

THE SQUAMISH ABORIGINAL ECONOMY, 1860-1940

by Chris Roine

L.L.B., University of Western Ontario, 1991

Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment  
of the requirements for the Degree of  
Master of Arts  
in the Department of History

©Chris Roine 1996

Simon Fraser University

August, 1996

All rights reserved. This work may not  
be reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy  
or other means, without the permission of the author.

## APPROVAL

**NAME:** Chris Roine

**DEGREE:** MA

**TITLE:** The Squamish Aboriginal Economy, 1860-1940

### EXAMINING COMMITTEE

**Chair:** Jack Little

Douglas Coie, Professor

Tina Loo, Professor

Robert McDonald, Professor  
Department of History  
University of British Columbia  
External Examiner

**Date:** August 12, 1996

**PARTIAL COPYRIGHT LICENSE**

I hereby grant to Simon Fraser University the right to lend my thesis, project or extended essay (the title of which is shown below) to users of the Simon Fraser University Library, and to make partial or single copies only for such users or in response to a request from the library of any other university, or other educational institution, on its own behalf or for one of its users. I further agree that permission for multiple copying of this work for scholarly purposes may be granted by me or the Dean of Graduate Studies. It is understood that copying or publication of this work for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

**Title of Thesis/Project/Extended Essay**

The Squamish Aboriginal Economy, 1860-1940  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

**Author:**  
(signature)

Chris Roine  
(name)

Aug. 15 / 96  
(date)

## Abstract

The arrival of white settlement and industry to the lower mainland of British Columbia had a profound impact on the economy of the Squamish first nation. From 1860 to 1940 the Squamish economy moved beyond subsistence activities to incorporate paid labour and revenues from the disposal of land and resources. In the course of expanding and diversifying their economy, the Squamish had to deal with numerous restrictions and impediments. Municipal, colonial, and provincial governments and local capitalists were often intolerant of the Squamish, while missionaries and officials of the federal Department of Indian Affairs hindered the Squamish economy with their benevolent paternalism. In the face of these obstacles, the Squamish failed to integrate fully into the provincial economy; they provided labour and resources to capitalists, but were not capitalists themselves. By 1940, the Squamish were wealthy but economically unstable. They had significant communal revenues from their lands and resources, but individual families relied on paid labour and subsistence activities, both of which were subject to intense, but variable, external pressures.

This thesis relies on the records of the Department of Indian Affairs, most of which are found in the National Archives of Canada. Records from the archives of the Oblate Missionaries, the British Columbia Archives and Records Service, and photographs from the Vancouver Public Library's Special Collections were also valuable primary sources of information. Several published interviews and biographies of prominent Squamish people help to offset the heavy reliance on government sources of information, as do numerous secondary sources on aboriginal cultures in the Pacific Northwest.

Major themes in the historiography of aboriginal-white relations in British Columbia and Canada play out in the evolving economy of the Squamish: the Indian policy of the colonial and provincial governments of British Columbia, the subtle but strong role of missionaries in aboriginal cultures, and the federal government's benevolent but often misguided paternalism towards aboriginal

people. Focussing on a single aboriginal group allows us to illustrate the complexity and nuance of aboriginal-white relations that works of a larger scope cannot convey. The arrival of white settlers and industry presented the Squamish with a mix of both opportunity and discrimination.

## Table of Contents

Approval	ii
Abstract	iii
Introduction	1
Chapter One: The New Order, 1860 to 1885	12
Chapter Two: An Impending Crisis, 1886 to 1913	28
Chapter Three: Wealth without Security, 1913 to 1923	51
Chapter Four: Subsistence, Labour, and Land, 1923 to 1940	70
Conclusion	89
Bibliography	92
Appendices - A. Maps and Photographs	97
B. Census Returns, 1879-1915	105
C. Timber dues & Bonuses, 1916-1927	106
D. Revenues from Leases, 1930-1940	107
E. Employment Statistics, 1954-1970	108
F. Squamish Trust Account no.54	111

This thesis deals with accommodation and intolerance, benevolent but misguided paternalism, and the resiliency of people coping with changes to their environment that are largely beyond their control. The setting for these themes is the southern coast of mainland British Columbia, during the period of 1860 to 1940. Specifically, this thesis looks at the changes that occurred in the economy of the Squamish First Nation. During this time period, the Squamish economy changed from one based primarily on subsistence activities to one that relied heavily on paid labour and revenues from the disposal of land. The catalyst for these changes was the development of Burrard Inlet as a centre of industry and settlement by white society. This development presented the Squamish with numerous opportunities for economic growth and diversification, but it also brought discrimination and restrictions.

This thesis is grounded in the political and academic environment of 1996. In this year, the Province of British Columbia, the Dominion of Canada, and the Nisga'a First Nation signed the first draft treaty agreement in British Columbia in almost a century. The agreement has served as a lightning rod for a wide range of opinions on the history of native-white relations. Many people in the public understand that white society assumed control over British Columbia without properly respecting the rights or interests of most aboriginal occupants, but find it difficult to connect what they see as an injustice that occurred over a century ago to a contemporary right to compensation. This attitude is grounded in only a partial understanding of the history of native white relations in British Columbia. It ignores the injustices that aboriginal people have suffered at the hands of white society in the years since contact. There is also a sector in society that focusses on the injustices without acknowledging the fact that many aboriginal people enthusiastically embraced many of the opportunities created by the arrival of white society. This limited understanding is connected to the state of the historiography of native-white relations in British Columbia.

Until the 1970s, historians of British Columbia considered aboriginal history as little more than a brief preface to the real history of white society's occupation of the region. Since the turn of

the century, anthropologists have conducted research into the pre-contact cultures of aboriginal people in the Pacific Northwest, but historians lagged behind in their inquiry into aboriginal history after contact. In the eyes of most historians of British Columbia, aboriginal people faded from view after the arrival of whites. Whether they agree or disagree with his arguments, historians must acknowledge Robin Fisher for leading the historiographical charge into this void. In 1977, Fisher showed that aboriginal and white societies were intimately connected during the first decades of contact. He also described the unfair treatment that aboriginal people suffered at the hands of white society in the colonial and early provincial era.<sup>1</sup> Fisher's research raised the profile of aboriginal history in British Columbia, but it drew criticism for its argument that aboriginal people became marginalized by white society after the mid-nineteenth century. Essentially, some argued, Fisher only pushed forward the era at which aboriginal people became irrelevant.

Several historians considered it possible to push the era of irrelevance forward even further, or even to dismiss the notion altogether. In 1978, Rolf Knight produced an admittedly "informal study" of aboriginal people as labourers in the provincial economy. Knight argued that aboriginal people were an essential component of the labour force of British Columbia's staple industries - fishing, timber, and mining - well into the twentieth century.<sup>2</sup> More recently, Paul Tennant has shown that aboriginal people have been vocal and politically sophisticated in pressing their claims of aboriginal title in British Columbia throughout the twentieth century. By explaining the history of cut-off lands in British Columbia and the suppression of native political activity, Tennant also showed that white society in British Columbia continued to suppress aboriginal claims to land well

---

<sup>1</sup>Robin Fisher, Contact and Conflict: Indian-European Relations in British Columbia, 1774-1890 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1977).

<sup>2</sup>Rolf Knight, Indians at Work: An Informal History of Native Indian Labour in British Columbia, 1858-1930 (Vancouver: New Star Books, 1978).



beyond the nineteenth century.<sup>3</sup> Dianne Newell addressed an equally contentious issue, by describing the discriminatory regulation that aboriginal people have suffered in their efforts to fish for food and profits since the late nineteenth century.<sup>4</sup> Knight, Tennant, and Newell have made valuable contributions to British Columbia historiography by showing that native people have occupied significant positions in white society well beyond the colonial era. Their works naturally led other historians to move beyond an assessment of white society's views of native people to an examination of the impact of these views. Several historians have pursued this line of inquiry by examining a single aboriginal group. Duane Thomson and Peter Carstens have written about the Okanagan,<sup>5</sup> while John Lutz recently has written a comprehensive history of the Songhees community in and around Victoria.<sup>6</sup> This thesis falls within this last category of historical writing - essentially a form of community study - by examining the experiences of the Squamish aboriginal people.

The proximity of the Squamish to Vancouver lent the contact experience of the Squamish an intensity and diversity not found in many other settings. Their history is not typical of all aboriginal communities, but it does illuminate some important themes in native-white relations in British Columbia. Numerous sectors of white society - missionaries, government officials, and capitalists - were profoundly interested in the Squamish well beyond the late-nineteenth century. This interest assumed many forms, from benevolent paternalism to covetous and suspicious regard

---

<sup>3</sup>Paul Tennant, Aboriginal Peoples and Politics: The Indian Land Question in British Columbia, 1849-1989 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1990).

<sup>4</sup>Diane Newell, Tangled Webs of History: Indians and the Law in Canada's Pacific Coast Fisheries (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993).

<sup>5</sup>Peter Carstens, The Queen's People: A Study of Hegemony, Coercion, and Accommodation among the Okanagan of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1991). Duncan Duane Thomson, "A History of the Okanagan: Indians and Whites in the Settlement era, 1860-1920" (Vancouver, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 1985).

<sup>6</sup>John Lutz, "Work, Wages and Welfare in Aboriginal-non-Aboriginal Relations, British Columbia, 1849-1970" (Ottawa: University of Ottawa, Ph.D. Thesis, 1994)..

for what the Squamish had to offer white society. Correspondingly, each of these groups had a profound impact on the way that the Squamish economy developed. Sometimes this effect was the result of direct intervention or regulation of how the Squamish lived their lives; sometimes it was the result of changes to the physical, social, and economic environment in which the Squamish lived. While white society imposed restrictions on how the Squamish could act, the Squamish were not simply passive objects. They were very much active in determining how their economy changed within the context of an environment that was itself influenced by forces beyond their control.

This thesis draws on a variety of sources to illustrate the changes in the Squamish economy. Records from the Department of Indian Affairs form the core of primary sources for this thesis. The Department's Annual Reports contain valuable anecdotal and quantitative information on specific bands in British Columbia from 1872 to the 1920s. Reports and transcripts of evidence from joint provincial/federal Commissions on Indian Affairs in 1876-80 and 1913-16 also contain detailed information about specific bands and often capture the opinions of bands of their own conditions. Department of Indian Affairs files in Record Group 10 of the National Archives of Canada are a narrow but rich source of information on specific issues in the Squamish economic history, primarily those dealing with land. Colonial correspondence from the British Columbia Archives and Records Service, records from the Department of Marine and Fisheries, photographs and records from the Vancouver Public Library's Special Collections division, and records from the archives of the Oblate missionaries in Vancouver served as valuable supplements to records from the Department of Indian Affairs.

Dealing with Department of Indian Affairs records requires a careful eye for bias. Indian Agents had a vested interest in portraying Indians under their charge as "progressive" individuals who were quickly acquiring the values of white society. Indian Agents were accordingly liable to exaggerate Indian interest in agriculture, Christianity, Euro-canadian clothing, and "modern" housing. To help offset this bias, this thesis draws on several thoughtful graduate studies of Squamish history and sociology. Several graduate theses from the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s

addressed specific Squamish land transactions, prominent figures in the Squamish community, Squamish relationships with municipal authorities, Squamish political organization, and Squamish associations with trade unions. These were valuable for both the subject of their research and the way that they addressed the methodological problems posed by relying on Indian Affairs records. Some offset that problem by conducting interviews or other fieldwork among the Squamish, others relied on intuitive interpretation of Department records. This thesis also relies on published interviews, biographies, and autobiographies of Squamish people to improve its sensitivity to Squamish perspectives.<sup>7</sup> Lastly, this thesis draws on the large and growing body of literature on aboriginal cultures of the Pacific Northwest to develop several perspectives on the Squamish economy.

The word "economy" represents a number of different ideas. At any one time, several economies co-existed and overlapped: the Squamish economy, the provincial economy, the white economy, and family economies to name a few. In the broadest sense, "economy" refers to the relationship between resources, labour, and wealth in any given community, whether that community be defined as a family, an aboriginal village, a white settlement or a geographic region. "Wealth," in turn, means both the subsistence needs and surplus of the community. "Economy" also refers to the mode of production connecting resources, labour and wealth. In this sense of the word, the economy of British Columbia underwent several major changes during the period under study. Prior to the arrival of whites, southern British Columbia's economy was characterized by subsistence activities supplemented by trade. Mercantilism gained importance with the arrival of white fur traders, as aboriginals and whites began to rely on trade as a means of acquiring wealth. By the late-nineteenth century, however, industrial capitalism became the dominant mode of production as timber, mining, and fishing (for salmon canneries) flourished.

---

<sup>7</sup>Unfortunately, the author was unable to arrange his own interview with Squamish representatives. Although the period of study is too early to expect accurate recollections of events, additional Squamish perspective would likely have improved this thesis. The author thanks the Squamish for considering his request, and regrets that they were unable to provide someone to discuss this research.

The way that the Squamish reacted to the arrival of white society was heavily influenced by the pre-contact structure of their own society. The Squamish were a distinct group of the larger Coast Salish cultural-linguistic group. Like most Coast Salish societies, the primary social unit for the Squamish was the kin-group. Villages correlated closely to kin-groups; larger villages of several hundred people might contain several distinct but connected kin-groups. Prior to the arrival of Old-World diseases, the Squamish population might have amounted to several thousand.<sup>8</sup> Howe Sound was the demographic centre of Squamish society, but they had several seasonal villages in Burrard Inlet, particularly on the North Shore, in Stanley park, and False Creek. The Squamish visited Burrard Inlet primarily in the spring and early summer to hunt, fish, and trade with other aboriginal communities. Appendix A contains several figures created by geographer R. Cole Harris that illustrate the distribution of aboriginal societies in the lower mainland of British Columbia (an area that includes Burrard Inlet and the mouth of the Fraser river). The figures also illustrate the seasonal movements of these societies within the lower mainland.

Subsistence activities - fishing, hunting, and gathering - formed the base of the Squamish economy upon which rested a broader socio-economic system, sometimes called the "prestige economy."<sup>9</sup> Fish and meat were staple foods and were supplemented by diverse undomesticated plants and berries.<sup>10</sup> Kennedy and Bouchard identified over sixty different types of fish, shellfish, and marine animals including sturgeon, herring, trout, and clams, but salmon was the single most important source of food<sup>11</sup> It is difficult to define salmon's precise importance,<sup>12</sup> but Gordon

---

<sup>8</sup>Charles Hill-Tout, The Salish People, Volume II: The Squamish and the Lillooet (Vancouver: Talonbooks, 1978) 28.

<sup>9</sup>Wayne Suttles, "Variation in Habitat and Culture on the Northwest Coast" in Suttles, ed. Coast Salish Essays (Vancouver: Talonbooks, 1987), 26-44 at 28.

<sup>10</sup>Dorothy I.E. Kennedy and Randy Bouchard, Ethnobotany of the Squamish Indian People of British Columbia (Victoria: British Columbia Indian Languages Project, 1976).

<sup>11</sup>Dorothy I.E. Kennedy and Randy Bouchard, Utilization of Fish, Beach foods and Marine Animals by the Squamish Indian People of British Columbia (Victoria: British Columbia Indian Language Project, 1976).

Hewes estimated that aboriginal people living north of the Fraser river consumed, on average, six hundred pounds of salmon per person per year prior to contact with whites.<sup>13</sup>

Fishing techniques for salmon were remarkably diverse. In discussing pre-contact aboriginal salmon fishing, Dianne Newell stated that:

The small amount of salmon-fishing that took place in tidal waters - in the calm inshore channels and estuaries, bays, and inlets where salmon congregated before heading for the spawning beds - involved tidal traps, harpoons, and reef nets and trolling from canoes with hook and line. Indians used traps and weirs, nets, harpoons, spears, and gaff hooks once the salmon ascended freshwater rivers and streams.<sup>14</sup>

By implication, the variety and complexity of fishing techniques highlights the importance of salmon fishing to the aboriginal economy. It also highlights the adaptability of aboriginal fishers to different conditions and technologies.

Salmon runs of several million in the Strait of Georgia are and were common, but these runs only occurred for several weeks at a time in the summer and early autumn. Catching enough fish was therefore less of a problem than having them spoil. Men from the same or closely associated kin groups worked together to fish with cumbersome reef nets or tend fishing weirs. Women then preserved the salmon through smoking, salting, and dry curing. If after tending to immediate needs and preserving enough for the winter there were surplus fish, the leading men of the kin

---

<sup>12</sup>Archaeologist Dianne Hanson issued a caution to avoid confusing the importance of salmon in the post-contact aboriginal economy with its importance in earlier times. Hanson felt that salmon was the most important, but not necessarily the main source of food for aboriginal people living around Georgia Strait in the early nineteenth century. Diane K. Hanson, "Late Prehistoric Subsistence in the Strait of Georgia Region of the Northwest Coast" (Burnaby: Simon Fraser University, Ph.D. thesis, 1991), 386-7.

<sup>13</sup>Gordon Hewes, "Indian Fisheries Productivity in Pre-contact Times in the Pacific Salmon area" Northwest Anthropological Research Notes 7, no.2 (1973): 133-155 at 136.

<sup>14</sup>Diane Newell, Tangled Webs of History: Indians and the Law in Canada's Pacific Coast Fisheries (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 33.

group could bring the surplus to in-laws in another village in exchange for gifts, which might later themselves be traded for food. If a man acquired more wealth than he gave, he could hold a potlatch and distribute his wealth among his relatives and earn prestige for himself. With this prestige, this man might attract other wealthy relatives and thus further enmesh himself and his kin-group into a socio-economic safety net.<sup>15</sup>

Prior to the establishment of New Westminster in 1859, contact between the Squamish and whites was indirect, marginal, and sporadic, but it did have an impact on the Squamish. First contact with whites likely occurred in 1792 when Captain Vancouver's ship encountered several dozen canoes of aboriginal people in Burrard Inlet.<sup>16</sup> The most significant feature of early contact with whites was the arrival of Old-World diseases like smallpox and influenza. While there are no studies of epidemics specifically among the Squamish, one can assume that they also suffered from mortality rates ranging from ten to seventy percent for each of several major outbreaks (generally of smallpox) that occurred in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries on the Northwest Coast.<sup>17</sup> By the mid-nineteenth century, the Squamish numbered from three to six hundred. Without belittling the disruption of epidemics, it is possible to say that the effects on the Squamish of contact with white society were otherwise nominal prior to 1860. A few Squamish hunters

---

<sup>15</sup>Wayne Suttles "Coping with Abundance: Subsistence on the Northwest Coast" in Suttles, Coast Salish Essays, 45-63.

<sup>16</sup>Captain Vancouver reports meeting aboriginal people in Howe Sound in his journal of the voyage: Captain George Vancouver, Voyage of Discovery (1789) v.1, 305. Charles Hill-Tout considered the aboriginal people mentioned by Vancouver to be Squamish: Hill-Tout, The Salish People, 28-29.

<sup>17</sup>See generally Robert Boyd, "Smallpox in the Pacific Northwest: The First Epidemics," in BC Studies 101 (Spring 1994) 5-40; Robert Boyd, "Demographic History, 1774-1874," in Wayne Suttles, ed., Handbook of North American Indians, volume 7: Northwest Coast (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1990) 135-48; and J.R. Gibson, "Smallpox on the Northwest Coast, 1835-38," in BC Studies 56 (Winter 1982) 61-81.

traded furs at Fort Langley at the start of the nineteenth century,<sup>18</sup> and Chief Joe Capilano did chores and worked as a canoeman for "the government" in Fort Langley,<sup>19</sup> but this was not a sustained or large-scale endeavour for the Squamish. Through this contact, however, the Squamish learned of European goods and technology. The Squamish even incorporated a European staple food, the potato, into their own diet by the 1820s,<sup>20</sup> as did many other Coast Salish societies.<sup>21</sup>

As white settlement and industry grew sharply around New Westminster after 1859, contact between the Squamish and whites became direct, intense, and sustained. The Squamish economy and society accordingly underwent major changes. The most noticeable change was a shift of the demographic centre of the Squamish from Howe Sound to Burrard Inlet. By the late-nineteenth century, hundreds of Squamish began using Burrard Inlet as a base from which they could trade with and work for much of the year.<sup>22</sup> In 1876 Indian Reserve Commissioner Gilbert Sproat claimed that, although at least half of the several hundred Squamish lived in Burrard Inlet at that time, the "real home of the Skwawmish Indians is upon the Skwawmish river which flows into Howe Sound."<sup>23</sup> Similarly, Justice of the Peace Chartres Brew asserted in 1862 that Squamish

---

<sup>18</sup>B.A. McKelvie, ed. by Charles Lillard, Fort Langley: Birthplace of British Columbia (Victoria: Porcupine Books, 1991), 38.

<sup>19</sup>Baker and Kirkness, Khot-La-Cha, 7. The names "Joe Capilano" and "Mathias Joe" recur in various forms frequently among the Squamish living on the North Shore.

<sup>20</sup>Indian Reserve Commissioner Gilbert Sproat claimed that in the 1820s an Indian Chief named Kah-pil-lah-no, a man of Squamish and possibly Musqueam lineage, brought a Hudson's Bay Company agent from Fort Langley to Burrard Inlet to "point out to him the best ground for potato patches." Sproat, "In Camp, Skwawmish River," report to Minister of the Interior, 27 November 1876, pages 11-12. RG10 v. 11028, file SRR-1.

<sup>21</sup>Wayne Suttles, "The Early Diffusion of the Potato among the Coast Salish," in Suttles, Coast Salish Essays, 137-151.

<sup>22</sup>See DIA census returns for the Squamish, reproduced in Appendix B.

<sup>23</sup>Commissioner Sproat, "In Camp," 14.

settlement of Burrard Inlet only began in 1859.<sup>24</sup> Both Brew and Sproat focussed on the recent use of Burrard Inlet as a year-round residence and ignored the long-standing use of the area as a summer destination.

Development of the lower mainland, including Burrard Inlet, by white society increased dramatically after 1859, as the gold rush of 1858 supported the growth of New Westminster as a starting point for ambitious miners. When primary industries like sawmilling and salmon canning began in the lower mainland in the 1860s, the region began in earnest its transformation from a minor area of settlement and trade into the economic hub and largest settlement of British Columbia. After 1860, the Squamish experienced a dizzying increase in the pace of change to their society. How and why the Squamish economy changed are the subjects of the following chapters.

Chapter one describes initial adaption of the Squamish to the development of Burrard Inlet as a centre of settlement and industry over twenty five years. Many Squamish families began using Burrard Inlet for more than just a few months a year; now it became a base from which men and women could pursue paid labour and trade with whites. The Squamish experienced a surge in wealth, but white government officials and capitalists ensured that the Squamish had only limited access to the growing white economy. The denial of aboriginal claims to land and resources laid the foundation for the Squamish to be funneled into the role of low or semi-skilled labourers. Chapter two, covering the period from 1885 to 1913, describes the instability that arose in the Squamish economy as immigrants flooded the labour market while several sectors of white society tried to influence the way the Squamish participated in white society. Chapter three deals with a ten year period, 1913 to 1923, that marked a watershed in Squamish economic and political history. During that time the Squamish acquired hundreds of thousands of dollars through the sale of large amounts of their lands and resources. These sales were the result of internal and external

---

<sup>24</sup>Letter from Mr. Brew to Mr. Bushby, 29 July 1869, Papers Connected with the Indian Land Question (Victoria: Government Printer, 1875), 75.



pressures which ultimately prompted the Squamish to amalgamate into a single political/administrative unit in 1923. Chapter four addresses the following two decades and describes how the Squamish began leasing and disposing of their reserve land and resources in a systematic way that brought them security but not stability. Over the course of eighty years, 1860-1940, the Squamish economy expanded beyond subsistence and minor trade to incorporate paid labour and revenues from the disposal of land and resources.

## Chapter One - The New Order, 1860 to 1885

Within twenty-five years of direct, intense, and sustained contact with white society, the Squamish economy underwent major structural changes. The Squamish moved beyond subsistence activities and trade to incorporate paid labour into their economy. Despite their desire to pursue new opportunities for wealth, the Squamish found they had only limited access to the growing white economy of Burrard Inlet. Capitalists and government officials allowed the Squamish to sell their labour, but denied Squamish claims to ownership of the natural resources that were essential to the budding industrial capitalist economy of British Columbia. Despite this limited access, the Squamish adapted their economy and society to the changing environment. Most families abandoned their traditional homes and pursuits in Howe Sound for at least part of the year to live in Burrard Inlet and seek work or trade with whites. Even in the face of discrimination by white government officials, the Squamish strove to exploit the opportunities created by increasing white settlement and industry in the lower mainland of British Columbia.

