

COMMUNITY AND COMMON SENSE THE ROOTS OF COMMUNICATION

by

GREGORY ALAN MILLBANK

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APPROVAL

Name: Gregory Alan Millbank

Degree: Master of Arts (Communication Studies)

Title of Thesis: Community and Common Sense The Roots of
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Examining Committee:

Chairman: Dallas Smythe

Fred Brown
Senior Supervisor

Robert Harper

Maurice Halperin

Date Approved: April 27, 1976

ABSTRACT

The pragmatist philosophical view as adumbrated by Dewey and Bentley is unique insofar as it stresses a transactional viewpoint rather than self-actional or interactional perspectives that lie behind most contemporary explanations in the sciences as well as in purely philosophical literature. The term 'transaction' refers to the full ongoing process in a field including all the aspects and phases of the field as well as the inquirer himself, seen in common process. This differs from the self-actional view (wherein independent powers, forces, actors, minds, etc, are seen as independent prime movers) and from the interactional view (in which independent entities are seen in some sort of causal connection). Organism and environment are seen as mutual participants in a transaction and are understood to be inseparably connected. The view that an organism is clearly distinct from, and in any way independent of the field in which it exists, is held to be fallacious and an outgrowth of a necessary linguistic convenience.

The word 'behavior' is thus used to stand for all of the accommodative processes of organisms in environments. Uniquely human behavior centres around a set of transactions about which it may be said that something stands for, or refers to, something else. Such transactions have been termed 'sign-behavior' and very broadly come under the heading of language. The transactional approach to linguistic behavior focuses on the entire sign-process rather than artificially promoting the

distinction between a sign, the user of the sign, and that which is signified. The investigation is thereby directed away from questions of meaning and reference and directed towards behavioral observation which includes the context in which the behavior occurs.

In part 1 of this thesis, a transactional interpretation of 'object', 'intuition', 'habit', 'custom', and 'common sense' is undertaken along with an analysis of some related terms. This gives rise to the predication that the habits which comprise common sense arise in conjoint activity and are consequently concomitant with a certain kind of social organization. It is argued that small co-operative communities are essential for the creation and maintenance of the habits of common sense, and that uniquely human manifestations such as 'mind' and 'consciousness' are products of social activity.

The second part of the thesis outlines the steady rise in popularity of the ideals of individualism at the same time as technological and economic changes began to erode the communitarian institutions of the middle ages. After the Reformation, an accelerating change in the structure of Western civilization replaced a quasi-organic structure (in which small communities made up the "organs" of the state) with an ordered structure (in which individuals are utilized as uniform parts in an economic machine). In practical matters, the medieval community created and sustained common sense. Inasmuch as common sense arises out of conjoint activity, it serves as the link between consciousness and the actual (or real) world.

But the ordered society does not provide the intimate and sustained circumstances for shared activity that forms the foundation of common sense, and so common sense has been replaced by a surrogate which is termed popular sense.

In the third part of the thesis, it is argued that human intelligence is primarily social in nature and is closely connected with the evolutionary flexibility of habits. Since popular sense is removed from shared activity in which such habits are forged and reshaped as actual conditions demand, it follows that the popular sense society is markedly less intelligent than a more loosely organized system that permits small organic groups to evolve in tune with local environmental conditions. The question of means and ends in relation to social action and the bearing this has on theories of historical inevitability is discussed in the light of the foregoing argument, and conclusions are drawn as to the possibility of social reorganization under present doctrines.

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Introduction

The rising tide of pessimism that threatens the stability of Western culture is not merely, as has been suggested, an artifact of the termination of a millenium.¹ Mere numbers, in themselves -not even when they are followed by three zeros- do not have the power to topple nations and undermine their ideals. The pessimism goes much deeper and appears to be well rooted in an often expressed feeling that technology has run amuck; that man's technological abilities have by far outstripped his social understanding and that we cast ourselves adrift on a fearful ocean of possibilities without oar or rudder. For perhaps the first time, man's ability with tools has amplified his strengths, and in relation thereby deepened his weaknesses to the point where he is able to do the entire race, even the living globe, genuine and lasting harm. We know far better how to do things than we know what to do.

It seems that the current pessimism has broad roots, and this realization suggests that its causes cannot be understood nor rectified by a little specialized academic chiseling on one rootlet or another. No academic field or discipline seems broad enough in view or methodology by itself to grasp or grapple with such a broad and overwhelming problem. Various disciplines have come up against internal conditions of diminishing return suggesting failures of sense within the fundamental assumptions of the fields themselves. This realization has lead to an interest in the establishment

of multi-disciplinary approaches to important practical problems. In turn, the experienced difficulties of coordination and communication within such interdisciplinary groups has lead to an interest in highly general theoretical approaches on one hand, and on the other hand, a renewed interest in the fundamental principles of human communication.

Unfortunately, although it seems that the foundation of successful communication is a common framework of understanding, it does not follow that efforts at communication necessarily result in better understanding. Fortunately, in large measure, the common practices of survival on the same planet assure a degree of congruence in the languages of ordinary life. Reasonable translations from one language to another are generally possible, although a considerable distortion of sense can occur over things which are not common between two linguistic groups. But in strictly theoretical undertakings beyond the possibility of reference to actual common experiences, no degree of congruence of usage is assured even among members of the same linguistic group. The sense of specialized jargon depends on the close cooperation and frequent communication of those who share an intense practical interest in the specific undertakings of the field.

The recognition that there are structural similarities in the various theoretical frameworks of different fields of investigation leads to the consideration that underneath the

surface there is a deep structure; a super-general kind of order that, if correctly interpreted, will enable men to tie everything together in a way that will generate sense where now there is only nonsense. Unfortunately, it is equally reasonable to assume that whatever structural similarities exist may simply be artifacts of a reliance on a limited pool of logical and mathematical resources rather than profound reflections of a deep order inherent in the universe itself.

The earnest effort to avoid ontological and epistemological constructions, that is, intermediary "things" which have no demonstrable existence in the actual world leads a theoretician to positivism, or beyond, to pragmatism which attempts to build the universe of actual things directly on the foundations of observable human behaviors², with special attention to the fact that men are social animals whose behavior consists of transactions within a contributing environment in which change is an ever present feature.

To the extent that the pragmatic viewpoint stresses that the roots of knowing are behavioral and social, it represents an ideal philosophical foundation for an understanding of human communication. It is a viewpoint which revolves around man as an actor in a participating world, and which places man's sociality at the root of the uniquely human business of talking. A fundamental thrust of this paper is to examine the social matrix of communication from a pragmatist view and to view some aspects of the current social scene in the light of some implications of this view.

Central to the argument of this paper is the notion of consensus — shared sense — which is the nexus of words and action. It is maintained, following the pragmatist thrust of the argument that the most fundamental kind of consensus, which is termed 'common sense', rests on common or conjoint action. Shared doings are the basis of shared sense. This is the most fundamental argument of the paper.

Establishing a common conceptual framework then appears to be more a matter of cooperation in actual undertakings than a matter for endless colloquies. It is through conjoint activity, according to the view expounded here, that things are formed out of the previously undifferentiated environment. Only in conjoint action can the actual, practical limits, qualities and so forth of a thing be established. In this light, it can be argued that the process of education is primarily the business of doing things, not the business of merely talking about them. Schools and universities consequently do not represent the ideal environment in which a sound common sense might root and grow. Rather than fostering a willingness to do and try, a peculiar sterility with regard to physical action is encouraged. It is perhaps a condemnation of modern thinkers that so many of them talk well but live badly. What is the value of talk if it never shapes human activity? It is undoubtedly a fault in an engineer that he can calculate but not handle a wrench, for his behavior is cut off short of the crucial revitalizing test of his thinking. The shattered geography of human knowledge attests to the failure of thinkers and doers to bring their viewpoints together in the measure of experience.

Although words may have become divorced from their direct referents in action, thereby losing much of their sense, they still command a set of behaviors, which, though perhaps reduced in scope, are still potent. Such near-nonsense language can render human behavior unintelligent, as current behaviors are tied thereby to environmental transactions of the past rather than being keyed to possible changes in the present. In part, the current pessimism is tied to evidence that the totality of human activity is not intelligent. The main thrust of human activity is in directions that once were suitable for human survival, but which now threaten disaster. As an example, it might be argued that the fundamental requirements for survival were once a maximum efficiency in the production of life's necessities and a sustained rate of human reproduction. It is no longer certain nor, many would argue, even likely, that continued efforts to increase production nor to sustain the current rate of reproduction are in the interests of the human race. Yet the reasoning which supports such activities and maintains a blindness to contemporary circumstances is rooted in sign-behavior which takes its sense from the past.

Although the circumstances of life have markedly changed, the thrust of verbal behavior and the accompanying range of beliefs and undertakings has not. The technological revolution has not been accompanied by a revolution in sense. This paper will promote and examine the contention that there has been failure of sense to evolve with evolving conditions of technological life, and that this failure rests on changes in

the social conditions of life that have reduced the opportunity for the evolution and revitalization of sign-behavior.

The interrelation between verbal behavior and direct action implies that intelligent action is a matter of communication, and that communication is a matter of community. To the extent that members of different disciplines do not share common undertakings, they are not liable to share a common understanding. Though an attempted interdisciplinary view of the world's problems may be broad, it is not necessarily a view inasmuch as it does not rest on a common conceptual framework. It may be rather a collection of views masquerading as one.

A test of genuine consensus; of a common sense, is in a reliable similarity of intuitions. Emerson applauded reliable intuitions when he wrote:

...there are more excellent qualities in the student than preciseness and infallibility; a guess is often more fruitful than a precise affirmation, and a dream may let us deeper into the secret of nature than a hundred concerted experiments.³

Common and reliable intuitions rest on common experiences.

Reliable intuitions are the result of shared or common sense.

Conjoint undertakings assure similarity of intuitions. Members of a common group feel the same way about things. Thus, it may be said that they understand each other. Feelings and intuitions point to subverbal behaviors which are shared by the members of a group.

Common sense itself rests on shared experience. It is

knowledge of the actual world gained in conjoint exercise. The appropriateness of sign-behavior revolves around the hub of common sense. Common sense regulates society, nay more; it makes society possible. The maintenance of common sense and its environs is thus a far nobler calling than the maintenance of the state, or of law and order. These are but pale reflections of the fundamental social role played by common sense.

It may be necessary on the sociological side of this discussion to distinguish between types of human social organization. The broad use of the term "society" masks fundamental differences, seen from the point of view entertained here, in the foundations of communication systems, and ultimately in the resolution of problems of social control. The continuum on which these distinctions may be drawn ranges from loose collections of familial or tribal groups on one hand, in which there is a maximum opportunity among members of a group for conjoint activity, and on the other hand, huge collections of individuals, such as appear to be developing in the major technological states. Conditions which approach the former case may be termed "organic" and those which approach the latter, "ordered".

A part of the argument which will be developed later in the paper describes the historical transition of Western society from the organic mode towards the ordered mode.

An ordered society lends itself to mass production and consumption, but does so at the expense of the development of

common sense. The conditions for conjoint transactions are diminished and so true consensus based on a congruence of sense tends to dissolve into merely verbal agreement with little opportunity for test or revision. An ordered society cannot therefore readily adapt to changes in its environing conditions whether they are created by itself or not. The enormous short-run success of an ordered society in the tasks of production and consumption of goods can consequently only be maintained insofar as the evolution of environing conditions can be held within the limits of acceptability for a non-adaptive social order. The ordered society, like a machine, has no capacity for evolution. Changes tend to be revolutionary rather than evolutionary, since language tends to direct activity rather than the reverse.

The reliance on doctrine rather than common sense is a mark of an ordered society. Doctrine is the linguistic instrument whereby order is maintained. Doctrines are promoted as absolute truths by those who benefit from the status quo.

Various kinds of organic societies still exist insofar as the social requirements of technological change have not wiped them out. But organic societies cope with a very small range of undertakings compared to those necessitated by technological progress and in general the quest for security has always driven primitive man to a heavy reliance on the proto-doctrines of totem and taboo. Nonetheless the patterns of social organization whose shadows exist even today in the

ordered machine-like social structure of technological societies, and many of the assumptions that are basic to sociological thought, all spring from collections of organic communities such as were common even in North America in Emerson's time.

In a sense, the purpose of an organized society would be anti-utopian. Static utopian schemes necessarily involve tyranny if they are to be attempted at all, since, as offsprings of the geometrical world promoted by machine-society philosophers, they ignore the universality of change. An organized society would be an attempt only to maximize evolutionary capability at the most fundamental level of human organization.

History becomes more and more a record of enforced doctrinaire solutions to problems which result from an inability to reach a natural consensus. The isolation of men in the technostructure⁵ is the end product of a movement toward individualism that surged forward at the time of the Reformation. The gradual dispersal of cooperative communities since that time destroyed the communitarian foundations of common sense. The ability of society to regulate its affairs in tune with changing needs was thereby reduced. The iron bands of totalitarian bureaucracy now attempt to enforce a degree of consensus from above. Such an enforced social order robs society of its natural adaptability or intelligence and at best represents only a short term solution to the problem of social order.

The theological traditions of Western philosophy have lead philosophers to venerate the intellectus purus at the expense of the practical life. Intuition, understanding, knowledge and so forth have been given mentalistic, almost magical interpretations, but the commonest transactions in the everyday life of people have been largely ignored as the primary source of knowledge about fundamental philosophical problems. The view that some ultimate understanding of the actual world may be deciphered by recourse to unsullied reason or the mere critique of a singular aspect of the human scene, (such as language alone) by its holy simplicity demonstrates its ancestral relation to the notion that the Gods send rain to farmers that offer sacrifices and deny it to those that do not. It is as ignorant of the actual well-springs of meaning and sense as such an agrarian theology is of the physical causes of rain.

Those who feel sympathetic to the point of view thus far expressed may recognize its roots in some of the works of C. S. Peirce, C. H. Cooley, G. H. Mead, William James, and John Dewey. In short I have been strongly influenced by thinkers of the Pragmatist or Instrumentalist school. The clear insights offered by these men have been largely ignored in the academic enthusiasm for philosophy with a European flavour. The great advantage of this uniquely North American viewpoint is its freedom and freshness from the musty worship of the intellectus purus that permeates the European scene. Unfortunately, the pragmatic viewpoint is not flattering to

the intellectual qua intellectual, and it is understandable that among university intellectuals as among trade unionists a certain amount of time must be devoted to matters of prestige and job security. Nonetheless, it is regrettable that by and large the methods of honest boast and direct confrontation have been left to the trade union movement while a subtle propaganda of self aggrandizement at the expense of honest learning has so often been the unspoken policy of "educators".

The relative success of the trade union world of tools and action is demonstrated by man's enormous technological prowess, while the sterility of the purely intellectual approach is clearly evident in our relative social impotence, for the former has always been the bailiwick of the man of action and direct trial and error experiment whereas the latter has always been the realm of the idle speculator buoyed by a love of doctrine and surrounded by a shallow virtue of his own design.

It is high time that a melding of heedless industry and powerless speculation should take place; to tame the former and to revitalize the latter. Action and talk are inter-related and necessary components for the conduct of life and for the furtherance of inquiry. The Pragmatist view was an attempt to describe the fundamental ties between action, sociality, and thought. Today more than ever it deserves serious consideration by those who remain unimpressed by the eloquently expressed fear and loathing uttered by insecure academics of the old school.

Undoubtedly, some will criticize this paper as being too general or broad in scope, yet in the only important respect, the intentions of the writer are quite narrow and modest indeed. It is only intended by means of argument and example to offer a different point of view that can be tried on for size, so to speak, and then further investigated or rejected outright as the reader prefers. It cannot be denied, however that the establishment of a new viewpoint necessarily leads one through jealously guarded fields and over countless borders and fences. But it is not the intention of the writer to pose as an expert in anyone else's field, nor to offend the cognoscendi. It is simply hoped that a new perspective may be gained by taking circumstances in a different order and from a different side than the customary one. In this little jaunt over well-tilled fields it is simply hoped that the reader may get a slightly different picture of the geography of verbal, physical, and social aspects of human existence and of how these aspects interrelate.

Common Sense

1. Speaking of Things

Dualism is pervasive in Western thought. Body and soul, thinker and doer, necessary and contingent, sacred and profane, are all children of a fundamental dichotomy in the Western world view. These polarizations of the continuum of circumstance are related and partake of a long tradition in European thought and its long standing social manifestations. The Greeks were very much impressed by the promise of perfection offered by

imaginary realms beyond the contingencies of actual life. The tradition of imaginary worlds in one of its forms, we may assume, must be nearly as old as the use of language itself. Language permits its users to escape the bounds of actuality and spin visions of lives without trials or errors; but detailed versions of such realms probably awaited the advent of written notation to take on fixed forms.

Aspects of life which are relatively stable are amenable to prediction with a reasonable rate of success whenever they are treated as absolutely static or even if an imaginary version of change can be plotted for them. The possibility of using ordinary speech and the processes of counting for the purposes of calculating outcomes was not lost on the ancients, but it was customary to treat false predictions as evidence of an annoying imperfection in the real world rather than evidence of a wistful idealism in the application of imaginary changes to real changes. For the most part in any case, the reasonably accurate predictions to be obtained by the juggling of asymptotes by far overshadowed the fundamental but usually minor inapplicability of ethereally pure calculations to the writhing uncertainties of actual life.

In an uncertain and dangerous world, the security from an unknowable future promised by the clockwork world of the mind, in which there were no contingencies, was enormously appealing. The dancing figure of perfection could be discerned in the realm of the intellectus purus, far from the inconstancies of everyday life. Even to this day, most men are lured by the

wraith. So, although heaven has grown from the requirements of man and not man from the whimsies of heaven, everywhere it has been customary for men to offer sacrifice and prayer to the child of their own hopes and fears in the belief that by so doing, some of the magic of the pure mind may rub off and bless their everyday lives.

The realm of the pure intellect, the soul, of necessary outcomes in a perfect world, has become exalted as the Most High, whereas the actual life of the body, of work and risk, was demeaned as earthy and low. When fed, men have a natural tendency to sit and dream of "How nice it would be if..." and it is only understandable that the products of these secure and pleasant times have been given a high value. Men have often fought to the death to protect the virginity of their beliefs and dreams, and yet have lived in severest misery for centuries without ever lifting a finger against their oppressors.

Thus, the ancients, impressed by the security and exactitude offered by ideal posited worlds, came to regard posited existences as of a higher order and even more real than actual life. The Greeks, for example, came to equate the highest level of being, that is, Complete Being, with Non-Being in the actual world.⁶ Non-being required insubstantiality, and insubstantiality ruled out the possibility of change. Substantial objects after all, undergo changes, and were thus considered to be too imperfect to be the true subjects of knowledge. Only insubstantial and immutable things could be the perfect subjects of knowledge. The highest degree of being in the Greek world

view was therefore reserved for such perfect existences or forms.

The veneration of the ideal at the expense of the real or actual world is a philosophical tradition that has been maintained on numerous levels ever since. It is at the root of the so-called mind-body problem and comes to the fore in every instance when the relations between varieties of man-created immutable forms and writhing actuality are under scrutiny.

