CITIZENS AND THEIR MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS:

INCREASING ACCOUNTABILITY

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines factors affecting voter participation in Canadian municipal elections through longitudinal case studies of local voting in two major Canadian cities: Vancouver and Winnipeg. It poses this in the context of current generalizations about the municipal electoral process. This study suggests that certain of these factors - particularly those focusing information for local voters - may explain important variations in municipal voting turnout patterns.

The rationale for this research is based on suggestions from a number of democratic theorists that there is a relationship between public participation and democratic accountability in municipal governance. Countering this contention that the more citizens participate in elections, the more governments are held accountable for their decisions, is the clear finding that many municipal elections in Canada do not generate high voter turnout rates. These low rates hint at a weakening of electoral accountability mechanisms.

The research results are drawn from observations of a four stage study conducted in the two cities. Voter turnout data from mayoral elections in Vancouver and Winnipeg were compiled from primary and secondary sources. These data were organized chronologically for each city to determine general trends and periods during which electoral participation peaked. These critical 'peak' periods were then examined, exposing a small variety of recurring factors. Finally, observations from both cities were compared to establish parallel trends. These findings and comparisons were tested against generalizations about municipal elections in Canada. The study concluded that some factors were instrumental in explaining higher rates of local electoral participation: specifically, the highest and most stable periods of voting occur in ward based elections contested between parties. This finding suggests a need for additional research and a need to rethink some of what we think we know about the municipal electoral process in Canada.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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CHAPTER 1- INTRODUCTION

*Since the free individual can only maintain his identity within a
society/culture of a certain kind...we exercise a fuller freedom if we can
help determine the shape of this society and culture.*

- Charles Taylor

INTRODUCTION

This thesis examines factors affecting voter participation in Canadian municipal elections through longitudinal case studies of local voting in two major Canadian cities: Vancouver and Winnipeg. It poses this in the context of current generalizations about the municipal electoral process. This study suggests that certain of these factors - particularly those focusing information for local voters - may explain important variations in municipal voting turnout patterns.

Some local politicians state that, for reasons of efficiency, "political" issues have no place on the municipal agenda. As this thesis demonstrates, although municipal politicians sometimes see their role as purely administrative, by definition their policy choices are indeed "political", for they decide "who gets what and how" (Laswell, 1958). Because Canadians have constructed federal and provincial governmental systems based on democratic principles, municipal institutions should also reflect these ideals.

However, many authors offer alternative versions of "democracy", making this a slippery concept to define. Starting with Greek philosophy, this thesis examines what "democracy" has meant in the past, but more importantly, what characteristics should be considered essential for modern societies to be deemed "democratic". Central to this discussion is the concept of elections as mechanisms of "accountability", and how these contests provide an essential link between and citizens and their representatives. This examination also demonstrates how representative accountability is strengthened by strong citizen participation in elections, and how institutional arrangements can affect voter turnouts.

In studies of Canadian municipal politics, much of the literature addressing participation in civic elections has been based on common assumptions or rough estimates. Comprehensive compilations of election turnout data have never been assembled for most cities in Canada, greatly limiting opportunities for empirical evaluation. Despite this, authors such as Donald Higgins (1986), Jack Masson (1994), and C.R. and S. Nobes Tindal (1990) have offered significant and valuable generalizations concerning participation in municipal politics. For example, they state that the absence of political parties, certain socio-economic factors, and biased electoral systems may cause significant variations in public participation during civic contests. This thesis explains eight of these generalizations, and uses them as a base for empirical tests run on voter turnout data from Vancouver and Winnipeg.

Based on this analysis, this study has determined that the most stable and highest levels of public participation in civic elections are generated by local contests under ward systems in combination with parties. These factors appear to be mutually reinforcing, and for both to be truly effective, it is best if they exist in tandem. The remainder of this chapter explains why this study was conducted, and provides an outline for the rest of this thesis.

BASIS FOR STUDY

Critical differences in opinion can exist regarding just how much progress "democracy" is making in any particular governmental setting depending on how the very word is defined. For example, some authors, such Joseph Schumpeter, have written that "democracy" can be satisfied by simply allowing the citizens of a polity to choose between groups of elites. Others, like Jean-Jacques Rousseau, demand that this is the bare minimum and more direct rule is needed to satisfy this classification (Pateman, 1970: 17-20).

Debate has raged without resolution since the concept was dreamed up by the Greeks, and what the term ought to mean is usually left to normative judgment. However,

these ancient Mediterraneans gave us much more than just basic ideas for a society based on democracy. They also provided us a working model. Briefly, it is estimated that in 507 B.C. there were 60,000 eligible voters in Athens, with 6,000 required for quorum in the Assembly. The Assembly was steered by a much smaller group, mainly composed of elected officials who held office for no more than one year. (Held, 1987: 14-35).

Shared concepts which seem central to Athenian and most modern democratic visions is that democratic progress concerns elections, and electoral participation. In representative government, these mechanisms are one key ensuring accountability of the rulers to the ruled. Even vigorous proponents of democracy feel that popular and fair elections are crucial to any state deemed democratic (Pateman, 1970: 20). The more the public is exposed to, and provided with, information to evaluate and criticize government policy, the more representatives must consider the implications of their decisions. If the government decides to implement a policy that has low public support, or vetoes a popular initiative, they risk losing office in subsequent elections. This most basic element of our democratic process is a central theme in this thesis.

Public participation in elections is important in more than one sense. Carol Pateman, in Participation and Democratic Theory (1970), stresses that when participation in elections is widespread, much more is accomplished than a mere selection of representatives. Pateman counters the claim of 'classical' theorists, such as Joseph Schumpeter, that democratic elections are no more than a *method* by which citizens choose between ruling elites. Building on the theories of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, John Stuart Mill and G.D.H. Cole, Pateman offers a much broader vision of democracy and its potential. Pateman explains that democracy should be viewed as a self-perpetuating *process* through which a whole society is transformed:

> The theory of participatory democracy is built round the central assertion that institutions cannot be considered in isolation from one another. The existence of representative institutions at the national level is not sufficient for democracy; for maximum participation by all the people at that level socialization, or 'social training', for democracy must take place in other spheres in order that the necessary individual attitudes and psychological qualities can be developed. This development takes place through the process of participation itself. The major function of participation in the theory of participatory democracy is therefore an educative one, educative in the widest sense, including the psychological aspect and the gaining of practice in democratic skills and procedures (Pateman, 1970: 42).

Pateman continues to explain how political involvement itself cultivates greater participation, expanding this idea to incorporate other spheres where participation could grow, including the workplace. However, no matter what venues are eventually altered to become more democratic, this cycle of change must start somewhere. In many cases elections can serve to lay the groundwork for future progress (Pateman, 1970: 1-44).

On any given day, one can pick up a newspaper or turn on the television and listen to the political leaders of most western nations extol the virtues of democracy. Canadian politicians follow suit, and are definitely not immune from this practice. Our leaders have sworn for years that Canada is ruled by its citizens, and it may be that this trend is becoming entrenched in the minds of ordinary citizens.

On the surface the harmonic humming of "O Canada" sounds pleasing to the ear. One only has to remember the recent referendum and defeat the Charlottetown Accord, or ponder the earlier rejection of the Meech Lake Accord to see that ordinary citizens appear to be demanding, and getting more say in the affairs of government (Cairns, 1994: 229). However, a discriminating listener may hear discord in this song, and in more than one verse.

The health of democracy in Canada has been probed and prodded for years. Many flaws within our existing governmental system have been identified and commented upon. For example, Royal Commissions, such as the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and

Party Financing (1991), and the Royal Commission on Financial Management and Accountability (1979), have given us great insight into representative government at the federal and provincial levels. With studies such as these offering comprehensive evaluations, it is no surprise that electoral systems themselves have attracted much exploration, as these institutional arrangements can sometimes be more influential on the outcome of an election than any other single factor. As Alan Cairns notes:

> Elections do not take place in a state of nature. They occur within a network of institutions and sets of rules, all of which inform the calculations of voters, parties and leaders as they interact with each other....Unquestionably... the most salient institutional variable in electoral politics is the electoral system, the set of rules which transforms votes into seats (Cairns 1994: 223-4).

One of the best examples of this occurred during the 1993 Federal Election. Although the Progressive Conservatives received virtually the same proportion of the popular vote (16%) as the Reform Party (18.7%), the Reform Party almost formed the official opposition with 51 seats, while the Progressive Conservative election result was a rump of two seats. The Bloc Quebecois, with 13.5% of the national vote controlled more seats than either party (Eagles, et. al., 1995). Because the BQ form the official opposition they will have more chances than the Reform Party or the Progressive Conservatives to voice the concerns of their constituents. Institutional rules in the federal electoral system have dramatically pre-shaped the parliamentary agenda.

These discussions need not be limited to the federal level of government, and are applied directly to municipal institutions and rules governing civic elections in this thesis. It is at this level of government that politicians and political scientists may blush, for although this governmental tier appears to garner lower levels of public turnout when compared to our federal and provincial governments, few attempts have been offered to explain this deficiency. At the local level, other methods of participation such as plebiscites, interest group activity and protesting can be venues for public participation,

but elections still remain a crucial tool for controlling governments in representative democracies.

To highlight this point, in a recent article about community-based groups becoming empowered to directly influence their neighborhoods' development, one Vancouver City councillor's comments put this dream into perspective. COPE* councillor Jenny Kwan advised Georgia Straight writer Shawn Blore that "if you were to ask me if neighbourhood government will ever happen (in Vancouver) with this NPA council**, my response would be very quickly 'no'." (Blore, 1994). In other words, any institutional reforms which are unpopular with those possessing the power to approve or dismiss changes are almost certain to be rejected by that body. If those in power do not endorse change, the status quo will most likely remain. A similar history exists regarding wards in Vancouver (Gutstein, 1983: 189-221).

Consistent with the above example Jack Masson, in his book <u>Alberta's Local Governments</u>, gives many examples of how basic democratic practices such as council meetings or public consultations, as well as institutional reform movements, can be undermined by pro-status quo politicians. Masson paints a bleak picture of these politicians who use tactics such as secret or in camera meetings, or just not showing up to answer the public's concerns, to shield themselves from a prying public (Masson, 1994: 10-13). Masson's examples demonstrate not only how seemingly basic democratic practices are sometimes evaded in local institutions, but also sizable barriers facing reformers who exist outside the decision making circle.

Illustrations by these authors help illuminate the point that no matter how popular neighbourhood-based interest groups become, how many non-binding plebiscites are called, or how many protests are staged, the most powerful political lever to controlling

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* Before the 1993 municipal election, the Committee of Progressive Electors joined with the New Democratic Party , to form the Coalition of Progressive Electors, but still use the COPE party label.
** The Non-Partisan Association is a pro-business civic party that has held almost continuous power since 1935.

civic government is the government itself. Even the most logical, lucid and practical proposals from citizen to government can be arbitrarily thrown aside if they are unpopular with the reigning power.

If these examples accurately depict the state of municipal democracy in Canada, even the most hopeful democrat may become forlorn. As portrayed by Donald Higgins, municipal institutions are sometimes far from a democratic beacon:

> According to classical theory of participatory democracy, the matter of popular control is the essence of democracy. If that logic holds true, and if voter turnout is the main indicator of the level of participation, then local government is a shaky foundation on which democracy is built in Canada (Higgins, 1986: 259)

Higgins' point is in evidence when voter turnout in coincidental federal and municipal elections are compared. For example, between 69.3% and 75.3% of those eligible voted in the last four Canadian Federal Elections, with 69.6% voting in 1993 (Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, 1993: Table 4). Since 1945, our national turnout level has been approximately 75% (Canada, 1991: 51).

In Vancouver, only 35% of those eligible voted in the 1993 mayoral election. Mayor-elect Philip Owen received support from only 15% of the total city electorate. With support from a firmly partisan NPA council Owen now has control of a $168 million dollar capital budget (Vancouver, 1994), and can drastically change the character of individual neighbourhoods by, for example, funding various public works projects or altering zoning by-laws. This turnout rate, at less than half the federal average, is potentially troubling, but can we expect these rates to climb to our national levels?

In a international study of election participation, Robert L. Morlan compares national and municipal turnout rates in various countries from 1956-1979. His findings, demonstrated in Table 1.1, indicate that in most countries surveyed, municipal and national rates are quite high, and within the same country both rates are within 15% of one

another. This study also shows that participation in European municipal elections is far higher than in the United States (Morlan, 1984).

Table 1.1 - Election Turnout Rates in Seven Countries		
Country	**National Turnout Rate**	**Municipal Turnout Rate**
Denmark	87.1%	72.8%
Sweden	86.4%	85.9%
Netherlands	83.5%	70.0%
Norway	81.5%	74.5%
Finland	79.7%	75.3%
Ireland	74.5%	59.8%
United States	59.1%	31.0%

The high turnout rates in European countries indicate that is possible to achieve substantially higher participation in municipal elections . However there are many factors which could elevate these averages. Political culture may in some way explain disparity between municipal turnout rates in Europe and those in the United States , but as Morlan notes, municipal governments in Europe also have very different institutional arrangements than those in North America:

All elections in the West European countries and states are partisan, generally involving the same parties as in national elections. Since local power is considered an important base and local elections are seen as indicating trends for upcoming national contests, the parties are normally very active in mobilizing the electorate. In most cases they are quite strongly organized and fairly well financed at the municipal level. Virtually all West European local governments use some form of proportional representation, in contrast to the United States. This characteristic may contribute to higher turnout because of a more prevalent feeling that one's vote is more likely to count significantly in the outcome (Morlan, 1984: 463).

Although Morlan does not include Canada in his survey, both our national and municipal governmental structures are comparable to those found in the United States. For example, both countries have a federal system of government in which municipal governments are separated from the national level by another level of regional government: states or provinces. If, as Morlan posits is the case in the US, the structure of Canadian municipal electoral systems is such that they encourage less participation than European institutions, this may help explain our lower turnout rates.

A few weaknesses become apparent when reviewing the literature about public participation in municipal elections in Canada. Not only is there overlap as authors borrow a great amount from common data sources, there are also significant gaps in the literature's span. Compared to other fields, a relatively small number of studies specifically designed to examine municipal politics have been conducted. Even fewer election studies or electoral system studies, such as Survey of Municipal Voting in Fourteen Canadian Urban Centres of 100,000 or more Population (Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities, 1967), have been published. Some studies offer rough estimates of voter turnout and observations, but few conduct rigorous empirical tests.

Existing theories about municipal governance suffer greatly from this paucity of information. Without really knowing how many people vote or which time periods exhibit peak turnouts, it is very difficult to form specific theories. As a result, many of the

assessments offered to explain voter turnout, or theories given to improve participation rates, are merely generalizations. In an attempt to fill gaps in the current literature concerning municipal elections, this thesis uses empirical methods to analyze municipal elections in Canada. By examining how municipal electoral systems may discriminate against certain groups, suggestions are offered as to and how this bias could be corrected.

To return to Alan Cairns' proposition, if institutional rules play a key role in determining who participates in elections, and in turn, who governs, it may be possible to alleviate institutional discrimination by altering the mechanisms of governance to more fairly distribute power. However, even if these changes are successfully implemented, immediate results may not be apparent. Political culture may play a large role in determining the public's interest in civic government. But, if Carol Pateman's definition of democracy is followed and fair elections are thought of as one step in a long process rather than an end in itself, institutional alterations could eventually instill less active Canadians with a more positive interest in municipal politics, encouraging them to more actively participate.

STRUCTURE

In **chapter two**, the general theory behind public participation is further explored. A number of important terms are defined, with various boundaries and limits being assigned to the concept of "democracy", and with special emphasis placed on the importance of "representative accountability". In addition, the importance of voter turnout in elections, including general factors which may affect this turnout, is also explored.

The above definitions are complemented in the second chapter by a literature review of participation in Canadian municipal government. A number of comprehensive books have been published concerning the subject of municipal democracy including <u>Local and Urban Politics</u>, by Donald J.H. Higgins (1986), <u>Local Government in Canada</u>, by C.R. Tindal and S. Nobes Tindal (1990) <u>Alberta's Local Governments</u>, by Jack Masson (1994), <u>Canadian Municipal Government</u>, by K.G. Crawford (1954), and <u>Canadian Metropolitics</u>,

edited by James Lightbody (1995). These books have all examined participation in municipal elections to some extent, but few have conducted detailed empirical studies and offer only broad suggestions as to why these events elicit low rates of public participation. Generalizations common to all these authors are examined, condensed and used as a basis for more empirical testing.

Finally, this chapter offers a participatory norm for municipal elections. This norm is based the information presented previously in chapter two. After turnout levels are established in the two test cities, this norm is compared against actual rates of participation in Vancouver and Winnipeg in chapters four and five.

Chapter three narrows the focus of this thesis from general theory to empirical testing by describing the methodology used in the rest of the thesis. This chapter explains how turnout information was gathered for Vancouver and Winnipeg, and outlines tests to be run on these cities in chapters four and five. These tests stem from observations made from patterns forming within the data sets themselves coupled with the generalizations taken from chapter two. Also included in this chapter is a detailed description of graphing and analytical techniques used in chapters four and five

The next two chapters deal exclusively with participation in the two case cities. Although **chapter four** presents information for Vancouver and **chapter five** for Winnipeg, the structure of both chapters is almost identical. Exact turnout figures are presented as an average, followed by chronological graphs demonstrating the historical development of citizen turnout in elections. Next, another chronological graph contrasts population growth with voter turnout trends. The final graph in the general sections compare federal, provincial and municipal elections to demonstrate the comparative rates of voter participation at the local level.

Following this general section for each city, a more detailed look at turnout trends is presented by breaking the data into specific periods. Possible explanations as to why some periods demonstrate higher voter turnout rates than others are offered by comparing

turnout trends with anecdotal evidence. An analysis of what specific factors may affect voter turnout forms the basis for suggestions offered in the conclusion of this chapter.

Before conclusions are presented, one more avenue is explored in relation to voter turnout. Voting patterns in specific neighbourhoods of high and low socio-economic status in both cities are compared to actual turnout averages. The information presented in this comparison is then related to Vancouver and Winnipeg's institutional structure. Throughout both the general and specific sections of chapters four and five, results are compared to generalizations offered in chapter two to either establish or disprove previously held notions about factors influencing voter turnout, and to add information where gaps exist in municipal electoral literature.

Chapter six uses the findings in chapters four and five to compare factors affecting voter turnout between Winnipeg and Vancouver. This comparison is then used as a basis for suggesting how municipal institutions could be better structured to increase voter turnout . These suggestions not only offer some insight into the types of institutional reform needed to increase citizen control over their municipal governments, they also contribute to attempts to theorize about municipal governance in general.