For the Squamish, Burrard Inlet grew in the 1850s from a summer destination for fishing, trading, and socialization, to a base from which Squamish men and women could trade with and occasionally work for different elements in white society. However, the Squamish were not the only aboriginal people to develop an interest in trading with whites; members of other aboriginal societies began to visit the area with increasing frequency. When the gold rush started in 1858, New Westminster's commercial economy grew exponentially, as did aboriginal interest in the opportunities for wealth. The Squamish were but one of several aboriginal groups looking to exploit new opportunities. Long before whites settled in the lower mainland, nuisance raids were common between different aboriginal societies to protect trade routes,<sup>1</sup> but the increased interest in the lower mainland of British Columbia around 1860 stimulated inter-tribal conflict to new

---

<sup>1</sup>The Yuclataws, a Kwakiutl tribe from Cape Mudge, were notorious raiders in the Fraser. Squamish Chief Baker referred to frequent hostilities with the "Yacultas" of southern British Columbia. Simon Baker, Verna Kirkness, ed., Khot-La-Cha, the Autobiography of Chief Simon Baker, (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 1994) 1.

heights. In 1860, Colonel Moody of the Royal Engineers feared that this increased inter-tribal conflict threatened the security of white settlers in the region. Moody blamed the Squamish for instigating much of the conflict and threatened "to wipe out the entire Squamish Tribe with gunfire" unless the raids stopped.<sup>2</sup> A Squamish Chief, Snatt, took Moody's threats to heart and solicited the aid of Father Fouquet, an Oblate Missionary. Fouquet promised to try to intervene on behalf of the Squamish, but only if Snatt found a plot of land for a mission and convinced the Squamish to "leave their evil ways and become civilized and Christian."<sup>3</sup>

Snatt assented to Fouquet's wishes and applied for a plot of land in what is now North Vancouver. Colonel Moody, also the Chief Commissioner of Lands & Works, submitted this application in May of 1862, and remarked that Snatt applied to purchase the land "just as a white man would. The lot selected ... is at some distance from the town, so that it cannot prove an annoyance, and the man proposes actually to reside thereon."<sup>4</sup> Snatt's actions and Fouquet's appeals ultimately convinced Moody to not carry out his earlier threats. The site chosen by Snatt was a Squamish settlement known as Ustlawn; it became the primary residence of the Squamish in Burrard Inlet.<sup>5</sup>

The conflict with Colonel Moody and intervention of Father Fouquet foreshadowed part of the relationship that the Squamish would develop with white society. Government officials had little tolerance for aboriginal people, while religious officials were willing to facilitate the adaption of aboriginal people to "civilization," but only under strict regulation by Christian leaders. The incident with Colonel Moody also illustrates the change in authority in Burrard Inlet that occurred

---

<sup>2</sup>Andrew Paull, untitled article, Oblate Missions (Dec.1950-Mar.1951), 7-10. Oblate Archives, Vancouver, Box 47 - "St. Paul's Church," file 4 - "history."

<sup>3</sup>Paull, Oblate Missions, 8.

<sup>4</sup>R.C. Moody to Colonial Secretary, 27 May 1862, Papers Connected with the Indian Land Question, 23.

<sup>5</sup>T.A. Lascelles, the deceased archivist for the Oblates, was slightly sceptical of this story's strict accuracy, but accepts the basic premise. Thomas A. Lascelles, Mission on the Inlet (Vancouver: T.A. Lascelles, O.M.I., 1984), 8.

by the 1860s. Prior to this time, the Squamish defined their rights to the region through negotiation or conflict with other aboriginal groups. After this time, the Squamish were forced to seek recognition of their rights to the region from white government officials. The presence of Colonel Moody and the Royal Engineers lent legitimacy to the government's authority by their administrative and engineering activities and their potential use of force to govern. Missionaries also cultivated an acceptance of white authority by presenting themselves as useful intermediaries between the Squamish and white society. Oblate Missionaries helped the Squamish to assert their rights and protect their interests throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but they did so from within the white power structure.

The colonial government defined aboriginal rights to land and resources in mainland British Columbia through the creation of Indian reserves. For the Squamish, this process began in the 1860s. The reserves that the colonial government granted, and the way that it granted them, reflected the limited role that white society wanted the Squamish to have in the white economy. Government officials were reluctant to define reserves that conflicted with real or potential claims by white settlers or capitalists, and often framed the issue as how much land the Squamish "needed," not how much they "deserved." The notion of "need" was itself limited, as officials did not consider the possibility that aboriginal people might want to use their land for more than just settlements and agriculture. The colonial (later the provincial) government failed to grant the Squamish sufficient rights to land and resources that would allow the Squamish to act as capitalists themselves; instead, if the Squamish wanted to participate in the white economy, they could only do so as labourers. Equally significant was the government's failure to protect the ability of aboriginal people to preserve their traditional subsistence activities. The government condoned and often sponsored the development of land, forests, and fishing areas by industrial capitalists, whose use of the resources eventually conflicted with that of aboriginal subsistence uses. In one sense, therefore, one can trace the crises facing the Squamish economy in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries to the reserve creation process of the mid-nineteenth century. In this period, white society established the limits to which aboriginal people could participate in the white economy. This period marked the beginning of the new order in Burrard Inlet.

When the Squamish did try to secure white recognition of their interests in land and resources in Burrard Inlet, government officials were slow to respond. Writing in 1892, Father Durieu alleged that, at the request of the Squamish, Governor Douglas had authorized a reserve in 1862 or 1863, but that officials had not acted on this.<sup>6</sup> In the meantime, however, government officials eagerly accommodated white business interests in the area. In looking for a site for his sawmill in Burrard Inlet in 1865, Captain Edward Stamp initially favoured a spot near present day Brockton point in Stanley Park, which was also the site of a small Squamish village known as Whoi-Whoi.<sup>7</sup> Stamp's demands included one hundred acres of land at one dollar per acre and access to 15,000 acres of timber land on a twenty one year lease at one cent per year. Colonial officials were keen to accept these demands,<sup>8</sup> despite the encroachment of Stamp's lands on the Squamish settlement. Justice of the Peace Chartres Brew explained to Colonial Secretary Arthur Birch that "Captain Stamp has no objection to their (the Squamish) remaining where they are. They can at any time be removed. The Ground does not belong to their Tribe."<sup>9</sup> Brew's assessment of the situation clearly rested on the assumption that the Squamish had no rights to the timber or even the land despite their longtime occupation of the region. Instead, as was common among government officials, Brew assumed that the Squamish had only what rights the white government had deigned to grant them and no more. This attitude served to deny aboriginal people a role as owners of natural resources in the growing white economy of the colony.

Captain Stamp ultimately chose a different site for his mill, further east from the rip tides in First Narrows, but the areas for which he demanded a timber lease covered part of another, larger Squamish settlement in False Creek. In the spring of 1866, several dozen Squamish men, women

---

<sup>6</sup>Durieu to A.W. Vowell, 24 March 1892, cited in Lascelles, Mission on the Inlet, 13-14. No record exists of Douglas' alleged authorization, or a request for a reserve in 1862/63, but this did not dampen Durieu's insistence that these did occur.

<sup>7</sup>Matthews, Conversations with Khahtsalahno, 31.

<sup>8</sup>Morton, The Enterprising Mr. Moody, 44-45.

<sup>9</sup>Cited in Morton, The Enterprising Mr. Moody, 46.

and children living at False Creek approached Mr. Ball, a local official, asking for a reserve for themselves.<sup>10</sup> The government was slow in defining an Indian reserve for the Squamish in this area and discovered the overlap with Stamp's timber lease in 1868 after Stamp's mill had begun operations. J.W. Trutch, Chief Commissioner of Lands and Works, explained to the Colonial Secretary that there was in fact no conflict. The proposed reserve was indeed

included within the limits of Captain Stamp's timber cutting license, but I cannot see that its occupation by the Indians would interfere with his use of the timber for logging purposes, or be in any way an infringement of the agreement of the Government with him.<sup>11</sup>

By asserting that the Indians would not interfere with Stamp's timber cutting license, Trutch agreed with Brew that aboriginal people were mere occupants of the region. They believed that any rights the Squamish claimed that did not flow directly from express Crown grants were no rights at all. This denial of ownership of land and natural resources restricted the role that aboriginal people could play in the budding white economy.

In the spring of 1868, Trutch recommended to the Colonial Secretary that the government should survey reserves for the Squamish around False Creek and on the North Shore. There was no action on this request, but after complaints by the Squamish in the summer of 1869,<sup>12</sup> Trutch instructed a local official, Mr. Bushby, to determine the extent of overlap between white pre-emptions and the claims of the Squamish.<sup>13</sup> Bushby moved slowly, however, and so with the aid

---

<sup>10</sup>Extract of note from Ball to Chief Commissioner of Lands and Works, 15 February 1866, Papers Connected with the Indian Land Question, 76.

<sup>11</sup>J.W. Trutch to Colonial Secretary, 18 February 1868, attached to letter from Trutch to Mr. Bushby, 05 August 1869, Papers Connected with the Indian Land Question, (Victoria: Government Printer, 1875) 75-76.

<sup>12</sup>Bushby to Chief Commissioner of Lands and Works, 30 July 1869, Papers Connected with the Indian Land Question, 74.

<sup>13</sup>Trutch to Bushby, 5 August 1869; Trutch's letter to the Colonial Secretary of 18 Feb 1868 is attached to his letter to Bushby. Papers Connected with the Indian Land Question, 75-76.

of Father Durieu the Squamish issued a memorial in 1869. The memorial complained of persistent encroachment by white settlers, including "Gassy Jack" Deighton, the founder of Gastown. Speaking specifically about their settlement on the North Shore, the memorialists stated that:

we are 50 married men and 16 young men, who have built our church in the midst of our village, and we respectfully demand that there be left for us 200 acres of land having 40 chains of frontage along the sea. Surely 200 acres for 50 families and 16 young men who may hereafter have families, is a very small portion indeed, when compared to 160 acres which the Government allows to each single white family.<sup>14</sup>

The Squamish appeals were partly successful, for that fall the government defined three reserves of moderate size on Burrard Inlet: 35 acres on the North Shore (Ulstwan), 37 acres on the South shore of False Creek, and 111 acres on the North Shore about 1 mile west of the North Arm (present day Burrard IR3).<sup>15</sup> At some point, possibly before 1869, the colonial government also defined an Indian reserve of 165 acres at the junction of First Narrows and "Rapiland Creek" (present day Capilano Creek IR5).<sup>16</sup> The government did not grant reserves for Squamish settlements in what is now Stanley Park, because the government believed the area had a military value.<sup>17</sup>

In 1871 British Columbia joined the Dominion of Canada as a province. One consequence of union was a transfer of authority over Indians and Indian lands to the federal government. The transfer did not go smoothly, as the two governments disputed the proper size of Indian reserves

---

<sup>14</sup>Enclosure to the letter of Bushby to Chief Commissioner of Lands and Works, 18 August 1869, Papers Connected with the Indian Land Question, 76-77.

<sup>15</sup>Appendix from the Provincial Gazette, 25.Nov.1869, signed by Joseph Trutch, Papers Connected with the Indian Land Question, 164.

<sup>16</sup>Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 1872 & 1873, 20.

<sup>17</sup>Memorandum from W.E. Ditchburn, Chief Inspector of Indian Agencies, B.C., to Duncan Campbell Scott, Deputy Superintendent General, Department of Indian Affairs, 28 July 1919. RG10 v.4089, file 521,804.

in the province. The governments tried to resolve their differences by appointing a Joint Commission. Deciding to deal with the sites of most intense interest to whites and Indians alike, Gilbert Sproat led the joint commission to visit the Squamish people first. The Commission granted reserves in both Burrard Inlet and Howe Sound, but according to different principles.

In Burrard Inlet, the Commission only granted enough land for residential purposes. Sproat was surprised and pleased that Squamish representatives in Burrard Inlet asked for little more than that. The submissive Christian tones of Squamish appeals reveals the strong influence of missionaries. "God was good and wished well both to the Indians and white men," spoke Chief Joseph of the Mission reserve, continuing

The Queen was all the same as God in the world, and the Queen had sent the three Commissioners to settle the land question, and so they were all the same as God. ... If the Indians only got half of what God gave them they would be happy.<sup>18</sup>

The Commission accepted Joseph's plea literally and only granted the Squamish a portion of the land requested in Burrard Inlet. Commissioner Sproat explained to the federal government that he was influenced by the interests of white settlers and the failure of the Squamish to cultivate any of the land that colonial officials had already reserved for them.<sup>19</sup>

The appeals of the Squamish in Howe Sound were different from those in Burrard Inlet, as were the Commission's recommendations. Squamish elders and representatives living in Howe Sound pushed for a reserve to cover the whole of the Squamish valley, an area of over 8000 acres, to allow them to pursue traditional means of existence. Sproat felt that the potential development of the region by white settlers and industry prevented him from recommending too much land near the mouth of the Squamish river.<sup>20</sup> Nonetheless, he still granted several thousand acres of reserves in the area, including a large reserve in the Squamish valley. In 1881, E. Mohun completed his

---

<sup>18</sup>Sproat, "In Camp," 25-26.

<sup>19</sup>Sproat, "In Camp," 15, 21.

<sup>20</sup>Sproat, "In Camp," 27, 30-31.



survey of the two dozen Squamish reserves recommended by Sproat as a reserve Commissioner.<sup>21</sup> For the balance of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Squamish reserves remained unchanged.

In the course of two decades, white government officials had defined the limits of Squamish legal rights to land and resources in British Columbia. The extent of those rights significantly influenced the way in which the Squamish could participate in the provincial economy. There were significant natural resources in Howe Sound, but they were too remote and inaccessible to allow for industrial development. So long as surrounding lands remained vacant, however, the Howe Sound reserves could support traditional subsistence activities like hunting, fishing, and gathering. The reserves in Burrard Inlet, meanwhile, were well-situated for development, but were too small to allow for anything other than residential and minor agricultural use. As a result, they became a popular base from which Squamish men and women sought paid labour. Being labourers was not, in itself, a bad thing, for it provided many Squamish people with a new source of wealth. The problem was that the Squamish worked primarily as low or semi-skilled labourers, which was most vulnerable to competition in the labour market. For much of the mid-nineteenth century, particularly in the commercial fishing industry, there was little of such competition, but when immigration swelled in the late nineteenth century, the Squamish suffered for their vulnerability. Had the government granted the Squamish ownership of all lands and resources in all of their traditional territories, the Squamish could have participated in the white economy as vendors of resources, as opposed to simply selling their labour to work with those resources.

The Squamish entered the white economy to supplement their traditional subsistence economy. They adopted European forms of clothing, shelter, and even food to supplement and occasionally replace traditional items. This produced an ironic circle of dependence on the white economy, for as the Squamish came to rely on European goods instead of traditional goods, they needed to

---

<sup>21</sup>Mohun surveyed two dozen reserves for the Squamish. Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 31 December 1881, 157.

devote more time to earning money to purchase these goods, which necessarily inhibited their ability to acquire or produce traditional goods. This partly explains the sense of nostalgia evident in one Squamish man's recollection of the changes in Squamish diet by the late-nineteenth century. "Whiteman's food change everything," August Khahtsalahno remarked, though the transition was not immediate, and occasionally humorous. He remembered a story about several Squamish people who acquired some molasses from European traders in the early nineteenth century, but unfortunately confused it for a balm to be rubbed on the skin. Despite initial misgivings, European staples like tea, sugar, and biscuits became staples of the Squamish diet.<sup>22</sup> Indian Commissioner Lenihan reported in 1875 that many Indians of the Fraser River agency (which included the Squamish) supplemented their diet of smoked and dried salmon with "considerable flour, meat, groceries &c., for which they pay in cash."<sup>23</sup> By the 1880s, the Squamish acquired their "cash" primarily through paid labour in the commercial fishing and timber industries.

Salmon was already important to the traditional Squamish economy, but its importance changed as salmon canning plants sprang up along the mouth of the Fraser in 1871. Recent advances in canning technology had made the export of canned salmon to Europe financially possible. For the first decade, the relationship between white capitalists and aboriginal fishers was symbiotic. The canneries needed a large supply of skilled and semi-skilled labour, but only for a few months of the year. Hundreds of aboriginal people easily adapted from fishing with a reef-net - a common traditional fishing technology - to fishing with a gill-net - a fishing technology advocated by the canneries. Further, aboriginal people's reliance on a number of activities during the year meant that the canneries did not have to provide for them during the off-season; fishing for money became but one of the activities they pursued. This compatibility, compounded by the absence of any other source of labour, meant that aboriginal people were the primary source of labour for

---

<sup>22</sup>Matthews, Conversations with Khahtsalahno, 18-19.

<sup>23</sup>Department of the Interior, Annual Report, 30 June 1875, 56.

the canneries for the 1870s and part of the 1880s.<sup>24</sup>

Aboriginal people fished commercially for salmon either for wages or by selling fish on a piece rate system. Fishing for wages became less common among fishers after the mid-1890s, when government regulators increased access to independent fishing licences. This "independence," however, was offset by the fact that many fishers began renting their boats and equipment from canneries in exchange for a third of the price paid per fish.<sup>25</sup> Fishing was a family activity for aboriginal people; husbands and wives often fished together and shared the money that the canneries paid to the husband. Many Squamish families found piece rate sales a lucrative source of money - a competent fisher could average five to six dollars per day for the several weeks that the salmon were running.<sup>26</sup> In 1882, Indian Agent McTiernan reported that one Squamish man

... last fishing season, after the sockeye run of salmon was over, contracted with Mr. English to catch at the second run and sell to him salmon at seven cents each. His wife pulled the boat; he cast the net. He made, in fourteen days, \$280. ... The women are, with very few exceptions, always ready and willing to help their husbands.<sup>27</sup>

McTiernan's report highlights the short, intense and lucrative fishing opportunities seized by the Squamish. It also reveals the important, but overlooked, role played by Squamish women. Although the husband and wife in this report worked together, the agent considered the husband to be the worker and the wife to be simply the helper.

Aboriginal women also faced gender discrimination in other aspects of the canning industry. Many Squamish women worked for wages in the canneries, processing the caught fish. Asian men made tin cans and butchered the fish. Aboriginal women washed, cut up, and put the fish

---

<sup>24</sup>H. Keith Ralston, The 1900 Strike of Fraser River Sockeye Salmon Fishermen (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, M.A. Thesis, 1965), 41-42.

<sup>25</sup>Ralston, The 1900 Strike, 44.

<sup>26</sup>Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 31 December 1882, 155.

<sup>27</sup>Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 31 December 1882, 60.

in cans, and Asian men finished the canning process.<sup>28</sup> Ten hour days in an oppressive factory atmosphere only earned aboriginal women \$1.00 per day in 1882, while aboriginal men earned \$1.75 per day for fishing and boat handling.<sup>29</sup> Alicia Muszynski explained this discrepancy by arguing that canneries practised a European gender ideology that placed more value on men's work than on women's work. Further, she argued, canneries relied on the fact that aboriginal women needed to perform some kind of work to earn money while their husbands were engaged in fishing for money instead of pursuing subsistence fishing with them.<sup>30</sup>

In contrast with fishing related work, only men pursued the second major means by which Squamish earned money - timber related work. British Columbia's mainland timber industry began with the establishment of a sawmill at Yale in 1858, which was soon followed by another mill owned by H.A.R. Homer in New Westminster in 1860.<sup>31</sup> European markets and the gold rush of 1858 provided a demand for timber, but competition from American mills and a shortage of capital prevented rapid growth of sawmills in the colony. It was not until 1863 that a second mill, the British Columbia Mill Company, arose on the mainland. 1863 was also the first year of sawmilling in Burrard Inlet. Burrard Inlet provided an excellent base for the growing timber industry of mainland British Columbia. Vast stands of quality fir and cedar were easily accessible along the craggy coastline and Burrard Inlet had a good natural harbour, providing a secure area to boom logs and to establish a sawmill and loading dock. After a fitful start by a couple of mills

---

<sup>28</sup>Geoff Meggs, Salmon: the Decline of the British Columbia Fishery, (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 1991), 24.

<sup>29</sup>1300 Indian men and 400 Indian women worked for the canneries at these rates in 1882. Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 31 December 1882, 61.

<sup>30</sup>Alicja Muszynski, "Race and Gender: structural determinants in the formation of British Columbia's salmon cannery labour forces" in Gregory Kealey, ed., Class, Gender & Region: Essays in Canadian Historical Sociology, (St. John's: Committee on Canadian Labour History, 1988) 114 & 116.

<sup>31</sup>Ed Gould, Logging: British Columbia's Logging History, (Saanichton: Hancock House, 1975) 27.

in 1863-64,<sup>32</sup> two mills dominated the lower mainland sawmill industry: Sewell Moody's mill, which began operations in 1865<sup>33</sup> and that of Captain Edward Stamp, whose larger mill - known as the Hastings mill by the 1880s - opened in 1867.<sup>34</sup> Moody's mill and the Hastings mill produced and shipped hundreds of thousands of board feet lumber, including spars and shingles.

Both mills drew their lumber from Burrard Inlet and further north along the coast of Howe Sound.

Until the twentieth century, logging occurred in one of two ways. One or two men could pursue hand logging by cutting logs with axes and wedges - later using cross-cut saws - that they could "fell" into coastal waters. If a hand logger could not fell the log directly into the water, he used a hand jack to provide enough leverage to move the logs down the slope. The second and larger method involved logging crews with oxen and sometimes draft horses to drag timber cut from larger, more isolated stands to the water. The use of skid rows also helped to move cut logs over steep terrain to the water. Once in the water, a crew could move the logs to booming grounds for later use by the mills.

Squamish men worked in all facets of the industry - logging, sawmilling, and longshoring (loading timber onto ships) - but as labourers, not as owners of natural resources. Government officials and capitalists did not acknowledge aboriginal claims to natural resources, thus limiting the ways in which the Squamish could participate in the growing timber industry of the young province. In addition to granting timber licences over traditional Squamish settlements, government officials generally failed to include any significant, accessible stands of timber in the Indian reserves that they did define. Referring to the Squamish, Sechelt and Musqueam tribes, superintendent Powell

---

<sup>32</sup>Gould, Logging, 31.

<sup>33</sup>James Morton, The Enterprising Mr. Moody, the Bumptious Captain Stamp, (North Vancouver: J.J. Douglas, 1977) 37.

<sup>34</sup>Robert A.J. MacDonald, "Lumber Society on the Industrial Frontier: Burrard Inlet, 1863-1886," in Labour 33 (Spring 1994), 69-96 at 73. Morton, The Enterprising Mr. Moody, 58.

remarked wistfully in 1882 that it was

a pity that a greater extent of timber reserves has not been set aside for them by the [Indian land] commission. Their allowances are small as compared with their population or ability to utilize them.<sup>35</sup>

While these aboriginal peoples did "derive no inconsiderable amounts in cutting and supplying logs,"<sup>36</sup> logging was limited by the inaccessibility of the timber and a lack of capital. The failure to include large, accessible, stands of timber in Indian reserves in the region was consistent with a denial that aboriginal people owned any significant amount of land or resources in the region. As a result, if the Squamish wished to participate in the timber industry, they had to do so as labourers.

The timber industry of British Columbia was limited by more than just a meagre supply of capital; labour was also in short supply. Only a few thousand whites lived on the mainland prior to 1871, and in the 1860s many of the able bodied men among them were still pursuing dreams of gold in the Cariboo. In this context, the capitalists of the budding timber industry looked upon aboriginal people as a convenient, if unfamiliar, source of unskilled labour. Indian Commissioner Lenihan reported in 1875 that many of the Indians of the lower mainland worked "in the sawmills, the logging camp, the field, the store in fact in every department where labour is required, and are fairly remunerated."<sup>37</sup> Squamish men were prominent fixtures among the hundreds of aboriginal workers in the timber industry, particularly in the sawmills and docks in Burrard Inlet.

Squamish men often treated timber related work as a casual and sporadic means of earning money, working for intense but short periods of time and then leaving to pursue other activities. The industry, particularly logging, in fact encouraged this rhythm. Loggers typically worked for several weeks at a time, then returned to urban centres to await the next call for a crew. In

---

<sup>35</sup>Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 31 December 1882, 161.

<sup>36</sup>Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 31 December 1882, 160.

<sup>37</sup>Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 30 June 1875, 56.

sawmill work, a shortage of labour in the province until the twentieth century allowed Squamish men to enter and leave the industry, although accounts from local Indian Agents suggest that many Squamish men worked in the sawmills for prolonged periods of time. Indian Agent McTiernan reported in 1882 that the Squamish of Mission Indian reserve in North Vancouver were occupied with "fishing, and working at the lumber mills. They are very anxious to make money." That same year, Superintendent Powell noted the presence of "many expert mill hands" among the Indians of the southern mainland coast.<sup>38</sup> By 1884, Agent McTiernan was able to report that the Squamish men of the Mission Indian reserve "are almost constantly employed at the saw-mills, where they receive good wages."<sup>39</sup> In 1886, McTiernan reported that the Squamish of Capilano Creek Indian reserve "make their living by fishing and working at the sawmills at Burrard Inlet," while most of the men from Mission Indian reserve were employed full-time at the sawmills for "as high wages as the most skilled white man." Similarly, McTiernan reported in 1884 that most of the Squamish men of the False Creek reserve worked in the False Creek sawmill.<sup>40</sup>

The Squamish economy changed significantly within a few decades of direct, intense and sustained contact with whites. The Squamish moved away from an economy grounded in subsistence activities to one that incorporated paid labour, primarily in the fishing and timber industries, but the change was neither universal nor homogeneous. Some of the younger men largely abandoned hunting and subsistence fishing in favour of working in the mills and canneries. Other families remained in Howe Sound for most of the year, only coming to Burrard Inlet for a few weeks of the year to fish for the canneries. Similarly, Squamish men and women pursued other types of work than sawmilling and fishing, such as farm-labour, working on steamships or as general labourers in the secondary industries of Burrard Inlet. Jericho Charlie, for instance, moved

---

<sup>38</sup>Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 31 December 1882, 60 and 160 respectively.

<sup>39</sup>Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 31 December 1884, 104.

<sup>40</sup>Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 31 December 1884, 80-81.

supplies from Hastings Sawmill's store to Roger's logging camp near English Bay for wages.<sup>41</sup> The Squamish retained their cultural pattern of pursuing a variety of economic pursuits at a variety of places and times, but they adapted the rhythm of their lives to opportunities presented by the growth of white industry and settlement.

An 1878 report on aboriginal earnings along the Fraser river illustrates the extent to which aboriginal people of the lower mainland had adapted to paid labour. The local Indian Agent reported the following earnings for the year:

Earned as fishermen and at other work in connection with the various salmon canning establishments on the Fraser River during the fishing season (a period of about three months) - the sum of ...	\$65,862
In the saw mills and lumber shanties, loading ships and as deck hands on steamers ...	38,000
Amount of furs sold to traders ...	25,000
As farm labourers ...	15,000
Cordwood, cut and sold ...	5,000
Cattle and produce ...	3,000
Fish oil ...	1,500
Cranberries ...	800
	\$154,162 <sup>42</sup>

Commissioner Sproat similarly estimated in 1876 that annual wages for the Squamish, Sechelt and Musqueam bands from timber and fishing ranged from \$50,000 to \$100,000.<sup>43</sup>

The increased wealth of the Squamish manifested itself unevenly but visibly. The Squamish added Euro-canadian staples to traditional foods like salmon, deer and berries. The quality of housing improved as dozens of Squamish families in Burrard Inlet built and lived in painted frame houses of the most modern style. The Squamish even built one of the first churches in Burrard Inlet, St. Paul's (Sacred Heart), using their own labour and money. Indian Agent McTiernan was

---

<sup>41</sup>Matthews, Conversations with Khahtsahlano, 31-32, 45, 82.

