# WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY THAT?

## AN ANALYSIS OF THE USE OF LANGUAGE TO MEASURE
## TRUST DEVELOPMENT
## ON THE
## WEST COAST VANCOUVER ISLAND AQUATIC MANAGEMENT BOARD

by

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# APPROVAL

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# Abstract

Trust contributes in multiple ways to the success of collaborative initiatives through, for example, facilitating open communication, helping parties form common objectives, and encouraging development of a common identity. In this study, I create an analytical framework for identifying expressions of trust in language, and tracking trust development. I link 12 types of trust to antecedents or "elements" of trust, to criteria or "foundations" that individuals use to assess another's trustworthiness, and to phases of trust development. Through coding language for types of trust, one can discern the phase of trust development reached. By understanding the bases of trust, and how they are expressed in language, parties can better address the issues preventing trust development or foster further trust development. I test this framework on the West Coast Vancouver Island Aquatic Management Board, a 16-member, multi-party, collaborative management board, which underwent a pilot phase during the years 2002 – 2005.

**Keywords:** trust development; trust measurement; trust; co-management; collaboration

**Subject Terms:** Conflict management; Organizational behaviour; Psychology, Industrial; Management; Leadership; Trust

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# Setting the Context: The Who, What, Where, When, and Why of Examining Development of Trust

## 1.0  Introduction

### *1.1  The Impetus for this Study*

This project emerged from the performance evaluation (Pinkerton, Bedo, and Hanson 2005) required under the Terms of Reference[1] of the Nuu-chah-nulth/West Coast Vancouver Island Aquatic Management Board (later shortened to the West Coast Vancouver Island Aquatic Management Board, or simply, the AMB), Canada's first multi-party, aquatic co-management board. The board began as a three-year pilot project over the years 2002 – 2005, involving four governments (federal, provincial, regional, and tribal council) and eight non-government sectors (commercial fishing, recreational fishing, Aboriginal fishing, aquaculture, fish processing, tourism, labour, and environment).

During the two years that my thesis supervisor and I observed and assessed the AMB's performance, I noted that the members had a persistent difficulty in coming to agreement, particularly on the more contentious issues, and consequently, in making significant progress on meeting their objectives, or even in agreeing on what those objectives were. What was holding back the Board's progress? The evaluation report identified contextual issues that added to the Board's difficulties, such as governments' failure to give it any specific function, despite a broad, enabling Terms of Reference;

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[1] See http://www.westcoastaquatic.ca/Aquatic_Mgmt_Board.htm (accessed June 24, 2007) for the AMB's Terms of Reference, meeting minutes, the evaluation report, and other documents of interest.

being under-resourced financially, and consequently lacking administrative and project support; and being forced into the position of waiting for the chronically tardy or non-existent flow of those financial resources from both the federal and provincial governments. Any collaborative initiative would struggle under these conditions.

As I discuss below (see section 3.1 Interdependence and Risk), one of the antecedents of trust is a condition in which outcomes depend on the behaviour of others. If a critical partner in the collaboration is behaving in a manner that effectively prevents the achievement of goals and objectives, trust can not develop. Because the governments' behaviour in this instance created a situation in which the achievement of outcomes was severely impaired, trust development was also hampered. As well, because the AMB had no specific task, accountability was an issue, which in turn affected cooperation. Hence attendance suffered, preventing the quorums required for decision making.

However, I do not examine the reasons for poor attendance, nor for the lack of government support. These matters are beyond the scope of this analysis. Neither does this analysis delve into the prehistory of the Board, or into the broader context in which it was operating, such as the handicaps noted above, or the political environment at the time, except where such things were specifically mentioned at Board meetings. Instead, I focus on the Board meetings per se during the performance evaluation of the AMB's pilot phase as a means to test the efficacy and reliability of the analytical framework developed in this study for assessing trust development in collaborative initiatives in general. Because of the broad spectrum of interests represented on the AMB, and the long history

of conflict among the sectors, it presents an instructive case study for the examination of trust development.

## 1.2 The Analytical Framework

The question of what was holding back the Board's progress led me to examine how parties in conflict come to work effectively together. That examination revealed the importance of trust in successful collaborations, and resulted in the product of this study: an analytical framework for assessing, tracking, and fostering the development of trust (see Chapter Two). The analytical framework and its application address five questions:

- To what extent did trust develop among the AMB members?

- Under what conditions is trust necessary?

- Under what conditions does trust develop, or not develop?

- How do individuals decide whether to trust one another?

- How can we use the language of participants in a collaborative initiative as a measure of trust among them?

What follows is an exposition of the importance of trust in collaborative initiatives, and an analysis and synthesis of the various preconditions for trust development ("elements" of trust) and the evaluation criteria individuals use to assess others' trustworthiness ("foundations" of trust).

While the trust literature consists of writings from many disciplines and areas of study, such as political science, economics, anthropology, and sociology, a means to measure trust development through examining verbal interactions represents a significant gap. Some studies have been conducted in the experimental psychological tradition regarding cooperation and associated trust development (e.g. Kopelman 2002). In

contrast, my analysis draws heavily on the social psychological and organizational management literature to measure trust development in a non-experimental setting. I do not draw upon the communications, linguistic or textual analysis literature, given that this analysis is interpretive in the ethnographic tradition, rather than being a rigorous examination of sentence structure or word usage.

This study examines working relationships in the specific context of multi-party collaboration in natural resource management, and elaborates a method to assess a particular aspect (trust development) of that collaboration, thereby contributing to the co-management literature (including evaluation of co-management initiatives), and trust measurement literature, as well as confirming previous work in social psychology and organizational management. Because governments are often in a state of fiscal deficit, they rely more and more on partnerships to aid in delivering on their mandates in an efficient and cost-effective fashion. Trust is a major contributor to the success of collaboration. Government evaluations tend to measure the extent to which a program delivered specific outcomes, but do not focus on the interpersonal aspects that may have prevented, or hampered, the achievement of those outcomes. A means to measure and assess trust development, accurately interpret expressions of lack of trust, and address barriers to trust development will greatly assist all parties in achieving their objectives in collaborative initiatives. As well, having the knowledge of the importance of trust, the elements of trust, and foundations of trust prior to engaging in a collaborative initiative allows the parties to prepare themselves for the partnership, and to make a more positive and productive start.

In Chapter One, I will examine findings in the social science literature on the functions and genesis of trust (section 3.0 Elements of Trust below), as well as the criteria people use in making their decisions about whether to trust others (section 4.0 Foundations of Trust below). Chapter Two details the steps I took to create the framework. I will examine two prominent models of trust development, assign the elements and foundations, as well as the types of trust identified in Chapter Two, to the stages of trust development outlined in these models. Finally, in the analysis that follows in Chapter Three, I will test the efficacy of the framework in measuring trust through examining the language of AMB members in selected excerpts from interviews, a written survey, meeting minutes, and meeting information packages for evidence of the elements and foundations of trust identified in Chapter One, and the types of trust identified in Chapter Two. A final summary will identify the types of trust that are exhibited most frequently in order to assess the stage(s) of trust that the AMB members achieved over the course of their pilot period.

Through the application of this framework to the case of the AMB, I show that expressions of trust do emerge through an analysis of language. Consequently, the framework can predict where in the trust development cycle certain types of trust, elements and foundations are most prevalent and relevant, thereby predicting the level of trust that may be achieved, given the existence of a particular set of types of trust, elements, and foundations. This methodology is, however, most reliable when the researcher has some intimate knowledge of the parties involved; a lack of this knowledge may compromise the accuracy of the results. The framework may also be used as a tool to educate participants on the importance of trust, and to assist in fostering trust

development through revealing the specific issues that may arise during the course of the collaboration, and suggesting means to address them.

## 1.3 Background

After many years of acrimony among the sectors, loss of fishing access, and perceived mismanagement of marine fisheries on the west coast of Vancouver Island, the four governments and eight non-government parties with interests in the fishing industry agreed to come together in an effort to collectively solve the problems plaguing the West Coast fishery. The multiple parties engaged in the AMB may have seen themselves as disadvantaged in relation to each other, e.g. Aboriginal fishers may have seen themselves as disadvantaged in relation to the non-Aboriginal commercial fishers, while the commercial fishers may have felt disadvantaged in relation to the recreational sector or vice versa. But even more important, they saw themselves as disadvantaged relative to the rest of the coast.[2] Disadvantaged, lower status, or unjustly treated groups may only attempt to modify inter-group standing under certain circumstances, e.g. when the status system seems unstable, when distance among groups is relatively small, when individualistic options seem blocked, when both distributive and procedural injustices based on group membership seem salient, when circumstances promote inter-group comparisons, or when the disadvantaged group has or develops a strong ideology that promotes collective action against the higher status group (James 1993).

The definition of who is disadvantaged may be subjective, or may be relative to another group beyond the organizations in question. Because one of the elements that brought the AMB together was a sense of deprivation in relation to other fishers

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[2] I do not attempt to address the factual basis for these perceptions, nor the complexity of motivations for creating the AMB, which is beyond the scope of this discussion.

elsewhere on the coast, the non-government AMB signatories felt some collective

disadvantage: a group identity as fishers of the west coast of Vancouver Island,

perceiving that they were receiving less access than their compatriots elsewhere. In order

to improve their collective situations, the groups came to the conclusion that their internal

differences had to be addressed in a cooperative fashion. The result of this conclusion

was the formation of the AMB. In the next section, I outline the events leading up to the

inaugural meeting of the AMB.

## 1.4    A Brief History of the West Coast Vancouver Island Aquatic Management Board

This summary is based on a chronology developed by the AMB, available on their

website[3]. Starting in the early 1980's, the Nuu-chah-nulth Tribal Council (NTC) leaders,

in conjunction with university-based researchers, planners, and their own fisheries staff,

began to examine how the experiences of community-based fisheries management

models in other jurisdictions around the world might help deal with their issues of loss of

access to their traditional fisheries. The first stage of research was supported by Indian

and Northern Affairs Canada, the British Columbia Native Affairs Secretariat, and

Department of Fisheries and Oceans and produced a report "Launching a Fisheries Co-

Management Pilot Project: Learning from the Experience of Alaska and Washington

State. Phase I: Final Report" (Pinkerton, Cohen, Langdon, Keitlah, Rees, Boothroyd,

Lightly, and Green 1987a). The second stage of research was supported by the Social

Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and produced 20 articles on the

research published in the Nuu-chah-nulth newspaper Ha-shilth-sa 1989-1991 and a

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[3] See http://www.westcoastaquatic.ca/PDF/WCVI%20AMB%20Chronology.pdf (accessed February 10, 2007) for the full text of the document.

report: "The Point No Point Treaty Council: Innovations by an Inter-Tribal Fisheries

Management Co-operative" (Pinkerton and Keitlah 1990), providing a context for policy

discussions.

Despite evidence of successful co-management of fisheries in other jurisdictions

and analysis of effective management board structures, and despite having contributed

funding to the above research, Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO), the federal

department responsible for the management of all ocean fisheries, remained firmly

committed to its exclusive constitutional mandate for this management[4]. It did not permit

any Aboriginal peoples in Canada to practice their traditional fisheries management, or to

fish outside the regulations enacted for all commercial fisheries. With the Supreme Court

of Canada's historic *Sparrow* decision in 1990, which recognized the Aboriginal right to

fish for food, social, and ceremonial (FSC) purposes, DFO and Aboriginal peoples began

to work more cooperatively, but neither the courts nor the federal government have

recognized a universal Aboriginal right to fish commercially. Aboriginal peoples

continued to struggle with loss of access to fisheries over which they had no control.

By 1993, the Protocol Respecting the Government-to-Government Relationship

between the First Nations Summit[5] and the Governments of Canada and British Columbia

had established that "a government-to-government relationship" existed between the First

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[4] While the current federal *Fisheries Act* of 1985 has been amended piecemeal a number of times since its original enactment in 1868 (http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/media/backgrou/2006/hq-ac46a_e.htm, accessed May 21, 2007), it does not contain any mention of co-management. Significant amendments to the Act, including major changes allowing for co-management, were tabled to Parliament in late 2006, but many years may pass before the new Act is passed, if it passes at all. Senior government staff have asked Parliamentarians to either accept all the changes to the Act or reject them all. Significant amendments to the Act have been attempted before; if these changes are rejected, it will likely be many more years before another attempt is made to update the Act (Colin MacKinnon, Manager, Policy Analysis and Treaty Support Division, Treaty and Aboriginal Policy Directorate, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, pers. comm.).
[5] The First Nations Summit broadly represents Aboriginal peoples in Canada in the development of policy for the negotiation of treaties with First Nations.

Nations and the governments of Canada and British Columbia. In 1994, five Nuu-chah-nulth Nations in Clayoquot and Barkley Sound and the BC government negotiated the creation of the Clayoquot Central Region Board, which was implemented to address First Nations' land interests while treaties were being negotiated. The renewal of this agreement took the form of an Interim Measures Agreement[6]. (See Abrams 2000 for a detailed discussion of the creation and renewal of this board.) However, Aboriginal peoples were not alone in their desire for more access to fisheries resources; the small-boat commercial fleet was also suffering financial hardships due to decreased access. The Coastal Zone Canada Association (CZCA), a national non-profit organization of coastal zone management professionals and others interested in coastal zone management, was incorporated in 1993 with the objective of improving integrated coastal zone management (http://www.czca-azcc.org/html/home.html, accessed May 20, 2007). In 1994 at its inaugural conference entitled "Cooperation in the Coastal Zone", the CZCA noted the need for empowering local communities through community based management, including meaningful public participation and the building of partnerships with Aboriginal peoples.

In 1994 and 1995, a number of meetings were organized in the West Coast Vancouver Island (WCVI) region regarding aquatic management issues and the formation of a regional management board. In 1995, the West Coast Sustainability Association (WCSA) was formed to give the region a greater voice in decision making, build support and capacity for a regional management board, and to undertake projects to improve the region's access to, and stewardship of, aquatic resources. In the fall of 1996,

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[6] The parties (the governments of BC and Canada, and the First Nation) negotiate interim measures agreements before or during treaty negotiations when an interest is being affected that could undermine the process (http://www.bctreaty.net/files/sixstages-inter.php, accessed May 20, 2007).

Nuu-chah-nulth leaders tabled an interim measures proposal to DFO regarding joint

management of aquatic resources. In January 1997, Nuu-chah-nulth leaders brought the

interim measures proposal for joint aquatic management to the federal and provincial

governments in the BC Treaty process. (See Day 2003 for a comprehensive analysis of

the development and outcome of this proposal.)

In May 1997, WCSA and the NTC brought together over 70 diverse groups from

throughout the WCVI region in a Future Search conference. Participants in the workshop

agreed to set their individual agendas aside to work together towards a regional aquatic

management board implemented under the umbrella of Treaty negotiations. A Steering

Committee was created to help establish a Regional Aquatic Management Board for the

West Coast of Vancouver Island. The Steering Committee was later formalized into the

Regional Aquatic Management Society (RAMS).

Through both the *Canada Oceans Act* (1997) and the *Canada – British Columbia*

*Agreement on the Management of Pacific Salmon Fishery Issues* (1997), the Prime

Minister and Premier continued their support for the principles of "bringing decision-

making closer to clients and stakeholders", and "creating effective partnerships to better

manage the fishery" (*Canada – British Columbia Agreement on the Management of*

*Pacific Salmon Fishery Issues* 1997: preamble)[7]. On May 25, 1997, the BC Coastal

Communities Network unanimously adopted a resolution at their annual conference

supporting the concept of regional fisheries management organizations, and in May 1998,

passed a resolution specifically supporting the Nuu-chah-nulth/WCVI Regional Aquatic

Management Board initiative. On February 17, 1998, the BC Aboriginal Fisheries

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[7] See http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/media/backgrou/1997/hq-bc_e.htm (accessed July 20, 2007) for the full text of the agreement.

Commission also unanimously adopted a resolution at their Annual General Meeting

supporting the Nuu-chah-nulth/WCVI Regional Aquatic Management Board initiative.

Over the course of the year, the governments of BC and Canada also reasserted their

interest and commitment to involving communities in the management of a sustainable

fishery.

In January 1998, DFO, BC and the NTC began formal discussions in the treaty

process to establish an area-based aquatic management board. The meetings were open

to all groups with an interest in aquatic management issues. In his Report to B.C. on the

Coho Crisis, April 1998, Dr. Parzival Copes, Professor Emeritus at Simon Fraser

University, stated, "It is recommended that senior governments continue the development

of effective co-management regimes with community, aboriginal and regional

governments, in conjunction with local stakeholder groups, for which the draft proposals

by the Nuu-chah-nulth/West Vancouver Island Aquatic Management Steering Committee

may serve as an exploratory example." The National Roundtable on the Environment

and Economy produced "Sustainable Strategies for Oceans: A Co-Management Guide" in

1998 that recommended "establishing a series of pilot co-management arrangements in

cooperation with various users groups through departments such as the Department of

Fisheries and Oceans". In July 1998, the parties met with the Regional Director General

of DFO and the lead treaty negotiator for BC to discuss whether the AMB would be

entrenched in treaty; the parties agreed that it would not be, except by agreement of all

parties.

In addition to open invitations to participate in discussions, a two-day workshop

was held to gather stakeholder input in Tofino in April 1999. At this workshop, over 60

diverse participants from around the Province told the governments to speed up the process and establish the board. Negotiations were set to commence in May 1999, but were delayed as the initiative was reviewed by DFO in Ottawa as a 'national pilot.' WCVI representatives met with the Deputy Minister of DFO in Ottawa to discuss the initiative and push for negotiations to recommence. DFO returned to the negotiating table in October 1999.

The governments agreed in February 2000 to a Joint Policy Framework outlining the policy and process framework guiding development of the Board's Terms of Reference and implementation. All parties re-committed to negotiating an Agreement in Principle, which was reached in October 2000 and all parties had ratified by February 2001. The provincial election of 2001 delayed negotiation of implementation and cost-sharing, but the Province returned to the implementation working group in October 2001 and the parties invited applications for non-governmental Board members. The selection process was completed in January 2002 when the governments ratified the eight non-government members. In February 2002, the Executive Director was selected and the Board held its first two-day meeting. The NTC hosted a celebration banquet for all those involved in the Board's development.

## 2.0 Why Examine Trust?

In this section, I examine some of the literature on the importance of trust and communication in collaborative endeavours, to provide justification for examining language as a means to measure trust development.

### 2.1 The Importance of Trust

Some scholars suggest that trust is not critical to successful collaborations, as long as the lack of it can be effectively managed, i.e. it does not hinder the achievement of goals: "[T]here is a tension between the ideology that trust is needed for collaboration to be successful, and the pragmatic difficulties pertaining to trust building itself and the frequent need to initiate and enact collaborative agendas in situations where trust is lacking" (Vangen and Huxham 2003:26, emphasis in original). Raymond (2006:37) suggests that "policymakers might spend more energy on creating incentives and assurance mechanisms to encourage collaboration, rather than [on] the potentially fruitless task of building of [sic] social capital among rival stakeholders." Indeed, scholars who examine collaboration as the product of rational self interest (Axelrod 1984, Ostrom 1990) have tended to see trust as epiphenomenal.

Other researchers on partnership, however, identify trust as crucial to the success of collaborative initiatives (Vangen and Huxham 2003), and describe trust as an important antecedent to conflict resolution; each of the parties must trust that the others will reciprocate, rather than exploit, concessions and move toward agreement (Pruitt and Olczak 1995). In entering into a collaborative endeavour, the parties have made a common decision to work together, despite existing animosity or hostility. As we will

see below, different types of trust exist, and even in situations where trust appears to be

absent, some minimum level of trust is, in fact, present, as witnessed by the fact that the

parties have at least agreed to attempt to work together. Table 1 summarizes the findings

discussed in this section on the value of trust in collaborative endeavours.

**Table 1. Summary of Contrasting Views on the Importance of Trust in Collaboration**

| Trust is Necessary | Trust is Unnecessary |
|---|---|
| trust is crucial to the success of collaborative initiatives | trust is not critical to successful collaborations, as long as the lack of trust does not hinder the achievement of goals |
| trust is an important antecedent to conflict resolution | it is more important to create incentives and assurance or accountability mechanisms to encourage collaboration than to develop trust |

Trust has been seen as critical in a multitude of settings, including the firm,

government bureaucracies, and working groups within those settings. In a private

institution, such as the firm, trust contributes to the ability of team members to work

collaboratively, and improves the ability of the firm to adapt to complexity and change

(Lander, Purvis, McCray, and Leigh 2004). "The essential ingredient of collaborative

effort is trust....An organizational climate of trust enables employees to surface their

ideas and feelings, use each other as resources, and learn together. Without trust, people

assume self-protective, defensive postures that inhibit learning" (Costigan, Ilter, and

Berman 1998:303). Trust and openness result in a situation where people's actions

support one another; parties develop favourable attitudes towards each other, and even

create strong friendships (Vanderslice 1995). Trust can help sustain a cooperative

relationship by reinforcing mutually supportive actions even when goals change, or are

frustrated. Social exchange theorists posit that relationships providing more rewards than costs will yield enduring mutual trust and attraction (Deluga 1994).

In an environment consisting of multiple, and possibly competing, organizations working collaboratively, trust mitigates perceptions of opportunistic behaviour, thereby easing the transfer of knowledge and resources in the partnership, increasing the quality of output, and increasing efficiency by lessening the need for structural controls, such as formal contracts and agreements; it provides a more flexible environment in which decisions and work are performed, and heightens strategic focus (Lander et al 2004). Development of mutual expectations influences both effectiveness of working relationships and how satisfying they are: Gabarro (1990:97) found that "over time, expectations about performance, goals, and each party's role became not only more mutual but more concrete and specific as well."[8]

Collaboration among individuals representing a wide variety of organizations poses a number of challenges, such as unequal resources, power struggles, jurisdictional issues, interpersonal conflicts, and differing goals and objectives. These challenges can exist simultaneously in a complex web of concerns, creating a domino effect that can impede trust development: unequal resources can lead to power struggles, while power struggles and jurisdictional issues contribute to frustrations and friction, which provoke interpersonal conflicts, thereby hampering progress in achieving the organization's goals and objectives, or even agreement on what the goals and objectives are. (See sections 4.2

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[8] Development of shared expectations requires clear communication, exploration and testing of differences, and negotiation over differences. An exception to this pattern of increased mutuality and specificity of expectations over time occurred in situations with little interdependence, where one or both parties were dissatisfied with the relationship once it had stabilized, due to insufficient openness, testing, or exploration (Gabarro 1990). This exception demonstrates the importance of interdependence in the development of trust, as will be discussed below in section 3.1 Interdependence and Risk.

Power and Control and 4.6 Psychological State for more information on how these

challenges affect trust development.)

The lack of trust in scientific recommendations or in governments may prevent

collaborative organizations from succeeding in their objectives (Smith and Gilden 2002).

As well, development of mutual expectations is difficult and complicated when parties do

not know what they want at the outset of the relationship; this process may become

clearer after some experience working with the other party (Gabarro 1990). Authors in

many disciplines have identified trust as significant and important in the nurturing of

collaborative relationships (e.g. Vangen and Huxham 2003, Lander et al 2004).

> High levels of trust help reduce transaction costs.... Trust
> reduces uncertainty about the future and the necessity for
> continually making provisions for the possibility of
> opportunistic behaviour among participants.... Trust
> lubricates the smooth, harmonious functioning of the
> organization by eliminating friction and minimizing the
> need for bureaucratic structures that specify the behaviour
> of participants who do not trust each other. But trust does
> not come naturally. It has to be carefully structured and
> managed (Limerick and Cunnington 1993, quoted in
> Lewicki and Bunker 1996:95-96).

Declining trust, on the other hand, increases transaction costs, so that parties feel

the need to engage in self-protective actions, such as contingency planning for the

possibility of others' opportunistic behaviour (Tyler and Kramer 1996). Strategic

alliances among organizations are calculatively formed, mainly based on resource needs,

such as information, technical expertise, materials, or labour. The details of the

relationship are spelled out in a contract; there may be no "natural" basis of trust, such as

proximity or sense of common membership (Powell 1996). Contracts curb potential

opportunism through formally structured monitoring, prearranged progress reports,

milestone dates, and pre-agreed sanctions. Such contracts are generally short-term agreements for specific purposes. "Under such settings, trust is not easily established; fear and uncertainty must be overcome before information can be shared" (Powell 1996:60).

The parties can cooperate through concessions or problem-solving, the latter involving expanding the pie; exchanging concessions on issues of greatest priority to the other party, or analyzing interests in order to find a new approach (Pruitt and Olczak 1995). If the relationship is successful, further cooperation becomes easier. "A trusted other is viewed as likely to search hard for a mutually acceptable agreement and to adhere to this agreement once reached. Hence, it seems safer to enter negotiation, engage in joint problem solving, and conclude an agreement" (Pruitt and Olczak 1995:72).

If the relationship is not successful, "as trust declines, people are increasingly unwilling to take risks, demand greater protections against the possibility of betrayal, and increasingly insist on costly sanctioning mechanisms to defend their interests" (Tyler and Kramer 1996:4). The parties may remain at a stalemate, as neither party is willing to initiate, or reinitiate, the trusting behaviour required to advance toward their goals. A "critical mass" of trust, i.e. the minimum required to break the stalemate, would set the wheels in motion for achieving mutual benefit through their collaborative effort. Clear communication is essential to convey the existence, or non-existence, of this critical mass of trust; hence the need for the present study to assess the feasibility of measuring trust development through verbal communication.

## 2.2 The Importance of Communication

Research has shown that communication in general, and communication regarding specific issues in particular, is critical in laying the foundation for a trusting relationship (Vangen and Huxham 2003). Lander et al (2004) uncovered at least eight distinct communication-oriented trust-building mechanisms, including the encouragement of communication, the sharing of relevant information and knowledge, the provision of timely feedback, the creation of a common language, the creation of a shared vision, the offering of explanations for decisions, the creation of an open communications environment, and the presence of receptive actors. Indirect communication through one's actions also helps to nurture trust, such as humble or self-effacing behaviour, or being an involved member of the group, dependent on the others, genuinely interested in settling the conflict, and willing to make reasonable concessions (Pruitt and Olczak 1995).

Honest communication is vitally important; parties tend to view duplicitous behaviour and hidden agendas as particularly disruptive. Further, truthfulness involves not only honesty, but also candidness: in addition to telling the truth, individuals want others to be forthcoming, realistic, and accurate (Cropanzano and Randall 1993), so that while "beating around the bush" or choosing to remain silent does not necessarily amount to deception, these behaviours do not satisfy the criteria for truthfulness. From the initial stages of newly formed relationships, individuals make efforts to determine the trustworthiness of other individuals in that relationship. Before trust can develop, individuals must have strong confidence in each other's values and integrity (Lander et al 2004). "Previous research has identified two mechanisms that positively impact trust: (1)

being forthright and truthful in interactions with others, and (2) fulfilling promises. When consistently practiced, these behaviours provide team members with direct evidence of trustworthiness and go toward the development of a reputation for honesty and truthfulness" (Lander et al 2004:512).

Many individuals may find that exhibiting untruthful behaviour is much more difficult in a face-to-face situation. While much communication takes place electronically or via telephone, face-to-face interaction is critical in developing trust because it reduces the risk of misinterpretation and provides an efficient environment in which to move beyond superficial information exchange toward more substantive levels of mutual understanding (Lander et al 2004). Accurate communication may be particularly important in situations characterized by severe conflict. An additional benefit of face-to-face interactions is that physical contact increases favourable perceptions of others and leads to an increase in group cohesiveness (Lander et al 2004).

The intense emotions involved in situations of extreme conflict typically arise from the frustration of basic human needs or the violation of the fundamental principles of justice (Pruitt and Olczak 1995). Understanding this frustration helps each party to tolerate the other's behaviour, to act in a manner less annoying to the other, and to show this understanding, thus helping to build mutual trust. (Regarding justice, see sections 4.1 Moral Evaluation and 4.4 Procedural Justice for discussions on the importance individuals place on the concepts of "right and wrong" and fairness in assessing the trustworthiness of others.)

In order to build and sustain trust, researchers have found that participants in a collaborative group should adhere to the following (Vangen and Huxham 2003:15):

- have clarity of purpose and objectives

- deal with power differences

- have leadership but do not allow anyone to take over

- allow time to build up understanding

- share workload fairly

- resolve different levels of commitment

- have equal ownership and no point scoring

- accept that partnerships evolve over time

All of the above are conveyed through effective communication, and harken back to the discussion above on the importance of trust. Regarding commitment, to the extent that trust amongst participants is strengthened by a sense of shared commitment, the development or preservation of individual commitment is important to project success (Lander et al 2004). Commitment is characterized by individual loyalty, individual job satisfaction, and a focus on the long-term interests of individual participants, as in identification-based trust. Similarly, loyalty has been described as the willingness of an individual to support, protect and encourage others (Lander et al 2004). Leaders of collaborative organizations may also find that they need to balance activities geared toward building trust with those that are designed to cope with the lack of trust (Vangen and Huxham 2003). Commitment to a decision (i.e. acceptance of the decision and intention to cooperate in carrying it out) is as important as commitment to the organization, or to the individuals within it; those who do not commit to a decision can delay or sabotage the implementation of initiatives, which can be disastrous in highly competitive or dynamic environments (Korsgaard et al 1995).

