

THE CONVERSATIONAL STRUCTURE AND FACE IMPLICATIONS OF EVERYDAY  
ARGUING

by

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## ABSTRACT

Everyday arguing is the activity of making, defending, and disagreeing with claims, and the processes by which such disagreements arise, are dealt with, and resolved.

Examination of naturally occurring conversation revealed that arguing has a regular structure consisting of concatenations of a basic three move exchange which consists of Speaker A in Move 1 (A1) making a claim that is disputed by Speaker B in A2, following which Speaker A in A3 either directly supports his/her A1 claim or directly disagrees with the A2 disagreement. Further examination of the acts within each move of the arguing exchange revealed distinct types of acts with varying syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic characteristics. Each act type also has different implications for *face*, identity claims of self, other, and relationship.

The relationship between acts occurring in A2 and A3 of the arguing exchange was examined, and it was proposed that speakers' attempts to do facework is a major determinant of this relationship. In order to test this claim, A2 acts were characterized along a continuum of face aggravation in which high aggravating acts highly damage Speaker A's face and low aggravating acts minimally damage A's face. It was found that the more Speaker B's A2 act damages Speaker A's face, the more likely A is to respond with an A3 act that directly supports A's A1 claim.

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

APPROVAL.....	ii
ABSTRACT.....	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .....	iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS .....	v
LIST OF TABLES .....	vi
CHAPTER ONE: OVERVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK .....	1
1.1 Introduction and Overview.....	1
1.2 Pragmatics.....	3
1.3 Face and Facework .....	8
1.4 Methodological and Analytical Issues .....	12
1.5 Overview of Thesis .....	15
CHAPTER TWO: THE STRUCTURE OF EVERYDAY ARGUING .....	17
2.1 An Overview.....	17
2.2 Procedure.....	17
2.3 Discourse Hierarchy .....	23
2.4 Arguing Exchanges .....	26
2.5 The Necessity of Three Moves .....	28
CHAPTER THREE: MOVES IN THE ARGUING EXCHANGE .....	32
3.1 An Overview.....	32
3.2 Procedure.....	32
3.3 Move Position (A1): Claim Types.....	34
3.4 Move Position (A2): Disagreement Types.....	37
3.5 Move Position (A3): Disagreement Types.....	45
3.5.1 A3 Orientation .....	49
3.5.1.1 A3 Acts that Support A1.....	49
3.5.1.2 A3 Acts that Contest A2.....	52
CHAPTER FOUR: FACE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ACTS OF ARGUING.....	56
4.1 An Overview.....	56
4.2 Procedure.....	56
4.3 The Face Implications of A1 Claims .....	57
4.4 The Face Implications of A2 Disagreements .....	58
4.5 The Face Implications of A3 Disagreements .....	65
CHAPTER FIVE: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A2 AND A3 ACTS .....	69
5.1 An Overview.....	69
5.2 Procedure.....	70
5.3 Results and Discussion .....	72
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION.....	80
6.1 Summary of Thesis .....	80
6.2 Implications for Future Research.....	81
REFERENCES .....	86
APPENDIX A.....	94
APPENDIX B.....	95

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 1:	Frequency Ranking of the Level of Aggressiveness of Acts of Disagreement of Claim of Irrelevancy, Challenge, Contradiction, and Counterclaim	71
Table 2:	Number and Percentage of A3 Acts with A1 or A2 Orientation Following A2 Acts of Claim of Irrelevancy (IR), Challenge (CH), Contradiction (C), and Counterclaim (CC)	72
Table 3:	Number and Percentage of A3 Acts with A1 or A2 Orientation for High, Intermediate, and Low Face Aggravating A2 Acts	73

# CHAPTER ONE: OVERVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

## 1.1 Introduction and Overview

When a speaker (i.e., Speaker A) puts forward a claim in a conversational move, an immediate relevant next response by Speaker B may be to disagree with A's prior claim. B's disagreement may, in turn, invite continued disagreement. If A does choose to disagree with B in the following move, then arguing occurs. In other words, such extended disagreements would be construed as speakers doing much more than simply disagreeing; rather, speakers would then be doing arguing, the making, defending, and disagreeing with claims, and the processes by which such disagreements arise, are dealt with, and resolved. [Other terms appearing in the literature that refer to a similar though not identical type of interactional activity include *disputing* (Brenneis, 1988; Kotthoff, 1993), *the adversative episode* (Eisenberg & Garvey, 1981), *conflict talk* (Grimshaw, 1990), *dialogical asymmetry* (Knoblauch, 1991), *verbal discord* (Krainer, 1988), and *oppositional argument* (Schiffrin, 1985)].

An analysis of everyday arguing provides information about the way in which speakers interactionally produce conversational structure (Antaki, 1994; Coulter, 1990; Goodwin, 1983; Jackson & Jacobs, 1980; Jacobs & Jackson, 1982, 1989; Maynard, 1985). An analysis of everyday arguing also provides information about the ways in which social structure is negotiated in conversation (Corsaro & Rizzo, 1990; Eder, 1990; Eisenberg & Garvey, 1981; Goodwin, 1983; Grimshaw, 1990; Kakavá, 1993, 1994; Kotthoff, 1993; Lee and Peck, 1995; Schiffrin, 1984, 1990; Tannen and Kakavá, 1992; Vuchinich, 1990). Most research on arguing is strongly functionalist in nature, focusing on how the negotiation of social structure leads to positive social relations by strengthening group bonds (Grimshaw, 1990). People who argue have been shown to strengthen their group bonds by displaying solidarity and cooperation (Kakavá, 1993, 1994; Tannen & Kakavá, 1992; Schiffrin, 1984, 1990), by valuing arguing as a skill (Corsaro & Rizzo, 1990) and by resolving and communicating



normative concerns (Eder, 1990). However, arguing may involve creating negative social relations by destroying, rather than generating, social structure (Grimshaw, 1990). The most insidiously destructive effects of conflict can range from verbal aggression or emotionally heated exchanges that precipitate a suspension or destruction of social relations to verbal aggression in abusive relationships (e.g., between family members or between heads of state) that may lead to violence and death. In sum, arguing involves the creation of both positive and negative social relations.

The conversational structure of arguing influences, and is influenced by, social structure. Social theorists who adopt a pragmatic orientation identify conversation as the medium in which and through which social life is enacted and created (Garfinkel, 1967; Goffman, 1967, 1972; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Sacks, 1972; Schegloff, 1972). Because social structure is both revealed in and created by conversation, an analysis of social structure has implications for an analysis of conversation, and vice-versa (R. Brown & Gilman, 1960; R. Brown, 1965; Hilton, 1990; Resnick, Levine, & Teasley, 1991; Robinson, 1972, 1985; Slugoski & Turnbull, 1988; Turnbull, 1986, 1992; Turnbull & Saxton, in press; Turnbull & Slugoski, 1988; Van Dijk, 1985c, 1990; Wood & Kroger, 1991; Wood & Ryan, 1991).

The mutual influence of social structure and conversation should be most clearly observable in situations in which important social goals are at stake. Labov and Fanshel (1977) suggest that the most critical conversational actions that impact on conversational structure “are not such speech acts as requests and assertions, but rather challenges, defenses, and retreats, which have to do with the status of the participants, their rights and obligations, and their changing relationships in terms of social organization” (pp. 58-59). These crucial interactional activities involve *face*, identity claims about self, other, and relationship (Goffman, 1967, 1972). One activity with strong implications for face is arguing. Certainly, the (inter)activity of arguing may involve the negotiation of competing claims about the nonsocial world. But arguing also, and centrally, involves the negotiation of competing claims

about social structure (Cosser, 1956; Grimshaw, 1990; Simmel, 1908). Through arguing, people actively attempt to reaffirm accepted or to create new perceptions of self, other, and relationship (Mehan, 1990; O'Donnell, 1990; Schiffrin, 1984, 1990; Vuchinich, 1984, 1990). Thus, the analysis of arguing should be highly revealing of the ways in which social structure influences conversation.

In this thesis, I focus on cooperative instances of arguing in which speakers work to strengthen their group bonds. I provide a detailed examination of the structure of everyday arguing and an analysis of how concerns about face influence this structure. Specifically, I focus on the types of acts and inter-act relations that occur in arguing exchanges and suggest that one of these inter-act relations is a consequence of face concerns. To set the background for this analysis, a summary is presented of the concepts and methodologies typical of research on pragmatics and conversation. In 1.2, I describe the importance of Grice's (1975) theory of conversational implicature and of the tenets of conversation analysis for a pragmatic analysis of everyday conversation. In 1.3, I describe how the concept of face plays a critical role in explaining how social structure is negotiated in conversation. In 1.4, I illustrate the specific type of methodology used, and finally in 1.5, I outline the rest of this thesis.

## 1.2 Pragmatics

A common aim of the study of conversation is the investigation of how language is used in the world (Schiffrin, 1994; Mey, 1993; Leech, 1983; Levinson, 1983). Specifically, language is used to perform actions within the world (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969). In demonstrating how one *does* something when one *says* something, Austin suggested that for any given utterance, speakers perform three acts. Speakers perform a locutionary act which expresses a sense or literal meaning, an illocutionary act which displays an intended meaning indicating what the utterance does (e.g., requesting, inviting, promising), and a perlocutionary act which brings about effects on the audience (e.g., a feeling of fear or uneasiness if

threatened by a stranger).

Austin and Searle restricted their investigation to analyzing the illocutionary act or intended meaning that speakers convey. Since an utterance's intended meaning plays a central role in language understanding (Levinson 1983:228), its identification remains a dominant concern in pragmatic investigations of language. The philosopher H. P. Grice (1975) proposed a theory of how intended meanings are accomplished and recognized. Grice suggested that speakers negotiate meaning in a cooperative environment. In this way, speakers engaging in social interactions assume that everyone is behaving in an efficient, rational, and cooperative manner to fulfill the goals of the interaction. Further, every move that a person makes in a given interaction, be it verbal or non-verbal, will be taken as a pertinent action to the activity at hand. These notions about the bases of coordinated activity are embodied in the Cooperative Principle (CP) that is governed by four maxims: Quantity (make your contribution as informative as is required and no more), Quality (make your contribution one that is true), Relation (be relevant), and Manner (be clear, unambiguous, brief, and orderly). According to Grice, speakers assume that everyone is adhering to the four maxims unless they have reason to believe that someone is opting out of the CP (e.g., everything someone says is known to be a lie).

Intended meanings are conveyed by conversational implicatures and are calculated by an addressee on the basis of the maxims of cooperation.

Consider an example from Grice (1975):

- (1) A: I am out of petrol.  
B: There is a garage round the corner.

A's intended meaning is a request for information (i.e., *Where can I get some petrol?*) and not a simple declarative statement. B can work out A's intended meaning or conversational

implicature by assuming that A is observing the maxims of Relation and Quantity. Therefore, B will assume that what A says is relevant and informative. By producing an utterance that contains the conversational implicature that A will find an open garage in which A can obtain petrol, B's response reveals that he recognizes A's intended meaning. A, in turn, would work out B's conversational implicature by reasoning that B was being informative and relevant and was therefore providing him with the necessary information to buy some gas. Example (1) has illustrated how speakers convey and infer conversational implicatures from the observation of the maxims. Another avenue in which to generate implicatures is by not ostensibly observing the maxims. This is known as flouting the maxims. In flouting a maxim, a speaker is still behaving as a cooperative social actor, yet only gives a surface impression that a maxim is being violated. Consider an example from Levinson (1983:110):

- (2) A: Teheran's in Turkey isn't it, teacher?  
B: And London's in Armenia I suppose

B's response to A's question is blatantly false, and thus on the surface it appears that B is being deceptive and therefore uncooperative. One way that A can assume that B is being cooperative is if B actually means something quite different from what she uttered. A must therefore assume that B is purposely not observing the maxim of truth in order to appear ironic rather than to try to deceive A. In this way, B utters a patent falsehood with the intention that A will recognize its irony. A will therefore be able to infer from B's ironic utterance that A's assumption about the location of Teheran is erroneous; that is, if London is not in Armenia then Teheran could not possibly be in Turkey.

Under the CP, the meaning of a speaker's utterance is interpreted by an addressee from the propositional content of the speaker's utterance used in the context of conversation. In addition, researchers in conversation analysis (CA) have suggested that speaker meaning is

situated in conversational structure and is jointly constructed on a turn-by-turn basis (Atkinson & Heritage, 1984). Therefore, the sequential organization of conversation and the details of what people say to produce this sequential organization are critical in determining speaker meaning.

Conversation analysts contend that the meaning of an utterance may only be understood in reference to that utterance's location in the sequence of actions in a conversation. Therefore, the meaning of an utterance is not exclusively determined by its content, but also by what precedes and follows the utterance. For example, we know an utterance to have the meaning of an answer when it is preceded by a question, and followed by an explicit or tacit acknowledgment of the answer.

Consider the following example taken from Pomerantz (1984:58):

(3) (SBL:2.2.-1)<sup>1</sup>

A: How is Aunt Kallie.

→ B: Well, I (suspect) she's better.

A: Oh, that's good.

B's utterance is made in response to a question and may be analyzed as an answer to a question because of its location in a sequence of utterances. Also, we know that B's response is being interpreted as an answer because of A's second utterance that acknowledges B's utterance as a relevant and suitable response to A's first utterance. The sequential organization of talk therefore plays a critical role in making sense of speakers' utterances. In this way, speakers

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<sup>1</sup> The abbreviated letters and numbers, (SBL:2.2.-1), occurring in (3) refer to the specific corpus of data from Pomerantz (1984) that this example was derived from. The examples that are taken from my data set all appear with the single letter S or U, followed by a number, a semi-colon, and another number (e.g., S8: 108). The S refers to the family conflict data and the U refers to the university student data. 8 refers to the family, from 1 to 22 that was tape recorded, and 108 refers to the argument number. Examples that do not have data set numbering are not derived from a corpus. Below the numbering of the data set, if present, is the conversational data. The uppercase letter followed by a colon represents the speaker (e.g., A:), and to the right of the indicated speaker is the speaker's utterance. An arrow pointing to an utterance indicates the specific utterance(s) that the reader should draw his/her attention to.

design their utterances in response to a prior utterance and therefore show their appreciation and understanding of what was said.

Conversation analysts also propose that everything occurring in conversation be regarded as potentially meaningful including silences, hesitations, false starts, or even an unwillingness to communicate. Therefore, all of the details of talk may be used as a possible resource for speakers to make sense of their addressee's prior utterance (Atkinson & Heritage, 1984). Consider the following example taken from Pomerantz (1984:77):

(4) (SBL: 3.1.-8)

B: ... an' that's not an awful lotta fruitcake

→ (1.0)

B: Course it is. A little piece goes a long way.

A: Well that's right

B's initial assessment indicates that the pieces of fruitcake are sliced too small. According to Pomerantz (1984), assessments invite and are therefore immediately followed by agreement from next speaker. However, instead of agreement following B's assessment, a silence ensues. The 1.0 second pause is potentially meaningful and is construed as a source of trouble for both speakers. In this case, A's delayed acknowledgment or ratification of B's initial assessment signals that A may disagree with B. In order to avoid disagreement, B then chooses to modify her initial assessment by asserting that a piece of fruitcake is sufficient to eat (i.e., *A little piece goes a long way*). B's subsequent assessment yields immediate agreement from A and therefore has successfully avoided disagreement.

