

THE GEOGRAPHICAL, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL
IMPLICATIONS OF DE-URBANISATION AND DE-CENTRALISATION
IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

by

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B.A. (Hons.), Simon Fraser University, 1971

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
in the Department
of
Geography

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SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY

April 1975

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ABSTRACT

A socialist landscape is in the process of emergence in the People's Republic of China today. Two facets of this landscape transformation form the focus of this thesis, namely, de-centralisation and de-urbanisation. Understanding of the Chinese landscape is sought through the utilisation of an historical and theoretical analysis of the domestic conditions of China and the connection of those conditions to the relationships with both the socialist and capitalist realms. Two interrelated themes run through the analysis of Chinese historical geography since 1919; first, the nature of the revolutionary struggle which took place in China, and second, the sinicising of Marxist-Leninist theory, both of which, it is argued, provide an understanding of the unique city-country relationships in China today.

Initially, the historic role of the peasant in agricultural society is investigated. Special consideration is given to the importance of the role of the peasantry as visualised by Mao in his "Report of an Investigation of the Peasant Movement". In this report, Mao perceives the peasantry in agricultural society as analogous to the proletariat in industrial society. The thesis discusses this and other conceptual and methodological differences between Mao and the Moscow-oriented Chinese Communists and the theoretical split within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) engendered by Mao's report. It poses questions relevant to the association and the estrangement of the Kuomintang (KMT) from the tri-partite alliance of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the KMT and the CCP.

Ancilliary to the peasant question, the May 4th Movement is investigated because of its importance in the rebuilding of a Chinese nationalist consciousness and to the creation of a worker-student-literati rapport.

A major objective of this thesis is to show how the vicissitudes of a war--simultaneously a revolutionary civil war and a fight for national liberation--forced a hunted and persecuted minority of revolutionaries from defeat after defeat to ultimate victory. It follows the course of events and demonstrates how the revolutionaries profited from successive defeats and established a revolutionary headquarters in north-central China at Yen-an.

Yen-an became the "cultural hearth" from which revolutionary features of contemporary Chinese society came into being. Most important to this particular work is the emphasis therein devoted toward attainment of a de-centralised organisation of society. This is one aspect of the philosophy which developed in Yen-an and became known as the "Yen-an Way".

It is argued that the influence of the Soviet Union after Liberation in 1949 resulted in a temporary (and from the perspective of present Chinese thinking, an unwise) move toward centralisation in the Soviet model. A reassessment of the Yen-an concepts, engendered by the emergence of contradictions in Chinese development, led to the split between China and the Soviet Union on the international level and a re-orientation to a policy of de-centralisation on the domestic level. The consequence of de-centralisation and de-urbanisation, as of this writing, is that an estimated 27 million people have moved out of the 17 largest cities, pointing the way to a new socialist landscape.

DEDICATION

*To Amber, who started me; to Marge, who
believes with me; to my Stranded comrades
from P.S.A., who taught me.*

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PREFACE

This thesis will examine and appraise the socio-geographic phenomena of de-urbanisation and de-centralisation in the People's Republic of China.

Based on the premise of cultural relativism, a conscious effort is made to assess the developments and behaviour in China from the viewpoint of the Chinese rather than an ethnocentric, comparative evaluation based on the accepted criteria of the observer's society.

The nomenclature of Marx, Lenin and Mao has been selected for this work. Although euphemisms might be found, it is maintained that word substitutions obscure concepts and often prove imprecise and cumbersome.

The bibliography contains source material which runs the gamut of the political spectrum, from those who perceive China and its development in a pejorative sense, to those who recognise no imperfections. Neither is considered free from error.

While the writer's perspective has been shaped by the material itself, much insight has also been gained from conversations and interviews with eminent China Scholars:

Professor M. Briemberg, Rhodes Scholar. Area: political/technological/educational development; the Great Leap Forward and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

Professor emeritus, Royal Roads College, Victoria, Charles Burchold. Area: Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the KMT.

Dr. Edward Friedman, professor University of Wisconsin, member Concerned Asian Scholars. Area: China foreign policy.

Professor Rene Goldman, U.B.C., educated University of Peking and Columbia. Area: Chinese history and Confucianism.

William Hinton, author of Fanshen, Iron Oxen, Turning Point and 100 Day War. Participant observer in China from 1947 to 1952. Chronicled the transition to and consolidation of power by the Chinese Communist Party.

✓ Dr. Graham Johnson, Professor U.B.C., Sociologist and Anthropologist. Area: peasant movements and communes in China.

Dr. Paul T.K. Lin, degrees in International Law, Political Science and Sociology; Director, Asian Studies, McGill. Lived and worked in China from 1949 through 1964.

Dr. Rhoads Murphey, professor University of Michigan, Sino-geographer. Area: Resource and industrial development.

Dr. Sam Noumoff, professor Asian Studies, McGill, Political Scientist and analyst of China's political movement.

Mr. Jack Scott, worker, long time friend of China and author of Sweat and Struggle, Painful Political Decisions and Two Roads.

Mr. Earl Willmot, missionary, teacher and resident of China for 31 years (1921-1952), author of numerous articles on China, guest lecturer, U.B.C.

Dr. William Willmot, professor U.B.C. and University of New Zealand; Anthropologist; born and educated through high school in China; author of Political Structure of the Chinese Community in Cambodia; Economic Origins in the Chinese City; and Economic Organisation in Chinese Society.

The writings of Baran, Sweezy, Mills, Buchanan and Bettelheim have influenced my interpretive approach to data. Bettelheim's objective was to trace and clarify the Soviet Union's move toward revisionism. This work intends to interpret the different path taken by China in its rejection of revisionism. A similar methodology to that utilised by Bettelheim has been employed. Paul M. Sweezy describes it:

. . . this work is not the kind of history which professional historians are trained to produce. Quite apart from the fact that Bettelheim had a very specific (political) purpose in mind, there is a notable absence of research in original materials such as archives, etc. Bettelheim, of course, makes extensive use of the published speeches and writings of Bolshevik leaders and of

official Party documents, but the rest of his sources are mostly drawn from the vast monographic literature on the Soviet Union and Soviet History.*

Particular attention has been given to the biographies of current leaders, monographs of Chinese society, Party documents, speeches and internal news coverage in an effort to better understand, and put into perspective, the aims and actions of the new society. The material becomes, as Sweezy put it:

. . . not only essential for analytical works like Bettelheim's but receives its *raison d'etre* and justification through them. At least for Marxists, *historia gratia historae* makes no more sense than *ars gratia artis*.*

In the mountains of publications and books relating China's path through history there is a virtual lacuna of data explicit to de-urbanisation. Considerable information alludes to de-centralisation. De-urbanisation is referred to peripherally rather than specifically. The data are extricated from material written for other audiences with other purposes in mind. This thesis attempts to organise the scattered bits of information into a more sharply defined form.

The problem is further exacerbated by an absence of intellectual debate on the specifics of de-urbanisation and de-centralisation. The subject has not been argued widely, no "schools of thought" have been developed and thus no body of knowledge has been garnered from which to publish detailed works.

Similarly, its geographic, social and political significance has generally been ignored. While social scientists would hardly

* Sweezy, Paul M. "Review of Bettelheim's Nature of Soviet Society"-Monthly Review, 26:6, Nov. 1974, pp. 5N & 6N.

dispute the multitude of problems created by the urban growth patterns of industrialised countries, none has yet suggested utilising the Chinese experience to consider the possibility (or advisability) of reversing the trends.

All revolutionary movements create their own way of seeing. Both China and Russia profess a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist ideology. Interpretations of that ideology are at variance--each determined by national interest. China's vision of its society evolved from its unique objective condition, its interpretation and sinicisation of Marxism-Leninism and the simultaneous struggle for national liberation from imperialism and a class struggle engulfing the nation in a revolutionary civil war.

An examination will be made of the results of that struggle and China's search for answers to the myriad problems facing the new government since 1949.

INTRODUCTION

"Although Maoists share the utopian goal Marx proclaimed, they differ significantly in their historic understanding of the problem, and the means by which they strive to resolve it are profoundly different from anything Marx or Lenin might have conceived."¹

The socialist transformation of the Chinese landscape is unparalleled in the experience of the underdeveloped world. The distinctive character of Chinese development is brought into bold relief when it is compared with what has been a fairly standard developmental scenario.

Developing nations face common problems. All must solve their industrial and agricultural development so as to meet their internal requirements and to withstand their external threats.

Usually, as attested to by Baron, Frank, Magdoff, Sweezy, and others, new or developing nations come under the influence of foreign powers before they have a chance to develop either a plan or even a common ideology.² The new nation's economy becomes locked into the dominant nation's economy and the exploitative relationship is developed through unequal exchange and dependency.

Development, or more accurately, "the development of underdevelopment", is produced through the exploitation of natural resources and through the dislocation and exploitation of a large, cheap labour force--uprooting the peasantry from its traditional life style.

As a new nation becomes dependent upon a dominant nation, its internal spatial development mirrors the global pattern: the developing nation becomes a microcosm of the metropolitan-hinterland macrocosm. The internal response to the underdeveloped

country's dependent status is the creation of urban bureaucracies and the expansion of service industries in the metropolitan centres. Hinterlands become increasingly impoverished in response to these centralising bureaucracies. The city thus attains political and economic dominance over the countryside.

China's developmental strategy breaks with this model in several significant ways. This study's focus is upon two of them --instead of urbanisation, China today is de-urbanising. Rather than centralisation, it is de-centralising.

The concept of DE-urbanisation is unfamiliar. Urbanisation, however, is described by the Encyclopedia of Social Sciences as "characterised by movement of rural people from small communities concerned chiefly or solely with agriculture to other communities, generally larger, whose activities are primarily centred in government, trade, manufacturing or allied interests . . . Urbanisation depends largely on the extent to which industrial and mercantile products are *divorced from* agriculture."³ (Emphasis added).

Lamphard is more specific: "Specialisation of function makes inevitably for specialisation of areas. *It promotes a territorial division of labour between town and country.* City growth is simply the concentration of differentiated, but functionally-integrated specialisms in national locales. The modern city is a mode of social organisation which furthers efficiency in economic activity."⁴ (Emphasis added).

De-urbanisation is one component of the process of de-centralisation in China and is defined as:

3.

- a. The urban centre's population is either static or increasing at a lower rate than the national increase.
- b. The urban centre has a decreasing population, or
- c. The urban centre expands areally while its general and core area population densities decrease and its internal spatial arrangements are altered so as to integrate housing, manufacturing, agriculture and administration throughout the entire municipality. This differs markedly from the western experience where the expanded city is "zoned" for industry, for core (administration and finance), for low, medium and high density, etc., with "bedroom areas" at distances from the workplace requiring expensive and elaborate road and transport systems for commuting. As Prof. Briemberg explained at a recent SFU lecture, each industry is, typically, surrounded by agricultural land, administration and housing, and shopping and entertainment facilities for the residents. In effect, agriculture is brought *into* the city.⁵ The ideal, as reported by Leanardon, is that no one will reside more than ten minutes by bicycle 6 from the work place.

The altering and rearranging of the urban landscape (as described in (c) above) is implicit to all urban areas in China.

De-urbanisation says much about the composition of urban centres and their industrial base, in relation to the goal of reducing the disparity between town and country. It is intended to increase economic efficiency in rural areas as well as urban areas. De-urbanisation is of both local and national importance and central to China's model of de-centralisation.

De-centralisation is primarily a national concern. Its effect is a spreading of the industrial base and a broadening of the decision-making process. Within this rubric provisions are made to develop de-urbanisation, national defence, transportation, adequate and sufficient exploitation of the national resources,

and the minimisation of regional disparities -- including those between town and country.

Marxist scholars are conflict theorists and believe that society evolves from each stage of development by struggle. Each resolution in turn contains contradictions which become the seeds for conflict at the next stage. China is a classic example. The examination of more than fifty years of a succession of victories, defeats, compromises and reassessments by the Chinese Communist Party testify to the validity of this theory.

Marxists agree on the holistic approach to understanding, that is, nothing can be understood in isolation nor extracted from reality. Since the only real science of society is the *total* science of society and since society keeps changing, then it is reasonable to assume that theory will develop and evolve also.

That Marx, Engels and Lenin were relevant to the nineteenth and early twentieth century in Europe is obvious. Further they outlined the basic framework for the understanding of the capitalist system. Yet they never claimed to have expounded the ultimate universal theory. It is argued in this study that Mao Tsetung has contributed to the evolution (synthesis) of Marxism-Leninism and continues its direction. Mao's formulations are all the more important to us in that he is dealing with the problems of the emergence of socialism in the middle of the twentieth century when the parameters of capitalism have changed in many ways from those of the nineteenth century.

The question relating to the role of both the industrial

proletariat and the peasantry has long been an issue between Marxist scholars. Original comments by Marx and Engels as outlined in the Communist Manifesto were made very much in the context of the emergence of industrial capitalism in nineteenth century Europe. The role of the peasantry in Russia during and after 1917 needs to be firmly placed in the context of the nature of the Soviet Revolution. The obviously revolutionary role of China's peasants effectively negates any deterministic notion of the industrial proletariat being *the* revolutionary vanguard. It necessitates a re-evaluation of revolutionary forces in countries where the overwhelming percentage of the people are peasants.

Finally, the theory of underdevelopment and world capitalist expansion, as formulated by Frank, Magdoff, etc., points out that *no* nation can develop or exist in isolation from world mainstream development. The emergence of socialism in one country, no matter how large, will of necessity need to be cognisant of the strength of world capitalism at any moment in history.

China's need to develop an internal structure and an external defence mechanism must be seen in the light of policies pursued by both the Soviet Union and the United States. Fear of counter-revolution or invasion is necessarily a principal consideration in Chinese policy and must affect it. The reaction of China in the 1950s and 1960s will therefore be viewed in this context as outlined by Snow:

During the 1950s and 1960s the United States followed a policy of armed encirclement or containment of China which aimed to isolate and bring about the collapse of the People's Republic. The Soviets, however, were also

6.

massing men and materials in an effort to thwart the emergence of China as a viable alternative to the Russian hegemony. 7

Consequently an understanding of de-urbanisation and de-centralisation is placed in the context of the sinicisation of Marxism-Leninism which is, in brief, the major objective of this study.

NOTES - INTRODUCTION

1. Maurice Meisner, "Utopian Socialist Themes in Maoism", essay in Peasant Rebellion and Communist Revolution in Asia, edited by John W. Lewis (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974), p. 208.
2. See Baran and Sweezy, Monopoly Capital; Andre Gunder Frank, The Development of Underdevelopment, Harry Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism.
3. The Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Vol. XV, (New York: MacMillan and Co., 1959), pp. 189-190.
4. Eric E. Lamphard, Regional Development and Planning, (Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 1964), pp. 64-65.
5. M. Briemberg, Lecture at S.F.U., March 25, 1975 (Tape, S.F.U. Library).
6. F. Léanardon, Chine: Vraie ou Faussé Désurbanisation, (Paris: Press Francaise, 1973), p. 2.
7. Edgar Snow, Red China Today, (New York: Vintage Books, 1971), p. 38.



MAP 1

PROVINCES of CHINA

CHAPTER I

FROM FEUDALISM TO SOCIALISM

Nature of Peasant Societies

The values, morés, superstitions and legends which combine to form a part of the superstructure of a society are neither lightly discarded or easily modified. This is particularly true within traditional agrarian societies principally because the peasantry upon which such systems are built have little more than their accepted folkways to sustain them.

Anthropologists and sociologists attest to a contradictory situation within peasant-based societies; they are both rebellious and conservative.¹ The history of these societies is a chronicle of protest, uprising and rebellion. The tendency of peasant movements toward ultra-conservatism has generally negated the gains of struggle. Politically unschooled and knowing no form of government other than that which had governed them, they replaced leaders instead of ideas. By treating the symptoms and not the disease, a new cycle only assured succeeding generations a very similar dilemma.

To re-structure a society in which the new (and radical) values of the oppressed class become dominant requires massive and determined struggle, long beyond the years of revolutionary warfare. Johnson noted: "China stands as one of the foremost examples of a traditional agrarian society in which her peasants have radically altered the structural conditions of their existence."²

The recurrence of rebellion is an integral constituent of peasant-based societies. In China, as Mao pointed out:

"There were hundreds of uprisings, great and small, all of them peasant revolts or peasant revolutionary wars--from the uprisings of Chen Sheng, Wu Kuang, Hsiang Yu and Liu Pang in the Chin Dynasty, those of Hsinshih, Pinglin, the Red Eyebrows, the Bronze Horses and the Yellow Turbans in the Han Dynasty, those of Li Mi and Tou Chien-teh in the Sui Dynasty, those of Wang Hsien-chih and Huang Chao in the Tang Dynasty, that of Chu Yuan-chang in the Yuan Dynasty, and that of Li Tzu-cheng in the Ming Dynasty, down to the uprising known as the War of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom in the Ching Dynasty. The scale of peasant uprisings and peasant wars constituted the real motive force of historical development in Chinese feudal society. For each of the major peasant uprisings, and wars dealt a blow to the feudal regime of the time, and hence more or less furthered the growth of the social productive forces. 3

Each rebellion, each uprising, weakened or upset the dynasty that was challenged. Ironically, the forces exerted by the Taipings, the Niens and the many peasant secret societies strengthened the Manchu Dynasty by motivating the expansion and modernisation of its military. At the same time, however, the tremendous cost of recurrent war left the dynasty weakened and vulnerable to foreign domination. With external influence and the impact of imperial intrusion, the Manchu Dynasty, too, came to an end in 1911.

Whether or not the movements given life by the peasants proved even briefly successful in relieving their plight, millions of victims died as nameless casualties. The Taiping rebellion, for example, is estimated to have cost between ten and thirty million casualties. The province of Anhwei was decimated by the death of nearly 70% of its population.⁴ And survivors invariably found themselves helpless pawns controlled by new and often more despotic regimes. As R.H. Tawney observed in the early 1930s:

. . . the position of the rural population is that of a man standing permanently up to his neck in water, so that even a ripple is sufficient to drown him. . . . such ripples repeatedly turn into waves, sweeping millions to an agonizing death by starvation and relegating tens of millions of others to a marginal existence at the mercy of imponderable natural and 5 political forces.

The tradition of rebellion was kept alive by the tales and verse of the Chinese story-tellers and by songs such as the following from the beginning of the nineteenth century:

The people of the top class owe us money,
Those of the middle classes should wake up,
Lower classes come with us!
It is better than hiring an ox to plough thin land!⁶

During the final phase of the civil war (1945-49) in China, the "speak bitterness" sessions in the liberated areas revealed that the peasantry as a whole nurtured a deep and lasting hatred for their oppressors. The repressed bitterness engendered by years of accumulated suffering and personal degradation was recounted at every village, every town.⁷

Throughout history the peasants in China have always played a major role in local uprisings, as well as being the determining factor in organised forms of rebellion. But never before this century (as will be developed subsequently) have the circumstances of rebellion so combined as to produce the revolutionary developmental changes which are occurring in today's China.

A revolutionary Communist leadership and a strongly developed nationalist consciousness motivated this transformation. The concept of de-urbanisation and de-centralisation is a significant example of the moving away from a traditional feudal mentality, which only replicated the old order, into an evolutionary process

of radical experiments which changed the whole structure.

Stillborn Republic

China underwent two revolutions in the twentieth century. The first, reformist in nature, was led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1911. While this first revolution did not deal with the accumulated miseries of the peasant, it did bring into focus the principles of nationalism, and introduced a concept new to China--republicanism.

Although Dr. Sun had great intellectual appeal to large numbers of urban peoples, he had no power base, did not have the support of the military or the financial structure, nor did he have a well organised party organisation from which to draw personnel capable of administering a government attempting to rule by entirely new democratic concepts. Within two months Sun Yat-sen conceded his inability to cope and conferred the presidency on Yuan Shih-kai. Yuan had effectively served the Manchu dynasty in civilian and military postings and enjoyed the loyalty of the military, although he was convinced that China's greatest need was for a new emperor: himself.

Three years after assuming the presidency, Yuan had consolidated his power and was ready to seek a new "Mandate to Heaven".⁸ Despite foreign support he was ultimately frustrated in this attempt, and by 1916, the first revolution had faded into a period of warlord rule.

The regional army officers who had maintained the republic by force of arms became "warlords" and partitioned China into individual territories where each governed, often with foreign

support and finance, as a dictator in a balkanised territory.⁹

The suffering of the Chinese people is described by a Chinese intellectual and quoted by Orville Schell:

In all the civil wars, the rifles and field guns came from abroad. Bombs and powder came from abroad. The money comes from abroad. It has gone so far that in recent years the flour and military provisions come from abroad. Only the blood and flesh of our dead countrymen who kill one another on the battlefield are Chinese. 10

Inter-class Understanding Develops

By 1916, the governments of France and Great Britain, faced with a serious war-induced labour shortage, contracted with the Chinese government to recruit workers for labour service in France. To many Chinese intellectuals the idea had merit. By aiding in the war effort, it was reasoned, the Chinese would be able to strengthen their argument that England should abandon its support of the Japanese control of China's internal affairs which had become increasingly oppressive and humiliating with the imposition, by the Japanese, of the "Twenty-one Demands" in 1915.¹¹ By the end of 1918, 140,000 Chinese workers were employed by the French, British and American governments. In addition to the Chinese employed purely as menials, over 30,000 middle and lower-middle class Chinese intellectuals were used as worker/translators with the largely illiterate labourers.¹²

Workers and intellectuals toiling together was unprecedented in the Chinese experience. It provided a unique opportunity for two hitherto disparate and often hostile classes to learn about each other. A mutual respect grew from this association and many benefits accrued in the twenties when intellectuals found them-

selves able to organise workers in numerous anti-imperialist struggles.

Growth of Nationalist Consciousness

Concomitant to the large numbers of Chinese working and learning Western ways in Europe, the students within China were agitating against Japanese and other foreign domination of their homeland. The students painted slogans on walls and buildings throughout the nation urging "Don't Forget Our National Humiliation", "Struggle for Sovereignty", and "Throw Out the Warlord Traitors". In the stores, placards advocated "Boycott Foreign Goods".¹³

Touted as the war to end all wars, the armistice after W.W. I brought world-wide expectations that the Versailles Peace Conference would serve as the instrument to ameliorate inequalities between nations. New countries were established, old relationships between colon and colony were modified. The Chinese people expected a resolution of their problems with Japan and the imperialist nations. However, in collusion with the delegate members of the Republic of China, German interests in China were given over as war-time reparations to Japan and no decisions were reached which would benefit the Chinese people.

