

JAPAN'S POSTWAR REARMAMENT AND REACTIONS OF EAST ASIAN STATES

by

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the changing reactions of eleven East Asian states to Japan's postwar rearmament from 1945 to 1984. Although Japan is still supposed to be a disarmed state under the 'no-war' provision of the Constitution, Japan has expanded its military forces up to 250,000 personnel with the eighth largest annual military expenditure in the world. The recent trend has been towards accelerated military buildup with resurgent arrogance as an economic power. The military development of Japan has been of special concern to East Asian nations who had been invaded by the Japanese. This thesis endeavors to show a gap between a 'pacifist' image of Japan and the reality of Japan's accelerated military buildup. In addition, it discusses the differing views of the East Asian states towards Japan's increasing military power.

The thesis begins by analyzing Japan's postwar change from disarmament to rearmament as background information. It is observed that Japan's postwar military buildup was not a simple product of the external pressure but one of combined internal and external pressures: Japanese conservatives discreetly took advantage of US encouragement and used the Soviet threat for Japan's military recovery. The thesis goes on to examine East Asia's general and persistent suspicions concerning Japan's military power and the ideological split which has arisen

between those countries approving Japan's military buildup because of their connections with the USA and those countries criticizing it because of their ties with the USSR.

The thesis finds that most of the East Asian states shifted from criticism of Japan's rearmament to passive or ardent approval of it because of strategic considerations for their own security and because of Japan's overwhelming economic influence in the region. Without strong criticism of its military buildup from East Asia, Japan has recently shown a sign of becoming a military power commensurate with its economic power. This study also finds the existence of a serious gap between the East Asian people's image of Japan and the actions of their respective governments towards the resurgence of Japanese militarism. This will cause problems between Japan and its neighbors in the future.

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NOTES ON THE TEXT

- Asian names They are given in the customary rule of presenting the surname first or in the order given in the original.
- Place names The term East Asia usually covers the area from Japan to Burma inclusive, but in the analysis of this thesis Burma is excluded from the scope of East Asia.
For the pre-independence period, colonial place names such as the Dutch East Indies and French Indochina are used. Contemporary names are used for the post-independence period. The term Malaya is used before 1963 when Malaysia was formed.
- Country terminology For convenience, the geographical rather than the formal official names are used for certain countries. For example: North Vietnam for Democratic Republic of Vietnam, South Vietnam for Republic of Vietnam, North Korea for Democratic People's Republic of Korea, South Korea for Republic of Korea, and Taiwan for Republic of China.
- Currency All references to \$(dollars) are to US dollars, unless otherwise specified.
- Numeral Billion equals 1,000 million.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Subject and Purpose of Analysis

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the changing reactions of 11 East Asian states to Japan's postwar rearmament from Japan's defeat in what the Japanese had called the 'Great East Asia War' ¹ in 1945 to 1984. Although Japan's rearmament has been a sensitive issue to the Japanese who had started the war and to Asians who had suffered from it, changing international and domestic circumstances have diluted fear of Japanese militarism both in Japan and in East Asia, enabling steady growth of the Japanese military forces.

Japan was disarmed in accordance with the Potsdam Proclamation in 1945, and it is still supposed to be a state without "land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war

¹The Japanese side had called the war starting from the Pearl Harbor attack on 8 December 1941 and ending with the Japanese surrender on 15 August 1945 (respectively according to Japanese time) the 'Great East Asia War.' After the war the US occupation forces ordered the Japanese to rename it the 'Pacific War.' Although the term of the 'Great East Asia War' sounds reactionary in postwar Japan, the 'Great East Asia War' describes more accurately the nature of the war that Japanese militarism had waged to establish the 'Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere' for the monopoly of East Asia by expelling Western powers. Since the war in Asia was fought separately from the war in Europe, the term of the Second World War does not fit well into the Asian context. Some Japanese scholars consider the whole war period from the Manchuria Incident in 1931 to the Japanese surrender in 1945 as a series of aggression and call it the 'Fifteen-Year War.' In this thesis, unless specified, 'the war' refers to the 'Great East Asia War,' and 'postwar' refers to the period after 15 August 1945.

potential" ² under the Japanese Constitution promulgated in 1946. However, in reality, Japan rearmed itself with the establishment of the Police Reserve Forces (PRF) in 1950 and its successor, the Self Defense Forces (SDF) after 1954, and today Japan has about 250,000 armed forces with the eighth largest annual military expenditure in the world. ³ It has now become more apparent that a gap exists between a 'pacifist' image of Japan and the reality of Japan's accelerated military buildup. Recently Japanese nationalists have been even more eager to remove the legacy of the defeat--the 'no-war' provision of the Constitution.

Japan's rearmament has been of special concern to East Asian nations who have not yet wiped out bitter memories of Japanese aggression. In contrast to the US swift change from punishing to helping Japan, and eventually from disarming to rearming Japan in the immediate postwar period, East Asian nations have had psychological difficulty in supporting Japan's rearmament. In general, owing to the US-Soviet confrontation, pro-US East Asian states have shifted from severe criticism on Japan's military buildup to passive or ardent approval of it, whereas pro-Soviet East Asian states have continued to oppose it. However, besides strategic considerations influenced by their affiliation with the respective superpowers, East Asian nations still have reason

²Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution.

³International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance, 1984-85 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1984), pp. 140-142.

to worry about the direction of Japan's military buildup, since they sense that Japanese nationalists have increased their desire to gain power status equipped with economic and military strength. Therefore, Japan's rearmament is to be examined not only from the viewpoint of Japan's own 'defense' but also from that of its impact on its surrounding area, East Asia which Japanese militarism had invaded.

Scope of Analysis and Key Definitions

Focusing on Japan's postwar rearmament, in this thesis we will examine reactions of 11 East Asian states which were once under the 'Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere:' ⁴ the Korean Peninsula--North Korea and South Korea; China; the five ASEAN states--Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand; ⁵ and Indochinese states--Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. Although Burma and Papua New Guinea were under the Japanese occupation, they will be excluded from this analysis. Some mention will be made to Japanese-Taiwanese relations, but Taiwan itself will not be taken up as an independent entity. The

⁴Japan proclaimed the 'Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere' in September 1940, which had its center in Japan, Manchukuo (Manchuria) and China, and covered such areas as Pacific islands under former German trusteeship, French Indochina and Pacific islands, Thailand, British Malaya, British Borneo, the Dutch East Indies, Burma, Australia, New Zealand and India. The Philippines was included in the Sphere just before the Pearl Harbor attack. Cited in Yano Toru, Nihon no Nanyo Shikan (Japan's Historical View of Southeast Asia) (Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, 1979), p. 183.

⁵Although newly independent Brunei joined the ASEAN in 1984, this thesis does not include Brunei in the analysis.

11 states to be examined were coerced to cooperate with the Japanese-centered 'Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere' in different ways: Thailand was the only ally of Japan and was allowed to exist as an independent state; in Indochina, Japan used the French administration until near the end of the war; the Philippines was given nominal independence in 1943; Malaysia and Singapore (then British Malaya) and Indonesia (then the Dutch East Indies) were under direct Japanese military rule; the Korean Peninsula was a Japanese colony from 1910; and China was controlled by the Japanese military under the Japanese-sponsored puppet regimes--the Manchukuo government and the Nanjing government.

Since many Japanese politicians, military men and scholars in influential sectors often deliberately abuse military terms, we need to set working definitions for several key terms in this thesis. First, many people tend to disagree with the view that Japan has in fact 'rearmed.' For example, John K. Emmerson and Leonard A. Humphreys question the possibility of Japan's rearmament in Will Japan Rearm? based on their premise that Japan's conventional armed forces fall short of their definition of 'rearmament' which includes nuclear armament. ⁶ Even though Japan is still supposed not to rearm itself by Article 9 of the

⁶Will Japan Rearm?: A Study in Attitudes, AEI-Hoover Policy Study 9 (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Policy Research, 1973), p. 1.
Joseph M. Ha and John Guinasso also develop argument on Japan's rearmament based on the similar premise; see "Japan's Rearmament Dilemma: The Paradox of Recovery," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 53, No. 2 (Summer 1980), pp. 245-268.

Constitution, Japan rearmed itself in 1950 with the establishment of the Police Reserve Forces (PRF) and its development into the Self Defense Forces (SDF) in 1954. The definition of Japanese rearmament, for the purpose of this thesis, will include the provision to military forces of conventional weapons but not nuclear weapons.

Second, there is a question whether the Japanese armed forces are the military or 'self defense' forces. The Japanese government has tried to tone down the military nature of the armed forces by using the 'self defense' forces for the military forces, the 'defense' budget for the military budget, and 'defense' power for military power. The use of euphemism obscures the nature of the Japanese armed forces which have, in fact, become "the seventh strongest all-round military establishment in the world since 1967" ⁷ with highly sophisticated weapons surpassing power of the former Japanese imperial military. In recent years, the Japanese armed forces have also increased joint-exercises with the US Army, Navy, Air Forces and Marines. We will use only terms properly describing Japan's military power, and the Japanese government's official use of the word 'defense' will be placed in quotation marks in this thesis.

Third, Japanese 'militarism' needs special explanation. Since the Japanese and the people in East Asia have not yet

⁷Herbert Bix, "Japan: The Roots of Militarism," Remaking Asia: Essays on the American Use of Power, ed., Mark Seldon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974), p. 306.

wiped out the bitter memories of Japanese militarism, the Japanese government has tried to play down the military nature of the Self Defense Forces so as to break off any association between the SDF and old Japanese militarism. Old Japanese militarism until 1945 fits into a definition of militarism by Okabe Tatsumi: "a tendency in a nation which places highest priority on military values and on war preparation, to the extent that the nation does not hesitate to take military actions abroad in order to protect its overseas interests." ⁸ Based on this definition, Okabe concluded in 1974 that Japan would not revive militarism.

When we apply Okabe's definition of militarism in this thesis, we observe some signs of resurging Japanese militarism today. We find that postwar Japan has not yet eradicated the roots of militarism, and that there is a possibility that Japan will lean towards renewed militarism in light of the following facts:

1. Old militarists who escaped from punishment in the immediate postwar years under the US protection have returned to politics, business and the military and have served as promoters of postwar rearmament. While continuing to praise the military spirit and the old morale of the hierarchial system in which the emperor sits at the top, they have not admitted the aggressive nature of the past war ⁹ and have

⁸Revival of Japanese Militarism?, Occasional Paper, No. 22 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1974), p. 1.

⁹One example is the LDP government's pressure to alter

paid visits to the Yasukuni shrine where Tojo Hideki and other war criminals were enshrined.

2. In spite of the constitutional restriction, Japan has allowed steady growth of military power up to the eighth in the world in terms of expenditure. ¹⁰ Especially since 1982, in spite of the policy of austerity, the Japanese government has given special consideration to the 'defense' budget, while cutting or freezing other major expenditures such as the social security budget and the education budget. ¹¹ Militarism itself cannot grow without the existence of the strong military forces.
3. Japan has gained economic and technological power, which has provided an infrastructure for military development. Recently the USA asked Japan to transfer military technologies to the USA, and the Nakasone cabinet agreed to

⁹(cont'd) descriptions of history textbooks so as to dilute Japanese aggressiveness in the past war. This turned into the textbook controversy in the summer of 1982 in which East Asian states criticized the lack of remorse for the war among the Japanese. See Chapter IV.

¹⁰The recent trend shows that the percentage of personnel and provisions cost in total defense expenditure has declined from 56.0% in 1976 to 44.6% in 1984, while the percentage of equipment acquisition cost has increased from 16.4% in 1976 to 26.3% in 1984. Japan, Defense Agency, Boei Hakusho 1978 (Defense White Paper) (Tokyo: Ministry of Finance, Printing Bureau, 1978), p. 224; Defense of Japan 1984 (English Translation of the Defense White Paper) (Tokyo: Japan Times, n.d.), p. 267.

¹¹Since 1982, the growth rate of the 'defense' budget has surpassed that of the total general account. For comparison with the growth rate of other major expenditures, see Table 2.5. The official development assistance (ODA) has increased slightly more than the increase rate of the defense budget, but the ODA only accounts for 1.6% of the general account outlays in fiscal 1984, in contrast to 9.0% of the defense budget to the general account outlays.

do so in January 1983. Even though the ratio of military production in the total industrial production remains low,¹² civil technologies can be turned for military usage at any time.

4. The Japanese economy has been continuously fragile because of its dependence on key raw materials from abroad, such as the crucial energy source, petroleum,¹³ and has needed to secure stable sea-lanes for its imports and exports. This fundamental economic structure poses the possibility of Japan's taking any actions necessary for protecting its economic interests.
5. Forty years after the war, the Japanese have changed from a miserably defeated nation to an economically successful nation; self-pride has been regained. Besides this, a tendency toward collectivism has persisted in the form of

¹²The Defense Agency estimates that the military production (the total amount of special procurement by the Defense Agency) constitutes 0.4% of the whole industrial production, but it has already reached as much as one trillion yen. Boei Hakusho 1983, p. 125.

¹³In 1941, the main reason for Japan to wage war against the USA was to break the ABCD (American-British-Chinese-Dutch) blockade, especially the oil embargo and to secure petroleum from the Dutch East Indies. In 1982 Japan imported 227.4 million kl of crude oil, which accounted for 99.8% of total crude oil consumption. White Papers of Japan: 1981-82, Annual Abstract of Official Reports and Statistics of the Japanese Government (Tokyo: The Japan Institute of International Affairs, n.d.), p. 36.

According to Martin E. Weinstein, "Japan now imports more petroleum than any other country in the world and depends on petroleum imports for close to 70 percent of its total energy consumption, far more than either Western Europe or the United States." "Japan: External Security Guarantees and the Rearmament Question," The Great-Power Triangle and Asian Security, ed., Raju G.C. Thomas (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1983), p. 175.

group cooperation and submissiveness to central authority. This regained self-pride and the unchanged nature of the Japanese collectivism combined together could become a hotbed of militarism.

Thus, in the postwar era the Japanese have not yet built up a strong barrier to the revival of militarism. It is most unlikely that the old fanatic militarism will revive, but it is likely, owing to increasing economic and technological power combined with a psychological superiority complex towards East Asian nations, that more politically aggressive policies will emerge. From the viewpoint of some East Asian states, Japan's economic expansion is as aggressive as in the prewar military expansion, and a much sophisticated version of the 'Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere' exists today exclusively for the benefit of Japan. East Asian nations have not yet been freed from worrying about the direction of the accelerated Japanese military buildup, and therefore, this thesis will concentrate on the views of East Asian nations towards Japan's rearmament.

Methodology

Tracing the reactions of the 11 East Asian states on Japan's rearmament needs wide-ranged analysis of various materials. The analysis is based on primary sources such as Japanese government documents and Japanese and East Asian newspapers and journals. Due to the lack of some primary information available in

Vancouver, the author has to rely on secondary data, books and papers. Within the limited time of one year, the author has not been able to collect data widely and directly from the 11 East Asian states. Furthermore, due to the scarcity of publications from smaller East Asian states and relatively easy access to Chinese materials, the analysis has centered more around Chinese reactions than others, but it is hoped that the importance of the Chinese impact on the region endorses this tendency. Also with the author's limited linguistic ability, she has had to use translated materials from East Asian languages into either Japanese or English. With these restrictions some doubt remains as to how much the author has been able to absorb East Asian voices. Yet her contact with Asians in Tokyo and in Vancouver and her previous trips to Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand might have given her a background to understand East Asian suspicion and expectation of Japan as well as their reactions to Japanese militarism.

Focus of Examination

The main parts of this thesis are in Chapters in II, III, and IV. The examination will center on how much Japan's military buildup and East Asian attitudes towards it were influenced by the superpowers or how much internal initiatives were taken on the parts of Japan and East Asian states.

Chapter II will trace Japan's postwar change from disarmament to rearmament between 1945 and 1984 to provide a background to the subsequent chapters, which will analyze East Asian nations' views towards Japan's rearmament. The Rearmament of Japan will be examined from the viewpoints of both the external pressure rendered by the superpowers and Japan's own initiatives. The external pressure under the US-USSR confrontation enabled Japan to rearm in 1950, and the subsequent US encouragement based on its world strategy helped the Japanese military grow steadily. However, we will observe that Japanese conservative nationalists discreetly exploited the external pressure in the forms of the Soviet threat and US encouragement. The Japanese nationalists consistently endeavored to remove the 'no-war' provision of the Constitution, the last deterrence to massive military buildup, which the USA had imposed originally but soon regretted having done so. Japan's rearmament was linked not only to the US world strategy but also to the Japanese nationalists' desire to remove the legacy of the occupation and to regain power status for Japan, not only in the economic, but also in the military sense.

Next, Chapter III will examine the attitudinal change of the East Asian states on Japan's rearmament from 1945 to 1981, focusing on the external pressures that influenced the political courses of postwar East Asian states and their reactions towards Japan's rearmament. The heightened US-USSR confrontation split East Asia into two blocs, and according to the superpower

affiliation, East Asian states came to have two contrasting views--the pro-US bloc's approval of Japan's military buildup and the pro-Soviet bloc's disapproval of it. However, after experiencing regional turmoil and then gaining some stability, East Asia tried to be set free from any strong affiliation with the superpowers and to ensure more independence and security. The drastic change of Chinese views towards Japan's rearmament from severe criticism to encouragement illustrates the Chinese wish to separate itself sharply from the Soviet influence. The degree of superpower influence over East Asia has decreased since the end of the rigid bipolarity in the early 1970's, but the new alignment of East Asian states into the pro-Soviet bloc and the anti-Soviet bloc has still constituted an unshrinking gap between approval and disapproval of Japan's military buildup.

Then, Chapter IV will analyze the recent reactions of East Asian states on Japan's accelerated military buildup between 1982 and 1984 with emphasis on internal factors of the respective states. Besides the superpowers' influence, the internal factors based on bilateral relations between the respective states and Japan caused the emergence of diversified views towards Japan and Japan's military buildup. The analysis will begin with examining the wartime linkage between Japan and East Asian states and the continuities and discontinuities of the linkage after the war. This examination will help us understand East Asian reactions, first, to the textbook

controversy in 1982 in which East Asian states were reminded of Japanese arrogance once again, and second, to Japan's accelerated military buildup under the Nakasone regime. Either in the Soviet bloc or not, the general public in East Asia remained skeptical about Japan's rearmament and the extinction of Japanese militarism. The governmental approval on Japan's military buildup from the anti-Soviet bloc did not accurately reflect public sentiment, and the textbook controversy revealed that some East Asian governments exploited fear of Japanese militarism among the public for their own political gains. Anti-Soviet East Asian states sporadically used a 'remember-the-war' card against Japan in a hope to draw out more economic and partially military cooperation from Japan, and hence did not necessarily direct the card at Japan's current military reinforcement. In other words, Japan no longer encounters strong East Asian opposition to its military development.

Summary and Prospects

Postwar East Asia was an arena of superpower confrontation: without Soviet-US rivalry, Japan could not have been allowed to rearm so soon after the war, and East Asian states could not have been sharply split into two blocs--one, accepting Japan's rearmament and the other, opposing it. However, the internal pressure in Japan spurred up its military development and caused the East Asian states to worry about the resurgence of Japanese

militarism. The governments in anti-Soviet East Asian states faced a dilemma: although they had the necessity of promoting economic and partially military cooperation with Japan, they had to carefully handle the deep-rooted anti-Japanese feeling among the public. Their endorsement of the Japanese military buildup was a reflection of a diluted fear of Japanese militarism in favor of economic and strategic interests, which enabled Japan and the anti-Soviet East Asian states to develop an implicit military link.

The thesis will be concluded with prospects for the future. The trends since the late 1970's have shown that Japan has deviated from moderate omni-directional foreign policy and onesidedly cooperated with American anti-Soviet strategy by reinforcing the Japanese military. This move has caused unnecessary tension in the region and has gone against the wishes of those East Asian states which would like to avoid, by all means, heightened superpower confrontation over the region. Since the Japanese military has been strongly tied to the US world strategy, it has become more and more difficult to define the aim of the Japanese military solely for the 'self defense' of Japanese territories. If Japan further heightens confrontation against the USSR rather than mending relations with it, East Asian states will feel uneasy with Soviet-Japanese military competition and voice apprehension over the threat of Japan's 'defense' power. On this point, it is highly probable that China will swing back once again to censuring Japan's military buildup

and the revival of Japanese militarism. For the peace and security of East Asia, Japan's military policy has to be in line with an East Asian desire to avoid tension in the region and has to adhere to the principle of defense strategy: it is wiser not to create enemies than to excessively side with friends.

CHAPTER II

JAPAN'S POSTWAR REARMAMENT, 1945-84: FROM RENUNCIATION OF MAINTAINING ARMED FORCES TO EMERGENCE OF NEW NATIONALISM, MILITARISM

Japanese militarism was supposed to be crushed by Japan's defeat in the war in 1945, but postwar Japan could not eradicate the roots of militarism. First, in the cold war scheme, the US occupation policy tacitly allowed the revival of anti-communist reactionaries who had sustained prewar Japanese militarism, and this failure in dismantling wartime reactionary forces prolonged the life of Japanese militarism. Second, Japan itself has a thousand-year of military tradition and had difficulty in fostering democratic military forces based on the alien principle of the 'civilian control.' Japan's dynamic economic development in the postwar era covered up the deep-rooted militarism and showed an image of the pacifist nation to the world. This chapter aims at revealing the false image of pacifist Japan in the postwar era and serves as a background to the subsequent chapters in which we will examine East Asian reactions to Japan's postwar rearmament.

We are going to discuss how much Japan's postwar military development was influenced by pressure of the two superpowers--the USA and the USSR, and how much Japan's military policy was formulated by its own internal pressure. The USA ordered Japan to rearm in 1950 at the outbreak of the Korean

war, and the Soviet threat gave much stimulus and an excuse to Japan's military buildup. But it is wrong to interpret that Japanese military planners merely responded to the external pressure. They hoped to attain military recovery first and then to legitimize the Self Defense Forces (SDF) by removing the 'no-war' provision of the Constitution. As the SDF grew larger, so did the nationalistic and militaristic sentiments of the Japanese conservatives. The general public, being absorbed in economic prosperity, became less sensitive to militaristic trends. The conservatives discreetly took advantage of the external pressure for Japan's military recovery.

In this chapter, we will look at Japan's rearmament by dividing the postwar era into five periods: the first period between 1945 and 1949; the second, between 1950 and 1959; the third, between 1960 and 1970; the fourth, between 1971 and 1977; and the fifth, between 1978 and 1984. At the end of this chapter we will consider prospects for revising Article 9 of the Constitution, since the main forces in the conservative party consistently endeavored to revise the Constitution and the revision will lift the last deterrence to massive military buildup.

The First Period (1945-49): A Brief Period of Disarmed Japan

Japan's disarmament was forced by the defeat in the war and the initial US occupation policy to implement faithfully the

provisions of the Potsdam Proclamation, which reads:

(6) There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.

(7)... until there is convincing proof that Japan's war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth.

(11) Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those which would enable her to rearm for war.

The brief period of disarmed Japan from the defeat in the war until the establishment of the Police Reserve Forces (PRF) in August 1950 has to be divided into two halves according to the changes of the US occupation policy. In the first half until 1947, the US aimed at truly disarming and democratizing Japan and thus imposed the 'no-war' Constitution to wipe out all war-making power from Japan. However, in the latter half after 1948, being obsessed with the communist menace, the US turned to rebuild Japan as an economically and militarily strong bulwark against communism and began to consider establishing new military forces in Japan. Japan's disarmament was a direct product of the external pressure but had to be abandoned soon by another external pressure, a rivalry between the USA and the USSR.

The First US Occupation Policy: Strict Disarmament

Until 1947, General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), tried to promote demilitarization and democratization of Japan by implementing such measures as abolishing military education and militaristic organizations, purging militarists and military officials, closing down military factories, diverting them into 'peace' industries and dissolving the Zaibatsu (financial groups).¹ The supreme aim of the US occupation policy was included in Article 9 of the new Constitution that was promulgated in November 1946.

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of forces as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

Aversion to war among the general public made it easy to welcome the no-war provision of the Constitution, though remnants of militarists were somewhat uneasy with the 'MacArthur-imposed' Constitution and the abolition of the sovereign right of the nation to wage war in particular.

In the immediate postwar years, MacArthur and Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru considered that any form of rearmament was

¹As for general US occupation policy, see Arthur E. Tridemann, "Japan Sheds Dictatorship," From Dictatorship to Democracy: Coping with the Legacies of Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism, ed., John H. Herz (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), pp. 179-212.

unconstitutional, but their firmness did not last long. In 1946 Prime Minister Yoshida replied at the Lower House that Article 9 negated the right of self-defense; ² however, in the process of examining the draft Constitution at the Diet, the Yoshida Cabinet adopted the Ashida Hitoshi's amendment, which added the clause, "in order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph," to the second paragraph of Article 9. ³ In the subsequent constitutional debates on rearmament, this addition gave the conservative government a strong theoretical foundation to justify the maintaining of armed forces for 'self-defense,' because the government interpreted that the Constitution negated only war for aggression. By this amendment, the Japanese side resisted against the SCAP as much as it could and succeeded in leaving room for possible rearmament at the later stage, while the SCAP gave tacit consent on the amendment, neglecting the voice of apprehension in the Far East Commission. ⁴

The Second US Occupation Policy: Preparations for Rearmament

After 1948, the heightened US-USSR confrontation increased Japan's strategic importance to the USA, and the speech by Kenneth Royall, Army Secretary in January 1948, set off the overall change of the US occupation policy to rebuild Japan as a

²Yomiuri Shimbun, ed., Showa Sengoshi: Saigunbi no Kiseki (A History of the Postwar Showa Era: A Process of Rearmament) (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbunsha, 1981), p. 266.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid., p. 267.

bulwark against communism.⁵ In October 1948, the US National Security Council adopted 'NSC-13-2', an original plan of establishing mobile police reserves in Japan, and in November 1948 proposed MacArthur to implement the plan. ⁶ MacArthur rejected the proposal, saying that it contradicted against the order of the Far East Commission, and maintained the disarmament policy until the end of 1948. ⁷

The US preparations for rearming Japan started in 1948, though actual rearmament was not materialized until the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950. Yoshida also considered it necessary to create national police forces to cope with internal disorder and urged MacArthur to allow its establishment. ⁸ Along with the US preparations for Japan's rearmament, Yoshida secretly ordered former military officers to plan for rearmament in 1948, saying that Japan might be rearmed in the future. ⁹ Ashida, Foreign Minister in the Katayama Cabinet, ¹⁰ proposed to the USA that

⁵Ibid., p. 260.

⁶The 'NSC-13-2' included a proposal to establish mobile police reserves of about 150,000. Ibid., p. 261.

⁷Ibid., p. 84.

⁸Although Yoshida was against massive rearmament which would give unnecessary burden to Japan's economy, he was not against rearmament itself.

Martin E. Weinstein stresses that that Japan's postwar defense policy was not simply imposed by the USA but formulated by the Japanese leaders who had careful examination of US-USSR power balance. Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, 1947-68 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971).

⁹Saigunbi no Kiseki, p. 219.

¹⁰The only socialist coalition cabinet in postwar Japan that was

Japan's security be maintained by strengthening national police forces as well as the US-Japan military arrangement that would allow US military presence in Japan at the time of emergency. ¹¹ Yoshida states in his memoir that his cabinet succeeded to the general principle of the Ashida's proposal, ¹² which became the foundation of the subsequent US-Japan Security Treaty. The idea of establishing national police forces was formulated by the external pressure--the US containment policy against communism--and the internal pressure--Japanese conservatives' wish to rearm by taking advantage of the US pressure.

The Second Period (1950-59): Rearmament and Political and Economic Take-off from the Occupation Period

Heightened US-USSR confrontation finally let MacArthur proclaim that the Japanese Constitution did not negate a right of 'self-defense' in January 1950, ¹³ and the outbreak of the Korean war in June 1950 enabled Japan to establish the Police Reserve Forces (PRF). The abandonment of the disarmament policy also meant loosening punitive measures taken to remove militarism from Japan: while the SCAP lifted the purge of former military officers and vitrually gave up dissolution of the

¹⁰(cont'd) set up in June 1947 and replaced in March 1948.

¹¹Saigunbi no Kiseki, p. 264.

¹²Kaiso Junen (Memoirs of Ten Years) (Tokyo: Tokyo Shirakawa Shoin, 1982; reprinted from the edition published by Shincho-sha in 1957), Vol. 1, p. 265.

¹³Saigunbi no Kiseki, p. 85.

Zaibatsu, it turned to oppress labor unions and to purge communists. Exploiting the external tension of the Korean war, the Japanese government succeeded in turning the public opinion to the approval of the PRF and its successor, the SDF, and the one-sided peace settlement by the San Francisco Peace Treaty attached with the US-Japan Security Treaty. Yoshida set the principle of the post-occupation military policy, which was based on the US-Japan Security Treaty: the combination of gradual strengthening of Japan's military power and the continued US military presence in Japan. Yoshida succeeded in establishing the US-Japan Security Treaty system with his pragmatic assessment of the external and internal environment: while arguing that massive rearmament would become only possible with economic development and the change of morale among the general public, he carefully tried to balance between the Japanese militant nationalists who advocated massive rearmament by revising the Constitution with the US world strategists who hoped to take maximum advantage of Japanese bases.

Impacts of the Korean War and the US-Japan Security Treaty System

The Korean war contributed to creating the military, political and economic framework of the post-occupation period. Militarily, the Korean war enabled Japan to rearm. Just after the outbreak of the Korean war, ¹⁴ on 8 July 1950 MacArthur ordered the Yoshida government to create the Police Reserve

¹⁴The Korean war started on 25 June 1950.

Forces (PRF) of 75,000 men and to expand the personnel of the Maritime Safety Agency up to 8,000. ¹⁵ Anticipating the opposition in the Diet, the SCAP used the Potsdam ordinance to establish the PRF and tried to cover up the US intention of remodelling the PRF into genuine military forces in the future. ¹⁶ Owing to the preparations made since 1948 both on the US and Japanese sides, the USA and Japan acted very promptly for implicit rearmament of Japan and inaugurated the PRF on 10 August 1950, only a month after the MacArthur's order.

Politically, the Korean war speeded up Japan's regaining independence. In its need to make Japan a strong ally against communism, the USA hastened to conclude a package of the Peace Treaty and the US-Japan Security Treaty, which were signed in September 1951. In exchange for gaining political sovereignty by concluding the Peace Treaty with 48 anti-communist states, Japan agreed in the US-Japan Security Treaty to "increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression" and allow the continued stationing of the US forces in Japan for "the maintenance of the international peace and

¹⁵Japan, The Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 1981 (English Translation of the Defense White Paper) (Tokyo: Japan Times, 1981), p. 144.

¹⁶In the early days of Japan's rearmament, the USA set up a 'cover plan' to play down the military nature of the PRF, considering the restriction by Article 9 of the Constitution and international reaction against Japan's increase of military power. Thus, the PRF was more emphasized with the police character rather than the military one; for instance, military terms were replaced by special terms such as a 'special vehicle' for a 'tank.' The Japanese side also willingly cooperated with the US 'cover plan.' Saigunbi no Kiseki, pp. 69-74.

security in the Far East and to the security of Japan."

It should be noted that the PRF and the US-Japan Security Treaty were not merely imposed by the USA. Before the outbreak of the Korean war, the Yoshida government was engaged in the preparatory work for the future rearmament, and Yoshida welcomed the MacArthur's order, ¹⁷ emphasizing to the Japanese public that the the PRF had nothing to do with rearmament and that the PRF would strengthen peace-maintaining power only in Japan to fulfill the vacuum created by the transfer of the US forces from Japan to the Korean peninsula. ¹⁸ As for the US-Japan Security arrangement, Yoshida developed the Ashida proposal and in April 1950 dispatched Ikeda Hayato as his special envoy to the USA secretly to propose the permanent stationing of the US forces after concluding the peace treaty for the security of not only Japan but also Asia. ¹⁹ Although Japan's option was quite limited under the US occupation, Japan did not simply respond to the US initiative. As a matter of fact, Japan went against the

¹⁷Yoshida states in his memoir: "Since I worried about the lack of national police power and considered it very necessary to strengthen it..., I rather thought that the MacArthur's order gave me a good chance." Memoirs, Vol. 2, P. 142. (The author's translation)

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Miyazawa Kiichi, who accompanied Ikeda to the USA, states: Yoshida considered that the US military would not want to lose the advance bases in Japan by concluding the peace treaty but could not openly demand for it due to the Soviet or other allies' apprehension. Thus, to Yoshida's view, the US would welcome Japan's offer of continued stationing of the US forces in Japan if Japan would propose it. Cited in Saigunbi no Kiseki, p. 273. (The author's translation)

US demand of massive rearmament.²⁰ Japan could embarrass the USA by citing the 'no-war' provision of the Constitution²¹ and maintained that the gradual increase of military power should come in proportion to economic growth.

Economically as well, the Korean war was a catalyst to Japan's recovery from the war. The special procurement boom of the Korean war spurred up economic revival.²² The Peace Treaty stipulated Japan's obligation to pay reparations in the forms of industrial goods and services of the Japanese, in spite of East Asian states' displeasure to the less punitive nature of Japan's reparations (See Chapter III, Section 1). Japan's reparations opened its re-entry into international trade. Under political-military arrangements of the Peace Treaty and the Security Treaty, Japan moved on to post-occupation economic

²⁰John Foster Dulles, foreign policy advisor to the Secretary of State who was in charge of the peace treaty, visited Japan in June 1950 and January 1951 and demanded massive rearmament of Japan (350,000 men for ground forces) to "contribute positively to the defense of the Far East." Weinstein, Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, p. 59.

²¹F.C. Langdon states: "When Yoshida first confronted Dulles on rearmament, the prime minister argued that the Constitution, popular sentiment, and economic weakness of Japan made Japanese rearmament impracticable." Japan's Foreign Policy (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1973), pp. 24-25.

²²The total Japanese earnings from the Korean war during 1950-53 was \$750 million, constituting 3.8% of Japan's average GNP during that period. Hankuk Sangkong heuiso (The Korean Chamber of Commerce), Walnam Hyuchon kwa Hankuk Kyon-che (The Armistice of the Korean War and Korean Economy) (Seoul: Sanhwa Insoe Chusik hoe-sa, 1969), p. 194; cited in Roy U.T. Kim, "Two Koreas and the Indo-Chinese Crisis," The Role of External Powers in the Indochina Crisis, ed., Gene T. Hsiao (Edwardsville, IL: Southern Illinois University, 1973), p. 109.

development.

