THREE APPROACHES TO POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT: A CASE STUDY OF MEXICO

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the degree to which three general approaches to political development are applicable to the development process in Mexico. The three approaches have been particularly important in the literature on political development, and are referred to as the dependency, evolutionary, and institutional approaches. They variously view political development as: 1) a dependent relationship in which a weaker state maintains unequal economic relations with a stronger state, with adverse effects on the former's economic system and, by extension, on its political and social systems; 2) an evolutionary process similar to that experienced by some European states, where political, economic, and social systems progress step by step towards a specific end; and 3) a process of establishing autonomous, flexible, and coherent political institutions that are capable of meeting economic and social pressures.

In the thesis I first explore the differences among the political, economic, and social variables, noting that language and ideological orientations are inextricably linked with the premises of the three approaches. I also note that the approaches are all connected with European thought and development, and that all see today's industrialized nations, with their European-type political, economic, and social institutions, as a model for development. I then examine the historical development of Mexico, noting that this nation is

also a product of European thought and action, with political, economic, and social institutions that are basically European, and that what mainly differentiates it from the others is its status as a developing nation. This examination is followed by a survey of the political, economic, and social structures of Mexico at particular moments of its history. Finally, I evaluate the adequacy of the three approaches in interpreting the political development of Mexico.

I conclude that while some aspects of the three approaches may be applicable to certain periods of Mexican development, they all underestimate the importance of the political variable. I then suggest that some modified approach may be found that can adequately interpret the political development of a Third World country such as Mexico.

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A. THE CONCEPTS

I. Introduction

In this thesis I will evaluate the applicability of three general models of political development to a case study. The three models are those known as the dependency approach, the evolutionary approach, and the institutional approach. The case study is the Mexican state. I will divide my discussion into three parts.

In the first part I will discuss the three approaches in various ways, and will attempt to reduce their general premises to common denominators. This will facilitate discussing their relative merits--or demerits--in connection with the case study.

In the second part I will discuss the Mexican state from various points of view and in various periods of time, in order to provide an overall picture that can later be examined from the perspective of each of the three approaches.

Finally, in the third part, I will assess the adequacy of the three approaches to the study of political development by analyzing their applicability to the political development of a nation such as Mexico.

1. Theoretical Approaches

Modern political development theory came into prominence after the Second World War, as new nations began to appear on the international scene and American scholars began to take a new interest in international politics. In the decades that followed, political scientists postulated a number of theories to explain how and why societies change and develop as they come in contact with industrialization and the modern world. Eventually, several of these theories fell into three general categories which today seem to represent the most commonly used approaches to the study of political development. These three categories, or approaches, can be described as follows:

1. Dependency. This is the approach which studies the development of society from the viewpoint of economic and political dependence. This approach argues that the process of development of certain countries created the underdevelopment of others, leaving the underdeveloped ones with distorted economies incapable of self-sustained growth, and of political self-determination.
2. Evolutionary. This approach maintains that the developed nations of Europe and America went through a long process which eventually took them, stage by stage, to industrialization and development. According to this view, all societies must follow a similar movement from traditional to modern industrial state before they can be

categorized as economically, politically, and socially developed nations.

3. Institutional. This approach is concerned chiefly with political systems and government. It holds that development consists of being able to establish institutions that can adequately handle new problems that are created as social and economic changes overtake a society.

The basic premises of these approaches, with multiple variations, have been applied to numerous political development studies in the past three or four decades, in the attempt to analyze the degree and quality of development of various nations around the world.

Although much interesting information has been gleaned from such studies, there has been a great deal of controversy in academic circles about the results obtained. Questions have been raised about the ability of these three approaches to explain the many contradictions that are found in most developing or underdeveloped nations. For instance, can the dependency approach adequately explain the capacity for self-sustained growth shown by some nations classified as underdeveloped? How does the evolutionary approach account for the fact that some otherwise still backward nations have reached a highly industrialized stage without first fulfilling the prescribed preliminary stages? Does the institutional approach consider the fact that external demands and pressures, rather than internal ones, can topple a capable and stable government?

These types of contradictions will be examined in evaluating these three approaches with regard to Mexico's political development. But there are also some basic differences to contend with. For one thing, the three approaches differ in their respective inter-relationships between political, economic and social variables. In this connection, the first approach, dependency, posits that external economic forces exerted by developed nations are the cause of economic underdevelopment and consequently of social and political backwardness. The second approach, evolutionary, claims that advanced political development is the result of a long historical process of interrelated social, political, and economic change. And the third approach, the institutional, postulates that only well-established political institutions can guarantee social and economic development.

Furthermore, there are differences in the language and interpretation of each approach, as there are in many fields of the social sciences. In the present case, not only do the three approaches come from different backgrounds and postulate different theories, but there is controversy, even among scholars who postulate the same approach, as to the meaning of political development and its terminology.

However, there is one similarity that seems to bind the three approaches. This could be referred to as the European bias, because the developed nations of the Western World, i.e. Europe and North America, are present, implicitly or explicitly,

in all three, either as the model of development to be followed (as in the evolutionary and the institutional approaches), or as the cause of underdevelopment of other nations (as in the dependency approach).

Because of the underlying European values and ideologies that color the three approaches, this bias has some significance in studies of political development. This would especially be true where non-European nations are the focus of study. In studies concerning the political development of Latin American nations such as Mexico, which are themselves products of a European system, the effects of the European bias would be less significant, unless, as is often the case in such studies, the structural Europeanness of these nations is ignored.

I will examine this and other similarities and differences in this thesis. But more important, in order to discuss the relative merits of the three approaches, I will locate and examine some of their common denominators. For example, I will discuss the fact that there seems to be implicit or explicit recognition in the three approaches of a dynamic interaction between social, political, and economic factors, in that the strength or weakness of one can affect the development of the others.

In sum, in this thesis I will examine some of the general aspects of three approaches to the study of political development, as well as the more salient characteristics of their respective premises, in order to determine how each one

can explain the political development of the Mexican state.

2. A Case Study

Mexico has been selected as a case study for several reasons. First, it is a kaleidoscopic, many-faceted nation that provides ample room for analysis on the part of social scientists. Seen variously as democratic, totalitarian, socialistic, or oligarchic, Mexico has, in fact, already been the subject of numerous and controversial political development studies. Secondly, from a historical point of view, Mexico was the first and most important of Spain's colonies on this Continent. Founded more than 500 years ago in the early sixteenth century, its economic, social, and political institutions were a transplant from Spain, and their evolution has been coherent with European changes and structures throughout that entire period. And thirdly, in its present form, Mexico is a country of glaring contradictions. It is a highly industrialized society, yet it has a generally low standard of living. It is a country where extreme wealth exists side by side with extreme poverty, yet it is a state that has had a stable government for more than sixty years. It is a country of vast resources, an exporter of manufactured goods, with a high degree of self-sustained growth, yet it is an underdeveloped nation.

In other words, Mexico is a country of many realities which seems to provide a good background for testing and evaluating

the three approaches to the study of political science that will be discussed in the following parts.

II. Political Science, an Imperfect Discipline

Mathematics, for more than two thousand years considered "a perfect body of reasoning," has been shown to contain irreducible inconsistencies and contradictions.[1] What then can be said of political science, the result of more than two thousand years of thought, and always, at best, considered perfectible? That it probably contains more inconsistencies and contradictions than could be calculated mathematically. And if this is so, how can political science, an imperfect discipline, prone as it is to human biases, measure accurately that most variable and imprecise of all things, society, in a constant process of change, composed of human beings with all their unique and individual foibles?

The answer, of course, is that it cannot. At least so far. And although political science has contributed much to the understanding of human groupings and their systems of organization, it is becoming increasingly evident, as the field branches out into new sub-fields, that the inconsistencies and contradictions are not being reduced.

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[1]Morris Kline ("Interview", Omni (June 1981), p. 124), says that "if there are contradictions within any particular branch [of mathematics], then you can prove almost anything. If you don't want to use one side of the contradiction, you can use the other."

Many of these contradictions and inconsistencies stem from what Korzybski calls "the multiordinality" of terms,[2] not only in the lexicon of the discipline, but in the common language of everyday use. Johnson says that according to Korzybski, recognition of the multiple meanings of terms like 'true', 'false', 'fact', 'reality', 'cause', 'effect', "leads to a conscious use of these terms in the multiordinal, extremely flexible, full-of-conditionality sense." Other elements that contribute to the confusion are, for instance, the "Aristotelian prejudice that knowledge resides primarily in definitions, and that inquiry should start with definitions;"[3] and the tendency among political scientists to analyze what policies governments should pursue, rather than what policies they do pursue. In this connection, it is interesting to note that, according to Puchala, officials involved in the European Economic Community complained that political scientists were "working at levels of theoretical abstraction too far removed from day-to-day political behaviour," and suggested that they should study the reality.[4]

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[2]Wendell Johnson, People in Quandaries. The Semantics of Personal Adjustment (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1946), p. 156.

[3]Johan K. de Vree, "On Some Problems of Political Theory," in Power and Political Theory; Some European Perspectives, ed., Brian Barry (London: John Wiley, 1976), p. 162.

[4]Donald Puchala, "Domestic Politics and Regional Harmonization in the European Communities," World Politics, vol. 2, no. 4 (July, 1975), p. 496.

But the problem is compounded when a theoretical model of political development is used as a tool to explain the reality of a given political development process, and it is found that the subject of analysis has as many realities as there are different models of political development to explain them. This may be due, as Riggs says, to the fact that "'theory' of political development seems to imply that there is such a 'theory', and that we are talking about something real when we refer to 'political development'," although there is no "consensus on the meaning of the word 'development'."[5]

It is this lack of consensus that, according to Foster-Carter, led Kuhn to "hit upon the concept of a 'paradigm' precisely in the context of trying to discover why social scientists argue endemically about fundamentals, whereas the natural scientists do not."[6]

Perhaps the reason lies in the fact that what the social scientists are trying to explain with their theoretical models is not the sort of reality that natural scientists deal with, but a reality that "in the broadest sense continually changes, like the river of Heraclitus."[7] At the same time, the social scientists continue to cherish traditional "general rules,

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[5]Fred W. Riggs, "The Theory of Political Development," in Contemporary Political Analysis, ed., James C. Charlesworth (New York: The Free Press, 1968), p. 317.

[6]Aidan Foster-Carter, "From Rostow to Gunder Frank: Conflicting Paradigms in the Analysis of Underdevelopment," World Development, vol. 4, no. 3 (March 1976), p. 170.

[7]Johnson, p. 24.

beliefs,... theories, without thoroughly questioning their validity, and to retain them long after they have been shown to be meaningless, false, or at least questionable."[8] In fact, as Johnson points out, once a belief has been adopted, there is a general tendency to,

> give particular attention to the cases that seem to support it, . . . distort other cases in order to make them seem to support it, and . . . ignore or belittle other cases.[9]

In other words, the state of controversy that seems to afflict the social sciences in general, seems to derive from the fact that while the socio-political river flows through history, the eye of the beholding social scientist remains in a fixed focus. And in the case of the political scientist, the focus is fixed mainly on the development of the Western world, and on the ideas of Western political thought that have accrued over the past two thousand years.

From the time of the Greeks to the present, political philosophers and analysts have propounded different theories to identify and explain the intricate schemes of political organization and political action in different types of societies.

There have, of course, been numerous shifts in the theoretical assumptions as new modes of political organization developed, especially in modern Europe, where the pace of social

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[8]Ibid., p. 26.

[9]Ibid.

change accelerated through time. But, as Kuhn explains it, shifts in theories or paradigms typically contain an accumulation of past ideas and values, the result of a "piecemeal process" by which a "constellation of facts, theories, and methods . . . have been added, singly and in combination, to the ever growing stockpile that constitutes . . . knowledge".[10]

Consequently, although inherited theories and values have been reassessed from time to time, the intellectual roots of contemporary political theory are still well grounded in the past, resulting in contradictions and sometimes in misreadings of current situations.

According to Unger, an example of this can be found when the social contract theorists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, from Hobbes to Rousseau to Kant, opposed the Aristotelian tradition, overthrowing "the traditional view of a continuity between the natural and the moral order," and replacing it "either by the reduction of the moral world to the natural one, or by the idea of a complete separation between the two realms," while all the time continuing "to rely on the assumption of a suprahistorical human nature."[11] Furthermore, adds Unger, these same theorists viewed society as "an

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[10]Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd. ed. enl., International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, vol. 2, no. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 1-2.

[11]Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Law in Modern Society: Towards a Criticism of Social Theory (New York: The Free Press, 1976), p. 38.

association of individuals, with conflicting interests, . . . a highly individualistic civilization", at a time when "the ties of interdependence may never have been tighter than they became in modern Europe."[12]

This type of inconsistency is not exclusive to past centuries. Numerous examples can be found in the thinking of twentieth century political philosophers, especially in connection with new fields of analysis, such as political development. But it is in this field that yet another problem of contradiction arises.

This problem lies in the fact that political development theory, based on the historical experience of modernization of highly developed Euro-American nations, is generally used, with certain variations, as a yardstick to measure the modernization experience of non-Western or less developed nations.

Most scholars agree that the antecedents of political development theory are in Europe. Somjee says that political philosophy in general--whose "universal validity" has hardly been challenged to date--is "deeply grounded in the political history and tradition of the countries of the West."[13]

Theories of social and political organization originally grew out of the European experience of the last three hundred years, and with time the political and social organization of

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[12]Ibid., p. 39.

[13]A. H. Somjee, The Democratic Process in a Developing Society (London: Macmillan Press, 1979), p. 1.

modern European nations, with their economic system, came to be considered the prototype of democratic development, the model to be looked to in analyzing the political and industrial development of non-Western nations. As Ortega y Gasset puts it,

> Europe had created a system of standards whose efficacy and productiveness the centuries have proved. Those standards are not the best possible, far from it. But they are, without a doubt, definite standards as long as no others exist or are visualized.[14]

Ortega y Gasset makes the point, however, that "by Europe we understand primarily and probably the trinity of France, England, Germany. It is [in that] portion of the globe, . . . that there has matured that mode of human existence in accordance with which the world has been organized." The United States, in his view, is not a creator of new thought (not even of "technicism" which "we are told [is] the essence of America," but which was "invented in Europe during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries"), but rather it is an adapter of the European thought.[15]

As modernization spread from Europe to other parts of the world, bringing with it a "proliferation of industrial societies that share many of the economic and technological attributes of Western society, but differ from it in their characteristic

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[14]Jose Ortega y Gasset, "Who Rules the World?", in J. Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses, (London: Unwin Books, 1961), p. 102.

[15]Ibid., pp. 103-106. In this connection, Ortega y Gasset says of Marxism (Ibid.), that it was "thought out in Europe in view of European realities and problems," and adapted by Russian philosophers to fit local idiosyncracies.

styles of consciousness and organization,"[16] it was generally assumed by scholars in political science, as Somjee says

> that unless the conditions which gave rise to democratic institutions in eighteenth- and nineteenth- century Europe and America [could] be replicated in the non-Western world, any attempt to transplant or superimpose such [democratic] institutions [would] not get off the ground.[17]

But in recent years, as more and more scholars in the field have attempted to understand and explain the political systems of the new and developing industrial and industrializing societies, it has become increasingly apparent that many bits of data here and there refuse to fit into the Western scheme of political organization. Riggs, for instance, says that "the methods and concepts of political science had . . . been built around the study of [European] institutions [with], for example, identifiable boundaries between state and local governments, on the one hand, and central governments on the other . . . . [but] in the new states of Asia, Africa, and to some degree even in Latin America, these formal distinctions made little sense." He refers to a study where the authors asserted "that there are three main types of political system: the presidential, the parliamentary, and the Communist"--a classification that applied to Western polities and, on paper at least, to non-Western ones as well--but where it was found that, in practice, "the actual behavior of legislatures, chief executives, courts, and

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[16]Unger, p. 40.

[17]Somjee, p. 1.

political parties was quite different from the patterns of familiar Western societies."[18]

Von Vorys also expressed his doubts, saying that comparative politics "promptly confirmed that governmental organization in newly independent states was, in general, patterned after Western European models," only to "soon expose these similarities as superficial and trivial," adding that "concepts such as 'politics', 'political system', even 'government', lose most of their meaning in such cross-cultural transfer."[19]

As early as the mid-sixties, Pye wondered if "the oldest of the social sciences [could] provide understanding and guidance about the great revolution of our era," as he pondered the fact that,

> academic fields whose universe was once comfortably limited to Western societies and maybe a few primitive cultures have suddenly been called upon to yield knowledge about the profound but erratic forms of change that are sweeping much of the world.[20]

Undoubtedly, as Steinbruner says, "serious analysts [are forced] to concern themselves with the [new] process" as new complex social and political systems come into being, followed by more complex political issues, thus "stimulating doubts about

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[18]Riggs, p. 323.

[19]Karl von Vorys, "Use and Misuse of Development Theory," in Contemporary Political Analysis, ed., James C. Charlesworth (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 351.

[20]Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), p. vii.

the adequacy of the established conceptions."[21]

The tendency to judge as not civilized, backward, or nondemocratic those countries that do not fit the Western model, is giving way to a new awareness of the "wide variety of configurations"[22] not only in groups of nations of different regions of the world--Africa, Asia, Latin America -- but also of the nations in each group, as in the case of the Latin American republics. It is one of these Latin American republics--Mexico--that has been selected as a case study for this thesis.

Obviously, my choice of Mexico as a case study, as well as my choice of the three approaches to political development study, and the selection of authors I have relied on for information, all indicate my own biases and interpretations, my own "fixed focus" as I view the flowing river. However, I shall try to be aware of this as I discuss the material that will go into the following section, where I shall discuss the theoretical assumptions of the three approaches.

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[21]John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis (Princeton University Press, 1974), p. 7; see also pp. 4-7.

[22]Von Vorys, p. 351.

III. Three Approaches to Political Development

1. The European Bias

Generally speaking, as was seen in the previous section, "nation-building" has long been the subject of academic interest, but "political development" in the modern sense, i.e. theories about how nations build, is a relatively new sub-field of study. It first evolved three or four decades ago when the focus of academic attention, particularly in the United States, began to shift towards nations characterized as politically and economically underdeveloped. In this regard Foster-Carter tells us, for instance, that "development theory . . . emerged in the Western academic world after the Second World War;"[1] and Tipps says that "the idea of modernization is primarily an American idea, developed by American social scientists [and] reaching the height of its popularity in the middle years of the 1960s." [2]

But regardless of when and where they evolved, the fact is that new theories of political development, as Covell puts it,

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[1]Aidan Foster-Carter, "From Rostow to Gunder Frank: Conflicting Paradigms in the Analysis of Underdevelopment," World Development, vol. 4, no. 3 (March 1976), p. 171.

[2]Dean C. Tipps, "Modernization Theory and the Comparative Study of Societies: A Critical Perspective," Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 15, no. 2 (March 1973), p. 208.

reflected

> the changes then taking place in the political position of the countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, and changes in the attitudes of Americans towards international politics, as well as changes in American political science itself.[3]

As a result of such changes, there has been a proliferation of theories of political development, as well as of publications that postulate or refute such theories. Broadly speaking, however, the study of political development--or underdevelopment--seems to have been approached mostly from three general viewpoints. These are known as the dependency approach, the evolutionary approach, and the institutional approach. Covell describes them as follows:

> The "dependency" or "development of underdevelopment" school argues that the developed countries of Europe and North America[4] based their economic growth on the expropriation of the surplus produced by the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. The same historical process created both developed and underdeveloped countries, and left the underdeveloped countries with distorted economies incapable of self-sustained growth and political systems controlled by elites whose power depends on their ties with the developed countries and who therefore are unwilling to end the dependency relationship with those countries.
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> The "evolutionary" approach sees political development as a process of transition from a "traditional" to a "modern" society: the developed nations of Europe and North America went through this process in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; the underdeveloped

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[3]Maureen Covell, "Introduction to a Reader on Political Development Theory," [Simon Fraser University, Department of Political Science, 1981] (Mimeograph), p 9.

