

**BUILDING AND MAINTAINING CO-MANAGEMENT:  
A CASE STUDY OF AQUATIC MANAGEMENT ON THE WEST  
COAST OF VANCOUVER ISLAND, CANADA**

by

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LLB, Queen's University 1992

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of the Requirements for the Degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy**

IN THE  
SCHOOL OF  
RESOURCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT

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
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## ABSTRACT

A foremost question in resource and environmental management is how to build cooperative management ('co-management') arrangements reflecting principles of sustainability. To generate and test hypotheses about this question, I used participatory research methods in a five year case study of an aquatic management organization on the West coast of Vancouver Island. The organization was in a second phase of organizational development (Gray 1989) and was undertaking community self management, engaging in co-management over some management functions related to several species and issues, and negotiating for a robust co-management agreement over all management functions related to the area's aquatic ecosystem.

Five main conclusions arose. First, building co-management involves static and dynamic elements. Some features remain constant while others evolve as participants go through stages of learning to work together. It is therefore essential to build commitment around stable elements and to think of co-management as an evolutionary process reflecting the natural history of a geographic area. Second, all organizations face persistent, classic organizational challenges when building co-management. These challenges are often overlooked, despite their impact on aligning concepts with the capacity to implement them. Organizations building co-management can have the incentive to transform these challenges into creative new approaches. Third, participants' motivations for engaging in co-management are essential to its success. A high degree of commitment born from a range of incentives and psychological motivations—including pride, identity and culture in an area—are important. Fourth, collaboration does not exist in a political vacuum. Tensions arise between those advocating collaboration and sustainability, and those either committed to the status quo or advocating change towards less sustainable principles and structures. This tension

creates both challenges and opportunities. Finally, while building collaboration appears difficult and complex at one level, it is simple at another. Two principles, 'hishukish ts'awalk' (everything is interconnected) and 'iisaak' (respect with care), provide guidance to 'leave agendas at the door'—opening and expanding participants' minds by letting go of mental habits and attachments. Uncovering space out of which new mutually-beneficial possibilities can arise is an essential element of successfully building collaboration.

## DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to people who have been working in the spirit of hishukish ts'awalk on the West coast of Vancouver Island, and to those who will continue to do so in the future.

It is also dedicated to my wife, Micha Prins, and family.

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Approval.....	ii
Abstract.....	iii
Dedication.....	v
Acknowledgements.....	vi
Table of Contents.....	viii
List of Tables.....	xii
List of Figures.....	xiii
<b>1 Introduction.....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1 Background and Rationale for the Dissertation.....	1
1.2 About the Dissertation.....	10
<b>2 Theoretical Approach.....</b>	<b>13</b>
2.1 Geographic Scope and Coordination.....	15
2.2 Mandate.....	17
2.3 Representation.....	21
2.4 Decision-Making Rule.....	25
2.5 Guiding Vision and Principles.....	26
2.6 Facilitation and Leadership.....	27
2.7 Accountability, Monitoring, and Evaluation.....	28
2.8 Funding and Capacity Building.....	30
2.9 Trust and Consensus Building.....	32
2.10 Summary.....	33
2.10.1 Geographic Scope and Coordination.....	34
2.10.2 Mandate.....	34
2.10.3 Representation.....	35
2.10.4 Decision-Making Rule.....	36
2.10.5 Guiding Vision and Principles.....	37
2.10.6 Facilitation and Leadership.....	37
2.10.7 Accountability, Monitoring, and Evaluation.....	37
2.10.8 Funding and Capacity Building.....	37
2.10.9 Trust and Consensus Building.....	38
<b>3 Methods.....</b>	<b>39</b>
3.1 Phase I: Participatory Research Methods.....	40
3.1.1 PRM Stage 1: Entry into Case Study Context.....	40
3.1.2 PRM Stage 2: Implementation and Data Collection.....	43
3.1.3 Stage 3: Review and Analysis of Results.....	46
3.2 Phase II: Deductive techniques.....	46

3.3	Phase III: Reporting Results .....	47
3.4	Addressing Research Issues and Limitations.....	47
3.4.1	Researcher Objectivity .....	48
3.4.2	Repeatability .....	48
3.4.3	Generalizability.....	49
3.4.4	External Validity.....	49
3.5	Limitations of Participatory Research Methods .....	50
3.6	Ethical Issues .....	52
3.7	Researcher Biases, Assumptions, and Learning.....	53
<b>4</b>	<b>Case Study Profile and Context.....</b>	<b>57</b>
4.1	The Origins of WCSA and RAMS .....	57
4.2	The Context and History of WCSA and RAMS.....	61
<b>5</b>	<b>Results: Challenges, Approaches, and Propositions from Building Aquatic Co-Management in Nuu-Chah-Nulth-aht/WCVI .....</b>	<b>77</b>
5.1	Geographic Scope and Coordination .....	77
5.1.1	Geographic Scope Profile.....	77
5.1.2	Case Study Results Related to Geographic Scope.....	81
5.1.3	Case Study Propositions about Geographic Scope .....	86
5.1.4	Coordination Profile.....	87
5.1.5	Coordination Results.....	87
	5.1.5.1 Coordinating with groups outside the area .....	87
	5.1.5.2 Coordination within the area.....	91
5.1.6	Case Study Propositions about Coordination .....	97
5.2	Mandate .....	98
5.2.1	Mandate Profile .....	98
5.2.2	Case Study Results Related to Mandate .....	109
	5.2.2.1 Delegated authority over specific tasks .....	109
	5.2.2.2 Building an internal mandate and negotiating an external mandate .....	113
5.2.3	Case Study Propositions about Mandate.....	126
	5.2.3.1 Stage I: Building an internal mandate for change .....	126
	5.2.3.2 Stage II: Building alliances outside the region and cementing a regional partnership .....	127
	5.2.3.3 Stage III: Broadening the regional circle, taking on responsibilities, and overcoming challenges .....	128
	5.2.3.4 Stage IV: Receiving the external mandate .....	129
5.3	Representation .....	130
5.3.1	Representation Profile .....	130
5.3.2	Representation Results .....	131
	5.3.2.1 'Good citizens vs. Sectoral representative' .....	131
	5.3.2.2 Recognizing the unique status of First Nations.....	139
	5.3.2.3 Addressing representation in relation to a wide range of issues.....	141

	5.3.2.4	Addressing conflict of interest and technical information .....	143
	5.3.3	Case Study Propositions about Representation .....	143
5.4		Decision-Making Rule .....	145
	5.4.1	Profile about Decision-Making Rule .....	145
	5.4.2	Decision-Making Results .....	146
	5.4.3	Case Study Propositions about Decision-Making Rule .....	150
5.5		RAMS and WCSA Vision, Guiding Principles, and Objectives .....	151
	5.5.1	Profile of WCSA's and RAMS' Vision, Guiding Principles, and Objectives .....	151
	5.5.2	Vision, Principles and Goals Results .....	154
	5.5.3	Case Study Propositions about Vision, Principles and Goals .....	161
5.6		Facilitation and Leadership .....	162
	5.6.1	Facilitation Profile .....	162
	5.6.2	Facilitation Results .....	162
	5.6.3	Case Study Propositions about Facilitation .....	169
	5.6.4	Leadership Profile .....	169
	5.6.5	Leadership Results .....	170
	5.6.6	Case Study Propositions about Leadership .....	175
5.7		Accountability, Monitoring, and Evaluation .....	176
	5.7.1	Accountability Profile .....	176
	5.7.2	Accountability Results .....	177
	5.7.2.1	Contract and financial accountability, monitoring and evaluation .....	178
	5.7.2.2	Staff accountability, monitoring and evaluation .....	179
	5.7.2.3	Organizational accountability, monitoring and evaluation in relation to principles and goals .....	181
	5.7.3	Case Study Propositions about Accountability, Monitoring and Evaluation .....	182
5.8		Capacity Building and Funding .....	182
	5.8.1	Capacity Building Profile .....	182
	5.8.2	Capacity Building Results .....	185
	5.8.3	Case Study Propositions about Capacity Building .....	192
	5.8.4	Funding Profile .....	193
	5.8.5	Funding Results .....	195
	5.8.6	Case Study Propositions about Funding .....	200
5.9		Trust and Consensus Building .....	200
	5.9.1	Trust Profile .....	200
	5.9.2	Trust Results .....	200
	5.9.3	Case Study Propositions about Trust .....	208
	5.9.3.1	Trust within the organization .....	208
	5.9.3.2	Trust with external groups and agencies .....	209
	5.9.4	Consensus Building Profile .....	209
	5.9.5	Consensus Building Results .....	212
	5.9.6	Case Study Propositions about Consensus Building .....	221

<b>6</b>	<b>A Discussion of Methods, Theoretical and Case Study Propositions, and Key Lessons .....</b>	<b>222</b>
6.1	'Inside Out' and 'Outside In': Discussion of Case Study Process .....	223
6.2	Expanding Co-management Theory: Discussion of Research Outcomes .....	225
6.2.1	Geographic Scope.....	225
6.2.2	Mandate .....	230
6.2.3	Representation.....	236
6.2.4	Decision-Making Rule .....	240
6.2.5	Vision, Principles, and Goals.....	241
6.2.6	Leadership and Facilitation.....	243
6.2.7	Accountability, Monitoring, and Evaluation .....	246
6.2.8	Funding and Capacity Building .....	247
6.2.9	Trust and Consensus Building.....	250
6.3	Essential Lessons from the Case Study.....	257
6.3.1	Aligning Concepts with Capacity .....	257
6.3.2	Motives and Commitment.....	259
6.3.3	Tension, Conflict, and Resistance .....	261
6.3.4	Change and Stability .....	264
6.3.5	What Does 'Hishtukish ts'awalk' Mean? .....	268
<b>7</b>	<b>Summary .....</b>	<b>273</b>
	<b>List of References .....</b>	<b>278</b>
	<b>Appendix A: Sample of Groups Interacting with WCSA/RAMS.....</b>	<b>287</b>

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 1:	Gray's Three-Phase Model of Collaboration .....	8
Table 2:	Management Functions, Rights, and Duties (Pinkerton and Weinstein 1995) .....	9
Table 3:	Reasons Why Locally Designed Rules are Effective at Controlling Self-Interested Behaviour.....	16
Table 4:	Ten Steps in Implementing Participatory Research Methods .....	40
Table 5:	Communications with Categories of People in the Case Study .....	44
Table 6:	Problems Identified in Common by Participants in May 1997 Common Ground Conference, Port Alberni, BC.....	57
Table 7:	Social and Ecological Problems in the WCVI Area .....	105
Table 8:	RAMS' Decision Rule .....	145
Table 9:	RAMS' Goals.....	153
Table 10:	Actions that Built or Undermined Trust in WCSA/RAMS.....	202
Table 11:	RAMS Policy Development Process/Approach .....	210
Table 12:	Key Challenges in Building Co-Management .....	257
Table 13:	Dynamic Elements of Building Co-Management .....	267

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1:	Continuum for Participation in Decision-Making (after Darling 1999).....	19
Figure 2:	Nuu-chah-nulth-aht and WCSA/RAMS Boundaries .....	78

# 1 INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 Background and Rationale for the Dissertation

In order to use resources in a sustainable manner, the ultimate goal of aquatic management must be to produce social and economic benefits without undermining the long-term productive capacity of a harvested species and its ecosystem (WCED 1987; Mangel et al. 1996; Costanza et al. 1998; deYoung et al. 1999). However, as with most common pool resources,<sup>1</sup> aquatic resources present humans with extremely difficult challenges in achieving the goal of sustainability. The highly dynamic and interconnected nature of aquatic ecosystems and divergent preferences amongst humans contribute to 'hard choices,' such as deciding what information to collect and analyze with limited resources, what risks to take in the face of uncertain information and projections, and who should bear those risks and receive the benefits of access to scarce resources (Caddy and Gulland 1983; McCay and Acheson 1987; Bailey and Jentoft 1990; Lee 1992).

These 'hard choices' rarely involve black and white 'correct' answers or easy 'win-win' solutions. Instead, we are most often making trade-offs between a range of options with different associated advantages, disadvantages, and risks. Assessing these advantages, disadvantages, and risks is difficult for several reasons. First, they can change depending on the scale (personal, local, regional, national, international) one is assessing (Levin 1992). They can also be particular to a specific area, issue, or time period under consideration, defying generalizations or 'blanket' approaches

(deYoung et al. 1999). As well, the highly dynamic nature of aquatic and social systems means that we must monitor and adapt our choices according to changing circumstances (Holling 1978; Mangel et al. 1996). In addition, our uncertain understanding of many aquatic ecosystems means that the process of generating and interpreting data involves subjective, value-laden judgments, beliefs, and preferences (Harman 1981; Robinson 1992). Finally, and perhaps most significantly, advantages, disadvantages, and risks frequently accrue differently to different groups or species, so that options benefiting one group/species almost always come at the social, physical, or financial expense of another group/species (Jentoft 1985; Bailey and Jentoft 1990; Derman and Ferguson 1995; Copes 1999). Groups often engage in conflict with each other to affect how advantages, disadvantages, and risks are assessed and to whom they are attributed. The outcome of conflicts may result from power imbalances rather than equitable agreements based on respect for the needs of others and/or the best available information and analysis (Pinkerton and Weinstein 1995; Durrenberger and King 2000).

Decisions in aquatic management therefore primarily involve different groups' values, beliefs, and preferences regarding equity amongst people (including future generations), equity between humans and other species, and what to do in the face of uncertainty. Thus, the central goal behind improving aquatic management must involve pursuing conditions under which diverse groups with differing values and preferences will collectively produce equitable trade-offs that account for and adapt to uncertainty.

Common pool resource management theorists believe that the main obstacle to achieving this goal occurs when one or several groups can successfully impose self-

<sup>1</sup> Common pool' resources refer to resources such as fish, air, wildlife, ocean, or rangelands that are difficult to divide or privatize because of their "mobility, scale, or [limited] opportunities for secret use...." (Pinkerton and Weinstein 1995:19).



interested strategies on other groups (Berkes 1985; Jentoft 1985; Pinkerton 1989; Feeny et al. 1990; Ostrom 1990; Pinkerton and Weinstein 1995; Ostrom et al. 1999). These self-interested strategies may range from manipulating decision-making processes to over-harvesting, benefiting from services without paying ('free-riding'), and poaching. They are particularly hard to control in relation to common pool resources because of their inherently 'common' nature. For instance, common pool resources tend to suffer from the problem of 'non-excludability', where monitoring and excluding access are extremely difficult (Berkes et al. 1989). Common pool resources also suffer from the dilemma of 'subtractability', which arises because individual resource users can benefit personally at the expense of others—they subtract from the welfare of other users rather than their own welfare when over-harvesting (Berkes et al. 1989).

Current decision-making structures and approaches characterized by central government control with stakeholder consultation are criticized because they tend to exacerbate rather than alleviate problems of self-interested behaviour. Rather than helping align individual behaviour with collective interests, 'command and control' management structures and approaches often stem from and perpetuate the imposition of one person or group's values and preferences on other people, species or natural processes (Holling and Meffe 1996). This approach suppresses or ignores the potential 'social capital'<sup>2</sup> that arises when a variety of individuals and groups undertaking an activity are able to develop their own informal and formal arrangements to align individual and collective goals and adapt to changing circumstances. When human capital is undervalued, people eventually lose their commitment, ability, and incentive to participate in decision-making, with rules and procedures becoming increasingly

inappropriate to their lived experiences and changing ecological circumstances (Pinkerton and Weinstein 1995). This results in conflict, instability, and resource decline, all of which provide few incentives for producing equitable trade-offs and aligning individual behaviour with collective objectives such as stewardship (Hoffman 1990).

Problems with central government approaches to common pool resource management have led to a pressing need for “. . . alternative policy instruments and management techniques as well as a new conceptual framework for the analysis of governance issues in modern society” (Dubbink and Vliet 1996: 500). To address this need, numerous authors have attempted to produce principles and propositions reflecting sustainable governance of aquatic resources. These principles include both broad ‘guiding principles’ that define the conceptual framework for a new approach to aquatic management and more refined, empirically-derived theoretical propositions that focus on the conditions under which such principles are likely to be implemented.

Broad ‘guiding principles’ for sustainable oceans governance include: nested management institutions whose responsibilities ‘match’ different ecological scales; alignment of access rights with social, ecological, and economic responsibilities; precaution; adaptive management; full cost allocation; participatory decision-making; and taking an integrated, ecosystem approach (Costanza et al. 1998, Ostrom et al. 1999, deYoung et al. 1999). More detailed theoretical propositions from co-management literature outline that an organization is more likely to implement these kinds of sustainable aquatic management principles under certain conditions. It is possible to use propositions related to organizational structure and process as a framework for analysing co-management case studies. Such a framework is useful

<sup>2</sup> Social capital (also called human or cultural capital) is “what individuals and communities build up over time in the way of knowledge, skills, experience, attitudes, and values about how to solve problems”

because it describes the main headings of a 'Terms of Reference' for governance institutions. The following points summarize the key elements of such a framework, and will be used throughout this dissertation. A co-management institution is more likely to successfully implement principles of sustainable aquatic management where it:

- works within a clearly defined local area with enforceable boundaries and coordinates with institutions working at broader spatial scales.
- has a mandate and scope adequate to the problems and issues at hand, some autonomy to develop rules, the ability to directly implement or compel implementation of decisions, the ability to adapt them in a flexible manner, and the ability to monitor and enforce rules through graduated sanctions.
- includes consistent representation of the diverse interests affected by decisions and builds on local values, culture, capacity and institutions.
- has a clear rule for decision-making and a forum for discussing grievances and resolving conflicts.
- has a common vision, principles, and goals.
- has formal and informal methods of accountability, monitoring, and evaluation.
- has a locally appropriate facilitator
- has respected and knowledgeable leadership that are able to build a structure others are willing to join.
- has capable staff and stable and adequate funding for its initial years of operations, with the ability to revise policy to undertake cost recovery after a set period of time.
- builds trust and relationships over time by fostering repeated encounters among participants who are willing to align self and group interests and by addressing issues through fair administrative processes characterized by principles of democratic organization.

Each of these elements is accompanied by more refined theoretical propositions and references in Chapter 2 of this thesis.

These broader principles and theoretical propositions provide some direction regarding improved common pool management structures and approaches. However,

(Pinkerton and Weinstein 1995:2). Human capital is believed to be critical for sustained collective

there are three significant opportunities in this emerging body of theory. First, we need more detail and examples of the decision-making structures and processes that allow different principles and propositions to be implemented successfully. Because the guiding principles and associated propositions defining a new resource management paradigm have emerged relatively recently, there are few case studies on organizations that are explicitly established to apply them (Roling and Wagemakers 1998).

Understanding the conditions, barriers, and opportunities involved in putting the principles into practice is crucial to their utility and will help produce a richer, more pragmatic body of theory.

A second opportunity in current common pool management literature is that there are few case studies focusing on complex multi-party, multi-cultural, and multi-species or ecosystem-based approaches. Many propositions have been generated either from studies of artisanal fisheries and communities with culturally homogenous circumstances or in the context of a single species.

Third, few studies of cooperative management are based on extensive participatory research methods where the researcher is participating full time in the design and development of a co-management organization. Participatory research methods used over a long period have the potential to produce more in-depth data on the organizational challenges, opportunities, and strategies associated with the various phases involved in building sustainable aquatic management institutions. Coupled with a 'grounded theory' approach (Glaser and Strauss 1967), theoretical propositions can also be brought closer to the original sources of data. Rich accounts and propositions generated through participatory methods can strengthen the body of middle range theory needed to bridge principles and practice.

human endeavours (Hoffman 1990; Scott 1998).

In this study, I address these three opportunities and contribute to common pool management theory about institutional structures and processes that help diverse groups work cooperatively towards sustainable aquatic management. I examine decision-making structures and processes that help diverse groups align self-interested behaviour with common goals. My research was informed both by a literature review and a participatory research approach to a case study from the West Coast of Vancouver Island (WCVI).

A case study from WCVI presented an exciting opportunity to expand existing theory for four main reasons. First, organizations in the WCVI area have been developing a co-management approach for a land area (roughly the size of Ireland) and its adjacent ocean area. In 1995 this approach was institutionalized in the West Coast Sustainability Association (WCSA). In 1997 it was further institutionalized in the Regional Aquatic Management Society (RAMS). The diversity of members in these organizations was rare and included a partnership between First Nations and local governments, commercial and recreational fishermen, fish processors, environmental groups, volunteer groups, and others. (A full description of the case study context is provided in Chapter 4). These organizations were at a particular stage of cooperative decision-making, corresponding roughly with phase two of Barbara Gray's three-phase model of collaboration, as outlined in Table 1.

**Table 1: Gray's Three-Phase Model of Collaboration**

---

Phase 1: Problem setting

- Common definition of problem
- Commitment to collaborate
- Identification of stakeholders
- Legitimacy of stakeholders
- Convener characteristics
- Identification of resources

Phase 2: Direction setting

- Establishing ground rules
- Agenda setting
- Organizing subgroups
- Joint information search
- Exploring options
- Reaching agreement and closing the deal

Phase 3: Implementation

- Dealing with constituencies
  - Building external support
  - Structuring
  - Monitoring the agreement and ensuring compliance (Gray 1989)
- 

The second phase has not received significant attention in the co-management literature, so there is strong potential for my research to enrich theory.

As well, over the four-year period of case study research, WCSA/RAMS successfully negotiated the establishment of a co-management organization—the WCVI Aquatic Management Board-- with Provincial and Federal governments. Pinkerton and Weinstein (1995) define 'co-management' as mutual management arrangements somewhere between exclusive government management and exclusive geographic community management (mutual arrangements between industry and government are

better considered as partnerships). The extent to which 'co-management' occurs depends on the degree to which decision-making rights and responsibilities are shared, and on the number of those rights and responsibilities (as summarized in Table 2). In the case study context, WCSA/RAMS were carrying out community management activities and co-management activities over specific projects while attempting to negotiate a robust co-management arrangement involving all management functions. The final Terms of Reference for the WCVI Aquatic Management Board includes the full suite of management functions, but has a far higher degree of external government control than envisaged by WCSA/RAMS, as the Board is advisory only. Nevertheless, the arrangement results in 'nested organizations' working across geographic scales—a key principle of sustainable common pool resource management.

**Table 2: Management Functions, Rights, and Duties** (Pinkerton and Weinstein 1995)

- 
- Policy-making and evaluation (scoping problems, setting long-term objectives, research and education).
  - Ensuring the productive capacity of the resource (monitoring habitat, enhancing/restoring habitat, enhancing stocks)
  - Regulating fishery access (membership or exclusion, transfer of membership, allocation of harvest)
  - Regulating fishery harvest (stock assessment, harvest planning, harvest monitoring)
  - Co-ordinating potentially conflicting resources uses and management activities (sport, commercial, and subsistence fisheries; harvest and enhancement activities)
  - Enforcing or implementing rules
  - Maximizing benefits to fishermen (supply management, quality enhancement, product diversity).
- 

In addition, WCSA/RAMS was attempting to build an integrated, ecosystem-based approach over a large ecological area that is part of a complex social and economic environment. The area includes many sedentary species (shellfish, marine

plants, etc.) and highly migratory species (whales, salmon, sardines, tuna, hake). An ecosystem approach in this kind of setting adds to the literature, which is mainly focused on single species/use management or on artisanal uses.

Finally, the organization's constitution and design was explicitly focused on implementing many of the design principles outlined in the literature on common pool resource management. It therefore represents an attempt to build a 'state of the art' design. The case study therefore not only addresses gaps in theory but also provides a fertile context for practical new ideas about some of the more complex issues facing communities and common pool management institutions in a modern multicultural setting.

## **1.2 About the Dissertation**

My objectives in undertaking a study on cooperative decision-making were to:

1. Better understand the kinds of stresses impacting collaborative processes and, more importantly, the kinds of structures and processes that give collaboration the resilience it needs to successfully achieve principles of sustainability.
2. Work with participants in a case study context to enhance cooperation and sustainable outcomes in aquatic management decision-making.
3. Compare propositions generated from a case study context with theoretical propositions regarding sustainable common pool management institutions, with the goal of refining and advancing current common pool resource management theory.
4. Integrate deductive and inductive research methods that involve close collaboration with case study participants in order to document and understand the case study from multiple perspectives.

In order to achieve these objectives and address gaps in current literature, I participated in the single case study of the cooperative aquatic management organization described above (WCSA/RAMS) from 1997 to 2002. Using participatory



research methods,<sup>3</sup> I collected in-depth data on the key components of decision-making structure and process. For structure, these components include an organization's geographic scope, mandate, decision-making rule, guiding principles, representation, leadership and facilitation, accountability, and capacity and funding. For process, relevant components include level of trust between parties and approach to building consensus.

The thesis is organized in the following manner. Chapter 2 describes current theoretical propositions regarding common pool management. In Chapter 3, I describe the methods I used. These included participant observation, open-ended interviews, and archival records as my main sources of data, added to and validated by structured interviews. Chapter 4 gives a brief history of WCSA/RAMS and the West Coast of the Vancouver Island area. In Chapter 5, I describe the case study results, using narratives, interview excerpts, and examples generated through the methods described in Chapter 3. This is a lengthy chapter organized to reflect the structural and procedural elements of co-management outlined above. It describes the main challenges that WCSA/RAMS faced, how it approached those challenges, and key lessons learned in relation to each element. In Chapter 6, I compare the common pool management propositions identified in Chapter 2 with the case study results presented in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 is structured in a manner that shows how current academic theory is rejected, confirmed, refined and/or advanced by the propositions generated through the case study. It also includes a discussion of participatory research methods and of essential lessons from the case

<sup>3</sup> Participatory research methods are described in different bodies of literature, including ethnography, community-based ethnography, 'grounded theory', participatory action research, action research, case study research, rapid rural appraisal, and participatory rural appraisal. While these bodies of literature share a strong common theme, each body has distinct approaches, tools and useful elements to contribute to research design. To access the most useful of these contributions I draw key elements from each body of literature under the general title of 'participatory research methods.' See Chapter 3 for key references from each of these areas.

study. I conclude in Chapter 7 by summarizing the intent, methods, and key findings of the dissertation.

## 2 THEORETICAL APPROACH

There is a growing consensus amongst aquatic resource management theorists concerning broad guiding principles for sustainable oceans governance. These principles include nested management institutions whose responsibilities 'match' different ecological scales, alignment of access rights with social, ecological, and economic responsibilities, precaution, adaptive management, full cost allocation, participatory decision-making, and taking an integrated, ecosystem approach (Costanza et al. 1998, Ostrom et al. 1999, deYoung et al. 1999). Similarly, there is growing consensus that current decision-making structures and approaches characterized by central government control with stakeholder consultation are poorly suited to implementing these principles (Holling and Meffe 1996; Scott 1998).

Common pool management theorists have been supporting these broader principles and the 'grand theory' of participatory governance with 'middle range' theory that identifies key factors enabling sustainable decision-making structures and processes. Middle range theory is built when researchers generate testable theoretical propositions or hypotheses that generalize from one or more case studies.<sup>4</sup>

Theoretical propositions about these factors can therefore be arrayed in a nested hierarchy of detail, from the more general to the more specific. In this chapter, I will focus my discussion on theoretical propositions at the middle range level and avoid describing in detail the grand theory related to broad principles for sustainable oceans governance or problems with central government decision-making structures and

<sup>4</sup> Middle range theory can be comparative in nature and also emerge inductively from even one case study because it is framed in testable form, e.g. NOT "This happened here, so it might be true elsewhere" BUT "Under condition A, B outcome is likely to apply or arise." It is possible to look for other cases of condition A in the real world, to see if B also occurs there. A proposition differs from a hypothesis only in that it is advanced with more confidence that it is true, because it has been seen in different forms before in other cases in the literature. If there is significant foundation for a proposition, it is possible to elevate its status to a design principle (Evelyn Pinkerton, pers. comm. 2003).

approaches.<sup>5</sup> I have selected middle range propositions related to organizational structure and process as a framework for analysing co-management case studies. Such a framework is useful because it describes the main headings in the normal 'Terms of Reference' one finds for governance institutions. The following points summarize the key elements of such a framework, and will be used throughout this dissertation. Middle range theory proposes that sustainable outcomes are most likely to result from management institutions that:

- work within a clearly defined local area with enforceable boundaries and coordinates with institutions working at broader spatial scales.
- have a mandate and scope adequate to the problems and issues at hand, some autonomy to develop rules, the ability to directly implement or compel implementation of decisions, the ability to adapt them in a flexible manner, and the ability to monitor and enforce rules through graduated sanctions.
- include consistent representation of the diverse interests affected by decisions and builds on local values, culture, capacity and institutions.
- have a clear rule for decision-making and a forum for discussing grievances and resolving conflicts.
- have a common vision, principles, and goals.
- have formal and informal methods of accountability, monitoring, and evaluation.
- have a locally appropriate facilitator
- have respected and knowledgeable leadership that are able to build a structure others are willing to join.
- have capable and adequate staff and stable and adequate funding for its initial years of operations, with the ability to revise policy to undertake cost recovery after a set amount of time.
- build trust and relationships over time by fostering repeated encounters among participants who are willing to align self and group interests and by addressing issues through fair administrative processes characterized by principles of democratic organization.

<sup>5</sup> I have reviewed these areas in a paper titled "Command and Control or Respect and Connection? Decision-making approaches in fisheries management." (Day 2000)

In the remainder of this chapter I describe more detailed propositions arising under each of these characteristics.

## 2.1 Geographic Scope and Coordination

*The organization works within a clearly defined local area with relatively homogeneous ecological and human characteristics and enforceable boundaries, and coordinates with organizations working at broader spatial scales.*

Decision-making that is rooted in an area with relatively homogeneous ecological and human characteristics can allow for greater integration of different groups responsible for and affected by management. This can allow groups to focus on the whole as well as their particular 'part', leading to more of a 'soft systems' approach (Brown and MacLeod 1996). For instance, management can be more efficient and effective when practiced in a well-defined local area because it can collate, analyze, and share information on forestry, water flow and quality, wildlife, mining, economic development, human resource development, real estate development, pollution, local climate changes, and other activities or environmental variables occurring in the area (Ruddle et al. 1992; Pinkerton 1998). It can recognize and address cumulative or subtle changes that might be missed by more remote, segregated decision makers, and allow for greater interest and knowledge about the health of specific stocks or habitats that are the building blocks of larger aggregate systems (Singleton 1998).

In addition to having a more integrated and detailed spatial perspective, locally based information and knowledge is also often multi-generational, giving strong temporal perspectives on changes happening within an area (Pinkerton 1998). Geographic communities "serve as a living, oral reference library for observations, practices and experiments—a body of knowledge that an individual could never amass alone" (Scott

1998: 324). This reduces the "chronic inability to separate short and long term processes" (Lee 1992: 76) characterizing external management.

In addition to fostering more of an ecosystem approach, the closer that management is to the area managed and the more it reflects the ecology of the area (including human social norms, institutions, knowledge, and experiences), the more effective it will be at designing and implementing effective, accepted, and integrated rules and regulations in a timely fashion. Locally designed rules can be effective at controlling self-interested behaviour for the reasons described in Table 3.

**Table 3: Reasons Why Locally Designed Rules are Effective at Controlling Self-Interested Behaviour**

- 
- Greater population homogeneity and local cultural values can lead to an increase in normative behaviour (Begossi 1995; Knudsen 1995; Singleton 1998; Pinkerton 1998).
  - Rules devised by participants (or those working directly for participants) have greater legitimacy and acceptance among participants (Jentoft 1989; Costanza 1998; Singleton 1998).
  - People who use an area regularly have more detailed knowledge because of fine-grained detailed experience (Jentoft 1989; Sunderlin 1997). Decision-making within a relatively small, well-defined area allows for development of a sustained, common knowledge base (Pinkerton 1989).
  - Trust and relationships are developed over time, allowing for most information and knowledge to be shared in the community (Ostrom et al. 1999).
  - Information and knowledge from different sources is often 'interdisciplinary', coming from a range of traditional and 'Western scientific' sources (Pomeroy and Berkes 1997; Pinkerton 1998; Prystupa 1998), which can help address harvesting and non-harvesting impacts on species (Hanna 1998).
  - There is a strong incentive for local/fishers' information and knowledge to be used in designing, implementing, and enforcing effective policy and rules because of a sense of direct costs and benefits (Pinkerton 1989; Rettig et al. 1989; Ostrom 1990; Wilson et al. 1994; Townsend 1995; Ostrom et al. 1999).
  - Users are likely to think that the costs of making rules are too high when the resource is large and complex and when they lack a common understanding of resource dynamics and have substantially different interests. Users will see the benefits of participating in management when they have accurate knowledge of external boundaries and internal microenvironments and reliable and valid indicators of resource conditions (Ostrom 1990).
-

In order for many of these benefits to flow, boundaries should be clear and enforceable, especially when there are threats from outsiders and/or fewer internal norms of respect and reciprocity (Berkes 1985; Jentoft 1989; Pinkerton 1989; Ostrom 1990; Pinkerton 1994; Kurien 1995). The exact boundaries should be appropriate to human and ecological resources and should be decided collectively (Pinkerton 1994).

While a well-defined local area provides numerous decision-making benefits, common pool theorists recognize that integrated ecosystem management is only possible through 'cross-scale' linkages between local, regional, national and international geographic scales (Ostrom 1990; Wilson et al. 1994; Montgomery et al. 1995; Grumbine 1997; Singleton 1998; CRIFQ 1999; Berkes 2002). A 'nested' set of institutions that operate at different scales with close coordination and information sharing mechanisms is therefore proposed as having the most potential for sustainable use of sedentary and migratory species (Ostrom 1990; Wilson et al. 1994; Pinkerton and Weinstein 1995).

## 2.2 Mandate

*The organization has a mandate and scope adequate to the problems and issues at hand, some autonomy to develop rules, the ability to directly implement or compel implementation of decisions, adapt them in a flexible manner, and monitor and enforce rules through graduated sanctions.*

Almost every country in the world today has a central government holding decision-making power over common pool resources. While informal decision-making institutions operate without formal state recognition by making *de facto* rules, such institutions can only sustain themselves when they are free from external threats from


more powerful actors (Pinkerton and Weinstein 1995). Evolved local norms and *de facto* rules are therefore more effective when accompanied by formalized *de jure* rules (Ostrom 1990) in a nested system (Pinkerton and Keitlah 1990).

If an alternative decision-making structure is granted its authority from the state in order to successfully implement and legally enforce decisions over time, a question then arises about how much power it needs in relation to the larger state decision-making structure. To discuss this question, common pool theorists have outlined different types of rules. These include constitutional, collective-choice, and operational rules. Constitutional level rules refer to the overarching system of governance and its associated legal infrastructure (Ostrom 1990), and they are always *de jure*, having formal legal status. Collective-choice rules include “the processes of policy-making, management, and adjudication of policy decisions” (Ostrom 1990: 52), including specifying “who may participate in changing operational rules and the level of agreement required for their change” (Schlager and Ostrom 1993: 14). Operational level rules include “the processes of [resource] appropriation, provision, monitoring, and enforcement” (Ostrom 1990: 52), and they usually include formal *de jure* rules, but these are often supplemented or replaced by more pragmatic *de facto* rules designed by participants.

It is also useful to outline a continuum of forms of participation in decision-making in order to understand the amount of power needed by an alternative decision-making structure to produce sustainable outcomes (see Figure 1).



**Figure 1: Continuum for Participation in Decision-Making (after Darling 1999)**



Information and consultation do not allow parties to directly participate in key aspects of decision-making. Similarly, negotiation, delegation, and devolution over only operational level rules do not address the heart of decision-making: generating and selecting solutions about common problems faced by participants. Information, consultation, or limited decision-making scope do not provide any guarantee that groups'

interests will be represented or that new and innovative solutions can be developed (Amy 1987; Gray 1989).

Lack of meaningful decision-making authority will undermine a process' legitimacy for participants (Felt 1990). Participants are unlikely to participate over time in a decision-making structure where they are not involved in making meaningful trade-offs about issues impacting their livelihood. Put another way, the costs of participating in decision-making must be balanced by participants' ability to reap equivalent benefits. This has been demonstrated by Schlager and Ostrom (1993) and by Schlager (1994), who show that fishers with more complete bundles of property rights (giving them the ability to design rules to address common problems and to benefit directly from their rules) are able to reduce at least some of the major common pool resource problems they face.

Therefore, negotiation, delegation, or devolution of collective-choice rules provide the minimal effective means of developing optimal decisions (Ostrom 1990). Parties must have a mandate and scope adequate to the problems and issues at hand, some autonomy to develop rules, and the ability to directly implement or compel implementation of decisions and adapt them in a flexible manner, and the ability to monitor and enforce rules through graduated sanctions (Jentoft 1989; Ostrom 1990; Gray 1989; Pinkerton 1994; Deyle 1995).

This implies state recognition, support, and commitment to sharing decision-making for key property rights issues such as access and withdrawal, management, and exclusion (Ostrom 1990; Schlager and Ostrom 1993; Singleton 1998). It also may involve a constitutional level framework that gives groups enough security over access that they can benefit from their decisions. For instance, after reviewing a decade of experience with cooperative management in the Philippines, Pomeroy and Carlos (1997)

conclude, "government support through legislation, funding and enforcement is crucial to sustaining [community-based resource management] and to specifying, legitimizing, and enforcing security of tenure and property rights to coastal resources (p. 461)."

Taking on these powers does not need to happen all at once for all issues in all places, and may be difficult to implement without prior relationship building. Singleton's (1998) case study demonstrated how difficult and time-consuming it can be to implement a strong mandate arising from a court decision, for instance. A strong mandate can be established and agreed to, but it may best be phased in over time according to the priorities and capacity of the decision-making body (Pinkerton 1989; Pomeroy and Carlos 1997; Prystupa 1998). Short-term successes can help build commitment to the body and help build its experience base (Pinkerton and Weinstein 1995).

Decision-making structures with adequate scope and mandate, whether pilot or not, are best formalized in multi-year legal agreements that include a clear legal definition of powers, roles, rights and responsibilities (Pinkerton 1989; 1994; and 1996). Without this formality, government agents and different groups may consistently attempt to undermine the decision-making body. As Pomeroy and Carlos (1997) further note:

It may be insufficient for governments simply to call for more community involvement and fisher participation; they must also establish commensurate legal rights and authorities and devolve some of their powers. . . . If new fisheries co-management initiatives are to be successful, these basic issues of government policy to establish supportive legislation, rights and authority structures must be recognized (p. 469, 470).

## 2.3 Representation

*The institution includes consistent representation of the diverse interests affected by decisions and builds on local values, culture, capacity, and institutions.*

There are five basic propositions regarding representation in decision-making. The first proposition involves risk preferences. Parties who do not have to suffer repercussions are likely to take larger risks than those who will suffer, which may result in short-term ecological/community collapse and intergenerational inequities (Pomeroy 1991; Pinkerton and Weinstein 1995; Scott 1998). Parties that have to assume the risks associated with a decision should be able to decide what level of risk they are willing to accept (Pearse and Walters 1992; Pinkerton and Weinstein 1995). The second proposition is that large central governments have essentially become another stakeholder or user group, "with separate interests, world views and powers" (Jentoft and McCay 1995: 242). They cannot be said to represent different interests in society or the broad public interest (Pearse and Walters 1992). The third proposition is that the more direct the representation of affected parties, the more chances for improved communication, education and relationship building, increased information flow, improved legitimacy of the decision and credibility of the decision-making process, and lower long-term transactions costs resulting from decreased conflict and ease of implementation (Pinkerton 1989; Gray 1989; Wilson et al. 1994; Prystupa 1998). A fourth proposition regarding representation states that repeated encounters under roughly similar circumstances enables the identification and negotiation of optimal rules (Pinkerton 1989; Ostrom 1990; Fisher and Ury 1991; Gray 1989; Ostrom et al. 1999). A final proposition is that decision-making approaches must represent and build on geographic community capacity, values, cultural systems, and institutions for common property management rather than externally imposing new structures (Pinkerton 1989; Rettig et al. 1989; Ruddle et al. 1992; Schlager 1994; Pinkerton and Weinstein 1995; Copes 1998; SSCF 1998; CRIFQ 1999).

These propositions imply certain structures of representation. For instance, representation of a diversity of interests or values appears to be critical (Robinson 1992; Hanna 1995; Yaffe 1997). It is not possible to make real trade-offs within homogeneous groups or groups of 'like-minded' individuals, while dissenting voices are outside the group. Excluding diverse interests is dangerous, as indicated by Jentoft and McCay (1995): "societal interests may be in danger when management decisions are subject to user group pressure and power—the more narrow the definition of user group is, the greater the risk" (p. 239). Risk may arise because of short-term agendas driving management or due to ineffective decisions. With regard to the latter, Hanna (1998) notes: "information needed to deal with harvesting impacts is different than information needed to sustain resources. The latter information can be missing from a narrow partnership excluding communities and others" (p. 204). Such information includes taking a more ecosystem-based approach to management—something extremely difficult to do under narrow government-industry partnerships.

From this perspective, movement toward 'industry-government' partnerships are not effective models of inclusive representation in decision-making because industry and government are only two stakeholders affected by fisheries management decisions, each with their own agenda and limited resources (Jentoft and McCay 1995; Grumbine 1997; Pomeroy and Berkes 1997). As Pearse and Walters (1992) point out,

Ministers of fisheries come and go, threatening inconsistency over time; external advisors and bureaucrats raise questions about representativeness and accountability; resource users cannot always be relied upon to represent the broader public interest in long-term conservation . . . [so] decisions . . . [that] involve subjective value judgments and compromises among conflicting values. . . must include representatives of the broader public interest (p. 173, 181).

Legitimate interests such as communities with large investments in infrastructure and strong economic, social, and cultural connections to fisheries are therefore critical

participants, as are other groups that are directly affected by decisions (Andranovich 1995). In fact, a strong argument can be made that where management is based in a local or regional area, community representatives, and not civil servants, should be the ultimate decision makers (M'Gonigle 1999), as, for example, in many traditional management systems where fishermen are involved in all decisions but ultimate authority rests with a chief, council, or elders.

Translating these propositions into practice gives rise to the immediate questions of how many participants, selecting representation, and ensuring representatives are accountable. For example, in trying to limit a decision-making structure to a reasonable number of participants, problems can arise in deciding who is directly affected by fisheries decisions (Jentoft and McCay 1995), especially for issues that cross multiple geographic and temporal scales. For instance, does participation include consumers, environmental groups, 'the public', other countries or jurisdictions? How are sub-groups (i.e., crew, skippers, owners) within larger groups (i.e., fishermen) represented and in what manner (e.g., geographically, by species fished, by gear-type)? These issues can have a significant impact on how some view their role in a decision-making process; e.g., representing principles, a broad group, an area, a specific gear-type, or an investment (Jentoft and McCay 1995). Similarly, questions arise regarding how representatives are selected and held accountable. This is especially complex for a 'group' like future generations or the species themselves—how are these groups' interests represented?

While significant, these issues are not insurmountable. There are a number of different propositions for structuring representation, none of which are perfect but each of which can address different issues. For instance, committees and working groups are effective methods of involving numerous affected parties in decisions that are most

relevant to them (Gray 1989; Pinkerton 1994). Multi-disciplinary technical committees and/or external advisory committees are also ways of supporting decision-making bodies with good advice while not overloading them with experts (Pinkerton 1989; Jentoft and McCay 1995; Prystupa 1998). Similarly, dividing responsibilities to allow for higher representation of users at the policy level and less at the technical or administrative level can be effective (Pinkerton and Keitlah 1990).

To address selection and accountability, representatives can be chosen by vote or state or group appointment, though there are few propositions on which is preferable or why. It appears to be helpful if the process of organizing and monitoring representation is done by an independent, legitimate 'process manager' or facilitator (agreed to by all parties) rather than by government (Gray 1989; Pinkerton 1994; Deyle 1995) and if the process is reviewed periodically by an ombudsman or similar independent body (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987). Councils of elders have frequently played this role in communities (Ruddle et al. 1992; Monbiot 1994). It is clear that representatives must communicate effectively with their 'constituencies' to ensure fair representation and support for agreements (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987; Hanna 1995).

## 2.4 Decision-Making Rule

*The organization has a clear rule for making decisions and a forum for discussing grievances and resolving conflicts.*

Decision-making may be by consensus of all parties, by consensus of all parties minus one, by 50+% majority vote, or by double-majority voting.<sup>6</sup> Rules about quorum

<sup>6</sup> Double-majority voting protects minority interests by stating that not only must a majority of all members agree, but a majority of the minority group must also agree to a decision.

must also be present. Evidence suggests that it is easier to achieve consensus where parties have regular encounters rather than single, isolated meetings and where there are mutual benefits or an 'exchange of satisfaction' where both parties get some benefits (Axelrod 1984; Andranovich 1995).

There is also general agreement that there must be a forum for discussing grievances and resolving conflicts, though there are many different models for how this role is best fulfilled (Ostrom 1990; Hanna 1995; Prystupa 1998).<sup>7</sup> As Pomeroy (1991) notes, community relations, such as peer pressure and customs, can serve to reduce conflicts, but these may not be successful in resolving all conflicts, especially where parties do not live in the same smaller area. There also may be certain types of decisions that are simply difficult to resolve in collaborative processes.<sup>8</sup> Therefore, in addition to more routine dispute resolution procedures (facilitation, interest-based negotiation, informal interaction, dispute committees), an independent arbitration mechanism may be needed to resolve serious differences where the parties cannot come to agreement (Ostrom 1990).

## 2.5 Guiding Vision and Principles

*The organization has a common vision, principles, and goals.*

A common vision and guiding principles reflecting sustainable management are frequently outlined and described as being important (Gray 1989; Maser 1992; Pinkerton 1994; Deyle 1995; Stephenson and Lane 1995; Brown and MacLeod 1996; Pomeroy

<sup>7</sup> Conflict and cooperation are integrally connected—it is not possible to 'do away' with conflict all together in any structure. Fostering cooperation therefore necessarily involves building and using informal and formal dispute resolution procedures that handle conflict in a fair manner (Andranovich, 1995).

<sup>8</sup> Some authors note that negotiating over basic rights, for instance, is difficult through collaborative processes (Andranovich, 1995).



and Berkes 1997). For example, Gray (1989) emphasizes that in the absence of some sense of commonality and interconnection, including shared recognition of problems and recognition of interdependence in addressing problems, there is no 'glue' that binds people together and keeps them committed to each other in the face of pressure and opportunities to pursue short-term self-interest or positions. Additionally, a clear statement of vision, principles, and goals can play the simple role of reminding people of what they are trying to achieve (Fisher 1991; Hanna 1995). Because goals can appear to be contradictory and mutually exclusive (Bailey and Jentoft 1990; Hanna 1995), it may be useful to have a 'bottom line' such as 'short-term self-interest will not outweigh long-term sustainability of the resource.' Unfortunately, these general propositions are not accompanied by details or more refined propositions about the specific ways in which vision, principles, and goals can be used in decision-making.

## 2.6 Facilitation and Leadership

*The organization has a locally appropriate facilitator and respected and knowledgeable leadership that are able to build a structure others are willing to join.*

Most common pool theory proposes that a facilitator or mediator is important in helping groups make decisions. This can help balance power in the trade-off process, prevent coercive or purposefully negative behaviour, and keep parties focused on their common goals and interests rather than their positions (Gray 1989; Fisher and Ury 1991; Pinkerton 1994; Andranovich 1995).<sup>9</sup> The facilitator/mediator's role should be appropriate to the local situation, coming from either inside or outside the organization

(Gray 1989; Pinkerton 1994 and 1995). For instance, in a case study of co-management in Washington State, Pinkerton and Keitiah (1990) note that the key staff person working for cooperative management organizations needs to have the traditional characteristics of a chief for conflict resolution. Similarly, they note that rotating leadership from each tribe democratizes the commissioner role and allows for different styles of leadership.

Leadership appears especially critical in building and maintaining a collective decision-making structure. The ability and experience of a core group of motivated individuals to build a structure that others will join is essential to aligning self and group interests. Respected and knowledgeable leadership who have previous organizational experience are critical for legitimacy and reduce the users costs of coming to agreement and finding effective solutions for a particular environment (Pinkerton 1989; Ostrom, 1990; Pinkerton 1998; Singleton 1998; Ostrom et al. 1999).

## **2.7 Accountability, Monitoring, and Evaluation**

*The organization has formal and informal methods of accountability, monitoring, and evaluation.*

Pearse and Walters (1992) note that "the reassignment of roles and responsibilities must ensure that those who make decisions about resource management are accountable, as far as possible, for the costs, benefits and risks that flow from their decisions" (p. 182). Accountability has been said to include: a) common access to information on the status of the resource; b) the ability to have public discussion to debate and scope out what are 'the real problems'; c) the ability to reach

<sup>9</sup> Fisher and Ury's well known book "Getting to Yes" (Fisher and Ury 1991) outlines the idea and practice of using interest-based negotiation rather than positional bargaining. Their methods include: 1) separate the people from the problem; 2) focus on interests, not positions; 3) invent options for mutual gain; 4) insist on using objective criteria. All of these can be reflected in a code of conduct.

agreement on what the most basic problem is and what the basic strategy should be; d) the ability to identify the need for new data if existing data is inadequate; e) the ability to have clear, publicly articulated standards for evaluating management actions; and f) the ability to have timely feedback on outcomes of management actions (Pinkerton and Weinstein 1995: 181).

Accountability can be both formal and informal. Formal accountability includes legal liability, financial performance, written contracts, reporting on achieving tasks or objectives, and sanctions on those who transgress a rule. Formal evaluation processes to ensure accountability include: 1) establishing clear and measurable indicators of progress, timelines, and reporting structures; 2) budgeting for a periodic external audit (financial and organizational) and/or partnering for academic case studies; and 3) establishing procedures for imposing sanctions, including revoking rights or privileges. Formal monitoring processes to ensure accountability can involve an ongoing 'ombuds' role, where an independent party addresses complaints or issues as they arise, formal hearings, or people hired to 'patrol', inspect, or supervise activities (Jentoft 1989). Where monitors are hired, they are likely to be more effective if they are accountable directly to all harvesters (Ostrom 1990). In all cases, it is critical to decision-making that participants have a way to monitor and enforce their rules (Pinkerton and Weinstein 1995).

Informal accountability occurs through mutual feedback in ongoing relationships. It can be positive or negative and can range from praise and thanks to requests for action to threats and violence. Having decision makers close to those affected by decisions has a strong impact on informal accountability (Pinkerton and Keitlah 1990). Similarly, the way fishermen harvest can be set up in such a way that "monitoring is a

by-product of using the commons" (Ostrom 1990: 96). In other words, harvesters monitor each other.

Opportunities for people to interact repeatedly over time is therefore critical not only to rule making but also to accountability and monitoring (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987; Pinkerton 1989; Ostrom 1990; Fisher and Ury 1991; Gray 1989; Singleton 1998; Ostrom et al. 1999). Repeated interactions make it less likely that a person will adversely affect another because of the direct consequences on him/her or family in other community interactions (Pinkerton 1994). Local people are the first to feel the effects of decisions (Ruddle et al. 1992), and information about opportunistic individuals or activities is widely shared and subjected to local political pressure (Pinkerton 1994).

Evaluation and monitoring processes that support informal accountability include independent media, ". . . regular meetings, sharing sessions, and consultations" (Pomeroy and Carlos 1997: 459), "open problem-solving sessions at which all participants have a chance to hear other's ideas and suggestions" (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987: 8), and methods for tracking and communicating what different people are doing (for example, through an internet-based data base that all staff can use to post their activities, upcoming meetings, events, or deadlines and where others can register complaints or suggestions). Key management staff or directors are often crucial to the integrity of this kind of informal monitoring and evaluation.

## **2.8 Funding and Capacity Building**

*The organization has capable and adequate staff and stable and adequate funding for its initial years of operations, with the ability to revise policy to undertake cost recovery after a set amount of time.*

'Transaction costs' are incurred when resources (personnel time and energy, finances) are used in trying to reach, implement and enforce decisions. Transaction costs include information costs (collecting, analyzing, organizing information, developing understanding of species/area); collective decision-making costs (meetings, making policies and rules, communicating decisions, coordinating with other groups, dealing with fisheries problems, lobbying, maintaining legitimacy); and collective operational costs, such as monitoring and enforcement, resource maintenance, resource distribution, and administration (Abdullah et al. 1998).

Cooperative management arrangements have a strong potential to lower the overall transaction costs of management—"most notably costs incurred for describing and monitoring the ecosystem, designing regulations, coordinating users and enforcing regulations" (Hanna 1998: 205; Singleton 1998). Decisions and "rules can be revised without the costly and time-consuming coordination process that would ensue from a more hierarchical decision process" (Hanna 1998: 204). Furthermore, fishermen, processors, and volunteers can contribute to managing the resource they benefit from (Pinkerton 1989 and 1994).

However, at least three critical elements are necessary for this to happen. First, as Hanna (1998) points out, "the extent to which communities are willing to invest in management depends critically on the relative magnitude of costs compared to the expected return" (p. 206). In other words, management benefits must exceed management costs for participants. This normally means that groups must be able to exclude outsiders, and government may have to help them achieve this. Second, government must initially provide stable and adequate resources for the decision-making body to operate and revise policy to allow for the body to undertake cost recovery after a set amount of time (Gray 1989; Pinkerton 1994 and 1995; Nielsen and Vedsmand 1997).

Stable external support is especially important for the first three to ten years of a process because this is when the costly relationship building, training, and systems design work occurs; this takes more or less time depending on initial circumstances (Pomeroy and Carlos 1997; Abdullah et al. 1998). Costs after this initial period should decline, and cost-recovery systems can be phased in as management becomes more effective (Pinkerton 1989; Andranovich 1995; Abdullah et al. 1998; Hanna 1998; Singleton 1998). When this happens, it is important to remember that the more equitably any costs or restrictions are allocated among participants, the greater the legitimacy of a decision-making body (Felt 1990). Third, the collective decision-making process must be well organized and relationship building must be balanced with efficiency. As Jentoft and McCay (1995) point out, "user involvement in fisheries management confronts a classic dilemma 'between internal democracy and external efficiency.' Time is money, and management council members are often working under extreme pressure" (p. 246). This highlights the importance of adequate and capable staff with well-defined roles in aiding decision makers (Pinkerton and Keitlah 1990).

## 2.9 Trust and Consensus Building

*The organization builds trust and relationships over time by fostering repeated encounters among participants who are willing to align self and group interests and by addressing issues through fair administrative processes characterized by principles of democratic organization.*

Common pool theorists propose that for sustainable resource management to occur, trust and relationships need to be developed over time, allowing for most information and knowledge to be shared in the community (Singleton 1998; Ostrom et al. 1999). A sense of collective agreement on basic values and principles is believed to be critical for aligning self and group interests. However, propositions outlining the exact

process of developing trust and coming to agreement are not explicit. The majority of theoretical propositions address general conditions that must be present in order for trust and agreement to develop.

For example, theorists propose that those who can identify one another are more likely than are groups of strangers to build trust and limit self-interested behaviour (Ostrom 1990). Also, the majority of participants must agree there is a problem that needs solving and must perceive that benefits outweigh the costs of negotiating rules (Ostrom 1990; Pinkerton and Weinstein 1995; Pomeroy and Carlos 1997). In order for this to happen, individuals must overcome their tendency to evaluate their own benefits and costs more intensely than the total benefits and costs for the group (Berkes 1985; Pinkerton 1989; Ostrom 1990). Furthermore, there must be a fair administrative process (Pinkerton and Weinstein 1995) characterized by principles of democratic organization (Jentoft 1989). Singleton's (1998) work emphasizes that trust builds over long periods of time when participants are forced to work together under joint decision-making arrangements, and where there is strong, determined leadership. Finally, whether agreements evolve depends on the relative proportion of behavioural types in a particular setting; e.g., self-interested, those who will free ride unless assured others will not, those who are willing to initiate reciprocal cooperation in the hopes that others will return their trust, and altruists (Ostrom 1990; Pinkerton and Weinstein 1995).