May 4th Movement

On May 4th, 1919, thousands of students from the colleges and universities in Peking gathered in a massive demonstration to protest the loss of Shantung and the integrity of China's sovereignty. In Peking, the students issued a brief manifesto calling for the support of justice by all the citizens:

. . . We earnestly hope that all agricultural, industrial, commercial and other groups of the whole nation will rise and hold citizens' meetings to strive to secure our sovereignty in foreign affairs and to get rid of the traitors at home. This is the last chance for China in her life and death struggle. Today we swear two solemn oaths with all our fellow countrymen: (1) China's territory may be conquered, but it cannot be given away; (2) The Chinese people may be massacred, but they will not surrender.¹⁴

The movement spread to other cities, other universities and gathered support from workers, merchants and intellectuals. "For the first time in Chinese history, a massive effort was made to organise resistance beyond the intellectual community."¹⁵ Within a few weeks, what had started as purely student protests had engulfed larger segments of the community and a rash of strikes spread throughout the urban centres to protest the signing of the Versailles Treaty. By the 9th of June the students had effectively struck all middle schools and post-secondary schools in more than two hundred large and small cities in twenty-two provinces. Each time the pro-Japanese government in Peking increased its pressure on the students, the students gained further sympathy and new allies. In Shanghai, for example, a merchant strike was organised in one day that effectively closed the city's business. "This meant that within a few hours a city with a population of 1,538,500 was seized by an impromptu and sketchily organised commercial strike in support of the 13,000 striking students."¹⁶ 1919 ✓

The merchants and between 70,000 and 90,000 urban workers (mostly industrial, textile, printing and metal workers) stopped all commercial activity in Shanghai for seven days. It is estimated that more than one hundred companies, factories, bus lines

telephone and telegraph and seven transportation, railroad and steamship lines were involved.¹⁷

Chou Tsetung stressed the sense of unity amongst the Shanghai people:

The movement had such a thorough influence at the grass roots of society that even beggars, thieves, prostitutes and sing-song girls went on strike. Later on, postal clerks, policemen and firemen also threatened that they would stop work if the government maintained its attitude toward the students. 18

It was not a strike for wages or conditions of work; it was a strike that crossed class lines and was the first 'political' strike in China's history. The consciousness of the people precluded a return to pre-May 4th activity.

By January of 1920 Sun Yat-sen was actively approving the actions and results achieved by the students and termed it "a new cultural movement".¹⁹ Dr. Sun did not consider the informed youths in China as revolutionaries but viewed them only as an effective means toward building support for his party, the Kuomintang--the revolutionaries. "There is no doubt that the movement will produce great and everlasting effects if it continues to grow and expand. The success of the revolution which is carried on by our party must depend on a change of thought in China. . . ." ²⁰ In succeeding years, that change of thought would come to include urban/rural priorities.

Birth of the CCP and the First United Front

Mao considered the May 4th movement the beginning of political actions by himself and many others against feudalism, warlordism and imperialism--which changed from an intellectual

movement to a revolutionary mass movement.²¹ He believed it led directly to the most significant occurrence in the chronology of events between the historic May 4th demonstrations and Liberation in 1949; the establishment of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) by twelve men in Shanghai on July 1, 1921.²²

In the beginning the CCP was organisationally bonded to Moscow and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The Soviet Comintern members exercised a high degree of control. The Party's official documents reflected the Soviet influence in the selection of its leadership and in its earliest political and military priorities.²³ By direction of the Comintern, the CCP subordinated its objectives to those of the Kuomintang. An official merger at the KMT Reorganisation Conference in January 1924 made the First United Front operative.²⁴

Both groups had serious weaknesses which the United Front helped overcome. The Kuomintang officer-corps was predominantly of a bourgeois or landlord class background and interest; they had no worker-based support in the cities and their taxing methods, as well as their pressgang conscription tactics, effectively alienated them from the peasant masses in the countryside.²⁵ On the other hand, the Communists with barely three hundred members (mostly intellectuals of varied class backgrounds) understood the theoretical necessity of building a worker constituency in the urban areas. It proved effective in the cities but gave no consideration to the revolutionary potential of the peasantry.²⁶ Working within the Kuomintang, the CCP membership grew to more than a thousand members by the spring of 1925 and by November the

mass actions and the visibility of the Party as the spokesman for the oppressed had attracted ten thousand new members.²⁷ Its supporters and sympathisers numbered in the hundreds of thousands.

Chiang Kai-shek Gains Leadership

In the same year, Sun Yat-sen died in Peking, depriving the two parties (KMT, CCP) of the one personality around which both could ally. Within the Kuomintang, the inevitable struggle for the right of succession was taking place. Under the aegis of Mikhail Borodin of the Comintern, the Japanese educated, Russian trained Chiang Kai-shek became Kuomintang leader. With Borodin's aid, the Generalissimo reorganised the KMT hierarchically along the lines of the Bolshevik model (still in effect in Taiwan).²⁸

Under this reorganisational guise, Chiang removed from the KMT upper echelons all known CCP members. Later, with the help of Shanghai bankers and underworld leaders, he followed this purge with a massacre of CCP supporters. Beginning with 7,000 in Shanghai, it spread to other cities under KMT control.²⁹ Despite these occurrences, Stalin still urged the CCP to cooperate in a United Front.³⁰

Mao Theories Rejected

Mao was not yet in a position of leadership within the Party. His investigations and analysis of the peasant situation continued, as well as his argument that peasants in the countryside should be organised instead of limiting organisational efforts to the proletariat in the urban areas. In continual disagreement with the Soviet trained and influenced Central Committee of the CCP, Mao had been rebuked, disciplined or expelled from office on three

occasions since 1924. The Central Committee refused to accept his "Report of an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan". He was reprimanded and removed from a secretarial position in the Party for his work in forming a peasant's and worker's army which led to the establishment of the soldier's soviets and people's councils. In November of 1927 he was expelled from the Politburo of the Central Committee as a "rightist". His organisational efforts in the Ching kangshan area were considered illegal. He was only reinstated to the Politburo in June of 1928.³¹

With no official Party support and despite the "rightist" charge by Central Committee Chairman Wang Ming, the flexible policy adopted by Mao was, as Seldon noted, "keyed to the problems of survival under extremely arduous conditions in the base areas".³² The Mao-Chu "land to the people" movement was modified from a policy of confiscation and re-distribution of *all land*, as was first promulgated in the Land Law of 1928, to the April 1929 Land Law which called for confiscation of the *public land and the land of the landlord class*.³³

This modification "made it possible for the Communist forces to concentrate on the major enemy at any given time by uniting with a variety of classes and factions, including dissident military and secret society elements and even at times rich peasants."³⁴ The strategy proved successful and the area was stabilised.

As the position of the Communists in the KMT Central Committee deteriorated, making further CCP-KMT collaboration untenable, the Central Committee members joined the exodus of hundreds of Communists within the Nationalist army and moved to Kiangsi. By


December 1931 a Central Soviet Government was formed with Mao serving as Chairman and Chu Teh as Commander-in-Chief of the new Red Army.³⁵

Extermination Campaigns and the Long March

Over a period of time, Chiang launched a series of five encirclement campaigns against the CCP base. Finally, using German military advisors Von Secht and Von Falkenhausen, the fifth encirclement prompted a CCP disengagement culminating in the "Long March" from Kiangsi to Yen-an. (See Map 2). Beginning with over 100,000 men and women, in Snow's words:

. . . there was an average of almost a skirmish a day, somewhere on the line, while altogether fifteen whole days were devoted to major pitched battles. Out of a total of 368 days enroute, 235 were consumed in marches by day, and 18 in marches by night. Of the 100 days of halts--many of which were devoted to skirmishes--56 days were spent in northwestern Szechuan, leaving only 44 days of rest over a distance of about 5,000 miles, or an average of one halt for every 114 miles of marching. The mean daily stage covered was 71 li, or nearly 24 miles--a phenomenal pace for a great army and its transport to average over some of the most hazardous terrain on earth. 36

Along the march, at Tsunyi, Mao was elected Chairman and assumed control of the Party apparatus. In October 1935 some 15,000 survivors of the ordeal reached their destination in Shensi Province: the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region, referred to hereafter as "Yenan". It became one of nineteen wartime bases (see Map 3) isolated by terrain, poor communications and its enemies, and yet the headquarters from which the methods of organisation and the techniques of urban industrial, social and agricultural innovation emanated and evolved into a systematised



Routes of the
Long March



Base Areas



Central Red
Army



Second Front
Army



Fourth Front
Army

Adapted from HARRISON FOREMAN

MAP 2

methodology which became known as the "Yenan Way".³⁷


The Yen-an Way

By 1936 the Communists had consolidated their forces, achieved a cohesive organisation and were concentrating on the most immediate problems of the peasantry--land and taxes.

Land reform was the fundamental and crucial policy which unified the people and it became the core around which a new ideological movement was begun. The CCP modified the Land Reform Programme, i.e. the Red partisans who had consolidated the Yen-an area before the arrival of the Mao-Chu forces had, as in the early Kiangsi experience, expropriated *all* landlord and rich peasant holdings. The Wa-yao-pao conference in December of 1935 sought to build a united front and the land redistribution policy was drastically changed so as to seek a broad intra-class cooperation against the primary enemy, Japan. The Politburo decreed: "The Soviet People's Republic will change its policy toward rich peasants; rich peasant property will not be confiscated, rich peasant land, except for that portion of it in feudal exploitation . . . will not be confiscated."³⁸

Land confiscation and redistribution problems in the Northwest were greatly reduced by reclaiming large areas of unused land (considered 'wasteland') and because the big estates had belonged to absentee landlords or to officials and tax collectors who fled at the approach of the Red Army.

When the Communists actually carried out land reform with no personal profit to themselves, the people began to trust and accept them. By abolishing tax exploitation for all, support was



MAP 3



Areas firmly under C.C.P. administrative control at end of World War II (1945)

gained even from the small landholders and rich peasants. Several important Shensi Communists came from landlord families.³⁹

Social change began very simply with efforts to break down feudal family structures and social relationships, e.g., since women had traditionally been considered mere chattels to be bought and sold at will, the CCP actively championed a broadened Marriage Law which freed the women from bondage and opened up the possibility of women's involvement in the work force as well as in the numerous social and political organisations which were being mobilised.⁴⁰

Free education was instituted and though limited by the prevailing economic and wartime conditions, it nevertheless upgraded the general constituency by extending the knowledge and capabilities of the people. At the same time it allowed for political training and raised the level of proficiency of army recruits.

Additional help was given the people by providing low interest (5%) loans. Simple agricultural implements, seed and fertiliser were supplied to the peasants reclaiming wastelands. An agricultural school and an animal husbandry school were established, free to all.

Food shortages were overcome by mobilising all able-bodied people to participate, according to ability. The CCP urged its cadres "to make widespread propaganda to induce the masses to participate voluntarily, without involving any form of compulsory command."⁴¹ Mao and the other leaders shared in "productive labour" and the Red Army, when not at the front fighting the enemy, worked alongside the peasant to support itself.⁴²

Cooperatives were initiated which extended throughout the range of activities of the people--including the collective use of farm animals (even cavalry horses were used to pull ploughs and carts), and mutual aid in farm production and consumer distribution.

State Enterprises

To stimulate the peasant economy and support the fighting forces, crude handicraft and industrial enterprises were developed with the equipment which the Red Army had carried on their backs during the Long March.⁴³ Additional machines, tools and raw materials were captured during battles with the Japanese, e.g., in areas under Japanese occupation, railway tracks were torn up, sent to the 'rear' and converted into weapons and tools. Among others, these new undertakings included clothing, uniform, shoe, paper, rug, small arms and ammunition factories, wool and cotton spinning and weaving mills, a printing shop and a rudimentary iron foundry. Bombings and ground attacks were so frequent that all possible equipment was set up to enable quick transport to safety when conditions dictated.⁴⁴

The most important soviet cooperative enterprises, each under de-centralised administration, were the salt lake refining plants, a small oil field (which provided gasoline, paraffin, wax, candles, etc., on a very limited scale) and mines which produced "the cheapest coal in China".⁴⁵

Pragmatic Innovations

The CCP eliminated privileged groups, official corruption, the planting of the opium poppy and the production of opium.

They applied the "each one teach one" technique and employed a variety of educational devices, such as sending propaganda teams to tour the countryside and villages performing vaudeville-type shows. These groups introduced the new political philosophy, presented simple but powerful war plays based upon true incidents such as an heroic deed or a Japanese atrocity, and taught basic hygiene and medical concepts. Actors presented current news events and these scenes were called "the living newspaper".

Practical, imaginative and effective techniques were utilised, by every means at hand, to break down the influence of the counter revolution and to posit solutions for broadening the economic and cultural horizons of the people. On the economic front, for instance, all forms of taxation were abolished in the new districts for the first year and only a small single tax (5 to 10%) was charged on businesses in the old districts.

An American Army observer, Lt. Col. Evans F. Carlson, wrote his view of the peasant reaction:

The peasant appears not only willing but even enthusiastic about paying taxes because he is doing it for his Army, which is protecting him and his possessions, and for the first time in centuries he feels he is getting something in return for his money or goods. It is not the ideology of Communism that impresses the people. It is the practical results of Communist leadership. 46

A New Kind of Army

The heritage of the struggle for Liberation produced significant results. By the time their name was changed to the PLA (People's Liberation Army), the CCP's Red Army had long been an integral and much respected part of the peasant's life.

Mao would say that under the dictatorship of the proletariat, the Party must control the gun--the gun must not control the Party.⁴⁷ In 1929 Mao contrasted the role of the Red Army to that of the KMT (White) Army:

They think that the task of the Red Army, like that of the White Army, is merely to fight. They do not understand that the Chinese Red Army is an armed body for carrying out the political tasks of the revolution. Especially at present, the Red Army should certainly not confine itself to fighting: besides fighting to destroy the enemies military strength, it should shoulder such important tasks as doing propaganda among the masses, organising the masses, arming them, helping them to establish revolutionary political power and setting up Party organisations . . . without these objectives, fighting loses its meaning and the Red Army loses the reason for its existence. 48

U.S. Pacific Commander General Joe Stillwell noted:

Chiang Kai-shek is confronted with an idea, and that defeats him. He is bewildered by the spread of Communist influence. He can't see that the mass of Chinese people welcome the Reds as being the only visible hope of relief from crushing taxation, the abuse of the Army and the terror of Tai Li's Gestapo (the Nationalist's secret police). Under Chiang Kai-shek they now see what they may expect: greed, corruption, favoritism, more taxes, a ruined currency, terrible waste of life, callous disregard of all rights of men. 49
(brackets in original)

Developing in All Directions

During the decade that Yen-an was the Communist headquarters, Mao devoted considerable time to meditation and political writings. He was convinced of Lenin's injunction "Without revolutionary theory, there can be no revolutionary movement". Mao sinicised Marxism-Leninism by espousing Lenin's dictums of 1899 to "develop in all directions" and utilised Marx's theory as the

guiding principle, altering it to China's particular condition.⁵⁰

In essence the sinicisation process worked to reduce town and country disparities, the contradictions between manual and intellectual labour and, in a very real way, marked the point in the development of Marxian theory at which utopian fantasies became attainable in China.

Utilising the sinicisation process and the Party's historical experience, Mao produced and developed the "Yenan Forums". These were delivered to arm the revolutionary fighting forces with the ideological weapons required in the battle for men's minds and loyalties. Here, with empirical testing, the analyses, the allegories and the theories which were compiled into the body of knowledge now known as the Selected Works of Mao Tsetung was begun.

These writings and those pertaining to de-urbanisation and de-centralisation which emanated from the Cheng-feng Movement (see p. 29) now form the foundation of the CCP's continually growing ideological arsenal.

Internal Conflicts

Yenan represented two schools of political thought and leadership. The educated elite cooperated with the communists on the basis of adherence to United Front principles.⁵¹ These groups formed the bulwark of the regional and county bureaucracy. County magistrates and all district and township cadres, on the other hand, were local revolutionaries, for the most part illiterate peasants who had shown leadership capabilities during the armed struggle. They were committed to social revolution.⁵²

Such people had little in common beyond a hatred of the

Japanese and visions of a free China. This presented significant ongoing ideological and practical problems to the communist leadership. By 1939, the KMT had officially acknowledged the breakdown of the second United Front, and steps were taken to tighten political control in areas under their aegis. Cut off from central government subsidies, agreed to in 1936, Yen-an was forced to solve its own problems.

Reform or Revolution

The Rectification (Cheng-feng) Movement of 1941 to 1944 re-oriented and changed the direction of communist policy. Each future movement to correct mistakes and elicit more mass participation (Hundred Flowers Movement and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution) had its roots in the Cheng-feng Movement. A description of the scope and intent of the major campaigns which formed the basis of the movement are summarised as:

1. The "Crack Troops" and Simple Administration Campaign, 1941 to 1943, was devised to (a) reduce military and bureaucratic administrative personnel, thereby decreasing costs to the taxpayer, and (b) to curb developing independent command of the bureaucracies by initiating dual authority. This was accomplished by increasing Party controls and the prerogatives of district magistrates and other officials. In effect, this shifted the government work downward from the regional or county level to the township and the village;
2. The "To the Village" Campaign (later more widely known as "To the Country"), 1941 and 1942, was designed to destroy barriers between outside and local cadres, between high and low administration, between administration and production, and to strengthen the grass roots level of government.
3. The "Rent and Interest Reduction" Campaign, 1942 to 1944, was implemented to increase peasant support for the Party and its programme in areas that

had experienced little or no land revolution, to stimulate production by guaranteeing the producer an increased share of the crop, and to act as an incentive to the peasant to wrest economic power from the landlord.

4. The "Cooperative Movement", 1942 to 1944, was a major thrust by the Party to re-organise the village economy, increase agricultural production, and to alter traditional power relationships within the village.
5. The "Production Movement" of 1943 introduced:
 - a) "Organisational Economy". Labour by all cadres in the Party, government, army, and schools was designed to increase production, reduce the tax burden, stimulate a greater acceptance by all for manual labour, and provide experience in management of the economy; and
 - b) Labour Hero campaigns to provide economic and political incentives for peasant and worker producers. Labour heroes not only served as models in their local communities, they also received special training and encouragement to lead the transition to a cooperative agricultural economy.
6. The "Education Movement" in 1944 expanded the scope and modified the forms and content of education (accenting practical versus abstract), spreading literacy and introducing new ideas to many villages for the first time. 53
(Condensed from Seldon's Yenan Legacy: the Mass Line)

Beginning in 1938, one of the military brigades (Nan-Ni-Wan) provided an exceptional example of self-sufficiency for the rest of the army. In 1943 Mao enjoined *all* troops to aim for 80% self-sufficiency. Although this goal was never fully realised, the cumulative results of between one-third and one-half self-sufficiency by 1944 is credited with the spurring of the economy of the entire region. It also relieved the peasantry of a large portion of the taxes required for total support of their army. 54

The objective of the Cheng-feng Movement was to develop a unified country under the direction of Party members who were

committed to mutually shared goals. It endeavoured to extend the commitment beyond the anti-Japanese struggle and toward a radically changed form of Chinese landscape and society.

A sweeping re-examination was made of the reform (United Front) politics being practised in Yen-an versus revolutionary concepts. Each Party member evaluated his own class position, ideology and work habits and those of his comrades, fundamental values and perceptions were tested and challenged, and the role of ideology was studied. Hundreds of thousands of Party members studied Mao Tse-tung thought and the writings of Marx and Lenin --especially as they applied to the peculiarities of the Chinese experience.⁵⁵ This process increased communication between leadership, cadres and the people, prepared the cadres to act on their own out of a common understanding, and thus broke down bureaucratic 'fiat-ism' and greatly simplified administration.

Most importantly, it led to the articulation of a new concept, mass line politics, which institutionalised popular participation; millions of Chinese could now actively share in the implementation of policy. The process is outlined by a resolution from the Central Committee:

Correct leadership can only be developed on the principle 'from the masses to the masses'. This means summing up (coordinating and systematising after careful study), then taking the resulting ideas back to the masses, explaining and popularising them until the masses embrace them as their own, stand up for them and translate them into action by way of testing their correctness. Then it is necessary once more to sum up the views of the masses . . . and so on over and over again. 56

With leadership based on a common ideology and commitment,

the cadres were able to operate with more autonomy and less structure at the grass roots level. Seldon describes the new situation:

. . . the style and many of the techniques developed earlier in the land revolution were utilised in the attack on nature, in overcoming the social and economic obstacles posed by the harsh terrain and remnants of landlord power, and in the creation of new forms of rural community. 57

With the development of a consistent methodology for decentralised administration, the dispersal of men and material throughout a large area and the constant efforts to avoid either population concentration or industrial centralisation became the proto-type for future de-urbanisation and de-centralisation policies.

By 1942 Yen-an had become the nerve centre, the clearing house of concepts and the laboratory for new procedures and methods. Each area reported its successes and failures back to Yen-an where every factor was studied by the Party for strengths and weaknesses. To break down traditional leadership conceptions, any deviation from the 'correct line', e.g., commandism, opportunism, elitism, etc., necessitated intense 'unity, criticism, self-criticism, unity' sessions. New methods, or refinements of the old, came under painstaking analysis and corrected procedures were then spread by Party cadres to the other struggling regions.

Throughout the period of the rectification campaigns and while absorbing devastating attacks in the Yen-an area, the Red Army continued to organise mass resistance and to maintain constant pressure on the Japanese forces. In spite of numerical and

ordinance superiority, guerrilla tactics prevented the Japanese from deploying their forces at will. By 1944 the Communists had defeated the worst that the Japanese could contrive and had passed from the defensive to the offensive, immobilising whole Japanese armies. In 1945 with the Japanese surrender a new phase of civil war was realised.

In the civil war the KMT moved from early success to continuous disaster, culminating in the evacuation of remaining troops to Taiwan in November of 1949.

In August of 1949, Peking was secured; the new People's Republic of China was proclaimed on October 1, 1949.

NOTES - CHAPTER I

1. For detailed and explicit references to this contradiction, see Jean Chesneaux, Peasant Revolts in China, 1840-1949 (London: Thames & Hudson, 1973); Eric Wolfe, Peasant Wars of the 20th Century, (New York: Harper & Row, 1969); and Lucien Bianco, Origins of the Chinese Revolution, (London: Oxford University Press, 1974).
2. Graham Johnson, The Great Leap Forward and the Commune Movement in China: Questions of Organisation, paper presented at conference "Peasant Social & Political Participation: Asia and Latin America", University of British Columbia, February 1973.
3. Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Works, Vol. 2, (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1965), p. 308.
4. Chesneaux, p. 40.
5. R.H. Tawney, Land and Labour in China, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1932), p. 71.
6. Chesneaux, p. 19.
7. William Hinton, Fanshen, (New York: Random House, 1968), pp. 37-45; Gunner Myrdal, Report From a Chinese Village, (New York: Signet, 1965), passim. / Jan Myrdal
8. O. Schell & J. Esherick, Modern China, (New York: Vintage Books, 1972), p. 50.
9. Bianco, p. 7.
10. Schell & Esherick, p. 59.
- *11. Chou Tse-tung, The May 4th Movement, (Stanford University Press, 1972), p. 20.
China's current chaotic internal disarray and the West's preoccupation with W.W. I encouraged the Japanese to expand their control of China and its resources, gained in an 1895 military victory. In 1915 Japan imposed further humiliating concessions upon China; the "Twenty-one Demands". These included: Japanese control of Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Shantung, China's southeast coast and the Yangtse Valley; acceptance of Japanese 'advisors' in political, financial, and military affairs; joint organisation and administration of Chinese police forces; forced purchase of war munitions from Japan or a Sino-Japanese munition and arsenal industry in China; conscription of indigenous Chinese into a Japanese-controlled military, etc. This action exerted a deep and far-reaching political influence on Chinese society and may be regarded as a key historical incident which led directly to the social and intellectual ferment of the following years.

For full text see V.A. MacMurray, Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China, Vol. 2, No. 1915/18, (Washington, D.C.; U.S. Dept. of State Publications), pp. 1216-37.

