THE "POPULAR" CONCEPT OF TOTALITARIANISM

by

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ABSTRACT

Although the first major written work dealing in name with the totalitarian form of government was Mussolini's "La Dottrina del Fascismo". this paper aims to offer neither an analysis of the political philosophy of totalitarianism nor an historical analysis of any particular political system. Rather, it aims at an analytical understanding of the development, weaknesses and functions of the "popular" concept of totalitarianism which developed in the U.S.A. after 1945 and which for twenty-five years, has provided the main conceptual framework for study of the socio-political structure of the USSR and Nazi Germany.

During the nineteen thirties academics adopted Mussolini's idea of totalitarianism in order to study Germany under the National Socialists. However, the meaning of the concept altered slightly in the process. The differentiation between state and party control became blurred and there was a change in emphasis away from Mussolini's vague philosophical ends in favour of a study of the institutional mechanisms used to put totalitarian philosophy into practice. However, the motivation for such studies was limited to a desire to understand why totalitarian dictatorship could be preferred to liberal democratic forms and did not provide a thorough structural analysis. Chapter I offers a resumé of the work undertaken on totalitarianism during the thirties whilst, at the same time, drawing attention to

the beginning of a tendency of academics to perceive Fascism and Communism as one and the same thing. This perception was itself linked to the contemporary socio-political climate, changing as soon as the USSR entered the Second World War.

After the Second World War, analysis of totalitarianism as a particular set of institutional arrangements was given great impetus with the development of the "popular" concept which commonly defines totalitarianism in the form of a syndrome of inter-related features. Chapter II provides a synthesised definition of the nature of totalitarianism as it evolved in the "popular" concept.

Chapter III develops a criticism of the concept in terms of its inherent limitations and weaknesses. In particular the concept is limited by its specificity arising from the syndromic nature of its definition, the features chosen for the syndrome and the supportive empirical studies that are employed. This specificity makes the concept more applicable to historical studies than to political sociology.

With this criticism in mind, Chapter IV offers an explanation for the concept's weaknesses and its popularity since 1945. In particular, the concept is placed in its historical context, and its relationship to U.S. Cold War policies is discussed. Specifically, it is argued that anti-totalitarianism provided the basic rationalisation for U.S. foreign and domestic policy during the Cold War, and that the "popular" concept is merely a reiteration of this ideology.

The final Chapter attempts to reformulate the concept of totalitarianism so that it may become a useful tool in political sociology. It is suggested that a study of totalitarianism should essentially be a study of total downward vertical control, which may be obtained through the use of ideological and material control mechanisms as well as by coercion.

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I

ACADEMIC TREATMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF TOTALITARIANISM UP TO 1945

The notion of a totalitarian state was first introduced by Mussolini in 1932.[1] Between then and 1945, totalitarianism became a subject of study by many American academics. However, the academics tended to place emphasis upon aspects of totalitarianism not stressed by Mussolini. This process culminated in the establishment, after the War, of the "popular" concept of totalitarianism (defined in detail in chapter II) and which has since been generally accepted as the main theoretical framework for analysis of the USSR and Nazi Germany.

The ideas contained within Mussolini's "La Dottrina del Fascismo" were a development of earlier fascist philosophy which had tended to place the "nation" before all else. The Charter of Labour (21st April, 1927) reflected this emphasis, with the Italian nation being seen as "an organic whole, having life, purposes and means of action superior in power and duration to those of the individuals, single or associated, of which it is composed."[2] By 1932, however, the primacy of the "state" had replaced that of the "nation" in fascist philosophy so that "the foundation of fascism" was "its conception of the state, its character, its duty, its aim."[3] Mussolini argued

that

> "The higher personality is only a nation in so far as it is a State. The nation does not exist to generate the State... the nation is created by the State, which gives to a people...an effective existence."[4]

The fascist state was, in Mussolini's terms, a moral entity. It provided the means whereby the "objective will" of the nation could be determined. Because of this fact the individual could be expected to deny himself as an individual for the wider good of the whole, and by so doing would raise himself to a conscious membership of a spiritual society. In this way man arrives at complete personal fulfillment. Because of the state's moral property

> "everything is in the State and nothing human or spiritual exists, much less has value, outside the State. In this sense Fascism is totalitarian, and the fascist state, the synthesis and unity of all values, interprets, develops and gives strength to the whole life of the people."[5]

Mussolini's conception of totalitarianism stressed the vague philosophical ends to be achieved. Thus totalitarianism represented a situation where society in all its aspects was subsumed by the state, which possesses certain moral and spiritual properties.

The notion of totalitarianism was utilised by American academics during the nineteen thirties, but its meaning was altered somewhat. The concept, in fact, was primarily employed not in relation to

Mussolini's Italy, but rather to Germany under National Socialist rule. The National Socialists, although at first sharing Mussolini's emphasis on the state, later, around 1934, stressed (in the post-revolutionary phase of National Socialism) the predominance of the Party and the Volk.[6] Thus academics, interested mainly in developments within Germany, tended to identify a totalitarian regime either by the presence of state control (as in Italy) or party control (as in Germany). With this lack of differentiation between state and party control, the academic concept began to move away from the original definition offered by Mussolini. This movement was furthered by the fact that academics were less interested in the vague philosophical ends of totalitarianism than they were in analysing the means by which totalitarian domination could possibly be maintained. The concept, therefore, tended to drift towards definition as a set of means and ends rather than merely as a set of ends, as emphasised by Mussolini.

This tendency towards a blurring of the differentiation between state and party control and a consideration of means as well as ends, culminated in the development of the "popular" concept after the Second World War. During the nineteen thirties, however, there were certain limiting factors which prevented the kind of thorough analysis found later in the "popular" concept. Sociology and political science were developed to a small degree only before the War, and generally adopted a formalistic, descriptive approach. Thus a great proportion

of political studies took place under the auspices of political theory and constitutional history rather than being of a comparative or analytical nature. The study of history and literature, therefore, dominated the research interests of academics studying other nations and in the sphere of Russian studies, for example, there was a tendency to examine only pre-revolutionary Russia.[7] This general approach severely restricted academic knowledge on important contemporary issues in international politics. As one writer has put it

> "the judgement of intelligent journalists from McKenzie Wallace onwards has, on the whole been more reliable than that of academics."[8]

It was not really until the outbreak of the Second World War that academics became concerned with a study of the structure of any particular political system. The contemporary interest that did exist was largely in relation to the phenomenon of National Socialism and tended, for the most part, towards an explanation of how and why human beings in the twentieth century could wish Hitler to wrest from them the liberties of constitutional democracy. Because of the poverty of sociology and political science at this time, the answers to such questions tended to come mainly from the broad area of psychology.

Chakotin adopted a Pavlovian approach to explain the popularity

of Hitler who had himself "unconsciously by intuition, applied to the movement of crowds, to the political battle, the laws defined by Pavlov" relating to the power of repetition.[9] Chakotin's approach did not attempt to analyse or explain the political structures involved in the National Socialist system, but he did provide a study of the influence of propaganda in totalitarian states, which he identified as Italy and Germany. Fascism was synonymous with totalitarianism in Chakotin's analysis and it was Fascism that "rapes the mind of the masses with its baleful propaganda".[10] However, by pointing to propaganda and its importance, Chakotin's work did provide a slight link with the post-war development of the "popular" concept of totalitarianism.

A similar psychological emphasis was adopted by Franz Alexander, who, claiming that the world was becoming irrational, saw totalitarianism as the greatest example of this trend because it had rejected pluralist democracy.[11] The psychological pressures on man provided Erick Fromm with the central idea in his thesis that freedom, by stressing man's individualism, had created psychic tensions in man which led him either to advance to real freedom or to escape from it and its responsibilities. In the totalitarian nations, he argued, man reverted back to a state of submissiveness to a leader or a race or a state.[12]

Studies with an emphasis on psychology, however, were by no

means the only analyses of totalitarian regimes and, as has already been stated, Chakotin's psychological approach itself led to an explication of one element of the political process. A structural analysis, in fact, was adopted by Lederer who emphasised the role played by the 'mass'. "The totalitarian state" he argued, "is the state of the masses...for it destroys any potential source of political opposition."[13] Hayek, on the other hand, believed that the greatest threat to democracies was a rejection of free enterprise in favour of a planned economy.[14] For him, the element of planning was central to totalitarianism, to the extent that he even saw the Labour Party as the main source of totalitarian controls in the U.K. because of its belief in a planned society.

In general, therefore, there were very few studies on totalitarianism as a particular form of government during the nineteen thirties or early forties. The majority of studies stressed one element or another of the political process in Germany as being of use in an attempt to understand how non-pluralist regimes could possibly have become popular. This general direction of study was preferred both to one which might attempt to understand or enlarge upon the relationship between society and state or party in Germany and Italy, or to an analysis of the whole of the political processes involved. It is because of this emphasis that totalitarianism was not, at that time, widely viewed as a comparative tool in political science; it

was seen as an evil phenomenon to be explained, rather than as a political form to be analysed.

There are, however, two exceptions to the usual pre-War approach to the study of totalitarianism; those of Sigmund Neumann and Franz Neumann. Indeed, such was their originality that they provided the foundation for the development of the "popular" concept of totalitarianism.

The subtitle of Franz Neumann's book provides a clue to the important difference between his work and most of the previous studies concerning German totalitarianism,[15] for he essentially analysed "the structure and practice of National Socialism". Neumann wished not so much to explain why the German people supported Hitler, but rather attempted an analysis in terms of the structure and political processes of Germany under National Socialist rule. Dealing only with Germany, he employed the notion of totalitarianism to describe the fascist regime in power. He defined totalitarianism as the situation where the state, through its ministries "is completely unrestrained and unlimited. It is subject to no institutional control".[16] He provided a solid, historically documented study of the German social, political and economic systems under National Socialism, but did not, in any real sense, extend this study towards the development of 'totalitarianism' as a concept for political science.

Sigmund Neumann, on the other hand, placed more stress on studying

a general phenomenon called totalitarianism, than he did on analysing any particular nation.[17] However, this is only a question of emphasis because, although wishing to apply his analysis to Italy, Russia and Germany, he was forced to use the latter as the source for most of his abstractions. Nevertheless, he did provide the first major attempt by academia to develop a conceptual framework for totalitarianism. His method of abstracting certain common elements of structure and process in Italy, Germany and Russia, and calling this system "totalitarianism" was the precursor of the methods used in later studies and will, therefore, be criticised with these other studies below.

The work of Sigmund Neumann and Franz Neumann extended a process whereby the label of totalitarianism was applied to political systems other than Italy, which was, by Mussolini's original definition, the closest approximation to a totalitarian system. In Italy fascism aimed at being totalitarian; the National Socialists were also popularly seen as fascists, and, therefore, it was not difficult for National Socialism to be defined as totalitarian as well. By the early nineteen forties, academics had moved away from Mussolini's conceptualisation of totalitarianism as a vague set of ends, towards a consideration of the means employed to achieve such ends. In addition, there had also been a blurring of the distinction

between state and party control. The modus operandi for totalitarianism, moreover, was seen as denying the individual freedoms which were perceived to exist in contemporary liberal democracies. The definition of totalitarianism that emerged was, in fact, so different from the original definition that Mussolini, the theoretician and practitioner of totalitarianism, was largely excluded from, or at best was only a periphery of, any studies on totalitarianism. Thus, for example, Chakotin included Mussolini as a kind of small-scale totalitarian, with Hitler's regime being the true representative of this type of political system.[18] Similarly, Franz Neumann's study referred almost entirely to the National Socialists, and only infrequently did it attend to Italian Fascism.

It was during this same period that another development occurred in academic thinking on the concept which also later influenced the post-war "popular" conceptualisation, namely the grouping together of Fascism and Communism as if they were one and the same thing in political terms. Lavine, for example, claimed that "the communists and fascists seek to infect others with their own lack of respect for government"[19] whilst Heimann reflected the idea of many Russian sympathisers when he saw Marxist Socialism as having gone sour in the USSR with "both liberty and party abolished and something like a totalitarian class substituted for them".[20] Sigmund Neumann makes

the same link, although he also appeared to see certain differences between Germany and Russia.[21]

The perception that Communism and Fascism were manifestations of the same phenomenon was not entirely unrelated to the contemporary political climate. Firstly, the American "public" was already feeling disappointed by Russia because of the lack of economic benefits to the U.S. after having given Russia diplomatic recognition in 1933. Exports from the U.S.A. to the USSR totalled 115 million dollars in 1930 and "a vast increase of these exports - a prospect especially attractive in the midst of the depression - was predicted in the event that relations should be regularised".[22] However, after waiting several years for this increase in exports the U.S.A. came to the realisation that trade with the USSR was, in fact, constantly declining.

Secondly, in the area of international relations the USSR had, since 1934, been on relatively good terms with the West in the hope that some collective security pact could be agreed upon which would offer protection to the USSR from Hitler's expansionist aims.[23] These overtures were aided by the fact that even anti-Communists were mildly respectful of the changes that had occurred within the USSR. Vincent Sheean states that, until 1939, there had "grown up a bias in favour of the Soviet Union based upon the magnitude of the historic effort made there, which in many cases overrides serious disagreement with

the basic theories of that effort".[24] However, the Russian attempts at collective security failed and, instead, Stalin signed a non-aggression pact with Hitler. Despite the popular preference towards isolationism in world affairs, many Americans were already cognizant of the fact that, sooner or later, the U.S.A. would have to go to war against Hitler in order to protect her long-term interests in Europe. The Non-Aggression Pact, therefore, had an immediate effect in the U.S.A. Traditional anti-Communism, the economic frustrations felt because of the sharp decline in trade to the USSR and the news of the Russo-German agreement combined to produce an atmosphere in the U.S. which was decidedly anti-Russian. According to Sheean, the Pact "was so contrary to previous Communist professions, and was so shocking...that it created a revolution in emotional attitudes" towards Russia.[25]

It would seem at least possible, moreover, that this domestic political atmosphere influenced contemporary academic studies. In this context, therefore, it is interesting to note that nearly all the studies that considered Russia to be a totalitarian power akin to Fascism in Germany, were written either after the outbreak of the Second World War or after the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact of 1939, and before the Russians joined the allied war effort in 1941. In some cases the fact that Russia was now perceived as an enemy or even as a non-belligerent against Hitler obviously influenced authors

to portray both Russia and Germany as being fundamentally of the same genus. The title of Franz Borkenau's book ("The Totalitarian Enemy"), for example, provides at least a partial explanation of why he, and others, linked Germany and Russia together in the early forties. He writes that the Russo-German Pact

> "has convinced many...that Russia and Germany, in the main, do not represent two antagonistic types of social regime, but one and the same type. It is no longer heresy to describe the Nazi regime as 'Brown Bolshevism' and Stalin's regime as 'Red Fascism'."[26]

It is this belief that allows Borkenau to see totalitarianism as "the socialist revolution which Marx has foretold whether it be in the form of fascism or communism"[27] and, indeed, he claimed that "Germany is rapidly moving towards communism".[28] One might be forgiven if one were to assume that Borkenau merely defined 'totalitarianism' as the 'enemy', thus subsuming as totalitarian any regime which, in the context of the early years of the Second World War, might in any sense appear to be pro-German and hence anti-democratic.

The USSR had never been treated in a very favourable light even before her apparent alignment with the German totalitarian menace. There were very few political studies made of Russia during the nineteen thirties, but it is safe to claim that in such work as existed, she was seen as a dictatorial threat to the West via

ideological subversion of the domestic populace and not as a totalitarian power providing a physically direct military threat in the same way as Germany. The difference is slight but important. Russia was pictured as autocratic, despotic, dictatorial, cruel, illiberal etc., but not as totalitarian until it became apparent that neither Hitler nor Stalin had any great desire to fight each other. Thus by the outbreak of the war the concept of totalitarianism had, in fact, also become an instrument of political propaganda.

The corrollary of all this is the fact that the literary treatment of Russia changed after she entered the war. The totalitarian enemy was now quite obviously German fascist totalitarianism and if Communist Russia was allied to the West, it was not really possible to describe her also as totalitarian. Without realising it, Borkenau summarised the situation when he stated that "the division could not be more clear-cut; liberal powers here, totalitarian powers there".[29] The only difference, however, was that with Russia fighting against Germany, the application of totalitarianism had to change, so that Russia found herself 'here' and not 'there'. The Second World War was seen as a war of liberation[30] and it was inconceivable for one of the liberators to be of the same kind as the enemy. It was accepted that Stalin was not a very liberal man, but he was now perceived as being obviously of a different type than Hitler or Mussolini, who were both Fascists and "totalitarian

monsters".[31] It was the Germans who suffered from "inverted sentimentalism the reverse side of which is their brutality, their...madness".[32] Essentially the war showed people that it was Germany and Italy who were the totalitarian enemies, whereas Russia was no more than a rather despotic ally and a victim of Fascist aggression.

American public opinion dutifully committed its volte face in line with these developments, and it is interesting to note the results of some of the contemporary public opinion polls. Prior to Russia entering the war 39.7% of a sample stated that they believed that Russia was worse or no better than Germany, whereas after her entry into the war 71% of a sample replied that they would prefer Russia to be in charge of Europe rather than Germany.[33] Asked whether they would prefer to live under the kind of government in Russia or Germany 61% of a sample in 1937 replied in favour of Germany, a figure which by 1942 had fallen to 9%, and, also in 1937, 39% chose Russia, which by 1942 had risen to 52%.[34] Asked whether there should be a law against joining the Communist Party in the U.S., the total in favour dropped from 75% in 1940 to 44% in 1946 and the percentage against such a law rose from 12% in 1940 to 38% in 1946. By 1944, replying to a question asking which kind of government existed in the USSR, only 2% believed that she had a fascist or a totalitarian system.[35]

The war changed the popular view of the USSR considerably, and it changed towards a more favourable perception, albeit only temporarily. The importance of Russia in the war effort could not be minimised for, as Fleming says, "...in mid-1942...the West was dependent for its survival, in Europe at least, upon the stamina and power of the Red Army".[36]

The propaganda machine in the U.S. was turned against Germany and Japan, whereas Russia was treated very sympathetically. One of the most important war-time pro-Russian propaganda films portrayed the courage of the Russian nation where "peoples of all races live together in peace". The greatness of the Russian people was matched only by the greatness of their leader, Uncle Joe Stalin, who, realising that the Russians needed time to prepare for the inevitable fight, stalled Germany by signing a non-aggression pact in 1939. The Russians, it seems, were side by side with the other free nations of the world and together they would teach Germany that "terror is not strength".[37] This general atmosphere towards the Russian allies was reflected in the press, and Chamberlain, for example, reports that

> "the editor of a publication which prides itself on the qualities of integrity and objectivity privately urged me not to 'sock Russia' in an article...on the status of religious freedom in the Soviet Union".[38]

President Roosevelt made it quite clear to the population of the United States that Russia was a defiant friend and ally. In a

broadcast he asserted that "Russia has destroyed more armed power of our enemies...than all the other United Nations put together".[39] In November, 1942, New York provided the venue for a mass meeting of the Congress of American and Soviet Friendship, at which the Russian Ambassador Litvinoff was presented with four massive volumes containing over a million signatures pledging continuance of U.S.-Soviet friendship, with apparently thousands more arriving every day.[40] Vice President Wallace believed that

> "Russia and the U.S. are far closer today than Tocqueville could possibly have imagined...the peoples of both nations have a profound hatred of war and a strong love of peace....Both are striving for the education, the productivity and the enduring happiness of the common man".[41]

Both systems, he said, are similar, with Russia practising a rigid economic democracy and the U.S. a political democracy, but "both have been working towards a practical middle ground" which "by definition abhors imperialism".[42]

It thus also became a little difficult for the U.S. government to suspect such an important ally and friend, as was Russia, of plotting to overthrow them, and Russian Communism was, therefore, perceived as being less of a subversive threat than at any time since the Revolution. Joseph Davies, who was U.S. ambassador to the USSR from 1936 to 1938, stated his belief that "the idea that there is any menace to our way of life (from the Communists and the USSR)...is so

utterly unsound as to be silly,"[43] an opinion which was shared by a New York Times editorial.[44] It was also Davies' opinion "that the Commintern, under the present Stalinist regime, is not conceived as an instrumentality to provoke international revolution".[45] Davies was urging Americans to "remember how the enemy would welcome the confusion that anti-Russian sentiments would bring about"[46] and proclaimed his belief that "the bugaboo of the 'Communist Menace' was part of the Nazi war offensive".[47] Indeed, the official feeling towards Russia was such that the FBI went to the extent of investigating and uncovering a plot against the Stalinist regime.[48]

During the war years, therefore, it was obvious that the socio-political atmosphere which enveloped the U.S.A. influenced both the development and the application of the concept of totalitarianism. In a situation where both the USSR and the U.S.A. were fighting against totalitarianism, it is not surprising that Sigmund Neumann's analysis, published in 1942, did not provide an immediate stimulus to the study of Russia as a totalitarian state. In any case, at that time, academia was directing its analytical attentions to the immediate enemies, Germany and Japan. After the war, however, there was a very definite change in the political atmosphere with the development of Cold War politics. Attention was then turned toward the development of the "popular" concept of totalitarianism, using as a base the concept as it had developed by 1942. Thus the "popular" concept was

based upon work done in the thirties and early forties which tended to blurr the differentiation between state and party control, and which perceived totalitarianism not as a vague philosophy concerning the fulfillment of man through the State but rather as an institutional structure whereby the polity could exercise total control over society.

