TEACHER DEVELOPMENT:
A STUDY OF AN IDEA

by

Jonathan Neufeld

BA, University of Manitoba, 1978

M.Ed., University of Toronto, 1990

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Jonathan Neufeld

(Name)

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(Date)

APPROVAL

Name: Jonathan Neufeld

Degree: Doctor of Philosophy

Title of Thesis: Teacher Development: A Study of An Idea

Examining Committee:

Chair: Michael Manley-Casimir

Peter Grimmett
Associate Professor
Senior Supervisor

Celia Haig-Brown
Associate Professor

Frederick Dolan
Associate Professor
Department of Rhetoric
University of California
Berkeley, California

Stephen Smith
Associate Professor
Internal/External Examiner

Frances Schoonmaker Bolin
Professor
Teachers College
Columbia University, New York
External Examiner

Date Approved ___April 1, 1996___

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Abstract

The literature on teacher development assumes the validity of a certain notion of truth. This dissertation uncovers that notion and locates it within the philosophical discourse of modernity. I begin with a Heideggerian analysis of the foundational principles behind the modern concept of human being and its relationship to the world. I show how that theoretical construct is composed of metaphors which are consistent with those used by Charles Taylor, who identifies alienation as the fundamental predicament facing modern humanity. Taylor's metaphors are then compared with those involved in theorizing teacher development. On the basis of its metaphors, teacher development is construed as a moral allegory in which teachers are presupposed to be alienated from themselves, from others, and from their environment. The path of teacher development meanders through political, ethical, and epistemological dualisms towards liberation from alienation. I characterize this allegory as a story of "homecoming." I provide a historical summary of the philosophical discourse of modernity, specifically focusing on the meaning of consciousness, in order to show how and where the allegory of teacher development is rooted. The most relevant thinkers of this tradition are Déscartes, Rousseau, and Hegel, and I show how the latter, in particular, has affected the rhetoric of teacher development through his influence on John Dewey and George Herbert Mead. From my review of its metaphors and its philosophical genealogy, I conclude that the idea of "teacher development" is theological in its metaphysics, in its theoretical structure, and in its rhetoric.

Dedication

For my father and my mother

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What, do you imagine that I would take so much trouble and so much pleasure in writing, do you think that I would keep so persistently to my task, if I were not preparing — with a rather shaky hand — a labyrinth into which I can venture, in which I can move my discourse, opening up underground passages, forcing it to go far from itself, finding overhangs that reduce and deform its itinerary, in which I can lose myself and appear at last to eyes that I will never have to meet again. I am no doubt not the only one who writes in order to have no face.

Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language*

But, then, what is philosophy today — philosophical activity, I mean — if it is not the critical work that thought brings to bear on itself? In what does it consist, if not in the endeavor to know how and to what extent it might be possible to think differently, instead of legitimating what is already known? There is always something ludicrous in philosophical discourse when it tries, from the outside, to dictate to others, to tell them where their truth is and how to find it, or when it works up some case against them in the language of naive positivity. But it is entitled to explore what might be changed, in its own thought, through the practice of a knowledge that is foreign to it. The "essay" — which should be understood as the assay or test by which, in the game of truth, one undergoes changes, and not as the simplistic appropriation of others for the purpose of communication — is the living substance of philosophy, at least if we assume that philosophy is still what it was in times past ... an exercise of oneself in the activity of thought.

Michel Foucault, *The History of* Sexuality, *Vol. 2*

Preface: Statement of Thesis

I begin by presenting an autobiographical account of what led to my interest in teacher development. Let me state at the outset that the events which I shall recount combine to produce a disenchantment with problem-solving as an effective means of resolving human predicaments (be they sacred or secular), and a mood of disillusionment runs through my entire dissertation.

As a lad of eleven, the text which provided the most profound influence in my life was John Bunyan's *The Pilgrim's Progress* (1678). That Puritan allegory of the wayfaring foot-traveler named "Christian," advancing through life with his burden, became the model upon which I would rely as an adult. Christian begins by awakening to the realization that he is guilty of sin and that he cannot ground the meaning of his life on moral righteousness alone. Since the path of good deeds is destined to fail, he forsakes his family and embarks on a retrospective journey which brings him into contact with successive localities and personalities which influence him along his path towards ultimate redemption. His progress is the chronicle of a religious education, taking its images and lessons directly from biblical scripture. It is a figurative curriculum whose stages are represented by symbolic forms of consciousness which lead to enlightenment in a celestial city (see Revelation 21:2). Christian reaches the city with his closest male companion, "Hopeful." The archetype for Christian alternates between the courier and the soldier (see 1 Corinthians 9:24; Hebrews 12:1; 2 Timothy 4:7). The journey of life is portrayed as consisting of numerous graduated steps which lead, ultimately, beyond the horizon. The horizon is the boundary from which light announces itself at the close of a prolonged period of darkness; it is the dividing line between earthly and non-earthly experience, and it leads towards unity with the origin of light. This destination greatly affects the pilgrim's development; for to imagine one's life as a journey towards a specific destination is to recognize the importance of correct procedures. Upon arrival, the meaning of the whole journey is known with perfect clarity. For the pilgrim, the

original shining city exists in the sky above the horizon. It symbolizes the point at which everything becomes illuminated, including the meaning of human existence.

As a result of a two-year fixation on *Pilgrim's Progress*, I also came to interpret my life as a series of adventures in a struggle between the powers of light and darkness. This struggle was integrated into the psychology of my Christian conversion experience which took place when I was 12 years of age. I was culturally conditioned to welcome such an interpretation of development, for I was raised as a pious Anabaptist. My religious education had its origins in the culture of Reformation Holland and Hanseatic Prussia. I had no need of Bunyan's footnotes; the symbolic events and characters which he depicts were already an intimate part of my cultural discourse. As a first-generation Canadian, it was also easy for me to identify with the lonely traveler wandering through a hostile land. And so I came to see my life experience as a personal fiction of individual growth. My journey began nine years after studying the allegory, as I imitated Christian by suddenly leaving my home and community to wander for a year in Europe. During my journey, I dutifully and introspectively documented my reflections on all of the events and personalities which I encountered along the road.

While spending an extended period at a Greek monastery, I decided to pursue religious studies in the hope of becoming a pastor. This dream was soon set aside due to my interest in history. I discovered, however, that there was little promise of employment as a history teacher, and I began studying French. However, my undergraduate years as a student of theology and history are what led to this dissertation. From the study of biblical exegesis, I gained a fascination with text interpretation; from history, I gained a fascination with historical processes of development (in the German sense of the narrative tale [*Geschichte*]). Another profound influence came about during an extended period of study in Chicoutimi, Québec. While living with a French Canadian family, I was told of how the English Canadian majority oppressed the *Québecois*. This prompted me to see my pedagogy as an emancipatory activity intending to unite two cultural solitudes, one of which, I had decided, had good reason to desire cultural freedom.

This interpretation of pedagogy led me to pursue graduate studies in educational administration after having had the opportunity to be the principal of a French immersion summer program. My teaching and leadership styles were intended to empower both students and staff. Even then I believed that teaching and administering should be emancipatory activities. A review of my Master's thesis bears this out (see Neufeld 1991). There, I documented how teachers interpreted temporal processes in a way that enabled them to establish ordered moral priorities. I portrayed teachers as oppressed by the intensification of bureaucratic demands which kept them from caring for their students. The final words of that text are telling:

> If we see a third wave of curriculum reform on the horizon, it must challenge the historically rooted structures of social control which underpin our present educational system. In this way, the values, purposes and assumptions of care may become part of a new research orientation. This may nourish a struggling counter-culture of teachers in schools who base their practice on an understanding of care. If this orientation is not explored, we may continue to research and develop smart weapons of bureaucratic accountability instead of people who care about themselves, about others, and about the world which they create.

The target of my critique was the historically rooted structures of social control which were responsible for the oppression of teachers. My temporary research agenda was to identify and empower a struggling counter-culture which could base its practice in a notion of pastoral care. This counter-culture could then rise within the dominant culture to alter the course of increasing bureaucratic oppression. I assumed that this was possible, for I assumed that human beings possessed the power to create their world.

The results of my study were presented at an annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association in Chicago in 1991. During my visit to Chicago, I wandered into a bookstore and purchased a book by the American historian Eric J. Leed entitled *The Mind of the Traveler* (1991). In that book, Leed traces the history of European civilization through various textual interpretations of the experience of travel. In 1995 I presented a paper in San Francisco in which I applied Egan's (1979) curriculum theory to Leed. Egan's theory rests upon the notion that students progress through successive stages, or forms of consciousness, in their development, and that these stages resemble the successive periods of European cultural history. I argued that Egan's stages could be read as successive chapters in a cultural narrative of the travel experience.

My scholarly identity thus follows a continuum, and its origins may be found in *The Pilgrim's Progress*. This allegory tells of the soul's purposeful journey through a secular world — a world which keeps it from experiencing freedom. My work is not so much epistemological research (a mind's journey) as a theological pilgrimage (a soul's journey) which is transcribed in the rhetoric of social science. Whereas the purpose of the soul's journey is to reach some empowering metaphorical homeland in order to be released from the bondage of sin, the purpose of the mind's journey is to be released from ignorance of "the truth." This double purpose became incorporated into the ways in which I expressed my pedagogy, my interpretation of administration, and my investigation of teachers' work. However, the fundamental point of my research remained buried until it was revealed to me through a retrospective look at my life and through paying close attention to the dominant metaphors in my recent texts.

My scholarly identity is a result of the texts and events which have coalesced to produce my particular rhetorical signature. Signature and significance are related, etymologically, to the "sign." The rhetorical signs, or conceptual metaphors, which I use in my texts provide clues to my implicit research agenda. Of greater note, however, are the ways in which my chosen metaphors guide my personal research bias with regard to teacher development. I have mentioned the way in which the soul's journey may be transcribed as a mind's journey, structured by the metaphor of travel. Witness, as further evidence of my concern with metaphors of redemption, the rhetoric which I employed in some pre-doctoral projects.

In a paper criticizing my previous patterns of qualitative research, I make the following observation:

> The process of doing theory with people instead of for or on people (Lather 1991), as I had done, could only have been possible if I had clarified and disclosed, with my participants, what my implicit theories were about the perception of time in their work. Had I clarified the sources and desires of my own emancipation (the meaning of my longing) I may have been able to progress quickly beyond a mere understanding of teachers' situations to the level of emancipating them from the negative aspects of their situation.

Ripped from its context, the above quote may seem both presumptuous and naive. Even so, note how I saw my life as a fictional journey in which I had the mission of emancipating

teachers from bondage. Furthermore, my collaboration with Peter P. Grimmett ultimately characterized teacher development as a struggle towards emancipation. We chose to entitle our edited collection *Teacher Development and the Struggle for Authenticity: Professional Growth and Restructuring in the Context of Change* (Grimmett and Neufeld 1994). Looking back, the title foreshadows a setting which is fraught with change — a setting in which teachers feel alienated from their environment. They must journey onward (i.e., they must grow), and their journey, like Christian's, will be a struggle. But it may lead to a state in which they will be liberated from the bondage of alienation and come to know themselves, their colleagues, and their contexts authentically.

I have said that a mood of disillusionment runs through this dissertation. My belief in the above story of the possibility of authenticity is at the final stage in a long journey — a journey which has led to a fading light rather than to a hopeful beam. In a lengthy 1992 position paper, I suggested that the ideals presented in some typical examples of teacher development literature were close to those found in Taylor's (1989) study of modern identity. I observed that these same ideals could be found in the texts of Rousseau. I wrote that we were presented, in the teacher development literature, with the hopeful image of an ideally educated person — an image which is rooted in a modernist interpretation of human freedom as limitless power. I added that this image seemed to have strong pragmatic overtones and then stated that I was becoming disenchanted both with it and the entire idea of human perfectibility. My disenchantment was less with specific authors or with the notion of teacher development *per se* than with the foundational themes of the tradition which provided them with their metaphors. I was uncomfortable with how the texts seemed to be preoccupied with arriving at fixed points of intellectual and moral destinations. At that time, I was tentative in my identification of those points, but I argued that some deterministic tendencies did exist in the literature and that these did seem to bear close resemblance to Taylor's "horizons of significance." I wrote several times that I was becoming disillusioned with these tendencies and that I wondered what promise they held for teacher development. In suggestive Puritan language, I closed that paper with the following paragraph:

I have wrestled with these questions and, at the conclusion of the match, have left the ring in disappointment. It is now time for me to begin my struggle elsewhere; to travel beyond established horizons and to return with recountings which are, for the moment, unrecognizable but which may be, perhaps, even audacious.

The hopeful illusion which has now faded is the celestial city as a symbol of ultimate destination (be it religious or secular). The audacious reading which I shall bring to selected examples of the teacher development literature comes from my disillusionment both with this symbol and with what it symbolizes.

It is my thesis that the metaphors and the rhetoric of teacher development arise from attempts to articulate life in theological terms. These metaphors have public appeal because of their ability to inspire practices which assume recognizable cultural definitions of excellence. They follow a narrative structure whose plot line leads to predicated models of those definitions. Within this structure, normative directions are prescribed as passages and illustrate some assurance of cultural redemption. These rhetorical tendencies are also part of the modern philosophical tradition — a tradition which sought to articulate cultural redemption in distinctly humanist terms. The main authors of this tradition are Déscartes, Rousseau, Kant, Fichte, Schiller, and Hegel.

Hegel is pivotal in this philosophical genealogy. To bring Kantian epistemology and Christian morality down to earth, Hegel drew poetic/metaphoric images of development from the Greek *polis* and then reconciled them with his immediate social conditions. This reconciliation was intended to provide inspirational metaphors for the emerging modern age in Napoleonic Germany. In Hegel's writings, the ideal status of the human spirit's phenomenology was clearly articulated as a process of growth towards freedom through speculative reflection on what it means to be a conscious human being within a moral community (i.e., a community in which all activity has ethical/moral implications). I shall argue that this summarizes the pious ideal of the developed teacher found in some authoritative examples in the scholarly literature. I shall also show how the thematic components of this ideal were transferred into that literature through the Hegelian-inspired pragmatic writings of John Dewey and George Herbert Mead, respectively. (Of course, this notion of freedom has its origins in Plato's allegory of the devoted learner, who strives for a glimpse of the ultimate ideal of moral virtue [1945, pp. 227-35].)

It should be obvious, therefore, that this dissertation is written from a self-consciously personal perspective. I understand that many other perspectives could be brought forward to study the idea of teachers' educational development. This one is authentically my own. The document follows the sequence of this preface. I begin by identifying the importance of metaphor; I highlight pertinent aspects of the philosophical discourse of modernity and reflect on its relevant texts; and I then analyze some contemporary examples of teacher development literature. With regard to this literature, I focus on the dominant themes which emerge in a few representative texts (those of Donald Schön, Peter P. Grimmett, Ann Lieberman, Michael Fullan, Andy Hargreaves, Milbrey McLaughlin). These texts are among the brightest lights in the field of teacher development.

Chapter 1
Modern Philosophical Discourse and Teacher Development

Introduction

In this chapter I examine what teacher development means by taking an ontological approach to the explicit rhetoric used in some of its texts, thereby arriving at some clues as to its predicaments and goals. I then look at how Taylor and Habermas articulate the current state of modernity. Taylor, in particular, sounds an alarm as he observes the disintegration of modernity's highest ideals. I look at what is implicit within his rhetoric and, from this, argue for the importance of metaphor with regard to understanding educational development. I conclude by looking at how metaphor enters discussions of teacher development, and I reveal (1) the assumptions behind what constitutes the predicaments of contemporary teachers; (2) what is required to resolve those predicaments, and (3) how these predicaments/resolutions are theorized.

The Ontological Approach of the Study

There is a general consensus among academic researchers and school-district officials alike that the continuous educational development of teachers is beneficial to students. I question the deepest and most pervasive assumptions behind that consensus by critically examining the rhetoric employed to articulate teacher development. I am certainly not alone in stating that there is "depressingly little fundamental analysis" of what the concept of teacher development means (Fullan 1994). Doyle (1990), Burden (1990), Tozer et al. (1990), Grimmett (1991), Fullan and Hargreaves (1991, 1992), Hargreaves and Fullan (1991), to name only a few, have also struggled to clarify teacher development. However, the ontological approach which I take to teacher education is different from anything that has been done previously, and it calls into question the doctrine of teacher development as such. I begin by identifying the fundamental priorities of the philosophical discourse of modernity and by juxtaposing them with representative examples of teacher development literature. By comparing the themes in the grand narrative of modern philosophy with those in the subnarrative of teacher development, I shall show how theories

regarding the latter are traditional in both their assumptions and their aims. In order to achieve the kind of fundamental analysis longed for by Fullan, it is necessary to investigate the assumptions which researchers have held vis-à-vis teacher development. In other words, what is the assumed theoretical framework within which teacher development is discussed in the extant research literature?

Before looking at this literature, I assumed that it would not define the concept of teacher development theologically (i.e., it would not assume that a teacher's essential nature is defined by his/her status as the product of a divine creator). In other words, I assumed that its theoretical framework was purely secular. However, a more thorough study revealed that the secular nature of the research literature contained many theistic metaphors. But because these accounts are explicitly secular, any conception of meaninglessness is framed neither as alienation from some divine power nor as alienation from a supportive community which believes in that power; rather, it is expressed as a lack of contact with some human power and/or the community of others who gather to incite and draw from that power. This alienation may manifest itself in feelings of emptiness, lack of purpose, loss of self esteem, or the chronic "self-doubt" reported by Huberman (1993).

It is important to distinguish, first of all, between questions which are "ontic" and those which are "ontological."[1] Ontic questions concern a particular type of entity (e.g., How do volcanoes erupt?; 4 + 4 = ?; in English, when does the verb follow a noun?). Ontic questions and accounts always operate within some understanding of the being of entities (which is taken as "given") and then asks about the properties of specific sorts of entities (Guignon 1984). "Being," in this context, is used as an approximate synonym for "existence." When I use the word "being" to refer to all that exists, I will capitalize it (e.g., Being). Ontic questions presuppose conceptions of what it is to be some entity not only within a pre-established regional "science" such as geomorphology or mathematics, but also within linguistics or theology. Entities are studied within pre-given frameworks which legislate discursively the boundaries of what can be asked,

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[1] In approaching this question, I follow Heidegger (1962).

answered, or understood. As an example, asking questions about the development of the teacher assumes we already have some pre-understanding *about* teaching and *about* development. Similarly, to ask "What is the joy in parenting?" assumes, first of all, that we know what parenting is and what it is like. A question like, "What is teacher development?" assumes that we already know what teaching is and that it is possible to find out what might happen when a teacher becomes developed. We might actually hope to discover some generalized criteria for measuring what constitutes a developed teacher. Ontological questions, on the other hand, question the very grounds of being as such.

It is important to pose ontological questions before posing such ontic questions as, "How should a teacher best be developed?" Such questions can be posed and answered confidently only so long as the ontologies which support them are stable and accepted. Ontological assumptions determine, for example, both what is accepted as "development" and what it means to be a "teacher." When crises occur in regional sciences such as sociology (or in the community which that science is intended to serve), one needs to return to the ontological assumptions which determine research practice.

An ontological study, such as this dissertation, challenges the pre-given framework of regional science itself (e.g., it asks such questions as what are the basic elements of the universe? what are numbers? what is language? what is sacred?). Every regional science operates within a regional ontology; that is, it operates within a conception of the being of some domain of entities (Heidegger 1962; Guignon 1984). The framework of a regional ontology allows researchers to conduct normal scientific inquiry within a prescribed understanding of the existence of entities. For example, the regional ontology of mathematics allows researchers to pose questions concerning the relative value of numbers, the regional ontology of linguistics allows researchers to pose questions concerning the interpretation of texts, the regional ontology of theology allows researchers to pose questions about the existence and nature of God, and so forth. Researchers, therefore, conduct normal scientific inquiry (i.e., ask ontic questions) based upon ontological assumptions about the objects of that inquiry. Sociology, for example, poses ontic questions

regarding how people form meaningful relationships because it assumes, ontologically, that human beings are social beings.

Posing ontic questions about teacher development can become somewhat confusing because, although the latter does not function within any specific regional science, it draws its rhetoric from many. For example, from Sociology, teacher development researchers borrow political theories; from Philosophy, they borrow epistemologies and ethical theories; and from Psychology, they borrow notions about learning sequences. Such a rich, inter-related spectrum can be beneficial in so far as it allows the posing of questions from several domains but it can be frustrating in so far as the rhetoric of various domains may become confused and subcommunities of researchers may compete for discursive dominance. I have chosen to examine the entangled rhetoric of teacher development as being typical of modern philosophical discourse. Since the philosophical discourse of modernity is itself constituted by an interwoven language derived from several regional sciences, I have decided that the most productive approach will be to concentrate on teacher development as an emerging polyvocal dialect which is attempting to form some coherent cultural message. Arriving at this message will involve a rhetorical analysis of selected examples of the literature on teacher development.

This dissertation should benefit researchers who work within the polyvocal dialect of teacher development, for, as Fullan (1994) notes, there is evidence that the latter may be reaching a crossroads. Huberman (1993) cites autobiographical accounts which indicate that almost all teachers reach some stage in their career when they experience "self-doubt" — a stage when everything seems shrouded in meaninglessness and despair. Grimmett and Neufeld (1994, p. 206) have indicated how teacher development literature may be read as a response to a perceived anomic individualism which is manifested by a loss of meaning in the culture of teaching generally and a lack of choice within the micro-culture of schools. This has led to teachers experiencing a loss of freedom in their daily affairs. Grimmett and Neufeld go on to argue that research in teaching and its culture seems to be increasingly concerned with (1) reviving a sense of meaning in the experience of teaching, (2) building supportive relationships between teachers along with

restoring a sense of choice, and (3) restoring to teachers a sense of freedom. Doubting the source of one's inner power, losing a sense of meaning, and experiencing the slow erosion of freedom all indicate a general crisis in the culture of teachers.

Academic researchers have proposed that a curriculum should be developed to respond to this perceived crisis. Hargreaves (1993), for example, has posed questions relating to the institutional frameworks of schools and their relationships to the social economy. He recommends new collaborative working conditions and points to outmoded institutional structures as a root-cause of teachers' occupational despair. I have decided not to pursue ontic questions concerning appropriate responses to emerging challenges in the teacher culture but, instead, to examine the ontological assumptions beneath those texts which do address such issues.

I shall begin my ontological search by looking at what it means to be human according to the European philosophical tradition stretching from Déscartes to Hegel. According to this tradition, within the totality of existence there is a way of being which is distinctly "human." This tradition articulates a number of theoretical positions regarding notions of truth. These notions characterize teachers as unique types of human beings who are worthy of being both researched and developed.

Ontological accounts tend to assign predicates to human being (Taylor 1989). "Predicate" comes from the Latin *praedicatus*, the past participle of *praedicare* (to proclaim or to preach). A cultural example of a nominal "predicate" would be a "preacher" who preaches a divinely inspired message. Indeed, in German, *praedicare* is the root for *Prediger* (preacher). The late Latin word, *praedicamentum*, is the root for "predicament." "The human predicament" is what is proclaimed as the most urgent dilemma facing human beings in any given age. I shall reveal several predicaments typical of the modern human condition, all of which will evince moral concern with what is good.

I think of ontological predicates in grammatical terms. Where human being is a neutral "subject," its verbal predicates may be any number of qualities which attribute to it an essential nature. The human subject can be predicated in many ways: it can, for example, be the product of

a divine creator, a conscious agent of rational choice, or a biological creature not unlike other biological creatures. Combinations or variations of all three of these cultural attributes may be found in teacher development literature. Fundamental predicates are usually hidden underneath everyday descriptions — descriptions which we rely upon in order to be able to deal with other human beings in practical ways. Reference to fundamental predicates is not necessary for everyday ethical and practical decisions, for they refer directly to a theoretical conception of the world and the place of human beings in it. Clearly, not every decision is so grave that we need to invoke what we believe to be our essence before taking a stand. Nonetheless, we assume that our fundamental predicates will support our explicit decisions.

Predications are cultural prescriptions which emanate from an implicit ontology and its fundamental predicates; subpredications determine people's conceptions regarding which ethical decisions are appropriate to which experiences. For example, if we believe that human subjectivity is determined by a divine masculine creator, then we might ultimately consider how we should follow his commandments when making ethical choices; if we believe that subjectivity is a consciousness with rational agency, then we might consider "reasonable" approaches to logically defined problems; if we believe that we are children of a goddess, then we might perceive the earth as a natural living organism. Various interpretations of ontological frameworks may co-exist within a single culture, and they may, at times, come into direct and serious conflict, as in the public debate over the life-status of a fetus. Interestingly, the ethical frameworks of each party in that debate share at least one element — the sanctity of human life (even though their ontological interpretations of "human life" are at odds).

A fundamental ontology may remain implicit with regard to understanding Being, but the interpretation of selfhood (what it is good to be) and of ethics (what it is right to do) is explicit. Notions of selfhood and ethics are intertwined through subpredications and are represented as ways of being and behaving. Another word for subpredication, in grammatical terms, is "object," and it is from "objective standpoints" that researchers make sense of teachers' lives and careers. Without objective representations, cultural discussions of what it would mean to "develop" as a

teacher would be senseless to both teachers and researchers alike. Archetypal predicates, as cultural landmarks, can come to represent the ethically sanctioned goals of an educational curriculum, and it is important to emphasize that choices of subpredications are defined by the tacit ontological stance of any given culture. For example, if we believe that we are the products of a divine masculine creator, then we may tacitly deal with each other as archetypal saints or sinners — the idea being to educate and socialize as many saints and as few sinners as possible.[2] If, on the other hand, we understand ourselves to be self-conscious agents confronting a problem-presenting world, then we might try to socialize children to refine autonomous problem-solving skills. Similarly, researchers who focus on teachers, and who assume an ontology of self-conscious agency, may construct teachers either as reflective practitioners or as active researchers.

An implicit, fundamental ontology is behind any given culture's archetypes, and it is expressed in the performance of everyday, ordinary practices. As Taylor (1989, p. 8) explains, if we are interested in justifying such questions as "What makes people worthy of our respect?", then we must claim an ontology which takes a stance towards a human being's access to the world and, by extension, towards other human beings. Likewise, if we wish to explain what makes teachers worthy of "development," then we must claim an ontology which expresses our modern spiritual nature and the human predicament which that nature implies. This is so because what is understood to be our essential nature and our practical predicament is what will provide the ground for an implicit doctrine of teacher development within an explicit research literature. It thus becomes necessary to pose the following ontological questions: (1) "What makes the research practice of 'teacher development' an appropriate cultural response?" and (2) "How is that response connected to the fundamental human predicament as defined within that culture?"

Researchers who write about teacher development do so in the omnipresent shadow of inherited foundational goals and within implicit frameworks which determine the correct procedures for reaching those goals. When we awaken each morning, we awaken submerged in culture. Our foundational goals proclaim what it is good to be in this culture, and their framework

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[2] I credit Hubert L. Dreyfus for this idea.

is explicitly constructed by ethical prescriptions. The terms of reference will be mutually accepted by all participants and will provide codes of ethics. Conforming to these codes will be rewarded, while transgressing them will be punished. I have called these terms of reference cultural landmarks or "predicates" because they say something about the, in and of itself, neutral concept of human being. These predicates function as guides to behavior. We orient our choices, decisions, and patterns of interaction according to them. (Gendering is a strong example of how the neutral human being becomes predicated with all kinds of cultural baggage based solely on what genitalia marks the body at birth.)

To see what motivates people who write about teacher development, I begin by looking at the age which forms the cultural context of their literature. Living in the spirit of a particular age is either to pursue or to resist its goals, either to follow or to reform its structures; and it is to do these things in order to address the human predicament. I look at the foundational goals of the modernist age and at the structures set up to ensure that they are achieved. In so doing, I look at the thinkers who have come to represent the modernist tradition.

The Normative Tendencies of Modernity

Habermas (1992) distinguishes between the different but related concepts of "modernization" and "modernity." Modernization is a relatively young term, and it came into common usage after the Second World War. It refers to a collection of interconnected economic and social processes characteristic of late capitalism. He identifies such processes as the increasingly narrow mobilization of resources towards hyper-efficient production; regional political identities controlled by centralized power structures; and notions of productivity and labor value which formed in reaction to the technologizing of the workplace. The economic processes of modernization are lately being threatened by such alarming trends as the reduction of primary resources (e.g., fossil fuels and rain forests); environmental devastation from air, water, ground, and noise pollution; the assertion of micro-regional political identities as a result of the decentralization and disintegration of former power structures (e.g., the former Soviet Union);

and notions of productivity and labor value which are associated with service industries and/or the hyperspace of information technology.

My focus is not on modernization; it is on the ontological conception of the modern human being as one founding principle of modernity and on how it relates to teacher development. Taylor (1989, p. 3) describes this focus on the human being as a concern with "what it is to be a self", a person, a human agent — all of which are conceptions which are both taken for granted and crucial to social, economic, and political analyses of modernization. With regard to the concept of modernity, Habermas shows how it turns on what it means "to be some being" called a human being. He suggests that those interested in modernity seem to be concerned with a series of specific issues which relate to practical ethical problems of how best to interact with other human beings as well as with objects and things. But the primary concern is always with what it means to be a human being in the first instance.

Some philosophers, such as Plato, Rousseau, and Dewey, devoted special attention to how children and youths should be raised to be healthy participants in their cultures. In every case, however, their pedagogies depended upon an interpretation of what it meant to be a human being in the world. It could be said that the philosophical discourse of modernity came into its own in the texts of Immanuel Kant; that is, Kant's texts provided a vocabulary and structure which would bring both Rationalist and Enlightenment ideas of being, science, and Christianity into a cohesive system. Many of the questions which motivated Kant, and the metaphors and structures upon which he based his system, are still in place, for he was concerned with assigning meaning to human life during a time when such meaning seemed to be constantly eroding (e.g., Enlightenment epistemologies and scientific theories were in direct competition with church doctrine).

Déscartes would unlock the modern philosophical box by focusing on attaining knowledge through "reason" rather than through divine revelation. Reason was modeled upon the paradigmatic science of mathematics, and it could be applied to the workings of the world through carefully planned procedures of empirical observation and experimentation. A new secular hope

seemed to be promised through faith in human knowledge, which, it was believed, possessed a novel potential to solve human problems. This secular faith was beginning to attain as much authority as was that of divine intervention. It would be Rousseau who would tackle the question of whether the meaning of life could be profanely inspired. Kant would take Rousseau's notion of meaning and focus on whether a promise once delivered by a sacred theology could be delivered by a secular epistemology. Kant noticed the crisis involved in the competing truths of religion and science, but, more significantly, he articulated both what it meant to be human in the modern age and what kind of hope this entailed. Hegel would take this notion of hope to its logical philosophical conclusion.

The tension of being a modern human may be reduced to the establishment of, and relationship between, dualities which we are constantly seeking to unify. For example, while, on the one hand, modern humanity is based on a belief in the potential for limitless transformation, progress, and growth due to advances in "science," it is this very belief which threatens to destroy what we define as "nature." The late twentieth-century destruction of local and global environments is a classic example of what can happen when science and nature stand in contradiction to each other. In order to further a context for economic profit and growth, a unifying argument must be established whereby development becomes "sustainable"; that is, science and nature may be presented as at one — as in harmony. The anguish of living out a modern social identity is manifested as a balancing act between individualism and community. Charles Taylor argues at great length that a modern human identity, if understood and expressed as a state of "authenticity," can continue to believe in the ethics of transformation, growth, and adventure without succumbing to the disintegration and destruction of the community.

In *The Malaise of Modernity*, Taylor (1991) responds to three perennial criticisms which late twentieth-century social scientists put forward — in particular, Lasch (1979) and Bloom (1987) — concerning the perceived destructive, disintegrative aspects of modernity. He names these concerns as:

(1)   an anomic individualism manifested in a "loss of meaning" when interacting with others in our culture;

(2)   the predominance of instrumental reason, which fosters the formation of instrumental, temporary relationships with others; and

(3)   the increasing restriction of choices, which leads to a perceived loss of freedom in our society.

Responding to the "loss of meaning" in our society, Lasch (1979) criticizes individualism per se as the root cause of (1) disaffiliation from community and (2) relationships which are temporary and/or instrumental. Taylor counters by arguing that Lasch unfairly misinterprets the genuine meaning of the ethic of individualism itself and, moreover, that he selectively criticizes and inappropriately isolates distorted, baser forms of individualism. In other words, Lasch has pessimistically chosen to attack those aspects of modern individualism which are negative, while ignoring those aspects which are positive. If people are not committed to a sense of community or are choosing to enter into temporary or instrumental relationships, says Taylor, it is not because they are living in conformity with an ethic of self-fulfillment or self-realization per se. Healthy individualism, Taylor reminds us, is linked to affiliation within the community and depends on significant, binding relationships. Forms of anomic individualism which negate community are the result of the baser forms of self-gratification which have been transmitted into popular, mainstream culture by the ephemeral social structure of industrialism and by a consumer-driven society. It is these which have resulted in genuine examples of social breakdown. Such situations are the result of the absence of a morally binding community — an absence which leaves "mere anomie in [its] wake, and everybody is left to fend for themselves" (Taylor 1991, p. 125).

Bloom (1987) located our contemporary "eclipse of ends" in an outlook which accepts a rather facile relativism grafted onto modern individualism. Taylor again disagrees, explaining how the positive and more complex ethic of individual self-actualization, which has deep moral

significance, has wrongly been conjoined with a trivialized ethic which ignores community. Taylor argues that this misinterpretation has historical origins. Art and beauty underwent a qualitative shift in meaning around the turn of the eighteenth century, and this shift has influenced both our image of the independent artist and our modern notion of artistic creation. Art gradually became less a medium of imitative depiction and more a practice driven by the kinds of feelings it could arouse in the beholder — feelings which induced a kind of pleasure which differed from moral pleasure (Taylor 1991, p. 64). The creation and enjoyment of art came to be understood as internally motivated, and the appreciation of beauty emerged as something which provided satisfaction for its own sake. For some, such as the German poet Friedrich Schiller, authentic moral fulfillment and aesthetic fulfillment retained their compatibility; but, for the most part, the two came to be contrasted, with aesthetic fulfillment carrying its own telos and its own goals —goals which were often in stark opposition to the moral goals of the community.

Over the past 200 years, the gulf between the moral and the aesthetic has become widely accepted. Popular conceptions include the solitary, eccentric artist who thrives on imagination and creation. Popular images of the self-destructive but obsessively creative composer or of the bohemian, poverty-stricken painter holed up in a garret may come to mind; we may see the Irish poet as chronically intoxicated; accept the mystique surrounding the blues musician who "lives his/her music"; and some may expect actors and rock stars to be motivated by drug-use or pansexuality. In art, self-discovery has come to be contrasted with communally defined morality, and this has meant that the artist may opt out of any morally binding dialogue with the community. Taylor blames this particular interpretation of aesthetic self-fulfillment for the fact that we have lost sight of moral concerns.

Taylor's revival of individualism demands the establishment of a renewed community spirit. Trivial forms of individualism have called for the subjective creation of a relativized order based on emotional rather than on communal notions of moral significance. Alleged liberation from a unifying spirit of community may provide the illusion of freedom and power, but, as Taylor warns, this kind of naïveté ignores the community of significant others — those who

establish, define, and fix questions, decisions, and issues of moral significance. According to Taylor, it is this distortion of authentic individualism that has led to the moral relativism of our popular culture and to Bloom's "closing of the American mind."

In opposing the base forms of self-gratification and the aesthetic/subjective moral relativism of our modern era, Taylor strongly argues for an allegiance which exists beyond our own personal development and against which we can define and contextualize our choices. He refers to this allegiance as the valuative horizon of significant choices. The horizon of significance is determined through community recognition of vital questions. Questions of significance cannot exist in and of themselves; they emerge from a framework existing independently of our will. Taylor explains:

> Even the sense that the significance of my life comes from its being chosen — the case where authenticity is actually grounded on self-determining freedom — depends on the understanding that, independent of my will, there is something noble courageous, and hence significant in giving shape to my life. There is a picture here of what human beings are like, placed between this option for self-creation, and easier modes of copping out, going with the flow, conforming with the masses, and so on, a picture which is seen as true, discovered, not decided. (1991, p. 39)

Clearly, Taylor has great respect for the ethic of individualism and self-fulfillment. Unlike its detractors, he argues that modern individualism is a positive aspiration but that, unfortunately, it has been "sold short," misunderstood, misinterpreted, and trivialized. He advocates retrieving this ethic by reminding members of society of the importance of inclusive moral dialogue with and within the community. These ideals would necessitate an allegiance to moral horizons of significance which have their roots in our very existence as human beings. Basically, he calls for a complex, multilevel struggle (intellectual, spiritual, and political) in which public debates interlink with those occurring in a host of institutional settings (e.g., hospitals and schools) (Taylor 1991, p. 120).

I find it interesting that Taylor locates two stereotypical "caring" or service institutions as strategic sites, both of which have retained some vestiges of a hierarchical structure (i.e., nurses vis-à-vis doctors; teachers vis-à-vis principals). In the case of hospitals, physicians and nurses

handle, care for, and cure the human body with the assistance of medical sciences. In the case of schools, (meta)physicians acting as curriculum writers and educators handle, care for, and cure the human spirit with the assistance of social/philosophical sciences. The hospital and the school have both adopted and, increasingly, co-opted the caretaking functions of such traditional institutions as the church and the nuclear family.

Modernity is a constellation of ontological presumptions about the self, the other, and human purpose. Kant provided a philosophical vocabulary for how the modern human being relates to self and others, the details of which will be elaborated upon in the next chapter. Kant's achievement was the unification of four subsystems (rational thinking, a Newtonian conception of the world, an Enlightenment interpretation of being human, and the pietistic morality of his age) into a single comprehensive system of thought. Hegel's achievement was to provide a hope for humanity which equaled the theological hope of bodily resurrection and immortality. The secular promise of a life-fulfilling mortality, with its growth and transformation, presumed a hitherto unimagined human potential. It is this immense motivational potential which Taylor attempts to revive.

A tension was retained in Kant's system, however, and this tension was a vestige of the former theological ontology he sought to revise. Whereas formerly the fundamental human predicament was the individual's alienation from, and unification with, God, it was now the individual's alienation from, and unification with, the self and the objective world. Hence, it was important to represent clearly a series of conceptual dualisms within a philosophical system which presumed their ultimate reconciliation. In the following chapters, I shall show how one such dualism (i.e., individual/community) shows up in teacher development literature.

Taylor prefers the word *malaise* to the word predicament, possibly because the former can be translated as "sickness," and he takes the erosion of community to be one acute symptom of a chronic pathology in modern ethics. I would like to draw attention to the solutions which he proposes and, especially, to the metaphors which he uses. Taylor criticizes a narcissistic self-actualization precisely because it ignores the community. Moral self-"wholeness" entails the

unification of the concept of self with the concept of others in such a way as to provide the conditions for a total moral individual. It is an allegiance between the ethics of personal development and the standards of the community which produces the context for a "total" person.

Taylor insists that there is a "picture" of a true humanity. This picture is related to the original motivating idea(ls) of modernity, and it rests on a "horizon" of moral significance. It must be discovered through the use of appropriate procedures. According to Taylor, wholeness is attained by fixing one's gaze on the ideal. This is a gaze similar to that of the allegorical pilgrim who does not tarry on his way to the prized place where he hopes he will be made whole. The secular hope of modernity may be construed as a life-fulfilling mortality reminiscent of the story of redemptive reconciliation as told by Paul, the traveling New Testament evangelist (see 1 Corinthians 9:24; Romans 8:18-25; 2 Corinthians 15: 16-91).

Modernity is the discursive context within which researchers predicate teachers as unique phenomenological specimens of the modern human spirit. In a theological context, the path leading towards redemption involves developmental procedures promising spiritual growth and salvation from the bonds of sin; in a secular context, the path towards mastery over the self and the world involves procedures promising growth and transformation along with freedom from the bonds of ignorance/oppression. Teacher development texts may be referred to as secular scriptures because of the didactic functions they serve in determining what care (maintenance) and cure (reform) lead to a "healthy" professional identity.

A Metaphorical Turning Towards Teacher Development

Kliebard (1972) recognizes that educational metaphors are transferential concepts which are usually based in traditional experiences such as travel, hand-crafted production, and biological growth. These three categories may all be associated with traditional agrarian practices. Even though cultivating a field with hand-crafted tools may not be part of many educational researchers' daily experiences, it does have metaphorical value. Like a handicraft, a theory can be generated, honed, and refined. Research can be "cutting edge"; like the farm/cottage, it can have firm foundations and be supported by strong structures. The ideas within teacher research may be viewed as plants in an emerging "field" of inquiry. As I described in the preface, educational development can be rhetorically structured as a journey, with the path of learning consisting of stages of growth leading towards some hoped-for arrival at ultimate knowledge. A vast storehouse of graphic information can be associated with such images — hence, their motivational power. Cross-identification with traditional cultural phenomena through the use of metaphor results in evocative images which are accessible conceptually and understood linguistically. Evocative images can also function to justify certain interpretations of experience and to exert disciplinary power through ethical prescriptions. The agrarian lifestyle of the small village, where all work in common and where the tempo of life vibrates around the bounty of the harvest and a belief in God's providence, may have little direct association with late twentieth-century teaching practices; but the metaphors derived from such a lifestyle may provide rhetorical building-blocks for theories of teacher development. Following the advice of Lakoff (1992a), it is essential to be aware of the power of metaphor and the influence of the philosophical tradition which spawns them, for they may rhetorically structure both educational practice and development.

Hawkes (1972) has said that, historically, metaphors perform a didactic (from the Greek *didaskein*: "to teach") function instrumental in the articulation of community values, and that they reinforce rather than challenge established practices. In Chapter 3, I will show how the metaphors upon which the rhetoric of teacher development depends perform precisely this function.

Normative rhetorical images stimulate the emotions, arouse commitment, and motivate action (Elliott 1984). Metaphors can point towards the promise of an ultimate homecoming; knowledge for its own sake or for the sake of improving the world; empowering, autonomous freedom; self-mastery; mastery over the changing and unpredictable environment; and so on. Such promises are poetic, and in order to understand their effect on teachers, one must understand the power of rhetoric in academic writing. Evocative images used by teacher development researchers have as much to tell us about how teachers and teaching are conceptualized as do their empirical studies. As noted by Bullough and Stokes (1994), the poetic quality of teacher development literature is often more akin to myth than it is to the supposed objective certainty of a scientific discourse supported by a proven body of knowledge.

According to Elliott (1984) several metaphors for understanding the concept of education have become ensconced in our culture. Education may be construed as (1) preparation (for life, work, war, or the love of one's neighbor); (2) initiation (Peters 1965; Oakeshott 1975) (into a community through the teaching of its values, practices, and rituals); (3) liberation (Freire 1971) (from alienation or cultural domination, ignorance, and/or prejudice); and (4) guidance (Schimmel 1975). Each of these four metaphors for education involve moving, through stages (defined as forms of consciousness), towards some culturally sanctioned end. Preparation moves towards outcomes which will benefit the learner, enabling her/him to meet expectations; initiation assumes that distinct displays of theoretical and practical knowledge exist, along with worthwhile public practices (Peter's "citadel of civilization" [1965, p. 43]), and it moves towards getting the educated person to where she/he comes to understand and love knowledge; Liberation moves towards freedom (e.g., towards participatory democracy or the dictatorship of the proletariat), and it involves "empowering" the oppressed through enabling them to understand their alienated condition; finally, guidance moves towards perceived perfection through imitating an ideal, usually represented by an individual.

The use of metaphor in curricula reaches back to ancient Greece. "Metaphor" is rooted in the ancient Greek *metaphorein*, which may be translated as "transference"; and it shows up in

modern Greek as *metafora*, which may be translated as "a vehicle of transport." Thus metaphor may be seen as a vehicle which enables transference between experience and language. Until the mid-twentieth century, poetic transference between experience and language was looked upon with suspicion by the philosophical tradition rooted in Plato and Aristotle — a suspicion which has been fed by Christian and by positivist philosophies of language.

The quarrel over what constitutes "truth" as distinct from poetic embellishment shows up in *The Republic* (1945, p. 85), wherein Plato defends banishing poets from his ideal republic because they produce knowledge which is not directed towards the soul's inner vision. Plato was very aware of the power of rhetoric and myth to incite allegiance to phenomena lying beyond the realm of acceptable reason. Poetry, allegory, fable or parable, confuses fiction with literal statements of fact and only serves to deceive in the education of Guardians and warriors (see Plato, 1945, pp. 68-80).