Positional objects, or, in other words, asymptotes, were not regarded as such by the Greeks. They were regarded as actually "out there" in some sort of nature, but on a very high plane. Thus even today we talk of mathematical discoveries when we might more properly say inventions.⁷ In mathematics, new procedures are not uncovered, they are assembled. In school, we say that things are taught, as if teaching someone about something were a process that had a natural beginning and end. Actually, something could only be taught in its entirety if it were unchanging and fundamentally finite. The Greek view was simply that; that the subject matter of knowledge was fixed and finite. But we are beginning to regard knowledge as variable and infinite. Yet we still teach as if we held the Greek view, which in practice, therefore, we do. Discovery and learning, in the Greek view, were the same thing, namely, coming into possession of something already known in some existence somewhere. Learning involved some sort of change

and was therefore an activity on an inferior plane. To a greater and greater extent, however, we have come to recognize that in many cases discovery and learning involve finding out something new. A new fact is created in a novel transaction.

In Runes' Dictionary of Philosophy we find 'fact' described as "an indubitable truth of actuality". Here is a clear example of the allegiance of modern philosophers to an ancient and unyielding doctrine. Can anything of useful specificity be "indubitably true of actuality"? Which actuality? As seen from your point of view or mine? Notice how time is ignored. Change is thus ruled out. "of actuality when?" one ought to ask. It is a strange comment on philosophers to observe that the meaning of the word has been so badly twisted from its roots in the old Latin factum, meaning "something done". This speaks simply of the actual world in which things are done and undone as a matter of course. Nothing done remains just so for ever.

Dewey attempted to reinstate time and change into 'fact' and proposed that it be understood to stand for "knowings-knowns durationally and extensionally spread; not what is known to and named by any one organism in its lifetime".⁸ Fact is thereby established for philosophical purposes as nothing less than the cosmos known through a multitude of ongoing transactions involving men as doers and knowers.

The continuing effect of the Greek worship of stasis has been the creation by philosophers and theologians of a

host of intermediary entities on various levels of purported existence whose primary function is to connect the clockwork apparatus of an almost medieval metaphysics with a growing scientific realization of the mutable nature of the actual world. To this day, logicians feel obliged to clutter their ontologies with mentalistic creations in order to substantiate cabalistic claims about the nature of their subject matter. Dewey and Bentley brought a pair of well known thinkers to task on this point:

Cohen and Nagel believe their logic to be in tune with the infinite, this being a standard convention among logicians. 'Its principles,' they say, 'are inherently applicable because they are concerned with ontological traits of the utmost generality'. We, on the contrary, believe their principles are inherently defective because they are concerned with verbal traits of the utmost triviality.⁹

A major problem of any epistemology is the relation of observable, factual material on one hand, with theoretical, ideational material on the other. The roots of this problem appear to lie in the religious proclivities of our forefathers. But the problem has been carried forward by theologian-philosophers into a period of history far different from that out of which it sprang. The canonical attitude of modern philosophers contrasts sharply with a vastly modified and improved set of techniques for inquiry and invention that are a matter of routine in the less exact sciences. The resolution of the conflict within philosophy does not lie in further manipulations of ontological schemes, nor in the

positing of more potent mental capacities. Cluttered ontologies must ultimately be faced with the task of explaining away their own cumbersome existence, and all theories of mind must face the nagging question of the physical whereabouts of this remarkable meeting place of the practical and the divine. No, the ontological and epistemological routes have been well travelled over the centuries and have of late given little satisfaction to an ever increasing need for good theory to unite a growing body of practical scientific information.

A solution may be found in a change in viewpoint from ontology to inquiry, and in general, a study of human behavior of which inquiry forms a part. Dewey explained this shift in viewpoint in the following way:

The elimination of ontological reference that at first sight may seem portentous actually amounts to the simple matter of saying that whatever claims to be or to convey knowledge has to be found in the context of inquiry; and that this thesis applies to every statement which is put forth in the theory of knowledge, whether the latter deals with its origin, its nature, or its possibility.¹⁰

This implies that the knower and the known must enter the picture together; whereas the epistemological approach focused on the knower and the ontological approach examined the nature of the known, the study of inquiry takes the two together as opposite ends of the same piece of behavior. An act of inquiry is taken as a transaction, an example of human behavior in its environing conditions. Unlike 'knowledge' inquiry is

studied complete with its field of coexistent conditions in the actual world.

By the same token, then, so must observer and observed be taken as equal contributors to the act of observation. All behaviors are to be seen as processes in an environment in which both the environing conditions and the organism are seen as coequal partners. In another place, Dewey wrote:

Our position is simply that since man as an organism has evolved among other organisms in an evolution called 'natural', we are willing under hypothesis to treat all of his behaviors, including his most advanced knowings, as activities not of himself alone, nor even as primarily his, but as processes of the full situation of organism-environment; and to take this full situation as one which is before us within the knowings, as well as being the situation in which the knowings themselves arise.¹¹

The traditional language about knowings and knowns shatters the subject matter in advance of the proceeding inquiry. Distinctions are made where none are necessary. Traditional epistemologies have imprisoned themselves through the incautious use of biased language. The knower and the known are separated in the knowing subject and the known object, yet it seems much more reasonable to assume that what is known is equally as much a partner in the act of knowing as is the knower. In other behaviors this can be observed to be true. A game of baseball would make little sense if one insisted on analyzing it in strict terms of the ballplayers acting on the ball. All the rules, the stadium, and so forth, would have to be explained in terms of some innate inclination

on the part of ball players to set up ball playing situations. How much simpler to see the ball players, the spectators, the stadia and all the other paraphernalia of baseball as part of an ongoing continuum of transactions roughly called "the game of Baseball". The question of why baseball players play baseball, or of how they play baseball, can best be answered by reference to various aspects of the whole continuum of transactions that roughly makes up the history and psychology and so forth, of baseball. A sensible man would not attempt to explain the game otherwise. Yet when we look at a more fundamental and complex piece of human behavior, namely knowing, we find the knower and the known separated and considered apart from each other and from the circumstances of the knowing. Epistemological questions generally follow the lines of "What is it about a knower that enables him to know?" or "What is it about the known that enables us to know it?" When the basic epistemological questions are asked in such a manner, it is not surprising that no one can give a clear account. In spite of the generation of a host of artificial, limiting and imaginary entities by epistemologists over the centuries, all of the important evidence has been ruled out of order in advance of the investigation.

The transactional view, forwarded by Dewey and Bentley and asserted in this paper, establishes unity where traditional epistemologies create diversity. The act of knowing is seen to be a transaction in which both knower and known and all the historical and environmental accompaniments of the case

are participants. A consequence of this shift of viewpoint is further that names are not to be taken as naming items or characteristics of organisms alone, nor can they be considered to name items or characteristics of the environment alone, but rather they are to be understood as naming an activity undertaken conjointly between environment and organism.

The naming of a repetitive occurrence in the concatenation of ongoing circumstance signifies and thereby creates an object. Seen transactionally, objects are as much social matters as they are physical. Attention to the process of naming discloses the social aspect of objects, for language, and hence naming, is a social undertaking as is the investigation or other activity out of which naming proceeds. It is the conjoint or shared value of an event that causes it to be picked out of the ongoing flux as a thing of interest and ultimately, as it becomes named, an object.

Lest there be objections that this usage distorts the English language, let it be asserted here that a transactional interpretation wreaks less havoc than does the self-actional treatment proposed in traditional philosophy. For example, here is a typical treatment of the term 'object':

"Epistemological Object: The object envisaged by an act of knowledge whether the knowledge be veridical, illusory, or even hallucinatory in contrast to ontological object, which is a real thing corresponding to epistemological object when the knowledge is veridical."¹²

We are also told that knowledge is "relations known" and "apprehended truth". Now the Oxford Dictionary informs us

that 'object' comes either from Latin objecta, meaning "things objected, charges, accusations;" or from objectus meaning "the fact of throwing itself or being thrown in the way: interposition, obstruction;". This sits well with the transactional view which also obviates the need for a differentiation between epistemological and ontological objects which appears to be generated in at least some traditional views.

In the course of ongoing transactions in the environment the nature of the activity being performed and the nature of the environing conditions in which it is performed conspire to give a degree of importance to a certain aspect of the overall situation. In a manner of speaking, certain features of the environment by their potential for use in a certain way, "throw themselves in the way" of individuals who can utilize them. On the other hand, and at the same time, the need for a certain something to use in a certain way, "throws something in the way", so to speak, that is, selects a thing for use. If this occurs in a repeated or habitual manner, it is likely that the particular aspect of the environment will acquire a name. A thing which acquires a name is an object. A thing, according to the Oxford Dictionary is "a matter of concern or interest" or, interestingly, "that which is done or to be done; a doing, act, or deed". A thing is an activity undertaken conjointly between environment and an actor or actors within the environment. This activity named, is an object.

As the transactions of a group within the environment assume a fairly regular pattern in some respect, this pattern or form becomes named. Thereby, it becomes an object. As a new entity it is in recognized "interposition" between man and environs. It stands on its own. There are no objects which are not named, although the gamut of names runs from polysyllabic Greco-Roman appropriations to grunts and gestures.

Seen in this light, a language is a system of names. 'Name' as used in this context is not congruent with 'noun' as it is in traditional philosophy. Names always refer to some sort of action or activity.¹³

Language is a collection of behaviors of men, although possibly not uniquely so. There seems little reason to doubt that language is powerfully developed among men. This fact is likely closely tied to man's unique prowess as a tool-using being, and both these facts issue from man's social nature. The creation of names-objects is obviously a social matter. Language is a social behavior among other behaviors and is not of the organism alone or of the environment alone, but is a transaction of the organic environmental situation. Names men and things named form the apices of a tightly interconnected triangle which is the embodiment of human-ness or humanity. All three components are in a state of constant evolution along with the interrelations between them. Thus the evolution of man proceeds for the greater part outside of genetics, but proceeds through the evolution of tools, language and sociality.

In this discussion, as has been mentioned, 'language' is being used in the widest sense. This use of the term extends it beyond merely oral and written speech. It includes aspects of rites, ceremonies, works of art, monuments, and even aspects of the products of industry and handicrafts. Tools and machines as objects can also take on aspects of language insofar as they are intimately connected with kinds of responses in their users.

Dewey best summed up the matter thus:

"The importance of language as the necessary, and in the end sufficient condition of the existence and transmission of non-purely organic activities and their consequences lies in the fact that, on one side, it is a strictly biological mode of behavior, emerging in natural continuity from earlier organic activities, while on the other hand it compels one individual to take the standpoint of other individuals and to see and inquire from a standpoint that is not strictly personal but is common to them as participants or 'parties' in a conjoint undertaking. But it first has reference to some other person or persons with whom it institutes communication - the making of something common. Hence to that extent its reference becomes general and 'objective.'¹⁴

2. Intuition and Common Sense

A transactional view of objects and language leads to the realization that shared or conjoint activity is the nexus of human communication. Actual physical participation by members of a group in matters of mutual interest lies at the root of human consciousness. Such a familiar acquaintance of men with things lies at the foundation of all subsequent linguistic behavior. Regarding this, Dewey wrote:

"Only by direct, active participation in the transactions of living does anyone become familiarly acquainted with other human beings and with 'things' which make up the world. While 'common sense' includes more than knowledge, this acquaintance knowledge is its distinguishing trait; it demarcates the frame of reference of common sense by identifying it with life actually carried on as it is enjoyed or suffered."¹⁵

A recognition of the fundamental importance of common sense is not new. The so-called "Philosophy of Common Sense" has a long, if not entirely respectable history. What is different about the pragmatic regard for common sense is that for the first time, common sense is understood not as a mysterious "faculty", but rather as a group of fundamental human behaviors.

Sir W. Hamilton in Ried's Works describes common sense as a "faculty of primary truths" or "the complement of those cognitions or convictions which we receive from nature: which all men therefore possess in common; and by which they test the truth of knowledge, and the morality of actions."¹⁶

Neither is the recognition that intuition and common sense are closely tied a new understanding. In fact, Sidgwick criticized common sense philosophy in 1874 as "Dogmatic Intuitionism, in which the general rules of Common Sense are accepted as axiomatic."¹⁷ In 1770, Beattie described common sense as:

"...that power of the mind which perceives truth, or commands belief, not by progressive argumentation, but by an instantaneous, instinctive, and irresistible impulse; derived neither from education, nor from habit, but from nature."¹⁸

A need to assert the universality of truths inclined even

common sense philosophers to look for an unflinching faculty "which all men possess in common." It is neither expedient nor proper here to take antique doctrines apart, although a lament or two is offered for the small improvement offered by some modern practitioners of the art. Nonetheless, the assertion that common sense is simply received "from nature", and that it is a "power of the mind", seems unnecessarily devious and magical and reason enough for rejecting "Common Sense Philosophy" here.

The Oxford Dictionary offers "Good, sound, practical sense;" as a definition, and it seems good sense to begin with that here. Good sense is judged in practice by its results in everyday activity. The judgement that sense is good is passed by those who share in the activity and also, therefore, partake of an aspect of the "sound, practical sense". It is generally agreed that the resort to common sense is intuitive, and thus it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that common sense might be described as shared intuitions or intuitive sense.

Intuitions have a special immediacy and directness that perhaps first prompted philosophers with epistemological problems to seize upon them as a way out. Well developed intuitions are a sign of an active practical life; of sound experience in one's customary affairs. They are remembrances in nerve and muscle of paths often taken; of the best things to be done in various kinds of circumstances.

The Latin root of the word is intueri; to look at. In the sense that looking and intuiting are both direct and immediate, there is some guidance to be gleaned from etymology.

But the idea that intuition involves some sort of conscious looking or examination is misleading. Intuitions are simply fundamental, habitual, reflex knowings. Intuitions are the class of knowings for which the familiar comprises the knowns. In large measure we operate within our familiar environment intuitively. The everyday articles of our lives are utilized in a habitual, half-conscious fashion that characterizes intuitions. An experienced pilot adjust the controls of his aircraft intuitively, and is hard pressed to give a verbal account of just why or even how he does what he does. Intuitions are fundamental knowings that need not reach the conscious level of namings. On the intuitive level the act of knowing how to handle a mosquito is simply swatting it. There is no prior internal rational discourse.

The transactional and fundamentally behavioral account of intuitions as habits retains the flavour of immediacy that characterizes traditional philosophical accounts while avoiding all the problems of traditional dualism inherent in the assumption of the existence of a separate and self-actional mind. Of course, the assumption of universality is fatally impaired. Any man with a Chinese wife, however, will assure the most sceptical reader that there are varieties of intuitive solutions to everyday problems.

Man is a social animal, however, and his intuitions are forged conjointly with those of his fellows. Over a period of time, people who work and play together grow more alike, even to their most fundamental habits. The conjoint set of intuitions

of a familiar group are what we will collectively term common sense, or, from the other way around, as has been suggested, common sense is the set of shared intuitions. Common sense is to a familiar group as intuition is to an individual in that group. This strictly behavioral account of common sense bears little resemblance to "common sense" in traditional philosophical theory. The transactional view of common sense does not hold it to be at the root of a self-actional mind, although a later, behavioral account of mind is not ruled out either. Common sense is simply the shared sense of a close group of people who customarily undertake life's tasks more or less conjointly. Intuition is the reflection of this sense in each individual.¹⁹

Common sense is consequently not entirely common to large numbers of people from varied circumstances. The sense of aspects of the environment and accompanying words, gestures, and so forth, are only common to the extent that they are familiar to all concerned. The conveyed meaning or sense of a phrase is deeply connected with the familiarity of the circumstances which prompt it, and with a shared familiarity of the circumstances in which it is habitually uttered. The failure of one person to make sense to another person is not simply a failure of words to express or transmit a meaning. Meanings are not "somethings" which are frequently improperly attached to words. It is necessary that the sense of an utterance be common, that is, that the experience forming the response it evokes be sufficiently similar on both sides

that a congruity of response is assured. Thus common or shared experiences lie at the root of meaning, not a simple facility in memorizing contiguous words in a dictionary or from everyday life.

The ability of a group of individuals to come to an understanding on something deeper than a superficial level rests on their ability, through talk to some extent, but far more powerfully through a combination of talk and relevant shared activity, to make underlying experiences common. Community of understanding rests on a community of undertakings. The social conditions that encourage conjoint activity, therefore, encourage the growth of common sense, and through it, the possibility of a deeper level of conveyed meaning or understanding. As the social circumstances for cooperative undertakings wane, so do the possibilities for a firm understanding. Inasmuch as any statement ultimately makes sense, it refers back to common sense. Words, in themselves are not the stimuli that evoke accordant responses. The connection between verbal behavior and physical action goes deep, and it is upon the similarity of the connection in each case that a successful conveyance of meaning resides. It is no exaggeration to say that sense is fundamentally a social matter.

3. Habits

Habits are dispositions, or rather, tendencies to do certain sorts of things in certain sorts of circumstances. The thing which is done and the circumstances in which it is

done are coequal constituents of a habit. The circumstances produce the act, the act defines the circumstances. In other words, habits, including the habits of common sense, are functions. Like biological functions such as breathing, digesting, and so forth, they are as much functions of the surrounding environment as they are of the organism in it. Breathing is a matter of air as much as lungs. Digesting is as much a matter of food as it is of the various organs of the alimentary canal. The word 'function' demarcates a body of transactions in space and time that are similar in respect of actions and conditions. The habit of picking one's nose when it is itchy is a function involving an inherent predisposition to pick, and the humidity, dustiness, temperature and so forth that trigger the predisposition into action. All the components, both on the environmental side, and on the side of the organism, are equally partners in the function.

Habits are functions, but not all functions are habits. Many functions are built into the structure of an organism, whereas habits are learned. Apparently, as one moves up the phylogenetic scale, the preponderance of activity is rooted less in simple functions and more in habits. This is the foundation of a necessary flexibility among the higher animals. It is a human conceit that comparatively, a greater part of our behavior is learned than is that of any other animal. We are creatures of habit.

It seems reasonable to assume that all habits are possible intuitions, and consequently, that common or shared habits are

the basis of common sense. Since habits are learned, and can be changed as circumstances change, so then common sense is similarly flexible. The evolutionary capability of common sense is one of its chief assets for survival. Since environmental circumstances are participants in functions and habits, a new set of circumstances forms new habits. Habits persist only as long as their environing conditions persist. The conjoint habits of common sense gradually coalesce around new utterances, or old utterances gradually become connected to new habits. In this manner a degree of compatibility between verbal behavior and physical action under a new set of circumstances is maintained. It is only when old habits are deliberately prevented from evolving that there is a potential for serious friction between men and their environs.

4. Customs, Traditions and Laws

In a recent paper, Fred Brown stated: "In a given culture, custom is the generic form, or kind, while the specific form we call habit."²⁰ More simply, it might be proposed that a custom is a social habit; the way we do things, rather than the way I do things. In fact, custom is usually defined as "behavior typical of a group or class" (Webster's) or in the Oxford Dictionary, "a habitual or usual practice".

There are habits which are not customs, but there are no customs which are not habits. Customs are the habits of common sense, more or less, and take shape in conjoint activity. As habits, customs may modify or petrify. Customs offer security as tried and true ways of operating within the customary

environment. The essence of routine is to insist upon its own continuation. In the absence of a powerful environmental stimulus, the violation of custom is a transgression against the right. Emotional disturbance is the price of a perturbation of habit, and the temporary reward of a carefully maintained custom is tranquility.

It was no doubt this quality of customs that leads Confucius to emphasize the fundamental importance of a strict observance of tradition and ritual as the foundation of good order in society.²¹ Custom that is consciously maintained and passed on from generation to generation is called tradition. Traditions are fossilized habits. The need for traditions increases as conditions become less familiar, since the need to know what to do becomes predominant. Of course, the resort to tradition is a kind of retreat; a proverbial ostrich act, which provides the least likely route for an assessment of new conditions and the action-creation of new, more appropriate habits. The retreat to tradition attempts to gain stability at the expense of adaptability or intelligence. In the long run, traditionalism is undoubtedly unintelligent.