But what exactly is trust?  Under what conditions will it, or will it not, develop?

In the next section, I explore the answers to these questions.  In Chapter Two (see section

1.2 Model of Development and Decline.), I will outline steps the parties can take to

rebuild trust, should they violate it.

# 3.0 Elements of Trust

What is the basis of trust? What prevents trust from developing? In this section, I attempt to answer the fundamental question "what is trust?" – as well as indicate a few scenarios in which trust may not develop, or could be hampered – through a discussion of the following components, or "elements" of trust, which I define as the conditions that render trust necessary: interdependence, risk, and cooperation.

## 3.1 Interdependence and Risk

According to the social psychological perspective on trust at interpersonal and group levels, an individual may make the decision to trust when faced with a course of future action that is ambiguous, outcomes that depend on the behaviour of others, and consequences that are greater from a harmful event than from a beneficial event (Deutsch 1960). "At th[e]level [of working relationships], trust can be defined as the expectation of the other party in a transaction, the risks associated with assuming and acting on such expectations, and the contextual factors that serve to either enhance or inhibit the development and maintenance of that trust" (Lewicki and Bunker 1996:116). The literature reveals a number of additional definitions of trust, only some of which I list below:

> Trust is "the feeling that the other would never do an injustice to one" (Gustafsson 2005:142).

> "Trust is the willingness to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations about another's behavior" (Dunn and Schweitzer 2005:736).

> "Trust is the 'perception that those in authority are not biased against one, that the working of the system does not result in special costs for oneself or one's group'" (Flacks 1969:132).

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Trust is "a state involving confident positive expectation about another's motives with respect to oneself in situations entailing risk" (Boon and Holmes 1991:194).

Trust is "a mechanism to reduce the risk of opportunistic behaviour" (Vangen and Huxham 2003:11).

"The act of trusting is the willingness to assume that a partner will bear the vulnerability stemming from the acceptance of risk" (Vangen and Huxham 2003:11).

"The notion of trust generally is associated with one party having confidence in another and this often implies some degree of alignment between relevant value systems" (Lander et al 2004:510).

"[W]e used trust here to represent the degree of confidence the members of a team have in the goodwill of its leader, specifically, the extent to which they believe that the leader is honest, sincere, and unbiased in taking their positions into account" (Korsgaard, Schweiger, and Sapienza 1995:62).

Trust is the "belief that another party can be relied on in a situation where that party controls one's outcomes" (Pruitt and Olczak 1995:71).

Trust is the "belief that one's adversary is motivated to resolve the conflict" (Pruitt and Olczak 1995:71).

An underlying assumption of these definitions is that trust entails interdependence between the parties, i.e. the one engaging in trusting behaviour and the "trustee". One depends on the other for a particular behaviour or for a particular outcome to come to fruition. In order for trust to evolve, the parties must believe that they can form common expectations, in fact be able to form common expectations, believe that they can collectively fulfill those expectations, and be willing to take a risk to achieve them (Vangen and Huxham 2003). These beliefs can be based either on anticipation of the trustee's future behaviour and the possibility of favourable results, or on past positive experiences with the other party. Conversely, an inability to arrive at these conclusions regarding their collective ability to work together, due perhaps to highly polarized views,

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or to an intensely negative past experience with the other party, would prevent the evolution of trust, at least in terms of the collaboration[9].

While an understanding of, as well as an affinity with, what the other hopes to achieve is critical, one's initial, visceral reaction to the other party, i.e. general "liking" for the other, may not be of much relevance regarding whether one can work with the other. In their study of trust building between management and staff, Lander et al. (2004) found that first impressions or "initial interactions" did not play a large role for either party in developing trust, while Vangen and Huxham (2003) found that in the future-based scenario, building understanding of the other's expectations at the beginning of the relationship is a crucial step to building trust. Early trust is gained through agreements and serves as a substitute for formal contracts. Put differently, while the parties need not like each other on a personal basis, both authors agreed that the parties must be able to agree on the purpose of the collaboration, to be clear about how much they are willing to invest, and what they expect in return.

Another assumption of the above definitions is that when parties are highly dependent on each other, a desirable outcome is the development of a relationship that is mutual and robust enough to be rewarding and effective (Gabarro 1990). This development takes time, and accelerating the process would require much emotional energy and action, and a high level of self-awareness that most people do not possess. Development of mutual expectations plays a key role in developing the relationship; task-salient aspects involve expectations about outcomes, interdependence, autonomy, and

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[9] An inability to develop trust in a working relationship does not preclude the development of trust in an unrelated, or social context. See section 4.5 Ability regarding the contextual nature of trust.

individual influence. All of these are affected by each person's assumptions about trust and power (see section 4.2 Power and Control below).

Explicit goals are helpful so that all parties are clear on what the collaboration is intended to accomplish, and to set direction for future activities. However, discussion of explicit goals can also provoke disagreement or even hostile conflict if the parties have incompatible goals (Vangen and Huxham 2003). As stated above, an inability to agree on goals may ultimately prevent the development of trust, and preclude further collaboration. Agreement may only be reached through extensive discussions and negotiations, which may have the unintended consequence of leading parties to feel that the others are infringing upon their territories, which has a negative impact on trust building. Ironically, the very activity that is intended to build trust may have the opposite effect through arousing hostility or defensiveness.

In order to skirt the possibility of developing hostility through negotiation of goals and objectives, the parties may take the approach of addressing other aspects of trust building, such as interpersonal relations (Vangen and Huxham 2003). Engaging in interpersonal activities unrelated to a particular, functional task allows the participants to get to know each other on a personal, intimate level, rather than merely viewing each other as "business partners" or even adversaries. In so doing, the partners can build a more complete picture of each other, understand each other in different contexts, and therefore be less guarded in interactions that they perceive as more risky. As this process takes place, individuals may become more comfortable and more willing to take greater risks, and to aim for "bigger wins" in their collaborative efforts.

Aiming first for modest achievements or "small wins" is one way to instil trust, and conversely, to avoid perceptions of untrustworthiness that might arise if the collective aimed for more difficult objectives and failed to achieve them (Vangen and Huxham 2003). At the same time, members should continue to strive to "nurture" the relationships, rather than simply succeeding at a particular task, as that success may not be sufficient to build a strong and lasting trust. Some authors have found that a coalescing of values and objectives may take approximately two years, or less if the parties have a long history of working together or are very mature in their ability to work collaboratively (Vangen and Huxham 2003).

The "small wins" approach, however, may be problematic in those situations where there is a greater urgency to achieve greater gains or to solve a major problem more quickly, or to meet the funding agency's requirements and demonstrate concrete results. This approach is more suitable to situations where the parties have the luxury of time, and can start with low-risk, smaller initiatives, and work toward more complex issues as trust builds. If there is a greater sense of urgency and the "small-wins approach" is not feasible, the parties would have to manage the risks of collaboration (e.g. vulnerability and opportunistic behaviour) as part of trust building (Vangen and Huxham 2003). Risk management would entail negotiation of collaborative aims and expectations, and to clarify willingness and ability to engage in particular activities in support of those aims.

The absence of risk or vulnerability renders trust irrelevant; trust is unnecessary in an inherently safe situation, or where an individual does not perceive any risk or vulnerability (Bigley and Pearce 1998). The statement "I trust you" implies that

something could go wrong, but I believe that nothing will because you will protect me, or you will prevent any negative outcome. Therefore, trust and risk form a reciprocal relationship where trust leads an individual to engage in risky behaviour, and successfully navigating through any risk and attaining the expected goals reinforces the feeling of trust (Vangen and Huxham 2003). Conversely, the act of embarking on a risky venture that yields a negative outcome has the possibility of decreasing trust.

Hence, another assumption that is consistent throughout the above definitions of trust is the element of risk. Some authors characterize the risk component as fear that the other will act opportunistically, or as the trustor's acceptance of vulnerability (Vangen and Huxham 2003). A trustor is particularly vulnerable in a situation where the trustee is unfamiliar or where there is no history of trust. In these situations, an effective course of action is for the individuals to initiate a three-stage trust-risk cycle through a leap of faith that the parties will be able to develop trust: 1) aim for realistic (initially modest) outcomes, i.e. the "small-wins approach"; 2) reinforce trusting attitudes; and 3) gain underpinnings for more ambitious collaboration (Vangen and Huxham 2003). Once again, to arrive at the first stage of aiming for realistic outcomes, the parties form expectations based on past behaviour or on contracts, and at the same time, they must be willing to be vulnerable to risk in order to initiate the collaboration. To ensure that this cycle is sustained, the outcomes aimed for must be realistic relative to the level of trust between, and to the capabilities and capacities of, the participating organizations. One indication of the level of trust is the extent to which the parties are willing and able to cooperate with each other, as I will discuss below.

## 3.2 Cooperation

Competitive, cooperative, and individualistic goal structures usually coexist in any group; what matters is which goal structure dominates (Vanderslice 1995). Cooperative relationships exhibit trust and trustworthiness, willingness to accept influence from one another, and the ability to help move one another toward shared goals (Bunker and Rubin 1995). A central tenet of cooperative decision-making is that everyone shares opinions and perspectives so that everyone may benefit from the richness of diversity (Vanderslice 1995). This sharing of opinions may heighten differences and disagreements, but people are encouraged to work through disagreements. A cooperative situation is characterized "as one in which the goals of the participants are so linked that any participant can gain his goal if, and only if, the others with whom he is linked can attain their goals," thereby requiring a coordination of efforts (Vanderslice 1995:176). "Goal interdependence creates a cooperative situation in which people behave supportively of one another" (Vanderslice 1995:178). Thus, cooperation echoes the interdependence characteristic of trusting relationships; trust is a fundamental building block of cooperation.

However, members of a collaborative group do not always express their opinions openly (Vanderslice 1995), and people tend to view those of their in-group as more trustworthy than outsiders, as well as more cooperative and honest (Kramer, Brewer, and Hanna 1996). Since trust is fundamental to cooperation, as with trust, cooperation involves vulnerability, and more specifically, a willingness to expose oneself to vulnerability (Powell 1996). Trust must be reciprocal for cooperation, and one must believe that they are trusted by the others. Furthermore, cooperation happens when one

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believes that others in the group will also do so; trust plays a key role in this process (Kramer, Brewer, and Hanna 1996).

Establishing this reciprocal trust can be difficult for groups that have been in conflict in the past. "The reestablishment of contact between previously competing groups under cooperative conditions often requires each group, in concert with the other, to experience a confrontation approaching a "controlled explosion". This provides for the release of pent-up tensions existing between them prior to the possibility of collaboration" (Blake and Mouton 1986:73). In the aftermath of this controlled explosion, the parties must work to reduce or eliminate intellectual distortions by reconstructing the historical events that led up to the disagreement. This process allows the parties to expose the falsehoods, which, unless corrected, will continue to have adverse effects on the relationship (Blake and Mouton 1986). When the probability of future association is high, the parties are more likely to cooperate, and more willing to punish defectors; common interests foster cooperative relations (Powell 1996), and through mutual encouragement and assistance, cooperative acts beget further cooperative acts.

Trust plays a key role in critical social processes, such as cooperation, coordination, and performance (Lewicki and Bunker 1995); it is confidence in the face of risk (Lewicki and Bunker 1996), allowing parties to work effectively together without fear of undue losses. To maintain strong, cooperative values, the organization should develop formal behavioural standards and expectations, hold members accountable to these standards, and, where appropriate, link these expectations to economic success (Vanderslice 1995). However, Tyler and Degoey (1996) found that trust is based less on

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economic concerns and serving self-interests, than on social relationships, and being treated with dignity and respect. Identification with the group plays an important role in facilitating cooperation and appears to lessen competition; this is the non-instrumental nature of cooperation (Tyler and Kramer 1996). As well, studies have found that displaying overt respect for team members, when appropriate, quickly and genuinely apologizing for unpleasant events or consequences, and demonstrating concern for specific stakeholder interests are also effective techniques for developing trust, since they show consideration of, and sensitivity to, the needs and interests of individual team members (Lander et al 2004).

Thus, collaboration is ultimately based on interpersonal relationships, and not simply faceless businesses or other entities working together; communication is a fundamental component in the foundation of interpersonal relationships.

# 4.0 Foundations of Trust

Why do people trust others? What sort of evaluations do people make about the other or about the situation that lead them to choose to trust or not to trust? While the elements discussed above spoke to the conditions that rendered trust necessary, I define "foundations" of trust as evaluation criteria that individuals use to assess another's trustworthiness. According to Jones and George (1998:531), "trust is determined by the interplay of people's values, attitudes, and moods and emotions." I explore these factors below, as well as a number of other antecedents and "evaluation criteria" that have an impact on the formation of trust.

## 4.1 Moral Evaluation

Part of the trust that individuals are willing to bestow in one another, as well as their willingness to acknowledge authorities' control, partially stems from their moral evaluation of the relationship or situation. The psychological literature on moral development finds that regardless of the original motives and attitudes about obligations to others, the attitudes eventually develop a functional autonomy: "people help others and/or their group because they feel it is the morally appropriate action" (Tyler and Kramer 1996:5), especially when the individuals come to identify with the group. In fact, Hosmer (1995) argues that "trust is based upon an underlying assumption of an implicit moral duty" (379, emphasis added). In this way, individuals make a conscious decision to engage in trust behaviour, that is, to trust the other, and to behave in a trustworthy fashion (Kramer, Brewer, and Hanna 1996), which creates the opportunity for perceived individual and collective gains, if trust is reciprocated.

On the other hand, if the parties do not have the same moral foundations for their participation in a collaborative initiative, moral evaluations of the other group's actions may intensify emerging perceived group differences and serve to maintain entrenched conflicts (Austin 1986). "Without combining a moral belief in cooperation with a conviction that cooperation will positively affect the bottom line, it may be difficult to adhere to cooperative principles" (Vanderslice 1995:193). Policies are evaluated not only on the basis of affecting material welfare, but also on the moral bases of good/bad or right/wrong (Austin 1986). These dichotomies involve differences in values, which groups use as moral arguments to reinforce their positions on social issues such as an authority-instigated conflict based on the redistribution of a scarce resource. Conflict is most difficult to resolve when it involves ideology, since each side sees their position as morally justified.

Responsibility is central to moral evaluation; individuals assess who is responsible for previous injustices, such as violation of freedom (Austin 1986). This violation is seen as morally wrong and unfair, leading to conflict with those who were responsible for violating the individual's freedom. "A state of psychological reactance is construed as a tension state caused by the violation of a particular norm (such as freedom) or social convention (such as free choice)" (Austin 1986:168, emphasis in original). If responsibility is disputed, conflict becomes more intense, and communication is more difficult, further hampering trust development.

The concept of freedom or liberty is important in the analysis of conflict (Austin 1986). Individuals engage in "free behaviours": acts that they know they are capable of performing and have been allowed to perform in the past. Usurpation of choice prompts

efforts to re-establish freedom, increases aggression, and increases the attractiveness of

forbidden behaviours. Reactance is negatively related to social influence and

helpfulness, and positively related to aggression toward authority and attraction to the

eliminated choice. While the harvesting of resources is not a "freedom", in that it is

government regulated, an imposed decrease in access to the resource elicits a response

similar to violation of freedom, especially when the decrease is not universal. Sharing of

power over the regulation of the harvest could mitigate negative reactions to decreased

access. I discuss power sharing below. (See also section 4.3 Attitude Toward Leaders,

Authorities, and Institutions for a discussion on how positive relationships with

authorities contribute to increased regulatory compliance.)

## 4.2 Power and Control

While the discussion below on psychological states discusses control in the

context of one's ability to affect the emotional state of another or to control one's own

emotions, control in broader terms can also influence trust through the amount of

influence an individual has over a situation or issue (Vangen and Huxham 2003). The

impact control has on the development of trust is grounded in the expectation of receiving

desired outcomes (Tyler and Degoey 1996). The instrumental model of trustworthiness

states that people tend to trust authorities whom they view to be motivated to share

control, where the other parties have a reasonable degree of control over the outcomes

(Tyler and Degoey 1996). "[T]rust can not be built in isolation of any other key variables

and ... trust building requires investment of time and careful consideration of other key

issues including the management of purpose, power imbalances, credit sharing, the need

for leadership while not allowing anyone to 'take over,' and so on..." (Vangen and

Huxham 2003:8).

Power imbalances can be significant contributors to distrust and hostility, and can

hamper the development of trust. Distribution of power in working relationships tends to

be asymmetrical, which has a negative effect on self-disclosure[10] and development of

trust, unless self-disclosure is legitimized by role-related social norms, such as

consultations with physicians, priests, or psychiatrists (Gabarro 1990). Individual

perceptions of control or ability to influence decisions are associated with perceptions of

the ability to protect one's own interests (Lander et al 2004). Power differentials can

cause lower-power members to decrease participation; therefore, parties must resolve

issues regarding the imbalance in order to develop and maintain trust (Vanderslice 1995).

Sharing of power can be beneficial to achieving the group's objectives, especially when

experimenting with alternative delivery mechanisms: "empowerment...requires

management to entrust the work force with responsibility and authority....Team-based

organizations are anticipated to outperform traditional bureaucratic structures when it

comes to...making adaptive changes" (Costigan et al. 1998:303). The conundrum of

empowerment, however, is that it may only enhance cooperation and organizational

performance if trust already exists (Jones and George 1998).

Studies have shown that as team leaders entrust group members with

responsibility and authority, group members' feelings of trust in the team leader increase

(Lander et al 2004). The studies reveal two mechanisms that may increase the sharing of

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[10] Gabarro (1990) also notes, however, that self-disclosure is not as important in working relationships as in
personal ones. In working relationships, openness regarding task-related and organizational issues is much
more important. People can still get to know each other better without extensive self-disclosure through
repeated interactions in sustained relationships.

control: the delegation of obligations and responsibilities across team members, and the

sharing and delegating of control across team members. Team leaders should employ

these two mechanisms in tandem, since the assignment of responsibility without control

or authority is unlikely to yield a successful outcome, and participants may see this

approach as an insincere gesture, i.e. not truly intended to delegate any measure of

control. The sharing of control has the additional benefit of yielding more frequent

interactions and communication within the team, which further stimulates trust

development (Lander et al 2004).

Trust where the parties have unequal power may be characterized as

"asymmetrical reciprocity", where the weaker party must rely on the stronger one's

willingness to treat the other justly (Gustafsson 2005). Jurisdictional power differences

are inevitable when dealing with various levels of government, but the government

agencies' willingness to share the power of dictating the collaborative activities will go

some distance in mitigating the differentials in legal authority. The sharing of control

also contributes to the perceived fairness of decisions (Lander et al 2004). Conversely,

the non-government parties must learn to acknowledge that differences in power are to be

expected; doing so may help to prevent loss of trust (Vangen and Huxham 2003).

"Furthermore, an understanding of the way in which balances of power tend to change

during the life of a collaboration and indeed whether and how power imbalances can and

should be deliberately shifted seems essential in sustaining the trust gained. This,

however, requires a great deal of sophistication in managing trust in practice" (Vangen

and Huxham 2003:22). Lander et al. (2004), on the other hand, found that almost all

stakeholders in their study explicitly described the sharing of control as necessary to

project completion but relatively unimportant in the creation of trust amongst stakeholders, and that it may, in fact, lead to group disintegration as individual responsibility becomes diluted.

Power may also manifest itself as glory-seeking, or claiming credit for successes of the group as a whole. This behaviour can hinder trust, or other members of the collective may perceive this behaviour as a lack of trust in the others' ability to contribute to the success of the organization (Vangen and Huxham 2003). A tendency for public sector representatives to take credit for success, however, may be due to the need to show progress in order to secure funding for further work, while those from the private sector are more concerned with meeting the goals of their own organizations, rather than the collective goals of the collaborative group. "For larger, public agencies, the issue often arises out of overlapping agendas and a need to justify their existence. For example, where agencies have overlapping or identical physical boundaries, we have seen many examples of one organization apparently taking control through taking a strong lead in the creation of an 'overarching' plan for the area and then aiming to influence the behaviour of others in line with the plan" (Vangen and Huxham 2003:14). Building trust, then, becomes, in part, a willingness to collaborate on shared issues, rather than jealously guarding one's own "territory" or jurisdiction.

As well, despite the intention to work collaboratively, some initiatives may be entirely dependent on government agencies' willingness to participate, so that they become pivotal in the success of the organization, thereby giving the impression of "taking over" or having more control of the agenda. At the same time, where groups require consensus, or at least a quorum to make decisions, even a group with lesser power

or authority is able to block, or at least hinder, an undesirable option by their non-compliance or absence during votes (Vangen and Huxham 2003). In so doing, a "junior" or weaker partner is able to exercise power equal to all other parties, even without the jurisdictional authority that government agencies possess.

## 4.3   Attitude Toward Leaders, Authorities, and Institutions

Leadership is essential to establishing and maintaining cooperative culture, especially in an organization with an internal culture that contrasts with the external one (Vanderslice 1995). Leaders must be able to clearly articulate and justify the values of the organization; a strong leader is essential to the success of the organization, especially during the first several years. The leaders could play key roles in establishing goals, and in ensuring that the outcomes are attainable. Trustworthiness in a leader is characterized by behavioural consistency, behavioural integrity (i.e. being truthful and keeping promises), sharing and delegation of control, communication (including accuracy, explanations, and openness), and demonstration of concern (Whitener, Brodt, Korsgaard, and Werner 1998). Trustworthiness can also be demonstrated via individual consistency of word and deed (they did what they said they were going to do), as well as through dependability (Lander et al 2004).

People's perceptions of the trustworthiness of authorities shape their willingness to accept the authorities' decisions, as well as their feelings of obligation to follow organizational rules and laws (Tyler and Degoey 1996). Group members are more likely to accept the decisions of an authority if they show intent to maintain respectful relations in decision-making processes. (See section 4.4 Procedural Justice below.) Respectful relations may also foster a sense of belonging and identification with a particular

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organization. A sense of attachment to a group fosters cooperation, and individuals will work more diligently to ensure that objectives are met; the opposite also holds – acrimony limits consensus and acceptance of decisions (Korsgaard et al 1995). As well, studies have found that displaying overt respect for team members, when appropriate, quickly and genuinely apologizing for unpleasant events or consequences, and demonstrating concern for specific stakeholder interests are also effective techniques for developing trust, since they show consideration of, and sensitivity to, the needs and interests of individual team members (Lander et al 2004).

"Group members are more concerned about trustworthiness when they feel they have a social bond with the authority and when they identify with the group in which the authority operates" (Tyler and Degoey 1996:333). Openness in confrontation of differences can make outcomes more effective, but parties are faced with the dilemma that some threshold of trust is required before people are willing to be open (Gabarro 1990). Parties that are in leadership roles, or higher-status parties in general, are in a safer position to model open behaviour, thereby leading to openness in others. In this way, leaders can play a critical function in initiating trusting behaviour in all parties, if they are willing to do so.

To use power effectively, gain acceptance of, and compliance with, social policies, authorities need to obtain legitimacy (Austin 1986). Legitimacy is a key basis of power and is granted by subordinate groups; it can be asked for, but not demanded, and it can not be earned without mutual trust or respect. Because of their jurisdictional authority, government agencies may emerge as the official, or unofficial, leaders of a collaborative organization. Over the years, scholars have found that leadership is

important to the strategic decision-making process, that it is a prerequisite to the existence of a stable cooperative system, and that to be effective, a leader must gain the team members' trust (Korsgaard et al 1995). If the leader has not managed to secure the team's trust, a lack of cooperation with decisions, unwillingness to share information, and sabotage of future decision-making processes may result. Because strategic decisions will not always be made by consensus, nor will a team leader's decisions always equally favour all members of a team, the team leader needs the trust of members to maintain direction over the process of making and implementing strategic decisions (Korsgaard et al 1995).

Trust may be seen as an institutional phenomenon within and between institutions, and between individuals and institutions (Bunker and Rubin 1995). Personal trust is based on repeated interactions, familiarity, interdependence, and continuity; it functions to reduce uncertainty in regularized social interactions. "Institutional trust develops when individuals must generalize their personal trust to large organizations made up of individuals with whom they have low familiarity, low interdependence, and low continuity of interaction" (Lewicki and Bunker 1995:137). It is dependent on, for example, the openness of the political system to citizen participation, objectivity of authorities in handling disputes, and perceived procedural justice of law enforcement.

A collaborative body may be seen as a conduit for the development of institutional trust – building trust in large organizations, such as senior governments, through interaction with individuals in a cooperative setting. Trust is more likely to develop in settings where the opportunity exists for repeated interaction on an intimate level, rather than in large, complex organizations (Kramer, Brewer, and Hanna 1996).

Participants look to the "shadow of the future": "the expectation of an ongoing

relationship that sustains trust in the actions of others" (quoted in Tyler and Kramer

1996:3). Through this sustained trust and consequent development of positive working

relationships, the members of the collaborative body can achieve their goals through

cooperation.

## 4.4 Procedural Justice

Attitudes toward leaders and authorities is linked to procedural justice, defined as

"the perceived fairness of the means used to make decisions" (Greenberg and Tyler

1987:129)[11]. "Trust in CEOs and other senior management usually is based less on direct

observation than on the efficiency and perceived fairness of organization-wide systems

created by individuals in these positions. ...[I]ndividuals are, in fact, more concerned

with the fairness of decision making processes than with the fairness of the outcomes of

those decisions" (Lander et al 2004:513). Individuals may evaluate the fairness of a

process through assessing the extent to which the procedures create consistent

allocations, suppress bias, are based on accurate information, are correctable, represent

the concerns of all recipients, and are based on prevailing moral and ethical standards

(Greenberg and Tyler 1987). The implication of this definition is that individuals will

react relatively positively to a decision, even if it is not in their favour, as long as they

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[11] The complement to procedural justice is distributional justice, which refers to the distribution of outcomes, or allocation of rewards or resources (e.g. Greenberg and Tyler 1987, Alexander and Ruderman 1987). Distributional justice very specifically concerns how happy individuals are with rewards or resources received, be they fish, salary, or accolades, rather than with the means for determining *how* those rewards or resources would be disseminated – that is the realm of procedural justice. Because DFO saw the AMB as an advisory board with no authority to allocate specific quantums of fish to the various user groups, the AMB was never a direct mechanism for distribution of resources, despite the fact that some members wanted to use the AMB as a means to right distributional justice. As well, despite the early emphasis on distributional justice, the literature now recognizes the lesser importance of distributional justice relative to procedural justice in assessing legitimacy and support for legal authorities (Folger and Konovsky 1989). Therefore, I will not examine distributional justice.

perceive the procedures used to arrive at that decision to be fair, and particularly if they have the opportunity to have a "voice" in the design of the process (Alexander and Ruderman 1987). However, individuals are more likely to consider the fairness of the decision-making process if it is not in their favour (Korsgaard et al 1995).

Consideration of members' input and their consequent influence on a decision affect their perceptions of procedural fairness and, consequently, their commitment to the decision, attachment to the group, and trust in its leader (Korsgaard et al 1995). Allowing members to have input into the decision-making process conveys the leader's affirmation of the status and value of the individuals, that they are respected, and that the leader is affording them some measure of control. However, merely having the opportunity to speak, without having an influence on the process does not ensure a perception of procedural fairness (Korsgaard et al 1995). Simply being allowed to speak, but not having any influence, may result in a perception of lower procedural justice than not having had any voice at all (Lind, Kanfer, and Earley 1990). Attachment to the group and the associated trust may diminish over time if leaders do not consider members' input – a phenomenon referred to as the "frustration effect" (Korsgaard et al 1995:77). An element of sincerity in incorporating input is critical in instilling trust in the decision makers.

While procedural justice writ large is "the structural quality of the decision process, the interactional justice [component of procedural justice] refers to a social exchange between two participants" (Cropanzano and Randall 1993:13). Interpersonally fair procedures exhibit four attributes: truthfulness, respect, propriety of questions, and justification, i.e. removing discontent following an unfair procedure (Cropanzano and

Randall 1993). Interactional justice itself consists of two components: whether reasons for a decision were clearly and adequately explained, and whether parties affected were treated with dignity and respect. Bies and Shapiro (1987) found that individuals' perceptions of interactional justice were more positive when decision makers gave causal accounts, or justifications for their decisions. Furthermore, the adequacy of the causal accounts played an important role in perceptions of procedural justice where the outcomes were unfavourable.

According to identity-based models of procedural justice, trust is linked to a sense of identity that people derive from their relationships with authorities (Tyler and Degoey 1996). All group members are agents and recipients of the collective actions, so that group members feel at least somewhat responsible for the group's behaviours (Brockner and Siegel 1996). The individuals' assessment of whether the group has acted fairly or unfairly has implications for their own self-esteem and self-identity, since procedural fairness implies trustworthiness. When procedural justice is high, the needs for self-esteem and self-identity are satisfied.