## **2.10 Summary**

Common pool theorists have developed a substantial number of propositions regarding decision-making structures, though fewer regarding decision-making processes. In this chapter I have reviewed the middle range theory regarding common

pool resource management. The following is a synthesis of the propositions arising from the literature reviewed in this chapter. It will be used as an analytical framework in Chapter 6 to compare case study results with common pool management literature, and is also offered as a common framework for examining other case studies.

### **2.10.1 Geographic Scope and Coordination**

1. If the organization works within a clearly defined local area with enforceable boundaries and coordinates with organizations working at broader spatial scales, it will be more successful at implementing principles of sustainability. (Berkes 1985; Jentoft 1989; Pinkerton 1989; Ostrom 1990; Pinkerton 1994; Wilson et al. 1994; Kurien 1995; Montgomery et al. 1995; Pinkerton and Weinstein 1995; Grumbine 1997; CRIFQ 1999).
2. If the organization works within a clearly defined local area with relatively homogenous ecological and human characteristics, there is a greater possibility that the interconnection between activities will be recognized, fostering an 'ecosystem approach' (Lee 1992; Brown and MacLeod 1996; Pomeroy and Berkes 1997; Hanna 1998; Pinkerton 1998; Prystupa 1998). This may arise because more detailed information on the integration and subtlety of spatial and temporal relationships will develop and be used in management. For instance, individual stocks and habitats will receive attention rather than looking only at aggregates of stocks/habitat (Singleton 1998), cumulative or cross-sectoral impacts will be noted (Ruddle et al. 1992), and intergenerational knowledge will develop (Pinkerton 1998; Scott 1998).
3. If the organization works within a local area and reflects the sociology and ecology of the area, it will be more effective at designing and implementing effective, accepted, and integrated rules and regulations in a timely manner (Jentoft 1989; Pinkerton 1989; Rettig et al. 1989; Ostrom 1990; Wilson et al. 1994; Begossi 1995; Knudsen 1995; Sunderlin 1997; Ostrom et al. 1999).

### **2.10.2 Mandate**

1. An organization is more likely to develop optimal decisions if it has a mandate and scope adequate to the problems and issues at hand, some autonomy to develop rules, the ability to directly implement or compel implementation of decisions, adapt them in a flexible manner, and monitor and enforce rules through graduated sanctions (Jentoft 1989; Ostrom 1990; Gray 1989; Pinkerton 1994; Deyle 1995). This implies state recognition, support, and commitment to shared



decision-making for key property rights issues such as access and withdrawal, management, and exclusion (Ostrom 1990; Schlager and Ostrom 1993; Schlager 1994; Singleton 1998). It also may involve a constitutional level framework that gives groups enough security over access that they can benefit from their decisions (Pomeroy and Carlos 1997).

2. If an organization has an adequate scope and mandate and it is formalized in a multi-year legal agreement that includes a clear legal definition of powers, roles, rights, and responsibilities, it is less likely to be vulnerable to the attempts of government agents and different groups to consistently undermine it (Pinkerton 1989; 1994; and 1996; Pomeroy and Carlos 1997).
3. People will be unlikely to participate in an organization if the costs of participating are not balanced by their ability to reap equivalent benefits (Schlager and Ostrom 1993; Schlager 1994). Therefore, if an organization lacks meaningful decision-making authority, participants will question its legitimacy and likely not participate in a sustained manner.
4. If a strong mandate is established without prior relationship building, the organization may face difficulty implementing it immediately (Singleton 1998). An organization will have a better chance of success if the mandate is phased in over time according to the priorities and capacity of the organization (Pinkerton 1989; Pomeroy and Carlos 1997; Prystupa 1998). The achievement of short-term success will mould commitment and help build experience and capacity (Pinkerton and Weinstein 1995).

### **2.10.3 Representation**

1. The organization is more likely to achieve principles of sustainable aquatic management if its representation and approaches to decision-making represent and build on geographic community capacity, values, cultural systems, and organizations for common property management, rather than externally imposed new structures (Pinkerton 1989; Rettig et al. 1989; Ruddle et al. 1992; Schlager 1994; Pinkerton and Weinstein 1995; Copes 1998; SSCF 1998; CRIFQ 1999).
2. If the organization includes consistent representation of the diverse interests affected by decisions and those representatives will accept the repercussions of their decisions, the organization is more likely to achieve principles of sustainable aquatic management (Pomeroy 1991; Pearse and Walters 1992; Robinson 1992; Hanna 1995; Pinkerton and Weinstein 1995; Yaffe 1997; Scott 1998). Excluding diverse interests (especially geographic communities) and focusing on narrow government-industry partnerships is much less likely to achieve principles of sustainable aquatic management (Pearse and

Walters 1992; Andranovich 1995; Jentoft and McCay 1995; Grumbine 1997; Pomeroy and Berkes 1997; Hanna 1998; M'Gonigle 1999).

3. If participants have repeated encounters under roughly similar circumstances, this will enable the identification and negotiation of optimal rules (Pinkerton 1989; Ostrom 1990; Fisher and Ury 1991; Gray 1989; Ostrom et al. 1999).
4. The more direct the representation of affected parties, the more chances for improved communication, education and relationship building, increased information flow, improved credibility of the decision-making process, and lower long-term transaction costs resulting from decreased conflict and ease of implementation. (Pinkerton 1989; Gray 1989; Pearse and Walters 1992; Wilson et al. 1994; Jentoft and McCay 1995; Prystupa 1998).
5. The organization is likely to encounter difficulties in representing a large number of groups (Jentoft and McCay 1995). To address this successfully, committees and working groups are effective methods of involving numerous affected parties in decisions that are most relevant to them (Gray 1989; Pinkerton 1994). Multi-disciplinary technical committees and/or external advisory committees are also ways of supporting decision-making bodies with good advice while not overloading them with experts (Pinkerton 1989; Jentoft and McCay 1995; Prystupa 1998). Similarly, dividing responsibilities to allow for higher representation of users at the policy level and less at the technical or administrative level can be effective (Pinkerton and Keitlah 1990).
6. If representatives communicate effectively with their 'constituencies', there is more likely to be fair representation and support for agreements (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987; Hanna 1995). In achieving fairness and support, it is also helpful if the process of organizing and monitoring representation is done by an independent, legitimate 'process manager' or facilitator (agreed to by all parties) rather than by government (Gray 1989; Pinkerton 1994; Deyle 1995) and if the process is reviewed periodically by an ombudsman or similar independent body (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987).

#### **2.10.4 Decision-Making Rule**

1. The organization has a clear rule for decision-making and a forum for discussing grievances and resolving conflicts (Ostrom 1990; Hanna 1995; Prystupa 1998).
2. An independent arbitration mechanism may be useful where an organization faces decisions or disagreements that are difficult to resolve through cooperation, facilitation, negotiation or committee (Ostrom 1990; Pomeroy 1991).

### **2.10.5 Guiding Vision and Principles**

1. If the organization has a common vision, principles, and goals, reflecting some sense of commonality and interconnection (including shared recognition of problems and interdependence in addressing them), the organization is more likely to successfully implement their principles in the face of pressure and self-interested behaviour (Gray 1989; Fisher and Ury 1991; Maser 1992; Pinkerton 1994; Deyle 1995; Hanna 1995; Stephenson and Lane 1995; Brown and MacLeod 1996; Pomeroy and Berkes 1997).

### **2.10.6 Facilitation and Leadership**

1. If an organization has a locally appropriate facilitator, this can help balance power in the trade-off process, prevent coercive or purposefully negative behaviour, and keep parties focused on their common goals and interests rather than their positions (Gray 1989; Fisher and Ury 1991; Pinkerton 1994; Andranovich 1995).
2. If the organization has respected, knowledgeable, and experienced leadership that are able to build a structure others are willing to join, there is a greater chance of finding effective solutions and reducing the costs of coming to agreement (Pinkerton 1989; Ostrom, 1990; Pinkerton 1998; Singleton 1998; Ostrom et al. 1999).

### **2.10.7 Accountability, Monitoring, and Evaluation**

1. If an organization has formal and informal methods of accountability, monitoring, and evaluation, it is more likely to achieve its principles and goals (Ostrom 1990; Pinkerton and Weinstein 1995; Pomeroy and Carlos 1997). Repeated interactions and clear, articulated social consequences of breaking rules increase the likelihood that people will be accountable for their actions (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987; Pinkerton 1989; Gray 1989; Ostrom 1990; Fisher and Ury 1991; Singleton 1998; Ostrom et al. 1999).

### **2.10.8 Funding and Capacity Building**

1. If an organization has capable and adequate staff and stable and adequate funding for its initial years of operations, with the ability to revise policy to undertake cost recovery after a set amount of time, it is more likely to achieve its principles and goals (Gray 1989; Pinkerton 1994 and 1995; Nielsen and Vedsmand 1997).
2. If the costs of management exceed the benefits for participants, the organization is likely to lose support and not be able to achieve its principles and goals (Hanna 1998).

3. Costs after this initial period should decline, and cost-recovery systems can be phased in as management becomes more effective (Pinkerton 1989; Andranovich 1995; Abdullah et al. 1998; Hanna 1998; Singleton 1998). The more equitably any costs or restrictions are allocated among participants, the greater the legitimacy of a decision-making body (Felt 1990).
4. Cooperative decision-making organizations are likely to encounter tension between internal democracy and external efficiency (Jentoft and McCay 1995). If an organization has adequate and capable staff with well-defined roles in aiding decision makers, it is more likely to successfully address challenges (Pinkerton and Keitlah 1990).

### **2.10.9 Trust and Consensus Building**

1. It is easier to achieve consensus if an organization builds trust and relationships over time by fostering repeated encounters among participants (Ostrom 1990).
2. It is easier to achieve consensus where the majority of participants agree that there is a problem that needs solving and perceive that benefits outweigh the costs of negotiating rules or solutions (Ostrom 1990; Pinkerton and Weinstein 1995; Pomeroy and Carlos 1997).
3. If individuals overcome their tendency to evaluate their own benefits and costs more intensely than the total benefits and costs for the group, it is more likely that consensus will be reached and will include mutual benefits or an 'exchange of satisfaction' where both parties get some benefits (Berkes 1985; Pinkerton 1989; Ostrom 1990).
4. If the relative proportion of behavioural types in a particular setting (e.g., self-interested, those who will free ride unless assured others will not, those who are willing to initiate reciprocal cooperation in the hopes that others will return their trust, and altruists) favours those who are cooperatively oriented, there is a greater likelihood of achieving consensus (Ostrom 1990; Pinkerton and Weinstein 1995).
5. Trust is likely to build over long periods of time when participants are forced to work together under joint decision-making arrangements, where there is strong, determined leadership, and where cultural identity animates the process of institutional design and change (Singleton 1998).
6. It is easier to achieve consensus if there is a fair administrative process (Pinkerton and Weinstein 1995) characterized by principles of democratic organization (Jentoft 1989).

### 3 METHODS

My research was informed both by a literature review and a participatory research approach to a case study from the West Coast of Vancouver Island (WCVI). In the literature review I examined research related primarily to common pool management. I also read articles in other fields where they were referenced regularly in the common pool literature or where they were of special relevance to my thesis topic.

I used a range of methods in a time-sequenced approach to achieve the objectives of my thesis. In the first phase of research, undertaken from 1997 to 2001, I used participatory research methods (PRM) in the RAMS case study context and a grounded theory approach to developing theoretical propositions. Participatory research methods involve close collaboration between the researcher and participants in the case study context and cover a range of approaches from observation to active participation. A grounded theory approach involves generating hypotheses from direct observations of or interactions with events as they occur (Glaser and Strauss 1967). I used these approaches in my active participant role, which included acting as Executive Director and consultant to RAMS and its sub-committees.

In the second phase of the research (2001-2003) I interviewed participants about the lessons they learned in the case study context and also discussed the validity of main theoretical propositions. In the third phase of my research (2003) I compared theoretical propositions with those generated in the first two phases. A detailed account of methods is provided below.

### 3.1 Phase I: Participatory Research Methods

Theory and practice regarding implementing PRM can be summarized in ten main steps, as outlined in Table 4. Using these steps to guide me, I undertook the following three stages in the participatory research phase of my research.

**Table 4: Ten Steps in Implementing Participatory Research Methods**

- 
1. Contacting participants, agreeing to work together, and developing conditions for doing so (e.g., who sets research questions and how, goals, roles, funding, intellectual property) during the project.
  2. Preliminary data is gathered and the community identifies issues.
  3. Participants and researcher establish strategies and methodologies for addressing problems and carrying out research.
  4. Participants prioritize preferred strategies and develop some evaluative framework and criteria for assessing effectiveness of strategies.
  5. Participant training in methodology is carried out as needed
  6. Strategies and methodologies (data collection phase) are implemented
  7. Results are reviewed and analyzed.
  8. Results are presented and discussed.
  9. Results are compared with other theories and propositions to try to determine lessons learned and theoretical advances.
  10. Strategies are revised and new theories and strategies are developed and implemented.
- 

#### **3.1.1 PRM Stage 1: Entry into Case Study Context**

I became familiar with the case study context by meeting several key participants through related work that I was doing with my senior supervisor, Dr. Evelyn Pinkerton. We were writing a discussion paper on community-based management of salmon (*Oncorhynchus spp*) for the Pacific Salmon Alliance—a diverse group whose members

were temporarily united against Federal strategies for 'fleet rationalization' (i.e., downsizing the commercial salmon fleet). I was in regular contact with Mr. Dan Edwards of the WCSA and Mr. Eric Tamm of the Coastal Community Network (working out of the WCSA office), who helped review the paper.

Dr. Pinkerton was invited to speak at a community vision workshop in Ucluelet (where WCSA and the CCN were located). As she could not attend, she recommended to them that I might go in her place. I was invited and made a presentation at the workshop.

Before, during, and after the workshop I had a chance to talk in more detail with Mr. Edwards and Mr. Tamm. After the workshop, Mr. Edwards and I had a discussion in which we came to understand each other's basic intentions and perspectives more closely. I expressed interest to Mr. Edwards about helping WCSA with their goal of building a regional management organization as part of my thesis work. Mr. Edwards expressed some interest in the possibility but emphasized that he was interested in a true partnership—not one where I was detached or above the work that needed doing. He also noted that he had to check with his other partners in the region.

After consulting with all participants and based on recommendations and requests from my senior supervisor (whom they had known for a number of years), key participants agreed that I could volunteer to help them as needed. They reiterated Mr. Edwards' initial comments that they were not interested in either being observed or used for my research purposes. We agreed that I would play an active participant role under their direction and that information or intellectual property would be collectively owned.

It is important to note that the participants had spent several years building relationships, infrastructure and capacity that allowed room for me to become involved in the project and play the role I eventually came to play. It is also very important to note

that Dr. Pinkerton played a sponsorship role in my initial involvement with WCSA/RAMS. Beyond participating in the paper on co-management and recommending me for the initial workshop, Dr. Pinkerton was in contact with Mr. Edwards and other participants and recommended that I might be of assistance to them. She also encouraged me to take the project on as a worthwhile case study. Her role as a sponsor was invaluable given the difficulties associated with becoming involved in a community-based project of this kind.

For the first seven months I volunteered and did some paid work with participants on a part-time basis. During this time my relationship with participants developed, I gathered preliminary data and became familiar with their issues, and I worked with them to establish strategies for addressing main issues. One of the major events during that time was the 'Common Ground' workshop in Port Alberni from which the Regional Aquatic Management Society was born. This was a significant event, as will be described in the next chapter. It served not only to introduce me to many members of the community and raise my awareness of their issues but also to make me a part of the consensus in the area. This latter point is significant; many participants later referred (and still refer) to the feeling at the workshop and how it touched and energized them in a profound way. For me, sharing in the feeling at the workshop was a first experience with the power of consensus and connection within a larger group setting.

At the encouragement of Mr. Skip McCarthy, a consultant hired to help WCSA, and my supervisor, I then took several months in Vancouver to write a thesis proposal about my potential work. The draft proposal was accepted by my committee, but I did not have time to do requested revisions as I was asked by Mr. Edwards to return to Ucluelet to help further with the development of RAMS.



### **3.1.2 PRM Stage 2: Implementation and Data Collection**

After a period of approximately seven to ten months of gaining entry into the case study context, I began full-time paid work as coordinator for RAMS. I continued in this capacity for two and one half years. During this time, I collected data according to the following sources of evidence: documentation, archival records, researcher and participant observation, and open-ended interviews (Yin 1994; Stringer 1999). Within the limits of working full time, I maintained a case study database including some history and chronology of the case study and non-confidential raw data.

Researcher observations, which provide the bulk of my data, were gathered in my day-to-day activities as I engaged in the case study context and were kept mainly in a journal format. I further documented my observations by having my wife interview me in depth about my experiences and observations. This interview served as a 'test run' for participant interviews and enabled me to clearly outline my views before interpreting those of others. This can be a useful tool in highlighting researcher biases (May 1997). I gathered participant observations through participants' notes, written materials (letters, emails, memoranda, meeting minutes, papers and documents) or unofficial correspondence that participants were willing to share. Any informal discussions conducted during the case study are being used in a supplementary manner where the results of these discussions were documented and where the discussion is clearly stated not to be in confidence.

Table 5 summarizes the frequency and degree of communication I had with different categories of people during the case study. It does not express the frequency and degree of communications by other participants in WCSA/RAMS.

**Table 5: Communications with Categories of People in the Case Study**

Category	Frequency (F= more than 1 communication per month; I= less than 1/month) and Degree (H= high breadth and depth of communication; L= moderate or low breadth and depth of communication).			
	Number of people			
	F H	I H	F L	I L
<i>First Nations</i>				
Elected officials or representatives	2	3	2	11-40
Elders or hereditary chiefs	1	1	0	4
Staff	5	1	0	0
Community members	1	5-10	5-20	20-80
<i>Other Communities</i>				
Elected officials or representatives	2	3	2	10-30
Staff	1	2	0	1
Community members	8	5-15	10-25	20-80
<i>Federal and Provincial Governments</i>				
Staff based in WCVI	2	4	2	2
Middle management	3	4	2	10-20
Senior management	0	4	1	5-10
Elected officials or representatives	0	1	0	4
<i>Aquatic resource users</i>				
WCVI residents	3-5	5-15	5-10	20-80
Non-resident individuals operating in WCVI	2	10-15	2-10	20-80
Harvesting companies operating in WCVI	1	2	2	5-15

Category	Frequency (F= more than 1 communication per month; L= less than 1/month) and			
	Degree (H= high breadth and depth of communication; L= moderate or low breadth and depth of communication).			
	Number of people			
Processing companies operating in WCVI	1	1	1	5
Union representatives	0	1	2	4
<i>Other</i>				
Non-Government Organizations	2	3-8	1-3	5-15
Universities	0	2	0	5-10
Consultants	1	2	1	10-30
Commissions, Reviews, etc.	0	3	0	8
Boards in the area	1	1	0	2
Communities outside the area	1	5	3	20-40

In addition to the discussions I had with participants and others during my work with RAMS, I conducted formal open-ended interviews with key participants, in which conversations invited respondents to describe events and make theoretical propositions about those events. There are eight key individuals whom I interviewed based on their knowledge and ongoing participation in RAMS. These were Cliff Atleo, Wilf Caron, Darren Deluca, Dan Edwards, Don Hall, Maureen Sager, Tom Pater, and Trevor Wickham. Laura Loucks, a consultant to RAMS and Ph.D student living in the area, also participated in the interview with Mr. Wickham. I recorded and later transcribed these interviews. Key aspects of the narratives in these interviews are included in the thesis or the case study database without editing. All narratives used in the dissertation were checked and verified by participants.

### **3.1.3 Stage 3: Review and Analysis of Results**

I approached data analysis through two complementary strategies. First, I searched for common patterns found amongst multiple experiences, perspectives, or realities. This approach is also called 'bracketing' and is referred to frequently in the literature as a dominant mode of analysis (Yin 1994). To undertake this, I formulated categories, identified recurring themes and significant data points or features, and grouped common items or categories. My second strategy for data analysis includes presenting multiple perspectives and raw evidence so that readers can draw their own conclusions as much as possible.

To increase the validity and reliability of results, I used data source triangulation (using multiple sources of evidence), methodological triangulation (researcher undertakes multiple approaches within a case study—observer, facilitator, advocate, etc.), and participant triangulation (participant checking, participant debriefing, interviews focused on interpretation, and review by participants in case) (Yin 1994; Stringer 1997).

## **3.2 Phase II: Deductive techniques**

Once I had generated a number of propositions from the case study context, I reviewed middle range theoretical propositions from the literature on common pool management relevant to the institutional structures and processes under study. I then identified propositions and grouped more detailed propositions under main propositions.

Using these theoretically derived propositions, I developed interview questions that attempted to test the propositions' validity in the case study context. I asked participants to discuss their applicability and refine or add to them as appropriate. I used focused interview techniques with the following participants.

- Wilf Caron, Commercial fisherman, Port Alberni
- Darren Deluca, Recreational fisherman, Port Alberni
- Dan Edwards, Commercial fisherman, Ucluelet.
- Don Hall, Nuu-chah-nulth Tribal Council Fishery Program Manager, Port Alberni
- Laura Loucks, Consultant, Tofino
- Maureen Sager, Alberni Environmental Coalition, Port Alberni
- Tom Pater, Comox Strathcona Regional District, Kyuquot
- Trevor Wickham, Consultant, Tofino

I use 'revelatory' quotes to illuminate key issues, approaches, or perceptions, and codified the results of all interviews into main propositions regarding each theme.

### **3.3 Phase III: Reporting Results**

In this final phase of the study, I outlined and presented the research conclusions. I classified, ordered, and assembled patterns in coherent, detailed accounts related to specific aspects of decision-making structures and processes. I then compared propositions arising from the case study with those arising from literature on common pool resource management. I identified propositions that were common to the case study and the literature and those that arose only in one or the other setting in order to allow a clear outline of where current theory can be advanced or refined and set a direction for future areas of research.

### **3.4 Addressing Research Issues and Limitations**

Research has traditionally been considered rigorous when it is objective, replicable, generalizable and valid externally. While some claim that these are

inappropriate to participatory research methods (Stringer 1999), different techniques have been developed for addressing the issues they represent.

### **3.4.1 Researcher Objectivity**

Complete objectivity in research is now considered to be an impossible goal. Researcher values are inherent in the very definition of a research problem, as well as in research design, data collection, and analysis. However, this does not mean we should not attempt to minimize researcher bias. To do so, I used several approaches. I documented my assumptions and perspectives and include these in the final section of this chapter so that the reader is aware of at least some of my biases. I also included a variety of perspectives in the results and analysis section of the report (Argyris and Schon 1991). This gives equal weight to a variety of people's values or interpretations and clarifies the researcher's perspective by comparison. Finally, I had the other participants in the project verify my conclusions.

### **3.4.2 Repeatability**

As far as possible, it is important that a research process be applicable in other contexts so that its utility can be further examined and the theories it develops can be explored and/or expanded. Repeatability in participatory research methods is therefore described in the following way:

given the same theoretical perspective of the original researcher and following the same general rules for data gathering and analysis, plus a similar set of conditions, another investigator should be able to come up with the same theoretical explanation about the given phenomenon. Whatever discrepancies that arise can be worked out through reexamination of the data and identification of the different conditions that may be operating in each case (Strauss and Corbin 1990: 251).

In order for this to happen, I have documented my assumptions and perspectives, a history and chronology of the case study, and the research process and

my role in influencing or determining the process, including the means by which readers may refer to raw data. Most importantly, I have tried to maintain a 'chain of evidence' in developing theory so that readers can follow the logic of any line of evidence from initial research questions to final conclusions or propositions (Yin 1994).

### **3.4.3 Generalizability**

While organizational design and process is highly site specific, there are principles that can be used in helping others think about what will be appropriate in their particular setting. As Strauss and Corbin (1990) state, "if the data upon which it is based are comprehensive and the interpretations conceptual and broad, then the theory should be abstract enough and include sufficient variation to make it applicable to a variety of contexts related to that phenomenon" (p. 23). I established generalizability through descriptions that enable readers to identify similarities between the research setting and other contexts (Stringer 1999). In addition, I aggregated diverse instances within the case study context or aggregated common perspectives from within the case study and within other case studies or literature (Stringer 1999).

### **3.4.4 External Validity**

The main means of establishing credibility in participatory research methods is through triangulation. Triangulation occurs when multiple perspectives, data or methods are used to either validate a perspective or add different perspectives to the analysis of a phenomenon. It can help researchers determine whether their observations, reports, and analyses carry ". . . the same meaning under different circumstances" (Stake 1995: 113). According to Denzin (1989), there are four types of triangulation: data source triangulation (using multiple sources of evidence); investigator triangulation (have other investigators look at the same phenomenon); theory triangulation (having observers or

reviewers from alternate theoretical viewpoints); and methodological triangulation (researchers undertake multiple approaches within a case study—observer, facilitator, advocate, etc.). A fifth category is alluded to in the literature but not identified explicitly: participant triangulation. This is similar to investigator triangulation and includes methods such as participant checking, participant debriefing, interviews focused on interpretation, and review of products by participants (Yin 1994; Stringer 1997).

In this case study I used data source triangulation, methodological triangulation, and participant triangulation to increase the validity and credibility of results. For example, in searching for common themes, I looked first at different sources of data. I identified a number of propositions that arose from different sources, and then checked to see which propositions were consistent across different kinds of data. I then considered propositions generated through different methodologies I undertook—(observer, facilitator, advocate). I compared these propositions with those found in different data sources, again with the goal of ‘winnowing’ down the number of propositions. Finally, I compared propositions generated in this manner with propositions generated by participants in interviews. The criteria I used was the extent to which propositions could be supported by at least two different types of reliable data, by the validation of different participants, and by at least one of the participant researcher methodologies employed. Propositions that were not strongly supported through this triangulation process were rejected.

### **3.5 Limitations of Participatory Research Methods**

There are several limitations to participatory research methods. Involvement directly in the case study context puts the researcher in a difficult position in relation to



time for proper research protocol and for viewing the case study from an independent perspective. Researchers may get so engaged in the participant role that their observer role can suffer. This may result in inadequate notes, inability to raise questions from different perspectives, and loss of emphasis on research procedures. It may also result in attachment to group identity and theories to the detriment of producing or raising alternative explanations for phenomenon. This can result in conclusions that simply reflect the views of people with the same theoretical viewpoint. While this limitation can be seen as an inherent disadvantage to active participation by researchers, I attempted to limit it by playing different roles in the case study at different times and by triangulating results with participants with divergent viewpoints.

Another main limitation with participatory research methods is the poor guidance given researchers on how to address conflict or historical power imbalances within groups (Rahnema 1990; Chataway 1997; Perez 1997). Participatory research methods tend to assume that communities and participants are homogenous entities that naturally arrive at consensus on all issues. The diverse values and perspectives in most communities are difficult to resolve for professional mediators, let alone untrained researchers with no skills in dispute resolution. There is considerable danger that the researcher simply becomes aligned with a certain group within the community, viewing others as 'enemies' or 'ignorant'. This is especially the case where the researcher is playing an active managerial or facilitative role and where there are numerous parties. I addressed this potential limitation in my research methodology through previous training in facilitation and conflict resolution and by focusing on common principles and objectives. Much more important, I was fortunate to have the guidance and mentorship of several key participants who were very skilled at conflict resolution, as well as the commitment of the diverse parties to work together towards their mutual goals.

The potential for conflicts and tensions arising between the researcher and participants is another limitation of participatory research methods. Israel et al. (1992) identify the following potential sources of tension:

a) the parties involved hold different *values and interests* on issues of time frame, the immediate use of the findings, action versus research, and ideology; b) the multiple *skills and knowledge* required are not available; c) the researcher has to give up some *control* over the project; d) the *political realities* and ramifications are uncomfortable for researchers; and e) the *rewards and costs* involved are not balanced (*authors' emphasis, p. 76*).

Scant attention has been paid to dealing with these conflicts in the literature on participatory research methods, despite the fact that the researcher's ability to handle them has a significant impact on the efficacy of the research. I addressed this limitation at the outset of my research through clear communication and development of agreements with research participants regarding the study's time frame, my role, our approach to the issues and to each other, rewards and costs, and control over the project and its results. The development of trust and mutual respect in our relationship allowed us to deal with further issues that arose during the research process.

Finally, human inquiry is always incomplete in some way. Interviews, for example, may include bias, misinterpretations or poor expression, inaccurate recall of events, omissions, or different perspectives depending on the mood of the interviewee. At best, participatory research methods can help provide multiple perspectives that capture most of the main elements of a situation. I acknowledge this inherent limitation.

### 3.6 Ethical Issues

I received approval of my research protocol through the University ethics approval process. However, different ethical issues tend to arise when carrying out

participatory research methods (Yin 1994; Stake 1995; Perez 1997; Stringer 1997). These include acquiring and owning information, taking credit for collaborative work, privacy, sensitivity to cultural values, advocacy for participant goals, and receiving payment. During the course my research, I negotiated an informal research protocol with participants to address these issues. However, if ethical issues were to have arisen in the context of the collaborative process, I would also have consulted with my supervisory committee or the appropriate university body.

### **3.7 Researcher Biases, Assumptions, and Learning**

In this section I outline my background, basic values, and assumptions when entering the case study context. I also highlight some of the main changes in my perspective during my research.

I am a 34-year-old Caucasian male. I was 28 when I started this research process. I was raised as the younger of two sons in a middle-upper class suburb of Vancouver, British Columbia. My father's family immigrated to the United States in 1634 and eventually moved to California in the late nineteenth century. My mother's father immigrated from Greece to the northeastern United States in the early 1900s and her mother came in the 1930s. My parents immigrated to Canada in 1966. I have a law degree and travelled and worked in various parts of the world. For instance, I worked as a commercial fisherman in the North Sea, a smokejumper in the Yukon, and a game warden and community development manager in Africa. During the course of the research process I lived in Ucluelet—a remote town in the WCVI area- and on Lasqueti Island—a remote island outside of the WCVI area.

I began the research process being somewhat idealistic about community-based management. I mostly thought I could accomplish change by applying the variety of principles outlined in the academic literature regarding common pool resource management, ecosystem management, and organizational theory. In other words, at that point I was operating under the assumptions that: 1) these new principles and theories were 'right'; 2) most civil servants and politicians were unaware of these new principles and theories; 3) these principles and theories were known and held by most rural communities; and 4) through rational application of the principles and theories with these groups, we could change people's minds and actions, creating a sustainable, rational outcome.

Over the course of the research process, I let go of these assumptions and some of my idealism about community-based co-management. I remained committed, however, to change reflecting principles of sustainable aquatic management. The following two main categories and sub-points summarize main changes over the research period.<sup>10</sup>

1) Letting go of external agendas and opening my mind.

- At the beginning of the research period, I was attached to a variety of complex ideologies and theories regarding human behaviour. By the end of the research period these became simplified into the Nuu-chah-nulth principle of 'hishtukish ts'awalk', Everything is One. That is, I understood that each circumstance might require a different approach in order to open a situation or mind (including my own) to new possibilities and that groupings and categories missed people's subtlety or the subtlety of different circumstances. Sometimes we needed to push things along, and sometimes we needed to move slowly, sometimes talk frankly, sometimes talk diplomatically, sometimes just listen, etc. Some approaches worked well in one circumstance but were inappropriate in others. I found that a strong ideological framework hindered my ability to be fully present within a circumstance. By constantly thinking in terms of what 'should' and 'should not' be happening, or what someone (including

<sup>10</sup> I have learned further lessons in the course of my current work as Executive Director of the WCVI Aquatic Management Board, but I have made a conscious effort to exclude those from this thesis as they represent a different stage in cooperative development.

myself) 'should' or 'should not' be thinking, I was missing what was happening and any chance of helping open a situation or mind (including my own) to new possibilities. The concept of 'hishtukish ts'awalk' gave me the simple guidance to pay close attention, see someone or something else as a part of myself, understand others by understanding myself, and treat others and myself with respect. In order to fulfil this, I found I had to be in a much more subtle and perceptive part of myself than the part of myself wrapped up in ideology. Part of that subtlety is using ideas as pathways into new possibilities rather than as blinders to new possibilities.

- I started to understand that problems are comprised both of the way others act and the way that I see the problem. Rather than try to control how other people acted, I learned to focus more on trying to understand myself and others in terms of belief/action patterns and habits. This led to a more subtle understanding of the power of ideology and belief and how it pervades everyone within a culture, establishing itself at all levels and relationships.
- I learned that telling people directly what to do or how to think are rarely effective ways of interacting with people (except in emergency situations) and lead to frustration all the way around. I began to learn from several elders in particular that telling stories and using humour are amongst the most artful forms of communication because of their ability to impart a message without eliciting a defensive response that makes the listener unreceptive. As noted above, building consensus requires subtlety and heightened awareness, not blunt instruments and force.

## 2) Building the strength and wisdom needed to have an open mind.

- As my awareness expanded, my perception of problems and solutions changed. One main characteristic of this change was becoming familiar and patient with cycles of change. I began to see things that appear 'bad' or 'negative' are often necessary steps in change. Trying to change or stop many things is like stopping a boulder that has gathered momentum rolling downhill towards a town. Flailing at it or standing in its way without huge support is vain and dangerous. It is more effective either to wait for the right opportunity to steer it away from the town or let it run its course and to take it as an opportunity to rebuild a better, safer town. Finding the fine line between action and non-action requires close observation and a patient eye for opportunity.
- As a corollary of seeing patterns of change, I had to learn to cope with situations or crises by not getting so emotionally involved that I lost focus on changing the situation. That is, when dealing with someone who was saying or doing things that were either frustrating to me or who was attacking what we were doing or attacking me personally, I learned not to internalize these things. For much of the research process I did internalize these things and would bring them home after work. This meant I was in a negative mood most of the time given that we faced innumerable challenges. It seriously affected my productivity and relationships. I learned that I was internalizing negativity because I had

not dealt with the negativity in myself, as if the negativity in myself attracted rather than repelled the negativity outside me. By coping with external negativity I came to grips with negativity in myself.

The research process provided rich opportunities for personal and professional growth. Some of the advantages, disadvantages, and lessons involved with using participatory research methods are discussed further in Chapter 6.

## 4 CASE STUDY PROFILE AND CONTEXT

### 4.1 The Origins of WCSA and RAMS

WCSA was initially formed because other avenues for input into decision-making were felt to inadequately address community and small boat fishing interests. Major policy decisions and structural changes were being made regarding aboriginal fisheries and salmon fleet restructuring that were having or would have significant impact on local fishermen and their communities. Local fishermen and Nuu-chah-nulth leadership started to host forums and identify common issues and strategies for addressing these issues. Dan Edwards, the main WCSA organizer, was told at the time that in order to 'get in' to advisory processes where decisions were being made, he needed to have a formal constituency. This prompted him to formalize interested local parties into the WCSA (Dan Edwards, pers. comm. 1997). These parties included local First Nations representatives, interested fishermen and industry representatives, and local government representatives.

RAMS originated in a May 1997 Common Ground Conference where over 70 representatives from different groups and governments in the WCVI region came together for two and one half days to find common ground on aquatic resource management. The problems participants outlined at the May 1997 conference are described in Table 6.

**Table 6: Problems Identified in Common by Participants in May 1997 Common Ground Conference, Port Alberni, BC.**

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- Many species and their ecosystems were being degraded.
  - Communities were losing access to adjacent resources while those resources were increasingly being privatized and concentrated in a few hands. License

prices were highly inflated; licence leasing was common; and the cost of re-accessing aquatic resources was out of residents' reach and out of the reach of fair treaty settlements.

- Decisions were continuing to be made through unclear and closed processes, despite the significant impact of many of those decisions on communities.
  - Decisions were not guided by or evaluated according to any common principles or goals.
  - Communities were becoming or had become 'program' dependent rather than self-sufficient, and the majority of programs were highly ineffective and normally short-term.
  - Inter-generational training and information related to aquatic resources was being lost as access was being lost.
  - Governments were not fulfilling their resource protection and enforcement obligations adequately.
  - Communities were expected to bear all costs of conservation while realizing few of the benefits.
  - Government policies were artificially dividing First Nations and other community residents.
  - Segregated single-species management included very little coordination or understanding of ecosystem linkages.
  - Local knowledge was heavily discounted in management.
- 

Participants summarized these problems by stating that they could no longer stand the devastating effects of power politics, dysfunctional centralized decision-making, and a privatized, industrial model of resource use. The relationships among many communities were felt to be unhealthy and the adjacent ecosystems were believed to be declining.

In order to restore some balance to the region, participants sought to establish a framework that would be stable over time for residents. They no longer wanted to be directed by the agendas of people outside the area and were tired of not seeing concrete implementation of concepts such as sustainability, integrated coastal zone management, ecosystem management, and community economic development. These often meant



the imposition of someone else's agenda and the coming and going of consultants and short-term processes with no grounding or commitment.

Participants were aware that if they were serious about change, they would have to put aside their differences and work together. They agreed on the goal of implementing a regional aquatic management board. Then they agreed on the vision, principles, and purposes that would guide their work. It was a major turning point to formally recognize common problems and commit to a common will. Wilf Caron (pers. comm. 2003), a participant and later RAMS Board member, notes the following about the Common Ground Conference:

. . . that first meeting there at the Tseshaht Hall sure demonstrated that there was a huge amount of healing needed. That was the first instance that we started doing that, is demonstrating that respect for our positions, our varied positions, and came out of it and it showed that basically we had one position, from all of the directions and I remember seeing all of those reams of papers, old newsprint, on the walls everywhere with all of these thoughts, ideas, grievances, bitches, complaints, dreams, hopes, aspirations, and black holes... So we agonized over that, and I saw tears there and people were racked with grief and pain and whatever else, frustration. And out of that, winnowed out of that was a vision of the future. That is where it started. That is where somebody re-lit the light... because it was pretty darn dark prior to that.

RAMS members were initially those who volunteered at the May 1997 Common Ground Conference to sit on the Steering Committee to implement the vision of the conference.<sup>11</sup> Representatives were from the Nuu-chah-nulth Tribal Council and individual Nuu-chah-nulth governments and from the Alberni-Clayoquot and Comox-Strathcona regional districts and local governments in the WCVI area. In addition, the following governments and non-governmental groups participated as RAMS directors over the five years of its existence:

<sup>11</sup> The steering committee that was formed at the conference was eventually formed into the Regional Aquatic Management Society. This formalization was only significant as an administrative incorporation to enable the group to enter into contracts and administer funds. The work and circumstances leading up to the Common Ground conference were the main catalysts for collaboration.

- Alberni Environmental Coalition (an environmental organization working primarily in the Alberni Valley area)
- Alberni Valley Sport Fishing Association (the recreational fishing organization for Alberni Valley/Barkley Sound portion of WCVI--connected to the coastwide Sport Fish Advisory Board)
- Area G Troll Fisheries Association (a salmon troll fishing organization for the WCVI area)
- West Coast Sustainability Association (a native/non-native organization established to gain a greater say in policy and to implement projects in the area working towards greater economic, ecological, and social benefits).
- Alberni Valley Enhancement Association (a salmon stream and stock rehabilitation/enhancement organization working in the Alberni Valley area).
- Alberni-Clayoquot Economic Development Commission (the economic development wing of the Alberni-Clayoquot Regional District)
- Scandic Seafoods (Finfish aquaculture company operating in Gold River)
- Canadian Seafood Processors (A foreign owned company with a large processing plant in Ucluelet (no other holdings in BC).
- Ma'Mook Development Corporation (the economic development organization of 5 Nuuchahnulth Nations in the Alberni-Clayoquot area).
- Nootka Sport Fish Advisory Board (the recreational fishing organization for the Nootka Sound portion of WCVI—connected to the coastwide Sport Fish Advisory Board)

In addition, over 100 individuals and groups from the WCVI area and beyond participated in RAMS committees and working groups on a volunteer basis (Field notes 1999). Appendix A outlines some of the groups participating in various RAMS processes during its lifespan. WCSA/RAMS influence and activities were centred mainly in Barkley and Clayoquot Sounds, and to a lesser degree in the rest of the WCVI area (which is less populated and more difficult to access). WCSA/RAMS had an extensive network of partners both inside and outside the area. WCSA/RAMS staff interacted

frequently with external governments' staff from a range of agencies, with more frequent interactions with field staff and middle level management, and less frequent interactions with senior staff, Ministers, and politicians.

## 4.2 The Context and History of WCSA and RAMS

For thousand of years Nuu-chah-nulth communities were sustained primarily by their dependence on adjacent sea resources, from which they drew sustenance, cultural, and economic fulfilment (Nuu-chah-nulth Tribal Council 1997). Over the past two hundred years other people have settled in Nuu-chah-nulth Ha-hoolthee (territories), developing a similar shared dependence on the aquatic resources of the area. Today, the WCVI is home to about 40,000 people, almost all living adjacent to the rivers, lakes, and ocean.

Traditional Nuu-chah-nulth management structures and approaches are well defined. They include a Haa-wilth (chief), Haa-wilth-mis (roles, responsibilities, and duties passed on to the Haa-wilth and council), Haa-wilth-paa-tuu (the cloak of dignity, discipline, wealth, rights, and authorities of a Haa-wilth to govern and deliver services and justice to tribal members, and to care for the resources and people in the Haa-wilth's haa-hoolthee), and 'Haa-hoolthee' (the air, land, seas, waters, and resources of a Haa-wilth) (Ehattesah Tribe 1996).

Nuu-chah-nulth culture also included essential teachings such as Hishtukish ts'awalk (Everything is One), and lisaak (Respect). According to these teachings, Nuu-chah-nulth identity is linked to place. The concept of "iisaak"—respect, or 'respect with caring', is central to the identity of the Nuu-chah-nulth, who refer to themselves as "quu?as" (translated as "people from the West Coast of Vancouver Island" (Nuu-chah-

nulth Community Health Services 1995: 20)). Nuu-chah-nulth elders state, "being quu?as means having pride, pride in who you are, and having self-respect and respect for others. Being quu?as means being iisaak" (Nuu-chah-nulth Community Health Services 1995: 20). That is, to be a person in this world means to embody respect with caring. Respect is connected with pride in your identity as an individual, as a member of a group, and as an inhabitant of an area. It is also connected to a worldview that recognizes the interconnectedness of life forms, including a belief that Nuu-chah-nulth only survive if their area is healthy, and the area is only healthy if the Nuu-chah-nulth are healthy (Simon Lucas, pers. comm. 1997).

In the past 150 years there have been significant changes to the aquatic uses that sustained WCVI communities. Many species are significantly less abundant now, and Nuu-chah-nulth and WCVI communities' access to the aquatic resources has declined substantially (Nuu-chah-nulth Tribal Council 1997). For example, Nuu-chah-nulth participation in all fisheries (excluding clams (*Tapes philippinarum*)) has declined to 56 licences for all 15 Nuu-chah-nulth First Nations (Andy Amos, pers. comm. 2002). 49 of these licences were purchased from non-native commercial licence holders under the federal Aboriginal Fisheries Strategy in the last 10 years. In many traditional fisheries such as geoduck, black cod, or sea cucumber, the Nuu-chah-nulth no longer have any commercial access (Danielle Edwards, pers. comm. 2003). In the valuable quota fisheries, WCVI residents (native and non-native) hold only 13 licences out of 1006 coastwide, and again, 9 of these were purchased in the last several years under the Aboriginal Fisheries Strategy. Cultural and social decline have accompanied loss of access and resource declines (Nuu-chah-nulth Community Health Services 1995).

The 1980's was an important decade in terms of changes in fishing and access to resources in the WCVI area. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to relate historical

trends in the fishing and fish processing industries in British Columbia (see Marchak et al. 1987), but it is worthwhile to briefly outline one contextual issue for the case study. The first Pacific Salmon Treaty (PST) signed between Canada and the United States in 1985 had a major impact on the access of WCVI salmon troll fishermen to passing stocks (Marchak et al. 1987). The trollers—who comprised a large proportion of WCVI fishermen-- were traditionally very independent and had been little unionised. They therefore had few voices of support in the PST negotiations or its subsequent implementation (Evelyn Pinkerton pers. comm. 2003). A long-term structural change in WCVI access to salmon (*Oncorhynchus spp.*) began, but the loss of opportunities under the PST and other management measures was not accompanied by a government transition strategy. This kind of structural change carried through the 1990s and is still being played out today. It has been an important impetus behind attempts within the area to gain a stronger voice in decision making and provides a difficult structural context for attempts at shared decision making.

The 1980s was also an important decade on the forestry front. Large conflicts began to erupt over the use of forest resources in Clayoquot Sound (approximately one fifth of Nuu-chah-nulth territory). The Nuu-chah-nulth and environmental groups joined together to oppose continued over-harvesting of local forests, and the Nuu-chah-nulth won a landmark injunction to prevent further harvesting on Meares Island in 1987. A series of processes led by government were then put into place to develop a strategy for sustainable forestry in Clayoquot. According to members of WCSA and RAMS who were involved in these processes, they provided a learning experience in what does not work. Dan Edwards (pers. comm. 1997) mentioned on several occasions that this period in Clayoquot history made it abundantly clear that interests from outside the communities, whether government, industry, environmental, or otherwise, caused

significant rifts within the community with their agendas and drew away from the focus communities needed to work internally to set their own direction and plans.

In the late 1980's and early 1990's the Nuu-chah-nulth Tribal Council (NTC) began to examine how community-based management—giving local people a greater say in how local resources are managed—might rebuild WCVI aquatic resources and restore WCVI participation in aquatic use and management. Several Nuu-chah-nulth leaders including co-chair Nelson Keitlah joined maritime anthropologist Dr. Evelyn Pinkerton in looking at other areas, such as Japan, Washington, and Alaska, where local people were using community-based management to achieve similar objectives. Nuu-chah-nulth leaders were interested in building upon their traditional models of governance based on their Ha'wiih's (hereditary chiefs') responsibilities for their Ha-hoolthee (territories) (Nelson Keitlah, pers. comm. 1997).

Nuu-chah-nulth pursuit and participation of cooperative rather than adversarial approaches was based on an interpretation that the Haa-wilth's Haa-wilth-paa-tuu embraced all people living in the area (Cliff Atleo, pers. comm. 1998). To them this was translated into co-management—working with other people rather than working separately or trying to eject them from their territory. The Nuu-chah-nulth are also recognized as having a long and rich history of choosing cooperative approaches rather than adversarial ones (Drucker 1951).

The 1990's started off with a major shift for First Nations' rights of access to adjacent resources. The R. v. Sparrow Supreme Court of Canada decision ([1990] 1 SCR 1075) recognized aboriginal rights to food, social, and ceremonial use of resources. Several other court cases followed that prompted the Department of Fisheries and Oceans to establish an Aboriginal Fisheries Strategy (AFS) to increase aboriginal community access to resources. The AFS was opposed at once by many First Nations,

who had not agreed to it as the proper mechanism for addressing their pre-treaty interests, and by fishermen, who saw it as a mechanism to strip away their access without fair compensation (Nuu-chah-nulth Tribal Council 1997; Wilf Caron, pers. comm. 1997). Many fishermen organized into the Fisheries Survival Coalition to oppose the AFS. In many respects the Nuu-chah-nulth quest for recognition of their rights—and the significant non-native opposition to their quest—is similar to the controversy over the fishing rights of tribes in Washington State in the 1960's and 1970's (Cohen 1986).

Nuu-chah-nulth First Nations entered into the BC Treaty Process in 1994. The Treaty Process was meant to provide protection for First Nations interests while treaty negotiations were taking place by establishing interim measure agreements. Nuu-chah-nulth were successful in negotiating a joint management board in their central region (Clayoquot Central Region Board) as a means of protecting their interests, but the Federal government refused to be a party to the negotiations (DFO stated that their Aboriginal Fisheries Strategy was a form of interim measure protection). While it did not include fisheries, the Central Region Board was accompanied by the Clayoquot Scientific Panel on Forestry—a panel of international scientists and several Nuu-chah-nulth members. This panel was one of the first native/non-native government panels in B.C. to formally advocate an ecosystem-based management approach and define a management system based on a mix of ecological and cultural knowledge (Ken Lertzman pers. comm. 2003).

As the Nuu-chah-nulth were experiencing further loss of access to fisheries that undermined their treaty interests, they attempted to negotiate a joint management agreement for fisheries. A delegation of Nuu-chah-nulth Ha'wiih and leaders met with the Department of Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO) Regional Director General in October 1996 to outline their interest in establishing a working co-management

relationship with DFO and the Province to address this concern. In January 1997, the Nuu-chah-nulth formally presented an Interim Measures Agreement proposal to the Federal and Provincial governments through the BC Treaty Process. On February 11, 1997, the NTC wrote to the DFO Regional Director General, stating,

Nuu-chah-nulth are of one mind that the key to aquatic resource restoration lies in returning management of local resources into the hands, minds, and spirits of people that live with and depend on the resources. Nuu-chah-nulth are well aware that applying this concept in B.C. today will require compromise between Nuu-chah-nulth systems of resource management and the various governments, sectors and interests that are now involved with harvesting, managing, and protecting aquatic resources. . . . We do want to emphasize the comment that we made at our October 4 meeting that this is not an initiative that can be accommodated by existing DFO programs, but instead represents a new beginning in resource management. As such, it will require the major commitment and fundamental change in the relationships of all parties involved. We are stepping forward to initiate this necessary change.

During the same period, other WCVI community and fishing interests were suffering similar loss of access, declines in fish stocks, and difficulty having their interests represented in decision-making. The federal 'Mifflin Plan' to restructure salmon fisheries involved a prolonged and bitter battle between small boat fishermen favouring community-based approaches and companies favouring a corporate and 'economic rationality' approach to fleet restructuring. The Plan favoured the corporate approach, resulting in the 'buy-back' of a significant number of local licenses amongst other measures.

During this time, Nuu-chah-nulth and other local fishermen and leaders began meeting to discuss their common plight. Former members of the Fisheries Survival Coalition dropped their membership as they saw that the Survival Coalition had no plan to resolve differences and instead focused on anti-native campaigns (Dan Edwards, pers. comm. 1997; Wilf Caron, pers. comm. 1997). Native and non-native residents agreed that they needed to work together to bring about positive change and formed the



West Coast Sustainability Association, a locally based, native/non-native association in 1995. The WCSA worked tirelessly for several years to build further support amongst others within and outside the region. This work was fundamental to building the community cohesion and vision necessary for future cooperation.<sup>12</sup>

In May of 1997, WCSA and the NTC brought together over 70 diverse groups from throughout the WCVI region to address common concerns and interests. Participants in the Common Ground Conference agreed that there was more to be gained by working together than separately. They also agreed that having a say in local aquatic resource management and having a regional board linked to the Treaty could address most of their concerns. A Steering Committee was created to help establish a Regional Aquatic Management Board for the West Coast of Vancouver Island. The Steering Committee was later formalized into the Regional Aquatic Management Society (RAMS).

The Steering Committee met several times in the summer of 1997 to discuss strategies for building a Board. At this point these were mostly political lobbying strategies. At the same time a consultant with experience in building community development capacity, Skip McCarthy, was helping WCSA organize administrative and physical infrastructure. Two of the main potential sources of funding were the federal agency, Human Resource Development Canada (HRDC), and a similar Provincial human resource development agency. The local HRDC manager had come to the Common Ground Conference and met with WCSA on several occasions. His experience at the Common Ground Conference was clearly important, as he notes:

It was at a two-day workshop in May 1997 that I saw how these diverse and often confrontational groups are committed to working together. I

<sup>12</sup> There are significant details about this phase of development of cooperation that I have not attempted to capture, as it is beyond the scope of this thesis. A fuller account is currently being undertaken by Dr. Evelyn Pinkerton of Simon Fraser University.

knew that if these groups maintained their commitment to this process, a unique opportunity would unfold to assist these communities in taking responsibility for their own future (Mike Kardynal, pers. comm. 2000).

This eventually ended up in a three-year agreement (half funding coming each from the Provincial and Federal government) between WCSA and the two agencies. Though Provincial funding was withdrawn after the first year due to changes in ministries and programs, HRDC paid for the balance. RAMS funding was part of the agreement between WCSA and HRDC, as half of the contract was focused on building an aquatic management board.

With proper funding and paid full-time staff, RAMS and WCSA began carrying out a number of initiatives. These included the following activities between 1998 and 2001:

- An agreement with the Province to select projects and deliver Provincial funds for salmon renewal in the area
- A pilot agreement with the Province to select projects and deliver Provincial funds for community economic development in the area
- An agreement with the Province to map available areas, set development rates, and use community criteria to review and select shellfish aquaculture tenure applications in parts of the area
- An agreement with the Federal government to select projects and deliver federal funds for labour adjustment projects in parts of the area
- An agreement with the Federal government to hire and supervise three stewardship coordinators in the area
- A license and allocation from the Federal government for developing mackerel (*Trachurus symmetricus*) trap technology
- An agreement with the Federal government to pilot a winter Chinook salmon (*Oncorhynchus tshawytscha*) fishery
- An agreement with the Federal government to develop a Tanner crab (*Chionoecetes tanneri*) fishery
- An agreement with the Federal government to rehabilitate wild abalone (*Haliotis kamtschatkana*) and develop a commercial abalone aquaculture venture
- An agreement with the Federal government to reopen a closed Goose barnacle (*Lepas fascicularis*) fishery on an experimental basis

- An agreement with the Federal and Provincial governments to establish a community-based clam management board
- An agreement with a variety of agencies to map streams and beaches in two sub-regions
- An agreement with the Federal government to undertake a variety of projects in the Clayoquot area, including hiring a coordinator to address women's issues related to fishing, habitat restoration and remediation, trail building, and other projects.
- Convening multiple stakeholders to develop a salmon (*Oncorhynchus spp*) allocation framework
- Convening multiple stakeholders to develop a salmon (*Oncorhynchus spp*) management plan to avoid endangered coho salmon (*Oncorhynchus kisutch*) stocks
- Developing a '10 point' plan for herring (*Clupea harengus*) management
- Convening an on-going conservation committee to provide policy advice and coordinate stewardship efforts in the area
- Convening an on-going economic development committee to provide policy advice and coordinate stewardship efforts in the area
- Convening an on-going information management committee to provide policy advice and coordinate stewardship efforts in the area
- Undertaking a project to study marine survival for juvenile salmon (*Oncorhynchus spp*)
- Formation of several on-going watershed committee
- Designing an integrated ecosystem information system
- Publishing a watershed resources guide
- Publishing a fisheries interpretive map
- Publishing a fisheries investment strategy
- Publishing a handbook on using local knowledge in assessment and management
- Publishing quarterly newsletters and annual newspapers

Many of these initiatives could provide a separate case study on co-management, and it is not possible to give details on them here. Some aspects of the development of these initiatives are contained in the next chapter as examples of lessons learned.

RAMS and WCSA carried out the range of initiatives outlined above to demonstrate that local management could work and to build capacity in the area. After three years of work and several million dollars in projects, RAMS held a strategic planning and vision retreat in June 2000 to celebrate its achievements and set future directions. Unfortunately, WCSA/RAMS funding was not renewed by HRDC in June 2000, leaving RAMS and WCSA with no core capacity to undertake any further activities. Limited transition grants were provided by Department of Fisheries and Oceans to continue RAMS operations until November 1, 2000, when the area-based board was to be implemented. RAMS was able to stretch this funding out until March 2002 though at minimal capacity. WCSA had a long battle with HRDC and other agencies over committed funding, and eventually had to declare bankruptcy (described further in Chapter 5).

The stories regarding these initiatives involved many challenges and successes, as described in the chronology listed at the end of this chapter and in chapter 5. Despite the challenges, WCSA and RAMS did not lose sight of their primary goal of building a WCVI aquatic management board. As a result of their continued lobbying pressure, discussions to develop the WCVI Aquatic Management Board began in January 1998. They were guided by six principles presented by then Fisheries and Oceans Minister David Anderson: fiduciary responsibility, conservation, inclusivity, transparent and fair selection of representatives, members endorsed by a broad range of fishery interest groups, and recognition of Canada's international obligations. The Federal, Provincial, Nuu-chah-nulth, and local governments agreed to negotiate a board, assisted by organizations affected by WCVI aquatic resource management and with an interest in establishing a management board. From the beginning, the process was voluntary and open to any interest. For those organizations that chose not to participate directly,

repeated efforts were made to inform them and include their advice, including a two-day workshop in Tofino in April 1999. At this workshop, over 70 participants from around the Province told the governments to speed up the process and establish the board (Craig Darling, pers. comm. 1999).