II

SYNTHESIS OF THE "POPULAR" CONCEPT OF TOTALITARIANISM

Political scientists appear to be in slight disagreement about the status of what, in this paper, is referred to as the "concept" of totalitarianism. Tucker, for example, sees it at one point as a "kind of comparative concept"[49] but then later refers to "the theory of totalitarianism".[50] Coser tends to discuss it as a 'model' or a Weberian ideal type of construct,[51] whereas other authors do not explicitly name what kind of a tool it is meant to be. The latter is the more common occurrence, although it would appear to be safe to assume that this particular notion of 'totalitarianism' is implicitly a comparative concept for use in the social sciences in general and in the political sciences in particular. It is therefore accepted here that the writers on totalitarianism are attempting, as Friedrich and Brzezinski claim they are, to "delineate, on the basis of...factual data, the general model of totalitarian dictatorship and the society which it has created"[52] and that such a conceptualisation is to be used for comparative work.

As a comparative concept, its use is not made any the easier by the underlying ambiguity concerning its definition. Wolfe probably comes the closest to defining the concept in terms similar to that of

the philosophy of Mussolini. For Wolfe "the totalitarian state is designedly total, in that it becomes coextensive with the society itself".[53] This definition is elaborated by Franz Neumann who sees totalitarian dictatorship as that political system

> "where it may be necessary to control education, the means of communication and economic institutions and thus to gear the whole of society and the private life of the citizen to the system of political domination".[54]

It is, however, probably through the important and influential work of Friedrich and Brzezinski on the one hand and Hannah Arendt on the other that the influence of the academic works of the thirties is most apparent, and where the definition of totalitarianism has moved furthest away from its philosophical birth in Mussolini's writings. Thus one finds again that emphasis is placed upon means and not philosophical ends and that there is usually no differentiation in their work between state or party in terms of political domination. Arendt's "total domination", for example, is a rather broad idea which seems to mean any form of downward vertical domination of the political system, whether by state, party or any other means. This can be quite a beneficial development, however, for it does permit one to realise the similarities in practice between, for example, the dominance of the state in Italy, the dictatorship of the National Socialist Party in Germany and the dictatorship of the Proletariat in the USSR.

Despite the fact that all of the post-war academics concerned

with the "popular" concept of totalitarianism share an orientation that is directed towards "means" and not "ends", there is nonetheless still a great deal of vagueness, ambiguity and, occasionally, disagreement about the actual nature of totalitarian domination. Different authors place slightly different degrees of importance on the various aspects of the phenomenon being studied, and, therefore, in order to discuss the "popular" concept, one must somehow bring together these various strands of thought.

One of the clearest things about Arendt's work is her ambiguity. It is extremely difficult to find in her work any lucid or explicit definition of totalitarianism, to the extent that at one point she proclaims that terror is the essence of totalitarianism and at another point argues that the USSR is no longer totalitarian not because it has dispensed with the Stalinist terror, but because of"the amazingly swift and rich recovery of the arts during the last decade".[55] The most explicit definition that Arendt offers is that it is a "form of government whose essence is terror and whose principle of action is the logicality of ideological thinking".[56] Arendt's vagueness is counterbalanced by the rigidities offered by Friedrich and Brzezinski in their definition of totalitarianism in terms of a syndrome of inter-related characteristics.[57] This syndrome is in fact a compilation of what appear to them to be the most important elements in totalitarian domination. Friedrich and Brzezinski's definition takes the form of:

> "six basic features, which we think constitute the character of totalitarian dictatorship form a cluster of inter-related traits, inter-twined and mutually supporting each other, as usual in 'organic' systems".[58]

Similarly, Sigmund Neumann's analysis adopts an implicit but rather vague syndrome of features, which are, in fact, a description of the important socio-political features of Nazi Germany, and Stalinist Russia.[59] Friedrich and Brzezinski, however, provide a far more concise and explicit syndrome of six inter-related characteristics: an ideology, a single mass party, typically led by one man; a system of terror; a communications monopoly; a weapons monopoly; and a centrally directed economy.[60] Most writers on the subject disagree with this syndrome only in relation to the emphasis given to one trait or another, although occasionally other features have been suggested as necessary additions. The above syndrome therefore provides a good starting point from which to embark on a synthesis and criticism of the "popular" concept.

Totalitarianism, therefore, involves the presence of:-

> "an elaborate ideology, consisting of an official body of doctrine covering all vital aspects of man's existence to which everyone living in that society is supposed to adhere, at least passively; this ideology is characteristically focused and projected towards a perfect state of mankind".[61]

Arendt's appreciation of ideology and its importance in providing a framework within which action may be taken has already been noted.

Both Friedrich and Arendt, however, tend to define ideology in dynamic terms, insisting that it is mainly a broad formula for social change; for example, Friedrich and Brzezinski define ideology as "a reasonably coherent body of ideas concerning practical means of how to change and reform a society".[62] However, there is nothing inherent in ideology that designates that a system of ideas has always to be concerned with change. It is, indeed, arguable that ideology is best seen as a system of beliefs and ideas that merely legitimate the activities of certain groups in society. In this sense ideology may be seen as a force for change or as supportive of the status quo; whether the emphasis is on the dynamic or not depends upon the groups and activities whose belief-systems are being analysed. It would appear that ideology is seen as a defining feature because in Russia and Germany ideology was overt and concerned with changing the status quo. It is, therefore, defined only in terms consistent with its expression in these two nations.

The second widely accepted characteristic of totalitarianism is the presence of a single mass party. Sigmund Neumann places much emphasis on this aspect of totalitarian domination and in his analysis "the party becomes an essential, if not the essential, organ of the regime"[63] for the "party and state are identical under a one party regime".[64] In his own syndrome of characteristics Franz Neumann acknowledges that a "monopolistic state party" is one of the

five totalitarian traits, and, indeed, that it is a very important one, being the main instrument for the politicisation of society by the state.[65] He does not seem to identify party and state as synonomous, but rather sees the party as the agent of the state, thus returning quite closely to Mussolini's original conception. Such a view, however, is not shared by Friedrich who sees the single mass party as being "typically either superior to, or completely intertwined with, the governmental bureaucracy".[66] He also goes into greater detail about the structure of the single party, which he sees as "typically led by one man, the 'dictator', and consisting of a relatively small percentage of the total population (up to 10%) a hard core of them passionately and unquestioningly dedicated to the ideology".[67]

The position of importance held by the leader is implicit in Arendt's work in that for her the changes in Russian totalitarianism are due to Stalin's death, after which there followed "an authentic, though never unequivocal, process of detotalitarization".[68] Arendt's argument about the importance of the leader is close to Sigmund Neumann's, where the leader is seen as the epitomy of the dictatorial totalitarian system, for "he is its beginning, its moving spirit, its fate".[69]

Despite this emphasis on the leader, Robert Tucker has recently criticised the use of the concept because it attends too much to the study of the dictator as a function of the system rather than as a

person, thus preventing the study of the dictator's biographical and psychological characteristics, which are seen as being essential to an understanding of totalitarian systems.[70] A less reductionist approach is adopted by Franz Neumann, however, who depersonalises the notion of the leader and is able to appreciate that dictatorship is "the rule of a person or a group of persons who arrogate to themselves and monopolise power in the state".[71]

Despite the attention given to both party and leader, the most important aspect of totalitarianism is generally accepted as being:

> "a system of terroristic police control, supporting but also supervising the party for its leaders, and characteristically directed not only against demonstrable 'enemies' of the regime, but also against arbitrarily selected classes of the population".[72]

Friedrich and Brzezinski later added that terror could be either physical or psychic.[73] Terror provides Friedrich with the third, and Franz Neumann with the fifth, characteristics of their respective syndromes of totalitarianism, and it is generally seen to be "the most universal characteristic of totalitarianism",[74] "the linchpin of modern totalitarianism"[75], "the vital nerve of the totalitarian system"[76] and the "essence" of totalitarian domination.[77]

The importance of terror is not greatly disputed, but there are differences concerning the rationality or utility of terror. Friedrich and Brzezinski realise the orientation towards change in Germany and the USSR in the thirties, and the use of terror as a

policy. This seems quite valid when considering the Russian context of rapid modernisation and change. Paul Mott tells us that:

> "Stalin...eradicated social class differences by eliminating many of its elements from the population. Six million wealthy peasants (kulaks) were killed, elements of the middle class were liquidated and many of the remainder lost their wealth and positions, and the nobility was liquidated or fled voluntarily".[78]

It would seem, therefore, that the Stalinist terror was closely connected with the desire to modernise the USSR along socialist lines, and therefore should not be reduced in a simplistic way to an irrational, purposeless act of inhumanity. This is acknowledged by Jerry Gliksman who argues that the "whole Soviet system of terror is to a great extent a rational instrument",[79] a view partly shared by Kennan who portrays totalitarian terror as having prophylactic purposes, although he does not actually specify which classes of citizens are being deterred from rebellion.[80]

Arendt, however, does not accept this point of view, arguing that the terror was directed against the whole of the population.[81] In contrast to Sigmund Neumann who suggests that terror is by no means the only form of political control, Arendt raises this aspect of totalitarianism to a position where it almost assumes the definition of totalitarianism itself. Thus, Mussolini is not a totalitarian ruler because of "the surprisingly small number and comparatively mild sentences meted out to political offenders".[82] Moreover, "it

was only during the war, after the conquest of the East furnished large masses of people and made the extermination camps possible that Germany was able to establish a truly totalitarian rule",[83] for "unlikely as it may sound, these camps are the true central institution of totalitarian organised power".[84] The camp itself is designed to produce (both in terms of the subordinates as well as the prisoners) "inanimate men...who can no longer be psychologically understood, whose return to the psychologically or otherwise intelligibly human world closely resembles the resurrection of Lazarus".[85]

Arendt, however, makes no attempt to differentiate between the concentration camps of Germany and the labour camps of the USSR; there is no analysis of the motivation behind the coercion used in each case and she therefore sees the terror as being essentially without either reason or purpose. She does not ask whether there are any differences in the way the terror was employed in Germany and Russia, and therefore could not possibly come to the conclusions that Moore does, when he argues that often in the Russian terror the bureaucratic machinery went so far in order to be just that it sometimes became unworkable and inefficient.[86] For Arendt, therefore, the terror is totalitarianism at work and all other institutional features have importance only in their relationship with these inhuman terroristic practices.

The process of centralisation provides the basis for the remaining characteristics of Friedrich and Brzezinski's syndrome.[87] The control

of the mass communication media is of obvious importance because, "since totalitarian movements exist in a world which is itself non-totalitarian, they are forced to resort to what we commonly regard as propaganda".[88] Sigmund Neumann is the only writer to consider the presence of propaganda in liberal democracies, and comes to the conclusion that there is a qualitative difference between the dictatorial and the democratic propaganda process, in that the former is a monopoly whereas the latter relies upon a competition of propaganda.

The near-complete monopoly of weapons in the hands of the party is obviously very similar to the Weberian definition of the state itself, and it is difficult to see how this could possibly be viewed as a distinguishing feature in a syndrome concerned with the traits of a supposedly unique form of political organisation. There can be only a few examples where a government does not have a near-complete monopoly of the control of weapons, and where such examples exist it is quite common for the army or other weapon-controlling groups to take over the function of government also. In totalitarian states the party provides the government and their near-complete monopoly of weapons is, therefore, not a great surprise.

Whereas Friedrich saw the control of weapons and mass communications to be vested in the hands of the party, the economic control of totalitarian states are under the auspices of the central bureaucracy. In a way similar to Hayek, Friedrich sees a transition

from "independent corporate entities" to a system of "bureaucratic co-ordination" of economic activity,[89] a view expressed earlier by Sigmund Neumann who pointed to the fact that "the rules of classical economy are abolished" in totalitarian states.[90]

The centralisation of the economic function in particular provides the basis for the development of another widely accepted trait of totalitarianism. Sigmund Neumann saw bureaucracy as one of the four structural elements in totalitarian elite rule, being "the life-line of the modern state".[91] This conclusion is accepted by Friedrich who regards the bureaucratic element of leadership to be the most important, for it is needed to maintain the system.[92] Similarly Franz Neumann's analysis stresses the role of the bureaucracy of the ministries, armed forces, industry and Nazi party in the National Socialist Party's control of Germany.[93]

There is general agreement that totalitarianism requires that somehow society has to be subsumed by either the state or the party or both. Although Friedrich does not include the phenomenon of the mass in his syndrome, it is obviously of importance to Sigmund Neumann as a means whereby society may be totally controlled in this way. He sees "substitution of crowds for society" as the means to achieve the dissolution of the distinction between society and state.[94] Lederer's analysis of mass society receives support from both Neumann and Arendt who see Fascism and Communism as breaking down traditional class allegiances, which, because such allegiances are seen as the traditional basis of party organisation, in turn leads to a mass society.[95]

Thus far, the domestic features of totalitarianism have been discussed. It appears as a society where there is no distinction between Society and State or Party. Total control is maintained by a system of terror. There exists only one party and this has at its head a strong leader; there is a strong overt ideological commitment in theory even if not in practice, and a centralisation of the control of weapons, media and economic activity which in turn places the bureaucracy in a position of much consequence. At the same time, the population is welded into an easily manipulable 'mass'.

A further feature of totalitarian states that has been given emphasis, although it is not given a place in the totalitarian syndromes, which are concerned mainly with structure only, is their dynamic orientation. Totalitarian societies are designed to bring about internal change to the extent that "the first aim of totalitarianism is to perpetuate and to institutionalise revolution",[96] and, for Neumann, it is this emphasis on permanent revolution that points to the difference between totalitarianism and older despotic systems. Similarly, Brzezinski claims that:

> "unlike most dictatorships in the past and present, the totalitarian movements wielding power do not aim to free society in the status quo; on the contrary, their aim is to institutionalise a revolution that mounts in scope, and frequently in intensity, as the regime stabilises itself in power".[97]

It is this orientation to action and change that necessitates the structural aspects of totalitarian dictatorship discussed above.[98]

It also leads Friedrich and Brzezinski to define 'ideology' with a similar dynamic emphasis as "a reasonably coherent body of ideas concerning practical means of how to change and reform a society".[99] Totalitarianism is seen largely in terms of the demolition and rebuilding of society, being "dedicated to the total destruction and reconstruction of a mass society".[100] Totalitarians not only destroy classes but must also destroy all bonds that are not to the state, and the main instrument used to achieve this end is terror.

The dynamic nature of totalitarian dictatorship is not confined solely to the domestic sphere, however, but is carried over to external policy decisions. The totalitarian orientation is towards action in foreign policy as much as in domestic policy, and "in fact, belligerence in world politics denotes a major element in the definition of modern totalitarianism".[101] This element parallels the ideological threat to democratic values, by posing a real physical threat from a phenomenon that "is by nature parasitic and predatory" and ideally suited to imperialistic expansion.[102] Totalitarianism provides a real threat of war, for 'the dictatorial regimes are governments at war, originating in war, aiming at war, thriving on war".[103]

After the Second World War, totalitarianism was still seen in the same belligerent mask for

> "totalitarian rulers are always moved to try to eliminate the awkward standard of comparison involved in the existence of freedom elsewhere, particularly in the country next door".[104]

The Russian totalitarians, it seems, have also a "compulsive obligation to assist the spread of Communism throughout the world", which is very different "from the relatively vague and rather generalised American desire to see a free but otherwise undefined world".[105] In short, totalitarianism implies a political system desirous to "dominate the whole world" and because of this, provides an example of "the supreme mobilisation of natural resources for war efficiency".[106] It was, in fact, seen in a light very similar (apart from its anti-Semitism) to the one in which Hitler viewed the Bolshevik menace, which:

> "attempts from its breeding ground in Soviet Russia to rot away the very core of the nations of the world, to overthrow the existing social order".[107]

There is, therefore, a danger on two levels from totalitarianism for its ideologies are subversive, dictatorial and anti-democratic and its foreign policies are expansionist, threatening physically nations which adhere to those democratic ideals, basically derived from an emphasis on individualism, which the totalitarians have destroyed in their own nations. The threat is seen as real and imminent on both the ideological and political levels.