"Procedural justice has especially strong effects on attitudes about institutions or authorities, as opposed to attitudes about the specific outcome in question" (quoted in Folger and Konovsky 1989:116). People have an interest in how authorities treat them, since it has implications for feelings of self-worth and self-esteem, as well as for status within the group[12]. For example, individuals want to be treated with deference,

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[12] The extent to which people value procedural justice, and how they interpret procedural justice, however, is influenced by four dimensions of cultural variability (James 1993): (1) individualism versus collectivism (individual goals and experiences versus those of the group); (2) masculinity versus femininity (achievement and object focus versus quality of life and relationship focus); (3) uncertainty avoidance, or "the extent to which people feel threatened by ambiguous (social) situations and have created beliefs and institutions that try to avoid these" (James 1993:22); and (4) power-distance (power differentials that are

neutrality, and dignity, rather than with rudeness and disrespect. "To a large extent, individuals make justice appraisals based on the quality of the interpersonal treatment they receive" (Cropanzano and Randall 1993:12). The group value model states that people value group membership for social and psychological reasons, and not just economic ones; self-identity and self-esteem are at stake (Brockner and Siegel 1996). People define themselves on the basis of group membership, and their self-esteem depends partly on how the others in the group treat them. Fair procedures serve to help protect individuals' interests, as well as to give individuals their due over the long run if current decisions are not in their favour (Korsgaard et al 1995). They are also symbolic gestures that strengthen the individuals' relationships with the other group members, the leader, and the organization; they indicate value and respect, thereby promoting harmony and trust between individuals (Korsgaard et al 1995).

Tyler and Degoey found that "trust – if defined in terms of positive intent, rather than calculated risk – is especially important during times of crisis and conflict." (1996:345). Intent again relates to the ability, or competence, aspect of trust discussed above; it is the instrumental component of why people trust others. Trust is based on whether the authorities can provide good solutions to disputes or conflicts, although problem-solving competence was found to be less important than relational aspects or social motives in terms of voluntary acceptance of decisions (Tyler and Degoey 1996). "Interpersonal trust among stakeholders in consensus-seeking partnerships is explained by the perceived legitimacy and fairness of the negotiation process more so than by the

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natural, enduring, and based on the actor's characteristics versus power differentials imposed for particular purposes in particular situations). On average, Canadians tend to be "masculine" and lean toward confrontational procedures, rather than harmony-enhancing procedures for handling conflicts, although males and females may differ on this point.

partnership's track record of [implementing] mutually agreeable policies" (Leach and Sabatier 2005:491, emphasis in original). In other words, procedural justice is of greater importance than the authority's ability to solve a particular issue.

## *4.5  Ability*

An individual's expectations of trustworthiness are influenced by the trustee's attributes, such as ability, integrity, and benevolence, which the individual typically infers from his own past experience with the trustee or from information that she has learned about the trustee's reputation and intentions (Dunn and Schweitzer 2005). However, the lack of ability to successfully complete a particular function does not prove the lack of ability to successfully complete another. Lewicki, McAllister and Bies (1998) found that a single act of untrustworthy behaviour does not necessarily paint the individual as entirely untrustworthy; trust can be contextual and proof that someone is untrustworthy in one context, or in terms of a particular activity, does not preclude another from placing trust in the individual in a different context, or for a different activity. In either case, ultimately, the individual is relying on his or her own perceptions of the trustee's trustworthiness, based on what the individual knows about the trustee's characteristics.

Competence, reliability, and openness make up for a lack of initial liking or attraction between individuals (Gabarro 1978). If a party is an effective working partner, the other party may overlook undesirable social traits (Gabarro 1990). Mutual liking can develop from a good working relationship, more than vice versa, but task accomplishment is central to relationship evolution. Research shows "that in task-base dyads, a person's ability to perform effectively influences a number of interpersonal

outcomes, including the other person's willingness to grant autonomy, the development of trust, and the other person's evaluation – all of which are important to the relationship-formation process" (Gabarro 1990:93). Studies have found that anticipation of a successful project outcome is linked to two factors: the competence (or ability) of participants, and the achievement of significant pre-established milestones (Dunn and Schweitzer 2005). More importantly, trust may be based on the achievement of pre-established project milestones, again, indicating that one's ability to achieve objectives is linked to one's trustworthiness (Lander et al 2004).

In addition to strictly project-related outputs, ability may relate to skill in interpersonal matters: "Kotter found that developing a network of interpersonal relationships was critical to a general manager's ability to formulate and implement an agenda and that the quality of these relationships was a key determinant of managerial effectiveness" (Gabarro 1990:79-80). In this way, strong social skills increase one's ability to achieve a particular goal, which speaks well to one's trustworthiness. In complex organizations, the ability of subordinates is essential to successful completion of projects, since the managers can not be experts in every necessary function; therefore, the manager's ability to develop and maintain positive, trusting relationships with the subordinates also becomes very important. Additionally, if subordinates have good relationships with their managers, they take on more responsibility, contribute more, and perform better (Gabarro 1990).

The basis of trust can be separated into motivation or intent, and the de facto ability to behave in a trustworthy fashion. Trust should be lowest when the trustee is seen as lacking intent and ability (Brockner and Siegel 1996); thus, if an individual has

no intention of behaving in a trustworthy fashion, and does not even have the capacity to do so, naturally, this person will be received as untrustworthy. Ability to perform a particular function, however, has less of an effect on self-evaluation than collective intent; that is, if a group or individual has the intention to perform well, the inability to actually do so will have less of a negative impact on evaluation of their own trustworthiness than would the absence of the intention to make the attempt (Brockner and Siegel 1996). Lander et al (2004) also found that all stakeholder groups felt having capable individuals assigned to the project was an important success factor, but that a positive attitude and a willingness and ability to learn could, to some extent, mitigate some degree of weakness in initial capability.

## 4.6 Psychological State

Dunn and Schweitzer (2005) reviewed the literature on the effect of psychological states on judgment and applied that to situations specifically of judgments of trustworthiness. Social psychologists distinguish between emotions and moods, emotions being the more complex of the two: "Emotions can be characterized not only by the primary appraisal of valence [positive or negative feeling] but also by a number of secondary appraisals, including perceptions of certainty (e.g., how certain am I about the situation?), required attention and effort (e.g., how much attention do I need to devote to this situation?), and control over the outcome (e.g., to what extent am I, another person, or exogenous factors responsible for this situation?)" (Dunn and Schweitzer 2005:737). Moods, on the other hand, relate only to the valence, either positive or negative, of the individual's psychological state; they tend to last for a longer period of time than emotional states, and are less intense.

"[I]ncidental emotions significantly influence trust in unrelated settings....
[However,] [e]motions do not influence trust when individuals are aware of the source of
their emotions or when individuals are very familiar with the trustee" (Dunn and
Schweitzer 2005:736). Positive emotions increase trust, while negative emotions
decrease it. Further, "emotions characterized by other-person control (anger and
gratitude) and weak control appraisals (happiness) influence trust significantly more than
emotions characterized by personal control (pride and guilt) or situational control
(sadness)" (Dunn and Schweitzer 2005:736). Similarly, Gabarro (1990:94) found that
"interpersonal trust as related to openness is a two-factor variable comprising a person-
specific, attitudinal factor, which is broad-based and stable, and a situation-specific
factor, which is less stable and is situationally contingent." Thus, anger caused through
an interaction with an individual in an unrelated exchange can have a negative impact on
the development of trust as it carries over into other situations, especially if the individual
is unaware of the emotion, or of the genesis of it.

Two models emerge pertaining to the effect mood has on judgment: the affect-as-
information model and the affect infusion model (Dunn and Schweitzer 2005). The
affect-as-information model posits that individuals often misattribute their mood to a
judgment at hand, meaning that an individual's mood at a given time may colour his/her
perception of how s/he feels about the decision to be made. That is, a negative mood
may lead the individual to perceive that s/he feels negatively about the issue, when in fact
the reason for the negative mood may be unrelated. This misattribution is more likely to
occur under certain conditions, such as when the individual is unaware of what is causing

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their mood, whether positive or negative; or when the judgments to be made are complex and/or affective in nature, i.e. related to issues that provoke an emotional reaction.

The affect infusion model suggests that the influence that mood will have on an individual's judgment depends on the type of judgment with which the individual is faced. The type of judgment may refer simply to a situation where the individual is unfamiliar with the trustee. In their own work, Dunn and Schweitzer (2005) found that incidental emotions affected trust significantly more, both positively and negatively, between unfamiliar parties than for familiar ones. Thus, the more familiar an individual is with the trustee, the more likely the individual is to be able to assess the other party's trustworthiness objectively, and not be swayed by his/her present state of mind.

Lerner and Keltner (2001) found that while angry people generally exhibit lower levels of trust compared to happy or sad people, they are more optimistic in terms of risk assessments than fearful people, although different appraisals of control mediated this relationship. Again, anger is characterized by other-person control, thus the level of anger, and therefore, the level of trust, is influenced by the extent to which the individual blames the other person for a particular situation. More generally, studies have shown that the appraisal of other-person control tends to mediate the relationship between incidental emotions and trust – the more control the individuals perceive that they have over the situation, the less their incidental emotions will influence their appraisals of the other party's trustworthiness (Dunn and Schweitzer 2005). (See section 4.2 Power and Control for more on this dynamic.)

Lerner and Keltner's (2001) result regarding risk assessment is important because, as per the definitions of trust listed above, the element of risk is critical in the

development of trust. This finding may bode well for volatile situations where individuals often exhibit anger and their continued participation is partly contingent upon their assessment of the risk of doing so, i.e. whether the attempt to develop and maintain the relationship is worth the risk of betrayal. Another important point to note is that Dunn and Schweitzer (2005) found that angry participants who were aware of the cause of their emotions displayed the same level of trust as the happy participants. Therefore anger did not preclude the development of trust. In fact, trusting behaviour may have a hedonic foundation: individuals experience pleasure as a consequence of the behaviour (Kramer, Brewer, and Hanna 1996). Individuals can anticipate the pleasurable states associated with positive, pro-social acts, as well as the negative states of guilt and fear associated with acts that violate collective trust. Consequently, this anticipation of either positive or negative states will push individuals to cooperate, either to pursue the positive state or to avoid the negative one.

## 4.7   Individual Factors

Because this research is interpretive, and is not based on a methodology that targeted individual personality characteristics or fundamental beliefs, these aspects of trust formation will not form part of the analysis. That said, an analysis of the development of trust must at least acknowledge the potential influence of individual factors on the process. Further examination of this aspect of trust development is beyond the scope of this work.

Studying development of relationships is methodologically difficult because of the effects of individual personality and predispositions, as well as the different levels and types of behaviours, such as affective, overt, evaluative, cognitive, verbal, and non-

verbal (Gabarro 1990). As noted above, one of the many definitions of trust is that it is

"a state involving confident positive expectation about another's motives with respect to

oneself in situations entailing risk" (Boon and Holmes 1991:194). This conception of

trust is based on one's chronic disposition toward trust, which is based in one's

personality from childhood; situational parameters, and the history of the relationship.

McKnight, Cummings, and Chervany (1998) posit that initial trust between parties is not

based on experience or first-hand knowledge of the other party, but rather on an

individual's disposition to trust.

## 4.8   Summary

Here I revisit the questions asked at the beginning of this section in order to

summarize and synthesize the discussion above:

1. Why do people trust others?  This question relates to the decision to trust at a very

   basic, or even visceral, level, rather than to a measured analysis of whether one is

   trustworthy.  In brief, people trust others for the following reasons:

**Table 2. Why People Trust**

| Moral Evaluation | they believe that trusting is a moral duty in and of itself (Tyler and Kramer 1996; Hosmer 1995) |
|---|---|
|  | their decision to trust derives from their values and ideology (Tyler and Kramer 1996; Kramer, Brewer, and Hanna 1996) |
|  | they share ideologies, or feel some connection or identification with the group (Tyler and Kramer 1996) |
| Power and Control | they possess greater power, thereby increasing their willingness to engage in trust behaviour due to being in a less vulnerable position (Lander et al 2004; Vanderslice 1995; Gabarro 1990) |
| Attitude Toward Leaders, Authorities, and Institutions | they have a social bond with the authority (Tyler and Degoey 1996) |
|  | they generalize their personal trust to large organizations (institutional trust) (Lewicki and Bunker 1995) |

**Table 2. Why People Trust cont.**

| Ability | they possess strong social skills and therefore have the inherent ability to engage in trust behaviour (Gabarro 1990) |
|---|---|
| Psychological States | they have a positive state of mind, or "are in a good mood" (Dunn and Schweitzer 2005) |
| | they anticipate the pleasure of behaving in a trustworthy fashion, thereby experiencing hedonic effects (Kramer, Brewer, and Hanna 1996) |
| Individual Factors | their personalities from childhood predispose them to engage in trusting and/or trustworthy behaviour (Boon and Holmes 1991; McKnight, Cummings, and Chervany 1998) |

2. What sort of evaluations do people make about the other or about the situation that lead them to choose to trust or not to trust? This is a slightly different question than the previous one, which dealt with the fundamental reason for *engaging* in trusting behaviour, rather than an assessment of whether a particular individual is deemed to be trustworthy. Individuals may assess:

**Table 3. Criteria for Evaluating Trustworthiness**

| Moral Evaluation | the quality (good/bad) of the relationship itself or of the situation that created the need for the relationship (why the relationship exists) (Austin 1986) |
|---|---|
| Power and Control | the willingness of those in power to share responsibility, control (jurisdiction), or influence (Gustafsson 2005; Lander et al 2004; Vangen and Huxham 2003) |
| | whether the other party shares the credit for successes (Vangen and Huxham 2003) |
| Attitude Toward Leaders, Authorities, and Institutions | familiarity with the other (Tyler and Degoey 1996; Bunker and Rubin 1995; Lewicki and Bunker 1995) |
| | interdependence with the other (Korsgaard et al 1995; Bunker and Rubin 1995; Lewicki and Bunker 1995) |
| | continuity of the relationship (Lewicki and Bunker 1995) |
| | dependability, behavioural consistency and integrity (Whitener et al 1998; Lander et al 2004) |
| | individual consistency of word and deed (Lander et al 2004) |
| | openness of individual communication (Gabarro 1990) |
| | openness of the political system to citizen participation (Lewicki and Bunker 1995) |
| | demonstration of concern and respect for others and their specific interests (Tyler and Degoey 1996) |

**Table 3. Criteria for Evaluating Trustworthiness cont.**

| Attitude Toward Leaders, Authorities, and Institutions cont. | consideration of, and sensitivity to, the needs and interests of individual team members (Lander et al 2004) |
|---|---|
| | willingness to offer a prompt and genuine apology (Lander et al 2004) |
| | objectivity in handling disputes (Lewicki and Bunker 1995) |
| Ability | individual characteristics, such as demonstrated ability, integrity, benevolence, competence, or reliability (Dunn and Schweitzer 2005; Gabarro 1978; Lander et al 2004) |
| | given a lack of demonstrated ability, whether the individual possesses a positive attitude and a willingness and ability to learn (Gabarro 1990; Lander et al 2004) |
| Psychological States | perceptions of certainty about the situation or individual (Dunn and Schweitzer 2005) |
| | required attention and effort (Dunn and Schweitzer 2005) |
| | control over the situation, in terms of one's ability to affect the emotional state of another or to control one's own emotions (Dunn and Schweitzer 2005) |
| | positive or negative valence (Dunn and Schweitzer 2005; Lerner and Keltner 2001) |
| Procedural Justice | perceived justice of law enforcement (Korsgaard et al 1995) |
| | perceived justice of decision making, comprising:<br>• the extent to which the procedures create consistent allocations, suppress bias, are based on accurate information, are correctable, represent the concerns of all recipients, and are based on prevailing moral and ethical standards<br>• whether the recipients have had the opportunity to influence the process<br>(e.g. Lander et al 2004; Greenberg and Tyler 1987; Alexander and Ruderman 1987; Korsgaard et al 1995) |
| | interactional justice, comprising:<br>• truthfulness, respect, propriety of questions, and justification, i.e. removing discontent following an unfair procedure<br>• whether reasons for a decision were clearly and adequately explained, and whether parties affected were treated with dignity and respect<br>(Cropanzano and Randall 1993; Bies and Shapiro 1987) |

We can see that the foundation of trust is highly complex and multifaceted, based on a myriad of criteria, both innate and experiential. Different individuals have different

values and employ different criteria, as well as varying quantities of criteria, for assessing

trustworthiness, which further complicates development of trust. Given the complexity

of this process and the numerous factors to consider, individuals may even develop too

much trust in another, giving way to possible free-riding, manipulation, and undermining

of the effectiveness of the collaboration. I will discuss this phenomenon further in the

next section.

## 5.0   A Word on Excessive Trust

Open acts of confidence in others tend to breed confidence, so that collective trust becomes institutionalized over time. Public affirmations and displays of trust affirm the importance or value of the individuals' membership in the organization. These affirmations have demonstrative value by communicating respect and liking of other group members, and signal to the others the importance assigned to preserving collective trust (Kramer, Brewer, and Hanna 1996). Similarly, while stakeholder groups in a complex collaborative body expressed disagreement as to the importance of showing concern for others, they unanimously agreed that demonstrating mutual respect was critical to project success, particularly when navigating equivocal or contentious issues (Lander et al 2004). However, affirmations of trust also create vulnerability, exposure to risk, and costs of misplaced trust, leaving the individual feeling, or being seen as, naïve, weak, or gullible (Kramer, Brewer, and Hanna 1996).

If individuals come to trust others too much, they may perceive a reduced need for personal action because one will assume that the others will act for the common good (Kramer, Brewer, and Hanna 1996). Too much trust may beget free-riding, or the presumption that someone else has already done the necessary work. Individuals may also too easily defer to others, either because they are suppressing their doubts or because they are engaging in severe self-censorship; they may ignore discrepancies in others' perceptions and just try to make sense of them (Kramer, Brewer, and Hanna 1996). A strong, successful leader can lead to dependency and degeneration of democratic decision making. "Even when leaders facilitate inclusion, participation, and cooperation, members may still feel dependent on their guidance" (Vanderslice 1995:195).

Because it is difficult to know what motivates others to engage in trusting behaviour, individuals will pay closer attention to others' action or inaction. Vigilance increases as costs of misplaced trust increase, and distrust invites further distrust. Individuals will proactively seek information to decrease vulnerability and uncertainty, and may also engage in behaviour to provide clarity to others; thus, trust often involves acts to reduce ambiguity. These attempts to assure others of one's trustworthiness may be seen as "cheap talk", but they may be useful in relatively benign situations (Kramer, Brewer, and Hanna 1996).

The concepts of reconciling discrepancies and cognitive dissonance surface again and again in the trust literature. For example, the "sacrific trap" describes a situation in which "once people are coerced, or even better, persuaded, into making sacrifices, their identity becomes bound up with the community organization for which the sacrifices were made. Admitting to one's self [sic] that one's sacrifices were in vain is a deep threat to identity and is always sharply resisted" (Boulding 1988:288). The dilemma, however, is that misplaced distrust can result in lost opportunity and gains, reducing the likelihood of incremental benefits of reciprocal exchange (Kramer, Brewer, and Hanna 1996). The result is possible damage to the reputation of one or both parties, and consequent defensive behaviour; the process of developing trust may be thrown into reverse as trust is diminished due to unsubstantiated concerns about the other party. "A damaged reputation is difficult to restore and 'trust…is never hard to destroy'" (quoted in Blois 1999:211).

Lewicki et al (1998:453) "contend that functional coexistence of trust and distrust may be a central component in high-performance teams." Distrust gives rise to

questioning and voicing of differences of opinion that may be essential for effective

group functioning; it is the impetus for critical thought and the general challenging of

ideas that prevent "groupthink" or excessive adherence to less than optimal decisions.

On the other hand, sufficient trust must exist in order to give individuals the confidence

to voice the questioning and alternative perspectives born of distrust. Ambivalence is to

be expected in complex, evolving relationships where uncertainty and conflict are

commonplace. However, with the understanding that some measure of distrust serves a

purpose, it becomes problematic when the possibility of trustworthiness is summarily

dismissed. "Ultimately, the functional co-existence of trust and distrust may be a

necessary precondition for the emergence of 'hot groups' and 'good fights'" (Lewicki et

al 1998:453).

In the next chapter, I will provide a framework for the development of trust,

which will assist in contextualizing the above foundations of trust, and will clarify where

in the trust development process these elements and foundations discussed throughout

this chapter are particularly important, and where excessive trust can become

problematic.

# Chapter Two

# The Analytical Framework for Measuring the Development of Trust

## 1.0 The Basis of the Framework

In this chapter, I will construct an analytical framework for measuring the development of trust. Schlager (1999) discusses the differences between frameworks, theories, and models. "Frameworks provide a foundation for inquiry by specifying classes of variables and general relationships among them, that is, how the general class of variables loosely fit together into a coherent structure. Thus, frameworks organize inquiry, but they can not in and of themselves provide explanations for, or predictions of, behavior and outcomes" (Schlager 1999:234). Theories derive from frameworks, propose relationships between the variables defined in the frameworks, and make predictions, while models test hypotheses derived from the theories.

My method has elements of all three of these explanatory tools, but most closely resembles the framework. I intend to identify particular behaviours and attitudes as they present themselves in language. My framework does have some explanatory capacity in that the synthesis of the elements and foundations discussed in Chapter One, and the models I will discuss in this chapter, suggest reasons for particular behaviours, and the framework does predict that specific elements and foundations will be more relevant to particular phases of trust development. Given the beginnings of explanation and prediction possible through my framework, it may be referred to as a theoretical, or an

analytical, framework. For the sake of simplicity, however, I will refer to it throughout the rest of this paper simply as "the framework".

The path to this framework was a long and tortuous one. My two years of observing the AMB impressed upon me the importance of positive interpersonal relationships and the need for trust in effective collaborations. Upon embarking on my literature review, I found a vast body of research from a bewildering array of disciplines debating the importance and relevance of trust. Because I was interested in the interpersonal aspects of collaboration, I chose to focus mainly on the social psychological literature, and to take the position that trust was, in fact, vital to the success of collaborative endeavours. I then sifted through that literature, selecting those studies pertaining to trust development in the context of collaboration in a non-experimental setting. Through that exercise, I noted the prevalence of references to fairness, thereby coming upon the organizational management literature's treatment of procedural justice in trust development. These two bodies of literature formed the basis for my research.

Two topics emerged through my review: a number of studies discussed the function and need for trust in collaboration, while others discussed what trustworthiness was and how individuals came to decide whether an individual possessed the characteristic of trustworthiness. Within these two topics, I noted a number of commonalities, which I synthesized into types of functions and antecedents of trust, and types of evaluation criteria for assessing trustworthiness. These two topics, and the types of functions, antecedents, and criteria within them, came to form what I would eventually term the elements and foundations of trust, respectively (see Chapter One, sections 3.0 Elements of Trust and 4.0 Foundations of Trust). I then realized that I required a means

to organize and relate these elements and foundations to each other in order to analyze the data, hence the construction of the framework.

The framework is derived from two models. It includes some components of the Model of the Development of Working Relationships (Gabarro 1990), which describes an entire cycle of trust development, from initial stages to stabilization. The framework, however, is largely based on the Model of Trust Development and Decline (Lewicki and Bunker 1995, Lewicki and Bunker 1996), which goes further to describe the diminution of trust. These models of trust development, as well as others (e.g. Lander et al 2004, Tuckman www.infed.org/thinkers/tuckman.htm, accessed May 15, 2007) consistently describe levels or stages of trust, with one setting the foundation for the other. In order to relate these models to the elements and foundations, I extracted prevalent themes from my discussions in Chapter One on each of the elements and foundations, and inserted these as indicators or "components" of each of elements and foundations, assigning them to specific phases of trust development, based on my own interpretation of the point in the trust development cycle at which individuals would rely on a particular element and foundation.

I also considered incorporating the Boundary-role Model (Holmes, Ellard and Lamm 1986), which focuses mainly on trust development in the early, conflictual stages of trust. It is a model of the behaviour of representatives of organizations, based on role conflict in organizational settings. Much of the model discusses the relationships between the representatives and their "in-groups" and how that relationship affects the representative's relationship with the "out-group", and vice versa. I found, however, that because this model describes a situation where competing organizations have arrived at a

situation of insurmountable conflict, giving rise to a need for negotiation through representatives, this model was more applicable to the situation leading up to the formation of the AMB, rather than to the interactions on the AMB itself. As well, this model largely depends upon knowledge of the climate between the representatives and their in-groups, an aspect on which I have no data. While this theory may have been instructive in helping us to understand the emotions and undercurrents behind the behaviour at the AMB meetings, I chose to discard this model, rather than speculating upon the influence of those relationships on their behaviour, or expanding the scope of this study to the prehistory of the AMB.

A violation of trust can reduce the level of trust, send trust back to a previous, lower level, as well as change the mechanisms used to develop trust (Lander et al 2004). As with the first model I will explore below, within these levels of trust, one can identify particular aspects of the relationship that tend to change as trust increases (see Table 4). All of these models offer valid and relevant frameworks for this analysis; at the conclusion of the discussion of the two models, I will summarize the commonalities that I will employ to examine trust development on the AMB. Finally, I will create a framework for measuring trust development by situating the elements and foundations discussed in Chapter One in the models discussed in this chapter.

## 1.1 Model of the Development of Working Relationships

Working relationships evolve through four stages, according to Gabarro's Model on the Development of Working Relationships (Gabarro 1990), which I here describe in brief. The stages below are based on archetype issues, not on the "goodness" or positiveness of the relationship, i.e. relationships can progress through these stages

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regardless of the quality of the interpersonal exchange. Thus, despite reaching the final stage of stabilization, one or both parties may still see the relationship as not fully effective or satisfying.

- **Orientation and Impression Formation**: This stage lasts for the first several weeks of the relationship. It consists of first impressions, and extended, less stereotypical interactions, where trust is impressionistic and undifferentiated, i.e. not dependent on context. Individuals have no personal influence on each other, question each other's motives, exchange general expectations for the relationship, and try to gain an initial understanding of their future working together.

- **Exploration and Moving Beyond Impressions**: For the first several months of the relationship, expectations become more specific and concrete. Individuals experience rapid learning of the other's important assumptions and expectations, and communicate their own. They assert personal identities, styles, and values, and confirm or reject first impressions of the other. Exploration of more concrete expectations about goals, roles, and priorities takes place, and the parties clarify differences with regard to these. They explore trust in terms of motives, competence, consistency, and openness, and explore positional and personal attributes.

- **Testing and Defining the Interpersonal Contract**: For the first six months, or more than a year, the parties test minimal expectations, existing trust, and limits of personal influence; thus, they define the limits of the interpersonal contract. They test mutuality of expectations, bases and limits of trust and influence, and work through differences. Parties assess the possibility and costs of mutual accommodation, and define the stabilized expectations for roles and bases for trust and influence.

- **Stabilization**: At this stage, the parties have firmly defined the interpersonal contract and they need make little further effort in learning and testing each other. Expectations, trust, and influence undergo little change; a major event or change would be needed to destabilize the relationship. The parties take steps to repair negative episodes or feelings, ensure a continued productive relationship, adapt as the situation arises or as needs change, and if the relationship does become destabilized, they rework the relationship from an earlier stage.

What is immediately apparent in this characterization of the stages of trust building is that they are not mutually exclusive; the first three stages, in fact, overlap temporally, which speaks to the complexity of processes and mechanisms taking place during the beginning of the working relationship. As well, according to this model, the first stage is quite short, lasting only several weeks. In the case of the AMB, because they only met bimonthly for two days at a time, I predict that this stage will reveal itself to be considerably longer on average, although that may vary by individual[13]. Gabarro describes his dimensions as "dyadic", i.e. between two individuals; however, I will examine the development of trust on the AMB as a whole in this stage through the application of the dimensions below in Table 4.

Gabarro mentions influence a number of times; his model elaborates two types of influence, positional and personal. Positional bases of influence he defines as the power to structure tasks of others, to reward and punish, to allocate or control scarce resources,

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[13] With the limited amount of data used for this analysis (those quotes falling into the "Process" category), defining exactly how long this stage was overall and for each individual would be very difficult to do with any accuracy. My prediction that this stage would be longer for the AMB is based on a logical deduction that meeting for two days over the course of two months will not produce the same results as meeting daily over the same period; therefore, this stage could not be completed over the course of a simple chronological measurement of several weeks. It is also based on my impressions of the individuals and their communication styles.

and to direct another person, as in legitimate authority. Personal bases of influence relate to the ability to create common goals, personal credibility, charisma, decisiveness, and the willingness to use power, if necessary. "To some degree, it is artificial to discuss the development of trust, mutual expectations, and influence as separate processes because, in reality, they are so closely interrelated" (Gabarro 1990:294). However, trust and influence become more differentiated with continued interaction, moving from impressionistic in the early stages to specific in the later ones. Two broad categories of dimensions exist along which attributions of trust are differentiated: (1) character-based (trust in the other's integrity, motives and intentions, consistency of behaviour, openness and discreteness; and (2) competence-based (trust in the other's functional or specific competence, interpersonal competence, and "general business judgment"). Here we see an echoing of the foundations of trust described in the previous chapter.

For a working relationship to develop effectively, mutual understanding and richness of knowledge must increase, so communication is imperative. Mutual knowledge moves from general and impressionistic to specific and concrete; task-relevant openness is as important as self-disclosure in intimate relationships. The depth of mutual investment that occurs in intimate relationships, however, will not occur in working relationships, unless doing so is beneficial overall, that is, that more pros than cons exist. Table 4 below summarizes the specific changes that relationships undergo in the process of moving from initial encounters to an effective working relationship.

