ALIENATION: A SOCIAL PROCESS

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ABSTRACT

Marx's early writings on alienation are examined; and his definition of alienation interpreted as the separation of "whole man" from his "species characteristic" of "free, conscious activity" through "forced labor", in which man treats himself as a "mere particular function". This definition is accepted as an hypothesis. Parts of Weber's social theory are examined for their relevance to Marx's thesis, and some limitations of Weber's value-free or normative approach are discussed. The critique of this approach is extended to include the work that has been done by contemporary, and especially American, sociologists. It is concluded that the concept of alienation has been so transformed by contemporary sociologists that it has little if any value for sociological analysis. With this conclusion in mind, Mead's social theory is considered with reference to Marx's alienation hypothesis in an attempt to link the two theorists, and through doing so, to make meaningful Marx's notion of "free, conscious activity". The purpose of this thesis is to reinstate alienation as a powerful concept for understanding human social behavior. In conclusion, some hypotheses relating to self-determined social behavior, as suggested by the uniting of these two theorists, are outlined.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

INTRODUCTION

> ...Society and politics only have
> the responsibility of arranging
> everyone's affairs so that each
> will have the leisure and the
> freedom to pursue (the absolute)...
>   Camus, The Rebel

An issue has climbed down from the philosophers'
tower to the streets of everyday life. Wearing various guises
in different situations the issue is that of ourselves as
spiritual beings and as physical creatures. We are being
forced through a number of means, and especially in connection
with the development of new communication techniques, to look
at ourselves in new ways that contradict our traditional
expectations, and the result is a most widespread dissonance.[1]

For thousands of years Western civilization has
grown on a conceptual foundation which contains a basic schism--
that separating mind and body. While in the past this <u>seems</u>
not to have interfered with "normal" living, it is becoming
increasingly obvious that today we pay a high price for its
maintenance, a price which has been stated as alienation.

✓The word serves both as a descriptive and as a criti-
cal device; it describes a human condition and at the same
time suggests a radical criticism of the factors contributing
to this condition. As a critical device alienation questions
the validity of our assumption of a split between mind and
body, and consequently questions the foundations of our self
knowledge. Questioning these foundations requires two things:

a critical examination of our "way of life", our behavior;
and an examination of our cultural heritage of values, the
humanist perspective and its accompanying assumptions about
the nature of man.

\We find, through our experience and investigation,
that our behavior and our cultural values are contradictory;
the contradiction experienced as one between humanist values
and "practical" ones, between the assumed equality of all men
and the apparent social inequality between men, between the
vision of men as self determining beings with freedom and res-
ponsibility and the experience of men as confined by ignorance
and poverty, enslaved rather than free and apathetic rather
than responsible.

The framework within which alienation (as it is here
being used) arose[2] suggested the possible solutions to the
"problem" as well as defining this human condition as a prob-
lem. The solutions are essentially of two sorts: the first
is destruction of the basic social organization within which
alienation has grown, destruction in the form of eliminating
classes; and the second is the creation of a new social
organization, symbolically represented by a classless society.[3]
The first can be accomplished within the limits of the frame-
work in which alienation is used as a critical description of
human experiences, but the second necessitates going beyond
this framework. The second solution neither necessarily
follows from the first nor does it presuppose the first. A

mistake made by interpreters of Marx's theory, in supposing that there is some necessary connection between the two solutions, rests upon a myth that Society exists.[4] It was with reference to this myth that alienation was considered to be a problem, and going beyond it is an essential step toward the solution of the problem.

Alienation presupposes a lack of unity where unity "should" be. Whether this dissociation is regarded as one between the individual and society or the individual and himself, one must necessarily, within the context of a mind-body duality, conclude that Society is the source of both unity and disunity. The development from assumption to conclusion occurs roughly in the following manner. The mind-body duality, as elucidated by Descartes' "Cogito, ergo sum", is handled not only as a schism between mind and body, but, as the arrangement of the words (I think, therefore I am) implies, is portrayed as mind preceding and justifying bodily existence. In his philosophical inquiry, Descartes verbalized and clarified a cultural assumption, which can be stated along the following line : The capacity of the mind to reason distinguishes man as a human animal. Loss of this ability is loss of humanity. When we probe the origin of mind and find it to be Society, we conclude: I am a member in (or part of) Society, therefore I think, therefore I am. This is the line of argument developed in the work of e.g. Comte & Durkheim. Where cultural standards of "right reason" are transformed into the source and justifica-

tion of existence for the "isolated" individual, the
existence of the "social" individual is explained by his
membership in Society, expressed as his "position" in the
Whole (Society). These two abstractions, Individual and
Society, derived by logical deduction on the basis of ques-
tionable assumptions, are considered to be distinct entities,
"interacting" with one another. Both the organismic and
mechanical analogies tend to lead one into this trap. Aliena-
tion, within this framework, is the experience of a disunity
between the Individual and Society (as part and whole), or
between the Individual and Himself (as mind and body) through
the medium of Society.

Marx criticised the use that men make of their human
capacities. It was this use (or misuse) of their abilities
in the form of "capitalist society" that he saw creating the
disunity expressed as alienation. He thought that men, in
misunderstanding their human capacities, worked against them-
selves, against their human interests. "Communism" represen-
ted for him, at least in his early work, a new organization
of social relations by means of which men would work for their
human interests, and he carefully warned against reifying the
abstractions "individual" and "society". A perusal of aliena-
tion theory in American sociology indicates that this warning
is as relevant today as it was when Marx wrote it.

The common fear of questioning our way of life beyond
speculative notions is, at first glance, a puzzle. It becomes

understandable if we assume that people are acting within the context of the myth of Society. Within this context, tampering with Society threatens one's mind and consequently one's body. To be genuinely critical of Society (i.e., in practice) invites the possibility of one's destruction as a human being.

This fear is reinforced by another myth which is the complement to the former. Represented by Prometheus and Christ, this myth suggests that even those few who can successfully deny the accepted order of things cannot escape destruction. Prometheus and Christ symbolize the man who can reject "legitimate" authority when it conflicts with the authority of his own experience, who can impose new meaning on the world through accepting, to the limits of his capabilities, responsibility for his own acts, and who is sacrificed to the gods (Society) for this transgression.

A paradox appears when these two myths are compared. This paradox was only briefly referred to by Marx but is of central significance to the study of alienation. Marx stated the paradox with reference to the alienation of both ruler and ruled in capitalist society. Alienation is expressed in the former through his being and in the latter through his activity.[5] The person who does not act with responsibility to his human capacities gives up his responsibility in name but not in deed. He is passively sacrificed through losing the "inner world" of his humanity to the "outer world" and external authority

When people externalize and make absolute their standards, the relation of the individual to these standards is of no consequence except insofar as he is able to "measure up to" and embody them. People treat one another and themselves as "mere" individual reflections of the standards they create and maintain. Against this background, the myth represented by Prometheus and Christ serves as a reminder of our human capabilities, illuminating the experiences of all people, both as a positive ideal and as a source of terror at having to face the fate of being human.

When these two myths are transferred from the privacy of assumption to the publicity of evaluation and the connection between them is recognized, the spell of Individual versus Society is broken. The public exposure of these myths illuminates the fact that both represent aspects of our common life as perspectives that we have invented to enable us to comprehend this life. I may face Society as Prometheus in one situation but for another person in another situation I may represent the Society with which he, as Prometheus, must contend. If we are able to see the relation of these myths to our common practice we have at least the rudiments of a new view of man with which we can review the relation between mind and body.

Marx provided a rudimentary new view of man through stressing practical activity as the source of human experience. He wrote comparatively little on human relations as such,

choosing to concentrate his attention on a critique of capitalism. In doing so he rather took for granted that men would realize their ideal human nature while ridding themselves of the "biasing" social perspectives associated with class relations. What remained rudimentary in Marx's theory was explored more thoroughly by Weber and became a well developed account of human relations in the work of George Herbert Mead.

According to Mead's theory of mind (mind being a process of self-consciousness) men are self-conscious while taking perspectives of the world in which they themselves appear as one of the objects within the perspectives. This taking of perspectives is a social process, dependent upon our being related to one another through a common language. We learn perspectives through one another and create new ones relative to old ones. What we know of the old (what has passed) is always bound by the new (what is coming) within which the old appears not as it "really was" but as it appears to have been within the context of the new. The new is equally as bound by the old out of which it arises, and in relation to which it finds expression. We see ourselves in the present through being able to take perspectives based on interpolating between past and future. There is an overlap between the old and new, where the one passes into the other, and it is in this overlap that the continuity between past and future is maintained. This continuity is based upon our

on-going experiences in our common life.

Mead's theory can be used to look at the mind-body problem in a new light. It is through our capacity to take perspectives of our common life by means of a common language that one person can "stand on the inside" of his experience while others can "stand on the outside" of it. Because of this capacity we are able to abstract, out of common experience the notions of mind and body (subject and object, individual and society). Both "sides", when a conflict occurs, may be equally as certain of the reality of their experience. If, when this occurs, we are acting on the assumption of the existence of Society, assuming that the world must be One, we are able to consider only one perspective to be valid within any given situation. The two must be prevented from coming into direct conflict. Our means of protecting the one from the other, the creation of two worlds, one for the spirit and the other for the body, is embedded in our customs regulating contact with one another. We refer to these customs in the rights of privacy and in public obligations. Those aspects of experience which are acknowledged publicly are considered to be profane because they are subject to external definitions. The more private aspects of experience, while considered to be sacred, are not allowed to interfere with the "necessity" of public obligation.

Within this polarization, one approaches a "stranger" initially through "public" modes of behavior and may, through

a complicated process of sharing more and more "private"

spheres, become intimate. The ability to do this depends upon

one's first having developed, to some extent, within "private"

spheres. The cultural assumption accompanying this behavior

is that men, while remaining isolated from one another, are

directly connected to "God" and to "necessity". "God" and

"necessity" are the two bridges spanning the space between

individuals.

To say that men are <u>essentially</u> isolated individuals

related to one another by necessity is analogous to saying

that magnetic poles are isolated individuals related by the

necessary currents passing between them. In fact, it is only

with respect to their relation that we can separate them,

calling one North and the other South. Similarly, it is the

<u>acknowledgement</u> by people of the currents passing between them,

their awareness of "God", that lies at the source of <u>human</u>

life. Deeper than particular cultural traditions, histories,

technologies, this shared experience is the fountain-head of

self-consciousness, responsibility and identity.

Shared experience or self-other-consciousness precedes

and acts as an anchor for self-consciousness,[6] and self-

consciousness is a necessary condition for the exercise of

responsibility.[7] We have a tendency in our common use of

"responsibility" to stress its meaning as obligation to respond

in particular ways in particular situations, passing lightly

over the fact that "responsibility" includes the ability or

capacity to respond. This tendency, as will be discussed

shortly, reflects the myth of Society. Identity emerges in

responsible co-operations where ability to respond is chan-

nelled by mutually determined obligations between people. (8)

I am using co-operation here in the literal sense to mean the

joint action of individuals effecting an event. (9)

   Unlike magnetic poles, we have the capability,

through being aware of ourselves in this relation, to direct

and control the "currents" passing between us. The possibi-

lities arising from this are enormous and we have learned to

protect ourselves from them with "insulators" manifested most

clearly in taboos against touch[10], and reflected in the

structure of our language.[11] We move through our assumed spaces,

our "social" spaces, guided by untested assumptions about the

world in which we move, "out of touch" humanly even though we

surround one another as strangers. Our experience of the

drastic effects that can result from this blind acceptance of

assumptions is enough to jar us into questioning them, and

yet these same assumptions prevent us from doing so for fear

of loss of what existence we do have. (12)

   Self-consciousness, rather than being used to explore

new possibilities, is experienced as shame at being exposed to

be other than what is expected and guilt for failing to adhere

to prescribed rules of behavior -- rules of behavior which

were created for movement in another time and space.[13]

   Responsibility is interpreted as obligation, the

ability to respond being taken for granted. That we may be demanding modes of behavior that we are not able to perform does not arise for consideration. Ability and obligation to respond emerge as two distinct "realities" opposing one another. The former is referred to as freedom (from responsibility) and the latter as restriction on that freedom if we stress the ability to respond. When we stress the obligation to respond the former is called lack of responsibility and the latter duty, obligation, or simply responsibility. In this confusion the urge toward unity is perverted into an attempt to escape the social process through increasingly rigid formal control of response; and the urge to explore, rather than being directed toward maintaining the social process, is transformed into rebellion against the effect of the perverted urge for unity. Those who strive for unity react in turn to the effect of the perverted urge to explore, and the process is one of an increasing spiral of violent confrontation between the representatives of both "sides".

It is the breakdown of informal communal control of behavior that lies behind this development. Formal control emerges in situations that cannot be handled informally, but it remains dependent upon forms of informal control. When communal control breaks down and formal control is used as an attempt to compensate for it, our myth of Society and the isolated individual finds its full flowering, unhampered by communal reality. The ability to respond, which could be

assumed before the breakdown of communal life, becomes problematic. The "problem" is indicated in high rates of divorce, crime, and "mental" illness, and in conformity (confused as "co-operation") with rules external and incomprehensible to the individual.

This conformity did not arise as a problem in former modes of communal life. In communal life an individual was not considered to be co-operative or rebellious -- he acted "properly" or was a heretic, traitor, or witch, depending on the quality of his deviation from the "correct" way.

The confusion between co-operation and conformity is made with reference to the myth of Society. If we detach "co-operation" from this myth and use it as I have indicated to refer to the joint action of individuals to effect an event, the word becomes a key stabilizer for a new understanding of our life. Rather than referring to the deliberate conformity of individuals to some predetermined and/or external set of rules for behavior, the word now emphasizes the mutual activity of people with reference to which consciously determined rules are but one factor effecting the event. The shift in emphasis is an important one because it indicates that the interaction of various individuals is the central factor in determining the shape of an event. It indicates that both the ability and the obligation to respond refer to this interaction.

By this definition, if a particular individual is

involved in an event (affected by it) he is involved in the co-operation effecting that event. The paradox involved in the confrontation between the myths of Society and the Responsible Individual, that we cannot escape being sacrificed whether we choose the one "way" or the other, is dissolved. We can choose to be passively or actively involved in the shaping of an event, but we cannot escape being involved. That we cannot escape is shown in the effect of the event on us.

Events occur in "presents"[14] and it is with reference to this fact that responsibility, as both ability and obligation, gains its significance. Both the ability and the obligation depend upon the individual's understanding of the event within which he responds. It is in terms of this understanding that we can speak of a person <u>choosing</u> a course of action, the opportunity to make choices between genuinely possible alternatives deciding the conditions in which responsibility can be exercised. Obviously, where no alternatives exist (both imaginatively and empirically) there is no possibility for responsible action.

While a person may attempt to avoid responsibility by refusing to respond (within the myth, either to conform or rebel), this attempt cannot, with respect to my definition of co-operation, be a genuine escape. Refusal to respond becomes equivalent to a decision, on the part of the person attempting the escape, to allow someone else's response to answer for his

own. It is necessary, in our complexity of relations, to delegate responsibility (i.e., to make someone else's response answer for one's own), and we organize elaborate "structures" to do this, but it is pure fantasy to suppose that these structures in any sense replace our personal responsibility, (i.e. our responses to one another as persons)(15). The person who allows another's response to answer for his own is passively rather than actively involved in the co-operation. His active involvement remains a possibility and it is this fact that creates the instability of events within which a majority of people are passively involved. The instability is due to the fact that while a person remains passive, his active involvement (i.e., the choices he can make) cannot be determined. He is an unknown factor. In any situation where responsible co-operation (as the ability and obligation with reference to some specified event, to make choices from among two or more alternative actions such that the joint action of the individuals effecting the event is consciously controlled) is possible, both active and passive involvement have to be taken account of.

Identity, the resolution of the alienation dilemma, emerges in responsible co-operations. To the extent that we try to create an identity within the framework of Society so that identity is interpreted as a "thing" which one "has" due to his "position" in Society, we will experience the strain of contradiction between this assumption and the sociality(16)

actually experienced by us, the strain of alienation. If we regard identity not as some "thing" but as a word referring to a method developed and used by human beings for <u>locating</u> themselves within the context of an event called a "lifetime", a word referring both to the continuity of the individual's experience of himself throughout his lifetime and to the changeability of circumstances relating to this event, our focus of attention moves to the sociality of our existence. Rather than being passively separated from some "thing" with which we have a need to be actively united, victims struggling to maintain an identity in a world we did not create and do not comprehend, we find ourselves standing on a new threshold, uncertain of what we are going to discover but confident of our human ability to discover.

The transformation is one of attitude which comes as we uncover our activities from the myths shrouding them. The method by which we have created new inventions was not to destroy the sailboat before inventing the steamer. Our method has always been to explore new possibilities against an <u>accepted</u> cultural background, transforming the world through incorporating the new and the old. The most firm obstacle in the way of this transformation is the assumption that society is a thing, with the properties of thingness such that it can be destroyed and replaced with a new one, and a thing, consequently, that has to be protected from destruction.

CHAPTER I

ALIENATION IN THE THEORY OF KARL MARX

In this chapter I discuss briefly the major uses of "alienation" leading up to Marx's definition, with major reference to those aspects of Hegel's and Feuerbach's work which seem to have particular relevance to Marx's theory. I then go into a detailed discussion of Marx's theory of alienation as "estranged labor", and finally, relate it within the larger context of community as Marx seems to have understood it. I have taken the major portion of this latter discussion from the German Ideology which, together with the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, seems to form a basic theoretical coherence which is missing from either work taken separately.

1. THE BACKGROUND

Origin and Early Uses of Alienation

The English term "alienation" has its root in the Latin "alienatio", and can be traced back to Greek and Hebrew sources. In the Hebrew usage it referred to separation of a person from God for various reasons such as a "wicked nature", the worship of false idols, and "darkened understanding" caused by "blindness of heart".[1] This meaning was incorporated into the Latin use of "alienation" to indicate what we would now refer to as psychosis. The Greek "ecstasis", as it refers to

the transcendence by the individual of his usual mentality into "pure contemplation", also flows into this use.[2] While in the Hebrew alienation was given negative connotation and in the Greek, positive connotation, the Latin use is more neutral, indicating separation of a person from some other person, group, being, or thing; a separation which may have positive or negative connotations, depending on the situation. This neutrality of affective connotation is indicated in the legal context within which alienation was used. In this legal sense alienation referred to the transference of property from one person to another.[3]

The Latin meanings of alienation were incorporated into European thought in two distinct definitions; the one indicating a mental condition and the other referring to possession of property. The first retained the Hebrew connotation of negativity while the second retained the neutral connotation of legality, until Marx merged them in his critique of capitalism.

Hegel's Two Uses of Alienation

Hegel retained the distinction between "mental" alienation and alienation of property[4], concentrating his attention on the former. He referred to "mental" alienation in two ways; as a condition or state of being, and as a process of becoming. In the first case one is alienated from himself and in the second, from others. In both cases Hegel

used the dialectic to forge a unity between finite and infinite.(5)

a. The Unhappy Consciousness

Hegel united the concept of alienation with the Cartesian dilemma of the self as both subject and object, a dilemma which had become, at his time, a recognized "fact".[6] As Daniel Bell summarized:

> Alienation, in its original connotation, (by original he means Hegelian -- DE) was the radical dissociation of the 'self' into both actor and thing, into a subject that strives to control its own fate, and an object which is manipulated by others.... Alienation was an ontological fact, in the structure of grammar as well as of life; for the self was not just an 'I' seeking to shape the world according to its intentions, but also a 'me', an object whose identity is built up by the pictures that others have of 'me'.[7]

Hegel considered the Unhappy Consciousness to be one of many stages in the development of the World Spirit from one level of consciousness to another.(8) Recognizing itself as both particular and universal (unchanging), the Unhappy Consciousness is unable to reconcile its "alienation". Hegel, using his dialectic to show that mind is "particularity in general", resolved the Cartesian dilemma as a "problem" of the alienated soul.[9] As a "problem" of the mind, alienation is not a necessary condition, but is due to a misunderstanding of a necessary condition, i.e., that of the duality of self. The duality of self is a necessary condition for the full development of the World Spirit, whose ultimate goal is self-contemplation. In order for It (as subject) to contemplate Itself (as object) the duality of self is essential.

b. Alienation of self from others

In an attempt to validate his notion that the goal of the World Spirit is self-contemplation (and consequently the necessary existence of the self as both subject and object), Hegel tried to prove that consciousness of self is the basic condition for consciousness of anything whatsoever.[10] In so doing, he developed his second use of alienation.

He argued that the object of consciousness is knowledge of the immediate, of what is. Consciousness is "I". Knowledge of what is is attained through the senses, and the essential nature of sense-certainty lies in neither the object nor in the "I", but in the fact that both are.[11] When one makes the statement -- I know --, the "I" knowing immediately becomes an object. Consciousness knows itself through reflection, i.e., it only "comes upon the grave of its life".[12] Consciousness coming upon the grave of its life is the alienated consciousness. The self passes beyond this state of mind.

> But since consciousness has found out by experience
> that the grave of its actual unchangeable Being has
> no concrete actuality, that the vanished particularity
> qua* particularity, it will give up looking for the
> unchangeable particular existence as something actual
> or will cease trying to hold on to what has thus
> vanished. Only so is it capable of finding particularity
> in a true form, a form that is universal.[13]

The self as object is formed through medium of culture. Culture, which includes all means of self-development, both ideas and material factors, is the means by which an individual gets objective validity and concrete actuality. It is through

* in the capacity of, by virtue of

estrangement from one another that individuals define one
another, this opposition and separation being essential for
the development of self-consciousness. The negation of this
negation is the recognition of their essential unity. Spirit
is this negation. Men, who are separated from one another
through the medium of culture in order to develop self-
consciousness, are united together in the World Spirit.
"Spirit is alone Reality ... it is self-contained and self-
complete, in itself and for itself at once", the unity of the
unchangeable and the particular.[14]

The first use of alienation describes a period in
the historical development of Spirit and the second describes
the history of individual development, i.e., the process by
which individuals grow into self-consciousness. Both senses
in which the term is used dismiss the possibility of genuine
contradictions between feeling, thought and behavior. Hegel
assumed that a logical solution of objectivity and subjectivity
as such constituted a complete solution of alienation.

Feuerbach's Anthropology

Feuerbach attacked Hegel's basic assumption that con-
sciousness of self is basic to consciousness of anything.

> ... Before I understand myself, I am grounded in the
> existence of others by nature. My thinking only makes
> me conscious of what I am already: a being, not
> ungrounded, but grounded upon another existence. Not
> 'I', but 'I and Thou' is the true principle of life
> and thought.[15]

The Essence of Christianity is devoted to describing how

essence is grounded in existence, and how theology is the

anthropomorphism of man's own qualities.

In Hegel's theory, man's consciousness of God is the

self-consciousness of God. Feuerbach took issue with this,

asking -- Why dost thou alienate man's consciousness from him,

and make it the self-consciousness of a being distinct from

man, of that which is an object to him? --.

> ... if it is only in human feelings and wants that
> the divine 'nothing' becomes something, obtains
> qualities, then the being of man is alone the real
> being of God, -- man is the real God. And if in the
> consciousness which man has of God first arises the
> self-consciousness of God, then the human conscious-
> ness is, per se, the divine consciousness. [16]

Ignoring the flaws in this argument, [17] Feuerbach opened up for

consideration the possibility that what is felt as divine is

consciousness of consciousness (as distinguished from parti-

cular contents of this consciousness). It is the attributes of

human consciousness that are attributed to God.

> As we can conceive nothing else as a Divine Being
> than the Rational which we think, the Good which we
> love, the Beautiful which we perceive, so we know no
> higher spiritually operative power and expression of
> power than the power of the Word. [18]

The Word (language as language) is sacred, the instrument of

human consciousness. The particular things referred to

through use of language are not sacred; the particular

rational thoughts, the particular good and beautiful; it is

rather these forms of consciousness that are sacred.

Feuerbach placed man within the framework of the

natural world, as a species of animal. As he saw it, consciousness of consciousness makes a qualitative difference between man and the other animals, this quality being anthropomorphised as God. But this consciousness does not have direct accurate reference to the natural world within which it emerges.

> A thing which has a special significance for me, is
> another thing in my imagination than in reality. The
> thing signifying is not itself that which is signified.
> What it is, is evident to the senses; what it signi-
> fies, is only in my feelings, conceptions, imagination,
> -- is only for me, not for others, is not objectively
> present. [19]

Feuerbach's distinction between subjective and objective is not the same as that made by Hegel, but is rather closer to the use that Marx made of these terms. For Hegel, a thing may be both subject and object for the Mind. Feuerbach saw an objective world independent of men's minds, which can be known by its effects -- "only that which produces effects, is". [20]

Feuerbach argued that the morality of a relation is derived from the sacredness of the relation as such to the persons honoring it.

> Property did not become sacred because it was
> regarded as a divine institution, but it was
> regarded as a divine institution because it was
> felt to be in itself sacred. [21]

The feeling of sacredness comes from the living relation in the community of men, and moral sanctions are applied as a result of this relation. The implication here, which is followed up by Marx, is that all morality and religion is dependent upon

actual concrete relations. If these actual relations change, what was formerly felt to be sacred no longer being present in reality and new relations having been formed, then morality and religion must change correspondingly.

Feuerbach believed that religion alienates man from himself by leading him to attribute his own nature, which is inter-subjective, to a separate being, God, and by leading him to (at least within the Christian religion) ignore his senses as being base and profane. But, he insisted, it is through the senses that we come to know reality, and to deny the senses is to deny reality.[22]

He used Hegel's method of synthesizing the infinite and finite to ground man's spiritual essence in his sensuous existence, and to analyse, within this context, the role of religion in alienating man from himself. He simply turned over the relationship between the Spirit of Hegel, or God, and man so that man now creates God in his image and is not merely the tool whereby God comes into self-awareness. Where Hegel saw men related in the common Mind of World-Spirit while remaining isolated from one another in their particular existence, Feuerbach united men in their sensuous inter-subjective exis-tence, and saw their minds as being isolated. ("What (a thing) signifies ... is only for me, not for others, is not objec-tively present.")[23]

2.   ESTRANGED LABOR

MARX'S Alienation Through Material Existence

Marx's organized theory of alienation is found in a short chapter entitled "Estranged Labor" in The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Here he elaborated upon four aspects of estranged labor; alienation from the products of labor, in the process of work, from species life, and from others.[25]

Where Hegel discussed alienation within the context of theology (i.e., with reference to the development of the World-Spirit) and Feuerbach used the concept within an anthropological framework, Marx employed it in a radical criticism of political economy. Political economists, he argued, accept the fact of private property as being natural or inevitable, and assume the relations e.g. between labor and capital, capital and land, to be laws. They do not try to explain the fact of private property, but merely describe it.[26] The import of this criticism is made clear in the light of Steven Toulmin's convincing argument distinguishing science from natural history.[27] Toulmin differentiated between science as physics, and natural history; but the argument holds for all fields in which the scientific method can be applied. The method of the natural historian is to look for empirical regularities and to classify objects in terms of these regularities. The scientist, on the other hand, looks for explanations of empirical regularities. As an example of the difference

between these two methods, with reference to life forms, it
is the job of the natural historian to classify life forms
into species, types, etc., and the job of the scientist to
account for the occurrence of life forms by inventing models
such as the gene, and by being able to recreate the conditions
under which life occurs.