<sup>42</sup>Lenihan compiled these statistics by surveying the "principal employers of Indian labour, merchants, and leading men." Department of the Interior, Annual Report, 30 June 1878, 72.

<sup>43</sup>Sproat, "In Camp," p. 16.



particularly impressed by the "modern" and "civilized" condition of the Squamish of Mission Indian reserve no.1. In 1882, he remarked that they "are the best and cleanest I have in my Agency; they are very industrious, they have very good houses and are kept clean and tidy, and most of them are well furnished. Outside their houses are also kept very clean."<sup>44</sup> McTiernan was prone to occupational exaggeration, however, for he failed to mention the tenacity of traditional housing on the Mission reserve. Photographs of the Squamish villages on the North Shore in the 1880s reveal a curious community; beside dozens of temporary tents lie several houses as "modern" and "attractive" as any proud British person could point to among white villages in the region.<sup>45</sup> The Squamish communities were changing with new sources of wealth and new opportunities to dispose of this wealth, but there was not a wholesale abandonment of traditional goods.

The Squamish acquired their wealth under the constraining attention of government officials and missionaries. The primary industries of timber and commercial fishing relied on the existence of cheap labour, abundant natural resources, and subsidized land grants on which to develop factories, mills and residences. White government officials imposed a scheme of laws and ownership on the region that limited Squamish ownership of land and resources. As a result, if the Squamish wished to participate in the white economy, they had to do so as labourers. This reliance on labour was initially compatible with traditional economic rhythms, but set the stage for instability in the Squamish economy as the labour market became flooded with immigrants in the last decades of the nineteenth century.

---

<sup>44</sup>Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 31 December 1882, 60.

<sup>45</sup>See the photographs reproduced in Appendix A.

## Chapter Two: An Impending Crisis, 1886-1913

While the provincial economy grew in leaps and bounds from 1886 to 1913, the Squamish economy did not. The Squamish found themselves faced with two major and related problems: a decreasing share of the labour market and increasing restrictions on their subsistence economy. These problems were caused by rapidly increasing immigration and, ironically, the growth of the commercial fishing industry. Unfortunately, government regulations continued to inhibit the ability of the Squamish to move beyond their role as labourers in the provincial economy, while concerned missionaries and the Department of Indian Affairs offered well-meaning but useless palliatives. These pressures were evident in the 1890s, but it took several years for them to manifest themselves into visible problems for the Squamish.

The most obvious problem for the Squamish economy was rising competition in the labour market. Paid labour was the major source of growth in the Squamish economy in the 1870s and 1880s, but a constant stream of immigrants increased competition for jobs. Immigrants to the province came from a variety of ethnic groups, with a notably large number coming from Asia. Competition from Asians proved to be a major problem for aboriginal people in British Columbia, as employers found Asians to be a dependable (and exploitable) source of cheap labour. Asians were themselves subject to intense pressures, as provincial politicians balanced the calls of capitalists for cheap labour against the calls of white labour to preserve jobs in the province for "our own race."<sup>1</sup> Aboriginal workers were not directly involved in this debate, but they suffered along with white workers from the increased competition from Asians for low-skilled jobs in the province.

The completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway ("C.P.R.") in 1886 increased the flooding of the labour market. As the C.P.R. neared completion, the several thousand workers involved in its

---

<sup>1</sup>Patricia Roy, A White Man's Province: British Columbia Politicians and Chinese and Japanese Immigrants, 1858-1914 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1989) 66.

construction, including hundreds of Asians, began to look for work elsewhere in the province. The C.P.R. also brought immigrants to the province by the tens of thousands, most seeking to share in what they believed was a booming provincial economy. The provincial economy was growing during this time - exports tripled from 1886 to 1896, and the mining industry continued to expand into the twentieth century<sup>2</sup> - but growth was uneven and was easily outstripped by the growth of the supply of labour. British Columbia's population increased exponentially in the late nineteenth century, with Vancouver leading the surge. Prior to 1886, the main centre of population in the lower mainland of British Columbia was New Westminster, but after the C.P.R. chose Vancouver as the terminus for its railway line, Vancouver's population exploded. Historian Robert A.J. McDonald pointed out that "in the quarter century after 1886 Vancouver grew from a community of approximately 500 people into a large and complex society with a metropolitan population of almost 124,000."<sup>3</sup> The resulting competition in the labour market made finding a job difficult and kept wages from growing at the same pace as did the provincial economy.

The effect of the arrival of immigrants on aboriginal workers' share of the labour market was nearly disastrous. Agent McTiernan reported in 1884 that

Indians from all parts of this agency complain ... of how they are undermined in the labor market by Chinamen, especially in all kinds of light work. Although many of them have come long distances this season to the fish canneries, very few of them got employment, as their places had been taken by Chinamen, in cleaning and canning the fish; they are also doing all the washing and ironing in private families, what Indian women used to do heretofore.<sup>4</sup>

In 1897, Superintendent Vowell noted that "competition in the labour market continues to be greater each year, which is successively augmented by an influx of whites, Japanese and

---

<sup>2</sup>Patricia Roy, A White Man's Province, 65 and 91.

<sup>3</sup>Robert A.J. McDonald, "City-Building in the Canadian West: A Case Study of Economic Growth in Early Vancouver, 1886-1893," in BC Studies no.43 (Autumn, 1979) 3-28 at 3.

<sup>4</sup>Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 31 December 1884, 104.

Chinamen."<sup>5</sup> This increase in competition in the labour market prompted Geoff Meggs to mark the year 1900 as a watershed in the history of aboriginal participation in the commercial fishing industry. "After that date," Meggs wrote, "native men and women had to struggle to retain any place in the wealth-producing machine they had helped to create."<sup>6</sup>

The Squamish felt competition in the labour market in the timber industry as well. Significantly, when workers entered the timber industry, they took jobs that correlated to their ethnic background. In 1906, for example, hundreds of Sikhs immigrated to Canada and landed in Vancouver. The vast majority of the Sikh men found work as unskilled labourers in Vancouver sawmills.<sup>7</sup> By 1918, over ninety percent of all workers in British Columbia logging camps were white<sup>8</sup> while by 1910 the majority of mill workers were Asian.<sup>9</sup> As a result employers in the timber industry, as in the fishing industry, dealt with a workforce divided by ethnicity. This limited the ability of workers to unite and take action to improve their wages and working conditions. Workers were therefore more vulnerable to shifts and restructuring in the industry.

The Squamish may have been aware of these problems in the 1880s, but they did not feel them yet. Agent McTiernan reported in 1888 that many of the "able bodied" men at the Mission reserve "work almost continually at the saw mills and receive as high wages as is paid to the best white laborers." Similarly, at False Creek "almost all the men are engaged at the False Creek saw mills."<sup>10</sup> In 1893, recently appointed Indian Agent Devlin claimed that "a great many of the

---

<sup>5</sup>Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 30 June 1897, 189.

<sup>6</sup>Meggs, Salmon, 52.

<sup>7</sup>James Conley, Class Conflict and Collective Action in the Working Class of Vancouver, British Columbia, 1900-1919 (Ottawa: Carleton University Ph.D., 1986), 212.

<sup>8</sup>Conley, Class Conflict, 206.

<sup>9</sup>Conley, Class Conflict, 213.

<sup>10</sup>Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 1888, 106.

(Squamish) men are employed in the lumber mills in Vancouver."<sup>11</sup> Devlin added in 1896 that "the Skawmish (sic) and all those living at Burrard Inlet also follow hand-logging."<sup>12</sup> As competition for jobs increased, however, the Squamish responded the same way as did most other ethnic groups; they specialized the type of work that they did. For the Squamish, those jobs were longshoring and, to a much smaller extent, hand-logging.

Although a few Squamish occupied skilled positions in the mills and logging camps, most found work as general or semi-skilled workers. These positions were the most vulnerable to the increased supply of labour. Squamish fortunes declined in sawmilling and logging, but they did not disappear. Hand-logging, requiring nominal capital and only one or two men, persisted as a moderate source of money for a few Squamish into the twentieth century. Meanwhile, Indian Agents did occasionally mention Squamish obtaining sawmilling work,<sup>13</sup> sometimes even "responsible positions such as driving donkey engines, as firemen, &c."<sup>14</sup> However, this type of work was clearly on the decline. Instead, the area of the timber industry to which Squamish workers turned was longshoring. Most Squamish who worked in the sawmills in the late-nineteenth century did general labour and longshoring work anyhow,<sup>15</sup> so when sawmilling became more formally specialized, longshoring simply became recognized as a type of work distinct from sawmilling.

According to an anonymous retired dockworker, longshoring was "one thing the Indian took to right off. They couldn't read or write but they could measure those timbers by eye and fit them

---

<sup>11</sup>Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 1893, p.120.

<sup>12</sup>Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 30 June 1896, 88.

<sup>13</sup>Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 31 March 1911, 237.

<sup>14</sup>Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 31 March 1912, 236.

<sup>15</sup>Sproat, "In Camp," pp. 16-17. Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 30 June 1898, 216-217.

into the ships better than the White Man."<sup>16</sup> Rolf Knight asserted that aboriginal labourers felt pride in their specialization as loaders of timber but, at the root, specialization was explained by the fact that loading lumber "was one of the more strenuous kinds of longshoring, that employers attempted to maintain competition between racially distinct crews and that a reluctance seems to have developed among employers to hire Indians to handle cargo."<sup>17</sup> Longshoring was a difficult and often dangerous form of work, but it offered slightly higher wages than did general labour in a sawmill<sup>18</sup> and provided the opportunity to work intermittently and pursue other activities when so desired. It remained a casual source of work until the 1930s, when management and unions re-organized dockwork. Until this re-organization, sawmill owners would contract with a foreman to load timber onto ships. Several Squamish men like Dan Paull and Chief Joe Capilano were prominent foremen at the turn of the century,<sup>19</sup> and they picked their loading gangs from their friends and relatives.

The working conditions of longshoring might have had some benefits for the Squamish, but they were far from luxurious. The work was casual (in the sense that one could work when one wanted), it was outside, and it was possible to work with friends and relatives, but it also involved long days, dangerous conditions, and moderate pay. The Squamish enthusiastically supported unions as a means of improving working conditions, but ethnic divisions in the labour force inhibited the strength of these unions. In 1906, the Industrial Workers of the World established

---

<sup>16</sup>Philpott, Trade Unionism and Acculturation, 42.

<sup>17</sup>Rolf Knight, Indians at Work: An Informal History of Native Indian Labour in British Columbia, 1858-1930, (Vancouver: New Star Books, 1978) 127.

<sup>18</sup>Ed Nahanee claimed that at the turn of the century even general labour on the docks earned 5 cents per hour more than what the average sawmill worker got. Knight, Indians at Work, 125; International Longshoremen and Warehousemen Union, Man Along the Shore, 55-56.

<sup>19</sup>Knight, Indians at Work, 124-5; E.P. Patterson, Andrew Paull and Canadian Indian Resurgence, (Seattle: University of Washington, Ph.D. thesis, 1962) 33; International Longshoremen and Warehousemen Union, Local 500, Man Along the Shore, the story of Vancouver's Waterfront, 1860-1975, (Vancouver: ILWU, 1975) 15-16.

a small chapter, the Lumber Handlers' [Industrial] Union, in Vancouver. This union was composed primarily of aboriginal workers and held its meetings on the Squamish reserves.<sup>20</sup> Having their own chapter of a union gave the Squamish a sense of solidarity and security within their ethnic group, but their failure to unite with workers from other ethnic groups in the industry gave it little power. By 1913, the Squamish chapter had dissolved, and would not be replaced by another union for several years.

The Squamish were also active in early union activity in the commercial fishing industry. Once again, class solidarity fractured along ethnic lines. The Squamish supported one of the first known fishing strikes in British Columbia, the 1893 strike by the Fraser River Fishermen's Benevolent Association. The Association secured the support of influential aboriginal people, including a Squamish man named Capilano George, in a strike against the Cannery Association. Aboriginal fishers stood firm, but felt betrayed when white fishermen, unable to rely on a subsistence economy for alternative support, broke ranks and went back to work.<sup>21</sup> Similarly, aboriginal people participated in a major strike in 1900, but cannery owners succeeded in exploiting ethnic divisions within the workforce to break the strike. At the start of the 1900 fishing season, cannery operators had refused to pay the twenty five cents per fish demanded by the loosely organized Fraser river fishers. Although whites and aboriginal people stood firm, Japanese fishers soon relented to cannery demands and sold at the lower price offered by the owners. After the cannery owners succeeded in calling out the militia, all fishers - including aboriginal fishers - returned to fishing for lower prices.<sup>22</sup> Department of Indian Affairs officials interpreted the consequences of the dispute as a signal to aboriginal people throughout British Columbia. In his 1901 report, the Inspector for the southwestern district (which included the

---

<sup>20</sup>Philpott, Trade Unionism and Acculturation, 43-44.

<sup>21</sup>Percy Gladstone, "Native Indians and the Fishing Industry," in Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science (1953) 19(1):20-34 at 28.

<sup>22</sup>Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 30 June 1901, 286-287. See generally Ralston, The 1900 Strike.

lower mainland) firmly asserted that aboriginal people "cannot now, or ever again, expect to make as much money as formerly when they were about the only people available to carry on the limited industries of the country."<sup>23</sup>

Even with the pressures facing them, dozens of Squamish families relied on paid labour in the timber and fishing industries as a source of wealth. Simon Baker recalled his family still relying heavily on work from the canneries just after the turn of the century. Simon's father John was "a fisherman ... he built gill net boats and he was hired as a net boss at one of the canneries. A net boss is the one who looks after all the net gear. ... Those canneries were quite large so he had quite a job." All of Simon's family would work at the cannery for several weeks in the summer, while young Simon spent his time playing on the wharves. At other times of the year, Simon's father obtained money from logging, although it was not clear if he was a hand-logger or worked in a logging camp.<sup>24</sup> Other, more quantitative, evidence also illustrates the continued importance of paid labour in the fishing and timber industries despite difficulties in the labour market. In 1905-1906, the Department of Indian Affairs asked Indian Agents to estimate the number of persons engaged in four general categories of work. For the Squamish, the local Agent provided statistics for the ill-fitting categories as follows:

Community	Farming	Hunting, Trapping & Fishing	Other Industries	Stock Raising
Burrard Inlet no.3	6	9	7	2
False Creek	10	17	16	0
Kapilano	10	12	11	8
Mission	30	40	40	4

<sup>23</sup>Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 30 June 1902, 284.

<sup>24</sup>Simon Baker, Khot-La-Cha, 19.



Community	Farming	Hunting, Trapping & Fishing	Other Industries	Stock Raising
Squamish (Howe Sound)	6	10	8	6
Seymour Creek	4	5	5	4 <sup>25</sup>

The Agent also recorded the following statistics for the Squamish:

Community	Value of Farm Products	Wages (General)	Earned by Fishing	Earned by Hunting	Other Industries (w/ explanation)
Burrard Inlet no.3	\$220	\$ 995	\$ 675	\$ 160	\$1850 - Hand logging
False Creek	120	2020	1540	580	1890 - Raising fruit & Hand logging
Kapilano	330	1700	1700	520	2230 - Hand logging, poultry & eggs
Mission	120	5910	5970	2770	5190 - Hand logging, fruit & poultry
Squamish Howe Sound	610	720	1450	660	200 - Hop picking
Seymour Creek	170	3370	860	520	15 - Hop picking <sup>26</sup>

The Agent was supposed to count hunting, trapping and fishing for subsistence purposes as well as for income. It is likely that subsistence activities are severely under-represented on these

---

<sup>25</sup>"Agricultural and Industrial Statistics, 1899-1919." New Westminster Agency. RG10 v.1493. The statistics in fact only range from 1899 to 1906. There is no explanation of how the Agent compiled the statistics. It is possible that a person was listed in more than one category and it is also possible that the Agent only counted men.

<sup>26</sup>"Agricultural and Industrial Statistics, 1899-1919." New Westminster Agency. RG10 v.4049.

charts, however, as the Agent would have had no reliable means of obtaining this information. Further, these were exactly the types of subsistence activities that his superiors expected him to replace with farming. Since the agent specifically mentioned fishing and "hand logging" elsewhere, "wages" likely referred to longshoring and sawmilling work.

Fishing for money was an important source of wealth for many aboriginal people, including the Squamish, but it suffered from unique pressures. In addition to the problem of increasing competition in the labour market, government regulation and restructuring of the industry severely limited the ability of aboriginal people to fish for money by the early twentieth century. During the late nineteenth century, cannery owners changed their perception of aboriginal fishers from "partners" to "competitors."<sup>27</sup> The canneries used their influence with government officials to have the law protect their interests. Upon union with Canada in 1871, federal jurisdiction over sea coast and inland fisheries extended to British Columbia. The first regulations for British Columbia, in force in 1878, were limited to salmon fishing, but their most significant feature for aboriginal fishers was severe restrictions on net fishing in fresh water.<sup>28</sup> With the introduction of these regulations, aboriginal fishers found themselves increasingly restricted in where and how they could fish for food. The government fully revealed its support of the canneries in 1888, when it banned the sale of salmon by aboriginal fishers<sup>29</sup> thus establishing a legislative dichotomy between aboriginal food fishing and commercial fishing.

By the early-twentieth century, aboriginal people were allowed to fish for their own subsistence needs with moderate regulation, but if they wanted to sell their fish for money, they had to do so from within a heavily regulated commercial fishing industry. They had to obtain licences for

---

<sup>27</sup>Newell, Tangled Webs, 52-53. Dyck, And Then We Will Mind The Law: The Enforcement of Federal Fisheries Regulations in British Columbia and the Resistance of Native Fisher, 1894-1916 (Burnaby: Simon Fraser University, MA Thesis, 1994) 36-37.

<sup>28</sup>Dianne Newell, Tangled Webs, 49.

<sup>29</sup>Department of Marine and Fisheries, Annual Report, 1888, xiv.

commercial fishing and follow regulations established for all commercial fishers. The rise of this regulatory scheme protected the growth of the commercial fishing industry,<sup>30</sup> but ignored the diversity of ways and purposes that aboriginal people fished. Dianne Newell argued that cannery owners and regulators created a regime that captured aboriginal people in

a scheme that paid them for their labour, not for the sale of their resources. ...Corralling Indian labour for the white-owned industry, along with other measures such as banning use of the highly productive Indian fishing technologies, eventually undermined Indians' ability to continue their ancient entrepreneurial traditions on their own terms.<sup>31</sup>

The regulatory scheme that emerged in the late nineteenth century therefore limited the ways that aboriginal people could fish for food and profit. It perpetuated the channelling of aboriginal people into the position of dependent labourers, away from the role of independent vendors of resources.

As canneries grew in number and capacity, they placed ever larger demands on the salmon runs of the Fraser River. Occasionally, the ecosystem of the Fraser could not handle the demands placed on it. Salmon are anadromous fish; they spawn in freshwater rivers, travel to the sea, and return to spawn in three to eight years, depending upon species. Particularly among the sockeye, the size of runs varied significantly each year, though four year cycles of high, moderate, low, and low are perceptible.<sup>32</sup> In some years, a low run resulted in a disastrous commercial fishing season. For example, Superintendent Lenihan reported in 1879 - a low year - that "the salmon fisheries have employed fewer hands this season and reduced the rate of wages paid the two years previous." Lenihan therefore expected a rise in requests for aid in provisions and clothing because so many had counted on earning money during this period.<sup>33</sup> Ecological problems occasionally

---

<sup>30</sup>Jos Dyck, And then we will mind the law, 31. Newell, Tangled Webs.

<sup>31</sup>Newell, Tangled Webs, 77.

<sup>32</sup>Michael Kew, "Salmon Abundance, Technology and Human Populations on the Fraser River Watershed," in Northwest Coast Studies Conference Papers, v.2 (Burnaby: Simon Fraser University, 1976), 4.

<sup>33</sup>Department Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 30 June 1879, 137.

forced aboriginal people to choose between fishing for subsistence and fishing for wages. Aboriginal families from the lower mainland occasionally ensured that they had enough fish to preserve for the winter before they sold fish to the canneries. In years when there was a low run, there wasn't enough left after preserving to sell to the canneries. In 1886 and 1887, for instance, Indian Agents reported very low runs of salmon that met the subsistence needs of the aboriginal people near the Fraser River, but made for a disastrous commercial fishing season.<sup>34</sup> There was a similar "failure" of the salmon in 1892 that only left sufficient fish for salting.<sup>35</sup>

Aboriginal fishers and canneries had different cultural values about work and the environment. To Coast Salish like the Squamish, the Strait of Georgia was a place where one pursued a number of economic activities, of which fishing for money was simply one. To the canneries, however, the Strait of Georgia supported only one mode of production. This difference in attitudes to work and the environment occasionally resulted in conflict. Canneries were particularly distressed by the habit of aboriginal people to only fish for a few weeks, then leave after the first run of salmon to pursue other activities. This conflict reached a peak in 1883 when cannery owners kept the wages of aboriginal fishers until the end of the last run in the autumn. Even when there was a break in the salmon runs, the canneries refused to release the wages, fearing that they would have no fishers for subsequent runs. As a result, the Indian Agent reported that "the Indians are obliged to remain idle about New Westminster for that length of time or forfeit their wages."<sup>36</sup> An idealistic Superintendent Lenihan felt that this conflict would "work its own cure, and that canners will have difficulty in obtaining Indian labour without some more agreeable plan another year."<sup>37</sup> While it is true that fewer aboriginal people worked in the canneries as years passed, this

---

<sup>34</sup>"One fourth the usual quantity" of fish were taken in 1886. Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 31 December 1886, 80. A poor run created low employment levels for 1887. Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 31 December 1887, 111.

<sup>35</sup>Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 31 December 1892, 237.

<sup>36</sup>Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 31 December 1883, 46.

<sup>37</sup>Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 31 December 1883, 106.

was largely because canneries began to replace aboriginal labour with Asian labour.

Selling fish and seafood directly to whites was not a major source of money, but several Squamish families relied on it for occasional revenue. In 1882 the Indian Agent reported on two Squamish women who "pulled their boat from Burrard Inlet to New Westminster, 22 miles, with a lot of fresh herring; they went round town and sold them at 25 cents a bucket, and made \$2 each."<sup>38</sup> Indian Agent Devlin reported in 1896 that "nearly all the fresh fish used in the city (Vancouver) is caught by Indians."<sup>39</sup> Capilano Mary similarly recalled gathering clams as a young woman at the turn of the century. She would dig them up on the North Shore, then paddle to Vancouver and sell hundreds of clams at a time to the chef of the Hotel Vancouver for five cents a pound.<sup>40</sup>

Enforcement of the fisheries regulations regarding aboriginal fishing was uneven. On the one hand, there simply were not enough resources to supervise all fishing activity. As a result, Squamish continued to sell fish and seafood to non-aboriginals around Vancouver into the 1910s, although this provided little more than "grocery money."<sup>41</sup> When officials did catch aboriginal people breaking the law, they were zealous and often officious. As a matter of policy, fisheries officers were not supposed to seize aboriginal nets if they were fishing "for their own use in their accustomed way."<sup>42</sup> However, Indian Agent McTiernan reported in 1883 that, out of apparent frustration, a Fisheries officer had seized "all the Indian fishing nets to be found in the Fraser River". McTiernan interceded, and after speaking to the Inspector of Fisheries for British Columbia, Alex Anderson, convinced the officer to return the nets, but not before angering

---

<sup>38</sup>Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 31 December 1882, 60.

<sup>39</sup>Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 31 December 1896, 88.

<sup>40</sup>Mildred V. Thornton, Indian Lives and Legends (Vancouver: Mitchell Press, 1966) 120.

<sup>41</sup>Royal Commission on Indian Affairs, Evidence, 07 March 1916, 19.

<sup>42</sup>Newell, Tangled Webs, 63.

aboriginal people "from Burrard Inlet to Yale."<sup>43</sup>

Government officials quickly began referring to aboriginal food fishing as merely a privilege, not a right, that had better not interfere with the important commercial fishing industry. In 1891, Sir Charles Tupper, Minister of Marine and Fisheries, wanted it made clear to the Indians of British Columbia that:

in extending to them the valuable privilege they now enjoy of taking fish for their own use, whenever and howsoever they choose, such permission is not to be considered as a right, but as an act of grace, which may be withdrawn at any time should it be found that it is abused, or used for other purposes than those for which it is granted, or in such a manner as to embarrass the action of this department.<sup>44</sup>

Tupper neglected to mention that the regulations did not allow aboriginal food fishers to fish "whenever and howsoever they choose." Instead, he focussed on the "privilege" which he felt the government had granted aboriginal people. Like numerous government officials before him, Tupper implicitly denied the legitimacy of an aboriginal activity or interest that predated the arrival of white society.

Fisheries regulations already restricted aboriginal people fishing for food to "traditional" equipment and methods, but they increased anyhow, even without "embarrassing" conduct by aboriginal fishers; they increased because cannery owners became more demanding. In 1894, fisheries regulations provided that "no Indian shall spear, trap, or pen fish on their spawning grounds or in any other place leased or set apart for the natural or artificial propagation of fish, or in any other place otherwise specially reserved."<sup>45</sup> The effect of these regulations was to subordinate aboriginal fishing to commercial fishing, making it more difficult for aboriginal people to obtain their food fish even using traditional means in traditional areas.

---

<sup>43</sup>Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 31 December 1883, 45.

<sup>44</sup>Charles Tupper to Minister of the Interior, 24 August 1891, BCARS GR1751, reel B-308, file 32876.

<sup>45</sup>Order in Council, 3 March 1894. Newell, Tangled Webs, 89.