CHAPTER 2 - DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND LOCAL POLITICS

It seems to me the real political task in a society such as ours is to criticize the workings of institutions, which appear to be both neutral and independent...

- Michel Foucault

CHAPTER OBJECTIVE

In chapter two, democratic theory and Canadian municipal literature are examined and evaluated. This chapter forms a foundation on which empirical testing in chapters four and five is based, and is broken into three distinct sections. To counter the claim that governance at the municipal level somehow falls outside the arena of the political, the first section provides definitions of terms such as "politics", "democracy", "accountability" and "legitimacy". These definitions are also used to narrow the focus of this thesis. The essential theme emerging from this section pivots ′ the idea that a high level of public participation in elections is critical to ensure that elected representative are held accountable to the public for their actions.

The second section, links this theme to public participation in municipal governments. By reviewing existing literature is this field, this section catalogues eight conventional explanations for varying levels of voter turnout in municipal elections. These explanations are condensed, and in some cases combined into five more concise factors. Tests run in chapters four and five explore the extent that population, special conditions during elections, information availability, and socio-economic status can influence voter in municipal elections. The final section in chapter two establishes a participatory norm for municipal elections in Canada by combining the definitions and literature review from sections one and two.

DEFINITIONS

One of the basic disclaimers made about local governance is that the business of running municipalities is namely that, a type of business. Following this logic, decisions made at the local level are merely "administrative" in nature, and lengthy debate would

only cause unnecessary processing delays. This view is typified in a recent decision made by the Supreme Court of Canada.

Briefly, in the 1980's Vancouver City council decided that because Shell Canada had dealings in South Africa, the City would no longer do business with that company. Shell took this case to court, and eventually the Supreme Court decided that council policy "passed the boundaries of proper city conduct". NPA councillor George Puil agreed with the ruling stating that he and other councillors were elected "to run the city, to see that the sewers operate, to see that we have fire protection, and that jurisdiction is given to us by the provincial government". (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, March 15, 1994). This judgment and comments illustrate the role which "politics" are supposed to play in municipal governance. The Supreme Court decision indicates a municipal politics have certain boundaries. George Puil's comments indicate that his view of "politics" at the local level is even more limited. Critics such as Puil may state that municipal governments should not concern themselves with "political" issues, as they distract council from its administrative duties.

Many hold similar opinions about keeping politics and city governance separate. For example, Councillor Puil's Non Partisan Association was formed in the mid-1930's to keep partisan politics out of city hall (Gutstein, 1983: 196). Ironically, the NPA has maintained almost continuous control of Vancouver's civic council for the last 50 years by organizing slates of candidates to run on this platform. Although the NPA professes to keep the city clean of politics, this goal, and the policies these politicians implement once elected, may themselves be deemed "political".

Basic definitions describing "politics" help substantiate this accusation. For example, Harold Lasswell defines "politics" as "who gets what, when and how" (Lasswell, 1958). When this idea is associated with power relationships, "politics" can be expanded to include the way "authoritative decisions concerning the allocation of scarce resources are made and carried out in society" (Van Loon & Wittington, 1981: 8). These ideas are

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combined by Robert and Doreen Jackson, in <u>Contemporary Government and Politics,</u> who

offer the following definition:

> Politics embraces all activity which impinges upon the making of binding
> decisions of who gets what, when and how. It is an activity through which
> contending interests are conciliated and differences are expressed and
> considered. Through politics the collective welfare is supposed to be
> advanced and the survival of the whole community protected (p.6).

If motions passed by municipal councils are examined using the above definitions,

it is hard to consider their policy decisions "non-political". Anytime a road is paved, a

community centre is built, or zoning by-law changed, one policy is followed, and many are

abandoned. Distinct choices are made whether to support one group's demands over

another's, or to spend money in a certain area of the municipality at the expense of

another part of the community.

Perhaps one of the toughest questions for the NPA to answer would be, "if

running a city is more administrative than political, why do we have elected bodies to

oversee the municipality's administration? Why not simply draw lots or have the provincial

government appoint administrators?" It is very possible that one of the main reasons why

many city councillors wish to continue this charade of city council as a non-political entity

is to discourage people with different political views from becoming active and to maintain

their control over the political agenda. If this is the case this denial of ideology is a very

political goal.

If we accept the above definitions, and admit that governing any municipality is

inherently political and should be regarded as such, another basic question could follow as

to what kind of political system should be put in place to run this polity. If the rest of our

country is to serve as an example, it should be "democratic". "Democracy" can be broadly

defined as "... a form of government in which...the people rule. It also entails a state in

which there is some form of political equality among the people" (Krieger p.220).

There are many theoretical loose ends left from the above definition. For example, who "the people" are is always a contentious issue. For the sake of simplicity, this paper will consider all enfranchised citizens "the people". Even though the debate about franchise extension is intriguing (especially in the case of youth), it will be left for another time. Likewise, the term "rulers" is open for interpretation. In this thesis "rulers" indicates those who are elected by the ruled.

To elaborate further, this concept of "rule by the people" can include a broad range governmental systems. Some authors, such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, propose that democracies should operate on the premise "...that all should be involved in legislating, in deciding on general policy, in applying laws and in governmental administration...". Others, such as Joseph Schumpeter, suggest that citizens should have little direct influence over legislative process or their leaders, but instead rely on their rulers to consider the interests of the public when making policy decisions (Held, 1987: 3).

As mentioned in chapter one, although the ancient Greeks were able to employ a very direct style of democracy, they still used representatives to carry out some governmental functions (Held, 1985: 14-35). If principles of direct democracy were limited in a society where only 60,000 were able to participate, the larger populations and broader concepts of citizenship which exist in our modern societies would make it very difficult, if not impossible, to employ a system in which every citizen had a say in every piece of legislation. These factors suggest that modern societies are limited to some form of representative democracy.

In Participation and Democratic Theory (1970), Carol Pateman proposes that the more citizens participate in government, the better government policy will reflect the desires of that polity's citizenry. Pateman sees political participation as a self-perpetuating process, meaning that the more citizens participate in governance, the more they will want to take part in the future. Although Pateman also admits that representative democracy is

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necessary in modern societies, she believes that participation must be viewed in a much broader context than just voting in elections (Pateman, 1970).

These examples demonstrate that most modern democratic governments must use representative, as opposed to direct, democracy. However, even this limitation is still very broad. "Representative government", can be defined as a ruling body composed of agents of the people who urge consideration of the interest of those he/she represents. This type of democracy either follows the concept of the representative as "trustee" or "delegate". Briefly, representatives who are trustees follow a "Burkean" notion, where they may disregard the will of constituents, voting with his or her conscience. On the other hand, "delegates" only act on the specific desires of electors (Scruton, p.400). A combination of these two concepts can be found at the federal and provincial levels of government in Canada. Representatives at these levels are free to use some judgment, but must also represent the interests of his/her electorate (Jackson, 1994: 319).

In Canada, politicians are held accountable to the electorate primarily through elections. If the elected agent's actions are deemed improper or ineffective, the electorate may hold the representative accountable by voting for another candidate in a subsequent election. Although there may be more direct methods, such as recall and initiative, elections are presently the most widely used mechanisms of accountability in Canada.

A recent report by The Royal Commission on Financial Management and Accountability (1979) stresses the importance of accountability in Canada. The report defines "accountability" as a systemic quality which "...obliges the participants *to pay attention* (emphasis from the Report) to their respective assigned and accepted duties..." (Canada, 1979: 10). When this definition is applied to governance in Canada, the Commission sees accountability as a complex network, linking the public's wishes to policy outcomes (Canada, 1979: 9).

Elections provide a bridge of accountability between politicians and their constituents, but there is no consensus on how strongly governments should be held

accountable for their actions. For example, there is considerable debate as to whether

accountability helps or hinders government efficiency. Some feel that the more officials are

held accountable, the less efficient they become (Self, 1972: 161). Others, like Allen

Lambert and Patrick Smith argue the opposite, that strong accountability actually

increases efficiency (Canada, 1979; Smith, 1986). Although this controversy is common at

all levels of government (Smith, 1986: 15), even those authors who argue that

accountability which is too strong may decrease efficiency, agree that some degree of

accountability is still an important component of representative democracy (Self, 1972:

299).

If a government is not seen as being accountable for its actions, it may suffer a

crisis of legitimacy. Early concepts of the "legitimate" state revolved around the use of

coercion or the ability to provide stability by state rulers, but these requirements have

become outdated. Modern democratic requisites demand that institutions be legitimate in

the eyes of the governed. It is no longer acceptable, at least in Western liberal democracies

for governments to force citizens to obey laws, or to oppress certain segments of the

population to maintain the state.

Although this is a fairly recent practice, it is not a new concept. Jean Jacques

Rousseau notes in the Social Contract, that if a government loses legitimacy, people have

a right to demand change. He feels that when a government is formed:

> the administration is given a provisional form, until the people choose to
> order it otherwise. It is true that such changes are always dangerous...but
> the circumspection this involves is a maxim of policy and not a rule of
> right, and the State (citizens) is (are) no more bound to leave civil authority
> in the hands of its rulers than military authority in the hands of its generals
> (p. 272).

Maxims of governance suggest that governmental institutions should reflect some

form of the Rousseauean "will of the people" and may lose power if legitimacy is first lost.

At times this lost legitimacy can be restored by simply making minor adjustments in laws

and legislation, or the situation may deteriorate to the point where institutions which are found to be illegitimate are dissolved peacefully, or in the extreme, demolished through civil war. Particularly in a democracy, the mechanism which keeps representatives accountable is the perception of how legitimate that representative is, and how well the governmental institutions allow the representative to voice the constituents' wishes.

To reiterate, accountability links the rulers to the ruled in Canada. In our present system, elections are arguably the most important mechanism of accountability in Canada, thereby becoming one concern of any serious study of democracy. Regular elections which attract the attention of a significant level of participation are one way of ensuring accountability. Patterns of voter turnout are important standards by which to gauge how citizens feel about their system. As explained by the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing:

> The exercise of the franchise is one of the critical elements in maintaining public support for our form of government. Through voting, voters participate, however indirectly, in the nation's governance, giving their consent to the institutional arrangements for exercising political power....Voter turnout is therefore a basic measure of citizen's confidence in the political system and, ultimately the health of the polity (Canada, 1991: 50).

Various factors can influence voter turnout rates. Natural disasters or other events which fall outside of our sphere of influence can affect turnout in elections. Although these deterrents can have an effect, they are impossible to plan for or correct. However, there are factors which are within our control which can have a dramatic effect on citizen efficacy. Institutional rules and structures which help or impede citizen participation can greatly influence turnout rates.

An extreme example of institutional hindrance pertains to the suffrage. Before 1920 women, and 1960 many aboriginals were not allowed to vote in Canadian federal elections, dramatically shaping how these groups were able to influence government policy. However, many institutional impediments are more subtle than blatant denial of

suffrage rights, and thus harder to identify and correct. In <u>Governing Canada</u>, Michael

Atkinson notes that in may cases:

> ...institutions do not determine policy outcome in any mechanical
> sense...there are simply too many other constraints on policy and too many
> ways in which institutions matter differently in different settings. ... (but) it
> is clear that institutions constrain outcomes and create opportunities....
> Rules are crucial to outcomes, and so is organizational capacity. It would
> be hard to imagine a description of the policy process that neglected either.
> (Atkinson p.45).

Thus, when exploring relationships between accountability and elections, it

important to explore more than just factors affecting eligibility. If institutional flaws exist

which impede certain groups or communities from participating on an equal level with

other groups or communities, a less obvious prejudice may exist. In some cases these less

conspicuous barriers to participation can even be more serious than blatant obstacles,

causing the root of the problem to go undetected and uncorrected. If a system appears

open and fair, but certain segments of the population still do not participate, non-

participants may be labeled as apathetic by those whom the system favours.

LOCAL DEMOCRACY AND MUNICIPAL POLITICS

The terms discussed in the previous section, " representative democracy",

"accountability", "legitimacy" are as applicable to municipal politics as they are to any

other governmental tier in Canada. All themes explored in the previous section are central

to the tests conducted in this thesis. However, attaching these ideas to local governance is

not new. Other authors have linked democratic theory to municipal institutions in the past.

Building on information provided earlier in this chapter, and by conducting a

literature review, this section identifies various generalizations made about voter turnout

in Canadian municipal elections. When conducting this review, it was found that although

there are a number of texts which discuss voter turnout in Canadian municipal elections,

those offering broad surveys , such as <u>Local Government in Canada</u>, by C.R. Tindal and S.

Nobes Tindal (1990), and <u>Local and Urban Politics in Canada</u>, by Donald J.H. Higgins (1986), and <u>Canadian Municipal Government</u> by K.G. Crawford (1954), recent edited works, like James Lightbody's <u>Canadian Metropolitics</u> (1995), as well as studies with a more local focus, such as <u>Alberta's Local Governments</u>, by Jack Masson (1994), all share common generalizations about this subject. The fact that many of these books borrow from a number of common sources and primary studies concerned with voter turnout in local elections, may explain these shared perceptions.

Using information stemming from these three books, Table 2.1 groups the above authors' writings into eight general factors which may affect voter turnout. Not all the generalizations presented in Table 2.1 are examined in detail in this thesis. However, all are mentioned, with some being compressed into more compact generalizations as presented in Table 2.2.

Table 2.1 -Eight Factors Affecting Voter Turnout
1. Political culture in Canada acts against voter turnout
2. Small areas have higher turnout than areas with more population
3. Special election conditions raise public interest and turnout
4. Non-partisan elections do not affect, or lower voter turnout
5. At-large elections lower turnout, elections based on wards raise turnout
6. A high level of competition leads to higher voter turnout
7. Because of election complexity, name familiarity/placement on ballot are the important factor in becoming elected
8. Socio-economic factors can lead to lower or higher turnout

The theme of political culture is briefly touched upon in this thesis. General trends are identified indicating the strength of municipal participatory culture in each city. Other than this brief description, emphasis will be placed on the following, more tangible generalizations.

The effect of population on voter turnout is perhaps best explored through an urban and rural comparison. However, as will be explained in chapter three, as most Canadians live in urban centres, this study does not focus on rural areas. However, this theme is explored in a limited way by comparing voter turnout patterns within increases in population density in individual municipalities.

The generalization that special election conditions raise public interest is explored extensively in chapter three, and used as a base for all tests. Specifically, much emphasis is given to the argument that elections with a mayoral contest increase voter turnout. In addition to this factor, the importance of institutional changes (i.e., boundary shifts or the mere fact that a change is being made to the electoral system) are factored into observations made about various voting patterns.

The next four generalizations concerning non-partisan elections, at-large electoral systems, competition and election complexity are grouped under the rubric of *information availability*. Issues of competition, non-partisan elections, at-large vs. wards and election complexity all revolve around the amount and quality of information available to citizens at election time. When evaluated individually, these generalizations all indicate that the more information is focused for the electorate, the better they are able to decide between competing solutions. The more dispersed or obscured policy options and electoral choices become, the more interest drops off.

The importance of political parties as vehicles that increase and focus information for voters plays a prominent role in this thesis. Many authors agree that political parties play an important role in democratic governance.[*] One of these authors, John Meisel, believes that political parties structure the vote in most elections:

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[*] Also see A.Blais and E. Gidengil Making Representative Democracy Work (1991); Canadian Political Party Systems (1992), edited by R.K. Carty; and Political Parties and Ideologies in Canada (1990) by W. Christian and C. Campbell for a more detailed look at political parties in Canada.

> They [parties]...present options to the electorate about current issues, and so can be said to organize mass opinion....The preparation of electoral lists, staffing at polling booths and organizing the campaigns on a polling-division by polling-division basis all takes a great deal of effort, most of which is provided by volunteer activists. This not only enables the electoral process to function, it increases the public's knowledge of political questions and facts. It is well-established that a greater sense of partisan attachment is associated with a greater knowledge of politics (Meisel, 1991: 178-9).

In chapters four and five the term "municipal party" is used to describe organized groups engaged in local civic election contests. The word "municipal" should not cause much difficulty, however the second half of this term may be much more contentious. Broadly speaking, the term "party" describes an organized group of people who hold the common goal of becoming elected to political office. A more narrow usage of this term suggests that a party has a common ideology and platform (Blake, 1991: 17).

This thesis uses "municipal party" to describe civic groups using the broad definition of the word "party". As Lousie Quesnel explains, the mere fact that some local groups abhor this classification does not exclude them for this category:

> It is our contention that strictly local groupings of people who aim to run for municipal elections and hold political office are political parties....these organizations...have the theoretical characteristics of political parties: an effective party apparatus, members, leaders, resources, programs (Quesnel, p.583).

As previously mentioned, parties similar to Vancouver's NPA usually wish to avoid this classification because they adhere (at least publicly) to the false notion that city administration is inherently apolitical, and organized parties only confuse and complicate the business of running a city. If they admitted they were a party, then this would open the door for other parties to oppose them on an equal political footing.

Finally, socio-economic factors are sometimes crucial to voter turnout. This theme will be explored extensively in chapters three, four and five. The general premise of this theory, discussed more fully in chapter three, is that people of low socio-economic status

are less likely to vote than those of high status. This theme is especially important if a city has noticeable class divisions.

Table 2.2 provides a revised list of the eight generalizations in Table 2.1 based on the above explanations. This abbreviated listing forms the basis for all tests performed in chapters four and five. Details of these tests are provided in chapter three.

Table 2.2 -Factors Affecting Voter Turnout
1. Political culture in Canada acts against voter turnout
2. Small areas have higher turnout than areas with more population
3. Special election conditions raise public interest and turnout
4. Greater information availability raises voter turnout
5. Socio-economic factors can lead to lower or higher turnout

PARTICIPATORY NORM

Although the previous section listed generalizations which form the basis of tests performed on voter turnout data in chapter four and five, it may be useful to put these tests into a more specific context. This section attempts to establish a participatory norm, or ideal level, for voter participation in municipal elections, taking care to heed C.B. Macpherson's caveat about unrealistic expectations:

> A political system that demanded for instance, that citizens have more rationality or more political zeal than they now demonstrably have, and more than they could be expected to have in any attainable social circumstances, would not be worth much advocacy (Macpherson, p.4).

Following this advice, to demand that 100% of all eligible citizens vote in every elections would be unreasonable. Even in Australia, where voting is compulsory at the national level, in the 1980's turnout levels reached only 94% (Canada, 1991: 53). Likewise, it is reasonable to suggest that at least some citizens will vote in every election. These loose limitations leave us with a very wide range when addressing the issue of turnout limits and expectations. The real question is, given an average over time, what level of participation is required to ensure accountability?

