

CASE SCREENING: A STUDY OF POLICE DECISION-MAKING

by

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## ABSTRACT

There is a limited amount of research focusing on the role of case screening by police in the Canadian context. American case screening literature emphasizes the use of formalized, statistically derived case screening models to facilitate decision-making in evaluating criminal incidents for further investigation. However, Canadian criminal investigation research has tended to suggest that these formal case screening models may be inapplicable and of limited utility to Canadian police administrators. Nonetheless, all relevant research stresses the importance of management control over this decision-making process.

This thesis examines American literature concerning the development and perceived need for the implementation of formal case screening models in an attempt to identify potential strengths and weaknesses of those models. Additionally, the study addresses possible concerns and issues of police management in reviewing this decision-making process.

A descriptive analysis conducted in a large Canadian municipal police department documents investigative phases, information processing, and the role of case screening in the criminal investigation process in this particular police organization. Specific attention is given to active case screening as conducted in "generalist" detective units. This examination records and analyzes case screening decisions by detective supervisory personnel, subsequent case conclusions and

outcomes, and investigative activities engaged in by detectives in reaching case outcomes. Findings suggest that the present system is informal, promoting a situation whereby the potential of organizational efficiency and effectiveness in achieving higher case clearances is diminished.

This study concludes with several recommendations directed at a realignment of existing investigative resources which may potentially enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the case screening process.

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## DEDICATION

To Nana, on her 86th birthday; a fine and gracious lady who is devoted to the love of God and family.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

Blake (1981:77) questions whether there is a "clear, precise, or definitive role for police in Canadian society". He states:

Some definitions (of the police role) go further and become tenets, generally accepted and acted upon by most police, while others are merely policy, leaving the individual policeman to interpret for himself exactly what he should be doing. In addition, there are role definitions of the police formulated by the public and the public's expectations, which may be quite different from those defined by the police.

These comments suggest that much of the police role involves a great deal of individual interpretative action. However, other questions are raised about various law enforcement functions; how criminal investigations are conducted; and, more importantly, how criminal investigations are managed. Additional concerns are raised about the minimum level of service citizens can expect of their police and the stance taken by the police in response to reported crime.

Grant (1981), in writing a study paper for the Law Reform Commission of Canada, notes that the police must develop a "preventive policing philosophy". He declares:

It is not enough for a police force simply to react to public calls for service and reports of crime. A modern police force must see such responses as simply the beginning of the task. An important evaluative function has to be built into analysing this raw data and seeking preventive remedies using either existing community resources or contributing to have them put into place. Police resources used to prevent trouble arising in the

future are resources well spent (p.67-68).

Another recommendation, in facilitating a reallocation of investigative resources to provide a more comprehensive service to the public, suggests that:

A major reorganization of detective resources should occur to ensure that available detective personnel are not only employed on the investigation of reported crimes but are also engaged on pro-active measures not dependent on individualized victimization (p.69).

Before such a recommendation can be seriously considered, existing investigation processes should be analyzed. More precisely, such an analysis should focus on investigative decision-making and its management, in relation to reported crime. It is suggested that the early decisions set the course for further investigative action. It follows that if early decisions are managed prudently, investigative resources may be spared and reallocated to more productive pursuits (i.e., pro-active policing measures). Ultimately, the return will be an improved police service which both the police administration and public can accept.

Specifically, the management of criminal investigations seems to demand a thorough examination of the case screening process as an important, first step in evaluating the efficiency and effectiveness of the police organization's investigative process.<sup>1</sup> It is at the case screening stage that possible

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<sup>1</sup>Throughout this thesis the term "efficiency and effectiveness" refers to management efficiency or effectiveness in achieving its desired goals. This term could be measured with regard to the degree of job satisfaction among personnel, departmental or unit clearance rates, and/or the cost-effectiveness of various operations with the police organization.

deficiencies in investigative effort can be most readily detected. This is due to the fact that important pivotal decision-making takes place at this point in elevating preliminary investigations to follow-up investigations. Furthermore, case screening personnel should be in an ideal position to assess the quality of preliminary investigation reports, estimate the potential for a successful follow-up investigation, appraise and target chronic crime problems, and make judgements as to the possible linkages between reported criminal events. As well, based upon decisions made at the case screening level, resource allocation judgements may be made with regard to the number and deployment of both uniformed members and detective personnel. Consequently, this may enable a reduction of the overall crime problem by allowing the police to more effectively respond to incidents of reported crime.

In an attempt to provide information on investigative decision-making, this thesis will focus on the management of criminal investigations, particularly the case screening function. It is this decision-making process which determines whether or not a "case" warrants further investigative action by detectives. In turn, these decisions may directly affect subsequent clearance rates, the deployment of police personnel, and resource allocation decisions; which are all of major concern to both police administrators and the public.

## Description and Need for Case Screening

Case screening is a mechanism to facilitate decision-making regarding the continuation or cessation of an investigation based upon the existence of sufficient solvability factors obtained at the preliminary investigative level (Cawley, Miron, Araujo, Wasserman, Mannello, & Hufferman;1977:37). Solvability factors are those elements of information regarding a crime which have been demonstrated to be important in determining the likelihood of solving a crime. Greenwood, Chaiken, & Petersilia (1975:74) note:

These factors include locating a witness to the crime and finding out whether a suspect can be named, located, described, or identified. Other items include license plate number and presence of significant MO or physical evidence.

A screening decision to expend further investigative resources is not solely based upon the existence of solvability factors. Also taken into consideration are the nature and seriousness of the offence, departmental policies, political factors, and public relation concerns (Cawley et al.,1977; Eck,1979; Greenberg, Yu, & Lang;1973).

Case screening is designed to provide sufficient information at the earliest possible stage in the investigative process to permit a prediction on whether it would be fruitful to proceed with an investigation. This screening allows for the early suspension of unpromising cases or for the continued follow-up investigation of those thought to have a high



probability of being successfully concluded. Additionally, the utilization of formal case screening procedures enables the police administrator to exercise control over the expenditure and type of investigative effort made on an individual case (Cawley et al., 1977:37).

In recent years, an increasing number of police agencies have been critically examining effective management procedures for the efficient allocation of resources devoted to the criminal investigation process. As a result, changes are being made in the placement of investigative responsibilities, in the establishment of investigative priorities and, in areas affecting operational tactics and strategies (Cawley et al., 1977:vii).

These developments, including enhancement of the investigative role of patrol officers, and the general management and monitoring of continuing investigations, appeared to require an important prerequisite -- that of implementing formal case screening procedures. Formal case screening (in contrast to informal screening, as noted by Ericson, 1981) is one of the most recent tools to be introduced into the management of criminal investigations in the United States (Cawley et al., 1977; Eck, 1979; Greenberg et al., 1973; Greenberg, 1975; Pindur, 1983). Based upon experience and findings from U.S. empirical research, as well as the pressures of financial restraint, an increasing number of U.S. police executives have seriously examined case screening as one method by which they

can maximize the effectiveness of both investigative and uniformed personnel.<sup>2</sup>

As a review of the available literature will indicate, there was initially a strong emphasis on the development and implementation of statistically weighted screening models in U.S. police agencies to facilitate this decision-making process. But as further research has been conducted, there appears to be a shift in focus and emphasis towards developing police management information systems in which case screening information is an integral component. This shift attests to the importance of case screening decision-making and the need to document case screening in the Canadian municipal police environment.

### The Problem in the Canadian Context

Many Canadian police administrators are faced with increasing crime rates, flat (or declining) levels in clearance rates and severe budgetary constraints due to national, provincial and municipal economic restraints which reduce investigative resources. Although evaluation of procedures and

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<sup>2</sup>Miron, Wasserman, & Rickard (1979) designated the topic of Managing Criminal Investigations (MCI) as the principal police subject in its new National Criminal Justice Executive Training Programme. The MCI programme contained five principal components: (1) the enhancement of the investigative role of patrol officers; (2) case screening; (3) management of continuing investigations; (4) police/prosecutor liaison; and, (5) monitoring of criminal investigations.

their effectiveness should be an institutionalized, ongoing process, economic restraint and the need to provide a more effective police service has precipitated the need for a systematic review and evaluation of the effectiveness of criminal investigations. Specifically, a review and evaluation should focus on the organization and operation of detective units in police departments, particularly with respect to case screening decision-making. It is in these detective units that a great amount of investigative resources are concentrated and, to a large extent, their performance, and ultimately that of the police organization, is measured against the outcome of those investigations not concluded by uniformed officers.

In Canada, a review of the literature indicates a paucity of previous empirical research in Canada concerning case screening as a device in the management of criminal investigations. Only two research projects in Canada have even mentioned the issue of case screening in the administration of the investigative process by Canadian municipal detectives (Ericson, 1981; 1982). Chappell, Gordon & Moore (1982; 1983) have supplemented Canadian knowledge in the area of case screening through publication of a literature review and a national survey of Canadian municipal police departments.<sup>3</sup>

Contrary to the Canadian situation, extensive empirical research on case screening has been conducted in the United

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<sup>3</sup>These studies and another which has recently been completed will be discussed in more detail in Chapter II.

States for more than a decade (e.g., ABT Associates, 1983; Cawley et al., 1977; Cawley, Miron, & Araujo, 1977; Eck, 1979, 1983; Greenberg et al., 1973, 1975; Pindur, 1983). A wide scope of case screening issues have been examined as they affect criminal investigations, and alternatives have been explored.<sup>4</sup> This research has resulted in the formulation of statistically derived case screening models with reported success as effective and efficient decision-making devices for predicting the probability of case outcomes. These models are discussed in Chapter II. This research has also provided police administrators and managers with a wide range of methods for establishing case screening criteria, for implementing formal case screening procedures, and with recommendations regarding the appropriate placement of case screening in the criminal investigation process.<sup>5</sup>

However, the results of the Chappell et al., (1983) national survey indicated that only two Canadian municipal police departments have experimented with a statistical case screening model, although neither agency had implemented the model due to

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<sup>4</sup>See Pindur (1983) for a more complete description on the total integration of police service delivery, in The Story of ICAP (Integrated Criminal Investigation Program) with the motto, "Doing more with less and doing it better".

<sup>5</sup>ABT Associates (1983) report that in one U.S. police agency, case screening has achieved a "state of the art" sophistication whereby case screening and case assignment decisions are made entirely by computer.

its perceived performance limitations.<sup>6</sup> In its place, a formal set of guidelines for the management of the case screening function was adopted. Moreover, the survey revealed a lack of consensus among police administrators as to what the case screening process entails, and many reported a range of informal procedures under the generic term of case screening.

Nevertheless, the extensive American research on case screening provides an in-depth empirical base from which Canadian police agencies may begin to critically examine their own criminal investigative process and case screening procedures. Such a review could encourage the formulation of guidelines for the effective and efficient management of criminal investigations and allocation of investigative resources. In the absence of a knowledge base, police administrators and managers are forced either to negate this important decision-making process or to make intuitive judgements as to the proper policies governing case screening. Furthermore, a lack of sound management policy permits line-level personnel indirect authoritative control over resource allocation decision-making; something which is vital to the administration of the police organization.

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<sup>6</sup>These police departments were located in Calgary, Alberta and London, Ontario.

## Purpose of the Present Study

Given the importance of formal case screening as a decision-making tool in the effective management of criminal investigations, as noted in U.S. research literature and, given the failure of Canadian municipal police administrators to adopt formalized case screening models, it is the purpose of this thesis to:

1. Outline the developments in the United States that led to an increase in research on case screening and report some of the major case screening issues raised by that research. In addition, the relevant case screening literature relating to the Canadian municipal policing context will be reviewed;
2. Profile the research methods used to document criminal investigation processes and case screening decision-making;
3. Provide a descriptive analysis of the criminal investigation process in a large Canadian municipal police department and the role of case screening in this process;
4. Identify case screening criteria, case screening decisions and their relationship to the assignment of those screened cases;
5. Relate case assignment decisions to eventual case dispositions and subsequent investigative activities; and,
6. Present recommendations which may produce meaningful direction for police administrators in the area of case screening.

The areas outlined above are a sequential summary of the chapters of text in this thesis. The text of each chapter will clarify the relationship between chapters and the chosen order.

A systematic study of case screening as a tool for the management of criminal investigations in the Canadian municipal police context would hopefully represent an important

contribution to the growing knowledge base in the area of criminal investigations. Moreover, this study would provide a research base for effective policy-making by Canadian municipal police administrators and managers. Presently, little is known about case screening processes which could facilitate the implementation of new "streamlined" policies for organizational decision-making.

Consequently, an in-depth documentation of active case screening procedures in Canadian municipal police departments is required to determine how case screening is conducted and to assess this decision-making process in criminal investigations. This analysis, in turn, is intended to provide an evaluative framework in which to assess case screening procedures, their impact on investigative activities, and case dispositions.

As a further point of clarification, this study is designed to provide information on the criteria used by detective supervisors in making case screening decisions. As well, the study provides information on the investigative steps taken by detectives in follow-up investigations and the information they obtain that may contribute to the solution of crimes. Specifically, this study examines the case screening function in relation to the criminal investigation process.

The objective of this thesis, then, is to analyze the role of case screening in the criminal investigation process as it occurs in a large Canadian municipal police department. This objective will be accomplished by addressing such issues as

detective's workload, organizational policies directing case screening, experientially derived decision-making criteria, case assignments, case dispositions, and investigative activities.

In summary, this brief introduction and discussion of the case screening role in criminal investigations outlines several important issues to be addressed. The chapter which follows will present a more detailed overview of the developments in the United States that led to an increase in the amount of case screening research, as well as the relevant Canadian case screening literature as it applies to municipal policing in this country.



## II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND MAJOR ISSUES

### Perspectives on Management Problems with Criminal Investigations

During the last decade and a half, the organization and administration of the detective or investigative function has emerged as a major area of focus in academic research. Much of the literature is derived from the experience of the United States (e.g., Eck, 1979, 1983; Greenberg et al., 1973; Greenberg, Elliott, Kraft, & Procter, 1975; Isaacs, 1967; Manning, 1980; the Presidential Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 1967; Repetto, 1976; Sanders, 1977; Wilson, 1978). In Canada, substantive attention has only recently been given to the organization and administration of the investigative function (Chappell et al., 1982, 1983; Ericson, 1981, 1982).

Numerous investigators of detective operations note that the bulk of traditional investigative work is clerical in nature due to detectives being charged with the task of preparing extensive reports on crime occurrences and arrests while they themselves do not generate a great many arrests (Ericson, 1981:6; Goldstein, 1977:55; Greenberg et al., 1973, 1975; Repetto, 1976:133).

Many of these researchers have noted that in more traditional police departments, detective efficiency is

collectively evaluated in terms of solving the "hot" cases or making the "big" arrests. In more modern "professional" police departments there is greater emphasis placed on overall clearance rates. Nonetheless, a Rand Corporation study (1975) determined that crime clearance rates for detective units were highly manipulable; the determining factor was the desire of individual squad supervisors to achieve higher clearance rates for reported crimes (Greenwood et al., 1975:18).

Several authors (Ericson, 1981; Manning, 1980; Reppetto, 1976; Sanders, 1977; Skolnick, 1966; Wilson, 1978) have narrowly focused on the role of the detective in the investigative process. Other researchers (Cawley et al., 1977; Chappell et al., 1983; Eck, 1979, 1983; Greenberg et al., 1975) have expanded their focus to analyze the detective function in the larger context of the police organization, administrative practices, and criminal investigation process. However, the detective role does not emerge ex nihilo; the failure of researchers to consider this role within a broader theoretical framework has resulted in a lack of information on how and under what constraints the detectives' tasks are enacted (e.g., supervisory case screening decision-making places parameters on the volume and type of investigations to be conducted by detectives).

These outlined problems have necessitated a movement by police agencies to critically examine the organizational structure and effectiveness of the resources allocated to the criminal investigation process. As a result, formal case

screening procedures have been adopted as one of many management information devices which enable U.S. police administrators to assess the efficiency of their criminal investigation process. This shift in focus emphasizes case screening as an important concern for police management because primary responsibility for the successful conclusion of investigations rests ultimately with management, not with individual detectives, detective supervisors, or detective units.

### Case Screening Evolution: U.S. Experience

The following U.S. literature places a strong emphasis on the development of statistically derived case screening models which assume formalized management guidelines directing case screening decision-making. A review of this U.S. literature will enable the reader to gain familiarity with the topic and a wide range of issues including: 1) the development of formal case screening models; 2) methods of establishing case screening criteria; 3) early case closure; 4) managing criminal investigations; 5) case screening in criminal investigations; and, 6) case screening and management information systems. Moreover, these dimensions will provide a theoretical framework within which to place a detailed examination of the case screening process as it occurs in a large Canadian municipal police department.

## Development of Case Screening Models

In one of the first serious examinations of the criminal investigation process, Greenberg et al., (1973) focused on the investigator's decision-making role in case assignments and the absence of organizational policy on this aspect of the operation. Eck(1979:4) notes:

Currently, investigators make case assignment decisions based on their judgement. Collectively these individual decisions determine department practice in the absence of an established management policy. Individuals rather than management, are making the important choices inherent in the investigative decision-making process, thus removing control of the process from management.

In an attempt to provide management with policy information pertaining to investigative decision-making, case solvability elements were analyzed from the results of break and enter preliminary investigations. These elements included: 1) estimated range of time between occurrence and police arrival; 2) witness report of offence; 3) on view report of offence; 4) usable fingerprints; 5) suspect information developed; 6) vehicle description; and, 7) all other information. These investigations were further examined to determine which of the elements were found to exist with respect to the break-in. Statistically derived weights were allotted to each individual element present. These weights indicated the degree to which the elements contributed to an arrest, as determined by the Stanford

Research Institute.<sup>1</sup> Appendix A briefly describes the burglary case decision model and the application of the six information elements and corresponding numerical weights. Appendix B outlines the robbery case decision model.

One aspect of the model's utility was the ability of managers to lower or raise the cut-off point on the weighting scales. If the weightings exceeded ten (10), the model predicts that the case should be assigned for follow-up investigation; if the score was less than ten (10), the case was not assigned. In this way, if the detective unit was overwhelmed with cases for follow-up investigations, the cut-off point could be raised to reduce the number of cases being sent through for investigation. Conversely, the cut-off point could be lowered if detective work-load was minimal. The fluctuation of this cut-off point could also be influenced by varying crime rates and departmental policies.

One major criticism of these SRI models was noted by Greenberg et al., (1973, 1975) who expressed their concern that case screening studies and replications suffered from reliance on data from previously investigated cases. That is, these studies could not show how much effort went into investigations and/or whether increased amounts of investigative effort for

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<sup>1</sup>The Stanford Research Institute assumed the only relevant reason for investigation was arrest, citizen satisfaction, support to victims, recovery of property, and collection of intelligence information. Eck (1979:5) noted that these factors are important but arrest contributes significantly to all of those other factors.

cases with little information would have led to arrests.

Furthermore, Eck (1979) noted that the SRI models differed from other investigative screening procedures in two respects: first, they were crime specific and second, they were statistically derived. It would appear that in spite of these two features, other screening methods would need to be employed for the many offence categories generalist detectives have a mandate to investigate. As well, because they are statistically derived, they would not be very responsive to public relation concerns (i.e., responding to elderly victims' interests or the need to investigate a case where there is a high property loss but no strong solvability factors are available).

In a 1975 Oakland, California study (Greenberg et al., 1975), the SRI research team sought to minimize police investigators' use of intuitive judgement on case handling by statistically analyzing factors that had contributed significantly to case clearance in the past. As well, the formulation of these SRI models also reflected a need for the development of guidelines to aid investigators who frequently were relatively inexperienced in the initial investigation process.

## Establishing Case Screening Criteria

In formulating a manual for the management of criminal investigations Cawley et al., (1977) report that there are two major approaches to establishing case screening criteria. The first approach involves the development of a listing of unweighted criteria for the screening of cases.<sup>2</sup> The second establishes a listing of weighted criteria.<sup>3</sup> Both of these methods work best when a task force, representative of personnel who will eventually utilize the case screening criteria and who have a real input into the design of the program, is created to establish the criteria. The task force should include managers as well as investigative line personnel. The acceptance of another agency's system without internal review by the staff who will be expected to carry it out is likely to lead to strong resistance within the organization. Additionally, the practice

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<sup>2</sup>Cawley et al., (1977:40) identify two methods for establishing the criteria in the "unweighted screening" approach; a unilateral administrative decision or a decision by a representative task force. Neither approach utilizes the in-depth statistical approach of the SRI model which analyzes how cases have been solved in the past. For example, a Rochester Police Department task force designed and field tested a case screening system using experimental solvability factors.

<sup>3</sup>Cawley et al., (1977) note that the weighted case screening methods range from the nonstatistically derived system of Multnomah County, Oregon (Appendix C), to the statistically derived system of Oakland, California (Appendix A & B), based on the Stanford Research Institute (SRI) developed case follow-up decision model.

may lead to the development of a system which is not responsive to the needs of the particular agency.

In summarizing the two methods of establishing an "unweighted" approach, Cawley et al., (1977) state that "the process should require that cases identified as not solvable because insufficient success criteria exist, be suspended as soon as possible". In effect, this approach to case screening involves methods of establishing a case priority system for further investigative action by detectives or the suspension of investigative activity.

#### Early Case Closure

Eck(1979), suggests that throughout the screening process, cases can be sorted into 3 groups: 1)those cases for which no reasonable level of investigative effort will likely produce results; 2)those cases that can probably be solved with little effort; and, 3)those cases which may be solved if a reasonable level of effort is devoted to investigation. With this in mind, the Rochester Police Department attempted to develop a new investigation form which allowed patrol officers to search for solvability factors (previously overlooked) and to decide whether early suspension of investigations were appropriate in certain circumstances. As a result, patrol officers were encouraged to view the initial investigation as an integral part



of the investigative process rather than as an exercise in miscellaneous data collection (Cawley et al., 1977). Greenberg et al., (1973:3) suggest that "unless offender identification was made by the responding officer, case solution at the detective level was minimal".

Police discretion is not negated in this process; a review of the patrol officer's decision to continue or suspend the investigation of a case is conducted by a supervisor prior to a final decision being made. Moreover, to respond to the vicissitudes of political and community demands for follow-up investigations, the supervisor who reviews an early closure recommendation is accorded some flexibility and may decide to continue an investigation even though solvability factors may suggest an early case suspension.

Furthermore, the system was flexible enough to allow patrol officers to establish case priorities after conducting preliminary investigations. Under this approach to establishing investigative priorities, officers consider the seriousness of the crime, the amount of readily available information about suspects, the availability of agency resources and, community attitudes. The officers consider four major aspects of the crime and its priority numerically; the gravity of the offence; the probability of solution; the urgency for action; and supervisory judgement (Brand & Koroloff, 1976:65-67).

## Managing Criminal Investigations

According to Eck(1979), the SRI model can best be described as a management tool for decision-making which provides police managers with information for the allocation of police resources. It allows managers to concentrate on those cases most likely to be solved. However, the model neither improves investigative procedures nor directly increases case clearance rates. As well, a case that is screened-out should not be considered of negligible value and disregarded. A screened-out case may nevertheless contribute to a system of information about crime patterns, the modus operandi of criminals and/or the solution of other cases through arrest.

At least partially, in response to those outlined criticisms of SRI models, Eck(1979), undertook "a large scale replication of the SRI model that would validate and generalize the model's potential and provide valuable information for police executives in using this type of model".<sup>4</sup>

Eck's research resulted in two major findings.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>Twenty-six Police Executive Research Forum member police departments agreed to take part in this Burglary Investigation Decision Model Replication (BIDMOR).

<sup>5</sup>Eck(1979:8), in comparing the SRI model's performance with that of both formal and informal approaches to case assignment decision-making, had each department select a systematic sample of 500 burglary cases already investigated and resolved. Using the information derived from the preliminary investigation phase of these cases, the model's "predicted" outcomes were then

First, he reported that "the SRI decision model is very accurate in predicting the results of burglary investigations, and it can be adapted to the particular conditions of individual police departments". Implicit in his statement is the suggestion that the characteristics of burglary cases, not follow-up investigation activities per se, determine the overall success or failure rate of burglary investigations. This does not preclude the need to investigate cases; it simply stresses the desirability of explicit knowledge of case screening processes and suggests that this knowledge will allow for greater flexibility and cognizance in assigning burglary cases.

Secondly, Eck's research indicates that in those police departments having no formal screening procedure, on average, 87% of the caseload would still be screened-out by informal means, thus, "freeing up" investigative resources for those cases possessing the best chance of being cleared by arrest. However, where formal screening procedures were already in existence, the weighted SRI model was proven to be more efficient than a case screening process based on intuition and experience. The SRI model assigned fewer cases, a fact which could potentially conserve investigative resources for more efficient use.