12. Schell & Esherick, p. 37.
13. Schell & Esherick, pp. 61.
14. Chou Tse-tung, pp. 106-7.
15. Schell & Esherick, p. 62.
16. Chou Tse-tung, p. 153.
17. Chou Tse-tung, p. 157.
18. Chou Tse-tung, p. 158.
19. Chou Tse-tung, p. 195.
20. Chou Tse-tung, p. 195.
21. Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China, (New York: Grove Press, 1961), pp. 153-155-73N.
22. Snow, p. 151.
23. K.S. Karol, The Other Communism, (New York: Hill & Wang, 1968), p. 422.
24. Bianco, p. 55.
25. Snow, pp. 64-5.
26. Mao's position as described in "A Report of an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan" was not accepted by the Party as correct or viable until much later.
27. Snow, p. 159N.
28. Snow, p. 99.
29. Harold Issacs, The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution, (New York: Stanford Univ. Press, 1966), pp. 165-185.
30. Hsu Kai-yu, Chou En-lai; China's Gray Eminence, (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1969), p. 63.
31. Snow, p. 166N.
- x 32. Mark Seldon, The Yen-an Way, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1971), p. 77.

33. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, Vol. 1, (Peking: Foreign Language Press), P. 89. "There were various forms of public land in China's rural areas--land owned by the township or district government, by the ancestral temple of a clan, by a Buddhist or Taoist temple, Catholic church or a mosque, or land whose income was used for public welfare purposes such as famine relief or the maintenance of bridges or roads, or for educational purposes. In practice, most of such land was controlled by landlords and rich peasants, and few peasants had any say in its administration". (p. 139).
34. Seldon, p. 77.
35. Snow, p. 173.
36. Snow, p. 205.
37. Seldon, p. IX.
38. Seldon, p. 97.
39. Snow, p. 224.
40. The Marriage Law of the Chinese Soviet Republic contained provisions against mother-in-law tyranny and decreed: Marriage by mutual consent; legal age raised to 18 for women and 20 for men; prohibition of dowries; no marriage fee; no marriage broker and divorce, free of charge, on insistent demand of either party. Spouses of Red Army personnel were required to have partner's consent before decree; equal division of property; equal responsibility for children, etc.
41. Order of Instruction, Land Commission, Wayapao, Shensi, January 29, 1936. Seldon, p. 67.
42. Seldon, p. 251.
43. Snow listed the equipment as: many lathes, turning machines, stampers, dies, sewing machines, lithographing blocks, light printing machines and some gold and silver.
44. Lathes, for instance, were bolted onto mobile wheeled mountings.
45. Snow, Red Star, pp. 247-8; and The Battle for Asia, p. 267; Harrison Forman, Report from Red China, (London: Robert Hale Ltd., 1946), pp. 77-85.
46. Schell & Esherick, p. 97.
47. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, Vol. 2, p. 224. The 1975 constitution reaffirms and codifies this position by naming the Chairman of the Party as Commander-in-Chief of the army.

48. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Military Writings, (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1971), p. 54.
49. Schell & Esherick, p. 101.
50. V.I. Lenin, Selected Works, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1968), p. 34.
51. Seldon, p. 189.
52. Seldon, p. 189.
53. Seldon, p. 209-212.
54. Seldon, p. 251-253.
55. Seldon, p. 261.
56. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, Vol. 3, (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1965), p. 119.
57. Seldon, p. 207.

CHAPTER 2

FROM LIBERATION

Two of China's most pressing problems at Liberation in 1949 were industrial expansion and agricultural development. Consideration will first be given to the land reform movement, through the period of mutual aid teams and early cooperatives, as well as to the problems and contradictions which developed during this radical transformation of the Chinese countryside which ultimately laid the foundation for the twin policies of de-urbanisation and de-centralisation.

At this time, we should note, the Chinese People's Republic (CPR) formed a political and economic alliance with the Soviet Union, although this was not long enduring. The alliance, lasting roughly a decade, was an uneasy one given Stalin's past misunderstanding of the Chinese situation and his support of Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT, and given the fact that from August 1945 to March 1946 the Soviets had looted most of Manchuria's industrial equipment.¹ Considering China's geo-political position in a hostile world, she had little choice at that time but to seek what support was forthcoming. The break in 1960 was probably, therefore, inevitable.

Land Redistribution

At Liberation there were about ten million households belonging to the rich peasants, landlords and those classed as 'other reactionaries'. The environment created by revolutionary enthusiasm had unified and activated the masses to confiscate their lands for redistribution. The peasant behaviour typified revolutionary struggle at the grass roots level.

No changes occurred without turmoil. The forces of counter-revolution, although defeated so far as state power was concerned, created pockets of confusion and wrought havoc by constantly inciting dissension and by undertaking acts of assassination and sabotage. Mao argued that every peasant must recognise that all progress, so far, could be negated unless the peasants were ideologically prepared to struggle and vanquish the elites amongst themselves.

Nearly twenty years before, Mao had described the spirit of the revolution and the steps necessary in order to consolidate land reform gains that the revolutionary war had won:

The agrarian revolution by the peasantry aims at the overthrow of the power of the landlord class . . . Great revolutionary enthusiasm must be generated in the villages in order to arouse the tens of thousands of peasants to forge tremendous power. All excessive acts possess their revolutionary significance . . . Every village must go through a short period of terror, without which counter-revolutionary activities cannot be suppressed. 2

In the early land reform programme 'vanquishing the elites' (by determining class differentiation) was accomplished by a process known as 'passing the gate'.³

The time spanned by the operation varied according to the locality, i.e., areas which were liberated before 1949 had largely completed the analysis, whereas in the other regions, redistribution was not completed before late 1951. Political administrative units known as 'hsien' (counties), each comprised of populations ranging upwards of a million, supervised the redistribution.

Land amounts varied greatly due to areal differences and population densities. By 1952, according to official reports, land reform had re-apportioned 700 million mu (115.7 million acres) and divided it among 300 million peasants. The amount distributed averaged 2.3 mu (mu = 1/6 acre) to each person, and since the new egalitarian ethos treated both men and women as persons, the amount was virtually doubled on a per-family basis.⁴

Re-distribution served two purposes: it consolidated mass support at the village level and it overcame the unequal economic power, social standing and prestige that had traditionally doomed previous reform efforts. The educational advantages of the former landlords and rich peasants, plus a shrewd awareness of the influence of the as yet unobliterated feudal thinking in the peasant mentality, made it possible for the former privileged classes to opportunistically prey upon the peasantry's superstitions and long-engrained fears, thus sowing dissension and confusion in the peasant ranks. Their artful use of fear and deliberate misrepresentation of Party decisions, effectively challenged Party credibility until about mid-1957.

A 1953 survey of conditions in Paoying hsien (Kiangsu province) revealed a highly disturbing trend which threatened the advance of the peasantry to the next level of development in their transition to socialism.⁵ Shortly after the redistribution of land, a few peasants who had never owned anything with a cash value in their lives, felt the 'flush' of affluence as owners of capital property and a move to convert their holdings into cash began. At first, the movement to liquidate the 'fruits of the

turnover', as the lands and goods were called, was small, and in 1951, 500 households sold 1,735 mu of land and 25 draught animals.⁶ The number of households increased from 500 in 1951 to 1,705 in 1952, selling 6,853.5 mu and many animals. The first ten months of 1953 saw 2,264 households dispose of 7,472 mu of land and a moderate quantity of 'means of production', defined as tools, hoes, rakes, etc. A new rich peasant class was forming. They hired permanent workers and quickly re-discovered the same old ways to exploit the poor through grain speculation and usury. Usury rose to 5 - 10 percent per month.⁷

The most disturbing fact about these figures was that people such as Party cadres in Paoying had misused their power and were fast becoming a dominant portion of a newly landed class. Eighty-three percent (83.2%) of the Party cadres and 80% of the Communist Youth League had become well-to-do peasants. The re-emergence of a class society was real. Steps to curb the "spontaneous growth of capitalism" were initiated at once.⁸

Mutual Aid Teams

The Party's response began in a few localities as an experimental programme of mutual-aid and cooperation in agricultural production in December of 1951.⁹ Mutual-aid Teams were neither an innovation nor were they new to some areas of China. Such a policy was especially helpful in overcoming the chronic shortage of draught animals and labour shortages during the busiest seasons, and had been customarily employed for many centuries. The tradition was refined, employing two types of operations.

The first was 'seasonal' or temporary mutual aid teams com-

posed of three, four or five households and was operational only during sowing and harvesting periods. The second, referred to as "advanced mutual aid teams", was a year-round arrangement consisting of from six to fifteen households. Their group efforts generally allowed sufficient capital accumulation to acquire some communally-owned equipment (such as tools and draught animals) not affordable by individual effort.

The tortuous climb was fraught with mistakes, and at times with individual cases of opportunism. Occasionally the struggle was marred by the pessimism of a few leading cadres. This behaviour was quite understandable--it sprang spontaneously from the contradictions inherent within the admittedly transitional phases to a higher organisational form of structure. The principal contradiction within the schema of "Elementary Cooperatives" developed from the symbiotic relationship within the concept of private ownership of land, tools and, if fortunate, draught animals. Members were paid for their work, use of their land and tools and, if an ox was owned, their return was twice the amount otherwise received--hence a growing disparity between those working shoulder to shoulder. The problem was further exacerbated by those individuals with a surplus who speculated in the selling of grain. The increasing agrarian imbalances (coupled with centralised industrial development) resulted in a nascent resistance to socialist concepts as espoused by the Party.

Cooperatives

Cheng, in his book Communist China's Economy, quotes the CCP Central Committee, "Because the cooperatives were developed

rather quickly, and we are without sufficient experience and preparation, we did not provide a concrete policy and unified decision to the co-operatives. A section of the peasantry came to entertain suspicions and misunderstanding concerning the co-operative movement". While not the majority attitude, many members at all levels of the Party tended toward an increasingly pessimistic posture. More than a few argued for retrenchment and a dissolution of much that had been accomplished--even to the point of disbanding co-ops whose members included some 400,000 households, in one gigantic action.¹⁰

The history of Liberation had seen many retreats, as well as advances, but Mao determined not to retreat from the urgent obligation of China's transformation toward a more socialist construction. On July 31, 1955 he called a meeting of all provincial secretaries, municipal and area Party committees, to confront the problem. Mao, in his report on the question of Agricultural Cooperatives, criticised the intra-party conservatism and its slowness in implementing cooperativisation:

A new upsurge in the socialist mass movement is imminent throughout the countryside. But some of our comrades are tottering along like a woman with bound feet and constantly complaining 'You're going too fast'. Excessive criticism, inappropriate complaints, endless anxiety, and the erection of countless taboos --they believe this is the proper way to guide the socialist mass movement in the rural areas.

No, this is not the right way; it is the wrong way. 11

To summarize the remaining points as promulgated by Mao:

1. Reprimands cannot solve the problem, education is needed;
2. Industrialisation cannot be accomplished without

- agriculture and agriculture cannot bear the burden without collectivisation. Industry must be expanded in two ways, light and heavy, both impossible within a small peasant economy;
3. Do not use force; do not let upper middle or rich peasants in for a few years (unless there is a socialist consciousness and complete willingness to cooperate);
 4. Combat the tendency towards spontaneous capitalism;
 5. Engage in long-range planning.

He ends with:

Let us all work in this way. Comprehensive planning and more effective leadership-- that is our policy.

Advanced Cooperatives

During the next few months the weight and rationale of Mao's position had its effect and in October of 1955, at the sixth plenary session of the Seventh CCP Central Committee, the decision was made to accelerate agricultural co-operation. Nine months later, 91% of the 110 million households had joined the agricultural cooperatives, paving the way to the next stage of development, "advanced co-operatives".

These were structured at their inception to nullify the contradictions of private ownership and disparate earning rates. ✓
 When a peasant joined the co-operative, his land and/or tools (means of production) changed from private to collective ownership. Terms of reference were defined at the third session of the First National People's Congress, June 30, 1956. The following is a condensed summation of the "Model Regulations for Advanced Agricultural Producers Co-operatives":

Membership: All working peasants sixteen or older. Former landlords and rich peasants could only gain membership after many years

of labour reform and with the approval of the cooperative membership. (Some only gained partial status, i.e. work and share but no vote).

Ownership: Land and major implements or tools and animals all came under cooperative ownership and more centralised management. One exception to private ownership was permitted; members were allowed to acquire or retain small private plots for the purpose of using as vegetable gardens. There was a limitation; private plots could not exceed five percent of the average land holding in any particular village.

Share Funds: There were two share funds collected by the cooperative from its members, viz., the Production Share Fund, used to cover the costs of production, seed, fertilizer and fodder, and the Common Property Share Fund, used to purchase equipment and other means of production.

Income Distribution: Income to be distributed to all members based on an accounting of the individual's number of days worked, after deductions were made for expenditures for next year's production, allocation for reserves, welfare purposes and state agricultural taxes.

Payment for work to be based on a piece-work system using the principle "to each according to his work". The system utilised a rate of compensation consisting of days worked, with ten points comprising the work day. The value of the work points, in turn, depended upon the total of the income available to be distributed to the members.

Organisation of Production: The basic unit was a labour entity known as a production brigade. The brigade had considerable latitude and arranged its day to day and seasonal schedules of work in accordance with the agreed-upon production plan of the cooperative.

Co-operative Management: Overall directives affecting the brigades were laid down at a general membership meeting where they, in turn, elected a management committee to conduct the affairs of the cooperative. A supervisory committee was elected to check on the cooperative's affairs, and a chairman was also elected to direct the daily operation.

With ownership now vested in the co-operative, the dividends formerly paid for land, means of production and draught animals were discontinued, thereby removing the major contradiction of disparity between theoretically equal members. Rich peasants who worked and were paid, but who could not vote, reduced, but did not fully eliminate, another contradiction--class distinction.¹³

Such novel adaptations affected profound changes in the society. The conversion from individual endeavour to the dynamic of communalism created within the peasants well-nigh as many problems as it solved. Peasants who, from time immemorial, had cherished the dream of private land ownership found themselves still without holdings. Socialist consciousness had not kept ✓ pace with the rapidly changing situation and the consequent lag manifested itself in numerous ways.

A marked disregard for common property became immediately ✓ evident; losses and breakage increased dramatically. A survey of conditions in Kiangsi and Shantung provinces revealed that 60,000 head of draught animals perished in Kiangsi during the ✓ winter of 1956 and the spring of 1957.¹⁴ In animal-rich Shantung, thirty percent of the draught animals were weak and/or incapacitated. The resultant shortage of their principle source of agricultural cultivation power, seriously impaired the 1957 production. Moreover, the people themselves generally suspended the sideline occupations which, before collectivisation, had accounted for from thirty to forty percent of individual income. A most critical consequence resulted; a seventeen million head

decrease in pig production--from one hundred million in 1954 to eighty-three million in June 1956.¹⁵

Dialectically, before a synthesis can occur (in this case, the development of a higher level of organisation growing from a lower form), the contradictions must be sufficiently exacerbated to illuminate them clearly and sharply. The CCP analysis revealed the contradictions to be between the individual (including the subsidiary 'sideline occupations') and the collective economy; between disparate co-operatives, i.e. better off and poor co-operatives; between the collective and state economies; and between town and country.¹⁶

In a move demonstrating great candor and openness, the government described organisation defects in a CCP Central Committee report which listed them as: 1) waste and faulty planning; 2) neglect of industrial crops and subsidiary occupations; and 3) defective organisation due to the rapid advance of the movement.¹⁷

The enemies within (former rich peasants and landlords) employed every device at hand to sow dissension amongst the rank and file. Many local cadres and Party leaders were injured or killed in landlord-organised counter-revolutionary attacks.¹⁸

The problems listed above were largely the result of faulty organisation and differences in local adaptation, acceptance and implementation. However, another dilemma having far-reaching ramifications was the problem of under-employment and unemployment. Chen and Galenson stated, "That China was faced with an under-employment problem of serious dimensions can hardly be doubted".¹⁹

Further, they estimated Chinese unemployment at between 29 and 35 million.²⁰ The Central Committee increased the call for more water conservancy programmes beyond those begun in 1952 in order to give productive work to the under-employed farm labour and also because the nature of their crops demanded more attention to irrigation and water control.²¹

More emphasis was placed on the use of traditional (non-mechanised) transportation in order to conserve capital during this first period of industrial growth. In 1957, 4.8 million people were employed in traditional transportation as compared to 1.9 million in the modern transportation sector.

Handicraft expansion answered the growing need for employment and consumer goods and was an important adjunct to light industry. Chen estimated that Chinese handicraft employment and output almost doubled from 1952 to 1957.

Restructuring of labour organisation began in August 1958 with the launching of the Great Leap Forward (GLF) and the rural commune movement.

Industrial Organisation With Soviet Aid

The Chinese leadership, charged with international responsibility, recognised the vulnerability of a China without industry; the new People's Republic must industrialise in order to survive. China, like the majority of peasant societies, is poor. In the words of Mao Tse-tung, "Poor and Blank".²² The immediate need for China was to become less poor and less blank.

The industrial legacy which had survived the Japanese, European and American imperialists and China's compradores (and

should have passed on to the People's Republic at Liberation) had either been seriously damaged by the long years of war and revolution or, as in the case of Manchuria, had been expropriated by Stalin. Instead of industry, China inherited empty shells and empty buildings. The industrial capacity intact in Tientsin, Shanghai, Nanking, Wuhan and Kwangchow was pitifully inadequate to provide even rudimentary requirements for a country of China's size.

The nation's needs for industry, flood control, inland navigation, hydro-electric construction/water conservancy, afforestation, transportation, disease control, education and defence were staggering, and so interconnected as to constitute *a priori* a condition of extreme underdevelopment.

Using the Soviet Model

At Russia's insistence, industrial development after Liberation began again to concentrate in the same locations chosen earlier by the imperialists. Given the immediate pressing need and as a rational plan of action (ignoring the qualitative aspects of life) the decision made sense. In addition to foundations and buildings in Manchuria and war-damaged plants in the other areas, a nucleus of an industrially trained work force existed. Few, if any, were trained for technical or supervisory duties.

Internally, China concentrated on the rapid growth of a centrally planned economy and the proliferation of industry in the North-east. Manchuria was the locus, the proto-plan of centralisation on the Soviet model, beginning a dichotomy that China has not completely resolved in practice to this day.


When the First Five Year Plan was initiated in 1952, seventy-seven percent of the gross value of China's industrial output originated in the coastal area--old Treaty ports (see Map 4). The proportion was even higher for some products: eighty-two percent for cotton yarn, eighty-eight percent for cotton cloth, and eighty percent for metal manufacturing.²³

Questioning the Soviet Direction

The Russian-style controlled economy came at a time when agriculture was seen by China as the major source of savings. But the prime emphasis was on industrial growth. The capitalisation needed for industrial development could only come from the peasants. Russia's method of raising capital is exemplified by Stalin's admonition to the CPSU Central Committee in 1928:

The peasants *pay too much* for manufactured products and *lose on farm prices*. We must preserve this tribute in order to maintain the rhythm of industrial growth.
(emphasis added)²⁴

In the 1950's, the Soviets continued to promote Chinese development parallel to the Russian experience. China thus grew during this period in a highly bureaucratised, rigidly centralised manner, which stressed economism and urban industrialism at the expense of all other aspects of life for the peasant majority. Although Stalin's plan for capitalisation was originally intended as a temporary expedient, the policy became dogma in the Soviet Union, contributing to the tremendous urban immigration of the Russian peasantry in the 1930's. Once institutionalised in the Soviet Union, it was thenceforth considered by them to be the 'correct line' for use elsewhere as well.



Map 4



"Western industrial influence" (pre-1949)

- | | |
|--------------|--------------|
| 1. Harbin | 8. Peking |
| 2. Changchun | 9. Tientsin |
| 3. Shenyang | 10. Tsingtao |
| 4. Fushun | 11. Nanking |
| 5. Anshan | 12. Shanghai |
| 6. Dairen | 13. Canton |
| 7. Tangshan | |

By April 1956, Mao, as if in answer to Stalin, warned others in the Chinese hierarchy of the dangers inherent in the plan:

The fundamental reasons for the failure of certain (socialist) countries to increase farm production are that the policy of the State toward the peasants is debatable, that the taxes on the peasants are too heavy, that the prices on agricultural produce are low whereas industrial products are expensive. While developing industry, especially heavy industry, we should put agriculture in its proper place and realise a fitting fiscal policy on agriculture, as well as a just policy in matters of establishing the prices of industrial and agricultural products.²⁵

According to figures taken from a lecture by Paul Lin at U.B.C. in 1972, China's policy was implemented in the following manner: agricultural taxes in 1970 were 50% of 1952 rates; prices paid by the State for agricultural produce have increased 20%; consumer cost of rice is the same as in 1952 and the overall 'cost of living' has generally decreased in all sectors of the Chinese economy.²⁶

The Liu Shao-chi Line

Developed in response to and in conjunction with CPSU influence, emulating the Soviet stress on economism, Liu's policies initiated a contradiction in fiscal and developmental directions almost from the inception of the new government. Essentially, the contradiction was based on the concept that China should centralise its industry and utilise material incentives instead of moral suasion to boost production. *Disparities between town and country increased as a result of these contradictory forces* as did individual worker competition. The difference between the Liu (Soviet) line and the Mao (Chinese) line has been described

by Karol:

The Chinese want to ensure the development of their country without recourse to physical coercion . . . There is no piece work in factories, Stakhovanism is not extolled, and there are no labour camps. 27

China's (five year) overall average net growth rate was six percent per annum during the First Five Year Plan (1953-57) under Liu's direction.²⁸ It was a solid achievement. If growth *per se* had been the sole and ultimate goal, such progress would have been ample to allow satisfaction--even complacency. However, by 1954 evidence was mounting which signalled that the economy was becoming overcentralised under a burgeoning bureaucracy.²⁹ China faced the potential danger of developing islands of urban sophistication dominating a sea of rural backwardness. If continued, the historical experience of the peasantry would repeat itself.

A Minority Position

Throughout this period of heavy Soviet influence and Liu leadership, Mao expressed a growing concern that China was travelling a revisionist course.³⁰ His resolution of December 24, 1953, "Strengthening the Unity of the Party", is said to have begun argumentation within the Central Committee which slowly reversed the Soviet trend.³¹ By 1956, centralised capital-intensive development stressing supervision by experts was yielding and was being replaced by the more innovative de-centralised labour-intensive Chinese model. This policy, reminiscent of the Yen-an Way, de-emphasises a cost-benefit analysis and solicits the involvement of the workers in decision-making. ✓

The changing direction following Mao's expressed concern was initiated none too quickly. By minimising agricultural development and maximising industrial growth, the national economy had been driven into a state of imbalance in which severe difficulties were multiplying. Agricultural production, sales and balance of payment were lagging dangerously, while Shanghai, Wuhan and Manchuria were becoming the increasingly centralised, labour-short areas of industrialisation. Throughout the country, a questioning of and a resistance to the Soviet-inspired method of administration arose. Lacquer and Labeledz described the now-discredited policy:

The dominant principle was the 'Single Director System', copied straight from the Soviet Union . . . with modification. Soviet conception of planning was adopted: centralised, long-term planning. The organisational accent during the period was on *centralisation*, on management from the top down.

(emphasis added) 32

City control became increasingly centralised. The rural sector, on the other hand, was moving from advanced cooperatives into communes and the 'backyard-technology' developed during the Great Leap Forward Movement.

The Rural Commune Movement and the Great Leap Forward

These movements presented the Chinese with the opportunity to utilise a heretofore unemployed economic concept, "Agricultural economies of scale". For example, at the completion of China's rural cooperative movement, its more than 120 million households were involved in 752,113 cooperatives. 668,081 of these were of the advanced type, averaging 158 households per unit. By

September of 1958, 121,936,350 households (98.2%) had formed 26,425 communes averaging 4,614 households each.³⁴

The implications and ramifications of the communisation of agriculture contributed to the consolidation of state policy and encouraged an increased (though in no way monolithic) homogeneity. Consolidation promoted modifications and alterations. The first case in point concerned individual earnings and capitalisation. Cheng specifies that 70% of total agricultural income was distributed directly to the peasants in 1956.³⁵

With increased production, the amount to peasants did not decrease but the percentage of the whole decreased to 53.2%. After communisation, the peasant share of agricultural income was 30% and investment rose to 70%--a virtual turn-about. Side-line occupations also increased and significantly augmented returns to each household.

