English-language press that caters to foreign audiences (e.g. – business people, diplomats and visitors).[340] By putting restrictions on "expat" publications, Kyiv may be decreasing ties to the west, in the first instance by creating discriminatory legislation, and also by reducing communication between Ukraine and the west.

While the recent law is currently restricted to advertising, in a country like Ukraine that still has some authoritarian tendencies, it may be the first step towards even more discriminatory legislation. For example, Quebec's *Loi 101* of 1977 restricted not only language in terms of advertising, but also access to English language schools for new immigrants. While in Quebec the law may have had some validity in terms of promoting the use of French, the difference between Quebec and Ukraine is that the one is a province; the other is a state. *Quebecois* may have had reason to be apprehensive about being assimilated into an English-speaking state; Kyiv is in control of the entire country. It is debatable whether or not the Ukrainian language needs to be protected by quasi-discriminatory laws now the state of Ukraine is recognized on the international level. In short, such laws within a *de facto* multi-lingual state may actually increase the propensity for ethnic reidentification and calls for the secession of Russian-speaking regions from the state. Moreover, in a state with authoritarian tendencies, this may be a step towards completely eliminating government accountability. It is only a small step towards restricting other rights traditionally associated with a civic (hybrid model) state.

Throughout the post-Soviet period, there have been various protests against the government of Ukraine. Following the recent uprising against Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze, thousands of Ukrainians demonstrated outside Parliament on

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[340] Krushelnycky, RFE/RL October 24, 2003.

November 27, 2003, calling for the resignation of their own government against the adoption of the new budget. This budget reduces the national minimum wage by fourteen per cent. At the same time, bread prices have been rising, due in part to a bad harvest, and in part due to alleged "market manipulation that resulted in excessive exports of grain."[341] By failing to provide a basic standard of living for its inhabitants and failing to effectively manage corruption, Kyiv had increased the degree of political alienation experienced by citizens. Overall, the current internal threats to Ukraine seem to be of a secular (e.g. – economic and political) nature rather than having ethnic undertones. In fact, these issues may further unite the population as citizens struggle to prosper in a free market environment.

2. Ukraine: Western Borderland or Eastern State? Prospects for Foreign Policy

Ukraine's twelve years of transition have been tumultuous to say the least. In terms of building a national identity and developing a proto-civic form of nationalism, Ukraine has been more successful than other post-Soviet states. Over the long term, however, "Ukraine's best guarantee of sovereignty and parity in its relations with Russia is its commitment to democracy and a strong economy tied to global markets."[342] This means that if Ukraine wishes to remain independent, it needs to strengthen ties to the West. Further efforts also need to be made to ensure transparency and fair competition in independent Ukraine. By fully abiding by the rule of law and the customary regulations of free market trade, Ukraine can make a decisive bid for its place in the international arena and Europe.

Ineffective management of corruption is particularly worrisome to Ukraine's ability to fully establish itself in the international environment. While Huntington's

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[341] Anna Melnichuk, "Protesters Call for Government to Quit of Ukraine's Economic Crisis." The Scotsman Friday November 28 2003. http://www.news.scotsman.com. Date Accessed November 29, 2003.

[342] Carlos Pascual and Steven Pifer, "Ukraine's Bid for a Decisive Place in History" in The Washington Quarterly 25(1) 2001: 186.

"civilizational fault line" may bisect Ukraine, overall national concerns seem to be more pragmatic than civilizational squabbles. Specifically, day-to-day survival in a troubled economy is the order of the day. Further integration into the international community and adhering to Western Liberal practices may help Ukraine both in terms of national integration and in terms of the economy. Ukraine has the basis for integration into the West: a peaceful form of state building and an absence of interethnic violence. At the same time, there are questions about Ukraine's democracy and financial practices. While there is a general acceptance that Ukraine should continue to exist, its role in the international sphere is still questionable, primarily due to these internal factors.

Ukraine's primary problem in the international arena is in achieving a balance between "eastern authoritarian tendencies" and "western liberal tendencies." Pressing domestic concerns continue to hamper Ukraine's ability to achieve this balance. The parasitical state bureaucracy, widespread corruption and inefficient economy are "alarmingly reminiscent of a variety of states in Asia, Africa and South America...Ukraine could easily become an East European version of Pakistan or with some luck, Turkey."[343]

(Re)integration into Central Europe appeals to many Ukrainians. Economically, it would end economic dependence on Russia and supply access to a strong part of the expanding global economy.[344] Such integration would also support democratic consolidation and transparency in economics and politics. After all, both integration and Western business investment will not occur without a fair degree of transparency. This in turn, may save Ukraine from becoming another Turkey or Pakistan.

At the same time, strengthening relations with the West may be perceived as threatening by Russia (see introduction). Ukraine then needs to occupy a middle ground between East and West. For as long as possible, Ukraine must not "make any moves

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[343] Motyl, 1997: 7.

[344] Ilya Prizel, "Ukraine's Foreign Policy as an Institution of Nation-Building" in John Blaney, ed. The Successor States to the USSR. Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1995: 202.