The Birth of the Self-Defense Forces

Even though the USA and Japan tried to play down the military nature of the PRF, they could not limit the role of the PRF only for maintaining the internal order. In August 1952, the Security Forces were inaugurated, combining the PRF and the Maritime Safety forces. In May 1953, Secretary of State Dulles proposed an application of the US Mutual Security Act (MSA) ²³ to Japan, and to receive US military assistance under the MSA, Japan had to build genuine military forces. Based on US-Japan mutual agreement on strengthening Japan's military forces, ²⁴ the Japanese government concluded the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with the USA in March 1954 as the application of the US Mutual Security Act ²⁵ and finally inaugurated in July 1954 the Defense Agency, and the Self Defense Forces (SDF), consisting of Ground Self-Defense Forces (GSDF), Air Self-Defense Forces (ASDF) and Maritime Self-Defense Forces

²³The MSA was designed for strengthening military power of the US allies against the Soviet bloc and applied to those states which had military forces. Saigunbi no Kiseki, pp. 346-355.

²⁴In the Ikeda-Robertson talks in October 1953 it was confirmed: "Japan's self-defense capabilities should be strengthened in order to defend Japan from danger of invasion and reduce the US burden for the defense of Japan." Defense of Japan 1981, p. 146.

²⁵The purpose of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement was "to establish a proper legal basis for the furnishing of military equipment and technology by the United States to Japan under the Mutual Security Act of 1951, and to clarify the terms of Japan's contribution to the support of the United States forces in Japan." Weinstein, Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, p. 74. The equipments of the SDF were greatly improved under this agreement (p. 77).

(MSDF).

The SDF was created to show the existence of military forces to the USA and to be cooperative and subordinate forces under the US-Japan Security Treaty. However, to the Japanese conservatives, the SDF served as a leverage to take off from the wreckage of the occupation days and possibly regain military sovereignty in the future. The aim of the SDF was set to defend Japan against not only direct but also indirect aggression, ²⁶ and Weinstein points out that the Japanese government openly acknowledged "its responsibility for Japan's external defense."

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Since the SDF was born without amending Article 9 of the Constitution, subsequent debates on the SDF were centered around its constitutionality. To justify the right of 'self-defense,' the government provided its own interpretation of Article 9 as: "Japan renounced war under the Constitution but did not renounce the right to fight for self-defense." ²⁸ As for the exercise of the right of 'self-defense,' the government position was: "If the country is invaded without justifiable reason and if there is no other recourse, the nation can take the minimum necessary

²⁶ Article 1, Chapter III of the Self-Defense Forces Law, cited in Weinstein, Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, p. 76.

²⁷ Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, p. 76.

²⁸ Director-General of the Defense Agency, Omura Seiichi's remark at the Standing Committee on Budget, House of Representatives on December 22, 1954; cited in Defense of Japan 1981, p. 147.

defense action."²⁹ The minimum necessary defense action was then enlarged to include attacking an enemy base when a guided missile was aiming at Japan and there was no other counter-measure to prevent a missile attack.³⁰ The government also justified the entry into the collective security with the USA by citing that Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations admitted the right of individual or collective self-defense.³¹ The Japanese government tried to avoid direct constitutional debates on the SDF and to avert public attention from the still sensitive issue of rearmament in those days.

Post-Occupation Economic Development and Military Recovery

Deliberately covering up the unconstitutionality of the SDF and the US-Japan Security Treaty, the government gradually started strengthening the SDF. The target set for the First Defense Buildup Plan (FY1958-60) was to have 180,000 GSDF

²⁹Director-General of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, Sato Tatsuo's remark at the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Councilors on April 16, 1954; cited in Defense of Japan 1981, p. 150.

³⁰The government's remark on February 29, 1956; cited in Defense of Japan 1981, p. 151.

³¹Defense of Japan 1981, pp. 152-153.
Article 51 of the UN Charter states: "Nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." United Nations, Office of Public Information, Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, p. 27.

personnel, 124,000 tons of MSDF ships and 1,300 ASDF aircrafts.

³² Between 1954 and 1959, more than 10% of the government budget was allocated for rearmament each year. ³³ In 1956, Japan produced the first postwar domestically built naval vessels and jet fighters. ³⁴ Economic recovery helped military recovery and strengthening of the SDF, as Yoshida had hoped for.

In sum, Japan's political, military and economic take-off from the occupation days was accelerated in the 1950's, taking advantage of the strong US pressure under the height of the US-USSR confrontation. The US pressure turned out to be less punitive to the defeated nation, Japan, and allowed the return of militarists and reactionaries to Japanese politics, the military forces ³⁵ and economy. The Japanese government was not merely coerced to rearm by the USA but actively sided with the US world strategy to secure the US protection of Japan and to attain military recovery as a sovereign state. Japan's political recovery at an international scene was accelerated by normalization of diplomatic relations with the USSR and the

³²Ibid, p. 165.

³³In 1954, 12.87% of the government budget was allocated for the military expenditure; in 1955, 12.58%; in 1956, 12.36%; in 1957, 12.64%; in 1958, 11.08%; and in 1959, 10.29%. Cited in Weinstein, Japan's Postwar Defense, p. 123.

³⁴Defense of Japan 1981, p. 340.

³⁵ Former middle-level military officers were allowed to enter the PRF; while former top-level military officers who had been directly responsible for the execution of the war were invited to the Security Forces in 1952 and then became leading figures of the SDF. Saigunbi no Kiseki, pp. 290-294.

entry into the UN in 1956. ³⁶ Every effort was made to wipe out war misery from the Japanese life and to show a picture of newly born, reconstructed and pacifist Japan to the outside world. As political and economic recovery was attained, the Japanese government turned to more expansion of the SDF and hoped to upgrade Japan's stance vis-à-vis the USA with a revision of the Security Treaty 1951, which includes the provision that the US forces could work for putting down "large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan."

The Third Period (1960-71): The Revised US-Japan Security Treaty and Japan's Cooperation with US Belligerency in East Asia

The desire of Yoshida and other conservatives was attained by the revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1960, while oppressing the nation-wide opposition to the revision. In exchange for gaining nominal mutuality in the revised Treaty, Japan was obliged to expand its SDF and to support US war activities in East Asia: Japan provided the US forces in Japan with logistic and technical services, and the East Asian anti-communist states with economic assistance. As in the case of the Korean war, Japan gained an economic stimulus from the Vietnam war and started vigorous economic expansion to East Asia. Influenced by rapid growth of GNP, Japan's military expenditure jumped up as well (see Tabel 2.1), and the SDF came

³⁶Until normalizing diplomatic relations with Japan, the USSR obstructed Japan's entry into the UN.

to be rated "the 7th strongest all-round military establishment in the world since 1967." ³⁷ The Yoshida's rearmament policy was proved to be effective in this period of economic development, and the Japanese government continued to make use of the external pressure for strengthening of 'defense' power.

The Revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty, 1960

Ever since the US-Japan Security Treaty was concluded in 1951, the Japanese government considered that the Treaty was only a "provisional arrangement," ³⁸ and wished for especially taking off Japan's subordinate position to the USA in the clause that the US forces could work for putting down Japan's internal disorder. The Japanese government sought literal mutuality in the new Treaty, backed up by the economic recovery and growth of the SDF in the post-occupation years. ³⁹ The USA also found it more beneficial to assign a larger military role to economically recovered Japan, not only for security of Japan but also of the Far East. The LDP government led by a war criminal, Kishi Nobusuke, ⁴⁰ could ratify the Treaty of Mutual

³⁷Herbert Bix, "Japan: The Roots of Militarism," Remaking Asia: Essays on the American Use of Power, ed., Mark Seldon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974), p. 306.

³⁸The US-Japan Security Treaty 1951 states: "... Japan desires, as a provisional arrangement for its defense, that the United States of America should maintain armed forces of its own in and about Japan so as to deter armed attack upon Japan."

³⁹Foreign Minister Shigemitsu visited Washington in August 1955 and urged for the first time Secretary Dulles to take up the revision of the Security Treaty. Weinstein, Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, pp. 78-79.

⁴⁰Kishi was Deputy Director of Industry in Manchukuo and

Cooperation and Security in 1960 only with the unconstitutional measures to oppress the opposition, ⁴¹ and eventually Kishi had to resign from premiership for this reason. US President Eisenhower's visit to Japan was cancelled at the last moment due to the strong opposition among the Japanese public, and the USA had to face a dilemma that it had created: the USA had demanded the Japanese public to be truly pacifist without arms but soon turned to demand the Japanese to increase military commitment for security of the Far East.

The new Treaty removed the clause stipulating the US forces mission to put down Japan's internal disorder and literally assured Japan's mutual position to the USA:

(The USA and Japan) have a common concern in the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East. (Preface)

The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty, and, at the request of either Party, whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened. (Article 4)

However, the Japanese public felt uneasy with the ambiguous term of what the USA calls "the Far East" and Japan's extended military commitment beyond its territories. Article 6 of the

⁴⁰(cont'd) Minister for Commerce and Industry in the Tojo Cabinet. After the war he was imprisoned as a A-class war criminal but released in 1948. When the last purge of former militarists was lifted after concluding the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Kishi reentered politics in 1953 and became Prime Minister in 1957. For his career see Kishi Nobusuke and others, Memoirs of Kishi Nobusuke (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju, 1979).

⁴¹The ratification of the Treaty was passed by the LDP during the absence of the opposition parties.

Treaty further states:

For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan.

The subsequent interpretation of "the Far East" is to cover "the area north of the Philippines, including Taiwan, the off-shore islands of Quemoy and Matsu, S. Korea and extended to the northern islands still under Russian occupation." ⁴² The fear of the Japanese became stronger when the USA escalated the Vietnam war in the middle of 1960's and made full use of their bases in Japan for the Vietnam war that was fought outside the original scope of the "Far East."

Military Policy in the 1960's

In the 1960's, the aims of Japan's military policy were "to possess adequate defense capability to cope effectively with aggression on a scale no greater than localized war by conventional weapons" ⁴³ and "to raise efficiency to cope with aggression" especially in Japan's adjacent waters and air space. ⁴⁴ Japan's defense planners assumed that the USSR would not invade Japan as long as the US forces were stationed in Japan

⁴²Cited in F. Quei Quo, "Japan and the Pacific Rim: A Historical Review," Politics of the Pacific Rim: Perspectives on the 1980's, ed., F. Quei Quo (Burnaby, BC: Simon Fraser University, 1982), p. 61.

⁴³An aim of the Second Defense Buildup Plan (FY1962-66), Defense of Japan 1981, p. 165.

⁴⁴An aim of the Third Defense Buildup Plan (FY1967-71), Ibid.

and the USA maintained military supremacy over the USSR.⁴⁵ Weinstein draws attention to a fact that in 1968 "only 4 of 13 divisions of the GSDF were stationed on Hokkaido," the most probable target of Soviet invasion, and points out that most of GSDF divisions were rather designed to cope with internal disorder.⁴⁶ With economic and technical development the Japanese government started to emphasize domestic production of military equipment from the Third Defense Buildup Plan (FY 1967-71)⁴⁷ but in this decade generally maintained the level of gradual military buildup under the US military supremacy over the USSR.

While the Japanese government increased the SDF power, it also increased contradiction between the existence of the full-fledged armed forces and Article 9 of the Constitution. Nevertheless, the LDP government did not dare to take up the revision of the Constitution and maintained a pragmatic stance that Yoshida had taken: the revision of the Constitution would lead to the loss of any cabinet because of the strong public rejection; and Japan could sometimes use the Constitution to restrain the US strong pressure for massive military buildup; and the Constitution helped to impress the image of the 'pacifist' nation to the world, especially to East Asian states once invaded by Japan. Thus, the government only tried to cover

⁴⁵Weinstein,, Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, p. 127.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 121.

⁴⁷Defense of Japan 1981, p. 166.

up the contradiction between the SDF and the Constitution and to turn the public's attention to economic prosperity, such as the Ikeda cabinet's 'Doubling Income Plan.'

Prime Minister Sato Eisaku ⁴⁸ further succeeded in creating the pacifist image of Japan and deceiving the Japanese public for a long time by advocating "Three Non-Nuclear Principles," which proclaim that Japan will not possess, produce and introduce nuclear weapons into Japan. ⁴⁹ The White Paper of the Defense Agency, Defense of Japan emphasizes that the government adhered to these principles since the Kishi Cabinet. ⁵⁰ These principles, however, were only illogical as long as Japan sit under the US nuclear umbrella by the US-Japan Security Treaty. Since the US government never publicized the transfer of nuclear weapons to Japan and the Japanese government did not openly raised a question to the USA, the third principle, 'not introducing' virtually did not exist from the beginning. ⁵¹ The

⁴⁸Sato was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1974 for his adherence to the controversial 'Three Non-Nuclear Principles.'

⁴⁹Defense of Japan 1981, p. 159.

⁵⁰Ibid., pp. 158-159.

⁵¹At the later stage, introduction of nuclear arms into Japan was revealed by the US side. In December 1974, the US Congress revealed minutes of the hearings which included a testimony of Rear Admiral Gene LaRocque, former commander of the US Seventh Fleet ship Providence: he testified that naval ships equipped with carrying nuclear arms had never removed nuclear arms except overall refit, suggesting that those ships had carried nuclear arms into Japanese ports. In January 1978, Secretary of the Navy Clator revealed that Midway stationed in Yokosuka served as a home base for nuclear-armed fighters since October 1973. In July 1978, former advisor to the Secretary of Defense, Elsborg stated that the American base in Iwakuni had stored strategic nuclear arms. Gendai Yogo no Kiso Chishiki 1983 (Encyclopedia of

"Three Non-Nuclear Principles" served only as the government's expedient to calm down the public fear of nuclear weapons, and Prime Minister Sato himself in 1967 accused the Japanese of too much sensitivity to nuclear arms by naming it "nuclear allergy."

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Military Buildup in Rapid Economic Development

In the 1960's Japan made all efforts in economic development, and by the early 1970's Japan was ranked the third largest economic entity in the world after the USA and the USSR. With the rapid growth of GNP, the ratio of defense budget to GNP declined as shown in Table 2.1, but it is misleading to state that Japan ignored military buildup because of too much obsession with economic development.

The 1960's began with the large-scale demonstration against the revision of the Security Treaty but ended calmly with the automatic extension of the Treaty in 1970 without much criticism and even attention. This is because the Japanese government succeeded in nurturing the majority of people who became silent to military buildup in the age of rapid economic development.

⁵¹(cont'd) Contemporary Terms) (Tokyo: Jiyu Kokumin sha, 1983), pp.68, 128-120.

In May 1981, former US ambassador to Japan, Edwin O. Reishauer revealed that nuclear-armed US ships had visited Japan. He states: "US naval units armed with nuclear weapons had routinely been permitted to dock at Japanese ports since 1960 on the basis of an 'oral agreement' between Washington and Tokyo." "US-Japan: Meaning of the Flap," International Herald Tribune, June 6-7 1981, p. 4

⁵²Gendai Yogo no Kiso Chishiki, p. 68.

Although Japan became more involved in the US anti-communist policy and the US war in Vietnam, the Japanese lost fear of and sensitivity to the war that was fought outside their territories. Under the stable relationships between the USA, a superpower, and Japan, a much smaller ally, the Japanese government could relatively easily maintain the principle of Yoshida's rearmament policy--gradually increasing Japan's military power while relying on the US military presence. Then, the stable relationships came to be shaken at the next period when trade frictions grew larger between the two states, and the USA became much irritated at the lack of defense efforts on the part of Japan.

The Fourth Period (1971-77): Coping with the New Alignment in Asia and the US-USSR Détente

The Nixon shocks in 1971 marked the turning point in US-Japanese relations. Japan's obedience to the USA started to erode, and Japan had to seek its own foreign policy, somewhat detaching its economic interests from US interests. Spurred by the US move towards China, Japan did not waste time in establishing diplomatic relations with China. Détente between the USA and the USSR in this period made it possible for Japan to soften a little bit its attitude towards communist states and adopt omni-directional, resource-oriented foreign policy. However, despite the lack of the strong external pressure under US-USSR détente, the Fourth Defense Buildup Plan (FY 1972-76)

doubled the military expenditure.

The Nixon Shocks

In 1971 Japan was alarmed by the US President Nixon's two announcements: one was to visit China in 1972; and the other was to change the international financial system that the USA had created after the war. These announcements shook diplomatic and economic basis of Japan. Since Japan considered its future closely tied with the USA and played its role as an obedient ally of the USA, the Japanese government was dismayed at not having been consulted by the USA beforehand, especially on the change of the US policy for China. ⁵³ The Nixon shocks left Japan to reconsider its faithfulness to the USA and initiate some independent policies for its own interests.

The early 1970's was the first time since the end of the war when Japan took diplomatic initiatives instead of merely following the USA. In addition to the Nixon's change of the international economic system, the OPEC price hike in 1973 further increased vulnerability of Japan's economy. In 1973 Japan started to take the pro-Arab Middle East policy to secure access to Middle Eastern oil. Japan also established diplomatic relations with North Vietnam in 1973 and united Vietnam in 1976. In a short period of détente between the USA and the USSR, Japan sought omni-directional diplomacy, sometimes diverting from the

⁵³Until then Japan cooperated with the US anti-China policy such as obstructing China's entry into the UN. Also, the US-Japan Security Treaty was originally designed to cope with hypothetical enemies of the USSR and China.

US world strategy.

Normalization of Relations with China

The US antagonism against China obstructed normalization of Sino-Japanese relations for a long time after the war. The change of US policy towards China startled the Japanese conservatives who had by then developed strong ties with Taiwan.⁵⁴ It was the overall economic interest in the business circle and the general public's enthusiasm to approach China that pushed the Tanaka cabinet to imitate the US move towards China promptly. In September 1972 Japan and China normalized diplomatic relations and finally ended the abnormal state that lasted since Japanese invasion of China in the 1930's. Japan's rapprochement with China dropped China from the list of hypothetical enemies of Japan, and Japan's defense came to be directed solely at the USSR.

Military Policy in Détente

In this period, military policy generally followed the course set in the previous period, though the new task of defending Okinawa was added to the SDF after its reversion in 1972 and tension with China was reduced. Even under the US-USSR détente the military expenditure doubled in this period, though the economic stagnation due to the oil shock in 1973 caused to

⁵⁴The leader of the pro-Taiwan group, Kishi stated in January 1971 that he opposed Sino-Japanese normalization because it would sacrifice the Taiwan government. Memoirs of Kishi Nobusuke, Appendix.

reduce the target of the huge Fourth Defense Buildup Plan (FY1972-76).⁵⁵ In 1976 the Miki cabinet and the National Defense Council decided that the 'defense' budget should be within 1% of GNP. This ceiling became the principle of the subsequent cabinets, deliberately concealing the substantially large size of the military budget and giving an illusion of the low military expenditure to the Japanese as well as to foreigners. The principle of national 'defense' was compiled in the "National Defense Program Outline,"⁵⁶ and the defense goal was set:

the most appropriate defense goal would seem to be the maintenance of a full surveillance posture in peacetime and the ability to cope effectively with situations up to the point of limited and small scale aggression.⁵⁷

In this period, Japan was not so much pressed by the Soviet threat nor the US urge. An incident of a Soviet defector, who flew over to Hokkaido by MIG-25 in September 1976, revealed the lack of alertness on the SDF and poor surveillance capability of Japan's radar. The US pressure on Japan's military buildup was not so apparent because of the US move towards China, the end of Vietnam war and the US-USSR détente.

Benefitted from the reduced external tension, Japan, on its own, tried to expand relations with China and Vietnam. However,

⁵⁵Defense of Japan 1981, p. 166.

⁵⁶This was adopted by the National Defense Council and approved by the cabinet in October 1976. For the text of the Outline, see Defense of Japan 1984, pp. 215-220.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 215.

Japan began to face new tension with the USA: the USA became quite unpleasant to an economic challenge of Japan to which the USA had rendered generous help to revive Japan's war-devastated economy without imposing the heavy reparations and military burden. Until this period the US administration still officially refrained from directly connecting large trade deficit with the accusation of the small ratio of Japan's military spending, but Japan would have to consider the US economic accusation in expanding the military budget in the next period.

The Fifth Period (1978-84): Japan's Challenge Against the Superpowers and the Rise of New Nationalism, Militarism

Japan adopted once again the postwar pattern of exploiting the external pressure for increasing its military power. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 caused the new US-USSR confrontation, and Japan started to emphasize its membership in the Western alliance system. The external pressure was combined with the growing conservatism among the Japanese public, and this made it easier for military planners to break taboos on security issues one by one. With oblivion of the war, the nation's self-pride was growing. With economic power that has surpassed the Soviet economy in the 1980's, Japan even started to challenge the Yalta-Potsdam system created by the USSR and the USSR: to the USSR, Japan raised anti-Soviet campaigns and emphasized its claim on the 'Northern Territories' occupied by

the USSR since the war;⁵⁸ to the USA, Japan entered a kind of trade war, though fundamentally cooperating with the US world strategy against the USSR. The birth of Nakasone regime in 1982 gave further stimulus for military buildup, and Nakasone's nationalism aimed at the total revision of the postwar political system by removing the MacArthur-imposed Constitution and gaining strong military power commensurate with economic power.

Increased Soviet Threat

The Soviet threat was the main thrust and excuse for Japan's military development in the postwar era, and Soviet expansionism since the late 1970's further accelerated this trend. The Soviet Pacific Fleet increased its power speedily.⁵⁹ Paul Kelemen

⁵⁸The 'Northern Territories' refer to the small islands of Habomais, Shikotan island, Kunashiri (Kunashir in Russian) island, and Etorofu (Iturup in Russian) island. The combined land area is 5,000 square km, more than twice that of Okinawa prefecture. At the end of the war, 16,500 Japanese lived in the entire Kurile chain, but all were repatriated after the Soviet occupation. The Yalta agreement decided the transfer of Sakhalin and all of the Kurile islands to the USSR, and the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951 made Japan officially renounce "all right, title and claim to the Kurile islands." Since mid 1950's, the Japanese government began to interpret that the 'Kurile islands' renounced in the Peace Treaty excluded the four Northern Territories, and emphasized Japan's historical claim to these territories. The Japanese government has argued that these territories had never belonged to the USSR and had not been acquired by violence but recognized as Japanese territories by the Treaty of Commerce, Navigation and Delimitation in 1855 between the Tokugawa Shogunate and Tsarist Russia. See, Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bureau of Information and Cultural Affairs, Warera no Hoppo Ryodo (Our Northern Territories) (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1980). For general introduction to the Kurile problem, see John J. Stephan, The Kuril Islands: Russo-Japanese Frontier in the Pacific (London: Oxford University Press, 1974).

⁵⁹The Soviet Pacific Fleet increased its tonnage by 30% up

states: "In terms of combat effectiveness, the Soviet Pacific Fleet is still marginally inferior to the U.S. Pacific Fleet, which has a more complete network of bases in the area, but in the past ten years the balance of power has been shifting in favor of the Soviet Union." ⁶⁰ Since 1979 Soviet ships and planes expanded its range by operating from Danang and Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam and from Kompong Sam in Kampuchea. ⁶¹ Since 1978 the USSR started to strengthen military deployment on three of the four Northern Territories. ⁶² To counter these moves, Japan simply chose the confrontation by strengthening the military capability and further promoting military cooperation with the USA.

The main task of Japanese military planners became to arouse fear against the USSR among the public. ⁶³ In February 1979,

⁵⁹(cont'd) between 1960 and mid 1970's, and further 30% up between 1977 and 1981. In 1981, the Soviet Pacific Fleet had 1,580,000 tonnage, while Japan's MSDF, 200,7000 tonnage, and the US Seventh Fleet, 650,000 tonnage. Research Institute for Peace and Security, Azia no Anzen Hoshu 1982 (Asian Security) (Tokyo: Asagumo Shimbun sha, 1982), p. 22.

⁶⁰"Soviet Strategy in Southeast Asia," Asian Survey, Vol. 24, No. 3 (March 1984), p. 341.

⁶¹Ibid., p. 342.

⁶²The USSR redeployed ground troops and expanded military installations in Kunashiri, Etorofu, and Shikotan. Defense of Japan 1981, pp. 82-83. Allen S. Whiting refers that 6,000 Soviet troops were stationed on the Northern Territories. "Prospects for Japanese Defense Policy," Asian Survey, Vol. 22, No. 11 (November 1982), p. 1136.

⁶³According to an opinion poll conducted by the Prime Minister's Office in June 1983, only 9% find the USSR friendly; 89% find it unfriendly. In the same opinion poll conducted in August 1978, 11% find the USSR friendly; 78% find it unfriendly. Asahi Shimbun, 26 September 1983, p. 2.

Director-General of the Defense Agency, Yamashita Ganri mentioned that the Soviet Forces in the Far East were the potential threat, though the government had long refrained from naming directly the USSR the threat. ⁶⁴ Since the 1979 edition, Boei Hakusho (Defense of of Japan), the White Paper by the Defense Agency, started to emphasize the Soviet threat and Japan's responsibility in the Western alliance, indicating the departure from the previous omni-directional foreign policy. Japan's challenge against the USSR culminated in the increased claim over the Northern Territories: in February 1979 the Diet passed the resolution to promote the settlement of the northern territorial issue, and in January 1981 the government designated February the Seventh as the "Northern Territories Day." ⁶⁵ Increasing military power and raising the territorial claim, Japan tried to wipe out the legacy of the Yalta-Potsdam agreements that determined Japan's disarmament and territories.

66

⁶⁴Gendai Yogo, p. 149.

⁶⁵ February the Seventh is the day when Japan and Russia concluded the Treaty of Commerce, Navigation and Delimitation in 1855, which set the Japanese-Russo border between Etorofu and Uruppu. The Japanese government bases its historical claim over the Northern Territories on this Treaty.

⁶⁶The Yalta agreement stipulates: "The Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union."
In spite of the fact that the Northern Territories did not fall into a category which the Cairo Declaration stipulated on 27 November 1943 ("Japan shall be stripped of all islands in the Pacific which she has seized and occupied since the beginning of the First World War in 1914. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed."), the USA and the USSR decided the transfer of the Kurile chain at a disadvantage of Japan.

Increased US Pressure on Japan's Military Buildup

Along with the Soviet threat, the US pressure constituted another pillar to stimulate Japan's military buildup, and in this period, the US pressure turned to accuse Japan's lack of military responsibility as an ally of the free world, incommensurate with its economic power. The USA demanded Japan to share the military burden of the Western alliance, especially to help decrease the burden of the USA that suffered from trade deficit with Japan (see Table 2.2). The USA openly came to link trade deficit with the defense issue. As US frustration in trade grew, its demand for an increase of Japan's defense budget came to be raised to warning and even to threat. ⁶⁷

Trade war with the USA became a catalyst not only to increase Japan's military expenditure ⁶⁸ but also to stimulate nationalism. Japanese nationalists still viewed the continued stationing of the US forces in Japan not only as the legacy of the US occupation but also as a lack of Japan's independent

⁶⁷ For example, in March 1982 Secretary of Defense Casper W. Weinberger warned Japanese leaders that Congress might restrict Japanese imports or press for the withdrawal of American military forces, if Tokyo did not quickly and significantly increase its defense capabilities. New York Times, 28 March 1982.

⁶⁸ In May 1982, at the time of drawing up the budget for the fiscal 1983, Minister of Finance, Watanabe Michio stated that the decrease in the defense expenditure would invite a backlash in trade friction with the USA. Cited in Tomiyama Kazuo, "Gunju Kakudai ni Ikioizuku Boei Sangyo (Military Industries Spurred up by Military Expansion)," Ekonomisuto (15 June 1982), p. 10.

military power, subduing to free ride of US military protection.
69 Japan's economic challenge to the US dominance turned out somewhat successful, and then Japan's military challenge was now aimed at taking off the subordinate nature of the SDF to the US forces and making the US-Japan Security Treaty truly mutual. 70 The Nakasone cabinet was not only cooperating with the Reagan world strategy but also hoping to regain more military independence.

Breaking Taboos on Security Issues

Exploiting increased confrontation between the superpowers and the US urge for strengthening military capabilities, the Japanese government openly challenged what had been considered 'political taboos.' As long as the public could not forget the disaster of the war and cruelty of the former imperial military, anything pressing for military buildup had been politically

69From another viewpoint, the US-Japan Security has provided 'a free ride' for the USA. Kamishima Jiro states: "... by entering into the Japan-US security arrangement Japan has undertaken a role in the American world strategy, contributing to US objectives in the Far East. This is a free ride for America, not Japan." "The Tradition and Realism of Demilitarization," Japan Echo, Vol. 7, No. 3 (1980), pp. 25-32. (Translated from "Hibuso Shugi--Sono Dento to Genjitsusei," Sekai, July 1980.)

70In January 1980, Foreign Minister Okita Saburo stated that Japan-US relations should be strengthened by Japan's more cooperation and contribution, suggesting that Japan should actively cooperate with the US world strategy through strengthening the US-Japan Security Treaty. In March 1982, 100 scholars, politicians and businessmen established a "100-member committee requesting for the revision of the Japan-US Security Treaty," and issued a statement: "It is not adequate any more for only the USA to maintain peace and security in the world. It is time to revise the Security Treaty and make it more mutual by increased Japan's commitment." Gendai Yogo, pp.129 and 123.

sensitive taboos. Any political leaders who aspire to take power did not openly dare to break taboos, such as the revision of Article 9 of the Constitution, the acknowledgement of the US-Japan military alliance and raising the ceiling of the defense budget over 1% of GNP. However, as the old generation went by and the public were entraptured with economic prosperity, Japanese fear of 'militarism' declined.⁷¹ As strong antipathy against war potentials waned, public opinion poll shifted decisively in favor of the SDF and the US-Japan Security Treaty since the middle of 1970's (see Table 2.3). Influenced by the external pressure and the erosion of internal constraints, security issues became no more taboos in Japanese politics.

(1) Expansion of the SDF Activities

The SDF vigorously expanded their activities beyond the scope of 'self-defense' and strengthened offensive capabilities.

First, the three forces of the SDF increased joint exercises with the US forces since 1978. In 1978 the ASDF restarted joint exercises with the US forces after a break of 10 years, and the MSDF conducted joint training with Midway, "an attack carrier deploying nuclear weapons."⁷² Asian Security points out that

⁷¹Yukio Satoh describes the change of generations and its impact on defense policy: "... growing number of young people born after World War II began to water down the public aversion to war and militarism. Young people were prepared to consider security of defense issues more on their own merits than those of older generations were able to." The Evolution of Japanese Security Policy, Adelphi Papers No. 178 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982), p. 5.

⁷²Research Institute for Peace and Security, Asian Security 1979

the MSDF had previously refrained from joining nuclear-armed Midway, ⁷³ in view of the 'nuclear allergy' of the Japanese. While continuing US-Japan joint exercises since 1955, the MSDF participated in the Rim Pac since 1980, the joint biannual naval exercise of the five Pacific rim countries: the USA, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and Japan. The Rim Pac was conducted in the mid-Pacific, far away from the Japanese territories for 'self-defense.' The GSDF also started joint exercises with the US forces since 1981. The SDF previous restraint from active participation in the joint exercises with the USA disappeared in this period. ⁷⁴

Second, the SDF was far more tightly linked to the security of the Far East and the US world strategy. In November 1978 the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee ⁷⁵ made up "Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation;" ⁷⁶ and based on them, the US-Japan joint study took up, first, the case of emergency in Japan, and second, the case of emergency in the Far East. ⁷⁷ The .

⁷²(cont'd) (Tokyo: Research Institute for Peace and Security, 1979), p. 173.

⁷³Ibid.

⁷⁴As for the recent US-Japan joint exercises, see Defense of Japan 1984, pp. 286-287.

⁷⁵Established in January 1969 on the basis of the Article 4 of the US-Japan Security Treaty, 1960.

⁷⁶The guidelines comprise: (1) how to deter invasion of Japan; (2) how to respond to invasion of Japan; and (3) how to cooperate in emergency outside Japan in the Far East which would cause serious influence on Japan's security. See, Defense of Japan 1984, pp. 278-282.

⁷⁷The details of these joint studies are kept secret. Gendai

USA and Japan were also engaged in the joint 1,000 nautical-mile sea-lane defense study to share the military burden between the two states. ⁷⁸ The USA especially looked forward to seeking a close linkage between the SDF and the South Korean military; ⁷⁹ thus, in 1979 Director General of the Defense Agency, Yamashita Ganri made the first official visit to South Korea, and in 1984 Prime Minister Nakasone visited South Korea for the first time as a Japanese Prime Minister, pledging to provide \$4 billion loan in consideration of the security of South Korea. The Defense Agency does not rule out the possibility of laying mines to blockage the three straits, namely Soya, Tsugaru and Tsushima, in case of emergency. ⁸⁰ Japan became the US frontline base for confronting the Soviet forces and executing the US world strategy. ⁸¹

Third, the SDF further widened their interpretation of 'self-defense' and moved decisively towards expansion of operations. Although it was not possible to precisely classify

⁷⁷(cont'd) Yogo, p. 140.

⁷⁸Boei Hakusho 1983 states: "Based on the interpretation of the Constitution, the territorial scope of exercising the right of self-defense is not necessarily limited to Japanese territorial land, waters and air but can be expanded to international waters and air." (p. 89). (The author's translation).

⁷⁹Takashi Saito, "Nikkan Kihon Joyaku Taisei (The Japan-ROK Basic Treaty System," Sekai (August 1984), p. 24.

⁸⁰Boei Hakusho 1983, p. 90.

⁸¹For instance, Okinawa serves as headquarters of US Pacific/Far East Marines and Air Force, and their mission is directly connected to the contingencies not only in the Far East but also in the Middle East.

weapons into defensive and offensive ones, the SDF had paid much attention in selecting weapons of more defensive nature than offensive. In 1979, the SDF "refused to remove the in-flight refuelling equipment from the F-15, the new fighter," and opposed the argument that the refuelling capacity would extend the range of the aircraft and make it an offensive weapon. ⁸² This was a sharp contrast to the F-4 from which bombing and in-flight refuelling equipments were removed in 1967. ⁸³ In 1984 Prime Minister Nakasone reconfirmed the nature of Japan's 'self-defense:' if Japan would be attacked by a nuclear bomb, the right of 'self-defense' would justify attacking of an enemy's base. ⁸⁴ The government promoted to equip the SDF with more sophisticated and efficient weapons regardless of defensive or offensive nature.

(2) Politicians' Degraded Sensitivity on Security Issues

Politicians lost sensitivity on security issues: they ceased to demand clarification on activities of the SDF and the US forces in Japan and allowed erosion of the civilian control, enabling expansion of Japan's military power.