It is at this point that we can see how Marx dis-
tinguished himself as a scientist. The particular way in
which he related theory to practical reality constitutes the
revolutionary nature of his approach, in comparison with
Hegel and Feuerbach, to the study of man. Hegel knew that the
laws of logic must arise from the nature of logic[28], but did
not question the nature of logic. He can be seen as a natural
historian of "the mind". Marx wanted to explain the nature of
private property and was, to the extent that he accomplished
this intention, a scientist of human society.

Marx neither ignored history as did Feuerbach, nor
did he attempt to explain present relations only in terms of
historical development as did Hegel. "We proceed from an
economic fact of the present."[29] i.e., private property.

Characteristics such as competition, greed, classes,
which were taken for granted, at the time that he wrote, as
human nature, independent of particular social organizations,
Marx hypothesized to be characteristics of human society
induced by an economic organization based upon private pro-
perty. The source of these "traits of human nature" is the

practical economic relations engaged in by men, rather than
being "found" in man as such. Marx analysed estranged labor
to show how private property induces these characteristics.[30]

Alienation of man from his "species characteristic"
(i.e., his human nature) is both the least discussed and most
basic aspect of estranged labor. Alienation of the process of
labor and the consequent alienation from the products of labor
constitute the means by which men are alienated from their
species characteristic, and alienation from self and others is
the result of alienation from the species characteristic.

a.   Alienation from species character.

Marx saw the relationship between man and nature as
an essential, living relationship.

> Man lives on nature -- means that nature is his body,
> with which he must remain in continuous interchange
> if he is not to die. That man's physical and spiritual
> life is linked to nature means simply that nature is
> linked to itself, for man is a part of nature. [31]

The universality of man consists of the "universality which
makes all nature his inorganic body".[32] Labor is the means by
which man is related to his inorganic body, and it is this par-
ticular relation that distinguishes man from other forms of
life. All life is sustained in a process of exchange between
the life form and its environment. Only man has the capacity
to produce his means of life. The species characteristic
making this capacity possible is "free, conscious activity".

Labor is the means by which man is able to realize
his human nature. While the animal "is its life activity",

meaning that the animal hunts for food, procreates, etc., to
keep physically alive, man does these things in order to "live"
in a different sense.[33]

> (the animal) ... produces only under the dominion of
> immediate physical need, whilst man produces even
> when he is free from physical need and only truly
> produces in freedom therefrom.[34]

The purpose of labor is to make objective or to actualize in
the material world, man's species life. In creating his world
of objects, man does not create for himself alone or for his
children, but universally, for all men.

Estranged labor alienates man first from his relation
with nature and consequently from himself.

> It changes for him the life of the species into a
> means of individual life. First it estranges the
> life of the species and individual life, and
> secondly, it makes individual life in its abstract
> form the purpose of the life of the species, like-
> wise in its abstract and estranged form.[35]

b. Alienation from others

The estrangement between men is implied in their
estrangement from their species nature, and it is in their
relations with each other that their alienation is "first
realized and expressed". Men are always objectively related
to themselves in the same way that they are objectively related
to each other.

> Hence within the relationship of estranged labor
> each man views the other in accordance with the
> standard and the relationship in which he finds
> himself as a worker.[36]

It is interesting to note here that, although alienation from
each other is logically the result of the alienation of the

individual from his species nature through estranged labor,
it is alienation from each other that is first recognized. It
is through this recognition that we are able to trace its
origin. At this point we get a clear insight into Marx's rea-
sons for analysing so thoroughly the "material" organization
of society while passing lightly over the "ideology" shared by
us in our relations with one another. He was obviously
assuming that since our relations with one another stem from
our labor, if we alter the latter the former will be taken
care of. It remained for Weber to show that the relation
between material organization and ideology is much more of a
two-way flow than Marx seems to have believed.

c.   Alienation from the process of labor

Active alienation occurs in the process of labor,
where work is not a source of fulfillment to the person, but
a source of self-denial and degradation. This is forced labor
rather than chosen. The individual is coerced to work in
order to survive so that the labor has no value in itself for
the worker, but has value only with reference to an external
need.

This notion of forced labor has to be set within an
historical context to be properly understood. Marx recognized
that however man relate to their species nature, they have
first to survive as a species. But he also recognized that
what was once a necessity may later be arbitrary for survival,
due to man's creation and development of new means for

producing the things that he needs to survive.   Forced labor refers to forms of labor that are arbitrary.   It occurs through the control by some men to the exclusion of others of the means for labor, and their consequent control over the ability of those excluded to do labor.   It is through this control over the ability to work that the work done, the activity, "belongs" to the person controlling the means rather than to the worker.   In forced labor, the person is compelled, not by his relation to his environment as a member of the human species,not by his own relation to himself as a member of the species, but by another member of the species.   As such, forced labor is the activity alienating the person both from his relation to nature and from his human capabilities.   It follows that labor that is not alienated requires two conditions: that the person recognizes what is necessary for him in his relation to nature, and that he has the ability to make choices from genuine alternatives.

d.   Alienation from the products of labor

Marx began his analysis of estranged labor with an empirical proposition: that the greater the increase in commodities, the greater the decrease in human values, i.e., the value that men place on themselves as human beings.   It is important to note, with Mills, that this increasing poverty does not necessarily include material poverty.[37]

> The worker becomes all the poorer the more wealth
> he produces, the more his production increases in
> power and size.   The worker becomes an even cheaper

> commodity (emphasis mine -- DE) the more commodities
> he creates. With the increasing value of the world
> of things proceeds in direct proportion the devalua-
> tion of the world of men. Labor produces not only
> commodities; it produces itself and the worker as
> a commodity -- and this in the same general propor-
> tion in which it produces commodities.[38]

The product of labor, the commodity, is the "objectification"

of labor. When people are alienated in their activity, their

labor, it follows that they will be alienated from the products

of alienated activity. In alienated labor the work is not only

objectified as the product, but the product, the object,

appears to the person as a thing external to him. It is seen

as something for which he is not responsible and which exists

independently of him. The product of labor is reified.

> The more the worker spends himself, the more powerful
> becomes the alien world of objects which he creates
> over and against himself, the poorer he himself --
> his inner world -- becomes, the less belongs to him
> as his own.... The worker puts his life into the
> object: but now his life no longer belongs to him
> but to the object.... The alienation of the worker
> in his product means not only that his labor becomes
> an object, an external existence, but that it exists
> outside him, independently, as something alien to
> him, and that it becomes a power on its own con-
> fronting him. It means that the life which he has
> conferred on the object confronts him as something
> hostile and alien.[39]

Only when labor is done for the benefit of someone other than

the laborer, when the labor is forced, does this objectifica-

tion appear as "a loss of the object and bondage to it."[40]

To summarize the relations between the four aspects

of estranged labor: Men are species beings, with a species

nature just as are horses and dogs. It is in their universal

species nature that they gain their human characteristics.
The universal character of the human species is "free, con-
scious activity", and the purpose of labor, the means by which
man is related to his inorganic body, nature, is to actualize
or "objectify" his species nature. In doing labor man objecti-
fies himself, i.e., he can "see" himself in relation to the
products of his labor. Estranged labor turns the "life" of
the species (free, conscious activity) into a means for indi-
vidual life. People, rather than laboring to develop their
human capacities, use their human capacities to labor for
"mere" individual survival. They (as abstract individuals
isolated from their species nature) view themselves and others
objectively as isolated individuals, recognizing not their
common species nature but only their common need to survive.
This common need to survive is viewed within the context of
scarcity of opportunity which results in the necessity of each
isolated individual to compete with each other isolated indi-
vidual for individual survival.

e. The Cause of Alienated Labor

Marx asked,

> If the product of labor is alien to me, if it
> confronts me as an alien power, to whom, then,
> does it belong? If my own activity does not belong
> to me, if it is an alien, a coerced activity, to
> whom, then, does it belong? [41]

He outlawed both the gods and nature as the "lords of labor".

> The alien being, to whom labor and the product
> of labor belongs, in whose service labor is done
> and for whose benefit the product of labor is
> provided, can only be man himself. [42]

The alien being is, of course, the person(s) who benefits from the labor of others without himself doing labor. He is the person who owns the means of production.

Private property Marx understood, "as the material, summary expression of alienated labor, (emphasis mine -- DE) embracing both relations -- the relation of the worker to work and to the product of his labor and to the non-worker, and the relation of the non-worker to the worker and to the product of his labor."[43]

In this passage, we see that Marx recognized the common alienation of all men in an alienating social organization. He outlined three ways in which alienation is expressed by workers and non-workers:

> First it has to be noted that everything which appears in the worker as an activity of alienation, of estrangement, appears in the non-worker as a state of alienation, of estrangement.
> Secondly, that the worker's real, practical attitude in production and to the product (as a state of mind) appears in the non-worker confronting him as a theoretical attitude.
> Thirdly, the non-worker does everything against the worker which the worker does against himself; but he does not do against himself what he does against the worker.[44]

At this point the manuscript ends, which is most unfortunate considering that this is the only place where Marx considered alienation as a universal social problem shared by all people, all other references being ones of implication.

This is an important passage, both for an understanding of other aspects of Marx's thought and for interpreting Marx's theory in the contemporary world. Throughout this chapter on

estranged labor, Marx referred to the laborer as <u>being</u>
estranged, i.e., as having a passive involvement; and to the
non-worker as the alien <u>power</u>, i.e., as the agent. That he
not only saw the interests of the worker and non-worker to be
in opposition but also assumed the interests of the worker to
be the "legitimate" ones (legitimate with reference to species
nature) is reflected in his other works, notably in the <u>Com-
munist Manifesto</u>. His notion of the worker as passive victim
and non-worker as active villain was probably instigated by
his outraged sense of justice and related to the third men-
tioned expression of alienation in worker and non-worker, i.e.,
that while the worker acts against his own human interests, the
non-worker acts against the interests of the worker but <u>not
against his own</u>. His championship of the worker was related
more to his personal values than to his analysis of alienation,
i.e., it does not <u>logically</u> follow from his analysis. What
does logically follow from his analysis is that <u>all men</u> are
alienated from their species nature, and that <u>all alienate
themselves</u>. There is a co-operation (as defined in my Intro-
duction) underlying class relations which Weber, perhaps
unwittingly, uncovered.

The Transition from Contemplation to Action

Feuerbach's view of man was formulated in opposition
to Hegel's, such that while Hegel began with the premise of
historical consciousness in the form of the World-Spirit,
Feuerbach began with the premise of non-historical inter-

subjective "natural" man. Marx premised historical conscious-
ness in terms of man as a social being, not only in the sense
of "I and Thou", but in the sense which involves all men in
community. "Man" became the universal historical development
by the species of its species nature, i.e., Marx saw man
creating his human world through a long development of his
senses. Where Feuerbach, contrary to Hegel, devoted his
attention to "that part of man which does not philosophize,
which is against philosophy and opposed to abstract thought",[45]
Marx went beyond "simple" negation of Hegel's theory and
carried the dialectic into a new realm of material socio-
historical existence.

There are many ways of viewing the change in meaning
of alienation from Hegel to Marx[46]. To my mind, the most
obvious and profound, found in a comparison of their different
world views, involves the transition from contemplation to
action. Hegel's central criterion for validity of thought was
reason, while for Marx it was science. Between the one and
the other Feuerbach acted as a bridge, with his attempt to
anchor the spirit in material existence.

Hegel, as was previously mentioned, was familiar with
the distinction between alienation of property and mental
alienation, and chose to maintain the separation between these
two uses.

> I may abandon a thing provided that the thing in
> question is a thing external by nature. Therefore
> those goods, or rather substantive characteristics
> which constitute my own private personality and

> the universal essence of my self-consciousness
> and my right to them is imprescriptible. [47]
> (emphasis mine -- DE)

With reference to spiritual alienation, he distinguished two forms. He described alienation of the individual from himself as the experience of the individual (mind) by himself as both infinite subject and finite object, and the experience of this "double" life as a contradiction. He solved the "problem" through relating this experience to the development of the World-Spirit through human history. The infinite subject became the World-Spirit and the finite object, the individual person. Each individual is, essentially, an "eye" through which the Spirit can contemplate itself. The alienation, then, does not lie in the subject-object duality, but in the notion of this duality being contradictory with the Oneness of the World. When people fully recognize their instrumentality in the World-Spirit's development, they pass beyond the notion that there is a contradiction. They see that, for the World to be One, It needs to comprehend Itself as an object.

The second sense in which he used alienation was to describe the process by which all individuals become self-conscious (i.e. objects to themselves) and are thus able to serve as "eyes". This is the development, through the medium of culture, of a sense of identity distinguishing each person from all others.

Comparing these two uses of alienation, the former

refers to a mental state of being while the latter refers
to a process necessary for people to attain a state of being.
The state of being toward which this process is directed is
that of self-consciousness. As such it is a process gone
through by all people at all times in all societies. The
state of being referred to by the former definition is
experienced only by some people, i.e., those who happen to
live within the temporal span in which the Spirit is passing
through Unhappy Consciousness.

Feuerbach took alienation out of the historical
context and placed it within the sensuous present. He inter-
preted God (equivalent to Hegel's World-Spirit) as man's
anthropomorphization of his own human qualities. It is not God
that expresses Himself in man, but man who expresses himself
and then reifies, as God, the capacity that he has to notice
himself.

Feuerbach recognized no state of alienation, but
viewed it as a process carried on by man in the present natural
world. He took, as his focal point, Hegel's notion of the
alienation of people from one another through the medium of
culture. He agreed with Hegel that it is in our relations
with one another that we come to identify ourselves as persons,
but this is not a process of alienation. These relations are
intersubjective. It is in these inter-subjective relations
that we gain our identity, and it is these same relations that
we externalize as a sacred "world". We then place this sacred

"world" over and above ourselves, mystifying and denying our real (inter-subjective) sensuous contact with each other.

Marx, in his analysis of estranged labor, unified the two definitions of spiritual alienation and alienation from property. He not only rejected Hegel's distinction between "things external by nature" and "private personality", but denied that there are any "things external by nature". In Marx's theory there is an exchange between man and his environment such that the "external", the "objective", is man's relation to the environment. Purposive activity (labor: free, conscious activity) defines both subject and object, and the relation between them.

For Marx, man's "right to" his "private personality" and the "universal essence of (his) self-consciousness" is determined by his relation to "things external by nature". As well as alienation of property being related to spiritual alienation, property itself, as private property, is "the summary expression of" alienated labor. Thus it is in the work of Marx that alienation was, for the first time, solidly grounded in the material conditions of life.

The solution to alienation, as given by Hegel, is "correct thought". Marx's solution is "correct practice", a synthesis of thought and action.

3. THE CONTEXT

Community and Society

Throughout his early work Marx made a consistent

distinction between community and society. The exact nature
of this distinction varies in different parts of his work,[48]
but there remains a _general_ coherence of meaning. Society
man shares with other animals, as the means by which the
individuals in the particular species are united with their
environments, for the common survival of the species. The
difference between human society and that of other animals
is that men create their society through their ability to pro-
duce their means of subsistence. Society, for men, is not
only their means for survival, but is also used by them as a
basis for another "order of life", i.e., the development of
their human capacities. Specifically human capacities are
developed within communities, or community is the development
and maintenance of human capacities. Community, therefore, is
necessary for personal freedom.

> Only in community with others has each individual
> the means of cultivating his gifts in all direc-
> tions. Only in the community, therefore, is
> personal freedom possible.[49]

The development of the division of labor has marked
the development of man's potential for human life. But in
this division of labor "social relationships take on an inde-
pendent existence,"

> ... there appears a division within the life of each
> individual, insofar as it is personal and insofar as
> it is determined by some branch of labor and the con-
> ditions pertaining to it. [50]

It is to that part of the person's life which is determined by
labor that the terms "class individual", "citizen", "partial

man", refer. It is this part that is "accidental" to the

whole man.

The division of labor has developed in "natural"

rather than "voluntary" association. Man has been governed

by rather than governor of society.

> The social power, i.e., the multiplied productive
> force, which arises through the co-operation of
> different individuals as it is determined within
> the division of labor, appears to these individuals,
> since their co-operation is not voluntary but
> natural, not as their own united power but as an
> alien force existing outside them, of the origin and
> end of which they are ignorant, which they thus
> cannot control, which on the contrary passes through
> a peculiar series of phases and stages independent
> of the will and the action of man, nay, even being
> the prime governor of these. [51]

Natural society is further characterized by a dissociation of

particular and common interests, associated with the division

within the life of each individual.

> As long as man remains in natural society, that is,
> as long as a cleavage exists between the particular
> and the common interest, as long therefore as acti-
> vity is not voluntary, but naturally, divided,
> man's own deed becomes an alien power opposed to
> him, which enslaves him instead of being controlled
> by him. [52]

The common interest of men is the development and maintenance

of society, the particular interests referring to each man's

development of his human capacities: complementary interests.

In natural society, the State is a substitute for

community, an "illusory" community, in which people are bound

rather than freed. It is independent of and "divorced from

the real interests of individual and community." [53] Men are

within it, but it is not within them. If men are to get

society "in" them, i.e., so that they use the tools they have

developed for their own purposes, they have to develop the

ability to do so, and this requires communism.

> The transformation, through the division of labor,
> of personal powers (relationships) into material
> powers, cannot be dispelled by dismissing the
> general idea of it from one's mind, but only by
> the action of individuals in again subjecting these
> material powers to themselves and abolishing the
> division of labor. This is not possible without
> the community. [54]

> Modern universal intercourse can be controlled by
> individuals ...., only when controlled by all. [55]

To control society, to develop the ability to control it, they

have to transcend the limitations of nationality (State),

classes, tribe and family, all of which form the basis of the

"illusory" community. In transcending these limitations, each

individual is freed to associate voluntarily with all others,

and in doing so, to develop the capacity to control society.

> ... the communal relationship into which the indi-
> viduals of a class entered, and which was determined
> by their common interests over against a third party,
> was always a community to which these individuals
> belonged only as average individuals, only in so far
> as they lived within the conditions of existence of
> their class -- a relationship in which they parti-
> cipated not as individuals but as members of a class.
> With the community of revolutionary proletarians on
> the other hand, who take their conditions of existence
> and those of all members of society under their con-
> trol, it is just the reverse; it is as individuals
> that the individuals participate in it. [56]

Objectification and reification; science and ideology

       Objectification is the method, according to Marx, by

which men become self-conscious and acquire control over their

world. Tools are such objectifications.

> An instrument of labor is a thing, or a complex
> of things, which the laborer interposes between
> himself and the object of his labor, and which
> serves as the conductor of his activity....
>
> Leaving out of consideration ... ready-made means
> of subsistence ... the first thing of which the
> laborer possesses himself is not the object of labor
> but its instrument. Thus Nature becomes one of the
> organs of his activity, one that he annexes to his
> own bodily organs ... (Machines, etc.) are instru-
> ments of the human brain created by the human hand;
> they are materialized power of knowledge. [57]

Self-consciousness is not equivalent to thought in Marx's

theory, but is an activity including all of the senses.

> Man is affirmed in the objective world not only in
> the act of thinking, but with all his senses. [58]
>
> Each of his human relations to the world -- seeing,
> hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling, thinking, obser-
> ving, experiencing, wanting, acting, loving -- in
> short, all the organs of his individual being ...
> are in their objective orientation or in their orien-
> tation to the object, the appropriation of that
> object. [59]

To make objective, then, is to make material. Language,

writing, music, painting, machines, films, etc., are all objec-

tifications of man's human capacities.

Reification is the transference of human powers from

their human context to an "outside" source. Objects are an

aspect of human self-consciousness, but, in reifying them, men

treat objects as alien powers. Things "become the measure of

man through the reification of human self-consciousness". [60]

> Marx particularly warns against establishing 'society'
> as an abstraction over against the individual. The
> individual is a social being as the subjective,
> experienced existence of society. [61]

Man reifies things when he does not relate to them as a

"positive, depersonalized objectification of himself."[62] Reification is _false_ consciousness.

Ideology, equivalent in Marx's theory to illusion, is a form of reification. Ideologies are symbolic representations of actual social organizations and have their major purpose in justifying actual power relations associated with the organizations.[63] Not all ideas are ideological. Those associated with the scientific method, especially, are not ideological.

Marx's belief in the possibility (actually, the inevitability, in the long run) of community control over society was based on his understanding of the scientific method and his belief that it could be used to understand society. Arguing against "the Hegelians' " solutions to false consciousness, Marx gave a parable about the man who believed that people drown only because they have the idea of gravity.

> If they were to knock this idea out of their heads
> by stating it to be a superstition, a religious
> idea, they would be sublimely proof against any
> danger from water. His whole life long he fought
> against the illusion of gravity, of whose harmful
> results all statistics brought him new and manifold
> evidence. [64]

This passage not only illustrates Marx's argument with the philosophers of his time, but it indicates as well his awareness that ideas do not exist on their own, and that if an idea is only a reflection of experience (i.e., superstition) it is not enough simply to deny the validity of it. Simple denial does not eliminate the experience associated with the idea.

His answer was to replace the superstitious idea with an "objective" one.

Marx's Whole Man

Marx said that his primary interest was in "man as such and as a whole" rather than in man as a "particular function and not as a complete human being."[65] The whole man is not subsumed under any particular classification such as economic man, political man, alienated man, moral man, existential man. These particular classifications are perspectives that men take of themselves with reference to particular functions that they can distinguish. Man making these classifications is man exercising his human (species) characteristic of free, conscious activity.

That free, conscious activity is a species characteristic means that it is common to all cultures. In fact, the presence of different cultures with distinct languages, mores, etc., can be construed as evidence of such a species characteristic. If we accept, for purposes of the development of his argument, his assumption of free, conscious activity as a species characteristic, we are still left with the question of the relation between man's species characteristic and his alienation from it. It is quite clear in Marx's theory that man is alienated from this characteristic through forced labor. He denied that the agent of forced labor was God or Nature. This point is also clear. He thought that men enslaved men and that this forced labor has never been necessary for the

survival of the species. He did not deny that alienation was necessary for the <u>development</u> of civilization to the time àt which he lived, nor did he deny the continuing necessity of forced labor <u>if</u> we choose to maintain civilization as we now know it.

Marx suggested that man could overcome alienation by abolishing division of labor. He also said that division of labor <u>as social organization for the survival of the species</u> could never be discarded; that society is the basis of human life, and as long as humans survive they will do so in society. He further stated that if man is to control his human destiny he must control his society.

When he spoke of abolishing division of labor, and labor as such, he did so with reference to his notion of classes. He was not, in this context, referring to specialization of tasks based upon communal agreement and communal control where all people involved in society are also members of the community controlling social organization. The division of labor to which he referred was the division into workers and non-workers. It was in these terms that he distinguished between the "illusory" community represented by the State, and the larger "human" community of "whole men".

In the "illusory" community, large numbers of people act as if and are treated as if, in their labor, they are not whole men. Since their labor takes up the majority of their time, they act and are treated as if they are not whole men the

majority of the time. They do not, as members of the "human"

community, control their own activities, but are controlled

by the social organization which appears external to them.

The freedom of those who do treat themselves as whole men,

i.e., those who control the social organization, is a false

freedom because it depends, not upon their membership in the

"human" community, but upon the "enslavement" of the majority

of men to the social organization.

Marx did not consider the problem of alienation to be

one of making men whole, but saw it rather as a practical prob-

lem of bringing society into the control of men who are whole.

He saw men not as one-dimensional[66] or fragmented[67], but as

treating themselves and one another, in society, as if they

were one-dimensional and fragmented. If men are not assumed

to be whole, there is no basis upon which they can transcend

their alienation. In fact, it is the contradiction, in Marx's

theory, between this assumed fragmentation and the actuality

of wholeness that makes alienation problematic.

In alienated society men realize (actualize, objectify)

their human capacities only to the extent that it is necessary

in the "service" of society. The more routinized labor

becomes, the more particularized, the less necessity there is

for the whole man to exercise his full capacities in his work,

and the more he becomes aware of labor as a partial function.

The man becomes a "particle" in the social organization, but at

the same time, social organization becomes a "particle" in his

life.

Now a distinction can be drawn between two uses that
Marx made of the term "society". On the one hand, the term
refers to the organization of those activities required to
maintain the life of the species. On the other hand, in a
broader sense, the term refers to the association of people
with one another for whatever purpose. When Marx discussed
man controlling society in community, he meant that man could
control "society" (in the former sense) in "society" (in the
latter sense) where the former is treated as a "thing" and the
latter is a process, an activity.

This activity was what he meant by practical activity.
Men, in their practical relations with their environment,
create their means of production (including both forces and
relations of production). These means can then be treated as
"things", to be used and manipulated, i.e., they have been
objectified. If men want to control a "thing", the nature of
which includes relationships between people (relations of pro-
duction), all people involved in the relationships have to
agree to the use of the "thing". When people can do this,
they are not only "in" society (i.e., fulfilling particular
functions), but society is "in" them (i.e., within their sub-
jective control).

In order for people to agree to use society in one
way or another, they must be able to communicate their wishes
and plans to one another. Marx held that the decisive barrier

to such communication is the fact that some members (in his case, most) of the "human" community are treated as if they are <u>only</u> parts in the "thing" and, as such, need only be manipulated in the "illusory" community associated with the State.

Marx's political activity, his suggestions to workers of modes of action that can be taken, was not a logical step from his theory of society. It was based much more upon his recognition of the power of "whole man" to control himself as "particular function", in combination with his outraged sense of justice. He did not recognize that, while in many senses "workers" can be seen as victims, they victimize themselves. I do not mean to imply, in the simple minded sense, that <u>particular</u> men prevent themselves from getting an education, a good job, etc., but that <u>in community</u> (or lack of) men perpetuate alienating activity.

If there is any validity to Marx's theory of alienation, if men are whole and only act <u>as if</u> and are treated <u>as if</u> they are "particular functions" in Society, it follows that they are active agents in alienating themselves. The question is no longer one of who is to blame but of how do they do this to themselves.

CHAPTER II

WEBER'S CONTRIBUTION TO MARX'S THEORY OF ALIENATION

1. THE RELEVANCE OF WEBER'S WORK

I have discussed among other things Marx's alienation theory as a hypothesis that man (as whole man) alienates himself from his species characteristic of "free, conscious activity" by treating himself as a "mere particular function", and that his alienation of himself is practised in forced labor. If the hypothesis that man alienates himself in this way is accepted for serious consideration, we need to find out whether the hypothesis is a valid one. This can be done by trying to discover how man alienates himself from himself.

I would like, now, to interpret some aspects of Weber's social theory with reference to Marx's alienation theory; and to show how Weber's work both clarified and solidified Marx's hypothesis. Weber also contributed independently to the study of alienation by drawing attention to the fact that our participation in societal organization is directly related to our irrational fears and hopes. By drawing attention to this fact, he not only supported Marx's contention that capitalism is, with reference to man's species characteristic, an irrational mode of organizing, but described the basis upon which any mode of organizing can be evaluated as to its rationality for man's goals.

If man's particular involvements in societal

organization are related directly to his hopes and fears;
when his hopes and fears motivate him to behave in particular
ways (societal organization), and when these particular ways
of behaving do not resolve the fears and realize the hopes
motivating them, then man's behavior is irrational.

Weber did not question the origin of motivation and,
consequently, did not consider the possibility that particular
hopes and fears are created in relation to particular ways of
behaving. Marx, with his theory of alienation, did consider
this possibility, and suggested a standard external to parti-
cular hopes and fears, and particular modes of behavior.
With modes of behavior reduced to fear and hope, human goals,
of course, are similarly reduced, both being re-oriented toward
"practical" human life. This latter theme will be taken up in
depth in Chapter IV.