Johnson (1980) writes that the late twentieth-century interpretation of metaphor is directly connected to the first extended treatment of the subject by Aristotle (384-322 BC). Aristotle defined the use of metaphor as a poetic art by which the poet provided knowledge through artistic intuition (*mimesis*). In his *Poetics*, Aristotle wrote:

> Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else; the transference being either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or on grounds of analogy. (1941, 1457b)

This definition separated metaphor from a more literal truth, and this has complicated its value for the last 2,300 years (Johnson 1980). Since Aristotle, metaphor has set up the dichotomy of explicit versus implicit knowledge. In the next section, I shall show how this dichotomy enables current teacher development researchers to use metaphors as lamps to illuminate the mind's inner vision.

Like Aristotle, the Roman Cicero saw metaphor as a misuse of words and a sidetracking of literal meaning.

> A metaphor is a brief similitude contracted into a single word; which word being put in the place of another, as if it were in its own place, conveys, if the

resemblance be acknowledged, delight, if there is no resemblance, it is condemned. (1970, pp. 156-57)

Latin rhetoricians valued metaphor chiefly as a linguistic ornamentation clearly subservient to other words involved in the setting out of argumentative proofs (Johnson 1980). Medieval rhetoricians furthered this derisive interpretation of metaphor when fortifying Christian scripture with such proofs. In *Concerning Figures and Tropes* (1973), Bede (ca. 673-735) distinguishes between rhetoric and logic in a manner reminiscent of Plato. Metaphor was a stylistic device devoid of serious philosophical argument. Bede's opinion came about while he was attempting to distinguish between the status of serious Christian scriptures and lesser Greek texts (which, incidentally, included Aristotle's favorable definition of poetic metaphor and rhetoric) (Johnson 1980). This attack was reinforced by a rising European monastic tradition which emphasized the outward expression of what were coming to be understood as the inner truths of the soul. Thus, words and scriptures should be literal rather than figurative expressions of the truth. Figures of thought were not necessary, as they were completely concerned with style. As Alberic of Monte Cassino (1973, pp. 146-47) argues:

> The method of speaking in metaphors has this characteristic: it turns one's attention from the particular qualities of the object; somehow, by this distraction of attention, it makes the object seem something different; by making it seem different, it clothes it, so to speak, in a fresh new wedding garment; by so clothing it, it sells us on the idea that there is something new and noble to be bestowed ... If a meal were served up in this way, it would disgust us, would nauseate us, would be thrown out ... Take care that in your eagerness to please with some novel delight, you do not start serving "poppycock." Be careful, I say, that when you invite someone to enjoy himself you don't inflict him with boredom to the point of vomiting.

The monastic lifestyle demanded utter simplicity and celibacy. The sexual and culinary images of the wedding-feast in the above quote indicate how a repulsion for sensuality became one agenda for the suppression of metaphor in early European and Christian writings. Metaphor was temporarily salvaged by Thomas Aquinas, who adopted a general Aristotelian interpretation of Christianity and, with it, a favorable view of metaphor. But the derisive attitude towards metaphor, as a deviation from orthodox meaning, remained in the philosophical tradition of Europe and North America until the present century (Johnson 1980). It was reinforced during the

seventeenth century when the foundations for ontological certainty began to be shift from the unified sacred power of a monotheistic god to the unified secular power of a mono-epistemic humanity. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1609), for example, held that speech consisted of names used to record thoughts (Johnson 1980). Thinking which entailed such recording was regarded as knowledge; thinking which entailed the use of poetic metaphor was regarded as deception. Rationalism and Empiricism fueled this negative sentiment. According to Déscartes:

> I esteemed eloquence highly, and loved poetry, but I felt both were gifts of nature rather than fruits of study. Those who reason most cogently, and work over their thoughts to make them clear and intelligible, are always most persuasive, even if they speak only a provincial dialect and have never studied rhetoric. (Déscartes in Sallis 1989, p. 28)

Déscartes' concern was not with figurative, but with cogent and reasoned, knowledge. In chorus, John Locke provides a definitive statement on the immorality of rhetoric:

> We must allow that all the art of rhetoric, besides order and eloquence; all the artificial and figurative application of words eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions and thereby mislead the judgment; and so indeed are perfect cheats ... They are certainly, in all discourses that pretend to inform or instruct, wholly to be avoided. (Locke in Sallis 1989, p. 28)

Toulmin (1990) categorizes "scientific rationalism" (a term which he borrows from Feyerabend 1988) as a historical tendency which carries with it a view of how the ontological structure of the world came to be interpreted. Between 1600 and 1700, philosophy began to pursue universally valid answers by developing a distinct separation between rationality/logic and rhetoric/emotions. According to this distinction, a "good reason" for action had to be universally justified by logic. According to Toulmin, from the seventeenth century onwards, a linear posture and method ensured that philosophical validity was dependent upon the internal relations of logical arguments. Rhetoric and metaphor were disdained in philosophical arguments, as they were considered to be figurative and therefore not graspable as logical proof. Universal proofs which could be set down in writing became valued in systematic research. Such a philosophical context fed an early Anglo-American enthusiasm for logical positivism, which only enhanced hostility towards metaphor.

Positivism held that any phenomenon may, in principle, be explained through the techniques of the natural sciences (Priest 1991). Thus, as every genuine problem could be solved scientifically, non-scientific ways of approaching it would be meaningless. Logical positivism assigned "meaning" to propositions which could be given a truth value which corresponded to "reality" (i.e., a body of verifiable propositions) (Sallis 1989). In its quest for literal truth, positivism rendered poetics meaningless.

It was for Rousseau and the later German Romantics to revive a favorable interpretation of metaphor. In his *Essay on the Origin of Language,* Rousseau called for a limited but benign interpretation of figurative thinking:

> As man's first motives for speaking were of the passions, his first expressions were tropes. Figurative language was the first to be born. Proper meaning was discovered last. One calls things by their true name only when one sees them in their true form. At first only poetry is spoken; there was no hint of reasoning until much later. (Rousseau in Sallis 1989, p. 29)

Truth may be a function of reason but tropes (from the ancient Greek *tropos*: "a turning") are primordial, and they are linked to the passions. However, the use of primordial tropes was not a symptom of a mature intelligence. Rousseau's education of Emile was intended to mold the latter's passions into self-conscious reason. The relative importance which Rousseau placed on tropes was transmitted to Kant. For Kant, the model of artistic genius was the poet who could use metaphor in an intuitive sense for the purpose of artistic creation (Johnson 1980). Metaphorical representations could carry more thought than could literal concepts, and poetic thought could play with understandings in ways which reason could not.

Nietzsche (1844-1900) took Rousseau's naturalistic philosophy and Kant's sympathy for artistic creation to extremes. For Nietzsche, since poetic metaphor was the linguistic process whereby human beings encountered the world, metaphorical understanding was pervasive in both thought and in speech. As with Rousseau, Nietzsche believed that metaphor was the first instance of thought, but, unlike Rousseau, he believed that it remained essential to all knowledge. What epistemologists called valid truths, Nietzsche called metaphorical interpretations which had

become conventionalized to the point where their metaphoric nature was forgotten (Johnson 1980). There is no "literal" truth; all is interpretation.

> What therefore is truth? It is a mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of human relations which become poetically and rhetorically intensified, metamorphosed, adorned and after long usage seem to a nation fixed, canonic and binding; truths are illusions of which one has forgotten that they are illusions; worn out metaphors which have become powerless to affect the senses. (1964, pp. 179-80)

Nietzsche's interpretation of metaphor only served to further alienate early twentieth-century logical positivists and drove a wider wedge between literal and figurative distinctions. This cognitive and emotive distinction remained secure until the mid-twentieth century, when the philosophy of rhetoric began to revive. There are presently several theories of metaphor, and most depend upon what constitutes the literal and the figurative, respectively, and how the latter bears on scientific knowing (Sallis 1989). The most popular of these theories is that of Lakoff and Johnson (1980), and it is commonly cited in research studies in teacher education (although I have yet to read a critical analysis of their theory when applied to teacher development).

I very much appreciate the rigor of the following works: Lakoff (1980), Lakoff and Turner (1989), and Lakoff (1992a). Lakoff and Johnson, especially, provide comprehensive analyses of the presence of metaphor in both spoken and written language. They argue that metaphor is essential to a form of interaction between what they call conceptual "gestalts." Sallis (1989) summarizes their position quite clearly:

> Even our scientific systems and the argumentative strategies by which we establish and defend them are metaphorical. A typical Lakoff and Johnson ploy would be to focus on the words "strategy," "establish" and "defend" in the foregoing sentence in order to bring home the central metaphor "argument is war." "War" is viewed as connoting an entire experiential gestalt of feeling — tones, experiences and expectations which structure our experience of argument ... By showing how the metaphors "argument is war" and "argument is a container" (or building or journey) structure the vast majority of our verbal interactions involving metaphor, Lakoff and Johnson evolve a notion of "literal metaphor," whereby a primitive metaphorical structuring of our experience is treated as if literally true. (p. 46)

In the case of teacher education, traditional practices originating in the gestalts of travel, handicraft, or biological growth would thus be understood to interact with the gestalts of learning to teach in a school. As a cognitive scientist, Lakoff systematically studies what he calls

"unconscious ideation" of a symbolic nature (Lakoff 1992b). He specializes in the study of conceptual systems — the largely unconscious systems of thought which determine how we think (Lakoff 1992c, p. 8). Metaphor, in this analysis, enables correspondences across conceptual domains, typically from concrete spatial domains to more abstract domains (Lakoff 1992c, p. 22). The study of metaphor, therefore, can yield to the researcher a sort of dictionary of the unconscious. Lakoff assumes that there is an unconscious metaphorical language of will which functions separately from the body and its passions (Lakoff 1992b). Since there is no way to get conscious control over the unconscious usage of metaphor, Lakoff advises that we be aware of the components of our metaphorical systems and what they entail (1992b). Lakoff's work has been influential with regard to devising research strategies dealing with behavior modification during teacher development.

Over the past several years a flurry of research papers have discussed metaphor as a useful tool for understanding the thinking processes, knowledge, and beliefs of teachers (Berliner 1990; Collins and Green 1990; Marshall 1990; Munby and Russell 1990; Tobin 1990). The preferred uses of metaphor in teacher development is summarized in an article by Bullough and Stokes (1994). They identify angles of research, most of which converge with regard to the preparation of teachers and all of which are concerned with how the latter identify themselves as pedagogues. These angles are "images of self," "self-narratives," and "personal metaphors." Bullough and Stokes begin by saying that metaphors can be used to represent and to reconstruct problems. They cite Calderhead and Robson (1991) when describing how mental models are used in this process. Teachers

> draw upon images of lessons, incidents or children to help them interpret and solve
> teaching problems. In fact, being able to recall images, and to adapt and manipulate
> these images in reflecting about action in a particular context is possibly an
> important aspect of the task of teaching ... Images, whether representations or
> reconstructions provide us with an indicator of teachers' knowledge and enable us
> to examine the knowledge growth attributable to different training experiences and
> the relationship between knowledge and observed practice. (p. 3)

The ability to manipulate and reconstruct assumes a tacit knowledge (Polanyi 1958) which needs to be made explicit. Conscious experience brings forth and embodies implicit metaphorical

images (Connelly and Clandinin 1988) which are then made explicit in order to guide practice. Subconscious images form preunderstandings (Bullough et al. 1984) upon which conscious practice is based. According to Bullough and Stokes, one of the most abstract of these implicit metaphorical images is the preservice candidate's self-conception as a teacher. The concrete experience of learning to teach requires a coherent self-image, and this coincides with being socialized into the profession. Citing Lakoff and Johnson (1980), they argue that metaphors are foundational in unifying diverse experiences into a coherence. In their words:

> Just as we seek out metaphors to highlight and make coherent what we have in common with someone else, so we seek out personal metaphors to highlight and make coherent our own pasts, our present activities, our dreams, hopes, and goals as well. A large part of self-understanding is the search for appropriate metaphors that make sense of our lives. (pp. 232-33)

A related angle of metaphor and teacher development research relates to the role of metaphor in teacher socialization (see Carter 1993; Connelly and Clandinin 1988). Self-narratives are one of the main strategies of articulating images of the self in a purposeful and coherent fashion. According to Elbaz (1983), it is through such a teleological invitation to conformity that metaphorical images operate for teachers (for an excellent example, see MacKinnon and Grunau 1994). Metaphors shift the emphasis from internal "vision" to external "voice," thus enabling teachers to "see" themselves through language and to create a self in that image (Collins and Green 1990). Beyond the creation of a personal identity, metaphors are also instrumental in the construction of conceptual images of students and colleagues (Bullough and Stokes 1994)

I believe that it is valuable for preservice educators to articulate their experiences in order to learn how to teach proficiently. I am not, however, a cognitive scientist. Studies of teacher thinking have presupposed the existence of both the conscious and the subconscious. This is consistent with a religious and philosophical tradition which preaches the existence of a transcendental versus a phenomenal realm of existence. Internal and external realms of Being exist as a fundamental dualism. External experience awakens the subconscious soul, or mind, so that knowledge can be seen in the light of reason. This tradition values metaphor as a conceptual tool

for accessing knowledge, but it maintains a traditional hierarchical relationship between subconscious images and their explicit expression.

Metaphor is figurative, and , as such, it may produce "delight," but it lacks the authority of the literal. Any "turning" of attention away from the face of objective reality is considered to be deceptive. An important part of educational development, therefore, assumes that inner poetry must be translated into reasonable speech before it can be considered legitimate. Metaphor unifies experience, assigns a narrative coherence to our lives, leads to a concept of community by enabling one to identify with others, and unifies our goals. In short, metaphor is a rhetorical vehicle for showing the wholeness and unity of experience.

This theory of metaphor plays into Taylor's notion of modernity by providing meaning, enabling lasting relationships, and promising a sense of freedom. As the provider of meaning, it is a vehicle of moral wholeness; as an enabler of lasting relationships, it is a vehicle of both self-discovery and the recognition of the importance of community. It is a poetic device which makes development and transformative knowledge, initiation, freedom, and guidance educational possibilities.

The theory of metaphor most useful to teacher development research is that which treats metaphor as a vehicle for unifying two separate realms (e.g., the conscious with the subconscious, the internal vision with the external voice, etc.). To be developed (prepared, initiated, liberated) is to be guided by a "truth," a doctrine which is supported by a rational epistemology. Until Nietzsche, the theory of metaphor depended on interpreting human essence as a transcendental entity (a soul, a mind, or a consciousness) which has the power to hold, to produce, and to manipulate knowledge. This humanist metaphor of "homecoming" was formerly conceptualized as a unification with the divine source of power which created the human soul; in modern, secular times, when human beings are believed to create reality through thought, "homecoming" is conceptualized as the unification of an inner source of human power with an outer world. I elaborate on this great detail in Chapter 4.

Summary and Conclusion

In this chapter, I have addressed the basic predicament of modernity (i.e., alienation) and, by implication, of teacher development. What does teacher development mean? To answer this question I have chosen to take an ontological approach to selected texts in the literature. By looking at their explicit rhetoric and then at their implicit metaphors I hoped to arrive at the predicament which teacher development is attempting to address. By beginning with the predicament which every human being in the culture has to face (i.e., alienation from the world and from each other), I hoped to identify how teachers might be able to deal with it. Taylor and Habermas articulate the spirit of the current age in which teacher development research is situated. From Taylor, I took the idea of what he calls a pathological malaise — the conceptual alienation of human being from its self, from others, and from the world. From Taylor, the predicament is alienation; the goal is reconciliation.

I then examined Taylor's concern that conceptual dualisms are no longer being effectively unified. People and ethics need to be brought together as they were formerly. Moral self-wholeness is to be gained by a renewed allegiance to the ethics of personal development according to community standards. And those community standards need to be aligned with a picture of "true" humanity — a picture which is related to the original motivating ideals of modernity. I claimed that this unquestioned picture of true humanity is reminiscent of the divine power which attracted Christian pilgrims in their progress towards spiritual development. I cited Paul, the New Testament evangelist, as one painter of such a picture. This led me to the importance of metaphor with regard to the expression of ontological predicaments, goals, structures, and principles.

In the preface, I indicated that my research agenda had originated within a theological context, and I noted that the predicaments and goals of modernity were reminiscent of what I there encountered. I contend that the literature on teacher development has its metaphorical roots in the Christian predicament of sin (as alienation from a divine power) and redemption (as reunion with divine power).

Based on my historical survey of metaphor, I show how teacher education is biased towards the outward expression of explicit knowledge. This bias works only if two realms of knowledge can be theorized: (1) the subconscious and (2) the conscious. Thinking is articulated through reflection, which amounts to the metaphorical visualization of self and world. Thinking is theorized as both a seeing and a speaking; first the internal is visualized, then the external is vocalized. It is taken for granted that the human being is a conscious, thinking agent capable of accomplishing these tasks, and that metaphors facilitate transference between the conscious and subconscious realms.

A fundamental predicament emerges (i.e., that of alienation), which is to be resolved epistemologically and ethically by the unification of conceptual dualisms. In the following four chapters I review the philosophical discourse of modernity through assessing the texts of its major thinkers. From these texts I extract the ethics of personal development and community standards necessary to bringing about the reconciliation of fundamental dualisms.

Chapter 2

The Fiction of Consciousness

Introduction

In this chapter, I explore four thinkers who present an influential concept of human spirituality: René Déscartes, David Hume, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Immanuel Kant. This chapter expands on Chapter 1 in that it reveals what structures and ethical principles service the project of unifying the conscious and subconscious realms of existence. I show how the subconscious realm is to be illuminated, vocalized, and set into practice. This will indicate what the modern human being should be like and will also reveal the moral authority for an ethics and politics of modernity (and, by extension, for an ethics and politics of teacher development).

Déscartes and the Mind's-Eye View

In ancient Greece the existence of two realms of Being — an internal realm and an external realm — was the ground for defining how human beings related to themselves and to the world. This particular dualism supported the interaction between Meno's slave and Socrates.[1] The scenario involved Socrates' instructions with regard to a specific geometrical theorem: the inscription of a triangle within a circle. The specific example is less important, however, than the pedagogical assumptions which allowed Socrates to use it. The recognizable object, the triangle, did not belong to a sensible world but was represented by the "soul" as if from an "inner vision."

Plato believed that knowledge was witnessed in a pretemporal life. Visionary insight, therefore, involved being brought to inherent, in-born knowledge. Of course, this concept had moral implications, since knowledge of perfect forms and ideas, including what is "good," was independent of "external" experience; it was part of a "higher" experience — that found within the soul (Jaeger 1943, p. 168). The role of sensory experience was to awaken the soul by bringing it into the light of day and recollecting its eternal essence.[2] Truth existed within our souls, and the

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[1] The most helpful analysis of the Meno dialogue, and of the origins of educational theory generally, is Jaeger, (1943).

[2] Jaeger, 1943, vol. 2, p. 169; see also Klein, (1965).

search for truth was the opening up (the enlightening) of the soul in order to view its contents.[3] Several times, Socrates rejects the Greek word for teaching, the root for the English word "didactic," since this word seems to imply the filling up of the soul with external properties (Jaeger 1943, p. 169). Meno was able to recognize the mathematical theorem because he produced the knowledge "out of himself."[4] With regard to the philosophical discourse of modernity, it was Déscartes who established the importance of the thinking subject and who defined that subject as the locus of human knowledge in an objective world.

René Déscartes was a philosopher of science. Born on 31 March 1596, his formative years were "strikingly un-intellectual" (Sorell 1986) — then came his college years at the Jesuit school of La Flèche at Anjou, France. While a student at La Flèche, Déscartes became interested in the equivalent of what is now known as "physics." At that time mathematics played no part in the explanation of physical reality.[5] The importance of Déscartes can be measured by the fact that mathematical physics is now the only sort of physics anyone studies (Sorrell 1986).

The Roman inquisition had been founded only fifty-four years before Déscartes' birth and had grown from being a morality court and board of censors into a gigantic European network of educational administrators with a mandate to defend a curriculum whose ontology was theological and whose cosmology was Aristotelian. Copernican astronomy was perceived to be a threat to the doctrine of divine creation and Aristotelian metaphysics. In such a cultural context, it was extremely daring to suggest that a divine power was no longer behind the workings of the universe. Galileo, for example, paid the price for threatening the accepted metaphysics; he was censored and placed under house arrest. It seems odd to think of mathematical reasoning as heresy, but it is plausible if we imagine the contortions involved in making the transition from a medieval to a modern world-view (not to mention the adjustments of cultural principles involved in such a reordering). Such events may be further understandable when we consider the

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[3] Klein, pp. 179-84.

[4] Ibid., p. 175.

[5] Aune, (1970). I have also consulted Sorrell (1986), Taylor (1989), and Soloman (1988) for this section.

connections between ontology and morality. Public behavior, ethical decisions, political involvement — in short, "morality" — is ordered according to an ontological framework within which everyone in a given culture can make sense of what is or is not permitted. If someone seriously tinkers with ontological questions (i.e., what it is to be) by replacing a divine order with scientifically inspired theories, then the source of moral authority may easily be perceived to be threatened.[6] If traditional and established accounts of self-mastery (what it's good to be) and morality (what it's good to do) become threatened, then advocates of new accounts may be persecuted.

The entire battle in Déscartes' time involved a debate over the ontological source of ultimate power. In this sense, Cartesianism was not very different from the threat posed to orthodox Roman Catholicism by the teachings of Luther and Calvin (and by the practices of the radical Anabaptists) during the Protestant Reformation. As a social movement, the Reformation challenged a religious hierarchical structure of authority which led from a metaphorical "flock" to the "shepherd" (i.e., from parishioners, through priests, bishops, cardinals, and the pontiff to, ultimately, God). This hierarchy was patterned on the Roman legionary system, which had a chain of command leading ultimately to the Roman emperor. One of Luther's transgressions was translating biblical scripture into the vernacular, for this permitted any literate individual to have direct contact with the divine without having to rely upon the authorized hierarchy. The Lutheran Reformation affected interpretations of personal morality and socio-political arrangements; the Cartesian revolution affected the way in which the research community did its research. However, both movements were concerned with the place of ultimate authority; that is, with what counted as the truth of Being. Divine power was considered to be complete in and of itself, and this perfect power ordered everything in the universe, including human being, into a grand and sometimes mysterious scheme. In Aristotelian cosmology, self-mastery was measured by a human being's relative proximity to a divine source which was understood as being "out there" in the cosmos.

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[6] Witness this throughout North America in the debates over which origin theory, creationism or evolutionism, should be presented in school science classes.

Déscartes' writings altered the location of the ultimate source of power, placing it within the thinking subject.

Déscartes subverts the singular authority of divine power ("And God said, Let there be light") with *"Cogito, ergo sum"* ("I think, therefore I am"). The ultimate source and force of power no longer resides "out there" but "in here," in all of us; and knowing the source starts from knowing what is within. If this ontology were to become culturally mainstream, it is not difficult to imagine how it would alter how people think about personal development and self-mastery. If the ontological source of power is thought of as being "out there," then researchers search for the true nature and ultimate purpose (the *telos*) of the divine cosmic order of things.[7] However, if the ontological source of power is thought to be inside us, then there will be an obsessive interest in the true nature and ultimate purpose of human subjectivity. Furthermore, this shift from out there to in here changes what it is good to do: whereas in a divinely centered universe the focus might be on obedience, confession, and prayer, in a human-centered universe it may be on scientific experimentation, reasoned argumentation, and myriad variations of psychotherapy. Also, in a human-centered universe, eschatology is profanely defined as the hope for a secular heaven within the human world (heaven, from the Anglo-Saxon *heofon*: a haven or port of rest; a place of safety; a home). Whereas ethical practices formerly conformed to a predetermined cosmological order, they now conform to a reasonable epistemological order. As a metaphor for completeness-in-itself, "God" becomes less alive; the "mind" and, later, the "heart" become more alive. The cosmos once lived, but now human beings have become the center of all metaphysical attention. The dream becomes mastery over the mind and all natural processes, even to the extent of controlling the total functioning of human (and other) bodies.[8]

Déscartes published *Discourse on Method* in 1637 and *Meditations on First Principles* in 1644. He never found writing to be an easy task (Sorell 1986), and his challenge would have been aggravated by the cultural context in which he wrote and published. By 1633, Galileo had

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[7] For the history of such an ordering see Foucault, (1973).

[8] The hope of such a mastery is explored in Foucault, (1990).

been censored and imprisoned by the Inquisition for teaching the new Copernican science. Institutional and legal sanctions were implemented to prevent any rewriting the curricula and to discipline instructors who attempted to do so. Déscartes would have studied the official curriculum as a Jesuit novitiate at La Flèche. After graduating from college in 1618, he entered military service as an engineer (this was only for a year). The following year he moved to Paris, where criticism of traditional metaphysics seemed to be in vogue, and where critical debate was increasingly directed at educational curricula in schools and colleges (Sorell 1986). The focus of these conferences tended to be critiques of Aristotelian metaphysics — critiques which, in some cases, resulted in academic authorities declaring some conferences illegal (even when held outside the Sorbonne). It was in such a tumultuous setting that Déscartes began composing his controversial *Rules for the Direction of the Mind* in 1627.

Déscartes' thesis involves a few basic positions. The first has to do with doubt: every "thing" and every belief is considered to be false until proven to be true by reasonable procedures. Déscartes hoped to isolate truths by relating them to graspable mathematical axioms rather than to illusive natural forms. He proceeded from a position in which everything previously accepted was doubted, thus liberating himself from all accepted "opinions" and foundations. Since any metaphysical system seeks to explain all that exists, he necessarily questioned the entire ontological framework of the existing tradition. By doubting common sense, Déscartes demonstrated that all beliefs are suspect unless and until they are justified through reason. This involved re-evaluating everything which had previously been learned and believed.

Beliefs, now considered deceptive and untrustworthy, would have included everything perceived by the senses, up to and including common-sense beliefs about what it means to be. Following Décartes, I would be led to question whether I could believe even that my fingers were actually attached to my hand, touching the keyboard and typing this text. And yet, Déscartes knew that some people did claim that their fingers were not part of their hands; their minds clouded with what he called "dark bilious vapors," and they would claim to be wealthy while they were actually homeless, or dressed in expensive clothes when they were actually in rags. Déscartes warned that

such people were insane and that we would be demented to take their claims as examples of clear reasoning. And yet he knew that it was possible to have night-dreams during which we were truly flying. Moreover, these things could be imagined during the day by allegedly sane people who might momentarily believe them to be true. If they occur during waking hours, then such reveries indicate that there may be very little to distinguish waking from sleeping dreams. This being the case, there may be no certain indication of when we are awake and when we are asleep. All of our experiences may have been illusory, and it is possible that our body and the perceptual world around us may be quite different from what we take them to be. What methodology, asked Déscartes, can lead us to know those things which are certain and which are illusory?

Déscartes presupposed that everything which we perceive as external to our being, including our body, earthly objects — in short, all "external things" — are illusions. This was a distinct possibility in Déscartes' historical and cultural context, since the divine power which created the world could not be deceiving him — or could it? In light of even this possible deception, what could Déscartes have regarded as being true and certain beyond all reasonable doubt? The answer is: nothing, save the single fact of his own doubting existence. And with this answer, Déscartes arrives at the foundation of modern metaphysics:

> Here I find what belongs to me. I am, I exist: that is certain. For how long? As long as I continue to think, for it might be that if I ceased to think, I would also cease to exist. I am not now admitting anything which is not necessarily true; I am therefore regarding my self only as a thinking thing, that is, a mind, a soul, understanding or reason — terms whose meaning has hitherto been unknown to me. I am, then, a real thing, one that truly exists. But what kind of thing? I have already said it: a thinking thing. (1986, p. 88)

As commented upon by Sorell (1986):

> We turn out to be essentially minds, and minds turn out to be, at bottom, thinking substance — utterly different from the body, which in essence is extended or spatially spread-out substance. The fact that human minds are essentially thinking things means that they are not different in kind from the minds of God and the angels, only different in degree or power and perfection. On the other hand, human minds do turn out to be completely different in kind from those of non-human animals, for, in Déscartes' sense of the term, *thought* is beyond creatures like cats, dogs or dolphins. (p. xxi)

I would like to focus on Déscartes' radical statement that the fundamental ontological relationship which human being has towards the world is as a "thinking thing" not different in kind from God. According to Cartesian epistemology, we are not essentially a brain (which is a spatially spread-out substance) nor are we a personality (which is a collection of perceptions based on commonly held beliefs which must be doubted). Human being is a degree of power which thinks towards increasing mastery. This is the possibility which distinguishes the human "being" from beings such as animals and substances.

Déscartes' theory needs a human body in ways which Plato's theory does not. Plato's human essence was not a "mind" but a soul which housed ideal forms of knowledge. Déscartes' human essence lies in an immaterial mind, but the way to realize our immaterial essence is to take a conceptual stance towards all bodies, including what is represented as our own (Taylor 1989). Déscartes had learned in college that the soul realizes its eternal nature by becoming absorbed in the suprasensible cosmic order. His re-vision affirms an immaterial human nature by objectifying bodies as matter. The central point of his scheme is that knowledge entails adopting the correct stance towards the body, and this is accomplished by objectifying it as a piece of matter to be collected and ordered as part of a larger order. The subjectivity of the "mind" has ontological status over the objectivity of the "body"; it is ontologically prior to the body, and, in the texts of Déscartes' intellectual successors, "knowing" the mind will become the necessary condition of knowing all external objects and beings in the world (Sorell 1986). This mind/body distinction has implications for the metaphorics of teacher development; for the separation of implicit, intuitive knowledge; and for the truth of explicit practice.

The two other points in Déscartes' thesis are related. The first asserts that the mind is a distinctive realm and so must face the challenge of coming to know a world "outside of" its own experience; the second is that there is a "first person" perspective by which knowledge and experience are possible from one's own point of view (thus enabling human beings to establish, through reasoned thinking, an objective stance to their experience and knowledge) (Solomon 1988). Both have to do with the dilemma of separating self-as-mind from matter-as-world. Mind

and matter do not share the same properties. "Brain" and objects may be qualitatively similar, but "mind" and objects are qualitatively different. The union of mind and object is incompatible, except through the application of mathematics. It is through methodology that the mind can interact with external objects and "know" them, and, in the final section of Chapter 5, I show how this belief informs the epistemological assumptions of teacher development.

According to his *Discourse on Method*, Déscartes' methodology is governed by four rules. (Rules 2-4 duplicate the structural basis of a lesson plan which I recall employing successfully during my years as an elementary school teacher.)

Rule 1: Never accept anything as true which is not known to be manifestly so; that is, avoid bias. Include nothing in judgment except what is presented so distinctly and clearly to the mind that you never have occasion to doubt it.

Rule 2: Divide each problem into as many parts as possible; that each part being more easily conceived, the whole may be more intelligible.

Rule 3: Conduct thoughts in an orderly manner, beginning with those which are simplest and easiest to know, and then rise, step by step, to knowledge of more complex levels, assuming order to those things which may have no natural order of precedence.

Rule 4: Always make complete enumerations and comprehensive reviews to be sure that nothing has been overlooked.

Rules for the Direction of the Mind (1966) goes on to state that certainty is the result of intuition (as from Latin *intueri*: to look upon) and deduction, the former being clarity of conception. Deduction is the process of inferring from facts that are known with certainty (i.e., that have been attained according to the rules of method outlined above). Intuition is thus a necessary basis for deduction (see Rule 1). Since deduction may yield long chains of reasoning (see Rule 2), we may be obligated to rely on our memories (recollected images of perceived objects and beings) in order to form conclusions. Each link in the chain can be established through

successive intuition and deduction (Rule 3). However, because memory is not always accurate, careful review and enumeration is essential (Rule 4).

In future interpretations, the source of knowledge comes to reside in several places: Déscartes locates it in the mind, Rousseau locates it in the heart, Kant locates it in consciousness, and Hegel locates it in the Spirit of humanity. During the twentieth century, Mead locates it in group activity and Marx locates it in productive labor. In all of these interpretations, however, an essential power remains set off from the things of the world, and the goal is to bring the particular to the universal. In other words, the overall goal is to unify, and the steps involved in this process entail the use of metaphor.

To conclude, three foundations upheld the structure of European rationalism, and they would carry over into what would be referred to as the Age of Reason: (1) rationality, (2) universalism, and (3) humanism (Soloman 1988). Rationality looks at human being through a methodology which is structured as closely as possible upon mathematical reasoning. Under a theological system, human beings have little power in the world; under a scientific system, they have more power. Under the latter system, people could control and manipulate the workings of the world on the basis of human (rather than divine) authority. The proper study of humankind was no longer the task of theocentric disciplines; it was the task of anthropocentric disciplines which presumed the essential power of the human mind. Thus came about the new disciplines of psychology, sociology, and anthropology.

The second foundation of European rationalism is universalism. Being was once understood to have been the creation of a divine transcendental power, and all human beings could be ranked according to their relative relationship with that power. However, once the source of creative power was believed to be located within, it followed that all human beings had something in common, regardless of social and/or economic rank. Furthermore, if all people are basically rational, then everyone ought to believe in the same reasonable truths and follow the same rational, political and moral structures. This belief, however, was twinned with the belief that every thinking entity should have the autonomy to be able to think for itself. This belief would

eventually place a high degree of responsibility on education, as it presumes that every individual should be able to arrive at rational and universal conclusions if she or he is provided with the correct way of seeing things. Rousseau would write the definitive treatise on how thinking things should be trained to follow their reason rather than the whimsical dictates of mass culture.

The third foundation of European rationalism is humanism — a celebrative, egocentric view of the human species and its creative aspirations. I find it useful to think of humanism as an overturning of the grand narrative of divine creation.

Déscartes' textual interpretation of the mind and its relationship to the world did not go unchallenged. It was embellished by his friend and countryman, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and challenged by the Englishman David Hume (1711-1776). In the next section I select the elements which complicated Cartesian rationalism and which provided the groundwork for Kant's resolution of the rationalism/empiricism conflict. As an aid to understanding Kant's synthesis, I summarize specific elements of Hume's empirical philosophy.

Hume and Human Sapience

Déscartes theorized that human beings are essentially things which think rather than substances connected to and created by some unquestionable divine power. As human being is a self-contained thinking thing of potential perfection, innate ideas form the basis for knowledge, and certainty is ascertained through logical deduction. This set up a philosophical problem which preoccupied philosophers into the twentieth century. How was the human being to reconcile its separation from the world of matter? Hume's empiricism is in opposition to Déscartes rationalism in so far as the former contends that all thoughts are directly traceable to the world of perception. Thus we have an opposition which remained until it was partially resolved by Kant's transcendentalism and finally reconciled by Hegel's phenomenology. And through Dewey and Mead, Hegel's reconciliation of rationalism and empiricism found its way into the literature on teacher development.

Sapience comes from the Latin word *sapere*, which means "to taste; to have sense; and to know." To Hume, human beings were essentially *homo sapiens*. There are no innate, intuitive

thoughts; all ideas can be traced back to feelings. Ideas, including the idea of teacher development, comes down to actual experience. Experience is perception, according to Hume, and perceptions fall into two general classes. First, there are direct impressions, which comprise such immediate experiences as the emotions, feelings, and desires; second, there are ideas, which are the thoughts which our emotions, feelings, and desires inspire. Raw experiences differ from ideas because the former are more dynamic, primal, and inspiring than the latter. So, two levels of experience are proposed: one direct, the other derivative. Ideas may mimic direct impressions, but they lack the latter's intensity (Hume gives the example of the difference between thinking about a migraine and actually having one). Nonetheless, both direct impressions and ideas are experiential in nature.[9]

Ideas are extracted from direct impressions, and, according to Hume, they are of two kinds — simple and complex. Complex ideas, such as "broken door," are built up of simple ideas, such as "broken" and "door." Complex ideas can be highly abstract and may include everything from "an innocent man" to the "lion-king." Déscartes argues that simple ideas are innate; Hume argues that even simple ideas are produced from experience alone. Thus, the proper methodology for obtaining clarity of thought entails going back to original impressions (which incite simple ideas, which one can then order into complex ideas).

Hume also contends that objects of human reason may be divided into two aspects: (1) there are relations of ideas (such as the deductions underlying the science of geometry) and (2) there are cause and effect relationships. The latter have a special status for Hume, as his philosophy rests upon the assumption that similar causes will produce similar effects, and that this will provide the evidence upon which our memory and senses rely. The distinction between (1) and (2) demonstrates the difference between what Hume identifies as prior knowledge (relations of ideas which are constructed through systematized operations of thought) and retrospective knowledge (knowledge which is collected through direct experience, is based on evidence, and is stored in memory). Relations of ideas cannot tell us what green grass is until we directly

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[9] Aune's (1970) summary of Hume's empiricism is used here.

experience grass which is green. They may provide information about sensual experience, but they cannot tell us anything about the actual existence of the world.

Conclusions based on cause and effect are gained through direct experience and are collected and compounded through habitual association. We may be things which think, but the ideas which we manipulate are the products of direct and primal impressions; they are not intuitive. Hume concluded that we never directly perceive "a mind," and so we cannot infer the existence of either our own or the minds of others through reasonable argumentation. The only phenomena of which a self can have genuine knowledge are those which are experienced directly. Hume may not have had any confidence in the innate powers of reason, but he did have confidence in the power of emotions and desires. And his view that reason arose from feelings shows up in a more developed form in the writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

Rousseau and the Good-Hearted Soul

Rousseau's theory of education seeks to unify human essence with its purpose in the world. For such a reconciliation, the human being must be conceptualized as more than a mere thinking "thing." Rousseau's metaphor for human essence is the "heart." The heart is full of feelings and desires, and hearts may be united with each other through mutually beneficial contracts. Rousseau introduces the possibility of reconciling the individual with others through a special type of political arrangement (a variation of this arrangement shows up in the teacher development literature). Furthermore, Rousseau's theory of consciousness introduces three concepts (all of which are significant for teacher development theory): (1) care, defined as the maintenance of a context for development; (2) empowerment, defined as adaptation to that context; and (3) practical knowledge. This third concept will be expanded upon by Hegel and then adopted by Dewey and Mead.

Soloman (1988) provides an amusing account of the way in which Rousseau discovers the self:

> Strolling in solitude through the lush forests of St. Germain during the early adolescence of the modern age, Jean-Jacques Rousseau made a miraculous discovery. It was his self. This self was not, as his more scholastic predecessor

Déscartes had thought, that thin merely logical self ... [n]or was his the frustrated, skeptical search that led his friend Hume to declare, paradoxically, that "whenever I look inside myself, there is no self to be found." What Rousseau discovered in the woods was a self so rich and substantial, so filled with good feelings and half-articulated good thoughts, so expansive, so natural, and at peace with the universe, that he recognized it immediately as something much more than his singular self. It was rather the Self as such, the soul of humanity. Looking deeply into himself Rousseau had discovered the self that he shared with all men and women the world over. (p. ix)

Rousseau's notion of human essence (or self) is far more poetic than is Déscartes' unfeeling monolith or Hume's perceiving absentee. Rousseau's self has a personality which is inherently and naturally likable. It has feelings, needs, and desires, and these allow for a wide use of descriptive rhetoric.

With regard to Rousseau's conception of the self as a "heart," it should be clear that the latter's corporeal location is less important than are its normative possibilities. Human being was still a universal moral force, but in Rousseau's texts it began to take on a more individualistic character (Soloman 1988). Moreover, moral freedom led to three new developments in the theory of consciousness: (1) the self was inherently good; (2) it possessed an inherent moral immunity which transcended cultural norms (i.e., ontologically, humanity was structured as having transcendent freedom; ontically, humanity was predicated as deserving the right of political freedom); and (3) when persons interact with each other, they defer to reasoned thinking and become rational "citizens" whose good inner natures lead, politically, to the establishment of a "social contract" (Soloman 1988). The process of interaction cited in (3) produces a "general will."

> *Each of us places his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will; and as one we receive each member as an indivisible whole.* At once, in place of the individual person of each contracting party, this act of association produces a moral and collective body composed of as many members as there are voices in the assembly, which receives from this same act its unity, its common *self*, its life and its will. This public person, formed thus by union of all the others formerly took the name *city*, and at present takes the name *republic* or *body politic*, which is called *state* by its members when it is passive, *sovereign* when it is active, *power* when compared to others like itself. (Rousseau 1987, pp. 148-49; italics in original)

Rousseau's dream was to unify human essence and its moral purpose through the establishment of a radical, and revolutionary, social ethic. "Will" entails bringing ideas into consciousness and carrying them out in practice. "Social contract" is the name for a community in which self-empowered, willing individuals embody expressions of the universal voice of humanity: the voice of Rousseau's ideal human community. "Voice" within the "social contract" is not majority rule but an expression of unified communal practice, where universalism is based on self-interested individualism and where the latter forms a single, overwhelming force. This vision of the social contract is to be contrasted to the premodern situation in which Rousseau lived. There, individuals seemed powerless against the voices of sovereigns, church hierarchies, and the ignorance of mass culture. Rousseau advocated the establishment of a society made up of empowered individuals who contracted as equals and who knew that personal prosperity is at its height when all prosper equally. If the universal essence of all human beings is free and good, then the universal essence of corporate citizenry should also be free and good. Human consciousness has the potential for ontic perfectibility; hence, Rousseau's interest in "education."

Rousseau insisted upon the unity of education and the norms of society. In his terms, liberty could be defined as the unification of the individual with the community, but only when the latter provided a favorable environment for the desiring, willing, autonomous individual (Barrow 1978). It is necessary, therefore, for the individual and the community to be compatible. This compatibility may be brought about through education, but the latter must have a reciprocal relationship with the community and its individual members. *Emile: or, On Education* provides us with Rousseau's ideas regarding how this reciprocity may be accomplished. The book contains some of the motivating ideals of the modern school curriculum, along with the earliest ways of posing modern problems in educational psychology (Bloom 1979, p. 4). It is a speculative and wistful educational fiction, not unlike the modern fictional texts of Jules Verne.

Emile was the boy-child of a futuristic age imagined but as yet unrealized. As Rousseau says in the opening lines of the *Contract*:

I want to inquire whether there can be some legitimate and sure rule of administration in the civil order, taking men as they are and laws as they might be. I will always try in this inquiry to bring together what right permits with what interest prescribes, as that justice and utility do not find themselves at odds with one another. (1987, p. 141)

Emile draws a fictional portrait of the early modern individual. It is less about the development of a living, breathing boy and girl than it is about the development of a certain concept of humanity. Rousseau's ideal modern individual is an unabashedly masculine, heterosexual patriarch. Clearly, the bias of his creation myth can serve as a springboard for questioning the assumptions of modern discourse.

Rousseau required a model for what his moral essence would be like and a pedagogical plan for constructing it. Since such a model would be intended to live in the culture in which Rousseau composed his work, it would be a selective interpretation of what he believed to be an authentic human essence. Rousseau's choice of cultural archetype was the father as defined within the context of the nuclear family (van den Abeele 1992, p. 92). What motivated Rousseau to mold his modern human being after Adam? A number of answers have been given, including his distaste for society outside the home. There is also the documented evidence of his specific fears surrounding sexuality (sexual practices are one among several classes of seductions which would lure Emile away from the home).[10] I would stress the requirement in Rousseau's narrative curriculum for a symbol of authority capable of morally interpreting the general will of the community. Within a theocratic framework, authority is established by one's location in an ecclesiastical or social hierarchy leading to some divine source of ultimate power; but within a democratic framework, where power is located in the general will of autonomous human individuals, the place of ultimate authority may be less obvious. Rousseau's pedagogy required a carnate representative of ultimate moral power. Thus, the "Father" came to symbolize the fully developed human being.

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[10] See Derrida, (1974) and Wexler, (1976).

Emile's development is tested through guided travel intended to expose him (albeit safely) to the dangerous detours of "otherness."[11] It is significant that Rousseau prescribes the eighteenth-century novel, *Robinson Crusoe*, as essential reading in his educational program (van den Abeele 1992). The novel relates how Crusoe is exiled to an island for disobeying his father's commands not to stray from home. Crusoe's redemption comes as a result of his creating a home on his island, and the book may be seen as an allegory of atonement for sins against the father. Van den Abeele comments on the name "Emile," as in the French *Aime-ile*: lover of an island (i.e., lover of insularity; a free and autonomous individual; a self-sufficient moral unity).

It is Emile's duty to return from geographical and moral wanderings and to report what he has learned to his father-tutor:

> In my travels, I searched if I could find some corner of earth where I could be absolutely mine; but in what place among men does one no longer depend upon their passions? All things considered, I found that my wish was itself contradictory; for had I nothing else to hang onto, I would ⸱ least hold onto the land in which I had fixed myself: my life would be attached tᴏ ᴄhis land as the land of the Dryads was attached to their trees; I have found that power and liberty were two incompatible words; I could only be the master of a thatched cottage by ceasing to be master of myself. (Rousseau 1974, p. 856) [12]

Safe in his rural cottage-home, Emile is provided by his tutor with a "fairy-tale" companion named Sophie (from the Greek, *sophia*: wisdom) as a reward for having satisfactorily completed his curriculum. Here Emile can retire as a lover of wisdom (a *philos sophia*). But even in his thatched cottage, Emile feels the inner conflict of having to be master of the home (a part of the body-politic) as well as master of his self (a transcendent entity). It falls on the woman to sustain the moral structure in the social sphere (the man's de-scendent half) over which Emile is still the arbitrating lord.