The commercial fishing industry underwent significant structural changes during this period. Aboriginal fishers were able to adapt to some of the changes, but suffered from others. In 1892 the government vastly increased the number of independent fishing licences it issued, which affected all fishers, aboriginal or otherwise.<sup>46</sup> Accordingly, when Squamish people did fish commercially, they did so on a semi-independent piece-rate basis. By 1913, several Squamish living on Capilano IR5 owned their nets and boats; there were in fact twenty boats and two gasoline launches on the reserve. Many others chose to use "cannery gear," although they received only two-thirds the value of the fish caught in exchange for this use of the boat and net. By either method, \$400 was an average gross earnings for a year's fishing, while "a good fisherman can make \$800."<sup>47</sup> On Mission IR1, meanwhile, there were twelve gasoline launches in addition to hundreds of canoes and dug-outs.<sup>48</sup> While Squamish women continued to work as wage-labourers in the canneries, Squamish men and women who fished commercially did so ostensibly as independent sellers of fish, not as mere labourers for the canneries. However, the control that canneries had over the price paid for fish, particularly when fishers used cannery gear, largely offset this independence.

Reliance on semi-independent piece rate sales produced significant problems for the Squamish. To begin with, British Columbia's commercial fishing industry was liable to economic as well as ecological fluctuations. Although the industry generally grew throughout the last quarter of the nineteenth century, there were many failed ventures and reorganizations as markets fluctuated and individual companies rose and fell. In 1885, for example, Indian Agent McTiernan reported that the large run of salmon that summer was good only for food purposes, as the fisheries offered little employment. "Only six of the establishments had canned salmon, and they canned only

---

<sup>46</sup>Meggs, *Salmon*, 38.

<sup>47</sup>Royal Commission on Indian Affairs, *Evidence*, 21 June 1913, 9-10.

<sup>48</sup>Royal Commission on Indian Affairs, *Evidence*, 20 June 1913, 16.

about half the quantity of other years."<sup>49</sup> Superintendent Powell explained that "a very low market has caused nearly all the canneries on the coast to shut down."<sup>50</sup>

For part of the 1890's, the demand for canned salmon reached a plateau so that canneries had only a fixed amount of salmon that they wished to process. The Squamish learned some difficult lessons in supply and demand economics because of this condition. In 1897, the canneries responded to a large run of salmon by accepting only 150 fish per person per day, so that many aboriginal fishers had lower earnings for the season than normal.<sup>51</sup> The following year, the canneries accepted more fish, but reduced fish prices to levels that were nearly unprofitable for many aboriginal fishers.<sup>52</sup> Fishing remained an important source of income for all aboriginal people in the lower mainland, including the Squamish, but it was becoming increasingly restricted and insecure.

Government regulation also restricted Squamish opportunities in the timber industry, perpetuating the restriction of aboriginal people to providing only labour to the timber industry. In 1908 the provincial government restricted timber licences to persons eligible to vote in provincial elections. This provision was designed to limit American speculators, but it also affected aboriginal people.<sup>53</sup> The only way aboriginal people could log was by working for wages, or by cutting timber on their reserves. Logging on the reserves might have been very lucrative, because recent advances in logging technology had made it possible to harvest the large stands of timber on the Howe Sound reserves that were previously inaccessible. Donkey engines - large steam engines with winches

---

<sup>49</sup>Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 31 December 1885, 84.

<sup>50</sup>Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 31 December 1885, 119.

<sup>51</sup>Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 31 December 1897, 80.

<sup>52</sup>Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 30 June 1898, 87.

<sup>53</sup>Knight, Indians at Work, 117. Indians were not able to vote in provincial or federal elections until after World War Two.



to tow cut timber - and logging railroads extended the range of logging operations several miles from the coast. The Squamish could not engage in this kind of high-volume logging, however, because they lacked the capital to purchase the equipment themselves. As a result, Squamish logging was limited to hand-logging from their Reserves along the coast, or using their boats to tow stray logs to booming grounds.<sup>54</sup>

When the Squamish did try to engage in large scale logging, officials in the Department of Indian Affairs were reluctant to authorize it. This authorization was critical; without it, it was illegal to cut and sell timber from an Indian Reserve.<sup>55</sup> In April 1910, four Squamish Chiefs asked a local white businessman, E.A. Haswell, to purchase timber from several reserves in Howe Sound. "We have got no money to buy donkey engines and outfit to log it or to build a railroad," wrote the Chiefs, "we know you and will give you the first chance to cruise it and buy it." The Chiefs explained that they were worried about fires and high water erosion and had found hand logging this timber to be unprofitable. "We want money in the bank," they claimed, "so we can get a little money every year to improve our property and buy tools."<sup>56</sup> Haswell welcomed the opportunity and applied to the Department of Indian Affairs for permission to cruise (estimate the volume and quality of) the timber.

The department ultimately rejected Haswell's application due to confusion over the federal crown's title to Indian reserves and resources in those reserves. For several years, provincial and federal officials had debated the ownership of Indian reserves. The province claimed it had a reversionary interest in the reserves that was triggered as soon as the Indians ceased using a reserve. Federal officials feared that this dispute affected timber on reserves as well. "Owing to the dispute as to title to the Indian Reserves in British Columbia between the Province and the

---

<sup>54</sup>Royal Commission on Indian Affairs, Evidence, 7 March 1916, 7, 18, 19.

<sup>55</sup>Indian Act, R.S.C. 1886, c. 43, ss.54-68; R.S.C. 1906, c.81, ss.73-86.

<sup>56</sup>Letter from Chiefs Harry, Tom, Joseph and Thomas Randall to Mr. Haswell, 16 April 1910. RG10 v.4049 file 361,780.

Dominion," explained the Secretary of the Department of Indian Affairs in a memorandum about Haswell's application, "the department is unable to take any action towards alienation of a Reserve or the timber thereon."<sup>57</sup>

Department officials also inhibited small scale logging, not by denying permission to log, but by inserting themselves into any transaction involving reserve land or resources. In 1898, for example, Agent Devlin insisted on looking after the disposal of logs hand logged by Chief Joe Mathias, as Devlin felt he could obtain a better price than could the Chief on his own.<sup>58</sup> Sociologist Noel Dyck has characterized the relationship between aboriginal people and the Department of Indian Affairs in the past century as one of "tutelage." Dyck defined tutelage as "a form of restraint or care exercised by one party over another as well as the condition of being subjected to such protection or guardianship."<sup>59</sup> In Dyck's view, the relationship itself was (and is) a major problem for the successful adaption of aboriginal people to the encroachment of white society because it inhibited the initiative of the subject of the tutelage. The supervision of the local Indian Agent attached a subtle inertia to selling timber from the Squamish reserves; that inertia was an impediment that non-aboriginals did not have to address.

In 1913 Chief Mathias expressed his frustration with the impediments to economic development on the reserves. He complained to a Royal Commission on Indian Affairs that the Squamish could not "sell a rock or a stick of wood of (our) reserve to get money."<sup>60</sup> The Chairman of the Commission empathized, but offered no solutions. "Some of the reserves are composed of pretty nearly all wooded land," he observed and agreed that "this timber is of very little use to the Indians if he is not allowed to make use of it; but all we can do is to represent the matter to the

---

<sup>57</sup>J.D. McLean, Secretary, DIA to T.R.E. McInnes, Parliamentary Agent, 12 July 1910. RG10 v.4049 file 361,780.

<sup>58</sup>Agent Devlin to Chief Joe Squamish, 7 March 1898. RG10 v.1452, Letterbook, 1898-99.

<sup>59</sup>Noel Dyck, What is the Indian "Problem" 24.

<sup>60</sup>Royal Commission on Indian Affairs, Evidence, 21 June 1913, 2.

Government."<sup>61</sup> In time, the Department of Indian Affairs did allow aboriginal people in British Columbia to dispose of their timber in large quantities, but until then the timber on their reserves had only a frustrating potential for the Squamish.

Timber and fishing-related work were not the only means by which Squamish earned money at the turn of the century, although they were the largest and most lucrative. One popular form of alternative work was picking hops. There is little information about this industry, but it appears to have been characterized by numerous small operations owned by whites, located principally in the Lower Fraser valley and northern portion of Washington State.<sup>62</sup> Owners of hop-fields had moderate connections with each other and established uniform working conditions and rates of pay - usually a dollar per picked basket. The work was strictly casual, in the sense that there was only work for a few weeks a year, but those weeks were made up of long days. Squamish men and women picked hops, although the statistics gathered by the Indian Agent in 1905/06 (referred to earlier) do not indicate how much any given family made in a season. Daily wages were not very high and the picking season conflicted with the fishing season, so hop-picking was likely only a small and sporadic source of income for a few dozen Squamish families.

The ability of aboriginal people to rely on subsistence activities gave them the ability to enter and leave the labour market as conditions suited them. However, subsistence activities were themselves subject to mounting restrictions, particularly in Burrard Inlet where the growth of settlement and industry made hunting, fishing, and gathering more and more difficult. Squamish people living in Burrard Inlet witnessed major ecological changes in their environment, the most obvious of which were in the forests around their reserves on the North Shore. The thriving sawmills of the region naturally looked to the closest source of timber, resulting in heavy logging

---

<sup>61</sup>Royal Commission on Indian Affairs, Evidence, 21 June 1913, 3.

<sup>62</sup>Agent MacDonald referred to Indians from the Vancouver Agency working in Washington state, but did not specify which Indians. Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 31 December 1887, 111.

in Vancouver and the North Shore. The arrival after 1900 of railroad logging companies like the Capilano Timber Company further disrupted the ecological balance of Burrard Inlet by pushing logging further up the slopes of the local mountains.<sup>63</sup> This disruption had an obvious effect on the Squamish people's ability to hunt, but also likely affected the ability of the North Shore streams and creeks to accommodate salmon by increasing erosion of stream beds and blocking up watercourses. The City of Vancouver's demand for fresh water, satisfied by waterworks construction in the watersheds of the North Shore, also likely placed a strain upon the streams and creeks as spawning grounds for salmon. The sustainability of subsistence fishing among the Squamish therefore faced direct pressure not only from government and industry, but also faced environmental pressures brought on indirectly from the growth of white society and industry in Burrard Inlet.

The Department of Indian Affairs was aware of the pressures facing aboriginal subsistence activities, but offered ill-fitting advice. "I have impressed upon them," wrote Indian Agent Devlin in 1895, "the advisability of getting more ground cleared and cultivated, as hunting and fishing will become a more precarious livelihood year after year."<sup>64</sup> Superintendent Vowell echoed this belief, reporting in 1898 that:

The Indians are being constantly warned to prepare for their future support and welfare by giving up their wandering habits in search of labour that does not pay and to devote themselves more to the cultivation and improvement of their reserves .. and to such means as nature has ... with a prodigal hand placed within their reach.<sup>65</sup>

A decade after that, Vowell was even more pessimistic:

---

<sup>63</sup>See Appendix A for photographs of some of the clear cut regions left by the Capilano Railroad Company. Although the pictures were taken in 1922, the Company had conducted this kind of logging since the turn of the century. See also David Rees-Thomas, Timber down the Capilano: A History of the Capilano Timber Company and railroad logging on Vancouver's North Shore (Victoria: British Columbia Railway Historical Association, 1979).

<sup>64</sup>Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 31 December 1895, 163.

<sup>65</sup>Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 30 June 1898, 247.

(Owing) to the settlement of the country and the enactment of new laws, &c., barriers are being set up preventing (aboriginal people) from following their old-time pursuits for the maintenance of themselves and their families.<sup>66</sup>

The growth of the province had now taken on a more ominous tone for the Squamish economy, but the department encouraged the Squamish to pursue a curiously inappropriate avenue: agriculture.

The Department of Indian Affairs constantly urged Indians in Western Canada to cultivate land, encouraging them to become, in essence, peasant farmers who could meet their subsistence needs and hopefully sell their surplus produce in local markets. Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century, Indian Agents kept statistics and reported annually on "progress" in an activity that, in British Columbia, was largely inappropriate due to ecological and economic conditions. One commentator has argued that the government was obsessed with the possibility of Indians needing relief; agriculture seemed the least risky way to make an Indian self-sufficient and thereby avoid the need for government relief.<sup>67</sup> Aware of the importance of paid labour to the Squamish, and the relatively small size of the North Shore reserves, Department of Indian Affairs officials in British Columbia never tried to direct the Squamish into agriculture with the same oppressive approach used in the prairies. This was fortunate for the Squamish, for Sarah Carter has shown that government parsimony and mismanagement had disastrous effects on Indian Reserves in Saskatchewan.<sup>68</sup> By the turn of the century, department officials favoured having the Squamish remove themselves to Howe Sound and pursue agriculture as a means of existence, but they did little more than preach their message.

In addition to restrictions on subsistence activities, the traditional Squamish economy also suffered

---

<sup>66</sup>Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 31 March 1909, 261.

<sup>67</sup>Noel Dyck, What is the Indian Problem, 60-61.

<sup>68</sup>Sarah Carter, Lost Harvests: Prairie Indian Reserve Farmers and Government Policy (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990).

from attacks upon the potlatch. Potlatching involved the exchange of goods for prestige and economic security in traditional Coast Salish cultures, but priests and government officials felt that this "worse than useless" custom inhibited the proper advancement of aboriginal people. The government declared the potlatch illegal in 1885<sup>69</sup> and missionaries like father Durieu worked fervently among the Squamish of Burrard Inlet to replace traditional ceremonies with Christian ones.<sup>70</sup> Agent McTiernan, for his part, constantly criticized and harangued a Squamish Chief on Seymour Creek for his participation in potlatches.<sup>71</sup> Though enforcement was uneven, the attitude of missionaries and officials inhibited the free flow of goods through the potlatch - a vital means of maintaining socio-economic security between kin-groups. In place of traditional cultural values and institutions, missionaries and government officials tried to cultivate white values and institutions among the Squamish. A vast majority of Squamish people living in Burrard Inlet accepted them with impressive conviction, apparently with the belief that their spiritual, social and economic success lay in adopting white values. By the turn of the century, many of the Squamish were devout, practising Roman Catholics. The Oblate missionaries worked with the Squamish to try to improve the chances of the Squamish to adapt socially and economically to the growth of Vancouver. What the Oblates offered, however, was not quite what the Squamish needed.

In 1899, the Oblates supported the establishment of a boarding school beside the Mission Indian Reserve. The Squamish Mission school was operated by the Sisters of the Child Jesus and received operating subsidies from the Department of Indian Affairs. The Squamish of Burrard Inlet held high hopes for the school and contributed labour and money for its construction.<sup>72</sup> Dozens of Squamish families sent their children to the school, hoping that they would acquire sufficient education to allow them a good chance at success in later life. The Sisters soon had to

---

<sup>69</sup>Cole and Chaikin, An Iron Hand upon the People, 1.

<sup>70</sup>T.A. Lascelles, Mission on the Inlet, 9.

<sup>71</sup>Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 31 December 1888, 114.

<sup>72</sup>Lascelles, Mission on the Inlet, 23-24.

accommodate over seventy students, even though the Department of Indian Affairs only provided funding for sixty.<sup>73</sup> Agent Devlin indicated that the school could only accommodate a quarter of the children whose parents wanted them to attend.<sup>74</sup> Within a few years, however, the Squamish became disillusioned with the potential benefits of the school. Sending children to school presented parents with what James Redford described as a short term "economic sacrifice," for "there was an abundance of work which older children were able to do."<sup>75</sup> Accordingly, most of the students stayed for only a few years, enough to acquire rudimentary reading, writing and arithmetic skills.<sup>76</sup> Students at Squamish Mission school also received some time off during the summer, likely for the same reason that the administrators at the St. Mary's Mission Boarding school allowed their pupils a leave - "to fish at the Canneries and assist their parents."<sup>77</sup>

The school provided a new generation of Squamish children with similar opportunities available to white children of the lower mainland, and a few Squamish used their education to acquire semi-professional employment as clerks and secretaries in the subsequent decades. A few even used this education to impressive ends, as did the journalist, political organizer, promoter, and entrepreneur, Andrew Paull.<sup>78</sup> Laudable as these occasional, long-term successes were, the school failed to address the immediate concerns of the Squamish - access to skilled-labour positions.

---

<sup>73</sup>Due to limited funding, even Chief Mathias Joseph had to plead with administrators to accept his son. Indian Agent Devlin to Chief Mathias, 5 April 1908. RG10 v.1451, Letterbook 1897-98.

<sup>74</sup>Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 30 June 1899, 224.

<sup>75</sup>James Redford, "Attendance at Indian Residential Schools in British Columbia, 1890-1920" in BC Studies 44 (Winter 1979-80):41-56 at 45.

<sup>76</sup>See, for example, attendance figures broken down by Division in Squamish Mission School report, 2 April 1907. Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 31 March 1908, 402-403.

<sup>77</sup>Agent Devlin to Rev. Father Chirouise, Principal, St. Mary's Mission Boarding School, 22 June 1908. RG10 v.1452, Agency Letterbook, 1898-99.

<sup>78</sup>E. Palmer Patterson, Andrew Paull.

Industrial schools were far more expensive propositions than boarding schools, however, and so Sister Mary Amy apologetically noted that the school could not offer "much as regards trades." Instead, the children performed only rudimentary tasks like gardening, repairing shoes, chopping wood and minor carpentry work.<sup>79</sup> Chief Mathias Joseph complained in 1913 that his children needed to learn "useful" skills at the school like carpentry, blacksmithing and wagon-making.<sup>80</sup> Several years later, Chief Mathias decided the Mission school was not giving his children the education they needed to succeed in the modern economy, so he sent his children along with his nephew Simon Baker to St. George's Residential Industrial school in Lytton.<sup>81</sup> While the Mission school did cultivate white values and skills in Squamish children, limited funding inhibited the school's ability to develop the skills most needed in the short term.

By 1913, the Squamish economy was on the brink of a major crisis. Its two central pillars - paid labour and subsistence activities - were becoming increasingly unstable. Government regulation continued to funnel aboriginal people towards providing labour to white industry, instead of allowing them to act as vendors of resources. The Squamish could not sell their timber or fish without heavy interference and regulation by government officials. As low or semi-skilled labourers, the Squamish were hurt severely by the rapid growth in the supply of labour that occurred in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Worse, as settlement and industry expanded, the Squamish found their subsistence activities increasingly restricted. Their traditional economic activities were being threatened, while the more recent avenues of earning wealth in the white economy were also threatened. Indian Agents and missionaries offered well-meaning advice, but the plans they developed were either short-sighted or under-funded. Insecurity among the Squamish was high by the start of 1913 and it manifested itself in some dramatic transactions.

---

<sup>79</sup>Squamish Mission Boarding School Report, 6 April 1908, in Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 31 March 1908, 412.

<sup>80</sup>Royal Commission on Indian Affairs, Transcripts, 21 June 1913, 37.

<sup>81</sup>Simon Baker, Khot-La-Cha, 28-29.



### Chapter Three: Wealth without Security, 1913 to 1923

At the beginning of 1913 the Squamish economy was facing serious structural problems as its two central pillars - paid labour and subsistence activities - had become unstable. Then, in the course of a few years, the Squamish experienced a dramatic increase in wealth. The disposal of major portions of their reserves in 1913 earned the Squamish hundreds of thousands of dollars. Several years later, the federal government removed its objection to large-scale disposals of resources on Indian reserves; the resulting sales of timber injected tens of thousands of dollars into the Squamish economy. This short term infusion of wealth did not correct the structural problems of the Squamish economy, it merely removed the symptoms. The Squamish still had difficulty finding paid labour and following subsistence activities, but revenues from the sales of land and resources provided them with a financial safety net.

1913 was a watershed year for the Squamish economy. In that year, various Squamish communities disposed of over 1,200 acres of reserve land for close to \$400,000. These disposals were the result of several forces. First, the Squamish were in desperate need of money. Second, white society and industry were very interested in acquiring the type of property and resources that the Squamish possessed. A third and less obvious pressure to sell was the hostile sentiment among white society in Burrard Inlet towards the Squamish. Several prominent individuals openly stated that the government should "do something" to move the Squamish from Burrard Inlet. These forces combined to produce several major sales and expropriations from 1913 to 1923. The Squamish used most of the proceeds of these dispositions to meet immediate needs, but still retained a large enough portion to allow for minor annual distributions of interest. The money satisfied short term needs, but it did not provide long-term solutions to the problems facing the Squamish.

On 9 April 1913, representatives of the provincial government paid the dozen or so Squamish families living on the Kitsilano reserve \$11,250 each for their interests in the reserve. This sale was the culmination of several weeks of negotiations. The Squamish had used Kitsilano reserve

no.6 for primarily residential purposes, but municipal and provincial officials wanted to see the lands put to more "public" uses. Including expenses to move several families to the Capilano reserve, the total amount paid was \$220,950.<sup>1</sup> Surprisingly, after money changed hands the Department of Indian Affairs claimed to have had no knowledge that the transaction was anything more than a rumour. One result of the department's alleged ignorance was that the money went directly to the Squamish families, and not into Squamish trust funds managed by the department. However, without the consent of the department, there could be no transfer of title to the land.<sup>2</sup>

The department did not consent to the sale because it was concerned that the provincial government had taken advantage of the Squamish. In Parliament, members of the opposition party challenged the apparently negligible price paid for almost eighty acres of prime land in Vancouver.<sup>3</sup> Opposition members were particularly outraged that, only a few weeks earlier, a representative of an American railroad company, C.A. Calkins, offered to purchase the lands for two million dollars - in cash.<sup>4</sup> One cannot directly compare Calkins offer to the price paid by the province because the provincial government insisted it had a reversionary interest in the lands. Had the department accepted Calkins' offer, it would have had to compensate the provincial government for its claims to the lands. Nevertheless, the huge discrepancy embarrassed the federal government and the flagrant neglect of the interest of the federal government embarrassed the provincial government. To save face, the two governments agreed that the payment was in

---

<sup>1</sup>Vancouver Daily (World?) 9 April 1913 in RG10 v.3741 file 28835-2. Some Squamish also returned to Howe Sound, some went to Mission Indian reserve, and a few families joined Musqueam or Coquitlam communities. William Zaharoff, Success in Struggle: The Squamish People and Kitsilano Indian Reserve no.6, (Ottawa: Carleton University M.A. Thesis, 1978) 97.

<sup>2</sup>Indian Act, R.S.C. 1906, s.33.

<sup>3</sup>Canada, Debates of the House of Commons, 11 May 1914, p.3547.

<sup>4</sup>Telegram from C.A. Calkins to Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, 20 March 1913. RG10 v.3741, file 28835-2.

fact only to compensate the Squamish for leaving the reserve.<sup>5</sup> By mid-century, title to this reserve still lay with the federal government, although the 1913 agreement confused rights to the land.

Less than six months later, several other Squamish communities also disposed of major portions of their reserves for large amounts of money. This time the department was actively involved in the negotiations. On 22 September 1913, The Pacific Great Eastern Railway (the "P.G.E.") signed agreements with Squamish representatives from 6 different reserves in the Howe Sound area. In exchange for 1133 acres of reserve land, the P.G.E. paid approximately \$3,200 per family for a total of \$160,661.39. In addition, the Company agreed to construct 50 houses on the remaining reserve land.<sup>6</sup> Representatives of the families who signed these agreements wished to receive all of the purchase price directly, as did their peers involved in the Kitsilano reserve transaction.<sup>7</sup> The Indian Act, however, allowed Indians to receive only half of the proceeds of a sale of reserve land; the other half had to go to trust funds maintained for each band.<sup>8</sup> The department insisted that the Squamish amend their surrender to reflect this requirement, which the Squamish did in January 1914.<sup>9</sup> On 2 September 1914, Inspector Ditchburn distributed \$80,907 to the various Squamish people with "interests" in the reserves;<sup>10</sup> the balance went to the Squamish

---

<sup>5</sup>Letter from Agent Byrne to Robert Rodgers, Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, 13 April 1913. RG10 v.3741, file 28835-2.

<sup>6</sup>Two Agreements, 22 September 1913, one covering Yekwaupsum IR18, one covering Ahtsann IR23, Skwulwilemi IR23, Skwawmish Island IR21, Stawamus IR24 and Mamaquam IR20. RG10 v.11002, file 974/34-23. The agreements are also on RG10 v.4074, file 441,744.

<sup>7</sup>The surrenders, dated 27 September 1913, requested that the Squamish living on these reserves get all the money. RG10 v.11002, file 974/34-23.

<sup>8</sup>Indian Act, R.S.C. 1906, c.81, s.89.

<sup>9</sup>Affidavit of Execution, signed by W.E. Ditchburn, Inspector of Indian Agencies in B.C., 3 January 1914. RG10, v.11002, file 974/34-23.

<sup>10</sup>Letter from Inspector Ditchburn to Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, 2 September 1914. RG10 v.11079, file "Squamish" pt. A.

trust fund.

The P.G.E. also purchased a smaller parcel of land from the Squamish on Capilano Indian reserve no.5. On 17 November 1913, the federal government accepted the surrender of twenty acres of the reserve for sale to the P.G.E.<sup>11</sup> The department played a valuable role in negotiations for this land, nearly doubling the price obtained by the Squamish. The Squamish resolved to sell the land for \$300 per acre,<sup>12</sup> but the department hired an evaluator to verify this value and decided to push the P.G.E. for more. Their efforts were successful, for the Band received more than \$500 per acre, for a total of \$11,000 for the land. Half of the money went directly to trust funds managed by the department and half was distributed among the several dozen Squamish with interests on the reserve.

More major disposals of reserve lands were planned in 1913, but Indian Agent Byrne intervened to stop them. Hamilton Read, a negotiator in the Kitsilano transaction, had offered \$198,000 for the whole of Seymour Creek Indian reserve no.2 in the fall of 1913. Agent Byrne explained that the Chief and members of the Seymour Creek community "are very anxious to sell the reserve and get some money distributed amongst them," particularly after witnessing the thousands of dollars involved in the Kitsilano and P.G.E. transactions. Nonetheless, Agent Byrne and Ottawa officials of the department of Indian Affairs convinced Read and the Squamish to stop negotiations, claiming neither had authority to deal with the land.<sup>13</sup>

These transactions occurred at the beginning of a Royal Commission into Indian reserves in British Columbia. Commonly called the McKenna-McBride Commission, this Commission was a joint

---

<sup>11</sup>Order in Council P.C. 2854, Instrument #14929, Reserve General Register, Department of Indian Affairs.

