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THE DEVELOPMENT AND PARTIAL VALIDATION OF A
CARE-BASED MEASURE OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT

by

Eva Elisabeth Skoe

B.A. (Hons.), M.A.

THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
in the Department
of
Psychology

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ABSTRACT

This study involved the development and partial validation of a care-oriented measure of moral development based upon Carol Gilligan's theory. The relationship of this newly-developed measure to ego identity and to Kohlberg's justice-oriented system was also investigated.

Several researchers concerned with sex differences in moral development have found that women typically score lower than men on Kohlberg's measure. Gilligan suggested that this difference might disappear if moral development were defined appropriately differentially for men and women.

Gilligan has delineated various levels of "the Ethic of Care" that purport to represent women's moral development. The main purpose of the present study was to construct and validate a measure of moral development (ECI) based upon Gilligan's description of feminine care-based levels of moral thought. In order to determine construct validity, the relationship between the ECI and ego identity was examined. Also, a Kohlbergian measure of morality was included to establish concurrent validity.

Eighty-six female undergraduate students between the ages of seventeen and twenty-six were seen individually by two female experimenters. The two morality tests were administered by different experimenters and the order of the two tests was

counterbalanced. The identity interview was given between the two morality measures.

Inter-rater reliabilities using three independent raters were in the .80's and .90's, indicating that the Ethic of Care stages can be determined with a fair degree of inter-scorer agreement. A significant positive correlation between the Kohlbergian measure and the ECI was found. The ECI was also significantly related to age. As hypothesized, subjects high on the ECI were higher in identity than subjects low on the ECI, and the ECI was found to discriminate better among the identity statuses than the Kohlbergian test.

This study supports Gilligan's theory that there are various stages of the Ethic of Care and it suggests that these may follow a developmental sequence. The implications for future research are discussed.

DEDICATION

• This thesis is dedicated to Jesus Christ who provided the inspiration and strength to complete the work with joy amidst the darkest years of my life.

It is also dedicated to my father, Jens Aage Dybwad Aspaas, whose deep wish to live until I received my doctoral degree was not granted. He died on March 20, 1986. "I learned from him the meaning of fatherly love, and that gave me an idea of the love of our heavenly Father, the only unshakeable thing in life, the true Archimedian point" (Kierkegaard, 1840).

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Finally, I gratefully acknowledge the contribution of the participants in this research, the women who in openly sharing their thoughts and experiences, provided the data for this thesis.

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Long afterward, Oedipus, old and blinded, walked the roads. He smelled a familiar smell. It was the Sphinx. Oedipus said, "I want to ask one question. Why didn't I recognize my mother?" "You gave the wrong answer," said the Sphinx. "But that was what made everything possible," said Oedipus. "No," she said. "When I asked, What walks on four legs in the morning, two at noon, and three in the evening, you answered, Man. You didn't say anything about woman." "When you say Man," said Oedipus, "you include women too. Everyone knows that." She said, "That's what you think."

Muriel Rukeyser

"Myth"

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Issue of Women's Development and Psychological Theory

Within the areas of ego identity and moral development there is growing awareness and concern about sex differences and the need for more adequate, expanded theories and measures that include the values and thoughts of women. Both theoretical and empirical attention have focused primarily on male development while female development has been comparatively neglected. It has been argued, for instance, that Erikson's descriptions (1950; 1959; 1968) of identity development are normative for males but not for females (Gallatin, 1975; Matteson, 1975). While the heuristic value of Erikson's theoretical groundwork in these areas cannot be doubted, questions have arisen concerning the adequacy with which his theory can accommodate specific aspects of identity development. Several writers and researchers have cautioned that male and female identity development may be processes whose difference is underplayed by Erikson. For example, Douvan and Adelson (1966) concluded that there is not one, but two identity crises: the masculine and the feminine. These investigators regard the female task of adolescence as a truce between, or integration of, conflicting goals (achievement vs. marriage/motherhood). They also suggest that the order of Erikson's developmental tasks of adolescence and young adulthood - identity and intimacy, respectively - may actually be