A synthesis of the work done on totalitarianism, therefore, presents one with a general definitional picture of the concept. A totalitarian society is seen as one where either the State or the Party has total control of the population by destroying in 'society' all allegiances which might give rise to loyalties potentially rivalling

those of state or party (e.g. classes, family, neighbourhood, church etc.). The main pillar of this control is the use of coercive techniques, especially terror. Organisationally there is a single mass party with a strong leader at its head, from whom all political authority stems. The nation possesses an overt and all-embracing ideological foundation, and is characterised by a large bureaucratic structure centrally controlling all economic activity. There is, in addition, a near-monopoly of both the mass media and weaponry in the hands of the party and state. Internal policies are characterised by an orientation towards the dynamic, being motivated by a desire to change society. A similar orientation in foreign policy means that totalitarian governments are by nature belligerent, expansionist and imperialist. Essentially, totalitarianism provides liberal democracy with its antithesis, as well as being an ideological and physical threat. The "popular" concept is, therefore, best expressed as a syndrome of features, as suggested by Friedrich, Brzezinski and Franz Neumann. The characteristics chosen for the syndrome are generally seen as inter-related, and, as Friedrich and Brzezinski suggest, "mutually supporting each other, as usual in organic systems".[108]

III

CRITICISM OF THE "POPULAR" CONCEPT

I

The major problems concerning the actual nature of the "popular" concept, as well as the difficulties associated with its employment as a comparative device in political science, can be traced to the fact that the concept is to a large extent more appropriate to historical, rather than sociological, studies. Both history and sociology share an interest in the study of human interaction. However, despite the fact that both may be studying the same phenomenon, they will be doing so for different reasons and motives, and these will influence the general approach of each, as well as the nature of the questions to which answers are ultimately sought. Disposing of naive arguments which distinguish history and sociology along lines such as 'description versus analysis', one may identify the respective levels of generality on which each works. History is concerned with the description, study and analysis of events, processes and phenomena which are essentially restricted to a particular historical period or situation. Sociology, of course, employs this form of study but in addition attempts to develop from such historical material, concepts and theories which belong to a higher level of generality, and are applicable as heuristic devices in the study of social interaction in any historical period. Sociology uses temporally

specific historical data in order to develop tools with which to understand the general. The two disciplines can, therefore, be distinguished by their respective inclinations towards specificity and generality. Sociology is concerned with the latter, and, as Lewis Namier argues:-

> "The subject matter of history is human affairs, men in action, things which have happened and how they happened; concrete events fixed in time and space, and their grounding in the thoughts and feelings of men - not things universal and generalised".[109]

Conceptual schema, models and theories designed to increase knowledge on, and help analysis of, specific historical phenomena are therefore more directly adopting an historical approach than a sociological one. Sociological concepts are of value for their utility in the study of the general, even though they may be based upon historically specific data. The "popular" concept of totalitarianism is founded upon such historically specific data but does not abstract from this a form which is of value for understanding the general. It has been argued that the "popular" concept is best viewed as a syndrome of inter-related institutional and structural characteristics which are selected as being of value relevance to the study of totalitarianism. However, a definition such as this imposes a specificity to the study which moves the concept away from the area of sociology towards that of history.

If the features in the totalitarian syndrome are inter-related and mutually supporting each other, then a society has to possess all

of the features in order to be totalitarian. This involves one in a problem not dissimilar to the philosophical dilemma concerning abstract concreteness (for example, if one leg of a tripod has been broken in half, can the object still be a tripod?). Thus, if a political system possesses all the features of totalitarianism except, for example, a centrally controlled economy, can this political system still be described as totalitarian? If one insists on the inter-relatedness of features, then such a political system is non-totalitarian. In order to distinguish such a non-totalitarian society possessing all but one of the necessary features from other non-totalitarian societies which have only one of these features (e.g. a monopoly of weapons), one has to employ a continuum of totalitarianism which somehow places different weightings on the sundry characteristics, and this obviously introduces considerable complications. The alternative to this would be to have as many continua as there are relevant features, comparing societies for totalitarianism along each continuum. This would be an improvement but would also be limited by another weakness of the syndrome as it developed after the War, in that it concentrates on form and structure without analysing function. This element will be discussed later, but one should realise that the same end may be achieved through many different means and therefore to define continua solely in terms of the means employed to obtain a particular goal places severe limitations on the thoroughness of understanding which such a

comparative concept or continua should provide.

A syndromic definition, therefore, because of the problem of abstract concreteness, almost guarantees that only the specific case studies from which the concept is abstracted may be called totalitarian. It is unlikely that societies elsewhere both spatially and temporally will develop exactly the same combination of inter-related characteristics. The nature of the definition therefore places a high degree of specificity on the concept because it adopts a basically historical approach and not a sociological one.

In addition, the syndromic definition presents difficulties concerning the "degree" to which a feature has to be present before it can be described as totalitarian. Despite the analyses of the two Neumanns in the early 1940's, Arendt claims that:-

> "it was only during the war, after the conquests of the East furnished large masses of people and made the extermination camps possible, that Germany was able to establish a truly totalitarian rule".[110]

In this case ambiguity arises not from the presence or otherwise of a particular trait of the syndrome but to the difficulty of whether the trait is developed enough to deserve the description of being totalitarian. One somehow has to determine where the threshold lies between totalitarian and non-totalitarian manifestations of the same feature. For example, one has to decide how much of a monopoly is a "near-complete" monopoly when referring to the control of media and weapons. Anything less than a "near-complete" monopoly is

obviously non-totalitarian, but the division can be nothing less than an extremely arbitrary one.

All concepts in the social sciences involve a degree of arbitrariness in their construction but in most cases this does not necessarily imply the presence of basic and fundamental weaknesses in a concept. Concepts which are constructed by the arbitrary selection of information may be useful and valid; if this were not the case then no form of sociological study could ever be undertaken. In relation to the "popular" concept, however, the arbitrariness involved is closely related to the level of generality at which the concept is forced to function. The arbitrariness, in fact, results in the development of a concept more suited to the study of history than sociology. It is largely because of this fact that the "popular" concept is analytically weak.[111]

The historical specificity of the concept is made even more apparent by the selection of supportive evidence for the writer's arguments. In a way, there is a self-supporting circular process whereby the concept is defined in terms of the features of the society one wishes to study, and the result is, naturally enough, that the concept is found to be applicable to that society. In this process highly specific examples are quoted as evidence supporting the form, structure and content of what should be a general concept. Thus, when Friedrich and Brzezinski analyse the "problem of succession" in totalitarian regimes, the discussion is little more

than a description of Krushchev's rise and fall, with a few speculations about potential successors to Hitler.[112] In the same way, Arendt makes certain generalisations about the form that totalitarian terror takes; it would appear that whilst the terror is being employed as a means of political domination "it may happen that due to a shortage of new human shipments the danger arises that the camps become depopulated and that the order is now given to reduce the death rate at any price".[113] Arendt is here actually discussing the relevant historical events in 1942, but these events are taken as an essential element in a generalised description of the political use of terror, which is the "essence" of what should be a general concept of totalitarianism. There is, therefore, a tendency for specific historical details to be used as if they were fundamental elements of a general conceptual framework, instead of only providing the basis for the development of such a framework.

In conjunction with this tendency, analysis is not often extended beyond the usual examples of totalitarian regimes, namely Fascist Germany, Stalinist Russia and (sometimes) Fascist Italy. The composition of the totalitarian syndrome itself, of course, makes such an extension rather difficult, but there are instances where a broadening of the analysis would be quite feasible and instructive. Thus, Friedrich and Brzezinski argue that totalitarian regimes often possess a popular

> "stereotyped image of the enemy. For the Nazis it was the fat rich Jew or the Jewish Bolshevik; for the Fascists it was

> at first the radical agitator, later the corrupt and weak, degenerate Bourgeois; for the Soviets, it is the war-mongering atom-bomb-wielding American Wallstreeter; for the Chinese Communists, it is the Yankee imperialist and the western colonial exploiters".[114]

The narrowness of the applicability of the concept prevents the authors from asking further important questions: do other countries have a stereotyped perception of their enemies? If they do, what are they, and why? If not, why not? All that the authors can say, even after the experiences of the U.S. in the nineteen fifties, is: "it is also found to some extent in the competitive politics of constitutional regimes".[115] It appears to be an implicit understanding that there is some real difference between the stereotyped images of so-called totalitarian nations and so-called constitutional nations, and therefore, the analysis need not apply itself to those nations not generally acknowledged as being of the totalitarian genus.

Given the specificity of the definition of the "popular" concept, the limitation of its applicability is not altogether surprising. However, there are certain features of the syndrome which, if applied to 'constitutional' regimes, might have provided the source of informative insight. There are, for example, totalitarian traits which, although present to a certain extent in particular liberal democracies, take a slightly different form than envisaged in the "popular" concept. Such manifestations, however, cannot be categorised as totalitarian in relation to the "popular" concept, because

this concept concentrates on form and not function. For example, although the mass media is not controlled in America in the same way as in Hitler's Germany, there is nevertheless an informal process of news selection whereby the newsman anticipates the public's value position and acts accordingly, being sure at the same time not to offend powerful local vested interests.[116] The dangers of this also happening in the national media are adequately demonstrated by Felix Greene.[117] Thus, although the situation is obviously different for the mass media in Hitler's Germany and contemporary America, there are certain manifestations which, whilst they have a different form, do perform the same functions, albeit to different degrees.

A further example is provided in the United Kingdom by the rapid increase after the war in the centralisation of power in the hands of government. Before 1939 the task of government in the economic field was, for the most part, to set the rules of the game within which private industry and commerce should operate on a competitive basis. The government concerned itself with tariffs, the supply of credit, factory safety, labour and company legislation and provided some unemployment relief. Intervention in the economy was not common and it did not accept responsibility for full employment. Because of the war, governmental responsibility for the conduct of the economy increased, and it is now responsible, amongst other things, for full employment, nationalised industries,

health, education and welfare services, town and country planning, regional development, economic growth and prices and income stabilisation. This situation is not too far removed from the one described by Friedrich, where a totalitarian society may be identified by "a central control and direction of the whole economy".[118]

In this same way one may point to arguments concerning the power of the executive in the U.K. and the U.S. as paralleling the emergence of a strong leader in totalitarian societies. Other features of totalitarianism such as the monopolistic control of weaponry, imperialism, expansionism and the ultimate threat of coercion are all evidenced in the liberal democracies. However, the "popular" concept fails to point to these tendencies for the simple reason that these particular manifestations are not identical to those found in the original historical case studies that were analysed. It therefore prevents clear analysis of approximations to those traits designated as totalitarian.[119]

The specifity of the concept places further limitations on its use in sociology in addition to those already discussed. Political systems are rarely static entities, and for a concept to be of value sociologically it should be applicable over a period of time in which change occurs. It should be able to register and direct attention

to such changes and, possibly, prophesy those changes. If this is not the case then one is left with a conceptual framework applicable only to a particular historical period. Indeed, such a framework may quite easily not be a concept at all but rather an abstracted description of historically specific events. Despite the fact that the "popular" concept of totalitarianism has been extended analogically from the study of National Socialism to include most of the Communist world, it does appear that it belongs to this latter category. As such certain ambiguities and problems make it difficult, in sociological terms, to cope adequately with changes that have occurred in the relevant political systems.

The case of Germany is not too confusing since the Second World War provided the mechanism for a near-complete change in the nature of politics, and obviously post-war Germany could not be described as totalitarian in the same way that pre-war Germany could. With respect to Russia the totalitarian theorists acknowledge that there has been a tremendous degree of change. It has been argued that these changes may be explained by the fact of Stalin's death, because it was followed by "an authentic, though never unequivocal, process of detotalitarization".[120] The succession of Krushchev appears to have introduced a change whereby "the apparently monolithic and highly centralised structure of the Communist movement has given way to a pluralist centralism".[121] This explanation of change in the political system appears, therefore, to add weight to the opinion of

Tucker who emphasises the importance of the leader.

Amongst the changes that occurred the party increased its importance relative to the leader, who, however, still maintained a special position. In addition, the coercion of Stalinist rule diminished and the terror as such no longer existed. With the absence of such an important trait as the terror, the USSR would appear to have moved into a post-totalitarian era. However, this is not the case in the eyes of either Friedrich or Brzezinski. The latter writes that "obviously, Krushchev's political system is not the same as Stalin's" but at the same time "both may be generally described as totalitarian".[122] No adequate explanation of why this is the case is offered by Brzezinski, and the reader has to wait until the recent edition of "Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy" to discover the logic behind it. Here one finds that there has been a considerable watering down of the syndrome of totalitarian traits, so that 'terror' as such is more or less replaced by the vague notions of "psychic terror" and "widespread consensus".[123]

The original concept of totalitarianism as set forth by Friedrich and Brzezinski, being so historically specific, appears to be faced with the dilemma either of being inapplicable in the late fifties and early sixties because of historical change, or requiring such revisions in its own definition as to make it once again historically relevant for a contemporary analysis of the USSR.

Friedrich and Brzezinski chose the latter of the two alternatives and have moved themselves into a situation where one might be forgiven for thinking that totalitarianism is definable as 'the present situation in the USSR'.

Totalitarianism developed as an historically specific conceptualisation of the process of rule in Germany under the National Socialists, and was extended to cover the similar political structures in the USSR. The latter changed over time and to prevent the concept from becoming completely redundant, the definition of totalitarianism itself changed. Definitions in the social sciences are continually being refined, but it is quite inadequate to define a concept of totalitarianism by adopting a largely historical approach and then to adapt the fundamental meaning of the concept to keep pace with socio-political adjustments and changes in the society originally denoted as totalitarian. A concept such as this logically becomes no more than a contemporary sketch of the socio-political organisation of one particular nation.

Further difficulties with the concept arise in relation to its application to Italian Fascism. The specificity of the concept means that, in Arendt's eyes, Mussolini (despite his philosophical writings) was never a totalitarian. This is because of the "surprisingly small number and comparatively mild sentences meted out to political offenders".[124] The absence of all-out terror in Italy is enough to make her differentiate between that country and Germany. Friedrich

and Brzezinski, however, do not make such a differentiation and include Italy in their category of totalitarian states. The result is that because of the very real difference in coercive practices between Italy, Russia and Germany, Friedrich and Brzezinski continually either have to leave Italy out when citing empirical cases to support their arguments, or have to dilute the features in their syndrome to a point where almost any nation could be called totalitarian.

Additional problems derive from the categorisation of both Germany and Russia as basically the same type of political system. It should be noted that authors have tended to stress the similarity between Communism and Fascism, rather than the likeness of Stalinism and German National Socialism. On the whole the concept does not acknowledge any difference between Communism, Stalinism and Fascism. This is rather strange since the first major study of the concept by Sigmund Neumann provided a clear statement concerning the differences between dictatorships; both Fascism and Communism were seen as:-

> "worlds apart from one another...in actual fact, significant and numerous as their structural similarities and common human traits are, the dynamic movements of our day...must be differentiated in time and space. They have their distinct national climate. They arrive from a specific historical background....Hence a full definition of modern dictatorship must include this diversity with all its shades and conflicting aims. Any sweeping formula should therefore be regarded with suspicion". [125]

In addition, in the other main work on totalitarianism in the late

thirties and early forties, Franz Neumann is extremely careful to limit his analysis solely to the German case. However, Sigmund Neumann also points to certain basic similarities in what he calls "modern dictatorships"[126] and it would appear that post-war studies have tended to stress this aspect of his work and neglect his other warnings.

Arendt does casually refer to the differences between Russia and Germany in respect to their ideological bases, and to the fact that Stalin had to engineer the atomised society which Hitler was fortunate enough to inherit. However, one has an impression that the important differences between the two nations are the fact that "drunkenness and incompetence...which are still widespread today... played no part in Nazi Germany" and that in the USSR there was "an absence of the gratuitous cruelty found in German concentration camps".[127] Giving emphasis only to the similarities in organisation and process in both Russia and Germany means that Arendt does not consider whether such structures actually perform the same functions and for the same reasons. She, therefore, manoevres herself into a position where both Communist Russia and Hitler's Germany are merely geographically differentiated examples of the same phenomenon.

Friedrich and Brzezinski are not quite as naive in this respect, but their analysis does tend towards the same emphasis, arguing that "communist and fascist totalitarian dictatorships are basically alike",[128] which means that they "are more nearly alike to each other than to any

other systems of government and society".[129] This latter statement lacks a certain degree of positiveness in its approach, which gives rise to an unusual comparative technique whereby two regimes are categorised as alike, because neither resemble any other regime more than they resemble each other. The comparison is carried out with a negative perspective, thus limiting the scope and utility of the study.

Friedrich and Brzezinski, however, do admit that differences between Germany and Russia existed in respect to their acknowledged purposes and intentions, and with regard to their historical antecedents.[130] However, although Russia and Germany were "basically alike" and therefore "not wholly alike", the emphasis is overwhelmingly on the similarity between the two systems. In the historical examples of Stalinist rule at the height of the Purges and of Hitler's rule when the Terror was at its most rampant, such an approach is, of course, not without a certain degree of validity and value. It does direct attention towards practice rather than theory, and process in favour of professed ideology, thus helping to achieve an analysis similar to the type suggested by Almond and Coleman.[131] However, Friedrich and Brzezinski do not go quite the whole distance towards the Almond and Coleman orientation, for they stress not function but rather process, institution and structure. Thus it is never clear from employing the concept of totalitarianism whether the structures being analysed, and which are common to both

societies, do actually perform the same function in each. Indeed, one's first impression might be that, since both the motivation in each society and the goals of the respective leaders appear to differ between the two cases, similar institutions might perform different functions. This, however, is something that one cannot easily ascertain from Friedrich and Brzezinski's approach.[132]

The "popular" concept, by directing attention towards process rather than function, is unable to study, for example, the difficult and ambiguous relationships between state and party in Nazi Germany, the USSR or Fascist Italy. A comparative analysis of regimes resembling each other in their formal institutional framework is limiting, for it denies the existence of functional alternatives where the same function may be performed by different institutions as well as denying the corollary of this, that similar institutions need not perform similar functions. The "popular" concept has these weaknesses built into it and therefore stresses the basic similarities of political systems which on other criteria may differ considerably.

The inclination towards historical specificity in the concept also leads most of the political scientists concerned to consider totalitarianism as an essentially unique phenomenon. The nature of the definition given to the concept inevitably precludes similarities to most other political systems, including other forms of dictatorship. Thus, although "totalitarian regimes are autocracies", or at least are "the adaptation of autocracy to twentieth century industrial society",[133]

Friedrich and Brzezinski also claim that old autocracies "did not seek to get hold of the entire man, the human being in his totality, but were satisfied with excluding him from certain spheres and exploiting him...in others".[134] Totalitarianism is therefore seen as "historically an innovation and sui generis".[135] Similarly, Sigmund Neumann argues that "present-day dictators are not at all the direct offspring of the despots of the past",[136] and Arendt seems to share this view, at least in terms of totalitarianism's unique value-system.[137]

The perception of totalitarianism as a unique phenomenon, despite its similarities to other forms of dictatorship, creates a concept which is not ideally suited to comparative analysis. If totalitarianism is, indeed, unique then it cannot easily be compared with other political systems for there is no common ground whereby one may engage in a useful comparison. When employing the concept one has to undertake detailed historical studies of each society, noting both differences and similarities. This would be acceptable if the concept provided a generally balanced approach. However, the placing of totalitarianism in a special unique position assumes an inherent difference between it and most other systems of political domination, which in turn directs attention towards differences more than it points to similarities. Moreover, the nature of the definition itself almost makes inevitable the unique character of totalitarianism. If one defines a conceptualisation of a form of

political domination in terms of its historically specific and unique manifestation in a particular nation, then this form of political domination can be little else than unique.

