



National Library
of Canada

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services Branch

Direction des acquisitions et
des services bibliographiques

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0N4

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa (Ontario)
K1A 0N4

Yours faithfully,
/s/ [Signature]

Yours faithfully,
/s/ [Signature]

NOTICE

AVIS

The quality of this microform is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

La qualité de cette microforme dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise au microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

S'il manque des pages, veuillez communiquer avec l'université qui a conféré le grade.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us an inferior photocopy.

La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer, surtout si les pages originales ont été dactylographiées à l'aide d'un ruban usé ou si l'université nous a fait parvenir une photocopie de qualité inférieure.

Reproduction in full or in part of this microform is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30, and subsequent amendments.

La reproduction, même partielle, de cette microforme est soumise à la Loi canadienne sur le droit d'auteur, SRC 1970, c. C-30, et ses amendements subséquents.

**A NEW, MORE IDIOGRAPHIC TECHNIQUE FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF ETHNIC AND
GENERAL PREJUDICE**

Sven van de Wetering

B. Sc., The University of British Columbia, 1983

B.A., Concordia University, 1992

**THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE
DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS
in the Department
of
PSYCHOLOGY**

© Sven van de Wetering 1994

SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY

November 1994

**All rights reserved. This work may not be reproduced in whole or in part,
by photocopy or other means, without the permission of the author.**



National Library
of Canada

Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services Branch

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0N4

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Direction des acquisitions et
des services bibliographiques

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa (Ontario)
K1A 0N4

Your file / Votre référence

Our file / Notre référence

**THE AUTHOR HAS GRANTED AN
IRREVOCABLE NON-EXCLUSIVE
LICENCE ALLOWING THE NATIONAL
LIBRARY OF CANADA TO
REPRODUCE, LOAN, DISTRIBUTE OR
SELL COPIES OF HIS/HER THESIS BY
ANY MEANS AND IN ANY FORM OR
FORMAT, MAKING THIS THESIS
AVAILABLE TO INTERESTED
PERSONS.**

**L'AUTEUR A ACCORDE UNE LICENCE
IRREVOCABLE ET NON EXCLUSIVE
PERMETTANT A LA BIBLIOTHEQUE
NATIONALE DU CANADA DE
REPRODUIRE, PRETER, DISTRIBUER
OU VENDRE DES COPIES DE SA
THESE DE QUELQUE MANIERE ET
SOUS QUELQUE FORME QUE CE SOIT
POUR METTRE DES EXEMPLAIRES DE
CETTE THESE A LA DISPOSITION DES
PERSONNE INTERESSEES.**

**THE AUTHOR RETAINS OWNERSHIP
OF THE COPYRIGHT IN HIS/HER
THESIS. NEITHER THE THESIS NOR
SUBSTANTIAL EXTRACTS FROM IT
MAY BE PRINTED OR OTHERWISE
REPRODUCED WITHOUT HIS/HER
PERMISSION.**

**L'AUTEUR CONSERVE LA PROPRIETE
DU DROIT D'AUTEUR QUI PROTEGE
SA THESE. NI LA THESE NI DES
EXTRAITS SUBSTANTIELS DE CELLE-
CI NE DOIVENT ETRE IMPRIMES OU
AUTREMENT REPRODUITS SANS SON
AUTORISATION.**

ISBN 0-612-06840-4

Canada

APPROVAL

Name : Sven Gerald van de Wetering
Degree : Master of Arts
Title of
Project : A NEW, MORE IDIOGRAPHIC TECHNIQUE FOR THE ASSESSMENT
OF ETHNIC AND GENERAL PREJUDICE

Examining Committee:

Chair: S. Hart

A. Paranjpe
Senior Supervisor

C. McFarland

D. Lehman
External Examiner
Department of Psychology
University of British Columbia

Date Approved: 30 November 1994

PARTIAL COPYRIGHT LICENSE

I hereby grant to Simon Fraser University the right to lend my thesis, project or extended essay (the title of which is shown below) to users of the Simon Fraser University Library, and to make partial or single copies only for such users or in response to a request from the library of any other university, or other educational institution, on its own behalf or for one of its users. I further agree that permission for multiple copying of this work for scholarly purposes may be granted by me or the Dean of Graduate Studies. It is understood that copying or publication of this work for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

Title of Thesis/Project/Extended Essay

A New, More Idiographic Technique for the Assessment of

Ethnic and General Prejudice

Author:

(signature)

Sven Gerald van de Wetering

(name)

9 Dec 1994
(date)

ABSTRACT

A new means of assessing prejudice was developed based on the IMIS of Zavalloni & Louis-Guerin (1984). This method basically involves asking respondents to list a number of different ingroups and the corresponding outgroups, then listing a number of attributes which they impute to each of those groups, then making value judgements about those attributes. Prejudice for any particular type (e.g. ethnic) of group was then assessed by comparing the mean positivity of ingroup attributes to that of outgroup attributes. In study 1, the test was administered to 58 subjects, along with the Manitoba Prejudice Scale (MPS), the Collective Self-Esteem Scale (CSE), and the Positive Affect and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS). Ethnic difference scores were found to be highly positively correlated with the MPS, but not significantly correlated with the CSE or the PANAS. In study 2, the test-retest reliability of the ethnic attribute difference scores, assessed for a sample of 59 subjects was .64, indicating that this may be a psychometrically adequate new measure of prejudice that avoids some of the cultural biases of existing scales.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My most heartfelt thanks must go to the people who participated in this investigation by filling out questionnaires. I presume that each one of them is the most important person in her/his personal universe, yet each gave of her/his time and energy in order to fill the less than glorious social role of experimental subject. Thank you all.

I would like to thank my supervisor, Anand Paranjpe, for his intellectual assistance at virtually every stage of this enterprise. Thanks are also due to Cathy McFarland for her incisive comments on both the thesis proposal and an earlier draft of this thesis.

My thanks go to the support staff at the SFU Psychology Department who frequently assisted me in various ways. I am particularly thankful to Bev Davino, Christine Medford, Lorie Tarcea, Joan Wolfe, and Joanne Finlay, without whose instrumental assistance I would have had much greater difficulties.

Finally, I would like to thank Birgit Giesser, who has played no direct role at all in the creation of this thesis, but without whose emotional support I would undoubtedly have uttered many a wail of despair.

CONTENTS

Abstract.....	iii
Acknowledgements.....	iv
Contents.....	v
List of Tables.....	vi
Chapter 1: Introduction.....	1
Chapter 2: Study 1: Validation of the modified IMIS as a measure of prejudice.....	29
Chapter 3: Study 2: Assessment of test-retest reliabilities.....	51
Chapter 4: Factor analysis of the combined data from studies 1 and 2.....	59
Chapter 5: General discussion and conclusions.....	63
References.....	69
Appendix A: Measures used in study 1.....	74
Appendix B: Supplementary data from study 1.....	99
Appendix C: Measure used in study 2.....	104

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Means, Standard Deviations, and Extreme Values of Global Difference Scores.....	36
Table 2: Means, Standard Deviations, and Extreme Values of Attribute Difference Scores.....	38
Table 3: Intercorrelations of Some Key Variables of Study 1 with Ethnic Difference and Rank Scores.....	39
Table 4: Correlations of Total and Ethnic Difference Scores with the Four Subscales of the Collective Self-Esteem Scale.....	40
Table 5: Intercorrelations of Global Difference Scores, Attribute Difference Scores, and Ranked Importances to Identity.....	42
Table 6: Intercorrelations of Global Difference Scores among Different Group Types.....	43
Table 7: Intercorrelations of Attribute Difference Scores among Different Group Types.....	45
Table 8: Means, Standard Deviations, and Two-Week Test-Retest Reliabilities of Global Difference Scores.....	53
Table 9: Means, Standard Deviations, and Two-Week Test-Retest Reliabilities of Attribute Difference Scores.....	54
Table 10: Sources of Change in Ethnic Attribute Difference Scores for 15 Subjects.....	55
Table 11: Summary of the First Five Factors Extracted from Seven Global and Seven Attribute Difference Scores.....	60
Table B1: Means and Standard Deviations of Rank Scores.....	99
Table B2: Means and Standard Deviations of the Manitoba Prejudice Scale, the Collective Self-Esteem Scale, and the Positive Affect and Negative Affect Scales.....	100
Table B3: Correlations of Nonethnic Global Difference Scores with the MPS, the CSE, and the PA and NA.....	101
Table B4: Correlations of Nonethnic Attribute Difference Scores with the MPS, the CSE, and the PA and NA.....	102
Table B5: Correlations of Rank Scores with the MPS, the CSE, and the PA and NA.....	103

Chapter 1

Introduction

Opening Remarks

Prejudice and intolerance of ethnic outgroups is a dangerous and growing problem in much of the world today. It manifests itself in the rise of extreme nationalist movements, in ethnically motivated violence, and in virtually all of the myriad small wars that presently pock the planet. Understanding this phenomenon would appear to be an important goal for anyone attempting to find means of controlling this sort of violence.

In this first, introductory chapter, a number of topics will be covered. First, the literature on previous techniques for assessing ethnic prejudice will be reviewed. The weaknesses of these approaches will then be briefly discussed, followed by an outline of a possible alternative approach. Two areas of research which are particularly germane to this new approach, namely that on the generality of prejudice and that on social identity theory, will be briefly discussed. Finally, the present study will be briefly described, and its hypotheses made explicit.

Literature Review

General Works

A number of books have attempted to summarize the massive body of research in this area. The most famous of these is Allport's (1954) The nature of prejudice. Allport identifies six major approaches to the study of prejudice. These approaches are the historical, sociocultural, situational, personality dynamics and structure, phenomenological, and

stimulus object approaches. The historical approach (which focuses primarily on the history of relations between groups) falls somewhat outside the domain of what is usually considered psychology. The stimulus object approach (i.e. the examination of actual differences between ethnic groups which might lead to prejudices) is more of an anthropological approach than a psychological one, and carries the burden of being politically volatile. Phenomenology (the examination of the inner thoughts and feelings which are related to prejudice) also has a bad name among many modern psychologists, but much of what Allport placed under this heading can now be considered under the new heading of "cognitive processes underlying prejudice."

One of the most recent surveys of psychological research in prejudice, Duckitt's (1992) The social psychology of prejudice, introduces a new classification scheme, taking into account the developments of the intervening 38 years. Duckitt does not unambiguously define his use of the term "prejudice," but writes with approval of the definition of prejudice as a negative intergroup attitude, where "attitude" refers to some sort of global evaluation, e.g. along a good/bad continuum. Duckitt identifies four major approaches to the study of prejudice. The first of these approaches consists of examining psychological fundamentals of prejudice (e.g., in basic categorization processes). The second approach examines the social transmission of prejudiced attitudes. The third approach attempts to explain prejudice in terms of social and intergroup dynamics. The final approach which Duckitt identifies consists of attempts to link prejudice with personality and individual differences. With the possible exception of the first, all of these approaches assume that not all people are equally prejudiced; indeed the level of prejudice

should be an important dependent variable in studies which try to assess the effects of differing types of attitude transmission, differing sets of interindividual and intergroup relationships, and differing personality types, respectively. Because this variable is so important, it is also very important to have powerful assessment techniques to measure levels of prejudice.

Prejudice Measurement Instruments: A Brief History

Early Approaches. Given the importance for all these approaches of assessing degree of prejudice, it is not surprising that the development of instruments intended to measure levels of prejudice has a long history. One of the earliest attempts to develop such an instrument is Bogardus's (1925) social distance scale. This scale assesses neither negative stereotypes (i.e. beliefs that members of these groups possess specific negative characteristics) nor negative attitudes (i.e. generalized dislike of the group), but rather the degree to which respondents were willing to achieve varying degrees of social closeness with members of a given racial or ethnic group. It should be borne in mind that this scale was developed at a time when the majority of white Americans, including many social psychologists (e.g. Floyd Allport), still believed that prejudice against blacks was to some extent justified by (among other things) blacks' inferior intelligence (Milner, 1981).

Another early approach to prejudice, exemplified by Guilford (1931), consisted of presenting respondents with large numbers of pairs of ethnic groups, and asking them which member of each pair the respondent would prefer to admit to the United States as a fellow citizen. The number of times each ethnic group was preferred to another group was then divided

by the total number of times that ethnic group appeared on the questionnaire, thus yielding the proportion of times each ethnic group was preferred. Guilford's primary justification for his initial study was that the topic of racial preferences was subject to considerable sociological inquiry, but that such preferences were only being assessed by means of very crude scales. Guilford explicitly put the social distance scale in this category of "crude scales."

It would appear that Guilford's method of pairwise comparisons would allow no basis for judging which respondents are most and least prejudiced, because respondents are forced to make a choice between a preferred and a less preferred group. Nevertheless, Guilford addressed the possibility that his technique can be used to measure differences in levels of tolerance between reasonably homogeneous groups of subjects. The reasoning is as follows: if all the subjects in a group are highly tolerant of all outgroups, then the probability that any given subject will prefer any given outgroup to any other outgroup is around 50%. In a large group of subjects, this should lead to all groups being rated roughly equally. Guilford rejected this reasoning, because this equality of ratings of different outgroups could just as easily correspond to heterogeneity in the opinions of the members of the group (e.g. half the members of the group violently hate Japanese, the other half violently hate Jews, giving the net result that these two groups are rated very similarly). Thus, this measure is not useful for assessing differences in overall levels of prejudice, either between individuals or between groups.

The E-scale. Probably the most famous of the measures developed to measure individual differences in prejudice is the E-scale (ethnocentrism scale) of Adorno et al. (1950), which consists of 34 statements. Most of

these statements are derogatory, stereotypical statements about several ethnic groups (including Japanese, blacks, European refugees, Germans, Mexicans, Filipinos and "zootsuiters") which were widely disliked by white, middle-class inhabitants of California. An example of such a statement is "The Negroes would solve many of their social problems by not being so irresponsible, lazy, and ignorant." A few statements of an intensely patriotic nature were also included, for example "Patriotism and loyalty are the first and most important requirements of a good citizen," as well as a number which are generally xenophobic, such as, "The most vicious, irresponsible, and racketeering unions are, in most cases, those having largely foreigners for leaders." Respondents were asked to state their degree of agreement or disagreement with these statements on a Likert-type scale. These scores could then be summed to create an overall index of prejudice. Of the many instruments designed to assess prejudice, the E-scale was the first to explicitly assume that people differ in their overall levels of prejudice.

The E-scale has a number of problems, including the fact that all items are worded in the same direction (i.e. agreement always indicates a high degree of prejudice), creating the possibility that response sets, rather than prejudiced attitudes, might produce high scores. Two of the authors of The Authoritarian Personality (Levinson & Sanford, 1944) have justified the procedure of unidirectional items for the case of the Anti-Semitism Scale, claiming that the psychometric problems with unidirectional items are slight, and are outweighed by the advantage which accrues because negatively worded items tending to be more discriminating (i.e. there is a larger difference between the way that unprejudiced individuals and the way that prejudiced individuals respond

to these items) than positively worded ones (Levinson & Sanford, 1944). Cronbach (1946) had already written his classic paper introducing the concept of response sets when The Authoritarian Personality was published. In that paper, he defined response sets as being "any tendency causing a person consistently to make different responses to test items than he would have made had the same content been presented in a different form" (Cronbach, 1946, p. 491). He showed that one of the most readily observed of these response sets is a tendency to mark items consistently true or consistently false when subjects are unsure of the answer.