Since the modification of habits relies on the evolution of conjoint activity, and the social circumstances conducive to shared undertakings are those of the small familiar group, it is a reasonable assumption that the breakdown of such groups into the fabric of mass society might leave no route for the evolution of customs. Common sense would cease to function, leaving a resort to tradition as the only recourse. But since

the bones of various customs are left after the groups that spawned them have dispersed, a question would develop as to the moral superiority of one set of customs over another. Dewey believed this to be the growing case in the modern world, and it is hard to deny the compelling accuracy of his analysis;

"No amount of intellectual transition can seriously disturb the main tenor of custom or morals. Hence, the greater danger which attends the attempt in period of social change to maintain the immutability of old standards is not general moral relaxation. It is rather social clash, an irreconciled conflict of moral standards and purposes, the most serious form of class warfare."²²

Laws are the ultimate form of petrified customs. Although they may not be the most rigid forms of custom, they are the most conscious efforts to buttress customs against the eroding forces of change or the forces of class struggle. The combined weight of traditions and laws in the machine society colludes against the forces of evolutionary change and common sense. The possibilities for violent clashes become greater as the accumulating pressures of change fail to be relieved by a suitable evolution of the customary forms of behavior. It is an obvious failure of the methods of science that although a great change in the style and effectiveness of human transactions with the materials of physical nature in production has been wrought, the problems of social change and control have hardly been touched. Dewey was right in proclaiming that because scientific method is an extension of common sense, "the difference that now exists between common sense and science is a social, rather than a logical matter."²³

He deplored the fact that although science was itself more than simply organized common sense, its potential for organizing common sense remained unused.

"The paths of communication between common sense and science are as yet largely one way lanes. Science takes its departure from common sense, but the return road into common sense is devious and blocked by existing social conditions."²⁴

The implications of Dewey's transactional view of common sense and customs, are that the social conditions for the successful evolution of these forms of behavior have largely disappeared from the ordered, industrial society. It is not clear, however, that Dewey himself was convinced that an application of scientific organizing principles to revived common sense would prevent bloodshed and misery that he saw on the horizon. It seems clear from this standpoint, however, that a fundamental reorganization of the social structure is the minimum requirement for the reestablishment of flexible social principles that are amenable to modification by, and in tune with the achievements of the refined common sense of scientific method. Dewey believed that the "attainment of a unified logic" of common sense and science was a necessary step in the reunification of our "beliefs and procedures", that is, our moral and social traditions and our scientific and technological capabilities. The position of this paper is that a reunification of beliefs and procedures in the theory rests on a unification in practical life, and that this unification requires the recreation of cooperative communitarian groups in which actions and their social

consequences evolve together.

5. Inquiry

The ordinary processes of life are the simple prototypes of distinctively human behavior that may be termed 'inquiry'. Any movement of an organism for the satisfaction of some organic need constitutes a prototypical example of inquiring behavior. In its most fundamental form, inquiry is the basic transactions of existence. Every living organism is constantly moving towards equilibrium in the face of disequilibrating forces. Many of the forces of disequilibrium spring from prior equilibrating attempts. A protozoan, for example, moves towards light until increasing disequilibrium moves it away again, and so forth. Each change of course represents the culmination of many minute disequilibria, the majority of which thereby tend toward equilibrium for a time, while a slowly increasing collection of disequilibria gradually tends to turn the whole course of the organism in another direction at some future time. "Living," Dewey stated, "may be regarded as a continual rhythm of disequilibrations and recoveries of equilibrium."²⁵

Nothing illustrates the inherently tentative nature of the process of inquiry as well as the simplest examples of it one finds in primitive biological functions. Behavior, including behaviors which may be specifically labelled as "inquiry", is a tide of interrelated changes all moving in response to the comparatively astronomical force of external conditions. The conjoint equilibrating modification in organism

and environment, conditions, that is, establishes the range of possibilities for further behavior. Equilibrations, as functions, can also be seen as habits, although not all functions are habits. Habits constitute a learned preference or "direction" in equilibrating moves. In this light, nonetheless, it is obviously a mistake to think of habits as mere repetitions. Neither environing circumstances nor organic responses are liable ever to be precisely the same. Simple repetition is a mechanical mimicry of flexible organic functions. "Sheer repetition," Dewey stated, "is, in the case of the human organism, the product of conditions that are uniform because they have been made so mechanically. Such habits ... certainly do not provide the model upon which a theory of habit formation and operation should be framed."²⁶

Inquiry, in its sophisticated human form, is nonetheless a set of habits. The habits of inquiry constitute a learned bias in social and linguistic behavior as well as in overt physical action. The adaptive flexibility of the habits of inquiry relate them to more primitive equilibrating functions, but whereas biological functions are functions of individual organisms, inquiry is primarily a social function. Common sense sets the aims, defines the field and supports the language of inquiry. The habits of reasonableness, of well conducted inquiry, are not natural or automatic, but are customary and have arisen through the test and modification of custom just as biological functions have arisen in the competition of genotypes. Or, as Dewey stated it:

"The reflective disposition is not self made nor a gift of the gods. It arises in some exceptional circumstance out of social customs as we see in the case of the Greeks. But when it has been generated it establishes a new custom, which is capable of exercising the most revolutionary influence upon other customs."²⁷

Reasonableness or intelligence are qualities closely linked to adaptation, as is the process of inquiry. A successful outcome of inquiry is an adaptation. Evidence of intelligence is repeated successful adaptation. Just as much as the roots of inquiring behavior are deep in the most fundamental biological functions, so are the roots of intelligence to be found in the successful continuance of those functions. Man's sociality, by increasing the available avenues of perception, and through the related growth of language which can render individual perceptions conjoint, enormously increases the power and sophistication of methods of inquiry. 'Conjoint perceptions' is but a cumbersome term for common sense.

The power of common sense as a director of inquiry stems from its growth in the problems of inquiry and its roots in the procedures of inquiry. The social process of inquiry and adaptation is analogous to the equilibrating functions of a simple organism, except that the conscious functions which make up common sense inquiry rest in the conjoint actions of a group, not in the activities of an individual alone. The group or community that is the locus of inquiring activity is the body of the organism that adapts through common sense inquiry, and the social organization of the group has as

much to do with the continued success of common sense inquiry as the genetic make-up of a biological organism has to do with its adaptive success in prototypical inquiry - that "continual rhythm of disequilibrations and recoveries of equilibrium".

But common sense, as a collection of the conjoint needings and knowings of a group not only directs inquiry as to its subject matter, but also guides it on paths similar to those which have been profitable in the past. This control of inquiry maintains the habits of inquiry that yield reliable information while avoiding those that might give information of questionable reliability. In this way, common sense underlies logic, that is, logical inquiry is a formalization of common sense inquiry, which is guided by a conjoint experience and history of successful and unsuccessful outcomes. This view is essentially Dewey's view, and he stated it in the following way:

"The theory, in summary form, is that all logical forms (with their characteristic properties) arise within the operation of inquiry and are concerned with control of inquiry so that it may yield warranted assertions. This conception implies much more than that logical forms are disclosed or come to light when we reflect upon processes of inquiry that are in use. Of course it means that; but it also means that the forms originate in operations of inquiry. To employ a convenient expression, it means that while inquiry into inquiry is the causa cognoscendi of logical forms, primary inquiry is itself causa essendi of the forms which inquiry into inquiry discloses."²⁸

But, to the extent that common sense is not common to everyone, and that it arises in the conjoint undertakings of a group, so

the control of inquiry, even ultimately of logical inquiry, rests on shared activity. A modification in the rules of inquiry can only come about through demonstration in practice of the triumph of new directions in inquiry. Once developed in the right social circumstances, the habits of inquiry may continue to exist indefinitely, as traditions. But without the social circumstances for conjoint activity, real modification of such habits is not likely to come about. The habits of reasonable inquiry flourished and grew among the Greeks, but changing circumstances rooted the habits in a more unyielding society. Under a different social order, the habits of reasonable inquiry became the canons of logic, and in such a petrified state became relatively impervious to change. Thus Aristotelian logic underwent little change for more than a millenium.²⁹

Scientific inquiry maintains perforce of subjectmatter, close connections with results in the actual world, and as a consequence it retains a modicum of evolutionary flexibility. Other forms of inquiry, no less important, but devoid of close affiliations with concrete undertakings, rely on subtle changes within the social organism for evidence of success or failure of undertakings. To the extent that the communitarian bases of common sense are no longer a part of the contemporary social structure, evidence of change, along with the circumstances for effecting it, have disappeared from the social scene. Individuals therefore must cling blindly to such customs and traditions as have been handed

down to them in more communitarian times. Without social circumstances for evolution and revision of customs, conflict seems assured. Dewey pessimistically wrote:

"Nations and races face one another, each with its own immutable standards. Never before in history have there existed such numerous contacts and minglings. Never before have there been such occasions for conflict which are the more significant because each side feels that it is supported by moral principles. Customs relating to what has been and emotions referring to what may come to be go their independent ways. The demand of each side treats its opponent as a wilful violater or moral principles, an expression of self-interest or superior might. Intelligence, which is the only possible messenger of reconciliation dwells in a far land of abstractions or comes after the event to record accomplished facts."³⁰

6. Community and Mind

The notion of individual minds partakes of a long and tortuous history. All the ghosts and warlocks, witches and goblins that formerly inhabited the world "out there", under the pressure of scientific discovery, have sought refuge in the "minds" of individual men. Thus, when a modern man sees a ghost, he probably does not fall on his knees and pray, but instead wonders if there is not something wrong with his mind. The actual investigation of the concrete world by active men in search of useful examples of concrete actuality to further some purpose or other has gradually swept the creations of superstitious and fearful men out of the nooks and crannies of the physical world and into the last sacrosanct refuge from scientific methodology. Even in circles where the

notion of "soul" has fallen into disrepute, the idea of "mind" still soldiers on under a heavy load of conflicting claims.

One reason for the persistence of the idea of individual minds is that it is hard to construct an epistemological viewpoint under traditional philosophical assumptions without assuming some kind of knowing subject. The range of theories of mind is vast and confusing. On one hand there are monistic views extending from the Aristotelian description of mind as a bodily function to Berkeleyan pluralistic idealism. On another hand, there are dualistic theories ranging from psycho-physical parallelism to epiphenomenalism. Treatments of "mind" and "mental events" in contemporary linguistic philosophy are generally behavioristic, after the manner of Wittgenstein and Ryle in which "knowing", "believing", "understanding", and so forth are described in terms of behavioral dispositions, or after the manner of Tolman in which consciousness is simply viewed as a kind of "sampling" behavior.

It seems that some sort of an account of mind is necessary to explain human behavior just as some sort of an account of "culture" is necessary to make sense of the behavior of a television set. A mere physiological account on one hand, or a description of circuitry on the other just does not offer sufficient reasons for the "why" of behaviors. To say that X scratches his nose whenever a certain electro-chemical occurrence takes place in his brain, gives no information about why he scratches his nose (with accompanying

physiological phenomena) rather than shouting "Halleluja!". Even to say that an itch is simply a disposition to scratch seems to avoid the question of why one phenomenon is observed rather than a totally different one. Of course, the preference of scratching to shouting "Halleluja!" at a certain time and place is a matter of environing conditions, personal history, and so forth, but given that it is, is it then necessary to continue to try to give an account of behavior solely with reference to some sort of internal processes of an individual? Surely a great simplification might be obtained by simply moving "mind" out of the head of an individual being and into the transactional social process of communication.

Inasmuch as 'mind' partakes of a long tradition of dualist epistemological explanations, perhaps it is better to reject the term in favour of some other term such as 'consciousness' which is less involved in a dualistic tradition. In any case, whatever word is used in its stead must be steered clear of the unwarranted but traditional assumption that any such mental agent is the initiator of behavior. For as long as behavior is thought to be the work of a special agent; be it soul, or mind, or even consciousness; to the extent that such an hypothetical construct is regarded as the originator of human behavior and not an artifact of it; then it is reasonable to argue that morality is within the province of such a special agent and not a development of everyday life processes. The realization that the traditional artificial separation between knowing, willing, and the like, on one

hand, and between more physical varieties of behavior on the other, was responsible for epistemological and ethical confusion on a theoretical level, and functional helplessness in the same areas on a practical level, prompted Dewey to denounce the concept of mind in the following terms:

"Mind' or 'mental', as a preliminary word in casual phrasing is a sound word to indicate a region, or at least a general locality in need of investigation; as such it is unobjectionable. 'Mind', 'faculty', 'I.Q.', or what not as an actor in charge of behavior is a charlatan, and 'brain' as a substitute for such a mind is worse. Such words insert a word in place of a problem and let it go at that; they pull out no plums and only say, "What a big boy am I!"³¹

The relations between conscience and consciousness are more than merely verbal. Tied to a transactional, and consequently behavioristic account of knowing, must perforce be a transactional and behavioral account of morality. The isolation of the mind as an independent agent or intellect outside of the empirical facts of impulse and habit asserts a discontinuity of mind and nature. Reason is placed above experience; and by the same token, conscience is asserted to rest on a more divine foundation than mere habit. This non-naturalist or intuitionist view is the standard view even today in philosophical circles. The basic propositions of ethics are assumed to be ultimate, underivative, primitive and uninferable.³² A transactional account of morals as habits promotes the naturalistic consideration that the basic moral propositions are abstracted verbal components of more fundamental habitual behavior and are thus derivative and,

in a manner of speaking, inferable. The habits of morality and the habits of reasonableness derive from experience and rest upon a social foundation, and are deeply concerned with verbal behavior in the broadest sense, that is, in the process of communication.

Affairs which are usually, in traditional terms, regarded as "affairs of the mind" are in reality communicative affairs. To the extent that traditional mental entities are not communicable, they are not ontologically solid enough to have any status. Current philosophical and psychological theories abound with such entities necessary to support "phlogiston" explanations of behavior. The transactional account of intuition proposed in this paper places ethical intuitions, like all other intuitions, squarely on the shoulders of conjoint habits or customs. Only when knowings of an ethical nature, along with all other knowings for that matter, can be seen as part of the broad continuum of human behavior, and not as somehow distinct from it, is there the possibility of a framework of discourse that will permit the discussion of active means for intentionally securing such changes as are necessary for the peace and security of mankind.

The "consciousness" in which morality is "perceived" is, as a collection of (mainly verbal) customs, a communitarian social phenomenon. It is easy to see that for a people to be of one "mind", they must at least be more or less speakers of the same language. But it is not hard to see that a common linguistic background is not really adequate; as Dewey pointed

out, "Genuine community of language or symbols can be achieved only through efforts that bring about community of activities under existing conditions".³³ A consciousness which does not rest on "community of activities" is diffuse and incomplete; without a center. It takes no jump of the imagination to see that the children of our times are without a center to the same extent that the communitarian foundations of their consciousness are shattered and without a center. The habit of morality, conscience, if you wish, rests on a community of activities; the conjoint basis of common sense. Moral degeneracy is an indication of the degeneration of the communitarian foundations of morality.

It is always to the idea of community that this investigation has returned. Not the bonds of language, nor of politics, nor of class surround a collection of individuals with the deep intimacy in shared action that nourishes and sustains the process of making common or communication that forms the basis of consciousness. Only at the level of shared activities can doings and utterances be melded into language. Neither a man alone, nor the masses of a nation can share -- community, communication, and, to an extent, meaning, all spring from the Latin communico; to share -- closely enough to attach utterances to common interests in the conjoint creation of objects and language that has given man his unique capacity to know. The bounds of familiarity are the real bounds of common sense.

If new sense is to be created in the face of new conditions,

intimate interaction among the members of a familiar group at the interface of old habits and new environmental demands is the best crucible out of which new behaviors and corresponding language may be cast. Modifications in the customs of morality in the face of technological pressures are best attained in the same conditions. The establishment and survival of varieties of familiar communities is a requirement for the evolution of human understanding through the birth and proliferation of new aspects of common sense. Names and things named can only arise conjointly in such a fertile atmosphere of cooperative activity and almost telepathic understanding. Out of a secure foundation in such a communitarian background also springs a firmer understanding of the generally common features of human life. A solid foundation in such a background enabled Emerson to confidently exclaim:

"I am the owner of the sphere,
Of the seven stars and the solar year,
Of Caesar's hand, and Plato's brain,
Of Lord Christ's Heart, and Shakespeare's strain."³⁴

Secure in the knowledge of his own place, Emerson could more confidently ascertain where other thinkers stood. Such a confident knowledge and natural morality as Emerson possessed, grows best in familiar communitarian surroundings. The conjoint sharing of a variety of basic human activities is of fundamental importance to the happiness and security that an individual can derive from his life. An evolutionary flexibility is the outgrowth of such social organization, which secures the survival of human-ness on a broad scale.

The continued vitality of human civilization rests on the recreation and maintenance of new opportunities for communitarian cooperation so that new discoveries may be rendered familiar and common. Only by such a social reorganization can the road back from science and technology to the reorganization of common sense be opened, and intelligence restored to the conduct of human life.

Individualism1. The Rise of Individualism

The transactional viewpoint asserted in this paper proposes that an organism is an integrated part of the world in which habits form and operate. In the case of man, all of his behavior that relates to what may be termed 'sign-behavior' or, in other words, linguistic behavior, is intrinsically social. Language and linguistic signs, as communication, are concerned with making things common, and to the extent that all knowledge is necessarily symbolic or linguistic before it is known, knowledge itself is social. C. S. Peirce stated the proposition this way: "The woof and warp of all thought and all research is symbols; and the life of thought and science is the life inherent in symbols; so that it is wrong to say that a good language is important to good thought, merely; for it is of the essence of it."³⁵ An implication of this understanding that there is no thought outside of a linguistic representation, be it internal or external, is that if the term 'mind' is to be used at all, it must be considered to refer to something conjoint or common. In this vein, Peirce forthrightly stated even that "Logic is rooted in the social principle".³⁶

Inasmuch as a word, as a sign, can only represent or signify an object and cannot, except indirectly in a pointing function, acquaint or furnish recognition of an object, objects must arise in non-linguistic behavior. It is at the point where an intersection of non-linguistic and linguistic modes

of behavior occurs, that is, where a thing becomes named, that an object is created. Such an interlocking of linguistic with non-linguistic behaviors occurs in conjoint undertakings and represents a fundamental level of knowing that has been termed 'common sense'.

The transactional view of man is therefore profoundly anti-individualistic. On the biological side, man is seen integrated in a continuous series of transactions within the environment. On the linguistic side, all of his knowings are fundamentally and inescapably social.³⁷ Nowhere is the repudiation of individualism so powerfully plain as in this passage from Peirce:

"When we come to study the great principle of continuity and see how all is fluid and every point directly partakes the being of every other, it will appear that individualism and falsity are one and the same. Meantime, we know that man is not whole as long as he is single, that he is essentially a possible member of society. Especially, one man's experience is nothing if it stands alone... It is not 'my' experience but 'our' experience that has to be thought of, and this 'us' has indefinite possibilities."³⁸

The effort to unify philosophical subject matter where other viewpoints strive to dissect is perhaps the most prominent and persistent feature of the pragmatist philosophical method. At least since the Reformation, and in ontological and epistemological fields since considerably before that time, philosophical efforts have been directed towards the discovery of ultimate principles or truths. The effort to uncover the ultimate simples of reality may be seen as a kind of philosophical atomism corresponding to the quest for ultimate material simples in the physical sciences. An offspring of such

a trend has been social atomism or individualism, in which individual men are seen as the constituents or components of societies and not as inescapably and necessarily interlocked in society as is the pragmatic view.

