ZERO HOUR HAS COME AND GONE:

ALLIED EFFORTS TO ALLEVIATE THE RUHR HOUSING SHORTAGE

FROM 1945 TO 1949

by

Cedric Bolz

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Zero Hour Has Come and Gone: Allied Efforts to Alleviate the Ruhr Housing Shortage from 1945 to 1949

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ABSTRACT

The following Master of Arts thesis examines the immediate post-war era or Interregnum period of German history from 1945 to 1949. In 1946 the French historian Edgar Morin published his influential work, The Year Zero in Germany, in which he introduced the controversial concept of a German "zero hour", or a new beginning after the total collapse of the so-called Third Reich. This thesis will apply the zero hour hypothesis to the reconstruction process of Ruhr housing during the Allied occupation period. More specifically, Allied housing reconstruction policy will be examined and critically assessed in relation to its break or continuum from National Socialist precedents. Prior to determining whether or not the Anglo-American efforts diverged significantly from the German traditions between 1933 and 1945, it was essential to establish which German housing policies could clearly be identified as "National Socialist". This in turn required a survey of the German housing traditions from 1918 to 1933.

The actual implementation of the Allied reconstruction directives is examined in the Ruhr community of Essen-Haarzopf. Based on twelve interviews with local residents, Essen military government announcements from 1945 to 1949, and secondary research, this thesis argues that the British occupation authorities did attempt to significantly influence housing policy in the Ruhr prior to the formation of the Federal Republic. The British Labour government's efforts to draft a centralized German reconstruction law, its proposal to create a central housing office and its attempts to persuade German officials to build prefabricated dwellings, all represented potential departures from Ruhr housing traditions. Ultimately, these efforts faltered due to Britain's bleak economic predicament

after the war, a lack of support from the non-interventionist Americans and the South German States, and above all, due to the opposition of the immensely powerful Ruhr Regional Planning Authority. In contrast, the introduction of an Allied point system of settler selection, the British Lemgo reconstruction proposal, and American financial aid did in fact have a considerable impact on post-war Ruhr housing.

Overall, the 1948 Haarzopf development represents a fascinating study in adapting applicable German housing traditions to the catastrophic conditions of the post-war era. The above-mentioned Allied contributions were therefore combined with elements of Theodor Fritsch's and Alfried Krupp's garden cities, Stephan Poerschke's Weimar Kleinsiedlung, Gottfried Feder's "New City" and Philipp Rappaport's Ruhr regional planning precedents. To merely apply the concept of a German "zero hour" to the planning and construction process of Haarzopf's post-war housing development would therefore be a gross over-simplification.

Für Opa Helmut

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Copies of the Appendix (including a community plan, housing blueprint and construction pictures) are available at the S.F.U. Department of History.

INTRODUCTION

While the unconditional German surrender at Reims and Karlshorst on the 7th and 9th of May 1945 was the pinnacle of Allied military achievements, it simultaneously ushered in an era of unconditional Allied responsibility for shaping the future of Germany. This thesis will focus on the examination, documentation and critical assessment of Allied post-war housing policy towards the key Ruhr industrial city of Essen. More specifically, the thesis will be primarily concerned with the actual implementation of these reconstruction policies in a single Ruhr-community, Essen-Haarzopf. This locale has been chosen as I lived in the community for twelve years and have since returned on seven occasions. Thus, the close ties to the local population have remained intact and subsequently provide an ideal opportunity to collect invaluable oral accounts of the post-war experience. It is hoped that through combining archival and secondary sources with the oral testimony, five central questions will be answered: What German state housing policies were in place prior to the National Socialist era? What were the characterisics of National Socialist housing policy? How did post-World War II Allied proposals differ from German traditions? Did Anglo-American reconstruction plans significantly influence post-war Ruhr housing? And to what extent therefore, was Essen's post-war housing repaired or begun anew? It is hoped that through examining the post-war development (1948) of Essen-Haarzopf, these questions will be answered.

The city of Essen had the dubious distinction of being labelled the "Munitions Capital of the Third Reich"[1] due to the overwhelming presence of the Krupp Steelworks, which occupied over five square kilometers of the city center and employed an astounding one tenth of its total population of about 700,000. The immense industrial potential of the Krupp factory would prove to be extremely significant to the future of the city both during and after the Second World War. During the campaign, Essen was subjected to 272 Allied bombing raids which destroyed 90% of the inner city.[2] Essen would rank fourth behind Hamburg, Cologne and Dresden in actual tonnage dropped on a specific target. The four thousand residents of the Essen-Haarzopf suburb would suffer a similar fate, perhaps compounded by the inaccuracy of Allied bombing and the town's close proximity to the area's only major airfield at Mülheim, the surrounding region was

completely devastated. Consequently, the war-time destruction, coupled with the city's post-war industrial potential, would present Allied policy makers with a particular challenge.

The time-frame of the thesis ranges from March 1901 to November 23rd 1949. The former date is the day on which the first Prussian attempt at a state housing law was passed. The latter date represents the signing of the Petersberg agreement, which was to return control of the Ruhr industrial region back to the German authorities. Within this time-frame, the thesis is broken down into three very distinct stages of state housing policy: 1901-1932: From the initial attempts to the collapse of the Weimar Republic; 1933-1943: Ten years of National Socialist housing policy and its effects; and most importantly, 1945-1949: From British Occupation to the end of Bizonia. This periodization will serve to provide an overview of Allied policies, the respective policy changes, as well as their development in relation to pre-existing traditions and subsequent effect on the community rebuilding process. The Petersberg agreement was also chosen as a concluding date as it marks the beginnings of the end of Allied control.

The main inspiration for this project was stumbled upon during a meeting with an ex-German air force member on June 12th, 1992. I had entered the interview with the intent of documenting his experiences during the Barbarossa campaign, however the conversation soon shifted to his post-war experiences in the community of Essen-Haarzopf. Most significantly, this person was very proud and eager to relate his experiences as the head of the community "Siedlerbund", which is the equivalent of a chairman of a strata council. The responsibilities of this position entailed meticulously documenting all building permit applications and subsequent supervision of the construction process. Unfortunately, I was not yet aware that this conversation might be critical to a future thesis topic, since I had been more interested in the Soviet-German campaign. Far more tragic was that the aforementioned person passed away in August of 1993.

During my Summer 1994 research semester which was spent in Essen, the deceased person's son was kind enough to allow me access to his father's files. The visit allowed me to conduct twelve interviews with both current and previous residents of Essen-Haarzopf. The

insight provided by their relating personal experiences proved to be invaluable. Further primary sources were provided by the Essen archives, the University of Essen and the Essen City Library. Especially the full collection of the Essener Mitteilungen (Collection of Public Announcements and civic meetings), published by the military government from 1945-49, was a key find. Lastly, the Simon Fraser University Inter-Library Loans Division has been an incredibly thorough and patient provider of even the most obscure German primary and secondary documents.

Secondary sources on German state housing policy, especially between 1901 to 1945, have been predominantly published by German scholars. It would be impossible to list the entire catalogue, therefore I will cite only the titles which have had the greatest impact on my thesis. Comprehensive and ground-breaking studies in this field have been published by Joachim Seraphim and Stephan Poerschke, a collection of essays entitled Heimstätten in Westfalen im Lichte 50-jähriger Staatlicher Wohnungspolitik (1952), Ulrich Blumenruth's Deutsche Wohnungspolitik seit der Reichsgründung (1978) and the most recent collection of essays edited by Günther Schulz: Wohnungspolitik im Sozialstaat 1918-1960 (1993). Since this thesis is concerned with attempting to clarify whether a break or continuum with Germany's national Socialist past manifested itself in post-war Allied housing reconstruction policy, the studies focussing on the 1933-45 era are of special interest. First and foremost, National Socialist publications such as Rudolf Seiff's Die deutsche Kleinsiedlung (1938), Wilhelm Gisbertz's Systematische Darstellung der deutschen Kleinsiedlung (1938), W. Wiedemann's Industrielle Heimstättensiedlung- Der Weg zur Krisenfestigkeit des deutschen Arbeiters (1936), and above all, Gottfried Feder's blueprint for the National Socialist city Die neue Stadt (1939), were critical to my work. Detailed analysis and deconstruction of these National Socialist proposals are represented by Anna Teut's Architektur im Dritten Reich (1967), Ute Pelz-Dreckmann's detailed work Nationalisozialistischer Siedlungsbau and most recently Bruno Wasser's Ph.D. dissertation from Bonn, Die Neugestaltung des Ostens (1991). For the pre-World War Two period, these publications had the greatest impact on the first section of this work.

Writings on post-war housing policies have been predominantly published in the 1990's. Paul Wendt's 1963 comparative study of Sweden, the United Kingdom, West Germany and the United States Post-war Housing Policy-The Search for Post-World War II Solutions, represents an exception. Due to the enormous scope of Wendt's comparative work, German developments are provided only in a basic survey type format. Far more detailed assessments are the 1990 state sponsored Wohnungspolitik nach dem 2. Weltkrieg and Günther Schulz's very impressive Ph.D. dissertation Wiederaufbau in Deutschland published by the University of Bonn in 1994. While the state publication and Schulz's superior dissertation deal partially with the Interregnum 1945-1949, neither examines the effects of Allied reconstruction policies on a specific locale. By contrast, Jeffry M. Diefendorf's recent Oxford publication In the Wake of War (1993) apparently began as an area-specific comparison of Cologne, Munich and Berlin, yet was ultimately expanded to address the post-war reconstruction in Germany as a whole. Quite correctly, Diefendorf continuously underlines that every urban locale's experience differed, thus making an overall German `reconstruction experience' an impossible concept. This thesis is thus a partial answer to a call for further in-depth studies of major German urban centers.

While detailed area-specific studies of the 1945-49 period do exist, British and American writings do not comprehensively address the Allied plans to alleviate the German housing shortage. Furthermore, these local studies are predominantly concerned with depicting and assessing Anglo-American denazification and democratization efforts. In this community study genre, two works stand out: John Gimble's ground-breaking 1961 work: A German Community under American Occupation, Marburg 1945-52, and especially Barbara Marshall's 1988 work on Hannover: The Origins of Post-War German Politics. Two German publications: the Düsseldorf Museum's 1946 A New Beginning Life in Düsseldorf (1986) and Georg Wagner's essay "Kommunalpolitik und Wohnungsbau in Bielefeld 1918-1960" (1993) go beyond the denazification effort to provide a local account of the physical reconstruction process. With the exception of the Düsseldorf collection however, it is disturbing to note that no effort has been

made by either Gimble, Marshall or Wagner to utilize fully the oral traditions of their respective communities. The direct effect which Allied reconstruction policies thus had on the inhabitants is only mentioned in passing.

The following Masters of Arts thesis is predominantly concerned with the concept of a German "zero hour" or a rebirth as it applied to housing policy after the Second World War. Edgar Morin's groundbreaking 1946 publication The Year Zero in Germany, which has been at the heart of countless post-war debates on Germany's past and future, was a central inspiration to my work. When examining the above-mentioned publications, only three authors address the National Socialist break or continuum hypothesis as it relates to state housing policy: Dieter Schulz, Ute Peltz-Dreckmann and Jeffry Diefendorf. Niels Gutschow and Werner Dürth's brilliant essay "So Viel Anfang war Nie" also needs to be mentioned since it also criticizes German post-war urban planners for their inability to break with National Socialist traditions.

Even though the zero hour controversy has been dealt with by all five scholars, none have chosen to document what effects Allied post-war reconstruction had on a single community. In the subsequent pages I hope to bridge at least some of these gaps with my area-specific study of Allied reconstruction efforts in the Ruhr industrial center of Essen. More specifically, I will conclude this study with a focus on one community: the 1948 housing development in Essen-Haarzopf. In his thorough 1955 geographic study The Destruction and Reconstruction of Essen, Erich Heyn called Haarzopf one of the most desirable post-war communities in all of Essen. Due to the fact that the construction of this so-called "ideal community" began a year before the formation of the Federal Republic, planning, development and construction had to be sanctioned by the Anglo-American military authorities. In essence therefore, this community serves as a perfect setting in which to test the hypothesis whether or not the Occupation powers chose merely to continue pre-war state housing traditions or significantly influence post-war developments.

The central rationale behind this thesis was to utilize my own personal background and experiences to contribute significantly to the historical record. As a former resident of Essen-

Haarzopf, a native speaker of the German language and a Simon Fraser History Graduate, I have attempted to combine these attributes to provide a scholarly account of post-war German reconstruction, one whose methodology is both unique and historically relevant. In order to address this complex issue, it is essential to begin by providing an outline of German State housing policies prior to the National Socialist takeover of 1933.

CHAPTER I

German Housing Policy from Inception to Depression 1901-1932

The German word "Wohnungspolitik" has no direct equivalent in the English language. Comprised of the words "Wohnung", meaning dwelling or housing, and "Politik", easily translated as politics[3], the nearest English equivalent would be housing policy. The origins of this term have generally been associated with the date of March 19th, 1901 on which Prussia's first housing legislation for the "Social Welfare of the Commercial [Gewerbliche] Worker" became law.[4] Prior to 1918 however, housing policy was still predominantly the responsibility of provincial authoritizies. Comprehensive, centralized measures to plan and regulate the German housing shortage did not begin until after World War I. Overall, the initial stage from 1900-1918 was thus characterized by either minimal or sporadic centralized state attempts to become involved in the housing market. As D.O. Lehmann indicates in Poerschke's 1952 collection of essays: Heimstättenarbeit in Westfalen im Lichte 50-jähriger Wohnungspolitik [Homestead Work in Westphalia during 50 Years of Housing Policy]: "The Prussian state until 1918 viewed housing as a commodity just like any other, one whose price would be determined by economic factors; supply and demand."[5] The following chapter will outline the central aims of both pre-Weimar and Weimar attempts to address the housing issue.

Theodor Fritsch's ground-breaking study Die Stadt der Zukunft - Gartenstadt [The Future City - Garden City], first published in late 1896 apparently had little or no impact on Prussian politics. Written in response to Germany's enormous rate of industrial expansion in the 1890's and its accompanying urban population explosion, Fritsch called for centralized and orderly city planning. The author's pleas to the Prussian state to take control of regional planning in order to fight the ever increasing population density and horrific living conditions in Germany's major urban centres, went unheeded. The name Fritsch has since become synonymous with the "garden city"[6] concept which advocated centralized urban planning to include adequate green spaces and recreation areas to safeguard against uncontrolled urban sprawl. Fritsch wrote: "We need to begin by thoroughly planning our new cities, perhaps this is the only way we will one day attain our goal of an orderly state. The root of all [good and] evil - just like any other root - lies in the

soil."[7] [Critique of ill-conceived land usage of the past]. Die Stadt der Zukunft represented perhaps the first comprehensive attempt to "re-root" the German population in its native soil, by providing each new dwelling with a sizeable plot of land. Only after its second publication in 1912, when the overcrowding of urban centres had become acute, did Fritsch's ideas gain widespread support. Especially his concept of re-rooting the German population with its native soil would become a reoccuring theme amongst social reformers. Its list of future supporters included Field Marshal Hindenburg, Stephan Poerschke, Walter Darré, Gottfried Feder and Philipp Rappaport to name only a few. Theodor Fritsch's 1896 fears were further exasperated by Germany's, and especially the Ruhr's, seemingly endless pre-World War I industrial growth.

Perhaps most startling in this growth of the industrial sector was its accompanying demographic urban explosion. At the Reichsgründung [founding of the Reich] in 1871, 63.9 percent of Germany's population resided in rural districts and only 36.1 percent in the cities, but these figures were inverted by 1919 with 62.5 percent living in the cities and a mere 37.5 percent remaining in the countryside.[8] The most extreme embodiment of the overcrowding and the unsanitary conditions of this pronounced demographic rural to urban shift were Berlin's horrendous "Mietskasernen" (rental barracks). These dingy, over-crowded, predominantly five storey workers' housing developments seemed to resemble military barracks, rather than adequate family housing. Even though these abysmal housing projects existed directly in the Prussian capital prior to 1901, local authorities were only legally empowered to enforce existing police and fire regulations which merely specified Mietskasernen height and firewall prerequisites.[9] The Prussian state's lack of interest in the quality and/or availability of dwellings is supported by the fact that no government housing survey was conducted until after 1918.

It should be noted that a rather timid government attempt to become involved in the housing sector, did in fact exist prior to 1901. The German Reich's bill officially recognizing the existence of Baugenossenschaften (Building Societies), became law on May 1st 1889.[10] Baugenossenschaften had existed in Prussia since the late 1840's and this legislation specified

their main objectives. According to the bill, a Baugenossenschaft was to be controlled by the Bauherr (Building Society supervisor) who would function as land speculator, urban planner, architect and accountant. It was the central role of the Bauherr to provide the prerequisites necessary for members of the co-operatives to have the opportunity to build their own homes. Ideally, the burden of financing would be carried by an equal division of overall costs between the co-operative members (potential house owners), the private sector, the provinces and the remainder which was to be contributed by the State. These early Baugenossenschaften required a 300 Reichsmarks (RM) contribution from their new members; government lending rates slowly, but gradually improved from 1891 onwards. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities in 1914, the initial two hundred Baugenossenschaften had been joined by an additional 1200 which had become certified between 1899 and 1914.[11] Although the German state had recognized the existence of the co-operatives, it did not implement any further legislation to encourage their development prior to 1918.

The wording of March 19th, 1901 ministerial legislation represents the first official mention of Wohnungspolitik (state housing policy). Contained in the ministerial document entitled "Social policy for the commercial worker", its main intent was to provide adequate housing for the working classes. The state however, limited the definition of "workers" to those individuals who were directly employed by the state itself. Obviously influenced by the relative success of the housing co-operatives, federal and provincial authorities now took the initiative in creating state worker co-operatives. In other words, from 1904 onwards, Baugenossenschaften for Post Office, Railway, Army, Navy and Mining workers began to emerge throughout Germany and were especially prevalent in Prussia's heavy industrial areas. Furthermore, the state passed legislations in 1904 which allowed Prussia to designate areas for either industrial or residential development[12] in order to allocate suitable land for their Baugenossenschaften. Employees of the state were also provided with favourable financing terms. Significantly, from 1901 onwards

Prussian state housing policy was remarkably similar to Krupp's workers housing provisions pioneered in the 1870's.

Krupp's ties to the Prussian state are well-documented and do not need to be reiterated here. The supposed evil influence of the Prussian ruling class on the subservient Krupp patriarchs has been taken to the absurd by authors like Peter Batty, The House of Krupp and William Manchester The Arms of Krupp, to name only two. The fascinating reverse effects the Krupp family may have had on Prussian politics, especially in regard to social policy, has been predominantly overlooked. Really, only Peltz-Dreckmann, Heinrichsbauer and Feder have succeeded in depicting the social importance of Krupp's "garden city" communities from Kronenberg (1872) to Emscher Lippe (1900) and Alfredshof (1903), and eventually culminating in the firm's "ideal development", Essen Margarethenhöhe (1906).[13] Krupp's critical role in the history of Ruhr and most significantly Essen's workers' housing will be examined in greater detail later. For now, it is important to keep in mind that between 1900 and 1913 the number of Krupp housing units in Essen alone rose from 3869 units to an impressive 7039 units.[14] The Krupp Firm thus became by far the largest single provider of housing in the Reich. Significantly, all of the Krupp housing was created without the reliance on Baugenossenschaften or organized labour assistance. More importantly for Krupp, the quality and design of these housing projects seemed to keep his workforce content. It is this successful Krupp model of social control which needs to be kept in mind when considering Prussia's first comprehensive housing regulation of 1918.