In the years subsequent to the publication of The Authoritarian Personality, evidence accumulated that F-scores (fascism scores) in particular (but presumably also E-scores) are substantially influenced by subjects' tendencies to respond in an affirmative manner, independent of content (Cohn, 1953). This led to an investigation which showed that an acquiescent response set (i.e. a tendency to endorse items, independent of content) is a reliably measurable and stable personality trait which is moderately positively related to other traits such as impulsivity and anxiety (Couch & Keniston, 1960).

Another problem is that the items of the E-scale are all about a relatively small number of ethnic groups, making the instrument useless for assessing the prejudices of people whose prejudices are against groups not mentioned on this scale. In addition, many of the items are relevant only to the time and place in which the E-scale was written, for example, "It is a mistake to allow any Japanese to leave internment camps and enter the army where they would be free to commit sabotage."

New measures related to the E-scale. In recent years, various scales have been developed in an attempt to rectify the problems associated with the E-scale. A typical example is the Manitoba Prejudice Scale developed by Altemeyer (1988). This measure solves the response set problem by having an equal number of protrait and contrait items. In other words, agreement with half of the items indicates a high degree of prejudice, but agreement with the other half indicates a low degree of prejudice. This measure also assesses prejudice against a slightly wider variety of ethnic groups. Nevertheless, this scale has the same basic structure as the E-scale, with prejudice being defined as the possession a specific set of negative attitudes toward and stereotypic beliefs about a particular set of ethnic groups.

Attempts to analyze the structure of prejudiced attitudes. The E-scale and its later derivatives were all constructed based on the underlying assumption that ethnocentrism or prejudice is a relatively monolithic, unidimensional construct. Researchers such as Bernard Kramer (1949) were already questioning this idea at the time the E-scale was being constructed. Kramer suggested that, although prejudice might have a unified core, it is likely to have a fairly complex structure centering around a large number of dimensions. Kramer himself lists a total of thirty such dimensions, organized under a bewildering array of headings and subheadings. The three principal headings which Kramer used were "Cognitive Orientation," "Emotional Orientation," and "Action Orientation." Unfortunately, this whole organization of headings and dimensions was not based on any sort of empirical examination of the way people responded to the impressive array of racist items which Kramer listed in his appendix, but rather on a simple examination of the content

of these items. This is not a problem if these headings are thought of primarily as a conceptual organization used primarily for its heuristic value to researchers, but it may cause difficulties if one assumes that peoples' attitudes are organized primarily around these dimensions.

A group of researchers at the university of Colorado (Woodmansee & Cook, 1967) attempted to demonstrate empirically the existence of these component dimensions of prejudice, particularly of the three major components of cognitive, affective, and conative orientations. They gathered a large number of questionnaire items (initially 120) concerning attitudes toward blacks. They tested these items using several hundred subjects, many of whom were recruited from organizations with strong stances on the rights of blacks (e.g. the NAACP, the Young Americans for Freedom) as well as participants in optional university classes on race relations. A factor analysis of the items showed no sign of the three presumed attitudinal components, but did find ten relatively stable content factors, corresponding to ten discrete subgroups of items. The mean intercorrelation of these subgroups was .47, indicating that these subgroups did share a substantial core of common variance despite the multidimensionality of the full scale. Ten representative items from each of these ten subgroups were then brought together to form the Multifactorial Racial Attitude Inventory. Two more subscales were added after further research, and a short version (one item per subscale) was also created (Ard & Cook, 1977).

Modern racism. In the wake of the civil rights movement of the sixties and seventies, it appeared that racial prejudice was declining in North America (McConahay, Hardee, & Batts, 1981). A number of researchers suggested, however, that only certain components of racism

were declining, and that another type of racism, variously called "modern racism" (McConahay et al., 1981) and "symbolic racism" (Sears & McConahay, 1973; Kinder and Sears, 1981), was taking its place. Sears and McConahay (1973) argued that racial attitudes in America were at that time organized into three attitudinal clusters, which they labeled "generalized egalitarianism," "personal racial threat," and "symbolic racism." Sears and McConahay (1973) claimed that the first two components of racial attitudes among southern Californians were quite weak at the time of writing. In other words, most people believed that blacks were entitled to equal rights, that they were not intrinsically less intelligent than whites, and so forth (generalized egalitarianism), as well as that they (i.e., the white southern Californians) were not personally threatened by either the presence or the rise in status of Blacks (personal racial threat). The component which remained strong for this group, symbolic racism, was described as an expression of a mixture of mild racial antagonism with strongly held traditional Protestant values. According to Kinder and Sears (1981), blacks are often felt to violate such values as self-reliance, discipline, obedience, and individualism; thus, symbolic racists are most strongly outraged by any actions undertaken by the government which they feel give blacks an unfair advantage.

McConahay et al. (1981) more explicitly related their construct of modern racism to the affective component of the three-component model of attitudes. They claimed that the affective component of an attitude is more resistant to change than the conative and cognitive components because the affective components of attitudes are acquired very early in life. McConahay et al. (1981) invoked this explanation to deal with the seeming paradox that virtually all Americans espouse egalitarian values,

but that many oppose the concrete measures intended to give blacks an equal opportunity. For example, someone with deep-seated negative affective reactions to blacks might be converted to a cognitive point of view espousing equality for all races, but still feel emotional unease at affirmative action, and therefore oppose such action on the basis of some invented justification. In an attempt to measure this "modern" form of racism, McConahay et al. (1981) devised the modern racism scale. They found that, unlike items on traditional racism scales, modern racism items (e.g. "Blacks are getting too demanding in their push for equal rights.") were not perceived as being related to racism by many of the subjects, and were apparently unaffected by the social desirability effects which biased the results of traditional racism scales. This led them to boast that "this might be the only nonreactive racial attitudes questionnaire extant" (McConahay et al., 1981, p. 577).

The concept of modern or symbolic racism has not gone unchallenged. Bobo (1983) argued against the usual interpretation of studies which purported to demonstrate that such behaviors as voting along racial lines were primarily influenced by symbolic racism rather than perceived group conflict (e.g. Kinder & Sears, 1981). Bobo argued that these studies were marred by their use of an excessively narrow definition of self-interest, leading their authors to assert that affirmations of long-term or group-level self-interest are really forms of symbolic racism. Using a broader definition of self-interest, Bobo (1983) demonstrated that negative attitudes toward busing could be credibly explained by realistic group conflict theory, without having to invoke an historically new form of racism.

Weigel and Howes (1985) also attacked the claims of novelty of modern racism, but were particularly concerned with the modern racism scale itself. They examined correlations between modern racism scores and short form MRAI (multifactor racial attitude inventory, Ard & Cook, 1977) scores among a randomly selected sample of white residents of a medium-sized American city, and found that the correlation between the two was .67. Weigel and Howes (1985) argued that this result showed that the distinction between traditional racism and modern racism is not nearly as sharp as was often claimed.

Anthropological approaches. Anthropologists as well as psychologists have taken a considerable interest in ethnocentrism (the concept of ethnocentrism differs somewhat from that of prejudice in that ethnocentrism also consists of highly positive attitudes toward the ingroup; Duckitt, 1992). Brewer & Campbell (1976), for example, examined the attitudes of thirty ethnic groups in East Africa to their thirteen most closely neighboring groups. The instrument they used, which was developed specifically for the study, consisted of three parts. The first part consisted of five social distance items applied to each of the target outgroups (e.g., "Would you be willing to work with a ____?"). The second part contained only two items, asking what the most important good and bad qualities of each of the groups were. The third section consisted of a list of 48 traits, and respondents were asked to state which of the thirteen groups possessed that trait to the greatest degree. This instrument was very good at determining which groups were most commonly the objects of prejudice, but was not used to assess individual differences in prejudice. Because only the first part could even produce differences in levels of prejudiced responses (and these were only of the

social distance type), this scale would require considerable revision to make it an appropriate individual difference measure.

Behavioral approaches. Another approach to assessing prejudice involves behavioral rather than pencil and paper measures. Gaertner and Dovidio (1986) reported that overt prejudice had decreased greatly in extent in North America over the previous few decades, due largely to a shift in the dominant social norms; nevertheless, more subtle forms of racism could be detected by placing people in situations where the normative forms of behavior were more ambiguous. Gaertner and Dovidio (1986) called this more subtle form of racism "aversive racism." The word "aversive" was used to emphasize the fact that people with this type of racist attitude possess strong egalitarian values, and find their own lingering racist attitudes repugnant. Gaertner and Dovidio (1986) assert that these sorts of racist attitudes persist because of the long history of racism in American culture, as well as the innate biasing influence of human cognitive mechanisms for processing categorical information. In a sense, this idea is not dissimilar to the concept of modern racism, discussed above. Nevertheless, the emphasis is different, because the modern racism concept emphasizes interindividual differences in racism in much the same way as the classical racism concepts which led to the creation of such instruments as the E-scale. The concept of aversive racism, on the other hand, attempts to emphasize the persistence of racism in the American culture, without paying so much attention to the differences between individuals within that culture. In short, Gaertner and Dovidio (1986) fall more strongly into the tradition of social psychology rather than personality psychology.

The method used to demonstrate the existence of aversive racism was also very different from the Modern Racism Scale. One of the techniques which Gaertner and Dovidio (1986) used was a behavioral assessment of the helping behavior of subjects, often particularly of subjects who had scored low on prejudice in previous paper and pencil measures of prejudice. They found that even these "unprejudiced" subjects were significantly more likely to help white than black confederates of the experimenters, both when the request for help came on the phone and when it came in person. The weakness of this approach as an assessment instrument is obvious: the experimental procedures are far too cumbersome to be used as standard measures of prejudice. Furthermore, attitudes toward only a single ethnic outgroup can be examined in this way. It should be pointed out that Gaertner & Dovidio (1986) never intended this as an individual difference measure.

Some members of this same group of researchers (e.g. Gaertner & McLaughlin, 1983) have also developed another means of assessing racism. This method is based on the effects of semantic priming on reaction time in a lexical decision task. They assert that, because this sort of semantic priming is automatic and not subject to conscious control, it provides a more accurate picture of the subject's real stereotyped beliefs than do tests which allow conscious processing, and therefore allow subjects to engage in strategic self-presentation (and self-deception as well, to persuade themselves that they are fair, egalitarian people) (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). If this is true, then such methods are more accurate than any others for measuring prejudice. However, Devine (1989) has argued persuasively that what is measured by such semantic priming tasks is not belief in commonly held racial stereotypes, but simply knowledge of them.

It is surely unfair to call people prejudiced simply because they are aware of cultural stereotypes.

Devine's (1989) argument against the aversive racism concept began with the truism that knowledge of a stereotype and endorsement of that stereotype are not the same thing. She then went on to show empirically that high- and low-prejudiced individuals (as assessed by the Modern Racism scale) are equally well acquainted with the stereotypes which are current in the society of which they are members. This, too, is hardly surprising. In a second study, she then showed that high- and low-prejudiced individuals were also equally susceptible to having these stereotypes activated by stimuli presented in such a way that they were not available to consciousness. This, according to Devine (1989), is an indication that automatic processing (as opposed to conscious, controlled processing) of stereotype-relevant information is largely the same for low- and high-prejudiced individuals. So far, this does not contradict Gaertner and Dovidio's (1986) assertions. In her third study, though, Devine asked her subjects to list their thoughts about blacks. Here she found a large difference between the low- and high-prejudice subjects, even though the protocols were completely anonymous. Low-prejudiced subjects were much more reluctant to make sweeping generalizations of any sort about blacks than high-prejudiced subjects, as well as listing fewer negative thoughts about them in general.

Devine (1989) explained this discrepancy between automatic and controlled processing by asserting that the same stereotypes are activated automatically (in the presence of an appropriate stimulus) in all members of the culture where those stereotypes are current, but, when the opportunity for conscious processing is available, low-prejudiced

subjects become aware of the incongruence between the unconsciously activated stereotypes and their conscious beliefs, and suppress the cognitions which are connected to the stereotype. Thus, the racial stereotypes may continue to form a well-formed cognitive structure, but will cease to have an impact on behavior except in a few exceptional situations where the individual does not become aware of the discrepancy between stereotypes and conscious beliefs. If one accepts this assertion that the conscious beliefs exercise a much more pervasive effect on the individual's behavior than the unconsciously activated stereotypes, it becomes pointless to assert that the individual is "really" prejudiced solely on the basis of the vestigial cognitive structure of racial stereotypes.

Weaknesses of Existing Instruments

All of the approaches to the assessment of prejudice cited above suffer a common weakness: they all assess the degree of prejudice against a given group or set of groups which has been determined in advance by the designer(s) of the instrument. This is not a problem if one is only interested in prejudice against those particular groups; however, many psychologists are interested in prejudice as a general psychological phenomenon. This is much more problematic, because not all prejudiced people are prejudiced against the same groups (Duckitt, 1992). In Vancouver in 1993, for example, prejudice against people of Chinese ancestry, Native Indians, and French Canadians may be a much more pervasive and serious problem than the prejudice against Jews and Blacks that was such a major concern in Allport's time and place. This problem

becomes all the more acute when one attempts to make cross-cultural comparisons.

Another problem faced by paper and pencil measures is that they also determine in advance what constitutes a negative trait or stereotype. This poses two problems. The first problem is that it is likely that not all people who are prejudiced against a given group will necessarily have the same stereotypes about them. For example, one Vancouverite who is prejudiced against ethnic Chinese might hold that they are aloof and overcontrolled, while another who had witnessed a gang fight might consider them excessively violent. The second problem is that not all traits are evaluated in the same way by all people. To cite just one example, the word "aggressive" has highly negative connotations to many people, suggesting a dangerous willingness to resort to excessive pressure tactics and violence; however, many individuals and firms in our society proudly advertise the fact that they are aggressive. In the 1993 Vancouver telephone directory, there are 11 companies which have "Aggressive" as the first word in their names. Obviously, for many people, aggressiveness is something positive, connoting a drive and ambition to get good things done despite overwhelming obstacles.

Zavalloni and Louis-Guerin's Approach

The problems outlined above can be overcome by using a more idiographic approach, where respondents themselves choose the ethnic outgroups which are most salient to them, the traits which best describe those groups, and the evaluative valence of those traits. Zavalloni and Louis-Guerin (1984) have taken this approach, and have developed a detailed questionnaire/interview protocol, the IMIS ("Investigateur

multistade de l'identite sociale", which translates roughly as "multistage social identity protocol"). The technique is much more ambitious than a simple prejudice inventory. It is an attempt, as the name suggests, to map out the entire framework of an individual's social identity. It is based on the presupposition that the primary processes that form social identity are anchored as representations of the self and others in memory. These representations can be elucidated in a series of stages. First, one must determine to which social groups subjects feel that they belong. The next step is to find out what attributions people make about these groups, as well as about corresponding outgroups. These attributions are then further analyzed by the subjects themselves in order to determine to what degree they are also attributable to the self and the degree to which they are considered positive.