The failure to perceive the inescapably social nature of human life, particularly insofar as the roots of knowledge and morality are concerned, has permitted the communitarian foundations of common sense that were intrinsic to a preponderantly agrarian existence to be swept away by the economic forces of technology. In fact, as the industrial revolution gained momentum, the idea of individualism which at first had been perceived with fear and loathing among European thinkers, began to be accepted, and ultimately promoted until today, the primary vision of man in the Western world, if not yet world-wide, is the vision of man alone, fulfilling his own destiny. It is the understanding here, that such a vision is not only ludicrous, but extremely dangerous to the extent of underlying the greatest crisis of values that man has ever faced.

The term 'individualism' is itself of fairly recent origin, having been coined by Alexis de Tocqueville in his De la Democratie en Amerique, wherein he explained:

"Individualism is a novel expression, to which a novel idea has given birth. Our fathers were only acquainted with egotism. Egotism is a passionate and exaggerated love of self, which leads a man to connect everything to his own person, and to prefer himself to everything in the world. Individualism is a mature and calm feeling which disposes each member of the community to sever himself

from his fellow creatures so that after he has thus formed a little circle of his own, he willingly leaves the rest of society to itself."³⁹

This does not sit well as a working definition, but it does illustrate the barely submerged loathing that first greeted expressions or evidence of the atomistic view of man.

The first complete philosophical expression of the doctrine of individualism predates de Tocqueville's use of the term. Thomas Hobbes outlined an individualistic social philosophy in his Leviathan. Hobbes was interested in physics as well as political philosophy, and there is little doubt that he was attached to an atomistic view of the physical world which he later explicitly mimiced in Leviathan. A. D. Lindsay remarked on this aspect of Hobbes' political theory as follows:

"Hobbes was the first systematically to attempt to make political theory scientific in this new sense. His men are, for the purposes of his theory, identical; their relationships with one another are external. Their relations are not affected by the relationships into which they enter."⁴⁰

Hobbes espoused the clockwork view of nature then current in physical theory even to his description of the human body: "For seeing life is but a motion of limbs... for what is the Heart but a Spring; and the Nerves, but so many Strings; and the Joynts, but so many Wheeles, giving motion to the whole body?"⁴¹

In the first twelve chapters of Leviathan Hobbes laid out his vision of man as a combination of mechanical elements in a clockwork cosmos. He derived an explanation of sensation,

reason, religion and morality from his simple mechanical description. His universe was composed of innumerable atoms all moving in respect to one another. In this respect, his view of physics was remarkably modern. But he saw a hard determinism in nature and claimed a direct causal sequence between the motions and collisions of such atomic particles and the "compounded" motion of larger bodies including the bodies of animals and men. The study of this motion he called "Naturall Philosophy", and he thought such a study the only proper subject matter of philosophy.

Four subdivisions of "Naturall Philosophy" were seen to cover the entire spectrum of possible events, namely, physics; the study of "compounded" motion, geometry; describing the spatial coordinates of moving bodies, ethics; the study of the motion of nervous systems, and politics; the study of the compounded motion of nervous systems in collision. Hobbes thus outdid Aristotelian monism to the extent of declaring that not only was the mind merely a bodily function, but also that the body was simply a mechanical function and thus that everything was ultimately reducible to a mere description of the behavior of atomic particles.

Since the primary condition of all matter, organic and inorganic, was a state of constant motion and collision, the resultant state among humans was constant conflict and war. For this vision of the "state of nature" Hobbes is usually thought of as a pessimist, though for his assertion that this essentially simple state of conflict might be overcome

by his vision of the commonwealth or Leviathan, he might as well be termed an optimist. For although the horrors of his description of the state of nature were not as horrible in actual fact, the possibility of the blessed peace he hoped for through the reorganization of society into the Leviathan was not realizable either.

Inasmuch as Hobbes saw each man as a fundamentally isolated individual, roughly random in behavior and unattached to class or clan, he laid the cornerstone for many a political or economic individualist theory. Hobbes was a thoroughgoing determinist and a devout protestant and saw in the laws of nature as they pertained to the behavior of every man, a sign of the stern and uncaring hand of God. Although his physics seems somewhat quaint in the light of modern discoveries, the powerful and simple link he assumed between physical and social events still underlies a tendency to see sociological law as a variety of natural law akin to the laws of physics, to this day. The belief in inexorable laws of history gained considerable momentum from Hobbes political theory. He thus laid the grounds for a justification for dictatorship which supports many a totalitarian regime.

Individualistic theories which justify the modern liberal-democratic state also have roots in Hobbes' work, both in their unquestioning assumptions of simple individualism, and by their foundation on reactions to Hobbes' happy espousal of totalitarianism (e.g. Locke's political theories). Hobbes' belief in the fundamental independence of individual men lived on long after his quaint physical theories were abandoned. The

individualist idea not only fell upon good economic times, but, more important at first, it grew out of, and along with the powerful force of Protestantism, which has an interest in declaring men to be free and individual agents before God. In fact, the right of private judgement had its roots in the early reforms of pre-reformation Catholicism. Buckle states:

"That same right of private judgement that the early reformers proclaimed was pushed to an extent fatal to those who opened it. This it was which carried into politics overturned the government, and carried into religion, upset the church. For rebellion and heresy are but different forms of the same disregard for tradition, the same bold and independent spirit."⁴²

Hobbes' claim that free men would give up a portion of their freedom in exchange for peace reflects a similar contradiction in Luther's statement:

"Christianus homo omnium Dominus est liberrimus, nulli subjectus;
Christianus homo omnium servus est officiosissimus, omnibus subjectus."⁴³

The power of the dichotomy is in both cases due to the unquestioned assumption that each man is totally independent of his fellows. If men were perfectly independent, they would be perfectly free as in Hobbes' "state of nature". Since there is no "natural" reason for good order among such separate agents, then order must depend on total control by the sovereign, or God.

To some extent Locke saw through the dichotomy and ridiculed Hobbes' theory in these words:

"As if when men, quitting the state of nature, entered into society, they agreed that all of them but one should be under the restraint of Laws; but that he should retain all the liberty of the State of Nature, increased with power and

made licentious by impunity. This is to think that men are so foolish that they take care to avoid what mischiefs may be done to them by polecats or foxes, but are content, nay, think it safety to be devoured by lions."⁴⁴

Locke rejected the implied determinism of Hobbes' state of nature and his own natural man was, as R. H. S. Crossman remarked, "a gentleman of rural England, with a comfortable property and a respect for the property of others". Locke's version of the "state of nature" was pre-political, but definitely not pre-social. "Natural law", a body of rules based on reason, controlled affairs therein. Such natural law, he maintained, is the fundamental regulator of human conduct everywhere. There is no space to go into an analysis of Locke's theory from a purely transactional viewpoint here, but it seems worth remarking that any assumption of "natural law" removes the burden of social regulation from groups of humans which are supposed to be governed thereby, and places the responsibility in the hands of the Gods. Such a denial of direct human responsibility for human affairs can be made to seem plausible under assumptions of strict individualism, since it is indeed difficult to see how individual men, even in cooperative undertakings, could forge a common understanding and yet come to oppose it bitterly later. Under the transactional view, however, the realization of the strictly social nature of language, including language pertaining to moral and political understandings, inevitably leads to the conclusion that morality and the language of morals are, strictly speaking, customary. Thus undercut by a more comprehensive and simpler explanation, all reliance on hypotheses of "natural law" as

support for sociological theses fall prey to Occam's razor. The as yet unexplained machinery for the publication and dissemination of natural law is simply dismissed as ontological impedimenta and the belief that language alone, be the words divine or mundane, has the power to shape men's lives as a prior force to the actual events of living, is regarded as a simple belief in magic.

In this respect, Hobbes can be seen as more courageous than Locke inasmuch as he tried to give a physical basis to his explanation of behavior. Locke, on the other hand, resorted to a respectable bit of philosophical mysticism in a manner that had a long history prior to him and which has been a frequent refuge since. If natural reason is "natural" in some sense, then it must be customary, that is, common sense. If not, then it must be magical.

Locke's "social contract", because it simply represented an agreement to uphold natural law rather than an agreement to create order out of chaos, as Hobbes' would have it, was a comparatively mild and gentlemanly affair. Individuals simply agreed to compulsory arbitration in matters of law, so that a standard interpretation of "natural law" might apply to all. Individual rights to interpretation of the "law of nature" were given up in return for a guarantee that natural rights to life, liberty and property would be better preserved.

Locke retained the social contract idea, but in comparison to Hobbes, he completely altered its nature. Individuals ceded their anarchic powers into the common hands of society, not simply to a sovereign. Individuals retained their liberties

and the state engaged by a constitutional pact to respect and maintain such liberties. The thought of the common purpose or end of society, so prominent in Hobbes' theory, was ignored in Locke's view of the foundations of the state. He seems to have been of the understanding that men merely seek in society such security as is necessary for the attainment of their own individual ends. As Viallatoux somewhere remarked, Locke substituted the "absolutism of the individual" for Hobbes' absolutism of the sovereign.

Both social contract theories rest on a fundamental assumption of independence of individual men, one from another. This naive assumption has been unquestioned by almost all serious philosophical thinkers, and probably represents the stumbling block on which traditional philosophy will fall. The obvious fact of man's primary, fundamentally social existence has been ignored by nearly all but the Pragmatic thinkers. All of the profoundly human aspects of man relate to his sociality, and more specifically to sign-behavior or language as an outgrowth of this central fact of human existence.

Whatever the full history of the dogged doctrine of individualism, there can be little doubt that it has recent roots in Protestant theology. As Laski pointed out, there can be little reason to doubt that Hobbes and Locke were both greatly influenced by Puritanism. Of Locke in particular he wrote:

"God, he tells us, has given the world to the 'race of the industrious and rational', and the State, by their own consent, is there

to protect their exploitation of it. He has the full sense of indolence as sin, the corresponding insistence on the obligation to labour and the recognition of the successful man's goods as an enrichment of the commonwealth. If property is the outcome of labour, clearly it is entitled to security, for it is 'the great and chief end, therefore, of men's uniting into commonwealths.'"45

It is undeniably a doctrine of the stricter forms of Protestantism that property is God's reward for industriousness. It is also true that the basis of political egalitarianism is also to be found in the doctrines of the Reformation. The Puritans who made up the parliamentary party in the civil war of 1638 were firm in the belief that God viewed all right-minded Christians in the same light and since within the tight limits of Puritan Christianity it was impossible for mere mortals to gauge God's will, then all Puritans deserved an equal say in the affairs of church and state. This belief stemmed from a scheme proposed by John Calvin who perhaps was the greatest proponent of protestant individualism. According to Hilaire Belloc:

"Calvin conceived of a scheme of self government. The units of his scheme, the individual churches, elected their chiefs who were then competent to meet in assemblies and to decide on church discipline and the rule of faith....But the chiefs or ministers, once elected had absolute authority over the electors."46

One can perceive the totalitarianism of Hobbes reflected here near its roots. Nowhere is the machine like inexorability of the seventeenth century view of the cosmos more clearly evidenced than in the doctrines of seventeenth century

Protestantism. Calvin taught and enforced a severe isolation of each individual from his fellows. A man's attention was to be turned toward God alone. The fate of every individual was thought to be laid out in the cards of God's awful determinism and no alteration in the exceedingly fine grind of God's mill was imagined to be possible. Human warmth, other than that necessary to sustain on the most austere level only the essential relationships between individuals, was forbidden.

Max Weber stated:

"In its extreme inhumanity this doctrine must above all else have had one consequence for the life of a generation which surrendered to its magnificent consistency. That was a feeling of unprecedented inner loneliness of the single individual."⁴⁷

Yet it is in this doctrine of "extreme inhumanity" that the political and philosophical rationale that underlies the contemporary world view has its roots. From this religious doctrine sprang the philosophy of the so-called enlightenment, which was, following its roots, subjectivist, atomistic and mechanistic. The inductive empiricism of Locke's Essay was fatal to the mystical intuitionism of the scholastics, but the subjectivist individualism also implied thereby was to set a tradition in post-Reformation philosophy and political thought that was to obscure the social foundations of human knowledge from all but a few eccentric academics from that time until the present. In such regard, it is difficult to see that the enlightenment represented so much of an illumination of the human condition as an exchange of the myths of the

Renaissance for the less humane myths of the Reformation.⁴⁸

For the most part, epistemologies since the enlightenment have centered on the knowing subject in a distinctly separate environment, thereby not only implying a duality of body and soul (a tradition shared with the scholastics) but a clear separation between these two and environing conditions which was not suggested in the belief in an organic relation between the natural and the supernatural that the scholastics had derived from Augustine's motto: "credo, ut intelligam". Kant claimed that the enlightenment represented man's coming of age from the infancy in which he was incapable of: "using his understanding without the direction of another. This state of minority is caused when its source lies not in the lack of understanding, but in the lack of determination and courage to use it without the assistance of another."⁴⁹ And in this statement he disclosed his whole hearted endorsement of one of the primary myths of the Aufklärung, namely that which herein is termed individualism; the doctrine which this paper attempts to dispel. For it is the position taken here that an individual cannot "use his understanding without" at least the assistance of others, or rather more strongly, that without others, there would be no understanding to use. But that Kant should take such a position of heroic individualism is of important consequences, for there is no doubt that his philosophy represents the bridge between seventeenth and eighteenth century rationalism and a variety of more modern philosophical forms.

Also out of the outpouring of individualist thought brewed in the Reformation and uncorked in the enlightenment, sprang the impetus for further ferment in Jean-Jacques Rousseau's Contrat Social. The influence of Rousseau's writings on modern civilization is undoubtedly immense. Belloc wrote:

"Rousseau's hundred pages are the direct source of the theory of the modern state; their lucidity and unmatched economy of diction; their rigid analysis, their epigrammatic judgement and wisdom - these are the reservoirs from whence modern democracy has flowed."⁵⁰

There is no doubt that most of the Contrat Social is directly borrowed from Locke's second Treatise; Rousseau frankly admitted that he had treated the same subjects on exactly the same principals as Locke. In such a way the predominantly Calvinist doctrine of individualism found its way into predominantly Catholic France, with ultimately devastating results. Voltaire, Diderot, Condillac, Helvetius and others in France were also independently influenced by the writings of Locke and Bacon, but in a sense, the strong criticism of established French tradition put forward by such thinkers only prepared the way for Rousseau's dynamic attack. In the introduction to his translation of Rousseau's most influential work, Tozer states:

"The individualistic philosophy and democratic political theory of Locke... when carried out to their logical conclusions... bore an aspect that would have terrified their sober-minded author. The reverence for tradition and custom that had for so long dominated French minds began rapidly to vanish before this awakening

spirit of free enquiry. Scepticism in religion, destructive criticism of conventional morality, and scathing denunciation of royal misrule were the characteristics of the comprehensive movement which ushered in the age of reason."⁵¹

The culmination of the French enlightenment was, of course, the French Revolution. Inasmuch as it was spawned from a conflict of doctrines, and based on the incomplete emancipation of enlightenment philosophers from myths of the "Ghost in the Machine", the slogans of the French Revolution composed a fabric of contrarities. The assertion of individual rights was intended to establish a new social order, but succeeded rather in merely destroying the old. Ultimately the Revolution led not to the establishment of a republican government, but to the establishment of an authoritarian and bureaucratic regime more intolerant of human eccentricities than the old monarchy. The mixed blessings of the French Revolution are described by W. H. McNeill in the following way:

"Viewed in this light, the French Revolution looks suspiciously like a renewal of the thrust towards centralization and consolidation which had resided in the French monarchy since medieval times. But the revolutionaries acted in the name of a new and peculiarly absolute monarch: the People. The theory which declared the People sovereign,... made it easier for the Sovereign People through its official agents to demand new services and greater sacrifices from the people severally."⁵²

The great and ultimate blossoming of Protestant doctrine in France was an overturning of town and country life and all

the traditional organizations of common sense such as the guilds and cooperative village landholdings.⁵³ Calvinist individualism finally settled in France in the form of a well to do bourgeoisie governed by bureaucracy. The doctrine of individualism in its first great flowering failed to secure the rights of individuals appreciably beyond the level customary under the old regime, on the other hand, the practical power of men to order their own affairs had been reduced and the control of such matters had passed into the hands of a growing bureaucracy.

Another child of the enlightenment was, of course, growing on the North American continent. Franklin, Jefferson, Adams, Hamilton and Paine were all undeniably men of the enlightenment, but the American version of the individualist doctrine, which first prompted de Tocqueville to coin a new word, did not immediately result in the suppression of individual expression. It seems reasonable to give credit for this not so much to a superiority in the men of America, but rather to the opportunities for expansion that provided a safety valve for the young republic and a refuge for non-conformists.

For his powerful influence over the political affairs of Europe, Jean Jacques Rousseau has been termed "the father of the modern world". Be this as it may, it seems more reasonable to suppose that much of the credit or blame should go to John Calvin, who most powerfully promoted and justified the doctrine of individualism. It seems a realistic appraisal to maintain that Calvin did for the bourgeoisie of the seventeenth century

what Marx did for the proletariat of the nineteenth. He provided the justifying doctrines that were needed to overthrow the guilt which inevitably sprang from the breaking of customs and traditions. Tawney emphasised that Calvinism had a profound political and economic influence which soon was to outgrow the religious doctrines which had spawned it.

"Calvinist leaders addressed their teaching not of course exclusively, but none the less primarily to the classes engaged in trade and industry who formed the most modern and progressive elements in the life of the age. In doing so, they naturally started from a frank recognition of the necessity of capital, credit, and banking, large scale commerce and finance, and the other practical facts of business life. They thus broke with a tradition which regarded a preoccupation with economic interests beyond what is necessary for subsistence as reprehensible, had stigmatized the middleman as a parasite and the userer as a thief." 22

But the tradition which regarded the "middleman as a parasite and the userer as a thief" was a tradition which had maintained the structural integrity of communities throughout the middle ages. The equation of usury with sin had prevented the proliferation of powerful capitalist concerns which could have broken the fragile economic ties which held the medieval village into a primarily local economic and political system. It may be true that the narrowness of its trading circle rendered the small medieval community somewhat idiotic in scope, but the counter-balance to this admittedly serious deficiency was that the very intimacy of village life (or in the larger towns, of neighborhood life) assured that for the

most part everyday political decisions were within the reach of the citizenry. The rise of Calvinist individualism released man from the doctrinal responsibility for his fellows that had been a central part of medieval Catholic theology. Individualism in religion sanctified a social individualism and accompanying economic individualism that by its ultimate enormous profitability dynamically increased the power of the justificatory religious inculcation. It is not a great exaggeration, as Tawney pointed out, to state that in a relatively short period of time Calvinist theology primarily existed as a justification for the new mood of exploitative individualism, and has lost much of its primal potency as a purely religious doctrine.

"The influence of Calvinism was not simple but complex, and extended far beyond the circle of churches which could be called Calvinist. Calvinist theology was accepted where Calvinist discipline was repudiated... In the version of Calvinism which found favour with the English upper classes in the seventeenth century, individualism in social affairs was on the whole, the prevalent philosophy."⁵⁴

Somewhere Max Weber wrote that "the specifically middle class outlook of the Puritans stood at the cradle of modern economic man". There is no reason to doubt that the relative freedom from social responsibility implied by the Calvinist belief in a direct responsibility to God alone, allowed the rising Protestant well-to-do to undertake comparatively unscrupulous economic deals secure in the belief that God signaled his approval by granting large profits to the pious.