First, politicians increasingly ignored the 'prior consultation,' a means for the Japanese government to check

⁸²Asian Security 1979, p. 171.

⁸³Gendai Yogo, p.144.

⁸⁴Prime Minister's remark at the Budget Committee of House of Councillors on 27 March 1984.

activities of the US forces stationed in Japan.⁸⁵ The Japanese government tended to permit any activities of the US forces in Japan, unless the USA initiated the 'prior consultation' with Japan. Thus, unless the US government admitted introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan, the Japanese government simply repeated that the US forces did not introduce nuclear weapons into Japan. As for the Team Spirit '78, the US-South Korean joint maneuver, the Diet had a debate whether the exercise mobilizing the US forces in Japan to South Korea was a subject of the 'prior consultation' or not; however, as for the Team Spirit '79, no question was raised at the Diet.⁸⁶ Since the government did not use a means of the 'prior consultation' and the opposition parties did not ask for it, the Japanese government only gave an 'ex post facto' approval to the US military activities involving Japan.

Second, military men turned to challenge politicians up to the point of endangering the principle of the civilian control. In 1978 General Kurisu Hiroomi of the SDF advocated the SDF's extra-legal action in case of emergency. Even though he was dismissed for this remark, the government started in 1978 the

⁸⁵Concerning the implementation of the Article 6 of the US-Japan Security Treaty, the 'prior consultation' was agreed upon on the day when the Treaty was signed in 1960 in the form of the exchange of notes between Japanese Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke and US Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, confirming that Japan should be consulted in advance regarding major changes in the deployment and equipment of the US forces and the US use of bases in Japan for military operations outside of Japan. Weinstain, Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, p. 96.

⁸⁶Asian Security 1979, p. 171.

study of emergency legislation to legitimate wide-range activities of the SDF in the event of emergency. This study was quite a contrast with the "Mitsuya Study" to which the opposition parties made severe criticism in 1965 for its proposal of the extra-legal activities of the SDF and the encroachment on the civilian control in case of emergency.⁸⁷ Another case suggesting the encroachment on the civilian control is the way of formulating the "53 Chugyo," mid-term Defense Program estimate (FY1980-84), which the Defense Agency alone culculated without debates at the National Defense Council, the supreme body on defense matters. Although the Defense White Paper does not admit encroachment on the civilian control saying that the "53 Chugyo" was formulated as an estimate for use within the Agency alone and the next Mid-Term Estimate "56 Chugyo" would be debated at the National Defense Council,⁸⁸ the Defense Agency was tactfully aiming at soley assuming the decision power on military policy.

Third, the "Three Weapons Export Principles" were being eroded. The Principles that were established in 1967 banned export of weapons to "communist states, countries which UN resolutions banning weapons exports are applied, and to others involved or suspected of involvement in an international conflict,"⁸⁹ and later included banning export of military

⁸⁷Ibid., p. 172.

⁸⁸Defense of Japan 1981, p. 175.

⁸⁹Cited in Akaha Tsuneo, "Japan's Nonnuclear Policy," Asian Survey, Vol. 24, No. 8 (August 1984), p. 861.

facilities and technology. This virtually banned export of weapons, but a slight flow of Japanese weapons overseas was recorded (see Table 2.4). In 1983, the Nakasone regime approved transfer of military technology to the USA, which was highly involved in many international conflicts. Since some ASEAN states have already requested Japanese arms export ⁹⁰ and Japanese military industries were willing to expand their business, ⁹¹ the "Three Weapons Export Principles" were in danger of being lifted up.

Fourth, in support of the men in uniform, the LDP politicians were not afraid of raising militaristic tones. During his visit to the USA in 1981, Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko pledged Japan's commitment to defend 1,000 nautical miles of sea-lanes and the Suzuki-Reagan joint communique used, for the first time, the term "alliance" officially to describe the US-Japan relations. Although it was clear that the essence of the US-Japan relations was the military alliance based on the US-Japan Security Treaty, the LDP politicians had avoided using the term "alliance" publicly. On his return to Japan, Prime Minister Suzuki insisted that the US-Japan "alliance" had no military meaning, and due to the controversy over this term,

⁹⁰For example, during Prime Minister Nakasone's visit in 1983, Indonesia requested Japan for cooperation in fostering Indonesian military industry, i.e., the transfer of military technology and export of weapons. Asahi Shimbun, 12 May 1983, p.1.

⁹¹Tomiyama predicts that the current expansion of military industry will cause expansion of arms sale abroad. "Gunju Kakudai ni Ikioizuku Boei Sangyo," p. 13.

Foreign Minister Ito Masayoshi resigned. The incumbent Prime Minister, Nakasone Yasuhiro, however, did not hesitate to acknowledge the military alliance with the USA and was exceedingly fond of using militaristic terms: Japan was an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" against Soviet Backfire, would "control the 'four' straits" to counter the Soviet forces, and would take up defense of two sea-lanes, Guam-Tokyo and Taiwan strait-Osaka. ⁹² Japanese Prime Ministers' active challenges have been not only welcomed by Japanese military men but also by the US administration. ⁹³

Lastly, the LDP politicians gave special consideration to the 'defense' budget and were prepared to lift the ceiling of the 'defense' budget over 1% of GNP. While the expenditures on social welfare and education were frozen or cut down under the policy of austerity, the 'defense' budget grew steadily year by year, especially since 1981. Also since 1982, the growth rate of defense budget surpassed that of general account outlays (see Table 2.5). The point to be questioned is not merely the figure in comparison with GNP but the formula for determining the ratio

⁹²In the interview by the Washington Post, 18 January 1983. Nakasone later corrected that "four" straits should be "three", namely Soya, Tsugaru and Tsushima straits.

⁹³The US. Department of Defense, Annual Report to the Congress Fiscal Year 1985 states: "Prime Minister Suzuki enunciated the goal for Japanese roles and missions when he stated in May 1981 that defense of Japan's territory, its airspace, and its sea-lanes out to 1,000 miles are legal under Japan's Constitution and are, in fact, its national policy. Prime Minister Nakasone has been even more forthright in expressing what Japan's responsibilities should be under a national division of labor with the United States." (p. 218).

of military expenditure and the real strength of the military budget. For example, according to the NATO formula, the Japanese military expenditure was about 1.6% of GNP in the fiscal 1982, while the Japanese government figure was 0.93%.⁹⁴ The military expenditure would probably go up to the fourth in the world in the late 1980's or early 1990's with the current rate of increase maintained;⁹⁵ or if the 1% ceiling were taken off, it would not need a long time for Japan to become the fourth largest military power.⁹⁶

(3) Change of Opposition Parties' Platforms on Defense

The taboos on security issues were broken one by one not only because of active challenges of the LDP leaders but also because of approval by opposition parties. In the 1960's all the four opposition parties were against both the SDF and the Japan-US Security Treaty; since the late 1970's only the Communist Party continued to oppose both. This change responded partly to the external environment, accelerated US-Soviet confrontation, but mainly to the internal change, increased approval of or indifference to the SDF and the Security Treaty among the public. Especially a drastic change in the public attitude towards the US-Japan Security Treaty was observed: a

⁹⁴Tomiyama, Gunju Kakudai ni Ikioizuku Boei Sangyo, p. 11.

⁹⁵Ibid.

⁹⁶Sakanaka Tomohisa states that "Japan can catch up conventional military capacity of France and the UK within a few years by investing 2% of GNP in defense." "Military Threats and Japan's Defense Capability," Asian Survey, Vol. 20, No. 7 (July 1980), p. 774.

survey shows that in 1960 at the time of signing the revised security treaty, 46% of respondents disapproved the treaty, and only 20% approved; while in 1980, 54% approved the treaty, and only 14% disapproved. ⁹⁷ To create a wider basis of supporters the opposition parties altered their stances on security issues, though these issues were not decisive factors to influence voters.

The major opposition parties except the Communist Party recently came to coordinate views on security issues for the election cooperation by approving the SDF and the US-Japan Security Treaty in principle. The Democratic Socialist Party endorsed the Security Treaty in 1976 and declared the constitutionality of the SDF at the party congress in 1981, arguing that the present Constitution did not negate the right of 'self-defense' and that this became the consensus among the public. ⁹⁸ The Komei Party turned to support the SDF and the Security Treaty in 1981. ⁹⁹ The Socialist Party came to approve the SDF and the Security Treaty in 1981 and "unarmed neutrality" that the party had advocated for a long time virtually went into bankruptcy. ¹⁰⁰ Only the Communist Party still opposes both the

⁹⁷Data from a survey by the Institute of Statistical Mathematics; cited in Defense of Japan 1981, p. 164.

⁹⁸Gendai Yogo, p. 59.

⁹⁹Ibid., p. 60.

¹⁰⁰For "unarmed neutrality," see Ishibashi Masashi, "On Unarmed Neutrality," Japan Echo, Vol. 11, No. 1 (1984), pp. 47-54. (Translated from "Hibuso Churitsu to Jieitai," Hibuso Churitsu-ron, Tokyo, Party Organ Beaureau, Japan Socialist Party, 1983, pp. 61-81.)

SDF and the Security Treaty but "proposes that the SDF be transformed into a force to protect territorial integrity." ¹⁰¹ In the postwar era, the opposition parties failed to show the public positive defense policies alternative to the US-Japan Security Treaty and the SDF and became almost powerless against the majority domination of the LDP.

The Rise of New Nationalism and Militarism

Japanese militarism was being revived in a new form as Japanese politicians and the public became less sensitive to accelerated military buildup. The failure of dismantling militant and reactionary forces during the occupation years became an apparent problem, when they pressed for recreating militarily strong Japan. LDP politicians did not hesitate to applaud war heroes enshrined in the Yasukuni shrine, and the Cabinet Ministers paid annual quasi-official visits to the shrine on 15 August, the day of the defeat in the war. ¹⁰² The problem of Japan's military development was that it spurred up nationalistic, militaristic sentiment of right-wing conservatives.

¹⁰¹Cited in Satoh, The Evolution of Japanese Security Policy, p. 6.

¹⁰²For the militant nature of the Yasukuni shrine, see Cyril Powles, "Yasukuni Jinja Hoan: Religion and Politics in Contemporary Japan," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Fall 1976), pp. 491-505.

On 15 August 1985, Prime minister Nakasone paid the first official visit to the shrine, breaking the previous restraint of paying quasi-official visits.

Furthermore, the problem was not only old-type nationalism among professional politicians and the men in uniform but also the newly 'rationalized' arrogance among the general public as well as the new militarism advocated by some academics. ¹⁰³ The nation regained self-pride not by irrational, fanatical ethnocentrism as in the prewar era but by assessment of economic success in the postwar era. The applause of Westerners helped foster new nationalism in Japan, ¹⁰⁴ and new nationalism could turn into a dangerous direction provided with the powerful military.

In this period, exploiting the external pressure, namely the Soviet threat to Japan's security and the US threat to link the military issue to the trade problem, Japan could furthermore develop its military capabilities. The external pressure also helped weaken the internal pressure against military buildup and instead helped strengthen the advocates of increasing military

¹⁰³As for the new militarism, see Shimizu Ikutaro, "The Nuclear Option: Japan, Be a State!" Japan Echo, Vol. 7, No. 3 (1980), pp. 33-45. (Translated from "Kaku no Sentaku: Nippon yo Kokka tare," Shokun, July 1980). Shimizu advocates: "If nuclear arms are important, and if Japan has a special status as the first nuclear victim, Japan should indeed have the right to make and maintain nuclear weapons before anybody else." (p. 44). Also see, Nakagawa Yatsuhiko, "Why Japan Should Let Nuclear Arms in," Japan Echo, Vol. 7, No. 4 (1980), pp. 99-110. (Translated from "Kaku no Mochikomi Igai ni Michi wa nai," Shokun, September 1980, pp. 62-85.)

¹⁰⁴For example, the translation of Ezra F. Vogel, Japan as Number One became the best seller in Japan and helped increase self-conceit among the Japanese. Kunihiro Masao has named such phenomenon 'Japan as Number One' Syndrome. See "The 'Japan as Number One' Syndrome," Japan Echo, Vol. 11, No. 3 (1984), pp. 44-51. (Translated from "Japan as No. 1 teki Shoko gun," Sekai, December 1983, pp. 118-130.)

power. In the period of economic prosperity, the Japanese regained the national pride and began to challenge the postwar political and military arrangements made by the two superpowers, which in the 1980's do not have dominant power over the world any more as in the 1940's and 1950's. In this sense, Japan's military development is related to the defeated nation's ego to challenge the USSR and the USA. This is why the LDP leaders were consistently eager to break the biggest taboo, what they call the "MacArthur Constitution," and totally remove the legacy of the defeat in the war.

Prospects for the Revision of the Constitution

Postwar Japan has been largely influenced by the USA, but Japanese conservative leaders have their nationalistic tendency not to allow US political, economic and military dominance over Japan. To them, the Constitution was imposed by MacArthur, and Article 9 in particular has been the symbol of humiliation by and subordination to the USA. The revision of the Constitution or enactment of an independent constitution has been on the LDP party platform since the party was formed in 1955. ¹⁰⁵ The revision has been the long-time dream of former Prime Minister, Kishi and the incumbent Prime Minister, Nakasone. ¹⁰⁶ The

¹⁰⁵The LDP was founded by merging the two conservative parties--the Liberal Party and the Democratic Party.

¹⁰⁶Kishi states: "Since I retired from the Diet, incumbent Diet members should actively promote the revision of the Constitution. Today there are no prominent Diet members advocating the revision except Nakasone, so I am thinking to ask

revisionists of the Constitution have been demanding to gain what they call 'true sovereignty' by taking off the illegitimacy of the SDF and reforming the SDF into the genuine, powerful military forces. We will look briefly at changes of interpretations of Article 9 and constitutional debates on the SDF and the US-Japan Security Treaty, and then consider prospects for the revision of the Constitution.

The original idea of Article 9 was to weaken Japan and prevent it from becoming a military power. As explained in the first section of this chapter, in the early occupation period, the USA interpreted that any form of armed forces was unconstitutional. General MacArthur adhered to the principle that Japan would not go into war even for 'self-defense,'¹⁰⁷ and Prime Minister Yoshida considered that the amendment of Article 9 would be necessary for rearmament.¹⁰⁸ However, the USA soon abandoned the disarmament policy in its growing rivalry against the USSR and turned to rebuild Japan as a bulwark against communism. Without revising Article 9, Japan's rearmament started with the establishment of the PRF in 1950 and

¹⁰⁶(cont'd) him to take up the revision." Memoirs of Kishi, p. 176. (The authors' translation)

¹⁰⁷Gendai Yogo, p. 76.

¹⁰⁸Weinstein, Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, p. 54. Although Yoshida is known publicly as opposing the revision of the Constitution, Kishi states: "Yoshida was for the revision of the Constitution, saying that the revision would be impossible after withdrawal of the US occupation forces. This is why Yoshida appointed me, outspoken revisionist of the Constitution, chairman of the constitutional research committee of the Liberal Party." Memoirs of Kishi, p. 219. (The author's translation)

then the SDF in 1954 and created the controversy over the constitutionality of the armed forces.

Several lawsuits were fought over the unconstitutionality of the US-Japan Security Treaty and the SDF, but the judiciary at the final level consistently avoided judicial review on security issues. The two district courts declared the unconstitutionality of the Security Treaty and the SDF respectively in 1959 and 1973, but both verdicts were reversed by higher courts on the ground that highly political issues such as the Security Treaty and the SDF were beyond the sphere of judicial review.¹⁰⁹ In the subsequent cases, the courts of first trial did not dare to make constitutional judgement on the SDF any more.¹¹⁰ Thus, indirectly acknowledging supremacy of politics, the judiciary, deprived the Japanese of the right of questioning the highly important matter, the constitutionality of the SDF and the

¹⁰⁹One was the Sunagawa case in 1959. The Tokyo District Court declared the unconstitutionality of the US forces stationed in Japan, but the Supreme Court that received the jumping appeal from the public procurator's office, reversed the decision of the lower court on the ground that "Article 9 of the Constitution did not prohibit Japan from asking another country for protection" and that "the Security Treaty was of 'a highly political character'"... and thus constitutionality of the treaty was not for the judicial court to review. Defense of Japan 1981, p. 162.

The other case was the Naganuma litigation in 1973. The Sapporo District Court declared unconstitutionality of the SDF, but the Sapporo High Court reversed the decision of the lower court, saying that constitutionality of the SDF was a "judgement related to an act of state, therefore, it should be left to the Diet and the Cabinet and eventually to the political judgement of the entire nation and a court should not pass a judgement on the matter." Ibid., p. 148.

¹¹⁰In the cases of Konish anti-war SDF member in 1975 and the Hyakuri Air Base Litigation in 1977, the courts of first trials both avoided giving judicial review on the SDF.

US-Japan Security Treaty.

In postwar Japan, politicians, military men, the general public as well as judges have gradually lost sensitivity on military matters, and this atmosphere has been creating a condition to enable the revision of the Constitution. Article 96 of the Constitution stipulates a procedure for the amendment:

Amendments to this Constitution shall be initiated by the Diet, through a concurring vote of two-thirds or more of all the members of each House and shall thereupon be submitted to the people for ratification, which shall require the affirmative vote of a majority of all votes cast thereon, at a special referendum or at such election as the Diet shall specify.

The condition for the revision has been fostered; however, it is still too risky for Prime Minister Nakasone to initiate the motion, and the general public has not yet find the necessity of revising the Constitution (refer to Table 2.6). Unless the LDP dominates more than two-thirds of Diet members and secures a wide range of support from the silent public, it will not succeed in the revision.

The LDP needs more time to 'educate' the public in favor of military buildup and waits for the growth of the new generation. This aspiration is well described in the Defense White Paper: "in education, too it is important that the people as members of the nation love their own country and that sentiments and awareness to defend the country should be exalted" since "all the countries are ardently making efforts in this direction."

¹¹¹ In line with this aim, the Ministry of Education has been

¹¹¹Defense of Japan 1981, p. 160.

tightening authorization criteria of textbooks used in elementary and secondary schools, and pictures and materials depicting misery of war and cruelty of the former imperial military have been intentionally excluded from textbooks. ¹¹²

The possibility of removing Article 9 also depends on the external environment of Japan. An emergency around Japan may create situation in which the SDF will go into actual battle against foreign troops and will be dispatched beyond Japanese territories. The most probable place of contingency is in the Korean Peninsula. As the Japanese public accepted the establishment of the Police Reserve Forces due to the threat of the Korean war in 1950, the next emergency in the Peninsula may serve as a catalyst to the abolition of the 'no-war' provision.

In the postwar era, Article 9 certainly provided a deterrence to Japan's military expansion and sometimes was useful to restrain the US pressure for Japan's massive military buildup and to give a pacifist image to the world. Admitting the utility of Article 9, the Japanese government only increased contradiction between Article 9 and accelerated military buildup: regardless of what the Constitution says, the government created and expanded the military forces, calling them euphemistically the 'Self Defense' Forces. However, right-wing conservatives became increasingly irritated by the euphemism and the cover-up, and they hoped to see Japan provided

¹¹²Refer to Chapter IV, "Background and Outline of the Textbook Controversy in 1982."

with strong military power commensurate with its economic power. When they increase the challenge against the postwar order set by the superpowers, Article 9 will become more in danger of being removed.

Conclusion

We have traced Japan's change from disarmament to rearmament in the postwar era and found out that Japan's postwar military development was a product of external and internal pressure. The US pressure under the height of confrontation against the USSR and China enabled Japan's rearmament. Along with the US abandonment of the disarmament policy, former militarists were revived in Japanese politics and military forces, and they constituted the nucleus of spurring up Japan's postwar military buildup. Japan chose the US-Japan Security Treaty system, by increasing its own military power and providing services to the US forces for the security of not only Japan but also the Far East. Since the late 1970's, the Soviet threat to Japan became more acute under the new cold war; on the other hand, the US threat pressing for Japan's accelerated military buildup also became apparent, reflecting US frustration over trade deficit with Japan. Exploiting the Soviet and US threat, remnants of militarists could strengthen military forces steadily.

As Japan grew up rapidly to the second largest economic entity in the world, Japan moved onto a dangerous direction to

neighboring states with some signs of new nationalism and militarism. Recently the Japanese fostered a new arrogance based on self-confidence in economic and technological development. With oblivion of misery of the war, the public and politicians lost sensitivity to war potential despite Article 9 of the Constitution. Japan's military development is discreetly linked to its challenge to wipe out the Yalta-Potsdam system and to lift off the last legacy of the occupation, the Constitution, especially Article 9 which does not legitimize the SDF.

Recently the Japanese conservative leaders came to emphasize Japan's responsibility as a member of the Western alliance: the responsibility to share the military burden of the 'free' world to counter the Soviet threat. The USA apparently wished to assign a larger military role to Japan, and Japan became more willing to assume responsibility for the security of the Far East. East Asian nations invaded by Japan, however, could not merely respond to the US world strategy, since they knew that Japan's military expansion always started in East Asia.

CHAPTER III

ATTITUDINAL CHANGE OF EAST ASIAN STATES ON JAPAN'S REARMAMENT, 1945-1981: FROM CRITICISM TO ENDORSEMENT

Just as most of the Japanese became less sensitive to their rearmament in the postwar years, most of East Asian states became less critical of Japan's postwar military buildup. Until the middle of 1971 China continued to censure the revival of Japanese militarism, and other East Asian states, either in the communist bloc or not, tended to look at Japan's rearmament with suspicion. However, since the normalization of relations with Japan, China stopped condemning Japanese militarism, and anti-Soviet states, including China, endorsed Japanese military buildup as a counterbalance against the Soviet threat. In this chapter, we will analyze what made most East Asian states alter their views on Japan's rearmament, from criticism to endorsement in the postwar era until 1981, while the more recent analysis between 1982 and 1984 will be made in Chapter IV.

First, we will look at effects of external pressure on the formation of East Asian views on Japan's rearmament. Changes in international politics and big power alignment split East Asia into pro-Soviet and pro-US blocs, and according to their affiliation with one of the superpowers these states either condemned Japan's rearmament or refrained to do so.

To examine changes in East Asian views on Japan's military buildup, we will make a historical analysis by dividing the

postwar era into four stages. At the first stage immediately after the war, East Asian states rejoiced at the defeat of Japan and frankly expressed their determination not to allow the revival of Japanese militarism and a resurgence of militarily strong Japan. At the second stage, heightened East-West confrontation roughly up to the middle of 1960's, brought about two contrasting views on Japan's rearmament: anti-communist views, accepting Japan's rearmament as a bulwark against communism, and communist views, accusing Japan of its military collusion with US imperialism. At the third stage, the region went through a transition period from bipolarity to tripolarity due to Sino-Soviet confrontation, and Sino-American rapproachment caused abrupt Chinese endorsement of Japan's military buildup. At the fourth stage after the liberation of Saigon, the new confrontation between the USSR and the USA-China, let East Asian states adjust themselves to side either with the anti-USA-China bloc or the anti-Soviet bloc, and anti-Soviet states began to make more active approaches to Japan than ever for drawing out favorable economic cooperation. Rather than criticizing Japan, anti-Soviet states started to encourage and applaud Japan's military buildup as a counterbalance against the USSR. In the historical analysis, we will trace Chinese comments on Japan's rearmament carefully, because no other state showed such a drastic change from severe criticism to applause and because Chinese impact in this region was always immense.

Next, we will examine military development in the region and the role played by Japan, because militarization in East Asia itself caused to dilute fear of Japanese militarism as well as to draw out more militarily useful economic cooperation from Japan. Japan's pledge of non-cooperation in the military field became quite ambiguous in view of the fact that economic development created the infrastructure for further military development and that Japan concentrated economic aid on anti-Soviet states from strategic considerations. The use of Japan's economic power not only indirectly contributed to modernizing the military in anti-Soviet states but also to widening a gap between those states endorsing Japanese military buildup and those condemning it harshly.

By looking at the external pressure to and military development in East Asia, we will find that Japan gained favorable conditions for its military buildup in the postwar era. The disappearance of harsh condemnation of Japan's military buildup was most welcome to Japanese military planners. However, beneath governmental cooperation in endorsing Japan's rearmament existed the public fear and suspicion of the direction of Japan's military power. In spite of strategic considerations shared by the governments of Japan and anti-Soviet states, no enthusiastic support for Japan's rearmament was voiced by the general public. East Asian nations could not easily bury bitter memories of Japanese occupation during the war, just as the Japanese could not wipe out the legacy of militarism.

The First Stage: Victory and Determination to Bury Japanese Militarism

Immediately after the war, East Asian states enjoyed victory of war and liberation from Japanese occupation and frankly expressed their determination not to allow the revival of Japanese militarism. To most of East Asian states, however, the end of the war was also the start of new war--struggle for independence and new nation-building. Indonesian and Vietnamese (Vietminh) leaders took the opportunity of Japanese surrender and proclaimed the creation of new states in August 1945 before the return of former colonists. ¹ The Philippines gained independence in 1946. In 1948 two states emerged in the Korean Peninsula at the height of East-West confrontation. The Japanese surrender immediately brought the civil war in China, which resulted in the communist victory in 1949. Within a few years after the war, East Asia was split into two blocs: the communist bloc led by the USSR and the anti-communist bloc led by the USA.

¹Indonesian and Vietnamese leaders shared the view that Japan's intervention would eventually lead to the defeat of Japan and then to their chance to acquire independence. Ho Chi Minh predicted: "If ... Japan went to war with the US and eventually lost, its defeat could create a vacuum in Vietnam at the end of the war that the communists might hope to fill before the arrival of Allied occupation forces to accept the surrender of Japanese troops." Cited in William J. Duiker, Vietnam: Nation in Revolution (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 38-39. In Vietnam, the August Revolution in 1945 led by Ho succeeded in expanding Vietminh influence throughout the country; however, due to the return of the French and later the US intervention, Vietnam was not unified until 1976, after the prolonged First and Second Indochina wars. In Indonesia, Sukarno and Hatta declared independence on 17 August 1945, but true independence was prolonged until 1949 because of the armed struggle against the returning Dutch.

Although split into two, at the first stage of the postwar era East Asian nations shared the desire that they would not allow the revival of Japanese militarism.

The San Francisco Peace Conference

The desire of East Asian nations was expressed at the San Francisco Peace Conference in September 1951, at which Japan concluded the Peace Treaty with 48 non-communist states² as well as the US-Japan Security Treaty. This Conference showed a gap between East Asian small nations which had tremendously suffered from Japanese aggression and the USA which was more absorbed in rearming Japan to confront the USSR and China rather than punishing Japan for the past war conduct. Excluded from the Conference, Asian communist states and divided states could not appeal to the international community their determination that Japan should be disarmed and punished thoroughly. On the other hand, the cold-war scheme diluted the same determination of Asian non-communist states.

At the San Francisco Peace Conference delegates from Asian states voiced their determination to prevent a resurgence of powerful Japan. The Philippine delegate expressed dissatisfaction with the less punitive nature of the Peace Treaty and stated that the Treaty did not reflect the desire of

²The USSR, Poland and Chechoslovakia attended the Conference but refused to sign the Treaty. China, Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea were not invited. Though invited, India, Burma and Yugoslavia did not attend. For Japan's peace settlements in general, see R.K. Jain, Japan's Postwar Peace Settlements (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1978).

smaller states. He expressed fear of Japan's military and economic revival:

Under conditions other than the present (Japan now had to rearm itself against communists), the Philippines would regard as completely intolerable the unrestricted right of Japan to organize its own military force. ³

the restriction of reparations in the form of services (of the Japanese) will precisely have the effect of returning the claimant states to that condition of subservience, as mere suppliers of raw materials for the Japanese industrial machines. ⁴

The Philippines accepted the Peace Treaty only on the condition that Japan's rearmament would be restricted within the framework of US-led collective security arrangements and that further satisfactory reparations settlement be made. ⁵ The Indonesian delegate, estimating that Indonesian human loss was four million people and that the material damage was billions of dollars, proposed amendments for reparations settlement. ⁶ The delegate of South Vietnam also asked for other effective formula for reparations. ⁷ Laos and Cambodia renounced their demands for reparations, and the Cambodian delegate expressed generous view towards Japan:

³ A statement by Carlos P. Romulo, Foreign Minister; quoted in Jain, Japan's Postwar Peace Settlement, p. 312.

⁴ Ibid, p. 314.

⁵ The Philippines refused to ratify the Treaty until reparation arrangements were completed. Jain, Japan's Postwar Peace Settlements, p. xv.

⁶ A statement by Ahmed Subarjo; quoted in Jain, Japan's Postwar Peace Settlements, p. 328. Even though Indonesia signed the Treaty, it failed to ratify it. Instead, Indonesia concluded a separate peace treaty with Japan in 1958.

⁷ A statement of a South Vietnamese delegate; cited in Jain, Japan's Postwar Peace Settlements, pp. 344-345.

the imposition of severe conditions upon the Japanese people as regards reparations would be an illusion and would only serve to keep alive in Japan the spirit of revenge.⁸

Although Asian small states could not be fully satisfied with the Peace Treaty, in view of strong US presence in postwar Asia, their voices could not have decisive impact on the Peace Treaty.

While the above states expressed their concerns over the political and military direction of postwar Japan at the Peace Conference, other East Asian states, namely South Korea, North Korea, China and North Vietnam were deprived of a chance to accuse Japan of the past aggression. Considering the fact that the Koreans and the Chinese had suffered most for the longest period by Japanese aggression and occupation, we cannot but raise a question on the legitimacy of the Peace Treaty. In other word, due to the US containment policy against the USSR and China, Japan was exempted from full compensation for its past aggression and excused for rearming itself soon after the war.

Communist Solidarity in Accusing Japan

At this stage, the communist bloc led by the USSR showed firm solidarity in accusing Japan's peace settlements. Chinese accusation was fully in tone with the Soviet one. North Korea supported the Chinese and Soviet stance.⁹ In isolation from the

⁸A statement by Phleng, Foreign Minister; quoted in Jain, Japan's Postwar Peace Settlements, p. 340.

⁹For example, see Foreign Minister Pak Hen Yen's note to Soviet Foreign Minister concerning the Peace Treaty with Japan in July 1951 in News and Views from the Soviet Union; quoted in Jain, Japan's Postwar Peace Settlements, pp. 355-357.

most of the world, China continued to express anger against the US occupation policy on Japan and especially the US plan to rearm Japan and allow the revival of reactionary forces. It was a tragedy in postwar history that the so called 'free' world refused to hear Chinese voices, labeling them as communist propaganda. The Chinese comments at this stage carried true warning to the Japanese beyond the mere communist propaganda. In November 1950 China sent Wu Hsiu-ch'uan to the UN Security Council meetings, though he was not allowed to deliver a speech. In his speech prepared for the meeting, he condemned Japan's rearmament and the preparations for the US-led peace treaty as a US plot to encircle China. ¹⁰ In September 1951, Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai condemned the Peace Treaty and accused the USA of its plot to rearm Japan:

It is only a treaty for reviving Japanese militarism, a treaty of hostility towards China and the Soviet Union, a menace to Asia and preparation for a new war of aggression. ¹¹

When the US-Japan Security Treaty came into effect in May 1952, Zhou Enlai further condemned US collusion with Japan's reactionary forces:

... after the conclusion of the 'treaty,' it (the Yoshida government) at once released 88 of the most vicious Japanese war criminals, including the notorious Yasutsugu Okamura, whose hands are stained with the blood of the Chinese people. This shows that throughout the period of nearly 7 years, since the end of the Second World War in 1945, the reactionary rulers of

¹⁰Cited in Akira Iriye, The Cold War in Asia: Historical Introduction (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1974), p. 185.

¹¹People's China, 1 October 1951; quoted in Jain, Japan's Postwar Peace Settlements, p.278.

Japan have shown not the slightest intention of atoning for their crimes. ¹²

In sum, China and the communist bloc could not accept the US-led peace settlement, because China was not allowed to participate in the Peace Conference; there was no provision of disarming Japan in the Peace Treaty; the USA released many war criminals arbitrarily; the USA started rearming Japan; and US imperialism perpetuated occupying Japan for its aggression against China and other communist states.

In the immediate postwar years, genuine Asian concerns over the revival of Japanese militarism were voiced but could not prevent Japan from rearming itself. Tied with the US containment policy, anti-communist states unwillingly had to accept the less punitive peace treaty which did not set restrictions on Japan's rearmament and reparations favorable to them. The concerns of communist and divided states were virtually neglected. Thus, escaping from serious punishment for the wartime conducts, Japan started to serve as an obedient ally of the USA, which had strategic interest in using Japan as advanced bases for its world strategy. The failure of setting restrictions in Japan's rearmament at this stage created a source of new fear of Japan among East Asian states.

¹²People's China, 16 May 1952; quoted Ibid, pp. 282-283.

The Second Stage: Heightened East-West Confrontation and
Division of East Asian Views on Japan's Rearmament

Heightened East-West confrontation, which culminated in the Korean war and the first Indochina war, sharply divided East Asian views on Japan's rearmament according to the affiliation with superpowers--the USA or the USSR. The anti-communist states had to reluctantly accept Japan's substantial rearmament, the establishment of the Police Reserve Forces in 1950 and the SDF in 1954. For them, the growing communist menace was more serious than the memory of Japanese militarism. The communist states, on the other hand, looked at Japan's rearmament as a step of US aggression into Asia and strongly accused Japan of its collusion with US imperialism. Asian reactions to Japan's rearmament, therefore, were split sharply into two along the ideological lines.

In the 1950's and the 1960's, the East-West confrontation was between the US bloc and the USSR-China bloc. The USA stepped up as a 'policeman' of anti-communist East Asia by concluding military treaties respectively with Japan (1951), the Philippines (1951), South Korea (1953) and Taiwan (1954), as well as creating the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954 together with European powers and the Philippines and Thailand. ¹³ To counter US drive to encircle communist Asia, the

¹³SEATO was created under the aegis of the Manila Pact, of which signatories were originally the USA, the UK, France, Thailand, the Philippines, Pakistan, Australia and New Zealand. Pakistan withdrew from it in 1973. SEATO was formerly disbanded in 1977,

USSR concluded similar treaties with China (1950) and North Korea (1961), and China, North Korea and North Vietnam tried to enhance their socialist solidarity. ¹⁴ With various military treaties, East Asian states were tied firmly with either the USA or the USSR (see Table 3.1).