Rousseau's definition of self-mastery is consistent with his definition of freedom as social contract. Freedom cannot be tied to the contingent circumstances of the social realm, for which the ideal sanctuary — the patriarchal home — is the metaphor. It is to be optimally achieved through

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[11] This account is reminiscent of the biblical transgressions of the prodigal son who returns to the father's house to be rewarded for acknowledging patriarchal authority. See Luke 15:11-32.

[12] This quote comes from the translation by Foxley, (1974).

self-domestication, whereby the individual declares himself "home" without having to adapt to any contingent circumstances (van de Abeele 1992, p. 104). He has the discretionary privilege of participating in the general will as a civilized husband, for example, but such participation is not what is most authentic. The human subject is a transcendent moral entity and, while fatherhood may be its closest cultural expression, its authentic state transcends all cultural norms. Autonomy is determined by an inner subjective process which lies beyond the boundaries of empirical being, and it is the connection with that inner source which leads to mastery over the self.

In Rousseau's curriculum, the supervisory educator should personify the priorities of the institution (i.e., he/she should be the embodiment of the social contract), as is evident in the French translations for "teacher" (masculine, *instituteur*; feminine, *institutrice*). *Emile* is, therefore, an early theoretical elaboration of educational administration-as-care. Educational institutionalization hangs on the pedagogue-pedant relationship, which is one not of equality but one which evokes the Latin-derived Old French word "service": *administrare*. The master is the servant of the student in the sense that the former serves the interests of the latter by creating a context for learning which leads towards the creation of a new and better society. It is in the master's self-interest to contract a temporarily dominant relationship over the student, for the former naturally wishes to produce adult social-contractors to sustain and further the natural order of things. The teacher is the supervisory *intendant* (French, from the Latin *intendere*: to direct one's thoughts to a thing) of those who will eventually direct their thoughts to society, of which the teacher is a sustaining member. Every modern individual is unique, and the administrator's policies should be governed by the "nature" of the governed. This assigns great responsibility to the teacher-governor, who must emphasize what the governed ought to know in a future social setting. The teacher must also be aware of what students are capable of knowing at any given time, and this requires constant, intensive (albeit passive) panoptic supervision. This form of supervisory administration hones the skills of correct and appropriate intervention. The relationship between supervisor and supervised is not one of affection (as is allegedly the case, for example, with the expression of parental compassion), but one of professionally styled "care";

that is, it evinces concern for all aspects of the learning environment for the good of those being supervised.

With regard to the environment, it becomes a microcosm of the social world. The supervisor is context-master, and his/her presence is total. Freedom in the wider community is presented in microcosm so that the student's future adjustment into the habits of social contract will be effortless. It is the ease of this adaptation to the larger social contract which empowers Emile, for he had been able to explore his will under the guided supervision of the tutor (from the Latin *tutor*: to watch). The learning context is akin to a laboratory in which the teacher continually refines and manipulates the student's environment (Rousseau 1972, p. 104).[13]

A further example of superintendence concerns how the modern individual is expected to develop a philosophy of "right" through recognizing "what is due" rather than through meaningless instruction (p. 61). Punishment should thus be seen as a natural consequence of inappropriate action. In other words, the lesson has to do with experience rather than with catechism. For example, if one lies, then the social context will be such that one experiences mistrust and isolation. It is up to the tutor-as-superintendent to ensure that the context for learning is such that the students may learn from such communal experiments. The certainty of natural consequences will encourage the individual to become a willing member of the community; he/she will see the need for certain social rules which benefit all. However, students must understand that the rules to which all adhere are of primary benefit to the self. The social contract provides one with a sense of security — an individual conscience. And conscience is a type of knowledge (derived from the Latin *conscrire*: "to know"); it is the expression of an inner spirit-as-judge, which resides in our hearts and justifies our behavior.

Rousseau's philosophy has a vocational bent (1972, p. 160) and a bias towards practical as opposed to theoretical knowledge (pp. 211 and 143). Reflecting on good reasons for action leads to the formation of (self)consciousness, and it is up to the supervisor to guide learners towards initiation into a state in which action is guided by conscience and reflective reason (lest

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[13] Subsequent references to the text of Emile are from Rousseau (1972).

they remain controlled by instinct and thus fall prey to others). Knowledge must be useful, and the environment should be its subject matter — environment being defined as both objective (i.e., the actual objects involved in learning) and personal (i.e., the supervisors and the events which they organize).

Literary fictions such as *Emile* may become canonized as the "truth," and personal as well as institutional arrangements can become altered so as to reify them. 14 Rousseau's fictions are consistent with the early philosophical discourse of modernity, and they were welcomed because of their familiarity. Rousseau was inspired to write about the potential for a new society, and people were presented with the opportunity to adopt his theoretical fictions as workable social arrangements.

Kant and Transcendentalism

Kant takes Rousseau's notion of transcendence and expands its creative powers. In Kant, consciousness is given the power to name and to frame the phenomenal world. He maintains the separation between worldly phenomena and the transcendental — a separation which will come to be highly resisted in teacher development literature in both epistemological and, especially, ethical terms. The reconciliation of the phenomenal and the transcendent was accomplished by Hegel and, via Dewey and Mead, is maintained in the texts of teacher development. As Chapter 5 shows, it is found in discussions condemning the positivism of externalized, bureaucratic authority. The problem of finding a moral authority for principles of practice remains central to teacher development. In this sense, the dialogue between Kantian idealism and Hegelian reflective speculation still informs contemporary theoretical discussions of teacher development. As I shall show, the pendulum swings towards a practical ethics rather than towards transcendental moral principles.

In England, France, and North America, Enlightenment ideas of individual autonomy and freedom led to revolutionary political reorganization. However, the political state in which Kant lived was not a conducive setting to this sort of thing. Prussia was ruled by the autocratic Frederick the Great, and the middle class was relatively powerless. Germany was spread out into

hundreds of small principalities, each having a different dialect and local customs. In pre-Bismarck Germany, Enlightenment ideas were promoted as forms of ordered thinking, with revolutions taking place in the abstract realm of philosophical ideas. Kant's mission became the redefinition of what it meant to be a rational human being. He addressed the issue by enormously expanding the concept of human subjectivity through integrating the views of his major intellectual predecessors with the Christian-inspired morality of his particular time and place. Both epistemologically and morally, the emphasis moved from a passive subjectivity which received impressions directly from the world (as if it were a mere receptacle) to an active subjectivity which was able to impose a complex order upon the world.

Kant was born in Königsberg (present-day Kaliningrad) in 1724, and he died eighty years later, without ever having left his native region. He began his academic career as a student of theology, and, eventually, he became a professor of logic. Sullivan (1994) succinctly sums up his biography:

> The relevant details of Kant's biography take little space. He was born in 1724 in Königsberg, the capital of East Prussia and one of Frederick's garrison towns. Kant knew what it was like to live as a peasant, since he came from peasant stock himself (his father was a harness maker). Because he showed such promise, Kant was able to attend a school called the Collegium Fredericianum, an institution run by Pietists. Pietism was an eighteen-century fundamentalist movement within German Protestantism (similar to Methodism in the English-speaking world), to which Kant's parents also subscribed, that minimized the authority of the church and stressed individual moral conduct. He then attended the University of Königsberg, also staffed mainly by Pietists. (p. 7)

Inspired by the local theology of his period, Kant saw value in individual autonomy from church authority and would have favored justification by faith in Christ alone as the route to personal salvation. 15 Justification by faith came about as the result of insecurity over whether or not one was among those who had been chosen by God regardless of their actions in the earthly realm. Such insecurity manifested itself in the form of attempting to attain a sense of purpose and meaning through fervent introspection and inner discipline. The scientific method of inquiry fed into this by providing one with the means to engage in personal observation and therapeutic self-examination (a sort of constant watch over the soul). Deeds were necessary but never sufficient,

the result being that the individual believer was in a chronic state of guilt. But, if one could be saved through faith in Christ alone, then constant vigilance and inner searching could free one from this guilt. 16

Kant might have believed in God, but he was not a theist in the philosophical sense. His theory of knowledge favors an inherent human power, and it praises humanity as a special form of being in a world of objects and other beings. Kant's idealistic philosophy had some traits which were reminiscent of earlier French rationalism. Though much refined and expanded by the eclectic German philosopher, von Leibniz, rationalism retained an emphasis on the centrality of the mind in an essentially human world. In the German context, the monolithic concept of "mind" became a human "consciousness" which transformed human being into a mediation between the human spirit and the world. The major challenge to philosophers interested in defining and elaborating human subjectivity was the construction of an all-encompassing systematic epistemology: a total science of the self.

According to Kant, conscious experience involves the three faculties of sense, understanding, and reason (Soloman 1988). One receives a "sense" of the world through sight, smell, and touch. Sensual experiences are recognized, identified, and categorized, and they can be accumulated conceptually. We do not merely perceive objects sentiently; we also perceive them as names (thus making them something more than objects). We can experience concepts; and concepts, in turn, can be grouped into more systematic concepts. One can see here the influence of Hume's "simple" and "complex" ideas.

"Understanding" is gained through recognition, identification, and categorization. But (*pace* Hume) there are fundamental concepts which cannot be learned, for they are beyond phenomenal experience. Consciousness, as the essential nature of human being in the world, exists because of these fundamental concepts. Kant distinguished between understanding and reason, categorizing them as two distinct faculties of the human mind. Understanding phenomena amounts to applying reasonable thinking to those fixed sets of categories which are the source of truthful knowledge.

Things and concepts may exist independently of our being, but we can attain certainty through "reason"; that is, through the patterned manipulation of concepts. But Kant was less concerned with metaphysical questions of existence than he was with epistemological questions of how the world could be based on human knowledge of it. In other words, he shifted philosophical inquiry away from theology and metaphysics and towards epistemology. To the benefit of the social sciences, philosophy became focused upon the nature of conscious existence. This was the legacy of Cartesian rationalism, which had been imported to the German states through von Leibniz.

The refinement and expansion of Rousseau's notion of human transcendence was the single most important and far-reaching element of Kant's writings (Soloman 1988). He insisted that transcendentalism was the only possible interpretation of knowledge, and that his system was universal. Human beings can each experience an empirical "self"; however, there is also a transcendental "self" which is always more than can be accounted for by empirical phenomena. This self transcends the world of objects, things, and concepts, and it is common to all humanity. Recalling Sorrell's comments about Déscartes, Kant's transcendental human spirit is very close to the metaphor of God as a supreme power.

Kant introduced Rousseau's transcendental framework into a moral framework and distinguished between two worlds (which ultimately implied that the human being possessed twin "selves" [Soloman 1988]): (1) the phenomenal world (as constituted and experienced by us) and (2) the noumenal world (which cannot be "known" because it is the world "in-itself," independent of empirical experience). Such a dualistic worldview was particularly useful with regard to Kant's theory of moral agency. Morality was grounded in formal principles known as "categorical imperatives." Kant denied the necessity of relying on particular contexts or individual good works in order to determine the validity of moral claims and actions (Kant 1959). Kant's transcendental philosophy involves principles of pure reason which demonstrate the universal and necessary elements of self-conscious understanding. Universal principles liberated the autonomous individual so that he or she could set aside particular personal interests and desires in order to act

in the interest of impersonal moral imperatives (Allison 1990, p. 2). Autonomy does not translate into the freedom to decide whatever one wishes in any given situation; it translates into the freedom to comprehend, and to act in accordance with, universal maxims. Kant's poetic image of the civilized man, detached from society at large but conforming to a "higher" rational morality, was a variation on Rousseau's natural man. Again, the need for a rational education is present in Kant's system. While he did not share Rousseau's disgust with society, Kant did share a self-centered theory of morality which de-emphasized the influences of community, social custom, and tradition. This positivist moral orientation would be severely attacked by Fichte, one of Kant's most brilliant students, and by Hegel, who would return moral deliberations to the community.

Kant was keenly interested in education. His third critique, *The Critique of Judgement*, directed attention to emotionally inspired creativity. It was an evaluation of aesthetic appreciation and a philosophical account of the purposeful nature of the noumenal world-in-itself. According to Kant, the human world was more than an aimless, mechanical cosmology; it had to have some purpose, some destiny. And humanity could be inspired, through art, to actualize this purpose in the sensible world. Human life was to be celebrated, and Kant's cultural hero was the creative artist (especially the poet) rather than the father, for artistic creation synthesized emotion and reason. There was, therefore, no eschatological fulfillment; but there *was* artistic fulfillment. There is a faint hint of Rousseau here. Where Rousseau depicted the melding of the heart and mind in the form of the social contact, Kant depicted the melding of emotion and reason in the form of the creative genius. The key to both, however, is that they stress the unity of reason and emotion through rational action. Habermas (1992, p. 19) credits Kant with providing the groundwork for the modern concept of self. Soloman (1988) praises Kant as the "Abraham" of every philosophical movement of the past 200 years. But Abraham was only one individual, and he required a community before his leadership could become institutionalized. It would be accurate to state that the philosophical discourse of modernity (at least the structural foundations of modern epistemology) were refined by Kant, but it would be unjustified either to congratulate or to blame him for later philosophical and social movements. It should be recalled that Kant's

writings reflected the spirit of his age, and he wrote in a philosophical tradition which stretched back to ancient Greece and forward into the late twentieth century. Kant's method could be called Cartesian in so far as he sought to establish subjective criteria for objective truths (Soloman 1988, 70). Kant's transcendental idealism would gradually migrate across Europe and emigrate across the Atlantic in the texts of the early American Hegelians.

Summary and Conclusion

The quest for the self has been motivated by anxiety surrounding what it means to be a human being, given a receding divine presence. Simply put, the two driving questions are (1) "What am I" and (2) "What am I to do?" Déscartes responded that (1) the human being was a thinking thing and (2) that it should follow a particular methodology; thus he initiated a series of other questions which ultimately transformed a theo*log*ical eschato*log*y into an epistemo*log*ical teleo*log*y. Notice the common element of *logos*: the first principle underlying an ordered account of all things. 17 Under epistemological teleology, the first thought emanates from human consciousness, which orders all things, potentially knows all things, and moves towards the realization of some purpose.

The fundamental metaphors required to symbolize purpose are as old as Plato. The grand old metaphor is "light," which speaks to one's reflective vision of the world. Theologically, power is posited as exploding throughout the universe from a source of creation which exists "out there"; epistemologically, it is posited as imploding within some essential source of human creativity which exists "in here." In either case, the power source must be conceptually positioned and methodologically illuminated so that human being can know other beings and things, advance towards them, touch them, and perhaps even unite with them in order to attain wholeness and purpose. The anxious desire which motivates this quest is the desire for freedom. Within the philosophical tradition of modernity, freedom may be expressed as a demand for political liberation, as a retreat into a transcendental moral autonomy, and/or as a state of intellectual self-mastery. In some cultures, freedom has been expressed as the independence associated with financial security, promising a Sabbath without end on the islands of autonomous individualism.

In all cases, however, these concepts of freedom are the result of a quest for power. The anxiety which drives this quest is perennial, and it asks the question: How must I be, and what must I do, to free myself from the bondage of alienation — from "not being." For, indeed, the predicament of alienation can be interpreted as an absence of being. Separation from what counts as freedom can be interpreted as a form of death, and every step which leads towards freedom can be interpreted as one step away from actual or metaphorical death. In the philosophical discourse of modernity, metaphors of darkness signal danger and metaphors of light signal hope. I shall return to this in Chapter 5, when I review the work of Hargreaves and Grimmett, respectively.

Faced with an increasing anxiety over the absence of a hopeful redeeming light on the horizon of being, modern human being drives towards some kind of purposeful fulfillment in mortal life. Whatever form of consciousness is hoped for will be dependent upon whatever cultural practices are available. Recall the hopeful fictions promised by early writers in the philosophical tradition of modernity: knowing all things, knowing one's own mind and the mind of others, knowing the purpose of life, being free, being autonomous, being "natural" (i.e., feeling in harmony with the "environment," variously defined), being reasonable, being a citizen, being a patriarch, and being an artist — all predicated fictions of human perfectibility and mastery. The word "fiction" derives from the Latin *fingere*: to invent or to feign. The concept of self, with all its associated attributes, is fictive. Within the culture of modernity, it is molded by human rather than by divine fingers.

One of the goals of this chapter is to elucidate ethical principles. The fundamental predicament of modernity is evident in the writings of Rousseau and Kant, as are the principles and educational schemata to address and resolve it. These will prove to be useful in understanding the ethics and politics of teacher development. The philosophical tradition of modernity presumes the existence of two realms of Being: one is dark and distant, the other is bright and close. The question of how to unify these two realms was the challenge addressed by writers from Déscartes to Kant as well as by schools and universities which had grown out of religious orders. There was a continued obsession with arriving at some transcendental truth. This obsession placed

increasing importance on planned education and ontic research. Method was the key to success. The correct method would arrive at a conclusion which would be accepted as authoritative. In the case of ontic research, two strategies are presented: (1) intuition (from the Latin, *intueri*: to look upon), which offers a way of seeing both the inner and outer realms of Being and (2) deduction (from the Latin, *deducere*: to lead; to draw), which offers a way of ordering (1) and of drawing relevant conclusions .

In the following chapter, I shall show that the theoretical foundations of Cartesian rationalism and Humean empiricism still appear in the texts of teacher development. More significantly, the ethical principles and politics of teacher development appear to be drawn from Rousseau and Kant, but with some interesting variations. Rousseau's definition of care and empowerment remains intact in the teacher development literature, as does the dualism of mind and matter (along with the urgency for their conceptual unification).

Chapter 3
What, Indeed, Is Teacher Development?

Introduction to Major Themes

My review of the philosophical tradition from Déscartes to Kant has shown how consciousness can be developed through being united with purpose. This union symbolizes the reconciliation of mind with matter. Through Rousseau, this became more than a cognitive exercise and was expanded into a moral and social dilemma (and, hence, into an educational dilemma). With the increasing erosion of an authoritative God, Kant elaborated on Rousseau's transcendental humanism in order to achieve a comprehensive epistemological system. In this chapter, I show how transcendental authority becomes accessible to human beings engaging in everyday social and moral interactions. I will show how such moral accessibility is one of the agendas of much of the teacher development literature. The fundamental modern predicament of alienation remains intact, and social/ethical practices continue to attempt to reconcile the self and the world. Within teacher development theory, moral self-wholeness and personal and professional ethical development is articulated through community involvement. The hope for, and assumption of, a distinctive human spiritual power encourages teachers to engage in practices of community interaction. Explicit knowledge is favored, and "thinking" is conceptualized as a process of metaphorical reflection. A certain notion of truth begins to emerge. Teachers are alienated from the world and need to be reconciled with it. If they are in harmony with their environment, then they will be empowered; they will be "total persons." Part of being in harmony with the world will involve caring for it. Here, one can detect the Christian ethic of stewardship, which values practical knowledge over abstract knowledge. There is an aversion to all forms of transcendental authority, and a preference for a phenomenological concept of human spirit (i.e., consciousness).

In describing the academic study of teacher development, Lieberman (1994, p. 27) writes that the activities characterizing it are accompanied by the growth of a new language, a language

that is trying to explain and describe new ideas. There has been little analysis of the language of teacher development. In fact, the study of teacher development itself is relatively young. It began in the United States with Waller's (1932) classic sociological study, in which he foretells at least one future agenda item: "It is not possible to develop the personalities of students favorably without giving like opportunities for teachers, and it is not possible to liberate students without liberating teachers" (p. 445).

It was Lortie's (1975) significant study of teachers' work-contexts, however, which helped to launch the field in its present state (Lieberman 1992). Lieberman says that there are no distinct divisions between the various ways in which researchers approach teacher development. Researchers dedicated to teacher development classify themselves under various headings, and many of these overlap theoretically. Some contribute to discussions regarding the nature of teachers' knowledge, their autonomy, and the improvement of their practice (e.g., Wasley 1991; Shulman 1987; McLaughlin 1987, Goodlad 1975; Lortie 1975). Others approach the area sociologically and utilize such categories as: social realities of teaching, the culture of the school, organizational change processes, and moral interpretations of practice (e.g., Fullan and Hargreaves 1991; Goodlad, 1990; Hargreaves 1991; Sarason 1971). Organizational change has been more specifically categorized as "restructuring" (e.g., Hargreaves 1994; Lieberman and Miller 1991; Little 1988). Other titles categorize the field of study under such terms as "change theory" (e.g., Fullan and Stiegelbauer 1991), "organizational theory," and "policy analysis." Teacher development is an amorphous field of study, which winds its way among departments of educational administration and supervision, curriculum theory, and social and cultural studies in education.

This chapter focuses primarily on the texts of Fullan, Hargreaves, and Grimmett, authors who have devoted much time to describing and explaining teacher development. As I mentioned earlier, Fullan (1994) has said that very little analysis has been devoted to articulating what the concept of teacher development means. Curriculum writers, who specialize in the educational growth of the experienced teacher, have used language which rests on unexamined assumptions

about "development" and "teaching." There is a need to push deeper into the meaning and complexities of teacher development as a unique area of study.

The push begins by questioning the use of the compound title of "teacher development" without considering its historical and rhetorical roots. At first glance, we could suppose that teacher development refers to changes in the pedagogy of persons who earn their livelihoods through instructing children and youths. The word "teaching" describes polymorphous activities encompassing a wide variety of specific practices (Barrow and Milburn 1986). Barrow and Milburn call teaching a "messy affair," and many teachers might agree that composing their own job descriptions would be a difficult task, since their day often includes multifaceted responses to various student needs. The word "development" is also ambiguous. It is a very complex word and could refer to many different facets of development: cognitive, moral, emotional, physical — to name only a few. In a comprehensive empirical study of secondary-school teachers, Huberman (1993) chose to approach teacher development as "career development", principally because this allowed the use of several ordinarily unrelated research variables and because it provided a category which could be compared across professions. "Career" is a very general term and can include both professional and/or personal developmental sequences (or any combination of thereof). If we are interested in specific areas of development (e.g., the emotional, the cognitive, or the moral), then the designation "career development" is far too broad to be of any use.

Some conceptualists (e.g., Hirst and Peters 1970) argue that there should be little difference between the philosophical concepts of development and those of education. They construe development as a process of initiation into a cultivated way of life, with standards and procedures of conduct and speech recognized by others who have undergone the same process. The mark of this cultivation, write Hirst and Peters, would be a unified autonomy based on the principles of cognitive reason and a moral ordering of activities in accordance with reasonable standards — a noticeably Kantian orientation.

During a symposium held at the American Educational Research Association in 1994,[1] eight researchers grappled with contemporary challenges in teacher development. The presenters proposed that the school-workplace is characterized by rapidity and spontaneity, and that teachers' knowledge of practice was situated in this milieu. It was necessary, therefore, to help teachers "stop" and clarify what they were doing and to construct new knowledge. This entailed what Schön (1983, 1987) terms "reflection" as a self-monitoring of deliberative processes. "Book knowledge," being typically theoretical, was distinguished from "experiential knowledge," which was considered to be more practical than the former. The word "beliefs" surfaced several times during the symposium, either as the motivating force behind development or as the motivator of action. It was proposed that teachers must change "from within." People called for more theorizing around (1) what kind of meaning teachers were bringing to teaching; (2) issues of power and equity between and among the professional communities (e.g., departments, parents, male and female teachers); and (3) the institutional context of the school. With reference to (3), a great deal of emphasis was placed on a teacher's moral and emotional commitment to teaching. This area was identified as one which required more extensive research. This priority was connected to political concerns regarding how a classroom/school is organized as an institution, the implication being that schools are not "caring" places. Schools/classrooms need to be reorganized in such a way that teachers are better able to construct new knowledge and beliefs, to reflect on processes, to reshape their beliefs about teaching, and to rejuvenate their moral and emotional commitment. There was an underlying assumption that schools were alienating settings where teachers were separated from opportunities to connect with their work. At the conclusion of the symposium, the open discussion concerned how to create an institutional context which would

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[1] *New Paradigms and Practices in Professional Development*; New Orleans, April 4, 1994. Participants and topics: Dynamics of teacher career stages, Ralph Fessler, John Hopkins University; Teaching learning in the workplace: Implications for school reform, Mark A. Smylie, University of Illinois; Developing professional knowledge within a client-centered orientation, Michael Eraut, University of Sussex; Professional development in the postmodern age, Andy Hargreaves, University of Toronto; Expanding a teacher's knowledge base: A cognitive psychological perspective on professional development, Ralph T. Putnam, Michigan State University; Hilda Borko, University of Colorado; Professional development in education: In search of the optimal mix, Thomas Guskey, University of Kentucky. Discussants: Michael Huberman, Harvard Graduate School of Education, and Matthew B. Miles, CPRE.

enable teachers to learn, to reshape their beliefs, and to work towards enhanced emotional commitment. In other words, the question was how to make schools into more learner-friendly institutions.

Scanning the language used in this symposium reveals a cultural message. Teachers conceptualize knowledge which is specific to their work-environment, and they do this through reflective thinking. Contextual knowledge produced by reflective thinking is prized along with other forms of knowledge. Their motivation to conceptualize stems from their moral and emotional commitments to teaching. Sadly, their environment is such that they are often hindered from believing in the value of their work and from feeling the joy of teaching. Because they are alienated from their environment (which is what provides the objective stimuli for their reflection), teachers are unable adequately to conceptualize practical knowledge. Consequently, as I have said, the environment must be reorganized to become a more motivating place. The messy affair of teaching concerns cognitive knowledge, moral knowledge, and emotional knowledge. Teacher development has the potential to lead to a unified, empowering autonomy. However, in order for this to occur, the teaching environment has to become a more "caring" place. The Kantian divisions of cognitive, moral, and emotional knowledge were evident in this symposium, as was the Rousseauist concern for emotions and feelings.

The problem of articulating a caring curriculum of development was taken on by the combined faculty of education at Simon Fraser University (see Neufeld, Grimmett, & Manley-Casimir 1995). Faculty members attempted to compose a graduate program in teacher education and teacher development in order to prepare teacher educators in the province of British Columbia. A challenge arose, not surprisingly, over curriculum content and course emphasis. They agreed to distinguish between the terms "teacher education" and "teacher development" as follows: the former was to refer to the processes that are initiated and structured for teachers by teacher educators in faculties of education as well as by experienced teachers in school systems; the latter was to refer to those processes that are initiated and structured collectively or individually by teachers themselves in their efforts to understand and improve their practice. In addition, the

combined processes of teacher education and teacher development take place (and can be studied) within and across the various stages of preservice, induction, and in-service. Two learning sequences were presented: (1) initiation into the profession as a sort of apprenticeship and (2) continuous improvement through meaningful interaction with the motivating environment. The faculty's decision suggests that initiation is ongoing and that a caring, developmental environment is best conceptualized and implemented by the teachers themselves.

This collaborative orientation is further evident in Fullan and Hargreaves (1992), where edited readings are prefaced by an introduction criticizing an "innovation focused approach" to educational change (pp. 1-4). The innovation approach is criticized for being narrow and weak, as it ignores four crucial components:

(1)   the morally driven purposes of the teacher;

(2)   the categories of particularity which should be used to view the teacher as a "total person" (I assume this to encompass the cognitive, moral, and emotional realms);

(3)   the significant institutional and demographic contexts in which teachers work; and

(4)   the characteristic manifestations resulting from teachers occupational work cultures.

These four points are reminiscent of the priorities expressed in the symposium. Conduct is motivated by moral beliefs; teachers conceptualize knowledge cognitively, and they feel very strongly about their work; and the environment must be such that conceptual knowledge and moral purposes can unfold productively. The pieces in Fullan and Hargreaves' collection then elaborate on the urgency of listening to and sponsoring teachers' voices and of creating communities of teachers who, together, discuss and develop their moral purposes. This requires understanding teachers as "total persons" rather than simply as innovators who resist any change which might come from external sources. Some suggested organizing categories are age, stage of career, and gender. Along with the recommendations put forward in the volume, the editors argue that most schools foster an alienating culture of individualism and that more collaborative settings

would appeal to teachers' moral purposes by enabling them to be viewed and treated as "total persons." This assumes a dualistic theoretical structure which separates human being from the environment (i.e., teachers' consciousness is alienated from teachers' experiences). It also (1) suggests that morality is the source of a teacher's reason for being; (2) distinguishes between particularity and wholeness in the work environment; (3) highlights the importance of bringing the individual and her/his environment into harmony; and (4) defines the workplace as a forum wherein one may seek wholeness.

In another context, Hargreaves and Fullan (1991) define teacher development as the practice of providing teachers with improved "opportunities to teach," which seems to imply that teacher development refers to improved opportunities to bring about student learning. However, on closer reading, it becomes clear that Hargreaves and Fullan are referring to continuous adaptation and improvement, as teachers attempt to gain self-mastery and institutional reform. In their introductory comments, they focus on the following three approaches to training and improvement:

(1)   having opportunities to learn and acquire knowledge and skills;

(2)   having opportunities to develop self-understanding essential to becoming a sensitive and flexible educator; and

(3)   having opportunities to create a work environment which is supportive of professional learning and improvement

If the description of a teacher as one who "brings about learning in students" holds fast and is included with the above three points, then some puzzling questions emerge. Improving "pedagogy" is not conceived as "bringing about learning in students" but as self-mastery and "creating a context" in which the development of self can take place. This is indeed a "messy" image — a pedagogue who is an instructor of students but who is also a perpetual "student," "curriculum planner," and, perhaps, "petit administrator." Is the focus on the role of the

"professional" who desires refinement of pedagogical mastery? is it on "personal" as opposed to "professional" development (or are they one and the same)? or are the authors advocating allowing teachers some of the authority which has been traditionally reserved for elected district officials, administrators, and/or government policy-makers?

As Hargreaves and Fullan go on to argue, the strategies of administrators and elected school officials have been based on the assumption that teachers are implementers rather than designers of policy. A shift in perspective requires some reorganization of power relationships — both formal and informal — between the controllers and the controlled. In a shorter monograph, Fullan and Hargreaves (1991) spell out a series of guidelines for teachers, principals, and school systems which might enable them to realize this power shift. Essentially, they (1) promote viewing teachers as perpetual learners who should reflect on and trust their "inner voices"; (2) advocate replacing the current hierarchical structure of school governance with a collaborative one; (3) argue for giving teachers more freedom; and (4) promote increased authority and autonomy for teachers in areas of decision-making and curriculum design. In short, these guidelines provide a manifesto for the enhanced growth of teachers who, currently, are not allowed sufficient opportunities to assert their wills. Providing teachers with opportunities to teach requires providing them with opportunities to self-actualize through dialogue with their peers. Fullan and Hargreaves' use of the term "inner voices" is reminiscent of Rousseau's heart and Plato's inner vision. The preference for collaboration might be seen as a remnant of the social contract, but those interested in teacher development seem to place a higher emphasis on community than did Rousseau.

The message is clear: teachers are alienated from their environment; that is, they are alienated from any meaningful moral and/or emotional experiences which might motivate them to conceptualize the knowledge they need in order to carry out their work adequately. They are morally and emotionally abandoned. They need to be in harmony with their environment so that their development consists of a continuous initiation into moral autonomy and emotional

satisfaction. This requires reorganizing the teaching environment by replacing hierarchy with community, thus allowing teachers to assert their wills as total persons.

Grimmett (1991) further supports this message. He begins by identifying a shift in perspective from a once pervasive externally mandated authority to one which provides teachers with the opportunities to take charge of their professional lives (i.e., the "humanistic strand" of teacher development). This "humanistic strand" enables teachers to be directed by "perpetual learning." Knowledge accumulated through such learning originates in the collective interaction of practice. Where practical knowledge was once "handed down" to teachers as if they were instruments, there now seems to be a research-based movement which is encouraging teachers to develop the skills of their craft through engaging in collaborative dialogue within the workplace. This humanistic approach to teacher development also concentrates on the personhood of the teacher, thus extending ontic research into the subtleties of teacher development. I have cited one example of such research (i.e., Huberman 1993), but extensive work in this area has also been carried out by Ball and Goodson (1985), Sikes et al. (1989), and Nias (1989). Taken collectively, these people focus on the influences of ontic predications such as gender, class, lifestyle, and life cycle in order to attain a deeper understanding of the teacher as a "total person." But Grimmett sounds a warning:

> By focusing on the person and not on the context in which teaching takes place, humanistic approaches to teacher development place too much stress on personal responsibility for change and draws vital attention away from controversial questions about the context in which teachers work, and the ways in which it enhances or inhibits personal and professional development. The critical strand of teacher development attempts to redress the balance by focusing on the work context of teaching as both a condition and target for development. (p. 21)

The critical strand of teacher development, then, focuses on what conditions either foster or impede opportunities for the development of the teacher with regard to the ontic categories mentioned above. The preferred context for development is within a culture of interdependent collegiality wherein teachers design curriculum collaboratively. This perspective is put forward as transformational in that "development becomes a process in which teachers construct profound

and fresh appreciations of the learners' perspective, the classroom context, and their role as an active enabler of student learning" (Grimmett 1991, p. 3).

A "perspective" is a way of seeing, and the perspective on teacher development which Grimmett advocates in the preceding quote is not confined to how students understand their own learning. The "learners' perspective" refers as much to a redefined notion of the teacher as it does to the learner. Teachers are to be transformed from implementers of curriculum (in the sense of applying externally mandated materials) into learners (defined as people who continually adapt to a changing environment and design appropriate curricula in response to it). Once again, the message remains consistent. Teacher development is seen as a process of continuous redemptive transformation through unification with, and recreation of, a stimulating environment.

Grimmett, referring to Lieberman and Miller (1990, p. 112), closes his paper by differentiating between two "worlds": the world of hope and the world of danger. The world of hope is characterized by mutually supportive learning communities, ad hoc leadership based on situational practices, the melding of educational administration and curriculum development, and an interpretation of instruction which is inventive and sensitive to the imperfections of humanity. The world of danger is characterized by stasis, externally mandated directives, centralization of leadership, limited teacher control over the learning environment, and tight bureaucratic accountability (which results in anomic individualism).

Like modernity, the concept of teacher development is determined by the language through which it is expressed and by the cultural practices to which it is subject. It is therefore crucial to account for the generative power of discourse. It is necessary to look at the history of teacher development rhetoric in order to gain an understanding of its implicit cultural messages. 2 The dialect of teacher development is part of a 400-year-old rhetorical tradition. In accordance with this tradition, teachers are conceptualized as thinking things; they are potentially rational beings and their development should lead to useful practice. There is a great emphasis on how the environment molds teachers into sapient beings. One can see the influence of empiricism in the

importance placed on teachers' emotions, feelings, and desires. This explains the value of ontic research into how teachers think and put ideas into practice.

The primary theoretical source for the ethical principles of teacher development is the romantic element of the Enlightenment, of which Rousseau is the modern spokesperson. This accounts for teachers being represented as beings who have feelings, as well as thoughts, about their work. More important, however, teachers are written about as motivated by what they believe to be "good" practice. And the ethics of good practice arise from teacher interaction with the environment. When looking at teacher development literature, it is worth noting the selective use of Kantian divisions of knowledge into cognitive, moral, and emotional realms.[3] Déscartes separated mind from matter, thus initiating an epistemology of gross distinctions between thinking human being and everything else in the world. These distinctions appear in the rhetoric of teacher development, which adopts the metaphorical image of the mind as a heart. Remaining rationally Cartesian, Rousseau separated moral being from ethical personhood when he dreamed of unifying human essence with human purpose. Also remaining rationally Cartesian, Fullan, Hargreaves, and Grimmett separate teachers from those aspects of their environment which are to stimulate cognitive conceptualization, practical reasoning, and emotional satisfaction. Remaining true to Rousseau's project of modern education, they hold that sponsoring teachers' voices means creating conditions in which intuitive knowledge can be transferred into reason through practice.

A Rousseauist concept of care also surfaces in teacher development literature. Administratively, the teaching environment needs to be welcoming — a place where principles and policies are to be grounded by the inherent morality of the governed. A totally caring environment will provide the prerequisite stimuli for the nourishment of the three Kantian divisions of knowledge: cognitive reflection; moral judgment; and emotionally inspired creativity. For Rousseau as well as for Fullan, Hargreaves, and Grimmett, empowerment is expressed as a state wherein knowledge is useful, relevant, and in harmony with the environment. Rousseau saw the cultural environment as derelict, and this led to Kant's emphasis on moral transcendence. However, teachers need to get involved with the environment rather than to transcend it. The

teacher development texts, so far, offer no moral paragon/arbitrator, either transcendent or carnate. In fact, administrative practices which favor such models are regarded as "the way of danger" (Grimmett, 1991).

Where and how is moral arbitration to take place if not through transcendentally unquestioned categories or an ontically predicated figurehead? If arbitration takes place in empirical practice, how is this to become explicitly demonstrated as knowledge? Is there any archetype for a developed teacher? What paradise awaits the teacher on the strait and narrow way of hope? Is there any metaphysical foundation for conceptualizing a myth to express that hope, given teacher development's aversion to transcendental power? In order to address these questions, it is necessary to proceed beyond Kant and his moral positivism and to see how transcendentalism was brought down to earth so that his categories and imperatives could be challenged. This will show why teacher developers see theoretical unity with the environment as essential to the creation of an explicit morality. The story now returns to the German philosophical context after Kant.

By 1800, philosophical knowledge in Germany and throughout continental Europe was divided into Kant's three distinct epistemological spheres (Habermas 1992, p. 19): the cognitive (a concept of the truth), the moral (a concept of right), and the emotional (appreciations of what is pleasing). These spheres of knowledge were distinct from beliefs, since the latter relied on faith rather than on philosophical arguments. Thus there was a distinction between institutions which assumed the authority of reason (e.g., the state apparatus, public education, and commerce) and those which assumed the authority of faith (e.g., churches and seminaries). The separation of knowledge from faith, however, resulted in moral insecurity — a condition which is still with us. As has been said, basic dualisms and inconstancies were once overcome by a belief in the divine. The demise of a divinely revealed order brought with it Kantian categories, and it became the task of philosophers to overcome moral relativism by reuniting an estranged humanity with a disenchanted world (i.e., unifying mind and matter).

The concept of modern subjectivity is structured by reflective thinking (Habermas 1992). To grasp this structure, I find it useful to consider the sentence "I am a professor." Whenever we think of ourselves as an "I" and follow that proclamation with a verb and objective designates, we erect a reflective structure which defines our being as an identity composed of cultural activities. "Professing," as one cultural activity, has a reflective relationship with "I." Recalling the structure of the sentence in Cartesian terms, "professing" is something which belongs to the subject as thought. The subject is what is posited as thought, such that the activity of professing is brought to presence in the world as some "thing" which is known and owned by the subject and which stands against all other objects and beings (i.e., all that is not "I"). And since subjectivity stands over and against all other objects and beings, it is structurally separated from "matter" (i.e., the world, the environment). The problem which Déscartes introduced, and which Rousseau and Kant refined, with regard to modern identity was the dualistic structure of transcendent authority and world (a clear vestige of theological ontology). This dualistic structure prevented humanity from experiencing the kind of theological union with the truth which it enjoyed when it could hope for salvation and everlasting life. With the demise of the church, philosophers were left to address the anxiety of a humanity separated from the world. This problem was addressed by attempting conceptually to unify such dualisms as self/world, mind/body, and individual/society.

The continuing crisis of modernity arises from a need to provide a sense of purpose for human being after the erosion of a belief in the divine. As social practices increasingly made religion irrelevant, secular options entered to fill the void. The legacy of human subjectivity initiated by Déscartes provided two priorities for the modern age: (1) a humanist concept of freedom and (2) an epistemology which could make redemption a philosophical and practical (as distinct from religious) possibility. If human subjectivity issued from human thought, then so would a sense of freedom in the world.

Development as a Moral Struggle

Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) adds the urgency of life-as-a-moral-struggle to the ongoing philosophical discourse of modernity, and Schiller adds a romantic notion of community

interaction. For Fichte, it is in the struggle of communal relations that consciousness finds its potential to develop through moral interactions. This struggle becomes central to Hegel's theory of community ethics, and I contend that this philosophical continuum will eventually reach Lieberman, McLaughlin, Hargreaves, and Fullan through Dewey, Mead and Marx.

What followed Kant was a rigorous philosophical examination of the value and role of consciousness. Fichte was renowned as the greatest Kantian scholar of his time, and it was he who took on the project of developing a new structure of epistemology. This move by Fichte had immense significance, for it changed the metaphor for the quest for knowledge from that of a line to that of a circle. This liberated theory from an obligation to stay "at home," and it also provided an image of human purpose as a continuous striving.[4]

Fichte did not abandon the need for a first principle, but he did abandon a Kantian reliance on transcendent first principles (Fichte 1931). His philosophy is non-Kantian in that justifiable claims and arguments are not grounded on any single and unquestioned first principle. After Fichte's important departure from Kant, one has to choose between: (1) foundationalism, where moral principles are fixed transcendentally (perhaps dictated by a divine spirit and interpreted by its authorities) and (2) a speculative view of knowledge, in which the horizon of ultimate truth claims is visible despite the impossibility (or undesirability) of grounding them in unchanging first principles. First principles can be questioned, said Fichte, and when we return to them we can revise them. Our learning is thus a metaphorical circle within which we are constantly revising, altering, and developing our knowledge. First principles are necessary, but they are changing and contingent. The system continually rejuvenates itself and moves in relation to and interaction with

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[3] These three divisions of knowledge show up in a discussion of teacher development (see Hargreaves, 1994, p. 56) in which participatory democracy is advocated in opposition to organizational effectiveness and oligarchy. As Hargreaves writes: "Participatory leadership is advocated but not on the grounds of *truth, beauty or justice*. The grounds of organizational effectiveness are the ones that are invoked. While Schlechty (1990) appears superficially to support changes in power relationships, essentially only the "symbols of power" are to be rearranged. Much of the mechanics of leadership may change, but ultimately control of the organization is vested in "strong leaders" - leaders who are architects of their respective organization's vision" (italics mine). The establishment of truth, justice, and beauty were exactly the three themes of Kant's three critiques of pure reason, practical reason, and aesthetic judgment.

[4] This image would contribute to the young Dewey's "liberation" in his quest to free himself from his Puritan upbringing in New England. See Dewey, 1930.

first principles which are, in turn, influenced by the system which depends upon them for revision (Rockmore 1993). The system, its movements, its principles, and its theories are thus laid open for public scrutiny and revision.

Fichte did not believe that Newtonian physics was essential to understanding human consciousness. He was interested in collapsing Kant's three *Critiques* into a single systematic science (where "science" means a rigorously worked out rhetorical system for explaining human consciousness). The key word in Fichte's philosophy is *Wissenschaft*, which can be translated as "science" or even as "scholarship," but which, more literally, means "a working knowledge." Science was a system of propositions, each of which was either a "first principle" or an axiom or theorem which could be deduced from a first principle (Soloman 1988). *Geisteswissenschaften*, translated as "a working knowledge of human spirit's phenomenology," is a discipline of equal value to mathematics with regard to understanding the world. The humanities are legitimate sciences as long as they are not esoteric; that is, as long as they are subject to public scrutiny and are active in applying rigorous thinking to community practice.

Fichte's motivation for destabilizing Kantian epistemology arose from a desire to reinterpret Kant's rigid moral positivism (Soloman 1988). He argued that knowledge should be deduced from events rather than from transcendental moral principles. His ambition was to elevate morality over reason and to prioritize what Kant understood to be a science of justice. Fichte did not, however, make use of Kant's borrowings from pietistic transcendental principles. He concentrated, instead, on what it meant to live a human life and what that would mean for a theory of justice. He was primarily interested in the ethical struggles of life, in how being human was essentially a striving towards a sense of freedom in a human world. And if freedom is devoid of theological implications, then living and striving towards it will result in the introduction of such humanistic disciplines as biography, sociology, and history. Kant's transcendental ideals were unchanging and exemplary; thus, they were ahistorical and acultural. Fichte believed that moral principles were contingent and necessarily tied to a unique cultural context (Habermas 1992).

From this, it follows that principles cannot be enshrined in a higher realm but must be created out of human interaction in a particular place during a particular time.

The source of authority is thus located in the current activities of ordinary people. Subjectivity is united with the world through human creativity, production, and reproduction. Focusing on the present provides the possibility for zealous pride in a "new time" of great expectations. History and individual biographies are interpreted as linear processes which have the potential to lead towards some horizon of ultimate perfection. Since these are quantifiable processes, they can be held by the creating human subject and measured, controlled, accelerated, or postponed. Modern temporality can then be viewed as a scarce resource (e.g., something to be managed and measured).