Soon the powerful Protestant economic interests were

tearing at the very fabric of communitarian social structure. Where small farming communities interrupted the plans of some landlord for higher profits, the landlord no longer felt a strong responsibility for the social well being of his tenants. By casting poor peasants out of their villages, Protestant profiteers not only gained firmer control over the land, and an additional area for more profitable crops than peasantry, they also assured themselves of a ready supply of cheap and tractable labor for working the expanding farms. The opposition to Catholicism, therefore, had a solid economic basis in the dereliction of social responsibilities permitted by the Calvinist assertion that man is utterly dependent only on God, not on man, and that man's responsibilities are to God alone, not to men.

When the rising power of Protestant capitalism was threatened in England by a Catholic monarch, even the monarch was overthrown, (which occurrence obviously impressed Locke). Concerning the revolution of 1688, Marx wrote:

"The glorious revolution brought into power along with William of Orange, the landlord and capitalist appropriators of surplus value. They inaugurated the new era by practicing on a colossal scale thefts of state lands, thefts that had hitherto been managed more modestly. These estates were given away, sold at a ridiculous figure, or even annexed to private estates by direct seizure... The bourgeois capitalists favoured the operation with the view, among others, to promoting free trade in land, to extending the domain of modern agriculture on the large farm system, and to increasing the supply of free agricultural proletarians ready to hand."⁵⁵

The individualist practices of the rising class of bourgeois capitalists did not wait long for a theoretical justification in the work of Adam Smith. Smith's thesis amounted to the

claim that self interest ultimately was in the public interest. The immediate success of his Wealth of Nations demonstrates that in large measure he was preaching to the already converted. He articulated views which were already rooted in the practices of the captains of industry. Erich Roll pointed out:

"The results which followed Smith's efforts were amazingly rapid and complete. The impact of the Wealth of Nations upon businessmen and politicians alike was very great. But, although the apostle of economic liberalism spoke in such lucid and persuasive terms, his success would not have been so great if he had not spoken to an audience that was ready to receive his message. By analyzing economic activity against a background of naturalist philosophy, this theory gave to the conduct of the prospective leaders of economic life an imprint of inevitability. They recognized in the self-interest which he put at the centre of human conduct the motive which inspired their everyday business life. And they were delighted to know that their pursuit of profit was now to be regarded as unselfish. Gone was any lurking suspicion that trade might be sinful or beneath the dignity of gentlemen. These remnants of platonic and canonist thought were swept aside; the business man was now in theory what he already was in practice - the leader of the economic and political order."⁵⁶

The doctrine of private judgement which set off the turmoil of the Reformation ultimately destroyed the society that had spawned it. The doctrine of universal priesthood which opened the Reformation, not only swept away the Catholic hierarchy in the regions which it conquered, but also swept away a delicate balance of ecclesiastical and secular powers that encouraged a bondage between men and the land. Inasmuch as this bond was stultifying, it also offered a degree of security and humble freedom. The fierce onslaught of capitalism

broke the bonds, and in doing so, broke the linkage of agrarian cooperation that protected and sustained the medieval community. The freedom from ecclesiastical control over the personal practice of religion quickly developed into a freedom from governmental control over entrepreneurial adventure. In such a manner, the Calvinist denigration of brotherly love was translated into a vision that justified simple greed as a virtue and social irresponsibility as unselfish egalitarianism. Laski described the connection in these terms:

"In a sense, perhaps, it is true to say that Adam Smith completes an evolution that had been continuous from the Reformation. The latter substituted the Prince for the Church as the source of the rules which regulate social behavior. Locke and his school substituted Parliament for the Prince as being better fitted to pervade them with social purpose. Adam Smith went a step further and added that, with minor exceptions, there was no need for Parliament to interfere at all."⁵⁷

The Reformation and its consequences comprise a revolution in social consciousness in European thought. The upheaval of the Reformation broke down the barriers between aristocrats, peasants and burghers. Nations were melded into larger units through the greater freedom of warfare permitted ~~under~~ a more secular government. Merchants, miners and manufacturers were able to extend the geographical scale of their operations without running afoul of local discrimination of outsiders or of mutually contradictory systems of law. By the seventeenth century, a flourishing national economy was no longer considered to be a sign of impiety. Eventually, under the greatly reduced moral restrictions on commerce and particularly usury, which

became the rule under Protestantism, industry and trade began to grow to an extent that made Europe unique in the world insofar as its urban centers began to exercise a considerable influence over national politics.⁵⁸

The rural environment also reflected the expansion and intensification of the commercial economy. Land and rents became treated as commercially negotiable commodities, thus disinheriting vast numbers of peasants and destroying the communitarian foundations of society. For the first time, perhaps in all of civilized history, large numbers of people, and in some nations, the absolute majority of the population, were freed from the restrictions and the securities of communal agrarian life. Instead, they faced the troubling ups and downs of a troubled market economy. Some grew rich, many grew poor, and all suffered a tyrannical uncertainty as to their future.

The widening patterns of trade and warfare wrenched local affairs from the hands of local governments and gave them into the hands of bureaucracies which began to grow in distant seats of national governments. Periods of rapid inflation impoverished the rural populace as enclosure of their lands forced them to rely to a greater and greater extent on money as a means of exchange. The shattering of village life, and the consequent migration of peasants to impoverished and insecure positions as labor for the growing manufacturing industries bore out in actual life the feeling of inner isolation and fearful insecurity that distinguished individualistic protestant doctrines from the placid traditionalism of the Roman church.

In general, the uncertainties of rapid change and economic instability contributed to a degree of religious fanaticism and philosophical desperation that have seldom been equalled.⁵⁹ The Reformation tore apart the delicate fabric of Hellenic and Judeo-Christian threads that constituted the cultural heritage of Europe. The delicate compromise between this world and the next, common sense and spiritual ardor, reason and faith, sociality and individuality which had been maintained by the thinkers and artists of the high Middle Ages was rejected. The constant striving between these liberated factions deepened the need for a resolution in faith or philosophy. Yet it was the failure to reach conclusions that satisfied the craving for a revival of certainty, that left the door open for the growth of secularism and modern science. W. H. McNeill stated:

"The political diversity of Europe thwarted the heart's desire of nearly all the intellectually sensitive men of the time by making impossible the construction of a single authoritative, definitive, and (as almost everyone desired) enforceable codification of Truth."⁶⁰

Although the failure to construct a world view commanding general assent may be responsible for the remarkable creativity of seventeenth and eighteenth century Europeans, it also seems true that the flowering of commerce eventually shattered the communitarian environment that had nurtured Renaissance humanism. The outcome of the Reformation in those places where Protestantism was successful, was a greatly reduced interest in humanity and a general increase in the love of things.⁶¹

Once the small cooperative agrarian village was no longer

a political and cultural force, the local common sense control over local affairs was gradually assumed by the burgeoning bureaucracies. The relative instability of the economic marketplace and resultant inflation are arguably direct results of the passing of local economic control out of the hands of the people directly concerned in local affairs. In any case, the decline and dissolution of the medieval guilds and of the system of "just prices" certainly heralded widespread suffering among the poor and dispossessed peasantry. The control exercised by the merchant guilds over prices and the craft guilds over wages, was both fair and flexible. The fairness and the flexibility were both results of the decidedly local and cooperative nature of these guilds. Prices were established according to local expenses, and wages were set according to local requirements.

Guilds were also the basis of local education and technical training. Local control over local education assured that there was a supply of skilled workers more or less equal to the demand for each place. The traditions and attitudes of each trade were passed on through the guild-controlled system of apprenticeships which assured not only adequate training in the particular craft, but a high degree of social training as well, so that each journeyman would be brought up in a tradition of social responsibility and deportment suitable to his station. In reference to the system of guilds and apprenticeships, Lipson wrote:

"In the effort to provide a fair remuneration for the worker and to

reconcile the conflicting claims of producer and consumer, were developed principles of industrial control and conception of wages and prices to which we may perhaps one day return."⁶²

It presently seems that society, far from returning to the guild system, through a continuing expansion of bureaucracy continues to centralize its powers of modification and control over the marketplace. It may be that widespread trade demands a general uniformity in economic conditions throughout broad regions. This, coupled with the ability to raise greater quantities of capital over a wide economic system rather than over a narrow one may explain the success of huge superpower states such as the United States and the Soviet Union since the end of the Second World War. McNeill wrote:

"The rise of the United States and the Soviet Union to world pre-eminence since World War II was, indeed, only another instance of a familiar historical phenomenon: the migration of a military-political power from more anciently civilized but less effectively organized heartlands to regions nearer the frontier. Machine technology, which within recent memory carried Europe to the apex of its world domination, seems now, like Zeus of ancient fable, to have turned ruthlessly upon its parent. Since 1917, and more particularly since 1945, the extractive, transport, processing and distribution complexes of modern industrialism no longer fit easily within the narrow frontiers of the old west European nation-states. In 1945, the elbow room of half a continent gave both Russia and the United States a more or less satisfactory basis for military power; yet even this semicontinental scale is sure to become inadequate if any one center of power should succeed in uniting the resources of still greater areas. Modern industrialism and transport, in short, have begun extravagantly to reward mere geographical extent."⁶³

All this may come to pass. But at what terrible expense

to humanity? The spread of the doctrine of individualism has not brought notable increases in individual freedom, just as the doctrine of private judgement did not create an outburst of individual religious freedom after the Reformation. If anything, regardless of claims made about rights, and about individual responsibility to God, life in Protestant communities after the Reformation was more savagely controlled in respect of religious matters than life in the same communities before the Reformation. The same has been true in the political field. Since Hobbes' individualistic determinism stood as an argument for totalitarianism, on through the bureaucratic state that was the outcome of the French Revolution, the vigour of individualism has shattered the communitarian foundations of common sense and the conjoint control of the practical matters of human life and substituted instead bureaucratic control over practical human affairs, legalistic promises of various "rights" that were unnecessary in communitarian surroundings, and a tyranny of economic uncertainty coupled with an isolation of man from man and from the earth, that stands as an ongoing cruelty on a scale never before equalled in the history of mankind. Each man, when separated from the community of his fellows, is without direction and sense. He is therefore in need of some kind of management and becomes an easy prey for the managerial thrust of bureaucracy.

As the doctrine of individualism runs its course, the twentieth century may come to be known as the dawning of the age of bureaucracy. Individual men, without the individuality

conferred by communitarian life, are easily directed into the production and consumption of goods which drive the wheels of industry stupidly onward. Ultimate chaos may well eventually result simply because men as individuals are unintelligent. The mechanism for the evolution of their language (and inescapably, thereby, their thinking) lies in communitarian transactions with environing conditions. It is doubtful that man, trapped within the confines of bureaucratic management, can find the means to overcome the massive problems that the technological-bureaucratic life style confers upon the near future.

The triumph of individualism on an almost world wide scale has deprived each man of the sense of his own place in the world - of a sense of self - that comes from the cooperative association of men in communities. Communitarian man (or common sense man) controlled a much larger portion of his own destiny than has ever been possible since the rise of individualism. In recognition of the control exercised by communitarian man over his own affairs, particularly economic affairs, Drucker lamented the passing of common sense communitarianism in the following words:

"Through the collapse of Economic Man the individual is deprived of his social order, and his world of its rational existence. He can no longer explain or understand his existence as rationally co-related or co-ordinated to the world in which he lives; nor can he co-ordinate the world and the social reality to his existence. The function of the individual in society has become entirely irrational and senseless. Man is isolated within a tremendous machine the purpose and meaning of which he does not accept and cannot translate into terms of his own

experience. Society ceases to be a community of individuals bound together by a common purpose and becomes a chaotic hubbub of purposeless isolated monads."64

If one agrees with Peirce that language is "rooted in the social principle", and that "it is wrong to say that a good language is important to good thought, merely; for it is of the essence of it", then there is great cause for despair in the triumph of individualism. For inherent in the shattering of communities is the shattering of the common sense foundations of language, and thereby, of logic, morality, and meaning. This is not to say that men simply cease to speak, but rather that their speech ceases to have meaning, to make sense. Politics aside, there is a trilling truth in a speech recently given at the United Nations by the Israeli ambassador, Mr. Herzog:

"The melancholy truth is that the candles of civilization are burning low. The world is increasingly governed, not so much by capitalism, or communism, or social democracy, or even tribal barbarism, as by a false lexicon of political cliches now assuming a kind of degenerate sacerdotal authority."65

When language loses its ground in conjoint experience every utterance becomes a cliché. As a consequence, the conduct of life becomes simply the repetition of empty shadows of dying traditions. The communitarian foundations of the evolutionary revitalization of human life have been castrated by the triumph of individualism. The future of human culture does not seem bright.

2. Uniformity in the Modern State

Given the likely connection between wealth and political power, it does not seem unreasonable to assume that the major

supporters of the modern bureaucratic state are those that profit most from it. In this respect, it is perfectly reasonable to argue that money is the real God in the modern world, for economic considerations now have the political power to move nations to the same extent that religious considerations had in the middle ages. It seems strange, but it is nonetheless true that the Reformation, a genuinely religious movement, is at the bottom of the individualism that grew into the modern profoundly secular state.

There can be little doubt that supporters of the current state of affairs have by chance and design done what they could to blacken the popular reputation of the medieval era. Although whig historians, particularly during the last part of the nineteenth century, did their best to obscure the significance of the dispossession of the peasantry, there are a few dissenters, notably Tawney among others, that saw through the pleasant surroundings of the academe to the suffering of the masses.

A careful study of the communitarian basis of the regulation of practical aspects of medieval life, and of the humanitarian consequences of local control of local affairs, leads even a strongly biased supporter of the credo of the liberal democratic state to question the wisdom of increasing bureaucratic control especially in the light of frequent failures of modern governments to maintain a suitable degree of economic stability. To the extent that economic ups and downs are the result of mass psychology, as it is sometimes termed, they are a demonstration of the lack of adaptive response or intelligence of the bureaucratic machine state.

To the extent that ordinary men have been stripped of responsibility for their own economic condition through the abolition of communitarian life and the guild system which was the specific cooperative system for economic regulation, the total economic situation has comparatively little immediate feedback into the lives of the producing and consuming masses. Further bureaucratic controls always tend to be directed against evolutionary change in the economy, since only in a condition of stasis can an organism or machine without sensory feedback hope to survive. When blinded, a man stops walking. A bureaucracy likewise attempts to suppress the agents of change.

There can be little doubt that organized bureaucratic structures of the past, notably the Roman, Egyptian, and Chinese, have withstood the trials of time fairly adequately, and have also provided their subjects with a degree of security surpassing that of barbarian contemporaries. Nonetheless, it is quite misleading to identify such superficial bureaucratic overlays with the all encompassing bureaucracy of the modern technostucture. A comparison of the sheer quantity of modern regulatory statutes with such as were published during the Han period in China, for example, will convince the wary that modern bureaucracy controls on an unprecedented scale. Nor has there been any mention of the so-called "Marxist" states wherein bureaucratic control and bungling arguably exceeds the high levels customary in the liberal democratic state.

Perhaps a total and tyrannical bureaucracy holds the potential of quieting war and unrest in the contemporary world simply by bringing all change to a halt. Such a view was

promoted by McNeill:

"Historical parallels to such a stabilization of a confused and chaotic social order are not far to seek. The Roman empire stabilized the violences and uncertainties of the Hellenistic world by monopolizing armed might in a single hand. The Han in ancient China likewise put a quietus on the disorders of the warring states by erecting an imperial bureaucratic structure which endured, with occasional breakdown and modest amendment, almost to our own day. The warring states of the twentieth century seem headed for a similar resolution of their conflicts, unless, of course, the chiliastic vision that haunts our time really comes true and human history ends with a bang of hydrogen nuclei and a whimper from irradiated humanity."⁶⁶

But such bureaucracies of history merely sought to provide and maintain a political and military framework within which the ordinary social processes of humanity could continue to function. The modern bureaucratic state, however, is individualistic to the extent that the ordinary regulating functions of human society are no longer operable. Thus the bureaucracy at least potentially must control the details of individual lives as well. To some extent, an attempt is made to modify human behavior through advertising, propaganda, and so-called "public education" which includes not only a mass variety of the academic education offered to medieval society by the guilds and the church, but also the rudiments of social skills and simple morality that came naturally and untaught as part of an individual's participation in cooperative communitarian society. Of course, the public school must go to incredible lengths to attempt to gain an artificial control over students that have no desire nor apparent need to be indoctrinated.

The attempt to impose a general direction on society from

the top down will always be resisted, even if the resistance is unintentional, simply because the impetus for such change does not flow out of an organic change in the total environing situation. Human behavior changes in response to a demonstrated personal need, not to a pronounced general order. Language naturally flows from the activities of a group. The sense of an utterance lies therein. The imposition of verbal orders from the top down cannot result in behavioral change because the behavioral referents of imposed utterances are simply not there. Dewey realized that the best a man can do when ordered to stand correctly, if he has never stood correctly before, is to "stand another kind of badly". If the experience of "correct" stance is not in the behavioral repertoire and called by the same name, it is not realistic to expect the correct change in posture simply because of an utterance. Nothing is coded within an utterance to make it magically effective. If the common sense connections cannot be made, if conjoint experience does not exist, behavior cannot be properly modified, even if, by some lucky happenstance, a willingness to change does exist. A belief that a change in human behavior is purely and simply the result of an utterance is what is termed "the belief in magic".

The results of the breakup of the organic community are a continuing trend towards a pervasive social uniformity. By means of artificial institutions such as schools, universities and prisons, a diversity of individual behaviors is discouraged through the maintenance of an artificial and uniform environment, devoid of natural stimuli which vary from place to place,

and without functioning family or communitarian ties to interrupt the process of "learning" to be alike. Contemporary social structure is thus an ordered social structure of "isolated monads". Standardization and uniformity mark the products of technology off from the products of human craftsmanship. Similarly, the application of standardized methods of coercion to homogenized masses of unattached individuals demarcates the ordered society.

In each case, the benefits of standardization and uniformity of product are an enormous increase in productive power at an equal expense in terms of evolutionary flexibility. Soldiers that are well drilled in uniform responses to standard orders will be extremely effective so long as the encountered conditions fall within the limits for which they are programmed. Their preparedness will make them powerful opponents so long as the conditions of warfare remain similar. Should conditions be radically different from those expected, however, the uniform training of the standardized army will set it at a clear disadvantage since in its ranks there can be found no man with a varied enough background to understand some aspect of the new conditions.

A well drilled army may be a good offensive force when it can control the conditions of its advance, but should conditions be highly variable, the flexibility of a guerilla force gives it a better chance of ultimate success. For this reason it is said that time sides with the guerillas, for time brings change and change can only be detrimental to a well ordered army.⁶⁷

Standards of conduct, that is, moral standards, are originally customs of the communitarian group. Dewey put it this way:

"For practical purposes, morals mean customs, folkways, established collective habits. This is a commonplace of the anthropologist, though the moral theorist generally suffers from an illusion that his own place and day is, or ought to be, an exception. But always and everywhere customs supply the standards for personal activities. They are the pattern into which individual activity must weave itself."⁶⁸

But the rise of individualism has deprived humanity of its wellspring of customs in the communitarian group. Thus those customs which have become petrified in statute or dogmatic tradition either remain powerful by virtue of the support they receive from the established political power, or else they fade and die. In any case, moral standards no longer are a function of local conditions as once they commonly were. Bureaucratic control of moral standards is not new. It may be argued that the first instance of bureaucratic control is control over public morality. Perhaps it is true that nothing makes a conquering bureaucracy seem so much of an imposition as evidence that the standards it imposes are arbitrary. The first wish of every slave is that free men might be slaves like himself.