To de-emphasise the trend toward competitiveness and individual profit, the CCP began to organise the peasantry into communes. Some of the advantages were cited in a Central Committee directive:

The forces of large scale agricultural production, like the forces of large scale industrial production, constitute an industrial army . . . We are now applying this system to the rural areas, thus establishing a socialist industrial army for agriculture based on democratic centralism, which is free from exploitation by the landlords and rich peasants, and is elevated above the level of small-scale production. 36

By transforming the mass of peasants into 'agricultural' workers, a class division between the peasants was broken down.

Additionally "economies of scale" accelerated the rate of capital accumulation, paving the way toward a greater, more generalised and de-centralised industrial growth, hastening the development of the society.

In 1956, in a booklet entitled The Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, Mao began to review the enigma of implementation, and the dangers which inevitably arise if or when the people do not fully understand or agree with a programme. The paper was again discussed at an enlarged meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee. Particular attention was devoted to general internal policy and China's relationship to the socialist bloc countries. Continuing his development of the theory of contradiction and its resolution through awareness, criticism and self-criticism, logical debate and learning through practice, Mao extended to the Soviets a comradely criticism of Stalin's methodology of implementation. Speaking of the internal situation, specifically organisational problems, he said:

. . . Even when the basic system corresponds to the need, there are certain contradictions between the relations of production and the productive forces, between the superstructure and the economic base. These contradictions find expression in defects in certain links of the economic and political systems.

As Mao expressed his thesis, he repeatedly stressed the importance of peasant education, and the vital necessity of going to the masses and discussing both the short-term and long-term implications of plans with them, and emphasising the need to learn from mistakes as well as from successes.

After clarifying errors which his analysis had exposed, he

cited the danger of blindly replicating the actions or sequence of developments in any other country:

. . . there must be a proper method of learning. All the experience of the Soviet Union, including its fundamental experience, is bound up with definite national characteristics, and no other country should copy it mechanically. Moreover, as has been pointed out, part of the Soviet experience is that derived from mistakes and failures . . . Indiscriminate and mechanical copying of experience that has been successful in the Soviet Union--let alone that which was unsuccessful there--may lead to failures in 38 another country.

Mao accented the use of a hard, critical analysis of objective conditions and contended that even in China, the most populous nation in the world, the building of a socialist system (at China's stage of backwardness) required that every man and woman join in the labour force. Many more workers had to be integrated into the workforce in order to attain industrial and agricultural goals. In speaking of the transformation of social productive forces, Mao declared that women were half the world, must hold up half the sky, and that "Genuine equality between the sexes can only be realised in the process of socialist transformation of society as a whole."³⁹ The Central Committee embarked on a campaign to integrate women into the work force in an even more positive way. One does not, however, simply decree a new concept--a radical departure in which social relationships between men and women are drastically altered. Rather, the approach must consider the multifaceted changes in personal relationships.

China initiated new educational, birth control and welfare policies, through the mass line methods. Women's associations, which had carried out vanguard work before and since Liberation,

were requested to participate. The media was utilised to help further acceptance of the belief that women were capable of a good deal more than child bearing and rearing.

Positive and Negative Factors of the Leap

The Great Leap Forward Movement in 1958 was of tremendous scope, involving the utilisation and mobilisation of vast amounts of as yet untapped human resources and energy including that of many women who were just beginning to discover the advantages of personal economic security and freedom from twenty-four hour a day child care.

The ability and necessity of the commune to diversify en-compassed far more than the usual agrarian pursuits. The communes, within a brief time span, learned to embrace numerous skills and industries hitherto associated only with the urban technological sector, thus narrowing the gap between town and country. The impetus, rationale and psychology of the GLF vouchsafed the peasant masses the requisite increase in momentum towards self-reliance and the revolutionary determination to do more, quicker, better and with more economy.

Upon his return from China in 1971, Professor Briemberg commented upon his conversations with the peasants at Shashiyu Commune. The peasants looked back on the period of the GLF with great nostalgia, remembering the tremendous enthusiasm experienced during that time.⁴⁰

In slightly less than three years (1958-61) virtually every man, woman and child acquired training and knowledge in some technological field, particularly metallurgy. Within two years,

peasants had developed sufficient skills for self-reliance in the production of low to medium grades of iron and steel. After considerable initial difficulties, including low quality production, the so-called backyard furnace technology has grown to a point where China now actively maintains more than seventy thousand 'Backyard Furnaces' which produce, on a yearly basis, high quality iron and steel at a man-hour rate comparable to the larger integrated complexes.⁴¹

In industrial centres, the tremendous surge of enthusiasm resulted in the development of many novel economic and time-saving techniques. At Tayeh (coastal China), workers discovered that by adding slag from an electric furnace to the molten steel from an open hearth furnace, the usual melting time of a 'heat' of steel was reduced by one hour--the average increase in production was 7.6 percent. At the Anshan Iron Works in 1959, a worker/cadre/technician team found that high quality steel for structural use could be made which utilised high-sulphur, lower purity pig-iron--a gigantic breakthrough in any economy. In Wuhan, mass experiments by workers developed new type hot air blast pipes which simultaneously increased production and reduced operating costs more than \$15,000.00 per year per furnace. Coke consumption was also reduced by more than 32 pounds per ton of iron produced.⁴²

Despite the great enthusiasm evinced during this period, Buchanan reported that by 1960 the economy, and especially the industrial sector, was running into difficulties of crisis proportion. For the planners "had tended to overlook a reality

demonstrated by the earlier experiences of Europe and evident in most Third World countries today--that successful consolidation of the industrial base was an essential prerequisite for successful industrialisation".⁴³ Buchanan tended to ignore the political dichotomy (see page 52) and quoted Guillain to illustrate a lack of planning by the leadership:

The Leap broke the coordination between various sectors of the economy and overloaded the transport system; it overdeveloped certain sectors of industry such as the manufacture of machine-tools while related sectors tended to lag; it developed other activities such as hydro-generation or the extractive industries insufficiently. ⁴⁴

Negating such assessments of the Great Leap Forward, Wheelwright and McFarlane wrote:

We cannot agree with these propositions. As we hope to show . . . they are rooted in misconceptions of the Leap Forward as a mixture of the creation of communes and the development of 'backyard' iron production. The aim of the commune system was the intensification of agricultural socialism to increase the marketable agricultural surplus and widen local agricultural and other investment opportunities. The industrial policy of 'walking on two legs' aimed to tap the sources of industrial growth inherent in widely spread, easily mined coal and iron deposits, and small scale indigenous technology, by rapid development of small and medium industry in the interior of the country, both *within* and *without* the communes. In this respect it can be viewed as a kind of 'crash industrialisation' program, but within the context of developing agrarian socialism without large scale labour transfer ⁴⁵ to the cities.

The authors provide information which indicates that the quality of the product was comparable to the efforts of the 'modern' industrial giants:

. . . in 1958-59, a large number of blast furnaces of a capacity of up to 100 metres each, and a total capacity of 43,000 cubic metres were established; also some medium furnaces, which produced 50% of total pig iron output; and that the quality was good. (The pig-iron output-to-input coefficient, which shows tons output per cubic metre of furnace volume, in September 1959, was 0.85 for small furnaces compared to 1.49 for big furnaces. The corresponding coefficients for the Soviet Union and the United States were 1.0 and 1.4). In the steel industry small and medium converters, taking less than 3 tons, were widely used, and produced 3 million out of the 11 million tons of steel produced in 1958. Pig iron so produced was, in the main, up to international standards in 1958. 46

Controversial assessments continue. Both points of view have some justification. The centralised economy of the First Five Year Plan was inappropriate. The excesses, faulty planning and three years of extreme weather (severe drought conditions in the North, heavy flood and typhoon damage in the South), coupled with the abrupt termination of Soviet technical assistance in July of 1960 (see p. 73) changed the Leap to a stumble so far as China's economy was concerned.

The legacy to the people was that they were learning from experience that individual advancement went hand in hand with the advancement of all; that the peasants, as a whole, could only succeed in direct ratio to individual cooperation. It was a lesson which entailed a gigantic leap from feudal obedience to scientific reasoning. Their dedication and firmness of purpose produced a net qualitative change in their lives and became the most important factor responsible for achieving China's industrial breakthrough. This was an important early step to de-centrali-


sation and de-urbanisation.

On the other hand, China's overdependence upon Russian technical and leadership planning forced the Chinese, upon the sudden exodus of the Soviets, to drastically reappraise their situation. This resulted in resurrecting the historically based Yanan policy of "self-reliance" and a readjustment demanding adherence to the concept of "Agriculture as the base of the national economy with industry as the leading factor".


Efforts were begun to decentralise in all sectors, but the early imbalance in favour of the cities would be extremely difficult to overcome. Even to fulfill the needs of China's 700 million people required a massive exertion on the part of all. Efforts to achieve an urban-rural balance (de-urbanisation and de-centralisation) continues as a priority issue.⁴⁷

New plans were developed for promoting and building small and medium sized plants in the outer regions and inland cities. (See Map 5 & 6). In the large-scale industrial areas, a "Bourgeois Expert" element (legacy of the Russian style of operation) was firmly entrenched. To protect their own personal privilege, they united as a body to promote a concept that preached no progress possible without technological leadership from the experts, exacerbating the "Red versus Expert" dichotomy extending itself widely throughout China.

In April 1956, Mao wrote an analysis encompassing his overall view of accomplishments, contradictions and relationships within the People's Republic, entitled "The Ten Great Relationships and the Ten Principle Contradictions". It was an internal



MAP5



New Industrial Centres and Areas of Increased Industrialisation
as of 1955-57:




1. Pao-tou
2. Lan-chou
3. Sian

4. Loyang
5. Chengchow
6. Wuhan



"Western industrial influence" (pre-1919)



MAP 6

New centres established between 1958 and 1963 illustrating dispersal of manufacturing capability:

- | | |
|---------------|-----------------|
| 1. Urumshi | 9. Lien-yuan |
| 2. Ha-ni | 10. Chang-sha |
| 3. Chiu-chuan | 11. Nan-chang |
| 4. Pao-tou | 12. Kunming |
| 5. Chung-tu | 13. Kuei-yang |
| 6. Chiang-yu | 14. Nan-ning |
| 7. Chung-king | 15. Lui-chou |
| 8. Hsiang-tan | 16. Chang-chang |
| | 17. Ko-cr-nu |

paper, to be released later for study and discussion among the leading cadres, PLA and Central Committee members. The original discussions were held at the Politburo level and shortly thereafter a special meeting was called for the lower levels of government.

Mao introduced the subject: "In the past two months the Politburo has listened to reports on the work of 34 departments of the Centre concerning finance and economics. After an exchange of views and several discussions of the Politburo, these reports have been summarised into ten problems; ten contradictions".⁴⁸ Mao set the scene by pinpointing the problems:

These ten problems were raised for one purpose, i.e. to mobilise all the active factors and all available strength for socialist construction in accordance to the principles of 'more, faster, better and more economical'. To mobilise all active factors and all available strength has always been our principle. Formerly, this principle was applied to winning the people's democratic revolution and terminating the imperialist, feudalist, and bureaucratic-capitalist domination. Now it is applied to a new revolution--the socialist revolution and the construction of a socialist country. It should be applied to the revolution as well as the construction. This everyone knows. But there are some problems worth discussing. Some new factors and the defects and deficiencies of our work ought to be talked about and considered. By correctly handling these contradictions, we may avoid unnecessary detours. 49

As in much of what Mao has written, fallibility is freely admitted. But, more importantly, we should examine two factors in this statement to better understand that leadership requires also the ability to teach as it leads. Here, Mao is drawing attention to the fact that the *relationship* between the problem and the *contradiction* within the problem, must always be consid-

ered in the context of what the masses, in conjunction with their cadres, recognise as the objective conditions, utilising the Marxist methodology (dialectical analysis) to arrive at a workable solution.

Mao defined the problems as follows:

1. the relationship between industry and agriculture and between heavy and light industry;
2. the relationship between coastal and inland industries;
3. the relationship between economic and defense construction;
4. the relationship between the state and productive units and individual producers;
5. the relationship between the Centre and the regions;
6. the relationship between the Han⁵⁰ and other nationalities;
7. the relationship between the Party and others;
8. the relationship between the revolution and counter-revolution;
9. the relationship between right and wrong;
10. the relationship between China and other countries.

All of these are contradictions. Contradictions are everywhere in the world. The world would not be what it is, if there were no contradictions. 51

To the Chinese leadership, political theory is not just a guide (and a rhetoric) for a few people at the top; it must be understood and put into practice by the masses. But, it cannot be practiced until the masses understand and agree.

By 1958, the Sixth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee began considering the ramifications of the "Ten Great Relationships", and the methods necessary for implementing change, in order to resolve some of the defined contradictions. First on its agenda was a discussion of the general need for dispersal of industry. The committee agreed that:

People's communes must go in for industry in a big way. The development of industry by the people's communes will not only accelerate the industrialisation of the whole country, but also promote the realisation of ownership by the whole people in the rural districts, and reduce the difference between town and country. 52

Additionally, it was necessary to make the people of each area aware of their regional differences, thereby minimising efforts which might be made by regions to discard their own adaptations (even when experience had shown them valid). The Committee was aware that *all* regions *could never* be uniform. The varying soils, climate, weather and resource availability were important regional factors which had to be utilised to the advantage of the area.

According to the differing conditions in each people's commune, an appropriate part of the labour force should be transferred, step-by-step, from agriculture to industry so as to develop, according to plan, the production of fertiliser, insecticides, farm implements and machinery, and building material; the manufacture of sugar, textiles and paper; and the expansion of mining, metallurgy, electric power, and other light and heavy industries. Industrial production on the people's communes must be closely linked with agricultural production; it should first of all serve the development of agriculture and the mechanisation and electrification of farming. 53

Nearly as important as the stress placed upon regional differences was the next grouping of priorities, which the Central Committee saw as indispensable and to which they must concomitantly respond: the need of maintaining morale, coordinating supply, and establishing foreign socialist exchange. The response to need and the supply of consumer goods would act as positive morale-builders; provision for 'Big' industries, according to

capabilities, would reduce total capitalisation and integrate indigenous country capabilities with urban specialised facilities (walking on two legs), and; trade with other socialist countries would give China access to scarce machinery and needed foreign exchange.

The Central Committee members were concerned also with the dangers inherent in expansion at the local level (such as high capitalisation for facilities) without due consideration of transport limitations. The Committee therefore advised on "Rational Transport Market Considerations":

The principles of adaptation to local conditions and those of obtaining raw materials locally should be taken into consideration; in order to avoid increased costs and waste of labour power, industries should not be set up in places where there are no raw materials or where these have to be brought from far away.

54

As if in a classroom situation, the C.C. gave counsel in a step-by-step manner, explaining needs while cautioning against excesses. At the same time they called on the people to draw upon their great capabilities for innovation and synthesis. Their recommendations were offered in the style of the earlier "walking on two legs" concept: a rephrasing, as it were, of the dictum "Keep what is good and old and learn what is good and new":

With regard to production techniques, the principle should be carried out linking handicraft with mechanised industry, and indigenous methods with modern methods of production. All handicraft industries which have good foundations and prospects for expansion must continue to be developed, and gradually carry through the necessary technical transformations. The mechanised industries must make full use of indigenous methods and iron, steel, machine tools, other raw

materials and equipment produced by indigenous methods; they will gradually advance from indigenous to modern; from small to large; and from low to high level. 55

Both rural and urban workers became aware of their relationship to the means of production. They perceived the need for a worker discipline, wherein each person accepts his role in attainment of the mass goal.

Although it cannot be denied that impressive advancements were made by the Chinese under early centralised administration, the increasing awareness of the masses--together with their infinite capability for discovering and introducing new and different techniques and methodology--argued well for the people's ability to move toward de-centralisation and local autonomy.

Initial endeavours toward more local autonomy indicated to the outside observer that the centre had relinquished all direction and control. Closer examination, however, reveals that the new system of de-centralisation in 1957-58 retained all of its industrial/agricultural ministries. Local governments (including the new work teams) were empowered with 'ground-up' supervisory influence of all the ministries. The Chinese termed this phase "Double Track Leadership" and, as with most responsibilities, it carried commensurate accountability. All engaged in the liberalised activities were responsible for their own annual budgets, including revenues and expenditures. Eklestein, Galenson and Liu write of this new era:

The real significance of the decentralisation is that both local governments and individual enterprises were granted more freedom in determining their own production and investment plans, and more sources of funds for financing invest-

ment if they wished, without interference from the central government. 56

Red Versus Expert Dichotomy

At Liberation, the Chinese Communist Party was overwhelmingly peasant in numbers and character. China was immediately confronted with the need for an enormous contingent of citizens with managerial and technical skills to carry on the tasks of reconstruction. "The solution, for the moment, was to recruit and train intellectuals. More cadres had to be trained, for China faced urgent economic tasks. The only way to do it was to intensify the programme of higher education".⁵⁷ To augment its formal education planning, special programmes were established with training courses to build job skills, and 'people's universities' were developed to train political cadres.⁵⁸

Those within the university system became more 'Expert' than 'Red' as the nature of their study became intensively academic and political training was de-emphasised. Curriculum was expanded and time in school increased from four to five, six or even eight years.⁵⁹ As Lenin had said of the old schools, they "compelled their pupils to assimilate a mass of useless, superfluous and barren knowledge, . . . nine-tenths of which was useless".⁶⁰

The Party schools, on the other hand, concentrated on political training and a minimum of liberal education. As Schurmann noted, "They learned a little of everything from science to literature, all within the context of heavy political indoctrination."⁶¹

The contradiction in this approach--more formal, non-political education for the intellectuals; job training and

political indoctrination for the uneducated peasantry--has occasioned heated debate within the Party.

Some individuals within the CCP, such as Liu Shao-chi and Lu Ting-i, who had a leading position in the field of education, espoused the 'Expert' approach.⁶¹ They contended that industrial, technological and scientific achievement could only progress under the supervision of highly trained, extensively educated professionals. They wanted to give recognition for individual expertise in a specialised field, special privileges and extra ✓ compensation. Mental--but no physical--labour would be expected of the intellectuals.

This approach had great appeal to the highly trained elites functioning within large, insulated (from the people) bureaucracies. "The traditional bureaucrat wanted harmony and sought to maintain the status quo. He was regarded as the opposite of the 'Red' cadre who saw struggle as the means to change the status quo and create a new society".⁶³ Schurmann continued, "This does not mean that intellectuals are disloyal, but rather that, like all professionals, they are more motivated by self-interest than ✓ by commitment to collectivity".⁶⁴

Mao and others within the CCP long argued for more 'Red-ness', contending that the quality and dedication of those who contribute to the implementation of policy are crucial to the nature of the social and economic changes sought by the Party.

In 1958, during the Great Leap Forward, official directives called for more emphasis on 'part work/part study' programmes. Seybolt suggests that Liu and Lu paid lip service to the direct-

ives but, in fact, continued to accentuate formal education.⁶⁵

By 1966, when the Cultural Revolution began, Mao said, "The period of schooling should be shortened, education should be revolutionised; the domination of our schools by bourgeois intellectuals should by no means be allowed to continue".⁶⁶

Said Schurmann, "If continued, the Party would probably have turned into an elite club resembling the Soviet Communist Party under Stalin, or into a new version of the Kuomintang."⁶⁷

During the Cultural Revolution, the struggle between the two schools of thought (two lines) became a national debate. Schools were closed and mass criticism of the old system ensued. A new orientation evolved from this confrontation; henceforth the educational system aimed to integrate intellectual and manual labour, professional competence with political consciousness, and to inculcate within the student a respect for both head and hand. In China today, it is believed that only such people can become both Red and Expert.

The 'Expert' syndrome has yet to be completely resolved and will undoubtedly surface many more times, but probably never to the extent seen when experts dominated China's development during the years of Soviet influence. The downgrading of Liu Shao-chi in 1966, the further efforts during the Cultural Revolution and the positive, people-oriented tactics which came about after the Cultural Revolution give evidence that the struggle continues.

Sino-Soviet Schism Surfaces

In July 1960 the CPSU used the pretext that China was attempting to proselytise the Russian specialists and that those who

were not open to the Chinese enticements were being harassed and brutalised. The Soviet government sent a protest to Peking alleging misuse and maltreatment of Russian personnel in China, contending that their people were expected to work under intolerable conditions (the same conditions as the Chinese workers). It further complained that the Chinese often disregarded the Soviet experts' advice. By the end of August, 1,390 technicians (together with their families, a total of more than 4,000 persons) were recalled to Russia. The specialists removed their blue-prints as well, and where possible they took with them uninstalled machinery (later returned) and spare parts.⁶⁸

China's Internal and External Situation

With the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations and the potential of a further isolation of China by both the capitalist and the Soviet-dominated socialist states, the CCP inventoried global conditions, specifically as they pertained to China. Data suggest that the leadership evaluated and determined essential strategies to deal with the deteriorating situation on two levels, i.e. internally and externally. China would have to improve, strengthen and consolidate her forces internally by applying, in the light of accumulated experience, the 'mass line', 'self-reliance', 'one-speciality and many capabilities' themes in an even more vigorous and positive fashion, while maintaining and improving her abilities to counter world pressures externally.

The international threat to Chinese survival can be summarised:

1. Since Liberation, the U.S. had followed a policy of

boycott and containment of China, exacerbated by an increasing American involvement in the military, economic and political affairs of Asia, specifically Vietnam, Taiwan, the Phillipines, South Korea and Japan. The situation was further complicated by a U.S./Japanese conflict of interest in Okinawa. The Ryuka island served simultaneously as an inducement to the Japanese who entertained visions of re-possession of valuable colonial territory and as a huge unsinkable U.S. Air Force bastion from which to intimidate China.

2. The U.S. strategy of containment was complemented by Russian foreign policy; by her seeking to improve and/or change her relationships with Japan, India, Indonesia, Burma and Afghanistan, and by becoming more deeply involved, both economically and militarily, with the Mongolian People's Republic. Supplementally, the USSR augmented the diplomatic, military and economic pressures it had launched against China by instigating a serious provocation in an area of extreme sensitivity to the Chinese, the Sino-Soviet border. Despite the CPR's declaration for acceptance of 'status quo' boundaries pending in-depth studies and negotiations to alleviate the tensions aroused by inequitable, Tsarist determined boundary lines, the Soviets (from 1960 through 1969) initiated a steadily increasing military build-up on the Chinese-Russian border⁶⁹--fully one-third of the USSR's standing army--backed by nuclear weapons.⁷⁰

Internally, China had sustained a succession of natural catastrophes--the most extreme in over a century; extensive and 'unending' drought in some areas; storms and devastating floods

in others. Also to be dealt with was the growing dichotomy engendered by an ideological split between Mao and Liu Shao-chi, ✓ whose New Economic Policy was considered revisionist ('taking ✓ the capitalist road') by Mao Tse-tung.