As Kosseleck (1985) has written:

> Modernization mobilizes the experiential space of the producer and replaces it with experiences and notions of developmental progress toward visions of utopian expectations. Where a circumference of vision may have at one time been narrowly focused and vertical, looking up with eschatological hopes of heavenly salvation, the modern circumference of vision is focused laterally, rendering such salutary hopes profane but also extending the motivation for progress towards a heaven on earth and the associated urgency of a continuous, profane renewal in the form of constant progress. (p. 276)

Another key difference between Kant and Fichte was the latter's rejection of the thesis of things-in-themselves (i.e., that which determines intuition and which is beyond human activity). For Fichte, abstract categories were non-existent; there was nothing beyond experience. But experience is more than mere sensation (as in Hume), and it is by no means limited to knowledge (as in Kant); rather, it is what unites Kant's practical, moral, and aesthetic realms. The sort of philosophy human beings choose depends on what sort of people they are. And philosophy is not some doctrine that can be rejected or accepted; it is a dynamic "thing" animated by the human beings who typify it in their moral decisions (Fichte 1931).

For Fichte, Kant's three divisions really made up one activity, and that activity had fundamentally to do with practical working knowledge. And where Kant retained a place for a transcendent spirit, Fichte argued that such a spirit is nothing more than the moral order of

humanity (which may be realized through communal struggle). Fichte breaks decisively with Kant by insisting that all transcendental unities are part of the shared human world. This opened the door for future philosophers to insist that the human ego could, indeed, be a consciousness, and that consciousness was common to all human beings. Consciousness becomes life-as-a-challenge, and it is in accepting this challenge that human being manifests itself in innumerable individual egos, all of whom "live" by collectively striving for moral worth. We are basically struggling moral agents, according to Fichte, not knowers; and we produce a moral world for no better reason than to be moral players in the collective ego known as humanity.

A Romantic Vision of Community

There were cultural reasons for Fichte's optimistic interpretation of human morality. At the time of his writing, there was no unified political entity called "Germany"; Germans were scattered into 234 small principalities which were similar in size to contemporary Liechtenstein and culturally divided by various dialects. Germans were sometimes considered to be a backward and uncultured people by the more "enlightened" Western Europeans. The early modern political revolutions in England, France, and the United States were urban bourgeois movements inspired by the Enlightenment ideologies of a fast-rising mercantile class. Slogans of equality and brotherhood were of political and economic advantage to the revolutionaries. This upwardly mobile group lived mostly in urban centers and included lawyers, merchants, professors, and bureaucrats (Soloman 1988). After the feudal system was overthrown, a rising modern bureaucracy was institutionalized in its place and eventually expanded into a modern governmental system. In the German principalities, this kind of revolution never took place. The bourgeois (*bürger*) element remained in harmony with the ruling families of a regal, proprietary class. Unlike the civic settings of the democratic American colonies, England, and France, political involvement in the German principalities was highly curtailed. For Napoleon, the principalities were merely buffer-states between France and the withering Holy Roman Empire. As occupied territory, the Germans lived under Napoleonic law.

At the turn of the nineteenth century, Germans found few points of common cultural reference. Apart from a language colored by a mosaic of regional dialects, they lacked the cultural cohesion of the French, who could point to the revolutionary attributes of liberty, equality, and fraternity; their legal code; their military dominance; and the empire — all of which provided them with national pride and a personal sense of confidence and belonging. The early modern Germans saw few examples of national identity or purpose. Their quest turned towards the revolutionary discovery of consciousness. They would claim emancipation through expressions of a secular, spiritual freedom rather than through political revolution. This required a thorough-going study of the history of consciousness, stretching all the way back to ancient Greece. Interestingly, after the revolution, France had little use for its history (Soloman 1988). German philosophers, however, embraced and valorized their history. And just as all people involved in emancipatory movements are inspired by poetic images in story and song, so early modern Germans were inspired by poets like Goethe and Hölderlin (Soloman 1989). The German revolution was cultural rather than political, with the single dominant issue being the development of a systematic philosophy which could distinguish and articulate a unified German culture.

Fichte began to see his cultural period as one of transition. Faced with Napoleon's occupation, the spiritual void left by the demise of the divine, and the decline of the 1,000-year-old Holy Roman Empire, Germans placed their hope in the promise and potential of a universal human spirit. It was this promise of a humanist redemption within the context of the ceaseless struggle of human life which would motivate much of German philosophy during the nineteenth century (Abrams 1971). Germany's liberatory aspirations were expressed through the media of literature, music, and drama, contributing to what is historically referred to as Romanticism (Soloman 1988).

The word *Romantik* was first coined by the German poet, Friederich Schlegel (1767-1845), and it became the typical German reaction to Enlightenment rationalism. There are significant differences and similarities between the Enlightenment and Romanticism. Both movements valued the dynamic of change and assumed a powerful sense of destiny. But the

Enlightenment looked towards the future and the promise of ultimate fulfillment through progress, while Romanticism looked towards the past and the promise of ultimate completion through historical fulfillment. Both movements used Kant's philosophy, but for different purposes: the Enlightenment emphasized the power of reason as basic to the attainment of knowledge and looked favorably on Kant's first *Critique*; Romanticism emphasized feelings as basic to morality and looked favorably on Kant's second and, especially, third *Critique*. Both movements inspired revolutions, but they were revolutions of a different nature: the Enlightenment inspired outward political movements and fought to have a rationalized legal system replace a confused and inconsistent medieval, ecclesiastical system; Romanticism celebrated the "inner" and communal qualities of human spirituality and artistic creativity. Both movements placed great emphasis on the individual: the Enlightenment preached radical equality and advocated a republican government; Romanticism preached the equality of a universal humanity and advocated the celebration of the inspired genius. Both movements also shared a will to raise the level of human dignity: the Enlightenment by providing democratic political structures and associated universal legal principles; Romanticism by inspiring personal enthusiasm and collective confidence. In short, the Enlightenment preferred rationality, expressed in social and economic terms; Romanticism preferred morality and artistic expression, expressed in humanistic terms.

One German Romantic poet was Friederich Schiller, who was also a student of Kantian philosophy. In an effort to produce a picture of the individual as an idyllic being, Schiller sought to marry Kant's pietistic moralism with the artistic fervor of Goethe. This marriage of philosophy and poetry was spelled out in *On the Aesthetic Education of Man* (1965). Like Fichte, Schiller was not a mathematician, nor was he sympathetic to a mathematical epistemology. He departed from Kant's third *Critique* and adopted the metaphor of *Bildung* in order to develop his idea of learning as biological growth. The value of *Bildung* as a metaphor for human development is that it may be translated as "formation," "education," or "culture." Wholeness is thus attained through an integrative and formative education rather than through political upheaval. The emphasis was not on the usurpation of political power but on the continuous maintenance and recreation of the

communal self. Individuals grow to the extent that they are integrated into their cultural environment. Thus, political activity is defined as the developmental expression of an aesthetic connection to a living and thriving culture rather than as the practical application of abstract principles like equality and liberty. Growing to maturity means being socialized into one's culture; education means learning the principles of one's culture through immersion rather than through the acceptance of codified abstractions.

Biological growth occurs on its own and is empowered by its own inherent nature. Growth defines the structure of a living being's phenomenology; it was, therefore, a useful and productive leitmotif in Schiller's *Aesthetic Education*, which was written when Germans perceived themselves to be in cultural crisis. It is for this reason that the philosophy which emerged from this period in German history is referred to as "speculative" (from *speculari*, the past participle of the Latin *speculatus*: "to spy out"; "to observe"). Speculations can regulate decisions and produce a sense of purpose by looking towards completion. Inner harmony could be attained by being "developed," and community support helps one to live through times of crisis.

Like many other intellectuals in Germany, Schiller was appalled by the reign of terror and genocide which followed the revolution in France. He turned away from the social contract and towards the simpler image of the "whole person" as a kind of living unity of Kantian reason, morality, and aestheticism. His model for this image was ancient Greek city-statesmen, who conducted their daily affairs individually but whose practices were completely entwined with the political affairs of the community. The ancient Greek was the German cultural counterpart to Rousseau's natural man. When the human condition is conceptualized as being fragmented, and when this fragmentation prevents access to a comforting identity, the appeal of the image of the "whole person" is obvious. Long before Marx, Schiller pointed out how the early modern bureaucratic condition of urban life limited human experience, most obviously by increasing people's isolation from one another (Soloman 1988). This isolation was causing what Schiller referred to as the "alienation" of human being from the human experiences which make for a fully

formed person. Schiller also criticized the Kantian notion of first principles for being too removed from the problems of everyday experience. Schiller's whole person was not an atomized, self-sufficient individual, but a person who was nurtured through being completely absorbed in the community. In *Aesthetic Education*, when Schiller refers to the importance of art, he is referring to public art; that is, to "popular art" of the kind which expresses the common context of people as a whole.

The notion of an artistic utopia, in which public art fills the void once supplied by an animist religiosity, is characteristic of Romanticism (Habermas 1988). "Modernity," having been influenced by this Romantic notion of art, urged a departure from the Classical concept of art as *mimesis*, the imitation of nature. Art as mimesis is consistent with a cosmology which understands the external world as a unified subject which includes human being. Artistic creation was to be the imitation of that perfect natural order. With the modern emphasis on human subjectivity as the source of creation, the concept of art came to be a reflective representation of inwardness (Soloman 1988). Art became humanity's expression of its self-realization. Creativity now sprang from the subject, who was the center of metaphysical attention. Realizing one's "self" through art became an accepted way of attaining unity with one's inner nature; hence, the value of folk art as a public expression of an inner vision of individual and communal freedom.

In Rousseau's version of development (embellished by Kant), the ideal individual functions as part of an empirical community but is separated from the latter either by virtue of an essential nature (Rousseau) or by an appeal to moral, categorical imperatives which transcend any public opinion (Kant). Furthermore, (1) human being is morally autonomous in the sense of being able to learn, on its own, the nature of abstract principles (Kant) and (2) education negates societal norms and places the student in contact with an inherent goodness (Rousseau). Thus both Rousseau and Kant share a disparaging view of society. In contrast, Fichte's and Schiller's versions of development valorize an idealized community whose members interact to establish a cultural identity and who develop self-mastery through that interaction. According to Fichte and Schiller, the happy individual is completely contained within community; her/his autonomy is

defined by virtue of her/him being able to become a member of, and participant in, society. Kant places the onus on the transcendent moral principles to which the community and its members are free to aspire; Fichte and Schiller place the onus on the continued health of the ideal community, since it is the community from which healthy morality emerges. Common to both scenarios is the Enlightenment view that moral virtues are universally applicable. To be a member of Rousseau's community one needs to participate in a social contract which is the imperfect rational expression of a perfect intrinsic moral goodness; to be a member of Kant's community one has to believe without question in the categorical imperatives; and to be a "whole person" in Schiller's community, one needs to be so immersed in culture that it is difficult to distinguish when one is acting for one's self alone and when one is acting for the benefit of all concerned.

One of the leading metaphors of the German Romantic experience was that of the cosmic human spirit coming into full historical bloom. The preparatory context for this image is Kant's third *Critique*, but the metaphor was developed to epic proportions by Hölderlin. Under Hölderlin's pen, the world spirit of humanity becomes a unifying force which manifests itself in all human purposes. This cosmic spirit was not divine but distinctly human. Here I must emphasize, once more, that the philosophical discourse of early modernity is cousin to the discourse of early modern Christian theology. Both discursive systems aspire to attaining redemptive freedom through passing into a brilliant new age full of promise; and both encourage a celebratory mood. Hölderlin's optimistic notion of a world spirit growing to eventual perfection is compatible with Schiller's image of the ancient Greek polis and with Fichte's idea of the whole person united with the moral environment.

Summary and Conclusion

This chapter shows how post-Kantian philosophers attempted to bring Kant's system down to earth in order to achieve cultural unification during a period of crisis. I would call the mood of this philosophy apostolic (from ancient Greek, *apostolos*: to send away, as in "broadcast"). A great moral reform is advocated in the name of humanity, and the message is sent. This message is connected to the dominant motif of the New Testament Acts of the Apostles. In

the first twelve verses of that book, Jesus is about to enter into a transcendental state. He comforts his disciples by assuring them that they will be baptized by the (Holy) Spirit among them. The disciples ask if Jesus will restore "the kingdom" (a reference to the original message of his birth, in which Gabriel tells Mary that her son shall restore the throne of David to Israel [Luke 1:32]). Jesus avoids this question and responds that the power for which the disciples search is already upon them "with the Spirit." Jesus then transcends, and the disciples are left gazing into heaven. Two angels then appear to ask the disciples why they stand looking into heaven; in other words, they are fixing their gaze incorrectly. "Then they returned to Jerusalem from the mount"; that is, with the assistance of "the Spirit," they returned their gaze to the world, for *that* is where the promised "kingdom" shall be found.

After Kant, transcendent ideas, categorical imperatives, noumena, and things-in-themselves were all philosophically inaccessible for human being. As forces for action, those phenomena needed to be metaphorically returned to earth in order to enrich the Spirit of humanity. However, once this had been done, due to the traditional separation of humanity and the things of the world, the task then became to unify the human spirit with the world. The concept of redemption, albeit mortal, remains intact, as does a reflective methodology.

Fichte destabilizes first principles in order to make them accessible, and his circle metaphor enables one to conceptualize human knowledge as continuous involvement in the world. This conception is compatible with the Romantic metaphor of learning as growth. The goal is to destabilize the moral abstractions of Kant in order to make room for the particularities of the everyday human struggle; the message is that humanity should return to worldly phenomena and focus on social interaction in the hope that this will lead to freedom.

Fichte's and Schiller's recommendations for the human predicament are echoed in the recommendations of those concerned with teacher development. Teachers are alienated from their environment. In effect, teachers are in bondage and must be freed.[5] According to Fichte and Schiller, for liberation to be possible, one must pay attention to the community as the context for

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[5] This is one of the central conclusions of Grimmett and Neufeld (1994).

growth. Freedom is realized through being in unity with one's community. Ideally, moral conflicts should be non-existent, for all individuals, as members of the community, are united in spirit. This is far more than a mere social contract; it is an image of a social paradise in which the community's members embody the community.

The lasting authority of Kant was due to his ability to unify diverse traditions into a single rhetorical system. This talent was shared by his philosophical successor, G.W.F. Hegel, who brought the Cartesian-Kantian tradition to its crowning glory. In the following chapter, I treat Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* as a curriculum theory supported by two pillars: (1) self-reflection and (2) the desire for freedom. During Hegel's time, the human spirit was conceived of as growing towards freedom through speculative reflection on what it means to be a human agent in an ethical community. This could also serve to describe the course of teacher development.

Chapter 4

Hegel's New Covenant

The Value of Hegel for Educational Studies

I have entitled this chapter "Hegel's New Covenant" because Hegel's message for the early nineteenth-century modern world is strikingly similar to the apostle Paul's message for the first-century ancient world. Covenant has its root in a Latin word used to signify an agreement or convention (*Convenire*, which developed into an Old French word, *covenir*: "to come together"). The term covenant is used in the Old Testament to signify God's solemn and binding contract with the descendants of Abraham (Genesis 17:7). Paul interpreted a new covenant which was free of the legalistic tendencies which he saw in the tradition which had grown out of the contract made in Genesis (Hebrews 8:6). The "old covenant," according to Paul's interpretation, was not meeting the demands of first-century Christian practice and was due to vanish (Hebrews 8:13). The new covenant promised a new kind of freedom — a salvation — and this freedom was promised to all humanity in the spirit of Christ. Similarly, Hegel's new covenant involves breaking free from Kant's legalistic transcendentalism. Kant's theory of truth was bound up with principles which were inaccessible to human understanding; Hegel's theory of truth sees knowledge come into understanding through human interaction.

Hegel's philosophy influenced the late nineteenth-century dispute between German historians and economists, which gave rise to the sociology of Max Weber (Lichtheim 1967). His philosophy was the inspiration for Marx's concept of alienation and his notion of historical materialism (Blackledge and Hunt 1985). While he was critical of some of his teacher's work, Marx acknowledged that his discovery of Hegel was the most important intellectual step of his life (McLellan 1975). George Herbert Mead studied with the renowned Hegelian scholar, Josiah Royce, at Harvard between 1887 and 1888. He continued these studies between 1890 and 1891 with Wilhelm Dilthey at the University of Berlin. It was Dilthey who drew attention to Hegel's

early theological writings and connected them to his mature philosophy (Kaufmann 1960). Mead

integrated his Hegelian studies into his version of sociology (Guignon 1983).

Reck (1964) describes Royce's influence on Mead as follows:

> Mead's own social goal of a universal community which fulfills human needs and
> aspirations is, in one sense, a naturalization of Royce's "Blessed Community." For
> Mead brought down to earth Royce's "Blessed Community" — which, as unveiled
> in The Problem of Christianity (1913), is nothing less than the ideal Christian
> Church — and converted it into a secular democracy in which intelligence and
> industry tackle social problems. (p. lviii)

Hegel's philosophy was very influential during the post-American Civil War period, when

American philosophy was in its formative stages. The first professional philosophical journal in

the United States, *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, was founded by the Hegelian W.T.

Harris, who later became the commissioner of education for the United States (Bernstein 1986).

This was the most important philosophical journal in America between 1867 and 1893

(Goetzmann 1973, p. 8). It explored Hegelian themes; published papers by James, Pierce, and

Dewey; contained translated works of Kant, Schelling, and Fichte; and introduced Asian

philosophical texts to American readers. Among the many Hegelians who filled American

university positions during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was George Holmes

Howison. For twenty-five years, Howison was dean of the Department of Philosophy at the

University of California at Berkeley. In memory of him, Berkeley's philosophy library bears his

name.

Hegel was very interested in the United States. He saw it as the "land of the future,"

where, after Europe's inevitable decline, the next major stage of freedom and progress would

unfold (Goetzmann 1973). The American civilization was a supreme example of what Hegel

called "the concrete universal," where the next chapter in the drama of the world's history would

eventually reveal itself (Hegel 1900, pp. 85-87).

In the autobiographical *From Absolutism to Experimentalism*, Dewey summarizes Hegel's

influence on him:

> There were ... "subjective" reasons for the appeal that Hegel's thought made to me;
> it supplied a demand for unification that was doubtless an intense emotional

craving, and yet was a hunger that only an intellectualized subject matter could satisfy. It is more than difficult, it is impossible, to recover that early mood. But the sense of division and separations that were, I suppose, borne in upon me as a consequence of a heritage of New England culture, divisions by way of isolation of self from the world, of soul from body, of nature from God, brought a painful oppression — or, rather, they were an inward laceration. My earlier philosophic study had been an intellectual gymnastic. Hegel's synthesis of subject and object, matter and spirit, the divine and the human, was however no mere intellectual formula; it operated as an immense release, a liberation. (1930, p. 19)

Dewey's New England culture preached that "the world was not our home." It was founded upon a belief in the alienation of human being from the world, which he would later express as the alienation of experience from nature (Dewey, 1925). Hegel's philosophy offered the promise of freedom from dualisms (i.e., binary oppositions) because it was able to synthesize them. Dewey's words are complemented by Nisbet's (1980) conclusions about Hegel's influence.

It would be difficult to comprehend Dewey's lifelong opposition to all forms of dualism, his conception of freedom as realization by the individual of innate potentialities, with the central purpose of education and other institutions that of aiding in this realization, and, perhaps most important, his conception of all norms, laws, and values as being in a dynamic process of becoming, without understanding Dewey's early Hegelianism. (p. 303)

I have mentioned that Josiah Royce, one of Mead's professors, was influenced by Hegelianism. Unlike Dewey, James, or Pierce, Royce did not become a centerpiece of early American philosophy. And this is curious, since Royce held many views similar to those of Dewey, in particular the hope of the Great Community (see Dewey 1927). This spirit of community pervades the passages in which Royce advocates the virtues of loyalty and community along with a sustained and practical moral life (Royce 1916). Royce is more enthusiastic than Dewey, writing that we are "saved through community" and that individual fulfillment requires devotion to a communal cause (Royce 1916). Reck (1964) attributes Royce's obscurity to his inability to make his philosophy practically "useful" to the average American, whereas Dewey's pragmatism fused the breach between cultural currents (experience) and directive forces (nature) and thus succeeded in inspiring twentieth-century American civilization.

Hegel's importance in this inspiration is one of the greatest ironies, considering the early twentieth-century movement to conceal the American trail which led to his texts. I believe that this

concealment may be responsible for a contemporary situation in which teacher development, as a young field of study, has become orphaned. It lives without knowledge of its birthplace, of its cultural heritage, and of the origins of its language. If pressed to locate the birthplace of "teacher development," I would place it in early nineteenth-century Berlin at the newly established university. But why was Hegel suppressed in the United States of the early twentieth century?

The American pragmatist William James was contemptuous of Hegel's philosophy and did what he could to discredit his writings (Bernstein 1986). James' critiques might also help to explain the relegation of his Harvard colleague, Josiah Royce, to the intellectual backwater of early classical American philosophy. James also attacked an English colleague, the Hegelian F.C. Bradley. A series of lectures which James delivered at Oxford, entitled "The Present Situation in Philosophy" (later to be published as *A Pluralistic Universe* [1971]), was intended as a direct attack on what the behaviorist James interpreted as the "vicious intellectualism" of Hegel's philosophy. *A Pluralistic Universe* was so successful that, by the mid-twentieth century in North America, Hegel was no longer taken seriously as a significant philosopher. This dismissal was complemented by the rising analytic philosophies of Bertrand Russell (1912) and G.E. Moore (1903), whose writings were used to refute British Hegelianism. The attack was further reinforced by the growth of logical positivism. The ultimate condemnation was then issued by Karl J. Popper in *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (1963), in which he associates Hegelianism with totalitarian ideology (Bernstein 1986).[1] Thus there emerged an intellectual milieu in which positivism and pragmatism succeeded in dismissing Hegelianism. Bernstein, for example, remembers being scolded during the 1950s for wasting his time taking Hegel seriously.

Walter Kaufmann (1960, p. 13) argues that Hegel is immensely interesting and that he provides an alternative to the positivism of mainstream Anglo-American philosophy. Hegel may indeed be interesting, but that alone does not merit his return to the university classroom. The question to be pursued is, what educational void might be potentially filled by Hegelian studies?

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[1] Anyone with reservations about pursuing an interest in Hegel's philosophy for this reason should read Kaufmann's step by step refutation of Popper's thesis in *From Shakespeare to Existentialism* (1960, pp. 94-128).

The less-traveled road leading to Hegel passes through a century of Marxist sociology and its interest in emancipatory praxis. Without Hegel, Marxism would have lacked its historicism. In particular, Hegel's parable of the master and slave (found in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*) sets up the socio-psychological dynamic for Marx's theory of labor (Marx 1977). Hegel's foundational philosophy may provide students in Social and Cultural Studies in Education with a broader understanding of the roots of social analyses. Furthermore, he was the first philosopher of modernity whose main interest was the philosophical process of social change (Soloman 1989). With regard to theories of teacher development, Hegelian metaphorical concepts enter its texts via Dewey and Mead. These concepts are continuous growth, alienation, reconciliation, reflection, and community.

Hegel's rejection of philosophical positivism could provide a starting point for viewing educational practice as a product of speculative reflection. The subject/object split formed the basis for Cartesian consciousness, and this dualism manifests itself in contemporary discussions of the relative value of "theory" versus "practice," which is common in undergraduate faculties of education and in school staffrooms. A knowledge of how Hegel resolves this dualism would be valuable to such discussions.

In summary, a renewed interest in Hegel provides great promise for educational studies — a promise which could be realized through enriching the sociological perspective on education and through bringing historical and conceptual analyses to bear on teaching. In particular, I believe Hegel's philosophy has the potential to enlarge the historical and theoretical component of teacher development literature.

Hegel's Formative Education

Hegel's mature philosophy emerged out of the cultural milieu of his time, his early studies in theology, and the dominating presence of Kantian philosophy. Hegel was born on 27 August 1770, the same year as Beethoven and one year after Napoleon. His elementary school-education was shaped by such Jewish-German Enlightenment philosophers as Gotthold Lessing (1729-1781) and Moses Mendelsohn (1729-1786). Lessing was a playwright and religious scholar who

had little respect for the rational interpretations of the Enlightenment thinkers and who argued that the "heart" of human reality was founded upon the free expression of the sentiments. Lessing had established the German National Theater in order to compete with the French theater which dominated Germany during his time. The National Theater staged German works in the German language. Hegel inherited his critique of contemporary Judeo-Christianity from Mendelsohn, who insisted that the Hebraic laws could be pragmatically interpreted as expressions of essential human needs and feelings (Harris 1972, p. 284n.).

At the age of seventeen, Hegel entered the theological seminary at Tübingen. Random events led him to meet the future poet, Johann Hölderlin, and they quickly became close friends and college roommates. It was at the Tübingen seminary that Hegel read Rousseau's political and educational texts, which fueled contemporary discussions of the relative successes and failings of the French Revolution. As already mentioned, the attempt by the French revolutionaries to make a social order and cultural tradition accord with abstract notions was perceived as disastrous by the German states. They saw that this project had resulted in Robespierre's reign of terror. Their disgust was also due to what many Germans saw as the lack of any spiritual/cultural base to what seemed to be an exclusively political movement (Soloman 1989). By contrast, the primitive religiosity of the ancient Greek folk religions became the cultural ideal for Hegel and his student colleagues. It was this ideal of community, embellished by a Rousseauist vision of a return to the primal "garden," which inspired the development of Hegel's notion of the phenomenology of the human spirit. Hegel referred to his cultural ideal as "subjective," as it was to satisfy an emotional as well as an intellectual craving through bringing to light shared feelings and rituals in order to celebrate the community. His ideal is not unlike that put forward for Christianity. However, Hegel believed that there are two ways to be religious.

> Subjective religion is alive; objective religion is an abstraction ... the former is the living book of nature, plants, insects, birds and beasts, as they live with one another and upon one another, each living its life and getting its pleasure ... The latter is the cabinet of the naturalist wherein the insects have been killed, the plants dried, the animals stuffed or pickled, all organized for one single end where nature had interlaced an infinite variety of ends in a friendly bond. (Hegel quoted in Harris 1972, p. 484)

The friendly bonds of infinite and interlaced ends are tied together in an appropriate cultural context:

> Buried in every man [is] a seed of the finer feeling that springs from morality, [and] it has placed in him a sense for what is moral, for ends that go beyond the range of mere sense; to see that this seed of beauty is not choked, that a real receptivity for moral ideas and feelings actually grows out of it, this is the task of education — religion is not the first thing that can put down roots in the mind, it must have a cultivated plot there before it can flourish. (1972, p. 485)

A cultivated plot must be manicured and nurtured; it must be ordered in such a way that cultivating and harvesting are efficiently facilitated. By a "cultivated plot," Hegel is referring to a well-ordered culture and its educational institutions (which are intended to provide cultural solidarity). An individual's life has meaning in so far as she/he is a member of a well-ordered culture. In keeping with the ancient Greek ideal, the basis for morality is the cult(ure), or small community, and its shared experiences. Thus the task for Hegel was to compose an ideal philosophical system — a system in which cultivated human virtues could be developed.

According to Hegel, there had to be a social dimension to secular philosophies — a dimension through which feelings, rather than cold doctrines, could give individuals a sense of community (Hegel 1972, p. 483). By "objective" religion, Hegel meant the religion that was observed in the Germany of his time. Reason had become *doxa*, detached from the living culture of the people; and it mostly served those who designed and imposed it. In order to solve this problem, Hegel did not call for replacing the current system with an allegedly superior one; rather, he called for valorizing those existing institutions which made the human being feel at home in the world and expanding their influence and importance. The influence of Lessing and Schiller may be seen here.

Hegel shunned Kant's pietism, preferring a morality dependent on relevant history rather than one dependent on abstraction. Some of Hegel's earliest tendencies stem from certain aspects of Rousseau, but the communal element of his work stems from the sorrows and celebrations of cultic religiosity which were part of the romantic fervor of his university days. What Hegel added to this, through Schiller, was his definition of "natural": harmonious togetherness. In other

words, for Hegel, human life gets its meaning and direction from social interaction rather than from immutable transcendental principles.

After leaving college, Hegel increasingly distanced himself from institutionalized religion, largely because of his perception that it was too legalistic and authoritarian. It was this authoritarian tendency which Hegel came to criticize as "positive" (Hegel 1948). Hegel included Judaism along with Christianity as a positive religion (Soloman 1989, p. 129), and his position was consistent with that of many Jewish scholars of his time. Hegel was not attacking nineteenth-century Christianity and Judaism individually, nor was he presenting them as competing options; he disagreed with the entire Judeo-Christian tradition, which had come to emphasize what he felt were abstract rules and doctrines instead of the practical ethics of the earliest Christian community. This nostalgic admiration for the early apostolic church was pivotal to Hegel's interpretation of community ethics (Harris 1972, pp. 276 ff.) There are, then, three elements leading to Hegel's mature philosophy: (1) the intellectual tone of his time; (2) the nostalgic image of ancient, cultic religiosity; and (3) his reaction to Kant's legalistic transcendentalism.

In Kant's system, human beings looked up towards suprasensible concepts which were perfect and unknowable; humans could know only the sensible world of phenomena. Fichte's secular humanism freed the human subject to speculate, neither on the noumenal nor the divine, but on human being in the world. It was as if Descartes' "pure light of reason" had illuminated the world as such. The lamp was now held, however, by the self-deifying subject which sought to redeem itself by reflecting on both subjectivity and objectivity as natural (as part of the world) and moral (as part of human activity). That reflection resulted in the image of the spirit of humanity. The spirit of humanity could only be "whole" (i.e., free) when it was in complete union with the world and meaningful human activity.

Hegel's text relies on many poetic metaphors (e.g., the struggle, bondage, freedom, voice). Primarily, these metaphors represent a movement from alienation to reconciliation and from particularity to universality. Foremost among them is *Bildung*. Bildung may be translated as "development"; that is, as taking form or as evolving towards maturity. It may also be translated

as the process of giving determinate social and cultural shape to biological needs. This orientation forms the basis for one of Dewey's definitions of education-as-growth (Dewey 1916, Chapter 4). Hegel saw human being as alienated from the world of human activity. A "whole person" was one who was well-"built" or "enculturated" within a healthy culture. This ideal requires the metaphor of a secular human spirit, a generic term for healthy communal activity in which human being is able to engage in meaningful ethical activities with others. These activities lead towards a liberating unity with the world. In the following section, I elaborate on how Hegel affected the philosophy of the modern era and, by extension, the literature on teacher development.

The Phenomenology of the Human Spirit[2]

Beginning around the middle of the eighteenth century, "mind" (as opposed to the "divine") became the ontological foundation for explaining human practices. Here, I describe how this foundation was undermined and destabilized. For, not unlike its theological predecessor, the metaphysics of mind (i.e., Déscartes' thing that thinks) broke down when it could not meet changing social practices in nineteenth-century German culture. In the case of the previous century's Cartesian revolution, it was not that mind was "better" than God, it was that, given the rising moral authority of scientifically inspired research, theology was no longer able adequately to account for social phenomena. The contemporary acceptance of the existence of consciousness is the vestige of a historical period in which social practices rendered Aristotelian cosmology

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[2] This chapter is a compilation of material drawn from various sources. I began my research of Hegel's philosophy by reading Habermas (1992) and the introductory chapter by Weiss (1974). Habermas was an especially good introduction to Hegelian themes in the context of the overall philosophical tradition. Weiss referred to Hegel's writings as a philosophy of education (a dialectical *paideia*) and this led me to search for more comprehensive studies approaching Hegel's *Phenomenology* as a sort of curriculum theory of life. The best of these is by Soloman (1989), whose excellent work forms the background for much of this chapter. His research was especially useful for my thesis, since Soloman highlights the importance of Hegel's early theological writings. My reading of A.V. Miller's translation of Hegel's *Phenomenology* (1977) was supplemented by Inwood (1992), whose dictionary of Hegelian terms includes a good introductory chapter explaining the idiosyncrasies of philosophical German. Quotations from *The Philosophy of Right* (1952) are from the translation by T.M. Knox. The section on community ethics benefits from the complementary study by Hardimon (1994). My interpretation of Pauline theology is influenced by Meeks (1972). My general knowledge of the contents of Paul's letters, however, comes from notes accumulated during an undergraduate course in systematic theology given by Dr. Peter Fast, now professor emeritus at Canadian Mennonite Bible College, an affiliate of the University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Canada.

inadequate to the task of explaining human experience. Ontologies make sense only so long as they can adequately address cultural practices.

The narrative of consciousness enjoyed its finest hour during the speculative age of Hegelian philosophy. In early modern Germany, philosophers, poets, and musicians wrote with an ear to social and political changes. The Cartesian notion of consciousness was maturing and coming to its grand finale. Hegel writes prophetically of this completion:

> It is not difficult to see that ours is a birth-time and a period of transition to a new era. Spirit has broken with the world it has hitherto inhabited and imagined, and is of a mind to submerge it in the past, and in the labor of its own transformation. Spirit is indeed never at rest but always engaged in moving forward. But just as the first breath drawn by a child after its long, quiet nourishment breaks the gradualness of merely quantitative growth — there is a qualitative leap, and the child is born — so likewise the Spirit in its formation matures slowly and quietly into its new shape, dissolving bit by bit the structure of its previous world, whose tottering state is only hinted at by isolated symptoms. The frivolity and boredom which unsettle an established order, the vague foreboding of something unknown, these are the heralds of approaching change. The gradual crumbling that left unaltered the face of the whole is cut short by a sunburst which, in one flash, illuminates the features of the new world. (1977; hereafter, *PG*)

The "Spirit" to which Hegel refers is the spirit of humanity, which is now breaking from Kant and entering into the worldly affairs of humanity. The German word for "Spirit" is *Geist*, which is related etymologically to "ghost." It once meant "emotion or excitement," but by the nineteenth century it had also developed into the word for "soul" or "mind." The English word stems from the Latin *spiritus*, which became the French *esprit*, as in *esprit de corps* (community spirit). It was not an important item of vocabulary for Kant, who saw spirit as a convivial animating principle similar to *esprit de corps* (as in the word *Gemütlichkeit*; see Kant 1959, §49). In Hegel's text, *Geist* is meant to include all human experience. The Spirit of humanity *is* subjectivity, and human being can become aware of this Spirit through a critical awareness of self (i.e., of consciousness).

Hegel's childbirth metaphor invokes the image of the nocturnal announcement of Christ's birth to the shepherds in Luke 2:11. Hegel proclaims that a new understanding of Being is now coming into place in the world. This new understanding is part of a long historical movement which is ongoing and which, Hegel believes, will someday come to its fulfillment. There are

signs, says Hegel, that the new era is dawning, and that the stablished order will be dissolved and all will be revealed, as in the flash of a sunburst.

Since Déscartes, most ontic questions had been posed within the framework of mathematics and physics. Inquiry into consciousness presupposed both mathematically ordered patterns of deduction and a mechanistic universe. Understanding was to conform to legalistic principles of knowledge which existed independently of mundane human concerns. Human beings were seen as receptors of a pre-established conceptual order which was complete in itself and against which practical knowledge was interpreted. The birth of Hegel's new era is marked by the destabilization of this conception of Being.

Hegel continues to use birth and building metaphors to explain that the dawn of the nineteenth century is only the beginning of modernity.

> But this new world is no more a complete actuality than is a new-born child; it is essential to bear this in mind. It comes on the scene for the first time in its immediacy or its Concept. Just as little as a building is finished when its foundation has been laid, so little is the achieved Concept of the whole itself. When we wish to see an oak with its massive trunk and spreading branches and foliage, we are not content to be shown an acorn instead. So too, Science, the crown of a world of Spirit, is not complete in its beginnings. The onset of the new spirit is the product of a widespread upheaval in various forms of culture, the prize at the end of a complicated, tortuous path and of just as variegated and strenuous effort. It is the whole which, having traversed its content in time and space, has returned to itself, and is the resultant simple Concept of the whole. But the actuality of this simple whole is consistent in those various shapes and forms which have become its moments, and which will now develop and take shape afresh, this time in their new element, in their newly acquired meaning. While the initial appearance of the new world is, to begin with, only the whole veiled in its simplicity, or the general foundation of the whole, the wealth of previous existence is still present to consciousness in memory. (*PG* §12)

In German, the word for concept is *Begriff*. *Begriff* is related to the German *begreifen*, "to grasp with the hands," and this meaning may be seen in Hegel's use of the word. For Kant, concepts (*Begriff*) were rules for interpreting experience. Hegel uses *Begriff* in two different ways: (1) a concept is a particular aspect of a complete organic whole (a larger concept) and (2) it is the whole in its totality (used synonymously with "the truth" or "the Absolute"). For clarity, when I refer to a Hegelian concept as particular aspect of the whole, I will use the lower case

(concept), and when I refer to concept as "truth," I will use the upper case (Concept). "Science" or scholarship (*Wissenschaft*) in Hegel's text is to be taken as Fichte understood it: a cohesive body of knowledge which grasps the workings of experience through its involvement with the world. *Geisteswissenschaften* (the science of consciousness) will then be understood to be the working knowledge of human Spirit in the world as it evolves towards a realization of the Concept. Indeed, Hegel's original title of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* was a *Science of the Experience of Consciousness* (Soloman 1989).

The new era is arriving on the scene, according to Hegel, not in its completed actuality but only as a new concept of what the world is becoming. In some sense, it can begin only as a dream, as was the case with Rousseau's transcendental humanism. The science of scholarship, as the act of acquiring knowledge of these changes and their implications, is the practice which retrospectively documents the developmental path of the Concept. It articulates the "whole" only when concepts have consolidated themselves for our understanding. According to Hegel, only then is the whole comprehensible.

Previous understandings of Being are completing themselves, and the new understanding is now becoming faintly accessible.

> Spirit has now got beyond the substantial life it formerly led in the element of thought, that it is beyond the immediacy of faith, beyond the satisfaction and security of the certainty that consciousness then had, of its reconciliation with the essential being, and of that being's universal presence both within and without. It has not only gone beyond all this into the other extreme of an insubstantial reflection of itself into itself, but beyond that too. Spirit has not only lost its essential life; it is also conscious of this loss, and of the finitude that is its own content. (*PG* § 7)

Hegel expresses the progress of Spirit by referring to previous understandings of human being as "empty husks" (*PG* § 7). Hegel's concept of spirit is distinctly modern. Spirit is all of us, the "world-soul," rather than some transcendental perfection. Spirit is secular, historical, and realizes itself through worldly events. Lumping theology and epistemology into one category, Hegel tells us of the "empty husk" the culture of modernity is now forsaking.

> Formerly [we] had a heaven adorned with a vast wealth of thoughts and imagery. The meaning of all that is, hung on the thread of light by which it was linked to that

heaven. Instead of dwelling in this world's presence, men looked beyond it, following this thread to an other-worldly presence, so to speak. The eye of the Spirit had to be forcibly turned and held fast to the things of the world; and it has taken a long time before the lucidity which only heavenly things used to have could penetrate the dullness and confusion in which the sense of worldly things was enveloped, and so make attention to the here and now as such, attention to what has been called "experience," an interesting and valid enterprise. Now we seem to need just the opposite: sense is so fast rooted in earthly things that it requires just as much force to raise it. The Spirit shows itself as so impoverished that, like a wanderer in the desert craving for a mere mouthful of water, it seems to crave for its refreshment only the bare feeling of the divine in general. (*PG* § 8)

Hegel argues that Kantian moralism is "heavenly" and that it forces human beings to be obedient to transcendental laws which have little bearing on their actual lives. Hegel proclaims a new era in which the law is irrelevant and consciousness is to be guided by the Spirit of humanity. Here, there are clear similarities between Hegel and Paul. In Paul's second letter to *Corinthians*, chapters 3 and 4, he writes that the members of the church have become ministers of a "new covenant," not in written code, but "in the Spirit"; for the written code kills, but the Spirit gives life. Using the metaphor of light, which is consistent with the Greek philosophical tradition, Paul continues that the laws (referring to the Ten Commandments) were carved in stone with splendor but that the dispensation of Spirit is attended with even greater splendour. He then states "the hope" of the new era. The Lord is the Spirit, and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom. With "unveiled faces" believers are being transformed through eye-to-eye relationships with Spirit. In his letter to *Hebrews*, Chapter 9, Paul speaks of two distinct covenants (the original Greek may be translated either as "covenant" or as "will" [as in "will and testament"]). The first covenant is fading away, meaning that it is increasingly unable to meet the demands of first-century Roman society. Specifically, it needs, in an ecumenical sense, to include Hebrews as well as Greeks and Romans (Romans 2:7-13). The second or new covenant cannot be ratified, however, as long as the old covenant remains alive. The copies of "heavenly things" in the old covenant have to be purified (Hebrews 9:23) by the appearance of the Spirit at the end of the age (9:26; Paul is referring to the appearance of Jesus). The Spirit of the new covenant abolishes the first order and establishes a new one (9:10). The former law was "but a shadow of the good

things to come instead of the true form of these realities" (10:1), a phrase suspiciously reminiscent of Plato's cave. In 2 Corinthians 4:6, Paul adds that a light will shine out of the darkness onto our hearts, and this light will provide knowledge of the glory of God. Hegel adopts Pauline rhetoric in order to present his hope in a new age of modernity where freedom will be realized in the Spirit of humanity.

In Hegel's text (i.e., *PG* § 8), the eye of the Spirit has now to be forcibly held to the things of the world because, to this point, the brightness of transcendentalism has hypnotically held the human gaze. Hegel proclaims the death of such archaic forms of human spirit as those expressed by Déscartes, Rousseau, and Kant. He attacks the division of experience as a spatial alienation of subject and object and argues that experience and truth may be unified into one activity. The world, as it is for us, is the Absolute reality of existence.

Hegel seeks to replace the notion that consciousness is an instrument used to conceptually grasp the things of the world. His goal is to topple the inside/outside structure of human essence. If this spatial metaphor is not replaced, he argues, we will spend all of our time perfecting ever-more correct methodologies which supposedly "cross over" to a realm of knowledge. He attacks the Cartesian rules for directing the mind and Kant's notion of transcendental understanding, for both are efforts at establishing a correspondence between thought and things (the inside and the outside). He rejects Déscartes' "thinking thing"; he rejects Rousseau's transcendental humanism; and he rejects Kant's transcendental consciousness. But he does acknowledge the presence of a force in the world of human experience, and this force he calls Spirit. And this force is no individual being, either divine or mortal: it is the neutral but universal Spirit of humanity coming to its full development in history. Hegel's main concern was to bring Kant's transcendentalism "down to the earth" through a dialectic notion of organic development. I think of Hegel as taking Kant's suprasensible world of perfect noumena and turning it over so that it spills down onto earth as phenomena. In this "inverted world" (*die Verkehrte Welt*, § 157-65) human being now fixes its gaze on the earth; it sees the availability and feels the malleability of all conceptual forms. Hegel shows us that (à la Plato) the shadows which we have been seeing are, in fact, concepts

created out of our own experience. There never is and there never was any reality outside those shadows. Plato's world of forms and shadows, like Kant's world of noumena and phenomena, are now seen as products of the human Spirit. As does Kant, Hegel emphasizes a relationship between particulars and universals. For Kant, however, this involved a relationship between the phenomenal world and transcendental absolutes; for Hegel, universal Concepts are not separable from the particulars of experience in the actual world.

Hegel discovers the explanation of phenomenal change in the interface between oppositional forces below the surface of human events. Experience itself should be thought of as an event, not as a thing, since the phenomena of experience are themselves events. The purpose of these events is not divine, however; it is what will be realized in the fullness of the evolution in human affairs. In humanist terms, the force of human consciousness comes to an increasing awareness of itself as a succession of adaptive transformations.

According to Soloman, Hegel presents us with a coherence theory of knowledge, in which "the truth" of consciousness comes into agreement with itself through its development. This means that knowledge is not attained only when the search reaches its conclusion, as in deductive logic; rather, knowledge includes the events of the search. Hegel explains:

> The goal is as necessarily fixed for knowledge as the serial progression; it is the point where knowledge no longer needs to go beyond itself, where knowledge finds itself, where Concept corresponds to object and object to Concept. Hence the progress toward this goal is unhalting, and short of it no satisfaction is to be found at any of the situations on the way. (*PG* § 80)

This is what gives Hegel's phenomenology its orientation to *praxis*. Valuable knowledge exists for the sake of the world, and it is literally pointless to search for knowledge which corresponds to some external truth. The coherence of this search for knowledge is revealed by addressing the practical problems of the world, and self-satisfying knowledge is attained through the resolution of these problems. The events of experience are therefore what consciousness makes of them in its involvement with the world.