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Since 1945, our turnout rate for federal elections has ranged from 68% to 81% (Canada, 1991: 51). In provincial elections the range is similar, but the average is lower. For example, in British Columbia between 65% and 78% turned out to vote in provincial elections, for an average of 71% since 1928 (British Columbia, 1928-1991). In Manitoba, the turnout ranged from 51% to 87%, for an average of 69% since 1903 (Manitoba, 1991). As noted in the first chapter, turnout in national elections in democratic countries other than Canada sometime exceeds our federal level, but our national and provincial institutions do not seem to be suffering any crisis of legitimacy because of these somewhat lower rates.

In Canadian municipal politics, most resolutions can be passed by a majority vote by council members. Likewise, in local referendum and plebiscites a 50% + 1 margin of those voting is needed, although a 60/40 ratio has sometimes been required to pass specific motions.[*]

This narrows the limit enough to expect that since a simple majority decision is not enough to ensure passage of a referenda question, that the mark should be set near the 60% level, and not lower than 50%. It should be noted that this 50% to 60% level applies to only those eligible to vote, and not those citizens who are disqualified due to residency requirements or age limits. If turnout is measured using overall population as a denominator, even this level of participation could be questioned, but for the purposes of this paper, this issue will not be pursued further.

By breaking chapter two into three sections, it is hoped that this chapter adequately established the theoretical and practical foundations of this thesis. By exploring democratic theory and relating this exploration to a literature review of local democracy

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[*] Such is the case for the three plebiscites held in Vancouver regarding changing the city back to a ward based electoral system. In two of these non-binding referenda, the proposal would have passed under the 50% + 1 rule, but the decision was over-ruled because it did not have 60% support. In 1973, 41% of voters wanted to switch to wards. In 1978, 51.7% voted 'yes' to the change, while in 1982, 56.9% favoured wards (Higgins pp.325-29.)

and municipal politics, the three sections in this chapter attempted to limit the span of this thesis to include factors affecting voter turnout in municipal elections. Chapter three further focuses this paper by specifically defining the methodology used in chapters four and five.

CHAPTER 3 - METHODOLOGY

CHAPTER OBJECTIVE

In chapter two, general democratic theory and definitions were explored and related to generalizations derived from recent municipal literature. From this review came the suggestion that governments ought to adhere to democratic principles, and policy choices should reflect the "will of the people". The notion was offered that elections which exhibit high levels of voter participation may be one way to ensure that politicians are held accountable for their actions. This chapter also suggested that electoral systems themselves may affect voter turnout.

These ideas were then linked to existing Canadian municipal literature. Following the widespread observation that voter turnout in local elections is lower than federal and provincial elections in Canada, eight general explanations for this phenomenon were drawn from a number of academic studies. These were condensed to five generalizations about how population, socio-economic status, special conditions during elections, and information availability affect voter turnout in municipal elections. A proposed participatory norm, against which actual voter turnout levels can be compared, also stemmed from this discussion. By building on the information presented in chapter two, chapter three outlines the methodology used in the rest of this thesis.

VOTER TURNOUT: PROBLEMS AND LIMITATIONS

Perhaps the most logical first question to ask when exploring elections in terms of voter turnout should be, "how many people showed up to vote?" In the case of municipal elections, this question is harder to answer than may be first imagined. Compared with a single federal or ten provincial elections every four or five years, local elections are both more numerous and frequent.

For example in British Columbia there are 180 municipalities and regional districts (Moffatt, 1993: 18-19), most run by directly elected officials. Municipal elections in B.C. are now held every three years, but were once held annually or bi-annually. If these

numbers are multiplied over time, literally thousands of elections have been held since British Columbia became a province of Canada in 1871.

If this total is expanded to include all municipalities in Canada since the time of their incorporation, the sheer number of individual elections available to track makes this an enormous task. A complete history of municipal voting results is in fact impossible to compile because registries listing eligible voters and election results are not available for every election ever held in Canada. In Winnipeg, for example, records are only available from 1902 to the present day. This limited array of elections records will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

Consequently, an accurate expression of voter turnout has never been, nor will it ever be, compiled. At this stage the best any student of municipal politics can do is hazard a guess. That appears to be what most standard municipal texts have done. For example, C.R. Tindal and S. Nobes Tindal express concern that while "the approximately two-thirds voting turnout in federal and provincial elections is not great, it certainly contrasts with the 40% who vote at the municipal level (Tindal, 1990: 170). Donald Higgins is less exact with his estimation, but notes that overall turnout in municipal elections is low and not everyone who is eligible or "even a majority of those eligible" actually vote in municipal elections (Higgins, 1983: 311).

Taking these complications into consideration, this study has not attempted to compile chronological voter turnout records for all municipalities in Canada. Instead, this thesis has been confined to a detailed examination of municipal elections in two large urban centres: Vancouver and Winnipeg. Urban centres are particularly important in Canada because approximately 77% of the population live in Urban Areas, and 61% in Census Metropolitan Areas* (Statistics Canada, 1993: 4). In some areas this concentration

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* As defined by Statistics Canada, an "Urban Area" is an area with over 1000 people and a density of 400 or more per square kilometer. A "Census Metropolitan Area" (CMA) is an area with a population concentration of 100,000 or more (Statistics Canada, p.4).

is even more profound. For example, in British Columbia almost 90% of the population lives in less than one percent of the provinces' land mass (Smith, 1986, p.8).

Of these urban areas, Vancouver was chosen because of its unique electoral system, while Winnipeg was selected because of this city's attempts at municipal reform in the 1970's and 1980's. However, even this limitation is not sufficient as over one hundred years of election data for mayoral, councillor, and other municipal positions exist for each city. Further pruning has made this study more manageable.

To narrow the vast amount of turnout information available for analysis, this thesis only utilized data from elections including mayoral contests. This limitation is deemed reasonable because elections contests including the mayoral position elicit more public participation than those without, with very few exceptions. Information from both Winnipeg and Vancouver supports this conclusion.

As noted by Paul Beaulieu and Phil Wichern in Studies in Winnipeg, there was an average turnout of 40.4% in Winnipeg civic elections between 1920-1969. During this period, "the average turnout in 'mayor years' (30) was 45.6% while the turnout in 'non-mayor' elections was 27.6% -- 18% less... this affirms the conclusion that mayoralty contests elicit a higher turnout" (Manitoba, 1976: 47). Between 1958 and 1993 there was a similar disparity between elections including and excluding mayoral contests in Vancouver. Elections featuring mayoral contests in this period averaged a turnout of 40%, while those not contesting this position averaged 27%, a difference of 13%. There are a few exceptions, when especially potentially contentious issues are put to referendum for example, but these spikes in voter interest are an unreliable turnout predictor.[*]

Elections in both cities have recently been grouped to include most positions and questions on one ballot, virtually eliminating municipal elections which do not feature a mayoral contest. Except for the infrequent referenda or by-law approvals, these trends are

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[*] See appendix 1 and appendix 2 at the end of this chapter for a more detailed listing of election turnout figures in Winnipeg and Vancouver during these periods.

likely to continue. Limiting the span of this thesis to included only data from mayoral contests makes it possible to expand election analysis over long periods of time.

DATA COMPILATION AND DEMONSTRATION

This thesis used a chronological compilation of voter turnout in mayoral elections in Winnipeg and Vancouver. The data were gathered from four main sources: Municipal voter's lists and election results; City clerk records; newspapers; and various academic studies. Although scattered, Vancouver has a complete catalogue of voter turnout results from mayoralty elections from 1886-1993. Unfortunately, in Winnipeg many of the early voters records were destroyed due to neglect. No other copies of these records exist (they were never copied by the Winnipeg City Archives), and newspapers of the day did not report them. Regrettably they are lost, allowing access to records only from 1902 to present day with few exceptions.[*]

In both cities, when reported turnout figures conflicted and it was impossible to determine which was correct, the most reliable source was chosen. For example, city records or academic figures were always chosen over newspaper reports. When exact sources were not cited, the turnout figure was calculated by dividing the number of votes cast by the number of people eligible to vote. These figures were found by using voter lists and election results from the archives in both Winnipeg and Vancouver.

The accuracy of even city records come into question occasionally. The worst example of this is the election turnout figures for the 1988 civic election in Vancouver. Officially there were 174,120 eligible voters, with 126,843 votes cast. When turnout percentage is calculated by dividing votes cast by the number of eligible voters, the turnout figure is 72.8%, but the official figure is 43.3%.

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[*] Field research conducted in Winnipeg in 1994 confirms this loss. Interviews conducted with city staff and research at both the City and Provincial Archives indicate that few records of election participation exist before 1902. Early newspapers, such as the Manitoba Daily Free Press, offer only scattered and vague details of elections held before this date.

This discrepancy is a result of an inaccurate count of eligible voters. In 1986 there were 290,168 eligible voters, while in 1990 there were 257, 352 eligible voters, substantially more than the 174,120 cited in 1988. According to Edwina Endair of the Vancouver City Clerks' Department (1994), this unusual fluctuation was due to a change from using voter's lists compiled by the municipality, to one compiled for provincial elections, and not counting the number of voters who registered on the day of the election. Endair also explained that corrections have been made in recording techniques since 1988, and later figures are much more accurate.

The City Clerks' Department also indicated that earlier figures were not 100% accurate either. Repeated names and other processing flaws caused more people to be listed than were actually eligible. This inaccuracy means that turnout rates could be slightly higher than indicated, except for the 1988 election as already noted. Like all methods of statistical compilation, there is some error, but all possible attempts have been made to use the best figures available, or when they are not accurate, the best estimation possible. Any questionable number or estimation is noted in the appropriate appendix in this thesis.

After the data were compiled, it was graphed using three alternative methods of demonstration to establish broad trends and to group the data into distinct chronological periods. To better evaluate broad trends in chapters four and five, linear regressions and moving averages were used to organize time-series data. To break data into more distinct periods, bargraphs are also used in these chapters. These are fairly standard methods of data demonstration, but a few short explanation may be necessary to further clarify each technique.[*]

Linear regressions can be described as a line of "best fit", in which a line cuts through the "heartland" of a series of data points (Wilson, 1988: 169). When evaluating

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[*] Many studies which measure voting behaviour through empirical methods use similar techniques to present their information and findings. These studies, such as those conducted by Campbell (1960), Shienbaum (1967), Rea (1976), Bakvis (1991), Johnston (1991), and Rosenstone (1993), use linear and non-linear regressions as well as bargraphs to better illustrate data patterns.

data over time, this technique is used to better illustrate long trends of either decline or increase. However, this is not always the best choice when attempting to identify variance occurring within a certain series of data points.

Non-linear regressions, in the form of moving averages, are used to better illustrate fluctuations over time, while still linking and smoothing data (Wilson, 1988: 172-74). This technique is used to project values over a specific period of time based on the average value of the variable over a specific number of preceding periods. Non-linear graphs presented in this thesis average two concurrent points, then connect this point to an average of the next two points, repeating this process for all data. A two point average was chosen to distort the information as little as possible.

Chapters four and five will also use bargraphs to establish and analyze distinct chronological periods of voter turnout in Vancouver and Winnipeg. These graphs are fairly standard with one exception. Bargraphs showing low and high turnout do not cross the X-axis at the zero point on the Y-axis. Instead, the average turnout for the whole period was calculated, and the X-axis has been adjusted to cross the Y-axis at this point, better demonstrating periods of low and high turnout. This distinction helps clarify which elections are most important to analyze, and allows the data to be distinctly grouped, showing periods of stability and change (Johnston, 1992: 49).

Although Vancouver and Winnipeg have different data sets, the graphing techniques described above are applied to data from both cities. These graphs are presented in the appropriate chapters, with the data sets included in appendices at the end of each chapter, or at the end of this thesis. Data sources are included with the appendix material.

ANALYTICAL STRUCTURE

Vancouver and Winnipeg are examined separately in the next two chapters: Vancouver in chapter four and Winnipeg in chapter five. As will be explained in detail later, there is some variance in data collected for each city, but the structure of both

chapters in identical. Each chapter is split into three sections to better explore voting data from each city. In all sections, voter turnout data is compared to generalizations presented in chapter two.

The first section presents and examines voter turnout from a broad perspective. Since very little empirical information has been compiled and analyzed by previous researchers in existing studies of municipal elections, these chapters begin by presenting a longitudinal overview of voting behaviour in the two cities. Special attention is paid to long term increases or decreases in overall voter turnout, relative to population growth. The final graph in this broad section compares municipal voter turnout to provincial and federal turnout in each city.

Borrowing techniques from two authors, the second section utilizes a methodology to compliment broad observations with more detail. Kenneth Carty, in "Three Canadian Party Systems: An Interpretation of the Development of National Politics", looks at Canadian politics from 1867 to 1985 and outlines three distinct party systems. Carty delineates between the three systems by identifying various watershed periods of change, marked by a major alteration "in the role of political parties in the governing process" (Carty, 1988: 15). He describes the party type in each of the three eras, and considers the forces which caused these transformations to occur.

In a like manner, Donald Gustein breaks the development of Vancouver's civic government in into three periods. Gutstein bases these divisions on various civic party systems. Unlike Carty, Gutstein's analysis focuses less on the reasons for change, than events occurring during these periods (Gutstein, 1983).

By loosely following these examples, the second section in chapters four and five divides the electoral histories of Vancouver and Winnipeg into distinct periods of continuity and change. However, unlike the above authors, these divisions are based on periods of voter turnout rather than party systems. Using the generalizations compiled in

chapter two, each period is examined in detail. Suggestions as to what caused these intervals are then given.

In the third section of the chapters on Vancouver and Winnipeg, the effects of socio-economic status on voter turnout are examined. This section provides a detailed comparison between voter turnout and household income in specific sections of each city. The comparative technique used in this section differs slightly between chapter four and chapter five. Also, a slightly more detailed analysis is performed on Vancouver because, unlike Winnipeg's with its ward system, elections in Vancouver are held at-large. Specific details and reasons for these variations are provided in the appropriate chapters later in this thesis.

In the conclusion of each chapter, observations generated from these data are presented. This information is then complimented by a number of specific suggestions as to how to improve voter turnout in each city. In chapter six, observations and suggestions from both cities are compared and combined.

APPENDIX 3.1

Voter Turnout in Mayoral and Non-Mayoral Elections in Vancouver (1958-1993)

Year	Mayoralty	Non-Mayoralty	Year	Mayoralty	Non-Mayoralty
1958	32		1972		37
1958		40	1972	32	
1959		25	1973		21
1959		24	1973		40
1960	36		1974	32	
1961		35	1975		22
1961		25	1976	36	
1962	44		1978	38	
1963		28	1980	37	
1964	40		1981		16
1965		26	1982	42	
1965		45	1984		16
1965		23	1984	49	
1966	35		1985		33
1967		33	1986		19
1967		20	1986	49	
1968		33	1988	43	
1968		21	1990		13
1968	44		1990	55	
1970		32	1992		10
1970	45		1993	35	
1971		40	**Average**	**40%**	**27%**

Appendix 3.1 expresses voter turnout in both mayoral and non-mayoral elections in terms of percentages. The overall average for mayoral election in Vancouver between 1958 and 1993 is 13% higher than elections which did not feature contests for this position. Data was collected from records kept by the Vancouver City Clerks office, and is rounded to the nearest whole number.

APPENDIX 3.2

Voter Turnout in Mayoral and Non-Mayoral Elections in Winnipeg (1920-1969)

Year	Mayoralty	Non-Mayoralty	Year	Mayoralty	Non-Mayoralty
1920	34		1948	49	
1921		34	1949		44
1922	35		1950	48	
1923	39		1951		38
1924	42		1952		33
1925	39		1952	55	
1926	35		1953		23
1927	43		1953		34
1928		38	1954		33
1929	35		1954	53	
1930	35		1955		43
1931	54		1956	58	
1932	49		1957		26
1933	55		1958	44	
1934	53		1959		25
1935	53		1960	39	
1936	59		1961		29
1937	57		1962	49	
1938	59		1963		23
1939		46	1964		25
1940		38	1964		27
1941		31	1965		26
1942	38		1966	33	
1943		35	1967		24
1944	46		1968	43	
1945		30	1969		23
1946	42		Average	46%	32%
1947		39			

Appendix 3.2 expresses voter turnout in both mayoral and non-mayoral elections in terms of percentages. The overall average for mayoral election in Winnipeg between 1920 and 1969 is 14% higher than elections which did not feature contests for this position. Data was collected from information provided by Phil Wychern and Paul Beaulieu in Studies in Winnipeg, pp.48-49, and is rounded to the nearest whole number.

CHAPTER 4 - VANCOUVER

Incorporated in 1886, city government in Vancouver has, for the most part, always had close connections with business. Selected by the Canadian Pacific Railway as the final stop of the transcontinental railway, most of the land in the area was originally owned by railway interests and developed according to their wishes (Gutstein, 1983: 189). Business and development has been a consistent and prevalent theme in Vancouver's brief history.

Since the early days as a port city, Vancouver has grown considerably, both in area and in population. An amalgamation in 1929 with South Vancouver and Point Grey marked the end of the city's geographic expansion, but the city continues to become more and more dense. Politically, the provincial government has always been reluctant to intervene in city affairs, a relationship reflected in Vancouver's City Charter. The Charter elevates major civic debates to the legislature, by-passing the traditional bureaucratic administration (Tennant, 1981a: 127).

Possibly as a result of this "hands-off" approach by provincial governments, Vancouver's electoral system has only undergone one major institutional change. In 1935 the city abolished the ward system and moved to at-large elections. This move was instigated and supported by various groups within the city and was not a result of provincial intervention. The at-large system is still in effect today.

During the same period, a group of business interests created a municipal party to combat the rising popularity of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation. Formed in 1937, the Non-Partisan Association (NPA) has dominated civic politics, and continues to do so under current NPA mayor Philip Owen. Any attempts to alter the institutional arrangements of the city after 1935, especially a return to the ward system, have run counter the NPA's wishes, and as a result failed. This chapter explores the connection between various social and institutional trends and changes in voter turnout in Vancouver between 1886 and 1993.

GRAPH 4.1

Turnout in Vancouver Mayoraly Elections

2 per. Mov. Avg. (Turnout%)

Linear (Turnout%)

Turnout Percentage

1995
1992
1989
1986
1983
1980
1977
1974
1971
1968
1965
1962
1959
1956
1953
1950
1947
1944
1941
1938
1935
1932
1929
1926
1923
1920
1917
1914
1911
1908
1905
1902
1899
1896
1893
1890
1887
1884

60 55 50 45 40 35 30 25 20

Detailed information in Appendix 4.1

BROAD TRENDS

General Patterns

Between 1886 and 1993 the average voter turnout in Vancouver elections involving mayoral selection was 36%. Alone this number tells us very little. At first glance it does indicate that this average is low compared to national and provincial elections in Canada, much lower than municipal elections held in some European countries, but slightly higher than turnout rates in local elections held in the United States.[*] However, a much deeper examination of voter turnout in Vancouver municipal elections is needed if this figure is to be explored. Such explorations can then provide a basis for policy proposals for improving local electoral participation.