[4] Although Mexico is geographically part of North America, the term North America or North American in this thesis will be taken to mean the United States and/or Canada, or Anglo-Saxon North America.

> nations of the twentieth century will go through the same process, although the paths they follow and their rate of movement may be different from those of the "early modernizers".
>
> The "institutional" approach focuses more narrowly on the political system and argues that development consists of adapting or creating institutions to handle the problems a society faces at a given period in history. For modern-day underdeveloped countries, the problem is that of incorporating the groups created by economic and social change into an orderly political system.[5]

On the surface, the three approaches to political development seem very different. The first one posits that external economic forces exerted by developed nations are the cause of social and political underdevelopment; the second that only a long historical process of social, political, and economic evolution (such as took place in Europe after the sixteenth century), can produce development; and the third that only well structured political institutions on the Euro-North American model can guarantee social and economic development.

However, a closer look indicates that there are three common elements in the three groups:

a) the claim that a historical pattern impedes or advances growth in a society;

b) awareness of a dynamic interaction between three basic elements of a society: political, social, and economic institutions;

c) a "European bias:" the model of development to follow is that of Europe and the United States, as in the case of

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[5]Covell, pp. 3-4.

the institutional and the evolutionary approaches; or else, as in the dependency approach, Europe and the United States are viewed as causing underdevelopment in other nations.

As far as this last common element is concerned, the three approaches implicitly or explicitly reflect a set of values that, by and large, are European cultural values. As was discussed in the previous section, theories of political development derive from European political philosophy, and European political philosophy is a product of, as well as a producer of, "democratic principles". Consequently, European cultural values appear in the three groups as a constant in the variations produced by the interaction of political, social, and economic factors.

However, there is an interesting distinction to be made between the three approaches. The first one (dependency) was proposed by Latin American scholars, whereas the other two (evolutionary and institutional) were proposed by American scholars. And this distinction is interesting because it is central to one factor that will be discussed in this thesis, which has to do with different cultures. For although both Latin American nations, and North American nations (United States and Canada) were created by European thought and actions, they each have different customs, their words - even words like "democracy" - often have different meanings, and their actions have different connotations.

Therefore, the understanding by a North American scholar of the political development of a Latin American state such as Mexico, depends to some degree on an understanding of the differences between the Hispanic and the Anglo-Saxon cultures.

First, however, there is another factor that would need to be understood. Of the three approaches here discussed, it appears that the first, dependency, concerns itself more with the unequal economic (and by extension, with its effects on the political and social) relationships between a developed and an underdeveloped nation, than with the "Europeanness" or "Americanness" of its political development.

In contrast to this position, the other two political development approaches, the evolutionary and the institutional, examine the degree to which non-Western or non-European nations have acquired and made to function the imported European-style political, social, and economic institutions.

It is debatable whether all supposedly new or relatively new developing nations can be simply classified as non-Western or non-European. Toynbee says, in this connection, that non-Western means not to be "part of [the] larger whole . . . [not to be part of the] 'society' to which England belongs . . . identified as Western Christendom."[6] Asia and Africa, as Toynbee sees it, are not part of Western Christendom. For diverse reasons, each of these regions belongs to a different 'whole',

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[6]Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History, abridgement of vols. I-VI by D. C. Somervell (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1965), p. 648.

each is part of a different 'society'.

But Latin America is part of Western Christendom, and thus is a part of the European 'society'. It is a product of European endeavour, created by European people, with social and political institutions originally established on the European model, with histories and traditions rooted in Europe, and more importantly, with European cultural values deeply embedded in its societies, albeit with the differences inherent to the Anglo-Saxon and the Hispanic cultures.

This fact raises some questions. For instance: Do the Euro-American approaches to political development (evolutionary and institutional), premised as they are on the new acquisition of European-style democratic institutions, adequately explain the political development of a Latin American nation such as Mexico which, as a fragment of Europe, already possesses such institutions from its inception? Do these Euro-American approaches take into account external as well as internal historical forces and influences, or do they view the political development of a nation as a purely internal matter? On the other hand, does the Latin American approach see as a basic cause of underdevelopment only the external one of dependency created by developed nations in the process of their own development? Or does it take into account internal as well as external historical forces and influences?

These questions and other related ones will be considered in this thesis. First, however, I will discuss the general

premises of the three approaches more fully, although I wish to point out here that they will not be analyzed in depth, since for the purpose of this thesis a general outline of each one will suffice.

2. The Dependency Approach

Interestingly, this is perhaps one of the earlier theories of political development in the field, although only recently has it been recognized or accepted by American scholars. It was first formulated in the 1940s by Latin American scholars connected with the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) and others from central banks and local government planning agencies. These were persons who were becoming increasingly concerned with finding explanations and solutions to some of the problems that they encountered and which seemed to have become more critical in the area as a result of Latin America's changing economic and political relations with the Western World, and particularly with the United States.

The dependency theorists argued that Latin American countries were traditionally exporters of natural resources and importers of finished products, in a pattern set by Spain during three hundred years of colonial rule. Now they began to perceive a new pattern of economic dependence on the United States, as the latter increasingly controlled the Latin American export market and also increasingly became the principal supplier of

manufactured goods to the area. This unequal exchange created conditions that prevented the development of larger internal markets and a better standard of living for the people. In an attempt to change this pattern, the Latin American scholars proposed a series of economic strategies including increased government participation, expanded industrialization, and the setting up of inter-regional common markets for the distribution of the locally produced manufactures. These strategies were originally conceived as an economic development theory, but Urquidi says that

> it would be a mistake to ignore the social and political setting in which the problems of the Latin American economy evolve. Many economic problems can be explained only in terms of the political and social situations.[7]

The main premise of the theory was the "perception of the international economic system as one of industrial center and agrarian periphery, in which the former dominates the latter," implying, as Love puts it, "a hegemonic relationship between two discrete elements in a single economic system [unequal exchange, in which] the center derived part of its wealth from the periphery" in an enduring relationship. The formation of new centers by peripheral areas was possible only by breaking away

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[7]Victor L. Urquidi, The Challenge of Development in Latin America (New York: Frederick A. Prager, 1964), p. ix and passim. See also: Joseph L. Love, "Raul Prebisch and the Origins of the Doctrine of Unequal Exchange," Latin American Research Review, vol. 15, no. 3 (1980), pp. 45-72; and Raul Prebisch, "Joint Responsibilities for Latin American Progress," Foreign Affairs, vol. 39, no. 4 (July 1961), pp. 622-633.

from the old center."[8]

Taken up by political scientists, this theory was developed into an approach to the study of political development that became known as the dependency theory, premised on the idea that national development depends on the character of international relations.[9] As long as a country is contributing to the development of another country at the expense of itself, it cannot develop socially, politically or economically. The dependency theorists indicated that historically, the industrial development of the Western World was made possible by taking control of the resources and markets of their colonies or other weaker economies. Furthermore, they maintained control by manipulating the leadership and institutions of those other countries, thus creating a state of permanent underdevelopment in the latter that could not be altered, since any attempt at breaking the hold of the established interests led to reprisals and to further intervention, both political and military. They further postulated that as long as these conditions existed that curtailed their possibilities of growth, these countries would be prone to social and political unrest and instability.[10]

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[8]Love, p. 45.

[9]See Olga Pellicer de Brody, "Mexico in the 1970s and its Relations with the United States, in Latin America and the United States: The Changing Political Realities, eds., Julio Cotler and Richard R. Fagen (Stanford University Press, 1974), pp. 314-333.

[10]See Osvaldo Sunkel, "The Pattern of Latin American Dependence," in Latin America in the International Economy, eds., Victor L. Urquidi and Rosemary Thorpe, (New York-Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, 1973), pp. 3-25; and Osvaldo Sunkel, "Big

As an example, the dependency theorists pointed to the fact that as industrialization increased in Latin American countries in response to economic development plans and strategies, so did imported technology, foreign investment and finance loans, chiefly from the United States. As American economic interests grew in the region, so did American political intervention, previously no stranger there, aimed at protecting and maintaining its own interests.[11]

3. The Evolutionary Approach

About the same time that the dependency theory was being formulated in Latin America, American social scientists were starting to take a closer look at the "developing areas." Perhaps, as Tipps believes, this was a response to two main features of the period: "a widespread attitude of complacency toward American society, and the expansion of American political, military, and economic interests throughout the world," both products of post-war prosperity and political stability. "Such social problems as might exist," says Tipps, "were treated not as endemic but rather as aberrations which could be resolved by normal political processes within existing institutions." American scholars could only assume that "at

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[10](cont'd) Business and Dependencia; a Latin American View," Foreign Affairs, vol. 50 (April 1972), pp. 517-531.

[11]See Federico G. Gil, Latin American-United States Relations (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971).

least as they existed in their more idealized manifestation," the institutions and values of American society "represented an appropriate model to be emulated by other, less fortunate societies."[12]

Among the first theories of political development to emerge from North America in this period, and the most widely acclaimed, was the theory of stages of growth propounded by economist-political scientist Walt W. Rostow. Broadly based on Darwin's theory of evolution, Rostow's model established that all societies were economically lying within one of five categories of growth, which he expressed as: 1) "the traditional society" (from primitive life in China and the Middle East to medieval Europe); 2) "the preconditions for take-off" (the beginning of modern science and industry in Western Europe in late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries); 3) "the take-off" (when technological development helps remove the "old blocks and resistances to steady growth [and] the forces making for economic progress . . . expand and come to dominate the society");[13] 4) "the drive to maturity" (a long interval, perhaps of sixty years, of "sustained if fluctuating progress" before maturity is attained); and finally, 5) "the age of high

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[12]Tipps, p. 208.

[13]It is interesting that Rostow's assessment in the early 1960s that Mexico was in the "take-off" stage produced a pronounced shift in the orientation and number of North American academic publications on Mexico's political system and political development. See W. W. Rostow, The Process of Economic Growth (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1962) pp. 283n., 290, 300.

mass consumption" (the post-maturity stage: politically, increased social welfare and security; socially, a shift towards production and consumption of durable consumer goods. In the United States, 1946-56; in Western Europe and Japan, 1950s; and in the Soviet Union, 1960s).[14]

Based, as it was, on the history of development or evolution of European and British society and later of the United States, Rostow's theory seemed ideally suited for analyses of political development. It was modified and adapted in various forms by political scientists, mostly on the basis of a transition from traditional social man and form of government, to democratic social man and democratic political institutions in the Western world, and studies were conducted to determine at what comparable stage of development the non-Western and newly emerging nations were to be found on the Western evolutionary development scale.

However, since one of the basic assumptions of the evolutionary theory was that the stipulated stages of development must take place in the same sequence as they did in Europe and the United States, it became evident that few underdeveloped countries, particularly the newly emerging ones, could aspire to be classified in this category. This and other contradictions led to a search for alternative theories in the field.

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[14]W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth. A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), pp. 4-16.

4. The Institutional Approach

One of these alternative theories, the institutional approach, postulates that survival of a political system at any given moment in history depends upon the existence of strong and flexible institutions capable of withstanding and absorbing the challenge of modernization. In this approach, it is not important if a country has or has not taken the prescribed steps from traditional society to modern society, or if it is economically dependent on a stronger nation, but whether it is the type of system where "the government governs [with] an overwhelming consensus among the people on [its] legitimacy."[15] In fact, as Covell puts it, "it is quite possible [from this point of view] to argue that a traditional political system is "developed" if it is stable and capable of governing its society,"[16] and as long as it can adjust to whatever new demands the process of change puts upon it. The other extreme, of course, is the political system--"developed" or "underdeveloped"--that is stable and governs its society, but is

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[15]Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore, eds., Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society. The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems (New York: Basic Books, 1970), p. 12. See also: Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); and Samuel P. Huntington, "Violence and Social and Economic Modernization," in Politics and Society: Studies in Comparative Political Sociology, ed., Eric A. Nordlinger (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1970).

[16]Covell, p. 9.

not flexible to change and becomes authoritarian in order to withstand the challenge of demands.

Huntington, one of the first exponents of the institutional approach, considers that time is an important factor to examine when looking at the political development of a nation. Huntington sees the time as 'reaction time'. Political instability is caused by social and economic modernization, but "the degree of instability is related to the rate of modernization." As modernization enters the social order with new demands, new ideas, new conditions, the government must be able to meet these new conditions at a speed that will enable it to assimilate them.[17] Otherwise the system will collapse and give way to a new one--sometimes by revolution, sometimes by civic pressure. Huntington says that,

> In the "Western" revolution very little overt action by rebellious groups is needed to overthrow the old regime. "The revolution . . . does not begin with the attack of a powerful new force upon the state. It begins simply with a sudden recognition by almost all the passive and active membership that a state no longer exists." The collapse is followed by an absence of authority.[18]

If this is so, perhaps only the modern, developed, Western nations can meet these requirements, since according to Huntington there is more domestic violence in less developed societies, which he describes as:

> exposed to modernity; disrupted socially from the traditional patterns of life; confronted with pressures to change their ways, economically, socially and

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[17]Huntington, Violence, p. 322.

[18]Huntington, Political Order, p. 267.

politically; bombarded with new and "better" ways of producing economic goods and services; and frustrated by the modernization process of change, generally, and the failure of their governments to satisfy their ever-rising expectations, particularly.[19]

In sum, institutions must be strong and capable, as well as "sufficiently adaptable, complex, autonomous, and coherent to absorb and to order the participation of . . . new groups and to promote social and economic change in the society."[20]

These, then, in brief general outline, are the premises on which are based the three approaches to political development studies. They are all, of course, far more complex than they appear in this simplistic rendering, with intricate and carefully developed arguments. They are also the product of thoughtful, careful scholars who are concerned with the problems that beset society as a whole. Naturally, they contain some contradictions, possibly some errors of vision, or of understanding, due in large part to the all too common foibles that were discussed in the previous section and will again be examined in the following sections, where I will try to locate some of the similarities and differences of these three approaches.

In this connection, Johnson says that "a generalization is a statement that asserts that different things are somehow similar, or even identical, and so are to be reacted to or

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[19]Huntington, Violence, p. 322.

[20]Huntington, Political Order, p. 266.

treated alike, or nearly so."[21]

But it is not my aim to draw a generalization about these three approaches to political development. I only seek to find in them such similarities and differences as may relate to the case study in this thesis, which is Mexico and its political development.

For this purpose I shall briefly discuss in the next section some of the more obvious differences and similarities between the three schools of thought involved, not only in their orientations, but also in connection with language and ideologies.

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[21]Wendell Johnson, People in Quandaries. The Semantics of Personal Adjustment (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1946), p. 27.

IV. Three Formulas

1. Differences

As was shown in the last section, the three approaches discussed in this thesis differ from each other in many ways, and yet their respective premises are to be applied to one single case study. But this can only be done if it is possible to reduce the differences and to find some common denominators for the three approaches. At first glance, however, the differences seem to be irreductible for a number of reasons.

Some consideration was given previously to the fact that in the field of political science, as elsewhere in human endeavour, there is much controversy caused by different conceptions and interpretations of reality and values. This is the case, of course, with the three approaches here discussed. The problem is compounded in attempting to study a single subject from the point of view of three different approaches which, as has been seen, stem from two different worlds of development, the Hispanic and the Anglo-Saxon.

Both of these worlds are of European descent, and both are products of the same general knowledge accumulated in the West over the span of two thousand years. But each of them has its own history of development, much of it involved in wars for

power and influence over each other, colored in large part by the long and deep-seated antagonism created by those wars. And last, but far from least, the two have different languages.

1.1 Language

In the question of language, for example, one finds that there is little consensus, even in English, about the meaning of certain terms, such as "development" and "modernization", (also called "Europeanization" and "Westernization").[1] The very words "political", "politics", and "policy" produce volumes of different opinions. Lane, for instance, says that "a comparison between the concept formations of Weber, Easton and Lasswell and Kaplan concerning the concept of political confirms the assumption that there is little agreement on the use of the key term of political science;"[2] and Heidenheimer points out that

> American and British political scientists have tended to

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[1]See David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965); Cyril E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization. A Study in Comparative History (New York, Harper and Row, 1966); Dean C. Tipps, "Modernization Theory and the Comparative Study of Societies: A Critical Perspective," Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 15, no. 2 (March 1973); Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968). For meanings of "modernization" as characterized in Latin American social content literature, see Jean Franco, "From Modernization to Resistance: Latin American Literature 1959-1976", Latin American Perspectives, vol. 5, no. 1, (Winter 1978).

[2]Jan-Erik Lane, "On the Use of the Word 'Political'," in Power and Political Theory. Some European Perspectives, ed., Brian Barry (London: John Wiley, 1976), p. 242.

> separate the study of behavior and institutions from that of administration and implementation because [in English] "politics" and "policy" were such conveniently distinguishable terms.[3]

The problem increases in translation, for in Spanish there is no such distinction and both "the politics of import control" and "import policy" would be expressed as _politica de importacion_. Thus, Rose's expression "policy is 'what politics is about'," would sound like gibberish in Spanish, even in light of his explanation that policy can refer to intentions of politicians, to the actions of government, or to the impact of government.[4]

1.2. Orientations

There is another problem related to language that it is important to consider. Lohrey says that,

> language is not a neutral medium; . . . like politics it is based upon sets of historic/cultural viewpoints-orientations . . . that may have been arbitrarily set at one time but now form "fields of expectations," that impose on us, through the structure of the language used, those old frames of reference.[5]

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[3]Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Hugh Heclo, and Carolyn Teich Adams, _Comparative Public Policy. The Politics of Social Choice in Europe and America_ (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975), p. 4.

[4] Richard Rose, ed., _The Dynamics of Public Policy: A Comparative Analysis_ (London: Sage Publications, 1976) p. 9.

[5]Andrew Lohrey, "Politics and the Regime of Meaning," _Etc., A Review of General Semantics_, vol. 38, no. 4 (Winter 1981), p. 341.

In other words, if "a particular orientation or set of related orientations will express themselves in a distinctive language, with its own . . . levels of abstraction and meaning," [6] then the three theories of political development here examined undoubtedly reflect different sets of meanings which must be taken into consideration.

For instance, the political language and terminology of a Latin American country like Mexico, reflects a particular outlook based on the combined historical experience of Spain and Latin America and, in Mexico's case, on its own more recent and culturally influential Revolution. On the other hand, in North America the language of politics and of the social sciences denotes the historic/cultural events that shaped Great Britain and the United States.

When studying the political development of a country such as Mexico, North American and Latin American political scientists literally and figuratively talk two different languages, since they have different sets of historic/cultural viewpoints/orientations.

Furthermore, orientations normally yield their own key words, and these change from time to time. For instance, it is possible that some of the key words common in Europe in the Middle Ages were God, sin, salvation, etc., whereas in the nineteenth century they might have been words like fact, matter, evolution, progress. Key words in the Anglo-Saxon world today

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[6] Ibid., p. 342.

probably include democracy, free enterprise, individual rights, freedom, justice, moral values, progress, and law-and-order.

In the Latin American context key words are different. For instance, in their English translation, some of these might be social justice, sovereignty, inequality, exploitation, industrialization, revolution, independence, nationalism, and national goals.

In other words, the key words in the Anglo-Saxon group seem to be so different from those in the Latin American group, that finding common denominators for the three approaches may be very difficult. In fact, the differences may be even deeper than they seem. The cleavage may be so great that it might be necessary to paraphrase Kipling and say that "North is North and South is South and never the twain shall meet," and thus conclude that we are dealing with "mutually incompatible paradigms."[7]

We have already intimated that perhaps, in some Freudian way, the Anglo-Saxon and Hispanic worlds may still be playing out their historical antagonisms. The unconscious mind has a long memory, or as Braudel would put it, the rhythm of history of long duration is associated with geographic, social, and cultural continuities.[8] It might not be too fantastic to say that the battle of the Armada (which historically never took

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[7]Aidan Foster-Carter, "From Rostow to Gunder Frank: Conflicting Paradigms in the Analysis of Underdevelopment," World Development, vol. 4, no. 3 (March 1976), p. 176.