Hegel goes on to argue that truth is not stable, that truth (as the object of knowledge in-itself) and the procedures used to judge it are both contingent.

> As knowledge changes, so too does the object, for it essentially belongs to this knowledge. Hence it comes to pass for consciousness [*bewusstsein*] that what it previously took to be the in-itself is not an in-itself, or that it was only an in-itself for consciousness. Since consciousness thus finds that it does not correspond to the object, the object itself does not stand the test; in other words, the criterion for tests is altered when that for which it was to have been the criterion fails to pass the test; and the testing is not only a testing of what we know, but also a testing of the criterion of what knowing is. Inasmuch as the new true object issues from it, this dialectical movement which consciousness exercises on itself and which affects both its knowledge and its object, is precisely what is called experience. (*PG* § 85-86)[3]

A dialectic movement occurs as a process of development through apparently opposed or contradictory stages. Hegel's notion of experience, therefore, involves a temporality which Kant's does not. For Kant, the phenomena of experience are tested against principles which are unchanging and beyond the interventions of phenomenal time; for Hegel, there can be no such thing as ahistorical time, and all events are involved in an ongoing evolutionary history.

Hegel's unification of subject and object rests on interpreting experience as pure change (*PG* § 23). In Chapter 1, I wrote that a subject can be assumed to be a neutral entity and that the human predicament in a given culture becomes whatever is attached to it. In Chapter 3, I noted that Habermas maintains that the concept of modern subjectivity is structured by reflective thinking. Presented in Cartesian terms, in the phrase "I am a professor," "I am" and "a professor"

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[3] Hegel's definition of experience (*Erfahrung*) includes its objects and their conceptualization. It involves the process of reflection as the essential cognitive structuring of experience. It is the notion of a process rather than momentary consciousness of some thing. The genealogy of the word *Erfahrung* has some determinate effect on how experience is conceptualized in Hegel's German. The Indo-European root of *experience* is *per*, which can be translated as "to try," "to test," "to risk," connotations which persist in the modern English word "perilous." *Per* shows up in Latin in *experimentum*, which is translated as "experiment." Secondary meanings of *per* have referred explicitly to motion: "to cross space," "to reach a goal," or "to go out. Experience may take on the characteristics of an ordeal, as a passage through a frame of action that gauges the true dimensions and nature of the person who passes through it (Leed, 1992, p. 5). Notions of risk or danger are present in the Gothic cognates for *per*, in which the letter *p* mutated to an *f* for the German word *fern* (far away) and the English words *fare* (as in, "how did you fare on your exam?"), *fear* (inspired by the risks of crossing metaphorical space to reach a goal), and *ferry* (to cross over a boundary). These meanings continued into Hegel's modern German. *Erfahrung*, literally translated as "experience," is connected to the modern German word for travel (*fahren*), with Old German roots in the word *irfaran* (to wander). This also has connections to the modern word *bewandert*, which the Germans use to describe the virtues of being "astute," "skilled," or "clever." The literal meaning of *bewandert*, however, is "well-travelled." Experience, it follows, is a developmental travelling of conceptual reflection which is continuously taking place between subject and object, unifying them and changing them both.

have a reflective relationship whereby the activities of professing are brought to presence as thought. In other words, human subjectivity is structurally separated from the projected concepts of the world, but it needs those concepts in order to identify itself (as the Cartesian mind needs a body in order to identify itself). Hegel disputes the separation of mind from matter, the independence and neutrality of the subject, and reality as thought (of).

Hegel uses the biblical statement "God is love" (1 John 4:8) to explain his position. The statement has inadequacies, he writes, for the absolute truth of God, as being "love," assumes that He is an independent subject. The subject is assumed to be a fixed point to which predicates are affixed by a reflective movement belonging to the knower of God. "God" itself is a meaningless neutrality — a mere name — and it is only the predicate of love which says what God is. The predicate gives "God" its meaningful content (i.e., the activity of loving). The beginning of the sentence is thus an "empty husk," and we need to wait until its conclusion to learn what God "is." Hegel wonders why it is that we do not just speak of "love" without using meaningless terms such as "God." And he answers his own question. What is posited in the statement "God is love" is not a being (i.e., something that merely is) but, rather, some activity that is reflected into itself so that the reflection is the "Subject." God, as the subject of the statement, should be understood as a reflective relationship between the concept of its self and its activity, thus producing its Self as reflection. It is only through this reflective movement that the content of love can be represented as being what God is. The subject, therefore, is not a fixed point but an activity which is incessantly on the way to becoming. Hence, he concludes, "Absolute" knowledge (as God, as the truth of Being as thinking, as a transcendental principle) is a transitory Concept, where concepts themselves are in transition. Dewey refers to this reflective process as "transaction" (Dewey and Bentley 1949, pp. 67-69); Mead preferred the term "reflexiveness." Mead describes how individual selfhood depends on the subject's ability to be an object to itself. In his theory of language, Mead wrote that the subject and object are unified by our ability to talk to ourselves (1912, p. 105) in a "reflexive conversation" (1913, p. 377). His phraseology resurfaces in the late twentieth century in the work of Schön (1983). I return to Mead and Schön in Chapter 5.

To grasp Hegel's radical philosophy, it is crucial to remember that he is not writing in light of the regional sciences of mathematics or physics; he is writing in light of the regional science of biology (Darwin's *Origin of Species* was published eighty-two years after the *Phenomenology*). An organic conception of Being allowed him to conduct philosophical inquiry with an historicist understanding of existence which was unavailable to either Déscartes or Kant. Hegel's concern is with living a meaningful human life, not with abstract truths. The movement of consciousness, therefore, cannot be ordered according to logical stages (à la Déscartes); rather, it is transformative in the biological sense of reacting with, and adapting to, the environment. Hegel's dialectical movement is the working out of an evolutionary adaptation towards more sophisticated forms of development, ultimately culminating in total unity with the world.

Dewey's version of Hegel's organicism shows up in *Art as Experience* (1934):

> Life itself consists of phases in which the organism falls out of step with the march of surrounding things and then recovers unison with it — either through effort or by some happy chance. And, in a growing life, the recovery is never mere return to a prior state, for it is enriched by the state of disparity and resistance through which it has successfully passed. If the gap between organism and environment is too wide, the creature dies. If its activity is not enhanced by temporary alienation, it merely subsists. Life grows when a temporary falling out is a transition to a more extensive balance of the energies of the organism with those of the condition under which it lives. (pp. 14-18)

Dewey further states, in *Experience and Nature* (1925, p. 312), that the apex of human consciousness is the point of *re*-direction, *re*-adaptation, and *re*-organization (italics in original). Reflective self-movement is one of the founding principles of pragmatism. Mead (1936) traced the emergence of philosophical pragmatism to behaviorist psychology and scientific methodology. The behaviorist foundation, he writes, originated in Darwin's theory of biological evolution. In his words, the methodology of pragmatism is "only the evolutionary process grown self-conscious" (1936, p. 364).

Dewey's writings (see especially 1916; 1938) are thick with evolutionary metaphors for learning: "development," "formation," "integration," "unification," "assimilation," "adjustment," "continuity," and "progression" — all of which convey the forward movement of mind through

the resolution of problems. Growth implies potentiality, the ability to develop from immaturity to adulthood. And students' "pliable elasticity" enables them to interact with their environment, to modify behavior, and "to acquire new habits through the continuous reconstruction of experience" (Diggins 1994, p. 309). These themes, albeit expressed through Mead's and Dewey's naturalistic metaphysics (see Boisvert 1988), are distinctly Hegelian. So as early as 1807, "development" is being philosophically explained as environmental adaptation.

Environmental adaptation consists of a continuous striving towards the unity of environment and organism. As an adaptive striving, knowledge cannot be "absolute" in the sense of being unconditional; it must be part of a dynamic system. Our thinking is not only mathematical, it is also random and contradictory; everything is part of a constant striving to adapt to new conditions. The dialectic of this evolutionary movement could be understood as the process of gaining organic maturity in harmony with the natural environment. There cannot be absolute standards with regard to how to know something about the world, since development is a constant unfolding. Indeed, Hegel regarded the dialectic as an organic process which, through the continuous creation and resolution of contradiction, would lead ultimately to the unity of humankind and the world (i.e., to Spirit).

Hegel took this organic process seriously, and this has led to serious confusion over how to interpret his *Phenomenology*. What initially began as a critique of Kant's philosophy turned out eventually to be a gigantic treatise on a science of consciousness (Soloman 1989). His textual journey can be categorized into several events: (1) "consciousness" (the first three chapters of the book, which include the topics of sense-certainty, perception, force, and understanding); (2) "a self-conscious awareness of the self" (which includes Chapter 4, the truth of self-certainty); and (3) "reasoned critical awareness of being, as self-conscious unity with the world" (Chapter 5, the certainty of truth and reason). In other words: (1) attention first becomes fixed on the object, which provides either pleasure or displeasure; (2) consciousness "catches itself" being self-consciously aware of the fact that it is devoting attention to the object which pleases or displeases it; and (3) consciousness becomes aware of itself as consciousness. In (3), consciousness reflects

on the context and on the particular object of its attention, which is now more than a mere object; it is the self-conscious object as it relates to consciousness. In the final stage, (1), (2), and (3) are all present in unison — they have merged into a single Concept. This movement is similar to a sunrise. The various stages of the sunrise are indiscernible as colors alter and mix. Suddenly, a gleaming light announces the rise of the sun, but all of the individual events of the sunrise are still present in that sunburst.

To appreciate what Hegel understands as experience, therefore, we must account for how conceptual stages are united into a single event. Self-consciousness includes all three "levels" of knowing: (1) knowing, (2) self-knowing, and (3) reflective reason. There is really a trio of "voices" of consciousness: (1) conscious awareness of a form; (2) self-conscious articulation of that form *and* its content; and (3) reason, which rationally reflects concepts and self-conscious goals. The way self-consciousness sees its self-concept and the world-concept combine into an adaptive comprehension.[4]

> Hegel uses an ecological example to illustrate the conceptual coherence of his system:

> The bud disappears in the bursting-forth of the blossom, and one might say that the former is refuted by the latter; similarly, when the fruit disappears, the blossom is shown up in its turn as a false manifestation of the plant, and the fruit now emerges as the truth of it instead. These forms are not just distinguished from one another, they also supplant one another as mutually incompatible. Yet at the same time their fluid nature makes them moments of an organic unity in which they not only do not conflict, but in which each is as necessary as the other; and this mutual necessity alone constitutes the life of the whole. (*PG* § 2)

The truth of an object is what it is for consciousness and what experience makes of it. It is less a question of consciousness adjusting itself to the environment than it is of the environment being adjusted to consciousness (Findlay 1958). Conceptual contradictions will not, therefore, emerge through comparing practice to some abstract standard; they will emerge when the concept

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[4] There are different interpretations of these three voices. Mead (1938) characterized them as perception, manipulation, consummation. Perception stimulates an organism; manipulation is a mediating activity which brings the organism in contact with the object; and consummation completes the act. Schön (1983) characterized as naming the object(ive situation); framing the terms of the situation conceptually; and reframing it in new terms so that a problematic situation can be brought into a new coherence.

is no longer adequate to its practical surroundings. The phenomenal world consists of the ever-changing evolution of subject and object, which eventually become indistinguishable from one another. The path to knowledge, therefore, is found by throwing our selves into the phenomenal world of experience and learning about truth by searching for it.

By forcing attention on the world, Hegel was the first philosopher to proclaim the death of the transcendental Absolute and to present a philosophical system which celebrated the world-Spirit of humanity. Hegel announced the death of God eighty years before Nietzsche's Zarathustra reminded us of it (see *PG* § 752). It was announced in the context of Hegel's discussion of the "unhappy consciousness"; that is, the grief which comes with (1) the realization of God's passing and (2) no knowledge of how to retrieve a notion of spirit through involvement with others in the world. As I have mentioned, Hegel was very critical of the authoritarian nature of Judeo-Christianity. Dewey identified with Hegel's dislike of authority and recognized the potential of Hegelianism for providing a philosophical path out of the Judeo-Christian tradition (Dewey 1930). Hegel was not completely opposed to the presence of organized religion. He saw Christian practices as an acceptable part of a well-ordered society, but he argued against the existence of any divine, transcendental power which directed human affairs. I think Hegel would have welcomed a sociology of religion. Soloman (1989, pp. 484-85), for example, distinguishes between Kant's and Hegel's respective interpretations of ethics by referring to how each would have viewed the Ten Commandments. Kant would have seen the commandments as a list of unquestioned categorical imperatives; Hegel would have looked at the whole history of the Israelites, their political fortunes, and social needs (in particular, he would have suggested that the paternal social structure of the Jews required them to project an external male authority called "God," who supposedly dictated a list of laws from Mount Sinai). In Hegel's interpretation, God would be no more than what was collectively recognized by the spiritual community of Israel.

The concern of philosophy, therefore, should be less with attaining a dependable epistemology than with attaining an account of the biological creatures who are making their ways in the world. Such an account does not require a transcendental realm but a search for some

concept of "life" itself. Dewey's definition of a human being as a biological creature suggests that this is precisely what philosophy should be doing.

> That the physiological organism with its structures, whether in man or in the lower animals, is concerned with making adaptations and uses of material in the interest of maintenance of the life-processes, cannot be denied. The brain and nervous system are primarily organs of action-undergoing; biologically, it can be asserted without contravention that primary experience is of a corresponding type. Hence, unless there is breach of historic and natural continuity, cognitive experience must originate within that of a non-cognitive sort. And unless we start from knowing as a factor in action and undergoing we are inevitably committed to the intrusion of an extra-natural if not supernatural agency and principle (Dewey, 1925, p. 23).

When empirically pursued, the study of philosophy should not be a study of philosophy per se but a study, by means of philosophy, of life's experiences (p. 37). Similarly, Hegel's interest is in the dynamics of change and what it means to live in the world. Kantian questions about autonomous knowledge become questions about how knowledge functions to satisfy human "desire" (*begierde*) (*PG* §167, § 174). Desire, for Hegel, means "striving." This definition stems from the influence of Fichte (Soloman 1989), an influence which Hegel, in turn, transferred to Dewey's theory of experience (1925; 1938).

The force behind self-consciousness is the need to reconcile conceptual dualisms into new but contingent positions which are open to further mutation. Hegel calls this the elimination of "the otherness of the other" (*PG* § 167). This is not a question of a stable subject (an "I am") which instrumentally mediates the concept of a thing so that it can be known; the stability of subjectivity evaporates into the activity of reflective unification (recall what Hegel says about the phrase/notion "God is love") through meaningful human dealings in the world. These dealings include interactions with other people. As Hegel explains:

> The nature of this relationship is thoroughly speculative; and when it is supposed that the speculative is something remote and inconceivable, one has only to consider the content of this relationship to convince oneself of the baselessness of this opinion. The speculative, or the rational and true, consists in the unity of the Concept or subjectivity, and objectivity. This unity is manifestly present in the standpoint in question. It forms the substance of ethical life [*Sittlichkeit*], namely, of the family, of sexual love, ... of patriotism, this willing of the general aims and interests of the State, of love towards God, of bravery too, when this is risking of one's life in a universal cause, and lastly, of honor. (Hegel 1971, vol. 3, p. 177)

The inherent desiring force behind the formation of self-consciousness is the need for a critical self-awareness of one's own presence in the world. It is the demand that otherness be made a part of one's self-concept in the sense of one's being genuinely a part of every thing one meets. The constant quest is for the unity of self with all other concepts at any given moment in time. This implies that the basic craving of human being can never be satisfied, for there is no limit in the phenomenal world to what can be conceptualized and integrated into the self.

In Hegelian terms, self-consciousness is most thoroughly developed when it is integrated with other human beings; just as whomever we meet becomes a part of us, so we become a part of her/him. Ultimately, Hegel concludes, self-consciousness can find its satisfaction only in another consciousness; that is, in other people. This drive is modeled on evolution, and thus initiates interactions which are perceived to be part of a life and death struggle for survival.

The Life-and-Death Struggle of Self-Consciousness

The epistemologies of Déscartes, Rousseau, and Kant required the existence of a source of ultimate power towards which a thinking thing might advance and with which it might unite in order to achieve its purpose for being. In Hegel's philosophy, a unique form of power is attained when consciousness reaches a reflective relationship with its own self through its interaction with the world and with other human beings. This power is what Hegel calls self-conscious freedom.

The question is, where should one look for such an organic concept of freedom? As influenced by Fichte, Hegel responds that human beings should look at the formation of self-consciousness through their interpersonal moral conflicts as they struggle for self-recognition (*Anerkennung*). Hegel's classic explanation of this takes the form of a parable describing the opposing forces of domination and submission (*Herrschaft und Knechtschaft*) (*PG*, § 172-96). The lesson of this parable is: freedom, as unified self-consciousness, emerges from the confrontation between, and mutual recognition of, two self-consciousnesses. Without interpersonal interaction and the mutual demand for interpersonal knowledge, there can be no self-consciousness (Soloman 1989). This is virtually the same position taken in the sociology of G.H.

Mead (1910) and Emile Durkheim (1927) almost a century later. Hegel's parable is also intended as a refutation of Rousseau's and Kant's vision of consciousness as something inherent to the individual and therefore devoid of social involvement. By refuting this, Hegel moves philosophy away from an emphasis on epistemology and towards an emphasis on social ontology — an emphasis which is retained, for example, in the work of Lieberman and Hargreaves (see Chapter 5).

Let us now take a close look at Hegel's parable. Hegel portrays a "master" (*ein Herr*) and a "slave" (*ein Knecht*). He chooses two very different social conditions in order to emphasize that the struggle for identity occurs in all codependent relationships. The parable is divided into two sections, each of which puts a different emphasis on the same theme. The first section deals with the struggle for mutual recognition with regard to the attainment of self-consciousness (*PG* § 178-189); the second section deals with the intrinsic value of the creative manipulation of objects with regard to the attainment of self-consciousness (*PG* § 190-96).

In the first half of the parable, Hegel attacks all remnants of the notion that we possess an individual identity independent of interaction with others (*PG* § 179). The master and the slave enter a level of self-awareness when they begin to mutually absorb each other's respective self-consciousness. Both attempt to appropriate the other's presence by conceptually negating the other's consciousness and taking control of it (§ 180). The field of play is equal during this process, for the negation takes place simultaneously for both individuals. On the ontic level of social interaction, the master may rule the servant, but on the ontological level (the conceptual level) there is equality. In encountering "the other," we all demand that this mutual struggle be waged (§ 182). The anxiety which drives this struggle is the continuous desire to see one's own presence reflected in the eyes of another self-consciousness. Each, at first, desires the total negation of the other, and each must risk his or her own self-identity in this struggle. Although death is symbolic in the master-slave parable, the possibility of an actual fight to the death is always present. This, however, would be literally self-defeating, for it would cut off the possibility of self-awareness through seeing one's own presence in the eyes of the other. This

attempted elimination of "the other" was the mistake made by the French revolutionaries. Humanity requires the dominance and submission dynamic in order to inspire the struggle for self-awareness, and the extermination of either the metaphoric master or the metaphoric servant would mean the termination of the evolutionary process of consciousness.

In the second half of the parable Hegel argues for the importance of work with regard to attaining self-consciousness. This section inspired Marx to theorize an image of humanity as *homo faber* (man the producer). The leveling of material inequities between two individuals is not what concerns Hegel; it is labor itself which concerns him. His interest is in creatively manipulating objects in order to enable consciousness to become aware of, and involved with, physical nature (i.e., the environment) as a forum for gaining self-realization. Hegel does recognize that there is a gulf between how the master and the servant may respectively self-actualize. The master enjoys the things fashioned by the servant, but he remains estranged from those things because he is not involved in the processes of their creation. Because he merely reaps his pleasure from the servant's labors, he is deprived of the consciousness-shaping potential of work. Servants, on the other hand, are unable to attain self-consciousness through the use of the completed objects of their labor because they are fashioned for the enjoyment of the master. They are thereby deprived of their products' consciousness-shaping potential as finished works of art. Karl Marx later referred to this deprivation as "alienated labor." (1977, p. 77). Of the two, however, Hegel believes that servants enjoy a more genuine self-consciousness than do masters because the former can overcome the otherness of the material things which they fashion. Servants make things by putting their selves into the objects which they fashion, and through this involvement with the otherness of material things, they discover their selves. In other words, servants become aware of their identities through the process of bringing material things into presence.

Three factors contribute to the servant's independence from the master: (1) the certainty of biological death; (2) the intrinsic value of work; and (3) the majesty of service for its own sake. The fear of losing one's own life and the realization that death is something that all human beings

share gives the servant a sense of freedom. There is a creative relationship between human beings and the making of handcrafted objects, and this gives the servant mastery over some areas of his/her life. Finally, Hegel believed that there is an inherent value in service (Soloman 1989), as it builds character. Through service, the servant establishes an independent identity, for the master is dependent on the servant for her/his lifestyle (*PG* §191-93).

The freedom which concerns Hegel is attained on a conceptual level. Master and servant find themselves dependent on each other for setting and maintaining their respective self-concepts. For either to imagine him or herself to be wholly independent of the other, or of others in general, is considered by Hegel to be an impossibility. So why, he wonders, do people continue to search for such vapid independence? He accounts for this through what he refers to as the "unhappy consciousness."

Generally, an unhappy consciousness is one which conceptualizes itself as torn between two dissimilar realms of existence (à la Rousseau and Kant). In the case of Rousseau, the social world was derelict and the realm of ultimate value was an inherent human essence; in the case of Kant, the truth was located in transcendental ideas, and the phenomenal world could not achieve them. In both Rousseau and Kant, life is a solitary struggle to form a self-concept in isolation from the world. According to Hegel, the solution to this alienation (*Entfremdung*; literally, "estrangement") of self from others is, quite simply, purposeful activity. Self-wholeness is attained by making our selves a part of the world, its relationships, and its activities. Given this, it is not surprising that, for Hegel, "ethics" means community ethics (membership has its advantages).

The Spirit of Community

The all-important word which Hegel uses to locate the source of community ethics is *Sittlichkeit*. Sittlichkeit, like many German nouns, is difficult to render accurately in English. It can be translated as "community life," but the most useful translation with regard to understanding Hegel is "community spirit" — a definition which is similar to what Bellah et al. (1985) refer to as

"moral ecology."[5] Sittlichkeit is that familiar sense of belonging which comes from one's involvement in the collection of community practices (implicit as well as explicit), rituals, rules, and roles which defines one's identity (Soloman 1989, p. 494). It includes everything which binds a community together, including ideas about good and bad behavior, sexual mores, ways of conducting business, religious practices, and so on.

To be "reasonable" within a community context is to have a purpose for life which is synchronous with the purpose of the community. Practical reason defines community spirit as purposeful activity; thus, reason as such may be interpreted to mean purposive action (*die Vernunft das zweckmassige Thun ist. PG* § 22). Kant obeys transcendental principles which are utterly separate from the fleeting concerns of the community; Hegel embraces the fleeting concerns of the community and recognizes them as the source of ethics. In moral terms, the contingency of community concerns is a strength, for it enables the community to adapt to whatever is required with regard to the ethical deliberations of its participants.

In "Philosophical Basis of Ethics" (1908), Mead also rules out an order of ethics which exist outside the phenomenal world of social interaction. He connects his ethical theory to biological evolution, whereby individuals adjust to each other and to the environment in order to find an equilibrium (another version of the life-and-death struggle of consciousness). So-called natural rights derive from shifting social circumstances. Ethics are social constructs and consist of claims made by individuals on one another with respect to certain objects and actions (i.e., in the struggle of dominance and submission). In his discussion of the "Great Community" and the "Great Society" (1927), Dewey takes the value of community interaction just as seriously as does

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[5] Bellah et al. define moral ecology as "the web of moral understandings and commitments that tie people together in a community" (p. 335). Their book, *Habits of the Heart*, does not cite Hegel as a main source, but it is remarkably Hegelian in the way in which it frames the moral problems of American society and their possible solutions. For example, the authors lament the loss of social coherence in American culture (p. 283) and use "ecology" as a metaphor for social context (p. 284); they employ the term "culture of separation" (p. 281), a synonym for alienation; they call for a personal "transformation of consciousness and individual action" (p. 288) and the need to give priority to the intrinsic value of work rather than to the extrinsic motivations of private aggrandizement (p. 289); they prioritize membership and "getting involved" (Chapter 7); and they advocate social science as a public philosophy (p. 297), a notion traceable to Fichte but also fundamental to Hegel. It seems to me that their rhetoric clearly descends from the social philosophy of Dewey and Mead, who were both influenced by Hegel.

Mead. Dewey invokes Rousseau's natural instincts (old Adam), which must be enlightened through education:

> To learn to be human is to develop through the give-and-take of communication and effective sense of being an individually distinctive member of a community; one who understands and appreciates its beliefs, desires and methods and who contributes to a further conversion of organic powers into human resources and values. But this transaction is never finished. The old Adam, the unregenerate element of human nature, persists. It shows itself wherever the method obtains of attaining results by use of force instead of by the method of communication and enlightenment. It manifests itself more subtly, pervasively and effectually when knowledge and the instrumentalities of skill which are the produce of communal life are employed in the service of wants and impulses which have not themselves been modified by reference to a shared interest. (pp. 154-55)

Again, Hegel cites various escape mechanisms which people use to flee from meaningful give-and-take interaction within the community. The first is the utilitarian pursuit of pleasure (hedonism) (*PG* § 360-66). This search is insatiable and can result in nothing short of the "dead actuality" of an addiction (*PG* § 363). The second is "personal virtue" or the inner goodness of personal pietism (*PG* § 381-92). In criticizing pietism, Hegel is taking aim at Rousseau's disengagement with the social sphere as a viable source of ethics. But his main target is, yet again, Kant's transcendentalism. Self-righteousness does not work as a route towards self-consciousness, for it attempts to sidestep the ways of the world in favor of transcendental standards. It is voluntary alienation from the world. The authentic life-and-death struggle of self-consciousness is replaced by a quarrel between the world and personal standards which have nothing to do with it. The third escape mechanism has to do with an early modern social condition which Hegel satirically calls the "spiritual animal kingdom" (*PG*, § 397-418). The menagerie of this spiritual "zoo" are members of the rising bourgeoisie. Here, Hegel sees an affected individualism which denies the necessity of genuine communal interaction. Rousseau, of course, harbored the same disdain for the bourgeoisie, with the result that he disengaged from it in both actual and philosophical terms. Hegel, however, only criticizes a specific social phenomenon in bourgeois culture: the notion that individualism exists as some original state prior to social interaction or as some aloof condition which denies the primacy of the general moral struggle.

The image of the bourgeois zoo comes from Schiller, who observed the onset of social fragmentation due to urbanization and industrialization (Soloman 1989). A person's identity became increasingly rooted in explicit expressions of work-related achievements and the accumulation of financial and material resources. In Hegel's analysis, such markers of individual integrity were fragile in that they were not conducive to the development of self-consciousness through eye-to-eye interaction and were, therefore, not able to adequately adapt to changing social conditions. The development of a confident self-concept was supplanted by an arrogant self-autonomy, where community became a mere resource for attaining upward social mobility. This created a dangerous confusion between identity as self-consciousness and identity as self-worth. Should one recognize the person or merely the status of the person's work and material accumulations? Before long, people might confuse who one is, as an integrant and source of identity, with how one is connected within the economic sphere of society. The primary value of the struggle for self-consciousness might thereby become demoted to a competition over comparative status associated with financial achievement. In such a social environment, individuals would not strive for the freedom of self-consciousness but would be seduced by hedonism. With his warning about bourgeois values, Hegel was alluding again to a Kantian moral framework wherein "good intentions" were what mattered in one's social dealings (Kant 1959, pp. 399-402). In Kant, a responsible person is devoted to transcendental laws, and good behavior can be measured by whether or not one acts out of good will (as in faith alone) rather than out of the daily moral struggle. In other words, the adherence to transcendental maxims provides one with autonomy from civil society, thereby encouraging an ethical duplicity which may result in a self-righteous utilitarianism.

According to Hegel, the ways of the world are rational (Hegel 1952, Preface, ¶ 14; *Philosophy of Right*, hereafter *PR*), for the actual world is the only liberating paradise that can exist. He therefore recommends that we endorse the status quo because it is rational. Mainstream social institutions should be fortified as the ideal settings in which to reconcile our selves to the rational world and make it our home. Hegel's status quo becomes the world. Hegel saw the

nuclear family as the cornerstone of a well-ordered structure (Soloman 1989; Hardimon 1994); for him, the domestic arrangement of father, mother, and children was the ideal setting for the unification of mutually attracted opposites.

The nuclear family was the model of ethical community and a perfect example of *Sittlichkeit* in practice. Contrary to Rousseau, for Hegel marriage was far more than a mere social contract; it was a nexus for the achievement of self-consciousness in exactly the sense outlined by his master-servant parable. Marriage was an immediate type of ethical relationship. Furthermore, sexual intercourse in marriage was far more than a mere physical act; it was a spiritual union — the manifestation of self-conscious love (*PR* § 161).

Hegel was, in fact, describing the bourgeois ideal of marriage and family (Soloman 1989) — an ideal which was also to become very popular during the mid-twentieth century. Hegel's dream for the modern family was a product of the alienation of urban life — a situation wherein extended families were being de-emphasized and where the self-reliant, economic unit of the household was producing and sustaining a productive industrial workforce. (The ancient Greek for "economy," *oikos*, may be translated as "family.") Hegel's interest in family life arose from his psycho-social agenda for community solidarity. The family home was to be the living classroom in which children and adults ideally learned how self-consciousness was attained through dominance and submission.

With his idealization of the family, Hegel departs from the solitary apartments of Déscartes and Kant, travels past the rural cottage of Rousseau's Emile, and arrives at the early modern suburban family home. There, the thinking thing which became the self-made husband and inspired genius discovers himself to be the father of a family. He is no longer morally autonomous from his surrounding community. He has aged, and, as he raises his family, he begins to gain an anxious sense of his mortality. Since death is a certainty, the humanists must fashion the home and the community into a paradise, for it is only there that the Absolute Concept of freedom will be discovered. The main goal of this fashioning is the total "reconciliation" of all divisions (Hardimon 1994; *PR* § 360). The most useful philosophical question is no longer "How

do I know something?"; it is now the more pragmatic, "What is it like to live when something is known?" Knowledge is dependent on the practical concerns of family and community life, and universal principles emerge from practice rather than from some transcendental domain.

Hegel's motto remains "from particularity to universality." Universality is found in social roles such as "fathering." The individual should identify his/her self-concept with a social role and actualize his/her individuality through the social membership which that role provides. Through membership in a universally accepted role, the individual may grasp the Concept of her/his place in society, thus making the modern social world her/his "home."

Alienation from the world was also a constant problem for American pragmatic philosophers. Charles M. Cooley (1927; 1964), a noted professor of sociology at the University of Michigan and an important influence on G.H. Mead (Diggins 1994), explicitly attempted to use social science to translate Christian values into secular ethics (Noble 1958). Mead, the son of a New England clergyman, was distressed over the loss of moral authority in the face of the growing biological and physical sciences. His search for an equivalent to religion in the discipline of sociology eventually resulted in his influential work on the integration of mind, self-concept, and society (Diggins 1994, p. 367). Mead criticized some of Cooley's dogmatic views but generally endorsed his scholarship (Diggins 1994). The adage "the world is not our home" enters Dewey's naturalistic philosophy in his depiction of the environment as "uncertain, unpredictable, uncontrollable, and hazardous" (Dewey, 1925, p. 42). Fear, for Dewey, was a function of the environment; the world was a fearful and awful place (1925, p. 42) precisely because it was unpredictable and uncontrollable. For Cooley, Mead, and Dewey, the solution to the predicament of alienation was to gain a controlling relationship to the world through forming meaningful ethical communities and through the expansion and application of the scientific method. Faced with the absence of a transcendental home, these strategies would enable human being to "come home" to the world. This sort of metaphorical homecoming was the goal of Dewey's political philosophy (Dewey 1927, 1928, 1935) and of his curricula for a democratic education (Dewey 1916, 1938).

Hegel believed that a child's development in school recapitulated the cultural development of the world in which it lived.

> We find that what in former ages engaged the attention of men and mature mind, has been reduced to the level of facts, exercise and even games for children; and, in the child's progress through school, we shall recognize the history of the cultural development of the world traced, as it were, in a silhouette.... In this respect formative education, regarded from the side of the individual, consists in the acquiring of what thus lies at hand, devouring his inorganic nature and taking possession of it for himself. But, regarded from the side of universal Spirit as a substance, this is nothing but its own acquisition of self-consciousness, the bringing-about of its own becoming and reflection into itself. (*PG* § 28)

Similarly, Egan (1979) divides the ideal social studies curriculum into stages of education-as-recapitulation of cultural history. Mead's ideas on education were more concerned with the necessities of membership. He theorized that selfhood depended on membership and the adoption of universal roles. He saw great value in playing organized games which permitted children to assume the roles of adults. It was through the game that the child learned to act according to rules and to self-govern its actions with consideration for the whole.

> The child must not only take the role of the other, as he does in the play, but he must assume the various roles of all participants in the game, and govern his action accordingly. If he plays first base, it is as the one to whom the ball will be thrown from the field or from the catcher. Their organized reactions to him he has embedded in his own playing of the different positions, and this organized reaction becomes what I have called the "generalized other" that accompanies and controls his conduct. And it is this generalized other in his experience which provides him with a self. (1924/25, p. 269)

To return to Hegel's conception of the modern family, it was not "traditional" in the sense of the family being an extended kinship network which produced commercial goods; it was, in fact, very 1950s North American. It was to be nuclear, having a father and mother and distinct sexual divisions of labor; it was to be patriarchal; the man was to be considered the head of the home, the woman was to be its heart and soul; and the woman was to be in charge of child-rearing and to remain in the private sphere, while the man was to be involved in the public sphere of civil and state-related activities. Hegel's counterpart to Rousseau's morally autonomous individual closely resembles the early American ideal of the independent (male) citizen who lives in a community in which the demands of work, family, and neighborliness intersected (e.g., the

"town father"). Dewey (1927) depicts this ideal as follows: "A good citizen finds his conduct as a member of a political group enriching and enriched by his participation in family life, industry, scientific and artistic associations" (p. 148).

Bellah et al. (1985) describe this archetype more fully:

> The husband enters the public world while the wife specializes in being a "homemaker." Within the family, the husband provides authority, the wife emotional support. The role played within the community by the town father is modeled on this kind of moral and emotional division of labor. The town father serves his community not so much by openly showing affection for it — that would be considered unduly "sentimental" — but by furthering its economic well-being and providing authoritative leadership. His wife assists by joining clubs that with the help of funds raised by the town fathers' "service clubs" deliver personal charitable help to the "truly needy" — usually children and old people — of the community. (p. 170)

This division of sexual roles was considered rational. As Hegel writes:

> Thus, one sex [the male] is mind in its self-diremption into explicit personal self-subsistence and the knowledge and volition of free universality, i.e. the self-consciousness of conceptual thought and the volition of the objective final end. The other sex [the female] is mind maintaining itself in unity as knowledge and volition of the substantive, but knowledge and volition in the form of concrete individuality and feeling. In relation to externality the former is powerful and active, the latter passive and subjective. It follows that man has his actual substantive life in the state, in learning, and so forth, as well as in labor and struggle with the external world and with himself so that it is only out of his diremption that he fights his way to self-subsistent unity with himself. In the family he has a tranquil intuition of this unity, and there he lives a subjective ethical life on the plane of feeling. Woman, on the other hand, has her substantive destiny in the family, and to be imbued with family piety is her ethical frame of mind. (*PR* § 166)

Hegel's ideal family further foreshadows the 1950s in that it is to be an urban center of social stability and, as such, a unit of consumption rather than a unit of production. Prior to mass industrialization, the traditionally rural extended family was the center of a commercial cottage-industry. The modern family was to enjoy the purchase and use of commodities which were increasingly being produced in the civil sphere of society. The presence of the civil sphere, as a forum for self-actualization, did not yet exist in Rousseau's time. And Hegel's insistence that the civil sphere was essential to the functioning of society was clearly ahead of his time (Hardimon 1994). Civil society (*die bürgerliche Gesellschaft*) is a distinctly modern concept, and it emerged as the result of a rapidly increasing bourgeois culture in the rising industrial cities of Europe

during the nineteenth century. Prior to Hegel, civil society was a term which was used interchangeably with "political society," as in Rousseau's social contract (Hardimon 1994). The civil level of society was increasingly becoming an important source of identity for the rising middle and laboring classes. Hegel's definition of *bürgerliche Gesellschaft* included such social communities as trade unions (as successors to the dwindling medieval guilds), house-churches, and even charitable social movements and neighborhood clubs (Hardimon 1994). Bellah et al. (1985, p. 169) define civil society as any "self-reliant congregation created and maintained by voluntary cooperation of self-reliant individuals living in self-reliant families."

Hegel employs the term "corporation" (*die Korporationen*) to identify the social phenomenon in which individuals were linked together by common commitment (like second families). Trachtenberg (1982) uses an appropriate bodily metaphor in defining "corporation":

> The word [corporation] refers to any association of individuals bound together in a *corpus,* a body sharing a common purpose in a common name. In the past, that purpose had usually been communal or religious; boroughs, guilds, monasteries and bishoprics were the earliest European manifestations of the corporate form. It was assumed, as it is still in nonprofit corporations, that the incorporated body earned its character by serving the public good. (pp. 5-6)

In his *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel defines the term as follows:

> As the family was the first, so the Corporation is the second ethical root of the state, the one planted by civil society. The former contains the moments of subjective particularity and objective universality in a substantial unity. But these moments are sundered in civil society. To begin with, on the one side there is the particularity of need and satisfaction, reflected into itself, and on the other side the universality of abstract rights. In the Corporation these moments are united in an inward fashion, so that in this union particular welfare is present as a right and is actualized. (§ 255)

The corporation educates and promotes the professional development of its members through co-option and training (*PR* § 252). As with the family, the particularities of members' needs are transformed into ethical norms and values with regard to the care of the occupational community (*PR* § 170). The professional community offers the collaborative qualities of collegiality and occupational solidarity through the objective recognition of skills, abilities, and achievements (*PR* § 253). It provides a sense of identity through internalizing the values of the

community, whose members come to regard its common interests as their own. Beyond the family, communities develop sentiments of connection and loyalty through joint professional pursuits so that members begin to act not just for their own sake but for the sake of the community. This involves explicitly conceiving of oneself as "someone who joins in." It is a matter of seeing membership in a universal body as central to one's self-concept. Indeed, in German, the word for "member" is *Mitglied. Mit* means "with," and *glied* means "the limb of a body" or "the link of a chain."

Summary and Conclusion

In the preface to this dissertation, I suggested that teacher development could be seen as a journey towards liberation from the bondage of alienation. On this journey, metaphors of "home" provide the promise of an ultimate place of rest (salvation) in exchange for moral struggles. In Hegel, homecoming is conceptualized as the reconciliation of the subject and object into a unified Spirit. With Hegel's Spirit, the mythology of human consciousness makes a radical shift: Consciousness is no longer a thinking thing; it is a striving towards unity with the phenomenal world. In other words, consciousness is no longer attained through an attempt to be guided by transcendental principles; it is achieved through human beings' mutual recognition of each other's respective self-consciousness.

Chapter 5

What, In Text, Is Teacher Development?

Introduction

One goal of this dissertation was to uncover the theoretical assumptions behind the literature on teacher development. I began searching for the most urgent modern human predicament. This led me to the philosophy of Charles Taylor, who identified three symptoms of modern malcontent: (1) anomic individualism, (2) apathy towards community, and (3) absence of freedom. These conditions were symptomatic of a moral crisis in the culture of modernity, which is perceived collectively as the state of human alienation from a meaningful environment. Taylor, in the face of the increasing recession of an omnipresent moral authority, called for a complex, many-leveled struggle in an attempt to return the culture of modernity to its original ideals. I turned to "secular scriptures" to find those ideals and to analyze their relationship to teacher development. I discovered that they used religious metaphors, and these became the key to interpreting teacher development.

By transferring ontological primacy from God to mind, and by separating mind from matter, Déscartes initiated a predicament for human development. Without an omnipotent God, the writers of the modern philosophical tradition were left to search for another source of power which could provide moral authority for human purposes. With the absence of God, moreover, the chain of moral command became disrupted. The philosophical articulation of "development" required an ethereal presence not unlike the one which had united Christian believers with the divine Spirit. For Rousseau, human being consisted of the potential to be improved and perfected, and his fictional pedagogy became the foundation for the modern dream of educational development. Rousseau established a coherence between human being and the world, and he suggested how the world could be manipulated in such a way as to develop an ideal human being. Being human meant having a moral will, and this will could be generalized; the resulting general will could unite human essence with practical purpose through bringing personal development and

politics into harmony in order to reconcile the moral and social realms. Where redemption was once thought of as a human soul's reconciliation with a divine power, in Rousseau it became the joining of a human being with its inner moral essence.

One of Rousseau's most important contributions to the narrative of consciousness was his emphasis on how the context of human development should be rationally ordered. He placed a great deal of importance on the administration of education as a way of structuring present activities with an eye to future expectations. Kant's system transformed Rousseau's general will into a transcendental moral will, which functions as a sort of judiciary which looms over human beings who interact in the shadow of its universal principles. These principles ultimately determine what is true as well as what is good. Hegel sought to bring this Kantian authority down to earth and place it within the moral interactions of interpersonal activity.

In many ways the dream of teacher development is a dream of reconciliation, recapitulating the themes of the modern philosophical tradition from which it is derived. Yet discussion about teacher development is difficult without an awareness of the legacy of transcendental aspirations which underpin it. The recognition of metaphor in teacher development literature assumes a dichotomy between implicit and explicit knowledge. Such a position is consistent with the modern philosophical tradition, which assumes the separation of the human spirit from the world.

Metaphorical language articulates hope for the resolution of the modern human predicament. It shows that the mythology of teacher development rests on the premise of some ultimate homecoming which will be the reward for the moral struggle of living a human life. In Chapter 3, my discussion of teacher development showed how certain themes were consistent with those of Déscartes and Rousseau. Teachers were conceptualized as alienated from their environment. That environment was to be transformed into a caring place where they could develop their cognitive, moral, and emotional capacities in order to become whole beings. Such a liberation was not to be static, however, but was to entail continuous improvement as teachers continued to adapt to a changing environment. In order for such a notion of teacher development to be conceptually possible, a revolution had to take place with regard to how one viewed the

environment; that is, the environment had to be seen as a place conducive to aiding development in the human world. Up to and including Rousseau, the conceptualization of such an environment was only partially articulated because, like Kant, Rousseau held to a transcendental pretense which did not allow mundane humanity ultimate moral authority. Nonetheless, both Rousseau's pedagogy and his theories on teacher development include care for one's environment, the importance of self-empowerment as a strategy of adaptation, and a preference for practical knowledge over theoretical knowledge.

Moral crisis is a constant in the story of modernity. It is as though humanity has never recovered from the 300-year-old suspected non-existence of God. A sensible humanist power needed to be developed so that education could be seen as providing a rational technology for gaining a kind of redemption. This redemption would consist of the reconciliation of human being and the world, and it would address the moral crisis of modernity. It was Hegel, in reaction to Kant's transcendentalism, who provided the mature philosophical context for the idea of teacher development. Moral crisis was to be overcome by ensuring that humanity was in harmony with the modern, disenchanted world.

At the conclusion of Chapter 3, I indicated that Hegel's human spirit grows towards freedom through speculative reflection on what it means to be a human agent in an ethical community. In this chapter, I show how this statement summarizes the phenomenology of teacher development. Throughout Chapter 4, I indicated how this phenomenology is theological in both its metaphorics and in its structure. The phenomenology of teacher development derives largely from the Acts of the Apostles and Pauline theology, which sought to consolidate an emerging Mediterranean Christian community during the first century AD. The inspirational message of the early Christian minority in the Roman Empire may have struck a sympathetic cultural chord in early nineteenth-century Germany, which had to face the expanding French Empire. The social and economic conditions of Germany required a philosophy of life which was flexible and which would provide cultural renewal without violent revolution. Such a cultural renewal is also the agenda of the field of teacher development (Neufeld and Grimmett 1994). Significant elements in

Rousseau, Fichte, and Schiller combined in Hegel to produce a comprehensive system which included theological metaphors. The deep and pervasive assumption of redemptive reconciliation through the unity of spirit with the world continued into Dewey and Mead and, from there, entered the theoretical discourse of teacher development.