Detailed housing legislation had been drafted prior to August of 1914, yet it was post-poned until the spring of 1918 due to the outbreak of the war. It is amongst the post-war chaos and turmoil of the prevailing social, economic and political conditions that this legislation must be seen. Krupp's precautionary measures against the threat of radicalism between 1900 and 1913 no doubt paled in comparison to the threat of a nation-wide social upheaval in 1918. Lehmann indicates that in 1918 Field Marshal Hindenburg had promised each "deserving German fighter a homestead upon his peaceful return to civilian life".[15] Failure to deliver on Hindenburg's promise

in 1918 would surely only add to the disgruntled serviceman's pre-existing sentiments of Prussian state betrayal. The Conservative Prussian government obviously recognized the merit of this attempt to diffuse a potentially explosive social climate and subsequently expanded Hindenburg's proposal culminating in the First Prussian Housing Law on March 28th 1918.[16] The Hindenburg plan to reward loyalty to the state by rerooting the German soldier with his plot of German soil was to become a central aim of National Socialist housing policy in the 1930's. (see Chapter Two).

The chronic state of the German housing market during World War I is underlined by the following figures provided by Paul Wendt. Whereas the annual rate of new housing construction in 1913 was estimated at an astonishing 200,000 annual units, this figure had dropped to less than 3000 units by 1918.[17] In addition, the flood of refugees, returning servicemen, and overall economic disparity, combined with the near collapse of the building trades, resulted in an unprecedented housing crisis by 1918. The first comprehensive Prussian housing Law attempted to alleviate this shortage by finally recognizing that:

> ...the government's role was not only to stimulate new, modern housing construction but also to facilitate the introduction of many innovations in urban planning such as the provision of park and recreation areas. Adapted by the government of the Weimar Republic and the parties of the Weimar Coalition, the [1918] law established the legal framework for the first large-scale public subsidies for new housing.[18]

The state would subsequently provide 20 million Marks to stimulate the creation of the so-called Heimstätten [homesteads] which were to become a cornerstone of Weimar policy and went beyond Hindenburg's "loyal soldier" prerequisites.

A further building block of Weimar housing policy was the creation of regional state housing offices, which were to organize and supervise local development. Paramount in their list of duties was the gradual elimination of chronically overpopulated urban industrial sectors

through the provision of newly created peripheral communities. In theory, the Mietskaserne was to be replaced with the idyllic single family house whose sufficient plot of land would make good on Hindenburg's promise of re-rooting the [loyal] German to the soil. The central mechanism with which these regional housing offices were to take on their daunting task were the newly created homesteads or provincial housing co-operatives.

The Westfälische Heimstätte (founded on June 26th 1918) represented the first, largest and for the Ruhr, most significant of these organizations.[19] A brief excerpt from its mission statement (adopted in this form on October 8th 1920) outlines the homestead's main functions:

1. It is the central aim of the homestead to assist in the construction of affordable housing in urban and rural areas. Personal construction, in other words construction by the owner, is to be encouraged at all times. As head of the provincial housing co-operatives, it is our obligation to make housing as affordable and construction as cost-efficient as possible by bringing all community co-operatives under a centralized planning body.

2. It is therefore required that specifications and building materials be standardized as quickly as possible. Prefabrication, the regulation of building materials, unitary floor plans and mass production facilities need to be established as quickly as possible.

3. Potential settlers with building trades experience are to be preferred in order to assist in the building process directly through self-help. ("eigene Tat").

4. Obtaining affordable financing measures predominantly from the business sector, lending institutions, insurance companies, and private banks is one of our central aims in order to lessen the burden on the state, provincial, and especially the community co-operatives.[20]

In theory, the Heimstätten mission statement read like the perfect complement to Article 155 of the August 11th, 1919 Weimar Constitution, which stated: "It is the state's purpose to supervise all land speculation and usage so that every German will receive a dwelling and every German family, especially every large family, will be able to afford a healthy home."[21] Author Ute Peltz-

Dreckmann highly praised the movement to provide homes with gardens as: "The safest mechanism with which to attain the government's housing policy objectives prior to 1931. Their importance would further increase when they were brought under direct state, rather than provincial control in 1931."[22]

In the same year the Westfälische Heimstätte ratified its central objectives, another centralized body for the supervision of regional development was called into being. On the fifth of May 1920, the Siedlungsverband Ruhrkohlenbezirk [Ruhr Regional Planning Authority] or otherwise known as the Ruhrsiedlungsverband, was formed with its head office located in Essen. The substantial centralizing function of this regional district planning body can be seen by the fact that it had 260 rural communities encompassing over 3000 square kilometres under its direct authority.[23] A. Heinrichbauer commented on the Ruhrkohlenbezirk's main objectives in 1936:

> [From its inception] The first and most pertinent tasks facing the Siedlungs-verband were the planning of a unified traffic infrastructure, the regulation of an inter-community transit system, preservation, and cultivation of green spaces. The purpose of this task is not to regulate traffic and urban planning when it is too late but instead to conduct far reaching traffic and community planning policies. Unfortunately due to the missed opportunities of the past, this planning process will take time.[24]

The Ruhrkohlenbezirk thus went beyond the role of the Heimstätten to provide all-encompassing regional planning function. Its precedent was quickly followed after 1920 and regional planning districts were created in the Lower Elbe, Weser and Hannover areas to mention only a few. By 1932 these districts combined, covered an area of 135 km^2 with 37 million inhabitants, representing 29% of the total German land mass and 58% of its population.[25]

The Ruhrsiedlungsverband's close ties to Essen need to be kept in mind; its first National Socialist Mayor Justin Dillgardt had actually been a leading official in the Ruhrkohlenbezirk. The Siedlungsverband also controlled an area which produced three quarters of the Ruhr's entire coal output.[26] The economic leverage and political influence the head of the Ruhrkohlenbezirk

enjoyed was therefore considerable. The vital role Ruhr coal played in Germany's economic rebirth after both World Wars made the head of the Ruhrkohlenbezirk an extremely powerful individual. (See Philipp Rappaport in Chapter 5).

It became quite evident to Weimar officials early in the 1920's that the creation of the first housing and subsequent homestead law did not have the desired impact on the housing market. By 1922 the astronomical rate of inflation had devalued the German Mark to one seventieth of its pre-war value. In the face of this inflationary dilemma, the provision of new housing had averaged 120,000 units from 1919-1924.[27] Emergency government measures were thus implemented in 1922, preventing rent increases except with official permission (Reichsmietgesetz). The 1923 Housing Shortage Law (Reichswohnungsmangelgesetz) allowed the government to maximize the usage of all available living space, and the 1923 Tenants' Protection Bill (Mieterschutzgesetz) prescribed that tenants could not be evicted from housing except with government approval.[28]

The establishment of the Deutsche Bau- und Bodenbank in 1923 represented a further government measure to improve the flow of capital to potential builders. However, as Paul Wendt's figures depict, the true recovery in housing production was most probably the result of an economic upturn, culminating in the long-awaited currency stabilization by 1924. Gustav Stolper supports Wendt in isolating the 1924 House Rent Tax (Hauszinssteuer) as the critical state legislation stimulating housing production during the Weimar period. Stolper writes:

> The rationale for this tax was that all pre-inflationary-era houses were free of interest costs, since the owners had been able to pay off mortgage debt at the height of the inflation. During this period, houseowners netted handsome revaluation profits, since they were mortgage debtors and mortgages were revalued by only 25 percent after the stabilization of the currency.[29]

It was therefore the central aim of this tax to equalize this unfair advantage. Simultaneously, the tax provided the government with sufficient funds to provide builders with affordable mortgage rates.

During what Wendt has dubbed the "Hauszinssteuer Era" from 1924-1930, the volume of new housing construction increased three-fold. More startling however, are the figures provided by the United Nation's Economic Commission for Europe (Geneva, 1952). Covering the period from 1923-1931, it indicated that public sector financing of housing construction averaged 51 percent. Real estate credit institutions contributed 37 percent and the remaining 12 percent came from private sources. Wendt actually estimates the public sector contribution during the Weimar Republic to have peaked at an amazing 60 percent. By contrast, under the National Socialists, between 1932 to 1939 a mere 14% of financing came from public funds, 46% from real estate credit institutions and the remaining 40% stemmed from the private sector.[30]

The overwhelming success of the Hauszinssteuer era in creating new housing came to an abrupt end in 1929 with the onset of the Great Depression. The bottom fell out of the Housing market in 1932 when 131,160 new dwellings were constructed,[31] and nearly five million[32] Germans were searching for work. This housing construction downturn provided the far right with additional arguments with which to attack the government. In a desperate attempt to solve both dilemmas, the state passed one final legislation with the ominous heading: "Emergency measure from the Reichspresident for the Security of the Economy and Finance and the elimination of potential political disturbances" on October 6th, 1931.[33] Whereas previous to this legislation, no official state preference for the type of dwelling constructed had existed, this measure specifically singled out the Kleinsiedlung (small settlement) as the solution to both the housing and unemployment crisis. Diefendorf shows that the three to five level co-operative projects with allocated green spaces, aligned at different angles from the main streets, had become (by the late 1920's) the dominant housing form in the Weimar Republic. Walter Gropius and his so-called Bauhaus school of architecture had displayed the cost-cutting advantages of

prefabricated and standardized housing with their model settlement at Dessau-Törten in 1926.[34] The use of prefabricated panels and increased standardization of material had subsequently become the norm during the cost-conscious construction of the late Weimar co-operatives.

It is also significant to note that while the influential Bauhaus innovations of the mid to late 1920's were extremely cost-efficient, they were simultaneously remarkably labour-efficient. The final Weimar attempt at direct intervention into the housing sector, however, represented a marked shift away from the Bauhaus precedent. It was predominantly based on a 1931 proposal by Professor Stephan Poerschke entitled: "Program for the reduction of Unemployment through the creation of small settlements."[35] The final Weimar measure would have a considerable impact on state housing policy during the 1930's and beyond. As a direct result, Stephan Poerschke has been labelled the "Father of the German Kleinsiedlung"[36] and his plan deserves further attention.

Poerschke's opening statement in 1931 proposal recognized Germany's chronic unemployment rate as a profound long-term phenomenon. He wrote: "A unified mass of unemployed workers represent a political, economic and social threat. The reduction of unemployment is the most pressing issue facing our state."[37] Poerschke continues to identify the uttermost spartan agrarian Kleinsiedlung located on the urban peripheries, as the most plausible solution. The state was to provide the land and building materials (predominantly consisting of local wood reserves), as well as allow only unemployed workers who were "physically and morally qualified"[38] to construct and eventually occupy these new developments. Each settler was to be alotted two morgens (two acres) of land on which to build in Poerschke's words:

> ...a predetermined and uniform type of house with only the minimum of necessities (2-3 rooms), provision of drainage is out of the question, provision of electricity and gas must only be allowed with the permission of the local gas and electric authority and road construction is to be kept in most primitive form.[39]

The potential settler was also required to become self-sufficient by growing his own produce and keeping livestock (chicken, geese, pigs, goats) on these two acres. The resulting social assistance savings to the German state were estimated at 70 million Marks per annum.[40]

Critical to the success of Poerschke's idea was that the entire process needed to be planned and supervised by a centralized body, whose absolute authority was to be established through an emergency decree. The emergency decree was in fact passed on October 6th, 1931[41] and adopted the Poerschke proposal almost in its entirety. A Reichskommissar for Kleinsiedlungwesen (small settlement development) was appointed and directly answerable to the Reich Chancellor. This Reichskommissar was to work in close association with the Ministry of Labour in order to find "suitable" unemployed settlers. In addition, local Reichssiedlung branches were to be created, whose function was to ensure that building co-operative resources were utilized to their fullest potential. Brüning's subsequent proposal to allocate the land for these settlers at the expense of East Elbian landowners, the so-called "Fürstenentneigung"[42] ran into heavy, conservative opposition. Hindenburg himself referred to the plan as 'agrarian bolchevism'[43], a label which no doubt contributed to Brüning's downfall. Unfortunately, the relative success or failure of this emergency measure can never be completely assessed since the decree was only implemented fifteen months before the change of government in 1933.

To conclude, it would be unfair to label the 1931 Poerschke proposal a blueprint for the ideal Weimar community. Its main purpose was to provide an answer to an unemployment problem which all previous attempts had failed to alleviate. The spartan, back to basic, 2-3 room wooden buildings allocated on land without proper drainage facilities, gas or electricity seemed to represent a step backwards, rather than forwards in German community planning. The prerequisite of growing produce and maintaining livestock closely resembled nineteenth century small holdings and not the progressive Gropius flat-roofed prefabs at Dessau-Törten. However, in the final analysis, it must be remembered that Poerschke's plan was dictated by economic necessities. The adverse effects of the Great Depression had made the potential of social unreset

a very real one. "Community improvements beyond the realm of these basic necessities...", Poerschke wrote, "...must be determined by the overall improvement of economic conditions."[44] By 1932 these gradual economic improvements were beginning to take shape.

CHAPTER II

The New City: National Socialist Attempts to Alleviate the German Housing Shortage 1933-1943

From September of 1933 to April of 1943, the German National Socialist Workers Party (addressed hereafter as the N.S.D.A.P) implemented numerous pieces of legislation which were intended to alter radically the planning and composition of German communities. Within ten years the National Socialist community planning program passed through three rather distinct phases:

I. 1933 to 1936 - Emergency housing during the period of economic stabilization.

II. 1936 to 1939 - Increased Centralization and Gottfried Feder's blueprint for the ideal German community during the second Four Year Plan.

III. 1939 to 1943 - Future Plans: Sacrificing ideals for the "New Realism" (Neue Sachlichkeit).

As well as examining these distinct stages, this chapter will also focus on Hitler's N.S.D.A.P. social housing proposals which were intended to be implemented after the final victory. Gottfried Feder's The New City was to serve as the blueprint for the ideal N.S.D.A.P. communities of the future. Feder however, was unable to complete his three years of research until 1939, only ten months before the Führer Order for the sole construction of war essential buildings. By 1943 the ideals presented by Feder had been realized only in a handful of German communities. The multi-storied apartment style social housing projects which dominated the Weimar era had once again become the norm. It is the central intent of this chapter to outline National Socialist Community planning and its results in the hope that it may serve as a backdrop to the subsequent chapters examining German post-war reconstruction.

Phase I Emergency Housing and the advent of Economic Stabilization: 1933 to 1936

Following the N.S.D.A.P.'s coming to power on January 30th, 1933, immediate steps were taken to bring the German state under centralized control. During the final years of the

Weimar Republic, the former chancellor Brüning had already implemented legislation which was intended to curb the immediate shortage of workers housing. The Reichssiedlungskommissariat and the Reichsheimstättenamt had been created to embark on a program whose primary objective was to provide affordable housing with a minimal burden to the financially over-extended state. While the economic recovery had begun in 1932, the need for emergency housing was still estimated at 900,000 living quarters in February of 1933.[45]

It would indeed take the N.S.D.A.P. several months before they publicly announced a comprehensive plan for the economic renewal of Germany. Hitler's first four-year plan was published on February 1st, 1933. In accordance with Blood and Soil (Blut und Boden) Nazi ideology, this four-year plan was to utilize the German agrarian population and the industrial workers as the twin pillars of German economic reconstruction. In one of his first speeches as Reich Chancellor, Hitler vehemently stated that the paramount aims of his proposal were: "[to utilize] the reserve of the German farm worker in order to maintain [German] self-sufficiency and the living foundation of the nation."[46] At the time of this speech the German unemployment rate was peaking at 30 per cent. Furthermore, Hitler promised every worker should receive a home in which: "he will feel like a Lord in his Castle."[47]

Hitler's 1933 proposal was greatly influenced by the so-called "ground-breaking" [Darré's own words] Nazi polemics: Das Bauerntum als Lebensquell der Nördlichen Rasse (1928) [The Farm as the Foundation of Life for the Nordic Race], Um Blut und Boden (1929) [For Blood and Soil], and Neuadel aus Blut und Boden 1930 [New Aristocracy from Blood and Soil], written by the head of the S.S. Central Office for Race Settlement and simultaneously Minister of Agriculture (1931-1942) Walter Darré. This obscure individual whose lesser known publications include the ludicrous essay "Das Schwein als Kriterium für Nordische Völker und Semiten" [The Pig as Criterion for Nordic Races and Semites] (1933), sadly did have a considerable ideological impact on N.S.D.A.P. housing policy. It is generally accepted that this "renowned Reich expert on animal breeding"[48] was a key founder of the Blood and Soil ideology. "Blood" in Darré's

terms was to be purely German and the purest type of Germanic blood stemmed from those individuals whose past generations had been most closely bound to the German soil: the German farmer. Darré, similar to Fritsch and Poerschke, looked upon the overpopulated urban centers as potential social and political powder-kegs. Diefendorf comments:

> The ideology of Blut und Boden called for housing produced with traditional arts and crafts techniques and situated in greenery, thereby enabling [all] Germans to become attached to the soil. The Nazis thus viewed the large (and modern) co-operative housing projects characteristic of the late 1920's with disfavour.[49]

According to Diefendorf therefore, N.S.D.A.P. housing "situated in greenery" seems to adhere to Fritsch's garden city concept. A closer examination of Darré's writing however, reveals that he was completely opposed to the garden city idea. He wrote in Neuadel:

> Whoever robs the German soil of its natural landscape, destroys her. Even the best garden city is not [authentically German] landscape in this sense. Take the restlessness of the big city inhabitant who seldom finds a refuge in the concrete [jungle], in which to grow spiritually, as well as the city's negative influence on the premature independence of our youth, ruins the soul and contributes to a highly undesireable development of their intellect which is [influenced by] external forces (Äußerlichkeiten).[50]

Hitler's 1933 promise to "every worker" thus specifically went beyond Darré's Blut und Boden definition. The N.S.D.A.P. pledge to provide the industrial worker with the opportunity to own a "sizeable house" in a "well-planned" Kleinsiedlung near the city, according to Bruno Wasser, served three key functions. First, it would [hopefully] guarantee Party loyalty of Germany's skilled workforce. Secondly, the new N.S.D.A.P. settlements were to be located in close proximity to the workplace, thus safe-guarding against labour transience. And finally, the skilled worker was to be further bound to the state and/or employer by government and corporate financing packages.[51] It thus becomes evident, that the underlying theme of massive German

rearmament immediately took precedence over a strict ideological adherance to Darré's Blut und Boden.

The first Reinhard plan [named after the State Secretary in the Ministry of Finance], was in theory dedicated to the elimination of unemployment through massive government-sponsored job-creation projects. The construction of the German armaments industry was to receive the vast majority of the 600 million Reichsmarks allotted for the economic recovery proposal. In 1933 investments from the public sector had dropped over 50% from 1928, approximately 7 billion Marks to 3.1 billion Marks in 1933.[52] Thus, restoring confidence in the German economy initially received priority over the chronic housing shortage of nearly 1 million workers dwellings.

Not until the second Reinhard plan of 1934 did the housing dilemma receive the state capital it so desperately required. The German Reich contributed RM 500 million for the restoration of old and implementation of new housing projects.[53] In order to lessen the burden on the individual states, the Reich Community Planning Division thought it to be extremely desirable to allow the building of new projects to be undertaken by housing co-operatives and homestead organizations. Ideally, these so-called Genossenschaften (see Chapter 1) would place the focus on owner involvement in the building process, really therefore perpetuating Brüning's self-help or "Eigene Tat" program. Essentially therefore, the N.S.D.A.P. through a combination of a lack of investment from the public sector and a sheer lack of a comprehensive plan regarding the housing shortage, merely continued the Weimar program until 1935.