Although this study indicates an exhaustive testing of the SRI burglary investigation decision model, one could speculate on the need for an elaborately designed statistical model built

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5(cont'd) compared with actual case outcomes.

for only one specific offence category. Common sense would indicate that the most important criterion for case suspension or case assignment is whether or not the suspect's identity is known. With this aspect in mind, it may be more appropriate to design a screening model which is more adaptable to the wide variety of offence categories police departments are mandated to investigate.

### Case Screening and Criminal Investigations

In a later study, Eck(1983) conducted research to ascertain how investigations were conducted and what investigators do that may contribute to the solution of crimes. Specifically, the study asked, "How much do preliminary and follow-up investigations contribute to crimes being solved?" Research was conducted in three U.S. police agencies and involved the collection and analysis of data regarding burglary and robbery investigations. These offence categories were chosen because:

1. they are relatively common offences;
2. they consume a large amount of police resources; and,
3. the investigations are difficult (Eck,1983:2).

Although the study's primary focus was on the role of preliminary and follow-up investigations in the solution of crimes, there are implications for the case screening function. Eck (1983) provides a section in which an attempt is made to predict which cases will result in an arrest being made based on

an analysis of preliminary investigations by patrol members and subsequent follow-ups by detectives.<sup>6</sup>

This study illustrates how these results changed when the actions of detectives and information collected during the follow-ups were taken into account. Predictably, no singular activity or source of information uniformly leads to crimes being solved. Eck (1983) concluded:

1. preliminary investigations were found to be a good predictor of whether follow-up arrests would be made (this is owing to the effect of preliminary information on the decision to conduct follow-ups);
2. investigative emphasis on victims is inappropriate because observations of detective activities suggest that many victim interviews were conducted when there were few or no leads on which to base an investigation -- once these interviews were conducted investigation was frequently suspended; and,
3. the arrest of suspects was related to detectives both conducting routine actions and collecting crucial pieces of information -- this implies that policies establishing routine investigative procedures may improve investigative performance but detectives must still be allowed flexibility in investigating cases.

In summary, these factors may directly affect administrative policy in the development of a case screening model, especially in relation to the issue of detective autonomy in conducting criminal investigations and the fact that decisions for further investigative action should be made early

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<sup>6</sup>This information was ostensibly gathered from the preliminary investigation report submitted by uniformed patrol officers. To predict the probability that investigating a case would result in a follow-up arrest being made, 6 information variables were used: witnesses, suspect information, vehicle description, latent prints, related offence information, and the range of time of occurrence.

in the process.

Additionally, Eck (1983) notes that much of previous quantitative research on case screening has suggested that investigations are routine. However, when on-going investigations are examined, the uncertainty of success that pervades the investigative process becomes apparent. Furthermore, this study suggests that SRI models may have been simplistically developed as they did not address the ambiguities of the investigative effort.

#### Case Screening and Management Information Systems

The research of ABT Associates(1983) provides an overview of management information systems in seven American police organizations. The study outlines a descriptive analysis of several factors: a demographic overview of the community and police department; the investigation division; and, the investigative management information systems.

It is apparent in each of the department sites visited by ABT, that quite extensive performance and evaluation assessments have been devised for detective operations. Of particular interest, for the purposes of this paper, is the study's section on case screening, case assignment, and reporting procedures. Summarily, a list of relevant case screening practices which

outline other issues for consideration are given:

1. Two police departments notified victims of the name of the detective investigating their case by means of posting a card. This practice seems useful; it provides feedback to the victim about police action in their case (although action may, in fact, be non-existent or negligible) at low cost to the community;
2. In one particular police department, case screening was based, in part, on a patrol recommendation for further follow-up investigation. However, one should note that some detectives felt that the patrol officer's recommendation warranted little regard given their perceived inexperience in the investigative function;
3. In yet another department, case assignments were made with the assistance of a computer; and,
4. In one police department, some cases could be sent back to patrol by detectives for follow-up investigations.

These findings suggest that merely implementing formalized case screening guidelines is not a panacea for effective policies but other related case screening issues or implications are also worthy of consideration. These include: (1) victim notification procedures (especially with those cases that are screened-out); (2) patrol officer recommendations which could influence the decision to follow-up a case; (3) the employment of "state of the art" technology in decision-making processes; and, (4) the enhancement of patrol officer's investigative responsibilities.

A wide variety of methods were employed by these police departments for case screening including weighted and unweighted screening models or a mixture of the two. For example, some conducted the case screening function at the patrol level; others employed case screening at the detective level. However,

regardless of which method was employed or at which level in the investigation process case screening was accomplished, the case screening and case assignment functions were completed by supervisory personnel (i.e., patrol team sergeants, detective sergeants, and, in one instance, with the use of a computer).

The ABT Associates' study again indicates the adaptability of the case screening function in a variety of applications and addresses the importance of management information systems in the criminal investigation process.<sup>7</sup>

#### Case Screening in the Criminal Investigation Process

In 1975, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) began to support a law enforcement program known as the Integrated Criminal Apprehension Program (ICAP). The ICAP study was designed to focus on: 1) the development of a system of operations management; 2) improved resource allocation; 3) expansion of uniformed patrol capabilities; and 4) the integration of police order maintenance functions with crime prevention, crime repression and apprehension (Pindur, 1983:4-5).

The general objectives of the study were to improve patrol resource allocation and deployment tactics and strategies based

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<sup>7</sup>For further details on other innovative, "state of the art" technology as applied in criminal investigations, see ABT Associates - Case Study (1983).



on systematic data collection and analysis; to decrease crime target vulnerability; and to improve patrol force investigation, apprehension and prosecution of career criminals. This focus on patrol operations emphasized a restructuring of investigative processes and a tightening of management of investigative elements.

Significantly, the case screening function was the first focus in implementing a management of criminal investigation model (ICAP). Pindur (1983:35) suggests that "the screening of cases should result in supervisory review, verification, and approval of the continuation or non-continuation of the investigation".

In conjunction with case screening, solvability factors and management of the continuing investigation were examined in implementation of the ICAP plan. Pindur (1983:39) reports that:

The use of experienced judgement in determining solvability has worked well in both theory and practice. Evaluation determined that the average inactivation of investigations by initial screening rates in both burglary and larceny varied, on average, between 40 and 50 percent. It was found that initial screening rates above these levels were associated with decreases in the UCR (Uniform Crime Reports) clearance rates for burglary and larceny. The inactivation by screening rate in robbery averaged 27% and variation in this rate was not associated with changes in the UCR clearance rates.

These figures provide some evidence that by placing the case screening function at the patrol level and by adopting an early case closure system, there should be no damage done to clearance rates. It is anticipated that detectives would be resistant to placing these important screening functions at the patrol level,

since traditionally, these activities have usually been in the hands of the detective or their supervisors.<sup>8</sup>

### Formal Case Screening: Potential Benefits and Issues

At least theoretically, a well documented formal case screening function holds many potential benefits for the most efficient utilization of police patrol and investigative resources. Cawley et al., (1977:38-39) suggest that:

1. case screening procedures facilitate the early rejection or closure of unpromising cases (these time differences demonstrate that early case closure can reduce the amount of time invested in cases);
2. with respect to the volume of cases flowing through the investigative process, organizations with formal case screening procedures, can illustrate the dispositional levels (i.e., percentage of cases cleared, closed, or inactivated and the rationale for that dispositional decision); and,
3. another advantage of case screening to the police administrator is the opportunity to review investigative performance on the basis of realistic (and actual) investigative workloads (when more manageable detective caseloads are achieved, investigators will be able to concentrate their efforts on solvable cases, which should lead to more prosecutions through more thorough case preparations).

In the absence of such a system of screening and the early suspension of investigations, a considerable amount of investigative time and energy is wasted by detectives in

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<sup>8</sup>The ICAP plan involves many other areas of interest which are beyond the scope of this thesis. For a more comprehensive picture of ICAP, see Pindur's (1983) sections dealing with: Managing Criminal Investigations, Major Offender/Career Criminal Program, and, Crime Analysis.

unproductive follow-up activities.

Furthermore, as noted by Greenberg et al., (1973) in a report published by the Police Research Foundation, prior to the introduction of a formal case screening system, patrol officers had little motivation to conduct a "good preliminary investigation". Cawley et al., (1977:40) suggests that this lethargy was:

...due to the officer's realization that their work would be passed on to detectives, who would probably criticize and unquestionably duplicate the work. With the constant repetition of this process the patrol officers tended to produce preliminary investigative reports in a perfunctory manner, since the entire matter was perceived as a nuisance and a burden. At the same time, the patrol officers had never been given clear or definitive guidance on conducting a preliminary investigation.

The Rochester experience, as previously outlined, suggests that as a result of working more closely with investigative personnel, and with the development of new procedures, officers became more inclined to conduct thorough preliminary investigations. Cawley et al., (1977) stress that "in essence, the purpose of the preliminary investigation became the hunt for solvability factors". As well, at the conclusion of the initial investigation, each case was screened on the basis of the existence of solvability factors in conjunction with certain other exceptional criteria, and a decision was made on whether the crime would be investigated further.

In the application of a formal case screening system, Cawley et al., (1977:47) summarize the basic beneficial components of the method:

1. accurate and complete collection of crime information;
2. an on-scene determination of the sufficiency of crime information collected;
3. permitting the patrol officer to make decisions concerning follow-up investigations; and,
4. review of that decision by a supervisor.

Furthermore, implementing formal case screening will require an agency to:

1. redefine the mission of the major divisions;
2. redefine roles for patrol officers, supervisors, investigators, and managers in the case screening process;
3. develop and use criminal collection forms that incorporate early closure information; and,
4. provide training in the use of the new system to all affected personnel.

Hence, not only does the introduction of a case screening method provide management with information about this crucial investigative, decision-making process, it also provides a feedback mechanism for the improvement in the quality of information gathering techniques at the preliminary level. Initial data collection sets the course for future investigative actions and determines the probability for a successful outcome.

The following section will examine relevant Canadian criminal investigation literature to uncover case screening research in Canadian municipal police organizations.

## Case Screening in the Canadian Municipal Police Context

### The Absence of Policy

The subject of case screening is only obliquely mentioned by Ericson (1981), in this first serious research endeavour conducted on the investigative role of Canadian municipal detectives.

In outlining the occupational environment of detective work, Ericson (1981:41-42) provides our first glimpse into the case screening and case assignment procedures in a large Canadian municipal police department:

...most cases that detectives worked on were initially mobilized on the basis of occurrence reports submitted by a patrol officer to his patrol sergeant, and from the patrol sergeant through a staff sergeant to the detective sergeant, who either assigns the occurrence directly to a detective team or left it on a general file to be selected by any detective who chose to work on it.

Ericson (1981:42) further notes that "at this point the detective's task becomes one of deciding what investigations he could do to provide a legitimate written account of a particular case 'clearance'". In this manner, "he worked to 'cover his ass' by producing a 'clearance' with written reasons that fit within organizationally established criteria".

In a section entitled "Detective Mobilization, Investigation, and Disposition of Cases", Ericson (1981:69) elucidated the case screening process within the police

department he studied:

It (patrol officer's preliminary report) is usually scrutinized by the patrol and staff sergeants before it is passed on to the detective unit. If it is passed on, it is reviewed by a Detective Sergeant, who decides whether to immediately assign the case to detectives (usually because a suspect is in custody or identified, the matter is viewed seriously, and/or the matter is important because of a senior officer's desire for action); whether to place the occurrence on a general file open to any detective to work on; or, whether to mark it for 'Information Only' and pass it on to particular detectives.

This basic procedure appears to be the only foundation for case screening decision-making in the particular police agency studied. Moreover, these descriptions provide little specific information on precisely what decisions are made, and the criteria on which the decision to follow-up a case is based.

Ericson (1981:56) also entertains the thought that perhaps the administrators are not overly concerned with case screening and case assignment procedures. He states:

There were not sustained production expectations (other than in some individual cases) emanating from administrative resources. Nevertheless, one might expect that supervisory officers, especially the Detective Sergeants, would effect considerable control over production during the course of their everyday review of cases worked on by their subordinates. This, however, was not the case in any clear-cut sense.

According to Ericson, not only are case screening decisions made on the basis of vague criteria, but management seems to have little knowledge or control over the process.

While Ericson's work focused mainly on detectives and their investigative function, implicit in his descriptions are a lack of management control over case screening. Although not an

explicit empirical evaluation of this decision-making process, his work does reveal a candid portrayal of the vagueness involved in case screening decision-making of this Canadian police organization. Further, his work does provide a focus upon which to base further exploration of case screening in other Canadian municipal police departments.

### Experiments and Innovations

Further details concerning case screening in the Canadian policing context were provided by Chappell et al., (1983). The objective of this research was to conduct "a comprehensive state of the art survey of municipal police agencies throughout the country to gather basic data about a range of issues" related to the criminal investigation process. Specifically, the survey questionnaire asked respondents a series of questions about local experiments and innovations; one area of interest was in relation to the case screening function.

Chappell et al., (1983) found that several police departments had either considered, experimented with, or were in the process of utilizing a case screening process:

In particular, it appeared that reports of burglary, robbery and fraud were screened in a number of police departments of different sizes prior to undertaking a follow-up investigation. In each case the rationale given for this screening investigation was the easing of workloads by reducing to a minimum the number of cases

forwarded for follow-up which had a low probability of clearance (p.30).

On closer examination of the survey data, "it seemed that many departments were referring to a process as opposed to a formalized screening model designed, for example, by the SRI" (Chappell et al., 1983:31-32). That is, respondents included the following procedures under the generic term of case screening:

1. Informal and long standing systems of case screening involving the use of a supervisory officer's discretion. In some departments this process was said to be regulated by broad guidelines issued by senior management but in most departments the screening involved an informal decision based on the supervisor's opinion about the utility of pursuing a particular case;
2. Crime analysis systems. In this context "screening" was seen as a necessary process to be undertaken prior to directing patrol or other resources to high crime areas with a view to identify and apprehend suspects (detection). It was also applied to intelligence related procedures whereby crimes and major arrests would be monitored to assist in the investigation of major and/or organized crime; and,
3. Establishing investigative priorities on a semi-formalized basis. This category of screening was similar to the informal system discussed in (1) above, differing only in regard to the adoption of procedures and options which were more structured and integrated with a crime analysis system.

These case screening procedures were considered to be general, informal methods currently used by Canadian municipal police departments. The survey additionally noted that of all the departments who responded, only two (Calgary, Alberta and



London, Ontario) had experimented with formal case screening models.<sup>9</sup>

In Calgary, unfavourable results with the implemented SRI case screening model precluded its adoption for general use in the police department. The Calgary researchers found the model "to be a less accurate predictor of case outcome than the existing, discretion based screening process undertaken in Calgary by staff sergeant supervisors" (Chappell et al., 1983).

The London Police Department's experience with the SRI model clearly articulated their reasons for not adopting the model for general use in the organization. The London police researchers noted that "if the model were to be implemented the department could expect a 5% loss in clearance by arrest". However, they qualify this statement by adding, "this factor might be off-set by the availability of additional resources released as a consequence of screening out about 75% of all burglary reports" (as cited in Chappell et al., 1983:34).

The researchers in London additionally note recommendations and modifications to be employed in the event the SRI model was adopted for use in their department. These include:

1. changing the SRI weighting system to favour any report where suspect information was available;

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<sup>9</sup>Chappell et al., (1983:33) caution that neither the Calgary nor London evaluations, which were both "in-house" projects, resulted in published reports and the descriptions given of the research design and findings are therefore based upon information supplied to the authors in the questionnaire, and in conversations with some of the personnel involved.

2. even when a case had been screened out, using the SRI model, some contact should be made with the victim in the interests of police-community relations; and,
3. the introduction of procedures to ensure that preliminary investigations by patrol officers in burglary cases were conducted with extreme thoroughness since the validity and reliability of all formal screening models rested on this assumption (Chappell et al., 1983:34).

Despite these recommendations, the SRI model was not adopted in the London Police Department. However, as Chappell et al., (1983) report, "a decision was made to adopt written guidelines for personnel responsible for preliminary and follow-up investigations which would make them aware of elements predictive of successful investigations". Furthermore, they remained optimistic about the possibility of successfully adopting formal case screening methods, "as it was hoped that these guidelines would result in a higher quality of preliminary investigation, as well as assisting burglary investigators in setting their own case priorities".

#### Police-Community Relations

Chappell et al., (1983) note that, of particular concern in the London Police Department's decision not to adopt the formal SRI model, was "the possible impact of such a model upon police-community relations". The researchers state that:

It was felt that a significant level of public dissatisfaction might occur if it were discovered that the London police had formal rules about investigating certain burglaries, even though informal screening procedures produced a similar result. Whether these fears were justified is a matter for conjecture but it

is clearly a key issue for any police administrator to consider when contemplating the introduction of a formal case screening procedure. Experience gained in the use of such procedures in a number of United States police agencies (Eck, 1979) suggests that providing the purpose of these procedures are carefully and fully explained to the public, they are not unduly concerned about, or critical of, police actions. As long as some feedback is given victims of crimes like burglary about the success, or otherwise, of an investigation most will express their satisfaction with police services and recognize the problems associated with solving cases (Chappell et al., 1983:35).

In light of the recommendations provided by the London Police Department (Chappell et al., 1983), when compared with evidence provided by other researchers (ABT Associates, 1983; Cawley et al., 1977; Eck, 1979; Pindur, 1983), it is debatable how legitimate the prohibitive fears are which discouraged adoption of SRI screening models due to this police-community relations aspect. For instances, Greenwood et al., (1975:73) provide a "clear-cut" procedure for handling the victim feedback aspect of police-community relations:

In this connection, one department specifically noted the importance of sending a form letter to those crime victims where cases are "screened out". The letter was said to be well received, eliminated a great deal of unnecessary "legwork", and provided the victim with information about what to do if there were any new developments in the case that he knew of.

Additionally, this feedback system could perform another important function; educating the community about investigative limitations and the public's obligation to provide the necessary information to facilitate that process. Ideally, the community would gain a more realistic view of what level of police service they can expect for reported crimes.

In conclusion, Chappell et al., (1983:36) note:

It is clear from the survey responses that 'case screening' is far from becoming a term of art in the vocabulary of Canadian police. A range of procedures, all of them informal, seem to guide current screening practices in burglary and other types of crime investigation. The degree of informality adopted varies substantially -- some departments appear to allow almost unfettered discretion to individual investigators to allocate case priorities while others rely upon written guidelines, closely monitored by staff supervisors.

As a result of these observations, it is suggested that formalized case screening models may not have a place in the Canadian municipal police context. While it must remain tentative, two possible reasons for the failure to implement case screening models are: 1) the police departments who attempted implementation had other concerns not addressed in their report; or 2) more realistically, there are contextual or procedural differences between Canadian police departments and U.S. police agencies which preclude the adoption of these models. However, the need for guidelines directing case screening decision-making in Canadian police departments is quite apparent.

### Summary

Overall, the most glaring criticism to be made of the case screening literature is the lack of specific documentation on how case screening is actually conducted in relation to the large volume of crime reports generated by a police organization in a given time period. Specifically, the literature reviewed

failed to outline such information processing dynamics such as: patrol officers conducting preliminary investigations, detectives performing follow-up investigations, and supervisors engaged in case screening decision-making. As a result, there appears to be insufficient information available in Canada to achieve an important Rand Corporation study (Greenwood, 1975) recommendation, i.e., "increasing the use of information processing in lieu of investigators". However, this review of research conducted in the U.S. and Canada, in the area of case screening, has identified several critical issues.

First, the Canadian experience with case screening models and research conducted in Canada on case screening, when compared with that in the American context, is very limited. Only two Canadian municipal police departments appear to have experimented with the SRI model and neither department has adopted the model. Although the criticisms levelled against formal case screening (SRI models) by the researcher in the London Police Department appear valid, they are nevertheless far from insurmountable. Evaluations of the formal case screening processes in the American policing context have been both extensive and positive. Thus, speculative questions remain as to whether there exists something specific to Canadian law enforcement which would prevent the adaptation of a formalized statistical case screening model. Perhaps it may be that those models are too elaborate and crime specific for the Canadian policing environment given the relatively low volume of cases as

compared to the American police context. This issue is unresolved and may warrant future exploration and research.

Secondly, there are no empirical studies on the case screening function in Canada. The descriptive analyses provided, by Chappell et al., (1983) and Ericson (1981), of the case screening function in Canadian municipal police organizations, indicate that the process is informal, lacks definition of specific screening criteria, and that there is an absence of precise policy guidelines for the management of the process.

Finally, in light of the formidable amount of U.S. case screening research, as one area of investigative management control, Canadian police administrators may not have critically examined some of their administrative guidelines in this area of their investigation process. Moreover, a lack of knowledge and information concerning this vital decision-making component (i.e., case screening) prevents the formulation of sound administrative policies which could effectively assist in managing investigative decision-making. As Cawley et al., (1977:38) note:

The establishment of a formal case screening system can bring about a major and critical improvement over an informal system. It takes the decision-making authority out of the hands of individual detectives (or supervisors) and places it in the hands of management -- where it properly belongs. The police executive cannot manage and control the investigative process workload unless he monitors the commitment of investigative resources and then makes critical determinations concerning the allocation of resources.

The limited Canadian experience with formal case screening procedures has been discouraging. However, the utility and

desirability of formal case screening is arguably masked by the paucity of research on case screening as currently practiced in the Canadian municipal police context. Although research on American criminal investigations is extensive (ABT Associates, 1983; Eck, 1979; Greenberg et al., 1973, 1975; Greenwood et al., 1975,; Manning, 1980; Pindur, 1983; Reppetto, 1976; Sanders, 1977; Wilson, 1978) reference to case screening in the Canadian context is made only obliquely (Ericson, 1981) and qualitatively (Chappell et al., 1982, 1983). The available literature on Canadian case screening does not provide information on: 1) the volume of reports screened; 2) the types of reports screened; 3) listings of experientially derived criteria; 4) quality of preliminary investigation reports; 5) an outline of investigative activities; 6) case dispositions and rationale given for those decisions; 7) the nature of the offences that are screened; and, 8) the nature of the relationships, if any, between variables.

The present research attempts to address these issues and provide in-depth documentation and analysis of the case screening process in a large Canadian municipal police department. However, this thesis does not support the adoption of formal case screening models but it does recommend the formulation of guidelines to aid in investigative decision-making.

The following chapter will provide an outline of the methods employed in the examination of the criminal

investigation process and the role of case screening in the police department studied.



### III. METHODS

#### Introduction

Subsequent to Chappell et al., (1982, 1983), a criminal investigation study, funded by the Ministry of the Solicitor-General of Canada, Police Research Division was commenced in July, 1983. The site chosen for the study was the Vancouver Police Department (VPD). One of the major objectives of this study was to document current investigative practices, particularly with respect to case handling and decision-making. A further objective was to recommend possible cost-effective innovations in the management and practices of criminal investigations. It was in the context of this larger study that the information was gathered for this thesis.

#### Research Design

This evaluative study addresses those case screening activities performed by supervisory personnel in "generalist" detective units of the Vancouver Police Department. The decision to focus specifically on generalist detectives will be discussed in a later section of this chapter. A triangulation approach consisting of formal survey instruments, unstructured interviews

and observation was used for the collection of data for this study. The formal research instruments included: 1) a "Case Screening Form" (Appendix D), which identified criteria used in case screening decision-making; and, 2) an "Investigation Conclusion Form" (Appendix E) to document investigative activities and supplement case screening information in the areas of case dispositions, investigative results and investigative actions. Additionally, secondary data were provided by archival sources including: official statistics i.e., Uniform Crime Reports (UCR); in-house reports, manuals, inter-departmental memos, and in-house police statistics.

Observation and unstructured interviews were conducted with police personnel who were representative of various stages in the criminal investigation process. These included: information processing personnel, patrol officers, detectives, supervisors, crime analysts, evidence technicians, communications personnel, computer systems personnel, and police executive personnel. Observation was undertaken to gain familiarity with investigative operations at the VPD and identify possible areas of discontent, concern and, commendation in the investigative process. Consequently, this analysis documented: 1) the preliminary investigation phase; 2) the follow-up investigation phase; 3) the relationships between those two phases; 4) the role of investigative support services (i.e., information processing, police/prosecutor liaison, property units, evidence units, and communications); and, 5) the role of case screening

and case assignment procedures in the investigative process.