confronted in reverse order by women. Other researchers have suggested a third view, namely, that the identity and intimacy stages are merged in women (Josselson, 1973; Josselson, Greenberger & McConochie, 1977). Josselson, et al. (1977) believe that due to such a merger, for females "identity development proceeds at a deeper and less tangible level..." (p. 164), and that understanding of female development in adolescence is a far more complicated task than the understanding of male development. They see female development being "quieter, subtler" (p. 162). While Marcia (1980) states that "... the identity formation process takes longer for women than for men (just as the establishment of intimacy probably takes longer for men)" (p. 179), Hodgson and Fischer (1979) conclude that female identity development is not necessarily delayed, but that it follows different pathways.

Similarly, several researchers in the area of moral development suggest that there are two gender-related developmental paths, "justice" representing the thinking of males and "care" representing the conception of females (Gilligan, 1982; Langdale, 1983; Lyons, 1983). Gilligan (1979; 1982) connects the recurrent problems in interpreting women's development to the repeated omission of women from the critical theory-building studies of psychological research. Consequently, theories in the social sciences may reflect a consistent observational and evaluative bias. Measurements have largely been derived and standardized on the basis of men's observations

and interpretations of research data predominantly or exclusively drawn from studies of males. Gilligan (1982) states that

The disparity between women's experience and the representation of human development, noted through the psychological literature, has generally been seen to signify a problem in women's development. Instead, the failure of women to fit existing models of human growth may point to a problem in the representation, a limitation in the conception of human condition, an omission of certain truths about life. (p. 2)

Moral Development and Identity Formation

Theoretically, there is a close link between ego identity and morality. Both are assumed to be related to cognitive development (Marcia, Waterman & Matteson, in preparation) and development in both involves similar processes, such as disequilibrium or conflict, exploration and commitment. Marcia (1980) suggests that ego growth occurs in the identity formation process of exploration (involving some conflict) and commitment. Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) emphasize the importance of conflict (exploration) for moral development in terms of generating movement from stage to stage and also of commitment in the form of stabilization (greater stage "purity"), resulting in a greater consistency between structure and action. Murphy and Gilligan (1980) relate moral development to ego development in late adolescence by positing experiences of commitment and responsibility as critical to both developmental processes. It seems reasonable to infer that going through a crisis or

exploration period with regard to one's identity will affect moral reasoning to a significant degree (and perhaps vice versa).

Various writers have made such a connection between identity and moral development. Gilligan (1982) points out that there is a close tie in women's thinking about the self and morality. Marcia (1980) speculates that identity and moral reasoning are linked reciprocally; whereas Kohlberg (1973) believes that certain features of ego development are a necessary but not sufficient condition for the development of moral structures. Kohlberg and Gilligan (1971) state that "Erikson's picture of an adolescent stage of identity crisis and its resolutions... is a picture dependent upon formal logical thought and of questioning conventional morality" (p. 1078).

Research appears to confirm at least the moral thought aspect of this assumption. Podd (1972) and Poppen (1974) found subjects high in ego identity (Identity Achiever and Moratorium) to function at postconventional levels of moral development while subjects low in identity (Foreclosure and Identity Diffusion) tended to be at pre-conventional and conventional levels of moral development. Although this is disputed by Cauble (1976), there are sufficient methodological difficulties in this study to retain confidence in the original findings, particularly in view of recent replications of the identity/moral reasoning relationship by Rowe and Marcia (1980) and Leiper (1981). However, while this relationship has been

fairly well established for men, there is only limited evidence that the same positive relationship holds for women (Hult, 1979; Poppen, 1974). All the subjects were male both in the research by Podd (1972) and Leiper (1981), and there were only six female subjects in Rowe and Marcia's (1980) study. Consequently, Hult's (1979) and Poppen's (1974) findings are in need of replication in order to confirm the relationship between identity and moral reasoning for women.