<sup>12</sup>Memorandum of Indian Agent Byrne, 25 November 1913, Reserve General Register, Instrument #14929.

<sup>13</sup>Indian Agent Byrne to Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, 15 October 1913. RG10 v.10896, file 167/1903-21.

effort of the federal and provincial governments. Since union with the Dominion of Canada, the provincial government had challenged the standards by which the federal government wished to establish Indian reserves in the province. While a series of joint provincial-federal commissions had travelled the province in the forty years since union, the province was still concerned that Indian reserves were too large. Further, the province insisted that it had a reversionary interest in any Indian reserve. Once land was no longer needed as a reserve, the province insisted, it reverted to the province. In the eyes of the province, Indian reserves were only for the use and occupancy of Indians; Indians could not sell the land or resources in the reserves. The federal government disputed this claim, but agreed to hold a further joint commission to settle the "proper" boundaries of Indian reserves in exchange for the province dropping its claims to a reversionary interest.

The fact that the disposals of the Squamish reserves occurred before the McKenna-McBride Commission had completed its work is significant because the matter of the province's reversionary interest was not yet settled. In the circumstances where the province waived its claim to a reversionary interest, the province was not trying to help the Squamish; it was supporting the interests of railway builders or municipal leaders who coveted aboriginal lands. In the Kitsilano transaction, the province was following a precedent it set several years earlier, when it paid the Songhees Indians to relocate from a reserve in downtown Victoria to the edge of the municipality.<sup>14</sup> The province wanted to make the Kitsilano lands available for whites, not Indians, although it had only vague plans to use the land for a park or industrial sites.<sup>15</sup> The P.G.E., meanwhile, was a part of Premier McBride's plan to use railways to stimulate the provincial economy.<sup>16</sup> To support this effort, the province told the Squamish that it would waive its

---

<sup>14</sup>Jeannie L. Kanakos, "The Negotiations to Relocate the Songhees, 1843-1911," (Burnaby: Simon Fraser University, M.A. Thesis, 1982).

<sup>15</sup>Zaharoff, *Success in Struggle*, 75-77.

<sup>16</sup>Patricia Roy, "Railways, Politicians and the Development of Vancouver as a Metropolitan Centre, 1886-1929," (Toronto: University of Toronto, M.A. Thesis, 1963) 179-183.

reversionary interest if they sold the lands to the P.G.E.<sup>17</sup> The province's reversionary interest was a major obstacle to any development plans for the Squamish reserves. The prospect of not having to deal with that obstacle likely induced the Squamish to take what opportunities for immediate wealth were available to them. Further, members of the McKenna-McBride Commission made it clear to the Squamish that if they refused to sell to the P.G.E., railway laws would enable the P.G.E. to expropriate much of the land anyhow.<sup>18</sup>

The motives among the Squamish for selling were clear. In testimony before the McKenna-McBride Commission, Chief Mathias expressed his frustration with obstacles to development and his hopes for the future:

We Indians of British Columbia who have been shut down in our lands are looking forward to a new life when we are able to open up our lands. ... No man can improve land by His will alone; you need something else. You can't kill deer by your will. You need an instrument to do it and the land is the same way. ... You must have money to buy the tools with which to clear the land.<sup>19</sup>

The Chief was aware of the declining opportunities for the Squamish in Burrard Inlet, but he was aware also that the Squamish lacked the financial capital to pursue new options. In one sense, the Chief agreed with the pessimistic outlook and advice offered by the Department of Indian Affairs. Several months earlier, Inspector Ditchburn claimed that the Squamish Chiefs fully realized that "they will eventually have to move off the reserves close to the cities and move up to the Squamish River, where they have plenty of reserves."<sup>20</sup> Ditchburn was convinced that pressures to acquire the Squamish reserves in Burrard Inlet combined with a poor labour market made moving back to Howe Sound inevitable.

---

<sup>17</sup>Royal Commission on Indian Affairs, Evidence, 17 June 1913, 3.

<sup>18</sup>Royal Commission on Indian Affairs, Evidence, 17 June 1913, 6.

<sup>19</sup>Royal Commission on Indian Affairs, Evidence, 21 June 1915, Capilano Indian reserve no.5, p.2.

<sup>20</sup>Letter from Ditchburn to Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, 26 April 1913, RG10 v.3741, file 28835-2.

Other Squamish echoed Chief Mathias' perception of the problems facing the Squamish. Chief Harry of Seymour Creek Indian reserve no.2 claimed that his people were interested in selling the reserve because "we cannot use our lands the way we would like to for the reason that we are very poor."<sup>21</sup> Chief Harry qualified his people's desire to sell the land by insisting that they would not sell it to any "Orientals, such as Chinese and Japanese."<sup>22</sup> Chief Harry did not explain his reasons, but was likely angered by the competition that Orientals provided to the Squamish in Vancouver's labour market. Like Chief Mathias, Chief Harry considered agriculture to be the cure to his people's problems. He explained that, years ago, Superintendent Vowell had urged him to cultivate the land. At that time, the previous Chief of the Seymour Creek community, Chief George, did not pursue agriculture. Chief Harry expressed his disapproval of Chief George's ways, and even condemned Chief George because, "instead of setting an example for his people, he devoted a great part of his time in holding potlatches till he died."<sup>23</sup> Chief Harry's testimony reveals the split between traditionalists and modernists among the Squamish. Chief Harry spoke for those Squamish who accepted the advice of missionaries and Indian Agents to pursue a modified version of a white Christian life; although this was the majority view, the reference to the beliefs of Chief George reveal that it was not unanimous.

Local government officials and capitalists were also interested in removing the Squamish from Burrard Inlet, though with more obvious hostility than the provincial government displayed. To these people, Indian reserves were a blight and an annoyance; not only were Indian reserves not subject to provincial or municipal taxes,<sup>24</sup> but they were also exempt from municipal by-laws.<sup>25</sup>

---

<sup>21</sup>Royal Commission on Indian Affairs, Evidence, 23 June 1913, Seymour Creek Indian Reserve, p.2.

<sup>22</sup>Royal Commission on Indian Affairs, Evidence, 23 June 1913, Seymour Creek Indian reserve, p.2.

<sup>23</sup>Royal Commission on Indian Affairs, Evidence, 23 June 1913, Seymour Creek Indian reserve, p.1.

<sup>24</sup>Indian Act, R.S.C. 1886, s.77; R.S.C. 1906, s.99; R.S.C. 1927, s.102.

Immediately after the incorporation of North Vancouver in 1907, City officials made it clear that they wanted to take over the reserves and hoped that the McKenna-McBride Commission would satisfy this demand.<sup>26</sup> In his testimony in 1913, Mayor Hanes made no effort to hide his distaste for Indians living in the middle of the growing city of North Vancouver. The mayor firmly believed that Mission Indian reserve no.1 "blocks the proper progress of the City, and it is the general impression that it is not desirable to have them there."<sup>27</sup> It was not just the reserve that bothered the mayor, it was the Indians. When the commissioners asked if it would be preferable for the Indians to become citizens, Hanes came up with a hasty objection. "I don't know that their conditions would be any better than they are now," he stammered, then quickly qualified his statement. "We have no control," he explained, "and they have not got the finances to develop their places or property."<sup>28</sup>

Representatives of North Vancouver wanted the Indians removed from the municipality and their reserves sold, but made it clear that the Indians should not get fair market value for the lands. Reeve W.H. May did not want the Indians to get "the value of the adjacent property, but the value which the Government might put on it." The Chairman of the North Vancouver Board of Trade explained that it was not proper to pay fair market value when "the city has developed the surrounding property and made the reserve property more valuable." Former Mayor McNeish added that "it is the energy of the whites that has made the price of lands what they are."<sup>29</sup> The Board of Trade and municipal government of North Vancouver re-cast the industrial history of Burrard Inlet to suit their ends. In their eyes, the Squamish were no better than indolent

---

<sup>25</sup>Jack Woodward, Native Law, (Toronto: Carswell, 1996) 132.

<sup>26</sup>Jillian Hightower, "Reserve Land and Irreconcilable Objectives: A Study of Political Interaction Between an Urban Indian Band and Municipal Governments," (Burnaby: Simon Fraser University, M.A. Thesis, 1979), 39-44.

<sup>27</sup>Royal Commission on Indian Affairs, Evidence, 19 June 1913, 1.

<sup>28</sup>Royal Commission on Indian Affairs, Evidence, 19 June 1913, 11.

<sup>29</sup>Royal Commission on Indian Affairs, Evidence, 19 June 1913, 12-14.



speculators. They ignored the major contribution that the Squamish had made to the local economy as labourers and as consumers, and perpetuated the notion that aboriginal people really did not "own" the land; they just occupied it at the government's sufferance.

The submissions by the Mayor and Board of Trade of North Vancouver likely made the Squamish more receptive to whatever offers they obtained for their reserves in Burrard Inlet. The alternative was to wait and see if the lands might be taken under less favourable conditions in the future. This concern was well-founded, for when the McKenna-McBride commission finished its hearings, it recommended cutting off 130 acres from Capilano Creek Indian reserve no.5, leaving just under 300 acres for the use of the Band.<sup>30</sup> The Commission's decision to make this cut-off was influenced by Agent Peter Byrne's testimony. Agent Byrne noted that much of this reserve was suitable for "industrial sites ... but it is beyond the Indians to make any use of it." The Commissioners asked Byrne which part of the reserve was of "no use to the Indians but if sold and the Indians get their equity what portion would you say should be sold?" Byrne indicated "all that portion which is most valuable for industrial sites and which is subject to overflow and erosion" - an area of about 130 acres.<sup>31</sup> Despite the Commission's reference to the Squamish receiving the equity from the lands, the Squamish received no compensation for these cut-off lands.<sup>32</sup>

The Squamish lost reserve land to other government bodies and Crown corporations for less than market value on several more occasions. After the Panama Canal opened in 1913, the Canadian government labelled Vancouver as a first class port to take advantage of the potential for increased

---

<sup>30</sup>Royal Commission on Indian Affairs, Minutes of Decision, volume 4, 690.

<sup>31</sup>Royal Commission on Indian Affairs, Evidence, 7 March 1916, Testimony of Indian Agent Peter Byrne, 16-17, 22-23.

<sup>32</sup>In the 1970s, the provincial government bowed to political pressure from aboriginal groups in British Columbia and re-negotiated the cut-off lands. The government returned half of the lands cut-off from Capilano IR5 and promised to consult the band about future development on the remaining lands.

trade.<sup>33</sup> The government also formed the Vancouver Harbour Commissioners to oversee the growth and administration of Burrard Inlet as a shipping harbour.<sup>34</sup> One problem with navigating the harbour, however, was the existence of dozens of unregulated booming grounds. For decades, several Squamish families had received ten to fifty dollars per month from shingle or sawmill owners for the use of the reserves' foreshores as booming grounds. On 17 December 1917, however, the federal government signed a Quit Claim to the Vancouver Harbour Commissioners for the foreshore of the Burrard Inlet reserves. In exchange, the Commissioners paid one dollar, and promised to pay to the Department of Indian Affairs half of the net profits of operating a booming ground on the foreshore.<sup>35</sup> The Commissioners had made it clear years earlier that they were not interested in maximizing revenue; they wanted to improve navigation in the Inlet and hoped to help the timber industry by offering booming privileges for "less than is charged at present in booming grounds operated by private firms."<sup>36</sup> The Squamish did not find out about this policy, or even the quit claim, until after 1917. They asked the department to rescind the agreement, but to no avail.<sup>37</sup> The Squamish were further incensed by late payment by the commissioners. It was not until 1924, after the Squamish complained, that the commissioners remitted half of the annual profits, averaging \$1,000 per year.<sup>38</sup>

The Squamish also lost valuable portions of the Seymour Creek reserve when the Burrard Inlet

---

<sup>33</sup>Roy, Railways, Politicians and the Development of the City of Vancouver, 144.

<sup>34</sup>"Constitution of Vancouver Harbour Commission" in Vancouver Harbour Commissioners, Port of Vancouver, British Columbia: Annual Report, (Vancouver: 1933) 37.

<sup>35</sup>DIA copy of Quit Claim on RG10 v.7786, file 27150-5-2).

<sup>36</sup>W.D. Harris, Secretary, Vancouver Harbour Commissioners to Deputy Superintendent General, Department of Indian Affairs, 6 December 1914. RG10 v. 7786, file 27150-5-2.

<sup>37</sup>Petition of Chief George, Chief Harry and Andrew Paull, c.April, 1920. RG10 v.7786, file 27150-5-2.

<sup>38</sup>W.G. Stickney, Acting Secretary, Vancouver Harbour Commissioners to Deputy Minister, Department of Indian Affairs, 3 May 1924. RG10 v.7786, file 27150-5-2.

Bridge and Tunnel Company expropriated seven and a half acres to construct the Second Narrows Bridge in 1923. The company and the Squamish disagreed over the price to be paid, so the company pushed the matter to arbitration. In arbitration, Justice Cayley deemed the professional valuation obtained by the Department of Indian Affairs to be "sentimental," and accepted the company's offer of \$8,730.55 - roughly one third the value claimed by the department. Cayley found it inappropriate to consider the increase in value that the bridge might bring to the lands and ordered the department to pay the company's costs out of the arbitration award.<sup>39</sup>

One can say two things about the role of land in the Squamish economy from 1913 to 1923. First, prejudice by the dominant white society against the Squamish ensured that Squamish reserves did not produce as much wealth as might have comparable land in the hands of whites. Second, even in the face of this prejudice, land was a major source of wealth for the Squamish, as land sales and compensation for expropriations injected hundreds of thousands of dollars into the Squamish economy. After 1917, timber began to play a similar though smaller role for the Squamish.

The year after the McKenna-McBride Commission ended its hearings the department removed its objections to selling resources in Indian reserves. The department was likely influenced by the complaints that surfaced during the commission's tenure, and by a belief that the province's reversionary interest was a thing of the past, now that the commission had completed its work. The department took surrenders from the Squamish for the timber on their reserves in Howe Sound in 1917 and 1920<sup>40</sup> and allowed both Squamish and non-aboriginal loggers to cut the timber. The department supervised the sales of the timber and deducted a large percentage of the sale price as "timber dues" which it placed into the Squamish trust funds. These timber dues amounted to tens of thousands of dollars in the course of the next ten years.<sup>41</sup>

---

<sup>39</sup>Arbitration Award of H.S. Cayley, c.1924, RG10 v.11079 file "Squamish" part 3G.

<sup>40</sup>12 April 1917 Surrender for Cheakamus IR11, Instrument #X20137, 10 February 1920 Surrender for Waiwakum IR14, Instrument #2125-43, Reserve General Register, DIA.

<sup>41</sup>See summary of timber dues in Appendix C.

Despite the injection of wealth, the Squamish economy still was not stable. Selling land was a short-term means of acquiring wealth; the two other means of acquiring wealth among the Squamish - working for wages and subsistence activities - were still under pressure. For the first time, Squamish people began drawing relief for more than just care for indigent members of the community. Andrew Paull claimed in 1920 that there was a "deluge" of claims for relief because "the law prohibits the Indian from selling fish so he can get money to buy necessities."<sup>42</sup> The Squamish also continued to have trouble finding paid labour. Aboriginal people throughout the province benefitted from a drop in the supply of labour produced by World War One, particularly in the commercial fishing industry,<sup>43</sup> but these gains were offset by a recession. As early as 1913 and certainly by 1915, Premier McBride's policy of using railways to foster economic growth revealed itself to be a bust.<sup>44</sup> Inspector Ditchburn accordingly hoped that the \$81,089 distributed among the Squamish in 1914 from the P.G.E. sale would "carry them over the period of depression when labour is scarce."<sup>45</sup>

Increased restrictions on aboriginal participation in the commercial fishing industry compounded the pressures upon the Squamish economy. In 1913, the Pacific Division of the Fisheries Advisory Board recommended

issuing independent fishing licences to enfranchised Indians only, as there is a provincial and federal policy to issue independent licences to whites only and Indians can already obtain employment with canneries. Opening up Independent licences to Indians would cause whites to lose the licences reserved for them.<sup>46</sup>

---

<sup>42</sup>Letter from Andrew Paull to Peter Byrne, Indian Agent, 3 May 1920. RG10 v.10899 file 167/20-2 (1920-23).

<sup>43</sup>Gladstone, "Native Indians and the Fishing Industry," 30-31.

<sup>44</sup>Jean Barman, The West Beyond the West: A History of British Columbia (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1993) 200.

<sup>45</sup>Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 31 March 1915, 112.

<sup>46</sup>Minute of Meetings, Pacific Division, Fisheries Advisory Board, 21 October 1913. Department of Marine and Fisheries records, Reel 73, file 4591, pt.1.

The government appears not to have acted on this recommendation immediately but Geoff Meggs claimed that when soldiers returned from the War, the Department of Marine and Fisheries adopted a policy of excluding Asians and natives from receiving independent fishing licences.<sup>47</sup>

In subsistence activities, too, the Squamish faced declining opportunities. In 1917, the Department of Marine and Fisheries took the anticipated step of requiring aboriginal fishers to obtain licences for even food fishing. These licences placed limits on the methods and location allowed for food fishing, such methods to be determined by local officials.<sup>48</sup> While Fisheries officials lacked the resources before the War to fully enforce the law,<sup>49</sup> an ecological disaster on the Fraser in 1912 prompted the government to direct more attention to enforcing fishing laws. In that year, a major rock slide occurred in a narrow part of the Fraser River, effectively blocking salmon from migrating further north. As a result, there was a widespread fear that subsequent salmon runs would be disastrously low. It was therefore more important than ever that Fisheries officials protect the limited resource for the highest good, which in their view was the commercial fishing industry. To ensure the resource was protected, the department increased its monitoring of illegal fishing in British Columbia.<sup>50</sup> Locally, the increase in enforcement produced some absurd actions. In 1924, local fisheries officials ordered Indian Agent Perry to warn two young Squamish boys to stop selling or even giving away fish to their friends, as this was a clear violation of the fishing regulations.<sup>51</sup>

Despite the stated intentions of Chiefs Mathias and Harry before the McKenna-McBride

---

<sup>47</sup>Meggs, Salmon, 122.

<sup>48</sup>Order in Council, 11 September 1917. Newell, Tangled Webs, 96.

<sup>49</sup>Dyck, And Then We Will Mind the Law, 40-41.

<sup>50</sup>Meggs, Salmon, 103.

<sup>51</sup>Letter from Agent C.C. Perry to Billy Newman and Henry Newman, 09 October 1924, RG10 v.10899 file 167/20-2 (1920-23).

commission, few Squamish actually took their share of the land sales money and returned to Howe Sound to take up agriculture. Instead, they remained in Burrard Inlet, seeking paid labour, pursuing subsistence activities, and using the proceeds of the land sales to supplement their livelihood. Agent Byrne recognized that there was no hope of the current generation of Squamish living in Burrard Inlet moving back to Howe Sound; working for wages around Vancouver was now ingrained in their economy.<sup>52</sup> Byrne estimated that even the Squamish living in Howe Sound earned at least half of their "livelihood" from "outside labour," primarily by fishing at the canneries and longshoring around Vancouver.<sup>53</sup>

One solution to long-term stability for the Squamish might have been investment in industrial capital. The sales of land and resources from 1913 to 1923 generated close to half a million dollars, which could have supported relatively large scale industrial development. By purchasing donkey engines, logging railroads, modern fishing vessels with mechanized seining equipment, or similar equipment, the Squamish might have ensured long-term wealth and employment for themselves. However, the Squamish did not make such investments. All of the \$220,000 from the Kitsilano sale, half of the P.G.E. and Capilano sales, and part of the revenue from timber sales went directly to individual families who used the money to meet immediate needs. Only a few people used their earnings from the past few years and their share of the land sales to buy gasoline powered boats or hand-logging equipment. There still remained over \$100,000 in the Squamish trust funds by 1923, but the Squamish drew on only a fraction of this money. What money they did spend from their trust funds went primarily towards minor improvements to the reserves or annual distributions of interest.

Indian Affairs officials dismissed the absence of industrial development as a failing of Squamish character. Agent Byrne's opinion that developing Capilano Indian reserve no.5 for industry was "beyond the Indians" was typical. In submitting the P.G.E. transaction for approval to his

---

<sup>52</sup>Royal Commission on Indian Affairs, Evidence, 25 January 1916, 11-12.

<sup>53</sup>Royal Commission on Indian Affairs, Evidence, 28 January 1916, p.496-7.

superiors, Inspector Ditchburn explained that the surrendered lands had

no practical value to the Indians in their present condition and could only be made so at the expenditure of a vast amount of capital in the work of reclamation, and such a huge undertaking of this character would be quite impossible for the Indians.<sup>54</sup>

It is quite likely that Squamish culture was a factor in the general absence of industrial development on the reserves. The traditional Squamish economy was non-industrial; trade and labour were familiar activities, but industrial development was not. In addition to the ambiguous role that culture might have played, however, the Squamish were shackled by constraints that were not of their making, most notable of which was the smothering paternalism of the Department of Indian Affairs.

The absence of industrial development on the Squamish reserves prior to 1913 is understandable given the meagre amount of financial capital that the Squamish possessed. Agent Byrne described, but seems not to have appreciated, the role the department played in a circular problem facing the Squamish. The department was reluctant to permit cutting timber on Squamish reserves, he explained,

in sufficient quantities to justify the establishing of a plant capable of removing the timber economically. ... (In the West) you need a plant costing anywhere from \$5,000 to \$10,000 in donkeys, cable and equipment, and owing to the Department being adverse to permitting the Indians to remove large quantities of timber they are unable to do anything with the land.<sup>55</sup>

However, Byrne offered no opinion on whether the department should change this policy. After 1913 the Squamish had significant financial capital from the sale of reserve lands, but they did not invest it in industrial capital. Part of this condition was likely attributable to cultural values, but the mandatory and restrictive financial management by the department of Indian Affairs played a large role.

---

<sup>54</sup>Letter from W.E. Ditchburn to Frank Pedley, Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, 30 September 1913. RG10 v.4074, file 441,744.

<sup>55</sup>Royal Commission on Indian Affairs, *Evidence*, 28 January 1916, p.481.

Until 1919, the Indian Act required that at least half of the proceeds of a sale of land and at least ninety percent of the proceeds of a sale of timber go into trust funds managed by the Department of Indian Affairs for the Band.<sup>56</sup> In 1919, the government decreased the percentage from timber sales to fifty percent.<sup>57</sup> Once money was in the trust funds, the Indian Act prescribed only two limited pools of expenditures. The first covered maintenance of the reserves such as surveys, compensation to Indians for improvements to reserves, construction of roads, bridges, ditches and watercourses, school buildings and charitable institutions.<sup>58</sup> The second included only purchases of additional lands, cattle, construction of permanent improvements on the reserve or other "works" which the government might consider to be of permanent value or "properly represent capital."<sup>59</sup> It was not until 1924 that the government amended the Act to specifically mention "implements or machinery" and provided for "loans to members of the band to promote progress."<sup>60</sup> One further means by which the department could spend trust funds was to distribute the annual interest from the funds to the members of the band. These modest annual payments - averaging a few dollars per person per year<sup>61</sup> - were popular among the Squamish and considered safe by the Department.

On a more general level, the way that the department administered the trust funds made it virtually impossible to apply trust funds to a single large project. The department placed most of the proceeds from land and timber sales in an account known simply as the "Squamish" account. However, the Squamish were still organized primarily by kin-oriented communities that

---

<sup>56</sup>Indian Act, R.S.C. 1906, c.81, s.89.

<sup>57</sup>Indian Act, s.c. 1919, c.36, s.2.

<sup>58</sup>Indian Act, R.S.C. 1906, c.81, s.89(2).

<sup>59</sup>Indian Act, R.S.C. 1906, c.81, s.90(1).

<sup>60</sup>Indian Act, s.c. 1924, c.47, s.5.

<sup>61</sup>See Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Reports, 1916-1923, Report of the Auditor General, Account #54. Interest distributions continue to the present.



corresponded roughly to several of the reserves..<sup>62</sup> The department required a consensus decision, expressed through a "Band Council Resolution", before releasing money from the trust funds. It was impossible, however, in their current structure, for the Squamish to reach such a consensus. The department had effectively imposed a requirement for communal activity that did not correspond to the traditional Squamish social structure. As a result, it was not possible to plan major expenditures with the Squamish trust funds.

The way that the department distributed the proceeds of sales also inhibited investment in industrial capital. The department distributed the money that did not go into the trust funds directly to the heads of families who were resident primarily on the affected reserve. This broke up the hundreds of thousands of dollars from the land sales of 1913-14 into small units, which made it difficult to invest in large industrial capital.<sup>63</sup> Further, department officials were constantly worried that Indians would squander their money on alcohol or "worthless" things. To avoid this perceived problem, Inspector Ditchburn "deemed it wise" to deposit the money from the P.G.E. sale into the Bank of Montreal and open accounts for the families. Ditchburn then made arrangements with the "bank and the Indians themselves that none of the Indians could draw money unless one of the Chiefs go with them to the bank and see that they do not draw too large a sum at any one time."<sup>64</sup> Thus, the department's distrust of Indians' ability to fend for themselves produced bureaucratic restrictions and delays on the use of not just the trust funds, but also the personal funds of the Squamish.

Andrew Paull summarized the sentiment of the Squamish succinctly: the administration of trust funds was "one of our greatest grievances. It was very difficult for the Indians to make use of that

---

<sup>62</sup>Royal Commission on Indian Affairs, Evidence, 20 June 1913, 12.

<sup>63</sup>John Lutz uncovered similar patterns in the sale of the Songhees reserve in Victoria in 1912. Lutz, "Work, Wages, and Welfare."