The absence of a viable National Socialist remedy however, did not curb the party from openly criticizing the shortcomings of Weimar social housing programmes. The N.S.D.A.P. plans in place by 1934, offered only vague and characteristically ambiguous solutions. The top priority according to the Party program points [8 and 17] was therefore that: "The housing shortage must be eliminated through energetic means and by providing housing for those who deserve it."[54] Essentially, as Ute Peltz Dreckmann outlines, the N.S.D.A.P. aims were nearly identical to their Weimar predecessors: "Combatting the unemployment crisis with limited government capital

expenditure, eliminating the transient nature of the populace and priming the construction industry."[55] Construction of the one-family suburban home therefore remained the desired ideal for the German worker.

The main critique which N.S.D.A.P. housing experts had of the Weimar program was that it was simply lacking thorough planning and overall vision. Even though the Weimar officials deserved little if any blame for the heavy demographic concentrations in industrial centers like Berlin and Essen, the N.S.D.A.P. propaganda ministry did its best to discredit and denounce Brüning for the 'evils' of these socialist multi-level dwellings. Here are some of the central criticisms the N.S.D.A.P. had of their Weimar predecessors:

> 1. The agrarian-based Weimar communities situated on the peripheries of the larger cities were simply built without taking the quality of the real estate into account. On the whole, it was argued that the communities were developed cost-efficiently rather than through thorough analysis of the quality of land.
>
> 2. The unemployed communities require an efficient infrastructure system in order to safeguard against the alienation of the unemployed worker from the industrial sector. It was therefore argued that the unemployed worker needed to be integrated with, rather than eliminated from, the industrial sector.
>
> 3. On the whole, these primitive [Weimar] communities served to hamper the healthy expansion of the growing urban centers.
>
> 4. The poor quality of these wooden structures with their pathetic minuscule plots of land simply did not fit the image of Darre's Germanic blood and soil ideal.[56]

Predictably, the Party program thus placed considerable emphasis on the so-called ethnic quality of its potential inhabitants. Rather than adopting Brüning's seemingly logical "Eigene Tat" methodology (see Chapter 1), which provided preferential treatment to members of the building trades, in not only filling, but more importantly physically constructing these new communities, the N.S.D.A.P. predictably embarked on a settler selection process based on German blood-lineage.

A key step towards the overall centralization of rural and urban planning was taken on September 22nd 1933 when the Reich Settlement Office and the Reich Housing Office (Neue Heimat) divisions were created to supervise developments.[57] Ever-increasing government control was met with little opposition from the building trades due to the continued promise of enormous contracts (Autobahn, Airports, Westwall etc.). The two individuals heading these newly created branches were J.W. Ludowici, who headed the Reich Housing Office and most importantly, Gottfried Feder, who was placed in charge of the Reich Settlement Office. On the 3rd of May 1934 Feder announced to the press that his most important task would be to:

> Eliminate the ever-increasing population density of the urban centers, permanently connecting the new settlers to the German soil, to free the people from the confines of the large cities and to provide a healthy living environment for future generations.[58]

Feder therefore continued with Brüning's policy and adhered to the "garden-city" proposals of Theodor Fritsch and Ebenzer Howard, which had been published as early as 1896.

Ludowici and Feder would combine to implement a legislation which provided a further break from Weimar policy. Following the thorough analysis of land speculation and the assessment of the settlers' "ethnic qualities", it was deemed essential that the settler should not be burdened with high mortgage payments. (Feder's first book was actually entitled Die Zinsknechtschaft des deutschen Bürgers [The Tax Burden of the German Citizen]). The mortgage rate and duration was to be set by the Homestead office in direct relation to the settler's overall financial predicament. Thus, in order to lessen the burden on the state, the N.S.D.A.P. gave preferential treatment to potential housing candidates who were in a financially stable position.[59] Poerschke's ideal Weimar community, which provided cheap housing for the unemployed as a means of reintegration into the workforce, was thus abandoned. The settler's credit rating and ethnicity represented the two most important prerequisites for the acquisition of housing in the early N.S.D.A.P. communities.

As early as December of 1934, the autonomous Reich Settlement Office was eliminated and placed under the direct control of the Ministry of Labour (D.A.F.) under Robert Ley. Feder also took on his new position as the head of the Reich Labour Union and Urban Planning Department at the University of Berlin-Charlottenburg in the same year.[60] Not only does this merger represent yet another step towards the ever-increasing centralization of urban planning, but it served to further underline the state's preference for "qualified" settlers/workers. The prerequisite of financial stability in obtaining a new home was actually codified in February of 1935, allowing only the fully employed in good financial standing to qualify for a new home. These so-called "preferred settlers" took up residence in the first N.S.D.A.P. communities, whose names serve as a direct reflection of the ideological fabric of the new inhabitants: "Community of Deserving Fighters", "Community of Wounded War Veterans" and the "Old Fighters" and "Front Fighters" communities.[61]

Housing as a reward for years of hard service, similar to Hindenburg's World War I promise, (see Chapter I), was also codified on July 12th, 1935. The legal text blatantly stated that:

> Front-line soldiers and fighters for the National Socialist cause, and contributors to nationalist labour and in all cases large families, as long as they are racially useful must be given priority. The settler selection process shall be conducted by the Gau Homestead offices of the N.S.D.A.P. in co-operation with the D.A.F. (German Work Front); in this regard it is to be determined what percentage of the mortgage is to be carried by the home owner and the Reichsbank.[62]

Therefore, by 1936, the acquisition of a new home in these communities was becoming a reward for years of hard work and/or loyalty to the German nationalist cause. The Führer's promise to provide every German with a suitable home had been replaced by a hand-picked system which alotted housing to employable, financially stable and obedient middle to upper class party loyalists.

Phase II - Increasing Centralization and Feder's Blueprint for the ideal German Community: 1936 to 1939

While the N.S.D.A.P. had been content with the gradual centralization of urban planning, land development and settler selection during the pre-1936 period, the post-1936 phase would expand the Party influence into the actual architectural design and layout of the buildings themselves. To a great extent, this was made possible by the relatively successful campaign which had shifted the financial burden away from the state and onto the home owners, financial institutions, building co-operatives and homestead organizations. Rather than predominantly focusing on the permanent settlement of the German worker, the state policy now shifted towards the preparation for war. In relation to the settlement and housing policies therefore, this three-year period was characterized by an attempt to safeguard the new and existing communities for a potential crisis or food shortage, as well as the provision of more cost-efficient housing to divert as much capital as possible towards the strengthening of the rearmament industry.

In 1936, the same year that Gottfried Feder was beginning his research on what was to become The New City in 1939, the N.S.D.A.P. passed three more significant laws: the Directive for Regional Development (January 1936), the Directive for the Regulation of Regional Development (February 1936) and legislation concerning the Regulation of Architectural Design (November 1936).[63] Combined, these three measures centrally regulated the height of buildings in specific regions, multi-level, multi-family structures were to be discouraged due to their communal tendencies. Furthermore, all new building permits now needed to be approved by the special Building Police Force, which determined whether the new plans fit into the existing structural scheme of a specific region. By late 1936, it was nearly impossible to receive a building permit for any structure which even marginally strayed from the regional norm and/or was not agreeable to the local [N.S.D.A.P District] Gau office.

The legislation for the Regulation of Architectural Design, which became law in November of 1936,[64] represents the next stage of N.S.D.A.P. community development. No

longer content with merely controlling the planning and regional development of the Reich, this directive actually allowed the Party to regulate the physical appearance of every building. The connection between National Socialist ideology and the increasing uniformity of post-1936 housing was critical and will be examined at length.

The core of this legislation was the so-called Führer principle and its relationship to Prussian militarism. In hindsight, as ludicrous as this connection of militarism and community planning might seem, this was the essence of Gottfried Feder's key N.S.D.A.P. community planning project: The New City. In the 1937 N.S.D.A.P. survey project entitled Bauten des Dritten Reiches [Structures of the Third Reich] Hubert Schrade enthusiastically echoed Feder's fascination with housing uniformity:

> Like soldiers at the Nuremberg rally..., [all] in the same dress, focused on one goal, they [settlers] must adhere to the signals which will show the way of order, whose service they have pledged allegiance to. The same principle of order and uniformity must be implemented in our future communities.[65]

Both Schrade and Feder conclude by praising the Alfred Krupp A.G.'s Margarethenhöhe in Essen as one of the best existing examples of community planning in Germany.

A closer examination of the Krupp family's central rationale in creating workers' housing reveals further clues about the admiration Feder and Schrade had for the Krupp projects. As early as 1865 Alfred Krupp warned his management:

> It is not the low wages which lead to worker discontent, but the limits of his spending power, predominantly high rent and expensive board allowance. I believe that a greater sacrifice must be made. No one can imagine the crisis, which will result, and the advantages we could enjoy over others [employers], if we provide our workers with a roof over their heads. Who knows, when in years or days, an all out revolt sweeps this land, an uprising of workers from all classes against their employers, if we might be the only ones who remain unscathed, if we implement our plans early.[66]

It would take the Krupp empire almost thirty years, until 1906 to realize Alfred's dream of creating a self-contained/sufficient community which was designed, funded and controlled by the steel giant. While Krupp had completed workers' housing projects as early as 1880 (Altendorf), the Margarethenhöhe represented the first Krupp community which was open to non-Krupp employees. It was in essence, a development which was located on the peripheries of the industrial center of Essen, self-contained with shops and recreation/social facilities, yet permanently bound to the Krupp family through rent and mortgage payments.[67]

As of September 14th 1937, Feder and the N.S.D.A.P. possessed the required legislative directives to control fully the social housing developments of the Third Reich. These "New Regulations for the advancement of small communities" represented a summary of all N.S.D.A.P. social housing directives starting in February 1933. The central aim of this legislation was the overall clarification and simplification of guidelines in the hope of accelerating the overall settlement process. Additional emphasis was placed on the self-sufficiency aspect of the new communities. Every new house was therefore to be situated on a minimum of 1000 m^2 of property.[68] The central purpose of this large allotment was to provide suitable land in order to grow vegetables, fruit and maintain small livestock. In addition, this minimum property regulation would contribute to the elimination of high density population concentrations and provide adequate space for the large German families, which the government encouraged to live a healthy life. German Work Front offices were thus further empowered to select potential settlers and dictate the location, size and type of dwelling they would be residing in as a reward for their overall value to the National Socialist cause. By 1938 the D.A.F. also required all potential builders to publicly announce the starting date and location of their projects in the local party publication.[69]

"Even after five years of National Socialist rule", Anna Teut indicates in Architektur im Dritten Reich", Germany was still experiencing a housing shortage of 1.5 million flats".[70] Increasing lack of construction material, predominantly as a result of the priority given to the re-

armament program had proven to be stifling for the building trades. Fritz Todt, as head of the Reich Building Trades Commission, attempted to implement norms, standardization and mass-production guidelines but this had little impact by 1939. Alarmingly, for Nazi ideologues, such as Feder, Seldte, Wagner and Schrade, the small self-sufficient, single-dwelling Germanically pure communities on the peripheries of urban centers became simply outdated. The party was now forced to build massive social housing projects to cover the increasing demand. While all the legislative guidelines were in place by 1938, a true N.S.D.A.P. plan for the size, composition and structure guidelines of these 'new communities' simply did not exist.

Finally in January of 1939, State Secretary Gottfried Feder's three years of research at the Technische Hochschule of Berlin had seemingly paid dividends for the Party. Julius Springer published the results of Feder's research as: The New City: An Attempt at a Justification for the Urban Planning based on the Social Structure of the Populace. The document was to provide the basic schema and guideline for the "ideal National Socialist City". Predictably, Feder's work had the binding of the German farmer and labourer to his native soil at its foundation as a first premise. While the author does not cite Walter Darre's 1928 work The Farmer as the Source of the Nordic Race directly, the ideological parallels in the New City are obvious. Credit is given to Ebenezer Howard, Günther Fritsch, and Benito Mussolini for his work on Pontinia, Littoria and Sabavdia. The author concludes with further praise of the Krupp A.G. Essen's Margarethenhöhe and Heimaterde which were described as: "ground-breaking and practical communities of exemplary stature".[71]

According to Feder, the new city was to combine the most positive aspects of rural and urban living while simultaneously eradicating their negative attributes. The unsanitary conditions, poverty, increasing traffic congestion and overall unhealthy transient lifestyles of city dwellers served as Feder's central targets of urgent reform. London, New York and Berlin[72] were therefore continuously targeted as the antithesis to the ideal garden-city models in the Heimaterde genre. Not only did Feder (similar to Krupp in 1865) warn against the potential threats of social

unrest in urban areas as a result of "this continuous planless development",[73] but he also openly criticized the "outright backwardness" of Germany's rural communities and villages. Feder agreed with Darré that the German populace must be reunited with their soil, yet the return to the land was to be combined with "the most progressive aspects of National Socialist community planning".[74] Criticism of Darré's rural village was therefore directed at its lack of modern necessities: proper drainage, plumbing, gas and electric utilities, as well as facilities of cultural merit, high schools, libraries, theatres, public administration buildings and a local shopping centre.[75]

Gottfried Feder envisioned his perfect city accommodating approximately 20,000 inhabitants. In this sense, the relative size of these new housing projects far exceeded the scale of the Margarethenhöhe model which provided housing for only approximately 6000.[76] The central rationale given for this figure was that it was large enough to create a community which was predominantly self-sufficient, yet small enough to escape the level of large-scale urban population density and its negative effects. The 20,000 inhabitants were to be divided into families ideally numbering 4.2 members, which were allotted their two-storey houses with a minimum of 600-800 m^2 of yard.[77] The prerequisite of this large plot of land again served three key functions. First, it was to provide the residents with a feeling of permanence, a sense of being bound to the German soil. Secondly, it would allow the inhabitants enough area on which to grow fruits and vegetables, as well as maintain livestock. And thirdly, the continuous upkeep of this small plot of land was to serve as a sense of 'escapism' from the everyday turmoil of the outside world.

On the surface, Feder's intentions thus seemed quite admirable, but his role as an adamant party ideologue must be kept in mind. Ernst Nolte credits Feder as having been "the most immediate cause of Hitler's concrete decision to enter politics in 1919". Nolte also cites Hitler's "teachers and masters in rising order of importance as: Gottfried Feder, Erich Ludendorff, Ernst Röhm and Dietrich Eckart."[78] Feder however, was soon to realize that the impressionable young Hitler of 1919 and the Chancellor of 1939 had little in common.

A key characteristic of Feder's proposed new German city was to be its striking uniformity in architectural design. It is this uniformity in the structure and layout of the settlers' houses that provides the most glaring insight to Feder's hidden political agenda. Throughout his work, the author attempted to justify the striking similarities of the new city's homes, which his contemporaries had vehemently criticized at Frankfurt's National Buildings Trade show in 1937.[79] Feder argued that "skillfully curved streets" could easily correct the monotonous appearances of the communities. More importantly, his comment on the desired architectural uniformity is extremely enlightening. Feder wrote:

> If I could allow myself the comparison - and I do believe the comparison is thoroughly justified, then we will discover that the beauty of uniformity is similar to the feeling one has when seeing a [military] uniform. The uniform is without a doubt more beautiful than the ordinary civilian dress with its boring and single-minded differences in colour, fabric, cut etc. Still with all the similarities of the uniform there are still enough possibilities - in housing as in the uniform - to enhance its appearance through lapels, colourful cuffs, regimental numbers, shiny buttons or service insignia, just like the single family house it is possible, through artistic decor or the variation of front doors, creative floral designs in the garden yard, exterior painting or through careful and tasteful selection of stone masonry to eliminate any sign of monotony.[80]

In retrospect, Feder's desire for a uniform community served two important functions in 1939. Material shortages and an economy increasingly geared to war called for the most efficient means for providing "every German a home". More importantly however, this army barrack-type community represented a conscious shift away from fostering individualism. The monotonous exterior of these dwellings was to create the impression of a classless society in which all people were treated equally. Driven by the idea of the Führer principle, Feder's new city was not only to be a direct reflection of the social hierarchy of the N.S.D.A.P. state, but was to serve as its most important perpetuator. The uniformity of the average person's residence was to be offset by the grandiose splendour of its geographical hub and centerpiece; the House of the N.S.D.A.P. A

prerequisite for this striking Party house was its allocation on the 'New City's' only central green space.

The continuous emphasis on the self-sufficiency of the 20,000 person development also served the political and socio-economic agenda of the Party. In case of a potential emergency, each settler would be able to provide for himself/herself and thus take considerable pressure off the providing state. The amount of time which was required to maintain this sizable plot of land would foster a society which was focused on its own little world, rather than spend the day on analyzing external political developments. The role which the state played as the provider of land and favourable mortgage terms was also to enhance further its image as the benevolent patriarch in the Krupp tradition.

Feder's denunciation of large urban structures which exceeded more than three storeys, coupled with the prescribed 40 metre minimum between free-standing structures,[81] also served a defensive military function. While the devastating effects of area bombing were still to come, the potential threat of these massive air raids weighed heavily on Feder's mind. If the 20,000 person ideal community could be realized, it would require the German population to be widely distributed across the entire Reich. In doing so, the potential destruction of strategic bombing could be neutralized. Feder wrote in this regard: "Especially the rapid technological advances of the Air Force provide considerable impetus for the decentralization and population relocation away from areas of high density."[82] Feder's sentiments were shared by Essen's National Socialist city planner Kegel, who stated in 1938:

> Historically, walled cities with high population densities were the best defence against the enemy, today the new weapons of war prescribe low density construction. It has not yet been fully understood that this type of defence against air attack will greatly influence future regional planning.[83]

It seems therefore that Feder and Kegel were well aware of the distinct possibility of military conflict in the years to come. Arguably, Feder was probably not aware that this conflict was to begin only nine months after the initial publication of his book.

Following Feder, Franz Seldte had published his Sozialpolitik im Dritten Reich 1933-38 in which he summarized his research from 1935-37 on small communities. Five main points are depicted in his own defence:

1. The small community with four-room houses represented the best and most economical form of social housing for the German worker.

2. These small self-sufficient communities were essential for the survival of our state. In times of emergency and illness the worker was to be able to provide for himself in such a dwelling.

3. The small community bound the worker to the German soil and further contributed to his sense of patriotism [Heimatgefühl].

4. Furthermore, the four-room house and suitable land allotment was to strengthen the families' desire to have children. It was therefore critical that all new communities contain enough land [per lot] for further [housing] expansion.

5. The small community also played a key role in the Führer's four-year plan. The creation of a new community would cause the Reich's population density rate to decrease. Especially in the rearmament sector, these new homes would house contented workers who would remain non-transient, thus adding skilled and experienced labour to the German workforce.[84]

Seldte therefore overtly echoed Feder's preference for this type of housing as representing the socio-political and economic foundation of the so-called "new Greater German Reich". It is safe to say that both Seldte and Feder must have read the Führer subsequent directives with a considerable amount of disappointment.