Class and Status

Marx did not clearly differentiate between "class"
and "status" in his work, and indicated in The Communist Mani-
festo that he thought the two to be equivalent.

> In the earlier epochs of history, we find almost
> everywhere a complicated arrangement of society
> into various orders, a manifold gradation of social
> rank. In ancient Rome we have patricians, knights,
> plebeians, slaves; in the Middle Ages, feudal lords,
> vassals, guildmasters, journeymen, apprentices, serfs;
> and in almost all of these particular classes, again,
> other subordinate gradations. 1 (Emphasis mine -- DE)

Without distinguishing between "social rank" and "classes", he
went on to say that in modern industrial society "society as a

whole is more and more splitting into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other ...".[2] The fact that this has not occurred, that if anything we have a more "manifold gradation of social rank" than was evident in "earlier epochs of history", has served as one central point for criticism of Marx's social theory. Both Dahrendorf and C. W. Mills, for example, have discussed this problem in Marx's theory.[3] As I argued previously, Marx's political theory does not logically follow from his analysis of society, but rather reflects the man and the time at which he lived. Criticism of his political theory cannot serve as a basis for criticism of his analysis of society.

Weber, interested in showing how ideas act as an independent variable in determining the form of society rather than being mere reflections of economic relations, made a careful and precise analysis of status relations and distinguished status from class.[4] Leaving aside the differences in Marx's and Weber's definitions of class which are irrelevant to my argument, Weber agreed with Marx that

> 'Property' and 'lack of property' are ... the basic categories of all class situations.[5]

He agreed that class could be the basis for social ranking in society, but disagreed that social rank is necessarily based on class relations. Status is the necessary basis of social rank.

> In content, status honor is normally expressed by the fact that above all else a specific style of life can be expected from all those who wish to belong to the circle.[6]

Weber differentiated class from status by defining class in terms of "property and lack of property", and status in terms of "style of life". When he discussed the relation between the two, he considered "property" as one of many factors determining status.

> Property as such is not always recognized as a status qualification, but in the long run it is, and with extraordinary regularity. 7

> But status honor need not necessarily be linked with a 'class situation'. On the contrary, it normally stands in sharp opposition to the pretensions of sheer property. 8

In considering "property" (as ownership of the means of economic production) as one possible and usual status qualification, Weber treated it as one form of "property" in a broader sense. If status is _expressed_ in life styles, particular statuses can be determined by studying the behavior required for them. Some indications of status are mannerisms, taste in cultural products, speech. All of these can be considered to be "property" of the individuals expressing them, in the sense that people can be said to "have" mannerisms, tastes, speech habits. By treating class in this way as one variable related to status, and failing to reverse the relation, considering status as a variable related to class, Weber ran into a difficulty indicated throughout his work. The difficulty, of course, is his failure to consider the factors determing style of life.

To illustrate his point that status honor "normally stands in sharp opposition to the pretensions of sheer

property", Weber used the example of the reception given the
entrepreneur by the aristocracy in the early stages of capi-
talism. This example is representative of vertical mobility
in general as related to status, and vertical mobility is pro-
bably the most obvious single indicator of the necessity for
differentiating between class and status. The treatment of a
new-comer by a status group indicates the presence of a rela-
tionship between class and status, but does not indicate the
nature of the relationship.

Weber himself, although he did not seem to realize
it, gave some explanation of the nature of the relationship
between class and status, and at the same time solidified his
argument for the independent effect on society of ideas, in
his discussion of the relation between class and status, and
communal action.

> In our terminology, 'classes' are not communities;
> they merely represent possible, and frequent bases
> for communal action. 9

Weber listed specific conditions under which communal action
may occur as a result of class situation. I stress "may" here
because Weber stressed the fact that even given the necessary
information for communal action, it still remains for the
individuals in the community to choose to act.

> For however different life chances may be, this
> fact in itself, according to all experience, by no
> means gives birth to 'class action' (communal
> action by the members of a class). The fact of
> being conditioned and the results of the class
> situation must be distinctly recognizable. For
> only then the contrast of life chances can be felt

> not as an absolutely given fact to be accepted,
> but as a resultant from either (1) the given dis-
> tribution of property, or (2) the structure of
> the concrete economic order. It is only then
> that people may react against the class structure
> not only through acts of intermittent and irra-
> tional protest, but in the form of rational
> association.[10]

In this passage Weber pointed out the importance of the atti-

tudes of people, as well as their class situation, in deter-

mining their actions. Marx was aware of the importance of

attitudes as reification in the illusory community and objec-

tification in the human community. These specific conditions

outlined by Weber, necessary for communal action based on class

situation, were conditions that Marx assumed in his political

theory. The importance of Weber's work here is that by

specifying these conditions he, by implication, directed

attention to the conditions under which communal action will

not arise in relation to class situation.

Weber went on to say that "in contrast to classes,

status groups are normally communities".[11]

> Communal action refers to the action which is
> oriented to the feeling of the actors that they
> belong together. [12]

This definition of community as we-feeling includes both of

Marx's "communities". Weber did not make value-judgments about

the bases on which communities are formed. His definition is

a normative one. Marx, on the other hand, hypothesized the

existence of a species characteristic common to men, and used

the relation between men and their assumed species characteris-

tic as an independent standard against which normative

relations could be evaluated.

Status groups, by their nature as communities, "hinder the strict carrying through of the sheer market principle". [13] With these associations between class and status, and community, in mind, the treatment given a newcomer to a status group, and the opposition of status groups to "mere property" are easily understood. An individual who is vertically mobile can thoroughly learn a style of life only by associating with members of the status group in which he wants to belong. (in the case of downward mobility, it may be a matter of the individual being forced to associate with members of a status group through lack of availability of other groups.) He may have the means to live as the others do, but cannot know how to use these means in terms prescribed by the status group. Complete acceptance by the newcomer and his family can, and usually does, take generations. [14]

To consider the questions and problems that arise from Weber's definition of status would serve to detract from my argument. I would just like to reiterate my point, accepting his definition, that while the results of individual movement from one status group to another indicates that a distinction between class and status is a valuable one, these results do not indicate the nature of the relationship between class and status.

It is clear that class situation is, for any given individual, only one of the determinants of the status groups

to which he may belong. Other "possessions" which can influence the individual's chances are, to name a few, beauty, intelligence, race, religion, and nationality. The questions that have to be answered are: what are the factors determining the "possession" of these characteristics, and what explains their being used as determinants of status; questions which lead to a confrontation with Marx's theory of classes.

Power and Authority

Marx did not explicitly define power. He indicated his understanding of this term through his use of it. His usage indicates that with reference to people he understood power, in relation to the possession of the means of production, as the ability to control the factors determining modes of human life. He was concerned more with particular uses of power, i.e., to direct society, rather than with power as such. Weber was interested in defining power independently of the various purposes for which it might be used.

> In general, we understand by 'power' the chance of
> a man or of a number of men to realize their own
> will in a communal action even against the resis-
> tance of others who are participating in the action.[15]

According to Weber then, men may exercise power individually or in concert with others and the action is taken within a communal context. This definition is confusing because it does not specify whether all people who are "participating in the action" are also involved in "communal action". Weber also defined another form of action which he called "societal

action" which is "oriented to a rationally motivated adjust-
ment of interests". [16] Both communal and societal action
depend on the intention of the individuals involved in the
actions, since, in the former action is <u>oriented</u> to the <u>feeling</u>
of belonging together, and in the latter action is <u>oriented</u> to
rationally <u>motivated</u> adjustment of interests.

For my argument, the important point here is that
societal action can be taken independently of community and
communal action can be taken independently of rationally moti-
vated adjustment of interests. It also follows from his defi-
nitions of communal and societal action that, with reference
to the exercise of power, while power must be exercised in
communal action, those resisting the action may not be doing
so communally. Communal and societal <u>interests</u> can also con-
flict for members of a group or for individuals. The possible
relations between communal and societal action and the rele-
vance of considering them for understanding aspects of aliena-
tion are clarified by Weber's discussion of authority.

Weber saw that the basis for power is the ability to
use force. Authority is the means by which the use of force
is legitimized. Weber distinguished between three types of
"legitimate power" or "authority": charisma, traditional and
legal-rational, of which the third he felt to be the most
prevalent in modern industrial society. Legal-rational autho-
rity refers to the "belief in the validity of legal statutes
and functional competence based on rationally created <u>rules</u>". [17]

Weber pointed out that methods of legitimizing power do not answer to some external control. They are "inner justifications" for use of power.

> It is understood that, in reality, obedience is
> determined by highly robust motives of fear and
> hope -- fear of the vengeance of magical powers
> or of the power-holder, hope for reward in this
> world or in the beyond -- ... However, in asking
> for the 'legitimations' of this obedience, one
> meets with these three 'pure' types ....[18]

Weber defined power "in reality" as the chances of an individual or a number of them to realize their will even against the opposition of others. Types of authority, as modes of justifying some uses of power (and, of course, rejecting others), are "in reality" modes of expressing fears and hopes. Weber considered legitimacy to be normative. If authority is normative we can question to what conditions "in reality" do the norms refer, which leads directly back to Marx's theory of alienation.

Weber's "authority" answers to Marx's "ideology" as the reification of self-consciousness. In the case of legal-rational authority, man reifies rules he created into "legal statutes" and "functional competence" which become standards over man to which he must answer as if to an external force. His relation to them is as to "things" that he did not create; for which he is not responsible but to which he is responsible.

Marx distinguished between community as human and as illusory, the former being based on man's capacities as a species and the latter based on the State. In human community

all action not only flows from man's species characteristic,
but is controlled by his knowledge of this characteristic and
directed toward the development of human capacities suggested
by this characteristic. In civil society (illusory community)
man's actions flow from his species characteristic but are not
controlled by knowledge of it and are not directed toward
development of human capacities. The development of human
capacities in civil society is _accidental_ and limited by the
conditions (including ideology) which are required to maintain
civil society.

The major distinction that I wish to draw here
between Marx and Weber is that while Weber described what he
saw normatively, Marx denied the validity of normative beha-
vior _as such_. He set up man's species characteristic as an
absolute standard, i.e., an objective standard external to
particular norms, against which normative behavior can be evalu-
ated as to its benefits or harmfulness to man _as man_.

Bureaucracy

Weber considered bureaucracy, as a stable mode of
organizing for the realization of goals, to be technically
superior to other forms of organization because it ensures
"that the official business of the administration be discharged
precisely, unambiguously, continuously, and with as much speed
as possible".[19]

> The fully developed bureaucratic mechanism compares
> with other organizations exactly as does the machine
> with the non-mechanical modes of production.[20]

Administration in bureaucracy, is carried out with reference to "objective considerations", which means "a discharge of business according to calculable rules and 'without regard for persons'." [21]   Administration in bureaucracy, ideally, is societal action. Weber's description of bureaucracy as a "machine", and administration as societal action parallels Marx's description of self-consciousness objectified into society as a "thing", and the reification of this object through disregarding the relations between it and the persons who create and maintain it.

Bureaucracy is perfected through the "dehumanizing" of official relations.

> Its specific nature, which is welcomed by capital-
> ism, develops the more perfectly the more bureau-
> cracy is 'dehumanized', the more completely it
> succeeds in eliminating from official business love,
> hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and
> emotional elements which escape calculation. [22]

He equated "dehumanization" with the elimination of "personal, irrational, and emotional elements which escape calculation". Within the framework of Marx's theory of alienation, "dehumanization" of official relations does not, in itself, necessarily imply the dehumanization of man. Alienation does not follow from the depersonalization of relations in society (as a thing) but from the use that man makes of this object, society, that he has created. In his communistic society, man "possess objective reality".

> ...through the fact that all objects are for him
> a positive, depersonalized objectification of him-
> self. He is the man to whom the world indeed
> belongs, because its manner of production does not
> alienate him, but establishes him. [23]

He also said, in his discussion of human requirements, and
the "emancipation" of the human senses, that men in human
community

> ... relate themselves to the thing for the sake
> of the thing, but the thing itself is an objec-
> tive human relation to itself and to man, and
> vice versa. Need or enjoyment have consequently
> lost their egotistical nature, and nature has lost
> its mere utility by use becoming human use. [24]

Weber too recognized a distinction between social
organization as a tool and the human use of it. His recogni-
tion of it is indicated in his association of power with com-
munal action, and in his further discussion of communal and
societal action with reference to bureaucracy.

> Once it is fully established, bureaucracy is among
> those social structures which are the hardest to
> destroy. Bureaucracy is the means of carrying
> 'community action' over into rationally ordered
> 'societal action'. Therefore, as an instrument for
> 'societalizing' relations of power, bureaucracy has
> been and is a power instrument of the first order --
> for the one who controls the bureaucratic apparatus. [25]

It follows that control of bureaucratic apparatus heavily
weights the chances of an individual or a group of individuals
to realize their will in communal action.

> Under otherwise equal conditions, a 'societal action',
> which is methodically ordered and led, is superior
> to every resistance of 'mass' or even of 'communal
> action". And where the bureaucratization of adminis-
> tration has been completely carried through, a form
> of power relation is established that is practically
> unshatterable. [26]

Weber's belief in the invulnerability of power rela-
tions based on control of bureaucratic apparatus is dependent
upon his assumption that a change in power relations would

require the breakdown of the bureaucratic machine. This assumption is questionable since communal action can be carried on independently of particular societal organizations, and it is possible that power relations expressed in bureaucratic organization can be changed on other grounds. This might entail a change in the uses made of bureaucracies but would not necessarily entail the breakdown of bureaucracies. Weber thought that such re-organization would be at least highly unlikely because of the nature of bureaucratic organization.

> The individual bureaucrat cannot squirm out of the apparatus in which he is harnessed. In contrast to the honorific or avocational 'notable', the professional bureaucrat is chained to his activity by his entire material and ideal existence. In the great majority of cases, he is only a single cog in an ever-moving mechanism which prescribes to him an essentially fixed route of march. The official is entrusted with specialized tasks and normally the mechanism cannot be put into motion or arrested by him, but only from the very top. The individual bureaucrat is thus forged to the community of all the functionaries who are integrated into the mechanism. They have a common interest in seeing that the mechanism continues its functions and that the societally exercised authority carries on. [27]

The continuing functioning of bureaucracy is in the interests of the vast majority of people.

> The ruled, for their part, cannot dispense with or replace the bureaucratic apparatus of authority once it exists. For this bureaucracy rests upon expert training, a functional specialization of work, and an attitude set for habitual and virtuoso-like mastery of a single yet methodically integrated function. If the official stops working, or if his work is forcefully interrupted, chaos results, and it is difficult to improvise replacements from among the governed who are fit to master such chaos. This holds for public administration as well as for private economic management. [28]

Weber has shown that destruction of bureaucratic organization
would lead to chaos and would thus be in no one's interests,
neither those of the rulers nor of the ruled. He has not shown
how he can justify his assumption that this fact entails the
necessity of maintaining power relations as they exist. He has
not shown the necessary connection between the use of bureau-
cracy and the existence of bureaucracy.

Weber was, in fact, unable to show any such necessary
connection. He unwittingly equated bureaucratic organization
with capitalism, i.e., he equated the object and one particular
use of it. He recognized that modern forms of bureaucracy
were first developed in relation to capitalism.

> The bureaucratic structure goes hand in hand with
> the concentration of the material means of manage-
> ment in the hands of the master. This concentration
> occurs, for instance, in a well-known and typical
> fashion, in the development of big capitalist enter-
> prises,which find their essential characteristics in
> this process. [29]

Alongside this development of bureaucracy in capitalist enter-
prises is a corresponding development of bureaucracy in public
organizations. Because bureaucracy arose parallel with capital-
ism, Weber assumed that, once fully developed, it could not be
separated from capitalism.

> More and more the material fate of the masses depends
> upon the steady and correct functioning of the
> increasingly bureaucratic organizations of private
> capitalism. The idea of eliminating these organiza-
> tions becomes more and more utopian. [30]

The equation of a social object with the use to which it was
originally put is a false equation. The beauty of Marx's

theory of alienation is its questioning of this equation, but one need not resort to Marx's theory to show the inadequacy of it. The development of social objects is a process of creating social objects, separating them from their original use, and using them in new ways. One example of this process is the development of travel by water. Sailboats, which were once a primary means of travel, were replaced by steamers as a primary means. But the sailboats were not destroyed. Sailing has become a means of recreation.[31]

2. WEBER AND THE MYTH OF SOCIETY

In my discussion of Weber's work I have been laying the foundation for my argument that his analysis of authority is an analysis of one of the methods by which people alienate themselves from their species characteristic. His analysis of communal and societal action, power and authority, and bureaucracy is invaluable to the study of alienation. He clearly showed how ideas must be treated as an independent variable in man's understanding of society. He also clarified and, perhaps unintentionally, added weight to Marx's contention that if man wants to overcome alienation he has to understand and control his relation to social objects.

But Weber, with his phenomenal range and depth of interest, went far beyond a simple clarification and affirmation of Marx's theory. It was with reference to his discussion of rationality as a general cultural development underlying all aspects of modern life that Weber reached beyond Marx's rather

simple classification of the alienated as worker and the

alienator as owner, and contributed independently to an under-

standing of alienation in the contemporary world.

Rationality

Weber used the term "rational" in a variety of ways[32]

of which I am going to consider three: rational action,

rational systems, and rationalization as an attitude toward

the world. Of Weber's definition of rational action Talcot

Parsons noted,

> Weber unfortunately does not give us an explicit
> statement of (the) criteria, but they can be inferred
> from his discussion. An act is rational in so far
> as (a) it is oriented to a clearly formulated unambi-
> guous goal, or to a set of values which are clearly
> formulated and logically consistent; (b) the means
> chosen are, according to the best available knowledge,
> adapted to the realization of the goal. [33]

Rational action, then, includes orientation toward a goal, the

means used to achieve the goal, and some judgment of the

adequacy of the means for the realization of the goal.

Of the second usage that I wish to consider, Weber

stated simply, " 'Rational' may also mean a 'systematic arrange-

ment'." [34] A systematic arrangement is a method which is

"unambiguously oriented to fixed goals"[35], which formally

includes it in the specification of the above definition of

rational action listed after (b). My reason for considering

the two uses separately is that, while rational action focuses

attention on the actors, rational system focuses attention on

the method.

Rationalization as an attitude toward the world, refers not to any increased rationality on the part of the individual but to the assumption by individuals that the world is rational (as systematically arranged). In "Science as a Vocation"[36] Weber discussed "intellectualist rationalization" as the belief that, although one has no increased knowledge of the conditions under which one lives, one could, if one wished, discover what they are. It is the belief that all things can be mastered by calculation, and that there are no mysterious and incalculable forces in the world, a belief related to the development of the scientific method.

Weber saw the development of the scientific method historically from Socrates to the Renaissance within the context of the search for "true art". He pointed out that for the early experimentors science was the path to true art and thus to true nature. But this faith in science is no longer tenable.

> After Nietzche's devastating criticism of those 'last men' who 'invented happiness', I may leave aside altogether the naive optimism in which science -- that is, the technique of mastering life which rests upon science -- has been celebrated as the way to happiness ....[37]

He asked what meaning we can make of science,

> ... now after all these former illusions, the 'way to true being', the 'way to true art', the 'way to true nature', the 'way to true God', the 'way to true happiness', have been dispelled? Tolstoy has given the simplest answer with the words: 'Science is meaningless because it gives no answer to our question, the only question important for us: "What shall we do and how shall we live?" ' That science does not give an answer to this is indisputable.[38]

Weber concluded that the value of science is that it can give

us clear means for reaching our goals, but we ourselves must

specify those goals for ourselves.

Intellectualist rationalization is an attitude toward

the world based on a misconception which is that, because

science gives explanation but no meaning, there is no meaning

in the world aside from the mundane calculability of it. It

was toward this attitude that Weber directed his observation

that the world is "disenchanted".

> We live as did the ancients when their world was not
> yet disenchanted of its gods and demons, only we live
> in a different sense. As Hellenic man at times sacri-
> ficed to Aphrodite and at other times to Apollo, and,
> above all, as everybody sacrificed to the gods of his
> city, so do we still nowadays, only the bearing of
> man has been disenchanted and denuded of its mystical
> but inwardly genuine plasticity. Fate, and certainly
> not 'science', holds sway over these gods and their
> struggles.... Our civilization destines us to realize
> more clearly these struggles again, after our eyes
> have been blinded for a thousand years -- blinded by
> the allegedly or presumably exclusive orientation
> towards the grandiose moral fervor of Christian
> ethics. 39

Weber was not deluded by a longing for some romantic past. He

believed that these "gods and their struggles" would have to

be dealt with in practical life, in "meeting the 'demands of

the day' " 40   His notion was that we are coming into a time

characterized by the necessity of facing the "gods" of the

ancients without the protection either of their myths or of

our own - our heritage of Judeo-Christianity. In a sense, he

"prophesied", as did Marx, a "new world"; but where Marx

stressed the positive aspects of man gaining his freedom from

societal organization, Weber stressed the fantastic amount of
effort and discipline required to deal with our "civilization".
As we well know now, Weber's point of view cannot be passed
off as "mere" pessimism.

Weber showed how our societal organization is becoming
increasingly rationalized in bureaucratic systems. He also
described the subjective attitudes which have developed
parallel with this increasing empirical rationalization. What
he failed to do was to distinguish clearly between the one and
the other, and to indicate the nature of the relationship
between them, an important distinction for the study of aliena-
tion.

For example, Weber presented his three forms of "legi-
timate power" as "ideal types", emphasizing that none is ever
found in a pure form in reality. As ideal types they are con-
structs that we can employ to get a clearer understanding of
human behavior in any society. Historically, in Western
civilization, he believed that our society is characterized by
a general development of the legal-rational type with a decrease
in both charismatic and traditional. He related the decline in
traditional authority to the development of science in European
culture; and the decline in charisma to the diminishing impor-
tance of the individual and of the effectiveness of individual
action in societal organization. Applied to a concrete
example, such as the development of European civilization, the
ideal type of legal-rational authority now refers both to a

factual empirical development of rational systems based on
the use of scientific method, and to the orientation (of
attitudes) of people to these rational systems. As Marx showed,
the two can be separated, the one being the objective develop-
ment of man's capacities and the other the reification of these
"objects".

Weber saw the increasing appeal to rationally created
rules as a method of justifying the distribution and use of
power, to be an aspect of the general trend of rationalization.
The general trend of rationalization, as an attitude toward
the world, is based upon certain assumptions, as I have dis-
cussed, about science. These assumptions reify*science[41], and
consequently are not necessarily implied in the empirical
rational systems. They indicate, not the character of the
systems man has created, but the use of these systems by man.

Individual and Society

It is by confronting Weber's ideas about the
relation between the individual and society with Marx's under-
standing of man that I wish to complete my argument. The
validity of Marx's theory of alienation rests finally on
his assumption that man is "whole man" and not "merely a par-
ticular function", that he may treat himself as a mere
particular function, and to do so is to alienate himself
from his "species characteristic" of "free, conscious
activity", i.e., to deny his wholeness, acting out of it with-
out recognition of doing so. If man has no "nature, if he

*Transfer human powers from their human context to
an outside source. (p.41)

is determined only by environmental situations, a "mere reflection" of his culture; or if men are isolated indivi- duals related together only through shared myths and shared necessity, then there is no need to consider alienation as a problem. The experience to which the term "alienation" refers can indicate, in the first case, at most, contradictions between different aspects of a given culture, contradictions reflected in man; and in the second case can indicate, at most, the natural isolation of individuals and their natural conflicts of interest. These are the two senses in which Hegel considered alienation, and in both cases there can be no genuine "solution" to alienation. There can be only the recog- nition of a necessary human condition and acceptance of it.

I would like to continue my "defense" of alienation theory with an appeal to the fact that, while this theory encompasses the relations described by Weber, he offered no alternate theory explaining the experiences to which "aliena- tion" refers. Weber never explicitly formulated his ideas about the nature of the relationship between the individual and society, but they are implied in his work. Without attempting to define his "real" thoughts, his writing indicates a theoretical assumption that men are naturally isolated indi- viduals, related together in society through shared bonds of myth and necessity.

Weber took the individual and society "as given", recognized the "distance" between private and public life, and

saw that private life as given has very little, if any, effect
on public life.

> The fact of our time is characterized by rationaliza-
> tion, intellectualization and, above all, by the
> 'disenchantment of the world'. Precisely the ultimate
> and most sublime values have retreated from public
> life either into the transcendental realm of mystic
> life or into the brotherliness of direct and personal
> human relations. [42]

Believing that power in the hands of a few to control the lives
of the many goes hand in hand with large-scale bureaucratic
organization, that a radical change in the distribution of
power implies disruption of bureaucracy and consequently "chaos",
and believing in the increasing indestructibility of bureau-
cratic organization, Weber thought that the only thing for men
to do is face up to the realities of life as they are with
individual integrity.

> ... We want to draw the lesson that nothing is gained
> by yearning and tarrying alone, and we shall act
> differently. We shall set to work and meet the
> 'demands of the day', in human relations as well as
> in our vocation. This, however, is plain and simple,
> if each finds and obeys the demon who holds the
> fibres of his very life. [43]

What he left unquestioned was the content of the 'demands of the
day'.

Rejecting the idea that the 'demands of the day' fall
on the shoulders of individuals (as isolated individuals),
what these demands consist of depends on the ways in which
people are prepared to organize themselves in relation to
societal organization. Weber saw the individual as helpless
in the face of increasing rationalization of society, the only

channel for _effective_ power being bureaucratic organization.
In his discussion of power, he defined it in terms of an individual or individuals in concert being able to "realize their own will in a communal action even against others who are participating in the action". Since communal and societal action can be distinguished, any particular societal organization, such as bureaucracy, is only one of the means by which "wills" can be "realized". Since power is the realization of individual wills in communal action, and societal organization is one means by which power is exercised, at least some individuals are far from helpless in our society.

Rejecting Weber's assumption that one particular use of bureaucracy is a necessary use of it, it follows that the power distribution now related to bureaucracy is not a necessary one. Weber saw legal-rational authority as a justification for existing power relations. In Marx's theory this parallels the reification of law in the interests of the "ruling" class. Weber saw that such justification was equally in the interests of the ruled, referring to _both_ their hopes and their fears. However, as long as such justification stems from hopes and fears without actually resolving fears and realizing hopes, it is based on irrational feelings (love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements which escape calculation) and is not rational action, as he defined the term. As an irrational means of dealing with "real" hopes and fears, it is a failure of man to use his societal organization

in his human interest; a reification rather than an objectification of his powers. Legal-rational authority, as a reification, attributes power belonging to individuals in relation to one another (regardless of the complexity of these relations) to rules which are believed to have an existence independent of the men using them. Justification of power relations is a communal activity, and to the extent that men in community reify their objective power relations, they define themselves individually as helpless in the face of mass society. Each individual is helpless because all individuals in community define themselves as such and act on their communal agreement.

Rationalization of societal organization, as the objectification of man's powers, does not necessarily imply individual helplessness. Weber realized that societal organization can be used as a tool for communal goals. The question that has to be answered here is which "community" (or communities) is using existing societal organization to its own advantage. By Weber's definition, individual men can organize in many different kinds of community, depending on to what they are referring for their "we-feeling". By Marx's definition, men can refer to one of two communities for their "we-feeling", to an illusory one or to that based on their species nature, including all members of the species.