<sup>64</sup>Letter from Inspector W.E. Ditchburn to Secretary, Indian Affairs, 2 September 1914. RG10 v.11079 file "Squamish part A."

money that is in Ottawa."<sup>65</sup> The way that the government administered band trust funds inhibited investment in industrial capital by limiting the class of eligible expenditures, by imposing a need for communal decisions on a society without the appropriate structure, and by imposing bureaucratic delays on the expenditure of those funds.

For many Squamish families, barriers to long-term investments in industrial capital were not a major concern. Many families liked having a modest amount of money available - whether through bank accounts or interest distributions from the trust funds - to tide them over hard-times. The restrictions only concerned the small portion of Squamish, like Andrew Paull, Chief Mathias and Chief Harry, who had more ambitious goals for their people. These people were the leaders of the Squamish communities, but their authority to make major decisions that concerned all of the Squamish was limited. All Squamish were economically tied to each other, but there was no one forum to address overlapping interests or set group goals.

In 1922, several Squamish chiefs moved to amalgamate the Squamish bands into a single political/administrative unit. The chiefs felt the need for better planning of the use of their reserves as economic resources but predictably stumbled over the question of how to share these resources. The Squamish bands in Howe Sound were concerned that the bands in Burrard Inlet had already sold as much land and timber as they were going to sell, but wanted to share in any future sale of timber or land in Howe Sound.<sup>66</sup> On 23 July 1923, most of the bands overcame their differences and agreed to amalgamate their trust funds and unite to form the Squamish Band Council. The preamble to the agreement alluded to the tensions that had arisen over the sharing of resources, particularly the trust funds, and declared complete amalgamation to be the best

---

<sup>65</sup>Royal Commission on Indian Affairs, Evidence, 17 June 1913, 6.

<sup>66</sup>Memorandum from Indian Agent Charles Perry to Inspector Ditchburn, 31 December 1922. RG10 v.11079, file "Squamish part C."

solution "for the good government of the members."<sup>67</sup> One band, the Squamish of Burrard Inlet Indian reserve no.3, refused to amalgamate. Chief George explained in a petition that the band knew that they soon would have to "make way for the further development of industry on Burrard Inlet" and hoped to receive compensation for their land. However, they had not received a share of the money paid for previous sales and did not want to share money from the sale of their own reserves or subject themselves to "majority rule."<sup>68</sup> From 1923 onward, the Burrard band therefore conducted itself as a separate entity from the rest of the Squamish.

Amalgamation into a Band Council and uniting the trust funds did not solve any economic problems for the Squamish in and of itself. It did, however, give the Squamish the administrative structure to make large-scale, long-term plans for the economic development of the reserves. This amalgamation came as short-term revenues from land and timber sales were tapering off and the Squamish realized that their economic future would have to include more than just labour and subsistence activities. This amalgamation was timely, for pressures on paid labour and subsistence activities increased after 1923.

---

<sup>67</sup>Agreement and Petition of the Squamish tribe, 23 July 1923. RG10 v.11079 file "Squamish, part C."

<sup>68</sup>Petition from Burrard Inlet no.3 band, 29 January 1923. Letter from Chief George to Inspector Ditchburn, 5 September 1923. RG10 v.11079, file "Squamish, part C."

#### Chapter Four: Subsistence, Labour, and Land, 1923 to 1940.

Following their amalgamation into a single administrative organization, the Squamish were poised to start a new era of economic growth. They seemed ready to move beyond the two pillars of subsistence and labour to become *managers* of resources. The requisite tools were all in place; they had an administrative structure to make major collective decisions, they had resources, and they had money. The Squamish economy did in fact diversify during this period, but not through investment in industrial capital and direct resource exploitation. Instead, the Squamish leased land and sold resources to non-Squamish capitalists, who developed the land and refined the resources themselves. This course of action added a third pillar to the Squamish economy, but it was not the most intensive or lucrative use of their resources.

Becoming landlords was a reasonable means of growth and diversification for the Squamish, given the crises and constraints with which they had to deal. The Department of Indian Affairs continued to provide stifling supervision of Squamish resources, while the Depression, labour disputes, new restrictions on subsistence activities, and expropriations of Squamish reserves forced the Squamish Band Council into a reactive instead of proactive mode for much of its first decade of existence. The Council responded to these crises by co-ordinating the distribution of relief, starting an agricultural experiment in Howe Sound as an alternative means of existence, and working on several fronts to defend Squamish rights. In addition to these reactive ventures, the Council worked with the Department of Indian Affairs to develop its reserves in some way, to take advantage of the growth of local industry. Leasing undeveloped land and selling unprocessed resources was not the most intensive or lucrative use of the reserves, and did not specifically address the problems inherent in relying on labour and subsistence activities, but it did provide the Squamish with a collective sense of security. Individual families might face instability, but revenues from the land and resources of the Squamish reserves provided a communal safety net.

Crises for the fledgling Band Council began almost immediately after its formation in the summer of 1923 with a major labour dispute in the longshoring industry. Class conflict in the longshoring

industry affected the Squamish heavily due to the prominence of longshoring among Squamish men. Since the turn of the century, the Squamish had been active supporters of unions in longshoring. Following the quick demise of a chapter of the I.W.W. among the Squamish, in 1913 the International Longshoremen's Association formed a chapter, Local 38-57. Commonly known as the "Bows and Arrows," the Local was composed mainly of lumber handling aboriginal people in Vancouver. Squamish men occupied many of the executive positions in this organization, and its successor, the Independent Lumber Handler's Association, for the next several decades.<sup>1</sup> Enthusiasm for unions and rising class-consciousness among Vancouver workers, however, was not strong enough to challenge determined employers.

In 1923, several longshoring unions struck for higher wages and better working conditions. Employers brought in strike breakers and formed a management-friendly union among the new workers. Employers then consolidated their hold on the workers by blacklisting many members of the striking unions, including dozens of Squamish longshoremen. One Squamish man responded to the blacklisting by returning to Howe Sound, where he hunted and fished and received \$4.86 per month in relief from band funds.<sup>2</sup> Conditions were so desperate as a result of this blacklisting that the Department of Indian Affairs agreed to distribute \$15,000 from the Band's trust fund after the Squamish Band Council complained of hardship to the "large number of the Indian heads of families participating in the strike."<sup>3</sup>

Squamish workers slowly returned to longshoring, but they had to deal with a hostile union and poor economic conditions. 1929 marked the beginning of the Great Depression in North America, which brought industry to its slowest pace of activity in decades. Locally, the obligation to

---

<sup>1</sup>Philpott, Trade Unionism and Acculturation, 44-45. ILWU, Man Along the Shore, 80.

<sup>2</sup>Philpott, Trade Unionism and Acculturation, 46.

<sup>3</sup>Squamish Band Council Resolution, 7 November 1923, RG10 v.1761, file 63-167. Memorandum from Agent Perry to Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, 15 November 1923, RG10 v.1761, file 63-167.

provide relief to thousands of unemployed people drove the municipal councils of Burnaby and North Vancouver City and District to default on bond payments and hand over administration to provincial commissioners.<sup>4</sup> Dozens of Squamish workers found themselves looking for work. Even August Khahtsalahno, who had decades of experience in sawmilling and logging, was out of work in 1932, blaming his troubles on "hard times."<sup>5</sup> The Squamish Band Council responded to low employment by tapping into its trust funds as much as possible, using it for authorized expenditures like relief, medical expenses, and maintenance on the reserves. Indian Agent Perry was concerned with this practice, but realized that "their longshoring work is limited to the number of ships entering the port and ... they seem to have more time on their hands than would be the case were port conditions more favourable."<sup>6</sup>

Employment opportunities in other areas were equally difficult to find. Hop-picking for wages continued among the Squamish into the 1920s, but it was hard, low-paying, and temporary work. Nevertheless, a few Squamish families still picked hops for a few weeks of the year.<sup>7</sup> Simon Baker, for example, recalled picking hops in Yakima, Washington, as a teenager in 1926 with his brother, his aunt Molly and her granddaughter Connie Band. Pickers earned two cents a pound at that time; a dollar sixty a day was all that Simon Baker could earn, until he found a day job loading forty pound sacks on trucks for five dollars a day. Simon only stayed in Yakima for a few weeks before he left to pursue longshoring in North Vancouver for \$1.30 an hour. This work also lasted only a few weeks, after which Simon tried seine fishing with his uncle.<sup>8</sup> Aboriginal people

---

<sup>4</sup>Bettina Bradbury, "The Road to Receivership: Unemployment and Relief in Burnaby, North Vancouver City and District and West Vancouver, 1929-1933," (Burnaby: Simon Fraser University, M.A. Thesis, 1975) iii, 170.

<sup>5</sup>Matthews, Conversations with Khahtsalahno, 12.

<sup>6</sup>Memorandum from Agent Perry to Duncan Campbell Scott, Deputy Superintendent General, 7 May 1929, RG10 v.1761, file 63-167.

<sup>7</sup>Royal Commission on Indian Affairs, Evidence, 28 January 1916, 57.

<sup>8</sup>Simon Baker, Khot-La-Cha, 53-55.

seeking work in the hop fields were caught by a conflict between Canadian and American employment and immigration officials in the late 1920s. In 1925, United States Immigration officials issued a ruling prohibiting aboriginal people from Canada to cross the border. Indian Commissioner Ditchburn passed the message to Agent Daunt "as no doubt a number of Indians from your Agency will be meditating going to the American side for the purpose of looking for labour."<sup>9</sup> In 1928, Canadian officials retaliated by closing the border to aboriginal people from the United States, and also made provisions through the Employment Service of Canada to supply "white pickers" for the hop-fields in the Fraser valley.<sup>10</sup> Enforcement of these bans was likely nominal and uneven, but it added to the pressures of finding paid labour for aboriginal people in southern British Columbia.

Not only were opportunities for paid labour around Burrard Inlet declining, but so were opportunities for subsistence activities. Evidence of the decline of hunting among the Squamish is indirect and must be inferred from the evidence of the changing environment of the North Shore. Hunting opportunities were limited by increased settlement and development, most visibly by the disappearance of trees and brush in which one might find deer or other game. August Khahtsalahno and Chief Joe Capilano had both hunted elk in the lower mainland in the late nineteenth century, but elk had left the region by the early twentieth century.<sup>11</sup> By the 1920s loggers had exhausted all of the easily accessible stands of timber in Burrard Inlet, significantly changing the landscape. The photographs of logging debris left by the Capilano Timber Company in 1922 (reproduced in Appendix A) illustrate the large scale transformation of the physical environment of Burrard Inlet. The City of Vancouver was so concerned with the impact of large scale logging on the city's water supply, that it forbade logging in the Capilano and Seymour

---

<sup>9</sup>Letter from Commissioner Ditchburn to Agent Daunt, 6 June 1925, RG10 v.10896, file 987/1-1 (1927-39).

<sup>10</sup>A.E. Skinner, Division Commissioner, Department of Immigration and Colonization to A.O'N Daunt, Indian Agent. RG10 v.10896, file 987/1-1 (1927-39).

<sup>11</sup>Matthews, Conversations with Khahtsalahno, 39 & 195. Thornton, Indian Lives and Legends, 120.

watersheds in 1930.<sup>12</sup> Deer might have thrived in the light undergrowth that followed clearcut logging, but the development and settlement of the region likely prevented that from happening. One cannot make absolute statements about hunting in Burrard Inlet by the mid-twentieth century, but it was certainly more difficult to pursue than it had been at the start of the century.

The Squamish also suffered from increased restrictions on their food fishing. By the 1920s Capilano Creek had become one of the most popular destinations for anglers but this was also a popular destination for Squamish food fishers living in Burrard Inlet. In December 1924, the Chief Inspector of Fisheries notified Indian Agent Perry that:

from an angling standpoint and the fact that there are other streams in the vicinity available for the Indians, permission for taking fish from the Capilano by the Indians by nets, gaffe, or other apparatus apart from that employed by anglers, is being withdrawn from the 1st of January next. There is no objection to the Indians fishing with fly or hook and line in a manner any angler uses.<sup>13</sup>

The Squamish did not accept this major encroachment on a long time fishing practice passively. Soon after the order was in force, a Squamish man named Dominic Charlie broke the law and initiated a test case that had major repercussions for the Squamish, the Department of Indian Affairs, and the Department of Marine and Fisheries.

In the summer of 1925, Dominic Charlie was arrested by a fisheries officer for fishing in the Capilano River with a gaffe hook. Agent Perry protested that Charlie caught only "unsaleable" dog salmon that would not "bite fly or spoon," and asked for help in changing the mind of fisheries officials seeking to prosecute him.<sup>14</sup> Secretary McLean responded that the Department

---

<sup>12</sup>Anna G. Kahrer, "Logging and Landscape Change on the North Shore of Burrard Inlet, British Columbia, 1860s to 1930s," (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, M.A. Thesis, 1988) 21.

<sup>13</sup>Recorded in a letter from Indian Agent C.C. Perry to Andrew Paull, Secretary, Squamish Indians, 24 December 1924, RG10 v.10899 file 167/20-2 (1924).

<sup>14</sup>Telegram from C.C. Perry to Secretary, DIA, 24 October 1925, contained in Memorandum from Agent Perry to Indian Commissioner Ditchburn, 16.Nov.1925, RG10 v.10899 file 167/20-2



of Marine and Fisheries considered Capilano Stream to be "one of the best sporting streams in [the] Province." McLean was not willing to intervene, for he agreed that it was "in [the] best interests of [the] province [that] this stream should be reserved for angling."<sup>15</sup>

The charge proceeded to a police magistrate on 2 November 1925. Agent Perry represented Dominic Charlie and protested that the Indian Act applied to the administration of Indian lands, including the rivers and streams that ran through them. Magistrate Alex Philip agreed with Perry and dismissed the case, asserting that "Fisheries Officers have no jurisdiction with regard to Fisheries within Indian reserves."<sup>16</sup> Sensing the importance of the case, the fisheries officials appealed to the British Columbia County Court. Agent Perry received the support of his peer, Agent Hyde of Hazelton, B.C., who urged Perry to succeed against "sometimes too officious officers, who think because they are armed with acts, they must enforce them to the letter."<sup>17</sup>

The Squamish Band Council and the Department of Indian Affairs both appreciated the significance of the case and each hired counsel. The department had changed its perception of the issue and was concerned with an apparent infringement of its jurisdiction.<sup>18</sup> The Squamish Band Council was not satisfied with either the ardour or goals of the department, and hired its own

---

(1925-26).

<sup>15</sup>Telegram from J.D. McLean, Secretary, DIA, to C.C. Perry, 26 October 1925, contained in Perry's memorandum of 16 November 1925, RG10 v.10899 file 167/20-2 (1925-26).

<sup>16</sup>Memorandum of C.C. Perry, 16 November 1925, RG10 v.10899 file 167/20-2 (1925-26). Perry also noted that Andrew Paull and Rev. P.R. Kelly, President of the Allied Indian Tribes of B.C. offered their support of him in arguing the case.

<sup>17</sup>Letter from E. Hyde to C.C. Perry, 23 November 1925, RG10 v.10899 file 167/20-2 (1925-26).

<sup>18</sup>Letter from Commissioner Ditchburn to C.C. Perry, 05 December 1925, RG10 v.10899 file 167/20-2 (1925-26).

lawyer to protect the interests of the accused, Dominic Charlie.<sup>19</sup> Mr. Justice Cayley heard the case and issued his judgment on 14 December 1925. He concluded that the federal government may regulate Indian fishing and held that the order of Inspector Motherwell was valid. "I do not see," wrote Justice Cayley, "that any right of an Indian is interfered with in hunting and fishing on his reserve. He can hunt and fish all he wishes to. The Fisheries Act only says he shall not use destructive methods." Justice Cayley overturned the decision of the police magistrate, but issued a nominal fine of one dollar and did not order the defendant to pay costs.<sup>20</sup> The Squamish protested Justice Cayley's decision,<sup>21</sup> but the fight was over. Possibly due to the cost of litigation, neither the department nor Dominic Charlie appealed the decision. It was now part of British Columbia jurisprudence that the Department of Marine and Fisheries could regulate the use of rivers that even passed through Indian reserves and did not have to consider aboriginal fishing rights. Once again, government regulators perceived of aboriginal fishers as "destructive" competitors to the "legitimate" endeavours of white-sponsored industry.<sup>22</sup>

The Dominic Charlie case added to the pressures facing Squamish food fishers, but it was not the only pressure. Fisheries officials also harassed Squamish for failing to comply with the most technical details of fishing regulations. Only Squamish *men* applied for food fishing permits by the mid-1920s,<sup>23</sup> but Squamish *women* occasionally fished for food purposes also. When they did

---

<sup>19</sup>Telegram from C.C. Perry to Secretary, DIA, 08 December 1925, RG10 v.10899 file 167/20-2 (1925-26).

<sup>20</sup>unreported decision of Mr. Justice Cayley, R. v. Charlie, B.C. County Court., 8 December 1925, found in RG10 v.10899 file 167/20-2 (1925-26).

<sup>21</sup>Squamish Band Council Resolution, 16 December 1925, RG10 v.10899 167/20-2 (1925-26). Letter from Andrew Paull to C.C. Perry, 11 October 1926, RG10 v.10899 file 987/20-2 (1925-27).

<sup>22</sup>It was not until R. v. Sparrow (1990) 70 D.L.R. (4th) 385 (S.C.C.), that the courts fully reversed the law on this issue.

<sup>23</sup>List compiled by Unknown person, possibly Indian Agent Perry, c.1927, RG10 v.10899 987/20-2 (1925-27). The list also includes names of applicants from the Burrard IR3, Sechelt,

so, fisheries officials harrassed these women for not having licences, ignoring that their spouses might have had licences. Chief Harry of Seymour Creek IR2 complained in 1925 that fisheries officers were seizing the nets of Indian women who fished on the reserve and did not want the women to fish.<sup>24</sup> On a more general level, Andrew Paull complained in 1926 that fisheries regulations made it hard for most Squamish to catch the several hundred fish each person needed to salt and dry for the winter.<sup>25</sup> Subsistence activities were still important to many Squamish families, but mounting restrictions were threatening the viability of these pursuits.

When faced with these serious economic problems, the youthful Squamish Band Council focused primarily on short term solutions, generally by using the trust funds to provide relief and to pay for as many things as the Indian Act allowed. Paint, ploughs, harrows and rakes served to improve the houses and land on the reserves, while money spent on instruments allowed the Squamish to develop a popular musical band that performed at local events.<sup>26</sup> The Council also began to look for means of long-term economic security. Resource exploitation was the logical way to diversify the Squamish economy in the context of British Columbia's industrial capitalist economy, but the Squamish and the department did not pursue this route. Instead of constructing and operating industrial operations on the reserves in Burrard Inlet, the Squamish leased their land on an unimproved basis for use by non-Squamish industrial capitalists. These capitalists developed the land themselves with saw and shingle mills and gravel processing plants, and occasionally hired Squamish people as labourers. This approach earned money for the Squamish immediately, but was not the most profitable use of the land or resources of the Squamish

---

Sliammon, Homalco, Klahoose and Musqueam bands. For each of these bands the applicants represented the majority of adult males in each community.

<sup>24</sup>Letter from Chief Harry to Indian Agent Perry, c. August 1925, RG10 v.10899 v.167/20-2 (1924).

<sup>25</sup>Andrew Paull to Agent C.C. Perry, 11 October 1926, RG10 v.10899 file 987/20-2 (1925-27).

<sup>26</sup>See, for example, Band Council Resolution, 19 August 1924. RG10 v.1761, file 63-167.

reserves. It was, however, an understandable approach; neither bureaucrats in the Department of Indian Affairs nor the fledgling Council had any experience as managers of such a large undertaking and it took most of both parties' time just to respond to the numerous crises that arose.

One of the first land-revenue issues to which the Council turned its attention was revenue from its foreshore. The Squamish were not pleased with the amount of money or speed of payment they received from the Vancouver Harbour Commissioners for its management of the foreshores covered by the 1917 Quit Claim agreement. In 1925, Squamish representatives and the Harbour Commissioners agreed that \$50,000 would be sufficient to cancel the Squamish interest in the foreshore completely, but the deal failed because the Commissioners insisted that the Department of Marine and Fisheries should provide the money.<sup>27</sup> Instead, the Squamish continued to press the Commissioners for payments, which varied from year to year over the next few decades, but averaged a thousand dollars per year for several decades. Similarly, the Council revisited the matter of Kitsilano Indian reserve no.6. No Squamish had lived on the reserve since the 1913 agreement, but in 1924 the Council asked the department to inquire into the status of the reserve.<sup>28</sup> Although it took several years, the department eventually convinced the province that the Squamish had the right to revenues from leasing out the Kitsilano reserve, even though they could no longer live on it. By 1930, the Squamish were receiving several hundred to several thousand dollars per year in leasing revenues from this reserve alone.<sup>29</sup>

The most visible feature of long-term economic planning by the Squamish in the 1920s was the transformation of Seymour Creek Indian reserve no.2 from a small residential community to an industrial park. In the early 1920s, the Squamish sold gravel from the Seymour Creek reserve

---

<sup>27</sup>Letter from Agent Charles Perry to Secretary, DIA, 18 September 1925, RG10 v.10903, file "Vancouver - Squamish IR2 - lease."

<sup>28</sup>Band Council Resolution, 8 February 1924. RG10 v.1761, file 63-167.

<sup>29</sup>See chart of leasing revenues, 1930-1940, in Appendix D.

and leased part of the land to construction companies. Pemberton & Son was the first such lessee, paying \$200/year for a light rail line and 4 cents/cubic yard for whatever gravel they removed, to a maximum of 100,000 cubic yards.<sup>30</sup> Several Squamish families also collected a few dollars a month rent from the Hastings shingle mill for the use of part of the reserve in the early 1920s.<sup>31</sup> Other lumber companies had used portions of Seymour Creek reserve with informal approval from individual families, but in 1926 the Council and the department decided to take a more coordinated approach to the reserve.

The transformation of the Seymour Creek reserve was a logical response to the changing environment of Burrard Inlet. Increased shipping and the completion of the Second Narrows Bridge supported the growth of industry in Burrard Inlet. To take advantage of this growth, the department had the Seymour Creek reserve surveyed and divided into industrial sites in February 1926.<sup>32</sup> One of the first tenants of the industrial park was the Cotton company, who paid \$500/year plus 6 cents/cubic yard for gravel removed from an 11.5 acre operation.<sup>33</sup> The Cotton company expanded its use of the reserve under separate leases to a related company, Cascade Rock and Gravel, and to executive members of the company, W.J. Timlick and Will Ellis. Beginning in 1926, the Squamish also leased a small site in the subdivision for a shingle mill for

---

<sup>30</sup>Letter from Duncan Campbell Scott, Deputy Superintendent General, DIA to Pemberton & Son, 3 January 1924. RG10 v.11079, file "Squamish" part 3G. Pemberton sub-contracted the work to Northern Construction company, who paid \$1,637.56 for gravel it removed in 1926. Letter from J.W. Stewart, Northern Construction Company to C.C. Perry, Indian Agent, 5 March 1926. RG10 v.10903, file 987/32-7-2 (1923-30).

<sup>31</sup>Letter from Hastings Shingle Ltd. to C.C. Perry, Indian Agent, 15 June 1925. RG10 v.10903 file "Vancouver - Squamish IR2 - lease" (1923-36).

<sup>32</sup>Letter from W.E. Ditchburn, Indian Commissioner, to Rodger Burnes, B.C.L.S., 8 February 1926. RG10 v.11006, file 987/33-14.

<sup>33</sup>Letter from J.D. McLean, Assistant Deputy and Secretary, DIA, to C.C. Perry, Indian Agent, 12 January 1926. RG10 v.10903, file 987/32-7-2 (1924-27).

\$500 per year.<sup>34</sup> Together, these leases and gravel rights brought in several thousand dollars per year for the Squamish.<sup>35</sup>

The Council also showed a good understanding of other areas of the local economy. In 1924, it rejected an application by the Gibson's Landing Development and Improvement Association to lease part of Checkwelp Indian reserve no.26. Instead, the Council proposed subdividing the reserve and renting individual lots as summer residences for vacationers from Vancouver.<sup>36</sup> This action resulted in steady revenues of almost a thousand dollars per year for the next several decades, with few long-term obligations. Similarly, the Squamish leased out the foreshore of some of its reserves in Howe Sound to logging companies, for use as booming grounds.<sup>37</sup>

By the 1930s, the reserves in Burrard Inlet were generating tens of thousands of dollars of revenue per year, but this revenue brought special problems with it. By leasing land for industrial purposes, the Squamish linked themselves to the ebb and flow of the provincial economy; when times went bad in British Columbia, the Squamish suffered with the rest of the economy. Further, the Department of Indian Affairs supervised all land transactions by obtaining a surrender from the affected Band, then administering the land itself. Not surprisingly, bureaucrats proved to be occasionally inept. From 1930 to 1933, for instance, a major portion of Seymour Creek reserve no.2 sat vacant because the department mishandled a major lease. In 1929, Seaboard Oil & Gas was willing to pay \$3321 per year in rent, but the department was too slow in drafting a lease.

---

<sup>34</sup>"History of the Burrard Shingle Co. Lease - Squamish I.R. 2". c.June 1943. RG10 v.11006, file 987/33-14. Interestingly, the Squamish Council initially proposed renting the land for \$1000 per month because many Council members were longshoremen hurt by the strike of 1923 and who bore a "grudge against sawmill companies in general." Band Council Resolution, 24 August 1925. RG10 v.11006, file 987/33-14.

<sup>35</sup>see Appendix D.

<sup>36</sup>Band Council Resolution, 8 February 1924. Band Council Resolution, 19 August 1924. RG10 v.1761, file 63-167.

<sup>37</sup>See Appendix D.

Seaboard claimed that the delay caused it to lose its financing and abandoned the property.<sup>38</sup> When the department thought to seek damages for breach of contract, the company had no assets left in the province.<sup>39</sup> Similarly, the department granted overlapping leases to two different companies in the 1930s, which allowed the tenants to make significant deductions from their rent, and allowed one company to lower its rent due to a fire on the tenant's premises, but then forgot to raise the rent in subsequent years.<sup>40</sup> Department officials were well-meaning and often vigilant, but they occasionally stumbled as managers of industrial property.