Phase III - Future Plans - Sacrificing N.S.D.A.P. Ideals for the "New Realism": 1939 to 1943

On November 15th 1939, Adolf Hitler announced the Führer Order for the prohibition of non-war essential Buildings. Issued only ten months after the publication of the N.S.D.A.P. blueprint for the German cities of the future, this legislation effectively marked the end of National Socialist Community construction. Anna Teut commented on this 1933-39 period as follows:

> In no other area had the National Socialists disappointed their middle-class supporters more than in their ineptitude in rectifying the need for social housing. What the average German actually received after 1933 was far removed from both the quality and mere quantity of the Weimar Republic.[85]

Between 1933 and the outbreak of hostilities in 1939, 983,964 new residences were built, yet the overall required figure had also risen to 1.5 million. During the 1919-1932 Weimar period by contrast, 2,036,453 dwellings were constructed.[86] Even if the average rate of approximately 300,000 per annum would have continued for another five years, the total would have exceeded the Weimar production by only approximately 400,000. Compared to the economic instability of the Weimar years therefore, this figure must be interpreted as being rather disappointing, even to staunch party supporters. The 300,000 per annum average and even the peak year of production in 1938 when the figure rose to 370,000, really only amounted to 50% of the desired quota of 600,000. A remarkable point which was overlooked in all but Bruno Wasser's research, was that the N.S.D.A.P. vacated 70,000 of these 370,000 dwellings as a direct result of their atrocious anti-Semitic expulsion efforts (Kristallnacht-November 9th, 1938).[87]

Even though construction of housing projects all but came to a standstill in 1939, giving way to war-essential building, planning for post-war construction had already begun. The final blueprint which was to determine the creation of new communities after the war was issued on the 15th of November 1941. The so-called "Führer Order for the Expansion of German Housing Construction after the War",[88] was a comprehensive, if rather vaguely-worded document, which

was not so much concerned with the potential reconstruction of Germany, but rather with the planned resettlement of its newly acquired "Eastern Provinces". Given the remarkable degree of success in the war, plans for dealing with land acquisition were the order of the day.

The Order for the creation of German housing after the war reflected the extremely positive outlook Hitler must have had during this stage of the European campaign. This document contained thirteen points which were characteristically vague and open to interpretation. On the whole, the first post-war year was to create only 300,000[89] houses and therefore represented a considerable reduction of the earlier promises [600,000], falling in line with the aforementioned N.S.D.A.P. yearly construction average. The D.A.F. was to be in charge of the post-war program under the guidance of Robert Ley who directly answered to Hitler with a detailed yearly plan for the entire Reich. In requesting an annual report from Ley, Hitler could calculate the resources allotted for the construction of housing in relation to the primary objective of maintaining the war-time rearmament program.

Point III of the Führer Order confirmed the secondary status which the building of new communities has been relegated to in the late 1940. In accordance, Hitler wrote: "The financing of this [5 year] plan must be undertaken by the private sector whenever possible. The communities themselves and local homestead offices must determine the suitable settlers and undertake the financing and building construction themselves."[90] The trend was for the state to distance itself from contributing public funds to the housing sector. Subsidies had already been cut in half from 20% in 1933 to 10% in 1937. The figures are placed in perspective when compared to the last four Weimar years during which nearly 50% of all new houses were subsidized by state-funded mortgages.[91]

By far the most glaring shift in the post-1940 National Socialist housing policy depicted in the Führer Order, were points VII and VIII. Point VII actually provided specific guidelines for the types of dwellings to be created after the war. Three forms were supposed to dominate: multi-level rental housing, the privately-owned home with yard and the small community with an

economically viable land allotment. Hitler therefore did not express a preference for one particular housing type over another. Not even the height prerequisite of the multi-level structures was addressed. The critical social, political and economic benefits of the traditional small communities with sufficient land allotments, vehemently supported by Seldte and Feder, were thus not the Führer's predominant choice for the post-war period. The three types were to be applied "according to the term dictated by the specific locale".[92] The "bolshevizing tendencies" of multi-level rental housing so adamantly denounced by Feder, were therefore to remain an integral part of the German landscape even in the post-war period.

The increasing labour and resource shortages of the early 1940's ultimately determined the greatest about-face in N.S.D.A.P. social housing policy. Most startling of all, what had been described as an integral step on the road to full-fledged communism during the Weimar years[58] had now become a cornerstone of N.S.D.A.P. post-war housing policy. Führer Order Point VIII: "The Rationalization and Codification of Building Materials" was now hailed as Hitler's most innovative solution to the housing dilemma. Weimar's "Cultural Bolshevism" was now praised by the N.S.D.A.P. as "the new realism" (Neue Sachlichkeit).[93]

The codification of building norms and materials was detailed to the point of prescribing the specific square metre area of each room in the new structures. The average apartment was categorized under three specific types labeled "aa, bb and cc", ranging from type aa with two bedrooms totaling 62 square metres, the three bedroom bb type, with 74 square metres, and finally the cc type flat with four bedrooms and 86 square metres. Furthermore, Point VIII called for the creation of standardized housing blueprints to be codified in an all-encompassing new "Reich Norm". This norm was to take regional diversity into account and thus gave way to a "Landnorm" which was to be strictly enforced by the local Gauleiter and Gau Housing Commissioners. Windows, doors, shingles, staircases etc. were thus to be pre-fabricated according to local capacities.[94] Deviations from the norms were held accountable to the local building police.

Two final Führer Directives also addressed the housing issue. The first one on November 23rd 1942, formally dissolved Seldte's Section III of the Labour Ministry and relieved him of his duties. Therefore, the order essentially provided a rubber stamp for Robert Ley's complete control of post-war Housing and Community Planning. Ley's dominant role in this capacity was however to be of limited duration since the Final Führer Order of April 6th 1943 sternly forbade any post-war Social Housing planning for the already crumbling Reich.[95] In Hitler's warped Social Darwinian outlook, this task was to be undertaken by the 'race' which by 1945 had proven itself superior: the Soviet Union.

In conclusion, the period of N.S.D.A.P. Social Housing Policy from 1933 to 1943 was predominantly characterized by the implementation of continuous centralizing legislation. By 1943 Hitler's promise to provide every German a home in which "he will feel like a lord in his castle" had, however, remained unfulfilled. The Party Social Housing program has been examined in three distinct stages. The initial economic predicament and the overall absence of a concrete community planning proposal resulted in a continuation of Weimar policies from 1933 until 1936. In theory, the small, self-sufficient peripheral community remained the ideal. Legislation and economic stabilization from 1936 onwards gradually placed a marked National Socialist accent on the new communities. By 1938 settler selection, increasing building typification and enforcement of prescribed area norms were supervised by the D.A.F. in association with the local Gau offices and building police forces. Even during its peak production year of 1938 however, N.S.D.A.P. housing production figures only reached one half of their desired quota and must thus be interpreted as rather disappointing. Germany's ever-increasing allocation of available resources to the rearmament sector from 1933 onwards, had taken its toll on the housing market. The Feder blueprint for the new N.S.D.A.P. city was completed in 1939, only eight months prior to the outbreak of hostilities. The next chapters will examine to what extent Feder's ideas and the final Führer Housing directives actually influenced Germany's post-war reconstruction.

CHAPTER III

The Scope of Destruction and the British Predicament

It has been shown that the former area of the Federal Republic of Germany had experienced a chronic housing shortage since the First World War (1-1.5 million dwellings), one which was alleviated neither by Weimar planning, nor National Socialist remedies. The scope of war-time destruction, coupled with the demographic upheaval of the immediate post-war era, resulted in a 1945 housing shortage of unsurpassed proportions. Germany's unconditional surrender at Reims and Karlshorst on the 7th and 9th of May 1945 respectively, represented the height of Allied Military dominance while simultaneously ushering in an era of unconditional Allied responsibility for shaping the future of Germany. The Soviet Union, United States, Great Britain and France thus inherited a devastated land mass with an astonishing housing shortage of over 7 million dwellings.[96] The following chapter will begin by examining the magnitude of this devastation in the four Allied zones of occupation beginning in May of 1945. The chapter focus thereafter will shift towards the British occupational zone and conclude by an area specific examination of Essen's predicament itself. By adopting this methodology it will become clear that the daunting task of German reconstruction was regionally, and therefore zonally diverse. In accordance to the Yalta Agreement, Great Britain would occupy the Ruhr industrial heartland containing Essen: the former "Munitions Factory of the Reich". The daunting task of rebuilding this key economic region was thus assigned to a nation which the global conflict had transformed from the world's leading creditor to its greatest debtor.

Post-war German conditions on May 9th have often been described by German historians as "Die Stunde Null" [Zero Hour]. The French Historian Edgar Morin had actually coined this term as early as 1945 and used it as a metaphor for a potential new beginning. Indeed, pictures of the devastated German cities from 1945 with their enormous rubble heaps, charred remnants of churches, schools, factories and the complete annihilation of entire city blocks, depicted a desolate nation of ruins. Seven million Germans had perished in nearly six years of armed conflict, 3.2 million of whom had been

civilian casualties.[97] Immediate post-war conditions were characterized by acute shortages of even the most basic necessities: water, food, shelter and medical supplies.

The squalid living conditions were compounded by a massive influx of displaced persons, many of whom had fled from the devastating advance of the Red Army in the East. Various estimates of the number of displaced persons range from 9.2 million to as high as 13.5 million[98] (including the former East Germany). One displaced person (D.P.) who returned to Germany in 1946 provided a graphic depiction of local conditions in his former home:

> The German nation is maimed in its biological structure with a long-term sharp decline of population inevitable...intellectually crippled by the horrors of twelve years of despotism, by isolation from the outside world...morally ruined...without food or raw materials...a nation where the social fabric has been destroyed by mass flight, mass emigration...in imminent danger of partition between its former enemies...[99]

A similarly desolate account of post-war conditions was provided by the German historian Volker Berghahn who expands on the above-mentioned D.P.'s commentary by depicting the post-war Germans as "living like cavemen".[100] Klaus von Beyme concluded: "After 1945 it seemed as though Germany's physical identity had been destroyed."[101] While all three descriptions fall into the trap of over-generalizing about a uniform national experience by not referring to a specific locale, all accounts would have been applicable to the destruction of the Ruhr's major industrial centers. And in Berghahn's defense, a national state of emergency remained in effect until 1947.

Due to the magnitude of destruction and overall chaotic administrative conditions existing in the four occupational zones in 1945, exact housing shortage figures are nearly impossible to discern. Four sources in particular may serve to provide some insights into the scope of overall destruction: Alan Levine's 1990 study The Strategic Bombing of Germany, The Federal Republic of Germany's Housing and Building Trades Branch

Division 1952 Statistical Yearbook, Günther Schulz's Ph.D. 1994 dissertation Wiederaufbau in Deutschland [Reconstruction in Germany], and finally, the most detailed assessment of Essen's war-time destruction, the 1955 geographical survey: Zerstörung und Aufbau der Großstadt Essen [Destruction and Rebuilding of the city of Essen] by Erich Heyn. A brief comparison of these four diverse studies will provide a strategic bombing perspective based on Anglo-American military documents, an official German government assessment, a comprehensive Ph.D. dissertation, and most importantly, a detailed, area-specific geographic survey of Essen itself.

It has been shown in the previous two chapters, that neither the Weimar, nor the National Socialist policy makers had been able to bring the German housing shortage under control. Estimates of the overall magnitude of this deficit vary between 1 to 1.5 million dwellings. By 1939 the figure was closer to the 1.5 million mark, due to the ever-increasing N.S.D.A.P. measures for rearmament. These figures and the previous ineptitude of German policies need to be kept in mind prior to any assessment of the relative success or failure of Allied reconstruction programs. And as Günther Schulz astutely points out in his deconstruction of the first official Federal Republic housing study, released in 1952, the pre-war deficit has been completely left out of its final figures.[102] Nonetheless, the 1952 study does form the backbone of not only Schulz's but also von Beyme's and Heyn's assessments of post-war damage and thus merits a closer examination.

In accordance to the F.R.G. Housing Office figures of 1950, 2.34 million dwellings were destroyed by air attack or ground fighting, leaving them uninhabitable. 2.3 million living quarters were required for the displaced persons, a figure which calculated four persons per dwelling and thus estimates the total number of displaced persons at a rather low 9.2 million. In addition, this first comprehensive government survey cited the need for another 1.2 million dwellings for new families. This figure was arrived at through a complex calculation of new marriages (1946-1950) and the single-parent households left

behind as a result of war casualties and the subsequent living areas they occupied. The overall total thus required in 1946 was an astonishing 5.74 million dwellings.[103] Once the existing pre-war shortage of 1.5 million is added, the numbers swell to approximately 7.24 million. In other words, the Allied Occupiers faced a task which had increased nearly six-fold compared to the most acute housing deficits prior to World War Two.

Figures of the above-mentioned scale often tend to marginalize the actual scope of undertaking such a daunting rebuilding process. In the case of the enormous structural damage suffered by major urban centers like Hamburg, Berlin, Dresden, Cologne and Essen as a result of Allied bombing, a simple numerical gauge of housing units required is insufficient. It was not merely a case of building over 7 million dwellings, but it was first and foremost a task of finding workers and resources to rebuild the devastated infrastructure; roads, rail and waterways, to re-establish water and electrical necessities and above all, to provide the basic necessities of food, water and temporary shelters. Jeffry Diefendorf provides just one example which places this enormous undertaking in a clearer perspective. Using the example of Cologne which was estimated to have 24,100,000 cubic meters of rubble [compared to Essen's 14,947,000], Diefendorf uses a football field to indicate that: "the pile of Cologne's total amount of rubble would cover the pitch with 4.48 miles of debris".[104] If a similar visual aid is applied to Essen, the pile of rubble would have been 2.78 miles high.

The reasons for the Anglo-American Bombing preoccupation with the city of Essen become glaringly obvious by briefly commenting on this city's geographic and historic significance. The Ruhr industrial region is located in the present state of North Rhine-Westphalia and its main urban centers include: Bochum, Wattenscheid, Gelsenkirchen, Dortmund and Essen. Due to its favourable location to some of Europe's richest coal and iron-ore deposits, it comes as no surprise that the Ruhr was home to the vast majority of the N.S.D.A.P.'s "exemplary industries". The label served as a reflection of their support of the Nazi war effort. Heading the list of these industrial giants were

such formidable names as Thyssen of Duisburg, Mannesmann of Mülheim and the Krupp factories in Essen. The direct result of the high concentration of crucial war-time industry was that the region would become the target of some of the heaviest Allied bombing raids of the war. Between 1940 and 1945, Mülheim was subjected to 160 attacks, Duisburg to 299 and Essen to 272.[105]

As early as 1934, Adolf Hitler had revitalized the Kaiser's glorified description of Essen as "The Munitions Factory of the Reich" and proudly draped this slogan on a 100-meter banner from Essen's largest hotel (Essener Hof).[106] Hitler and William II's descriptive slogan did have a factual rooting in the city's past. As far back as 1620, the Essen archives mention an annual production quota of "14,000 muskets and pistols".[107] For our intents however, the Alfried Krupp Gußstahlfabrik is of foremost significance. In 1935 the steel magnate Alfried Krupp and his wife Bertha were justly rewarded for years of admirable civic service and ceremoniously inducted, as "Honorary citizens of the city of Essen"[108], along with Hitler and Göring. Krupp's fame and fortune was built on such artillery monstrosities as the giant World War I mortar "Big Bertha" and the pinnacle of Krupp's megalomania, the 1,465t heavy gun "Fat Gustav" whose 40m barrel was used to shell Sevastopol in 1942 (both nicknamed in loving memory of family members). By the 1940's Alfried Krupp thus successfully lived up to his predecessor's reputation as the Cannon King[109] of Europe, an achievement which was to have devastating repercussions for the city, both during and after the war.

In his 1992 work The Strategic Bombing of Germany, 1940-45 Alan Levine indicates that due to the magnitude and frequency of the Ruhr attacks, Allied pilots came to refer to this region sarcastically as the "Happy Valley".[110] Similar to Cologne, Essen would experience Arthur Harris' infamous Thousand Bomber Raids, especially the attacks on October 23rd and 24th, 1944 were unsurpassed in their destructive force. Even at this late stage of the campaign, the Essen runs were considered to be strategic, rather than area bombings, since the bombs were destined for a single target: the Krupp Gußstahlfabrik

[steel works]. However, since the factory grounds stretched over 1,088 acres[111] surrounding the city center, and bombing was rarely accurate, the damage inflicted on the inner city more closely resembled an area rather than a strategic bombing campaign. Levine stops short of providing civilian casualty figures for Essen and provides rather low estimates of Dresden's single raid firestorm casualties at 35,000, Hamburg's at 40,000 and Berlin's most devastating conventional bombing raid at 25,0000 killed.[112] In contrast, given the intensity and ferocity of Essen's 272 raids, it remains perhaps the most astounding legacy of the war that only 6803 civilians were lost to air attack.[113]

Only Erich Heyn's geographical survey of 1955 was able to explain comprehensively why this figure was so extremely low in relation to other major German urban centers. The most obvious reason was, that Essen was fortunate enough not to experience the devastating firestorms which ravaged the cities of Dresden and Hamburg. As Levine indicates, however, Berlin was subjected to conventional bombing raids similar to Essen's thousand bomber attacks, yet a single Berlin raid had resulted in nearly four times the casualties Essen would experience during the entire conflict combined. Heyn mentions the existence of twenty-four bunkers and calculated that their entire full capacity would hold only 48,000 individuals in a city which had 664,523 inhabitants in 1939.[114] The answer lies in Essen's extensive tunnel network of pre-existing coalmine tunnels which served as invaluable shelter during the raids. Heyn concluded that this endless mine-shaft network proved to be a mixed blessing, as Essen would experience the most acute damage to foundations in all of Germany.

The N.S.D.A.P.'s Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels, visited Essen on the 10th of April 1944 and made the following diary entry:

> We arrived in Essen before 7 a.m.. We went to the hotel on foot because driving is quite impossible in many parts of Essen. This walk enabled us to make a first-hand estimate of the damage inflicted by the last three air raids. It is colossal, and, indeed ghastly...The city's building experts estimate that it will take twelve years to repair the damage.[115]

Goebbels thought Essen to be the most devastated city of the Reich. Essen would indeed receive the heaviest concentration of bombs in the Ruhr region, 32,511 conventional and 1,401 957 incendiary bombs exploded there, compared to the next closest city of Duisburg which was hit by 30,698 conventional and 727,685 incendiary bombs. Upon returning from one of the final missions over the city in 1945, an Allied bomber pilot described the damage as "the most devastating conventional destruction [he had witnessed], only to be exceeded by a nuclear blast."[116] In accordance to the Yalta Agreement of February 1945, the daunting initial task of administering the reconstruction not only of Essen, but the entire Ruhr, was to be left to British authorities.

Historical interpretations, especially those of German historians, of post-war Allied planning for the reconstruction of Germany are often too narrowly focused on developments within the German boundaries while disregarding the disastrous conditions which also existed in the Allied nations. Great Britain in particular had paid a heavy price both in loss of human life and material destruction during nearly six years of global conflicts. While the physical damage to England's urban centers paled in comparison to the German cities, her economy lay in ruins. Food rationing, the intense labour required for the clearing of rubble and the hoarding of necessities were thus not solely a German phenomena in 1945, but had their counterparts in Great Britain.[117] As is so often the case, this discontent on the home front would culminate in a change of political leadership on July 25th 1945. Thus, Clement Attlee's Labour government was entrusted with rebuilding a crumbling British Empire which the war had turned from being "the world's most important creditor nation to being its largest debtor, culminating in a £654 million trade deficit in 1945.[118] The latter statistic is especially relevant, when one considers that the cost of supporting the German ex-enemy during the first year of occupation totaled £80 million.[119] Any assessment of post-war British policy towards the reconstruction of Germany must take this development into account.