[8]See Richard Boyer, "Escribiendo la historia de la religion y mentalidades en Nueva Espana," in Familia y sexualidad en Nueva Espana (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1982), p. 123.

place) is still being fought through the fragment/surrogates of England and Spain, or that papists and protestants are still fighting for European hegemony.

It may be useful, however, to examine the infrastructure of some of the concepts often expressed on both sides of the fence.

1.3. Infrastructure

It would be burdensome to discuss the many interpretations of democracy and liberty which, judging by the number of pages that these subjects usually occupy in encyclopedias and the amount of treatises written on these concepts, cover a broad range. But it is obvious that one country's idea of democracy is not necessarily another country's idea of democracy. The American conception of democracy lies at the core of North American political development theories, and any deviation from that model is regarded as a sign of underdevelopment. Yet Ortega y Gasset points out that to the Greeks and Romans, originators of the Western World's concepts of democracy, democracy and liberty did not mean that the individual citizens had the right to participate in or influence government.[9] But rather than look to the Greeks for the roots of the differences between the Latin American and the Anglo-Saxon views of democracy and liberty, it may be best to look at more recent times.

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[9]Jose Ortega y Gasset, Concord and Liberty, trans. Helene Weyl (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1963), passim.

The battle cry of both the American Revolution and the French Revolution was "liberty", but there the similarity ends to a large degree. To the Americans it meant individual liberty, the right to act individually in society, to pursue individual activities that would lead to individual benefits, to influence government as an individual. This concept of liberty derived from the English liberal movement of the seventeenth century. The French concept, on the other hand, was based on "nationhood". "The people" meant "the nation". When the Estates Generales referred to the people in, for instance, the French Declaration, they meant the nation. The French "Liberty, Equality and Fraternity" meant complete sovereignty of the states, liberty from privileges of the Church, the guilds, the aristocracy and the nobility, legal equality of all citizens, and fraternal cooperation for the benefit of the entire community, i.e. the nation. The citizen was born, lived, and died for the nation.

The influence of the French Revolution was strong in Latin America, and French concepts of liberty, equality, and patriotism strongly influenced the Mexican constitution-makers of the nineteenth century.[10] This factor is basic to understanding some of the differences between the North American

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[10]See Francisco Lopez Camara, La genesis de la conciencia liberal en Mexico, (Mexico: Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, 1977); and Hector Fix-Zamudio et al., in Evolucion de la organizacion politico-constitucional en America Latina (1950-1975), I, Mexico y Centroamerica, eds., Gerardo Gil-Valdivia and Jorge Chavez Tapia (Mexico: Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, 1978).

and the Latin American orientations, for while in the Anglo-Saxon world development means achieving individual progress, in Mexico, for instance, development means achieving national, i.e. collective, progress, from which will derive individual progress. As the state develops or progresses in its collective economic capacity, so will the individual members of its society.

On the contrary, in the Anglo-Saxon ideology, the concept of progress or development is based on the evolutionary theory of Darwin, which views each progressive step forward as a step towards a superior state (the survival of the fittest) for the individual. By implication, as the individuals progress, i.e., become more superior, so does their society.

Mumford points out that Darwin confused the fact of survival, "which rests on many other circumstances besides individual ability and capacity, with the fact of . . . development," and that he confused fitness with betterment by taking uncritically Malthus' theory, which served to explain that the poor must remain poor because they are innately evil or lazy.[11]

From the Latin American point of view, this approach serves Anglo-Saxon scholars as justification for their theories that because their world is "developed" and the other is

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[11]Lewis Mumford, Interpretations and Forecasts: 1922-1972. Studies in Literature, History, Biography, Technics, and Contemporary Society (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1973), pp. 196-7.

"underdeveloped". They are somehow "better". They have "more". And, since the acquisition of more is premised on the freedom to acquire it, it is not strange, as Welte puts it, that

> to many of the people of the third world the American concept of freedom means freedom for the rich and powerful to exploit the poor and underprivileged.[12]

2. Common Denominators

So far, the three approaches present a number of differences that seem difficult to reconcile. Although the approaches could all be classified as being indirect products of European thought, they stem from different European backgrounds. One originates in Latin America, an extension of Spain, deeply influenced by the French Revolution and French philosophy. The other two originate in the United States, an extension of England, and they are deeply rooted in the British philosophies and traditions. The first one attributes underdevelopment to external forces, the second to insufficient development along the path of evolution, and the third to the lack of political institutions capable of adjusting to change. How can these differences be reconciled?

Nachmias says that because there are so many "diverse methodologies available to social scientists, . . . that different evaluations of the same policy or program are not

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[12]Cecil R. Welte to Professor Paul Kurtz, editor, The Humanist, (unpublished letter, 15 August 1975).

comparable.[13] On the other hand, Lehner says that "it is evident that identical theoretical statements together with different descriptions of initial conditions will lead to different conclusions."[14]

It is true that in this thesis 1) a single case study will be viewed from three different perspectives and, the results, as Nachmias points out, would not be comparable, since the three approaches stem from different social science methodologies; and 2) a case study such as the one to be presented here, can show so many facets (different descriptions of initial conditions) that it could certainly lead to the Rashomon effect[15] The dilemma, however, can be solved. For one thing, an attempt will be made to find some commonly shared factors in the three approaches that will make it possible to compare them when they are applied to the case study. For another, an attempt will be made to present the case study in such a way that it will be coherent with those commonly shared factors.

In order to do this, and to overcome the initial difficulty of handling such diverse approaches and break down the language

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[13] David Nachmias, Public Policy Evaluation, Approaches and Methods (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1979), p. 6.

[14] Franz Lehner and Hans Gerd Schutte, "The Economic Theory of Politics: Suggestions for Reconsideration," in Power and Political Theory. Some European Perspectives, ed., Brian Barry (London: John Wiley, 1976), p. 143.

[15] Rashomon is a classical Japanese film in which each of three participants in a crime separately gives his or her version of what happened. The result is three totally different accounts of the same event, presented as three separate stories in one single film.

and orientation barriers previously discussed, it will be necessary to reduce the general premises of the three approaches to bare essentials and, if possible, to manageable formulas. In this regard, Pye says that it is the "commitment of political science theorists to seek universal patterns that can only be found at a level of abstraction at which the particular is no longer sovereign."[16]

But at what level of abstraction must the universal patterns be found in these three approaches? What are the commonly shared factors? Each comes from a different outlook. The dependency approach seems to be mainly concerned with economic development and its dependence on international relations; the evolutionary approach looks mainly at the supposed evolutionary processes of social change; and the institutional approach appears to be mainly concerned with the capacity of political institutions to withstand the pressures of modernization.[17]

It might be tempting here to strip the three approaches down to three single elements and say that the dependency model

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[16]Lucian W. Pye, "Foreword," in Crises of Political Development in Europe and the United States, ed., Raymond Grew (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978) p. v.

[17] See: Victor L. Urquidi, The Challenge of Development in Latin America (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), passim; Cyril E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization. A Study in Comparative History (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), pp. 56-94; and Samuel P. Huntington, "Violence and Social and Economic Modernization," in Politics and Society, Studies in Comparative Political Sociology, ed., Eric A. Nordlinger (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 322.

deals with economic factors, the evolutionary model with social factors, and the institutional one with political factors. This, however, would negate the statement made in an earlier section of this thesis, that one of the similarities between the three approaches is that they all recognize the existence of a dynamic interaction between the three basic elements of a society: the political, social and economic systems. As Covell puts it,

> the study of political development is, of all the subfields of political science, the most aware of the connections between economic, social and political systems [and includes] sometimes implicitly but most often explicitly, descriptions of all three systems and of the connections between them.[18]

There may, however, be certain variations in the relationship between those three factors or systems, as well as a key factor, for each different approach.

For instance, in the dependency approach one might consider the fact that because economic development depends upon outside factors and these, in turn, influence domestic issues, political and social problems depend upon the existing type of economic system. From this it could be said that in the dependency relationship, the economic system is the key factor, and development of the political and social systems are contingent upon it.

In the evolutionary approach, development, or progress, means moving from one stage to the next in the European style.

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[18]Maureen Covell,"Introduction to a Reader of Political Development Theory," [Simon Fraser University, Department of Political Science] (Mimeograph), p. 3.

Here the underlying assumption is that progress is achieved when the political, the economic, and the social systems work in combination with each other in a relatively balanced way. Thus, in this relationship, the key factor would be that development (progress) depends upon the concurrent development of the political, economic, and social systems.

In the institutional approach, social and economic demands can affect, or destroy, a political system. This means that in this relationship, economic and social development is the key factor, since the stability of the political system is dependent upon it.

These relationships and their key factors could be further simplified by expressing them in formulas, as follows:[19]

Dependency approach: political and social development depend upon any variable of the economic system. Thus:

eSY(x) --> p+sDV.

Evolutionary approach: any variable of development (progress), depends upon the concurrent development of the political, economic, and social systems. Thus:

p+e+sSY --> DV(x).

Institutional approach: any variable of the political system depends upon economic and social development. Thus:

e+sDV --> pSY(x).

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[19] In the formulas, p = political, e = economic, and s = social factors. SY means system, and DV means development; and the (x) stands for the infinite variables that each factor may have.

In other words, although this is admittedly an oversimplification of intensely complex matters, by reducing the three approaches, first to common denominators, and then to the key factors in each particular relationship between those common denominators, it should be easier to evaluate each approach in terms of the case study.

Conversely, these reductions should also facilitate the presentation of an overview of Mexico and its development. By categorizing data roughly into the same three common denominators (political, economic and social factors), it may be possible to determine:

- whether Mexico's political and social development depends upon, or has depended upon, its economic relations first with Spain, and later with the United States (as in the dependency approach, where eSY(x) --> p+sDV);
- or whether Mexico's present day stage of development is, or is not, the result of a concurrent forward movement of its political, economic, and social systems (as in the evolutionary approach, where p+e+sSY --> DV(x));
- or whether Mexico's present political system responds adequately to the economic and social demands made on it, while still maintaining its stability and flexibility (as in the institutional approach, where e+sDV --> pSY(x)).

In the next section I will present a general view of Mexico. Later, I will try to determine if and how the key factors in the three approaches correspond to the key

factors in Mexico's political development.

B. THE CASE STUDY

I. Mexico

Mexico seems to be an appropriate subject for this three-pronged study because, as Needler says,

> appraisals of the political regime of Mexico vary widely, indeed, bewilderingly. Some observers, taking their cue from the self-conceptualization of the leaders of the regime, regard [it] as essentially democratic and the thrust of national policy as revolutionary. To others, the system is totalitarian to an almost Stalinist extent, the social achievements minor and incidental. For yet others, it is a typical Latin American oligarchy whose policies benefit only its own members and foreign business interests.[1]

There are many reasons for such a wide variety of appraisals. For instance, Mexico is a country where extreme wealth and extreme poverty exist side by side and the way of life ranges from the very modern to the very traditional. It has a low per capita income, a high rate of population growth, a negative balance of payments, and a political system that revolves around one dominant party, as well as a history of uprisings and political strife in the nineteenth century, and a major revolution in the early twentieth century that took a toll of over a million dead.

In contrast, however, Mexico also has a highly developed industrial base, a far-reaching network of social services, and a record sixty years of democratic participation and political

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[1]Martin C. Needler, "Problems in the Evaluation of the Mexican Political System," in Contemporary Mexico, eds. James W. Wilkie et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), p. 339.

stability.

In other words, Mexico is a country of "numberless contradictions and inconsistencies," as Gruening says. "They are an integral part of the Mexican complex."[2]

From this viewpoint, Mexico would be a good subject to study from any of the three approaches here discussed, granted that in presenting a view of any nation's social and political development, facts as well as trends and patterns can be sorted out to substantiate any hypothesis. Showing, as it does, so many facets, the results of a political development study of Mexico from any one of the approaches, could be considered valid. Of course, it could be argued that such results might not represent the overall reality of that country's development. However, in this thesis the three approaches will be evaluated on a comparative basis to determine their relative applicability to the Mexican development experience. This means that facts about Mexico presented here should be able to relate to the three approaches, and therefore that a broad overview of Mexico will have to be made.

Organski says that "it is no trick to see things partially", as he sets out "to see them whole, to encompass their sweep, to search out the significant," admitting that he does so "with the full realization that one man's view of so

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[2] Ernest Gruening, Mexico and its Heritage (New York: Century Co., 1928), p. xi.

broad a landscape will never quite satisfy another."[3]

I will not attempt such a task in this thesis. I do, however, make the same excuse, since some choices have to be made and there is no way to present an impartial overview of any nation.

A nation's history unfolds in a long ribbon of time, and its beginnings, frayed and faded, are lost somewhere in the past. How far back, and how far afield must one go to present a broad picture of Mexico? What segments of its history should be looked at in order to find representative patterns and trends? There are no stop and go signs that tell exactly where things start and where they end, and it is difficult to say "stop the film here and cut out this portion because it is a good example." There are innumerable good examples to choose from.

What I will attempt to do, then, is to present some aspects of Mexico's history and development in the framework of the three categories discussed in the last section, insofar as it is possible to catalogue separately the three factors that together form the fabric of society, i.e., the political, the economic, and the social systems. For instance, in the section on Economic Structure, although economic issues are the key factor, political and social issues will necessarily be discussed as well. And vice versa. By presenting a general view of Mexico in this manner, it may be possible to evaluate the three approaches

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[3]A. F. K. Organski, The Stages of Political Development. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965) p. 3.

and see how adequately each one interprets Mexico's political development.

Perhaps the results will show, as the dependency approach would see it, that Mexico is a dependent nation whose underdevelopment has hinged, and hinges, upon its unequal economic relations with other nations, and whose political and social development has lagged behind as a result of this, in spite of a highly developed industrial process.

Or, as the evolutionary approach would have it, Mexico may turn out to be one of the world's "nations in construction. . .[a] rising new state thrown up in haste and built in a fury with whatever comes to hand" rather than an old nation, a "stately structure erected over centuries," moving from stage to stage with changing functions "towards industrial efficiency and national political organization."[4]

And then again, as the institutional approach would perceive it, this general view might present Mexico as a nation where rising demands have led to the demise of several of its governments in the past, and to a repressive and unpopular government in the present.

But before the final picture can be assessed, it has first to be painted. The first category I will discuss is Mexico's Social Structure. I have chosen for this section the long period of Spanish colonial rule, followed by a turbulent century of wars and invasions, the former because it will show how the

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[4]Ibid., pp. 3-4.

foundations of this society were laid, and the latter because the combination of independence from Spain, foreign invasions, and the conflict between the conservative and liberal ideologies set the stage for Mexico's twentieth century development.

To begin, however, I would like to put Mexico into dramatic perspective by contrasting two images of Mexico's capital city over a span of more than 550 years.

When the Spanish Crown overtook the Empire of the Mexicas[5] in the early sixteenth century, its capital, now Mexico City, was one of the largest known to Europeans. In 1519, according to Bernal, its population of about 80,000 was comparable only to that of "four European cities--Paris, Naples, Venice, and Milan [which] had just over 100,000 inhabitants each. The largest city in Spain, Seville, had a population of 45,000 according to a 1530 census."[6] A city of towering pyramids, great palaces and great houses diminishing in size as they spread out, among gardens and canals, towards the shores of lake Texcoco, this American Venice was truly impressive. However, little, if anything, remained of it after 1521.

Today, Mexico City is again considered one of the largest, if not the largest, cities in the world, with close to 18 million inhabitants. To give an idea of what this means, it has

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[5]The Empire was Anahuac, ruled by the Mexicas (pronounced Meshicas, commonly and erroneously known as Aztecs), and its capital was called Tenochtitlan.

[6] Ignacio Bernal, "The Pre-Columbian Era," in A Compact History of Mexico, 2nd ed. in English (Mexico: El Colegio de Mexico, 1975), p. 33.

a subway system that moves more than 4 million people a day, and its international airport, with 40 shops, three banks, 17 waiting rooms and numerous VIP rooms, handles more than 100,000 persons daily through 35 national and international airlines, with a staff that includes 330 security guards working full time on the premises, plus 300 cleaning people in three shifts, 3,000 office and general employees, and 1,000 fuel attendants. And its services, which include 90 private and public hangars, are in constant need of expansion to fulfill the daily increasing demands.[7]

Between these two images lies the birth and growth of modern Mexico.

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[7]Data obtained from current Mexican news media.

II. Social Structure

1. A Fragment of Europe

To fifteenth and sixteenth century Europeans, the world was divided in three parts: Western Christendom (Europe) was the First World, Asia the Second, and Africa the Third. When America was discovered, it became not the Fourth World, but a "new Europe", albeit a sub-Europe. Thus Mexico, along with other Latin American nations, the United States, Canada, and Australia, became "a fragment thrown off from Europe, "an echo of the old world, or "an invention of Europe."[1]

Horowitz says that in order to understand the ideological development of a new society, it is necessary to look at its point of departure from Europe. He believes that in the case of Mexico, Canada, and the United States,

> the ideologies borne by the founders of the new society are not representative of the historic ideological spectrum of the mother country. The settlers represent only a fragment of that spectrum. . . . French Canada

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[1] A fuller discussion of these concepts will be found in Louis Hartz, The Founding of New Societies. Studies in the History of the United States, Latin America, South Africa, Canada, and Australia (New York: Harcourt Brace and World, 1964), p. 9; Edmundo O'Gorman, "America," in Estudios de historia de la filosofia en Mexico (Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, 1963), p. 74; and Jose Ortega y Gasset, "Who Rules the World?" in J. Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses (London: Unwin Books, 1961), pp. 96-141.

> and Latin America are 'feudal fragments' [because] they were founded by bearers of . . . the feudal or tory values. [2]

The question of whether the Spanish settlers who came to America were "bearers of feudal or tory values" is debatable, but there is one distinction that must be made between Mexico and the United States. Mexico is a fragment of Spanish Europe, and the United States is a fragment of British Europe. Otherwise, Mexico shares, with the other countries of Latin America, four hundred years of European history. It is populated by countless generations of mestizos, people of mixed European and native race, who were bred in the Spanish traditions and cultures, with Spanish their common language. Its social, political and administrative institutions were established by Spain after the conquest of the Mexicas in 1521, and were modified with the times in accord with historical changes taking place in Spain and other European nations.

But the Spanish colonization of America does not fit into Pye's description of a European power reaching out "to intervene in the lives of traditional societies and to set in motion the process of change [by relying] upon the persistent grip of the ancient, indigenous traditions to maintain the basic fabric of the society."[3] On the contrary, in this case, the Spanish crown took the territories of this Continent by sword and fire, gave

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[2]Gad Horowitz, Canadian Labour in Politics (University of Toronto Press, 1968), p. 4. See also Louis Hartz, passim.

[3]Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), p. 10.

the region a new name, and literally established the Spanish institutions over the rubble and ashes of what had been there before.

The conquered people were absorbed into the new system, and, to a slight degree, so was some of their culture. In this connection Boyer says that "dominated peoples found ways to retain their culture, to resist the dehumanization of the domination, and to select and shape cultural elements from their past and present that enabled them to survive rather than become merely victims."[4] He cites a Peruvian study that explains "how the curacas of rural Peru, even as they acted for the Spaniards, preserved their traditional authority in their communities by practicing and nurturing traditional religious beliefs."[5]

In the meantime, however, by the 1530s, barely ten short years after the destruction of Tenochtitlan by Cortes, there was already a flourishing new city with churches and palaces in the Spanish style, built with the stones from the destroyed native temples, and planned on the model of the Spanish cities of that time.

There was also a large first generation of Mexicans, or mestizos, children of Spanish-Mexica parents who "tended to

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[4]Richard Boyer, "Writing the History of Religion and Mentalities in New Spain," in Familia y sexualidad en Nueva Espana (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1982), p. 125. (Quoted from Boyer's own version in English).