Disposing of natural resources like gravel and timber on a large scale also forced the Squamish to confront unfamiliar environmental issues. The Squamish proceeded to sell gravel from Seymour Creek reserve no.2 despite warnings in 1925 that doing so would weaken the banks of Seymour Creek and cause sand bars to shift.<sup>41</sup> Although nobody thought to record it, disrupting sand banks and gravel beds in the creek would have caused serious harm to salmon spawning grounds. Female salmon lay their eggs in shallow sand and gravel, where the males fertilize them. The eggs must remain undisturbed for several weeks before they hatch. If lessees of the reserve were removing tens of thousands of cubic yards of gravel each year, the number of salmon that spawned in Seymour Creek - and whose offspring could return to spawn in a few years - likely dropped significantly. Seymour Creek was not a major fishing ground, but it was important to at least a few families. The Squamish encountered environmental problems in exploiting their timber resources. In 1946, the department commissioned a report on the forest stands of the

---

<sup>38</sup>Draft Lease dated 20 June 1930. RG10 v.10903, file 987/32-7-2 (1929-34). Letter from Seaboard Oil & Refining Company to Department of Indian Affairs, 27 June 1930. RG10 v.10903, file 987/32-7-2 (1929-34).

<sup>39</sup>Letter from F.J.C. Ball, Indian Agent, to Secretary, DIA, 9 February 1934. RG10 v.10903, file 987/32-7-2 (1929-34).

<sup>40</sup>Memorandum from D.J. Allen, Reserves & Trusts, to D.M. McKay, Indian Commissioner for B.C., 14 September 1943. RG10 v.11006, file 987/33-14.

<sup>41</sup>Letter from G.E. Webb, District Chief Engineer, to J.T. Johnson, Dominion Water & Power service, Ottawa, 13 October 1925. RG10 v.11006, file 987/33-14.

Cheakamus reserve in Howe Sound. The author of the report, R.C. Telford, thoroughly criticized the existing management (or lack thereof) of this forest. Telford felt that the unsupervised granting of small (less than 500,000 feet of timber) licenses without on-the-ground supervision had resulted in a patchwork of cut and uncut timber. Squamish loggers' understandable preference for the easiest, most accessible stands had consequently threatened the potential for sustained cutting.<sup>42</sup>

Partly due to environmental concerns, but mostly due to conservative and pessimistic paternalism, the Department of Indian Affairs sometimes limited Squamish use of their reserves to the most basic of activities. To an extent, many Squamish shared this pessimistic and conservative outlook. In 1937, Indian Agent Ball rejected two applications from logging companies to purchase large amounts of timber on the Cheakamus reserve. Instead of selling large stands, the department now only advocated letting individual Squamish hand-log a few dozen trees at a time for moderate sums of money. Ball explained to one purchaser that the Squamish "think the time may come when this last stand of their timber may provide employment for many of them."<sup>43</sup> Not everyone agreed that Cheakamus should be only a subsistence refuge, but Agent Ball and the Indian Act discouraged entrepreneurs who wanted more out of the reserve. In 1940 Louie Lewis negotiated with the Mohawk Handle Company of Vancouver to sell a large amount of hardwood. When Mohawk asked for the department's permission, Agent Ball promptly discouraged the idea. "I do not think," Ball wrote to Mohawk, "the Indians would ever cut enough alder and maple to warrant the installation of a siding (to load logs) on their account."<sup>44</sup>

A Squamish man named Moses Billy was also frustrated by the Indian Agent and the Indian Act

---

<sup>42</sup>Report of R.C. Telford, 1946, RG10 v.11078, file 167/20-7-7.

<sup>43</sup>Agent Ball to R.E. Jordan, 17 March 1937. See also "rejected" notes on application of W.J. Dent & Sons, 5 July 1937. RG10 v.10902, file "timber sales."

<sup>44</sup>Agent Ball to Mohawk Handle Company Ltd., 24 April 1940. RG10 v.10902, file "timber sales."



in his plans for a major logging venture. Moses Billy had arranged with a crew of six Squamish men to cut hardwood for W.J. Dent & Sons. The company required at least 500,000 feet of hardwood and wanted to provide Billy with \$1,000 for a logging truck, but the company was concerned that "a contract with an Indian is not binding."<sup>45</sup> This concern was partly justified. The Indian Act prevented any non-Indian from taking security in any real or personal property of an Indian that was located on an Indian reserve. There was an exception that might have covered the truck, but Dent might not have been able to collect on any loan to Moses Billy if the collateral was on the reserve. These provisions of the Act were created in the 1800s to protect "foolish" Indians from "tricky" whites, but the effect was to inhibit non-Indian investment in Indian business ventures.<sup>46</sup> Agent Ball further frustrated Moses Billy's plans by limiting the timber permit to 300,000 feet of timber because he did not recommend "realising a large sum in a short time ... which would be promptly squandered as far as the Indian share of the proceeds is concerned."<sup>47</sup> Moses Billy could not deal with these obstacles and decided to abandon the project in favour of fishing and longshoring. Agent Ball misinterpreted Moses Billy's reasons for abandoning his logging venture; he cynically reported to his superiors that the Squamish only logged when other work failed. Ironically, Agent Ball then claimed that "no able bodied Squamish Indian will ever apply for relief, because he knows he will be told to go to Cheakamus and cut timber for a living."<sup>48</sup>

Some Squamish men exercised their entrepreneurial skills, but generally by going outside of the department's sphere of influence. Andrew Paull, for instance, worked as a sports and

---

<sup>45</sup>Letter from W.J. Dent & Sons to Indian Agent, Vancouver, 28 July 1941. RG10 v.10902, file "timber sales."

<sup>46</sup>Indian Act, R.S.C. 1927, c.98, s.105.

<sup>47</sup>Letter from F.J.C. Ball to Secretary, DIA, 14 August 1941. RG10 v.10901, file 167/20-7 (1939-45).

<sup>48</sup>Letter from F.J.C. Ball to H.W. McGill, Director of Indian Affairs, 26 August 1941. RG10 v.10901, file 167/20-7 (1939-45).

entertainment promoter, among other things. He even recruited several Squamish to play for his semi-professional lacrosse team in the 1930s.<sup>49</sup> In the 1920s, Paull negotiated with a local business man to set up an "amusement park or auto camp" on a piece of land in North Vancouver in exchange for \$400 per year and 10% of the venture's profits. Paull showed good business planning by reserving a parcel of this land for himself for a gas station.<sup>50</sup> In the 1920s and 1930s, Chief Joe Capilano toured white communities in southern British Columbia and northern Washington, selling Indian "souvenirs" including totem poles.<sup>51</sup> These men were exceptional members of their community, however, and were even ostracized by some Squamish for their opportunistic activities.

Most Squamish dealt with difficult economic times by maintaining a variety of sources of income. In one year, for example, Simon Baker picked hops in Washington state, did some longshoring in North Vancouver, seine fished with his uncle near Qualicum beach, and cut firewood back in North Vancouver. The next year he joined his brother fishing on the Skeena for the summer. Simon pulled the boat while his brother worked the nets.<sup>52</sup> Simon Baker, Andrew Paull, and Chief Joe Capilano's stories illustrate the fact that the Squamish economy operated on many levels. While the Band Council was concerned with communal opportunities and challenges, individuals and families demonstrated impressive initiative to make a living for themselves. The economic, social, and political environment of Burrard made such initiative necessary.

Relationships with municipal governments continued to be a problem for the Squamish into the

---

<sup>49</sup>Letter from Agent Ball to C.C. Perry, 1 June 1933. RG10 v.11079, file "Squamish" part B.

<sup>50</sup>Lease agreement between Andrew Paull and Will Ellis, 30 August 1927. RG10 v.11006, file 987/33-14.

<sup>51</sup>Thornton, Indian Lives and Legends, 126-128. See Appendix A for a photograph of Chief Capilano's souvenir shop.

<sup>52</sup>Simon Baker, Khot-La-Cha, 54-57.

1930s. In the late 1920s, The City of Vancouver began plans for the Burrard street bridge across False Creek. The city's preferred route lay across part of Kitsilano Indian reserve no.6, still ostensibly held by the Crown for the Squamish. The city decided to push the matter to arbitration. The Department of Indian Affairs estimated that the eight acres required by the City of Vancouver was worth \$132,972.10,<sup>53</sup> which was consistent with the value of surrounding lands that were zoned for industrial use. The city used a devious tactic to arrive at a lower valuation. The city passed a zoning by-law declaring that the Kitsilano lands would be zoned for residential use once they were expropriated. Accordingly, the city argued, the lands were worth only \$44,988.58. The department protested that this was illegal, and inequitable because the City would benefit by its own wrong-doing,<sup>54</sup> but the arbitrator accepted the City's ploy. Further, the arbitrator ordered the department to pay the city's costs out of the arbitration award. Andrew Paull later claimed that, after paying the city's costs and those of the Squamish and the Department, the Squamish only received \$16,134.08 of the award.<sup>55</sup> In 1923 the arbitrator in the expropriation proceedings for the Second Narrows Bridge ruled that the Squamish should not be compensated according to the value that their land might have *after* the Bridge was constructed. Exactly the opposite principles guided the arbitrator when considering the proposed Burrard Bridge in 1931. In the face of (white) public interest, principles were apparently malleable.

By 1930, leasing reserve land showed excellent potential but was not yet a major source of money for the Squamish. When the extent of the Depression became evident in the early 1930s, many Squamish became desperate. Dozens of Squamish families living in Burrard Inlet decided to

---

<sup>53</sup>Letter from Scott to Mayor L.D. Taylor, 23.Feb.1931, RG10 v.11062 file 33/14 "Squamish" part 3E.

<sup>54</sup>Letter from Lennie & McMaster, Barrister & Solicitors, to W.E. Ditchburn, Superintendent of British Columbia Indian Affairs, 27 May 1932. RG10 v.11062, file 33/14 "Squamish part 3B."

<sup>55</sup>J.S. Matthews, Conversations with Khahtsalahno, 206. See also, Zaharoff, Success in Struggle, 164. Zaharoff incorrectly describes the right of way as being only 6.241 acres. See Reserve General Register, Abstract for Kitsilano Indian reserve no.6 and Instrument #F21167-5A for an accurate description of the land.

follow the advice of the Department of Indian Affairs and pursue agriculture in Howe Sound as an alternative means of existence. Agent Ball reported in 1933 that seventeen families were planning an agricultural "scheme" on Cheakamus Indian reserve no.11, by trying to clear land and eventually settle there permanently. Agent Ball and the Squamish Band Council supported this effort by committing \$2500 for these families' expenses.<sup>56</sup> C.C. Perry, now Assistant Indian Commissioner for B.C., was reluctant to authorize the payment from the trust funds because he was sceptical of the long-term success of this venture, especially once the fishing season started.<sup>57</sup>

However, the department's agricultural agent convinced Perry to support the plan. The agricultural agent was impressed with the efforts of the families at Cheakamus and was equally impressed by the tales of "hard times (in) the past few years in Vancouver."<sup>58</sup> Perry was nervous of a Band Council resolution to spend a further \$8,000 on the project, now for only thirteen families, but ultimately approved of the plan.<sup>59</sup> The department has no record of how this experiment turned out, but its significance lies primarily in the fact that the Squamish felt desperate enough to pursue a plan with such limited potential. The best these people could have hoped for was to meet their subsistence needs, as the region was not developed enough for any kind of commercial agriculture; still, they considered it to be a better alternative than to remain in Burrard Inlet. The story is also significant for its revelation that, while Department of Indian Affairs' policies clearly supported such a project, bureaucrats were reluctant to authorize so major an undertaking. They were comfortable with stop-gap or cosmetic ventures, but balked at anything meaningful.

---

<sup>56</sup>Letter from Agent Ball to H.W. McGill, Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, 13 April 1933. RG10 v.11079, file "Squamish" part B.

<sup>57</sup>Letter from C.C. Perry to H.W. McGill, Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, 13 April 1933. RG10 v.11079, file "Squamish" part B.

<sup>58</sup>Report of J.D. Caldwell, Indian Agricultural Agent for B.C., 2 May 1933. RG10 v.11079, file "Squamish" part B.

<sup>59</sup>Joint Letter of C.C. Perry, F.J.C. Ball and J.D. Caldwell to H.W. McGill, 30 June 1933. RG10 v.11079, file "Squamish" part B.

By the middle of the 1930s, economic conditions for the Squamish had improved. By 1932, Simon Baker was able to buy his own fishing boat and fish on the Fraser, after spending many years working for credit on the Skeena. This was still insecure work, for fish prices fluctuated wildly. In 1934, Simon caught thousands of pink salmon, but only six hundred sockeye. "You would think," claimed Simon, "with that much fish we could make a lot of money, but we didn't because we were getting only one and a half cents for each humpback (pink). We got fifty cents a fish for sockeyes." As it turned out, Simon's wife Emily made more money in wages working for a cannery that summer.<sup>60</sup>

Longshoring opportunities also increased in 1935 when the formerly management-friendly union went on strike. Several Squamish men took work as strike breakers but then helped form a new union, the North Vancouver Longshoremen's Association. Several Squamish were executive members of this new union which had fifty five Squamish among the eighty two members<sup>61</sup> To assist the new union, the Squamish Band Council even allowed the union to use part of the Band Council facilities as a dispatching office.<sup>62</sup> Returning to longshoring had a price, however, because longshoring was no longer a casual means of employment; it was difficult to enter and leave the workforce if one wanted to pursue a variety of economic activities. A few Squamish chose to abandon longshoring altogether because of these changes, but most chose to become semi-permanent longshoremen.<sup>63</sup> It was in 1935 that Simon Baker, now married with children, gave up pursuing a variety of jobs in favour of being a longshoreman. He lived on the Capilano reserve with his family, and with a three hundred dollar loan from the Band Council he built a house with a bathroom and hot water, one of the first such houses on the reserve.<sup>64</sup> Longshoring

---

<sup>60</sup>Simon Baker, Khot-La-Cha, 58, 66-67.

<sup>61</sup>Philpott, Trade Unionism and Acculturation, 46.

<sup>62</sup>Band Council Resolution, 16 October 1935, RG10 v.1761, file 63-167.

<sup>63</sup>Philpot, Trade Unionism and Acculturation, 52.

<sup>64</sup>Simon Baker, Khot-La-Cha, 71-72, 76.

provided many Squamish men with good, consistent wages for many years after that, and helped form a coarse but intimate bond between men in the loading gangs.

On the eve of World War Two, the Squamish economy was a paradox of instability and security. Individual families continued to rely on paid labour and, to a lesser extent, subsistence activities for their direct means of existence. The extent to which a family pursued paid labour or subsistence depended on where they were primarily resident. Opportunities for paid labour were higher in Burrard Inlet than in Howe Sound, but so were the constraints on subsistence activities. For both means of existence, instability was common. Restrictions on subsistence activities grew continually with the expansion of settlement and industry, while the low or semi-skilled jobs that were most common among the Squamish were also the most susceptible to swings in the labour market. However, revenues from the leasing and sale of reserve lands and resources provided the Squamish with a communal sense of security. The three pillars of the Squamish economy - subsistence, labour, and land - were essentially discrete, but combined to provide the Squamish with a viable means of existence.

## Conclusion

The arrival of white settlement and industry in the mid-nineteenth century brought both opportunity and discrimination to the Squamish. White society's arrival offered the Squamish the opportunity to improve their material standard of living through the pursuit of new economic activities. However, white capitalists and government officials offered only a limited recognition of aboriginal claims to land and resources. As a result, the Squamish entered the white economy as labourers, not as owners of resources. The Squamish economy grew and expanded because of their pursuit of paid labour but became unstable as immigration to the province increased competition in the market for labour. The growth of white society also created other pressures for the Squamish. Subsistence activities became subject to increasing restrictions, municipal and provincial governments tried to acquire Squamish reserve lands without paying the Squamish fair market value, and the federal government smothered Squamish ambitions with benevolent but conservative and pessimistic paternalism. Partly due to these pressures, but partly in spite of them, the Squamish disposed of large portions of their reserves in the early twentieth century, injecting much needed wealth into their economy, but without solving its underlying problems. Over the course of several decades, the Squamish re-organized themselves to address these underlying problems. Their solution - essentially becoming landlords in the local industrial economy - was not the most intensive or lucrative use of Squamish resources, but it added a communal sense of security to an otherwise unstable economy. By the start of World War Two, the Squamish economy had moved beyond subsistence and trade to rest upon three pillars - subsistence, labour, and land.

In the course of eighty years, 1860 to 1940, the Squamish economy changed dramatically, but it also retained many familiar traits. Many Squamish families retained a seasonal, diverse approach to acquiring wealth, although the activities they pursued changed over time. Although the kin-group was not as prominent an economic unit in 1940 as it was in 1860, it still bound Squamish families together in matters concerning revenue from land. Working with relatives, but not the whole kin-group, remained a prominent feature of Squamish activity in subsistence and

commercial fishing, longshoring, and hop-picking. Further, the dichotomy that government regulators imposed on commercial fishing versus aboriginal food fishing cannot hide the resonant similarities in technology, time, place, and even goals between the two.

It is impossible to say if the Squamish were economically better off in 1940 than they were in 1860 because the standards of success and failure were different. In 1940, the Squamish certainly did not want for the necessities of life, so one might argue they had achieved a superior level of economic security. However, there were trends in their economy that were cause for different kinds of concern. Throughout the period under study, the Squamish were employed primarily at low or semi-skilled positions. These positions were the most vulnerable to swings in the provincial economy, particularly in the labour market. Further, restrictions on subsistence activities showed no signs of abating; indeed, it was clear by 1940 that conflicts between subsistence and the interests of industry or settlement were always won by the latter. Even the rise of land as a pillar of the Squamish economy was cause for some concern because it provided Squamish families with money, but not with anything to do. Unemployment, annual distributions of interest, and payment of relief accordingly increased among the Squamish after World War Two,<sup>1</sup> which raises awkward - and arguably unresolvable - questions of social policy.

The Squamish had a complex relationship with white society; the effect on the Squamish of that relationship was far from homogeneous. The experiences of individuals within the Squamish community were fundamentally diverse, as the stories of Chief Joe Capilano, Chief Joe Mathias, August Khahtsalahno, Andrew Paull, Dominic Charlie, and Chief Simon Baker illustrated. There was also diversity in the experience over time, as fortunes rose and fell with new developments. Any given Squamish family experienced both hardship and prosperity within relatively short periods of time.

---

<sup>1</sup>See Appendix E for surveys of Squamish employment statistics in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s.



It is not realistic to argue that contact with white society brought unrelenting oppression to the Squamish, for contact brought opportunity as well. Illustrating the opportunities that existed, and the efforts of the Squamish to exploit those opportunities, however, does not detract from the discrimination suffered by the Squamish - it makes it real. The Squamish made choices on how to live their lives according to their own values, but they did so within constraints that were not of their own making.

## Bibliography

### A. Primary sources

#### 1. Published Sources

Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 1872-1940.

Papers Connected with the Indian Land Question (Victoria: Government Printer, 1875), 75.

Royal Commission on Indian Affairs for the Province of British Columbia, Report (Victoria: 1916).

Indian Act, R.S.C. 1886, c.43; R.S.C.1906, c.81; R.S.C. 1927, c.98.

#### 2. Unpublished Sources

Royal Commission on Indian Affairs for the Province of British Columbia, Evidence and Transcripts of Proceedings (New Westminster Agency) (Victoria: 1913-1916). In the possession of the British Columbia Archives and Records Service, and in the possession of the Department of Indian Affairs, Lands & Trust Services.

Records of the Department of Indian Affairs, National Archives of Canada, Record Group 10, Black Series (Western Canada).

RG10 v.1451, Letterbook 1897-98.

RG10 v.1452, Letterbook, 1898-99.

RG10 v.1493.

RG10 v.1761, file 63-167.

RG10 v.3741, file 28835-2.

RG10 v.4049 file 361,780.

RG10 v.4074, file 441,744.

RG10 v.4089, file 521,804.

RG10 v. 7786, file 27150-5-2.

RG10 v.10896, file 167/1903-21.

RG10 v.10896, file 987/1-1 (1927-39).

RG10 v.10899 file 167/20-2 (1920-23).

RG10 v.10899 file 167/20-2 (1924).

RG10 v.10899 file 167/20-2 (1925-26).

RG10 v.10899 file 987/20-2 (1925-27).

RG10 v.10901, file 167/20-7 (1939-45).

RG10 v.10902, file "timber sales."

RG10 v.10903, file "Vancouver - Squamish IR2 - lease."

RG10 v.10903, file 987/32-7-2 (1923-30).

RG10 v.11002, file 974/34-23  
 RG10 v.11006, file 987/33-14.  
 RG10 v.11062 file 33/14  
 RG10 v.11078, file 167/20-7-7.  
 RG10 v.11079, file "Squamish"

Department of Indian Affairs, Reserve General Register.

Department of Marine and Fisheries records, UBC Collections, Reel 73, file 4591, pt.1.

Andrew Paull, untitled article, Oblate Missions (Dec.1950-Mar.1951), 7-10. Oblate Archives, Vancouver, Box 47 - "St. Paul's Church," file 4 - "history."

## **B. Secondary Sources**

### 1. Published Sources

Baker, Simon (edited by Verna J. Kirkness), Khot-la-Cha: The Autobiography of Chief Simon Baker (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 1994).

Barman, Jean, The West Beyond the West: A History of British Columbia (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1993).

Carstens, Peter, The Queen's People: A Study of Hegemony, Coercion, and Accommodation among the Okanagan of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1991).

Carter, Sarah, Lost Harvests: Prairie Indian Reserve Farmers and Government Policy (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990).

Cole, Douglas and Chaikin, Ira, An Iron Hand upon the People: the law against the Potlatch on the Northwest Coast (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 1990).

Duff, Wilson, "The Fort Victoria Treaties," in BC Studies 3 (Fall 1969).

Dyck, Noel, What is the Indian "Problem": tutelage and resistance in Canadian Indian Administration (St. John's: Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1991).

Fisher, Robin, Contact and Conflict: Indian-European Relations in British Columbia, 1774-1890 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1977).

Gladstone, Percy, "Native Indians and the Fishing Industry," in Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science (1953) 19(1):20-34.

Gould, Ed, Logging: British Columbia's Logging History (Saanichton: Hancock House,

1975).

Hewes, Gordon, "Indian Fisheries Productivity in Pre-contact Times in the Pacific Salmon area" Northwest Anthropological Research Notes 7, no.2 (1973): 133-155.

Hill-Tout, Charles, The Salish People, Volume II: The Squamish and the Lillooet (Vancouver: Talonbooks, 1978).

International Longshoremen and Warehousemen Union, Local 500, Man Along the Shore, the story of Vancouver's Waterfront, 1860-1975 (Vancouver: ILWU, 1975).

Kennedy, Dorothy I.E. and Bouchard, Randy, Ethnobotany of the Squamish Indian People of British Columbia (Victoria: British Columbia Indian Languages Project, 1976).

Kennedy, Dorothy I.E. and Bouchard, Randy, Utilization of Fish, Beach foods and Marine Animals by the Squamish Indian People of British Columbia (Victoria: British Columbia Indian Language Project, 1976).

Kew, Michael, "Salmon Abundance, Technology and Human Populations on the Fraser River Watershed," in Northwest Coast Studies Conference Papers, v.2 (Burnaby: Simon Fraser University, 1976).

Knight, Rolf, Indians at Work: An Informal History of Native Indian Labour in British Columbia, 1858-1930 (Vancouver: New Star Books, 1978).

Lascelles, Thomas A., Mission on the Inlet (Vancouver: T.A. Lascelles, O.M.I., 1984).

McDonald, Robert A.J., "Lumber Society on the Industrial Frontier: Burrard Inlet, 1863-1886," in Labour/Le Travail 33 (Spring 1994), 69-96.

Mathias, Chief Joe and Yabsley, Gary R., "Conspiracy of Legislation: The Suppression of Indian Rights in Canada" in BC Studies 89 (Spring 1991) 34-45.

Matthews, J.S., Conversations with Khahstalahno (Vancouver: s.n., 1955).

Meggs, Geoff, Salmon: the Decline of the British Columbia Fishery (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 1991).

McKelvie, B.A. ed. by Charles Lillard, Fort Langley: Birthplace of British Columbia (Victoria: Porcupic Books, 1991).

Morton, James, The Enterprising Mr. Moody. the Bumptious Captain Stamp (North Vancouver: J.J. Douglas, 1977).

- Muszynski, Alicja, "Race and Gender: structural determinants in the formation of British Columbia's salmon cannery labour forces" in Gregory Kealey, ed., Class, Gender & Region: Essays in Canadian Historical Sociology (St. John's: Committee on Canadian Labour History, 1988).
- Newell, Dianne, Tangled Webs of History: Indians and the Law in Canada's Pacific Coast Fisheries (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993).
- Redford, James, "Attendance at Indian Residential Schools in British Columbia, 1890-1920" in BC Studies 44 (Winter 1979-80):41-56.
- Suttles, Wayne, Coast Salish Essays (Vancouver: Talonbooks, 1987).
- Suttles, Wayne ed., Handbook of North American Indians, volume 7: Northwest Coast (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1990).
- Tennant, Paul, Aboriginal Peoples and Politics: The Indian Land Question in British Columbia, 1849-1989 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1990).
- Thornton, Mildred V., Indian Lives and Legends (Vancouver: Mitchel Press, 1966).
- Vancouver Harbour Commissioners, Port of Vancouver, British Columbia. Annual Report (Vancouver: 1933).
- Wells, Oliver, The Chilliwacks and Their Neighbours (Vancouver: Talonbooks, 1987).
- Woodward, Jack, Native Law (Toronto: Carswell, 1996).
2. Unpublished Sources
- Band, Richard W., "Decision-Making and Leadership among the Squamish" (Burnaby: Simon Fraser University, M.A. Thesis, 1969).
- Bradbury, Bettina, "The Road to Receivership: Unemployment and Relief in Burnaby, North Vancouver City and District and West Vancouver, 1929-1933," (Burnaby: Simon Fraser University, M.A. Thesis, 1975).
- Conley, James, "Class Conflict and Collective Action in the Working Class of Vancouver, British Columbia, 1900-1919," (Ottawa: Carleton University Ph.D. Thesis, 1986).
- Dyck, Jos, "And then we will mind the law: The Enforcement of Federal Fisheries

Regulations in British Columbia and the Resistance of Native Fisher, 1894-1916," (Burnaby: Simon Fraser University, MA Thesis, 1994).