In addition to the conceptual weaknesses discussed above, most of the writers on totalitarianism seem to be at least equally concerned with expressing their moral indignation about the system of government they are studying as with developing a useful framework for analysis. Franz Neumann's title for his book "Behemoth" (meaning a monster ruling the land) provides an introduction to the kind of treatment that totalitarianism has received.[138] Neumann's book itself, however, is emotively uncharged compared with the work of Hannah Arendt in which totalitarianism is seen as "an unpunishable, unforgivable, absolute evil", an "evil spirit gone mad" where "bestiality" can be witnessed in the "horror" and "appalling spectacle of the camps" which can themselves "very aptly be divided into three types....Hades, Purgatory, and Hell".[139] Arendt's emotion is understandable because when she first wrote the book she was in a state of "speechless rage and impotent horror", and even today she is "still in grief and sorrow",[140] seeing totalitarianism as basically "a reversal of all our legal and moral concepts".[141] Understandable as these sentiments are, Arendt does appear to succomb to the temptation of denigrating totalitarianism at the expense of scholarly analysis.

Apart from the fact that her book reads like the outburst of a

highly incensed moralist, Arendt's emotions seem to lead her to make several dubious statements which are not backed up by evidence. She argues that:-

> "totalitarianism in power invariably replaces all first rate talents, regardless of their sympathies, with those crackpots and fools whose lack of intelligence and creativity is still the best guarantee of their loyalty".[142]

However, the stupidity and lack of sagacity of individuals such as Goering and Goebbels is never demonstrated. Arendt's lack of rigour might also be explained by the bias of her study, which is itself a result of her outrage. Thus, for example, she is quite prepared to accept and quote evidence from what she herself concedes to be a somewhat dubious source, giving as a rationalisation that it would be no more dubious than would be material furnished by the Russian government, for such "official material is nothing but propaganda".[143]

Arendt manages to provide the reader with an excellent picture of her moral disgust over the use of extreme coercive techniques by governments, but achieves little in terms of political sociology or political science. Emotion and bias appear to make her content to emphasise the role of terror in totalitarianism without going very much further.

Friedrich and Brzezinski provide a far less emotionally moralistic attempt at constructing a concept of totalitarianism, although even they find it difficult at times to hide their bias. The Communist

Manifesto is slightingly referred to as the "Marx-Engels Bible" and Lenin as the "revolutionary fanatic".[144] Similarly, at the conference on totalitarianism held by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Kennan tells us that he:-

> "was repelled from the start by certain features of Russian Communism apparent even in the shadow; notably, its reckless injustice, its shocking physical cruelty and its congenital untruthfulness....This repulsion was so great that I could never take seriously the theory that lay behind it".[145]

Much of the work on the "popular" concept appears to share the disgust expressed in the thirties concerning totalitarianism. The result is that the analysis and study of totalitarianism as a political system, at least to a certain extent, is lost in the desire to express moral disgust about that system. Objectivity in the social sciences is obviously not possible, but, at the same time, conceptual schema should be a little more than mere expressions of a certain moral viewpoint. Frequently the "popular" concept crosses the line between understandably subjective analysis and simple denunciation of the political system being studied.

The "popular" concept was originally designed to "delineate, on the basis of...factual data, the general model of totalitarian dictatorship and of the society which it has created".[146] In reality, however, it has been shown to be little more than an abstracted description of institutional and structural features found within Germany between 1933 and 1944, extended to incorporate the

institutionally similar political system of the USSR under Stalin's rule. Case studies, examples, factual data and corroboration are given in respect of these two nations. Mussolini's Italy cannot easily be included in the totalitarian category, and is therefore often given only scant attention, if given any at all. The syndromic definition of the concept is at best only relevant to the period and nations from which the supportive evidence is taken. A general concept of totalitarianism is lost within the narrow specificity of its own definition, becoming employable only as a framework for historical analysis.

There have been attempts to revise the concept, the most widely known of these being by Robert Tucker,[147] who claims that with the growth of nationalist regimes in the third world (such as those in Tunisia, China, Ghana and Egypt) a new concept is needed which can link these types of regime to the older totalitarian single party regime.[148] He argues that such a concept is the "revolutionary mass-movement regime under single party auspices", which he thoughtfully shortens to "movement-regimes". Within this category are identified three species; Communist single party regimes, Fascist single party regimes and nationalist single party regimes.

Tucker does improve the concept to a certain extent in that he manages to differentiate three species of "movement-regime" which is more useful than calling all three 'totalitarian' in its popular meaning. However, he tends to do as the totalitarian theorists do,

and imposes an arbitrary limit to the exhaustiveness of his concept. He indulges in specificities less than do Arendt, Friedrich, Brzezinski etc., but enough to prevent him from developing a definition of totalitarianism which would be helpful to a comparative political science of all political systems. The "movement-regime" is characterised by (1) revolutionary goals and dynamism, (2) active organised mass participation and (3) the organisational centrality of the vanguard party. This is an improvement on the syndrome discussed above but still contains many of the associated weaknesses and limitations.

Both Tucker and the "popular" theorists define their respective concepts in terms of the institutional means employed to achieve political domination. Both concepts tend to direct attention towards differences within a particular type of formal political organisation, the boundaries of which are set by a kind of intuitive judgement which indicates that there is something fundamentally very different between political systems which have different institutional and structural elements. Institutional and structural difference may well denote very real diversity in the type of political system present, but it should not be assumed that this is the case. Only thorough historical and sociological analysis can provide the answer to this question. The concepts of 'totalitarianism' and 'movement-regime' imply a functional specificity to institutional form, and as such may do a disservice to political analysis. The fact that

there is, for example, a single party in Tanzania and a two-party system in, say, the U.S.A., may indicate that the two countries differ significantly in degree and type of political domination. However, this certainly should not be assumed beforehand, because other important cultural, social, economic and historical variables also have to be considered.

The foregoing criticisms and limitations of the "popular" concept would be obviously of little import if the use of that concept had been abandoned or radically changed. However, this is certainly not the case, despite certain disillusions about its value to political analysis. In the last five years, for example, several of the important books concerned with the "popular" concept have been republished (Sigmund Neumann's "Permanent Revolution" and Friedrich and Brzezinski's "Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy" in 1965 and Arendt's "Origins of Totalitarianism" in 1967). The concept also provided the framework for most of the studies produced by the Russian Research Centre at Harvard and the Russian Institute at Columbia. Probably the most important political analysis of the USSR is offered by Merle Fainsod, who adopted totalitarianism as a rather vague theoretical framework for his study.[149] Wolfe's study of the Soviet Union is even more explicitly reliant on totalitarianism,[150] whilst Carew Hunt, although not directly studying the USSR does accept the "popular" concept in his references to the Soviet Union, whose leaders are seen to have adopted a totalitarian-

democratic approach to politics, based upon coercion.[151]

There are a further collection of political scientists who tend to employ a concept similar to that espoused in the recent edition of Friedrich and Brzezinski's book.[152] Adam Ulam, for example, acknowledges a liberalisation process in the USSR since 1953, but is still moved to refer to the USSR as 'totalitarian' because:-

> "a western observer, remembering how often in Soviet - indeed, in Russian - history, periods of liberalisation and reform have been followed by a renewed wave of centralisation and oppression, may sombrely forecast the triumph of totalitarianism".[153]

Kassof portrays the USSR as an administered society which is:-

> "a varient of modern totalitarianism with the important difference that it operates by and large without resort to those elements of gross irrationality (in particular, the large scale and often self-defeating use of psychological terror and physical coercion as basic means of social control)".[154]

Totalitarianism is also the model adopted by Boris Meissner, although he does admit that mass terror (so central to Arendt's conceptualisation) is no longer a prerequisite of totalitarian government.[155] He tends to define totalitarianism in terms of the contemporary institutional and structural phenomena present in the USSR. He enumerates three phenomena which suggest the totalitarianism of a political system: (1) unrestricted autocracy of the party, (2) total control from above and (3) total planning "extending not

only to the economy but also to the political and cultural sectors of society".[156] Hence, the USSR is still totalitarian because it contains the phenomena defined as totalitarian and which were initially abstracted from an analysis of the USSR anyway.

Probably the best recent example of an almost complete acceptance of the "popular" concept is provided in the work of William Ebenstein.[157] He claims that

> "concentration camps, slave labour camps and mass murder are more than incidental phenomena in totalitarian systems. They are the very essence of totalitarianism".[158]

Totalitarian governments "threaten the very survival of democracy" and are "permanent forces that we shall have to reckon with for a long time to come".[159] It is based on a one-party system, monopoly of power, propaganda, naked force and a dictatorial leader,[160] whilst in its foreign policy it is dynamic and expansionist. Communism is definable as

> "a revolutionary movement that seeks to overthrow existing political and economic systems by subversion or force and to establish the dictatorship of the Communist Party in every country".[161]

Indeed, already "a billion people, or about one third of the human race, now live under totalitarian Communism",[162] (which is not differentiated from non-totalitarian Communism). However, he does progress beyond the point where analysis of totalitarianism in terms of the regimes of Stalin and Hitler only, including as totalitarian (on the Left) the USSR, Bulgaria, Cuba, Red China and Albania, and

(on the Right) Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy.

Totalitarianism is, therefore, not an abandoned concept by any means, being employed regularly as an analytical framework (sometimes in a revised form, but not always), or as a categorisation of a particular form of government. Many of the major writers on the political system of the USSR either implicitly or explicitly rely on the concept to provide them with an analytical structure for their study, and its employment as a comparative concept brings together nations such as Fascist Italy and Albania under one category of government.

IV

TOTALITARIANISM, THE COLD WAR AND IDEOLOGY

The social sciences can never be truly objective. In terms of the "popular" concept however the influence of the dominant societal values in the U.S. has given rise to a construct which is so historically specific that it becomes difficult for it to relate to regimes other than Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia (and, perhaps, Fascist Italy). Limits are placed arbitrarily upon the scope of the concept in such a manner as to assume that totalitarian regimes are somehow completely different political entities from western liberal democracies. Whilst there are very real differences between the two, a complete distinction of the kind implied in the "popular" concept is false. It becomes necessary, therefore, to consider those aspects of the contemporary situation which influenced the growth, scope and nature of the "popular" concept.

The development of the concept was very closely associated with the growth of Russian studies in the U.S. During the War the United States discovered the utility and importance of detailed non-military information about the enemy. In one of many similar studies "Clyde Kluckhohn, Ruth Benedict and their colleagues proved by their incisive studies that it was possible, working at a distance and relying on the raw materials at hand, to analyse the Japanese institutional and psychological structure to great effect".[163]

The experience of war-oriented social research opened new visions as to the utility of such work for providing the basis of policy decisions. This type of work was still very much in its infancy, but, as Moseley points out:

> "the conviction grew among the overworked area specialists that systematic steps must be taken after the war to plug these gaps in the arsenal of national policy".[164]

Thus before the War had actually ended, influential Americans, perceiving the importance of policy studies and the nature of the likely post-War international problems which would need to be solved, were beginning to demand a thorough analysis of "the nature of probable constellations of forces in the post-War world and for fresh definitions of U.S. national interests".[165] Without this knowledge, Moseley argued, "the United States would, in truth, be poorly equipped intellectually to comprehend and fulfill its responsibilities as a member of the unruly family of nations".[166]

Moseley's opinions were obviously shared by the large philanthropic foundations. The Carnegie Corporation argued that

> "At mid-century, the U.S. faces a world in which confusions and tensions abound. It is a matter of vital importance to the welfare and safety of our country to have available centres where detailed and accurate knowledge of other parts of the globe can be assembled".[167]

This attitude is echoed by the Ford Foundation who have pledged themselves to

> "seek opportunities to help individuals and institutions improve the formulation and

> execution of United States foreign policy and programs. Aid will be given to efforts to increase American understanding of and participation in world affairs".[168]

The institution to be chosen as the vehicle for the gathering of necessary information on which to base policy was the university, which according to the Ford Foundation, "serves the needs of society, as no other institution can, primarily through its teaching and research".[169]

After the War, therefore, the universities found themselves in the forefront of pressures for more detailed information and knowledge about those factors which were perceived to be of major importance to the U.S., the most important of which were the threat of Communism and the USSR. According to Dirksen, writing in a government pamphlet in 1946, "the real antidote to communism lay in a diffusion of knowledge and information on how it operates".[170]

Responding to the demand for such an antidote, the three largest philanthropic foundations (Rockefeller, Carnegie and Ford) steered the universities into the required areas of study by making available substantial grants. In 1946 at Columbia's School of International Affairs (itself an outgrowth of the War-time Naval School of Military Government), the Russian Institute was established with a grant of $1,250,000 from the Rockefeller Foundation. This was followed in 1947 by postgraduate fellowships to the value of $75,000 and a $100,000 grant from the Carnegie Corporation. It was in this same year that the Carnegie Corporation also provided Harvard with the

$750,000 needed to establish its Russian Research Centre. In 1955 the financing of both research centres was taken over in large part by the Ford Foundation. The Foundations thus established and paid for those research institutions whose work would be highly pertinent to the information needs of U.S. foreign policy. Their underlying principle was still the same one illuminated by Andrew Carnegie:

> "the millionaire will be the trustee for the poor, intrusted for a season with the great wealth of the community, but administering it for the community far better than it could or would have done for itself".[171]

The Foundations were performing those functions which in other nations would have been undertaken by an elected government, and what the "poor" apparently needed, and therefore received, were well-supported research institutes to study the USSR. However, the mass of empirical data that was being collected on Russia could be interpreted meaningfully only within an accepted theoretical framework.

The groundwork for such a framework had already been completed by Sigmund Neumann, as well as by the variety of studies undertaken in the thirties. Thus the "popular" concept developed within the context of the needs of the Russian area studies that were being undertaken at Harvard and Columbia. However, the links between the concept and Russian research were also more concrete than this, and, indeed, there were very close formal institutional relationships

between the two endeavours. Zbigniew Brzezinski was himself a member of the faculty at the Russian Research Centre at Harvard, and Carl Friedrich, at Harvard since 1926, was Eaton Professor of the Science of Government there. Both academics acknowledged the influence that Merle Fainsod had on the formation of their ideas (Fainsod was onetime Director of Studies at the Russian Research Centre and author of "How Russia is Ruled"). The final work was a product, Friedrich and Brzezinski tell us, of "constant discussions with others, notably members of the Russian Research Centre",[172] and as such it reflects the mainstream of contemporary Harvard thinking on totalitarianism.

The Harvard school of thought on totalitarianism later had the opportunity to formulate and argue their ideas in a conference held at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in March 1953. Consideration of some of the major participants in that conference illustrates the close relationship between the "popular" concept and the Russian Research Centre. Besides Arendt, Friedrich and Brzezinski, participants included the following:-

Raymond Bauer	- Fellow of the Russian Research Centre, Harvard, and later a Ford Foundation visiting professor there.
Abram Bergson	- Professor of Economics, Harvard, and onetime Director of the Russian Research Centre.
Erwin Canham	- Broadcaster, and a member of the Harvard Club.
Karl Deutsch	- Professor of Government, Harvard.

Merle Fainsod	-	Onetime Director of Studies, Russian Research Centre, Harvard.
Alexander Gerschenkron	-	Director of Economic Projects, Russian Research Centre, Harvard.
Alex Inkeles	-	Director of Studies on social relations at the Russian Research Centre, Harvard.
George Kennan	-	U.S. Ambassador to the USSR and Fellow of Harvard.
W. W. Leontief	-	Professor of Economics, Harvard.
Geroid T. Robinson	-	Founding Director of Russian Research Centre, Harvard.
Adam Ulam	-	Research Associate at the Russian Research Centre, Harvard.
Bertram Wolfe	-	Senior Fellow, Russian Institute, Columbia.
John Curtiss	-	Senior Fellow, Russian Institute, Columbia.

The proceedings of this conference were edited and published in book-form by Friedrich and is one of the more influential books on the subject of totalitarianism. The relationship between the development of the "popular" concept and the need for a theoretical framework for Russian research at Harvard is duplicated in the case of Columbia's Russian Institute. Friedrich and Brzezinski's arguments were given weight by the publication of an essay by Franz Neumann, who more or less agreed with the major points raised by them.[173] Neumann, after serving in the OSS and State Department during the war, had joined the Russian Institute at Columbia in 1946. His ideas on totalitarianism were employed in research by Bertram Wolfe, who was a senior fellow at

the Russian Institute.[174] Already at Harvard, Fainsod had employed the "popular" concept as an implicit framework for his research and it was soon accepted that the "popular" concept as it was evolving in the work of Neumann, Friedrich and Brzezinski provided the necessary frame of reference for the work of both the Russian Research Centre and the Russian Institute. The "popular" concept, therefore, in terms of both the personnel concerned and the direction of thought that evolved, constituted a fundamental element in the collectivity of work and research on Russia undertaken at both Harvard and Columbia, and which was paid for by the Rockefeller, Carnegie and Ford Foundations.

On one level therefore, the concept became popular because of the academic need for a conceptual framework in the study of Russian society. The concept of totalitarianism answered this need, and, in fact, did so quite well. As far as knowledge was available, the USSR more or less fitted the concept of totalitarianism.[175] However, the knowledge available was not very reliable. It was not until 1958, for example, that the U.S. - USSR Cultural Exchange Agreement permitted academics to visit the USSR. Until that date, information had been gathered mainly from emigres from the USSR and assorted ex-Communists with a variety of origins. It was lack of knowledge concerning such things as the existence of power politics within the outwardly monolithic party structure and the highly complex links between party

and bureaucracy that made it easier to employ the "popular" concept in the study of Russia.

This aspect of the concept's growth, however, cannot be divorced from the context in which it developed. Academics have to work within a particular social situation which inevitably influences not only the choice of problems to be studied but also the questions which are asked in respect to such problems. Given that Russian studies needed an analytical framework, it was the relevant social situation in the U.S.A. which provided the determining influence concerning the adoption and retention of the "popular" concept as that framework. The contemporary atmosphere was characterised by an immense fear in both domestic and foreign affairs. The outcome of such fears was to introduce into American history one of its most chaotic and hysterical periods to date, culminating in the Communist witch-hunts of the fifties and the phenomenon of McCarthyism. The "popular" concept developed out of this period of hysteria.

The right wing of American politics, for reasons of national expediency, were relatively silent concerning the threat of Communism during the War years.[176] However, in 1946 the importance of anti-Communism as a doctrine in post-war politics began to assert itself when the Republicans obtained victories in the Congressional elections, after running an anti-Communist campaign. The effect of this campaign had been aided by J. Edgar Hoover, who,

shortly before the election, had "let loose a resounding blast against Communists in the U.S.A. saying more or less directly that they were at work at every level and in every organisation".[177]

The Republicans obviously planned to represent future electoral conflicts as being a choice between the Republican Party and Communism. Moreover, this perception was not too difficult to create in the popular mind because of the pro-USSR policies of the Democrats during the War. The Democrats themselves chose to fight this challenge by employing the same tactics, setting out to demonstrate that they were just as anti-Communist as the Republicans. Once the two parties had agreed upon this common area of electoral conflict it was almost inevitable that the Cold War should become the most important political phenomenon for the next two decades. Truman very swiftly introduced anti-Communist measures in both foreign and domestic policies. In March 1947 the Truman Doctrine virtually declared war on international Communist movements. Two weeks later the domestic equivalent was introduced requiring that all government employees should undergo new security checks. By adopting these measures Truman gave weight to his electioneering argument that

> "the most brazen lie of the century has been the fabrication by reckless demagogues amongst the Republicans to the effect that Democrats are soft on Communism".[178]

Within the logic of this dynamic of party politics it was not difficult for somebody like McCarthy to utilise the situation in a gross manner and by so doing to accumulate political capital for himself and his

party.