Regional Instability

Aside from the East-West confrontation, East Asian states themselves were still under turmoil of decolonization and civil war roughly up to the mid-1960's, except the much prolonged warfare in Indochina. In Malay Peninsula, the situation was in fluidity until 1965. Even moderate transition to decolonization in Malaya caused a limited scale of civil war up to 1960, which were somewhat combined with ethnic conflicts between the Malay who had collaborated with the Japanese during the Japanese occupation and the Chinese who had not. After Malay Peninsula gained independence in 1957, the Federation of Malaysia was created in 1963, comprising the Peninsula, north Borneo (Sabah

¹³(cont'd) though the Manila Pact itself is still in effect. See Leszek Buszynski, "SEATO: Why It Survived until 1977 and Why It was Abolished," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, vol. 12, no. 2 (Sept. 1981), 287-296.

¹⁴China recognized the Ho Chi Minh regime in 1950 and started economic assistance to North Vietnam. China sent 'volunteer' troops to the Korean war to gain strong influence over North Korea and in 1961 concluded Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with North Korea. North Korea established diplomatic relations with North Vietnam in 1950 and gave economic and military assistance to Hanoi. See King C. Chen, "The Chinese Role in the Indochina Crisis," and also Roy U.T. Kim, "Two Koreans and the Indo-Chinese Crisis," The Role of External Powers in the Indochina Crisis, ed., Gene T. Hsiao (Edwardsville, IL: Southern Illinois University, 1973).

and Sarawak), and Singapore. Indonesia challenged the creation of the Federation of Malaysia over the incorporation of north Borneo, accusing the UK of the neo-colonial plot. In 1965, due to the friction between the Chinese and the Malay, Singapore left the Federation of Malaysia and became an independent state.

Political instability gave military men chances to assume absolute political power in South Korea and Indonesia. In South Korea, General Park Chung Hee staged a military coup in 1961, while in Indonesia the military coup in 1965¹⁵ led to the downfall of President Sukarno and the birth of General Suharto's military rule. Under the strict military rule, the government of South Korea could conclude the highly controversial South Korean-Japanese Basic Treaty in 1965, suppressing nation-wide anti-Treaty movements.¹⁶ Blaming the PKI (Indonesia Communist Party) of having staged the coup in 1965 and eliminating a large number of communists and those suspected as communists as well as ethnic Chinese in 1965-66,¹⁷ Indonesia separated itself from

¹⁵The author does not take the position that the coup was staged by the PKI (Indonesia Communist Party) as the Indonesian government has asserted. For the anti-Indonesian government interpretation of the coup, see Julie Southwood and Patrick Flanagan, Indonesia: Law, Propaganda and Terror (London: Zed Press, 1983).

¹⁶As for the South Korean political situation at the time of signing the treaty, see Kim Kwan Bong, The Korea-Japan Treaty Crisis and the Instability of the Korean Political System (New York: Praeger, 1971).

¹⁷The number of persons killed in the massacre is not clarified and differs much. J.D. Legge cites about a quarter million in Indonesia, 2nd ed. (Sydney: Prentice-Hall of Australia, 1977); Nishihara Masashi cites 150,000-500,000 in The Japanese and Sukarno's Indonesia, Monograph of the Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University (Honolulu: The University Press of

the anti-US circle.

Japanese War Reparations

Though the turmoil prevailed in the region up to the mid-1960's, anti-communist Asian states completed, by this stage, the first step of postwar diplomatic relations with Japan--negotiations of war reparations and economic cooperation. After the lengthy negotiations, war reparations were settled as in Table 3.2. Outside the sphere of war reparations, Japan started to offer economic cooperation separately with Cambodia, ¹⁸ Laos, ¹⁹ Thailand, ²⁰ South Korea, ²¹ and Taiwan. ²² Thus, the framework of Japan's economic return to East Asia was set up under the name of war reparations and economic cooperation, while in exchange of Japan's economic cooperation, the

¹⁷(cont'd) Hawaii, 1976); and Amnesty International cites more than half a million in Indonesia: Amnesty International Report (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1977).

¹⁸Grants-in-aid of 1,500 million yen was paid between 1959 and 1961. Jain, Japan's Postwar Peace Settlement, p. 122.

¹⁹Grants-in-aid of 1,000 million yen was offered. "Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement Between Japan and Laos," 15 October 1958; quoted Ibid., p. 342

²⁰5.4 billion yen was offered. "Agreement between Japan and Thailand concerning settlement of 'special yen problem'," 9 July 1955; quoted Ibid., p. 353.

²¹\$300 million of free aid over 10 years and \$200 million of loan over 10 years were offered. "Agreement between Japan and the Republic of Korea on the settlement of problems concerning property and claims and economic cooperation," 22 June 1965; quoted Ibid., pp. 360-361.

²²Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan was concluded on 28 April 1952, and this allowed Japan to resume economic expansion to Taiwan.

anti-communist governments tended to soften their attitudes toward rearmament of Japan.

However, it was quite unacceptable for communist and divided states, namely, China, North Korea and North Vietnam to see that Japan concluded agreements on economic cooperation or war reparations only with their enemy states, respectively, Taiwan, South Korea and South Vietnam. In 1957, Foreign Minister of North Vietnam issued a statement on Japanese-South Vietnamese reparation negotiations:

The Japanese government must bear the responsibility of compensating to the whole of the Vietnamese people ... The separate negotiations between the Japanese government and the South Vietnam administration on the question of war compensation are unjustified. ²³

In June 1965 when the Japanese-South Korean Basic Treaty was signed, the North Korean government issued an statement:

the treaty between the Republic of Korea and Japan are 'a series of plots and maneuvers' of the United States to fabricate a military alliance in Northeast Asia. They impede independent and peaceful unification, and therefore, should be null and void. ²⁴

China, North Korea and North Vietnam intensified antagonism against Japan whose aid helped strengthen not only economic but also military power of their enemy states.

²³Vietnam Information Bulletin, 20 Dec. 1957, p.2.; quoted in Jain, Japan's Postwar Peace Settlements, p. 352.

²⁴Cited in Myong Joo Roe, "North Korea's Diplomacy toward the United States and Japan," Korea Observer, vol. 10, no. 2 (Summer 1979), p. 156.

China's accusation of Japan's rearmament continued to be harsh. In 1954 when the Japan's SDF was established, an article in Kwanming Daily censured Japan's rearmament:

Japan's armed forces, established in the past in the name of 'maintaining internal order,' are being greatly expanded under the guise of 'self-defense'... Formerly purged militants have become active in Japan. Today over 80 percent of the officers in the 'sea self-defense' forces are professional military men of the former imperial navy and about one-fourth of the officers of the 'ground self-defense forces' are former Japanese officers. ²⁵

When Japan-US Security Treaty was revised in 1960, Chinese Foreign Minister issued a statement:

the conclusion of the Japanese-US treaty of military alliance signifies the revival of Japanese militarism and Japan's openly joining the US aggressive military bloc. ²⁶

Chairman Mao Zedong ardently supported Japanese people's just struggle against US imperialism:

Recently, a large-scale mass movement has started throughout Japan to oppose the entry and stationing in Japan of US F-105D nuclear aircraft and nuclear submarines and to demand the dismantling of all US military bases, the withdrawal of US armed forces, the return of Japan's territory of Okinawa, the abortion of the Japan-US 'Security Treaty'... The Chinese people whole-heartedly support the just struggle of the Japanese people. ²⁷

²⁵Xinhua News Agency, Daily News Release, 19 July 1954; quoted in, R.K. Jain, China and Japan, 1949-1976 (London: Martin Robertson, 1977), p. 180.

²⁶China Today, 16 January 1960; quoted, Ibid, p. 230.

²⁷Peking Review, 31 January 1964; quoted, Ibid, p. 246.

Political and economic basis of most of East Asian states was still weak and unstable until the mid 1960's, while Japan recovered from war devastation largely owing to the special procurement boom of the Korean war and moved on to rapid economic development. Asian authoritarianism prevailed over East Asia in the forms of tightly-controlled communist regimes, anti-communist military regimes or bureaucratic authoritarian regimes. Then East Asian states came to be divided into those which accepted Japan's economic expansion and those which still could not establish even diplomatic relations with Japan; or those which accepted Japan's rearmament and those which strongly denounced it.

The Third Stage: Transition from Rigid Bipolarity to Tripolarity

From the middle of the 1960's to the middle of the 1970's, the region was shaken by the second Indochina war and drastic change in Chinese foreign policy following the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution. When the regional disturbance came close to an end, East Asia was not the one it used to be. First, Japan grew up as the third economic power in the world by the early 1970's. Japan attained unprecedented economic development until the first oil crisis in 1973, and the special procurement boom of the Vietnam war spurred up Japan's economic invasion of East Asia. ²⁸ Second, Sino-US rapproachment beginning in 1971 created

²⁸With the Vietnam special procurements Japan not only gained from direct sales of goods and services to the US armed forces in Japan but also increased indirectly Japan's exports to the

a new division of East Asia. The rigid bipolarity was broken, and China came to side with former enemies, the USA and Japan. Accordingly, East Asian states had to adjust themselves to the new international power alignment. Third, with the birth of the new alignment in East Asia, China and anti-communist states came to share the view towards Japan's rearmament as a counterbalance against the USSR. At this stage, we will observe the transition from rigid bipolarity to tripolarity in East Asia and East Asian's changing views on Japan and its rearmament.

The Second Indochina War and Anti-Communist Cooperation

When the second Indochina war broke out, the anti-communist states in East Asia supported the USA and then perceived Japan's military buildup as a means to supplement their efforts to protect themselves against communists. The anti-communist regional cooperation with the USA was embodied in the establishment of the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC) with the strong initiative of South Korean President Park Chung Hee. ²⁹

²⁸(cont'd) USA and seven Southeast Asian countries/regions, closely connected with the war (Okinawa, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, the Philippines, South Vietnam and Hong Kong). According to the MITI estimate, the amount of export increase to the above seven countries/regions was \$262 million for the fiscal 1966 and \$225 million for the fiscal 1967. "Betonamu Senso no Nihon Keizai e no Eikyo," Chosa Geppo (Naikaku Kambo Naikaku Chosashitsu) 14, No. 5 (May 1969), 43-47; cited in Young C. Kim, "Japan and the Vietnam War," The Role of External Powers in the Indochina Crisis, p. 162.

²⁹The first ministerial conference was held in Seoul in June 1966 under the name of 'the First Ministerial Meeting for Asian and Pacific Cooperation,' and since the second meeting the name of the 'Asian and Pacific Council' was used. The members of ASPAC were: South Korea, Australia, Republic of China (Taiwan), Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and

Among the ASPAC member states, South Korea contributed most to the USA by sending the largest number of troops to South Vietnam.³⁰ Japan played a supporting role to the US combat in Indochina, by supplying bases and military and non-military equipments to the US forces and giving economic injections to South Vietnam.³¹ Between 1967 and 1969, Japan became the largest trade partner to South Vietnam.³² In 1967, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand formed the ASEAN with the official purpose "to accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region,"³³ but the main concern of the ASEAN heads was to secure regional peace and stability against the communist challenge.³⁴ Thailand and the Philippines provided military bases to the USA and sent troops to South Vietnam, while Singapore and Malaysia

²⁹(cont'd) Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam). Kingdom of Laos participated as an observer. ASPAC was de facto abolished in 1973.

³⁰South Korea sent nearly 50,000 men by 1968 to South Vietnam. Charles E. Morrison and Astri Suhrke, Strategies of Survival: The Foreign Policy Dilemmas of Smaller Asian States (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), p. 23.

³¹For Japan's involvement in the Vietnam war, see Betonamu ni Okeru Senso Hanzai Chosa Nihon Iinkai (Japanese Investigating Committee on the Vietnam war crimes), ed., Genosaido: Minzoku Minagoroshi Senso (Genocide of the Vietnamese) (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1967), pp. 77-133.

³²Young C. Kim, "Japan and the Vietnam War," The Role of External Powers in the Indochina Crisis, p. 161.

³³The ASEAN Declaration, 8 August 1967.

³⁴At the time of foundation (the Bangkok Meeting in 1967), 'economic cooperation' was not almost totally discussed. Morrison and Suhrke, Strategies of Survival, p. 271.

politically assisted the US policy in Vietnam.³⁵ Indonesia, though posing as a somewhat neutral state, helped indirectly US war in Indochina by training Malaysian, Laotian, Vietnamese and Cambodian troops in the country.³⁶ The anti-communist states accepted Japanese military buildup as long as it was directed against their common enemies, communists.

Drastic Change of Chinese Views and Its Effects

When the Second Indochina war came close to an end, China made a drastic change in its foreign policy and started to sit with pro-American states to denounce Soviet 'socialist' imperialism. At this stage Chinese attitudes towards Japanese rearmament were shifted sharply from severe criticism to endorsement. The Sino-Soviet conflict brought about the Sino-US and Sino-Japanese rapprochement. Aligning with the USA and Japan, China tried to create a united front against the USSR. In the early 1970's, antagonism against the USSR let China abandon former accusation of Japan and started endorsing and encouraging Japanese military buildup.

Until mid-1971 China continued to issue the harsh condemnation of Japanese militarism. For example, in the

³⁵As for the ASEAN members' cooperation with the USA in the Vietnam war, see Kaw Guat Hoon, An Analysis of China's Attitudes towards ASEAN, 1967-76, Occasional Paper No.48 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1977), pp. 16-22.

³⁶Peter Britton, "Indonesia's Neo-Colonial Armed Forces," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars (July-September 1975), p. 20.

Memorandum Trade Agreement China forced the Japanese side to condemn the US-Japan military alliance treaty and the revival of Japanese militarism. The communique on Memorandum Trade on 4 April 1969 included:

The Chinese people resolutely oppose the Japan-US military alliance treaty. The Japanese side expresses its understanding of the stand of the Chinese side and duly takes cognizance of the fact that the Japan-US "Security Treaty" is a threat to China and to the people of the Asian countries, and that it constitutes a serious obstacle to relations between Japan and China.

³⁷

The communique on Memorandum Trade on 19 April 1970, after condemning the Nixon-Sato communique of 21 November 1969, ³⁸ stressed:

The revival of Japanese militarism, backed up by US imperialism, is already a harsh fact confronting the people of Asia and the whole world. ³⁹

Furthermore, the communique on Memorandum Trade on 1 March 1971 states that "the revival of Japanese militarism is already a reality." ⁴⁰

For another example, in April 1970, Prime Minister Zhou Enlai strongly accused Japan of the revival of militarism during his visit to North Korea. The Sino-North Korean joint communique

³⁷Peking Review, 11 April 1969; quoted in R.K. Jain, China and Japan, p. 259.

³⁸In the communique, Prime Minister Sato stated that "the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area was also a most important factor for the security of Japan;" Japan Times, 22 November 1969.

³⁹Peking Review, 24 April 1970; quoted in Jain, China and Japan, p. 264.

⁴⁰Peking Review, 12 March 1971; quoted in Jain, China and Japan, p. 269.

included the condemnation of Japan:

The two sides vehemently condemned Japanese militarism which, revived again as a dangerous force of aggression in Asia under the active patronage of U.S. imperialism, is embarking on the road of open aggression against the Asian people with a delusion to realize the old broken dream of 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere' ... ⁴¹

However, the alleged revival of Japanese militarism and the US-Japan military alliance treaty did not constitute "a serious obstacle" ⁴² to normalize the Sino-Japanese relations. After US President Nixon announced his visit to China in July 1971, China stopped the harsh condemnation of Japanese militarism. After Tanaka's visit to China in September 1972, China started even to encourage Japan's military buildup. The New York Times carried a report that at the time of Tanaka's visit to China, Prime Minister Zhou did not express concern over the Fourth Buildup Plan of the SDF but rather welcomed Japan's strengthening military power as a counterbalance against the USSR. The report further stated that Premier Zhou referred to the possibility of Chinese military assistance to Japan in case the USSR would launch military attack on Japan. ⁴³ When Premier Zhou met a Japanese Diet member, Kimura Takeo in January 1973, Premier Zhou admitted that it was necessary for Japan to possess its own

⁴¹Pyongyang Times, no. 14 (272), 13 April 1970, p. 11; quoted in John K. Emerson, and Leonard A. Humphreys, Will Japan Rearm?: A Study in Attitudes, AEI-Hoover Policy Study 9 (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Policy Research, 1973), p. 44.

⁴²In the communique on Memorandum Trade on 4 April 1969 quoted above.

⁴³The New York Times, 14 December 1972.

armed forces and to maintain the US-Japan Security Treaty.⁴⁴

The drastic change of Chinese policy directly affected North Korean views on Japan. Since North Korea was put in an awkward situation between two socialist rivals, the USSR and China, Sino-Soviet conflicts enabled North Korea to explore independent policies and to approach non-communist states including Japan. In September 1972, North Korean Vice Premier Pak Song-chol revealed North Korea's willingness to drop the annulment of the South Korean-Japanese Treaty from the conditions to normalize relations with Japan:

North Korea could normalize its diplomatic relations with Japan even before the Korea-Japan Treaty is annuled if Japan employs an equidistant diplomacy toward South and North Korea. ⁴⁵

In February 1973, Kim Il-sung stated in an interview with the editor-in-chief of Tokyo Shimbun that "I do not demand reparation for past deeds." ⁴⁶ In the early 1970's, influenced by the Chinese change, North Korea withdrew these two main condemnations on Japan.

⁴⁴Asahi Shimbun, 18 January 1973 (Evening), p. 1.

⁴⁵Dong-a Ilbo, 8 September 1972; quoted in Myong Joon Roe, "North Korea's Diplomacy toward the United States and Japan," Korea Observer, vol. 10, no. 2 (Summer 1979), p. 158.

⁴⁶cited in Myong, "North Korea's Diplomacy," p. 158.

New Anti-Japanese Feeling: Tanaka Visit to the ASEAN States in 1974

The governmental cooperation between Japan and anti-communist East Asian states was consolidated through the Second Indochina war and the expansion of economic ties, but aside from the official links, the people in the region came to develop new anti-Japanese feeling as Japan further aggressively infiltrated into the region economically. Their anti-Japanese feeling was revealed, when Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei visited the five ASEAN states in January 1974. Students' protests in Indonesia and Thailand not only showed the deep-rooted anti-Japanese feeling but also were directed at their governments which colluded with the Japanese government and businessmen in draining out their resources and inviting Japan's economic domination. Small-scale students' demonstration was also seen in Malaysia. It was considered that the Filipinos would have also staged anti-Japanese demonstrations if they had not been under the martial law.

The news editorials of the ASEAN states depicted the anti-Japanese feeling erupted at the Tanaka visit. In Malaysia, the editorial of Straits Times stated that the Malaysians would never forget the war and the 'Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere' and still remember the Bushi-do (the code of the warrior); thus they could not easily wipe out the image of economic Samurai from Japanese businessmen. ⁴⁷

⁴⁷Straits Times, 2 January 1974; cited in Japan, Ministry of

In Indonesia, editorial of Sinar Harapan, supported the student protest that the Indonesians should realize the burden in Indonesian-Japanese relations: the Japanese injured Indonesian's pride and tried to manipulate the Indonesians by using money and materials as in a case in which Japanese businessmen offered President Sukarno Japanese women to gain favorable treatments in their business. ⁴⁸ While accusing Japanese economic domination, the students directed their protest mainly at the repressive government and some pro-Japanese generals, who, taking advantage of their positions as personal assistants to the President, abused power and accumulated money. ⁴⁹

In Thailand, the editorial of Siam Rath stated just after the Tanaka visit that the Japanese and ASEAN governments would try to promote friendly relations but that the dissatisfaction

⁴⁷(cont'd) Foreign Affairs, Bureau of Information and Cultural Affairs, Tanaka Sori no Tonan Ajia Homon ni Kansuru Kaigai Roncho, (The Foreign Press Editorials on Prime Minister Tanaka visit to Southeast Asia) (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1974), p. 18.

⁴⁸Sinar Harapan, 14 January 1974; cited Ibid, p. 22.

⁴⁹The student protest turned into a violent riot, but at the stage of the riot, non-students, youth and children from Jakarta's slum areas were main participants. Today, the Malari affair (January 15 riot) is considered the outburst of army rivalry between Personal Assistants to President Suharto, Major-Generals Ali Murtopo and Humardani, and Kopkamtib (military security forces) Commander General, Sumitro, exploiting students' criticism against the Suharto-associated generals. The Indonesian government charged that remnants of Socialist and Masyumi parties (both banned in 1960) staged the riot. For the Malari affair, see Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), pp. 314-316.

among the people would not change. ⁵⁰ Since Thailand suffered from huge trade imbalance with Japan, the Thai people had deep fear of Japanese domination in their economy. The campaign of boycotting Japanese goods organized by the national student council in 1972, for example, was well supported by the Thai newspapers. ⁵¹ Even though Tanaka promised to correct trade imbalance and to guide Japanese businessmen to alter their behavior, the suspicion among the Thais against the Japanese did not disappear easily.

Tanaka's visit to ASEAN states in 1974 let the ASEAN people as well as the Japanese realize the difficulty of establishing friendly relations between those once invaded by the Japanese and the former invaders. War memories were not yet wiped out, and Japan's economic expansion was considered as Japan's second invasion. Diverting the responsibility to 'dirty' businessmen and promising to give guidance to them, Tanaka did not treat seriously the basic problem of trade imbalance and economic exploitation. Furthermore, both the Japanese and ASEAN governments disregarded, in spite of the student protest, the fact that the Japanese government and businessmen assisted and enriched only one segment of ASEAN societies and then strengthened the repressive regimes in the region.

⁵⁰Siam Rath, 17 January 1974; cited in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tanaka Visit, p. 9.

⁵¹Nation, 2 December 1972; cited in Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bureau of Information and Cultural Affairs, Nihon no Keizai Shinshutsu ni Kansuru Kaigai Roncho (The Foreign Press Editorials on Japan's Economic Expansion) (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1973), p. 89.

In this period, not only the Japanese but also the people in China and other East Asian countries were astonished by the sudden withdrawal of Chinese condemnation of Japanese militarism and encouragement of Japanese military buildup. Chairman of Sino-Japanese Friendship Association, Liao Cheng-zhi stated in an interview by Japanese news editors that at the time of Tanaka visit to China it was somewhat difficult to protect the Japanese flag because among the Chinese were those whose families were killed during the war against Japan.⁵² Since Sino-US and Sino-Japanese rapproachment, East Asia has entered a new era with new alignment of regional powers. The respective governments had to adjust themselves to the new development of international politics and accordingly form their views on Japan's rearmament. But, either in the non-communist bloc or the communist bloc, people's sentiment persisted outside the scheme of bipolarity or tripolarity and continued to question Japan's economic and military resurgence.

The Fourth Stage: The Liberation of Saigon and East Asian Adjustment to the New East-West Confrontation

The liberation of Saigon in 1975 turned out to be the start of new confrontation in East Asia. Isolated in the region,

⁵²Yomiuri Shimbun, 12 March 1973; cited in Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bureau of Information and Cultural Affairs, Nihon o Meguru Saikin no Chu-So Ryokoku no Roncho (The Chinese and Soviet Press Comments on Japan). (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1973), p. 19.

antagonized by China, not rendered economic help by the USA,⁵³ war-devastated Vietnam had no option but leaning to the USSR. Looking at the growing Soviet influence in Vietnam, China and the anti-communist ASEAN states found a common enemy in the USSR. Thus, they began to see the need of militarily strong Japan as counterbalance against the USSR. Since the late 1970's Japan moved on to further military expansion and confrontation against the USSR. We will look at Vietnamese, ASEAN and Chinese adjustments to the new East-West confrontation which developed between the USSR and the USA-China, and examine the new division of East Asian views on Japan's military buildup.

Vietnamese Adjustment

Unified Vietnam at first sought omni-directional foreign policy for its economic recovery, but Chinese and US rejection prompted Vietnam to lean to the USSR. The traditional feud erupted between Vietnam and China, and Vietnam turned to push the ethnic Chinese out of the country. When Vietnam entered the COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) in 1978, China immediately withdrew all economic assistance to Vietnam. The USA refused to recognize the new government of Vietnam partly in view of the Sino-Vietnamese confrontation.⁵⁴ Vietnam only

⁵³In the 1973 Paris Peace Agreement, the USA promised to pay Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) over \$5 billion, but did not materialize it. Morrison, and Suhrke, Strategies of Survival, p. 84.

⁵⁴Joseph M. Ha, and John Guinasso, "Japan's Rearmament Dilemma: The Paradox of Recovery," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 53, No. 2 (Summer 1980), p. 252.

enhanced military and economic ties with the USSR, which in return could obtain access to the Vietnamese bases in Danang and Cam Ranh Bay that were formerly constructed by the USA. ⁵⁵

Put into a Soviet orbit, Vietnam could not enhance relations with Japan, though both Vietnam and Japan tried to develop new relations in the middle of the 1970's. Vietnam needed economic help from Japan to reconstruct its country, while Japan hoped to conduct some independent diplomacy from the USA by developing relations with Vietnam. Japan established diplomatic relations with North Vietnam in September 1973, recognized the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam in May 1975, and established relations with unified Vietnam in July 1976 soon after its formation. Japan started economic aid to North Vietnam in 1975. ⁵⁶ However, Vietnamese close association with the USSR let Japan abandon exploring friendly relations with Vietnam. When Japan signed in August 1978 the Treaty on Peace and Friendship with China, Vietnam charged that the Treaty would help China use Japan's economic power to attain its hegemonic ambition to bring Asian states under its influence. ⁵⁷

⁵⁵According to the 1985 edition of Soviet Military Power compiled by US Department of Defense, Cam Ranh Bay has become the largest advanced naval base for the USSR. Mainichi Shimbun, 3 April 1985, p. 7.

⁵⁶Japanese grant aid was agreed at 8,500 million yen for the fiscal 1975. Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Blue Book for 1975: Review of Recent Developments in Japan's Foreign Relations (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1976), p. 29.

⁵⁷Cited in Chun Whan Chun, "Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Amity and the Korean Peninsula," Korea Observer, vol. 10, no. 1 (Spring 1979), p. 36.

Then, Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in late 1978 halted the flow of Japan's new aid to Vietnam, largely decreasing official contacts between these states. ⁵⁸

ASEAN Adjustment

The ASEAN states faced the security crisis at the communist victory in Indochina and the gradual withdrawal of US troops from the region. On the day when Phnom Penh fell to the communist, ⁵⁹ the Philippine President Marcos proposed to hold the ASEAN summit meeting. The summit meeting was held in February 1976 for the first time since the formation of ASEAN in 1967. The substantial growth of the ASEAN started from this first summit meeting. The ASEAN states took up the security issues more seriously than ever, and one of their options to counter Vietnam was improving relations with China.

While exploring political cooperation with China, the ASEAN states looked for more economic cooperation with Japan that would help strengthening national and regional resilience necessary to counter Vietnamese and Soviet threat. The Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo was invited to the second ASEAN summit meeting in August 1977 along with Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand, and Fukuda's ASEAN tour after the summit meeting escaped from anti-Japanese demonstrations that Tanaka had to encounter in 1974.

⁵⁸Aid already agreed (14,000 million yen for the fiscal 1979) was provided to Vietnam. Asian Security 1979, p. 165.

⁵⁹Phnom Penh fell on 17 April 1975; Saigon, on 30 April 1975.

A few years after Tanaka's visit, Japan and the ASEAN states changed much. For Japan, Fukuda brought massive 'aid,' totalling 1,500 billion yen of economic and technical cooperation to the five ASEAN countries and Burma, ⁶⁰ and pledged to offer US\$10 billion for ASEAN industrial projects; ⁶¹ while Tanaka could not make special commitments to the ASEAN states in 1974 when Japanese economy was severely hit by the first oil crisis. Although Japanese business practice did not change much since the Tanaka visit, Fukuda received favorable news comments both in the ASEAN states and Japan. For the ASEAN states, the respective governments tightened security much more in welcoming Fukuda in 1977. In 1977 Thailand was put once again under the military rule, whereas Tanaka visited Thailand in January 1974 just after Thai students brought back the civilian government from the military in October 1973. Student power in Thailand and Indonesia decreased through accelerated repression by the military regimes. Faced Vietnamese challenge, the ASEAN governments had the urgent need to enhance their economic as well as military power by drawing out more favorable economic 'aid' from Japan.

In 1977 the desire of the ASEAN and Japanese governments was consorted to promote their solidarity against the Vietnamese

⁶⁰Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bureau of Information and Cultural Affairs, Tonan Ajia to Nihon: Shinjidai no Kaimaku: Fukuda Sori no Tonan Ajia Rekiho (Southeast Asia and Japan: The Opening of the New Era, Prime Minister Fukuda's visit to Southeast Asia) (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1977), p. 10.

⁶¹Ibid, p. 26.

threat, and the ASEAN governments carefully created the warm reception to Fukuda. Japan, in a way making up for US military withdrawal from Indochina, tried to comply with ASEAN needs. Thus, at the end of his tour, Fukuda issued a Manila speech, declaring Japan's willingness to contribute to enhancing the ASEAN resilience and take diplomatic initiatives to ensure stability in Southeast Asia. ⁶²

Chinese Adjustment

Since the mid-1970's, it seemed that China would do anything to prevent the increase of Soviet influence over East Asia. First, China antagonized Vietnam which leaned to the USSR and launched an invasion of Vietnam in early 1979.

Second, China changed its attitudes towards the ASEAN from harsh condemnation that ASEAN was a tool of US imperialism and an anti-China military alliance to a more conciliatory approach. China started to praise the ASEAN for its efforts of rejecting Soviet hegemonist objectives. ⁶³ China established diplomatic relations with Malaysia in May 1974, the Philippines in June 1975 and Thailand in July 1975. Despite non-existence of diplomatic relations, China developed friendly relations with Singapore. ⁶⁴ Only relations with Indonesia continued to be

⁶²Ibid, pp. 24-27.

⁶³For the change of China's views on ASEAN, see Kyaw Guat Hoon, An Analysis of China's Attitudes towards ASEAN, 1967-1976, Occasional Paper No. 48 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1977).

⁶⁴Singapore, with about 76% of the Chinese population (at

strained owing to the coup in 1965 in which the Indonesian government blamed the involvement of the Chinese government. China and the ASEAN states jointly supported the Democratic Kampuchea, ousting Vietnamese-led the People's Republic of Kampuchea from the UN seat.

Third, China changed its attitudes towards the Korean situation. China did not any more strongly demand the withdrawal of the US military from South Korea as the condition of reunification of the Korean Peninsula. This change dismayed North Korean leaders who set the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea as the first condition for reunification. ⁶⁵ Though discouraged by China's sudden changes, North Korea tried to maintain a balance between the two conflicting partners, the USSR and China. ⁶⁶

Fourth, China succeeded in encircling the USSR by enhancing relations with Japan and the USA. China managed to bring Japan further away from the USSR by signing the Sino-Japanese Treaty on Peace and Friendship in 1978, in which China insisted on

⁶⁴(cont'd) mid-1983), tries to play down its image as an ethnic Chinese state and waits for Sino-Indonesian normalization before its establishing diplomatic relations with China. The Far East and Australasia 84-85, 16th ed. (London: Europa Publications, 1984), p. 810.

⁶⁵Cited in Joseph M. Ha, "Japanese Rearmament: Fukuda's Legacy, Ohira's Choice," Korea Observer, vol. 10, no. 4 (Winter 1979), p. 419.

⁶⁶For example, North Korea recognizes the Democratic Kampuchea supported by China and the ASEAN states, while other pro-Soviet states recognize the Heng Samrin regime. But, North Korea participated in the Moscow Olympics in 1980.

including the anti-hegemony clause, clearly directed at the USSR. China established the diplomatic relations with the USA finally in January 1979. Then, finishing the necessary preparations to blockade the USSR, in 1979 China notified the USSR of non-extension of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance.

Chinese pursuit of self-interest let China abandon the absolute anti-capitalist stance, and Chinese aspiration to accomplish Four Modernizations worked out to consolidate Sino-Japanese relations in economic and military fields. To China, Japan's military power was useful to counter the USSR and to maintain the regional stability, and Japan's technology was strongly needed for economic and military modernizations. Since late 1978 an increase in exchange visits between incumbent and retired personnel of the Chinese and Japanese military was noted, and Japan was loosening the COCOM standard for China.⁶⁷ While China needed Japan's economic and technical cooperation, China refrained from issuing statements which might displease Japanese conservative leaders.

Thus, East Asian states adjusted themselves to the changing power alignment, and in their adjustments altered their views on Japan's rearmament. At the stage of the new East-West

⁶⁷William T. Tow, "Sino-Japanese Security Cooperation: Evolution and Prospects," Pacific Affairs (Spring 1983), Vol. 56, No. 1, pp. 51-83. In October 1978, Foreign Minister Sonoda remarked: "Japan should not oppose Chinese military modernization, since China, like Japan, had the right to defend its independence in the face of a clear Soviet military threat." (cited in p. 61).

confrontation especially since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, China and anti-Soviet states heightened their antagonism against the USSR and increased their expectation that Japan could be a regional military power. Japan, China, South Korea, the ASEAN states boycotted the Moscow Olympics in 1980, ⁶⁸ and jointly opposed the Heng Samrin regime in Kampuchea. In heightened alertness against the USSR, anti-Soviet governments in the region did not reject Japanese military buildup openly, but rather welcomed it. What they asked for Japan was more economic cooperation, which would indirectly lead to enhancing military power to counter Soviet expansionism.

Military Development in East Asia and Japan's Role

We have made an attempt to analyze East Asian views on Japan's rearmament by looking at effects of international politics in the region. Furthermore, we have to turn our attention to military development in East Asia, which itself had decisive impact on East Asian attitudes towards Japan's military buildup. As Japan rebuilt its armed forces after the war, East Asian states also proceeded to modernizing their own military forces. In contrast to Japan which did not have to use its armed forces for actual combats in the postwar years, most of East

⁶⁸Laos, North Korea and Vietnam participated in the Olympics. Martin H. Sours states that "no other region, including Europe or Latin America, displayed such an overwhelming coherence and congruence on the issue (boycotting the Olympics)."
"Trans-Pacific Inter-Dependencies," Region Building in the Pacific, ed., Gavin Boyd. (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982), p. 135.

Asian states mobilized their armed forces in wars against foreign invaders, civil wars, or in some cases for their territorial expansion (see Table 3.3). Armed forces in East Asian states constantly enriched their arsenal, and this military expansion provided a situation in which most of East Asian nations became less sensitive to militarization of their states and also less critical to Japan's military buildup.