[5]Ibid.

become thoroughly Hispanized in their upbringing."[6]

The history of the next three hundred years of colonial rule is well documented. It was a period of discovery and exploration, by land and by sea. Hundreds of thousands of pioneers, men and women, took off into every corner of Mexico and beyond to settle and build a future for themselves and their children. Cities and towns sprang up everywhere in Mexico, to be populated by Spaniards, mestizos, and natives. Mining and agriculture, sheep and cattle raising, were important activities, but trade and industry were not neglected, and many technical innovations, especially in mining and construction, came out of this area in that period. Roads were constructed to criss-cross the region, and ships and all types of land transportation were built in Mexico to carry goods back and forth. Among these were shipments of gold, silver, and other products to Spain. Bernstein says that "the products of [Mexico's] mines and plantations provided the base of numerous manufacturing industries and fed millions of people in North America and Europe."[7]

This is undoubtedly true. But it is also true that the mines and plantations of Mexico provided the base of numerous

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[6]Richard M. Morse, "The Heritage of Latin America," in Hartz, p. 130. See also Magnus Morner, Race Mixture in the History of Latin America (Boston: Little, Brown and Co, 1967); and Patricia Seed, "Social Dimensions of Race: Mexico City, 1753", Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 62, no. 4 (1982), pp. 569-606.

[7]Marvin D. Bernstein, "Introduction," in Foreign Investment in Latin America. Cases and Attitudes, ed. M. D. Bernstein (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), p. 8.

domestic manufacturing industries and fed Mexico's own millions. For instance, the textile industry in Mexico became so important that it undermined Spain's attempt to export woolens to Mexico. It even competed with Spanish exports to Peru and Guatemala. By 1604 there were 114 large and numerous smaller mills in more than ten cities of Mexico, and the number of establishments increased all the time. When Spain prohibited Mexico's exports of textiles to Peru in 1703, 130,000 looms were closed down in Mexico City alone, leaving countless people out of work.[8]

In the next section I will discuss this period in more detail.

2. The Colonial Period

Mexico was ruled by Spain under a carefully structured hierarchical system, established in 1524.[9] On the local level the region was divided into municipalities on the Spanish model, and government in small and large communities was sometimes shared between Spaniards and local people, especially when these

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[8] Andres Lira and Luis Muro, "El siglo de la integracion," in Historia General de Mexico, vol. 1, 3d ed. (Mexico: El Colegio de Mexico, 1981), pp. 434-437.

[9] Much of the information contained in this section comes from two excellent studies: one, by Lira and Muro, pp. 371-469: and the other by Enrique Florescano and Isabel Gil Sanchez, "La epoca de las reformas borbonicas y el crecimiento economico, 1750-1808," in Historia General de Mexico, vol. 1, 3d ed. (Mexico: El Colegio de Mexico, 1981), pp. 471-589. The name Mexico will be used throughout this section to signify the entire region known as New Spain, New Biscay, etc.

were leaders in their communities. High positions could also be held by local Spaniards and mestizos, but direct representatives of the crown usually came from Spain, and the viceroy always. Spanish law and customs prevailed at all times.[10] Almost every aspect of social activity was legislated in a systematic and rational body of law that was very modern for its time, implemented by the largest bureaucracy known until then in the Western World. Every district and jurisdiction had a provincial government, and decisions could be appealed up the line all the way to the Consejo de Indias, a council in Spain that acted as supreme arbiter and administrator, directly under the king. In Mexico another council, the Real Audiencia, acted as arbiter on local matters under, and sometimes with, the king's alter ego, the viceroy. All of this was designed to produce a centralized power in Spain, but in fact it did not. There was much independence of action, due in part to distance, and in part to the patronage system set up by the crown itself to raise funds, which consisted of selling government posts on certain levels in public auction. Wealthy local people found it advantageous and prestigious to buy such posts, and this eventually led to bending laws. Rights and privileges were granted and monopolies allowed outside the letter of the law.

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[10] For a very complete and interesting study of the transplant to Mexico of European political, economic, and social institutions, see Luis Weckmann, La herencia medieval de Mexico, 2 vols. (Mexico; El Colegio de Mexico, 1984).

There was another factor that added to the de facto decentralization of power. This was the church, a structure which ran alongside the judicial one and was certainly more pervasive and possibly more powerful than the other. Charged originally by the crown to help in the administration of the region and absorb the local people into the Spanish culture, its members infiltrated every community, from village to large city, where they acted as defenders, judges, intermediaries, educators, and community leaders, as well as being representatives of the church and the state. They became bankers, creditors, partners in mines, business and industry, and in agriculture. The church was allowed to collect 10% of all agricultural products in Mexico and this, with the interest collected from loans and mortgages, with foreclosures and outright gifts, provided it with enormous wealth and power, which it shared with the ruling class.

In the midst of this large bureaucracy, the common people--Spaniards, mestizos, and natives--moved about with much freedom from place to place. There was exploitation and poverty to be found, as well as opportunities and wealth. Craftsmen and workers belonged to guilds that protected their members. The most powerful guild, however, was the Merchants' Guild (Consulado de Comercio), which held a monopoly on all trade in Mexico City. Small and large industries thrived, as in the case of the textile industry mentioned earlier, where profits were enormous due to pittance wages and, in some cases, forced labor.

In many ways, this was a typical sixteenth and seventeenth century European-type society.

However, two shifts occurred in the Colonial period that set off considerable long range repercussions. The first shift was connected with the period known as the Century of Depression (1640-1740). The second one came after the 1760s, when the Bourbon monarch instituted reforms designed to take back the power that had slipped away from Spain in the more than two hundred years of colonial rule.

There are various theories concerning the depression of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. From registries in Sevilla, it appears that gold shipments from the colonies fell from 35.5 million pesos in the period 1591-95 (average for five years), to 27 million between 1621 and 1625, to 11.7 million from 1646-50, and down to 3.3 million from 1656-1660, with Mexico's contribution registered at 11 million, down to 5.2 million between 1626 and 1630, followed by 3.7 million in the 1631-1635 period, and down from there in the following years.[11] Some scholars attribute the drop in gold shipments from Mexico to a coincidental decimation of native population, resulting in the shut-down of mines for lack of sufficient laborers. Another school attributes the depression to a reduction in demand and markets in Spain, with a consequent reduction in the extraction of gold and silver in Mexico. There is, however, another theory for the decline in the shipments of fine metals to Spain after

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[11] Florescano, pp. 473-477.

1640.

According to this school Mexico, unlike Peru, was not chiefly an exporter of gold, but rather of silver and other products. For instance, in 1609 Mexico's exports to Spain were 65% silver and 35% dyes, hides, medicinal plants, etc. However, Mexico had not stopped extracting gold, but rather than exporting it to Spain, was using it in other ways. Increasing amounts were going towards trade with and financial support of other Spanish dominions such as Florida, Puerto Rico and some of the other Caribbean islands, as well as for defense and maintenance of the Spanish colony in the Philippines and the new settlements in California and along the north Pacific coast. In this connection, Boyer mentions the fact that

> Gelves's campaign in Mexico to police the treasury enabled him to remit unprecedentedly large sums to Spain, after covering his administrative costs and paying expenses associated with the defence of the Philippines.[12]

Furthermore, increasing amounts of gold were being invested locally. This may have been partly due to the fact that in 1634 Spain had cut back supplies of mercury to Mexico, whilst increasing them to Peru. As a result, Mexican miners had the choice of closing down their mines or looking for capital

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[12] Richard Boyer, "Absolutism versus Corporatism in New Spain: The Administration of the Marquis of Gelves, 1621-1624," The International History Review, vol. 4, no. 4 (November 1982), p.476. (My emphasis in the last sentence of this quote). For more information on Mexico's trade with Asia through the Philippines, and its financial support of the Philippine colony, see for instance: Leslie E. Bauzon, "Deficit Government: Mexico and the Philippine Situado (1606-1804)," East Asian Studies Series 21 (Tokyo: Centre for East Asian Cultural Studies, 1981).

elsewhere. They found plenty of liquid capital in Mexico City. Merchants and church entered into partnerships with miners, then became owners of mines and plantations. With more capital investment, a more productive economy was created. As markets increased, increased production, as well as diversification, became necessary to satisfy the growing needs of the people. This meant a very fundamental change in the relations between Spain and Mexico, and a radical transformation of Mexico in the eighteenth century. In fact, Boyer says that "as shipping between Seville and the colonies became less frequent and more erratic, Mexico . . . assumed a more independent . . . role." [13]

Then, in the midst of what had become a thriving economy, the Bourbon crown created the second shift in the 1760s. Spurred on by fear of events taking place in Europe, the king of Spain decided, contrary to the advice of some of his counsellors, to postpone the loss of his dominions by tightening his grip on them. He did this by increasing garrisons and adopting systems of control that were best suited to produce repression and, eventually, as they did, rebellion.

Mexico had been showing too much independence and was not contributing enough to the royal coffers. Spain decided to centralize power again by instituting a series of reforms based on a new liberal conception of the state, and a new system of

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[13]Boyer (p. 456) ("Mexico in the Seventeenth Century: Transition of a Colonial Society," Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 57, no. 3, 1977, pp. 456-478) presents a very informative study of this period of independent economic development in Mexico.

provincial governments copied from France. With new people recruited from the educated middle classes, the Bourbon administration set out to change the image of Mexico from that of a semi-independent sub-kingdom, to that of a state under tight control. The key word for this new image was submission. The Bourbon crown cancelled one form of government and put in another, taking away the relative independence that had been created over the years.

The 1760s reforms unleased a chain of events that included the expulsion of the Jesuits from all Spanish territories, and removed all power delegated to the church. No body but the Bourbon could rule. Under the new government, all the acquired rights and privileges were removed, even those of the powerful and influential Merchants' Guild which had controlled an immense monopoly throughout Mexico, and new merchants' guilds were allowed to function in other cities as a result of free enterprise laws.

The worst was yet to come, however. In 1804 the Spanish crown struck a shattering blow at the Church, and decreed that all church loans and mortgages were to be called in and the proceeds, plus all liquid assets available, were to be sent on loan to the crown. With a church that had acted for so long as banker and investor, this meant that thousands of agriculturers and landowners, miners, and merchants were now forced to liquidate their assets to pay back their loans. Consequently, not only the church, but also the landowners and miners with

whom it shared such activities, were affected directly by that decree, which was applied between 1805 and 1809, amid much protest and criticism.

However, the indirect effects of this decree and other Bourbon reforms were perhaps more important, because they created a split in what had up to then been a fairly cohesive society. For instance, although affected by the decree in some ways, in the relatively recent past the miners had received some assistance from a crown that was anxious to increase production and have more control of the mineral resources. A special court had been created in 1776 to deal with mining matters, a special bank was created for miners in 1784, and a technical university, the School of Mining, was established in 1792. The miners' new privileges rankled with their old partners the merchants, the landowners, and the church.

The split was also to be found in the relations between the church and the state, which had hitherto been relatively cordial. From that time on relations soured, culminating in the mid-eighteenth century Mexican Laws of Reform, which eventually led to the separation of church and state in Mexico.

There were other changes in the composition of the traditional groups in power, producing more division in the ranks of the elites. For instance, an army was created by the Bourbons with special new rights, privileges, and jurisdictions, and its officers took over administrative duties previously shared by the church and the privileged classes.

Changes were also made in the mode of production. For instance, the tobacco industry, which had been a source of income for large numbers of people through small home and community industries, now became a very profitable state monopoly, with concessions in many cities of Mexico. One of these, in Mexico City, became one of the first mass production operations, employing as many as 6,000 male and female workers at one time.

These, and many other reforms and changes, brought an end to the Colonial era, as reaction grew to this fast and efficient application of a new system. By the end of the eighteenth century, thirty years of free enterprise decrees had broken the monopolies and privileges of Mexican merchants that had taken almost 300 years to build. But progressive Mexicans began to use the ideology of the free enterprise system, first to attack Spain, and later as a political argument against the old holders of privileges and monopolies. In the nineteenth century, to be Mexican became synonymous to being an advocate of free enterprise, and the liberals made this a principle of opposition against the conservatives.[14]

The next section will refer to the consequences of reactions to the Bourbon reforms, and to the establishment of liberal republicanism in Mexico.

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[14] See Florescano, passim; and Lira, passim, for more information on the period discussed in the preceding pages.

3. A Century of Turmoil

To explain what events led to Mexico's declaration of independence from Spain, there is little to say that has not already been said in the last section, except perhaps to add that 1) the war between Spain and England had indirect effects on Mexico, since the British naval blockade had affected the export of agricultural products and dyes, and enormous amounts of resources had been applied to military defense against a British threat to Mexico's northern territories on the Pacific; 2) the war between France and Spain was also taking up increasing amounts of resources from a weakened Mexican economy that needed to rebuild the industrial and agricultural bases broken by the Bourbon reforms; and 3) the rift between the old elites, fueled by resentment towards the new ones, became increasingly wider.

War broke out between Mexico and Spain, and from 1810 to 1821, the country was ravaged and torn. For the first time, the common people were brought into the fray. But the struggle was not for the deprived masses, who would have to wait many more decades before a liberal constitution gave them some consideration.

Szekely, who calls the war of independence "complicated, meandering, protracted, decentralized, and ultimately unfulfilling for the masses", says that "independence came only when the Mexican upper class finally turned against Spain,

partly because Spain itself had now adopted a liberal constitution."[15]

Even more complicated, meandering, and protracted, however, were the 35 years that followed independence. The conservatives, supported and abetted by the church, fought to get back their old power and privileges. The liberals, proponents of a new order, fought to break forever the hold of the old monopolies and open Mexico to an enlightened free enterprise system. According to Roeder, Thiers said, after analyzing the history of Mexico in that period, that it had "had to perform all at once all the revolutions through which Europe passed in three hundred years."[16]

One short period in the 1830's shines bright at that time. Santa Anna had been elected President after having ousted the government in power. According to the 1824 Constitution, the Vicepresidency fell to the defeated candidate of the opposition, who in this case was Gomez Farias . Left in charge of the government during Santa Anna's absence, he "administered a profound shock to the country by initiating a program of sweeping reforms . . . as measure followed measure, each more unsettling than the other," says Roeder. Among these were

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[15]Daniel Levy and Gabriel Szekely, Mexico. Paradoxes of Stability and Change. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), p. 24.

[16]Ralph Roeder, Juarez and his Mexico, A Biographical History, (New York: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1968), vol. 2, p. 674 (and passim for a careful analysis of the problems Mexico had to face in trying to establish a democratic constitutional government in the nineteenth century.

secularization of education and the suppression of several ecclesiastical rights and privileges, including coercion in the collection of tithes, and interment in the churches. Roeder adds that Santa Anna returned and dismissed Gomez Farias, again setting back the wheels of progress, "but the Reform Laws of 1833-34 . . . clearly presaged the separation of Church and State."[17]

In 1847, Mexico was invaded militarily by the United States, and as a consequence of this act of war lost half of its territories. The importance of the American invasion in the formation of Mexico and Mexican national identity cannot be overstressed. "The 1847 so-called Mexican war was and is of fundamental importance in shaping Mexico's continuing distrust of the United States," says Ross.[18]

However, with an economy devastated by so many years of war, a liberal government finally issued a Constitution in 1857, embodying the ideals that had cost so many years of struggle. Roeder calls it "a mosaic of the collective progress of many minds." It included freedom of thought, of teaching, of the press, of labor, of petition, of assembly, and "a faithful replica of the rights of man."[19] The new government instituted adult suffrage and free education. And it gained the sympathy of the working classes, together with the indignant disapproval of

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[17]Ibid., p. 54.

[18]Oakland Ross, The Globe and Mail, May 3, 1984, p.12.

[19]Roeder, pp. 138-139.

the aristocracy.[20]

Although the conservative and church opposition in Mexico had been stalled, the war had not been won. Once again the enemy came from outside. This time it was France, Great Britain, and Spain demanding reparations for losses suffered during the decades of war. These demands were followed by a French invasion complete with a puppet emperor, and already worn out by its triumph, the liberal government had to spend another ten years in bloody war to rid itself of the invader.

Szekely points out that it is indeed a great achievement that, although they did not hold continuous sustained power, the liberals ruled the country for much of the third quarter of the century.[21] He says that

> their accomplishments were numerous. They permitted many political liberties, including elections, although within limited suffrage. They attacked the church's enormous privileges, reducing . . . its immunity before the law, and its control over social affairs such as education and marriage.[22]

But the liberals did more than that. They instituted civil laws, and they set the stage for a modern state which they, themselves, were unable to achieve. The liberal government fell in 1876 to a coup by Porfirio Diaz, who held power for thirty years and imposed the new political philosophy of the moment, positivism.

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[20]Ibid., pp. 675-676.

[21]Levy and Szekely, p. 26.

[22]Ibid.

The Diaz regime provided a period of political stability and economic growth, albeit at the expense of democratic participation. Foreign investors, previously wary of bringing their money to a war-torn country, now poured their wealth into railroads, oil, electricity, steel, sugar mills, and mines. As the economy grew, civil liberties decreased. An enormous army was created, composed in very large part of drafted unemployed rural workers and vagrants, for whom the military was a good way to rise in status. But Mexicans in general did not benefit by this regime. Rather, their wages and living standards diminished as they were pushed increasingly off the farms and into the labor force. And education for the poor, which had been provided in the Colonial period by the church and the large landholders, and by the government during the liberal regime, now ceased completely. According to Szekely, "while most Mexicans suffered, foreigners prospered. The porfiriato encouraged foreign penetration of major sectors of Mexico's economy. Independence took a giant step backward."[23]

Bernstein looks at this period from a different angle. He believes that it was not until the end of the nineteenth century, through loans and investments made by British, French, German and American investors, that modernization began to get under way, and "certain areas began to display signs of betterment." He adds that Mexico was

still in a backward, pre-Industrial Revolution state,

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[23]Ibid., p. 27.

> plagued by a shortage and neglect of public works and improvements, outdistanced materially by the rapidly advancing economies of the United States and Western Europe."[24]

However this may be, the Revolution of 1910 was a logical outcome for the situation. Closed to social and political mobility, the porfiriato had to fall. Szekely states that the regime reacted with repression when new interest groups, spawned by economic growth, "felt thwarted by the [Porfirio Diaz] dictatorship. Intellectual foundations for rebellion were established by a reborn liberal movement that demanded, at a minimum, free elections, a free press," and a return to the 1857 liberal constitution.[25]

The goals of the revolution were modest, and the push was mild. Led by a wealthy young idealist, his goal was simply: "effective suffrage, no reelection." However, the pent-up frustrations of millions of Mexicans who had been deprived of everything through years of wars and struggles, and especially by the porfiriato, launched the revolution into several years of violence, to be followed by the long period of political stability and social gains that represent Mexico today. This period will be examined in the framework of Mexico's Political Structure.

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[24]Bernstein, p. 8.

[25]Levy and Szekely, p. 28.

III. Political Structure

1. Revolutionary Goals

The 1910-1917 Revolution produced profound changes in the social, economic, and political context of Mexico. The 1917 Constitution established guidelines for state participation, and by 1927, when consolidation of the new political system was firmly achieved, government planning programs in education, health, agriculture, industry, development of national resources, etc., had been initiated. The government's two basic goals were economic growth and social growth.[1]

Shelton says that the keyword to understanding the Mexican government's policies in the pursuit of these goals is "Revolution". He says that,

> the Revolution is supposed to express the will of the Mexican people and to find its practical driving force in government . . . . Government should be the agent of, and instructor in, revolutionary change. From close

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[1] See for an interesting discussion on various aspects of the Mexican 1917 Constitution and specific laws, in The Mexican Forum, vol. 3, no. 4 (October 1983); Diego Valades, "The Right to Health as Provided for in the Mexican Constitution", pp. 1-4; Hector Fix-Zamudio, "The Confluence of Common Law and Continental European Law in the Mexican Writ of Amparo," pp. 9-14; Jorge Madrazo, "A discussion of Constitutional Rights Regarding Property in Mexico," pp. 15-21; Braulio Ramirez Reynoso, "Labour Unions and the Mexican Constitution," pp. 21-26; Gerardo Gil Valdivia, "Agrarian Reform and the Ejido," p. 26-32.