In this thesis, I adopt the work of Grice (1975) and CA whereby speakers construct meaning by employing the CP to convey and interpret intended meaning and that in addition, speakers use conversational principles that make use of the sequential organization and details

of conversation to interpret speaker meaning.

### 1.3 Face and Facework

The previous section has dealt extensively with non-social aspects of language use and language understanding. But, social aspects of language use such as the phatic or interpersonal also play a critical role in determining how speakers interpret each other's utterances.

To illustrate the role of social aspects in language use, consider what conversation would look like if it were Gricean. If speakers follow the CP, then they should converse in a brief, clear, direct, and informative manner. However, sometimes a speaker's conversational contributions appear very non-Gricean in structure. For instance, it has been shown that when speakers refuse a request, they often do so in a lengthy, equivocal, and indirect manner (Turnbull, 1992). Consider the following examples of refusals that were generated subsequent to a request to participate in a university experiment (Turnbull, 1992: 121-122):

- (5) S: (1.9) Oh. Yeah. Uh, huh, huh <giggle>. Um, no, I don't think so. Okay?
- (6) S: (1.6) Uuumm (1.2) hum (1.5) until 10:30, I have an exam that day (2.7) soo (0.6) I don't think I should.

Examples (5) and (6) are instances in which speakers do not say only what is required and no more, nor do they refuse in a brief and clear manner. Instead, the refusals are marked by pauses, hesitations, partial agreements, and accounts. It has been suggested that refusals often occur with non-Gricean turn shapes because of the refuser's concern for the requester's self-image (Brown & Levinson, 1987; Heritage, 1988; Turnbull, 1992). Specifically, the refuser produces a turn shape marked by hesitations, silences, and accounts to minimize the threat to the requester's *face*, the positive value people attach to their social identities (Goffman, 1967).

Building on Goffman's notion, Brown & Levinson (1987) (henceforth B&L 87) in

their seminal work on politeness, conceptualized face as consisting of two basic wants: *positive face*, the desire to have one's wants approved by some others and *negative face*, the desire to be unimpeded. B&L 87 suggested that all speakers possess a positive and a negative face, and that it is in every speaker's best interest to try and maintain the face of their addressee. In this way, all speakers work to maintain their addressee's face during conversation, which minimizes any damage or loss to face that may be incurred from an interaction. However, even though face maintenance may be a priority among speakers, many interactions are replete with face threatening acts (FTAs). For instance, invitations threaten an addressee's negative face by potentially restricting the addressee's freedom if the addressee accepts and disagreements threaten an addressee's positive face by signaling disapproval of his/her beliefs or claims. In order not to damage an addressee's face, speakers employ a range of linguistic devices that perform *facework*, communicative acts oriented to minimizing face-threat. B&L 87 proposed five super-strategies (i.e., politeness strategies) that range from low face-saving to high face-saving. Consider an example. By performing a request, the requester threatens the addressee's negative face by attempting to get the addressee to perform a future action. In doing the request, the lowest face-saving strategy is to perform the request bald on-record, such as "Lend me your car!". This is a Gricean form of speech and is characterized by its directness. The next highest face-saving strategy is positive politeness. Here, utterances are used that attend to the addressee's positive face by expressing approval of their wants such as "Your car has the most dazzling paint job, will you lend it to me?". Next is negative politeness which minimizes the imposition on the addressee. An example of this is "I don't want to inconvenience you but my car broke down and I was wondering if it is possible for you to lend me yours?". Speakers may also perform the act off-record to create an ambiguity as to whether the speaker wishes to perform the act or not. So, uttering "Gee, my car won't start again and I've no way to get to work" may be viewed as a request to borrow someone's car or just a statement of someone's unfortunate state of affairs. The most polite strategy is not



to perform the act at all.

B&L 87 proposed an economy in the usage of politeness strategies to avoid their over-proliferation so that they are used in accordance with the amount of face-threat conveyed by an utterance. Speakers will therefore not use a high face saving politeness strategy to perform a minor request and will not use a low face saving strategy to perform a highly threatening request. Rather, speakers will attempt to match the politeness strategy to the FTA. How then does one calculate the weightiness of the FTA? B&L 87 introduced a formula in which the weightiness ( $W_x$ ) of a FTA is equal to the sum of three independent social variables; namely power of the addressee over the speaker ( $P$ ), social distance between the speaker and addressee ( $D$ ), and the degree of imposition of the act in the culture ( $R_x$ ).

$$(7) \quad W_x = P_{(A,S)} + D_{(S,A)} + R_x$$

As (7) illustrates, an addressee of greater power than a speaker, a large social distance between speaker and addressee, and a large degree of imposition will all significantly increase the  $W_x$  of the FTA engendering the need for greater face-saving strategies to perform the act. A large power differential may be found between an employer and an employee, a large social distance may be found between strangers, and a large  $R_x$  may exist when someone wishes to borrow a hundred dollars as opposed to ten cents.

More recently, the view that facework is oriented to protecting the addressee's face has been criticized as being based on an overly simplistic conceptualization of speakers' goals (Penman, 1990; Tracy, 1990; Wilson, Meischke & Kim, 1991; Wood & Kroger, 1994). According to these authors, utterances have multiple functions and may impose a variety of threats to both speaker and addressee. For instance, B&L 87 tacitly implied that speech acts threaten only one face want yet Wilson et al. (1991) have shown that directives may threaten both the positive and negative face of an addressee. Consider an example from Wilson et al.

(1991:472):

- (8) U: don't agree to wage reopeners and then complain about them. And don't do it in the face of a financial report such as you've issued. And don't do it in the face of telling us you're going to decentralize. And don't ask us to refrain from wage reopener requests so that you can continue to expand to move out of town! (from the Atlas case; U = Union, M = Management)

The labor negotiator U both threatens his opponent's negative face by issuing commands that try to constrain his opponent's behavioral options, and also threatens his opponent's positive face by expressing strong disapproval of the opponent in response to what he believes is an inappropriate request.

Another observation is that speakers do not solely perform facework on other's face, but they also perform facework on own face. Further, whereas speakers may indeed try to avoid threatening face or to minimize or repair bad effects to face, they may also try to injure or to benefit face. As a consequence, the effects on face of a facework attempt include not only maintenance and restoration, but also enhancement and damage (Wood & Kroger, 1994).

Consider an example in which a speaker orients to both own and other's face:

(9) (S13:1)

T1 C: Yes, but if I did do that, I'd probably never do it again (pause) because it would probably be just like an accident or something.

→ T2 M: Ah, that's not true. (pause) If you do it once its too easy to

D: To repeat.

→ M: to do to repeat it (pause) the very fact that you do it once makes it very easy to repeat (pause) its like you hear people all the time (pause) they say the word once and ah pretty soon they say it a second time and before you know it becomes a form ah, they can't say anything without without swearing, its awful to hear (pause) Have you ever heard people that their whole language is swearing?

In T1, C claims that she would not swear purposely nor repetitively. M in T2, orients to and threatens C's positive face by expressing disagreement with C's claim. M also orients to and enhances own face by providing reasons for why C's claim is erroneous. By explicitly stating the reasons for why C would swear again, M depicts herself as a competent and skillful negotiator, which greatly benefits her own face. In sum, M has both damaged C's face and enhanced her own face and has therefore performed a very different kind of facework that is typically found in the B&L 87 model.

In sum, speakers' interpersonal concerns influence what people say and also play a role in constructing conversational meaning. The next step is to outline the kind of methodology and approach to analyzing discourse that I have adopted for this thesis.

#### 1.4 Methodological and Analytical Issues

Choosing the correct type of methodology and analysis that best fits one's research objectives is a critical issue in analyses of conversation. Recent work has illustrated the immensity of research being done under the cover term of discourse from such disciplines as linguistics, communications, psychology, sociology, anthropology, and artificial intelligence, and the various methodologies that these researchers employ (Gallois & Pittam, 1995; Schiffrin, 1994; Tracy, 1991, 1995; Van Dijk, 1985a, 1985b, 1985c, 1985d). From this vast array of disparate approaches to the analysis of conversation, I provide a list of criteria that specifies the type of methodology that I use to investigate everyday arguing. These criteria are:

- (i) Whether one should use only naturally occurring texts or whether one may construct examples and use discourse produced in laboratory settings.
- (ii) Whether and how discourse data should be used with other kinds of data (e.g., interviews, contextual information).

- (iii) Whether or not one should categorize the data.
- (iv) What are the most important systems of recording and transcribing discourse.

The first criterion involves the type of data used in research. Many researchers suggest that the data under investigation must consist of naturally occurring conversation (Antaki, 1994; Atkinson & Heritage, 1984; Bilmes, 1988, 1991; Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson, 1974; Turnbull, 1992, 1995). They argue that constructed conversations, such as invented or recalled conversations, are inadequate in describing the details of talk, since our intuitions on what we say do not accurately reflect what we actually say and our memory of prior conversations tends to omit many relevant details of talk. Research that makes use of constructed conversations generally occurs in the form of interviews, constructed texts, or questionnaires (Blum-Kulka, House & Kaspar, 1989; McLaughlin, Cody & O'Hair, 1983; Hymes, 1974), some or all of which is used for the analysis of the phenomenon under investigation. The question whether there exists a difference between naturally occurring and constructed data has been investigated empirically by Turnbull (1995). In a study in which refusals were elicited from subjects, Turnbull (1995) compared pragmatic elicitation techniques that generate constructed data, such as the discourse completion technique (DCT) of Blum-Kulka et al. (1989), oral elicitation techniques, and role plays to elicitation techniques that generate naturally occurring data. Turnbull (1995) found that the types of acts found in refusals by techniques that elicited constructed data varied greatly compared to the types of acts found in the refusals of techniques eliciting naturally occurring data. Therefore, he concluded that the use of constructed conversation is an inadequate representation of the kinds of utterances people would use under more natural settings. Because naturally occurring conversation provides a more accurate representation of everyday conversational interactions, I

have chosen to use this type of data for my analysis.

The second criterion involves whether one may use various types of data other than the conversational data to substantiate one's research claims. For instance, Tannen (1984) argued that conversational style is influenced by such factors as ethnic, family, and class similarities and differences. While Tannen (1984) used naturally occurring conversation to analyze conversation styles among various speakers, she also used the information gained through speaker interviews to verify her claims. In this way, her description and analysis went beyond the conversation but not beyond the data (Grimshaw, 1990). I also made use of similar resources using subject interviews, in which I obtained subject rankings of the degree of aggressiveness of the various types of disagreements found in arguing.

The third criterion involves categorization. An investigation of the various acts occurring in conversation requires that the acts somehow be categorized. However, the degree of categorization varies from approach to approach. For instance, conversation analysts mainly use general cover terms to describe social acts. These acts, such as disagreements, invitations, assessments, and requests are never placed in more specific categories. Other researchers however, use very specific categories to capture the subtle syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic differences in the way acts are performed (Coulthard, 1992; Freed, 1994; Stenström, 1994; Turnbull & Saxton, in press). Similarly, in this thesis I categorize the types of acts that occur in arguing based on their specific syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic characteristics.

The last criterion involves transcription detail. The amount of detail used varies from one approach to another. CA practitioners use highly detailed transcripts from naturally occurring taped conversations for their research since they assume that all the details of talk are potentially relevant to their analysis. Other researchers however, use broadly transcribed data for analysis (cf., Labov & Fanshel, 1977). Tracy (1991) suggests that "A researcher's purpose will determine which and how many particulars need to be recorded. In general, the

more deductive and theoretically motivated one's research approach, the more license a researcher has to transcribe broadly; the more inductive one's approach, the more important it is to record a larger number of particulars (pronunciation, pausing, stress, overlap, nonfluencies, etc.)" (pp. 184). For this thesis, conversations were transcribed based on the relatively detailed transcription notation system illustrated in Appendix A.

### 1.5 Overview of Thesis

I analyze everyday arguing in the remaining chapters using the methodology and the pragmatic and sociopragmatic concepts outlined above. In Chapter Two, I describe the conversational structure found in everyday arguing. It is suggested that arguments consist of concatenations of a basic three move exchange.

In Chapter Three, I provide an analysis of each of the three moves in the exchange. The acts that occur in each move are identified using syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic criteria.

In Chapter Four, the face implications of the acts within each move are considered. Specifically, an act's face implications will be described in reference to its effects on other's positive and/or negative face.

In Chapter Five, I examine the relationship between acts occurring in the second (A2) and third (A3) move of arguing exchanges, and propose that speakers' attempts to do facework is a major determinant of this relationship. More specifically, it seems likely that the extent to which an A2 act damages other's face will determine in large measure how other responds to that act in A3. An empirical assessment of the hypothesis is made through an examination of A2 and A3 acts in naturally occurring arguing exchanges. The observed relations between the face implications of specific A2 and A3 acts are shown to be generally consistent with the hypothesis. However, several unpredicted effects are evident in the data and are addressed in the discussion.

In Chapter Six, I summarize the main points of this thesis and also I mention some implications for future research.

## CHAPTER TWO: THE STRUCTURE OF EVERYDAY ARGUING

### 2.1 An Overview

In 2.2, I outline the procedure used in identifying the regular three move structure of everyday arguing. In 2.3, I describe the discourse levels, in the form of a discourse hierarchy, that are necessary for explicating the conversational structure of arguing exchanges. In 2.4, I provide the conversational data that are representative of arguing exchanges. And finally, in 2.5, I illustrate that a three move arguing exchange is necessary and sufficient to describe and analyze everyday arguing.

### 2.2 Procedure

On the basis of the analysis of naturally occurring conversations, it appeared that there was a regular structure to everyday arguing. Arguing consisted of a minimum of two speakers producing a minimum of three moves in conversation. The first move (A1) consists of Speaker A making a claim that is disputed by Speaker B in A2, following which Speaker A in A3 disagrees with B's A2. To test this claim, approximately five hours of conversations between university students were taped, transcribed, and then analyzed for any occurrences of arguing.

Consider an example of a transaction containing an argument:

(10) (U10: 1)

- |    |   |
|----|---|
| T1 | S: That Pub night.  |
| T2 | P: Yeah.  |
| T3 | S: He uh, I drove him home 'cause he was really drunk right an he had a, he had his he had his motorbike here so I thought okay I'll drive him home |
| T4 | P: He had his what?   |
| T5 | S: He had his motorcycle [here  |



T6 P: [Oh motorcycle

T7 S: So I said, so I said okay I'll drive you home right?

T8 P: Yeah

((pause))

((coughing))

→ T9 A1 S: And I drove him home he tried to kiss me right? And I was like uhgh okay, now I know.

→ T10 A2 P: Well yeah, who do you what did you expect though? H [eh heh

→ T11 A3 S: [Well, what  
d'ya mean what do I expect? I expect everything and I expect nothing. I don't know.

((pause))

T12 P: Well I mean if you uh uh well maybe that's just because you didn't want to y'know

T13 S: I was

T14 P: you didn't want him to kiss you. You wanted him to kiss you and he wouldn't of then you would of been extremely disappointed. like ((click)) what's the matter with this guy. Y'know he d [rove you home

S: [No way

T14 P: and everything and [I think I was interested heh heh heh

T15 S: [Get out of here, I'm beyond that.

((pause))

T16 S: No, I'm beyond that. If I want something I get it or [or

T17 P: [Heh heh heh he  
[h heh

T18 S: [I don't mean [it that way. I didn't mean I didn't mean it that way but

P: [Heh heh heh oh is that the way it is. Ah, I see.

T18 S: [I, I mean I'm not I don't.

P: [Ahhhh

T19 S: I'm direct right? [I don't feel the need to like.