Up to this point, the procedure can be carried out with a written questionnaire, but from here on, the analysis becomes more subtle, and must be carried out by means of an interview schedule. Themes that are dealt with in this schedule include a much more precise examination of what the trait attributions made by subjects mean to subjects themselves, which individuals subjects think of as concrete exemplars of given groups, and what the perceived relationships are among the traits which are attributed to each given group. The end result of this procedure is a highly complex and detailed map of the subjects' internal representations of themselves, their social worlds, and the relationships between the two. Such a map can then supply invaluable information about an enormous range of features of people's social identities, ranging from their existential projects to their ethnic prejudices.

Unfortunately, the technique in its entirety is very time- and labor-intensive. Furthermore, the technique as it stands does not lend itself to quantitative analyses. Zavalloni and Louis-Guerin (1984) take a great interest in elucidating the structures of the social identities of individuals, but are relatively uninterested in generating the numerical indices that could be used to test hypotheses pertaining to interindividual differences. They do state that it may be possible to use the techniques to make quantitative comparisons of the frequencies of certain types of representations between different groups, but they do not extend this to make any sort of quantitative interindividual comparisons. One of the main purposes of the present study is to modify Zavalloni and Louis-Guerin's technique so that it can be used to compare the degree to which given individuals are prejudiced.

A further weakness of the approach taken by Zavalloni & Louis-Guerin is that it primarily assesses stereotypes rather than attitudes. Intuitively, this does not appear to pose a problem, because it would seem that negative attitudes toward a group would necessarily be strongly related to negative stereotypes about that group. This intuitively appealing idea is contradicted by a recent study about attitudes toward homosexuals (Haddock, Zanna, & Esses, 1993). Haddock et al. found that negativity of stereotypes about homosexuals was only moderately related to negativity of attitudes toward them ($r=.455$ and $r=.393$), and that this relation was not significantly different from 0.0 in the case of highly authoritarian subjects. For this reason, it is desirable that a direct measure of attitudes toward the various groups be added to the Zavalloni and Louis-Guerin (1984) procedure, if the goal is the measurement of prejudice.

The Generality of Prejudice

The goal of determining the degree to which given individuals are prejudiced is only attainable if "generalized prejudice" is in fact a meaningful concept. Even the definition of prejudice is highly problematic. Duckitt (1992) lists over a dozen definitions of prejudice which occur in the literature. For the purposes of the present study, prejudice will be defined as a system of negative stereotypes about and attitudes toward a particular group of people. The focus of this study will be ethnic prejudice, but the method used will also be applicable to other forms of prejudice, such as sexism. Prejudice will be considered generalized if a person has such prejudices against a large number of such groups, and in extreme cases against all groups to which the person does not perceive him/herself as belonging.

The question of the generality of prejudice is subject to some debate. Most studies which have examined the question have found moderate correlations among negative attitudes and stereotyped beliefs about different minority groups (Adorno et al., 1950; Beswick & Hills, 1972; Ray & Lovejoy, 1986). Nevertheless, the frequently cited finding that people who are prejudiced even tend to be prejudiced against nonexistent groups, whose names have been simply invented by the experimenter (Hartley, 1946), has been challenged by Fink (1971). According to Fink, people report mild prejudices against nonexistent groups when they are not given an opportunity to indicate perfect neutrality; thus, this apparent instance of highly generalized prejudice may be nothing more than an artifact of questionnaire design. More recently, even the more established findings of high intercorrelations among prejudices against different groups has also been disputed; Seeman

(1981) claims that these findings may be due to the fact that these studies used either social distance scales or scales that involve endorsement or rejection of highly stereotyped, prejudiced statements about various groups. Seeman argues that the common variance among attitudes toward different minorities which has been found in these studies is due to the highly categorical, stereotyped responses which respondents must make in order to achieve high scores on such scales, rather than any underlying relationship among attitudes toward different groups.

The debate is complicated by the historical factors that militated for the adoption of models in which prejudice was seen as a pervasive personality trait (Milner, 1981), particularly in the period following the Second World War. Milner argues that the holocaust horrified people in the social milieus where social psychology was studied to such an extent that a strong demand arose for the creation of theories which saw this event as the result of some sort of mass pathology. Thomas Pettigrew, writing at a time (1958) when this demand was still strong, emphasized the extremism that was popular among researchers developing theories of prejudice at that time. He pointed out that theories of prejudice could be ranged along a continuum between, on the one hand, theories that emphasize the personalities of bigots, while ignoring the social milieu in which they learn and exercise their bigotry, and, on the other hand, theories which emphasize the effects of social circumstances but ignore the effects of individual personality. Although it was possible to envision theories that fall anywhere between those two extremes, in fact Pettigrew found that most theories were located at one extreme or another. This makes sense if one considers the social imperatives for a

mass pathology theory discussed by Milner (1981). A theory of prejudiced personality makes it easy to see events like the holocaust as aberrations due to the warped personalities of the perpetrators. Similarly, a theory which sees prejudice as being exclusively the result of a particular set of social circumstances is comforting because the absence of those circumstances in one's own society can then be taken as a sign that events such as the holocaust are not likely to occur. A theory which mixes the two types of factors is much less reassuring, because it becomes much harder to convince oneself, based on such theories, that something like the holocaust could never happen "here," wherever here happens to be.

Pettigrew himself (1958) took up a point of view located in the middle of this continuum. Pettigrew carried out comparisons of levels of anti-Black prejudice between English and Afrikaners in South Africa, as well as between northerners and southerners in the United States. The Afrikaners and the southerners were found to be more strongly prejudiced against blacks than were the English and the northerners. Despite these differences, there were no significant differences in the mean levels of authoritarianism, as assessed by means of the F-scale, among these four groups. On the other hand, F-scale scores were found to be significantly associated with levels of prejudice within each of these groups.

Pettigrew concluded that people's social milieu has a strong influence on the prejudices they develop, but that this influence is moderated by personality variables which increase or decrease susceptibility to prejudice. Within this framework, the concept of a generalized personality trait of prejudice is still meaningful. Personality is dethroned as the only determinant of prejudice, but within a given social

milieu, personality should be the primary factor that influences the strength with which socially normative prejudices are asserted.

It could be argued that one aspect of generalized attitudes toward outgroups is general negativity. People who are very negative and cynical might well hold negative stereotypes about and attitudes toward outgroups, but would also have negative stereotypes about and attitudes toward the groups to which they belong. Such people would usually be described as unhappy or misanthropic rather than prejudiced. For this reason, it is desirable to control for the effect of general negativity by comparing stereotypes about and attitudes toward outgroups with those pertaining to ingroups. In fact, a recent study by Haddock, Zanna, and Esses (1994) has indicated that there are significant mood effects on intergroup attitudes, particularly among those who are prone to intense affect. This effect could presumably be related to long-term mood effects as well.

Social Identity Theory

The social identity theory of intergroup relations, normally associated with Henri Tajfel and his associates (e. g. Tajfel & Turner, 1986), has also spawned a procedure, the minimal group paradigm, which shows bias in favor of ingroups even when the basis of classification into groups is trivial. This procedure is most often used to test the effects of experimental manipulations, rather than to measure individual differences, but because differential allocation of rewards is readily measurable in this paradigm, degree of ingroup bias can be measured as an individual difference variable using this paradigm (e.g. Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990). Thus, although the main thrust of this line of

investigation has been to show that the tendency to prefer ingroups to outgroups is a very robust one, being present in virtually all individuals even when the ingroup is a trivial one, the potential does exist to compare individuals in terms of a very general tendency to make evaluative ingroup/outgroup discriminations. Conceptually at least, this seems similar to prejudice in its most general form. The main weakness of this approach is the difficulty in extrapolating from these findings of relatively mild discrimination in favor of trivial ingroups to the more severe discrimination which goes on against significant outgroups in the world outside the laboratory (Duckitt, 1992).

Social identity theory asserts that people identify themselves with social groups primarily in order to bolster their self-esteem (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). When the first minimal group results became known, this was only a theoretical assumption, but subsequent research empirically demonstrated both that people in the minimal intergroup paradigm do respond to threats to self-esteem by derogating outgroups (Hogg & Sunderland, 1991; Crocker, Thompson, McGraw, & Ingerman, 1987) and that successful discrimination against an outgroup does raise self-esteem (Lemyre & Smith, 1985). Nevertheless, these assertions must be qualified somewhat. Hogg and Sunderland (1991) failed to replicate Lemyre and Smith's (1985) finding that outgroup discrimination helps raise self-esteem. Crocker et al. (1987) report that only subjects with a generally high level of self-esteem respond to threats to that self-esteem with intergroup discrimination, whereas subjects who were lower in their general level of self-esteem did not respond in this fashion. Although Lemyre and Smith (1985) found that intergroup discrimination raises self-esteem, they also found that being divided into groups without being

given an opportunity to discriminate against the outgroup appears to be a threat to self-esteem.

The Present Investigation

Goals of the Investigation.

The present study is an attempt to validate a new measure of general prejudice, based on the IMIS of Zavalloni and Louis-Guerin (1984), which does not assess prejudice by means of endorsement of highly stereotyped statements or categorical affirmations of willingness to achieve different degrees of social closeness. Instead, this measure attempts to determine how positive or negative respondents' beliefs are about ethnic groups which respondents themselves consider meaningful outgroups.

Because this measure does not have "items" in the sense that most psychological tests do (because one cannot necessarily compare the first ethnic group which one respondent mentions with the first one another respondent mentions), many normal means of assessing reliability (e.g. interitem correlations, split-half reliabilities) are useless. Instead, test-retest reliability was used.

Three types of validation were attempted. One of these is convergent validation, that is, comparison of scores on the new instrument with those on an established general prejudice scale.

The second type of validation which to be attempted is convergent validation, i.e. comparison of results on this measure with those of a measure which is expected for theoretical reasons to be positively correlated with it. In this case, the correlation of generalized prejudice scores with scores on a test of collective self-esteem will be assessed.

The construct of collective self-esteem is expected to have a moderately strong positive correlation with general prejudice. Luhtanen and Crocker (1992, p. 303) assert that "To the extent that one's social groups are valued and compare favorably with relevant comparison groups, collective identity is positive." In other words, the collective self-esteem which is measured by the collective self-esteem scale is postulated to be a function of the individuals' abilities to successfully identify themselves with groups which they consider superior to relevant outgroups

The third type of validation to be attempted is discriminant validation: an attempt will be made to show that this measure is not confounded with positive or negative affect. This is important because of the reported effects of mood on reported evaluations of outgroups (Haddock et al., 1994).

These attempts at validation lead to three specific hypotheses:

Hypothesis #1: Scores on this new measure should be closely related to scores on a well-established test of prejudice. Thus, there will be significant and fairly high positive correlation between the ethnic global and attribute difference scores on this new measure (see the method section of study 1 for a description of how these scores will be arrived at) and the Manitoba Prejudice Scale, an existing and well-validated measure of ethnic prejudice in Canadian society. This correlation is expected to be particularly high when respondents who do not consider themselves Canadians, Americans, or ethnic Europeans are excluded from the analysis.

Hypothesis #2: In accordance with the predictions of social identity theory, which sees prejudice primarily as a means of boosting collective self-esteem, it is anticipated that prejudice scores should be positively related to measures on a test of collective self-esteem. Thus, there will be significant positive correlations between the Collective Self-Esteem Scale and both total global difference scores and total attribute difference scores (see method section of study 1 for an explanation of these scores).

Hypothesis #3: Because the new measure is not supposed to be confused with affect, the scores on the new prejudice scale are not expected to be related to the score on tests of positive or negative affect. Thus, there will be no significant correlation, either positive or negative, between ethnic or total global or attribute difference scores and either the PA or the NA scale. As this is equivalent to asserting the null, this point cannot be conclusively demonstrated in this study. What is important is that it is predicted that these correlations will all be small.

Validity is not the only criterion of the usefulness of a measure. Reliability is also crucial, otherwise most of the variation in a measure is simply error variance, rather than an indicator of the construct being studied. For this reason, the following hypothesis must also be made:

Hypothesis #4: Two week test-retest reliabilities for all difference scores will be high.

This study will also attempt to confront the issue of whether prejudice against outgroups is a generalized trait across different types of outgroup. Studies have already been mentioned above (e.g. Ray & Lovejoy, 1986; Beswick & Hills, 1972) which address the question of whether prejudice against different outgroups are intercorrelated, but the issue here is the even more general one of whether prejudices against different types of outgroups are intercorrelated, for example whether racism is related to sexism. This can also be framed as a more specific hypothesis:

Hypothesis #5: The mean interitem correlation among global difference scores for different groups will be positive and fairly high, as will the mean interitem correlation among attribute difference scores. In this context, "high" means at least .20 (Altemeyer, 1981). A factor analysis of global and attribute difference scores will reveal a single general factor which explains a substantial portion of the variation of these difference scores.

A final goal of this study is to test an idea which can be derived from social identity theory. Social identity theory states that one of the primary motives which influences our perceptions of our group memberships is the desire to feel good about ourselves. This suggests that people will tend to value group memberships which boost self-esteem; in other words, groups where being a member of the ingroup is perceived as being significantly better than being a member of the outgroup. This leads to a final hypothesis:

Hypothesis #6: Both global and attribute difference scores for each group will be negatively correlated with the ranked importance of those groups to subjects' identities.

The anticipated correlation is negative rather than positive because a high ranking corresponds to a low number on the ranking scale, e.g. a rank of 1 indicates that the group is extremely important to the subject's sense of identity, while a rank of 11 indicates that the group is extremely unimportant to the subject's sense of identity.

Outline of the Organization of this Investigation

For practical reasons related to the number of hours each subject was willing to participate in any given study, the investigation was divided into two smaller studies. In the first study, scores on the full form of the IMIS were correlated with scores on the other measures (MPS, CSE, and PANAS). In the second study, the test-retest reliability of an abbreviated version of the modified IMIS was examined. Finally, to shed further light on the internal structure of the IMIS, a factor analysis was performed on pooled data from both studies.

Chapter 2

Study 1: Validation of the Modified IMIS as a Measure of Prejudice

Method

Subjects

A total of 68 subjects filled out the questionnaire package. Of these 68 subjects, 10 failed to produce usable data (usually due to failure to fill in the global evaluations of groups). This left a total of 58 subjects who produced usable data. Thirty-eight of these subjects were female, and the other 20 were male. Nine of these subjects were drawn from the SFU psychology department volunteer subject pool and five were graduate students. The remaining 44 were drawn from the SFU psychology department subject pool, and were given course credit in return for their participation.

Measures

The new measure. The measure which this study attempted to validate was a modified and considerably abbreviated version of the IMIS (Investigateur multistade de l'identite sociale) developed by Zavalloni & Louis-Guerin (1984). The full form for the version of the instrument which was used in this investigation is contained in Appendix A. Briefly, this instrument asks respondents to list what they consider to be their own ingroups in eleven domains: ethnicity, province/region of origin, political orientation, religion, social class, occupation, age, sex, marital status, family, and other. In this study, the primary focus of interest was the category of ethnicity, but the other categories were also useful in

testing the hypothesis that prejudice tends to be generalized across different types of categories.