> contact with all strata of society the public authority is presumed to sense the required direction of change and to foster movement in that direction.[2]

Shafer believes that "the viability of the Mexican sociopolitical system is explicable in part as a triumph of communication and the mobilization of influence by the government," which, he adds, "has the ability to maintain a workable national consensus with a minimum of violent frictions." He sums this up by saying that,

> it is uniquely Mexican that conflict over goals and values is tied to debate over the condition of the Revolution--[whether it is] ongoing, moribund, or defunct.[3]

There are, of course, dissenting voices, and perhaps the most important area of disagreement between the government and other sectors is the question of whether "social" or "economic" values are to have precedence in determining policy. "This must be accepted as a matter of some practical importance in contemporary Mexico," says Shafer. "It colors debates over investment priorities, the relative importance to growth of expansion of production facilities (investment), or of increases in consumer purchasing power (wages), . . . the relative importance of short-term as against long-term goals. . . . [and]

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[2]David H. Shelton, "The Banking System, Money and the Goal of Growth," in Public Policy and Private Enterprise in Mexico, ed., Raymond Vernon (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 175.

[3]Robert J. Shafer, Mexico, Mutual Adjustment Planning (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1966), p. 75.

the value of agricultural as against industrial development."[4]

To put this debate over "social" and "economic" values in its proper context, it must be noted that a large majority of Mexicans are still, in Shafer's words, "much isolated by poverty", in spite of titanic efforts on the part of the government to achieve the goals of social justice and adequate distribution of income. This situation, which is due in large part to a very high rate of population growth and the concomitant impossibility of creating sufficient job opportunities to match that growth, serves as a constant spur to government to intensify its efforts toward economic growth.

In the efforts to stimulate economic growth, one of the main actors in the ongoing debate with the government, albeit not an altogether voluntary partner, is the private sector.

The involuntary partnership between the government and private enterprise developed slowly in the years that followed the Revolution. By the early sixties, Vernon says, "both the public and private sectors were utterly changed in capability and in quality," and the "engine of growth" was no longer driven "exclusively [by] the private sector, a sector dominated by foreign interests."[5] as it had been during the porfirian era.

During the period between 1917 and 1960, while the

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[4]Ibid., p. 76.

[5] Raymond Vernon, Public Policy and Private Enterprise in Mexico (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 2.

government "built the apparatus of a modern state,"[6] and the private sector built the apparatus of highly sophisticated modern entrepreneurship, there was a gradual buildup of communication between the two sectors, and there was a substantial agreement between them that permitted the expansion of the private domestic sector. Some of the supportive measures taken by the government to help strengthen the Mexican private sector were subsidized loans, protectionism through import controls and prohibitions, and curbs on the operations of foreign-owned competitors producing inside the country. Vernon points out that "to hold the foreigner in check within the Mexican economy [is a] thread running through Mexico's regulatory policy."[7] And yet, according to Vernon, in one of those contradictions that is frequently found in Mexican affairs, attracting foreign investment has unequivocably also been an objective of Mexican policy. On this question there has seldom been dispute between the public and the private sectors. In general, as Vernon puts it, "Mexico, it appeared, had found the means for harnessing the creative energies of both sectors in support of the goals of economic development."[8] There was willingness on both parts to accommodate and compromise.

There is one issue, however, on which there has been some disagreement between the public and the private sectors, and

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[6]Ibid.

[7]Ibid., p. 15.

[8]Ibid., p. 6.

that is the extent of public investment in Mexico. Since the economic goal of the post-revolutionary government has been growth, government intervention in Mexico's economy has been deliberate and extensive. For example, the public sector controls a number of resources, industries, and services (i.e., oil production, electric power supply, railways and a majority of airlines, all telephone and telegraphic communications, production of sugar and several other agricultural products, parts of the mining production and the petrochemical industry, and a considerable number of other manufacturing industries),[9] as well as banks, financial institutions and public development banks such as Nacional Financiera, which borrow money abroad with cost advantages and loan it to Mexican investors at low interest rates.

According to Vernon, public investment in Mexico has rarely been less than one third and sometimes as much as one half of the annual gross investment. However, Velazquez says that in 1961, for instance, the government participated with 46% of the annual gross investment only to counteract the negative effects of the low level of private investment that year. He adds that Mexico's public investment figure must be offset against the public sector participation in the gross national product which, in 1960, for instance, was 9.5% for Mexico, compared to 19% for

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[9] It is interesting to note, in this regard, that in August of 1983 the Confederation of Mexican Workers purchased from the government 150 of the public sector-controlled manufacturing industries. El Nacional (Mexico, October 14, 1983) p. 1.

France, 10.6% for Britain, and 21% for U.S.[10]

Another bone of contention between the public and private sectors is "nationalization". This is a term that is used for some types of public sector investment, such as the purchase of privately-owned firms for national purposes (i.e., the railway companies or the light and power companies) Sometimes the government has invested in bankrupt industries to keep them going for job preservation or for their usefulness to the economy. In some cases, the public sector has invested in big industry necessary to the industrialization process (i.e., steel), because the private sector has been either unable or unwilling to invest in that area.[11] And occasionally, as in the case of banking institutions, the government nationalizes a particular field of endeavour in response to some national crisis.[12]

There is, however, no rigid boundary between the kinds of economic activity considered the preserves of public and private enterprise. The Mexican public sector has neither curtailed nor

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[10] M. Velazquez, Revolucion en la Constitucion, Perspectiva de la constitucion, la ideologia y los grupos de presion en Mexico (Mexico: Costa-Amic, 1969), pp. 281, 283.

[11] For interesting studies of the government's direct participation in the industrial and economic development process, see Calvin P. Blair, "Nacional Financiera: Entrepreneurship in a Mixed Economy," in Vernon, Public Policy, pp. 191-240; and Harry K. Wright, Foreign Enterprise in Mexico, Laws and Policies (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971), passim.

[12] In September 1982 the government nationalized the private banks, in the face of an unprecedented economic crisis which threatened to decapitalize the country.

interfered with the private sector's liberty to invest where and how it pleases, outside of the limited number of fields reserved exclusively for the public sector by constitutional mandate. But there are government constraints on foreign investment in Mexico, including total restriction in certain fields, and a mandatory 51% Mexican capital participation in others.[13] On the other hand, the public sector has seldom exceeded its prerogative to function as public investor. As Shelton puts it,

> where the process of socio-economic transformation is not affected or is well-served by private enterprise, the government is not bound to take any action at all. But where it appears that the unregulated progress of events will contravene the advance [of the revolutionary program], the government is free . . . to take whatever action is necessary to speed the pace of desired change.[14]

Vernon believes that although the "public investment policies and programs sometimes led to protests on the part of the private sector," in the long run they have been welcomed, and public regulation "has also garnered support at least as often as it provoked opposition from the private sector. Perhaps," adds Vernon,

> these results flowed from the fact that the Mexican government's activities in investment and regulation were not haphazard or unrestrained; most of them could be defined in explicit terms, relevant to the need to

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[13] See "Iniciativa de ley sobre inversion extranjera," Comercio Exterior, (Mexico: Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterior, January 1973), pp. 16-25; see also Wright, Chapter 3; and Timothy King, Mexico, Industrialization and Trade Policies since 1940 (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), passim.

[14] Shelton, p. 176.

foster economic growth in the country.[15]

2. The Planning Process

It is not infrequent to find in the literature references to lack of proper planning in connection with Mexico's economic growth policies, which some authors see as helter-skelter. But as Gross points out, the absence of a central planning agency, or of an "official series of technically-embellished national plans" may be misleading, because there is a "remarkable continuity in the Mexican government's management of economic affairs toward the attainment of openly stated objectives."[16]

Mexico's economic development process, according to Gross, revolves largely around four powerful institutions that he refers to as

> a central guidance cluster . . . a complex and flexible network or system of central government institutions embedded in a broader system of relations with the society as a whole.[17]

Occupying first place among "the Big Four", as Gross calls the cluster, is the President of Mexico who is "above all, the chief of [the PRI], a remarkably powerful political party," and who possesses an "authority over [it] . . . much greater, for example, than that of the United States President over the

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[15] Vernon, p.6.

[16] Bertram M. Gross, "The Dynamics of Competitive Planning: A Prefatory Comment," in Mexico, Mutual Adjustment Planning, ed., R. J. Shafer (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1966), p. x.

[17] Ibid., p. xvi.

apparatus of his party."[18]

Second in the cluster is the Ministry of Finance. This Ministry is not only a budgeting, taxation, credit, and foreign exchange institution. It is also, as Gross explains, "an active, growth-oriented organization alive to the political realities, the economic refinements, and the technological aspects of domestic expansion and international negotiation [and] it is intimately associated at the working levels . . . with both the Bank of Mexico and Nacional Financiera."[19]

The central bank, Banco de Mexico, is important as the third element in this cluster, not only because of its traditional function, but also because it is development oriented, and flexible, making the banking system "viable in a rapidly changing Mexico committed to growth but short of voluntary savings and reluctant to expand public sector revenues rapidly."[20]

Last in the cluster is Nacional Financiera, "probably the strongest, largest, most experienced, and most flexible

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[18]Ibid., p. xvii.

[19] Ibid. These qualifications have been evident in the Ministry's negotiations with the International Monetary Fund in the period September 1982 to September 1983, and since then, in connection with Mexico's enormous foreign debt and economic crisis.

[20]Ibid., p. xviii. The important role of this Bank has been enhanced since the entire banking system of Mexico was nationalized in September 1982.

institution of its type among all industrializing nations."[21] Gross says that "supported by goverment funds [Nacional Financiera] uses all possible devices of financing industrial development," and "while unquestionably serving as an agent of political masters, it has posted a profit record which would do credit to some of the best-managed of private enterprises."[22]

In connection with this institution, Blair says that "after 1947, an entrenched and successful NAFIN served three administrations as agent for developing the infrastructure and promoting import substitution. . . . with a continuity and a sameness that warrant treating the post-1947 years as one period of NAFIN history."[23] But, as Velazquez points out, public investment, channelled through the public finance institutions, depends to a large extent upon foreign loans (e.g., 30.8% in 1959, 34.8% in 1960, and 47.4% in 1961), and availability of international loans can affect the availability of Nacional Financiera funding.[24]

Finally, as Gross mentions, under this central guidance cluster is a labyrinth of organizations and specialized agencies whose "complexity . . . does immediate violence to those still

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[21] Ibid., p xviii.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Blair, p. 205.

[24] Velazquez, p. 283. In this connection, Nacional Financiera's activities in the year since the nationalization of the private banks in 1982 may have been considerably curtailed, due to shortage of investment capital, both foreign and local.

suffering from outmoded concepts of public administration based upon simplistic concepts of "span of control" and "unity of command."[25]

These institutions have undergone reorganization from time to time, but "underlying these complex processes of reorganization and growth there has been a steady building-up of the institutional capacity to promote change and react constructively to changing, even unexpected, circumstances."[26]

Much of the planning that is produced within this labyrinth of organizations requires legislation, and the pattern of public regulation in Mexico, like the pattern of public investment, is shaped to some extent by the relationship between the public sector and the private sector.

3. The Legislative Process

Ordinary federal legislation is enacted by the Congress. But although bills may be introduced by members of Congress and state legislatures, in practice it is the presidency that originates most legislation and, traditionally, Congress neither vetoes measures proposed by the President, nor does it "enact measures of which the President disapproves."[27]

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[25]Gross., p. xix.

[26]Ibid., pp. xv-xvi.

[27]Shafer, p. 10. See also Jorge Carpizo, El precidencialismo mexicano (Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno, 1979, passim); Wright, pp. 16-21; and, S. G. Ross and J. B. Christensen, Tax Incentives for Industry in Mexico (Cambridge: Law School of Harvard University,

The Constitution provides that every resolution of the Congress shall have the character of a law or a decree, but where such provisions in the U.S. jurisprudence "would have the force of law," in the Mexican jurisprudence, which is similar to some of the European systems, they are "without force and effect until implemented by statute"--i.e., officially endorsed by the President and published in the official gazette.[28]

Further, whereas duly enacted statutes in the U.S. system would create legal rights and liabilities, enforceable in the courts, under the Mexican (Latin jurisprudence) system they require executive regulations before they can have judicial effect. "The President exercises wide power through issuance of the reglamento, . . . an executive interpretation of legislation, often issued shortly on the heels of the latter, and subject to no effective control by any agency of government. The effect of the occasional judicial interpretation of the constitutionality of legislation is minute."[29]

Consequently, "in Mexico, the most important single factor determining the outcome of any program of public regulation is the will of the executive, . . . [and] the fact that Mexico's presidents have wide discretionary powers means that entrepreneurs are persistently concerned that the exercise of

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[27](cont'd) 1959), passim.

[28]Vernon, Policy, p. 11.

[29]Shafer, pp. 10-11.

these powers should be consonant with their interests."[30] For this reason, says Vernon,

> a proper knowledge of the bureaucratic maze and the individuals who operate it is recognized, . . . as an indispensable attribute of the effective Mexican entrepreneur.[31]

Furthermore, "in a regulatory system with these characteristics, entrepreneurs have little interest in battling over questions of purely ideological significance. The ideological overtones of any law and regulations, . . . are less relevant than the machinery for their application."[32]

Up to this point the relationship between the Mexican state and the private sector with respect to Mexico's development has been approached from the viewpoint of state planning, state participation, and state regulations. But to understand how this "laberynth of organizations" functions, it is necessary to understand the basic structure of the Mexican state, and to take a closer look the private sector as well as some of the other groups engaged in the development process, from the viewpoint of support, pressure, or opposition to the existing political system.

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[30]Vernon, Policy, pp. 11-12.

[31]Ibid., p. 12.

[32]Ibid.

4. The Government

In Mexico, power is institutionalized in a dominant party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which is a coalition of the agrarian, labor, and the popular sectors.[33] The first two groups had been main actors in the revolutionary process, and their support has been a mainstay in the political stability of the new state. The third group brought together civil servants, small business people, people in the professions and others.

The PRI's great success is due largely to the fact that it is organized "into sectors that compete with each other for members," since "the sector with the most party members in a specific locality [can] nominate the party's legislative candidate for that locality, plus the fact that the prestige and authority of a leader depend partly on the number of people he claims to speak for."[34]

In the course of time, other pressure groups not formerly organized, became affiliated to the PRI through one or another of its three basic sectors. But not all pressure groups joined the party. The private sector, for instance, although supportive

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[33] For an interesting study of the PRI, see Robert K. Furtak. El Partido de la revolucion y la estabilidad politica en Mexico, Estudios 35, Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, 1978, passim.

[34] Martin C. Needler, Politics and Society in Mexico (Albuquerque, University of New Mexico Press, 1971), pp. 108-109.

of the PRI for the most part (the public sector's goal of procuring a higher standard of living for the Mexicans obviously coincides with that of the private sector, which requires an ever expanding national market for its goods and services), has maintained a position of independence and from time to time it has openly opposed the government over specific issues.

Overall, however, as Gross puts it, the "building of this national party was the single most important factor in counterbalancing the power of the [different interest groups] and welding Mexico into a genuine nation capable of purposeful action."[35]

The system does not, of course, exclude official opposition. There are several registered opposition parties which contend regularly with the PRI in elections, but their support is weak. Needler refers to this opposition as "not only tolerated but in some ways encouraged, for example by the amendment to the constitution which introduced a proportional representation feature guaranteeing opposition representation in the Chamber of Deputies."[36] According to Shafer,

> the opposition to the PRI has been ineffective in the sense that it has not been able to win elections, or convince a significant portion of the populace that it has been deprived improperly of such victory. In fact, the ineffectiveness of the opposition is so conspicuous as to constitute an occasional embarassment. This is one reason for the fact that several opposition parties are

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[35]Gross, p. xvii.

[36]Needler, p. 109.

subsidized by the government.[37]

Shafer explains that one of the realities of the Mexican political life is that Mexicans identify government-with PRI-with Revolution-with possibilities of progress. Therefore, overwhelming support of the PRI candidate at elections is a given fact of life, and consequently, the incumbent government's decisions are not directly contingent on constituent support.[38] "The PRI," he says, "maintains its position primarily by reason of popular support, founded on the evident achievements of the administration it has installed."[39]

The leader of this powerful political party and chief executive of the state is the President of Mexico. During his six non-renewable years in office,

> no one disputes [his] central and overriding power. He possesses an unquestioned authority throughout all echelons of the elaborate hierarchical structure of the PRI . . . . This centralization of party decisionmaking in the presidency, . . . coupled with the one-party system, makes the pressure against schismatics irresistible for all but the desperate.[40]

Nevertheless, the President must share his authority with others and respond to pressures, from one sector or another, as the occasion demands.[41] In fact, in Vernon's words,

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[37]Shafer, p. 7.

[38] Ibid., pp. 4-6.

[39]Ibid., p. 5.

[40]Ibid., p. 6.

[41] For an interesting discussion on the powers and limitations of the Mexican presidency, see Carpizo, presidencialismo ; and Jorge Carpizo, "The No-Reelection Principle in Mexico," The Mexican Forum, vol. 3, no. 4 (October 1983), pp. 9-14.

> [the] tendency to temporize and compromise with the interests of any significant splinter of the Mexican body politic [is] an ingrained habit of operation [of the Mexican Presidency].[42]

In this connection, some of the pressure groups that most require presidential attention, are organized labor, the private sector, the agrarian and popular sectors, and the student/intellectual groups.

5. Pressure groups

Some authors argue that although in Mexico power is officially institutionalized in a dominant party in which agrarian, labor, and popular sectors are represented, in contemporary terms only two sectors can be viewed as a political force of any significance, and one of these, although supportive of the PRI, does not formally belong to the party. These two sectors are labor (one of the "pillars" of the PRI), and private enterprise (the state's "involuntary partner" in economic and industrial development).[43] Whether or not this assertion is true is open to discussion, but their respective importance as pressure groups must not be underestimated, as will be discussed below.

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[42] Vernon, Policy, p. 4.

[43] See for instance Vernon, Policy, passim; and Laurence Whitehead, "Why Mexico is Ungovernable--Almost," Paper no. 54 (September 1979), Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C., passim.

5.1 Labor

As has been mentioned, after seven years of revolution, a new government was established in Mexico in 1917, partly with the support of labor groups. In the course of time, the workers became one of the three powerful groups in the PRI coalition, represented by the Mexican Confederation of Workers (CTM). Generally speaking, labor has participated actively in the Mexican development process and has achieved considerable gains, but there are many contradictory statements about its status and power. Vernon, for instance, says that "it does not violate reality too much to think of Mexico's labor unions as an arm of government through which it seeks to affect the conduct of the private sector."[44] However, according to Camp, "Mexico's organized labor has recently stopped being controlled by the government, and has started to exert pressure on the President to influence his political and personal decisions, even though [this group] does not yet conceptualize itself as representing the interests of all Mexicans."[45]

Nevertheless, Needler points out that "as far as labor is concerned, the record of Mexico is of a general climate of labor peace and steady advancement . . . the government's labor

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[44] Raymond Vernon, The Dilemma of Mexico's Development. The Roles of the Private and Public Sectors (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 65.