P: [Yeah

((pause))

T20 P: Yeah

In the beginning of this conversation, S tells P of the experience she had driving someone home who was drunk. The first nine turns involve S's telling of her past experience (i.e., T1, T3, T5, T7, T9), and P's acknowledgment and ratification of S's story (i.e., T2, T4, T6, T8). In T9 (A1), S has just finished explaining to P that the person she had driven home had tried to kiss her. Further, S reacted unfavorably to the kiss presumably because she did not want nor expect to be kissed. The first instance of disagreement occurs in T10 (A2), with P disagreeing with S's expectations (i.e., ...*what did you expect though?*). Disagreement continues in T11 (A3) with S questioning and refuting P's T10 disagreement. Thus, the procedure to identify the beginning of arguing is a two step process as follows: First, (a), identify the first disagreement move in the conversation and, consequently, the move that is being disagreed with; then (b), examine the move subsequent to the disagreement. If the move is another disagreement, then an argument has begun. If the move is not a disagreement, then not an argument, but a disagreement has occurred that has been repaired in the subsequent move. Note that the argument in (10) does not end in T11, but continues until T20 when P finally agrees with S's remonstrances.

Consider a disagreement occurring later in the same conversation that does not lead into argument:

(11) (U10: 1)

T26 P: It's just that you don't. I mean you don't want a uhm a sort of romantic interlude with this guy so [if he tries something then you ((pause)) y'know

S: [Absolutely not.

- T26 P: you want it to stay then you shouldn't go home with the guy then.
- T27 S: I didn't go home with him.
- T28 P: Or or I mean you shouldn't let him drop you off.
- ((pause))
- T29 ? : Heh heh
- T30 P: Or?
- T31 S: Or what? I dropped I drove people home a lot.
- ((pause))
- T32 P: Oh you drove h [im home. O:h I thought you said he had his motorcycle up  
S: [Ye::ss
- T32 P: here?
- T33 S: No:, and I didn't want him to drive ho::me because he was drunk.
- T34 P: Ahhh I [see.
- T35 S: [So I drove him home.
- T36 P: Ahhh I get it.
- T37 S: Okay?
- T38 P: Right.
- ((pause))
- T39 P: Yeah I I understand yeah
- T40 S: So::, that's what happened

The first disagreement occurs in T27 when S disagrees with P's T26 claim that S wanted to go home with the man that she was driving with. For this exchange to be an argument, T28 must contain a disagreement. However, since P does not disagree with S in T28 but rather repairs his initial T26 claim (i.e., *I mean you shouldn't let him drop you off*), a disagreement and not

an argument has occurred. A similar sequence occurs in turns T32 to T34. Again, P ends up agreeing with S's reinterpretation of P's initial claim.

Each instance of arguing from the data set was identified in this manner. Following the identification of arguing, the first three moves that began each argument were set aside for further investigation. In order to ascertain whether the three move structure identified above occurred in all arguments, I obtained a second data set of audio tapes lasting approximately 45 to 90 minutes of each of 11 families consisting of a mother, father, and a 14 year old daughter.<sup>2</sup> The families were given a tape recorder to take home and they were asked to tape a discussion of some important and unresolved moral issue. Typical issues discussed included curfew, drugs, and swearing. In addition, each family was asked to attempt to resolve a slightly revised version of one of the Kohlberg moral dilemmas. Both the university students and the families gave their permission for the tapes to be used in research. Personally identifying information was deleted from the transcriptions.

The same procedure for identifying instances of arguing was used for the family conflict data. Consider an example:

(12) (S13: 1,2)

- |    |   |
|----|---|
| T1 | M: Okay, for the family conflict we couldn't think of one so we chose to do number five - your daughter is angry with you and she talks back and swears at you  |
| T2 | D: That is not a very pleasant scene, so  |
| T3 | C: What would you do  |
| T4 | D: It needs ah that would need a good talk and find and discuss what this is all about - especially the swearing part of it (pause) that so not go over very well with me   |
| T5 | M: There's no need for swearing I agree there (pause) I think I'd be ah a bit upse..ah hurt and disappointed to hear my daughter swearing or even talking back (pause) um I think we would I think I would have to say to her how disappointed I was in her to hear any such words coming out of her sweet mouth, and I would also tell her, I I would really feel very |

---

<sup>2</sup> I wish to thank Dr. D Krebs and S. Vermeulen for the use of these audio tapes.

offended if she, if I hear her swear because I don't like to hear people swearing.

T6 C: Well.

→ T7 A1 M: if she is that, if you're angry I would like I would like to know why you're angry (pause) but I don't think its necessary to swear (pause) You can express it in such a manner without swearing.

→ T8 A2 C: Yes, but if I did do that, I'd probably never do it again (pause) because it would probably be just like an accident or something.

→ T9 A3 M: Ah, that's not true. (pause) If you do it once its too easy to

T10 D: To repeat.

→ T11 A3 M: to do to repeat it (pause) the very fact that you do it once makes it very easy to repeat (pause) its like you hear people all the time (pause) they say the word once and ah pretty soon they say it a second time and before you know it becomes a form ah, they can't say anything without without swearing, its awful to hear (pause) Have you ever heard people that their whole language is swearing?

T12 C: That's in the movies mom.

T13 M: That's not true (pause) that's in everyday life.

T14 D: You mean that is even in the movies - some of the these movies that we've seen - the language is atrocious - there is no need for all this swearing and the faulty language that we hear.

T15 C: Yeah, I agree with you, you can get your point across without having to use swear words.

The first disagreement in (12) occurs in T8 (A2). C disagrees with M's claim in T7 (A1) by asserting that if C swore, it would not create a problem since it would be accidental. M follows in T9 and T11 (A3) by disagreeing with C. Therefore, since the act following the first disagreement is another disagreement, M and C are arguing. All arguments in the second data set were identified in this manner. The three move structure of arguing consistently found in the first data set was also consistently found in the second data set. Again, the three moves of arguing were set aside for further investigation.

In the next section, I demonstrate that the first three moves of arguing may be described

using a hierarchy of discourse levels.

### 2.3 Discourse Hierarchy

Based on the data of three move arguing sequences from both sources, I proposed that six levels of description are necessary to define the structural and interactional components of everyday arguing. These six levels are categorized as follows: Transaction, Exchange, Turn, Move, Act, and Orientation. The terms/definitions of the exchange are essentially identical to those proposed by Coulthard (1992) and Stenström (1994) except for the level orientation. The inter-relationship between the five levels (excluding transaction) of arguing is illustrated in the following exchange:

(13)

#### **Arguing Exchange**

<i>Turn</i>	<i>Move</i>	<i>Act</i>	<i>Orientation</i>
T1	A1	claim	A0
T2	A2	disagreement	A1
T3	A3	disagreement	A1 or A2

Stenström (1994:30) defines these discourse levels which pertain to any social action accomplished in discourse as follows:

**The Transaction** consists of one or more exchanges dealing with one single topic; one or more transactions make up a conversation

**The Exchange** is the smallest interactive unit consisting, minimally, of two turns produced by two different speakers

**The Turn** is everything the current speaker says before the next speaker takes over; it consists of one or more moves

**The Move** is what the speaker does in a turn in order to start, carry on and finish an exchange, i.e., the way s/he interacts; it consists of one or more acts

**The Act** signals what the speaker intends, what s/he wants to communicate

The final level, *orientation*, taken from Muntigl & Turnbull (in press) describes an act's orientation to a previous move in the exchange:

**Orientation** The move within the argument exchange to which a speaker responds (i.e., orients to) in a subsequent move.

The above levels provide the necessary tools to begin analyses on various social actions in everyday conversation at a descriptive level. I have changed the components of some of the levels from Stenström (1994) to better suit the needs of my analysis. The first alteration occurs with the level *move*. Stenström specifies that the first move in an exchange is termed the [initiate], followed by a move by next speaker termed [response]. I have labeled the moves A1, A2 and A3 (A stands for argument) for simplicity of reference since I do not want to keep referring to the [initiate] or the second [response] move in the argument when this can more easily be done with abbreviations. The second point of difference occurs with the level *act*. Stenström uses the general cover terms *inform* and *statement* for acts that convey information,

and *disagree* and *object* for acts that convey disagreement. My cover terms are more general than Stenström's. Instead, I use *claim* and *disagreement* to include any number of more specific acts of claiming or disagreeing. The act *claim* therefore refers to any act that Speaker B may find disputable, and *disagreement* will serve as another cover term for the various ways in which speakers disagree, such as disagree by contradiction, challenge, counterclaim, etc..

Using the six levels illustrated above, arguing can be described in discourse analytic terms. Arguing is a social activity in the everyday world that occurs in at least one transaction, consisting of one or more exchanges dealing with a single topic. An arguing exchange is the smallest interactive unit of arguing and consists of three exchange turns produced by two different speakers. At least one move is mapped onto each turn of the arguing exchange. The first move (A1) opens the exchange and corresponds to the first exchange turn (T1). A2 in T2 continues the exchange. A3 in T3 terminates the exchange. Each move consists of at least one act. A1 consists of the act *claim*, providing information about the social or non-social world. In addition, an A1 claim orients to a move (A0) that is immediately prior to the exchange. A2 consists of the act *disagree* which orients to and expresses disagreement with some aspect of A1. A3 also contains an act of disagreement. However, the disagreement in A3 may orient to either A1 by supporting the A1 claim, or A2 by contesting the A2 disagreement.

The arguing exchange, as defined here, is shown only as backwards projecting. This was done for simplicity. Moves performed in each turn of the argument schema also project forwards, that is, "... a current turn projects a relevant next action, or range of actions, to be accomplished by another speaker in the next turn --- a phenomenon generally referred to as the "sequential implicativeness" of a turn's talk. ... Virtually every utterance occurs at some structurally defined place in talk. Thus the vast majority of utterances occur as selections from a field of possibilities made relevant by some prior utterance, and in their turn project a range of possible "nexts"." (Heritage and Atkinson (1984: 5-6))



## 2.4 Arguing Exchanges

I now turn to some examples of arguing exchanges. 140 argument exchanges were identified in the corpus. Of these, the 10 arguments presented below are used to illustrate the three move structure of the arguing exchange.

(14) (S3: 99)

- A1 M: I I haven't got an objection to a ten-thirty phone and eleven-thirty come in (pause) seems half way between your present curfew and your friends' some of your friends' curfew.
- A2 C: Yeah (pause) but its its still not, what I like (pause) like.
- A3 M: Well, its not exactly what we like.

(15) (S16: 43)

- D: You put call alert on our phone?
- C: Yeah.
- M: Without me knowing.
- C: Yeah so then I was gonna
- A1 D: Well, shouldn't we know we are paying for the damn thing?
- A2 C: I was going to pay for it.
- A3 D: Well, you should have told us that first (pause) It would help to know these sort of things, wouldn't it?

(16) (S12: 74)

- A1 M: We never dealt with the fact that you went by bus downtown when you told me that you'd gone to Tenth Avenue.
- A2 C: I did go to Tenth Avenue. We did.
- A3 M: Yeah, I know you went to Tenth Avenue, but then you went downtown after you had told me you were going to Tenth Avenue, and and then you went all

the way downtown.

(17) (S8: 114)

A1 M: We were trying to protect your reputation. We had reason to believe that at that time your reputation was going downhill.

A2 C: My reputation is not going [downhill.

A3 M: [Yeah, well that's not what we heard. We heard

(18) (S7: 77)

A1 C: If its totally stupid, like I have to be home at nine o'clock, that's kind of dumb, when all of my friends are allowed out til about twelve-thirty.

A2 M: Okay, have we ever um, insisted that you be home at nine o'clock?

A3 C: Dad insisted that I had to be home at nine-thirty once.

(19) (S3: 95)

D: What curfew do your friends have?

A1 C: Twelve o'clock.

A2 M: That's only Erin.

D: All your friends?

A3 C: Jessica and Erin and Carrie.

(20) (S2: 137)

A1 D: Well, I think the fact that he has gone out and he has earned it for specific reasons.

C: He's the one who worked for it.

A2 M: I don't think it matters.

A3 D: I think it makes it even stronger.

(21) (S2: 135)

C: Okay, is the fact that Joe earned the money himself important in this situation and why or why not?

A1 M: I don't think its important.

A2 D: Well, I think it is. (pause) So there.

C&D: (laughs)

A2 C: I think it is because it certainly proves that it isn't his money its

A3 M: Yeah, but if it was given as a gift, it is still his money.

(22) (S3: 91)

A1 M: That gives me a problem because in order to get a good night's sleep, I don't want to be waiting up 'til twelve o'clock before I go to sleep. (pause) No, eleven o'clock would suit me better, if you were in the house by eleven (pause) and I like the way you phone at ten o'clock to tell us where you are. That helps.

A2 C: Yeah, but I don't like coming home alone because (pause) because I

A3 M: Well, we will always come and get you.

(23) (S7: 81)

A1 M: We have no idea what you're doing tonight (pause) You let us know what you're doing and then we'll come up with a reasonable curfew for you to be in [at. I mean, your usu..

A2 C: [Yeah, but sometimes your curfews aren't reasonable.

A3 M: Well, that depends on whose end its at.

## 2.5 The Necessity of Three Moves

Examination of the first two turns or moves of an exchange is not sufficient to determine if the conversational interaction is an argument. A3 is the crucial move. In all the above examples, A3 is a disagreement that either contests A2 or supports A1. Therefore, if after an A2 disagreement, the next speaker in the following turn fails to contest A2 or support

A1, an argument does not occur. Thus, the first two turns or moves of an exchange may constitute a disagreement, but a specific type of A3 is needed before there is an argument.

Consider a T1-T2 disagreement in which T3 fails to contest T2 or support T1 and therefore is not considered an A3 (i.e., turns (T) are used instead of arguing moves (A) since the following is not an argument):

(24) (K:1)

T1 M: But then again this guy might... I don't wanna sound... bigoted in any way... but the Italian people are a very close-knit community, right? This Italian guy...

T2 T: He's Greek.

T3 M: Oh he is Greek. Same thing. Then he might have a Greek insurance agent...

In T1, M claims that a certain individual is Italian, to which T in T2 contests by counter-claim that he's Greek. Based on the arguing exchange (13), we can make a prediction that if an argument is to unfold between M and T, then M in T3 should disagree with T either by supporting his initial claim in T1 or by contesting T's disagreement in T2. Instead, what occurs is that M in T3 agrees with T by uttering "Oh he is Greek". M therefore reneges on his initial claim, choosing not to support T1 nor disagree with T2. The three-turn exchange in (24) is therefore not an argument and does not fit the arguing exchange.

It is often found that arguments are longer than three turns or moves. I propose that arguments greater than three moves are composed of iterations of the basic argument exchange. Consider example (25):

(25) (S16: 52-53)

T1 D: Is the fact that Joe earned the money himself important?