The observations and interviews were conducted over a fourteen month period. The interviews involved hundreds of hours of discussions with police personnel and centered around: 1) the individual's role in the investigative process; 2) the relationship of their role to other components of the investigative process; and, 3) problems they encountered in processing criminal investigations. Additionally, the researcher was permitted to accompany detectives on "ride-alongs" where he was afforded unique opportunities to witness investigative techniques in a variety of situations. At no time was the research conducted surreptitiously. Observations were made of supervisors and detectives in the performance of their duties and with their informed consent.

The triangulation method of data collected allowed for substantial information to be generated on the processing of criminal investigations. This knowledge permitted attention to be focused on the case screening process while maintaining a perspective as to its relative importance in the criminal investigation process.

### Operational Definitions

For the purpose of this study, a "case" was considered as any report (Investigative, Supplementary, Crown Counsel, outside police report, or other non-police agency report-see Appendix F)

which necessitated a decision by a supervisor as to whether or not to invest further investigative resources i.e., follow-up investigation by detective personnel.

"Case screening" was determined to be the process whereby an investigative supervisor, applying experientially derived criteria to cases, decided to: 1) terminate the investigative process; or 2) instigate follow-up investigation by detectives. This decision was made individually by one of six supervisory personnel who were members of two Divisional Detective units at the Vancouver Police Department.

### Survey Instruments

Collection of case screening decision-making information necessitated the development of two research instruments.

The first survey instrument, adapted from Eck (1983) was called the "Case Screening Form" (CSF) (see Appendix D). Eck's study (1983, Technical Appendices) provided identification of several variables tested in various contexts and found to be important in case screening decision-making. These were: 1) description of suspect; 2) identification of suspect; 3) description of vehicle; 4) usable physical evidence; 5) caseload of investigator; 6) relation of case to other offences; 7) degree of injury to victim; and, 8) value of the loss. Additional variables addressed in the present study were: 9) notoriety of the case; 10) request by a supervisor; 11) request

by Crown Counsel; 12) victim request or complaint; 13) victim co-operation and interest in the case; and, 14) other factors considered important by screening supervisors.

The present form is designed to document case screening decisions and ascertain the reason(s) why these decisions are made. In adapting the CSF to the Canadian municipal police context, several discussions were held with case screening personnel and detectives to identify relevant variables. VPD personnel suggested that criteria listed on Eck's (1983) "Case Screening Form" (Appendix D) appeared applicable to the VPD criminal investigation process. The only amendment suggested attempts to make Eck's survey instrument more applicable to the Canadian context. Thus, the possibility of Crown Counsel returning or forwarding cases to detectives for follow-up investigation was addressed in the modified "case screening form". Moreover, unlike Eck's form, the present study allowed information to be collected on the location and rank of the screening supervisor; the type of report screened; and case information (nature and date of offence).

These additions provided sufficient information to match the CSF's with the subsequent "Investigation Conclusion Forms". As well, the screening decision category was expanded to determine more precisely the destination of those cases screened-out and, for those cases screened-in, to whom they were assigned. The CSF was additionally restructured to facilitate coding and subsequent keypunching in preparation for data

analysis.

Prior to the distribution of the CSF's, a user's guide was designed to assist supervisors in their preparation (Appendix D). A pretest of the CSF was conducted to maximize the instrument's reliability and familiarize screening supervisors with their use. Difficulties raised by screening supervisors in the completion of the CSF's were addressed and interpretive queries clarified. The CSF was then distributed to the two "generalist" detective units with the request that, on a daily basis, every screening supervisor complete a CSF for each type of report (case) which required a decision made on whether or not an investment of further investigative action was warranted.

The impetus for the second research instrument, the "Investigation Conclusion Form" (ICF), was similarly derived from Eck (1983), although the present ICF bears little resemblance to Eck's "Investigation Suspension Form" (See Appendix E). The latter form was felt to be inadequate and of limited utility for the Canadian municipal policing context: the terms were not the same as those used by Canadian police departments (e.g., larceny, misdemeanor, felony); there was no attempt to assess the quality of the preliminary investigation report; Eck's form (ISF) did not include information on case disposition or the rationale for case outcome and, it did not adequately address investigative activities which produced case outcomes. Like the CSF, the ICF was developed in consultation with supervisory and detective personnel at the VPD.

Using Eck's "Investigation Suspension Form" as a benchmark, decisions were made to: 1) insert case identification items which would allow the CSF to be matched with the ICF in later analyses; 2) document the date of the offence, case assignment and case conclusion to determine the time taken to investigate and conclude cases; 3) provide space for the detective to provide his opinion on the quality of the preliminary investigation report; 4) record case disposition and rationale; 5) document investigative results (i.e., number of persons arrested and/or charged, by whom, and for what investigation); 6) note the clearance of other cases through the investigation process;<sup>1</sup> 7) compile a list of possible investigative actions a detective could take (these are not mutually exclusive categories); and, 8) determine at what point in the investigative process detectives notified victims and/or patrol officers on the status of a case.

Supervisory personnel were provided with both forms; the CSF and the ICF. Upon screening a case for assignment, the detective responsible for the investigation was requested to complete the ICF. It was not feasible to personally instruct all detectives on ICF documentation due to staggered days off, shifts, annual leave, court time, and sick leave of detective personnel. Therefore, attempts were made to ensure that

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<sup>1</sup>This was included due to the frequency of detectives reporting that an investigation of a suspect for one case frequently evoked suspicions that other cases were involved but for which they lacked specific evidence.

supervisory personnel possessed sufficient information to knowledgeably address any questions detectives may have had concerning the ICF. The completed ICF was to be submitted to supervisory personnel upon conclusion of the investigation. The format followed departmental policy regarding review periods for cases under investigation (i.e., crimes against persons must be investigated and concluded within 15 days after assignment; crimes against property are given a 30 day case conclusion period).

During the administration phase of the CSF and ICF, on-going monitoring and contact was made with all supervisors and some detectives, both individually and, on occasion, collectively. This method attempted to ensure that individuals were completing the forms in relatively the same manner. One could hypothesize that data generated by the CSF and ICF would reveal that case screening, though informal, follows an implicit set of guidelines (i.e., that the decisions made by supervisors and detectives at the VPD are not totally idiosyncratic and/or capricious). Thus, any variance in performance of supervisors and/or detectives could be attributed to individualistic combinations of criteria for case screening, on the part of supervisors, or individual investigative techniques on the part of detectives during follow-up investigations.

In summary, the CSF's are designed to gauge the solvability factors available to supervisors and the criteria used in making a screening decision. The ICF's, on the other hand, indicate



what investigative actions are undertaken by detectives and the results of those investigations. In essence, this information forms the basis for a predictive model which determines the probability of the successful conclusion of a case. That is, the screening supervisor, in making his decision, effectively makes the prediction, based upon information made available through the preliminary investigation report, that the case will be successfully concluded by investigative personnel. The ICF's then provide information supporting or denying that prediction, outlines the investigative steps taken, and indicates further information, if any, uncovered as a result of those investigations.

### Sample Selection

The two "generalist" Detective units at the VPD were chosen for case screening analysis for several reasons.<sup>2</sup> These are:

1. collectively, these two units are theoretically responsible for the follow-up investigation of approximately 88% of the total criminal investigations handled by the VPD although these units account for only one-quarter of the total investigative personnel;
2. there are no explicit guidelines which outline screening criteria nor are there established policies for the monitoring of the informal screening process in the "generalist" detective units at the VPD;

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<sup>2</sup>There are many "non-generalist" or, preferably, "specialist" detective sections within the VPD's several Investigative Divisions (Appendix I). Generally, these units receive their name from the various offence categories which fall into the exclusive domain of these units. These offence types include: homicides, sexual offences, robbery of financial institutions, motor vehicle thefts, stolen property, fraud, vice and, drugs.

3. the two "generalist" detective units process a wide range of offence categories which, although relatively common offences, are difficult to investigate and demand a great deal of investigative resources; and,
4. in theory, the case screening function in each of the two "generalist" detective units is centralized under the auspices of a sole supervisor; in reality, this is not the case. Decision-making at the VPD "generalist" detective units presently is conducted by several supervisors with varying degrees of rank and experience. Rather than the Sergeant at the VPD being solely responsible for case screening, in his absence, responsibility lies with the Staff/Sergeant and sequentially with the senior detective.

As indicated by the CSF's, there were six individuals acting in the supervisory capacity to assign cases to detective personnel. A total of 32 detectives (15 in Patrol North and 17 in Patrol South -see Appendix G) received case assignments and were eligible to fill out ICF's. CSF's were administered and compiled for a 30 day period, August 24, 1983 to September 24, 1983. The test period of the ICF's was 60 days (August 24, 1983 to October 24, 1983) to enable tracking cases screened (CSF) through case assignment and case conclusion. This test period was chosen arbitrarily. All supervisors and detectives were included; twenty-nine of a possible thirty-two detectives completed ICF's. As previously noted, the sample of supervisors responsible for compiling CSF's contained six individuals (Sergeant, Staff/Sergeant, and senior detective) at the two Division Detective units.

During the 30 day test period 3564 cases were screened (CSF) by supervisors in the two Divisional Detective units. The use of ICF's permitted documentation of 203 reports screened and assigned to the VPD "generalist" detectives in both detective

units. This included the possible investigative activities undertaken and the disposition of those cases assigned and investigated by detectives. An examination of the police department's official records was used as a benchmark to provide information on expected volumes of:

1. cases processed per month by the police department during 1983; and,
2. cases assigned per month by detective supervisors in both Patrol North and Patrol South during 1983.<sup>3</sup>

In addition, these records indicated that the research test period was typical in regard to the number of cases screened and cases assigned(i.e, the number of cases documented by this research fell within the expected volumes reported monthly by the VPD). This lends validity to the survey instruments (CSF & ICF) in relation to the frequency and volume of reports processed by the VPD investigative units during this time period. It also suggests that the officers were reasonably dutiful in completing the forms.

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<sup>3</sup>Data from the VPD's Information Section (i.e, UCR's and case logging unit) and detective supervisor's case assignment log book were collected. The structure of information in the Information Section did not permit documentation of the number of cases directed to the various detective units within the department for case screening nor did it provide an easily accessible breakdown on whether patrol officers or detectives had concluded a case.

## Data Analysis

For analytical purposes, the number of cases, as documented by CSF's (n=3564), were subdivided, by screening decision, for comparison. These groups included: 1) cases concluded by uniformed officers (n=428) versus cases which remained unconcluded after the initial investigation (n=3136); 2) assigned cases (n=203) versus unassigned cases (n=3361); and 3) of those unconcluded cases (n=3136), cases discarded (n=2355) versus cases circulated for information purposes (n=584) versus cases assigned (n=197).<sup>4</sup> Variables controlled for included: patrol division, screening supervisor, screening date, date of offence and, nature of offence.

Before analysis of the ICF data, several refinements in the data were necessary. During the research test period, VPD records revealed that 269 case assignments were made to detectives (Patrol North-119 and Patrol South-150).<sup>5</sup> However, CSF's indicated 203 case assignments and the ICF's showed 217 case assignments. This discrepancy in numbers is more apparent than real. For example, it was discovered that one supervisor continued to distribute ICF's after the test period was over, thus, 191 cases fell into the research period, the others were -----

<sup>4</sup>Six cases which had been concluded by uniformed officers were assigned for follow-up investigation.

<sup>5</sup>The discrepancy between the number of cases assigned according to the VPD records (n=269) and cases assigned as indicated on the CSF and ICF, is due to a method of "direct case assignment" which circumvented documentation on the survey instruments.

rejected. As well, the 203 assigned cases, as indicated by the CSF, were analyzed and refinements were made to reduce any duplication of case numbers.<sup>6</sup> When these duplications were eliminated, there remained 191 assigned cases available for comparisons with ICF data regarding 191 returned, concluded cases.

Although there were 191 cases reported by the CSF data and 191 cases shown on the ICF's, again the numbers suggest a correspondence which is more apparent than real. When matched by case number, 143 case matches were achieved. This indicates a return rate of 75%; that is, for each case screened and assigned (CSF), a corresponding ICF was returned in three quarters of the cases. The remaining 48 cases (25%) were lost through a process of direct case assignment.<sup>7</sup> Briefly, direct case assignment

<sup>6</sup>There were 12 episodes where either an Investigation Report and a Supplementary Report or an Investigation Report and a Crown Counsel Report, with the same case number, were assigned. Hence, where a criminal incident may generate many varieties of reports, all with the same case number, they would be treated as one case.

<sup>7</sup>The VPD refers to this process as HPI (hold pending investigation). Typically, an arrested suspect is brought to the detective unit by uniformed officers for immediate follow-up investigation. Generally, these investigations involve serious offences or the alleged offender is suspected of being involved in other criminal activity. For example, with a suspect arrested for break and enter or robbery, there is a high probability that he may have been involved in other similar offences. Additionally, this process of investigation and charge may involve: gathering victim, witness, and suspect statements; collecting physical evidence; conducting identification line-ups; writing reports; and, consulting with Crown Counsel for approval of police charges. All of these activities may have to be accomplished within 24 hours to enable taking an accused before the court pursuant to Sec.454(1)(a) of the Criminal Code of Canada.

occurs when an arrested suspect is brought to detectives for investigation; there is no report to be screened in the traditional manner, thus, no CSF documentation of the incident. Nevertheless, documented evidence indicates that the majority of case assignments are made through the traditional screening process than through direct case assignment.

Eight months after the initial data collection, a random sample of approximately 25% of the unconcluded, screened-out cases (n=3136) were checked against the VPD's records system. This method was used to determine whether there had been a change in case status (i.e., the case had been concluded). Of the 719 cases examined, 31 cases had been concluded by charge with the majority being cleared by uniformed members. In 44 incidents, the case was cleared by other means, with two cases stolen property was recovered and, in three cases, the incident was unfounded. It remains unclear at what point in this eight month period the case status changed. As well, it is not known whether these case status changes were fortuitous (i.e., new information came to light) or there was some other systematic process taking place.

#### Limitations of the Survey Instruments

It is important to note several difficulties associated with the use of the CSF's and ICF's.

A first difficulty was noted by the VPD supervisors responsible for case screening. Given the number of reports screened daily (on average 60-100/day per supervisor), supervisors complained that the process of submitting a CSF for each case dramatically increased time needed to complete their case screening duties. A compromise was negotiated whereby supervisors would fill out a CSF for each report assigned for follow-up and for each report circulated for information. The remaining reports would be placed into discrete collections based on the screening criteria identified by the supervisor. For example, cases screened-out due to "no suspect identification" would be grouped together; "completed by patrol" separately and so on. The researcher then completed a CSF for each discarded report submitted by supervisors. This process did not involve decision-making on the part of the researcher as the screening decision and identification of the criteria for cases screened-out had previously been determined by the supervisor. Based on the supervisor's decisions the researcher simply coded the CSF for future keypunching and data analysis.

A second problem surfaced in the coding of the "nature of offence" category since the wording of the offence used by patrol officers was inconsistent. For example, the offence of robbery was variously termed "strong-arming", "purse-snatching" or "armed robbery". Although these terms may record important distinctions for the police, the multitude of terms tended to confuse rather than enlighten. For example, in an attempt to

acknowledge the proliferation of terms the researcher initially coded approximately 80 items for the "nature of offence" question. Upon the realization that the majority of these codes accounted for less than .1% of the total cases, an attempt was made to retroactively distribute the categories under more generalized groupings of offences. For example, the break and enter(B&E) category includes: B&E(residential), B&E (commercial), B&E (other) and, attempted B&E's.

A third problem arose with regard to the "date of the offence" category. Frequently the date of the offence was not identical to the date on which the offence was first reported by the victim or reportee. Moreover, in instances where the exact date of the offence was unknown (for example, in the case of a householder who returns after a vacation to find that his house has been broken into but can only give the dates of his absence as parameters) a plurality of dates could be recorded. Unfortunately, the date the offence was reported was entirely omitted on the ICF's. This could have the unfortunate consequence of making the follow-up investigation process at the VPD, in some instances, appear ponderously slow. For example, in the hypothetical illustration of the holidaying householder whose residence is broken into, by omitting a section on the ICF for the date on which the offence report was made, creates an impression of police inefficiency (this aspect is discussed in more detail in Chapter VI involving calculation of investigative lagtimes).



A final problem arose when the supervisor, upon reaching a screening decision, did not indicate all considered criteria by checking the appropriate boxes. That is, certain sections of the CSF's were incomplete. Upon questioning the supervisors as to why certain sections were omitted, they stated that if they ignored a box they felt it self-evident that the particular reason was not considered germane. Thus, effective reporting was undermined by their considerations of efficiency, expediency and the minimization of time invested in what they saw as a time consuming pursuit. Such omissions of attention to detail most frequently occurred with those reports that were screened-out (i.e., in cases where there was no suspect identification or description and where the offence was relatively minor). Supervisors saw any or all of these factors as sufficient for their decision to screen-out the case; and so, no further justification was thought necessary.

The following chapter will provide a descriptive analysis of the criminal investigation process of the Vancouver Police Department. The proceeding chapters will discuss the results of research analyses focusing on: case screening decisions and screening criteria; investigative activities and case outcomes; and, lagtime between the date of offence and case conclusion.

#### IV. THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION PROCESS OF THE VANCOUVER POLICE DEPARTMENT

In the VPD, the investigative process can best be conceived as having two distinct stages -- Preliminary Investigation and Follow-up Investigation. These investigative phases will be discussed first in order to provide a framework in which to place subsequent research findings. The second section addresses case screening and case assignment methods employed in the "generalist" and "specialist" detective units at the VPD. A third section outlines the role of Crime Analysis Units (CAU) as an important adjunct support service in the criminal investigation process.

##### The Criminal Investigation Process

###### Preliminary Investigation

The Vancouver Police Department is organized into two districts which are further stratified or subdivided in accordance with the team policing concept (Appendix G). Two divisional Patrol Units and two divisional Detective Units provide investigative services to their respective districts, while "specialized" Detective Units provide services, in the area of specific crime categories, to both divisions (see

Appendix I).


The preliminary investigation stage is generally undertaken by Patrol Division uniformed officers (216 in Patrol North and 243 in Patrol South) assigned by a dispatcher to the scene of an incident reported by a complainant. The VPD received 142,477 calls for service and uniformed personnel spent a minimum of 123,594.36 hours responding and investigating those events in 1983. Moreover, the VPD issued 84,463 case numbers for those calls for service indicating the need for further documentation of those events and, of these, 72,074 cases were reported on the UCR's for Statistics Canada.<sup>1</sup> The objective of the preliminary investigation is to determine whether a crime was actually committed, who the alleged offender is, who witnessed the event, and what physical evidence is present at the scene. See Figure 1 which shows how cases flow through this initial investigation phase.

Once the uniformed officer has determined that a crime has occurred, that it was a serious offence and/or that the victim desires to see the offender prosecuted, they will proceed with the investigation at the scene. This step of the preliminary investigation must be directed towards the identification and

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<sup>1</sup>All figures are based on VPD - Monthly Activities Reports for 1983. The discrepancy between the case numbers generated by the VPD and the number of crimes listed for the UCR is created by the UCR criteria for reportable crime. Although the VPD may assign a case number to events such as: noisy party complaints, barking dog complaints, suspicious circumstances, and domestic threatening or harassment complaints; UCR crime criteria would preclude the inclusion of those events.

Figure 1

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION PROCESS: CASE FLOW  
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS



\*Major crime squad - investigation of homicide, sexual assault, robbery, other serious offences.

development of solvability factors (leads or clues) which will ultimately point towards identifying the suspect, recovering the stolen property and prosecuting the offender in court.

It is during the preliminary stage of the investigation that the fundamental elements of the case are documented. This includes ascertaining whether there are sufficient leads to justify patrol concluding the case immediately or referring the case to detectives for follow-up. For example, during the investigation of a typical property offence, the investigator at the scene may engage in some of the following tasks to elicit potential solvability factors:

1. establish the type and owner of the premises;
2. document the particulars of the victim;
3. determine when the premises were last secured and by whom;
4. discover the point of entry or means of attack (looking for fingerprints, tool marks, other physical evidence or anything left behind by the suspect);
5. examine other parts of the premises disturbed by the suspect;
6. record what was taken from the premises, listing identifying marks and serial numbers;
7. identify the presence of latent fingerprints or other physical evidence requiring the Identification Squad to attend the scene;
8. if identification personnel have been called, advising the victim not to disturb anything;
9. locate and interview any witnesses to the crime; and,
10. telephone the Information Section for a case number for the event and requesting the victim to call with this number in the event that other information becomes available.

Either during or immediately after completion of the preliminary investigation, the uniformed officer prepares a written Investigation Report, or if there is additional information which comes to light during immediate follow-up of

the case or at a later date from the victim or witnesses, a Miscellaneous/Supplementary Report (Appendix F). Assessing the need for immediate follow-up by the uniformed officer requires consideration of a number of factors:

1. the approval of the Patrol Team Supervisor and/or the Dispatcher at the Communications Section;
2. the number and significance of leads or solvability factors which emerge as a result of the preliminary investigation;
3. whether immediate follow-up activities are imperative to clear the case;
4. the estimated duration of proposed follow-up activities;
5. the possibility that overtime will be incurred;
6. whether the proposed follow-up activities will take the uniformed officer outside his Team area or beyond the city limits;
7. the time of day or workshift;
8. the number of immediate or stacked emergency calls for service demanding police response;
9. the number and location of other available Patrol Units;
10. the complexity of the case;
11. the competency of the uniformed officer to undertake the specific follow-up activities proposed;
12. whether the case falls within the jurisdiction of a "specialized" Detective Squad; and,
13. whether a suspect is in custody.

One can surmise from the list of factors to be considered by the uniformed officer, the Patrol Division Supervisor and/or the Dispatcher, that whether an immediate follow-up investigation is necessary and appropriate is a difficult decision involving many complex, interrelated factors. In consultation with his Patrol Division Supervisor and/or the Dispatcher, the case may be continued by the uniformed officer who conducted the initial investigation. All cases not concluded by uniformed officers are usually referred to Patrol Division Detectives for subsequent follow-up.

If the preliminary investigation is competently executed and comprehensively recorded, the need for detectives to duplicate the work of the uniformed officers is reduced, if not eliminated, and detective supervisors can assign to detectives only those cases which have a reasonable likelihood of being successfully concluded.

As preliminary investigation reports are received from uniformed officers, Patrol Division Supervisors enter selected cases in a Patrol Team Log Book. Generally, if the offence is of a sensitive or serious nature and/or a suspect has been identified or arrested, the case will be recorded in the Patrol Team Log Book. If the supervisor decides to enter the case in the Patrol Team Log Book, the entry includes the following information about the case:

1. type of crime;
2. name and address of the victim;
3. modus operandi of the crime, including type of weapon used (if any);
4. identity of the suspect, if known; and,
5. name and number of the uniformed officer who conducted the preliminary investigation.

Entries in the Patrol Team Log Book do not indicate whether the case is to be assigned for follow-up. This decision is made later by the Supervisor of Patrol Division Detectives. The only solvability factor recorded in the log, albeit an important one, is whether there is a known suspect. This process of recording case information forms the basis of a manual case management system used for tracking cases at later investigative stages.

Presently in the VPD, preliminary investigation reports originating from both Patrol Division units, and which remain unconcluded, pass through that supervisory level with no check as to the quality of the report (completeness) or on the quality of the preliminary investigation (accuracy and thoroughness).

From here, all preliminary investigation reports, including both concluded and unconcluded investigations by patrol members, are then forwarded to the information processing component of the VPD. The first processing is quality control where the quality (completeness) of the report is assessed, but not the quality (accuracy and thoroughness) of the preliminary investigation effort. Incomplete reports are rejected and returned to the originating officer for completeness with a set date for return to Quality Control. Those reports meeting the criteria of completeness are then photocopied and distributed to the appropriate sections of the police department for screening. The original reports remain in the Information Section for further processing and eventual filing.<sup>2</sup> Figure 2 indicates the flow of reports as they pass through the Information Section (Appendix H indicates the manpower in each of the sections).


Objectives of the preliminary investigation are similar to those of the follow-up stage; apprehend the suspect, recover

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<sup>2</sup>At this point in the information processing, aggregate statistics are compiled on the percentage of cases cleared, closed or inactivated and the rationale for that dispositional decision. It appears that the bulk of this processing activity is directed toward general accounting to satisfy UCR criteria for Statistics Canada.



Figure 2

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION PROCESS: CASE FLOW  
INFORMATION SECTION



stolen property, gather physical evidence and, interview witnesses in order to prepare the case for prosecution. However, at the VPD, it appears that often a uniformed officer becomes a report taker rather than an investigator.<sup>3</sup> This seems to result from the fact that the report itself is merely an instrument documenting the findings of the investigation. In most instances, the preliminary investigator is the only investigator ever to examine the case. As a consequence, the typical preliminary investigation document becomes a report of the "classic" offence being reported with little regard as to a summary of the findings or potential for follow-up investigation.