[45] Roderic A. Camp, "Reclutamiento politico y cambio en Mexico," Foro Internacional, vol. 20, no. 3 , (January-March 1980), p. 483.

machinery [in the 1960s for instance] conciliated 96.4-percent of the disputes on which strike notices were given, without a strike actually taking place."[46]

The fact is that organized labor has been one of the cornerstones of the labor-employer-state relationship since the Revolution, and especially during the crucial years of Mexico's industrial and economic development (1940-1960), despite momentary restlessness and a series of wildcat strikes from time to time. The 1917 Constitution included, among other things, a very progressive labor law, and the national goals of the revolutionary government, among others, were to protect workers' rights, and to seek a higher standard of living for all Mexicans. Whitehead explains that,

> key aspects of official protection policy include enforcement of the closed shop, automatic deductions of union dues, the distribution of party political positions (as congressmen, and even state governorships) among officialist labour leaders, and the inclusion of union representatives in the management of major bureaucratic institutions (the Minimum Wage Commission, the Workers Housing Fund, the Tripartite Profit-Sharing Commission, etc.).[47]

The rationale for such widespread government protection has been "to consolidate organised labour as a pillar of social stability, providing the government with a counterweight to conservative and business pressures, on the one hand, and a means to attract and enmesh the workforce in a posture of support and understanding towards those in authority, on the

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[46]Needler, 55-56.

[47]Whitehead, p. 17.

other."[48] On this issue, as Whitehead puts it,

> the official labour leadership has repeatedly demonstrated its capacity to deliver disciplined support, even when this had implied acceptance of rising unemployment or falling living standards that must have been unwelcome to most of the membership.[49]

Whitehead suggests that one major reason why labor has for so long acquiesced in this role is job security, and quotes President Lopez Portillo in this connection: "Our country progresses because we have a strong union movement which understands the importance of not destroying what exists, but of preserving our sources of employment."[50]

Today "by international standards the Mexican labour movement is surprisingly strong, both in numerical and financial terms."[51] Needler observes, however, "that only some 10-percent of Mexico's labor force of about 16 million is actually unionized," and that "a little over a million workers are covered by collective contracts which normally are of two years' duration. In recent years the norm has been for a wage increase averaging 7-percent or 8-percent per year to be reflected in each new biennial contract."[52]

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[48]Ibid., p. 17. For an interesting study of the Mexican labor movement, see also: Jose Luis Reyna, Francisco Zapata, Marcelo Miquet, and Silvia Gonzalez, Tres estudios sobre el movimiento obrero en Mexico (Mexico: El Colegio de Mexico, 1976).

[49]Whitehead, p. 17.

[50]Ibid.

[51]Ibid.

[52]Needler, pp. 55-56.

Whitehead gives different figures. He says that in 1978 "there were apparently about 5 million union members, which amounts to 26% of the total labour force," compared to 24% of the U.S. labor force who are union members.[53]

Segovia does not share some of these views. He claims that the working class is not a majority group in Mexico, and consequently that it cannot be a decisive political or electoral factor, although it can be a factor of the utmost importance insofar as any alliance is concerned.[54]

Whitehead sees a new relationship evolving. He believes that since the early 1970s "the old mechanisms of control have shown some signs of weakening, and independent-minded local unions have grown in number and militancy (although still very much a minority tendency)." He adds that in the past decade, a new young labor force is emerging, "containing some considerably better educated elements" than the established labor leadership that has been in power for as long as thirty or forty years. It is aware of its bargaining power and is beginning to choose who it will form alliances with. In fact, Whitehead says that over the past three years, labor discipline and loyalty are contributing, not to "a balanced and solid attitude towards social rights," but to "a lopsided outcome in which the private sector obtains all the advantages, making no concessions in

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[53]Whitehead, p. 17

[54]Rafael Segovia, "Autoritarismo de la clase obrera," Razones, Mexico, Feb-Mar. 1980, p. 16.

return . . . The labor sector in Mexico may continue to be "governable" if, but only if, the government does not seem totally at the mercy of the private sector."[55] "A change is taking place," he adds, though "quite how big a change is underway remains to be seen."[56]

To this, Segovia says that "there can be no doubt that a change in the traditional labor-employer-state pact, on which the Mexican political system has relied, would produce a general change in the system."[57]

5.2 Private Sector

This raises the question of the role of the private sector in the labor-employer-state relationship. As has been mentioned earlier, it is interesting that, like labor, the Mexican private sector grew and expanded under official protection, especially since 1940 when all efforts went into economic and industrial development. As a result, the private sector, like labor though perhaps to a lesser degree, has also "been vulnerable to political discipline," and "viewed over a long perspective, has had reason to feel somewhat insecure.[58] Mexican traditions on

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[55]Whitehead, p. 20.

[56]Ibid., pp. 18-19.

[57]Segovia, p. 16.

[58]Whitehead, p. 20.

the question of property rights, for example, find their expression in the 1917 Constitution, "which is not indiscriminately favourable to private capital accumulation". As Whitehead points out, "Mexican national ownership has in some cases been promoted at the expense of foreign ownership . . . and private ownership rights in land, water, and minerals, are significantly restricted."[59]

Nevertheless, although "some areas of economic activity were closed to private enterprise, this was offset by very favorable incentives (tax concessions, protected markets)"[60] which have systematically been highly favorable to private capital accumulation. In spite of what may have seemed at times excessive intervention on the part of the public sector, conditions were being created for private sector expansion. There is some controversy in the literature as to the degree of government control, but the general consensus seems to be that outside of those areas of economic activity held exclusively by the government, the Mexican private sector has not been restricted in its choice of activities or investments, and that in any case, as Needler puts it, "as far as individual businesses are concerned, there are often ways around the [government] provisions."[61]

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[59]Ibid., pp. 20-21. See also Madrazo, for information on property rights in Mexico.

[60]Whitehead, p. 21.

[61]Needler, Politics, p. 55. See also passim: Vernon, Dilemma; Wright; and Shafer.

Even the "existence of a large and politically protected labor movement," says Whitehead, "has not been a major issue with the private sector, provided the authorities control labour costs and curb working-class unrest."[62] Purcell makes the point that "although most analyses correctly stress the control of organized labor, . . . the full picture is somewhat more complicated. Employers complain that they cannot fire union members; small businessmen in particular find their profits continually squeezed by obligatory contributions for social security, profit sharing, workers' housing, and the like . . . One student of the labor movement went so far as to state that "the government controls labor basically by giving it what it wants"."[63]

In other words, although the system "imposed some political conditions on the business sector that might seem onerous from a North American perspective," says Whitehead,

> in pragmatic terms these were not difficult to live with as long as the government concentrated on providing a highly favourable economic environment. The basic rule was not to publicly challenge the authority of the state or engage too openly in activities classified as "political".[64]

But in this sector, as in labor, a change has been taking place, and it has become noticeable in the last decade or two.

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[62]Whitehead, p. 21.

[63] Susan Kaufman Purcell and John F.H. Purcell ("State and Society in Mexico: Must a Stable Polity be Institutionalized?", World Politics, XXXII, January 1980, no. 2, p. 202).

[64]Whitehead, pp. 20-21.

Perhaps it started in the 1960s when, according to Rostow, Mexico had entered the "take-off" stage in economic development.[65] Or earlier, with the emergence of what Mosk termed Mexico's "new industrialists", or "the new group".[66] However, as Whitehead indicates, government "reformist" policies that started to be implemented in the early 1970s--for instance, the decision to increase the size of the public sector when it was deemed that "public investment required reactivation if the economy's underlying capacity for growth was to be sustained"-precipitated a conflict between the government and the private sector, whose outcome "was to accelerate the process of inflation, and therefore to intensify sectoral conflicts."[67] A series of reactions and counter-reactions took place between the government and the private sector, which went from denunciations of pro-fascism to forms of popular mobilization (eg., officially orchestrated labor demands) versus sector-orchestrated attacks against the government. As a result,

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[65]See W. W. Rostow, The Process of Economic Growth (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1962), p. 283n.

[66]See Sanford A. Mosk, Industrial Revolution in Mexico (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954), pp. 21-35. See also passim: Salvador Cordero and Rafael Santin, "Los grupos industriales: una nueva organizacion economica en Mexico," Centro de Estudios Sociologicos, #23, El Colegio de Mexico, 1977; Carlos Arriola, "Los grupos empresariales frente al Estado (1973-1975)," Foro Internacional, v. XVI, no. 4, El Colegio de Mexico, 1976; and Jose Luis Reyna, "Redefining the Authoritarian Regime," in Authoritarianism in Mexico, eds., J. L. Reyna and R. S. Weinert (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1977).

[67] Whitehead, "Why Mexico", p. 22.

as Whitehad puts it, this situation

> [consolidated] the unity and fighting spirit of the private sector, [and] enhanced its confidence in its own resources, [liberating] many sectors of the business community from a tradition of submissiveness towards the political system.[68]

It also, in more concrete terms, precipitated a massive capital flight which came close to destabilizing the government and caused a serious devaluation in 1976. An earlier example of capital flight had occurred in 1961, when the Lopez Mateos regime implemented a series of changes (through a short, medium and long range economic growth plan), which, combined with the regime's support of Castro in Cuba, refusal to join GATT, and other measures, had set the Mexican private sector--in conjunction with foreign investment--against the government.

This factor, Whitehead said prophetically, might "signify that the Mexican regime must live with a permanent threat of capital flight, if either political or economic conditions for the wealthy are ever allowed to deteriorate."[69] As events in 1982 proved, the government had not yet found the formula to prevent this sort of action. It had been thought possible that the new oil revenues in the late 70s would add to official reserves, and therefore that the capacity to resist capital flight would be enhanced. However the oil revenues were unable to cover the endemic balance of payments deficit and an enormous foreign debt, and the flight of capital was of such proportions

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[68]Ibid., p. 22.

[69]Ibid., p. 23.

that it helped create a grave financial crisis that culminated in the nationalization, in September 1982, of Mexico's private banks.[70]

Thus, although the labor-employer-state relationship on which Mexico's development is based is still holding together, according to the authors reviewed in the foregoing pages there is some concern that there are signs of strain at the seams.

There are, of course, other contending pressure groups in Mexico. A cursory examination of the literature on the current status of some of these groups shows that they have either been de-fused by cooptation or control, or that they are too weak and ineffective to take any position that could challenge the state. They are nevertheless briefly reviewed in this section.

5.3 The Agrarian Sector

The role of the agrarian sector is more difficult to define. Once a major force in helping to bring the revolutionary constitutional government to power, as well as a major influence in government policy with regard to economic planning, according to some authors the sector has become so fragmented and weakened that it no longer holds power to sway the state, or to support

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[70] In this connection, see for instance; Enrique Krauze, "Mexico: The Rudder and the Storm," The Mexican Forum, vol. 3, no. 1 (Jan 1983), pp. 1-9: and Mario Ojeda, "Some Basic Misconceptions about the Present Mexican Crisis," The Mexican Forum, vol. 3, no. 3 (July 1983), pp. 1-3.

the state in any significant way.

In the thirties, says Hellman, millions of landless farmworkers, "sharecroppers, agricultural wage earners, the owners of small land parcels, and the recipients of government land grants" (ejidatarios), were brought together into the PRI under one organization, the National Farmworkers Confederation (CNC), with the idea that "such an organization would come to represent a political force equal to that of any interest group or class in Mexican society." [71] However, the situation changed in the last decades for a number of reasons. To Hellman, who says that "it is both tragic and ironic that the major instrument that has rendered the peasants politically ineffective is the very organization designed . . . give [them] genuine political power," the reason is that

> as the official party machine gained full control over national politics, it became increasingly unlikely that the government would ever need to call upon an armed peasant and worker militia to rescue itself from a military coup d'etat. Accordingly, the loyalty of the peasantry became marginal to the government, although government support continued to be crucial to the peasantry. And in most regions of Mexico, the mutually supportive relationship between the peasants and their national government gradually disintegrated.[72]

Shafer, however, disagrees with this position. He says that "the party has had great success in organizing the rural population, in involving . . . the farmer indirectly in politics, and in satisfying some of his material needs. Thus

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[71]Judith A. Hellman, Mexico in Crisis (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978), pp. 43-44.

[72]Ibid.

party and government have enjoyed the allegiance of the huge rural populace, reducing problems of civil disorder, and minimizing the likelihood that rural dissatisfaction can be used as a base for opposition political growth."[73] He states that

> the fact that critics believe that the [farmer] has misplaced his confidence [in the party] is of little political interest.[74]

Whether or not the political position of the agrarian sector is weaker than it was, there are some practical reasons to explain its fragmentation. For instance, Mexico's international market for agricultural products declined drastically after the Second World War; the need to develop the economy in the forties and fifties led to extensive planning in industry rather than in agriculture; the population explosion rendered the small farm parcels and ejidos incapable of supporting the growing numbers of large families that were becoming the norm in the rural areas; the increase in cash crops drove many subsistence farmers off the land; and land for redistribution purposes was almost exhausted. Whitehead, for instance, says that

> The land reform (or hopes of land distribution) had for many decades given the governing party an unbreakable grip on the countryside that could be used to offset its relative weakness or unpopularity . . . But there is now no way to activate [farmer] support with the promise of further land distributions, for the [rural workers] are being converted into unskilled wage labourers . . . The major political problem is no longer to provide land . . . , but to provide employment to the young, both urban

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[73]Shafer, p. 5.

[74]Ibid., p. 5.

and rural, who are flocking into a labor market that shows little sign of being able to absorb them.[75]

In sum, according to some authors, it would appear that the agrarian sector is now divided into two major groups. One is the group that is actively working the land and traditionally functions in the PRI under a state that is no longer interested in controlling it, and which it can no longer influence. The other consists of a series of sub-groups which are swelling the ranks of the unemployed, the under-employed, and the non-organized labor groups as unskilled workers, including domestic servants, or those who are becoming part of the popular sector in the lower ranks of trade or the bureaucracy. None of these by-groups is individually politically strong, and few have representation in the party.

Other authors, however, do not disallow the strength or the potential strength of the farm workers. For one thing, although there has been a major change in the composition of the Mexican population from majority rural to majority urban, it is too soon yet to fully assess the consequences.[76] For another, the results of the intensive programs instituted by the government for increased food production are still to be analyzed in terms of renewed power to agrarian groups.[77]

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[75]Whitehead, p. 14.

[76]For an interesting study on this subject, see Dinamica de la poblacion de Mexico, 2d ed. (Mexico: El Colegio de Mexico, 1981).

[77] See for instance, Sylvia Hewitt de Alcantara, Modernizing Mexican Agriculture: Socioeconomic Implications of Technological Change, 1940-1970 (Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1976); and "The National Food Program,

And finally, the groups represented in the PRI play an active and very important role in support of the party in the rural areas.[78]

5.4. Other Sectoral Groups

There are two other groups that are discussed in the literature but generally discarded as being either too weak or too ineffective to count as political forces. One of these is a hodge-podge of middle classes, either unorganized or loosely associated under the National Confederation of Popular Organizations (CNOP) in the PRI. This sector includes civil servants (according to the latest census the single largest group of employees in Mexico) who, like labor, are an instrument of the state; tradespeople, owners of small-scale transportation units, members of small agro-industries and fisheries cooperatives, bank employees, small farmers, operators of small home industries, professionals (engineers, doctors, lawyers, artists), part-time workers, etc., all with different interests

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[77](cont'd) 1983-1988, A Report on Food Production Targets," in Review of the Economic Situation of Mexico, vol. 60, no. 700 (March 1984), pp. 97-102.

[78]See: Silvia Gomez-Tagle, "Organizacion de las sociedades de credito ejidal de La Laguna," CES-8, 2d ed. (Mexico: El Colegio de Mexico, 1977); and Rodolfo Stavenhagen, "El campesinado y las estrategias del desarrollo rural," CES-19 (Mexico: El Colegio de Mexico, 1977).

and different income scales.[79]

Furtak says that some of the groups in this sector are numerically, even politically important, but that their representational power is so seriously fragmented and disunited that they do not constitute, separately or together, a challenge of any significance to the state, or a controllable unit.[80]

The other group is the one loosely referred to as "university students", or as "the intellectuals". For the most part this group is casually disposed of by most authors as insignificant as a threat in the political scheme, although occasionally, as in 1968, they can coalesce sufficiently to produce a momentary confrontation with the government. Tuohy believes that there are in Mexico three "major subcultures" in the student political culture. He classifies these into those "who usually operate in channels prescribed by the regime;" those who are "only slightly less interested but relatively inactive;" and those who are radicals but "who largely avoid regime-sanctioned participation structures." He does make the point, however, that active students, although only a minority, "represent a much greater proportion of the student body than active citizens represent among the general public."[81]

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[79] Furtak, pp. 68-71.

[80] Ibid.

[81] William S. Tuohy and Barry Ames, Mexican University Students in Politics: Rebels Without Allies? (Denver: University of Denver, Social Science Foundation Monograph 3, v. 7, 1969-1970), p. 30. See also Rafael Segovia, "Mexican Politics and the University Crisis," in R. R. Fagen and W. A. Cornelius, eds., Political Power in Latin America: Seven Confrontations

On the other hand, as Smith points out, "university training constitutes a near requisite for entering either the economic or the political elite[82] On this point Camp agrees, stating that because the intellectual/university sector shares in an overwhelming proportion the same characteristics of political background as the politicians, this group represents little threat of major dissension.[83]

Camp explains that the National University of Mexico is indeed an apprenticeship for public careers, adding that those who want to succeed in the Mexican political system, by their third or fourth year in professional school have allowed themselves, in terms of their behaviour, to conform to the practices of that system, rather than to challenge it. They do not mold the system; it molds them.[84] In sum, according to these authors, it would seem that the only groups with sufficient strength to provide alternative leadership are the business community and the organized workers.

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[81](cont'd) (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1970), passim.

[82] P. H. Smith, "Does Mexico have a Power Elite?" in Authoritarianism in Mexico, J. L. Reyna and R. S. Weinert, eds. (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1977), p. 147.

[83] Camp, pp. 482-83.

[84]Ibid.

IV. Economic Structure

There remains one section of the case study that must be discussed in this thesis, and that is the one that concerns the economic factor in society. From the previous sections, however, it is apparent that in Mexico the economic and the political factors are so closely interlinked that it is impossible to discuss one without the other. In fact, it would appear that under the heading of Political Structure, basically all important issues of the Economic Structure have been discussed. Nevertheless, in order to provide a small example of how the economic structure functions, I will discuss here a brief period in which a specific policy decision was taken with regard to economic development.

1. Economic Policy (1940-1960)

The twenty-year period selected for this section is believed to be fairly representative of the current contemporary situation, since most authors agree that 1940 marks the point when Mexico's contemporary economic and industrial model began to take shape. By 1940, following the years of civil war that had ravaged the country from 1910 to 1917 and virtually destroyed the economy, political stability was firmly planted on a solid base. Most of the programs in the state's first six-year

plan (1934-1940) consisting of agrarian reform, development of agriculture, mass education, protection of organized labor, and some infrastructure for economic development, had been implemented or initiated. During this period the stress had been on equality of distribution. The relative position of the rural workers and labor in the economy had improved, but the economy as a whole had failed to grow. In Needler's words,

> an indefinite continuation of this policy would have led to the stagnation of the Mexican economy and possibly to a gradual deterioration in standards of living as population increased and machinery became obsolete.[1]

The government was faced with the dilemma of higher productivity versus social justice--whether to "aim primarily at raising the total product or rather at ensuring its more equal distribution."[2] Perhaps at this point one factor that was especially influential in shaping what was to become Mexico's economic development after 1940, was the 1938 nationalization of petroleum, which produced two side effects: 1) by challenging foreign control in Mexico, it created a new feeling of nationalism that brought all Mexicans together in support of the government, a factor which strongly enhanced the growing relationship between the government and the private sector; and 2) it provoked an economic boycott by the international oil companies that seriously affected Mexico's incipient industrial development and helped to intensify the attitude of "Mexico for

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[1]Martin C. Needler, Politics and Society in Mexico (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1971), p. 51.

[2]Needler,

the Mexicans" in both the public and the private sectors.

But it was World War Two that dramatically changed the picture of Mexico's industrial development. The war created a new external demand for Mexico's exports, not only of agricultural products, but of manufactures as well, while at the same time it held down Mexico's supply of manufactured goods, generating internal shortages. Vernon says that,

> the demand for manufactured exports and the shortage of manufactured imports represented an opportunity which Mexican entrepreneurs could not resist.[3]

Mexican investors, under the government's extensive protectionism policy, mostly in the form of import licensing, poured money into industry. At the same time, "lured by the tariff protection offered to Mexican-based industry,"[4] foreign investors, pulling out of war-wracked Europe, started to invest heavily in Mexico.