Negotiations were set to commence in May 1999, but DFO delayed the negotiations until further notice, stating that the initiative was of national importance and needed to be reviewed in Ottawa. DFO did not return to the negotiating table until October 1999. After further DFO delays in December 1999, the governments agreed to a Joint Policy Framework in February 2000 outlining the policy and process framework guiding development of the Board's Terms of Reference and implementation. This document reflected all Provincial and Federal policies and legislation that were aligned with the internal mandate developed by WCSA and RAMS.

All parties recommitted to negotiating an Agreement in Principle for April 1, 2000. This was subsequently pushed to June 1, 2000 due to delays within government and their desire to ensure that all interested parties had a final chance to participate.

Agreement in Principle on a draft Terms of Reference for the Aquatic Management Board was reached on June 1, 2000. The document was then sent for ratification by all governments by July 11, 2000, with a deadline for board implementation set at November 1, 2000. While the DFO Pacific Regional Director General (a strong proponent of the process) was on vacation, DFO officials in Ottawa canceled ratification on July 10, 2000 and subsequently sent proposed amendments to the draft Terms of Reference in August. The parties reached agreement on another version of the Terms of Reference in October 2000, with an implementation schedule set for April 1, 2001. This was then sent for ratification.

The Nuu-chah-nulth and local governments ratified the Terms of Reference in November 2000. The Province ratified them on February 16, 2001 and the Federal government did so on February 26, 2001. The parties began working on board implementation in March of the same year, with a revised implementation date of June 30. This date was subsequently pushed to September 2001 because of a change in the Provincial government.

In November 2001, the parties began implementing the Board. Board members were selected and an Executive Director hired. The Board held its inaugural meeting in February 2002 and has been operating since that time.

Concurrent with the community-based WCVI initiative and negotiations, a number of significant provincial and national developments recognized the fundamental importance of including substantive local input to the integrated management of aquatic resources.

1. Canada and British Columbia have accepted the June 1991 Report of the BC Claims Task Force, including recommendations 1 and 16 stating in part that, "the parties negotiate interim measures before or during treaty negotiations when an interest is being affected which could undermine the process."
2. Pursuant to the August 20, 1993 Protocol Respecting the Government-to-Government Relationship between the First Nations Summit and the Governments of Canada and British Columbia, it was agreed that "a government-to-government relationship" exists between the First Nations and the Governments of Canada and British Columbia.
3. In 1994, the Clayoquot Sound Central Region Board (CRB) was established as an interim measures agreement between the Nuu-chah-nulth central region First Nations and the Province of BC. The CRB was the first and last interim measures agreement for a joint management board in BC.
4. Coastal Zone Canada Association stated in 1994: "The Conference Participants at Coastal Zone Canada '94 noted with particular concern the need for... empowering local communities through community-based management...and recommend:
  - Co-management be included as an essential element in Coastal and Oceans Management

- Community-based decision-making be actively supported
  - Public participation must be meaningful and effective
  - Building partnerships with Aboriginal People.
5. The Canada Oceans Act (1997) states: "Whereas Canada recognizes that the oceans and their resources offer significant opportunities for economic diversification and generation of wealth for the benefit of all Canadians, and in particular coastal communities. ... In exercising the powers and performing the duties and functions assigned to the Minister by this Act, the Minister (a) shall cooperate with . . . affected aboriginal organizations, coastal communities and other persons or bodies . . ."
  6. In the "Canada – British Columbia Agreement on the Management of Pacific Salmon Fishery Issues" (1997), the Prime Minister and Premier continued their support for the principles of "bringing decision making closer to clients and stakeholders" and "creating effective partnerships to better manage the fishery."
  7. In the BC Fisheries Strategy (1997), Fisheries Minister Evans stated: "We need a solution that will bring both consensus among all sectors of the industry and decision-making power closer to those most affected."
  8. On May 25, 1997, the BC Coastal Communities Network unanimously adopted a resolution at their annual conference supporting the concept of regional fisheries management organizations and in May 1998 passed a resolution specifically supporting the Nuuchahnulth/WCVI Regional Aquatic Management Board initiative.
  9. In 1997, Donna Petrachenko was appointed as the Pacific Regional Director General of DFO. Ms. Petrachenko had a strong vision for the Pacific region, and her vision included the WCVI Aquatic Management Board.
  10. BC Government's "Proposal to Renew Our Fish and Our Fishing Communities" (June 18, 1998) stated: "British Columbia believes that the best solution is only possible if the province and the people involved in our fisheries resource are involved in designing the programs needed to sustain our salmon and our communities. The province also believes that communities need to have more say in decision making and more responsibility for managing the fisheries resource in their backyards, through regional management boards."
  11. In 1998, DFO Minister Anderson released "A New Direction for Canada's Pacific Salmon Fisheries." Principle 11 states that "Government and stakeholders will together be responsible and accountable for sustainable fisheries." Principle 12 states that "Enhanced community, regional and sector wide input to decision making will be pursued through a structured management and advisory board system." The explanation of this principle states: "In the future, many decisions related to fisheries resources and their habitat could be made through a series of regional boards. These

boards could cover a geographic area containing one or more watersheds. The scope of these boards is intended to cover a variety of issues.”

12. On February 17, 1998, the BC Aboriginal Fisheries Commission unanimously adopted a resolution at their Annual General Meeting supporting the Nuu-chah-nulth / WCVI Regional Aquatic Management Board initiative.
13. Samuel Toy, Advisor to Minister Anderson on inter-sectoral allocation issues, recommended the following in his report to the Minister in 1998: “You should create a new initiative the object of which is the empowering of regional management boards throughout the entire province, democratically elected, with an overarching independent tribunal. The purpose of these new creations will be to formulate advice and undertake local conservation and habitat enhancement programs, coordinate and present preseason fishing plans, assist with in-season management and . . . inter- and intra-sectoral allocations and or reallocations by an independent overarching tribunal.”
14. A major crisis in salmon fisheries occurred in June of 1998 when DFO announced massive closures to protect endangered coho stocks. Then Minister Anderson announced a \$400 million salmon renewal package to reduce fleet size, improve stewardship, diversify communities, and provide labour adjustment funding. Some of this funding was used for the various programs and activities carried out by WCSA and RAMS.
15. Dr. Parzival Copes, Professor Emeritus, Simon Fraser University, Report to B.C. on the Coho Crisis (April 1998) stated: “It is recommended that senior governments continue the development of effective co-management regimes with community, aboriginal and regional governments, in conjunction with local stakeholder groups, for which the draft proposals by the Nuu-chah-nulth/West Vancouver Island Aquatic Management Steering Committee may serve as an exploratory example.”
16. David Poole, Pacific West Training Ltd., Report to DFO on the Benefits Associated with Fish Habitat Restoration, Stock Rebuilding, and Stream Stewardship (1998) stated: “Finally, a review of the literature provided support from other jurisdictions for the trends and conclusions evident in this report. In BC, the widely-supported regional management approach being adopted on the West Coast of Vancouver Island...provides further evidence in support of the directions identified in this report.”
17. Brian Peckford, Final Report of the Peckford Inquiry on Salmon Fisheries Management (1998) stated: “That one of the management structures will be a Community/Regional Authority, sharing powers and responsibilities....The West Coast of Vancouver Island and the Central Coast should be two early candidates for this new structure.”



18. Report of the Panel Studying Fisheries Act Partnering, 1998, stated:  
“The panel’s fifth recommendation is to urge DFO to review and coordinate efforts to develop a community-based management approach.”
19. The National Roundtable on the Environment and Economy produced “Sustainable Strategies for Oceans: A Co-Management Guide” in 1998 that recommended: “Establishing a series of pilot co-management arrangements in cooperation with various users groups through departments such as the Department of Fisheries and Oceans.”
20. Marine Protected Areas: A Strategy for Canada’s Pacific Coast. (A Joint Federal and Provincial Initiative), 1998, stated: “The federal and provincial governments will work in partnership with First Nations, coastal communities, marine stakeholders and the public on Marine Protected Area identification, establishment and management.”
21. The government of British Columbia established Fisheries Renewal British Columbia in 1998. Its mandate included “providing assistance and advice to government on how best to co-ordinate and deliver fisheries-related programs.” The Fisheries Renewal strategic plan identifies one of its key principles as: Partnerships . . .
  - community-based involvement is essential in everything we do
  - cooperative partnerships based on shared objectives are crucial to our success
  - the basis for successful partnerships is mutual respect and integrity
22. DFO Minister Anderson, in his “Allocation Framework for Pacific Salmon 1999-2005”, stated: “It is evident that allocation issues cannot be addressed solely on a coast-wide basis nor solely on an area basis. Therefore, arrangements involving area-based interests and the coast-wide allocation board must be designed to ensure a coordinated approach to salmon allocation. This coordination can be facilitated in part, through multi-sector area based groups that are inclusive (open to all parties), have transparent and fair selection processes for their representatives and a mandate that is broadly endorsed by a broad range of fisheries interest groups.”
23. A University of Victoria Centre for Dispute Resolution team, tasked by the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans with making recommendations for improved decision-making in DFO’s Pacific Region, recommended that governments “test the WCVI Aquatic Management Board for exploring area-based management and greater community and First Nations participation...and that the role of communities and regional management boards be a priority topic for the Policy Advisory Committee [to be created].”

These developments provided external support for RAMS and its principles and objectives. As will be further explored in the next chapter, the combination of strong community cohesion and commitment towards RAMS, supported by external policy directions and commitments, were instrumental in the development and maintenance of co-management in the WCVI area.

## **5 RESULTS: CHALLENGES, APPROACHES, AND PROPOSITIONS FROM BUILDING AQUATIC CO-MANAGEMENT IN NUU-CHAH-NULTH-AHT/WCVI**

In this chapter, I present results of the case study, including key challenges and approaches encountered.<sup>13</sup> From these results, I generate propositions about building co-management.

The structure of this chapter mirrors the main institutional characteristics outlined in Chapter 2. These are: geographic scope and coordination, mandate, representation, decision-making rules, vision, principles and goals, facilitation and leadership, accountability monitoring and evaluation, capacity and funding, and trust and consensus building. Under each heading, I outline a profile of the issue in the area, results and examples from the case study, and case study propositions describing what was important about the institutional characteristic in relation to building co-management.



### **5.1 Geographic Scope and Coordination**

#### **5.1.1 *Geographic Scope Profile***

WCSA and RAMS shared the same geographic scope—Nuu-chah-nulth territory on the West Coast of Vancouver Island (see Figure 2).

<sup>13</sup> Being conscious of 'example overload' and the length of this chapter, I refrain from including examples in relation to less important points or points where there was no apparent need for in-depth illustration.

**Figure 2: Nuu-chah-nulth-aht and WCSA/RAMS Boundaries** (from height of land to Canada's 200 mile limit at sea)



The external boundaries were clearly defined and uncontested by neighbouring First Nations. Internal boundaries dividing 'sub-regions' and First Nations territories were not always so.

There were three main groups of reasons for choosing the Nuu-chah-nulth area as the boundary of WCSA and RAMS. The first group relates to First Nations in the area. The Nuu-chah-nulth had already clearly defined their traditional territory based on their history. Within this area, the Nuu-chah-nulth had a central administration, communications, and decision-making structure--the Nuu-chah-nulth Tribal Council. They also had a shared history, culture and language with which they defined themselves.

From a Nuu-chah-nulth perspective, it was important to build on their historic governance structures and territory. A chief or 'ha-wiih' was responsible for a defined territory and everything within that territory or 'ha-hoolthee' (Ehattesah Tribe 1996). Any governance initiatives for the area, such as WCSA and RAMS, would have to reflect the concept of 'ha-hoolthee' in order to have committed Nuu-chah-nulth participation (Cliff Atleo, pers. comm. 1997).

From both a Nuu-chah-nulth and other WCVI community perspective, using the Nuu-chah-nulth boundary was also important because of the on-going Treaty process. It was believed that by linking to the Treaty process there was the possibility of bringing more power and authority into the area (Dan Edwards, pers. comm. 1997). Co-management was also recognized as a bridge to Treaty settlement (Nelson Keitlah, pers. comm. 1997). This decision took some time to reach, and initial hesitations from non-native communities about using Nuu-chah-nulth boundaries had to be overcome (Field notes 1997).

The second main group of reasons for the choice of boundary had to do with the nature of aquatic resources and ecosystems in the area. The range of species varying from highly migratory to sedentary posed a challenge for managing aquatic resources. From a practical perspective the delimited area could not be so large as to reflect highly migratory stocks such as salmon (*Oncorhynchus spp*) because this would move away from the local knowledge and management advocated by WCSA and RAMS. At the same time, the area could not be so small as to focus solely on sedentary species such as clams (*Protothaca staminea*; *Tapes philippinarum*) because this would make management of more migratory species too complicated and cumbersome. The Nuu-chah-nulth boundary appeared to be an appropriate size to reflect this challenge. It captured the movement of most species and a substantial part of some migratory species habitat. Additionally, the Nuu-chah-nulth area reflected internally homogeneous ecological characteristics that were somewhat different from adjacent areas.

The third group of reasons for choosing the Nuu-chah-nulth territory was socioeconomic. People living in the WCVI area have a similar culture, as noted by Tom Pater (pers. comm. 2003) where he states,

That whole process... was based on the WCVI attitude, Nuu-chah-nulth attitude, and a West coast attitude in general... less sure of itself, more willing to listen to others, a willingness to go along. Maybe the rules of operation made it easy to like people because it softened everyone's harder edges.

People living in the WCVI area also have similar lifestyles and political connections because of the geographic features and economic activities of the area (Nuu-chah-nulth Tribal Council 1998). The towns within the area are mostly small and remote and rely on forestry and fishing. With the exception of Tofino, which has increasingly become a 'white-collar' town due to high property values and an influx of urban professionals and retirees, most people from the area either harvest or process resources or work in

related support industries. There is a shared understanding of what it takes to live in a remote area both individually and as a community and what it means to make a livelihood directly from natural resources.

This understanding was strengthened by changes in government natural resource policies and resource abundance over several decades. Industrial approaches were having a negative impact on the health of resources and access by WCVI residents to adjacent resources. They affected almost everyone in the area in some way and communities were suffering from high unemployment rates and other social issues associated with a downturn in the economy and declining resources. There was considerable frustration with and mistrust of Provincial and Federal governments and a general sense that they were abandoning rural communities. Thus, there was a shared economic and political incentive amongst participants to look for alternative governance models.

### ***5.1.2 Case Study Results Related to Geographic Scope***

The most important characteristics of WCSA/RAMS geographic scope were the balanced size of the area, a high degree of cultural and ecological homogeneity, and an uncontested external boundary based on existing social, political, economic and ecological characteristics. It is not possible to conclude which of these factors was more important than the others or to link each with specific outcomes. They were cumulatively necessary elements in building co-management and working towards principles of sustainable aquatic management. They were especially important in producing four outcomes. First, they fostered movement from a segregated, sectoral management approach to a geographic or ecosystem-based one. Second, they promoted economies of scale in addressing different issues. Third, they allowed for a higher degree of local

knowledge and relationships ('social capital') to be used in management. Fourth, they fostered a stronger sense of community pride and territoriality.

In relation to an ecosystem-based approach and economies of scale, the characteristics of WCSA/RAMS' geographic scope allowed the organizations to focus on the full range of aquatic resources and their uses rather than on one or several uses, species, or narrow areas. Thus, they were able to continually focus on the ways that different aquatic activities and issues related to each other, as well as the status of the area as a whole. For example, the characteristics of its geographic scope allowed WCSA/RAMS to recognize what was happening with wild clam (*Protothaca staminea*; *Tapes philippinarum*) fisheries and shellfish aquaculture development (which could displace wild clam diggers), and to link those with the recovery of threatened sea otters (*Enhydra lutris*) (which eat clams (*Protothaca staminea*; *Tapes philippinarum*) and shellfish), and to connect that with threatened abalone (*Haliotis kamtschatkana*) recovery (which sea otters (*Enhydra lutris*) eat), and to begin to address the fact that threatened rockfish (*Sebastes spp.*), salmon (*Oncorhynchus spp.*) and other species use kelp (*Macrocystis pyrifera*) forests, which are enhanced by sea otters (*Enhydra lutris*) eating urchin (*Strongylocentrotus franciscanus*) (who otherwise will destroy kelp (*Macrocystis pyrifera*) forests).

WCSA/RAMS only began touching on this complex web through projects and decisions, discovering quickly that shifting from a sectoral to ecosystem-based approach required extensive incorporation of the knowledge, skills, and relationships of people in the area. The characteristics of WCSA/RAMS geographic scope gave participants access to sectoral knowledge, finer scale geographic knowledge, and knowledge of a range of sectors. This was mainly facilitated by the rich web of informal and formal relationships upon which WCSA/RAMS participants could draw and the trust that



participants had within communities (Darren.Deluca, pers. comm. 1999). (This issue is discussed further under s.5.3 Representation, and s.5.9 Trust and Consensus Building.). In short, the existing 'social capital' of the area gave WCSA/RAMS a platform on which to build approaches and consensus, as noted by RAMS Board member Maureen Sager (pers. comm. 2003), where she states:

A lot of people were familiar with the whole area. For example the sport fishing representative knows very well the whole coast and similarly with the commercial fishermen--they might fish out of Port Alberni but are very well acquainted with situations and conditions all up and down the coast of the Island. Someone living in Vancouver is not as likely to have that range of geographic knowledge just because of where they live. [Also], the fact that First Nations were on the board and are actually resident in many of the small settlements around the coast made a really big difference in being able to constitute RAMS. There was a tremendous amount of knowledge there from a geographic point of view . . . . It made it more possible to agree on things because you had a variety of people not only buried in their category, I suppose--sports, commercial, whatever--but also in where they came from.

The characteristics of its geographic scope also meant that WCSA/RAMS could achieve some 'economy of scale' in addressing these issues (Field notes 2000). As an example, it was possible to host a meeting and talk about all or several of these issues, rather than hosting a number of meetings in different places on each different issue. Similarly, it was possible to carry out different resource assessments at the same time. Because other agencies or groups focused on only one sector or a relatively small area, they lacked the range of knowledge and economy of scale that WCSA/RAMS could bring to an issue. On the other hand, the advantages of increased social capital and economies of scale were tempered by the basic management challenges associated with coordinating a large diversity of people, information, and activities. Dilemmas of this type are discussed further under s.5.1.4 Coordination, and s.5.8.2 Capacity.

It is important to emphasize that for WCSA/RAMS, 'taking an ecosystem approach' was not simply the coordination or integration of different people, information

or activities. It was also a much deeper attempt to maximize the value of aquatic resources for the community as a whole rather than for any one particular sector. WCSA/RAMS felt that the characteristics of their geographic scope made possible a shift from a sectoral approach and self-interested behaviour towards one of overall community benefit (Cliff Atleo, pers. comm. 1997). WCSA/RAMS believed that this shift only happens when individuals see themselves as part of a defined ecological and social community rather than as part of a narrowly defined sector (Dan Edwards, pers. comm. 1997). Put another way, there must be a defined, relatively homogeneous geographic area within which people understand and negotiate their impact on others, and they must stand to gain from an overall benefit to that geographic area by being a part of it.

Wilf Caron (pers. comm. 2003) describes how shifting from maximizing one resource or one sector to maximizing overall ecosystem benefits is an important factor in building co-management. He begins by noting some of the questions WCSA/RAMS would ask when looking at issues:

Do you realize the interconnectedness of this? Are you cognizant of the impacts of this? What's happening to others? Is there a better way of doing things? Or is it comfortable right now and you're surviving? Or are you making a profit on the backs of other principles, that is short-changing people of the community and the resources of the community?

When we . . . demonstrate prideful initiatives brought about by an organization such as RAMS or the [Aquatic Management] Board, using those principles, where everybody feels part of it--that they figure that they haven't been short-changed-- then this will gather momentum. People will be delighted to demonstrate this to the world. *Not that people will get rich. But they'll live within riches. It's a difference of application there. I think that is where the change comes.* If there is reluctance because of the flavour of the month right now, then perhaps what we need to do is demonstrate what our capital is, what our current capital is, and make the best use of it . . . . *How can we make the best use of the assets of this area, using the Terms of Reference, to raise the profile of everything's worth?*

There is a difference between sustainability and sustenance level. I don't want to be on a sustenance level, on a 'just getting by' level. I want progress to be made. Progress comes through maximizing what you

have. *Maximizing is just showing respect for all aspects of that [geographic] community.* That is your full circle is coming back and showing the interconnectedness of it all and the respect for it within that interconnectedness. Respecting all of the components in that interconnectedness. It doesn't just mean I respect you at the table of the Board and I am not going to call you an asshole. No, the issue of respect is broader than that, that's for sure.

That is mainly what we were discussing was common sense and how to apply common sense, without getting boxed into the old stovepipe mentality and divorced from everything. So I can't even remember who was the first persons who used those two key phrase words [Hishtukish ts'awalk and Issaak—Everything is One and Respect] from the Nuuchahnulth to install them and engrave them in our relationship. But there should be no end of applauding them (*Emphasis mine*).

A fourth way in which having a defined geographic scope contributed to building co-management is where it built on and fostered a sense of pride and territoriality in the area. Defining WCSA/RAMS' geographic scope contributed to a stronger sense of cohesion within the area and differentiation from other areas, as noted by Tom Pater (pers. comm. 2003) where he states,

At times I thought it would be simpler if it was Alberni-Clayoquot [a smaller subset of the area]. But from a personal point of view, the addition of all of the Nuuchahnulth territory added something larger in terms of identification. I had never really recognized or identified so much with the whole of the Nuuchahnulth area, and I think that was true for many non-native residents. It was a new loyalty to something larger than your neighborhood but something recognizable. That was one way that the Nuuchahnulth inspired people to recognize broader links.

At a practical level, the boundary allowed WCSA/RAMS to do things such as begin to develop a profile of the area, develop plans for specific areas and resources, administer funding for stewardship projects, and develop a mechanism to hold and disperse access to resources. A greater sense of cohesiveness also laid the foundation for a stronger sense of pride in the area, which was critical as a motivator for action and long-term commitment, as noted by Wilf Caron (pers. comm. 2003) where he states:

It's community pride. It's people have been beat down here. This whole West coast. We've not come here because we want to advance something that is grand and glorious. The initiative came from despair.

But the people had an inherent pride in where they live. The Native community has got eons of pride. The people who know the history and the interconnectedness of this place here have this inherent pride. They despair of the current situation.

Having a defined geographic scope also laid the foundation for a clearer sense of territoriality, or 'us and them.' While drawing a line around 'us' fostered an existing sense of cohesion and pride, it also allowed the group to define a 'them.' In many WCSA/RAMS' meetings, reference was made to people from outside the area coming and depleting resources without caring about resource sustainability or leaving any benefits. There was a clear direction to take care of the needs of the resources and area residents first, and then share any excess benefits with people from outside who would contribute to the area. As discussed in more detail in the next section under Mandate, the existence of an external threat was as powerful a motivator for co-management and stewardship as internal community pride.

### **5.1.3 Case Study Propositions about Geographic Scope**

1. Four characteristics related to geographic scope are cumulatively necessary in fostering co-management and working towards principles of sustainable aquatic management. These are:
  - a) A sufficient degree of cultural, economic, and ecological homogeneity in the area.
  - b) An area that balances being small enough to capture local knowledge and input, while being large enough to address migratory species or other broader aquatic issues.
  - c) Existing political and administrative reasons and features supporting the chosen boundary.
  - d) A cultural and historical basis for the boundary that is supported locally.
2. Where these four characteristics are present, there is a greater likelihood of:
  - a) moving to an ecosystem-based approach, involving coordination and integration of a diverse range of people, information, and activities, and shifting people's focus from maximizing one sector at the

expense of others to maximizing overall area benefits by balancing different uses.

- b) using local knowledge and relationships ('social capital') in management.
- c) achieving economies of scale in addressing different management issues.
- d) fostering a stronger sense of community pride, values, and territoriality, all of which can be powerful motivators for co-management and sustainable aquatic management principles.

#### **5.1.4 Coordination Profile**

WCSA and RAMS made significant efforts to coordinate with organizations managing fisheries or aquatic resources. Where they had a formal relationship with such organizations (such as Fisheries Renewal BC), this coordination occurred through ongoing dialogue and workshops or conference calls hosted by the outside organization. Where WCSA/RAMS had an informal relationship (i.e., they were not recognized as a formal management institution nesting into broader formal management institutions), they led or participated in coast-wide or international forums through individual conversations, letters, submissions and reports, direct action, and attendance at workshops, conferences, and meetings.

#### **5.1.5 Coordination Results**

In this section I will discuss both coordination with groups outside WCSA/RAMS' geographic scope and groups within the area.

##### **5.1.5.1 Coordinating with groups outside the area**

WCSA/RAMS impetus for forming a larger WCVI Aquatic Management Board was based on the decision to expand their formal cooperation to include external authorities. One of the projects WCSA/RAMS worked on highlighted the importance of coordination and cooperation with external groups. This project was a study of how

WCVI communities could access and maximize local benefits from use of the area's resources. It became evident in that project (and indirectly through other projects such as salmon and sardine (*sardinops sagax*) allocation and management plans) that while the geographic scope of WCSA/RAMS gave incentives for co-management and stewardship in the area, the interconnected nature of aquatic resources and their uses required coordination with the jurisdiction of provincial, national and international bodies. Quite simply, many issues influencing stewardship and benefits stemmed from outside the region (pollution, exotic species, global warming, investment, markets, trade agreements, etc.). Also, given the migratory nature of some aquatic species, coordinated management or sharing arrangements with adjacent areas were clearly necessary.

Moreover, it was difficult to keep benefits within the region, however well defined the boundary and however strong the mandate and resources regarding enforcement. WCSA/RAMS' research indicated that rules of access such as residency in the area could be subject to challenges under the Canadian Constitution or under international 'free-trade' agreements. Even where they could be implemented, financing and corporate ownership relationships might mean that an owner/operator from the area might be *de facto* leasing from a bank, processor, money lender, or shareholders who were taking profits out of the area without reinvesting (Field notes 1999). While these issues could sometimes be addressed by creative arrangements, it became clear that WCSA/RAMS' boundary would involve complex legal definitions open to challenge. WCSA/RAMS was quite aware that if valuable local resources attracted powerful groups outside the region, such groups would likely raise challenges. As it was unlikely that WCSA/RAMS would have the funds and resources to defend its position, the legislative and financial support of larger governments or external bodies was essential.

WCSA/RAMS participants recognized that without coordination with external groups, they were isolated and vulnerable, having less political weight and lacking resources to develop regionally beneficial coast-wide approaches (Dan Edwards, pers. comm. 1998). Participants recognized that while the existence and enforceability of a defined geographic scope was important, coordination and cooperation with external authorities and groups were just as necessary. WCSA/RAMS therefore put a considerable amount of time into extra-regional forums and partnership building. In doing so, they encountered the following challenges (Field notes 1997-2001):

- First Nations and communities in other regions were seldom organized in an integrated manner and often lacked a cohesive vision, making it difficult for areas to have a common regional position or approach on activities, issues, or policies.
- External authorities were seldom organized in an integrated manner and often lacked a cohesive vision, making it difficult for them to have a common position or approach on activities, issues, or policies.
- Many external groups had narrow agendas regarding one particular sector or issue, or different priorities from WCSA/RAMS, making it difficult to find common ground for a partnership.
- WCSA/RAMS co-management vision represented a new and unfamiliar approach, and therefore required more explanation and discussion as people tried to understand its potential role and benefits.

Addressing these challenges required significant and continuous energy and resources.

The energy required to undertake coordination and cooperation with external agencies and groups gave rise to tension within WCSA/RAMS. While some participants recognized the importance of this work, they felt it was distracting from projects and communication within the region (Field notes 1999). Although on the surface WCSA/RAMS staff appeared to have the energy and commitment both for extra- and inter-regional issues, the effort required to do both extra- and inter-regional work was not

sustainable over the long run at either a personal or organizational level. Most WCSA/RAMS staff worked far beyond capacity, ignoring family or personal health and not paying adequate attention to organizational details. For example, I was travelling outside the region an average of once a week, and when coupled with the travel demands within the area, I did not spend sufficient time either with RAMS stewardship coordinators (I was assuming that they could or should be self-motivated and self-regulating) or on administrative details such as financial management (again assuming that it was all being managed effectively). It was also taxing on my family. As Executive Director of the WCSA and the lead staff person coordinating with external groups and agencies, Mr. Edwards was generally out of the region more often than in it. Other staff rarely complained about this situation because of the unspoken culture of the organizations, but over time RAMS/WCSA staff expressed significant frustration (Field notes 2000; Trevor Wickham 2003).

The issue of time spent on intra- and extra-regional issues came to a head when Mr. Edwards went on a 59 day hunger strike to protest the Federal government's lack of response to a collapse in the Fraser River salmon (*Oncorhynchus spp.*) runs and their harvesting (the river is outside the region and has the largest salmon (*Oncorhynchus spp.*) runs in BC, which were a mainstay for fishermen of all regions). Some participants felt that this was at the expense of work and energy that needed to be done in the region. Mr. Edwards recognized this but argued that if WCSA/RAMS did not engage in such coast-wide issues, the region would suffer loss of access to one of its major sources of revenue—the passing Fraser River stocks. Furthermore, he argued, the government would take the same approach in the region on salmon (*Oncorhynchus spp.*) and other issues if they were not confronted on the Fraser River collapse. Mr. Edwards and other participants also noted on numerous occasions that WCSA/RAMS could not



bury their head in the sand, nor exist in a political vacuum—either they confronted issues outside the area impacting it or there would be no space created in which alternatives could be developed. WCSA directors gave Mr. Edwards the approval to engage in the hunger strike, but one RAMS member later speculated that this decision contributed to financial problems in WCSA both because of the unrecoverable costs of the hunger strike and the loss of their Executive Director for several months (Field notes 2000 and 2001).

There was no 'right' answer to this problem—it was an ongoing matter of limited capacity and the difficulties associated with being a coast-wide leader in a regional approach that was not being implemented elsewhere. Over the long term, this dilemma was probably one of the most significant and challenging in terms of building co-management.

#### **5.1.5.2 *Coordination within the area***

I now turn to the issue of coordination inside the area. As noted above under Section 5.1.2, WCSA/RAMS geographic scope allowed individuals and groups within the region to access and share knowledge, achieve economies of scale, and benefit from a sense of pride and territoriality. However, several challenges were evident in terms of finding the time needed to administer a large area in a way that was meaningful to communities. As Dan Edwards (pers. comm. 2002) pointed out,

On paper, if you draw out things on a map, the job of organizing those communities and coordinating activities towards projects and policies regarding sea resources, looks like a doable job on paper. It's a small enough area and a small enough number of people. But when you start looking at the real differences and the geographic distances and the kinds of communication needed to reach all of these communities, the job is quite massive. The disconnection was much more, and dissimilarities larger than what WCSA/RAMS originally anticipated. That depended on what kind of project. Workshops to bring people together were more doable. But other projects were harder. The reason WCSA [eventually]

focused more on Clayoquot [for projects] was because of the labour adjustment process and our lack of capacity to handle a broader area.

This practical challenge reflected a deeper ongoing dilemma: how to address the constant tension between the local level of municipalities and surrounding areas and the broader perspective of a regional level. While local levels had fine-grained local knowledge, good communication networks, more direct accountability (such as repeated face-to-face interactions), and a solid connection to what was really happening in aquatic resource use, they also tended to be mired in local politics and sometimes had a narrow, inward-looking focus that was slow to change. While managing at a regional level gave freedom from such localisms, it bore the cost of increased detachment from what was actually happening and from the people involved and affected. There was a marked tendency to focus more on projects that were manageable from a regional perspective (workshops, reports, etc.) but which had less tangible applications in communities.

The challenges of coordination outlined above are probably fairly standard in all organizations. What is more interesting is the manner in which WCSA/RAMS addressed them. The basic approach was to have different structures play different roles. To make these structures work, WCSA and RAMS adopted different processes and approaches depending on the role being played. (Because this section describes differences between the two organizations, I will refer to them separately). This evolution happened gradually and chronologically as the organizations adapted to what worked and what did not.

Initially WCSA and RAMS played primarily policy roles. They relied mainly on the direct participation of people from communities, providing forums such as ongoing committees, periodic workshops, and open houses, where people felt they could meaningfully participate in decisions affecting their lives. WCSA and RAMS Board members were respected leaders who could act as bridges between local and regional

perspectives. Both organizations relied heavily on their leadership and network of connections. As mentioned above under Section 5.1.2, success in this area depended mainly on the level of trust with communities, which was in turn based on the organizations' demonstrated commitment, leadership, and longevity.

Gradually both RAMS and WCSA started to undertake projects. To differentiate between the roles of the two organizations and set a general direction for the whole region, they tried to build capacity at the community level through project development and delivery, while playing more of an oversight and facilitative role at the regional level. Reflecting this approach, WCSA focused on a range of projects and project delivery in the Clayoquot and Barkley Sound areas, whereas RAMS concentrated on establishing partnership frameworks and policy forums for the entire area. It was recognized that other sub-regions needed to develop project organizations with a strong link to RAMS in order to balance and ground the regional perspective in community needs and realities.

The process used by WCSA to develop and implement projects at the local level varied depending on the nature of the project. There were two main groupings: shorter-term projects with clear physical results (trail building, habitat restoration, etc.) and longer-term projects with ongoing economic benefits to communities (tanner crab (*Chionoecetes tanneri*) fishery). The former involved mainly administration and management and some negotiation with the funding agent over basic contract terms and ongoing contract implementation. Longer-term projects, such as development of an experimental Tanner crab (*Chionoecetes tanneri*) fishery, involved mainly negotiations with the licence administrator (DFO) as well as administration and management. In both cases there was a strong need for extensive administrative and managerial capacity within WCSA. (This topic is discussed in more detail under Section 5.8 Capacity).

In addition to policy and project organizations, the third structure that WCSA and RAMS recognized as important in addressing the tension between local and regional levels was the role of a Trust organization to attract, hold and allocate resources. Participants learned quickly that allocation of resources is a highly contentious issue with the potential to quickly undermine cooperative efforts. The following example of a pilot abalone (*Haliotis kamtschatkana*) aquaculture program illustrates the rationale behind the Aquatic Conservation Trust established by RAMS and WCSA.

In 1999, DFO released a request for proposals for an abalone aquaculture program. The program was to develop pilot abalone aquaculture technology that could be replicated and used elsewhere in remote coastal communities as an economic development tool. As was often the case with such requests, distribution of information was not widespread and the time frame for submitting applications was short. RAMS became aware of the opportunity and submitted a statement of interest for WCVI generally. DFO replied with a request for a more detailed proposal. RAMS then held an application process whereby community or community groups in the WCVI area could apply for the permit based on a detailed plan. Several groups expressed interest, but a plan from the town of Bamfield clearly demonstrated the most capacity. RAMS accepted the Bamfield submission but took some political heat from the communities whose applications were denied. RAMS appeased their complaints with a letter outlining the condition that the other groups submitting applications could be trained in the Bamfield facility and eventually adopt the pilot technology developed. RAMS submitted a revised proposal to DFO, which was accepted. At this point, there was a change in RAMS staff.

New RAMS staff then helped the Bamfield community establish as a legal entity, develop a business plan, and attract funding and capacity. RAMS raised and administered several hundred thousand dollars for the project over its first year. The

administrative, operational, and legal challenges of starting an abalone aquaculture facility would have been impossible for RAMS to carry out on its own, while the initial and ongoing policy and political issues associated with a pilot facility would have been impossible for Bamfield to address. The match was well suited.

A licence was issued by DFO to the Bamfield group once it became a legal entity. It was assumed at the time that the licence did not have to be held by RAMS (as was originally intended) because of the condition that Bamfield train and transplant the developed technology and because a seat was set aside for RAMS in the new legal entity (Field notes 2001). However, this intent was slowly eroded over time as RAMS became increasingly less involved, as DFO and the Bamfield partnership developed a direct relationship, and as the Bamfield partnership developed its own capacity, including new staff with more of a business agenda (which did not include RAMS' agenda of sharing with the broader region). In addition, RAMS eventually folded when the WCVI Aquatic Management Board (AMB) that it had been trying to establish was put in place. The AMB did not choose to take over RAMS seat in the Bamfield project as it did not have any background in the project and had questions of liability and conflict of interest. It did, however, play a role in ensuring that the licence was reissued in a manner that met the interests of the project. Ironically, when DFO issued a renewal licence to the Bamfield project, there was no longer any link between the project and the broader region. The original condition of providing training for other communities did not happen.

The abalone aquaculture story had a start and ending similar to many initiatives and projects that started off being for broader community benefit. The initial allocation of a limited opportunity was always contentious. It occasionally caused the organizations to lose support from those who were unsuccessful or to 'end-run' the regional organization and lobby the external authority for direct access (Don Hall, pers. comm.

2002). The subsequent distribution of benefits from those who were successful was also challenging and contentious. The drive towards increased concentration of benefits amongst successful candidates was often met with a lack of attention from the regional level and a lack of understanding from external authorities, who would exacerbate tensions by excluding the regional perspective. External authorities were consciously or unconsciously consistent in giving money, licences, or allocations to individuals or groups with the effect of undermining any attempts to have more regional authority and equitable distribution in access to resources (Field notes 1999).

These issues demonstrated the need for an organization to attract, hold and administer funds, licences, tenures, and allocations on behalf of the region. We established such an organization, called the Aquatic Conservation Trust (ACT), in response to this need, though we did not have the resources to make it fully operational. We established the role of the ACT to be distinct from the policy facilitation and project implementation roles. Rather than being focused on policy development, facilitation, or project management, the Trust role was more about attracting and lobbying for investment/allocation to the area, allocating and investing resources and developing capacity to utilize allocations within the area, and managing and auditing contracts with regional partners. The benefit of the Trust was to allow policy development and project implementation to occur without being distracted by the numerous tensions and issues surrounding allocation-related roles. The Trust was also designed to ensure that the overall WCVI region would regain and retain benefits from activities in the area over time. Without a Trust mechanism, there would be no focus and method of holding broader community access, and disputes would likely arise regarding allocation.

### **5.1.6 Case Study Propositions about Coordination**

1. Coordinating with and gaining strong legal, financial, and policy commitment from external authorities and groups working at broader spatial scales increases the likelihood of working cooperatively towards principles of sustainable aquatic management.
2. When coordinating and seeking commitment from external authorities and groups working at broader spatial scales, a classic organizational challenge is likely to arise in terms of the amount of work spent coordinating outside of the region and that spent dealing with issues and building capacity within it. If leaders and staff spend too much time outside the region, the organization and internal mandate will start to disintegrate. If leaders and staff do not spend enough time outside the area, the organization and its internal mandate will not receive the support and coordination it needs to survive. This is likely to be exacerbated if other regions are not organized and coordinated in a coast-wide body or if the co-management initiative is new and unfamiliar.
3. As the cooperative organization takes on more responsibilities and plays a variety of roles, a challenge is likely to arise in the terms of coordinating with local bodies over power and allocation of resources.
  - a) There is a greater chance of addressing this challenge if three inter-related functions are fulfilled under the umbrella of co-management: 1) policy development and facilitation; 2) holding and administering funds, licences, tenures, and allocations; and 3) developing and implementing 'on the ground' projects at the local level. This proposition has the following sub-propositions about the characteristics and approach required under each of these functions:
    - b) The chances of successfully undertaking a policy function are increased if local participants have a means of participating in decisions and sharing information with the regional forum. Trust in the organization, based on its demonstrated commitment, representation and network of contacts, and longevity will increase this likelihood. The approach is mainly one of communication, information sharing, facilitation, and mediation.
    - c) The chances of successfully holding and administering funds, licences, tenures, and allocations, are increased if external governments and local bodies recognize the role of a regional organization in holding these items in trust for the overall region. It is hypothesized that this likelihood will be increased if the regional organization has the political independence and appropriate capacity to undertake an investment, allocation and contract auditing and management approach, and administrative capacity to maintain accountability, though further experience and research is needed in this area.
    - d) The chances of successfully fulfilling a project implementation function are increased if local level organizations and businesses have the capacity to turn concepts into concrete results. The approach mainly

involves administering and managing the development and implementation of 'on the ground' projects that show tangible results.

## 5.2 Mandate

### 5.2.1 Mandate Profile

RAMS was a non-profit society incorporated under the *British Columbia Societies Act*. Its Constitution (1998) gave it a broad mandate to negotiate and build a joint aquatic management board with Federal and Provincial governments. This included a mandate to build capacity for managing aquatic issues in Nuu-chah-nulth territory/West Coast of Vancouver Island while a joint management board was being negotiated.

Although RAMS did not have any formal authority from Federal or Provincial governments for their overall tasks, they did have the endorsement of both local and Nuu-chah-nulth governments. These governments took this endorsement seriously, as described by Don Hall (pers. comm. 2002):

Some of the groups had clear authority to do what they set off to do. The Nuu-chah-nulth went through a specific mandating experience to say that they liked the idea and to send representatives. Local government did that as well through Gary Swan and Rose [Davison][Regional District Chair and Regional District Fisheries Committee Chair]. You need some groups to do that. WCSA also discussed it and formalized their endorsement and appointments with their Board of Directors. That provided the core of people that then got together. I have a hard time imaging that just a bunch of people could get together without some kind of mandated authority. We emphasized with [Federal and Provincial] governments the Nuu-chah-nulth formally recognizing the mandate and going through a formal process of endorsement.

As described in Chapter 4, RAMS was formed out of an internal mandate cemented in the region at the May 1997 Common Ground Conference. This internal mandate was the basis for RAMS actions during the course of its existence and included founding principles and goals and a vision for aquatic management in the region. A



central part of this was an aquatic management board with a strong, comprehensive mandate from external authorities, operating under the umbrella of a First Nations Treaty.

RAMS chose various means for achieving its internal mandate and direction (Field notes 1998). These were to: a) communicate and build partnerships regarding its mandate; b) pursue formal negotiations with external authorities under the Treaty process to establish an aquatic management board; c) build and demonstrate capacity and success by entering into agreements with external authorities over aspects of aquatic management; and d) resist the policies of external authorities having a negative impact on the region. In a letter to Federal Fisheries and Oceans employee Ruth Dantzer (October 31, 2001), Dan Edwards describes some of the approaches used:

There were two fundamental strategies adopted by the Association. One could be characterized as renewal, and on that front, we focused on building partnerships within the region in order to do everything from rebuilding salmon streams, mapping and inventories of salmon habitat, community beautification projects, developing new and underutilized species fisheries and supporting and maintaining traditional fisheries such as the winter troll fishery. We were primarily fisheries focused as this was our original mandate. Our largest project by far was the development of an Area Based Aquatic Management Board for the region. We held several large workshops in the region in order to create a cohesive community spirit around this idea and formed the Regional Aquatic Management Society in order to help set up a negotiation process that would include those parties that were needed at the table for this Board to be a success. The second strategy could be characterized as resistance. In order to create the space needed for the renewal efforts, continuous resistance against existing government policies, such as the so-called Mifflin plan, industry consolidation. Individual quota agendas, and the list goes on and on, had to be done. All these programs excluded communities and their intergenerational health, all of them led down the path to resource and community unsustainability and created instability except for a few licence holders that would eventually control all access to resources.

I became known more from my role on the resistance side of this equation although I was equally engaged on both fronts. The resistance role led me into occupations of Federal buildings, organizing protests against area licencing in the northern Johnstone Straits and culminated with a fifty-nine day hunger strike that ended in December of 1999 with a

meeting with Minister Dhaliwahl, where he promised to act  
review of the consultative process, surrounding f

WCSA/RAMS resistance to policies and plan  
government advisory or consultative processes,  
civil servants, to civil disobedience when conciliator,  
members' participation was frequently characterized by anger of  
apparent lack of response to their interests. This frustration and anger  
from cultural communication differences with civil servants and politicians.  
meetings, for instance, were often characterized by heated debates and expressions  
emotions. First Nations often discussed issues in an emotional manner. Civil servants,  
on the other hand, rarely expressed emotion. It was as frustrating for civil servants to be  
the object of heated emotion as it was for fishermen and First Nations to express  
emotion with no apparent response, or the ubiquitous "we'll take that under advisement"  
from civil servants (Field notes 1998).

Conflict also stemmed from problems with government consultative processes.  
Dysfunction within DFO's consultative processes and the Department's difficulty  
protecting wild salmon (*Oncorhynchus spp*) garnered three reports from the Auditor  
General of Canada (1997, 1999, and 2001), and one independent review. The reports  
noted serious problems and major issues resulting in a frustrating situation for  
participants and some civil servants and a threatening situation for the sustainability of  
salmon (*Oncorhynchus spp*) and related fisheries. The following issues were identified  
by the independent review:

- Issue 1:* Trust is broken.
- Issue 2:* Inconsistent consultation protocols, information and standards of practice.
- Issue 3:* Perception that lobbying is more successful than participating in the sponsored consultation process.

meeting with Minister Dhaliwahl, where he promised an independent review of the consultative process surrounding fisheries in BC.

WCSA/RAMS resistance to policies and plans ranged from participation in government advisory or consultative processes, to written submissions, to meeting with civil servants, to civil disobedience when conciliatory avenues failed. WCSA/RAMS members' participation was frequently characterized by anger and frustration at the apparent lack of response to their interests. This frustration and anger stemmed partially from cultural communication differences with civil servants and politicians. Fishermen's meetings, for instance, were often characterized by heated debates and expressions of emotions. First Nations often discussed issues in an emotional manner. Civil servants, on the other hand, rarely expressed emotion. It was as frustrating for civil servants to be the object of heated emotion as it was for fishermen and First Nations to express emotion with no apparent response, or the ubiquitous "we'll take that under advisement" from civil servants (Field notes 1998).

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- Issue 1:* Trust is broken.
- Issue 2:* Inconsistent consultation protocols, information and standards of practice.
- Issue 3:* Perception that lobbying is more successful than participating in the sponsored consultation process.

*Issue 4:* Perception that Fisheries and Oceans Canada has failed to act on the advice provided in the past.

*Issue 5:* Insufficient or lack of support for participants.

*Issue 6:* Lack of transparent and accountable representation (Institute for Dispute Resolution 2001).

Within these and other reports, the lack of an independent body to address allocation of resources was seen to be a major source of conflict among stakeholders and within DFO (Independent Panel on Access Criteria 2002).

An example is instructive in understanding how poor the state of consultation was before and during the case study. At a consultative meeting for one fishery in the area, DFO officials sat at the front of the room, gave a detailed presentation on the results of the previous season, and then invited comments. The structure of the meeting did not promote dialogue, but instead promoted DFO talking at participants and participants talking at DFO officials. First Nations and other community members raised concerns about the status of stocks and the fact that the total allowable catch had been exceeded the previous year. They believed stocks were a fraction of their historical abundance, with impacts on the ecosystem and other sectors indirectly reliant on the fish. They also raised concerns that the fishery had produced \$17 million dollars in the previous year, with virtually no benefits to local communities as almost all licences were owned outside the region and processing occurred outside the region. First Nations participants also noted their inability to harvest in their traditional territories, as per their aboriginal food, social and ceremonial rights. These concerns were mainly expressed in an angry manner, accusing DFO officials of inept, biased, and arrogant approaches. DFO officials listened and occasionally took notes, responding only to a few comments. No minutes were produced from the meeting, and there was no follow up with participants regarding their concerns.

Another example is useful in understanding the adversarial context of building co-management in this case. In a meeting between the Deputy Minister of Fisheries and Oceans Canada and coastal community representatives, the Deputy Minister stated, "It is not that we are trying to kill your communities-- it is the unconscious effect of policy" (Eric Tamm, pers. comm. 1998). Participants considered this comment in two ways. First, how does policy causing ecological and social degradation become unconscious? Second, how could policy outcomes be unconscious given participants' repeated attempts to make the effects of policy conscious? (Rose Davison, pers. comm. 1998).

Participants had little opportunity to understand how external governments work. Similarly, civil servants had few opportunities to understand community issues and dynamics. Part of the problem with poor consultative processes was that they afforded few opportunities for people to understand differing perspectives and sources of information. Participants had no window into the kinds of internal debates and conflicts within governments between civil servants with different values. They had few opportunities to understand the constraints and pressures under which civil servants were operating. Civil servants and politicians also had few opportunities to see the effects of their decisions. Without that understanding, it was difficult for participants to develop empathy for civil servants, and vice versa. Instead, they were left to draw conclusions from their often adversarial experiences or from second-hand sources.

A few experiences supported participants' beliefs that some government officials were consciously undermining coastal community access and benefits from adjacent resources and were resisting movement towards area-based co-management. For instance, First Nations and elected municipal representatives had expressed an interest to DFO in being involved in salmon (*Oncorhynchus spp*) allocation decisions because of the impacts on their communities. They were not notified but found out about a meeting

hosted by DFO where salmon (*Oncorhynchus spp*) allocation was to be discussed. They showed up to find a select group of industry representatives with several DFO officials. Industry representatives told DFO that they would not participate in the meeting if First Nations and communities were involved. DFO officials cancelled the meeting and re-convened it privately some time in the next week, without any further contact with the First Nation and local governments representatives (Field notes 1999).

In another instance, participants accessed a leaked internal DFO memo showing that officials were aware that privatizing resources would negatively impact First Nations access in treaty settlements and provide windfall profits to industry but that options for addressing the issue would be subject to significant resistance from industry groups. In the end, First Nations' concerns were not addressed and privatization proceeded (Field notes 2001). Finally, WCSA/RAMS put considerable effort into developing a proposal for community access to a new fishery, but never received a response from governments. A government briefing note regarding development of the fishery recommended an industrial approach, stating that coastal communities' benefits would not be addressed under the recommended approach but that this was not a primary objective. The recommendation was implemented. In numerous other cases, the objective of coastal community health or access to adjacent resources was not considered as evaluation criteria when looking at options for allocating or managing resources (Field notes 2002).

The external governments also did not give strong, clear direction to their agents or groups outside the region regarding support for co-management in the area. Some people among the external authorities encouraged participation and others actively discouraged it (Field notes 1998-1999). Reference to the initiative occurred tentatively and sporadically in publications and policies of external governments. For instance,

even after the Terms of Reference were ratified by the Federal government and it had been declared a national pilot, the initiative was not mentioned once in the federal 'Oceans Strategy'—an omission that DFO declared to be "an administrative oversight" despite the in-depth reference to several other less developed initiatives (Field notes 2002).

Frequently, throughout the negotiations, WCSA/RAMS found that external groups would refer to departmental officials telling them that certain issues were not being negotiated or 'not to worry about RAMS' because it would not be dealing with anything other than habitat restoration (Field notes 1999-2000). When the federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans was developing a confidential internal document to guide negotiations, a draft quickly and 'mysteriously' ended up in the hands of the external groups who most opposed the initiative (Field notes 1999).

Other examples that WCSA/RAMS interpreted as resistance may have been less conscious. For example, when WCSA/RAMS would request a meeting with senior officials, the external agency would often arrange separate individual meetings with different WCSA/RAMS members rather than meeting with them collectively (Field notes 1997-2002). Generally governments did not recognize WCSA/RAMS as a group, and some WCSA/RAMS members were given greater access to decision makers, stronger roles in coast-wide processes, or greater access to funds or opportunities (Field notes 1997-2002). WCSA/RAMS members frequently countered this by inviting other participants to join them in their meetings or by pooling resources.

While these kinds of activities created frustration and anger in participants, their motivation to engage in conflict was perhaps most related to the fact that it was not just a philosophical dispute--government decisions and management approaches were having

a significant, tangible impact on their livelihoods, communities and adjacent resources.

A few facts outlined in Table 7 illustrate the extent of these problems in the WCVI area.

**Table 7: Social and Ecological Problems in the WCVI Area**

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- Close to two thirds of salmon (*Oncorhynchus spp*) stocks in the WCVI area are not assessed. Of those that are assessed, 54% are estimated to be endangered or threatened by a Nuu-chah-nulth biologist using national criteria for listing species at risk. Many of the stocks that are not assessed are likely to be extinct, endangered or threatened. Only several of the stocks considered to not be at risk could support small commercial activities. This problem is masked and exacerbated by hatchery production (Roger Dunlop, pers. comm. 2003).
  - As of 1989, the total estimated costs to restore damaged watersheds in the area was estimated at half a billion dollars (\$454,280,000). Logging and development have continued since that time. These costs do not include the costs of enhancing stocks at risk or the opportunity costs of lost revenue due to reduced fishing opportunities (Hall et al. 1996).
  - In 2003, there are approximately 160 commercial licences held by 113 WCVI residents and First Nations, representing a reduction in access of approx. 80% over the past 20 years. About one third of these are salmon troll licences, which have generated an average of less than \$10,000/year gross income over the past 8 years (Reid 1989; Danielle Edwards pers. comm.. 2003).
  - Nuu-chah-nulth First Nations, who once had exclusive access to adjacent fish stocks, now have 56 licences. 49 of these have been purchased under the Aboriginal Fisheries Strategy in the past 10 years. Other than the twenty or so licences held by the Tribal Council, half of the First Nations have no licences in their communities (Andy Amos, pers. comm. 2002).
  - Between 3% and 46% of total employment was permanently lost in different WCVI communities in 1996 due to a salmon fleet restructuring program (ARA Consulting Group 1996).
  - Dependence on welfare in Alberni-Clayoquot (8.3-9.4% of pop) has been 30 to 50 percent higher than in BC. (5.3-6.4 %) (Statistics Canada 2001)
  - Dependence on government employment insurance in Alberni-Clayoquot has been about the provincial average during summer months, but soars by 50 to 90 percent above provincial averages in the off-season. (Statistics Canada 2001)
  - According to statistics from 1995-99 on potential years of life lost due to suicide and homicide, Alberni-Clayoquot has been the worst area in the province: 10.3 years per 1,000 population compared to an average of 5.3 for B.C. (Statistics Canada 2001)
- 

As noted above, participants had few opportunities to understand the reasoning behind these actions and outcomes. They attributed the decline in resources and local



social and economic conditions to governments' pursuit of an industrial model of aquatic resource use, involving privatized access and narrow management agreements with industry groups. This was the basic agenda of many industry groups, and some civil servants and politicians supported this model (see for example, Jones and Walker 1997). It was these groups that most strongly opposed WCSA and RAMS initiatives towards area-based co-management. Based on several conversations I had with industry representatives and on their contributions to various government-led processes, they believed:

- The resources were not in bad shape or would recover quickly from a temporary lull.
- Access to resources should be granted to existing licence holders and then transferred on the open market to the highest bidder, which would be the most efficient firms.
- Fishermen and communities that could not compete in a 'highest bidder' system should die, and attempts to save them would be 'social engineering.'
- First Nations and communities did not have the capacity to compete in a global marketplace.
- Greater First Nations and community involvement in decision-making would create 'balkanization' of the coast and make migratory stocks unmanageable.

There was not much room for discussion or negotiation between these groups and WCSA/RAMS. Not only did consultative processes make constructive dialogue difficult but also industry groups did not have much interest or incentive to negotiate.

WCSA/RAMS meetings were open and invitations to participate were sent to all groups, but a representative came to a meeting only on one occasion. In a conversation following the meeting, he noted that they had most of the power and most of the access, so participating would not be negotiating but instead giving something away and having to spend time and energy doing so. With a finite number of fish, more access for First

Nations or communities would simply mean less for them. He did not see what they would gain from participating as he did not see a problem with the state of the resource or communities. He also did not believe First Nations should have or had any special rights or privileges. In other words, he perceived that the costs of conflict and resisting WCSA/RAMS were less than the costs of engaging in co-management (Field notes 1999).