T2 C: Yes

T3 M: Yes it is (pause) its Joe's money

- T4 A1 C: 'Cause if grandma [gave Joe a cheque that'd be different.  
D: [We::ll,
- T5 A2 D: Why?
- T6 A3/A1' C: Because Joe didn't have to go out [an and face the elements of  
D: [I
- T7 A2'/A1'' D: I don't agree. If grandma gave Joe a cheque, it is still Joe's money.  
(pause)
- T8 A3'/A2''/A1''' C: Yeah, but Joe wouldn't want Joe wouldn't like Joe wouldn't um value that money so much because all he did was stick out his palm for it.
- T9 A3''/A2'''/A1'''' D: I don't think that is an issue (pause) Its Joe's money whether he earned it, whether it was given to him, whether he found it.
- T10 A3'''/A2'''' C: Well yeah, I th [ink there's a slight difference in getting taking  
D: [De. de
- T10 C: money, well like getting receiving money other than working for it like if somebody gave me two thousand bucks, I'd I'd um I'd think less of it if I went out on my own and earned it (pause) if I earned two thousand dollars I would.
- T11 A3'''' D: Alright, YOU would FEEL differently about it, but I don't think that its [any less your money as whether you earned it or  
C: [Well, no it doesn't make, yeah
- T11 D: whether you were given it or whether you found it.
- T12 C: Yeah, okay.
- T13 A3'''' D: Uh ya know I think the only exception might be if his father had given it to him and asked for it to be returned da its not quite the same but still it its Joe's money for wha as far as I'm concerned for him to do with what he wishes (pause) it doesn't matter whither he earned it found it of given to him other than you say if he worked hard for it then you are more upset to see it as it goes.  
(pause)
- T14 M: Okay, I agree. Number five. you can read it John.

Here we have fourteen turns and sixteen moves of arguing yet only three moves may occur within a single arguing exchange. I suggest that the above is the concatenation of four arguing exchanges to form an arguing transaction. A3 is the critical move that terminates the first exchange and initiates a second arguing exchange. The second arguing exchange is marked by A'. A further arguing exchange is added in T11 in which three arguing moves are uttered simultaneously (A3'/A2''/A1'''). The argument comes to an end in T13 when D utters the third and final move of the arguing exchange (A3''').

In sum, three distinct types of observations have been put forward to reveal the presence of a three move arguing exchange. The first is that a speaker in A3 may orient to A1. This orientation to A1 is seen explicitly in A3 acts that support A1 and indirectly in A3 acts in which Speaker A contests A2. The second observation is that a two move claim-disagreement does not constitute an argument. A speaker in the third move may renege on his or her claim thereby not engaging in argument. And finally, arguments with more than three moves can be generated by recursively applying the three-move arguing exchange.

## CHAPTER THREE: MOVES IN THE ARGUING EXCHANGE

### 3.1 An Overview

Each move within the arguing exchange occurs within a turn at talk and contains at least one act with a specific orientation to a prior move in the transaction. The acts within each move may be identified using syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic criteria.

In the following sections, each move from the arguing exchange is analyzed. In 3.2, I describe the procedure used to identify the various types of acts in each move of the exchange. In 3.3, I describe A1, the types of claims typically found in arguing. Next, in 3.4, I describe A2, the types of disagreements identified in the data. In the final section, 3.5, A3 is also described by the types of acts found in the data. A special note is made of the type of orientation of each A3 act. A3 acts may orient to either A1 or A2, unlike A1 or A2 acts that have only one orientation to the immediately preceding move in the conversation.

### 3.2 Procedure

From the corpus of three move arguing exchanges, I examined each move for the types of acts that occurred therein. The general cover term *claim* was used to identify the A1 act, *disagreement* to identify A2, and *disagreement* to identify A3. However, I noticed that further variability existed among the acts that occurred in each move. For instance, there are different ways that one may state a claim, disagree with a claim, or even disagree with a disagreement. The first move that I analyzed was A1. Although there are many ways that a claim may be stated, I had limited success in deriving a classification system to express this variability. Perhaps the range of claim types were too large to be adequately represented by my 140 examples of arguing exchanges.

I had considerably more success at identifying different types of A2 disagreements. The most conspicuous type of disagreement appeared in the following form:

(26) (S8: 111)

M: And why not welcome all of your friends to come here. Don't you think we are

C: Yeah

D: (mumbles) 'cause I don't

A1 C: You you ignore them.

→ A2 D: No, I don't.

A2 in (26) has specific syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic characteristics. It has the syntactic structure of a negated sentence, using negative markers such as *not*. Semantically, it expresses the negated proposition of the A1 claim, and pragmatically, it directly repudiates C's claim. I call this type of disagreement a contradiction.

Other types of disagreements do not have such a simple structure and therefore are more difficult to identify and describe. Consider such an example:

(27) (S3: 103)

A1 C: I was at Carrie's (pause) but that's why I said pick me up at the end of the street.

→ A2 M: Yeah, but you weren't at the end of the street, so I had to turn up.

M introduces her disagreement in A2 with *yeah but*, which serves as a token agreement that acknowledges other's point of view, and displays cooperation with other speaker (Schiffrin, 1984). Many of these disagreement types appeared with a prefaced agreement. In addition, M's A2 provides an alternative claim to C's A1. C's claim asserts that she requested to be picked up at the end of the street. M's disagreement contrasts with C's claim by providing the reasons why M was unable to pick up C at the end of the street. The pragmatic function of M's disagreement is to negotiate further discussion of the topic. By acknowledging C's point



of view, and by providing additional claims to negotiate the disagreement, M displays cooperation and a willingness to continue negotiating with C. These types of disagreements are termed counterclaims.

The identical procedure was used to identify A3 disagreements. Syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic criteria were used to differentiate between different types of A3s. It was found that the identical range of disagreement types existed in A3 as in A2. Furthermore, A3 disagreements were identified in terms of their orientation to the preceding moves in the exchange.

### 3.3 Move Position (A1): Claim Types

From the arguing exchange (13), it follows that A1 is produced by Speaker A and must contain an act of type *claim*. A claim is quite broadly used to refer to any utterance by which the speaker expresses a statement about the social or non-social world.<sup>3</sup> A1 is given an orientation of A0 that corresponds to the move that immediately precedes A1.

Consider the following A1s:

(14) (S3: 99)

A1 M: I I haven't got an objection to a ten-thirty phone and eleven-thirty come in (pause) seems half way between your present curfew and your friends' some of your friends' curfew.

(15) (S16: 43)

A1 D: Well, shouldn't we know we are paying for the damn thing?

---

<sup>3</sup> My description of a claim suggests that there is predominantly one action (i.e., expressing a statement) that a claim conveys. However, by expressing a statement, a speakers may perform a range of actions. For instance, in example (15) below, D's A1 claim yields a minimum of three actions; expressing information (D is paying for the call alert), questioning (interrogative syntax), and an accusation (D accuses C of having withheld information from him). Therefore, any claim may perform a number of acts. It is in A2 that next speaker reveals what aspect of the A1 claim is being disagreed with. Similarly for A2 and A3, the acts performed within these moves do not only function as a disagreement with other speaker. A2s and A3s may also question, express information, accuse, request, etc. .

(16) (S12: 74)

A1 M: We never dealt with the fact that you went by bus downtown when you told me that you'd gone to Tenth Avenue.

(17) (S8: 114)

A1 M: We were trying to protect your reputation. We had reason to believe that at that time your reputation was going down hill.

(18) (S7: 77)

A1 C: If its totally stupid, like I have to be home at nine o'clock, that's kind of dumb, when all of my friends are allowed out til about twelve-thirty.

While any aspect of a claim may become arguable, it is the propositional and performative levels of a claim that are most frequently disputed (Jackson & Jacobs, 1980). Furthermore, Jackson & Jacobs propose that disagreements tend not to be solely over propositions, but rather over actions involving propositions. They suggest that "viewing argument as simply involving opposing propositions misses the 'command aspect' of the speech act in which such propositions are expressed: Semantic relations are only one expression of a fundamentally pragmatic organization" (p. 255). Lee and Peck (1995) also suggest that everyday arguments rarely involve disputes over propositional claims. Rather, they found from their data on the everyday interactions of an Australian family that arguments have to do with future courses of actions to decide relevant issues (e.g., *Can I have a birthday party?*, *Can he borrow the car?*). In contrast, the families in my data base that attempt to resolve moral issues tend to focus more on the facts and evidence relating to past courses of action rather than to future courses of action. However, while the predominant issue of dispute in the family conflicts revolved around past courses of action such as curfew, drugs, and swearing, they also provided immediate debate about the future course of action on these issues. For instance,

families that argued over past courses of action such as breaching curfew, also argued over future courses of action, such as whether curfew should be extended or punishments given for breaching curfew.

Examples (14), (16), (17), and (18) all function syntactically as declarative sentences and semantically as describing a state of affairs. Further, all describe some past course of action that caused a conflict between the parents and the daughter. Although all these A1 claims may contain disputable propositions, it is not solely the propositional content, but rather the propositional content in relation to a past contentious event that is disputed. Example (17) is a typical example of a claim. M states that there is sufficient reason to believe that someone's reputation was going downhill; that is, M expresses a belief about the status of a person's reputation, a belief that is open to agreement or disagreement in the subsequent turn. In addition, example (14) expresses a future course of action that is open to dispute in the subsequent move. M both refers to the past conflict involving curfew, and to the future course of action taken that will slightly extend the daughter's curfew, a course of action that may be disputed by the daughter. By contrast, example (15) functions syntactically as an interrogative sentence, having the pragmatic force of an accusation. In what sense then, can we say that (15) may become disputable? The answer lies in the phenomenon of presupposition. The utterance, *shouldn't we know we are paying for the damn thing?*, presupposes that D is the one that is paying for the call alert. Therefore, D in example (15) indirectly claims that he is paying, and it is this presupposition that is then open to dispute by his interlocutor in the subsequent turn, as illustrated below:

(15) (S16: 43)

A1 D: Well, shouldn't we know we are paying for the damn thing?

→ A2 C: I was going to pay for it.

C in A2 contests A1 by a contradiction in uttering “I was going to pay for it”. C is disagreeing with D’s presuppositional claim that D is paying for call alert. However, C is not restricted to disagreeing with the presuppositional content of D’s A1. Instead, C may have disagreed with the performative aspect or intended meaning of the A1 claim by responding with *You can’t accuse me of trying to hide something from you!*. C could also have disagreed with D’s right or authority to pose his question. C could then have responded in A2 with *You have no right to ask me that!*.

### 3.4 Move Position (A2): Disagreement Types

The second position in an argument exchange is allocated to Speaker B who contests and therefore orients to A1 by way of a disagreement.

Consider the following examples:

(14) (S3: 99)

A1 M: I I haven’t got an objection to a ten-thirty phone and eleven-thirty come in (pause) seems half way between your present curfew and your friends’ some of your friends’ curfew.

→ A2 C: Yeah (pause) but its its still not, what I like (pause) like.

(15) (S16: 43)

A1 D: Well, shouldn’t we know we are paying for the damn thing?

→ A2 C: I was going to pay for it.

(17) (S8: 114)

A1 M: We were trying to protect your reputation. We had reason to believe that at that time your reputation was going down hill.

→ A2 C: My reputation is not going downhill.

(18) (S7: 77)

A1 C: If its totally stupid, like I have to be home at nine o'clock, that's kind of dumb, when all of my friends are allowed out till about twelve-thirty.

→ A2 M: Okay, have we ever um, insisted that you be home at nine o'clock?

(20) (S2: 137)

A1 D: Well, I think the fact that he has gone out and he has earned it for specific reasons.

C: He's the one who worked for it.

→ A2 M: I don't think it matters.

As seen in the above examples, whereas all A2 acts are acts of disagreement that oppose some aspect of the A1 claim, A2 disagreements come in various shapes and forms that express different types of disagreement (Brenneis & Lein, 1977; Eisenberg & Garvey, 1981; Goodwin, 1983; Kakavá, 1994; Knoblauch, 1991). Using syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic criteria, four types of disagreements were identified in the corpus, namely, *claims of irrelevancy*, *challenges*, *contradictions*, and *counterclaims*. A claim of irrelevancy may be identified syntactically by discourse markers such as *so*, or by phrases such as being *off topic*, semantically as containing minimal propositional content, and pragmatically by asserting that the previous speaker's claim is not relevant to the topic under discussion. A challenge may be identified syntactically by its interrogative structure, semantically by its bare propositional content, and pragmatically by questioning other's claim and demanding that other provide evidence for his or her claim. A contradiction may be identified syntactically by contradiction markers such as *no* or *not*, semantically by expressing the negated proposition of the A1 claim, and pragmatically by directly repudiating Speaker A's claim. And finally, a counterclaim is often identified syntactically by prefaced partial agreements, semantically by one or more

propositions, and pragmatically by offering an alternative claim that invites further negotiation of the disputed claim.

Examples of each A2 disagreement are provided below.

### *A2 claim of irrelevancy*

In uttering a claim of irrelevancy, a speaker asserts that the previous claim is not relevant to the discussion at hand. Asserting that other's claim is irrelevant conveys a specific view on what is being argued about and what constitutes an allowable contribution to the conversational argument. In this sense, irrelevancy-claims are *meta-dispute-acts* that comment on the conversational interaction. Claims of irrelevancy vary widely in form. Some examples begin with the discourse marker *so*, others have the form *It doesn't matter*, *You're straying off topic*, and *Its nothing to do with it*.

Consider the following example with *so*:

(28) (S7: 82)

A1 C: Yes it should be such a big deal because I'm moving in a week.

→ A2 D: So what.

C and D are arguing over C's curfew. C contends that she should be allowed to stay out later than usual due to special circumstances. In A1, C voices these circumstances by indicating that she is moving in a week. Here C implies that it is important that she spend more time with her friends, since she will not be able to see her friends anymore after she moves. D disagrees with C in A2 by a claim of irrelevancy (i.e., *So what*) suggesting that C's A1 claim is not a valid reason for extending the curfew.

Consider now a different form of claim of irrelevancy:

(29) (S7: 88)

A1 C: Okay then, why do you guys bring up (pause) Oh Tracy went to clean her room or Tracy wouldn't yell at her mom (pause) Sheila wouldn't [do this or Sheila

→ A2 D: [You're straying

C: [wouldn't do that.

→ D: [off the topic, you're straying off the topic.

In negotiating C's curfew, C argues that her curfew should match the curfew of her friends and, therefore, if C's friends can stay out until twelve o'clock, so should she. C's parents do not accept the argument that C's social behaviors should be compared, and consequently made equivalent, to her friends' social behaviors and that therefore C is entitled to the identical benefits and restrictions that her friends possess. Curfew, C's parents maintain, is determined by the rules and regulations of the family and not by the social network of teenagers. In A1, C then questions why she is constantly being compared to her sister Tracy and her friend Sheila when C's behavior is being negatively evaluated by her parents (e.g., *Tracy always cleans her room but you do not*), since her parents do not believe that behavioral comparisons of this sort should be made. D then thwarts C's line of reasoning in A2 by asserting that C's A1 claim is not relevant and that it is off the topic of curfew.

### *A2 challenge*

Challenges have been given a very general definition in the literature, referring to any negative thought, attitude or action that a speaker attributes to an addressee (Labov & Fanshel, 1977; Krainer, 1988). In this thesis, a challenge is described as a specific type of disagreement by which the speaker questions the addressee's prior claim and demands that

addressee provide evidence for his/her claim. Challenges often have the syntactic form of an interrogative, appearing with question particles such as *when, what, who, why, where* and *how*. Although challenges do not appear to make a specific claim (e.g., *Why?* or *Like who?*), they may however do so by presupposition or conversational implicature (e.g., *Who are you gonna get a ride home with?* may imply that there is nobody that can give you a ride home).

Consider the following example of a challenge with some implicit semantic content:

(30) (S3: 92)

A1 M: We don't always know where you are at least [at eleven to twelve at night.

C: [Yes, you do.

→ A2 C: When haven't you?