Like the well ordered army, the individualist bureaucratic state imposes its code upon individuals, not upon members of strong and contrary minded groups. Such a group is an occasion for warfare or other means of destruction of the anti-individualist ties that bind members to a different way of seeing and doing. But a sea of conforming individuals is ultimately more clumsy than a group that evolves its manners

as conditions require. It might therefore be argued, following the military metaphor further, that time is on the side of moral guerillas as well. In any case, it may be hoped that home grown morality, like home baked bread may prove to be so much more palatable that some will count it worth the extra effort.

In any case, there is always a possibility that imposed moral standards of the bureaucratic state will simply become so irrelevant to exceptional local conditions that they will be ignored to the extent of becoming unenforceable. This may be the case with the ban on marijuana, for example. In spite of broad public support and intensive advertising campaigns against the use of marijuana, the acceptance and use of the herb among a relatively close knit sub-group eventually put the standard mores in jeopardy. A similar phenomenon may be recognized in the inability of the bureaucracy of the Catholic church to deal with the widespread practice of birth control within predominantly Catholic states.

Nonetheless, so long as a state is set up on individualist principals, so that standardized rules and controls are applied to all by bureaucratic organizations set up for the purpose, the failure of such controls is a comment on a dangerous weakness in such a system of social organization at the same time as a vigorous attempt to apply the rules to an unwilling population is an example of inherent tyranny. In short, both the weakness and the brutality of bureaucratic individualism stem from the unbending rigidity of mass uniformity.

3. Common Sense and Popular Sense

Over the past half century or so, small, self-sufficient, cooperative, agrarian communities have almost totally disappeared from even the backwaters of North America and Western Europe. The economic results of technology and a widespread faith in the tenets of individualism have conspired to destroy the farming village and the way of life propagated therein. The passing of such villages may be mourned as the ending of a picturesque and friendly style of life, but the greater tragedy is that such communities were among the last refuges of an independent communitarian consciousness which resisted the spreading uniformity of thought in the burgeoning technostucture. As the rural villages were dispersed or altered into suburban dormitories, the special consciousness of environment and of self which had permeated the citizens of such familiar conditions diffused like smoke on a spring breeze. Those who knew the communitarian feeling still long for it, and those that never knew it are yet aware of a vague but painful need in their lives.⁶⁹ The fundamentally practical common sense of task and purpose that typified life in such communitarian circumstances disappeared along with the conditions that had sustained it. The close and cooperative bonds between people that were nourished in the background of common problems and purposes, gradually broke down as the cold power of technological economics seeped into the cracks and broke each community apart. External interests and a growing reliance on money thus eventually destroyed almost

all of the last footings of common sense.

As the communitarian control over the local conditions of life was gradually relinquished, so the close and conjoint bond between word and deed broke down and the (experientially) common sense of utterances began to fade. As the control over local conditions of life passed to bureaucrats, so control over the foundations of language was given up entirely and the common images upon which utterances began to rest were to a greater and greater extent furnished by a corps of literati and later by their descendents, the ad-men. The mass sense propagated by this linguistic bureaucracy is as divorced from the practical well-springs of sense as the technological life style is divorced from the underlying facts of human existence.

The fundamental sense that derives from conjoint activity has been termed common sense. The mass sense which is propagated through the various mass media, the schools and universities, and other institutions of public education shall be termed popular sense. The Oxford Dictionary defines popular as "fit for the generality", which contrasts markedly with common (shared; in conjoint use). It is the difference between 'popular' and 'common'; the difference between "fit for the generality" and "in conjoint use", which demarcates the difference between the predominantly verbal "knowledge" based on popular sense, and the concrete understandings based on common sense.

It is not unreasonable to argue that the dominance of popular sense over common sense in the modern bureaucratic

state, gives doctrine and myth, rather than environmental necessity the most potent leverage over the behaviors of men. In communitarian conditions, man's understanding and his communications are primarily concerned with conjoint undertakings in the immediate environment. Under the dominion of popular sense, however, human communications are primarily about other communications and so forth. The most widespread view, rather than the most effective view in some material sense, is the most powerful view. Man has traded the idiocy of rural village life for the lunacy of popular mythology.

Common sense is conjoint sense, but popular sense merely rests on well known images. The first is involved with familiarly shared sensations, whereas the latter is truncated very often before the senses become directly involved. Common sense evolves with the conjoint transactions from which it springs. Popular sense does not spring from physical transactions with the actual environment; the known is not comprised of actual objects and the knowing has no foundation in conjoint undertakings. When language is not continually refreshed from immediate tests in actuality, the lexicon becomes more and more magical.

Now Peirce knew that a linguistic sign can only represent an object, not furnish an acquaintance with it. He also stated that linguistic signs have no reference in things or objects: ("The Sign can only represent the Object and tell about it. It cannot furnish acquaintance with or recognition of that

Object; for that is what is meant in this volume by the Object of a sign; namely, that with which it presupposes an acquaintance in order to convey further information concerning it."⁷⁰) If one accepts the reasoning that a sign presupposes an acquaintance with the object in question, then one is forced to accept that the connection between signs and things cannot be purely linguistic. It has been argued in this paper that the connection is made in physical transactions in the environment, and that it is the conjoint nature of such transactions that gives rise to linguistic signs. That this point of view is basically in line with that expressed by Peirce is evidenced by his insistence that a man cannot act alone, that "no mind can take a step without the aid of other minds"⁷¹ and so forth.

But that conjoint undertakings become the exception rather than the rule does not imply that linguistic behavior should cease. Quite the contrary: without a connection between actual things and linguistic signs, sign-behavior continues on in a somewhat circular way. For there is never any direct reference of sign to object in any case. "The immediate object of a symbol can only be a symbol".⁷² And so without regeneration of signs from conjoint transactions, the evolution of sign-behavior in connection with actual changes in the environment need not occur.

The difference between popular sense language and common sense language is not so much a matter of there being no evolution of sign-behavior in the first case and of there

being a perfect link in the second case, but rather of the degree of intimacy of the average individual with the roots of his utterances. Under common sense conditions, a far greater portion of sign-behavior is grounded in shared experience whereas in popular sense conditions, professional purveyors of sense control the sense of utterances.

By and large the distinction between common sense and popular sense has been ignored. Nearly always, the concept of customs is ambiguous so that there is no distinction between what is customary and evolved, and what is, rather, traditional and imposed. But common sense language is customary, habitual behavior whereas popular sense language tends more towards the forms of imposed traditional behavior. The sense of the first arises in familiar things, the sense of the second arises in the popular lexicon. The first evolves through shared activity in new circumstances whereas the second is changed as a matter of official or unofficial policy. The chief example of popular sense changes in the language is to be found in the realm of official euphemisms. Thus libraries become "Information Resource Centres", extermination of the enemy is called "pacification" and so on ad nauseam.

It is not surprising that the chief producers of euphemistic alterations in the language are the bureaucrats. Popular sense language is only an extension of the centralized control over human behavior that is the ultimate outgrowth of the doctrine of individualism. An addiction to euphemisms likewise indicates a deep subservience to a bureaucracy. If

one accepts Peirce's equation that good language is good thought, then there is plenty of reason for despair.

It appears then that the foundations of communication within the communitarian group on one hand, and throughout the bureaucratic state on the other, are quite different. In the framework of conjoint action in a familiar communitarian surround, communication rests on shared experiences. There is a continuity between the demands of the environing conditions, the customs of the group, and the sense of the language. In the individualistic bureaucratic state, however, the ties in conjoint action that form the link between physical transactions and linguistic behavior are broken just as the communitarian ties between men are broken. Such customs as exist are merely remnants of communitarian times often preserved as petrified and frequently enforced traditions. Both traditions and language are imposed without consideration for local conditions from the centers of bureaucratic power. From a local viewpoint, language tends to be euphemistic rather than practical, and points to popular myths rather than to shared experiences. Possibly the current quasi-religious search for deeper "meaning" in life by way of the pursuit of mysticism and magic is a confused yearning for the deep mutual understanding that was a common feeling prior to the disintegration of common sense communities since the Reformation.

Winston Churchill once said, "We shape our buildings and afterwards our buildings shape us". Of course, the same may be said of civilizations, although the process of social

evolution is not so conscious as the process of construction nor immediately apparent. It is obvious that to some extent the "shape" of a society reflects the customs of the groups out of which it is formed. It is also obvious that the social organization at a given time and place profoundly shapes the thought of those who live under such conditions. Of course, it is in the interests of those who are in power to sustain the status quo both in customs and in politics, just as it is in the interests of those who would gain a place in the sun to throw over the old guard and the traditions and conditions that sustain them. Such observations are commonplace. But what is not commonly observed is that the predominance of popular sense culture gives all the advantages of power to the powerful, including the fundamental advantage of establishing the norms of sense. The dismemberment of common sense leaves language at the mercy of those who can artificially fill the requirement for the interconnection between linguistic and non-linguistic modes of behavior.

The apparently greater power of television, film and theatre to affect human behavior above the power of mere print,⁷³ undoubtedly rests on the ability of an animated scene to partially reproduce the conditions of conjoint activity that are the genuine foundations of common sense. All serious attempts to modify human behavior in a dramatic way, attempt to some extent to set up artificial conditions of conjoint undertaking in which the environing conditions, including a majority of the participants are "loaded" or biased in a

desired direction. The so-called mass media, including, with some reservations, the popular press, have the power to create a climate of opinion which is a weaker but far broader analogue of changes in communitarian common sense wrought by conjoint transactions with altered environing conditions. The media present a kind of artificial environment. The ability of the comparatively "weak" transactions of simple acquaintance to produce powerful and long lasting effects was foreseen by Alexander Pope:

"Vice is a monster of such frightful mien
As to be hated needs but to be seen;
But seen too oft, familiar with its face,
We first endure, then pity, then embrace."

In such a manner it seems that the media are the organs that enable popular sense to alter in a ponderous way. Such changes are evidenced in fashion and fad throughout the popular sense culture. In this respect popular sense mimics common sense. But the danger inherent in popular sense rests on its independence from local social-environmental conditions. To the extent that the mass of humanity is brought into step, a tyranny over the natural transactions for a time and place is established. The local environment; natural, social, and economic, may be savaged by those very individuals who stand to lose the most by its destruction because they are blind to their own affairs while they are swayed by popular myth.

The gradual shift in social organization from a basis in common sense communities to an ordered bureaucratic state is paralleled by a gradual change in the usage of words such as truth and fact. The Oxford Dictionary shows a gradual shift

in the usage of 'truth' from meaning something like trust; implying faithfulness to one's fellows, or in some cases a troth, that is, a promise of faithfulness; to meaning primarily a conformity to fact. The first instances of the changed usage appear just prior to the Reformation in connection with the veracity of religious doctrine. It is also interesting to note that 'fact' similarly shifted from meaning "action; performance; doing;", to "having objective reality".⁷⁴ In the case of both words, it is reasonable to assert that the change in meaning reflects a tightening of doctrine within the church and a shift in intellectual emphasis from the common sense to a dogmatic interpretation of holy writ. In the earlier instances a connection with small groups and physical action is evidenced, whereas in the latter instance, a preoccupation with eternal verities becomes evident. 'Truth' first reflects the functional union of men in a community, but later demarcates the legitimate from the illegitimate. 'Fact' is first concerned with doing; the connection between linguistic and non-linguistic behaviors; but later becomes identified with an imposed "reality". The slow change in viewpoint from a local, common sense viewpoint to a broad, imposed, popular sense viewpoint is marked by such a shift in emphasis from the functional to the appropriate and from the practical to the legitimate. The foundations of common sense rest in the conjointly experienced outcomes of action. Popular sense rests on established and guarded doctrines.

The bureaucratic state perforce must rely on mass indoctrination to tie its members together since the thrust of diverse conditions reflected in common sense is towards an unacceptable degree of diversification, the counter-vailing forces of popular sense promote a simplistic unity in human thinking in spite of basic differences in needs and obligations. In general, whatever passes for learning within the institutions of a bureaucracy is consequently tainted with doctrine if it is not solely and simply indoctrination per se. H. M. Kallen attacked the prevalence of indoctrination in the guise of public education:

"Wherever alternatives fight for place, wherever an issue is controversial and options are live, weighted and momentous, indoctrination becomes an applauded educational method, a pedagogic trouble-shooter which strips away the hesitations and trials and errors of natural learning. Pass from the multiplication tables to statistics, to non-euclidian geometries, to relativity, to quantum theory and biophysics, and you enter worlds of active controversy. Schools among the Communists, the Catholics, the Nazis, the Facists, will treat those as issues of doctrine... Each labors to hold its own conception invariant against its own inner changes and against the outer impacts of the libre examen."⁷⁵

Whatever passes for knowledge in the bureaucratic state, inasmuch as it must agree with the doctrines of popular sense, is sophistical rather than actual. Popular sense knowledge arises in the exchange of lexical signs rather than in shared experience and it seems, in the light of this understanding, more than simple coincidence that schools are designed to prevent the best opportunities for conjoint action from surfacing in the process of education. Sharing of any sort is

discouraged, as is overt physical action. Indoctrination, the inculcation of sophistical knowledge, cannot proceed in the face of opportunities for actual learning, that is, learning by conjoint doings, and so the potential for active learning through actual undertakings is suppressed.

Actual learning as opposed to indoctrination, is antithetical to the aims of bureaucracy, since there is no guarantee of uniformity of conditions or results throughout the entire system of education. Actual learning tends to be concerned with actual conditions, in fact it is necessarily and directly connected with them, and this simple fact assures that common sense knowledge will always have an individual and local flavour. Within the schools of any bureaucracy, there is always a great deal of effort expended, consciously or unconsciously, to create a degree of uniformity of environing conditions so that what is learned will not vary too widely from place to place. A school room is a clear and concrete example of the expense that is unhesitatingly undertaken by modern bureaucracy to create controlled and uniform conditions for the indoctrination of potential participants in the great mechanical scheme.

In this regard, as in every other matter, the modern bureaucratic state by far outdoes the great imperial bureaucracies of the past. In imperial China, a set of public service exams selected only those candidates who were well versed in the classics and in proper traditions for offices in the bureaucracy. But in the modern technological state,

uniform training facilities guarantee widespread uniformity of skills and opinions throughout the populace as well as in the offices of state.

Bureaucratic suppression of the natural communitarian base of common sense learning nonetheless has an ultimate and overwhelming disadvantage. On the local level of actual transactions between man and his environment, it cannot avoid producing what may be simply termed "stupidity". To be stunned or stupified in the face of a sudden change in the course of actual events is an often caricatured fault of the well-indoctrinated academic. A profound ignorance of actual local affairs marks the product of modern bureaucratic education systems. The roots of the so-called "ecological crisis" are to be found in the simple inability of popular sense understanding to be "in tune" with any particular aspect of the environment as it undergoes changes. This contrasts strongly with the inability of common sense knowing to be out of touch with its environing conditions.

Now, as far back as 1868, Peirce noted that: "The very origin of the conception of reality shows that this conception essentially involves the notion of a community." But Peirce did not differentiate between communities and larger agglomerations in his own day. Undoubtedly, there was far less cause to do so at that time. Nonetheless, we can accept his argument as it stands:

"And what do we mean by the real? It is a conception which we first must have had when we discovered that there was an unreal, an illusion; that is, when we first corrected ourselves. Now the distinction for which

alone this fact logically called, was between an ens relative to private inward determinations, to the negations belonging to idiosyncrasy, and an ens such as would stand in the long run. The real, then, is that which, sooner or later, information and reasoning would finally result in, and which is therefore independent of the vagaries of me and you."⁷⁶

But perhaps, given Peirce's uncritical and unexplained use of 'community' in this case, there is yet a further distinction buried in his analysis. That is the distinction between common sense reality and popular sense reality. In fact, the word 'real' has been carefully avoided throughout all the foregoing chapters of this paper because of a conviction on the writer's part that such a possible distinction between the knowledge provided by conjoint activity and that which has a merely verbal base, is irretrievably obscured in the use of the word 'real'. The word 'actual' has been used herein to refer to that view of the world which is formed in transactions. That actuality is determined in social circumstances is a point on which agreement with Peirce firmly rests. But that actuality is totally free from "the vagaries of you and me" is obviously false under the view expressed here. A uniform "reality" can only be the product of a uniformity of experience. As far as the net of linguistic utterance catches "reality", an agreement of sameness depends upon a uniform understanding, a shared experience of actual conditions.

Now, there must be a difference between the "reality" of mountains as seen by plains dwellers, and on the other hand as seen by mountain dwellers. In prehistoric times, given

that there was little contact between the two groups, there would understandably be a great difference in spoken languages. This matter has been made a great deal of under the title "Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis" but its roots are to be found in the work of Peirce and its ramifications loom large in the works of Dewey and Mead. In order to avoid the pitfalls and assumptions of universality inherent in the use of the term "reality", actuality will herein be used to denote knowings of a specific group at a specific time and place. The possibility of a detailed general actuality is denied. There can be no detailed, universally applicable, geography, although there can be certain geographical generalizations, and so it is with actuality. General statements can be made about it, but in total, an actuality is particular to people, time and place.

Of course, this treatment of the word 'reality' will raise the hackles of philosophers of the magical-theological type, but if their hair is not already standing on end, then they have not understood the rest of this paper clearly. There is nothing essentially different in this treatment than in that offered by Dewey, however, and in his investigation of traditional philosophical views of the word, he was driven by the inconsistency of such views to reject the word altogether:

"Reality: As commonly used, it may rank as the most metaphysical of all words in the most obnoxious sense of metaphysics, since it is supposed to name something which lies underneath and behind all knowing, and yet, as Reality, something incapable of being known in fact and as fact."⁷⁷

But the conditions under which popular sense flourishes,

nourish a kind of "reality". That is, a commonly accepted view of affairs which, since it is divorced from the cradle of conjoint transactions, scarcely justifies the name actuality. Rather than an evolving, genuine, shared feeling or deep understanding of a given type of event in space and time, the mass bureaucratic social order promotes a spurious and shallow mimicry of actuality. The conjoint but limited understandings of common sense are replaced by a general lexical facility, unlimited in scope and inconsequentiality.

So it has been that the conditions underlying the spread of the doctrine of individualism, culminating in the rise of mass popular sense, has raised "a false lexicon of...cliches", but the "degenerate sacerdotal authority" possessed by these cliches of popular sense rests on their being the predominant world-view and divorced from the actual undertakings of common sense knowing. Each man has become deprived of a genuine place in the world thereby. Instead of communal transactions on a human scale and a profound understanding of his own place in the environment, popular sense man exists in an isolated illusory world of popular imagining; sustained by a faith in popular credenda, inculcated in a factory-system for mass indoctrination from early childhood to adulthood, and supported by the media-barrages of popular sense thenceforth until death. As a consequence, a faith in the fantastic, a high regard for magical solutions, and a stupid inconsequentiality in practical affairs both physical and social, mark the emergence of popular sense man as a new and degenerate type arising from the disastrous decline and death of the common sense environment.

Intelligence and Change1. Social Intelligence

Intelligence is a broad word, but in one sense at least, it is customarily used to refer to a trait of minds or more concrete things. In such cases it indicates approval or appreciation. A man might say that he finds a certain dog or horse intelligent, and on the other hand, he might say that he always thought that Shakespeare must have been a very intelligent man. Such commonality as there is in these statements lies in the feeling of approval they generate - a sort of respect for an implied success. Now whatever else might be argued about the idea of intelligence, it does not take a great leap of diplomacy to establish an agreement that intelligence is concerned with success.