British occupation policy towards the Ruhr industrial heartland was primarily concerned with two objectives: guaranteeing British military and economic security against any continental power imbalance at the lowest possible cost to the British taxpayer. Central to this pre-1947 stage of British occupation were the establishment of law and order, the restoration of basic necessities and the enforcement of the Potsdam Directives: demilitarization, decentralization and decartilization of industries, denazification and gradual democratization.[120] Keeping both cost and security in mind, enforcing the above-mentioned directives often sent mixed signals to the local population. Thus, incentives were offered to increase coal production while simultaneously a dismantling list of 681 key industries was published.[121] Prior to American involvement, Britain would therefore be involved in a complex balancing act of safeguarding herself against any future German military or economic threat and not allowing her zone to deteriorate into the chaos, hunger and poverty which would contribute to the spread of communism. Given her weakened post-war economic condition and extensive global commitments, Britain's occupation record of the Ruhr may have indeed been, as Ian Turner sarcastically remarked in Reconstruction in Post-war Germany, *besser als ihr Ruf* [better than its reputation].[122]

Clement Attlee and his Labour government were sworn into office on July 25 1945. The new Premier chose the very competent trade unionist and ex-member of Churchill's war cabinet Ernest Bevin as his new Foreign Secretary. Bevin proved capable of handling foreign affairs at the highest level in most critical times. Alan Bullock and Michael Howard have compared him with the greatest of his predecessors, on an equal level with Lord Palmerston.[123] Ernest Bevin wasted little time, and shortly after his appointment, clearly listed Britain's central areas of concern as:

1. The Commonwealth and the Empire.
2. The international economic system to be established after the war.
3. An international security system with particular regard to controlling the development of atomic weapons.
4. The post-war settlement of the Mediterranean and Middle-East.
5. The settlement in Europe and in particular what was to be done with Germany.[124]

The German question therefore occupied the last space on Bevin's wish-list. His attitude towards Germans, perhaps bordering on prejudice, is well-documented. Bullock indicates: "The Germans he could never forgive for the war and because he felt they had betrayed the efforts which he and other trade unionists had made for re-established relations of trust after 1918."[125] Bevin told the British Military Governor General Robertson: "I tries `ard, Brian, but I `ates them."[126] His lack of faith in the German Left would be of particular significance in British relations to the strong socialist elements in Ruhr industry and politics.

Central to all five objectives outlined by Bevin in July 1945, was a continued co-operation with her two main post-war allies, the United States and the Soviet Union. By the summer of 1945, the balance of power between the Big Three had been altered considerably. As early as September 1944 at Quebec, Winston Churchill had been made painfully aware of Britain's diminishing role in relation to the United States. In return for the essential extension of American Lend-Lease support, the Prime Minister was `persuaded' to endorse the ludicrous (Henry) Morgenthau proposal entitled: "Program to prevent Germany from starting World War III", which outlined that:

> The Allied Government shall not assume responsibility for such economic problems as price controls, rationing, unemployment, production, reconstruction, distribution, consumption, housing or transportation, or take any measures designed to maintain or strengthen the German economy.[127]

Essentially, this proposal by the American Treasury Secretary was intended to destroy Germany's industrial potential completely, turning the nation back into a predominantly agrarian society. The industrial void left behind by a weak Germany was to simply be filled by Great Britain's industrial capacity. The Morgenthau Plan would be endorsed only as official Anglo-American policy for less than one month, yet it serves as an effective gauge of American economic predominance and British dependency on the United States' support in Europe. Churchill and Attlee were well aware of the power-vacuum and local unrest such a plan would have created in a defeated Germany. They were also aware that a hurried American retreat from Europe, similar to that of the First World War would leave the continent extremely vulnerable to potential Russian expansionism. Cost and security therefore made the post-war American continental presence essential to the British cause, often at the expense of sacrificing her initial aims towards the reconstruction of Germany, especially in regards to dismantling, reparations and the potential export of socialism.

Coupled with this embarrassing British dependency on the United States, was an uncertainty about American intentions and an overall fear of American ignorance in regard to the future of Germany. Taking the Germanophobic example of the Morgenthau proposal and the fact that Truman, the new President had set foot on European soil only once prior to taking his oath of office on April 12th, 1945,[128] the British had just cause for concern. With the exception of projecting an image of being of being on a moral crusade against the evils of Nazism and attempting to maintain positive relations with the Soviet Union, the overall American position on the future of Europe was notoriously vague. With the announcement of a planned two-year withdrawal from the continent announced at Yalta and the abrupt halt of Lend Lease in July 1945, the Americans seemed to have few immediate plans for the fate of central Europe. Similar to the British, the Americans allowed the Supreme Headquarters of Allied Expeditionary Forces to maintain control of Germany, thus adopting what Barbara Marshall has termed "a policy of postponement"[129]

until official directives were received from the planned Big Three summit at Potsdam Cecilienhof (July-August 1945). They did issue a Handbook of Conduct to their forces in Germany, but this was later withdrawn under pressure from Vansisttart and Morgenthau supporters for being "too soft on the Germans".[130] The directives for the future of Germany were to be subsequently established through the continued 'harmonious' planning of the war-time allies.

Dependency and uncertainty exemplified the British relationship to the United States in 1945: fear and a genuine dislike best describe its relationship with the Soviet Union. While it was very desirable to maintain a continued co-operation with "Uncle Joe" in order to lessen the financial commitments of their zone, Attlee and Bevin were not overly optimistic about Soviet support. The Prime Minister's impression of the Soviet leadership is succinctly preserved in his following description of Josef Stalin: "[he] Reminded me of the Renaissance despots - no principles, any methods, but no flowery language - always Yes or No, though you could only count on him if it was No."[131] Bevin took this animosity towards Bolshevism one step further by personally blaming his counterpart Molotov for the murder of millions. The speed and ferocity with which the Red Army had maximized its territorial gains on the German eastern frontier had been impressive indeed. Speed of westward conquest had been the instrument with which Stalin had hoped to increase his political leverage in relation to his two most powerful Allies. Unlike the Americans, Stalin's foreign policy took a far less subtle approach, exemplified by his 'enlightening' Potsdam statement: "In politics one should be guided by the calculation of power".[132] On the eve on the first and final Big Three post-war summit in Potsdam on July 17th 1945, Stalin, Truman and Attlee were all very aware that the most recent calculations had left Great Britain a very distant third. Bevin and Attlee therefore held few cards with which to seriously influence the outcome of the summit and consequently, the future of the German question.

Allied post-war plans for the fate of Germany, while seldom in agreement, did recognize the Ruhr's industrial potential as being essential in rebuilding the European economy. Pounds provides a contemporary assessment of the Ruhr's industrial capacity (1952):

> Possession of the Ruhr countries with its control over a productive capacity of up to 15 million tons of steel a year and some 120 million tons of coal. If the U.S.S.R. be excluded, the Ruhr coal production is almost as much as that of the rest of continental Europe together. [The Ruhr] steel production greatly exceeds that of either Great Britain or France and again almost equals the total for the rest of continental Europe.[133]

Maynard Keynes provides the second central issue concerning the fate of the post-war Ruhr region. Keynes stated: "The German Empire has been built more truly on coal and iron than on blood and iron."[134] Finally, history had repeatedly provided lessons of creating a power-vacuum in central Europe by establishing a German nation which was too weak. However, on the eve of Potsdam, the Ruhr presented the British policy makers with a complex balancing act: utilizing the region's immense industrial potential in reconstructing Europe, while simultaneously safeguarding the continent against any future extreme power imbalance. Coal was to fuel the European recovery process, and wheat was to provide the necessary food source. Supplying the mine workers with adequate food and shelter was thus critical to the rebirth of the Ruhr.

The Big Three negotiations of Potsdam lasted from July 17th to August 2nd 1945. Compounding Britain's already precarious power imbalance and economic plight, was the disturbance of political continuity resulting from the July 25th elections. Churchill and Eden had begun to represent the British cause from the outset of the conference, only to be replaced by Attlee and Bevin halfway through the proceedings. As Alan Bullock effectively points out in his comprehensive biography of the British Foreign Secretary:

> Bevin was as much aware as Attlee that the British had few cards in their hands, even when played by Churchill, and that there would be an uproar at home if after turning the experienced Churchill and Eden out of office, they came back [from Potsdam] without a settlement.[135]

On August 3rd 1945, Attlee and Bevin did return to Whitehall, whether they actually returned with a true settlement is still open to debate. For the legacy of the Potsdam Conference is its vague and open-ended wording, all published in a "loose protocol of proceedings format". Potsdam did, however, provide the occupation forces with the long-awaited guidelines with which to finally proceed. The central conclusions drawn from the Protocol were that Germany was to be: "De-militarized, her industries decentralized and decartelized, its population denazified and in time democratized."[136] In addition, industrial reparations were to be extracted by the Allies, forcing Germany to "compensate to the greatest possible extent for the loss and suffering she has caused to the United Nations and for which the German people cannot escape responsibility."[137] It was this question of reparations and dismantling of industry which was to expose the first great rift between the Big Three negotiators. It would be the Ruhr industrial heartland which lay at the center of the dispute. Germany's potential to wage another war was to be completely neutralized, spelling the end of the Krupp Empire.

At a Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, Bevin reflected on Potsdam: "We had only leadership to sell."[138] Britain did have possession of the Ruhr's industries from which the majority of Allied reparations were to be removed. Especially the Soviet Union showed a strong interest in obtaining Western technology and demanded 10 billion dollars in retribution payments. In desperate need of foodstuffs, Bevin and Molotov were able to hammer out an agreement which entitled the Soviets to 25% of the reparations extracted from the Western zones in addition to those of her own area of occupation. In return, the British zone was to receive agricultural produce from the Eastern regions. As late as July 1946, no such deliveries had been received, while reparations were delivered to the

Russian zone.[139] Bevin's suspicions about the Soviet intent in assisting in the reconstruction of central Europe, were thus confirmed. Stalin seemed quite content to allow the Western zones to deteriorate into the chaos, hunger and poverty which would fuel communism. Bevin issued an ultimatum in 1946:

> The United Kingdom will co-operate on a fully reciprocal basis with the other zones, but in so far as there is no reciprocity from any particular zone or agreement to carry out the whole Potsdam Protocol, my Government will be compelled to organize the British zone of occupation in such a way that no further liability shall fall on the British taxpayer.[140]

Prior to the American commitment to Bizonia with Byrnes' famous Stuttgart speech in September 1946, Britain reluctantly went in alone and attempted to enforce the Potsdam Directives. Gillingham cynically remarks in Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of the Ruhr: "It is impossible to speak of allied co-operation, because it never existed."[141]

By May 9th 1945 it was estimated that the area of present day Germany experienced a housing shortage of approximately 6-6.5 million dwellings. The victorious Allies thus inherited a housing dilemma which represented a four-fold increase over even the most dire Weimar and National Socialist shortages. It should be kept in mind, that both aforementioned German governments were unable to develop sufficient policies which even marginally decreased the pre-World War II housing deficit of 1.5 million dwellings. In accordance to the Yalta Agreement of 1945, the daunting task of rebuilding the most devastated Ruhr industrial heartland was to be left to Great Britain. Due to the Ruhr's immense industrial potential and the presence of Krupp's 'Munitions Factory of the Reich' located in the heart of Essen, this region (future North Rhine-Westphalia) experienced the heaviest Allied bombing concentration of the war. During the next four years, reconstruction of the Ruhr became increasingly important to the overall economic recovery of Western Europe. Especially for the financially over-extended British Labour Government which was unsure of American intentions and simply did not trust Stalin, the

future of the Ruhr posed a complex dilemma. With the gradual deterioration of harmonious quadripartite relations from 1945 through 1946, the potential of an Anglo-American zonal merger rapidly increased. The following chapter will examine the rather diverse plans of British and American officials to alleviate the Ruhr's housing shortage from 1945 to 1949.

CHAPTER IV

Allied Ruhr Plans during the Interregnum: From Liberation to Directive #137 1945-1949

Commenting on the 1945 to 1949 Allied Occupation era, Günther Schulz has concluded that these four years represented a "politically and administratively unintelligible era"[142] of German history. During the Interregnum (May 9th 1945 to May 23rd 1949), Allied plans for the future of Germany would indeed take some remarkable shifts. While general Anglo-American guidelines of German occupation had been in place since September of 1944, concrete policy decisions on the fate of Germany were postponed until the conclusion of the Potsdam Conference on August 2nd, 1945. From 1946 onwards, the housing question was complicated by the ever-increasing Cold War rift. The Potsdam Proposal had contained a brief reference to emergency shelters and vaguely outlined the dubious concept of regulating a "general standard of living for the Germans". The initial Anglo-American legislation; Wohnungsgesetz [Housing Law] #18 issued on March 8th, 1946, provided the first concrete directives for combatting the housing crisis. Still, as British and American planners moved towards a merger of zones, their respective ideas on the future of German post-war housing differed considerably. In an attempt to clarify the complex developments of this period, Allied housing policy will be broken down into three phases:

I. Spring 1945 to February 1946 - Emergency Measures and increasing Allied Reparation Problems.
II. March to December 1946 - The First Allied Housing Law [Wohnungsgesetz #18] and the American shift towards Bizonia.
III. January 1947 to May 23rd 1949 - Rebuilding the Ruhr with Philipp Rappaport and George Marshall.

I. Spring 1945 to February - Emergency Measures and increasing Allied Reparation Problems

Although Essen was designated to fall under British Occupation authority, its first occupation force was American. The city was liberated by the American 9th Army on

April 11th, 1945, which was subsequently replaced by the 507th Parachute Regiment of the 17th Airborne Division under Edison D. Raff six days later.[143] Essener historians Heinz Schulte, Ulrich Kemper and Hermann Schröter have criticized the 17th Airborne for being a stone-faced, victorious power who strictly adhered to their non-fraternization orders.[144] Really, the Americans were simply adhering to their Joint Chiefs of Staff Occupational Directive 1067 (April 1945) which ordered: "Germany will not be occupied for the purpose of liberation but as a defeated nation. Your aim is not oppression but to occupy Germany for realizing certain Allied Objectives."[145] J.C.S. 1067 defined the central Allied aim as: "preventing Germany from ever again becoming a threat to the world"[146] and perhaps most significant in relation to potential reconstruction, Paragraph #21 outlined:

> You will take no action that would tend to support basic living standards in Germany on a higher level than that existing in any one of the neighboring United Nations and you will take appropriate measures to ensure that basic living standards of the German people are not higher than those existing in any of the neighboring United Nations when such measures will contribute to raising the standards of any such nation.[147]

In the Morgenthau tradition, J.C.S. 1067 dictated that Germany was to be held accountable for its aggression and treated as a defeated nation.

The 130th British Military Government detachment arrived in Essen two weeks after the American liberation and immediately attempted to restore some semblance of law and order. The 130th was headed by Majors Downe and Fry, Lieutenants Forby and Boyes, who were assisted by an additional seven administrative officers and a further 24 troops. The scope of their initial duties are placed in perspective when one considers that twenty-eight British officials were given the task of administering a city of over 600,000 residents, 250,000 of whom were displaced persons.[148] Similar to Barbara Marshall's findings in Hanover, it seems that Essen's new occupiers continued to adhere to the

British version of J.C.S. 1067: the so-called 38 Directives of Occupation. The British Directives had been published in the now infamous October 1944 'how-to' Occupation Handbook: Germany and Austria in the Post-Surrender Period: Directives for Allied Commanders in Chief. This document had been based on the combined Chiefs of Staff Directive 551 of April 1944 and although Barbara Marshall refers to it as having been "less harsh and not based on the punitive principle of U.S. Secretary of State [Henry Morgenthau],"[149] it does in fact contain some glaring J.C.S. overlaps. For instance:

> The administration [of German territories] shall be firm. It will be at the same time just and humane with respect to civil population so far as consistent with strict military requirements. You will strongly discourage fraternization between Allied troops and German officials and population. It should be made clear to the local population that military occupation is intended.[150]

Prior to the announcement of the Potsdam Protocol therefore, both American and British Occupation Directives were pragmatic and stern, intended to maintain the peace.

The loose protocol of proceedings which serves as the legacy of the final Big Three summit at Potsdam was finalized on August 2nd 1945, effectively ending Britain's "policy of postponement"[151]. The document itself was dominated by the "variety of D's". Stalin, Truman and Attlee were in agreement that the former territory of the German Reich was to be: denazified, demilitarized, decartelized, decentralized and democratized.[152] Implementation of the five "D's" was to serve as the means to a single end; Germany was to never again possess the potential to wage an aggressive war. Furthermore, the Potsdam Protocol contained rather vague and ambiguous guidelines for the continued co-operation of the Allied Central Control Commission, economic policy and the payment of reparations. The latter aspect would be of vital importance to the future of Ruhr industry, Krupp steel and therefore, to the city of Essen.

Lacking in agricultural produce and overall food stuffs, yet rich in industrial rolling stock, the Potsdam Protocol specified an interzonal exchange under Section IV Paragraph 4(a):

> ...15 percent of such usable and complete industrial capital equipment, in the first place from metallurgical, chemical and machine manufacturing industries, as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the Western Zones of Germany, in exchange for an equivalent value of food [from the Eastern Zones]...[153]

As early as December of 1945 it became clear to British authorities that the requested food supplies were not forthcoming from the Soviet zone. Given Britain's post-war predicament, the most logical alternate supply of grain should have been provided by the United States. Ian Turner, however, has pointed out:

> Unfortunately the United States did not initially prove very forthcoming and in March the [British zonal] ration had to be cut to 1100 calories per day. The reality of the situation was that increased grain shipments to Germany meant reducing supplies to Britain. To its credit the British government introduced bread rationing [in the U.K.] in July 1946.[154]

In defense of the Soviet Union, the vague Potsdam text did not specify when the eastern food supplies were to be provided. Therefore, the Soviets were not obliged to initiate the process until their requested reparations had been received.

In his influential 1959 work Four Power Control in Germany 1945-1946, Michael Balfour presents a scathing critique of the Potsdam Protocol due to its ambiguous wording. Overall, Balfour concluded that it was simply an "unsatisfactory document"[155]. The author supported his assertions with one particular example which not only focused on the reconstruction process, but also showed how one power reacted to the dubious

standard of living clause. Remarkably similar to J.C.S. 1067, the Potsdam Directive outlined:

> The occupying powers should assure the production and maintenance of goods and services required to meet the needs of the occupying forces and displaced persons in Germany and essential to maintain in Germany average living standards not exceeding the average standards of living of European countries.[156]

Furthermore, Section B, paragraph 17 prescribes:

> Measures shall be promptly taken:
> a) to effect essential repair of transport;
> b) to enlarge coal production;
> c) to maximize agricultural output; and
> d) to effect emergency repair of housing and essential utilities[157]

In response to the Potsdam Protocol, the American State Department released a statement on December 12th, 1945 clarifying: "Since the Berlin (Potsdam) Declaration does not specify guidelines for the German standard of living during the Occupation period, the Allied Powers are not required to provide Germany with aid to attain "the average European standard of living".[158]

When examining the above-mentioned points, it becomes clear that J.C.S. 1067 had a considerable impact on the Potsdam Proceedings. "Meeting the needs of the occupying forces" meant that Allied Forces were now officially empowered to seize housing quarters. In Essen this had already been common practice prior to August 2nd 1945. Shortly after their arrival, American forces had cleared the entire Hotel Essener Hof and taken up quarters.[159] The British preferred the posh Essener suburb of Bredeney to downtown and established their headquarters in the Glückaufhaus (August 11 1945).[160] Even in the small community of Haarzopf, the entire Auf'm Bögel three-level, rowed housing development was cleared of its approximately sixty residents. The only

justification provided by the U.S. troops was that they required `suitable accommodations' during their stay. Owners were allowed to return after three months only to find their houses in an abysmal state.[161]

As early as September 1944, Great Britain had provided for the transfer from military to civil authority by creating the Control Commission for Germany British Element (C.C.G./B.E.), which was to become part of the four power Allied Control Council (A.C.C.).[162] The A.C.C.'s first preliminary meeting on July 1945 was held to take over zonal government authority from the British Army of the Rhine. Placed under the leadership of General Bernard Montgomery, the C.C.G. was soon after renamed the Control Office for Germany and Austria and relieved the British War Office of its German administration obligations in 1946. Significantly, the C.C.G. was "organized in parallel to the central German government with the C.C.G. Divisions corresponding to the [former] Reich ministries they were to control."[163] It will be shown later that this was particularly true of the implementation of housing policy. For now, it is important to keep in mind that the C.C.G. employed approximately 26,000 staff which in 1946 alone cost a startling £80 million to maintain.[164]

Costs and security were mentioned earlier as the two key elements of British post-war foreign policy towards Germany. Ian Turner comments on the 1945 to 1949 period: "The initial phase of the occupation from mid-1945 until mid-1947 was characterized by desperate attempts on the part of British authorities to reinvigorate the economy."[165] Point 17 (b) of the Potsdam Protocol represents the first clues as to how this process was to develop. It gave priority to agricultural output, repair of emergency housing and essential utilities, but above all, the production of coal was to be primed to fuel not only the German, but potentially the entire European recovery program. This essential role of Ruhr coal is evident in Turner's linkage theory stating:

> Overcoming the transport problem [deemed most urgent at Potsdam, see page 57], meant above all improving the freight capacity of the railways, which in turn was conditioned by the supply of open wagons and locomotives. Yet as Lieutenant-General Brian Robertson [British Deputy Military Governor] was to recognize, the inability to repair rolling stock and locomotives was due to low steel production, caused by insufficient supplies of coal in 1946, which was ultimately attributable to the food shortages and the cut rations in March of that year.[166]

The existence of an abundant supply of Ruhr coal was never in question, whereas the availability of a sufficient workforce certainly was.