Furthermore, several researchers concerned with sex differences in moral development have found that women typically score lower than men on Kohlberg's measure (e.g. Haan, 1978; Holstein, 1976; Langdale, 1983; Pratt, Golding & Hunter, 1983). Gilligan (1982) suggests that this difference may disappear if moral development is defined appropriately differentially for men and women.

The purpose of this research was to construct and validate a measure of moral development based upon Gilligan's (1982) description of feminine care-oriented levels of moral thought, and to use this test as well as a Kohlbergian test of moral thought to explore the relationship between ego identity and moral development in women. It was hypothesized that the relationship between ego identity and morality would be greater for the new measure than for the Kohlbergian one.

Erikson's Theory of Ego Identity Development

Erikson (1950; 1959; 1968) proposed that ego growth follows a series of stages through eight psychosocial crises experienced during the life cycle. Each of these eight normative crises presents the individual with a challenge which the person will meet for better or worse depending upon the current maturity of the person's ego functions and the support received from society. The core of this theory is the epigenetic developmental scheme which postulates a series of issues linked to life stages. The quality of resolution at any one stage influences the possibilities for resolution of subsequent stage.

The adolescent's primary task, as described in Erikson's (1968) "eight stages of man", is to develop a sense of personal identity or to risk identity confusion. However, Erikson is clear that the two polar outcomes he describes are opposite ends of a range of possible solutions. It is more likely that an adolescent would fall somewhere between identity and identity confusion, resolving some but not all of the conflicts which comprise the identity conflict. Marcia (1980) defines identity as "a self-structure - an internal, self-constructed, dynamic organization of drives, abilities, beliefs and individual history" (p. 159). He points out that the identity structure is dynamic, not static and that over a period of time the entire gestalt may shift. The key word in comprehending what is involved in a sense of identity is "continuity", a felt inner

cohesiveness from which confident decisions and actions may proceed. "The sense of ego identity is the accrued confidence that one's ability to maintain inner sameness and continuity, one's ego in the psychological sense is matched by the sameness and continuity of one's meaning for others." (Erikson, 1959; p. 89). According to Blos (1962), late adolescence is primarily a phase of consolidation, where general integrative processes occur: ego synthesis, patterning and channeling. "It is the task of late adolescence to arrive at a final settlement, which the young person subjectively feels to be 'my way of life'" (Blos, 1962, p. 127).

Ego Identity Statuses

Marcia (1966) has operationalized Erikson's ego identity formation as four identity statuses, or modes of identity resolution. The four identity statuses are as follows:

1. Identity Achievement is the most developmentally advanced status. The individual has gone through a period of exploration of alternatives and has made well-defined commitments.
2. Moratorium is the predecessor to Identity Achievement. Here, the person is in the exploration period with commitments only vaguely formed.
3. Foreclosure refers to the individual who has undergone no, or very little, exploration, and remains firmly committed to childhood-based values.

4. Identity Diffusion, the least developmentally advanced of the statuses, is comprised of persons who, whether having explored alternatives or not, are uncommitted to any definite directions in their lives.

Research on Sex Differences in Identity Development

Ego identity has been investigated most extensively by means of the semi-structured identity status interview developed by Marcia (1966). It utilizes process variables of exploration of alternatives (crisis) and degree of commitment in the content areas of occupation, religion and politics. More recently the areas have been extended to include sex role attitudes and beliefs about personal sexuality, thus incorporating interpersonal material within the interview (Marcia, 1980; Rogow, Marcia & Stugoski, 1983; Schiedel & Marcia, 1985).

According to Marcia, et al. (in preparation), the interpersonal area was added because it was thought to be particularly relevant for women. Theoretical support for the addition of a sexual-interpersonal area was based upon Erikson's (1968) discussion of "inner-space" issues as important for women and upon Douvan and Adelson's (1966) empirical work indicating the importance of interpersonal issues in the psychosocial development of adolescent girls. These findings were replicated by Josselson, Greenberger and McConochie in a later study (1977). However, there has been growing support for the value of a common interview for men and women, indicating that

interpersonal-sexual concerns are important for both male and female identity development (Grotevant, Thorbecke & Meyer, 1982; Hodgson & Fischer, 1979; Hopkins, 1982; Matteson, 1977; Rogow, et al., 1983).