#### Follow-up Investigation .

Upon receipt of those cases from the Information Section, a supervisor assesses each case to determine whether it warrants assignment to detectives for further investigative attention. The detective supervisor bases his decision on an assignment to the significance of the crime to the local community (public

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<sup>3</sup>This assertion is supported by discussions with the detective supervisors who revealed that most investigation reports are not checked by patrol supervisors with regard to the accuracy and thoroughness of the initial investigation. Other complaints by these screening supervisors indicate that uniformed officers generally do not make an assessment as to the potential for follow-up investigation by the detectives. As well, concerns of the Identification Unit personnel show the ambiguity some uniformed members have relating to the request for Identification members to attend the scene of a crime to collect physical evidence.

relations), departmental policies (political factors), and the presence of solvability factors brought to light as a result of the preliminary investigation. In cases where the criminal event is of a sensitive or serious nature and/or the initial investigation effort reveals substantive leads or clues, it is assigned by the supervisor to detectives for follow-up.

A follow-up investigation consists of the following generalized steps:

1. determine whether the preliminary investigation was complete and accurate;
2. pursue or follow through with investigation of those leads which surfaced during the initial investigative effort;
3. attempt to link the offence with other similar crimes; and,
4. if an arrest is made, prepare the case for prosecution.

The first step ensures that important issues will not be overlooked. If after careful scrutiny of the investigation report the detective believes that the initial investigative effort was flawed or less than satisfactory, they should return it for corrective action to the uniformed officer who undertook the original investigation. Generally however, a preliminary investigation report is not checked for accuracy or completeness until it reaches the detective to whom it has been assigned for follow-up. If errors or deficiencies are present, they are often over-looked as the detective attempts to duplicate the original investigation by reinterviewing the victim and/or witnesses.

Rarely does the uniformed officer who carried out the preliminary investigation receive explicit feedback on the competence of their investigative technique or on the quality of their reporting.

Occasionally, the supervisor does return a report to the originating officer if there is no bottom-line (i.e., the report is ambiguous or there is no clear-cut recommendation as to follow-up). But the message is clear; only in a small percentage of those cases assigned, i.e., approximately 6%, is there a close examination on the quality of the preliminary investigation. The majority of cases are not closely scrutinized for this aspect of quality. The report is now far removed in space and time from thorough corrective action by the originating preliminary investigator. Moreover, unaware of any weaknesses in their work, the uniformed officer is given implicit reinforcement to perpetuate them.

During the second step of the follow-up investigation, the detective pursues leads identified during the initial investigative effort. If all possible leads are pursued with little or no result, the detective in consultation with the supervisor must decide whether to deactivate a case or continue the investigation.

It is at step three of the follow-up investigation that the detective attempts a comparison of the case with other similar offences in order to determine whether or not it forms part of an overall crime pattern. Pindur(1983:47) notes that "a major

portion of all crimes are committed by a relatively small number of habitual offenders". Therefore, because the set of leads arising from each crime are different, exploring the possibility of linkages between similar crimes increases the likelihood of an identification of the offender. However, due to apparent limitations in the Information Section (i.e., manual filing systems with limited retrieval capabilities), and restricted mandate of the crime analysis units, it may not be possible for investigators to systematically pursue case linkages. In most instances, it appears that both investigators and supervisors must rely on their intuitive judgement as to whether a crime is linked to other similar crimes.

The fourth step, preparing the case for prosecution, is a crucial step in the investigative process. Successful conclusion of a case does not end with the arrest of a suspect. Often an arrest is only the halfway point in a successful investigation. The competence of all previous investigative steps will have little impact if the case is not skillfully prepared for prosecution.

#### Case Screening and Case Assignment

##### 'Generalist' Detective Units

At the two Divisional Detective Units, case screening is undertaken daily by the detective supervisor (usually a

Sergeant) who reviews all preliminary investigation reports, supplementary reports, Crown Counsel reports, and other police department reports (if a request is made for investigative action) submitted by patrol officers from the previous workshifts of the four Patrol Teams in each of the two divisions. The present structure of the preliminary investigation report does not appear to facilitate the easy capture of solvability factors on which to base early case decision-making. A screening supervisor must read the entire report to: 1) identify leads; and, 2) assess their potential, before making an experientially derived decision to assign a case for follow-up investigation.

At this stage of the screening process the supervisor is faced with several options. The supervisor can read and discard the report, circulate it among Division detectives for information, or assign it to a detective for follow-up investigation. Additionally, this review and decision-making process the supervisor attempts to formulate possible linkages between cases screened on previous occasions.

If the Supervisor decides to assign the case for follow-up, he enters in the Patrol Division Detective Supervisor's Log Book the following information about the case:

1. case number;
2. type of crime;
3. name and address of victim;
4. name and number of the detective to whom the case is to be assigned; and,
5. eventual disposition (or status) of the case.

Upon assignment of a new case, a Patrol Division Detective enters essential background information on the case in their own personal log book. If the case involves robbery, the same information is again entered in a Patrol Division Robbery Case Log Book.<sup>4</sup> No other cases are logged in a specific offence log book. As back-up to the log books, a card index is maintained which includes background information on the case, the name and number of the Patrol Division Detective to which the case was assigned for follow-up, and eventual case disposition. This process of recording case information forms the second half of a manual case management system.

The assignment of cases to detectives by supervisors in the Patrol Divisions is sometimes founded upon the detectives' particular investigative skills. Some detectives for example, prefer to investigate crimes against property (such as theft or burglary) as opposed to investigating crimes against persons (such as assaults, muggings or robberies). Other detectives have developed specialized skills in the investigation of a particular type of crime like robberies (i.e., interrogative techniques or statement taking abilities). However, there does not appear to be any hard and fast rule with regard to any assignment criteria. Thus, if there is a rapid upswing in the number of robbery cases, some of these may be assigned to the

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<sup>4</sup>This specific crime category log book was started in 1983 due to the dramatic increase in robberies. It is used as an aid by detectives to assist them in establishing possible linkages between robbery offences.

investigator outside the recognized group of robbery specialists. Nor is it clear if some intuitive measure of the number and complexity of total active cases being worked on by a particular investigator has a significant bearing on a supervisor's decision whether or not to assign a new case to that detective.

In Patrol Division North, cases are typically assigned to a single investigator for follow-up. Even though other detectives may participate in the investigation, the Patrol North detective originally assigned the follow-up is responsible for the case. In contrast, cases in Patrol South are assigned to teams of two detectives who are then both equally responsible for the outcome of the investigation.<sup>5</sup> Once assigned the case, detectives have a fairly significant degree of autonomy in conducting the investigation. However, they usually begin their follow-up inquiries by prioritizing assigned cases on the basis of immediate action required.

According to the VPD procedure, a detective supervisor must review the status of every active case with the detective to whom it was assigned. This policy states that case reviews must occur 15 days after the assignment of a case involving crimes against persons and 30 days for cases involving crimes against property. At this time, based on an assessment of investigative progress to date, a decision is made whether to continue or

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<sup>5</sup>This difference in case assignment methods seems to be more of a difference in management styles than any specific operational tactic.



conclude the investigation. Inactivation of the case and rationale must be documented in a report. The Supervisor then records the status of the case in the Case Assignment Log Book. Before, during, and after this review process, the case disposition may be any one of the following:

1. active;
2. inactive;
3. unfounded;
4. cleared by charge;
5. complainant to lay charge; or,
6. cleared by other means.

For a particularly difficult and complex investigation, a detective may request a case consultation meeting with other detectives and the supervisor. In this meeting the detective would outline the facts of the case, investigative progress to date, and address the unresolved issues which are preventing a successful case conclusion. This procedure allows information sharing and group problem solving to assist the detective with the investigation. New leads may be developed or new courses of action suggested. These consultation meetings appear to occur relatively infrequently.

In summary, the existing case management system for follow-up investigations provides close supervision and monitoring of the number and type of cases actively being pursued. However, it does little to assist the supervisor to readily review with the detective assigned the case those investigative activities required to rigorously pursue and thoroughly develop the solvability factors identified in the preliminary investigation report.

## 'Specialized' Detective Units

While "specialized" detective units are not the primary focus of this study, it is helpful to briefly outline case screening as it occurs in these investigative units. Although these case screening practices are not radically different from those of the "generalist" detective units, they are reflective of a lower volume of reported cases which are generally more serious offences.

Chappell et al., (1982) report that "most police managers agree that homicides and other major crimes of violence, like rape, should never be screened out". This view is still relevant in the Vancouver Police Department's "Specialized" detective units. All reported homicides and robberies of financial institutions are assigned to detectives. However, in the newly formed Sexual Offence Squad (1983), which investigates offences ranging in severity from obscene phone calls to aggravated sexual assault, case screening does take place. The supervisor in this unit is responsible for collecting preliminary investigation reports, submitted by patrol members, and reviewing them to determine which cases should be assigned and which should simply be filed for reference purposes. The process of assigning cases is an informal one, with cases being screened out largely on the basis of two factors: the seriousness of the offence, and the amount of information provided about the

suspect. Serious sexual offences, however, are never screened out. At the present time, it is not known whether other "specialized" detective units conduct formal case screening. However, based on general screening practices outlined in other units, it seems reasonable to assume that case screening is not enacted on the basis of any formalized criteria.

### Crime Analysis Units

The analysis function within a police organization is potentially the most valuable resource available in the criminal investigation process. Owing to the fact that a significant proportion of criminal events (and particularly those in offence categories like burglary and robbery) are committed by "career criminals" who seek to avoid detection by disguise, or by striking when it is unlikely that witnesses will observe their actions, it is improbable that the most common solvability factors (e.g., a physical description or related identification of a suspect at the scene of a crime) will be readily available. As a result, the police organization becomes saddled with the burden of a large number of unsolved crimes which have been screened-out of the traditional follow-up investigation process. Nevertheless, some of these cases may lend themselves to solution through an analysis of the information they do contain.

Given these problems, there is a clear need for a crime analysis capability which is able to identify and predict crime

patterns and trends, link cases together by modus operandi, gather and disseminate intelligence information on known active criminals, and direct preventative measures or other resources which would increase the likelihood of apprehension of offenders. This crime analysis function is based on the assumption that the documentation of individual events (crimes), when put together in a comprehensive package, will provide a much larger picture of related criminal activity - "the whole being greater than the sum of its parts".

The VPD has responded to this well-recognized dilemma of sporadic crime analysis by instituting specific Crime Analysis Units (CAU) in several key areas of its criminal investigation process. For the purposes of this section of the chapter, only the Crime Analysis Units of the two Patrol Divisions will be discussed as they are the nexus in the information gathering and dissemination process for the majority of unsolved cases. Generally, CAU activities are manually performed by the VPD's crime analysts who handle approximately 72,000 criminal cases per year.

There are several immediate differences between the crime analysis units (CAU) in the VPD, North and South Patrol Divisions. Firstly, the CAU at Patrol Division South appears more advanced in their techniques of analysis and informational outputs than Patrol Division North. Whether or not this apparent increased sophistication stems from the deliberate intervention of management or is simply fortuitous - due to the longer

history of the CAU at Patrol Division South and/or their greater level of available resources (e.g. manpower, space allocation, etc.) - is unknown. Nevertheless, it exists. Secondly, the CAU at Patrol Division North is technically becoming extinct; the unit is presently in transition from an analysis unit to an intelligence unit. Although this change may be nominal (i.e., a change of appellation rather than function in that a CAU subsumes the work of an intelligence unit by definition), it does signify the divergent methods of CAU operations at the VPD. Accordingly, CAU operations at Patrols North and South shall be dealt with in separate sections of this chapter. The term "crime analysis unit" will be employed simply to expedite clarity.

#### Crime Analysis Unit - Patrol South

This unit conducts crime analysis and generates statistical information exclusively on reported crime in Patrol South. Data for statistics and crime analysis are derived from Investigation, Supplementary, and Crown Counsel Reports submitted directly or indirectly by uniformed officers and detectives in Patrol South. These are supplemented with information, in the form of Crime Bulletin and Information Bulletins, distributed by the VPD's Information Section.

Patrol South's CAU is manned by three full-time uniformed officers who report directly to the Superintendent of the Patrol Division. On occasion regular personnel may be supplemented by

other officers placed in the CAU on light duties. However, both types of personnel may be deployed elsewhere in the event a task force is established. When this occurs, crime analysis is disrupted creating a backlog of data for analysis and an erratic flow of information for operational personnel. For example, while CAU personnel show initiative and innovation in crime analysis and are willing to implement different ideas and experiments (e.g., review court records re: sentences and releases of known offenders to inform uniformed officers; photo-outlays of youth gangs and associates), these new systems are sometimes discontinued because of fluctuating manpower resources.

Regardless of manpower fluctuations, a single officer of the CAU is responsible for the preparation of weekly statistics, based on VPD Crime Bulletins, which indicate the increase or decrease of events in specific crime categories. These statistics are then compared with statistics for the previous week and those for the same week the year prior to indicate the percentage of variation in crime rates. The figures are broken down by patrol team areas to evaluate the performance of the various patrol teams. Additionally, data from Crime Bulletins are used to create extensive pin-up maps of some specific crimes (e.g., break and enter offences - residential, commercial and robbery - all types) which specify location and time of occurrence. While compiling statistics, uniformed officers in the CAU attempt to locate patterns, trends and links from

information contained in Crime Bulletins.

The two remaining uniformed officers, at the CAU Patrol South, are responsible for maintaining an extensive crime intelligence filing system. Information for this system is based on Crime Bulletins; Investigation, Supplementary, and Crown Counsel Reports; suspect cards; and, Information Bulletins from within the VPD and from all Lower Mainland law enforcement agencies. The intelligence information file at Patrol Division South began in 1980. Various spin-off innovations have occurred as a result of basic known suspect information. For example, a break and enter M.O. file system was attempted although later rejected due to its reliance on a manual collection and retrieval system which proved awkward and unwieldy. Nevertheless, this information was eventually incorporated into specific intelligence files of known, active criminals. Similarly, the robbery M.O. file system presently in operation began in response to a large increase in robberies. Information is categorized by location of offence, type of robbery (armed, strong-arming or purse-snatching), type of premises, weapons used and suspect identification and description information.

Within suspect intelligence files, there is a card system which lists special identifying suspect features such as: tattoos (by type and anatomical location), scars (by type and location) and, deformities (types, amputations, and irregularities of teeth and/or complexion). Additionally, the intelligence file lists crime or suspect vehicles by license

plate number or partial plates, vehicle size and colour, known drivers, registered owners and associates.<sup>6</sup>

Approximately 700 information cards are generated and filed into the intelligence system per week. Cards are cross-filed by suspect name and address, description, criminal activities, vehicles used and, cross-indexed to another file system which extensively documents the history of those criminal activities, known associates of offenders, and criminal records of known offenders.

The intelligence system is intentionally publicized among members of the VPD and is reputedly frequently utilized by both uniformed officers and detectives. As well, intelligence information is shared with the Vancouver Integrated Intelligence Unit(V.I.I.U.), the Co-ordinated Law Enforcement Unit(C.L.E.U.) and other law enforcement agencies. However, little, if any, formal documentation on the use of this system or its overall success is recorded. One obvious reason for this paucity of information is due to the fact that CAU personnel work only one shift whereas three operational shifts have access to the intelligence system. CAU cannot monitor the utilization of its resources in absentia. Although a few specific examples of success were stated and limited feedback was given to CAU personnel, their overall effectiveness remains unknown. As well,

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<sup>6</sup>CAU personnel would like to expand and supplement this suspect intelligence system to include: suspect race, hair colouring, eyes, etc.; but because of limited resources they are unable to maintain this type of system.



the amount of use made of the CAU in directing patrol operational tactics by targeting high crime areas similarly remains unknown.

It would be regrettable if the present intelligence system at Patrol Division South collapsed, not because of a lack of initiative or experimentation, but rather due to a shortage (or instability) of manpower, proper management and, monitoring of the CAU's effectiveness. Additionally, the CAU's total reliance on a manual system may eventually become too cumbersome to produce desired results.

#### Crime Analysis Unit - Patrol North

Since early 1984, the Crime Analysis Unit in Patrol Division North has expanded its operation to include an intelligence gathering and dissemination function. The unit has been renamed North Intelligence Unit (N.I.U.); moved its location to a highly visible section in the Patrol North operations area, and increased its personnel to two uniformed officers whereas formerly a single officer was assigned.

Of the two CAU officers, one is responsible for generating statistical information for half of the shift, while the other half is allocated to crime analysis. The other uniformed officer devotes the entire shift to intelligence gathering and dissemination. This aspect of the crime analysis process is similar to that of Patrol South, though it lacks Patrol South's

preparation of an extensive carding and filing system for recording known suspect information. While the CAU at Patrol North maintains photo-outlays of some known offenders and associates, it omits the elaborate pin-maps constructed by CAU officers at Patrol South. The N.I.U. would appear to focus its attention on individual offenders as opposed to criminal events.

The North Intelligence Unit can theoretically be viewed as a constituent part of a CAU focusing on intelligence gathering and dissemination. Its operation began with a request for Patrol North Division personnel to scan their notebooks and memories for the names of known, active criminal suspects and to submit this information to the intelligence unit. This request for information was circulated in an inter-departmental memo and reiterated during various Patrol Division parades, outlining: 1) the need of the N.I.U. for type of data; and, 2) the potential value of this information to uniformed members and detectives.

Upon receipt of information, N.I.U. personnel compile comprehensive intelligence packages on suspected individuals and their known associates. Patrol North personnel submit information on a form recording a suspect's name, address, number of times investigated, places stopped, dates on which checked or investigated and so on. This information is collected and collated at the N.I.U. Sequentially, a memo is sent to the Information Section requesting that all information pertaining to the named suspect be compiled (i.e., check cards on the suspect, vehicle information, addresses, associates, case

numbers of criminal occurrences). All reports (Investigation, Supplementary, Crown Counsel) relating to the named suspect are pulled from the filing system and photocopied. This collated suspect file is then made available for investigative use by uniformed officers including those officers who initially brought the name of the suspect to the attention of the N.I.U.

At Patrol North, all reports with a named offender are copied and forwarded to the Crime Analysis Unit from the Information Section. From these reports, suspect information (name, address, date of birth, offence type, case number, investigating officer, etc.) is carded, and indexed. Offender and associates photo outlays are displayed and the Canadian Information Centre(CPIC) is alerted to the observation of these individuals. Thus, the intelligence system allows for the sharing of information among officers over a wide area. For example, information on suspects known and active in one patrol zone is available to uniformed officers in other zones. This allows officers to obtain up-to-date information on suspects and, additionally, facilitates the monitoring of potential criminal activity by known suspects and their associates. The use of the CPIC observation function should encourage the continuous generation of up-to-date information on check cards and provide for a greater wealth of investigative information. This, in turn, could potentially facilitate arrests of suspects and the clearance of criminal cases.

## Summary

This descriptive analysis of the criminal investigation process at the VPD indicates that overall, the case screening decisions remain informal. That is, there are no explicit or documented criteria on which to base the screening decision. Furthermore, no record is kept by the Information Section as to the number of cases forwarded to the "generalist" detective units nor is there a record kept of the number of cases received by these investigative units. Additionally, there is no documentation of decision-making at the case screening level other than a recording of the cases to be assigned for detective follow-up investigation. Thus, case screening decision-making is generally based upon undocumented, experientially derived criteria which, in turn, leads to a lack of specific management information to critically monitor investigative activities and to make future resource allocation decisions which may be beneficial to the present structure of the investigative process.

Furthermore, for those cases which remain unsolved and do not warrant further investigative action, there appears to be a lack of control over resources which may insure consistent case linkages. As a result, the police agency becomes overburdened with criminal events which, through a more systematic approach, may be more effectively cleared.

By and large, every individual involved in preliminary and follow-up investigations is concerned with patterns and trends,

but sometimes those trends and patterns appear to transcend the individual's sphere of influence or jurisdictional boundaries. For example, a "career criminal" involved in burglary may strike several times in one area of city one week and another area the next. The uniformed officer who conducts the preliminary investigations in this one area may not be aware that this pattern of burglaries has occurred in other areas over a period of days, weeks, or months. Further, when these reports are submitted for case screening by supervisors, they are likely, because of the absence of specific solvability factors, to be individually screened-out from any follow-up investigation. Presently, the reports are be circulated for information, or filed away in the event a suspect becomes known or other solvability factors become available.

This type of situation was encapsulated in an example given by a crime analyst who attempted to provide detectives with case linkage information concerning numerous break and enter occurrences. The analyst spent approximately six weeks examining past records of all break-ins occurring in a specific patrol team area. Eventually, over 100 case linkages were established by way of M.O. information and suspect descriptions. Culprits were identified and arrested, and many cases were cleared as a result. However, the crime analyst pointed out that only one patrol team area records were examined, due to resource limitations (i.e., a manual information system and a personnel shortage). Hence, there appeared to be sufficient evidence to

suggest that those identified suspects had not been restricted by artificial police boundaries.

Consequently, present methods of crime analysis appear to be generally informal and not very effective, for it is virtually impossible for any single individual to store enough information in their head which would permit the detection and dissemination of specific crime patterns, trends, or likely perpetrators. This is not to say that these informal methods do not work; they do produce results. However, these results appear to be rare occurrences and often as an outcome of luck as opposed to any diligent and systematic method of crime analysis.

Presently, CAU's operation in North and South Patrol Divisions utilize systems of collecting, collating and disseminating crime analysis and intelligence information in a very haphazard, hit and miss fashion. Further, the situation is encouraged by insufficient management guidelines establishing overall objectives, specific goals, and identifying viable methods by which to achieve desired results. This situation is exacerbated by an erratic flow of information within and among Patrol Divisions and related external agencies. Moreover, the CAU's of Patrol North and South lack direct and consistent lines of communication; they do not provide for a city-wide overview of crime patterns and trends. Rather, the Crime Analysis Units of the VPD seem to be presently working in isolation; criminals are able to benefit from the artificial boundaries demarcating patrol divisions and the closed knowledge monopoly on

information available to the individual CAU's.

Given the large volume of reports and/or data available, the VPD's reliance on manual methods of crime analysis appear to be self-defeating. Instead, noting the VPD's expressed interest in the automation of it's record-keeping facilities, of salient concern is the formulation of plans and information requirements that will facilitate the transition of a manual crime analysis system to a computerized operation. Moreover, the VPD management appears to lack realistic and accurate information on which to assess organizational performance. At present, management relies on statistics generated by the Data Conversion section of the Information Section which satisfy UCR criteria for Statistics Canada but provides a distorted vision of total VPD activities. For example, many crime categories investigated by VPD personnel are not listed in UCR crime lists. As well, the structure of UCR reporting formats do not permit information breakdowns on the number of cases cleared by uniformed officers and detectives in either Patrol Division. A more sophisticated technique for organizational evaluation would provide management with a more realistic portrait of the scope and breadth of the VPD's operations and activities.

The next two chapters will outline the findings of this present study and discuss how these findings relate to present case screening practices at the VPD.

## V. AN ANALYSIS OF CASE SCREENING

### Introduction

The preceding descriptive discussion indicates that the investigation of criminal events demands a concerted, organized effort from uniformed officers, detectives, evidence technicians, information processing personnel, crime analysts, and police managers to achieve an effective and efficient criminal investigation process. Moreover, an integrated policing system appears to require, in part, explicit guidelines for case screening to provide management with information for the proficient monitoring of criminal investigations (Miron et al., 1979).

Within the Vancouver Police Department, many aspects of the criminal investigation process appear to be informally managed at the Patrol Division and Division Detective unit levels. Presently, no explicit procedures exist for early case closure at the preliminary investigation stage. Additionally, no formal screening criteria are articulated to assist uniformed officers, detectives, or supervisors with case screening decision-making.

Although the generalist Division Detective units of the VPD, Patrol North and Patrol South, account for only 25% of the total departmental investigative personnel, they are



theoretically responsible for the follow-up investigation of 88 percent of the department's total volume of reported criminal cases (see Table 1). Decision-making responsibility for determining which cases warrant follow-up investigation rests with the Division Detective Sergeants. Decisions made at this stage in the process precipitate an investigative effort by detective personnel and potentially facilitate successful case conclusions or outcomes. However, within the Vancouver Police Department, the only procedure explicitly directing case screening and case assignment decision-making is located in the Job Classification Manual Index which outlines that Division Detective Sergeants are required to:

.... Maintain a schedule of duty and to co-ordinate and assign all cases to the appropriate detectives....  
Monitor crime trends and confer with Division Sergeants  
re: Combatting same (p.70) (emphasis added).