**Table 4. Summary of Dyadic Dimensions along which Working Relationships Develop (Adapted from Gabarro 1990)**

| Dimension | From | To |
|---|---|---|
| Openness and self-disclosure | Limited to "safe," socially acceptable topics | Disclosure goes beyond safe areas to include personally sensitive, private, and controversial topics and aspects of self |
| Knowledge of each other | Surface, "biographic" knowledge; impressionistic in nature | Knowledge is multifaceted and extends to core aspects of personality, needs, and style |
| Predictability of other's reactions and responses | Limited to socially expected or role-related responses, and those based on first impressions or repeated surface encounters | Predictability of other's reactions extends beyond stereotypical exchange and includes a knowledge of the contingencies affecting the other's reactions |
| Uniqueness of interaction | Exchanges are stereotypical, guided by prevailing social norms or role expectations | Includes multiple modalities of communication, including nonverbal and verbal "shorthands" specific to the relationship or the individuals involved; less restrictiveness of nonverbal |
| Substitutability of communication | Little substitution among alternative modes of communication | Possession of and ability to use alternative modes of communication to convey the same message |
| Capacity for managing conflict and evaluation | Limited capacity for conflict; use of conflict-avoidance techniques; reluctance to criticize | Readiness and ability to express conflict and make positive or negative evaluations |
| Spontaneity of exchange | Interactions tend to be formal or "comfortably informal" as prescribed by prevailing social norms | Greater informality and ease of interaction; movement across topical areas occurs readily and without hesitation or formality; communication flows and changes direction easily |

The reader may note that these dimensions imply interaction in the context of a

casual conversation, rather than discussion of a specific topic related to a business

partnership. However, on closer examination, the underlying tone is that of comfort level

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with the other individual, regardless of the subject matter or of the valence of the exchange, which is a manifestation of the level of trust between individuals. However, because I did not record the casual conversations between pairs of Board members during break times, I am unable to assess Gabarro's model in terms of dyadic interactions. Nonetheless, the model is still applicable, but in a different fashion. Because the analysis is based on discussions in meetings regarding resource management, rather than on conversations between two individuals attempting to become acquainted, I will measure dimensions such as knowledge of each other, not in terms of biographical information in the strict sense, but as references to the member's expectations for the Board, or personal experiences in terms of the fishery, for example.

Given the different context, I will not examine the data for each individual dimension; instead, I have grouped them, since they overlap and are not as easily distinguishable in conversations with a larger group of individuals and in a strictly business environment. In the context of the AMB, Gabarro's seven dimensions fall into three groups: 1) those relating to candour and comfort with each other (openness and self-disclosure, knowledge of each other, and spontaneity of exchange); 2) those relating to the extent of divergence from social norms (predictability of other's reactions and responses, and uniqueness of interaction and substitutability of communication); and 3) capacity for conflict and evaluation falls into its own category. Regarding the second category, the analysis is, of necessity, somewhat limited, given that I am examining mainly written language and do not have the luxury of examining non-verbal communication, except in terms of my own recollection of the members' general behaviour, rather than in relation to a specific quote.

While we may assume that a relationship that has suffered a decline in trust may exhibit behaviour more akin to those listed in the "from" column in Table 4, Gabarro does not discuss specifically how to repair trust, other than to mention "reworking" trust in the stabilization stage. Neither does he elaborate on what may cause trust to decline. Lewicki and Bunker's (1995, 1996) model below, however, while somewhat echoing Gabarro's conception of the stages of trust, gives us a much more detailed foundation for understanding the dynamics of the complete cycle of trust, through development, stabilization, decline, and rebuilding.

## 1.2 Model of Trust Development and Decline

Lewicki and Bunker (1995, 1996) developed a comprehensive model of trust development, maintenance, and decline in work relationships. Because this model forms the basis of the data analysis below, I will describe it in detail. They begin by comparing the stages involved in developing work relationships to those in a romantic relationship (Lewicki and Bunker 1996). While task-based relationships differ from social ones in that they are subject to different situational and contextual forces (Gabarro 1990), the main message that Lewicki and Bunker relate is that no relationship is static:

- Stage 1 is the romantic love stage, dominated by positive feelings and idealization, where love is equated with trust, and hope overshadows fears of the relationship ending.

- Stage 2 is the evaluative stage where the parties step back, weighing the pros and cons of the relationship, seeing imperfections in the other. They engage in reciprocal self-disclosure, and determine whether the other's responsiveness is genuine.

- Stage 3 is the accommodative stage characterized by negotiation of conflicting needs, expectations, and perceived incompatibilities. Trust is solidified, and the parties take a leap of faith that the relationship will survive.

Lewicki and Bunker's (1995) conception of working relationships also develops through three stages, bearing some resemblance to the process outlined above:

- Stage 1 is deterrence-based (or calculus-based) trust, where parties focus on the others' consistency of behaviour, i.e. that they do what they say they are going to do. This type of trust and consistent behaviour is sustained by threat of punishment.

- Stage 2 is knowledge-based trust, where the parties have developed behavioural predictability, such that one has enough knowledge of the other to understand them and to be able to accurately predict behaviour. Parties can understand actions, thoughts, and intentions well enough to predict behaviour.

- Stage 3 is identification-based trust, characterized by full internalization of the other parties' desires and intentions. Each party fully understands, empathizes with, and endorses what the other wants, and can act for the other without the need for monitoring the other's behaviour. Parties trust that the other will not act harmfully, so that no surveillance is required, and each believes that the other will protect and defend his or her interests.

Calculus-based trust and knowledge-based trust are mostly cognitively based, while identification-based trust is mostly emotionally based, although all three types have both components. The three types of trust are linked and sequential, with identification-based trust being the highest level. However, the stages are not necessarily linear; parties may bounce back and forth between stages, rather than permanently leaving one stage as

the subsequent stage is reached, and identification-based trust may never be reached. As well, the stages are not necessarily discrete; a relationship may have characteristics of all three stages. I will examine these stages more closely below.

## 1.2.1 Calculus-based trust

Calculus-based trust (CBT) is based on behaviour control through fear of punishment for violating trust, as well as on the rewards to be derived from preserving it, hence CBT comprises a component of self-interest (Lewicki and Bunker 1995). It is a market-oriented view of trust, measuring the pros and cons of engaging in a relationship, assessing one's ability to get the other party to do what one wants, examining the benefits to be derived from staying in the relationship, the benefits to be derived from cheating on the relationship, the costs of staying in the relationship, and the costs of breaking it. The behaviour control aspect plays into the success of negotiations, since negotiation is defined as "discussion aimed at reaching an agreement that changes behaviour on one or both sides" (Pruitt and Olczak 1995:67). Parties engage in trustworthy behaviour for the sake of building a good reputation, and to avoid other parties spreading rumours of untrustworthiness amongst their network: "...at this stage, the deterrence elements will be a more dominant 'motivator' than the benefit-seeking elements" (Lewicki and Bunker 1996:120). In order for the threat of deterrence to be effective:

1. loss of interaction must outweigh the profit from defecting

2. the potentially harmed party must be willing to harm, or withdraw benefits from, the other parties, in a form of behaviour control

3. the parties must be willing to monitor each other, and be willing to communicate a violation of trust

"Upside" and "downside" calculations of CBT may be shaped by one's orientation to risk, which predisposes a party to being exploited or toward being suspicious. (Individual aspects of personality development will not be examined here.) Another point to remember is that trust is fragile and partial – it can take one step forward and two steps back. Three vehicles for ensuring continued trust through deterrence are (Lewicki and Bunker 1995):

1. Repeated interactions: in each transaction, each party derives some benefit from the other; as trust grows, interdependence becomes multifaceted, so that if the relationship is broken, each party has multiple ways to hurt the other. Trust violations jeopardize the relationship and undermine future interdependencies.

2. Degree of interdependence and alternative relationships: a distrustful interaction can spread from one aspect of a multifaceted relationship to another. As the number of interdependencies increases within a relationship, the number outside it decreases. Therefore, trust erosion can affect transactions with the other party, as well as affect the number of alternatives.

3. Personal reputation as a hostage: if trust is violated, reputation can be tarnished throughout one's network. People invest resources to develop a reputation of honesty or trustworthiness.

While CBT is only the first stage of trust development, parties may not necessarily move beyond it (Lewicki and Bunker 1995). They may remain at this first stage if the relationship does not require more than arms-length or business transactions; if interdependence is heavily bounded and regulated by formal, legal, or organizational arrangements, such as contracts or agreements; if parties have sufficient information

about each other, and further information-gathering would be unnecessary or unproductive, e.g. if parties have little in common, or do not like what they have seen and do not want to know more about the other party; or if CBT has been violated at least once, and the parties are leery of further developing the relationship.

## 1.2.2 Knowledge-based Trust

While calculus-based trust is based on behaviour control, knowledge-based trust (KBT) is based on information about the other, not control (Lewicki and Bunker 1995). During the KBT stage, parties build knowledge of each other, gather "data" in different contexts, experiencing the other's range of emotions and behaviours. Trust is not necessarily broken by inconsistent behaviour, as long as the other party believes they can explain the behaviour, even if it has created costs. Parties are forgiven and move on. KBT is grounded in the other's predictability, so that behaviour can be anticipated. It relies on information gathered from a history of interaction; judgements of the other are based on cumulative experience with them (Kramer, Brewer, and Hanna 1996).

While parties may be able to predict that the other will behave in a trustworthy manner, even being able to predict untrustworthy behaviour can enhance trust (Lewicki and Bunker 1996). "It may be argued that the key to success lies in the ability to predict others' behaviour and that trust management is about managing the risk and vulnerability inherent in the collaborative situation" (Vangen and Huxham 2003:26). While trust is tied to the predictability of others, it also is based on knowing the consequences of one's own actions, i.e. how others will react toward one's behaviour (Kramer, Brewer, and Hanna 1996). Knowing that the other party will respond to a particular action with an

untrustworthy behaviour allows one to avoid these actions and take a different tack to elicit a more favourable response.

This type of trust develops over repeated interactions in multidimensional relationships. Regular communication and courtship are key; "courtship" here is defined as learning more about the other, "interviewing," observing, experiencing various emotional stages, and learning how others view this behaviour (Lewicki and Bunker 1995). "Courtship permits actors to gain enough information to determine whether the parties can work together well, whether compatibility in style, approach, and preferences exist" (Lewicki and Bunker 1995:150). Causal attributions one makes of the other's behaviour are critical to deciding whether the other can be trusted, and if so, how much (Kramer, Brewer, and Hanna 1996). Through regular communication, parties may come to understand the way the other approaches the world and compare it with their own. Without regular communication, parties can lose touch emotionally, as well as in terms of being able to think and/or react like the other.

## 1.2.3 Identification-based Trust

Identification-based trust (IBT) is the most highly-developed form of trust. A number of authors have weighed in on the topic, referring to it variously as IBT (e.g. Lewicki and Bunker 1995), or as group identification (e.g. Lander et al 2004). Kramer, Brewer and Hanna (1996:359) articulate the importance of IBT: "The willingness of individuals to engage in trust behaviour situations requiring collective action is tied to the salience and strength of their identification with an organization and its members". Lander et al (2004) list five trust-building mechanisms believed to generate this sense of group identification: (1) co-location of group members, (2) the ready availability of group

members to participate in activities, (3) the degree of attachment to the group, structural

and psychological, (4) meaningful participation in group activities, and (5) the frequency

and duration of group interactions. Repeated group interactions engender shared vision

and meaning, and foster cohesiveness. Other authors have also identified co-location, as

well as other activities similar to the above list, to strengthen IBT, including developing a

collective identity (a joint name, title, logo, etc.); creating joint projects or goals, whether

a new product line or a new set of objectives, and committing to commonly shared values

and objectives so that they can substitute for each other in external transactions (Lewicki

and Bunker 1996).

Parties may possess a strong belief in the critical role played by group interactions

and group identification in the development and maintenance of trust amongst

stakeholders (Lander et al 2004). Identification-based trust is characterized by strong

empathy, incorporating others' needs into one's own psyche as a collective identity

develops. Parties play off each others' strengths, compensating for weaknesses, and

knowing when to lead and when to follow (Lewicki and Bunker 1996). IBT is

identification with the others' desires and intentions, understanding and appreciating the

others' wants. Each can effectively act for the other; no surveillance or monitoring is

necessary. "A true affirmation of the strength of identity-based trust between parties is

found when one party acts for the other even more zealously than the other might"

(Lewicki and Bunker 1995:151).

This zeal, however, can be counterproductive if the other parties see it as

exaggerated, resulting in loss of credibility. As IBT increases, one may come to

understand what one must do to sustain the other's trust, but it is possible that IBT will

foster an overestimation of reciprocity or leniency. Such a situation may lead individuals to persevere beyond the point where such behaviour is prudent, resulting in misplaced trust (Kramer, Brewer, and Hanna 1996). An individual may feel that other members of a collective will perceive a given trust dilemma in a similar fashion and that they will act in a similar fashion; this common categorization may inflate judgments of consensus. Assumptions of similarity and consensus provide a basis for action, such that the individual perceives a reduced risk that he or she will be the only person thinking and acting in collective terms (the "sucker") (Kramer, Brewer, and Hanna 1996).

The world can be viewed through the lens of group norms, values, goals, and outcomes, or through the lens of personal expectations, values, goals, and outcomes (James 1993). Individuals are most likely to employ the group lens when the group is seen as a unitary entity because of member proximity, similarly, attraction, common agency, or fate. IBT depends on the extent to which strong collective identities are created, the effectiveness of the leader's symbolic management activities at reinforcing the identities, and the power of the organizational culture to sustain them (Kramer, Brewer and Hanna 1996). IBT does not, however require a foundation of a particularly strong or cohesive bond in the organization. All that is necessary is that the collective identity provides some basis to believe that trusting behaviour does not involve unacceptable levels of risk, e.g. one party does not have to care about the other's welfare, although that generally does exist (Kramer, Brewer and Hanna 1996).

Four types of motives underlie IBT (Kramer, Brewer and Hanna 1996):

1.  Reciprocity-based trust: engaging in trust behaviour because the individual believes that the other is likely to do the same. This is a form of calculative trust (CBT).

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2. Elicitative trust: believing or expecting that one may be able to induce others to engage in acts of trust by doing so him- or herself. This type of trust is linked to perceptions of personal efficacy, and is important in a climate where individuals fear being the "sucker", or the only one cooperating. This behaviour is likely to surface when expectations of reciprocity are low, but perceptions of personal efficacy are high.

3. Compensatory trust: if the organizational members perceive the collective trust to be a valuable shared resource worth protecting, individuals may be willing to compensate for others' behaviour that they perceive to be a threat to the organization's stability or survival. Individuals who engage in compensatory acts do not necessarily see the behaviour as altruistic; they actually recognize the link between collective and self interests. They incur personal costs in the short term with the expectation of long-term gain.

4. Moralistic trust: acting in a trusting and trust-worthy fashion irrespective of what others in the group do or do not do. This type of trust is not contingent on social or causal expectation; it is based on ethical convictions and moral values, and intrinsic values associated with group membership. "Moralistic trust is about the identities and images that attend being a 'good' group member who cares about maintaining that good standing" (Kramer, Brewer and Hanna 1996:375).

Parties may not move to IBT if they lack the time or energy to move beyond KBT; if the parties have no desire to identify with each other, do not want to "get involved" or the relationship may jeopardize another one; if developing knowledge about the other may lead one individual to not identify with the other, e.g. they might find out

something unpleasant; or if the information gained does not lead to effective understanding, such as if one's ability to predict behaviour is constantly disconfirmed (Lewicki and Bunker 1995).

Conversely, relationships characterized by strong IBT may be able to withstand strong challenges to CBT and KBT. For the trustor to accept the invalidating information (i.e. prediction was wrong), he or she must be willing to accept that the basis on which the trust existed was ill-founded. These dissonant cognitions are identity-challenging and may be dismissed as a means of self-preservation. "To accept them requires a willingness to see oneself as a fool for trusting, which is a self-image most would prefer to reject if alternative cognitions and interpretations can be found" (Lewicki and Bunker 1996:128). The act of dismissing the invalidating information, however, is not necessarily applied consistently: in-group members' negative behaviours tend to be attributed to external, unstable factors, while the same behaviour from out-group members is more likely to be attributed to stable, internal factors (Kramer, Brewer and Hanna 1996). That is, in-group members get the benefit of the doubt if they have behaved in an uncharacteristic fashion, and trust remains intact.

Movement from CBT to KBT to IBT may require a fundamental shift in perceptual paradigm (Lewicki and Bunker 1995). For example, in shifting from CBT to KBT, parties move from a focus on differences to a focus on similarities. This shift requires accelerated momentum; detection of large differences may send the parties backwards from KBT to CBT. At KBT, differences are minimized to the extent that they can be explained by the information one has gained. Only extreme, unexplainable behaviour destructive of the underlying CBT will threaten trust. Once the parties reach

IBT, they will most likely cycle between IBT and KBT as people change, interests

change, and new knowledge of the other must be processed and assimilated.

### 1.2.4 Decline of Trust

Once trust has been established, there is, of course, the possibility that that trust

will be betrayed or broken in some way. Lewicki and Bunker (1996) describe a model of

trust decline whereby (1) mutual trust is established and an equilibrium is reached; (2) an

event that provokes a perception of distrust creates instability; (3) the situation is assessed

at cognitive and emotional levels, i.e., how important is the situation and who is

responsible; and (4) feelings of hurt, anger, fear, and frustration lead the individual to

reassess how he/she feels about the other. The violator may accept or deny the other's

reaction. A denial may cause the recipient to terminate the relationship, restore it to its

former state, or renegotiate and develop it into a different state. Trust decline can be

severe and immediate due to a gross violation, or it can be more gradual if the violation

was less egregious. The contrast effect states that if one is trusting at the outset of an

interaction and then perceives that they have been treated unfairly, there is a sharp

decline in subsequent support and trust (Brockner and Siegel 1996). Gross violations can

utterly destroy a relationship, or may cause it to deteriorate to a point that it becomes very

superficial and strained:

> We argue that trust is so intimately connected to the
> fundamental nature of a relationship that trust-shattering
> events that can not be repaired will probably be coincident
> with destroying the essence of the relationship itself. If the
> relationship does sustain, it is likely to be a "shell" in which
> only the most formal, emotionally distant, and calculative
> exchanges can continue to occur (Lewicki and Bunker
> 1996:129).

The severity and seriousness of a trust violation depends somewhat on the type of trust that is violated (Lewicki and Bunker 1996). Violations of CBT, for example, can cause trust to go back to zero, where it can then be renegotiated, or parties may choose to seek another relationship. The parties may be disappointed, but not deeply aggrieved because of the nature of CBT – it does not involve much emotional investment, being characteristic of an impersonal, formal type of relationship.

Violations of KBT are more serious. Again, KBT is based on predictability; behaviour that is no longer predictable is unsettling for the other party. As well, the unpredictability is a blow to the receiving party's self esteem, since that individual can no longer rely on his/her own perception or ability to accurately predict the other's behaviour. If the individual perceives the unusual actions to be situationally controlled, rather than by the individual's own choice, the individual may perceive no trust violation. If, however, the violation is based on free will, the recipient will be more likely to re-evaluate the relationship.

Most serious of all are violations of IBT – these go against common interests or agreements, and values that underlie the relationship. They create a sense of moral violation that fundamentally undermines the basis of the relationship, breaking down its foundations. Only one person need feel a moral violation to destroy IBT. "'Hollow shell' relationships, in which at least one party feels antagonism but must display some modicum of cooperation and collegiality, may actually consume more energy than re-establishing a more genuine trust and some consistency between beliefs and feelings" (Lewicki and Bunker 1996:130).

## 1.2.5 Repairing Trust

Repairing trust is possible, but both parties must be involved and must be willing to invest the time and energy required to do so (Lewicki and Bunker 1996). They must consider that the payoff is worth the investment, and that the benefits are preferred to having their needs satisfied through an alternative arrangement. In the case of CBT, parties may simply choose to employ additional safeguards, such as contracts or other legal agreements that will bind both parties to acceptable behaviours.

Repair of KBT and IBT is much more difficult because they involve the individuals' self-image and self-esteem, i.e. adequacy of knowledge of the other, one's ability to predict the other's behaviour, and one's emotional commitment to the relationship. A complete restoration may not be possible; the victim may always suspect that the violator could be capable of a "repeat offence" and may not be willing to make him/herself vulnerable to another violation. The capacity to "forgive and forget" depends on the individual's disposition, the severity of the violation, and the extent to which the violation challenges the integrity or the foundation of the relationship.

Parties are "ripe" for conflict resolution when one or more of these circumstances exist (Pruitt and Olczak 1995):

1. the parties perceive that they are at loggerheads and are both suffering costs in an unwinnable battle

2. the parties experience a catastrophe or near-catastrophe associated with the conflict

3. the parties are conscious of an impending catastrophe or deteriorating position associated with the conflict

4. the parties perceive an enticing opportunity to resolve the conflict that preserves their essential values.

Still, regardless of readiness, both parties need to undertake particular steps, outlined below, to initiate a reconciliation. Violations of all three types of trust (CBT, KBT, and IBT) may be addressed through the violator following the four steps outlined below (Lewicki and Bunker 1996:131 – 133).

1. Recognize and acknowledge that a violation has occurred. This admission is more difficult if the violator does not recognize the violation or the consequences of it, or if the victim must confront him/her. The victim then has the double burden of the violation as well as the embarrassment of confrontation.

2. Determine what caused the violation, and understand that one's actions cause it. If the violator is unaware of causing a violation, the relationship will go on as before and the repair process will not be able to begin. If the violator believes that they did not cause the event, or that the behaviour was only remotely related, the causality of the violation may be debatable.

3. Admit that the event was destructive of trust; the violator must fully understand the victim's experience and how the relationship has been affected in order to decide whether trust can be rebuilt and what events must occur.

4. Be willing to accept responsibility for the violation. A denial of the act, its consequences, responsibility for it, or importance of it will likely intensify anger and distrust.[14]

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[14] Nadler and Liviatan (2006) explored the effects of expressions of empathy for the other's conflict-related suffering, and assumption of responsibility for it, on the recipient's willingness for reconciliation. The conundrum in relation to Lewicki and Bunker's suggested solution is that Nadler and Liviatan found that positive expressions by an adversary will only have positive effects on reconciliation if a minimum level of trust already exists between the parties. In fact, Nadler and Liviatan found that expressions of empathy may actually have negative consequences if levels of trust are low, since the lack of trust calls into question the sincerity of the adversary's overtures.

While the above four steps place the onus on the violator, the victim must also be willing to engage in these steps and participate in rebuilding trust. A lack of trust can often block reconciliation: both sides may want resolution, but they do not believe that the other is motivated. Therefore, neither party is willing to make the first step and appear weak if the other does not reciprocate (Pruitt and Olczak 1995). The critical, and probably most difficult, next step in rebuilding trust is forgiveness and atonement. The victim must ask for, or the violator must offer, an apology. The apology must be sincere, and the violator must also explain what happened and why; this latter step is important in persuading the victim to accept the apology. Lewicki and Bunker (1996) describe four different scenarios that the victim may engage in, in response to the violator's overtures for forgiveness:

1. The victim refuses to accept any actions, terms, or conditions for re-establishing the relationship because he/she is too angry or injured, considers that the relationship is not worth the effort, that the violation was the "last straw" after a series of violations, and generally believes that trust is irreparable. The violator may not agree with that assessment, however, and may indicate that forgiveness is desired. This may be done through gestures of apology (e.g. letters, cards, flowers), telling others what they have done and expressing shame, engaging in acts of altruism, all with the goal of bringing the victim to a state of readiness to participate in repair of trust.

2. The victim acknowledges forgiveness and specifies "unreasonable" acts of reparation and/or trust restoration that the violator must fulfill. The violator believes that what the victim is asking is unreasonable and is unwilling to agree to the terms of repair. Repair is unlikely to happen unless the parties can negotiate viable alternatives.

3. The victim acknowledges forgiveness and indicates that no further acts of reparation are necessary. Parties attempt to "pick up where they left off" before the violation, although the relationship will probably experience strain and tension for some time. The violator may expect attempts at revenge or retaliation and the victim may be hyper-vigilant. Forgiveness without reparation may not be adequate for effective trust repair. This alternative would not happen frequently.

4. The victim acknowledges forgiveness and specifies "reasonable" acts of reparation and/or trust restoration that the violator must fulfill, which may be specific or vague, short- or long-term. The violator must demonstrate commitment, sincerity, willingness to incur personal loss, and express remorse. The parties will likely monitor these actions to rebuild CBT and KBT.

A party can also engender trust through unilateral conciliatory initiatives, which are more likely to be effective if they are unexpected, so that they provoke thought; they weaken or are costly to their originator, so that they can not easily be dismissed as a trick; and their originator has equal or greater power than the other party, so that they can not be easily written off as a sign of weakness (Pruitt and Olczak 1995).

## 1.3  Summary of the Trust-building Models

A number of common themes emerge among the two models elaborated above. Both Gabarro's and Lewicki and Bunker's models refer to an early stage in which parties assess the pros and cons of working with the other, engage in more formal, perhaps superficial, interactions in order to gauge the other's character and motives, and generally remain on guard during this period. Both models also describe a period of information gathering where the parties learn about the other, become more comfortable with the

other, and familiarize themselves with the range of the other's behaviour. However, Gabarro's depiction of this stage refers more directly to the working relationship (e.g. understanding of the other's expectations and objectives), while Lewicki and Bunker's conception of the stage refers to behavioural aspects and knowledge of the other's personality. An examination of the combination of these two components of reciprocal knowledge provides a solid foundation for the assessment of the level of trust between the parties at this intermediate stage of trust development.

At the final stage of trust, Gabarro, and Lewicki and Bunker diverge fairly significantly in their characterizations of mature working relationships. While Gabarro's stabilization stage seems to refer only to a condition of comprehensive knowledge of the other's behaviour and the ability to resolve disputes, and a confirmation of "the contract," Lewicki and Bunker describe an internalization of the other's needs and expectations in what appears to be a much more intimate knowledge of the other, forming a much deeper interpersonal connection. Granted, Gabarro does not claim to describe the penultimate form of trust in his stabilization stage, but rather a point where little further learning is taking place in regard to the other party. Lewicki and Bunker, however, describe the ideal state of trust, where parties care for the other and want to help each other. While Gabarro's stabilization stage may be more realistic, or at least depict a more common state of affairs, it does limit the possibilities in trust building to a very bureaucratic and business sense of the concept, and somewhat ignores the human, emotional component of building friendships in collaborative efforts. Still, because Lewicki and Bunker describe something of a utopia in the state of trust, once again, the combination of these models provides a balanced approach in evaluating development of trust.

## 2.0 The Framework for this Analysis

In this section, I piece together the information presented thus far in an effort to construct a cohesive framework for tracking and measuring the development of trust on the AMB (see Table 5 below). This framework is based on Tables 2 and 3 presented in Chapter One, and will serve as the basis for the analysis in Chapter Three. Note that this table is constructed by section (i.e. levels, elements, and foundations of trust), designed to be read vertically by phase, rather than horizontally by row. For the sake of simplicity, I have not attempted to arrange the entries across rows so that they correspond directly to each other, although a number of similarities emerge. I will address those in the next chapter.

While I build this framework on Lewicki and Bunker's Model of Trust Development and Decline, I will be supplementing their stages with details from the other model. To prevent any confusion, rather than referring to the development of trust as occurring in the stages of CBT, KBT, IBT, Decline, and Repair, I will refer to the stages as phases, entitled Introduction, Familiarization, Connection, Deterioration, and Restoration, respectively. Note that almost all components of the foundations of trust may be present in multiple, if not all, phases of trust, but repeating them for all phases would not be useful, since this approach would not allow us to distinguish between the phases and assess to what extent trust had developed on the AMB. Therefore, I have attempted to assign them to the most appropriate phase, that is, to the phase in which the component would have the greatest relevance or impact.

Most of the components of the foundations of trust fall under the first two phases of trust, with very few being ascribable to the last three. However, as we will see, while

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the AMB exhibited some characteristics of the Connection phase, they mostly remained in the first two phases, so that any lack of trust was not so much a result of loss of trust over the course of the pilot, but rather, trust that never developed. Therefore, the dearth of indicators for the last two phases should not pose a problem. It may also be that Deterioration is not a discrete phase, nor a phase that occurs only after the Connection phase; a lessening of trust may happen at any time and simply entail decreased trust in a given phase, or stepping backwards to a previous phase. In any case, the indicators that I have listed for the Deterioration and Restoration phases, as well as for Connection, are quite specific and evocative, so that the limited number of indicators should not preclude the identification of language and behaviours attributable to those phases. With the establishment of this framework, I now move on to the analysis in Chapter Three.