In this example, M and C are negotiating a curfew that is agreeable to both. C wishes to stay out past eleven o'clock so that her curfew is commensurate with her friends' curfews, enabling her to spend more time with them. M, on the other hand, fears the possible repercussions of a later curfew by fearing for C's safety. M expresses this concern in A1 by asserting that she doesn't know where C is at eleven o'clock, possibly implying that C could get into trouble. C expresses her disagreement initially by contradicting M with an overlapping utterance (i.e., *yes you do*). C then challenges M in A2 by demanding that M provide her with the times or instances in which M had not known where C was.

The next example is of a semantically bare A2-challenge:

(31) (S16: 52)

A1 C: 'Cause if grandma [gave Joe a cheque that'd be different.

D: [We::ll,

→ A2 D: Why?



The speakers are arguing over whether there is a difference between earning money or receiving money as a gift; that is, does earning money, as opposed to receiving money as a gift, make it more yours. C believes that there is a difference between earning and receiving money and claims in A1 that receiving money from a grandparent is different from earning it. D in A2 challenges C by demanding that C supply reasons for asserting the A1 claim. D's utterance in A2 is not simply a request for information but a disagreement which demands that C back up her claim. One piece of evidence that suggests this is D's overlapping utterance *well* with prolonged vowel articulation, which indicates D's reluctance to accept C's claim.

*A2 contradiction*<sup>4</sup>

A speaker contradicts the previous speaker by uttering the negated proposition expressed by the previous claim. In other words, if speaker A utters P, then speaker B will utter  $\neg P$ . Contradictions often occur with a negative particle such as *no* or *not*, as in *No, I don't*, indicating that the contradiction of the A1 claim is true. Contradictions that do not contain a negative contradiction marker will contain positive contradiction markers such as *yes* or *yeah*, as in *Yes it does*, which assert the affirmative in contrast to a negated A1 claim. Or, in semantic terms, if A utters  $\neg P$  in A1, then B will utter P in A2.

Consider a contradiction with negative contradiction markers:

(32) (S8: 106)

A1 C: He thinks you guys hate him.

→ A2 M: I don't hate him. I think...

In the preceding context for this example, M inquires why C's boyfriend doesn't come around

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<sup>4</sup> Contradictions, as I have described them, are also given the term *denial* (Brenneis & Lein, 1977; Eisenberg & Garvey, 1981). Other researchers also make use of the term contradiction, yet their descriptions include many other types of disagreeing (Goodwin, 1983; Knoblauch, 1991; Maynard, 1985).

to their home anymore. C responds to this in A1 by providing the reason (i.e., the parents hate him) for the boyfriend's absence. M contradicts C in A2 by uttering the negated proposition of A1, *I don't hate him*, which directly repudiates C's A1 claim.

Consider a different example of a contradiction with a positive contradiction marker:

(33) (S8: 124)

A1 D: Laura, listen to what I'm saying to you. (pause) It doesn't matter who [it was.

→ A2 C: [Yes it does.

Here D has heard from some sources that C was seen with a person who sells drugs. C wishes to know the name of the drug seller but D is not providing this information. In A1, D makes the claim that the name of the drug seller is not important. C in A2 subsequently contradicts the A1 claim by uttering the affirmative, *Yes it does*.

### *A2 counterclaim*

The final category of A2 disagreements is the A2 counterclaim. For these disagreements, speakers propose an alternative claim that does not directly contradict nor challenge other's claim. Proposing alternative claims allows further negotiation of the A1 claim.

Consider the following example:

(14) (S3: 99)

A1 M: I I haven't got an objection to a ten-thirty phone and eleven-thirty come in (pause) seems half way between your present curfew and your friends' some of your friends' curfew.

→ A2 C: Yeah (pause) but its its still not, what I like (pause) like.

Here, M and C have negotiated C's curfew from eleven o'clock to eleven-thirty. In A1, M seems satisfied with the compromises both have made in their exchange. For instance M has conceded by extending C's curfew, yet M hasn't given C the identical curfew that her friends have. C then disagrees in A2 by way of counterclaim by partly agreeing (i.e., *Yeah but*) yet offering an alternative claim indicating that the new curfew still does not meet her approval (i.e., *its still not, what I like*). By partially agreeing with M, C acts to acknowledge M's contribution and display cooperation (Schiffrin, 1984), and by providing an alternative claim, C attempts to keep the negotiation of the curfew open for changes.

Consider another example of a counterclaim:

(22) (S3: 91)

A1 M: That gives me a problem because in order to get a good nights sleep, I don't want to be waiting up 'til twelve o'clock before I go to sleep. (pause) No, eleven o'clock would suit me better, if you were in the house by eleven (pause) and I like the way you phone at ten o'clock to tell us where you are. That helps.

→ A2 C: Yeah, but I don't like coming home alone because (pause) because I

Here again the speakers are arguing about when to set the curfew. In A1, M expresses dissatisfaction with a twelve o'clock curfew because it would conflict with her sleep schedule. M is advocating the status quo; ten o'clock phone call and eleven o'clock come in. C counters M's A1 claim in A2 by pointing out a negative consequence of an eleven o'clock curfew; that is, C would have to do something that she does not enjoy which is coming home alone. Notice again that C offers a token agreement (i.e., *yeah but*) before launching into the A2 counterclaim. By expressing dissatisfaction with the A1 claim, and by suggesting alternative reasons for not wishing to comply with the current curfew, C attempts to further negotiate the curfew to a time more amenable to C's liking.

Consider now a slightly more complex counterclaim, requiring more interpretive work

on the part of both speakers and analysts:

(34) (S3: 98)

A1 D: Well, we'd like to know where you are (pause) in the late hours of the night.

→ A2 C: I tell you where I where I am but I don't have to tell you what I'm doing.

This example again involves curfew. However the issue here is not at what time C should be at home but rather that C should call her parents to let them know what she is doing. In A1, D implies that he has no knowledge of C's whereabouts at night (i.e., *we'd like to know where you are*). C in A2 disagrees with the implication that her parents do not know where she is (i.e., *I tell you where I am*) and further provides an alternate claim (i.e., *but I don't have to tell you what I'm doing*) which may function as either disagreeing with any further implications of the A1 claim (i.e., we don't know where you are, therefore we don't know what you are doing), or it may simply be anticipating further restrictions and complaints that D might have on what C does when she goes out at night. In any case, C's A2 counterclaim seems to negotiate the A1 claim by providing alternative interpretations of D's concerns and also by suggesting what is and is not allowable behavior for C.

### 3.5 Move Position (A3): Disagreement Types

A3 is the critical move in an exchange that determines whether or not an argument has ensued. In order for Speakers A and B to be arguing, A must disagree with B in A3. However, if A reneges on his or her initial claim then an argument has not occurred, only a disagreement with A conceding to B's disagreement.

The various types of disagreements that occur in A2 also appear in A3. Examples of A3 disagreements are provided below:

### *A3 claim of irrelevancy*

(35) (S8: 123)

A1 D: I heard it from very reliable sources, darling.

A2 C: Like who?

→ A3 D: It doesn't matter.

(36) (S3: 94)

C: Yeah, you knew I was there.

A1 M: I knew you were there that's right.

A2 C: So, why did you come down?

(pause)

→ A3 M: Well, that's not getting us solving our curfew.

In both cases, the speakers in A3 reject the relevance of the A2 disagreement. In (35), D asserts in A3 that C's demand that D provide C with the name of the reliable source is not relevant to the discussion. In (36), C challenges M in A2 by demanding that M provide the reason why M came down when M knew that C was there. M counters C in A3 by asserting that C's A2 challenge is not relevant to the resolution of the curfew dilemma.

### *A3 challenge*

(37) (S8: 121)

A1 D: I'm not blowing it out of proportion.

A2 C: Yes you are::.

→ A3 D: Tell me how?

(38) (S8: 125)

A1 C: Who was labeling me? (pause) Eric Owen's mom, I KNEW it was Eric Owen's mom.

A2 M: No, she she was not labeling you.

→ A3 C: Ah who was?

Both examples are instances in which Speaker A in A3 demands that Speaker B provide evidence for his or her A2 disagreement. In (37), D's A3 act is not simply a request for information, but a challenge in which D disagrees with C's contradiction by questioning the tenability of her position. In this way, D demands that C provide the necessary evidence that will support C's A2 contradiction of D's A1 claim. In (38), C demands in A3 that M provide C with the name of the person that was labeling C. Again, the A3 challenge is not a request for information. Since C in A1 asserts that she knew that Eric Owen's mother was labeling C, M's A2 contradiction that Eric Owen's mother is not the guilty party is not likely to convince C. Therefore, in A3, C is not asking who the person is (i.e., C knows who it is from A1), but rather is challenging M to provide another name.

### *A3 contradiction*

(39) (S7: 80)

A1 D: It wasn't much to ask for you to come in early (pause) just one night. Nine-thirty, ten o'clock is not that out of line.

A2 C: Yeah, it is out of line.

→ A3 D: No, its not.

(40) (S8: 111)

M: And why not welcome all of your friends to come here. Don't you think we are

C: Yeah

D: (mumbles) 'cause I don't

A1 C: You you ignore them.

A2 D: No, I don't.

→ A3 C: Yes you do.

In both cases, A3 speakers directly repudiate the A2 claim by contradiction. In (39), D contradicts C's A2 contradiction in A3, and in (40), C contradicts D's A2 contradiction in A3.

### *A3 counterclaim*

(14) (S3: 99)

A1 M: I I haven't got an objection to a ten-thirty phone and eleven-thirty come in (pause) seems half way between your present curfew and your friends' some of your friends' curfew.

A2 C: Yeah (pause) but its its still not, what I like (pause) like.

→ A3 M: Well, its not exactly what we like.

(18) (S7: 77)

A1 C: If its totally stupid, like I have to be home at nine o'clock, that's kind of dumb, when all of my friends are allowed out til about twelve-thirty.

A2 M: Okay, have we ever um, insisted that you be home at nine o'clock?

→ A3 C: Dad insisted that I had to be home at nine-thirty once.

In both cases, A3 speakers disagree by way of counterclaim, which acts to further the negotiation of the topic under discussion. In (14), M makes an A1 claim that a compromise has been reached on the curfew. C disagrees in A2 by asserting that the new curfew is still not

satisfactory. M disagrees by counterclaim with C's A2 disagreement by pointing out that the new curfew is not satisfactory to the parents either. In other words, M suggests that if M can accept the new curfew even though M does not find it satisfactory, then so should C. In this way, M opens up the negotiation of M's initial claim that the new curfew is reasonable and should therefore be accepted. In (18), C makes an A1 claim that C's curfew is at nine o'clock, which is much earlier than her friends' curfews. In A2, M challenges C's A1 claim by demanding that C provide instances in which M had insisted that C be home at nine. C provides an instance in A3 that continues the argument that C's curfew is too early.

### 3.5.1 A3 Orientation

Speaker A in A3 may orient to either of the preceding moves A1 or A2. If the orientation is to A1, Speaker A is described as supporting A1 by disagreement. If the orientation is to A2, Speaker A is described as contesting A2 by disagreement. In the following two sections we examine A1 and A2 orientations of various A3 disagreement moves.

#### 3.5.1.1 A3 Acts that Support A1

A3 is the first opportunity, aside from A1, for Speaker A to support his or her A1 claim. Support is accomplished by providing direct evidence (i.e., data) or reasons for having made the claim expressed in A1. An important question is which A3 disagreements may function as A1 supports? It seems that only counterclaims may work in supporting A1 in A3 since they provide alternative claims and therefore possible evidence for the tenability of the A1 claim. In contrast, A3 challenges, contradictions and claims of irrelevancy do not offer A1 support since these are purely oppositional acts.

A speaker in A3 often defends A1 by support after his or her claim has been either challenged, contradicted, or claimed irrelevant in A2.



Consider example (31), in which D in A2 contests A1 by challenge:

(31) (S16: 52)

A1 C: 'Cause if grandma [gave Joe a cheque that'd be different.

D: [We::ll,

A2 D: Why?

→ A3 C: Because Joe didn't have to go out an and face the elements of

C claims in A1 that receiving money as a gift is different from having earned the money yourself. D's disagreement contests A1 by challenge (i.e., *Why?*). C responds in A3 with a counterclaim that supports A1 by asserting that Joe would not have made any sacrifices if he had received money as a gift. Therefore the primary orientation of C's A3 is to A1.

Another instance of A3 support occurs when in example (17), in which M contests A1 by contradiction:

(17) (S8: 114)

A1 M: We were trying to protect your reputation. We had reason to believe that at that time your reputation was going downhill.

A2 C: My reputation is not going [downhill.

A3 M: [Yeah, well that's not what we heard. We heard

M claims in A1 that C's reputation is going downhill. C in A2 disagrees with M and contradicts M's claim by asserting the negation of M's claim. Finally, M disagrees with C in A3 by supporting her A1 claim. Specifically, M provides evidence for her claim expressed in A1 (i.e., 'We believe that your reputation is going downhill because of what we heard.').

Consider next an example of A1 support following a claim of irrelevancy.

(41) (S15: 14)

A1 D: Well, I wasn't thinking back when I was a teenager I was thinking back as an adult. Well, if I found out one of my friends was cheating on his income tax would I t [urn him

A2 C: [That's a different situation dad, that's [a lot more unusual.

→ A3 D: [Well but, no but, you're not understanding me well, I I think would turn him in to Revenue Canada and I would say the answer I probably wouldn't turn him into Revenue Canada (pause) I might say to him I was concerned about that but I might not even do that, so I tried to put it into an adult situation that I might have to face.

D and C are arguing about whether cheaters on exams should or should not be exposed to the proper authorities. D believes that if an injustice is being committed, then one should confront the perpetrator of the injustice. C on the other hand, adopts the belief that one should mind one's own business. In A1, D brings up a hypothetical adult scenario of D's friend cheating on his income tax and whether or not D should inform Revenue Canada. C objects to D's claim by asserting that it is irrelevant, presumably because they had been discussing teenage instances of cheating. In A3, D primarily orients to and therefore supports his A1 claim by providing evidence for why he provided an adult situation that involved cheating. That is, in order for D to corroborate his belief that perpetrators should be exposed, D must place himself in a hypothetical adult situation, rather than in a teenage situation. Providing an everyday adult situation in which D is confronted by cheating allows D to verify whether his actions would be consistent with his beliefs.

Consider an example of A1 support following an A2 counterclaim:

(42) (S6: 40)

A1 M: Well, uh the problem is that (pause) if the father takes Joe's money so many things that he's trying to teach Joe will just strictly go down the drain.

C: Mom, you're making it too technical.

A2 D: No, I think I think that in the father's eyes that giving the money to the uh the

father's eyes the son is a good son for giving him the money, from Joe's perspective obviously the son would not be impressed (pause) but in the father's eyes he'd be considered a good son.

→ A3 M: Well, but the father has broken his promise, h [e said he'd keep a promise

D: [Yeah, but I mean.

M: with Joe but he can't.

In this example, the argument concerns one of the Kohlberg dilemmas. The issue at stake is whether a father is justified in taking back money that he has given his son towards a camp holiday. M claims in A1 that taking back the money would be inconsistent with what the father is trying to teach his son, and is therefore a bad parenting strategy. D disagrees by counterclaim with A1 by offering a different perspective on the father's actions. D suggests that the issue is not so much about correct parenting practices, but rather concerns the father-son relationship. In other words, it is justifiable for D to take C's money since C would then be considered a good and obedient son for responding positively to his father's wishes. Perhaps D is suggesting that in a positive father-son relationship, one may renege on one's promises without any serious damage resulting to the relationship. In A3, M disagrees with A2 by providing support for her A1 claim. M reinforces her position that the father's actions are a poor parenting strategy because he has broken a promise that he had made with his son.