A long series of studies have supported the validity of Erikson's theory and Marcia's approach to the study of identity development in males (see Bourne, 1977a,b; Marcia, 1980; Marcia, et al., in preparation, for research review). However, studies of female identity development have been fewer and more ambiguous as well as contradictory in their findings. For example, some studies suggest that females' identity formation, in comparison to males', may be less dependent upon occupational and more dependent upon affiliative factors such as religion (e.g. Constantinople, 1969; Josselson, 1973; Josselson et al., 1977; LaVoie, 1976; Toder & Marcia, 1973). Other studies report that occupational identity appears to be as meaningful and important to women as to men (e.g. Hopkins, 1982; Kacerguis & Adams, 1980; Waterman & Nevid, 1977). Hodgson and Fischer (1979) concluded that males focus on intrapersonal aspects of identity, while females focus on interpersonal aspects, suggesting a characteristic sex difference in identity development.

This conclusion has been supported by recent research. Examining gender differences among high school students in the sexual-interpersonal area of identity development, Grotevant and Thorbecke (1982) found that expressiveness (femininity) was

important to the interpersonal aspect of identity and that females were somewhat higher in identity in the interpersonal area than were males. The authors noted "... it appears that for young men, vocational and interpersonal identity achievement proceed independently... For young women, it appears important to negotiate identity achievement in the interpersonal domain in order to be engaged in occupational identity formation" (pp. 488-489). Supporting and expanding somewhat on these findings, Archer (in press) noted the greater salience of the career/marriage issue for high school girls than for boys. Bilsker, Schiedel and Marcia (1985) found that ideology (religion and politics) was the most important area for men's identity development while the interpersonal area (sexuality and sex roles) was most important for women's identity, although both men and women said that the interpersonal area was most important to them. Kroger (1986a) studying adolescent and adult women in New Zealand concluded that the questions of identity for women center primarily on interpersonal areas. Marcia, et al. (in preparation) state that Kroger (1986b) describes accurately many identity researchers' impressions of differences between male and female identity formation: "Rather than decisions about individual content areas, meta decisions about how to balance competing identity contents and at the same time consider the implications for significant others seemed to capture identity concerns for many women from this sample" (p. 15). Archer (in press) notes that her findings suggest that females "... not only have a more complex identity to establish

because of the number of identity domains they are attempting to define themselves in, but also because their societal orientation is less popular and less well supported" (p. 14).

There have been conflicting reports on the pattern of identity status grouping for women. Marcia, et al. (in preparation) report that while almost all studies with men have demonstrated a high-low identity status grouping: Achievement plus Moratorium, Foreclosure plus Diffusion, this has not been true for women. Beginning with the first women's study by Marcia and Friedman in 1970, Foreclosure women tended to score similarly on dependent variables to Achievement women, and Moratorium women were more similar to Diffusions than to Achievements (e.g. LaVoie, 1976; Schenkel, 1975; Toder & Marcia, 1973). As Marcia, et al. (in preparation) points out, this finding was perplexing, especially in light of the somewhat negative consequences of Foreclosure for men. It looked as if developmental immaturity (Foreclosure status) was somehow adaptive for women. However, since 1977, out of 16 studies with discernible patterns, only four have shown the earlier grouping while the remaining 12 conformed to theoretical expectations underlying the identity status construct, i.e. Moratorium women resembled Achievement women more than they resembled Foreclosure women (Marcia, et al., in preparation). It is Marcia's opinion that this change in the ordering of the statuses for women may be attributed to: 1) change in social conditions and values, e.g. growing social support for women's occupational identity

formation, and 2) the use of more sophisticated measurements, e.g. "deeper" ego structural measures such as Loevinger, (1972). Marcia, et al. (in preparation) conclude that "whether for socio-political reasons or because of more sophisticated measurement, or both, the issue of the grouping of the identity statuses for women is no longer problematical. Moratorium women more closely resemble Identity Achievement women than do Foreclosure women" (p. 49). Still, it is interesting and somewhat perplexing to think that socio-political changes and/or improved measures should affect women only. Does this imply that women are more influenced by such factors than men, and if so, why?