The distinction between Weber's normative and "value-free" approach and Marx's suggestion of a standard external to cultural norms by which normative behavior can be evaluated

is important to the study of alienation. Both approaches are
"value-free" in the sense of being amoral. Marx and Weber
used their analyses of society to make moral evaluations of
it, but their morality is not implied in their analysis. Marx
interpreted "free, conscious activity" within a 19C framework.
Weber's penetrating analysis of normative authority took us
beyond Marx's rather simple optimism, but did not answer
Marx's basic hypothesis that man is whole and only treats him-
self as a partial function in forced labor. Nor have we who
are fully within the 20C done so.

We have studied fairly extensively, in functional
analyses of society and in role and games theory, ways in which
man treats himself as a particular function. Weber anticipated
the problems inherent in this kind of study when it is unchecked
by being placed within a more encompassing understanding of
man. With reference to the use of functional analysis, he had
this to say:

> For purposes of sociological analysis two things can
> be said. First this functional frame of reference is
> convenient for purposes of practical illustration and
> for provisional orientation. In these respects it is
> not only useful but indispensable. But at the same
> time if its cognitive value is overestimated and its
> concepts illegitimately 'reified', it can be highly
> dangerous. [44]

Functional analysis of "society", as the objectified power of
man, is one way of describing societal organization. It is,
to use Toulmin's terminology, a method of natural history and
not a scientific explanation. It neither explains human

behavior, nor does it illuminate our understanding of man's relation to societal organization. If the results of functional analyses of "society" are not referred to "whole man", the method contributes to the perpetuation, in our culture, of the myth of Society.

What has yet to be accomplished in the social sciences is an explanation of how man is related to himself as a particular function, and consequently, how he alienates himself. Weber contributed to the beginning of such an explanation by hypothesizing that our justifications for power relations, and consequently our use of societal organization, are based on our fears and hopes.

CHAPTER III

1. THE MYTH OF SOCIETY IN AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY

In this chapter my main intention is to show how con-
temporary definitions of alienation do not touch on Marx's
basic hypothesis: that alienation is a relation between man and
his species characteristic (i.e., that which distinguishes him
as a species from other species of life), such that man uses his
species characteristic without consciously realizing what he is
doing. Contemporary thinkers in America have concentrated on
what Marx considered to be the <u>activity</u> of alienation (i.e.,
forced labor, reification), but have approached this activity as
a "thing" without referring the "thing" to the people to whom it
relates. They consider alienated man (man treating himself as
a particular function; civil man) to be the whole man and,
in doing so, fail to get beyond normative models of man in
society. I argue that contemporary thinkers have retained
alienation as an evaluative concept, referring to <u>inhumane</u>
treatment of man as <u>inhuman</u> treatment, and reducing Marx's
notion of species characteristic to ethical values peculiar to
one culture and one period of time. In contemporary theory,
alienation refers mainly to a comparison between cultural
values and societal organization, and to contradictions between
the two. This usage is more closely affiliated with Durkheim's
notion of anomie, and especially as the term has

been developed by Robert Merton, than to Marx's alienation.
One would have to agree with Kaufman that alienation, as used
in this manner, is not a fruitful concept for scientific
analysis of society.

My argument is that the contemporary usage of the
term is a distortion of Marx's definition, which can be stated
in the form of a hypothesis, if extricated from its narrow
19C humanist value orientation. Marx's theory was stated, as
he himself pointed out, in the form of a rough and incomplete
outline, and he himself derided idealistic humanism. I raise
these points as an attempt to justify my separation of certain
aspects of his general theory from the traditional "Marxian"
framework, with the conviction that his theory of alienation
can be used as a hypothesis with reference to which empirical
data can be meaningfully interpreted.

I.   CONTEMPORARY DEFINITIONS

Eric and Mary Josephson, in _Man Alone_[1], devoted a
rather extensive introductory chapter to a survey of the
various ways in which "alienation" has come to be used. Their
survey illustrates the wide range of interest in the concept,
an interest spanning the distance between poets and politi-
cians. Walter Gerson[2] constructed a less extensive and less
detailed list of uses to which the concept has been put by
psychologists and sociologists. He suggested that, even though
incomplete, his list shows "a sizeable _majority_ of persons
living in our advanced industrial society" to be alienated.[3]

Melvin Seeman[4] attempted a logical historical classification of kinds of alienation which he hoped to be of use as a basis for empirical research.[5]

On the critical side, and relevant to my thesis, Horton[6] has questioned whether contemporary definitions of alienation are value-free, "or are we witnessing a transformation from radical to conformist definitions and values under the guise of value-free sociology?" In an unpublished paper entitled "Alienation and Anomie", Stephen Lukes[7] argued that alienation has been debased in favor of the divergent "contemporary pre-occupations" of researchers, resulting in "the common core of Marx's concept" having been lost. Kaufman[8], finally, has suggested that since alienation is a concept primarily used in moral contexts it should be recognized as such and eliminated from the scientific vocabulary of sociology.

If the contentions of Lukes, Horton and Kaufman are well founded, and a perusal of the literature pertaining to alienation suggests that they are[9], a question arises as to what value there is in the contemporary work being done. While agreeing with Lukes that the common core of Marx's concept has been lost (or perhaps not yet found), I would further argue that, with respect to the approaches of social scientists to alienation, the contemporary definitions indicate the presence of the Myth of Society.

This myth, stemming from the philosophical mind-body problem, takes different forms in different contexts, e.g.,

society as a whole versus isolated individual, and individual
(as passive clay) determined by society as a whole; but the
essential referent of the myth remains the assumption of a
separation between "mental constructs" and "sensuous exis-
tence", without any attempt to consider the origin of this
separation. The general form in which the myth is expressed
and implied via Durkheim and Weber is: with reference to
Durkheim, that "society" is normative and places moral res-
trictions on otherwise anarchistic individual men[10]; and with
reference to Weber, that "society" is normative and indivi-
duals relate to "it" motivated by fear and hope.[11]

John Clark has remarked that in spite of the proli-
feration of definitions of alienation,

> an isolable feature of all of them is man's feeling
> of lack of means (power) to eliminate the discrepancy
> between his definition of the role he is playing and
> the one he feels he should be playing in most situa-
> tions".[12]

Two others who explicitly agree with Clark are Arnold Kaufman,
for whom "'alienation' might be defined as such and such a
feeling which results from certain beliefs together with
certain objective social conditions", the alienated persons
having a relationship to something else such that avoidable
discontent or loss of satisfaction results[13]; and Fritz
Pappenheim who placed alienation, as so defined, within an
historical perspective.

This "common core" definition of alienation as a

discrepancy between what one _expects_ and what one _finds_ to be

true - a discrepancy which is unnecessary or avoidable, and

at the same time a threat - highlights the fact that aliena-

tion cannot be separated from values (as expectations). It

makes no reference to 1) the source of the expectation, 2) the

source of the objective social conditions, or 3) the relation

between expectation and actual conditions _in terms of_ their

respective sources. The definition is a normative one, taking

values as given and social conditions as given, without

attempting to explain _both_ relative to some external standard.

This orientation toward alienation is radically

different from that of Marx, who stressed alienation as a _prac-_

tical activity (in forced labor), and the objective external

factor of species characteristic. He distrusted considerations

of "actual roles" versus ideas of what "should" be, except

within this practical context. Outside of practical contexts

the study of alienation can, as he well knew, degenerate into

a form of romantic idealism.

Pappenheim's historical approach is of value today in

that it checks the tendency of American social scientists to

ignore the cultural past and view alienation only in our social

present, and specifically with reference to modern technology.[14]

> In the course of history alienation has undergone ✓
> significant qualitative changes (so) that its
> meaning today is quite different from what it was
> in previous eras. In the present stage of history
> man has means of self-realization at his command
> which were unknown to him in former periods ....

Once this concept of the individual's sovereignty
has been awakened in the minds of men, a new
climate is prepared. The consciousness that man's
yearning for self-realization is thwarted becomes
a crushing experience which could not have existed
in previous stages. In such a situation the aliena-
tion of man is not any longer accepted as an
inevitable fate; more than ever before in history
it is felt as a threat and at the same time a
challenge. [15]

Alienation is not, he reminds us, a peculiarly modern problem,

but is an age-old problem which takes different guises at

different times: it becomes a problem, perhaps, for considera-

tion in a new context, more of a "crushing experience",and

obviously, with the power of self-destruction available to

modern man, a much greater threat.[16]

The major question which comes out of an examination

of contemporary uses of "alienation" is that of the criteria

for evaluating both values and conditions of life. Kaufman

raised the point that the discontent experienced by the

"alienated person" is avoidable, but since both expectations

and objective social conditions are to some extent arbitrary,

the question remains one of how alienation can be avoided.

This question, which I have been posing throughout this thesis,

is usually handled today as a question of "adjustment". To

what extent can people be expected to "adjust" to present

"conditions of life" and to what extent can they change these

conditions to suit their expectations?[17] Which of our values

are left-overs from environments that no longer exist and can

exist no longer, and which aspects of our new environment are

undesirable and avoidable?[18'] The question raised by Marx of

an objective <u>method</u> of evaluating man's expectations in rela-

tion to his experience remains the basic problem in alienation

theory and remains unanswered.

2. THE SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH TO ALIENATION

Keeping in mind Marx's definition of alienation as a

relationship expressed in his practical activity, in which he

treats himself as a <u>mere</u> particular function, between whole

man and his species character, I will move into a more specific

consideration of the problems raised by Horton, Lukes and

Kaufman.

Value-free Sociology as Realism

Contemporary alienation theory is being approached in

two ways. On the one hand there are those who are trying to

extend and/or improve upon the work done by Marx; and on the

other there are those who, to use Horton's phrase, are

attempting to study alienation within the framework of "value-

free sociology". Those who can be placed in the latter cate-

gory are characterized as "realists". They have attracted

criticism, more so recently, from many directions.[19] Helen

Lynd, for example, characterized this approach as "less than

full realism".

> In finding conscious identifications with and beyond
> our own time and society, much turns upon the way we
> conceive realism, what meaning we give to 'facing
> reality'. Continually we are urged by therapists,

> by realists in foreign policy, by practical
> persons of various kinds to abandon sentimental
> dreams, idealistic utopias, and romanticism,
> and to face reality. Reality when so used
> almost always means limitation. The reality
> we should face is the limitations in ourselves,
> in other people, in the possibilities of human
> society. Rarely are we urged to face the
> reality of the slanting light of early morning
> and late afternoon, of Berlioz' 'Luceat!', or
> of Braque's colors, of human courage and integrity
> under stress, of delight in wit and laughter,
> of a child's expectancy, of the revelation of
> new human experience in unimagined openness and
> communication with another person, of the ranges
> of the possible ....
> Statements of realism, or of the reality prin-
> ciple, as acknowledgment of limitation, of
> adjusting to the is rather than dreaming of the
> possible, are well known. All of them are some
> version of Machiavelli's central tenet:
> ... how one lives is so far distant from how one
> ought to live that he who neglects what is done
> for what ought to be done sooner effects his ruin
> than his preservation ...
> Realism that excludes the longer, enduring pur-
> poses of men and men's unrealized dreams is less
> than full realism. [20]

Lynd's criticism suggests that when men refer to "reality",

the "reality" may be one thing in one context and another in

a different context. This is a theme that will become central

in my discussion of Mead's theory, but for the present it is

sufficient to note that the "reality" to which advocates of

"value-free sociology" refer indicates as much value as reality

i.e., the value of "facing an implied unpleasant necessity."

Marx's Theory Debased

Lukes, discussing the differences between Marx's outlook

on society and that of Durkheim, saw the basic distinction

between them in their radically different visions of the

relation between the individual and society.

> Compare Marx's statements that 'it is above all
> necessary to avoid postulating "society" once
> again as an abstraction confronting the indivi-
> dual' and that communism creates the basis for
> 'rendering it impossible that anything should
> exist independently of individuals' with Durkheim's
> that society is 'a reality from which everything
> that matters to us flows', that it 'transcends the
> individual's consciousness' and that it 'has all
> the characteristics of a moral authority that
> imposes respect'. Marx begins from the position
> that the independent or 'reified' and determining
> character of social relationships and norms is
> precisely what characterises human 'pre-history'
> and will be abolished by the revolutionary transi-
> tion to a "truly-human" society, whereas Durkheim
> assumes the "normality" of social regulation, the
> lack of which leads to the morbid, self-destructive
> state of "non-social" or Hobbesian anarchy evident
> in unregulated capitalism. Social constraint is
> for Marx a denial and for Durkheim a condition of
> human freedom and self-realisation. [21]

It is true, as Lukes argued, that where Marx stressed
the "rights of the individual", Durkheim stressed the moral
authority of society. But this does not get at the essential
difference between their world views with reference to aliena-
tion: a difference as relevant today as at the times they
wrote. If one is to grasp firmly the contradiction between
Marx and Durkheim, one must consider that where Marx saw men
in social intercourse creating themselves and their world,
Durkheim saw men in social intercourse being created and con-
trolled by the "collective conscience".

Without going into a discussion of which view is the
more generally adequate for sociological analysis, I would
like to stress the point that with respect to alienation, the

Marxian orientation is a necessary one. Alienation is not a
meaningful concept when used within a theoretical framework
that assumes man to be passive and powerless (either as an
explicitly stated assumption or as an implied one, by taking
man's expressions of passivity and powerlessness at face value
without attempting to explain this expression). In Marx's
theory passivity and powerlessness indicate alienation. If one
now assumes passivity and powerlessness to be "natural" to man
or accepts them as "given", one has presented no alternate
theory of alienation (i.e., is giving no alternate explanation
for the phenomena referred to by the concept "alienation"),
and has relegated alienation to a feeling state, independent of
practical activity.

Value-free Debasement, Illustrated

I have chosen Blauner's <u>Alienation and Freedom</u> as the
sacrificial lamb in a not altogether arbitrary manner, since
to date he has done the most thorough, empirical study of
"alienating conditions", and has explicitly stated his intention
to "fuse an empirical, realistic approach with the valuable
humanistic tradition of alienation theory that views all human
beings as potentially capable of exercising freedom and con-
trol ...." [22] My criticism of Blauner's approach to alienation
is meant not as an attack on his work specifically, but on his
work as an example of a general tendency among American socio-
logists interested in studying alienation.

Blauner limited his discussion of alienation in modern society to the blue collar worker, with the intention of explaining the "uneven distribution" of alienation among factory workers in American industry. He studied four kinds of industry: printing, textiles, automobiles and chemicals; each industry being typified by a technology particular to it.[23]

Blauner defined alienation as "a quality of personal experience resulting from specific kinds of social arrangements" [24], and used a modified version of Seeman's dimensions of alienation[25] as a working definition of the conceptual one. The four dimensions or modes of alienation, as modified by Blauner, are powerlessness, meaninglessness, social isolation and self-estrangement; his concentration of interest being upon the mode of powerlessness.

In his usage, powerlessness results when a person is treated as an object and is unable to act as a subject to change or control the conditions in which he finds himself. The polar opposite of powerlessness is freedom, as the ability to control these conditions. Lack of freedom exists when the person has no "real choices", while lack of control refers to the person being unwillingly dominated by others. Blauner distinguished four modes of powerlessness: the separation from ownership of the means of production and the finished product, the inability to influence general managerial policies, the lack of control over the conditions of employment, and the lack of control over the immediate work process. He

suggested that the third and fourth modes are most important for the blue collar worker, and devoted the major part of his study to a consideration of the variations in control over the immediate activity of work within the different kinds of industry. The form of control he thought to be of central importance is the control over pace of work, which relates to other important factors such as freedom of physical movement, freedom to control the quantity of production, and control over the quality of work.

Meaninglessness, according to Blauner, exists when the employee lacks an understanding of the purpose of his work and its co-ordination with the other aspects of the industry. Under such conditions the worker's ability to act "intelligently" in given situations declines. He has little insight into the interrelations of events, and consequently, little idea of what his work is "for".

Social isolation refers to the feeling of the worker that he does not belong. He is unable or uninterested in identifying with the organization and its goals.

Self-estrangement, alienation from the "inner self", is absent under two conditions: when the work is satisfying in itself, or when the work is integrated with the total life of the individual. Self-estrangement is experienced as a heightened awareness of time with a split between present activity and future considerations. Non-alienated activity

consists in immersion in the present -- total involvement.
Blauner stressed that there is no necessary connection between
social isolation and self-estrangement, so that an individual
might be both satisfied and self-estranged.

Blauner, following Seeman, treated the four modes of
alienation as independent from one another.[26] Marx considered
these four concepts as _aspects_ of alienation, aspects of one
process, inseparable practically and separable only concep-
tually, for the purpose of analysis.[27] It is questionable,
in simple common sense terms, whether these four concepts can
be usefully treated in the way that Blauner and Seeman choose.
With reference to the dimension of meaninglessness, one might
question how a person can be expected to have a sense of pur-
pose in his work if he is subject to all four of the modes of
powerlessness, or even to some of them. If the products he
makes do not belong to him, if he has no influence over
managerial policies, if he cannot control or influence the
conditions of his employment, if he has no say in the pace of
work, how can he possibly have a sense of purpose in his work?
The same holds more clearly with reference to social isolation.
What possible reason could a person have for being interested
in "identifying with the organization and its goals" when the
organization and its goals are irrelevant to him personally,
and he is personally irrelevant to them (i.e., powerless)?
As Blauner defined self-estrangement, the only way in which
work under conditions of powerlessness could be non-alienating,

i.e., be integrated with the total life of the individual,
would be if this powerlessness were to be extended into the
whole life situation of the worker.

One can understand Blauner's failure to see the con-
nection between his modes of alienation as an indication of
his failure to grasp, as Nisbet would say, the "perspective of
alienation". [28] That he did use the concept without compre-
hending the implications of it is evident through casual
remarks he made throughout the book, of the following sort --
"... few people in pre-industrial societies seem to be aliena-
ted (the powerlessness of the masses might be the exception)." [29]
He could as sensibly have said that few people in _industrial_
society seem to be alienated (the powerlessness of the masses
might be the exception), in which case one would question the
purpose for his study on alienation and freedom among blue
collar workers in industrial society, i.e., the masses.

Blauner related the four modes of alienation to an
underlying fragmentation, with each mode representing a dif-
ferent kind of fragmentation. Powerlessness is a split
between the person as subject and object, meaninglessness
between the part and the whole, isolation between the indivi-
dual and social components of human behavior and motivation,
and self-estrangement between the temporal continuity of
experience with activity as a means to an end rather than
being an end in itself.

The relationship between the concepts used by Blauner
can be interpreted in the following manner:

MODES OF ALIENATION	FRAGMENTATION	SYMPTOM OF MODE	POLAR OPPOSITE
powerlessness	subject-object	man as mere object, impotent to control conditions	potency to act, control of conditions
meaninglessness	part-whole	cannot see connection of activity to whole	connectedness
isolation	individual-society	cannot relate self to activity	organic relation
self-estrangement	present-future	activity is means to end	activity is end in itself

I question the relevance of such a classification. In relation to Marx's theory, this classification is a reification of alienation, the supreme irony. There is no reference to the man who treats himself in this fragmentary fashion, nor to the relatedness of these modes of alienation "in reality". Is there not, for example, some connection "in reality" between self-estrangement and subject-object fragmentation, between isolation and being unable to see a connection between one's activity and the "whole"?

The major points made by Blauner are: that each of the dimensions of alienation varies in form and intensity according to the industrial setting; that alienation is distributed unevenly in industrial society; and that the kinds of blue-collar occupations, e.g., assembly-line work (usually

associated with alienation by commentators), include a small proportion of the total work force, something under one fifth. He also points out that, in terms of history, the industrial world is shifting from craft technology to continuous-process technology. What we experience in assembly-lines and in machine-tending jobs is a passing phase in technology. With the development of continuous-process technology many of the problems raised by technology which tend to alienate persons will be solved, but the development is going to take a long while and we must face the problems of the more severely alienating technologies now. His assumption is that workers in continuous-process technology are less alienated than in the other kinds of technology, giving as evidence the fact that they are becoming more like white collar organization men.

That white collar workers are less alienated than blue collar workers is a question that quite a few people would be willing to argue with him, notably Riessman, Fromm, Ericson, and Whyte[30], as well as some students of political alienation.

Blauner's assertion that technological organization as such, is the cause and solution to alienation ignores the contribution of Weber to alienation theory. At best, it is a vulgar interpretation of Marx's notion of economic determinism.[31]

Blauner's attempt to "fuse empirical realism" with
the humanist tradition failed because he did not succeed, in
his theoretical orientation to his empirical data, at freeing
the "whole man" from his "particular function", his role as
employee/employer. By ignoring the first and second modes of
powerlessness (separation from ownership of the means of pro-
duction and the finished product, and the inability to influence
general managerial policies) and concentrating on the third and
fourth modes (lack of control over the conditions of employment,
and lack of control over the immediate work process), Blauner
refrained from questioning the essential power relations, i.e.,
ownership and control of the means of production. By his own
definition, workers remain passive objects. His point that
employers are coming more and more to see the worker as a
human rather than as a part of the machinery is irrelevant.
Firstly, he has not demonstrated that employers ever did "see"
the worker as part of a machine. Marx's contention was that
workers are <u>treated</u> as and treat themselves as objects. It is
quite possible that employees have always "seen" employees as
humans, but the question is, what do they "see" as "human". ✓
He also failed to consider to what extent employers treat
themselves as "part of the machinery". Weber's study of
bureaucracy showed that, with reference to "human" considera-
tions, the bureaucrat is equally as helpless (and perhaps more
so) as the worker to make radical changes in the structure of

societal organization.

The limitations of the "realistic" approach exemplified in Blauner's become obvious through contrasting this approach with another kind of "realism". Compare Blauner's comments:

> A characteristic of machine industry that usually
> contributes to social integration if the large
> number of female employees. Male workers feel
> that their status is higher and that they are
> recognized as more important than the women.
> They have somewhat increased chances for promo-
> tion into the minority of jobs with skill or
> responsibility. Women, who tend to be more
> satisfied than men with the prevailing unskilled
> routine jobs, 'cushion' the occupational floor in
> machine industries, raising the ceiling slightly
> for the men who might otherwise be frustrated in
> low positions. [32]

> People with limited education are most concerned
> with being free from restrictive and oppressive
> conditions. The absence of opportunities to
> develop inner potential, to express idiosyncratic
> abilities, and to assume responsibility and deci-
> sion making functions may not be a source of
> serious discontent to most workers today. For this
> reason, empirical studies show that the majority of
> industrial workers are satisfied with their work
> and with their jobs. [33]

with those of Virginia Woolf and Arthur Quiller-Couch:

> The news of my legacy reached me one night about
> the same time that the act was passed that gave
> votes to women.... Of the two -- the vote and the
> money -- the money, I own, seemed infinitely the
> more important. Before that I had made my living
> by cadging odd jobs from newspapers, by reporting
> a donkey show here or a wedding there; I had earned
> a few pounds by addressing envelopes, reading to old
> ladies, making artificial flowers, teaching the
> alphabet to small children in a kindergarten. Such
> were the chief occupations open to women before 1928.
> I need not, I am afraid, describe in any detail the
> hardiness of the work, for you know perhaps women who
> have done it; nor the difficulty of living on the

money when it was earned, for you may have tried.
But what still remains with me a worse infliction
than either was the poison of fear and bitterness
which those days bred in me, To begin with,
always to be doing work that one did not wish to
do, and to do it like a slave, flattering and
fawning, not always necessarily perhaps, but it
seemed necessary and the stakes were too great to
run risks; and then the thought of that one gift
which was death to hide -- a small one but dear to
the possessor -- perishing and with it myself, my
soul -- all this became like a rust eating away the
bloom of the spring, destroying the tree at its
heart. However, as I say, my aunt died; and
whenever I change a tenshilling note a little of
that rust and corrosion is rubbed off; fear and
bitterness go. Indeed, I thought, slipping the
silver into my purse; it is remarkable, remem-
bering the bitterness of those days, what a change
of temper a fixed income will bring about. No
force in the world can take from me my five hundred
pounds. Food, house and clothing are mine forever.
Therefore not merely do effort and labour cease,
but also hatred and bitterness. I need not hate
any man; he cannot hurt me. I need not flatter any
man; he has nothing to give me.... In a year or
two ... the greatest release of all came, which is
the freedom to think of things in themselves....
Indeed, my aunt's legacy unveiled the sky to me....

<div align="right">34</div>

Virginia Woolf

What are the great poetical names of the last
hundred years or so? Coleridge, Wordsworth, Byron,
Shelley, Zandor, Keats, Tennyson, Browning, Arnold,
Morris, Rossetti, Swinburne -- we may stop there.
Of these, all but Keats, Browning, Rossetti were
University men; and of these three, Keats, who died
young, cut off in his prime, was the only one who
was not fairly well to do. It may seem a brutal
thing to say, and it is a sad thing to say; but,
as a matter of hard fact, the theory that poetical
genius bloweth where it listeth, and equally in
poor and rich, holds little truth. As a matter of
hard fact, nine out of those twelve men were Uni-
versity men: which means that somehow or other they
procured the means to get the best education England
can give.... The Poor Poet has not in these days,
nor has he had for two hundred years, a dog's chance.
Believe me -- and I have spent a great part of ten

years in watching some three hundred and twenty
elementary schools -- we may prate of democracy,
but actually, a poor child in England has little
more hope than had the son of an Athenian slave
to be emancipated into the intellectual freedom
of which great writings are born.

Arthur Quiller-Couch [35]

The two statements made by Blauner are "realistic" --
His ideas about women and about the uneducated are backed up
by empirical studies which have been done. But so are the
quotations from Woolf and Quiller-Couch "realistic" -- one the
description of a personal experience of a woman in the economic
sphere, and the other an evaluation, based on experience and
observation, of the chances of working class boys.

What distinguishes the two kinds of "realism" is the
way in which the observer is prepared to interpret his "facts",
his "empirical evidence". The kind of "realism" which asks us
to "face up to necessity" has to be examined for the assumed
content of "necessity". If the assumption is that what is,
necessarily is, the approach cannot be considered a scientific
one and is, instead, the approach of the natural historian who
accepts "what is" as given and attempts to classify objects
within this framework. Marx hypothesized that alienation is
related to class relations, and Weber's work served to strengthen
the hypothesis. Contemporary students of alienation in America
have not considered alienation in relation to Marx's "classes"
nor in relation to Weber's "social stratification". They have,
in the main, assumed that some form of stratification is a

necessary aspect of human social life, and have failed to distinguish this possibility from the notion that the parti-cular kind of social stratification that we now have is a necessary aspect of human social life.

In his discussion of man's relation to his work, the central theme of Blauner's book, he rejected Marx's contention that "as soon as no physical or other compulsion exists, labor is shunned like the plague". He rejected it on the grounds that both observation and research have disproven it. The research cited by him to support his position consists of the fact that 80% of a national sample said they would keep working if they inherited enough money to live comfortably. In order to be meaningful, this kind of data would have to be balanced by a study of those who are independently wealthy; of how they spend their time and, if they work, what kind of work they do and for what reasons. Otherwise the data is not amenable to meaningful interpretation, because a person living in one social environment cannot say with reliability what he would or would not do given different conditions with which he is not at present familiar. Blauner's observation that "even in the most unalienated conditions, work is never totally pleasurable; in fact, the freest work, that of the writer or artist, usually involves long periods of virtual self-torture" [36] indicates his neglect of Marx's distinction between voluntary and forced labor, one of the essential distinctions in alienation theory.