Although the above examples of A3s all reveal a primary orientation, they also have a secondary A2 orientation. By buttressing one's claim in A3, Speaker A indirectly, by inference, disagrees with, and secondarily orients to, Speaker A's A2 disagreement.

### 3.5.1.2 A3 Acts that Contest A2

Another possible function of an A3 disagreement is to contest A2. Speakers frequently contest in A3 by making claims of irrelevancy, challenges, and contradictions, as seen in examples (35) to (40). As argued previously, these disagreements are primarily oppositional

acts and therefore orient primarily to A2 and not A1. To see how A3 claims of irrelevancy, A3 challenges and A3 contradictions do not offer A1 support, consider example (35) of an A3 claim of irrelevancy:

(35) (S8: 123)

A1 D: I heard it from very reliable sources, darling.

A2 C: Like who?

→ A3 D: It doesn't matter.

D's initial claim asserts that he received information from reliable sources. C challenges D in A2 to provide the name or names of D's sources. In A3, D asserts that C's challenge is immaterial. According to D, naming the sources will not serve any useful or relevant purpose. D's claim of irrelevancy does not support his A1 claim that he received information from reliable sources and therefore does not orient to A1. D's A3 works purely to oppose and undermine C's A2 contribution.

Consider next an A3 challenge in example (37):

(37) (S8: 121)

A1 D: I'm not blowing it out of proportion.

A2 C: Yes you are::

→ A3 D: Tell me how?

In this example, D's A3 challenge of *Tell me how?* does not support his A1 claim that he isn't blowing things out of proportion. Instead, the A3 challenge directly orients to and questions C's A2 contradiction.

Example (39) contains an A3 contradiction:

(39) (S7: 80)

A1 D: It wasn't much to ask for you to come in early (pause) just one night. Nine-thirty, ten o'clock is not that out of line.

A2 C: Yeah, it is out of line.

→ A3 D: No, its not.

Again, D's A3 contradiction, *No, its not*, does not Provide A1 support for D's A1 claim that asking C to come home early for just one evening is not out of line. Rather, D's A3 contradiction directly attacks and repudiates C's A2 contradiction that D's request in A1 is out of line.

A3 counterclaims, as seen in examples (14), (20), and (22), may also orient to and therefore contest A2. Although in such cases the A3 act is oriented primarily to A2, there may also be a secondary orientation to A1.

Consider (20) as an example:

(20) (S2: 137)

A1 D: Well, I think the fact that he has gone out and he has earned it for specific reasons.

C: He's the one who worked for it.

A2 M: I don't think it matters.

A3 D: I think it makes it even stronger.

In A2, M claims that it is irrelevant whether someone worked for their money or not, whereas in A3, D provides the counterclaim that working for one's money makes a significant difference, which openly contests and therefore directly orients to A2. These two claims are mutually incompatible since working for one's money cannot be both irrelevant and highly

significant. D in A3 also indirectly supports A1 emphasizing the A1 claim's significance. In sum, A3 is oriented directly to A2 and by inference to A1.

## CHAPTER FOUR: FACE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ACTS OF ARGUING

### 4.1 An Overview

In this chapter, I describe the face implications of the different types of acts from each move in the arguing exchange outlined in Chapter Three. In 4.2, I discuss the procedure used in identifying the face implications of all acts. In 4.3, I describe the face implications of A1 claims. Next, in 4.4, I describe the face implications of A2 disagreements. In addition, the face implications of each A2 disagreement is noted and ranked in accordance with the relative amount of face damage that is done to Speaker A's face. In the final section, 4.5, I describe the face implications of each A3 disagreement and suggest that an A3 act's orientation has direct face implications.

### 4.2 Procedure

The different types of A1, A2, and A3 acts have different face implications. The face implications of each act type were identified using the description of positive and negative face, and facework outlined in the first chapter. I mainly focused on the type of damage that these acts cause to face. Therefore each act type identified in the data was analyzed for negative and/or positive face damage to other's face.

To see how the procedure of identifying face implications applies, consider an example of an A2 disagreement:

(43) (S17: 27)

A1 M: But this is the one that is going to, um it carries force from the last term.

→ A2 C: No, it's not from the last term.

A2 in example (43) is a contradiction. Since A2 is a disagreement, it inherently threatens M's

positive face. C's A2 contradiction is particularly damaging to M's positive face since it directly repudiates M's A1 claim. C's contradiction also damages M's negative face. By not offering an alternative claim to M's A1 claim, C's contradiction attempts to constrain M's behavioral options by denying the validity of M's claim, thus closing off that avenue of discussion. All other act types were analyzed in this manner. The next section begins with the face implications of the acts in the first move of the exchange.

#### 4.3 The Face Implications of A1 Claims

It was suggested in the previous chapter that an A1 claim expresses actions through propositions that may be disputed in the next move. However, a claim also expresses information about the social world, such as claims about other's face, that may become disputable. Let us now re-examine example (15) in regard to its face implications:

(15) (S16: 43)

A1 D: Well, shouldn't we know we are paying for the damn thing?

Recall that D accuses C of having withheld information from him. Since accusations convey that the addressee has undesirable qualities, D's accusation threatens C's positive face. Therefore, C's contradiction in A2 may not so much involve a disagreement of the facts concerning who had paid for the call alert, but rather C may be disagreeing with D over D's negative evaluation of C's self-image. While on the surface it may appear that only propositions are being disputed, speakers are also negotiating face. In sum, A1 claims may convey information that damages Speaker B's face and therefore may provoke B to contest the face damaging claim.

The face damage expressed in an A1 claim is at times difficult to determine. Furthermore, it is not at all obvious how some A1s motivate disagreement in A2.



Consider an example:

(21) (S2: 135)

C: Okay, is the fact that Joe earned the money himself important in this situation and why or why not?

→ A1 M: I don't think its important.

A2 D: Well, I think it is. (pause) So there.

C&D: (laughs)

A2 C: I think it is because it certainly proves that it isn't his money its

In A1, M makes a claim that the fact that Joe earned the money himself is not important. M's claim does not specifically damage anyone's face. However, M does take a specific stand on the issue of Joe's money, a stand that others may be in disagreement with. This disagreement is expressed in A2, in which D and C both assert contrary claims to M's claim. Perhaps in making a specific claim, M threatens the negative face of her interlocutors by attempting to restrict the possible answers to C's initial question.

In sum, the face implication of A1 claims were at times difficult to identify. More success was achieved by analyzing the face implications of the acts in A2 and A3.

#### 4.4 The Face Implications of A2 Disagreements

Disagreements are inherently threatening to other speaker's face since they express disapproval of another person's thoughts, beliefs, actions, or attitudes (Brown & Levinson, 1987). Also, a disagreement may be injurious to other's face and thereby may aggravate other's face. In the preceding chapter, it was shown that various types of disagreements are produced by speakers in A2 of an arguing exchange. The extent of the damage to other's face is likely to depend on the specific way in which an act of disagreement is done, including the specific words used in carrying out that act. Therefore, the different acts of disagreement will

have different implications for other's face and may be ranked according to their face aggravating effects.

Ranking conversational acts along an aggravation-mitigation continuum for their aggravating and mitigating effects on other's face has been done extensively for requests (Labov & Fanshel, 1977) and also for account sequences (McLaughlin, Cody & O'Hair, 1983). Labov & Fanshel (1977:85) proposed that requests that are more direct (e.g., *Dust the room!*) are more aggravating, and therefore less mitigating than requests that are less direct (e.g., *You have enough time to dust the room?*). Similarly, McLaughlin, Cody & O'Hair (1983) suggested that justifications and refusals in account sequences are more aggravating, and therefore less mitigating than concessions and excuses. Disagreements may also be categorized along an aggravation-mitigation continuum (Goodwin, 1983; Kakavá, 1993, 1994).


The types of A2 disagreements identified in the previous chapter may be graded along a continuum of face aggravation; that is, some types of disagreements are inherently more aggravating to other's face than other types of disagreements. Further, I suggest that the order of disagreements from most to least face aggravating are as follows: *Claims of irrelevancy, challenges, contradiction, and counterclaims*. The most aggravating A2 disagreement is the claim of irrelevancy. This act is the most aggressive since it attacks the most fundamental social skill of a conversationalist; that of making relevant conversational contributions. It generally has a simple turn-shape with very little informational content, and expresses pure opposition that acts to limit any further discussion. Next along the continuum is the challenge. A challenge is highly face aggravating since it directly attacks the competency and rationality of the other speaker. It is not as face damaging as a claim of irrelevancy since it does not refute the relevance of other's conversational contribution. The next type of A2 disagreement along the continuum is the contradiction. A contradiction is face-aggravating because it directly and unambiguously repudiates other's claim. However, it is less face-aggravating than a claim of

irrelevancy or a challenge since it does not directly attack the competency and rationality of the other speaker. The least face-aggravating A2 disagreement is the counterclaim. A counterclaim provides an alternative contrasting claim and/or reasons for why speaker disagrees, which invites negotiation of the A1 claim by opening up the topic of discussion rather than closing it down. Providing alternative claims and/or reasons positions self as being less oriented and aggressively opposed to other, and does not typically attack central aspects of other's self-image. Thus, the speaker's emphasis is not on pure opposition, a *me against you* tactic, as with challenges, contradictions and claims of irrelevancy. Rather, counterclaims emphasize alternative claims that foster the negotiation of both self's and other's claims, thereby mitigating the damage to other's face.

The types of A2 disagreements and the proposed ranking from most to least face aggravating are summarized below:

(44)

**Aggravation-Mitigation Continuum**



In order to clarify the basis for the proposed rankings, consider specific examples of A2 acts and their face implications.

Example (29) contains a claim of irrelevancy:

(29) (S7: 88)

A1 C: Okay then, why do you guys bring up (pause) Oh Tracy went to clean her room or Tracy wouldn't yell at her mom (pause) Sheila wouldn't [do this or Sheila

→ A2 D: [You're straying

C: [wouldn't do that.

→ D: [off the topic, you're straying off the topic.

In A2, D portrays C as someone who does not recognize what is relevant to the conversation at hand. This act severely attacks C's positive face. C is deemed deficient in an important, even central, social skill, that of being a competent and rational conversationalist. Since C's claim is deemed irrelevant, there is the implication that whatever C's views are, they are wrong. In trying to impose his own view of relevancy on C, D limits C's options, thereby attacking C's negative face. C's options are limited also by the fact that D's A2 act provides no clear alternative claim for C to consider. D's act seems more oriented to closing off discussion rather than to opening up issues for negotiation.

Consider another example with a claim of irrelevancy:

(28) (S7: 82)

A1 C: Yes it should be such a big deal because I'm moving in a week.

→ A2 D: So what.

In A1, C claims that because she is moving in a week, she should be allowed to stay out later than usual to spend time with her friends. D attacks C's claim in A2 by asserting that C's reasons for wanting her curfew extended are irrelevant. D's claim of irrelevancy is particularly damaging to C's positive face since it explicitly denies that C's claim is even remotely credible

or convincing. Also, D attacks C's negative face by imposing his view of relevance on C, thereby restricting C's options. In sum, claims of irrelevancy contain many attributes that are likely to severely damage important aspects of other's positive and negative face.

Another type of face aggravating disagreement occurs when the A2 speaker challenges the A1 speaker's claim. Consider example (30):

(30) (S3: 92)

A1 M: We don't always know where you are at least [at eleven to twelve at night.

C: [Yes, you do.

→ A2 C: When haven't you?

With this challenge C implies that M could not provide the exact instances when M did not know where C was. Another possible implication of C's A2 act is that there were no instances in which the parents did not know where their daughter was, in which case either M has a bad and biased memory or she is lying. In either case, C implies that M's claim lacks support and is, perhaps, insupportable. M's options are also restricted by C's challenge; that is, since questions invite answers, there is some degree of pressure on M as a cooperative and competent conversationalist to provide the exact times or circumstances in which M did not know where C was. Further, just as with claims of irrelevancy, a speaker who challenges does not put forth his/her own claim and, therefore, tends to shut off the negotiation and exploration of competing positions.

Consider another example of a challenge:

(45) (S8: 119)

A1 D: That was the evidence that caused us not to trust him (pause) and from there the stories I heard coming back to me from very reliable sources.

C: I I hate it when you say very reliable sources.

(pause)

D: You don't need to know who they were.

→ A2 C: Dad, if you how do you know these people even knew them?

In this segment, D asserts that reliable sources were able to inform D about certain unfavorable aspects of C's boyfriend's behavior. The third person pronoun *him* in A1 refers to C's boyfriend. C challenges D's claim in two important respects. First, C questions D's knowledge concerning these sources. In this way, C damages D's positive face by suggesting that D could not possibly know whether the sources were reliable or not. Second, C demands that D provide evidence for the reliability of his sources. This acts to both damage D's positive face by suggesting that D is unable to competently back up his claims, and also damages D's negative face by getting D to provide evidence, thereby restricting his behavioral options. In sum, the A2 challenge attacks both the positive and negative face of the other, but since it does not question the most basic competence of a social interactant, that of making relevant contributions, the challenge is likely to be less damaging to other's face than the claim of irrelevancy.

A slightly less damaging A2 disagreement occurs when speakers contradict the A1 claim. Consider example (32):

(32) (S8: 106)

T1 C: He thinks you guys hate him.

→ T2 M: I don't hate him.

M's contradiction attacks C's positive face by directly and unambiguously repudiating C's claim. In making a contradiction, M offers no specific alternative claim. Thus, as with claims of irrelevancy and challenge, contradictions are oriented towards closing the discussion rather

than opening up negotiation and are generally uttered with bald-on-record directness which makes them particularly injurious to face. However, unlike claims of irrelevancy and challenges, contradictions do not directly attack the competency or rationality of the other. Contradictions are more opposed to the content of other speaker's conversational contribution than to other speaker's social identity and therefore are less face damaging. Given that the latter type of attack is likely to be more injurious to face, contradictions would then rank third after claims of irrelevancy and challenges in amount of face damage done to other.

The least face aggravating A2 disagreement is the counterclaim. Consider example (46):

(46) (S17: 25)

A1 D: Don't you think that's a valid point, that if she was just left on her own that it would be much better for her to be able to inculcate that sense of personal responsibility and not having anybody saying anything.

M: Well, I h [ave...

D: [that much of her reliance is predicated on somebody already telling her?

→ A2 M: I have left her on her own and when I do that, the next thing we know it's been five days without her practising or five days without her doing any of her school work

M in A2 does not attribute to D incompetence, irrationality, or lack of supportive evidence for his claim. In suggesting an alternative claim, M opens up the negotiation rather than closing down D's options. Counterclaims are disagreements and do, therefore, damage the other's face somewhat. However, counterclaims do not typically attack central aspects of the other's self-image and, in addition, they invite further cooperative discussion. As such, they are the least face-damaging type of A2 act.

Consider another example of a counterclaim:

(14) (S3: 99)

A1 M: I I haven't got an objection to a ten-thirty phone and eleven-thirty come in (pause) seems half way between your present curfew and your friends' some of your friends' curfew.

→ A2 C: Yeah (pause) but its its still not, what I like (pause) like.