White (1973) has indicated how an existing rhetorical tradition can supply a preconceived story-line when philosophers think, talk, and write about development. History may be viewed as a formal system in which an account of life may be given in any of several modes: (1) the epic, (2) the satire, (3) the tragedy, and (4) the comedy (White 1973). According to White, neither the epic nor the satire served Hegel's purpose because the former did not presuppose substantial change and the latter did not offer a substantial base upon which to measure change (White 1973, p. 93). Hegel characterized development as a panorama of suffering leading towards the ultimate realization of a superior but temporary principle. He deemed desire to be the immediate cause of all historical events (White 1973, p. 107). The spectacle of development, when viewed by an individual who actually succeeds in changing her/his form of life, is seen as a tragic drama (p. 110). Development, according to Hegel, was construed as a teleological and dialectic transition from stability through confusion to a new-found (but temporary) stability. Such a narrative structure finds its way into how teachers characterize the development of their own careers. The most vivid example of this narrative structure is found in the trajectories mapped out in the comprehensive study by Huberman (1993). White summarizes as follows:

> Significant transitions in history ... display the kind of gain which we often intuit to be present, even if we cannot specify its content, at the end of a tragic play or a philosophical dialogue carried out in the dialectical mode. In it, when something dies, something else is born; but that which is born is not merely the same thing in its essence as that which has died, as it is in plant and animal life. It is something new in which the earlier form of life — the action of the play, the argument of the dialogue — is contained within the later form of life as its material or content, which is to say it is turned from an end in itself into a means for the attainment of a higher end only dimly apprehended in the afterglow of the resolution. (p. 113)

White's observation is significant, especially considering the religious tone of Hegel's phenomenology. Something passes and something else is born, something which is new but which also contains part of what it once was. White's quote could apply to Hegel's organic

metaphor of the acorn evolving into the oak tree (*PG* § 12) or of the truth as bud, blossom, and, finally, fruit (*PG* § 2). I would further suggest that a fundamental template for Hegel's theory of development was the biblical account of Jesus' life, death, and resurrection. The story of Jesus is an excellent example of organic regenerative adaptation. Jesus is crucified but resurrects as something new which yet contains the message of its previous form. However, his resurrection and ascension is not the afterglow; the afterglow is the spirit of his message, which remains as an adaptive force in the world whenever two or three of his followers are gathered in his name (Matthew 18:20). The spirit is infinitely more adaptive than is the physical body, and this adaptive potential applies to Hegel's concept of spirit just as much as it does to the Christian concept of spirit. I would argue that the Christian notion of spirit is one of the fundamental inspirations for those texts which present the ideal political arrangements for teacher development.

Hegel's spirit was a force in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century American philosophical discourse. Goetzmann (1973) argues that it would be difficult to find any movement of American culture in the late nineteenth century that was not influenced by German philosophical thought. Its greatest impact was on the administration of education, the professionalization of philosophy and social sciences at the university level, and the establishment of the kindergarten movement. The kindergarten is an excellent example of a North American institution which was inspired by German idealism. The evolution of the kindergarten movement (translated literally as "child-garden") was due to Hegel's contemporary, Friedrich Froebel (1782-1852). Froebel was the son of a German pastor. As a young man, he apprenticed as a forester and gained a deep appreciation for trees — an appreciation which he later applied to children's educational development (Guteck 1987). In his *Education of Man* (1887), Froebel attempted to combine German idealism, mysticism, Christianity, Romanticism, and the natural sciences into a systematic philosophy of education. He outlined a theory of educational growth very similar to the pattern established by Hegel's dialectic. He leaned heavily on a concept of interconnectedness, in which all beings are related in a vast, ethereally organic unity. Education should not be overly prescriptive but should permit the child to attain self-consciousness through activity. Like Mead,

Froebel believed that children's games enabled them to imitate adult activities and, thereby, to develop a sense of community (Guteck 1987, pp. 227-28). He believed in the concept of the world-soul and held that students recapitulate the spiritual and cultural history of the human race (Guteck 1987). Kindergarten classrooms were introduced in the United States by refugees fleeing the abortive German revolution in 1848, and they were initially organized in Watertown, Wisconsin (Guteck 1987). Elizabeth Peabody (1893), one of Froebel's enthusiastic followers, established the first English-language kindergarten in Boston in 1868. Seven years later, William T. Harris, a Hegelian scholar and superintendent of schools in St. Louis, established kindergarten as a basic part of the school curriculum. By 1900, the year in which John Dewey composed *The School and Society*, the "child-garden" was an accepted institution in many American educational systems.

Researchers and writers in the field of teacher development retain many of the themes of German idealistic philosophy, including the tragic mode of conceptualizing the teacher's metamorphosis from a state of impotence to one of empowerment. Teacher development is a story about how one may be freed from alienation through reflection and communal dialogue and through an acceptance of the emotional and moral implications which follow. It is a tragic drama which promises, for those who succeed in the struggle, a happy and rewarding dénouement. It is a story of redemption and of atonement vis-à-vis the resolution between a teacher's spirit and her/his work environment. As I shall show in this chapter, all of the following concepts are present in the literature on teacher development: (1) development as an organic process; (2) empowerment as adaptation through continuous mutation; (3) the authority of the social over the transcendental; (4) the value of practical knowledge; (5) desire as the motivator of development; (6) reason as purposeful activity; (7) community as a favored context for self-conscious development; (8) reflective reason; (9) the valorization of the status quo; (10) the concept of care as nurturance of context; (11) *Bildung*, Spirit, and *Sittlichkeit*; (12) the moral model of the well-ordered home and the marriage bond; (13) teachers as moral guardians; and (14) the pervasive movement from particularity to universality. These are coherent themes in the politics and ethics of

modernity, and they enter the literature on teacher development through Dewey and Mead. A summary of how Dewey conceptualized educational development and connected it to the political administration of education will show how this thinking contains all of the aforementioned concepts.

According to Dewey (1925), generation and regeneration was what life was all about. He rejected what he saw as "external" authority in favor of authority embedded in the social context (1930) (a distinctly Hegelian idea). His work was an attempt to make philosophy relevant to the daily life of the ordinary person. He suggested that a fundamentally intimate relationship exists between education and actual experience, and he argued in favor of a curriculum whose guidelines reflected the relevant day-to-day experiences of the learner (1916). Clearly, Dewey's philosophy of education emphasized the needs and desires of those being educated. The importance placed on these needs and desires required a theory of how people interacted with their environment (1925; 1933). Education was growth towards what Dewey called "intelligence of purpose" (1938), and reason was expressed as purposeful activity. Bad educational experiences were those which impeded or deflected the formation of a systematic pattern which enabled needs and desires to be regulated within an organized social network. The heart of intellectual organization and of the disciplined mind is the ability to reflect; that is, to look back over what has been done in order to deal intelligently with further experiences (1933). Educators should view teaching and learning as a continuous process of reconstruction; the present should be viewed as a mobile force which influences the nature of future experiences.

Hegel chose his contemporary social world as a rational model and valorized the status quo as the ideal setting for the formation of self-consciousness. When Dewey referred to attitudes and habits which displayed maturity of intelligence, he was referring to a moral philosophy exemplified in the ideals of American social democracy (Diggins 1994). For Dewey, democracy was synonymous with community, and the sovereignty of the community was ensured by social interaction and civic participation (Dewey 1929). With this as his guiding focus, Dewey discriminated between positive and negative educational experiences. Experiences were intended

to form a "continuity" (1938). For Dewey, continuity was both an educational and a political concept. The process of education was structured in such a way that experiences were distinguished on the basis of whether they would contribute positively or negatively to a continuous thematic coherence guided by normative principles with behavioral outcomes (1938). Means (experiences) were thereby united with ends (democratic ideals) to produce educated persons who had attitudes and habits which relied upon the social democratic system. I see a connection here with Rousseau's unity of learner and context (Chapter 2) as well as with Hegel's view of education as developing/growing (*Bildung*) with the norms and values of society.

The mere quality of "growth" was a necessary but insufficient criterion for an educational experience. Dewey was concerned with growth as a continuum which pointed towards ideals of social democracy and the needs of an expanding industrial infrastructure in the early twentieth-century United States. This continuum earned the status of "educational development," and it was one part of a self-supporting system of experiences organized in such a way that its means and ends engendered and maintained the survival of the host democratic society. Dewey's educational philosophy combined the sustainability of the host-system with the sustenance of the constituent participants (who depended on the system for their material survival and normative orientation). His organic system was thus self-contained, self-sustaining, and, given the availability of sufficient material resources, could continue indefinitely. He likened it to a well-ordered home and rightly realized that his educational system would be far more difficult to implement when was the traditional preindustrial system of education (1938). Dewey, like Hegel, also referred to the institution of marriage as an example of how "union" with others brings new levels of awareness and responsibility (Diggins 1994, p. 300).

The role of teachers is thus extremely important in Dewey's system of education. Educators are the custodians of habits, attitudes, and experiences. They influence the environment, which is, of course, an organic connection with the needs, desires, and impulses of the learners. In order to do this effectively, educators should be in a symbiotic relationship with the host-system (i.e., sympathetic to the politics which legitimizes and sustains it). As Dewey

counsels, educators must be aware of the external learning environment as well as of what is going on in the minds of the learners (1938). They must also think reflectively; that is, they must have a subtle understanding of the connection between means and ends and of how selected educational experiences are congruent with the ideals towards which the continuum is moving (1938). Educators must organize the learning environment so that its experiences mirror, in microcosm, the ends intended for their students. Teachers must, therefore, be agents of the system of which they are a part.

The educator thus embodies the principles of continuity and monitors the experiences, needs, and desires of the learners. It was Dewey's hope that students and educators would share an identical understanding of the continuity of the educational system. This would make the classroom an ideal learning setting, since both educators and students would be united in will, motivation, and commitment. It is tremendously difficult to reduce the ideals and principles of a political system into seemingly unrelated particulars so that, in combination, experiences unite into compatible attitudes and habits. Such a feat requires a pervasive but hidden focus on what it means to be a responsible and participating contributor to the "common good" of the community. The educator's task is greatly facilitated if it does not include initially having to socialize students into a voluntary acceptance of the principles upholding the status quo. The value of the pre-school environment as a preparatory setting for maintaining continuity is therefore highly significant, as is shown by the birth and proliferation of the kindergarten movement.

For Dewey, the purpose of education is to ensure that the learning experience is part of a democratic interpretation of social governance. The integrated (i.e., educated) individual, upon leaving the education system, would need to be supported by experiences which would maintain the continuity established by her/his preparatory education. Offerring a way for the individual to think about her/his life as part of a coherent continuum (i.e., the integration of past memories, present situations, and future plans) was one of the goals of Dewey's philosophy of education. The value of an experience is established by the degree to which one's desires (the old Adam) and one's environment are united within a rational pattern of events. Echoing Hegel, self-governance

is determined by the limitations imposed by the encircling community rather than by an appeal to transcendental imperatives.

Finally, like Hegel's, Dewey's system functions on the assumption that particularity should be part of universality. He cautions that he is not romantic enough to claim that all students will be willing to accede to the conformity which his system demands; some will not be willing to contribute to the general principle of community. These students might be victims of "injurious conditions," such as a dysfunctional early childhood or poverty. These students might be "passive, unruly, docile, bumptious, or even rebellious" (1938, p. 56). The general principle of social control cannot be predicated on such exceptional cases, however, and Dewey recommends they be approached on a case-by-case basis. It is the educator's duty to discover the causes of such recalcitrant attitudes, and, when all else fails, Dewey suggests that exclusion from the group may be the only available course of action; but this is by no means to be seen as a solution. Exceptions rarely prove a rule or give a clue to what a rule should be, Dewey concludes, for it is unity of task and purpose which is most highly valued (1938). All of these traditional themes will surface in the following analysis of teacher development literature, and all are Hegelian.

For the remainder of this Introduction, I will critically analyze a discussion of the ethics of teacher development which I prepared with Peter Grimmett in 1994. I will show how Romanticism and Idealism were present in my former analysis, thus providing important background information with regard to my current analysis. I divide my presentation into three sections: (1) the politics of teacher development, which focuses on the texts of Lieberman (1994) and McLaughlin (1994); (2) the ethics of teacher development, which focuses on Hargreaves (1993); and (3) the epistemology of teacher development, which focuses on Schön (1983), Grimmett (1988), Grimmett and Erickson (1988), Grimmett, MacKinnon, Erickson, and Rieken (1990), and Grimmett and Crehan (1990, 1991).

In the conclusion to an edited collection focusing on the continuing education of teachers, Grimmett and Neufeld (1994) argue that "there is a need to refine more rigorously our theoretical understanding of teacher development as a way of making sense of life's phenomena and

experience through pedagogy" (pp. 226-27). At that time we also argued that the theoreticians in the field drew upon concepts and theoretical perspectives which belonged to a European tradition which valued development towards an "authentic identity." This term came from our reading of Taylor (1989, 1991), and we chose to interpret it as "an autonomous self-directed agency" (p. 227). We also characterized the search for a modern identity as a "struggle of negotiation" between such dualisms as "renewal and disintegration, agreement and contradiction, [and/or] serenity and anxiety" (p. 227). We then tentatively concluded that these and other rhetorical features of teacher development literature aligned the theory of teacher development with a mature European tradition. This tradition "had the potential to carry with [it] prescriptive implications for the settings and conditions in which teachers work" (p. 227). At that time, we were unsure of the full implications of our conclusions, and we said that it was time to ask what coherent theoretical tradition and conceptual categories were central to the interests of teachers.

At this stage, I would argue that the "European tradition" which we suspected undergirded the rhetoric of teacher development literature has Hegel as its most erudite spokesman. Consequently, I would replace "authentic identity" and "autonomous self-directed agency" (as priorities of teacher development) with Hegel's "reasoned critical awareness of a self-conscious presence." This, I would now argue, is the curriculum priority of the teacher development literature reviewed in this dissertation. In fact, I hesitate to use the term "teacher development," since I believe that critical self-consciousness is what the authors of the literature are seeking to articulate. Increasingly, prescriptions for the settings and conditions which lead to self-consciousness point to *Sittlichkeit* and the communal ethics which arise from moral struggles over dominance and submission. The epistemological and moral point of these communal interactions is the reconciliation of all conceptual particularities (albeit tentatively and temporarily) into a harmonious universal.

Grimmett and I began to observe this tendency towards reconciliation when we suggested that the negotiated struggle was occurring between such dualisms as "renewal and disintegration, agreement and contradiction, [and/or] serenity and anxiety," all of which may be seen as

synonyms for the primary Hegelian dualism of reconciliation and alienation. Our attention at that time was focused on the theoretical characteristics of teacher development literature, but we did not have sufficient backgrounds in Continental philosophy to justify adequately our claim that teacher development was a moral struggle towards critical self-conscious awareness. We were concerned, however, that researchers, teacher educators, and administrators were writing texts prescribing cultural practices based on existing theoretical frameworks without realizing that those practices were part of a long philosophical tradition. The problem, as I wrote in Chapter 4, was that the study of teacher development was orphaned — was unaware of its genealogy. Unfortunately, the most that Grimmett and I could conclude was that teacher development was, indeed, "a struggle"; for, without knowledge of its conceptual origins, it was difficult for us to hear what the literature was saying. Nonetheless, we distinguished certain forms of struggle with the assistance of a table based on Sergiovanni (1992; see Table 1).

Table 1

Traditional, Alternative, and Authentic Forms of Struggle

RULE	MOTIVATION	INVOLVEMENT	STRUGGLE
Traditional What gets rewarded gets done	Extrinsic gain	Calculated	"fit in"
Alternative What is rewarding gets done	Intrinsic gain	Personal	"find what appeals"
Authentic What is good gets done	Moral aim	Moral	"act morally"

From Grimmett, P.P., and J. Neufeld. (1994). *Teacher development and the struggle for authenticity: Professional growth and restructuring in the context of change*. New York: Teachers College Press (p. 229).

We stated that when teachers develop their practice according to what is rewarded by the system, they are attempting to achieve extrinsic gain; when they develop their practice according their own beliefs, they are attempting to achieve intrinsic gain. We aligned our conclusions with the Hegelian distinction between unhappy consciousness and self-consciousness. The extrinsic calculated gains of "fitting in" are not dissimilar to the rewards provided by the superficial culture of the bourgeois zoo, where a teacher's identity would be interpreted as an explicit expression of her/his work-related achievements. This would be detrimental to the teacher's interests, as it is a dysfunctional route to self-consciousness. We thought that such a route would be fragile because it was not particularly adaptable to changing educational conditions.

"Intrinsic gain" was also a great concern for Hegel, who condemned autonomy from community relations as hedonistic and/or pietistic. When Grimmett and I concluded our study, we wrote that teachers should "act morally" in accordance with what is important and of value to learners (which, according to the literature, includes teachers and their colleagues). The struggle became one of grappling with practical and ethical problems in "an uncertain and constantly changing context" (here we see the emergence of *Sittlichkeit*). We concluded that

> the pursuit of moral aims in teaching constitutes the struggle for authenticity. It is exertion, negotiated within the discourse of a community of a common language and shared values, toward a continual grappling with the perplexing dilemmas of practice in morally appropriate ways ... *The more teachers embark on this moral quest, the more they experience the authenticity of struggle.* That is, they come to recognize the value and importance of struggle in teacher development. (pp. 229-30; emphasis in original)

I read Fichte, Schiller, and especially Hegel between these lines; I also read Paul's evangelistic New Testament dream of salvation through a community of believers, in which the particular members of a unified body make themselves "living sacrifices" and transform themselves through the renewal of their minds (Romans 12:1-5). At the time of the Grimmett and Neufeld edition, however, I was unaware of Fichte's, Schiller's, and Hegel's importance with regard to our work. I certainly did not imagine any theological connections to its messages, and none of the aforementioned philosophers are referred to in our book. We based our conclusions on a reading of Charles Taylor (especially *The Malaise of Modernity*). When I returned to Taylor

(1989) during the writing of this dissertation, I noticed that I had highlighted the following passage as being potentially significant:

> This is a more radical definition of freedom, which rebels against nature as what is merely given, and demands that we find freedom in a life whose normative shape is somehow generated by rational activity. This idea has been a powerful, it is not overstated to say revolutionary, force in modern civilization. It seems to offer a prospect of pure self-activity, where my action is determined not by the merely given facts of nature (including inner nature), but ultimately by my own agency as a formulator of rational law. This is the point of origin of *the stream of modern thought, developing through Fichte, Hegel, and Marx, which refuses to accept the merely "positive,"* what history, or tradition, or true nature offers as a guide to value or action, and insists on an autonomous generation of the forms we live by. The aspiration is ultimately to a total liberation. (Taylor 1989, p. 364; Emphasis mine)

In concluding Chapter 3, I identified Hegel's human spirit as a process of growth towards freedom through speculative reflection on what it means to be a human agent in an ethical community. I would claim that this nineteenth-century dream of non-violent liberation is what the literature of teacher development is all about, and it has rhetorical and conceptual connections to the New Testament story of redemption and liberation through the spirit of Christ. Grimmett and I finished our book by writing that the authenticity of struggle comes about when teachers value "stretching themselves [Fichte's moral striving] because it is the morally appropriate thing to do." We ended the book as follows:

> This entails negotiating the dualities and seemingly endless contradictions inherent in a changing educational context. It involves grappling with vexing questions and puzzling dilemmas to obtain some form of moral coherence in settings in which dispersion and fragmentation are the prevalent features. Whereas the struggle for authenticity suggests that teachers exert themselves in settings that do not typically have conditions that value and encourage a strenuous wrestling with moral issues and dilemmas, the authenticity of struggle implies that the presence and celebration of struggle per se constitutes one of the primary criteria of teacher development in a changing educational context. (p. 230)

We maintain that the predominant features of the cultural world are fragmentation, dispersion, and contradiction. Context is therefore conceptualized as a collection of alienated particulars. The solution to this involves becoming engaged in a dialectic struggle of dominance and submission in order to reconcile these particulars into some universal coherence, the truth of which will ultimately become known. The faint undertone of the second precept of Déscartes'

Discourse lingers beneath our words. Combining the particular with the universal is the point of teacher development; it is what gives it its modernist rhetorical nature. In the following three sections of this chapter, I address the struggle which Taylor calls for on the political, spiritual, and intellectual levels, respectively. Through examining the politics, ethics, and epistemology of selected examples of the literature, I show how this struggle for renewal is being worked out in the field of teacher development.

The Politics of Teacher Development

> A major commitment for all of us in the coming decade is to build the kind of conditions that make possible teachers' continuous growth by providing ongoing opportunities for inquiry into their own practice. The challenge of how to do this, though seemingly obvious, has been historically elusive. Virtually the entire educational establishment has been set up to accept quick fixes — single-shot workshops, or even week-long summer seminars and "good presenters" — rather than developing a set of mutually reinforcing conditions that would need to be considered, understood, and built over time (Lieberman 1994, p. 15).

Lieberman calls for a commitment to build conditions which would be conducive to teachers' growth, and which would enable them to continuously question their practice. These conditions are to be mutually reinforcing, and they are to be part of a coherently considered and understood educational and political context in which norms of human behavior are inspired by continuous questioning, learning, and problem-solving. It must become the norm for teachers continuously to inquire into their work, and, she adds, building the conditions for facilitating such a norm is no simple task.

Growth is a curious concept, and one which has interested me throughout my research for this dissertation. In the book which I edited with Peter P. Grimmett, thirteen authors filled 236 pages of text, and the word "growth" surfaced seventy-two times. Grimmett and I were the ones who used the word the most; We used it twenty-two times in the concluding chapter, where we reviewed and discussed the contents of the book. McLaughlin used the word fourteen times in her chapter; Hargreaves, MacKinnon, and Grunau used it five times each; Lieberman, Woods, Ceroni

and Garman, each used it five times; Chard used it once; and Siskin and Egan did not use it at all. Across authors, the word was most commonly used in the context of "professional growth" (14 occasions), followed by the context of "community (of) growth" (5); "continuous growth" (2); "growth" in connection with learning (2); "growth" as authentic (professional) identity (2); and growth as a synonym for power (2). The word appeared in thirty-three other contexts (e.g., growth through reflection, growth through a moral language, growth through interaction, conditions for growth, and growth-enhancing environment). What is the meaning of all this growth? I argue that "growth" is the code word for a biological conception of educational development inherited from Hegel and refined by Dewey.

Dewey referred to his entire rationale for learning as "growth" (Diggins 1994, p. 309).

> In reality there is nothing to which growth is relative save more growth, there is nothing to which education is subordinate save more education ... life means growth, a living creature lives as truly and positively at one stage as at any other, with the same intrinsic fullness and same absolute claims. Hence education means the enterprise of supplying the conditions which insure growth, or adequacy of life, irrespective of age. (Dewey 1916, p. 51)

Above all, there was no end to the learning process, and Dewey spent his life attempting to show this. For him, each stage of growth was only a condition for the creation of yet more conditions for learning; for life itself was education, just as growth/development was life (p. 48). In one instance (p. 410), he defines growth simply as "the cumulative movement of action toward a later result," but when looking at the several contexts in which growth is used, it is clear that the concept is more complicated than this implies.

Dewey's explanation of growth was inspired by the biological evolutionary theories common in his day (Diggins 1994, p. 224) and by his early exposure to Hegel. Learning and education, under such conditions, were articulated in terms of "struggle" and "adaptation," concepts which, I have argued, descend from the philosophical tradition of Fichte and Hegel. Dewey conceived of the "environment" as that with which the learner interacted as she/he moved towards "intelligence" (Dewey, 1925).

Dewey celebrated the human organism's interaction with the environment as the wellspring of intellectual growth and as a context in which to think, analyze, imagine, plan, and, thereby, attempt to exert some control over its uncertain processes (Diggins 1994, p. 223). Teachers, in like manner, are conceptualized by Lieberman and McLaughlin as being in an unstable relationship with their environment. Their struggle to adapt demands that they learn how to control their environment through becoming involved with(in) it in order to be potentially united with it. The biological metaphor of growth comes from Darwin, but the promise of freedom and the ethics of unity is primarily Hegelian. Hegel also had an organic conception of Being, for he saw self-consciousness as a continuous process of adaptation. As he wrote in the *Phenomenology* (§ 80), progress towards the goal of knowledge is unhalting, and no satisfaction may be found at any of the situations along the way. Mutation and adaptation must be continuous.

Dewey (1916) saw the primary condition of growth as immaturity. By immaturity he did not mean the state traditionally associated with youth; he meant the positive "ability to develop" — "the power to grow" (1916, p. 41). Growth was something humans did as a matter of course, and two traits of growth were "dependence" and "plasticity." Dependence denoted a positive, constructive trait and involved *inter*dependence — the point being that no one grows without receiving stimuli from the environment. Plasticity was the ability to learn from experience and to retain from it something which would lead to successful coping strategies with regard to future experiences. The educational process was unending; it was a continuous process of reorganizing, reconstructing, and transforming. To be empowered was to be in a state of continuous, limitless adaptation. One recalls Hegel's belief that truth was to be found in reflection, which was a constant process of generation and regeneration.

Dewey did have something to say about the relationship of biological evolutionary theory to philosophy and, by implication, to education (1910):

> Changes in living things are orderly; they are cumulative; they tend constantly in one direction; they do not, like other changes, destroy or consume, or pass fruitlessly into wandering flux; they realize and fulfill. Each successive stage, no matter how unlike its predecessor, preserves its net effect and also prepares the way for a fuller activity on the part of its successor ... Nature as a whole is a

progressive realization of purpose strictly comparable to the realization of purpose
in any single plant or animal. (pp. 4-6)

These words almost paraphrase Hegel's example of how bud, blossom, and fruit form an

organic unity in which each is as necessary as the other with regard to constituting the life of the

whole (*PG* § 2). For Hegel, as for Dewey, learning may be discussed in terms of biological

mutation and adaptation. Thus, in Lieberman's quote, human behavior mutates and adapts to its

environment through continuous questioning, learning, and problem-solving.

The conditions conducive to uniting teachers with their environment will also be referred

to in naturalistic terms. The environment itself will be referred to as a cultivated plot in which

teachers will be able to attain liberating self-consciousness. "Professionalism" is the metaphor

used to describe this self-conscious state, which is to be attained through continuous mutation and

adaptation within a community devoted to the formation and enhancement of self-consciousness.

This is intended to free teachers from the bondage of environmental alienation. Through unity

with the environment, the teacher will be empowered through becoming a critically aware self-

consciousness.

Lieberman cites Rosenholtz (1989) in identifying four variables which must be present

within an adaptive community.

> She found that there was a strong relationship between the structures, norms, and
> pattern of interactions in school cultures and the potential for teacher growth and
> development. Four variables influencing teachers' perceptions of opportunities to
> learn were identified: goal-setting, teacher evaluation, shared goals, and teacher
> collaboration. In more collaborative settings teachers reported that teaching is a
> complex craft with professional learning as an unending process. (p. 17)

Thus, it is necessary to identify patterns of cultural interaction within schools and, through

them, to gain an understanding of what sort of well-ordered cultural arrangements will most

facilitate self-generating consciousness (here we have Hegel's *Sittlichkeit*). Goal-setting will entail

a coherent theory of truth which should become clear as teachers continue the process of their

development. Shared goals and collaboration will identify ethical principles which, in turn, will

facilitate the self-movement of teachers' consciousness. A revised evaluation system should be in

place to ensure the maintenance of a well-ordered culture in which, ideally, teachers should be

their own and each other's evaluators. The ethical structure will cultivate the virtues needed to enable teachers to reflect on their actions.

Ideally, teachers should not be forced to revise their behavior; they should do so naturally while socially interacting in the course of their work. They should systematically and continually question their practice in the context of the classroom. Such discipline should involve a new concept of educational leadership, one in which accountability is not exerted from a hierarchical superordinate but is integrated among and between colleagues. Citing Little (1986), Lieberman explains that

> when principal and teachers observed each other in classrooms, had time to talk about what they were doing, and worked to find solutions to commonly defined problems, the lives of the teachers and the principal were transformed. Traditions of practicality, privacy, and isolation were replaced by shared ownership of issues and problems of practice, a willingness to consider alternative explanations and a desire to work together as colleagues. The staff was building a new set of norms for work and thus a new culture that encouraged and supported inquiry. (p. 16)

The religious Hegelian metaphor of transformation surfaces to show how the bonds of alienation are loosened when teachers and principals are "transformed" through reconciliation. A new time dawns when all work together with the shared norms of a new liberatory culture. Alienation is replaced by reconciliation. *Bildung* is evident. This transformation calls for a conception of educational leadership which is mutually reinforced by, and is seen as part of, the workplace. Traditional forms of leadership have impeded the establishment of a culture of inquiry, for they have privileged authority in those who can restrict teachers' patterns of interaction and thereby restrict their empowerment. Once there was "the law," but now all are potentially freed in the spirit of the community.

> Lieberman elaborates on this promise by citing a passage from Sergiovanni (1989):

> Transformative leaders practice the principle of power investment. They distribute power among others in an effort to get more power in return. They know it is not power over people and events that counts but power over accomplishments and the achievement of organizational purposes. To gain control over the latter, they recognize that they need to delegate or surrender control over the former. Empowerment by cultural transformation, as an alternative to empowerment through revolution, involves the redistribution of power from principals to teachers. Many principals own it and they withhold it to impede teachers' growth toward power. If power is in shared ownership with teachers then more powerful

accomplishments can result. The achievement of purposes and goals is the goal of transformational leadership, not control over people and their events (p. 220).

Accordingly, teachers are in an unequal power relationship vis-à-vis principals. Little and Lieberman express a Hegelian notion of cultural transformation, looking towards new patterns of interaction and cultural norms. They draw on a concept of *Bildung*, whereby teachers can begin to enter into self-conscious reflective inquiry and empowering forms of collaboration. Teachers will then be emancipated and transformed into leaders who share a collective spirit and who are capable of achieving their goals.

If principals could set aside their vision of themselves as masters over teachers, then they might merge with the latter in some form of mutually beneficial universality. They would understand that their level of self-conscious power would be enhanced by acknowledging that it is dependent upon the recognition granted it by teachers. Principals and teachers would both be emancipated through recognizing their mutual interdependence. As it is, principals often keep teachers (and, by extension, themselves) in bondage by keeping the latter alienated from their environment. Of course, if principals were to be eliminated, the master-servant struggle would only take on another form. This was shown by Ceroni and Garman (1994), who studied the replacement of principals by "lead teachers" and discovered that dominance/submission struggles continued. Principals and teachers need each other. The status of this institutional relationship should be maintained.

Teachers and principals face three challenges which they should address together: (1) they must institute a *Sittlichkeit* which will facilitate development in a spirit of continuous inquiry; (2) they must maintain *Bildung* in order to transform teachers from mere curriculum implementers into self-conscious curriculum leaders; and (3) (assuming the achievement of [1] and [2]) they must ensure a continuous reflective relationship between the teacher and her/his environment. Again, both principals and teachers must understand that they need each other in order to achieve mutual self-conscious recognition within the moral struggle of universal self-consciousness. This has been researched by McLaughlin and her colleagues (1994).

McLaughlin opens her text with a quote from Roland Barth (1990, p. 49), who states that nothing within a school has more impact on students' development of skills, self-confidence, or classroom behavior than the personal and professional growth of its teachers — an assertion which relates directly to a suggestion made by Waller (1932, p. 445). She divides the teacher into two metaphorical spaces: (1) his/her subjective being and (2) his/her objective role. The former is inherent, the latter is cultural. Personal (subjective) growth involves interpreting phenomena within a broad ethical framework in order to attain individual self-consciousness; professional (objective) growth involves teachers' interacting as social identities (i.e., as co-workers) within their work setting. Self-consciousness is achieved through moral negotiation, and this demands the presence of an ethical community within which teachers develop by integrating their respective particularities with those of other professionals.

Special criteria are reserved for the designation of such "growth." As McLaughlin states:

This chapter draws upon three years of field work in diverse secondary school settings to argue for and illustrate a different way of thinking about teachers' professional development. It sees professional development not as a special project or scheduled event but as a locally constructed product of an active professional community that is responsive to teachers' immediate professional concerns as well as their professional identity. My analysis is based on the view that teachers' professional development of the most meaningful sort takes place not in a workshop or in discrete, bounded convocations but in the context of professional communities — discourse communities, learning communities. Further, I show that teachers can and typically do belong to multiple professional communities, each of which functions somewhat differently as a strategic site for professional growth. Thus, the argument is made that enabling professional growth is, at root, about enabling professional community. (p. 31)

In Hegelian terms, the focus of her research is *Sittlichkeit* and how the spirit moves the self-consciousness to an awareness of its reasoned presence in the environment, thereby adapting to it and unifying with(in) it. Professional growth is the product of a specific political arrangement called "community." It is locally constructed, which means that it is responsive to the immediate environment. A moral ecology provides teachers with a meaningful environment within which to conduct their personal and collective ethical practice. Thus, to enable growth is to enable a spirit of community.

There is an undertone of urgency in McLaughlin's study. Lieberman has indicated that teachers are not free, and that this hinders the accomplishment of their purpose. McLaughlin specifically cites a crisis in late twentieth-century American secondary schooling. Some of the teachers she studied were frustrated, burned out, disconnected, fatigued, low in morale, and isolated (p. 33). They displayed symptoms of alienation similar to what Taylor (1991) described as typical of the malaise of modernity. Most of these unhealthy symptoms were due to an inability to adapt to the "different learning styles, needs, and backgrounds of today's diverse students" (p. 33). Other teachers had changed their behavior and had adapted to the challenges presented by their changing environment. These teachers felt efficacious, energized, dignified, and competent; they had become transformed through some form of redemptive reconciliation. The consistent variable of successful adaptation was membership in a community of colleagues.

> As we looked across our sites at teachers who report a high sense of efficacy, who feel successful with today's students, we noticed that while these teachers differ along a number of dimensions — age and experience, subject area, track assignment, and even conceptions of pedagogy — all shared this one characteristic: membership in some kind of a strong professional community. Further, almost without exception, these teachers singled out their professional discourse community as the reason that they have been successful in adapting to today's students, the source of their professional motivation and support, and reason that they did not burnout in the face of some exceedingly demanding teaching situations. (p. 33)

McLaughlin cites Farber (1991), who also highlights the role of community in promoting positive adaptation to professional work and the importance of intellectual challenge, stimulating collegial discourse, and opportunities to share social realities. She then continues:

> We found active, positive discourse communities at different locations within teachers' professional domain — at the department level, at the school level, at the district level, and within teachers' professional networks. Each occasion for community arose for a different reason, functioned in a different structural and cultural context, took a different form and served a somewhat different purpose. Each also made a somewhat different contribution to teachers' professional development, dignity, competence, and efficacy. Each community was important in its own right to teachers' growth and professional learning. (p. 33)

So self-conscious freedom comes about through joining a group of other teachers. Here we see Hegel's corporate metaphor of reconciliation paving the route to freedom.

Clues to what McLaughlin means by "growth" may be found by looking at how the word is used with other nouns. In order of appearance, McLaughlin writes of "stimulation and growth" (p. 37), "learning and growth" (p. 37), "problem-solving and growth" (p. 41), and "community and growth" (p. 41). Taken together, these phrases suggest that growth refers to the stimulation provided by learning to problem-solve within a community setting.

Many challenges are presented by "today's students." McLaughlin refers to today's students as being "new" and "diverse." "Yesterday's students" are distinguished in terms of former "academic interests and motivation, family support and participation in the cultural mainstream" (p. 38). There is a shift from a homogenous student environment to one which displays the socio-economic and cultural diversity characteristic of late twentieth-century North America, especially in large urban areas. The challenge of instructing such a diverse student population seems to have caused a pedagogical crisis which demands that teachers adapt to a changing educational environment. Teachers are under stress to respond to a variety of students, and they are having to resort to assistance from their colleagues (which may not have been necessary in the past).

McLaughlin concludes her paper with five observations regarding "healthy" communities. She introduces this important section with a paragraph emphasizing that supportive collaborative unions form at various levels and locations within the educational system (i.e., the district, the department, the school, and the professional organization). Each makes a different contribution to a teacher's motivation, commitment, and sense of efficacy. This is of great importance and indicates what is at stake in the formation of healthy communities. Motivation is incitement to action; commitment is a promise of action; and efficacy is the power to produce an action. And today's teachers need to be motivated, committed, and to have a sense of their own power in order to respond to a culturally and economically heterogeneous student population. In each of the following cases, "health" is conceptualized as the unification of the individual with the community (i.e., of the particular with the universal).

[Case 1] Healthy professional communities at all levels embrace diversity. They acknowledge and integrate the tension between individual and group, and possess effective strategies of conflict resolution that enable individual preferences and needs to coexist within the context of shared beliefs, goals, and values. (p. 48)

Communal political arrangements acknowledge that particular divergences may coexist with group loyalty. A healthy community embraces individual diversity and integrates it. Where diversity means differences of belief, these differences may be shared and thus unified. McLaughlin specifies that teachers establish recognized standards and expectations of teacher development. This is expressed by reference to ethical "norms." For example, there are norms of sharing (p. 36); proactive strategies to maintain and enforce school-level norms and values (p. 40); daily adaptations to norms, codes, and beliefs (p. 43); a process of "socialization" vis-à-vis district norms, practices, and expectations (p. 45); the use of cultural authority to communicate, reinforce, and monitor district goals and norms of professional conduct (p. 45); and the fact that managing the professional community at the district level is, at heart, a problem of managing district-level norms and values (p. 45).

Divergence may be thought of as two points receding from a common center. Community unites these two points through a process of arbitration. The identity which results from the union of individual and community does not distinguish between "self" and "other." "Community" has its root in (1) com + munis (being bound; obligated; mutual indebtedness) and (2) com + unus (what is together as one; absorption into oneness). This etymology shows two ways of thinking about community: (a) the organicist "body politic" of Hobbes; and (b) the "social contract" of Rousseau. Both theoretical positions conceal the essentialism of a self-empowered subject immanent to itself either (a): as a part in itself already a whole before its encounter with other parts (com + munis) and (b): as a whole that precedes the parts (com + unis) (van den Abeele 1990, p. xii). In Hobbes the social body is ruled by a sovereign under whose leadership the subjects are subsumed, while in Rousseau the social body is made up of self-determining subjects who "freely" aggregate to form a community.

The movement to involve teachers in a community could be seen as the movement from a transcendental to a modern populist model of teacher development. The latter replaces the separation of human being from transcendent power with the separation of human being from the world. According to Nancy (1987), modern theories of community (e.g., communism and liberalism) contribute to the inability to think of humans without relying on the concept of a self-empowered subject immanent to itself. What this overlooks is the differences among communal participants — differences which, when collaboration takes place, complicate presumptions of equality. This may result in some teachers becoming more or less equal than others (see Ceroni and Garman, 1994) and may also affect the theory of power used in teacher development literature.

Ceroni and Garman (1994) refer to the *Oxford English Dictionary* to show that the word "empowerment" came into English usage around 1645 and was used to mean "authorization or licence." After only forty years, it came to mean enablement and permission. As Ceroni and Garman indicate, the first definition assumes that some person or formal body has the power to sanction the transmission of power to another person or body; the second definition assumes that a person or body may provide an opportunity for another to develop his or her own power. In the second definition, the idea of direct transmission is de-emphasized, and the implication is that responsibility for empowerment is shared by both parties (p. 142). These two definitions relate directly to the roots of the term "community" (com + munis; com + unus) as a site for the political exercise of power. Whereas the first definition prioritizes the immanent subject, the second definition prioritizes the whole. Again, we see echoes of Hobbes and Rousseau. For the most part, discussions of empowerment and of community in the teacher development literature continue to assume a Cartesian split between human being and the world.

Sears and Marshall (1990) make a distinction similar to that of Ceroni and Garman when they separate (1) empowerment-by-authorization (working within the limited framework of those who authorize empowerment) from (2) empowerment-by-enablement (a deeply personal process of producing meaning within particular historical, cultural, and economic contexts). In (1) the

bestower authorizes power and in (2) the community of participants authorizes power. Thus, in either case, the solution to teacher alienation is looked at within a dualistic framework (i.e., consciousness/world). As I have shown, the urgency to unify places a tremendous onus on correct methodology. Stepping out of this Cartesian dilemma, but still maintaining the need to unify, was what Hegel's speculative system attempted to do. This system, embellished by Darwin, Dewey, and Mead, was present in Grimmett and Neufeld (1994). It is also present in the efforts by Lieberman and McLaughlin, as it is in Hargreaves and Grimmett. And it surfaces wherever problem-solving, reflection, and the school as a second family emerge as important aspects of community.

> [Case 2] Healthy professional communities maintain problem-solving structures that enable individuals to examine the problems they face and enlist the advice and perspective of colleagues. Learning and professional growth requires on-going problem solving. Learning occurs at all levels of professional community when individuals challenge one another, evaluate their own thinking, and construct practice and principles together.
>
> [Case 3] Healthy professional communities at all levels maintain strategies for critical review and reflection. Healthy professional communities recognize that shared beliefs can be shared delusions and open themselves to scrutiny and feedback from others on a regular basis.
>
> [Case 4] Healthy professional communities exhibit high levels of trust and teamwork. They are safe places in which to examine practice, try new ideas, and admit disappointment. They provide a setting of collective endeavor and reliable alliance, rather than isolated, individual effort; they create and foster interdependence. Healthy communities achieve the difficult combination of low anxiety and high standards essential to learning. (McLaughlin 1994, p. 48)

Communal political arrangements acknowledge that there will be divergence between the individual and the environment, however that environment is defined (e.g., nature, world, today's students, the classroom, colleagues, etc.). A politics of community is built upon conceptual structures which encourages individuals of various ethical and cultural persuasions to encounter, examine, challenge, evaluate, and resolve problems. It should provide a setting in which struggles between dominance and submission are welcomed and appreciated for their consciousness-generating powers. Adaptation requires motivation, commitment, and the power to produce

results by bringing diverse opinions and practices into a workable cohesion. The divergence of individual and environment must, therefore, be addressed in order to make communities into "safe places." Teachers, administrators, and students should feel at home, rather than alienated from, the world and each other.

> [Case 5] Healthy professional communities of all varieties pay active attention to the on-going renewal of community. As John Gardner (1991) advises, passive allegiance is insufficient. Individuals must see themselves as having a positive, on-going duty to nurture and reconstruct community. An important part of this reconstruction is affirmation. A healthy community continually validates itself through ceremonies, symbols, and celebrations. Each of the professional communities we examined here — department, school, district, and collaborative — developed ways to reward itself, celebrate itself, and strengthen bonds, whether through lunch time rituals or through ceremonies recognizing individual achievement. (p. 48)

The German translation of "membership" surfaces here, displaying a direct connection to Mead's social philosophy. Rousseau's concept of care and Dewey's concept of continuity are also present. Selfhood is dependent on membership and the adoption of a universal role. Self-consciousness is a matter of linking one's concept of self to a body and functioning as a particular unit within a universal role. Teachers, as well as learners, are to nurture and care for their mutual environment. This is reminiscent of the kind of cultic religiosity which appeared in the ancient apostolic community. When one member suffers, all suffer together; when one member is honored, all rejoice together (1 Corinthians 12:26). Community is to be a "safe place" assuming and requiring the loyalty and fidelity of participants. "Allegiance" derives from the Old French feudal term for "lord" (*liege*), which referred to the relation between servants and their masters. Within a hierarchical system, passive allegiance may have been sufficient; however, within the interdependent arrangements of communal accountability, passive allegiance is not sufficient. It is a teacher's duty to affirm the community through private and public declarations, thereby strengthening the bonds which unite the particular with the universal. This assumes the understanding that principals and teachers are mutually dependent upon one another in their struggle towards self-conscious awareness.

Enabling professional development is about enabling professional communities characterized by candor, sharing, mutual dependence and support, trust, and high standards. Such professional communities can be created and sustained only if they are valued and nurtured by their leaders. The only way to make professional development an on-going, satisfying, challenging part of teachers' lives is to make the tending and support of the teaching community a number-one priority. Indeed, as McLaughlin concludes, all else is secondary.

I have shown that the path to self-consciousness entails moral negotiation, and this demands the presence of an ethical community in which to develop through integrating one's self with the selves of other human beings. One of the most complete descriptions of the complexities of this path is found in Hargreaves (1993). In the following section, I analyze this text in light of previous discussions of Taylor and, especially, of Hegel.

The Ethics of Teacher Development

Hargreaves concludes his book with the following alarming words:

> The one sure thing is that we cannot cling to the crumbling edifice of the modernist and bureaucratic present with its departments, hierarchies and cubbyhole structures of schooling. Nor can we take nostalgic refuge in the reconstruction of mythical educational pasts with their conceptions of traditional standards, conventional subjects and the narrow pursuit of basic skills. Educationally, it makes no sense at all to go back to the future in this way!