'sideways' – neither toward nor away from Russia, neither toward NATO nor to the [CIS-oriented] Tashkent Military Agreement of the post-Soviet state."[345]

The existing literature portrays Ukraine as having one of two choices: it may either join the West or "return to Russia." This merely reinforces the realist paradigm of power blocs at the very moment it is being questioned. A new perspective employing constructivist ideas that portray Ukraine as a bridge, not a bulwark, between two potentially competing civilizations provides a much more accurate portrayal of Ukraine's prospects in the twenty-first century.

Quite simply, despite the fact that there are strong external factors influencing Ukraine's foreign policy, "the crucial factor is the internal development, inner cohesion of Ukrainian society."[346] In terms of the larger international framework, adopting a middle of the road stance as a channel of communication and trade between East and West may also help with the consolidation of a national identity. Because the socio-cultural cleavage that divides East and West is replicated on a smaller scale within Ukraine, the state has been forced to develop inter-group communication and understanding on a domestic level. Ukraine's new role in the future may be as simple as expanding this medium of communication to the international level. By managing corruption and developing an active civil society that can help consolidate democracy, Ukraine can help provide the balance expected of the state by both its European and Eurasian neighbours.

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[345] Kulyk, 1996: 12.

[346] Olexiy Haran', "Between Russia and the West: Prospects for Ukrainian Foreign Policy Choices." NATO Democratic Institutions Fellowships. Kyiv: 1998: 2.

APPENDIX A: ZONES OF NATIONALISM[347]

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[347] Map retrieved from the CIA World Factbook. The above map is a graphical depiction of Gellner's Zones of Nationalism. Gellner does not discuss the northern Scandinavian countries, which are not included in this analysis.

APPENDIX B: THE 1996 CONSTITUTION

The Ukrainian constitution is, on the surface, a work reminiscent of the spirit of liberal democracy. It provides for social and political life based on the principles of political, economic and ideological diversity by removing the notion of a state-required ideology. [348] At this level, the Constitution can be seen as an attempt to break free from the shackles of the Soviet legacy by delegitimizing the idea of national, monolithic ideology, and common property rights.

Individuals are guaranteed "freedom of literary, artistic, scientific and technical creativity."[349] By protecting scientific and technical creativity in the Constitution, the state can promote a break from the past that may help in creating a civically-oriented national identity.

The 1996 Constitution also legitimized the office of President. At the same time, there was no overt shift away from either the institution or the actuality of a strong leader. The President's powers are vast, and lean towards Ukraine's totalitarian legacy.[350]

Chapter V, Article 106 enumerates the duties and powers of the President. Part 9 gives the officeholder the power to appoint "the Prime Minister of Ukraine with the consent of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine; terminates the authority of the Prime Minister and adopts a decision on his or her resignation." Part 10 allows the President to appoint members of the Cabinet of Ministers and others on submission of the Prime Minister (who is appointed by the President). In some ways, the President is ostensibly

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[348] Central Election Commission of Ukraine. Constitution of Ukraine 1996, Especially Article 12, Article 15.

[349] Central Election Commission of Ukraine. Constitution of Ukraine 1996., Article 54. This presumably applies equally to the media.

[350] At the same time, it should be noted that like the American President, the Ukrainian President is limited to two terms in office. While this may provide somewhat of a limitation on his powers, Kuchma's recent actions regarding the amendment of the Constitution (discussed below) indicate that he wishes nothing more than to stay in power.

controlled by the Prime Minister, however this is overridden by part 16 which gives the President the power to revoke Cabinet decisions, giving him final say on policy. Furthermore, parts 12, 13 and 14 give the President the right to appoint half of the Council of the National Bank and the National Council on Television and Radio Broadcasting. While a vibrant civil society and checks on the government generally necessitate a free press, such organizations can hardly be said to be free when one individual – presumably rational and functioning to maximise his own interests – appoints half of the leading councils of Ukraine. Furthermore, half of the Council on Television and Radio Broadcasting is appointed by the Rada,[351] which has a tendency to support the President. While this was not a problem in Kuchma's first term, recent changes to the Constitution deemed legitimate by the Constitutional Court, have increased the President's control over this body.

The same article gives the President the power to appoint the Chairmen of the Antimonopoly Committee, of the State Property Fund and the State Committee on Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine, giving him virtual control over these bodies. Due to the Soviet political and cultural legacy, family and friends are more likely to be trusted than strangers who may be more competent, the President may be inclined to appoint those he knows he can trust to these posts.

On first reading, the Constitution seems quite democratic in nature. However, the extensive powers of the President, in combination with Ukraine's history of authoritarian rule, may eventually promote a return to (soft) authoritarianism. It is easy enough to implement the forms of democracy in such a document; the habits of democracy are much harder to learn. To this end, the 1996 Constitution allowed for the establishment of a Constitutional Court.

According to the Constitution[352] "the Constitutional Court of Ukraine is the sole body of constitutional jurisdiction in Ukraine" giving it the power to decide on "issues of

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[351]Central Election Commission of Ukraine. Constitution of Ukraine,
[352]Chapter XII, Article 147.