Mark Rosemann has shown that the death and disablement of Ruhr miners called up for military service, had taken a very heavy toll on the industry. In April 1945 the underground workforce had dwindled to 127,000 labourers, little more than half of the 1938 numbers. By Autumn of 1945 the C.C.G./B.E.'s Manpower Division had therefore embarked on a massive campaign to coerce labour in the Ruhr mines. The over-extended Manpower Division allowed German labour exchanges to conduct this task. Roseman citing "a reliable source" within the Landesarbeitsamt Nordrhein-Westfalen [Labour Office N.R.W.] indicates that "by 1946 up to 50% of the total activity of German labour exchanges was devoted to finding new miners."[167] Manpower's recruitment techniques would involve granting miners larger food rations, desirable consumer goods and first pick of building materials. In essence, the British Manpower Division had effectively replaced the defunct Reichzentralamt für Arbeit [Reich Central Office for Labour], whose responsibilities had also included devising and regulating German Housing Policy during the N.S.D.A.P. period. The British ministry with its subsidiary Housing Branch therefore represented one striking continuation of N.S.D.A.P. administrative practices. Moreover, Manpower would utilize its position to entice potential mine labourers with one of the most precious post-war commodities: housing.

The Siedlungsverband Ruhrkohlenbezirk or S.V.R. [Ruhr Regional Planning Authority] was allowed to remain intact as an advisory body after the war. The S.V.R. area had contained over 1,217,000 dwellings in 1939, but by 1945 only 196,000 had survived undamaged. It has been estimated that an astounding four-fifths of miner accommodations had been damaged or destroyed by Allied air raids and artillery shelling.[168] Due to economic necessity, the Manpower Division embarked on a frantic repair program of marginally damaged houses near the collieries. Citing quarterly reports from the Siedlungsverband, Mark Roseman has shown that these initial provisional repairs were relatively successful. During the final quarter of 1945, 19,511 dwellings were repaired. Roseman however, attributes this substantial figure to: "the private initiative of the miners and the willingness of collieries to see part of their pit supplies illegally hived off to housing repairs as it did to efforts of authorities."[169]

Although this preferential treatment of miners had been practiced since late 1945, a supporting legislation did not exist until March of 1946. Prior to this implementation, repaired miners' housing would actually reach a peak of 36,571 dwellings between January and March of 1946. Once the law was in place, the S.V.R. figures indicate a considerable drop to 15,570 repaired units in the second and third quarters combined, and an even further drop to 6,889 in the final 1946 quarter. Whether this downward trend can be attributed to the unusually harsh winter of 1946-1947, the end of the repairs to buildings with moderate damage, lack of building materials and labour or an excess of bureaucratic red tape, often associated with the British Occupation,[170] is open to debate. At least, the winter hypothesis can be eliminated by considering that the combined quarterly results for 1947 only averaged 6012 dwellings per quarter. A closer examination of the first Allied housing law will also clarify whether it proved a help or hindrance to the post-war Ruhr housing construction process.

II. March to December 1946 - The First Allied Housing Law [Wohnungsgesetz #18] and the American Shift towards Bizonia

Zonal and regional regulations prior to March of 1946 were predominantly designed to maintain law and order, supply food rations and provide suitable shelter for both the local population and the flood of displaced persons. By 1946 even interzonal travel and local changes of residence were not permitted. In fact, J.C.S. 1067 would not be lifted until July 11th of 1947.[171] Given the chaotic situation in Germany's major urban centers, it is not surprising that a unified zonal housing law was not implemented until some sense of normality had been restored. What is surprising however, is that not even a preliminary housing policy draft had been devised prior to March 1946. It is presumed that the British authorities were possibly still hoping that quadripartite planning and co-operation was possible until the spring of 1946.[172] Whatever the case may have been, the local housing authorities were assigned the task of distributing the meager supply of accommodation without clear guidelines. By the spring of 1946 these officials were desperate to receive official word on who was to be assigned the limited housing available.

The C.C.G./B.E. finally devised a remarkable set of housing directives which were first published on March 8th 1946.[173] The final draft was entitled C.C.G. Directive #18 or Housing Law. Amazingly, the only reference to Directive #18 I have come across in my research, was made by Günther Schulz. During a Summer 1994 interview in Haarzopf, one of the first residents of the 1948 housing development had informed me, that she had been granted her first new home by "collecting the most points".[174] I asked her if she was aware of how these points had been distributed. She replied: "I am uncertain of the exact process which the Wohnungsamt [Housing Office] used, but it seemed to have something to do with the fact that my husband had been in the [military] service and the number of kids we have." Both attributes, she figured, had been very positive in relation to obtaining prime real estate in Essen. This 'point system' also surfaced in two subsequent

interviews.[175] Each time, the interviewee informed me that "their family had received by far the highest score"[176] and was thus able to choose the most desirable lot in their new community. I did not realize it at the time, but the residents interviewed, were all referring to the most significant aspect of Allied Directive #18: housing distribution according to points.

The 1946 Wohnungsgesetz's central objective was outlined as: "the preservation, increase, survey, distribution and usage of the existing dwellings."[177] First, regional housing offices staffed by German authorities needed to be created. These housing offices were also instructed to set up advisory councils which represented a break from previous German traditions. All citizens were legally required to report any available housing. The German Housing authorities were further granted a truly remarkable range of powers. For example, they could evict tenants without notice; they could order tenants to exchange dwellings to increase efficiency; they were allowed to expand or add on to existing space without the owner's consent, and were able to force a landlord to sign a rental agreement with a tenant of their choice. All new builders also needed to publicly announce the starting date and location of their construction site, thus continuing D.A.F. precedents (see page 28). Finally, the Wohnungsämter needed to provide the British authorities with comprehensive reports on the number of dwellings available, their condition, and a list of potential tenants.[178] These far-reaching measures were to be implemented with the assistance of the traditional Baupolizei [building police] which had been reinstated under the British. The British pragmatically justified the extensive authority vested in the Wohnungsämter by citing that necessity warranted such extreme measures.[179]

Ironically, by mid-1946, the powers vested in the post-war housing authorities were at least on an equal level with those of the Nazi regime. In fact, a strong argument could even be made in favour of a substantial Housing Office power increase in relation to tenant/owner rights. This development was perhaps most noticeable in "one of the few characteristically innovative"[180] aspects of Directive #18 [in relation to previous German

legislation]: The Point System. Günther Schulz does outline some of the key aims of the so-called "Wohnraumverteilung nach Punkten", [Housing distribution according points] but his dissertation does not provide the exact criteria of points allotted for the preferred tenants or owners. The Essen City Library was able to provide me with an original list from 1946 containing the exact guidelines given to the local Housing Office. In Essen the list was first discussed by City Council on June 29th, 1946 and first published on June 10th 1946. It represents one of my most fascinating finds.

The preamble to the point distribution list contains an explanation from the leading Housing Office official stating:

> Repeatedly, we [Wohnungsamt] have been accused of not distributing the existing living quarters in a fair manner. The executive has therefore decided that the distribution of future dwellings will no longer be conducted by local Housing Office chapters, but by a Central Distribution Branch in the main Housing Office. In order that the Central Distribution Office will not be personally influenced, the public has been denied access to this location.[181]

The distribution list then allotted the following ranking criteria:

1. Politically Persecuted and Miners - 5 points
2. Tenants in cellars or other non-suitable accommodations - 4 points
3. War casualties level III and IV and returning Wehrmacht veterans - 3 points
4. Recognized complainants - 3 points
5. Essential workers - 3 points
6. Workers related to Directive #16 [arming of the German police] - 3 points
7. Age or Health preferred cases - 2 points
8. Pregnant women - 2 points
9. Children under 14 years - 2 points
10. Air Raid casualties with special permits - 2 points
11. Others searching - 1 point[182]

An example was then provided: "A politically persecuted miner, who is an air raid casualty and lives in a basement; 5 and 5 and 4 and 2 = 16 points. The total number of points will determine the rank of applicants."[183] Essen's Housing Office would also add a single point for every three months spent on the waiting list as well as reserve the right to distribute up to five points for "extraordinary cases".

The point system represented an intriguing exercise in righting past wrongs and attempting to cope with 1946 realities. On another level, it provided the Central Wohnungsamt with a remarkably powerful mechanism with which to influence the social composition of future Ruhr communities. Miners and victims of the N.S.D.A.P. regime were to be assigned the highest possible points. In the Ruhr tradition of organized mine labour this essentially meant that the vast majority of mine workers could immediately claim ten points. The third placing of war casualties and Wehrmacht returnees bore a striking resemblance to Hindenburg's "Community of Deserving Fighters" and to N.S.D.A.P. programs (see pages 11 and 25). The dire need for essential labourers is reflected in their three point allotment and similarly, the vague reference to Directive 16 represented the desperate shortage of law enforcement personnel. Remarkable and rather appalling, was the spartan distribution of only two points for pregnant women. In the final chapter, I will provide a breakdown of the occupational, marital, religious and military background of the initial two hundred new post-war residents of Haarzopf, therefore providing one example of the point system's implementation.

Just over two months after the publication of Directive #18, U.S. Secretary of State J.F. Byrnes made his famous speech at Stuttgart (September 6th 1946). This proclamation of the American reconstruction policy effectively opened the door to a potential merger of the Anglo and American zones. Regarding the Ruhr, Byrnes also diverged from previous restrictive economic measures by hinting:

> While the people of the Ruhr were the last to succumb to Nazism, without the resources of the Ruhr, Nazism could never have

> threatened the world. Never again must those resources be used for destructive purposes. They must be used to rebuild a free, peaceful Germany and a free, peaceful Europe.[184]

The official British reply was made by Ernest Bevin on October 22, 1946. The British Foreign Secretary stated:

> H.M. Government find themselves in almost complete agreement with what Mr. Byrnes said. It cannot be too often repeated that the continuance of American interests in Europe is vital to the peace of Europe and particularly to the future of Germany. In fact, it is one of the brightest parts of the post-war picture.[185]

Certainly, American involvement and a zonal fusion would also lessen the financial burden of maintaining the British zone. An Anglo-American zonal merger thus seemed imminent and was in fact finalized on December 2nd 1946. Soon after the merger, it became apparent that the British Labour government's socialist approach favouring state intervention and centralized control, stood in direct opposition to American laissez-faire capitalism. Predictably, this fundamental ideological rift between the two governments would soon have considerable repercussions concerning the formulation of a comprehensive housing law for the so-called Bizonia.

III. January 1947 to May 1949 - Rebuilding the Ruhr with Philipp Rappaport and George Marshall

The American and British differences were especially pronounced in relation to the centralized state control of housing. Prior to the zonal fusion in 1947, the British Manpower Division had set up its central zonal office in the North German town of Lemgo. The National Socialist precedent of placing its housing and community planning

branch under the centralized control of its Labour Ministry (see p. 35) thus bore a striking resemblance to this British approach. The central office model from a British perspective was not only compatible with Attlee's preference for increased state intervention, but also seemed to be absolutely essential in order to bring the German housing crisis under control. Prior to permitting elections and the subsequent formation of the Länder [provinces] governments, the British deemed the centralized Manpower Division approach to be a necessity. The Americans had allowed local elections to take place in their zone in January 1946, whereas the British waited until September 1947. Landtag elections were held in Bizonia in April of 1947.[186] Subsequently, British centralization plans were thwarted not only by their American counterparts, but increasingly by the new Länder governments, including their various pressure groups. Often citing the N.S.D.A.P. experience, South German states, especially Bavaria, and powerful Siedlungsverbände, combined with the rejuvenated political parties demanded that control of housing should be decentralized.

Even after the creation of Bizonia, the British did not buckle under the pressure, and forged ahead with a centralized bizonal planning law. In this task they received considerable support from the Social Democratic Party (S.P.D.). The Reconstruction Ministers of the British, and subsequently the American zones, had been meeting with Manpower representatives since August of 1946. Remarkably, on August 18th of the following year, the Länder representatives, among them Philipp Rappaport of Essen, were able to hammer out a first draft of a comprehensive bizonal reconstruction law. The document has survived as the so-called "Lemgo Draft"[187] and provided the Länder with considerably freedom of interpretation and implementation. The very modest progress made in reconstruction by August of 1947, coupled with the vast scale of the task ahead, no doubt persuaded even the staunchest Christian Democrats (C.D.U.) and Germany Party (D.P.) supporters that some centralizing measures were essential.

The Lemgo Draft itself received considerable circulation among German housing officials and proved to have a significant impact on the first reconstruction law of North Rhine-Westphalia (N.R.W.).[188] The N.R.W. law was however not implemented until 1950 and therefore the Lemgo document must be viewed as the key reconstruction guideline for Essen during the Interregnum. It was based on two proposals, one by Johannes Lubahn, which was closely based on the Reichsheimstätten principles of 1920's (see p. 12-13), providing affordable housing for the needy [Unbemittelten], bombed-out and displaced persons. Similar to Stephan Poerschke's Kleinsiedlung remedy of the late Weimar era (see p. 16-18), Lubahn stressed the need for homes with suitable land allotments in order to provide the owner with a degree of self-sufficiency, which in turn would lessen the financial burden on the state. The Lubahn element of Lemgo, in essence represented a continuation of the October 1931 Weimar emergency decree (see p. 17). The truly innovative aspects of the 1947 plan were attributed to Johannes Göderitz, the head of the newly formed Deutschen Städtetages [German Cities Association] and pertained to land usage legislation.

The key for Göderitz lay in the control or restriction of private land speculation during the immediate post-war period. In accordance, the Lemgo Draft proposed that city planners should be allowed to infringe on private property owners' rights and confiscate land if it was not being used to its full potential. The owner was entitled to compensation for his/her loss of property, but this was subject to the discretion of municipal authorities. Considerable powers were thus vested in the municipalities, which could designate a particular area for building purposes. In order to receive approval from the provincial housing authorities, the municipalities were required to provide a detailed land usage plan containing the size, location and type of dwellings to be built, a map of subdivided lots, road-building criteria, connections to the existing transportation infrastructure and the economic viability of the proposed region. These first local "Aufbaupläne" [construction plans] were then to form the basis of provincial "Durchführungspläne" [implementation

plans], which could further alter land and building usage patterns, as well as specify the height of new structures. Only rubble removal, financing and building supervision guidelines were not addressed in the Lemgo Draft and were thus left to the Länder jurisdictions.

The centralizing proposals of Lubahn and Göderitz were certainly not new to the British manpower authorities. In fact, the British had created their own Ministry for Town and Country Planning as early as 1944. Philipp Rappaport, who as the director of both S.V.R. and the German advisory council to the Manpower Division, must be considered the most influential German housing official, actually cited the British 1944 precedent as an exemplary model.[189] Similarly, Göderitz often "illustrated his planning theories with British Garden City examples."[190] Especially the British tradition of communal or lease-hold tenure (up to 99 years) proved particularly appealing for German socialist planners. Whereas the German equivalent [Erbpacht] did exist, Göderitz and Rappaport hoped hereditary lease-hold tenure would become the national norm rather than the exception. For the Christian Democratic Union (C.D.U.), German Party (D.P.) and American defendants of private property however, the Lemgo proposal simply went too far and the initiative was voted down. As of March 30th, 1948 the bizonal authorities therefore placed community planning back into the hands of the provinces with Directive #137.[191]

The C.C.G./B.E. not only attempted to export the concept of a centralized planning office and a national reconstruction law, but it also attempted to influence the actual physical appearance of post-war housing. Although not nearly as comprehensive as the Lemgo Draft, this British plan involved building affordable, mass-produced housing and was presented to the Städtetag representatives on February 27th 1946. During this British zonal meeting of housing officials, the idea of building temporary pre-fabricated, corrugated tin "Churchill huts" (also referred to as Nissen or Quonset huts) were vehemently opposed by the German delegation. Philipp Rappaport in particular was a staunch opponent of these corrugated tin structures. Even though the British 'pre-fab'

program had been rather successful with nearly 100,000 units being built in England by February of 1946, it was denounced as 'un-German'. Commenting on the ten to twelve year durability of such structures, Rappaport explained: "Germany is much too poor to have to rebuild twice."[192] Even far less extreme British proposals in the name of cost and efficiency, were passionately denounced by German officials. For example, merely constructing the most expedient miner housing without a basement and a flat, rather than a steep roof, was vehemently opposed by the mining representatives as non-traditional. This mining tradition so entrenched in the Ruhr, also entailed a suitable plot of land on which the mining families could grow sufficient produce. A basement was therefore deemed a necessity in order to store coal and food supplies. Given the aforementioned economic leverage of the Ruhr's coal miners and their overall 1946 scarcity, it comes as no surprise that they were able to fend off all British proposals. Sizable Churchill hut developments were however built outside of the Ruhr in Berlin and in Hamburg where a massive project housed up to 60,000 inhabitants.[193]

Whereas the C.C.G./B.E. did attempt to influence post-war housing with limited financial means, its comparatively affluent O.M.G.U.S. (Office of Military Government for Germany United States) counterpart adopted a non-interventionist approach. To this day, the Marshall aid package of June 5th 1947 has symbolized the American post-war recovery contribution to Germany, yet it did not specify housing as a priority. In his essay "American Policy and the Rebuilding of Urban Germany", Jeffry Diefendorf provides an excerpt from a 1989 interview with Charles Kindleberger who helped to formulate the Marshall Plan. Commenting on the package, Kindleberger indicated: "Interest 43 years ago was in money trade, food, investment in productive activities, plus property questions and not in the German standard of living in housing."[194] American policy thus provided the required influx of capital from which an overall economic recovery could take place. A stabilized economy, it was hypothesized, would thereafter allow the reconstruction process to take its course without the assistance of an American blueprint.