To provide a more detailed demonstration, Graph 4.1 charts voter turnout uses two techniques: by moving and linear average[**]. By using a moving average to chart a broad pattern with turnout figures from Vancouver, this chart demonstrates a wide fluctuation in turnout since 1886. This fluctuation was lowest just before the turn of the 20th century, increasing dramatically in the late 1920's through 1930's. Later in this century, high patterns of turnout are evident with levels dipping low in the 1970's, but never sinking as low as during the late 1800's or early 1900's.

Examining this data using a linear average demonstrates two very significant trends. As one could predict from the moving average patterns, turnout in Vancouver municipal elections has been increasing steadily. Not only has the rate not been decreasing or increasing slightly, but it has been climbing at a remarkable rate, averaging close to 45% as we near the millennium. However, the fluctuation in participation rates is still quite wild, and the rate of 45% is still well below described norm levels.

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[*] See Table 1.1 on page 8 of this thesis for detailed turnout rate information.
[**] See chapter three, pp.30-31 for a explanation of these techniques. Briefly, moving averages help identify long-term trends of fluctuation, while linear regressions can indicate increasing or declining trends.

GRAPH 4.2

Increase in Population and Voter Turnout

Population

Turnout Percentage

▪ ▪	Linear (Voter Turnout)
▬▬	Linear (Population)

Detailed information located in Appendix 4.1

40

Exploring turnout rates using these two techniques casts doubt on the thesis that Canadian political culture is marked with an apathy toward municipal politics (Higgins, 1983: 262). For whatever reasons, the increase in voter turnout in Vancouver shows that at least in this city, citizens are becoming more and more involved in elections. Specific factors causing this increased turnout are explored later in this chapter.

Population and Voter Turnout

Graph 4.2 demonstrates the increase in Vancouver's population using the linear averaging technique. Although it is difficult to compare voter turnout with population increase, this simple graph indicates that since 1886 Vancouver's population has increased tremendously, but not to the exclusion or even the hindrance of voter turnout. This result contradicts the conventional theory that larger populations elicit lower turnout than areas with a less dense concentration of people (Tindal, 1990: p.170). Since Vancouver will almost inevitably become more dense, these results suggest that greater density will not necessarily affect turnout rates.

Federal/Provincial Comparisons

Graph 4.3 demonstrates voter turnout trends in Vancouver since the early 1930's in federal, provincial and municipal mayoral elections. This graph holds no real surprising results. Turnout in federal elections are usually highest, their dominance interrupted only occasionally by provincial turnouts. Municipal election turnout has never surpassed either tier when it comes to electoral participation.

What is useful about this graph is that it demonstrates important features of the Vancouver electorate. On a very consistent basis, well over half of the Vancouver citizenry participate in politics at the federal and provincial level. Although there is room for an increase in municipal turnout, this comparison shows that citizens in this city are willing to turn out in large numbers. If citizens could be encouraged to participate in civic elections, it is reasonable to expect that voting turnout rates could climb to the level exhibited at the other two tiers.

41

GRAPH 4.3

ElectionTurnout in Vancouver

- - - 2 per. Mov. Avg. (Vancouver Mayoral %)
— — 2 per. Mov. Avg. (Vancouver Provincial %)
——— 2 per. Mov. Avg. (Vancouver Federal %)

Turnout Percentage

Detailed information located in Appendix 4.1

Graph 4.3 also indicates that, while turnout patterns in federal and provincial elections has been very stable, turnout rates in municipal elections have fluctuated greatly. For example, since 1928 an average of 73% of voters in Vancouver have voted in federal election. No fewer than 60% of those eligible have participated in elections at the national level, with these levels never climbed above 80%, both high and low averages being within 13% of the overall average.

During the same time period, an average of 42% of voters have participated in mayoral elections in Vancouver. These rates have ranged from a low of 26% to a high of 56%. These rates are frequently almost 40% away from the overall average. This information, along with graph 4.3 may indicate that although the same voters participated in elections at all three levels, turnout rates at the municipal levels are more prone to unpredictable variables than elections at the federal or provincial levels. This idea is explored more fully later in this chapter.

EXPLORING DISTINCT PERIODS OF VOTER TURNOUT

All tests and comparisons conducted in this section of chapter four will be based on graph 4.4. This bargraph demonstrates turnout percentages of all mayoral elections held in Vancouver since incorporation, excluding those won by acclamation. The various turnout rates are separated into two halves using the overall average of 36% as a divisor. By using this technique, periods of high and low turnout are more easily identifiable.[*]

Graph 4.4 also shows four periods of election participation. Described chronologically (and matched on graph 4.4 in numerical order) these four periods are as follows: (1)1886-1889, (2)1890-1926, (3)1928-1940, (4)1942-1993. The rest of this section explains these periods in accordance with voter turnout.

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[*] See chapter three, page 31, for a detailed explanation of this graphing technique.

GRAPH 4.4

Vancouver Mayoralty Election Turnouts (1886-1993)
Acclamations not Included (1887, 1888, 1903, 1906, 1908, 1913, 1921, 1956)

Detailed information located in Appendix 4.1

44

Period 1: 1886-1889

This period in the formative era of Vancouver includes just five elections, in two of which the mayor was acclaimed, and one for which no voter records are available. The two remaining annual elections had a turnout rate much higher than the city's 36% overall average. This high rate can be reasonably explained by the excitement generated with the incorporation of the city, and the accompanying festivities and publicity.

Although this period is much shorter than the other four, it is important for it reinforces the theory of information availability. The public was energized by the very first institutional change in Vancouver, and the change itself generated a high level of information about the city. After the novelty wore off turnout rates soon sank to the worst turnout worst level in Vancouver's history.

Period 2: 1890-1926

From 1890 to 1926 voting turnout was consistently low. At one point the turnout dipped to approximately 15%, and never climbed above 36%. In addition there were seven elections where only one candidate ran for mayor, resulting in acclamation for the single contestant. Initially this is surprising because the city had a very small population and a ward system, two factors which according to traditional explanations should lead to high turnout.

This low interest can generally be explained by the tight connection between the voting public and their attitude toward the city. As Donald Gutstein notes, enfranchised citizens were confident that politicians would represent their interests:

Politics in the new city was straightforward. The voting population was overwhelmingly male, property-owning, English-speaking, and Protestant....Most elected officials believed in growth and progress and the continuing increase in property values. The role of council, they believed was to provide services in the rapidly growing centre. There was a meshing of public and private interests unmatched in the city's history. Three of the first six mayors and many alderman were involved in real estate, and many were partners in the syndicates that built and operated utilities (Gutstein, 1983: 192).

The tight grid of limited suffrage and business interest at city hall was enough to convince the eligible voters that their interests were well taken care of. Information about municipal affairs was readily available, but because the interested parties were in agreement, there was little need to debate difference in public. As the next period demonstrates, this "golden age" for business interests in Vancouver would soon be challenged.

Period 3: 1928-1940

In 1927, Vancouver, South Vancouver and Point Grey voted to amalgamate into one city. Elections were held in 1928 (now biennial) to chose a new mayor, councillors representing twelve wards, and School and Park Board representatives. This was the first major structural change since the incorporation of Vancouver, and voter turnout echoed past participation rates. Over 50% of the eligible population voted in the election which saw W.H. Malkin elected. The election of 1928 would mark the beginning of a watershed period, for not only did the city grow in size, the political system was radically altered.

Paul Tennant, in his history of Vancouver civic politics, states that the addition of Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) candidates to election contests in 1934 forever changed the city's political course. Although the CCF disappeared from the civic scene in 1940, the reaction of the business elite to the socialist challenge prompted the ward system to be abolished in favour of "at-large" elections, and the creation of the Non-Partisan Association (Tennant, 1981a: 128).

Wards were abolished in 1935 by a council dominated by business interests, and an at-large system was in place for the 1936 mayoral elections. According to Gutstein, the system was changed because old ward loyalties were unpopular with the newly amalgamated residents from Point Grey. Ironically, the CCF also supported this change from wards, reasoning that if they could group all their votes together they could maintain seats in council. This strategy proved unsuccessful. Instead of gaining control of council, the CCF soon faded from the scene (Gutstein, 1983: 195).

In 1937, business interests in Vancouver formed the NPA, a political party carefully crafted to appear neutral to Vancouver residents. They claimed to be opposed to politics in city hall, and fronted a slate of candidates to counter the CCF. Long after the demise of their initial rivals, the NPA dominated civic elections for years, and is still a major force in municipal politics in Vancouver. The rise of this civic organization marked one of the first times that opposing political views were rigorously presented to voters.

The years between 1928 and 1940 elicited the highest voter turnout in Vancouver's history. During this period, the average participation rate in seven concurrent mayoral elections was 49%. As previously noted, in the first period higher turnout continued for a few elections, and then dropped off. In this period rates remained comparatively high until 1940, never dipping below 40%. The sudden switch from very low participation to 12 years of consistently high rates indicates that new factors were holding citizens' attention.

As in the first period, after the decision was made to create an amalgamated Vancouver, voter turnout was very high at 50.8%. Turnout rates dropped slightly in 1930 and 1932, possibly because the excitement wore off. In the mayoral election of 1934 turnout rates unpredictably skyrocketed to 56%, their highest level ever. There is a strong possibility that this new interest in municipal politics was generated by the combined factors of wards and strong local parties. The elections of 1934 were the first in which the

business elite of the community was challenged by the CCF, and the last time that wards were used to contest elections in Vancouver.

After Vancouver changed to an at-large system, voter turnout dropped slightly during the elections of 1936, 1938 and 1940, and then dropped dramatically, to just over 25%, in 1942. The trend of high voter turnout after 1934 correlates exactly with this first period of organized party activity in Vancouver, although the highest periods of voter turnout came when the NPA and the CCF were competing head to head under the ward system.

In 1934, the CCF did not win any wards but did fairly well in some (Gutstein, 1983: 195). This party did win three east-side seats in the1936 mayoral election, and continued to be a strong contender until 1940, polling approximately 31% of the vote (A. Smith, 1982: 62). In 1938, under the CCF banner, Dr. J. Lyle Telford was elected mayor. After 1940 however, the CCF disappeared from city politics leaving the NPA as the only established civic organization.

The CCF briefly reappeared for time to time, but never again posed a serious threat to the NPA. The party had always been weak and splintered, even when it was most popular (Miller, 1975: 6). It is possible that the party's eventual disappearance was due to how the new electoral system hindered the CCF's ability to translate votes into council seats, causing frustration, as loss of party support, and further splintering.

When voter turnouts are matched to institutional changes a clear picture is revealed. This era of political controversy, focused through political parties, corresponded to the highest levels of turnouts in Vancouver's history. Also, in 1934 before wards were abolished and the support for the CCF was peaking, the turnout rate was as high as it ever has been at 56%. Through this combination of wards and parties, information about city politics was focused for the voter in a new, and very short lived way. After a short lived foray into civic politics, the CCF did not run in the 1942 civic election, and voter turnout plummeted to 26%.

Period 4: 1942-1993

After 1940, Vancouver's electoral history is remarkably consistent. Various political parties entered the political milieu, experienced a brief period of success, and then faded away. The only exception to this rule in the NPA. They are the only political party that has consistently contested elections in Vancouver since 1937. Although they lost power briefly in the 1970's, their control and dominance is striking. They have weathered splits, upheavals, parties with clever acronyms, hostile provincial governments and angry citizens. This longevity must be admired.

Table 4.1 lists opponents vanquished by the NPA. The NPA would undoubtedly like to add another notch on their belt and banish the Committee/Coalition of Progressive Electors from the ballot. Formed in 1968, this party has been a thorn in the side of the NPA for almost 30 years. If the pattern from this period continues however, COPE may also disappear.

Table 4.1	
Party	**Active Dates**
Civic Reform Party	1947-50
Civic Improvement Group	1947
Civic Voters Association	1957-62
Civic Action Association	1964-66
Citizens for the Improvement of Vancouver	1966
The Electors Action Movement	1968-1984
New Democratic Party	1970-74

Voter turnout during this fourth period mimics the life and death of political parties opposing the NPA, turnout increases the more polarized the civic debate becomes. For

example, when TEAM* was the NPA's dominant opponent in the 1970's voter turnout was not as high as in the late 1980's when COPE was the major opponent. TEAM, as described in <u>COPE: Working for Vancouver</u> , was "just the NPA is disguise, because once elected, it moved steadily to the right, siding with developers on crucial issues " (Church, 1991: 9). Although this judgment may be a bit harsh, when TEAM became established as the NPA's major opponent (1972-1976), voter turnout dropped to its lowest level since 1942.

On the other hand, COPE was formed by east-side socialists and have always presented a firm alternative to the NPA. After the demise of TEAM in 1984, COPE, either on their own, or with support of independent members such as Mayor Mike Harcourt, grew to be the dominant party opposing the NPA. During these years voter turnout levels almost matched the zenith point of the 1930's, reaching 51% in 1990. However in 1993 COPE was less successful, marking the triumphant return of the NPA, with turnout levels declining to 35%.

Like a champion prize fighter, the NPA has powerful backers in its corner, and while it occasionally wobbles, it will not fall down. When a new party enters the ring, if the new party is lucky, there is a brief spike of voter support, possibly even enough to knock to NPA out of power, but after a relatively short period of time the opponent weakens and fades away. No rival party has ever presented a successful opposition to the NPA on a continuous basis. This pattern describes *all* parties opposed to the NPA.

There will probably be objections to lumping the years between 1942 and 1993 together into one section. For example many authors, including Donald Gutstein and Paul Tennant, may argue that there is another distinct period marked by the establishment of the Electors Action Movement (TEAM) and the Committee of Progressive Electors (COPE), both formed in 1968. Gutstein claims that, "the new era in civic politics began in

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* The Electors Action Movement. Formed in 1968, this municipal party were committed to reforming certain politics at city hall, while mainly protecting the status quo in Vancouver (Tennant, 1981 :137).

1968," and Tennant feels that, "out of this second period (1968 to 1972) emerged an new multi-party system" (Gutstein, 1983: 205; Tennant, 1981a: 126).

These assertions are understandable. After dominating council since 1936, between 1968 and 1993 the NPA has held only 49%, 70 of a possible 143, council seats. This decline prompted the assessment that the NPA was declining as a political power in Vancouver. However, this death knell appears premature. Starting in 1986, and continuing to the last election in 1993, the NPA has dominated council in the last four elections winning 86% of the contested council seats.[*]

Instead, Tennant's 1980 declaration that "Vancouver politics has progressed from democracy to oligarchy" may be more apt (Tennant, 1981b: 1). Since the demise of the CCF in 1942, there has been little shift in the patterns of opposition to the NPA. Both TEAM and COPE parties fought the odds and put up a good fight, however TEAM has faded away, and COPE was reduced to one seat on council in 1993. To say that the formation of these parties has significantly altered the balance of power is hopeful, but premature. Under the current institutional structure, the NPA's dominance is not only formidable but almost assuredly guaranteed.

The above analysis demonstrates that voter turnout can be directly related to the amount of quality information they receive about political issues in their city. Major institutional changes, such as the formation of the city or enlarging its borders, generate a short lived burst of information which fades as the excitement passes and cannot be relied upon to generate a consistent increase in voter turnout. Longer periods of above average voter turnout occur when political parties, especially polarized parties, contest elections. They focus a wide variety of city issues into somewhat more clarified choices for the electorate, and boost election coverage by advertising their various positions.

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[*] See appendix 4.2 for a detailed listing of council seat distribution between 1968 and 1993.

As indicated above, it appears that parties may hold the key to any long-term increase in voter turnout. However, there is resistance to formally acknowledging this in Vancouver. For example, as indicated in chapter one, the NPA insists that partisan politics do not belong in city hall, and avidly push for a city hall free of "ideology".

The success of the NPA at least partially indicates that their objection to formal parties is popular with citizens in Vancouver. This popularity is also substantiated by a 1991 Angus Reid poll conducted in Vancouver. This poll indicates that 44% of respondents at strongly agreed with the statement that "political parties should not be allowed in municipal politics" and only 14% strongly agreed with the statement that "the system of municipal government is badly flawed". However, only 18% of those polled strongly agreed that their municipal governments do a "good job at communicating to the public" (Reid, 1991).

In Vancouver there have been only two periods featuring consistent contests between polarized parties. * The first, beginning in 1934 and ending in 1940, the second starting in 1978 and possibly ending in 1993 if COPE cannot recover from its stinging defeat in the last election. Voter turnout during these periods is the by far the highest and most consistent. Also, the election eliciting the highest voter turnout (56%) occurred in 1934, contested between two very polarized groups under a ward system.

The NPA has always been the major opponent of any new party, and the only group that has maintained its status since it inception in 1937. All new parties (with the current exception of COPE), have faded away soon after any success is achieved, along with any upward swing in voter turnout with that party. This raises the question of how to create a stable party system that will ensure a high level information availability and thus contribute to voter turnout? A common response is that the NPA already adequately

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* Although the NPA did not form until 1937, its interests were represented strongly enough at city hall and in the community to constitute an organized opposition to the CCF in 1934. There was no formal "organization" at this time, but interests were cohesive enough under mayor Gerry McGeer to be considered a municipal party in everything but name.

reflects the genuine wishes of the community because they keep being elected and other parties fade because they do not have the support of voters. A closer examination suggest that this overwhelming dominance is more artificial than the NPA would have the citizens of Vancouver believe.

The institutional changes affected in 1936, when the city changed from wards to an at-large system, biased the electoral system to directly favour the NPA. The following example explains that at-large elections favour parties supported by the largest cohesive voting group, even if that group represents a minority of voters:

> Let us suppose that there are 100,00 voters and that of these 35,000 support group A; 20,000 group B; 10,000 group C; 10,000 Group D; and that 25,000 support not particular group and so vote randomly. Group A will elect all its candidates, because each of them will receive 35,000 votes as well as additional random votes. Thus one group, composed of a minority of voters, fills all positions (Tennant, 1981a: 129).

Using this explanation, it is clear why NPA has held office for so long; because they appeal to the largest cohesive group in Vancouver. Formed by businessmen, and forever loyal to development and law and order (Roy, 1980: 154), the NPA has consistently appealed to the city's elites. This overwhelming dominance is better explained if city-wide voting behaviour is further analyzed.

SOCIO- ECONOMIC FACTORS AND VOTER TURNOUT

One factor which may have a huge effect on voter turnout is socio-economic status. As many authors have indicated, income levels can greatly affect how individuals participate in government. [*]Although this has been examined at other governmental levels, studies at the municipal level are scarce, and will be examined here.