Blauner also supported his position by referring to

the fact that in America there is little class consciousness
in the Marxian sense, and that class consciousness is replaced
by job consciousness. As Landecker[37] has argued, class con-
sciousness is a concept referring to a complex phenomenon, and
the fact that class consciousness is virtually non-existent
does not, as Blauner seems to have assumed, imply that there
no objective problems of class in America. The "satisfaction"
indicated by workers with their position may be an indication
of their ignorance of any real alternatives, such awareness of
alternatives being one of the basic requisites for class con-
sciousness.[38]

Blauner assumed that alienation is a modern problem
brought about by the large-scale organizations and impersonal
bureaucracies in industrial societies. To limit alienation to
this modern setting and interpret it within the framework of
industrial society is misleading. It ignored the larger
question posed by Marx of the relation between man and his
species characteristic, and results in a loss of awareness of
the basic issue inherent in the concept of alienation. In
Marx's theory, it is whole men who happen to fulfill the func-
tional role of manager (particular function) and other whole
men who happen to fulfill the functional role of worker (par-
ticular function) who alienate themselves as whole men from
their common species characteristic of "free, conscious
activity", through their relations as particular functions.

All empirical information gained about men and their
relations with one another has implications relative to the
values that men have; and all social scientists who gather
this information bring into their study values and assumptions
about men, which influence the kind of data they organize and
the way in which it is organized. Many social scientists are
willing to pay lip service to this fact, and yet are able to
see "society" as a thing independent of men, their values and
their methods of organizing. In the American school, at least,
and especially in the area of social stratification and bureau-
cratic organization, the tendency of social scientists is to
present information in such a way that the structure they are
describing appears to be not only fact, but fact independent
of particular historical material conditions, particular modes
of thought, particular values held by men who perpetuate the
organization. As Alvin Gouldner has summarized:

> For the iron law of wages, which maintained that
> workers could never improve their material stan-
> dards of life, some sociologists have substituted
> the iron law of oligarchy, which declares that
> men cannot improve their political standards of
> life. Woven to a great extent out of theoretical
> whole cloth, much of the discussion of bureaucracy
> and of organizational needs seems to have provided
> a screen onto which some intellectuals have pro-
> jected their own despair and pessimism, reinforcing
> the despair of others. Perhaps the situation can
> be illuminated with an analogy. For many years
> now infantile paralysis has killed and maimed
> scores of people. For many years also doctors,
> biologists, and chemists have been searching for
> the causes and cure of this disease. Consider the
> public reaction if, instead of reporting on their
> newest vaccines, these scientists had issued the
> following announcement: 'We have not reached any

conclusions concerning the causes of the disease,
nor has our research investigated defenses
against it. The public seems to have perfec-
tionist aspirations of flawless health, they
have "utopian" illusions concerning the possi-
bilities of immortality and it is this -- not
the disease -- that is the danger against which
the public needs to be armed. We must remember
that the human animal is not immortal and that
for definite reasons his lifespan is finite.' 39

Gouldner concluded that these men would be castigated for

"having usurped the prerogatives and functions of clergymen".

Of central relevance to contemporary work on aliena-

tion is Marx's insight into the relations between men's notions

of what should be and the actual lives they lead. For Marx,

ideas about what should be are as open to question as are the

societal institutions to which they refer. His alienation

theory assumes that men create themselves (both their values

and organizations) in their daily activity, and poses the

questions: created by whom, of what, for what, and for whom.

If men create themselves and their world, they do so by their

nature as a species of animal. Since they create out of this

"nature", they "should" make decisions with reference to this

"nature". This is the only "should" necessarily implied in

Marx's theory of alienation. His specific suggestions for

political action do not logically follow from and are not

necessary to his analysis. If we relegate this "should" to

the status of just one more value-judgment, none of us can

answer for our sanity because to do so is to relegate the affir-

mation of life to the status of just one more value-judgment.

3. ALIENATION AS EXPERIENCE AND CONDITIONS OF ALIENATION

Kaufman's definition of alienation as being dependent upon both beliefs and objective social conditions leads to a distinction that has been made only recently, between alienation as it is felt or experienced and the conditions which produce this feeling. A large section of the literature on alienation has been devoted to attempts to describe the experience and to measure it, with very little attention paid to conditions producing the feeling. According to Kaufman, the feeling of alienation is a product of the interaction between beliefs and objective social conditions, both of which are to some extent arbitrary, and therefore open to question. Beliefs can be examined independently of objective conditions and objective conditions can be examined independently of beliefs, and the interaction between them can be studied.

Some of the work that has been done on political alienation examines the reasonableness of political beliefs and expectations. Reissman & Maccoby[40] and Levin & Eden[41] consider the possibility that political alienation is realistic and not due to some anti-social characteristic or psychological defect of the votor.[42] With reference to the American ethic of realism, Reissman & Maccoby suggest that "often, 'realism' becomes no more than the opposite of idealism, reasonableness, or morality".[43] They suggest that feelings of helplessness are realistic in face of questions about real

social problems such as "what can you do about nuclear war?"

Levin and Eden, in a discussion of "Political Strategy for the Alienated Voter" suggested,

> In some political situations, the views of aliena-
> ted voters are correct. Their alienation is
> testimony to their powers of rational perception.[44]

Aside from the fact that their use of "alienation" is more representative of Durkheim's "anomie" than of Marx's use, they raise a point that is relevant to this study.

According to Levin and Eden, the political expectations of the "alienated" which are not being realized are: the right to be politically effective, the ability to cast a vote based on adequate information, and government by due process of law without recourse to bribery.[45] The question of the reasonableness of these expectations is dependent upon, aside from the possibility of them being able to be realized, whether the expectations are more highly valued by people than are the existing institutions. Most of the articles in periodicals imply that their authors see alienation as a "fault" of the individual, a problem that he has with facing the reality of existing institutions.[46] They assume that it is easier to change the beliefs and expectations of people so that these beliefs are in line with existing institutions than it is to change institutions so that they are in line with beliefs and expectations. Both Riessman and Maccoby, and Levin and Eden question this assumption, suggesting a more critical attitude toward existing institutions.

Many studies have been done on objective social
conditions conducive to alienation, with major focus on working
conditions.[47] The central factor relating to alienation that
has emerged out of these studies is that of organization, both
physical and interpersonal. Weber's work on bureaucracy pio-
neered the way for a good deal of critical evaluation of large-
scale, highly stratified, impersonal organizations, with
emphasis on how these organizations are conducive to aliena-
tion.[48] A few writers, however, have been interested in
studying the positive effects of organization. Neal and
Seeman[49], for example, have pointed out that organization
mediates between the isolated potentially powerless individual
and the massive state. One might question their idea of
"isolated potentially powerless individual" versus "massive
state", but their work does remind us that it is not organiza-
tion as such which is alienating, but certain kinds of organi-
zation. The only extensive attempt to delineate different
kinds of organizations and their relation to alienation has
been done by Robert Blauner in his study of Alienation and
Freedom, discussed earlier.[50] Regardless of his questionable
interpretations of his data, Blauner's attempt to distinguish
and make comparisons between different kinds of organization
is an important step in the study of alienating conditions.

Goffman[51] has studied some aspects of interpersonal
organization which are conducive to alienation. He related

alienation to lack of spontaneity in conversation, and
asserted that, in our present society, alienation is the rule
and spontaneous conversation the exception. Goffman listed
four modes of alienation, or barriers to spontaneous conversa-
tion: self-consciousness, external preoccupation, interaction
consciousness, and other-consciousness. The effect of these
barriers is to prevent people from paying attention to the
content of conversation or the activity going on. Goffman did
not probe into the reasons for these barriers, beyond describing
the superficial connections between them and individual motiva-
tion. For example, interaction-consciousness is grounded in
feelings of responsibility on the part of persons for things
to go well. [52]

Helen Lynd, in On Shame and the Search for Identity[53],
did probe more deeply into these forms of awareness, and con-
cluded that they may be illuminating rather than alienating
experiences, depending on how the person experiencing them is
able to cope with his awareness. The forms of consciousness
considered by Goffman are forms of exposure of social life, and
these exposures are generally accompanied by feelings of shame
and guilt. It is the experience of shame and guilt that Lynd
found interesting and, contradicting Goffman's conclusion, saw
them as potential clues to identity.

Of those who have studied alienating conditions,
sociologists have been more concerned with studying physical
organization and especially with reference to work situations.

Studies of interpersonal organization have been done mainly
by social psychiatrists and psychologists, often with no
reference to alienation as a concept describing the phenomena
with which they deal. A consideration of these people's work
and the relevance of it to the study of alienation would con-
stitute a thesis in itself. Within the limitations of my
work, I can only make short reference to theirs.

The success of Ericson's therapeutic approach[54] sug-
gests that men are in fact whole men, and that they treat
themselves as particular functions with reference to their
symbolic systems. The power of the individual to create
himself and the fact that he does so in terms of his personal
emotional relations with others is illustrated in Bettleheim's
study of "Joey, the Mechanical Boy"[55]. The conformity studies
of Asch show the vulnerability of the individual to "group
consensus", and his dependence upon information about the
situation in which he finds himself.[56] Group therapy techniques
illustrate how very much more successful is personality change
when it is carried on "communally" rather than by techniques
oriented toward "isolated" individuals.[57] Studies of sensory
deprivation and of feral men indicate that, except in a very
crude sense (i.e., as objectively distinct biological organism),
there is no such thing as an "isolated" individual in reality.[58]
That "individual" is an abstraction from reality, as is
"society", cannot be denied in the light of the results of

these studies. They indicate that "man" is a concept including very complex relations among the human organism, physical environment, and social organization. All of these studies, as well as many others on perception, when related together, upset radically our traditional assumptions about man, and raise the question of whether we "know" (knowledge here being used as formalized systematic explanation) anything about <u>him</u>, as man.

4. MAN AS PROBABLE AND MAN AS POSSIBLE

In attempting to understand alienation, one is continually thrown back to the question of man as man, indepently of particular cultures and particular times. The myths of Society and Prometheus outlined in my Introduction can be looked at within another framework: that of man as probable (relating to the myth of Society) and man as possible (relating to the myth of Prometheus). An interesting relation between the two "views" of man is uncovered in this framework.

The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines "possible" as "that can exist, be done or happen", and "probable" as "that may be expected to happen or prove true, likely".[59] Statistically, these two concepts are usually applied to events within a static frame of reference, such that the most probable event is that event which is most likely to occur, measured by the ratio of the favourable cases to the whole number of possible cases.[60] The relationship between the two concepts is such

that an event must be possible in order for it to be considered to have some probability: the major interest being focused on "probability" rather than on "possibility". If these two concepts are considered within the framework of change over time, the relationship between them is transformed, not statistically, but in reality. With this transformation, the fact that the probability of the occurrence of events is constantly conditioned by the emergence of new possibilities becomes the major focus of interest. It is the emergence of new possibilities that transforms the world of man. An example of such an event is the invention of the phonetic alphabet, a tremendous improvement on syllable-writing and picture writing. As Hogben noticed,

> Writing by alphabet-signs for the separate consonant and vowel sounds in a syllable has turned up once and once only in history. The possibility is not by any means obvious; and it is doubtful if it could have happened in more than one way. [61]

Not only man's inventions, but man himself can be seen in these terms. Man, as a species of life, was one of many possible species of life, but having occurred, became a probable event in the world, and a necessary condition for new possibilities. His particular life as a human animal is also one of many possibilities. Social psychologists and psychiatrists have come to recognize that men, as biological organisms, are active non-directed creatures. Direction and peculiarly human life are gained in organized social life. Direction and, consequently, probable behavior, are conditioned by the

particular possibilities which are historically created or which emerge over time in society.[62] What is a mere possibility at one "stage" in time becomes a necessary condition for possibilities at another "stage", and the probability of events is conditional upon the emergence of new possibilities.

This temporal relationship between possibilities and probabilities is an important one when the possibilities and probabilities that we are considering relate directly to man. One can easily make a mistake, when viewing society as a static organization, of seeing the events occurring in it as necessary, not only with reference to the static situation being considered, but over time as well. When one considers events to be necessary and inevitable one dismisses from consideration events which are improbable given "things as they are" in an abstract (static) representation of the actual world. But dismissal from consideration does not dismiss them from the actual world, and in the actual world change occurs in terms of a relationship between probable events and possible events, between the "old" and the "new".

Relating this back to alienation theory, Petrovic, following the line of Marx's thought suggested that "man really is man when there is no split between his essence and his factual existence",[63] and defined man's essence as "historically created human possibility", such that "man is at one with himself if he stands on the level of his possibilities". He distinguished between human and inhuman possibilities, an

example of the latter being a war criminal. With reference to
the fact that, biologically, the human animal is non-directed,
Petrovic's notion of human and inhuman possibilities is
revealed as a humanist oriented value-judgment. While agree-
ing with him that man's "essence" is "historically created
human possibility", and that there can be no expression of
human "nature" apart from historically created human values,
it seems important that we recognize both humane and inhumane
expressions of human "nature" as human possibilities. If we
want to maintain the value of alienation theory we must extri-
cate it from 19C humanism, and recognize that, as a biologi-
cally non-directed creature, man is ethically neutral. It is
only with reference to ethical neutrality that we can meaning-
fully speak of man as having a natural capacity to make
choices, and it is with reference to man's capacity to choose
his "essence" that alienation theory is applicable in the
contemporary world.

De Jouvenel [64], while recognizing the difficulties
involved in Utopian ideals, did not abandon the belief in
people being able to work toward them. He suggested that
Utopian ideas which are simple fantasy be separated from
ideas which can be realized and which are labelled Utopian
on the grounds that they are not now being realized. His
major point is that to bring Utopias into existence we have
to think of daily life in all its aspects instead of pro-
ceeding analytically from a few accepted premises. Here again

we hear the echo of Marx's voice, with his insistence on
examining practical daily life for clues to the factors con-
ditioning the behavior of men. But where Marx stressed
economic organization as the essential factor, de Jouvenel
cautions us to look at all daily activity.

The development from Marx to people like Petrovic
and de Jouvenel is a subtle but a profound one. The realiza-
tion and self-control of our species characteristic within
the humanist orientation has come gradually to be seen less
as something which is inevitable or even highly probable, and
more as one possibility. But we can carry this development
much farther. I would like to suggest that alienation theory,
as formulated by Marx, does not have as its central concern
man's realization of his humane capacities, but is centrally
oriented toward, and has its lasting value with reference to,
man's relation to the species characteristic which dis-
tinguishes him as human apart from other forms of life. I
would further suggest that Marx's 19C humanist orientation
has been maintained by contemporary thinkers while his socio-
logical analysis has been ignored. I suggest, as well, that
his notion of alienation is dependent upon his awareness of sci-
entific methodology, i.e., on the notion that we can discover
lawful relations in the world and can use our knowledge of
these relations to create new possibilities. The misunder-
standing of Marx's theory is related to a general misunder-
standing of scientific methodology, a misunderstanding

outlined by Weber in his discussion of increasing rationaliza-
tion in our culture.

We do not, through "discovering" laws of the universe,
come to control the universe. What we do, through the use of
these laws, is to control our human environment by creating
new "objects" out of our knowledge of these laws. We control
ourselves in doing this. Certainly, we influence small areas
of the universe -- our own planet -- and possibly will
influence larger areas in the future, but the major referent
of our scientific methodology is ourselves. The development
of uses of atomic energy and our recent growing understanding
of how life lives are the proof of this. Our major concern
with reference to this knowledge is how we are going to affect
ourselves through using it.

With our scientific methodology we relate our common
experience of the physical world to models that we construct
of relations between objects in the physical universe, and we
transform our common experience with reference to this relation.
If we are going to apply this method to human society, we have
to relate our common experience of the social (physical) world
to models of the social, and expect our common experience to
be transformed.

In the physical sciences common experience acts as
a standard against which our models can be tested, and our
models act as a standard against which our common experience
can be tested. Marx's alienation theory, insofar as it

hypothesizes a relationship between man's common experience of himself and models of his species characteristic, is a testable hypothesis which can be referred back to common experience. This theory of alienation is a small first step in getting beyond our "cultural screen", our assumption that we "know" ourselves. The theory specifies the factors that we can study in order to begin to "know" ourselves.

George Herbert Mead also assumed a "species characteristic" and, in his discussion of it, suggested a method by which we can study the factors specified by Marx, comparable to the scientific method used in physical sciences, i.e., a method based upon the scientific attitude of doubt and systematic exploration, which takes us outside of the attitude with which we perpetuate the myth of Society.

CHAPTER IV

THE RESOLUTION OF ALIENATION IN THE THEORY OF
GEORGE HERBERT MEAD

Before entering into a discussion of Mead's theory,
I would like to summarize the development that I have intended
to this point. In Chapter I, discussing the change in usage
of the concept "alienation" from Hegel to Marx, I suggested
that Hegel's work could be characterized as a "natural history"
of the mind while Marx was attempting a scientific explanation
of human society. I separated Marx's alienation theory from
a political context for analytical purposes, arguing that the
analysis of alienation is logically connected neither with
Marx's discussion of worker as alienated and non-worker as
alienator nor with his political theory following from this
discussion. I interpreted his definition of alienation as
the separation between "whole man" and his "species characteris-
tic of "free, conscious activity" through the medium of "forced
labor". I argued that it is consistent with his general theory
of the relations among man, community and society to understand
alienation as the activity of man as a whole, both "workers"
and "non-workers" contributing to this alienation; and
concluded that with this interpretation the question of blame
becomes irrelevant for sociological analysis and how man
alienates himself becomes the moot question.

With the question of how man alienates himself in
mind, I went on to discuss some of Weber's ideas as

contributions to alienation theory. I interpreted Weber's
description of increasing rationalization in Western civiliza-
tion, with reference to Marx's theory of alienation, as a
description of the development in Western society of "forced
labor", i.e., the means, both "objective" as rationalization
of institutions and "subjective" as intellectual rationaliza-
tion, by which man treats himself as a "particular function"
in contemporary society. Weber's description of kinds of
authority as justifications of power relations based on fear
and hope strengthened Marx's argument that "natural society",
"illusory community", is an irrational form of organization
with respect to man's relation to his species characteristic.
I criticised Weber's normative approach to the analysis of
society as failing to consider Marx's thesis that these
normative societies are the means by which man alienates him-
self.

In my discussion of contemporary alienation theory
in America, I applied the same criticism as to Weber's approach,
and suggested that contemporary definitions of alienation more
closely approximate Durkheim's concept of "anomie" as developed
by Robert Merton.

Relating George Herbert Mead's thought to Marx's
theory of alienation, I refer again to Chapter One and my dis-
cussion of Marx. Mead did not use "alienation" in his analysis
of human society, but his theory can be applied to the study of
alienation as defined by Marx.

Marx drew our attention to practice as the expression
by man of his species characteristic. Mannheim, considering
the possibility of a science of politics, noted

> If we seek a science of that which is in the
> process of becoming, of practice and for
> practice, we can realize it only by discovering
> a new framework in which this kind of knowledge
> can find adequate expression. 1

His observation holds true with reference not only to politics,
but to all forms of human activity.

In this chapter I would like to discuss Mead's work
as the "discovery" or creation of a new framework of the sort
Mannheim envisaged. His three major works, Philosophy of the
Act, Philosophy of the Present, and Mind, Self and Society,[2]
centre around the common theme of what characterizes man as a
species of animal distinct from other life forms. Mead did
not use the phrase "species characteristic", but it is a
phrase adequate to describe the subject of his work, and serves
as a conceptual link between his theory and that of Marx.

Of the two works to which I will refer in this
chapter, Mind, Self and Society is devoted to a description
of the process of human socialization, i.e., humanization, and
of the relation of man to society. In The Philosophy of the
Present Mead outlined his theory of the relationship between
mind and sensory experience.

1.   MEAD'S PHILOSOPHY OF THE PRESENT

In the development of his philosophy Mead referred
to Einstein's Relativity Theory, and created his theory in

terms of the four dimensional time-space perspective suggested
by Einstein's work rather than within the traditional three-
dimensional Newtonian "timeless" spacial perspective. Marx,
in his theory of society, anticipated this four-dimensional
perspective, but he had no formal philosophical theory of the
universe; and his discussion of man's relation to the
physical universe suggests that he assumed, "in the back of
his mind", a three-dimensional Newtonian universe. [3] The most
basic difference, with relation to my discussion of alienation,
between the two universes rests in the fact that, while in the
Newtonian universe everything can be reduced to concrete enti-
ties and their interrelations, in the Einsteinian one, every-
thing is reduced to transformations of energy so that concrete
entities are "concrete" and "entities" only in a relative sense.
A "thing" may be concrete with reference to one system (one set
of relations between elements) and lose its "thing-ness" with
reference to another. For example, an "organism" in one
system is a "constellation" of atoms in another and an organi-
zation of energy transformations in a third. The reality of
these different systems in which "things" are located is
demonstrated by, for example, the effects of atomic reactions
upon organic life and, in turn, the effects of organic life
(man) on physical systems, as in the splitting of the atom.
Philosophers have in the past questioned matter, but with
Einstein's theory we have for the first time a science which

questions it, and which explains a way in which matter and
energy are equivalent.

Mead's understanding of Einstein's theory is basic to
his social·philosophy. In attempting to explain the fact of
the occurrence of different systems and their interrelations,
and the common experience of them by men, Mead developed three
fundamental concepts, most clearly stated in a set of four
lectures delivered to the American Philosophical Association
in 1930 at Berkeley. These lectures have been included in a
book published posthumously, The Philosophy of the Present.
These concepts, "the present", "sociality" and "emergent", are
important keys to understanding his theory about human society.

The Present

The present, according to Mead, is the "locus of
reality".[4] It is in the present that we experience, our
experience occurs via our senses, and it is to this sensuous
experiencing in the present that thought refers. Mead sugges-
ted that thought (abstraction) which "leads to a metaphysical
separation of what is abstracted from the concrete reality
from which the abstraction is made", is "improper use" of "a
tool", the proper use of which is "intellectual control of that
reality".[5] One must be careful here, as with Marx's relating
of thought to "practice", not to mistake this idea as
scientism gone mad. The poet, the painter, the composer of
music, all use abstraction for the control of the particular

"perspective"⑥ of reality with which they deal. The perspective of the philosopher is intellectual, and it was toward philosophical thought that Mead directed this argument.

Pasts and futures, in reality, arise out of present experience, and

> the different pasts of experience are (not) subjective reinterpretations (of) a past which is independent of that or any present".7

Mead was arguing here with the interpretation of our changing human history which assumes one real world of which we have partial knowledge, which we "subjectively" reinterpret as we develop new tools (e.g., techniques of studying geological evidence of former human societies). This interpretation of human history assumes a "metaphysical separation" between subjective interpretation and the "concrete reality" to which it refers. To this position, he replied that

> ... a reality that transcends the present must exhibit itself in the present. This alternative is that found in the attitude of the research scientist, whether he confesses it in his doctrine or not.8

How clearly we can hear the voice of Marx over the span of one hundred years --

> Do not let us go back to a fictitious primordial condition.... Such a primordial condition explains nothing; it merely pushes the question away into a grey nebulous distance. It assumes in the form of a fact, of an event, what the economist (sic scientist) is supposed to deduce -- namely, the necessary relationship between two things -- between, for example, division of labor and exchange. Theology in the same way explains the origin of evil by the fall of man; that is, it

> assumes as a fact, in historical form, what has to
> be explained.
> We proceed from an economic fact of the present.9

The similarity between Mead's differentiation of "abstractions

leading to the metaphysical separation of what is abstracted

from the concrete reality from which the abstraction is made"

and knowledge used as a tool for intellectual control of reality;

and Marx's concepts of reification and objectification, is

striking. Rather than speaking of "true" and "false" knowledge,

Mead distinguished between proper and improper use of a tool.

The differences between their respective ideas about uses of

knowledge are equally as striking. Marx left the relation

between subject and object pretty much as an assumption in his

work. That he assumed, as did Mead, the boundaries between

subject and object to be conventional, is indicated in his dis-

cussion of the difference between "civil man" and "whole man".

His idea was that civil man is conventional (i.e., arbitrary),

but whole man is not. Mead did not make this kind of bifurca-

tion, and treated the conventional in a conservative manner.

To give an example illustrating his argument: the

scientific method is used to discover relations that hold

regardless of particular occurrences in particular presents,

e.g., the laws of gravity and of optics; yet these discoveries

are made under definite conditions within particular presents.

A biologist studying the DNA molecule is at the same time

sitting in a laboratory looking through a microscope, or

perhaps staring at a wall across the room, thinking. His

activity is also related to other presents in which he will relate his discoveries to other scientists,in which tests will be carried out on animals relative to his discoveries, and in which new life forms may appear as a "result" of these particular activities in particular presents. The biologist's theory (if he creates one) transcends particular presents, but is created, proved valid, and used, in particular presents.

The ultimate implication of Mead's argument, in contrast with the notion of "subjective reinterpretation" of an external (objective) reality, is that both the "subjective" and the "objective" aspects of human life emerge in presents, together and in relation to one another, as a means of locating the organism in the present. Mead argued that our ability to classify experience into subject-object dichotomies is learned through our involvement in human society, via the "significant symbol". (10)

Mead observed that the past is "as hypothetical as the future". [11] He did not mean by this that we can wilfully re-create the past, changing what has happened and causing something else to occur.

> ...The irrevocability of the past event remains even if we are uncertain what the past event was....
> It may be thinkable that viewed from some vast distance the order of some of what we call the same events might differ in different perspectives, but within any perspective what has passed cannot recur.... There is an unalterable temporal direction in what is taking place.... In general, since passage is itself given in experience, the direction of changes that are going on partly conditions what will take place. [12]

The hypothetical nature of 'both past and future is a condition of our knowledge.

> The event that has taken place and the direction of
> the process going on form the basis for the rational
> determination of the future. The irrevocable past
> and the occurring change are the two factors to
> which we tie up all our speculations in regard to
> the future. 13

Both past and future <u>are</u> only <u>for</u> us in our experience in the present.

Knowledge has here been related to "reality" in a peculiar way. Mead saw it as an aspect of the individual (self's) relations in the world, as a process occurring within the more inclusive process of living. As such it is both part of the individual's equipment for survival, and is an aspect of "reality", the natural universe. Because it is both an aspect of the natural universe and a tool "belonging" to individuals, people can use it deliberately to influence themselves in the natural universe. The difficulty that we have in recognizing knowledge as an ongoing process in present activity arises from the fact that

> ... the emergent has no sooner appeared than we set
> about rationalizing it, that is, we undertake to
> show that it, or at least the conditions that deter-
> mine its appearance, can be found in the past that
> lay behind it. Thus the earlier pasts out of which
> it emerged as something which did not involve it are
> taken up into a more comprehensive past that does
> lead up to it. 14

Mead argued that conditions necessary for the occurrence of an event are necessary <u>after the fact</u>.

> ... In our use of the term irrevocability we are
> pointing toward what must have been, and it is a
> structure and process in the present which is the
> source of this necessity.... The force of irrevoca-
> bility then is found in the extension of the neces-
> sity with which what has just happened conditions
> what is emerging in the future. [15]

We only begin to trace necessary conditions for the occurrence

of a phenomenon when there is something about that phenomenon

which is new to us. The necessary conditions which we "dis-

cover" arise out of the perspective that we take relative to

the phenomenon, and this perspective arises out of a (believed,

perceived, conceived, experienced) contradiction between what

we were prepared to experience on the basis of our knowledge

of the world in the past and what we experience in the present.