After subjects had listed their ingroups on this measure, they then listed their corresponding outgroups. For some groups, such as sex, there was only one possible outgroup; for others, particularly ethnicity, the respondent was encouraged to list a number of outgroups. Because ethnic attitudes were the main focus of this investigation, respondents' choices of outgroups were guided in this domain: they were asked to name two ethnic outgroups which they considered to be very similar to their own and three which they considered to be very different. Once these various groups had been named, respondents were then asked to list at least five attributes which they felt that each group possessed. When this list of attributes had been made for all groups, subjects were then asked to go back again to determine whether the attributes they had listed were very positive, somewhat positive, neutral, somewhat negative, or very negative. Finally, subjects were asked to go back one more time and rate their global approval/disapproval of all the groups they had named, also on the same five-point scale on which they have rated the specific traits.

The Manitoba Prejudice Scale. The Manitoba Prejudice Scale, constructed by Altemeyer (1988) and displayed in Appendix A, was considered the best of the conventional prejudice scales for the purposes of the present study. The scale is psychometrically strong (Cronbach's $\alpha=.87$), and fully balanced against response sets. Furthermore, it is a relatively current measure, and was developed for a similar population to the one being investigated in the present study, i.e. Canadian university students.

The Collective Self-Esteem Scale. The Collective Self-Esteem Scale (see appendix for sample) was developed specifically by Luhtanen and Crocker (1992) to assess the degree to which people value their group memberships, and the degree to which self-esteem is derived from the sense of collective identity, where "collective identity" is understood to be an American synonym for the term "social identity" (i.e. that part of one's self concept which is derived from membership in social groups) as used by Tajfel and Turner (1986), as well as by other European social psychologists. A copy of this scale is contained in Appendix A. Scores on this measure have been shown to be significantly associated with the level of ingroup favoritism shown in the minimal ingroup paradigm (Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990). As the measure currently being validated is also intended to measure ingroup favoritism, but in a more naturalistic context, it is postulated that scores on the Collective Self-Esteem Scale will be positively correlated with total difference scores.

The Collective Self-Esteem Scale consists of four subscales. The first of these, the membership subscale, is intended to assess how valuable the individual considers him- or herself to the group(s) of which he/she is a member. The second subscale, the private subscale, assesses the degree to which the individual considers his/her groups to be good or valuable. The third subscale, the public subscale, assesses the degree to which the individual believes that his/her groups are held in high esteem by others. Finally, the fourth subscale, the identity subscale, assesses the degree to which group memberships are important components of the individual's identity.

The Positive Affect and Negative Affect Scale. The PANAS (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) is a scale intended to measure the two dominant

dimensions of affective structure. These two dimensions are positive affect and negative affect. Although the idea that positive and negative affect are two ends of a single continuum is intuitively appealing, Watson et al. (1988) have shown that they are largely uncorrelated. The Positive Affect subscale of this scale measures tendencies to experience states of "high energy, full concentration, and pleasurable engagement" (p. 1063), while the Negative Affect subscale measures tendencies to experience such negative states as anger, disgust, contempt, nervousness, and fear. A copy of the PANAS is contained in Appendix A.

Procedure

Preliminary pilot work was undertaken to ensure that instructions were comprehensible and seemed relevant to subjects, as well as to determine the approximate length of time it took most subjects to fill out the various instruments. Most subjects understood the instructions well enough to provide usable data, and required between fifty and ninety minutes to fill out the complete questionnaire package.

All subjects were administered a modified version of the IMIS. They were also asked to rank order the importance of the different types of groups to their sense of identity, and were administered the Manitoba Prejudice Scale, the Collective Self-Esteem Scale, and the PANAS during the same testing session. Between 1 and 10 subjects were run per session. All subjects were assured of anonymity and of the confidentiality of the results. Subjects were told emphatically not to place their name or any other identifying symbol on their questionnaires.

Data Analysis

Calculation of difference scores. Attribute difference scores were calculated in the following manner for each of the different classification dimensions (e.g. ethnicity, age, etc.). First of all, an average positivity score was calculated for the ingroup(s), such that two points were assigned for each strongly positive attribute, one point for each somewhat positive attribute, zero points for each neutral trait, minus one point for each somewhat negative attribute, and two points for each strongly negative attribute. A similar average positivity score was calculated for the outgroup(s). The outgroup positivity score was then subtracted from the ingroup positivity score to yield a difference score. Thus, if the attributes attributed to outgroups were as positive as those attributed to ingroups, this difference score was zero. If the traits attributed to ingroups were more positive than those attributed to outgroups, then this difference score had a positive value; if the traits attributed to ingroups were less positive than those attributed to outgroups, then it had a negative value. The possible range of this difference score was from +4.0 to -4.0. Evaluation of ingroups was included in this index, despite the fact that the focus of interest is attitudes towards outgroups, because attitudes toward ingroups were intended here to serve as a baseline, so that people who (for example) were highly cynical and thought badly of all groups regardless of whether they themselves were members of them were not incorrectly scored as being prejudiced against outgroups in particular.

A similar procedure was followed to determine the difference scores for global attitude ratings. That is, for each type of group, the global ratings of outgroups were subtracted from the global ratings of

ingroups. In the case of the ethnic ratings, the average global rating for the dissimilar out groups was subtracted from the average global rating for the similar outgroups and the ingroup taken together. Thus, the global difference scores, like the attribute difference scores, had a possible range from 4.0 to -4.0.

Correlations. When these indices had been calculated for all eleven types of group, they were summed to form two total difference scores (one for attributes and one for global attitudes) for each subject. These were intended as measures of the degree to which subjects were biased against outgroups in general. The correlation between these two measures of bias (i.e., bias in stereotypes and bias in attitudes) was calculated. The degree to which each of these types of bias against outgroups was general was then assessed by means of the mean interitem correlations (within each of the two types) among the eleven group categories: ethnic, political, vocational, religion, class, sex, age, and other. All subsequent analyses were conducted separately for each of the two types of difference scores (i.e. attribute and global).

Pearson correlations were also calculated between the rank order of the importance to subjects of the various group memberships and the degree of polarization.

The ethnic polarization indices were then correlated with the scores on the Manitoba Prejudice Scale (MPS). Because a substantial proportion of the subjects used in the present study belonged to various of the ethnic groups which the MPS measures prejudice against, this correlation was also assessed separately for that subset of respondents whose stated ethnic ingroups were Canadian, American, or European.

Both ethnic and overall polarization indices were also correlated with Luhtanen & Crocker's (1992) Collective Self-Esteem Scale, and with both subscales of the PANAS (Watson et al., 1988).

Results

Ethnic Ingroups and Outgroups Chosen

Respondents claimed to belong to a wide variety of ethnic groups. Of 58 respondents, 22 called themselves Canadians, 14 called themselves ethnic-Canadians (e.g. Dutch-Canadian), and 22 called themselves members of some other ethnic group. Of these 22 non-Canadians, 14 were European, 7 were Asian, and one was Jamaican. In total, 27 different ethnic ingroups were named.

There was an even greater diversity of ethnic groups which respondents considered similar to their own. The 110 responses for this category fell into 44 different groups. The greatest number of responses in this category were some European ethnicity (n=55), followed by Asian ethnic groups (n=24), Americans (n=16), hyphenated groups (n=7), Canadians (n=2), and others (n=5), with one response, "Christians," which would not normally be considered an ethnic group at all.

The 155 responses for very different ethnic groups fell into 58 different categories. There were 67 responses that named Asian ethnicities, 32 that named European ones, 13 that named Americans, 3 that named Canadians, 3 hyphenated responses, 32 others, and 7 which were not ethnic groups at all (including "neo-Nazis" and "people who have studied abroad").

Means and Standard Deviations of Difference Scores

The means and standard deviations of the global difference scores are summarized in Table 1. As one would predict from social identity

Table 1

Means, standard deviations and extreme values of global difference scores.

Social Group	Mean Global Difference Score	Standard Deviation of Difference Score	Extreme Scores	
			Lowest	Highest
Ethnic	0.95***	1.12	-1.32	3.5
Provincial/Regional	0.80***	1.04	-1.0	4.0
Sex	0.07	0.64	-2.0	3.0
Religious Affiliation	0.96***	1.28	-3.0	4.0
Occupation	0.75***	1.24	-3.0	3.0
Social Class	0.96***	1.28	-3.0	4.0
Political Orientation	1.98***	1.32	0.0	4.0
Age	0.55***	1.03	-2.0	3.0
Marital Status	0.31*	0.99	-1.0	4.0
Family	0.45*	1.24	-3.0	3.0
Other	0.94***	1.28	-4.0	4.0
TOTAL	9.19***	5.41	-7.32	20.68

Note: Means marked with asterisks are significantly different from zero.

* $p \leq .05$

** $p \leq .01$

*** $p \leq .001$

theory's assertion that self-esteem needs motivate perceived superiority of ingroups to outgroups, all of the average difference scores are positive, indicating that, on average, subjects had more positive global evaluations of their ingroups than of their outgroups in all of these different types of group. Nevertheless, in none of the eleven different types of group did the difference score approach the theoretical maximum of 4.0, and in ten of the eleven types of group there were some subjects whose difference scores were negative, indicating that they had more positive global evaluations of the outgroup(s) than of their own ingroup. It should also be noted that the difference score for sex was not significantly different from 0.0 (Mean=0.07), $t(53)=0.80$; $p=.43$ (all t-tests quoted in this section are two-tailed).

Table 2 summarizes the means and standard deviations of the attribute difference scores. Like the global difference scores, these tend to be positive, but far from the theoretical maximum (4.0). Once again, the mean attribute difference score for sex is not significantly different from 0.0 (Mean=0.17) $t(57)=1.58$, $p=.12$. The mean attribute difference score for family was also only marginally different from 0.0 (Mean=0.27) $t(53)=1.95$, $p=.056$.

Correlations

Table 3 summarizes the correlations among some of the key variables in this study. As predicted by hypothesis #1 (see introduction), there was a significant positive correlation of 0.45 between ethnic global difference scores and the Manitoba Prejudice Scale. The obtained correlation of .40 between ethnic attribute difference scores and MPS scores also conforms to this prediction. These correlations did not change

significantly when the 10 subjects who did not consider themselves Canadians, Americans, or ethnic Europeans were excluded from the sample (the two correlations were $r=.48$ and $r=.39$, respectively). It

Table 2

Means, standard deviations, and extreme values of attribute difference scores

Social Group	Mean Attribute Difference Score	Standard Deviation of Difference Score	Extreme Scores	
			Lowest	Highest
Ethnic	0.79***	1.04	-2.36	2.80
Provincial/Regional	0.86***	1.02	-1.40	4.00
Sex	0.17	0.81	-1.40	1.60
Religious Affiliation	1.06***	1.38	-3.40	4.00
Occupation	0.51**	1.17	-2.40	2.80
Social Class	1.24***	1.25	-2.20	4.00
Political Orientation	1.74***	1.04	-.60	4.00
Age	0.78***	1.11	-2.00	3.40
Marital Status	0.34·	1.03	-2.00	2.40
Family	0.27	1.01	-2.40	4.00
Other	1.02***	1.28	-1.80	3.80
TOTAL	8.57***	5.40	-1.83	19.90

Note: Means marked with asterisks are significantly different from zero.

· $p \leq .05$

· · $p \leq .01$

· · · $p \leq .001$

should be pointed out that the multiple R which is obtained when both ethnic attribute difference scores and ethnic global difference scores are used as predictors of the MPS is only .46. This does not represent a significant improvement over either of these two difference scores, taken separately. Furthermore, the difference between these two simple correlations is also nonsignificant, $t(55)=-.49$, $p=.63$.

Table 3

Intercorrelations of Some Key Variables of Study 1 with Ethnic Difference and Rank Scores.

	MPS	CSET	PA	NA
Total Global Difference Score	.34*	-.02	.11	.23
Total Attribute Difference Score	.32*	.22	.25	-.12
Ethnic Global Difference Score	.45***	-.02	-.10	.19
Ethnic Attribute Difference Score	.40***	.14	-.02	-.02
Ethnic Rank	.02	-.06	.11	.07
MPS	1.00	-.03	-.18	.13
CSET	-.03	1.00	.27*	-.27*
PA	-.18	.27*	1.00	-.25*
NA	.13	-.27*	-.25*	1.00

Note: Correlations marked with asterisks are significantly different from zero.

* $p \leq .05$

** $p \leq .01$

*** $p \leq .001$

One of the most surprising of the findings presented in Table 3 is that the Collective Self-Esteem (CSE) scale does not correlate significantly with either the total global difference score or the total attribute difference score. This is a direct contradiction of the

Table 4

Correlations of Total and Ethnic Difference Scores with the Four Subscales of the Collective Self-Esteem Scale.

	Collective Self Esteem Subscales			
	Membership	Private	Public	Identity
Total Global Difference Score	-.08	.13	-.20	.07
Total Attribute Difference Score	.12	.41**	.34*	-.10
Ethnic Global Difference Score	-.14	.06	.01	.04
Ethnic Attribute Difference Score	-.09	.32**	.19	.02

Note: Correlations marked with asterisks are significantly different from zero.

* $p \leq .05$

** $p \leq .01$

*** $p \leq .001$

hypothesis that this correlation would be significant. Also somewhat surprising, because it contradicts the statements of Watson, Clark, and Tellegen (1988) that these two scales are nearly independent, is the

finding that PA scores do have a significant negative correlation with NA scores ($r=-.25$; $t(56)=2.06$; $p=.04$). Nevertheless, the findings summarized in this table are consonant with hypothesis #3 which predicted that none of the difference scores would correlate significantly with either the PA or the NA.

Table 4 gives a breakdown of the correlations between the four subscales of the CSE and the total global, total attribute, ethnic global, and ethnic attribute difference scores. It can be seen that both the total and ethnic attribute difference scores do have significant positive correlations with the private subscale of the CSE, and that the total attribute difference scores also show a significant positive correlation with the public subscale of the CSE.

Table 5 presents the correlations between global difference scores, attribute difference scores, and ranks of the eleven different types of groups examined in this study. It can be seen that attribute difference scores have consistently positive correlations with their corresponding global difference scores, and that the mean of these correlations is $r=.57$. As predicted by hypothesis #6, which stated that the ranked importance of traits should be negatively related to both types of difference scores, 10 of the 11 global-rank correlations are negative, five of them significantly so. Similarly, 8 of the 11 attribute-rank correlations are negative, 3 of them significantly so.

Table 6 presents the matrix of correlations of the different global difference scores with each other. The mean of these correlations (i.e. the mean interitem correlation) is $r=.093$. Of the 55 correlations in this matrix, 42 are positive; nevertheless, the correlation of the greatest magnitude in this table, that between sex and religious affiliation, is

negative, $r=-.38$, $t(46)=-2.77$, $p=.008$. Thus, although the prediction made by hypothesis #5 that mean interitem correlations would be positive is

Table 5

Intercorrelations of Global Difference Scores, Attribute Difference Scores, and Ranked Importances to Identity.

Group Type	Global-Attribute	Global-Rank	Attribute-Rank
Ethnic	.77***	-.07	-.10
Provincial/Regional	.54***	.02	.03
Sex	.31**	-.18	-.29*
Religious Affiliation	.69***	-.27*	-.32**
Occupation	.66***	-.31**	-.08
Social Class	.60***	-.17	.02
Political Orientation	.46***	-.42***	-.25
Age	.45***	-.40***	-.23
Marital Status	.41***	-.02	.16
Family	.65***	-.57***	-.54***
Other	.51***	-.18	-.24
MEAN	.55	-.23	-.17
TOTAL	.44***	-	-

Note: Correlations marked with asterisks are significantly different from zero.