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[*] Writings concerning socio-economic status and how/if it has an affect on voting behaviour is abundant. Authors consulted for this thesis include: Kleppner (1965), Shienbaum (1967),, Teixeria (1967), Eagles, et.al.(1991), Lambert (1991), Roenestone (1993).

GRAPH 4.5

Voter Turnout In Communities of High and Low Socio-economic Status (1958-1993)

Legend:
- 2 per. Mov. Avg. (Low Average)
- 2 per. Mov. Avg. (Citywide Average)
- 2 per. Mov. Avg. (High Average)

Turnout Percentage

Detailed information located in Appendix 4.5

GRAPH 4.6

Difference in Turnout Between Communities of High and Low Socio-economic Status (1958-1993)

(Number of COPE members on Council Indicated)

Percentage Difference

| 35 | 30 | 25 | 20 | 15 | 10 | 5 | 0 |

1993, 1990, 1988, 1986, 1984, 1982, 1980, 1978, 1976, 1974, 1972, 1970, 1968, 1966, 1964, 1962, 1960, 1958

Detailed information located in Appendix 4.5

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In general, much of the literature asserts that socio-economic status does affect voting behaviour suggest is that the more wealthy a person is the more likely he/she is to vote. When examining voter turnout patterns on a citywide basis, class differences between neighbourhoods tend to become obscured. It would be a mistake to presume that all areas of a particular municipality participate equally in municipal elections. This becomes evident when voter turnout is broken down by polling districts, and chronologically compared between neighbourhoods.

In this analysis, Vancouver's 22 communities (as defined by the city's planning department) were ranked according to average household income using data from the 1971, 1981 and 1991 census. The three overall highest and lowest, were picked and voter turnout charted against the citywide average between the years of 1958 and 1993.[**] All polling districts within the boundaries of each community were averaged together for each year to give the yearly turnout for each separate community. Although the boundaries do not match exactly, they are very close and accurately reflect election participation in each area. A map of Vancouver's official communities is included in Appendix 4.4.

Table 4.2 indicates that people who live in communities of low economic status participate in elections less frequently in mayoralty elections than those from more wealthy communities. By comparing voter turnout data from these communities over time, a common pattern emerges. Graph 4.5 uncovers the mystery behind the NPA's success. Communities with low socio-economic status consistently vote less frequently than communities with a high socio-economic ranking. As already demonstrated, the introduction of competitive parties has increased overall voter turnout in Vancouver during certain periods, but these peaks and dips appear equally across class lines. When a party enters that captures the interests of communities of low socio-economic status, this

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[**] The top three and the three of the bottom four were chosen. Although the Downtown community is ranked near the bottom in socio-economic status (22nd overall) it was not chosen because of its small and highly mobile population. See appendix 4.3 for details.

increase is matched by an increase by those communities of higher status. Only recently
has this gap narrowed with the emergence of COPE to represent the views of communities
of lower socio-economic status.

Table 4.2		
Rank	**Community**	**Average Turnout 1958-1993**
1	Shaughnessy	49
2	Kerrisdale	54
3	Dunbar-Southlands	53
City-wide Average		**40**
19	Grandview-Woodland	32
20	Mount Pleasant	29
22	Strathcona	29

When compared to seat distribution, this pattern reveals the inherent bias present
in the at-large system. Graph 4.6 demonstrates that only when turnout in low socio-
economic communities is increased disproportionately in comparison with communities
with high socio-economic status can the east-side gain substantial representation on
council. This has happened only during the period between 1980 and 1990, and began to
taper off in 1993.

This discrepancy could perhaps be remedied if Vancouver switched from an at-
large to a ward system. Although people of low soci-economic status would in all
likelihood continue to turn out in smaller numbers than those with higher status, at least
people in poorer wards would elect someone who better represented the interests of that
community. This change by itself might not only give the poorer communities better
representation, but possibly raise the visibility of municipal politics in their eyes, further
increasing turnout.

CONCLUSIONS

To return to the five generalizations presented in chapter four, the information and analysis in this chapter raises some important confirmations and contradictions. In general, interest in elections including contests for the mayoral position has increased substantially over the last century. This trend, which has also occurred while the population of this municipality has increased substantially, contradicts the generalization that people just are not interested in municipal politics, and indicates that the overall municipal political culture is tending toward greater public participation in elections.

The formation of a new municipality, or a major change to its boundaries also can have the effect of exciting the population, increasing information about politics in the area, and thus increasing voter turnout. This excitement however is usually short lived, as evidence from Vancouver has demonstrated. Although change itself may generate brief periods of high turnout, unless that change alters the electoral system in some substantive way, it does not appear to have any long term effect.

In contrast, when organized parties appear at the municipal level, a coincidental rise in voter turnout is also in evidence . This turnout increase is most noticeable the more polarized the primary parties become. Parties which present competing alternatives serve to increase the amount of information available to voters. In Vancouver, when a competitive party system did not exist, voter turnout decreased considerably. When an strong alternative to the NPA does present itself, participation rates rise considerably.

These alternative parties very rarely have held power. Since 1935 , there has only been one short period when an alternative party, TEAM, unseated the NPA. Alternative parties, with the possible exception of COPE, are never long lived. In some cases these parties disappear because they cannot sustain the interest of their members, mainly due to the fact that they cannot translate votes into council seats. This could be due to the electoral system in Vancouver.

When the ward system was dropped in favour of an at-large system, it effectively guaranteed that the party which attracted the support of the largest cohesive voting group would maintain power. The NPA has been the benefactor of this bias. Supporters of the NPA may suggest the success of this party is because they reflect the wishes of most of the community, but this may be a false assumption.

By comparing voter turnout in communities with high and low average family incomes, it can be suggested that people who have low incomes vote less frequently than those of high socio-economic status. If elections in Vancouver were contested through a ward system that reflected existing communities, this would be of little consequence. Each community, no matter what their voting rates could elect a representative from their area. Under the at-large system, communities of with low socio-economic status and low turnout compete head-to-head with the communities of high socio-economic status and high turnout. Because this second group usually supports the NPA, independent candidates or other municipal parties continually fail to win elections.

If the cycle of rise and fall continues in Vancouver, COPE might also disappear, like all other parties opposing the NPA. Consequently, voter turnout might drop-off in East-side communities, weakening their already limited voice in council. If election contests were held under a more representative-friendly system, and the system were altered to give the NPA less of an advantage, not only might communities of low-socio-economic status stay more active in civic politics, city-wide turnout rates might increase due to party competition and the focus they bring to city issues. This can possibly be achieved in two ways: direct funding to encourage parties, and changing to a ward system.

If parties were directly funded by the city or the province, for example via campaign finance or tax credits, they could continue to survive and attract members even during periods of low turnout. This funding system could be similar to those at the federal or provincial levels of government. Funding would enable parties without a firm economic base to recruit members, advertise their positions on city issues, and other actions

common to real political parties. This would ensure that alternatives were presented to the public in each and every election.

If Vancouver returned to elections based on wards, the results may be similar. Disparity in voting turnout between communities would matter little as each would have their own representative on council. These seats would most likely go to parties which best represented the views of the community. Communities of both high and low socio-economic status would have their concerns voiced in council. This would not mean the end of NPA dominance as they could campaign in east-side ridings, or the entrenchment of COPE as they may not appeal to all east-siders, but merely allow residents of low socio-economic status to elect representatives who reflected their concerns.

Ideally, the best solution to this dilemma would be to institute both changes. If parties regularly contested elections based on wards elections in Vancouver, these contests would take on a new importance and attract much more attention. Important issues facing the city could be debated within council, publicized through the media or other direct routes of communication bringing a greater awareness of civic issues to the public and a greater accountability of politicians to the people.

The possibility of this change becoming reality is a bit of a conundrum. Because the provincial government is reluctant to intervene in city affairs in Vancouver, there is little chance that a provincial government would enable legislation to directly fund parties. This means that this change may have to come from within the city itself, with the city providing funding for parties out of the municipal budget.

However, with the almost guaranteed dominance of the NPA in council, there is little chance that this municipal party will change the electoral rules. As demonstrated earlier, the NPA are favoured under the current system and will probably not change the electoral system or approve measures to finance alternative parties, leaving change to other parties. But if these other parties can never gain power, or if they do not institute the needed changes when they do win, a vicious circle is created.

This leads us back to a bottom-up approach where concerned citizens fight to win democratic control of their institutions. If a pro-ward party can ever manage to gain power in council and change the system back, then the NPA will be a less formidable opponent. A ward system will mean that the NPA will have to appeal to a large number of voters in the majority of wards to continue to hold power in council. One can assume that they will not have the success that they have had in the past, and other parties will have a chance to establish themselves more fully.

Although this will inevitably take much longer than a provincial decree, perhaps this is the way any institutional alterations should be made. If civic politics are seen as independent and provincial governments are expected to maintain a "hands-off" policy, the chances of future interventions and adjustments to favour one party or another may be considerably lessened. As an examination of Winnipeg will reveal, institutional changes initiated by the provincial government do not always have the desired effect of increasing citizen participation.

APPENDIX 4.1 - VANCOUVER ELECTION STATISTICS

Date	Population	Mayor	Eligible	Voted	Turnout %	Provincial Turnout	Federal Turnout
1886		Maclean	No record	No record	No Record		
1886		Maclean	662	281	42		
1887		Oppenheimer	N/A	N/A	Acclaimed		
1888		Oppenheimer	N/A	N/A	Acclaimed		
1889		Oppenheimer	2421	1039	43		
1890		Oppenheimer	3702	1010	27		
1891	13709						
1892		Cope	5303	1715	32		
1893		Anderson	5538	1768	32		
1894		Collins	6227	1627	26		
1895		Collins	6518	1005	15		
1896		Templeton	6983	2036	29		
1897		Garden	7391	2096	28		
1898		Garden	7854	2238	28		
1899		Garden	N/A	N/A	Acclaimed		
1900		Townley	10100	2920	29		
1901	27010	Neelands	9736	2443	25		
1902		Neelands	10340	3190	31		
1903		McGuigan	N/A	N/A	Acclaimed		
1904		Buscombe	11272	3277	29		
1905		Buscombe	12581	3605	29		
1906		Bethune	N/A	N/A	Acclaimed		
1907		Bethune	14992	3650	24		
1908		Douglas	N/A	N/A	Acclaimed		
1909		Taylor	19673	5290	27		
1910		Taylor	23694	6159	26		
1911	100401	Findlay	28157	7545	27		

APPENDIX 4.1 - VANCOUVER ELECTION STATISTICS

Date	Population	Mayor	Eligible	Voted	Turnout %	Provincial Turnout	Federal Turnout
1912		Baxter	35284	10270	29		
1913		Baxter	N/A	N/A	Acclaimed		
1914		Taylor	39552	11323	29		
1915		McBeth	38805	13885	36		
1916		McBeth	38667	10386	27		
1918		Merchant	39818	9853	25		
1919		Gale	N/A	N/A	Acclaimed		
1920		Gale	40292	11135	28		
1921	163220	Tisdall	N/A	N/A	Acclaimed		
1922		Tisdall	41539	11214	27		
1922		Tisdall	41539	10954	26		
1923		Owen	43436	13859	32		
1924		Taylor	43058	15077	35		
1925		Taylor*	43948	11210	26		
1926		Taylor		16132	36		
1928		Malkin	73075	37158	51	61	
1929	240241						76
1930		Taylor	81382	40605	50		
1931	246593						
1932		Taylor	79293	36924	47		
1933						68	
1934		McGeer	79397	44087	56		
1935							78
1936		Miller	81191	39201	48		
1937						66	
1938		Telford	83021	42372	51		
1940		Cornett	85023	35313	42		76

APPENDIX 4.1 - VANCOUVER ELECTION STATISTICS

Date	Population	Mayor	Eligible	Voted	Turnout %	Provincial Turnout	Federal Turnout
1941	275353					70	
1942		Cornett*	98855	26023	26		
1944		Cornett	109276	35216	32		
1945						55	77
1946		McGeer	116847	58564	50		
1947		Jones	124416	45449	37		
1948		Thompson	128604	62349	48		
1949						67	65
1950	344833	Hume	134441	60656	45		
1952		Hume	172026	73523	43	59	
1953						58	62
1954		Hume	219333	72033	33		
1956	365844	Hume	N/A	N/A	Acclaimed	54	
1957							72
1958		Alsbury	242282	76857	32		72
1960		Alsbury	243253	86387	36	61	
1961	384522						
1962		Rathie	241206	105167	44		76
1963						63	78
1964		Rathie	241769	96139	40		
1965							73
1966	410375	T.Campbell	253124	87497	35	64	
1968		T.Campbell	256757	113021	44		73
1969						63	
1970		T.Campbell	267116	121430	45		
1971	426256						
1972		Phillips	265282	84418	32	64	73

APPENDIX 4.1 - VANCOUVER ELECTION STATISTICS

Date	Population	Mayor	Eligible	Voted	Turnout %	Provincial Turnout	Federal Turnout
1974		Phillips	257474	81458	32		
1975						63	
1976	410188	Volrich	261411	93557	36		
1978		Volrich	255374	96710	38		
1979						63	74
1980		Harcourt	292080	109442	37		69
1981	415549						
1982		Harcourt	286879	120355	42		
1983						75	
1984		Harcourt	289066	141788	49		77
1986	427131	G.Campbell	290168	142858	49	74	
1988		G.Campbell**	290168	126483	44		75
1990		G.Campbell	257352	133107	52		
1991	473210					71	
1993	494487	Owen		95357	35		64
Average					36	64	73

APPENDIX 4.2

Vancouver Council Seat Distribution (1968-1993)

Year	NPA	TEAM	COPE	IND
1968	8	2	1	0
1970	7	3	1	0
1972	1	9	1	0
1974	4	6	1	0
1976	3	5	1	2
1978	5	1	1	4
1980	5	2	3	1
1982	3	2	4	2
1984	4	2	3	2
1986	8	0	2	1
1988	7	0	3	1
1990	6	0	5	0
1993	10	0	1	0

Sources: Tennant, 1981a: 138.
Church, 1993: 211-216.

APPENDIX 4.3

Vancouver Communities Ranked by Socio-Economic Status

Overall	Community	1991 Rank	1981 Rank	1971 Rank	Avg. Household Income 1991
1	Shaughnessy	1	1	1	$120,933
2	Kerrisdale	3	2	3	$82,714
3	Dunbar-Southlands	2	3	5	$83,741
4	Oakridge	5	4	2	$65,022
5	West Point Grey	4	5	6	$73,129
6	Arbutus-Ridge	6	6	4	$63,622
7	South Cambie	7	8	7	$55,530
8	Killarney	8	7	8	$48,829
10	Renfrew-Collingwood	12	9	11	$45,785
10	Victoria-Fraserview	13	10	9	$45,666
11	Riley Park	10	12	12	$46,666
12	Sunset	14	11	13	$45,568
13	Marpole	16	14	10	$44,032
15	Hastings-Sunrise	15	12	14	$44,538
15	Kitsilano	9	16	16	$46,142
16	Fairview	11	17	17	$45,808
17	Kennsington-Cedar Cottage	17	15	15	$41,918
18	West-End	18	18	18	$33,492
19	Grandview-Woodland	19	19	19	$30,293
20	Mount Pleasant	20	20	20	$29,180
21	Downtown	21	21	22	$20,295
22	Strathcona	22	22	21	$17,380

Sources: City of Vancouver Planning Department - Community Profiles, 1993.
Statistics Canada.

APPENDIX 4.4

APPENDIX 4.5
Vancouver Communities

Year	Strathcona	Mount Pleasant	Grandview-Woodland	Low Avg.	Dunbar-Southlands	Kerrisdale	Shaughnessy	High Avg.	Difference:High And Low
1958	18	24	24	22	43	45	40	43	21
1960	25	28	28	27	53	50	45	49	22
1962	28	32	33	31	62	65	59	62	31
1964	24	30	31	28	57	59	53	56	28
1966	21	27	30	26	49	52	47	49	24
1968	26	31	35	31	63	65	58	62	31
1970	28	32	35	32	64	65	59	62	31
1972	21	19	22	20	48	52	45	49	28
1974	18	19	21	19	45	48	41	45	26
1976	23	20	26	23	50	53	47	50	27
1978	26	24	32	27	52	52	46	50	23
1980	25	25	29	26	48	49	44	47	21
1982	33	28	32	31	53	54	49	52	21
1984	39	37	42	39	60	59	54	58	18
1986	40	38	44	41	61	61	56	59	18
1988	37	37	40	38	46	43	43	44	6
1990	52	43	49	48	60	61	55	59	11
1993	34	25	31	30	48	47	43	46	16
Avg.	29	29	32	30	53	54	49	52	22

Appendix 4.5 gives voting turnout for individual communities in Vancouver mayoralty elections from 1958-1993. Individual totals are given, as well as an average for communities of high and low socio-economic status. The final column gives the difference between the high and low averages by year. Averages of each column are included in the last row. Data was collected from comparing voting results from Vancouver City Clerk documents and socio-economic data compiled by Statistics Canada and further defined by the Vancouver Planning Department. All figures have been rounded to the nearest whole number.

CHAPTER 5- WINNIPEG

This chapter compares voting turnout trends in Winnipeg with institutional and social changes. Incorporated November 8th, 1873, Winnipeg's civic history is closely tied with that of the entire province. From the General Strike in 1919, to the Unicity reforms in 1971, provincial governments have paid close attention to political activities within the provincial capital. This is not an unreasonable preoccupation as Winnipeg has always been home to a large proportion of the province's population. Currently, 652,354 of Manitoba's 1,091,942 residents live in Winnipeg, just under 60% of the entire provincial population.

Since 1873, elections in Winnipeg have always been based on wards. Various adjustments to the number of wards have accompanied most territorial addition to the city. For example, when Fort Rouge was annexed in 1892, the city added two wards, increasing from four wards to six wards. A seventh ward was added when the community of Kildonan joined Winnipeg in 1906 (Lightbody, 1978: 315).

Immediately following the 1919 General Strike, the number of wards was dropped to three, an arrangement which would last until 1971. Although this motion was introduced at the municipal level, the provincial government fully endorsed this change, making a great effort to quickly pass the necessary legislation (Lightbody, 1978: 318). Since the creation of Unicity in 1971, there have been considerable changes to the number of wards in the city, ranging from a high of 52 in 1971 to the present total of 15.

The Unicity reforms, legislated by the provincial government in 1971, instituted much more that just an increase in the number of wards. Other institutional changes, such as the addition of resident advisory groups (RAG's), were an attempt to increase participation in municipal governance. This was not the first time the senior government had intervened in the city's affairs. A metropolitan level of government was introduced in 1961. Under this arrangement, wards at the metropolitan level were more "pie-shaped", and not strictly based upon communities.