> Teachers know their work is changing, along with the world in which they perform it. As long as the existing structures and cultures of teaching are left intact, responding to these complex and accelerating changes in isolation will only create more overload, intensification, guilt, uncertainty, cynicism and burnout ... These are the stark choices we now face. The rules of the world are changing. It is time for the rules of teaching and teachers' work to change with them. (1993, p. 261)

It is not difficult to see that ours is a birth-time — a period of transition. Hargreaves' text hearkens back to the opening words of Hegel's *Phenomenology*, which was composed during alarming social/political changes. Hegel wrote part of the *Phenomenology* while living in Jena, as German and Napoleonic troops assembled outside the city's gates to engage in battle (Goetzmann 1973). The spirit of Hegel's time was certainly undergoing a crisis. Hargreaves wishes to convince his readers that a different battle, but one with similar ramifications, is pending outside

the gates of the schoolyard. And what happens during this battle will affect the ways in which schools are administered. For Hargreaves, current patterns of educational change are constituted by a powerful and dynamic struggle between two immense social forces: those of modernity and those of postmodernity (p. 8). But there are other struggles afoot as well, and many of these duplicate those which motivated Hegel. I now go on to analyze Hargreaves' *Changing Teachers, Changing Times* and show the ways in which it is classically Hegelian. I begin by looking at Hegel as a modern philosopher of crisis.

Hegel is tremendously important with regard to current debates around the distinction between modernity and postmodernity, for it is he who made the concept of "crisis" available philosophically (Megill 1985). He did this through integrating the concept of history into the philosophical discourse of modernity, a move which altered the course of modern history when it was adopted by Marx. Mandelbaum (1971) defines historicism as "the belief that an adequate understanding of any phenomenon and an adequate assessment of its value are to be gained in terms of the place which it occupied and the role which it plays within a process of development" (p. 42). To put this in Hegelian terms, nothing happens in nature without process and purpose. Unless history has a direction, it cannot have a "crisis."

Megill notes that the notion of crisis is one of the greatest clichés of modernist and postmodernist thought. Only within the context of a directional and linear view of history can crisis be possible, and the resultant metaphors of that crisis are those pertaining to the organic adaptation to new conditions (1985, p. 296). The developmental view of history was what unified the diverse schools of nineteenth-century thought (p. 295), and its implication of imminence and destiny in human affairs was reinforced by Darwin's *Origin of Species*. The notion of completion and regeneration is ultimately traceable to the final apocalyptic chapters of the book of Revelation. It is the consummation towards which the whole biblical message of redemption is focused, and it assumes that God's divine plan is linear. When understood and adopted as doctrine, this belief carries its followers towards its fulfillment. The notion of biblical crisis involves a dramatic fall in the moral order of things (i.e., the City of Man) — a fall which ultimately results in the

establishment of the celestial City of God (cf. Revelation 18 ff.). Prior to this fall, there is an all-out war between the forces of light and the forces of darkness (Megill 1985, pp. 347-48). Those who believe this myth should welcome this battle, for it heralds the coming of their salvation.

Hargreaves describes the difference between what he sees as the old and the new eras:

> On the one hand is an increasingly postindustrial, postmodern world, characterized by accelerating change, intense compression of time and space, cultural diversity, technological complexity, national insecurity and scientific uncertainty. Against this stands a modernistic, monolithic school system that continues to pursue deeply anachronistic purposes within opaque and inflexible structures. (p. 3)

His portrayal of the crisis as a struggle between two forces suggests that some dialectic movement is occurring. Events are consolidating to produce conditions which, depending on how they adapt to any given environment, will have either positive or negative implications for educational institutions.

Hargreaves' environment is conceptually framed in socio-economic and political terms. The gap between a monolithic school system and cultural and technological changes is widening. In negative terms, the school is becoming increasingly anachronistic, meaning that it is not adapting to, and is increasingly alienated from, the wider culture. Schools are lagging behind, and this is creating a crisis which may result in their extinction. Hargreaves' invocation of a general crisis reminds us of McLaughlin's (1994) more specific crises

Hargreaves explores the topic of change using the key thematic domains of (1) work-related activity, (2) the reorganization of time, (3) culture, and (4) the moral crisis which (1), (2), and (3) imply. He begins by speaking in terms which reverberate with Hegelian philosophy:

> Meaningful and realistic analysis of educational change therefore requires us to do more than balance out the advantages of particular reforms like school-based management. It requires us to relate part to whole — the individual reform to the purpose and context of its development. And it requires us to look at the interrelationships between the different parts in the context of that whole. There are big pictures of educational change, and it is important to look at them. (p. 8).

> But without an understanding of context, of where all the pressure and changes are coming from, there can be no clarity or coherence about the changes as we experience them. And without clarity or coherence, we can exert little control or direction over the future of education and role that teachers will play there. Without a theory of context, educational change is a mystical and mysterious process that

cannot be adequately conceptualized or controlled by those who experience it. So it is with a theory of context that we must begin. (p. 24)

The phraseology places the analysis within the philosophical discourse of modernity — specifically, at the second precept of Déscartes' *Discourse on Method.* From a Hegelian perspective, Hargreaves' approach to crisis is organic. Context is the body and individual reforms are the particulars which, taken together, constitute the former's totality. Hargreaves' approach is historicist in that he uses history to justify the need for action. This requires a Hegelian-styled dialectic which realizes its truth in the course of its development.

Hargreaves clarifies present cultural changes by putting them into historical context. He does this by showing how particulars are related within a universal scheme. This clarity is necessary, he writes, in order to exert control over the direction of an unpredictable moral environment. As with Hegel, Hargreaves is researching and discussing the conditions of living a human life in a social world. He characterizes the early culture of modernity as having gone through the same thing which Schiller and Hegel witnessed in Germany; that is, the alienation of family from modes of production and the move towards the mass production of the factory system. Politically, Hargreaves characterizes early modernity as having large, centrally controlled political structures with hierarchical chains of command; organizationally, he portrays it as having large, cumbersome organizations ordered according to rank and seniority. The cost of these social and economic developments, he observes, was a "loss of spirit," which led to "estrangement, alienation and lack of meaning in individual lives" (p. 8). The recovery of "spirit" and, especially, the resolution of alienation is what drives Hargreaves' analysis.

He first looks at the fact that teachers desire to change their practice. If we cannot understand their desire, then we will lose valuable insights. (p. 11). For most teachers, at the heart of meaningful change is the issue of whether knowledge is practically applicable in the environment in which they work (p. 12). Hegel also saw human desire as the motivating force behind self-consciousness — as what lay behind the striving for greater comprehension and union

with the environment. Indeed, the most valued knowledge came from the fulfillment and satisfaction of human desire (*PG* § 167; § 174). Similarly, teachers strive to comprehend their environment, and they are motivated by their desire for enhanced self-consciousness.

Hargreaves adopts a modernist stance (p. 40) and criticizes pragmatists such as Cherryholmes (1988), Bernstein (1983), and Rorty (1982) for their suspicion of the existence of foundational ethics. He insists that moral frameworks must exist beyond the generative power of discourse (p. 39). Hargreaves does not advocate transcendental moral absolutes of the Kantian sort, but he does search for universally binding moral principles of a practical nature. It is this position which makes his philosophical and moral stance distinctly Hegelian. His insistence on the existence of practical moral principles necessitates an acceptance of the status quo as a valid forum within which to find those principles. The articulation of the moral crisis of modernity and the way in which he proposes to resolve it are, in many ways, similar to what is advocated by Taylor (1989, 1991).

It is sometimes difficult to determine whether Hargreaves is referring to epistemology or to morality when he refers to "knowledge." Since the concluding section of his book focuses primarily on moral principles and the social arrangements required in order to arrive at them, I believe that his references to "knowledge" are references to practical ethics. I believe that it would also be fair to say that Hargreaves is of the view that nothing exists outside the social world of human interaction. I support this claim by pointing out the way in which he conceptualizes his excellent discussion of temporality and teaching in Chapter 5 of *Changing Teachers, Changing Times*. There, he treats time as a subjective phenomenon dependent upon intersubjective convention (p. 99), thus making temporality the outcome of human action (p. 100). Such an interpretation of temporality was one of several which existed during Hegel's time. I would suggest that it most closely resembles Kant's view that temporality is a form of human sensibility which human beings impose on phenomena (see Inwood 1992, 294). This perspective is combined with Schelling's (1811) view that time is an inner principle articulated by things and events ("everything has its time"). Overall, Hargreaves approaches phenomena as products of

intersubjectivity. In short, reality is social, and inspecting that reality requires the collection, examination, and ordering of predications and behaviors.

Hargreaves begins by observing that confidence in all belief systems is in decline and that foundational ethics are becoming provisional to the degree that the validity of curricula based on alleged universal moral conventions are losing credibility (pp. 56-57). One of the greatest educational crises of the postmodern age, therefore, is the collapse of the common school — a school tied to its community and having a clear sense of the moral values which it should instill in its students (p. 59). Even religious certainties are in decline, leading to a moral vacuum in which many schools attempt to establish and implement purposeful mission-statements and create some sense of "wholeness" (p. 59).

Hargreaves' term, "scientific certainty" (i.e., Kantian moral authority), is being replaced by situational certainty; that is, "the certainty that teachers and others can collectively glean from shared practical knowledge of their immediate context and the problems which it presents" (p. 59). Thus, in the absence of a positive Kantian morality, Hargreaves looks for ethical foundations which are situational (i.e., which are particular to human events and phenomena). His reference to "wholeness" gives us a clue as to where these foundations will be located. Following in the footsteps of Romanticism and post-Kantian Idealism, Hargreaves' situational moral certainties will be found in the ethical struggles of various teachers' organizations/communities. He refers to these ethical organizations as collaborative cultures (p. 192) and moving mosaics (p. 62). In characterizing them, he writes,

> In collaborative cultures, much of the way teachers work together is in almost unnoticed, brief yet frequent informal encounters. This may take the form of such things as passing words and glances, praises and thanks, offers to exchange classes in tough times, suggestions about new ideas, informal discussions about new units of work, sharing of problems of meeting with parents together. Collaborative cultures are, in this sense, not clearly or closely regulated. They are constitutive of the very way that the teacher's working life operates in the school. (pp. 192-93)

Regulation through "the very way that the teacher's working life operates" suggests that Hargreaves is advocating the type of community spirit which emanates from *Sittlichkeit*. Ethics grow out of almost unnoticed encounters; they also grow out of the moral struggles between teachers involved in maintaining a "moving mosaic."

Hargreaves' "moving mosaic" is taken from Toffler (1990):

> A moving mosaic [is] composed not on a flat wall, but on many, shifting see-through panels, one behind the other, overlapping, *interconnected,* the *colors and shapes continually blending, contrasting, changing.* Paralleling the new ways that knowledge is organized in data bases, this begins to suggest the future form of the enterprise and of the economy itself. Instead of a power-concentrating hierarchy, dominated by a few central organizations, *we move toward a multidimensional mosaic form of power.* (p. 216; Emphasis mine)

This is an organic model of change, having biological, evolutionary characteristics just like those of the sunrise described in Chapter 4. Colors, shapes, and forms continually blend, contrast, and change. They react to one another, mutate, and adapt to changing conditions. It is a recapitulation of Hegel's organic dialectic of development, in which truth is not some abstract conception but a working reality (Hargreaves 1993, p. 257) and in which conflict is a necessary part of change (p. 257). The conflicts which inevitably emerge will be resolved as the mosaic mutates and adapts. Hargreaves has a romantic team-spirit view of his mosaic; teachers work together "as a team, no one of them being dominant" (p. 257). This, once more, suggests Schiller's and Hegel's image of the Greek *polis* and the ancient apostolic Christian community, both of which were idealized as harmonious and caring (2 Corinthians 12:25-26). The moving collaborative mosaic, writes Hargreaves, is the kind of organization which can prosper in an age of moral uncertainty because it is adaptable and continuously improving (again, hear the echoes of Hegel, Dewey, and Darwin). Furthermore, its adaptability springs from a "positive orientation of problem-solving" (p. 62). Reason is not an abstract conception but a purposive activity (Hegel's *"zweckmassige Thun"*) which moves towards the accomplishment of both individual and corporate goals. The truth of an activity, then, is in its process as much as in its "goal."

As Toffler mentions, power in the evolutionary mosaic is multi-dimensional. This rhetoric again shows the aversion which writers in the field of teacher development have for abstract moral

principles of the Kantian variety. Empowerment is a result of adaptation, and it is attained not

through revolution but through cultural revival. Thus, Hargreaves quotes Renihan and Renihan

(1992):

> Empowerment is... giving teachers and students a share in important organization
> decisions, giving them opportunities to shape organization and goals, purposefully
> providing forums for staff input, acting on staff input, and giving real leadership
> opportunities in school-specific situations that really matter. (p. 11)

Principals should understand that their identity is dependent on their relationship with

teachers. Principals who empower view administration as a form of service. As I showed in the

previous section, they understand that by setting aside their particular individuality they can attain

universality. Freedom entails sharing, not hoarding, power. This, of course, assumes the

modernist notion that power is something which can be owned and transferred from one person to

another.

Renihan and Renihan's emphasis on giving, providing, acting upon, and yet more giving

reminds me of Hegel's valorization of service as the route to character-building. But in this case,

"giving" is the key to a storehouse of hidden administrative practices and is akin to what occurs in

the idealized nuclear family (or what ideally occurred in the days of the early Christian church). To

open this storehouse, I must again distinguish between ontic and ontological levels of being.

In Chapter 1, I wrote that a fundamental ontology of Being lies behind interpretations of

what it is good to be (selfhood) and what it is right to do (ethics). Predicates of selfhood and

ethics are ontic reference points for being and behaving. Objective terms of reference are mutually

accepted and orient cultural codes of ethics. From a social perspective, Hargreaves' concern is

with ontic predicates of selfhood and ethics, and it is the culture within which these variables

occur that is now undergoing a dramatic change. But the ontology of what it means to be a human

being remains stable. Hargreaves will invoke, manipulate, and reorganize cultural predications

from within a philosophical discourse of modernity. And, of course, the ontological foundation of

what it means "to be" human extends all the way back to ancient Greek philosophy. This

discursive heritage is also part of Hargreaves' conceptual context. Beneath Hargreaves' rhetorical storehouse lies the fundamental metaphysical position that thinking involves the correct interpretation of truth. For Plato, truth may be found by looking towards the soul; for the apostle Paul, it may be found by looking towards God through the living spirit of Christ; for Déscartes, it may be found by looking towards the world as thought; for Kant, it may be found by looking towards phenomena as the shadow of noumena; and for Hegel, it may be found by looking towards reflective self-consciousness. The ontological stability of this heritage allows Hargreaves and others to call up culturally recognizable metaphors from any location in its long narrative history.

Personally, my experiences as a pietistic Anabaptist continue to influence the metaphors which I bring to my readings of teacher development literature. These influences have sharpened my sensitivity to such metaphoric dualisms as freedom/bondage and light/dark and their place in ethical frameworks which distinguish "good" from "evil." In Hargreaves' writings, particular cultural practices are chosen to further unification and to alleviate all forms of alienation. I argue that his choices are influenced by Hegel via Marx, Dewey, and Mead. However, the practices upholding this dedication to unity are traditionally Christian. In the remainder of this section, I argue that these practices are trust, confidence, faith, hope, and, especially, Christian love (*agape*) as defined by Paul in his attempt to unify the fledgling Christian diaspora throughout the Mediterranean.

Hargreaves declares that a crisis is taking place in the areas of cultural identity and morality, and that it is affecting the ways in which people, especially teachers, interrelate. One of his main concerns is the weakening of morality (pp. 69-92 ff.). In his discussion of "the boundless self," Hargreaves laments the loss of singular moral interpretations in contemporary culture. Due to the erosion of social institutions which once delineated clear and universal roles, moral boundaries are less clearly defined than they once were. The institutions which are eroding are the family and communal organizations. These are the institutions which Hegel saw as unifying agencies in a well-ordered culture. Hargreaves cites Lasch (1979) when he argues that

some patterns of parenting are increasingly emphasizing self-actualization, self-expression, and self-development (all of which are morally boundless from a communal perspective). Dysfunctional patterns of parenting (e.g., fatherless domestic arrangements) have resulted in some children experiencing delusions of omnipotence (i.e., they deny any limitations to their potential development). Disturbing expressions of boundless morality have led to what Hargreaves calls excesses of personal empowerment and human potential movements (p. 71). Hargreaves argues that there is an absence of moral anchors and that this produces uncertainty, vulnerability, and alienation. This position returns us to Hegel's *Phenomenology*.

As I showed in Chapter 4, Hegel, like Hargreaves, was very disturbed with the hedonistic havens of the unhappy consciousness. Hedonists sought to attain self-consciousness through self-indulgent activities which were separate from the community and its moral boundaries. He also identified the nuclear family as the ideal community within which to learn what it means to become self-aware through interpersonal conflict. The family enabled individuals to understand what it means to be a member of a community. But Hargreaves is not primarily interested in either parenting or the family; he is interested in the practices that bind those institutions. And he is interested in these practices because he wants to know how they might help teachers deal with alienation.

Hargreaves quotes Taylor (1989) when he argues that self-development can degenerate into self-indulgence, and he agrees with Taylor that contemporary concerns for self-fulfillment have led people to lose sight of other priorities (Taylor 1991). The challenge lies in uncovering what these priorities are. They begin to emerge when Hargreaves' argument is compared with that of another social philosopher whom Hegel influenced: John Dewey. Hargreaves wishes to convince his readers that only certain practices of personal growth and empowerment are valid. For Dewey, a practice was worthwhile if it could contribute to the normative principles of social democracy (Dewey 1916). These normative principles cohered with an the ethics of community solidarity, the latter being manifested by social interaction and civic participation (Dewey 1929). Membership in the organizational communities of civic society was, therefore, synonymous with

democratic participation, as the ethics of micro-communities were synonymous with those of the macro-community. Hargreaves also argues that self-development and personal empowerment should be connected to a wider sense of purpose (e.g., the needs of others) and to an awareness of the political realities of the school and/or educational system (p. 72). Hargreaves sees the school as a potentially ideal setting for self-development and empowerment — a setting within which one could inculcate ethical principles connected to the wider moral concerns of society.

Like Hegel, Hargreaves discounts "personal virtue" (*PG* § 381-92), for it attempts to side-step the social in favor of the personal. As he says:

> These delusions of omnipotence within the culture of narcissism, with its pious and precious investments of the power of self-development and personal growth, are deeply paradoxical. For with its denial of and inability to interact knowledgeably with contexts which delimit the self, constrain its actions and fragment its connections to others, narcissistic impotence and the boundless self create not more personal power but less. As contexts of opportunity and constraint fail to be acknowledged or confronted, they lead to impotence not empowerment. (p. 73)

Hargreaves warns that organizational changes are helping to create new forms of social selves. He is referring to a distinct form of individualism, in which moral frameworks are not connected to the normative principles and practices of an arbitrating community. He insists that the opportunities and constraints of community membership must be maintained. There is a tension between what Hargreaves identifies as empowerment (the Hegelian concept of self-consciousness) and narcissism (the Hegelian concept of unhappy consciousness). As Hargreaves writes, "when moral frameworks are missing or senses of context are weak, approaching teacher development predominantly or exclusively as a process of self-development has serious limitations" (p. 73). As with Dewey, "development" entails maintaining and fortifying that context which has been chosen for the growth of selected human virtues. The school, as a moral context, must be organized so that members guard it as they are being socialized by it. This recalls Hegel's concept of *Bildung* and Dewey's concept of continuity. When separated from a universalizing context, practical morality can quickly degenerate into particularized morality (i.e., personal pietism). Teachers need to feel morally obligated to be aware of the contexts and conditions which currently limit what any one teacher can reasonably achieve (p. 74).

In fact, à la Rousseau, Hargreaves refers to teachers as "moral guardians" who should be aware that the way things *appear* are not necessarily the way things *are* (his emphasis, p. 76). Serious and sustained moral discourse about purpose and values is necessary to ensure that aesthetics are not favored over ethics (p. 76). On first impression, this is seemingly inconsistent with what has been, so far, the evident connection between Hargreaves' moral prescriptions and Hegel's ethical philosophy. The motivation for Hegel's philosophy was partly his revulsion over Kant's positive moral imperatives. According to Hegel, everything is changeable; things are what they appear to be in practice. Demonstrating this was the point of bringing Kant's noumena down to earth and replacing them with phenomena. Given his emphasis on the importance of a morally arbitrating community, I conclude that Hargreaves' concept of truth is Hegelian. In the micro-culture of the school, truth is what comes about through the moral struggle of community practices.

By searching for truth as a collaborative "joining," Hargreaves is searching for some means of constructing a sense of "wholeness" within the school (p. 235). He does this in Deweyan style, by naming and framing those cultural practices which are conducive to the purposes of the educational community and by eliminating those which are not. Two cultural practices are named as alienating teachers from one another: individualism and balkanization.

Hargreaves is aware of the difficulties associated with uniting the concepts of individualism and community. His discussion of this problem is very similar to Dewey's in *Individualism Old and New* (1928; see Diggins 1994, p. 300). Here, Dewey calls for the restructuring of the American social environment along the lines of the ancient Greek *polis* so that "individuality," as distinct from "individualism," could flower. Hargreaves begins by citing Flinders (1988), who argues that isolation can be construed as a healthy adaptive strategy for focusing on students and their needs. Working with colleagues can actually divert teachers from student interaction, which is the prime motivator for most teachers. Hargreaves notes that Lortie's (1975) landmark study pointed to positive aspects of individualism with regard to the culture of teaching. He goes on to say that it may be helpful to distinguish between three strains of

individualism. First, constrained individualism is a social pattern imposed by representatives of the bureaucratic structure who seeks to force teachers to engage in prescribed cultural patterns which are not conducive to their growth. Constrained and contrived patterns seek to further the growth of the bureaucracy, and constrained individualism subverts a teacher's genuine interaction and hinders her/his political liberation. Second, strategic individualism is a pattern of interaction which seeks isolation as a defensive mechanism. It is a coping strategy. Third, elective individualism is a principled choice to work alone either all or some of the time.

Hargreaves' three distinctions (constrained, strategic, and elective individualism, respectively) lead to his distinction between what Lukes (1988) calls individualism and individuality. Individualism consists of private activity divorced from group interaction and is considered to be a negative trait leading to social atomization (Lukes 1988); individuality consists of personal independence and is considered to be a positive trait. Hargreaves praises individuality as being inspired by the ethic of professional care. He then warns:

> If most teachers in a school prefer solitude, this is probably indicative of a problem with the system, of individualism representing a withdrawal form threatening, unpleasant or unrewarding working relationships. If teachers prefer solitude only some of the time, however, or if ~olitude is the desired state for only a few teachers, then a school and its administration ought to be able to tolerate its presence. (p. 182)

Individuality is the power to exercise discretion, initiative, and creativity in one's work (p. 178). A well-ordered culture should, therefore, avoid individualism while fostering individuality. In other words, private behavior should not be judged deviant if it has the potential to enhance a well-ordered culture.

Balkanization is defined by certain patterns of social inter-relationships. As Hargreaves explains:

> These patterns mainly consist of teachers working neither in isolation, nor with most of their colleagues as a whole school, but in smaller sub-groups within the school community, such as secondary school subject departments, special needs units, or junior and primary divisions within the elementary school. (p. 237)

The dysfunctional social element of balkanization is not small-group work as such, but the particular patterns and effects characterized by small groups which insulate themselves from one

other. Such patterns entail the semi-permanence of these groups as occupational, subcultural entities. The detrimental effects of these subgroups include the bureaucratic power which they can exert over other groups and individuals. The result of this is not unlike the situation in the former Yugoslavia, observes Hargreaves, where various cultural communities compete for cultural and economic dominance. Generally, the pattern of balkanization fits into the bureaucratic model of control in which a recognizable, stable hierarchy is set up to divide individuals into closed-membership groups. As Hargreaves shows, balkanization has the potential to divide the school into antagonistic factions based on various allocations of status and power:

> Imbalances of power and status between tightly bounded groups make it difficult for teachers to reach common agreement in areas that threaten their career opportunities, resources and conditions of work. When major innovations are introduced, they also divide teachers into supporters who will prosper from the innovation, and opponents who will suffer by it. (p. 215)

Educational balkanization springs not only from the principle of difference but also from variable levels of power and influence within the teaching community. The route to a debalkanized world of teaching, Hargreaves suggests, requires "active and ongoing struggles" to establish some balance and to eradicate differences in size, prestige, and the allocation of high- and low-status subjects (p. 236).

Hargreaves seems to be calling for a dialectical struggle similar to that which Marx calls for with regard to economic classes. In debalkanized conditions, boundaries will be blurred and differences in status flattened to produce more egalitarian categories. Subsidiary departments may persist, but they will function alongside other cultural units and will evolve "in response to continuing challenges" (p. 237). These subunits will be adaptive cultural organizations dedicated to the resolution of ongoing problems. Membership in these subunits will, ideally, change over time, and their leaders will be neither permanent nor receive institutional rewards greater than those which might be received in any other role. The teachers who lead these subunits will be elected, rotating, and temporary (p. 237).

In Marx's interpretation, the laboring and productive human being is constantly mutating and adapting the relationship between self and world, thereby refining her/his self-consciousness

(McLellan 1975). As inspired by Hegel's master-servant parable, the instruments of creative production should not diverge from the context in which they originate. The dialectic of development between human being and world moves towards an ultimate unity (p. 42). History is a progressive story of class struggle between a bureaucratic bourgeoisie and a proletariat (and this rhetoric is used almost literally in some portrayals of teacher development [e.g., Woods 1994, p. 98]). Ultimately, differences are leveled through historical struggle, the division of labor is abolished, and instruments of production converge with the environment. Marx's dream of a utopian society may have been modeled on the Greek *polis* — the political ideal during the time of his own classical education (p. xiii). In the ideal communist society:

> Nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dining, whatever I have in mind, without ever becoming a hunter, fisherman, shepherd, or critic. This fixation of social activity, this consolidation of what we ourselves produce into an objective power above us, growing out of our control, thwarting our expectations, bringing to naught our calculations, is one of the chief factors in historical development up till now. (Marx quoted in McLellan 1975, p. 71)

In the ideal community, bureaucratic hierarchy would no longer be required. Hargreaves' restructuring schools towards "wholeness," therefore, has to do with restructuring power relationships in such a way that lives are not organized around hierarchy and alienation but around collaboration (Hargreaves 1993, p. 244). Collaboration, Hargreaves proposes, may function as a "metaparadigm" for organizational change (p. 245). He calls for the generation of more metaparadigms of understanding, analysis, development, and change in order to interpret, analyze, synthesize, and respond to the specific paradigm shifts in technology, organizational life, and intellectual thought (p. 245). According to Hargreaves, "One of the emergent and most promising metaparadigms of the postmodern age is that of collaboration as an articulating and integrating principle of action, planning, culture, development, organization and research" (p. 245).

"Paradigm" derives from the ancient Greek word *paradeigma*, "sight of a model," and *meta* is the ancient Greek word for "beyond." Is Hargreaves calling for a totalizing transcendence beyond all mundane phenomena which is intended to guide teachers towards a correct perspective of organizational life and intellectual thought? His text would seem to suggest this. But it is not a meta*paradigm* for which he is calling; it is a meta*physics* (something beyond *physikos*, "nature") — some ultimate transcendent authority upon which to base an ethics. I contend that a metaphysical position, as an ultimate authority, has always been behind the assumptions of teacher development literature. Without metaphysics, the metaphors for "teacher development" as a striving towards critical awareness of a self-conscious presence would be nonsensical. Part of this metaphysics extends from Plato to Hegel and tells of how human being can be at home in the world by uniting its essence with nature. Metaphysics facilitates the story of how one may gain redemption and freedom through a specific pattern of reasoning which assumes that knowledge of the truth is attainable (Heidegger, 1959). This entails the assumption that when one's metaphorical vision is correctly focused on a single point on the horizon of all conceptual possibilities, perfect closure can result. At that point, one will know the truth; a fully and self-sufficient present will then show itself to us without reserve, and we shall finally know "the mind of God."[1] It is the utopian hope that there is a place where all can be known and where all can be shown with a perfect, gleaming clarity: the celestial city of absolute knowledge. This is further hinted at when Hargreaves returns to the Marxist view that, as the forces of bureaucratic control and teacher-led professional development wrestle with one another, one of the great challenges is to orchestrate a common vision (1993, p. 249). It is not collaboration as the act of working together which is to be highly valued, but the unity which that act allegedly produces.

What then, are the normative principles and practices intended to produce this unity? In other words, what practices are most conducive to teacher development? They are not the arrogance of personal virtue, the narcissistic insistence of having one's own way, the preference

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[1] This is the concluding wish of Stephen Hawking's book (1988), but for my purposes the argument originates in Sallis 1989, pp. 22-23.

for isolation from the group, the preference for horizontal bureaucratic arrangements, or restrictive membership; they are open membership, equality, a willingness to join in, a willing desire for compromise, and care for the concerns of others. They indicate the difference between what is considered to be virtuous and what is considered to be evil. I will close this analysis of Hargreaves with a look at his distinction between light and dark.

During the final stages of his book, Hargreaves writes that the "dark side" of school restructuring is a world in which community and authority have disappeared. This world, he continues, is one of vision without voice. "Voice" is, of course, a Hegelian metaphor (McCumber 1993, p. 243-44), for in his opposition to Kant, Hegel most clearly changed the metaphor of moral purpose from one of vision to one of voice. Voice is public and requires interpretation — interpretation which takes place within the intersubjective actions of community relations. Without agreement, voice can have no common moral core (Levin 1993, p. 244), and it is just such a core which Hargreaves seeks to establish among teachers. As he writes, when there is no means of understanding, *reconciling*, or drawing voices together, they can be reduced to "chaotic babble" (Hargreaves 1993, p. 251). Voices need to be heard, but they also need to be engaged, *reconciled*, and argued with: "It is important to attend not only to the aesthetics of teachers' voices but to the ethics of what it is those voices articulate! ... A major challenge for educational restructuring is to work through and *reconcile* this tension between voice and vision; to create a choir from a cacophony" (p. 251). The references to "reconciliation" liken his advice to the most basic theoretical organizing principle of Hegel's social philosophy. I am intrigued, however, by his disdain for "chaotic babble" and "cacophony" and by what this says about the struggle between the forces of darkness and of the forces of light. His comments in this section of the book, combined with his earlier aversion to unrestrained self-expression, evoke first-century Christian practices as advocated in the New Testament.

Hargreaves indicates that a pervasive theme of shared leadership and collaboration throughout teacher development literature is the "truism of trust" (p. 251). Trust is essential for the creation of effective and meaningful collaborative relationships. Hargreaves quotes Lieberman

and her colleagues: "Trust and rapport ... are the foundations for building collegiality in a school" (Lieberman et al. 1988). Drawing from Giddens (1990, p. 34), he goes on to say that trust, defined as "confidence," is the reliability of a person or system with regard to outcomes. Confidence expresses a faith in the probity or love of another, or in the correctness of an abstract principle (p. 252). Confidence, along with "hope" (see Grimmett 1991; Lieberman 1994), has traditionally been cited in company with "faith" and "love." This brings us to the New Testament.

Paul portrayed the ideal Christian community as an organic body composed of many parts, all of which functioned in perfect and equal unison (1 Corinthians 12:22-26). He then tells the Corinthians the "excellent way" to create this perfect unison; it is to love one another. Love has all of the qualities required to unite community members in the spirit of Christ. It is patient and kind, never jealous, arrogantly virtuous, or rude. It is not narcissistically individualistic, and it inspires a search for what is morally good. Love bears, believes, hopes, and endures. Love is to guide the members of the Christian community in their face-to-face relationships. Through love, they will understand their role, and that of the community, with full clarity. In fact, they will understand with such clarity that they will realize their self-conscious being. Paul counsels them to make love their aim (1 Corinthians 14:1). He writes earlier that, without the unifying chorus of love, the voices of believers may resemble "a noisy gong or a clanging cymbal" (1 Corinthians 13:1). Paul's reference here is probably an exortation to avoid the cacophonous singing and instrumental music which accompanied the pagan festivals of his time (2 Corinthians 6:14; 1 Corinthians 8: 1-13; 10: 14-22). Dionysian revels seemed to have no unified form and encouraged unfettered displays of personal expression.[2]

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[2] See Oxford annotated Bible 1973, p. 1392n. (See also Fox 1987 and Cochrane 1949). Paganism rivalled the fast-expanding Christian community throughout Paul's time. This rivalry continued for several hundred years after Paul and was finally eradicated when Christianity was institutionalized as the only official religion of the realm (see Cochrane 1949, p. 369 ff.). Dewey was not opposed to the ecstasy of festal celebration. In his most comprehensive philosophical statement, *Experience and Nature* (1925) he spends one chapter discussing causality, teleology, and the characteristics of early Greek thinking. He begins this chapter with the following appeal, borrowing phrases from Matthew 6:28 and Luke 12:27:

> Human experience in the large, in its course and conspicuous features, has for one of its most striking features preoccupation with direct enjoyment, feasting and festivities; ornamentation, dance, song, dramatic pantomime, telling yarns and enacting stories. In comparison with intellectual and moral endeavor, this trait of experience has hardly received the attention from

The best way to unite the particularities of the Christian church was through the type of love known in ancient Greek as *agape* (see also Romans 13: 8-10). This form of love, though not explicitly mentioned, is continually alluded to in teacher development literature; for example, "needs of others" (Hargreaves 1993, p. 72), "praise," "sharing" (p.192), "warmth," "intimacy" (p. 254), and "caring, compassion, and concern for people" (Lieberman 1992, p. 11). Trust, confidence, faith, hope; these are the normative principles and practices intended to bring teachers into collaborative unity. They are an integral part of our cultural discourse, and they are part of the teaching culture. But it is love which is to bind teachers in professional community so that they may feel at home in their schools. Teachers should love one another, and that is what they should be struggling for in their school.

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philosophers that it demands. Even philosophers who have conceived that pleasure is the sole motive of man and the attainment of happiness his whole aim, have given a curiously sober, drab, account of the working of pleasure and the search for happiness. Consider the utilitarians how they toiled, spun and wove, but who never saw a man arrayed in joy as the lilies of the field. Happiness was to them a matter of calculation and effort, of industry guided by mathematical book-keeping. (p. 78)

The Epistemology of Teacher Development

Teaching may be seen as a process of being liberated from bondage (i.e., alienation from one's environment) and entering into a relationship of equality with other teachers and supervisors. For some authors, such as McLaughlin and Hargreaves, such freedom was idealized as "professionalization." There was a perceived crisis brought about by the mounting organizational challenges of institutionalized schooling, and this crisis required that teachers master their environment through achieving harmony with(in) it, a concept dreamt of by Rousseau, refined by Hegel, biologized by Darwin, and moralized and politicized by Dewey. Thus, teacher development may be seen as *a process of growing towards freedom through adapting to one's environment within the context of a moral community.*

I now go on to discuss how thinking patterns are defined in selected examples of teacher development literature. I begin by defining Hempel's logical behaviorism in order to show how it attempts to unify mind and matter through the correct use of scientific concepts. I then compare logical behaviorism with Ryle's contention that the mind/matter dichotomy could be united through the correct use of linguistic concepts. I then review Mead's social behaviorism and argue that his attempt to unify mind and matter combines Dewey's behaviorism, biological theory, Hegelian dialectics, and scientific methodology. I then review Schön's theory of action and reflective practice in light of Hegel and the behaviorist theories of Dewey and Mead. The section culminates with an exploration of Grimmett's analysis of reflective practice.

Logical positivism holds that all problems may be solved by following the methodology of the natural sciences (Priest 1991), and logical behaviorism is its psychological offshoot (p. 37). Carl G. Hempel (1980) was a logical behaviorist and a member of the Vienna Circle of the 1930s. He hoped to translate the sentences of psychology into statements about the physical behavior of human beings (p. 39). He argued that there is no "mind" outside the physical world:

> The time-worn problem of the relation between mental and physical event is based on the confusion concerning the logical function of psychological concepts. Our argument therefore allows us to see that the psycho-physical problem is a pseudo-problem, the formulation of which is based on an inadmissible use of scientific concepts. (1980, p. 20)

Understood in these terms, there is no confusing distinction between a mental mind and a physical body, for the correct use of scientific concepts indicates that they are united.

Another approach to unifying mind and matter is found in the philosophy of Gilbert Ryle (1949). Ryle, like Hempel, argues that the mind/body problem is the result of conceptual confusion involving the incorrect use of language. He thus sets out to "rectify the logical geography of the knowledge which we already possess" (Ryle 1949, p. 7). According to Ryle, there is no "ghost in the machine":

> This Cartesian dualism is entirely false, and false not in detail but in principle. It is not merely an assemblage of particular mistakes. It is one big mistake and a mistake of a special kind. It is namely a category mistake. It represents the facts of mental life as if they belonged to one logical type or category ... when they actually belong to another. (p. 16)

Ryle attempts to reorder the logical chain of reasoning which completely isolates, and then alienates, the mind from the environment. The largest mistake, argues Ryle, is misusing abstract concepts in order to postulate a "mind" — an entity which does not exist substantially. Mind should be thought of not as a non-physical entity but, rather, as a collection of skills and performances which include believing, knowing, problem-solving, perceiving, and desiring. Priest holds that Ryle's project presents a logical behaviorist perspective, since he argues that mental terms take on meaning through their reference to overt bodily behavior. It is possible that Ryle was influenced by the functionalist, pragmatic psychologist William James (1890). James also argued that mental feelings were to be identified with specifically located bodily sensations (Priest 1991, p. 54). However, it is more likely that Ryle was influenced by the social psychology and action theory of George Herbert Mead.

Whereas Dewey developed a teleological theory of morality and politics, Mead developed a teleological theory of psychological development based on concepts drawn from behaviorism, biology, Hegelianism, and the rhetoric of scientific experimentation. All four of these influences are still present in teacher development literature, as is evidenced in the following quote from Lieberman and Miller (1990).

> By teacher development, we mean continuous inquiry into practice ... We see the teacher as a "reflective practitioner," someone who has a tacit knowledge base and who then builds on that knowledge base through ongoing inquiry and analysis, continually rethinking and reevaluating values and practices. (p. 107)

Continuous inquiry and ongoing analysis recalls the behaviorist conception of an organism integrating with and adapting to its environment. This concept stems from Dewey (1896) and is elaborated upon by Mead (1932; 1938). It is based on a naturalistic conception of mind, which Dewey and Mead gleaned from the Hegelian dialectic and Darwinian evolution. The philosophical historicism of Hegelianism facilitated integrating evolutionism into a pragmatic epistemology which conceived of the human being as an organism which interacted with an unpredictable environment (Diggins 1994). From Mead's perspective, a tacit knowledge base is awakened by human interaction with the environment, for knowledge is built through the continuous perception, manipulation, and aesthetic re-evaluation of objects (Mead 1932).

Mead[3] employed a naturalist conception of mind, in which the test of intelligence was to be found in human action (1936, p. 345). For Mead, the aim of inquiry, indeed of life itself, was to continuously adapt to a changing environment (Reck 1964). The researcher, wrote Mead, does the same thing as does the animal in its natural environment (p. 346) — a perspective which he later refined in his action psychology (1938). Such a functionalist psychology was suggested by James (1890), but it can be textually traced to a tremendously influential paper published by Dewey in 1896. In this paper, evolutionary theory infiltrated psychological behaviorism (Reck 1964). By the dawn of the twentieth century, "functionalism" became an established school of psychological theory at the University of Chicago, with work being produced and drawn upon by Dewey, Mead, James Rowland Angell, and Harvey Carr (p. xvii). Mead integrated behavioral functionalism into his later social psychology in order to develop his interrelational theory of mind, self, and society (Mead 1934).

The point of Dewey's theory was to devise an account of the human being as a biological creature making its way in the world (1896). His theory of behavior as a "reflex arc" conceived

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[3] I draw on Reck's (1964) excellent and detailed elaboration of Mead's life's work.

human action to be a continuous whole rather than a collection of discrete and particular activities. The distinction between stimulus and response was thus based on the functionality of the organism interacting with its environment. Environmental stimulus required a response, thus placing the environment at the center of the organism's self-consciousness. And just as the environment shapes the organism's consciousness, so the latter shapes the former. Clearly, a Hegelian dialectic is evident in Dewey's theory of behavior.

Mead expanded on Dewey's notion of the reflex-arc by suggesting that consciousness comes into existence when the organism's attention is interrupted by a problem (Mead 1900). Upon encountering a problem, the organism engages in the following dialectical process of thinking: (1) recognition of problem, (2) consciousness of past experiences, (3) a grasping of universals, and (4) a focusing on immediate experience. In other words, a problem is recognized "now"; past experiences are recalled in some tacit dimension of consciousness; a future is projected through the grasping of potentially universal solutions to the problem; and the problem is addressed "now" with the assistance of past and future references. The organism's perception of temporality is determined by the current event, thus rendering time conditional. The relation between subject and object is thus purely speculative, and it assumes the existence of a thinking mind inspired to thought by action.

Mead's "Philosophy of the Act" (1938) further expands his functionalist psychology by integrating the evolutionary metaphor of development into a general theory of unity between organism and environment. Mead held that an object was a contributive part and a resultant product of psychological structuration. Objects of perception unite into a coherent experience. This unity demands that questions be raised about particular properties when their conduct and characteristics do not reach a "successful conclusion" (p. 11). In Hegelian terms, the inability of particulars to unite in their practical workings is what renders a situation unsatisfactory. Questioning results when the organism perceives problems in its encounters with objects. Objects are manipulated when the organism comes into contact with them and attempts to test the possibility of bringing them into conceptual unity through activity (p. 141). Mead suggested that

this process consisted of three stages: perception, manipulation, and consummation. In the latter stage, the test of knowledge is whether or not the organism can function satisfactorily in practical situations. This demands the aesthetic unity of self with objects perceived, manipulated, and "consumed" by the organism. Consummation of this sort is eminently Hegelian. In the *Phenomenology* (*PG* § 109), Hegel explains how the dialectic of sense-certainty is nothing other than the movement of consciousness through experience. Consciousness is always reaching towards a result (Mead's "successful conclusion"). Referring to the practical sphere, Hegel indicates that even animals have sense-certainty with regard to objects. Objects have no intrinsic meaning; they attain their reality through the practical dealings of the organism.

This pattern of thinking, which Mead called "reflective," arose in testing the means for carrying out continued action (Mead 1938, p. 79). There were five steps in this process: (1) the presence of a problem, (2) the statement of the problem in terms of the conditions of its possible resolution, (3) the getting of ideas or the forming of hypotheses, (4) the mental testing of hypotheses, and (5) the experimental testing of hypotheses. Again, there is a Hegelian-styled unity between the organism's self-concept, the speculated context of its action and perception, and the object which it perceives. Form (the problem) is articulated with its conceptual content (the terms and conditions of its reconciliation).

Like Dewey, Mead had faith that the procedural language of scientific methodology could reconcile practical problems. Moreover, for Dewey as for Mead, scientific methodology was synonymous with the practice of democratic decision-making, which, in turn, was synonymous with the practice of communal interaction (Diggins 1994). This meant that the procedural method of solving problems replicated the method by which an ideal community arrived at solutions to its moral problems. In the latter struggle, all variables may potentially unify and thus adapt to changing environmental conditions. And adaptation is what the democratic process was all about, for it is to provide (1) an equal voice to all individuals and (2) the universal satisfaction of diverse interests and desires (Reck 1964, p. xxxii). And a scientific researcher is expected to adapt, for

research is a "continued reconstruction of problems in the face of events of ceaseless novelty" (Mead 1932, p. 102).

While at the University of Michigan between 1891 and 1893, Mead had been attracted to Charles Horton Cooley's theory that consciousness was "a social process going on, within which the self and others arise" (1930, p. 700). By integrating Cooley's influential sociology, Mead developed the position that individualism arose only in the field of social experience and that it necessarily involved the recognition of other selves (Mead 1910, p. 174-80). This is consistent with Hegel's position that, ultimately, one attains self-consciousness during the face-to-face struggles of communal interaction. With this assumption, Mead developed his very influential theory that human being is essentially social. Self-consciousness, furthermore, assumed that human being had the capacity to be social with itself (i.e., to engage in self-reflection). Self-consciousness could not arise if human beings could not talk to themselves (Mead 1912, p. 105).

The tradition of social psychology inspired by Mead influenced the subsequent sociological traditions of role theory and symbolic interactionism (Reck 1964). Reck wonders, at one point, why Mead's social psychology had more impact than did the theories of some of his colleagues. The esteemed American philosopher, George Santayana, for example, was born the same year as Mead, both were students of Royce and James at Harvard, and Santayana survived Mead by over twenty years. Unlike Santayana, Mead (like Dewey) was able to make himself relevant to the American public by embedding his theories solidly in the world of practical problems (Reck 1964, p. lix). And, in Mead's day (as now), both the American public and professional elite demanded that philosophy be immediately useful, for there was great interest in manipulating and controlling the environment.