Given the world situation, there existed the distinct possibility, even probability, that China would be drawn into fighting a defensive war with one or both of the super-powers, or that escalation by the U.S. in either Vietnam or Korea would entail even higher commitments of China's men and material. At the same time, protection of her 4,500 mile Sino-Soviet border from a preemptive strike demanded a high defence capability, without destructive exactions on economic development. China's problem, then, was to create and establish an internal situation in such a manner as to achieve a powerful defensive posture without a disproportionate allocation of its GNP, which could dangerously set back China's socio-economic development.

Why De-urbanisation and De-centralisation?

It is my thesis that China's plan to de-urbanise and de-centralise was a decision of the first magnitude. With respect to defence policy, it afforded the nation more effective short *and* long range strategic advantages by allowing extensive and widely dispersed industrial maturation while avoiding the costly social disruptions of massive internal migration. Also of major import, the policy dramatically raised China's external defensive posture.

The advantages of the programme can be summarised in the following points:

1. De-urbanisation and de-centralisation increase defence capabilities by deploying the nation's industrial capacity over the entire country, rendering a pre-emptive strike both uneconomical and difficult to achieve in a short time span. There are additional benefits: each region tends to become independent and self-sufficient; each area can, in classical guerrilla style, defend itself. ✓

2. De-urbanisation and de-centralisation requires less capital accumulation for the logistics of supply and distribution requisite to centralised development. One additional benefit to the Chinese: a potential invader must be prepared to commit a larger occupation garrison to control a widely dispersed people. Cities are like ghettos; electricity, fuel, water or food become weapons in the occupiers' arsenal.

3. De-urbanisation and de-centralisation decreases under-employment and unemployment in the agrarian sector. At peak seasons of the year farming is labour intensive but there are also long periods wherein the work force can utilise other or outside employment. Additional benefit: diversified employment tends to minimise the alienation found among workers engaged only in repetitive work.

4. De-urbanisation and de-centralisation can achieve more industry for a given capital by reducing internal migrations which require additional housing, sewerage, transit and social integration into a new life style. Additional benefits are lower concentrations of pollution and lower population density which reduces vulnerability to air attacks.

5. De-urbanisation and de-centralisation sanctions and fosters a mass participation in the nation's tasks by raising mass consciousness of the economic and political realities facing the population. All of the people become involved in achieving self-sufficiency. The additional benefit of wide dispersal lowers the impact and concentration of 'experts'. It allows for the harnessing of the tremendous innovative capabilities of 500 million workers who have demonstrated that employing both old and new techniques has produced synthesis far more effective than many laboratory-developed processes. This, then, encourages self-reliance.⁷¹

6. De-urbanisation and de-centralisation are the principle determinants of reduction in disparities between town and country. As increasing numbers of educated youth and technicians "go down to the country", they provide skills which produce qualitative changes more rapidly, i.e., electrification, some industrialisation, technical education, etc. The interaction between city and country peoples; working and living together under the same circumstances, contributes toward reducing class differentiation. Input from the more sophisticated urbanites helps to break down traditional rural prejudices, i.e., resistance to family planning, new marriage laws, etc.

7. De-urbanisation and de-centralisation are the vehicles by which a sparsely inhabited province (such as Sinkiang) can be populated with corps of skilled technological workers from the high density cities. The additional benefits, of course, are that the settlement of remote, thinly populated regions precludes

'lightening occupations' of such areas and enables the borderlands to attain a self-sufficiency comparable to the interior zones.

The strategy of de-centralisation is not original to China *per se*, (anticipating war with Germany within ten years, Russia de-centralised in the 1930s by developing industry east of the Urals). The magnitude of China's action, the thoroughness of its decentralisation (i.e. its efforts to make every region a self-contained entity) however, is unique.

China has progressed to the point where it can now produce ninety percent of its machinery requirements. Industry, science and technology, now de-centralised and expanding, have placed China in a position wherein it can continue to develop even if completely blockaded. Moreover, the capital for its socialist construction has been obtained within China's own independent economy.

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was launched at the very time (August 1966) China was caught in the pincers of the Soviet and U.S. war machines. External threats notwithstanding, Mao considered the GPCR a priority for combatting the revisionism which was building and consolidating within China under Liu Shao-chi.

Much practical wisdom had been drawn from the example of Russia's revisionism (restoration of capitalism). China had learned that it matters little if the means of production is owned by the whole people. What matters is that leadership must

be incorruptable and that *control* of the means of production must rest in the hands of the masses. The Cultural Revolution was the means whereby the masses could wrest the growing control of the means of production from the new class that was building --the bureaucrats and specialists. Mao said:

The present Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is only the first of its kind. In the future such revolutions must take place . . . All Party members and the population at large must guard against believing that everything will be fine after one, two, three or four cultural revolutions. We must pay close attention, and we must not relax our vigilance.⁷²

During the years of the GPCR, the discussions, criticisms, and confrontations involved every sector of the population, plunging the whole of Chinese society into the struggle for socialism. In the history of the world, no government had ever before asked and encouraged its total population to challenge and examine minutely every facet and principle; every theoretician and administrator.

Bettelheim contends that "the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution represents a turning point of the greatest political importance: it 'discovered' (in the sense in which Marx used the expression in connection with the Paris Commune) an essential form of class struggle for the construction of socialism".⁷³
(parenthesis in original)

One of the important lessons learned by the CCP was how to integrate structural conservatism with functional flexibility-- at all levels of government. That is to say, the leadership has not been forced to scrap its administrative structure in order to radically alter its practice. On preliminary observation, formal

administrative changes do not appear to be extreme. Closer scrutiny reveals, however, that in implementation, the CCP's decision to de-centralise has led to a completely new approach to economic and political management.

Schurmann observed that the new Party men who came to power at the provincial level were committed to the radical line that had triumphed in the Politburo. Precisely because they were so, Peking felt it could grant them a broad range of operational autonomy to carry out policy in terms of the slogan "Do the best according to local conditions". Further in his discussion of de-centralisation, Schurmann makes the point that provincial governments acquired the right to place orders directly with enterprises still under the Centre, and, hence, they became a part of regional planning. By 1959 the policy was expanded to include three levels, i.e., local (regional), provincial and state, allowing an unprecedented operational flexibility.⁷⁴

The Party has avoided perpetuating its control through the creation and staffing of huge ministries, whose vested interest could only be supportive of those who gave them power. Such is the tradition of most other socialist states. The CCP line "from the masses to the masses" is more than rhetoric in China. It is doctrine. More than that, the whole aim of socialist construction is, in the long run, equality between worker, peasant and professional. The repudiation of profit motivation and the material transformation which a change in motivation and attitude, feelings and orientation, can promote, cannot be overstressed. Socialism is, more than any other, a system where compulsion of

any kind defeats its purpose. In China, the people, through their own education, study and experimentation have supplanted any need for compulsion with a "tremendous revolutionary enthusiasm".⁷⁵

Regional Character

An historical heritage of China is its distinctive regional character. The people identify themselves with their region--their landscape. The granting of an unusually high degree of autonomy in their own back-yards elicited an inordinate amount of grass-roots support. The decision which granted freedom (and commensurate responsibilities) in regional decision making, addressed itself to reducing one of the major contradictions Mao had recognised and identified in his article "On the Ten Great Relationships", e.g., the contradiction of the duality between Centre and Region.⁷⁶

In the Soviet Union, and formerly in New China, the implementation of the 'branch' concept of organisation generally meant centralisation of both command and administration.⁷⁷ In contrast to the branch concept, the new policy in the People's Republic resulted in interaction between branches, which cut across organisational lines and generally took the form of committees whose membership was comprised of members from several branches. This operational schema assured the utilisation of politically conscious personnel. Thus, the consideration of use, quality and integration of the whole was given priority, rather than promoting pure production for production's sake.

From Theory to Praxis

No nation can advance and flourish unless it makes correct use of its resources. In China, perhaps more than in any other country, the *people* are genuinely considered the most valuable resource of all. The Chinese feel that their human treasure must develop through new social institutions. In many ways China's social organisations and social interactions are far more advanced than its economic or technological development, for China has suffered from both the external constraint of a hostile world and an internal paucity of technology. An integral and decisive ingredient in New China's political thought is the conviction that comprehensive social experimentation is vital to social progress. In the words of a Red Guard in late 1967, "When society is motionless it is like a pool of stagnant water . . . When the water is moving turbulently, it purifies itself, the society moves ahead".⁷⁸

In spite of the fact that many of China's leaders in the 1950's, impressed by the Soviet model, were advocating immediate centralised direction of industrial and technological development wherever possible (and corrections of the imbalance later) Mao refused to deviate from his conviction that China could never attain either international security or internal stability unless its 500 million peasants kept pace with its 100 million urban dwellers. In the face of substantial opposition within the Central Committee, Mao raised the tempo of his drive to make 'self-reliance' the battle-cry of the late '50s and early '60s and the guiding principle in its economic developmental policy.

Russia's economic and political attacks in the 1960s changed China's perceptions of who constituted her principle external threat. Although the U.S. became no less a menace to China, Soviet actions produced the realisation that Russia had become an even greater threat to China's sovereignty.

China's success in achieving self-reliance (without substantial material aid or expertise from foreign sources) paid off in the clearly observable ability to defend herself. After her nuclear detonation in 1964, China was no longer susceptible to Soviet nuclear blackmail, and no nation, regardless of its self-perceived strength, could be eager to involve itself in a land war with such a strong and united China.

The late Anna Louise Strong (an American author and long-time friend of the Chinese people) has succinctly described, from her personal observation and experience in China, the self-reliance of the masses and how, in fact, ideas and concepts are made and accepted. Referring, for instance, to the agricultural communes, she said:

Neither the origin of the commune nor any of its changes began as a decree by the state or even as a resolution by the Communist Party. The rise of the communes was a mass movement which the Party summed up and promoted. The first Party resolution about it was issued on August 29, 1958 when thirty percent of the peasants had already formed communes; the second resolution in Wuhan in December, with the modest title "Some Questions Concerning the People's Communes" was adopted after 99% of the peasants had joined. 79

This type of action then is, in the purest sense, the very thing that Mao promulgated when he said "from the masses to the masses".

In Canada, and in the United States, we pride ourselves on being nations of laws; impersonal and accompanied by an abiding mythology that laws equate with justice. Strong summarises the critical difference between mass leadership, mass decision, and the 'decree by law':

Most of the changes came similarly, by local actions to meet local problems, followed at intervals by a summary or analysis from the Central Committee or perhaps merely a reference in the People's Daily, noting that such practices had appeared and making comments about them. Any summing up by the Central Committee, any 'suggestion' made with the approval of the People's Daily, at once became a strong indication to all Party members that this was a policy to be regarded with favour. In no case were they legally binding or passed as laws. The final work in every commune lies with its members. 80

What the author was saying does not imply either narrow regionalism nor does this methodology lead to irresponsible or anarchistic tendencies. There are many data in China documenting the effect of large-scale, public criticisms of high level decisions which were changed, stopped or drastically modified through rectification campaigns, e.g., the Hundred Flowers Campaign. The new directions taken, after criticism, were predominantly more progressive and received greater acceptance by the masses. 81

Mao has consistently referred to these experiences as being directly analogous to the historical experience of the communards in the Paris Commune. That is, the Chinese peasants, like the communards the century before, construct their own people's organisations, arm themselves for self-defence and stress self-reliance growing from praxis.

The striking difference to us, from our sphere of experience, is that in China, social change develops from praxis. Here, it is most often instituted by legal edict, in company with a proliferation of contradictory statutes whose codification and precedence can only be translated by lawyers schooled in the art of legal rhetoric and loop-hole evasions. Needless to say, all of this legal hocus-pocus is generally far above the level of competent understanding of the common (lay) person, and only contributes to alienation, frustration and suspicion of the law as it applies to the 'masses' in capitalistic societies. The significance to Mao of the Paris Commune lay in the organisational methods developed by the communards which were significantly different from the usual implementation and tenure of representation, e.g., direct election and recall through universal suffrage; low salaries for officials; mass check-up on the work of the commune and its members; and, an organisational network of basic-level mass organisations who met frequently to review higher decisions, and mass solicitation of activist-proposals and/or criticisms on social and political performance.⁸² Such control of wages, property or influence disparities are more easily accomplished by de-centralisation in China, as is accountability and/or immediate recall by peers. This is radically different than representation for a specified term, wherein legalistic barriers for removal become so involved that the original thrust is dulled and lost by time-consuming machinations.

"Walking on Two Legs"

Of all the socialist countries, China began the first radical

change from the pattern set by Russia. Mao insisted, "We cannot wait until machines drop from heaven", and so the determination was made not to wait for industrialisation before collectivised agriculture. The Chinese created labour intensive communes, where most of their progress was achieved by old-fashioned methods while utilising any modern innovations available--"walking on two legs". Small scale enterprises within the communes learned to produce most of their own tools, machinery and equipment, and they were able to make regional adaptations of purchased machinery, to the advantage of each locale. The economic sense of this paradigm should not be lost. The system requires less transport and promotes a production technique wherein no equipment is scrapped, nor is any method rejected so long as the required materials, technique or labour cannot be more advantageously utilised elsewhere. Countless examples exist of local groups who have built lathes, grinders and pumps from scrap of their own, and on unpaid time.⁸³ While such products may be less productive than highly specialised machinery, the economic cost is minimal. And the psychological value, to a people hitherto almost entirely dependent upon foreign assistance, is immeasurable in dollars and cents.

The prime desideratum of New China puts socialist principle before profit. This brands them, henceforth, as an unpredictable factor in a world where monopoly capitalist "production is not geared to satisfy needs, but to make money. The two do not coincide".⁸⁴

NOTES - CHAPTER II

1. Franz Schurmann & Orville Schell, Republican China, (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), p. 279.
2. Mao, Selected Works, Vol. 1, p. 22.
- 3.. "Passing the gate" refers to a process at the village level wherein each person underwent intense public scrutiny as to ideological behaviour and an assessment of material holdings. By consensus, the villagers then placed each other in the landless, poor, poor-middle, middle and rich peasant class. The poor peasants were totally without land and had only their labour to sell, the poor middle had some land but were forced to sell part of their labour, the middle peasant was self-sufficient and the rich peasant hired and exploited the labour of the lower classes.
4. Liao, Lu-yen, New China's Economic Achievements, (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1952), p. 171.
5. Hsueh Mu-chao, The Social Transition of the National Economy of China, (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1953), pp. 98-101.
6. "Fruits of the turnover" denotes the material goods in each community, redistributed and shared by all who had "Fanshened". Depending entirely upon the relative wealth in each specific area, the 'fruits' could represent an acquisition of some importance, hitherto unknown to the poor peasants existence, or as little as a square of worn cloth.
7. Hsueh, pp. 98-101.
8. Hsueh, pp. 98-101.
9. Hsueh, pp. 98-101.
10. Cheng Chu Yuan, Communist China's Economy, (Massachusetts: Seton Hall University Press, 1963), p. 32.
11. Mao Tse-tung, On the Question of Agricultural Co-operation, (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1955); pamphlet.
12. R.R. Bowie & J.K. Fairbank, Communist China 1955-1959: Policy Documents With Analysis, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 119.
13. Tung Ta-Lin, Model Regulations, (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1955), p. 148-79.
14. Remmin Ribao, (Hsinhua News Agency, April 19, 1957), newspaper.
15. Da Kong Bao, (Peking, May 2, 1957), newspaper.

16. The first contradiction revealed that many peasants were spending more time on their own private plots and on raising personally owned animals. The second revealed that surplus enabled the rich co-operatives to engage in outside business operations, including speculation in grain and in usury. The third resulted in a re-appraisal of the order of revenue distribution, i.e., the state, trying to minimise resistance, reversed itself and allowed the collective to distribute its earnings to members first. The decision was found to be a serious mistake and a large amount of grain was lost before the original order was restored. The fourth reflected a large disparity of supply which developed between town and country, especially in medicines, machinery and sugar.
17. Renmin Ribao, March 3, 1957.
18. Chen Chu Yuan, The People's Communes, (Stanford, California: Hoover Institute, 1969), pp. 15-16.
19. N. Chen & W. Galenson, The Chinese Economy under Communism, (Edinburgh University Press, 1969), p. 44.
20. Chen & Galenson, p. 45.
21. Chen & Galenson, p. 39.
22. Poor and blank is laudatory as Mao defined it, i.e., the people are unspoiled by sophistication. Lenin termed it "the privilege of backwardness".
23. Chen & Galenson, p. 72.
24. The Howard Series on the USSR, Politburo Papers of the 2nd Five Year Plan, (New York: Progress Publications, 1965), p. 45.
25. Mao Tse-Tung, "Report on the Proposals for the 2nd Five Year Plan on the National Economy"; (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1956).
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30. Revisionist Course: Certain Party members pursue a course by which a small number of the hierarchy use their position to control information and knowledge and become an "expert" elite. The new elite are then in a position to modify (frequently using revolutionary rhetoric) the thrust of revolutionary struggle against capitalism, proletarian dictatorship, and to distort and/or negate the Marxist theory of class struggle. For example, a common revisionist ploy proclaims "the class interests between the proletariat and 'some' capitalists are not irreconcilable".
31. Referred to by Ch'en in Great Lives Observed, p. 27. The text of the resolution has not been released to the public.
32. J. Lacquer & L. Labedz, The Future of Communist Society, (London: Bodely Head Ltd., 1962), p. 156.
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36. Survey of China Mainland Publications (SCMP), U.S. Counsel General, Hong Kong. Central Committee of the CCP, August 29, 1958.
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42. E.L. Wheelwright & B. McFarlane, The Chinese Road to Socialism, (New York & London: Monthly Review Press, 1971), pp. 47-48.
43. Keith Buchanan, The Transformation of the Chinese Earth, (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1971), p. 231.
44. Buchanan, p. 231.

45. Wheelwright & McFarlane, p. 43-45.
46. Wheelwright & McFarlane, p. 43-45.
47. As late as 1961, the momentum of urban centralised growth had become so great that, notwithstanding the seemingly incredible progress of the rural sector, Shanghai's industrial capacity was five times larger than the next centre, Tientsin, and more than six times the size of Wuhan, China's third largest industrial complex. Communes varied in resources, population and managerial skills, further contributing to the disparity between the regions.
48. The "Ten Great Relationships" was released for internal study in 1966 and appeared in Baijing Dashue (Peking Univ.) December 22, 1966. Published in English by Jerome Ch'en in Mao: Great Lives Observed, (New Jersey, Prentice Hall Inc., 1969), pp. 65-85.
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50. Han: The original and dominant Chinese and their culture.
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CHAPTER 3

SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE INDUSTRIAL: FROM AGGLOMERATION TO DE-URBANISATION

First Five Year Plan

Speaking to the First National People's Congress on September 23, 1954, Chou En-lai outlined the rationale for the First Five Year Plan. It was designed to emphasise dispersal, national security and de-centralisation, and to give China new industrial regions considerably different in scope and practice from the traditional industrial location practice as determined by the West and by Russia.

We shall locate the productive forces of industry in different parts of the country in such a way that they will be close to producing areas of raw materials and fuel and also to consumer markets. They will also satisfy the requirements for the strengthening of national security, lead to the gradual improvement of the irrational locational pattern, and elevate the economic level of the backward areas. In the establishment of industrial areas, we shall, first of all, utilise, reconstruct and transform the existing industrial bases so as to avoid over-concentration of enterprises and to bring about a suitable measure of de-centralisation.¹

The Congress specifically called for some further expansion and qualitative transformation of cities already possessing an industrial capacity, i.e., Shanghai, Tientsin, Nanking, Tsingtao, Chinan and Kwangchou. In the area formerly known as Manchuria, reconstruction was extensive but the major effort was expended on an iron and steel complex in Anshan. Other townsites and industries which were expanded in the area include coal mining at Fu-shan, Fou-shin, Shaung-ya-shan, Chi-hsi and Ho-kang; metallurgical specialisation at Pen-ch'i; machine manufacture at Mukden; a chemical manufacturing complex and an important elec-

trical power industry (generators, turbines, motors, and power itself) at Kirin. This development was augmented by laying the groundwork for the creation of two iron and steel conglomerates of major proportions at Pao-t'ou and Wuhan during the next Five Year Plan.

Prime industrial construction was initiated in several new areas in North China, Northwest China and in Central China in the communities of Tai-yuan, Shih-chia-chuang, Lo-yang, Cheng-chou, Chu-Chou, Heng-yang, Lan-Chou and in historic Sian. In the Southwest, further development was undertaken at Chunking, Ch'eng-tu, Tzu-Kung, Nei-chiang and Nan-ch'ung.

The growth of old established areas, augmented by new locations, was conceived as a part of the plan described by Li Fu-ch'un: "of altering the irrational state of affairs inherited from old China", was of supreme importance to national defence, and a major act to equalise regional disparities.²

He continued by discussing ". . . appropriately locating new industries in different parts of the country so that industrial production would be closer to the sources of raw material and fuels as well as consumer markets, of allowing industrial location to conform to the requirements of civil defence and of gradually elevating the economic level of backward areas."³

All of China was underdeveloped but, in a comparative sense, certain areas were more backward, i.e., possessing virtually no primary or secondary installations. The people existed very much as they had for thousands of years. (For a grouping of the most backward areas, see Table #1).

TABLE #1: AREAS MOST ECONOMICALLY BACKWARD AS OF 1949.

<u>Region</u>	<u>Province or Autonomous Region</u>
North China & Inner Mongolia	Shansi and Inner Mongolia
East China	Anhwei and Chekiang
Central-South China	Honan and Kwangsi
Northwest China	Ningsia, Tsinghai and Sinkiang
Southwest China-Tibet	Tibet

(Source: WU, YUAN-LI, *An Economic Survey of Communist China*,
(New York: Bookman Associates, 1956), p. 30.

TABLE #2. THE SEVEN ECONOMIC COOPERATION REGIONS.


<u>Region</u>	<u>Provinces/Autonomous Regions</u>
Northeast China (formerly Manchuria)	Lianoning, Kirin, Heilungkiang
North China	Hopeh, Shansi, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.
Northwest China	Kansu, Shensi, Sinkiang, Tsinghai and Tingsia Autonomous Region.
East China	Kiangsu, Chekiang, Shantung, Anwei.
Central/South Central	Honan, Hupeh, Hunan, Kiangsi.
South China	Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Fukien.
Southwest China	Szechuan, Yunan, Kweichou and Tibet Autonomous Region.

Source: WU, YUAN LI, *The Spatial Economy of Communist China*,
(London: F.A. Praeger, 1967), p. 21.

China's economy in 1949 shared most of the negative factors long considered irreparable in other underdeveloped countries, i.e., superstition/ignorance, lack of capital, inadequate transport system, and virtually no industrial base upon which to build. A principle aspect, also endemic in other Third World nations, was its non-existent economic integration. China resembled a vast, stagnant sea of marginal, subsistent, peasant agriculture--dotted along one shore with isolated islands of economic development. Until Liberation, these 'islands' had been occupied by foreigners seemingly unaware of or indifferent to the decaying sea surrounding them. Between these poles, all contact was severely limited. Most of the foreigners chose not to learn the Chinese language. Greed and ethnocentrism accomodated small concern for the great mass of humanity perceived as dumb, pagan and beneath notice.

Transportation


Related to the lack of economic integration, the nation's transport capabilities were neither inter-connected nor of sufficient proportion to serve the needs of the country. As with most countries 'developed' by interests from outside their borders, China's transport system consisted of a series of unconnected links of road, rail and water, constructed only to serve the requirements of those interested in plundering the nation of its treasure. The major portion of existent rail was concentrated in eastern China, supplying the coastal or river-side cities easily dominated and made 'safe' by the gunboats of the maritime Imperialist nations. (see maps next pages).