However, by 1952 the economic boom of the prior decade was beginning to slacken as the external demands for Mexican exports began to decline. With Mexican agricultural products no longer in high demand, there was a slump in agricultural products, which resulted in increasing unemployment of rural workers and considerable migration from rural to urban centers. The purchasing power in the domestic market was low, and the highly

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[3]Raymond Vernon, The Dilemma of Mexico's Development. The Roles of the Private and Public Sectors (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 95.

[4]Harry K. Wright, Foreign Enterprise in Mexico, Laws & Policies (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971), p. 76.

profitable investment opportunities that had attracted foreign investment were becoming less plentiful. Foreign capital began to pull out, inflation set in, and balance of payment pressures began to appear. As a result, the peso was devaluated in 1954, bringing a new flood of foreign investment into Mexico, and although foreign capital increased in every sector of the economy, the great bulk of new investment continued to go into manufacturing, which accounted for over 34% of the total in 1957. Wright says that "by the end of 1958 total direct foreign investment was estimated at close to $1,200 million, an increase of more than 50% over the 1952 total."[5]

The new increase of foreign investment brought new pressures on the government, especially from the Mexican private sector, to limit the role of foreign enterprise in the country. Since the realities of Mexican politics forced the President to take some action without losing sight of the realities of the economy, the government adopted two policies.

The first one of these policies was to encourage "Mexicanization", which Creel describes somewhat billiously as

> a policy of a political and economic nature, directed against foreign-owned enterprises, compelling them to transfer at least 51% of their corporate stock to Mexican nationals . . . . conceived as early as 1925, to limit the foreign ownership of the petroleum industry . . . . although it was not known under the currently fashionable label of Mexicanization.[6]

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[5] Ibid., pp. 78-80.

[6] Luis J. Creel, Jr. "'Mexicanization: A Case of Creeping Expropriation," Southwestern Law Journal, vol. 22 (1968), p. 282.

Blacklanoff, somewhat more tolerant, explains that Mexicanization represents "an effort to induce a foreign enterprise to sell an important part, preferably a majority, of its stock, to Mexicans." He adds that "reluctance to surrender majority ownership could result in discriminatory taxation, lowering of production quotas, diversion of government contracts, and the withholding of business operation permits and import licenses, . . . [but] willingness to yield . . . has received sympathetic reaction from the government in the form of tax benefits and other inducements."[7]

The second policy was to stiffen Mexico's protectionist policies, through stronger import controls. Earlier protectionistic measures had included a 1943 decree providing for substantial increases in customs duties on many products, and an import licensing system, which had not been applied, mainly because at that time local manufacturing could not yet supply many of the prohibited products. Later, in 1947, in an attempt to strengthen a steadily declining balance of payments, another step had been taken. A group of "luxury" items, including automobiles, which had accounted for 18% of the total value of imports in 1946, was made subject to import licenses, and annual quota restrictions were placed on imports of knocked down assembly kits for various products. However, says Izquierdo "the restrictive effect of these prohibitions was mitigated in

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[7] Eric N. Backanoff, Expropriation of U.S. Investments in Cuba, Mexico and Chile (New York: Praeger Publications, 1975), p. 47.

many cases by the importation of the raw materials and intermediate goods needed to produce the final product."[8] Perhaps, as he puts it, it was a case of the "Mexican industrialist [who] takes an eclectic position toward protectionist policy: absolute protection for his product, and free importation of the goods he requires to manufacture it."[9]

Nevertheless, this 1947 measure "marked one of the early appearances of a type of import replacement which was to become a well-defined trend in subsequent years,"[10] and although some changes were made in the policy in the following years, "the objectives of import policy during these crucial postwar years--i.e., to reduce imports and encourage domestic production--were accomplished."[11]

In 1954, import duties were raised again for certain goods, and most of the articles that had been removed from the licensing control list in the intervening years were returned to it, with many new items added for the first time. A new tariff classification system went into effect in 1956 and duties were increased once more.

And yet, in spite of these and other measures taken during this period, the balance of payments continued to show growing

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[8] Rafael Izquierdo "Protectionism in Mexico," ed. R. Vernon, Public Policy and Private Enterprise in Mexico (Cambridge, Mass.: 1964), p. 265.

[9] Ibid., p. 277.

[10] Ibid., p. 266.

[11] Ibid., p. 268.

deficits. Izquierdo reports the following figures:

> In 1946, the current account of Mexico's balance of payments, which had beeen positive from 1942 to 1945, showed a deficit of 174 million dollars. Foreign-exchange reserves, which had increased from 54 to 344 million dollars in the four preceding years, went down in 1946 by more than 40% . . . [The deficits in the balance on current account] were particularly high in 1957, 1958, and 1960; in these three years the deficits were 199 million, 182 million, and 174 million U.S. dollars, respectively.[12]

By 1957, confronted with this drain, it was clear that the government had two major alternatives. One alternative was "to concentrate on industrial integration through persuasion or compulsion," and in this connection, a national law which granted tax exemptions to "new or necessary industries," had been amended and now stipulated that such industries would receive the specified tax benefits and even larger ones, only if they included at least 60% of the prime cost of production, including labor and depreciation.[13]

The other alternative was to "concentrate on expanding the flow of foreign capital, public and private, into the country irrespective of its use."[14]

The government chose the second course, although no official statements were issued regarding the choice. In fact,

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[12] Ibid., p. 265.

[13] Ibid., pp. 270-271. It is interesting that at about this time a First National City Bank of New York analysis of the situation suggested that "Mexico's economy may be expanding too fast, and in view of the balance of payments gap, it needs curtailment rather than stimulation." (The New York Times, October 8, 1957) p. 52.

[14] Izquierdo, p. 271.

Izquierdo says,

> official declarations of policy were simply barren of any indication of motive . . . statements on import policy during this period were meager and timid. The protectionist impetus of previous years seemed lost. The absence of specific references to industrial integration was especially conspicuous.[15]

However, there were obviously a number of reasons that could explain the government's decision at that time. One reason could have been the desire to avoid more price increases, "even at the risk of reducing the possibilities of growth."[16] The recent devaluation had produced a 9.4% rise in domestic wholesale prices in 1954 and 14% in 1955 and, though wages had also increased considerably that year, in 1956 the leader of the Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM) had announced that new demands would be made shortly to the government to "solve all the problems that affect the workers and their families."[17]

Another reason for the government's decision could have been the desire to "create a still more favorable climate for foreign investment, particularly for investment in joint ventures of Mexicans and foreigners." It might have been feared that further restrictions, added to the already extensive existing ones, might discourage foreign direct investment "and . . . defeat the administration's efforts to increase

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[15]Ibid.

[16]Ibid., p. 272.

[17]Jose Luis Reyna and Marcelo Miquet, "Introduccion a la historia de las organizaciones obreras en Mexico: 1912-1966," in Tres estudios sobre el movimiento obrero en Mexico, eds., J. L. Reyna et al., (Mexico: El Colegio de Mexico, 1976), p. 67.

foreign-exchange reserves."[18] In fact, according to Kennedy, the Minister of Finance was "studying the possibilities of [permitting the establishment of] 'tax haven corporations' in Mexico for U.S. concerns; the corporations could be set up under existing legislation. . . . [but] the idea was being approached cautiously because of fear of arousing nationalistic elements resentful of anything even hinting of special privileges to foreign-owned industries."[19]

And still another possible reason could have been the fact that 1957 marked the end of the Ruiz Cortines regime and it is conceivable that the outgoing President did not wish to become involved at that time in a controversy with foreign investors and preferred to leave it to the incoming President, Lopez Mateos, to take a firmer stand.

When Lopez Mateos took office in 1958, "Mexicans [concerned with the continued expansion of their economy] were beginning to wonder where the next impetus to growth would be coming from."[20] The alternatives which faced the new government were still those that the previous government had faced: to increase industrial integration at the risk of possible alienation of foreign investment, with the uncertainty that Mexican private investment could or would fill the gap; or to let foreign investment flow

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[18]Izquierdo, p. 272.

[19] Paul P. Kennedy, "Mexico Proposed as U.S. Tax Haven." The New York Times, February 11, 1957, p. 5.

[20]Vernon, Dilemma, pp. 116-7.

in with limited constraints and face the double economic and political hazard of domestic protest and foreign domination. However, several new factors had entered the picture, both in the domestic and in the foreign scene.

For one thing, one of the labor unions, the Railroad Workers' Union with 60,000 members, pushing demands for a huge wage increase to meet increasingly rising prices, staged an aggressively escalating series of demonstrations that seriously challenged the government.[21]

Another factor was that the latest national census showed that the population of Mexico had virtually doubled since 1940. At the staggering growth rate of 3.4% per year, this meant that the rising population was outstripping all public services and employment opportunities.[22]

Still another factor was that events in Cuba had polarized the heretofore relatively passive left and right opposition groups in Mexico, and the government was being pressured by both sides to define its position with regard to Castro.

Furthermore, foreign investment, already somewhat wary after recent experiences of expropriations in Cuba and other Latin American countries, was beginning to shy away from Mexico,

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[21] Reyna, Introduction, pp. 68-71.

[22] For interesting studies on this problem, see for instance: Francisco Alba, La poblacion de Mexico, Evolucion y dilemas (Mexico: El Colegio de Mexico, 1979); John S. Nagel, "Mexico's Population Policy Turnaround," Population Bulletin, Ford Foundation, vol. 33, no. 5, Washington, D.C., 1978; and Martinez Manautou, ed., The Demographic Revolution in Mexico 1970-1980 (Mexico: Mexican Institute of Social Security: 1982).

contributing to a considerable decline in production growth.[23] This withdrawal was aggravated as a result of Mexico's refusal to go along with the U.S. proposition of an OAS boycott of the Cuban government, and further exacerbated when Mexico, realizing that it would be impossible to compete against exports of advanced industrial countries, refused to join GATT.

Faced with all these factors, Lopez Mateos followed the traditional "presidential habit of compromise," and set out on what some authors describe as a "zigzag course". He adopted the policies initiated by his predecessors and: a) went ahead rapidly with the Mexicanization and nationalization programs, (e.g. the government bought a number of foreign owned enterprises including the Light and Power companies, and a large steel plant; and pressed others into surrendering majority control to Mexican or public holders); b)vigorously implemented the industrial integration program (for instance, in the manufacture of typewriters, agricultural machinery and implements, in heavy construction equipment, and in the electronics and automobile industries); and c) simultaneously set out to attract foreign investment through a well-planned public relations campaign that he conducted with the cooperation of the Mexican private sector, a sector that was anxious to expand industrial projects through joint-capital ventures.

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[23] Robert J. Shafer, Mexico, Mutual Adjustment Planning (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1966), p. 56.

At the same time, Lopez Mateos undertook a major reorganization of the government planning agencies. This included some shifts in the responsibilities of the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, as well as the creation, by law of December 30, 1958, of two new ministries: the Ministry of the Presidency, which was legally empowered to plan and control economic development and public investment, and the Ministry of National Properties, which had considerable powers related to planning and the implementation of development projects.

Obviously the policy did not stop precisely in 1960. Among the projects produced after 1958 was the Plan for Immediate Action, which was a short- medium- and long-term economic development plan for Mexico. It went into effect in 1962 with much controversy, because it contained proposals for the industrial integration of several industries, notably the electronics and the automobile industries.[24]

However, it may be useful here to recall that the original thrust of the 1940-1960 government policy was to change the focus from agrarian development to industrial growth, in order to stimulate economic development and avoid stagnation, as well as to prevent the already improved standard of living from deteriorating. According to Needler, there are "various authors who argue that the economic advances made in Mexico in recent

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[24]For further information see, passim, Shafer; Vernon, Dilemma, and Vernon Policy; and other authors mentioned in this section.

years have been made at the expense of the poorer classes." However, he adds that "after examining the evidence as of 1962," Raymond Vernon concluded that "no solid support exists for the suspicion that Mexico's growth was largely a case of the rich growing richer while the real income of the poor declined. The rise of foodstuff consumption and decline of the infant death rate since 1940 suggest the opposite conclusion." In fact, says Needler, since 1952, when as a result of new economic policies profits rose sharply but inflation reduced the economic capacity of lower-class incomes, "Mexican policy has tried to hold to a middle ground in which it is possible to maintain business incentives and profits but at the same time enable the real income of the popular sectors to rise steadily."[25]

It was the purpose of this section to describe Mexico's Economic Structure by focusing on the industrialization policy in the 1940-1960 period. The three approaches discussed in the body of this thesis will now be evaluated in terms of data contained in the foregoing sections.

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[25] Needler, pp. 51-52.

C. AN APPRAISAL

I. Evaluations

The purpose of this thesis was to evaluate three approaches to the study of political development and find if, and how, each one interprets adequately the political development of a particular nation, which in this case is Mexico.

The three approaches, which have been described in previous sections, are those known generally as the dependency approach, the evolutionary approach, and the institutional approach.

Taking into account the many differences between the three approaches, not only in their premises and in their terminology, but also in more subtle aspects such as their ideological or philosophical points of departure, I found that only by reducing the general concepts of the three to common denominators, would it be possible to evaluate their respective merits with regard to one single case study nation.

I did this, and found that the three approaches dealt either implicitly or explicitly with three general categories which could be loosely classified as political, economic, and social factors. Attempting to further narrow down this classification, I found that the three factors were interrelated differently in each approach, that there was a key factor in each relationship, and that I could express the relationships as formulas.

In relation to the case study, I found that only by cataloging data about it in the same three general categories, would it be possible to relate the approaches to it. In other words, whatever data I used to describe Mexico would have to be grouped into political, economic, or social factors.

This proved to be more difficult that I had anticipated, for two reasons. The first had to do with selection of the representative data. Whereas in the approaches I was dealing in each case with one general set of ideas, in the case of Mexico I was dealing not only with a multifaceted nation that has a long history, I was also dealing with the many sets of ideas to be found in the myriad publications available on Mexico, as well as with my own set of ideas in the selection itself. Furthermore, my selection had to cover a fairly broad spectrum of Mexico's many realities, if there was to be sufficient data for evaluating the three approaches.

The second reason was that political, economic, and social factors are so closely meshed together in Mexico that it was not possible to separate them for the case study. Therefore, in discussing, for instance, Mexico's political structure, economic and social issues were constantly present, and vice versa.

I resolved the problem, first by selecting material on the basis of my own knowledge and appreciation of the Mexican political system, and second by including material from the Colonial and the Independence periods for the section on Social Structure, because I realized that the making of modern Mexico

was determined by its birth as a nation from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, and by the growing pains of its adolescence in the nineteenth century.

In the following pages I will try to evaluate the results of this exercise, bearing in mind that the purpose is not to determine what kind of state Mexico is or should be, according to each approach, but rather to recognize the adequacies or inadequacies of each approach in viewing Mexico's many realities as they are.

Each approach will be evaluated separately. I will briefly review the general premises of each approach , and I will then determine whether or not each approach and its corresponding formula adequately describes the Mexican development experience as I have presented it.

1. The Dependency Approach

To dependency theorists, the industrial development of the first world nations was made possible by their taking control of the resources and markets of their colonies or other weaker economies. Then in order to maintain their control, these Western nations manipulated the leadership and institutions of those weaker countries, creating a state of permanent underdevelopment that could not be altered, since any attempts at breaking the hold of the established interests led to reprisals and to further intervention, both political and

military. Furthermore as long as these conditions existed and curtailed their possibilities of growth, the weaker countries would be prone to social and political unrest and instability.

As an example, dependency theorists pointed to the fact that as industrialization increased in Latin American countries in response to economic development plans and strategies, so did imported technology, foreign investment, and finance loans, chiefly from the United States. As American economic interests grew in the region, so did American political intervention.[1]

This approach was based on the theory of "industrial center and agrarian periphery," in which the former dominates the latter. This means that one nation derives part of its wealth by obtaining the raw materials of another at low prices, and providing it with finished products at high prices, but to keep the prices low and the raw materials flowing in, it must control the other's political system.

Stated another way, if the economic system of a nation depends upon external factors, those factors will influence domestic issues and cause political and social problems. Therefore, in the dependency approach the economic system of a nation determines its political and social development.

This means that in the relationship between political, economic, and social factors, the key factor is the economic system, with the development of political and social systems

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[1]All of these statement are taken from the body of the thesis, and their sources identified therein.

contingent upon it.

The formula for this approach, then, is: political and social development depend upon any variable of the economic system. Thus, in the dependency approach:

eSY(x) --> p+sDV

The question is: does this formula apply to Mexico? From this approach, Mexico's colonial period would be viewed as one in which Spain derived its wealth from the resources provided by the young colony, leaving it little to develop with. The products of its land and of its mines were extracted mostly for the purpose of supplying Spain, and in exchange, Spain provided Mexico with manufactured goods for its domestic market. Exploitation labor was employed in these activities, and a wealthy and powerful elite was established by a system of patronage that produced privileges and monopolies.

This is undoubtedly true, and examples can be found to show that Spain intervened strongly when it appeared that there was a tendency to develop independently, as in the case of the textile industry in the early seventeenth century, when exports to Guatemala were prohibited to prevent competition with Spain's own textile exports. This was also true in another instance, when Spain curtailed supplies of mercury to the miners, bringing about a shutdown of mines and massive unemployment. In fact, all attempts at independent economic development were repressed, creating what Roeder called "a race of political minors and a dependent mentality in the colonials, which provided the best

means of perpetuating their bondage."[2] At the same time, however, Mexico was a country where the pioneer developed, the rugged individual who fought his way through every kind of conceivable obstacle, to settle new lands and create cities and towns where there were none. This was the land of opportunity for both the common man and for the upper classes, but hard work and hardy spirits were indispensable ingredients, and a dependent mentality could not survive. It was precisely the independent mentality of the Mexicans that Spain tried to quash at the end of the eighteenth century, and it was that same independent spirit that helped Mexicans to break the bond with Spain in the nineteenth century.

The entire nineteenth century was, in fact, a struggle against dependency. And in spite of terrible setbacks, a state did emerge that was not dependent on anything but its own resources. Unfortunately, decades of civil war and wars with other states in defense of its sovereignty, depleted both Mexico's coffers and the strength of its leaders, and Mexico then entered into a second period of dependency, this time by opening its doors in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, to American and European investors. In the following thirty years, the Porfirio Diaz regime put Mexico in a dependency situation never experienced even in colonial times. The economy began to pick up, but for the benefit of the foreign investors

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[2] Ralph Roeder, Juarez and his Mexico. A Biographical History, 2 vols. (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), vol. 1, p. 14.

and the elites who ruled for them and their interests. Political and social development became entirely contingent on the economic system. The people were ruled by a repressive government. But once again, an independent mentality helped to break that situation, again by war, and again with empty coffers at the end of a second civil war in the early twentieth century. This time, however, some strategies were developed to try and prevent a third round of dependency.

It has been shown that the 1917 Constitution established guidelines for state participation in the economic and social development of the nation, and that consequently the Mexican government has had a constitutional mandate to intervene in any social or economic activity that will provide benefits to the Mexican people. In the pursuit of these goals, the government has taken a number of steps, including a continuous program to expand industrialization and strengthen the domestic private sector through a system of increasing protectionism, import substitution, restrictions on foreign capital in certain areas of the economy, and mandatory "Mexicanization" (joint ventures with majority Mexican capital) in others.

In the process of stimulating growth, the government has often been faced with the dilemma of having to choose between social values and economic values, and policy decisions have often been guided by political expediency in one direction or the other. In fact, perhaps the most important area of disagreement between the government and the private sector has

been the question of whether "social" or "economic" values are to have precedence in determining policy.

However, throughout the years following the Revolution, the private sector and the government developed a working relationship through which an apparatus of highly sophisticated modern entrepreneurship was built. Substantial agreement between them and sufficient state support permitted the expansion of the private sector.