Different values, assessment of problems, and incentives for negotiating were exacerbated by a 'zero-sum' game mentality where conflicting parties saw themselves as being in a power struggle that would produce a winner and a loser. The 'zero-sum' game mentality was powerful because it fed on people's anger and beliefs in a dualistic world with black and white struggles between good and evil (Field notes 2000). While the intent of WCSA/RAMS was to find mutually beneficial solutions producing win/win situations, participants occasionally made statements that they were going to 'take back' access and decision-making power (Field notes 1997-2001). This was mainly out of frustration that opposing groups were not willing to discuss or negotiate solutions and that WCSA/RAMS members had limited means of bringing them to the table (Dan Edwards, pers. comm. 1998). The court system was a possibility for First Nations but was viewed as extremely costly and risky—it was also not viewed as a cooperative approach (Cliff Atleo, pers. comm. 1998). Participants' statements reflecting a 'zero-sum' game mentality contributed to industry resistance and conflict. They gave opponents fuel to raise people's fears that WCSA/RAMS was an 'enemy' out to destroy or take away their livelihood (as evidenced by emails sent to fishermen by industry leaders (Field notes 1998-2001)).

A final source of tension and conflict was the nature of historical relationships between groups. The Nuu-chah-nulth have a long, bitter history with external

governments and groups. Most of this animosity stems from the fact that the Nuu-chah-nulth believe their ownership and management of resources has been largely ignored and undermined by external governments. Consider the following statement, referring to B.C. First Nations fisheries issues in 1889:

But the prior question of ownership had been shunted aside. Instead of negotiating access to a valued and owned resource, the Canadian State assumed access for all British subjects, and reduced prior Native claims of ownership to a tenuous claim to a food fishery. The Native fishery had been a source of wealth, not just of sustenance, and confining it to a food fishery was a means of reallocating the resource to the canneries. (Harris 2001: 67)

The question of jurisdiction over management of resources was similarly shunted aside during colonization of British Columbia (Harris 2001). The Nuu-chah-nulth's traditional allocation and management systems have never been fully recognized by the Canadian State, as there has never been a Treaty signed with a Nuu-chah-nulth Nation, and Treaty negotiations only began in the early 1990s. Almost all advances in the recognition of Nuu-chah-nulth rights have come through court decisions. Industry groups such as the BC Fisheries Survival Coalition have been formed specifically to oppose recognition of First Nations rights and title. Based on conversations I had with several members where I tried to understand their concerns, it was apparent that some members of the Survival Coalition group were motivated by basic prejudice (Field notes 1998). It was also clear that over a century of racial tension could not be easily overcome within First Nations communities (Field notes 1999).

The dispute over traditional rights of access and management was exacerbated by Federal government policies and practices such as making 'potlatches' (traditional management and social ceremonies) illegal and requiring First Nations children to attend government residential schools as a tool for assimilating them into European culture (Simon Lucas, pers. comm. 1998). The resulting tensions and conflicts created a web of

adversarial relationships within which movement towards co-management was embedded.

### **5.2.2 Case Study Results Related to Mandate**

The results of lessons learned from WCSA and RAMS experiences with respect to mandate are grouped into two categories. The first category called 'delegated authority over specific tasks' relates to building and demonstrating capacity by entering into agreements with external authorities over aspects of aquatic management. The second category called 'building an internal mandate and negotiating an external mandate' relates to building the internal mandate that gave birth to RAMS and then negotiating its implementation. In both cases, the results draw on the profile discussion outlined above and the case study profile and history described in Chapter 4.

#### **5.2.2.1 Delegated authority over specific tasks**

As noted in Chapter 4, WCSA and RAMS took on delegated authority from Federal and Provincial governments over a large number of projects and initiatives. When authority was delegated to WCSA and RAMS by specific agencies over specific tasks, they encountered both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, they were able to build capacity and achieve some of their goals over a limited time frame. Their experiences with delegated authority gave them a better understanding of management issues associated with aquatic resources and a chance to try out some alternative approaches around specific tasks. Moreover, the flexibility in the WCSA/HRDC contract regarding building the Aquatic Management Board was essential to achieving that objective and working towards a longer-term vision. They were also able to demonstrate success and produce tangible products and benefits in

communities. Finally, they were also able to develop relationships with agency staff and generate alliances within external authorities.

On the other hand, WCSA/RAMS tended to simply replicate the problems and issues facing those agencies. For instance, both WCSA and RAMS staff and directors became mired in administration and 'short term fixes', which distracted from meaningful policy issues and focus on their longer-term goals. For some people in communities, WCSA/RAMS lost credibility by becoming a somewhat kinder front for external authorities, who were withdrawing from providing services in communities (Trevor Wickham, pers. comm. 2003). The arrangements also put WCSA/RAMS into the segregated sectoral management framework of dealing with issues in isolation from each other, which undermined the organizations' main principle of ecosystem management. The arrangements also made WCSA/RAMS increase capacity to carry out the programs, which therefore made them more dependent on that funding. This dependence made WCSA/RAMS more vulnerable to political changes and pressures, including withdrawal of funding and direct attempts to undermine them, without any dispute resolution mechanisms. This inevitably led to acrimony and pessimism in communities when governments withdrew funding or when government agents consciously or unconsciously revoked agreements. Capacity building was therefore both built and challenged by delegated authority relationships.

Several examples help illustrate some of these points. The first example relates to delegated authority that was minimal and time limited, and two other examples relate to more substantial delegation. In the first example, RAMS was only minimally able to achieve its goals. For instance, when contracted to run a selective fishing workshop in the region by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO), RAMS was able to set the agenda and organize the workshop. It produced some excellent recommendations and,

within the context of the workshop, addressed its goal of open, inclusive and transparent decision-making. But it did not have the mandate to implement the recommendations. Indeed, most of the recommendations were not implemented after going through DFO's internal decision-making process, and the process and reasons were never made clear to RAMS or other participants. This limited RAMS' ability to truly achieve its goal of inclusive and transparent decision-making and to contribute to its other goals, such as conservation (Darren Deluca, pers. comm. 2002).

In cases where delegated authority was more substantial, RAMS' and WCSA's ability to achieve their goals was influenced by various factors such as the breadth, time frame, and commitment of the agency delegating the authority. For example, Fisheries Renewal BC (FsRBC) delegated almost all aspects of decision-making on Provincial salmon (*Oncorhynchus spp*) renewal investments in the West Coast of Vancouver Island area to RAMS from 1998 to 2001. Fisheries Renewal BC set some overall parameters (in consultation with RAMS and other groups throughout the province), determined the overall allocation to the region, and performed a monitoring and auditing function. RAMS was responsible for setting overall priorities for the region and determining how, when, and where to invest their allocation. RAMS was also responsible for contract administration with local level project implementation groups. RAMS and FsRBC communicated regularly through email, phone, conference calls, and meetings. Generally the working relationship was excellent, with both groups responsive to the needs of the other group (Field notes 1999, 2000, 2001).

This arrangement allowed RAMS to make strong positive steps towards some of its goals within the context of the particular program. For instance, RAMS was able to build its own management capacity while implementing projects that contributed to its goals of conservation, integration of local and scientific knowledge, inclusive and

transparent decision-making, and capacity building. However, there were several factors that impaired RAMS' ability to achieve its goals in a meaningful way over time (Field notes 1999, 2000, 2001). RAMS had authority only over Provincial salmon renewal funding and not Federal salmon renewal funding or funding for other species. RAMS also did not have a mandate to address the allocation of benefits from salmon renewal, nor to address the issues impacting salmon (*Oncorhynchus spp*) and their habitat, such as forestry or salmon harvest planning. Finally, the time frame for the program was limited, as a new Provincial government dissolved Fisheries Renewal BC and did not replace it. The short time frame was out of line with many salmon renewal activities and with capacity building.

The problems described above made achieving the goals of an integrated, ecosystem approach difficult within the context of the salmon renewal program and made other goals unachievable over time. In fact, the program had some long-term negative repercussions for achieving goals. Many people in the region became disillusioned with the commitment of external authorities towards habitat and communities, given that such a model organization as Fisheries Renewal BC was so easily and quickly dissolved. People became increasingly unwilling to invest energy participating in a process that might not last, making it difficult for RAMS and WCSA to get feedback and participation in other forums.

The arrangement between Human Resource Development Canada (HRDC) and WCSA provides another example of substantial delegated authority. The arrangement was similar to that between Fisheries Renewal BC and RAMS in that it involved funding to carry out projects, with HRDC establishing a framework and WCSA having flexibility within that framework to set and implement community priorities. However, there were two main differences from the Fisheries Renewal/RAMS relationship. HRDC's

framework was much more restrictive regarding projects. Also, part of the contract with WCSA included broad authority for WCSA to set up a regional aquatic management board. There were very few parameters regarding this side of the contract and WCSA had substantial flexibility in achieving this general objective.

The main advantages in the relationship between WCSA and HRDC stemmed from the flexible side of the contract, with WCSA able to achieve its goal in the manner it saw fit. The relationship also had advantages in helping garner support from other agencies for more innovative projects. The projects helped show some tangible benefits in communities and demonstrate the commitment of WCSA. On the more restrictive project side, some staff did not feel that WCSA had flexibility to do anything interesting or innovative and were acting mostly as a front for HRDC (Trevor Wickham, pers. comm. 2003). The bureaucracy involved in these kinds of projects distracted from the objective of building a regional management board or implementing higher priority projects. WCSA also did not have the mandate or power to address problems in the execution of contracts with HRDC. This meant that HRDC did not have to respond to WCSA's interests and views in disputes (see s.5.8 Funding for further details on the relationship). Legal recourse was not an option for WCSA/RAMS given the costs and energy required. Moreover, legal recourse cannot repair the damage to community political will and volunteerism caused by such deep disputes with delegating agencies.

#### ***5.2.2.2 Building an internal mandate and negotiating an external mandate***

As noted above, RAMS and WCSA had a mandate only from the groups participating in them. Its mandate, which I will call an 'internal mandate', was voluntary and coming from the people of the region rather than from an external source. Dan Edwards (pers. comm. 2002) describes its importance in the following way:



. . . the ability to do anything is determined by your ability to bring partners together to build political will. It doesn't come from above. It is voluntary. Then you can convince those with money and authority that there is a real partnership [which leads to getting a mandate from government].

WCSA/RAMS faced two kinds of challenges in establishing an internal mandate.

One was how to build and maintain such a mandate and the other was the question of whether it was adequate to achieve their goals.

The following narrative from Dan Edwards (pers. comm. 2002) describes the process and issues involved in building an internal mandate and achieving organizational goals. The narrative is quoted at length because these challenges are perhaps most critical to co-management enterprises, yet they are very poorly described in common pool management literature. Mr. Edwards was the person who spent the most time and energy addressing the dilemmas and describes them far better than I could.

Mr. Edwards first describes how people came together to address an issue of concern to them:

In the initial workshops and building of political will which was made up of individual citizens—meetings/workshops were made up of people from the community who were interested and concerned enough to come together and find and explore solutions to issues we were facing. They weren't made up of people with mandates and power. The objective was to bring citizens together who were concerned. Then you could judge whether the issue is of concern by the amount of participation you get. Most of the work initially was personal meetings, meetings with different groups, chambers of commerce, municipal government, stakeholder groups . . . several meeting just dealing with fishery issues. You phone people directly and say 'are you interested in this issue?' and then invite them to come and find solutions and then judge if there is political will by whether people make the time to come.

Mr. Edwards then describes the intricacy of building political will in communities:

The other part of this is that political will was created at two levels at that time. The idea of an issue, such as economic decline of communities around sea resources, builds political will in the community, but at the same time you are resisting policies of central governments. There was so much work done at that level. If you are organizing at a local level,

you are also working outside the region to create resistance to policies from central governments. As this kind of stuff builds, it is not as though you are manipulating the situation to create space. You are bringing people together and learning some things as you do that. One is that existing government policies are not working for your community. They are creating the problem. That comes out as you work through the issues. It becomes known and apparent as you work through it. It is important because if you look at it from a theoretical viewpoint you could say that people with certain ideologies will manipulate people to raise issues to the extent that they then go to the next step that the ideology says should happen. That was not part of our consciousness at the time. That is a fundamental difference between people within community starting the process and people outside the community starting the process.

We were not working from a theoretical model of c.e.d. [community economic development] or any political model or ideology. We were feeling a lot of economic and other social and cultural pain. Pain being a decline in a number of areas, everything from social values to economic values. Responding to that by getting together and figuring out why is this and what are sources of this and is there anything that could be done about this and working through to see and design what could be done.

Then people in the community start to look outside the region for help. That comes from several different sources. I remember the first day I phoned Lyn [Dr. Evelyn Pinkerton] and had a meeting with her and was trying to work through this stuff with her and knowing her reputation of working on this kind of stuff. Asking for help connects into many others, like Skip [Skip McCarthy], you [Andrew Day], Laura [Laura Loucks], Pat Gallagher, Bob Brown, and others at SFU. That is what process is. And Suzuki Foundation. And consultants who are supposedly trained to help develop cooperative models like Jim Morrison, Doug Kelly, etc.

Mr. Edwards sums this up, stating when he thinks it is necessary to involve external authorities:

At the end of the day, it's about the political will built at the community level to change policies destroying the community level. The need is first to get will at the regional level and then inform central government that policies are destructive. At that point when there is recognition of the destructive effects of policy, when unconscious effects of policy are made conscious, then central government should provide a new form of mandate that would allow us to address our objectives. At that point they have to work with us towards the same objectives. Without that, all the work at the local level will be for nothing. It won't work.

In response to my question on the topic of government's role in directing people to participate, Mr. Edwards first stresses the need for voluntary participation and the dangers of government involvement too early in the process:

*Interview question: One of the things that we often talked about was whether government should be directing people to participate in the local initiative.*

That is about the fourth stage. The 1997 workshop had a lot of local and First Nation government reps with stakeholders and people with no mandate other than through their own sectors coming together to decide on the next step and future. One vision of the future was that governments be fully involved [with communities] in bringing people together to collectively deal with issues in the region. RAMS was formed to continue on with what WCSA had started, to get an overarching process to deal with stuff in the region. The role of RAMS was more specifically to get governments involved.

Up to that point, it was all voluntary because it has to be in order to build political will, and governments won't respond if there is no political will. If they see it and enough information comes out of a large enough group of people coming together, then government will start to recognize that they have to be involved and recognize policy change.

There is a point at which you don't want government anywhere near a process because they'll kill it. They'll spread some money around and keep the status quo. We had a debate before the 1997 Conference about whether to involve government. There is a point in grassroots movements where governments are corrosive. The question is when to bring governments in so that they won't be corrosive.

*Interview question: So when is that point?*

The deciding point is when enough [local] political leaders and the people representing them at regional level have got together with a strong cooperative message and a directed strategy of what they want to have happen. The Board is the outcome of the 1997 Conference when groups demonstrated enough strength of will to be of one mind when they went to government. The first thing government will do is see if they can sabotage it deliberately or test it to see if it is real. They'll find weak points if it isn't real. A lot of this may not be done maliciously; some do and some do it unconsciously because they recognize it means a power shift and they don't want to see it happen.

The difference between the 1997 Conference and previous ones was that now you had municipal government and those with mandates deciding to go to central government for help on changing policy. And then lo and behold they have a perfect vehicle they have legislated which

allows them to put in place the process to put people under one tent. That is what the *Oceans Act* does—government are not forcing people, but they just lay out the process. If you don't want to be involved in this process, which is where policy gets developed, then you won't have another process to go to.

*Interview question: When that point is reached and government becomes involved, what kind of mandate is needed?*

Government then has to say that this is the vehicle through which policy is made. They already have that through *Oceans Act*. All they have to do is implement their own policy.

We then turned to the topic of the power/authority needed. Mr. Edwards first refers to a letter as background, the relevant parts of which are quoted below.

*Interview question: How much power/authority did the group need in order for you to put time into it and cooperate?*

There is a bit of history that needs to be laid out. I talk about that in my letter to Ruth Dantzer [DFO official in Ottawa]. [The following is an excerpt from that letter]:

Our original timeline for the development of the board was November of 1997. Louis Tousignant, then Regional Director General, was petitioned by the Nuu-chah-nulth Tribal Council. He ignored the entire idea. When Donna came on board we found a more sympathetic person willing to listen to the idea. She became our government champion for the board and helped it through several difficult stages. Unfortunately, the intense dislike of the inclusion of communities in the development of fisheries policies through the development of a multi-governmental, multi-sectoral board met intense resistance from the larger industry players, mostly organized by Mike Hunter and Michelle James, both former DFO employees who had become industry lobbyists, and they were helped considerably by many people from within the Department. The fact that government was mandated through the Ocean's Act to find a more inclusive consultative process meant nothing to these people. (D. Edwards' letter to Ruth Dantzer, Oct. 31, 2001).

He then stresses how critical timing is:

It is time sensitive. You don't have a lot of time to hold political will together. It has to be mandated at some point in order for political will to maintain itself. Opposition mostly comes from outside. We tried to build partnerships with these groups but either they weren't interested, or they were actively opposed. Then government decides whether to listen to people in the region or outside it. Donna [Petrachenko, DFO Regional

Director General] took a leadership role here. Which was critical. But is one person's will enough when others in the organization [DFO] were opposing it?

This is a critical time frame—when things either get struck or leadership happens and it moves forwards.

All the bullshit DFO stonewalling was using time as a weapon against the political will in the region. Every time government uses stalling tactics rather than pursuing objectives, people in the region need to continue to forge political will. We went to Ottawa twice and the reason was to instill in central government the need for moving quickly before losing the temper in the region. The stalling tactics created a situation for us where the elements of the need to cooperate fell apart as they stalled, and the only thing that survived was negotiation to build the Board, and the Board was struck, which was the beginning of a solution that we needed.

The question is whether there is any political will left at the end of a process that was stalled for so long, to make the [Aquatic Management] Board effective. Will it be able to change all the issues that we originally came together for? ...There is a big question mark around that in my mind.

The question is whether or not at the present time the Board is in a place where the people who put it in place including federal and provincial governments are actively doing what they said they would do in the first place which was creating an integrated approach in the region. There are so many other separate processes that are not integrated that are setting policies and affecting the region, and not using the Board to lead discussion or help frame discussions. I'd venture to say the feds and province are both not following on their mandate and have very little interest and no leadership from above to actually make the Board real. One factor is certain personalities such as Donna [Petrachenko, DFO Regional Director General] being sidelined or removed and in a situation like that the bureaucrats are not given clear direction, and when bureaucrats are not given clear direction, they will maintain their own comfort space and not be willing to take a chance or go out on a limb politically. I would venture to say that stalling the process has seriously destroyed the local, regional, and First Nations political will as well. And that is somewhat deliberate. If you look at what government has done is they've stalled and given more power to sectoral groups or First Nations or local government to divide communities and give them less incentive to participate cooperatively. So First Nations are trying to put in a geoduck farm, and they'll be able to deal with it through some other process in some other place, and a municipal coalition to deal with hake will get an audience with the Minister [of Department of Fisheries and Oceans], as examples. If government was serious, they would say there is a Board in place to deal with this kind of initiative.

*Interview question: One of the theories is that for community-based management to work it has to be legislated. What do you think?*

Well it is. Under the *Oceans Act*. But it is written so broadly you could drive a truck through it. If there is not the political will to make it work, then there will be enough loopholes found to make it ineffective. The question is whether there are issues that can be raised to raise political will in government to give it more and more power.

There is no issue right now that is strong enough to make that happen. Fish farming is not right—too many divisions around it. You can't look at it from the view of the press; you have to look at it from community level, where jobs and money will break down cooperative development around better more stringent requirements around the industry.

I don't know if I agree with Craig [Darling, facilitator for AMB negotiations] that there needs to be one specific issue. My sense is that there are a number of different things happening in the region which are connected. If you just deal with sea resource issues, then there are groupings of issues which create a larger issue.

. . . . I've been struggling with bankruptcy [of WCSA] because I'm seeing a denial sequence in the community. The pushing for 'destination resorts' and that kind of development glosses over problems that occur because you can't get people to a region where there are undercurrents of serious issues. I'm trying to keep a sense of a vision of what possible good outcomes could come from bankruptcy and not have it turn into one more negative story of how governments fuck communities. That story has to be told within a framework for that to happen. Here we have ten years of building, and indicators of success and failure in a region—there are some elements of success in Tanner crab but lots of potential for it to go off the rails, with capacity destroyed in community, but we need to tell the story in such a way that in order for communities to survive, government have to invest in the communities. Well, the obvious place is through the [Aquatic Management] Board, which needs to have capacity and have avenues to get capacity to deal with this stuff.

*Interview question: What do you mean by destination resort stuff glossing over problems?*

The destination resort stuff kills political will. If the story is that everything is OK and there are no problems, then government will not do anything to change direction. They'll see everything as being fine. If things were in a better balance and there was a resort strategy that was part of licencing and allocation and forestry development, etc., then it is not a denouncing, then it is real. But if other things are thrown off the table, then you are into denial and the problem is that fishery and forestry issues are both off the table at the municipal level and there is no political will around them and no organizational capacity. People are barely able to hold on economically so there is no volunteerism.

*Interview question: How much of a mandate do you think you need from central government to work cooperatively?*

That question is more for down the line. I don't think we've explored that enough. We never got to a place where the federal government thought there was a need for a mandate. [End]

Mr. Edwards narrative describes key elements in building an internal mandate.

Darren Deluca's comments (pers. comm. 2002) reflected other WCSA and RAMS members' feelings regarding whether an internal mandate was sufficient to achieve WCSA/RAMS goals. He noted:

RAMS never had any authority. To some degree it had a common enemy which is what brought people together. We loved to hate DFO together. But just because you don't have [government] authority doesn't mean you can't get things done. You don't have to have [government granted] power to lead change. RAMS had no power but it led change . . . . You don't need authority if you have cooperation, which we could get in the region. We could do this largely because of the credibility and influence of the people involved. It was all done through our network of contacts and influence within the area.

*Interview question: Was the internal mandate enough to work together over time?*

It was frustrating not to have authority to make decisions especially when you have a good solution. You get too much interference from outside sources. It was outside influences that always blocked us.

Maureen Sager's comments (pers. comm. 2003) also reflected many WCSA/RAMS members who recognized the importance of WCSA's resistance work in building an internal mandate within the area. She stated:

I think our authority was very severely constrained by what authorities the Provincial and Federal governments were willing to give us, and if they had not been interested or, well, forced into looking into possibilities of setting up an aquatic management board, it never would have happened - we couldn't have set it up on our own. It was through the actions of WCSA over the years, the marches, the sit-ins, the hunger strike, that it actually ever got going. Plus the First Nations, of course.

Ms. Sager's last comment regarding First Nations alludes to one element of WCSA/RAMS' attempts to develop an internal mandate that is not emphasized above--

the relationship of RAMS and the future Aquatic Management Board to the First Nations' Treaty process. Don Hall (pers. comm. 2002) added the following comments in support of the need for having a strong internal mandate before seeking an external one, noting the importance of a link to First Nations. He stated:

RAMS needed recognition from communities and First Nations and the [Nuu-chah-nulth] Tribal Council that it had legitimacy and organization—it needed an internal mandate. And then it needed external recognition by [Federal and Provincial] governments that it was an organization that had some representation of First Nations. That was its appeal to governments—a unique native and non-native community-based organization.

As previously noted in the profile section on Geographic Scope (s.5.1.1), the importance of First Nations participation was critical not only from the perspective of their history and residence in the area but also because of the potential power that the Treaty process might bring to the region.

For First Nations, the initiative had to be linked to the Treaty process for three reasons. It reflected their principle of an integrated, ecosystem approach and their traditional governance structures. It would also build relationships and understanding that would form the basis of a Treaty and would garner support for Treaty from non-native communities and groups. And it would give First Nations a greater say in management decisions while Treaties were being negotiated.

For other communities in the area, the advantage of a link with the Treaty process was that more power might be vested in the process. More decision-making power in the area was recognized as a benefit to all groups. Maureen Sager (pers. comm. 2003) reflects this where she stated:

I think [First Nations participation] gave us...made us feel we had a lot more power to have First Nations there, and their levels of government, represented as equals, that was very empowering, and was a source of pride too. It gave us a feeling that we were headed in the right direction. In a progressive direction. .... We certainly felt we had a lot of power there to achieve something because of Treaty negotiations. And I doubt



we would have if it hadn't been for Treaty negotiations. I mean, we probably wouldn't have gotten anywhere in getting a board like that [the current AMB] put in place if it hadn't been for the connection with Treaty.

Other advantages of having the initiative connected to the Treaty process was that it gave other communities more say in Treaty settlements and implementation—something they did not feel they were getting in other processes and which they knew could have a major impact on their livelihoods. Finally, it was recognized that for the ecosystem approach to be implemented, Treaty had to be a part of the initiative. It would not be possible to have a separate bilateral process happening outside of an integrated, holistic approach to aquatic management.

Despite these advantages, there were significant barriers to agreement on connecting the initiative to Treaty. Consider the following statement in a letter from Dan Edwards to DFO employee Ruth Dantzer (Oct. 31, 2001), describing some of the history and difficulties working through this issue.

I am a third generation fisherman who more by osmosis than a directed strategy, became involved in fisheries and regional politics. In the early nineties, with the advent of the Aboriginal Fisheries Strategy and the beginning of the Aboriginal Treaty process, a number of us started working on the possibility of developing a working relationship between the native and non-native communities in the region that respected the cultural identities of the varied communities and at the same time would allow us to fight on a number of common fronts. On the West Coast of Vancouver Island, the population is split almost evenly between native and non-native citizens. This movement towards cooperative relationships was in stark contrast to the John Cummins, Mike Hunter, Survival Coalition inspired rhetoric that refused to accept the constitutionally defined rights of the Aboriginal community. Together we created the West Coast Sustainability Association, which had a unique double majority makeup between the native and non-native directors on the Board and was based on principles of sustainability that many of us had become sensitized to due to the land-use fight over Clayoquot Sound.

I should be clear here that this was not just one or two people starting a non-profit group. At the original meetings there were often over a hundred people from both the native and non-native communities in the region who came together to endorse the idea. It was a grassroots movement in the true sense of the word, which came out of the economic

pain felt in the region and the severe tensions surrounding the Aboriginal Fisheries Strategies. It also came out of a realization that forces outside the region would be more than willing to start a war over the fishing rights issue. The problem as we saw it was that we would be the battleground, it would be our communities that would be wasted as the rest of the fishermen on the coast retreated to their safe havens in Vancouver or wherever.

That all started back in 1994. Try to imagine seventy fishermen and local political leaders from both communities, coming together at that time, with the severe tensions surrounding native rights that was just then starting to be dealt with through the treaty process. I am a white guy. I have lived most of my life in Ucluelet. Across the bay from the town is a native reserve. In my forty years of living in this community, my first time even stepping onto this land was when we started WCSA. I was forty four years old. The bay is half a mile across.

The final decision for the internal mandate to include an aquatic management board under the umbrella of Treaty took years of discussions and relationship building to produce. People like Rose Davison (a local government representative), who were adamantly opposed to the idea initially, eventually accepted it. She communicated to me at the time that she had changed her mind based on the practical realization that it would bring more power to the area, and that First Nations and other communities were facing similar issues and needed to present a common front to external authorities (Field notes 1997).

The difficulties that WCSA/RAMS faced in achieving its goal of gaining an external mandate are chronicled above and in Chapter 4. Several actions were important to addressing these difficulties. First, WCSA/RAMS ensured that external authorities committed to a formal negotiation process to establish the external mandate. This provided a focused, stable, facilitated forum where groups could work out their differences, build relationships, and reach agreements. It also elevated the stature of discussions, giving communities a sense of progress and external governments the incentive to show commitment. Second, WCSA/RAMS outlined the policies and legislation of the external governments supporting the internal mandate of the region and

consistently reminded governments of these. This made it easier for government negotiators to advance the external mandate within their organizations and with opposing groups (Chris Dragseth, pers. comm. 1999). Third, WCSA/RAMS worked to merge its guiding principles and goals with these legislative and policy commitments to provide a framework for negotiations to establish an external mandate.

WCSA/RAMS also tried to find people in external authorities or opposing groups who supported the foundations of the internal mandate. Their alliances were essential in helping guide the initiative to successfully achieve an external mandate (Field notes 2001). Not only did they provide information and perspectives to WCSA/RAMS, but they also guided the initiative through internal debates. In some cases allies stated that they should not be identified as their anonymity was important in ensuring they could be of assistance. Wilf Caron (pers. comm. 2003) notes the importance of these external government supporters where he states,

The bureaucracy has forward thinking individuals too that recognize that the status quo is not moving out of its hole. So I applaud those forward thinking people that gave their stamp for their staff or whatever to keep an ear to the ground on what was happening here on the West coast... we needed that. It would have been a much more difficult road to do it on our own without their participation... and [it wouldn't have worked] to just present them with a baby all there... they had to grow with us, and they did.

Losing potential allies was one of many casualties of conflict and resistance. The variety of sources of tension that created an atmosphere of conflict and resistance are described in Section 5.2.1 Profile above. Participants' contributions to these tensions likely created resistance to the initiative well beyond those who were consciously trying to undermine it. By engaging in conflict and expressing frustration, anger, and a 'zero-sum' game mentality, participants not only lost potential support but provided ammunition for those who opposed them (Field notes 2002). Several allies within government told me that participants' anger and frustration toward external governments

and groups closed the door on many potential allies and opportunities (Field notes 1999-2003). My lack of understanding of governments' internal processes caused me to act arrogantly and with frustration in a number of circumstances, and it has since become clear to me that this was not productive in generating support.

Tension and conflict also had internal costs. Some WCSA/RAMS participants began to lose momentum for the external mandate, though no one gave up on it. It took its toll mainly after negotiations for the external mandate concluded, when many of the original proponents took long breaks or permanent withdrawal from the process. In an email to an inquiring student, Darren Deluca (2002) noted the challenge this may present for the new Aquatic Management Board, when he stated,

Many of the original people who got involved are now stepping aside, for a variety of reasons. Not the least among them is bitterness towards DFO and the damage that they have done to our communities over the past several years. Many of the originals are community and industry leaders and without their active support it will be difficult for the Board to reach its full potential. As a result of some of the negative actions of DFO, it may be difficult to create an environment of trust and respect for the Board to operate. I believe that will be the single most challenge that the Board faces. Only through demonstrated action will the AMB be able to prove itself as effective and honest despite DFO's presence.

On the other hand, participants like Dan Edwards (pers. comm. 2002) felt that his participation in the Aquatic Management Board (AMB) would be detrimental because of the previous adversarial role he had played. He recognized that the resistance role created numerous opponents who would not support the board if he was involved. As also noted by Mr. Deluca, he felt that his cynicism towards external governments had grown stronger than his ability to work cooperatively with them, and so he did not apply to sit on the AMB.

### **5.2.3 Case Study Propositions about Mandate**

1. Authority delegated to an organization by specific agencies over specific tasks or elements of its broader mandate has certain advantages and disadvantages.

Advantages include: a) building short-term capacity in the organization; b) working in the short term towards one or several organizational goals; c) increasing appreciation for management issues and trying some limited alternative approaches around specific tasks; d) using the capacity and funding under delegated authority as a means to achieve broader goals and longer-term change; e) demonstrating success and producing tangible products and results in communities; and f) developing allies within governments.

Disadvantages include: a) replicating the problems and issues facing delegating agencies; b) becoming mired in administration and 'short-term fixes', which distracts from meaningful policy issues and focus on longer-term goals; c) becoming associated with governments and losing credibility in communities; d) adopting the 'stovepipe' management framework for dealing with issues in isolation from each other, which undermines the main principle and goal of ecosystem management; e) becoming dependent on government, and therefore more vulnerable to political changes and pressures, including withdrawal of funding and direct attempts to undermine the organization, with few avenues of recourse; and f) building up of acrimony and pessimism in communities when governments withdraw funding or misuse their power, meaning over the long term that capacity may be undermined rather than built and original goals not achieved.

2. If delegated authority from different agencies within external authorities is granted to the organization for specific tasks, it is easy for the organization to become distracted from its principles (for example, an integrated, ecosystem approach, equitable sharing of access to resources, democratic participation in decision-making, and other sustainable aquatic management principles).
3. If a broader external mandate is granted by external authorities, there is more opportunity for the organization to achieve principles of sustainability. However, this depends on the manner in which the external mandate is granted and adopted. Building to a more successful broader external mandate involves the following stages and issues.

#### **5.2.3.1 Stage I: Building an internal mandate for change**

- A first step towards the achievement of an external mandate is likely to involve people within the region identifying and demonstrating willingness to address issues most critical to them.

- If an internal mandate stems from the physical realities and pain facing people in the region and their sense of pride, identity and commitment to the area, rather than from an ideological program or agenda disconnected from people's needs or experiences, it is more likely to be successful. If issues significantly affect people's daily lives, these issues will garner more of their interest and commitment over time. If issues are defined such that different sectors or groups can recognize they share the same views, a broader internal mandate from the entire region is likely to develop.
- Political understanding of the issues will develop through a process of one-to-one discussions and community meetings. If respected community leaders having a solid understanding of issues and a vision for the community are involved, more people will be engaged and the base of support will be broader.
- If people are able to identify common issues, it is more likely that people will be motivated to address them and that political will and community cohesion will grow.
- The chances of building a strong internal mandate are better if people from outside the region are involved in a supportive capacity at the request of the participants. Types of support at this stage include description of different possible models and experiences from elsewhere, neutral facilitation, and advice when solicited.
- If an internal mandate and then formal mandate are to be adopted and implemented successfully, the activities in this stage do not 'end' but rather evolve into maintaining an internal mandate. The need for continued dialogue, identification of issues, and seeking commitment continues through all subsequent stages.

#### **5.2.3.2 Stage II: Building alliances outside the region and cementing a regional partnership**

- Once the basic issues and will to address them have been identified, there is a better chance of more extensive collaboration between people within and those outside the region. If external partnerships are selected carefully and if it is clear that their role is to support the communities' agenda, partnerships will aid in helping the internal mandate mature rather than stunting its growth or killing it by introducing new agendas, self-serving strategies, or incentives for fracturing at the community level.
- If the identification of issues and will have reached an adequate stage of maturity, formalizing them into a clear internal mandate will help produce and demonstrate unity and commitment. (This normally occurs in the form of a Constitution or terms of reference for an organization and the commitment of members and directors). If local governments and powerful community groups agree to the internal

mandate, there is a much stronger likelihood of making it through the next stage and being granted an external mandate.

### **5.2.3.3 Stage III: Broadening the regional circle, taking on responsibilities, and overcoming challenges**

- If a region has a clear internal mandate, it can then seek an external mandate from those with authority. If the external mandate is to be successful, it must have the same foundation upon which the internal one was built. This means working under the same principles and towards the same goals.
- If groups within the region find people among the external authorities or groups sponsors who support the foundations of the internal mandate, their alliance can help guide the initiative to successfully achieving an external mandate. The anonymity of their alliance can help some people in external authorities and groups be of assistance. If groups within the region do not appreciate the difficulties that supportive people within external authorities face, they are likely to miss opportunities to develop allies or will lose allies.
- An external mandate will be easier to achieve if:
  - a) the policies and legislation of the external authority support the internal mandate of the region and the governments are consistently reminded of them;
  - b) these legislative and policy commitments are used as a framework for negotiations to establish an external mandate; and,
  - c) the discussion of a formal mandate occurs within a formal negotiation process to which external authorities commit.
- If a regional organization has a clear internal mandate for substantial change and seeks an external mandate from those in authority, a variety of tensions and conflicts are likely to arise. Sources of these tensions may include:
  - a) A 'zero-sum' game mentality, in which participants and their opponents see themselves engaged in a struggle over finite resources and power, with the end result being a 'win/lose' scenario.
  - b) Historic anger, prejudice and mistrust built up between groups through events, actions and rigid attachment to ideologies. This latter source of tension was entrenched in the case study context and was extremely difficult to overcome.
  - c) Cultural barriers to communication and dysfunctional forums for communication. Along with poor communication came poor information sharing, that limit people's capacity for empathy and agreement.

- d) Tension as a motivating force for gathering support for a cause. Having a 'common enemy' can be a necessary force in galvanizing support for or opposition to co-management. Trying to understand and empathize with the perspectives of opposing groups can be counter-productive in achieving a group's short-term goals.
  - e) Differing values and principles amongst proponents and opponents of co-management.
  - f) Lack of incentives for some groups to negotiate. Groups whose values and goals have historically and currently been implemented through government policies and plans have few incentives for participation amongst.
  - g) Immediate issues and pressure to resolve them. The direct and immediate pain being experienced by participants, such as loss of livelihood, bankruptcy, and social problems such as high suicide rates and drug/alcohol/physical abuse in their communities needed some attention. Faced with those circumstances, participants tend to react either self-destructively or in a confrontational manner.
- These sources of tension can undermine the essence of co-management, which is finding 'win/win' solutions through collaborative partnerships that enable all parties to adapt to change and uncertainty. Further research is necessary on how tension and conflict interact with building co-management.

#### **5.2.3.4 Stage IV: Receiving the external mandate**

- The evolutionary approach in Stages I-III provides 'stepping stones' for building an external mandate. Most importantly, it provides a foundation of support, commitment, experience, and relationships within the area and a network of partnerships with groups outside the area.
- Receiving an external mandate is time sensitive in terms of maintaining and building on energy and momentum in the area.
- Further propositions about this stage, which is currently underway, are recommended for future research.



## 5.3 Representation

### 5.3.1 Representation Profile

WCSA was initially comprised of interested members of the community. Membership was open and directors were chosen at an Annual General Meeting (AGM) according to voting procedures within the British Columbia *Societies Act*. At some point, 'appointments' from First Nations and communities arose for director seats, though formally directors still had to be chosen at the AGMs. This was not a conscious choice of the organization, but resulted when participants who were elected in other forums stopped being elected and chose to pass on all their public duties to their replacements.

Nuu-chah-nulth and local government representatives were eventually officially appointed in order to give more of a formal mandate to RAMS. Sectoral support for non-government representatives was also recognized in order to raise the profile of RAMS as more than just a group of volunteers.

The RAMS Board had a three-member executive to chair meetings, guide staff, and perform other related functions. These were Richard Watts of the Nuuchahnulth Tribal Council, Rose Davison and later Tom Pater and Jim Levis from regional districts, and Dan Edwards from the WCSA. WCSA/RAMS also convened technical review committees and working groups to provide advice to Directors on certain issues.

Both WCSA and RAMS Board's represented the scope of the organizations' geographic area, and directors held considerable experience and knowledge about the area and its history.

When formal negotiations commenced to establish an external mandate for a co-management body in the area, representation in that process was formally convened by

the Federal, Provincial, Nuu-chah-nulth, and local governments, but was organized by the independent process manager.

### **5.3.2 Representation Results**

WCSA and RAMS faced four main challenges regarding those who sat on their Boards of Directors. These were: capturing the benefits of a 'good citizens' model of representation while recognizing the realities and benefits of a 'sectoral/political' model; recognizing the unique status of First Nations; issues associated with representing a very broad number and array of constituents in decision-making; and issues associated with conflict of interest and technical information.

#### **5.3.2.1 'Good citizens vs. Sectoral representative'**

Having sat through numerous planning processes (related to forestry and land-use planning) in Clayoquot Sound and elsewhere, many WCSA and RAMS members recognized the relative advantages and disadvantages of 'good citizens' and 'sectoral representatives' models. In a 'good citizens' model individuals bring their interest, experience, and knowledge to the table as individuals only and do not officially represent a defined group through some democratic selection process. In a 'sectoral representative' model, a Board director comes to the table through an official appointment process within their constituency.

WCSA/RAMS found that one benefit of a 'good citizens' model is that people participated out of interest and commitment, not because they were appointed or paid.

Tom Pater (pers. comm. 2003) states,

People were there because they were interested, not because they were assigned to go. It goes back to some original stimulus—a vision that was fed and nurtured by people and actions and luck.

Participants had a common desire to change from status quo approaches, commitment to common principles and values reflecting principles of sustainable aquatic management, and a willingness to accept management responsibilities. As noted under Geographic Scope above, participants' sense of pride, identity and commitment were essential factors in their motivation to build co-management. It was very advantageous to have their breadth of experience and knowledge of the region, as participants tended to 'wear a number of hats' in their communities and not be solely attached to a particular sector or narrow viewpoint.

A primary disadvantage, however, was that a good citizens model did not bring the kind of formal political weight and constituency needed for an organization to be taken seriously by external governments and to have wider support for its vision and values (Field notes 1997). WCSA/RAMS recognized that an advantage of the sectoral representative model is that representatives bring the political weight of that appointment to bear on decisions made by the group. They also are more accountable to communicating with a defined constituency. But there are at least five disadvantages. First, and most significantly, sectoral representatives tend to be more focused on their sectoral self-interest than on the principles and goals of the organization. This is the most significant problem and the one WCSA/RAMS was established to address. Wilf Caron (pers. comm. 2003) notes some of the issues associated with sectoral thinking as follows:

Well if there is no will within people who are beholden to sectoral interests to move from the positions, you are dead to begin with. And I think that within the different federal and provincial agencies there's too many people who are beholden to sectoral interests and they have been given their instructions. I don't think that I'm being paranoid about this, I think there is some foundation to this. So, there is . . . never mind accepting, there is reluctance even to consider [the broader community], because you don't like to have your [sectoral] way of thinking upset by having an alternative put before you.

I see the continuation of the deterioration of the situation by . . . I personally call it the last man standing theory, that nobody believes it's going to happen to them. That I will always have somehow a favoured position that I will be the last man standing. That when you narrow your interests down to such a point, you think that you can always dodge the bullet by there will be somebody there to protect you. It can only be a lack of consideration for the community. There is no community involvement in sectoral interests.

Thing is we live here. We don't have a place to go to. I'm not going to troll for Atlantic salmon in New Brunswick. I don't have the capacity, I don't have the desire to do it. But I have the interest to protect what is here. And in cases where there is diminishment of resources is to make best use of it, is to oblige to make a better use out of it.

A second disadvantage of the sectoral model is that people are often appointed who do not have interest or background in the issues and may not do the work of communicating with constituents. Third, this model tends to slot people into a 'single interest' mind-set rather than operating from different interests and perspectives. Fourth, appointments are subject to political manipulation. Fifth, sectoral representatives generally expect compensation for their time (Field notes 1997, 2000).

The following comments by Dan Edwards (pers. comm. 2002) highlight the dilemma of balancing the disadvantages of a sectoral representatives model with the advantages of a good citizens approach:

WCSA's initial Board of Directors was done through trying to be widely representative through individuals from the community who were interested and had energy. Then we went through an open voting process to accept people, under *Societies Act* procedures. There was a shift at some point—to native appointments and municipal appointments—but our actual mandate was to have people voted in and voted out if there were more people who wanted to be directors than there were seats. It comes down to how much interest there is in the community. There are people that just love going to meetings and being on Boards of Directors. They supposedly represent community but is she the best person for the job, is she talking to people about what is going on? Most groups behind her don't know what is going on. Same as someone like XXX, who are weak in going back to their organization even though they theoretically have a comprehensive democratic policy development process in the organization.

The appointment thing wasn't helpful. The trouble with it is that when we first started, people were there because they wanted to be there. You get a lot more truly interested people. Sometimes there were people like Bob Walton who had both interests [municipal council appointment and interest/participation in fisheries], but then he leaves and you get someone like XXXX appointed [with no interest in fisheries or the real issues].

At some point you want to have a broad variety of interests, but I don't think it is helpful to be all that specific around sectoral representation. Because at the fundamental community level, any person has a number of hats and interests that they wear. So the sectoral stuff is not close to people's lives the closer you get to community.

We had long discussions in the negotiation process about the validity of a board that was appointed as to one that was struck by a democratic voting process. There are valid concerns. The problems with appointment processes is also where governments will appoint people who will get along with government.

I don't know what the resolution of it is, to tell you the truth. There is a need for democratically elected representatives to stop where people get in and entrench themselves and refuse to move and get rid of democratic process in order to keep themselves there. One of the solutions that was developed [in the negotiations to establish an external mandate for an Aquatic Management Board] was having a wide enough spectrum on the appointment process—having four governments at that level so that it would be a fair enough process.

The model negotiated for the Aquatic Management Board (AMB) attempted to resolve this dilemma by trying to capture the advantages of each model while minimizing its disadvantages. Representatives applied for a seat on the AMB through an open call for applicants and were chosen based on a range of characteristics, including 'broad base of support or constituency' and 'commitment to the AMB's vision and principles.' This tried to attract people from within sectors who had political weight within those sectors and who were committed to the AMB's vision and principles. The selection committee was made up of Federal, Provincial, Nuu-chah-nulth, and local governments to avoid political appointments.

Many of the people who stepped forward as 'good citizens' during WCSA and RAMS were representatives of different organizations. Some of this happened naturally,

but it required the kind of background relationship building described in the previous section on Mandate. In RAMS case, these individuals were asked to formalize their participation through official appointments in order to give more legitimacy and weight to the process. RAMS continued to try to find people within different sectors who were oriented towards its principles and goals and who could show leadership within their groups. Darren Deluca (pers. comm. 2003) discusses the advantages to having 'good citizens that were influential in the area:

It was a good citizen model with industry expertise. RAMS accepted who showed up and who showed an interest. You have to want to be there. [Some] bureaucrats are there because they have to be there for defending their turf—they are there for all the wrong reasons. The good citizen model brings motivation and interest to the table but you also have to have influence. We did everything through influence and the peer base behind you that you bring with you, otherwise you cant get the job done. You have to be able to carry influence with your constituency.

Both WCSA and RAMS benefited and suffered from not having powerful industry or sector groups on their Boards (such as the Fisheries Vessel Owners Association, BC Seafood Alliance, etc). These groups were mainly based outside the region and were mostly opposed to WCSA and RAMS' vision and goals. On the one hand, their lack of participation may have been a limiting factor to WCSA/RAMS' ability to implement its decisions. Governments would weigh WCSA and RAMS submissions against those of these other groups, and in very few cases did they implement a WCSA/RAMS decision. On the other hand, the participation of these groups may have challenged both organizations' ability to arrive at decisions. Neither WCSA nor RAMS faced any significant problems with obstructionist Board members or destructive sectoral self-interest and almost always reached consensus.

There were several other filters that helped constrain destructive self-interested behaviour within the group. For example, it was limited because the people involved were very committed, thick-skinned, and blunt; they were quick to pick up on narrow

agendas and had a low tolerance for obstructionism. Also, RAMS had a formal code of conduct included in its Constitution, which stated that participation in the organization was conditional on working towards its principles and goals and on certain standards of conduct. This meant that 'good citizens' could still participate. At one point RAMS had over 25 people attending meetings without major distraction or incident (Field notes 1998).

WCSA and RAMS blended the advantages of 'sectoral' and 'good citizens' models by ensuring that everyone was focused on the principles and goals. One of the main slogans arising from the 1997 Common Ground Conference was 'leave your agenda at the door', and this carried on as a major driving principle of RAMS. One member described it as the operational definition of 'lisaak', or Respect (Darren Deluca, pers. comm. 2002). This commitment is what consistently allowed diverse representatives to find a balance between their sectoral interests and the organizations' interests. It is also what made it obvious when a person had a 'hidden' agenda that h/she was trying to promote—it stuck out like a sore thumb because the dominant culture of the group was so focused on honesty about agendas and moving beyond them. Put another way, the culture of the organization, as created by its participants, simply did not have much space for people working outside its principles and goals. This was partially due to the participants' awareness that it was the only way they could continue to move forward together. Don Hall (pers. comm. 2002) described this when discussing representation:

Everyone realized that they had a common objective even through they disagreed on a lot of issues—particularly commercial, recreational, and AFS [Aboriginal harvesting] issues. People that were interested in problems were there to do something about it and they recognized early on that there was more to be gained by working together than doing separate things. If they were going to make some kind of change they needed to work together.

As far as examples... remember the Uchucklesaht [First Nation] and the issue about their hatchery and funding. That was an example where people put aside their self interest or sectoral interest. We had our technical committee that had reviewed HRSEP and FsRBC salmon projects. The [Uchucklesaht proposal regarding a hatchery at] Henderson didn't score that well and WCSA/RAMS expected to take some heat [when it went before the RAMS Board for review and approval]. But Charlie [Uchucklesaht representative on RAMS] didn't push the sector interest thing at the meeting. He put aside self-interest to help the process move along, which was neat. That moment stands out.

Another example captures the subtle and intuitive nature of how representatives were reminded to stay focused on the principles and goals of the organization. I tell the story based on my notes at the time and provide comments made in hindsight in parentheses. RAMS had funds through Fisheries Renewal BC to carry out salmon renewal projects. Normally a portion of these funds was set aside to carry out projects of benefit to the region as a whole. A new member of the group suggested that RAMS undertake a project to 'audit' its projects to see if they were being effective from a biological standpoint. Different members raised some concerns about spending money on a 'process' project rather than projects that would actually show some tangible results, given the likelihood they would not be able to tell if the projects were effective or not. (These were standard comments to test the validity of the proposal—at this point I didn't see the concerns raised as being significant). The new person got up to get some coffee and came back to the table but did not sit down. The person remained standing and proceeded to speak very strongly about the benefits of this project. (It became obvious to almost everyone at this point, without anyone saying anything or even necessarily being totally aware of it, that the person had some kind of ulterior motive. His/her body language was about forcing the decision on the group, rather than having a balanced discussion to weigh the pros and cons and find a solution that worked for everyone). More discussion ensued, with people asking different questions of the new person, raising different concerns, or raising support for the concept. There was a much



lengthier discussion on the topic than normal for similar topics. Ultimately people accepted the validity of the project, based on the support it got from other respected members of the group about the project fitting well within its goals. The new member tried to move on to the next meeting item. Someone then brought up the issue of who would be hired to do the project. The new person said 'they knew of someone appropriate and would take care of it' and again tried to move on to the next topic. The person's body language—shuffling papers, looking at watch—suggested they were trying to rush past the issue. (The group had circled around until it uncovered the hidden agenda—the proposal was obviously more about who would do the project than about the project getting done). One of the members who supported the project then suggested that a certain consultant with whom people were familiar be hired and that he would contact the person on his/her availability. Before the new member could object, everyone approved the direction and the chair moved on to the next topic. The new person looked somewhat stunned and defeated despite the fact that the project had been approved. (The group, having uncovered the hidden agenda (hiring someone the person knew) was able to keep the proposal focused on its benefits to the group's goals and principles) (Field notes 1999).

Most people in the group do not recall this event, as it was a minor topic of little importance to them. Their reaction to a hidden agenda from newer members of the group was often subtle, non-confrontational, and intuitive. Where a member had been part of the group for longer, a hidden agenda was brought out much more quickly, normally with humour and a reminder about 'leaving agendas at the door' or 'I thought we were going to focus on principles here.' Where a non-member of the group came to a meeting with a hidden agenda, the group was normally more blunt and confrontational, being very sensitive to people from outside the area with agendas.

### **5.3.2.2 Recognizing the unique status of First Nations**

All participants recognized the critical importance and value of the initiative being a partnership between First Nations and other residents, as noted throughout this chapter. Tom Pater (pers. comm. 2003) notes how significant and uncommon the partnership was:

the principle of racial inclusivity was an inspiration. That drove people to think more broadly, less narrow. It forced people to kind of check their baggage. It's still pretty unusual, that cross cultural body that works together as well as RAMS did.

But while everyone recognized that it was necessary and valuable, there were two difficult issues regarding First Nations participation: how to protect minority interests in decision-making and how to recognize their unique status as governments. To address the first issue, WCSA had a 50/50 split of representation on its Board and implemented a 'double majority' voting procedure that required both a majority of all Board and a majority of First Nations Board members. RAMS did not have any allocated seats and operated by consensus, which meant that First Nations could withhold consensus if their interests were not being addressed (consensus was defined as unanimous consent of all participants). Neither organization encountered circumstances where this became an issue.

Cliff Atleo (pers. comm. 2001) described the reasoning behind First Nations comfort with a less defined approach in the context of representation on the Aquatic Management Board, once again highlighting the importance of focus on principles and goals, where he states:

We initially proposed in an interim measure document that we have equal representation on a management board. However, that was five years ago, and as negotiations progressed, we realized that it was not important to have equal voice, if everyone buys into the principles we have adopted. Our whole approach is to manage aquatic resources so that we can have them forever. That is, the resources come first for a change. We have worked very hard at providing the understanding to our non-aboriginal

people of our historical governance and the principles which guide them. Namely, there are two main ones: Hishtuk-ish ts'awalk, meaning all things are one and connected, and lisaak, meaning respect all things. Other user groups, on the West Coast of Vancouver Island, have accepted these principles, along with others, such as openness, inclusivity, and the precautionary principle. We now have a 16 member board, made up of two appointees from the Nuuchahnulth Tribal Council; two from Canada; two from British Columbia; and two from the Regional Districts and Municipalities; and there are eight members from at large, representing aboriginal commercial fishermen, non-aboriginal commercial fishermen, sport fishermen, environmental groups, tourism, the fish processing industry, aquaculture, and the Union movement in fisheries. All have bought into the principles which guide the Board. We have four aboriginal representatives. This number is not of concern, as long as everyone supports the principles, which has the resources coming first.

Mr. Atleo mentioned on other occasions (pers. comm. 2000) that the consensus nature of Board decision-making (as opposed to voting) influenced First Nations' comfort with this approach.

Related to this issue was the challenge of addressing the unique status of First Nations as governments. Some people inside and outside the region did not accept that First Nations had status as governments and still referred to and treated First Nations as stakeholders. This was not acceptable to First Nations, who considered themselves on the same level (if not above) BC and Canada. Fortunately, BC and Canada had formally recognized in the Treaty process that a 'government to government' relationship existed with First Nations. This did not resolve the underlying differences of opinion but did allow groups to move past the issue when it arose. For instance, in negotiations to build the Aquatic Management Board, the difference between stakeholders and governments needed to be resolved when it came to who was signing official agreements. First Nations wanted to be on the same footing as BC and Canada (signatories to the agreements) and some people in BC, Canada, and other groups initially thought First Nations should be stakeholders (not signing) (Field notes 1999). The 'government to government' relationship pointed towards their role as signatories, and so they were

described as a 'party' and 'co-convenor' of the process with BC and Canada. When a Joint Policy Framework to guide negotiations was ratified, it was ratified as an expression of Federal, Provincial, and Nuu-chah-nulth government policy. Similarly, when the Terms of Reference were signed, they were signed by Federal, Provincial, Nuu-chah-nulth, and local governments.

The issue of First Nations' status as a government also arose in AMB negotiations in terms of who were the final decision makers. The AMB was only granted authority to make recommendations to external authorities. Were First Nations represented in the decision-making process reviewing the AMB's recommendations? This question touched on the sovereignty of First Nations, which was undefined in Treaty negotiations or legal cases. It would have been a 'deal-breaker' in AMB negotiations as BC and Canada were not willing to fetter the authority of their Ministers under the Constitution. After lengthy discussion, the Nuu-chah-nulth accepted the Ministers' final authority (without prejudice to their stance on the issue in Treaty negotiations), knowing that they had to move forward and under the belief that the Ministers would rubber stamp Board recommendations because of the quality of and support for the recommendations.

### ***5.3.2.3 Addressing representation in relation to a wide range of issues***

A major dilemma faced by RAMS was how to represent the variety of aquatic uses, issues, and users facing the area. With over 36 commercially harvested species and over ten different sectors with even more kinds of uses, it was impossible for RAMS to ensure that affected groups were represented on its Board. To address this RAMS held meetings in different communities and produced communications materials such as newsletters. Participants and staff gave regular updates at a variety of meetings. Consequently RAMS decisions and approaches were rarely challenged within the area.

However, the time and resource required for regular communication were significant and presented a consistent challenge for RAMS.

The challenge of getting input and support around numerous issues gave rise to RAMS 'sub-committee' concept, where the main board would play an oversight, facilitation, coordination, and administration role, and then sub-committees would be formed to address specific issues, such as clam management, shellfish aquaculture development, salmon renewal and allocation. The sub-committees (and associated workshops, open houses, etc.) offered opportunities for people interested in the issues to participate.