Such a narrow admission is sufficient upon which to build an appreciation that intelligence is not a matter of mind (whatever that may prove to be) as much as it is a matter of survival. At least in less confused forms of life, success and survival are pretty much the same. But in the linguistic mode, a new dimension is added to purely biological life; that is the cultural dimension, and it is in this realm that human successes and failures generally are initiated even if they do not come to a final flowering there. In the sense that survival is either something you are for or against; you cannot be indifferent to it in action, even if you pretend to be indifferent in conversation. Even linguistic behavior ultimately connects with questions of survival. It has been argued that all referents of sign-behavior are in action, and

to the extent that all actions increase or decrease chances for survival at some point in time, sign behavior ultimately refers to matters of survival.

If this be so, then it seems reasonable to argue that evidence of intelligence is to be found in action. Or in the long run, biologically speaking, in the survival of a species. In corollary, it seems that one might speak of the intelligence of individual organisms as somewhat distinct from the intelligence of their species. But in an important way, these two are intimately connected, and that is in the broad historical overview. By and large, that which benefits the individual, benefits the mass of individuals.

But of course, if intelligent action is action which is liable to result in survival, then judging intelligence is a difficult task indeed, for the whimsies of the future are not revealed to mortals. Nonetheless, examples of reasonably intelligent conduct abound. For only those creatures which have been in the main intelligent up to this point, are with us today. One major stupidity, and you are out of the game. A persistent stupidity, and your species is out of the game.

Viewed in such a naturalistic light, intelligence takes on a very transactional tone. It is clearly as much a matter of the environment as it is a matter of the individual organism or species. Out of the environment come the various kinds of problems, changes in the direction of the environmental flux, against which intelligence is measured, and out of which, it is shaped or provoked. To the extent that the upcoming vagaries of any situation are not known, but may be guessed at in terms

of probability, a kind of biased flexibility would seem to be the best stance from which any organism or species might hope to spring into intelligent action. But a primary quality of bureaucracy is immobility, it follows that a bureaucratic society is fundamentally unintelligent. It should further be said that the intelligent social order is the one that enables its participants and itself (as a consequence) to survive. An intelligent organism is a surviving organism. An intelligent society is a surviving society. An intelligent biosphere is a surviving biosphere. Granted, the term 'intelligence' is also used in a comparative sense. To use it thus presupposes a foreknowledge of events leading to continued survival or demise, and constitutes an instance of the most common academic conceit; that which Dewey termed "the philosophers fallacy", namely the belief that whatever is found to be true under certain conditions may henceforth be asserted to be universally true.⁷⁸ Any comparative estimate of intelligence can only be reasonably assumed to be probabilistic in nature and ought to be so used.

This should not deter us, however, from inquiring into the foundations of intelligence, nor from stating that one social form may be more productive of it than another. Intelligence is a quality of life, which distinguishes the living from the non-living; the mutable from the immutable. But among the users of a language, intelligence takes on a new dimension, and rather than merely being an attribute derived from participation in a superior gene pool, it becomes an attribute of a social group; an outcome of

habits and customs occurs according to the predominant requirements of the group. Where customs modify in accordance with changed conditions, intelligence is manifested; where ironclad traditions fail to yield, a form of stupidity shows itself. Intelligence is not change per se, but a readiness to change appropriately in the face of a genuine need for change.⁷⁹ Chaos is not intelligence, nor is stasis, unless stasis is the requirement.

Among men, common sense is the basis of intelligence since it is the nexus of word and deed. As a consequence it can be seen that conditions which foster common sense, foster intelligence, both conjointly in the modification of customs, and severally in the modification of habits. It is through communication, a making common, that conjoint needs are perceived and conjoint changes are made, but it is in action that these changes are manifested.

The thrust of popular sense, however, is toward a static uniformity. It is no longer in touch with the wellsprings of adaptation, that is, conjoint action. But since common sense is the basis of knowledge within the bureaucratic state, it follows that bureaucracy is fundamentally unintelligent. Eventually, a bureaucracy's incapacity for intelligent adaptation may mean its end. Some form of cumbersome immobility seems to have brought about the downfall of the great bureaucratic states of history.⁸⁰ But in the case of the modern bureaucratic state, the situation is much more serious. Not only is bureaucracy more pervasive, but within

society is a virtually uncontrollable agent of change, namely technology.

The shared activity of a small group of individuals who regularly cooperate in some undertaking is the interface between linguistic behavior and non-linguistic behavior. It is in this setting that objects are made and die. It is this creation and death of objects that is the important "missing" side of dualist or mentalistic epistemologies which ultimately cannot give a good account of human knowledge of objects because they cannot give a good explanation of the existence or nature of objects in the first place. In conjoint activity are to be found both the transactions between man and the natural environment which create (through efforts to satisfy constantly arising needs) things of interest and the conditions for verbal interaction between the actors, who must coordinate such efforts. Thus, in Dewey's words, ... "linguistic behavior supervenes on other more immediate and, so to say, physiological modes of behavior, and that in supervening it also intervenes in the course of the latter so that through this mediation regularity, continuity, generality become properties of the course of events, so that they are raised to a plane of reasonableness".⁸¹ When linguistic behavior modifies non-linguistic behavior to the point that a certain regularity in the character of conjoint transactions occurs, an object is coming into existence. Looked at from the point of view of an already existing object, an apple, for example, is a certain regularity in the ongoing chain of transactions involving a certain aspect of the environment, a certain set

of physiological occurrences, and a certain propensity toward a linguistic utterance.

Should apples consistently fail to satisfy the need that has become associated with the whole set of transactions that attaches to the utterance "apple", then a break in the regularity occurs and after a time, the whole set of transactions, linguistic and non-linguistic, will quietly retreat into the general flow of changes out of which it initially came. Such would also be the case if any other part of the conglomeration of transactions were interrupted, for example, if the red, somewhat globular, edible, etc. environmental aspects should discontinue, the connection would also be broken.

In the respect of it being readily formed and extinguished at appropriate times, linguistic behavior can be more or less intelligent. When it is closely connected to the conglomeration of transactions of which it is a part, it is within the system which may extinguish it and call forth some other more appropriate connection. When it becomes a matter of widespread belief or doctrine, however, then it is out of touch, so to speak, with related transactions. The possibility of change is reduced and that behavior becomes unintelligent. Now, since such linguistic behavior is linked to "physiological" behavior in which it intervenes, then a whole pattern of behavior, not merely an utterance, becomes unintelligent. In fact, there is no such thing as a "mere" utterance, but always there is a group of behaviors that travel together, so to speak, called forth by, and calling forth the utterance.

What has been termed 'popular sense' is simply utterances and related behavior divorced from their direct connections to shared activities in the environment. There is no modification of behavior due to changing circumstance, thus inappropriate behaviors persist in spite of environing conditions which are antithetical to such behavior. The conditions for modifying the linguistic and non-linguistic transactional link are roughly those that formed it, where needs and conditions meet together with cooperating individuals. When an 'object' persists outside of the conditions that require it, it has become a matter of doctrine and is anti-evolutionary and unintelligent inasmuch as it calls forth behavior of little value, or possibly of negative value to the survival of a cultural group. This is the basis of the unintelligence of popular sense.

Popular sense is the mode of most non-experimental, non-scientific academic discussion. Rather than a conjoint and exploratory set of transactions of knowing, what is more generally undertaken is a discussion of what is supposedly known, that is, popular sense. Divorced from action, such behavior becomes unintelligent and if carried to an extreme, results in what Dewey has termed the "philosopher's fallacy":

"So common is it that one questions whether or not it might be called the philosopher's fallacy. It consists in the supposition that whatever is found true under certain conditions may forthwith be asserted universally or without limits and conditions. Because a thirsty man gets satisfaction in drinking water, bliss consists in being drowned."⁸²

As a part of the full complement of physical transactions that

are a part of an object as it grows in conjoint activity, limits and conditions, normally a part of the accompanying circumstances, are no longer part of the pattern in popular sense discussion; and thus divested of the circumstances of common sense, words stretch out of all proportion to their original sense. The use of language as a calculus without frequent tests in action, is therefore a dangerous procedure for those with an interest in the truth.

The use of language as a calculus rests on a confidence in the independence of words from conditions that is a hallmark of a belief in magic. Magic is the belief in the power of words alone to change actual conditions. Any belief in the correctness of a doctrine in the face of opposing evidence, or without an effort to substantiate the claims of doctrine by an actual test also constitutes a faith in magic. The use of 'magic' as a term to denote such a faith, is not too strong. It is merely a way of indicating a common feature of all forms of superstition, be they religious, political, or philosophical. In this regard, Dewey wrote:

"The essence of all hocus pocus is the supposition that results can be accomplished without the joint adaptation to each other of human powers and physical conditions... Belief in magic did not cease when the coarser forms of superstitious practice ceased. The principle of magic is found whenever it is hoped to get results without intelligent control of means."⁸³

The enormous success of technological activity rests on the direct connection between the development of tools and the practical test of such tools in actual use. There is very little room for magic in the arts of the practical except in

some cases of coexisting but unnecessary rituals. Such rituals as those surrounding the launching of a ship represent efforts by the masters of doctrine and hocus pocus to control the force of technology. Magical controls over the practical arts are nowadays easily broken by new developments which give technology a life and direction of its own. Unfortunately it seems that technology has slipped first from the hands of everyday practitioners, thence into the hands of magicians, and now the tools are creating (and beginning to satisfy) their own demands.

On the other hand, the relative stagnation of the evolution of intelligent social forms can be traced to the importance of the control of doctrine over social behavior. Belief, not practical experience, now forms the basis of social order. The desire to restore hanging as a cure for a rise in the general incidence of murder is probably a case in point. The biblical belief in a righteous application of the forces of vengeance as a proper response to criminal activity has confused and thwarted efforts to understand crime as an aspect of the total social scene. "It is hoped to get results without intelligent control of means."

2. Ends Are Means: A Case against Historicism

The Reformation and the subsequent rise of the technological society not only divested man of his close partnership in the economic facts of life but also in many other areas as well. Education, for example, was no longer a matter for the familiar group. Children were rapidly assimilated into the

growing proletariat as individual economic atoms. The conditions of the economic enslavement of proletarian children were truly horrible, but even after their gradual emancipation, they never regained the worth and sense of purpose they had as participating members of the medieval community. To this day, education is applied as the mass solution to the needs of children, notwithstanding that they need places within the community of men; not a separate mass institution of their own. Thus even today, individualism has progressed to the extent that children are by law alienated from the lives of their parents.

The feeling of isolation within the tremendous machine was so acute that it accelerated an intellectual phenomenon that has been termed by Dewey, "The Quest for Certainty". The collapse of the supportive circumstances for common sense knowing threw men back on doctrine as the source of meaning for life.

The practical affairs of men deal with unique situations, no two of which are ever exactly alike. Thus there is inherent in man's transactions a degree of uncertainty that is more or less in inverse proportion to the familiarity of the circumstances encountered. By virtue of the inherent insecurity in practical affairs, the arts of the practical have traditionally been looked down upon by those who sought to attain absolute security by supernatural means. It has been in the advantage of most practitioners of the magical arts of religion to insist that perfect certainty was attainable, if not on Earth, at least in the great Hereafter. The limited security available

in everyday life was offered as a sign of the inferiority of earthly affairs, whereas the acute desire for certainty led to the belief in a more certain world elsewhere.

This tradition of supernatural certainty persists in many forms. The extolled virtues of mathematics lie in its precision and its claims to absolute truths. Logic is seen as a system of discovered truths rather than the distillation of acquired experience. In fact, in the eyes of many philosophers, the virtue of philosophy lies not in its generality but in its supposed nearness to truth. Truth itself is seen as an absolute - a certainty - rather than an asymptotic expression denoting a perfection unattainable outside of contrived axiomatic systems. The complexity of such systems often obscures their fundamental circularity in which the attained truths turn out to be absolute because they are initially defined that way.

The revitalized quest for certainty following the unsettling events of the Reformation lead men to seek certainty in their abstract visions of nature. The removal of the authoritative certainty of Church doctrine left a vacuum that could only be filled by the finding of equivalent certainties in nature. Regarding this change, Dewey wrote:

"The scientific revolution of the seventeenth century effected a great modification. Science itself through the aid of mathematics carried the scheme of demonstrative knowledge over to natural objects. The "laws" of the natural world had that fixed character which in the older scheme had belonged only to rational and ideal forms."⁸⁴

Since certainties were sought, certainties were found,

primarily in the slow-changing macrocosm. The stars were not pursued merely because they were there, but because they had over the millennia exhibited an almost theological constancy. Attention was never turned to the essentially random happenings of the cosmos. The heavens were searched only for the comforting assurance of God's continued perfect presence; the conventional signs of perfection were sought and found. Nature became the evidence of God's perfect goodness. In this spirit Spinoza was able to confer upon Nature the name Natura sive Deus. Nature contained all the emotional associations and moral force that had hitherto been assigned only to God.

Spinoza typifies the extraordinary problem of modern philosophy that on the one hand endeavours to maintain the certainty derived from the Judeo-Christian faith in the ultimate being, and that on the other hand, wants to claim modern science as its own. Unfortunately the methodology of science, since it is human action in the actual world, must continue to turn up uncertainties. The most exact mathematical formulation will ultimately fail because change is defined out of mathematics in the interests of "truth". But human transactions follow the unpredictable path of equilibrium and disequilibrium and thus the relationship between man and things will eventually move beyond the inert perfection of mathematical description. Thus inasmuch as conventional philosophy (i.e. the philosophy of conventions) maintains that science is the search for truths, it will find

the search uncertain and endless.

The search for reassuring order still goes on, although at times suspicions dawn that there is something impermanent, conventional and human in the order that is found. This is not surprising when it is considered that order is itself a human convention applied to the universe and not from the universe itself. The universe itself is pretty well mute. The feeling that man just observes is slipping away from the natural sciences as practical solutions to practical problems entail the consideration of the observer as an active participant in each experiment. Although philosophers are still largely unwilling to give up their claims of direct routes to truth, the recognition that most natural laws are not much like their conventional human namesakes is dawning. Thus Russell remarked:

"We now find that a great many things we thought were natural laws are really just human conventions. You know that even in the remotest depths of stellar space there are still three feet to a yard. That is, no doubt, a very remarkable fact, but you would hardly call it a law of nature. And a great many things that have been regarded as laws of nature have been of that kind."⁸⁵

The argument from the supposedly perfect nature of natural law to the assumption of a natural Law Giver, that is, God, found increasing favour in the nineteenth century. Even Adam Smith found justification for the state of economic affairs in the law-like relationship between self-interest and national interest. It is no exaggeration to say that he saw the hand of God in the capitalist system. Even without the imposition of God upon nature, the belief in natural law gave a feeling

of certainty to the world that had been missing since the Reformation.

The prestige of certainty embodied in the claimed discovery of natural laws, has been so attractive that almost all branches of human investigation have laid claim to an immutable law or two in their time. In this century, governments that have not justified themselves by reference to God's law, have justified their actions by reference to other forms of immutable law, notably, historical law. This belief has been termed 'historicism'⁸⁶ but it is closely related to the belief in other kinds of immutable laws.

The ebb and flow of human affairs can only be appreciated in hindsight. This fact is compelling enough to cause some theoreticians to suggest that there is not even any such thing as the present.⁸⁷ Be this as it may, it is obvious that nothing can be said of the present ere it becomes the past. Historians prefer a somewhat longer view through which to obtain a better sense of the perspective of their subject. Of course the intervention of time gradually obscures important details. It is an example of the odd balance of life that a grasp of perspective and an understanding of minutiae cannot be obtained together.

To the greater extent the subject matter of a historian is more of the broad sweep of human affairs than of the intricate workings of individual lives. Patterns and trends populate the historian's landscape. Types and archtypes are the components from which his conclusions are constructed.

Individuals figure as examples of types or as interesting conglomerations of types rather than as mere individual people. Categories are the fundamental generalizations on which understanding rests.

The historian thus scans the past for repetitions. These are the fundamental things of his trade. Wars, famines, tragedies and triumphs are the objects of historical study, as robins, turtles, fleas and wood-beetles are the objects of biological study. War and wood-beetle are not names bestowed by historian and biologist, however, but are everyday words of the English language which delimit or define the world in ways which are not necessarily congruent with the theoretical ambitions of the historian or biologist. Renamings are therefore necessary, and the development of a new nomenclature is the surest sign of the undertaking of a serious field of theoretical study.

It is not surprising that the study of history should be somewhat emotionally traditional in character, nor that among the proudest traditions of historians are the traditions of their mother tongues. A careful consideration of the evidence history provides for the development of historical hypotheses has given rise to the argument that the literary traditions of history are a good thing, since if the study leaves behind the realm of ordinary sense it will be fearfully adrift with little else to sustain it. At any rate, pure history remains a largely descriptive and literary art while attempts at establishment of scientific theories of history go on under the banner of sociology to the extent that most schools of

sociology might be termed schools of theoretical history. Sociology has developed a technical terminology, not history.

Insofar as sociology remains the study of theoretical history, it will, as a science, rest purely on observation, not on experiment. For the most part, those who insist on the sociologists role as a theoretical historian deny the possibility of small scale sociological experimentation as a source of meaningful data for sociological theory. It is claimed that the experimental method cannot be applied to the social sciences because precisely similar experimental conditions cannot be reproduced at will. Of course this argument does not hold water, since the physicist or chemist cannot precisely reproduce experimental conditions either. If conditions were exactly the same, it would be difficult to determine whether or not there had been two experiments or one. Novelty and change are, after all, time's only markers.

The view that sociology is the study of theoretical history rests on a set of assumptions about the nature of historical evidence, primarily, that historical evidence indicates a law-like progression in the course of human events taken as a whole, and that there is sufficient evidence to be gained by the retrospective analysis of past events for such a progression to be understood and for its 'laws' to be deduced. Notwithstanding that such a claim puts enormous pressure on arguments supporting the reliability and sufficiency of historical evidence, it can also be seen that this view requires that the historian be seen as a kind of disinterested observer and not a participator in the creation of history.

In this respect, historicism is a version of the belief in natural laws, although as Popper has pointed out, historical law claims are based on much more tenuous evidence than those claims made in the physical sciences.⁸⁸ Furthermore, and perhaps most important in view of the political applications of such alleged laws, is the connection made between the existence of such laws and the necessity of certain present and future political changes. Of course, this represents an argument from what is considered to be the case now, to what ought to be the case. Such arguments are currently unpopular in modern logical theory, and ought to be avoided especially by those who worship Truth, not to mention those resigned to an inescapable degree of indeterminism or uncertainty. If one were to hold that there were immutable patterns in nature then it might be reasonable to insist that one ought to conform so as to avoid the possibility of needless difficulty. At first glance, this seems reasonable, that is, if it is an inescapable law of nature that rocks fall down, then we had better step aside if we see one in the air directly above us. But this is a specific instance. Existential referents of the law are in actions; events actually occurring. But the word "law" even in this specific application leads a double life, that is, it can be employed to designate the content of generalizations both when repeated observations of specific conjunctions of traits show no exceptions to those conjunctions, as in the instance above, and also when the relation is itself a member of a system of interrelated universal propositions. In the first case, as has been said, the reference is

existential, in the second case the word "law" refers to a universal hypothetical proposition, thus the reference is definitely non-existential.