This process was made easier by the discovery immediately after the War of a number of important cases of espionage. In 1945 the F.B.I. apprehended two of the editors of "Amerasia" when they were removing classified documents from government offices. In 1946 it was disclosed that twenty-three Canadians were involved in high level espionage for the USSR concerning atomic research. These, and other, discoveries of espionage, coupled with increasing frustration arising from the strikes of 1945-6, made it easier for politicians of both parties to exploit the idea of the "Communist menace".

The U.S.A. became increasingly afraid of anything to the left of the political centre, and anti-Communism emerged as an ideology in itself rather than as a reaction to the policies of the USSR or the U.S. Communist Party. This ideology was translated into many bizarre and frightening actions. Thus the Swedish Academy came under severe criticism for "digging way down in the literary barrel" for a Nobel Prizewinner in the person of Salvatore Quasimodo because he was a one-time Communist and longtime friend of Red Causes".[179] The State Department published a pamphlet entitled "100 Things to Know about Reds",[180] and three years later stood accused by McCarthy of having thrown their full weight "in the balance of the conspiratorial, subversive Reds against our ally, the Government of China".[181]

By 1953 the large philanthropic foundations were being accused

that they had

> "supported or assisted persons, organisations and projects which, if not subversive in the extreme sense of the word, tend to weaken or discredit the capitalistic system as it exists in the U.S. and to favor Marxist socialism".[182]

One witness claimed that the foundations had conspired to support federal taxation, which itself was a socialist plot to destroy the government.[183] Charles Dollard, President of the Carnegie Corporation, when defending a grant made to Gunnar Myrdal in front of the House Special Committee to Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations, was forced to argue that Myrdal, whilst a member of Sweden's Social Democratic Labour Party, was "safe" because Sweden had a free-enterprise economy.[184]

The fears of Communist conspiracy and subversion completely permeated the U.S. domestic scene and, in some senses, it was not until the late fifties that the chaotic counter-ideology of anti-Communism came to a head with the frothing verbiage surrounding Krushchev's visit to the States.

Despite the fact that Krushchev had been invited by President Eisenhower, the New York Times was adamant in its hope "that photographers will not press for arms-across-the-shoulder shots or demand excessive hand-shaking".[185] Cardinal Spellman called for an hour of prayer on the eve of the visit, which he saw as "a crisis no less menacing than that day of barbaric betrayal at Pearl Harbour".[186]

The U.S., Spellman claimed, should dedicate herself to keeping the torch of freedom alight for

> "this is our sacred duty to America's sons and daughters in hospitals or homes living in the bondage of broken bodies and minds, and to the multitude of her sons, who, slogging through mires of blood and mud, groping through hills of smoke and flame, met death with courageous, faithful hearts because they believed that God had willed their America to be a loving shrine of liberty, justice and peace".[187]

Spellman's emotionalism was matched in the moribund of private and corporate advertisements which appeared, such as those of the Committee for Freedom of All People, which called for a day of mourning because of Krushchev's visit,[188] and the Warren Bradley Corporation of Milwaukee.[189]

A measure of the pervasiveness of the post-war atmosphere of anti-Communism may be perceived by the degree to which the American left were themselves engulfed in that atmosphere. According to Kolko,

> "Succombing to the mood of the times, even while proclaiming a higher if not clearly defined morality, the American left gradually took over even more of the crucial assumptions of conventional politics, aligning itself to the more liberal wings of the Cold War....The Eastern European situation was described by the socialists in the blackest detail, but little was said for example, about the actions of French socialist ministers who in Indo-China, Madagascar and Algeria committed horrors on behalf of an older order that paled those of the bolsheviks...".[190]

The anti-Communist atmosphere in post-war America was almost totally enveloping. It was out of this atmosphere of frightened, irrational hysteria that the "popular" concept developed and established itself. In terms of critical scholarship it was hardly the most conducive atmosphere in which to work. Seldes reflected the opinion of many others when he argued that "when a cold war is declared, Truth is also the first casualty".[191] The precedent had already been set during the Second World War when, according to Houghton, the U.S. was

> "in very short supply of reasonably objective unemotional political scholarship or leadership. Potential scholars and intellectuals had been largely recruited, or expected to devote their talents to wishful thinking and propaganda, or to other work in the conduct of the war. One particularly frank individual proclaimed, as we approached that war, that while perhaps he might be too old to fight for his country, he would gladly lie to it".[192]

It is unlikely that many academics actually lied in their studies during the Cold War, but certainly the whole ethos of post-war America influenced the direction of academic thinking. The general ideological pressures on teachers at all levels were often translated into formal pressures which directly affected job security. J. Edgar Hoover, testifying before Congress in 1947, expressed alarm over the fact that

> "Communists and fellow travellers, under the guise of academic freedom, can teach

> our youth a way of life that eventually will destroy the sanctity of the home, that undermines faith in God, that causes them to scorn respect for constituted authority and sabotage our revered Constitution".[193]

The House Committee on Un-American Activities pointed out that "the real centre of power of Communism is the professional classes" and in particular those involved in the educational process.[194] The House of Representatives applauded loudly when hearing Representative Herbert proclaim the necessity "to ferret out to what extent our boys and girls are being led down the road to communism by professors who are supposed to protect our American way of life".[195] There was also much agreement with Secretary of Labour, Maurice Tobin's view that there were too many colleges and universities "encouraging and almost coddling the type of professor who ignores, ridicules or distorts the precious fundamental moral and religious truths" through the teaching of Communist propaganda. "Let us not forget", he said, "that the twin scourges of Nazism and Communism made their first appearance in the classrooms of Germany and other parts of Europe".[196] These attacks were followed by a series of dismissals and the introduction of loyalty oaths for teachers.

More important than the actual firings was the effect that such actions had upon the rest of the university faculty. The general reaction of the profession to these pressures has been well evidenced from a variety of sources. Research interests tended to be kept away

from "sensitive" areas, and academics frequently censored their own work. According to Eakins

> "This trimming was related in no way to academic standards, but had to do with a fear of what the non-academic arbiter of values might consider to be a 'pro-communist' or not sufficiently 'anti-communist' position".[197]

Jerry Farber writes that at the University of California at Los Angeles the McCarthy era "it was like a cattle stampede as they (the professors) rushed to cop out".[198]

Contemporary opinion adds weight to Farber's comment for "in many states, teachers and college professors have been frightened into sterile silence".[199]

Martin Wolfson claimed that:

> "the individual teacher is helpless and therefore is prone to follow the wave that calls for conformity and obedience...despite the fact that all his studies compel new visions".[200]

Barrington Moore warned that:

> "social science could continue in the present direction until it eliminated all reasoned reflection about society".[201]

The Monthly Review drew attention to:

> "Intellectuals, artists, ministers, scholars and scientists (who) are fighting a cold war in which they echo and elaborate the confusions of officialdom".[202]

Barrows Dunham summarised all these opinions when in 1960 he retrospectively wrote that he had:

> "seen such things occur off and on during my whole life, but never in such numbers as

> during the post-war period, when a sudden powerful attack from reactionaries drove so many intellectuals into recantation and mere tail-bearing. Indeed, for a time, the intelligensia was stunned and terrified. And so it turned out that all that love of liberty, so loudly professed and so tediously verbalised, amounted in the end to a whining plea to be let alone".[203]

The "popular" concept was a product of U.S. Cold War ideology. It developed in a social context characterised by fear and uncritical scholarship. Academics were obviously involved in an ideological setting which encouraged acceptance of the concept and all of its implications. The concept was accepted for so long, therefore, because it reflected so accurately the social situation out of which it grew. However, the relationship between the concept of totalitarianism and the Cold War went further than this. Essentially, totalitarianism became a fundamental part of the Cold War, providing an acceptable and easily understandable reason for the fear and hysteria of the times. The concept justified fear of Communism by demonstrating that Nazi Germany and Russia (and hence Communism) were basically the same phenomenon. In fact, it acted as an ideology for the ruling groups in the U.S.A. during the Cold War, justifying and legitimating anti-Communist policies.[204]

In 1947, when Truman introduced security checks for government employees, the test of disloyalty was to be

> "membership in, affiliation with or sympathetic association with...any... organisation, association, movement, group or combination of persons,

designated by the Attorney General as totalitarian".[205]

In 1948 the Mundt-Nixon Bill made illegal the participation in any activity designed to establish a totalitarian dictatorship within the U.S. The Bill was supposed, in the words of representative Mundt, to "put a leper's sign...a quarantine sign on these disease peddlers".[206] In 1950 Congress brought together many of the anti-Communist bills into the McCarran Internal Security Bill. The Bill provided for the establishment of a bipartisan Subversive Activities Control Board which could declare an organisation subversive and require it to register and submit membership lists and financial reports. However, to be a member or official of a Communist organisation did not of itself constitute a criminal act, rather it was illegal "to perform any act which would contribute to the totalitarian overthrow of the government."[207] The bill also required the State Department to enforce a ban on travel to and from totalitarian nations. However, in order to make the law work without offending most of America's allies the State Department later had "to broaden our definition of democracy and narrow our definition of totalitarianism" so that, for example, Spain, the Peronist regime and Yugoslavia (in conflict with the USSR) were designated as non-totalitarian.[208]

Totalitarianism, therefore, provided the rationale for the instigation of extensive anti-Communist measures by the political leaders of the U.S. As such it acted as an ideology for this group,

justifying their actions. The role of totalitarianism as an ideology for the ruling elite in the U.S. can most easily be appreciated, however, in the area of international relations. In particular the concept provided a rationalisation for a foreign policy which treated a wartime ally, the USSR, as a peacetime friend and identified a wartime enemy, Germany, as an important peacetime ally. It provided a reference point, and hence some meaning, to otherwise contradictory decisions concerning U.S. intervention and the allocation of U.S. foreign aid. Finally, it provided the foreign policy makers with a moral purpose in their foreign policy which could legitimate an enormous post-war military build-up. As an ideology, the concept of totalitarianism was employed in order to hide the real motivations behind U.S. foreign policy, namely the protection and expansion of U.S. interests abroad.[209]

The Cold War began with a dramatic change in relations between the U.S.A. and the USSR. After the Second World War, the U.S.A. was obviously seeking to understand a fundamentally reorganised world in the hope of being able to preserve and multiply her international political and economic interests. In Europe, the treatment given to the defeated Germans was to a large extent determined by the Western Allies' (particularly the Americans') perception of the necessity to safeguard liberal democratic capitalism, and, hence, the associated markets and resources. However, both the U.K. and the U.S.A. wished

to see a capitalist system develop in Eastern Europe also. Such a development would have contravened an agreement reached by Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt in 1944 to the effect that Eastern Europe would become a Russian sphere of influence after the War so long as Russia did not interfere with the Western Allies' plans for Greece. The USSR kept her part of the agreement and did nothing to prevent the U.K. (and later the U.S.A.) from establishing a right-wing government in Greece. However, when the USSR in its turn acted to assert control in Eastern Europe the West became very concerned, and there was even some talk of going to war with the USSR in order to liberate Poland and the Rumanian oil-fields. It was this clash over the future of Eastern Europe that heralded a change in relations with the USSR.

The rumblings grew louder when, in March 1946 Churchill made his Fulton speech declaring the Cold War to be imminent. In April 1946 President Roosevelt died, to be followed by a very different man in the form of Harry Truman. Fleming indicates the importance of this fact for "it is altogether probable that if Roosevelt had been able to finish his fourth term in the White House there would have been no Cold War".[210] However, with Truman as President, and Eastern Europe, including Poland, under Soviet control, the U.S. accepted the Churchillean rationalisation of foreign affairs and claimed that Russia, like all totalitarian regimes, was intent on controlling the whole world. It is this assumption (applied now to China also) that

has been one of the fundamentals of U.S. foreign policy ever since.

The immediate nature of this foreign policy was laid out in detail in the Truman Doctrine of March 1947 in which the U.S. outlined the differentiation between liberal democracies and totalitarian regimes. The President spoke of the fact that all nations were faced with a choice between two rival, alternative socio-political systems:

> "One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, represenative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion and freedom from political repression. The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms...".[211]

By the end of 1947 the world had moved into a situation where the two most powerful nations faced each other as Cold War enemies. The President of the U.S. had alluded to a world capitalist system which obviously entailed subverting or conquering Eastern Europe and the USSR, as well as preventing the establishment of Communist regimes elsewhere.[212] Ideologically, the USSR was committed to a world socialist system. Thus, at least in their threatening rhetoric, the U.S.A. and USSR posed two conflicting poles over the fate of the world, and in little over two years the whole wartime relationship between the two nations had been stood on its head. Never again would

an American leader be able to say, as did Eisenhower in 1944, that:

> "I believe that Russia's policy is friendship with the U.S.A. There is in Russia a desperate and continuing concern for the lot of the common man and they want to be friends with the U.S.".[213]

The concept of totalitarianism gave meaning to this sudden reversal in U.S.-Soviet relations. A totalitarian Russia obviously has a great deal in common with any other nation designated as totalitarian. Sigmund Neumann had already suggested that the concept of totalitarianism, used in analysis of the National Socialist regime in Germany, could be extended analogically to a study of the USSR, and perhaps even of Communism in general. At the time Neumann's study was not followed up, but during the Cold War it provided the starting point for the development of the "popular" concept. The implication of the "popular" concept was quite simple: Communism and Russia were as totalitarian as Hitler's Germany, and as such presented the same moral and political threat to freedom and democracy. By associating the Cold War protagonist with the hot war enemy, a situation whereby ex-allies were verbally attacking each other could easily be rationalised.

The USSR perceived as a totalitarian enemy, which by definition made her expansionist, had to be contained. By 1950, fear about the build-up of Russia's nuclear capabilities created speculation on the advisability of embarking upon a preventive war. Dean Acheson, resisting such demands, spoke instead of the advisability of re-arming

Germany as part of the U.S. policy of containment which aimed to build barriers to prevent possible Russian expansion. In such a policy a strong, preferably united, Germany was essential. The North Korean invasion of South Korea added propagandistic weight to U.S. fears, being interpreted as a new expansionist thrust by Communist totalitarianism engineered from Moscow, now confident after her recent acquisition of the atomic bomb. In this situation West German security and continued friendship with the West became even more urgent in order to protect the 'free world' from similar totalitarian expansion in Europe. Thus a movement to bring Adenauer's Germany into closer alliance with the Western powers gathered momentum until, on 6th May, 1955, West Germany became a member of NATO.

The re-armament of Germany inside NATO completed the process whereby the national wartime roles of Germany and Russia were reversed. In a similar way to its rationalisation of U.S. policy towards the new enemy, Russia, the concept legitimated and rationalised the metamorphosis of Germany the friend.

In his song, "MLF", Tom Lehrer offers a justification for military co-operation with Germany by pointing out that "we taught her a lesson in 1918 and she's hardly bothered us since then".[214] The concept of totalitarianism provided a much more realistic rationalisation for accepting the enemy of two world wars into the Western military alliance than merely forgetting completely the recent past. The concept, it will be remembered, emphasised the role

of coercion as a technique of control. In this situation the population could hardly be blamed for complying with the orders of a regime which they probably perceived as evil themselves anyway. The individual had no power, and the groups from which he could have gained strength had been destroyed by unscrupulous leaders.

Ebenstein tells us that:

> "the totalitarian ruler is not satisfied with the subject's fulfilling his duties: he wants all of the subject, body and soul, and above all his soul...the subject is not only oppressed, but is forced to say publicly that he loves his oppressors....The aim is not merely to destroy the enemy or the presumed enemy, but to turn a human into a 'non-human', and so restrict the meaning of being human to a complete subservience to the state".[215]

In a situation such as this, resistance is both stupid and useless. Those members of the population who would wish to change things are faced with a totalitarian terror which

> "aims to fill everyone with a fear and vents in full its passion for unanimity. Terror embraces the entire society, searching everywhere for actual or potential deviants from the totalitarian unity. Indeed, to many it seems as if they are hunted, even though the secret police may not touch them for years, if at all. Total fear reigns.... Scattered opponents of the regime, if still un-detected, become isolated and feel themselves cast out of society. This sense of loneliness, which is the fate of all, but more especially of an opponent of the totalitarian regime, tends to paralyse resistance and makes it much less appealing. It generates a universal longing to escape into the anonymity of the collective whole. Unanimity, even if coercerd is a source of strength for the regime".[216]

The totalitarian enemy had always been the political leadership, because the various sectors of the population, from economic giant to peasant farmer, had been forced to become a mere acquiescent partner to demonic totalitarian practices. As the U.S. High Commissioner to Germany put it, "No-one, least of all the U.S., is charging all Germans with responsibility for Hitler's crimes".[217] Circumstances were such that the population appeared to have supported a regime when, in fact, they were totally oppressed by that regime. Having been liberated, the population not only can be trusted but can be positively relied upon to fight any expansion of totalitarian forces similar to those that had recently oppressed them.

Thus "totalitarianism" offered a justification and rationalisation for the reversal of allegiances in the post-war period. In addition to this, however, it also provided the major rationalisation for the development in the U.S.A. of an interventionist orientation to foreign policy. The lesson had been learned from the Second World War that totalitarianism was basically an expansionist, imperialistic force. Hitler had caused a war because of this. National Socialism was totalitarian. Communism is totalitarian. Thus, logically, totalitarian Communism must be treated in the way that National Socialism should have been treated in the nineteen thirties. The foreign policy of the U.S.A. therefore, should assume a position completely opposite to that of Chamberlain's policy of appeasement. In particular, the U.S.A. should prevent the spread of totalitarian

Communism out of the USSR and, if possible, subvert the totalitarian regimes already created in Eastern Europe.

The Truman Doctrine provided the first example of the use of totalitarianism as a rationalisation for world intervention by the U.S. The President claimed that "the peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will".[218] In this situation the U.S. would not realise her objectives,

> "unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed upon free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the U.S.".[219]

The Marshall Plan and other aid programmes of the future were of great importance in this context because:

> "The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full strength when the hope of a people for a better life has died".[220]

Wherever U.S. interests and security were perceived as being threatened by what the U.S. itself defined as totalitarianism and/or Communism, the U.S. government would take measures, openly or covertly, to prevent such "creeds" from being established.[221]

Moreover, the policy of intervention was based upon the same misinterpretation as was the "popular" concept itself, in that it

perceived all totalitarian regimes as "basically alike". Thus, whenever and under whatever circumstances totalitarianism and/or Communism presented itself, it was perceived as another outbreak of a monolithic totalitarian plot, directed from Moscow, to subjugate the whole world. Steel summarised the situation concisely when he stated that:

> "Confusing communism as a social doctrine with communism as a form of Soviet imperialism, we assumed that any advance of communist doctrine anywhere was an automatic gain for the Soviet Union".[222]

In addition to this confusion, Communism was defined as totalitarianism and as very little else. The need for radical social change in many areas of the world was never appreciated, and nationalism as a force completely disregarded. Any exhibition of anti-Americanism was obviously due to the presence of totalitarian influences. The U.S. became the self-styled "watchman on the walls of world freedom"[223] with the power to define what was dangerous and what was not.