The main problem that arose in this scenario was the time and energy required to convene sub-committees, and the lack of initial commitment to RAMS principles and goals within the sub-committees. Some people were unfamiliar with WCSA or RAMS and had not benefited from the activities that bound it together. To address this, RAMS included several representatives from their Board on sub-committees to ensure consistency and focus on RAMS principles and goals. However, as previously noted in the Mandate section, it takes a great deal of time to build an internal mandate in a group. Normally sub-committees were brought together over specific tasks. To be inclusive, governments and groups outside the region were involved. This meant that it was much more difficult to build an internal mandate. The Clam Board, for example, was formed via negotiations amongst governments—it was granted an external mandate. It has struggled over issues for the past five years, mainly because of conflicting visions for the fishery and varying commitments towards 'leaving agendas at the door' (Roger Dunlop, pers. comm. 2002). In other words, it has been slow to develop an internal mandate. It also faces funding challenges.

#### **5.3.2.4 Addressing conflict of interest and technical information**

A final challenge related to representation in WCSA/RAMS occurred where participants were in conflict of interest over certain decisions or where decisions required a significant degree of technical information. To address conflict of interest, WCSA/RAMS had standard guidelines requiring directors not to participate in decisions from which they might personally benefit. They also formed technical review committees to provide recommendations. To address highly technical issues, WCSA/RAMS formed working groups or technical committees. For instance, in funding salmon renewal projects for the area, RAMS sent out a public call for proposals. RAMS directors represented some of the First Nations or communities who might apply. Some of the projects were likely to involve technical issues. Proposals were therefore reviewed by a technical review committee including local and external staff. The review committee used criteria established by RAMS Board that reflected their principles and goals, assigning scores to different criteria. The review committees' recommendations (which included recommendations on improving or refining the criteria and process) were then presented to the RAMS Board. The Board's roles were to ensure that the results reflected their principles and goals and to ensure that the overall distribution of funds reflected a rough equity between sub-regions in the area. The Board also had a conservation sub-committee and convened meetings in sub-regions to identify common projects that would benefit the entire region (Field notes 1998). This system worked well, with no complaints or issues arising over three years of operation.

#### **5.3.3 Case Study Propositions about Representation**

1. Co-management reflecting principles of sustainable aquatic management is more likely to be built if participants in the first several stages are from the area, represent its cultural and sectoral diversity, and have knowledge of its history and traditional management institutions.

2. If participants represent diverse interests and experiences in aquatic management but have a common desire to change from status quo approaches, common principles and values reflecting principles of sustainable aquatic management, and a willingness to accept management responsibilities, co-management reflecting principles of sustainable aquatic management is more likely to be built.
3. In the early stages of building co-management, a 'good citizens' approach to representation is effective at bringing out people from the community with energy and commitment towards the principles and goals of an organization and at building on local values, culture, capacity, and organizations.
4. If a regional organization wants to gain legitimacy and increased political weight, the 'good citizens' approach needs to be blended with a 'sectoral representation' approach.
5. It is not possible to make a proposition regarding the outcome of bringing representation from external powerful sectors into the organization. This is a subject for further research.
6. If the representatives in the organization are committed to 'leaving agendas at the door' and focusing on common principles and goals, a culture can arise that will limit self-interested behaviour and produce results that reflect the organization's principles and goals.
7. If a group member of the organization has partially defined legal status in relation to decision-making authority, a challenge is likely to arise regarding their role in relation to the group. The organization can address this dilemma through a mix of approaches, including decision-making rules protecting minority interests, focus on principles and goals, recognizing overarching government policy or laws that define the group's status, and negotiated strategies to move forward in the face of unresolved status that needs resolution in higher forums.
8. If there are numerous possible groups and issues to address, sub-committees are effective means of involving a broader number of participants. If sub-committees are to produce decisions in line with the organization's principles and goals, significant effort is needed in building an internal mandate within the sub-committee.
9. If participants communicate effectively with their 'constituencies' in order to solicit input and build support for agreements and directions, there is more likely to be support for building co-management. The time and effort required to undertake this communication is likely to present a challenge for participants. This challenge can be mitigated somewhat if participants have a high degree of legitimacy and trust as respected leaders in their communities.
10. Some decisions will likely involve a degree of conflict of interest among participants. This challenge can be reduced if there are clear conflict of interest guidelines and participants convene technical review committees to provide them with independent recommendations (see also the role of vision, principles and goals s.5.5).
11. Some decisions will likely involve detailed technical issues and information that can complicate decisions. This challenge can be reduced if participants have substantial local knowledge and expertise, have capable technical staff, or convene working groups to provide them with recommendations. (see also the role of vision, principles and goals s.5.5).

## 5.4 Decision-Making Rule

### 5.4.1 Profile about Decision-Making Rule

Both WCSA and RAMS had decision-making rules within their Constitutions.

**Table 8: RAMS' Decision Rule**

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- 5.1 The Society members will strive to make all decisions by consensus. In achieving consensus, the Society members will focus on the vision, goals, and purposes of the Society rather than personal or sectoral self-interest. If consensus cannot be reached, members may be asked to justify their arguments in relation to the vision, goals, and purposes of the Society. If the majority of other members are not satisfied that the arguments are justified, and a solution cannot be created, the issue will go to a 80% majority vote.
  - 5.2 Members may choose, by consensus, to use other procedures (voting, mediation, etc.) when necessary and/or appropriate.
  - 5.3 Members have only one vote, which may be issued verbally, by ballot, or by a show of hands.
  - 5.4 Members not present at meetings may not vote by proxy. However, they may make their interests known to the officers and ask how those interests were addressed in the decision-making process. (RAMS Constitution 1998)
- 

WCSA's decision rule was characterized by unanimous consent (defined here as consensus) and double majority (a 'double majority' voting procedure required both a majority of all Board and a majority of First Nations Board members). RAMS' decision rule is outlined in Table 8. It involved unanimous consent/consensus as the basic goal, but with an 80% vote as a fallback.

For most of its operations, RAMS did not use formal motions. After an issue had been discussed adequately, someone would propose wording that addressed people's main interests, and the wording would be changed or modified until there were no more comments. At that point, the chair normally asked if there was consensus or if there



were any objections. A hand signal developed over time that signified, 'OK, on to the next item.' Towards the end of its operations, RAMS started to use a formal motion process (a member 'moves' a resolution, the chair calls for discussion, chair calls for seconders, two members second the resolution, and it is approved). RAMS never voted on an issue, using consensus for each decision.

#### **5.4.2 Decision-Making Results**

Consensus was very important for WCSA and RAMS given their stages of development. Their members needed to build relationships and learn about each other's perspectives on issues in a safe and comfortable setting given the historic levels of mistrust and poor communication. It was important that all members felt they were on an equal footing and that they had a chance to express their interests in a comfortable setting. It was also important in keeping the group from jumping too soon into difficult, intractable issues. In the following interview excerpt, Dan Edwards (pers. comm. 2002) notes the importance of consensus and double majority to WCSA:

If consensus is the primary objective, it leads to full understanding of any particular issues. You can't have an educated discussion in other situations. There is a process of educated discussion around consensus. There is a process where issues arise to the top with consensus because they are of common value. The development of a multi-sectoral board that was consensus driven happened because of the recognition of the need for a framework to address issues. There were many examples [of the value of consensus]. ...

*Interview question: How did consensus or double majority affect people's ability to work together?*

Initially it created a space where people felt comfortable working together. Particularly native and non-native communities. There were a number of initiatives from the Federal government and Nuu-chah-nulth to have government to government discussions so at one government level there was push for separation and the use of double majority created a common space to work together on a number of issues that weren't governmental but were projects about social and economic issues. It created the space where people felt comfortable to work on certain issues

that would be agreed upon. So for fish farms it was never divisive because we never took a stance on it and instead created discussion forums around it.

Darren Deluca (pers. comm. 2002) reflects this same phenomenon in RAMS, when he states:

Early on when there were no relationships in RAMS, it [consensus] was important because consensus moves in baby steps and allowed people to move at a slow pace to build relationships. Later in the game, there was a lot of emotion and so people would stick around because they felt like they could be heard [through the consensus process].

The advantage was that everyone felt they were heard. Sometimes people would agree to a decision even if they disagreed with it they would adopt it because everyone agreed with it. They might have stuck with a position if it was voting. No one ever got alienated.

Maureen Sager (pers. comm. 2003) stated that it allowed people to be solution oriented rather than fall back into adversarial relations, and to learn more about others' perspectives:

It encouraged people to find a solution rather than to stick to their position—when you know that solving the problem is your aim rather than imposing the will of the majority on the minority.

...We'd start off with high levels of disagreement on some issues but then as you'd hear each other person's point of view, the different ways of looking at the issue, you'd gain an understanding of their point of view. It was a learning experience for all of us.

Don Hall (pers. comm. 2002) made a similar comment when stated,

The good part about it is that it developed more discussion around particular items instead of jumping to a vote—people ended up in agreement when the decision was made. People felt like they made positive movements forwards. In that kind of situation where people were working towards an end goal, there were not really any particular downsides to it.

The disadvantages of consensus were time, abuse of power, and the 'lowest common denominator' effect. Consensus was more time-consuming than voting because it invited all members to put forth their concerns verbally and then required that those concerns be addressed. It was more difficult to move through a multi-item agenda

in a day, and there were frequently many items to address. In addition, members shared an equal amount of power in that they all had a 'veto' over any decision by withholding consensus. This power could be abused where a member used a veto as a means of protecting a self-interested agenda rather than working towards a common solution. This problem became apparent in groups such as the Barkley Shellfish Aquaculture Committee or the Clam Board, where members would withhold consensus over decisions that supported the Board/Committee's Terms of Reference but did not support their particular position. Linked into this problem were situations where members simply did not understand a problem or issue in enough depth to feel comfortable making a decision. While at WCSA and RAMS there was generally enough trust in those who knew about an issue, in other circumstances decisions would get bogged down in requests for further information or discussion. Dan Edwards (2002) notes this phenomenon:

The danger of consensus is moving to lowest common denominator stuff. So this is where principles become very important. You have to have really good understanding of principles that are driving why you are working together at all. So if your mandate is to deal in an integrated fashion and ecosystem management and all that and that is not made really clear and understood by everyone, then consensus will be diminished to projects and policies that are not controversial, not seen to step on toes, and you'll be driven to deal with stuff that will not affect anyone. That has happened over and over in processes where there is not a clear understanding of why you are there in the first place.

Neither RAMS nor WCSA ever used voting, though it was recognized that there might be some instances where it was necessary (for example, in administrative matters where an obstructionist member might block the Societies' ability to carry out basic functions in a timely manner or at times when someone might join the group with the hidden purpose of slowing it down or sabotaging its ability to make decisions). As noted above, RAMS became more formalized in its decision-making process towards the end of its operations. This change came mainly from staff at the time, who wanted greater

clarity in the minutes as to what had been agreed upon, who made proposals, who objected, etc. Part of the reasoning expressed by staff was that it provided greater legal protection for those directors not in support of certain decisions and also that it provided more direction to staff. Darren Deluca (pers. comm. 2002) states:

[In consensus] you'd get a generic action that wasn't very specific. It might be hard to get on the ground, so there was lots of room for staff to interpret. It was good at high-level direction but hard to transfer into application—how do you take it and make it work? I'd say in some cases consensus was good for policy. But for a legal sense it had to be more specific. There needs to be a clear motion, seconded by someone, a vote, all that. Consensus was good for larger actions. Motions were needed for more executive or administrative tough decisions. Consensus won't work that well for tough decisions; it has to go to a democratic vote.

WCSA and RAMS did not have separate forums for dispute resolution. Neither organization needed this except, ironically, in the case of a dispute between the two. The dispute revolved around what funds were owed between the two organizations and resulted from WCSA's financial troubles with HRDC. The matter could not be resolved by simple accounting as opinions ranged from RAMS owing WCSA anywhere from several hundred to over twenty thousand dollars. In the end, as I was no longer working for either party at that time, I mediated a settlement between the two.

The settlement ended discussions on the issue but did not resolve some of the bitterness that arose in the dispute (Field notes 2001). Prevention, in the form of clearer accounting between the organizations, would have been a more effective dispute resolution mechanism. However, at a deeper level the dispute was not about the money so much as it was about WCSA needing help in its problems with HRDC. WCSA was undergoing a major crisis and was looking for people to help it. RAMS was hesitant to get involved because its staff believed that WCSA was at least partially responsible for the crisis but were not accepting any responsibility—essentially RAMS staff were not 'giving in' to what they perceived as WCSA's victim role. This view was not unanimously

held in RAMS, but RAMS Directors unanimously expressed concern about their organization spending all its energy and money trying to deal with the situation rather than continuing to fulfil its contractual and financial obligations and work towards AMB implementation. The complicated nature of the HRDC/WCSA/RAMS administrative relationship was extremely difficult for Directors to comprehend in the limited time available in meetings and appeared to be a 'black hole' that could easily pull RAMS down and put it at jeopardy. In the end WCSA felt abandoned by RAMS, and RAMS felt WCSA could not see RAMS perspective on the matter.

A dispute resolution mechanism was important in getting past the surface of the dispute so that both organizations could move on. But a deeper disagreement remained unresolved and may have been irreconcilable at the time. The irreconcilable nature of the dispute did not become an entrenched problem only because WCSA was no longer operating (other than to address its internal problems), so that RAMS and WCSA did not have to continue to interact on ongoing issues.

#### **5.4.3 Case Study Propositions about Decision-Making Rule**

1. In the initial stages of building co-management, rules that provide comfort and security to minority interests can be useful in building relationships and restraining the organization to a pace reflecting the capacity of its members.
2. As relationships, capacity, and trust grow in an organization, different rules may be employed for different kinds of decisions. If broad policy guidance is desired, then consensus can be useful. For more administrative and technical decisions or decisions requiring clear, firm, and detailed direction, voting may be useful.
3. An independent forum for resolving grievances and conflicts is useful and important in moving beyond certain disputes. However, if an issue arises in crisis circumstances or is the result of conflicting personalities, the issue may be irreconcilable for a time, even when a dispute resolution mechanism is in place.

## 5.5 RAMS and WCSA Vision, Guiding Principles, and Objectives

### 5.5.1 *Profile of WCSA's and RAMS' Vision, Guiding Principles, and Objectives*

WCSA was founded on the principle that healthy communities and healthy ecosystems are interconnected. The basic belief was that communities were socially and economically reliant on the health of local ecosystems and therefore had a strong incentive to steward them appropriately. If the social and economic link was cut, then communities would stop stewarding local resources and they would become vulnerable to the intrusion of outside interests with no real long-term stewardship incentives. Another aspect of this founding principle was that native and non-native communities were mutually reliant. Neither could exist in the current setting without the other, partially because of the critical mass needed to generate revenue to maintain basic infrastructure and services and partially because of the need to jointly address Federal and Provincial government policies undermining coastal community access to resources (Field notes 1997).

RAMS vision (written by staff) was that the ecosystems, communities, and individuals in their region achieve their inherent health and wealth for generations to come. The more detailed vision described in the May 1997 Common Ground Conference proceedings (1997), which carried through as the underlying vision of RAMS and WCSA work, had a number of key components. These were:

- Reconciliation and healthy relationships between First Nations and other communities within the context of a resolved Treaty
- Healthy community economies with strong access to local resources
- Healthy ecosystems

- Local management of local resources by local people.

RAMS founding principle was 'Hishtukish ts'awalk' (Everything is One). Roy Haiyupis, a late Nuu-chah-nulth elder, told the Scientific Panel for Sustainable Forest Practices in Clayoquot Sound (1995):

The Nuu-chah-nulth phrase 'hishtukish ts'awalk' (Everything is One) embodies sacredness and respect. Nothing is isolated from other aspects of life surrounding it and within it. This concept is the basis for the respect of nature that our people live with and also contributed to the value system that promoted the need to be thrifty, not to be wasteful, and to be totally conscious of your actual needs. . . . With respect for other life forms comes the Nuu-chah-nulth belief in the spirituality and sacredness of life and the earth and in a *oneness* between humans and the environment.

I interpreted RAMS' members understanding of this concept to be that the essence of respect is interacting in such a way as to produce a mutually beneficial or acceptable outcome. In order for this to happen, all parties must be willing to place the underlying needs of other groups and species on an equal footing and appreciate each other's subtleties and diverse perspectives. The basic term used at the May 1997 Common Ground Conference was that all parties must also be able to 'leave their baggage [agendas] at the door' and focus on jointly developing solutions that address common principles.

I also interpreted RAMS' members understanding of this concept to include looking after the resources, so that they would in turn look after communities and users. Looking after resources meant getting out of 'single-resource' management or looking at species or activities in isolation from other species and activities. That is, a key aspect of 'Hishtukish ts'awalk' meant trying to understand and account for the interconnections between species and uses by looking at the overall ecosystem (including humans).

This latter point reflects the Nuu-chah-nulth traditional governance model as a further foundation of RAMS. Nuu-chah-nulth refer to their traditional territories as 'Ha-

hoolthee' and to the chiefs of those territories as 'Hawiih.' The Hawiih are vested with a sacred responsibility to care for everything within their Ha-hoolthee (Ehattesah Tribe 1996). The concept of working with non-First Nations neighbours on common goals flowed from the understanding that these neighbours lived and worked in the Ha-hoolthee, and it was therefore the responsibility of the Hawiih to look after them (Simon Lucas, pers. comm. 1998). Similarly, the traditional governance system and its teachings underscored Nuu-chah-nulth commitment to the concept of stewarding the resource as the most basic duty and using benefits to care first for current and future generations of Ha-hoolthee residents and then for guests or visitors where surplus existed (Cliff Atleo, pers. comm. 1997). RAMS' detailed goals are outlined in Table 9.

**Table 9: RAMS' Goals**

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- a) Conserve and protect aquatic ecosystems in the region.
- b) Restore aquatic resources and habitat that have been adversely affected by human activity and natural events.
- c) Respect and protect aboriginal uses of aquatic resources.
- d) Provide viable sustainable fisheries for residents of the region, in accordance with the federal government's obligation to implement the adjacency principle and meet domestic and international obligations.
- e) Realize the long-term social, cultural and economic benefits from the comprehensive management and harvesting of aquatic resources.
- f) Promote sustainable economic development and diversification for communities in the region.
- g) Respect the knowledge of Nuu-chah-nulth First Nations, local governments, communities, fishermen, and individuals through active participation in managing regional aquatic ecosystems.
- h) Explore local management options to improve management of aquatic resources.
- i) Develop partnerships between First Nations, commercial and recreational industries, government resource managers and personnel, aquaculture industry, recreational users, and all others concerned with the management of aquatic ecosystems in the region.
- j) Assist Interim Measures Agreement negotiations to empower a regional aquatic management board that will exercise responsible joint management of aquatic ecosystems in the Nuu-chah-nulth/West Coast Vancouver Island region (hereinafter 'the region').



- k) Prepare and respond to policies that impact aquatic resources in the region.
  - l) Partner with other organizations undertaking aquatic management responsibilities or activities in the region to achieve the Society's vision, purposes and goals.
  - m) Facilitate the development of committees, cooperatives, corporations or other organizations to undertake certain management functions in conjunction with the Society.
  - n) Communicate to communities, industry, the federal and provincial governments, and the general public about the work of the Society and provide a public information function consistent with the Society's purposes (RAMS Constitution 1998).
- 

### **5.5.2 Vision, Principles and Goals Results**

RAMS' vision, principles, and goals fulfilled a number of functions that were critical to building co-management. For example, in the early stages of working together, they allowed participants to find common ground and move beyond their differences. As participants became more comfortable, they helped participants break mental habits and stay focused on the direction and rationale for the organization. They also allowed for greater efficiency in decision-making and in implementation of decisions or general directions. Further, they provided a focus of commitment that helped carry the organization past obstacles and challenges. Finally, they provided a dispute resolution mechanism in evaluating different options and proposals.

There were three elements of the vision, principles, and goals that allowed them to fulfil these functions successfully. The first was their characteristics, including a balance of flexibility and rigidity, difficulty manipulating them for a particular agenda, their simplicity and depth, and their ability to be embraced by participants. The second was participants' commitment to them. The third was the effort put into communicating them.

In the initial stages of co-management, when participants were ready to formalize their internal mandate and start working together, a common vision, principles, and goals

acted as a contract between members that outlined the underlying reasons why they were willing to cooperate and the rules by which they would operate. Darren Deluca (pers. comm. 2002) describes the importance of the principles to him and the group at the early stages of working together (and throughout the relationship) where he states:

In the beginning, the principles were the common ground that even if we didn't necessarily believe them, at least we understood them. They were sort of like the rules of the game. You could see where you were . . . . For myself I knew the game I was playing in. They were up front so I knew what they were.... [As cooperation developed] we always kept them top of the line—you didn't really see people go after each other—you had a bear hunter sitting with an environmentalist, which you don't see very often. . . . When it comes down to it, those [principles] would bind us. Amongst ourselves, we always had a high level of respect . . . . we wouldn't have survived without them. No way. What would have grounded us?

Having the mutual framework of a vision, principles, and goals allowed different groups to move ahead on issues. This was especially critical in the beginning stages of co-management when trust was low and past adversarial relationships hindered problem solving. Dan Edwards (pers. comm. 2002) reflects this where he states:

In the initial principles with WCSA they were pretty much frameworks for action rather than being led into being adversarial on every environmental issue. For instance we didn't want to get boxed into saying we can't do any logging in Clayoquot Sound. The principles provided a framework where people could develop solutions that were sustainable in all aspects of sustainability—social, economic, and environmental.

The vision, principles, and goals took on more depth in further stages of co-management as the organizations looked at them in relation to more detailed issues and actions. This rarely took the form of a major discussion or revisiting of the vision and principles but more often involved a reminder of or reference to them as being something on which WCSA/RAMS needed to stay focused. Maureen Sager (pers. comm. 2003) noted the following about their importance to co-management in RAMS:

Everyone that was on RAMS board accepted those principles. When you accept those principles it does force you to look at things in a different way. There were times when we had to be reminded about how

important respect was and what it meant when you had that as a guiding principle. And as far as the principle of Histukish ts'awalk, Everything is One, we had to remind each other constantly that we had to think in terms of ecosystem management, and because we are so used to treating species in isolation and managing them in isolation it was hard to break old habits and keep reminding ourselves that we had to think of these things as part of a whole, as part of an ecosystem. It was difficult too, it is difficult to manage things with ecosystem management so you always ended up having a lot of questions that you couldn't answer because the research isn't oriented that way either. I remember even scientifically trained people saying yes, but its not that easy to manage things by ecosystem.... [But] having that as a guiding principle forced us to... [laughing] at least pay lip service if nothing else to the idea of ecosystem management and to always keep it in mind, so if we had a new and developing fisheries for tanner crab, ask 'what difference is that going to make in the ecosystem?' Otherwise probably those kinds of questions wouldn't have arisen in our minds. But if you are used the idea of ecosystem management, then, if you have accepted that idea, if you've accepted Hishtukish ts'awalk, then you have to keep reminding yourself that you've got to think that way. I also think the idea of respect was quite important. You know, that sometimes you'd be tempted to fall into a kind of a stereotype way of thinking, but then you'd have to remind yourself that no, no, you have to listen respectfully, you couldn't just stop listening because you disagreed. And certainly people who are striving to go along with this principle of respect, it means that they are not so likely to insult each other.

As people developed a deeper common understanding of the vision, principles, and goals, their value grew in at least four ways. First, they allowed decisions to be made more efficiently. People had a stronger sense of unity and clarity around their general direction and purpose, thereby reducing the repetition of similar arguments or objections. Second, they allowed decisions to be implemented more efficiently. They gave staff greater ease and clarity in interpreting Board direction, which was important due to the often general nature of consensus decisions. One could say they provided a common 'wave length' for the different people in the organization, which allowed an easier and stronger flow from general policy direction to specific action and implementation (Field notes 1999).

The usefulness of a common vision, principles and goals also grew over time in that they gave people some focus of commitment to help carry them past obstacles and

challenges. Nuu-chah-nulth members often reminded the group to stay focused on them when different members expressed pessimism or despair. They were also used increasingly over time to refocus self-interest when it arose (within the organization or others). This happened both informally, where participants would jokingly remind each other if their agenda was too evident, or formally, where they provided a neutral, common means of assessing options, strategies, plans, or actions (whether from individuals, the group, or others).

This last function was critical from a practical perspective. What other mechanism exists for saying whether one option is better than another? What other tool exists to judge proposals in a way that gives consistent incentives for the proposals to work towards some broader direction? In the absence of a neutral 'arbitration' mechanism, there are few options other than to argue for the option that suits one's self-interest, with a third party ultimately acting as the neutral arbiter. If the third party has no clear principles, their decision is mainly one of personal preference. WCSA/RAMS saw this over and over with governments, who rarely used a clear framework to guide either their policy development or their assessment of different proposals (Field notes 1997-2002).

It is important to note that it was not just the existence and potential uses of principles that made them important in building co-management, it was also their particular characteristics. For example, Dan Edwards noted that, "the guiding principles have to be flexible enough that they don't drive you into a corner, but they also have to be inflexible enough that they give you some direction and meaning" (pers. comm. 2002). As well, the principles were not very open to manipulation for political agendas. In addition, there was only one of them (which became two) and they were simple yet

deep. Finally, they were principles that people could embrace in a more meaningful way. Darren Deluca (pers. comm. 2002) notes:

Principles can be used to drive political agendas, which corrupts the principles. There was some of that going on. Maybe this was the objectives, I can't remember . . . . There were two principles—and those didn't really have political connotations. Ecosystem management guided our function, and respect was that we'd treat each other properly. The respect thing was originally how we'll deal with each other, and it sort of got changed to respect for the environment. But I don't think that . . . I think that there was an important thing—we had two principles. We didn't have 87 principles. Now the [AM] Board has 12 principles—it was better to keep it simple. People don't really embrace principles like transparency. Principles have to be more something that people can embrace and be driven by.

It was hugely important that there were only two and they were really simple. Most of the stuff written by bureaucrats were more operational objectives. The [AM] Board should go back to those two principles. Ask everyone, 'Do you buy into them or not?' If you get into ecosystem management and respect, precautionary approach and other principles fall out of it. These kind of things [precautionary approach, transparency, etc.] are more like functions or end objectives.

Wilf Caron corroborates Mr. Deluca's statement that principles should be simple and understandable where he states,

[The current Aquatic Management Board] could throw out the terms of reference and the principles and go back to using those two same Nuu-chah-nulth phrases... The rest of it is just verbiage really, I mean if I respect you and the environment that is there, realizing the interconnectedness of everything else around, well those are the only principles that we need actually. The rest of it... a lot of that was to satisfy the lawyers.... How many times were we hung up by the legal staff of the Provincial and Federal governments as they laboured on how many angels could stand on the end of an adverb? It was incredible. More is not necessarily better.

In addition to these characteristics, the importance of people embracing the principles cannot be understated. It was not the simple existence of the vision, principles, and goals that helped people cooperate more effectively. Many people who attended the May 1997 workshop talked about the 'spirit' contained within the vision, principles, and goals that arose during the conference (Field notes 1997, 2000). It

invigorated and motivated people, transforming divisions, hesitations, and frustrations into common direction and will. This spirit was a necessary and fundamental part of the vision, principles, and goals. From what I saw of other organizations, words on paper that do not have any real spirit or commitment behind them do not motivate people. They end up getting manipulated to support people's agendas and there is no glue to hold the group together. Words that are not born from the spirit of commitment by the group are dry and have no heart or soul.

For instance, the vision statement that I wrote for a brochure ("... that the ecosystems, communities, and individuals in our region achieve their inherent health and wealth for generations to come") was accepted by RAMS (there was nothing significant about which to object) but seemed not to have an ounce of meaning to anyone other than me. It was not born out of the group's commitment and therefore was not vested with any spirit. Not one person ever talked about it or referred to it. Similarly, my definitions of respect in various documents shifted its meaning to reflect more about respect for the environment, which Darren Deluca notes above and which was a manipulation of the principles for a political agenda. In hindsight I recognize that this was outside of the spirit and principles of RAMS, despite the fact that the content was probably within the spirit of the organization if the group as a whole discussed it. Rather than being a point of common focus and motivation, it became a minor point of concern for some because it had not been discussed openly.

The challenge of building commitment to a common vision, principles, and goals was significant (as described above under s.5.2 Mandate). Open discussion, repeated reference, and explanation of the vision, principles and goals significantly enhanced their functions in the organization. It took a lot of time for new staff, members of the group, or others to understand them. Don Hall notes the importance of and reasoning behind Cliff

Atleo's consistent discussions of the principles and Nuu-chah-nulth foundations for RAMS and the Aquatic Management Board (AMB). He states:

In the early part of it, there were frequent lectures and instruction from Cliff and others about ha hoolthee and histukish ts'awalk—that kind of repetitive instruction from Cliff really did sink into people after awhile. He was so pleased when [DFO Minister] Anderson came and Rose Davidson [a local government representative] was up there talking. He said, "if you closed your eyes you couldn't tell if she was Nuu-chah-nulth or not." So people realized what he was saying. (Don Hall, pers. comm. 2002).

Personally, it took me several years to start to have some depth in my ability to communicate the vision and principles to others in a manner consistent with others in WCSA/RAMS. In fact, in writing this dissertation (almost six years after starting with WCSA/RAMS), I have realized that much of my intellectual understanding of the vision, principles, and goals had not come together in an integrated way for me until I was forced to write it down and try to make sense of it. This intellectual understanding doesn't speak to the deeper level of commitment that comes when one understands something from experience. As noted under Section 5.1, Geographic Scope and Representation, pride, identity, and commitment coupled with issue identification were significant factors in people's motivation to commit to WCSA/RAMS common principles and goals. Additionally, people were directly experiencing pain and were surrounded by decline. They had also had experiences of how things are interconnected through their activities harvesting or interacting with resources. As Simon Lucas (pers. comm. 1998) said to me once, "who feels it, knows it." My time with WCSA/RAMS gave me some of that experience, but if I am any indication, it took a lot of time and patience for participants to overcome this challenge in communication and understanding.

Without the benefit of experience, communicating the vision of WCSA and RAMS in such a way that other people might understand it in a deeper way was an evasive art. It did not involve telling the other person what he/she should think nor did it involve

speaking from a place of superiority. It needed to come from a much deeper place and required heightened awareness of the other person's state (Field notes 2001). It involved the genuine desire and ability to listen to and empathize with the other person's concerns and fears as a means of transforming them into some form of common action (Cecil Paul, pers. comm. 1998). Infusing a person with the vision of WCSA/RAMS was often more effective when they sat with the WCSA/RAMS group, where a 'group think' phenomenon seemed to happen, though this needed to be followed up by consistent individual conversations. When making presentations, different audiences would hear different people, and matching the right person to the right audience was an important consideration. Though I often wanted to be the speaker, I gradually realized I was under-qualified and overconfident in what I knew. It was much more important and effective that Board members conveyed their vision and understanding of the principles, while I talked more about our activities and strategies for implementing them. Communicating the vision, principles, and goals required considerable patience, time, commitment, and leadership from different Board members (Field notes 1999).

### **5.5.3 Case Study Propositions about Vision, Principles and Goals**

1. If an organization has a clear and simple common vision, principles, and goals reflecting common values, it is more likely to build and maintain co-management.
2. A vision, principles, and goals can fulfil the following key functions in building co-management.
  - Allowing participants to move forward in the early stages of working together
  - Helping participants stay focused on the original direction and rationale for the organization
  - Allowing for greater efficiency in decision-making and in implementation of decisions or general directions
  - Providing a focus of commitment that helped carry the organization past obstacles and challenges
  - Providing a dispute resolution mechanism in evaluating different options and proposals.



3. An organization is likely to fulfil these functions more successfully, where the vision, principles, and goals have the following three elements.
  - a) Their characteristics include a balance of flexibility and rigidity, difficulty manipulating them for any particular agenda, their simplicity and depth, and their ability to be embraced by participants.
  - b) Participants demonstrate commitment to them in their actions.
  - c) Effort is put into communicating them, including repeatedly referring to them, discussing their meaning, and explaining them internally and externally.

## **5.6 Facilitation and Leadership**

### **5.6.1 Facilitation Profile**

Neither WCSA nor RAMS had an external or local facilitator, except for certain events or larger workshops, such as the May 1997 Common Ground Conference. The only consistent facilitation (Craig Darling) was in negotiations with the Federal and Provincial governments. Instead, WCSA and RAMS relied on co-chairs and staff to play facilitative roles. The results below therefore include both a discussion of professional external facilitation with internal facilitative roles.

### **5.6.2 Facilitation Results**

WCSA and RAMS members recognized the importance of facilitation in consensus processes. Wilf Caron (pers. comm. 2003) states,

[Consensus] is a foundation but it does not work unless you have somebody there as a guide that knows how the consensus principles work.

But WCSA and RAMS members did not believe facilitation should always be from outside the group. They found that external facilitation influences a group's ability to converse in a comfortable, productive manner, mainly through the technical knowledge of the facilitator, her/his understanding of the principles guiding the process, her/his

familiarity and longevity in the region, and her/his perceived neutrality. The issue of neutrality raised issues of the role of the facilitator and the extent to which they should act as leader or mediator.

In the early stages of WCSA and RAMS, I rarely acted as facilitator because participants did not feel I was ready for this role. Over time I chaired sub-committees and occasionally at main board meetings. Based on feedback I received over time on my performance and the performance of other external facilitators (Field notes 1997-2002), several issues were evident with respect to the way facilitation influences co-management. First, for most discussions the facilitator needs a basic understanding of the issues in order to help the group identify solutions. Participants were often making detailed arguments or assertions around facts and figures associated with, for instance, a particular fishing gear or licence category. Without understanding the issues under study or their history, it was difficult to help participants see potential solutions that might get beyond impasses. As an example, when talking about whether or not a wild clam licence should be transferable, it was necessary that I understand fully the advantages and disadvantages of licence transferability in order to understand better the interests and concerns of different participants. With an initial absence of such understanding, I found myself drawn towards arguments that were either clearly presented or aligned with my personal biases. Too much time and energy went into trying to educate me as a facilitator in a meeting and not enough time and energy went into finding solutions. Part of this was a simple function of limited time within and between meetings.

It was also important for a facilitator to understand the role of principles in achieving consensus. In several sub-committees, a few participants were very effective at raising arguments against options that reflected the committee's guiding principles. Their arguments were logical and well presented, and were designed to either preserve

the status quo or push a particular self-interested position. But, as mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, all options involve trade-offs and disadvantages. Principles were one of the few ways to choose between competing options because they provided a neutral criteria for their assessment, as discussed previously (see s.5.5 Vision, Principles and Goals). When facilitators did not keep focusing on the principles of the group, they were unable to move the group forward on meaningful issues. In the absence of easy consensus, facilitators often steered discussions to non-controversial items that showed 'progress' during the day and set agendas in such a way as to avoid addressing difficult issues. The opportunity for meaningful debate under these circumstances was stifled or glossed over. Some participants believed that facilitation generally slowed processes down for this reason (Cliff Atleo, pers. comm. 1998). Referring back to the clam licence transferability issue above, after unsuccessfully trying to deal with it numerous times and avoiding it on agendas, the clam board was finally able to move past it when their secretary/coordinator helped them use their guiding principles to score and rank different options. The secretary/coordinator played a facilitative role that was important but could do so because of his technical understanding of the issue and understanding of how to use principles to arrive at decisions.

Familiarity and longevity in the region or with a process was an important characteristic of successful internal facilitation. As to be discussed later in this chapter (s.5.9 Trust and Consensus Building), trust was built through committed actions over time. An internal facilitator's effectiveness grew as he/she gained the trust of participants. Participants were more willing to share information and let the facilitator play more of a mediation/staff support role. The facilitator would do more work between meetings, helping participants generate options and potential solutions and testing their

acceptability (Field notes 1999, 2000). Longevity and familiarity was also important in understanding the history of participants and their past relations. In some cases participants knew each other for years and had many interactions. What they were talking about on and under the surface was different, so that finding solutions was not so much about the issues as the personalities (Maureen Sager, pers. comm. 2003). In the clam licence example, at least two participants had a hard time hearing the concerns or interests of others because they did not respect the person from past interactions (Field notes 1999).

External facilitators' communication styles were important, especially with First Nations and other remote community residents. Most facilitators came from urban areas and worked in an urban context. I noted many times that these facilitators' jargon and styles were not inclusive for local participants and tended to favour those comfortable with bureaucratic or academic styles of communication. I also noted that these facilitators often did not understand or misinterpreted what was being said (Field notes 1998, 2000, 2001). This became clearer to me after several years working in the region, as I began to understand what I had been misinterpreting or excluding earlier as a facilitator.

There was a positive difference in communication style when WCSA/RAMS had external or internal facilitators who had familiarity and longevity in the region and at least partially represented the cultural diversity of participants. Darren Deluca (pers. comm. 2002) notes,

It was good that we played the facilitation role in communities. It was very important that facilitators were from the community. We knew people and could call them by name. It opened people up and kept things running smooth. It bought us time—it got things going right from the start rather than no one trusting the process and taking awhile to warm up to it. [RAMS] Co-chairs acted as facilitators and that was balanced—on non-native side that there was a huge concern about the native juggernaut. Like in the shellfish process—it was good to have a

white guy who was a little bit of a redneck to give these guys comfort. And same on the native side to have Josie [Osborne, Nuu-chah-nulth biologist] there to give them some comfort too.

WCSA and RAMS experience demonstrated that having local co-chairs act in a facilitative role was appropriate in meetings that were predominantly local. However, it is important to note that local facilitation worked well in the WCSA and RAMS circumstance because local leaders were experienced and effective at playing a facilitative role and had experienced staff support when needed (Field notes 1999, 2000).

It was less suitable for local co-chairs to act as facilitators where detailed technical discussions were occurring, in large conference style meetings, or when engaged in longer-terms negotiations with external governments. For technical discussions, co-chairs often handed the facilitation role to a trusted staff member. For large conference style meetings, external facilitators with appropriate experience were hired. For instance, the facilitators who worked on the Common Ground conference in 1997 had a depth of experience working with similar communities elsewhere and a solid reputation (Jim Morrison had extensive experience working in rural areas and with First Nations. Doug Kelly was a First Nations person also with experience living and working in rural areas). They were extremely helpful in designing and facilitating the conference with a local steering committee, and it is doubtful anyone in the region could have filled their role due the experience and neutrality needed (Dan Edwards, pers. comm. 1997). Independent facilitation from outside the area was also more important in the context of negotiations to implement an Aquatic Management Board. Dan Edwards (pers. comm. 2002) notes that originally there was a divergence of opinions on whether independent professional facilitation was needed:

My perspective is different than Cliff's [Atleo]. Facilitation is necessary once you had enough powerful players involved somewhat working

towards the same objectives but different or unclear ideas of what objectives were. At one point Donna [Petrachenko] said the Board would be negotiated and sent Chris [Drågseth] and others in, then at that point there are a whole bunch of different people—some of whom have been directed to be there and others are there because of issues—and at that point I said we needed facilitation and got shit from Cliff because they [the Nuu-chah-nulth] saw it as being unnecessary. They saw professional facilitation as being a way to slow down processes and I saw it as a way to move forward. Maybe he was right—but we can't see this now because we did it with facilitation. My sense was that it would fall apart and people would walk out of the room quickly.

Most other RAMS' members came to a similar conclusion about the value of professional facilitation in the context of the negotiations to establish an external mandate. For instance:

I think we would have had a very difficult time if we didn't have Craig Darling [the facilitator] there. He was able to use full diplomatic skills to move us the right path, and make progress, in a forward direction, without, on his part anyway, making any backward steps (Wilf Caron pers. comm. 2003)

Nuu-chah-nulth did not want to see a facilitated process and they were pretty resistant to having someone come in and do what they thought could be done amongst the group. I didn't have a strong view when it started but having facilitated assistance helped the whole process along. Sometimes through meetings and negotiations, and through discussions between meetings, Craig [Darling, facilitator] helped the Province and Fed[eral] governments through some sticky points they had to deal with. There were better end results with facilitation. At times the particular style of facilitation may have seemed like it took longer-- the process stuff that you needed to get through to end up with a better agreement. I'd give him the benefit of the doubt but it seemed painful at the time.

Facilitation provided a bit more surety about the outcome. You might have gotten their quicker without it but there was a bigger risk that it would have broken down. It was a good idea to have a facilitated process.

RAMS had a clear objective so it was easy to stay focus on that objective and make decisions that achieved that objective so we didn't need a facilitator to help with that kind of process. (Don Hall pers. comm. 2003)

The final facilitation characteristic that WCSA/RAMS found important was perceived neutrality. Because of their position in directing agendas and conversation, facilitators often had significant power in a group. This power gave them the burden of

being looked to for leadership in getting the group through inevitable impasses. But facilitators, despite pretences to the contrary, had their own agendas. Even if this was only to show 'progress' or come up with a 'product' at the end of a session, such an approach influenced the group's direction. In my own experience, my agenda when playing a facilitative role was often subconscious or I was often subconsciously manipulating conversations towards my own desired outcome. I often elevated myself into a position of power as a leader, reducing the direct conversations and learning between participants. Some of this may have been acceptable in moving a group forward, but the line between leadership and manipulation was a very fine one. Dan Edwards (pers. comm. 2002) talks about this issue where he states,

In earlier stages you need guys like Jim [Morrison] and Doug [Kelly] who believed in leadership from behind and their philosophy and unobtrusive facilitation was appropriate. Creating a space for discussion to occur as opposed to leading discussion. At any level this is probably important—there is the need and way to go. My experience of people who lead discussion is that they have an agenda and end up with a dishonest product at the end of the day.

Craig [Darling] attempted to be unobtrusive for a large part of the time he facilitated [the negotiations for the external mandate] but he became impatient after awhile and sometimes took the role of advocate to get things done instead of trying to let people move at their own pace. But it seemed appropriate in that case, even though he was going out on a limb. He could see what needed to be done and that was pushing government past intransigence. He couldn't let people babble on until the end of time because that is what they'll do.

WCSA/RAMS used three methods to address the challenge of neutrality. The first was having co-chairs from WCSA and RAMS help set the meeting agendas and choose and guide external or internal facilitators. Their direction and guidance reduced the manipulative potential of facilitation. The second was using facilitators who had demonstrated a sufficient degree of neutrality to earn people's respect. The third was allowing a facilitator to act more as a mediator only when they had the trust of the group.

### **5.6.3 Case Study Propositions about Facilitation**

1. Facilitation is more likely to assist in building co-management when participants:
  - a) perceive the facilitator to be neutral.
  - b) share information with the facilitator.
  - c) feel comfortable with the language and style of the facilitator.
  - d) trust the facilitator to act as mediator when needed.
2. These conditions are more likely to be present if the facilitator:
  - a) has adequate technical knowledge to help participants develop feasible solutions during discussions around aquatic management issues.
  - b) is familiar with the guiding principles of the group and uses them to help the group assess options and agree on a direction.
  - c) has some basic familiarity with the issues, area, principles, and participants (including their past relations).
3. Having local participants play a facilitative role can assist in building co-management, with the following notations:
  - a) local leaders are experienced and effective at playing a facilitative role.
  - b) participants acting in a facilitative role reflect the cultural diversity of other participants.
  - c) experienced staff support is available when needed, especially for highly technical discussions.
4. Experienced external facilitation can assist in building co-management when:
  - a) there are negotiations between a range of parties from inside and outside the area with somewhat different goals.
  - b) highly contentious issues are being discussed.
  - c) large conference-style meetings are being held.
5. A challenge is likely to arise regarding the manipulative potential of facilitation. Three approaches can be helpful in minimizing the manipulative potential of facilitation and enhancing its positive leadership potential. These include:
  - a) having local co-chairs help set meeting agendas and choose and guide facilitators.
  - b) using facilitators who have demonstrated a sufficient degree of neutrality to earn people's respect.
  - c) allowing facilitators to act more as mediators only when they have the trust of the group.

### **5.6.4 Leadership Profile**

Both WCSA and RAMS were supported by strong, consistent leadership. This came in a variety of ways and from a variety of people. Dan Edwards provided the most day-to-day leadership from the beginning, especially within the Clayoquot Sound area



and with local commercial fishing interests. Cliff Atleo was also involved early in the development of WCSA and RAMS and was a recognized leader. While these two played important roles, many others took on key leadership roles within their 'sectors' or communities or generally in WCSA/RAMS. Having leadership from many participants was important in building co-management.

### **5.6.5 Leadership Results**

While facilitation was more controversial, everyone within WCSA and RAMS recognized the importance of strong leadership. There were several dimensions to leadership that arose in WCSA/RAMS' experience, including the breadth of leadership, style of key leaders, leadership roles, and leadership required in different phases.

WCSA and RAMS enjoyed both several key leaders and leadership from many participants. Having a breadth of leadership from diverse groups was important when dealing with a variety of interest groups and issues. For instance, it would not be possible for a commercial fisherman to lead recreational interests or an issue that was predominantly tourism related. Therefore, it was important to have leaders from different interests coming together in a joint body such as RAMS, and then having several leaders within that joint body. Wilf Caron (pers. comm. 2003) reflects on the importance of this breadth of leadership, noting the parallel importance of sharing a common vision:

Cream rises, and a lot of individuals rose to the top on various issues. But the core one was that they were all able to share in common, and that's absolutely crucial. I think there has to be a melding of minds as to what that vision is. And each one plays their role in giving it substance. They all have to be of one mind though. And that was shown time after time of the initiators of this movement. It was a great learning experience for me. Sometimes I almost felt I was there for the ride. It was a great privilege to be there and share that vision with these people.

The role of leadership at a staff level was also important, as reflected by Don Hall (pers. comm. 2002), where he notes,

A good group of staff people provided continuity between meetings. RAMS was quite lucky to have you [Andrew Day], Brenda [Bauer], and Darren [Deluca]—all contributed different roles at different times to getting things done. Each had different styles but provided a staff leadership role, which was important because it wasn't going to get done by directors.

While breadth of leadership was important, WCSA and RAMS participants recognized the importance of having several main leaders in their organizations. RAMS had two main leaders—Dan Edwards and Cliff Atleo. The following notes from different participants give a portrait of their styles:

There were two dominant leaders—Dan and Cliff. Everyone stepped up in different times and places but they were constant. . . . They had completely different styles . . . well, maybe not . . . Cliff could get militant and he was fighting for his people like Dan was. Maybe they were actually identical. They both had the cause. Certainly Dan's public style was as much of a problem as a benefit—for all those reasons. You sit down with him in a dinner and he is a mild-mannered philosopher. But in a meeting he had all kinds of venom. Cliff would have outbursts of anger, but he would always balance it with a calmer and more rational thing about sticking together. If you think of what we tried to do over all those years, at the end Cliff is still there and Dan bailed out . . . but the work was done by that point. When they [government] found out we wouldn't die then they accepted it. We just needed to be around and survive. (Darren Deluca, pers. comm. 2002)

Different people played different roles at different times. Dan was the glue that held it together in many aspects for the longest time. He was the driving force to keep things moving forward, especially for RAMS. The stability and patience of Cliff was a good asset throughout the whole RAMS process and negotiations. He lends a calming influence and puts things into perspective and provides a longer-term view. They stood out as leaders and were the most consistent ones. Dan was a high intensity, big effort, strong push and ends up being burned out by process and all things going around it, versus Cliff's slow and steady approach and still being involved (Don Hall, pers. comm. 2002).

You need the kind of leadership that is into building consensus. And leadership that is willing to listen to all different points of view. . . . For example I think of Dan Edwards and all of the actions that took place before the governments began to pay attention and say 'ya well maybe we have to do something about this.' You need that kind of dynamic leadership that is willing to take risks, especially in the lead up to getting RAMS established. And it's helpful to have leadership that is educated and well read in different methods that could be used, for example in community management around the world that at least knows the sources

where you can go and read information. And see what's worked in other places. You need leadership that is willing to look at things in the long term. This is one way that First Nations board members were so valuable in the looking at things in the long term and they were willing and able to instruct us in the way their resource management structures took place-- 'Ha hoolthee'-- and inspire us. (Maureen Sager, pers. comm. 2003).

It is apparent from these quotes and RAMS experience that two styles of key leadership personalities were important in building co-management in the case study. The first style was passionate, adversarial, high-intensity, tireless, thick-skinned, and willing to make major personal sacrifices and take large risks. The second style kept people focused on the longer-term, lending a consistent, positive, calming influence. Both involved charisma, unwavering dedication to the organizations' cause, and a breadth of knowledge of co-management and cooperative movements.

In addition to the characteristics of leadership, the case study also demonstrated the roles that leadership play in building co-management. Several different leadership roles were identified. These were: a) building the vision and principles of the organization; b) keeping people focused on them; c) representing the area and its vision and resisting external policies and processes undermining them; d) helping the organization come to consensus around decisions and action; e) motivating people and keeping them moving forward; f) leading partnerships with other organizations; and g) lending an effective administrative component to the organization (Field notes 1998-2002). The following interview excerpts illustrate some of these roles and describe some of the leadership characteristics considered important. They are also highlighted in other sections of this chapter.

Leadership is the ultimate decision maker. Dan or Cliff would speak and we'd come to a conclusion. Then it was the end of the road. Without a guy who owns the respect of the room, how do you get to a final decision? XXX could do it at times but doesn't have the same impact over time. He's not as knowledgeable—more of a philosopher. Dan and Cliff were extremely knowledgeable about issues, plus philosophical. It's a rare combination.

Leadership is more than just showing up and taking a pot shot—it's about keeping people motivated when people are bummed out—keeping things moving forward behind the scenes. Rallying the troops is a key role.

Staff has to play a leadership role. The Executive Director is not staff—he's more of a quasi-board member. Almost like a CEO [Chief Executive Officer]. But are you in a position to influence sectoral communities? You have to have leadership in the Board to allow you to do what you need to do (Darren Deluca, pers. comm. 2002).

. . . We had absolutely necessary leadership from the Nuuchahnulth community of long experience that were able to maintain focus on what the heart of the issues were and when . . . even on issues around facilitation, when the facilitator didn't know which way to go, that leadership brought it back to the heart of the matter and kept us on track and others demonstrated their vision as well and weren't going to be allowed to be swayed from it (Wilf Caron, pers. comm. 2003).

There were two people who continued to blow me away all the time with their ability to inspire. Cliff and Dan. They inspired a lot of what was going on. Cliff inspired me in that inclusive sense of west coast communities. Dan's energy... His stubbornness, and forthrightness, and dedication—I think a lot of people were inspired by that. Dan pulled me in originally with WCSA, before the workshop. That's how I got involved, Dan and his whole energy. [Another leader was] Bill Irving [who] is remarkably even keeled (Anonymous, pers. comm. 2003)

It is critical that you have enlightened leadership at all levels. Wherever you have it, it is a benefit. There are people who will deliberately and underhandedly try to stop cooperative development due to their own narrow agendas. If they look at what is going on in the cooperative approach and see that as being a hindrance to their self or own sector/community, then they'll try to destroy cooperative development. If you are pushing for an adversarial approach such as courts, then you will unconsciously or consciously kill cooperative development because you have another agenda. XXXX took our initial constitution and stalled the whole thing for four months and pretended he was being helpful. Maybe if you wanted to broaden it out, every organization or institution has its own confined agenda, and to define enlightened it would be people within any organization that had a sense that much more would be accomplished by working together on issues and who would lead the organization to work with other organizations. Those who didn't see this would keep within their own confines. Bill Irving [WCSA Director and municipal mayor] would look outside of the narrow municipal role to make partnerships based on principles. If these people are gone, then it becomes difficult to build the framework for cooperation (Dan Edwards, pers. comm. 2002).

The roles of leadership were also influenced by the phase of the organizations' development. Dan Edwards (pers. comm. 2002) notes several points about leadership in different phases where he states,

Initially you need an individual spark plug that will fire up the thing. That is the role I used to play. Someone totally committed to creating space for something to occur. There has to be a champion at the initial stages that will pick up the ball and run with it. If that happens then momentum will get started. The inertia of status quo has to be overcome by some vision of a different future that sometimes is embodied in one person but is within a number of other people. Once momentum comes, then it becomes a team effort and that person's role is no longer critical. In fact there are instances where people are in that role for awhile and then they are better off being sidelined because they become detrimental to the building process.

*Interview question: What was the main role of leadership in the process [during this phase]?*

To be a spokesperson for our particular vision of community-based management. The role is one of being a spokesperson at a number of levels, both in the region and creating workshops and so on, and then outside the region to be a spokesman to government and others out of the region to let them know what we were doing and to be a voice against existing process excluding communities. An adversarial situation develops, but the role is to represent the community constituency and not be sidelined off the role because people don't want you there. This role required seven days a week 18 hours a day focus on that kind of stuff. That is typical. In most of these kinds of things there is always someone who plays that role for a while to get momentum started.

*Interview question: When that phase settles, then what kind of leadership is needed?*

There is leadership needed from above. Leadership is needed from government to recognize the need for developing cooperative models of economic and social development and then using their power because they need to take the message and shove it down through middle and lower levels of bureaucracy. Leadership will frame the movement, with less need for individual leadership. At that time there is more of a need for a team approach at the community level. That is what the spark plug person has likely been pushing all along—trying to develop this cooperative approach rather than be a tin-pot dictator. Then you need enlightened and understanding leadership from above.

Darren Deluca (pers. comm. 2002) corroborates the importance of charismatic leadership at the early stages of building co-management and through the adversarial stage of getting an external mandate:

Early in the formation stage we required the emotional leadership heart and soul from both Dan and Cliff. Then we went through different phases—the resistance and renewal approach. It was almost like military manoeuvres. That went on for quite a period. Then when Dan left, there was a leadership vacuum which may still exist. Cliff can't communicate to the non-native community. The [AMB] Board suffers from a lack of leadership now. XXX is the highest ranking community white guy. Has some credibility but is more or less of an unknown. The biggest challenge is where leadership comes from. It ain't going to be senior governments. XXX and XXX are committed but are not leaders. We couldn't have done it without leadership. The worry now is that with those guys gone, where is it going to come from?

It is important to add that when initial individual leadership phased into more of a team approach, there was still a need for someone to maintain people's focus and energy on a day-to-day level (Field notes 2002). It is also important to note that when external governments granted an external mandate to the organization, the original 'spark-plug' leadership style was replaced by a more administrative style, and the longer-term vision style of leadership remained.

### **5.6.6 Case Study Propositions about Leadership**

1. Co-management is more likely to be built where an organization has 'enlightened leadership', where enlightened leadership is defined as people that have a sense that much more can be accomplished by working together with other organizations with similar leadership.
2. Co-management is more likely to be built where a breadth of leaders from different interests contribute in different ways and at different times to various issues, and where there are several key leaders.
3. Co-management is more likely to be built where key leaders have charisma, unwavering dedication to the organizations' cause, and a breadth of knowledge of co-management and cooperative movements.
4. Co-management is more likely to be built where there are two styles of key leadership.

- a) The first is passionate, adversarial, high-intensity, tireless, thick-skinned, and willing to make major personal sacrifices and take large risks.
  - b) The second keeps people focused on the longer-term, lending a consistent positive, calming influence.
5. Co-management is more likely to be built where an organization's leadership plays the following roles.
- a) Building further support for and understanding of the vision and principles of the organization.
  - b) Keeping people focused on the vision and principles of the organization.
  - c) Communicating the organization's vision and principles and resisting external policies and processes undermining them.
  - d) Helping the organization come to consensus around decisions and actions.
  - e) Motivating people and keeping them moving forward.
  - f) Partnering with similar leadership in other organizations.
  - g) Leading an effective administrative component to the organization.
6. To build co-management, organizations require different kinds of leadership at different stages of development. An organization is more likely to successfully build co-management where:
- a) there is substantial leadership from at least one individual acting as a 'sparkplug' to build momentum in the initial stage of cooperative development (Stage I outlined in the summary of s.5.2 Mandate).
  - b) a team effort develops, supported by day-to-day leadership that maintains people's focus, as momentum is built and the organization is solidified (Stage II);
  - c) external governments play a leadership role in directing their agencies to grant and implement an external mandate to the organization, at some point during Stage III of an organization's development; and passionate, high-intensity leadership style is supplemented or replaced by an administrative leadership style, who continues to work with the longer term leadership style in implementing the external mandate.