**Table 1. Framework for Measuring the Development of Trust on the AMB**

| Levels of Trust | | | | Elements of Trust | | Foundations of Trust | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Phase | Model | Stage / Type / Dimension | Component (Gabarro) | Element | Component | Foundation | Component |
| Introduction | Lewicki and Bunker | CBT | | Interdependence and risk | parties are faced with a course of future action that is ambiguous | Moral evaluation | parties view trust as a moral duty |
| | Lewicki and Bunker | Reciprocity-based trust | | Interdependence and risk | outcomes depend on the behaviour of others | Moral evaluation | values and ideology dictate perceptions of the relationship or subject matter |
| | Lewicki and Bunker | Elicitative trust | | Interdependence and risk | consequences are greater from a harmful event than from a beneficial event | Power and control | parties that possess greater power have an increased willingness to engage in trust behaviour |
| | Lewicki and Bunker | Moralistic trust | | Interdependence and risk | parties believe that they can form common expectations | Individual factors | parties are predisposed to engaging in trust behaviour |
| | Lewicki and Bunker | Romantic love | | Interdependence and risk | parties are willing to take a risk to achieve common expectations | Psychological states | parties exhibit a positive state of mind, or "in a good mood" |
| | Lewicki and Bunker | Hollow shell | | Interdependence and risk | parties clarify willingness and ability to engage in particular activities | Psychological states | parties assess how much attention and effort the relationship requires |
| | Gabarro | Orientation and impression formation | | Interdependence and risk | parties fear that the other will act opportunistically | Psychological states | parties feel that they have control over the situation |
| | Gabarro | Level of candour and comfort | interaction is formal; topics are safe and superficial | Interdependence and risk / Cooperation | parties accept vulnerability associated with collaboration | Psychological states | parties experience positive or negative valence associated with a specific topic |
| | Gabarro | Extent of divergence from social norms | interactions are predictable and stereotypical | Cooperation | parties view those of their in-group as more trustworthy, cooperative and honest than outsiders | Psychological states | parties experience pleasure or hedonic effects from engaging in trust behaviour, |
| | Gabarro | Substitutability of communication | interaction exhibits little substitution among alternative modes of communication | Cooperation | parties experience a "controlled explosion" for the release of pent-up tensions existing between them prior to the possibility of collaboration | Moral evaluation | parties assess the quality (good/bad) of the relationship itself or of the situation that created the need for the relationship (why the relationship exists) |

| Levels of Trust | | | | Elements of Trust | | Foundations of Trust | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Phase | Model | Stage / Type / Dimension | Component (Gabarro) | Element | Component | Foundation | Component |
| Introduction cont. | Gabarro | Capacity for conflict and evaluation | parties have a limited capacity for conflict; use conflict-avoidance techniques; are reluctant to criticize | Cooperation | parties work to reduce or eliminate intellectual distortions by reconstructing the historical events that led up to the disagreement | Attitude toward leaders, authorities, and institutions | parties generalize personal trust to large organizations (institutional trust) |
| | Gabarro | Positional bases of influence | parties possess power to structure tasks of others, to reward and punish, to allocate or control scarce resources, and to direct another person, as in legitimate authority | Cooperation | parties develop formal behavioural standards and expectations, hold members accountable | Power and control | parties assess the willingness of those in power to share responsibility, control, or influence |
| | Gabarro | Personal bases of influence | parties are willing to use power | | | Attitude toward leaders, authorities, and institutions | parties assess interdependence with the other |
| | | | | | | Attitude toward leaders, authorities, and institutions | parties assess continuity of the relationship |
| | | | | | | Procedural justice | parties assess procedural justice of law enforcement |
| | | | | | | Procedural justice | parties assess the procedural justice of decision making, comprising: a) the extent to which the procedures create consistent allocations, suppress bias, are based on accurate information, are correctable, represent the concerns of all recipients, and are based on prevailing moral and ethical standards |
| | | | | | | | b) whether the recipients have had the opportunity to influence the process |

| Levels of Trust | | | | Elements of Trust | | Foundations of Trust | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Phase | Model | Stage / Type / Dimension | Component (Gabarro) | Element | Component | Foundation | Component |
| Familiarization | Lewicki and Bunker | KBT | | Interdependence and risk | parties are able to form common expectations | Psychological states | parties perceive certainty about the situation or individual |
| | Lewicki and Bunker | Evaluative stage | | Interdependence and risk | parties gain increased understanding of the other's expectations | Ability | parties assess individual characteristics, such as ability, integrity, benevolence, competence, or reliability |
| | Lewicki and Bunker | Institutional trust | | Cooperation | parties are willing to accept influence from one another | Ability | given a lack of ability, parties assess whether the individual possesses a positive attitude and a willingness and ability to learn |
| | Lewicki and Bunker | Compensatory trust | | Cooperation | parties cooperate when they believe that others in the group will also do so | Ability | parties assess whether the other possesses strong social skills, ability to engage in trust behaviour |
| | Gabarro | Exploring and moving beyond impressions | | | | Attitude toward leaders, authorities, and institutions | parties possess familiarity with the other |
| | Gabarro | Testing and defining the interpersonal contract | | | | Attitude toward leaders, authorities, and institutions | parties assess dependability, behavioural consistency and integrity |
| | Gabarro | Level of candour and comfort | parties discuss more controversial and varied topics, interaction is less formal | | | Attitude toward leaders, authorities, and institutions | parties assess the individual's consistency of word and deed |
| | Gabarro | Extent of divergence from social norms | parties possess greater knowledge of other's reactions, use more non-verbal communication | | | Attitude toward leaders, authorities, and institutions | parties assess the openness of the individual's communication |
| | Gabarro | Personal bases of influence | parties possess personal credibility, charisma, decisiveness, and the ability to create common goals | | | Attitude toward leaders, authorities, and institutions | parties assess the openness of the political system to citizen participation |

| Levels of Trust | | | | Elements of Trust | | Foundations of Trust | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Phase | Model | Stage / Type / Dimension | Component (Gabarro) | Element | Component | Foundation | Component |
| Familiarization cont. | | | | | | Power and control | parties assess whether the other party shares the credit for successes |
| Connection | Lewicki and Bunker | IBT | | Interdependence and risk | parties believe that they can collectively fulfill shared expectations | Moral evaluation | parties share ideologies, connection or identification with group |
| | Gabarro | Stabilization | | Interdependence and risk | parties develop a relationship that is mutual and robust enough to be rewarding and effective | Attitude toward leaders, authorities, and institutions | parties have a social bond with the authority |
| | Gabarro | Substitutability of communication | parties possess, and have the ability to use, alternative modes of communication to convey the same message | Cooperation | parties possess the ability to help move one another toward shared goals | Attitude toward leaders, authorities, and institutions | parties assess whether the other demonstrates concern and respect for others and their specific interests |
| | Gabarro | Capacity for conflict and evaluation | parties are ready and able to express conflict and make positive or negative evaluations | Cooperation | the goals of the participants are so linked that any participant can gain his goal if, and only if, the others with whom he is linked can attain their goals | Attitude toward leaders, authorities, and institutions | parties assess whether the other considers, or is sensitive to, the needs and interests of individual team members |
| | | | | Cooperation | everyone shares opinions and perspectives so that everyone may benefit from the richness of diversity | | |
| Deterioration | Lewicki and Bunker | Decline | | Interdependence and risk | discussion of explicit goals provokes disagreement or hostile conflict if the parties have incompatible goals | Attitude toward leaders, authorities, and institutions | parties assess objectivity of authorities in handling disputes |
| | | | | Interdependence and risk | parties perceive that others are infringing upon their territories | Attitude toward leaders, authorities, and institutions | parties assess the other's willingness to offer a prompt and genuine apology |
| | | | | Cooperation | sharing of opinions may heighten differences and disagreements | | |

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| Levels of Trust | | | | Elements of Trust | | Foundations of Trust | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Phase | Model | Stage / Type / Dimension | Component (Gabarro) | Element | Component | Foundation | Component |
| Restoration | Lewicki and Bunker | Repair | | Cooperation | parties are encouraged to work through disagreements | Procedural justice | parties assess interactional justice, comprising:<br><br>a) truthfulness, respect, propriety of questions, and justification, i.e. removing discontent following an unfair procedure<br><br>b) whether reasons for a decision were clearly and adequately explained, and whether parties affected were treated with dignity and respect |

# Chapter Three

# Measuring Trust through Application of the Framework

## 1.0   A Word on Assumptions

To put the analysis into context, an important point to remember is that, as described

in Chapter One, trust can be affected by an individual's mood, which in turn can be

influenced either by the events currently taking place or by some other event that is

happening in the individual's personal life.  In this study, I did not examine the personal lives

of the AMB members, or ask them specifically about their moods, or to what they attributed

any positive or negative emotions they may have been experiencing during the Board

meetings.  Therefore, if an individual expressed overt hostility, complacency, satisfaction,

etc., I assumed that these emotions were mainly based in the events taking place during the

meetings, and were not due to unrelated personal issues.

Given the background of the AMB and the situation from which it arose, the meetings

were sometimes volatile and characterized by negative emotions.  It is not unreasonable to

assume that the negative emotion was wholly based in the subject matter at hand, either in

terms of the specifics being discussed at the time, or in the history that gave rise to the topic

being discussed.  For this reason, I am confident that the data were not unduly confounded by

emotion stemming from unrelated issues.  Unrelated situations may have exacerbated a

negative reaction to AMB members' comments, but likely were not the sole source of it.  The

final analysis is based on my own interpretation of the quotes according to my knowledge of

the individuals, having spent two years attending the AMB meetings, and the context in

which they were made.  No qualitative data analysis software was used for this analysis.

Rather, I conducted the analysis in the ethnographic tradition, "a holistic research method founded on the idea that a system's properties can not necessarily be accurately understood independently of each other" (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethnography, accessed August 4, 2007).

## 2.0 Methods

The data for this analysis consists of quotes I extracted from the transcripts of interviews with all the AMB members, my and my senior supervisor's notes from attending meetings, a short questionnaire I administered to the Board members at the beginning of the second year of the pilot phase, and from meeting minutes and information packages. The AMB discussed a wide variety of topics and a number of themes repeatedly emerged from these sources. I selected quotes that represented recurring themes, and that therefore might form a pattern of emerging trust or persistent lack of trust, and entered these into a spreadsheet. The result was a collection of over 8,000 quotes, divided into 58 categories representing topics such as discussion on various species (e.g. salmon, rockfish, tanner crab, gooseneck barnacles), broad concepts (e.g. conservation, economic development, stewardship), and administrative issues (e.g. policies and management, strategic planning, allocation and licensing). (See Appendix B for a list of the categories). Each quote fell into multiple categories so that it appeared multiple times in the spreadsheet under the various categories.

Rather than analyzing the entire body of data, and because procedural justice emerged from the literature in Chapter One as an important foundation of trust, I chose to focus on the "Process" category, which includes quotes that refer broadly to "the way things are done" on the AMB. I use this category as a means to assess the Board members' perceptions of procedural justice within the AMB itself, as well as the procedural justice of government activities relating to the AMB's activities and mandate, such as the inclusion of the AMB in various decision-making processes. However, this analysis is not focussing strictly on procedural justice, but on the entire body of elements and foundations listed in the

framework at the end of Chapter Two. I simply use the "Process" category as a convenient means of structuring and containing the analysis.

Each quote was identified by speaker, date, and source (interview transcript, information package, or meeting minutes). I employed a matrix to code the 370 quotes in this category for the 12 types and stages of trust (calculus-based, knowledge-based, identity-based, romantic, evaluative, accommodative, institutional, reciprocity-based, elicitative, compensatory, moralistic, and trust decline), as well as for "hollow shell relationships"[15], described in the Model of Trust Development and Decline in Chapter Two. For each quote, I entered an "X" in the column for each type of trust that was indicated in the quote. Specifically, if a quote indicated the existence, or the *clear absence*, of a particular type of trust, the respective column received an "X".

For example[16], in Table 6, this quote from an interview with a Board member indicates:

- a minimum level of trust in the AMB itself, in that the interviewee is obviously frustrated with the process, but is still engaged (calculus-based trust or CBT);

- familiarity and trust in the *individual* he is speaking about (knowledge-based trust or KBT);

- acceptance of the individual, but discontent with the organization the individual represents, so that the speaker recognizes pros and cons in the relationship (evaluative trust);

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[15] The reader will recall that a hollow shell relationship referred to a relationship in which at least one party feels antagonism, but must display some modicum of cooperation and collegiality.

[16] Because interviews were conducted in confidence, I have removed the speaker column from the table and blacked out references to another member to protect the Board members' identities. As well, for the sake of conserving space, I have deleted blank columns. To preserve anonymity throughout this document, I will alternate between masculine and feminine pronouns to mask the gender of the Board members.

- a clear *lack* of trust in the organization that the individual represents, in this case, government (institutional).

**Table 6. Example of Data Coding**

| Date | Quote | CBT | KBT | eval | institut | compens | moral | hollow shell |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2003-10-01 | It's not about individuals. ██ ███ has nothing to do with this, as far as I'm concerned. ██ is just the guy sitting in the chair. You can pick ██ up and stick somebody else in the chair and it wouldn't change. | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |

The inclusion of the other two types of trust listed in the table (compensatory and moralistic), as well as the characterization of "hollow shell", is based more on my interpretation and impressions of the speaker than on the language itself, although the language does hint at these:

- the speaker is referring to a systemic problem with the operation of the AMB that threatens its relevance and efficacy, but hopes that his persistence will assist the AMB in succeeding (compensatory)

- the speaker is trustworthy, even if the organization that the other represents is not, and he will continue to be so, regardless of the organization's actions (moralistic);

- he is maintaining civility despite a distaste for the organization that the other represents (hollow shell); he may or may not be sincere in defending the other individual (the other "has nothing to do with this"), but if not, he is still presenting himself as able to distinguish between the individual and his actions, and the policy of the government

organization the other represents, thus behaving in a somewhat duplicitous manner

indicative of hollow shell relationships

The balance of the quotes was assessed in similar fashion. A number of patterns

emerged in the use of language, indicating particular levels and types of trust, as I will

outline below. I will not discuss here all 370 extracts that I examined, nor exhaustively

discuss every item in the framework. Rather, this analysis will show the application of the

framework through the examination of some of the more telling quotes. I will conclude the

report with an illustrative quantitative summary of the results, demonstrating the level of trust

achieved by the Board members.

# 3.0 Analysis: Phase One (Introduction)

I begin this analysis with some generalities I noted during the coding portion of this project, all of which are interpreted through the Model of Trust Development and Decline. Interestingly, all of these generalities relate to the first phase of trust building, which eventually formed the largest section of the framework developed in Chapter Two, indicating the complexity of early trust formation. I will then, in section 3.2 below, discuss this phase according to the framework developed in Chapter Two, giving examples of quotes from the beginning and the end of the pilot to demonstrate that the types of trust I have assigned to Phase One do, in fact, best represent the Introduction phase. In subsequent sections, I will follow this format for the remaining four phases.

## *3.1. General Observations*

### 3.1.1 What is the First Phase?

Introduction, the first phase of trust development, presented itself in a fascinating variety of ways. In Chapter Two, we saw that romantic relationships go through a three-step process of romantic – evaluative – accommodative stages, the romantic stage being an idealistic, positive stage, and the evaluative stage being one of weighing positive and negative aspects of the relationship. While some members of the AMB did exhibit some "romanticism" regarding the AMB, many comments at the beginning of the pilot more closely resembled the evaluative stage, indicating a wariness or cautiousness right from the start, as though the individuals were unsure about how successful the AMB would be, or about whether they should be participating. In this way, these more tentative sentiments indicated an initial stage as described by calculus-based trust, rather than by the romantic stage. No romantic stage existed for these individuals, which stands to reason, since

calculus-based trust is actually more closely related to the evaluative stage where individuals

measure the pros and cons of the relationship. As well, the Board members may have felt

compelled to participate on the AMB to ensure that their interests were represented and

protected; in this way, their decisions to participate were not entirely voluntary, but were

made under some duress. Those exhibiting a romantic optimism from the start are atypical in

the sphere of working relationships.

This statement made at the inaugural meeting, dated February 23, 2002, clearly shows

a romantic optimism:

> I can not see us failing. I know that a governance system that
> this was based on was working for many, many years, and we
> will succeed. This is not going to be driven by self interest.

The quote also conveys reciprocity-based trust, in that the speaker is confident that

the others will cooperate and contribute to the common good, rather than being "driven by

self interest". Similarly, this quote below from the same day also indicates confidence and

good will reminiscent of the romantic stage:

> This Board is not about either/or long term strategy or
> responding to issues. We are moving from approaching issues
> from a positional basis to win-win solutions. The real and main
> value of [the] Board is that there are diverse views and we have
> captured a range of interests and views. To find solutions that
> address something beyond just our positions.

In contrast, these comments, once again, from February 23, 2002, point to calculus-

based trust in the form of the evaluative stage; while not negative, they suggest hesitancy, or

a need for vigilance or caution during the AMB's early, vulnerable period:

> One of our key challenges will be developing a strategy while
> balancing expectations of this being an issues driven Board.
> There will be people looking for results, and developing
> strategies doesn't really seem like doing anything to most
> people. We'll have to find a balance between keeping focused

> on the larger picture and developing a strategy that will have
> longer-term benefits and dealing with people's expectations.
>
> This Board is a different way of doing business. We'll have to
> walk down this pathway one step at a time....

Board members varied in amounts of trust being exhibited, particularly in this first

phase, due to the nature of the issue. The following two quotes exhibit elicitative trust, in

that they both suggest some confidence that the speaker will be able to persuade the others,

but to varying degrees:

> We have to be careful about not only advancing one position or
> interest on this issue [sardines]. If we are to be an inclusive
> process, then we need to look at putting forward something that
> addresses broader interests and local interest.
>
> [June 7, 2002]

This seems to be a fairly innocuous and uncontroversial statement about a fairly

uncontroversial species (as opposed to salmon, for example)[17]; a reasonable person would

probably agree that other interests must be considered, rather than unilaterally making a

decision regarding a resource that others also harvested. However, there were very few

species that fishers on the west coast of Vancouver Island could have had access to, and

twice, the effort the AMB had put into developing a local fishery (tanner crab and sardines)

was lost, i.e., the local fisheries did not materialize. As well, there was a history of outside

interests appropriating local efforts over local protest (Pinkerton 1987b). The statement is

not a demand nor a request, but merely a suggestion or offering of advice. Hence, the

speaker was proffering a thought or opinion, thus exposing herself to possible criticism, but

was implicating the other AMB members in the suggestion, using inclusive language ("we"),

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[17] I refer to sardines as uncontroversial because they are not a highly coveted species in terms of their commercial value, and they do not migrate as widely as salmon, for example, so that in managing sardines, the AMB would not have been met with the opposition that they would have been, had they aspired to managing any salmon stocks. Because salmon are migratory, many more user groups would be harvesting them than would be harvesting sardines on the west coast of Vancouver Island.

thereby shielding herself and not taking full responsibility for the suggestion. As well, the

speaker herself was somewhat controversial, largely seen as representing outside interests, so

that the statement could be seen as self-serving, thereby testing the value of participating on

the Board. Therefore, while the trust exhibited is not insubstantial, in that it raises a

potentially explosive suggestion, it is still an early stage of trust, i.e. calculus-based trust.

The following statement, while somewhat similar to the one above, has one important

difference — the ownership of the statement through the use of the singular personal pronoun

"I"[18]:

> We are all involved in bilateral processes that do not allow
> people to communicate effectively. People start to
> misunderstand what is going on. What I'm suggesting is
> maintaining some of the bilateral processes but ensuring that
> there are multi-sectoral forums where we can talk about what is
> going on.
>
> [February 23, 2002]

While the previous quote was also a suggestion of process, this quote above shows a

greater willingness to "go out on a limb" by prefacing the recommendation with "What I'm

suggesting", rather than implicating everyone in the suggestion by using "we", as in the

statement above. By presenting the suggestion as his own, the speaker is risking criticism

and disapproval of the other Board members. The use of "we" could arguably denote a

feeling of collective identity with the other AMB members, as in identity-based trust, but I

argue that the subject matter points to an earlier stage; it does not refer to an internalization

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[18] See McClish (2001) for a fascinating discussion on statement analysis in the context of FBI investigation. McClish discusses how sentences with a dropped subject (e.g. "Went out at midnight..." rather than "I went out at midnight..."), or using "we" rather than "I" suggest possible deception. While I am not suggesting here that the previous quote indicates that the member was lying, given use of the pronoun "we" in both sentences, one's willingness to "own" the statement through using the pronoun "I" does suggest the member's comfort level in making the statement.

of what the others desire, but rather to an attempt to garner agreement on what the individuals themselves want.

Some comments suggest a stage that is even pre-calculus-based trust and decidedly unromantic, or perhaps such comments may be characterized as a very early stage of calculus-based trust, where the parties have engaged each other, but the value of the relationship is very much in question, and the parties are confused about the purpose of the collaborative initiative. Consider this statement from March 27, 2002, just one month into the AMB's mandate, vividly demonstrating frustration and impatience with the AMB's progress:

> I ask the question, when is the role of the WCVIAMB to
> represent community concerns, as described in our mandate,
> and principles, and Terms of Reference, to be exercised? It is
> unacceptable to me, as a Board member, to wait while boxes
> are described to slot issues into, while real issues that defeat the
> health of our resource, our communities, our industries and our
> future are being designed in a private room.

This Board member is very anxious for the AMB to show some tangible results, and understandably so, since her own livelihood is at stake; she is not pleased with having to wait for the benefits of participating on this Board. One of the components of calculus-based trust is the ability to control others' behaviour, that is, to elicit a desired behaviour (I will address this further in the next section). Here, the desired behaviour is deliberate action to increase access to West Coast fisheries, but such is not forthcoming, or at least not forthcoming as quickly as this member would like. Because she is unable to control the behaviour of the AMB as a whole, her calculus-based trust is minimal, in that she is engaged in the Board, but is not happy with the results to this point.

What is already apparent is that different individuals express trust differently at a single stage, and that a single stage can manifest itself in widely different ways. As we saw in the first two quotes, some members show calculus-based trust through optimism and a willingness to venture forth into the collaborative initiative and encourage the others to do so, despite a lack of knowledge about the others. Other Board members show calculus-based trust through a much less positive and confident guise, even displaying open hostility or disgust with the process. All Board members began their tenure on the AMB at the same time, yet they still commenced the pilot at very different points within the first stage of trust building. This difference may be because a number of the Board members had worked together on the Regional Aquatic Management Society (RAMS), which was the precursor to the AMB, so that some trust (or distrust) had already developed between those members. With new people joining the group when RAMS evolved into the AMB, the trust development process started anew, at least with the new individuals.

## 3.1.2 The Prevalence of Behaviour Control

In addition to the varying amount of familiarity between the Board members, the gradation of trust development over the calculus-based trust stage also may be due partly to the variety of components described within this stage. For example, some components of calculus-based trust are trying to build trust, while others show the existence of trust. Behaviour control is one of the defining characteristics of calculus-based trust. One's ability to control the others' behaviour is a means to *build* trust – if one succeeds in controlling the other's behaviour, one may assume that the relationship will be productive, therefore worthy of trust. On the other hand, engaging in trustworthy behaviour to build one's reputation suggests that a fairly substantial amount of trust *already exists*, in that the individual is

willing to make him- or herself vulnerable through openness or other expressions of trust. Because of this difference, the quotes do not necessarily represent all components of a particular type of trust, although some type of attempt at behaviour control, whether coercive or encouraging, seems to be fairly consistent, as we have already seen in the quotes above.

In the last quote above, despite alluding to "community concerns", the member is, in fact, lobbying for her own sector and did throughout her tenure on the AMB. In an attempt to sway the other members, and DFO in particular, she seems to be saying, "I don't trust you, but I want you to trust me (and do what I ask)." This theme of endeavouring to influence an individual or sector in which a member instilled little trust surfaced often during the first half of the pilot. As in the above quote, this speaker is showing frustration in the AMB's inability to change DFO's modus operandi regarding the topics the Board would address:

> I think that ▮▮ would say that they don't dominate the Board.
> That they don't set the agenda, you know. We set the agenda,
> we deal with those issues, and that's about three-quarters true.
> But every time you get close to coming up against the policy of
> DFO's, that isn't in line with DFO policy, you run into this
> wall that says you can't go there.

[October 1, 2003]

"This is what we should do" -type comments all denote, at a minimum, calculus-based trust, in that the individuals are trying to sway the others, or trying to have an impact on process. The presentation of these comments can vary significantly: the comments may take on a more insistent or urgent tone, as we saw above, or they may refer to what the individuals feel the AMB can do, thus alluding to the "pros" of the relationship, trying to convince others of its value, thereby raising enthusiasm. This latter manifestation of calculus-based trust is, again, more consistent with the romantic stage:

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> This may be one of the only bodies that can look at this issue
> [rockfish] in an ecosystem manner. I don't think we should shy
> away from developing proactive mechanisms to do this.
>
> [February 23, 2002]

In addition to the tenor of the attempt to control behaviour, one's success in

controlling behaviour is partly dependent on one's knowledge, which is an indication of

ability, as I discussed in section 4.5 of Chapter One. The AMB members had fairly wide-

ranging experience and expertise, creating a knowledge gap on certain issues. Those with

more knowledge pertaining to a particular issue were at an advantage; those lacking in

expertise or authority on the same issue would presumably have more difficulty in

convincing those who knew more to follow a certain course of action, since the experts

would be more aware of some of the implications of the request. This quote alludes to that

dynamic:

> We haven't had the debate about ocean ranching, and I haven't
> decided about it. I understand there's a lot of no-nos about
> ocean ranching.
>
> [September 11, 2003]

This member is obviously not an expert on ocean ranching; the member has a

layperson's knowledge of the subject, and seems to be wary of the concept. Presumably,

someone with limited knowledge of ocean ranching would have difficulty convincing an

expert in favour of ocean ranching of the perils of it, thereby having limited ability to control

the expert's behaviour in opposing the initiation of projects promoting ocean ranching.

According to the Model of Trust Development and Decline, this inability to influence the

expert, i.e. control his behaviour, would limit development of calculus-based trust between

these two individuals.

Similarly, during the summer of 2003, access to the salmon troll fishery on the west coast of Vancouver Island became a particularly contentious issue, threatening to severely divide the Board, with the commercial fishing representatives and one DFO representative fundamentally disagreeing on the allocation formula. In response, one member noted that all the Board members "need support from DFO to learn more about the allocation and have some influence". The knowledge gap in this instance created a difficult problem: the organization with the requested information and expertise (DFO) was also the organization that managed the resource and was limiting the fishers' access to it; therefore, trust became critical in resolving the problem. DFO needed to exhibit enough trust in the commercial fishers to provide them with the information without fear of reprisal (calculus-based trust based on the desire to build a positive reputation, and on fear of punishment, such as aggressive lobbying and negative publicity), while the fishers had to trust that DFO was giving them correct information and dealing in good faith (calculus-based trust based on fear of the other withdrawing the benefits of the relationship, in this case, access or even support for the Board; as well as on the hope of changing DFO's behaviour). In the end, the parties resolved to examine the issue together and try to resolve it collectively.

Elicitative trust is also related to calculus-based trust, in that it attempts to convince the other, or encourage cooperation, i.e. "let's work together". This is also a form of behaviour control, but is a different approach that is not based on coercion or aggression, but on promoting trust by example. This cooperative approach tended to be more characteristic of the Aboriginal members of the Board, thus having a cultural component (see Footnote 8 in Chapter One regarding the influence of culture), as well as of the government members,

which speaks to the influence of power on one's willingness to model trust behaviour (see

Chapter One, sections 4.2 and 4.3). Consider the following quote from March 6, 2003:

> We are change. If we are expressing impatience at this point in
> time—we would never have gotten this Board. Five years ago,
> no one dreamed we would exist. We're new—we're just barely
> here. We are here for the long term. We have to keep focused
> on our vision, we can't lose track of where we're going. We
> have a collection of people here that are interested in the well-
> being of WCVI. Don't beat ourselves up too much. Don't take
> your eye off the vision. We can't turn things around on a dime,
> as evidenced by the fact that we got here.

This member of the NTC repeatedly expressed this sentiment of persevering and

continuing on with the important work of the AMB. It is an expression of good will, that she

is willing to work with the others, to "soldier on", and encourages the others to do so, as well.

Similarly, the paraphrased quote below from a government member encourages cooperation

in terms of working with the senior agency in order to garner benefits for all:

> On the other side, what does the Department [of Fisheries and
> Oceans] need? More efficient ways of doing things. Do more
> with less. New effective partnerships.
>
> [June 17, 2004]

Rather than criticizing DFO for its management practices, this quote acknowledges

DFO's fiscal troubles and offers assistance, so that DFO, the AMB itself, as well as all the

individual Board members and their constituents, will benefit. However, while the tones of

these speakers and their government counterparts tended to be more measured and composed

in general, even their tones changed over the course of the pilot, as I will demonstrate below.

## 3.2   Development of Trust, According to the Framework

While I have already discussed the Model of Trust Development and Decline fairly

extensively above, here I will discuss in more detail how trust is manifested in language,

according to the specific types and stages of trust outlined in this model. I have organized

this analysis based on the stages and types of trust described in this model, but, following the

framework I developed in Chapter Two (Table 5), I have incorporated the associated stages

and dimensions from the Model of the Development of Working Relationships, as well as the

elements and foundations apparent in each type or stage of trust. As mentioned above,

through the next sections, I will show how the tone of the statements tended to change over

the course of the pilot, with the earlier discussions being more representative of the types of

trust I have assigned to Phase One. Because calculus-based trust is already characterized as

the first stage of trust development in the Model of Development and Decline, my analysis of

this particular type of trust is mainly to show how the characteristics of this stage present

themselves in language, rather than to justify its assignment to Phase One.