* $p \leq .05$

** $p \leq .01$

*** $p \leq .001$

Table 6

Intercorrelations of global difference scores among different group types.

Group Type	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1) Ethnic	1.00										
2) Provincial/Regional	.17	1.00									
3) Sex	-.25*	-.20	1.00								
4) Religious Affiliation	.25	-.24	-.38**	1.00							
5) Occupation	.09	.07	.07	.22	1.00						
6) Social Class	.16	-.25*	.10	.37**	.21	1.00					
7) Political Orientation	.05	.08	.25	.22	.04	.24	1.00				
8) Age	.32**	.14	-.15	.19	.17	.07	.04	1.00			
9) Marital Status	-.00	-.22	.22	.05	.22	.27*	.05	.03	1.00		
10) Family	.35**	-.00	-.10	.16	.21	.13	-.16	.18	.26*	1.00	
11) Other	-.06	.27*	.10	.05	.36**	.13	.16	-.03	.33**	.02	1.00

Note: Correlations marked with asterisks are significantly different from zero.

* p ≤ .05

** p ≤ .01

*** p ≤ .001

confirmed, this mean correlation is much lower than would be desirable to support the claim that there is a single dimension of generalized prejudice.

Table 7 presents the matrix of correlations of the different attribute difference scores with each other. The mean interitem correlation of these attribute difference scores is $r=.103$. Of the 55 correlations in this matrix, 43 are positive. Once again, the results summarized in this table indicate a much weaker level of positive correlation among items than had been predicted by hypothesis #5.

Other results of this study which are not directly relevant to the central hypotheses of this study are included in Appendix B. The mean score on the Manitoba Prejudice Scale (see below) was -34.9.

Table 7

Intercorrelations of attribute difference scores among different group types.

Group Type	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1) Ethnic	1.00										
2) Provincial/Regional	.27*	1.00									
3) Sex	.04	-.01	1.00								
4) Religious Affiliation	.28*	-.20	.25	1.00							
5) Occupation	.22	.02	.11	.15	1.00						
6) Social Class	.25*	-.22	.44***	.29*	.19	1.00					
7) Political Orientation	.04	-.11	.14	.22	.16	.37**	1.00				
8) Age	.13	.09	.00	.14	.22	.09	-.14	1.00			
9) Marital Status	.00	-.21	.12	.09	.28*	.34**	.34**	-.02	1.00		
10) Family	.41***	.13	.10	.13	.24*	.12	.18	.12	-.13	1.00	
11) Other	.19	.27*	-.10	-.16	.16	.00	.04	-.25*	.11	.10	1.00

Note: Correlations marked with asterisks are significantly different from zero.

* p ≤ .05

** p ≤ .01

*** p ≤ .001

Discussion

Differences between the New Measure and the Manitoba Prejudice Scale

It is interesting to note that means on both global and attribute difference scores are on the positive side of the theoretical midpoint (0.0), while mean MPS scores are quite far below the theoretical midpoint (also 0.0). This highlights one important difference between the difference scores being developed here and the MPS: in the case of difference scores, a score at the midpoint is meaningfully interpretable, while the midpoint of the MPS is arbitrary, and has no intrinsic significance. The midpoint of the difference scores is achieved when ingroups are seen just as positively (or negatively) as outgroups; thus, it implies a real even-handedness in comparing groups. In the case of the MPS, a score at the theoretical midpoint indicates that the tendency to endorse highly racist statements and reject highly egalitarian ones is balanced by a tendency to reject highly racist statements and endorse egalitarian ones. It is difficult to argue convincingly that this is necessarily a sign of even-handedness, because there is no basis for saying whether the racist statements are more or less extreme than the egalitarian ones.

Convergent Validation of the New Measure

The finding that ethnic global and attribute difference scores are strongly positively correlated with the MPS directly confirms the first and perhaps most important hypothesis of this study. Thus, the assumption that these difference scores both measure ethnic prejudice is supported. If ethnic global and attribute difference scores are found to

have acceptable test-retest reliabilities in study 2, they can be considered to constitute a valid means of assessing ethnic prejudice.

The high mean correlation ($r=.55$) of global difference scores with attribute difference scores indicates that these two do in fact measure closely related constructs. The clear division between stereotypic beliefs and attitudes which is defended by Haddock, Zanna, and Esses (1993) is not strongly supported by these results.

Correlations of Total Difference Scores with the CSE

One unexpected result of this study is the absence of a significant correlation between total collective self-esteem scores and the total global and total attribute difference scores. This goes directly against hypothesis #2, which stated that these correlations would be positive and significant, as well as against the theory on which the Collective Self-Esteem Scale (CSE) is based, which states that collective self-esteem is derived from the ability to perceive one's important ingroups as being better than relevant corresponding outgroups on one or more important traits or dimensions (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992). Nevertheless, the hypothesized correlation can be partially salvaged if one examines the subscales of the CSE. The total attribute difference score (though not the total global difference score) was significantly positively correlated with both the private and public subscales of the CSE. Conceptually, this makes sense, because these are the two subscales which deal most closely with how "good" the ingroups are perceived to be, by subjects themselves in the case of the private subscale, and by others in the case of the public subscale. The other two subscales are much less directly relevant to how positively ingroups are perceived to be; it may be recalled that the

membership subscale assesses how valuable or worthy subjects considered themselves to be as members of their groups, and the identity subscale was concerned with how important group memberships were to subjects' senses of identity.

The lack of correlation between the identity subscale and the total difference scores warrants further comment. This correlation was expected to be positive, based on social identity theory, because social identity theory is a largely motivational body of theory which asserts (among other things) that groups are important to identity inasmuch as they serve as a source of positive comparison with outgroups. Nevertheless, social identity theory also asserts that a negative social identity can exist, such that group affiliations become important because they serve as a source of negative comparisons which support an existing low level of self-esteem. It may be that a combination of these two effects may be the source of the lack of linear correlation between the total difference scores and the identity subscale of the CSE.

Correlations of Ethnic Difference Scores with the PANAS

The failure to reject the hypothesis that ethnic global and attribute difference scores are not significantly correlated with PA and NA is important because it suggests that this new method of assessing ethnic prejudice does not confound prejudice with either positive or negative affect. This finding may appear to contradict the finding (Haddock et al., 1994) that mood does play a role in intergroup attitudes. Nevertheless, this contradiction may be more apparent than real. Haddock et al. (1994) found such correlations only among subjects who scored high on a test of affect intensity, but not those who scored low on this measure. This already would produce a dilution of the effect of mood on intergroup

attitudes. Furthermore, Haddock et al. (1994) were using a short-term mood manipulation to obtain their effects on intergroup attitudes; this is not the same as in the present case, in which long term tendencies toward a given affective state were correlated with intergroup attitudes.

Correlations of Difference Scores with Rank

Hypothesis #6, which anticipated that there should be significant negative correlations between both types of difference scores and ranked importance scores for their corresponding groups, was partially confirmed by the results displayed in table 5. Nevertheless, only seven of the twenty-two correlations were statistically significant, and four of the fifteen which were not significant were positive instead of negative. Both ethnic global and ethnic attribute difference scores were nonsignificantly correlated with the ranked importance of these groups to identity, thus failing to support (though not contradicting) the interpretation that disparagement of ethnic outgroups can be explained by motivations to enhance self-esteem.

Another finding which weakens the hypothesis that high difference scores should be related with low ranks (i.e. high stated importance) is that political orientation was ranked, on the average, as the least important of the groups to identity, even though it was also the group where mean global and the attribute difference scores were the highest. This may not be too important, because it is difficult to conceive of someone having a negative global or attribute difference score for political orientation (if one does not think highly of one's political orientation, why does one not change it?), while it is also a widely made informal observation that SFU undergraduates are extremely politically

uninvolved. Nevertheless, this finding is an anomaly if group memberships are expected to be valued primarily on the basis of their ability to boost our egos by making us feel superior to outgroups.

Chapter 3

Study 2: Assessment of Test-Retest Reliabilities

Method

Subjects

A total of 71 subjects participated in this study. Twelve of these were dropped, either because they failed to show up for the retest session, or else because they failed to fill in the questionnaire completely enough to calculate global difference scores. Of the 59 subjects who furnished usable pairs of questionnaires, 40 were female and 19 were male. All but 13 of the subjects used were obtained through the SFU Psychology Department subject pool, and were given course credit for their participation. The remaining 13 subjects were also psychology students, but were paid \$15 for their participation.

Measure

The measure used in this study was a shortened version of the modified IMIS used in study 1. The two items on ethnicity and province of origin were retained, because they were assumed to be most directly related to ethnic prejudice. In addition, the five items which were ranked, on average, as most important to subjects' senses of identity in study 1 were also included, yielding a questionnaire which inquired about seven different kinds of group. The complete form of this questionnaire is included in Appendix C.

Procedure

Subjects filled out this measure twice, at an interval of two weeks. As in study 1, the experimenter emphasized to subjects at the start of the first session that their questionnaires would be anonymous, and that they were not to put their names or their student numbers on their questionnaires. In order that subjects' two questionnaires could be associated with each other at the end of the second sessions, subjects placed their completed questionnaires in a manila envelope and wrote the last four digits of either their own or their best friends' phone numbers on the outside of the envelope.

At the start of the second sitting, subjects were instructed not to pay attention to how they remembered filling out the questionnaire on the previous occasion, but instead to fill it out according to how they felt at that moment, attempting to be as spontaneous as if they were filling out the measure for the first time. This set of instructions carried the risk that subjects would interpret it as indicating that the experimenter desired that subjects attempt to make their two sets of responses as different as possible from each other. Nevertheless, it was felt that it was better to risk this misinterpretation than to risk that subjects consciously attempt to recall their previous responses, and cause spuriously high test-retest reliabilities by imitating their previous responses.

Data Analysis. Difference scores were calculated as in study 1. Test-retest correlations were calculated for all difference scores.

Results

Reliabilities

The means, standard deviations, and test-retest correlations of all global difference scores are presented in Table 8.

Table 8

Means, Standard Deviations and Two Week Test-Retest Reliabilities of Global Difference Scores.

Social Group	Mean Global Difference Score	Standard Deviation of Difference Score	Test-Retest Reliability
Ethnic	0.70	0.91	.45***
Provincial/Regional	0.63	1.09	.57***
Sex	0.21	0.78	.60***
Occupation	0.65	1.66	.68***
Social Class	1.28	1.45	.59***
Age	0.10	1.10	.29
Family	0.11	1.40	.71***
TOTAL	3.72	3.61	.71***

Note: Test-retest correlations marked with asterisks are significantly different from zero.

* $p \leq .05$

** $p \leq .01$

*** $p \leq .001$

There was a considerable variation in the test-retest reliabilities. They ranged from age at .29 to family at .71. The test-retest reliability of the

ethnic global difference scores was .45. The total global reliability of .71 is greater than any of the individual reliabilities except that for family. This was expected because it is based on a greater number of items, and is thus less influenced by the vagaries of sampling fluctuation.

Table 9

Means, Standard Deviations and Two Week Test-Retest Reliabilities of Attribute Difference Scores.

Social Group	Mean Attribute Difference Score	Standard Deviation of Difference Score	Test-Retest Reliability
Ethnic	0.56	0.82	.64***
Provincial/Regional	0.44	1.12	.51***
Sex	0.15	1.01	.68***
Occupation	0.14	1.53	.69***
Social Class	1.21	1.29	.57***
Age	0.17	1.10	.28*
Family	0.13	1.64	.82***
TOTAL	2.76	3.69	.58***

Note: Test-retest correlations marked with asterisks are significantly different from zero.

* $p \leq .05$

** $p \leq .01$

*** $p \leq .001$

Means, standard deviations, and test-retest correlations for attribute difference scores are presented in Table 9. As for the global difference scores, the lowest reliability for attribute difference scores

was that for age ($r=.28$) and the highest was that for family ($r=.82$). The test-retest reliability of ethnic attribute difference scores was .64, considerably higher than that for ethnic global difference scores, though this difference is not statistically significant, $t(116)=1.57$, $p=.12$.

Sources of change in ethnic attribute difference scores. Given that even a test-retest reliability of .64 means that only 41% of the variance

Table 10

Sources of Change in Ethnic Attribute Difference Scores for 15 Subjects

	Total Number	Number Changing	Proportion Changing
Ethnic Ingroups	90	30	.33
Traits for Same Ingroups	293	185	.63
Evaluations for Same Ingroup Traits	54	18	.33
Ethnic Outgroups	88	38	.43
Traits for Same Outgroups	239	167	.70
Evaluations for Same Outgroup Traits	36	11	.31

in ethnic attribute difference scores was accounted by those same scores two weeks before, it was thought valuable to determine what the source

of the change over time was. Accordingly, 15 of the pairs of questionnaires were chosen at random in order to obtain at least an impressionistic idea of whether changes in ethnic attribute difference scores were the result of changes in the ethnic groups chosen, a change in the attributes imputed to those groups, or a change in evaluations of those attributes.

The results of this compilation are displayed in Table 10. It can be seen that substantial amounts of change occurred at all three possible levels: different ingroups and outgroups were chosen, different attributes were imputed to those groups, and different evaluations were made of those attributes. Nevertheless, the change in imputed attributes appears to play the largest role in the change in difference scores, given that 63% of attributes imputed to ingroups and 70% of those imputed to outgroups changed between the two testing sessions.

Discussion

The 2-week test-retest reliabilities obtained in this study are somewhat lower than was initially hoped, although the reliability of the ethnic attribute difference scores ($r=.64$) is comparable to the two-week test-retest reliability of the total Collective Self-Esteem scale ($r=.68$), which is considered "adequate" by the authors (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992).

Several explanations can be advanced to account for the relatively low reliabilities found in this study. One obvious possibility is that subjects genuinely changed their attitudes toward various outgroups over the two week period. Thus, they may have named different groups because different groups had become salient to them, then imputed different

attributes to the groups that remained the same because of changes in attitude-guided retrieval.

It is also possible that the changes were due simply to the fact that the responses to items were necessarily only a small subset of the subjects' total repertoire of outgroup attributions; change over the two-week period could represent nothing more than a change in the quasi-random subsample of subjects' total cognitive repertoire of outgroup attributions. This is particularly likely because the choice of which outgroups to use while filling out the questionnaire was relatively arbitrary. In the case of ethnic groups, for example, most subjects were probably at least vaguely aware of several dozen ethnic groups other than their own. This hypothesis is borne out by the fact that over 1/3 of ethnic groups named by subjects changed from the first session to the second. Unless one or more ethnic outgroups were tremendously important to subjects (e.g. if they intensely hated them, or were in love with a member of that group, or something of that nature), it is likely that the particular choice of which ethnic groups to write into the blanks of the questionnaire was a relatively arbitrary matter, influenced by trivial factors in subjects' lives. To cite just one concrete example of this, 4 of the 58 undergraduate respondents in study 1 gave the Norwegians as an example of an ethnic group very similar to their own. This was at first puzzling, because only one person listed Swedes and nobody listed Danes as examples of ethnic group similar to their own. Furthermore, none of the four people who listed Norwegians as a similar ethnic group spelled the word "Norwegian" correctly, which suggests that they did not list this group for reasons of great familiarity. It was finally postulated that this otherwise incomprehensible perceived similarity to Norwegians was due

to television coverage of the Lillehammer Olympics, which had taken place shortly before these particular subjects filled out their questionnaire packages.