The threat of totalitarianism (sometimes explicitly called "Communism" but sometimes not) has, therefore, been offered as a rationalisation and justification for virtually every instance of U.S. intervention since 1947. This has been the case from the Truman Doctrine through the Berlin Crisis, the Korean War, the coup in Iran, the Guatemalan coup, the Cuban crisis and blockade to Vietnam. Thus the U.S. was fighting in Vietnam because "no man, whatever the pigmentation of their skins, should ever be delivered

over to totalitarianism".[224] Even more recently, President Nixon has justified the presence of troops in Cambodia by claiming that:

> "If, when the chips are down, the United States acts like a pitiful and helpless giant, the forces of totalitarianism and anarchy will threaten free nations and institutions throughout the world".[225]

Intervention itself was backed by a degree of power previously unrealised by any nation. According to Steel, the impact of the U.S.

> "reaches everywhere and affects everything it touches. We have the means to destroy whole societies and rebuild them, to topple governments and create others, to impede social change or to stimulate it, to protect our friends and destroy those who oppose us".[226]

The use of such vast power to intervene in the affairs of other nations was also rationalised through the "popular" concept of totalitarianism, because it provided the basis of a high morality to U.S. foreign policy. The situation of 1939, which Lavine described as "virtue against villainy, in the primitive terms of Hoboken drama",[227] was repeated in 1947 by a situation where, according to Eisenhower, "Freedom is pitted against slavery; lightness against the dark".[228] John Foster Dulles thus claimed that the Cold War struggle against totalitarian Communism was not a political struggle but a moral one for "we are up against a creed which believes almost fanatically in a different concept of the nature of the world".[229] Thus President Johnson was able to claim, after ordering the bombing of North Vietnam, that:

> "What America has done, and what America is doing around the world, draws from deep

and flowing springs of moral duty".[230]

Totalitarianism was perceived as being so evil and depraved that the employment of vast U.S. resources to counteract its development anywhere was ethically justifiable as well as being for the benefit of the whole human race.

The concept of totalitarianism also enabled the U.S. to rationalise being both friend and ally to autocratic dictatorships of the Right simply by defining them as non-totalitarian and therefore as no threat to mankind. The standard to be set for the offer of U.S. foreign aid, for example, was that the recipient should not be of a totalitarian persuasion. Thus neither Syria nor Egypt qualified for aid because:

> "We do not want to give help except to a country that we believe is dedicated to maintaining its own independence, and by that we mean fighting against communist totalitarianism".[231]

The concept of totalitarianism, therefore, provided the U.S. with a means by which to identify those nations which were to be given aid and those to whom aid should be refused. The latter category consisted of totalitarian nations, which, because they were so evil, qualified only for possible subversive activity from the U.S. Nations such as Venezuela, Greece and Guatemala were non-totalitarian and, being mere autocracies, belonged to a completely different genus of dictatorship. Because of this they were able to receive U.S. aid. Such a justification in effect provided an alternative perception of reality to the one that would argue that the U.S. aided only nations

within which their interests (largely economic) were being protected. Thus the concept explained U.S. interest and sympathy with the dictatorships of Venezuela and Guatemala without directing attention to the neo-colonial situation in which these nations found themselves relative to the U.S.A.

Totalitarianism, therefore, has continually been used as a justification and rationalisation for U.S. foreign policy ever since the Cold War was declared. In so doing it has paralleled its role in U.S. domestic politics. It has functioned as an ideology for that section of the power elite in the U.S. that determined Cold War policies, providing a set of ideas which serve a particular vested interest, distorting social reality in order to hide the real motivations behind policy decisions. Domestically the ideology has permitted U.S. politicians to claim that they were protecting the American way of life from unthinkable evil when, in reality, their actions have been motivated more by a fear of change and the desire to obtain or maintain political power. In terms of foreign policy, totalitarianism has enabled decision-makers to conceal their self-interest behind a front of high morality; it has justified a complete reversal of the wartime allegiance with Russia and Germany and has rationalised decisions concerning foreign aid, the real basis of which was the perpetuation of U.S. interests.

However, as a rationalisation of policy, "totalitarianism" was little more than a vague, ill-defined notion of something evil. The

"popular" concept; developed during the period when the ideology of anti-totalitarianism was most influential, systematised this vague notion, adding the weight of "objective scholarship" to that ideology. In so doing it echoed the rhetoric of the Cold War almost completely. This fact can be seen when one considers the response of Friedrich and Brzezinski to changes within the USSR. As already pointed out, the reforms that Krushchev introduced (in particular the ending of the Terror) meant that the USSR could no longer easily be classified as totalitarian. Friedrich and Brzezinski's response to this fact was not to undertake a thorough examination of detotalitarianisation in the USSR but rather to adapt their definition so that the "new Russia" could still be categorised as totalitarian. However, the changes in the internal politics of Russia occurred whilst the Cold War was still being hotly fought, with Russia still being classed in the American political arena as a totalitarian threat to the 'free world'. Thus, despite the unusual methodology assumed by Friedrich and Brzezinski, their redefinition did conveniently maintain the rationalisation function of the concept in respect to U.S. Cold War policy. Russia, according to Friedrich's original definition, was no longer totalitarian and could not, therefore, be the evil against which the free world had to fight. In scholastic terms this was quite acceptable but in political terms, with the Cold War a contemporary fact of life, it was preposterous. The academic world, therefore, in the figures of

Friedrich and Brzezinski, would appear to have been motivated in their reaction to historical change in the USSR not by academic principles but rather by the logic of the Cold War.

It has been suggested that the "popular" concept was closely associated with Cold War policies because of the effect of the contemporary ethos of U.S. society. This made it extremely difficult for ideas to develop that might have questioned the dominant ideology. Moreover, pressures to conform to this ideology were particularly strong within the sphere of education and research. Because of these pressures the "popular" concept would probably have paralleled the dominant ideology of the Cold War anyway, but the academics concerned with its development guaranteed that such a parallel would exist. To a large extent they were themselves participating in the formulation of policies founded upon the ideology of anti-totalitarianism.

The "popular" concept evolved as a product of discussions within the Russian study centres at Columbia and Harvard. The first director of Columbia's Russian Institute was Geroid T. Robinson, formerly the head of the OSS Research and Analysis Branch, USSR Division. Robinson's whole approach to Russian research was geared to U.S. strategic needs. His appointment was paralleled at Harvard by the appointment of one of Robinson's assistants, Clyde Kluckhohn, as Director of the Russian Research Centre. Both men were members of the Council on Foreign Relations.[232] At Columbia the steering

committee of the Russian Institute was constituted of five men, four of whom had been employed by either the OSS or the State Department and three of whom were members of the Council on Foreign Relations. The most important of these men was Philip Moseley, who succeeded Robinson as Director in 1951. Moseley also held the extremely influential job as Director of Studies for the Council on Foreign Relations. He had been employed in the State Department prior to 1939, was the U.S. advisor at the Moscow and Potsdam Conferences, and served the Secretary of State in a similar capacity at the London and Paris meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers in 1945 and 1946. In 1944 and 1945 he was a principal negotiator in the U.S. delegation to the European Advisory Commission in London, which worked out the initial post-war arrangements for Germany, Austria and Bulgaria. At Harvard the Dean of Arts and Sciences, under whose jurisdiction the Russian Research Centre fell, was McGeorge Bundy, who has been in and out of White House advisory jobs for nearly twenty years.

The links between the academics concerned with the development of the "popular" concept and domestic and foreign policy-making bodies goes beyond those of the higher administrators of the Russian study centres. Carl Friedrich was employed by the U.S. High Commissioner to Germany, John McCloy, as his chief advisor and speech writer. Previous to this appointment Friedrich was Constitutional Advisor to the Puerto Rican government and advisor to the Council on

Foreign Relations' study group on the USSR. Zbigniew Brzezinski was a consultant to the State Department and, later, the RAND Corporation. He was a member of a White House panel fact-finding mission to Germany, Portugal and Morocco, an advisor at the Atlantic Alliance Conference in Munich and a member of the Policy Planning Committee at the Department of State. He was also a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Similar connections may be traced in relation to the participants at the conference on totalitarianism, organised by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Abram Bergson (director of the Russian Research Centre since 1964) was a consultant to the State Department after 1944, to the RAND Corporation after 1948 and, later, to the U.S. Office of Science and Technology. He was also a member of the Advisory Board of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Karl Deutsch was Chief of the Research Section in the OSS and State Department until 1946. Since then he has acted as a specialist for the State Department on India and Germany. Merle Fainsod was a consultant for the Council on Foreign Relations, an advisor on Russian affairs to the State Department and a member of the President's Committee on Administrative Management in 1951. Alex Inkeles was a consultant on program content to the International Broadcasting Division of the State Department. George Kennan was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and, as Mr X,[233] formulated and published the U.S. foreign policy of containment. He has been the chief long-

range advisor to the Secretary of State, 1949-50, and U.S. Ambassador to both Yugoslavia and the USSR.

The "popular" concept, therefore, was not only a product of the Cold War but was also the academic manifestation of the ideological underpinnings of Cold War politics. Many of the academics concerned with the concept were also occupying important policy advisory posts either within government or with the Council on Foreign Relations. As Eakins argued,

> "The political scientist or historian of foreign policy who remains within the confines of the State Department world view simply does not 'see' the evidence in conflict with this position".[234]

The "popular" concept did not derive from a synthesised argument amongst social scientists, but instead was the academic reiteration of official ideology. In addition, the social context in which it developed, and which obviously affected the people involved with the concept, certainly did not encourage any critical analysis of this ideology. Both Russian studies and the "popular" concept were developed within the ideological framework of the U.S. policy makers. The concept's historical specificity is a reflection of the dominant post-War American ideology which stressed the intrinsic structural and moral differences between the U.S.A. and the USSR. It is, therefore, largely because of the fact that it developed within the atmosphere of the Cold War and that it is an academic repetition of the ideology of the Cold War, that the "popular" concept is of such limited analytical value.

V

REFORMULATION

In 1942 Sigmund Neumann, arguing that there was a need for a new concept to deal with modern dictatorship, warned that,

> "All social concepts must be seen in their historical context. They are defined in time and space. They must be tested anew in every generation and in every society if they are to have meaning for their adherents and to render effective resistance to their challengers....A continuous misinterpretation of basic concepts is visible and extremely dangerous within the fast-moving social and political sciences which are especially affected by the time lag between ideological perception and historical reality....In order to be on guard, every democratic society needs a regular conceptual house-cleaning".[235]

The 'popular" concept of totalitarianism, which was founded upon Neumann's analysis, is now itself in need of reformulation in order to make it relevant to a generation of social scientists who look at Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia as historical controversy and not as contemporary phenomena. The influence of the Cold War produced a concept that can be employed efficiently only in the study of political systems which have reproduced the specific institutional structures of Nazi Germany or the USSR during the Stalinist Purges. Such a reproduction is not impossible, but it is unlikely because it would necessitate duplication of a particular combination of historical,

social, political, economic and cultural variables.

Political science is increasingly appreciative of the fact that there are certain similarities between political regimes possessing different institutional structures. This is represented in convergence theory and also in the work of political scientists oriented toward the ideas of Almond and Coleman.[236] The "popular" concept, however, assumes a fundamental difference between totalitarian regimes and all other forms of government. It is necessary to develop a framework of totalitarian control which permits comparison of both similarities and dissimilarities in political systems, whilst taking into account the criticisms already made of the "popular" concept. This may be achieved by analysing on a high level of generality the whole nature of downward vertical control within society.

The "popular" concept concentrated upon defining totalitarianism in terms of the highly specific institutional means by which the complete and total control of all elements of society could be achieved. It is more profitable, however, to define totalitarianism in terms only of this goal of total control, leaving consideration of the specific institutional means employed to thorough historical and sociological analysis.

Functional analysis provides one with certain useful ideas with respect to the consideration of more general mechanisms which might be employed to achieve totalitarian ends. The criticisms and

weaknesses of functional analysis are summarised by Robert Merton who has clarified many points of dissent.[237] In particular, he reconsiders the postulates of indispensability and universality of function, and the functional unity of society. In respect to the latter he states that,

> "one need not go far afield to show that the assumption of complete unity of human society is repeatedly contrary to fact. Social usages or sentiments may be functional for some groups and dis-functional for others in the same society".[238]

By introducing into this orientation an acknowledgement of the existence of differential power within society one may appreciate that it might be easy for group needs to be confused with societal needs simply because some groups might have the power to identify societal needs with their own needs. In addition, Merton solves the problems concerning the indispensability of function by postulating the idea of functional alternatives. By considering functionality in respect to the needs of a particular group and by accepting the idea of functional alternatives one is able, in an analysis of societal control mechanisms, to go beyond a study of mere form whilst at the same time considering to whom the mechanism is functional or disfunctional.

In the case of the "popular" concept, for example, post-war writers, analysing Stalinist Russia and Nazi Germany, emphasised the importance of coercive mechanisms of control to achieve totalitarian ends. This does not neglect the fact that other techniques of control such as the creation of a mass society and

propaganda were also analysed; however, the most important element of totalitarianism was quite obviously seen as its coercive nature. This emphasis derives from the inherent historical specificity of the "popular" concept. Both Stalinist Russia and Nazi Germany were regimes which relied to a considerable extent upon coercion in order to obtain a high degree of control, albeit for different reasons and with different ideological orientations. However, coercion is merely one of the means which can be used to achieve this end. It is, in fact, often the last means of control that those in power would wish to use, because it usually leads to greater alienation on the part of the subordinates than do other (more subtle) forms of control.

The fact that the "popular" concept does not attend solely to coercion, however, does suggest that it was appreciated that other control mechanisms might be important (for example, the role of ideology is discussed, but in very specific terms only). However, the concept does not move one towards an analysis of these other mechanisms, but instead directs one towards the study of specific institutions which are mainly based upon coercion. It is necessary to go beyond this specificity and clarify the mechanisms of control that are hinted at in specific form with the "popular" concept. These other forms of control are not merely supportive of a coercive system of control, but represent functional alternatives to such a system. A reformulation of the idea of totalitarianism would need to take

into account the nature of these alternative controls as well as a consideration of the fact that such controls might be functional to a particular societal group and not to others. The study of downward vertical control would provide this orientation.

The fact that there are forms of control other than coercion is certainly not a new discovery to the social sciences. Max Weber was suggestive of other means of control when he discussed class, status and power[239] although he did not develop the implications in this direction. In 1924, Commons made a distinction between physical, economic and moral power.[240] Similarly, Janowitz claimed that "international relations involve the use of economic resources, violence and persuasion".[241] More recently Etzioni has classified types of organisation based on different sources of power. He identifies coercive, renumerative and normative powers.[242] The "popular" concept, however, because it is better suited to historical rather than sociological analysis, does not attend systematically to any type of power other than coercion. Totalitarian ends, (i.e. the total control of society), in fact, may be achieved without any recourse to coercion, or by the combination of different types of power.

It is useful to identify (as did the authors discussed above) three main classifications of power.[243] Coercive power is based upon the legalised or legitimated application, or the threat of application, of physical sanctions. These sanctions include the infliction of pain,

deformity or death, the restriction of free movement and the control through force of "the satisfaction of needs (psychic and physiological) such as those for food, sex, comfort and the like".[244] Material power is based upon control over the distribution of material rewards and resources. Ideological power rests upon control of the normative structure of society. This may take the form of the development of a false consciousness on behalf of the subordinates who identify with a normative structure based upon the rulers' definition of reality. This situation is achieved largely by manipulation and the allocation of esteem and prestige.

The dilemma with which power incumbents are faced is to utilise these control mechanisms (is so desired) in such a way that the very use of such mechanisms does not bring about a reaction which neutralises the effect of the controls. In this respect there is a definite opportunity cost involved in the employment of coercion. Coercion, more than other controls, can easily become a radicalising experience for individuals, alienating them even more from the power holders and providing recruits for the very movements which those in power are attempting to control. Additionally, coercion may build up a solidarity amongst the coerced groups which did not exist before. Abbie Hoffman, one of the more influential members of the YIPPIE! movement in the U.S., is fully appreciative of these facts and invites coercive repression because of it. For Hoffman, the police and those who control the police are the only organisers of the

YIPPIE! movement; if it were not for the reaction of the authorities there would be fewer politicized hippies. During the Democratic Convention in Chicago, therefore, Hoffman

> "kept wondering what the fuck we would have done if they had let us stay in Lincoln Park at night. As usual the cops took care of the difficult decisions. The concept of the Pig as our leader was truer than reality".[245]

The employment of ideological controls, on the other hand, may produce a very positive commitment to the power holders and as such represents a far more efficient mechanism of control. Moreover, the greater is the strength of ideological control, the easier it is for the power holders to employ coercive methods against elements of society which can be portrayed as threatening the common values of that society.

The problems with ideological control arise from the fact that at any particular point of time it is difficult to change quickly the value commitments of a population. Thus in periods of revolutionary change, the power holders, at least in the short term, often have to rely heavily upon the coercive and material controls. This is represented in Marxist thought by the dictatorship of the Proletariat, where the last vestiges of capitalist thought and action are purged from society.

Material controls produce less alienation than do coercive controls but at the same time do not lead to any form of commitment from the population as in the case of ideological controls. Material control

was predominant during the McCarthy witch-hunts where "suspects" usually lost their jobs after being accused of Communist sympathies, but were seldom coerced in the physical sense. The House Un-American Activities Committee, having no legislative or judicial powers, is able to exercise power largely by employing material controls by stigmatising its "witnesses". In the past this system has functioned effectively because "witnesses" were usually afraid to lose their reputation and employment. In connection with the YIPPIE! movement, however, the Committee finds itself powerless because Yippies simply do not care what they are branded, so long as it is anti-establishment, or what they would call anti-Pig Nation. Thus it might become necessary, from the U.S. government's point of view, to instigate more systematically the use of coercive controls which are the only ones they have left in this situation.[246]

In general it is possible to maintain control effectively without recourse to coercion. In fact, given the state of technology that exists in the latter part of the twentieth century, it could be argued that control may be far more effectively maintained by employing non-coercive techniques. Only when these techniques fail would it be necessary to use coercion. In a sense, therefore, coercion today represents the working out of a lag between older coercive methods of control and the perfection of more subtle methods.

It is essential to realise that the categorisation of control mechanisms discussed above is employed here only as a useful device by which to illustrate the varied nature of such mechanisms. In

practice the different types of control are not easily separated, let alone fitted into convenient categorising boxes. All three modes of control are inter-related and separable only when abstracted from specific historical reality.