This statement invites the assumption that no case screening is practiced by the Vancouver Police Department (i.e., that all cases are assigned and investigated). In reality, however, this is not the case. In 1983, there were approximately 72,000 criminal cases falling in the province of generalist detective responsibility (see Table 1); of these 3,053 were assigned for follow-up investigation by generalist detectives (see Tables 12 & 13). This indication of case screening signifies important decisions are made as to whether or not a case is eligible for further investigative action.

Table 1

Vancouver Police Department Crime Activities Report - 1983<sup>1</sup>

Crime Categories	Generalist Detective Investigative Responsibility					Total	Specialist Detective Investigative Responsibility	All Other Criminal Code <sup>6</sup>	All Crime Categories Total
	Assault <sup>2</sup>	Robbery <sup>3</sup>	Break & Enter	Theft (under-over \$200) <sup>4</sup>	Mischief				
Number of cases	4668	2082	13442	28008	8292	6361	9212	72065	
Concluded Cases	2936	473	1086	4862	799	3965	5100	19203	
Clearance Rate	62.8%	22.7%	8.0%	17.0%	9.0%	62.0%	55.0%	26.6%	

<sup>1</sup> The figures for this table were compiled from VPD monthly activity reports (UCR) for 1983.

<sup>2</sup> Excludes sexual assaults.

<sup>3</sup> Robbery of financial institutions excluded.

<sup>4</sup> Excludes motor vehicle thefts.

<sup>5</sup> Includes bail violations, indecent acts, trespass, etc.

<sup>6</sup> Includes homicide, attempted murder, sexual offences, theft of motor vehicles, fraud, prostitution, gaming and betting, drugs, and other federal statutes

### Division Detective Case Flow


A decision to focus on case flow within the generalist Division Detective units was based on several factors. All reports (excluding those reports which fall within the realm of specialized detective units), requiring decisions on the feasibility, irrespective of cost, of follow-up investigations are channelled into the respective Patrol Division Detective units for case screening and possible, subsequent, case assignment. Figure 3 demonstrates this flow of information as it is processed through the detective unit for screening, assignment and, eventual disposition.

Analysis of the "Case Screening Form" data revealed a substantial volume of reports (n=3564) entering the investigative process and being screened by Patrol North and Patrol South detective supervisors during the test period. For purposes of this research analysis, those reports were subdivided and classified into two major groups: 1) reports concluded by uniformed officers; and, 2) unconcluded reports submitted by uniformed officers. Both classes of reports were further analyzed by: type of report, nature of offence, screening supervisor, screening decision, and screening criteria.

Table 2 indicates a breakdown in the volume of both concluded and unconcluded reports recorded during the research period. These reports were generated by uniformed officers in the two Patrol Divisions and forwarded through the VPD's

Figure 3

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION PROCESS: CASE FLOW  
FOLLOW-UP INVESTIGATIONS



\* Certain refinements were made to this figure (see Chapter III) which creates a discrepancy in the case disposition figures.

Information Section to the appropriate generalist Division Detective unit for case screening.

Table 3 shows the relationship between the volume and report types of the unconcluded report class in the two Patrol Divisions. Concluded reports were omitted from this analysis to demonstrate the amount of new information entering the screening process for case screening.

Although the figures in Tables 2 and 3 suggest significant differences in the volumes of reports handled by supervisors in the Patrol Divisions, (i.e., ostensibly Patrol North handles a greater number of reports or has a greater workload than Patrol South), the figures are deceptive. Rather, the figures appear to be reflective of different screening practices, not work performance. VPD statistics reveal that Patrol South has a 12% higher crime volume than Patrol North (see Table 4); a higher call-load rate; and a larger number of uniformed and investigative personnel.<sup>1</sup> Given the monthly reported crime averages of the respective patrol zones (as indicated in Table

<sup>1</sup>The figures in Tables 1 and 4 are not meant for comparative purposes due to the fact that the statistics were obtained from two different sources. Table 1 figures were obtained from UCR data and Table 4 figures were gathered from an "Offence Analysis by Months for 1983". The first source does not provide a breakdown of offences by Patrol Divisions but provides a finer discrimination of offence types. The second source outlines a breakdown of offence types by Patrol Divisions but does not include all offence categories as in the UCR data. For example, the mischief category is omitted but the UCR data indicated there were 8,292 offences for 1983. Nevertheless, the different sources compliment one another by demonstrating the overall volume and type of offences coming to the attention of the VPD, investigative responsibilities, and the crime rate differences between the Patrol Divisions.

Table 2  
Volume of Reports for Screening

	Unconcluded Reports	Concluded Reports	Row TOTAL
Patrol North	1,750 (49.2%)	350 (9.7%)	2,100 (58.9%)
Patrol South	1,386 (38.8%)	78 (2.3%)	1,464 (41.1%)
Column Total	3,136 (88.0%)	428 (12.0%)	3,564 (100%)

Table 3  
Volume and Report Types (Unconcluded Reports)

	Investi- gation Report	Supple- mentary Report	Crown Counsel Report	Other Police Dept. Report	Other Report	Row Total
Patrol North	1,601 (51.0%)	98 (3.1%)	45 (1.7%)	1 --	4 --	1,749 (55.8%)
Patrol South	1,189 (38.0%)	187 (6.0%)	10 (0.1%)	1 --	0 --	1,387 (44.2%)
Column Total	2,790 (89.0%)	285 (9.1%)	55 (1.8%)	2 (0.1%)	4 (0.1%)	3,136 (100%)

Table 4

## Offence Volume Breakdown by Patrol Divisions for 1983

	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Total	Monthly Average
<u>Patrol North</u>														
Assaults	192	200	230	221	222	199	255	200	182	197	174	170	2442	204
Robbery	105	97	111	117	94	115	103	98	119	132	109	112	1312	109
B & E	415	423	392	380	340	394	475	408	387	440	452	426	4932	411
Thefts	983	926	988	973	1067	1100	1200	1137	986	1067	1009	1001	12437	1036
Other Criminal <sup>1</sup>	102	92	115	95	92	126	119	120	112	123	93	102	1291	108
Totals	1791	1738	1836	1786	1815	1934	2152	1963	1786	1959	1837	1811	22414	1868
<u>Patrol South</u>														
Assaults	166	186	186	177	224	182	196	198	185	171	128	157	2156	180
Robbery	80	51	73	65	49	46	58	60	54	67	68	77	748	62
B & E	764	838	751	647	678	662	648	656	631	721	794	680	8470	706
Thefts	1157	1134	1443	1405	1424	1392	1312	1365	1181	1143	1112	916	14984	1249
Other Criminal <sup>1</sup>	159	154	168	169	150	154	143	121	130	145	131	134	1758	147
Totals	2326	2363	2621	2463	2525	2436	2357	2400	2181	2247	2233	1964	28116	2343

<sup>1</sup> Includes homicide, attempted murder, sexual offenses, theft of motor vehicles, fraud, vice, and drugs.

4), theoretically, Patrol South should generate more reports for case screening by detective supervisors than Patrol North. However, this is not reflected in Tables 2 and 3 which invites the assumption that Patrol North detective supervisors screen a higher percentage of reports and that Patrol North uniformed officers are concluding more reports than uniformed officers in Patrol South.

Examination of the procedures for processing reports from uniformed officers through to detective supervisors for case screening may account for the discrepancy in the figures recorded in Tables 2 and 3. Due to the proximity of Patrol North to the Information Section, reports generated by uniformed officers are processed directly by the civilian staff of that section. Copies are then made and distributed to Patrol North detective supervisors for screening.

However, in Patrol South, uniformed officers are responsible for making copies of the reports for distribution (station copy, detective copy and, crime analyst copy) and submitting the original to the Information Section. When marked "Submitted Oakridge", this indicates that no further copies are required to be sent back to Patrol South. The omission of this mark may account, in part, for incongruencies between volumes of reports in patrol zones as indicated by Tables 2 and 3. That is, copies of reports originating in Patrol South, but submitted at Patrol North, may simply not be returned to Patrol South for case screening by the detective supervisor. Evidence for this



assumption can be found in the VPD Policy Manual, Section 9(b), directing report from the Information Section to Patrol South:

If report is not marked 'Submitted Oakridge' then send 1 copy to Division Analyst. Extra copies will be made by the Analyst as required.

Moreover, during this process of copying reports in Patrol South other informal case screening decisions may be made so that some reports are not copied for detective supervisors to screen.<sup>2</sup> This informal screening, in itself, does not seem to create a problem in that information is not lost, but is processed (perhaps more efficiently) by the crime analysis unit.<sup>3</sup> As well, it is assumed that those reports not copied for screening are reports which contain little, or no, solvability factors and do not warrant detective supervisory screening.

Table 5 provides a breakdown of offence types for both concluded and unconcluded reports documented during the research period. Table 6 provides a monthly offence analysis in both Patrol North and Patrol South as recorded on monthly UCR reports for 1983. The discrepancies in total volume of reports evident in every offence category in Tables 5 and 6 should activate

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<sup>2</sup>This fact is most dramatically indicated by the differences in volume of concluded reports between the two zones (see Table 7).

<sup>3</sup>It is interesting to note how the Patrol South Division has adapted to compensate for its distance from the information processing facilities located at police headquarters. Perhaps the most ingenious adaptation is the Crime Analysis Unit which appears to have a higher level of sophistication than the Patrol North CAU.

management's concern over informal case screening.<sup>4</sup>

Although Table 5 underestimates the volume of those offences common to Tables 4 and 5 (i.e., theft, robbery, B & E, mischief and assault) it is useful in identifying offences neglected by UCR (eg. life & health events, harassment, threatening, etc.) and informing management of the types of offences handled by the VPD. Presently, VPD management relies on two sources of data, UCR statistics and in-house statistics, to acquire knowledge of the breadth and scope of police activities. However, patrol manpower deployment is based upon the in-house figures. Additionally, without explicit policy directives for case screening decision-making, management seems to be prevented from accurately measuring the performance of uniformed officers, detectives, and supervisors. Consequently, investigations appear to be conducted on offences not listed in UCR data, while investigative performance appears not to be measured at all.

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<sup>4</sup>One of two assumptions can be made in regard to inconsistencies between Tables 5 and 6 in specific crime categories to account for missing reports. First, detective supervisors did not indicate the true volume of reports on the CSF. If so, they conduct an even greater amount of screening activity than reported in this study. Second, Investigation Reports during the test period, were screened through a different process than indicated on the CSF. With regard to the latter, it can be noted that the volume of reports for Patrol North fell within the range of reported monthly figures (Table 4). However, this was not the case for Patrol South.

Table 5  
Breakdown of Offence Types by Patrol Divisions

	Thefts	B&E	Robbery	Health Events	Property Events	Fraud Events	Assaults	Mischief	Harassment	Suspicious Circum.	Threatening	Misc.	Total
Patrol North	887	356	177	45	32	12	163	297	12	30	19	61	2091
Patrol South	243	630	67	40	65	25	164	72	32	35	41	51	1465
Total	1130	986	244	95	97	37	327	369	44	65	60	112	3556

Table 6  
Offence Analysis for Patrol Divisions

	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Total	Monthly Average
Assault	378	363	395	441	421	425	439	400	377	363	307	359	4668	389
Concluded	181	236	267	245	267	313	267	278	247	222	201	212	2936	245
Robbery	195	144	182	183	144	164	159	164	171	202	175	199	2082	173
Concluded	61	25	43	16	49	52	30	38	50	36	33	40	473	39
B & E	1210	1192	1187	1031	964	1104	1110	1087	1024	1132	1270	1131	13442	1120
Concluded	99	76	116	67	94	123	64	75	75	92	94	93	1068	89
Theft	2297	1980	2471	2373	2507	2587	2531	2584	2168	2230	2212	2068	28008	2334
Concluded	483	370	505	328	408	504	332	390	302	370	453	417	4862	405
Mischief	703	611	701	737	634	746	662	708	694	741	747	608	8292	691
Concluded	71	66	58	76	44	90	83	67	74	60	47	63	799	66
Misc. Crim. Offences	538	521	527	531	593	466	578	579	596	510	462	460	6361	530
Concluded	310	329	283	319	347	320	361	383	332	339	259	383	3965	330
All Other Offences	845	650	822	750	715	793	905	814	717	790	671	740	9212	768
Concluded	537	345	422	454	393	452	502	432	402	433	394	334	5100	425
Monthly Total	6175	5462	6285	6046	5978	6285	6384	6336	5747	5968	5844	5565	72075	6005

## Screening Decisions and Screening Criteria

Although a VPD policy outlines that detective Sergeants are responsible for case screening, Table 7 indicates responsibility is unequally divided among Staff/Sergeants, Sergeants and, Detectives (in the role of acting Sergeants). Data derived from the CSF data reveal that a total of 6 supervisors made case screening decisions during the research period. Case screening decisions were made by a Staff/Sergeant, a Sergeant and, a detective in each of the two Patrol Divisions. Although Sergeants screened the majority of reports, Staff/Sergeants and detectives fulfilled the case screening role in the absence of the Sergeant due to staggered days off, annual leave, sick time, or shift rotations.

The number of supervisors responsible for case screening raises two important issues. The first involves the consistency of decision-making criteria in determining which reports are screened-in or screened-out of the investigative process. Preliminary findings suggest significant variations in case screening decisions among supervisors. For example, out of a total of 3,136 screened, but unconcluded reports, the decision to circulate a report for information accounted for 18.6%. Individual supervisory screening decisions for this particular screening category ranged from a high of 29.7% to a low of 8.9%. The decision to discard a report accounted for 75.1% of the 3,136 reports with individual decisions ranging between 83.2%

Table 7

## Breakdown of Screening Responsibility

	Staff Sergeants	Sergeants	Detectives	Row TOTAL
Patrol North	365 (10.2%)	1,225 (34.4%)	475 (13.3%)	2,065 (57.9%)
Patrol South	576 (16.2%)	657 (18.5%)	266 (7.5%)	1,499 (42.1%)
Column Total	941 (26.4%)	1,882 (52.8%)	741 (20.8%)	3,564 (100%)

and 66.8%. The decision to screen-in a report for assignment accounted for 6.3% of the 3,136 reports, with individual decisions ranging from a high of 9.8% to a low of 3.6%. While these findings remain inconclusive, they do suggest the inconsistency in decision-making criteria and discretion practised by individual supervisors where no specified guidelines for case screening exist.<sup>5</sup>

The second issue concerns a function of the case screening role, that is, the attempt to establish links and patterns in the criminal events that are documented in offence reports. In theory, a supervisor screening reports tries to establish links

<sup>5</sup>These results remain inconclusive as there was no control over the type of information contained in the initial investigation reports within which the screening decisions were based. Differences in the number and/or quality of solvability factors may be attributed to those noted differences in decision-making.

or patterns between those reports and those previously screened. In practice, this is a difficult task to accomplish given the number of persons responsible for case screening, the volume of reports to be screened, and the number of reports generated over an indeterminate time frame. As a hypothetical example, Supervisor A screens reports for five consecutive days and then has two days off. Supervisor B fulfills the case screening role in his absence and Supervisor C is responsible for case screening decision-making when Supervisor A is on annual leave for 4 weeks. During this time period, a suspect consistently commits the same type of offence. As a result of these supervisory changes no immediate or direct linkage is made to those reports which may indicate a similar modus operandi. This is perhaps due to the limited knowledge of any one active supervisor or individual discretion or circumstance.<sup>6</sup> The task of linking reports that fit a pattern and/or are related, appears to be impossible or, at best, inconsistent and ineffective.

This difficulty is due, in part, to an information gap whereby supervisors are generally unaware of the information contained in reports screened by another supervisor. This gap is compounded by the artificial boundaries set, by Patrol Division zones, on the overall crime picture in the city. If our hypothetical suspect traverses those boundaries, screening

<sup>6</sup>I would argue that most case linkages uncovered during the screening process would be due more to chance than any rigorous methodical effort on the part of the supervisors.

supervisors in one area may be unaware of crime patterns which develop and overlap both areas.

Furthermore, the present Investigation Report does not provide an adequate section in which to document exact M.O. information. Consequently, the Information Section is only able to codify rudimentary M.O. information. Analysis of this data is conducted in a convoluted fashion (i.e., no direct on-line access to data bases is available) and only when requested by those police members who are aware that such a program exists. As a result of all of these shortcomings, detectives are forced to rely upon the traditional suspect interviewing method in establishing case linkages.

In returning to our hypothetical suspect, for example, detectives would normally interrogate the suspect in the hopes he would confess to other offences. If no such admission was forthcoming, detectives lose the only source of information available to link cases - the suspect. However, if detectives were forewarned with analyses of potential case linkages, they may be in a better position to extract a confession which would conclusively enable the clearance of those cases.

It must be remembered that case screening decisions are based upon experientially derived criteria as opposed to any formal criteria set by policy. The screening task becomes one of determining which reports will be assigned for follow-up investigation based on the implicit identification of solvability factors.



Two important concerns of this study were: 1) the decisions made by supervisors when screening reports; and, 2) the criteria in making case screening decisions in the absence of policy. To address these concerns, the CSF adapted from a case screening form used by Eck (1979) and subsequently modified, was used to assess decision-making by screening supervisors at the VPD. It was determined that there were three possible screening decisions a supervisor could make on review of a particular report:

1. to discard a report and remove it from further investigative action;
2. to circulate a report within the detective unit for information purposes; or,
3. to assign a report for follow-up investigation.

The first two case screening decisions negated a follow-up investigation.

Table 8 indicates screening decisions by supervisors on those reports concluded by uniformed officers in both Patrol Divisions. Assaults, thefts, incidents of mischief, miscellaneous offences (possession of stolen property or weapons, etc.) and B & E account for 74.9% of all offence types concluded by uniformed officers. The factors which may promote the successful conclusion of reports by uniformed officers are possibly due to:

1. the rapidity of patrol response; or,
2. the higher probability of a domestic or civil dispute, where there would appear to be a greater chance that the suspect may be known to the victim.

As well, Table 8 reveals that, of the 428 reports concluded by patrol at the preliminary investigation stage, 94.2% of the reports were discarded; in 98.6% of the reports there was no follow-up investigation. This may suggest that uniformed officers are proficient at concluding their investigations (i.e., no assistance is required by detective units) and that the screening done is simply a review designed to oversee the quality of uniformed officer investigative work. Alternatively, it could be that supervisor's do not see any merit or value in assigning follow-up investigative work to ensure quality checks on cases already concluded.

The remainder of the concluded cases were distributed within the detective unit for information purposes (4.4%), generally due to the seriousness of the offence (i.e., robbery or B & E) and/or the known identity of the offender; and, 1.4% were assigned. The assignment of these reports may indicate detective assistance to uniformed officers in difficult investigations or follow-up investigations where the suspect may have been linked to other, similar crimes.

Table 9 shows the breakdown of decisions on reports which remained unconcluded after preliminary investigation. Additionally, Table 9 reveals that 93.7% of all unconcluded reports are screened-out and no follow-up investigations are conducted. With the remainder (6.3%) of the unconcluded reports, a decision is made to assign cases for subsequent follow-up

Table 8

## Screening Decisions - Concluded Reports

	No Follow-Up Investigation		Follow-Up	Row
	Circulated	Discarded	Assigned	Total
Patrol North	14 (3.3%)	331 (77.3%)	5 (1.2%)	350 (81.8%)
Patrol South	5 (1.2%)	72 (16.8%)	1 (0.2%)	78 (18.2%)
Column Total	19 (4.4%)	403 (94.2%)	6 (1.4%)	428 (100%)

Table 9

## Screening Decisions - Unconcluded Reports

	No Follow-Up Investigation		Follow-Up	Row
	Circulated	Discarded	Assigned	Total
Patrol North	425 (13.6%)	1,240 (39.5%)	84 (2.7%)	1,749 (55.8%)
Patrol South	159 (5.1%)	1,115 (35.6%)	113 (3.6%)	1,387 (44.2%)
Column Total	584 (18.6%)	2,355 (75.1%)	197 (6.3%)	3,136 (100%)

investigation. There are many factors which enter into this screening decision. The factors which appear salient in determining whether or not a case will be assigned to Division detectives for follow-up are the sensitivity or seriousness of the offence and the number and potential of solvability factors which emerged during the preliminary investigation.

Table 10 indicates the relationships between screening decisions and report types. Investigation Reports reveal the number of new cases entering the investigative process. Supplementary Reports include additional information to the Investigation Report and/or indicate miscellaneous events such as sick or injured persons, found or lost property, and suspicious circumstances. Crown Counsel reports indicate that charges have been laid, usually by uniformed officers. It should be noted that Investigation Reports constitute 89% of report types subject to case screening. Approximately, 94% of these Investigation Reports, representing new cases introduced to the investigative process, are screened-out; the remainder, 6.1%, are assigned for follow-up investigation.

Analyses of the CSF data revealed that the most important factor effecting whether or not a report would be circulated, discarded, or assigned, during the test period, was suspect identification(67.5%). Also salient was the supervisor's decision on whether a report was for information only, a Crown Counsel issue, or the province of another investigative unit(18.1%). Additional factors which were important involved

Table 10

## Screening Decisions by Report Types

	Investi- gation Report	Supple- mentary Report	Crown Counsel Report	Other Police Dept. Report	Other Report	Row Total
Circu- lated	469 (15.0%)	86 (2.7%)	26 (0.8%)	2 (0.1%)	1 --	584 (18.6%)
Dis- carded	2,152 (68.9%)	182 (5.8%)	21 (0.7%)	-- --	-- --	2,355 (75.1%)
Assigned	169 (5.4%)	17 (0.5%)	8 (0.3%)	-- --	3 (0.1%)	197 (6.3%)
Column Total	2,790 (89.0%)	285 (9.1%)	55 (1.8%)	2 (0.1%)	4 (0.1%)	3,136 (100%)

suspect description(8%) and whether the report indicated that the offence formed part of a crime series or pattern(3.7%). The remaining combined screening criteria (2.7%) did not appear to have an important influence on the screening decision.

### Summary

At present, case screening conducted in the VPD generalist detective units is based upon individual supervisor's experientially derived criteria. This process results in decisions regarding the feasibility of further investigative action. The present research findings indicate a large, daily

volume of concluded and unconcluded reports to be screened by supervisors. This screening results in decisions whereby over 90% of those reports did not result in a follow-up investigation. Further analysis revealed that case screening decisions were based upon the seriousness of the offence and whether there was sufficient suspect identification or description. Additionally, the preceding analysis raised questions about decision-making consistency between detective supervisors. Also, the research has indicated that there were two different methods of information processing for case screening in the two Patrol Divisions.

Moreover, the consequence of placing this case screening function at this stage in the criminal investigation process raises other concerns. For example, there remains an abundance of reports which have been copied, distributed, and screened, and which are simply discarded with no apparent value to screening supervisors. As well, there appears to be little likelihood of linking cases which may form part of a pattern or series. Any additional analysis of information these reports may contain is minimal.

Overall, the apparent private accumulation of knowledge leads to the absence of a pool of management information from which to critically monitor the case screening process and/or to make future resource allocation decisions in the investigative process. Meanwhile, the criteria on which any individual supervisor assigns cases for follow-up investigation remains

vague, ectoplasmic, amorphous standards cannot be scrutinized or appraised for effectiveness. That is, if the standards or prerequisites for case assignments are unarticulated, it is impossible for management to monitor the handling and effectiveness of the police investigative process.

This brief review of screening decisions attempted to chronicle the decision-making process of detective supervisors. It appears that these fundamental decisions activate follow-up investigations by detectives. The following chapter will examine case dispositions of those screened and assigned cases and the investigative activities which resulted in those case outcomes.

## VI. AN ANALYSIS OF CASE CONCLUSIONS AND OUTCOMES

As previously outlined, the "Investigation Conclusion Form" (ICF) was developed and implemented in conjunction with discussions with detectives and detective supervisors at the VPD. The ICF was designed to accompany cases screened-in and assigned to a detective for follow-up investigation. The ICF would allow for the analysis of case dispositions, document the number of suspects arrested and charged, and reveal investigative actions taken in reaching a case outcome.

The most important screening factor affecting whether a report would be assigned for follow-up investigation (N=143), during the test period, was suspect identification(46.2%). This factor was followed by vehicle description(11.9%); next was some other important factor (i.e., request from another police department, additional evidence, related to another case, Crown Counsel issue, unfounded, and so on)(11.2%). Suspect description(9.1%) was ranked fourth and whether the report formed part of a series ranked fifth(5.6%). The remaining 23 reports(16%) were assigned according to the notoriety of the case, the degree of injury, physical evidence obtained, whether the victim, a supervisor, or the Crown Counsel requested action, or the degree of monetary loss.