It is also possible that the relatively low stability of responses is due to the nature of the task. A number of friends of the experimenter's who have attempted to fill out the modified IMIS in study 1 have complained that the task was foreign to them, that they did not think of various outgroups in terms of the sort of easily formulated stereotypes which were required to fill out the questionnaire. Few other respondents made this complaint, but it may be that the relatively impersonal nature of experimenter-subject relationships precluded this sort of avowal. If many of the respondents engaged in this task in order to please the experimenter, rather than because they really believed that the groups they named really possessed the attributes which they imputed to them on the questionnaire, then the choice of attributes can be assumed to contain a large element of arbitrariness. In such a case, it is certainly understandable that any numerical index based on these imputed attributes would also tend to be fairly unstable.

CHAPTER 4

Factor Analysis of the Combined Data from Studies 1 and 2

Method

Data for the global and attribute difference scores for the seven groups which were common to both studies (i.e. ethnic, provincial/regional, sex, social class, occupation, age, and family) were merged for the two studies. In the case of study 2, only the data from the first of the two testing sessions was used. This gave a total pool of 117 questionnaires, of which 93 were complete enough to use for factor analysis (i.e. none of the fourteen global or attribute difference scores was missing). These data were then subjected to an unrotated principal component factor analysis, in order to determine whether there was evidence that they were all related to a factor of generalized prejudice. No rotation was used because a general factor is most likely to manifest itself without rotation (when the amount of variance in the data which is explained by the first factor is maximized) rather than after rotations, most of which are intended to achieve some approximation of simple structure (Gorsuch, 1974).

Results

Five factors were found that had eigenvalues greater than 1.0. Table 11 summarizes the proportion of the total variance explained by each variable, as well as the loadings of the 14 difference scores on those variables. It can be seen that, even using a method of factor extraction that maximizes the proportion of variance explained by the first factor, there is a second factor that explains more than three quarters as much

Table 11

Summary of the First Five Factors Extracted from Seven Global and Seven Attribute Difference Scores.

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5
Proportion of Variance Accounted For	.18	.14	.13	.12	.10
<u>LOADINGS</u>					
Ethnic Global	.67	-.18	-.16	.05	-.30
Ethnic Attribute	.75	-.21	-.05	-.24	-.24
Province Global	.27	-.53	-.18	.14	.41
Province Attribute	.24	-.59	-.13	-.06	.32
Sex Global	-.19	.14	.50	.48	.35
Sex Attribute	-.05	.00	.61	.11	.46
Occupation Global	.30	.79	-.07	-.05	.09
Occupation Attribute	.28	.71	-.12	-.08	-.01
Class Global	.27	-.02	.66	-.48	.03
Class Attribute	.26	-.08	.62	-.61	-.09
Age Global	.46	.10	-.32	-.19	.50
Age Attribute	.49	.25	-.20	-.06	.52
Family Global	.54	-.08	.24	.59	-.21
Family Attribute	.60	.08	.29	.57	-.15

variance as the first, and there are three others that explain at least one half of the amount of variance that the first one accounts for. It should further be noted that, although six of the fourteen difference scores have positive loadings of at least .4 on the first factor, six other difference scores have much weaker positive loadings on the first factor, and the two sex difference scores have negative loadings on this factor.

Discussion

The results of this factor analysis bolster those of the original correlation matrices among difference scores inasmuch as they, too, fail to suggest that "generalized prejudice" is a unidimensional construct. Instead, more favorable global attitudes toward and specific stereotypes about ingroups compared to outgroups appeared to be related to a number of different factors. The concept of "generalized prejudice" is of very limited utility in dealing with these data.

At first blush, the first factor, despite the small amount of variance which it accounts for, does look something like a general ingroup favoritism or prejudice factor. Unfortunately, the negative loading of sex difference scores mitigates against this interpretation. Instead, this factor is best interpreted in the context of the norms which are held in liberal arts programs at Simon Fraser University. Recalling that most of the subjects in the sample were female, this factor looks like a social undesirability factor: subjects scoring high on this factor tended to be more biased against most types of outgroups (which is socially undesirable in this context) but slightly less biased in favor of their own sex (which is also not particularly desirable for women striving for emancipation from a male-dominated society).

A tentative interpretation of the second factor can also be made. The strong positive loading of occupation on this factor, as well as the moderately strong negative loading of province, suggests that this factor is something like a capitalistic modernism factor. Subjects with high scores on this factor have strong biases in favor of their occupational groups, but little or no bias in favor of their home province. This suggests that this factor is indicative of the kind of loyalty to a profession and disregard for geographic ties which is being fostered by the norms of modern capitalism, which stresses mobility in pursuit of occupational goals.

It should be stressed that such interpretations are highly tentative, and that the factor structure itself should be expected to be highly unstable, given the very similar eigenvalues of the first five factors.

Chapter 5

General Discussion and Conclusions

General Remarks

The results of the studies reported here confirm the hope that the ethnic global and attribute difference scores can potentially form the nucleus of a psychometrically adequate measure of ethnic prejudice which is considerably more flexible than any existing measure. These measures have adequate convergent validity, as assessed by their correlations with the Manitoba Prejudice Scale, as well as having adequate test-retest reliability. The low correlations of ethnic global and attribute difference scores with the Positive Affect and Negative Affect scales indicate that prejudice is not being confounded with generalized affect. On the other hand, the hypothesis that there should be a relatively high level of mean intercorrelation among the various difference scores (which would then also manifest itself as a powerful general factor when those difference scores were subjected to a factor analysis) was not confirmed. The hypothesized correlation between the Collective Self-Esteem scale (CSE) and total global and total attribute difference scores was not obtained, although two subscales of the CSE did correlate significantly with total attribute (but not total global) difference scores. The hypothesis which postulated negative correlations of global and attribute difference scores with their corresponding ranks was only weakly confirmed. These failures suggest that it may be futile to attempt to find a meaningful interpretation for the modified IMIS as a whole, and more specifically to relate it to social identity theory and the construct of collective self-esteem (Crocker & Luhtanen, 1992).

Given that both the ethnic global and ethnic attribute difference score are comparable in both their validity (as assessed by correlation with the MPS) and reliability (as assessed by test-retest reliability), but the two together are not significantly better at predicting MPS scores than either one individually, the question then arises as to which one of these two measures should be used to measure ethnic prejudice. The answer is that it is probably better to use the ethnic attribute difference score, because subjects, when making their global assessments of ethnic groups, already had their attributions, as well as their evaluations of those attributions, right in front of them. They may well have made their global assessments more carefully partly because they were aware of their previous attributions. In addition, those few subjects who expressed their feelings about the questionnaire to the experimenter tended to be much more offended by the global evaluations of ethnic groups than by the particular traits they were asked to attribute to those groups.

Potential Uses of the Modified IMIS

One obvious use to which the ethnic attribute difference scores can be put is the intercultural comparison of ethnic prejudice. All previous measures have been inappropriate for this task, because they are always designed to assess a specific set of prejudices and negative stereotypes against particular ethnic groups, where prejudices, stereotypes, and target outgroups are all peculiar to the culture in which the measure was developed. The present measure avoids this problem by dealing with the beliefs a particular respondent has to the ethnic groups which are relevant and salient to that respondent.

Another area in which this method has great potential (and this is an area where Zavalloni & Louis-Guerin (1984) have already done considerable work) is in assessing the types of experiences which have led particular individuals to have particular beliefs about certain outgroups. Because most prejudice scales deal primarily with stereotypes which are widely held in a given culture, they would bias explanations about the origins of negative beliefs about ethnic outgroups. The types of prejudiced attitudes and beliefs which these scales measure tend to be those that are learned in the social group; thus, studies using such instruments will probably tend to overestimate the role of social transmission in creating such beliefs. The present method does not have this bias, and would give a greater variety of possible results, i.e. it is possible to consider personal experience as the source of many negative beliefs about ethnic outgroups.

This method is also very valuable inasmuch as it can be used to assess both generalized prejudice and specific stereotypes about specific groups at the same time. Although relatively little of this was done in this particular study, the ethnic portion (or any other portion) of this instrument can be subjected to content analyses, thus elucidating the content of stereotypes, as well as providing an index to the overall level of prejudice which a person has toward ethnic outgroups in general.

Limitations of the Present Investigation

One limitation of this study is a conceptual one. Because the measure under investigation compares attributions about and attitudes toward outgroups with attributions about and attitudes toward ingroups, this may more properly be thought of as a measure of ingroup favoritism

(a tendency to have more favorable attitudes and beliefs about ingroups than outgroups) rather than of prejudice (the possession of unfavorable attitudes and beliefs about outgroups) or ethnocentrism (the possession of favorable attitudes and beliefs about ingroups, as well as of somewhat or very negative attitudes and beliefs about outgroups). Thus, although it has been shown empirically that the new measure is fairly strongly correlated with scores on a measure of prejudice, this only indicates that the construct being assessed here is related to the construct of prejudice.

A more nuanced understanding of the distinction between the ingroup favoritism being assessed here and prejudice might be obtained by a recoding and reanalysis of the raw data acquired in this study. One possible method would be to code outgroup ratings to indicate absolute levels of negative attitudes and attributions about the outgroups examined here, without using the ingroup as a baseline for comparison. It might be desirable to correlate these absolute ratings both with the measure of ingroup favoritism examined in this study and with the MPS, to determine whether absolute negativity ratings have a stronger relationship with scores on an existing prejudice measure with which it may be conceptually more similar, as well as to determine how similar the two IMIS-based measures are to each other.

Several limitations of the present investigation should be briefly mentioned. One obvious limitation of these studies is the small and relatively homogeneous sample which was used. More comprehensive studies would use many more subjects from a wider variety of backgrounds (especially in terms of education, as all subjects in the present study had gone through at least some higher education). Furthermore, although many subjects were not native Canadians, all were tested in Canada. It is possible that their attitudes toward other ethnic groups have been molded by the Canadian experience. Testing in other

countries is highly desirable to further test the claim of cross-cultural validity.

Another limitation of the present investigation was its failure to control for social desirability effects. The care that was taken to assure subjects of their anonymity was intended largely to ensure that social desirability effects were minimized, but this is no guarantee that they were eliminated altogether. Future testings of this method should include some form of social desirability scale, in an attempt to further control these effects.

A further limitation of this investigation, is that all respondents were required to list exactly six ethnic groups. In future research, it might be useful to modify this procedure so that some subjects are asked to list more or less than six groups, to determine whether that has an effect on validity and reliability.

A final, rather severe limitation of this investigation was the use of the Manitoba Prejudice Scale as the standard used to validate the new measure. Given that the new measure was developed to compensate for the weaknesses of existing measures, it seems paradoxical to then use one of those older measures in validating the new one. Nevertheless, the alternative would be to use a behavioral measure of ethnic prejudice in validating the new measure. Such a behavioral measure would be unbelievably cumbersome, because what is being measured is a tendency to react negatively to a wide variety of ethnic outgroups, rather than attitudes toward any particular outgroup. This would require either a long series of contrived experimental interactions between subjects and target persons of a wide variety of ethnic backgrounds, or else a period of at least several weeks of naturalistic observation of experimental subjects.

Either of these procedures is likely to be prohibitively difficult, and will probably not be carried out by anyone in the foreseeable future.

References

- Adorno, T., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D., & Sanford, R. (1950). The authoritarian personality. New York: Harper.
- Allport, G. W. (1954). The nature of prejudice. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley.
- Altemeyer, B. (1981). Right wing authoritarianism. Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press.
- Altemeyer, B. (1988). Enemies of freedom: Understanding right-wing authoritarianism. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Ard, N. & Cook, S. W. (1977). A short scale for the measurement of change in racial attitude. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 37, 741-744.
- Beswick, D. G. & Hills, M. D. (1972). A survey of ethnocentrism in Australia. Australian Journal of Psychology, 24, 153-163.
- Bobo, L. (1983). Whites' opposition to busing: Symbolic racism or realistic group conflict? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45, 1196-1210.
- Bogardus, E. (1925). Measuring social distance. Journal of Applied Sociology, 9, 299-308.
- Brewer, M. B. & Campbell, D. T. (1976). Ethnocentrism and intergroup attitudes: East African evidence. New York: Sage.
- Cohn, T. S. (1953). The relation of the F scale to a response to answer positively. American Psychologist, 8, 335 (Abstract).
- Couch, A., & Keniston, K. (1960). Yeasayers and naysayers: Agreeing response as a personality variable. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 60, 151-174.

- Crocker, J. & Luhtanen, R. (1990). Collective self-esteem and ingroup bias. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58, 60-67.
- Crocker, J., Thompson, L. L., McGraw, K. M., & Ingerman, C. (1987). Downward comparison, prejudice, and evaluation of others: Effects of self-esteem and threat. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52, 907-916.
- Cronbach, L. J. (1946). Response sets and test validity. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 6, 475-494.
- Devine, P. G. (1989). Stereotypes and prejudice: Their automatic and controlled components. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56, 5-18.
- Duckitt, J. (1992). The social psychology of prejudice. New York: Praeger.
- Fink, H. C. (1971). Fictitious groups and the generality of prejudice: An artifact of scales without neutral categories. Psychological Reports, 29, 359-365.
- Gaertner, S. L. & Dovidio, J. F. (1986). The aversive form of racism. In J. F. Dovidio & S. L. Gaertner (Ed.s). Prejudice, Discrimination, and Racism (pp. 61-89). Orlando: Academic Press.
- Gaertner, S. L. & McLaughlin, J. P. (1983). Racial stereotypes: Associations and ascriptions of positive and negative characteristics. Social Psychology Quarterly, 46, 23-30.
- Gorsuch, R. L. (1974). Factor analysis. Philadelphia: Saunders.
- Guilford, J. P. (1931). Racial preferences of a thousand American university students. Journal of Social Psychology, 2, 179-204.

- Haddock, G., Zanna, M. P., & Esses, V. M. (1993). Assessing the structure of prejudicial attitudes: The case of attitudes toward homosexuals. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65, 1105-1118.
- Haddock, G., Zanna, M. P., & Esses, V. M. (1994). Mood and the expression of intergroup attitudes: The moderating role of affect intensity. European Journal of Social Psychology, 24, 189-205.
- Hartley, E. L. (1946). Problems in prejudice. New York: King's Crown Press.
- Hogg, M. A. & Sunderland, J. (1991). Self-esteem and intergroup discrimination in the minimal group paradigm. British Journal of Social Psychology, 30, 51-62.
- Kinder, D. R. & Sears, D. O. (1981). Prejudice and politics: Symbolic racism versus racial threats to the good life. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 40, 414-431.
- Kramer, B. M. (1949). Dimensions of prejudice. The Journal of Psychology, 27, 389-451.
- Lemyre, L. & Smith, P. M. (1985). Intergroup discrimination and self-esteem in the minimal group paradigm. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49, 660-670.
- Levinson, D. J. & Sanford, R. N. (1944). A scale for the measure of anti-semitism. The Journal of Psychology, 17, 339-370.
- Luhtanen, R. & Crocker, J. (1992). A collective self-esteem scale: Self-evaluation of one's social identity. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 18, 302-318.
- McConahay, J. B., Hardee, B. B., & Batts, V. (1981). Has racism declined in America? Journal of Conflict Resolution, 25, 563-579.