MAP7



1949 Areas of Rail Supply/Distribution and Transport



1970 Supply/Distribution and Transport (Rail)

MAP 8

----- Rail routes

- Centres serving surrounding area and producing goods in excess of regional needs, i.e., sells to the State for intra-regional sales and/or export. Many of the centres are commune headquarters or "mini-cities" having urban concentrations of less than 100,000 people.

SOURCE: C.I.A. Atlas
U.S. Dept. of Government Publications
Washington, D.C., U.S.A.

Buchanan writes that the *combined* aggregate of all interior rail service totalled less than eight hundred kilometers. "The creation of a national economy was, under such conditions, impossible; the resources of the interior inaccessible and the creation of any real unity between the various peoples (or various regions) of China impossible because of the isolation of many groups".⁴ The absence of integration and communication which posed such tremendous difficulties immediately following Liberation had been, needless to say, of inestimable worth to the poorly equipped revolutionaries fighting in the guerrilla areas before victory.

Excepting the cities under foreign control, the historical role of the Chinese city differed markedly from that of the Western industrial model. For example, Chinese cities were regional centres from which the bureaucracy maintained political nexus with the distant crown, military garrisons which operated as protection from external forces, for the suppression of the restive peasantry and as a coercive force used in the collection of taxes. They also served as cultural centres and trading hubs, law-enforcement and 'justice' dispensaries, collection points and/or centres for handicraft and primitive industry, and, the residential enclaves for local mandarins, landlords and the incipient bourgeoisie. They were not, however, centres for capital or investment.

Urban Growth

In 1949, there were 98 cities in China with populations exceeding 100,000. Only seventeen (actually nineteen, but two of

the cities were interlocking) had a manufacturing capability (see Table 3), excluding the industrially denuded area known then as Manchuria. Of the seventeen industrial cities, eight produced 96.6% of the measurable output and Shanghai alone possessed 60.4% of all of the operable Chinese factories.

By 1953, the 98 cities had increased to 164 and were all ✓ classed as municipalities. The political influence of each depended on location and importance; Peking and Shanghai had provincial status and a number of cities, such as Kuangchow (Canton) operated on an administrative par with their provinces. Others, such as Harbin, were equal in status to the counties (hsien). (See Table 4). Administrative rankings remain as described to the present.

Urban growth continued relatively unabated, in spite of the policies laid out by the Central Committee, until about mid-year ✓ 1961--largely because of built up momentum, the length of time necessary to reverse the trend and correct the methods inspired by the Soviet advisors, and by the subtle undermining of Politburo concepts by such upper-echelon leaders as Kao Kang, secretary of the Northeast central bureau of the Central Committee and the then Chairman of the People's Republic, Liu Shao-chi.

De-urbanisation and De-centralisation

In July of 1956, Li Fu-chun, reaffirming Mao's analysis contained in the Ten Great Relationships, spoke of the dual problems: de-centralisation and de-urbanisation. Of de-centralisation he said, "On the basis of this policy, 472 of the 694 above norm industrial projects planned to be started during the

TABLE #3. DISTRIBUTION OF FACTORIES AND PERCENTAGE OF PRODUCTIVE POWER (EXCLUDING MANCHURIA)* 1949.

- industrial (not population)
- ranking.

Cities or City Combinations	Share (%) of Indicated Parameter		
	Motive Power	Employment	Number of Factories
Shanghai	57.7	60.9	60.4
Tientsin	16.8	9.9	9.4
Tsingtao	7.4	4.7	1.4
Peking	6.3	1.5	2.1
Nanking	2.5	1.8	6.9
Wu-han	2.2	3.6	3.6
Chungking	2.2	5.5	5.2
Kwangchou (Canton)	1.5	4.5	3.7
Kunming	0.7	1.1	0.5
Nan-chang & Chiu-chiang	0.7	1.1	1.7
Sian	0.6	1.1	0.5
Chang-sha & Heng-yang	0.6	1.5	1.7
Foochow	0.4	0.6	1.4
Lan-chou	0.3	0.5	0.3
Kuei-yang	0.2	0.8	0.6
Swatow	---	0.9	0.9
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: WU, YUAN-LI, P. 34.

* Early statistics concerning China generally omit reference to Manchuria due to the virtually complete dismantling of its industrial capacity by the USSR following the end of W.W. II.

TABLE #4: POPULATION RANKING OF 17 LARGEST CITIES
in 1948, 1953 and 1958

1948	1953	1958
Shanghai	Shanghai	Shanghai
Tientsin	Peking	Peking
Peking	Tientsin	Tientsin
Canton	Mukden (Shenyang)	Mukden (Shenyang)
Nanking	Chungking	Wu-han
Mukden (Shenyang)	Canton	Canton
Chungking	Wu-han	Chungking
Wu-han	Harbin	Harbin
Tsingtao	Nanking	Lu-ta
Harbin	Tsingtao	Nanking
Ch'eng-tu	Lu-ta	Sian
Ch'ang-Ch'un	Ch'eng-tu	Tsingtao
Tsinan	Ch'ang-Ch'un	Ch'eng-tu
Hangchou	Sian	Tai-yuan
Lu-ta	Tai-yuan	Fu-shan
Fu-shan	Kunming	Ch'ang-Ch'un
Sian	Hangchou	Kunming

First official census after Liberation taken in 1953. Cities of Mainland China, (U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 1961), p. 2.

NOTE: Centres not included in this table (which appear on previous chart) reveal that many of the older cities (although large) had little or no industrial capacity and were primarily trade and cultural centres. Nan-chang, Chang-sha, Foochow, Lan-chou, Kuei-yang and Swatow (included in first table) have lower population rankings than their industrial ratings. Their relative positions in 1948 are listed as 28, 87, 21, 39, 30 and 35 respectively.

first five years will be in the interior provinces and only 222 will be in the coastal areas".⁵ On the question of de-urbanisation he was just as explicit. He said, "At the same time, on the basis of this industrial policy, our present task in urban construction is not to develop the large cities on the coast . . . but to restrict appropriately the expansion of cities. The present blind or unplanned development of the coastal cities is a phenomenon that has to be corrected."⁶

To develop the potential, to properly activate the masses and to implement the decision, required a more manageable organisation. Accordingly, in July of 1957, the country was divided into seven *Economic Cooperation Regions*: each area to be basically self-sufficient and able to exploit natural resources to a capacity consistent with regional conditions. Each region was to build (or enlarge) one major iron and steel complex, plus numerous secondary steel centres and, additionally, to construct a machine-building capability. Thus, the ECRs would reduce long distance transport and/or cross-country supply hauls. This would, in turn, promote the growth of complimentary and ancillary enterprises which could be sustained by and within each region (a pragmatic recognition of the 'friction of distance' theory). Implicit within the concept was the anticipated further regional development during the subsequent five-year planning periods. (See Table 2).

The construct embodied in the ECR formation pointed to the optimal (for China) arrangement for establishing a proper balance between intra-regional self-sufficiency and specialisation, plus

inter-regional exchange. Unlike the old China, the new People's Republic placed strong emphasis on developing formerly neglected, less developed and under-developed areas. Many of these were inhabited by minority peoples and later became autonomous regions. The plan was intended to strengthen the country politically, minimise (over a period of time) economic disparities, foster stronger and closer ideological ties and, at the same time, act as an important factor in the stabilisation of the national economy and in security.

The realities of China's precarious position; surrounded as it was (and is) by a constellation of hostile forces led by the U.S. and Russia, demanded of China a continuous struggle against domination or destruction by her adversaries. The new nation had at once to shatter the encircling world's illusion of order and, at the same time, to project its own image onto the pages ✓ of history. So it was that China, in order to assert its own identity as distinct from its former mentor, the U.S.S.R., became a 'Chinese' China, visible to itself. All successful revolutionary movements create their own unique ways of viewing their objective condition. This consciousness results from their *own* failures and from their *own* successes--but always a great cost, great labour.

Military strategy cannot be separated from ideology; China, for example, could have espoused dispersal simply for political or economic reasons. But China realised that in the nuclear missile era, the former distinctions between interior and peripheral installations no longer existed. Dispersal as initiated

by Russia in the 1930s (a series of huge complexes moved eastward to the Urals and beyond) was no longer viable militarily, even if more practical politically and economically. The expedient of building large internal agglomerations, a valid strategy prior to 1945, would not reduce the vulnerability of China's installations to missile attack--whereas de-centralised, small-scale, widely dispersed complexes would pose more difficult targets to the potential attacker. ✓

The reality of the nuclear missile potential gave credence to the call for "Strategic De-centralisation".

Let each region, each province, draft its plan in case of war; local administrations must create industrial complexes. First the regions, then the provinces, must create industrial systems that are relatively independent, considering both national distribution of industry and its overall development. If American imperialism and social imperialism impose war on our people, we will be ready with many industrial bases, big, small, solid, inextinguishable. We will be able to bear the war, wipe out the enemy, and win. ✓

7

Central to the thesis of building a unique Chinese image, and a core issue in constructing strategic self-sufficiency, was the decision to enlarge the perimeters of the Peking and Shanghai municipalities in 1958. After expansion, both included sizeable surrounding areas whose agriculture *and* industrial production improved the ability of each to become self-sufficient. ✓

Changing Spatial Patterns

In 1958, many cities of dense concentrations were areally expanded to a dramatic degree. Peking, as an example, more than quadrupled its area of jurisdiction; from just 3,973 square kilo- ✓

metres and four million inhabitants, to 7,300,000 people inhabiting slightly more than 17,000 square kilometers, forty-seven percent of which was classed as previously rural . . . a highly significant factor in the nation's attempt to blur the demarcation between rural and urban distinctions.⁸

The Regional District concept in the West is quite different from de-urbanisation in China. In the West, satellites have been built up as 'bedroom' areas, 'industrial' areas, 'financial' areas, etc. Most satellites have their own government and tax structures. Each competes with the others for industry, trade and commerce, but sometimes cooperates in hydro, transportation and sewerage facilities. Transportation difficulties abound as workers attempt to move to and from the 'bedroom' area to the workplace.

In China, de-urbanisation is part of the struggle for area self-sufficiency. Each municipality has co-mingled industry, agriculture, housing, shopping, parklands, administration, schools, cultural centres, etc. throughout its jurisdiction. This aims to decrease vulnerability from enemy attack, develop food and manufacturing capability from its own resources, reduce urban/rural disparities and to ensure that the worker is no further than ten minutes by bicycle from his/her workplace. (Refer to "c", p. 3).

Tientsin is perhaps the most striking example of the phenomenon of China's efforts to remove, perceptually as well as practically, the demarcation between town and country. The city's 1953 population of 2,694,000 in an area of less than 1,500 kilometres, became a jurisdiction slightly more than two-thirds as

large as the Netherlands (Tientsin, 20,000 sq. km./Netherlands, 27,973 sq. km.), with a total population of 11.4 million inhabitants--very nearly equal to the total Netherlands population of 12.3 million (a nation considered to be very densely populated.) The increased area has allowed for systematic planning which has integrated transport, food supply, water, industry, and lower population densities over the entire area.⁹

Typical examples of other well-known cities in China which have under-gone areal and spatial transformation include:

- Sian, which was populated in 1949 by 400,000 inhabitants ✓ in an area of only 30 sq. km. 1,300,000 people now live in Sian and the municipality encompasses 199.6 sq. km.-- a three-fold jump in population within an area more than five times larger than originally.
- Lanchow, which added 215,000 peasants and their living areas, raising its population from 517,000 to 732,000.
- Wuhan, in reality a trinity of cities, Hankow, Hanyang and Wuchang, which merged and included over 100,000 peasants and their commune areas. The 1953 population of 2,427,000 individuals living on nearly twice the spatial area.

A number of cities decreased in population, largely due to local conditions which did not lend themselves to areal expansion or to relative self-sufficiency through expansion. (see Table 5).

Buchanan summarised the urban/rural situation based on the 1953 census: 420 cities having more than 20,000 inhabitants ✓ totalling 51,000,000 people. Of this total, 102 cities counted

TABLE #5. CITIES HAVING A POPULATION OF MORE THAN 100,000 WHOSE POPULATIONS DECREASED WITH DE-CENTRALISATION AND DE-URBANISATION.

City	Province	Population in Thousands		Percentage
		1958	1968	
Nanking	Kiangsu	1,230	1,092	-11
Nan-tung	Kiangsu	260	240	-8
Chen-Chiang	Kiangsu	201	189	-5
Yang-chou	Kiangsu	180	160	-11
Huai-nan	Anhwei	287	280	-3
An-ching	Anhwei	109	105	-4
Wu-hu	Anhwei	242	237	-2
Swatow	Kwangtung	280	250	-11
Chan-Chiang	Kwangtung	271	166	-39
Fo-shan	Kwangtung	122	118	-3
I-ning	Sinkiang	108	85	-21
Tzu-hung	Szechuan	291	280	-4
Nei-chung	Szechuan	190	180	-5
Wu-tung-chiao	Szechuan	199	140	-26
Lu-chou	Szechuan	289	130	-55
Ying-Kuo	Liaoning	159	131	-18
Liao-yuan	Kirin	185	120	-35
Mu-tan-chiang	Heilungkiang	200	151	-25
Chia-mu-ssu	Heilungkiang	168	146	-13
Chefoo	Shantung	227	116	-49
Nan-ning	Kwangsi	194	159	-18
Wu-chou	Kwangsi	207	111	-46
Chuan-chou	Fukien	121	108	-11
Wei-hai	Shantung	175	35	-80

Source: C.I.A., Atlas of China.

their population as 100,000 or more; nine cities larger than 1,000,000. The nine cities represented twenty-five percent of the urban population. By 1960, the number of cities having more than a million inhabitants had grown to seventeen, and represented more than thirty-five percent of China's urban population.¹⁰

The significance of rapid urban growth between Liberation and 1960, according to Buchanan, was not due to a rural to urban migration as had been the Russian experience during the 1930s. It was attributable to greatly improved health measures and the high marriage rate of the Chinese urban population. The birth rate in the cities was four percent per annum (twice the national birth rate) and "may well have contributed more to the growth of the urban population than did migration". Buchanan noted, "in several cities over this period the increase of population through natural growth actually exceeded the total growth, thus implying a loss of population through migration".¹¹

As de-urbanisation is implemented, it radically changes the pattern of economic growth, responding to area and regional needs, thus promoting an agricultural-industrial balance. De-urbanisation is the vehicle by which China travels the road to a unified and stable de-centralised nation, conforming in practice to the Marxian concept and to the theoretical paradigm visualised by Mao earlier (Ten Great Relationships), and articulated by Chou En-lai and Li Fu-chun in 1955, 1956 and 1957. By 1960, the programme had established sufficient momentum to be clearly considered a successful working policy.

At the time of China's First Five Year Plan (as mentioned

earlier), all of its industry was concentrated in only one hundred cities. By 1963, rapid acceptance of de-centralisation had dispersed the industrial capacity to more than 2,100 cities. The formation and growth of new smaller cities (many in areas which, historically, could never have supported them) became a geographic fact. This is exemplified by such centres of recent origin as "Karmo, a new city in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, peopled and administered by Kazakls, formerly semi-nomadic herds-people. They are now building machine tools and developing the mineral potential of the region".¹²

There are similar examples in every province in China. Table 6 lists a number of municipalities that have integrated agrarian characteristics in the process of de-urbanisation.

RURAL-URBAN MUNICIPALITIES

TABLE #6

<u>Province</u>	<u>City</u>	<u>Province</u>	<u>City</u>
Liaoning	Antung Liao-yang	Kiangsi	Chiu-chiang Tai-chou
Kirin	Tung-hua Ssu-ping	Honan	Shang-chiu
Heilungkiang	Chi-chi-ha-erh	Hunan	Chu-chou
Hopeh	Han-tan Kalgan Chin-huang-tao	Sinkiang	Urumchi
Shansi	Ta-tung	Kansu	Lan-chou
Inner Mongolaa	Pao-tou Huhehot	Szechwan	I-pin Lu-chou
Kiangsu	Chang-su	Shantung	Tsinan
Fukien	Amoy	Anhwei	Ho-fei
		Chekiang	Shao-hsing

(Source: WU, YUAN-LI)

The reality of New China's municipalities, as well as the number of new smaller cities throughout the country, lies in the physical appearance of both the old and the new. The old cities were formerly dense, unsanitary concentrations of squalor and misery, surrounding centres of feudal opulence. Prime consideration has been given to the rehabilitation of usable old quarters, the planting of countless trees, and the construction of numerous parks.¹³

In Shanghai, more than 40,000 sq. metres of old housing has ✓ been renovated and electrified in the years between 1949 and 1969. Only the hovels and slums were demolished. Within the same time span, 24,000,000 sq. metres of new housing has been built.¹⁴ In 1949, Shanghai had a total of 14 parks--66 hectares of land. Today there are 32 parks covering an area in excess of 270 hectares plus 125 green squares of 47 hectares. The inhabitants, very early on, initiated an arboreal programme to beautify the city. Each year, more than 750,000 trees are planted and the once starkly barren streets have become forest like.¹⁵ The new housing is of the 'low-rise' type, restricted to four, five or six stories in height. They are now surrounded by large green areas of trees, gardens and fish ponds.

Street Factories ✓

Industry within the city has also been drastically changed. For instance, 'Street Factories' created on and by the initiative of the inhabitants, especially the women, have proliferated conspicuously, so that at the present time 2,800 Street Factories employ over 200,000 people manufacturing or, in some cases, re-

manufacturing virtually everything from light bulbs to exotic electronic paraphernalia.¹⁶

One of the Street Factories builds most of the medical equipment used by the Chinese para-medical corps, popularly known as the "Barefoot Doctors".¹⁷ Other communes or factories, collective property of each district, assume responsibility for the upkeep of roads--under the direction of an elected "Revolutionary Committee".¹⁸

The Communist Party also has a "District Committee" working in close coordination with many diverse groups. The municipality of Shanghai directs in excess of 100,000 small and medium factories in the same manner (both have equal political power) as the provinces. The sum of this multi-tiered coordination results in the astounding fact that State-run enterprises, once dominant in the nation, have shrunk in percentage of production to 53% of the whole. This political organisational schema aims at promoting ultimate control of all production by the workers and has served as a strong impetus to the large-scale integration of women into the socially productive work force.¹⁹

Investment allocation for the new construction is State directed (to control growth excesses), but the municipalities are entrusted with planning, implementation, upkeep and management. The latter is actually handled by the residents, by way of a committee structure. There is, surprisingly, a high percentage of privately owned individual housing (21.9% in Shanghai, 22.5% as a national average in the old cities), a contradiction, within a socialist society, yet to be resolved.

In Shanghai, and in the country as a whole, privately owned ✓ automobiles are non-existent. The city is intended primarily for pedestrians. Of course, many buses, some trucks and taxis and a few official passenger cars operate, but the street traffic bears no resemblance to our congested conditions wherein the car assumes priority, and buildings and parks are destroyed to make parking lots and wider streets for more and more automobiles. Surface transport in Shanghai such as buses, is insufficient, increasing only 45% since 1950, but underground transport has expanded ten-fold. The numbers of bicycles is notable: one for every four to ✓ five people, and increasing rapidly (a bicycle costs about two ✓ month's salary for the average worker).

Peking, a pre-industrial city, was built originally to house the rulers of China. Since Liberation it has grown industrially strong and has expanded its municipal boundaries to insure self-sufficiency. As the tensions mounted between Peking and Moscow, the city literally created another municipal complex underground, ✓ as a protective measure to counter threatened attack by the Soviet Union.²⁰ The underground city contains housing for the entire population, underground wells, air purification systems, factories, nerve centres of government and neighborhood food, clothing and medical supply depots adequate to sustain a two-year seige. Virtually every Chinese city is similarly prepared ✓ for survival.²¹

Taching is but one, albeit the most flourishing, example of China's success in building new de-urbanised communities. Taching is China's model industrial complex--a radical example of urban

spatial arrangement. It should be viewed, not as an illustration of the dominance of countryside over city, but rather, as a new unity combining and utilising the best aspects of both.

Taching is situated in Heilungkiang province on the Sung-liao plain--well nigh impossible to locate on current maps of China.²² Its approximate population is 200,000 people. The general population density of Taching, as well as the rest of the province, is 175 per sq. km.

In 1959, the area was (as it had been for hundreds of years) barely subsistent, sparsely populated pastoral land. Today Taching produces nearly 90% of its own foodstuffs and is the country's leading oil producer. Educated youth and revolutionary workers have constructed and operate vitally important petrochemical plants and have developed a multiplicity of other industrial capabilities. The Chinese say "In agriculture, learn from Tachai; in industry, learn from Taching".

Taching is the perfect example of Chinese 'foolishness' as defined by the Russian 'experts', whose advice on the development of the region was rejected.

Russian geological teams, aiding the Chinese in their search for mineral resources, ignored any kind of resource exploration in the area until, at Chinese insistence, a shallow test well (less than 300 metres in depth) was drilled. The test hole indicated the presence of oil, but according to the Soviet specialists, exploitation would not be economically viable. Data available do not indicate why the Russians were exploring at such shallow depths, only that they were in the area reluctantly and

were anxious to move on.²³

Undeterred by Soviet pessimism, this revolutionary group put to practice the slogans promoting "self-reliance" and "walking on too legs". With crude, hand-built equipment and the centuries old Chinese system of well-digging, they explored to greater depths.²⁴

In 1941 Professor C.M. Young, writing for the American Gas Association Monthly, said, "The Chinese, with the most primitive of tools and the use of nothing but human labour as power, had drilled wells which have reached the depth of 3,500 feet". He confirmed that in Szechuan province the Chinese had drilled for gas to use to evaporate salt brine for the salt monopoly and that "gas had been used in this way for as long as 3,000 years. The wells are still (1941) being drilled with primitive equipment and apparently there is no modern well drilling machinery in use in the natural gas district."²⁵ (brackets added).

"In part these wells are cased with bamboo, but there is another practice which shows how true it often is that modern practices may be the re-invention of old ones. In a crude way the Chinese drillers cement their wells and drill out the plugs. The "Christmas tree" also is nothing new, for the Chinese are still using a home-made tree of their own devising".²⁶

On September 26, 1959, just one week after the Russian departure and only six days before the tenth anniversary of Liberation, the Chinese crew 'spudded in' the first economically practicable well at a depth of 1,200 metres. The discovery was named Taching (Great Celebration) in tribute to the nation's

tenth anniversary.

Inspired by the news of a discovery with the potential of freeing China from dependence upon foreign petroleum, hundreds of young workers, intellectuals and engineers volunteered to go to the new frontier and develop the great find.

As the volunteers arrived at the site, they were confronted with the immediate problem of accomodation. In the spirit of Yen-an, they used traditional techniques and materials, i.e., walls of tamped clay bricks, roofs of fire-hardened clay tiles, and raised floors of hardened mud, and constructed their own housing. "Kangs", for sleeping and sitting, were incorporated into the structures and window openings were 'glazed' with oiled paper or, when available, wood shutters.²⁷

The New China News Agency carried the story, "Taching's way of life is in the revolutionary tradition that was developed in the late thirties and forties at Yen-an, where the leaders lived in caves. All the houses face south and allow adequate sunshine and fresh air. They are whitewashed. Every house has its own kitchen and heating equipment which keeps the rooms warm in the winter."²⁸

Some of the occupants considered the housing and its arrangement a temporary expedient and visualised early replacement with a new, conventional city requiring much capital and modern building materials; others in the group conceived a more radical plan. In a series of meetings and after much tan-i-tan (conversation/-debate), a consensual position was reached which opted for a constellation of simple villages, each convenient to the workplace

of the occupant and providing the basic amenities necessary to community life.