In summary, it is apparent upon reviewing the literature on identity research with women that they have caused more "problems" or at least required more interpretation and/or explanation than men. The reason for this may lie in the fact that Erikson's model of human development is essentially a male model. As Gilligan (1982) points out, Erikson's chart of life-cycle stages is defined by male experience. In spite of the fact that Erikson's (1968) observed sex differences, exemplified in his statement that "failure to develop fully the problem of female youth... was a severe theoretical handicap" (p. 265), his chart of life-cycle stages remains unchanged (Gilligan, 1982). Also, Marcia's initial identity status measure was developed on males only. However, recent research indicates that Marcia's current measure of ego identity revised to include

sexual-interpersonal issues is valid for both women and men.

This may be due to changes in the content areas of the identity interview as well as changes in the social status and power of women.

Kohlberg's Theory of Moral Development

Kohlberg (1958) commenced his dissertation with the intent of carrying forward into adolescence Piaget's (1965) pioneering investigation of moral development in children. He used Piaget's general assumptions and method which involved a focus on moral judgment, defined in terms of justice. Both Piaget and Kohlberg assumed that the developing child was a philosopher, constructing meanings around universal categories or questions, such as the question of fairness. Piaget's chief method in his early work was to use children's comparative evaluations of moral concepts such as naughtiness or fairness as a vehicle for probing their reasoning. After a subject made a comparative evaluation with respect to a given pair of stories differing in certain morally relevant respects, the subject would then be asked to explain or justify that evaluation. Kohlberg (1969) retained and intensified the Piagetian focus on justification by presenting moral or social problems and then probing the ways in which subjects justify their decisions and evaluations with respect to their proposed solutions. As a means of eliciting justice reasoning, Kohlberg chose to present "hypothetical dilemmas of ancient vintage that had been discussed by

philosophers" (Kohlberg, 1979, p. vii).

While Piaget (1965) described three stages of moral judgment (constraint, cooperation, generosity), Kohlberg (1969; 1971; 1973) derived six stages of moral development based on extensive case analyses of boys ranging in age from 10 to 16 years. These six stages were ordered into three distinct levels of moral orientation, summarized by Hoffman (1980) as follows:

I Preconventional

Control of conduct is external in two senses; standards consist of outer commands and the motive is to avoid external punishment, obtain rewards, have favors returned and so on. This level characterizes childhood.

Stage 1 - Obedience and punishment orientation.

Stage 2 - Naive hedonistic and instrumental orientation.

II Conventional

Morality is defined as maintaining the social order and conforming to expectations of others; adherence to established norms is the essence of moral obligation. Control of conduct is external in that standards consist of rules and expectations held by those who are significant others by virtue of personal attachment or delegated authority. Motivation is largely internal, although based upon anticipation of praise or censure by significant others, the child now takes the authorities' role and respects their judgment. Thus, the personal reactions of

authority serve as cues to the rightness or wrongness of an act and the moral virtue of the actor. This level is usually dominant in late childhood or early adolescence.

Stage 3 - Good boy/girl morality of maintaining good relations.

Stage 4 - Authority and social-order maintaining morality.

III Postconventional

Morality is defined as conformity to shared or sharable standards, rights, duties. Possibility of conflict between two socially accepted standards is acknowledged and attempts at a rational decision between them are made. There is a moral obligation to abide by established norms, but only insofar as they serve human ends. Control of conduct is internal in two senses: 1) the standards have an inner source; and 2) the decision to act is based upon an inner process of thought and judgment concerning right and wrong. This level characterizes adolescence, though many people never attain it.

Stage 5 - Morality of contract and democratically accepted law.

Stage 6 - Morality of individual principles of conscience.

Universal ethical principles.