- Milner, D. (1981). Racial prejudice. In J. Turner & H. Giles (Ed.s), Intergroup behavior (pp. 102-143). Oxford: Blackwell.
- Pettigrew, T. F. (1958). Personality and sociocultural factors in intergroup attitudes: A cross-national comparison. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2, 29-42.
- Ray, J. J. & Lovejoy, F. H. (1986). The generality of racial prejudice. Journal of Social Psychology, 126, 563-564.
- Sears, D. O. & McConahay, J. B. (1973). The politics of violence: The new urban blacks and the Watts riot. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Seeman, M. (1981). Intergroup relations. In M. Rosenberg & R. H. Turner (Ed.s). Social psychology: Sociological perspectives (pp. 378-410). New York: Basic Books.
- Tajfel, H. & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. In S. Worchel & W. G. Austin (Ed.s). Psychology of intergroup relations. Chicago: Nelson-Hall.
- Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and validation of brief measures of positive and negative affect: The PANAS scales. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54, 1063-1070.
- Weigel, R. H. & Howes, P. W. (1985). Conceptions of racial prejudice: Symbolic racism reconsidered. Journal of Social Issues, 41(3), 117-138.
- Woodmansee, J. J. & Cook, S. W. (1967). Dimensions of verbal racial attitudes: Their identification and measurement. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 7, 240-250.

Zavalloni, M. & Louis-Guerin, C. (1984). Identite sociale et conscience:
Introduction a l'ego-ecologie. Montreal: les Presses de
l'Universite de Montreal.

Appendix A: Measures Used in Study 1

SOCIAL IDENTITY INVENTORY

Each of us is a member of a number of different social groups by virtue of our identity and affinities. Thus, I am a member of a group of people of a certain ethnicity, of a certain region, of a certain age group, of a certain sex, etc.

We ask you to describe some of the groups to which you belong, as well as some groups which consist of individuals who differ from you to some extent. In order to do this, you will be asked to answer each of the questions on the following pages with at least five words or short phrases. We ask you to do this spontaneously, without worrying too much about accuracy. We are interested in your first impressions. There are no right or wrong answers, only your own personal impressions are important here.

We thank you for doing the sections of this questionnaire in order and for treating each question individually, without looking at subsequent questions. Please take as much time as you need to complete all questions. Do not write anything in the spaces marked "reserved" until instructed to do so.

Phase I

To what ethnic group do you belong? _____ reserved _____
insert name of your ethnic group

When you think of _____, what comes to mind?
insert name of your ethnic group

_____ are: (Please give at least 5 responses).
insert name of your ethnic group

Reserved Column

- | | | |
|----|-------|-------|
| 1. | _____ | _____ |
| 2. | _____ | _____ |
| 3. | _____ | _____ |
| 4. | _____ | _____ |
| 5. | _____ | _____ |
| | _____ | _____ |
| | _____ | _____ |
| | _____ | _____ |

Please name an ethnic group which you consider very similar to your own.

_____ reserved space

When you think of _____, what comes to mind?

_____ are: (Please give at least 5 responses).

Reserved Column

- | | | |
|----|-------|-------|
| 1. | _____ | _____ |
| 2. | _____ | _____ |
| 3. | _____ | _____ |
| 4. | _____ | _____ |
| 5. | _____ | _____ |
| | _____ | _____ |

Please name an ethnic group which you consider very dissimilar from your own. _____

reserved space

When you think of _____, what comes to mind?

_____ are: (Please give at least 5 responses).

Reserved Column

- | | | |
|----|-------|-------|
| 1. | _____ | _____ |
| 2. | _____ | _____ |
| 3. | _____ | _____ |
| 4. | _____ | _____ |
| 5. | _____ | _____ |
| | _____ | _____ |

Please name another ethnic group which you consider very similar to your own. _____

reserved

When you think of _____, what comes to mind?

_____ are: (Please give at least 5 responses).

Reserved Column

- | | | |
|----|-------|-------|
| 1. | _____ | _____ |
| 2. | _____ | _____ |
| 3. | _____ | _____ |
| 4. | _____ | _____ |
| 5. | _____ | _____ |
| | _____ | _____ |

Please name another ethnic group which you consider very dissimilar from your own. _____

reserved

When you think of _____, what comes to mind?

_____ are: (Please give at least 5 responses).

Reserved Column

- | | | |
|----|-------|-------|
| 1. | _____ | _____ |
| 2. | _____ | _____ |
| 3. | _____ | _____ |
| 4. | _____ | _____ |
| 5. | _____ | _____ |
| | _____ | _____ |

Please name one more ethnic group which you consider very dissimilar from your own. _____

reserved

When you think of _____, what comes to mind?

_____ are: (Please give at least 5 responses).

Reserved Column

- | | | |
|----|-------|-------|
| 1. | _____ | _____ |
| 2. | _____ | _____ |
| 3. | _____ | _____ |
| 4. | _____ | _____ |
| 5. | _____ | _____ |
| | _____ | _____ |

What region or province do you come from? _____
reserved

When you think of people from the region or province of _____, what comes to mind?

People from _____ are: (Please give at least 5 responses)

Reserved Column

- | | | |
|----|-------|-------|
| 1. | _____ | _____ |
| 2. | _____ | _____ |
| 3. | _____ | _____ |
| 4. | _____ | _____ |
| 5. | _____ | _____ |
| | _____ | _____ |

Please name a province other than your own: _____
reserved

When you think of people from _____, what comes to mind?

People from _____ are: (Please give at least 5 responses)

Reserved Column

- | | | |
|----|-------|-------|
| 1. | _____ | _____ |
| 2. | _____ | _____ |
| 3. | _____ | _____ |
| 4. | _____ | _____ |
| 5. | _____ | _____ |
| | _____ | _____ |

What sex are you: _____ reserved _____

When you think of people of your sex, what comes to mind?

_____ are: (Please give at least 5 responses)

Reserved Column

1.	_____	_____
2.	_____	_____
3.	_____	_____
4.	_____	_____
5.	_____	_____
	_____	_____

Now think of the opposite sex. _____ reserved _____

When you think of the opposite sex, what comes to mind?

_____ are: (Please give at least 5 responses)

Reserved Column

1.	_____	_____
2.	_____	_____
3.	_____	_____
4.	_____	_____
5.	_____	_____
	_____	_____

What is your religious affiliation? _____ reserved

When you think of people of this religious affiliation, what comes to mind?

_____ are: (Please give at least 5 responses)

Reserved Column

- | | | |
|----|-------|-------|
| 1. | _____ | _____ |
| 2. | _____ | _____ |
| 3. | _____ | _____ |
| 4. | _____ | _____ |
| 5. | _____ | _____ |
| | _____ | _____ |

Please think of another religion which is very different from your own.

_____ reserved

When you think of people of this religious affiliation, what comes to mind?

_____ are: (Please give at least 5 responses)

Reserved Column

- | | | |
|----|-------|-------|
| 1. | _____ | _____ |
| 2. | _____ | _____ |
| 3. | _____ | _____ |
| 4. | _____ | _____ |
| 5. | _____ | _____ |
| | _____ | _____ |

What is your main occupation? _____ reserved

When you think of other people with that same occupation, what comes to mind?

_____ are: (Please give at least 5 responses)

Reserved Column

- | | | |
|----|-------|-------|
| 1. | _____ | _____ |
| 2. | _____ | _____ |
| 3. | _____ | _____ |
| 4. | _____ | _____ |
| 5. | _____ | _____ |
| | _____ | _____ |

Now think of an occupation very different from your own. What is that occupation? _____ reserved

When you think of people in that occupation, what comes to mind?

_____ are: (Please give at least 5 responses)

Reserved Column

- | | | |
|----|-------|-------|
| 1. | _____ | _____ |
| 2. | _____ | _____ |
| 3. | _____ | _____ |
| 4. | _____ | _____ |
| 5. | _____ | _____ |
| | _____ | _____ |

Of what social class do you consider yourself a member?

_____ reserved _____

When you think of members of this class, what comes to mind?

Members of the _____ class are: (Please give at least 5 responses)

Reserved Column

- | | | |
|----|-------|-------|
| 1. | _____ | _____ |
| 2. | _____ | _____ |
| 3. | _____ | _____ |
| 4. | _____ | _____ |
| 5. | _____ | _____ |
| | _____ | _____ |

Which social class would you consider to be very different from the one to which you belong? _____

reserved

When you think of members of this class, what comes to mind?

Members of the _____ class are: (please give at least 5 responses)

Reserved Column

- | | | |
|----|-------|-------|
| 1. | _____ | _____ |
| 2. | _____ | _____ |
| 3. | _____ | _____ |
| 4. | _____ | _____ |
| 5. | _____ | _____ |
| | _____ | _____ |

How would you define your political orientation?

_____ reserved _____

When you think of people of this political orientation, what comes to mind?

_____ are: (Please give at least 5 responses)

Reserved Column

- | | | |
|----|-------|-------|
| 1. | _____ | _____ |
| 2. | _____ | _____ |
| 3. | _____ | _____ |
| 4. | _____ | _____ |
| 5. | _____ | _____ |
| | _____ | _____ |

Which political orientation would you describe as being opposed to your own? _____ reserved _____

When you think of people of this orientation, what comes to mind?

_____ are: (Please give at least 5 responses)

Reserved Column

- | | | |
|----|-------|-------|
| 1. | _____ | _____ |
| 2. | _____ | _____ |
| 3. | _____ | _____ |
| 4. | _____ | _____ |
| 5. | _____ | _____ |
| | _____ | _____ |

Which age group do you belong to? _____ reserved

When you think of people in this age group, what comes to mind?

_____ are: (Please give at least 5 responses)

Reserved Column

- | | | |
|----|-------|-------|
| 1. | _____ | _____ |
| 2. | _____ | _____ |
| 3. | _____ | _____ |
| 4. | _____ | _____ |
| 5. | _____ | _____ |
| | _____ | _____ |

Now think of an age group different from your own. Which group is this?

_____ reserved

When you think of people in this age group, what comes to mind?

_____ are: (Please give at least 5 responses)

Reserved Column

- | | | |
|----|-------|-------|
| 1. | _____ | _____ |
| 2. | _____ | _____ |
| 3. | _____ | _____ |
| 4. | _____ | _____ |
| 5. | _____ | _____ |
| | _____ | _____ |

What is your marital status? _____ reserved _____

When you think of people with this marital status, what comes to mind?

_____ people are: (please give at least 5 responses)

	Reserved Column
1. _____	_____
2. _____	_____
3. _____	_____
4. _____	_____
5. _____	_____
_____	_____

Now think of a marital status different from your own. What is it?

_____ reserved _____

When you think of people with this marital status, what comes to mind?

_____ people are: (Please give at least 5 responses)

	Reserved Column
1. _____	_____
2. _____	_____
3. _____	_____
4. _____	_____
5. _____	_____
_____	_____

Think about your family. What comes to mind when you think of people in your family? _____

reserved

Members of my family are: (Please give at least 5 responses)

Reserved Column

1.	_____	_____
2.	_____	_____
3.	_____	_____
4.	_____	_____
5.	_____	_____
	_____	_____

Now think about the people outside your family. What comes to mind when you think of people outside your family? _____

reserved

People outside my family are: (Please give at least 5 responses)

Reserved Column

1.	_____	_____
2.	_____	_____
3.	_____	_____
4.	_____	_____
5.	_____	_____
	_____	_____

There is certainly at least one other group of which you are a member.
Please state what that group is.

_____ reserved

When you think of members of that group, what comes to mind?

_____ are: (Please give at least 5 responses)

Reserved Column

- | | | |
|----|-------|-------|
| 1. | _____ | _____ |
| 2. | _____ | _____ |
| 3. | _____ | _____ |
| 4. | _____ | _____ |
| 5. | _____ | _____ |
| | _____ | _____ |

Now think of those who are not a member of this group. _____ reserved

When you think of those not in this group, what comes to mind?

Those who are not _____ are: (Please give at least 5 responses)

Reserved Column

- | | | |
|----|-------|-------|
| 1. | _____ | _____ |
| 2. | _____ | _____ |
| 3. | _____ | _____ |
| 4. | _____ | _____ |
| 5. | _____ | _____ |
| | _____ | _____ |

Phase II

1) Please look at your responses again and classify them in terms of *positive, negative, or neutral*

- Put two plusses "++" behind each characteristic which you consider very positive in itself
- Put a "+" symbol behind each characteristic which you consider somewhat positive in itself.
- Put a "0" behind each characteristic which you consider to be neutral, neither positive nor negative in itself.
- Put a "-" symbol behind each character which you consider to be somewhat negative in itself.
- Put two minuses "--" behind each character which you consider to be very negative in itself

Note: A column has been set aside at the right for you to indicate the evaluation (++,+, 0, -,-) for each response.

2) Please go back and look at the groups which you have named, both those to which you belong and those to which you do not. Please rate these groups in the same way you have rated individual traits. That is:

- Put two plusses "++" in the reserved space behind each group toward which, in general, you feel very positively.
- Put a plus "+" in the reserved space behind each group toward which, in general, you feel somewhat positively.
- Put a zero "0" in the reserved space behind each group toward which, in general, you feel neither positively nor negatively.
- Put a minus "-" in the reserved space behind each group toward which, in general, you feel somewhat negatively.
- Put two minuses "--" in the reserved space behind each group toward which, in general, you feel very negatively.

Phase III

Now think about these eleven types of group, and decide which of them are the most important to you for giving you a sense of who you are. Please rank the eleven kinds of group (ethnic, regional/provincial, sex, religious affiliation, occupation, social class, political orientation, age, marital status, family, and other (whatever you have chosen)). Please list them in the spaces provided below, with the most important listed on line 1, the next most important on line 2, and so forth down to the least important on line 11.

1. _____ most important group
2. _____
3. _____
4. _____
5. _____
6. _____
7. _____
8. _____
9. _____
10. _____
11. _____ least important group

7. Certain races of people clearly do *not* have the natural intelligence and "get up and go" of the white race.

-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4
 strongly disagree neutral strongly agree

8. The Filipinos and other Asians who have recently moved to Canada have proven themselves to be industrious citizens, and many more should be invited in.

-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4
 strongly disagree neutral strongly agree

9. It is good to live in a country where there are so many minority groups present, like the Indians, Chinese, and Blacks.

-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4
 strongly disagree neutral strongly agree

10. There are entirely too many people from the wrong sorts of places being admitted into Canada now.

-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4
 strongly disagree neutral strongly agree

11. No race on this earth is as good, hardworking, and noble as the white race.

-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4
 strongly disagree neutral strongly agree

12. Jews can be trusted as much as anybody else.

-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4
 strongly disagree neutral strongly agree

13. As a group Indians and Metis are naturally lazy, promiscuous, and irresponsible.

-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4
 strongly disagree neutral strongly agree

14. Canada should open its doors to more immigration from India and Africa.

-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4
strongly disagree neutral strongly agree

15. Black people as a rule are, by their nature, more violent than white people.

-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4
strongly disagree neutral strongly agree

16. The Pakistanis and East Indians who have recently come to Canada have mainly brought disease, ignorance, and crime with them.