Phase One is a highly complex phase of trust development, characterized by much

initial learning about the other, and generally deciding whether the relationship is one that the

individual will pursue, which can cause some emotional turmoil. Consequently, this phase

incorporates more components of the "interdependence and risk" elements and

"psychological states" foundation than any other phase, as well as a greater number of

foundations than any other phase. To set the context for the analysis, I draw attention to the

first component of the "interdependence and risk" element, which is the ambiguity of the

course of future action. The AMB was very much operating in an environment of ambiguity

and uncertainty: it was touted as the first co-management board of its kind in Canadian

history; the Board members did not have a solid nor consistent concept of what the Terms of

Reference meant in terms of the Board's mandate and activities; and none of the

governments had asked the AMB to do anything in particular. Faced with this vaguery, the

AMB plunged into the epic undertaking of consensus-based ecosystem management through a multi-party co-management board composed of representatives from previously competing sectors with no history of cooperation.

### 3.2.1 Calculus-based Trust (CBT)

As per both models, this stage of trust is characterized by the fear of, and the exercise of, punishment for violating trust. Even before the AMB's first meeting, these aspects, as well as the testing of pros and cons characteristic of the calculus-based trust stage, were already apparent with this quote from January 29, 2002:

> The ████ has been advised that without consultation with the other representative interests, the AMB Steering Committee has chosen to drop the seat originally awarded to the Tourism sector. In addition, ████████ was advised that the Steering Committee expected that representing tourism interests would in part become a responsibility of the ████████████ seat to the AMB. It is the belief of the ████ that the additional responsibility of representing part of the tourism mandate to the AMB is neither appropriate for the ████████ representative to undertake, nor consistent with the consensus developed beforehand at such length on the make-up of the WCVIAMB.

This passage from a letter written to the AMB is rife with examples of the behaviour predicted through the framework. For example, it is indicative of the wariness and hesitancy the parties experienced when first debating whether to participate on the Board. This organization is not threatening to withdraw its participation, but is making clear that it does not approve of the AMB Steering Committee's decision to drop the Tourism seat. With this quote, the organization is exercising the effective deterrence and behaviour control described under calculus-based trust: it is communicating a violation of an agreement, and monitoring the Steering Committee's activities to ensure that it upholds its commitment to a particular composition of representatives. Because the organization's participation on the Board was

uncertain to begin with, it was in a strong bargaining position to control behaviour, i.e. to "get what it wanted" in terms of how it would participate. This organization is a powerful body and is willing to exercise that power in order to prevent being taken advantage of.

This statement also serves as a warning that the organization will not tolerate alteration from the agreed-upon arrangement, and conveys opposition to representing the Tourism sector, thereby showing willingness to withdraw benefits (i.e. its participation as the Tourism sector representative) from the AMB – another component of effective deterrence. It is something of a "controlled explosion" that was perhaps necessary in this case to voice some concerns, and hints at the perception that the organization sees itself as more trustworthy than the AMB steering committee, both elements pointing to a need for trust before cooperation could take place. Psychological states also play into this response, being an assessment of the required attention and effort to take on the extra duty. Finally, the quote speaks to a concern for procedural justice, and a need to have some input into how events would unfold.

However, despite the organization "flexing its muscles" in this letter, the quote is also very telling of its capacity for conflict and evaluation. Granted that because this is a business letter, social norms would dictate that the letter take on a particular tone. However, the fact that it does so is, in and of itself, an example of the early stages of a relationship, in terms of the stereotypical behaviour characteristic of new working relationships, as per Gabarro's model – it does not diverge from social norms. The organization is obviously unhappy with the prospect of having to represent what it views as two different sectors, and wants to make its disapproval known. However, it is simply stating its "belief" on the subject, rather than openly criticizing the AMB Steering Committee for having made the decision for the

organization to represent the Tourism sector. This style of communication exemplifies the avoidance of conflict predicted in Gabarro's model – while the organization is protecting its interests, the wording is very careful and measured.

The quote exhibits some amount of moral evaluation (being put in the "bad" situation of having to represent another sector, as well as itself) and a negative psychological state that is a result of a sense of betrayal or broken trust, and a lack of control over the situation. The quote also clearly demonstrates the element components relating to the organization's (un)willingness and (in)ability to participate in a particular activity, and its fear of the AMB acting opportunistically by attempting to force a function onto it, to which it had not agreed. Through this action, the organization is flatly refusing to accept vulnerability through taking on this added responsibility.

In line with the discussion on behaviour control above in section 3.1.2, in the quote below from April 5, 2002, through the eyes of this staff person, we see how the Board members' assessments of pros and cons, and attempts at behaviour control, affect the staff supporting the Board, as well as the other Board members:

> Being pulled between different Board members' expectations and perspectives on the Board and its role. Recognize strong need for Board to develop a common sense of purpose and vision.

While the Board members were aiming to realize some benefit from their participation on the AMB, they had not yet built enough trust with each other to try to achieve those benefits together; rather, they attempted to pressure the staff to set a course in a direction that suited their own personal needs and expectations. They had apparently not yet come to the conclusion that they could form common expectations. Participation on the AMB was a situation of interdependence and risk, where the outcome was dependent upon

the behaviour of others. Instead of trying to control the behaviour of the other Board members, with whom they had little familiarity at this early date, perhaps the staff members were seen as less biased and as more likely allies than the competing sectors, therefore, easier to convince or manipulate. According to this quote, none of the positive components of the elements of trust, such as acceptance of vulnerability or a willingness to take a risk to achieve common objectives, had yet come to fruition. The parties were still very much looking out for their own interests, and not recognizing their interdependence in terms of achieving mutual benefits, this being only two months into the AMB's mandate. To that extent, this is also a concern with having influence over procedure, as well as the manifestation of the psychological state of anxiety with regard to having control over the situation.

By the end of the pilot, the sentiments expressed are more complex and reveal a greater variety of types of trust:

> We can't operate with current level of resources. Can't operate
> with this kind of instability. Contributes to disempowerment of
> the board. Hard to build in that kind of scenario. Undermines
> commitment of everyone around the board.
>
> [March 21, 2005]

A degree of calculus-based trust still exists in this quote: the issue of funding instability speaks to a feeling of DFO and the Province having violated trust in terms of not having afforded the AMB a genuine opportunity to prove its worth, now at the end of its pilot. The power and control foundation comes into play here, as the authorities were not showing a willingness to share responsibility for aquatic resource management. Lack of funding effectively prevented the Board from taking on many of the projects they would have liked to have undertaken: they did not even have adequate funds for staffing a project manager. The positive outcome of the AMB experiment depended upon firm commitment of

the government, and the government had committed to community involvement through the *Oceans Act*, so that the parties were interdependent in achieving their goals – a precondition for initiation of trust. By insufficiently committing to the funding, the governments violated the rest of the Board's trust. The funding regime did not provide the "consistent allocation" of funding that was required to yield a positive assessment of procedural justice. The funding agencies were neither consistent in their year-to-year provision of funding to the Board, nor in considering the rest of the Board members' concerns with the authority of the Board, which was partly contingent upon sufficient funding. Any personal trust that had been generalized to the agencies that the government members represented had been violated.

As well, the reference to commitment is a subtle hint that this member expects all the others to remain committed, and is expressing disapproval of any lack of commitment, this being a deterrent to violating calculus-based trust. However, the quote is richer than merely demonstrating calculus-based trust; it also conveys an appreciation for the Board's value, an urgency to maintain the Board, and a reluctance to entertain the possibility that the Board may fail. There is a sense of shared loss if the Board is unable to continue, thereby expressing an identification with the Board and with the other Board members that is more typical of later Phases of trust, particularly Phase Three (Connection). This member is beyond assessing the continuity of the relationship, and the requisite trust. In that sense, this quote also projects reciprocity-based trust – an assumption that the others will also want the Board to continue. I now turn to exploring this latter type of trust.

## 3.2.2 Reciprocity-based Trust

The expression of reciprocity-based trust was very much dependent upon the Board members' communication styles and personalities, and their optimism and enthusiasm for the Board. While it presented itself throughout the pilot, I assigned it to Phase One because it has an air of hope, and perhaps naiveté, that is reminiscent of the romantic love stage, thereby representing the optimism at the beginning of a longed-for relationship. Because of the setting of a positive tone that comes with reciprocity-based trust, it is arguably more important at the beginning of a collaboration when firm trust has yet to be established than when trust is already in existence.

The following quote depicts reciprocity-based trust as a confident declaration of what the AMB's function is: the speaker assumes that the others will agree:

> The Board's role appears to be mainly as a clearinghouse
> where issues get referred to other processes for resolution. This
> is a substantial role.
>
> [February 23, 2002]

As discussed in section 3.1.1, individuals exhibit reciprocity-based trust when making a non-threatening statement, feeling secure that it will not be met with opposition, thus also expressing the element of believing the parties could form common expectations. In addition to stating what the member sees as the AMB's function, the second sentence also exudes positiveness and a belief that the AMB will be a powerful entity, thereby conveying the elements of this member's confidence in the collective's ability to work together, and willingness to take a risk to achieve the AMB's objectives. The member exhibited the foundations of both positive state of mind, as well as positive valence regarding the Board's role. The member appears to have been "in a good mood" as he said this, and is also feeling positive about what he predicted the Board's role to be, thereby coming to the conclusion that

the Board was a worthy recipient of his trust. As well, because this member felt that the

Board could take on a substantial role, he also felt that the Board was in a position of control

regarding resolution of issues.

The next quote, from the middle of the pilot phase, seems to indicate an intermediate

stage between Phase One and Phase Two:

> Thinking beyond the pilot — ■■ and a few board members
> should meet with a subset of RMC [DFO's Regional
> Management Committee], report to them on AMB's activities,
> get more direct interaction; need to have a discussion with
> RMC about where the board fits, what the barriers are. Fits
> with DAAP[19] [Departmental Alignment and Assessment
> Process] — more integration, realignment, ecosystem
> management, socio-economic considerations.

[June 17, 2004]

This quote from one of the DFO representatives was an invitation to the AMB to

meet with DFO's senior regional executives; the speaker seems most comfortable in

extending the invitation, thereby indicating reciprocal trust. The future course of action is

still ambiguous, indicating that the Board is still in Phase One. However, he mentioned

"thinking beyond the pilot", which shows that he was no longer assessing the continuity of

the relationship – that was a given. Similarly, there is an obvious willingness to share power

(power and control; attitude toward leaders, authorities, and institutions)[20], at least from his

own perspective, if not DFO's, and an intent to ensure that the AMB had the opportunity to

influence its own future (procedural justice). Because these latter aspects are no longer in

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[19] Briefly, the DAAP was a review process designed to harmonize DFO's expenditures with its, and its clients', priorities.

[20] Throughout the rest of this chapter, I have referenced the various components of the framework (Table 5, Chapter 2) in this manner, indicating the specific element, foundation, or stage of trust that is implicated in the discussion.

question, at least from the speaker's point of view, the trust levels seem to be transitioning

onto the next stage.

As with calculus-based trust, the members' statements at end of the pilot showed a

much greater complexity in terms of trust:

> It's clear in the Terms of Reference that we can't walk away
> from it [the "Pearse McRae Report"[21]]. Different if no one
> came to me and I decided I would be an advocate. We are all
> busy—we are only going to respond to meaningful issues, and
> only going to do so where it is clearly within our Terms of
> Reference.

[March 21, 2005]

While exhibiting some measure of reciprocity-based trust in terms of assuming the

others would agree with the sentiment, the quote is more indicative of teamwork and of an

understanding of others' responsibilities and the demands being placed on them. It projects a

sense of shared disappointment, as well as a knowledge of the AMB's capabilities and

limitations that would only emerge after some experience working together. Therefore,

although reciprocity-based trust is present in this quote, the essence of it indicates greater

familiarity and comfort with the others. Common expectations appear to be firmly

established; the Board is past the stage of merely believing that they could arrive at them. At

the same time, the speaker does also seem to be employing the foundation of control over the

situation, both in terms of the AMB's control over dealing with the report, as well as her own

control over the other members' reactions to the report. To that extent, consistent with Phase

One, the quote does also project a sense of personal efficacy consistent with elicitation of

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[21] *Treaties and Transition: Towards a Sustainable Fishery on Canada's Pacific Coast*, simply known as the
"Pearse McRae Report", outlined options for post-treaty salmon fisheries. The report was met with much
opposition, particularly regarding the individual transferable quotas, which would essentially privatize the
resource. See http://www.gov.bc.ca/bcgov/content/docs/@2QS7U_0YQtuW/pearse_mcrae_report-
joint_fish_task_group.pdf for the full report. Accessed June 9, 2007.

trust, in that it offers an acknowledgment of the others' busy schedules, and is confident in inviting others to trust that the speaker will recognize and validate their input. I now turn to a discussion of elicitative trust.

### 3.2.3 Elicitative Trust

Elicitative is yet another form of behaviour control, in that, as described in Chapter Two, it demonstrates a feeling of personal efficacy, particularly where assumptions of reciprocity are low. Here again, we see how Phase One presents itself differently in different individuals – those who assume that others will trust, being more other-focussed; and those who assume that they have the ability to sway others to trust, being more self-focussed. Elicitative trust is an example of the psychological state of one perceiving him/herself as having control over the situation, as a result of the feeling of personal efficacy, thus, showing a self-focus, at least during the specific time at which the statement was uttered. Again, the government members (both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal) tended to express this type of trust more than the non-government members, perhaps because of being in positions of power (however relative they were to each other), thereby having greater personal efficacy. This tendency demonstrates the power and control foundation of those in a position of authority having greater willingness to engage in trust behaviour, as well as the cooperation element of having a willingness to make oneself vulnerable. While Aboriginal culture traditionally is strongly geared toward sharing, and therefore not self-focussed, perhaps the fact that the NTC finally succeeded in bringing their vision of the AMB to fruition contributed to a sense of personal efficacy among Aboriginal members.

The quote below suggests a confidence that this NTC member will be able to change the others' perspectives and create a sense of optimism and enthusiasm:

> Another thing that I'd actually like to see is a retreat with the
> board. Not just a voluntary retreat, but everyone should be
> there. A total commitment to a period of time that's agreed to
> for the purposes of actually just adjusting their thinking enough
> to be able to tackle the energy that's gonna be needed, and the
> time that's gonna be needed in a lot of strategic planning on the
> whole of the west coast.

[September 15, 2003]

This quote demonstrates a component of the cooperation element – developing formal expectations and standards, and holding members accountable to them. Attendance at the Board meetings suffered throughout the pilot, often not making the quorum of 50% plus one required for decision making. In order for the AMB to achieve its goals, the initiative required a concerted, committed effort from all Board members, at the very least in appearing at the meetings, as well as in making the effort to arrive at common objectives, that is, to cooperate. The member was also making reference to the Board members' interdependence, and the consequences of not participating – those being greater than the consequences of participating. All on the Board desired improved access to the fishery for the sake of reaping benefits for their communities; this Board was deemed to be a vehicle for achieving that. Thus, not participating in the meetings would jeopardize that outcome: the benefits of time spent in their regular duties (not participating in meetings) would not out-weigh the consequences of not participating (failure of the AMB pilot, resulting in the status quo on the West Coast).

Elicitative trust also manifested itself throughout the pilot as trust proffered from the AMB as a whole to the agencies that the government members represented. This presentation of elicitative trust conveyed the message, "We have something to offer and trust that you will place enough trust in this organization to include it in the advisory /

management process." Because the AMB was a "different way of doing business," and challenged the existing management regime, the AMB was taking a risk in sharing its views, e.g. risking loss of funding or support in general, but at the same time, this risk was necessary in order to fulfill the AMB's mandate.

> Board staff will contact DFO to arrange a meeting to discuss further development of this fishery [tanner crab] and the possible roles for the Board. This will include outlining the main policy issues that need to be addressed and determining processes and timelines through which this can happen.
>
> [June 7, 2002]

In this example, the AMB is not only asking for a role, but attempting to partner on determining the issues and how they would be addressed, i.e. fully participating in how the issues would be managed when DFO would otherwise be exclusively responsible. The passage has a challenging air, as though it is daring DFO to ignore the request. This is a more literal representation of elicitative trust, where the Board is pursuing opportunities to engage, rather than assuming that DFO will go to the Board to offer it a role, as would perhaps be the case in a situation of reciprocal (i.e. reciprocity-based) trust. This gesture is an expression of the AMB's "personal" or collective efficacy – a belief in its effectiveness and ability to deliver on its mandate, and an attempt to convince DFO of these qualities. Similarly, it shows both positional and personal bases of influence, exhibiting power to direct another, as well as the willingness to use its power. With this letter, the AMB was employing the power and control foundation to assess DFO's willingness to share its control of the tanner crab fishery, and the procedural justice foundation to determine how much influence on the fishery's management DFO would yield to the AMB.

By the end of the Board's third year, the personal efficacy seems to have come full circle to resemble the romantic love stage:

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> There is only one board with clear principles and mandate,
> including inclusivity, that is integrated and ecosystem based—
> that is the AMB.
>
> [March 21, 2005]

But while this quote clearly alludes to the Board's efficacy, it has lost the tone of challenging some other entity, or of trying to convince its own members, that is more representative of elicitative trust; rather, it is a pronouncement on the Board's uniqueness and value that speaks to the member's attachment and pride in it – identification, as in the Connection phase. As well, the romantic quotes at the beginning of the mandate were more about encouraging each other that they could succeed in this endeavour; this statement is an affirmation of that. The sentiment has firmly accepted the foundations assigned to Phase One; they are no longer being used as "evaluation criteria". For example, the moral evaluation foundation regarding values and ideology seems to have been satisfied through the AMB's accomplishments and its principles; the speaker appears to have experienced hedonic benefits through association with the AMB (psychological states); and with the positive reference to inclusivity, the speaker was suggesting a positive attitude toward leaders, authorities, and institutions in that she is comfortable with the interdependence of the Board members, and confident in the Board's continuity. No more convincing through elicitative trust was required. Through this demonstration, we see that elicitative trust fits squarely into the early stages of trust development, as does moralistic trust, as I will show below.

### 3.2.4 Moralistic Trust

As evidence of the early-stage nature of moralistic trust, only a small portion of these statements occurred during the last fiscal year of the pilot. This quote is typical of the tone of the moralistic quotes near the beginning of the AMB's mandate:

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We need to develop a strategy over the long term so that people can see where their issues fit. I don't want to work in a vacuum anymore – I want to talk to people with other interests; I'm not getting the feedback from other interests and management regimes that are in place. I need to know what you want from me, what your restrictions are in your endeavours. I need to know that your background is sufficient to give me a background that I need to consider.

[February 23, 2002]

The quote clearly is a declaration of the speaker's own trustworthiness, regardless of what the others intend, as well as an obvious attempt to build a positive reputation as someone who cares about the others' interests and concerns. The moral evaluation foundation is also fully expressed here, in all its components: the speaker was conveying his values and ideology with regard to the sort of process he was seeking, and seems to have viewed trust as a moral obligation, given that there is no apparent contingency in the willingness to engage in trusting behaviour. References to the other management regimes denote the moral evaluation of the unsatisfactory situation that gave rise to the AMB; because of his displeasure with the other options, this member was eager to embark on a completely different journey.

While the passage exudes good intentions, it also borders on judgemental, setting a moral standard for what the speaker feels the others should also be striving for. This individual also seems to be predisposed to engaging in trusting behaviour, seeing it as a matter of course (individual factors). Almost all of the interdependence and risk components, as well as some of the cooperation elements, are also reflected in this quote: the course of action was ambiguous and the outcome of the endeavour depended on the others' behaviour; the speaker was willing to take the risk and accept the vulnerability inherent in participating in this pilot; was hopeful that they would be able to agree on the approach; and

was proposing a standard for the other members' behaviour and expectations of how the Board would operate.

Similarly, this statement from February 22, 2002 also expresses trustworthiness, and almost a paternalistic attitude toward others who did not return their trust:

> The number of groups and individuals that the Board will interact with is significant. Many people will be unfamiliar or hostile towards the Board and its basic approach or principles. Involving groups in strategic planning is an effective means of educating people and getting support for the Board.

The speaker is conveying understanding and forgiveness toward those who would attempt to undermine the Board, while also strategically choosing to include them, so as to offer trust in the hopes of reassuring them and "converting" them. While plainly this strategy has a self-serving purpose, there is also no intention of excluding these groups and individuals, regardless of whether they trust the AMB, thus being an expression of moralistic trust. Because of the intention to include the others regardless, this statement differs from one exhibiting mainly elicitative trust, for example, which is geared toward obtaining the other's trust. It is, however, a confident perception of the AMB's ability to sway these other groups, thereby declaring its positional basis of influence, at least attempting to direct the others. As well, because the AMB had a mandate from multiple governments, it did have, in theory, a considerable amount of power, therefore being more willing to engage in trusting behaviour than other groups with lesser power (power and control). The psychological state of the speaker indicates a cautiously optimistic or positive valence, and a perception of some measure of control over the situation. Both the interdependence and risk, and cooperation elements are also represented with this quote in terms of the acceptance of vulnerability in facing and including these potentially hostile groups.

In contrast, this statement made during the last year of the pilot, while still exhibiting moralistic trust, also exhibits compensatory trust, a Phase Two form of trust, which I will discuss further below. It is, therefore, a transitional form of trust, moving from one phase to the next:

> Importance of remembering that we focus on common interests, not sectoral representation. We should all be able to speak on a range of issues.
>
> [September 16, 2004]

As in moralistic trust, this speaker is demonstrating her own trustworthiness, regardless of the others' undesirable behaviour. She also seems to have been anxious about the other's behaviour and how focusing on self-interests was detrimental to achieving the AMB's objectives. She was, therefore, reminding the others of how to conduct themselves in order to achieve the AMB's objectives, which is an expression of compensatory trust. She sees that the others' behaviour may undermine the Board's success, so is attempting to model the collaborative-minded behaviour on which the AMB is based. The speaker seems to have moved beyond the limited capacity to criticize and evaluate the others, and was fairly open in pointing out untoward behaviour, thereby also being quite candid in voicing her concern. This statement does not reflect the stereotypical niceties of an exchange between strangers, but rather, it demonstrates the comfort level more characteristic of greater familiarity of voicing more critical observations. Romantic love, in contrast, is totally accepting of the other, as we will see next.

### 3.2.5 Romantic Love Stage

While romantic love is obviously not characteristic of the "fear of punishment" tenor of pure calculus-based trust, it threads itself into all of the other types of trust discussed above. It has a presence as a positive undercurrent throughout Phase One, at least for those

who were disposed to express their trust in this manner – not all were (in total, 3 government and 4 non-government members did not express any "romantic" sentiments), although this may have been due to the nature of the information (i.e. process-related) assessed in this study. Other topics of discussion may have yielded different results. Because this aspect of the early stages of trust building has arisen a number of times throughout the discussion above, my discussion here will be brief.

This first quote has the characteristically positive outlook of the romantic love stage:

> This Board is not about either/or long term strategy or
> responding to issues. We are moving from approaching issues
> from a positional basis to win-win solutions. The real and main
> value of Board is that there are diverse views and we have
> captured a range of interests and views. To find solutions that
> address something beyond just our positions.
>
> [February 23, 2002]

The tone is hopeful and optimistic, showing positive valence and positive state of mind, and an eagerness to participate in this venture (psychological states – positive assessment of the effort required); the speaker has evaluated the Board as an inherently "good" thing (moral evaluation – quality of the relationship and situation) that incorporates the input of many interested parties (procedural justice, belief that the parties can form common expectations). Risk taking does not even appear to be an issue for this speaker (interdependence and risk – acceptance of vulnerability), perhaps being predisposed to trust others (individual factors).

After the first year of operations, I conducted a survey of the Board members, regarding their thoughts on the events so far:

> Q: Is the Board functioning as you had foreseen? (i.e. is the
> general operation of the Board what you were expecting? How
> so? If not, why not?)

A: I did not have specific expectations, but I am satisfied with
the Board's function to date. It has been a rewarding
experience.

[March 6, 2003]

Clearly, this member was in a positive psychological state, with a positive valence

toward the Board, and perhaps had experienced hedonic effects of engaging in trust

behaviour. Calling participation on the Board a "rewarding experience" would indicate a

positive moral evaluation, as well. While the statement itself is rather vague, we can assume

that the member was comfortable with taking the risk of further participation on this Board,

and was satisfied that further progress toward reaching their goals would be possible

(interdependence and risk – belief that the parties can form positive expectations).

By the end of the three years, one of the Board members arrived at this sentiment:

We haven't said anything derogatory since we started to work
together. No one recognizes what it means all of us sitting
down together, really of value – really quelled anxiety within
our communities.

[March 21, 2005]

Once again seeing a transition in trust levels, while this is a very positive and heart-

felt (i.e., romantic) statement, it speaks more to what the AMB has achieved, rather than

having a positive outlook on what could be possible. There is no fear of opportunistic

behaviour or feeling of vulnerability (interdependence and risk), and a full acceptance of

dependence on the others to succeed in this endeavour (attitude toward leaders, authorities,

and institutions – interdependence with the other parties). To that extent, this statement is

more representative of the accommodative stage, which I have assigned to the Connection

phase; the expression of friendship and sense of resolution points to an identification with the

other members that could not have appeared without some knowledge and experience with

the others. I now end this discussion of Phase One with the polar opposite of the romantic

love stage – hollow shell relationships.

## 3.2.6 Hollow Shell Relationships

In contrast to the types and stages of trust discussed above, hollow shell relationships

are characterized by mainly a lack of trust. The vast majority of these statements occurred

during the early stages of the pilot. Similar to the moralistic quotes, most of the "hollow

shell" quotes were uttered during the last fiscal year, indicating that by the end of the pilot,

some level of trust had developed among the Board members, at least in terms of a

willingness and comfort in voicing opposition, if not in terms of respect for, and friendship

with, the others. These quotes are similar to the very negative comments expressed above in

section 3.1.1, where not even calculus-based trust appeared to exist. This is a very clever

example of a statement depicting a hollow shell relationship:

> This Board is not just going to fit in government processes; that
> will be a two way street.
>
> [February 23, 2002]

This quote could be interpreted in a number of ways: 1) it is a defiant vow at the first

AMB meeting that the Board will not disappear into the morass of existing advisory

processes; 2) it is an invitation to the government members to cooperate, implying that the

AMB will do its share of the work; 3) it is a concern that the Board may be left out of

government processes; 4) it is a realization that working cooperatively with the government

is a necessary "evil", but will not be done on the government's terms (or not entirely); or, and

most likely, 5) it is all of the above. In any case, the sentiment is a challenge to government

(mostly DFO) to treat the AMB as the unique entity that it is, and to afford the Board a

genuine opportunity to prove its worth. The quote smacks of distrust and rebelliousness,

while also offering the interpretation of being cautiously optimistic – a tentative offer of collaboration. The capacity for conflict is very low, with the speaker employing careful wording, so as to avoid a dispute.

The quote is squarely aimed at a concern with procedural justice – whether the AMB will be able to influence the usual format of collecting input. It is an interesting expression of the positional basis of influence, dictating to DFO, itself a participant on the Board, how the Board should be interacting with DFO. The statement clarifies the speaker's limitations on his willingness to engage in certain activities, in this case, government processes (interdependence and risk). The moral evaluation is negative, and consequently, so is the valence – the participants arrived at this situation because of their dissatisfaction with the usual advisory procedures. Typical of hollow shell relationships, this statement is civil, with a palpable underlying animosity; trust is very unstable at this point.

Similarly, this statement downplays the frustration evident in the sentiment:

> Concern that we have adequate authority to have our
> recommendations [regarding rockfish] listened to. Concern that
> we go through a lengthy process only to have it ignored or side
> stepped.
>
> [September 16, 2002]

While this statement is obviously paraphrased, being an extract from the meeting minutes, and we do not know exactly how it was originally expressed, the fact that it was recorded as "concern" rather than an open accusation, whether it was spoken that way or not, shows a consciousness of the need to remain civil, however vehement the emotion behind the statement may have been. Possibly both the speaker and the minutes taker, or at least the latter, felt a need to tone down the allegation that DFO was going to make whatever management decision it chose to make, regardless of what the AMB recommended; the

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comfort level and consequent level of candour was low. There is a heavy suspicion

regarding the procedural justice of rockfish management decisions, a non-belief in DFO's

willingness to share control of the fishery (power and control), and a negative valence

(psychological states) colouring trust in DFO. This quote is indicative of the thinly veiled

aggravation and dissatisfaction that Board members, particularly the non-government

members, felt during the early months of the pilot.

However, already by the beginning of the second year, the members showed a greater

willingness to name the party they were referring to. Compare the quotes below to the two

above:

> Last meeting it was determined that we need to stop talking
> about it and start doing something [rockfish conservation
> strategy]. Key issue – start collecting local information,
> looking at ways to improve and show leadership as opposed to
> simply fitting into DFO's process.
>
> [May 8, 2003]

> The Province is giving verbal support, but no money or time;
> provincial attitude is pathetic; feds should be twisting the arm
> of BC; AMB can't carry on without BC, it's a pointless
> exercise; BC uses other provincial issues as excuses to not
> support the AMB.
>
> [September 15, 2004]

The first statement leaves no doubt as to whom the speaker is talking about, in

contrast to the previous ones, with "government" referenced, or no party at all referenced.