For administrative purposes, the entire oil field and the many ancillary industries are contained in more than ninety agro-industrial villages and are treated as one municipality. For convenience, each village is laid out geometrically around the local administration centre, stores, hospital and industrial plants (differing in individual villages), the granary/mill, soybean processing and bean curd plant, a small distillery, and service/repair facilities. The schools are located amongst the houses and all are heated by gas from the field, as are the gas-fired di-kuo (earthen stoves) for cooking. Shopping is done on a daily basis and no refrigeration is available.

Each village is self-contained, with underground storage and air-raid shelters. The population varies from 500 to 5,500 workers and their families. There are three larger agro-industrial cities whose size was dictated by the larger work-force needed for a type of integrated industrial output related to refining, vis., plastics, petro-chemicals, synthetic fibres, textile, rubber and machine production.

Ringed each of the villages and the cities are farms which were started by the women and children. Grain, soybeans, flax and most of the vegetables required by the people are produced on these farms, as well as a surplus which is sold to the state.

To the outside observer, it is difficult to realise that an oilfield exists, for, with the exception of a well in the process of being drilled, there are no derricks breaking up the landscape,

no waste pools and no machinery lying about to betray the presence of such activity.

The Chinese use the 'flush-well' system, a method whereby water is pumped into the hole, facilitating extraction and minimising pumping with the expectation of cleaning out each strata-belt before having to seek deeper levels.²⁹ These "new methods of extraction were put into practice. The result has been that China now holds the world record in terms of international drilling norms".³⁰ As the wells decrease their production, a percentage are taken out of use and the base is again used for deeper exploration and ultimate exploitation (again contrary to Russian advice).

By 1963, Taching and other petroleum fields in China had been developed to a point of national self-sufficiency. By late 1969, China was able to export some of its oil. "Annual production of crude continues to increase by about 30%".³¹ Within ten years, expanding as planned, China will have become a pivotal factor in the economics of the Asian world.³²

Hsiafang (Downward Transfer)

The "Ten Great Relationships" (p. 66) enumerated the serious shortcomings (contradictions) which the leadership felt were inhibiting a balanced social and spatial development in China. Subsequently, the 'Red versus Expert' controversy brought to light the contradiction manifest between the professionally trained individuals and the average worker.

Within China's cities growing numbers of educated young people were considering education and specialisation a vehicle

for individual success rather than as a means to aid socialist construction.³³ As Mao said, ". . . these are contradictions. Contradictions are everywhere. The world would not be what it is, if there were no contradictions".³⁴

A programme of 'planned emigration' from the old, coastal, industrially developed cities was required to: 1) combat the imbalances of the coastal cities; 2) create new communities in the interior; 3) provide the nucleus of trained personnel requisite to erasing the technological barriers between town and country; and 4) resolve the contradictions of the 'experts' and the urban youth.

As envisaged by Marx and Engels in the Manifesto, the implementation of such an exodus was intended to achieve the "combination of agriculture with manufacturing industries; gradual abolition of the distinction between town and country by a more equable distribution of the population over the country"³⁵--the genesis of the CCP dictum "Agriculture as the foundation, industry as the leading factor, and de-centralisation as the primary strategy".

The concept of Hsiafang is not pejorative, "Down from the cities and out to the countryside" is the social-geographic continuation (for the youth of China) of the revolutionary heritage of the Long March and Yen-an. It is central to the idea of 'red and expert', and to reducing the disparity between town and country. It makes areal and regional developments possible by moving massive numbers of people from the urban centres to the less populous rural, mountain and border areas. It restricts,

minimises, and in some cases, reduces the existent urban contradictions, and reinforces regional self-sufficiency/self-reliance while de-centralising the countryside and de-urbanising the larger cities.

A principle^{al} theoretical function of Hsifaxang is to combat ✓ the counter-productive effects of 'specialisation' engendered by the modernising process itself and is intended to further the Marxist concept of a society wherein the difference between manual and mental labour will ultimately be eliminated.

An obvious precursor to the August 1957 official announcement ✓ of the nation-wide "downward transfer" policy was Chou En-lai's report to the Eighth National congress of the CCP in September of 1956. In a spirit reminiscent of the "Crack Troops and Simple Administration" practices of the Yen-an period, he called for a downward transfer from the bureaucracy and large industry:

Generally speaking, the state administrative organs are, at present, still inflated and overstaffed. This is more true of the organisations at the higher levels than at the lower levels, more true of big organisations than the small ones--the structure of administrative organs is to be simplified. An appropriate number of people working in organisations at higher levels is to be transferred to lower organisations and part of the personnel in non-productive departments is to be transferred to productive departments. 36

Peng Chen, First Secretary of the Municipal Party Committee, carried the Yen-an analogy further, "While in Yen-an many responsible cadres of the Central government laboured in the field or on the farm. This fine tradition should be kept and propagated." The Party, in an editorial in The People's Daily (RMRB), advised that ". . . in principle all Communists, regardless of their

position and seniority should assume similar and equal work as the ordinary labourers".³⁷

Publications within China reflected a multiplicity of attitudes and varying degrees of success for the programme but early reports of the numbers 'sent down' were impressive. The New China News Agency (NCNA) reported in November of 1957 that 810,000 people had been sent down.³⁸ In February of 1958, NCNA reported 1,300,000³⁹ and "In the spring of 1958, the Party took nearly 1,000,000 more cadres out of government offices, enterprises and schools and sent them to work on farms and in factories for one year".⁴⁰ By 1960, reports indicated that there were many participants who lacked enthusiasm for the programme and some had become "artful in flitting from team to team, or between the production team and headquarters".⁴¹

Innovations were instituted, such as the "Two-five System" --two days of administrative duties and five days of physical labour⁴², or the "Three-four System"--three days administration, four days physical labour.⁴³

During 1957, concomitant to the Hsiefang programme, the Party launched a Rectification Campaign aimed at involving intellectuals from research centres and universities in the integration of practical and theoretical work. Under the heading "Philosophy and Social Science Research Personnel Leave Offices to Study From Actual Life in Factories and Rural Villages", the NCNA reported "As a result of the Rectification Campaign, various institutes of Philosophy and Social Sciences of the Chinese Academy of Sciences in Peking renovated their style of research. The new research

style of combining practice with theory and adopting the Mass Line in work begins to replace the old academic research style".⁴⁴

A dateline from Lushan gives more detail and scope to the red-expert question. The first Scientific Work Conference held in Kangsi province related, "The meeting decided to organise a strong, red and expert army of the proletariat class in the province championing science, technology and culture. It also decided to pick 2,000 professors serving in concurrent capacity from among the cadres now holding office in an effort to start and run properly Communist Labour Universities, Red and Expert Universities, as well as various types of Specialisation Colleges. The meeting was also prepared to select 20,000 spare time middle school teachers to meet the needs of a growing number of middle schools. It was also ready to foster 700,000 scientific and technical researchers from among 25,000 farm cooperatives (this was prior to communisation in October of 1958) in the province and train 3,000,000 scientific and technical researchers among factories, mines and schools". (Brackets added) The article concluded by asking the centres at the hsien and hsiang levels to sum up the inventions and innovations introduced during the Great Leap Forward.⁴⁵

The Mass Line approach utilised in the building of red and expert industrial and agricultural armies included massive efforts by the CCP to integrate women into the work force. From Peking, the twenty-nine day National Conference on Women's Work briefly summarised the role performed by women engaged in the building of the New China:

1. 90% of women in the nation had participated full or part-time in national production.
2. In twenty-one cities, 535,000 women had taken part in industrial production.
3. In Hopei province 282,000 women operated small factories.
4. In Hunan province women invented or improved 1,310,000⁴⁶ tools.

Many women joined the exodus from the cities. For example:

1. "More than half a million young women in Shansi province have left for the countryside after finishing primary⁴⁷ or middle school".
2. "In Kwangtung girls make up the majority of the 760,000 young people who have left for the rural areas since 1958"⁴⁸.
3. "16,000 young women left Shanghai last year for as far⁴⁹ away as Sinkiang".
4. "6,000 girl students have left the North China industrial centre of Tientsin in the past year to take up work in⁵⁰ the countryside".

As the Party moved forward to remove the demarcation between manual and mental labour, and to unify the labouring forces, it simultaneously employed the Hsiafang and Rectification Campaigns ✓ as the means by which to build and/or strengthen both base and superstructure. A 1957 CCP Central Committee 'Directive on Physical Labour' indicates the principles being propagated:

. . . the arduous task now facing us is to build our country into a great socialist state *having modern industry and agriculture* (the base). In order to achieve this task it is imperative for us to carry forward our Party's tradition of keeping in close touch with the masses and working hard under all conditions. *This excellent tradition will be carried forward by the leading functionaries at all levels participating in physical labour so as to combine mental and physical work.* (Value: superstructure). (Brackets and accent added)⁵¹

China has shown considerable preoccupation with another aspect of the red versus expert dichotomy which required remedial action. At the theoretical level Mao, and a significant number of other Party members, view bureaucratism, laziness and elitism ✓ as symptoms of capitalistic exploitation. Mao termed these characteristics "the practice of encroaching upon or stealing the fruits of 'others' labour."⁵²

So far as I am aware, there is no incontrovertible data to support the hypothesis that exploitative parasitism inhibits progress, *per se*, but it seems logical to posit that underdeveloped societies without large surplus must suffer retardation in their development if leadership becomes parasitic or becomes separated from the masses who must do the work.

From the Chinese viewpoint, non-participation in productive labour does not necessarily connote disloyalty or corruption so much as it places an inflated value on 'expert-ness'. This tends to over-emphasize personal interest, bourgeois individualism and 'boss-ism'. The red *and* expert concept does not down-grade the value of ability but is, instead, a methodology whereby proficiency *and* a socialist consciousness are utilised for the benefit of all.

The contradictions inherent to expertness without redness and the disadvantages to China's progress should those contradictions continue unresolved was articulated in an editorial in the People's Daily, "To be 'expert' without being 'red' is ideologically antithetical to collectivism, is 'bourgeois individualism' which can become a force that would divide society into tens of

thousands of selfish individuals and small cliques which would fight against each other for their own interest".⁵³

The analysis criticises the 'expert' expectation of material compensation and the excessive individual accumulation of 'social wealth' rather than the practice of 'strict economy in every field'. The article further charges that experts without redness have a propensity to "regard knowledge as their own personal property" and oftentimes "refuse to conduct personal research in certain problems of production and choose to watch the country's production sustain loss".⁵⁴ The editorial writer considered that the non-red expert is "the greatest waste of manpower of the state" and that individualism developed to a serious extent could "play a role that undermines the socialist cause".⁵⁵

The literature from China reveals the leadership's recognition of the value of mass involvement and activism. The Party continually stresses the need for cadres to be in the front line of production and problem solving in order to "stimulate the enthusiasm of the masses" in "actual practice in the struggle for production". This is merely a restatement of the Maoist belief that "knowledge stems from practice".⁵⁶

The Kuang-ming Ribao editorialised on the subject of Hsia-fang and the Red versus Expert syndrome, "If intellectuals fail to be identified with the workers and peasants, they will achieve nothing. The final line of distinction between a revolutionary intellectual and a non-revolutionary or counter-revolutionary intellectual lies in whether or not he is willing to identify himself with the workers and peasants and actually does so."

Continuing, "The 40,000,000 educated youths who returned to the country constitute a vital force . . . Young people in schools must step up their efforts at study, take an active part in productive labour, raise their class consciousness, be prepared to respond to the call of the mother country, go to places they are needed by the mother country and perform meritorious services there".⁵⁷

Such commentary reveals a good deal to the student of China concerning the basic ideological struggle between the Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi lines. Were we to evaluate the accomplishments of the Hsiafang movement only from the reports of the numbers of people involved in the downward transfer, we might fall prey to an overly euphoric assumption that the programme had been an unqualified success from its inception. We might also incorrectly conclude that the red versus expert question was, for all intents and purposes, solved and that as early as 1960-64 all essential reforms in the educational system had been effected. Such, however, was not the case.

Charles Bettelheim states, "the changes in question gained their present impact only because of the defeat of Liu Shao-chi's bourgeois political line. The adherents of this line had in effect begun to challenge similar changes in 1958 during the Great Leap Forward".⁵⁸ The dissemination of industrial knowledge to the peasantry during the GLF was the initial and most important step toward establishing an elementary industrial network throughout the nation. This phase was crucial to the breakdown of the capitalist mode of production and to the divis-

ions between town and country. "Between 1960 and 1966, the adherents of Liu Shao-chi's line had tried to undermine the economic and social changes in the countryside, . . . especially in the area of rural industrialisation, which had already substantially transformed Chinese rural life".⁵⁹

Data suggest that between 1962 and 1965 there was a marked decline in the numbers of people involved in Hsiafang, reinforcing Bettelheim's contention that the Liu Shao-chi line had seriously affected development towards a socialist division of labour.

As the Cultural Revolution gained momentum the basic ideological *raison d'etre* of Hsiafang, the red and expert concept and new educational approaches was debated in hundreds of thousands of forums in the schools, the factories, the fields and between the Party ideologues.

In spite of the inhibiting (revisionist) effect of the Liu line which stressed economism, professionalism and centralised control, the enormous changes that took place in the Chinese countryside after the implementation of the Hsiafang movement in 1957 and the commune movement in 1958 began to radically alter social relationships. "The Cultural Revolution", Bettelheim argues, ". . . was to provide the impetus for a massive socialist counter-offensive, especially in the area of rural industrialisation . . . Here, too, the Cultural Revolution posed a challenge to the immemorial division of labour and, notably, to the division between social classes."⁶⁰

During the Cultural Revolution, a KMRB editorial postulated

the long-term goals of Hsiafang, "thousands of urban educated youth . . . have gone to the vast rural and frontier areas of the motherland. This is Chairman Mao's great strategic plan and major action concerning fostering and training of millions of successors to the revolutionary cause of the proletariat. It is a long range plan for the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the prevention of the restoration of capitalism. It is required by the building of new socialist villages. It is a profound socialist revolution".⁶¹

Articles describing the movement of young people to the outlying areas, in China's effort to de-urbanise, appear frequently in official Chinese publications:

More than half a million young women in Shansi province have left for the countryside after finishing primary or middle school. In Kwangtung girls make up the majority of the 760,000 young people who have left for the rural areas since 1958. 16,000 left Shanghai last year for as far away as Sinkiang. ⁶²

Some 10,000 Chinese agricultural scientists have gone to the hilly and rural areas this year. In many agricultural-scientific institutes, two-thirds of the research workers have gone to the countryside, including highly experienced experts. Agricultural scientists have established research bases in communes of State farms, take part in ordinary farm work with the peasants and helped find ways to solve important questions affecting production. ⁶³

In Pingho hsien, Fukien province, 5,000 educated young people have waged a dogged fight against nature over the past few years. They have reclaimed more than 300 hillsides, afforested 3,500 hectares of wastland and planted tea oil trees on 650 hectares. ⁶⁴

In the mountains of Szechuan province, more than 70,000 young people who have come from the towns and cities over the last two years are hard at work. ⁶⁵

. . . 120,000 graduates of Junior and Secondary schools are leaving Shenyang, north-east China, to settle in the countryside so that they might integrate themselves with the workers, peasants and soldiers. 66

Hundreds of thousands of middle school graduates have gone to work in the countryside or in the factories or mines during the past few months. 67

In the first ten days of this month 70,000 went to settle in the countryside, 22,000 young people to Yenpien. 200,000 college and middle school graduates have gone to the forefront of agriculture. Since November 5, 60,000 middle school graduates have left Kwangchou. 68

More than a quarter of a million intellectual youths in Szechuan province have gone down to settle in the countryside since the beginning of the year. 69

The first batch of educated young people going to the countryside from the Chinese capital this year set out for their destinations on August 5. More than 170,000 Red Guards and other educated young people have already gone . . . from Tientsin. 70

This is the first time in the history of Tibet for intellectual youths to go to settle down in the countryside. Over 200 Red Guard small generals of Lhasa middle school recently went to Tatzu, Tueling, Teching, and other hsien of Tibet. 71

. . . The spiritual outlook of the engineering and technical personnel of this shipyard has changed profoundly and their revolutionary enthusiasm has risen to an unprecedented high. In the course of forming one with the workers, by bringing the revolutionary spirit of 'self-reliance' and 'hard struggle' into play, the educated youths have created a number of new products, new techniques, new technologies and new installations of advanced level, thus making contributions toward the development of China's ship-building industry. 72

The broad masses of poor and lower-middle peasants of Changhsi brigade took 40 educated youths who came from cities as their own children and took care of their livelihood. The educated youth . . . take the poor and middle-lower peasants as their kinsmen, tell them what is in their minds and actively accept re-education. The idea of settling in the country-

side has taken root in their minds.⁷³

In 1970, 130 hydro-electric station technicians, university graduates of the Communist Labour University, Chuannan branch, helped the people of the county build 93 small power stations with a total capacity of 1,804 kilowatts--47 times the county's generating capacity before the Cultural Revolution.

74

Many young people from the cities of Kwangchou and Chankiang in Kwangtung province are cultivating the famous 'Southern Pearls' at the Pearl Cove oyster farm in the far south of China--Kwangsi Chuang Autonomous Region.

75

To build the Nanshan, Ma-anshan's biggest iron mine (Anhui province), great quantities of earth had to be excavated and a long railroad built to haul out the earth. Mine leaders assigned the job to a construction department and gave them *three months* to do it. Hundreds of students came to help cut the hills open, build roads, prepare the roadbed and lay ballast. The railroad was completed in *twelve days*.

76

In recent years thousands of school graduates have joined in the reclamation of the "Great Northern Wilds" (Heilungkiang) in order to contribute to building the country's borderlands. Their hard work has turned the wilds into an important agricultural base and a new generation of young people has grown up strong and healthy in the process.

77

Each year in China today, quite a few millions of young people enter the labour force . . . All of them are given jobs according to the different demands of the growing economy . . . Thousands are helped to settle in the countryside where a great deal of manpower is needed not only for farming but for water conservation projects, forestry, stock breeding, fishing, sideline occupations and a developing rural economy.

78

In the past few days more than 2,900 educated young people from Shanghai have gone to settle in the rural areas of east China's provinces of Kiangsi and Anhwei to help build up new socialist villages. This was the first group of educated **young people** who applied to go to the rural areas of other provinces this year.

79

As Chairman Mao has pointed out, "The young people are the most active and vital force in society. They are the most eager to learn and the least conservative in their thinking. This is especially true in the era of socialism . . . In the last few years, millions of educated young people have gone to settle down in the countryside, pounding away at the centuries-old concept of despising manual labour and workers and peasants through their revolutionary actions. Socialist construction and battling nature is not plain sailing. To achieve greater, faster, better and more economical results in building socialism, young people should not only work with a soaring revolutionary spirit, but make efforts to master knowledge in modern culture, science and technology in order to be both red and expert. Since ancient times, those who dare have most frequently been young people . . ." ⁸⁰

Medical Profession to the Countryside

A notable example of revolutionary change, occurring as a result of the vast experiments and programmes pursued in New China in its efforts to better the human condition as it de-urbanises and de-centralises, concerns the role now being performed by the medical profession in the People's Republic. Their experience exemplifies the dispersal of expertise and the systematic break-down of elitism which is occurring in all of the professions.

At Liberation virtually every essential for adequate health care--doctors, medicines, hospital beds and medical equipment--were in desperately short supply. Estimates vary as to the number of Western trained doctors practicing in China--from a

minimum of 10,000 to a maximum of 41,000. Doctors trained in traditional (Chinese) medicine numbered at no more than 500,000. There were, at the most, 90,000 hospital beds for a nation of nearly 600,000,000 people, and these minimal resources were concentrated, as were the doctors, in the cities.⁸¹ China's medical care programme would have to deal with the needs of an immense country and a huge population who, for the most part, were living in extreme poverty in scattered rural areas.

Social forces played a major role in shaping China's health services. In the early 1950s, priorities were determined and an ideological basis was established:

1. Medicine must serve the working people-- workers, peasants and soldiers.
2. Preventive medicine must be given priority over curative medicine.
3. Traditional medicine must be united with Western medicine.
4. Health work must be integrated with mass movements. 82

Health care facilities were constructed and medical personnel was trained at an amazing pace. By 1957, China had 70,000 doctors schooled in Western medicine and had built 860 hospitals averaging 350 beds. By 1966 the number of doctors had increased to 150,000 and there were 700,000 beds.⁸³

Principles established and the methods for implementing them, however, were "strongly influenced, and in part diverted" by an influx of specialists from the Soviet Union. Hospitals were in the cities, doctors turned to specialisation, an incentive reward system was adopted and medical training periods for doctors were

extended to eight years.

Ruth and Victor Sidel commented that "Overall, by the mid-1960s there seemed to have developed a 'socially-oriented, prevention oriented, and reasonably well-rounded health care system, that had a long way to go to meet China's needs, but that had made enormous progress in the distribution and quality of its services and in the health of the people it served."⁸⁴

In June of 1965, Mao castigated the Ministry of Health because of the people it did *not* serve, since medical research was concentrating on rare and exotic diseases rather than on those unique to the Chinese rural areas, and because of the extended educational periods: ". . . the Health Ministry renders service to only 15% of the nation's population, it should better be renamed the Urban Health Ministry or the 'Lords' Ministry."⁸⁵ He directed that henceforth "In medical care and health work, put the stress on the rural areas".⁸⁶ Medical research should concentrate on "the prevention and improved treatment of common diseases . . . the masses' greatest needs". He emphasized that three years in medical school was enough and that more time should be spent in practical learning and directed that "all doctors except those 'not extremely proficient' should go to the rural areas to practice".⁸⁷

The Chinese press was quick to follow the Chairman's lead, citing examples which laid great importance on the need for a medical profession to move from the 'ivory towers' in the cities to serve the masses in the countryside, "The health department of Kwangtung province plans to set up a network of medical and

health services in rural areas. The aim is to set up a health clinic in every commune in which six or seven fully qualified doctors will work and train a peasant-cum-doctor ("Barefoot doctor") and a midwife for each production brigade and a peasant health worker for every production team".⁸⁸ (brackets added). In the same issue of the Canton newspaper, a directive was published advising that the province was to "immediately transfer 30% of medical personnel to the countryside".⁸⁹

By October 1965 the New China News Agency reported that "Sixty percent of this year's graduates of medical colleges in Kwangtung have been assigned to work in public health centres in rural people's communes".⁹⁰

From Peking, "Far-reaching reforms are being introduced in China's medical service, medical education and research as part of a nationwide effort to bring medical care to the 500 million peasants in the countryside".⁹¹ The item noted that sixteen hundred mobile medical teams staffed by 29,000 doctors and other health workers went to the rural areas between February and June of 1965 and that "more will go later on a regular rotation system".⁹²

The article became more specific regarding changes in orientation and time to be spent in training. "Medical schools will open courses on diseases endemic of rural areas. Three year combined farming and study departments have been opened in Shanghai and Peking medical colleges, enrolling middle school graduates from local peasant families to study medicine. On graduation, they will return to staff commune clinics. At the

same time, millions of volunteers are being trained in the communes to popularise hygiene and health knowledge in daily life".⁹³

In conjunction with the drive to bring Western medicine to the countryside, the leadership intensified its efforts to gain closer cooperation between traditional and Western medical doctors. The task was not an easy one. Western trained doctors, under the aegis of Liu Shao-chi and the Soviet influence (from 1949 to the early 1960s, much of the health service programme was copied directly from Russian models) had developed a hierarchical managerial structure and a tight bureaucracy which were relatively unresponsive to criticism from the masses they were trained to serve. Many were openly contemptuous of their traditional colleagues whose expertise was based on a wealth of empirically derived information. Their earliest medical treatises (written no later than the third century B.C. and containing theory and practice from much earlier times) reveal successfully utilised surgical techniques, general and local anaesthesia, and an ever-expanding pharmaceutical compendium of empirically useful remedies derived from animal, vegetable and mineral compounds proven effective over several millenia.⁹⁴

With the advent of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 1966, following closely Mao's indictment of the Health Ministry in 1965, the complete 'establishment' of medicine in China re-examined itself and was, in turn, subjected to intense scrutiny by the masses. Doctors, nurses, technicians, researchers, administrators and orderlies--the entire medical corps,

re-directed its efforts to a 'for whom' orientation.