Japan's Role in Militarization of East Asia

The USA played a major role in fostering the military forces in anti-communist states through massive military aid and training, but Japan also played its own role in militarization of East Asia. First, the legacy of Japan's military occupation remained in South Korea and Southeast Asia, since Japan sowed the seeds of the politicized military. In South Korea, the army had doctrinal impact from the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA), and the large number of power elites of the Park Administration came from those in the IJA. ⁶⁹ In Indonesia, the PETA (Sukarela Tentara Pembela Tanah Air--the Army of Defenders of the Homeland) created during the Japanese occupation constituted a nucleus of the Indonesian military, ⁷⁰ which became much

⁶⁹For comparison of prewar Japanese military politics (1930's-1945) and postwar Korean military politics (1960's-70's), see Jai-Hyup Kim, The Garrison State in Pre-war Japan and Post-war Korea: A Comparative Analysis of Military Politics (Washington: University Press of America, 1978), especially Chapter 5, "The IJA and the ROKA (the Republic of Korea Army): the Structural Links in the Development of Total War Concepts," pp. 67-72.

⁷⁰See Nugroho Notosusanto, "The PETA Army in Indonesia, 1943-45," Japan in Asia, ed., William H. Newell (Singapore:

politicized through independence war against the Dutch, Sukarno's Guided Democracy and then Suharto's military rule. In Thailand, during the war the military cooperated with the Japanese, while civilian officials and students resisted the Japanese by organizing 'Free Thai Movement;' in postwar Thai politics the struggle between the pro-Japanese military and the anti-Japanese civilian politicians continued along with the repetition of military coup. ⁷¹ In South Korea, Indonesia and Thailand, military rule once infused by Japan hampered the growth of civilian rule. ⁷²

Second, Japan provided East Asia with a model of development that was strongly led by the military-industrial interests. The military-industrial complex was the basis of Japan's development from the Meiji Restoration in 1868 until the defeat in the war, and 'Japan's' development was only possible by oppressing political and socio-economic development on the part of the majority of the population. Some East Asian states urdently praised 'Japan's' development, ignoring the fact that the Japanese model would only lead to the expansion of the military and the consolidation of authoritarian politics at the expense

⁷⁰(cont'd) Singapore University Press, 1981).

⁷¹See Thamsook Numnonda, Thailand and the Japanese Presence, 1941-45, Research Notes and Discussion Paper Series No. 6 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1977).

⁷²As for the impact of the Japanese military rule on the military bureaucracies in Southeast Asia, see Joyce C. Lebra, Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia: Independence and Volunteer Forces in World War II (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).

of egalitarian development and political freedom. ⁷³

Third, Japan's postwar massive economic injections to anti-communist states turned out strengthening military power in those states. While the USA concentrated in military aid to this region, Japan provided economic aid and supplemented US efforts in strengthening the anti-communist regimes. Lea E. Williams points out that Japan's new military intervention was apparent under the guise of economic cooperation:

Rearmament at home and the sale of militarily useful equipment abroad, notably to Indonesia, appear to be the initial phases of Japanese military intervention. ⁷⁴

Although the Japanese government insisted that Japan did not render military help to this region, economic connection with Japan was the first step to turn into military connection. As in Table 3.4, Japan's economic involvement in this region is almost limited to anti-communist states. An exception is China, to which Japan accelerated economic contacts since the normalization of relations in 1972. It should be noted that Japan's economic aid to South Korea is quite large, out of proportion to its population and area size as well as its status as a newly industrialized country. For a long period, Japan provided economic injections only to South Vietnam, ignoring needs of North Vietnam. Japan's economic aid reflects its

⁷³As for the negative aspects of Japan's prewar development and warnings to today's Asian nations derived from Japanese experiences, see F.Q. Quo, "Political Development of Japan: A Negative Lesson?", Contributions to Asian Studies, Vol. 14 (1979), pp. 121-135.

⁷⁴Southeast Asia: History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 284.

strategic interests to consolidate the regimes that share the anti-Soviet stance and then to secure Japan's security through indirect security assistance. Trade between Japan and East Asian states also endorses Japan's security consideration (see Table 3.5a) as well as Japan's immense economic influence over the region (see Table 3.5b).

Fourth, Japan launched military cooperation with some East Asian states. The Japanese Military Academy and the SDF officers' schools accepted students and trainees from Singapore and Thailand.⁷⁵ Japan examined how to provide assistance to the US armed forces in Japan that would be mobilized to South Korea in case of emergency, and was requested to enhance military cooperation with South Korea by the USA. Owing to the obligation set in the US-Japan Security Treaty, Japan assisted US military activities in the Far East and beyond, and therefore, the Japanese military has been indirectly allied with the armed forces in South Korea, the Philippines and Thailand.

Military Development in East Asia

East Asian states expanded their armed forces to cope with internal and external threats. Internally, authoritarian and repressive regimes needed strong military backup to oppress their dissidents. Such need turned into the birth of military regimes in South Korea, Indonesia and Thailand. The

⁷⁵As of 31 March 1984, the total number of the students and trainees since 1975 amounts to 56 from Thailand and 37 from Singapore. Defense of Japan 1984, p. 288.

long-standing Marcos regime in the Philippines was sustained by military repression. Tightly controlled communist states, China and North Korea were also maintained with the presence of a large number of armed forces. Continued war in Indochina put politics on the hands of the military men. Externally, East Asians have several fears: will Japan invade East Asia once again?; will the USA protect or invade East Asia?; will China stabilize or destabilize the region?; and will the USSR move down to south? East Asian militarization was accelerated under the banner of 'defense' against internal and external threats.

Tables 3.6a and 3.6b show the heavy burden of the military expenditure on the shoulders of the people in this region. According to Ron Huisken, the "action-reaction mechanism" is applied to the escalation of military buildup among the 'friendly' ASEAN states, in which an acquisition of sophisticated weapons by one country stimulated the other country to buy the same or much better ones. ⁷⁶ This mechanism explains a cause of military competition not only among hostile states but also among friendly states in the region. Owing to military competition, the military expenditure in the region rose constantly since the end of the war as shown in Tables 3.7a and 3.7b.

Pro-Japanese states came to accept Japan's military buildup if Japan's economic and partially military cooperation would

⁷⁶Limitation of Armaments in Southeast Asia: A Proposal, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defense No. 16. (Canberra: The Australian National University, 1977), p. 17.

help military development in their states. Although skepticism on Japan's military power was still voiced, it is also true that pro-Japanese states looked forward to a link between Japan's military buildup and military modernization of their states. Indonesian Lieutenant-General Sutopo Juwono, former chief of the Indonesian Intelligence Board, Bakin, and governor of the Indonesian National Defense Institute points out: "Japan's military capability should not be increased without a corresponding increase in ASEAN's military capability." ⁷⁷ The new military link could emerge between Japan and pro-Japanese states through expanding economic ties.

In contrast to the shrinking distance between Japan and anti-Soviet states through economic and military cooperation, the distance between Japan and pro-Soviet states was widening. Military bases in Vietnam came to provide services to the Soviet Pacific Fleet, which passed through the Japanese waters to sail down to Southeast Asia. As long as military development in Indochina was led by Soviet interests, Indochinese pro-Soviet governments had to maintain an anti-Japanese position. Military competition in the region worsened the split between pro-Soviet states and anti-Soviet states. Japan's economic involvement onesidedly enriched economic and military power of anti-Soviet states, jeopardizing relations among East Asian states. Japan contributed not to easing tension in the region but heightening it.

⁷⁷Far Eastern Economic Review (11 September 1981), p. 36.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have examined that the struggle between the two superpowers influenced the course of postwar politics in East Asia in general and influenced to diversify East Asian attitudes towards Japan's rearmament in particular. Although all of the East Asian nations once invaded by Japan commonly showed concerns over the revival of Japanese militarism in the immediate postwar years, at the height of East-West confrontation their attitudes towards Japanese rearmament came to be divided into two: communist condemnation and anti-communist connivance. While East Asian communist accusation of the revival of Japanese militarism did not gain an international approval, Japan swiftly moved on to the road of military buildup and resumed strengthening economic and political ties with anti-communist states in East Asia. Then, this division of East Asian views on Japan's rearmament was realigned by Chinese change in the beginning of the 1970's. As China became associated with the USA and Japan, East Asia was divided into the anti-Soviet group including China which endorsed Japan's military buildup and the pro-Soviet group which had to antagonize Japan. In adjusting to the international power alignment, East Asian states had to choose either to approve Japan's military buildup or not.

We have also looked at the influence of East Asian militarization and found that growth of military power in the

region made most of East Asian states less critical to Japan's military buildup. As economic development provided infrastructure to develop military technology and facilities, Japan's economic aid helped indirectly military modernization in East-Asian pro-Japanese states that came to demand Japan to expand economic cooperation from the standpoint of regional security. While anti-communist states and China needed Japan's economic cooperation for consolidating their economic, political as well as military power, severe accusation of Japan's military buildup was not heard from those states. On the other hand, pro-Soviet communist states only became suspicious about political and military effects of Japan's aid to their rival states in the region. Japan's contribution to the region was far from enhancing regional stability but heightening tension among suspicious East Asian states.

Lastly, either in communist or anti-communist states, the issue of Japan's rearmament created a gap between governmental reactions and public sentiment. Even though the governmental statements could change swiftly from accusation to endorsement of Japan's rearmament as in the case of China, deeply-rooted anti-Japanese feeling continued to exist and sometimes erupted. No matter how international politics changed, no enthusiastic support to Japan's rearmament was voiced by those suffered tremendously from the Japanese occupation.

CHAPTER IV

REACTIONS OF EAST ASIAN STATES ON JAPAN'S RECENT MILITARY BUILDUP, 1982-84: NATIONAL ANALYSIS

This chapter will examine how East Asian states look at Japan's accelerated military buildup since 1982, focusing on internal factors of the respective states. The year 1982 marked the tenth anniversary of Sino-Japanese normalization of relations as well as Chinese revival of censuring Japanese militarism on the occasion of the so called 'textbook controversy.' Japan's neighboring states, either in the communist bloc or not, criticized distortion of textbook accounts on Japan's aggression against other East Asian states in the past. This united voice from East Asia admonished the Japanese against their arrogance, but in the end, did not help prevent Japan from further leaning to the right-wing course, which continued to tighten the control over textbooks to the interests of the government and to rebuild militarily strong Japan. Except Indochinese states and North Korea, the willingness to cooperate with Japan in economic, political and security fields overpowered the fear of the revival of Japanese militarism, and Japan's military buildup did not encounter powerful opposition in East Asia any more.

We will look at each state's attitude towards Japanese military buildup from 1982 to 1984, and this chapter will be divided into four sections according to geographical area; (1)

the Korean Peninsula--South Korea and North Korea; (2) China; (3) the ASEAN five states--the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand; and (4) Indochina--Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. In each section, first, we will clarify the wartime relations between Japan and each state and examine continuities and discontinuities of these relations after the war. The degree of collaboration with Japan and the scope of Japanese aggression differ much country by country, and these differences give us clues to discern various reactions to the textbook controversy and Japanese military buildup today. Second, we will look at how each state handled the textbook issue that occurred in the summer of 1982. This issue showed that those countries suffered heavily from Japanese invasion naturally reacted strongly against the distortion of history textbooks by the Japanese government, but it also revealed political motives of South Korea, China and Vietnam to exploit the controversy to their advantage. Third, we will examine how East Asian states coped with the hawkish stance of the Nakasone regime since his inauguration at the end of 1982.

By analyzing the wartime relations, the textbook controversy and the reactions to the Nakasone military policy, we are going to conclude that an historical irony existed in today's East Asia. The militant Nakasone stance was well received by such countries as South Korea and China which had suffered tremendously from Japanese militarism. With their respective political aims, these states endorsed and encouraged Japan's

military buildup; while accusing Japan's old militarism as in the textbook controversy, these states gave fuels to Japan's right-wing drive for military development. Generally East Asian states used the 'remember-the-war' card not to prevent Japan from reinforcing military power but to exploit the public fear of Japanese militarism to the benefits of the respective governments--consolidating their national unity and drawing out more economic cooperation from Japan.

Background and Outline of the Textbook Controversy in 1982

Before going to the analysis of each group, we will start with some explanation on what the Japanese textbook authorization system is and how the textbook controversy happened. The textbook authorization system is the nucleus of the Japanese government's control over education. In Japan, textbooks are published by private companies, but all the textbooks to be used in elementary, junior high and senior high schools have to be authorized by the Ministry of Education. Textbook examiners in the Ministry check details of textbook accounts according to the curriculum outlines set by the Ministry. Unless authors of textbooks comply with directions given by the textbook examiners, the textbooks cannot go through the authorization. Textbooks are re-written whenever the Ministry changes the curriculum outlines, and they are also partially revised every three years.

Impartiality of the textbook examiners has been long questioned by authors of textbooks and educationists. Since 1955, the Education Ministry tightened authorization criteria in response to the conservatives' pressure, thus deleting materials depicting dark sides of Japan or calamity of the atomic bombs from textbooks. This change in education was much related to the change of Japan's military policy from disarmament to rearmament, and education once again became a tool of infusing the government's ideas to children. In August 1955, the Japan Democratic Party (which was merged to the LDP in November 1955), started the 'campaign to condemn deplorable textbooks,' advocating abolishment of the authorization system and re-adoption of the nationalization of textbooks. ¹ Thus, Ienaga Saburo, an author of a Japanese history textbook brought suits against the Ministry of Education in 1965 and 1967, ² claiming that the authorization system deprives the Japanese of the right of academic freedom and freedom of the press guaranteed by the Constitution. ³ Ienaga's history textbook was rejected (not

¹Ienaga Saburo, Kyokasho Kentei: Kyoiku o Yugameru Kyoiku Gyosei (The Textbook Authorization: The Education Administration Distorting Education) (Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha, 1965), p. 29.

²Ienaga brought a civil suit in 1965, claiming that the rejection of his textbook by the Education Ministry injured freedom in thought and expression as a scholar. Then, in 1967, Ienaga brought an administrative suit, claiming that the authorization system itself was unconstitutional. In either suits, Ienaga won at the first courts of trial, but due to the Education Ministry's appeal, the two suits have been still fought.

³Ienaga points out the unconstitutionality of the textbook authorization, citing the articles such as: "Freedom of thought and conscience shall not be violated (Article 19);" "Freedom of assembly and association as well as speech, press and all other

authorized) by the Ministry of Education, because it was not in line with the Ministry's intention of beautifying the Japan's past including Japan's aggression of Asia. In the Japanese eyes, textbook accounts were much influenced by the strong political pressure of the leading LDP, and the textbook authorization system itself was quite controversial in postwar Japan's education.

The distortion of history, therefore, did not happen out of sudden in 1982, and abrupt Chinese and South Korean diplomatic protests let the Japanese suspect true intentions of these states. After Japanese newspapers reported at the end of June 1982 how the Ministry of Education checked and revised textbooks to be used from the fiscal 1983, the issue invited severe criticism from East Asian states, especially China and South Korea. Many Asians received with anger Japanese media's report that Japan's 'aggression' of northern China was altered to 'advancement.' Asahi Shimbun reported that textbooks of Japanese history, world history, politics and economics were much revised and that some materials having backgrounds of Japanese occupation of Korea and Manchukuo were taken out of textbooks of the Japanese language. ⁴ Many of the directions of the Ministry

³(cont'd) forms of expression are guaranteed. No censorship shall be maintained, nor shall the secrecy of any means or communication be violated (Article 21);" and "Academic freedom is guaranteed (Article 23)." See Ienaga , Kyokasho Kentei. For an English material, see R.P. Dore, "Notes and Comment: Textbook Censorship in Japan: the Ienaga Case," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XLIII, no. 4 (Winter 1970-71), pp. 548-556.

⁴ Main points checked by the textbook examiners were: (1) to play down aggressive conducts during the war; (2) to write the

of Education were actually in line with the 'campaign to codemn biased textbooks' organized by the LDP education department and conservative, right-wing academic and business circles since 1980. ⁵ The charges given by the textbook campaign in the 1980's were almost identical to those given to Ienaga in the late 1950's and early 1960's. In view of this background, we cannot state that Japanese textbooks were revised tremendously only in 1982; in fact, the Ministry of Education advised textbook authors to use the word 'advancement' instead of 'aggression' since 1955. ⁶

The Japanese government was only startled to receive sudden condemnation on this issue from China and South Korea; especially the latter was given the powerful economic injection from Japan and Japanese conservative leaders always maintained 'special' ties with South Korean politicians to prevent problems between the two states. The Ministry of Education underestimated

⁴(cont'd) democratic elements of the former Japanese Imperial Constitution; (3) to use honorific language to emperors so as to instill the feeling of respect to them among students; (4) to claim legality of the SDF which was established according to the SDF law; (5) to claim the four northern islands occupied by the USSR as Japanese territories; and (6) to defend big business and capitalism. Asahi Shimbun, 26 June 1982, p. 1.

⁵The LDP committee on textbooks published a paper, "The Deplorable Textbook Problem (Ureubeki Kyokasho no Mondai)" in December 1980. Lee Chong-Shik, "History and Politics in Japanese-Korean Relations: The Textbook Controversy and Beyond," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Vol. 2, No. 4 (December 1983).

⁶Koyama Kenichi, "Shimbun Kisha no Rinri o Tou: Kyokasho Mondai Goho Jiken: Joho Osen no Mekanisumu (Questioning Ethics of Newspapermen: The Textbook False Report Case--Mechanism of Information Pollution)," Bungei Shunju (November 1982), p. 106.

the importance of this issue and tried best to maintain the authorization system without subduing to foreign pressure. Being more concerned with maintaining friendly relations with foreign countries, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs tried to make concession to China and South Korea at an earliest stage. The textbook controversy revealed dismay in the Japanese government under the weak leadership of then Prime Minister Suzuki as well as friction between the two ministries.

Diplomatically the textbook controversy had a speedy settlement, but it brought about counter-reaction among Japanese conservatives. The controversy was officially settled down when South Korea and China accepted the Chief Cabinet Secretary's statement ⁷ respectively at the end of August and early September 1982. And, when it was confirmed that actually there was no case of changing the expression of 'aggression' to 'advancement' in any textbook, Japanese conservative circles started attacking newspapers for producing the false report and diplomatic problems. In Japan the textbook issue came to be considered widely that sensational handlings of the Japanese newspapers invited unnecessary criticism from foreign states, and the foreign condemnation stimulated to raise prewar type

⁷On 26 August 1982, Chief Cabinet Secretary, Miyazawa Kiichi issued a statement: The Education Ministry would quicken by one year the partial revision of the already authorized textbooks. The disputed textbooks would be used by students for two years along with the newsletters of the Education Ministry that would provide supplementary guidelines for classroom teaching. Asahi Shimbun, 27 August 1982, p. 1.

nationalism among right-wing politicians.⁸

Consequently, the textbook issue revealed once again strong jingoistic sentiment of the Japanese conservatives, and their arrogance did not allow interference of Asian states with Japan's 'internal' affair of the textbook authorization. Rather than weakening the stance of right-wing conservatives, this controversy helped consolidate their unity in the end.⁹ The issue to be noted is not in the mere change of wording but in Japan's accelerated right-wing drive: the LDP government's consistent desire to create the young Japanese who will not voice against war and easily opt for the revision of Article 9 of the Constitution so as to legitimize the SDF and establish much stronger military forces. Furthermore, since beautification of Japan's past did not happen suddenly in 1982, why did China and South Korea consider it advantageous to use this controversy in 1982, after ignoring the distortion of Japanese textbooks for a long time? It is possible that China and South Korea took advantage of the textbook controversy to ease their respective internal problems. Therefore, these states carefully did not turn their condemnation to Japan's accelerated military buildup

⁸For example, Minister of Postal Services, Minowa Noboru used the word of a 'nation-seller' to accuse those who had handed over the information of the textbook revision to 'communist China.' Asahi Shimbun, 29 August 1982, p. 3. Until the defeat in the war, the word 'nation-seller' had been often used to those who had not been cooperative with the government.

⁹In December 1983, the 'National Conference to Promote Normalization of Textbooks' was organized by right-wing conservatives. This Conference succeeded the 'campaign to condemn biased textbooks' that started in 1980.

today, which was also promoted by the same Japanese conservatives, and Asian censure did not help weaken Japan's right-wing drive, which was later spurred up with the birth of the Nakasone regime in December 1982.

Group 1: The Korean Peninsula

Among East Asian nations, the Korean people suffered most, first from the long Japanese colonization and then from the result of the war caused by Japan--the separation of a nation into two. We will outline the nature of Japanese colonization of the Korean Peninsula and see how wartime relations between the Koreans and the Japanese continued or discontinued. Since the separation of the Korean Peninsula into an American bloc and a Soviet bloc after the war, two Koreas had to take symmetrical approaches to Japan: South Korea increased political, economic and military cooperation with Japan; while North Korea condemned consistently South Korean-Japanese cooperation that was linked to 'US imperialist world strategy.' Thus, a split came out between South Korea that was for Japan's military buildup and North Korea that was against it. Japan, on its part, adopted discriminatory policies, extending lavish cooperation to South Korea and harsh rejection to North Korea, in spite of the fact that Japan caused tremendous loss to all the Koreans either in the South or the North. Although the tragedy of the Korean nation today had much to do with Japan's past conducts, the Japanese were not well aware of it. This was the fundamental gap

between the Koreans and the Japanese and was revealed once again in the textbook controversy in 1982. To understand the background of the textbook controversy, we will start with the examination of Japan's colonization of the Korean Peninsula.

Japan's Colonization of the Korean Peninsula

The Korean Peninsula was the first step of Japan's aggression abroad, dating back to Toyotomi Hideyoshi's invasion in the 16th century.¹⁰ In the Meiji Era, newly-industrializing Japan fought over the Korean Peninsula against China and Russia.¹¹ Korea became Japan's protectorate in 1905 and was annexed to Japan in 1910. Japan's colonization lasted until Japan's defeat in the war in 1945. Japanese colonization was harsh to the Koreans: in 1912, the land census deprived many Koreans of land and forced many of them to work in Japan and later also in the extended areas of the Japanese empire; in 1919, Japan oppressed the March First Movement, the Koreans' plea for independence; in 1939, the use of the Korean language was banned with enforcement of the Japanese language; in 1940 the Koreans were forced to change their names into Japanese

¹⁰Toyotomi Hideyoshi dispatched troops to the Korean Peninsula twice, in 1592-96 and 1597-98. Once they occupied up to north of Seoul, but the death of Hideyoshi terminated this invasion. Mikami Tsuguo and Hidemura Kinji, ed., Sekaishi Shojiten (Pocket Encyclopedia of World History) (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1969), p. 123.

¹¹The Sino-Japanese war in 1894-95 and the Russo-Japanese war in 1904-05. Japan's victories in these wars enhanced Japan's advantage over Korea and opened pages of aggression of Asia, which was later expanded to the 'Greater East-Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere' in the 1940's.

ones; and also the Koreans were compelled to worship at Japanese Shinto shrines. ¹² Japanese colonization between 1910 and 1945 was a history of repeated persecution to the Koreans, and the Koreans' postwar history became a process of de-Japanization both in the North and the South.

Because of these bitter memories, the distortion of the textbooks by the Japanese Ministry of Education and arrogant reactions of Japanese conservatives angered many Koreans in the Peninsula. ¹³ In the revised history textbooks, the March First Movement in 1919 was a 'riot;' worship at Japanese shrines was only 'encouraged;' and Koreans were sent abroad legally 'by the application of draft legislature.' ¹⁴ Apparently this was the reflection of the Japanese government's intention to justify Japan's colonization of Korea and the lack of self-condemnation for Japan's aggression of Asia.

¹²For Japanese oppression of the Koreans, see Song Kum Ho, "Lessons of Pearl Harbour, Part 15: The Sound and the Fury," Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 August 1982, pp. 25-26. Shim Jae Hoon, "A Legacy of Bitterness," Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 August 1982, pp. 19-22.

¹³ For example, Minister of Land Administration, Matsuno Raizo angered the Koreans, saying: "There are inaccuracies in Korean history textbooks also. For example, Korea describes the annexation (of 1910) as an act of Japanese aggression. But considering the domestic situation in Korea at that time, I do not know which is the accurate expression." Asahi Shimbun, 24 July 1982. (The author's translation)

¹⁴Asahi Shimbun, 21 July 1982, p. 3.
In addition to distortion in contemporary history, the Korean side raised a question on Japanese distortion of ancient history that had created the founding myth of Japan and prejudice against Korea. Lee Chong-sik states that the 1982 controversy narrowly focussed on the term 'aggression,' ignoring other important distortions. "History and Politics in Japanese-Korean Relations," pp. 69-93.

We will trace how the Korean Peninsula was divided into pro-Japanese and anti-Japanese states after the war and how South Korea and North Korea dealt with the textbook controversy in 1982 and Japan's accelerated military buildup under the Nakasone regime.

South Korea

After the Japanese surrender in the war, unpreparedness of US occupation of Korea led to hasty drawing of the 38th parallel division and US collusion with those Koreans who had collaborated with the Japanese. ¹⁵ Although Syngman Rhee, the first President of the Republic of Korea, was not a wartime collaborator with the Japanese, the postwar ruling structure of South Korea was created largely by the wartime ruling class. The USA ruled the southern part of the Korean Peninsula by its military government until 1948, bringing in those Koreans who had collaborated in the Japanese colonial administration and the military. ¹⁶ Upper classes, such as landlords and former colonial administrators moved from the North to the South. ¹⁷

¹⁵Donald Macdonald points out that the US low priority to Korea contrasts to the careful preparation for the occupation of Japan and that this difference led to the birth of US military government in Korea and self-administration in Japan. "The 1946 Elections and Legislative Assembly in South Korea: America's Bumbling Tutelage," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Vol. 1, No. 3 (September 1982), pp. 53-70.

¹⁶Song, "The Sound and the Fury," p. 26.

¹⁷Bruce Cumings states that refugees from North to South Korea are divided into two groups: the first group comprising of Korean peasants from Manchuria and North Korea who simply returned to their homes in South, and the second group, higher classes who fled to the South especially after the land reform

The USA and former collaborators with the Japanese actively promoted to separate the Korean Peninsula into two and established the Republic of Korea (South Korea) in 1948. Thus, the legacy of the ruling structure installed by Japan's colonization remained strong in the postwar years, ¹⁸ and the governing class of South Korea was basically pro-Japanese, in contrast to deeply anti-Japanese general public who had suffered most from Japanese occupation.

In the postwar South Korean politics, it is often the case that the political leaders exploited anti-Japanese feeling of the public to enhance support to their regimes. Anti-communist and anti-Japanese campaigns were the most effective means to consolidate the unity of a new state. While bribery and behind-the-scenes negotiations were often seen among Korean and Japanese politicians and businessmen through channels of the wartime linkage, ¹⁹ the Korean leaders posed as anti-Japanese agitators to their public.

This tactics of exploiting anti-Japanese feeling was adopted once again by the South Korean government in the textbook

¹⁷(cont'd) in the North. The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-47 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 425.

¹⁸Yamada Shoji states that the oppression of human rights in South Korea today is carried out under the ruling structure that succeeded to Japanese colonization. "Nittei Shokuminchi Jidai (The Era of Japanese Colonization of Korea)," Sekai (August 1984), p. 25.

¹⁹For example, see Yamamoto Tsuyoshi, "Nikkan Kankei to Yatsugi Kazuo (Yatsugi Kazuo in Japanese-South Korean Relations)," Kokusai Seiji, Vol. 75 (October 1983), pp. 114-129.

controversy in 1982. The publicization of textbook distortion incited deep anger among the public and gave a good chance for the Chun Doo Hwan regime to exploit this anger. Since gaining power by the coup in May 1980, General Chun lacked legitimacy without public support. ²⁰ In the general election in March 1981, Chun's Democratic Justice Party got only 35.6% of the all votes, though the party gained 151 seats out of total 276 seats owing to the electoral system that also allocated seats on an appointment basis. ²¹ The textbook issue was a temporary help for the Chun regime to avert public dissatisfaction from internal problems to the Korean's fundamental problem--exploitation by Japan.

The textbook controversy was also helpful to the Chun regime from the economic point of view. To consolidate his regime Chun needed to revitalize South Korean economy and asked for US\$6 billion of economic aid to Japan in the summer of 1981. Facing South Korean pressure that Japan's aid would enhance Seoul's

²⁰ Chun launched a massive purge in the summer of 1980: purged over 800 politicians, 8,500 bureaucrats and 1,200 trade unionists and arrested a large number of dissidents including Kim Dae-jung and Kim jong-pil (President who immediately succeeded to Park). Kim Hong N, "Japanese-South Korean Relations after the Park assassination," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Vol. 1, No. 4 (December 1982), p. 73. Kim Shun-il states that the Chun's regime has created the direct military rule that resembles the Japanese military rule during colonization, whereas the Park regime remained the indirect military rule. Kim Shun-il, interviewed by Yasue Ryosuke, "Kyukoku to Wakai o Motomete: Kankoku no Genjo to Nikkan Kankei (In Search for Saving ROK and Reconciliation: The Present Situation of ROK and Japanese-ROK relations)," Sekai (October 1982), p. 102.

²¹ Asian Security 1982, p. 29.

military power and eventually contribute to Japan's security, the then Suzuki government was reluctant to combine economic aid with security issue and delayed settlement of the aid issue.²² The textbook controversy was effective in influencing the Japanese government to speed up the settlement of the pending economic aid issue.

With these two purposes the South Korean government responded to the textbook controversy but did not intend to damage South Korean-Japanese official relations. The South Korean government made a formal protest to Japan on 3 August 1982 but speedily accepted the statement of the Japanese government on 27 August. The South Korean government was reported that it had requested, several times since 1979, the Japanese Ministry of Education to correct the distortion of history but could not get any sincere reply from the Japanese Ministry; however, this was not revealed to the public until the textbook controversy in 1982.²³ The Chun regime actively instigated the public to react against Japan, in contrast to his usual measures to oppress public reactions.²⁴ Resorting to

²²See Kim Hong N., "Politics of Japan's Economic Aid to South Korea," Asia Pacific Community, no. 20 (Spring 1983), pp. 80-102.

²³Korea Ilbo, 31 July 1982; cited in Kim Hak Hyon, "Kyokasho Mondai to 'Yuko' no Kyoko (The Textbook Controversy and Fabrication of South Korean-Japanese Friendship)," Sekai (October 1982), p. 81.

²⁴Kim Shun-Il, "In Search for Saving ROK and Reconciliation," p. 87.

In the commemorating address on the liberation day, 15 August 1982, Chun emphasized the scar of Japanese imperialism, though he refrained from condemning the textbook issue directly. This

diplomatic protest and raising sensation among the public, the Chun regime tried to catch hearts of the Koreans.

The birth of the Nakasone regime in December 1982 was the most welcome to the Chun regime. The long-pending economic aid issue was settled at the amount of US\$4 billion by Nakasone, who, unlike his predecessor Suzuki, was willing to link aid with security. The Nakasone-Chun partnership opened a new era between Japan and South Korea: Nakasone became the first Japanese Prime Minister to visit South Korea; Chun, the first Korean President to visit Japan. ²⁵ In the joint communique between Chun and Nakasone in January 1983, they "shared the view that peace and stability on the Korean peninsula are essential to those all of East Asia including Japan" and agreed on more economic cooperation. ²⁶ Although the Japanese side tried to play down the tripartite security ties among the USA, Japan and South Korea, the South Korean government openly emphasized them. ²⁷ In addition to the existing economic and political cooperation, their new relations came to be based on security cooperation against the threat of communists.

²⁴ (cont'd) is a sharp contrast to the same address one year ago in which he did not make almost any critical remarks on Japan. Asahi Shimbun, 16 August 1982, p. 1.

²⁵ Nakasone visited Seoul in January 1983; Chun visited Tokyo in September 1984.

²⁶ "Joint Communique Between Korean President Chun Doo Hwan and Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone (An official translation)," Korea Observer, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Spring 1983), pp. 125-126.

²⁷ Asahi Shimbun, 12 January 1983, p. 2.

The Chun regime found a good partner in Japan, and US-Japan-South Korean military cooperation was in steady progress. ²⁸ The alliance of the Japanese right-wing conservatives and the Korean dictatorial regime seemed solid. However, its fundamental weakness is that it helps only the dictatorial military regime to consolidate its power and deprives the Koreans of chances of democratization. As long as the South Korean and Japanese governments relied on or were influenced by the personal ties among those who once had worked together for the 'Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere,' the anti-Japanese voices of the general public were not reflected in the South Korean government policies and such issues as the textbook controversy could only be exploited by the government to its advantage. We only see an irony of history in the current Japanese-South Korean relations: those Koreans who had suffered most from Japanese militarism now have to live under the dictatorial government which urgently supports Japan's military buildup.

²⁸One example endorsing US-Japan-South Korean military cooperation is the shooting-down of a Korean airline flight 007 in September 1983. Although these three states incited anti-Soviet campaigns by this case at the beginning, various facts were later revealed to suggest that it had not been merely the pilots' mistake but their deliberate intention to intrude Russian air space in collusion with the US military. Japan cooperated with the USA and South Korea by not revealing radar records of the KAL flight 007 collected by the Japan Defense Agency, which strongly endorsed KAL's deliberate actions. Under the pressure of opposition parties, the Nakasone regime disclosed the radar records only in May 1985. "The New Mysteries of KAL 007," Macleans (26 August 1985), pp. 6-8. Sugwon Kang raises a question of American culpability in KAL 007 disaster. See "Flight 007: Was There Foul Play?" Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, Vol. 17, No. 2 (April-June 1985), pp. 30-48.

North Korea

The end of the war was the beginning of a complete rupture between Japan and the northern part of the Korean Peninsula. The Russian entry in the war against Japan resulted in its occupation of the area north of the 38th parallel. Due to Russian unpreparedness in administering North Korea and its absorption in Eastern Europe, the USSR had allowed North Korea greater autonomy than it had given to its Eastern satellite states. Within a year after liberation, North Korea had carried out nationalization of major industries, and land reform that had been also demanded by many peasants in the South. ²⁹ Not only as a consequence of East-West confrontation, but also as a result of the class division between upper classes concentrated in the South and working class left in the North, Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) was established in 1948. ³⁰ North Korea continued to be the politically remotest state to Japan: officially Japan never tried to establish diplomatic relations with North Korea, though North Korea is recognized by more than 100 states today. ³¹ Although the

²⁹As for political and socio-economic changes in the immediate postwar North Korea, see Cumings, "Chapter 11: The North Wind," pp. 382-427 in The Origins of the Korean War.

³⁰Cumings states: "From early 1946 on, in Korean eyes, the conflict between North and South was a conflict of classes, around which were arrayed the other existing conflicts of politics, nationalism, region, and generation. The Origins of the Korean War, p. 414.