If we experienced no new things, things for which we are not

prepared, we would have no notion of past, present or future.

All would simply be; nothing would be becoming.

> ... where being is existence but not becoming there
> is no past, and ... the determination involved in
> passage is a condition of a past but not its realiza-
> tion. [16]

Mead's treatment of the concept "knowledge" is not a unique

one, but follows the line of argument posited by C. H. Peirce,

who did not accept the conventional separation of "belief" and

"knowledge". Peirce reduced all knowledge to opinion (belief),

commenting that "It now begins to look strongly as if perhaps

all belief might involve expectation as its essence"[17], and

suggesting that the purpose of an explanation is "the estab-

lishment of a habit of positive expectations that shall not

be disappointed".[18] We generally tend to regard opinion and

belief with suspicion, and to trust knowledge, as e.g., scien-

tific knowledge. But, contended Peirce,

> the sole object of inquiry (reasoning) is the
> settlement of opinion. We may fancy that this
> is not enough for us, and that we seek, not
> merely an opinion, but a true opinion. But put
> this fancy to the test, and it proves groundless;
> for as soon as a firm belief is reached we are
> entirely satisfied, whether the belief be true
> or false. [19]

If we reject, for example, theological explanations and accept

scientific ones, we are not exchanging "mere opinion" for "true

opinion", but are changing the criteria for acceptable opinion,

on the grounds that opinion (knowledge) based on the scienti-

fic method has proved, by experience over time, to be less

"disappointing" than theological explanations. Mead accepted

Pierce's "pragmatic" theory of knowledge, and used it as a

basis for his theory of society.

The Emergent

In the discussion of Mead's notion of "present" as

the center of reality, with reference to which pasts and

futures are created, we saw that the present is characterized

by novelty, and that the occurrence of novelty is necessary

for our recognition of past-present-future. Very crudely, he

has simply argued that we can recognize change only because

change occurs. Change occurs in the present, and is the

occurrence of emergent events.

> The chief reference of a present is to the emergent
> event, i.e., to the occurrence of something which

> is more than the processes that have led up to it
> and which by its change, continuance, or disap-
> pearance, adds to later passages a content they
> would not otherwise have possessed. [20]

We recognize emergents against the background of our knowledge

of the world. They appear as unique events which can neither

be predicted from the knowledge we have before their appearance

nor be reduced to the elements out of which they emerged. To

understand the appearance of a unique event we create a past

by which we can explain its emergence, and in doing this, in

"discovering" the necessary conditions of its emergence, we

create a future as well.

> Given an emergent event, its relations to antecedent
> processes become conditions or causes. Such a situa-
> tion is a present. It marks out and in a sense
> selects what has made its peculiarity possible. It
> creates with its uniqueness a past and a future. As
> soon as we view it, it becomes a history and a pro-
> phecy. Its own temporal diameter varies with the
> extent of the event. [21]

An emergent, then, can have a greater or lesser effect on the

world, depending on its relation to other events. Its "tem-

poral diameter" emerges with the event. This notion is

extremely interesting when applied to cultural change. An

individual (e g Aristotle) lives in a particular time and place

and the reach of his influence as a living organism is limited

by that time and space, but through his ability to use language

(as significant symbols) he can have an influence on other

individuals in different times and places, thousands of years

after he no longer lives.

Mead held that pasts and futures are located in mind

which belongs to organisms, "to emergent events whose nature involves the tendency to maintain themselves" through "adjustment looking toward a past, and selective sensitivity looking toward a future".[22] Mind is an aspect of this maintenance, and is itself an emergent. It resides neither within nor outside of the organism, but emerges in the social process of life which includes both the organism and its environment. The existence of an organism is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the emergence of mind. Feral men exemplify living organisms with no "mind".

With mind, the organism is able to transcend the sensuous present of its existence.

> The field of mind ... is the larger environment which the activity of the organism calls for but which transcends the present. [23]

> ... The field of mind is a temporal extension of the environment of the organism.... [24]

Mead treated mind as a phenomenon of the natural world, denying that inanimate bodies are more "natural" than animate ones, and suggesting that mind is a natural property of some animate bodies.

He contrasted the study of animate and inanimate bodies, not in terms of the one being more "real" or "natural" than the other, but in terms of the different perspectives required for their understanding. The perspective required for the understanding of inanimate bodies rejects "form" and environment as explanatory devices.

> No transformation affects the reality of the
> physical system.... The essential feature of
> the doctrine (relativity theory) has been that
> reality does not lie in the form -- for there
> may be endless transformations -- but in the
> matter, mass or energy.... The particular form
> of an inanimate body is irrelevant to 'what it
> is'. For such bodies the environment is as
> unessential as the object. [25]

The·process of life cannot be understood with this perspective,
but requires one which recognizes as necessary for the explana-
tion of life, the relation between form and environment.

> We find in the living form an individual thing
> that maintains itself through the mutual deter-
> mination of the form and its environment. [26]

The process of life involves the interaction of the living
thing with the things around it so that the "process of life
as really confers character upon the environment as it does
upon the plant or the animal". [27]

Mead argued that life emerged out of non-life,· and
human life emerged out of animal life, all natural processes;
and that once the "event" emerged it could not be explained
by the same perspective with which the former state of affairs
could be explained. Emergent events such as life and mind
implies the emergence of new "social" systems, which interact
with the old, changing the whole character of "reality".

Mead defined mind in such a way that it is peculiar
to man. Communication via significant symbols distinguishes
mind as the capacity of the human organism deliberately to
affect itself and its environment. Mind is not a constant in
human life, and is not identical with the occurrence of selves

(persons).

> The unity of the mind is not identical with the
> unity of the self. The unity of the self is con-
> stituted by the unity of the entire relational
> pattern of social behavior and experience in
> which the individual is implicated, and which is
> reflected in the structure of the self; but many
> aspects or features of this entire pattern do not
> enter into the consciousness, so that the unity
> of the mind is in a sense an abstraction from the
> more inclusive unity of the self. [28]

The person is self-conscious when he takes a perspective which
includes himself as one of the objects in his awareness. Only
when the person is self-conscious can he <u>deliberately</u> affect
himself. He can affect himself without deliberation through
deliberately affecting his environment without consciously
including himself as part of that environment. Mead's treat-
ment of "mind" suggests that it can be controlled by indivi-
duals for different purposes. The way in which it is con-
trolled would depend upon the perspective taken by minding
individuals in their "present existence", and the perspective
taken would depend upon the goals of the minding individuals.
Their "procedure answers to their goals". [29]

This theory of mind is precisely in line with Marx's
ideas about man as a productive animal (i.e., deliberately
affecting himself and his environment), and man's "species
characteristic" of "free, conscious activity". Mead has
defined mind as free (i.e., can be controlled for different
purposes, and may not be controlled) conscious (via signifi-
cant symbols) activity (as an aspect of the larger activity
of the organism in environment).

There is a further similarity between the two
thinkers. Where Marx, in his discussion of political economy,
insisted that if one wants to explain this phenomenon he must
"proceed from facts of the present", and must pay attention
to concrete empirical relations, Mead extended this argument
beyond the particular perspective of political economy, and
into all aspects of human life. "If we are to escape illusion
and hallucination", he held, we must refer to "the physical
thing of contact experience".[30]

> We find here the fundamental relation between the
> future and the past in the present.... In the
> immediate perceptual world what we can handle is
> the reality to which what is seen and heard must
> be brought to the test.... [31]

The human organism will influence itself and its environment,
regardless of whether it is "minding" or not, and regardless
of whether it is controlling its "minding", because of its
character as a form of life. But where it minds without
taking its present self-in-environment into account, it is
subject to delusion. Its mental activity is irrelevant to
its existence in the present, as a self-determining being.

The Social

The mind, in Mead's theory, is an activity of the
organism by which it passes from one perspective to another,
and this passage _may_ be deliberately controlled by the
organism to effect its self and environment. The mind exists
in the present, is an emergent in the present, and is

characterized by "sociality". "Sociality is the capacity of being several things at once." [32]

      In contrast to the conventional usage of the term "social", Mead proposed:

> Now that we are accustomed to call social is only
> a so-called consciousness of such a process, but
> the process is not identical with the conscious-
> ness of it, for that is awareness of the situation.
> The social situation must be there if there is to
> be consciousness of it.[33]

It is the passage from one perspective to another that charac-terizes sociality, and this passage occurs in the natural world.

> The scientist proceeds by transformations, but
> they are transformations which are possible only
> as the observer grasps that in his own situation
> which involves his placing himself in the situa-
> tion of that which he observes. Although this
> is more complicated, it comes back in its findings
> to perceptual occasions. Now this is only possible
> if that sociality of thought in which we occupy the
> attitude is also a characteristic of nature. [34]

Mead has grounded mind irrevocably in the natural world. He has, by constantly maintaining a vision of man as an animal organism, skirted around a number of metaphysical mind-body problems. He saw the relation between mind and body within the larger context of life, which includes both so that mind can be seen as an aspect of body and body can be seen as an aspect of mind. Mind is an emergent out of organic life which can carry on without it; but having emerged, mind changes the character of the natural world. It changes the character of the world through its interaction with non-mind (the organic) in a social process. This interaction occurs in the ongoing activity of

individuals in society (i.e., individuals being several things at once relative to one another, through their common use of significant symbols).

The interaction between "mind" and "body", then, is a social process in the natural world. We are aware of its occurrence in our conventional use of the word society, but "the process is not identical with the consciousness of it". In the conventional use of the term, we tend to think of society as a "thing" external to us as individual persons, rather than recognizing it as a process in which we are involved, and which is necessary for our ability to abstract out the notions "individual" and "society". We feel our involvement as pleasure and pain, but cannot explain the source of the pleasure and pain.

2. MIND AS A SOCIAL PROCESS OF TAKING PERSPECTIVES

"Present", "emergent", and "sociality" are three concepts basic to Mead's theory of human society. He discussed some of the problems involved in our understanding the origin of consciousness, commenting that

> The primary difficulty in dealing with these matters
> lies in our tendency to cut off life and conscious-
> ness at the boundaries of the organism. Selection
> undoubtedly lies in the living form, but such a form
> can only live in a physical environment of a definite
> sort. Living processes include active relationships
> with objects in an environment, and conscious living
> processes also include such objects. The response of
> the organism to its own response to food undoubtedly
> lies within the organism, but only as a part of a
> whole process of eating that includes also the food. 35

The terms "organism" and "environment" are abstractions from the social process organism-environment, and are useful abstractions for certain purposes. Mead was not suggesting that we begin to ignore the fact that we can distinguish between, e.g., a tiger and a tree, especially if we have a choice of being confronted with the one or the other. He was suggesting that if we want to understand and explain life and consciousness we have to understand the principles underlying our specious world, seeing the organism as an emergent in the natural world, and with its emergence, the transformation of aspects of the natural world to its "environment". We have to be able to see consciousness as an emergent, and the transformation of aspects of the natural world to its "environment", i.e., part of the environment of the organism relative to which consciousness emerges.

Mead argued that the "environment" or "field" of consciousness includes aspects of the organism being conscious.

> ... Life becomes conscious at those points at which
> the organism's own responses enter as a part of the
> objective field to which it reacts. 36

Consciousness occurs when the "individual" experiences his "self" as part of the "objective" field within which he is acting. Consciousness includes processes not only within the organism, but between organisms, and between organism and the natural world within which it exists.

Mead posited feeling as the most basic form of consciousness.

> ... When we say that the lowest form of conscious-
> ness is feeling, what is implied is that when living
> forms enter such a systematic process that they
> react purposively and as wholes to their own condi-
> tions, consciousness as feeling arises within life. 37

Feeling is dependent upon the organism's ability to distinguish
pleasure and pain. Feeling-consciousness is the basis out of
which mind emerges -- mind referring to ideas, images, sensa-
tions. Mind emerges at the point where one individual is able
to take the attitude of another into consideration so that he
is able to pass from one mutually exclusive system (perspec-
tive) into another.

From this discussion we can see that Mead considered
mind to be a special case of consciousness which arises when
one organism "sees" itself in relation to another, i.e., when
it includes both its own attitude and that of another in its
consciousness. He explained:

> ... Let us ... accept passage as the character of
> reality, and recognize that in passage there is
> change in the structure of things, and that because
> of passage objects can occupy different systems.
> If we then recognize that there is a form of
> sociality within which we can go from the one to
> the other by means of a system of transformations,
> and so occupy both systems, identifying the same
> objects in each, it becomes possible for passage to
> take place between alternative systems that are
> simultaneously mutually exclusive. The set of trans-
> formations and the mathematical structure built upon
> it are as much parts of nature as anything else.
> They are attitudes answering to meanings of things
> brought under our control by symbols. Passage from
> a system in motion to the same system at rest, while
> the rest of the world passes from rest to motion,
> means passage from the one to the other in what we
> call a mind. These two aspects exist in nature, and
> the mind is also in nature. The mind passes from one
> to the other in its co-called consciousness, and the

> world is a different world from the standpoint of
> one attitude from what it is from another. We say
> the world cannot occupy both meanings, if they are
> mutually exclusive; but passage in a mind enables
> it to do so by means of transformations. All that
> we need to recognize is that the world had the one
> aspect from one point of view, and that there has
> been the same passage in nature from the one to the
> other as has taken place in the mind, just as there
> is a passage from one price to another in stocks on
> the market because of the changing attitude in
> men's minds. 38

What I want to discuss here, with reference to the tradition

in Western civilization of an either-or philosophy, is an

implication of his observation that "We say the world cannot

occupy both meanings, if they are mutually exclusive; but

passage in a mind enables it to do so by means of transforma-

tions". According to Mead, when we say that the world is

either one way or another, e.g., that it is either basically

good or basically evil, we are not making statements about

necessary conditions of reality, but about two alternate

choices, and that the one entails one world, the other, another.

Just as the prices in the stock market fluctuate because of

"changing attitudes in men's minds", the natural world changes

when men take one attitude or another. Here we can see the

full implication of his argument that "the different pasts of

experience are not subjective reinterpretations of a past which

is independent of that or any present." The natural world is

a potential chaos, "brought under our control by symbols".

We have to be careful at this point to keep from assuming that

Mead has taken a solipsistic stand, remembering that he places

mind within the framework of the organism in the natural world, and that mind is subject to the "laws" of this world, that it is a natural process in interaction with other natural processes. But at the same time we can recognize the power at which he is hinting at the disposal of minding organisms, a power which they can use to control atomic energy for destruction and creation; and there is no reason to suppose that the control of atomic energy is representative of any more than a small fraction of their full capacities, i.e., future emergents.

Mead described the world as consisting of a finite number of objects occupying simultaneously many systems. One gets the impression that he imagined a temporal-spatial stratification of the world, of systems within systems, so that, for example, we can distinguish between atoms as objects, organisms as objects and persons as objects. The passage of persons from one system to another is an experience common to everyone: both in the sense that everyone experiences passage from one to another, and in the sense that the passage occurs only by communal agreement. For example, a "father at home" passes into a "motorist on the road" into a "professor at university". The person, in this passage, moves physically from one location to another, acting in ways specific to the different "temporal-spaces", and his physical movement means father-motorist-professor by communal agreement. The meaning, and the performance, of the physical activity depends on the

"mental" attitudes of the members of a community.

Mead's orientation toward this common experience illuminates some of the problems involved in deliberate social change, and reflects on Marx's idea that radical social change most probably (i.e., in most cases) requires violent revolution. His theory suggests that the smaller a group, the easier radical change will be, the smallest group being defined as a "self" (consisting of "I" and "me", which enables the individual to address itself as self and other); and the larger a group ("group" presupposing some sort of organization, excluding aggregates and mobs) the more difficult it will be to effect radical change. It also suggests that the kind of change will be peculiar to the size of the group. For example, the individual can "change his mind" much more readily than his inter-personal habits, which include at least some other people in the "group" to which they refer.

It suggests that, if we want deliberately to make radical changes, regardless of the size of the group moving from one perspective (system) to another, we need to have a clear understanding of the perspective that we now occupy, and a clear understanding of the methods that we can employ to move from one system to another, i.e., direct our own emergence.

With reference to Marx's theory of violent revolution, Mead's theory suggests that it is unlikely to be a method adequate to the goal of moving from one system to another.

It may be that violence (physical interpersonal or otherwise) is an aspect or indication of radical change, but it is not a method. Both our historical experience with violent revolution and Mead's theory imply that it is only a tool of destruction, and not a method of deliberate creation. Violent revolution alone, as Marx recognized, results not in a radical (basic) change, but in a "mere" revolution (turning over). What Marx did not recognize, in the light of Mead's theory, is the extent to which we control (or are capable of controlling) ourselves, and the "intermingling" of mind with our culturally created society. Mead's theory indicates that the streets, cars, buildings, clothes, etc., all are "entangled" with mind so that choosing to make radical changes involves much more than simply making a conscious decision (i.e., have an intention) and then acting on it. It involves continuous deliberate attention focused on the present.

Of the self, the minding organism, Mead said,

> The self by its reflexive form announces itself as
> a conscious organism which is what it is only so
> far as it can pass from its own system into those
> of others, and can thus, in passing, occupy both
> its own system and that into which it is passing.
> That this should take place is evidently not the
> affair of a single organism. Shut up within his
> own world -- that which answers to his stimulations
> and responses -- he would have no entrance into
> possibilities other than those which his own
> organized act involved. It is only as his activity
> is a part of a larger organized process that such
> a possibility can open. Nor is this the only pre-
> requisite. The social organization of a multi-
> cellular form is one in which each cell in living
> its own life lives the life of the whole; but its
> differentiation restricts its expressions to the

> single function to which it has become adapted.
> Only in a process in which one organism can in
> some sense substitute for another could an indi-
> vidual find itself taking the attitude of another
> while still occupying its own. Its own differentia-
> tion must never be so complete as to restrict it
> to fulfilling a single function only. 39

Mead has named two prerequisites necessary for the occurrence

of a self: the activity of the organism is part of a larger

organized process, and the organisms are "in some sense"

capable of substituting for one another such that they are

able to "take the attitude of the other" while still occupying

their own.

The mechanism "by which the individual living his own

life in that of the group is placed in the attitude of taking

the role of another" is "that of communication".[40] He disagreed

with the use of "communication" to describe all intra and inter-

organic interaction, and argued,

> There may be a type of communication in which the
> conditions of one organ stimulates others to their
> appropriate responses. There is in the physiologi-
> cal system such a system of communication carried
> out by the hormones. But this is only an elabora-
> tion of the interrelation of highly differentiated
> organs functioning in a common life-process.
> Communication as I shall use it always implies the
> conveyance of meaning; and this involves the
> arousal in one individual of the attitude of the
> other, and his response to these responses. 41

Mead distinguished between communication common to several

species of animal and communication which appears to be unique

to man as "conversation of gestures" and "conversation of sig-

nificant symbols". Conversation of gestures is a mode of

conveying feeling consciousness, while conversation of

significant symbols is the method of "mental" communication, dependent upon the faculty for language (as organization of vocal sounds).

Feeling consciousness is bound by the present in which feeling occurs, and it is only with mind that the present is transcended, and a past and future created, i.e., that consciousness becomes reflexive.

> ... The animal could never reach the goal of becoming an object to itself as a whole until it could enter into a larger system within which it could play various roles, so that in taking one role it could stimulate itself to play the other role which this first role called for. It is this development that a society whose life process is mediated by communication has made possible. It is here that mental life arises -- with this continual passing from one system to another, with the occupation of both in passage and with the systematic structures that each involves. It is the realm of continual emergence. [42]

Mind is a social process, a "temporal extension of the environment of the organism", the "larger system within which it", the animal, can "play various roles".

In the above passage Mead referred to "mental life" as the process in which the animal is an object to itself as a whole. Relating this to Marx's alienation hypothesis, interpreted as: "Man as a whole" alienates himself from his "species characteristic" of "free, conscious activity" through practising "forced labor"; Mead made no use of the term alienation but defined mind in a way consistent with Marx's "free, conscious activity", and said that the organism is an object to itself as a whole when it practises "mental life". Marx related

forced labor to the division in human society between mental and physical activity. He argued that this is a false distinction, and that, in order for alienation to be overcome, forced labor needed to be abolished, implying that the division between mental and physical activity has to be abolished. Mead did abolish this division in theory. The methods by which alienation (in Mead's terminology, illusion, hallucination) can be overcome in practice are implied in his theory and only cautiously hinted at by him overtly.

Mead understood mind to be located in nature, as a continual emergent; an interaction between selves-in-environment in systematic interrelations. These relations are characterized by sociality, selves having the capacity to slip from one system into another, in the present, marked by passage. If we try to look at an individual, or a group of individuals, outside of passage, we will see him (them) in only one system. This way of looking at individuals and groups is characteristic of the orientation typified by the Newtonian three-dimensional universe, in which the system appears to be of infinite extent; and is characteristic of the structural/functionalist approach to society. It is in this approach that man is regarded as a particular function, i.e., each man is a particular function. Seen within the larger framework of Mead's theory, the structural/functional approach can have great value, as a method of studying systems in isolation. As is well known in the social sciences, this approach cannot

explain change in society, and Mead's theory is an explanation
of why it cannot. Change is a process involving the movement
from one system to another.

Mead suggested the direction in which social scientists
can look (the perspective they can take) in order to determine
social change.

> Our problem is to determine just what it is that
> has preceded what is taking place so that the
> direction of temporal progress may determine what
> the world is going to be. There is a certain
> temporal process going on in experience. What has
> taken place issues in what is taking place, and in
> this passage what has occurred determines spatio-
> temporally what is passing into the future. So
> far then as we can determine the constants of motion
> we can follow that determination, and our analysis
> seeks to resolve the happening in so far as may be
> into motion. In general, since passage is itself
> given in experience, the direction of changes that
> are going on partly conditions what will take place.
> The event that has taken place and the direction of
> the process going on form the basis for the rational
> determination of the future. [43]

If we could "determine the constants of motion" in human society,
we could "follow that determination", i.e., predict change in
society. Change in human society can be effected by controlling
"mental life" in the process of "mental life".

One of Mead's cautious hints for effecting social
change is indicated in the following passage:

> I wish to make as emphatic as possible the reference
> of pasts and futures to the activity that is central
> to the present. Ideation extends spatially and
> temporally the field within which activity takes
> place. The presents, then, within which we live are
> provided with margins, and fitting them into a larger
> independent chronicle is again a matter of some more
> extended present which calls for a wider horizon.

> But the widest horizon belongs to some undertaking,
> whose past and future refer back to it. For
> instance, the present history of the sun is rele-
> vant to the undertakings of unravelling the atom
> and, given another analysis of the atom, the sun
> will have another history and the universe will
> be launched into a new future. The pasts and the
> futures are implications of what is being undertaken
> and carried out in our laboratories. [44]

In the physical sciences we study the relation between such

"objects" as the atom and the sun, relating microscopic systems

to macroscopic ones. We understand the "history of the sun"

in terms of our "analysis of the atom". Mead suggested that

we apply the same attitude to human society, relating the

"universal" process of ideation to persons existing in finite

presents. By analysing ourselves in our present activities

and relating our activity to ideation, we can control ourselves.

He suggested, as an implication of his theory, that

> This view then frees us from bondage either to past
> or future. We are neither creatures of the necessity
> of an irrevocable past, nor of any vision given in
> the Mount. Our history and our prognostications will
> be sympathetic with the undertakings within which we
> live and move and have our being. Our values lie in
> the present, and past and future give us only the
> schedule of the means, and the plans of campaign, for
> their realization. [45]

This means that regardless of whether we choose to be aware of

it, regardless of whether we choose to control our social exis-

tence, by the fact that we practise human living in the present,

we condition human life in the future and create our human

history. "Our history and prognostications will be sympathetic

with the undertakings within which we live and move and have

our being." Mead's tone in this passage was triumphant and

optimistic, but one is reminded of Weber's cautioning words:

"The fate of our times is characterized by rationalization and

intellectualization and, above all, by the 'disenchantment of

the world'",[46] and his recognition that "academic prophecy,

finally, will create only fanatical sects but never a genuine

community".[47] Being freed from the bondage to past and future

carries with it the implication of an awesome responsibility

in the present. We can orient toward this responsibility in

various ways, just as easily falling into despair over the

enormity of the situation and the ignorance with which we face

it as rising up to the challenge with eagerness to learn. The

attitude that we take toward our situation conditions "what

will be", because these attitudes have objective existence.

> .. the principle (that the individual enters into
> the perspectives of others, in so far as he is able
> to take their attitudes, or occupy their points of
> view) ... has serious implications ... if one accepts
> the objectivity of perspectives, and recognizes that
> these perspectives are made up of other selves with
> minds; that here is no nature that can be closed to
> mind. The social perspective exists in the experience
> of the individual in so far as it is intelligible,
> and it is its intelligibility that is the condition
> of the individual entering into the perspectives of
> others, especially of the group. [48]

"There is no nature that can be closed to mind", a logical imp-

lication of his theory of human society, resting on the accep-

tance of the "objectivity of perspectives". This is, of

course, a hypothesis, open to empirical verification.

As a principal evidence that perspectives are objective,

Mead cited the influence that our use of the experimental

method has had on us.

> It is instructive to note that never has the charac-
> ter of that common perspective changed more rapidly
> than since we have gained further control over the
> technique by which the individual perspective
> becomes the perspective of the most universal com-
> munity, ... that is, the technique of the experi-
> mental method. We are deluded, by the ease with
> which we can, by what may be fairly called trans-
> formation formulae, translate the experience of
> other communities into that of our own, into giving
> finality to the perspective of our own thought.....
> We have never been so uncertain as to what are the
> values which economics undertakes to define, what
> are the political rights and obligations of citizens,
> what are the community values of friendship, of
> passion, of parenthood, of amusement, of beauty, of
> social solidarity in its unnumbered forms, or of
> those values which have been gathered under the rela-
> tions of man to the highest community or to God. On
> the other hand there has never been a time at which
> men could determine so readily the conditions under
> which values, whatever they are, can be secured. In
> terms of common conditions, by transformation formulae,
> we can pass from one value field to another, and thus
> come nearer finding out which is more valuable, or
> rather how to conserve each. The common perspective
> is comprehensibility, and comprehensibility is the
> statement in terms of common social conditions. [49]

Men are now in a position to determine the conditions under

which values ... can be secured", and the perspective through

which they can do this is the common one of comprehensibility,

"the statement in terms of common social conditions". Common

social conditions are those that have an effect on all people

in society. The effects may not be uniform because different

people occupy different attitudes with reference to common con-

ditions. Through studying the various attitudes with reference

to the common situation, we can begin to "comprehend" our situa-

tion.

More specifically, Mead said of the common

perspective,

> In the process of communication the individual
> is an other before he is a self. It is in
> addressing himself in the role of an other than
> his self arises in experience. The growth of the
> organized game out of simple play in the experience
> of the child and of organized group activities in
> human society, placed the individual then in a
> variety of roles, in so far as these were parts of
> the social act, and the very organization of these
> in the whole act gave them a common character in
> indicating what he had to do. He is able then to
> become a generalized other in addressing himself
> in the attitude of the group or the community.
> In this situation he has become a definite self
> over against the social whole to which he belongs. [50]

The most comprehensive "generalized other" refers to the

relation between the individual and all others, or, in Marx's

terminology, to the individual who "treats himself as a

universal and therefore a free being".[51] The broadest relation

(individual to all), the macroscopic, is related to the

narrowest (individual to self), or microscopic. But in

relating these two systems we have to remember the source of

self is in communication between organisms. Neither Marx nor

Mead were interested in "isolated" individualism. Social

change implies the involvement of more than one individual.