The major changes and results of the new approach may be summarised as follows:

1. Reduced and/or eliminated hierarchical divisions between doctors, staff and between patients;
2. Closer integration and cooperation between Western and traditionally trained personnel;
3. Expanded cooperation between the 'levels' of staff, especially in consultation, and the inclusion of the patient, the patient's family and peers in consultation;
4. Physical labour by all members and levels of staff;
5. Revision of salary structure, e.g., the older, higher salaries frozen until the lower levels 'catch up';
6. Regular rotation from large or urban hospitals to the rural areas;
7. Research directed to endemic diseases or, in the case of industry, indigenous problems. Medical research predominantly applied research;
8. Reduction of medical school training time to three years. Occasionally, if needed, students given an additional six month curriculum in basic sciences and languages;
9. Strong emphasis on self-reliance. Much paraphernalia and medical instruments designed and built in the hospitals;
10. Massive sharing of knowledge through the training of para-medics (barefoot doctors) which include students, peasants and workers.

95

The sharing of knowledge has become the responsibility of all. Plagued with almost every known form of nutritional and infectious disease, Patriotic Health Campaigns, involving mass participation were undertaken to educate the peasantry about environmental sanitation, nutrition, family planning, etc.

Virtually every man, woman and child has been mobilised in massive wars against pests such as flies, mosquitoes, rats and the schistosomiasis carrying snail. Scientific knowledge of the subject is popularised door to door and at mass meetings through leaflets, pamphlets, movies, slides, group study and discussion. Convinced that people working together can achieve almost any goal, enthusiasm and initiative has been mobilised to fight and successfully eradicate cholera, plague and smallpox. Opium has been eliminated. Venereal disease was reported almost completely wiped out by the early 1960s.⁹⁵

Only with the hard work and cooperation of massive numbers of medical people who were "sent down" to the rural areas (where 80% of the population resides) could these amazing achievements have been accomplished.

The New China News Agency (NCNA), the Kuang Ming Ribao (KMRB) and other publications has furnished much evidence of the impact of Hsiefang on the countryside and, concomitantly, the implications of Hsiefang to the Red and Expert controversy, the re-education of China's youth, and the integration of traditional and western techniques and medication. The following are representative of the movement in various areas of the PRC between 1966 and 1975:

More than 3,000 doctors and nurses left the urban centres of Szechuan province to set up new hospitals in the rural areas or to take up posts in commune clinics. One third of all city medical personnel in the province is now working in the countryside.

97

A new type of peasant-physician, who is both a medical worker and a peasant, is coming into

existence in every part of China. Twenty-nine peasant-physicians have just completed a thirty months training course in a remote village in Kolanhsien, Shansi, north China. They are the first graduates.

The graduates have learned to diagnose and treat some 100 different ailments, have mastered thirty clinical techniques including blood transfusions and acupuncture. They are able to prescribe more than ninety Chinese and Western medicines. 98

Some 160,000 city doctors and other medical personnel have answered Chairman Mao's call this year alone. 99

More than 11,000 revolutionary medical workers in Kiangsi have moved to the countryside. Ten thousand others are going to the villages. 100

More than 4,600 medical workers in the province have already settled in the countryside. In addition, more than 4,500 graduates from medical schools and colleges and 2,000 practitioners trained in traditional Chinese medicine went to the countryside in the past three years. 101

Today there are more than 6,000 barefoot doctors in the countryside around Shanghai. This is equal to one half of the total number of full-time medical staff on the city outskirts in the past. 102

It is very encouraging to note that the twelve thousand urban medical workers in Kiangsi province who went down--settled in rural areas--have attained great achievements in the past year. In this way urban medical personnel sent to the countryside have trained over 40,000 barefoot doctors together with basic level medical personnel during the first half of this year alone. 103

Medical workers in Tientsin are actively going to the rural areas and mountain regions where they will settle down and serve the poor and lower-middle peasants. Over 9,100 medical personnel and medical school graduates and some 2,000 apprentices of traditional herbal medicine have gone to settle in the mountainous and rural areas this year. The first groups of them left the city for Ninghsia-hui Autonomous Region, Heilung-kiang and the Kwangsi-Chuang Autonomous Region. 104

Since March of last year . . . the Party branch has devoted considerable attention to the work of reforming the world outlook of the educated youth received from Peking, Paoting, Paotow and other cities. After a year of tempering, the educated youths' spiritual outlook has undergone an immense change. They have taken an encouraging step on the road of integrating with the workers, peasants and soldiers. When this group . . . arrived here, generally speaking, they lacked the will to stay in the border region permanently. The most basic reason for this was that, influenced by . . . Liu Shao-chi's revisionist educational line, . . . they held the belief that . . . after going to school for more than ten years, they had "lost much". 105

A mass campaign to gather, grow, process and use traditional Chinese medicinal herbs is under way throughout Yenan province . . . over 80% of the cooperative health service stations throughout the province now use such herbs to treat and prevent diseases. The health service system has been consolidated and developed. Medical and health work in the province has been vastly improved . . . with 'barefoot doctors' as the backbone. 106

Forty-five medical workers from the Peking Titan Tuberculosis Hospital settled in the grasslands in the southern part of Kansu, . . . to serve the poor and middle peasants and herdsmen. They are warmly welcomed by the local people. Thirty mobile medical teams have been organised over the past year to make the rounds of seventy-seven villages and pastures in four people's communes. 107

Medical workers of the first hospital of traditional Chinese medicine have achieved initial success in curing "traumatic paraplegia" (paralysis of lower part of the body caused by injury) by combining traditional Chinese medicine and western medicine. Bourgeois authorities had arbitrarily judged this ailment 'incurable'. The question of 'for whom' is fundamental, it is a question of principle. Medical workers were determined to follow Mao's teachings to help these patients stand up again. 108 ✓

~~Before~~ Liberation there were only eighteen doctors in Sinkiang, but now all *hsien* have well

equipped hospitals and most of the communes have their own clinics. More than ten thousand 'barefoot doctors' of the Uighur, Kazakh, Khalkhez and Jajik nationalities trained during the GPCR and several hundred visiting medical teams are active in the vast pastoral region and rural areas north and south of Tienshan. Since Liberation the Autonomous Region has founded eight senior medical schools and by 1970 had trained more than ten thousand senior middle medical and health personnel of which one-half belongs to minority nationalities. Owing to the continual rise in the people's standard of living and improvements in medical and health conditions . . . malaria is now under control. According to the statistics of 1970, the population of the Uighur nationality has increased 42% and the even smaller Sibo nationality has increased by 79% over that before Liberation.

109

In the past few years the Worker-Peasant-Soldier Hospital, Chanpei hsien, Hopei province has carried out more than 1,000 surgical operations in the vast countryside. This has helped to train large groups of medical workers and barefoot doctors.

110

In 1971 alone some 1,700 city doctors and nurses volunteered to work in villages and pastureland in response to Chairman Mao's call. Thanks to the encouragement of the regional party committee more than 13,000 part time medical workers, affectionately called barefoot doctors, have been trained during the Cultural Revolution.

111

Large numbers of workers were sent to Kezlesu to help the khalkhas develop adequate medical service and to train medical personnel from among the local khalkhas. Two thousand barefoot doctors were trained during the Cultural Revolution.

112

Chinghai province: There are 29 counties and 237 people's communes in the six Autonomous Chou. Each chou and county has a hospital and each commune a clinic. Medical institutions at all levels in the pastoral areas have trained 2400 barefoot doctors. The pastoral areas now have 27% more medical institutions, 61% more ~~medical~~ workers and 45% more hospital beds than before the Cultural Revolution.

113

Since the beginning of the GPCR revolutionary committees have strengthened their leadership over rural health work and provided the countryside with 10,000 medical workers plus 2,000 medical teams of city doctors touring the countryside . . . Every brigade has two barefoot doctors, each county a hospital, each commune a clinic. They now have in Tanyang county 1,100 medical workers and the same number of hospital beds. 114

There are now more than one-million barefoot doctors in China. They have helped to relieve the shortage of medical service in the countryside, consolidate the rural cooperative medical services and improve the health of the peasants. 115

Mass health stations of Changchiakou are training barefoot doctors from among housewives and young workers . . . while retired medical workers also come in to help. After a year's study and practice, the barefoot doctors are able to diagnose and treat a number of common, recurrent and infectious diseases. 116

In July of 1974, the Vancouver Sun carried a reprint from the Russian newspaper Sovietskaya Rossia which verified the numbers of young people leaving the urban centres, while giving the most perjorative rationale for the movement. The Russians viewed the emigration as 'banishment' to the hinterlands of 25,000,000 educated youth since 1968 from such cities as Peking, Shanghai and Kwangchou, principally because the Chinese leadership had failed to provide them with jobs, food, clothing and housing. ✓

In juxtaposition to the Soviet account (but agreeing with the core figure 25 million), many respected writers such as Snow, Greene, Needham and Myrdal have interviewed countless numbers of young people involved in the movement and have found them unreserved in the acceptance of the practice and quite happy in their pioneering roles. 117

In Summary

Mao's allegory, The Foolish Old Man Who Moved Mountains, identified the two big mountains on the backs of the Chinese people before Liberation as feudalism and imperialism. Since Liberation, other big mountains have appeared, such as urbanisation and centralisation, and they too have been (or are being) overcome, with the same revolutionary determination that freed the people from the old order. Of the myriad "mountains" to be conquered, release from the bondage of illiteracy, under-employment and unemployment took precedence.

Against this overwhelming heritage of frustration and deprivation, the critical importance of the government's all-out campaign against illiteracy, its phenomenal expansion of education for all, its continuing heavy emphasis on technological training and its constant concern that the individual develop as a socialist being concomitant with technical competence, cannot be overstated.

China has deemed it necessary to eschew that obsession of most Western planners--purely profit-motivated economics--if Chinese development is to progress beyond an individualistic, dog-eat-dog mentality, and on to the creation of a resourceful, self-reliant, truly socialist people living on a productive, decentralised, socialist landscape where the duality between town and country has been blurred. The mass movements that China has utilised to achieve its national goals are remarkably well integrated with the social structure the Chinese are attempting to build.

In his role of 'helmsman', Mao has not only mastered the developing situation within China in terms of theoretical comprehension, but has grasped an understanding of reality and applied the Marxist methodology best summarised in Marx's famous Thesis on Feurbach:

Social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which mislead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human practice, . . . The philosophers have only *interpreted* the world in various ways; the point, however, is to *change it*.

(emphasis added)

In Mao's efforts to seek realistic solutions to actual problems--in his approach and analysis of objective reality--he has made important contributions to the theories of Marxism and the dialectical process. As Richard Levy writes, "Mao's adherence to 'dialectics' and contradictions is more than mere lip service to 'sacred' theories. The entire collection of his writings is permeated by an analysis of a constantly changing world where everything, including today's goals, is undergoing a constant transformation. The constant application of the analytical framework of contradiction and dialectics to daily political and economic problems gives Mao's writings a flavour more similar to that of Marx's own constant dialectical analysis in the Grundrisse than those of most other Marxist political economists. . . . Mao must, certainly be seen as one of the foremost developers and practitioners of Marx's dialectical materialism."¹¹⁸

Social scientists generally interpret or describe events, or they compile statistics for others to interpret. Without assessing the ultimate implications of the exodus from the cities, Chen

and Galenson report, "Between 1961 and 1963 there was a reduction in urban population that may have been as great as 20,000,000 persons."¹¹⁹ Edwin F. Jones, in a paper presented to a conference of Asian economists (again, without exploring the ramifications), suggested that the number of people leaving the cities was close to 25,000,000.¹²⁰

While data are still insufficient to analyse the full impact of the re-location of millions of urban educated youth, experts and young workers in China's strategy of de-urbanisation and de-centralisation, it is obvious that China, indeed, has made every effort to change its old spatial arrangements and that the thrust of social and political revolutions which have freed the Chinese people to initiate radical solutions, will continue in spatial-organisational revolutions, as well.

NOTES - CHAPTER III

1. Chou En-lai, "The First Five Year Plan", Proceedings First National People's Congress, 1954, (Peking: People's Publishing House, 1955).
2. "People's Handbook", Renmin Shozi, (Peking: 1956), pp. 59-60.
3. "People's Handbook", p. 60.
4. Buchanan, p. 252.
5. Li Fu-chun addressing First People's Congress in Peking, 1956. SCMP, 1957.
6. SCMP, 1957.
7. First Document on the "Development of Large, Small and Medium Size Industries", (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1968).
8. Buchanan, pp. 272-74.
9. Buchanan, p. 273
10. Buchanan, pp. 263-277.
11. Buchanan, p. 272.
12. China Reconstructs, Vol. XXII, No. 2, (Guozi Shudian, Peking, February 1973).
13. Snow, excerpts pp. 513-554.
14. F. Léonardon, Chine: Vraie ou Faussé Désurbanisation, (Paris: Press Francaise, 1973), p. 58.
15. Leonardon, p. 58.
16. Street factories range in size from a few people to a few thousand who utilise neighborhood homes or buildings otherwise not useful to manufacturing. They are not State planned, are mutually owned, self-started and usually self-financed.

Joining the work force, such as in urban Street Factories, has freed many Chinese women from the total responsibility for home care. For instance, urban housing includes maintenance, cleaning, mending and laundry service. This is not to infer, however, that women have been 'liberated'; male chauvinism continues very much a fact of life. Child care centres, for example, are still totally staffed by women and the press must still exhort men to throw off the feudal-Confucian beliefs of 'wifely responsibilities'.

Information amalgamated: Number of Street Factories from China Reconstructs, Vol. XXII, No. 8, 1973; number of people

involved from Léonardon, Chine: Vrai ou Faussé Désurb nisa-
tion, p. 60; and manufacturing information from Bettleheim,
The Construction of Socialism in China, pp. 38-42.

17. Bettleheim, The Cultural Revolution and Industrial Organi-
sation, pp. 48-51.
18. Bettleheim, pp. 48-51.
19. Bettleheim, pp. 48-51.
20. Joseph Alsop, quoted in People's China, pp. 614-15.
21. James Reston, "Interview with Chou En-lai", New York Times,
(August 10, 1971).
22. Eight Atlases of China were consulted: Five made no men-
tion of Taching; one named it and its province, and one
noted, "Taching: an important petroleum producing region
whose precise location is unknown". The American C.I.A.
Atlas of China, however, gave exact placement and climatic
data.
23. John R. Walker, Vancouver Province, August 2, 1974, p. 5.
24. Survey of People's Republic of China (SPRCP - formerly SCMP)
#75-05, Chengtu, January 15, 1975.
25. C.M. Young, American Gas Association Monthly, Vol. 23, May
1941.
26. C.M. Young, p. 168.
27. Kangs are hollow, raised portions of the earthen floor ad-
joining the inside wall of the house and utilise a complic-
ated system of chimney flues to extract every BTU of heat
from the earthen stove for heating and cooking.
28. SCMP, #3616, NCNA, Peking, January 9, 1966.
29. Walker, Vancouver Province, p. 5.
30. Bettleheim, p. 17.
31. Bettleheim, p. 18.
32. Jonathan Sharp, quoting from Christopher Phillips of the
American Trade Delegation to China in 1973, Vancouver
Province,
33. SCMP #4093, Ko-ming Ching Nien, (Canton: November 10, 1967).
After the down-grading of Liu Shao-chi, the Red Guards
investigating Liu's case reported many subtle changes in
the Centre's directives which either blunted the thrust or

changed the direction of them. One such example appeared in the Kwangchow Ko-ming Ching-nien (Canton Revolutionary Youth). The editorial charges that in 1958 Liu changed the advice, "All intellectuals who can go to work in the countryside should do so happily" to "Educated youths who cannot continue their studies at a higher level upon their graduation from middle and primary schools nor find employment in the cities are to work as 'cultured peasants of the first generation' in the countryside".

34. Ch'en, p. 67.
35. Karl Marx & Frederick Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1968), p. 58. See also Meisner's essay, "Utopian Socialist Themes in Maoism".
36. Li Fu-chun, Report on the Proposals for the Second Five Year Plan for Development of the National Economy, (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1955), p. 101.
37. SCMP, #1538, Renmin Ribao (RMRB), Peking: May 10, 1957.
38. SCMP, #1668, New China News Agency (NCNA), Peking: November 26, 1957.
39. SCMP, #1724, NCNA, February 23, 1958.
40. Rensselaer W. Lee, "Hsïafang System", China Quarterly, #28, (London: Research Publications Ltd., March 1958), p. 51.
41. SCMP, #3300, RMRB, June 16, 1961.
42. SCMP, #2286, RMRB, June 16, 1960.
43. SCMP, #2307, RMRB, June 16, 1960.
44. SCMP, #1821-35, NCNA, Peking: July 26, 1958.
45. SCMP, #1824, NCNA, Lushan: July 27, 1958.
46. SCMP, #1824, NCNA, Peking: July 26, 1958.
47. SCMP, #3414, NCNA, Peking: March 7, 1965.
48. SCMP, #3414, NCNA, Kwangtung, March 7, 1965.
49. SCMP, #3412, NCNA, Shanghai, March 8, 1965.
50. SCMP, #3411, NCNA, Tientsin, March 3, 1965.
51. SCMP, #1532, NCNA, Peking, May 14, 1957.

52. SCMP, #3294, RMRB, Peking, August 28, 1964.
53. SCMP, #1717, RMRB, Peking, March 23, 1958.
54. SCMP, #1717, RMRB, Peking, March 23, 1958.
55. SCMP, #1717, RMRB, Peking, March 23, 1958.
56. SCMP, #3006, RMRB, Peking, June 2, 1963.
57. SCMP, #3139, RMRB, Canton, December 9, 1964.
58. Charles Bettelheim, Cultural Revolution and Industrial Revolution in China, (London: Monthly Review Press, 1974), p. 8.
59. Bettelheim, p. 8.
60. Bettelheim, p. 8.
61. SCMP, #4681-4685, KMRB, Peking, June 12, 1970.
62. SCMP, #3414, NCNA, Peking, March 7, 1965.
63. SCMP, #3555, NCNA, Peking, October 5, 1965.
64. SCMP, #3673, NCNA, Peking, April 1966.
65. SCMP, #3678, NCNA, Chengtu, April 10, 1966.
66. SCMP, #4294, NCNA, Peking, November 1, 1968.
67. SCMP, #4305, NCNA, PEking, November 19, 1968.
68. SCMP, #4441, RMRB, Peking, June 3, 1969.
69. SCMP, #4482, NCNA, Peking, August 18, 1969.
70. SCMP, #4530, NCNA, Lhasa, Tibet, October 21, 1969.
71. SCMP, #4643-4647, RMRB, Peking, April 21, 1970.
72. SCMP, #4663-4666, KMRB, Peking, May 13, 1970.
73. China Reconstructs, XXI, #9, September 1972.
74. China Reconstructs, XXII, #4, April 1973.
75. China Reconstructs, XXII, #4, April 1973.
76. China Reconstructs, XXII, #9, September 1973.
77. China Reconstructs, XXIII, #3, March 1974.

78. Hsinhua Weekly, #12, March 25, 1974.
79. Hsinhua Weekly, #12, March 25, 1974, p. 13.
80. Hongqi, #5, Peking, 1964. English translation by National Technical Service, Dept. of Commerce, Springfield, Virginia.
81. Ruth Sidel and Victor Sidel, Serve the People, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1974), pp. 19-21.
82. Sidel & Sidel, pp. 21-22.
83. Sidel & Sidel, pp. 23-26.
84. Sidel & Sidel, p. 28.
85. Sidel & Sidel, p. 29.
86. SCMP, #3418, NCNA, Peking, June 28, 1965. Also see SCMP, #4449, NCNA, Peking, June 29, 1969.
87. Sidel & Sidel, pp. 29-30.
88. SCMP, #3550, Yang-chien Wan Bao, Canton, September 15, 1965.
- A "barefoot doctor" is a peasant who has had basic medical training and gives treatment without leaving productive work. He gets the name because in the south peasants work barefooted in rice paddies. (Sidel, p. 80).
89. SCMP, #3550, Yang-chien Wan Bao, Canton, September, 15, 1965.
90. SCMP, #3562, NCNA, Canton, October 6, 1965.
91. SCMP, #3550, NCNA, Peking, September 28, 1965.
92. SCMP, #3550, NCNA, Peking, September 28, 1965.
93. SCMP, #3550, NCNA, Peking, September 28, 1965.
94. Sidel & Sidel, pp. 127-155.
- Chinese pharmacological data was added to and up-dated many times in Chinese history. Until Liberation, the most recent collection and compilation was Li Shih-Chen's great Compendium of Materia Medica, a thirty year effort published in 1578.
95. Sidel & Sidel, pp. 111-155.
96. Sidel & Sidel, pp. 99-106.

97. SCMP, #3662, NCNA, Cheng-tu, March 17, 1966.
98. SCMP, #3704, NCNA, Taiyuan, May 19, 1966.
99. SCMP, #3693, NCNA, Peking, August 29, 1966.
100. SCMP, #4321, NCNA, Peking, December 12, 1968.
101. SCMP, #4451, NCNA, Harbin, July 2, 1969.
102. SCMP, #4453, NCNA, Shanghai, July 5, 1969.
103. SCMP, #4525, KMRB, Peking, October 9, 1969.
104. SCMP, #4540, KMRB, Peking, November 4, 1969.
105. SCMP, #4606-4610, RMRB, Peking, February 22, 1970.
106. SCMP, #4686-4689, NCNA, Kunming, June 24, 1970.
107. SCMP, #4917-4920, NCNA, Lanchow, May 6, 1971.
108. SCMP, #4965-4968, NCNA, Peking, August 23, 1971.
109. SCMP, #4996-5000, KMRB, Peking, August 10, 1971.
110. SCMP, #5166-5169, RMRB, Peking, June 23, 1972.
111. SCMP, #5077-5080, NCNA, Huhehot, Inner Mongolia, February 5, 1972.
112. SCMP, #5133-5137, NCNA, Urumch, May 4, 1972.
113. SCMP, #5424-5428, NCNA, Sining, July 24, 1973.
114. SCMP, #5434-5438, NCNA, Nanking, May 8, 1973.
115. SCMP, #5439-5443, NCNA, Shanghai, August 8, 1973.
116. SCMP, #5807-5811, NCNA, Shih Chiachuang, February 25, 1975.
117. Vancouver Sun, July 10, 1974, p. 5.
118. Richard Levy, "New Light on Mao", China Quarterly, #61, (March 1975), p. 117.
119. Chen & Galenson, p. 133.
120. Edwin F. Jones, An Economic Profile of Mainland China, Unpublished paper, 1965. Conference of Asian Economists, Harvard University.

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