³¹North Korea has been recognized by 106 states; while South Korea, by 119 states. Cited in Mushakoji Kinhide, "Chosen-Hanto no Kincho o Ureu: Nihon Gaiko wa Nani o Subekika (Deploring Tension in the Korean Peninsula: What Japan's Foreign Policy

Koreans in the North equally suffered from Japanese occupation as those in the South, Japan never paid war reparations or rendered any economic aid to the North. The current relations between Japan and North Korea show that Japan has not yet completed postwar peace settlement with the Koreans as a whole.

Since those Koreans collaborated with the Japanese colonists established South Korea with the help of the USA, we cannot see any development of the wartime linkage between Japan and North Korea in the postwar years. In a rivalry against the South Korean government, North Korea's condemnation of Japan has been twofold: condemnation of Japan's colonization in the past, and that of tripartite collaboration among the USA, South Korea and Japan that was designed to threaten North Korea. North's condemnation of Japan reached a peak whenever Japan leaned to South Korea decisively; because of necessity in maintaining a balance between competitors, the USSR and China, North's accusation was echoed sometimes with the USSR and other times with China.

In a way, the textbook controversy in 1982 was a rare case in which the North and the South could find a common ground to express anger of all the Koreans in the Peninsula. The humiliating experience commonly shared in the past, however, could not alone unite the separated nation. Rodong Shimun, the newspaper of the Korean Labor Party, started accusation of the distortion of history at the end of July 1982 together with

³1(cont'd) Should Do), " Sekai (December 1983), p. 146.

China, ³² and its commentary on 7 August 1982 charged that "Japanese reactionaries still sought to militarize Japan and resume the road of overseas aggression" and that the revision of the textbooks was linked with this ambition. ³³ Rodong Shimun objected to the Japanese government statement of 26 August, ³⁴ which was accepted by South Korea. In contrast to speedy settlement of this issue by South Korea and the return to friendly relations between South Korea and Japan, North Korea continued to accuse Japan of its preparation for war. In October 1982, North Korea condemned Japan for being deeply involved with the American imperialist' world strategy by deploying the US fighter-bombers F-16 at the Misawa base in Japan, ³⁵ in line with the accusation made by the USSR. ³⁶ With contrasting perceptions of Japan's military buildup, South Korea did not voice fear of Japanese militarism today; while North Korea consistently opposed the Japan-US-South Korean military alliance.

Since Nakasone's inauguration, North Korea accelerated its accusation of Japan. On the Nakasone visit to South Korea in January 1983, North Korea warned that the US-Japan-South Korean

³²The first accusation on this case appeared in Rodong Shimun, 25 July 1982; quoted in Asahi Shimbun, 26 July 1982, p. 3

³³ Cited in Beijing Review, Vol. 25, No. 34 (23 August 1982), p. 13.

³⁴Asahi Shimbun, 3 September 1982, p. 3.

³⁵Rodong Shimun, 11 October 1982; cited in Asahi Shimbun, 18 October 1982, p. 2.

³⁶Asahi Shimbun, 1 October 1982, p. 3.

trilateral military alliance was being made and that Japanese militarists were preparing to invade the Korean Peninsula. ³⁷ On the Nakasone visit to Southeast Asia in May 1983, North Korea charged Nakasone as a 'mad militarist' with an anachronistic illusion to become a leader of Asia. ³⁸ The Rangoon bombing incident in October 1983 further worsened North Korean-Japanese relations, since Japan imposed the sanctions against the North to show support to the South. ³⁹ On the Chun's visit to Tokyo in September 1984, North Korea condemned that Japan could not wipe out the past by the Chun's visit and that his visit was designed to conceal Japanese imperialists' crimes of colonization of the Korean Peninsula. ⁴⁰

North Korea had a deep distrust of Japan because of its bitter experience of Japanese colonization and Japan's hostile policies towards North Korea after the war. Whenever the North saw active collusion between Japan and North's biggest enemy, South Korea, the North voiced strong condemnation of Japan. However, North Korea knew political and economic merits in

³⁷Asahi Shimbun, 14 January 1983, p. 2.

³⁸Asahi Shimbun, 30 April 1983 (Evening edition), p. 1.

³⁹The sanctions were imposed from 7 November 1983 until the end of 1984. The sanction were: (1) banning Japanese diplomats' contact with North Korean officials in a third country; (2) banning Japanese government's officials' visit to North Korea; (3) rejecting entry of North Korean officials to Japan; and (4) banning entry of charter flights between Japan and North Korea. Asahi Shimbun, 31 October 1984 (Evening edition), p. 1.

⁴⁰Asahi Shimbun, 23 August 1984, p. 2.

approaching Japan.⁴¹ Harsh condemnation of Japan stopped since early 1984 except the time of the Chun's visit to Tokyo, and Chinese assurance to support North refrained Kim Il Sung from taking the anti-Japanese stance as strong as the USSR.⁴² In an interview with a Japanese news reporter, Kim Il Sung appealed to the Japanese that they should stop hostile policies against the North and should not discriminate the North from the South.⁴³ North Korea seemed to be ready to open its door to Japan whenever Japan would take an equidistance position to the North and the South. As long as Japan's military buildup was directed at the USSR, not at North Korea, North Korea would be able to soften opposition to Japan's military buildup in a hope to advance relations with Japan.

Agreement and Disagreement in North Korean and South Korean Views on Japan

Korean attitudes towards the textbook controversy in 1982 and Japan's strengthening military power revealed two gaps. First it was a perception gap between those who had invaded and those who had been invaded. Although it is quite difficult to

⁴¹Gerald Segal states: "For Pyongyang, Japan provided another lever to obtain independence from Beijing and Moscow." "The Soviet Union and Korea," The Soviet Union in East Asia, ed., Gerald Segal, (London: Heinemann, 1983), p. 81.

⁴²Kim Il Sung visited the USSR in May 1984, 23 years after his last visit in 1961. Just before his visit, Hu Yaobang, General Secretary of the CCP visited Kim and was said to give assurance to security of North Korea. Asahi Shimbun, 2 June 1984, p. 7.

⁴³ Asahi Shimbun, 1 January 1983, p. 12.

discern public attitudes in a highly censored society in South Korea, an opinion poll jointly conducted by Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo) and Dong-a Ilbo (Seoul) in October 1984 showed remarkable differences in these nations' perceptions of the past: 39% of the respondents in South Korea mentioned 36-year-long Japan's colonization when they thought of Japan; while only 4% of Japanese respondents mentioned Japanese aggression of Korea when they thought of South Korea. ⁴⁴ We cannot get such a poll from North Korea, but people in the North definitely maintain bitter memories of Japan's colonization equally as those in the South. Politicians in North/South Korea used the memories of exploitation as a means to appeal to the public emotion and attract public support; while Japanese politicians used forgetfulness of the Japanese to allow today's expansion of the Japanese military.

Second, a gap lay between the world strategy of the USA and that of the USSR. Even though Koreans had equally experienced the persecution under Japanese colonization, separated Koreans had different views towards postwar Japan's military buildup, which the South considered to contribute to the US-South Korean military alliance; while the North opposed the emergence of the US-South Korean-Japanese military alliance directed at North Korea.

We might be able to see healthier development of Japanese-Korean relations, if the existing gaps were to be

⁴⁴ Asahi Shimbun, 26 November 1984, pp. 9-11.

reduced; namely, if the Japanese would be more aware of Japan's aggression of the 'whole' Korean Peninsula in the past, ⁴⁵ and if the Koreans in the North and the South would share the view towards today's Japanese military buildup, freed from the US and Soviet world strategies.

Group 2: China

Since the normalization of relations with Japan in 1972, China played down the past of Japanese aggression and tried to develop friendly relations with Japan. ⁴⁶ For China, which needed regional stability for its Four Modernizations, Japanese military buildup and the US-Japan Security Treaty turned out helpful to maintain military balance vis-à-vis the USSR. Chinese official encouragement for Japan's military buildup was received with embarrassment by the Chinese public who could not wipe out the memories of Japanese atrocities in the 1930's and the 1940's and also by the Japanese public who opposed Japan's military expansion in postwar years. Chinese sudden change from harsh condemnation to encouragement of Japan's military development not only dismayed the Chinese public but also turned out to encourage Japan's right-wing sectors whose dream of creating the

⁴⁵ Mushakoji proposes that to ease tension in the Korean Peninsula Japan should consider the Koreans as a single nation, not taking separate measures to those in the South and the North. "Deploring Tension in the Korean Peninsula," pp. 145-151.

⁴⁶ See Dick Wilson, "Lessons of Pearl Harbour, Part 13: A Bid to Bury the Brutal Past," Far Eastern Economic Review (23 July 1982), pp. 20-23.

'Great Japanese Empire' did not yet vanish. The textbook controversy was a commemorative event in the tenth anniversary of the Sino-Japanese normalization. The diplomatic protest helped convince the Chinese public that the Chinese government did not necessarily forget about the Japanese brutality in the past and gave a warning to the Japanese government that China could always use a 'remember-the-war' card to accuse Japan even at a time of friendly relations. Having attained these two purposes, the Chinese government soon returned to friendly relations with Japan and then actively approached the Nakasone regime for more economic and partially military cooperation.

Japanese Aggression of China and the 1982 Textbook Controversy

Like Korea, China had a long history of Japanese aggression. In 1895, Japan gained Taiwan and war reparations for the victory of the Sino-Japanese war. In 1931, the September 18th Incident led to the establishment of Manchukuo by the Japanese military and flow of a large number of Japanese citizens to Manchuria, depriving the Chinese of their land, possessions and lives. In 1937, the Japanese army started whole-scale war against China by plotting the Lugouqio (Marco Polo) Bridge incident. The history of invasion was never forgotten by those who had been invaded but easily forgotten by those who had invaded.

However, since 1972, China deliberately tried to bury Japan's ugly past and indirectly contributed to spur Japan's military buildup. Dong Chuncei, President of the China Education

Society stated that China "consistently educated its people not to blame the Japanese people for the debts of blood owed by the Japanese fascists." ⁴⁷ China was long silent to beautification of Japan's past in school textbooks by the Japanese Ministry of Education. If China had wanted, China could have launched condemnation of the Ministry's distortion of history much earlier than 1982.

Three characteristics are evident in the Chinese condemnation of Japan during the textbook controversy in 1982. First, China did not prolong the condemnation of Japan and accepted ambiguous settlement by the Japanese government. On 27 June 1982, a day after Japanese newspapers reported the distortion of history textbooks, Xin Hua News Agency quickly took up this issue without a comment; then Renmin Ribao carried the first condemnation against the Japanese government on 20 July; and on 26 July the Chinese Foreign Ministry made the first official protest to the Japanese government. ⁴⁸ Although China at first rejected the Japanese government statement of 26 August, the issue was diplomatically settled on 8 September through Chinese acceptance of additional explanations by the Japanese government. ⁴⁹ At the end of September, in his trip to China Prime Minister Suzuki was welcomed by the Chinese officials on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of

⁴⁷ Beijing Review, Vol. 25, No. 31 (2 August 1982), p. 10.

⁴⁸ Beijing Review, Vol. 25, No. 33 (16 August 1982), p. 8.

⁴⁹ Beijing Review, Vol. 25, No. 33 (20 September 1982), p. 7.

Sino-Japanese normalization, though he failed in issuing the joint press release. Suzuki's announcement not to run for re-election of the President of the LDP (who becomes automatically Prime Minister) on 12 October soon after his trip to China, made it further unclear how seriously the Japanese government was prepared to correct the distortion of textbooks as it promised. The Chinese government's quick settlement of the issue can be seen as its wish not to let the issue deteriorate the whole Sino-Japanese relations.

Second, since China started condemnation of the Japanese Ministry of Education by picking up reports from Japanese newspapers, Chinese condemnation was weakened by the false report of Japanese newspapers which fabricated that the term 'aggression' of northern China was changed to 'advancement.' An article by Chen Tiqiang gives a summary of Chinese condemnation: Japan's war against China was totally an act of 'aggression;' the Nanjing massacre was not caused by the Chinese army's resistance against the Japanese army but carried out solely by the Japanese army in the absence of the Chinese army, causing the death of 200,000 according to the Tokyo International Tribunal; although the textbook authorization was an internal affair of Japan, Japanese aggression of China in the past was not Japan's internal problem at all, having incurred a great loss to millions of the Chinese. ⁵⁰ But, when it was revealed

⁵⁰ "Conclusions Confirmed by History: Some Legal Aspects Regarding Japan's Distortion of History in Textbooks," Beijing Review, Vol. 25, No. 35 (30 August 1982), pp. 26-28. His last conclusion was directed at the remark of the Japanese Minister

that there was no actual case of changing the expression from 'aggression' to 'advancement' in any textbook, the Chinese condemnation lost the main ground and had to look for other reasons. ⁵¹

Third, the Chinese condemnation was limited to only 'a handful of militarists' and the Ministry of Education and conveyed even sympathy to the majority of the Japanese. Commentaries of Renmin Ribao tried best not to direct the censure against the Japanese public and thus to protect existing friendly relations:

The distortion of the history of Japanese aggression against China and Southeast Asian countries and embellishment of Japanese militarism by the Japanese Education Ministry disturbs the Chinese people and has generated widespread resentment in Japan. ⁵²

If "like the Chinese people the Japanese people were victims of Japanese militarism" as Renmin Ribao commented, ⁵³ then who had cooperated in the creation of the 'Greater East Asian

⁵⁰(cont'd) of Education and other cabinet members that the textbook issue was Japan's internal affair.

⁵¹ To prove that China did not start the condemnation using the reports in Japanese newspapers and had ground to sense the revival of Japanese militarism, Chinese participants in the first Sino-Japanese non-governmental leaders conference pointed out three symptoms of militarization of Japan: first, some factions led by former Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke were planning to set up a monument of Manchukuo; second, a movie 'The Great Japanese Empire' affirmed militarism; third, Prime Minister and Cabinet members occasionally visited the Yasukuni shrine, which enshrined Tojo Hideki and other war criminals. Asahi Shimbun, 8 October 1982, p. 1.

⁵² Renmin Ribao Commentary (24 July 1982); cited in Beijing Review, Vol. 25, No. 31 (2 August 1982), p. 10.

⁵³ Renmin Ribao Commentary (10 September 1982); cited in Beijing Review, Vol. 25, No. 38 (20 September 1982), p. 25.

Co-Prosperity Sphere' and who had actively participated in the war against China? These commentaries apparently overemphasized the reactions of the Japanese public to the textbook issue, who were in fact rather passive to the repeated revision of textbook accounts by the Ministry of Education.

The Chinese government needed to use the textbook controversy to its advantage in the year of the tenth anniversary of Sino-Japanese normalization. The publicization of the distortion of history and anti-Japanese campaign helped ease the Chinese public who feared that the Chinese government worked too friendly with the former aggressor, forgetting the past. The Chinese government also aimed at reminding the Japanese of the principle of Sino-Japanese relations, which required the Japanese to feel deep regret of aggression of China in the past.⁵⁴ The textbook controversy occurred in the midst of friendly relations, between Chinese Premier Zhao's visit to Japan in May 1982 and Japanese Premier Suzuki's visit to China in September 1982. From the outset of this controversy, China refrained from severely damaging the 10-year-old friendship with Japan.

Some Japanese emphasize that anti-Deng factions mainly in the military exploited the textbook controversy to damage the Deng-Hu-Zhao line and that the condemnation of Japan helped

⁵⁴During the textbook controversy, China reiterated the principle expressed in the joint statement of China and Japan in 1972: "The Japanese side is keenly aware of Japan's responsibility for causing enormous damages in the past to the Chinese people through war and deeply reproaches itself. The joint statement quoted in R.K. Jain, Japan's Postwar Peace Settlements, p. 284.

promote Sino-Russo rapprochement. ⁵⁵ Although Sino-Russo relations showed some sign of rapprochement in 1982, it is hard to note that the textbook controversy weakened Deng's leadership. ⁵⁶ The 12th CCP Congress held in early September 1982 resulted in Deng's overall victory: the Party abolished seats of Chairman and Vice-Chairman and removed Hua Guofeng from the Politburo, while General Secretary, Hu Yaobang literally came on the top of the CCP. ⁵⁷ Influenced by the textbook controversy, Hu remarked at the Congress that some forces in Japan were attempting to revive militarism, breaking the ten-year official non-reference to the revival of Japanese militarism. He also referred that the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations would be possible if the USSR was sincere to improve relations. ⁵⁸ Not only anti-Deng but also Deng

⁵⁵ For example, see Okada Hidehiko, "Kyokasho Kentei wa Chugoku no Naisei Mondai da (The Textbook Controversy is China's internal problem)," Chuo Koron (October 1982), pp. 82-96. Nakajima Mineo, "Ikasarenai Nichu Kosho no Gensoku (Principles of Sino-Japanese Negotiations are not Adopted)," Chuo Koron (October 1982), pp. 136-150. Koyama Kenichi, "Shinbunkisha no Rinri o Tou: Kyokasho Mondai Goho Jiken--Joho Osen no Mekanisumu (Questioning Ethics of Newspapermen: False Report of the Textbook issue--Mechanism of Information Pollution)," Bungei Shunju (November 1982), pp. 94-114.

⁵⁶ In October 1982, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Ilyichev visited China. This marked the "resumption of bilateral negotiations after China suspended contacts in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan." Christina Holmes, "The Soviet Union and China," The Soviet Union in East Asia, ed., Gerald Segal (London: Heinemann, 1983), p. 17.

⁵⁷ Asia 1983 Yearbook (Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review, 1983), p. 131.

⁵⁸ Asahi Shimbun, 4 September 1982 (Evening), p. 1. In March 1982, Soviet President Brezhnev "pleaded for the end of hostilities," and in September he further approached to China, stating that "the 'normalization' of relations with the PRC, on

factions used the 'remember-the-war' card effectively to enhance their interests.

Even after the temporarily harsh condemnation, Sino-Japanese relations did not show any deep crack. One thing that suggested a slight change in Sino-Japanese relations was a remark by a participant in the first Sino-Japanese non-governmental leaders conference in October 1982: the Chinese media had never supported the US-Japan Security Treaty.⁵⁹ This was a deviation from the usual Chinese endorsement of the Treaty, but the Chinese government did not follow up this remark, keeping it an unofficial view. The period of deterioration was short as China wished, and China returned to closer cooperation with Japan on its basis of 'equality and mutual benefits.'⁶⁰

The New Era of Sino-Japanese Cooperation

The birth of the Nakasone regime opened a new road for burying the past once again, though at the beginning China showed displeasure to the hawkish stance of Nakasone. To give support to North Korea, the spokesman of the Chinese Ministry of

⁵⁸(cont'd) the basis of 'common sense, mutual respect and mutual advantage,' was the main priority of Soviet policy in Asia." cited in Freedman Laurence, "The Military Dimension of Soviet Policy," The Soviet Union in East Asia, ed., Gerald Segal (London: Heinemann, 1983), p. 92.

⁵⁹ A remark by Sun Pinhua, Vice Chairman and Secretary-General, Sino-Japanese Friendship Association. Asahi Shimbun, 10 October 1982, p. 2.

⁶⁰ One of the principles proposed by Premier Zhao during his visit to Japan in May 1982. The other two were: 'peace and friendship;' and 'long-term stability.'

Foreign Affairs denounced the Nakasone visit to South Korea in January 1983, saying that his visit would not contribute to stability in and peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula.

⁶¹ Also, Nakasone's series of militaristic remarks during his visit to the USA in January 1983 caused suspicion on the part of the Chinese government. To ease displeasure of the Chinese government, Nakasone dispatched to China Nikaido Susumu, Secretary-General of the LDP, as his special envoy. In the meeting with Nikaido, Prime Minister Zhao was quoted that Japan should not cause fear among Asian states, though it was a right for Japan to strengthen self-defense capability. ⁶² Faced criticism at home and in Asia, Nakasone became cautious not to speak out frankly and anxious to play down his hawkish image. Through the exchange of visits by Hu Yaobang in November 1983 and Nakasone in March 1984, the Chinese government and the Nakasone regime further consolidated official friendship.

The recent Chinese attitudes to Japan's military buildup can be summarized as follows. First, China acknowledged that Japan had a right to maintain 'self-defense' capability. Second, China encouraged Japan to strengthen 'self-defense' power as long as it was directed at the USSR and helped maintain military equilibrium between a Soviet bloc and an American bloc in East Asia. Third, China might set a certain limitation in her tolerance of Japan's military buildup: China might be critical

⁶¹ Asahi Shimbun, 16 January 1983, p. 2.

⁶² Asahi Shimbun, 22 February 1983, p. 2.

again of Japan's 'defense' power, should there be stronger signs of the revival of Japanese militarism. The keys of determining Chinese reactions towards Japan are: Chinese perceptions of regional military balance; Chinese relations with the USSR; and the degree of Chinese modernization.

So far China needed Japan's overall cooperation rather than irritating Japanese conservative leaders by bringing up the issue of the 'revival of militarism.' Vice Premier Wan Li expressed Chinese expectation of Japan:

Both China and Japan have strong points. Japan is an economic power with advanced science and technology while China is a developing country. Their cooperation can grow in the fields of science, technology, economy and trade. ⁶³

China was absorbed in modernizing itself and avoiding any conflicts with neighbours, as Wan further states:

China's central task at present is to develop the living standards of the people. This is why China needs political unity and stability at home and a peaceful international environment, and this is the starting point of China's foreign policy. ⁶⁴

Thus, the resurgence of Japanese militarism was not the first concern to the current Chinese leaders. The Chinese leaders were permissive to Japanese right-wing conservatives who had constituted nuclei of former Japanese militarism. ⁶⁵

⁶³ China Daily, 3 March 1984, p. 1.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Sakamoto Yoshikazu points out that the shallowness of Chinese understanding of Japan weakened those Japanese who opposed Japan's rearmament and remilitarization and rather encouraged those who advocated military buildup. "Nichu Yuko no Aratana Kadai (A New Task of Sino-Japanese Friendship)," Sekai (January

Although China opposed the establishment of the Manchukuo monument, China had tried to invite former Prime Minister Kishi until the textbook controversy had occurred. ⁶⁶ In November 1984, Sasagawa Ryoichi, an influential ultra-rightist, visited China and offered a bid to help financially China's family planning. ⁶⁷ The Japanese people were also skeptical to the Chinese leaders showing special consideration to those politicians whom the Japanese public reprimanded for their involvement in the Lockheed scandal and money politics, such as Tanaka Kakuei and Nikaido Susumu. ⁶⁸ Since the Chinese endorsement of the US-Japan Security Treaty and Japan's military buildup encouraged Japanese right-wing conservatives who did not yet get rid of militaristic ideas, Chinese temporal condemnation of Japanese militarism lacked seriousness in eradicating roots of militarism from today's Japan.

⁶⁵ (cont'd) 1983), pp. 30-34.

⁶⁶ Asahi Shimbun, 29 August 1982, p. 1.

⁶⁷ Those Chinese who were engaged in promoting Sino-Japanese relations were critical to Sasagawa until several years ago. Asahi Shimbun, 13 November 1984, p. 3.

⁶⁸ During his visit to Tanaka's residence in 1982, Chinese Premier Zhao stated that the Chinese people would never forget an old friend (Tanaka) who contributed greatly to the promotion of Sino-Japanese relations. Asahi Shimbun, 1 June 1982 (Evening), p. 2.

Group 3: The ASEAN States

The ASEAN five states did not have identical perceptions of Japan and its military buildup. This is because these states had different degree of suffering from Japanese occupation during the war and different degree of struggles between pro-Japanese collaborators and anti-Japanese resistants after the war. The Filipinos had had almost no antipathy to the former colonists, the Americans who had promised the Philippine independence, and Japanese interlude had been rather an obstacle to independence, imprinting only bitter memories of Japanese atrocities. Although Indonesian independence had been in a way promoted by Japanese intervention, Indonesians could not wipe out images of the cruel Japanese. Ethnic divisions in British Malaya had created a split between the Malays, collaborators with the Japanese and the Chinese, resistants to them, and this became a cause of persistent struggle between them after the war. Thailand had been the only ally to Japan during the war, and the military who had collaborated with the Japanese controlled much of Thai politics after the war, facing the challenges of civilian politicians who had resisted against the Japanese. Today, the ASEAN states united firmly against the communist threat and showed some coherence in acknowledging Japan's 'self-defense' on the condition that it would help deter the Sovier threat; however, different experiences during Japanese occupation created different degrees of fear and support of Japan's military buildup among the ASEAN states.

In this section, we will start with examining how the wartime relations between Japan and the respective states affected their reactions to Japan's current military buildup. Then, we will look at ASEAN governments' reactions to the textbook controversy in 1982 and the Nakasone regime's accelerated military buildup. Although none of ASEAN states made a diplomatic protest to Japan over the textbook issue, the ASEAN people could not but sense the resurgence of Japanese militarism. Anti-Japanese feeling was deep among the general public due to Japan's military domination in the past and economic domination at present. In spite of public fear and suspicion, the ASEAN governments recently increased tone of endorsing Japan's 'defense' efforts, praising that militarily strong Japan could become a shield against the USSR. The ASEAN states cautiously tried to fill a gap between fear of economically and militarily powerful Japan and merits to be gained from Japan.

The Philippines

Among the ASEAN states, the Philippines voiced the strongest concern over Japan's military buildup. For one, the Philippines is geographically closest to Japan: Japan's plan of 1,000-nautical-miles defense sea-lanes reaches the Philippines if it is extended from a southern part of Japan. For another, dreadful memories of Japanese occupation were still vivid among those who had fought against the Japanese. To the ordinary Filipinos, wartime exploitation changed to postwar economic

exploitation, and at the bottom of their fear of today's Japan they felt that Japanese economic expansionism would inevitably invite military invasion. ⁶⁹

When we look at the wartime relations between the Philippines and Japan, the Japanese were least welcome by the Filipinos. As in the remark of the Philippine students who had been sent to Japan during the war, the Filipinos had not hated the Americans, as the Malays and the Indians had hated the British or Indonesians had hated the Dutch. ⁷⁰ The Filipinos had been promised independence by the USA to take effect in 1946. They had not found any attraction in Japanese offer of independence, nor any need to fight against the USA. ⁷¹ The Filipino views towards Japan thus became most cynical among the ASEAN states.

After the war, pro-Japanese collaborators were replaced by the anti-Japanese resistants. Those collaborators with the Japanese were used during the negotiations of war reparations with Japan due to their advantage of having personal ties with Japanese negotiators, ⁷² but they did not occupy the central

⁶⁹ Sheilah Ocampo, "Lessons of Pearl Harbour, Part 4: A Different Domination," Far Eastern Economic Review (1 January 1982), pp. 22-23.

⁷⁰ Grant K. Goodman, ed., An Experiment in Wartime Intercultural Relations: Philippine Students in Japan, 1943-45, Cornell Southeast Asia Program Data Papers No. 46 (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1962), pp. 19-20.

⁷¹ Iriye, The Cold War in Asia, pp. 62-63.

⁷² For this topic, see Yoshikawa Yoko, "Tai-hi Baisho Kosho no Tate Yakusha Tachi (Major Actors in Japanese-Philippine

part in the postwar Philippine politics.

The textbook controversy occurred when the Filipino came to fear military strength of Japan, which, after rising as an economic power, showed a sign of becoming a true power with commensurate military power. President Ferdinand Marcos only mentioned indirect criticism to the textbook issue, referring to a general tendency that a big power was prone to distort history to its advantage. ⁷³ The World News commented that Japan had started the aggressive war to pursue economic expansion and that today Japan needed to launch economic expansion once again; thus the distortion of history was in line with the economic necessity and did not happen accidentally. ⁷⁴ The Filipinos, being aware of Japanese arrogance by military and economic invasion, were once again reminded of Japanese arrogance by the textbook issue.

Although Marcos continued to show understanding of Japan's 'self-defense,' he voiced concern over Japan's military buildup in September 1982. ⁷⁵ It is not certain whether the textbook issue influenced his view or whether his anti-Japanese criticism was directed at the USA in a hope to draw out much more US commitment to the Philippines. During his tour in the USA,

⁷²(cont'd) Reparations Negotiations)," Kokusai Seiji , Vol. 75 (October 1983), pp. 130-149.

⁷³ Asahi Shimbun, 7 September 1982, p. 3.

⁷⁴ The World News, 15 August 1982; cited in Asahi Shimbun, 16 August 1982, p. 2.

⁷⁵ Asahi Shimbun, 7 September 1982, p. 3.

Marcos urged the USA not to press Japan for military buildup: he even mentioned that Japan's military power could aim at Southeast Asia. ⁷⁶ The Philippines clearly opposed unlimited expansion of the Japanese military being prompted by the strong US pressure.

When Nakasone visited the Philippines in May 1983, the Philippine side reminded him that Japan's 'defense' should be restricted only to its territories, showing concern over Nakasone's pledge to defend 1,000-nautical-miles sea-lanes. Nakasone's mention of remorse for Japan's wartime conducts did not ease fear of the Filipinos. Philippine human rights activists charged Nakasone 'a symbol of Japanese militarism' and 'a puppet of the US Asian strategy,' ⁷⁷ and anti-Japanese demonstrators blamed Japan's rearmament and imperialistic aggression by military power in the past and economic power at present. ⁷⁸

Protests against Japan turned into a new phase when anti-Marcos group spurred up their movements after the assassination of the opposition leader, Benigno Aquino in August 1983. Collecting wide-range support, anti-Marcos groups turned their direction to the USA and Japan, both of which were ardent supporters of the dictatorial Marcos regime. In May 1984, anti-Marcos demonstrators demanded Japan to postpone yen loans

⁷⁶ Asahi Shimbun, 21 September 1982, p. 7.

⁷⁷ Asahi Shimbun, 5 May 1983, p. 2.

⁷⁸ Asahi Shimbun, 8 May 1983, p. 2.

to the Marcos regime and pleaded that foreign backup made it more difficult to remove the dictator. ⁷⁹ No appreciation of Japan's economic aid came from those suffering from political repression by the regime that Japan assisted.

Fear of Japan's resurgence as a military power was not wiped out from the minds of Filipinos. Traditional pro-American stance seemed fading as the USA consistently sided with the dictatorial regime; this anti-US stance had a common ground with anti-Japanese stance. Since Japan's military buildup was related to its ambition to defend its economic activities beyond its territories, the Filipinos were not easy with Japan's strengthening of 'self-defense' power. Thus, Foreign Minister Romulo, who had reluctantly accepted Japan's rearmament only within the scope of the US-Japan Security Treaty at the San Francisco Peace Conference in 1951, ⁸⁰ had to reiterate the warning in 1982 that Japan's 'defense' should be limited only to its territories. ⁸¹

Indonesia

Compared to the Filipinos, Indonesians showed more complexed skepticism on Japan, because Indonesians were not only well aware of the disaster caused by Japanese occupation but also saw the

⁷⁹ Asahi Shimbun, 5 May 1984, p. 2.

⁸⁰ Cited in Jain, Japan's Postwar Peace Settlements, p. 311.

⁸¹ Asahi Shimbun, 5 May 1983, p. 2.

Japanese sweep away their former colonists, the Dutch.⁸² The Japanese military had done both what Indoensians had not wanted and what they had wanted for a long period. Indonesian independence was proclaimed by Sukarno and Hatta, collaborators with Japan. Post-war Indonesian politics and the military were dominated by those collaborators with Japan, and Japanese pro-Indonesian groups exploited the wartime channels to develop postwar economic ties with Indonesia. Although Indonesian hatred of the Japanese who had sent thousands of Indonesians away to Burma as 'Romusha' (slave laborers) was strong among Indonesians,⁸³ Indonesian-Japanese cooperation in the wartime and postwar periods was the strongest compared to relations between Japan and any other ASEAN state.

Indonesians expressed fear of Japanese military expansion reflecting their wartime memories as did the Filipinos; however, the existence of political, economic and to lesser extent, military cooperation between Indonesia and Japan made Indonesian stance different from Filipinos'. While the Philippine government can rely decisively on the US backup, the Indonesian government needed to strengthen ties with Japan and to refrain from direct accusation of Japan. While voicing fear of Japan's

⁸² See Nugroho Notosusanto, "Lessons of Pearl Harbour, Part 7: Collusion for Freedom," Far Eastern Economic Review (5 March 1982), pp. 14-16.

⁸³ Lea Williams states that "Sukarno was most helpful in his work to enlist up to 300,000 destitute men for labor service, from which many failed to return." Southeast Asia: History, p. 201.

military expansion on one hand, Indonesia sought increased military cooperation from Japan, on the other hand.

The textbook issue in 1982 hinted once again to Indonesians that Japan still had a danger of becoming a military power. Indonesian Observer pointed out that the distortion of Japan's aggressive history made outsiders suspect the seeds of the re-emergence of militarism in Japanese community.⁸⁴ In an interview with a Japanese newspaperman at the end of 1982, then Vice President Adam Malik warned Japan: Japan should not rearm itself and should not heighten tension by strengthening its military power and antagonizing the USSR.⁸⁵ Indonesians continued to reject an emergence of militarily strong Japan, but the Indonesian government that copied military fascism from the prewar Japanese model tended to view Japan's military buildup ambivalently.

When Nakasone visited Indonesia in May 1983, President Suharto only indirectly criticized Japan's military buildup, referring to his general concern over military competition of big powers.⁸⁶ On this occasion, Suharto asked for Japan's cooperation in developing Indonesian military industries as well.⁸⁷ Although Nakasone rejected this request, his position

⁸⁴ Cited in Beijing Review, Vol. 25, No. 34 (23 August 1982), p. 13.

⁸⁵ Asahi Shimbun, 1 January 1983, p. 2.

⁸⁶ Asahi Shimbun, 2 May 1983, p. 2.

⁸⁷ Asahi Shimbun, 12 May 1983, p. 1.

was not persuasive: he himself lifted Japan's three principles of exporting weapons by allowing export of military technology to the USA in January 1983. Also in May 1983, Indonesian-Japanese bilateral official security consultations were initiated at Jakarta's request. ⁸⁸ The Suharto regime seemed to find it more beneficial in strengthening military cooperation with Japan rather than denouncing Japan's military development directly.

The Indonesian government looked at more practical merits of supporting Japanese military buildup. Especially when the ASEAN was promoting defense links among its member states, ⁸⁹ Indonesia and other ASEAN states turned to the ASEAN's biggest trade partner, Japan, for more cooperation in creating 'regional resilience;' in direct terms, in upgrading military capabilities. Indonesia seemed not to worry about militarily strong Japan, as long as Japan's military power would help upgrade Indonesia's armed forces. Therefore, it became beneficial to use special relations with Japan that had been created during the wartime and developed in the postwar period for more economic and military cooperation.

⁸⁸ Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 December 1984, p. 28.