An analysis of the ICF data revealed that these 143 assigned and concluded cases represent a workload which was



roughly equal among the two Patrol Division Detective units; Patrol North handled 70 cases; and, Patrol South dealt with 73 cases. Table 11 reveals the relationship between the two patrol districts and case dispositions. As well, Table 11 indicates the most frequently used case disposition category was inactive (44.1%); followed sequentially by, cleared by charge(30.1%), and cleared by other means(16.1%). The most common justification for inactivating a case was a failure to link the suspect to the offence or insufficient evidence. In clearing a case by charge; the account given was that sufficient evidence had been obtained. Generally, the most common reason for deciding to clear a case by other means was that the complainant did not wish to prosecute. These three dispositional classifications accounted for 90.3% of all disposition categories.

Tables 12 and 13 provide monthly performance reports in both Patrol Division Detective units for 1983. They provide a framework and support the internal validity of the research results presented in this chapter. Tables 12 and 13 also show the number of new cases assigned and case dispositions for each patrol district per month for 1983. As previously noted, results from both patrol zones indicate that the three disposition categories (inactive, cleared by other means, and cleared by charge) accounted for 90.3% of all dispositional categories. However, due to the fact that Patrol South's monthly reports do not include the disposition category "cases cleared by charge" (Table 13), a specification Patrol North utilizes (Table 12),

Table 11

Case Outcomes

	Active	Inactive	Cleared Other Means	Un- founded	Complain. to Lay Charge	Cleared by Charge	Row Total
Patrol North	7 (4.9%)	33 (23.1%)	9 (6.3%)	2 (1.4%)	2 (1.4%)	17 (11.9%)	70 (49.0%)
Patrol South	--	30 (21.0%)	14 (9.8%)	3 (2.1%)	--	26 (18.2%)	73 (51.0%)
Column Total	7 (4.9%)	63 (44.1%)	23 (16.1%)	5 (3.5%)	2 (1.4%)	43 (30.1%)	143 (100.0%)

Table 12  
Patrol North-Monthly Reports

	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Total
New Cases Assigned	97	109	107 <sup>1</sup>	112	89	117	96	108	101	134	118	96	1284
Dispositions													
Active	35	37	42	41	22	55	42	49	33	66	43	44	509
Inactive	42	45	44	31	53	43	51	27	45	35	66	47	529
Cleared by Charge	29	34	38	52	43	38 <sup>1</sup>	38 <sup>1</sup>	29	46	24	63	23	457
Cleared by Other Means	16	8	14	8	7	10	15	26	22	13	14	20	173
Persons Charged	29	34	29	28	38	12	25	31	39	22	35	25	347
Total Manpower Days Lost	78	49	89	92	95	88	108	153	97	92	46	84	1071
Unfounded Cases	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Cases to CPIC	10	9	8	8	8	7	8	5	10	9	14	3	99

<sup>1</sup>Data not available. Monthly average is reported.

the two tables cannot be readily compared. Nevertheless, Table 11 figures for Patrol North indicate that the 3 disposition categories (inactive, cleared by charge, and cleared by other means) account for 90% of all dispositional categories and mirror the overall portrait of the VPD's case dispositions. When comparing 2 disposition classes (inactive, and cleared by other means) for both Patrol North and Patrol South; "inactive cases" constituted 42% and "cleared by other means" 15% of all case dispositions. These figures are comparable to the VPD's statistics on case dispositons given in Table 10 with inactive, 44.1%, and cleared by other means, 16.1%.

The lack of replicability in recording case disposition by Patrol North and Patrol South, as indicated by Tables 12 and 13, suggest an important management issue: how can police managers assess detective performance if there is no consistency in the reporting of information? For example, Tables 12 (Patrol North) and Table 13 (Patrol South), do not clearly indicate what types of offences are being cleared. Moreover, there appears to be minimal consistency in the variables used by the detective supervisors to report detective unit performance. In Patrol North, statistics for cases "cleared by charge" for June and July are not recorded and there is only a single mention of an unfounded case for the entire year. Data from Patrol South includes the number of charges laid, suspects cleared and, cases reassigned but does not include the number of case disposition "cleared by charge". Similarly, Patrol South was inconsistent in

Table 13  
Patrol South-Monthly Reports

	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Total
New Cases Assigned	195	139	155	160	158	141	116	160	155	123	156	111	1769
Dispositions													
Active	108	99	111	72	94	82	71	115	121	113	63	90	1139
Inactive	59	85	56	43	54	49	53	52	98	71	64	55	739
Cleared by Other Means	12	30	23	45	24	10	16	26	31	14	33	14	278
Charges Laid	84	55	64	46	38	44	49	46	108	87	70	33	724
Persons Charged	28	37	38	35	22	28	25	21	52	33	31	26	376
Unfounded Cases	5	20	7	4	3	2	3	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	---
Suspects Cleared	21	29	21	15	17	23	14	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	---
Cases Reassigned	4	5	2	3	0	0	1	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	---
Total Manpower Days Lost	n/a	4	80.5	57	n/a	64	92	118	88	96	88	76	---

their recording practices. Generally the number of manpower days lost were recorded, but this was not always the case. During the first half of the year, Patrol South recorded statistics on unfounded cases, suspects cleared and, cases reassigned. However, after August 1983, these data were not recorded. Such inconsistencies constitute a manager's nightmare and frustrate efforts to establish a basis for accurately assessing performance or attempting to formulate standards of performance.

Tables 12 and 13, additionally reveal the number of cases assigned to both districts. Patrol North received 1,284 assignments and Patrol South received 1,769 assignments in 1983. These figures average out to 86 case assignments per detective per month in Patrol North and 107 case assignments per detective per month in Patrol South. Although Patrol South has only 2 more detectives than Patrol North, Patrol South received 485 more case assignments. This skewed distribution of assignments results in Patrol South having more "active" cases reported in their monthly reports.<sup>1</sup>

Overall, a detective's workload did not appear to be salient in regard to a supervisor's screening decisions. Detective supervisors stated that an investigator's caseload was not a strong influence on their decision to screen-out a case. Additionally, this fact was borne out on analysis of the case screening data which indicated that about 90% of the time this

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<sup>1</sup>This dramatic difference in workload indicates that Patrol South detective personnel would take more time to conclude investigations.

factor was not considered as important to supervisors.

### Investigative Activities

The arrest and charging of suspects as a result of investigations is an important concern for police management. Arrest and charge are the most traditional methods of clearing cases. A further breakdown of ICF data indicated that of the 143 cases under study, in 102 cases (71.3%), there was no arrest made and, in 99 cases (69.2%), no charges were laid. In 31 cases (21.7%) an arrest was made and in the remaining nine cases (7%) there were multiple arrests. In 21 cases (14.7%), there was at least one charge laid and in the remaining 23 cases (16.1%) there were multiple charges.

In examining investigative actions taken by detectives, the most common activity consisted of interviewing the victim; this occurred in 108 (75.59%) investigations. The second most frequently occurring investigative activity was checking computer files, with the Canadian Police Information Centre (CPIC) the most favoured system. The checking of VPD record systems occurred in only 53 cases (37.1%) - this is hardly surprising when one considers that there are at least 16 different documented, manual filing systems that could potentially be checked for suspect information. The total number of manual filing systems at the VPD remains unknown; the total number of filing systems available to police in other outside

agencies further limits the collection of other potentially valuable suspect information.

Another important investigative action is checking the scene of the crime and collecting physical evidence. In 53 investigations (37.1%) the scene of the crime was checked; witnesses were canvassed in 30 investigations(21.0%); and a stakeout occurred in three investigations(2.1%). Physical evidence was collected in 49 cases(34.3%) by detectives in half of those cases and by the Identification Unit in the other half. Photographs were taken in 16 investigations; fingerprints in 14 cases; crime tools in six cases; in nine cases, weapons were taken; and in 17 investigations, other types of evidence were collected. In seven investigations the crime lab was used, probably indicating that bodily fluids evidence or chemicals were collected for analysis.

Discussing cases with police personnel or other criminal justice personnel seems to be a relatively low occurring investigative activity. This may indicate the relative ease of those investigations or possibly a reluctance to discuss investigations with others. For example, detectives discussed 26 cases with other investigators; 17 cases with uniformed members; 28 cases with supervisors; 18 cases with others (i.e., witnesses or victims); Crown Counsel in 32 cases; and, two investigations with defense counsel.

One more investigative activity involves conducting identification line-ups to enable positive suspect



identifications.<sup>2</sup> Photograph line-ups occurred in 21 investigations resulting in 12 successful identifications. In five cases, a regular line-up was conducted with four successes.

In addition, particularly difficult investigations often demand supplementary measures to locate "wanted" persons (suspects, witnesses) for investigative interviewing. One method used is contacting the media to generate public response in the hopes a witness can be located. Although this action only occurred once, there is another police resource available to locate wanted persons. This method involves notifying CPIC, a national computer network, of a suspect's particulars and that the VPD holds a warrant for their arrest. This investigative action occurred in 16 investigations. However, it is not known whether this action resulted in a successful location and/or a conclusion to an investigation.

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<sup>2</sup>Two varieties of line-ups could take place: 1) a selection of photographs containing physical characteristics similar to the suspect (including the suspect's photo) are randomly arranged in a folder for presentation to witnesses or victims; or, 2) a regular identification line-up consisting of 6-8 persons who are similar in physical characteristics to the suspect. Photo lines-ups appear to be the most favoured method of identifying suspects as they are portable and less time-consuming to construct.

## Related Investigative Issues

### Clearance of Other Cases

An important, common grievance expressed by detectives and administrators was also addressed in another section of the ICF. This complaint centered around investigations in which detectives believe a suspect may have been involved in other related offences, yet they lacked sufficient substantive evidence which would enable a case clearance in accordance with UCR criteria. For instance, many incidents were related (typically break and enter offences) where numerous charges were laid against a suspect but many other related events could not be cleared due to a lack of specific evidence with which to lay a charge. This lack of evidence could be a result of a victim being unable to positively identify property found in the accused's possession or a legally aware suspect who knows not to confess as he is the only positive link to substantiate the clearing of those other cases.

Analysis of the 143 assigned cases revealed that, in 133 investigations(93.0%), no other cleared cases resulted. Of the remainder, 10 cases(7.0%), detectives had officially cleared other cases due to the investigation of an assigned case. These clearances involved five incidents where 21 cases were cleared. Further analysis showed that in 129 assigned cases(90.2%), there

was no detective suspicion or lack of evidence to clear other cases as a result of that investigation. Of the remaining 14 cases(9.8%), detectives had a strong belief that other cases could be cleared but they lacked either a suspect's statement, physical evidence, a witness, or a positive suspect identification.

Although this low frequency of detectives' suspicions is immediately apparent on initial examination of the data, further inquiry may indicate a different picture. That is, in only 31 cases was there an arrested suspect to thoroughly interview. At this time, it is unknown how strong the relationship may be between these variables but it does imply further exploration is needed. However, the focus should be on devising methods which would insure stronger case linkages to enable more case clearances in conformity with UCR criteria. Alternatively, documentation of the frequency and circumstances of these occurrences may suggest that a change in UCR criteria is warranted.

#### Case Status Notification

Advising a victim and the uniformed officer who conducted the initial investigation of the status of an investigation is important for several reasons. First, it is anticipated that a victim who is aware of investigative progress may gain satisfaction with police service delivery regardless of the case

outcome. Increased satisfaction will undoubtedly create an atmosphere of increased cooperation and a likelihood of assistance to the police in future investigations. Secondly, notifying the uniformed officer with feedback on their investigative effort and performance enables them to learn more about the detective role which, hopefully, would insure further quality preliminary investigations.

Although the majority of detectives did notify both victims and uniformed officers of a case status, notification varied at differing stages in the investigation. For example, in 108 investigations(75.5%), victims were advised at the time of suspect charging in six cases; in 37 investigations, at the time the case was inactivated; in 48 cases, at the conclusion of the investigation; and, in 21 cases, at some other stage. In the majority of investigations (72.7%), the uniformed officer was also notified: in two cases, at the time of an arrest; in 15 cases, at the time of charging; in 40 investigations, at the time of case inactivation; in 57 cases, at the time of case conclusion; and in three cases, at some other point in the investigation.

These stages of status notification are not mutually exclusive. That is, the discrepancy in figure totals indicates that some investigators may have notified the victim or uniformed officer at two, three, or several different points in the investigation. However, it appears that these were rare occurrences. Regardless of whether a detective indicated, on the

ICF, that a uniformed officer was advised of a case status, a VPD policy stipulates that a report is to be sent to the uniformed officer at the end of an investigation. This report outlines the case disposition and reasons for that case outcome. Presently, it is doubtful whether all victims are advised of a case status in this manner. Additionally, for those reports that are screened-out from follow-up investigation, there are no guidelines for notifying a victim of case outcome.

#### Lagtime in Case Screening, Assignment and Conclusion

In calculating the time periods between the occurrence of an event and its conclusion several methodological limitations must be acknowledged to maintain a proper perspective on the findings contained in this section.

First, time periods were measured in days, as opposed to hours or minutes. This decision was based on simplicity, insofar as it was often impossible to precisely document the time frames in hours or minutes. The data provide for a rough estimate of elapsed time from the date of a criminal occurrence to eventual case disposition. However, this time estimate does not indicate the exact amount of work that may have gone into a particularly difficult investigation.

Second, the date of the preliminary investigation report was utilized as the offence date due to the recognition that most offences are reported almost immediately. However, one

disadvantage of of this method occurs when offences are reported several days, weeks or possibly months after their occurrence. For example, the data collected reveal one case which occurred in 1982. About 3% of included cases occurred several weeks before the commencement of this study, but were reported to police during the research period. To compensate for this, the median, as opposed to the mean, was used as a measure of central tendency in the distributions. This method eliminated those cases that are skewed out of the anticipated time frames.

Third, it was decided to refine the calculation of times between a crime occurrence and its conclusion into three parts: 1) offence date to screening date; 2) screening date to assignment date; and, 3) assignment date to conclusion date.

The 143 cases were further subdivided into two groups: 1) Crimes against persons (53 cases involving assaults, robberies, threatenings and, harassments); and, 2) Crimes against Property (90 cases involving: thefts, break & enter, mischief, and miscellaneous events). The decision to divide crimes into these two classes coincides with a VPD case review policy which outlines that detectives are given 15 days to investigate and conclude case assignments involving crimes against persons and 30 days with cases involving crimes against property.

### Crimes Against Persons

The median time from the date of an offence to the date it is screened by a detective supervisor is one day. This time period accounts for 66% of the Crimes against Persons cases (n=53). 20.8% of the cases were screened on the same day as their occurrence and 86.8% of the cases had been screened within two days after their occurrence.

All cases during the test period were assigned the same day on which they were screened. This perhaps is predictable given that a supervisor makes a decision as to whether a case will be assigned at the time of screening the case.

The median time to conclude a case involving Crimes against Persons from its assignment was eight days. Within this time period 54.7% of the cases had been investigated and concluded. Four cases were concluded the same day they were assigned and within 15 days, 77.4% of the cases had been concluded.

### Crimes Against Property

The median time between the date of occurrence for Crimes against Property and their screening date was two days. Within two days, 63.6% of the Crimes against Property cases (n=90), had been screened. 11 cases were screened the day they had occurred and 84.1% of the cases had been screened after eight days.

When compared to Crimes against Persons, there was only a marginal difference between the time a case was screened and when it was assigned. The percentage of cases involving Crimes

against Property screened and assigned on the same day was 88.9% and 98.9% were assigned within five days.

From case assignment to case conclusion, the median time was nine days. Within this time period 56.7% of the 90 cases were concluded. Within 30 days, 93.3% were concluded.

In comparing the two classes of offences, Crimes against Persons and Crimes against Property, the median time from the date of offence to the date of conclusion was 10 days and 12 days, respectively. This difference in time attests to the priority given to investigating those cases involving Crimes against Persons. The calculation of median time between the date a case is assigned and when it is concluded reveals that just over 50% of cases are concluded in half the either 15 or 30 days allotted to review an investigation.

### Summary

This chapter has outlined several aspects of the criminal investigation process including: case conclusions and outcomes resulting from follow-up investigations, investigative activities taken in achieving those outcomes, and the time factor involved from the date an offence occurs until its conclusion by detectives.

Present research findings have indicated that there were two processes for the assignment of cases for follow-up investigation. The first approach was through the case screening



process by which supervisors assigned cases based upon the seriousness of the offence and the number and degree of solvability factors (i.e., suspect identification, suspect description and so on). The second method was by direct case assignment whereby cases assignments were based upon the seriousness of the offence, or the possibility of suspect involvement in other related offences, and that a suspect was in custody.

An analysis of the case dispositions of those screened and assigned cases revealed that in approximately 70% of the incidents, an arrest and/or a charge did not occur. In the remaining cases, rarely was there evidence of a multiple arrest, or more importantly, evidence of multiple case clearances. Furthermore, investigative activities appeared minimal or misdirected. For example, the most frequent investigative activity was interviewing victims. However, Eck(1983) states that, "victims are not very important as sources of information that lead to arrests, even though a given piece of information is more likely to have been provided by a victim than any other source". Moreover, Eck notes that "witnesses, informants, members of the department, and department records are the sources most likely to provide information that is strongly related to the arrest of suspects". However, according to the present findings, the VPD generalist detectives appeared not to frequently engage in these activities in the majority of cases.

Overall, the research findings indicated that screening decisions were made whereby almost 94% of the cases were not assigned for follow-up investigation by detectives. Of the 6% of the cases that were assigned, about one-third were cleared by arrest and charge, and approximately one-half of the investigations were inactivated or remained active investigations. The remaining 20% of the cases were cleared by other means or were unfounded events. In addition, the present research revealed that throughout the screening process there is an attempt to uncover case linkages or patterns. However, there does not appear to be any applied, systematic approach which may enhance the success of these endeavours.

The following chapter will outline concluding discussions and provide recommendations for improved management of case screening as one method of increasing case clearances.

## VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### Conclusions

The preceding chapters have addressed several aspects of the criminal investigation process including: 1) the input of information from the preliminary investigation stage by uniformed officers; 2) screening decisions and the screening criteria used by supervisors to formulate decisions on the feasibility of follow-up investigations; 3) case conclusions and outcomes resulting from follow-up investigations; 4) investigative activities taken in achieving those outcomes; and, 5) the time factor involved from the date an offence occurs until its conclusion by detectives. Throughout this process, the most apparent inability of the VPD's attempt to improve case clearances is management's failure to explicitly monitor the case screening process and set guidelines, objectives, or goals for various aspects of the criminal investigation process.

To achieve effective management, VPD police administrators require information to set guidelines which provide a source of management information upon which to base resource allocation decisions in the investigation process. Unfortunately, the VPD does not appear to take advantage of existing processes which may provide this source of management information. For example,

the present case management system, mentioned in Chapter IV, seems to be used primarily for operational concerns as opposed to a source of data with which to inform management of detective performance or providing crime information for extensive analysis.<sup>1</sup>

In the absence of guidelines, line-level personnel are forced to make basic organizational decisions based upon intuition and varying levels of experience. If management is displeased with the productivity of their personnel, they perpetuate the situation in their failure to take responsibility for a formal policy directing case screening decision-making. Meanwhile, investigative efficiency and effectiveness are reduced.

Moreover, this absence of guidelines inhibits optimal performance of line-level personnel (i.e., uniformed members, detectives and, their supervisors), frustrates accurate measurement of their performance, and suppresses a valuable source of management information which could potentially enhance investigative performance. Due to the inefficient processing of information, valuable resources are squandered, investigative performance is decreased, supervisory decision-making becomes ad hoc and idiosyncratic, and data which could potentially reveal

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<sup>1</sup>This system is used to: satisfy victim's requests for case status information, back-up the log book system in the event the log book is lost or misplaced and, identify which investigator is responsible for an assigned case if an internal or external request is made or if additional information is revealed at a later date.

patterns in the commission of offences and offenders' M.O.'s is lost or improperly processed.

In particular, case screening decision-making at the VPD remains informal and without codified guidelines. There are no explicit and/or documented criteria upon which to base case screening decisions. Decision-making is derived from intuitive judgements, common-sense and unarticulated knowledge and experience. The resultant problems are threefold. First, the absence of pre-existent guidelines for case screening and assignment promotes low accountability and responsibility for decision-making. Second, informal case screening procedures encourage the duplication of information processing, reducing manpower resources and increasing processing costs. Finally, vital management information for the efficient administration of the criminal investigative process is lost in the informal case screening procedure due to the lack of a clear policy initiative directing and channelling information for the solution of crimes. The proliferation of superfluous paperwork on cases not assigned creates a cemetery of dead files. The reason for their unceremonious demise - their lack of prerequisite solvability factors - is not enunciated in a formal autopsy of what solvability factors are necessary for the successful investigation of any specific crime. Moreover, the information they do contain is simultaneously lost and buried along with the unassigned case.

Although clearance rates vary among specific crime categories (e.g. homicide-80% and break and enter-8%); the overall departmental clearance rate is approximately 27% across all crime categories. The remaining 73% of criminal events are, for the most part, left unsolved. Perhaps closer management and monitoring of present case screening and case assignment processes of generalist detective units at the VPD may insure higher clearances of criminal events.

Presently, generalist detective units at the VPD are assigned only 6% of the 88% of all cases which fall into their investigative domain. Despite this vastly curtailed caseload, 60% of cases assigned are concluded by inactivating the case or clearing it by other means. About a third or 33% are cleared through the charging of a suspect. The remaining percentile of cases assigned remain active or unfounded events. During the research test period, rarely did multiple arrests, multiple charges or multiple case clearances occur as the outcome of investigative actions. Moreover, a review of concluded investigations reveal that slightly over 50% of cases were solved with relative ease and these investigations were completed in half the allotted time for investigative case review.

At the VPD, two existing conditions would suggest the need for the implementation of a management program in this area of the decision-making process. First, with the exception of uniformed officers, detective personnel constitute the largest

operational component of the police department. Second, almost 90% of the police budget is spent on wages. Investigative work is, by its very nature, labour intensive. However, a reliance on "hunches", or an ad hoc approach, cannot reasonably be expected to result in the effective use of manpower and/or resources. The detective needs information and facts supplied by reliable data to precipitate successful case conclusions and to be cost effective.

To alleviate these problems, several recommendations will be presented, focusing on areas of the investigative process requiring change.

### Recommendations

#### Recommendation 1: Case Screening

Case screening may be more efficiently or appropriately handled at the Crime Analysis Units for the following reasons: 1) supervisors are not in a position to document and assess all crime information, their prime responsibility should be supervision and management of criminal investigation personnel; 2) case screening is too time consuming; 3) the present case screening system promotes an increase in manpower resources and the duplication of information processing; and, 4) it is questionable whether screening officers are in a good position to systematically assess the potential for case linkages.

Information input to the crime analyst must be provided on a regular basis to ensure timely analysis, rapid dissemination of findings to field supervisors and the precipitation of

responsive patrol strategies and tactics. Rather than forwarding crime reports to detective supervisors (as 75% of these reports are discarded during this screening process), it is suggested that reports at the VPD be screened by the crime analyst. The crime analyst would seem to enjoy a vantage point from which they could link cases by modus operandi information, formulate composite cases for eventual follow-up investigation, target specific offence categories which are on the rise, and recognize high crime areas which warrant supplemental deployment of officers. Furthermore, the practice of assigning single case investigations to generalist detectives generally does not promote multiple case clearances. It would seem more appropriate to have the Crime Analysis Units package multiple cases for investigative assignment.

However, data collection should not be limited to reports of crime received by the police agency. Investigative, arrest, intelligence and stolen vehicle reports obtained contain important information which could supplement existing crime pattern and suspect files. Additionally, extra-agency input from other police departments, parole and probation departments, and private security agencies are potential sources of valuable information that may help in computing a crime pattern and/or identifying a criminal suspect. These additional sources of information are particularly important to VPD given the numerous municipal police departments and RCMP detachments located in close proximity to the City of Vancouver.



## Recommendation 2: Restructuring of the Investigation Report

A restructuring of the present initial investigation report is required. This report should incorporate targeted solvability factors and modus operandi information, and uniformed officers' decisions as to the feasibility of follow-up investigation addressing departmental regulations, political concerns, and public relation concerns.

Most police agencies routinely record data on a broad range of events on specifically designed forms. These reports should provide information on crime and the modus operandi of the criminal. However, at the VPD the present format of the Investigation Report impedes the acquisition of this type of information by obscuring data relevant to the development of a suspect M.O. file. The necessity for proper coding of information becomes especially acute with the awareness of the VPD's contemplated move towards automated communication-information systems. As well, the quality of the data collected by police officers will directly affect the agency's analytical capability. Existing departmental forms should be reviewed to ensure that data necessary for the analysis function is being ascertained.