While this pattern may seem to indicate greater hostility toward DFO, it actually indicates

greater trust in that the parties were willing to openly criticize each other, rather than

euphemistically doing so; the capacity for conflict and evaluation had increased by this point.

The speaker also demonstrates a feeling of personal influence, being willing to use power

against DFO; rather than waiting for DFO's willingness to share its power (power and control), this individual wanted to force the issue.

The second statement is an even more vivid example of the comfort in freely criticizing the governments, of the candour the members had developed, and the personal basis of influence in terms of a willingness to use power to try to influence senior governments. This member is still trying to set a standard and hold the governments accountable, but the Province in particular was not adhering to that standard, and thereby not cooperating. Because that element of trust was not being met, resulting in this member's negative state of mind, as well as negative valence regarding the issue of the Province's participation, we see an obvious lack of trust in the speaker's words. The outcome of the pilot did depend in part on the Province's participation (interdependence and risk – outcome depends on behaviour of others), and this member's frustration in the toll the lack of participation would take on the Board's success is apparent.

By the end of the three years, Board members were naming individuals, here showing how this member's lack of personal trust reflected on her impression of DFO's commitment in general (attitude toward leaders, authorities, and institutions – dependability, consistency of word and deed). However, note that even at the end of the pilot, this statement was regarding an individual who was not present:

> AMB has tried to meet with Paul Sprout [DFO's Regional
> Director General, the senior executive in Pacific Region] and
> has been unsuccessful.
>
> [March 21, 2005]

At no point during the pilot, or at least not in the dataset used for this analysis, did anyone openly criticize an individual present at the meeting. Whether this was an issue of trust and comfort level, or just a manifestation of social norms, is impossible to say for sure

through this type of analysis. However, the adherence to social norms is yet another indication of low levels of trust. Again, this statement could be interpreted in a number of ways: rather than stepping away from the accepted custom of maintaining a polite decorum in order to emphasize the gravity of the situation, this member chose to convey the information in a very subtle and composed manner. While this member was fairly mild-mannered in general, she was known to have more emotional outbursts; to that extent, I do not believe that being more direct in her criticism was simply not in his/her nature. Or she may have been expressing sarcasm; the context and the manner in which this statement was spoken would have a large impact on the interpretation. I do recall some frustration in her voice as she said this; therefore, while the words were gentle, the non-verbal communication conveyed discontent.

My own observations above regarding this particular individual are indications of my own learning about the Board members. Over the two years that I observed and spoke to these people, both during luncheon and coffee breaks at meetings and at informal dinners afterwards, I came to understand their personalities, their communication styles, and to be able, to some extent, to predict their responses. All this is an example of knowledge-based trust (KBT); I will now turn to a discussion of Phase Two (Familiarization), beginning with knowledge-based trust.

# 4.0  Phase Two (Familiarization)

After the monumental amount of risk assessment, evaluation, goal-setting, and

general coming to terms with working with each other has taken place in Phase One, Phase

Two is relatively simple.  There is still a great deal of learning about each other to be done,

but the parties are standing on firmer ground, so that the risk has lessened and comfort levels

have increased.  In this stage, the parties are essentially enhancing their knowledge of each

other and solidifying their opinions, whether positive or negative.

## 4.1  Knowledge-based Trust (KBT)

Much overlap took place between calculus-based trust and knowledge-based trust in

the extracts, with about two third of the quotes showing signs of both types of trust.

However, one type of trust did tend to dominate over the other, depending on the phase of

trust the Board was experiencing.  Some knowledge-based trust was already taking place at

the beginning of the pilot:

> Feeling positive and confident about individual Board
> members and their ability to work together and develop a
> common vision.
>
> [April 5, 2002]

The timeframe here is very short, being more characteristic of Gabarro's

characterization of the first stage (orientation and impression formation), than of calculus-

based trust, allowing the speaker to have already jumped to knowledge-based trust after only

two months – this quote is from the Board's second meeting.  Perhaps the speaker (a staff

person) had spent more time with the Board members individually than the members had

with each other, allowing him to make this assessment.  The speaker's psychological state

showed a certainty about the others and optimism regarding the Board's success; he believed

that he had gathered enough information about the others to be able to determine that they would cooperate and would be able to reach common goals. The quote could be characterized as an expression of the romantic love stage, but presumably the speaker is basing his assessment on some knowledge of the others, rather than on a "gut instinct".

By the end of the first calendar year, the speaker's assessment was not quite so confident:

> Finding a large gap between governance concepts and capacity, especially regarding downloading. People generally still want government to carry out activities and are not willing to take them on or do not have the capacity to take them on. Difficulty getting people to make plans to address issues they are facing as they are skeptical that there is any use, but moving forward on it. Have to remind myself to not get too far ahead of where people are at in terms of will and real support. Capacity building takes a lot of time – pressure to be busy doing many 'activities' rather than focus on capacity building that doesn't show immediate results.
>
> [December 4, 2002]

Substantial additional learning had taken place over the course of the eight months between these two quotes, causing some frustration. This quote demonstrates the "ability" foundation – a questioning of the Board member's reliability, integrity, and competence in fully participating in the AMB's activities. Again, the timeframe is more characteristic of Gabarro's model: given the learning shown here, the AMB had arrived at the "exploring and moving beyond impressions" stage, despite the fact that at the same time, much Stage One behaviour was still being exhibited in terms of assessment of required attention and effort, negative valence, attempting to control others' behaviour, and an unwillingness to engage in the necessary activities. The overlap speaks to the overlaps in Gabarro's conception of the stages, with the first two (and third, in fact) occurring simultaneously; the stages are not discrete, but intertwined.

Interviews with the Board members occurred in the middle of the AMB's 3-year pilot

phase. A year and a half into the Board's pilot, this individual had had a most favourable

impression of her participation on the AMB:

> As a local government person, I've enjoyed being part of this,
> and valued being part of this process, more than any other
> outside activity, as a regional area director. It's been valuable
> to me personally. Raising my awareness of First Nations
> issues, the need for a foundation in living together, all those
> issues have inspired me personally.
>
> [September 11, 2003]

In contrast, on the same day, this speaker was showing much frustration with the

Board's progress, similar to the attitude the first speaker above had after only eight months:

> Here's a place [regarding the re-opening of the gooseneck
> barnacle fishery] where the board could actually grapple with a
> complicated, important – potentially important – policy issue in
> a development theme, and provide some real, meaningful
> advice to governments.... But you know, we can't get there,
> we can't get to the point where we can talk about that in a
> concrete way, because we're dealing with all of this issues
> management junk. And it's a classic problem with fisheries –
> everybody deals with the day-to-day issues and they can't
> focus on strategic things.
>
> [September 11, 2003]

This quote shows a case of increased knowledge of others resulting in a negative

assessment of their abilities to form common expectations. However, as troublesome as this

may seem, ironically, the predictability of this situation, and the consequent familiarity with

the others actually helps to build trust – a "better the devil you know" scenario. The speaker

was able to identify the problem; if the others had accepted his assessment of the problem,

they would all have known what needed to be improved and could have taken steps to do so.

Because they apparently had not come to the same conclusion yet, this individual was

struggling with the others' ability and willingness to learn, as well as his own influence on

the others. Again, with the temporal overlap, we see a demonstration of Gabarro's second

stage of exploration and moving beyond impressions, regarding goals, competency, and

consistency, and third stage of testing and defining the interpersonal contract with regard to

personal influence, mutuality of expectations, and working through differences. This sort of

assessment as a result of having had some experience with the others is typical of the

evaluative stage, as I will explore below.

## 4.2   Evaluative Stage

While, as mentioned above in section 3.1.1, the evaluative stage is similar to calculus-

based trust in terms of weighing the costs and benefits of a relationship, I assigned the

evaluative stage to Phase Two because the evaluation in the second stage of romantic

relationships is really a *re*-evaluation – an assessment that comes after some knowledge of

the other has been gained.

Here is another example of a Board member's response to my survey after the first

year of operations:

> Q: Do you have any suggestions for addressing issues of
> concern or improving Board performance?
> A: Less interference by fed rep on issues the DFO does not
> want us to address.
>
> [March 6, 2003]

This is a very clear comment on the perceived openness of the political system to

citizen participation (attitude toward leaders, authorities, and institutions). The speaker

obviously felt that one of the DFO representatives was preventing the Board from venturing

into DFO's legislative areas of responsibility, severely limiting the Board's activities, and

thereby preventing the AMB from meeting the objectives under its Terms of Reference.

However, the statement is very blunt, exhibiting candour and informality; it is not "sugar

coated". She openly stated her opinion on the subject, which suggests that she was beyond

the calculus-based trust stage of strained behaviour due to fear of reprisal.

The quote below demonstrates the changed tone of an individual who originally

showed a romantic optimism:

> We're an advisory group that is not considered terribly
> important. We don't meet often enough for us to experience
> the level of absentees we get. It tells me how the board is
> viewed. I want to put a little spark in all of us. We need to
> think of ourselves as a team. It will only be as important as we
> make it. If we don't pay attention and nurture, it will wither
> away and die. All it is right now is a seed. If we don't water it,
> it's not going to grow.

[September 15, 2004]

After almost a year and half, the AMB was struggling along, still trying a carve a

niche for itself, and by then, not everyone shared this person's enthusiasm, causing him some

frustration. He was perhaps feeling some challenge to his own person basis of influence – a

less than optimal ability to create common goals, or inadequate charisma to garner enough

support and recognition for the Board, either from the Board members or from those external

to it. While his own psychological state seemed to suggest a positive certainty about the

Board's future, that of the other members was less certain, according to this quote, or at least

was not as consistently positive as his was, creating a barrier to building trust based on

reliability or integrity (ability).

In terms of the "attitude toward leaders, authorities, and institutions" foundation, the

leaders in this context would be the Board members themselves, as representatives of their

sectors, rather than referring strictly to government members. The speaker was questioning

their consistency of word and deed – they applied to become AMB members and signed onto

the Board, implying a commitment to the process, but often did not appear at the meetings,

citing other, more important responsibilities, which also called their dependability into question. The tone is also somewhat informal and even scolding, showing a comfort level and candour that comes of greater familiarity among individuals, so while some measure of trust had been built in terms of the openness of communication, greater trust development was hampered by the others' lack of commitment and government's lack of recognition of the AMB.

At the final meeting of the Board's pilot, a member offered this piece of advice:

> Should be really open-minded about where to go from here.
> Don't tie ourselves to TOR [Terms of Reference] if that would
> hurt the future of the AMB.
>
> [March 21, 2005]

This quote is interesting for two reasons: first, this individual was very skeptical throughout most of the AMB's pilot, and regularly challenged the Board's direction. While this quote still seems to be challenging the direction, it also shows a definite interest in maintaining the Board, rather than questioning its existence and utility. While the member is still struggling with the formation of common expectations, the member's own expectations and desire for the continuation of the Board give the other members an increasing understanding of this member's expectations (independence and risk). The quote also hints at the member's psychological state regarding the future of the Board, that being somewhat anxious, but not discouraged or negative. It is a hopeful and encouraging sentiment that implies an interest in building trust, rather than a lack of it. As well, with this statement, the member offered the other Board members an opportunity to favourably assess her ability to learn to appreciate the Board's value, and to recognize her change in attitude from forever questioning to something more positive.

Secondly, this quote is interesting because it demonstrates the transition to the accommodative stage. The speaker was still evaluating the validity of the Terms of Reference, but, as is characteristic of the accommodative stage, the member was attempting to negotiate conflicting needs and expectations, as well as offering a commitment to the AMB and a desire to ensure its continuation. The passage is a demonstration of both benevolence and ability to engage in trust behaviour (ability). The concern for the future of the AMB, however, was largely a manifestation of the member's concern for government support, i.e. institutional trust. I turn to that type of trust next.

## *4.3 Institutional Trust*

Institutional trust relates specifically to governments and authorities; while these entities were included on the Board, I do not include trust of the AMB itself as an authority as part of the analysis of this form of trust. I do include statements referring to the governments as separate entities, or to the individual government representatives. This first quote regarding the Board's funding woes was an oft-repeated sentiment throughout the AMB's pilot:

> Government's lack of commitment to stable Board funding is a major hassle.
>
> [April 5, 2002]

The speaker here was one of the staff members, indicating a potential for those not directly on the Board, but working with it to influence trust development on the Board. Already at the second Board meeting, the staff were concerned with money, and rather than shielding the Board members from that information, the speaker chose to freely share it. While he made this statement very early in the AMB's mandate, he was already showing a candour and comfort in addressing controversial topics more characteristic of Phase Two,

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possibly due more to his personality than to trust development, showing a predisposition to

trust (individual factors, Phase One). However, with this statement, he was questioning

government's openness to citizen participation, since the Board's success and ability to

participate in resource management was largely contingent upon adequate funding (attitude

toward leaders, authorities, and institutions). As well, government was showing itself to be

undependable, leaving its integrity open to question. Consequently, the speaker's

psychological state showed some anxiety with regard to the certainty of the situation,

specifically effective Board administration and its ability to engage in projects. More than a

year later, another individual voiced the same concern:

> ▌ not happy with Province's participation; no financial
> contribution to the Board.
>
> [March 7, 2003]

Funding, however, was not the only issue with regard to institutional trust. The

following is an interesting example of how the government representatives had strained trust

with their own institutions:

> ▌ not comfortable with supporting some of Board's
> initiatives because of his position in DFO – can't be outspoken
> against DFO.
>
> [March 7, 2003]

He openly stated that he was not comfortable, which conveys his psychological state.

In an interesting twist, while the statement conveys certainty regarding the situation, i.e. he

was certain that he could not speak out against DFO, the certainty did not result in increased

trust towards his own organization. In this case, uncertainty may have been more positive, if

there had been any possibility of safely speaking out against DFO, thereby contributing his

support to the Board's initiatives. As well, the speaker displayed candour, and a questioning

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of DFO's openness to citizen participation through his reluctance to challenge DFO[22] (attitude toward leaders, authorities, and institutions).

Later in the Board's mandate, however, this member showed a little more adventurousness in terms of going against, or challenging, DFO's policies:

> You push the envelope, get agreement incrementally.
> Incrementally.
>
> [April 7, 2004]

As the AMB was creeping into the second half of its pilot phase, we see that this Board member was showing some identification with the AMB, indicative of Phase Three (Connection); his allegiances and loyalties seem to have been pulled toward the AMB, and he was very cautiously prodding DFO to move in a different direction that was more reflective of the management structures the AMB was attempting to promote. His psychological state, however, still shows some anxiety and a need to convince the other Board members that major changes would have to be introduced very slowly in order to gain government support. This member was generally very conservative throughout the pilot in terms of his willingness to venture into new management territory, but the shift in tone here demonstrates that he was, by this point, more comfortable addressing controversial topics, and was more willing to accept the other Board members' influence (cooperation).

By the end of the pilot, the DFO members were willing to openly admit that DFO had not adequately included the AMB in management processes and decisions, exhibiting candour and openness of communication (attitude toward leaders, authorities, and institutions), but the identification with the AMB was still not apparent. DFO representatives still saw themselves as a separate entity and not as an integral part of the AMB culture:

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[22] All federal public servants must sign pledges of allegiance to the Queen, thereby pledging loyalty to, and support for, the Canadian federal government and its policies. This Board member, as well as his DFO counterpart, were sworn to uphold DFO policies in their roles as senior DFO representatives on the AMB.

> Legitimate concern that we [DFO] have embarked on new
> processes without consulting Board or figuring out how they
> would fit together.
>
> [March 21, 2005]

From the same day, the following two quotes show contrasting attitudes toward DFO:

> Opening TOR is okay, if necessary, as long as those who
> initially built the AMB are included in the discussions. Can't be
> just a government decision.

> Have enough influence at this table to make this board
> successful. In position to go to [DFO] and say this is who we
> are, this is role [in which] we can be most successful. But there
> is no point unless we are all really behind it. First order is to
> figure out whether or not we can help NCN [the Nuu-chah-
> nulth Tribal Council] and DFO figure out what new structure
> might look like.

The first quote above was from an individual who joined the AMB late in its

mandate. He had a history of activism against DFO's policies and he seems to have not

developed much trust in DFO during the short period that he was participating as a Board

member. He was questioning DFO's openness to citizen participation, and his psychological

state reveals some uncertainty, and consequently, he was not confident about agreeing to the

suggestion of reopening the Terms of Reference. His willingness to cooperate is very much

contingent upon government's cooperation in including the others' input, which also relates

to his concern for procedural justice and wanting to influence the process. It is a most

tentative offer of trust in government, dependent upon government's behaviour.

Interestingly, this quote reveals more Phase One behaviour than Phase Two, which may be a

function of his shorter tenure on the Board and a lesser period of time to develop trust in

government than the other Board members had.

In fact, the second quote seems to show more trust in DFO than in the other Board

members in that the speaker wanted to help DFO – although this could be interpreted as

directing DFO to a particular conclusion, rather than being "helpful" – but was somewhat

skeptical about how the other Board members would respond to the suggestion. On the other

hand, the speaker also seemed to be making a positive assessment of the other members'

abilities and competence in believing that the composition of the Board could yield success.

Perhaps this encouragement was an expression of the speaker's view of her personal basis of

influence, and a belief in her ability to create common goals. Or the ambivalence could be

indicative of a need to offset the possible reluctance of the other Board members to propose a

role to DFO, which would be an example of compensatory trust; I turn to that now.

## 4.4  Compensatory Trust

As with the other types of trust throughout this analysis, compensatory trust showed

itself throughout the Board's mandate. I placed it in Phase Two because the definition –

compensating for behaviour that might threaten the organization's stability – implies some

knowledge of the other's behaviour (knowledge-based trust), while still being wary of the

other (calculus-based trust), but not identifying with the other, as in Phase Three

(Connection). As well, the definition implies that some value beyond romanticism is being

placed on the organization, which is indicative of later stages of trust development. The

combination of the wariness with the interest in maintaining the collaborative group seems to

indicate an intermediate level of trust development.

Early expressions of compensatory trust implicated those outside the Board, rather

than the members themselves, which suggests a lack of adequate knowledge about the Board

members' behaviour at the beginning of the pilot to form a concern about contrary behaviour:

> The Board will need to balance leadership with
> participation/facilitation. The Board's vision, for instance, must
> be shared by other individuals and groups not on the Board in
> order for it to be implemented effectively. The Board needs to

balance strategic plan development with issues that come to the
Board needing immediate attention. However, being reactive
should not take over from being proactive in support of the
vision.

[February 22, 2002]

While this statement shows some evidence of other characteristics of Phase Two,

because the elements and foundations are highly interpretive, their application depends on

the context. For example, we could say that the speaker was prepared to cooperate because

he believed that the others would also do so, which is a component of the "cooperation"

element in Phase Two because it implies some familiarity with the others. To some extent,

this is true because this individual did have extensive familiarity with many of the members,

given his long-time association with them through RAMS, the Board's precursor (see end of

section 3.1.1). In this context, however, because this statement is from the first meeting, it is

also an expression of elicitative trust – exhibiting some sense of personal efficacy in directing

the other members' perceptions – because of the number of new members on the AMB who

had not been involved with RAMS. As well, because the passage is about what "should"

happen, rather than an assessment of what has happened, it truly is an example of Phase One,

despite showing some measure of compensatory trust.

The following quote shows a concern that the more aggressive Board members will

want to take too strong a stance against the existing management regime. The speaker was

suggesting a more measured, patient approach that would not preclude the Board's success

and consequent benefits to all sectors. As indicated in Chapter Two, compensatory trust is

not altruistic; it demonstrates a concern for one's self-interest, and an understanding of the

connection of it to that of the collective:

We need to be mindful of taking smaller steps at first
[regarding management of the sardine fishery] and then

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> building on them. We need to be careful about what we take on
> right now and how we do them. If we push too hard right away,
> we could alienate ourselves. We need to build capacity and a
> track record.
>
> [June 7, 2002]

Once again, given the early date of this statement, the compensatory trust could be

interpreted as calculus-based trust or moralistic trust. In this case, however, the Board

members had had some time together, and by the third meeting, this member could have had

legitimate concerns about the others' behaviour, rather than simply voicing concerns about a

hypothetical scenario. Apart from that, this passage shows little in terms of the other

components of Phase Two, perhaps being too early for their development.

The following quote is somewhat more complicated, being from one year into the

pilot phase:

> Q: Are there any specific issues that concern you about the
> Board, its performance, or the context in which it is operating?
>
> A: The Board needs to find one or two issues soon that it can
> add value to or lead. This will be crucial for public and board
> member interest in the board.
>
> [March 6, 2003]

Here we have an example of a statement that is more representative of Phase Two.

The concern with how the Board members were conducting themselves is plainly an instance

of compensatory trust; the speaker was worried that the success of the AMB depended upon

its ability to coalesce around some common issues of concern, and to pursue those

comprehensively. His own interest was of a slightly different nature, being a government

representative needing to show results, rather than being a community person concerned

about livelihood, but in either case, the goal was a successful pilot. This member showed an

increased knowledge of the others' expectations, but was concerned with their abilities to

form common expectations, both being components of the "interdependence and risk"

element. Regarding the "power and control" foundation, while the above quote was from a

private, written submission and is an example of his own thoughts on the Board, rather than

another member's assessment of this individual, we can see that he was showing a

willingness to share credit for the Board's successes, and was trying to encourage it, which

boded well for trust development.

Towards the end of the pilot, compensatory trust manifested itself in this manner:

> Fill Wilf Caron's seat right away, not just temporary until end
> of pilot; latter would send message that we're not sure about
> AMB's continuation.
>
> [September 16, 2004]

One of the Board members resigned from the AMB before the conclusion of its pilot,

leaving a gap in the representation. The speaker above was concerned that a slow process of

replacement would jeopardize further support, particularly government's financial support.

By leaving little question as to what the course of action should be, as well as adding a

moralistic tone regarding any questions around the Board's continuation, she was

compensating for those whose hesitancy might bring about the demise of the Board, which

would have compromised her own benefits received through participation on the AMB. As

well, by stating her view in this confident manner, the speaker's psychological state showed

that she was herself certain of the AMB's continuation, thereby also showing a decisiveness

in terms of her personal basis of influence. Through this confident style of expressing

herself, she may also be said to be displaying strong social skills, as well as a strong ability to

engage in trust behaviour (ability). Finally, the quote demonstrates a sense of bonding with

the Board, and a need to ensure that it does not fade away, which is characteristic of the

identification of Phase Three. One of the characteristics of identity-based trust is the ability

to compensate for others' weaknesses; thus, this quote also demonstrates how compensatory

trust manifests itself as a component of identity-based trust, as described in Chapter Two,

section 1.2.3 Identification-based Trust. I will turn to a discussion of identification-based

trust next.

## 5.0  Phase Three: Connection

Identification-based trust (IBT) is the only type of trust from Lewicki and Bunker's

Model of Trust Development and Decline falling under Phase Three; consequently, this

discussion will be much more brief than that of the previous two phases. Far fewer extracts

from the Board meetings exhibited identity-based trust as described in the model; for the

most part, the AMB's "Connection" phase more closely resembled Gabarro's "stabilization"

stage. However, the quotes taken from private interviews did show a tendency to reveal

more heart-felt sentiments about the value of the Board or about each other, as though the

Board members felt that expressions of admiration at the meetings were inappropriate, or

they were simply not comfortable with openly expressing their feelings on the subject. In

this sense, the Board members did, to some extent, reach Gabarro's description of a readiness

and ability to express positive evaluations, but generally only in private and not to the

individual in question. The Aboriginal members tended to be more expressive in terms of

their feelings toward the other members and the AMB in general; the reluctance of the others

to do the same may be a function of cultural norms[23] and discomfort with drifting from those

norms, which is associated with Phase One.

In line with the temporal aspect of both models, identity-based trust did not show

itself in the extracts until the second year. This first example from September 11, 2003 is a

very subtle expression of identity-based trust, voiced by two of the Board members:

███████ needs to emphasize projects going on (e.g. mapping).

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[23] I refer again to Footnote 8 in Chapter One, which describes cultural variability with regard to masculine vs feminine dynamics (achievement vs relationships). The non-Aboriginal board members seemed to be very much of the masculine culture, where the feminine focus on nurturing relationships was less relevant, or at least was an aspect that the Board members were apparently uncomfortable addressing.

These members were interested in knowing what the staff were doing outside of Board meetings, to encourage the Board members that the AMB was accomplishing something other than just talking at the meetings. This gesture was an act of trying to foster a collective identity and pride in the Board, an attempt to bolster everyone's self-esteem so that they would feel good about being part of the Board. Further, it was an attempt to show that their cooperative efforts through the AMB could yield mutual benefits and rewards (interdependence and risk – relationship that is mutual and robust enough to be rewarding and effective). Hence, they were trying to move each other toward shared goals (cooperation) through showing that they had, in fact, accomplished some of those shared goals through their collective input and direction to the staff on what types of projects should be undertaken. Participation in joint projects is one way to foster identity-based trust, but if the Board members did not know what those joint projects were, development of identity-based trust would be limited.

In contrast, on the same day, one of the same individuals had this to say in a private interview:

> As a local government person, I've enjoyed being part of this, and valued being part of this process, more than any other outside activity, as a regional area director. It's been valuable to me personally. Raising my awareness of First Nations issues, the need for a foundation in living together, all those issues have inspired me personally.

This passage clearly shows the empathy, internalization of others' needs, and effects on self-esteem that typify identity-based trust. She was showing her own consideration for others' interests, and her sensitivity to them (attitude toward leaders, authorities, and institutions), and her belief in everyone's ability to fulfill shared objectives is also apparent (interdependence and risk).

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During an interview with another Board member, he also plainly referenced identity-based trust:

> ■: A number of them were also together on RAMS before, so they've already worked through a lot of the issues, a lot of the local people. ■: Yeah, that's a good point, that that local constituency, and just, like I said, that dynamic is there. It's impressive to see because I keep thinking at times when I hear the discussion going on, you can see the constructiveness, you can see the give and take, the drive to arrive at conclusions taking place. And it's all because they see themselves as sort of united by that local interest.
>
> [September 15, 2003]

This Board member witnessed the emergence of common goals and group identification among the other members, and the attempts to help each reach those goals. He observed the sharing of opinions for mutual benefit that is an important element for the formation of cooperative behaviour. What is interesting about this quote is that he does not include himself in the development of collective identity, seeing himself as an outsider, partly because he was a government representative, and partly because he did not live in the community. However, it is clear from his tone that he was very supportive of the activity among the other members, and did not feel excluded because of his position as outsider. The quote very much demonstrates his consideration of, and sensitivity to, the others' needs and interests, which lays a solid foundation for the other members to bond with him as a trustworthy individual in a position of power (attitude toward leaders, authorities, and institutions).

The staff sometimes expressed their appreciation for the other Board members a little more freely, although the quote below was taken from an information package, rather than from a Board meeting, i.e., the sentiment was not spoken directly to the Board members, but was rather written down in a document distributed to them:

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> Lots of work to get Goose barnacle project implemented and
> operating, but good participation from all parties and really
> great to see this kind of multi-party collaboration happening.
> Grateful for staff's work in relation to this fishery.

[April 7, 2004]

Again, we see the members helping each other toward shared goals, those goals now

firmly established, at least in terms of this particular fishery. The quote speaks to the value

of the Board's shared ideologies regarding collaborative management (moral evaluation), and

expresses a bond with the other Board members (attitude toward leaders, authorities, and

institutions). For whatever reason, however, the sentiment came through in a document – a

much more impersonal form of acknowledgement than a face-to-face exchange would have

been. The meetings seemed to be reserved for "business", while this sort of emotional

expression of appreciation was either not expressed at all, or was conveyed outside of the

meetings, most often to people such as myself who were in some way associated with the

Board, but were not members of it.

While the non-Aboriginal people tended to voice these sentiments "behind the

scenes", the Aboriginal members were not so reserved:

> We haven't said anything derogatory since we started to work
> together. No one recognizes what it means, all of us sitting
> down together, really of value – really quelled anxiety within
> our communities.

[March 21, 2005]

A fulsome analysis of the effects of cultural variability on the expression of trust is

beyond the scope of this analysis; however, given the number of times and number of ways

the differences in Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal expressions of trust have arisen throughout

this analysis, further exploration of this phenomenon would be warranted. It is unfortunate

that the non-Aboriginal members were not more comfortable in voicing their appreciation for

each other, as that may have inhibited further development of identity-based trust. However,

for the most part, the members were fairly committed and respectful, and by the end of the

pilot, little acrimony was apparent. I will now end this analysis with the few instances of

trust decline that appeared during the three years.