## **5.7 Accountability, Monitoring, and Evaluation**

### **5.7.1 Accountability Profile**

Accountability was important in contracts and finances, staff performance, and in the organizations' principles and goals. In terms of contracts and finances, WCSA's and RAMS' bookkeepers were responsible for financial reports to their Board of Directors

and funding partners. In WCSA's case (and for RAMS when its finances were being managed by WCSA), financial statements were produced for board meetings and normally were presented as spreadsheets with supporting documents. Senior staff would review these with the bookkeeper before meetings, ranging from once monthly to every six months. In RAMS' case, financial statements in a standard accounting format, contract report schedules, and operating budgets were normally reviewed monthly by the Executive Director and presented at each board meeting (held monthly or bimonthly). Executive Directors monitored staff performance in both organizations and were in turn monitored by the Board of Directors. Neither organization had formal staff performance review procedures, and reporting on activities was normally done to Boards of Directors at meetings. WCSA and RAMS had travel policies, WCSA eventually developed procedures regarding hiring practices, and RAMS eventually developed a detailed Human Resource Policy Manual.

Accountability to the organizations' principles and goals was carried out informally on a day-to-day basis between staff or between Board of Directors and staff. Neither organization had strategic plans or other detailed documents outlining specific activities, timelines, and assigned responsibilities related to its goals, nor did they have formal evaluation processes in place.

### **5.7.2 Accountability Results**

Results related to accountability, monitoring, and evaluation are organized under the following headings: contract and financial accountability, staff performance, and accountability to the organizations' principles and goals.



### **5.7.2.1 Contract and financial accountability, monitoring and evaluation**

Accountability between WCSA/RAMS and funding agents was straightforward insofar as the terms and conditions for reporting were normally outlined in a contract. While there was always some 'fudging' and rearrangement of budgets and contracts to address the circumstances of being a non-profit society with no independent funding, reporting/evaluation and occasional audits meant that everything had to be in good order. However, two challenges emerged in achieving the flexibility needed to operate while remaining within the written letter of contracts.

The first challenge involved responding to community needs within the context of restrictive and often inappropriate funding agent guidelines. The second involved handling late and insufficient payments from funding agents. Staff were constantly weighing the risks of flexibility and responsiveness against the constraints of contract rigidity (Field notes 1999-2002). While funding agency staff might orally express flexibility, everyone was aware that WCSA/RAMS would bear the consequences if an audit were to happen. Furthermore, funding was often delayed and occasionally less than expected, meaning that WCSA/RAMS had to cover the cash flow shortfall while waiting for funds by moving funds internally or taking out a line of credit. Weighing these risks was difficult for staff, who were under constant pressure to respond to community needs, meet project deadlines, and be something other than a 'delivery agent' for the funder. This created a burden that contributed to staff stress and 'burn-out' (Trevor Wickham, pers. comm. 2003) (Board Directors were rarely involved in these decisions as they were often immediate and complicated in nature-- both WCSA and RAMS staff were also conscious of burdening directors with too many administrative decisions that would distract from time spent on policy issues).

Addressing challenges in financial management were complicated by WCSA's difficulty holding its funding partners accountable. When a party refused to pay in accordance with an oral agreement (or even a written contract), WCSA had limited avenues of recourse. Legal recourse was often very costly and time-consuming (especially for amounts less than \$10,000), and political pressure did not work on external governments. Confrontational approaches exacerbated tension and jeopardized future relationships between WCSA and the other organizations, adding another layer of complexity to the issue. This last point is important as it underscores a significant issue associated with government funding; namely, if an organization resists the policies and plans of government too heavily, it is likely to have difficulty getting renewed funding and becomes vulnerable to attacks or manipulation by governments within its funding contracts (see s.5.8 Funding and Capacity Building).

To address these challenges and their impact on WCSA, RAMS eventually developed strict contract requirements (oral agreements were put into written form), internal financial and contract reporting requirements, operating budgets, cheque signing procedures, and other administrative procedures that minimized potential problems. While these somewhat helped reduce the constant risk management problem associated with finding flexibility within contracts, they increased the bureaucracy of the organization.

#### ***5.7.2.2 Staff accountability, monitoring and evaluation***

A high degree of trust was vested in staff, especially those who worked independently in smaller towns, for four reasons. First, senior staff were focused on policy issues rather than administration. (Board Directors provided general direction and oversight but did not have the time or interest to engage in extensive staff performance monitoring). Second, staff accountability was difficult because there was no 'bottom line'

such as profitability or production with which to measure staff effectiveness, nor a defined 'client' base. Third, WCSA/RAMS' had been established to avoid bureaucracy and to rely mainly on individual initiative, commitment, and trust. Fourth, there were insufficient funds to pay staff or directors to 'supervise' other employees.

Relying on trust and commitment was more appropriate when I first worked for RAMS because I worked in the same office as Dan Edwards (a co-chair of RAMS), and WCSA/RAMS were in constant contact and discussion. Mr. Edwards and other RAMS Directors frequently attended the same meetings as I, making me more accountable in my actions. When later I worked as a consultant to RAMS, I found that in the absence of regular day-to-day communication it was much easier for me to lose focus on the goals of the organizations and become distracted by lower priority items. Had I lacked commitment to RAMS vision and principles, it would also have been possible for me to undertake activities for personal benefit without any strong degree of accountability. This might include, for example, orienting a contract in such a way that it set up future work from which I would benefit. In short, more independent work saved the organization having someone paid to look over my shoulder consistently but allowed me greater scope for self-interested or undisciplined behaviour. Two other organizations affiliated with WCSA and RAMS were eventually undermined by lack of staff accountability (Field notes 2000, 2003).

As with contract and financial accountability, RAMS developed more formal staff accountability, monitoring and evaluation procedures over time. And as with contract and financial accountability, they helped somewhat in reducing problems but at the cost of increased administration and bureaucracy.

### **5.7.2.3 Organizational accountability, monitoring and evaluation in relation to principles and goals**

The final area of accountability important to WCSA and RAMS was the organizations' accountability to their vision and principles. The main form of accountability, monitoring and evaluation came from the use of the principles in decision-making and from the participants themselves. As noted earlier in s.5.5, RAMS regularly used their principles and goals to assess different options and monitor participant's self-interested behaviour. As long as participants felt the organization was working in line with its principles and goals, the organization enjoyed their political support. As diverse political support was essential to the continued operation of the organization, there was a high degree of accountability and monitoring. This appeared to be adequate in the first several stages of the organizations' development (see stages outlined in the summary to s.5.2 Mandate).

A challenge of 'goal displacement' began to arise towards the end of the third stage of RAMS development. This mainly came with the dissolution of WCSA, Mr. Edwards becoming significantly less involved in RAMS, the negotiations for the Aquatic Management Board (AMB) slowing down, and as RAMS adopted more bureaucratic procedures (to address the challenges outlined above). Several staff and participants began to question to what extent RAMS was losing focus on its initial goals and retracting into a centralized bureaucratic organization (Field notes 2000). This issue did not become significant as people waited for the new Aquatic Management Board to replace RAMS, but the need for more formal evaluation of the organization was discussed at the time.

### **5.7.3 Case Study Propositions about Accountability, Monitoring and Evaluation**

1. If an organization does more than just discuss policy issues in an informal way, it will likely have an administrative dimension to address its staffing, contracts, and financial arrangements. As organizations take on more responsibility, their administrative functions will tend to become significant. Three dilemmas are likely to arise. First, for groups or individuals who have come together mainly to address policy issues impacting their lives and who have other leadership responsibilities, administration can seem a boring and time-consuming distraction from these issues and responsibilities. Second, as the organization was probably set up in part to address the rigid nature of bureaucratic organizations, it will likely try to avoid 'bureaucracy' by relying more on trust, self-discipline, and commitment. Finally, it is costly and time-consuming to spend time monitoring performance and administrative details, and an organization building co-management is likely to have limited resources.
2. If an organization does not develop formal methods of accountability (both internally and with external partners) as it takes on more responsibility, there will be greater room for self-interested and undisciplined behaviour, conflict, and financial difficulties.

If an organization develops too many rigid and formal methods of accountability and does not foster trust, self-discipline, and commitment to its vision and principles, it will become overly bureaucratic and increasingly unable to implement its vision and principles.

Therefore, an organization is more likely to achieve its vision and principles, if it fosters trust, self-discipline, and commitment to them, while supporting these with formal methods of accountability that are not overly cumbersome.

3. In the early stages of co-management between diverse groups in an area (Stages 1-3), the self-monitoring nature of having diverse organizations involved will likely be adequate and appropriate in ensuring that an organization is accountable to its principles and goals. However, the need for more formal evaluation is likely to grow if leadership changes, movement slows towards the goal of receiving an external mandate, or the organization adopts more formal administrative procedures.

## **5.8 Capacity Building and Funding**

### **5.8.1 Capacity Building Profile**

Initially, volunteers staffed WCSA. Dan Edwards, a fisherman with a university degree whose family had lived in Ucluelet for over 50 years, was the main driving force

behind the organization. For the first several years, he worked out of his home. With limited foundation funding, Mr. Edwards then shared a small office with Eric Tamm of the Coastal Community Network and hired Skip McCarthy—a community development consultant—to help with administration. Mr. McCarthy left in the fall of 1997 after having worked intermittently in the area for several years. Mr. Edwards worked as Executive Director of WCSA until funding ran out in June 2000 and continued to work on WCSA on a volunteer basis until it completed bankruptcy proceedings in 2002.

WCSA also had two project managers. Trevor Wickham had considerable international community development experience and a master's degree and worked out of the Ucluelet office. Darren DeLuca was from Port Alberni and had considerable local political and fishing knowledge, with some business experience and education.

Lil Thomas, who was from the Port Alberni/Ucluelet area and had some administrative and bookkeeping experience, was the main WCSA administrator. She worked with WCSA/RAMS from November 1997 to January 2001. Initially she did all aspects of WCSA and RAMS administration but later focused only on financial management. Fiona Clark (from eastern Canada but living in Ucluelet) worked doing reception when Ms. Thomas focused on financial management. Pam Keel, from Port Alberni, provided administrative support in the WCSA Port Alberni office and had considerable bookkeeping and financial management experience (including having worked for a federal agency—HRDC). I worked as the Executive Director of RAMS from 1997 until November 1999. I was a doctoral student from Vancouver with some academic expertise and very limited practical experience in management and fisheries.

RAMS hired a project manager, Barry Baldwin, to manage their Salmon Renewal partnership with Fisheries Renewal BC. Mr. Baldwin was not from the area and had significant technical experience in salmon renewal projects but less management

experience. In the fall of 1999 RAMS hired two stewardship coordinators under a federal program. In both cases WCSA/RAMS hired local people with no official training or university degrees.

In November 1999 I stopped working full time in order to complete my comprehensive exams and was replaced by Brenda Bauer. Ms. Bauer had considerable practical and academic experience with profit and non-profit enterprises in an urban setting but little experience working with rural communities. She had a Master's degree in Public Administration. At the same time, the Nuu-chah-nulth received funding to have someone work with RAMS, and Jack Little, a Nuu-chah-nulth member with experience in negotiations, community economic development, and other projects, was hired. Another Stewardship Coordinator was also hired at this time, as was an Executive Assistant, Cindy McClung, and Contract Manager, Suvanna Simpson. Ms. Simpson had worked with a federal agency (HRDC) previously and was highly skilled in contract management and administration. Ms. Bauer subsequently left in June 2000 and was replaced by Darren Deluca who had previously worked as a WCSA project manager. RAMS' head office moved from WCSA's office in Ucluelet to Port Alberni at this time. Ms. Simpson and Pam Keel remained as RAMS staff members.

All staff were living in the local area when working with WCSA/RAMS. Only those originally from the area still live there at the time of writing this thesis.

Both WCSA and RAMS engaged a variety of consultants to work on projects from 1997 to 2001. Some of these consultants were local and some were from Vancouver, depending on the nature of the work and available budget.

Both WCSA and RAMS had considerable technical support from the Nuu-chah-nulth Tribal Council. The NTC had a fisheries program with a fisheries program manager and three sub-regional biologists. The fishery program manager, Don Hall,

participated as a RAMS member and as staff support to RAMS, and the biologists provided facilitation and technical participation on many of RAMS sub-committees.

Mr. Edwards and I worked very closely. The relationship can be characterized as one of mentor and apprentice, especially in the beginning when I understood very little about the personalities, histories, and methodologies involved in building local co-management. Mr. Edwards and I developed a strong friendship over time. We also worked closely with Eric Tamm of the Coastal Community Network, with whom we shared an office.

### **5.8.2 Capacity Building Results**

In this section I outline five types of capacity required in building co-management, and then outline the three main challenges WCSA/RAMS faced in relation to capacity.

In terms of capacity required, WCSA/RAMS first required leadership and vision from within the region to build an internal mandate (as discussed in section 5.2 Mandate). Second, WCSA/RAMS needed capacity to bridge between the internal mandate within the area and external groups and agencies. This was mainly a communication role and involved people from outside the region learning about the internal mandate, and people within the region learning more about large government bureaucracies, businesses, and politics. It took years of capacity building for someone like me from outside the area to understand the internal mandate within the region. This was mainly through consistent exposure to leaders and people within the area, both informally and formally, both at work and outside of work. Similarly, for people from the region, repeated interactions with external groups and agencies built capacity through experience over time. WCSA also engaged more politically experienced consultants



from outside the region to undertake certain tasks and act as 'guides' for people within the region.

A third type of critical capacity necessary was managing projects within the area. This required a blend of local and bureaucratic knowledge and experience, with a managerial set of skills. Fourth, WCSA/RAMS needed strong financial and contract administration support. As noted under Section 5.7 Accountability, this required a good understanding of bureaucratic procedures mixed with the ability to create flexibility. It also required more trained capacity than WCSA had considering its rapid growth and the size of its budget. WCSA's lack of capacity contributed in some part to its financial difficulties (Trevor Wickham, pers. comm. 2003). It underestimated the importance of this role, as noted by Darren Deluca (pers. comm. 2002) where he states:

... You certainly need qualified administrative capacity. Doing what we did was very onerous--there was no way we could deal with the amount of money and stuff we were dealing with. You have to be careful that the administrative infrastructure is in place to keep credibility and finances in order. That is one of the few things that can take you out. If you don't keep administrative records in order, particularly when you are picking a fight with anyone who comes by, you're in trouble. Here we were saying DFO couldn't manage anything and pointing fingers. Strong administration keeps a board out of trouble, and technical support helps a board make decisions.

As noted by Mr. Deluca, technical support was the fifth kind of capacity needed. This enabled the organizations to make informed and well-grounded decisions. It was not restricted to quantitative data and included knowledge from a variety of participants in WCSA and RAMS. Mr. Deluca (pers. comm. 2002) further notes its importance where he states:

As far as technical support, we did need it. From a technical perspective it is expertise of someone like Dan [Edwards]. He doesn't have a degree in biology but has lots of technical info about the industry you couldn't get anywhere else. We were in a lot of areas where we didn't know about something for sure and needed hard data. Dan and others would bring their own knowledge and [Dr.] Don [Hall] or someone else would normally have some [quantitative] data we could use. Otherwise we wouldn't have

had confidence to make decisions. If we didn't have hard info from PSARC [Pacific Science Advisory Review Committee] or whatever, then we wouldn't have made some decisions.

Technical support from the Nuu-chah-nulth Tribal Council and WCSA/RAMS staff was extremely important for a variety of activities undertaken by WCSA and RAMS. While WCSA and RAMS members were astute and well spoken, the language and procedures involved in government, consulting, or academic models was often difficult to understand (Maureen Sager, pers. comm. 2003). Having staff to engage in and help translate the technical details was important for WCSA/RAMS directors and committee members. NTC staff was especially adept in communicating in community, government and academic forums. Their understanding of the language and assumptions involved in government and academic models helped to 'debunk' them. At the same time, their ability to translate community concerns into technical language and models, helped give validity to those concerns and interests. This gave a more credible voice to the organization and, when combined with the knowledge and experience of fishermen and community residents, provided a solid balance in analyzing and evaluating information. Local technical staff were therefore extremely helpful not only in providing technical information but also in bridging the gap between local knowledge and expertise and government or academic models and approaches.

There were several challenges in building the five types of capacity outlined above. For instance, an important dilemma arose regarding hiring people from the region or getting external help. Early in WCSA, Dan Edwards recognized the importance of building capacity within the area and getting assistance from outside it. He was pragmatic about the limitations of both local residents and those from outside the area. People from outside the area tended to have more bureaucratic skills and links to governments or other groups but lacked grounding and trust in local communities and

tended to take longer to understand the organization's vision and principles. Frequently employees who were not from the area left after a short period of time. Mr. Edwards (pers. comm. 2002) noted one of the drawbacks of hiring people from outside the area:

If someone wants to come in and help, then they'll bring skills. Then there is tension between whether communities can retain some sense of direction. If they don't, then it can be bent to the outside agenda. [XXX] was helpful in developing internal administrative support and government relations but only to a point. There is a point at which it is helpful and a point at which it turns awful. I don't know exactly what happened but it becomes negative when a person's agenda starts conflicting with the community agenda. The community has to have a strong enough sense of itself. Personalities and power that are brought in can eat up communities. They can sabotage efforts and it is hard to detect.

Residents from the area, on the other hand, tended to lack experience dealing with bureaucratic procedures. To some extent this was a cultural issue—urban and rural cultures had distinct communication styles, beliefs and customs. For example, many fishermen expressed frustration, disagreement or disapproval openly and bluntly, expecting people to respond similarly if they didn't agree. In meetings WCSA/RAMS hosted where fishermen were present, that was the predominant style of debate—emotions were very much at the forefront and there was not a lot of patience for philosophizing or talking without really saying anything (Field notes 1998). This caused some tension and occasional bad feelings but everybody knew where the other stood on an issue. Civil servants, urban-based consultants, or academics, on the other hand, generally expressed few emotions and either tried to suppress them or ignore them by not responding. They could easily speak at length without committing to any viewpoint or divert attention from controversial issues in order to try to avoid tension. These are general representations and not the rule for all people or meetings, but they capture an on-going difficulty experienced by WCSA/RAMS in building collaboration.

WCSA/RAMS tried to find people with the ability to bridge the cultural gaps between rural WCVI communities and urban-based governments, foundations,

academics, etc. WCSA/RAMS focused on the primary functions of the job and whether they believed these could be done adequately locally as a first step and then tried to find local people where appropriate. In most cases they were making a conscious trade-off between the advantages of local versus bureaucratic knowledge and experience. They tended to decide in favour of the former in order to achieve one of their organizational goals, except in cases where the primary job functions were dealing with governments, foundations, academics, etc. They provided residents with any training they desired, but almost everyone was 'learning by doing' and did not make time for formal external training.

The importance of 'on the job' training highlights a significant challenge faced by WCSA/RAMS in capacity building for local residents: the contract partner has to recognize that part of the contract is about building capacity. In other words, mistakes will happen and they need to be treated as learning experiences. Dan Edwards (pers. comm. 2002) highlights this point where he states:

One of the objectives of all our funding was to train people in community to do a number of different things. There are a whole bunch of things that would provide long-term dividends to community. We brought people in from outside and people like Lil [Thomas, WCSA office and financial administrator] from the community.

There needs to be cooperative venture to recognize capacity building as part of the process. We did that with Lil being trained to learn to deal with HRDC and government processes—there has to be checks and balances and governments have to be willing to do accountability. When they killed us off, they came in three times to go through audits. They went through them each paper by paper. But their objective wasn't to train, it was to find mistakes to kill us off. If objectives aren't there, this happens. This is about governments giving direction from above to kill things as opposed to actually really being supportive. There is an opposition and adversarial position between what larger government is doing and what communities need. That is why AMB was so important to get in place quickly because with no direction it is open for sabotage.

The third challenge faced by WCSA/RAMS in building capacity was partnerships with other organizations. As described above, the partnership with NTC was extremely

strong and important to the success of WCSA/RAMS. However, the results were mixed in other cases. Some individuals within organization did not wish to enter into partnerships, or purposefully tried to break down partnerships that began to develop (Field notes 1998-2001). In these cases, WCSA and RAMS had the choice to:

- a) try to work with these individuals by understanding and addressing the individual's reasons for not wanting to partner;
- b) ask senior staff or directors to give strong direction within their organization to work cooperatively with WCSA/RAMS;
- c) try to have the person removed from their position;
- d) build capacity internally to perform the same tasks; or
- e) ignore the situation.

While the first of these routes was always the preferred method, the inevitable dilemma was how to deal with someone who either would not work in partnership or would break down partnerships. In several instances WCSA/RAMS tried repeatedly to act in a cooperative manner but still encountered resistance. When they took the second route, they occasionally got results but often with an uncooperative new partner. In the case of the third route, they found that they created an enemy who tried to get back at them at every chance. With the fourth route, they found it was difficult to justify duplication of services in attracting funds and inevitably they ended up competing with the other organization or in some kind of adversarial relationship. Finally, ignoring the situation was easiest but did not advance the vision and principles WCSA/RAMS set out to achieve (Field notes 1998-2001).

Other than trying to understand an individual's motivations fully, it is difficult to conclude that any one approach consistently worked best in addressing this dilemma. Based on the number of 'enemies' that WCSA and RAMS made during their life spans through adversarial approaches, but also the number of people who acted deliberately to

break down cooperation, I concluded that a mix of approaches was needed (Field notes 2000). I observed that the application of force normally results in an equal reaction against that force, leading to some form of conflict. This normally uses significant energy without building relationships towards some productive goal. Therefore, I concluded that more subtle methods of cooperation yielded more productive relationships in the longer term. All attempts at cooperation needed to be exhausted before contemplating other actions, no matter how difficult these attempts might be. As I recognized that this approach suited my conflict-avoiding nature, I also noted that in the event that these attempts at cooperation might fail, building a solid case on the person/organization while waiting patiently for the right opportunity for change was also important. It helped to have a 'good cop/bad cop' routine, where one person worked hard at cooperation and another presented the threat or reality of adversarial actions (Dan Edwards, pers. comm. 1998; Darren Deluca, pers. comm. 1999). I do not have adequate data to conclude on the efficacy of this approach.

The final challenge related to capacity building was the long-term nature of change. Capacity building was clearly more than just developing particular skills or knowledge in status quo approaches and activities. For capacity to change, a change in thought processes and values needed to occur at the community level amongst residents not directly involved in WCSA and RAMS and amongst government agents, academics, and others outside the area. Community approaches or experience needed to adapt to changing circumstances just as much as government, academic, or other approaches had to change. The vision and principles of WCSA and RAMS contributed to a new paradigm setting the context for new skills and knowledge and making those skills and knowledge more compelling and logical.

Most government or academic scientists and community residents did not quickly incorporate others' comments and concerns into their short-term models. WCSA and RAMS recognized several different actions and motivations for changing paradigms. First, changing people's roles and relationships from adversarial and segregated to more cooperative and integrated (through their participation on RAMS) allowed people the opportunity to question and explore new approaches in a productive setting. In addition, the ability of local technical staff and WCSA/RAMS directors to translate different ways of thinking and describe a different paradigm in a practical manner allowed for a change in paradigm over time. As well, practical examples demonstrating how a new paradigm worked 'on the ground' helped everyone learn about the advantages and disadvantages of different approaches and points of view. Finally, economic crises or tangible practical incentives were effective at helping people release their attachments to old paradigms and approaches and adopt new ones.

### **5.8.3 Case Study Propositions about Capacity Building**

1. There is a greater likelihood of building co-management where an organization has the capacity to:
  - a) Build capacity in the following five areas: leadership, negotiation (with external governments and groups), project management, contract and financial administration, and technical support.
  - b) Play a cooperative and self-defending role in relation to competing organizations.
  - c) Lead a change from adversarial roles and relationships to frequent constructive dialogue.
  - d) Translate between different cultures and ways of thinking.
  - e) Describe a new paradigm and implement concrete examples.
  - f) Capitalize on and foster economic or social incentives that cause people to abandon attachments to old views and approaches; and,
  - g) Take a 'learning by doing' approach supplemented with advice or experience from people elsewhere.
2. Three main challenges are likely to arise in building or attracting capacity.

- a) Finding local residents or people from outside the area who possess both knowledge of the area and of external processes, and who can translate between both.
- b) Finding funding agents and external governments who recognize and accept that the organization is 'learning by doing' and will make mistakes.
- c) Dealing with a person or group with an overlapping mandate in the area who will either not work cooperatively or purposefully undermine co-management.

#### **5.8.4 Funding Profile**

WCSA received some funds from the David Suzuki Foundation in the early days of its work. It then negotiated a major three-year agreement with Human Resource Development Canada and a similar Provincial agency (half funding coming from the Province and from the Federal government). The agreement was innovative in that it not only specified particular activities the government wanted to have carried out (fisheries-related labour adjustment in Ucluelet and later in Port Alberni) but also allowed money to be used for the development of the Board. Discretionary spending for the latter was fairly broad and largely up to WCSA/RAMS. Though the Provincial grant was withdrawn after the first year due to their internal restructuring, HRDC paid for the balance. Funding was approximately \$400,000 per year for core expenses, with additional money for specific projects.

Further core funding came from the Bullit Foundation and project funding from several sources including the Community Economic Adjustment Initiative and DFO. In May of 1998, RAMS entered into a partnership with Fisheries Renewal BC to deliver approximately \$600,000 per year in salmon renewal grants in the area. Only two years after the May 1997 workshop, WCSA and RAMS had gone from little or no resources to administering over \$1.3 million per year.

HRDC began showing signs of withdrawing funding one year before the end of the three-year commitment. The last year of WCSA operations was filled with numerous



disputes and issues over funding and contracts. The following are some key events during that period (Field notes 1999-2002):

- In Fall 1999 Dan Edwards undertook a 59 day hunger strike protesting DFO consultative processes and decision making regarding salmon management. Other groups that had formed a coastwide coalition to protest agreed orally to fund certain activities associated with the strike (conference calls, meetings, etc.). WCSA therefore paid for a variety of activities out of other budget areas in the expectation they would be reimbursed. WCSA's bookkeeper was cautious about this but was obviously not going to prevent the Executive Director from the hunger strike (Lil Thomas pers comm. 1999). The other parties ended up reimbursing very few of the costs, and WCSA was consequently left with a small debt. Covering this debt was difficult in that almost all of WCSA's funds were earmarked for specific activities within contracts. Funds from some budget areas had to be used to cover immediate bills in other budget areas because of lack of cash flow. This was common practice because HRDC and other external government agencies frequently were delayed several months in payments to WCSA/RAMS. If WCSA/RAMS had been strict, they would have had to close down their offices every time a payment was late, making operations impossible.
- In Summer/Fall 1999 WCSA had raised over \$750,000 from various sources to continue development of a new tanner crab (*Chionoecetes tanneri*) fishery set to begin that winter. WCSA claimed that they had an oral commitment from Human Resources Development Canada for \$169,000 to fund a portion of the tanner crab project. WCSA built traps and spent most of the expected \$169,000 to start the project, which was time sensitive due to the fishing season.
- In January of 2000 the Minister of Human Resource Development Canada came under scrutiny for the misuse of funds within HRDC, and a nation-wide internal review of funding followed.
- In late January 2000, WCSA and HRDC met. WCSA was told that HRDC would not be able to grant funds for the tanner crab project. WCSA was also told that the contract for core services would end in April, rather than June, and not be continued the following year.
- Over the following months, WCSA intermittently received core operating costs under their contract with HRDC. To cover shortfalls, delays, and some of the previous small debt they had accrued, WCSA took out a \$35,000 line of credit with a credit union to cover on-going operating costs.
- In Spring 2000, HRDC granted WCSA \$35,000 towards the tanner crab project.
- In Spring 2000, DFO refused to pay a \$10,000 holdback on funds for the tanner crab project stating that the terms of the contract were not

fulfilled. WCSA claimed that all involved parties had orally agreed not to undertake certain parts of the contract due to time and weather constraints. The issue was never resolved.

- In June 2000, WCSA's core contract with HRDC ended. WCSA claimed that they were still owed \$60,000 on their core contract with HRDC. Approximately \$40,000 was paid to WCSA by HRDC in November 2000.
- In Summer 2000 a bailiff came to the WCSA office to seize assets, noting that WCSA directors' houses could be seized to help pay for a debt owed to Revenue Canada. WCSA received a letter from Revenue Canada stating that WCSA owed \$102,000 in deductions, taxes, and penalties. In Winter 2001 Revenue Canada suspended interest and penalties. After work by WCSA and audits by Revenue Canada, WCSA received a letter from Revenue Canada with a cheque for \$102 in January 2002.
- With the Revenue Canada debt removed, and some funds from rental of the tanner crab traps to the tanner crab project (with which they were no longer involved), WCSA held a debt of approximately \$75,000 in Fall 2001.
- In November 2001, two HRDC employees from Ottawa and Vancouver met with WCSA to try to understand WCSA's continued grievances. No resolution resulted.
- WCSA filed for bankruptcy in 2002. The tanner crab traps were sold to pay creditors.

Rams funding originally came through the WCSA contract with HRDC. When that funding was terminated, the Nuu-chah-nulth Tribal Council and RAMS members proposed at the Aquatic Management Board negotiation table that Federal and Provincial governments continue to fund RAMS until the negotiations were complete, so that there would be a smooth transition of services from RAMS to the AMB. DFO granted \$60,000 towards RAMS operations. With this funding and administrative fees on several contracts, RAMS was able to operate at limited capacity until the AMB was implemented.

### **5.8.5 Funding Results**

In the previous sections I have discussed some of the issues associated with the funding relationship between WCSA and HRDC. The following excerpt of an interview

with Dan Edwards (pers. comm. 2002) outlines these issues and several others that arose.

At first we had no resources at all. When we did get some grants, the governments deal with capacity in community by hamstringing capacity by not allowing core capacity to develop. So projects get put in place but there is no core capacity. So you need committed volunteers to do core capacity without remuneration in order to keep project capacity going.

A key to the building process was the Suzuki Foundation coming through with money to pay me to continue as a community activist. For an entire year I was paid to do something I couldn't have done otherwise, after two years without pay. It is critical at some point that core capacity be developed. There was a point at 1995-1996 where Suzuki couldn't get money and core capacity ran out and there was a sense that there was no more support for what we were doing and the Foundation said that they didn't think the AMB would take off because of a lack of government support. That is when regional districts and NTC and others stepped up and gave support for HRDC to invest.

You have to have investment in core capacity to allow project development and if you don't it won't happen. [Mike] Kardynal [HRDC-Port Alberni] was clear on this because he knew that without capacity nothing would happen because there is no one to do it, but he wasn't technically allowed to do anything.

And then there is the whole issue of where money comes from and agendas attached. If you don't have a wide variety of funding sources then you are at the mercy of one funder and if they want to pull out and destroy you they can do it, which they [HRDC] did.

A lot of that comes back to policy development around governments not being allowed to fund core capacity. It comes from central agencies trying to maintain control—why would they fund something to take over their responsibilities even though they are not doing them?

*Interview question: How much is needed financially?*

There is enough needed that you can start seeding projects that will eventually become self-sustaining. It is not a whole lot needed to start projects that will keep going. You need a strategic plan that will develop core capacity to make self-sustaining drivers eventually. Core capacity needed in international groups is recognized as taking 10 to 15 years. You need a long enough time frame to provide continuity. Most of your time is spent trying to find funding as opposed to doing other work, without continuity. The three year time frame under HRDC taken down to 1.5 years and then extended to two years was a political hit, but even several years was not enough. From the perspective of the Board,

putting a three-year limit on it seriously hampers efforts of the Board to develop long term strategies and is a method of government control.

The other thing about finances has to be framed in such a way as being done in cooperation with governments towards agreed upon objectives. If not, it will be sabotaged. Unless you can find a champion in government who sees the usefulness of it or someone outside to give you funding despite government.

As an example, there is enough capacity to develop projects. WCSA had ten projects outlined in the initial agreement with HRDC. Actual capacity would have been huge to deal with all of these. We had enough to start on a few of them. If government was serious about these objectives and moving policies to allow them to happen, then there is a project there that is real. Maybe the end date is ten years down the road. Objectives are clearly outlined and everyone is working on their parts. If not, then it is being done for vague feel good reasons. SEP project [DFO's Salmon Enhancement Project] doesn't have clear economic objectives. It is not good enough to have educational incentives.

Mr. Edwards' comments highlight the following seven issues associated with financial capacity and building co-management. First, there is a need for core funding to support the basic operations of the organization. These operations include the 'invisible' work of building consensus and an internal mandate, which is hard to quantify as tangible outcomes. Core funding does not necessarily have to be there right from the beginning but needs to be in place after the initial building stages in order to maintain momentum, allow for the development projects, and make sure that those who cannot afford to attend meetings can be reimbursed a nominal fee for doing so (Maureen Sager, pers. comm. 2003). Second, the core funding needs to be supplemented with seed funding for projects. Having money to do projects is critical to engaging communities and building capacity. As Darren Deluca (pers. comm. 2002) states:

I don't know about a dollar amount. You need core admin funds plus money to do things with. What are you about if you have no wheels to do anything? You lose your presence in the community.

Third, the amount of core and project funding must be adequate but not overwhelming. Funding from HRDC allowed WCSA and RAMS to produce results,

without being so large as to produce an unmanageable bureaucracy or so small as to distract WCSA and RAMS from their original goals. As WCSA and RAMS became more established, they then had more capacity and ability to pursue other sources of funding. This transition did not happen easily, in part because HRDC removed their funding prematurely and in part because WCSA and RAMS had become dependent on HRDC and did not diversify their financial base away from government. After its HRDC funding collapsed, RAMS was able to stay operational by gathering funds from different government sources based on the number of its activities. However, staff did not undertake any new projects or activities because there was uncertainty around longer-term income and the implementation of the new Aquatic Management Board (Darren Deluca, pers. comm. 2001). The following two interview excerpts highlight that the initial amount from HRDC provided some incentives for results and diversification, but thereafter uncertainty about funding meant that little was done:

There were ongoing struggles because none of the governments were willing to fund core activities to see the Board happen. On one hand it would have been nice to get a core operational budget for RAMS, but if it was that easy maybe we wouldn't have done the work of getting money from different agencies and figured out innovative ways of getting operational funds out of those projects to fund the whole thing. (Don Hall, pers. comm. 2002).

Living on the edge keeps you on the edge. You don't get all fat and lazy. The [AMB] Board has to have motivation to struggle to survive. A big fat long term contract doesn't necessarily provide that. All the 'deliverables' stuff [in big fat long term contracts] is just empty bureaucratic file filler [it doesn't provide real incentives for results]. . . . [However] As you lose resources you retract and centralize--the same old story. We pretty much rode it out towards the end because we had no resources. (Darren Deluca, pers. comm. 2002).

In summary, you need some resources to get started, followed by a significant amount of core funding with seed money for projects, and then enough core funding to give the organization some certainty. It is important to diversify funding and explore revenue generation options.

Fourth, it was necessary that funding partners and the organization work towards the same goals and clarify agreements. Goals needed to come mainly from the community but have the ongoing support of the funding agency. Clarifying verbal agreements in writing can help minimize misunderstandings and written contracts can help address variability in funding support, though the legal costs of addressing disputes can be impediments to their equitable resolution.

Fifth, funding capacity needed to come from a variety of sources. RAMS was able to continue to operate, although at a minimum level, because it had a number of revenue sources. Having diversified sources of income and commitment to common objectives also helped minimize the manipulation of agenda that can arise when an organization is tied to a single funding source. Ultimately WCSA's strong resistance to Federal government policies probably led to some of its problems with HRDC and Revenue Canada, sending a clear message that reliance on one source of funding comes at a cost.

Sixth, both WCSA and RAMS were hampered by the time frames associated with most funding. The three-year commitment from HRDC was useful in giving WCSA and RAMS some certainty regarding hiring staff, establishing a presence in the community, and partnering with other organizations. After HRDC, uncertainty about the organizations' existence undermined longer-term thinking and planning. This influenced the decision of other organizations as to whether to partner with the organization and forced it to spend considerable energy trying to generate funds rather than focus on achieving goals and objectives.

### **5.8.6 Case Study Propositions about Funding**

1. If leaders are able to generate a small amount of funding in Stage I and II (as outlined s.6.2 Mandate) to help sustain their effort and bring groups together, there is a greater chance of building momentum towards an internal mandate.
2. If an organization is able to generate core funding supplemented with seed funding for projects at the beginning of Stage III (as discussed under s.5.2 Mandate), it will maintain momentum for co-management and develop projects that contribute to its principles and goals.
3. If the organization becomes too dependent on one source of funding, its ability to fulfil its mandate is highly susceptible to changes and political manipulation within the funding source. Conversely, diversified funding sources contribute to the resiliency of the organization.
4. If funders are committed to and work towards the same objectives as their community partners and those objectives are mainly set by the community, the organization will have greater independence and ability to achieve its goals.
5. There is a greater likelihood of the organization achieving its goal if it can meet the challenge of sharing knowledge and building consensus in the community while assuring that projects produce the tangible results required by granting agencies.

## **5.9 Trust and Consensus Building**

### **5.9.1 Trust Profile**

Both WCSA and RAMS were born out of a desire for fair and transparent processes where different parties could sit down and negotiate solutions. While there was not a written process for building trust, the basic principle of respect was understood to lead to trust building. That is, if people treated each other in a respectful manner, then they would gradually grow to trust one another.

### **5.9.2 Trust Results**

This section begins by looking at trust within WCSA/RAMS, and then looks at trust with external partners. Trust took a long time to build within WCSA/RAMS. It took several years of work to get leaders and residents from the region to a common table,

which was a product not only of their good will but also of their pragmatic recognition of the advantages of cooperation. Trust grew slowly based on WCSA/RAMS members' continuing assessment of the advantages of doing so and the degree to which the other parties demonstrated they could be trusted. As parties were committed to a common vision and principles, had strong incentives to cooperate, and interacted repeatedly, there was an incentive to work together at building trust.

Trust was not demonstrated by words about cooperation so much as by actions. The respect people showed each other in smaller actions on a day-to-day level and during significant events are what undermined or built trust. The way people acted in adverse circumstances or in circumstances where they had incentives for self-interested behaviour was especially important in showing how much a party could be trusted. Dan Edwards comments (pers. comm. 2002) reflect the importance of people's actions in building trust where he states,

Trust comes from the working relationship that is ongoing. In a letter to Ruth [Dantzer, DFO] I mentioned the AFS [Aboriginal Fisheries Strategy] and Treaty as being catalysts for the approach out here in response to the divisive policy of the [Fisheries] Survival Coalition. A lot went on back then. Dennis [Brown, a union organizer] felt bad about being involved in the hopes of steering the Survival Coalition away from racism and all that but got burned. I wrote to Dennis saying he was being defensive, but make no mistake that I was a member of the Survival Coalition. I had to tell everyone this at the beginning of each meeting. So I was honest about it to the NTC [Nuu-chah-nulth Tribal Council]. We tried to get Bob Alford to get the East coast Vancouver Island chapter together with the NTC. The NTC understood I was a member of coalition and was trying to build bridges. A month before Mifflin [a federal plan regarding salmon allocation and harvesting], Bob Alford said they would meet with NTC. But when the Mifflin thing came out, Alford did a class action suit against the Nisg'aa [another First Nation in northern B.C.]. That destroyed any relationship we were trying to build. At that point NTC said they didn't want to deal with anyone from the Coalition and I quit the Coalition.

Action becomes apparent as to whether someone is working honestly or not. If someone is going to have different actions from words, an atmosphere of mistrust grows. Like when suddenly Jim Lockhart [HRDC employee working closely with WCSA] is not allowed to talk to us



and immediately the whole idea of a trust relationship with HRDC broke down.

It doesn't take much to break trust and takes a long time to reestablish it.

I tolerated a lot of mistrust with XXX for a while, with a sense of building trust, but when he had hired a lawyer to deal with the WCSA and RAMS situation, then I knew he was being dishonest. There is a level of trust built on words but actions belie words and that is the end of it. Bad actions slowly filter up and eventually there is a breaking point.

Table 10 outlines some of the main actions that either built or undermined trust in WCSA/RAMS (Field notes 1997-2001).

**Table 10: Actions that Built or Undermined Trust in WCSA/RAMS**

Trust building actions	Trust undermining actions
1.a) Inviting other WCSA/RAMS members to participate in meetings with governments or other groups, refusing to meet with governments or other groups unless with other groups, or discussing the meeting with WCSA/RAMS members beforehand to come to common agreement on how to approach it	1.b) Meeting with governments or other groups about issues within WCSA/RAMS mandate without telling or inviting WCSA/RAMS members, especially where the issue had a major impact on the other groups
2.a) Agreeing amongst WCSA/RAMS members before a meeting as to who should be there and what roles they should play	2.b) Meeting with governments or other groups about issues within WCSA/RAMS mandate while only inviting a few WCSA/RAMS members and excluding others
3.a) Being comfortable with a few members of WCSA/RAMS representing the group in different forums, where that was agreed to by the group. If talking on behalf of WCSA/RAMS, staying with what WCSA/RAMS had agreed to as main messages	3.b) In a meeting with other parties, undermining what other WCSA/RAMS members were saying or what WCSA/RAMS had agreed to beforehand
4.a) Discussing and involving WCSA/RAMS members in any potential agreements before they were underway or substantially complete	4.b) Meeting with governments or other groups, making agreements, and then announcing them afterwards to WCSA/RAMS members or not telling them at all
5.a) Following through on agreements or at the very least communicating reasons why the agreement needed to be changed or dropped	5. b) Making an agreement to do something and then not following through on it or abandoning the agreement in favour of a 'better deal' without discussing it with the original party
6.a) Letting people know beforehand what was happening or planned around a specific issue, and discussing their views on it	6.b) Not communicating about taking unilateral strategies or actions on a particular issue
7.a) Being honest and up-front about agendas, actions, or intended directions	7.b) Dishonesty, manipulation of process, and not being up-front with agendas
8.a) Letting others know in good time when a person was going to miss a meeting or be more than a few minutes late	8.b) Not showing up to meetings without telling anyone

9.a) Giving people time to speak and listening to their interests and concerns, constructively debating with them if in disagreement, and trying to find solutions to disagreements by giving something up or suggesting new possibilities	9.b) Not listening, not taking someone else's issue seriously, consistently not incorporating their suggestions, or being consistently critical of people's suggestions without offering constructive help or alternatives
10.a) Pointing out their positive traits or supporting other WCSA/RAMS members when others were criticizing them or trying to undermine them	10.b) Undermining another member of WCSA/RAMS behind his or her back
11.a) Sharing information. Not telling others outside WCSA/RAMS certain views or information that were understood to be 'internal'	11.b) Withholding information or views and 'leaking' information or views
12.a) Supporting others' agendas in recognition of support they have given or would give	12.b) Using others for supporting a person's/group's agenda without supporting their agendas
13.a) Taking responsibility for mistakes or actions, apologizing, seeing both sides of a story	13.b) A person or group blames others for their mistakes or doesn't take responsibility for their internal problems
14.a) Confronting breaches of trust in a frank and open manner or letting them go	14.b) Taking things too personally and getting overly sensitive about small items, or not communicating while retaining resentment

The points in Table 10 outline a mix of process and substance—communicating about what was happening and being willing to listen, find common solutions, and show mutual support. On many issues just the act of communicating was important to building trust. On other issues it was critical to incorporate another person's concerns or interests. This required judgment, and a member's judgment was related to his or her commitment to other WCSA/RAMS members and the process. WCSA/RAMS members were relatively grounded and pragmatic; they realized that if the groups were to function they had to work at building trust. This meant that when a person or group breached trust, sometimes WCSA/RAMS members had to be willing to let it go and at other times they had to discuss it with the person or group in a frank and honest manner. For instance, I was told a number of times and always in a firm and clear manner if I was undermining trust, and generally RAMS members told each other directly if they had a problem with something rather than complaining about it to others (Field notes 1998, 2000).

WCSA/RAMS members point out other important features of trust. Don Hall notes that relationship-building and the genuineness of people's commitment became obvious over time and contributed to people's comfort and trust levels. He notes,

RAMS people were wary of people early on. Once they started to bond together through personal relationships the trust grew through that. By the end of the RAMS stuff there was a high level of trust between people. I don't remember comments to the contrary. People were comfortable with other reps being there—as long as they knew it was someone who had been in it for a while they felt OK. Nuu-chah-nulth didn't necessarily have to be there if they knew someone from RAMS would be there like Wilf. It was nice to see that grow over the course of RAMS. It was very important—a 9.5 out of 10 (Don Hall, pers. comm. 2002)

Darren Deluca (pers. comm. 2002) points out that initially a common enemy substituted for trust, but over time trust became necessary in the face of adversity:

Trust is important in the long haul. There wasn't that much trust at the beginning. It was more that we had a common enemy. Over time when we faced adversity, that is when it was more important. It was more of an issue with someone like Wilf and myself—he hates the recreational fishery and in the back of his mind knew what his anger wanted to do but because he had to face me again he didn't want to breach the trust. Personally I had two adversaries on board—the troll fisheries, from an 'on the water type of thing'—we had to trust each other or we would tear each others throats out . . . and the other was that the political agenda of the Nuu-chah-nulth conflicted with my agenda. But we always managed to deal with it.

Maureen Sager had similar comments to Mr. Deluca. She noted the importance of having some past relationships, and the importance of being from the same area and having a strong common purpose regarding difficult issues facing the entire community. She states,

...it made it easier that a lot of us came from the same communities and we weren't strangers to each other. [But, in a few] cases we worked with each other in spite of what we knew about each other and our lack of respect for each other.

*What allowed you to get over that and work together?*

Because we could see the absolute need for a change in fisheries management and we could all see that that would have to come about and so that inspired us to overcome our distrust--enmity-- in the case of

things that arose in the situation in Clayoquot Sound. [Protests and blockades regarding logging practices].

*How much trust do you feel like you needed for RAMS to work?*

I think in the case of XXXX that was an isolated situation. If that had been happening between all of us and we had all been at each other's throats it would have been very difficult to overcome that kind of dislike, hatred, on [her/his] part, not on my part, I never... but the fact that a lot of us had already worked together on different issues or some of us anyway, that made it a lot easier to avoid feeling like a target of one person's hatred.

I suppose you have to analyze this and say that the importance of the issue determines the level of mistrust that can be tolerated and makes it possible to work together.

When the ultimate aim is very important and the need for change is obvious, it is possible to work together.

In addition to trust within WCSA/RAMS, there was also an issue of trust with external partners. This was especially important in partnerships with Federal and Provincial governments. Dan Edwards (pers. comm. 2002) notes:

You have to be accountable and show that you are being accountable at the community level. The difficult side is for WCSA to know how much to trust HRDC or government. Take the example of putting the Tanner Crab project together and then being told to go ahead and then HRDC pulling back. The only way around that is to wait for the contract to be signed. Maybe the lesson is that you can't trust government. Look at the \$170,000 through the labour adjustment partnership which was then destroyed in January once the project was under way, and then coming up with \$38K instead of \$170,000. In some parts of the country they were just giving money to their friends. The Federal government doesn't have accountability in place for its own distribution of money. That is never going to change unless it is exposed and it won't be exposed by those giving and getting it.

This scenario highlights the dilemma WCSA/RAMS faced in many instances of how to work with a partner that you did not or could not trust. As Mr. Edwards notes above, the conclusion reached was that you could not trust governments. Even if WCSA/RAMS felt they could trust an individual, they learned that they were never dealing only with one individual when dealing with most institutions—especially external

governments. This did not mean that nurturing individual relationships and trust were not highly important—they were—but that the larger context of the relationship needed to be noted.

For example, in partnering with the Provincial government on releasing shellfish aquaculture sites in certain areas, RAMS knew that they could not trust the Province to implement RAMS' recommendations, despite the oral assurances of the civil servants with whom they were dealing. This meant developing other means of trying to ensure cooperation. As a first approach, RAMS tried to establish written contracts with them. However, they would not agree to restrict their legislated authority for final decision-making, and the time it would take for them to review any agreements with their legal departments would slow the initiative to a halt. As there was pressure to keep the initiative moving forward, RAMS had to look at other options. This included keeping careful track of oral commitments in meeting minutes, 'monitoring' activities to stay aware of what they were saying and doing, and confronting them on actions undermining trust. RAMS also engaged in political lobbying to increase the Province's commitment to RAMS projects, dialogue with civil servants to understand their perspectives and outline the political repercussions of not implementing RAMS recommendations.

In the end, the Province adopted some but not all of RAMS' recommendations. Many participants felt upset that the energy they had put into the initiative was not fully recognized and respected by the government. Essentially, they felt that a degree of trust had been breached (Field notes 2001).

Lack of trust created tension and frustration. WCSA/RAMS had a complex task: on the one hand they were bound by their Terms of Reference to act in a trust-building manner, and on the other they were frustrated by the nature of their relationship with the government. WCSA/RAMS were aware that if they followed the former path the

government would take advantage of them, thereby undermining their mandate, but if they followed the latter path, they would become hypocrites and weaken their position by adding to tension and conflict.

This issue is important--I was naïve in my initial belief that somehow acting in a trust-building manner and producing reasonable, well-balanced products would mean they would be implemented (Field notes 1998). While this happened often within the region and with individual civil servants on smaller issues within their jurisdiction, it rarely happened with issues reflecting more significant changes from the status quo. Dan Edwards (pers. comm. 2002) describes this issue in depth where he states:

You don't go into external processes with the intent of trying to sabotage and destroy but try to promote your vision and understand. But just by being there, you become a target and it creates resistance. You have to be on the front line and fighting all the time and resistance can then create support in the region. That process becomes clear to people in the region that it is a good process and should be built on – the resistance you encounter can be used.

You have to be very careful with resistance because you have to be careful not to hate them. You have to stay focused on what you are trying to do rather than on hating them for what they are doing to you.

I think that if you're not willing to fight for what you believe in, then you will lose the battle and the war. I worry that right now that is the situation. No one is willing to take things head on. Governments will then say everything is OK and fine. There are no real concerns around wild salmon because there have been no voices over the last few years.

What is to stop DFO from getting away with what they are doing now in goose barnacles, hagfish, and everything else? The only thing with any potential is the [Aquatic Management] Board. The Board has to deal with it but has to walk a fine line of not getting painted into a corner of being adversarial about all this stuff.

There is constant tension between what feds want and what communities want. XXX said, you don't want to be another Dan Edwards and beat your head against the wall. The [Aquatic Management] Board wouldn't have ever started if someone hadn't done it. It is needed at a bunch of levels. Hatcheries, rockfish, all those issues. They need to come to the Board's attention as issues to be dealt with.

You have to have some place to stand to negotiate cooperatively. You have to take a stand when someone is coming down on your neck with a sword. You can't drop adversarial reaction. There has to be something driven out of the community. There has to be a sense of urgency. Otherwise you are in a political vacuum.

In an informal conversation, Cliff Atleo echoed the importance of the need for constant resistance but emphasized, "You can't get caught up in it, or it will eat you from inside. You have to use the crap thrown at you as a source [of positive energy for change]" (pers. comm. 2001).

Both Mr. Edwards and Mr. Atleo's comments reflect the importance of engaging in the political battlefield that sets the context for most issues. Other than their comments about the difficult task of avoiding acting out of hatred, I cannot conclude that any one approach helped resolve the extreme challenge this presents. Besides trying to build their power base, a 'good cop/bad cop' routine was as close as WCSA/RAMS got to using a defined strategic approach. At a personal level I concluded that acting in a principled manner even in the midst of adversarial relationships was the most effective way of addressing issues. It is something of a 'self-defence' approach.

### **5.9.3 Case Study Propositions about Trust**

#### **5.9.3.1 Trust within the organization**

1. In Stages I and II of building co-management, the existence of a common enemy may substitute for trust, but cooperation is more likely to be maintained where trust develops over time.
2. Trust is more likely to grow gradually through repeated interactions over time if:
  - a) Participants develop personal relationships and demonstrate they can be trusted through their actions, especially under adverse conditions, where there are incentives of self-interested behaviour, or in day-to-day activities.
  - b) Participants recognize the absolute need for change and the importance of their ultimate aim, and the fact that they are from the same area and share a common commitment to that area.

3. Some actions undermining trust may be tolerated if the advantages of cooperating outweigh the disadvantages, if the critical nature of the issue is such that it outweighs historic animosity, if participants recognize that people make mistakes and learn over time, and if there are other compensating actions that build trust.
4. If parties have frank discussions about some actions undermining trust while letting other actions go, they are more likely to continue to build trust over time.
5. If a participant(s) makes either a unilateral action clearly signifying a change in the relationship or makes a cumulative series of actions that finally outweigh the advantages of cooperating, trust will break down. If a relationship breaks down because trust was breached in either of these ways, the possibilities for restoring the relationship are likely to be remote.

#### **5.9.3.2 Trust with external groups and agencies**

1. If an organization begins to negotiate an external mandate with external governments and groups, there are likely to be groups and agencies with whom the organization has an essentially adversarial relationship involving actions undermining trust. This is likely to consume a significant amount of the organization's energy and limit the possible outcomes of the relationships to the balance of power between the parties.
2. A difficult challenge is likely to arise in building trust with necessary partners on the one hand and engaging in conflict on the other.
3. The chances of successfully addressing this challenge are greater if:
  - a) The organization strives to build its power base to place it on an equal footing with the conflicting partner and engages in a 'good-cop/bad-cop' routine.
  - b) Organizational leaders can transform anger, hatred or other emotions that arise in adversarial interaction into a source of positive energy and act with the manner of someone engaged in trust building even during adversarial interactions.

#### **5.9.4 Consensus Building Profile**

As mentioned above, both WCSA and RAMS were born out of a desire for fair and transparent processes where different parties could sit down and negotiate solutions. The process of coming to consensus was a little more intricate than the process of building trust, though similar in that it centered on the respect between parties. Table 11 contains the text of a document in which RAMS described its process of consensus building.



**Table 11: RAMS Policy Development Process/Approach**

<p><i>RAMS 'Bottom-up' policy making approach</i></p>	<p>RAMS does not subscribe to a 'top-down' positional policy development approach. Out of respect for First Nations and outstanding treaty settlement, individual First Nations must be involved in any policy decisions affecting their Ha-hoolthee. Also, out of respect for local governments and groups that might be affected by decisions, RAMS recognizes that they must all be involved in developing policies and programs that affect them.</p> <p>RAMS provides a core Board of key decision makers and groups in the region, but other groups may be involved in relation to specific issues. It is up to the people involved in any given issue to jointly participate in and agree on policy. This may occur through ongoing committees such as the Shellfish Development or Economic Development Committees, or it may occur through time limited, issue-specific committees or groups.</p>
<p><i>RAMS Role in Policy Development</i></p>	<p>RAMS role in relation to policy development is to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inform relevant groups of policy issues that may affect them</li> <li>• Facilitate groups and governments coming together in fair, well-organized shared decision-making processes with clear terms of reference</li> <li>• Ensure that the objectives and principles in RAMS Constitution and the Joint Policy Framework are reflected in all resolutions</li> <li>• Where necessary, arbitrate on an issue that cannot be resolved by committees, using objectives and principles as the means of arbitrating between different options</li> <li>• Communicate and coordinate issues between RAMS processes, committees, and the public</li> <li>• Work with Federal, Provincial, Nuu-chah-nulth and local government agencies to jointly implement policies or programs</li> <li>• Work with Federal and Provincial governments on national or provincial policy issues</li> <li>• Build cooperative management structures that lead to the fair, smooth resolution and implementation of Treaties.</li> <li>• Provide and store information from various processes in an accessible, geographically-based information system.</li> </ul>

<p><i>Shared Decision-Making Process</i></p>	<p>RAMS process for facilitating resolution to policy development includes five stages:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• RAMS members, staff, or consultants identify the issue(s) needing resolution and collect relevant information and viewpoints (background discussions and information collecting);</li> <li>• RAMS works with affected groups to design an appropriate process to resolve the issue (who needs to be involved, how will they work together, is a facilitator needed, timeline, communication plan, etc.);</li> <li>• RAMS facilitates or mediates discussion/negotiation between affected parties of how to resolve the issue (assemble all necessary supporting information, question sheets/interest statements, option papers, ratification, etc.);</li> <li>• RAMS works with affected parties and governments to implement resolution (transition plan, schedule, training, staffing, funding, etc.);</li> <li>• RAMS and its partners monitor and evaluate implementation (ongoing evaluation and dispute resolution mechanisms).</li> </ul> <p>RAMS believes in fairness and respect for all those participating in shared decision-making processes. This means people talking to each other in a manner that leads to positive, constructive solutions. Code of conducts for participation may be applied. Fairness and respect also means implementing built-in feedback mechanisms that ensure processes are efficient and facilitators/mediators are accountable. (Field notes 2000; original italics)</p>
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In addition to the broad formal process described in Table 11, RAMS developed some more detailed procedures for consensus building. For instance, RAMS staff or directors would prepare materials for meetings so that directors had adequate background and information to reach consensus on a particular issue. Within meetings, RAMS developed a system of formalizing a motion and a hand signal for approving it and moving forward.