Management at the VPD must query its present methods of data collection addressing such questions as: whether the amount of information presently collected is sufficient, valid, or representative; whether information could be obtained in a more cost-efficient manner; and for what purpose information is

designed to be used (e.g. management and/or operations). At present, there are numerous system inadequacies which diminish the quality of information collected. For example, the Quality Control component of the Information Section reviews the quality of reports (i.e., completeness) but does not review the quality of preliminary investigations (i.e., accuracy and thoroughness). As well, supervisors remain unaccountable for the quality of the preliminary investigation. Thus, analysis of preliminary investigations may reveal inconsistencies in data collecting and in the reporting of information. It must be again stressed that this basic information input forms the backbone of an information system. Simply moving to an automated system will, in itself, not alleviate inconsistencies and inadequacies in the criminal investigation process.

To be a valid source of useful information, data collected must be of high quality. Comprehensive and exact features of a modus operandi (e.g., that a suspect's accomplice is typically used to distract a victim during a theft as opposed to reporting that the suspect is an "opportunist" or other amorphous terminology) must be recorded accurately if a standard for comparison is to be developed. As well, acts of omission may be as significant as acts of commission. For example, a burglar may leave easily fenced articles behind and take only cash and expensive jewelry. One drawback to the collection of these data is the endless possible activities a suspect may engage in for each offence category. Hence, distinctive M.O. classifications

should be developed for each offence type.

A section could be provided which would ascertain the need for follow-up investigation. Some of the criteria for this section, for example, would include: 1) the nature and seriousness of the offence; 2) the degree of loss or injury; 3) whether stolen property can be identified; 4) whether the reporting of the offence is only for insurance purposes; 5) whether the victim or witness can identify the suspect(s); 6) if the suspect is known, whether the victim wishes to prosecute; and, 7) an assessment by the initial investigator as to the feasibility of a successful case outcome. Other sections of the revised report would facilitate the easy capture of targeted solvability factors for early case decision-making.

Presently at the VPD, the same case information from the preliminary investigation report is duplicated in many different "Activity Logs" kept by the various investigative units in the police department. Careful design of the content and format of the data collection forms, coupled with training that explains what is required in completing the form, should ensure consistency in the collection of the needed data.

### Recommendation 3: Follow-up Investigation Responsibilities for Patrol Members

It is recommended that uniformed officers take on the added responsibility of investigating those cases, presently processed by generalist detectives, which are

less demanding and less time consuming.

First, this recommendation would allow generalist detective units to focus on those cases, packaged by crime analysts, in which there is an increased likelihood of the investigation resulting in multiple case clearances. Also, this change would free detective resources for a more proactive policing style (i.e., targeting known, active criminal).

Second, this proposed change in investigative responsibility would allow the assignment of cases with high solvability factors, which demand urgent follow-up, to uniformed officers for investigation. This shift in responsibility should be supported by changes in modes of case screening and case assignment practices and by the decentralization of the quality control function of the Information Section. Responsibility for case screening and case assignment would rest with the crime analysis units while supervisors would be accountable for ensuring that uniformed officers conduct and report a quality preliminary investigation.

Third, supervisory accountability for report quality is important, as the patrol supervisor is the nexus connecting patrol with all other aspects of the investigative process. The patrol supervisor can improve the quality of the initial investigation effort and crime reports by explaining, first-hand, the types of information required and the form in which they will be most useful for productive follow-up investigations. A supervisor's decision-making ability is dependent on his knowledge of problems and known techniques for

their amelioration. As well, it is in the supervisor's best interests to ensure that information given to the crime analysis unit is complete and accurate. Towards this end, a patrol supervisor should:

1. Review reports submitted by uniformed officers to ensure that they are complete;
2. Require that reports be submitted within the time period specified by departmental regulations;
3. Provide training, as required, in field reporting; and,
4. Assign cases for immediate follow-up by uniformed officers.

Fourth, these elements should facilitate early case closure. In particular, the assignment, management, and monitoring of cases investigated by uniformed members should be handled by patrol supervisors, thus, freeing-up detective resources. As well, the crime analysis process should improve by ensuring that the information upon which the patrol supervisor acts is timely, reliable, accurate, and valid.

One area of concern in this proposed change may be the perceived threat to the traditional role and practice of operation by detectives. This concern stems from the uneasy prediction that reducing the overall caseload may be tantamount to justifying a reduction in the number of detectives, particularly the "generalists". However, if the detectives are included in the formulation of this new system, they may see the reduction of workload as a means by which they can devote additional time to work on solvable cases. The improved quality in the cases that are assigned for follow-up activities may lead

to improved job satisfaction. Additionally, more time spent on solvable crimes may lead to higher conviction rates. Finally, having more time available will enable administrators to direct detectives to take a more proactive stance in their investigations of the criminal environment. The key issue is the quality of investigative work as opposed to the quantity of work with which detectives are generally confronted. Other critical areas of concern would be: training needs, reporting formats and the use of solvability factors.

#### Recommendation 4: Early Case Closure

If the initial investigation is competently conducted and reported, the police agency can eliminate unpromising cases early in the process and assign follow-up investigators to those cases where there is an increased likelihood of success.

A further problem that police managers may associate with a formal case screening function is the overburdening of the organization with unnecessary paperwork. Whenever possible, the new system could minimize paperwork by eliminating antiquated and redundant systems of data processing. Information gathered should be responsive to the need for efficient decision-making and early case suspension; the superfluous handling of cases unlikely to be investigated further should be discouraged.

In conjunction with this early elimination process, there should be a procedure to facilitate ready access to cases at a later date in the event that additional leads are discovered or

ascertained. A simple mechanical or computerized process, which features accurate case collection and retrieval capability should minimize this obstacle. As well as a concern for the retrieval of these cases, there should be an analysis of those unsolved cases in an attempt to establish patterns or links between them which may lead to their solution at a later date. Analysis of these cases would also assist in the deployment of personnel to specific problem areas by providing information on the extent of the overall crime situation.

#### Recommendation 5: Crime Analysis Support Service

There is a critical need for the VPD to develop a capability that provides police management with accurate information on crime occurrences and problem identification.

In this way intelligent and responsible decisions can be made on the effective and efficient use of uniformed, investigative and other police resources. Haphazard and reactive approaches to policing must be replaced by with more systematic methods. All too often at the VPD, this function (crime analysis) appears to consist of merely gathering statistics on crime with minimal analysis.

It is suggested that at the VPD a centralized crime analysis unit be placed in the Information Section. This unit would provide a source of management information and coordinate the efforts of the two existing CAU's which would be sustained

to satisfy the operational component of the individual Patrol Divisions. The addition of a centralized crime analysis unit would juxtapose and augment the work of both Patrol Divisions in crime analysis by facilitating collection of information from all facets of operation within the department as well as germane data from outside agencies. Dissemination of this information would help satisfy management needs for information (i.e., planning, budgeting, manpower deployment, etc.) and operational information (i.e., intelligence, M.O. files, crime analysis of patterns and trends, and both geographic and temporal information).

Whatever staffing format an administrator for a CAU chooses, it is essential that staff have formal analytical skills. It is proposed that a centralized CAU at the VPD be staffed with both civilian and sworn personnel with formal analytical skill. It seems reasonable to assume that sworn personnel in the existing decentralized Patrol Division CAU's could more readily develop and sustain relations among operational personnel.

Analyzing and disseminating data does not exhaust the potential merit of crime analysis. The crime analysis units could act as a specialist committee convened to recommend strategies and tactics concerning the effective resolution of identified problems. Moreover, a response to recommendations, including a plan of action based on the analysis provided, should be required for the operational supervisor. Crime



analysts could additionally provide directives to uniformed and investigative personnel to facilitate the utilization of effective techniques for required information for the solution of particularly difficult crime problems (i.e., thefts and mischiefs).

Additionally, to ensure that the CAU is capable of delivering analysis of a type and scope necessary for proactive, as well as reactive, decision-making by field supervisors, there is a need to provide for the supervision and evaluation of the crime analysis process. To achieve this, it is recommended that:

1. The analysis of crime patterns be routinely and periodically supplied to patrol supervisors;
2. The information be used to design crime specific prevention, deterrence, and apprehension tactics;
3. These tactics be implemented, reviewed, and modified on a daily basis; and,
4. A procedure be implemented to ensure tactical coordination across shifts.

Under the proposed model, the crime analysis units at the VPD would take on dramatically increased responsibility and importance for the management of criminal investigations. They would be responsible for:

1. Recording monthly report volumes, report types and case assignments for follow-up investigations;
2. Providing initial screening of case reports; eliminating certain minor offences from the process; and setting:
  - a. solvability factors,
  - b. screening criteria,
  - c. assignment criteria, and,
  - d. assignment of cases to the appropriate investigative units;

3. Maintaining generalist detective files and patrol follow-up investigations in a central location;
4. Serving as an investigative resource unit for patrol personnel;
5. Serving as a central clearing house for:
  - a. entry of additional property loss,
  - b. CPIC and UCR updates, and,
  - c. citizen requests for case status updates;
6. Tracking and monitoring of case progress and status - including the initial ongoing status of assigned cases; and,
7. Collecting, collating, and analyzing performance measures.

The crime analysis process will be used for:

1. Directing patrol activities by focusing resources on known offenders;
2. Generating composite cases to enable multiple case clearances. Many crimes which occur have very low solvability factors when viewed on an individual basis. However, when combined with hundreds of other individual facts, they may enable building composite cases with higher solvability factors;
3. Assignment of cases to investigative units. The case screening function would be taken up by the crime analysis unit, allowing supervisors more time to supervise the operational aspects of ongoing investigations, allowing detectives to pursue multiple cases with the same or similar M.O. as discerned by the crime analysis process, and increasing the efficient handling and timeliness of case tracking and monitoring;
4. Assignment of cases to patrol for follow-up. This would address the:
  - a. types of cases to be assigned,
  - b. development of a process to assure case tracking, and,
  - c. need for training uniformed officers in investigative techniques; and,
5. victim notification through:
  - a. identification of appropriate times when victim notification is most appropriate,
  - b. identification of responsibility for notification, and,
  - c. exploration of alternative means for victim notification.

Overall, there appears to be scope for a substantial expansion and improvement in the support provided by crime analysts to the criminal investigation function at the VPD.

## Recommendation 6: Police-Community Relations

It is recommended that a victim feedback mechanism be built into the early case closure stage of the investigative process.

As previously mentioned, there is the danger of possible damage to police-community relations and political reaction to the realization that the police will not investigate all crimes. However, anticipation of exhaustive investigation of all crimes may simply be an unrealistic expectation founded on a collective delusion by the public. Therefore, the issue becomes a question of whether the department's image actually suffers more from that false representation than it would from an honest declaration that there are cases which can never be solved. The realistic solution would be to properly inform citizens of what they may already suspect.

This could be accomplished through the development of procedures to inform victims on the probable outcome of the situation by sending a letter or postcard after the preliminary investigation report has been reviewed through the formal case screening process. As well, a procedure could be developed on the basis of departmental guidelines, removing possible inconsistencies in individual police officer's idiosyncratic approaches to the problem of notifying the victim. Allowing victim input into this decision-making process may alleviate some of the responsibility placed on police to investigate every

reported crime. In turn, this feedback process may have the additional benefit of educating the public about pertinent information the police require to successfully investigate reported crime.

### Research Limitations

There are acknowledged limitations in using data derived from observation and the use of unstructured interviews (Barker and Wright, 1955; Bott, 1934; Goode and Matt, 1962; Reisman and Watson, 1964; Reiss, 1971; and Weick, 1968). Obviously, the researcher could not be in all places nor in everyone's confidence. Consequently, the quality of information may be uneven. This researcher acknowledges this immediate limitation but cannot amend it. Moreover, the research itself was hampered by two events which frustrated and/or curtailed access to information.

First, shortly prior to the time at which the larger study of criminal investigations at the VPD was to begin (Chappell et al., 1984), an arbitration decision awarded police management the right to implement a rotation policy with regard to the promotion and assignment of detective personnel. The principle behind this policy was to allow a greater number of personnel to gain investigative experience. Whereas a detective position could formerly be viewed as an end in itself rather than as a stage in an on-going career progression, the rotation policy

policy made the tenured detective an endangered species.<sup>2</sup> However, the policy helped to create an environment of skepticism by detectives towards the criminal investigation research project. Comments made by detectives suggest that they viewed this research as a vehicle which would provide management with justification for the elimination of detective positions. As a result, VPD detectives presented a motion to their union representatives that stated that they would not cooperate with the research project. Formal negotiations conducted by management, union, and research personnel resulted in an advisory committee which cooperatively formulated some of the research issues and objectives.

Second, although this action attempted to clarify the purpose of the research objectives for police personnel and invited police union participation, a relatively high degree of skepticism and cynicism on the part of individual detectives remained. This was exacerbated by police antipathy towards a separate research project simultaneously undertaken at the VPD by the principal investigator of the criminal investigation project. Although the focus of the two studies were quite distinct, they were ostensibly juxtaposed in the minds of some VPD officers who declined to cooperate and eventually banned further investigation for the purposes of the larger study. However, these difficulties were, to an extent, assauged by my

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<sup>2</sup>This policy was originally introduced in 1975; it was not fully implemented until 1982.

identification as a former police officer. Prior police experience enabled me to gain the rapport and trust of the majority of detective personnel through identification as an "insider" (Hughes, 1951). This identification led to relative freedom of access in the police organization and detective units.

Furthermore, the generalizability of these research findings is unknown; the researcher is unable to state with certainty that the findings are typical or generalizable on indices other than those noted previously. For example, the time period may record atypical events (i.e., a "crackdown" on crime; a heat wave increasing motivation to investigate pursesnatchings at Kitsilano Beach). However, there are some parallels between the data collected for this research and official VPD records (these were discussed in Chapter V). These parallels suggest that the research findings may be generalizable, within the VPD, beyond the data collection period.

Nevertheless, this study of the VPD demonstrates weaknesses in the criminal investigation process which result from deficiencies in policy, administrative structure, information processing and analysis, and the lack of formal case screening guidelines. Moreover, this study also demonstrates that a police agency can assess its management of criminal investigations and introduce reforms which will improve the quality and cost effectiveness of those investigations.

## Summary

This thesis has focused on management themes and considerations with regard to the monitoring of criminal investigations, particularly the case screening process in generalist detective units at the VPD. The present research findings suggest that many other components of the criminal investigation process at the VPD (i.e., case assignment, information flows, case management, crime analysis, and performance evaluations) are in need of management attention. If the VPD wishes to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of its investigative process, it must enhance the investigative capabilities of uniformed officers in conducting preliminary investigations, increase the efficiency of follow-up investigations by both uniformed officers and generalist detectives, and enhance the analytical capabilities of the crime analysis units.

Additionally, there are several other issues related to the implementation of the proposed recommendations, namely, union-management cooperation, a willingness to experiment, and a progressive introduction of the recommendations. Most importantly, these recommendations form an integrated system of information processing which will result in a realignment of investigative responsibilities. As well, the recommendations imply a proposed decision-making system which should provide the VPD with management information from which to base resource

allocation decisions. These, in turn, will allow for more closely monitored supervision of the criminal investigation process involving uniformed officers and generalist detectives.

The first issue involves the cooperation of union and management in achieving improved working conditions and job satisfaction. Throughout the research period, it seemed apparent that both union and management personnel were oriented towards the achievement of those common goals. However, their present methods for accomplishing improved work performance and job satisfaction may defeat those goals. For example, in regard to the proposed recommendations, union personnel may see the change in investigative responsibility for uniformed officers as a rationale for increased wages. Similarly, management personnel may view the proposed change as an excuse to eliminate detective positions. Neither position would accomplish desired goals. There must be an attitude of cooperation from both perspectives.

Secondly, the VPD must develop a willingness to experiment with the proposed recommendations. These recommendations are not a panacea to curtail chronic problems in managing criminal investigations. Management should be prepared to evaluate, on an on-going basis, the implementation of the recommendations and to make modifications or adjustments where necessary. Complications and implications may arise with each introduction of change. Management will require an attitude of flexibility in overcoming those issues as they impact upon existing systems and methods of operations.



Finally, the recommendations should be introduced in progressive stages beginning with consideration of the re-designing of existing information collection forms, i.e., the Preliminary Investigation Report. These new re-designs should reflect factors which assist and promote investigative decision-making for early case closure, investigative responsibilities (i.e., follow-up investigation by uniformed members or generalist detectives), and crime analysis. This stage would be followed by a system for victim feedback, changes in information processes, the enhancement of crime analysis capabilities, and a redirection of generalist detective investigative activities (i.e., proactive policing).

In conclusion, future research should be directed towards an examination of other Canadian municipal police organizations. This focus should attempt to uncover methods for the amelioration of management problems associated with the criminal investigation process and case screening decision-making. It is suspected that the management difficulties outlined in this present study are not isolated in the Vancouver Police Department. A broader fund of knowledge may facilitate changes in administrative approaches to these common problems and direct a more systematic pursuit to their solution.

APPENDIX A

STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE (SRI)

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION INFORMATION ELEMENTS	WEIGHTS
1. ESTIMATED RANGE OF TIME BETWEEN OCCURRENCE AND POLICE ARRIVAL	Less than 1 hour 5 1 to 12 hours 1 12 to 24 hours 0.3 More than 24 hours 0
2. WITNESS REPORT OF OFFENCE	7
3. ON VIEW REPORT OF OFFENCE (discovered by police)	1
4. USABLE FINGERPRINTS	7
5. SUSPECT INFORMATION DEVELOPED (names or descriptions)	9
6. VEHICLE DESCRIPTION	0.1
7. ALL OTHER INFORMATION	0
	<u>TOTAL</u>

INSTRUCTIONS:

1. Circle the weights for each information element that is present in the PRELIMINARY investigation report.
2. Add the weighted circles.
3. If the sum is less than or equal to 10, the case should be suspended. If over 10, assign for follow-up investigation as an arrest is predicted.

APPENDIX B

ROBBERY INVESTIGATION DECISION MODEL

<u>Information Element</u>	<u>Weighting Factor</u>
Suspect named	10 *
Suspect known	10 *
Suspect previously seen	10 *
Evidence technician used	10
Places suspect frequently named	10 *
Physical evidence	
Each item matched	6.1
Vehicle registration	
Query information available	1.5
Vehicle stolen	3.0
Useful information returned	4.5
Vehicle registered to suspect	6.0
Offender movement description	
On foot	0
Vehicle (not car)	0.6
Car	1.2
Car colour given	1.8
Car description given	2.4
Car license given	3.0
Weapon used	1.6

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\* These values as calculated actually exceed the threshold of 10. The values provided here are conceptually simpler and make no difference in the classification of groups.

INSTRUCTIONS:

- 1) Circle the weighting factor for each information element that is present in the incident report.
  - 2) Add the circled factors.
  - 3) If the sum is less than 10, suspend the case; otherwise, follow-up the case.
  - 4) Weighting factors do not accumulate; i.e., if both the auto license and colour are given, the total is 3.0, not 4.8.
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B. Greenberg, et al., (1975), "Felony Investigation Decision Model--An Analysis of Investigative Elements of Information," Final Report, Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, California, pg.XXV.

APPENDIX C

PRIORITY RATING FACTORS IN MULTNOMAH COUNTY

A. Gravity of Offense

- a. Felony = 4 points
- b. Misdemeanor = 3 points
- c. Victimless crime = 2 points
- d. Violations/status offense = 1 point

B. Probability of Solution

Whether there are:

- a. Suspects
- b. Witnesses
- c. Physical evidence
- d. Undeveloped leads

(score one point for each factor present).

C. Urgency for Action

- a. Danger to others = 4 points
- b. Immediate action required = 3 points
- c. Impact on victim = 2 points
- d. Pattern/frequency of crime = 1 point

D. Supervisory Judgment

- a. Department policy
- b. Totality of circumstances
- c. Investigator's caseload

(Total possible: 4 points)

Scoring and Application of Priority System:

<u>Priority</u>	<u>Points</u>	<u>Report Investigative Process Within:</u>
A	16-22	1 - 5 days
B	10-16	15 days
C	4-10	30 days
D	Less than 4	Suspended (form letter to victim)

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Police Chief, September, 1976, pp.65-67, "Team Policing:  
Management of Criminal Investigation."

## APPENDIX D

### Case Screening Form

Date: : : : : 8:3: [1-6]  
Mon.    Day    Yr.

Screening Supervisor	Type of Report	Case Information	
Patrol North ( ) 1 [7]	Invest. Report ( ) 1 [13]	Case # :8: :-: : : : : :	[14-20]
Patrol South ( ) 2	Supplementary ( ) 2	Nature of Offence:	
	Crown Counsel ( ) 3	_____	
S/Sgt ( ) 1 [8]	Other police	_____	[21-22]
Sgt. ( ) 2	department ( ) 4	_____	
Det. ( ) 3	Other ( ) 5	_____	
		: : :	
		Date of Offence:	[23-28]
P.I.N. : : : : : [9-12]		: : : : : : : : :	
		<u>Mo.</u> <u>Day</u> <u>Yr.</u>	

#### Screening Decision

Case screened out (not assigned)	Case screened in ( ) 1 [30]
AND report circulated for information ( ) 1 [29]	AND assigned to:
OR report discarded ( ) 2	P.I.N. : : : : : or [31-34]
	Name: _____

#### Reasons Considered In Making Decision

	Not Considered	Why Considered:				
1. Description of Suspect	( ) 1	( ) good	( ) poor	( ) none		[35]
2. Identification of Suspect	( ) 1	( ) positive ID	( ) uncertain ID	( ) no ID		[36]
3. Description of vehicle	( ) 1	( ) good	( ) poor	( ) none		[37]
4. Usable physical evidence	( ) 1	( ) good quality	( ) poor quality	( ) no evidence		[38]
5. Caseload of Investigator	( ) 1	( ) heavy load	( ) moderate load	( ) light load		[39]
6. Relation of Case to Other offenses	( ) 1	definite part ( ) of a series	possible part ( ) of a series	not part of ( ) any series		[40]
7. Injury to victim	( ) 1	serious ( ) injury	minor ( ) injury	no ( ) injury		[41]
8. Value of Loss	( ) 1	( ) high	( ) moderate	( ) low	( ) no loss	( ) unknown [42]

#### Additional Reasons Considered In Making Decision Not Cited Above

	Not Considered	Considered	
9. Notoriety of case	( ) 1	( ) 2	[43]
10. Requested by Supervisor	( ) 1	( ) 2	[44]
11. Requested by Crown Counsel	( ) 1	( ) 2	[45]
12. Victim request or complaint	( ) 1	( ) 2	[46]
13. Victim is uncooperative or lacks interest in the case	( ) 1	( ) 2	[47]
14. Other	( ) 1	( ) 2	[48]
(List: _____			: : : [49-50]

15. Please give the number of the factor given above which was most important in reaching your screening decision:

: : : [51-52]

(83-09-09)

researcher use only

CASE SCREENING FORM

CCI-2

case #

/ / 80  
Date  
(97-100)

SCREENING DECISION <sup>(101)</sup> Case Screened Out  Case Screened In

REASONS CONSIDERED IN MAKING DECISION  
(Place an "X" in each applicable box)

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| <p><u>1/</u> DESCRIPTION OF SUSPECT <sup>(102)</sup><br/>Not considered <input type="checkbox"/><sup>1</sup><br/>If considered, reason:<br/>good <input type="checkbox"/><sup>2</sup><br/>poor <input type="checkbox"/><sup>3</sup><br/>none <input type="checkbox"/><sup>4</sup></p>                        | <p><u>2/</u> IDENTIFICATION OF SUSPECTS <sup>(103)</sup><br/>Not considered <input type="checkbox"/><sup>1</sup><br/>If considered, reason:<br/>positive ID <input type="checkbox"/><sup>2</sup><br/>uncertain ID <input type="checkbox"/><sup>3</sup><br/>no ID <input type="checkbox"/><sup>4</sup></p>   |
| <p><u>3/</u> DESCRIPTION OF VEHICLE <sup>(104)</sup><br/>Not considered <input type="checkbox"/><sup>1</sup><br/>If considered, reason:<br/>good <input type="checkbox"/><sup>2</sup><br/>poor <input type="checkbox"/><sup>3</sup><br/>none <input type="checkbox"/><sup>4</sup></p>                        | <p><u>4/</u> USABLE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE <sup>(105)</sup><br/>Not considered <input type="checkbox"/><sup>1</sup><br/>If considered, reason:<br/>good quality <input type="checkbox"/><sup>2</sup><br/>poor quality <input type="checkbox"/><sup>3</sup><br/>no evidence <input type="checkbox"/><sup>4</sup></p>  |
| <p><u>5/</u> CASELOAD OF INVESTIGATOR <sup>(106)</sup><br/>Not considered <input type="checkbox"/><sup>1</sup><br/>If considered, reason:<br/>heavy load <input type="checkbox"/><sup>2</sup><br/>moderate load <input type="checkbox"/><sup>3</sup><br/>light load <input type="checkbox"/><sup>4</sup></p> | <p><u>6/</u> RELATION OF CASE TO OTHER OFFENSES <sup>(107)</sup><br/>Not considered <input type="checkbox"/><sup>1</sup><br/>If considered, reason:<br/>definitely part of a series <input type="checkbox"/><sup>2</sup><br/>possible part of a series <input type="checkbox"/><sup>3</sup><br/>not part of any series <input type="checkbox"/><sup>4</sup></p> |
| <p><u>7/</u> INJURY TO VICTIM <sup>(108)</sup><br/>Not considered <input type="checkbox"/><sup>1</sup><br/>If considered, reason:<br/>injury <input type="checkbox"/><sup>2</sup><br/>no injury <input type="checkbox"/><sup>3</sup></p>   | <p><u>8/</u> VALUE OF LOSS <sup>(109)</sup><br/>Not considered <input type="checkbox"/><sup>1</sup><br/>If considered, reason:<br/>high <input type="checkbox"/><sup>2</sup> low <input type="checkbox"/><sup>4</sup> unknown <input type="checkbox"/><br/>moderate <input type="checkbox"/><sup>3</sup> no loss <input type="checkbox"/><sup>5</sup></p>       |

OTHER REASONS CONSIDERED IN MAKING DECISION BUT NOT CITED ABOVE

- 9/ NOTORIETY OF CASE <sup>(110)</sup> Not Considered <sup>1</sup> Considered <sup>2</sup>
- 10/ REQUESTED BY SUPERVISOR <sup>(111)</sup> Not Considered <sup>1</sup> Considered <sup>2</sup>
- 11/ VICTIM REQUEST OR COMPLAINT <sup>(112)</sup> Not Considered <sup>1</sup> Considered <sup>2</sup>
- 12/ VICTIM IS UNCOOPERATIVE OR LACKS INTEREST IN CASE <sup>(113)</sup> Not Considered <sup>1</sup> Considered <sup>2</sup>
- 13/ OTHER <sup>(114)</sup> Not Considered <sup>1</sup> Considered <sup>2</sup> IF CONSIDERED LIST

14/ IS THERE ONE OVERRIDING FACTOR THAT INFLUENCED THE SCREENING DECISION? NO <sup>1</sup> Yes <sup>2</sup>  
If YES, please list the identifying number to which it corresponds from ABCVE   
Comments on Reverse side.