In the same essay Diefendorf depicts a fascinating account of the correspondence between the influential co-founder of the "Bauhaus" movements (see page 15-16) Walter Gropius and the American military Governor of Germany, General Lucius D. Clay. Exiled in the U.S., Gropius had become a professor at Harvard in 1937 and returned to guest lecture in Berlin in August of 1947.[195] Similar to Lubahn and Rappaport, Gropius called for a centralized planning body, a national reconstruction plan and added pre-fabrication in the Dessau tradition. In relation to physical reconstruction, he "cautioned against the excessive emphasis on standardization that had appeared in the Nazi years..."[196] Gropius warned: "there is a political corpse buried in Germany's rubble and it is the job of the reconstruction planners to ensure it isn't revived".[197] Clay had actually invited Gropius to visit Germany and act as an American housing consultant. In response, Gropius submitted a report to Clay following his 1947 Berlin visit. Commenting on its overall impact on American reconstruction policy, Gropius reflected in 1951: "it [the 1947 report] was moldering like so much else, in the archives of the occupation army."[198] Given the British experience of being unable to influence the physical appearance of Ruhr housing, it is highly unlikely that Gropius's modern, flat-roofed Bauhaus style bungalows would have pleased conservative miners.

The estimated figures of housing construction during the Interregnum are predictably low. Housing statistics released by the Federal Republic of Germany in September 1950 cite approximately 250,000 repaired dwellings, approximately 190,000 rebuilt structures and only 170,000 new structures built prior to the formation of the Federal Republic (May 23rd 1949).[199] It should be noted, that all figures apply to Bizonia as a whole. Separate figures for the British and American zones were not available. Under Allied occupation 360,000 dwellings were therefore built from the ground up over four years, culminating in an average of 90,000 units per annum. It should be noted, that these figures do not account for the substantial number of "Schwarzbauten" [illegal buildings], built between 1945 to 1949. Temporary housing like the "Nissen" huts were

also excluded from the survey. The F.R.G. numbers also indicate that the real housing construction increase in Germany did not manifest itself until 1949-50 when the effects of the currency reform (June 20th 1948) began to pay dividends. In comparison, in 1949 approximately 150,000 dwellings were built; in 1950, 360,000 were constructed, compared to the peak year of 1959 when 550,000 dwellings were built. Construction increased from approximately 150,000 dwellings in 1949 to 360,000 in 1950, eventually reaching the post-war high of 550,000 per annum in 1959.[200]

The Interregnum has been examined in three distinct phases. From 1945 to 1947 Allied efforts were predominantly concerned with the restoration of basic necessities and the maintenance of law and order. This first phase was characterized by J.C.S. Directive 1067, which prescribed a pragmatic, military occupation of Germany. Housing for Allied occupation personnel thus took precedence over providing a comprehensive reconstruction plan for Germany. The notorious J.C.S. "standard of living clause" which was designed to ensure that the Germans would not attain a higher living standard than their neighbouring countries, was perpetuated in the Potsdam Protocol. Housing would receive a fourth place billing at Potsdam and followed transport repair, coal production and agricultural output on the list of the Allied priorities. The first comprehensive Allied attempt to address the housing crisis was Directive #18 of March 1946. Containing the point distribution system which had no German precedent, housing officials were able to assign available dwellings to those deemed most deserving. Miners and victims of the N.S.D.A.P. regime, followed by war veterans topped this list. After the creation of Bizonia in 1947, British proposals of a centralized housing office and a national reconstruction law encountered increasing opposition from the newly created Länder governments and the non-interventionist Americans. Attempts to directly influence the physical housing reconstruction were predominantly conducted by the British with the Gropius case being the exception. In the Ruhr such cost-cutting efforts were vehemently denounced by the extremely influential Ruhr Regional Planning as being simply "un-

German". As a result, British officials were forced to allow Ruhr communities to build better quality homes than their British counterparts. Essen-Haarzopf represents only one example of such a post-war community.

CHAPTER V

Post-War Community Construction in Essen-Haarzopf: "Germany is much too poor to have to rebuild twice" 1948-1960

The new development which was added to the Essen suburb of Haarzopf was under construction from 1948 until 1960. Throughout this twelve year period, the types of dwellings built were to remain nearly identical in outward appearance, size and lot provisions. As a former resident of this community, I had often been struck by this remarkable uniformity of the forty-four duplexes. Their overall solid brick construction, the spacious interiors and large yards containing extensive vegetable gardens and often small livestock, also left a lasting impression. These characteristics of Haarzopf differed considerably from the Vancouver communities I lived in after immigrating to Canada in 1979. These new surroundings, whether in Vancouver's East Side, or in our subsequent homes in Coquitlam, never seemed to have the same close-knit sense of community which I had experienced in Haarzopf. Why these differences between Haarzopf and the Canadian communities existed had therefore intrigued me from an early age. During a meeting with Professor Martin Kitchen in the Fall of 1993, he suggested that this curiosity may have the potential of being extended into a Master of Arts Thesis. This final chapter contains some of the answers to my questions. More importantly, the post-war development of Essen-Haarzopf will be depicted and placed into the context of German housing traditions and Allied influences.

In the summer of 1994, I was fortunate enough to spend one research semester on location in Essen. During these two months, the basis of my Haarzopf research material was accumulated. Twelve interviews were conducted in this time-span, all of which proved to be extremely insightful. I am therefore greatly indebted to the local residents of Essen-Haarzopf, to those who offered their time for my inquiries and to those who simply provided me with constant support and encouragement. Everyone I asked for assistance obliged and made the summer a truly rewarding experience. After the summer research semester, numerous faxes also kept me in touch with the community.

The suburb of Essen-Haarzopf is located approximately six kilometers north-west of the city center. It encompasses an area of about 257 hectares which borders on

Mülheim in the West, Bredeney in the East, Schuir in the South and Fulerum and Krupp's Margarethenhöhe in the North. The 1987 census recorded a population of 7183, with 3273 residents citing Catholicism as their religion compared to 2864 Protestants. Prior to 1900, the character of the community was predominantly agrarian with small Höfe [subsistence farms] dotting the landscape. With the rise of heavy industry in 1880's, the subsistence farmers were further supplementing their income by working in the local coal mines, located approximately two kilometers from the farms.[201]

By the 1900's mining was the dominant occupation of Haarzopf's residents. In 1907 the majority of Haarzopf's 1470 residents were miners.[202] These miners lived in the so-called Bergmanns Kotten [miners' cottages], which influenced the 1948 development considerably. Rather than supplementing their farm income with wage labour from the mines, the post-1900 residents chose to invert this process. While the mines had turned Haarzopf residents into wage earners, they still supplemented their incomes by farming. In fact, all the mine housing constructed between 1898-1905, which today still lines the Humboldtstraße, contained a modest plot of land. Furthermore, these solid brick, steep roof dwellings all contained a built-in shed attachment to the rear, in which small livestock could be kept. A sizable basement was also included for coal and produce storage. In essence, these houses represented exactly the Ruhr's mining traditions which Rappaport and the S.V.R. lobby attempted so vehemently to uphold in light of British opposition (see p. 68-69).

Prior to examining its post-war housing, it is relevant to comment briefly on Haarzopf housing traditions of the 1930's. The single rowed, multi-level development Auf'em Bögel serves as a prime example of the Weimar period. According to the guidelines prescribed by Brüning's "Eigene Tat" or self-help initiative (see p. 12), the unemployed were selected for their abilities in constructing their own housing. Thus, the building trades were well represented by the thirty initial families, which constructed this Haarzopf housing project. Due to its three-storeyed format, lack of spacing between each

dwelling and tiny garden plots, Feder and Kegel would have surely denounced these units as a typical Weimar blunder or a potential air raid disaster (see p. 32). Feder and Kegel's worst fears were indeed confirmed with the Essen raids of 1943 and the entire Bögel block was required to construct a network of connecting tunnels to provide additional protection from the bombings.[203] However, the Bögel and Haarzopf on the whole survived the bombing raids with minimal damage, only the areas close to the airfields of Mülheim were heavily damaged.

Significantly, even though the 1948 community bordered directly on the Bögel's (see picture #1 and 3) Weimar development, no attempt was made to continue with the 1930 plans after the war. The type of dwellings to be constructed in 1948 and even the occupants chosen, would represent a striking break with the Weimar precedent. Rather, the post-war plans for Haarzopf perpetuated the subsistence characteristics of the Humboldtstraße cottages. These houses were to be free-standing, single family dwellings with a sizable land allotment, containing built-in sheds for livestock and a basement storage area. Unlike the 1900 mine dwellings which differed in size and outward appearance, however, the post-war homes were to be completely identical. Schrade's (see p. 27) and Feder's (see p. 31) justifications for housing uniformity serve as an interesting N.S.D.A.P. backdrop to post-war Haarzopf in this regard. Whereas the miners' housing followed the pre-existing infrastructure of the Humboldtstraße, in a relatively straight line, the 1948 development was not bound to any pre-existing roads. The opportunity thus existed to build Feder's "skillfully curved streets" (see p. 31), which it was hoped could correct the monotonous appearance of the bland new homes.

From a regional planning perspective, this opportunity to begin with a blank slate existed because Haarzopf's new community was built on empty farm land (see picture #1). The city of Essen had bought out a local farmer after the currency reform and opened the area for development in 1948.[204] Presumably, the city could have used the Lemgo directives (see p. 66-67) in order to influence the negotiations with the previous land

owner. According to local account however, this was not deemed necessary since the transaction went smoothly.[205] In turn, the city provided the regional planner Rudolf Pierburg of Mülheim[206] with an area in which he was not bound to adhere to any pre-existing infrastructures or geographic obstacles. Pierburg really only needed to provide a suitable road into the community, a task which he accomplished by simply connecting his new roads to the existing Bögel and Hatzper Street arteries (see map).

A closer examination of the Pierburg plan reveals the overall subdivision of the proposed lots. With the exception of the houses marked in yellow, this is the way the finished development looked by 1960. A couple of points should be noted in regard to this map. One can indeed recognize that the new streets are "skillfully curved", designed to break the monotony of the uniform dwellings. The planned homes which were not constructed would have connected the community with the busy Hatzper motorway in the south-east. This diversion from the initial plans today gives the community an appearance of being self-contained due to its surrounding greenbelt (see p. 89). Only the north Bögel connector leads outwards to a variety of small shops, a bank, post office, butcher, baker and pub. In essence, local residents could purchase all their amenities within walking distance of their homes. In many ways, the new community thus shared many 'garden-city' characteristics with Krupp's Margarethenhöhe (see p. 27-28), which borders on Haarzopf in the north-east.

Haarzopf's post-war lots were quite substantial, covering an area of 641 m^2 and were on the average all of similar size and layout.[207] In comparison, these lot sizes barely met Feder's minimum requirements of 600-800 m^2 (see p. 30). They fell well short of the first N.S.D.A.P. directives of 1933 which called for 1000 m^2 lots (see p. 28) and were even further removed from Poerschke's extravagant two acre plots (see p.16). Still, the lots proved to be large enough for a sizable vegetable garden and, as the plan clearly shows, contained a common livestock pen, which was often shared by two families. The location of the pen itself also represented the only discrepancy between the overall floor

plans of the dwellings. It would either be attached directly to the side of the house or located in the center of the split yards. Maintaining the livestock and growing produce was made mandatory from the outset of construction. And as the attached pictures indicate, the gardens were being harvested well in advance of the completion of the homes (see pictures #18 and 19).

The types of homes chosen for the new community did not represent a significant break from German traditions. In fact, the identical Bauform Wersten two family duplex style (see attached blueprint and pictures #23 and 24) could be found in Stuttgart-Weilimdorf, Berlin-Marienfeld and Düsseldorf's Schlageterstadt, all planned and constructed between 1935 and 1940.[208] Especially the Schlageterstadt community is quite interesting, since the National Socialists actually cited it as an exemplary model of German community planning during a 1937 community exhibit. Whereas Ute Peltz-Dreckmann characterizes this Düsseldorf community as typically national socialist, its physical appearance did not represent a significant departure from pre-1933 German traditions. Wiedemann's Industrielle Heimstättensiedlungen (1936) clearly shows that the supposed N.S.D.A.P. Schlageterstadt houses were virtually identical to the houses built by the Talbot Works in Aachen, which began construction in October of 1931.[209] Even more remarkably, Heinrichsbauer's 1936 work Industrielle Siedlung im Ruhrgebiet contains a picture of the Ruhr's first mine housing development "Kolonie Eisenheim I" near Osterfeld, which was completed in 1844.[210] The outward appearance of the Eisenheim duplexes not only resembled Schlageterstadt, but also Haarzopf's post-war construction. In Peltz-Dreckmann's defense, neither the Talbot, Eisenheim, nor Haarzopf communities contained the massive Aufmarschplatz [military parade grounds] and grotesque political murals of the N.S.D.A.P. model community.

In retrospect, it is safe to state that Haarzopf's post-1948 planners were certainly not influenced by either the Bauhaus traditions (see p. 15-16 and 73) or the British pre-fab proposals (see p.68-69) of 1946. Given Essen's acute shortage of building materials in

1948, it is remarkable that planners chose these sizeable solid brick and cement structures over more cost-effective proposals. It seems that Rappaport's rationale: "Germany is much too poor to rebuild twice", perhaps provides the best explanation for their choice. In turn, the construction process would be relatively time-consuming due to the lack of building materials and the amount of manual labour required. The development therefore had to be constructed in four phases: Phase I 1948-49, Phase II 1949-50, Phase III 1950-53 and Phase IV 1953-60,[211] allowing sufficient time for resource allocation and settler selection.

The provision of building materials and the process of choosing Haarzopf's new residents were two areas where the British authorities did have a considerable impact. Whereas Essen did suffer from an acute shortage of framing lumber, fuel, production facilities (cement and glass), chaotic transport conditions and lack of qualified workers, it did possess one essential building resource in abundance: rubble. During my interviews, scavenging for building materials in the bombed-out centers of the inner city was repeatedly cited as one of the most pressing tasks of the new residents. Esseners, and Germans in general, referred to this collection and storage of essentials as "hamstering".[212] Under the cover of darkness, the builders would hoard as many usable materials as possible and store them in a hidden place until they were required.[213] Without the required permits, this removal of rubble from damaged dwellings was highly illegal.

British military officials had made their position on rubble removal from bombed properties very clear on September 6th 1945. The residents interviewed vehemently opposed this British measure as restrictive to a speedy German reconstruction process. A closer reading of the British public announcement however, indicates that the existing Führer Order regarding the trespassing and looting of damaged building sites (September 17th 1944) had simply been kept in place.[214] Similarly, the military government also continued the N.S.D.A.P. temporary building prohibition from October 29th 1936 until June 1st 1947.[215] As a result, residents were forced to postpone the utilization of their

hoarded supplies until the summer of 1947. Prior to the lifting of the building prohibition however, the housing officials needed to determine who qualified as a potential owner of a new home.

In the case of Haarzopf, the residents who were allowed to build from 1948 onwards, were indeed chosen according to the British point distribution system (see p. 61-64). The Allied rationale behind the ranking order and point allotment has been covered in Chapter Four. A brief discussion of the social background of the post-war residents will provide some insights into the actual impact which the "Housing Distribution according to Points" had on one Ruhr community. In order to take on this task, I sent a fax to Haarzopf in which I requested the current home owners to answer a number of questions regarding the first owners of their homes. Significantly, most individuals questioned were related to the first owners, in itself perhaps a comment on the sense of attachment or permanency to community (see p. 30).

All residents who participated in the anonymous survey were asked the following:

1. Age and occupation of the first owners
2. Number of children at the time
3. Military service and/or prisoners of war
4. Previous residence
5. Religion[216]

The area surveyed contained a total of forty-four duplexes (see map), housing eighty-eight families by 1960. Fifty-five of these were kind enough to answer these door to door questions verbally, while my extraordinarily helpful and patient aunt and grandmother recorded their answers. A number of residents did not know the previous owners' backgrounds. I was therefore only able to provide figures for approximately 63 percent of the first residents. Still, even these partial results provide some insights into the social composition of this community and were therefore too valuable to disregard.

I have calculated the following; the youngest owner was thirty years old, the oldest sixty-four, with the average age having been forty-four years. Only fifteen families had children before they moved in and only six had two or more. An astounding 83% had been in the military. Of these, 69% were P.O.W.S. and 21% were wounded. Religions were represented only by the Catholic (43%) and Protestant faiths (57%). The previous residency category can really be divided only into Essen and suburbs (73%), and the former East Germany (27%), Silesia, Pomerania and East Prussia.

It is not my intention to draw any sweeping conclusions about the social composition of this or any other post-war Ruhr community. Due to the missing data on 37% of the residents this would be highly problematic. The cited figures do, however, indicate that this point system of owner selection did not follow the Bögel's lead of preferring skilled tradesmen who could construct their own homes. Owners occupied in the construction or related industries actually represented just over one half (57%) of the new residents. Among these, not one worked in the mining sector. Forty-three percent cited occupations which did not require substantial manual labour; engineers, salesmen, federal employees etc. Intense manual labour was, however, exactly what was required of these first residents. Whatever their occupation, the initial phases of constructing required all to partake in the physical construction of the new community.[217]

The list of requirements which the new owners needed to fulfill also extended far beyond assisting in hands-on construction. From the interview I conducted, I gained the impression that all residents considered themselves extremely fortunate to be allowed to build a new home. The potential owners had gone through the application process at their local Siedlerbund [settlement society], which in turn forwarded the forms to the central housing office in Essen.[218] Beyond this submission of forms, the applicant really had no contact with the Central housing authorities (see p. 63). One person interviewed fittingly compared the uncertain waiting period to playing the lottery.[219] An annual fee to the Siedlerbund would guarantee that the applicant's name remained on the waiting list. Once

chosen, the building offices did not inform the lucky contestants what criteria had been used in reaching the decision. Rumours circulated in Haarzopf that it had: "something to do with the fact that the men had been in the service and the number of kids we had at the time."[220] This statement was made by the vice-president of the Siedlerbund, indicating that even the local representatives were not informed of the exact point system allotment.

During the interviews with the former head of the Siedlerbund, and subsequently with its former vice-president, it was amusing to find out that each claimed to have scored the highest number of points on the housing distribution survey. As a direct result, their respective families were allowed to choose the most desirable lot in their new subdivision. Each then proceeded to explain exactly why their particular lot was in fact far more desirable than their neighbours. Even after hearing their supporting evidence and viewing their supposed choices, I found the lots to be nearly identical. An examination of the community plans reveals, that the lot sizes averaged 641 square meters and their overall layout and location differed only marginally. The amount of sunlight received in each area of the house or the state of the cleared lot in 1948 was perhaps also a factor. All other interviewees indicated that they did not have a choice of lots and were just extremely glad to be given the opportunity to build so soon after the war.[221]

The building process itself proved to be a strenuous task in which all able-bodied new residents were required to take part. The number of local workers was automatically increased, since every family of four members or less was required to have an Einlieger [tenant]. The new homes were required to have a minimum of five individuals residing in each dwelling. The attached blueprint indicates that the entire upper level of the home was designated as an Einliegerwohnung [tenant apartment] in order to maximize the new building's capacity. Families with four or fewer members had the option of choosing their own tenants. In most cases, a relative was chosen or else the housing authorities would simply assign those searching for housing to the new development.[222] The first tenants usually lessened the owners' mortgage payments by assisting in the construction process

of the new homes. After the economy had stabilized, this method of payment was replaced with cash rents.[223]

Following the currency reform of June 20th 1948, the financing of the new community was left entirely in the hands of the Rheinisch-Westfälische Heimstätte (R.W.H.). In theory, the Kleinsiedlungsbestimmungen [small settlement directives] issued on September 14th 1937 and December 23rd 1938 remained in effect until January 21st 1951. The 1938 directives had specified:

> It is the responsibility of the Heimstätte to organize the settlement process, provide the necessary means and - as required - provide suitable land, community plans, building blue-prints, and to obtain the required building and other applicable permits.[224]

In 1951 the financial means were clarified by the N.R.W. Directive as: "a complete financing plan which clearly outlined the provision of public and private funding."[225]

The R.W.H. was greatly assisted in its function as sole financing agent by a number of government legislations contained in the first Federal Republic Housing Law of 1950. The legislation's central aim was to assist in the creation of low interest or interest-free loans which were distributed by the Länder or the communes [Heimstätten], but not by the Federal Republic.[226] In accordance, the general post-war housing financing involved a complex system of multiple mortgage loans, co-ordinated in the Haarzopf case by the R.W.H. As a general rule, the number of mortgages per home was set at two; the first derived from the private sector and the second mortgage from Bausparkassen [building-savings banks].