GRAPH 5.1

Turnout in Winnipeg Mayoralty Elections

Legend:
— Linear (Turnout %)
— 2 per. Mov. Avg. (Turnout %)

Detailed information located in Appendix 5.1

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This chapter connects patterns of voter turnout in mayoral election in Winnipeg with historical events and major institutional changes. These combinations are then compared with the five generalizations from chapter two. Stemming from this comparison, general observations are offered to help explain, and suggestions offered to increase, levels of public participation in Winnipeg civic government.

BROAD TRENDS

General Patterns

Between 1902 and 1992 the average voter turnout in Winnipeg elections involving mayoral selection was approximately 42%.[*] If all elections since 1874 were included in this calculation, this average would be slightly lower, possibly just under the 40% mark. This figure is still lower than Canada-wide federal and provincial turnout rates, but a closer look at Winnipeg's turnout trends paint a clearer picture of this city's electoral history.

Graph 5.1 demonstrates turnout data using both a linear and moving average technique.[**] The moving average demonstrates a great fluctuation in voting turnout over the years. In the earlier part of this century voter turnout plummeted to under 20%, and was almost always below 40% until the 1930's. After 1930, rates rose considerably, but still experienced instability. Despite this fluctuation, voters began showing up in greater numbers in recent years.

Using a linear regression, it is clear that voter turnout is on the increase, rising steadily since the turn of the century. Between 1902 and 1920 turnouts hovered around the 35% mark making a steady increase since that period. Since the 1970's the average turnout has been close to 50%. However, because of the great fluctuation it is difficult to predict whether the turnout rate will continue to increase to even higher levels. What can be established is which factors help explain this trend.

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[*] See appendix 5.1 for detailed information.
[**] See Chapter three, p.31 for an explanation of these techniques.

GRAPH 5.2

Increase in Population and Voter Turnout

Legend:
- - - Linear (Population)
— Linear (Turnout %)

Left axis (Population): 0, 100000, 200000, 300000, 400000, 500000, 600000, 700000

Right axis (Turnout %): 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70

X-axis (Years): 1902, 1905, 1910, 1912, 1917, 1919, 1922, 1924, 1926, 1929, 1931, 1933, 1935, 1937, 1942, 1946, 1950, 1954, 1958, 1962, 1968, 1974, 1980, 1986, 1992

Detailed information located in Appendix 5.1

The two analytical techniques used here cast doubt on the generalization that people are not interested in municipal politics (Higgins, 1983: 262). Although, a turnout rate of 42% is below the norm defined in chapter three, recent elections in Winnipeg have shown a marked increase in participation. For whatever reasons, the increase in voter turnout in Winnipeg demonstrates citizens are becoming more and more involved in local elections.

Population and Voter Turnout

Graph 5.2 contrasts voter turnout rates with population increase. Charting this information linearly on two different y-axis[*] , this graph demonstrates that Winnipeg's population increase has not had an adverse effect on voter turnouts. Voter turnout has risen from an average of just over 30% to an average of over 50% as the population has climbed from a few thousand to over 500,000.

These corresponding increases cast doubt of the generalization that higher population densities lead to lower turnout (Tindal, 1990: 170). Although this graph does not show if or how population increases affect voter turnout, it does demonstrate that cities can grow without negatively affecting how many of their citizens vote in elections.

Federal-Provincial Turnouts

Graph 5.3 compares to what degree citizens of Winnipeg turn out in federal, provincial, and municipal elections involving mayoral contests. These projections are interesting and important to understand that Winnipeg's electoral history is mainly affected by close ties between provincial and municipal turnouts. Regrettably, accurate federal turnout figures are only available since 1930[**] , but provincial and municipal turnouts have been tracked locally since the turn of the century.

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[*] See chapter three, page 31 for detailed information on this graphing technique.

[**] As Howard Scarrow notes in <u>Canada Votes</u>, "Since 1930...the voters lists have been prepared immediately prior to the election by means of a house-to-house canvass....Prior to 1930 the method of preparing the voters list did not guarantee such complete results" (Scarrow , 1961: 238).Although province wide results are available for federal elections, before 1930, Manitoba did not have voter turnout breakdowns for each constituency.

GRAPH 5.3

ElectionTurnout in Winnipeg

Legend:
- 2 per. Mov. Avg. (Winnipeg Federal %)
- 2 per. Mov. Avg. (Winnipeg Provincial %)
- 2 per. Mov. Avg. (Winnipeg Mayoral %)

(Provincial Results 1977-1990 based on estimates)

Turnout Percentage

1902, 1904, 1906, 1908, 1910, 1912, 1914, 1916, 1918, 1920, 1922, 1924, 1926, 1929, 1931, 1933, 1935, 1937, 1940, 1942, 1945, 1948, 1950, 1953, 1956, 1958, 1960, 1963, 1966, 1969, 1972, 1974, 1979, 1981, 1984, 1988, 1990, 1993

100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

Detailed information located in Appendix 5.1

This graph shows that between 1902 and 1942 there was a consistent drop in turnout rates for provincial elections, with a corresponding rise in rates during municipal elections. In the late-1930's, it appears that city elections were more important to Winnipegers than provincial elections. This may be a result of a coalition government at the provincial level who applied the philosophy that "government was merely a matter of administration, transcending class division and obviating class politics" (Peterson, 1978: 88), and the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation's (CCF) entrance into municipal politics in 1931. The decline in debate at the provincial level, coupled with the rise in controversy at the local level may explain the respective fall and rise in electoral turnout rates.

It appears that although the provincial government changed and the CCF faded from local politics, the people of Winnipeg attached almost equal importance to both levels of government for nearly 40 years. A see-saw battle between the provincial and municipal turnout rates continued until the early 1970's when provincial rates rose and municipal rates fell. Between 1930 and 1971, provincial turnout rates ranged between 60% and 45%, while municipal turnout rates were as high as 61% and as low as 33%.

In the 1950's, citizens of Winnipeg defied all laws of political science demonstrating that their interest in municipal and federal elections was equal! This trend is very surprising because traditional explanations assume that provincial elections and federal elections will always garner higher interest. This is not the case in this city. As a closer investigation of Winnipeg reveals later in this chapter, the city's proportion of the provincial population and overall importance to the fortunes of the province has lead many provincial premiers to directly intervene in the politics and institutional structures at the municipal level.

EXPLORING PERIODS OF VOTER TURNOUT

This section uses graph 5.4 as a base for all analysis. Turnout rates for each mayoral election between 1902 and 1992, excluding acclamations, are presented in the

GRAPH 5.4

Winnipeg Mayoral Election Turnouts (1902-1993). Acclamations and Incomplete Results not Included (1904,1907,1913,1914,1915)

Years (right axis): 1992, 1986, 1980, 1974, 1968, 1962, 1958, 1954, 1950, 1946, 1942, 1937, 1935, 1933, 1931, 1929, 1926, 1924, 1922, 1919, 1917, 1912, 1910, 1905, 1902

Value axis: 65, 60, 55, 50, 45, 40, 35, 30, 25, 20, 15

Detailed information located in Appendix 5.1

form of a bargraph. By dividing the data by the period average[*] , high and low periods of voter turnout are more easily recognizable. Aside from this horizontal division, four distinct periods are also included. Described chronologically (and matched on graph 5.4 in numerical order) these four periods are as follows: (1)1902-1918 (2)1919-1930, (3)1931-1956, (4)1958-1992. The rest of this section explains the significance of these periods in accordance with voter turnout.

Period 1: 1902-1918

Newspaper reports suggest that citizens of Winnipeg were as excited as Vancouver residents during the first set of civic elections, maybe even moreso. The Manitoba Daily Free Press reported a 125% voting turnout for the first election, citing 308 eligible voters and 388 votes cast. In 1876, after the votes were cast and tallies were being compiled "several persons raised a disturbance, during which the lamp was blown out, the stove-pipe knocked down, and the poll book stolen" (Manitoba Daily Free Press, Dec. 12, 1891) .

Any lack of evidence should not greatly hamper any chronological study. Voting turnouts before 1902, with the exception of the very first elections, should be comparable to rates of those between 1902 and 1918. Although very few voter turnout records are available from the early era of Winnipeg's municipal history, it may be safe to assume that because the franchise was limited to concerns of property owners, many of the approximately 27 elections were dominated by property owner concerns. In addition to rules restricting the franchise to property holders, according to Allan Artibise, of the 515 aldermen elected between 1874 and 1914, only three could be considered labour representatives. (Artibise, p.27). If the concerns of the business community were accurately reflected in council policy, there would be little reason for this community to change its leaders.

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[*] For details of this technique see Chapter three, page 31.

From the records which are available, from 1902 until 1918, voter turnout never exceeded the 35% mark, frequently dipping below 30%, and once falling as low as 20%. During this time period, the growing population of Winnipeg held municipal elections under a ward system. There were no municipal parties at this time, and as noted by M.S. Donnelly, provincial political parties had just begun to form:

> Party politics really began about 1900 when a Conservative in fact as well as in name took office. Other parties developed in the succeeding decade....A Manitoba Labour Party was formed in May 1910 and contested several Winnipeg seats in the election (but) failed to secure a single seat....In the election of 1914 Labour got three seats and in the following election seven, after which its number of members in the legislature fell off sharply" (Donnelly, 1963: 47).

Although being relatively bereft of partisan activity, Winnipeg's population was increasing at a very rapid rate. In 1901, the city was home to just over 40,000 people. By 1916, Winnipeg had grown to hold 163,000 residents (Artibise, 1977: 200). Caused by an huge influx of immigrants, this population boom would come to cause tensions to build in the city, resulting in one of the most famous events in Canadian history.

Period 2: 1919-1931

The Winnipeg General Strike 1919 is perhaps the quintessential example of class conflict in Canada. Denounced at the time as a threat to democracy, the uprising marks one of the first times conservative forces were directly challenged by labour, and served as the catalyst for parties committed to social democracy. This event had a profound impact on Winnipeg's municipal politics, defining the character of Winnipeg municipal, and indeed provincial, politics for years to come (Kaplan, 1982: 473).

As far as early elections go, the 1919 contest proved to be nearly as explosive as the strike itself. Described by McKillop as the "most fiercely contested municipal election of the twentieth century" (McKillop as quoted by Lightbody, 1978: 313), this election captured the interests of Winnipeg voters. 48% of eligible voters turned out to choose between candidates from the Independent Labour Party or the candidates fronted by the

Citizen's Committee (from the Committee of 1000 who fought against labour during the strike). The mayoral candidate presented by the Citizen's Committee was re-elected by a margin of 15,679 to 12,563 (Lightbody, 1978: 313).

Besides this significant rise in participation rates, the events of 1919 spawned two significant changes to the municipal political landscape. In 1920, the electoral system was modified considerably, a move considered by Phil Wichern to be "the best-engineered piece of civic gerrymandering ever perpetuated in Canada..." (Manitoba, 1973: 22). As James Lightbody notes, the number of wards were reduced from seven two member wards to three, with six elected members, and would remain this way until 1971 (Lightbody, 1978: 316).

Dividing the city into three large wards in essence created three at-large electoral systems which, as noted in chapter four, greatly favours a municipal party which appeals to the largest cohesive group of voters. This type of electoral system undermines community ties or loyalties and "can be almost as effective as at-large elections in denying representation to certain kinds of people in certain parts of the municipality" (Higgins, 1986: 332). If ward boundaries are drawn in such a way that communities of high and low turnout overlap, the wishes of the more active group may supersede the concerns of another on a consistent basis. Representatives from these types of wards will very likely appeal to the wishes of those who turn out in high levels, and pay less attention to the community whose members are less active. This will be explored in detail later in this chapter.

Also stemming from the strike came the formation of fairly organized political parties. Various groups representing business interests in Winnipeg owe their origins to the Citizen's Committee. When describing Winnipeg municipal politics in 1983, Kiernan and Walker stated that, "this coalition of business and professional interests has persisted for nearly sixty-five years and continue to constitute the foundation of conservative

politics in Winnipeg" (Kiernan & Walker, 1983: 223). Currently under the title of the Independent Citizen's Election Committee, this group has mirrored Vancouver's Non-Partisan Association in attempting to keep "politics" out of city hall and avoid being classified as an official party.

Parties with more overt agendas included the afore-mentioned Independent Labour Party (which also ran candidates at the provincial level), the CCF and occasionally, the Communist Party. These parties had limited success after 1919. Though two labour-supported mayors were elected between 1919 and 1942, as well as 19 labour aldermen, their presence in city hall made basically no impact on local policy. This was because a majority was needed in council to pass party policy, and labour never had the needed number of aldermen to constitute this majority. (Kaplan, 1982: 482).

The move away from community-based representation to a less focused system greatly affected voter turnout, despite the emergence of polarized municipal parties. After 1919, voter turnout dropped significantly, but never as low as in previous elections. From 1920 to 1930, voting rates only dropped below 35% once, but never climbed above the 43% mark.

Although the dramatic rise in voter turnout in the 1919 municipal election was anomalous, the emergence of polarized parties from that event served to boost rates from their earlier level. However, the institutional change instituted in 1920, dropping the number of wards from seven to three, prevented support for labour-based parties from translating support into council seats, consequently decreasing voter interest and turnout. Despite poor representation, class divisions in the city did not fade, and turnout began to increase. Soon the debate within Winnipeg would rise to dominate provincial politics.

Period 3: 1931-1956

Class divisions evident in Winnipeg during the previous period laid the base for political activity during the next thirty-five years. As the population grew in the city, Winnipeg became the locus for provincial politics. When the Depression hit in 1929, a

sharp rise in municipal turnout occurred soon after. City issues grew in importance as Winnipeg had the second highest unemployment rate in the country, with one out of every six citizens seeking government relief (Peterson, 1978: 82).

Also leading up to the Depression, participation in provincial politics had seen a steady decline, while municipal turnout rates had been on the increase. Thomas Peterson sees the decline in provincial politics typified in the actions of Progressive Premier John Braken. Braken was fond of "non-partisan" coalition governments, which he formed in 1931 with the Liberals and to which he added the Social Credit Party in 1936 (Peterson, 1978: 88). Provincial politics were often void of debate, and the concerns of labour shifted to the municipal level.

Born out of the General Strike, the Independent Labour Party (ILP) became an important voice for labour, both in municipal and provincial politics. By the mid-1920's, the rise of this party effectively caused a polarization of civic politics, becoming the major opponent of business-oriented municipal parties. The combination of these two factors, the decline in interest in provincial politics and a strong contest between polarized municipal parties, caused voter turnout to skyrocket from 35% in 1930, to almost 55% in 1931. Turnout levels stayed high until 1938, reaching almost 60% in 1936, 1937 and 1938.

In early 1932, the ILP joined forces with the newly formed Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF). Although these parties were similar in outlook, as the CCF grew in strength, divisions arose within the coalition. The ILP began to lose steam as an independent entity, and disbanded entirely in 1943.

As mentioned, the ILP ran candidates at the local and provincial levels of government. However, even at the provincial level, the "home grown" ILP had been a strong voice for Winnipeg-based labour groups, while the CCF were concerned less with maintaining their support within the city of Winnipeg than finding support outside of the city (Wiseman, 1983: 13-23). The CCF wing eventually won this battle to diversify, and

the voice of Winnipeg became just one of a larger chorus. Winnipeg-based labour continued to lose its grip on the coalition, matched by a corresponding turnout decline after 1938.

Between 1938 and 1946 turnout rates fluctuated and were lower than the preceding period. In 1940 there was no mayoral election, and in 1942 full adult suffrage was inaugurated (possibly lowering the rate because so many first time voters would have been counted on the list, but unfamiliar with the voting process). In 1946 turnout was still averaging just 42%.

In 1948 turnout rates began to pick up again, jumping to the mid-40's until 1952 when turnouts reached about 55%. These years, as explained by A.M. Gilies, are tied directly to the success of the CCF. It was at this point that the party, at both the provincial and municipal levels, was at its zenith, and after these years voter turnout dropped away as competing parties became less partisan (Gilies in Manitoba, 1978: 31). Allan Artibise echoes this statement claiming that during the 1950's, the CCF and their labour counterparts in council became less militant as a party as they attempted to woo the middle-class (Artibise, 1977: 182).

In 1956, Stephen Juba, a pro-status-quo candidate, defeated George E. Sharpe by a narrow margin to become mayor. This election featured some of the ethnic, class and establishment overtones prominent in past Winnipeg elections (Artibise, 1977: 185). Kiernan and Walker note that although Juba appealed to the "little guy", he was in essence very conservative and pro-development, also leading to support from the business community. Juba would continue to be re-elected as mayor until 1977 (Artibise, 1977: 185).

During this rather lengthy period, turnout rates are not only significantly high, but consistently over the 50% mark. The combination of strong class divisions, coupled with low interest in provincial politics and very active political parties at both levels, had a positive effect on public participation. Winnipegers would come to demonstrate higher

rates of turnout in the coming years, but never in the consistent way they had in the 1930's, 1940's and early 1950's.

Period 4: 1958-1992

This period exhibits a new pattern of voter turnout in Winnipeg. Four major spikes in election turnout occurred between 1958 and 1992. Of these four, the elections of 1971 and 1992 boasted two of the best turnouts in Winnipeg's history, with the election of 1971 peaking at 61%. However, the consistent turnout of the last period had vanished. In between these spikes were elections with turnouts lower than 35%, a dramatic drop off from levels achieved in the 1930's.

During this period, provincial politics regained its importance in the eyes of Winnipeg citizens, and the gulf between municipal and provincial politics began to widen. Turnout in municipal elections began to fluctuate wildly, ranging from less than 35% in 1966 to over 60% in 1971. However, provincial turnout rates began to increase and stabilize, steadily climbing from just over 50% in the early 1960's to 75% in the late 1980's. Four factors may have caused this gulf to widen and the new dramatic fluctuation in municipal voter turnout. The election of Stephen Juba and the decline in partisan politics explains the decline in voter interest, while the formation of new political parties and institutional change may explain periods of peak interest.

When Stephen Juba was elected in 1956, his working-class roots and appeal combined with his pro-business outlook effectively brought the two sides of the city together. With his aggressive core building activity and overall city boosterism, Juba put Winnipeg back on the map and raised civic pride to a level not seen since 1913 (Artibise, 1977: 182). Juba's endorsement by both upper, middle, and working classes, coupled with the decline in partisan politics, caused voter turnout to decline until he left office in 1977 (Kiernan, 1983: 224).

Two notable exceptions to this pattern of low voter turnout occurred in 1962 and 1971. In 1962, turnout rose to 48.5%, while in 1971, voter turnout hit 61%. Both of these

peaks can be directly attributed to changes made in Winnipeg's governmental system, and the corresponding rise of information available to the public. In 1961 Winnipeg was given a metropolitan level government by the provincial government. In 1971, Winnipeg and the surrounding municipalities were amalgamated by the provincial government to form Unicity.