Regarding the latter case, Dewey wrote:

"In the course of previous discussions it has been held that a physical law, such as is expressed as a relation of abstract characters, is a universal hypothetical proposition. For example, the law of gravitation is a formulation of the interrelation of the abstract characters mass, distance, and "attraction". But while the contents of the proposition are abstractions, nevertheless, since the proposition is framed with reference to the possibility of the ultimate existential application, the contents are affected by that intent. Such hypothetical universals do not exhaust the possible existential affairs to which they may be applied, and as a consequence may have to be abandoned in favour of other hypothetical universals which are more adequate or appropriate to the subject at hand. This is illustrated by the change from the Newtonian law of gravitation to the Einsteinian formulation. Although both are hypothetical universals in this sense, each is an empirically significant contrary of the other. In such propositions (including those of mathematical physics) the strictly mathematical phase resides in the necessary relation which propositions sustain one to another, not in their contents."89

Now laws as factual generalizations, as in the instance of falling rocks mentioned above, have sets of interactions for their subject matters, which define kinds of events. It is recognized that only universal propositions which are non-existential in content are necessary propositions. A proposition having contents of direct existential reference can be neither universal nor necessary. Thus the frequently expressed view that universal laws imply a necessarily ordered sequence of events is contradictory to accepted logical principles.

Yet it must be admitted that necessary universal propositions (i.e. scientific "laws") seem to be involved in scientific methodology. This is resolved in the understanding that hypothetical universals as laws are necessary propositions but that factual generalizations are not. Dewey remarked:

"The fallacy vitiating the view that scientific laws are formulations of uniform unconditioned sequences of change arises from taking the function of the universal proposition as if it were part of the structural content of the existential propositions."⁹⁰

When the distinction between logically necessary relations implicit in laws as hypothetical universals and the ordered sequence achieved by the potential consequences of the subject matter of a factual generalization is not maintained, the universe takes on a mechanical aspect. The logical necessity of an abstract deductive system becomes a part of the actual sequence of events. A logical method becomes entangled in an ontological sequence. The axiomatic determinism of a man made deductive system becomes transposed on to the actual world. Dewey said:

"We take out of our logical package what we have put into it, and then convert what we draw out to be a literal description of the actual world."⁹¹

Thus the patterns of events we find in the world are that; found patterns. Finding means picking out. It is transactional. In and of itself, the world is not sequenced or orderly. Patterns are picked out by men with regard to purpose. The falling of rocks, the rocks themselves, are so named, are so chosen out of the uncountable happenings of every instant

because of the importance they have to the acts of individuals associated with the events. The purpose is to avoid the rock.

The creation of causal law so regarded is to be understood as a specific and complex act of knowing. Inasmuch as such laws are creations of purposeful men, they are artifacts of the interaction of mind with environment. To this group of artifacts of man-matter knowings-transactions belong the abstract distillations of purposeful inquiry also - the axioms and structures of logical and mathematical systems. They too are the children of the fruitful interaction of mind and environment. Thus, for example, the mathematics that is used in some instance is not the only possible mathematics for a useful deductive system, it is simply an evolved mathematics of purposeful undertakings. It no more expresses a fact which is a priori true, than it expresses a fact which is inherently true of the environment. Mathematics expresses postulates of the acts of inquiry. Logical and mathematical forms are essentially formulations of conditions, discovered in the long history of the practice of the acts of inquiry - which further inquiries must satisfy if they are to yield warranted assertions as a consequence.

"Knowing marks the conversion of undirected changes into changes directed towards an intended conclusion."^{9a} There is no security in the imagined immutable truth of causal laws. No facts concerning the actual world can be always and forever true. There is no genuine security in combinations of words no matter how profound and elegant they may be. Only the

purposeful action to which words connect can provide a measure of safety in an endlessly disequilibrating chain of circumstance. A reassuring belief in certainty must be exchanged for a workable understanding of indeterminacy if the wolves are to be effectively kept from the door. The acts of inquiry must be recognized as the only basis of knowledge and natural laws must be understood as logical instruments born from the acts of inquiry which participate in subsequent creations of object and meaning from the ongoing transactions among observers and observed. The aim of science is not, as in the Newtonian mode, to ascertain the immutable laws of nature, but rather to string together in a way which tends to further some purpose, the useful components of a series of sets of transactions. This is the scientific method of reassigning meaning to aspects of the world that have escaped or surpassed the common sense realm of ordinary utility and have taken on a new usefulness in the modified transactions of scientific inquiry.

Laws function as formulae for the prediction of the probability of an observable occurrence. Less formally, they may be thought of as general statements which function as aids to direct observation of particular cases. They tell the observer what the components of his act of observation are, that is, what they are like. Laws are designations of fairly stable relations, thus they both serve to predict the likelihood of the observation of such relations in individual instances, and at the same time serve to designate the conforming relations as instances of the particular law.

The progress of man, the gradual mastery of aspects of his environment, does not come about by the discovery of inherent order in the universe and by subsequent exploitation of such order, rather the path is the path of a purpose, a teleological path towards an ever receding succession of ends, made sensible by growing and changing structures of explanation. New observations bring about new factual generalizations. New factual generalizations necessitate shifts in hypothetical universals. Such new understanding arouses new questions which promote further changes and so on. The organic pulsation of equilibration is reflected in the highly cultural processes of scientific investigation.

The distinctively human thing about human activity is its high degree of purpose. Human activity is undertaken with a conscious view of its probable consequences. Something is intended. The study of history is the study of purposeful human activity. The study of history itself is purposeful, though individual purposes of historians may range from the sublime to the merely pecuniary and usually include a mixture of both. In broad perspective, however, it can be seen that historical investigations are undertaken for the same reason as most researches - in order to understand kinds of events so as to be able to cope with them more effectively. Man, of course, is not unique in his efforts to cope with circumstance, but what any other species must accomplish primarily through the processes of natural selection, man, through the force of language, can immeasurably more rapidly accomplish through the medium of his culture. Formulations and statements are

sacrificed rather than individuals, (although up to now it has frequently been the practice to sacrifice individuals who hold to the wrong statements; this is not actually necessary - it is perhaps a hold over from pre-linguistic times when individuals and traits were inseparably linked). Schools of thought perish rather than genotypes. The acts of inquiry, both common sense and scientific inquiry, are parts of a process of meta-adaptation which is more rapid and more flexible than the process of natural evolution, and is thus productive of a far higher degree of security for each individual.

A study of history is a study of the evidence of this process of meta-adaptation, and of its circumstances both actual and cultural. A theoretical study, that is, one that attempts to be scientific, undertakes to utilize the system of factual generalizations and hypothetical universals to further the understanding of the historical process so as to attain some purpose. Such a purpose might be the elimination of certain pitfalls such as wars, or whatever other purpose is of powerful interest. Thus, from one point of view, we may say that sociology attempts to render a culture more intelligent by improving its adaptability, that is to render it more effective in reaching its ends. Since desired ends tend to change as the search progresses, the emphasis is to be placed more on the effective undertaking of purposeful changes rather than on the superiority of certain ends in any absolute sense. An important feature of successful scientific

investigation is the freedom to abandon old purposes as investigation discloses more interesting ones. In this regard, it is important to understand the relationship of means and ends. Perhaps the best explanation of this artificial dichotomy is contained in the following passage:

"The "end" is merely a series of acts viewed at a remote stage; and a means is merely the series viewed at an earlier one. The distinction of means and end arrives in surveying the course of a proposed line of action, a connected series in time. The "end" is the last act thought of; the means are the acts to be performed prior to it in time. To reach an end we must take our mind off from it and attend to the act which is next to be performed."⁹³

In the simplest organic rhythm of equilibration, means and ends are not distinct. The means is the end. The motion towards equilibrium is means and end. Equilibrium itself is asymptotic and cannot be achieved. Ends and means can only be attributed to unconscious acts retrospectively or through prior knowledge of a habitual sequence. When it is said that the end of a cat's stalking is the eating of a bird, we are artificially truncating a sequence of actions that arbitrarily might be said to begin with the fertilization of a cat ovum and that will roughly end with the burial of the cat. As the cat eats the bird, we may attribute to it the further end of finding a warm place for a snooze and so on. But the means and ends distinction is conferred on the cat by us. The cat was merely participating in the lifelong series of equilibrating transactions that we call 'being a cat'.

Thus when the cat doesn't eat the bird, but settles down

and goes to sleep in a warm sheltered spot half way across the lawn, we are apt to say things like 'it changed its mind' to cover up the fact that our projections were not shared by the cat. Means and ends are two names for parts of the same chain of transactions, which in toto we call "the life of a cat".

"'End'", says Dewey, "is a name for a series of acts taken collectively - like the term army. 'Means' is a name for the same series taken distributively - like this soldier, that officer."⁹⁴ To think of an end is to take a consolidated view of an act to be performed, for example, the eating of an apple. "I feel like eating an apple", we might say. To think of the means of eating the apple is to take the consolidated view apart, to think of chewing, swallowing, and so forth. Ends, then, and means, are conventions, not entities. They are postulated of nature, they do not exist in nature.

Thus, to propose ultimate and final ends for life, or for the evolution of society, is to propose the end of action; stasis; death. To say that the path of history inexorably tends toward some ideal end is to project a petty convention over the tide of human evolution with an inevitably absurd result. The recognition that ends are temporary abolishes the notion of human perfectability. It can be said that men can improve their situation in respect of some trait or other, but not that they can reach perfection. Perfection implies an end attained, or in an extreme interpretation, all ends attained.

But it has been shown that no end is the end, thus such ultimate attainment is impossible.

This has enormous impact on any doctrine that might claim that the attainment of an end justifies the means used to attain it. Since ends are means, this must be understood as the claim that the compressed view of a collection of means must justify the immediate acts in the hoped for sequence. But ends, as Dewey saw, are themselves endless. Means suggest further means, and unless the idea of an end as a fixed goal is fervently maintained, the natural evolution of common sense inquiry may tend toward a different direction as it comes to be viewed as more desirable. The claim that an end justifies the means amounts to the assertion that knowledge gained in the undertaking of means should not be allowed to effect the direction in which the means are supposed to tend. As the desired end is approached, this view becomes increasingly difficult to maintain because the view of the end held so firmly in mind tends to dissolve into further means.

Doctrines which preach the attainment of a specific end as their purpose; their entire *raison d'etre*, must therefore take care that their ends are unattainable by definition or by design. No Christian can attain heaven on earth, and no Hegelian ever attained the Absolute Idea. Dialectical Materialism suffers from an incongruity which can be traced to this Hegelian belief in an ultimate end. In the last paragraph of The Poverty of Philosophy, Marx wrote:

"It is only in an order of things in which there will no longer be classes or class-antagonism that social evolutions will cease to be political revolutions."⁹⁵

This prompted Bertrand Russell to correctly criticize:

"What these social evolutions are to be, or how they are to be brought about without the motive power of class conflict, Marx does not say. Indeed, it is hard to see, on his theory, how any further evolution would be possible. Except from the point of view of present day politics, Marx's dialectic is no more revolutionary than that of Hegel. Moreover, since all human development has, according to Marx, been governed by conflicts of classes, and since under Communism there is to be only one class, it follows that there can be no further development, and that mankind must go on forever and ever in a state of Byzantine immobility."⁹⁶

We have uncovered at least three good reasons for rejecting any doctrine based on historical necessity. By way of a summary, they are as follows:

1. The notion of inexorable historical trends implies an ultimate end to the historical process. For a trend to be defined as irreversible or inexorable, it must tend in some direction and a direction must be established in terms of some end point as in 'towards the classless society' or 'until there is total peace on earth'. But in strict sense, the belief in an ultimate end is itself a means in present action. It supports a degree of dedication or fanaticism that would otherwise have no direction; that is, it would be pointless. Furthermore, no ends are ultimate ends (except perhaps suicide). To give an end ultimate status is to entify a way of looking at things; to give it the status of a thing to be attained rather than an act to be performed. To assume the existence of an

ultimate end, is to propose a time when activity will cease.

2. Historical trends, even if they are not inexorable, are of the status of factual generalizations not hypothetical universals. As factual generalizations they have specific referential content. Each moment in history is quite unique and there is no allowance, since history is retrospective, for test and experiment. Thus there is not sufficient information in the study of history to enable the construction of broad generalizations, symbolic of common traits in many factual generalizations. Such hypothetical universals cannot be constructed. Factual generalizations, because of their existential content, do not have the force of logical necessity, they do not permit the construction of conclusions on purely deductive grounds. Thus historical trends cannot be the sole basis for a sociological theory.

3. Even if it were possible to construct hypothetical universals on the basis of historical evidence, there is no guarantee that the statements of the hypothetical universals themselves would not change under the pressure of new discoveries as history progressed. Under the influence of new facts about nature, physicists have been moved to alter their theoretical positions and to alter their resultant understandings of nature more than once. Since the attainment of a theoretical position is not an ultimate end, and since ends are not, in any case, ultimate, there is no reason to suspect that further changes will not take place. The same would be true of historical generalizations, if they were possible. Hypothetical universals are not permanent or

ultimate, they are part of a slowly evolving series of knowings generally termed 'explanation'. As information changes, so must explanations.

The logical inadequacy of theories of historical inevitability has not deterred men from striving after the "state of Byzantine immobility" forecast by Russell. But to the extent that an evolutionary flexibility in the face of change is an indication of what has been called "social intelligence", it is obvious that the thrust of historicist utopianism is towards a high degree of social stupidity. It is undoubtedly true that any doctrine which emphasizes the concentration of power in a path of ideological righteousness, promotes social stupidity. But it may also be argued that the present level of technological expertise enables a degree of control and suppression beyond the fondest imaginings of totalitarian thinkers of a half century in the past. McNeill argued:

"Perhaps the next step beyond the level of social and human engineering already pioneered by the Russian Revolution will be genetic tinkering with the human germ plasma to produce suitably specialized subhuman and superhuman biological varieties. The potential results in increased efficiency and social discipline, thereby further increasing the possibility of concentrating power, seem enormous... If this should ever happen, men of the future may come to differ from those alive today as much as modern domestic animals differ from their wild ancestors."⁹⁷

The viewpoint expressed in this paper, however, asserts that any continued striving for a given end, without the implicit realization that as ends are approached they begin to deteriorate

into further means, will certainly result in disaster as the actual striving for the end in view tends to prevent natural adaptation to changes brought about by the efforts to achieve the end. Total commitment to a desired end involves a total rejection of other possibilities. Blindness to intervening possibilities is a trait that can best be define as stupidity.

In the light of all this, it is difficult to foresee the limits of possible control that can be exercised by a central authority or ideology before the increase in "social stupidity" begins to cause a breakdown in the system. Certainly, high technology proposes powerful means of monitoring and coercing deviants that extend the powers of potential control to a remarkable degree. On the other hand, as long as there is a degree of competition possible between states, if not within states, perhaps some value will be given to evolutionary social intelligence and the conditions that foster it. It is an unhappy reflection that the future evolution of mankind may hang on the continuation of competitive and warlike international pressures. But such an assertion does not seem too fantastic. At the end of his massive history of civilization, The Rise of the West, McNeill foresaw just such a possibility:

"If and when the possibility of international war ceases to agitate mankind and no longer spurs officialdom within the separate political sovereignties of the earth to ever greater effort, we should expect a heavy weight of bureaucratic routine to fasten itself upon all parts of the globe."⁹⁸

Undoubtedly, the current trend in political affairs among the so-called "Western" nations, is still towards a centralization of power. Whether "third world" nations adopt one of the prevalent models for bureaucratic immobility offered among the supposedly "advanced" nations, or whether more flexible systems of local control will be developed remains to be seen.

3. Change and Choice

In his powerful book, Understanding Media, Marshall McLuhan tells the following tale:

"After the Second War, an ad-conscious American army officer in Italy noted with misgiving that Italians could tell you the names of cabinet ministers, but not the names of commodities preferred by Italian celebrities... He predicted that there was small hope that Italians would ever achieve any sort of domestic prosperity or calm until they began to worry about the rival claims of cornflakes and cigarettes, rather than the capabilities of public men. In fact, he went so far as to say that democratic freedom very largely consists in ignoring politics and worrying, instead, about the threat of scaly scalp, hairy legs, sluggish bowels, saggy breasts, receding gums, excess weight, and tired blood."

McLuhan agrees with the army officer's analysis, and then goes on to make the following pronouncement:

"Any community that wants to expedite and maximize the exchange of goods and services has simply got to homogenize its social life."⁹⁹

This sentence is an excellent summary of one half of the argument put forward in this paper. The other half of the argument pertains to the ultimate social and, in an important sense, mental ramifications of the actual truth of McLuhan's dictum. It does not seem likely that McLuhan would be in complete

agreement with the conclusions put forward here.

The purpose of this essay has really been threefold in nature. First, to present a philosophical-sociological standpoint that offers a superior view of the connections between sociality and communication. Second, to sketch the roots of the continuing trend away from local control over local matters, including the sense of utterances. Third, to point out deficiencies in arguments which are used to justify increased efforts to centralize political, economic, and communicative power.

It has been the unchanging aim throughout this paper to show the effects of a continued homogenization of human social life, and to oppose by means of argument and example this perilous trend in human affairs. The dominance of popular sense over common sense and the triumph of centralized bureaucracy over communitarian control of local affairs, promises a new era of stagnation and stupidity in the conduct of every man's life. For social stupidity implies individual stupidity. No man can stand alone, as Peirce understood in the nineteenth century, and in the twentieth century this suggests that we may fall together. The removal of the roots of sense from the actual conditions of local life, and their instatement in the myth of popular imagination has practically severed man's connection with his actual environing conditions. This result multiplied by every man so blinded, poses a grave threat to the continued benignancy of the natural ecology. Furthermore, each man no longer can be certain of his own best interests as they were once vested in his communitarian social

surrounds. Values have thus become as whimsical as perceived needs have become shallow. By this route, the powerful media of human culture - the arts - have been diluted as has the consciousness of their audiences, and they no longer speak directly to the hearts of men in tune with their emotional messages.

Unless the continuing movement towards social homogenization can be halted, a pale sterility will settle over the generative power of the creative mind. For inasmuch as the mind has roots in society, the freshness of new ideas springs from differences between evolving actualities of various social groups. Analogous to the necessity of sustaining a broad gene pool for optimum adaptivity in biological evolution, is the requirement for a variety of views and styles for the preservation of social intelligence. It is from a competition between methods and views only, that the best for a given time and place may be selected.

But perhaps the saddest result of the collapse of common sense consciousness is to be endured in the dispersion of the profound insights of the deepest levels of religion. Dewey sensed that religion was dying when he wrote: "...the office of religion as sense of community and one's place in it has been lost." For he was aware, as Peirce had been, of the critically delicate connections between community, thought itself, and the religious sense; and of the related correspondence between conjoint action, operations of the intellect, and human emotion. The force of the collapse of the traditions of communitarian life has been to cast each man into the isolated individualism of an existence in the burgeoning bureaucratic

state. The force of popular sense has been to pervert the deepest understandings that men can have of human life and to snatch thereby the greatest cause for peace and joy from the life of modern man. As far back as 1922, Dewey could see this aspect of a threatening future darkness clearly. It seems appropriate that Dewey's words should be the last in this paper.

"There is a conceit fostered by perversion of religion which assimilates the universe to our personal desires; but there is also a conceit of carrying the load of the universe from which religion liberates us. Within the flickering inconsequential acts of separate selves dwells a sense of the whole which claims and dignifies them. In its presence we put off mortality and live in the universal. The life of the community in which we live and have our being is the fit symbol of this relationship. The acts in which we express our perception of the ties which bind us to others are its only ceremonies."100

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11. *ibid.*, 104.
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