Especially Section "7c" of post-war income tax laws stimulated the early financing measures. Section "7c" allowed any private employer to deduct an amount of up to one third of his/her taxable income, provided this amount was made available to low-cost housing at no interest, with an amortization of two percent annually.[227] If these first mortgage funds were not provided by the private sector, the rate of alternate lending

institutions was fixed at 6.5 to 7.5 percent for a ten year period. The second mortgage loans were usually provided by building-savings banks under the condition that 50 percent of the required loan had been accumulated in a savings account. Alternatively, second mortgage loans could also be secured from commercial banks bearing interest rates of 4.5 percent. These however, required higher rates of amortization (5 to 7 percent) and were less frequently used.[228] Also, according to the 1950 law, public funds would only be granted for construction once all avenues of private finance had been exhausted. Robert Wertheimer's 1958 economic study indicated that between 1950 and 1956 fifty percent mortgage financing was a result of tax incentives.[229]

The Lastenausgleich [equalization] legislation of 1950 also proved to be quite significant regarding Haarzopf. In accordance, families whose homes had escaped the war undamaged were forced to pay special property taxes. These funds were subsequently used by the Länder governments to provide interest free loans of up to DM 4000 per dwelling to aid bombed-out people and refugees.[230]

One Haarzopf family's financing experience provides some insight into the impact of the above-mentioned financing measures. After the currency reform, each family member received 60 German marks in exchange for 60 old Reichsmarks. Their pre-war savings above 60 Marks were then converted at a rate of RM 10 to DM 1. The family had fled the former East Prussian region of Germany and as a result received the DM 4000 loan interest-free, repayable over ten years. As a result of the father's employment at the Hannomag Truck Company, the employer provided the "7c" provision, an additional DM 7000. Their overall mortgage payments were further reduced by the family's and Einlieger's self-help contribution in constructing the home. In this particular case, the monthly base payment in 1952 was kept to a remarkably low 49 Marks. The owner estimated that the total cost of her home had been approximately DM 53,000 and that the R.W.H. had been responsible for the entire financing plan.[231]

The attached pictures have been graciously provided by first head of Haarzopf's Siedlerbund and serve as a graphic reminder of this labour-intensive undertaking. In many ways the self-help principles of the 1920 homestead mission statement (see p. 12-13) manifested themselves in Essen-Haarzopf. Personal construction by the owner was in fact not only encouraged, but required in this post-war development. As I have outlined however, the Allied point system diverged considerably from the Weimar precedent by not giving special preference to settlers with building trade experience (see p. 15-16). The post-war construction process therefore proved to be a variation of the self-help idea in that the owners were only required to clear their lot sufficiently for building to commence, excavate their own basements, transport and provide as much building materials on their own accord and actually build their own brick foundation (see pictures #9-15). The exterior walls (see pictures #16,17,20 and 21), roof (picture #23) and remaining finishing work was then completed by the local construction company Hütsch.[232]

What the residents lacked in individual building expertise, they made up for with hard work and co-operation. The required excavation and foundation work was all carried out house by house with the entire block working on only a single dwelling at a time. The new neighbours immediately developed a sense of camaraderie and community before the buildings were actually in place (see pictures #9 and 10). Although often depicted as a harmonious exercise in community co-operation, especially in the countless commemorative German publications of the 1950's[233], it is seldom cited that the initial residents were really reducing their mortgage payments through manual labour. The head Siedlerbund representative was placed in charge of meticulously charting the labour hours of his new neighbours. His weekly records were then forwarded to the local building branch in Haarzopf's Tommesweg, who in turn submitted them to the Central Housing Office.[234]

The process of merely transporting the necessary building materials proved to be extremely archaic due to the complete breakdown of Essen's transportation infrastructure.

All of the inner city's cleared rubble was carted to a dumping site near the present day Gruga Park. The massive rubble heap was sarcastically named the "Montagsloch" [Monday hole] and prospective builders would scavenge through its remains in the hope of finding usable materials.[235] A number of trolley lines had been restored by 1948 but reached only the outskirts of Haarzopf, leaving two kilometers between the site of the new development. The residents were eventually able to solve this transportation dilemma by building their own track and trolley line (see pictures #4 and 5). Capitalizing on their close ties to the mining community, a number of coal containers and tracks were allocated, making the transport of building materials a bit easier.[236] Even after the necessary materials had arrived on site, their overall quality left much to be desired. Especially the rubble bricks needed to have attached debris removed and afterwards had to be combined like pieces in a jigsaw (see pictures #6-8 and 13-15). While the Siedlerbund and Westfälische Heimstätte attempted to provide as many materials and tools to assist in the task, the work was solely manual and conducted with shovels, pick-axes and hammers.

As the first and largest homestead organization in the Ruhr, the Westfälische Heimstätte continued its post-1918 function as: "The safest mechanism with which to attain the government's housing policy objectives..."[237] (see p. 12-13). In comparison to the post-World War I conditions of German housing, even during the most trying years of the Great Depression, the post-World War II destruction of the Ruhr had no historical precedent (see p.38-40). The relative importance of the homesteads in 1948 in lessening the burden on the over-extended occupying authorities can therefore not be underestimated. This provincial housing co-operative with its established ties to the local construction sector and over twenty years of experience in the Ruhr, was simply too valuable to disband. For the Ruhr in general, but Essen in particular, the Nuremberg trial of Alfried Krupp further compounded the housing crisis.[238] Along with the Westfälische Heimstätte, the Krupp family name had been synonymous with Ruhr housing since the 1870's (see p. 9-10). The guilty verdict levied against Alfried Krupp in 1948 not only

represented a devastating blow to the Ruhr's economic future, but it also eliminated by far the largest private sector provider of housing in Essen. Coupled with the British financial predicament (see p.44) and the temporary elimination of Krupp from the housing sector, the role of the Westfälische Heimstätte was vital.

In 1948 the Westfälische Heimstätte remained directly answerable to the Ruhr Regional Planning Authority or S.V.R. (see p. 13-14) headed by Philip Rappaport. The British Order issued on June 21st 1945 remained in effect. It outlined:

> In principle we shall continue to direct building - work as was done during the war. Moreover, all building-work is still controlled by building inspectors. New buildings, restoration and repair work, which according to the decree of the building inspectors, issued on December 28, 1938 are under the administration of the President of the Ruhr Regional Planning Authority, must get approval from the building inspectors.[239]

Local complaints that the British authorities were solely responsible for restricting the pace of reconstruction were therefore unfounded. In regards to the S.V.R. and the Baupolizei [building police] (see p. 36) the British thus allowed a direct continuation of the 1938 N.S.D.A.P. legislation to carry over into the post-war era. Given the wording of the British directive from 1945, it also seems highly unlikely that the building police branches would have been subjected to a thorough denazification investigation. This aspect seems to be directly supported by the overall conduct of the building police in their dealings with the Haarzopf community. By far the greatest complaint from those that I interviewed was, that the continuous Baupolizei inspection process was excessive, at times even frightening.

The central objective of the building police should have been the restriction of illegal buildings or Schwarzbauten [black buildings]. It remains one of the most puzzling aspects of Haarzopf's reconstruction, that an entire block of Schwarzbauten was allowed

to be constructed while the building inspectors apparently spent all of their time examining trivial specifications in the new development. During their obligatory rounds, the inspectors would repeatedly utter threats of "Entsiedlung" [community expulsion].[240] One example of their ridiculous conduct was related to me by an elderly female resident. After having worked in the construction of the new community for over one year, her family was finally able to move into their new home. Some interior finishing work remained to be completed, including the placement of electrical outlets. The family had diverged from the housing blueprints marginally by shifting one electrical outlet closer to their shed, in order to provide a hatching lamp for chicken eggs. The inspector adamantly demanded that this diversion from the norm was just cause for the family's entire Entsiedlung. In the end, the outlet slot was moved to the Baupolizei's specified location.[241]

I found the threats of Entsiedlung both fascinating and rather extreme and I asked the interviewee if these threats had ever been carried through. She indicated that a rumour had been circulating that one individual in a neighbouring community had actually been forced to leave.[242] The reasons for the expulsion were never clear, nor was the story verified by any eye-witnesses. Given the scarcity of post-war housing, the complexity of the selection process and the amount of hours invested in their new home, the residents took the threat of Entsiedlung very seriously. Orders from the building police were therefore seldom (if ever) questioned. In turn, this guaranteed that the building construction would not diverge from the original plans. The uniformity and standardization were justified by the necessity of 'trying times' and strictly enforced by the inspectors. British authorities were empowered to loosen the rigidity of these strict measures, yet neither had the initiative nor the means to change the existing N.S.D.A.P. precedent. One must however, be rather careful in placing the blame on the British occupiers in this regard, keeping in mind that the residents of Haarzopf are still required to obtain official permits to make any changes which diverge from the norm[243] to the exterior of their homes.

Overall, the means and methods used to construct the post-1948 development in Essen-Haarzopf accomplished their central objective: to keep building costs down. Added to the combination of self-help initiatives, homestead provisions, standardization and strict enforcement of building guidelines, was the hereditary lease-hold system of land tenure. During the Lemgo meetings (see p. 66-68) the British had actually expressed their support for this Erbpacht system in order to safe-guard against land speculation. This British proposal had been opposed by the South German States and the Americans as overly socialist, yet in Haarzopf it became the post-war norm. All new builders were locked into a ninety-nine year city lease of their lots, which did not contain a buy-out clause until the 1980's.[244] As well as safe-guarding against land speculation, the city's role in regional planning was further enhanced, while the overall cost of obtaining a new home were considerably reduced.

Given their non-interventionist approach towards Germany's post-war housing in general (see p. 69-70), it comes as no surprise that few residents even commented on the American impact on their reconstruction experience. Whereas the British were remembered for their seemingly endless array of regulations and special permits, the Americans were remembered for one thing: C.A.R.E. packets. Marshall aid and its impact on the German currency reform was also mentioned, but only in relation to the 60 Marks everyone received to begin a new life.[245] Having had an American sponsor family which provided clothing supplies, canned goods, sweets, cigarettes etc., thus remains the only U.S. legacy in Haarzopf.

As a brief postscript, the city of Essen sold its surrounding south-western land to Krupp industries in the early 1960's. By 1963 the company had subdivided the area into small Schrebergärten [hobby gardens] plots for its employees.[246] In the western peripheries of this development, a local farmer was allowed to retain his title to the surrounding fields at the expense of approximately eighteen further homes (see map). Further northwest, an additional six planned homes were never built in order to make

room for an apartment building with adequate greenery. The green belt around the community was then effectively closed with the city of Essen's nursery bordering on the Krupp gardens to the south, and a cemetery to the north. By the 1960's the community was thus completely surrounded by an impressive green belt, with its only opening leading to the local shops. Five years earlier, Erich Heyn's geographical survey had already declared Essen-Haarzopf as "one of the region's most desirable places to live."[247]

CONCLUSION

I would like to conclude this thesis by refocusing on the five main questions which I attempted to address from the outset:

What German state housing policies were in place prior to the National Socialist era?
What were the characteristics of National Socialist housing policy?
How did post-World War II Allied proposals differ from German traditions?
Did Anglo-American reconstruction plans significantly influence post-war Ruhr housing?
And to what extent was Essen's post-war housing simply repaired or begun anew?

All aforementioned questions therefore deal with the controversial concept of a German "zero hour" or a new beginning, as it applied to post-war housing. In regard to the British Ruhr (and later bizonal occupation), no particular answer to this question exists. Applied solely to the case study of Essen-Haarzopf, the answer becomes somewhat more manageable, but still far from definitive. The development which was added to the pre-existing community of Haarzopf, contained characteristics which drew on a number of German housing traditions. These had arguably begun with Krupp's letter to his management in 1870 and contained elements of 1918 homestead aims, the small settlement ideas of Stephan Poerschke, Brüning's self-help initiatives and hints of Feder's New City. The British point system and the Lemgo proposal of 1947, as well as American financial aid, also had an impact on this community. A more detailed summary of the five questions will clarify to which extent these influences manifested themselves in this Ruhr post-war housing development.

It has been shown in Chapter 1 that German state housing policy really began after World War I. Predominantly aimed at 'righting the past wrongs' of over-crowded and unsanitary living conditions in Germany's major urban centers, the Prussian state took the initiative with its 1918 First Housing Law. Remarkably similar to the paternal aims outlined in Krupp's letter to his management in 1865, the Prussian state attempted to regulate housing with the intention of safeguarding against social upheavals. President Hindenburg viewed the over-crowded multi-level Mietskasernen as the prime location for

such a rebellion to take hold. In response, Hindenburg promoted the idea of providing every "deserving German fighter" with a homestead upon his peaceful return to civilian life. These idyllic German homesteads were to consist of a single family home and a sufficient plot of land.

In order to lessen the burden on the financially over-extended German state, personal construction, pre-fabrication and centralized supervision of building co-operatives were deemed essential. During the early Weimar period, the creation of the Westfälische Heimstätte and the Ruhr Regional Planning authority in 1920 would have a considerable impact on the future of Ruhr housing. The Westfälische Heimstätte mission statement of October 1920 would serve as the basis for the final and most important Weimar Decree of 1931. The S.V.R. in turn, steadily increased its function as a regional planning body. By 1936 its jurisdiction included 260 Ruhr communities, covering an astounding 3000 square kilometers.

While the multi-level rowed housing has come to symbolize the Weimar era, the most influential legislation recognized the "Kleinsiedlung" as the way out of the housing crisis. Predominantly the work of Stephan Poerschke, the 1931 Emergency Decree borrowed heavily from the homestead mission statement. Modest 2-3 room homes with sizeable two acre lots were to be made available to the unemployed tradesmen. The two-acre lots, it was argued, were required for the settlers to become self-sufficient, thus lessening the burden on the state. Livestock and produce would have sufficient land to prosper. Poerschke's back-to-basics approach however, really did not have enough time to develop before the 1933 change of government.

Predictably, the National Socialists denounced everything the Weimar proposals had stood for as ill-conceived and far too spartan. Ironically, they would, however, continue to perpetuate the Kleinsiedlung principles of Stephan Poerschke. The National Socialists themselves really did not have a plan in place which could address the chronically inadequate supply of German housing. On the whole, the real impact of the

National Socialist period on state housing policy was its increased centralization and strict supervision. Newly created local Gau offices and building police detachments were to ensure that all post-1933 housing was distinctly National Socialist.

The real problem for the National Socialists, however, would be that a blueprint for the ideal N.S.D.A.P. city never existed until Gottfried Feder completed his Neue Stadt in 1939. His work stressed the dire need for peripheral cities of 20,000 people, which would be self-contained, uniform and self-sufficient. The spacious single family dwellings with 600-800 m^2 lots would serve to re-root the large German families in their native soil. Feder's 600-800 m^2 lots were actually scaled down from the Führer Order of 1936, which provided a ludicrously large land allotment of 1000 m^2. In part, this figure would increase German Lebensraum and more importantly for the Ruhr, this elimination of population density would safeguard against potential air raids. In practice however, the N.S.D.A.P. resorted to building the same multi-level barrack type dwellings, which its members had denounced as having "bolshevizing tendencies" during the Weimar period. This gulf between theory and practice widened as the nation was geared towards total war; "cultural bolshevism" was simply replaced by "the new realism".

One aspect which all of pre-1945 German housing policies had in common, was that no one policy was able even marginally to eliminate the chronic housing shortage. The estimated shortage of dwellings from 1918 onwards remained remarkably consistent at 1.5 million, no matter which legislation was implemented. By May of 1945, the victorious Allies inherited a housing dilemma which represented a four-fold increase over even the most dire Weimar or National Socialist shortages. Of the four occupational zones, Great Britain's contained the Krupp "Munitions Factory of the Reich" in Essen. As a result, 272 Allied air raids had caused some of the most devastating destruction in this city. Due to Britain's financial predicament after World War II, it was in no position to take on the reconstruction of the Ruhr on its own. Thus, the British were able to do little until Byrne's speech in Stuttgart and the subsequent creation of Bizonia in January 1947.

Official Allied Housing policy during the Interregnum was not clarified until March of 1946 with Directive #18. Given the priorities of restoring even the most basic necessities during the first ten months of occupation, as well as the uneasy alliance of Allied powers, this delay is understandable. Housing Directive #18 represented a significant break from German traditions in the form of the point distribution system for housing. The point system also represented an intriguing attempt to cope with 1946 economic realities and to right the past wrongs of the National Socialist regime. Miners and victims of the N.S.D.A.P., followed by war veterans, thus topped the distribution list.

After the creation of Bizonia in 1947, British proposals of a centralized housing office and a national reconstruction law, encountered increasing opposition from the newly created Länder governments and the non-interventionist Americans. Attempts to influence the physical housing reconstruction directly were predominantly conducted by the British, with the Gropius case being the exception. In the Ruhr, such cost-cutting efforts were vehemently denounced by the extremely influential Ruhr Regional Planning Association as being simply "un-German". As a result, British officials were forced to allow Ruhr communities to build better quality homes than post-war British housing.

The construction process of Essen-Haarzopf from 1948 to 1960 has been discussed in detail in Chapter 5. The Allied point system was indeed used to select the residents of the post-war development. From the results of the question survey, one can conclude that a definite break from the trade prerequisite approach of Brüning's "Eigene Tat" did manifest itself. Similarly, the large duplex format chosen with its sizeable land allotment had little in common with Haarzopf's Bögel, which was constructed in the 1930's. The early influences of the area's cottages could still be seen in the importance attached to the subsistence element of these dwellings. As it had since 1920, the Ruhr Regional Planning Authority and the Westfälische Heimstätte again played key roles in the reconstruction process. Given Britain's Labour government's preference for centralized control, the revival of the S.V.R. should come as no surprise. What is perhaps somewhat

surprising is that the Führer Order regarding the powers of the building police were also left in place after the war. Similarly, the striking monotony of these buildings, enforced with the threat of Entsiedlung, was justified by the economic necessity of the times. Ironically, this necessity argument was to be used by the powerful head of the S.V.R. Philip Rappaport to fend off British proposals regarding the construction of Ruhr housing. Rappaport defended the Ruhr's housing traditions with the statement: "Germany is much too poor to have to rebuild twice."

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II. Interviews in Haarzopf (Summer 1994)

1. June 22, 1994
2. June 30, 1994
3. July 9, 1994
4. July 12, 1994
5. July 21, 1994
6. July 24, 1994
7. July 25, 1994
8. July 29, 1994
9. July 30, 1994
10. August 2, 1994
11. August 6, 1994
12. August 9, 1994

III. Interviews by phone or fax from Vancouver to Haarzopf

13. January 12, 1995
14. March 2, 1995
15. March 3, 1995
16. August 19, 1995
17. March 30, 1996
18. April 5, 1996
19. April 8, 1996