Hanson, Diane K., "Late Prehistoric Subsistence in the Strait of Georgia Region of the Northwest Coast," (Burnaby: Simon Fraser University, Ph.D. thesis, 1991).

Hightower, Jillian, "Reserve Land and Irreconcilable Objectives: A Study of Political Interaction Between an Urban Indian Band and Municipal Governments" (Burnaby: Simon Fraser University, M.A. Thesis, 1979).

Kahrer, Anna G., "Logging and Landscape Change on the North Shore of Burrard Inlet, British Columbia, 1860s to 1930s," (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, M.A. Thesis, 1988).

Kanakos, Jeannie L., "The Negotiations to Relocate the Songhees, 1843-1911," (Burnaby: Simon Fraser University, M.A. Thesis, 1982).

Lutz, John, "Work, Wages and Welfare in Aboriginal-non-Aboriginal Relations, British Columbia, 1849-1970" (Ottawa: University of Ottawa, Ph.D. Thesis, 1994).

Patterson, E. Palmer, "Andrew Paull and Canadian Indian Resurgence," (Seattle: University of Washington, Ph.D. thesis, 1962).

Philpott, Stuart, "Trade Unionism and Acculturation: A Comparative Study of Urban Indians and Immigrant Italians" (Burnaby: Simon Fraser University, M.A. Thesis, 1963).

Ralston, H. Keith, "The 1900 Strike of Fraser River Sockeye Salmon Fishermen," (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, M.A. Thesis, 1965).

Roy, Patricia, "Railways, Politicians and the Development of Vancouver as a Metropolitan Centre, 1886-1929," (Toronto: University of Toronto, M.A. Thesis, 1963).

Thompson, F.W., "The Employment Problems and Economic Status of the British Columbia Indians," (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, M.A. Thesis, 1951).

Thomson, Duncan Duane, "A History of the Okanagan: Indians and Whites in the Settlement era, 1860-1920" (Vancouver, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 1985).

Verma, B.L., "The Squamish: A Study of Changing Political Organization" (Vancouver: University of British Columbia M.A. Thesis, 1954).

Zaharoff, William, "Success in Struggle: The Squamish People and Kitsilano Indian Reserve no.6," (Ottawa: Carleton University M.A. Thesis, 1978).

## Appendix A

The following collection of scanned images illustrate part of the physical environment of Squamish society in Burrard Inlet.

The figures on page 98 show the generalized population distribution and movements of aboriginal societies in the lower mainland of British Columbia. They reveal that the Squamish were but one of numerous aboriginal peoples with interests in the region and also reveal the seasonal flux of Coast Salish societies. The map on page 99 shows the current (c.1981) location of the Squamish Indian Reserves in Burrard Inlet and Howe Sound, as well as the Indian Reserves of nearby aboriginal societies in the vicinity of Vancouver and Salmon Arm.

The photographs on page 100 are of logging debris left by a local railroad logging company. They reveal the sudden, devastating changes that occurred to the ecosystem of Burrard Inlet; from these pictures one can infer the negative impact that such development would have had on hunting and other subsistence activities.

The pictures on page 101 suggest the diverse and complex nature of Squamish society. In the top picture, Chief Joe Capilano stands proudly in front of his souvenir booth. He is a model entrepreneur, although his business lies in selling glimpses of "real Indians" to whites. Below this picture is one perspective of the Squamish Mission village, which reveals a community as modern and elegant as anything to be found in white society. This latter image is frequently reproduced in local history books; what these books fail to mention is that it is in fact only a portion of the photograph that appears on page 102. That picture has a more complex meaning, as the shiny white houses of the "modern" portion of the village stand in stark contrast to the smoking fires and temporary tents of the large "primitive" portion of the community.

The photographs on page 103 and the top of 104 complement previous pictures in this appendix by presenting different perspectives of the Squamish community in North Vancouver. Fishing boats, temporary tent residences, and the attractive but vaguely incongruous St. Paul's church were all prominent physical features of Squamish society in North Vancouver. The final image on page 104, showing Kitsilano Indian Reserve after its partial expropriation for the Burrard Street Bridge, suggests another aspect of life for the Squamish in Burrard Inlet. Development of the region by white industry and settlement brought opportunities for wealth to the Squamish, but it also brought conflict.




Figure 1

Generalized population distribution about 1820

Population	Language
○ large	● Halkomelem
○ medium	● Straits
○ small	● Squamish

Adapted from R. Cole Harris, "the Lower Mainland, 1820-81" in Graeme Wynn and Timothy Oke, editors, *Vancouver and its Region*, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1992) 38-68 at 39, 40.

Figure 3

The Lower Mainland in linguistic context


Linguistic Family

- Coast Salish
- ▨ Wakashan
- Interior Salish
- Eyak-Athapaskan
- Chimakuan


Language

- HALKOMELEM
- Lower Mainland

0 30km








Excerpt from Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Technical Services, Map 475-33 "Vancouver District" (Ottawa: Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 1981).



Moore Company, 14 April 1922, "Logging Debris of the Capilano Timber Co. in North Vancouver."  
Vancouver Public Library, Special Collections, photos #1103, 1104, 1105.






S. Thomson, 30 June 1935,  
 "Chief Joe Mathias at Souvenir  
 boot, totem poles."  
 Vancouver Public Library,  
 Special Collections, photo  
 #11643.



Unknown, c. 189?, "Squamish Indian  
 Mission" Vancouver Public Library, Special  
 Collections, photo #19944.



Unknown, c.189?, "Squamish Indian Mission."  
Vancouver Public Library, Special Collections,  
photo #19943.




Unknown, c. 189?, "Indian Teepees at (Squamish) Mission (reserve)"  
Vancouver Public Library, Special Collections, photo #19945.



Unknown, c. 189?, "St. Mary's Indian Reserve" (caption is incorrect, this is  
St. Paul's church on the Squamish Mission reserve) Vancouver Public  
Library, Special Collections, photo #19946.



P. Timms, c.1902,  
"Indian Mission and  
Village in North  
Vancouver - fishing  
boats on shore."  
Vancouver Public  
Library, Special  
Collections, photo  
#5642.



Vancouver City Archives, c.1931, "Machines Clearing Land on Kitsilano Indian Reserve for the Burrard St. Bridge - man on the right is Major J.S. Matthews." Vancouver Public Library, Special Collections, photo #9403.

## APPENDIX B

Census Returns, 1879-1915<sup>1</sup>

	1879	1883	1887	1891	1895	1899	1904	1907	1911	1915
Burrard Inlet IR3	39	53	59	26	34	27	31	34	39	38
Capilano Creek IR5	41	59	47	74	60	52	45	42	39	42
False Creek IR6	42	44	73	70	64	52	50	49	45	0
Mission IR1	123	142	259	240	253	166	175	218	221	226
Seymour Creek IR2	22	55	26	37	40	46	45	19	18	18
Howe Sound, generally	n.c.	367	309	209	228	26 <sup>2</sup>	27	29	37	58

<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Reports, various years.

<sup>2</sup>In 1896, the number of Squamish reported living in Howe Sound dropped by 200. In his report for that year, Agent Devlin explained that "the Indians at Mission, Burrard Inlet, have in former census returns been also entered at Skwaw-wamish (sic), Howe Sound, thereby entered twice, which was misleading." Annual Report, 30 June 1896, 75. The fact that the Agent chose to record these Indians as living in Burrard Inlet, instead of at Howe Sound, reflected the major demographic shift that had been occurring since the 1860s.

## APPENDIX C

Timber dues and Bonuses - Squamish Reserves, 1916-1927

Year	Account name & number	Explanation	Amount
1916	Squamish #54	Timber dues & rentals	\$620.44
1917	Squamish #54	Timber dues & trespass fines	\$764.76
1918	Squamish #54	Timber dues	\$184.65
1919	Poquiosen Skamain #346	Bonus on timber	\$710.00
1920	Squamish #54	Bonus on timber	\$450.00
	Poquiosen Skamain #346	Timber bonuses & dues	\$12,340.53
1921	Squamish #54	Bonus on timber	\$4,050.00
	Poquiosen Skamain #346	Timber bonus and dues	\$11,250.00
	Poquiosen Skamain #346	(deduct refund of timber deposit)	(\$5,000.00)
1922	Checkwelp #168	Timber dues	\$145.95
	Capilano #241	Timber dues	\$50.40
	Burrard Inlet #334	Timber trespass dues	\$54.85
	Poquiosen Skamain	Timber dues	\$64.84
	Cheakamus #370	Ground rent, license fee & interest on deferred payments	\$1,016.60
	Cheakamus #370	Timber dues	\$22.00
	Waiwakum #411	Timber dues	\$1,349.62
1923	Checkwelp #168	Timber dues & shingle bolts	\$19.65
	Cheakamus #370	Timber dues	\$11,234.18
	Squamish no.3 (Burrard Inlet) #379	Timber dues	\$30.00
1924	Squamish (amalgamated) #54	Timber dues	\$11,196.38
	Cheakamus #370	Timber dues	\$7,120.31
1925	Squamish (amalgamated) #54	Timber dues	\$9,424.67
1926	Squamish (amalgamated)	Timber dues	\$13,006.53
	Checkwelp #168	Timber dues	\$50.10
	Capilano #241	Timber dues	\$12.00
	Mission #395	Timber dues	\$26.15
1927	Squamish (amalgamated)	Timber dues	\$5,534.01
	Chekwelp #168	Timber dues	\$20.40 <sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, Report of Auditor General, various years. The Squamish had several accounts, most of which the department amalgamated in 1923, when most Squamish bands joined to form a single political entity. After 1927, the Auditor General's reports do not itemize the debits and credits for each band. However, Squamish credits after 1927 averaged less than \$4,000 per year - even with the recent development of gravel sales and land leases - suggesting that timber dues steadily declined after that time.



## APPENDIX D

Revenues from Leases, 1930-1940<sup>1</sup>

Reserve	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	Total
Waterlots on Mission IR1, Capilano IR5, Seymour Creek IR2	\$0	\$0	\$884.63	\$359.19	\$768.06	\$1190.85	\$919.85	\$1144.85	\$1230.13	\$1235.95	\$1178.42	\$8911.93
Seymour Creek IR2	700.00	4021.00	500.00	850.00	2093.00	875.00	875.00	1657.00	1375.00	1375.00	1275.00	\$15,596.00
Capilano IR5	88.80	88.80	88.80	88.8	88.80	0	0	0	0	0	0	\$444.00
False Creek IR6	3235.56	4960.73	135.00	395.00	750.00	840.00	480.00	480.00	480.00	190.00	170.00	\$12,116.32
Aikvuks IR15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	75.00	75.00	0	\$150.00
Kaikalahun IR25	125	0	0	0	0	0	0	125.00	125.00	125.00	125.00	\$625.00
Checkwelp IR26	315	400.00	390	345.00	415.00	412.50	440.00	445.00	425.00	480.00	573.00	\$4,640.50
Checkwelp IR26A	0	0	0	25.00	25.00	25.00	25.00	50.00	50.00	75.00	75.00	\$350.00
Totals - All reserves	\$4,464.36	\$9,470.56	\$1,998.43	\$2,062.99	\$4,139.86	\$3,343.35	\$2,739.85	\$3,901.85	\$3,760.13	\$3,555.95	\$3,396.42	\$42,833.75

<sup>1</sup>Source: "Lease Book" RG10 v.10904.

## APPENDIX E - Employment Statistics

### A. 1954

A survey of 65 employed Squamish persons living in Burrard Inlet contained the following distribution:

Longshoremen	25
Sawmill Workers	12
Fishermen	6
Loggers	2
Clerical (women)	4
Business Agent	1
Teachers	2
Lawyer (unqualified)	1
Welder	1
Hair dressers	1
Casual Workers	4
Miscellaneous	<u>6</u>
	65

In addition to those who had paid employment, that many (although not most) Squamish drew relief from Band funds, Unemployment Insurance, Family Allowance and Workmen's Compensation. In 1954 alone, the Squamish allotted \$15,000 from their budget for relief. This was not a serious drain on their trust funds, for revenues from leasing reserve land (including the foreshores) came to over \$13,000 per year, while interest on the \$434,737.57 in the trust funds allowed for a comfortable surplus.<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>B.L. Verma, "The Squamish: A Study of Changing Political Organization," (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, M.A. Thesis, 1954) 101-107.

B. 1963<sup>2</sup>

Occupation	Mission Reserve	Capilano Reserve	Total
Longshoremen	21	12	33
Laborers	20	11	31
Millworkers	16	4	20
Retired	7	5	12
Fishermen	2	3	5
Unemployed	1	4	5
Shipyard Workers	3	0	3
Longshoring Foremen	0	2	2
Loggers	0	2	2
Seamen	1	0	1
Painters	1	0	1
Caretakers	1	0	1
Business Agent	1	0	1
Bakers	1	0	1
Cannery Workers (full time)	0	1	1
Totals	75	44	119

---

<sup>2</sup>Source: Stuart Philpott, "Trade Unionism and Acculturation: A comparative Study of Urban Indians and Immigrant Italians," (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, M.A. Thesis, 1963) 22. Philpott noted separately that some Squamish women worked as secretaries, while "about twenty women work in the canneries during the fishing season and often earn a significant part of the family income." Further, "thirty or forty" Band members - mostly "widows and teenage boys and girls" pick hops in Washington state for several weeks of the year.

C. 1970<sup>3</sup>

	Mission		Capilano		Total
	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>	
Longshoring	21		20		41
Wood and Concrete (full time)	11		1		12
(part time)	2				2
Canneries and Fishing (part time)	2	12		5	19
Casual Labourers (part time)	6		5		11
Other (Sales, professional, clerical, technical)	<u>8</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>16</u>
Total employed	50	16	29	6	101
"Housewives"	0	48	0	29	77
Sub-total	114		64		178
Unemployed	<u>29</u>		<u>13</u>		<u>42</u>
Total estimated labour force	143		77		220

---

<sup>3</sup>Source: Acres Western Limited, Squamish Indian Band: A Development Plan, (Vancouver: Acres Western, 1970) A-3. Acres Western provided an economic development plan for the Squamish to address unemployment problems, maximize revenue from the Burrard Inlet reserves and help plan non-economic uses of the reserves.

### APPENDIX F - Squamish Trust Account no.54

The Department of Indian Affairs placed monies held in trust for the Squamish into several accounts, but Account no.54 was the main account. Account no. 54 grew slowly in the nineteenth century, but grew quickly after 1910, when development on the North Shore of Burrard Inlet increased. The rise in revenues and expenditures reveals the growing significance that the trust funds had for the Squamish economy leading up to 1940.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Explanation of transaction</u>	<u>Debit</u>	<u>Credit</u>	<u>Balance (Capital)</u>	<u>Balance (Interest)</u>
1883	Opening Balance			\$68.10	
1884	Accrued Interest		\$2.72	\$70.82	
1885	Timber Collections		\$85.00		
	Accrued Interest		\$2.80	\$158.62	
1886	Accrued Interest		\$6.32		
	Paid for harness and agricultural implements	\$85.00		\$79.94	
1887	Accrued Interest		\$3.20	\$83.14	
1888	Accrued Interest		\$3.32	\$86.46	
1889	Accrued Interest		\$3.48	\$86.46	\$3.48
1890	Accrued Interest		\$3.60		\$7.68
1891	Accrued Interest		\$3.72		\$10.80
1892	Accrued Interest		\$3.88		\$14.68
1893	Unspecified	\$16.25	\$3.54	\$86.46	\$1.97
1894	Accrued Interest		\$3.10		\$5.07
1895	Accrued Interest		\$3.24		\$8.31
1896	Accrued Interest		\$3.32		\$11.63
1897	Accrued Interest		\$3.43		
	Relief supplies to G.S. Philip	\$7.72		\$86.46	\$7.34
1898	Accrued Interest		\$3.05		\$10.39
1899	Accrued Interest		\$2.91		\$13.30
1900	Accrued Interest		\$2.99	\$86.46	\$16.29
1901	Accrued Interest		\$3.08		
	J.McKenzie rent		\$45.00		
	Indian Land Management Fund fee	\$2.70		\$86.46	\$61.67
1902	Accrued Interest		\$4.44		
	J. McKenzie, rent of slough		\$36.00		
	Indian Land Management Fund	\$2.16			
	Wire nails, freight and wharfage	\$8.68		\$86.46	\$91.27
1903	Accrued Interest		\$5.33		
	D. Olson, rent of slough, 8 m. to 30 June 1903		\$24.00		
	Management Fund	\$1.44			\$119.16
1904	Accrued Interest		\$6.17		
	D. Olsen, rent of slough, 3m. to 30 Sept. 1903		\$9.00		
	Management Fund	\$0.54			
	Fir Lumber, wire nails	\$119.16		\$86.46	\$14.63
1905	Don't have A.G. Report				

<u>Year</u>	<u>Explanation of transaction</u>	<u>Debit</u>	<u>Credit</u>	<u>Balance (Capital)</u>	<u>Balance (Interest)</u>
1906	Overxpenditure in Interest Account	\$3.85		\$82.61	
	Interest		\$3.09		
	Red Cedar Lumber Co. rent of logging and booming privileges		\$90.00		
	Management Fund	\$5.40			
	Transfer to Burrard Band no.3 account no.334 of 2 year's rent for booming privileges on IR4.	\$94.00			
	Hospital for sick woman	\$14.00			
	Transfer of over-expenditure to capital account	\$3.85			\$0.00
1907	transfer from interest account		\$3.85	\$86.46	
	Interest		\$1.86		
	J.E. Johnston, 12m. rent of concession on reserve		\$50.00		
	Management Fund	\$3.00			
	Transfer to capital account	\$3.85			\$45.01
1908	Interest		\$3.94		
	Red Cedar Lumber Co., 12m. rent of concession on reserve		\$40.00		
	Management Fund	\$2.40			
	Hospital treatment, provisions for destitute	\$84.90		\$86.46	\$1.65
1909	Interest		\$2.64		
	Red Cedar Lumber Co., 12m rent		\$40.00		
	Management Fund	\$2.40			
	Hospital treatment, medicines, ambulance services	\$39.85		\$86.46	\$2.04
1910	Interest		\$2.66		\$4.70
1911	Interest		\$2.73		
	Howe Sound & Northern Ry. Co., Right of way		\$3,800.00		
	Management Fund	\$380.00			
	Howe Sound & Northern Ry. Co., payment for improvements & interest on late payment		\$1386.50		
	City of North Vancouver, payment for land taken for roads		\$3,000.00		
	Payment for improvements		\$1,260.00		
	Supplies for destitute	\$5.10		\$3,506.46	\$3,128.83
1912	Brittingham & Young, timber dues		\$23.40		
	Management Fund	\$2.34			
	Interest		\$199.06		
	North Vancouver Lumber Col, rent of mill site		\$300.00		
	Greer, Coyle & Co., booming privilege		\$115.00		
	Management Fund	\$24.90			
	Construction of church	\$3,000.00			
	medical attendance, supplies for sick & destitute	\$47.60		\$3,527.52	\$650.39
1913	Interest	\$125.34			
	Doctor, eye specialist	\$70.00			

<u>Year</u>	<u>Explanation of transaction</u>	<u>Debit</u>	<u>Credit</u>	<u>Balance (Capital)</u>	<u>Balance (Interest)</u>
	Harbor View Sanatorium	\$53.00			
	St. Paul's Hospital	\$534.00			
	Nurses	\$15.00			
	Seeds	\$30.00			
	Supplies for destitute	\$73.53		\$3,527.52	\$0.00
1914	Reserves sold and payment for road through reseerve		\$161,494.63		
	Transfer from Management Fund	\$432.68		\$165,454.83	
	Interest		\$105.83		
	Transfer from Management Fund	\$12.98			
	Maintenance in St. Paul's hospital, relief	\$114.68			\$4.13
1915	Distribution to band	\$81,089.50		\$84,365.33	
	Interest		\$4,963.77		
	Contribution to Patriotic Fund, refund of rent	\$600.00			\$4,367.90
1916	Timber dues and rentals		\$620.44	\$84,985.77	
	Interest		\$2,662.00		
	Rent collected		\$5.00		
	Interest distribution	\$1,178.10			
	Relief and hospital expenses	\$115.90			\$5,740.90
1917	Timber dues & trespass fines		\$764.76	\$85,750.83	
	Interest		\$2,721.80		
	Interest money distributed	\$1,297.50			
	Medical services	\$398.50			
	Maintenance in hospital, relief supplies, potato seed	\$542.23			\$6,224.47
1918	Timber dues		\$184.65	\$85,935.18	
	Interest		\$4,598.75		
	Interest distribution	\$1,495.75			
	hospital treatment	\$1,872.40			
	relief supplies & construction of dyke	\$405.75			\$7,049.32
1919	Fighting fires at Cheakamus	\$141.05		\$85,794.13	
	Interest		\$4,649.22		
	Rents collected		\$25.00		
	Interest distribution	\$1,296.05			
	Relief supplies, hospital treatment	\$1,196.70			\$9,230.79
1920	Bonus on timber		\$450.00	\$86,244.13	
	Interest		\$4,751.25		
	Rents collected		\$25.00		
	Interest distribution	\$1,597.95			
	Road construction; constable's salary	\$430.50			
	Hospital treatment	\$3,185.00			
	Medical supplies and relief	\$723.35			
	Clothing, furniture, fire fighting	\$85.65			
	Lumber, shingles, sash	\$439.04			
	Paints, hardware, etc.	\$67.05			\$7,478.50
1921	Timber bonus		\$4,050.00		
	Transfer to sub-accounts	\$21,879.33		\$68,414.80	
	Interest		\$4,686.13		

<u>Year</u>	<u>Explanation of transaction</u>	<u>Debit</u>	<u>Credit</u>	<u>Balance (Capital)</u>	<u>Balance (Interest)</u>
	rent, licence fees, right of way		\$76.85		
	Interest distribution	\$1,650.00			
	Relief supplies, burial expenses	\$349.46			
	Expenses of Ottawa delegation	\$230.70			
	Hospital treatment	\$1,927.75			
	Transfer to sub-accounts	\$2,098.31			\$5,985.26
1922	Interest		\$3,720.00		
	Interest distribution	\$1,346.40			
	Relief Supplies & hospital treatment	\$206.90		\$68,414.80	\$8,151.96
1923	Interest		\$3,828.34		
	Interest distribution	\$1,346.70			
	relief supplies & hospital expenses	\$283.20		\$68,414.80	\$10,351.40
1924	Amalgamation of Squamish funds		\$56,539.16		
	Timber Dues, Right of Way		\$33,196.38		
	Timber money, fire fighting, roads	\$419.21		\$157,731.13	
	Interest		\$3,938.31		
	Amalgamation of Squamish funds		\$23,657.99		
	Rents collected		\$556.30		
	Interest Distribution	\$16,705.50			
	Amalgamation of accounts		\$24.09		
	Hospitals, burials, clothing	\$1,169.94			
	Expenses of amalgamation	\$336.20			
	Relief, chairs, wagon	\$1,611.08			
	maintenance of church	\$186.00			
	Cemetery maintenance	\$446.50			
	Fires services, misc.	\$212.69			\$17,812.00
1925	Timber dues		\$9,424.67		
	Plank road	\$238.79			
	Refund of r/w payment	\$14,339.95			
	Arbitration costs	\$1,149.66			
	Claims against Chief Harry	\$1,887.30		\$149,540.10	
	Interest		\$8,777.16		
	Rent		\$3,396.62		
	Deferred timber payment, fines		\$1,269.96		
	Interest distribution	\$4,692.90			
	Medical services, hospital	\$5,324.25			
	Relief, misc.	\$4,178.91			
	Telephone, fire service	\$200.75			
	Band Instruments, misc.	\$1,803.32			
	Lumber, sundries	\$1,660.38			
	Transportation, misc.	\$167.05			
	Clearing land	\$1,034.52			
	Plows, sundries	\$607.91			\$11,585.75
1926	Timber dues, gravel dues		\$14,608.53		
	Timber money distributed, misc.	\$17,095.65			
1926	Claims against Chief Harry	\$63.63		\$146,989.35	
	Interest		\$8,056.29		
	Collections: rent, misc.		\$2,989.00		
	Hospital treatment, misc.	\$2,063.25			
	Relief, medical services	\$3,307.05			
	Delegates' expenses, misc.	\$762.81			



<u>Year</u>	<u>Explanation of transaction</u>	<u>Debit</u>	<u>Credit</u>	<u>Balance (Capital)</u>	<u>Balance (Interest)</u>	115
	Painting houses, electricity install.	\$2,915.79				
	Fire, transportation	\$137.10				
	Repairs	\$450.00				
	Clearing land, repairs	\$708.30			\$12,286.74	
1927	Timber & gravel dues, land sale		\$10,503.73			
	Distribution of timber money	\$8,415.00		\$149,078.08		
	Interest		\$7,963.80			
	Collections: rents, misc.		\$5,307.46			
	Amalgamating accounts		\$147.37			
	Hospitals, relief	\$5,535.40				
	Fencing	\$726.75				
	Electric light, misc. construction	\$823.78				
	Survey costs, misc.	\$2,274.16				
	Typewriter, piano, advertising, etc	\$1,152.89			\$15,192.39 <sup>1</sup>	

---

<sup>1</sup>Source: Report of the Auditor General, an appendix to Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Reports. The Auditor General's reports stopped providing detailed breakdowns of debits and credits after 1927.