Mead focuses on the interaction between the organism and the world and, like Dewey, does not much concern himself with the nature of mind. It is the immediate problems in the environment which deserve attention, and, in Dewey's case, the organism's attention to those problems is the source of self-consciousness (Rorty 1982). The purpose of philosophy is thus to make it useful with regard to specific practical problems rather than to speculate over questions of

metaphysics or fundamental ontology. The pragmatic priorities of accomplishing tasks, along with the avoidance of the nature of mind itself, also emerge in the following analysis of Schön and Grimmett.

Schön begins his book (1983) with an account of the American university, tracing its origins to the late nineteenth-century German ideal of the multidisciplinary research institution. He then announces the presence of a problem. The established professions are suffering from a crisis of legitimacy which is rooted in a perceived incapacity to help society solve its newly arising problems. In response, Schön attempts to distinguish between "low-ground" and "high-ground" problems. Approaches to low-ground problems are characterized by what he terms "experience, trial and error, intuition, and muddling through." In his opinion, these low-ground problems are not being addressed by professional theory, which focuses on high-ground problems. Approaches to high-ground problems entail a methodology of problem-solving which stems from technical rationalism. Technical rationalism, as a methodology for thinking about professional knowledge and problem-solving, ignores the day-to-day contextual workings of practice. It attempts to universalize and codify particularities of practice without consideration for the idiosyncratic and spontaneous occurrences of low-ground problems.

From the perspective of technical rationalism, problems are solved through the construction of a two-stage process: (1) make sense of an uncertain situation (i.e., what to do; how to do it) and (2) apply available techniques to achieve a desirable end. This two-stage process is inadequate, claims Schön, for it ignores the uncertain and spontaneous predicaments in which professionals may find themselves. He cites three theorists who have grappled with the dilemma he describes (i.e., Schein, Glazer, Simon), but he says that each of them has attempted to fill the gap between a scientific basis of professional knowledge and the demands of real world practice by privileging abstract interpretations of practice. This abstract perspective is separate from the spontaneous and immediate occurrences of the practical setting. As a solution, Schön searches for a theory which will unify practitioners with their environment. To do this he pursues an inquiry which falls outside the model of technical rationalism and which adopts what he calls artistic ways

of coping in the "swampy lowland" of practice — a place where, he believes, lurk the prol ems of greatest human concern.

The familiar urgency of crisis is invoked: problems are not being adequately dealt with. The cause is alienation, and Schön locates it between the challenges which practitioners face and the swampy lowland of practical experience. A Kantian-Hegelian styled transition is constructed. The "high ground" of rationality codifies and presents universal solutions to concrete problems. In Hegelian style, practitioners and researchers need to consider the practical workings of the real world. Problems need to be addressed through a philosophy of action (Schön's "epistemology of practice") implicit in the processes by which human organisms adapt to the environment. Some of these processes deal with the manipulation of objects; others, with moral struggles. With regard to the former processes, Hegel and Mead will surface; with regard to the latter processes, Hegel, Mead, and Dewey will surface.

Schön remains distantly but necessarily connected to the philosophical discourse of modernity. He will search for an epistemology of "practice," but he will assume the presence of a tacit mind. In light of Mead's psychology, intelligence will be measured by whether or not it can function satisfactorily in practical human situations. In light of Dewey's theory of nature, I read Schön's characterization of the environment as unstable and uncertain (1983, p. 49). Reaching back to Fichte, Schön maintains that the environment is characterized by "value conflict." His concern will be with objects: with their perception, manipulation, and conceptual reconciliation, and with the moral struggles of the organism when practitioners engage in eye-to-eye confrontations.

There is a declining trust in positivist interpretations of professional practice, says Schön, and to justify his claim he refers to a rebirth of interest in the ancient topics of craft, artistry, and myth. Schön ignores myth, but he does employ a conception of craft and artistry in his "search ... for an epistemology of practice implicit in the artistic, intuitive processes which practitioners ... bring to situations of uncertainty, instability, uniqueness and value conflict" (Schön 1983, p. 49). The reference to intuition is significant. As I mentioned during my presentation of Déscartes'

Rules for the Direction of the Mind, intuition (from the Latin, *intueri*; to look upon) is metaphorically expressed as the mind's eye conceptualizing the world while interacting with it. The product of this reflective interaction is knowledge of the world or, in Schön's terms, an epistemology of practice.

Conceptual "reflection in action" brings up the third stage of Hegel's movement towards self-consciousness. Objects are perceived, consciousness "catches itself" devoting attention to them, and then consciousness reflects on both the objects of attention and their context. In Mead's and Hegel's terms, perception is transformed into "sense"(-certainty) through the manipulation of objects. Reflective knowing comes about when attention shifts to consciousness itself.

Schön begins by arguing that we are often not able to articulate what we know and that "knowing is in our action" (Schön 1983, p. 49) — Mead's classic theoretical assertion (1936, p. 345). Knowing is the process of reflecting on action, and it is central to the "art" by which practitioners deal with situations of uncertainty, instability, uniqueness, and/or value conflict. People appeal to what Schön calls "common sense" for a kind of knowing which does not stem from a prior intellectual operation but which is unconscious or tacit. Schön quotes Polanyi (1958, p. 12): "When we learn to use a tool, or probe, or a stick for feeling our way, our initial awareness of its impact on our hand is transformed into a sense of its point touching the objects we are exploring." "Feeling" is a perception, the impact of which is transformed into a "sense" of meaning through touching explored objects. Our initial "feelings," therefore, are internalized as a tacit dimension of knowledge. We then allegedly behave according to rules and procedures that we cannot describe and of which we are often unaware.

Reflective knowing thus has the following properties: (1) we do not have to think about it, (2) we are often unaware of having learned to do the things we do, and (3) we are unable to describe the knowing which our action reveals. Action reveals knowledge, but "intelligence of action" (to use Dewey's term) is unthought, unaware, undescribed, and a mystery. This assumes the presence of two minds: (1) a conscious dimension of explicit knowledge and (2) an

unconscious dimension of tacit knowledge, both of which communicate through gesture (which may include metaphorical language).

Schön provides the examples of baseball pitchers and jazz musicians, both of whom learn and perform through on-the-spot adjustments and both of whom develop a "feel" for what is going on. In other words, they develop what could be called a "theory-in-action" which converts an unconscious knowing-in-action to knowledge-in-action. It is through this mode of reflection-in-action that teachers, as practitioners, cope with troublesome "divergent" situations in the classroom. When the phenomenon at hand eludes the ordinary categories of knowledge-in-practice, action theories "surface" from the tacit dimension of thought to criticize initial understandings of phenomena, construct new descriptions of them, and test these new descriptions through on-the-spot experimentation. Reflection-in-action ultimately returns to Hegel's project of bringing particularities to universality through sense-certainty, self-conscious awareness, and reasoned critical self-awareness. Schön goes on to describe the continuity between means and ends.

> When someone reflects-in-action, he becomes a researcher in the practice context. He is not dependent on the categories of established theory and technique but he constructs a new theory of the unique case ... He does not keep means and ends separate, but defines them interactively as he frames a problematic situation ... Implementation is built into his inquiry (p. 68).

When someone reflects in action, he or she is doing what the organism is doing in its natural environment; that is, adapting to changing conditions. Uniting means and ends interactively is what Hegel meant by adaptive comprehension, and he illustrated this with the example of the bud, blossom, and fruit (*PG* § 2). More directly, Mead's scientific methodology is here revived as involvement (recognition of the presence of a problem), manipulation, articulation of the problem, testing of hypotheses, and drawing of conclusions.

This functionalist dialectic has been used by many in the field of teacher development. Zeichner (1986), in describing the various approaches to teacher preparation, utilizes a concept of learning in which implementation is built into inquiry. Inquiry, as a reflective reasoning about human action, is an internationally recognized approach to teacher education and development. It

has entered the pedagogical approaches of action research (see, for example, McNiff 1988; Liston and Zeichner 1990), journal writing (Krol 1995), assumptions regarding teacher supervision (Smyth 1991; Grimmett and Crehan 1990), and curriculum analysis (Common and Grimmett 1992). In spite of its wide application, Grimmett (1988) observes that few who use the term "reflection" actually agree on its meaning. This could be due to the fact that, although reflection has been accepted as a powerful metaphor for reasoning and knowing, there has been little critical examination of its genealogy.

Grimmett has also traced reflective reasoning beyond Schön to the philosophy of Dewey (1933), who characterized reflection as a specialized form of thinking which led to purposeful activity. "The function of reflective thought is, therefore, to transform a situation in which there is experienced obscurity, doubt, conflict, disturbance of some sort, into a situation that is clear, coherent, settled, harmonious" (Dewey 1933, pp. 100-01)

Here, again, we have Hegelian universality. Reflection, as a way of reasoning about experience, reconciles alienation and thus leads to meaningful activity (Grimmett 1988). The perplexing nature of experience is conceptualized as a problem which must be resolved; hypotheses must be tested by mental reasoning, and the thinker must endure the suspense of (re)searching (Dewey 1933, p. 16). Ideas are ordered in a reasonable pattern which leads to a trustworthy "conclusion," a concept consistent with Mead's action psychology (1938, p. 11). Grimmett quotes Dewey as follows:

> First, the process of forming the idea or supposed solution is checked by constant cross reference to the conditions observed to be actually present; secondly, the idea after it is formed is tested by acting upon it, overtly if possible, otherwise in imagination. The consequences of this action confirm, modify, or refute the idea. (Dewey, 1933, pp. 104-05, quoted in Grimmett, 1988, p. 7)

The Hegelian pattern of sense-certainty, self-conscious awareness, and reasoned reflection on context and object is again present. Even more visible is the scientific method of gathering data, forming hypotheses, testing hypotheses, and arriving at valid conclusions. Experience is ordered by an organism engaged in action, and the presence of mind is tacit. Explicit action is the focus: a hypothesis is checked, tested, and acted upon. The process of learning, as adaptation, can

be metaphorically likened to a reflection of light on an object, for it is out of the darkness of student unknowing that the light of professional practical knowledge arises (Grimmett 1988, p. 11). Furthermore, the attainment of knowledge relies on the existence of a self-empowered human subject who uses the mind's eye in order to speculate on the illuminated world. It is this visual bias which locates Schön's concept of reflection-in-action within the philosophical tradition stretching back to Plato's cave and Meno's soul.

Indeed, Schön uses Plato to illustrate how reflective reasoning works. The Meno story

> captures the very feeling of mystery, confusion, frustration and futility that many students experience in their early months or years of [professional] study. He [the student] knows he needs to look for something but does not know what that something is. He seeks to learn it, moreover, in the sense of coming to know it *in action*. Yet, in the first instance, he can neither do it nor recognize it when he sees it. Hence, he is caught up in a self-contradiction: "looking for something" implies a capacity to recognize the thing one looks for but the student lacks at first the capacity to recognize the object of his search. The instructor is caught up in the same paradox: he cannot tell the student what he needs to know, even if *he* has words for it, because the student would not at that point understand him. (Schön 1983, p. 83; emphasis in original)

The need to "look," "recognize," and "see the object" further displays the ocular metaphors upon which reflective reasoning rests. It demands rational problem-setting and -solving in order to predict and control a world which is objectively conceptualized by a subjective mind. Schön explains:

> In the real world of practice, problems do not present themselves to the practitioner as givens. They must be constructed from the material or problematic situations that are puzzling, troubling and uncertain ... When we set the problem, we select what we will treat as the "things" of the situation, we set the boundaries of our attention to it, and we impose upon it a coherence which allows us to say what is wrong and in what directions the situation needs to be changed. Problem setting is a process in which, interactively, we *name* the things to which we will attend and *frame* the context in which we will attend to them (1983, p. 40; emphasis in original)

This conceptual framework places immense responsibility on the human subject and, thus, is consistent with the concept of power which emerged in Lieberman's and McLaughlin's respective analyses of teacher development. Problematic structures must be constructed; that is, they must be rhetorically conceptualized as objective entities by what is presumed to be an intentional mind with the will and power to manipulate the world. "We select the problem" from

an arbitrary store of possibilities, evaluate those possibilities, and treat the "things" that we feel merit our attention. As empowered agents, we name those things and concepts to which we will attend. Conceptual naming exerts control over the perceived uncertainties of the world, so that objects can have a use-value. What practitioners essentially "see" in an uncertain situation depends on what they make of it and how they "converse" with it. Reflective exchange with the situation leads to further framing and reframing (i.e., further conceptualization), for "the situation talks back, the practitioner listens, and as he appreciates what he hears, he reframes the situation once again" (Schön 1983, pp. 131-32). Here is the echo of Mead's reflexive conversation (1913, p. 377), which assumes that the subject can make an object of itself. The subject converses with an object of its own making and continually remakes and reconstructs both it and itself as it moves towards mastery.

Grimmett (1988) clarifies Schön's knowing-in-action by citing Carter (1984). According to Carter, the cornerstone for human beings' moral deliberations is akin to an intellectual condition of the eye in which the rays of distant objects are brought into focus before they reach the retina; in a word, shortsightedness. Grimmett next proceeds to Donmoyer (1985), who contrasts the pursuit of meaning with the pursuit of truth or facts.

Grimmett provides us with three conceptions of reflection in teacher development literature.

(1)   thoughtfulness about action originating in the consultation of research which is applied to practice (reflection as the instrumental mediation of action);

(2)   thoughtfulness about action originating from consultation and deliberation between competing versions of good teaching (reflection as deliberation among competing views of teaching); and

(3)   thoughtfulness about action originating in the direct experience of the practitioner in the situation-at-hand (reflection as the reconstruction of experience)

Direct experience has three aspects, and in each of these reflective thinking can redefine and alter action. These aspects of direct experience deal with the immediate context, the self within the immediate context, and the self within the wider context, thus forming what becomes an organic whole of subjective existence.

(1a)   appreciation and apprehension of the immediate setting of practice with an eye towards its redefinition;

(2a)   appreciation and apprehension of the self-concept with an eye towards self-definition; and

(3a)   appreciation and apprehension of the wider setting of practice with an eye towards its redefinition in social, political, and cultural terms.

The above triumvirate attempts to encompass an environmental totality: the self in its immediate setting within the wider cultural setting. For clarification, I consulted a paper published by Grimmett and colleagues in 1990, where they characterize the content of reflective inquiry in teacher development literature. The purpose of that review was to devise an extensive system for categorizing reflective reasoning in teacher education (p. 22). Three basic epistemological questions were asked: (1) Is knowledge seen as an external source for mediating action in the sense that it directs teachers in their practice? (2) Is knowledge regarded as informing practice as teachers deliberate among competing alternatives for action? and (3) Does knowledge constitute one source of information that teachers use to apprehend practice as they reconstruct experience? The task is to arrive at an interpretation of epistemology which can structure the attainment of knowledge so as to prioritize human interaction with the environment. How is meaning obtained? What is its source? To what use is it put? (p. 22). I now address each of Grimmett's three categories of reflection.

Category (1): Reflection as the instrumental mediation of action. In this category the source of knowledge is the external authority provided by conclusions drawn from empirical research. The mode of knowing is that of technical application (Zumwalt 1982), and knowledge is

used to direct practice. The knower applies external knowledge within the venue of the practical setting and ensures that his or her practice conforms to the conclusions of scientific research. New knowledge comes from authorities outside the immediate practical educational setting. There are some reminders here of technical rationalism.

Category (2): Reflection as deliberation among competing views of teaching. In this category, educational events are considered in context, but an external authority remains the source of valuable knowledge. According to Grimmett et al. (1990):

> Those who subscribe to this perspective on reflection are distinguished by their attention to the context of educational events and by the idea that, in reflecting about particular events in context, one deliberates between and among competing views of teaching and examines each in light of the consequences of the action it entails. Thus, there is a tendency for those who espouse this perspective to subscribe to an eclectic view of knowledge, the test of which is whether it benefits student learning. (p. 26)

A prime example of how this category works itself out in the school setting is documented by Grimmett and Crehan (1991). Here, an experienced teacher interacts with a supervising principal over a two-year period. Grimmett and Crehan focus on what Schön describes as a "reflective transformation of experience" (Schön 1988, p. 25). This transformation takes place when a teacher "names" what is relevant and "frames" it within the context of its use, appealing to images, understanding, and past action (Schön 1983; 1987). This may include framing what is relevant through the use of metaphorically generated poetic images and narrative constructions. Grimmett and Crehan cite Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and Connelly and Clandinin (1988) to support their view that conscious experience brings forth and embodies metaphorical images which are then made explicit in theories which guide practice.

Category (3): Reflection as the reconstruction of experience. For all three aspects of this category (immediate practice situation, self-concept, wider practice situation), the source of knowledge is found in the context of the action setting and in its practical application (Grimmett et al. 1990). Grimmett et al. refer to this mode of knowing as "dialectical," implying that consciousness progresses towards some resolution. The interpretation of experience, they write, is a matter of "seeing-as," where the mind casts, recasts, reframes, and reconstructs an

understanding in order to generate fresh experience. This dialectical process is demonstrated in the following three subcategories of reflective practice.

Category (1a): Appreciation and apprehension of the immediate setting of practice with an eye towards its redefinition. Garman (1986) provides a five-stage technique which defines dialectical redefinition as a new way of seeing. These five stages are: (1)involvement; (2) recording the scenario for conceptual manipulation; (3) making sense of the records; (4) making a hypothesis; and (5) drawing conclusions from the tested hypothesis. Again, scientific methodology is combined with a Hegelian dialectic. Garman provides an ordered procedure for conceptualizing, hypothesizing, predicting, and reconceptualizing metaphorical understandings of experience so that what is interpreted may contribute to future interpretations.

(2a): Appreciation and apprehension of the self-concept with an eye towards self-definition. Theorists with this interest focus on what contributes to teacher identity. Munby (1986), for example, applied the theories of Lakoff and Johnson (1980) to develop a notion of how "seeing-as" influenced the development of teachers' practical knowledge. From another angle, Elbaz (1981, 1983) employed metaphorical "images" to explain teachers' beliefs and values. She stated that such images permitted teachers to

> marshall experience, theoretical knowledge and school folklore ... to guide teachers
> thinking and to organize knowledge in the relevant area. The image is generally
> imbued with a judgment of value and constitutes a guide to the intuitive realization
> of the teacher's purposes. (1983, p. 61)

The word "marshall" derives from socio-political contexts of behavior-enforcement and, as a verb, may be defined as "ordering" in an appropriate and effective way. It is directly related to the French word *marcher*, which means "to march." In an effort to order the environment, experiences are conceptualized, organized, and imbued with normative value. Reflective reasoning is once more applied as a strategy for bringing projects to their completion (including the daunting project of mastering one's self), thereby exerting control over an objectively conceptualized world. As Grimmett et al. (1990) say:

> reflection shapes and restructures one's personal knowledge about teaching as well
> as about life. Such reconstruction of self-as-teacher enables the knower to

appreciate and transform his or her understanding of the cultural milieu in which he or she attempts to practice pedagogy. (p. 31)

One of the clearest presentations of this specific interpretation of reflective thinking is found in a study conducted by MacKinnon and Grunau (1994), who examined an organizational structure designed to support teachers at several stages of professional growth during a time of rapid and extensive curriculum reform. They sought to investigate "forums of action," such as behaviors, mannerisms, and gestures used in learning to teach. Their observations were guided by the social psychology of Mead (1932, 1934), and they argued that experiences within these forums enabled prospective teachers to "see" classroom experiences in a new way (MacKinnon and Grunau 1994, p. 167). A student teacher learns to see phenomena by appreciating and distinguishing the normative significance of the language which experienced teachers use when discussing teaching. MacKinnon and Grunau concluded that the way student teachers understand experience depends on how they regard the generalized "other" as the "good teacher." It is pertinent to note that this image involves a concept of education-as-guidance and re-emphasizes a point raised in Chapter 1, where I discuss a metaphorical turning in teacher development. Metaphor performs a didactic function in articulating communal values. It points to some promise (i.e., homecoming) in exchange for the struggle inherent in the process of teacher development. In this case, the promise is that of mastery over a changing and unpredictable classroom environment.

(3a) Appreciation and apprehension of the wider setting of practice with an eye towards its redefinition in social, political, and cultural terms. This third aspect of reflection draws on Habermas (1971). Van Maanen (1977), drawing on Habermas, sets up three levels of reflection which correspond to three forms of knowledge. The first level of reflection entails empirical-analytical knowledge, which is concerned with ends-means questions regarding how theory relates to practice and vice-versa. There is some correspondence here with the apprehension of the immediate setting of practice (Category 1a). The second level of reflection concerns, hermeneutic-phenomenological knowledge which deals with the life-worlds of other human beings, and we

can see here some similarities with regard to the appreciation and apprehension of the self-concept (Category 2a). The third level of reflection is qualitatively different from the others, in that it entails the objectification of abstract collections of practices into assumptions and norms which determine how actions are practiced and how self-concept is defined. Smyth (1986, 1991) and Carr and Kemmis (1983) are the major theorists associated with this latter stance towards the morality of education and schooling (Smyth 1986, p. 18). The point of reflective thinking is to develop emancipatory strategies vis-à-vis the redefinition of direct experience and identity-formation.

In all, these three levels of reflection articulate an epistemological position which assumes the presence of a human mind which constructs its conceptual picture of the world through interacting with it. Reflective thinking, on all three levels, is a strategy for achieving some sort of emancipatory reconciliation, be it through an autonomous self-consciousness or through practical freedom (both require the assumed presence of an intentional mind which reframes taken-for-granted assumptions, reconceptualizes them in order to make them adaptable to changing objective conditions, and thus exerts control over the environment). The source of knowledge on all three levels is external.

Reflective reasoning is an attempt to reconcile human being's alienation from the world. I argue that this form of reasoning assumes the Cartesian notion of mind as some mental power separated from the world but united to it through adaptive interaction. It is an organic model which assumes the ability of scientific methodologies to arrive at reasoned purposes, and it draws on Hegelian notions of self-conscious awareness. Reflective inquiry also borrows from behaviorism as initiated by James and Dewey and refined by Mead. Schön borrows from Dewey and Mead and observes that institutions which rely on traditional theories of mind are alienated from the world of daily practice. Schön believed that knowing was to be found in action, and this required the formation of an epistemology which would make research synonymous with organic action in the environment. This epistemology (along with its metaphors) is foreshadowed in psychological behaviorism, pragmatic philosophy, biological theory, and Hegelianism. I would argue,

therefore, that future studies of reflective practice need to include a comprehensive examination of the philosophical and psychological traditions which both precede and encompass them. And, by extension, so must the literature on teacher development.

In the following and final chapter, I describe how metaphors of sight are central both to the philosophical tradition of modernity and to the notion of truth implicit within the literature on teacher development. Hegel wrote that the eye of the human Spirit had to be forcibly turned to the things of the world; I will argue, in conclusion, that the eye of that spirit has become increasingly short-sighted.

Chapter 6

The Piety of Teacher Development

I have shown that the literature on teacher development is part of a much older and larger story of consciousness. This story has, as its lesson, the unification of particulars. After Hegel, the point of the narrative has been the reconciliation of all conceptual dualisms, the primary one being that of human/world. Uniting this primary dualism has traditionally called for a dialectic which, in Hegel's and Dewey's respective cases, was expressed as the organic process of life itself. The joining of all particulars into a universal demands some scientific theory, in the original Greek sense of *theoria*: a way of seeing all existence.

From the preface to the final words of the previous chapter, a consistent poetic metaphor for the grand narrative of consciousness and the derived narrative of teacher development has been *sight*. It began with my allegory of the pilgrim who had faith in a gleaming city on the horizon of significance. It continued into Descartes' directions for the mind — directions which sought the clear, natural light of reason. Those who "walked in darkness" weakened their eyesight, and this impeded their ability to bear the light of day. I first introduced the ocular metaphor of reflection in Chapter 1, where I described how teachers constructed mental representations in order to understand their practice. Knowledge came about through a reflective methodology which transformed external perceptions into internal mental contents, which could then be expressed as practical concepts and actions.

After the Enlightenment, an empowered human subject was assumed to have a mind's eye and a methodological lens with which to speculate on an illuminated world. Human being had the power to draw on its images, recall them, adapt to and manipulate them, and then to reflect upon them. Schön's epistemological looking, recognizing, and seeing objects reflectively demanded a basic scientific practice. This practice is known as prediction, which presupposes the ability to

solve problems by ordering phenomena rationally, testing that ordering, and comparing the results to a speculative hypothesis.[1]

The ocular metaphor arose once more in Chapter 5 during descriptions of reflective transformations of experience as "seeing-as," in which the mind casts, recasts, reframes, and reconstructs understandings (Grimmett et al. 1990). It was also present in Garman's (1986) reflective dialectic, and Carter (1984) used it as a cornerstone for human beings' moral deliberations. Clearly, the metaphor of sight is a dominant motif of the philosophical tradition behind teacher development. It refers to one of the body's functions, and it unites implicit with explicit consciousness through (inter)action with the environment.

In Chapter 1 and Chapter 5, I indicated that the metaphor of sight was present in the articulation of politics and ethics. It aroused commitment, motivated action, and invoked such traditional Christian notions as trust. It was instrumental in providing the promise of an ultimate homecoming. This promise, with its rewards of knowledge, power, freedom, mastery, predictability, and security, fulfills the myth known as "teacher development." I have argued that teacher development is part of a much larger myth — a myth composed of both philosophical and theological traditions. The ultimate promise of the metaphor of sight is the reconciliation of all single obstacles which stand in the way of arriving at the celestial city, however that might be defined.

Hegel used the metaphor of sight in an ontological context in order to explain how the meaning of existence once hung from a thread of light suspended from heaven (*PG* § 8). Like the apostles who watched Christ's ascension in the first verses of Acts, human being's gaze was fixed on a heavenly realm instead of on the affairs of the world. Hegel wrote that the "eye of the [human] Spirit" had to be forcibly turned to the "here and now" of experience. This was also how Paul used sight in 2 Corinthians 3 and 4, where he described the splendor of "the Law" as being dull in comparison to the brightness of the spirit of Christ.

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[1] The importance of prediction to the epistemology of modernity is an idea which I picked up from Avital Ronnell during a symposium on the work of the late Guy Debords, University of California, Berkeley, July 5, 1995.

Dolan (1994) writes that the founding gesture of the metaphor of sight is to be found in Plato's *Republic*. Here, an invisible and incomprehensible realm of perfect forms provides a reference point for reflection, reducing multiplicity to a single, univocal Goodness (Dolan 1994, p. 4). It is interesting to see what Heidegger makes of Plato's allegory. In brief, the story is as follows.

Plato (1945, pp. 227-35) describes an assembly of prisoners who are chained by the feet and neck so that may see only images which a fire throws on the wall of their cave. Plato explains that the cave is an "image" for the earthly realm, which is revealed to us through our sense of sight. The fire which burns in the cave is the "image" of the sun. Whatever goes on around the prisoners is, to them, true reality. In the cave the prisoners feel "at home," for in the cave they find what they assume is the truth of Being. When one of the prisoners is freed, he looks back and sees that what he had previously taken to be real were only images, and he is almost blinded by the brightness of the fire. Looking back at the fire causes great confusion, for he cannot comprehend that what he had formerly seen was only a shadow of the real. He then ascends into the clear light of day. At first he needs to become accustomed to the upper world, which is illuminated by the brilliant light of the sun. In the sun's brightness, phenomena manifest themselves in their immediacy. Outside the cave, the sun is the "image" for that which makes all ideas visible. The liberated prisoner thus draws the conclusion that the sun is the highest idea and that it controls everything — that it is the first cause of the images he and his colleagues used to see and believe were true. Having now seen the ideas in their essential form, he calls to mind his fellow prisoners in the cave. He returns to the bowels of the cave and re-enters a realm of darkness. Upon his return to his colleagues, however, he is surprised to find that they ridicule him, because his sight is now ruined by a kind of vision which they cannot understand. They conclude unanimously that the difficult ascent to the upper world is not worthwhile. And, according to Plato, if the liberated man attempted to free them, they would resist and even kill him.

This is a story about moving from darkness into light and then back into darkness. Heidegger (1947) is interested in what occurs during these movements, all of which demand a reorientation of eyesight. Something distinct occurs in whatever metaphor is used to represent the human essence (human nature, consciousness, soul, heart, mind, spirit) at each of the four stages of the allegory (confinement, release, illumination, and return). *Paideia* means total inversion, as in being uprooted from one realm and deposited in another. This transplanting is only possible if everything commonly accepted as the truth is changed. "Truth" is translated in Greek as *aletheia*, which may be translated into English as "unhiddenness" but which has come to mean an agreement between the concept and the thing itself. Heidegger insists that if we were to think of *paideia* and *aletheia* as the Greeks thought of them, then "education" and "truth" would be seen as comprising an essential unity. *Paideia* has to do with seizing and transforming one's essence so that it may adapt to a new metaphorical region. Plato's allegory illustrates such a definition of education and, at the same time, offers a glimpse into his notion of "truth." Heidegger claims that there is a relationship between Plato's notion of truth and the meaning of education and, further, that the essence of truth and the manner of its change is what first made modern "education" possible.

Plato's allegory takes place in four different abodes, and in each the truth (the unhidden and its unhiddenness) is dependent upon the region in which it resides. During the stage of confinement, for example, the truth is shadows of artificial objects. During the stage of release, the prisoner is freed from physical bondage but can only roam around in the cave. He comes somewhat nearer to things which were once only shadowy images and enters into a region in which things are "more unhidden" (i.e., more truthful). The mere act of shedding one's bonds is not real freedom. It is in the open air that a total inversion (a *paideia*) takes place — a transformative reorientation of "essence," as is effected through the prisoner's illumination by the newly discovered sun. The narrative does not end with this third stage, however. It ends with the liberated and illuminated prisoner returning to the cave to lead the others to what he has discovered. But the would-be liberator is silenced by the standard for truth in the darkness. For

Heidegger, it is at this fourth stage that the truth, as unhiddenness, no longer shines but must be extracted, invited, plucked, uprooted, and unraveled. At this stage truth, for the Greeks, was what was wrested from hiddenness; and there are many forms of engaging in hiddenness: enclosing, hoarding, disguising, covering-up, veiling, dissimulating, and so on. The most extremely hidden things in metaphorical darkness must be wrested from concealment.

Heidegger argues that the transitions from the region of artificial light into the radiance of the sun and back are all essential features of the allegory. But he argues that the interpretive force of the story does not arise from either the image of being enclosed in a subterranean chamber or from the freedom and openness outside it. The interpretive force is in the role of the fire, the firelight, the shadows, the sun, the sunlight, and the darkness of the cave. Everything in the allegory depends on the shining of the phenomenal — on the possibility of its visibility — and not on what is covered or hidden. Truth is conceived of as the act of perceiving the *idea* "as seeing." The adjustment involved in directing one's sight towards ideas is the essence of perception and inference and, consequently, the essence of the development of "reason." It is the eye which enables truth to be seen and known. As *idea*, the essential Form of Goodness is something that shines, and what is Good is that which is sighted properly. According to Heidegger, *paideia* consists in making us free to see the Idea. In other words, Plato deals with the correctness of looking towards the *idea* and not in uncovering an unhiddenness. As unhiddenness, truth is a basic feature of human subjectivity; but as correctness of sight, it is a particular attitude towards the correct development of a human identity and its activities.

Heidegger is interested in why Plato's notion of education is particularly concerned with correctness of vision. He proposes that *aletheia* (as unhiddenness) is mentioned and discussed by Plato, while *orthotis* (as correctness) is the standard for the highest truth. Plato writes: "For all things the essential Form of Goodness is the cause (the possibility of essence) of whatever is right [*ortha*] and good [*kala*] [*he tou agathou idea panton orthon te ke kai kalou aetia*]" (Plato 1945, p. 231). But he adds that the essential Form of Goodness is itself sovereign in the intelligible world as the master of truth and intelligence (*kuria aletheian ke noun paraschomeni*). Heidegger suggests

that *aletheia* does not correspond to what is right (*ortho*) as intelligence (*nous*), nor to what is good (*kala*); rather, *aletheia* loses its meaning as "unhiddenness" and comes to mean "correctness." This usage has significant implications, says Heidegger, for, ever since Plato, philosophers have worked towards attaining truth as a correctness of "seeing." The decisive methodology with regard to all phenomena has become the acquisition of the right way of focusing on the "Idea," and this has been incorporated into a philosophy of education.

With metaphysics and with Christian theology, the role of *paideia* as educational development has meant correctness of vision vis-à-vis the highest Idea, and this has influenced those who have thought and written about teacher development. Heidegger summarizes the general implications in the following way. The beginning of metaphysics in Plato's thinking is also the beginning of "Humanism." In broad terms, Humanism places "Man" at the center of beings. "Man" in the humanist sense can refer to humankind, the individual, or the community. When defined in this way, the human being is induced to free her/his potential through self-definition and the attainment of his/her "life." This comes about through molding her/his "moral" conduct (as salvation, as an unfolding of her/his creative powers, as development of reason, as cultivation of personality, as awakening of common sense, etc.). With Humanism we get what amounts to an ocular stance towards the world and its horizon of significant possibilities — possibilities towards which "Man" can develop.

The notion of humanism is crucial to the unfolding of the allegory of teacher development. Rousseau's notion of the human essence and Hegel's deification of the human spirit emphasizes freedom, moral perfection, salvation, and empowerment along with the cultivation of the personality and common sense. This was, writes Rorty (1991), the basic motive of Hegelianism and of pragmatism. Once the behaviorist, scientific, and biological rhetoric is stripped away, one is left with a romantic hope for the kind of society which the French Revolution tried to build through the application of abstract principles — a world in which every human is given a fair chance to develop her/his potential. It is this hope which enables the story of teacher development to unfold as a tragic narrative of liberation through metaphorical death and resurrection.

In my review of the historical use of metaphor, I wrote that the separation of implicit and explicit realms of mind was part of a philosophical tradition which ran from Plato to Nietzsche. Thereafter, a more radical interpretation of metaphor emerged. To think of metaphor as a *source* of beliefs rather than as a mere vehicle for *expressing* beliefs is ' , think of language and logic as open-ended. Open-endedness resists the closure associated with bringing the believer to a correctness of conceptual vision — a closure which I referred to in the preface as "fixed points of intellectual and moral destinations." According to Rorty, to embrace open-endedness

> is to abandon the idea that the aim of thought is the attainment of the God's eye view. The philosophical tradition downgraded metaphor because recognizing metaphor as a third source of truth would have endangered the conception of philosophy as a process culminating in vision [-as-]*theoria*. (1991, p. 12)

According to Heidegger, the aim of philosophical thought is to free us from language by reminding us that our language is not an inherent part of "human reason" but a human creation (p. 16). Reminding the reader of this was one of the reasons I reviewed the philosophical tradition of modernity before entering into a discussion of teacher development literature. And it is one of the reasons that I would like to conclude my dissertation with a discussion of the late nineteenth-century philologist, Friedrich Nietzsche. I strongly believe that Nietzsche's theory of metaphorical language may help us to abandon the God's eye-perspective which now characterizes the literature on teacher development.

Nietzsche (1956) distinguished between the visual (*bildlich*) bias of form and the non-visual (*unbildlich*) bias of formlessness in traditional philosophy. It is the visual hegemony of form which provides the model for culture as well as for contemporary philosophy (Levin 1993; Jay 1993). As I have already indicated, this bias has its origins in Platonism. Nietzsche's distinction between visual form and non-visual formlessness can be read as a rejection of Plato's interpretation of learning as a grasping of conceptual knowledge. Nietzsche insisted that concepts should be understood as fictional representations which provide human beings with the illusory certainty that there are graspable truths (Nietzsche 1956). He argues that the ancient Greeks were esteemed by Schiller, Hegel, Marx, and Dewey because of a notion of truth which sees all

phenomena in terms of their conceptual representation. This notion separated conceptual reality from dream reality and designated the former as the "really real." Coping with an experience, therefore, entailed thinking of it in conceptual terms in order to render it knowable and, hence, controllable. Concepts mediated experience so that human beings could function and interact collectively in order to achieve common ends. This interaction was facilitated by a common, metaphorical language.

Nietzsche was keenly aware of the power of discourse to structure existence. In *Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense* (1964), Nietzsche argues that a concept is not part of an epistemological system but a fictional metaphor which cannot be the equal of what it attempts to represent: "*Jeder Begriff ensteht durch Gleichsetzen des Nichtgleichen*" (p. 179). For example, each person differs from every other. A unified concept of what is individually good (to be) and right (to do) can only be formed through the selection of certain similarities and the omission of various differences. Nietzsche argues that what is included and/or omitted regarding the construction of identity is entirely arbitrary. Once constructed, however, some identities are more equal than others (hence racism, sexism, etc.). In other words, cultural resources may be unequally allocated so that those who are considered to be the same are privileged over those who are considered to be different. Such inclusions and omissions are inherently repressive, for deviation from the norm results in exclusion and/or marginalization.

Metaphorical concepts represent privileged truths, but they hold no "truth" for Nietzsche, who regards them as convenient fictions. Their purpose is to represent a culturally workable "reality"; they are what provide human beings with laws, privileges, and notions of acceptable behavior. In other words, they provide human beings with a schemata by which to assess the morality of their conduct (Nietzsche 1964, pp. 181-82). Nietzsche proposes that laws, privileges, and so on have nothing to do with an inherent human morality or nature. It is permitted, indeed encouraged, to call into question the arbitrary structure of cultural/moral orderings. Responding to this challenge would involve, first of all, recalling that concepts are merely reflections of the human preoccupation with creating a contingent and workable reality. It involves, further, asking

who benefits and who loses with regard to any given cultural ordering. Nietzsche goes so far as to suggest that we deconstruct culture itself, and this involves doubting the truth value of all cultural orderings. This opened the way for the twentieth-century poststructuralism of Foucault and the anti-structuralism of Heidegger and Derrida (Megill 1985).

Nietzsche, like the other philosophers discussed in this dissertation, wished for unity; but he simply did not believe that it was possible. Human beings are shut out from the immediate reality of the world — a world which they can only mediate through language. This means that thinking can never be a science; it must remain an "awkward portrayal" of reality (*tastendes Spiel*) (Nietzsche 1964, p. 175). By implication, moral and philosophical arguments do not originate from some explicit consciousness or from an implicit subconscious essence but from expressive (*ausschaulich*) metaphors which combine to form conceptual schemata (Nietzsche 1974, p. 179). Based on such fictitious schemata, human beings attempt to regulate their culture.

Nietzsche does provide some comfort by saying that conceptualizing is a necessary part of human survival. Human beings cannot have culture without using metaphorical concepts, including that of development. Problems arise, however, when people forget the fictitious status of metaphorical concepts. When one puts unquestioning faith in concepts and schemata, one can become deluded into believing that language and truth are identical (Nietzsche 1974). To paraphrase Nietzsche, humans build their shelters close to the cathedral of science; they buttress its walls and find protection in its presence and shadow for it provides them with a sense of certainty and security (1974, p. 187). Nietzsche wishes to inform us that the cathedral of metaphysics, in which the parishioners of humanism worship, is built on sand. The task is not to eliminate conceptual representation altogether, since this is culturally impractical; the task is to search for a path of thinking which recognizes the fictional status of metaphorical truths. Nietzsche proposes that we think towards difference and that we remember that a penchant for any one "truth" is nothing more than an aesthetic preference (Nietzsche 1966).

In continuing on Nietzsche's path, I have attempted to illuminate the rhetoric which is employed to order a conceptual schemata for teacher development. I have attempted to assess

teacher development as one cultural response to the universal human predicament of alienation, and I have also attempted to determine the authority behind its metaphysical assumptions — to show what cultural myths supply the rhetoric which enable it to choose an order, a point, and a moral justification. As I said in the introduction to Chapter 5, this endeavor requires some familiarity with the thinkers whose rhetorical fictions have been subsumed within the teacher development literature. It was through these fictions, these assumed truths, that researchers approach teacher development. They then address it through metaphors and narratives which are clearly recognizable as part of the philosophical discourse of modernity.

Finally, I should explain the title of this concluding chapter before returning to my own "pietistic" autobiography. Some theoreticians in this study have offered readers choices between what they interpret to be correct and incorrect ways of thinking. Grimmett (1991), for example, offers a way of hope and a way of danger; Hargreaves (1993) offers a choice between modernity and postmodernity. Whatever direction is chosen by teacher-pilgrims on the path of development will be fraught with both perils and joys.

Lyotard (1985) indicates the value of hindsight. He observes a tendency which has been present throughout the history of Western thought — the preference for pietism over paganism (Dolan 1994, pp. 6-7). The foremost example of piety is to be found in Platonism, the essence of which lies in the assertion that the pure state of freedom lies in the essential Form of Goodness. Focusing on the pious means always being aware that the present is in some state of depravity. Living piously implies the continuous representation of some ideal polity, over there, on the horizon, that must somehow be reached in order to cure society and all of its ills. Such a piety, says Lyotard (during a conversation with Jean-Loup Thébaud), has motivated the history of Western notions of political and ethical thought since Plato.

> We are dealing with discursive orderings whose operations are dual, something that is characteristic of the West: on the one hand, a theoretical operation that seeks to define scientifically, in the sense of the Platonic *episteme*, or in the Marxist sense, or indeed in some other one, the object the society is lacking in order to be a good or a just society; on the other hand, plugged into this theoretical ordering, there are some implied discursive orderings that determine the measures to be taken in order

to bring [society] into conformity with the representation of justice that was worked out in theoretical discourse. (1985, p. 21)

The "other ones" of which Lyotard speaks could be Hegel, Dewey, and/or Mead. In the case of the discursive ordering which I have been referring to as teacher development, the healing condition which the teacher culture is lacking is the reconciliation of the individual with the community, or of the organism with its environment. These are attempts to unite the essence of the teacher's being with some source of ultimate power through reflective thinking and communal interaction. What makes this endeavor pious is not just the rhetorical phantasm of some ideal *polis* but the hope of attaining it through following correct procedures. Pietism also entails representing human being as somehow bewildered and astray, looking for a truth that will somehow enable it to be at home in the world. It was Nietzsche who warned that such secular piety is disastrous, for it opens the door to the nihilism which is increasingly characteristic of late modernity. As Dolan (1994) explains,

> From the pious, theoretical, "philosophical" perspective, polities that are actually alive and kicking cannot but acquire a ghostly, "as-if" quality, as mere imperfect approximations of the true normative ideal. Though such a perspective is sustainable given a belief in a realm of truth that legitimates the actual as an imperfect approximation, the results are disastrous, as Nietzsche emphasizes, once the Platonic will to truth has devoured itself and its theoretical gaze has been exposed as only another mythology. In that event, given the absence of any perspective *other* than pietistic, one is abandoned to a world of appearances that remain "mere" appearances, relatively valueless and without connection to a more substantial reality. (p. 7; emphasis in original)

Pietism leads to fear and a desperate attempt to maintain mythology as truth (recall the fear of the prisoners who remained in the cave). For it is believed that the only alternative to a world based on truth is a world lacking any certainty or moral substance. Nietzsche's theory of language as metaphor may help us to avoid succumbing to a pious faith in narrow allegories of freedom.

Following Nietzsche, research should entertain alternative accounts of what have been portrayed as unified concepts of practice, community, thinking, teaching, learning, and development. Such accounts may deny the assumption of metaphysical certainty, be it implicit or transcendental; they may assume truth as fiction rather than as correct representation. I have attempted to uncover the assumptions behind the literature on teacher development and, in so

doing, it has become apparent that the desire for alternative accounts begins with disillusionment. For it is disillusionment which gives one the impetus to engage in exploratory thinking about alternative ways of being (human) in the world.

I have written under the assumption that there is little difference between truth and literary fiction. Such dogmatic distinctions have been the source of philosophical and religious suspicion ever since Plato. Throughout my life, I have piously lived and worked according to allegories of freedom, and their metaphors focused my vision on a gleaming horizon of truth whose margin has faded, perhaps forever, as I move. I have returned from this pilgrimage with the belief that the celestial point of teacher development is a mirage. This was a mild disappointment to me, until I remembered that the substantial hope which that image once promised provided me with the inspiration to accomplish my tasks (i.e., becoming a successful teacher, a doctoral student, and an assistant professor). And then I saw that it was all part of what Heidegger (1969) calls just another "ontological theology." Now a different strength is required. As Nietzsche might counsel, disillusionment does not mean abandoning illusions as meaningless — quite the opposite; we should celebrate their motivational power. But it is now time to take a different path through educational studies. As Derrida (1978, p. 31) said of Michel Foucault (employing metaphors from Paul and Hegel): the glass must be broken, or better, the mirror, the reflection, that infinite, incessant speculation. Only then, while on a different path of thinking, may one re-embark and start once more to speak.

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