According to James Lightbody, the addition of a metropolitan level of government was insignificant in terms of citizen participation except for the fact that it ratified the inequalities existing under the old system (Lightbody, 1983: 319-20). This new ten-member, directly elected body was put in place to increase "efficiency", and was given exclusive powers by the provincial government. According to Kiernan and Walker, this new tier of government was in no way an attempt to increase public input into the planning process, and these authors feel that the political aspects of governance were left untouched (Kiernan, 1983: 227). However, the discussion surrounding this change did raise the amount of information available to the public about municipal affairs, and hence the turnout in the 1962 Winnipeg elections.

The metropolitan reforms of 1961 did produce some long-term effects, but not the kind originally envisioned. According to Brownstone and Plunkett, for the next ten years a power struggled was wages between upper and lower tiers resulting in a "decade of conflict", where each level would try to impede the actions of the other (Brownstone & Plunkett, 1983: 25). In 1969, the New Democratic Party was elected to form the provincial government, and quickly acted to resolve this deadlock.

In December 1970, the Edward Schryer government released a White paper outlining proposals for governmental reform. This paper proposed that Winnipeg and the surrounding municipalities be amalgamated into one large municipality. However, in direct contrast to the 1961 reforms, there was a very intense effort made to make local government more participatory. The White Paper recommended that there be between 40-46 community based wards for the approximately 500,000 residents, a parliamentary style

government with a powerful mayor elected from within council, resident advisory groups, and community committees with important powers (Excerpts from White Paper cited in Brownstone & Plunkett, 1983: 201).

The election of a mayor from within council was key to these reforms. The mayor would be supported by the majority of council members who elected him or her, but held accountable to council by this same mechanism. In theory, polarized parties would become stronger because they would vie to control council and the powerful mayoral position, by campaigning with explicit policy positions (Keirnan, 1983: 233).

Most of these recommendations were passed into law July 24, 1971, with municipal elections under the new rules held in the October of the same year. The new City of Winnipeg was divided into 50 wards, resident advisory groups and community committees were created, but the parliamentary style of government was not implemented. Instead of a mayor elected from within council to oversee council decisions, it was decided that the mayor would be elected at-large. According to Brownstone, this significant change to one of the cornerstones of the Unicity reforms came as a result of opposition from then Mayor Stephen Juba. This popular and long-time public figure torpedoed this part of the legislation, and in effect, the development of a party system in Winnipeg (Brownstone & Plunkett, 1983).

The municipal elections of 1971 had the highest turnout totals in Winnipeg civic history. 61% of eligible voters cast a ballot. It appears that the discussion around the amalgamation and other changes prompted this high turnout in the first elections in the expanded Winnipeg. However this burst was short lived, and levels soon tapered off, dropping to just 35% in 1974 and 40% in 1977.

The Unicity experiment re-established a community-based ward system in Winnipeg, and demonstrated that achieving very high levels of voter turnout through institutional reform is possible. However, this level of support was very fleeting, and the reforms never achieved their goal of increasing public participation over the long-term.

Since 1971, the number of wards has been drastically reduced, from 50 to 15, significantly lowering the ratio of councillors to citizens. Also, the goal of establishing a strong local party system never materialized, and the turnout levels of 1971 have never been repeated.

The final effects of Unicity appear to be negative. By amalgamating the neighbouring municipalities with Winnipeg, and abolishing the lower tier of government, the population of the city increased dramatically. This coupled with the reduced number of wards to 29 in 1977 and to 15 in 1992, have served to centralize power, and place it in the hands of fewer representatives. Also, the expectations generated through Unicity were never met, possibly causing less involvement in future elections than if this change had never been attempted.

If Angus Reid's 1991 poll estimating public opinion about various municipal issues is examined, public support for future reforms is ambiguous. 68% of Winnipeg residents agree that "the system of municipal government is badly flawed", while another 68% feel that the government does not do a good job communicating with the public. However, the type of reforms these citizens would like to see are unclear. 71% of those polled feel that council is too large, and 59% agree with the statement that "political parties should not be allowed in municipal politics" (Reid, 1991). From these comments it appears that the system of government of 1991 were not pleasing to the public, but this same public disagrees about which reforms may increase communication and control.

Since 1971, there have been only two spikes in voter turnout rates, in 1983 and 1992. In 1983, the NDP offered a candidate for mayor, but lost badly to the more conservative mayoral candidate, Bill Norrie (Wichern, 1992, 2). However, the re-emergence of the NDP back into this arena may have had the effect of increasing information to voters, boosting the turnout level to over 50%.

Prior to the 1989 election, a new grassroots emerged on the scene, taking the "progressive-reform" torch from the NDP. Surprisingly, Winnipeg Into the Nineties (WIN) won eight seats in that election (Wichern, 1992, p.2). In 1992, this party again

contested local elections, and turnout rates jumped to almost 60%, the first time they have reached that level since 1971. It is too early to tell whether or not this group will stick around to compete with the traditional business party incarnations, or whether WIN is another flash-in-the-pan municipal party. However, this increase in level does conform with the hypothesis that a community-based ward system in combination with parties raises turnout considerably.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS AND VOTER TURNOUT

Graph 5.5 demonstrates a more detailed comparison of voter turnout and socio-economic status. By linking Statistics Canada data describing average family income with specific communities which roughly correspond to the 1992 ward configuration map (see appendix 5.2), areas of high and low socio-economic status were identified. Currently, one of the poorest communities in Winnipeg falls within the boundaries of the "Daniel McIntyre" ward. Families in this area had an average income of approximately $25,000 in 1991. One on the most affluent communities, with an average family income of over $80,000, corresponds to the River Heights ward. By further linking this information with voter turnout statistics from each area, turnout rates for each area were calculated between 1971 and 1992.

A comparison of voter turnout rates reveals that there is a significant difference in participation between these two communities. Graph 5.5 shows that voters in communities of high socio-economic status consistently show up in greater numbers than those in communities of lower socio-economic status. This graph also reveals that any increase in participation from the less affluent community is matched by an increase in turnout in the community of high socio-economic status.

A more detailed look at this trend shows that between 1971 and 1992 people voting in the Daniel MacIntyre ward area turned out 37% of the time, while those voting in the River Heights ward area turned out 51% of the time. The difference between these averages is 15%, but there is on a year to year basis the difference between these two

GRAPH 5.5

Voter Turnout in Communities of High and Low Socio-Economic Status (1971-1992)

Legend:
- 2 per. Mov. Avg. (Daniel MacIntyre)
- 2 per. Mov. Avg. (River Heights)
- 2 per. Mov. Avg. (City Average)

Y-axis: Turnout Percentage (0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80)

X-axis: 1971, 1974, 1977, 1980, 1983, 1986, 1989, 1992

Detailed information in Appendix 5.5

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communities could range from 4% to 28%. However, at no point did voters in Daniel McIntyre turnout in greater numbers than voters from River Heights.

As demonstrated in chapter four, these results are very similar to those found in Vancouver. On average, voters from communities of low socio-economic status in this city turned out to vote 22% less often than those from communities of high socio-economic status. This difference fluctuated greatly, ranging between 6% and 31%. Also similar to Winnipeg, turnout rates in communities of low socio-economic status in Vancouver never surpassed those in communities of high socio-economic status. These similarities help confirm the widely held notion that voters of low socio-economic status participate less often in elections than more affluent citizens.[*]

Under a community-based ward system, voters in communities of lower socio-economic status have a better opportunity to elected representatives of their choosing. If elections were based on wards which were less reflective of class divisions, such as the case in Winnipeg from 1919-1971, or in the worst case, held under an at-large system, there is a smaller chance of representatives becoming elected who reflect the wishes of poorer communities. This is because less active groups of citizens in less privileged communities would be competing head-to-head with more wealthy individuals who are more likely to vote, a disadvantage in the sense that these systems favour the largest cohesive group of voters[**]

As indicated throughout this chapter, politics in Winnipeg have been largely fought along class lines. Since the General Strike in 1919, various parties representing the working-class have contested elections in Winnipeg, electing a few councillors and mayors but achieving little success in establishing control of city council. This is probably due to

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[*] See Kleppner (1965), Shienbaum (1967),, Teixeria (1967), Eagles, et.al.(1991), Lambert (1991), Roenestone (1993), for more elaborate discussions about the connection between socio-economic status and voting behaviour.
[**] See chapter four (51-53) for a more detailed presentation of this argument.

the fact that the three-ward configuration caused the votes of those of higher socio-economic status to nullify the vote of the working class.

If the change to a community-based, multi-ward system in 1971 had remained, those of lower socio-economic status would have a better chance to elect representatives of their choosing, regardless of their levels of voting turnout. However, with the current trend of ward reduction, it is possible that ward configuration will slip back to its previous configuration. This could further reduce the representative nature of council by discriminating against those of lower socio-economic status.

CONCLUSIONS

Throughout the history of municipal elections in Winnipeg the issue of class has never been disguised. From the General Strike in 1919 until 1956, the class divisions within the city have been well represented in civic politics. In terms of voter turnout, the most consistent period of peak turnouts occurred when a grassroots labour party from within the borders of Winnipeg contested elections against municipal parties backed by business interests. In effect, more information was made available to entire the community as the labour party focused the issues for certain parts of the constituency, causing interest to rise.

This trend continued though the 1940's and into the 1950's, but to a lesser degree, when the CCF took over from the ILP. Because the CCF attempted to appeal to a broader constituency, issues were less focused, and hence voter turnout was lower. In the final period, local parties opposing business interests were not as prevalent and voter turnout dropped off. On only two occasions, when the provincial government intervened directly in municipal affairs, did this situation change; the other exceptions were when local parties came back on the scene. When the NDP ran a mayoral candidate in 1983, the presence of a party to focus information raised voter turnout. Likewise in 1992, when WIN became a legitimate voice for Winnipegers, levels also jumped.

In the early years, Winnipeg was overtly polarized by class divisions. When this class division was highlighted by local political parties, voter turnout increased because more information was available to community residents, and an avenue opened for them to express their political preferences. When this avenue was taken over by a party with a less local focus, the avenue for expression was narrowed, and turnout declined.

When this avenue disappeared, voter turnout dropped considerably, although interventions by the provincial government artificially boosted not only information to the community, but falsely raised expectations causing a brief flurry of activity. Only when legitimate local parties returned to the scene and became established did voter turnout increase again to an acceptable level.

Although the provincial governments intentions in 1971 may have been to improve citizen participation, the only real benefit from the program was a redrawing of the ward boundaries. However, subsequent governments have expanded the boundaries and reduced the number of wards in the name of efficiency. As has been demonstrated, the best way to raise voter turnout may be for grass roots to develop naturally from within the city and contest elections under a ward system which reflects real communities.

APPENDIX 5.1 - WINNIPEG ELECTION STATISTICS

Year	Population	Mayor	Turnout %	Eligible	Voted	Provincial Turnout	Federal Turnout
1902	42000	Arbuthnot	33.37	13760	4592		
1903		Arbuthnot	31.28	14722	4605	77	
1904		T.Sharpe	Acclamation				
1905	67262	T.Sharpe	33.96	19242	6535		
1906	92195	T.Sharpe	29.78	24919	7420		
1907		Ashdown	Acclamation			87	
1908		Ashdown	Incomplete				
1909		Evans	Incomplete				
1910		Evans	33.72	39938	13467	84	
1911	136035	Evans	29.18	40624	11854		
1912		Waugh	21.00	46942	9859		
1913		Deacon	Acclamation				
1914		Deacon	Acclamation			87	
1915		Waugh	Accalmation			72	
1916	203255	Waugh	19.18	54692	10488		
1917		Davidson	25.37	55310	14031		
1918		Davidson	23.68	56375	13349		
1919		Gray	48.19	58540	28212		
1920		Gray	34.10	86606	29530	76	
1921		Parnell	Acclamation				
1922		Fowler	35.22	84125	29625	72	
1923		Farmer	38.69	94505	36563		
1924	194850	Farmer	41.87	93242	39040		
1925		Webb	39.13	94780	37083		
1926		Webb	34.97	94789	33150		
1927		Webb	42.62	95526	40710	76	
1928		Mclean	Acclamation				

APPENDIX 5.1 - WINNIPEG ELECTION STATISTICS (CONT'D)

Year	Population	Mayor	Turnout %	Eligible	Voted	Provincial Turnout	Federal Turnout
1929		Mclean	35.16	97052	34120		
1930		Webb	35.17	97773	34384		60
1931		Webb	54.24	97872	53086		
1932		Webb	48.57	101489	49289	64	
1933		Webb	55.34	101998	56449		
1934	221242	Webb	53.12	103955	55216		
1935		Queen	52.74	104898	55321		77
1936		Queen	58.59	107552	63010	61	
1937		Warriner	57.31	106443	61006		
1938		Queen	59.23	102494	60707		
1939		Queen	No Election				
1940		Queen	No Election				76
1941		Queen	No Election			43	
1942		Queen	37.66	152531	57438		
1943		Coulter	No Election				
1944	228548	Coulter	45.49	143826	65425		
1945		Coulter	No Election			51	74
1946		Coulter	41.68	165868	69126		
1948		Coulter	48.89	164513	80438		
1949		Coulter	No Election			49	71
1950		Coulter	48.39	164078	79393		
1952		Coulter	54.44	162586	88515		
1953		Coulter	No Election			49	58
1954	243287	Coulter	52.76	163135	86063		
1956		G.Sharpe	57.55	163379	94032		
1957		Juba	No Election				72
1958		Juba	43.57	162937	70995	51	78

APPENDIX 5.1 - WINNIPEG ELECTION STATISTICS (CONT'D)

Year	Population	Mayor	Turnout %	Eligible	Voted	Provincial Turnout	Federal Turnout
1959		Juba	No Election			57	
1960		Juba	37.81	162646	61497		
1962	255786	Juba	48.46	158902	77000	51	76
1963		Juba	No Election				77
1965		Juba	No Election				73
1966	257005	Juba	33.29	151884	50567	58	
1967		Juba	No Election				
1968		Juba	42.55	152443	64857		76
1969		Juba	No Election			58	
1970		Juba	No Election				
1971	540260	Juba	60.70				
1972		Juba	No Election				73
1973		Juba	No Election			76	
1974		Juba	34.90				71
1977		Steen	40.10			72	
1979		Norrie	No Election				64
1980	564500	Norrie	38.80				67
1981		Norrie	No Election			74	
1983		Norrie	52.60				
1984		Norrie	No Election				73
1986	594600	Norrie	34.40			69	
1988		Norrie	No Election			77	76
1989		Norrie	34.70				
1990		Norrie	No Election			71	
1992	610300	Thompson	58.40				
1993		Thompson	No Election				67

Sources
Population - Statistics Canada and Artibise, 1977: 202.
Mayors - City Clerks Records
Municipal Voter Turnout Information - Winnipeg City Clerks and Wichern, 1984: 19.
Provincial Voting Information - British Columbia Chief Electoral Officer
Federal Voting Information - Chief Electoral Officer

APPENDIX 5.2

City of Winnipeg
Community Committee and Ward Boundaries

Ville de Winnipeg
Délimitation des districts et des quartiers électoraux

— Community Committee Boundary
— Electoral Ward Boundary

— Limite des districts
— Limite des quartiers électoraux

1 - City Centre Community / District du Centre-ville
2 - Assiniboia Community / District d'Assiniboia
3 - Lord Selkirk - West Kildonan Community / District de Lord-Selkirk - Kildonan-Ouest
4 - East Kildonan - Transcona Community / District de Kildonan-Est - Transcona
5 - Riel Community / District de Riel

APPENDIX 5.3

Information for Graph 5.5

Year	Daniel McIntyre	River Heights	City Average	Difference
1971	43	71	61	28
1974	27	44	35	17
1977	34	50	40	16
1980	37	44	39	8
1983	43	57	53	14
1986	32	36	34	4
1989	28	44	35	16
1992	49	63	58	14
Avg.	37	51	44	15

Appendix 5.3 gives voting turnout for communities in Winnipeg mayoralty elections from 1971-1992. Daniel McIntyre represents a community of low socio-economic status, while River Heights is a ward with high socio-economic status. Since 1971, ward sizes and numbers have changed. In years prior to 1992, these areas were divided into a number of wards, but were amalgamated into one each. This chart uses the current ward names for descriptive purposes, and averages wards from past systems to enable a longitudinal comparison.

The final column gives the difference between these areas by year. Data was collected from comparing voting results from Winnipeg City Clerk documents and socio-economic data compiled by Statistics Canada. All figures have been rounded to the nearest whole number.

CHAPTER 6 - CONCLUSIONS

At first glance, it may appear as if municipal institutions in Vancouver and Winnipeg have developed along fairly different tracks. Local government structures have changed very little in Vancouver, with the only major institutional alteration coming in 1935 when elections went from being held under a community-based ward system to at-large contests. In Winnipeg, there have been many changes. Although the city has always held elections using wards, the number and configuration of these wards has shifted considerably since 1919.

On the surface, the political history of both cities may also seem quite different. Winnipeg has a very colourful history of class conflict which has translated directly to municipal and provincial politics. Stemming from the General Strike in 1919, divisions between labour and business have been well represented in political parties at both levels. Vancouver's class politics have never been as overt as those in Winnipeg. However this does not mean that class divisions have or do not exist in Vancouver. The reality is that these cities are more similar in nature than they initially appear.

As the data presented in this thesis illustrate, socio-economic status can play a large role in determining who votes. People of low socio-economic status appear to turn out less frequently than those of higher socio-economic status. This discrepancy can have a striking effect on who becomes elected to office, depending on the electoral system by which elections are contested.

Vancouver's at-large system, which favours candidates appealing to the most cohesive voting group, discriminates the most against voters of low socio-economic status. Because this group turns out in smaller numbers than those of high socio-economic status, if those from wealthy communities vote for one group of candidates, and those from poorer communities vote for another set of candidates, the candidates who appeal to those of high socio-economic status almost always win. As reflected through the success of the pro-business and development Non-Partisan Association, this has been the case in

Vancouver since 1935, almost without exception Parities who have fought to change to a ward system have so far been unsuccessful.

Although there have been contested elections under a ward system in Winnipeg since 1873, these wards have not always been based on communities of high and low-socio economic status. After the General Strike in 1919, until Unicity in 1971, Winnipeg was broken into three multi-member wards. Although elections were not held at-large, this ward configuration almost generated the same effect. The votes of those of lower socio-economic status were still considerably dispersed, allowing the interests of high socio-economic status to dominate council. The Unicity reforms in 1971 temporarily remedied this institutional discrimination, increasing the number of wards from three to fifty, and basing these wards on actual communities. However over the last quarter-century these reforms have been altered considerably, and the number of wards in Winnipeg has dropped to fifteen.