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conformity of laws and other legal acts with the Constitution...and provides the official interpretation of the Constitution...and laws of Ukraine." However, the President, the Rada and the Congress of Judges each appoint one-third of the judges. This gives the President even more control, as he also controls the leadership of the Rada. In "The Ukrainian Constitution: Interpretation of the Citizens' Rights Provisions"[353] Richard Rezie provides not only an early evaluation of the court's effectiveness, but also provides some insights that are useful to its future decisions.

One of the main problems, according to Rezie, is the internal inconsistency of the Constitution. The result is that the Court "may use Ukraine's history to divine what was intended when the Constitution was written as well as what was intended to be avoided." Although Ukraine is considered to be European[354] and twentieth century history "reveals an intent to follow 'western' values and ideology," this is extremely limited as there is only one example of independence in the twentieth century – the end of World War I.[355] Seventy years of Soviet rule has more than likely had more influence on Ukrainian political culture.

More likely, these legacies are the elements that will impede the consolidation of constitutionalism and democracy in the new state. While both Ukrainians and Europeans may consider Ukraine European, it is erroneous to deny the effects of the Soviet legacy, which "reveals a long-standing disregard for human rights and the rule of law." As such, "Ukraine must overcome a legacy of massive political and economic corruption and the lack of civil society."[356] The fact that the President still has substantial control over the media as well as other bodies such as the Constitutional Court, are strikes against Ukraine in the potential for learning the habits of democracy. While a strong President is

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[353]Western Reserve Law Review, Winter 1999 31(1) Received from EBSCOhost [ehost@epnet.com] private email to Nicole Ludwig [nhludwig@home.com] September 8 2001.
[354]As opposed to Russia which is considered a Eurasian country. In this case, "European" means abiding by the virtues of civil liberties, the rule of law and all the traditionally associated with democracy.
[355] Rezie.
[356] Rezie.

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necessary in some cases, this position should be used mainly to break deadlock in the Parliament and to keep some measure of order in times of national crisis.[357]

At the end of the day, it is up to the Constitutional Court to enforce the rights and the meaning of these rights constitutional rights. The effectiveness of this body is brought into question, however, when six of eighteen judges are appointed by the President, and another six are appointed by the Rada, which has a tendency to lean towards supporting the President.

Although by the end of Kuchma's first term in 1999, it seems safe to say that he had established a formal framework for Motyl's first two elements of sequencing[358]: a Weberian state (partially Kravchuk's doing) and the rule of law embodied in the 1996 Constitution. The real test, of course, is how well the rule of law, defined by the Constitution is implemented. The rule of law is central to democratic consolidation in several respects. First, no one may be above the reach of the law; this includes the President. Second, the rule of law is conducive to the establishment of a vibrant civil society in which the media plays a large role. Furthermore, "without autonomous social institutions, it would be immeasurably more difficult, if not impossible, for market relations, and not just barter to actually take root."[359] At the end of the day, the constitution does not necessarily provide for the free establishment of these institutions. Combined with the legacies of Soviet leadership, the civil society that, according to Motyl, is necessary for successful marketization and consolidation of democracy will have many challenges to overcome.

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[357]Such as De Gaulle originally intended with the establishment of the French Fifth Republic.

[358] Motyl, 1993: 60-70. Motyl believes that in order for Ukraine to emerge as a strong and prosperous democracy, the following sequence needs to occur. First, a Weberian state that can administer the territory and population needs to be established. Following that, the rule of law, the development of civil society, entrance into a market economy and, finally, formal democracy can occur.

[359]Motyl. 1993: 69.

APPENDIX C: QUESTIONS ORIGINALLY SUGGESTED FOR INCLUSION IN A NATIONWIDE REFERENDUM ON 16 APRIL 2000[360]

Do you express no confidence in the Verkhovna Rada of the 14th Convocation and support the following amendment to paragraph 2 of article 90 of the Constitution: "and also in the case of a public expression of no confidence in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in a nationwide referendum, which gives the President grounds to dissolve the Verkhovna Rada"?

Do you support amending Article 90, paragraph 3 of the Constitution with the following contents: "The President of Ukraine may also dissolve the Verkhovna Rada before its term runs out if the Verkhovna Rada within one month fails to form a working parliamentary majority, or if it fails within three months to approve the budget submitted by the Cabinet?"

Do you agree that it is necessary to limit deputies' immunity and eliminate paragraph 3 of Article 80 of the Constitution: "People's deputies cannot be held criminally responsible, detained or arrested without the consent of the Verkhovna Rada"?

Do you agree that the total number of deputies should be reduced from 450 to 300 and paragraph 1 of Article 76 of the Constitution amended correspondingly by replacing the words 'four hundred and fifty' with the words 'three hundred,' and corresponding changes to election legislation be made?

Do you support the formation of a two-chamber parliament in Ukraine with one chamber representing the interests of the regions of Ukraine and which would see them fulfilled as well as the introduction of corresponding changes to the Constitution and election legislation?

Do you agree that the Ukrainian Constitution should be approved by a nationwide referendum?

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[360] Victor Zaborsky, "The 'New President' of Ukraine." World Affairs 163(3). Retrieved from EBSCO Database September 8, 2001.

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