⁸⁹ No ASEAN-wide military arrangement was made yet, but the member states developed military cooperation on bilateral basis. Especially Indonesia was active in promoting military ties and already conducted joint military exercises with all the four member states. Kuroyanagi Yoneji, "ASEAN Shokoku no Anzen Hoshō Senryaku (Security Strategies of the ASEAN countries)," Kokusai Seiji, Vol. 63 (1977), pp. 100-120.

With Prime Minister Mahathir's 'Look East Policy' being promoted since 1981, Malaysia recently looked at Japan more favorably, but the wartime divisions of pro-Japanese collaborators and anti-Japanese resistants casted a shadow over today's Malaysian views towards Japan. Post-war Malaysia (Malaya until 1953) experienced the consistent struggle between the indigenous Malay and the immigrant Chinese and Indians,⁹⁰ and this ethnic struggle was also based on a split between collaborators with Japanese and resistants against them during the war. Today, having seen the downfall of the British Empire, Mahathir advocated his people to learn from Eastern virtue--working ethics demonstrated by the Japanese and the Koreans; however, it was partly a bitter lesson for Malaysians, all Malays, Chinese and Indians, to learn from the former invaders, the Japanese. Although the government did not openly oppose strengthening of Japan's military power, Malaysians not necessarily wiped out fear of resurging Japanese military power.

We will begin with the analysis of the wartime relations between Japan and Malaya to understand ethnically-divided views of Japan. During the war, the number of the immigrant Chinese and Indians together had surpassed that of the indigenous Malays, and the Japanese military had used the divide-and-rule method to its advantage: the Japanese had used Sultan's

⁹⁰Of the population in 1977, the Malays constitute 47%; the Chinese, 33%; the Indians, 9%; Borneo indigenous, 9%; and others, 2%. The Far East and Australasia, 1984-85, p. 569.

authority to rule the Malays; the Japanese had encouraged Indians to fight against the UK for liberation of India, recruiting them to the Japanese-sponsored Indian National Army; but the Japanese had commandeered economic resources of the Chinese, also persecuting them in a suspect of their collusion with nationalists and communists in mainland China. ⁹¹ Generally Malay aristocrats had had relatively easier time, while Chinese had faced much tougher persecution. When the war had ended, Malay collaborators had been taken revenge by Chinese anti-Japanese guerrilla fighters; however, the returned British had started persecution of the communist-oriented guerrillas, and the state of civil war lasted until 1960. ⁹² "With considerable help from British propaganda" as in K. Das' remark, anti-Japanese feelings were shifted to anti-communist feelings, and this change helped dilute bitter memories of the Japanese occupation. ⁹³

Today more favorable attitudes towards the Japanese were seen among the Malays, and the 'Look East Policy' was introduced by a Malay leader who wished to upgrade Malay's economic position through combining Japanese investment with Malay's political power and breaking traditional economic domination by the Chinese. Under the 'Look East Policy,' indigenous Malaysian

⁹¹ C.M. Turnbull, "Lessons of Pearl Harbour, Part 5: Poverty and Fear," Far Eastern Economic Review (29 January 1982), p. 12.

⁹² Ibid., p. 13.

⁹³ K. Das, "Malaya's Changing Enemies," Far Eastern Economic Review (29 January 1982), pp. 12-13.

'Sogo-Shosha' (a Japanese-style general trading company) was created and Japanese-style in-house unions replaced British-style craft-based trade unions. Japan became the largest single investor in Malaysia, and Malaysian trade deficit with Japan grew bigger. Critics to this policy state that the government brought in "overt favoritism of Japanese or South Korean interests." ⁹⁴ And the Chinese were generally cynical to this policy, since they not only faced the decrease in their business but also had already tough work ethics by themselves, comparable to those of the Japanese and the Koreans. Although one of Mahathir's aims in this policy was to let the Japanese be aware that the Japanese should also learn from Southeast Asia, this inconspicuous aim was not appreciated by the Japanese. ⁹⁵

The textbook controversy occurred in 1982 when Mahathir's 'Look East Policy' was in full swing. Negating that the textbook issue would influence the 'Look East Policy,' Mahathir expressed his concern: the Japanese would lose a sense of war responsibility and go into war again, and we do not wish that the new generation of Japan are infused with an idea that war is wonderful. ⁹⁶ The Chinese newspaper, Nanyang Siang Pao voiced

⁹⁴ As for the result of the 'Look East Policy' by the middle of 1984, see James Clad, "Profit of the East," Far Eastern Economic Review (14 June 1984), pp. 113-118.

⁹⁵ Mahathir stated in his message to the nation on Independence Day, 30 October 1982: "Japan is not so sympathetic with developing countries, but always looking toward the West. Japan should also learn from Southeast Asia." Cited in Toba Reijiro, "ASEAN Development and Japanese Cooperation," Asian Pacific Community, No. 24 (Spring 1980), p. 84.

⁹⁶ Asahi Shimbun, 27 August 1982, p. 7.

stronger anger against Japan: "Asian peoples will never forget such heinous atrocities as rapes, slaughter and burning by Japanese militarists in China, Korea and Southeast Asian countries." ⁹⁷ To the opposition against Mahathir, the textbook controversy was a chance to damage his 'Look East Policy,' but the government maintained its policy without much trouble.

Expressing that Japan's 'defense' should not become too weak, Mahathir was in favor of Japan's current military buildup, which, to his view, contributed to defense of Southeast Asia against the Soviet threat. Though giving encouragement to the Japanese military sector, he did not forget to mention that Japan should restrict its 'defense' only around its surrounding waters: he could not think of assigning Japan a role of regional defender similar to that of the USA performed by the Seventh Fleet in the region. Setting China as a long-term threat, Mahathir was skeptical to too close economic cooperation between Japan and China, which would eventually reinforce Chinese military power. ⁹⁸

In Malaysia we have to note that Japan's rearmament could become an easy target of criticism on the government by the opposition. In contrast to the government support of Japan's military buildup, those critical to the 'Look East Policy' were apprehensive over the direction of Japanese 'defense' power. Tan

⁹⁷ Quoted in Beijing Review, Vol. 25, No. 34 (23 August 1982), p. 13.

⁹⁸ Asahi Shimbun, 1 January 1983, p. 11.

Sri Dr. Tan Chee Khoon warned the people of his country: "with the Look East drive in full swing, there is the danger that our country and our people may not be aware of a resurgent and rearmed Japan." ⁹⁹ The Chinese sector voiced concerns over the re-emergence of militant Japan, but their concern did not have decisive influence over government's policies that were largely formulated by the dominant Malays. The ethnically-split perceptions of Japan were sources of a gap between support of Japan's military buildup and fear of rearmed Japan.

Singapore

Among the ASEAN states, Singapore was most in favor of Japan's current military buildup. Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew openly encouraged Japanese acceleration of military power. He also launched the 'Learn from Japan Campaign,' a Singaporean version of Mahathir's 'Look East Policy.' Political tightness and business-bureaucratic complex of Singapore followed a model of prewar Japan. Singapore government's recent favoritism of Japan seems to have quickened oblivion of the brutal past caused by the Japanese. Lee advocated Singaporeans to learn Japanese ethics that had traits of feudalistic and hierarchical Japan, and ardently welcomed Nakasone's move to strengthen military capability.

In Singapore two things surpassed any other interest: first, economic development, and second, anti-communism. These supreme

⁹⁹ "Beware a Re-armed Japan," The Star, 16 March 1983.

considerations explain why Singaporeans severely damaged during the war could adopt favoritism of Japan today. The Chinese had experienced harsh persecution by notorious Japanese 'Kempeitai' (military police) as had other Southeast nations, and their bitter memories were still strong among older generations. ¹⁰⁰ Singaporeans hated Japanese atrocities but opted for expanding business with Japan after the war. Furthermore, Lee Kuan Yew's impression with tight ethics in prewar Japan and his anti-communist stance shortened distance between Japan and Singapore. ¹⁰¹ In the 1980's, his favor of Japan came out as the 'Learn from Japan Campaign,' with his tilt to tightly controlled prewar Japan. For example, Singapore made ethics as a compulsory subject in elementary and junior high schools modeled after prewar Japanese practice; legally obligated "young couples to support their elderly parents living separately after their marriage;" established "working ethics including loyalty to enterprises;" "adopted the Japanese-style police box" for surveillance of the neighbourhood. ¹⁰² Singapore, wishing to create a stable and prosperous country without communist penetration, only paid attention to the suppressed order of

¹⁰⁰ C.M. Turnbull, "Lessons of Pearl Harbour, Part 6: From Cog to Wheel," Far Eastern Economic Review (12 February 1982), pp. 40-44.

¹⁰¹ Lee Kuan Yew had worked as a translator in the official Japanese news agency, Domei, during Japanese occupation. Awanohara Susumu, "Lessons of Pearl Harbour, Part 6: In Pursuit of an Ideal," Far Eastern Economic Review (12 February 1982), p. 45.

¹⁰² Toba, "ASEAN Development and Japanese Cooperation," pp. 77-78.

prewar Japan and did not seriously look at the result of the tightly-controlled Japanese society.

On the occasion of the textbook controversy, Sin Chew Jit Poh commented that the Asian peoples were still apprehensive how seriously the Japanese condemned their own past.¹⁰³ The newspaper also stated that the distortion of textbooks and infusing the young Japanese with wrong ideas might suggest that Japan had been returning back to the militarist road as before.¹⁰⁴ An irony lay in the fact that the Singaporean government tried to learn from Japanese moral education, a nucleus of Japanese prewar education, which had made the Japanese obedient militarists with complete loyalty to the state.

The 'Learn from Japan Campaign' was carried out with Singaporean's ambivalence between appraisal and hatred of the Japanese. With the change of the generations and the government's education of the young generation, Singaporean opinions leaned towards more appraisal of Japan and Japan's military buildup. Lee Kuan Yew used anti-communism to justify Japan's military buildup, agitating that Japan should increase military capability against the USSR and help decrease a burden of the USA. Lee did not consider China as a threat, and his

¹⁰³ Cited in Beijing Review, Vol. 25, No. 34 (23 August 1982), p. 13.

¹⁰⁴ Cited in Asahi Shimbun, 9 August 1982, p. 6.

anti-communism was geared to the USSR and Vietnam.¹⁰⁵

Eliminating political opposition and inflating favor of the Japanese, Lee had liberty to support Japanese military development.

To Lee, the birth of the Nakasone regime was a welcoming sign in increasing Japan's military power. To Nakasone as well, Lee's strong encouragement was a great help. When Lee visited Japan in March 1983, Nakasone asked Lee to ease fear of Indonesia and the Philippines, pledging that the Japan's sea-lane defense plan would not threaten the ASEAN states.¹⁰⁶ Lee and Nakasone, both enthusiastic in creating obedient, loyal citizens in their countries,¹⁰⁷ shared the view that only balance of military power could create stability in the region and that for this purpose Japan and Singapore should emphasize military buildup. Sharing the anti-communist stance and the purpose of education, Lee and Nakasone pushed forward militarization of the region.

¹⁰⁵ Asahi Shimbun, 1 January 1983, p. 13.

¹⁰⁶ Asahi Shimbun, 29 March 1983, p. 2.

¹⁰⁷ As for Nakasone's views towards education, see Kamakura Takao, "Nakasone Kyoiku-Kaikaku no Kiken na Taishitsu (Danger of Nakasone's Education Reform)," Economisuto, July 10 1984, pp. 56-61.

Thailand

Thailand had not been formally occupied by Japan, and Thai's views of the Japanese could be different from those of other ASEAN states; however, Thailand presents a case in which not only military oppression in the past but also economic aggression in the postwar years influenced to create anti-Japanese feelings among the people. Compared to other ASEAN states, anti-Japanese feelings were quite strong in the 1970's and the 1980's in Thailand, reflecting the worst trade deficit with Japan. In a public-opinion poll about Japan conducted by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1983, 54% of the Thai respondents answered that 'Japan would become a military power to the extent of exerting threat,' while 46-56% of the respondents in other ASEAN states chose an answer that 'Japan would not become a military power and maintain the stance of a peace-loving nation.'¹⁰⁸ Thailand also shows a case in which postwar politics was largely dominated by the military, collaborators with Japan during the war, and a split between the military and civilian politicians was related to their

¹⁰⁸The answer that 'Japan would become a military power' was chosen by 19% of the Indonesian respondents, 37% of the Malaysian respondents, 28% of the Filipino respondents and 35% of the Singaporean respondents; while the answer that 'Japan would not become a military power and maintain the stance of peace-loving nation' was given by 65% of the Indonesian respondents, 48% of the Malaysian respondents, 60% of the Filipino respondents, 46% of the Singaporean respondents, and 22% of the Thai respondents. In each survey, 850-900 respondents were sampled from the newspaper subscribers. Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bureau of Information and Cultural Affairs, "ASEAN Gokakoku no Tainichikan 1983 (Survey of Public Opinion Towards Japan in the ASEAN Five States)," (unpublished), p. 4.

respective wartime relations with the Japanese. The military-controlled government did not hesitate to support strengthening Japan's 'defense' capability but had to deal with anti-Japan mood of the public, who saw Japan's economic invasion as a new face of militant Japan.

During the war, Thailand had maintained independence with discreet 'Thai art of diplomacy,' creating both pro-Japanese collaborators and anti-Japanese resisters. Facing the Japanese pressure, the Pibul government had granted the Japanese troops free passage through Thai territory and had concluded the treaty of alliance with Japan in December 1941; then had declared war against the Allies in January 1942. The Japanese had gained cooperation of dictatorial, ultra-nationalist Pibul by ceding to Thailand parts of French Cambodia and Laos, and British Burma and Malaya. On the other hand, anti-Japanese groups had organized the Free Thai Movement in the USA and the UK and dispatched Free Thai Army to the homeland. When the war had shifted to Allies' advantage, Thais had tried to play down their cooperation with Japan. In July 1944, the Pibul government had fallen, and the successor, the Khuang government had been regarded anti-Japanese by the Allies. The change of the governments and the existence of the Free Thai movement saved Thailand from revenge by the Allies after the war. Generally, the military were collaborators with Japan and civilian politicians resisted against Japan. This split became a cause of consistent struggle in postwar Thai politics, with overall

advantage of the military.

Today's anti-Japanese feeling among Thais had two origins. For one, Thais had suffered from Japanese invasion during the war, though they had not been directly under the Japanese military control as had been other Southeast Asian nations. According to Thamsook, Thais had "increased hatred against Japanese high-handedness and arrogance," and "in general resented the Japanese presence in the country." ¹⁰⁹ The war caused by the Japanese had been unwelcome and unnecessary to Thais. For another, the Thais experienced the second Japanese invasion since the early 1960's; this time, instead of the Japanese troops, the Japanese goods started to pour into the Thai society. Since 1972 anti-Japanese sentiments erupted in the forms of boycotting the Japanese goods and demonstrations against visiting Japanese Prime Ministers. ¹¹⁰ Looking at incessant current of arrogance in the Japanese either at war or peace, Thais deepened anti-Japanese feelings.

The 'Thai art of diplomacy' was applied in recent years as well. Facing the immediate threat from Vietnam, Thailand approached China most actively among the ASEAN states. Along with Singapore, Thailand welcomed Japan's strengthening of military capability, asserting that it would help containment of

¹⁰⁹ Thamsook, Thailand and the Japanese Presence, p. 51 and p. 18.

¹¹⁰ Paisal Sricharatchanya, "Lessons of Pearl Harbour, Part 2: The Memory Rankles on," Far Eastern Economic Review (11 December 1981), pp. 18-19.

the USSR and thus contribute to enhancing the ASEAN security. With the deliberate adjustment to the changing international environment, Thais survived difficult times, though other ASEAN nations sometimes look at this art of Thai diplomacy critically as in the remark of Tan Sri Dr. Tan Chee Khoon: Thailand is always "able to come to terms with her conquerors." ¹¹¹

Thai newspapers continued to be critical to Japan on such occasions as the textbook issue ¹¹² and Thai-Japanese trade imbalance but did not influence much the government policies towards Japan. Recently the Thai government was eager to promote economic cooperation with Japan and welcomed militarily strong Japan based on its strategic consideration, though the general public did not yet fully accept powerful Japan. On the occasion of Nakasone visit to Thailand, Thai Rath editorial commented:

Although Japan is the strongest economic power in Asia, Japan cannot be recognized as a moral leader in the region. We hope that Japan will become a moral power which will not only pursue its own interest but also consider benefits of its neighboring developing countries. ¹¹³

The Thais always questioned morality of the Japanese either in the textbook issue or the trade problem.

While Prime Minister Prem welcomed Nakasone's pledge to strengthen military power, the Thai people still worried about

¹¹¹ "Beware a Re-armed Japan."

¹¹² Asahi Shimbun reported that four Thai newspapers carried editorials censuring Japan; 16 August 1982, p. 2.

¹¹³ The author's translation from the Japanese; cited in Asahi Shimbun, 4 May 1983, p. 2.

the direction of accelerated Japanese military buildup. They were well aware of the degree of morality of the Japanese as were other ASEAN nations. Thailand was excluded from the ASEAN solidarity in condemning Japanese atrocities during the war; however, this nation's favoritism for Japan was quite low, ironically the lowest, among the ASEAN states.¹¹⁴ The Thais continued to face a problem in dealing with powerful Japan either at war or in peace.

ASEAN Suspicion of and Cooperation with Japan

The ASEAN states shared the view that Japan's southbound in the war had been prompted essentially by economic motive. Thus, it was very difficult for them to rule out the possibility that Japan, the ASEAN's biggest trade partner and investor, might intervene militarily in the event of economic crisis. With a historical lesson in mind, the ASEAN states were apprehensive of unrestricted expansion of Japan's military power.

However, the ASEAN heads unanimously agreed to endorse Japanese military buildup if it was within the scope of Japan's 'defense:' in other words, no ASEAN state encouraged Japan to decrease military power and become a genuine pacifist. As a means to enhance the ASEAN security against the USSR, the five ASEAN states did not oppose the Nakasone's 'defense' plan. The textbook issue reminded the ASEAN nations once again of Japanese arrogance in the wartime military aggression and postwar

¹¹⁴ According to a conclusion drawn from "the Survey of Public Opinion Towards Japan in the ASEAN Five States."

economic aggression, but did not affect the basic policies of their pro-Japanese governments. Notably Malaysia and Singapore were driving their pro-Japanese campaigns; the military leaders in Thailand and Indonesia maintained favorable relations with Japanese conservatives; and the Philippines did not have to raise alertness against Japan's pledge to defend the sea-lanes as long as Japan's military was under guidance of the US forces. Pursuing rapid economic development in collaboration with Japan, the ASEAN leaders were eager to maintain regional security indirectly helped by Japan's 'defense' efforts.

According to the two surveys of the ASEAN nations' views on Japan conducted by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1978/79 and 1983, the result in the second survey (1983) turned out more favorable to Japan than that in the first survey. In a question whether Japan played an active role for development of Asia, in the 1983 survey 70-90% of respondents in the four ASEAN states except Thailand, replied 'yes.' ¹¹⁵ Although it is not certain how much the respondents represented the general public's candid views towards Japan, we need to take into consideration that efforts by ASEAN governments to improve Japan's image, such as Malaysia's 'Look East Policy' and

¹¹⁵ The answer that 'Japan played an active role for development of Asia' was given by 90% of the Indonesian respondents, 79% of the Malaysian respondents, 85% of the Filipino respondents, 70% of the Singaporean respondents, and 49% of the Thai respondents; while the negative answer was given by 7% of the Indonesian respondents, 13% of the Malaysian respondents, 9% of the Filipino respondents, 15% of the Singaporean respondents, and 37% of the Thai respondents. "The Survey of Public Opinion Towards Japan in the ASEAN Five States 1983," p. 5.

Singapore's 'Learn from Japan Campaign,' contributed to create favorable views towards Japan. With the ASEAN governments' pro-Japanese policies economically and militarily, the Japanese government was growing ambition to play a larger role in the region as the first economic power and the second military power after China in East Asia.

Group 4: Indochina

Due to the scarcity of information from Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, we have difficulty in tracing their reactions towards Japanese military buildup, but the existing rivalry between communists and non-communists and that among communists give us a clew to search for their reactions to Japan. Indochinese communist regimes condemned Japan, first, using communist rhetoric against non-communist Japan, and then, challenging against communist China in support of the USSR. Thus, the Indochinese communist regimes denounced Japan not only because of Japan's own strengthening military capabilities but also because of Japan's collusion with 'US imperialists' and 'Beijing reactionaries.'¹¹⁶ The inter-bloc and intra-communist rivalries impeded development of relations between Japan and the

¹¹⁶ Vietnam Press Agency, Nhan Dan commented: "the revival of Japanese 'militarism' was proof that Tokyo was cooperating ... ever more closely with the US imperialists and Beijing reactionaries ... {in implementing} counter-revolutionary global strategy in Southeast Asia." Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Asia & Pacific (Daily Report), 11 May 1983, p. k-7; quoted in William T. Tow, "Japan's Rearmament: The ASEAN Factor," Asia Pacific Community, (Winter 1984), p. 20.

Indochinese states.

As in the previous sections, we will start with an elucidation of wartime relations between Japan and Indochina (then French Indochina). As Lea Williams states, "the whole of Southeast Asia came under a single authority for the first time and only time in its history" during Japanese occupation.¹¹⁷ We notice, however, the three fundamental differences between Japanese-ASEAN relations and Japanese-Indochinese relations during and after the war. First, Japan prolonged the Western colonial rule over Indochina in contrast to the quick disposal in the Philippines, British Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. The Japanese troops entered Southeast Asia, first of all, through northern Vietnam (Tonkin) in 1940 to blockade supplies to the Chinese government in Chungking and then to make Indochina an advanced base for their aggression of other Southeast Asia. Until the surprise attack on 9 March 1945, Japan had allowed the French administration over Indochina gaining the Vichy government support, thereby minimizing Japan's cost of administration. Only almost at the end of the war when the Japanese position had become totally disadvantageous, Japan had abolished the French rule over Indochina, setting up the puppet regimes in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁷ Southeast Asia: History, p. 195.

¹¹⁸ For Japanese occupation of Indochina, see Kiyoko Kurusu-Nitz, "Japanese Military Policy towards French Indochina during the Second World War: The Road to the Meigo Sakusen (9 March 1945)," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2 (September 1983), pp. 328-353.

Second, during the Japanese postponement of abolishing the French rule, the Japanese had increased collaboration with those Indochinese against the French colonization, but the Japanese support had been almost limited to nationalists who became counter-liberation forces in the postwar era. In Vietnam the Japanese had assisted only nationalists, persecuting Viet Minh¹¹⁹ and thus largely obstructing the main forces of liberation. Those Indochinese regimes initially set up by the Japanese and bolstered up by the USA after the war were all extinct during the prolonged Indochinese war, except the exile president of Democratic Kampuchea, Sihanouk. In contrast to the continued linkage between the ASEAN states and Japan in the postwar era, Japan did not have any tie with the current Indochinese regimes.

Third, postwar relations between the Indochinese states and Japan were further worsened mainly because of the interruption of the prolonged Indochinese war and the birth of communist regimes in this area. These events halted the Japanese economic penetration into Indochina and did not create strong economic dependency on Japan, whereas anti-Japanese feelings in the ASEAN states were fuelled by Japan's economic invasion since the late 1960's.

These three essentially differentiated Japanese-Indochinese relations from Japanese-ASEAN relations and give a background of

¹¹⁹ As for Japanese-Vietnamese collaboration during the war, see Kiyoko Kurusu-Nitz, "Independence without Nationalism? The Japanese and Vietnamse Nationalism during the Japanese Period, 1940-45," Journal of Southeast Asian Studis, Vol. 15, No. 1 (March 1984), pp. 108-133.

the current reactions of Indochina towards Japan. We will focus here how Vietnam took anti-Japanese policy owing to its affiliation with the USSR and antagonism against China, while reactions of Cambodia and Laos towards Japan's military buildup is not traced because of the lack of information from these war-torn states.

Vietnam

Vietnamese antagonism against the Japanese dates back to the wartime and was heightened by Vietnamese challenge against the USA and later China. At the bottom of Vietnamese views of the Japanese was the economic disaster and famine, killing a large number of Vietnamese owing to Japanese intrusion during the war. Vietnam had experienced a longer period of the Japanese presence than any other Southeast Asian states, but this did not alone constitute the anti-Japanese stance. Post-war Japan's anti-communist policy in support of the USA angered the liberation forces of Vietnam. Although Japan and united Vietnam tried to improve their relations in the middle of 1970's, this move was soon interrupted by Vietnamese collusion with the USSR and antagonism against China.

Thus, the textbook issue in 1982 became a subject of condemning China first and then Japan. Vietnam severely reprimanded China: (1) Although China withdrew an invitation to the Japanese Education Minister to visit China, the Chinese ambassador to Japan and the Director-General of the Japanese

Defense Agency conferred in Tokyo to promote the exchange of military personnel; (2) China strongly supported the increase of Japanese 'defense' budget and was trying to create the Sino-US-Japanese military alliance against the USSR and other states; and (3) Anger over the revision of Japanese high-school history textbooks was aimed at easing fear of the Chinese who worried that Deng Xiaoping, colluded with imperialism, would open the door to the former invader, Japan. ¹²⁰ After denouncing China, Vietnam turned attention to Japan: Hanoi criticized that the distortion of history by the Japanese government was a serious conduct injuring prides of the peoples in China and Southeast Asia who had been victims of the Japanese fascists. ¹²¹ In early September 1982, Vietnam formerly protested to Japan, by demanding the revision of textbook accounts relating to Vietnam. ¹²²

Since Nakasone came to power in 1982, Vietnamese reactions towards Japan's military buildup became more critical. Vietnam opposed the Nakasone visit to South Korea, blaming Japanese militarist collusion with US imperialists and the South Korean dictator. ¹²³ Vietnam charged the Nakasone regime as the most militant one since the war and criticized that Japanese

¹²⁰ Asahi Shimbun, 4 August 1982, p. 3.

¹²¹ Asahi Shimbun, 8 August 1982, p. 3.

¹²² Asahi Shimbun, 9 September 1982, p. 3.

¹²³ Asahi Shimbun, 24 January 1983, p. 7.

militarism had been revived.¹²⁴ Today, among the East Asian states, Vietnam most strongly condemned the Japanese military disguised in the name of 'self-defense' forces, pointing out that the SDF was an ordinary fighting forces beyond the scope of 'self-defense.'¹²⁵

Although the Vietnamese condemnation of Japan did not stop, Vietnam and Japan moved a little bit closer by holding the Foreign Ministerial meeting in Japan in October 1984 after six-year interval. Vietnam stressed its concern over Japan's drive to a military power, and both states had parallel argument on the Cambodian issue;¹²⁶ however, this meeting was effective in showing Vietnamese willingness to approach Japan and Japanese wish to exert some influence on regional problems.

Drawn into the Soviet orbit and heightening traditional feud against China, Vietnam became more isolated in the region, and the anti-Soviet stance of Nakasone further worsened Vietnamese reactions to Japan. Vietnam continued to watch carefully the development of Sino-Japanese relations and tried to seize an opportunity of condemning China and Japan. It seems that time has not yet come for Vietnam to become truly independent, free from superpower influence, and to formulate its own diplomacy towards Japan.

¹²⁴ Asahi Shimbun, 4 September 1984, p. 2.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Asahi Shimbun, 1 October 1984, p. 2; and 3 October 1984 (Evening edition), p. 1.

Indochinese Conflicts with Japan

In contrast to the ASEAN states where memories of wartime sufferings caused by the Japanese military were fuelled by postwar economic dominance by Japan, Indochina, due to its continued warfare and the stance of communist regimes, did not formulate anti-Japanese feelings on the same basis as did the ASEAN nations. Instead, the Indochinese communist regimes created their own anti-Japanese policies in line with the Soviet stance, accusing Japanese collusion with US imperialists and Beijing reactionaries. Vietnamese allying with the USSR and challenge against Chinese hegemony characterized its views on Japan, and thus today Vietnam became a state most severely denouncing Japan's military buildup among the East Asian states. Increased strength of the Japanese military itself did not endanger Vietnam directly, but Japan's accelerated cooperation with China was feared to enhance Chinese overall power including military one.

Based on this fear, Vietnam used the textbook controversy as an occasion to attack China and Sino-Japanese military collaboration. Although Vietnam did not have much room to initiate its independent policy towards Japan, restricted by its relations with two superpowers, the USSR and China, Vietnam was searching a way to enhance its political leverage vis-à-vis Japan, which was also seeking a mediator's role between isolated Vietnam and other East Asian states. The emergence of two Cambodian states made rival competitors to win Japanese support

to the respective governments. Japan's plan of increasing aid to Laos might give the Vietnamese and Cambodian communist governments one question: How much could they adhere to solidarity with the USSR? Although Vietnamese Foreign Minister stated that Vietnam would not solicit economic aid from Japan just because Japan was a rich country, ¹²⁷ the Indochinese regimes swung between ideology and economic needs in formulating their policies towards Japan.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have examined East Asia's reactions towards Japan's recent military buildup between 1982 and 1984, with an emphasis on the internal factors of the respective states. To clarify the nature of the textbook controversy in 1982, we have begun with the analysis of the wartime linkage and its postwar development between Japan and the respective East Asian states. Then we have taken up reactions towards the Nakasone military policy, both approval and criticism.

Looking at continuities and discontinuities of wartime relations between Japan and East Asian states, we have found that East Asian states are divided into roughly three categories. The first category goes to South Korea and Indonesia where the wartime collaborators with Japan became leaders after the war. Although Syngman Rhee of South Korea was not a wartime

¹²⁷ Asahi Shimbun, 20 April 1984, p. 7.

collaborator with Japan and was strongly anti-Japanese, the postwar ruling structure of South Korea itself was created by the wartime ruling class who had worked with the Japanese military government; thus, South Korea is to be put in this category. Postwar Indonesia and South Korea showed the continuity of the wartime linkage, and Japanese former militarists maintained strong connection with the politicians and the military men in these states, by increasing special economic ties and supporting the dictatorial military regimes.

The second category applies to Thailand and Malaysia where the struggle between pro-Japanese collaborators and anti-Japanese resisters became a major political issue in the postwar years. In Thailand, the struggle came out between the military and civilian politicians; while in Malaysia, between the Malay and the Chinese. In either state, pro-Japanese collaborators politically overpowered those resisted against the Japanese, and turned to promote friendly relations with Japan.

The third category is found in China, North Korea and Vietnam ¹²⁸ where anti-Japanese leaders took control of postwar politics and wartime linkage was discontinued. Until the normalization of relations with Japan in 1972, China had been a severe accuser of the revival of Japanese militarism and anti-Japanese leaders showed no reconciliation with Japan. Only

¹²⁸ Vietnam before unification needs different classification: South Vietnam is to be included in the first category in which the pro-Japanese collaborators constituted a nucleus of the postwar politics; while North Vietnam falls in the third category.

Vietnam and North Korea continued to condemn today's Japanese militarism harshly, and especially Japanese-North Korean relations remained the lowest without even establishing diplomatic relations. Cambodia and Laos after the communist take-over are included in this category on the ground that the wartime connections with Japan completely halted.

We have not included the Philippines and Singapore in any category because of the lesser importance of the open split between pro-Japanese collaborators and anti-Japanese resistants. Although postwar Philippine politics was led by the anti-Japanese resistants, the pro-Japanese collaborators were allowed to play a role in developing postwar Japanese-Philippine relations especially in economic fields. Singapore's split between the Malay and the Chinese was not so acute as in Malaysia because of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese populaion, and thus the Malaysian-type ethnic struggle did not occur.

Japan's sitting in the anti-communist bloc divided East Asian views towards Japanese military buildup, but we have tried to explain the division of East Asia by examining the internal factors--from the viewpoint of the continuation and discontinuation of wartime relations between Japan and East Asia. Except China which changed its foreign policy drastically in the early 1970's, those states maintaining wartime connections with Japan relatively favored Japan's military buildup. This premise has helped us examine reactions of East

Asian states towards the textbook controversy in 1982.

The textbook controversy produced various repercussions throughout East Asia. It is natural that those states suffered severely from Japanese atrocities reacted strongly against Japan's distortion of history in textbooks. However, the important feature of this controversy is the respective political motives behind the strong accusation of South Korea, China and Vietnam. South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan needed to gain public support by appealing to the anti-Japanese sentiment of the public and also took advantage of this controversy to draw out favorable economic deals from Japan. Chinese revival of condemning Japanese militarism helped ease fear of the Chinese public that the Chinese government might forget about Japanese brutality in the past and collude with the former aggressor for the sake of Four Modernizations. Vietnam took this opportunity to denounce ambivalence of 'Beijing reactionaries'--ardent support of strengthening today's Japanese military forces and condemnation of Japan's past militarism. The ASEAN states refrained from official protests to Japan and showed mixed feelings of hatred and expectation of today's Japan. In the end, the textbook controversy resulted in stimulating the jingoistic sentiment of Japanese right-wing conservatives rather than admonishing their militaristic ideas.

Then, through analyzing East Asian states' reactions towards Japan's recent military buildup under the Nakasone regime, we have reached an irony: those states with bitterest memories of

Japanese militarism supported and encouraged Japan's right-wing drive for military development. China in the communist bloc and South Korea in the anti-communist bloc gave much encouragement to the Nakasone regime's military policy. Singapore and Thailand were supportive of it as well. Though being apprehensive of Japan's military expansion, the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia did not wish to see the decrease of Japan's military power. Today, staunch accusers of Japan's military buildup were only Vietnam and North Korea, and their condemnation was politically weak to influence the Japanese public and military planners in particular.

Consequently, East Asian governments tended to use the public fear of Japanese militarism to their own benefit, not as a deterrence to Japan's military buildup. The most notable case is found in China, which adopted or abandoned the 'remember the war' card to manipulate the public attitudes towards Japan. Either in a communist bloc or not, East Asian states were prepared to use the 'remember the war' card against Japan, if they had some problems with Japan or Japan's military buildup came to a point of nuisance to them. While most of East Asian states generally endorsed Japan's military development, these states had to carry out inconspicuously 'forget the war' campaigns to their people for economic cooperation with Japan. Under this situation the memories of the past was neglected and manipulated, and whole East Asia was moving towards more militarized society, taking off the psychological barrier to

war.