It is clear that in both these cities, electoral systems have been constructed to favour those of high socio-economic status. Reformers have had little success in altering the system. Most efforts in Vancouver have come from local municipal parties, such as the Committee/Coalition of Progressive Electors, while most reforms in Winnipeg have come from various provincial NDP governments. Reform attempts in both provinces have been less than successful, although Winnipeg's current ward system is less discriminatory toward those of lower socio-economic class.

On the average, voter turnout in mayoral elections in Vancouver and Winnipeg, is lower than federal and provincial turnouts. Also, many European countries have higher participation rates at the local level, although voters in the United States are less apt to participate in municipal elections than citizens in both Vancouver and Winnipeg. Turnout rates have averaged about 36% in Vancouver mayoral elections since 1986, while they have averaged about 42% in Winnipeg since 1902. Although some specific elections have ranged between 50% and 60%, these averages are below acceptable levels.

In both cities, special events, such as the incorporation of the city, or grand institutional changes, such as amalgamations with other municipalities, have served to increase voter turnout. However, this increase is very fleeting and does not serve to increase voter turnout over the long-term. At best, these increases in voter turnout indicate that higher levels are achievable. Also in both cities, overall turnout in municipal elections has gradually increased, even though the population density has also grown considerably over the last century.

It appears that only when municipal parties contest elections under community-based ward systems do voters get involved at an significant rate. Groups who oppose pro-business, status-quo municipal parties and attempt to reform the system by gaining local office have been fairly unsuccessful. In both cities, local parties of this nature have captured the attention of the electorate by focusing and increasing the amount of information available to the public, but these parties have had very limited success and usually have short life spans. However, only when polarized parties contest elections does voter interest, and subsequently participation, increase. When elections contested under community-based ward systems coincide with a polarized party system, voter turnout in both cities has been high and consistent.

These observations lead to the conclusion that institutional changes may be needed in order to encourage more citizen participation in civic elections. More specifically, it is possible that if both cities had an electoral system with a reasonable number of community-based wards, and parties were encouraged to actively contest elections, voter turnout may not only increase, but representatives may better reflect the wishes of constituents. However, chances of these changes occurring in the near future are slim.

In Vancouver, the general "hands-off" policy practiced by the provincial government means that changes may have to come from reformers at the local level. However, as indicated by election results, these reformers are impeded by a

discriminatory electoral system and the NPA, a powerful party dedicated to the status-quo. This presents a "catch-22" where in order to change a discriminatory system, reformers will have to beat the odds and win elections under this same system. However, if this goal is achieved, the changes will probably be long-lived, virtually immune from provincial interference.

If reformers obtain their long-time goal and control council, they should institute two changes. First, and most obvious, to increases participation rates, Vancouver should be changed from an at-large to a ward system. These wards should be sufficiently numerous, proportional to the population, and reflect the nature of the city's communities. Second, a party support network should be put in place where these groups are guaranteed funding or citizen's tax breaks in order that they maintain themselves through hard times and be able to wage effective political campaigns. Both these measures could go a long way to ensure high turnouts in municipal elections.

In Winnipeg, reforms may come from two directions. As has happened in the past, if an NDP government is elected at the provincial level, they may opt to once again alter the system, making it more participatory in nature. These changes may include increasing the number of wards. However, this may not be the most desirable way to alter the governmental structure, as it opens the door for any subsequent provincial government to change the municipal system to be less participatory.

The second way that changes may be achieved is if a local party gains control of the municipal government and rallies public opinion to call for a response to grass-roots concerns. This process may take longer, but may better insulate the municipality from arbitrary changes from the provincial level. Reforms in Winnipeg could mimic those suggested for Vancouver. A system of community-based wards, with a support network for municipal parties may be changes which would best encourage public participation in elections.

Increasing public participation in municipal elections to consistently high levels may be essential to ensuring local politicians stay accountable to the public. If their actions and policy decisions are closely scrutinized by the public, this may cause politicians to create policy based on the wishes of citizens, rather than following some other agenda. However, what may be necessary is to convince the public that although municipal issues may not be as glamorous as politics at other governmental levels, they are still "political". Until this point there has been a strong, and somewhat successful, attempt by those in power to mask this connection. This may be the biggest hurdle to clear if local government is to become more democratic.

Voter Turnout in Vancouver Mayoral Elections 1958-1993, Poll by Poll

Poll Number	12/10/58	12/14/60	12/12/62	12/9/64	12/14/66	12/11/68	12/09/70	12/13/72	11/20/74	11/17/76
Overall	32	36	44	40	35	44	45	32	32	36
1A	28	31	42	39	34	48	53	37	38	35
1B	32	27	35	40	37	43	45	33	34	33
1C	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	36	35	24	21	40
1D	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	37
1E	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	26
2	24	26	33	27	22	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
2A	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	35	41	25	23	29
2B	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	31	38	24	24	28
3	24	28	31	26	25	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
3A	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	35	41	23	24	25
3B	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	33	31	22	21	29
4	25	28	34	25	25	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
4A	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	33	35	23	22	36
4B	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	33	38	24	24	26
4C	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	34	39	24	25	25
5	26	30	32	28	26	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
5A	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	28	34	21	18	23
5B	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	35	41	24	26	28
5C	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	33	40	29	26	38
6	25	25	30	26	22	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
6A	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	28	29	17	17	26

6B	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	27	29	20	13	23
6C	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	40	43	30	15	n/a
7	27	28	33	29	30	34	35	30	21	23
8	22	28	30	29	27	21	23	14	11	21
9	18	21	22	19	16	21	24	19	18	24
10	21	30	29	24	27	31	25	23	17	22
11	17	25	28	23	20	25	31	21	18	25
12	13	24	28	25	21	25	31	21	17	20
13	21	24	26	27	23	26	30	19	17	24
14	22	24	30	26	32	28	29	19	16	25
15	23	27	29	25	23	26	26	15	17	19
16A	36	40	47	46	42	52	52	34	35	39
16B	30	35	40	38	33	42	46	29	27	29
17	31	37	41	40	36	42	42	27	31	33
18	33	38	44	39	39	42	46	27	29	33
19	39	38	47	45	39	45	44	31	33	39
20	32	34	40	38	38	42	44	25	28	32
21	29	33	48	46	43	30	53	33	36	35
22	30	28	41	36	37	44	46	25	30	29
23	26	31	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	39
23A	n/a	n/a	46	44	41	46	47	34	33	39
23B	n/a	n/a	46	43	39	47	43	29	28	30
23C	n/a	n/a	41	38	33	44	41	26	26	31
24	29	34	41	38	32	44	45	29	31	33
25	27	30	36	35	33	43	42	n/a	n/a	n/a
25A	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	29	26	30

25B	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	28	29	31
26	30	35	42	37	33	44	44	29	31	33
27	29	33	42	40	35	44	46	27	21	31
28A	30	39	46	42	40	48	49	30	32	34
28B	n/a	36	47	40	38	45	45	29	27	34
29	29	31	39	35	32	41	39	24	24	26
30	29	38	44	39	35	45	45	32	29	33
31	38	41	44	39	35	46	46	28	30	34
32	33	45	46	42	35	47	47	34	30	37
33	28	33	40	37	31	43	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
33A	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	45	29	29	33
33B	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	51	35	36	40
33C	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	49	30	31	36
33D	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	44	27	29	33
34	35	50	52	49	39	51	52	27	24	28
35	23	28	29	30	26	30	33	17	13	18
36	23	28	33	30	26	33	34	21	24	24
37	23	27	28	29	25	28	28	15	17	n/a
37A	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	18
37B	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	22
38	23	29	34	31	27	31	33	18	19	17
39	21	24	33	28	27	30	31	19	19	25
40	26	29	38	32	30	34	34	22	21	15
41	31	38	45	39	37	42	44	27	31	32
42	27	28	37	35	29	39	37	22	23	26
43	34	39	44	39	34	40	41	28	29	31

44A	33	40	43	44	35	44	44	28	29	34
44B	26	31	40	36	31	36	37	24	24	26
45	30	33	46	37	n/a	n/a	n/a	31	31	34
46	27	32	41	36	30	39	40	25	24	30
47	33	38	45	40	33	38	42	27	28	31
48	32	40	44	40	34	45	44	28	35	34
49	39	40	47	43	39	43	44	30	30	34
50A	30	35	43	39	36	44	45	32	35	37
50B	37	41	55	49	45	53	51	36	35	38
50C	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	61	45	44	48
51	32	32	45	42	35	47	45	30	28	35
52	33	37	46	42	34	40	46	n/a	n/a	n/a
52A	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	33	34	39
52B	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	28	36	37
52C	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	34	35	35
53	31	33	43	39	33	40	41	30	30	37
54	31	33	43	40	36	42	44	28	28	28
55	27	34	42	37	33	46	47	30	31	34
56	28	26	37	32	29	39	45	28	27	n/a
56A	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	30
56B	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	32
57	28	29	34	34	30	40	40	28	25	n/a
57A	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	27
57B	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	38
58	27	28	35	29	24	32	38	24	21	27
59	20	24	31	30	34	49	40	32	18	32

60	27	32	39	36	32	42	44	31	31	35
61	29	37	44	41	39	46	47	31	33	37
62	28	30	41	39	34	44	46	31	34	34
63	24	24	30	27	22	34	33	23	21	25
64	24	24	30	27	24	30	33	19	16	n/a
64A	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	16
64B	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	42
65	42	47	61	56	50	62	63	46	47	54
66	34	41	51	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
66A	n/a	n/a	n/a	55	46	62	64	50	49	51
66B	n/a	n/a	n/a	37	34	40	44	31	29	37
66C	n/a	n/a	n/a	51	50	56	63	49	44	50
67	32	35	46	39	31	38	45	29	26	33
68	39	44	58	54	45	55	57	43	41	46
69	41	44	60	52	45	56	58	47	43	46
70	46	48	67	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
70A	n/a	n/a	n/a	59	49	63	57	46	40	44
70B	n/a	n/a	n/a	64	58	69	67	53	46	54
70C	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	67	56	52	57
70D	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	64	53	48	53
70E	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	64	50	41	47
71	43	44	56	43	43	54	52	37	35	37
72	45	54	69	60	53	69	69	53	51	54
73	42	44	63	58	51	65	65	53	50	49
74	37	43	60	56	43	60	54	38	34	34
75	37	44	58	51	44	53	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a

75A	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	47	30	31	37
75B	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	56	40	39	45
76	26	29	37	31	25	31	34	20	22	24
77	44	50	59	58	53	65	67	51	52	59
78	31	31	39	37	33	43	45	33	33	38
79	31	33	43	37	33	45	48	30	30	33
80	32	35	44	39	32	45	49	32	30	35
81	43	47	61	53	49	57	64	47	44	50
82	38	43	56	48	42	58	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
82A	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	60	44	41	49
82B	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	56	44	41	50
83	38	41	52	47	45	52	58	42	37	43
84	41	53	63	56	48	63	63	49	46	52
85	39	47	58	52	45	56	58	41	43	45
86	43	59	62	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
86A	n/a	n/a	n/a	61	52	64	67	51	50	55
86B	n/a	n/a	n/a	58	53	62	64	48	45	49
87	46	54	63	59	49	61	68	51	50	57
88	47	55	64	60	50	66	64	50	45	47
89&90	47	53	64	60	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
89	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	49	65	64	48	46	51
90	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	52	66	65	54	48	56

Poll Number	11/15/78	11/15/80	11/20/82	11/17/84	11/15/86	11/17/90	11/20/93
Overall	38	37	42	49	49	55	35
1A	46	47	43	55	56	54	41
1B	34	33	38	50	48	47	30
1C	40	43	40	53	52	54	34
1D	37	41	40	51	51	49	31
1E	29	28	34	49	n/a	n/a	n/a
2A	34	34	38	46	43	43	27
2B	33	35	36	42	46	45	25
3A	35	36	35	41	46	44	24
3B	33	35	37	45	46	39	22
4A	44	46	44	53	49	52	32
4B	31	30	30	30	34	36	18
4C	28	27	n/a	n\a	n/a	n/a	n/a
5A	28	28	30	33	41	38	25
5B	28	33	36	43	42	45	29
5C	41	35	38	40	43	41	25
6A	29	33	34	42	42	44	27
6B	28	31	31	35	35	39	26
7	24	24	28	33	25	36	32
8	17	19	20	30	n/a	n/a	n/a
9	22	24	29	30	35	50	32
10	25	23	39	47	44	53	36
11	28	28	38	44	43	56	37
12	25	22	34	38	40	56	36

13	23	22	30	39	48	42	25
14	23	26	27	42	47	49	32
15A	28	28	27	40	45	48	31
15B	24	22	29	38	36	45	24
15C	33	31	40	46	n/a	n/a	n/a
16A	39	40	42	50	59	54	32
16B	33	36	43	53	48	57	39
17	38	35	41	52	52	55	32
18A	36	38	40	48	42	52	32
18B	36	35	40	52	48	50	28
19	41	37	40	47	44	50	34
20	33	38	40	47	44	49	32
21	38	41	45	50	48	59	36
22	31	35	38	46	44	51	28
23A	40	40	42	51	47	53.5	31
23B	34	35	38	46	46	52	31
23C	31	33	38	45	45	55	36
24	37	40	46	50	48	56	36
25A	35	39	40	49	45	51	34
25B	32	32	43	46	46	50	31
26	34	36	39	47	45	49	30
27	31	30	34	46	42	47	27
28A	33	35	41	50	42	49	34
28B	34	35	43	47	45	56	34
29	29	27	29	37	35	45	28
30	35	35	41	47	46	50	32

31	33	36	43	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
31A	n/a	n/a	n/a	46	45	46	37
31B	n/a	n/a	n/a	45	46	53	35
32	37	38	41	51	46	53	33
33A	35	36	42	47	44	49	30
33B	43	40	43	52	49	55	39
33C	37	38	42	48	48	57	36
33D	35	35	41	47	45	48	31
34	30	32	36	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
34A	n/a	n/a	n/a	50	45	47	31
34B	n/a	n/a	n/a	43	44	44	29
35	27	24	27	41	36	42	26
36	27	31	33	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
36A	n/a	n/a	n/a	47	46	47	25
36B	n/a	n/a	n/a	43	46	45	27
37A	21	22	27	33	36	41	24
37B	22	26	27	34	n/a	n/a	n/a
38	21	18	24	30	31	37	20
39	29	28	27	37	40	48	28
40	27	28	32	42	37	46	26
41	33	34	39	50	48	53	31
42	28	30	36	45	41	51	32
43A	32	35	34	42	43	46	30
43B	31	32	35	48	47	53	35
44A	34	33	39	47	42	52	32
44B	30	30	36	49	41	50	33

45	35	37	37	45	48	56	37
46	31	34	36	46	44	53	38
47	33	33	39	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
47A	n/a	n/a	n/a	52	49	60	36
47B	n/a	n/a	n/a	45	42	48	30
48	35	37	42	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
48A	n/a	n/a	n/a	50	46	48	33
48B	n/a	n/a	n/a	52	49	55	40
49	35	36	44	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
49A	n/a	n/a	n/a	51	46	48	30
49B	n/a	n/a	n/a	53	44	51	35
50A	40	37	42	51	46	50	34
50B	42	40	44	50	49	51	40
50C	49	46	50	32	55	55	42
51	35	36	42	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
51A	n/a	n/a	n/a	48	44	52	32
51B	n/a	n/a	n/a	52	46	50	34
52A	37	38	42	49	45	52	35
52B	36	39	42	48	45	51	41
52C	36	35	41	49	46	52	37
53	32	31	38	42	46	50	38
54	33	31	40	49	46	48	36
55	33	35	38	48	45	47	33
56A	34	36	34	45	49	48	31
56B	38	40	36	47	46	44	29
57A	29	29	35	42	40	41	24

57B	40	39	40	47	48	48	32
58	33	35	37	45	44	44	28
59	34	35	36	47	46	46	29
60	38	37	41	49	52	49	33
61	40	41	41	50	48	44	32
62	37	40	42	49	51	45	25
63	26	31	33	41	47	40	26
64A	18	19	22	32	34	39	24
64B	29	25	28	35	37	43	30
64C	44	41	44	51	50	49	33
65	53	54	57	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
65A	n/a	n/a	n/a	65	64	63	46
65B	n/a	n/a	n/a	63	61	59	45
66A	49	50	52	61	57	54	37
66B	36	36	37	46	48	47	46
66C	48	46	55	60	59	61	n/a
67	32	33	36	44	42	47	34
68	51	58	36	n/a	n/a	n/a	45
68A	n/a	n/a	n/a	55	57	58	n/a
68B	n/a	n/a	n/a	61	65	59	n/a
69	48	50	51	56	57	58	43
70A	44	38	47	51	55	53	42
70B	53	47	55	57	62	61	45
70C	55	48	56	59	62	59	45
70D	52	48	55	58	60	61	49
70E	46	43	46	54	60	56	44

71	35	35	39	47	48	51	35
72	52	49	57	61	60	60	49
73	49	51	55	58	61	60	45
74	38	34	40	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
74A	n/a	n/a	n/a	43	44	43	34
74B	n/a	n/a	n/a	53	55	58	40
75A	35	35	39	47	46	50	28
75B	44	43	47	54	44	51	38
76	26	23	32	35	37	n/a	21
76A	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	29	n/a
76B	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	36	n/a
77	56	49	53	62	65	59	48
78	37	40	41	53	54	51	35
79	39	38	40	51	51	50	34
80	37	37	38	50	49	51	35
81	50	50	51	60	62	59	40
82A	49	47	52	61	60	60	46
82B	48	48	51	55	57	59	40
83	44	44	50	56	53	54	37
84	53	51	56	60	62	62	48
85	48	48	49	55	55	57	41
86A	55	51	55	42	62	60	49
86B	52	46	52	58	62	61	47
86C	n/a	n/a	n/a	65	65	61	48
87	59	56	60	63	69	65	54
88	49	45	50	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a

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88A	n/a	n/a	n/a	63	64	62	51
88B	n/a	n/a	n/a	54	56	65	47
89	51	48	55	59	60	60	44
90	54	48	54	60	64	63	51

The figures offered in this appendix are a compilation of voter turnout percentages from 1958-1993 by individual polls. Information is from Vancouver City Clerk's Department, and rounded to the nearest whole number. The figures for 1988 have not been included due to inaccurate calculations by the Vancouver's City Clerk's Department. When polls have been split or combined "n/a" has been inserted to indicate this change.

APPENDIX 2

Vancouver Polls, 1992.

Polling Districts
City of Vancouver
and
School District 39

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
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