The mechanisms of control are, therefore, usually extremely complex. The controls which Marcuse claims exist in one-dimensional society, for example, include coercive, ideological and material elements. In such a society control is efficiently maintained within what Henry calls "a strong new explosive compound....technological driveness"[247] by manipulating false needs. Such needs "are superimposed upon the individual by particular social interests in his repression".[248] In this situation,

> "The people recognise themselves in their commodities; they find their soul in their automobile, hi-fi set, split-level home, kitchen equipment. The very mechanism which ties the individual to his society has changed, and social control is anchored in the new needs which it has produced".[249]

These controls are so effective that "all contradiction seems irrational and all counter-action irresponsible".[250] In this context, Marcuse is arguing that controls have become so efficient that they find themselves embodied as an integral part of the overall system, being passively accepted and never questioned. Such controls involve coercion, in that psychic needs may not be met if one deviates, material control, in that without material reward one cannot fulfill such needs anyway, and ideological control, in that a pecuniary

philosophy and value system has been created in order to manipulate the population to the advantage of powerful corporate interests.[251]

Consideration of the functional alternatives to coercive control mechanisms is therefore, very useful but it does not provide any clear analysis of the institutional means through which such controls function. The "popular" concept, concentrating on the coercive aspects of totalitarianism, paid much attention to the destructive factors involved. Totalitarianism, it was argued, destroys all social groups and allegiances that are not to the state or party, thus creating a mass society. On the contrary, however, control may also be achieved by utilising and manipulating those social forces which, according to the "popular" concept, are destroyed.

Every society has some element of social control which places pressure on deviants and socialises other members into the norms of that particular society. Human behaviour is thus regulated and, within certain limits, predictable. It is guaranteed that sociologists on reading the term "social institution" will tumble headlong into definitional arguments, which in this case probably can only be solved by admitting that the term is a concept that can be given a meaningful definition only within the context of the study for which it is being used. The various definitions that have been offered are all rather vague and never really direct attention to the influence that institutions have upon the actions of individuals.[252] Gehlen, however, has recently argued that institutions such as the family, religion, education, economic organisation, the polity, law, class,

marriage, etc. have in common the fact that they all regulate human behaviour in certain directions based upon particular social norms and values.[253] Social institutions guide individuals into lines of action based upon a particular set of principles, and thus provide the main channels of social control.

Given that totalitarianism should not be limited to coercive control, totalitarian control may be achieved through the employment of broad social control mechanisms, the most important of which are tied very closely with the functionings of social institutions. However, social control as such is ubiquitous and if totalitarianism is to have any distinct meaning it becomes necessary to differentiate between the two.

This differentiation may be best achieved by drawing a distinction between the vertical and horizontal plane in relation to control. The horizontal plane involves control between individuals possessing more or less equal degrees of power, (e.g. in one's family, peer group, etc.). Vertical control implies control by individuals who for some reason or another occupy a higher rank within society as a whole. Classically, totalitarianism has represented a situation where there is complete downward vertical social control. This is achieved in the "popular" concept mainly by coercion and the destruction of social groups. However, the same degree of downward vertical social control is obtainable by manipulating the social institutions through which both vertical and horizontal controls

operate.

In effect, downward vertical controls often include horizontal elements. For example, in terms of the wider society, the inculcation by some English working class and middle class families of complete deference in the individual towards aristocracy, presents a situation where horizontal controls worked as an important element of the aristocracy's old vertical control of English society. Given that totalitarianism should not be defined in a narrowly historical way, either in respect to the specific group that controls society or in terms of the institutional set-up concerned, and that it can be achieved through a number of means and not through coercion alone, totalitarianism can be said to exist where downward vertical control, including its horizontal elements, is complete or total. Totalitarian controls are, therefore, definable as mechanisms of control that are instigated, supported or protected by an elite section of society or an individual; these have the function of preserving the privileged position of such a group or individual, and/or of assisting the development of changes considered necessary by that group or individual. Totalitarianism, therefore, implies that all alternatives to that system are excluded, as they are in a one-dimensional society of the type discussed by Marcuse.

This whole argument may become slightly more clear by considering one or two examples, drawn mainly from South Africa, of the way in which a ruling group may employ a selection of the

different types of control available to them, and the way in which different social institutions are utilised depending on the type of control preferred.

The "popular" concept, it will be remembered, emphasised the coercive elements of control. Coercion is in the main exercised through the legitimated political machinery, thus involving the institutions of the law and polity. The relationship between these institutions and what Mussolini called the State is obvious, and they do indeed provide the most easily identifiable control mechanisms to which the "popular" concept would draw attention.

The law in South Africa works within the values and ideals of apartheid and, therefore, in favour of the ruling group. By the introduction of acts such as the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, the Bantu Education Act and the Bantu Self-Government Act, the law provides the foundation of a society based upon ideals of 'different-ness' and 'separateness' between races. It provides the means whereby the ruling group may introduce the type of society in which they believe. However, the law does much more than this, for it also protects and buttresses such a society. The Public Safety Act, the Suppression of Communism Act, the Riotous Assemblies Act and the like, all provide for the efficient coercion of all those who might attempt to subvert or change South African society. For example, the General Law Amendment Act of 1963 provides for:

> "repeated detention of persons for 90 days at a time, for questioning; refusing to allow anybody, including legal counsel, to see detained persons;....indefinite

> imprisonment without trial for persons having completed ordinary gaol sentences...".[254]

Thus in the South African context:

> "the law is used like a maxim gun. And the non-Whites themselves perfect it as an instrument of their own oppression. The more immediately successful their campaigns, the more unsuccessful they are in the long run....The reason is that a successful campaign probes the weaknesses in the system of control, and the Government's response is to strengthen the controls precisely in those respects where they have proved inadequate".[255]

The law and the polity thus provide the most important institutional mechanism through which coercive power and control may be exercised.

The "popular" concept, however, whilst it acknowledges the importance of coercive power, does not readily allow an appreciation of the full importance of ideological control. Such powers are exercised through, amongst other things, one's family, class, race and peer group. Basically, ideological powers work towards the attainment of a value consensus in society, an element stressed by many sociologists since Durkheim. The role of the mass media in this process has already been alluded to, and Parsons has pointed to the importance of socialisation through education. Education, he argues, develops commitments and capacities in individuals which enable them to fulfill social roles. Such commitments are two-fold and education provides both a "commitment to the implementation of the broad values of society, and a commitment to the performance of a specific type of role within the structure of society".[256]

Using South Africa as an example again it is not surprising, therefore, that the main function of Bantu education is to create an individual who will be able to cope with, and passively accept, a society based upon the principles of apartheid. Education is designed to make easy the maintenance of white domination. Indeed, Verwoerd has stated his belief that:

> "racial relations will be improved when Bantu education is handled in the manner proposed by us. Racial Relations cannot improve if the result of Native education is the creation of a frustrated people who, as a result of the education they receive, have expectations in life which circumstances in South Africa do not allow to be fulfilled...when it creates people who are trained in professions not open to them.... Good relations cannot exist when the education is given under the supervision of people who believe in a policy of equality".[257]

This educational goal was made more realisable after the Bantu Education Act of 1953 which removed Bantu education from the hands of missionaries and into the hands of the government, which now controls all teaching appointments and curricula. The latter emphasises manual labour for the Bantu and shields the Bantu child as much as possible from Western influences.[258]

In higher education a parallel development was introduced with the extension of the University Education Act, 1959, which aimed to establish ethnic universities to replace the attendance of non-Whites at multi-racial universities. The reasons for this reorganisation are offered by the Minister of Education:

> "Control by the government was needed as it was necessary to prevent undesirable ideological developments such as had disturbed the non-White institutions not directly under the charge of the government and as the Bantu authorities had not developed to take over their control".[259]

Education in South Africa is, therefore, designed to instill within the individual those attitudes, beliefs and values which serve to perpetuate White rule. If the education system worked perfectly, it would create a false consciousness in the non-White population, whereby their well-being was perceived in terms of their own oppression.

This obviously is not the situation in all societies, but it is often only a question of degree. Thus the English Grammar School system is renowned for its inculcation of middle class values into its pupils. Such values include acceptance of the political and economic machinery of British society, an emphasis on "team spirit", a deference to all those holding rank or authority commonly accepted as higher than one's own and a fundamental belief in the wrongness of embracing unconstitutional extra-parliamentary or violent action in order to obtain any societal changes. Similarly, Greenstein has demonstrated the extent to which U.S. high schools introduce their pupils to "desirable" socio-political attitudes.[260]

Probably the most important element of material power was alluded to by Emile Durkheim in his consideration of "organic solidarity" whereby integration is obtained through an economic and

functional interdependence. In South Africa all races participate in the White dominated economy, and there is a reliance by the non-White population on the continued smooth-running of the economy in general, as well as on the maintenance of the security of their own particular position in that economy. This fact is heightened by the near-starvation level in which many non-Whites find themselves. In this situation the individual is discouraged from working for the changes that he might perceive as being necessary because, as an individual, he is vulnerable to retribution by losing his job; similarly, the dissenting group have to weigh carefully the costs of disrupting the economic life of their oppressors, in that to do so would also disrupt and threaten the little economic security enjoyed by those sectors of the population in whose interests they claim to be acting. The non-White middle classes have the most to lose from total disruption of the South African economy and this often encourages them to seek only reformist changes. Thus it is in their short-term interests to increase their portion of the national income or their chances of upward mobility (albeit still limited), rather than ridding themselves of the "system" itself.

Coercive powers are thus only one of the options which are open to a ruling group. The study of totalitarianism must be a study of control, and if it fails to recognise the importance of non-coercive controls, it also fails as a thorough analytical construct. A concept of totalitarianism should permit one to consider the type of

control employed, by whom and for what purposes, and the mechanisms, means or institutions through which the particular or prevalent types of control are exercised. Such a concept must be of a higher level of generality than was the "popular" concept. The answer to these questions will differ according to the historical case which one is analysing. Such answers are the product of historically based empirical studies and not the meat for sociological conceptual definitions. The same end may be obtained by employing very different means, and the concept of totalitarianism should be able to allow comparative study of the different means employed and should not, therefore, be restricted by a definition in terms of these means.

Having reformulated the idea of totalitarianism, one has to admit that a purely totalitarian system is probably not empirically possible. Thus one has to consider the relationship between societies that are more or less totalitarian in a relative sense only. In a recent essay, Lewis Coser attempts to achieve some understanding of this problem (although he still employs a shortened version of the "popular" definition of totalitarianism). He postulates two antithetical ideal type models of social integration, the liberal and the totalitarian. The liberal model is characterised by a "unified structure which nevertheless leaves a high degree of autonomy to the various institutional orders and minimises the domination of the State". Although "all institutional orders are related and influence each other, yet each maintains a high degree of autonomy".[262]

Compared with this, totalitarian societies "destroy traditional social groups, communities or self-conscious classes and then replace them by new units which are subject to coordination and control by State and Party".[263] Because he claims that the "totalitarian model may be considered the antithesis of the liberal model",[264] it would appear to be possible to construct a continuum of political control with liberal democracy at one end and totalitarianism at the other.

However, Coser's liberal and totalitarian models are not the antithetical polar opposites that he assumes. In describing the liberal model, Coser states that there is a "high degree of autonomy" (i.e. not absolute autonomy) and that there is a minimal domination by the state (i.e. there is still some domination by the state). When describing "totalitarian integration", however, he tends to talk in absolutes. Thus totalitarianism is where "no independent organisation even of an utterly non-political character is allowed to exist", where traditional social groups are destroyed and "the political order has unquestioned primacy over all others". He appears to be using a dual standard for model construction, liberalism not being taken to its logical extremity in the way that totalitarianism is. Totalitarianism alone is an ideal type construct; liberalism appears to be something else, which is undefined.

If totalitarianism is placed at one end of a continuum, therefore, it should not be possible to place liberalism as its polar opposite,

which, of course, is exactly what Coser does do. Thus Coser has a continuum that extends from totalitarianism to liberalism, but not beyond, thus failing to take into account the logical possibility of having a society less totalitarian than the western liberal democracies.

Employing the definition of totalitarianism which is suggested in this paper, it is possible to offer a more realistic conceptualisation of the antithesis of totalitarianism. This would quite simply be represented by a state of affairs in which there is no downward vertical control. Such a situation may be represented by a democracy where individuals make decisions on an equal basis and control a power hierarchy from the base upwards or alternatively it may be represented in the situation offered by so-called "primitive" bands which have no identifiable political organisation at all. Definition should not be in terms of a specific institutional arrangement but is better identified, on a higher level of generality, as a situation where there is no downward vertical control. The position which any particular society occupies on such a continuum, therefore, relies upon the degree of downward vertical control and not upon any particular institutional organisation.

The position of western liberal democracies on such a continuum would obviously be further away from the totalitarian pole than would the regimes of Stalinist Russia or Nazi Germany. However, they would by no means occupy the opposite pole, as Coser would have

one believe. They generally do permit the availability of sources of information counter to the existing social organisation, but at the same time there are informal and structural mechanisms which prevent such information from receiving as much attention as that which favours the status quo.

Control is still exercised in liberal democracies but there is a degree of tolerance for groups whose ideas challenge the established system. Control is not directed towards the whole of society but rather towards the large majority of society. Indeed, if the latter is accomplished successfully there is no necessity for total control. Total control is therefore redundant in this situation. However, liberal democracies are increasingly finding it necessary to repress, and hence control, those elements and ideologies challenging the social, political and economic structures of liberal democracy, and which previously have been tolerated. It is difficult to generalise concerning the threshold between tolerance and repression of such elements. Each political system has its own cultural and historical circumstances which make it different from other political systems. Thus further research is needed in order to ascertain what factors influence the tolerance threshold and what the limits are of ideological and material controls in liberal democracies and why these controls appear to be weaker amongst larger sectors of the population than for a long time.



It is probably only necessary for total control to be aimed at

in a situation where the power holders are either trying to prevent change in the face of potentially strong pressures or where they are attempting to bring about large-scale change within a society that is not atuned for such change. Again, further research is required in order to analyse whether there is likely to be a difference in the nature of control employed in societies aiming at conserving the status quo and those proposing to introduce radical change.

It might be necessary, if radical change is the desired end, to achieve a high degree of mobilisation amongst the population. This might require the creation of a more homogeneous society and hence necessitate the destruction of those traditional social allegiances preventing (this) homogeneity. Stalin's policy in the USSR reflects this orientation. In an effort to industrialise the USSR he created a far more homogeneous society than had existed previously. A political regime that is aiming to maintain the status quo, however, may not require to mobilise the population. The more heterogeneous is the society, the easier it might be to maintain control in order to preserve that status quo. In such a situation as this the power incumbents might utilise and strengthen those social groups and institutions which in a change-oriented society might be destroyed. The "popular" concept associated totalitarianism only with radical change, thus making research such as this rather difficult.

Having determined approximately the extent and type of totalitarian control in a given society, the sociologist may then proceed with

analysis of such things as the relative weightings of the different types of control employed, how it is that the ruling group can actually succeed in the employment of such forms of power, which obstacles they encounter etc. Given this range of study, the sociologist may then continue to analyse such things as whether or not there is a dialectic at work which may defeat the planned goals of the ruling group.

In South Africa, for example, such a dialectic may work itself out in the field of education. The integrative function of education has its other side and could be highly disintegrative. Despite its connection with apartheid principles, higher education could make lucid the consciousness and perception of the non-Whites' own situation relative to the White group's.[265] Thus an African student in a report to a newspaper was able to claim that:

> "When I went to Fort Hare, I wasn't politically conscious. My political awareness grew as my education at the college progressed and with it my resentment of the administration as a symbol of separate development".[266]

In a similar way it has been argued that there is an inbuilt dialectic in a situation where apartheid is practised in a growing economy. Hatch argues that "the conflict between economic and ideological interests has always been the weakest point of apartheid"[267] and such conflict would obviously influence the functioning of the ruling group's material powers, and should, therefore, provide an important area for sociological study. However, this whole aspect would be neglected if one adopted the "popular" concept of

totalitarianism as a tool for the study of South African society.

The "popular" concept is, therefore, of severely limited analytical use. It tends to be an historical abstraction rather than a sociological tool. Because of its historical specificity it fails to take note of the possibility of other means of control than those which rely largely on coercion. The reformulated concept which has been suggested in this paper rectifies this weakness. It adds the element of power to the study of social control and, because of its general rather than specific nature, one is able to extend analysis in a meaningful way. The construct is then no longer a moral judgement, but a working concept which allows scope enough for the sociologist to ask, and obtain answers to, questions unrelated to the mere coercive strength of a single party or single leader.

The reformulated concept admits the possibility, and even the likelihood, that totalitarian ends may be achieved by employing many different means. It is suggested here that analysis may be aided by realising that control may be obtained through material and ideological means as well as coercive ones. In addition, such control mechanisms are not necessarily related to the specific institutional structure of a particular case study. The three types of power and control mechanism suggested here are, however, themselves only broad frameworks for analysis. The extent, type and limitations of totalitarian control in any society has to be determined by careful and thorough historical analysis of that

society. The categorisation above of the three types of control, and the suggested relevance of social institutions in this context, can be guides to such an analysis but should not, and cannot, be a substitute for such an analysis.

FOOTNOTES

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4 Benito Mussolini "La Dottrina del Fascismo", quoted in Ernst Barker Reflections on Government, London, Oxford University Press, 1942. p. 340.

5 Benito Mussolini "La Dottrina del Fascismo" in M. Oakeshott, op cit. p. 166

6 For an account of this change see Franz Neumann Behemoth, London, Oxford University Press, 1942. pp. 39-181.

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8 Walter Laquer "In Search of Russia" in Walter Laquer (ed.) The State of Soviet Studies, Cambridge, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1965. pp. 3-14.

9 Serge Chakotin The Rape of the Masses, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1940. p. 163.

10 Ibid. p. XV.

11 Franz Alexander Our Age of Unreason, New York, Lippincott, 1942.

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13 Emil Lederer State of the Masses, New York, Norton, 1940. pp. 46-47.

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18 Chakotin, op. cit.

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21 For example Neumann somehow sees the "mass" as being rational in Russia but not in Germany.

22 George Kennan Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin, Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1960. p. 297.

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25 See editorial comment New Republic, November 15th 1939, Vol. CI, No. 1302. p. 98.

26 Franz Borkenau The Totalitarian Enemy, London, Faber and Faber, 1940. p. 13.

27 Ibid. p. 239.

28 Ibid. p. 247.

29 Ibid. p. 11.

30 See Hadley Cantril (ed.) Public Opinion 1935-1946, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1951. p. 1062, and, Sir Ernest Simon "Democracy and Nazism", Political Quarterly, Vol. XI, No. 1, January-March 1940. pp. 1-15.

31 See Kingsley Martin "Public Opinion During the First Six Months", Political Quarterly, Vol. XI, No. 2, April-June 1940. p. 250.

32 Simon, op. cit. pp. 28-29.

33 Cantril, op. cit. p. 870.

34 Ibid. p. 869.

35 Ibid. p. 764.

36 D. F. Fleming The Cold War and its Origins, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1961. p. 148.

37 "Mission to Moscow" copyrighted in 1943 by Warner Bros. who gave the film its first national distribution. The film depicts the Russian struggle against the German invasion of its territory; all quotations in the text are from the spoken commentary to the film. It is interesting to note that in 1951, Jack Warner had to appear before the House Un-American Activities Committee to explain the pro-Russian bias of the film.

38 William Chamberlain The Russian Enigma, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944. p. vii.

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40 See New York Times, November 4th 1942.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

43 Joseph E. Davies "Is Communism a Menace to Us", New York Times Sunday Magazine, April 12th 1942. pp. 3 and 36.

44 New York Times, April 14th 1942.

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56 Ibid. p. 474.