The description in Table 11 outlines the elements of a formal process but does not adequately describe the deeper practice of consensus building employed by WCSA and RAMS. Within this basic formal process, an internal mandate needed to be built, requiring the kind of leadership, capacity, and commitment described in the previous sections of this chapter.

While WCSA and RAMS undertook a deeper practice of consensus and trust building within their Boards, they did so more variably in relation to different sub-committees. For instance, the Barkley and Nootka shellfish aquaculture committees or the economic development committee convened by RAMS were more formal, time-limited processes that did not build strong internal mandates. Groups were brought together by RAMS staff under the terms of reference, but no one played a strong leadership role.

As mentioned under Section 5.3 Representation, RAMS also used technical review committees to provide recommendations where conflict of interest issues might have challenged RAMS ability to achieve consensus.

#### **5.9.5 Consensus Building Results**

Consensus building in WCSA was an accumulation of the points raised in the discussion of the other topics in this chapter. Consensus arose partially through the size of the area, characteristics of representatives, leadership, facilitation, commitment to mutual principles and goals, administrative and technical support, and trust between WCSA/RAMS members. However, it is worthwhile reviewing and adding to previous discussions by briefly highlighting the main components of consensus building present or practiced by WCSA/RAMS.

The first key component relates to the motivations and understanding of participants. Participants on the RAMS Board were generally people of 'good will' in the sense that they were genuinely committed to its principles and goals. They were not there to block consensus or to undermine the process. Their participation was born out of a real motivation for change, given the despair experienced personally or within their communities. Almost everyone was also a long-standing member of a small rural

community, and many had fished, logged, or hunted for a living. Over the course of RAMS, several participants noted that many people around the table had been humbled by nature—they had experienced near death experiences on the water that gave them a different perspective on issues (Field notes 1999). Wilf Caron (pers. comm. 2003) describes his perspective on the importance of the motivation and understanding of WCSA/RAMS members where he states:

The kernel of how it was able to be accomplished is to meditate on the two phrases which I'm so glad were put into our operational thinking patterns—Hishtukish ts'awalk, and Issaak. People came to the Board with good will and knew this inherently that things are interconnected and that they didn't have to be proved to them by situations. They had seen this as a living thing all around them all the time. But probably what made the initiative succeed was the issue of Issaak, was the respect that was shown to everybody's satisfaction. No matter how small or large or how long, the respect for their experience was put into the mix and counted as valid. They validated each other's experience through Issaak. Where the thinking that frames normal negotiations or consultative processes are too often guided by one set of criteria or another having levels of value, whether it happens to be science or economics or sociology or business administration or politics. And too often one of those is the flavour of the month and takes priority. When everything is interconnected in a holistic fashion, nothing takes priority yet they all take priority. That is what people brought to the table and they knew it inherently so we were away to the races when we started.

In addition to this experience and understanding, many WCSA/RAMS members were familiar with consensus-based processes and had sat through processes that were not effective. They therefore had a direct understanding of the importance of 'leaving agendas at the door', respecting each other's views, and committing to common principles. RAMS members consistently noted the importance of First Nations' members experience with consensus and how that experience benefited the group. Maureen Sager (pers. comm. 2003) also reflected a common sentiment that First Nations presence gave a sense of perspective to other members where she stated: "It helped a lot to have First Nations people there. Partly as a reminder of course... if we thought we

were hard done by we only had to look across the table to see someone who was really hard done by!"

This mix of good will, motivation, and experience created a culture in RAMS that contributed to all members sharing these characteristics. As noted in the previous section, over time relationship and trust developed based on the demonstrated level of people's commitment. Tom Pater (pers. comm. 2003) notes,

On the whole people liked each other and were trustful of each other in that process in that structure. Our decision making process and how we ran meetings was pretty loose. People were trustful. It wasn't because people were totally compatible. It was quite a strange bunch of people that you wouldn't pull out of a crowd to say this bunch is going to work together.

There was a willingness and central desire—a tone of getting on with it. Did consensus work because structure was there or did structure work because people were willing? Structure came out of our willingness, but I guess a bit of both, they fed on each other, especially as new people came on.

Maureen Sager (pers. comm. 2003) considers that structure was important to creating a culture of consensus in RAMS, as was Nuu-chah-nulth participation, where she states,

The set up of RAMS encouraged that kind of decision making and certainly having the First Nations there who were very much used to the idea of coming to consensus decisions and willing to spend the time to reach those decisions, I think that made a big difference in being able to convince board members that consensus decision making is a good form to follow.

Meeting frequently, staying focused on the common objective, and covering a range of topics helped build these relationships and culture (Don Hall, pers. comm. 2002).

Having technical review committees to help mitigate potential conflict of interest issues was also important in demonstrating administrative fairness and building consensus on some issues.

There were also some practical reasons why WCSA/RAMS were able to achieve consensus on some difficult issues. The existence of a common enemy was important,

for example. Members were acutely aware that if they did not achieve consensus, they would be subjected to the decisions and policies of the Federal or Provincial government. WCSA/RAMS members understood that if they could not present a common front, then the Federal and Provincial governments would adopt the projects of other groups, which might not have the interests of the region as their focus. This gave the group a sense of identity and of the importance of staying together. It added a competitive edge to the organizations as well as a strong desire to replace the status quo. Darren Deluca (pers. comm. 2002) notes the team-building aspects of confronting a common foe where he states:

Part of it was that we were sort of at war. It's a camaraderie you can only develop through challenges. Like a hockey team going to the finals—you can't really do it when it just meets once in a while and people tolerate each other. We faced adversity together and took hits together. You have to go through something. It builds a bond.

There were several other practical approaches to achieving consensus and getting past disagreements. First, members understood when not to force an issue.

Don Hall (pers. comm. 2003) states,

Some things just got worked out over time. If it wasn't pressing and wasn't going to be worked out, it was put off until more thought and more discussion. No one tried to really force an issue.

Related to this was recognition of framing issues in the context of the broader community and not trying to advance narrow agendas. Darren Deluca (pers. comm. 2002) notes,

If the issue was presented without attacking another sector and was for the common good of the region, then people accepted it. ... People wouldn't allow attacks on sectors. It had to work for both. You couldn't have one roll over the others. ... There was a higher level of discussion—if anyone used it to try to move a personal agenda—it didn't work.

Participants also knew when to overlook some differences of opinion in order to move forward and support one another. They understood that if they supported another

member on a particular issue, they were likely to get the same support on one of their issues. However, as Mr. Deluca notes (pers. comm. 2002), this was a different kind of consensus than that which arose out of true agreement with a decision. He states:

Once you get on side for 90%, 10% you can either let go or give in or whatever. . . You get what you want so you let go. You use power and influence of another to get what you want so you don't mind supporting their issue. Sometimes it was about getting what I wanted but at other times there was unanimous true consensus. I don't like the 'I can live with it' definition of consensus--at times there was unanimous agreement which is much stronger. Consensus can be the lowest common denominator. There could be consensus when there were differences, but there was strong agreement on some issues.

A further practical issue relates back to the nature of the topics under discussion. As noted in section 5.2 Mandate, the issues had to be critical to people's lives. Maureen Sager (pers. comm. 2003) reflected on her experience with different boards and processes and stated:

I guess that was the main thing, I mean trying to reach consensus when you are just dealing with the Long Beach Model Forest [a Society to do forestry research] and what to do with some federal money is different than when you are dealing with a vital issue like fisheries management. The degree of severity of whatever precipitated the crisis probably does have some effect on how easy it is to reach consensus. I don't know. That's just a theory.

Ms. Sager also raises an interesting point about RAMS members moving beyond impasses to reach consensus. She stated:

It used to get tense between commercial and sport fisheries around allocations. Maybe it was the structure. There were so many different interests. It wasn't just two. It was a lot of different interests. Some of them non-consumptive. Maybe that helped that it wasn't just two diametrically opposed interests but a lot of different competing interests. Maybe that helped make it possible to achieve consensus, whereas if it had just been commercial and sports they would have just strangled each other. (Maureen Sager, pers. comm. 2003)

Mr. Deluca makes the same point and reiterates the key role of leadership in moving beyond impasses:

Leadership was key. Someone who carried a lot of influence on the board would step up and try and find the middle somewhere. Really when we got to these areas of disagreement it was generally over opinion, and someone would cut it to substance. Then someone would take out agendas and opinions and bring it back to the issue. Generally someone who wasn't part of the differences. It needed an outside perspective to put something on the table—framed in principles—then two guys couldn't argue about it anymore.

Such cooperation was not always present in some of RAMS sub-committees, where participants did not share the characteristics outlined above. In such cases, it was important to have constructive dialogues with members outside of meetings. This was the part of building consensus that was 'invisible' and took considerable time (as described under s.5.2 Mandate when discussing building an internal mandate). Mr. Edwards placed a high priority on building good relations and understanding. He notes (pers. comm. 2002):

The very basis of consensus is developing a common intellectual understanding so that everyone is speaking the same language. There has to be enough discussion so that everyone is on the same page and understands what everyone else is talking about.

Meetings were most successful when participants had time to think about and discuss issues beforehand in one-on-one conversations or small groups. Providing written information or documents was not sufficient to generate a common level of understanding around an issue. Where this did not occur, the practical difficulties of having conversations in larger groups, coupled with the number of items on an agenda, made for slow and sometimes frustrating meetings.

At first I did not work hard enough to prepare for RAMS sub-committee meetings, relying too heavily on the meeting itself as the time for 'thinking' to occur. I was used to the WCSA/RAMS Board meetings, which generally flowed well and in which discussion and group thinking were constructive, and I thought that this flow of energy could be replicated within a meeting context. When this failed to happen, I assumed it was



because of something about the meeting itself (the mood, mix of participants, room, number of items on an agenda, etc.). I was not recognizing that these factors might influence whether a meeting was of extraordinary quality but were not sufficient to make meetings of consistently high quality. I came to recognize that WCSA/RAMS Board meetings went well because Mr. Edwards and other members/staff worked hard on issues between meetings and because of the 'platform' that had been built in giving RAMS its internal mandate. This kind of work allowed people to entertain and debate old and new ideas more fully, understand different views, clear up misperceptions or misinformation, and reflect on the consequences of different approaches. This created room in people's minds for new possibilities and alliances. No amount of paper or information that I produced beforehand could substitute for this kind of personal interaction and dialogue.

It was important to "leave agendas at the door" when developing a common understanding around an issue. It was not sufficient to have a solution that WCSA/RAMS were trying to sell—WCSA/RAMS needed to have a general sense of direction from their vision, principles, and goals but also needed to be open to people's perspectives on the issue. People had to feel that the decision was not already made, that their view was being respected in a tangible way, and that the process could lead to a direct benefit. Mr. Edwards (pers. comm. 2002) notes:

The biggest thing to me is that you have to be open about it and to discuss it without walking out of the room. People had to be willing to stay in the room to hammer it out. The difference between that and most processes is that the decision has been made. The typical approach of DFO. If you go to enough meetings, you pick up whether it is a real discussion or a dead discussion. It is obvious when a process is set in a certain direction and it is a sham process. You have to follow through on stuff in meetings. If it doesn't go in the direction they want it to go, then they just ignore direction of the meeting and move it into another process. You find out if it is being directed from other places. It is obvious when you are wasting your time.

The reason people came and stayed is because it was hitting them somewhere in their life. People have to feel something wrong is occurring and that it hits them in their life and that the process can address the issue. There has to be faith that it is leading somewhere.

Underlying many of these points was the issue of timing. As some anonymous person said, 'timing has everything to do with the outcome of a raindance.' Tom Pater (pers. comm. 2003) noted that the many factors outlined in this case study are part of a synergy that is influenced by internal and external circumstances, where he states,

You can have all those things happening and nothing will happen. Something else causes that gelling. Leadership is crucial, sure, but I was talking before about the ripeness of the soil. Things are sort of interdependent (Tom Pater pers. comm. 2003).

The following quotes from various Board members summarize many of these points about building consensus.

It goes back to previous questions—principle-based, trust, strong leadership. Those were the building blocks. We had a common goal and interests and enemy. Don't underestimate the value of a common foe.

Those allowed us to get to consensus. You need leadership. You need common ground and the objective to build the board. You need grounding of the principles (Darren Deluca pers. comm. 2002).

[Consensus] is a foundation but it does not work unless you have somebody there as a guide that knows how the consensus principles work.

[You need] Determination. Picking up and carrying on and moving along that same vision of determination, and a lot of other people got strength from that. Tolerance. There was lots of humour there too. New perspectives. A lot of those perspectives were humourous, looking at things from a different angle. ...Control[ling] ...frustrations.

...Using those two same Nuu-chah-nulth phrases.... I mean if I respect you and the environment that is there, realizing the interconnectedness of everything else around, well those are the only principles that we need actually (Wilf Caron pers. comm. 2003).

We met often, dealt with a broad range of subjects and we were at it long enough to establish the relationships you need to achieve consensus. We had associated groups...which operated on consensus-- people coming from that background helped.

Having a clear common objective was the main thing that made it work and kept people together. And good staff along the way to help (Don Hall pers. comm. 2002)

There was agreement on the absolute need for a different way of managing the fisheries. That was the belief that the current method of fisheries management was leading to disaster and there had to be a different way

When the ultimate aim is very important and the need for change is obvious, it is possible to work together.

First Nations board members were so valuable in the looking at things in the long term and they were willing and able to instruct us in the way their resource management structures took place-- "Ha hoolthee"-- and inspire us (Maureen Sager pers. comm. 2003).

People were there because they were interested, not because they were assigned to go. It goes back to some original stimulus—a vision that was fed and nurtured by people and actions and luck (Tom Pater pers. comm. 2003).

If you're not willing to fight for what you believe in, then you will lose the battle and the war. You have to have some place to stand to negotiate cooperatively.

At the end of the day, it's about the political will built at community level to change policies destroying the community level.

You phone people directly and say 'are you interested in this issue?' and then invite them to come and find solutions and then judge if there is political will by whether people make the time to come. Between meetings we were always working on issues.

There has to be a common understanding built and references back to history and what the reasons are for cooperating.

It is education and dialogue and discussion and understanding. If you get that, then the next step is to implement.

There has to be faith that it is leading somewhere (Dan Edwards pers. comm. 2003).

Everyone says this is complex. But this so-called 'complexity' isn't really there. If we cut through all that and stay focused on 'Hishtukish ts'awalk', all the complexity goes away. Everything we need to know is within that. We just need to stay focused on it and let it guide our actions (Cliff Atleo pers. comm. 1997).

### **5.9.6 Case Study Propositions about Consensus Building**

1. In addition to the many factors discussed in this chapter (leadership, facilitation, geography, capacity and funding, vision and principles, etc.), if the participants in an organization have good will, positive experience with consensus building, and a sense of interconnection, there is a greater likelihood that the organization will reach agreements.
2. If participants interact frequently around a range of topics, their experience and commitment will help them to build trust and a culture of consensus within the organization over time.
3. If there is a fair and transparent administrative process supporting decisions that might involve conflict of interest, it is easier to achieve consensus.
4. If the relationships and culture of an organization are supported by practical incentives for reaching consensus, including facing a common threat, gaining support for an initiative by supporting someone else's initiative, and dealing with issues that are of vital importance to people's lives, the organization will reach agreement more easily.
5. If there is a diversity of groups involved working towards the same goals, it is likely that they can help to diffuse tensions between several parties over certain issues, giving the competing parties some perspective on their dispute and providing more reminders and methods for achieving consensus.
6. If several participants work between meetings building a common knowledge base and working through issues, it will be easier to reach agreement at meetings. If participants have less experience, understanding and commitment or if there is not a strong internal mandate or fewer practical incentives for participation, more effort needs to be put into building a common knowledge base and working through issues between and during meetings.
7. If participants 'leave their agendas at the door', and make the decision-making process open and responsive so that people feel that the process can address their issues and interests in a meaningful manner, the organization will reach agreement more easily.
8. If the internal and external circumstances surrounding a co-management arrangement support the synergy of different groups' efforts to work together, consensus will be easier to reach.

## **6 A DISCUSSION OF METHODS, THEORETICAL AND CASE STUDY PROPOSITIONS, AND KEY LESSONS**

This case study is about co-management of aquatic resources, but it is distinct in the co-management literature in four ways. First, it is a study about the process of building co-management, rather than a study about an existing co-management institution. Second, it describes a regional level approach focused on an integrated, ecosystem approach rather than a study of single species/issue management. Third, it tells a story of a partnership between First Nations and other residents of an area to implement an approach to management rooted in their experiences, needs, values, and beliefs. In many ways it is a story about how co-management is embedded in the natural history of an area, and how the values, beliefs, and experiences of an area's people influence their pursuit of principles of sustainability. Finally, the case study differs from much of the literature in that the researcher was an active participant in the case study for 5 years, providing a depth and richness of insight and findings.

These distinct aspects of the case study do not detract from the relevance of its findings to other settings. In order to clarify and highlight the main contributions of this case study to co-management theory, this chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section I discuss findings about the participant research methods used. In the second section I relate findings from the case study described in Chapter 5 to the co-management research literature synthesized in Chapter 2. I restate propositions from chapter 5 and from the literature, and follow them with a discussion of whether and how they converge and diverge from the case study propositions. In the final section I discuss the essential lessons and contributions of the case study.

## 6.1 'Inside Out' and 'Outside In': Discussion of Case Study Process

Participatory research methods (PRM) provided me with the opportunity to gain rich, detailed understandings and examples from the case study and to contribute to the case study in an active, creative manner. PRM provided a useful framework within which I could develop a mutually beneficial partnership with participants in the case study context. They and I were both interested in sharing experience, rather than being either the objects of study or a detached observer. This meant learning together by working together and bringing our differing backgrounds and perspectives to the project. PRM offered us a unique opportunity to blend the kind of learning that arises from exposure to concepts and case studies with the kind of learning that arises when one tries to implement concepts and lessons learned by others.

In many ways the approach was similar to an apprenticeship, where I was exposed to the theory, given the opportunity to practice it, and then asked to reflect on both. As with any apprenticeship, there were several challenges. For instance, the advantages of gaining detailed understanding, relationships, and approaches as an inside participant were tempered by the difficulty I experienced in seeing other perspectives, views, or approaches. This happened for several reasons. First, there was pressure to adopt participants' theories if only by osmosis. Second, it is difficult to observe the way something grows when you are growing with it. In other words, the advantage of seeing things from the inside out make it difficult to see things from the outside in. It can also lead unconsciously or consciously to researcher bias.

As outlined in Chapter 3, PRM recognize this potential limitation, noting that participatory researchers can easily assume the thinking and values of the group with whom one is working. This can reduce the range of interpretations available to the

researcher when collecting and analysing data and discussing results. The suggested approach of documenting personal and ideological biases was useful in this regard, as was documenting the main transformations I experienced over the course of the research process (see Chapter 3). Also, maintaining rigorous standards around the collection and use of evidence to support propositions was helpful. However, I also found that my research supervisor and supervisory committee were important sources of an 'outside in' perspective. During the research process and when reviewing drafts of the thesis, it was extremely important that my supervisor and research committee were aware of these issues and diligent in helping me to address them.

A secondary challenge associated with PRM has to do with the integration of the academic and practical dimensions of a project. The degree of immersion and time and energy needed for working and being 'inside' a case study meant that I grew increasingly distant from the university setting and academic requirements. This was reinforced by being dismissive of academic viewpoints, which I saw at the time as being too detached from the 'struggle' of building co-management in the 'real world'. This was partially arrogance on my behalf and partially my wanting to be more of an 'insider' by distancing myself from 'outside' perspectives. To counteract these kinds of issues, the researcher needs to have a strong commitment to both the academic and case study endeavours. This must be supported by the kind of patience, commitment, and direction I had from my supervisor, supervisory committee and partners in the case study context—almost all of whom saw both the academic and case study work as valuable.

Despite these challenges, PRM provided a rich and broad spectrum of learning opportunities. While not for every researcher or research context, they are likely suitable in circumstances where potential research participants are interested in an equal, participatory learning partnership with researchers. Further PRM studies are needed to

enhance co-management theory and practice by providing more 'inside out' perspectives.

## **6.2 Expanding Co-management Theory: Discussion of Research Outcomes**

In this section I compare the theoretical propositions outlined in Chapter 2 with the results of the case study described in Chapter 5. The comparison uses the same format and headings as in both Chapters 2 and 5. Propositions from Chapter 5 are outlined first under each heading, and propositions from Chapter 2 are outlined in text boxes. Comparative discussion follows individual or grouped Chapter 2 propositions depending on the extent to which issues overlap. While the synthesis of theoretical literature included in the text boxes does not capture the richness of detailed findings in the literature, it provides a basic analytical framework for testing and discussing modifications and additions to existing theory. It also hopefully provides a window into co-management theory for readers from a range of disciplines and backgrounds.

### **6.2.1 *Geographic Scope***

#### **Case Study Propositions**

1. Four characteristics related to geographic scope are cumulatively necessary in fostering co-management and working towards principles of sustainable aquatic management. These are:
  - a) A sufficient degree of cultural, economic, and ecological homogeneity in the area.
  - b) An area that balances being small enough to capture local knowledge and input, while being large enough to address migratory species or other broader aquatic issues.
  - c) Existing political and administrative reasons and features supporting the chosen boundary.
  - d) A cultural and historical basis for the boundary that is supported locally.



2. Where these four characteristics are present, there is a greater likelihood of:
  - a) moving to an ecosystem-based approach, involving coordination and integration of a diverse range of people, information, and activities, and shifting people's focus from maximizing one sector at the expense of others to maximizing overall area benefits by balancing different uses.
  - b) using local knowledge and relationships ('social capital') in management.
  - c) achieving economies of scale in addressing different management issues.
  - d) fostering a stronger sense of community pride, values, and territoriality, all of which can be powerful motivators for co-management and sustainable aquatic management principles.
3. Coordinating with and gaining strong legal, financial, and policy commitment from external authorities and groups working at broader spatial scales increases the likelihood of working cooperatively towards principles of sustainable aquatic management.
4. When coordinating and seeking commitment from external authorities and groups working at broader spatial scales, a classic organizational challenge is likely to arise in terms of the amount of work spent coordinating outside of the region and that spent dealing with issues and building capacity within it. If leaders and staff spend too much time outside the region, the organization and internal mandate will start to disintegrate. If leaders and staff do not spend enough time outside the area, the organization and its internal mandate will not receive the support and coordination it needs to survive. This is likely to be exacerbated if other regions are not organized and coordinated in a coast-wide body or if the co-management initiative is new and unfamiliar.
5. As the cooperative organization takes on more responsibilities and plays a variety of roles, a challenge is likely to arise in the terms of coordinating with local bodies over power and allocation of resources.

There is a greater chance of addressing this challenge if three inter-related functions are fulfilled under the umbrella of co-management: 1) policy development and facilitation; 2) holding and administering funds, licences, tenures, and allocations; and 3) developing and implementing 'on the ground' projects at the local level. This proposition has the following sub-propositions about the characteristics and approach required under each of these functions:

- a) The chances of successfully undertaking a policy function are increased if local participants have a means of participating in decisions and sharing information with the regional forum. Trust in the organization, based on its demonstrated commitment, representation and network of contacts, and longevity will increase this likelihood. The approach is mainly one of communication, information sharing, facilitation, and mediation.
- b) The chances of successfully holding and administering funds, licences, tenures, and allocations, are increased if external governments and local bodies recognize the role of a regional organization in holding these items in trust for the overall region. It is hypothesized that this likelihood will be

increased if the regional organization has the political independence and appropriate capacity to undertake an investment, allocation and contract auditing and management approach, and administrative capacity to maintain accountability, though further experience and research is needed in this area.

- c) The chances of successfully fulfilling a project implementation function are increased if local level organizations and businesses have the capacity to turn concepts into concrete results. The approach mainly involves administering and managing the development and implementation of 'on the ground' projects that show tangible results.

### **Propositions from the literature and comparative discussion**

1. If the organization works within a clearly defined local area with relatively homogenous ecological and human characteristics, there is a greater possibility that the interconnection between activities will be recognized, fostering an 'ecosystem approach' (Lee 1992; Brown and MacLeod 1996; Pomeroy and Berkes 1997; Hanna 1998; Pinkerton 1998; Prystupa 1998). This may arise because more detailed information on the integration and subtlety of spatial and temporal relationships will develop and be used in management. For instance, individual stocks and habitats are likely to receive attention rather than looking only at aggregates of stocks/habitat (Singleton 1998), cumulative or cross-sectoral impacts are likely to be noted (Ruddle et al. 1992), and intergenerational knowledge is likely to exist or develop (Pinkerton 1998; Scott 1998).

2. If the organization works within a local area and reflects the sociology and ecology of the area, it will be more effective at designing and implementing effective, accepted, and integrated rules and regulations in a timely manner (Jentoft 1989; Pinkerton 1989; Rettig et al. 1989; Ostrom 1990; Wilson et al. 1994; Begossi 1995; Knudsen 1995; Sunderlin 1997; Ostrom et al. 1999).

These propositions are reflected in the case study results, though the latter part of the second proposition speaks more to the outcomes of an established co-management body than to the process of building one. The case study offers further insight into the challenge of defining an area and the cumulative nature of reasons for choosing a boundary that will foster co-management, as in Case Study Proposition (CSP) #1. Most significantly, the case study adds to current theory by highlighting the importance of participants' pride, identity, and commitment to an area (CSP #2d). This

builds on Singleton's (1998) conclusions regarding co-management in Washington State. These factors were clearly important as the basic motivation to build co-management. They provided the will-power needed to build co-management in the face of a variety of tensions and conflicts inherent in change. Their significance supports theoretical emphasis on local culture and institutions being important foundations for the success of co-management, and highlights the importance of indigenous cultural traditions and territories related to co-management (CSP #1d) (see also Pinkerton 1998).

3. If the organization works within a clearly defined local area with enforceable boundaries and coordinates with organizations working at broader spatial scales, it will be more successful at implementing principles of sustainability. (Berkes 1985; Jentoft 1989; Pinkerton 1989; Ostrom 1990; Pinkerton 1994; Wilson et al. 1994; Kurien 1995; Montgomery et al. 1995; Pinkerton and Weinstein 1995; Grumbine 1997; CRIFQ 1999).

This proposition is reflected in the case study results, though with several important notations and additions. First, 'enforceability' is likely to be complex in many current contexts. From the perspective of trying to retain local access to resources and participation in management, for instance, free trade agreements and international investment make boundary protection difficult to address at a local level. Coordinating with and gaining strong legal, financial, and policy commitment from external authorities and groups working at broader spatial scales are therefore especially important in building co-management that reflects principles of sustainable aquatic management (CSP #3).

The case study further shows that this proposition needs an additional notation regarding the challenge this represents for building co-management. A classic organizational challenge is likely to arise in terms of the amount of work spent coordinating outside of the region and that spent dealing with issues and building

capacity within the region (CSP #4). This is likely to be exacerbated if other regions are not organized and coordinated in broader institutions. This notation points to a growing area of research in relation to building and practicing co-management: the ways in which co-management can be integrated horizontally and vertically through networks, alliances, and 'nested' institutions (Berkes 2002). While the concept of 'nested' institutions has been in place for over a decade, common pool literature now needs to undertake case studies of how co-management institutions coordinate and divide roles and responsibilities between different areas and scales, and what challenges and opportunities arise.

The case study also adds to existing theory by outlining issues related to internal coordination. Co-management areas that take advantage of economies of scale and try to encompass sedentary and migratory stocks are likely to be reasonably large—in the case study the land area was as large as many countries. This creates a challenge of coordinating with more local areas and bodies—especially over decision-making power and allocation of resources. The case study outlines three inter-related functions that are important under an umbrella of co-management: 1) policy development and facilitation; 2) holding and administering funds, licenses, tenures, and allocations; and 3) developing and implementing 'on the ground' projects at the local level (CSP #5). The case study also outlined some of the characteristics and approaches related to each of these functions (CSP #5a,b,c). These outlines present a structure for future research about different activities within co-management institutions. Co-management literature could be improved by more explicitly showing how each of these functions are addressed, examining the interplay between these functions, and showing how they can be successfully fulfilled in the context of ecosystem management and other principles of sustainable aquatic management.

## 6.2.2 *Mandate*

### Case Study Propositions

6. Authority delegated to an organization by specific agencies over specific tasks or elements of its broader mandate has certain advantages and disadvantages.

Advantages include: a) building short-term capacity in the organization; b) working in the short term towards one or several organizational goals; c) increasing appreciation for management issues and trying some limited alternative approaches around specific tasks; d) using the capacity and funding under delegated authority as a means to achieve broader goals and longer-term change; e) demonstrating success and producing tangible products and results in communities; and f) developing allies within governments.

Disadvantages include: a) replicating the problems and issues facing delegating agencies; b) becoming mired in administration and 'short-term fixes', which distracts from meaningful policy issues and focus on longer-term goals; c) becoming associated with governments and losing credibility in communities; d) adopting the 'stovepipe' management framework for dealing with issues in isolation from each other, which undermines the main principle and goal of ecosystem management; e) becoming dependent on government, and therefore more vulnerable to political changes and pressures, including withdrawal of funding and direct attempts to undermine the organization, with few avenues of recourse; and f) building up of acrimony and pessimism in communities when governments withdraw funding or misuse their power, meaning over the long term that capacity may be undermined rather than built and original goals not achieved.

7. If delegated authority from different agencies within external authorities is granted to the organization for specific tasks, it is easy for the organization to become distracted from its principles (for example, an integrated, ecosystem approach, equitable sharing of access to resources, democratic participation in decision-making, and other sustainable aquatic management principles).
8. If a broader external mandate is granted by external authorities, there is more opportunity for the organization to achieve principles of sustainability. However, this depends on the manner in which the external mandate is granted and adopted. Building to a more successful broader external mandate involves the following stages and issues.

#### Stage I: Building an internal mandate for change

- a) A first step towards the achievement of an external mandate is likely to involve people within the region identifying and demonstrating willingness to address issues most critical to them.
- b) If an internal mandate stems from the physical realities and pain facing people in the region and their sense of pride, identity and commitment to

the area, rather than from an ideological program or agenda disconnected from people's needs or experiences, it is more likely to be successful. If issues significantly affect people's daily lives, these issues will garner more of their interest and commitment over time. If issues are defined such that different sectors or groups can recognize they share the same views, a broader internal mandate from the entire region is likely to develop.

- c) Political understanding of the issues will develop through a process of one-to-one discussions and community meetings. If respected community leaders having a solid understanding of issues and a vision for the community are involved, more people will be engaged and the base of support will be broader.
- d) If people are able to identify common issues, it is more likely that people will be motivated to address them and that political will and community cohesion will grow.
- e) The chances of building a strong internal mandate are better if people from outside the region are involved in a supportive capacity at the request of the participants. Types of support at this stage include description of different possible models and experiences from elsewhere, neutral facilitation, and advice when solicited.
- f) If an internal mandate and then formal mandate are to be adopted and implemented successfully, the activities in this stage do not 'end' but rather evolve into maintaining an internal mandate. The need for continued dialogue, identification of issues, and seeking commitment continues through all subsequent stages.

#### Stage II: Building alliances outside the region and cementing a regional partnership

- g) Once the basic issues and will to address them have been identified, there is a better chance of more extensive collaboration between people within and those outside the region. If external partnerships are selected carefully and if it is clear that their role is to support the communities' agenda, partnerships will aid in helping the internal mandate mature rather than stunting its growth or killing it by introducing new agendas, self-serving strategies, or incentives for fracturing at the community level.
- h) If the identification of issues and will have reached an adequate stage of maturity, formalizing them into a clear internal mandate will help produce and demonstrate unity and commitment. (This normally occurs in the form of a Constitution or terms of reference for an organization and the commitment of members and directors). If local governments and powerful community groups agree to the internal mandate, there is a much stronger likelihood of making it through the next stage and being granted an external mandate.

Stage III: Broadening the regional circle, taking on responsibilities, and overcoming challenges

- i) If a region has a clear internal mandate, it can then seek an external mandate from those with authority. If the external mandate is to be successful, it must have the same foundation upon which the internal one was built. This means working under the same principles and towards the same goals.
- j) If groups within the region find people among the external authorities or groups sponsors who support the foundations of the internal mandate, their alliance can help guide the initiative to successfully achieving an external mandate. The anonymity of their alliance can help some people in external authorities and groups be of assistance. If groups within the region do not appreciate the difficulties that supportive people within external authorities face, they are likely to miss opportunities to develop allies or will lose allies.
- k) An external mandate will be easier to achieve if:
  - i) the policies and legislation of the external authority support the internal mandate of the region and the governments are consistently reminded of them;
  - ii) these legislative and policy commitments are used as a framework for negotiations to establish an external mandate; and,
  - iii) the discussion of a formal mandate occurs within a formal negotiation process to which external authorities commit.
- l) If a regional organization has a clear internal mandate for substantial change and seeks an external mandate from those in authority, a variety of tensions and conflicts are likely to arise. Sources of these tensions may include:
  - i) A 'zero-sum' game mentality, in which participants and their opponents see themselves engaged in a struggle over finite resources and power, with the end result being a 'win/lose' scenario.
  - ii) Historic anger, prejudice and mistrust built up between groups through events, actions and rigid attachment to ideologies. This latter source of tension was entrenched in the case study context and was extremely difficult to overcome.
  - iii) Cultural barriers to communication and dysfunctional forums for communication. Along with poor communication came poor information sharing, that limit people's capacity for empathy and agreement.
  - iv) Tension as a motivating force for gathering support for a cause. Having a 'common enemy' can be a necessary force in galvanizing support for or opposition to co-management. Trying to understand and empathize with the perspectives of opposing groups can be counter-productive in achieving a group's short-term goals.

- v) Differing values and principles amongst proponents and opponents of co-management.
  - vi) Lack of incentives for some groups to negotiate. Groups whose values and goals have historically and currently been implemented through government policies and plans have few incentives for participation amongst.
  - vii) Immediate issues and pressure to resolve them. The direct and immediate pain being experienced by participants, such as loss of livelihood, bankruptcy, and social problems such as high suicide rates and drug/alcohol/physical abuse in their communities needed some attention. Faced with those circumstances, participants tend to react either self-destructively or in a confrontational manner.
- m) These sources of tension can undermine the essence of co-management, which is finding 'win/win' solutions through collaborative partnerships that enable all parties to adapt to change and uncertainty. Further research is necessary on how tension and conflict interact in building co-management.

#### Stage IV: Receiving the external mandate

- n) The evolutionary approach in Stages I-III provides 'stepping stones' for implementing an external mandate. Most importantly, it provides a foundation of support, commitment, experience, and relationships within the area and a network of partnerships with groups outside the area.
- o) Receiving an external mandate is time sensitive in terms of maintaining and building on energy and momentum in the area.

Further propositions about this stage, which is currently underway, are recommended for future research.

#### Propositions from the literature and comparative discussion

1. If an organization has an adequate scope and mandate and it is formalized in a multi-year legal agreement that includes a clear legal definition of powers, roles, rights, and responsibilities, it is less likely to be vulnerable to the attempts of government agents and different groups to consistently undermine it (Pinkerton 1989; 1994; and 1996; Pomeroy and Carlos 1997).

This proposition is partially confirmed by the case study results, in that the absence of a multi-year legal agreement over mandate made the organization vulnerable to attempts to undermine it. However, the organization did have a multi-year



legal agreement with government over certain aspects of a broader mandate. This agreement was prematurely terminated, so it is not totally clear that a multi-year legal agreement is enough to reduce an organization's vulnerability. The degree to which a mandate is legally entrenched (i.e., a memorandum of understanding, signing onto a terms of reference, a contract, or a Constitutionally recognized treaty) needs further research, as does the time frame for an agreement (e.g., 3, 5, 10+ years). It would also be useful to further research the causes and forces that work to undermine co-management arrangements (as suggested by CSP #8m).

2. If a strong mandate is established without prior relationship building, the organization may face difficulty implementing it immediately (Singleton 1998). An organization will have a better chance of success if the mandate is phased in over time according to the priorities and capacity of the organization (Pinkerton 1989; Pomeroy and Carlos 1997; Prystupa 1998). The achievement of short-term success will mould commitment and help build experience and capacity (Pinkerton and Weinstein 1995).

This proposition is reflected in the case study results, though with qualification. The building phase described in this case study allowed for an external mandate to be phased in over time, for capacity to be built, and for examples of success (CSP #8). This evolutionary approach provided critical 'stepping stones' for building an external mandate (CSP #8n). Most importantly, it provided a solid foundation of support, commitment, experience, and relationships within the area and a network of partnerships with groups outside the area. However, an important qualification is added to this proposition, as the case study demonstrated both advantages and disadvantages to this approach (CSP #6). For instance, in its discussion of delegated authority, the case study showed that having external governments divide the mandate into smaller pieces can replicate many of the problems with status quo management approaches and distract from implementing principles of sustainable aquatic management in a cohesive way (CSP #7). The case study also showed that the time between solidifying the

internal mandate and receiving an external mandate can be limited (CSP #8o). It is therefore important to emphasize building a strong internal mandate for co-management in the area, and then establishing a broad external mandate in a time-sensitive manner (CSP #8).

3. An organization is more likely to develop optimal decisions if it has a mandate and scope adequate to the problems and issues at hand, some autonomy to develop rules, the ability to directly implement or compel implementation of decisions, adapt them in a flexible manner, and monitor and enforce rules through graduated sanctions (Jentoft 1989; Ostrom 1990; Gray 1989; Pinkerton 1994; Deyle 1995). This implies state recognition, support, and commitment to shared decision-making for key property rights issues such as access and withdrawal, management, and exclusion (Ostrom 1990; Schlager and Ostrom 1993; Schlager 1994; Singleton 1998). It also may involve a constitutional level framework that gives groups enough security over access that they can benefit from their decisions (Pomeroy and Carlos 1997).

This proposition speaks more to an established co-management system than the process of building one. As noted in the introduction to this thesis, establishing the kind of mandate outlined in this proposition is not well documented. Therefore, while the proposition is generally reflected by the case study results, the case study adds to this aspect of co-management theory by describing key stages and challenges in building a broad external mandate reflecting principles of sustainable aquatic management (CSP #8). Most significantly, the case study outlines the importance of first building an internal mandate in an area, and then successfully addressing the significant tensions and conflicts that arise in moving from an internal mandate to a strong external mandate (CSP #8L).

4. People will be unlikely to participate in an organization if the costs of participating are not balanced by their ability to reap equivalent benefits (Schlager and Ostrom 1993; Schlager 1994). Therefore, if an organization lacks meaningful decision-making authority, participants will question its legitimacy and likely not participate in a sustained manner.

This proposition is reflected in the case study results, though the case study adds to existing theory by outlining a complex picture of participants' motivations (CSP #8a-d). For instance, pride, identity, culture and socioeconomic circumstances can create a range of psychological motivations and 'benefits' for participants (CSP #8b). Psychological, as opposed to mainly socio-economic, motivations for inter-group behavior are increasingly being studied by researchers working within social identity theory (Foddy and Hogg 1999; Shafer 1999; Brewer 2000). Looking at these issues through a partnership with psychological researchers might provide some interesting and useful advances in co-management theory.

### **6.2.3 Representation**

#### **Case Study Propositions**

9. Co-management reflecting principles of sustainable aquatic management is more likely to be built if participants in the first several stages are from the area, represent its cultural and sectoral diversity, and have knowledge of its history and traditional management institutions.
10. If participants represent diverse interests and experiences in aquatic management but have a common desire to change from status quo approaches, common principles and values reflecting principles of sustainable aquatic management, and a willingness to accept management responsibilities, co-management reflecting principles of sustainable aquatic management is more likely to be built.
11. In the early stages of building co-management, a 'good citizens' approach to representation is effective at bringing out people from the community with energy and commitment towards the principles and goals of an organization and at building on local values, culture, capacity, and organizations.
12. If a regional organization wants to gain legitimacy and increased political weight, the 'good citizens' approach needs to be blended with a 'sectoral representation' approach.
13. It is not possible to make a proposition regarding the outcome of bringing representation from external 'opposing' sectors into the organization. This is a subject for further research.
14. If the representatives in the organization are committed to 'leaving agendas at the door' and focusing on common principles and goals, a culture can arise that will limit self-interested behaviour and produce results that reflect the organization's principles and goals.

15. If a group member of the organization has partially defined legal status in relation to decision-making authority, a challenge is likely to arise regarding their role in relation to the group. The organization can address this dilemma through a mix of approaches, including decision-making rules protecting minority interests, focus on principles and goals, recognizing overarching government policy or laws that define the group's status, and negotiated strategies to move forward in the face of unresolved status that needs resolution in higher forums.
16. If there are numerous possible groups and issues to address, sub-committees are effective means of involving a broader number of participants. If sub-committees are to produce decisions in line with the organization's principles and goals, significant effort is needed in building an internal mandate within the sub-committee.
17. If participants communicate effectively with their 'constituencies' in order to solicit input and build support for agreements and directions, there is more likely to be support for building co-management. The time and effort required to undertake this communication is likely to present a challenge for participants. This challenge can be mitigated somewhat if participants have a high degree of legitimacy and trust as respected leaders in their communities
18. Some decisions will likely involve a degree of conflict of interest among participants. This challenge can be reduced if there are clear conflict of interest guidelines and participants convene technical review committees to provide them with independent recommendations.
19. Some decisions will likely involve detailed technical issues and information that can complicate decisions. This challenge can be reduced if participants have substantial local knowledge and expertise, have capable technical staff, or convene working groups to provide them with recommendations.

### **Propositions from the literature and comparative discussion**

1. The organization is more likely to achieve principles of sustainable aquatic management if its representation and approaches to decision-making represent and build on geographic community capacity, values, cultural systems, and organizations for common property management, rather than externally imposed new structures (Pinkerton 1989; Rettig et al. 1989; Ruddle et al. 1992; Schlager 1994; Pinkerton and Weinstein 1995; Copes 1998; SSCF 1998; CRIFQ 1999).

This proposition is significantly reflected in the case study results (CSP #1d; #9). As noted elsewhere, the main contribution of this case study to co-management theory is in the description of stages and issues involved in building an internal mandate rooted in geographic community capacity, values, cultural systems, and institutions, and

carrying that through to an external mandate (CSP #8). It is clear from the case study that the emergence and pursuit of co-management reflecting sustainable aquatic management principles is embedded in the culture and experiences of a geographic area.

2. If participants have repeated encounters under roughly similar circumstances, this will enable the identification and negotiation of optimal rules (Pinkerton 1989; Ostrom 1990; Fisher and Ury 1991; Gray 1989; Ostrom et al. 1999).

This proposition is reflected in the case study results (CSP #14), with the notation of the range of other factors influencing co-management outlined under each of these sections.

3. The more direct the representation of affected parties, the more chances for improved communication, education and relationship building, increased information flow, improved credibility of the decision-making process, and lower long-term transaction costs resulting from decreased conflict and ease of implementation. (Pinkerton 1989; Gray 1989; Pearse and Walters 1992; Wilson et al. 1994; Jentoft and McCay 1995; Prystupa 1998).

4. If the organization includes consistent representation of the diverse interests affected by decisions and those representatives will accept the repercussions of their decisions, the organization is more likely to achieve principles of sustainable aquatic management (Pomeroy 1991; Pearse and Walters 1992; Robinson 1992; Hanna 1995; Pinkerton and Weinstein 1995; Yaffe 1997; Scott 1998). Excluding diverse interests (especially geographic communities) and focusing on narrow government-industry partnerships is much less likely to achieve principles of sustainable aquatic management (Pearse and Walters 1992; Andranovich 1995; Jentoft and McCay 1995; Grumbine 1997; Pomeroy and Berkes 1997; Hanna 1998; M'Gonigle 1999).

These propositions are reflected in the case study results with one exception and with significant additions. The exception relates to a decrease in lower long-term transaction costs: there was not sufficient data in the case study to refute, support or modify this proposition. The significant additions from the case study relate to different kinds of representation in different stages of building co-management. The case study

demonstrated that 'good citizens' and 'sectoral' models of representation have advantages and disadvantages, and their suitability depends on the stage of building co-management (CSP #11, 12). A blend of the two models appears to be most appropriate in achieving improved communication, education, relationship building, and credibility (CSP#12). As noted elsewhere, case study contributions also relate to the complex motivations of participants and their willingness to take on a decision-making responsibilities in the context of co-management (CSP #2d, 8b, 10).

A final area of contribution relates to addressing a member group who has partially defined legal status in relation to decision-making authority. This is likely to present a significant challenge in building co-management. The organization can address this dilemma through a mix of approaches, including using decision-making rules protecting minority interests, focusing on common principles and goals, highlighting overarching government policy or laws that recognize the group's status, and negotiating strategies to move forward in the face of unresolved status that needs resolution in higher forums (CSP #15).

5. The organization is likely to encounter difficulties in representing a large number of groups (Jentoft and McCay 1995). To address this successfully, committees and working groups are effective methods of involving numerous affected parties in decisions that are most relevant to them (Gray 1989; Pinkerton 1994). Multi-disciplinary technical committees and/or external advisory committees are also ways of supporting decision-making bodies with good advice while not overloading them with experts (Pinkerton 1989; Jentoft and McCay 1995; Prystupa 1998). Similarly, dividing responsibilities to allow for higher representation of users at the policy level and less at the technical or administrative level can be effective (Pinkerton and Keitlah 1990).

This proposition is reflected in the case study results (CSP #16, 17, 19). The case study added that conflict of interest is a challenge likely to arise with representation (CSP #18). Rules regarding conflict of interest, sub-committees, working groups, and technical committees can help address this challenge (CSP #16, 17, 19).

6. If representatives communicate effectively with their 'constituencies', there is more likely to be fair representation and support for agreements (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987; Hanna 1995).

This proposition is reflected in the case study results (CSP #17), subject to the challenge described earlier under Geographic Scope regarding the enormous amount of time required to communicate with constituents inside the region and with groups outside the region (CSP #4). The case study confirms that the sub-committee approach previously mentioned can help address this challenge (CSP #16), and adds that the legitimacy and trust that participants have as respected leaders in their communities can also help address this challenge (CSP #17).

7. In achieving fairness and support, it is also helpful if the process of organizing and monitoring representation is done by an independent, legitimate 'process manager' or facilitator (agreed to by all parties) rather than by government (Gray 1989; Pinkerton 1994; Deyle 1995) and if the process is reviewed periodically by an ombudsman or similar independent body (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987).

This proposition is weakly reflected in the case study due to the stages of implementation being considered.<sup>14</sup>

#### **6.2.4 Decision-Making Rule**

##### **Case Study Propositions**

20. In the initial stages of building co-management, rules that provide comfort and security to minority interests can be useful in building relationships and restraining the organization to a pace reflecting the capacity of its members.

<sup>14</sup> While it was not relevant to representation in WCSA/RAMS, negotiations with external governments and groups to establish an external mandate technically involved more formal representation. The facilitator was to organize representation in the process, though no conflicts in representation arose. In forming the Aquatic Management Board, which is the body designed to implement the external mandate, representatives were selected by a committee appointed by Nuuchahnulth, Federal, Provincial, and local governments and supported by a facilitator. This approach was not evaluated as part of this case study.

21. As relationships, capacity, and trust grow in an organization, different rules may be employed for different kinds of decisions. If broad policy guidance is desired, then consensus can be useful. For more administrative and technical decisions or decisions requiring clear, firm, and detailed direction, voting may be useful.
22. An independent forum for resolving grievances and conflicts is useful and important in moving beyond certain disputes. However, if an issue arises in crisis circumstances or is the result of conflicting personalities, the issue may be irreconcilable for a time, even when a dispute resolution mechanism is in place.

### **Propositions from the literature and comparative discussion**

1. The organization has a clear rule for decision-making and a forum for discussing grievances and resolving conflicts (Ostrom 1990; Hanna 1995; Prystupa 1998).

2. An independent arbitration mechanism may be useful where an organization faces decisions or disagreements that are difficult to resolve through cooperation, facilitation, negotiation or committee (Ostrom 1990; Pomeroy 1991).

These propositions are strongly reflected in the case study results (CSP #20, 21, 22), though the case study results contribute further refinements. For instance, the case study showed that different kinds of rules are appropriate at different stages of building co-management (CSP #20). It also showed that different kinds of rules can be useful for different kinds of decisions (CSP #21).

### **6.2.5 Vision, Principles, and Goals**

#### **Case Study Propositions**

23. If an organization has a clear and simple common vision, principles, and goals reflecting common values, it is more likely to build and maintain co-management.
24. A vision, principles, and goals can fulfil the following key functions in building co-management.
  - a) Allowing participants to move forward in the early stages of working together



- b) Helping participants stay focused on the original direction and rationale for the organization
  - c) Allowing for greater efficiency in decision-making and in implementation of decisions or general directions
  - d) Providing a focus of commitment that helped carry the organization past obstacles and challenges
  - e) Providing a dispute resolution mechanism in evaluating different options and proposals.
25. An organization is likely to fulfil these functions more successfully, where the vision, principles, and goals have the following three elements.
- a) Their characteristics include a balance of flexibility and rigidity, difficulty manipulating them for any particular agenda, their simplicity and depth, and their ability to be embraced by participants.
  - b) Participants demonstrate commitment to them in their actions.
  - c) Effort is put into communicating them, including repeatedly referring to them, discussing their meaning, and explaining them internally and externally.

#### **Propositions from the literature and comparative discussion**

1. If the organization has a common vision, principles, and goals, reflecting some sense of commonality and interconnection (including shared recognition of problems and interdependence in addressing them), the organization is more likely to successfully implement their principles in the face of pressure and self-interested behaviour (Gray 1989; Fisher and Ury 1991; Maser 1992; Pinkerton 1994; Deyle 1995; Hanna 1995; Stephenson and Lane 1995; Brown and MacLeod 1996; Pomeroy and Berkes 1997).

This proposition is strongly reflected by the case study results (CSP #23), with a number of important additions to the literature about the characteristics of an effective common, vision, principles and goals, and the functions that they can play. For example, the case study outlined that a common vision should include a balance of flexibility and rigidity, should be difficult to manipulate for any particular agenda, should be simple and deep, and should be able to be embraced by participants (CSP #25a). Participants must demonstrate commitment to them in their actions and put effort into communicating them (CSP #25b,c). The case study also demonstrated that a vision,

principles, and goals can fulfil key functions in building co-management, such as allowing participants to move forward in the early stages of working together, helping participants stay focused on the original direction and rationale for the organization, allowing for greater efficiency in decision-making and in implementation of decisions or general directions, providing a focus of commitment that helps carry the organization past obstacles and challenges, and providing a neutral, consistent mechanism in evaluating different options and proposals (CSP #24).

## **6.2.6 Leadership and Facilitation**

### **Case Study Propositions Regarding Leadership**

26. Co-management is more likely to be built where an organization has 'enlightened leadership', where enlightened leadership is defined as people that have a sense that much more can be accomplished by working together with other organizations with similar leadership.
27. Co-management is more likely to be built where a breadth of leaders from different interests contribute in different ways and at different times to various issues, and where there are several key leaders.
28. Co-management is more likely to be built where key leaders have charisma, unwavering dedication to the organizations' cause, and a breadth of knowledge of co-management and cooperative movements.
29. Co-management is more likely to be built where there are two styles of key leadership.

The first is passionate, adversarial, high-intensity, tireless, thick-skinned, and willing to make major personal sacrifices and take large risks.

The second keeps people focused on the longer-term, lending a consistent positive, calming influence.
30. Co-management is more likely to be built where an organization's leadership plays the following roles.
  - a) Building further support for and understanding of the vision and principles of the organization.
  - b) Keeping people focused on the vision and principles of the organization.
  - c) Communicating the organization's vision and principles and resisting external policies and processes undermining them.
  - d) Helping the organization come to consensus around decisions and actions.

- e) Motivating people and keeping them moving forward.
  - f) Partnering with similar leadership in other organizations.
  - g) Leading an effective administrative component to the organization.
31. To build co-management, organizations require different kinds of leadership at different stages of development. An organization is more likely to successfully build co-management where:
- a) there is substantial leadership from at least one individual acting as a 'sparkplug' to build momentum in the initial stage of cooperative development (Stage I outlined in the summary of s.5.2 Mandate).
  - b) a team effort develops, supported by day-to-day leadership that maintains people's focus as momentum is built and the organization is solidified (Stage II outlined in the summary of s.5.2 Mandate);
  - c) external governments play a leadership role in directing their agencies to grant and implement an external mandate to the organization, at some point during Stage III of an organization's development; and passionate, high-intensity leadership style is supplemented or replaced by an administrative leadership style, who continues to work with the longer term leadership style in implementing the external mandate.

### **Propositions from the literature and comparative discussion**

1. If the organization has respected, knowledgeable, and experienced leadership that are able to build a structure others are willing to join, there is a greater chance of finding effective solutions and reducing the costs of coming to agreement (Pinkerton 1989; Ostrom, 1990; Pinkerton 1998; Singleton 1998; Ostrom et al. 1999).

This proposition is reflected in case study results, though the case study makes contributions to the literature in describing changes in leadership through different stages of building co-management, and some of the characteristics of leadership and the various roles that it plays. Because the personality of a co-management body is intricately linked to its leadership, and because building co-management involves a significant amount of change, the case study also notes that this is an important area of future research. Partnerships with researchers looking at leaders and 'change agents' could significantly enhance co-management theory.

### **Case Study Propositions Regarding Facilitation**

32. Facilitation is more likely to assist in building co-management when participants:
- a) perceive the facilitator to be neutral.
  - b) share information with the facilitator.
  - c) feel comfortable with the language and style of the facilitator.
  - d) trust the facilitator to act as mediator when needed.
33. These conditions are more likely to be present if the facilitator:
- a) has adequate technical knowledge to help participants develop feasible solutions during discussions around aquatic management issues.
  - b) is familiar with the guiding principles of the group and uses them to help the group assess options and agree on a direction.
  - c) has some basic familiarity with the issues, area, principles, and participants (including their past relations).
34. Having local participants play a facilitative role can assist in building co-management, with the following notations:
- a) local leaders are experienced and effective at playing a facilitative role.
  - b) participants acting in a facilitative role reflect the cultural diversity of other participants.
  - c) experienced staff support is available when needed, especially for highly technical discussions.
35. Experienced external facilitation can assist in building co-management when:
- a) there are negotiations between a range of parties from inside and outside the area with somewhat different goals.
  - b) highly contentious issues are being discussed.
  - c) large conference-style meetings are being held.
36. A challenge is likely to arise regarding the manipulative potential of facilitation. Three approaches can be helpful in minimizing the manipulative potential of facilitation and enhancing its positive leadership potential. These include:
- a) having local co-chairs help set meeting agendas and choose and guide facilitators.
  - b) using facilitators who have demonstrated a sufficient degree of neutrality to earn people's respect.
  - c) allowing facilitators to act more as mediators only when they have the trust of the group.