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION

Summary of Analysis

Through our analysis we have observed that in the postwar era Japan's elevation to economic and technological power has not only enabled Japan's military recovery but also revived Japanese conservatives' desire to increase the nation's military capabilities. On the part of East Asian states, we have noticed both deep-rooted suspicion of Japan's military buildup among the general public and approval of reinforcing Japan's military power among anti-Soviet governments. The anti-Soviet governments became less critical of Japan's military buildup owing to strategic consideration to counter the USSR and economic consideration to draw out more favorable deals from Japan. Furthermore, the desire of military modernization within these governments showed implicitly that they would endorse Japan's military buildup on condition that it would help military development in their own countries.

We have analyzed the postwar changes in Japan, from disarmament to rearmament, and the changes in East Asian states, from criticism to endorsement of Japan's rearmament, at three levels. First, we have examined the impact of external and internal pressures on Japan's rearmament in Chapter II. We clarified that Japan's postwar military buildup was not a simple

product of the external pressure but one of combined internal and external pressures: Japanese conservatives discreetly took advantage of US encouragement and used the Soviet threat for Japan's military recovery. Under the cold war scheme, many militarists and reactionaries escaped from punishment and returned to Japanese politics, business, bureaucracy and the newly established SDF. ¹ This failure to dismantle prewar militarism has been recently combined with new arrogance of the Japanese as a result of their economic and technological power. Here we have seen an emergence of neo-nationalism with a hint of militarism that has aimed at removing completely the legacy of the defeat and gaining more military capabilities.

Second, in Chapter III, we have focused on how East Asia was split into two blocs by external pressures from the USA and the USSR and how the 'external pressures created two contrasting views towards Japanese rearmament--acceptance and severe criticism. As Japan's rearmament was promoted with the excuse of countering the communist threat, soon after the war East Asian states in the US bloc had to change the target of threat from Japanese militarism to communism, thereby accepting Japan's rearmament reluctantly. Since the drastic change of Chinese policy in the early 1970's, East Asian anti-Soviet states now

¹John Herz points out that the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo only tried major war criminals whereas the Tribunal in Nürnberg was followed by trials of generals, industrialists, diplomats, SS leaders, and other persons at different levels. "Denazification and Related Policies," From Dictatorship to Democracy: Coping with the Legacies of Authoritarian and Totalitarianism, ed., John H. Herz. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), p. 19.

including China, increased their endorsement of Japan's military buildup, showing a sharp contrast to the continued accusation of the revival of Japanese militarism by pro-Soviet states. East Asian states basically formulated their views towards Japan's rearmament according to their affiliation with one of the two superpowers.

Third, in Chapter IV, we have concentrated our examination on internal factors in the respective East Asian states, another source influencing their views towards Japanese military buildup. Nearly 40 years after the war, antipathy against Japanese militarism erupted in East Asia in 1982 on the occasion of the textbook controversy. To examine reactions to the textbook controversy, we have started with an analysis of the wartime relations between Japan and the respective East Asian states and continuities or discontinuities of those relations in the postwar era. Regardless of the US or Soviet world strategies which were formulated after the war, the memories of Japanese militarism rankled in the minds of the general public; while the textbook controversy revealed that several East Asian governments tended to exploit public fear of Japanese militarism to their advantage for consolidating their national unity and drawing out favorable economic deals from Japan. The existing political, economic and partially military ties between Japan and East Asian anti-Soviet states made the anti-Soviet governments permissive of Japan's military power, and Japan's recent military buildup did not face severe criticism except one

from pro-Soviet states.

In general, the anti-Soviet states gave connivance to Japan's rearmament at the height of the cold war and perceived the increase of Japan's military power to be helpful for countering their common targets, communist states. The Japanese government, on the other hand, tried to emphasize the external pressure as the main cause of increasing 'defense' capabilities, concealing the internal pressure working for recreating militarily strong Japan. Under the new US-USSR confrontation since the late 1970's, we have seen an emerging link between Japan's military buildup and military modernization in anti-Soviet East Asian states. As Japan's military power increased, so did military power in East Asian states. It seems that military development in the region has helped to bury the old memories of Japanese invasion.

Prospects for the Future

Without severe criticism from East Asia, it is expected that Japan will further strengthen its military power backed up by economic and technological power. Anti-Soviet East Asian states will refrain from criticizing Japan's military buildup as long as they need economic and security cooperation with Japan. Pro-Soviet states will continue to oppose Japan's military reinforcement, but their voices will not be listened to seriously by the Japanese government. Encouraged by the US

pressure and the endorsement from the friendly East Asian governments, the incumbent Prime Minister Nakasone has shown ambition in raising Japan's political and military status.

What then, is the danger in Japan's military buildup? Japan's postwar rearmament raises a persistent problem that military development has spurred up conservatives' sentiment to regain power status not only with economic but also with political and military power. The future problem is whether Japan will strengthen its military power without reviving 'militarism.' We need to reexamine the possibility of reviving 'militarism' in Japan, referring back to Okabe's definition of 'militarism' cited before: "a tendency in a nation which places highest priority on military values and on war preparation, to the extent that the nation does not hesitate to take military actions abroad in order to protect its overseas interest." ²

The first issue is whether there will be a generation of young Japanese who will wish to sustain militarism. Those politicians, militarists and bureaucrats who sustained old Japanese militarism and worked toward the establishment of the 'Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere' have constituted a nucleus of Japan's postwar politics, but these men are old now: a time of generation change has occurred. Postwar generations brought up in economic prosperity are less militant by most standard. A strong force who protests against accelerated

²Revival of Japanese Militarism?, Occasional Paper, No. 22 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1974), p. 1.

military buildup has not developed. As described in Chapter II, recent public opinion polls show that the majority of the respondents endorse Japan's military forces, which is a significant change from the public's hesitation to accept the SDF at the early years of its establishment. Sensitive handling of military issues has disappeared in today's Japan, and voices of aversion to war and increasing war potential are not strong among those who have never known actual war. As shown in the textbook controversy in Chapter IV, postwar Japan has not properly educated the young generation to learn a lesson from the past war and has not actively endeavored to foster anti-militarist generation.

The second issue is whether Japan will be able to handle economic catastrophe, if it comes, without resorting to military expansion. Postwar Japan has been fortunate in expanding its economic activities all over the world, and without natural resources and food from abroad Japan could not have sustained the lives of its huge population. Japan's postwar political stability has largely depended on prosperous economy. However, if that economy fails, will Japan's fragile democracy be crushed?; if circumstances warrant, will Japan be prepared to "take military actions abroad in order to protect its overseas interest"? The recent controversial plan of defending 1,000 nautical-mile sea-lanes ambitiously aims at extending the scope of 'defense' beyond Japanese territorial air and water and shows signs of protecting Japan's interest by all means through

military actions.

In view of these dangerous signs, a question is still repeated as to the possibility of reviving militarism in Japan. As long as the Japanese have not yet constructed a strong barrier against militarism, we need to carefully watch the direction of Japan's military power. Also, since Japan's military buildup will have most impact on its neighboring states, we need to discern whether further Japan's military buildup will be in line with the wishes of East Asian nations.

Japan's military buildup poses two problems in relation to East Asian states. First, it is questionable whether an emerging link between the increase of Japan's military power and military modernization of the anti-Soviet East Asian states will contribute to peace and security of the region, or whether it will escalate tensions in the region. In view of the fact that most East Asian states are under repressive regimes backed up by the military forces, the security cooperation between Japan and those states tends to encourage and expand military sectors that mainly work for the repression of internal dissidents. This will serve only the interests of the repressive regimes, not those of the general public.

Second, Japan's military buildup tied as it is with the US world strategy may cause unnecessary tension in the region by inviting military competition between the USSR and Japan. When East Asian states strive to separate themselves from superpower

influence and secure their own safety by avoiding heightening tension with any state, Japan's military alertness may exert undue pressure on the East Asian states. Japan's pledge to assume military responsibility as a member of the 'Western' alliance is not necessarily welcomed by the anti-Soviet East Asian states, which do not face direct military confrontation against the USSR as the NATO allies do.

Therefore, Japan's further military buildup will irritate East Asian nations in the long run. Pro-Soviet states will continue to be critical of Japan's military collusion with the USA. Anti-Soviet states will endorse Japan's military buildup as long as it serves as a counterbalance against Soviet military power, but they will not wish Japan unnecessarily to heighten tension against the USSR. Especially, China may raise once again an opposition to Japan's military reinforcement if Chinese interests will be injured by heightened Japanese antagonism against the USSR.

In the postwar era, East Asian states have observed that not only US pressure but also Japan's internal pressure has spurred up Japanese military buildup. The Japanese government tried to impress East Asia with its pretended image of pacifism; however, from the viewpoints of East Asian nations, the catastrophe of the atomic bombs weakened the publicization of Japanese atrocities in East Asia. Since Japan's further military buildup will not contribute to easing tension in East Asia, Japan's choice will be limited to abandoning an anachronistic idea of

becoming a military power commensurate with its economic capability. And, it is of great importance that the East Asian states will not add further fuel to Japan's internal pressure promoting military buildup because of their absorption in the immediate interests in economic and military cooperation with Japan.

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APPENDICES: TABLES

Table 2.1: Japan: Growth of GNP and Defense Budget

Fiscal Year	GNP (initial forecast) (bn yen)	Defense budget (Original) (bn yen)	Rate of increase from previous year (%)	Defense budget to GNP (%)
'55	7,559	135	-3.3	1.78
'60	12,748	157	0.6	1.23
'65	28,160	301	9.6	1.07
'70	72,440	569	17.7	0.79
'71	84,320	671	17.8	0.80
'72	90,550	800	19.3	0.88
'73	109,800	936	16.9	0.85
'74	131,500	1,093	16.8	0.83
'75	158,500	1,327	21.4	0.84
'76	168,100	1,512	13.9	0.90
'77	192,850	1,691	11.8	0.88
'78	210,600	1,901	12.4	0.90
'79	232,000	2,094	10.2	0.90
'80	247,800	2,230	6.5	0.90
'81	264,800	2,400	7.6	0.91
'82	277,200	2,586	7.8	0.93
'83	281,700	2,754	6.5	0.98
'84	296,000	2,935	6.5	0.99

Source: The data for 1955-1982 are taken from Satoh Yukio, The Evolution of Japanese Security Policy, Adelphi Papers No. 178 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982), p. 43.
 For 1983-84, from, Japan, Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 1984 (English Translation of the Defense White Paper) (Tokyo: Japan Times, n.d.), p. 266.

Table 2.2: Japan-US Trade

	(bn yen)		
Year	Exports to the USA	Imports from the USA	Balance
'55	164	279	-115
'60	397	559	-162
'65	893	852	41
'70	2,138	2,001	137
'71	2,621	1,748	873
'72	2,725	1,802	923
'73	2,568	2,518	50
'74	3,734	3,694	40
'75	3,312	3,441	-129
'76	4,653	3,505	1,148
'77	5,292	3,357	1,935
'78	5,258	3,108	2,150
'79	5,773	4,457	1,316
'80	7,118	5,558	1,560
'81	8,519	5,552	2,967
'82	9,015	5,991	3,024
'83	10,179	5,855	4,324

Source: Japan, Management and Coordination Agency, Statistics Bureau, Japan Statistical Yearbook 1984 (Tokyo: Statistics Bureau, Management and Coordination Agency, 1984).

The data for 1971-74 are from Japan Statistical Yearbook 1976; for 1976-78, from Japan Statistical Yearbook 1980.

Table 2.3: Public Opinion Poll on the SDF and Defense

(1) Necessity of the SDF

Question: Which do you think is better, to have the SDF or not?

Year	Better to have	Better not to have	Don't know
'56	58	10	23
'59	65	11	24
'63	76	6	18
'65	82	5	13
'67	77	6	17
'69	75	10	15
'72	73	12	15
'75	79	8	13
'78	86	5	9
'81	82	8	10

(2) Defense Budget

Question: Is it better to increase defense budget or not?

Year	Better to increase	Maintain the current level	Better to decrease	Don't Know
'69	24	38	14	24
'72	10	42	23	25
'75	13	48	15	24
'78	20	48	10	22
'81	20	47	15	18

(Table 2.3 cont'd)

(3) How to Protect Japan

Question: What kind of measures should Japan take to protect its security?

Year	Maintain the current measures (US-Japan Security Treaty and the SDF)	Abolish US-Japan Security Treaty and protect independently by strengthening the SDF	Abolish US-Japan Security Treaty and decrease or abolish the SDF	Others, Don't Know
'69	41	13	10	36
'72	41	11	16	32
'75	54	9	9	28
'78	61	8	5	26
'81	65	6	7	22

Source: Japan, Prime Minister's Office, Jieitai ni Kansuru Seron Chosa (Public Opinion Poll on the SDF) (Tokyo: Prime Minister's Office, 1970); Jieitai to Boei Mondai ni Kansuru Seron Chosa (Public Opinion Poll on the SDF and Defense Issues), 1973, 1976, 1979 and 1982 editions.

Table 2.4: Japan's Export of Weapons: 1963-82

	(million US\$, current price)
Year	Value
'63	9
'64	13
'65	11
'66	4
'67	4
'68	7
'69	14
'70	6
'71	2
'72	10
'73	20
'74	20
'75	30
'76	10
'77	30
'78	90
'79	50
'80	60
'81	200
'82	60

Source: The data for 1963-71 are taken from USA., Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfer 1963-73; for 1972-82, from World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfer 1972-82.

Table 2.5: Japan: Changes in Major Account Expenditures (Original Budget)

Fiscal Year	General Account Outlays		Defense Budget		Social Security Budget		Education Science Budget	
	(bn yen)	Rate of increase (%)	(bn yen)	Rate of increase (%)	(bn yen)	Rate of increase (%)	(bn yen)	Rate of increase (%)
'60	1,765	-	158	-	192	-	225	
'65	3,745	-	305	-	544	-	494	
'70	8,213	-	590	-	1,157	-	964	
'75	20,837	-	1,367	-	4,031	-	2,698	
'77	28,514	17.4	1,690	11.7	5,692	18.4	3,357	12.0
'78	34,295	20.3	1,901	12.4	6,781	19.1	3,851	14.7
'79	38,600	12.6	2,094	10.2	7,626	12.5	4,299	11.6
'80	42,588	10.3	2,230	6.5	8,212	11.6	4,525	5.2
'81	46,788	9.9	2,400	7.6	8,836	7.6	4,742	4.8
'82	49,680	6.2	2,586	7.8	9,084	2.8	4,863	2.6
'83	50,379	1.4	2,754	6.5	9,139	0.6	4,818	-0.9
'84	50,627	0.5	2,935	6.5	9,321	1.9	4,867	1.0

Source:

The data for 1960-75 are taken from: Japan, Management and Coordination Agency, Statistics Bureau, Japan Statistical Yearbook 1984, 34th ed. (Tokyo: Japan Statistical Association, 1984), p. 440.

For 1977-82, from: Satoh Yukio, The Evolution of Japanese Security Policy, Adelphi Papers No. 178 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982), p. 43.

For 1983-84, from: Japan, Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 1984 (English Translation of the Defense White Paper) (Tokyo: Japan Times, n.d.), p. 266.

Table 2.6: The SDF and the Constitution: Opinion Polls

Question: Do you think that the Constitution ought to be amended so as to explicitly recognize the SDF constitutionally?
(Survey by the Asahi Shimbun, 3 January 1981)

Yes	44.0%
No	41.0%
Others, No answer	15.0%

Question: Is it desirable or not to amend Article 9 of the Constitution so that Japan can possess fullfledged armed forces?
(Survey by the Yomiuri Shimbun, 9 February 1981)

Desirable	13.5%
Not desirable	71.2%
No answer	15.4%

Question: Do you think that the SDF is against the Constitution?
(Survey by the Asahi Shimbun, 25 March 1981)

Yes	17.0%
No	47.0%
Hard to say which	23.0%
Don't know, No answer	13.0%

Cited in Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 1981 (Tokyo: Japan Times, 1981), pp. 300-301.

Table 3.1: Major Collective Security Treaties/Agreements in East Asia

<u>Name of Treaty/Agreement</u>	<u>Signed</u>	<u>Partners</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Military Assistance Agreement	1950	Thailand, USA	
Mutual Defense Treaty between South Korea and USA	1953	South Korea, USA	
The Manila Pact	1954	Australia, France, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, UK, USA	SEATO, which was set up to implement the pact, was disbanded in 1977.
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and USA	1960	Japan, USA	The former treaty was signed in 1951.
Soviet-North Korean Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance	1961	North Korea, USSR	
Sino-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance	1961	China, North Korea	
Five Power Defense Arrangements	1971	Australia, Malaysia, Newzealand, Singapore, UK	UK withdrew forces in Mar. 1976. NZ troops remain in Singapore, as do Australian troops in Malaysia and Singapore.
Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation	1978	USSR, Vietnam	

(Table 3.1 cont'd)

*Treaties Terminated

<u>Name of Treaty</u>	<u>Signed</u>	<u>Terminated</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance	1950	1980	
Mutual Defense Treaty between USA and Taiwan	1954	1980	Some arms supply and production arrangements continue under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act.

Source: Japan, The Defense Agency, Defense of Japan '81 (Tokyo: Japan Times, 1981), pp. 248-253.
International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance, 1984-85 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1984), p. 95.

Table 3.2: Japan's Reparations to Southeast Asia

<u>Country</u>	<u>Signed</u>	<u>Terms</u> (years)	<u>Reparations</u> (mil\$)	<u>Loans</u> (mil\$)
Burma	I 5 Nov. '54	10	200.00	50.0
	II 29 Mar. '63	12	140.00	30.0
Philippines	9 May '56	20	550.00	250.0
Indonesia*	20 Jan. '58	12	223.08	400.0
South Vietnam	15 May '59	5	39.00	7.5
<u>Total</u>			<u>1,152.08</u>	<u>737.5</u>

*In addition to the reparations, Japan agreed to cancel trade debt, \$172.92 million.

Source: Jon Halliday, and Gavan McCormack, Japanese Imperialism Today: Co-Prosperity in Greater East Asia (London: Penguin Books, 1973), p. 21.
 Masashi Nishihara, The Japanese and Sukarno's Indonesia: Tokyo-Jakarta Relations, 1951-1966 (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1976).

Table 3.3: Major Post-WWII Wars and Armed Conflicts in East Asia

<u>Name of War or Armed Conflict</u>	<u>Duration</u>	<u>Parties</u>
Chinese Civil War	1945-49	Chinese Nationalist Party vs. Chinese Communist Party
Indonesian Independence War	1945-49	The Netherlands vs. Indonesia
1st Indochina War	1945-54	France vs. Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia
Korean War	1950-53	South Korea, USA, UN vs. North Korea, China
Bombardment of Quemoy-Matsu Islands	1954-58	China vs. Taiwan, USA
Malayan Insurgency	1948-57	UK vs. Malayan Communist Party
Malaysian Insurgency	1957-60	Malaysia vs. Malayan Communist Party
Sino-India Border Conflict	1959-63	India vs. China
2nd Indochina War	1960-75	South Vietnam, USA, Philippines, South Korea, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand vs. South Vietnamese National Liberation Front, North Vietnam
West Irian Conflict	1961-62	Indonesia vs. the Netherlands

(Table 3.3 cont'd)

Malaysian Confrontation	1963-66	Indonesia vs. Malaysia, UK, Australia, New Zealand
Sino-Soviet Border Conflict	1969	China vs. USSR
Cambodian Civil War	1970-75	Cambodian Government vs. Kampuchean National Unity Front
Timor War	1975-78	Indonesia vs. Timorese faction claiming independence of Timor
Vietnamese-Kampuchean Conflict	1977-	Vietnam vs. Democratic Kampuchea
Sino-Vietnamese Conflict	1979-	China vs. Vietnam

Source: Japan, The Defense Agency, Defense of Japan '81 (Tokyo: Japan Times, 1981), pp. 255-257.
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament 1968/69 (New York: Humanities Press, 1969), pp. 366-369.

Table 3.4: Flow of Financial Resources from Japan to East Asian States (1983)

net disbursement, million \$

State	Official Development Assistance (ODA)			Other Official and Private Flow			Total	Grand Total 1969-83		
	Grants	Gov't loans	Sub total	Direct invest- ment	Export credits	Sub total				
	Non- repayable economic co- operation	Technical co- operation	Sub total							
S. Korea	-	9.23	9.23	-15.86	-6.63	509.72	-294.59	215.13	208.50	5,130.41
China	30.62	20.46	51.08	299.07	350.15	203.83	-170.11	33.72	383.87	5,419.91
Philippines	35.84	26.13	61.97	85.05	147.02	38.30	155.89	191.19	341.21	3,413.88
Indonesia	20.04	39.99	60.03	175.43	235.46	74.42	130.16	204.58	440.04	6,421.22
Thailand	52.16	37.19	89.35	158.77	248.12	140.30	41.11	181.41	429.53	2,965.53
Malaysia	6.72	22.57	29.29	63.01	92.30	694.28	133.63	827.91	920.01	2,860.15
Singapore	0.15	7.83	7.98	-4.13	3.85	203.79	-31.63	172.16	176.01	1,581.46
Kampuchea	-	0.09	0.09	-	0.09	-	-	-	0.09	41.79
Laos	1.73	0.31	2.04	-	2.04	-	0.33	0.33	2.37	79.52
Vietnam	0.10	0.60	0.70	-	0.70	12.02	-8.42	3.60	4.30	300.56

(Table 3.4 cont'd)

Note: - indicates net repayment

Source: Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Waga Gakko no Kinkyō 1984 (Blue Book of Foreign Affairs) (Tokyo: Ministry of Finance, Printing Bureau, 1984), pp. 610-611.

Table 3.5a: Japan-East Asian Trade, 1955-1983

Im: Imports from Japan. Ex: Exports to Japan.

State	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1981	1982	1983
China	Im	10	1.0	88	205	670	1,141	1,115	1,168
	Ex	29	7.5	81	91	455	978	1,170	1,209
Indonesia	Im	23	40	74	114	548	780	906	843
	Ex	29	25	54	229	1,018	3,004	2,916	2,474
Kampuchea	Im	-	5	4.8	3.9	0	5.6	2.4	0.8
	Ex	-	3	2.8	2.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1
N. Korea	Im	-	0.4	5.9	8.4	53	85	64	78
	Ex	-	0	5.3	12	19	41	31	30
S. Korea	Im	14	36	65	295	667	1,225	1,246	1,427
	Ex	3.4	6.7	15	82	389	681	748	800
Malaysia	Im	4.9	11	27	60	168	465	533	659
	Ex	33	70	95	151	205	792	643	744
Philippines	Im	19	56	86	163	305	382	424	415
	Ex	32	57	91	192	331	445	380	310

(Table 3.5a cont'd)

State	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1981	1982	1983
Singapore	Im	21	31	45	152	452	984	1,084	1,057
	Ex	5.9	4.9	12	31	119	430	454	349
Thailand	Im	23	42	79	162	284	494	474	596
	Ex	23	26	47	68	215	233	257	242
Vietnam*	Im	-	24	15	54	24	24	23	28
	Ex	-	5.4	6.5	3.9	12	8.2	8.9	8.9

*Until 1975 figures of North and South Vietnam are combined together.

Source: Japan, Management and Coordination Agency, Statistics Bureau, Japan Statistics Yearbook 1984.

Table 3.5b: Japan-East Asian Trade: Degree of Dependency on Japan

Percentage of imports from Japan and that of exports to Japan in total imports and exports of each state.
(Im: Imports from Japan. Ex: Exports to Japan)

Year		China	Indo- nesia	Kampuchea (Cambodia)	S. Korea	Laos	Malaysia	Philippines	Singapore	Thailand	Vietnam
'71	Im	na	32.9	13.3	39.8	1.8	19.5	29.5	19.6	37.7	na
	Ex	na	45.4	22.2	24.5	-	18.2	35.6	7.1	24.9	na
'72	Im	na	34.1	8.3	40.9	9.5	20.5	30.6	19.7	36.9	na
	Ex	na	50.1	35.1	25.1	-	17.1	33.8	6.4	21.0	na
'73	Im	na	31.0	4.9	40.7	12.6	22.7	31.4	18.3	35.7	na
	Ex	na	53.2	13.6	38.5	1.9	18.1	36.9	8.0	26.3	na
'74	Im	na	29.4	1.4	38.3	18.8	22.3	27.0	17.9	31.4	na
	Ex	na	53.4	11.6	30.9	3.3	16.9	34.4	11.4	25.9	na
'75	Im	na	31.0	na	33.4	9.9	20.1	27.9	16.9	31.5	37.5
	Ex	na	43.9	na	25.4	12.2	14.5	37.4	8.7	27.8	35.0
'76	Im	na	26.2	na	35.3	18.2	21.3	27.1	16.0	32.5	35.9
	Ex	na	41.7	na	23.4	22.2	21.1	23.5	10.3	25.8	34.1
'77	Im	na	27.3	na	36.3	26.5	23.4	25.2	17.5	32.4	23.8
	Ex	na	40.2	na	21.2	13.9	20.4	22.5	9.5	19.7	36.5
'78	Im	na	30.3	na	40.0	7.3	23.1	27.5	19.1	31.0	23.5
	Ex	na	39.2	na	20.6	33.6	21.6	22.9	9.7	20.3	25.3

(Table 3.5b cont'd)

Year	China	Indo- nesia	Kampuchea (Cambodia)	S. Korea	Laos	Malaysia	Philippines	Singapore	Thailand	Vietnam
'79	na	29.3	na	32.7	11.8	22.4	22.8	17.0	25.8	13.2
	na	46.1	na	22.3	48.4	23.4	26.4	9.6	21.2	27.9
'80	na	31.5	na	26.2	11.7	23.0	19.9	17.8	20.7	12.6
	na	49.3	na	17.3	22.9	22.8	26.6	8.1	15.1	28.7
'81	28.6	30.7	na	24.4	11.7	24.6	19.0	18.8	24.0	14.9
	22.1	47.4	na	16.5	36.6	21.1	21.9	10.1	14.2	2.6
'82	20.6	25.9	na	21.9	12.9	22.7	19.9	17.9	23.5	15.9
	25.4	50.2	na	15.5	4.6	9.3	22.9	10.9	13.7	17.4
'83	25.9	23.2	na	23.8	na	25.3	16.9	18.0	27.4	na
	37.6	45.8	na	13.9	na	17.4	20.4	9.2	15.1	na

Note: -: nil or negligible.

na: not available or applicable.

Data of North Korea is not available.

Source: Figures of China (1981-83) and figures for 1983 of other states are calculated by the author based on data taken from The Far East and Australasia 1986 (London: Europa Publications, 1985). Figures of Kampuchea, Laos and Vietnam are calculated by the author based on data taken from the United Nations, Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific 1982 (Bangkok: United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 1983).

All other figures for 1971-82 are taken from the United Nations, 1982 Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, Vol. 1 (New York: United Nations, 1984) and 1980 Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, Vol. 1.

Table 3.6a: Military Spending, Population and Economy in East Asian States

(US\$)

State	Population (million) 1984	GDP (bn\$) 1983	Military Expenditure 1982		Numbers in Armed Forces (000) 1984	Est. Reservists (000) 1984(g)	Para Military (000) 1984		
			million\$	\$ per capita				% of govt. spending (e)	% of GDP(f)
China	1,039.0	na (a)	9,464 (b)	9	15.8	4.2	4,000.0	5,000.0	12,000.0
Indonesia	158.3	73.0	2,870	19	12.4	3.3	281.0	na	82.0
Japan	120.8	1,178.9	10,361	87	5.2	1.0	245.0	43.6	na
Kampuchea(c)	(6-7)	na	na	na	na	na	(30.0)	na	na
N. Korea	19.6	19.1 (d)	1,724	92	14.6	10.2	784.5	3,300.0	4,138.0
S. Korea	41.6	76.6	4,324	110	36.0	6.0	622.0	4,830.0	6,220.0
Laos(c)	4.0	na	na	na	na	na	53.7	na	na
Malaysia	15.8	29.0	2,132	144	17.7	8.2	124.5	61.2	366.3
Philippines	53.4	34.2	910	18	14.8	2.3	104.8	118.0	108.5
Singapore	2.5	15.1	922	373	22.9	na	55.5	150.0	37.5

(Table 3.6a cont'd)

Thailand	50.7	40.3	1,822	38	25.3	5.0	235.3	500	72.0
Vietnam(c)	58.8	na	na	na	na	na	1,227.0	na	na

Note:

na: not available or not applicable.

(a) Western estimates of Chinese GNP varies greatly from \$2,600bn to \$6,000bn in 1982.

(b) Chinese Official defense budget figures. The figure is not comparable to Western estimates, since they exclude a number of items, notably pay and allowance for the troops.

(c) Data of Kampuchea, Laos and Vietnam are unreliable or unavailable.

(d) GNP

(e) Based on local currency. This is designed to show national trends only. International comparison may be invalidated by differences in the scope of government sector and in budgetary definition.

(f) Based on local currency.

(g) Countries' systems vary. The figures given may include reservists with recent training, active territorial militia and forces available for later mobilization.

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Military Balance, 1984/85 (London: IISS, 1984).

Table 3.6b: Military Expenditure as % of Government Spending in East Asian States

Year	China	Indonesia	Japan	N. Korea	S. Korea	Malaysia	Philippines	Singapore	Thailand
'72	na	19.7	7.2	na	21.2	14.5	22.1	20.8	19.7
'73	na	21.8	7.0	na	22.2	14.7	22.6	15.4	18.9
'74	na	15.8	6.4	na	25.3	13.8	24.2	16.5	18.5
'75	na	16.7	6.6	na	29.2	17.3	19.3	18.1	25.7
'76	na	12.1	6.2	16.7	34.6	16.9	na	15.3	18.0
'77	na	18.7	5.9	15.4	34.3	12.5	18.3	18.5	25.2
'78	na	14.6	5.8	14.2	33.3	13.4	17.9	16.6	20.0
'79	17.8	13.7	5.3	16.0	29.5	16.0	18.9	23.4	29.9
'80	na	12.3	4.7	14.6	36.0	14.3	13.0	16.5	20.5
'81	15.4	12.4	5.2	14.8	36.3	17.4	13.7	20.0	25.8
'82	15.8	12.4	5.2	14.6	36.0	17.7	14.8	22.9	25.3

Note: na: not available.

Data of Kampuchea, Laos and Vietnam is unavailable.

This is designed to show national trends only. International comparison may be invalidated by differences in the scope of government sector and in budgetary definitions.

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Military Balance 1984/85 (London: IISS, 1984); Military Balance 1983/84, 1982/83, 1981/82, 1979/80, 1976/77, 1975/76.

Table 3.7a: Military Expenditure in East Asian States: Local Currency, 1950-83

(Local currency, current prices)

Year	China		Indo-nesia		JapanKampuchea (Cambodia)		N. Korea		S. Korea		Laos		Malay-sia		Phili-ppines		Singa-pore (d)		Thai-land		Vietnam (e)	
	mn yuan	thou rupiahs	mn new rupiahs	bn yen	mn riels	mn won	thou won	mn won	mn kips	mn ringgits	mn pesos	mn S\$	mn baht	mn dong	mn thou piastres	mn thou	mn thou	mn thou	mn thou	mn thou	mn thou	mn thou
'50	na	(a)na	(b)119	na	na	na	na	na	8	114	na	na	298	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
'55	na	(a)na	151	na	na	na	5	na	161	157	na	na	855	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
'60	na	(a)na	163	{1,495}	(c){565}	14	na	na	131	193	na	na	1,378	1,103	{7.6}	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
'65	na	(a)na	300	1,846	{880}	29	7,391	na	303	237	na	na	1,921	na	28.5	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
'70	na	102	570	5,966	(1,800)	101	9,131	na	510	500	311	4,220	na	na	128.3	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
'75	na	407	1,356	na	(1,890)	452	na	na	(927)	2,655	744	8,339	na	na	{293}	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
'76	na	434	1,498	na	2,058	712	na	na	779	3,700	934	10,438	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
'77	16,400	577	1,669	na	2,096	1,000	na	na	972	5,100	1,128	13,488	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
'78	18,500	683	1,868	na	2,477	1,239	na	na	1,172	4,800	1,137	17,054	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
'79	24,500	865	2,046	na	2,563	1,559	na	na	1,834	5,240	1,151	{23,199}	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
'80	21,300	951	2,196	na	2,750	2,167	na	na	2,118	{5,121}	1,401	25,047	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
'81	18,600	1,224	2,358	na	3,010	2,770	na	na	3,688	6,700	1,663	28,680	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
'82	19,700	1,445	2,540	na	3,269	3,447	na	na	4,850	8,300	1,919	32,578	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
'83	-	(1,609)	2,729	na	3,602	3,420	na	na	5,479	8,800	2,011	36,062	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na

(Table 3.7a cont'd)

Note: na: not available or not applicable.

mn: million.

thous: thousand.

{ } : SIPRI estimates.

() : Imputed values, with a high degree of uncertainty.

(a): Because of high rates of inflation, these figures are not meaningful.

(b): 1951.

(c): 1961.

(d): Include internal security, etc.

(e): From 2 July 1976, North and South Vietnam constitute a single state, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, for which no military expenditure figures are available.

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1980 (London: Tayloe & Francis, 1983), pp. 26-27.
SIPRI Yearbook 1983, pp. 168-169.
SIPRI Yearbook 1984, pp. 124-125.

Table 3.7b: Military Expenditure in East Asian States: US\$ million, 1975-82

Year	China (a/b)	Indonesia	Japan	Kampuchea (Cambodia)	N. Korea (b)	S. Korea	Laos	Malaysia	Philippines	Singapore	Thailand	Vietnam
'75	na	1,108	4,620	na	878	943	27	385	407	344	542	na
'76	32,400	1,024	5,058	na	na	1,500	na	353	410	315	601	na
'77	17,000	1,515	6,090	na	1,000	2,033	42	542	680	411	746	na
'78	40,000	2,036	9,033	na	1,034	2,603	na	712	794	444	794	na
'79	46,000	1,653	9,120	na	1,363	3,181	37	1,165	760	529	1,554	na
'80	56,941	2,070	8,960	na	1,300	3,460	(c)21	1,465	962	574	1,092	na
'81	9,853	2,713	10,728	na	1,601	4,285	na	2,037	832	789	1,669	na
'82	9,464	2,870	10,361	na	1,724	4,324	na	2,132	910	922	1,822	na

Note: n.a.: not available.

(a): Since 1981 the Chinese government has released official defense budget figures. The figures until 1979 are estimates given by IISS. Chinese official figures are not comparable to Western defense estimates, since they exclude a number of items, notably pay and allowances for the troops.

(b): The difficulty of calculating exchange rates makes conversion to dollars and international comparisons imprecise.

(c): Data unreliable.

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Military Balance, 1984-85 (London: IISS, 1984).
Military Balance, 1983-84; Military Balance, 1981-82; Military Balance, 1979-80.