57 See Carl Friedrich and Z. Brzezinski, op. cit. p. 22.

58 Ibid.

59 Sigmund Neumann, op. cit.

60 See Carl Friedrich and Z. Brzezinski, op. cit. pp. 22-23, and, Carl Friedrich, op. cit. Chapter I. pp. 1-17.

61 Carl Friedrich and Z. Brzezinski, op. cit. p. 22.

62 Ibid. p. 88.

63 Sigmund Neumann, op. cit. p. 127.

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65 Franz Neumann, op. cit. pp. 244-245.

66 Carl Friedrich and Z. Brzezinski, op. cit. p. 22.

67 Ibid.

68 Hannah Arendt, op. cit. p. IX.

69 Sigmund Neumann, op. cit. p. 43.

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74 Z. Brzezinski Permanent Purge, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1956. p. 27.

75 Merle Fainsod How Russia is Ruled, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1953. p. 354.

76 Carl Friedrich and Z. Brzezinski, op. cit. (1961). p. 132.

77 Hannah Arendt, op. cit. p. 499.

78 Paul Mott The Organization of Society, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1965. p. 343.

79 Jerry Gliksman, op. cit. p. 68.

80 See George Kennan "Totalitarianism in the Modern World", in Carl Friedrich (ed.) op. cit. pp. 17-31.

81 Ibid. discussion, pp. 6 and 78-79.

82 Hannah Arendt, op. cit. p. 308 (footnote).

83 Ibid. pp. 310-311.

84 Ibid. p. 438.

85 Ibid. p. 441.

86 Barrington Moore Terror and Progress - USSR, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1966. p. 160.

87 See Carl Friedrich and Z. Brzezinski, op. cit. (1961). p. 10, and, Franz Neumann, op. cit. pp. 244-245.

88 Hannah Arendt, op. cit. p. 342.

89 Carl Friedrich and Z. Brzezinski, op. cit. (1965). p. 22.

90 Sigmund Neumann, op. cit. p. 158.

91 Ibid. p. 148. See also pp. 77-87.

92 See Carl Friedrich, op. cit. (1965). p. 35.

93 See Franz Neumann Behemoth, London, Oxford University Press, 1942.

94 See Sigmund Neumann, op. cit. p. 115.

95 Ibid. p. 116, and, Hannah Arendt, op. cit. p. 314.

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97 Z. Brzezinski Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics, London, Thames & Hudson, 1962. p. 14.

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104 George Kennan, op. cit. p. 25.

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106 Bronislaw Malinowski Freedom and Civilization, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1947. pp. 307 and 305 respectively.

107 Adolf Hitler, Speech made in Berlin, February 20th 1938 and quoted in G. W. Prange (ed.) Hitler's Words, Washington, American Council on Public Affairs, 1944. p. 265.

108 Friedrich and Brzezinski, op. cit. (1961). p. 9.

109 Lewis Namier "History and Political Culture", in F. Stern (ed.), The Varieties of History, New York, Meridian Books, 1956. p. 872.

110 Hannah Arendt, op. cit. pp. 310-311.

111 Chapter Four offers an explanation of the value positions underlying the arbitrariness of the authors.

112 See Carl Friedrich and Z. Brzezinski, op. cit. (1965). pp. 47-57.

113 Hannah Arendt, op. cit. p. 443.

114 Carl Friedrich and Z. Brzezinski, op. cit. (1965). p. 90.

115 Ibid.

116 See in particular Walter Gieber "News is what Newspapermen Make It", and, D. Manning White "The 'Gatekeeper'; a case study in the Selection of News", both in L. A. Dexter and D. Manning White (eds.) People, Society and Mass Communications, London, Collier-MacMillan, 1964. pp. 173-182 and 160-172 respectively.

117 Felix Greene A Curtain of Ignorance, New York, Doubleday, 1965.

118 Carl Friedrich and Z. Brzezinski, op. cit. (1965). p. 10.

119 Closely connected to this tendency is the failure of the concept to consider the question of function. This is discussed in a little more detail later.

120 Hannah Arendt, op. cit. p. IX.

121 H. Kohn, preface to Sigmund Neumann, op. cit. p. VIII.

122 Z. Brzezinski, op. cit. p. 71.

123 Carl Friedrich and Z. Brzezinski, op. cit. (1965). p. VIII.

124 Hannah Arendt, op. cit. p. 308 (footnote).

125 Sigmund Neumann, op. cit. p. IX.

126 Ibid. p. 54.

127 Hannah Arendt, op. cit. p. XI.

128 Carl Friedrich and Z. Brzezinski, op. cit. (1965). p. 15.

129 Carl Friedrich "The Unique Character of Totalitarian Society", in Carl Friedrich (ed.) Totalitarianism, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1965. (Proceedings of a Conference held at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, March 1953). p. 47.

130 See Carl Friedrich and Z. Brzezinski, op. cit. (1965). p. 19. However, many authors are loathe to admit any difference at all between Stalin's Russia and Hitler's Germany. See, for example, Hannah Arendt, op. cit; E. Hoffer The True Believer, London, Seeber and Warburg, 1952; William Ebenstein, American Democracy in World Perspective, London, Harper & Row, 1967; William Ebenstein Two Ways of Life, New York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1966; William Ebenstein Totalitarianism: New Perspectives, New York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1962; Hans Buchheim Totalitarian Rule, Middletown, Wesleyan University Press, 1968; Franz Borkenau, op. cit. especially pp. 239 and 247; Zevedei Barbu Democracy and Dictatorship, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956; John A. Armstrong The Politics of Totalitarianism, New York, Random House, 1961.

131 See Gabriel Almond and James Coleman The Politics of Developing Areas, Princeton University Press, 1960. pp. 3-65.

132 For a good criticism of the use of one concept to describe varied political systems see A. J. Groth, "The 'Isms' in Totalitarianism", American Political Science Review, Vol. LVIII, No. 4, December 1964. pp. 888-901. Adolf Hitler himself also acknowledged that differences existed between National Socialism and the Stalinist variety of Communism. See Adolf Hitler in a speech to the Labour Front, Berlin, May 10th 1933, quoted in Norman Baynes, (ed.), The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, London, Oxford University Press, 1942. p. 433.

133 Carl Friedrich and Z. Brzezinski, op. cit. (1965). p. 15.

134 Ibid. p. 4.

135 Ibid. p. 15.

136 Sigmund Neumann, op. cit. p. 1. It should, perhaps, also be stated that Franz Neumann did not share this view completely, but nevertheless did emphasise the difference between National Socialist dictatorship and older dictatorships because of technology.

137 See Hannah Arendt, op. cit. p. 460.

138 See Franz Neumann Behemoth, London, Oxford University Press, 1942.

139 See Hannah Arendt, op. cit. pp. 459, 445, 453, 444, 438 and 445 respectively.

140 Ibid. p. VII.

141 Hannah Arendt, discussant to paper by Jerry Gliksman, op. cit. p. 78.

142 Hannah Arendt, op. cit. (1967). p. 339. See also the lack of supportive evidence concerning her correlation between power and visibility of government agencies. p. 403.

143 Ibid. p. 321 (footnote 29).

144 Carl Friedrich and Z. Brzezinski, op. cit. (1965). pp. 42 and 39.

145 George Kennan, op. cit. p. 18.

146 Carl Friedrich and Z. Brzezinski, op. cit. (1965), p. XI.

147 Robert Tucker, op. cit. (1961) and Robert Tucker, "The Dictator and Totalitarianism". World Politics, Vol. XVII, No. 4, July 1965. pp. 555-584.

148 Robert Tucker, op. cit. (1961).

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150 B. Wolfe Communist Totalitarianism, Boston, Beacon Press, 1956.

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155 Boris Meissner, "Totalitarian Rule and Social Change", in Z. Brzezinski, (ed.), Dilemmas of Change in Soviet Politics, New York, Columbia University Press, 1969. pp. 74-82.

156 Ibid. pp. 74-75.

157 See the three books by William Ebenstein referred to in footnote 130.

158 William Ebenstein American Democracy in World Perspective, London, Harper & Row, 1967. p. 47.

159 Ibid. pp. XVII and XVIII respectively.

160 Ibid. pp. 37-39.

161 Ibid. p. 39.

162 Ibid. p. 36.

163 Philip Moseley, "The Growth of Russian Studies", in H. Fisher American Research on Russia, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1959. pp. 6-7.

164 Ibid. p. 7.

165 Philip Moseley, "International Affairs", in Warren Weaver U.S. Philanthropic Foundations, New York, Harper & Row, 1967. p. 383.

166 Ibid. p. 375.

167 Carnegie Corporation, Annual Report, New York, Carnegie Corporation, 1954. p. 28.

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169 Ford Foundation, The University and World Affairs: Report of the Committee on the University and World Affairs, New York, Ford Foundation, 1960. p. 1.

170 E. M. Dirksen Communism in Action, Washington, U.S. Government Printing House, 1946. p. iii.

171 Andrew Carnegie The Gospel of Wealth, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1962. p. 28.

172 Friedrich and Brzezinski, op. cit. (1965). p. XII.

173 See Franz Neumann, op. cit.

174 See Bertram Wolfe Communist Totalitarianism, Boston, Beacon Press, 1956.

175 The reasons for such a 'fit' have already been discussed. The "popular" concept was, after all, simply a broad description of the USSR and Germany in the thirties.

176 The extent of pro-Russian sentiment during the War has already been discussed in Chapter I.

177 Marquis W. Childs, New York Post, November 30th 1946, and quoted in D. F. Fleming The Cold War, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1961. p. 431.

178 Quoted in David Horowitz The Free World Colossus, New York, Hill and Wang, 1965. p. 99.

179 Time Magazine, Vol. XXIV, Number 18, November 2nd 1959. p. 34.

180 New York Times, June 17th 1948.

181 Congressional Record, Vol. 97, June 14th 1951. pp. 6556-6602 and quoted in David Horowitz From Yalta to Vietnam, London, Penguin, 1967. p. 103.

182 Final Report of Select Committee to Investigate Foundations and other Organisations. 82nd Congress, 2nd Session, House Report Number 2514, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1953. p. 9 and quoted in F. Emerson Andrews Philanthropic Foundations, New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1956. p. 344.

183 Ibid. p. 345.

184 See Carnegie Corporation, Annual Report, New York, Carnegie Corporation, 1954. pp. 100-102.

185 New York Times, August 20th 1959.

186 New York Times, September 6th 1959.

187 Ibid.

188 New York Times, September 14th 1959.

189 New York Times, September 12th 1959.

190 Gabriel Kolko "The Decline of American Radicalism", Studies on the Left, Vol. 6, Number 5, September - October 1966. p. 22.

191 George Seldes The People Don't Know: the American Press and the Cold War, New York, Gaer, 1949.

192 Neil D. Houghton, "The Challenge to Political Scientists in Recent American Foreign Policy: Scholarship or Indoctrination", American Political Science Review, Vol. 52, Number , 1958. p. 682.

193 Quoted in David Eakins "Objectivity and Commitment", Studies on the Left, Vol. I, Number I, Fall 1959. pp. 44-45.

194 New York Times, June 17th 1948.

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197 Eakins, op. cit. p. 50.

198 Jerry Farber, "The Student as Nigger", in Jerry Farber The Student as Nigger, North Hollywood, Contact Books, 1969. p. 120.

199 Raymond Fosdick, "We Must Not Fear Change", New York Times Magazine, July 2nd 1950. p. 5.

200 Martin Wolfson, letter to New York Times Magazine, April 13th 1949. p. 2.

201 Barrington Moore, op. cit. p. 87.

202 Monthly Review Editorial, Vol. II, Number 7, November 1959. p. 183.

203 Barrows Dunham, "Thinkers, Treasurers and the Cold War", Monthly Review, Vol. 12, Number 5, September 1960. pp. 318.

204 In this case "ideology" is defined as a set of ideas serving a vested interest in society by legitimating, explaining and sanctifying the position or actions of that vested interest.

205 Quoted in David Horowitz, op. cit. (1965). p. 100.

206 New York Times, May 7th 1948.

207 New York Times, September 25th 1950.

208 New York Times, October 1st 1950.

209 For historical studies supporting this view of U.S. foreign policy see Fleming, op. cit.; Horowitz, op. cit. (1967), and David Horowitz (ed.) Corporations and the Cold War, London, Monthly Review Press, 1969.

210 Fleming, op. cit. p. 215.

211 Quoted in Horowitz, op. cit. (1967). p. 68.

212 See Fleming, op. cit. p. 436.

213 Nashville Banner, November 15th 1944 and quoted in Fleming, op. cit. p. 256.

214 Tom Lehrer, "That Was The Year That Was", Reprise Records, Number 6179.

215 Ebenstein, op. cit. (1962). pp. 17-19.

216 Carl Friedrich and Z. Brzezinski, op. cit. (1965), p. 137.

217 New York Times, February 7th 1950.

218 Record of the United States House of Congress, 62nd Congress, 1947, page 2603 and quoted in Walter LaFeber (ed.) America in the Cold War, New York, John Wiley, 1969. p. 59.

219 Ibid.

220 Ibid. p. 53.

221 History in fact suggests that the actual relationship was that anything affecting U.S. interests was defined as totalitarian and/or Communist, thus making it fair game for U.S. intervention. See in particular Fleming, op. cit. and Horowitz, op. cit. (1967).

222 Ronald Steel Pax Americana, London, Hamish Hamilton, 1968. p. 19.

223 President Kennedy, quoted in Steel, op. cit. p. 3.

224 President Johnson; see New York Times, October 26th 1967.

225 New Statesman, May 8th 1970.

226 Steel, op. cit. p. 15.

227 Harold Lavine and Jack Wechsler War Propaganda and the U.S., New Haven, Yale University Press, 1940. p. 285.

228 Quoted in Horowitz, op. cit. (1967). p. 141.

229 John Foster Dulles, "John Foster Dulles Talks to Britain: Text of Television Interview", London, ATV, 1958. p. 13.

230 Steel, op. cit. p. 6.

231 United States Information Services, "The Middle East: Policy Statements", Washington, Government Printing Office, 1962. p. 31.

232 There has been relatively little research undertaken on the Council on Foreign Relations. However, the studies that have been completed suggest that the Council acts informally as one of the main agencies determining U.S. foreign policy. See in particular Joseph Kraft "School for Statesmen", Harpers, Vol. 217, Number 1298, July 1958. pp. 64-69. According to Kraft the Council "has been the seat of some basic governmental decisions, has set the context for many more, and has repeatedly served as a recruiting ground for ranking officials" (Kraft, op. cit. p. 64). Within the Council there is a highly organised system of study groups, and it is within these groups that the greatest influence lies. For example, "Eisenhower came (to the study group) with a

vague predilection in favour of building up Europe. When he left, European aid was a ruling conviction", (Kraft, op. cit. p. 66). The Council, in 1942, organised the framework for post-war policy planning and was influential in deciding the character of the United Nations, the U.S. decision not to remove the Japanese Emperor, U.S. policy over German reperations and, in particular, the necessity to combat totalitarian Communism.

233 Mr. X, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 25, Number 4, July 1947. pp. 566-583.

234 Eakins, op. cit. p. 53.

235 Sigmund Neumann, op. cit. pp. xviii-xix.

236 Almond and Coleman, op. cit.

237 Robert Merton Social Theory and Social Structure, New York, Free Press, 1967. pp. 19-85.

238 Ibid. p. 27.

239 See H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills From Max Weber, New York, Oxford University Press, 1946. pp. 80-95.

240 J. Commons Legal Foundations of Capitalism, New York, MacMillan, 1924. pp. 47-64.

241 M. Janowitz The Professional Soldier, Illinois, Free Press, 1960. p. 258.

242 Amitai Etzioni Complex Organisations, London, Free Press, 1964. pp. 4-22.

243 The classification suggested here differs from Etzioni's in that coercion is defined more narrowly as coercion legitimated through a particular power system. Etzioni's broad categorisation of coercion permits too easily the identification of material and coercive controls as being one of the same thing, for the denial of material resources could easily have the same net effect as does his notion of coercion (i.e. death, deformity, etc.).

244 Etzioni, op. cit. p. 5.

245 Abbie Hoffman Revolution for the Hell of It, New York, Dial Press, 1968. p. 115. It would appear that at least one police department in the U.S. is also appreciative of the opportunity costs involved with the use of physical coercion. The Berkeley police force, according to Tom Hayden, is now fostering a new image of itself as a young, well-educated group of community-minded law officers (See Tom Hayden, Introduction to Frank Browning, "They Shoot Hippies Don't They?", Ramparts, Vol. 9, Number 5, November 1970. p. 14). New police strategies are a part of this new image and the police are no longer; "into spontaneous police brutality; their speciality is full-scale counter-insurgency. Brutality is only a tactic within a larger strategy to remove cultural and political radicalism from Berkeley". Ibid.

246 This is the case with most dissident groups once the threshold between tolerance and repression has been crossed. In most cases, coercion is the only form of effective control that remains.

247 Jules Henry Culture Against Man, New York, Vintage, 1963. p. 15.

248 Herbert Marcuse One Dimensional Man, Boston, Beacon Press, 1964. p. 5.

249 Ibid. p. 9.

250 Ibid.

251 See Henry, op. cit. pp. 45-100.

252 For a brief summary of these see Ely Chinoy Society, New York, Random House, 1963. p. 22.

253 The work of Gehlen is briefly discussed in Peter Berger Invitation to Sociology, New York, Doubleday, 1963. pp. 89-91.

254 Pierre Van den Berghe South Africa - a Study in Conflict, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1967. pp. 131-132.

255 Leo Kuper An African Bourgeoisie, London, Yale University Press, 1965. p. 68.

256 Talcott Parsons, "The School as a Social System: Some of its Functions in American Society", in A. H. Halsey, J. Floud and C. A. Anderson Education, Economy and Society, London, Free Press, 1961. p. 436.

257 Quoted in Van den Berghe, op. cit. p. 130.

258 Ibid.

259 Minister of Education, House of Assembly Debates, Hansard, 27-29, May 1957, as quoted in UNESCO "Apartheid - Its effects on Education, Science, Culture and Information", Paris, Unesco, 1967. p. 87, and unpublished paper, Kogila Adam, "Dialectic of Higher Education for the Colonised", shortly to be published in Heribert and Kogila Adam (eds.) South Africa: Sociological Perspectives, London, Oxford University Press.

260 Fred Greenstein Children and Politics, Newhaven, Yale University Press, 1965.

261 Lewis Coser, "Prospects for the New Nations: Totalitarianism, Authoritarianism or Democracy?", in Lewis Coser (ed.) Political Sociology, London, Harper, 1967.

262 Ibid. p. 250.

263 Ibid. p. 253.

264 Ibid. p. 252.

265 See Moodley, op. cit.

266 The Star, Johannesburg, December 21st 1968, and quoted in Moodley, op. cit. pp. 17-18.

267 John Hatch, "Apartheid's Growing Dilemma", New Statesman, May 1st 1970. p. 606. For a theoretical discussion, see Herbert Blumer "Industrialisation and Race Relations" in Guy Hunter (ed.) Industrialisation and Race Relations, London, Oxford University Press, 1965. pp. 220-253.

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