Kohlberg's theory and stage schema has generated much research and criticism. While Kohlberg himself (1976) claims that the only valid argument against his theory is evidence in longitudinal data of regressions or stage skipping, his concept of the moral realm has received criticism as being biased culturally (Simpson, 1974), sexually (Gilligan, 1977) and

politically (Sullivan, 1977). Some psychologists (e.g. Kurtines & Grief, 1974) have recommended a total abandonment of Kohlberg's theory, claiming that more than a decade of empirical research has failed to provide the data necessary to confirm it.. Other critics have been less harsh, focusing instead on the upper half or third of Kohlberg's stages as problematic (Gibbs, 1977; Gilligan, 1977; Puka, 1976; Sullivan, 1977). This line of criticism has been supported both longitudinally (Holstein, 1976) and cross-culturally (Edwards, 1975; Simpson, 1974) by empirical work which has confirmed the sequentiality of the first three stages, while at the same time presenting evidence against invariant sequence for stages 4, 5 and 6 (Murphy and Gilligan, 1980). Gibbs (1977) claims that stages 5 and 6 are best considered not as naturally occurring stages in the strict Piagetian sense, but rather as metaethical or philosophical (existential) reflections upon the normative judgments of earlier stages. Murphy and Gilligan (1980) question this proposal on the basis that without the postconventional level, moral stage development ends in adolescence, "at least for bright subjects" (p. 78). Murphy and Gilligan (1980) put forth another hypothesis, the possibility of cognitive transformation in late adolescence or early adulthood that would provide the new structures of thought necessary to the development of a different form of moral judgment.

Kohlberg has in recent years made several revisions both in his theory and in his six stages. In 1973 he retracted his

earlier conclusion that moral development ends in adolescence and posited instead a kind of structural stage change in adulthood. Also, he has revised his manual in which the criteria for principled moral judgment is radically altered. Murphy and Gilligan (1980) point out that postconventional scores are still more vulnerable to regression than the conventional scores. In summary, at present there seems to be considerable agreement among developmental psychologists regarding the validity of the pre-conventional and conventional parts of Kohlberg's scheme, while the third, postconventional, remains a territory of both empirical and theoretical dispute.

Research on Sex Differences in Moral Development

With regard to sex differences, Haan (1978) reports that men are vastly over-represented and women under-represented in the principled moral reasoning category (78% to 22%). This may be due to inadequate norms and scoring systems rather than to a "moral deficiency" in women. Gilligan (1979) points out that in the research from which Kohlberg derives his theory, females simply do not exist. Kohlberg's (1958, 1981) six stages that describe the development of moral judgment from childhood to adulthood are based empirically on a study of 84 boys whose development Kohlberg followed for a period of over 20 years. Although Kohlberg claims universality for his stage sequence, those groups not included in his original sample rarely reach the higher stages (Edwards, 1975; Holstein, 1976). Prominent

among those who thus appear to be deficient in moral development when measured by Kohlberg's scale are women, whose judgments seem to "exemplify the third stage" (Gilligan, 1982).

Langdale (1983) found evidence that female data are consistently discordant with Kohlberg's theory in more than a dozen studies over a period of fourteen years (Bar-Yam, Kohlberg & Naame, 1980; Fishkin, Kerriston & MacKinnon, 1973; Gilligan, Kohlberg, Lerner & Belenky, 1970; Haan, Block & Smith, 1968; Haan, Langer & Kohlberg, 1976; Holstein, 1969; Holstein, 1976; Hudgins & Prentice, 1973; Kramer, 1968; Kuhn, Langer, Kohlberg & Haan, 1977; Langdale & Gilligan, 1980; Powers, 1982; Speicher-Dubin, 1982; Turiel, 1972). The general pattern found in these studies is that the scores of females are lower than the scores of males. In Kohlberg's scheme, the scores of females tend to gravitate toward stage 3, where what is right is defined in terms of interpersonal relationships, whereas the moral judgments of males typically advance linearly toward stages 4 and 5, where what is right is defined in terms of societal rules and universal principles (Langdale, 1983). In her longitudinal study of the development of the justice orientation in adolescents and their parents, Holstein (1976) notes that there may be a possible sex bias in the Kohlberg scoring standards. She states that:

One of the hallmarks of stage 3 reasoning is a stress on compassion, sympathy or love as a reason for moral action. Another hallmark of stage 3 is a concern of the approval of others, especially those in the primary group. This latter emphasis "catches" children's reasoning. But at the same time the stage 3 emphasis on

sympathy, so stereotypically part of the female role, is characteristic of much adult female reasoning in the present study. Many of the women are either predominantly stage 3 or, if stage 4, show so much stage 3 reasoning that their stage score is a mixed one. .. Emotional response to moral conflict which is exemplified by females more than males results in adult female reasoning being categorized with children's. (pp. 60-61)

Holstein (1976) goes on to say that the problem of where to categorize "irrational but morally relevant emotions such as compassion, sympathy and love will remain a problem, especially in light of consistent sex differences produced by scoring standards for these moral passions" (p. 61). Both Haan's (1975) and Holstein's (1976) research indicate that the moral judgments of women differ from those of men in the greater extent to which women's judgments are tied to feelings of empathy and compassion. Women are also more concerned with the resolution of real as opposed to hypothetical dilemmas. Gilligan (1982) and Langdale (1983) point out that Piaget's and Kohlberg's a priori definition of morality in terms of a single orientation (i.e. justice) does not take into account that, as a result of different experiences of interacting with others, people may define that domain differently. They argue that in terms of factors such as social status and power and reproductive biology, there are differences in how males and females experience their interactions with others.

Although the primacy of the rule-centered justice orientation is clearly reflected in Piaget's (1965) theory-building research, Piaget also discusses a second aspect

of morality. He notes that moralists have often stressed the conflict between justice and love since "justice often prescribes what is reproved by love and vice versa" (p. 323). For example, in her critique of moral philosophy, Murdoch (1970), the British novelist and philosopher, indicates the need for acknowledging a conception of love as central to people and to moral theory. Discussing the role of "adult conscience", Piaget states that "Charity and the forgiving of injuries done to one are, in the eyes of many, far greater things than sheer equity" (p. 323). Tracing this moral orientation to the parent/child relationship, Piaget states that "And here no doubt is the starting point for that morality of good which we shall see developing alongside of the morality of right or duty, and which in some persons completely replaces it" (p. 195).

It is interesting and somewhat perplexing to note that Piaget not only discusses this other aspect of morality, he also noticed clear sex differences in his study of the rules of the game. The "few little girls" he could find that took any interest in the game, seemed less concerned with legal elaboration, regarding a rule as good "so long as the game repays it" (p. 83). Girls, Piaget observed, are "extremely tolerant", more willing to make exceptions and more "easily reconciled to innovations" (p. 83). As a result, Piaget concluded that "the legal sense is far less developed in little girls than in boys" (p. 77). This view echoes Freud's (1961) opinion that women "show less sense of justice than men, ...

they are less ready to submit to the great exigencies of life... they are more often influenced in their judgements by feelings of affection or hostility" (pp. 257-258). Yet, Piaget did not investigate this difference more thoroughly. Instead, he generally equated child development with male development (Gilligan, 1982), a bias that has permeated many areas in psychology. As Langdale (1983) points out, the generalization of findings on studies of males to all human beings is frequently made on the basis of "no female data at all" (p. 41). She states that the ethical problem created by "the confusion between a male standard and a human standard in moral development research" (p. 45) has been identified by McClelland (1975) in his review of psychological gender differences:

Psychologists have found sex differences in their studies from the very moment they started doing empirical research. The difficulty in drawing conclusions from this mass of data is that they have tended to regard male behavior as the norm and female data as some kind of deviation from that norm. (p. 81)

Reiterating this problem, Rohrbaugh (1979) notes the consequences for females:

A woman cannot win when she is defined in totally male terms... psychology has been a male rather than a human science. The theories have been developed by males, the values have been male, and the studies have perpetuated myths about sex differences and male superiority. Women are the losers. (p. 463)