The extent of public investment, however, has been a source of some disagreement and debate between the two sectors. Government intervention has been deliberate and extensive in order to fulfill the economic growth goal, and through the years the government has come to control all oil production, electric power supply, most major communications and transportation networks, some agricultural products such as sugar, some of the mining production and all of petrochemical industry, and recently the entire banking apparatus, plus an assorted array of industrial ventures which it salvaged from the private sector or set up for strategic reasons when the private sector would not.

However, outside of the limited number of fields reserved exclusively for the public sector by Constitutional mandate, the public sector has neither curtailed nor interfered with the private sector's liberty to invest where and how it pleases.

All of this seems to indicate that Mexico has arrived at a pragmatic middle way economic policy, that combines encouragement for the private sector with initiative in the

expansion of the public sector; favorable conditions for foreign investment, with the retention of key powers of economic decision in national hands; and augmented benefits for labor, with maintenance of a favorable business climate.

This is not to say that the relationship between the public and the private sector has been one long honeymoon. The key powers of economic decision-making have not always been held firmly in the hands of the public sector, as was shown in recent years when massive flights of capital critically affected the government's economic policies.

Furthermore, several decades of endemic balance of payment deficits have influenced many of the government's decisions with regard to economic policy. The need to increase and diversify exports has been an overriding concern of every regime since the early 1940s, a concern deepened by the fact that international markets have not been readily accessible, and almost all of Mexico's foreign trade has continued to be with the United States in a relationship of highly unequal exchange.

For instance, in 1942 "Mexico represented one-half of one percent of the U.S. economy, in terms of output, in terms of the volume of foreign trade, and in terms of a series of indicators . . . . Forty years later, although showing a slight advance, the gross domestic product of Mexico is more or less 6.8 percent of the U.S. gross domestic product."[3]

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[3] Victor L. Urquidi, "Reflections on the Juxtaposition of the U.S. and Mexican Economies," The Mexican Forum, vol. 2, no. 2, April 1982, p. 1.

In this connection, it is interesting to note that in a comparative study of the respective economic relationships of Canada and Mexico with their mutual neighbour--"the most economically-important superpower"--Cohn concludes that both have a similar problem of asymmetrical dependence or interdependence. He states that not only Mexico's but also Canada's dependence on foreign trade is focused primarily on the United States, and he cites the following figures for trade with the Americans in 1980: Canadian exports to the U.S., 61 percent, and Canadian imports from the U.S., 68 percent; Mexican exports to the U.S., 63 percent, and Mexican imports from the United States, 66 percent.[4]

It is precisely in an attempt to solve this problem, as well as for the other reasons explained earlier, that the Mexican state sets national economic goals through short, medium, and long-term development plans, and establishes guidelines for the allocation of some resources, and controls others such as petrochemicals and oil. It does not, however, coordinate supply and demand in general. It leaves this activiy largely to the private sector, which is at liberty to pursue its activities as it sees fit, with state intervention only in areas that affect public interest.

In summary, then it might be difficult to say that in the contemporary Mexican state, political and social development are

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[4] Theodore Cohn, Canadian and Mexican Trade Policies Towards the United States: A Perspective from Canada (Ottawa: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1984).

contingent on its economic dependency on the United States or other industrial countries. Or even to say that Mexico's economic system is totally dependent on the United States, or any more so than, say, Canada is.

It would seem, then, that the eSY(x) --> p+sDV formula does not adequately read Mexico's political development, even if in some ways it does seem to fit into the general scheme of the dependency approach. This approach applies only to a certain extent, and in certain periods. For instance, one could say, in fact, that Mexico really became dependent, in the eSY(x) --> p+sDV type of formula, only twice in its modern history: at the end of the eighteenth century under the Bourbon reforms, and at the end of the nineteenth century, under Porfirio Diaz.

Thus, it might be more appropriate to look at Mexico's political development, at least in this section of the evaluation, from a different approach, which could be formulated as: pSY(x) --> e+sDV. Stated in other words, this means that in Mexico, economic and social development seem to be contingent on its political system.

2. The Evolutionary Approach

This approach is based on the theory of stages of growth propounded by Rostow, whose model established that all societies were economically lying within one of five categories of growth, which he expressed as 1) the traditional society; 2) the

preconditions for take-off (beginning of modern science and industry in Western Europe in late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries): 3) the take-off (when technological development helps remove the blocks and resistances to steady growth and the forces that make for economic progress expand and come to dominate the society); 4) the drive to maturity (a long interval, perhaps of sixty years, of sustained if fluctuating progress before maturity is attained), and 5) the age of high mass consumption (the post maturity stage: politically, increased social welfare and security; socially a shift towards production and consumption of durable consumer goods).

Based on the history of development or evolution of European and British societies and later of the United States, this theory was modified and adapted in various forms by political scientists, mostly on the basis of a transition from traditional social man and form of government, to democratic social man and democratic political institutions in the Western World.

The underlying assumption in this approach is that progress is achieved when the combined political, economic, and social systems of a nation take it from one stage to the next in the prescribed manner. This means that the three systems have to work in an interlocked manner, and that there can be no progress from one stage to the next if one of the systems lags behind.

In other words, the key factor in this case would be that development, or progress, depends upon the concurrent

development of the political, economic, and social systems. Thus, in the evolutionary approach:

$$p+e+sSY \dashrightarrow DV(x)$$

To evaluate this approach, one would have to look at the long chain of events that has taken place over several centuries, to see whether Mexico's political, economic, and social systems have moved concurrently, or relatively so, along the evolutionary stages of development from traditional to modern, and if so, perhaps one must also try to determine at which of the five stages of development it is to be found at present. Rostow himself stated in the early 1960s that Mexico had now reached the take-off stage. But was he correct in his assessment of Mexico?

By the 1960s Mexico had indeed entered a stage of rapid industrialization. The Mexican government had for the last two and a half decades stimulated growth, as has been mentioned in various previous sections, by many means: by state financing, by establishing development programs, by supporting and protecting the Mexican private sector, by controlling and offering at reduced costs many services useful to industry, by protecting and assisting the working class, etc.

In the social sphere, Mexico had established enormous and widespread programs of education, public health, and other services. There was universal franchise and, if not all the registered voters went out to vote, the percentage was no lower than, say, in Canada during the last Federal election, i.e, in

the vicinity of 40-50%.

On the political side, power was institutionalized in a dominant party (PRI) which brought together a coalition of the labor, agrarian, and popular sectors which, between them, represented a very broad spectrum of the citizenry. There existed several opposition parties, although none of them was strong enough to gain sufficient popular support in elections, which the PRI consistently won with overwhelming popular support. Furthermore, Mexico had had, by that time, half a century of political stability.

The appearances, then, were reasonably in agreement with the premises of the evolutionary approach. The p+e+sSY --> DV(x) formula, however, was not substantiated by the picture of Mexico as it emerged in this thesis. Through its political system, Mexico had arrived at a highly industrialized stage without achieving an equivalent stage of growth in its social system, and without having first gone through some of the prescribed preliminary stages. In fact, Mexico's political development, rather than evolutionary, had been one where economic and social development were contingent on political events which took place in a non-consecutive process. This did not at all agree with the neatly set out five stages of growth, or with the Darwinian pattern of evolution.

Mexico was born, not out of a traditional society moving towards modernity, but out of the violent rape of a society that had developed in ways totally strange to the Europeans, by a

typical European Renaissance society. Its development, from that moment on, was neither smooth, nor concurrent insofar as its social institutions were concerned. In fact, its pattern of evolution seems somewhat awry.

For instance, in the span of about 400 years, Mexico went from a society controlled in its early stages by Spain, to a semi-controlled, semi-independent society with a thriving economy, then back to a firmly controlled society in the eighteenth century. From thence, in the nineteenth century, it went on to become a fragile independent democratic state, slipping backwards and forwards between autocratic and democratic rule, and finally, it returned to democracy and a forward process of change in the twentieth century. This was, indeed, a zigzag course of development. The economic and social systems lagged behind during this period of winding and broken pathways on the road to progress. It is only now, in the second half of the twentieth century, under a government that sets national goals by Constitutional mandate, that Mexico seems to be following a consecutively progressive rate of growth and development. But the standard of living of much of its population is still very low, and Mexico is still importing technology at very high costs.

Therefore, Mexico's development, as seen in this section of the evaluations, seems to follow not the p+e+sSY --> DY(x) formula of the evolutionary approach, where political, economic, and social systems move concurrently towards progressive stages

of development, but rather a pSY(x) --> e+sDV formula. This means that in Mexico, economic and social development appears to be contingent on its political system.

3. The Institutional Approach

The institutional approach postulates that survival of a political system at any given moment in history depends upon the existence of strong and flexible institutions capable of withstanding and absorbing the challenge of modernization. Here it is the type of government, rather than any other consideration, that is important. But it must be the type of system where "the government governs" with an overwhelming consensus among the people.

According to this approach, political instability is caused by social and economic modernization, although the degree of instability is related to the rate of modernization. As modernization enters the social order with new demands, new ideas and new conditions, the government must be able to meet these new conditions at a speed that will enable it to assimilate them. Otherwise the system will collapse and give way to a new one, sometimes by revolution, sometimes by civic pressure.

This approach, which represents the ideal of American institutions and values as the appropriate model to be emulated by other societies, sees social problems as aberrations which

could be resolved by normal political processes within existing institutions.

An extract of this approach could be the following: that social and economic demands can affect, or destroy, a political system. This means that here, in the political, economic, and social relationship, the two latter factors are the key factors, since the stability or type of the political system is dependent upon them. The formula here would be: any variable of the political system depends upon economic and social development. Thus, in the institutional approach:

$$e+sDV \dashrightarrow pSY(x)$$

From the point of view of this approach, Mexico's history presents a number of cases to substantiate it. In fact, Mexican history books are peppered with instances in which one government or another is overthrown. For example, in the colonial period there were instances of a viceroy having to withdraw from his duties, voluntarily or by order of the king, when public criticism and pressures forced the issue. So obviously it is possible to speak of a government that was unable to govern even if that government was under the Spanish crown. However, it would seem more appropriate to leave behind 300 years of colonial rule, and approach Mexico in the nineteenth century with the institutional formula in hand. Is it applicable? It would seem so. The elements are there. An independent state, elections, an 1824 Constitution, another Constitution in 1833, and a third one in 1857. Government after

government is overthrown, some governments are elected with strong popular support, and others are not. This is an age of change. Europe is fast becoming highly industrialized and there is a demand from people everywhere for services, for merchandise, for new conditions. In Mexico, the succeeding governments are unable to meet some of those demands.

Can any of these instances, however, be examined as cases where economic and social demands overwhelm a government? From the data in the section on Mexico, it can be seen that the cause of governments falling during much of that period was not so much due to new internal demands, as to external forces over which there was little control, and old demands pitted against new government. It was a case of old conservatives trying to regain powers and privileges recently lost, versus the new liberals, trying to establish modern institutions and free enterprise. We do not have here the new ideas trying to throw out the old, i.e. new conditions creating new demands and pushing for a forward change that the old institutions cannot fulfill. On the contrary, what we have is the old regime pushing for a change backwards and trying to eliminate the new regime. A curious anomaly in this case, where the incipient Mexican liberal governments were trying to establish progressive, democratic institutions is that, ironically, pressures against these governments were coming precisely from nations which advocated democratic liberal government.

The institutional formula would have to be rewritten to be applicable to the circumstances of the nineteenth century. It would seem more appropriate, therefore, to look at Mexico's twentieth century history for possible applicability of the institutional approach.

As has already been mentioned, in 1917, after a revolution, Mexico issued a constitution that established guidelines for state participation. It had far reaching reforms and a very wide range of social benefits and goals. By 1927, when consolidation of the new political system was firmly achieved, power had been institutionalized in a dominant party (PRI), which was supported by the combined labor, agrarian and popular sectors. In the course of time, other groups, not formerly organized, became affiliated to the PRI through one or another of its three basic sectors. The PRI became a very widely based, representative institution--not an exclusive, but rather an inclusive party. One reason for this is its organization, which permits its sectors to compete with each other for members, since the sector with the most party members in a specific locality can nominate the party's legislative candidate for that locality.

Not all pressure groups, however, became affiliated to the PRI. The private sector, for instance, maintains its independence from the party. Although it is supportive of the PRI for the most part, it has from time to time openly opposed the government over specific issues.

Furthermore, the system does not exclude official opposition. There are several registered opposition parties although they cannot compete with the overwhelming support of the Mexican voters, who equate PRI with Revolution with Progress.

During the sixty years that this system has been in power, it has been shaken on a few occasions by crises. For example, when, after a 9.4% rise in domestic wholesale prices in 1954 and a 14% rise in 1956 following a devaluation, the leader of the Workers' United Front announced that new demands would be made shortly to the government, and a massive demonstration of workers took place, putting some considerable strain on the government. Openly criticized, the government nevertheless displayed an array of possible reactions, and chose to favor a course which would expand the flow of foreign capital into Mexico, creating in this way a bigger job market, and assuaging the discontent.

Pressures on the system have come from many directions: a critically high rate of population growth was pinpointed in the 1960s, bringing with it short and long range problems that strongly affect government resources and responses. One solution was to set up a nation-wide family planning program, sponsored by the government, which was under way by the beginning of the 70s.

Another crisis occurred in 1968 with a student movement that escalated to a point where the government deemed it

necessary to repress it with violence.

Following a brutal devaluation, and the nationalization of the private banking system in Mexico, the government today is facing the most severe crisis of its modern history. It has a foreign debt of great enormity, and is constrained in its use of funds for public investment by strictures imposed by the International Monetary Fund. Predictions of widespread social unrest and imminent chaos have so far failed to materialize, although restrictions on wage increases and a rise in consumer prices have begun to cause some social discomfort. The government, which has displayed ingenuity and flexibility in the past, seems so far to be handling the situation adequately.

The question, now, is whether the e+sDV --> pSY(x) formula can be applied to this image of the Mexican political system. In other words, does economic and social development determine the type of political system that Mexico has? Does the Mexican government fit into the design of a strong yet flexible institution whose stability is dependent upon its capacity to handle the demands created by modernization? Do the demands created by modernization threaten the stability of the Mexican political system?

In a sense, the institutional formula holds. As has been seen, through the years since the Revolution, the Mexican political state has had to face several crises as demands have strained the system. And it has not collapsed. It is important, however, to bear in mind that throughout its history, the

Revolutionary government has anticipated and in many ways orchestrated the changes that modernization has brought in the period from 1917 to the present. If one were to search for a reason for this particular situation, perhaps, for want of a better simile, one could say that the PRI, Mexico's dominant party, is an institution somewhat along the lines of the church in Colonial times, in that it is pervasive, charged with the task of absorbing the people of Mexico into the system, with its members infiltrated in every community from village to big city, where they act as defenders, protectors, judges, intermediaries, educators, and community leaders, as well as being representatives of the state.[5] In that case the demands put on the system are commensurate with its capacity to resolve problems, and not vice versa.

In other words, since in Mexico modernization seems to take place to a large degree by orchestration of the political system, then the political system is reasonably prepared in advance for whatever economic and social demands are made on it, and its response thus far has been appropriate to those demands.

Therefore, in this case, the formula e+sDV --> pSY(x) has to be turned around, and expressed as pSY(x) --> e+sDV. This means that in Mexico, economic and social development seem to be contingent on the political system, and not vice versa.

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[5] See the section on the Colonial Period in Chapter VI of this thesis.

II. Conclusions

In the previous chapter, Evaluations, an attempt was made to analyze the political development of Mexico from the point of view of three general approaches to the study of political development, the dependency, the evolutionary, and the institutional approaches. To facilitate their respective evaluations, these approaches had earlier been reduced to common denominators and expressed as formulas, which were proposed to represent the general premises of each approach.

In the case of the dependency approach, the formula was eSY(x) --> p+sDV, meaning that any variable of the economic system of a nation will have direct repercussions on its political and social development. If the economic system is a dependent one, the social and political systems will lag behind, creating a general state of underdevelopment.

In the case of the evolutionary approach, the formula was e+s+pSY --> DV(x). This means that any variable of development, or progress, will depend upon the concurrent development, from stage to stage, of the political, economic, and social systems of a nation, towards progress. If the three systems do not develop at the same rate, then the society as a whole remains in a stage of underdevelopment.

In the institutional approach, the formula was e+sDV --> pSY(x), i.e. any variable of the political system will depend

upon the development of the economic and social systems. If, as a result of modernization, demands come from the economic and social sectors of a nation that its political system cannot respond to adequately, this system will collapse, or become repressive.

As a picture of Mexico emerged in connection with the evaluation of each of the approaches, it became interesting to note that there was always a discrepancy between the Mexican system and the formula corresponding to each approach. In each case, to be concordant with Mexico's political development as portrayed in this thesis, the corresponding formula would have had to be changed to pSY(x) --> e+sDV, which means that economic and social development are contingent upon any variable of a political system. In the case of Mexico, this meant that its economic and social development depended upon its particular type of political system.

Conversely, it was not possible to establish that Mexico was, as posited in the dependency approach, a nation where political and social development were contingent upon its economic system; nor as in the evolutionary approach, a nation where political, economic, and social systems had evolved concurrently over time, reaching together a particular state of development; nor as in the institutional approach, that the stability of Mexico's political system depended upon its response to economic and social demands.

The picture that emerged was rather that of a nation with a long history of struggle to attain sovereignty and self-sustained growth, that had found a way to develop a political system that guides, cajoles, and, when necessary, pushes, the economic and social factors in the society towards overall goals that will contribute to a better standard of living for all of the population.

This could signify, of course, that Mexico is a corporatist state, fitting somewhat Manoilescu's description of a "collective and public organization composed of all persons (physical and juridical) who together fill the same function in the nation . . . by means of rules and rights imposed on [them]."[1] Or that it is, as in Winkler's definition, a directive state that

> tells private business what it must do and may not do. The state establishes national goals, controls the allocation of resources, provides some co-ordination of supply and demand for important goods and services.[2]

But from the data presented here, it would seem, rather, to be a supportive state, a state that "offers protection, subvention and, if necessary, therapy to private business."[3]

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[1]Mihail Manoilescu, Le siecle du corporatisme: doctrine du corporatisme integral et pur, as quoted in Daniel Chirot, "The Corporatist Model and Socialism, Notes on Romanian Development," "Theory and Society", v. 9, no. 2, March 1980, p. 364.

[2]J. T. Winkler, "Corporatism," Archives Europeennes de Sociology, vol. 17, no. 1, 1976, p. 104.

[3]Ibid.

Thus, in the case of Mexico, the formula pSY(x) --> e+sDV could be translated to mean, in Winkler's words,

> [a state] that provides incentives and subsidies to stimulate activity, manages aggregate demand, offers welfare services to the casualties of a competitive system, trains manpower, undertakes technological development, etc. It attempts to aid, even influence private economic activity, but not to prescribe it. Ultimately, the initiative remains with the private owner, who controls his own economic affairs. From this point of view, the state intervenes, but does not interfere. A system emerges of state support and private control.[4]

If this definition is accepted as reasonably explicatory of the Mexican political system, then perhaps it may be appropriate to consider that a new approach is needed to study the political development of nations such as Mexico, for it seems that if the three approaches here evaluated did not adequately interpret Mexico's case, they might not adequately interpret the political development of other nations whose political systems, although democratic and open, did not fall into the prescribed categories of political development.

It would, of course, take more than this thesis to corroborate the point of view expressed in these conclusions. Undoubtedly a great deal of research would have to be done, with other parameters than those I have used here, to see if the formula pSY(x) --> e+sDV could be substantiated.

Furthermore, it might also be necessary to consider that any approach to the study of political development should take into account a new factor that has recently appeared on the

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[4]Ibid.

scene, not only of underdeveloped nations, but also of the developed ones. That factor is that now all states seem to be dependent upon the international banking organizations and other large international cartels, which dominate, to one degree or another, their political, economic, and social systems.

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