The social individual can effect change "in" himself through

his social character as a self, as well as being able to act

in conjunction with others to effect change. As a fully iso-

lated organism, it has no self and can effect no human social

change.

3.   MARX AND MEAD ON HUMAN SOCIETY

Hegel used the dialectic method to describe the pro-

cess of ideation as a relationship between finite objects and
infinite subject (World Spirit). Marx took this method out of
the Hegelian context and applied it to the material world to
show how activity and not "mere" thought changes the world.
For Marx the great mover of society was the dialectic between
the forces and relations of production. In making this transi-
tion Marx bridged a gap between thought and action such that
anyone who reads and comprehends his theory (i.e., looks at
the material world around him and at himself in this world
with reference to the theoretical framework provided by Marx)
transcends the separation of thought and action, regardless of
whether or not he agrees with Marx's specific diagnosis. Marx
created a crude scientific method for analysing human society.

In his discussion of practice, he stressed activity
more than thoughtful activity. Immersed in the assumption of
a three-dimensional universe, he assumed that the physical
environment is a constant in which there are causal connections
between things independent of man's relation to them. He seems
to have assumed that we have only to understand the laws
associated with these causal connections and we will be able
to use them to control our own lives. The question of what we
would do with them was not a problem for him.

Mead, with the advantage of a four-dimensional picture
of the universe in which relations between "physical objects"
are just as questionable as are relations between "mental
constructs", was able to go a step further than Marx and

analyse the phenomenon of practice. Marx assumed that in practice, without reification, the real interests of people would become apparent to them, their real interests being objectively related to the real world of practice. Mead analysed practice as a social emergent occurring in a present, including both thought and action, i.e., as "mental life".

Marx used the dialectic to analyse movement or passage in the material world, but was unable to see the logical extension inherent in this method if applied in a four-dimensional universe -- a universe in which many mutually exclusive systems can co-exist. In this interpretation of the universe, an object may be a thesis T_1 relative to an antithesis A_1 in one system, and a thesis T_2 relative to an antithesis A_2 in another, the object having the capacity to exist in several systems at once. The resolution of the contradiction between T_1, A_1 and between T_2, A_2 may not take the form of a synthesis of each within the different systems, but may be in the form of an emergent which incorporates both systems and many others. Marx assumed that there can be only one human social system, and suggested that communism is the best one. Mead, on the other hand, assumed a limited number of objects occupying many systems at once, so that we can have a variety of systems in our human life, none being necessarily the best, each answering to specific goals.

Reification as a form of mental blindness, a way of disguising real connections between real conditions in the

objective world, which exist independently of the "phantoms
in men's minds" [52], became in Mead's theory, illusion and
hallucination. Reification means thought which is not _of_
practice, and it results in irrational action. Irrationality
and reification are directly connected with each other. Marx
concentrated his attention on economic activity, and referred
to capitalism, for example, as an irrational mode of organizing
for human purposes. Through Mead's critique of the whole of
human life as we now know it, Marx's theory of alienation
through forced labor is united with psychological and psychia-
tric theory of "mental illness", i.e., the study of methods
by which people hallucinate and delude themselves. [53]

Marx suggested that what is particular to human beings
is the relation of the whole man to his species characteristic,
man acting as a human being when he treats himself as a "uni-
versal and therefore free being". Mead said that to understand
human behavior, "It is the relation of the individual perspec-
tive to the common perspective that is of importance". [54] Per-
spectives constitute the natural world, i.e., are not "reflec-
tions of" or "approximations of" more "real" objects "out
there". Both the perception of the individual and the object
being perceived "belong" to perspectives. Thus the importance
of touch, physical contact, for the "sanity" (prevention of
hallucination) of individuals.

Both the individual perspective and the common per-
spective arise together in relation to the organisms-in-

environment. In ongoing particular human societies the
individual gains his perspective relative to the common per-
spective by learning "where he stands" in relation to others
in a particular society. He learns to be both self and other.
By learning both the individual and common perspectives he is
able to act out of the individual perspective with reference to
all others (including himself as one among many). This holds
for all "occupations" of perspectives, illustrated by e.g., the
occupations of father, doctor, artist, etc. Once the indivi-
dual has learned how to be a self, he can create new "occupa-
tions" for himself and for others, and can redefine the
boundaries of already existing perspectives. Artists and
scientists have as their specific "occupation" the purpose of
doing this.

    Within this framework, Marx's work on alienation can
be seen, with reference to forced labor, as his insight into
the fact that in "natural society", and especially within the
past few hundred years, labor (in the economic system) is at
the same time arbitrary to the identity of the whole man, and
overshadows all other "occupations" (of perspectives) to the
extent that it is a major determinant of the form that other
occupations will take. Man treats himself as essentially one
dimensional, rather than realizing himself to be by his human
"nature" multi-dimensional, a social being, capable of being
several things at once.

    The word alienation calls attention to the ways in

* to occupy

which human animals find themselves to be strangers to themselves, one another and their common environment. The word refers both to the individual and common perspectives, such that the individual experiences himself as a stranger in the world (as individual, distinct from the common), and the experience is a common one, all individuals having the experience. "Alienation" refers to this experience as a "problem" which is solvable. The solution is in man as a whole treating himself as man as a whole, and not as a "mere" particular function. The experience of being a stranger in the world is an objective one. People actually are strangers to themselves, to others and to the world. The beginning of the practical solution to alienation is the recognition of it, insofar as it is a problem, as a common problem, i.e., we are strangers to ourselves, one another, and the universe, rather than I am a stranger to myself among "those others" in "that world out there".

It is not the new and unfamiliar, i.e., strange, in itself that constitutes alienation, but the ways in which man approaches himself, others and the environment with reference to the strange. The fact of new and unfamiliar experiences is basic to human life by its characteristic of emergence. The experience of strangeness is a potentially meaningful one, and the scientific attitude, the experimental method, is an example of one way in which strangeness is part of a meaningful experience. The particular kind of estrangement constituting

alienation is that between body and mind as expressed within
the individual; between bodies and minds as expressed between
individuals; and, with reference to the universe, between mind
to "all", the oneness of the universe, and body to "particu-
larity", the physical discreteness of all objects, i.e., the
separation of "religious" experience and science.

"Alienation" draws attention to the arbitrary nature
of our individual perspectives relative to the common per-
spective (e.g., particular occupations in the economic system),
pointing to the fact that our individual perspectives are not
due to inherent differences in our biological make-up but are
the result of a combination of accident and choice in the social
world. (This is a statement of general conditions, and is not
meant to apply to e.g., the effect of possible innate differ-
ences which contribute to Van Gogh painting differently from
Paul Klee.) The realization of the extent to which particular
perspectives are accidental leads to the recognition of the
extent to which we are capable potentially of controlling them,
and the recognition, through experience in the world as it now
is, of the very complex set of conditions preventing us from
actually controlling them.

We can study the relation between potential and actual
control of society through analysing existing power relations,
i.e., particular uses of energy, as they now exist. Marx
discussed power relations as a problem within the context of

socio-economic organization where a few people use the organization to "exploit" the majority. He studied this "exploitation" as "forced labor", and considered the exploited, in their passivity, to be acting out of "false consciousness". He treated "false consciousness" as a rather simple (as opposed to complex) problem in his social theory, the solution to it being the realization by the exploited of their class position, i.e., of "class consciousness".

Weber defined power in a more general way, allowing for a clearer understanding of the problem Marx raised, power being

> ... the chance of a man or of a number of men to realize their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action. [55]

His definition presupposes, as conditions for the execution of power: 1) the existence of a "will", which must necessarily include (a) intention on the part of those acting and (b) a plan of action of some sort, and 2) interpersonal action, i.e., communal action. His definition does not imply that where power is exercised, there must necessarily be resistance to it. Realization of power against the resistance of others is only one possibility; another possibility being the realization of power by individuals in communal action such that there are no members who resist, or even would resist if they had the will to.

Weber's description of the combination of large scale

bureaucratic organization and capitalist ownership of the means of production (property) suggests that this combination is not only a use of societal organization which prevents a large number of people from realizing their "will", but suggests as well that it is a use of societal organization which prevents people, through the kind of involvement required by their participation in it, from forming "wills" that they might then try to realize. Weber defined power in such a way that power is the interpersonal use of energy. The enormous size of bureaucratic machinery gives the individuals involved in it the impression that they are dealing with an impersonal (consequently, inhuman) force, and directs their attention away from the fact that they are dealing with one another.

Marx's theory of forced labor, exploitation, etc., is an hypothesis that can be tested. To test it one would first have to analyse in detail the specific factors in contemporary socio-economic organization that "prevent" people from forming "wills" (i.e., discover whether there are such factors). Since power is an interpersonal use of energy, and since interpersonal activity is mediated through communication, the beginning of such an analysis could be undertaken by a study of communication channels. Familial, recreational, political, and economic organizations all can be seen as channels of communication. The questions to be answered by a study of these organizations (systems) would be communication of what, by whom, for what, and for whom. That is, who does what, where, when, why, to whom and

<u>how</u> is it done.

The task, however,is enormous enough, for it involves not simply breaking down passive barriers such as those of distance in space and time and vernacular, but those fixed attitudes of custom and status in which our selves are imbedded. Any self is a social self, but it is restricted to the group whose roles it assumes, and it will never abandon this self until it finds itself entering into the larger society and maintaining itself there. The whole history of war- fare between societies and within societies shows how much more readily and with how much greater emotional thrill we realize ourselves in opposition to common enemies than in collaboration with them. [56]

CONCLUSION

The 19C humanist perspective was one with which men criticised their social organization with reference to their traditional values. It seems that in order to get beyond alienation in the 20C men need to be critical of both their traditional values and their social organization. Men have a method by which they are now able to do this, the scientific method, and the attitude with which it is associated. In the broadest sense, the method consists of ways of checking our expectations about some specific event with the actual occurrence of that event. If we are going to adopt this method with reference to human behavior, we have also to take the attitude accompanying it, the attitude being characterized by "healthy scepticism", i.e., by delaying habitual responses, suspending habitual expectations about how people behave.

Marx's work, among other things, showed how men are, in general, unable to distinguish their values from their sensory experience, and consequently, in the process of reification, fail to control either. He also developed the notion that social organization can more or less allow for human expression, depending on the kind of organization and the goals associated with it. He suggested that all organization is directed to some end, and in fact, that people only organize for ends.

Marx assumed that social perspectives are, in general,

biasing, and that objective knowledge is independent of such bias. Social perspectives as biasing he termed reification, in contrast with objective knowledge. Marx assumed that if the biasing perspectives were exposed for what they really are, men would be free to act humanly, seemingly that human behavior is inevitable in the absence of reification and forced labor.

Mead approached knowledge from another direction, believing that social perspectives are basic to knowledge, i.e., _are_ knowledge. Mead suggested that there is one attitude common to all of humanity, the attitude of comprehensibility which is most basic to human life. He suggested that with the scientific method we are learning to test the past against the present.

Applying this notion to alienation, we are learning to cope with the authority of our ancestors. We are at present witnessing a confrontation between authority _as such_ and individual perspectives which deny the use of authority which is external to them.

Mead suggested that his analysis of human society frees us from the past, taking us beyond the necessity of adhering to old moralities and authority, and providing us with the freedom to choose. The old moralities and authority assume that people are incapable of taking individual responsibility, and that they must be cared for as children by e.g., the Church and the State. Mead did not, as Marx did, assume that man _will_ take individual responsibility in a "new world"; he assumed

that he <u>can</u> do so, through adopting the common attitude of comprehensibility. With the adoption of such an attitude, there can be no absolute social perspective in the sense of one best way, one total ideology. Nothing which is open to the conscious scrutiny of people can totally capture them. The ability to imagine and analyse the situations in which we find ourselves makes these situations arbitrary rather than total.

With this attitude our myths are exploded, and we are unable to justify our actions with reference to total ideologies. Instead, we are led to question, to test the validity of our assumptions -- to discover under what conditions people will act in one way or another, and the laws associated with their behavior.

One consequence or symptom of alienation in our contemporary world is the lack of significance in the lives of many, the majority of, people. Most people most of the time move "blindly" or habitually through the events comprising their lives, and are referred to by some contemptuously, as "the masses". Only when we become aware, within a larger framework of our movement, does our activity take on significance for us. Men <u>make</u> their actions human (i.e., give them significance) by referring them to larger frameworks, by seeing themselves through their actions in the world. The suggestion here is that removal of forced labor may be a necessary condition for going beyond alienation, but it is not a sufficient one. It is

also necessary for men to make their lives meaningful, i.e., in Marx's sense, to work freely to create themselves.

From the combination of Marx's theory of alienation and Mead's theory of human society, I have deduced some basic hypotheses about the ways in which men do and can make their lives significant, through controlling themselves and their interrelations.

1. Individuals can control events only if

    a. they are involved in effecting the events

    b. they are able to understand some possible alternate lines of action that can be taken to effect the event.

2. The less understanding there is of the possible alternatives, the less controllable is the event.

3. Any individual's understanding of an event (in terms of the possible alternate lines of action) derives from an understanding common to all individuals involved in the event and refers back to that common understanding for its validation.

4. It is equally as necessary, for each person's understanding of an event, to know the locations (perspectives, associated with identity) of all persons involved, since all involved contribute to the results and experience the effects of the co-operation.

5. Only to the extent that one knows the location (identity) of all persons involved in an event does he know his own location.

6. The fewer number of people, relative to the total number, deliberately effecting an event, the fewer number of locations that can be identified.

7. The fewer number of locations that can be identified, the less complete will be the common understanding of the event. (leading back to 2)

8. The limits of self-conscious co-operation (self-determination) are defined by the maximum size of a group in which all affected by the event can deliberately effect the event.

9. The maximum size of a group in which all affected also deliberately effect the action would depend, in turn, upon the nature of the activity. (Two factors involved in the limitations imposed by the nature of the activity would be technical skill at organizing and available communication channels)

By common understanding, I am referring to Mead's common attitude of comprehensibility.

All of these hypotheses refer to one event, and I have apparently ignored Mead's basic contention that significance emerges in the confrontation between one system and another. It seems to me that it would be in relation to the confrontation between different systems that men would see the alternatives for action with reference to one system, i.e., that they can understand one event only in relation to other events in which they are involved. This is Mead's basic notion of

sociality. It can be illustrated quite simply: one can ask what attitude a person has toward e.g., a specific sort of criminal activity, as a "father", as a "judge", as a "criminal", as a "political scientist", as an "artist", etc., getting different perspectives on the same "object", or event. It is not the specific content of any "role" that is human behavior, but rather the capacity to move from one "role" to another, to choose roles, invent new ones, etc., that is characteristic of all humans. We can see this as a fact from cross cultural comparisons. It is toward this capacity that scientists (as opposed to natural historians) must direct their attention if they choose to understand _human_ behavior.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. See Leon Festinger's A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance,
       Stanford University Press, 1957, esp. Ch.1. Festinger
       refers to cognition as mapping "reality", and to cog-
       nitive dissonance as an experience due to "the reality
       impinging on a person" and exerting "pressures in the
       direction of bringing the appropriate cognitive
       elements into correspondence with that reality".

2. I am referring to Marx's theory of alienation, and con-
       sider theories previous to his, e.g. those of Hegel
       and Feuerbach, to be partial theories. Hegel uses
       alienation to describe a state of mind, and Feuerbach
       uses it with reference to sensual experience. Marx
       was the first to ground both mind and sensual
       experience in practice.

3. "Classless society" is a symbolic representation of this
       second solution because we cannot assume that elimina-
       tion of classes will result in the elimination of
       alienation. Simple destruction of one way of life
       does not automatically imply the creation or con-
       struction of another to take its place. "Classless"
       tells us what will not exist, but does not adequately
       describe what will exist. Only in the development of
       a new form of social organization can the symbolic be
       actualized.

4. This myth has been expressed in different ways--e.g. as
       the Hebrew's "Jehova", Plato's "Forms", Durkheim's
       "Collective Conscience."

5. See Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts
       of 1844, tr. M. Milligan, International Publishers,
       New York, 1964, p.119.

6. See George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self & Society, University
       of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1934, with special attention
       to Part lll, "The Self", p.p.135-222.

7. Responsibility implies the capability of an individual to
       consciously make choices from among alternate lines of
       action, and to recognize himself as making these
       choices. It presupposes self-consciousness.

8. Identity as the recognition by the person of "where he
       stands"--both as the possibility that, given different

conditions, he would stand somewhere else, and of the
continuity of being the same individual making
different choices in different circumstances. Only
in responsible activity can an individual "discover"
and create his identity. I would like to note that
no temporal sequence is intended here.

9. This use of co-operation applies for other forms of life
as well as for men. Bees, ants, wolves, co-operate
to effect events. The distinction I am making is one
between all animals co-operating to effect events and
man's capability for responsible (consciously deter-
mined) co-operation.

10. See Edward T. Hall, The Hidden Dimension, Doubleday & Co.,
New York, 1966, for a discussion of the control of
social space in different cultures.

11. Property can be seen as an extension of the self, marking
boundaries between individuals, and identification of
outselves through property relations is indicated in
our uses of "me" and "mine", "you" and "yours".

12. See Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, New
York, 1951; and Gabriel Marcel, Man Against Mass
Society, Henry Regnery Co., Gateway Ed., Chicago, 1962,
for two excellent discussions on this problem. The
clearest and most aweful description that I have found
of the helplessness that can be felt by people when
faced with situations in which their old assumptions
have no effect is given by Rudolf Vrba in I Cannot
Forgive, Bantum, Toronto, 1964, in which he describes
with cool intelligence his experiences as a prisoner
in Auschwitz.

13. Both Erikson and Lynd study shame and guilt as possible
avenues toward the discovery of identity.
Erik H. Erikson, Childhood and Society, Norton, 1950;
Helen M. Lynd, On Shame and the Search for Identity,
Science Ed., New York, 1951.

14. This special use of the word present was developed in
Mead's Philosophy of the Present, and will be dis-
cussed more fully in Ch.4. It was through developing
some of the philosophical implications in Einstein's
General Theory of Relativity that Mead arrived at this
usage of the word. At present it is sufficient to
note that he referred to the present as the "locus of
reality", in which the self finds its expression and
to which mind refers.

15. Gerth & Mills, in the introduction to From Max Weber,
Oxford University Press, New York, 1958, p.p.71-73,
discuss Weber's idea of freedom in our complex
societal organization. Weber "...conceived of indi-
vidual man as a composite of general characteristics
derived from social institutions; the individual as
an actor of social roles...(only in so far as he does
not)...transcend the routines of everyday institu-
tions." (p.73) The point is that men can define
themselves as cogs in a machine, and can act on this
definition, and can understand, predict and control
their behavior on the basis of their self-definition
and their acting out of it. They do not have to, but
choose to do this. Marx's argument, with reference
to this issue, was that if men choose to do this,
they are not acting in the interest of their human
nature. Mead went farther and showed how human
nature is the transcendance of "the routines of
everyday institutions".

16. Sociality is another word that gains a particular
definition in Mead's work. It refers to that uni-
versal process which allows for the occurrence of
new phenomena. Mind is a social process which allows
the individual "minding" to take different perspec-
tives with reference to the same object. The object
being regarded is a social process as well, by his
definition of sociality as "the capacity of being
several things at once."

CHAPTER I

1.   The Holy Bible, King James Version, John C. Winston Co.,
         Philadelphia, see Ephesians, 4, 17-19, Colossians,1,21,
         Psalms, 58, 3, and Ezekial, 14, 506.

2.   See N. Rotenstreich, "On the Ecstatic Sources of the
         Concept of Alienation", Review of Metaphysics, 16,
         March, 1963, p.550-51.

3.   See Rotenstreich, op. cit., p.550.

4.   See Rotenstreich, op. cit., p.551.

5.   Both J. B. Bury (The Idea of Progress, Dover, New York,
         1932, esp. Ch. XIII, "German Speculations on Progress",
         pp.238-59) and Arthur O. Lovejoy (The Great Chain of
         Being, Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1960, esp. Ch.IX-
         XI) discussed the great concern of philosophers in
         Hegel's time with the idea of the historical develop-
         ment of man. Hegel, along with his friend Goethe,
         accepted the idea of eternal change, while still
         maintaining the notion that man is perfectable, (Bury,
         p.259) Self-conscious Spirit being the final stage of
         man's development.

         Hegel developed the dialectic method to describe this
         development as the continual merging of finite and
         infinite in the process of becoming. His notion was
         that while the subject as infinite and the object as
         finite are not contained within the same being, there
         is continual change, i.e., becoming. When the subject
         and object are united in the same being, Self, which
         is both finite and infinite, the negation of the one
         by the other is a self-negation. ~~The negation of this~~
         The negation of this self-negation, the synthesis of
         the finite and the infinite, is being-for-self, or
         self-contemplation, i.e., Self-conscious Spirit.

6.   See Karl Lowith's discussion in "Estrangement as the
         Source of Hegel's Reconciliation", From Hegel to
         Nietzsche, Holt, Rinehart, Winston, New York, 1964,
         pp.162-73.

7.   "In Search of Marxist Humanism", Soviet Survey, 32,
         April-June, 1960, pp.21-31.

8.   In Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind, (Tr. J. B. Baillie,
         New York, 1931) he traced the development of the World
         Spirit through three stages: Stoicism, Scepticism,
         and the Alienated Consciousness. Each stage, he

believed, represents a new "level of consciousness", or the Spirit coming more completely to be conscious of itself. The basic principle of Stoicism is that consciousness is essentially "that which things". Stoicism is the negation of otherness, i.e., of anything which is not thought. Because it ignores existence Stoicism does not negate existence in an absolute sense. Scepticism does absolutely negate existence by doubting existence. It is the "realization of that of which Stoicism is merely the notion, and is the actual experience of what freedom of thought is; it is in itself and essentially the negative, and so must exhibit itself". (p.246) Stoicism answers to the notion of independent consciousness; Scepticism corresponds to its realization. Stoicism recognizes only pure thought; Scepticism recognizes existence and denies it.

The Unhappy Consciousness has gone beyond both Stoicism and Scepticism through recognizing both pure thought and particular existence. The Unhappy Consciousness has transcended pure thought, "so far as this is the abstract thought of Stoicism, which turns away from particulars altogether, and again the merely restless thought of Scepticism--so far, in fact, as this is merely particularity in the sense of aimless contradiction and the restless process of contradictory thought. It has gone beyond both of these; it brings and keeps together pure thought and particular existence, but has not yet risen to that level of thinking where the particularity of consciousness is harmoniously reconciled with pure thought itself. It rather stands midway, at the point where abstract thought comes in contact with the particularity of consciousness qua particularity. Itself is this act of contact; it is the union of pure thought and individuality; and this thinking individuality or pure thought also exists as object for it, and the unchangeable is essentially itself an individual existence. But that this its object, the unchangeable, which assumes essentially the form of particularity, is its own self, the self which is particularity of consciousness--this is not established for it". (pp.256-57)

9. Phenomenology of Mind, p.253.

10. Ibid., Ch.14, pp.217-267.

11. Ibid., pp.149-55.

12. Ibid., p.258.

13. Ibid., p.259.

14. Ibid., Ch.VI, B.

15. Lowith, op.cit., p.80.

16. L. Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, Tr. G. Eliot, Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1957, p.230.

17. A major flaw in Feuerbach's argument is the assumption that if an event, A, arises out of conditions X,Y,Z; then the conditions X,Y,Z are equivalent to event A. George Herbert Mead argued against this assumption with his notion of "emergence", which will be discussed in Chapter IV of this thesis. An authoritative argument on this subject, with reference to the emergence of life out of non-life, can be found in the biologist, Ludwig von Bertalanffy's book, Problems of Life, Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1960.

18. Feuerbach, op.cit., p.79.

19. Ibid., p.244.

20. Ibid., p.245. For a discussion of the philosophical relation between Hegel and Feuerbach, see Lowith, op.cit., pp.71-82.

21. Op.cit., p.273.

22. See Lowith's discussion, op.cit., p.76.

23. See note 19 above.

24. Lowith, op.cit., p.76.

25. See Marx's The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Tr. M. Milligan, International Publishers, New York, 1964, esp. p.111, para.4, and p.112, para.2. That Marx consistently referred to aspects of alienation becomes relevant in my discussion in Chapter III of contemporary thinkers' handling of the concept. Seeman, for example, ("On the Meaning of Alienation", American Sociological Review, 24, Dec., 1959, pp.783-91) distinguished four kinds, rather than aspects, of alienation, arguing that they are logically distinguishable. Marx's reference was to the empirical world; and the way in which Seeman has handled this concept, without reference to empirical conditions of alienation, misses the point of Marx's argument, and results in an empty classification system.

26. The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, p.107.

27. The Philosophy of Science, Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1960, Chapter One, Two, pp.9-56.

28. See Hegel's Science of Logic, MacMillan, New York, 1961, Vol.1, Introduction, pp.53-75.

29. For some fascinating new information on the possible source of private property in the terrritoriality of animals; and for a discussion on the different uses social space in different cultures, see respectively, Robert Ardray's African Genesis, Collins, London, 1961; and Edward T. Hall's The Hidden Dimension, Doubleday, New York, 1966.

30. The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, p.107.

31. Ibid., p.112.

32. Ibid., p.112.

33. See Marx's chapter on "Human Requirements", op.cit., pp.147-164.

34. Ibid., p.113.

35. Ibid., p.112 ff.

36. Ibid., p.115.

37. See C. Wright Mills' The Marxists, Dell, New York, 1962, p.86.

38. The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p.107.
    Some contemporary theorists who are concerned with man's treatment as a commodity are, to name only a few, William H. Whyte, Marcuse, Fromm, Gabriel Marcel, Helen Lynd, Pappenheim, Bettleheim, and Arendt, whose works are referred to in my Bibliography.

39. Ibid., p.108.

40. Ibid., p.108.

41. Ibid., p.115.

42. Ibid., p.115.

43. Ibid., p.119.

44. Ibid., p.119.

45. Lowith, op.cit., p.76.

46. See, for example, Berlin, Karl Marx, His Life & Environment, Galaxy, New York, 1963; Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, Beacon, Boston, 1960; Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, Cambridge University Press, 1965; Plamenatz, Man and Society, Vol.2, Longmans, London, 1963; and Lowith, op.cit.

47. Rotenstreich, op.cit., p.553.

48. See Plamenatz, Man and Society, op.cit., Ch.6, pp.351-408, for a discussion of Marx's understanding of "society", and "community".

49. See Marx & Engels, The German Ideology, Ed. Pascal, International Publishers, New York, 1965, p.74.

50. Ibid., p.76.

51. Ibid., p.24.

52. Ibid., p.22.

53. Ibid., p.23.

54. Ibid., p.74.

55. Ibid., p.67.

56. Ibid., p.75.

57. See T. B. Bottomore and M. Rubel, Karl Marx: Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1964, pp.89-91.

58. The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, op.cit., p.140.

59. Ibid., p.138.

60. From Hegel to Nietzsche, op.cit., p.155.

61. See L. Easton, "Alienation and History in the Early Marx", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

62. From Hegel to Nietzsche, op.cit., p.281.

63. For a more detailed discussion of the various ways in which Marx defined "ideology", see Plamenatz, op.cit., pp.323-50.