User's Guide to the Case Screening Form

This guide provides a detailed description of procedures for the completion of the Case Screening Form. A great deal of time and effort has gone into the design of this form in order to minimize the inconvenience you may encounter and at the same time maintain a high degree of consistency among the participants. You may still find certain instructions unclear and there may still be ambiguities which may arise. If a problem should occur in this area, or any other, please call Larry Banks a local 3527 (Traffic Section, ground floor, 312 Main Street).

This research cannot be completed without your active participation. We hope the results of this information will be useful to you as it provides an opportunity to analyze some of the issues of particular importance you have addressed.

DATE - present date of the case screening decision.

SCREENING SUPERVISOR - refers to the particular Division and individual making the screening decision, e.g. Patrol North - Sgt.(P.I.N.) or Det. - indicates a detective acting in a supervisory position and making screening decisions.

TYPE OF REPORT - refers to the kind of report the decision is being made upon.

INVEST. REPORT AND SUPPLEMENTARY REPORTS - are self-explanatory.

CROWN COUNSEL REPORTS - indicates, for example, a returned report completed by Patrol which the Crown deems unacceptable and requires Detectives to do further investigation (this Report demands some action to be taken and a decision to be made or it may be for information only).

OTHER POLICE DEPT. - refers to, for example, a bulletin requesting information or action in regard to an individual case from another municipal department or R.C.M.P. detachment. OTHER - refers to other kinds of reports in which a decision must be made as to whether it should be screened in or out, for example, a Supplementary concerning information but not related to a specific case number.

CASE # - official V.P.D. case number assigned to a report. Leave blank if there is no specific reference to a V.P.D. case number.

NATURE OF OFFENCE - refers to what kind of crime has been committed or the heading on the type of report, i.e., robbery, B & E, theft, mischief, etc. or seized property, information only,

casualty, etc.

DATE OF OFFENCE - self-explanatory, if no offence, place the original date of the report, for example, a supplementary report containing information only, the date of that report would be placed in the appropriate section.

SCREENING DECISION - refers to what decision was made in regard to the type of report in question, for example, a Robbery Invest. Report with little or no leads is generally screened out, that is, not assigned for follow-up investigation but the Invest. Report is then circulated as information to be entered in a "case log book".

- or it is a report unworthy of any action and is not assigned, not circulated, but is discarded,

- a case that is screened in is generally assigned to a detective and becomes part of his caseload which demands some form of follow-up investigation.

REASONS CONSIDERED IN MAKING DECISION (Items 1-8)

- the criteria are self-explanatory and they refer to solvability factors or issues that may or may not go into a decision to screen in or screen out a case.

- the biggest difficulty may occur in item 1 - "Description of Suspect" - an example of not considering this factor would arise in a situation where there is an identified suspect in custody - the decision to assign this case would preclude the description of the suspect in favour of the identification criteria, that is, the suspect is known but his description, per se, is not an issue.

OTHER REASONS CONSIDERED IN MAKING DECISION BUT NOT CITED ABOVE (Items 9-14)

- this section is self-explanatory.

- the OTHER (14) category refers to any other fact unforeseen at the time this form was compiled and would apply to some extenuating circumstance not noted in any of the other categories.

OVERRIDING FACTOR (Item 15)

- this section refers to items 1-14 and only one corresponding number should be placed in the boxes - this is to ascertain which criterion is the pivotal point in the decision-making process. For example, there may be several factors involved in the decision to assign a case, i.e., identification of suspect, usable physical evidence or injury, but the identification aspect may be the overriding decision factor which led to a case assignment.

The directions and examples given may appear a little simplistic but the point which is being made is one of consistency in the filling out of the form. How one makes a



particular decision is not as important as everyone filling out the form, doing so in the same fashion.

APPENDIX E

Investigation Conclusion Form

[1] Patrol North ( ) 1 Detective P.I.N.: : : : : : Date of Conclusion: [ 6-11]  
 Patrol South ( ) 2 [2-5] Mo. Day Yr.  
 Supervisor assigning \_\_\_\_\_ Date of Assignment: [16-21]  
 case: (Name) : : : : :  
 P.I.N. : : : : : Mo. Day Yr.  
 [12-15]

[22-29] Case #:8: -: : : : : :1:

[30-31] Nature of offence: \_\_\_\_\_ Date of Offence: [32-37]  
 : : : : : : : : : : :  
 Mo. Day Yr.

Type of Report: Quality of Report:  
 [38] Invest. report ( ) 1 Excellent ( ) 1 [39]  
 Supplementary ( ) 2 Average ( ) 2  
 Crown Counsel ( ) 3 Poor ( ) 3  
 Other pol. dept. \_\_\_\_\_  
 bulletin ( ) 4 Comments \_\_\_\_\_  
 Other ( ) 5 : : : : : [40-41]

Case Disposition  
 [42] Active ( ) 1 Reason for Disposition:  
 Inactive ( ) 2 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Cleared by other means ( ) 3 \_\_\_\_\_ [43-44]  
 Unfounded ( ) 4  
 Complainant to lay charge ( ) 5  
 Cleared by charge ( ) 6

Investigative Results (Check all boxes that apply)

	Due to invest. by:			Due to invest. of:		
	PC	DET.	Other dept.	This case	Other case	
Arrested: Susp. #1	61	62	63	64	65	[Punch 1 if Checked: 61-80, 1-39] [61-65]
Susp. #2	66	67	68	69	70	[66-70]
Susp. #3	71	72	73	74	75	[71-75]
Susp. #4	76	77	78	79	80	[76-80]
						Crown Counsel
Charged: Susp. #1	1	2	3	4	5	Warrant Issued
Susp. #2	11	12	13	14	15	Summons
Susp. #3	21	22	23	24	25	Appear. Notice
Susp. #4	31	32	33	34	35	[Start new record] [ 1- 9]

Total Number of Suspects Arrested: : : : : [40-42]

Total Number of Charges Laid: : : : : [43-45]

(83-09-09)

Appendix E continued

- [1-8] :8: :-: : : : : : :3:
- Clearance of Other Cases
- Have any other cases been officially cleared due to the investigation of this case?
- [9] 1( ) No  
2( ) Yes; How many?:
- [10-11] : : :
- Do you have strong suspicion but lack sufficient court evidence to clear other cases due to this investigation?
- [12] 1( ) No  
2( ) Yes; How many?:
- [13-14] : : :
- If yes, what court evidence do you lack?:
- [15] 1( ) Suspect statement or confession
- [16] 1( ) Physical evidence
- [17] 1( ) Witness
- [18] 1( ) Positive identification
- Investigative Actions Taken.
- [19] 1( ) Suspect interview and/or statement taken
- [20] 1( ) Victim interview and/or statement taken
- [21] 1( ) Witness interview and/or statement taken
- [22] 1( ) Informant interview
- [23] 1( ) Other interviews (list):
- [24-25] : : : \_\_\_\_\_
- [26-27] : : : \_\_\_\_\_
- [28-29] : : : \_\_\_\_\_
- [30] 1( ) Checked crime scene
- [31] 1( ) Canvassed for witnesses
- [32] 1( ) Stakeout
- [33] 1( ) Collected physical evidence
- [34] 1( ) Yourself?
- [35] 1( ) Ident?  
What evidence?
- [36] 1( ) Photos
- [37] 1( ) Fingerprints
- [38] 1( ) Tools
- [39] 1( ) Weapons
- [40] 1( ) Other
- [41] 1( ) Used lab analyst
- [42] 1( ) Discussed with Detectives
- [43] 1( ) Discussed with Patrol Officer(s)
- [44] 1( ) Discussed with Supervisor
- [45] 1( ) Discussed with others in department
- [46] 1( ) Discussed with Crown Counsel
- [47] 1( ) Discussed with Defense Counsel

- [48] 1( ) Checked VPD records (list):
- [49-50] : : : \_\_\_\_\_
- [51-52] : : : \_\_\_\_\_
- [53-54] : : : \_\_\_\_\_
- [55] 1( ) Checked computer files
- [56] 1( ) CPIC
- [57] 1( ) NCIC
- [58] 1( ) PIRS (RCMP)
- [59] 1( ) MRDS
- [60] 1( ) Checked outside agencies
- [61] 1( ) Checked other agencies
- [62] 1( ) Checked other files or records (List):
- [63-64] : : : \_\_\_\_\_
- [65-66] : : : \_\_\_\_\_
- [67-68] : : : \_\_\_\_\_
- [69] 1( ) Conducted photo line-Up
- [70] 1( ) Successful  
2( ) Unsuccessful
- [71] 1( ) Conducted reg. line-Up
- [72] 1( ) Successful  
2( ) Unsuccessful
- [73] 1( ) Contacted media
- [74] 1( ) Contacted CPIC to locate for information or HPI
- [75] 1( ) Advised victim on status of case
- [76] 1( ) At arrest
- [77] 1( ) Charge
- [78] 1( ) Inactive
- [79] 1( ) Conclusion
- [80] 1( ) At any other stage
- [Start new record]
- [1] 1( ) Advised patrol officer on status of case
- [2] 1( ) At arrest
- [3] 1( ) Charge
- [4] 1( ) Inactive
- [5] 1( ) Conclusion
- [6] 1( ) At any other stage
- [7] 1( ) Seized property (Weapons, tools, clothes, etc.)
- [8] 1( ) Recovered property
- [9] 1( ) Other actions (list):
- [10-11] : : : \_\_\_\_\_
- [12-13] : : : \_\_\_\_\_
- [14-15] : : : \_\_\_\_\_
- Comments:  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Appendix E continued

INVESTIGATION SUSPENSION FORM DCI-3

Researcher use only

---

case # \_\_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_\_\_ / 80 PLACE AN "X" IN EACH APPROPRIATE BOX  
data (156-159)

---

PLACE AN "X" IN EACH APPROPRIATE BOX

	NO	YES	
	1	Due To The Investigation Of THIS CASE 2	ANOTHER CASE 3
A/ Suspect arrested and Charged (160)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
B/ This case cleared (161)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
C/ Warrant(s) issued (drawn) (162)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
D/ Suspect(s) identified but no warrants issued or charges filed (163)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

E/ Were any suspects in this case exonerated because of your investigation? NO  YES  (154)  
1 2

F/ Was this case unfounded because of your investigation? NO  YES  (155)  
1 2

G/ Was this case reclassified? NO  YES  If YES, mark new classification... (156-167)

Homicide  Rape  Aggravated Assault  Robbery  Burglary   
2 3 4 5 6  
 Larceny  Auto Theft  Other Felony  Misdemeanor  Other   
7 8 9 10 11

H/ Have any other cases been cleared due to the investigation of this case? NO  YES  (168-169)  
1 2  
 If YES please give the number of other cases cleared. \_\_\_\_\_

I/ This case has not been cleared but all leads have been exhausted. NO  YES  (170)  
1 2

J/ This case has not been cleared because of: Uncooperative victim(s) NO  YES  (171)  
1 2  
 Uncooperative witness(es) NO  YES  (172)  
1 2

---

INFORMATION OBTAINED DUE TO THIS INVESTIGATION (Place an "X" in all appropriate boxes)

K/ Description of at least one suspect  
 Good Description  Poor Description  No Description  (173)  
1 2 3

L/ Name of at least one suspect  
 Full Name  Partial Name  Nickname (AKA)  No Name  (174)  
1 2 3 4

M/ Know the identity of people associated with the suspect(s) or offense. NO  YES  (175)  
1 2

N/ Know the identity of a fence linked to the suspect(s) or offense. NO  YES  (176)  
1 2

---

COMMENTS ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THIS CASE & THE RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION. USE REVERSE SIDE IF NECESSARY.

# APPENDIX F

## VANCOUVER POLICE DEPARTMENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

FILE

PAGE \_\_\_\_\_ OF \_\_\_\_\_

CRIME INFO  
BULLETIN

CASE NUMBER

OCCURRENCE INFORMATION			
TYPE OF OCCURRENCE OFFENCE	TEAM UCC	DATE OCCURRED	
LOCATION No. Dir. Name Type Apt. St. and POSTAL CODE	TYPE OF PREMISE	TC	
WEAPON TOOL	TRADEMARKS MEANS OF ATTACK		

VICTIM			
SURNAME			
GIVEN 1		GIVEN 2	
HOME ADDRESS No. Dir. Name Type Apt. St. and POSTAL CODE		PHONE	SOCIAL INSURANCE NO.
BUSINESS ADDRESS and POSTAL CODE		PHONE	DRIVER LICENSE NO. P.D.
DOB	AGE	SEX	RACE
	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	HAIR
	COLOR	EYES	MISC. ID.

REPORTER/WITNESS			
REPORTER SURNAME		AGE	ADDRESS No. Dir. Name Type Apt. St. & POSTAL CODE
WITNESS SURNAME		AGE	ADDRESS and POSTAL CODE
		RES. PHONE	BUS. PHONE

SUSPECT			
SURNAME			
GIVEN 1		GIVEN 2	
ALIAS		MARKS/SCARS	
HOME ADDRESS No. Dir. Name Type Apt. St. and POSTAL CODE		PHONE	SOCIAL INSURANCE NO.
BUSINESS ADDRESS and POSTAL CODE		PHONE	DRIVER LICENSE NO. P.D.
DOB	AGE	SEX	RACE
	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	HAIR
	COLOR	EYES	MISC. ID.
TRANSPORTATION		CLOTHING DISTINGUISHING FEATURES	
IN CUSTODY	YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/>	CHANGED	YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/>
	PROCESS	INVESTIGATOR	VPD PHOTO No.
NEXT OF KIN	RELATIONSHIP	TO WHOM	VICTIM <input type="checkbox"/> SUSPECT <input type="checkbox"/> NOTIFIED <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/>
SURNAME		G1	G2
ADDRESS No. Dir. Name Type Apt. St. and POSTAL CODE		PHONE	

NARRATIVE (See Instructions)			
CAN PROPERTY BE IDENTIFIED		TOTAL STOLEN	TOTAL DAMAGED
YES <input type="checkbox"/>	NO <input type="checkbox"/>	\$	\$

INVESTIGATOR	RANK	PH	TEAM	ACCOMPANIED BY	RANK	PH
--------------	------	----	------	----------------	------	----

QUALITY CONTROL	DATA ENTRY	DISTRIBUTION
		2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

VANCOUVER POLICE DEPARTMENT  
INVESTIGATION REPORT INSTRUCTION GUIDE

<b>VICTIM</b>	UTI <input type="checkbox"/>	Alcohol <input type="checkbox"/>	Drug <input type="checkbox"/>	INJURY DEATH <input type="checkbox"/>
UNDER THE INFLUENCE CHECK - VICTIM-SUSPECT INFLUENCED BY ALCOHOL - VICTIM SUSPECT INFLUENCED BY DRUG		1 - VICTIM INJURED 0 - VICTIM DIED		CHECK

**OTHER CODES**

M -- MALE		METRIC		BALD	
F -- FEMALE		MAX		BLACK	
C - COMPANY BUSINESS		244 CM		BLONDE	
		8 FT.)		BROWN	
				GREY	
				RED	
				WHITE	

DOB	YR	MON	DAY	AGE	SEX	RACE	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	HAIR	COLOR EYES
-----	----	-----	-----	-----	-----	------	--------	--------	------	------------

IF EXACT DOB IS NOT KNOWN ENTER AGE OR APPROX. AGE.

WHITE  
NEGRO  
NATIVE INDIAN  
EAST INDIAN  
ORIENTAL  
OTHER

METRIC  
MAX  
205 KILOS  
(450 LBS.)

BLACK  
BLUE  
BROWN  
GREEN  
GREY  
HAZEL  
MARRON  
OR COMBINATION

For JUVENILES and SUDDEN DEATHS - Completion Mandatory

NEXT OF KIN | RELATIONSHIP \_\_\_\_\_ ENTER HUSBAND WIFE FATHER MOTHER ETC

**NARRATIVE**

NOTE: FURTHER INFORMATION ON ADDITIONAL PERSONS SHOULD BE RECORDED AS IN PREVIOUS FORMAT

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| <p><b>ITEM</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1 Identify additional victims and where they may be contacted by a follow up investigator</li> <li>2 Identify additional witnesses and where they may be contacted by a follow-up investigator</li> <li>3 Identify and/or describe additional persons arrested and/or suspect, and state the reason for suspicion.</li> <li>4 Casualties or death complete. Next of Kin section; state Nature of Casualty Attending Doctor Family Doctor Pronounced by and time</li> </ol> | <p><b>ITEM</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>5 If motor vehicle was involved report known details in following order: Type Licence No. Prov. Lic Yr. Vin Ven Yr. Make Model Style Colour Registered Owner Remarks</li> <li>6 Describe Property in the following order: Status Number of Items Serial Numbers Make Colour Identifying Marks Describe Damage Dollar Value i.e STATUS Stolen, Recovered, Lost Found Damage Seized</li> <li>7 Describe physical evidence Where Found By whom and disposition.</li> <li>8 Record if Identification Squad required and/or notified</li> <li>9 Reconstruct incident</li> </ol> |
|--|--|

VPO 19-83)

VANCOUVER POLICE DEPARTMENT  
**MISCELLANEOUS AND SUPPLEMENTARY  
 REPORT**

PAGE \_\_\_\_\_ OF \_\_\_\_\_  
 CASE NUMBER \_\_\_\_\_

FILE \_\_\_\_\_  
 CRIME \_\_\_\_\_  
 BULLETIN \_\_\_\_\_  
 INFOR \_\_\_\_\_

**OCCURRENCE INFORMATION**

TYPE OF OCCURRENCE OFFENCE \_\_\_\_\_ TEAM OCC \_\_\_\_\_ DATE OCCURRED \_\_\_\_\_  
 LOCATION \_\_\_\_\_ TYPE OF PREMISE \_\_\_\_\_ TO \_\_\_\_\_ DATE INV \_\_\_\_\_

**VICTIM**

SURNAME \_\_\_\_\_ AGE \_\_\_\_\_ ADDRESS AND POSTAL CODE \_\_\_\_\_ RES PHONE \_\_\_\_\_  
 GIVEN \_\_\_\_\_ AGE \_\_\_\_\_ BUS PHONE \_\_\_\_\_

**REPORTER**

SURNAME \_\_\_\_\_ AGE \_\_\_\_\_ ADDRESS AND POSTAL CODE \_\_\_\_\_ RES PHONE \_\_\_\_\_  
 GIVEN \_\_\_\_\_ AGE \_\_\_\_\_ BUS PHONE \_\_\_\_\_

**ADDITIONAL VICTIM**  **REPORTER**  **SUSPECT**

SURNAME \_\_\_\_\_ AGE \_\_\_\_\_ ADDRESS AND POSTAL CODE \_\_\_\_\_ RES PHONE \_\_\_\_\_  
 GIVEN \_\_\_\_\_ AGE \_\_\_\_\_ BUS PHONE \_\_\_\_\_

SUSPECT DESC	RACE	SEX	HT	WT	BUILD	HAIR	STYLE	EYES	GLASSES	COMPLEXION
CLOTHING, DISTINGUISHING FEATURES										

**NARRATIVE**

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
INVESTIGATOR \_\_\_\_\_ RANK \_\_\_\_\_ PIN \_\_\_\_\_ TM SCD \_\_\_\_\_ ACCOMPANIED BY \_\_\_\_\_ RANK \_\_\_\_\_ PIN \_\_\_\_\_

DATE OF REPORT \_\_\_\_\_ Y \_\_\_\_\_ M \_\_\_\_\_ D \_\_\_\_\_

QUALITY CONTROL	DATA ENTRY	DISTRIBUTION	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
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# TEAM BOUNDARIES

(Effective July 22, 1982)






Appendix G continued

PATROL DIVISION NORTH  
AUTHORIZED STRENGTH

PATROL DIVISION NORTH
1 Supt. 4 Insp. 5 S/Sgt. 13 Sgt. 15 Det. 13 Cpl. 216 P.C. 1 CS III 2 CT II
265 SWORN 3 CIVILIAN




REVISED: 83-01-02

Appendix G continued

PATROL DIVISION SOUTH  
AUTHORIZED STRENGTH


PATROL DIVISION SOUTH
1 Supt.
4 Insp.
5 S/Sgt.
13 Sgt.
17 Det.
13 Cpl.
243 P.C.
1 CS III
1 CT II
3 Report Clerks
296 SWORN
5 CIVILIAN



AMENDED: 07-01-02

# APPENDIX H


INFORMATION SECTION  
AUTHORIZED STRENGTH



AMENDED: 03-01-30

# APPENDIX I

## ORGANIZATION CHART




AMENDED: 22-10-10

INVESTIGATION DIVISION  
AUTHORIZED STRENGTH


INVESTIGATION DIVISION
1 Supt.
4 Insp.
1 Insp. **
2 S/Sgt. **
10 S/Sgt.
15 Sgt.
93 Det.
1 Cpl.
1 P.C. **
30 P.C.
1 Pol. Lab. An. II
1 Pol. Lab. An. I
1 Asst. Doc. Exam.
1 CS III
1 CS II
1 CL III
2 CL II
4 CT II
154 SHORN
4 SECONDED
12 CIVILIAN

\*\* SECONDED




SPECIAL INVESTIGATION SECTION  
AUTHORIZED STRENGTH

<b>SPECIAL INVESTIGATION SECTION</b>
1 Insp.
3 S/Sgt.
4 Sgt.
24 Det.
1 Cpl.
13 P.C.
1 Pol. Lab. An. II
1 Pol. Lab. An. I
1 Asst. Doc. Exam.
1 CS II
1 CL II
2 CT II
46 SHORN
7 CIVILIAN



AMENDED: 82-10-10

VICE SECTION  
AUTHORIZED STRENGTH




VICE SECTION
1 Insp.
2 S/Sgt.
5 Sgt.
24 Det.
1 CL II
1 CT II
32 SWORN
2 CIVILIAN

AMENDED: 83-02-27

MAJOR CRIME SECTION

AUTHORIZED STRENGTH





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