C's opposition to the A1 claim is demonstrably weaker than claims of irrelevancy, challenges, and contradictions. C suggests an alternative claim to M's A1 claim in an attempt to negotiate the current curfew proposal. Although C begins her A2 disagreement by partially agreeing with M's claim (i.e. *Yeah but*), C then explicitly disagrees with M by attempting to further negotiate the curfew to a possible later time by asserting that she is not content with M's proposal (i.e., *its still not, what I like*). The partial agreement attends to M's positive face by mitigating the damage done by disagreeing, and providing an alternative claim mitigates damage done to M's negative face by giving M further options with which to continue the negotiation of C's curfew.

#### 4.5 The Face Implications of A3 Disagreements

The various types of acts in A3 have face implications that are similar to those same acts occurring in A2. Based on similar arguments produced for A2, I suggest that A3 claims of irrelevancy and challenges are most face damaging to Speaker B, A3 contradictions produce an intermediate degree of face damage, and A3 counterclaims are least face damaging.

In addition to the type of A3 act, the orientation of the A3 act also determines in part its face implications. A3 acts orient either to A1 or A2, and these two orientations may reflect Speaker A's focus on own or other's contribution to the argument respectively. Consider an example of an A3 oriented to A1:



(33) (S8: 124)

A1 D: Laura, listen to what I'm saying to you. (pause) It doesn't matter who [it was.

A2 C: [Yes it does.

→ A3 D: What I'm telling you is you were getting labeled.

D asserts in A3 that C was getting labeled, presumably as a drug user, and that C should not concern herself with the name of the drug seller but rather with her reputation. D in A3 focuses on his original A1 claim and provides reasons why that claim should be accepted by C. In providing reasons for his A1 claim, D thereby portrays himself as a rational person who has warranted, true, and relevant beliefs. This portrayal is highly beneficial to D's face.

Focus on own contribution is evident also in the next example of an A3 oriented to A1:

(47) (S2: 132)

A1 D: Oh, but for God's sake but we have been through it (pause) We know that its easy to follow the crowd. If the rest of the kids are doing certain things, it [s

A2 C: [Oh  
no, it wasn't because everyone else (pause) well, everyone else was doing it, it

D: [easy to do.

C: [was because I wanted to try it, its not [that.

→ A3 D: [If other kids weren't doing it you  
wouldn't have had the chance though.

The family conflict involves C's behavior during a family visit to England, behavior deemed inappropriate by D. In A1, D claims that C had got into trouble because she had followed the crowd, meaning that she had done what the other kids were doing. C disagrees in A2 by suggesting that C's reasons for doing it were because she had wanted to try it, not because everyone else was doing it. D in A3 focuses on his A1 claim and provides support for it. That

support may be glossed as: If the rest of the kids are doing certain things, its easy to do, *because if other kids aren't doing it, you don't have the chance to do it.* D has produced a coherent and compelling account that warrants his A1 claim. In doing so, D portrays himself as a very competent person with convincing beliefs, a description that greatly benefits D's face.

When A3 orients to A2, Speaker A seems to focus on the other's contribution to the argument. Consider an example:

(35) (S8: 123)

A1 D: I heard it from very reliable sources, darling.

A2 C: Like who?

→ A3 D: It doesn't matter.

D's A3 is an aggressive irrelevancy claim that orients to C's challenge by opposing and undermining it. D damages C's positive face by asserting that C is not making relevant and worthwhile contributions to the conversational exchange.

Consider an A3 that orients to A2 yet does not greatly damage Speaker B's face:

(48) (S8: 112)

A1 M: Oh no, would you be happy if we allowed you to mix with people that we don't trust (pause) that we think are using you or,

A2 C: Yes, because I think that I can make my own decisions.

→ A3 M: Well, I agree there, but at the time we felt that you were incapable of making

C: I'm very cap [able of making decisions

→ M: [sensible decisions because you're, you were so impressed with this group at that time (pause) You've grown up a lot in the last few months.

M's A3 orients to C's A2 by counterclaim. M asserts that C was incapable of making sensible

decisions, thereby disagreeing with C and damaging C's face. However, M also partially agrees with C (i.e., *Well, I agree there, but...*) and claims that she has matured considerably (i.e., *You've grown up a lot in the last few months*) which mitigates the damage to C's face caused by the disagreement.

Counterclaims that orient to A2 need not necessarily be face mitigating. Consider another example:

(49) (S7:89)

A1 D: You're butting in.

A2 C: I want to say something.

M: Well, you [can.

A3 D: [After I'm finished.

In A1, D accuses C of trying to interrupt the conversation, which C justifies in A2. C's justification disagrees with D's implication that C has no right to interject in the conversation. In A3, D focuses directly on the A2 claim and attempts to counter it by invoking the social etiquette of turn taking in conversation; that is, next speaker should not speak until current speaker is finished speaking.

In sum, A3 acts orient to A1 or A2 and this difference in orientation seems to reflect a focus on own or other's contribution to the argument. A3 acts oriented to A1 focus on own contribution and seem, in general, to reflect attempts to repair damage to own face occasioned by the A2 act. A3 acts oriented to A2 focus on the other's contribution and seem, in general, to reflect attempts to counter the A2 objection. It seems reasonable to suggest that the degree of face aggravation of the A2 act determines the A3 orientation. This claim is examined in the next chapter.

## CHAPTER FIVE: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A2 AND A3 ACTS

### 5.1 An Overview

In this chapter, I analyze the types of A2 and A3 acts that co-occur. It was previously suggested that face will be a major determinant of this relationship. Recall that although all A2 acts damage Speaker A's face, it was proposed that some A2 acts do this more than others. Further, it seems likely that the extent to which an A2 act damages Speaker A's face will determine in large measure how A responds to that act in A3. Recall that, by definition, Speaker A in A3 of an argument exchange either directly supports A1 or directly disagrees with A2. These orientations of A3 seem to differ in terms of whether Speaker A focuses more on own or other's contribution to the argument. Focusing on own face implies an A1 orientation in A3, and a focus on other's face implies an A2 orientation to A3. One possible relationship between A2 and A3 is that A2 acts that seriously damage Speaker A's face cause A to focus on own contribution in an attempt to restore his/her image as a competent person with rational and warranted opinions. Therefore, the more face damaging an A2 becomes, the higher the probability that it will be followed by an A3 that repairs damage to Speaker A's face. A3 acts oriented to Speaker A's A1 claim have the potential to fulfill this function.

A very different pattern of responses is to be expected if A adopts a tit for tat strategy (McLaughlin, Cody & O'Hair, 1983; Cody & McLaughlin, 1988). Although damaging the other's face has little impact on repairing damage to own face, there may be some satisfaction in retaliating in kind. On this assumption, it could be expected that the more aggressive B's A2 act is, the more likely A is to respond in A3 with an act that is oriented to A2 and that is intended to cause considerable damage to B's face. The arguing exchanges in the present corpus occurred between members of long-term, intimate, and positive interpersonal relationships. Tit for tat strategies that predominantly damage each speaker's face would create a net loss of face and would ultimately undermine the relationship between close friends and

family members. For this reason, a tit for tat strategy of retaliation seems unlikely in these circumstances. Accordingly, I opt for the former position and hypothesize that the more Speaker B's A2 act damages Speaker A's face, the more likely A is to respond with an A3 act that directly supports A's A1 claim. In other words, the hypothesis is that high face aggravating A2 disagreements will yield A1 support more frequently than intermediate face aggravating A2s, and intermediate face aggravating A2s will yield A1 support more frequently than low face aggravating A2s.

## 5.2 Procedure

An assessment of the hypothesis requires that the theoretically derived ranking of types of A2 acts in terms of the extent to which they damage other's face is, indeed, the correct ranking. Accordingly, it was decided to assess this ranking empirically. To do this, rankings of the degree of aggressiveness of each type of A2 were obtained from a subject pool of 52 students at Simon Fraser University (i.e., aggressiveness is used synonymously with face aggravation). Each student was presented with three different sets of five statements (See Appendix B for a listing of all three sets of statements). Order of presentation of the sets was randomized across students. A set of statements consisted of an A1 claim and four A2 responses, one each of a claim of irrelevancy, a challenge, a contradiction, and a counterclaim. For example, for one set the A1 claim was "Some of the guys are saying that you're drinking heavily again", and the four types of A2 responses were "What does THAT have to do with anything" (irrelevancy), "Like WHO" (challenge), "No they don't" (contradiction), and "I've just been overworked, I barely touch the stuff" (counterclaim). Each statement was typed on an index card and the cards were shuffled after every ranking. The student was informed that the researcher was interested in people's perceptions of the aggressiveness of different disagreements. Each student was shown the A1 statement and told to imagine that someone had said this. The student was then given the four A2 responses and asked to indicate which

was the most aggressive way to disagree with A1 and which the least aggressive. These two cards were removed and the student was asked which of the remaining two disagreements was the more aggressive. This procedure was repeated for each of the three sets of cards.

**Table 1: Frequency Ranking of the Level of Aggressiveness of Acts of Disagreement of Claim of Irrelevancy, Challenge, Contradiction, and Counterclaim**

Type of disagreement	*Level of aggressiveness			
	1	2	3	4
Claim of Irrelevancy	66	65	24	2
Challenge	49	56	46	5
Contradiction	32	30	74	21
Counterclaim	9	5	12	128

\*Aggressiveness Scale: 1 = most aggressive; 4 = least aggressive;

As can be seen from Table 1, the results provided support for the theoretically derived ranking. Averaged across all three sets, the claim of irrelevancy was ranked first most often, the challenge was ranked second most often, the contradiction was ranked third most often, and the counterclaim was ranked last most often. However, there was considerable overlap in the rankings for both claims of irrelevancy and challenges for the most aggressive ranking, and for claims of irrelevancy, challenges, and contradictions for the second most aggressive ranking, and virtually no overlap between the first three most aggressive ranked disagreements

and the counterclaim. In order to do the most conservative estimate of the hypothesis, claims of irrelevancy and challenges were combined into the high aggressive category, contradictions were placed in the intermediate aggressive category, and counterclaims were placed in the low aggressive category.

All arguing exchanges in the corpus were identified. The A2 act in each exchange was coded as either a claim of irrelevancy, challenge, contradiction, or counterclaim. For every highly aggressive A2 act, the orientation of the A3 act that followed was noted.

### 5.3 Results and Discussion

Table 2 presents the number and percentage of types of A3 acts with varying orientation that follow A2 acts.

Table 2: Number and Percentage of A3 Acts with A1 or A2 Orientation following A2 Acts of Claim of Irrelevancy (IR), Challenge (CH), Contradiction (C), and Counterclaim (CC)

A2 Acts	A3 Acts					
	A2 Orientation				A1 Orientation	
	IR	CH	C	CC	IR	CC
IR				3 (19%)		13 (81%)
CH	2 (11%)			2 (11%)		15 (79%)
C	1 (4%)	5 (20%)	8 (32%)	2 (8%)		9 (36%)
CC	4 (6%)	2 (3%)	2 (3%)	42 (67%)		13 (21%)

A2 claims of irrelevancy tend to be followed by A3 acts of A1 orientation (13/16 or 81%). A2 challenges were similar to claims of irrelevancy. 15/19 (79%) of challenges were followed by A1 orienting A3s, and the remaining 21% were A2 orienting challenges or counterclaims. A2 contradictions yielded a greater variety of responses in A3. Only 9/25 (36%) of the A3s were A1 orienting whereas 64% were A2 orienting. Also, 14/25 (56%) of the A3s were of high or intermediate face aggravation, the majority of which were contradictions. Finally, A2 counterclaims yielded the lowest percentage of A1 orienting A3s (14/63 or 21%). The remaining A3s consisted mainly of A2 orienting counterclaims (67%).

Types of A2 disagreements were grouped into the categories of High, Intermediate, and Low face aggravation (Recall that claims of irrelevancy and challenges are high face aggravating, contradictions are intermediate face aggravating, and counterclaims are low face aggravating). Table 3 presents the number and percentage of A3 acts with either A1 or A2 orientation as a function of the degree of face aggravation of the A2 act.

Table 3: Number and Percentage of A3 Acts with A1 or A2 Orientation for High, Intermediate, and Low Face Aggravating A2 Acts

Degree of Face Aggravation of A2	Orientation of A3	
	A1	A2
High	28 (80%)	7 (20%)
Intermediate	9 (36%)	16 (64%)
Low	13 (21%)	50 (79%)

As can be seen from Table 3, the distribution of acts with A1 support as a function of degree of



face aggravation of A2 differs significantly from chance,  $\chi^2(2) = 19.5$ ,  $p < .005$ . These results provide support for the claim that when Speaker A's face is highly damaged by Speaker B in A2, then A will show a greater tendency to try and save face in A3 by providing A1 support to maintain the thoughts, beliefs and emotional investment that he/she has placed in the A1 claim. In contrast, low aggravating A2 disagreements such as counterclaims do not result in Speaker A repairing own face in A3 since B has not greatly damaged A's face but rather has mitigated damage to it. As anticipated, contradictions, which are of intermediate face aggravation, yielded a frequency of A1 support that lies somewhere between the high and the low face aggravating category. Recall that a speaker in A3 is compelled to repair own face only if it is highly damaged. Since, as I suggest, contradictions are of lower face aggravation, then a speaker's face will be minimally damaged following a contradiction and will have less need to repair own face by A1 orientation. As a consequence, following a contradiction, speaker A may equally orient to other's face and therefore to A2.

It is interesting to speculate why contradictions are followed by high or intermediate face aggravating A3s in 56% of the cases. Consider an example of a A3 act that strongly attacks a A2 contradiction:

(39) (S7: 80)

A1 D: It wasn't much to ask for you to come in early (pause) just one night. Nine-thirty, ten o'clock is not that out of line.

→ A2 C: Yeah, it is out of line.

→ A3 D: No, its not.

D's A3 disagreement of *No, its not* does not support his A1-claim that nine-thirty, ten o'clock is not an unreasonable curfew. Instead, D's A3-disagreement orients to A2 and damages C's face by directly repudiating C's A2 contradiction. The above contradictions express direct opposition to each other and result in a temporary stalemate between C and D. This recycling

of contradictions appears to be difficult to break once it has begun.

Consider another example of an A3 contradiction following an A2 contradiction:

(50) (S16: 44)

- T1 A1 C: But she came home too quickly (pause) so anyways, I was just motioning for her so I could tell it that its on but then she said get away so I just went and then anytime that my friends would call she would call them zit face punks and (crying) you always do that mom (pause) you would you call all of them zit face
- T2 A2 M: I don't use those [terms
- T3 A3 C: [yes you yes you do, zit faced.
- T4 M: I think its time to turn off the tape
- T5 D: No its not
- T6 C: (crying) You do and I can remember every time because I go in my room and thinks ask her about all of her friends I could say a lot worse about her friends but I don't (sniffles) You're always insulting my friends.

M and C are arguing about whether M uses opprobrious language against C's friends. M in T4 orients to C's A3 contradiction as a conversational move that is not proceeding in a fruitful direction, *I think its time to turn off the tape*, and suggests that C in A3 works to close down the exchange rather than foster further negotiation. In T6, C reintroduces her disagreement with M by adding more informational content to support her initial claim that M calls her friends zit face, (i.e., *I can remember every time*). C then proceeds to argue in her own favor that she does not resort to the same name calling tactics as M. In effect, C elaborates in T6 on her bare A3 contradiction.

The sequential contradictions offer very little informational content to the exchange and instead of inviting negotiation, they tend to close off and limit any further discussion on the topic. Therefore, responding to a high face aggravating A2 with a high face aggravating A3 is a poor strategy if both speakers wish to end the argument with minimal loss of face and if

Speaker A in A3 wishes to convince Speaker B to accept the A1 claim. It might be expected that such a strategy would be eliminated by experience from the repertoire of adult and adolescent arguing strategies. Why this primitive form of arguing persists is not clear.