-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4
strongly disagree neutral strongly agree

17. Much of the white race's accomplishments have occurred because it has continually exploited other races.

-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4
strongly disagree neutral strongly agree

18. More Chinese, Arabs, and Sikhs should be recruited for our medical, pharmacy, engineering, and other professional schools.

-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4
strongly disagree neutral strongly agree

19. It is a waste of time to train certain races for good jobs; they simply don't have the drive and determination it takes to learn a complicated skill.

-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4
strongly disagree neutral strongly agree

20. There is nothing wrong about intermarriage among the races.

- 4	- 3	- 2	- 1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4
strongly disagree				neutral				strongly agree

The Collective Self-Esteem Scale

Rate your degree of agreement or disagreement with the following items on a scale where 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = disagree somewhat, 4 = neutral, 5 = agree somewhat, 6 = agree, and 7 = strongly agree.

1. I am a worthy member of the groups I belong to.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

2. I often regret that I belong to some of the social groups I do.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

3. Overall, my social groups are considered good by others.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

4. Overall, my group memberships have very little to do with how I feel about myself.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

5. I feel I don't have much to offer the social groups I belong to.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

6. In general, I'm glad to be a member of the social groups I belong to.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

7. Most people consider my social groups, on the average, to be more ineffective than other social groups.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

8. The social groups I belong to are an important reflection of who I am.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

9. I am a cooperative participant of the groups I belong to.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

10. Overall, I often feel that the social groups of which I am a member are not worthwhile.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

11. In general, others respect the social groups that I am a member of.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

12. The social groups I belong to are unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

13. I often feel I'm a useless member of my social groups.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

14. I feel good about the social groups I belong to.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

15. In general, others think that the social groups I am a member of are unworthy.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

16. In general, belonging to social groups is an important part of my self-image.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

The PANAS

This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to the word. Indicate to what extent you generally feel this way, that is, how you feel on average. Use the following scale to record your answers.

1
very slightly
or not at all

2
a little

3
moderately

4
quite a bit

5
extremely

_____ interested

_____ distressed

_____ excited

_____ upset

_____ strong

_____ guilty

_____ scared

_____ hostile

_____ enthusiastic

_____ proud

_____ irritable

_____ alert

_____ ashamed

_____ inspired

_____ nervous

_____ determined

_____ attentive

_____ jittery

_____ active

_____ afraid

Appendix B: Supplementary Data from Study 1

Table B1

Means and Standard Deviations of Rank Scores.

Social Group	Mean Rank	Standard Deviation of Rank	Extreme Ranks	
			Highest	Lowest
Ethnic	5.48	3.16	1	11
Provincial/Regional	7.66	2.46	2	11
Sex	4.86	3.05	1	11
Religious Affiliation	7.54	3.00	1	11
Occupation	5.02	2.36	1	10
Social Class	5.29	2.40	1	10
Political Orientation	8.25	2.50	2	11
Age	5.09	3.02	1	11
Marital Status	6.27	2.73	1	11
Family	3.31	2.84	1	11
Other	7.05	3.36	1	11

Table B2

Means and Standard Deviations of Scores on the Manitoba Prejudice Scale, the Collective Self-Esteem Scale, and the Positive Affect and Negative Affect Scale

Scale (Subscale)	Mean	Standard Deviation	Extreme Scores	
			Lowest	Highest
MPS	-34.9	19.9	-76	10
CSE	86.3	10.1	62	108
(Membership)	22.9	3.5	14	28
(Private)	22.8	3.5	15	28
(Public)	21.2	3.9	11	28
(Identity)	19.1	5.4	6	28
PA	35.9	5.4	22	48
NA	20.8	6.0	10	34

Table B3

Correlations of nonethnic global difference scores with the MPS, CSE, PA, and NA.

Global Difference Score	MPS	CSE	PA	NA
Provincial/Regional	.22	.07	.05	.12
Sex	-.19	.03	.23	-.07
Religious Affiliation	.22	.07	-.18	.04
Occupation	.23	-.17	.12	.12
Social Class	.19	.19	.06	-.08
Political Orientation	-.03	.29	-.12	.13
Age	.35**	-.32**	-.36**	.48***
Marital Status	.04	.04	.03	.09
Family	.16	-.14	-.03	-.03
Other	-.02	-.03	-.21	.14

Note: Correlations marked with asterisks are significantly different from zero.

* $p \leq .05$

** $p \leq .01$

*** $p \leq .001$

Table B4

Correlations of nonethnic attribute difference scores with the MPS, CSE, PA, and NA.

Attribute Difference Score	MPS	CSE	PA	NA
Provincial/Regional	.01	.09	-.04	.10
Sex	-.26*	.06	.17	-.40***
Religious Affiliation	.25*	-.08	-.09	.07
Occupation	.15	.02	.25*	.07
Social Class	-.01	.17	.22	-.28*
Political Orientation	-.06	.25	-.03	.09
Age	.20	-.06	.14	.13
Marital Status	.11	.13	-.03	-.11
Family	.10	-.07	.20	-.04
Other	-.04	.21	-.06	-.07

Note: Correlations marked with asterisks are significantly different from zero.

* $p \leq .05$

** $p \leq .01$

*** $p \leq .001$

Table B5

Correlations of nonethnic ranked importances with the MPS, CSE, PA, and NA.

Ranked Importance	MPS	CSE	PA	NA
Provincial/Regional	-.07	.07	.22	-.03
Sex	.13	-.20	-.13	.23
Religious Affiliation	-.30*	.06	.03	-.19
Occupation	.11	.01	-.13	.03
Social Class	-.16	-.25*	-.08	-.07
Political Orientation	.11	-.03	-.06	-.02
Age	.05	.17	.10	-.25*
Marital Status	-.01	.22	-.06	-.27*
Family	.05	.05	-.03	.19
Other	.04	-.04	-.03	.22

Note: Correlations marked with asterisks are significantly different from zero.

* $p \leq .05$

** $p \leq .01$

*** $p \leq .001$

Appendix C: Measure Used in Study 2

SOCIAL IDENTITY INVENTORY

Each of us is a member of a number of different social groups by virtue of our identity and affinities. Thus, I am a member of a group of people of a certain ethnicity, of a certain region, of a certain age group, of a certain sex, etc.

We ask you to describe some of the groups to which you belong, as well as some groups which consist of individuals who differ from you to some extent. In order to do this, you will be asked to answer each of the questions on the following pages with at least five words or short phrases. We ask you to do this spontaneously, without worrying too much about accuracy. We are interested in your first impressions. There are no right or wrong answers, only your own personal impressions are important here.

We thank you for doing the sections of this questionnaire in order and for treating each question individually, without looking at subsequent questions. Please take as much time as you need to complete all questions. Do not write anything in the spaces marked "reserved" until instructed to do so.

Phase I

To what ethnic group do you belong? _____ reserved _____
insert name of your ethnic group

When you think of _____, what comes to mind?
insert name of your ethnic group

_____ are: (Please give at least 5 responses).
insert name of your ethnic group

Reserved Column

1.	_____	_____
2.	_____	_____
3.	_____	_____
4.	_____	_____
5.	_____	_____
	_____	_____
	_____	_____
	_____	_____

Please name an ethnic group which you consider very similar to your own.

_____ reserved space

When you think of _____, what comes to mind?

_____ are: (Please give at least 5 responses).

Reserved Column

- | | | |
|----|-------|-------|
| 1. | _____ | _____ |
| 2. | _____ | _____ |
| 3. | _____ | _____ |
| 4. | _____ | _____ |
| 5. | _____ | _____ |
| | _____ | _____ |

Please name an ethnic group which you consider very dissimilar from your own.

_____ reserved space

When you think of _____, what comes to mind?

_____ are: (Please give at least 5 responses).

Reserved Column

- | | | |
|----|-------|-------|
| 1. | _____ | _____ |
| 2. | _____ | _____ |
| 3. | _____ | _____ |
| 4. | _____ | _____ |
| 5. | _____ | _____ |
| | _____ | _____ |

Please name another ethnic group which you consider very similar to your own. _____

reserved

When you think of _____, what comes to mind?

_____ are: (Please give at least 5 responses).

Reserved Column

- | | | |
|----|-------|-------|
| 1. | _____ | _____ |
| 2. | _____ | _____ |
| 3. | _____ | _____ |
| 4. | _____ | _____ |
| 5. | _____ | _____ |
| | _____ | _____ |

Please name another ethnic group which you consider very dissimilar from your own. _____

reserved

When you think of _____, what comes to mind?

_____ are: (Please give at least 5 responses).

Reserved Column

- | | | |
|----|-------|-------|
| 1. | _____ | _____ |
| 2. | _____ | _____ |
| 3. | _____ | _____ |
| 4. | _____ | _____ |
| 5. | _____ | _____ |
| | _____ | _____ |

Please name one more ethnic group which you consider very dissimilar from your own. _____ reserved

When you think of _____, what comes to mind?
_____ are: (Please give at least 5 responses).

Reserved Column

- | | | |
|----|-------|-------|
| 1. | _____ | _____ |
| 2. | _____ | _____ |
| 3. | _____ | _____ |
| 4. | _____ | _____ |
| 5. | _____ | _____ |
| | _____ | _____ |

What region or province do you come from? _____ reserved

When you think of people from the region or province of _____, what comes to mind?

People from _____ are: (Please give at least 5 responses)

Reserved Column

- | | | |
|----|-------|-------|
| 1. | _____ | _____ |
| 2. | _____ | _____ |
| 3. | _____ | _____ |
| 4. | _____ | _____ |
| 5. | _____ | _____ |
| | _____ | _____ |

Please name a province other than your own: _____ reserved

When you think of people from _____, what comes to mind?

People from _____ are: (Please give at least 5 responses)

Reserved Column

- | | | |
|----|-------|-------|
| 1. | _____ | _____ |
| 2. | _____ | _____ |
| 3. | _____ | _____ |
| 4. | _____ | _____ |
| 5. | _____ | _____ |
| | _____ | _____ |

What sex are you: _____ reserved

When you think of people of your sex, what comes to mind?

_____ are: (Please give at least 5 responses)

Reserved Column

- 1. _____
- 2. _____
- 3. _____
- 4. _____
- 5. _____

Now think of the opposite sex. _____ reserved

When you think of the opposite sex, what comes to mind?

_____ are: (Please give at least 5 responses)

Reserved Column

- 1. _____
- 2. _____
- 3. _____
- 4. _____
- 5. _____

What is your main occupation? _____ reserved

When you think of other people with that same occupation, what comes to mind?

_____ are: (Please give at least 5 responses)

Reserved Column

- | | | |
|----|-------|-------|
| 1. | _____ | _____ |
| 2. | _____ | _____ |
| 3. | _____ | _____ |
| 4. | _____ | _____ |
| 5. | _____ | _____ |
| | _____ | _____ |

Now think of an occupation very different from your own. What is that occupation? _____ reserved

When you think of people in that occupation, what comes to mind?

_____ are: (Please give at least 5 responses)

Reserved Column

- | | | |
|----|-------|-------|
| 1. | _____ | _____ |
| 2. | _____ | _____ |
| 3. | _____ | _____ |
| 4. | _____ | _____ |
| 5. | _____ | _____ |
| | _____ | _____ |

Of what social class do you consider yourself a member?

_____ reserved _____

When you think of members of this class, what comes to mind?

Members of the _____ class are: (Please give at least 5 responses)

Reserved Column

- | | | |
|----|-------|-------|
| 1. | _____ | _____ |
| 2. | _____ | _____ |
| 3. | _____ | _____ |
| 4. | _____ | _____ |
| 5. | _____ | _____ |
| | _____ | _____ |

Which social class would you consider to be very different from the one to which you belong? _____ reserved _____

When you think of members of this class, what comes to mind?

Members of the _____ class are: (please give at least 5 responses)

Reserved Column

- | | | |
|----|-------|-------|
| 1. | _____ | _____ |
| 2. | _____ | _____ |
| 3. | _____ | _____ |
| 4. | _____ | _____ |
| 5. | _____ | _____ |
| | _____ | _____ |

Which age group do you belong to? _____ reserved

When you think of people in this age group, what comes to mind?

_____ are: (Please give at least 5 responses)

Reserved Column

- | | | |
|----|-------|-------|
| 1. | _____ | _____ |
| 2. | _____ | _____ |
| 3. | _____ | _____ |
| 4. | _____ | _____ |
| 5. | _____ | _____ |
| | _____ | _____ |

Now think of an age group different from your own. Which group is this?

_____ reserved

When you think of people in this age group, what comes to mind?

_____ are: (Please give at least 5 responses)

Reserved Column

- | | | |
|----|-------|-------|
| 1. | _____ | _____ |
| 2. | _____ | _____ |
| 3. | _____ | _____ |
| 4. | _____ | _____ |
| 5. | _____ | _____ |
| | _____ | _____ |

Think about your family. What comes to mind when you think of people in your family? _____

reserved

Members of my family are: (Please give at least 5 responses)

Reserved Column

1.	_____	_____
2.	_____	_____
3.	_____	_____
4.	_____	_____
5.	_____	_____
	_____	_____

Now think about the people outside your family. What comes to mind when you think of people outside your family? _____

reserved

People outside my family are: (Please give at least 5 responses)

Reserved Column

1.	_____	_____
2.	_____	_____
3.	_____	_____
4.	_____	_____
5.	_____	_____
	_____	_____

Phase II

1) Please look at your responses again and classify them in terms of *positive, negative, or neutral*

- Put two plusses "++" behind each characteristic which you consider very positive in itself
- Put a "+" symbol behind each characteristic which you consider somewhat positive in itself.
- Put a "0" behind each characteristic which you consider to be neutral, neither positive nor negative in itself.
- Put a "-" symbol behind each character which you consider to be somewhat negative in itself.
- Put two minuses "--" behind each character which you consider to be very negative in itself

Note: A column has been set aside at the right for you to indicate the evaluation (++,+, 0, -,-) for each response.

2) Please go back and look at the groups which you have named, both those to which you belong and those to which you do not. Please rate these groups in the same way you have rated individual traits. That is:

- Put two plusses "++" in the reserved space behind each group toward which, in general, you feel very positively.
- Put a plus "+" in the reserved space behind each group toward which, in general, you feel somewhat positively.
- Put a zero "0" in the reserved space behind each group toward which, in general, you feel neither positively nor negatively.
- Put a minus "-" in the reserved space behind each group toward which, in general, you feel somewhat negatively.
- Put two minuses "--" in the reserved space behind each group toward which, in general, you feel very negatively.

Phase III

Now think about these seven types of group, and decide which of them are the most important to you for giving you a sense of who you are. Please rank the eleven kinds of group (ethnic, regional/provincial, sex, religious affiliation, occupation, social class, political orientation, age, marital status, family, and other (whatever you have chosen)). Please list them in the spaces provided below, with the most important listed on line 1, the next most important on line 2, and so forth down to the least important on line 7.

1. _____ most important group
2. _____
3. _____
4. _____
5. _____
6. _____
7. _____ least important group