## 6.0 Phases Four and Five: Deterioration and Restoration

Because of the limited amount of data, elements and foundations falling into these

last two phases, I will address them together. Most of the pilot was geared toward trust

development; at no point had solid identity-based trust or stabilization taken place for the

entire Board. The only example of profound and absolute loss of trust was in the instance of

the Board's only member resignation:

> After 8 years of effort to no avail, and indeed a backwards slide
> of participatory relevancy for my constituency on this Board, I
> am left with the conclusion there is no voice for the
> commercial fishing small boat industry, local or otherwise, in
> this process. This conclusion is reached by observing the
> prominence that the dictates of organizations such as the
> Economic Council of Canada, the Fisheries Council of Canada,
> and the Fraser Institute have in regards to the Terms of
> Reference of the WCVIAMB. They and their bureaucratic
> handmaidens within the federal and provincial governments
> have thwarted the principles and ethics of this endeavour in
> disregard of the desires of their local citizenry for meaningful
> participation in decision making for future generations....For
> my Nuu-chah-nulth friends, may the Constitution and the
> Supreme Court of Canada protect your interests. My elected
> government has not.
>
> [June 23, 2004]

This passage conveys the most powerful sense of betrayal and even devastation aimed

squarely, at least in terms of representatives on the AMB, at DFO and the Province. It is full

of distain and sarcasm that leaves no doubt about the utter lack of trust in government. She

had no confidence in the governments' objectivity in dealing with the Board's, and

particularly her own, concerns and interests (attitude toward leaders, authorities, and

institutions), leading to a total breakdown in her willingness to participate any longer as a

Board member. Her goals (better access to the West Coast fishery, to her satisfaction) did

not mesh with what DFO and the Province were willing to undertake as part of the Board's

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activities (interdependence and risk). Because the fulfillment of her goals was totally

dependent upon the governments' willingness to allow the Board to take on that issue to the

extent she desired – which they were not – her sole purpose for participating on the Board

was dashed[24]. Conversely, DFO and the Province may have seen her demands as attempting

to infringe on the governments' territories (interdependence and risk), although there is no

evidence that DFO lost trust in the Board. They were simply never willing to afford the

AMB the amount of influence on the West Coast fishery that some of the members perceived

necessary in order to fully implement the Board's vision of consensus-based ecosystem

management. Stating this unwillingness most likely contributed to the member's discontent

and eventual resignation (cooperation – willingness to accept influence from each other).

Other than the above example, no disastrous, long-term crashes in trust took place.

Most of the other instances carried a tone of disappointment in the Board's progress, rather

than true trust decline in each other, as in the following quote:

> Q: What did you expect to have accomplished at the end of
> year one? How do you feel about the progress?
>
> A: Dunno what I expected, but I didn't think it would be so
> slow in coming.
> [March 6, 2003]

That said, the most striking example of trust deterioration and restoration that did take

place occurred halfway through the Board's pilot term, regarding the access to the Area G

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24 Interestingly, though, the Board member's reference to her "Nuu-chah-nulth friends" clearly indicates that her trust in those individuals had increased through her participation on the AMB, since before coming to the Board, she had been a member of an organization strongly opposed to Aboriginal fishing rights. The BC Fisheries Survival Coalition has a history of advocating against "race-based fisheries", and went so far as to appeal court decisions supporting these fisheries to the Supreme Court of Canada. For an example of the Coalition's activities and views, see http://www.cbc.ca/cp/national/060608/n0608128.html, accessed June 18, 2007.

(west coast of Vancouver Island) salmon troll fishery[25]. The following observations are

taken from my own notes from the meeting:

> Continuing tension in terms of what Board can do, some
> resistance from ████; provide input into existing processes,
> rather than creating new ones, provide advice to DFO, remind
> them of Oceans Act commitments (involve communities in
> decision making); ████ taking a lot of heat for DFO's lack of
> flexibility, stated lack of trust in DFO; ████ repeatedly brings
> up DFO's limited view of what the Board was intended to do;
> ████ prefers to have much more information before making
> decisions than other members feel is necessary.
>
> <div align="right">[July 10, 2003]</div>

The situation I described here speaks to all of the elements I assigned to the

Deterioration phase: the differences of opinion in terms of what the Board could do, and was

mandated to do (interdependence and risk – discussion of explicit goals provokes conflict),

resulted in the most hostile exchange of the second and third years of the pilot. The

differences in goals, and the sharing of those differences (cooperation – sharing of opinions

heightens disagreements), came to a head when the issue had the very real consequence of

keeping the fishers off the water for that season, thereby having a significant economic

impact on the Board members personally. DFO was firm in wanting to maintain

management control (attitude toward leaders, authorities, and institutions – willingness to

apologize), and wanting to feed any concerns through its existing advisory process, in this

way preventing the AMB from infringing upon its preferred management regime (attitude

toward leaders, authorities, and institutions – objectivity in handling disputes).

One of the Board members had this to say about the issue:

> Area G Troll issue is very important. Our numbers are very
> different than the governments. Policies outside our area that

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[25] The issue was regarding DFO's formula for calculating chinook salmon allocations, and the data they were using for the formula. The fishers on the AMB felt that DFO's information was inaccurate, thereby unjustly preventing them from accessing the fishery.

severely affect our area are very serious. We need to claim this whole area as ours – if there are policies that affect our area we need to do something about it.

[July 10, 2003]

This quote is the converse of the above – this Aboriginal member wanted to prevent

DFO from infringing upon management of *his* territory, i.e. the west coast of Vancouver

Island. He was questioning DFO's objectivity in dealing with the concern (attitude toward

leaders, authorities, and institutions), given that their data conflicted, but the DFO

representative showed little concern for auditing the information, and no admission of

wrong-doing or apology was forthcoming. By the next day, however, some attempt at

reconciliation had already taken place:

> Board members agreed to send a letter to DFO asking them to review the salmon allocation process; ▮▮▮ discussed with Kathy Scarfo [President, Area G West Coast Trollers Association] (provincial member made significant contribution). ▮▮▮ not willing to immediately comply with Kathy's request to have Board ask DFO to use accurate data; some acknowledgement that big changes can't be made at AMB meetings, but still seen as too slow.

[July 11, 2003]

In line with the items in the framework for the Restoration phase, one of the

Provincial representatives took a role as intermediary, working with DFO and the fishers, and

encouraging them to come to an agreement (cooperation). A measure of interactional justice

was apparent in terms of trying to remove the discontent associated with what the fishers saw

as DFO's unfair allocation procedures. However, the apology that Lewicki and Bunker

recommend to truly repair trust did not occur. While DFO yielded to the writing of a letter

alluding to the allocation process, the representative did not want to address the specific issue

of data directly, making the excuse that the complexity of the allocation process precluded a

definitive response or compliance as quickly as the fishers would have liked.

Deterioration of trust manifested itself in various, less catastrophic ways throughout

the pilot. I give examples below from each of the calendar years of the AMB's pilot:

> Concern about erosion of our mandate because we are not
> being included in activities. Not acceptable to postpone our
> involvement in activities until we have a full book on every
> issue.
> [December 5, 2002]

Relatively speaking, the lessening of trust exhibited in the above quote is less

significant than the previous examples because it was still early in the Board's mandate and

the members were still mainly in Phase One, so that any loss of calculus-based trust, for

example, would have been less damaging than loss of knowledge-based trust. Repair at this

early stage is not as difficult, since only so much trust had been built, and one's self-esteem,

as described in Chapter Two, does not depend upon trust as it does with knowledge-based

trust or identity-based trust. That said, the frustration in the quote is apparent, showing the

struggle with conflicting objectives and infringement on "territories" (i.e., the Board's

mandate) that is characteristic of trust deterioration.

The above sentiment regarding the Board's authority was raised again and again

throughout the pilot when levels of trust and identification with the Board, as well as comfort

in voicing negative evaluations, had increased, as in the next example:

> Q: Are there any specific issues that concern you about the
> Board, its performance, or the context in which it is operating?
>
> A: Inability of federal government to allow innovation, creative
> solutions, or even exploration of alternatives; lack of buy-in by
> province.
> [March 6, 2003]

Once again, the conflicting objectives and concern with territorial infringement

caused frustration and damage to trust in government. No apology was forthcoming. The

problem continued to exist a year and a half later, as seen in the quote below:

> Most people here were involved from beginning. I think board
> members have to look this in the eye, revitalize the board.
> When I see DFO not paying attention to AMB for recovery
> plan, I think we're not important, and we have to force the
> issue somehow. The policy end of the board is withering.
> ████ and staff are doing incredible stuff operationally on
> the ground, but not balanced by political considerations.
>
> [September 15, 2004]

Not until the very last meeting during the pilot period did DFO offer something of an

apology in the form of an admission regarding the lack of authority it had afforded the Board

(procedural justice – truthfulness, explanation of decision, parties treated with dignity and

respect):

> DFO not willing to support AMB in its current format; is
> willing to support integrated management; DFO hasn't listened
> well enough to AMB, has set up other integrated processes and
> are committed to those processes. Don't know exactly what
> DFO objected to with AMB; need to find out how to transition
> into something else; DFO not pulling funding immediately;
> AMB may be seen as an incremental step to Uu-a-thluk [the
> NTC's collaborative management body].
>
> [March 21, 2005]

DFO made some attempt to restore trust through trying to offer a justification,

although the member did not know exactly what DFO perceived the problem to be with the

Board, and was trying to offer alternatives for the Board's continuation in another form,

thereby encouraging the others to work collaboratively to come to a solution. The openness

and honesty of the statement, even criticizing her own sector, contributed to interactional

justice, with the member attempting to remove discontent after an unfair trial of the AMB,

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and providing possible alternatives. Now more than two years after the three-year pilot phase ended in 2005 , the AMB still exists with half of the original Board members still participating.

## 7.0  Summary

The types and phases of trust are not mutually exclusive. While some measure of the impact of time on trust development became apparent through this analysis, the phases were also very much about the quality of the relationship and the behaviour exhibited, as well as about temporality and "when" certain behaviours arose. So many factors came into play – personalities, styles of communicating, knowledge of some of the parties before the official start of the collaborative endeavour, personal stake in the issues, etc. The variety of types of trust exhibited throughout the pilot clearly demonstrate that the stages and phases of trust are not temporally discrete, as Lewicki and Bunker's Model of Trust Development and Decline would indicate. While they did not imply linearity, and stated that the levels of trust could increase and decrease over time, and possibly overlap, the example of trust development on the AMB showed that the levels of trust very much overlapped, as described in Gabarro's Model of the Development of Working Relationships.

The Board members exhibited characteristics of multiple phases of trust at any given time, although the overall tenor of the relationship, and the consequent phase, was discernable through this analysis. If we look at the stages of romantic relationships (romantic / evaluative / accommodative) as overriding philosophies (optimist / pessimist / pragmatist), rather than as stages, perhaps this would help to explain the overlaps. According to this hypothesis, those with an optimistic bent would be more likely to engage in behaviour that resembles the romantic stage of trust, regardless of the phase of trust development. However, because those philosophies would be at least partly determined by individual personality factors, which I did not examine through this analysis, I can neither accept nor reject this hypothesis, but it does warrant further investigation.

Because a single quote can demonstrate multiple types of trust, given the variety of types of relationships a member will have with the others, how are we to determine which phase of trust development the AMB members achieved? I did not intend to conduct a quantitative analysis, so I did not make an effort to collect equal numbers of quotes from each Board member; therefore, a count or percentage of each type of trust exhibited by each member would be misleading. Hence, I have aggregated the counts below into Table 7; from a very simplistic, quantitative perspective, we have the following distribution:

**Table 7. Number of Extracts by Stage or Type of Trust**

| Stage/Type | # of Extracts | Phase | Total |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| CBT | 329 | Introduction | |
| romantic | 49 | Introduction | |
| reciprocity-based | 97 | Introduction | |
| elicitative | 267 | Introduction | |
| moralistic | 192 | Introduction | |
| hollow shell | 79 | Introduction | 1013 |
| KBT | 201 | Familiarization | |
| evaluative | 306 | Familiarization | |
| institutional | 170 | Familiarization | |
| compensatory | 235 | Familiarization | 912 |
| IBT | 33 | Connection | |
| accommodative | 62 | Connection | 195 |
| Decline | 39 | Deterioration | 39 |
| Repair | ?? | Restoration | ?? |

Table 7 plainly indicates where the Board members stood in their trust development, despite all the overlaps in types of trust. After three years in the pilot stage, the AMB never fully reached the Connection phase, characterized by identification with the others and internalization of their perspectives, although they did show significant signs of it. For the most part, expressions of identity-based trust surfaced during the evaluation interviews when we asked the members what value they saw in the AMB. Apart from those instances, Aboriginal representatives voiced the expressions of identity-based trust, and mostly as

encouragement to the other members when they were feeling frustration, having both elicitative and compensatory trust components. In this way, the instances of identity-based trust were often expressions of the lack of identity-based trust or a plea for it, e.g. needing to work and think as a team.

Knowledge-based trust often presented itself in the same way – members pointing out the problems on the AMB, arising from knowledge of the other members. Because the numbers represent instances where a particular type of trust existed, as well as where it clearly didn't exist, the numbers are a little misleading. What this table indicates, therefore, is the number of times that a particular type of trust was at issue, or when a Board member was pleading for it, indicating the importance of it and the desire for it.

Despite the limited instances demonstrating Connection, the Board members very solidly reached the Familiarization phase, with almost the same number of extracts in the first two phases – almost all quotes demonstrated both testing the riskiness of the relationship, as well as gathering of information about the others. This may be because all Board members had committed to participating for the full three years of the pilot, so that the testing of pros and cons of staying on the AMB was virtually irrelevant, as well as because many of the Board members already knew each other.[26]

The reader will note that I have not entered any figures for the Repair or Restoration categories. Due to an oversight during the coding phase of this study, I neglected to code the data for repair or restoration of trust. However, I see this as a minor limitation of the study,

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[26] As I alluded to above in section 4.4, the member representing the commercial fishing sector did, in fact, resign in frustration before the conclusion of the pilot phase. The member representing the Ministry of Sustainable Resource Management (provincial government) attended for only the first year, after which time, the Ministry withdrew its support for the AMB. The representative from the Ministry of Agriculture, Food, and Fisheries was a fairly regular attendee, especially during the latter half of the pilot, but his Ministry did not see his participation on the AMB as a priority, nor did he have the ear of the Minister regarding the AMB's activities. The Province did eventually re-engage after the pilot had concluded, but in a different form with new representatives after the government had reorganized its ministries.

given that, as I mentioned in Chapter 2, section 2.0 The Framework for this Analysis, and as I demonstrated above, the AMB remained mostly in the first two phases of trust, so that lack of trust was generally due to trust that never existed, rather than trust that deteriorated[27]. Therefore, very few instances of restoration would exist – I estimate five or fewer instances that would fit the criteria set out in Lewicki and Bunker's model, e.g. offers of apology. Almost all of the expressions of trust deterioration were from non-government members, which means that generally non-government members lost trust in the government members, rather than vice versa. Of the 370 extracts examined in this analysis, the quotes above in section 6.0 from July 11, 2003 and March 21, 2005 are likely the only examples that closely resemble attempts at restoring trust, since governments do not like to admit fault.[28]

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[27] I emphasize once again that my observations regarding trust development are strictly limited to the three-year pilot phase, and do not include the history behind the Board. Any trust development, deterioration, or restoration that occurred during the Board's prehistory is not included in this analysis.

[28] As evidence of this reluctance, consider the many decades that passed before the Canadian government finally offered our Oriental citizens an apology for the head tax. Aboriginal peoples still await an apology for the long history of near cultural genocide in Canada.

# 8.0 Conclusions/ Implications

## 8.1 *The Utility of the Framework and Methodology*

The framework proved to be a very useful tool to measure trust development, with the levels, stages, elements, and foundations all clearly showing themselves in the language. (See Chapter 2, section 1.0 The Basis of the Framework, for a detailed description of the development of the framework.) Given that the types of trust can be fairly clearly slotted into specific phases of trust development, and multiple types of trust fall into each phase, one could derive a basic understanding of where the parties stood with respect to their regard for each other, even without personal knowledge of the members. In fact, this type of interpretation was necessary for this analysis, given that the fieldwork did not commence until the second year of the pilot. Thus, all data from the first year were taken from meeting minutes and information packages, as well as from second-hand information from the Board members and staff, but not from my own personal observation. However, having spent two years with the Board members afterwards, I am confident that my interpretation of their comments during the first year was reasonably accurate.

Through this analysis, I have shown that certain types of trust are more prevalent during particular phases of trust development. By carefully coding the statements for all possible interpretations, an investigator can still uncover a pattern of trust development, assuming that he or she has some personal knowledge of the speaker and of the context in which the comments were made, in order to correctly interpret the statements. Because so many interpretations of written language can exist, any measure of accuracy would be dependent upon having a fair amount of familiarity with the individuals; this type of analysis

would be rather less effective without having had fairly extensive contact with the individuals.

This method is contingent upon careful and active listening; hence an analysis based strictly on text with no personal knowledge of the individual, familiarity with his or her communication style or mannerisms would be questionable at best. Opportunities for misinterpretation abound, given that communication is multifaceted (i.e. composed of verbal and non-verbal components). As well, because the subtleties of communication can be forgotten over time, coding is best conducted while observing the interactions, or immediately thereafter, so as to more accurately capture the nuances of the meanings conveyed. The reliability of this method decreases with lesser knowledge of the individual, as well as with greater time spans between having witnessed the exchange and analyzing the statements. A subsequent review of the information years, months, or perhaps even weeks after the fact may yield different results, so expediency is important.

The framework can, however, be used on its own as a means to educate oneself on the importance of trust, on the various elements that render trust necessary, and on the foundations of trust that others will likely be employing to assess trustworthiness. By equipping oneself with this knowledge, individuals could anticipate barriers, be better prepared to address issues that may arise, or even prevent them from arising. A familiarity with the elements, foundations, types of trust, and phases of trust development may very well facilitate trust development and smooth the road to forming and achieving the collective objectives. This function of the framework may, in fact, be its strength, with the actual measurement of where the parties stand in their trust development being secondary in terms of fostering trust.

## 8.2   Reflections on the Case Study and Literature

Apart from the applied utility of the framework, this study makes an important

contribution from a purely scholarly perspective to the psychological, organizational

management, co-management, and communications literatures through synthesizing these

different aspects of trust development, thereby helping us to understand how and why trust

develops in the context of a collaborative initiative. Regarding the applied utility, this

analysis demonstrates the importance of active listening in order to understand the subtleties

of the messages people convey. Appearances can be deceiving, and without an

understanding of the complexities of how people decide whether to trust, what criteria they

use to assess trustworthiness, and what conditions need to be satisfied to allow trust to begin

to develop, one could not comprehend the multitude of messages that underlie the words.

Trust development becomes very complicated on a multi-party co-management board with

representatives from different professional, educational, and cultural backgrounds, different

personalities, and ranges of experience with each other or with the issues at hand. It

progresses at different rates because of the variety among the individuals, and because people

use different criteria and different quantities of criteria to make their judgements on the

others' trustworthiness.

Because of the fluidity of the behaviours indicative of trust development, the

assignment of elements and foundations, to the first two stages in particular, was fairly

interpretive and therefore subject to imprecision. I considered creating "before and after"

framework tables, but decided simply to note that trust development is changeable, and that

the elements and foundations should not be rigidly tied to a particular phase or timeframe.

Otherwise, an "after" table would just have been a list of components to look for in language,

rather than a tool for determining how far the parties' trust had developed, since the components do tend to appear sometimes in unexpected places temporally.

While the state of trust is often self-evident in how individuals express themselves, the reasons for trusting or not trusting are not quite as clear.

> First, decision makers should avoid making quick trust decisions and, instead, take precautions to make trust judgments over time and on the basis of interactions across multiple contexts. Second, individuals should recognize that incidental emotions could change the way others judge their trustworthiness. Individuals should recognize the importance of socializing with coworkers to develop familiarity (e.g., Schweitzer & Kerr, 2000) and adapt their behaviour to the emotions of the people with whom they interact (Dunn and Schweitzer 2005: 746).

The quote above also draws attention to the fact that building trust, and recognizing where trust does or does not exist, is particularly important for decision makers. The prevalence of extracts exhibiting references to the "power and control" and "attitudes toward leaders, authorities, and institutions" foundations shows that the Board members were very much concerned with the extent to which the senior governments, particularly DFO, were willing to share their influence, or to delegate certain functions to the AMB. Ironically, the federal and provincial governments were involved in the development of the AMB's Terms of Reference, DFO was the major funding agency, and both governments evaluate their own programs based on outcomes (the AMB being one of those programs[29]). However, DFO did not afford the AMB the authority that would have been required to deliver on its mandate, and one of the Province's ministries ceased participating after one year. DFO's and the Province's lack of trust in the Board's efficacy, and the non-government members'

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[29] In the evaluation report (Pinkerton et al. 2005), we insisted that the AMB was not, in fact, a government program, and that AMB members did not consider it as such. We also noted that a standard program evaluation was not what was needed, and was not appropriate to evaluating the effectiveness of a co-management initiative.

consequent lack of trust in DFO and the Province, significantly impaired the Board's progress.

While there was general agreement that the AMB was an interesting concept and had potential, the Board members did not even manage to clearly define what exactly they wanted to accomplish – a stumbling block which speaks to the elements of "interdependence and risk" and "cooperation", and harkens back to my discussion in Chapter One, noting the importance of shared goals and objectives in developing trust. While the Board did accomplish some notable achievements, such as convincing the Province to greatly alter its regional plan for the Kyuquot area, or convincing DFO that it could successfully reopen the gooseneck barnacle fishery, they did not make much headway in achieving the grand plan of consensus-base ecosystem management for the benefit of local communities – this due to a lack of clearly defined, shared goals and objectives, a product of a lack of trust.

In this way, a lack of trust produces a vicious circle in which goals are not clearly defined, major objectives are not met, the inability to achieve those vague goals causes all organizations to lose faith and trust in one another, and because they do not trust one another, they can not define shared goals. As I mentioned above, the main strength of the framework may be that it provides a comprehensive charting of requirements for trust to development, and may be useful as "instructions" for how to build trust, how to demonstrate trustworthiness, what to look for in terms of how others may be assessing one's trustworthiness, and how to repair trust should one or more parties violate it. Had the Board members had this information at the outset, they may have had less difficulty in coming to agreement on contentious issues or in solidifying their objectives.

In Chapter One, I pointed out that some authors question whether trust is at all necessary for collaborative endeavours, and propose that management of risk is more efficient, and therefore, cost effective. As I argued, however, some minimal amount of trust is still necessary to have faith in those risk management processes, and depending on the situation, risk management may be only marginally effective because the parties may have limited authority even with their own constituencies. Managing risk becomes problematic in that the risk is not from the individual at the table, but rather from the organization behind the individual. In order to build the institutional trust, the parties must first trust the individual at the table.

In addition to the "power and control" and "attitudes toward leaders, authorities, and institutions" foundations, the foundation of "moral evaluation" was another criterion that the AMB members frequently used to assess trustworthiness – whether the other Board members and their constituencies were behaving in a "good" or "bad" fashion. If the Board members' assessments of each other were negative, clearly that was problematic for both sides because they had little ability to change the perceptions of "badness", other than to alter their own behaviour on a personal level. The Board members were not truly representatives of their sectors, in that they could not make decisions for their constituencies. Rather, they were "wise people", as one member described them, able to speak from the perspective of their sectors. To that extent, they had little control over the situation, apart from how they interacted with the others, so that risk management processes would have been only marginally effective in minimizing risk.

Again, the "interdependence and risk" foundation was often implied in the quotes, meaning that risk was a major concern, and the outcome did depend on the others' behaviour.

Because the Board members were very much controlled by the policies or perspectives of

their respective sectors, trust in the individual at the table became that much more critical.

As I mentioned in Chapter 2, section 1.0 The Basis of the Framework, the dynamic between

the representatives and their sectors was not a dimension I was able to address in this

analysis, but it is an important component of the overall dynamic of the Board. The

interpersonal contact and interaction at the Board meetings form the basis for building trust

in the organizations behind the individuals. For this reason, an understanding of the

unspoken, or subtly conveyed concerns, and the motivations behind why a statement was

worded in a particular way, is fundamental to making the necessary adjustments, or voicing

the appropriate assurances or apologies, to allow trust to develop or to be rebuilt.

Communication skills, particularly listening skills, are crucial.

## 8.3 Suggestions for Further Research

The framework on which this analysis was based provided some insight into the

preconditions for trust, and the assessments people make regarding others' trustworthiness.

If we can examine language, learn how trust or distrust shows itself in language, and

understand what is behind trust development, or particularly a lack of trust, in a collaborative

initiative or in general, the other parties will have some direction for understanding how they

can try to change negative attitudes, or what specific issues need to be addressed without the

other parties suffering the embarrassment of having to specify why they do not trust the

others. By understanding what are the antecedents of trust, parties can take steps beforehand

to put those elements into place in order to set a positive tone for trust to develop. As well,

by understanding the criteria people use to assess trust, everyone will be in a better position

to foster trust, and to build those foundations of trust.

I hypothesize, then, that possession and knowledge of the framework prior to engaging in a collaborative initiative would assist in conflict resolution and trust development. Case studies comparing instances of conflictual collaborations, for example, with one employing the framework and one not, may indicate whether my hypothesis holds. In such a project, research should control for variables such as gender distribution and cultural background, since these do tend to influence communication styles.

That said, further examination of how gender and cultural background affect trust development would also be instructive in terms of composition of future collaborative initiatives. Aboriginal versus non-Aboriginal, or egalitarian versus individualistic combinations of participants may present interesting subjects for examining the barriers to trust development, and perhaps how, or if, knowledge of the framework assists in overcoming those barriers. Depending on the outcome of such a study, parties considering entering into a collaboration may choose to aim for a particular gender / cultural composition if that has positive implications for success.

In terms of research strictly pertaining to the AMB, it may be interesting to examine the extent to which factors external to the Board meetings themselves influence trust development. At this point, investigating the prehistory of the Board using the method employed in this study may be difficult and somewhat speculative, given the amount of time that has passed, but that would depend somewhat on the memory of the participants engaged in such a study, and the knowledge the researcher had of the participants. An investigation of the current composition of the Board and the current context would likely yield more reliable results, especially if the investigator makes the effort to become well acquainted with the Board members.

In terms of further testing of the framework itself and the models on which it was based, a future research project may entail investigating a new collaboration that did not have the extensive prehistory that the AMB had, to determine whether those parties would exhibit the same overlaps in phases of trust development. Was the AMB a special case because of the years of involvement some of the members had had with each other before the pilot, or do all working relationships experience the extensive overlaps that Gabarro (1990) suggested? Would other collaborations exhibit the same types of trust in the same phases? Would other collaborations meeting with the same frequency as the AMB show similar patterns in trust development? To what extent is the time required to reach identification-based trust a function of the state of the conflict versus simply the amount of time spent together?

The possibilities for further study in both experimental and non-experimental contexts are endless. What is clear, however, is that expressions of trust can be identified in speech, and with great frequency, indicating the importance individuals place on trust. Parties contemplating forming collaborative organizations would do well to heed the results of this study, and to make a concerted effort to address the elements and foundations identified in the framework in order to lay the groundwork for a successful and productive partnership through effective trust development.

# Appendices

## Appendix A: Sectors Represented on the AMB during the Pilot Phase

### Government Representatives:

*Federal Government:*
Ron Kadowaki, Department of Fisheries and Oceans
Dick Carson, Department of Fisheries and Oceans

*Provincial Government:*
Peter Leitz, Ministry of Agriculture, Food, and Fisheries
Lindsay Jones, Ministry of Sustainable Resource Management

*Regional Government:*
Tom Pater, Comox-Strathcona Regional District
Jim Levis, Alberni-Clayoquot Regional District

*Nuu-chah-nulth Tribal Council:*
Chief Simon Lucas, Hesquiaht First Nation
Cliff Atleo, Ahousaht First Nation

### Non-government Representatives:

*Small-boat commercial fisheries:*
Wilf Caron, Area G West Coast Trollers Association

*Recreational fisheries:*
Marilyn Murphy, Sportfishing Advisory Board

*Aboriginal fisheries:*
Errol Sam, Nuu-chah-nulth aboriginal harvester

*Processing:*
Garnet Jones, Seafood Alliance of BC and Fisheries Council of Canada

*Labour:*
Garth Mirau, United Fisheries and Allied Workers Union/Canadian Auto Workers

*Environment:*
Maureen Sager, Alberni Environmental Coalition

*Tourism:*
Victoria Wells, Ehattesaht community member

*Aquaculture:*
Odd Grydeland, BC Salmon Aquaculture Association

# Appendix B: Extract Categories

*These categories emerged through the initial extract selection stage; the 8000+ extracts were taken from AMB meeting minutes, information packages, survey, interview transcripts, and my and my supervisor's notes taken at the meetings. Only those extracts falling into the "Process" category were used in this analysis.*

Abalone
Aboriginal issues
Allocation and licensing
AMB inclusion in processes
AMB objectives
AMB staff
Aquaculture
Aquatic Conservation Trust
Authority of Board
Benefits to communities
Board member participation
Clam Board
Clams
Coast-wide issues
Communications
Conservation
Consultation
Correspondence: AMB to DFO
Correspondence: AMB to Province
Dogfish
Economic development
Ecosystem approach
Enhancement
Environmental concerns
Evaluation
Funding Issues
Gooseneck Barnacle fishery
Groundfish
Hake

Harvest Planning
Henderson Lake
Herring
Information mgmt / sharing
Interaction btwn AMB and gov'ts
Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQ)
Lingcod
New / underutilized fisheries
Ocean ranching
Partnership
Planning
Policies and Management
Prawns
Process
Rockfish
Roles for the Board
Salmon
Species at Risk Act (SARA)
Sardines
Strategic planning
Stewardship
Tanner crab
Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK)
Trust between sectors
Trust in DFO
Trust in Province
Tuna
Value of the Board
Wild Salmon Policy

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