2. If an organization has a locally appropriate facilitator, this can help balance power in the trade-off process, prevent coercive or purposefully negative behaviour, and keep parties focused on their common goals and interests rather than their positions (Gray 1989; Fisher and Ury 1991; Pinkerton 1994; Andranovich 1995).

This proposition is reflected in the case study results, with a number of conditions and additions (CSP #32-33). The case study further proposes that when building co-management, local participants are appropriate for certain kinds of discussions under certain conditions (CSP #34), and professional facilitation/mediation is useful for certain kinds of discussions under certain conditions (CSP #35). The case study also discusses the manipulative potential of facilitation and adds several propositions for mitigating this potential (CSP #36). While valuable in the context of building co-management, the case study results do not address the well-established literature about facilitation. Co-management literature would be well-served to look at this literature in more depth.

## **6.2.7 Accountability, Monitoring, and Evaluation**

### **Case Study Propositions**

37. If an organization does more than just discuss policy issues in an informal way, it will likely have an administrative dimension to address its staffing, contracts, and financial arrangements. As organizations take on more responsibility, their administrative functions will tend to become significant. Three dilemmas are likely to arise. First, for groups or individuals who have come together mainly to address policy issues impacting their lives and who have other leadership responsibilities, administration can seem a boring and time-consuming distraction from these issues and responsibilities. Second, as the organization was probably set up in part to address the rigid nature of bureaucratic organizations, it will likely try to avoid 'bureaucracy' by relying more on trust, self-discipline, and commitment. Finally, it is costly and time-consuming to spend time monitoring performance and administrative details, and an organization building co-management is likely to have limited resources.
38. If an organization does not develop formal methods of accountability (both internally and with external partners) as it takes on more responsibility, there will be greater room for self-interested and undisciplined behaviour, conflict, and financial difficulties.

If an organization develops too many rigid and formal methods of accountability and does not foster trust, self-discipline, and commitment to its vision and principles, it will become overly bureaucratic and increasingly unable to implement its vision and principles.

Therefore, an organization is more likely to achieve its vision and principles, if it fosters trust, self-discipline, and commitment to them, while supporting these with formal methods of accountability that are not overly cumbersome.

39. In the early stages of partnership between diverse groups in an area (Stages 1-3), the self-monitoring nature of having diverse organizations involved will likely be adequate and appropriate in ensuring that an organization is accountable to its principles and goals. However, the need for more formal evaluation is likely to grow if leadership changes, movement slows towards the goal of receiving an external mandate, or the organization adopts more formal administrative procedures.

### **Propositions from the literature and comparative discussion**

1. If an organization has formal and informal methods of accountability, monitoring, and evaluation, it is more likely to achieve its principles and goals (Ostrom 1990; Pinkerton and Weinstein 1995; Pomeroy and Carlos 1997). Repeated interactions and clear, articulated social consequences of breaking rules increase the likelihood that people will be accountable for their actions (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987; Pinkerton 1989; Gray 1989; Ostrom 1990; Fisher and Ury 1991; Singleton 1998; Ostrom et al. 1999).

The proposition is reflected in the case study results, with two important additions. First, the case study showed a dynamic nature to accountability issues, with different challenges and approaches occurring at different stages of building co-management (CSP #37, 39). Second, the case study showed a fundamental organizational challenge in balancing formal and informal accountability mechanisms (CSP #37, #38). This challenge is not adequately addressed in co-management literature despite the significant impact it can have on building co-management.

### **6.2.8 Funding and Capacity Building**

#### **Case Study Propositions**

40. There is a greater likelihood of building co-management where an organization has the capacity to:
  - a) Build capacity in the following five areas: leadership, negotiation (with external governments and groups), project management, contract and financial administration, and technical support.
  - b) Play a cooperative and self-defending role in relation to competing organizations.
  - c) Lead a change from adversarial roles and relationships to frequent constructive dialogue.
  - d) Translate between different cultures and ways of thinking.
  - e) Describe a new paradigm and implement concrete examples.
  - f) Capitalize on and foster economic or social incentives that cause people to abandon attachments to old views and approaches; and,
  - g) Take a 'learning by doing' approach supplemented with advice or experience from people elsewhere.
41. Three main challenges are likely to arise in building or attracting capacity.
  - a) Finding local residents or people from outside the area who possess both knowledge of the area and of external processes, and who can translate between both.
  - b) Finding funding agents and external governments who recognize and accept that the organization is 'learning by doing' and will make mistakes.
  - c) Dealing with a person or group with an overlapping mandate in the area who will either not work cooperatively or purposefully undermine co-management.
42. If leaders are able to generate a small amount of funding in Stage I and II (as outlined s.6.2 Mandate) to help sustain their effort and bring groups together, there is a greater chance of building momentum towards an internal mandate.
43. If an organization is able to generate core funding supplemented with seed funding for projects at the beginning of Stage III (as discussed under s.5.2 Mandate), it will maintain momentum for co-management and develop projects that contribute to its principles and goals.
44. If the organization becomes too dependent on one source of funding, its ability to fulfil its mandate is highly susceptible to changes and political manipulation within the funding source. Conversely, diversified funding sources contribute to the resilience of the organization.
45. If funders are committed to and work towards the same objectives as their community partners and those objectives are mainly set by the community, the organization will have greater independence and ability to achieve its goals.
46. There is a greater likelihood of the organization achieving its goal if it can meet the challenge of sharing knowledge and building consensus in the

community while assuring that projects produce the tangible results required by granting agencies.

### **Propositions from the literature and comparative discussion**

1. If an organization has capable and adequate staff and stable and adequate funding for its initial years of operations, with the ability to revise policy to undertake cost recovery after a set amount of time, it is more likely to achieve its principles and goals (Gray 1989; Pinkerton 1994 and 1995; Nielsen and Vedsmand 1997).

This proposition is supported by the case study results, with one exception and a number of refinements. The exception relates to cost recovery policy: there was not sufficient data in the case study to refute, support or modify this proposition due to the stage of co-management being researched. Refinements arising from the case study mainly relate to the kinds of capacity needed (CSP #40), the dynamic nature of capacity building and funding (CSP #42, 43), and key challenges and strategies (CSP #41, 44, 45, #46).

The role of capacity and funding is increasingly significant to all aquatic management organizations. Increasing competition over capacity and funding will doubtless impact initiatives to build and implement co-management. A variety of adversarial and cooperative (partnerships, networks and alliances) strategies became evident in the case study but were not the focus of study. These deserve further research as they can both positively and negatively impact co-management.

2. If the costs of management exceed the benefits for participants, the organization is likely to lose support and not be able to achieve its principles and goals (Hanna 1998).



This proposition is similar to literature proposition #4 under Mandate (Section 6.2.2 above), though it speaks more directly to financial costs. Because participants did not fund WCSA/RAMS (other than through volunteer efforts), there is not sufficient data to refute, support or modify this proposition. As noted under proposition #4 in s.6.2.2, the way that participants assess benefits might be an important consideration in future research about this proposition.

3. Costs after an initial period should decline, and cost-recovery systems can be phased in as management becomes more effective (Pinkerton 1989; Andranovich 1995; Abdullah et al. 1998; Hanna 1998; Singleton 1998). The more equitably any costs or restrictions are allocated among participants, the greater the legitimacy of a decision-making body (Felt 1990).

As the organization did not implement cost recovery from participants, there was not sufficient data to refute, support or modify this proposition.

4. Cooperative decision-making organizations are likely to encounter tension between internal democracy and external efficiency (Jentoft and McCay 1995). If an organization has adequate and capable staff with well-defined roles in aiding decision makers, it is more likely to successfully address challenges (Pinkerton 1990).

This proposition is confirmed by the case study results, which showed that there is a greater likelihood of building co-management if the organization can meet the challenge of sharing knowledge and building consensus in the community while assuring, for instance, that projects produce the tangible results required by granting agencies (CSP #46).

### **6.2.9 Trust and Consensus Building**

#### **Case Study Propositions**

Trust within the organization

47. In Stages I and II of building cooperation, the existence of a common enemy may substitute for trust, but cooperation is more likely to be maintained where trust develops over time.
48. Trust is more likely to grow gradually through repeated interactions over time if:
  - a) Participants develop personal relationships and demonstrate they can be trusted through their actions, especially under adverse conditions, where there are incentives of self-interested behaviour, or in day-to-day activities.
  - b) Participants recognize the absolute need for change and the importance of their ultimate aim, and the fact that they are from the same area and share a common commitment to that area.
49. Some actions undermining trust may be tolerated if:
  - a) the advantages of cooperating outweigh the disadvantages,
  - b) the critical nature of the issue is such that it outweighs historic animosity,
  - c) participants recognize that people make mistakes and learn over time; and,
  - d) there are other compensating actions that build trust.
50. If parties have frank discussions about some actions undermining trust while letting other actions go, they increase their chances of continuing to build trust over time.
51. If a participant(s) makes either a unilateral action clearly signifying a change in the relationship or makes a cumulative series of actions that finally outweigh the advantages of cooperating, trust will break down. If a relationship breaks down because trust was breached in either of these ways, the possibilities for restoring the relationship are likely to be remote.

#### Trust with external groups and agencies

52. If an organization begins to negotiate an external mandate with external governments and groups, there are likely to be groups and agencies with whom the organization has an essentially adversarial relationship involving actions undermining trust. This is likely to consume a significant amount of the organization's energy and limit the possible outcomes of the relationships to the balance of power between the parties.
53. A difficult challenge is likely to arise in building trust with necessary partners on the one hand and engaging in conflict on the other.
54. The chances of successfully addressing this challenge are greater if:
  - a) The organization strives to build its power base to place it on an equal footing with the conflicting partner and engages in a 'good-cop/bad-cop' routine.
  - b) Organizational leaders can transform anger, hatred or other emotions that arise in adversarial interaction into a source of positive energy and act

with the manner of someone engaged in trust building even during adversarial interactions.

### Building Consensus

55. In addition to the other case study propositions about building co-management, if the participants in an organization have good will, positive experience with consensus building, and a sense of interconnection, there is a greater likelihood that the organization will reach agreements.
56. If participants interact frequently around a range of topics, their experience and commitment will help them to build trust and a culture of consensus within the organization over time.
57. If there is a fair and transparent administrative process supporting decisions that might involve conflict of interest, it is easier to achieve consensus.
58. If the relationships and culture of an organization are supported by practical incentives for reaching consensus, including facing a common threat, gaining support for an initiative by supporting someone else's initiative, and dealing with issues that are of vital importance to people's lives, the organization will reach agreement more easily.
59. If there is a diversity of groups involved working towards the same goals, it is likely that they can help to diffuse tensions between several parties over certain issues, giving the competing parties some perspective on their dispute and providing more reminders and methods for achieving consensus.
60. If several participants work between meetings building a common knowledge base and working through issues, it will be easier to reach agreement at meetings. If participants have less experience, understanding and commitment or if there is not a strong internal mandate or fewer practical incentives for participation, more effort needs to be put into building a common knowledge base and working through issues between and during meetings.
61. If participants 'leave their agendas at the door', and make the decision-making process open and responsive so that people feel that the process can address their issues and interests in a meaningful manner, the organization will reach agreement more easily.
62. If the internal and external circumstances surrounding a co-management arrangement support the synergy of different groups' efforts to work together, consensus will be easier to reach.

### Propositions from the literature and comparative discussion

- |   |
|---|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. It is easier to achieve consensus if an organization builds trust and relationships over time by fostering repeated encounters among participants (Ostrom 1990).</li></ol> |
|---|

This proposition is reflected in the case study results (CSP #55, 56), but the case study offers a number of further insights into trust and consensus building. For instance, the case study showed that the opportunity and incentive to develop trust over time is enhanced if participants enter a process in good will, are committed to a common vision and principles, and have practical incentives for cooperating (CSP #55). The case study also showed that in early stages of building co-management, the existence of a common threat or enemy may substitute for trust (CSP #47).

The case study further outlined the conditions under which trust grows. Trust is more likely to grow gradually through repeated interactions over time if participants develop personal relationships and demonstrate they can be trusted through their actions when there are incentives of self-interested behaviour and in day-to-day activities (CSP #48a). Trust also grows when participants recognize the absolute need for change and the importance of their ultimate aim, and the fact that they are from the same area and share a common commitment to that area (CSP #48b). Trust is further enhanced if the advantages of cooperating outweigh the disadvantages, if the critical nature of the issue is such that it outweighs historic animosity, and if participants recognize that people make mistakes and learn over time (CSP #49). Some actions undermining trust may be tolerated if there are other compensating actions that build trust, and parties need to have frank discussions about actions undermining trust while letting other actions go (CSP #50).

The case study also shows that trust will break down if a participant(s) makes either a unilateral action clearly signifying a change in the relationship or makes a cumulative series of actions that finally outweigh the advantages of cooperating. If a relationship breaks down because trust was breached in either of these ways, the possibilities for restoring the relationship are likely to be remote (CSP #51).

The case study also enhances co-management propositions about trust by adding new insights into trust with external agencies and groups. The case study shows that if an organization begins to negotiate an external mandate with external governments and groups, there are likely to be groups and agencies with whom the organization has an essentially adversarial relationship involving actions undermining trust (CSP #52). This is likely to consume a significant amount of the organization's energy and limit the possible outcomes of the relationships to the balance of power between the parties (CSP #52). A difficult challenge is likely to arise in building and maintaining trust with necessary partners who are undermining trust (CSP #53). The case study shows that the chances of successfully addressing this challenge may increase if the organization strives to build its power base to place it on an equal footing with the conflicting partner and engages in a 'good-cop/bad-cop' routine (CSP #54a). However, it is most important that organizational leaders can transform anger, hatred or other emotions that arise in conflict into a source of positive energy and act with the manner of someone engaged in trust building even during adversarial interactions (CSP #54b).

2. It is easier to achieve consensus where the majority of participants agree that there is a problem that needs solving and perceive that benefits outweigh the costs of negotiating rules or solutions (Ostrom 1990; Pinkerton and Weinstein 1995; Pomeroy and Carlos 1997).

3. If individuals overcome their tendency to evaluate their own benefits and costs more intensely than the total benefits and costs for the group, it is more likely that consensus will be reached and will include mutual benefits or an 'exchange of satisfaction' where both parties get some benefits (Berkes 1985; Pinkerton 1989; Ostrom 1990).

4. If the relative proportion of behavioural types in a particular setting (e.g., self-interested, those who will free ride unless assured others will not, those who are willing to initiate reciprocal cooperation in the hopes that others will return their trust, and altruists) favours those who are cooperatively oriented, there is a greater likelihood of achieving consensus (Ostrom 1990; Pinkerton and Weinstein 1995).

These propositions are reflected in the case study, with a number of additions. First, positive experiences with consensus building can help participants achieve consensus (CSP #55). Second, as trust develops and people demonstrate commitment, a culture of consensus can grow over time (CSP #56). This culture can be a powerful force in influencing individuals' behaviour. Further, the case study showed that if the relationships and culture of an organization are supported by practical incentives for reaching consensus, including facing a common threat, gaining support for an initiative by supporting someone else's initiative, and dealing with issues that are of vital importance to people's lives, the organization is likely to reach agreement more easily (CSP #58).

The case study also showed that a diversity of groups can help to diffuse tensions between two or three parties over issues, giving the competing parties some perspective on their dispute and providing more reminders and methods for achieving consensus (CSP #59).

The case study further enhances common pool theory about consensus building by showing that consensus building is strongly connected to the development of a common knowledge base and attempts between meetings (CSP #60). One-on-one and small group discussions can help people work through issues and think about them before having to make a decision. If participants have less experience, understanding and commitment or if there is not a strong internal mandate or fewer practical incentives for participation, more effort needs to be put into building a common knowledge base and working through issues between and during meetings.

Finally, the case study showed that consensus depended primarily on participants' commitment to 'leaving their agendas at the door' and making the decision-making process open and responsive so that people felt that the process could address

their issues and interests in a meaningful manner (CSP #61). In addition to being impacted by the culture of the group, participants' motivations for this were complex—possibly more complex than simply being a cooperatively oriented behavioural type. As noted elsewhere, pride, identity, culture and experiences related to the geographic area were important ingredients motivating people to build co-management (CSP #8b). As also noted elsewhere (6.2.2), further research about the relationship between participants' motivations, the causes for their motivations, and their ability to reach consensus would present important additions to co-management theory.

5. Trust is likely to build over long periods of time when participants are forced to work together under joint decision-making arrangements, where there is strong, determined leadership, and where cultural identity animates the process of institutional design and change (Singleton 1998).

The statement in this proposition regarding participants who are compelled to work together cannot be verified by the case study as participants were working together voluntarily. However, the statements regarding time (#48), leadership (#28) and cultural identity (CSP #8b) are supported by the case study results with the additions outlined throughout this chapter.

6. It is easier to achieve consensus if there is a fair administrative process (Pinkerton and Weinstein 1995) characterized by principles of democratic organization (Jentoft 1989).

This proposition is confirmed by the case study results, which demonstrated that fair administrative processes were helpful in addressing issues such as conflict of interest, and in supporting consensus during difficult decisions involving allocation of funds (CSP #57).

## 6.3 Essential Lessons from the Case Study

I now attempt to synthesize what I think can be learned from the findings of this particular study, using the following major topics to organize the discussion: aligning concepts with capacity; motives and commitment; tension, conflict and resistance; change and stability; and 'Hishukish ts'awalk.'

### 6.3.1 *Aligning Concepts with Capacity*

I found that a co-management organization seeking to reflect principles of sustainable aquatic management faces persistent, classic organizational dilemmas that impact its ability to achieve its objectives. Key challenges identified in the case study are outlined in Table 12.

**Table 12: Key Challenges in Building Co-Management**

- 
- Addressing issues and building relationships within the area while also addressing broader issues impacting the area and building relationships with external bodies.
  - Priorizing between a range of important issues and needs
  - Minimizing the tension between the co-management body and more local bodies over power and distribution of resources.
  - Choosing between the advantages and disadvantages of authority delegated by governments.
  - Blending 'good citizens' and 'sectoral' representation models.
  - Addressing the status of member groups with partially defined legal rights, such as indigenous peoples negotiating treaties or engaged in court challenges.
  - Ensuring the founding vision and values are incorporated into sub-committees, new participants, and external parties or partners.
  - Minimizing the manipulative potential of facilitation.
  - Engaging participants in administrative choices and details without distracting from policy
  - Allocating staff time between administrative details and policy or communications issues.
  - Balancing reliance on trust and informal relationships versus more rigid and inflexible means of evaluation and accountability.



- Building local resident capacity or bringing in expertise from outside the area.
  - Finding financial sponsors and partners who accept mistakes and take a 'learning by doing' approach.
  - Working with groups who have overlapping mandates but choose not to participate or who act in an adversarial manner.
  - Maintaining stable, diversified core funding.
  - Working with partners who are undermining trust or have different values and principles
- 

These challenges are all too familiar to aquatic resource management personnel. However, they are often overlooked when discussing the advantages and disadvantages of different management structures, despite their impact on aligning co-management principles and concepts with the capacity to implement them. If poorly handled, any of them can constrain an organization's ability to function effectively, regardless of its structure or geographic scope.

Co-management organizations—as with any organization—are under a variety of pressures in dealing with these challenges. These pressures present both a challenge and an opportunity when building co-management. On the one hand, they challenge the capacity of the organization and the patience of its funders and patrons as the organization makes inevitable mistakes. On the other hand, the tension created by diverse pressures gives an incentive to produce balanced, innovative approaches that address a range of interests. This case study showed that community-based organizations trying to establish co-management have the incentive to find innovative ways of addressing these challenges. Because they are motivated to produce change, participants will try to find innovative, locally appropriate means of aligning concepts with capacity. This requires considerable energy, and highlights the importance of

participants' commitment and motivation in building co-management that reflects principles of sustainable aquatic management.

### **6.3.2 *Motives and Commitment***

Another key finding arising from the case study was the importance of participants' reasons for engaging in co-management. Building co-management requires a tremendous amount of energy—energy that could be spent on other activities. Participants are constantly trading off between a range of options for how they spend their limited energy and resources. Participants in this case study initially choose to engage as volunteers— not because they were mandated/directed to do so. Many of them were extremely busy with a range of other obligations. They also stated that they did not engage out of an intellectual or ideological agenda. Many participants stated that they were primarily motivated by declining economic, social and environmental circumstances in the area. This was later coupled with the perception of a main causal factor and common threat—centralized decision-making that was facilitating a movement towards privatization and consolidated ownership of resources adjacent to the area. It was also tied to a lack of feasible alternatives—the current decision-making process was unresponsive to their interests, and the legal system was costly and uncertain.

Underlying this range of motives was a shared pride, identity and commitment to a defined geographic territory, the area and its culture. Participants could have more easily done what many coastal community residents did during the same time period— moved from the area, changed employment, undertook self-destructive behaviour, or abandoned cultural teachings. Instead, they chose to try to find ways to protect and revitalize the area for themselves and future generations. This was both an act of resistance against forces undermining the health of the area and an act of creativity in

maintaining and rebuilding the area (as will be further discussed in the following section on Tension, Conflict and Resistance).

For some Nuu-chah-nulth, pride, identity and commitment was an expression of cultural teachings. This included traditional Nuu-chah-nulth management structures and approaches, such as Haa-wilth (chief), Haa-wilth-mis (roles, responsibilities, and duties passed on to the Haa-wilth and council), Haa-wilth-paa-tuu (the cloak of dignity, discipline, wealth, rights, and authorities of a Haa-wilth to govern and deliver services and justice to tribal members, and to care for the resources and people in the Haa-wilth's haa-hoolthee), and 'Haa-hoolthee' (the air, land, seas, waters, and resources of a Haa-wilth) (Ehattesah Tribe 1996). Nuu-chah-nulth participation was based on an interpretation that the Haa-wilth's Haa-wilth-paa-tuu embraced all people living in the area (Cliff Atleo, pers. comm. 1998). To them this had to mean co-management—working with other people rather than working separately or trying to eject them from their territory.

Nuu-chah-nulth culture also included essential teachings such as Hishtukish ts'awalk (Everything is One) and Iisaak (Respect). According to these teachings, Nuu-chah-nulth identity is linked to place. The concept of "iisaak"—respect, or 'respect with caring'—is central to the identity of the Nuu-chah-nulth, who refer to themselves as "quu?as" (translated as "people from the West Coast of Vancouver Island" ) (Nuu-chah-nulth Community Health Services 1995, p.20)). Nuu-chah-nulth elders state, "being quu?as means having pride, pride in who you are, and having self-respect and respect for others. Being quu?as means being iisaak" (Nuu-chah-nulth Community Health Services 1995, p.20). That is, to be a person in this world means to embody respect with caring. Respect is connected with pride in one's identity as an individual, as a member of a group, and as an inhabitant of an area. It is also connected to a worldview that

recognizes the interconnectedness of life forms, including a belief that Nuu-chah-nulth survive only if their area is healthy and that the area is healthy only if the Nuu-chah-nulth are healthy (Simon Lucas, pers. comm. 1997). Other WCVI residents arrived at a similar conclusion, as reflected in WCSA's original statement that healthy communities and ecosystems are interconnected, and RAMS member's adoption of Nuu-chah-nulth guiding principles.

These reasons and motives for participating in co-management cannot be manufactured. They are linked to participants' pride in themselves and identity with their area. This pride and identity is developed through experience over decades or over centuries in the case of the Nuu-chah-nulth. This suggests that the development of co-management is intricately linked to a place, its people, and its culture. Future research should examine this link more closely, focusing on how pride, identity, culture and commitment form the foundation of co-management that successfully follows principles of sustainable aquatic management.

### **6.3.3 *Tension, Conflict, and Resistance***

Another key lesson from this case study is that co-management does not exist in a political vacuum. Co-management that reflects principles of sustainable aquatic management represents a significant change from status quo structures and approaches. This can include changes to who makes decisions and how they make them, and to the allocation of benefits derived from resources. The case study demonstrates that tension is likely to arise between those advocating co-management and sustainability principles, and those either committed to the status quo or advocating change towards less sustainable principles and structures.

While it is easy and tempting to try to assign blame or 'take sides' in the context of this tension, it is also possible to see this tension as a natural and necessary product of change. In his study of the structure of scientific revolutions, Kuhn (1963) outlines the kinds of tensions that develop as individuals or groups introduce new paradigms that replace the status quo. In drawing a parallel between political revolutions and scientific paradigm revolutions he states:

Political revolutions aim to change political institutions in ways that those institutions themselves prohibit. Their success therefore necessitates the partial relinquishment of one set of institutions in favour of another, and in the interim, society is not fully governed by institutions at all. Initially it is crisis alone that attenuates the role of political institutions as we have already seen it attenuate the role of paradigms. In increasing numbers individuals become increasingly estranged from political life and behave more and more eccentrically within it. Then, as the crisis deepens, many of these individuals commit themselves to some concrete proposal for the reconstruction of society in a new institutional framework. At that point the society is divided into competing camps or parties, one seeking to defend the old institutional constellation, the others seeking to institute some new one. And, once that polarization has occurred, *political recourse fails*. Because they differ about the institutional matrix within which political change is to be achieved and evaluated, because they acknowledge no supra-institutional framework for the adjudication of revolutionary difference, the parties to a revolutionary conflict must finally resort to the techniques of mass persuasion, often involving force. . . . (Author's emphasis, p.93).

Detailed descriptions of how case study participants and external governments and interest groups contributed to tension and conflict through conscious and unconscious individual actions and 'techniques of mass persuasion,' were not central elements in this thesis. However, the case study outlined that significant conflict occurred in building co-management, and described a number of key sources of tension. Similar sources of tension, and their cumulative nature, are likely to be present in any context where co-management is being built.

It is apparent that tension and conflict present both challenges and opportunities in building co-management. In terms of opportunities, they can help create political will

in the area and build cohesion and partnerships between groups. Also, tension and resistance can bring consciously and unconsciously destructive policies, approaches, and actions into awareness, providing pressure for change and greater accountability. Conflict can create space and incentives for developing new approaches rooted in principles of sustainable aquatic management.

On the other hand, tension has significant costs. It can delay movement towards co-management, undermining political will in the area and challenging the energy and enthusiasm of participants, many of whom can become increasingly bitter and angry towards external governments and groups. It can also mean that people who might be supportive of co-management get 'turned off' or 'burned' by the conflict, and opportunities for partnerships and 'win/win' solutions to problems get missed. Finally, it can drag people into a 'zero-sum' game mentality where building co-management becomes a power struggle between enemies rather than a chance to find common ground and produce mutually beneficial outcomes.

Handling this double-edged sword is a challenge for those interested in building co-management. At a practical level, advocates of co-management will likely have to build their power base in order to act in self-defence against opposing groups and engage in a 'good-cop/bad-cop' routine so that they can take advantage of the opportunities inherent in tension. But in doing so they will need to transform anger, frustration and other emotions that arise during conflict into a source of positive energy and act with the manner of someone engaged in trust building and renewal even during adversarial interactions. The cooperative 'win/win' intent of co-management must be kept at the forefront so that building co-management is an exercise of realizing opportunities within tension rather than becoming a casualty of its destructive potential. This essential aspect of building co-management is discussed further below under 'What

does Hishtukish ts'awalk mean?' It can be a tremendous personal challenge, but its transformational potential can also be extremely liberating.

Understanding more about addressing the opportunities and challenges arising from tensions inherent in building co-management is an important area of future research that will significantly enhance co-management theory. Numerous articles in Durrenberger and King's book (2000) on state and community interactions in fisheries management point in a similar direction.

#### **6.3.4 *Change and Stability***

A third main lesson from the case study is that some co-management features remain constant while others evolve in a dynamic manner as participants go through stages of working together. Table 13 below contains a description of some of the dynamic elements involved in building co-management. It shows that the early stages of building an internal mandate are driven mainly by one or a few local leaders and volunteers who are responding to declining local conditions and instigating change due to their pride, identity and commitment to their area. As leaders work with people in the area to identify problems and causes, a broader alliance of people in the area start to work together on establishing a common set of values and principles that will serve as the basis for an alternative to the status quo. Leadership broadens into a team. Participants start to work together to resist the perceived causes of decline in their area. As their partnership grows, they enlist greater support from key political leaders in the area and people outside the area. At a certain stage they formalize their commitment. This marks a transition from being mostly inward looking and informal to becoming more outward looking and formal. Participants are now working together in an entity that starts taking on greater roles and responsibilities, building capacity, seeking more

significant funding, and building more extensive partnerships. Leadership remains a team approach but is driven by several people reflecting conflictual and conciliatory approaches to change. Trust begins to grow between participants, as does a culture of consensus. The entity seeks a formal external mandate with external governments in order to implement its principles and goals. As it does so, it faces a range of new challenges. Representation in the entity becomes more formal, as do accountability and reporting mechanisms. Administrative challenges become more apparent as the entity tries to maintain an informal, trust-based approach, address policies, and respond to community needs while meeting the requirements of funders and engaging in multiple tasks. At the same time, political opposition to the initiative grows and conflicts around it increase. As these range of new challenges start to sap the energy of participants, establishing an externally mandated co-management body becomes time-sensitive. It becomes imperative to relieve growing tensions and pressures in the entity by making another transition—this time to a new co-management body with broader representation, an expanded mandate, and more stable funding. If this transition happens successfully, it is likely that many of the original participants will step back from the new body for a time, and that the original 'spark-plug' leader is replaced by a more administrative leader.

In the midst of these dynamic elements in building co-management, there are some more static, constant dimensions. These include:

- The geographic scope
- Pride, identity and commitment to area, and willing to change approaches that are negatively impacting the area.
- Principles, values, and goals that act as a touchstone and focal point
- Enlightened, charismatic, knowledgeable leadership that stays focused on the long-term
- A high degree of work between meetings, frequent dialogue with a range of parties, and building a common knowledge base



- Activities that build or undermine trust and consensus.

These constant elements are presented as essential elements of successful co-management. Dynamic elements are presented as the likely path of efforts to successfully build co-management, but not as formal rules or procedures. Few constant or dynamic elements can be manufactured. It is more appropriate to think of co-management as part of a geographic area's natural history. It is an organic evolutionary process rooted deeply in the culture and circumstances of a place. In this sense, those interested in building or advocating co-management are well served to either focus within their own geographic area while being aware of lessons from elsewhere, or respond to local co-management initiatives in a supportive manner rather than trying to overlay rigid set of formulas and rules onto a place.

**Table 13: Dynamic Elements of Building Co-Management**

	<b>STAGE I: Building an internal mandate for change</b>	<b>STAGE II: Building alliances outside the region and cementing a regional partnership</b>	<b>STAGE III: Broadening the regional circle, taking on responsibilities, and overcoming challenges</b>	<b>STAGE IV: Receiving an external mandate</b>
Coordination	Building support from a variety of local bodies	Looking for suitable external support	Defining and assigning roles and responsibilities	Coordinating with external processes and bodies
Mandate	Reacting to a painful situation. Motivated by pride, identity and commitment to the area and culture Identifying issues and causes Seeking examples from elsewhere and selective external support and advice	Building further understanding, agreement, and commitment about issues and causes Working out key differences and identifying common ground Seeking more external support Crystallizing an internal mandate when regional partnerships and commitment adequately mature	Taking on responsibilities to build capacity and provide working examples and tangible benefits Negotiating an external mandate with governments and other affected parties Addressing tension and conflict, resisting attempts to undermine initiative or regional health Maintaining momentum and partnerships Building alliances with supportive people in external groups and governments	Maintaining commitment to original vision and values Further research
Representation	Good citizen, volunteer participation	Building support amongst sector/government representatives	Blending sectoral and good citizen model	Blending sectoral and good citizen model, with greater participation of external groups
Decision-making rule	No formal rule; consensus based approach	Consensus based, including protection of minority interests	Develop different rules for different kinds of decisions Develop a mechanism for dispute resolution	Further research
Leadership	Passionate, 'spark-plug' charismatic leader with vision	Team effort develops with a variety of leaders and one or two central organizers	Team effort continues, relying on combination of passionate, more militant leader and leader with a longer term, more conciliatory approach	Long-term conciliatory leader carries on; more militant leader and participants step back, replaced with more administrative style of leadership

	<b>STAGE I: Building an internal mandate for change</b>	<b>STAGE II: Building alliances outside the region and cementing a regional partnership</b>	<b>STAGE III: Broadening the regional circle, taking on responsibilities, and overcoming challenges</b>	<b>STAGE IV: Receiving an external mandate</b>
Facilitation	Mainly one on one dialogue  Occasional trusted local chair or facilitation help with larger meetings	Using local co-chairs  Occasional facilitation with larger meetings and conference	Internally using local co-chairs with staff support  Professional facilitation/mediation for negotiations to receive external mandate	Further research
Accountability	Few administrative duties; relationships mainly informal based on trust	Few administrative duties; relationships mainly based on informal trust building	Increased requirement to meet rigid accountability standards while maintaining informal trust-based relationships	Further research
Capacity	Mainly local participants learning by doing; some extrnl support	Mainly local participants learning by doing, with increased external support	Mix of local and external capacity	Further research
Funding	Small funding to sustain leadership	Small, more diverse local and external funding to sustain leadership and host meetings, conferences, etc.	Substantial core funding and seed funding for projects	Funding from sponsoring governments; Pursuing cost recovery strategies
Trust	Initial relationship building	Common enemy or shared commitment may substitute for trust	Growth of trust through working together more closely and facing challenges together	Further research
Building Consensus	Identify issues, explore causes  Build common knowledge base and relationships	Identifying issues, explore causes  Building common knowledge and relationships  Exploring solutions and options  Identifying and committing to common vision & values	Building culture of consensus  'Leaving agendas at the door'  Improving staff support and decision-making procedures to enable consensus	Further research

### 6.3.5 What Does 'Hishtukish ts'awalk' Mean?

While seemingly complex and multi-faceted, the really important part of building co-management can also be seen as being relatively simple. I remember meeting with

Cliff Atleo, a Nuu-chah-nulth participant, after about six months of working in the case study. I presented a number of complex organizational models and options and political strategies for involving different groups and advancing co-management. Mr. Atleo looked at my pages of notes and diagrams, and kindly reminded me that we already had what we needed—an internal mandate to be guided by a simple principle. He reminded me, as he was to do numerous times over the years, saying that, “Everyone says this is complex. But this so-called ‘complexity’ isn’t really there. If we cut through all that and stay focused on ‘Hishtukish ts’awalk’, all the complexity goes away. Everything we need to know is within that. We just need to stay focused on it and let it guide our actions” (pers. comm. 1997).

The major lessons I’ve learned in this case study have felt more like uncovering things I’ve known all along more than learning something new. I have been amazed at my capacity to learn something and then forget it--to become distracted from ‘Hishtukish ts’awalk’ and its emphasis on ‘lisaak’--respect with caring. The process of writing the case study results was a process of resurfacing and solidifying disconnected thoughts floating in my mind. In that process I have understood more and more what Mr. Atleo was saying. Complexity (and the resulting angst and wasted time and resources) comes from encouraging the emergence of disconnected strands and acting outside of the principle of respect. How much time do we spend developing individual strands of thought or action, as opposed to focusing on connecting those strands? How much time do we spend focused on satisfying our self interest (and dealing with resulting tensions with others) rather than seeing how we can satisfy our interests while respect the interests of others? Is complexity the result of avoiding simplicity? More importantly, then, how do we shift our minds from focusing on disconnected pieces to gaining an

understanding of the essence of the whole? How do we learn to focus and stay focused on the practice of respect with caring?

I believe it is partly a matter of habit and changing habits. The word habit is closely related to the word habitat. Home—comfort—the place that our mind is used to dwelling and the place that it can be very slow to leave, a place of certainty and sameness, a place where we have built external trappings that reinforce our beliefs about who we are and what is the world around us. To move from a paradigm--a mental habitat--of disconnected pieces and disconnected people to a new paradigm of interconnection and respect is a process of breaking mental addictions. It is a process of venturing out of our old familiar ways of seeing ourselves and the world around us.

Breaking old habits normally comes from either a crisis, a change in role, or an extraordinary act of will. Many people in the West Coast of Vancouver Island area were being forced out of their mental habitats due to the destruction of their physical habitats. To address the crisis around them, they made an extraordinary act of will and changed roles. They changed from trying to advance their individual or sectoral agendas at the expense of others to finding common agendas that benefited the broader community. They changed from being adversaries to being allies. They agreed that they would respect each other's views and that they would stay focused on a common vision or principle. They helped each other make this change and created a shared culture around it— a culture that provided enough comfort for people to work together.

To do so took considerable effort, leadership, and commitment to the common founding principles of Hishtukish ts'awalk and lisaak. It also involved using drastic measures—including civil disobedience—to impress the extent of the crisis in the area on people outside it. The depth of the group and its ability to attract people to it and engage in a long difficult initiative was largely the result of members' commitment to their

vision, principles, and goals and the spirit that these embodied. Breaking old attachments and sharing power require enormous effort, courage, and strength of character. It also required staying grounded in the relationships within the area, ensuring that people's comfort levels were changing within the limits of how far people were willing to go.

In my personal experience, breaking mental habits involved rooting out old concepts, preconceptions, and lazy habits. Gaining the resolve to break habits and address conflict occurred at first mainly through the constant example of and reminders by those around me and later with the added benefit of increased self-awareness and recognition. I came to better understand how my health and wealth are interconnected with the health and wealth of other people and species by experiencing the shared culture created in the case study. This was not just intellectual learning—it was experiential learning based on living in a small remote community, fishing, spending time in nature, going to ceremonies, experiencing the feeling of consensus resulting from people respecting each other, hearing people's stories and emotions, sharing with people, receiving generosity from people with little material wealth, seeing and feeling the difference between people working together and people struggling against each other. To help me and others like me understand interconnection required these grounded experiences, many strong people and leaders, and the clear guiding principle of 'hishtukish ts'awalk' acting as a constant touchstone.

Change was not just a process of adopting new ideas or gaining power. It was more about letting go than it was about taking on. Letting go of traditional forms of power and old paradigms is what creates space for new possibilities. Letting go of separate strategies and pooling power and resources together gave the region more ability to negotiate with external governments and groups to share their power. In other

words, by giving power to the region, the groups created space for more power to come to it. Similarly, by opening their minds and letting go of sectoral or personal agendas, they created mental space for the development of common agendas and new possibilities in the region. These common agendas and approaches were never fixed. They were not a rigid set of new ideas that plugged the space back up again. They were a set of common principles and goals—they gave a picture of where participants wanted to go together but did not prescribe how to get there. How to get there arose from commitment to Histukish ts'awalk and the constant work in building and maintaining commitment to that principle.

To me, Histukish ts'awalk is therefore not a thing, an idea, an agenda or any one group's power. It is the space between things, ideas, agendas, and the powers of different groups. It is the space into which old things, ideas, agendas, and power dissolve. It is the space in which new things, ideas, and common agendas can grow-- where new power can be found and shared.

Because it is not constrained by the form of a thing, idea, agenda, or group, it is does not come and go—it is always present. Being always present, it is always available to us. Being always available to us, it can be accessed by shifting our focus towards it. How do we shift our focus towards something that has no form? We leave our agendas at the door. We uncover space by opening our minds.

## 7 SUMMARY

In the introduction to this thesis I identified several key opportunities for advancing co-management theory. These included increased use of participatory research methods, more studies on multi-species, ecosystem-based approaches, and more research into the conditions, challenges, and approaches associated with successfully putting principles and propositions into practice. To help advance these opportunities, I set out to synthesize co-management literature into key propositions and compare them with results of a participatory research case study on building an aquatic co-management body reflecting principles of sustainable aquatic management.

I undertook the case study on the West coast of Vancouver Island, Canada. The case study focuses on an organization that was in the second stage of collaboration—somewhere after its initial conceptualization but before receiving a formalized mandate from external governments. I used participatory research methods: I was an active participant in the organization and used the results of the work to generate and test hypotheses about how co-management is built and maintained. After I left the case study context, I interviewed key participants in the case study. They then checked my discussion and analysis in order to review, change, and enhance my findings. I also compared propositions generated from the case study results with existing common pool management propositions in order to confirm, refine, and add to existing theory.

Based on the comparative discussion of propositions from the case study and from the literature, I found that current common pool literature was mainly supported, but has significant room for expansion. This is especially true in relation to the question of how to build co-management. While most co-management literature is useful in providing examples of existing co-management models, few studies look at the early stages of how those models were developed, or more importantly, how co-management



reflecting sustainable aquatic management principles can best be implemented in today's context. To promote expansion of co-management theory, I outlined important areas for further research arising from the case study. Among these are the following:

- The degree to which a mandate needs to be legally entrenched and the timeframe for building and implementing co-management.
- Further research on challenges and issues involved in building and implementing co-management institutions designed to reflect sustainable aquatic management principles (Including Stages I-IV identified in this case study and further stages).
- Further research on the roles and characteristics of leadership in building co-management.
- The sources of tension and conflict in building co-management and sustainable aquatic management principles, and how they can be mitigated or addressed.
- The ways in which participants' pride, identity, experience and culture in a geographic area impact their motivation and commitment to work cooperatively and to build co-management that reflects principles of sustainable aquatic management.

In addition to these areas of future research, the main contribution I offer in this thesis include five essential findings. First, I found that some co-management features remain constant while others evolve in a dynamic manner as participants go through stages of working together. For instance, guiding principles, essential values, and activities that build or undermine trust and consensus are relatively stable over time, whereas characteristics of representation, decision-making rules and tools, capacity, facilitation, leadership and other features are likely to change. The manner in which they change results from the participants, the place, and the broader context in which co-management is being built. When considering how to build or study co-management, it is therefore essential to build agreement and commitment in an area around those elements that will be constant over time. It is also essential to think of co-management as a dynamic, evolutionary process reflecting the natural history of an area rather than a

rigid set of formulas and rules. Thinking in this manner reinforces the emphasis in co-management literature that co-management is significantly linked to geography and culture.

Second, I found that a co-management organization faces persistent, classic organizational dilemmas that impact its ability to achieve its objectives. For instance, accessing stable funding, ensuring accountable but not overly rigid financial and organizational administration, prioritizing between a range of important issues and needs, finding and building capacity, and addressing the often tense relationship among multiple local level bodies and organizations all present significant challenges to a co-management body. These challenges are often overlooked when discussing the advantages and disadvantages of different management structures, despite their significant impact on aligning concepts with the capacity to implement them. The case study showed that community-driven organizations seeking to build co-management face a variety of pressures in trying to address these challenges. However, they also have a strong incentive and willingness to find creative new approaches to them. Though not very sexy, documenting and sharing some of these challenges and approaches is hopefully useful to others building co-management.

My third main finding was that participants' motivation for engaging in co-management is critical in building co-management and addressing principles of sustainable aquatic management. While there are a range of important reasons and incentives for participation in co-management, participants' shared pride, identity, experiences and culture in a geographic territory are especially important. These factors motivated case study participants to address social, ecological, and economic declines in their area and search for a new management model rooted in principles of sustainable aquatic management. The depth of their commitment was necessary in establishing an

internal mandate in the area, and then seeking to negotiate an external mandate with other governments and groups. Both of these tasks were significant. The case study adds further depth to co-management theory by describing some of the leadership qualities, trust building characteristics and consensus building approaches that enabled groups to undertake this work successfully.

Fourth, I found that co-management does not exist in a political vacuum. Co-management that reflects principles of sustainable aquatic management represents a significant change from status quo structures and approaches. This includes changes to who makes decisions and how they make them, and to the allocation of benefits derived from resources. The case study demonstrates that a tension arises between those advocating co-management and sustainability, and those either committed to the status quo or advocating change towards less sustainable principles and structures.

This tension creates both challenges and opportunities in building co-management. It requires considerable skill to create opportunities from tension and conflict. It also requires that participants stay focused on the essential nature of co-management reflecting sustainable aquatic management principles— working cooperatively across spatial scales to produce mutually beneficial outcomes. Though the attraction of conflict and power struggles can be strong, it is also destructive. Working together to build solutions, on the other hand, is a liberating force.

This highlights the final main finding of the thesis, which relates to an understanding of interconnection. While building co-management is difficult and complex at one level, it is simple at another level. As noted by participants in the case study, there were two essential, basic principles—understanding how things are interconnected, and respect with care. These two principles provided a compass and a touchstone. They also provided motivation and reminder for 'leaving agendas at the

door'—for opening and expanding our minds by letting go of mental habits and attachments. Individually and mutually uncovering space out of which new possibilities can arise is an essential element of successfully building co-management. And it may be more than that. For the Nuu-chah-nulth and other participants in this case study, commitment to these principles is a matter of the utmost practicality and the highest importance. As a respected First Nations leader has stated, “respect, ...treating everyone as equals...is the only way that we as human beings can survive in this world” (Pierre1992, p.5).

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## APPENDIX A: SAMPLE OF GROUPS INTERACTING WITH WCSA/RAMS

The following table summarizes organizations that interacted with WCSA/RAMS. It does not list all such organizations, nor does it list the many individuals who interacted with WCSA/RAMS but did not belong to any organization.

<b>Affiliation</b>	<b>Type of Interaction</b>
<b><i>Boards and Councils</i></b>	
Nuu-chah-nulth Tribal Council (north, central and southern regions)	RAMS Board members and participation on RAMS' sub-committees
Clayoquot Sound Central Region Board	Information sharing and meetings; Protocol agreement with RAMS re jurisdictions; Joint work on shellfish development in Clayoquot Sound
Nootka Resource Board	Information sharing and meetings; Joint work on shellfish development in Nootka Sound
WCVI Clam Management Board	Established by NTC, WCSA, RAMS; community representatives appointed by RAMS; facilitation and support by WCSA and RAMS
<b><i>First Nations</i></b>	
Kyuquot First Nation	Participation in RAMS' sub-committees; stewardship work
Hesquiaht First Nation	Directorship on WCSA and RAMS; participation in RAMS' sub-committees
Ehattesaht First Nation	Participation in RAMS' sub-committees; stewardship work
Nuchahtlath First Nation	Participation in RAMS' sub-committees; stewardship work
Mowachaht/Muchalaht First Nation	Participation in RAMS' sub-committees; stewardship work
Ahousaht First Nation	Directorship on WCSA; satellite WCSA work creation office; Participation in RAMS' sub-committees; stewardship work
Tla-o-qui-aht First Nation	Directorship on WCSA; Participation in RAMS' sub-committees; stewardship work
Ucluelet First Nation	Directorship on WCSA and RAMS; participation in RAMS' sub-committees; stewardship work

Toquaht First Nation	Participation in RAMS' sub-committees
Tseshaht First Nation	Directorship on RAMS; participation in RAMS' sub-committees; stewardship work
Huupacasath First Nation	Participation in RAMS' sub-committees; stewardship work
Uchuklesaht First Nation	Directorship on RAMS; participation in RAMS' sub-committees; stewardship work
Huu-ay-aht First Nation	Participation in RAMS' sub-committees; stewardship work; economic development work including abalone project
Ditidaht First Nation	Directorship on RAMS; participation in RAMS' sub-committees; stewardship work
Patcheedaht First Nation	Participation in RAMS' sub-committees; stewardship work
<b>Local Government Bodies or Towns</b>	
Alberni-Clayoquot Regional District	Directorship on RAMS; participation in RAMS' sub-committees; stewardship work
Comox-Strathcona Regional District	Directorship on RAMS; participation in RAMS' sub-committees; stewardship work
Cowichan Valley Regional District	Information sharing and endorsement of RAMS
District of Ucluelet	Directorship on RAMS; participation in RAMS' sub-committees; stewardship and economic development work
District of Tofino	Information sharing—participation in RAMS through regional district and through Central Region Board
Village of Gold River	Information sharing and meetings—participation in RAMS through regional district; shellfish development work
Village of Zeballos	Information sharing and meetings—participation in RAMS through regional district; shellfish development work
Walter's Island, Kyuquot	Information sharing—participation in RAMS through regional district
Village of Tahsis	Directorship on RAMS; participation in RAMS' sub-committees; stewardship and shellfish development work
Town of Bamfield	Directorship on RAMS; meetings; participation in RAMS' sub-committees; stewardship work; economic development work including abalone project
<b>Fish Processors</b>	

Lion's Gate Processing	Directorship on WCSA
Canadian Seafood Processing	Directorship on WCSA and RAMS
United Seafood Processing	Partner in Tanner crab fishery development
Neptune Seafood Processing	Participation in RAMS sub-committees and frequent dialogue
Portfish Seafood Processing	Dialogue
Nikoforuk Value-added Seafood Processing	Dialogue
<b><i>Community and Economic Development Organizations</i></b>	
Alberni-Clayoquot Community Skills Centre	Participation in RAMS econ development sub-committee; shellfish development committees; frequent dialogue
Community Futures Development Corporation	Participation in RAMS econ development sub-committee; shellfish development committees; partnerships; frequent dialogue
Nuu-chah-nulth Economic Development Corporation	Participation in RAMS econ development sub-committee; shellfish development committees; partnerships
Ma-Mook Economic Development Corporation	Directorship on RAMS
Alberni-Clayoquot Economic Development Commission	Participation in RAMS econ development sub-committee; shellfish development committees; partnerships; frequent dialogue
Ecotrust Canada/Shorebank	Partnerships, funding, participation in RAMS sub-committees, frequent dialogue
<b><i>Educational Institutions</i></b>	
Bamfield School for Field Studies	Partnerships, guest lectures and visits
Bamfield Marine Sciences Centre	Participation in RAMS conservation committee; partnerships in abalone project
Elementary and high schools in Gold River, Kyuquot, Zeballos, Ucluelet, and Port Alberni	RAMS educational programs
Simon Fraser University	Participation by RAMS in SFU sponsored events; partnership on several student projects; information sharing and frequent dialogue with professors
University of British Columbia	Participation by RAMS in UBC sponsored events; partnership on several student projects; information sharing
University of Victoria	Participation by RAMS in SFU sponsored events; partnership on several student projects; information sharing
<b><i>Stewardship, Community Groups, and NGOs in the Area</i></b>	



Westcoast Women's Resources Centre	Partnership with WCSA re hiring a women's resources coordinator
Kyuquot Streamkeepers	Established through RAMS
Ucluelet Shorekeepers and Streamkeepers	Established through RAMS
Gold River Streamkeepers and Watershed Committee	Established through RAMS
Gold River Rod and Gun Club and Gold River Chinook Enhancement Group	Partnerships on stewardship
Ecotrust Canada	Participation in RAMS sub-committees; contractor and support organization to RAMS;
Central Westcoast Forest Society	Participation on RAMS conservation committee
Alberni Valley Enhancement Association	Directorship on RAMS; Participation on RAMS conservation committee; joint stewardship projects; frequent dialogue
Forest Watch/Friends of Clayoquot Sound	Participation on RAMS conservation committee; discussion of joint projects
Strawberry Isle Research Society	Participation on RAMS conservation committee
Ducks Unlimited	Partnership on several projects
Thornton Creek Enhancement Association	Directorship on WCSA; Participation on RAMS conservation committee; partnership on several projects with WCSA and RAMS; frequent dialogue with WCSA
Tofino Enhancement Society	Partnership on several projects with WCSA and RAMS; frequent dialogue with WCSA
Long Beach Model Forest Society	Participation on RAMS conservation committee; partnership on several projects with WCSA and RAMS
Ucluelet Vision Group	Occasional participation in WCSA and RAMS meetings
<b><i>Resource User Groups</i></b>	
Western Forest Products	Participation on RAMS conservation committee; partnership on several projects with RAMS
Interfor Forest Products	Participation on RAMS conservation committee; partnership on several projects with WCSA and RAMS
MacMillan Bloedel/Weyerhaeuser	Participation on RAMS conservation committee; partnership on several projects with RAMS
Norske Canada Mill	Partnership on several projects with RAMS

BC Shellfish Growers Association	Participation on RAMS shellfish development committee; dialogue at various Provincial processes and conferences
Salmon harvesting interests from outside the area	Participation in RAMS selective fishing workshop; dialogue at various DFO processes and conferences;
Pacific Salmon Harvester's Society; Fisheries Vessel Owner's Association; Underwater Harvester's Association; Black Cod Association; Seafood Alliance	Dialogue at various DFO processes and conferences; generally adversarial interactions
Sport Fish Advisory Board	Local chapter (Alberni Valley and Nootka) directorships on RAMS; Formal participation in negotiations to establish an external mandate
Herring fleets	Dialogue during herring seasons and at DFO advisory processes
Pacific Sardine Association	Dialogue regarding development of sardine fishery; joint paper
Jamie's Whaling Station	Participation in RAMS map project
West Coast Goosebarnacle Harvester's Association	Participation in NTC/RAMS effort to re-start fishery
Canfisco (Canadian Fish Company)	Came to one negotiation session to establish external mandate; generally adversarial interactions
Scandic Seafoods (finfish aquaculture company)	Directorship on RAMS; information sharing.
<b>External Government Agencies</b>	
Human Resources Development Canada	Substantial funding to WCSA and RAMS; participation on RAMS economic development sub-committee
BC Ministry of Education, Skills and Training	Funding to WCSA
BC Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs	Participation in negotiation to establish external mandate
Federal Department of Indian and Northern Affairs	Participation in negotiation to establish external mandate; funding to hire Nuuchahnulth regional management coordinator.
British Columbia Ministry of Agriculture, Fish and Foods	Meetings, phone calls, letters, and emails with Minister and staff regarding policy; funding to clam board; frequent dialogue on new fisheries development
Fisheries Renewal British Columbia	WCSA worked to established FsRBC; Substantial funding to RAMS; dialogue regarding the program and RAMS participation in FsRBC coastwide forums.
British Columbia Assets and Lands Corp.	Meetings with staff; participation on RAMS

	shellfish development committees
British Columbia Ministry of Transportation, Environment, Parks	Participation in various RAMS stewardship projects
Federal Clerk of the Privy Council	Meeting with WCSA and RAMS re: DFO accountability
Federal Auditor General's Office	Meetings with WCSA and RAMS re: DFO accountability
DFO Fisheries Management Ottawa	Frequent letters regarding policy; Infrequent meetings or phone calls with staff regarding policy; 2 meetings with Minister of Fisheries and Oceans
DFO Fisheries Management- Pacific Region	Meetings, frequent phone calls, letters, and emails with staff regarding policy; work on projects such as new and developing fisheries; funding to RAMS and clam board; hosting advisory forums and consultative processes
DFO South Coast Stock Assessment;	RAMS participation in stock assessment reviews; participation in RAMS stewardship technical review committee, information management committee, and projects
DFO South Coast Habitat Branch DFO Hatcheries	Dialogue and partnership with RAMS and WCSA re projects; participation on RAMS conservation committee
DFO Community Mapping Network	Dialogue about information management
Streamkeepers and Shorekeepers Programs	Training to enable RAMS to establish programs in WCVI area
Senate Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans	Presentations to the Standing Committee
<b><i>Organizations Outside the Area</i></b>	
Coastal Community Network	Shared office space and frequent dialogue
Centre for Community-Based Management, Nova Scotia	Infrequent information sharing
North Atlantic Marine Alliance	Infrequent information sharing
Alaska Community Development Quota Program	Visited by WCSA members; Infrequent information sharing
Canadian Council of Professional Fish Harvesters	Dialogue; RAMS member holding directorship on CCPFH
National Roundtable on the Environment and the Economy	Meeting and infrequent information sharing
Community Fisheries Development Centres	Frequent dialogue
Inuvialuit Wildlife Management Boards	Infrequent information sharing

David Suzuki Foundation	Funding to WCSA and frequent dialogue
Union of Fisheries and Allied Workers	Frequent dialogue and occasional meetings and partnerships on issues
Bullit Foundation	Funding
Greenpeace	Participation in several RAMS workshops
Aboriginal Fisheries Commission	Frequent dialogue and occasional meetings and partnerships on issues
Native Brotherhood of BC	Sporadic dialogue and occasional meetings and partnerships on issues
Vancity Credit Union	Funding and meetings on projects
Other coastal First Nations	Information sharing, sporadic dialogue and occasional meetings and partnerships on issues
Skeena-Queen Charlotte Regional District	Frequent dialogue, meetings and discussion regarding tanner crab project
Consultants and Commissions	Meetings, presentations, and discussions with numerous consultants and commissions hired by external governments