One very strong but unpredicted effect was that low face aggravating A2 disagreements were much more likely to be followed by A3 acts that oriented to the A2 disagreement than to the original A1 claim. Examination of the 50 A3 counterclaims that orient to A2 revealed that in the majority of cases, Speaker A in A3 responds to B's A2 disagreement in a way that does very little damage to B's face. It appears that if B shows consideration for A's face in A2 by producing a low face aggravating A2 disagreement, A is then likely to respond in kind by showing consideration for B's face in A3. Attending to B's face in A3 is an effective strategy for strengthening group bonds since A is indicating to B that B's contribution is relevant and important to A. Also, attending to B's face in A3 has important rhetorical implications. I use rhetoric to refer to the ways in which speakers convince and persuade each other in conversation (Antaki, 1994; Billig, 1987; Cockcroft and Cockcroft, 1992). In this way, rhetorical strategies in arguing involve how speakers persuade and convince each other in order to win the argument.

Consider an example:

(51) (S12: 76)

A1 M: Yeah, I hate to tell you this (pause) you're gonna continue to get restrictions on the amount that you can spend on things.

C: Ah well, I know

(pause)

M: Because I know the value of things, be [tter than you.

→ A2 C: [Well, so do I

→ A3 M: Well, you're beginning to and you're beginning now (pause) since this happened, since this has happened you show a far better idea

C: So what did you think I did?

→ M: Of what things cost, right - no I'm saying that with the purchases you have made, no I think you learned your lesson - with the purchases that you have made you have shown restraint

Both speakers are cooperatively working to maintain each other's face while arguing. C disagrees with M in A2 using a low face damaging disagreement, and M responds in kind in A3 with a mitigated disagreement. M maintains or enhances C's face by partially agreeing with C (i.e., *you're beginning to* and *since this happened you show a far better idea of what things cost*) in A3, depicting C as a conscientious person who learns from his/her mistakes. While low face aggravating A2s and A3s attend to other's face, they also attend to other's claim in order to invite further discussion and negotiation. In A1, M wishes to maintain the spending restrictions that she has imposed on C because C does not have a sense of what things cost and therefore C might spend her money recklessly. In A2, C objects to M's claim by asserting that she fully understands the value of things and implies that spending restrictions for her are unnecessary. To convince C that she needs spending restrictions, M focuses on C's positive attributes by emphasizing C's clear progress in becoming a judicious and competent user of real world skills, such as spending money, rather than emphasizing C's insupportable spending habits. Emphasizing Speaker B's positive attributes rather than her negative ones both enhances B's positive face and in many cases leads to B's eventual acceptance of the A1 claim. Therefore, M's focus on C's positive attributes is an effective rhetorical strategy that allows C to concede to M's counterclaims without C suffering a great loss of face.

The prediction that the greater the extent of face aggravation of the A2 act, the greater the proportion of A3 acts supporting A1 may occur only in cooperative conversational exchanges. In such conversations, speakers are likely to work towards negotiating and, in some cases, resolving competing claims about the social and non-social world. However, the prediction is unlikely to hold when speakers are antagonistic, caring little for group solidarity

by refusing to attend to each other's needs and conversational contributions.

Consider an example:

(52) (S14: 61)

A1 M: I mean you know I (pause) I can't get to sleep until I know that you're in, even if you're babysitting or what (pause) I cannot sleep.

(pause)

→ A2 C: Well, tough.

A3 M: Well, it shouldn't be just tough (pause) I don't think that's very, [ its your

D: [That's,

M: [attitude.

D: [that's its your whole attitude is wrong.

M and C are arguing about C's curfew. M is against a later curfew because she cannot get to sleep knowing that C is not at home. C's disagreement, *well tough*, asserts that C is completely unsympathetic to M's situation, and thereby highly damages M's positive face by conveying unmitigated disapproval and insensitivity to M's wants and needs. Based on my predictions, I would surmise that M would return in A3 with explicit support to save her face, but instead, M orients to A2 and attacks C's disagreement by contradiction and by asserting that C's attitude is reprehensible. A possible reason to explain why M does not opt for support in A3 is because the exchange has become antagonistic. C's A2 basically closes down the discussion of curfew by refusing to attend to M's contribution as a viable and worthwhile move in the exchange. In essence, C has demonstrated that she will not attend to M's face in regard to M's A1 claim. Therefore, in this environment of antagonism, A1 support would not be a beneficial strategy to M since C will in all likelihood continue to be non-antagonistic and cause further damage to M's face. Instead, a superior strategy is the one adopted by M in which M attacks C on the issue of C's antagonism, which may lead to the possible resumption

of amicable talk.

Consider another example:

(53) (S3: 97)

D: Well, what are you doing after after eleven then requires you to stay out longer.

C: What?

A1 D: What what would you be doing after.

→ A2 C: That's my business.

A3 D: That's your business

M: (sighs)

A3 D: Its also our business.

Antagonism begins in A2 with C asserting that her parents have no business asking her certain questions. Again, the highly face aggravating A2 is not met with A1 support but rather with an A3 that contests A2. In sum, the proposed interrelationship between types of acts occurring in A2 and A3 of arguing exchanges is to be expected only for cooperative exchanges in which speakers attend to and care about other's conversational contribution. Further study is needed to determine the A2-A3 pattern of relationships in the domain of antagonistic arguing.

## CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION

### 6.1 Summary of Thesis

I became interested in arguing by the observation that arguing is a pervasive activity in the everyday world. I wished to know how arguments were interactively produced, and if there existed a common structure to arguing. This led to an interest in the relationship between the conversational structure of arguing and social structure. One such relationship is between the structure of arguing and face. Because the negotiation of face plays a critical role in conversational exchanges in which identity claims are constantly at stake, I speculated that an analysis of arguing should be highly revealing of the ways in which face influences conversation.

I began my investigation from tape recordings of everyday conversations. The tapes were transcribed and analyzed for instances of arguing. From the transcriptions, I found that everyday arguing has a regular three move structure. A descriptive vocabulary was created to define the three move structure as an arguing exchange that specifies the turns, moves, acts, and act orientations that speakers must produce in order to be doing arguing. Next, I analyzed all the specific act types that occurred in each move in the arguing exchange. All acts were identified using syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic criteria. The face implications of each act was identified and ranked relative to one another in terms of the amount of damage done to other's face.

The above provides the descriptive machinery by which to relate the conversational structure of arguing to any other aspect of language use. For this thesis, I chose to relate the conversational structure of arguing to face. I proposed that face is a major determinant of the structural relationship between A2 and A3 of the arguing exchange. To begin, I analyzed types of A2-A3 sequences. I found that A2 claims of irrelevancy, challenges, and contradictions occurred more frequently with A3 acts that support A1 than do counterclaims. Therefore, I

hypothesized that the more face aggravating the A2 act, the greater the likelihood that A3 will orient to and consequently support A1. The results provided some evidence for the hypothesis by demonstrating that high face aggravating A2 disagreements yielded A1 support more frequently than intermediate face aggravating A2s, and intermediate face aggravating A2s yielded A1 support more frequently than low face aggravating A2s.

## 6.2 Implications for Future Research

In this thesis, I have provided some evidence that is consistent with the view that face influences the conversational structure of everyday arguing. This appears to hold for the A2-A3 act sequences of an arguing exchange. Another possibility is that face will influence the types of A1-A2 sequences found in the exchange. In order to demonstrate that face plays a pervasive role in influencing the conversational structure of arguing, it will also be necessary to analyze the relationship of A1-A2 sequences in terms of face to see if the face implications of A1 determine the type of A2.

Another consideration for my analysis is the moves that precede the arguing exchange. Moves such as A0 and A(-1) may play a critical role in determining whether an arguing exchange will or will not ensue. Therefore, certain moves or move sequences may facilitate the onset of arguing more frequently than other moves. Also, the face implications of A0 may influence the type of claim that speakers will produce in A1.

I based the evidence to support my hypothesis on single disagreement acts occurring in A2 and A3 of the exchange. Combinations of disagreement acts occurring in A2 and A3 were excluded from the analysis because it was not known where these disagreements lie along the aggravation-mitigation continuum. Combinations were not part of the subject interviews in which subjects ranked single disagreement acts in terms of their aggressiveness. Since it is not known how face aggravating the disagreement combinations were, they could not be used to test the hypothesis of increased A1 support in A3 for higher face aggravating A2s.



Disagreement combinations only accounted for 17/140 or 12% of the data and therefore I felt that I could exclude these types from the analysis without largely influencing my results. The most frequently used combinations found in the data were contradictions followed by counterclaims.

Consider the following example of an A2 contradiction + counterclaim:

(54) (S8: 109)

A1 D: Oh hey, it is not. You wanted to go to a party.

→ A2 C: I didn't want to go to a party (whining) I wanted to go to his house and there were two other people there.

The first part of C's disagreement is a contradiction of D's claim that C wanted to go to a party. The second part of C's disagreement, in which C asserts that she wanted to go to someone's house in which only two other people were present is a counterclaim that expresses an alternative claim to D's A1 claim. By claiming that such few numbers of people were at someone's house creates some doubt as to whether a party could have occurred there. In effect, C's counterclaim is providing support for her contradiction. In A2, C opens up the discussion by providing reasons and contrasting claims to D's A1 rather than closing the discussion by pure opposition. C does not unambiguously repudiate D's claim but instead attempts to negotiate with D whether or not she had been to a party. Based on these observations, I suggest that this type of disagreement is less face aggravating than a contradiction, but more so than a counterclaim.

Next, consider an example of an A3 combination of disagreement types:

(55) (S8: 130)

M: Okay, what should the author..., be the authority of a father over a son?

C: Well, I said some, to an extent.

D: What extent?

A1 C: Well, I mean not extent like you can't leave the backyard, which you sometimes do to me.

A2 D: Not that I know of.

→ A3 C: You have so. (pause) When I wanted to go down to Carry's and it was at eight-thirty, (imitates dad) 'eight-thirty, you're not going anywhere!'. I said, 'But dad, I'm just going down the road.' 'No!' 'Can I go outside the lane?' 'No!'

C's contradiction in A3 orients to and therefore directly repudiates D's A2 thereby damaging D's positive face. However, C also orients to A1 by producing a counterclaim that buttresses her claim that her father is at times overly authoritative. C's recollection of a specific instance in which her father forbid her to go to Carry's enhances C's positive face by indicating that C makes true and accurate claims and that her capacity for recollection is superior to D's. The dual orientation of A3 makes it difficult to determine whether C is focusing more on own or on other's contribution of the argument. Is C in A3 primarily supporting her A1 claim or is she primarily contesting D's A2? Further investigation and more examples of these combinations are needed to determine their primary orientation and their degree of face aggravation in relation to the face aggravation continuum for disagreements.

Other characteristics of disagreements that were not included in my analysis may also have influenced the types of A2-A3 sequences found in the data. For instance, some disagreements are also attributive, in which Speaker B attributes some action, thought, or attitude to A that is in disagreement with what A has said.

Consider an example:

(56) (S15: 17)

D: Okay now the [other thing is is well say that half a dozen or so got the final

M: [No, I'm just I'm just curious.

D: exam and they were able to really do well and they and they penalized the other students.

A1 C: I wouldn't say anything (pause) I would probably let someone else do something, I don't want to go up... that is that is not something to do (pause) I would never do that, ask any teenager (laughs) the [re are

→ A2 D: [Well, it sounds to me like its not necessarily the right thing to do, it sounds to me like you're basically chicken to do it.

A3 C: I'm saying that I wouldn't do something like that

D: Yeah but

A3 C: Its a tattle-tale.

In A2, D aggravates C's positive face by calling C something undesirable (i.e., a chicken) and by implying that D knows better than C why C would not say anything. In attributing an alternative behavior to C, D is suggesting that he knows more about C's behavior than C herself. Notice that D's A2 would not have been as face aggravating if D would have produced a non-attributive disagreement such as *I'm sure that other students in similar situations would expose the cheaters*. C responds to D's face aggravating A2 in A3 by supporting her initial claim. This may suggest that attributive A2s are more face aggravating and therefore yield more A1 support than non-attributive A2s.

Another concern for my proposal that face strongly influences the conversational structure of arguing is that some of the unpredicted effects seen in the data may not arise solely from face, but may also involve rhetorical or other conversational strategies. For example, it was discussed in Chapter Five that low face aggravating A2 disagreements tend to be followed by low face aggravating A3 disagreements that orient back to A2. In these instances, both speakers display a mutual concern for each other's face and therefore orient to each other's turns in the exchange. The motivation behind the production of these sequences differ greatly from the need to repair own face as seen with highly face aggravating A2 acts. Instead, a tit for tat face strategy is employed to maintain the face of both speakers. In addition to face, it

appears that rhetorical strategies, such as attempting to win an argument by persuading and convincing, play a vital role in motivating these A2-A3 sequences. Specifically, low face aggravating A3s invite further discussion and negotiation and sometimes work rhetorically to convince Speaker B to accept the A1 claim while at the same time maintaining or enhancing B's face. Enhancing B's face may function rhetorically to minimize B's damage to face if B decides to agree with Speaker A's A1 claim, allowing B to save face even though B has conceded.

In other cases, it appears that neither face nor rhetorical strategies are the primary determinants of the A2-A3 sequence. For example, intermediate face aggravating A2 acts of contradiction often lead to reciprocal A3 contradictions. It was suggested earlier that the recycled contradiction sequences may be a throwback of a primitive childhood form of arguing. It will be necessary to investigate the bases of this tendency, since these sequences show minimal concern for face and are a poor choice of rhetorical strategy.

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## APPENDIX A: Transcription Notation

The transcription notation is essentially derived from Atkinson & Heritage (1984: ix-xiv). The following set of conventions capture the transcriptions in this thesis.

... or -	untimed short pause		
(pause)	untimed longer pause		
[	overlapping speech, e.g.,	A: how was the	[movie
[		B:	[great
:	extended sound, e.g., we::ll		
<u>underline</u>	emphasis		
CAPS	greater emphasis		
?	transcriber's guess		

Non-speech vocalizations are placed in parentheses, e.g., (laughter), (coughing), etc..

APPENDIX B: Stimuli used in the Assessment of the Perceived Degree of Aggressiveness of A2 Acts of Claim of Irrelevancy, Challenge, Contradiction, and Counterclaim

<i>Data Set 1:</i>	<i>Colleagues from work having lunch</i>
A1 claim	Some of the guys are saying that you're drinking heavily again
A2 claim of irrelevancy	What does THAT have to do with anything
A2 challenge	Like WHO
A2 contradiction	No they haven't
A2 counterclaim	I've just been over-worked, I barely touch the stuff

<i>Data Set 2:</i>	<i>High school friends discussing universities</i>
A1 claim	I heard that SFU is ranked no.1 in western Canada
A2 claim of irrelevancy	So what?
A2 challenge	How could you possibly know that
A2 contradiction	No it isn't
A2 counterclaim	I thought that UBC was

<i>Data Set 3:</i>	<i>Roommates discussing household chores</i>
A1 claim	You don't always wipe clean the kitchen counter
A2 claim of irrelevancy	That doesn't matter in the least
A2 challenge	Have I ever been even REMOTELY messy
A2 contradiction	Yes I do
A2 counterclaim	I remember wiping them spotless yesterday