64. *The German Ideology*, op.cit., p.2.

65. See K. Lowith, "Man's Self-Alienation in the Early
    Writings of Marx", *Social Research*, Summer, 1954,
    p.204.

66. See Marcuse's use of "one-dimensional" in *One-Dimensional
    Man*, Beacon, Boston, 1964.

67. See Floyd W. Matson, *The Broken Image*, Braziller, New York,
    1964; and Joseph R. Royce, *The Encapsulated Man*,
    van Nostrand, Toronto, 1964.

CHAPTER II

1. Karl Marx & F. Engels, The Communist Manifesto, Washington
       Square Press, New York, 1964. p.58.

2. Class & Class Conflict in Industrial Society, Stanford
       University Press, Stanford, 1959, see Ch.14, pp.117 ff.
       and C. W. Mills, The Marxists, Laurel ed., Dell,
       New York, 1962, see Ch.6, pp.105 ff.

3. Ibid., pp.58-9.

4. Ernst Fischer, in The Necessity of Art (Tr. A. Bostock,
       Penguin, 1963) noted that "Marx and Engels both warned
       against dogmatic and mechanistic over-simplifications
       of their fundamental thesis" (i.e., interpreted as
       economic determinism, against which Weber argued in
       favor of the influence of ideas independently of
       economics upon social change) (p.128). He quoted
       passages from letters written by Engels to Joseph Bloch
       and Starkenburg, explaining the approach Marx took to
       his subject matter. To Bloch he wrote, "According to
       the materialist view of history, production and repro-
       duction of real life are, in the last instance, the
       determining factor in history. Neither Marx nor I have
       asserted more than that. If anybody twists this into
       a claim that the economic factor is the only deter-
       mining one, he transforms our statement into a meaning-
       less, abstract, absurd phrase. The economic situation
       is the basis, but all the factors of the superstructure--
       political forms of the class struggle and its results,
       constitutions adopted by the victorious class after
       winning a battle, forms of law, and more than that, the
       reflections of all these real struggles in the minds of
       the people involved, political, legal, and philosophical
       theories, religious views both in their early and their
       more developed, dogmatic form--all these factors also
       influence the course of historical struggles and in many
       cases play the dominant role in determining their form".
       (p.128) Engels repeated the same theme in his letter
       to Starkenburg: "Political, juridical, philosophical,
       religious, literary, and artistic developments, etc.
       are based on economic development. But, in addition,
       they all react upon one another and also on the economic
       basis. The economic situation is not an original cause
       which alone is active while all else is merely passive
       effect. There is, rather, mutual action on the basis of
       economic necessity, which always proves the determining
       factor in the last instance."(p.128)

5.   See Hans Gerth & C. W. Mills, From Max Weber, Galaxy,
      New York, 1958, p.182. For further discussion of the
      similarities between Marx's and Weber's analyses of
      capitalism, see Birnbaum's article "The Rise of
      Capitalism: Marx and Weber", in Neil J. Smelser's
      Readings on Economic Sociology, Prentice-Hall,
      New Jersey, 1965, pp.3-5. His article can also be
      found in the British Journal of Sociology, 4, 1953,
      pp.125-41.

6.   Ibid., p.186.

7.   Ibid., p.187.

8.   Ibid., p.187.

9.   Ibid., p.181.

10. Ibid., p.184.

11. Ibid., p.186.

12. Ibid., p.183.

13. Ibid., p.185

14. Studies on the "marginal man" have shown that this is true
      for movement from one society to another as well as for
      movement within a society. See Everett V. Stonequist,
      The Marginal Man, a Study in Personality and Culture
      Conflict, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937, pp.139-58.

15. From Max Weber, op.cit., p.180.

16. Ibid., p.183.

17. Ibid., p.79.

18. Ibid., p.79.

19. Ibid., p.215.

20. Ibid., p.214.

21. Ibid., p.215.

22. Ibid., p.216.

23. From Hegel to Nietzsche, op.cit., p.281. See his note as
      well.

24. The Economic & Philosophic Manuscripts, op.cit., p.139.

25. From Max Weber, op.cit., p.228.

26. Ibid., p.228.

27. Ibid., p.228-29.

28. Ibid., p.229.

29. Ibid., p.221.

30. Ibid., p.229.

31. Arnold Hauser, in The Social History of Art (Tr. S. Godman, New York, Knopf, 1952), discussed the relation of cultural products to the society in which they arise, and their carry-over into different conditions.

32. From Max Weber, op.cit., p.293.

33. See Weber's The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, Ed. T. Parsons, Free Press, New York, 1966, p.16.

34. From Max Weber, op.cit., p.293.

35. Ibid., p.294.

36. Weber, "Science as a Vocation", in From Max Weber, op.cit., p.129.

37. Ibid., p.143.

38. Ibid., p.143.

39. Ibid., pp.148-49.

40. Ibid., p.156.

41. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, op.cit., p.103.

42. From Max Weber, op.cit., p.155.

43. Ibid., p.158.

44. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, op.cit., p.103.

CHAPTER III

1. Op.cit., Dell, Laurel Ed., 1962, Intro. pp.9-53.

2. "Alienation in Mass Society: Some Causes and Responses",
   Sociology and Social Research, vol.49(2), 1965,
   pp.142-52.

3. Ibid., p.144.

4. "On the Meaning of Alienation", American Sociological
   Review, vol.24, Dec., 1959, pp.783-91.

5. Seeman's discussion of alienation has been used as a
   basis for empirical research, both his own and that of
   other people. Some of the studies which have made use
   of his classification are: Seeman & Evans, "Alienation
   & Learning in a Hospital Setting", American Sociological
   Review, vol.27, Dec., 1962, pp.772-82; Neal & Rattig,
   "Dimensions of Alienation among Manual and Non-manual
   Workers", American Sociological Review, 28, Aug., 1963,
   pp.599-608; Neal & Seeman, "Organizations & Powerless-
   ness: A Test of the Mediation Hypothesis", American
   Sociological Review, 29, April, 1964, pp.216-66;
   Neal & Rattig, "On the Multidimensionality of Aliena-
   tion", American Sociological Review, 32, Feb., 1967,
   pp.54-64; Robert Blauner, Alienation and Freedom, the
   Factory Worker and his industry, Chicago, University of
   Chicago Press, 1964.

6. "Dehumanization of Anomie and Alienation: A Problem in
   the Ideology of Sociology", British Journal of Sociology,
   15, Dec., 1964, 283-300; p.283.

7. "Alienation and Anomie", seen by the author through the
   courtesy of T. B. Bottemore, then Head of the Department
   of Political Science, Sociology and Anthropology at
   Simon Fraser University, now at Sussex in England, shortly
   to be published.

8. "On Alienation", Inquiry, 8, Part 2, 1965, pp.141-65.

9. Many of the studies employing "alienation" as a tool for
   research have confused rather than clarified the prob-
   lem. John F. Clark, ("Measuring Alienation Within a
   Social System", American Sociological Review, 24,
   Aug., 1959, 849-52) criticized Nettler ("A Measure of
   Alienation", American Sociological Review, 22, 1957,
   Dec., 670-77) and Dwight Dean ("Alienation & Political
   Apathy", Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, The Ohio State
   University, 1956), specifically, and others, by
   implication, who followed the same approach as Nettler

and Dean in trying to measure alienation. Clark's criticism was that their measuring scales failed to be situationally specific. He argued, "It is necessary for man to consider himself deserving a role in the social situation before he can experience feelings of alienation within it..." (p.849). Scales which are not specific to situations imply some normative behavior in the society as a whole, an assumption which is unwarranted and which needs testing. With reference to Nettler's scale, which is an attempt to measure estrangement from popular culture, a person may be disinterested in 'items' of popular culture without being alienated.

Alienation scales which are based upon the assumption of normative behavior in society are meaningless within the Marxian definition of the word. This approach puts the onus on the individual who is seen as a deviate, rather than critically assessing the relation between individuals and their social relations.

Neal and Rettig (op.cit., ref.5) discussed the many meanings assigned to "alienation" by different sociologists in their attempts to operationalize the term, and concluded that "in the absence of agreement on the meanings of the major variables involved, alienation research, taken collectively, manifests a series of discrete and unrelated studies, rather than cumulative additions to a coherent body of empirically verified propositions". (p.63) They suggested that "careful empirical studies of alienation should eventually provide a basis for synthesizing numerous sociological and psychological concerns with man and society". (p. 63ff) It seems to me, as I argue in this paper, that the problem with alienation studies is not one of a lack of "empirical orientation", but one of the assumptions the researchers bring into their study of alienation.

10. The Division of Labor in Society, Tr. G. Simpson, The Free Press, New York, 1966, p.3, "Human passions stop only before a moral power they respect. If all authority of this kind is wanting, the law of the strongest prevails, and latent or active, the state of war is necessarily chronic."

11. I do not mean to disparage the positive contributions of these theorists, but merely to underline the limitations inherent in their analyses due to the assumptions that they carried into their analyses of society.

12. Op.cit., ref. 9, p.849.

13. "On Alienation", Inquiry, 8, Part 2, 1965, pp.143-44.

14. See Robert Blauner's Alienation and Freedom, op.cit.,
    ref.5, as an example of this tendency.

15. See Pappenheim, The Alienation of Modern Man; an inter-
    pretation based on Marx and Tonnies, New York, Monthly
    Review Press, 1959, and Josephson, op.cit., pp.16-21.

16. Nearly all of the books listed in my Bibliography are
    concerned in some way with the threat of alienation.
    Special attention might be given to Marcuse, One
    Dimensional Man , Matson, The Broken Image; Laing,
    The Divided Self; and Bettleheim, The Informed Heart;
    to name only a few.

17. For a classic study of some of the effects of "adjustment"
    to conditions in suburban districts, see Whyte's The
    Organization Man, Garden City, New York, Doubleday,
    1957. See, also, Alan Harrington's "Life in the Crystal
    Palace", in Man Alone (op.cit.) pp.133-43.

18. See the books by Lewis Mumford and by Ashley Montagu in my
    Bibliography with reference to this problem of man's
    adjustment to his environment and it to him.

19. See especially, Edward A. Tiryakian, Sociologism and
    Existentialism, two perspectives on the individual and
    society, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey,
    1962; Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, Barnes and
    Noble, New York, 1965; and Charles S. Peirce, Essays in
    the Philosophy of Science, Ed. V. Tomas, Bobbs-Merrill,
    New York, 1957, for well defined and extensive analyses
    of what is referred to here as the "realist" approach.

20. On Shame and the Search for Identity, Science Editions,
    New York, 1961, p. 217ff.

21. Op.cit., ref.7, pp.11-12.

22. Op.cit., p.187.

23. The printing industry is characterized by craft technology;
    the chemicals industry by continuous-process; the
    textiles by machine-tending; and automobile industry
    by the assembly-line technique. Craft technology is
    distinguished by lack of standardization, relatively
    low level of mechanization, a high proportion of workers
    with traditional skills, and it is the prototype of

pre-industrial society. Machine-tending is the proto-
type technique of early industrialism. The products
in this industry are highly standardized and the hand
work which existed in pre-industrial manufacture of
textiles has been eliminated. The job of the worker
is to tend a large number of machines, a job which
requires very little skill but demands attention of
the worker. The social and economic structure of the
automobile industry (assembly-line) is bureaucratic
rather than traditional in contrast to the printing
and textiles industries. The typical automobile
factory is large and has an impersonal atmosphere,
with even greater standardization of the product than
in machine-tending technology; large centralized
factories, compressed wage and skill distribution,
infrequent advancement opportunities and relatively few
close-knit, functional work groups. The continuous-
process technology common to chemical plants is
characterized by large plants with relatively few
workers, decentralization, a balance of skill distri-
bution, highly elaborate system of job classification,
variety of work and responsibility, and a relaxed work
pace. Blauner noted that the loyalty of the chemical
operator to the firm for which he works approaches that
of the white collar organization man.

24. Ibid., p.15.

25. See Melvin Seeman, "On the Meaning of Alienation".

26. Seeman argued that his five uses of "alienation" are
"logically distinguishable", but one can question the
value of such a distinction since the five modes of
alienation as defined by him are interrelated and not
separable in reality. For example, with reference to
his definition of powerlessness and meaninglessness:
powerlessness is "the expectancy or probability held
by the individual that his own behavior cannot deter-
mine the occurrence of the outcomes, or reinforcements,
he seeks" (p.784); and meaninglessness occurs when
"the individual is unclear as to what he ought to
believe--when the individual's minimal standards for
clarity in decision making are not met". (p.786)
By definition, if a person experiences meaninglessness
he must also experience powerlessness, indicating that
the two are not independent of one another. It might
also be debated whether a person can feel powerless in
situations which are meaningful for him.

27. See my discussion of alienation, Ch. One.

28. The Sociological Tradition, Basic Books, New York, 1966.

29. Op.cit., p.33.

30. See David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd; a study of the
     changing American character, with R. Denney & N. Glazer,
     New Haven, Yale University Press, 1950; Erich Fromm,
     Escape from Freedom, New York, Avon, 1965; and The
     Sane Society, New York, Rinehart, 1955; Erik Ericson,
     Childhood and Society, 2nd Ed. Rev. & Enl., N.Y. Norton,
     1963; and William H. Whyte, The Organization Man,
     Garden City, New York, Doubleday, 1957.

31. See note 3, Ch. Two.

32. Op.cit., p.176.

33. Ibid., p.183.

34. Virginia Woolf, A Room of One's Own, Harcourt, Brace & Co.,
     New York, 1929, pp.63-67.

35. Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch, On the Art of Writing, Cambridge
     University Press, 1928.

36. Op.cit., p.31.

37. "Class Crystallization & Class Consciousness", American
     Sociological Review, 28, 1963, Apr., pp.219-29.

38. For a discussion of the "unreal alternatives" considered
     by factory workers, see Ely Chinoy, Automobile Workers
     and the American Dream, Garden City, New York, Doubleday,
     1955.

39. "Metaphysical Pathos and the Theory of Bureaucracy", in
     Sociology: The Progress of a Decade, ad. Lipset and
     Smelser, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall,
     1961, p.81.

40. "The American Crisis: Political Idealism and the Cold War",
     Commentary, 29,6, Spring, 1960, pp.461-72.

41. "Political Strategy for the Alienated Votor", Public
     Opinion Quarterly, 26,1, Spring, 1962, pp.47-63.

42. See Riesman and Maccoby, op.cit., and Lewis Coser,
     "Comments on Bauer and Bauer", Journal of Social Issues,
     16, 3, 1960, pp.78-84; B. B. Seligman, "On Work,
     Alienation and Leisure", American Journal of Economics,
     24, Oct., 1965, pp.337-60; in contrast with Anthony
     Davids' article "Alienation, Social Apperception and
     Ego Structure", Journal of Consulting Psychology,

19, 1, 1955, pp.21-27, which pictured the alienated man
as being egocentric, distrustful, pessimistic, anxiety
ridden and filled with resentment.

43. Op.cit., p.464.

44. Op.cit., p.63.

45. Ibid., p. 49ff.

46. Most of. the empirical work that has been done on aliena-
tion confuses alienation with anomie, the focus of
attention being on the individual a) as a deviant from
some assumed norm and/or b) with specific reference to
his estrangement from "society". See John Clark,
"Measuring Alienation within a Social System", American
Sociological Review, 24, Aug. 1959, pp.849-52; Anthony
Davids, "Alienation, Social Apperception & Ego Structure",
Journal of Consulting Psychology, 19, 1, 1955, pp.21-27;
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the Alienation Syndrome and Cognitive Process", Journal
of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 51, 1955, July,
61-67; Dwight Dean, "Alienation and Political Apathy",
Social Forces, 38, 3, Mar., 1960, 185-89; Dean,
"Alienation: its Meaning and Measurement", American
Sociological Review, 26, Oct., 1961, 753-58; Goffman,
"Alienation from Interaction", Human Relations, 10, 1,
1957, 47-60; D. Gold, "Independent Causation in Multi-
variate Analysis: the Case of Political Alienation and
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Jeffery, "An Integrated Theory of Crime and Criminal
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R. P. Lowry, "The Functions of Alienation in Leadership",
Social Research, 46, 4, 1962, 426-35; E. L. McDill and
J. C. Ridley, "Status, Anomie, Political Alienation and
Political Participation", American Journal of Sociology,
2, Sept., 68, 1962, 205-13; Gwynn Nettler, "A Measure
of Alienation", American Sociological Review, 22, Dec.,
1957, 670-77; L. I. Pearlin, "Alienation from Work: a
Study of Nursing Personnel", American Sociological
Review, 27, June, 1962, 314-26; A. L. Rhodes, "Authori-
tarianism and Alienation: the F-scale and the Srole
scale as predictors of prejudice", Sociological
Quarterly, 2, 3, July, 1961, 195-203; A. Rose, "Aliena-
tion and Participation: A Comparison of Group Leaders
and the "Mass".", American Sociological Review, 27,
Dec., 1962, 834-38; J. L. Simmons, "Liberalism,

Alienation and Personal Disturbance", _Sociology and Social Research_, 49, July, 1965, 456-64; Smythe, "Nigeria's 'Marginal Men'", _Phylon_, 19, 3, Fall, 1958, 268-76; and F. S. Waisanen, "Stability, Alienation and Change", _Sociological Quarterly_, 4, 1, Winter, 1963, 18-31.

47. See, apart from Blauner's book here discussed, Norman Kaplan, "The Role of the Research Administrator", Admin. Science Quarterly, 4, 1, June, 1959, 20-24; Daniel Bell, "The Rediscovery of Alienation", _Journal of Philosophy_, LVI, 24, Nov., 1959, 933-53; Pearlin, op.cit., ref.48; B. B. Seligman, "On Work, Alienation and Leisure", _American Journal of Economics_, 24, Oct., 1965, 337-60; Zurcher et al, "Value Orientation, Role Conflict and Alienation from Work", American Socio- logical Review, 30, Aug., 1965, 539-48; Neal and Rettig, "Dimensions of Alienation among Manual and Non-manual Workers", _American Sociological Review_, 29, Apr. 1963, 599-608; George Friedman, _Industrial Society_; the emergence of the human problems of automation, ed. H. L. Sheppard, Free Press, New York, 1955; Friedman, _The Anatomy of Work_; Labor, Leisure, and the Implications of Automation, Free Press, New York, 1961; Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, C. W. Mills, _The Power Elite_, Ely Chinoy, _Automobile Workers and the American Dream_, and W. Faunce, "Automation and the Division of Labor", _Social Problems_, 13, 2, 1965, 149-60, as an example of the range of studies in this area. For contrasting approaches to the ideology of industrialism, see Clark Kerr et al, _Industrialism and Industrial Man_, Galaxy, Oxford University Press, 1964, and Reinhard Bendix, _Work and Authority in Industry_, Ideologies of Management in the Course of Industrialization, Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1963.

48. See Weber, _The Theory of Social and Economic Organization_, and Gerth and Mills, _From Max Weber_ for Weber's ideas on bureaucratic organization.

49. "Organizations and Powerlessness: A Test of the Mediation Hypothesis", _American Sociological Review_, 29, Apr., 1964, 216-26.

50. Refer to note 23, this Chapter.

51. "Alienation from Interaction", op.cit.

52. Ibid., p.50.

53. _On Shame and the Search for Identity_, op.cit.

177.

54. Childhood and Society, op.cit.

55. In Josephson, Man Alone, pp.437-46. See Bettleheim's The Informed Heart: Autonomy in a mass age, Glencoe Ill., Free Press, 1960, and The Empty Fortress: Infantile Autism and the Birth of the Self, New York, Free Press, 1967, for a wider view of his approach.

56. "Effects of Group Pressure upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgment", in H. Guetzkow (ed) Groups, Leadership and Men, Pittsburgh: Carnegie Press, 1951; "Opinions and Social Pressure", Sci. Amer., 193, 1955, 31-35; "Studies of Independence and Conformity. A Minority of one against a Unanimous Majority", Psychological Monograph, 70, 9, 1956 (whole no. 416).

57. See Abraham Luchins, Group Therapy, a guide, New York, Random House, 1964; James Johnson, Group Therapy, a practical approach, New York, Blakiston Division, McGraw-Hill, 1963; R. Speers and C. Lansing, Group Therapy in Childhood Psychosis, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1965; and Hubert Coffey and L. Wiener, Group Treatment of Autistic Children, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1967.

58. See Kingsley Davis, "Final Note on a Case of Extreme Isolation", American Journal of Sociology, LII, 5, 1947, 432-37; J. A. L. Singh, Wolf Children and Feral Man, Hamden, Conn., Archon Books, 1966; and Solomon Phillips et al, Sensory Deprivation: a symposium held at Harvard Medical School, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1965.

59. The Concise Oxford Dictionary, p.949, p.973.

60. See Sellitz et al, Research Methods in Social Relations, rev. ed., Holt-Dryden, 1960; Hubert Blalock, Social Statistics, McGray-Hill, Toronto, 1960; Ferguson, Statistical Analysis in Psychology and Education, McGray-Hill, Toronto, 1959.

61. The Wonderful World of Communication, Garden City Books, Garden City, New York, 1959, p.15.

62. For a discussion of the organic approach to the study of life see L. von Bertalanffy's Problems of Life, Harper Torchbook, New York, 1952; and for a discussion along the same lines of human life in particular, see R.E.L. Faris, Social Psychology, Ronald Press, New York, 1952, esp. Ch. 4,5; and Leeper and Madison, Toward Understanding Human Personalities, Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York, 1959, Part Three.

63. "Marx's Theory of Alienation", <u>Philosophy and Phenomeno-logical Research</u>.

64. "Utopia for Practical Purposes", Daedalus, 94, 2, Spring, 1965, 437-53.

CHAPTER IV

1.   _Ideology and Utopia_, Harvest, Harcourt, Brace & Co.,
         New York, 1936, p.171.

2.   None of which he wrote with the intention of publication.
         These three volumes are comprised of notes gathered
         from lectures, and from Mead's own notes. See Morris's
         introductions for details. _The Philosophy of the Act_,
         ed. C. Morris, Chicago, University of Chicago Press,
         1964; _The Philosophy of the Present_, ed. A. Murphy,
         Open Court Publishing Co., La Salle, Ill., 1959;
         Mind, Self and Society, ed. C. Morris, Chicago,
         University of Chicago Press, 1963.

3.   See _The Philosophy of the Act_, Part IV, essay XXVII, "The
         Back of our Mind", pp.479-93.

4.   See _The Philosophy of the Present_, p.1, and _The Philosophy
         of the Act_, pp.31-33, 56, 627-29, 119, 274-75, and
         364-65, for Mead's definition of "reality". He wrote,
         for example, "Appearance is the adjustment of the
         environment to the organism--that is, the effect which
         the environment has upon the organism because of the
         characteristics of the organism. Reality is the effect
         which the environment has upon the organism when the
         organism has responded to the primary influence of the
         environment upon the organism", (p.627) and "This world,
         which is the test of all observation and all scientific
         hypothetical reconstruction has in itself no system
         that can be isolated as a structure of laws, or uni-
         formities, though all laws and formulations of uniformi-
         ties must be brought to its court for its _imprimatur_."
         (p.31) This is the world of "things and events, which
         are what they are". For a view of the world sympathetic
         with that of Mead, see Wallace Stevens' poetry, and his
         book _The Necessary Angel_, where he discusses reality as
         things which are what they are, and the "pressures of
         reality" on the imagination. (Essays on Reality and the
         Imagination, London, Faber, 1960)

5.   _The Philosophy of the Present_, pp.20-21.

6.   Mead said of perspectives, e.g., (arguing against Whitehead's
         interpretation of relativity) "In his objective state-
         ment of relativity the existence of motion in the
         passage of events depends not upon what is taking place
         in an absolute space and time, but upon the relation of
         a consentient set to a percipient event. Such a rela-
         tion stratifies nature. These stratifications are not
         only there in nature but they are the only forms of

nature that are there. This dependence of nature upon
the percipient event is not a reflection of nature into
consciousness. Permanent spaces and times, which are
successions of these strata, rest and motion, are there,
but they are there only in their relationship to per-
cipient events or organisms. We can then go further
and say that the sensuous qualities of nature are there
in nature, but there in their relationship to animal
organisms. We can advance to the other values which
have been regarded as dependent upon appetence, appre-
ciation, and affection, and thus restore to nature all
that a dualistic doctrine has relaged to consciousness,
since the spatio-temporal structure of the world and
the motion with which exact physical science is
occupied is found to exist in nature only in its rela-
tionship to percipient events or organisms". (p.171)
A perspective, then, is a relation between the "per-
cipient event" and nature.

7.   Ibid., p.10.

8.   Ibid., p.11.

9.   The Economic and Philosophical Manuscrips of 1844, p.107.

10.   "A (significant) symbol does tend to call out in the
      individual a group of reactions such as it calls out
      in the other, but there is something further that is
      involved in its being a significant symbol: this res-
      ponse within one's self to such a word as 'chair' or
      'dog', is one which is a stimulus to the individual as
      well as a response. This is what, of course, is
      involved in what we term the meaning of a thing, or its
      significance....When we speak of the meaning of what we
      are doing we are making the response itself that we are
      on the point of carrying out a stimulus to our action."
      (Mind, Self, and Society, p.72)

11.   The Philosophy of the Present, p.12.

12.   Ibid., p.13.

13.   Ibid., p.14.

14.   Ibid., pp.14-15.

15.   Ibid., p.16.

16.   Ibid., p.19.

17.   Essays in the Philosophy of Science, Bobbs-Merrill,
      New York, The Liberal Arts Press, 1957, p.viii.

18.   Ibid., p.ix.

19.   Ibid., p.x.

20.   Ibid., p.23.

21.   Ibid., p.23.

22.   Ibid., p.24.

23.   Ibid., p.24.

24.   Ibid., p.25.

25.   Ibid., p.34.

26.   Ibid., p.33.

27.   Ibid., p.34.

28.   Mind, Self and Society, p.44.

29.   The Philosophy of the Present, p.35.

30.   Ibid., pp.36-37.

31.   Ibid., pp.36-37.

32.   Ibid., p.49.

33.   Ibid., p.48.

34.   Ibid., p.62.

35.   Ibid., p.72.

36.   Ibid., p.73.

37.   Ibid., p.69.

38.   Ibid., p.80

39.   Ibid., p.83.

40.   Ibid., p.83.

41.   Ibid., p.83.

42.   Ibid., p.85.

43.   Ibid., pp.13-14.

44.   Ibid., pp.88-89.

45.   Ibid., p.90.

46.   From Max Weber, p.155.

47.   Ibid., p.155.

48.   The Philosophy of the Present, pp.165-66.

49.   Ibid., pp.166-67.

50.   Ibid., p.168.

51.   The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, p.112.

52.   The German Ideology, pp.3-5.

53.   For two contemporary interpretations of "insanity" that
      are sympathetic with Mead's theory (1. see Laing's
      three books), The Divided Self, a Study of Sanity and
      Madness, London, Tavistock Publ., 1960; The Self and
      Others, further studies in sanity and madness, London,
      Tavistock Publ., 1961; and The Politics of Experience,
      New York, Pantheon Books, 1967; (2. and Szasz's two
      books), Pain and Pleasure: a study of bodily feeling,
      New York, Basic Books, 1957; and The Myth of Mental
      Illness, New York, Hoeber-Harper, 1961.

54.   The Philosophy of the Present, p.167.

55.   From Max Weber, op.cit., p.180.

56.   The Philosophy of the Present, p.194.

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