Unlike Piaget, Kohlberg initially did not consider any other aspect of morality as important (Langdale, 1983). As cited in Langdale (1983), Kohlberg, Levine and Hewer (1983) state that:

Our starting assumptions ... led to the design of a research instrument measuring reasoning about dilemmas of conflicting rights or of the distribution of scarce resources; that is, justice concerns. We did not use dilemmas about prosocial concerns that were not frameable as rights conflicts. Besides this limitation to justice dilemmas, we focussed our probing questions and scoring procedures on eliciting judgments that were prescriptive and universalizable, while ignoring statements of personal feeling and those that attempted to rewrite the dilemma situation in order to resolve it. (pp. 161-163) (Emphasis added.)

However, according to Langdale (1983), in the current presentation of his theory as "a pure theory of justice" Kohlberg makes a distinction between the justice orientation and what he refers to as "the personal sphere of morality" (Langdale, 1983, p. 25). Kohlberg states that "we think that such 'personal' morality is a part of the moral domain... we also feel that our justice stages can be directly applied to this 'personal' domain" (p. 47). Langdale (1983) concludes that Kohlberg sees the "personal" domain as secondary and ultimately subsumed within the justice orientation. There is empirical evidence that the way in which Kohlberg has applied his justice stages to the "personal" domain frequently results in the thinking of women being classified with that of children (Gilligan, 1982, Holstein, 1976). It remains to be seen whether women will fare any better with Kohlberg's new scoring system.

The attack on Kohlberg's theory as being sex biased has not gone unanswered. In defense of Kohlberg's scheme, Walker (1984) in his review article concluded that very few sex differences in moral development have been found. This conclusion was based upon the traditional method of literature review as well as a

metaanalysis of the studies reviewed, testing the hypothesis that males are more advanced than females in moral reasoning. Walker reports that "although the trend was in the predicted direction, this pattern was not significant..." (p. 687). To support his view, Walker noted that of the 108 studies summarized in his review "only eight clearly indicated significant differences favoring males" (p. 688). These findings are explained by Walker as being due to flawed methodology, primarily because sex and occupational educational differences were confounded. In addition, he notes that most studies reporting sex differences relied on early stage definitions and scoring procedures, thus representing "measurement artifacts".

Generally, Walker (1984) appears to be of the opinion that his review and metaanalysis establish that there is no sex bias inherent in Kohlberg's moral developmental theory. However, this conclusion may be somewhat premature. For example, the argument that the sex differences found in several studies represent "measurement artifacts", is exactly the point made by the critics of Kohlberg's scheme. Gilligan (1982) and Langdale (1983) argue that women tend to score lower than men in moral reasoning because Kohlberg's measure is based upon and thus favors the thinking of men (justice). As Kohlberg's system pulls for justice reasoning, women, representing a different moral orientation (care), frequently get misscored at stage 3 since this is the only stage where both the justice and care orientations are represented. According to Walker, Colby (1978)

claimed that recent revisions in Kohlberg's manual should "eliminate the tendency to underestimate the reasoning of females because of particular content, e.g. focus on relationships, love and caring" (p. 688). There is, however, to date too little evidence to accept this claim. It is interesting to note that Colby admits to such a tendency while at the same time asserting that there is no sex bias in Kohlberg's approach.

Walker argues that the sex differences found are due to confounding sex with educational and/or occupational differences, i.e. the males had careers while the females were housewives. The logical, implicit solution to this interpretation of the problem of discordant female data is that the problem would be solved if females had the same educational or occupational experiences and, hence, thought like males (Langdale, 1983). Kohlberg (1969; 1973) postulates that level of moral development is influenced by cognitive prerequisites and by exposure to sociomoral experiences, which provide role-taking opportunities in conflict situations. According to Walker (1984) these experiences arise "both through interpersonal relationships with family and friends and through real participation in the economic political, and legal institutions of society" (p. 678). By "explaining away" gender differences in moral reasoning on the basis that the males had more education and/or careers, Walker seems to say that the experiences of a housewife will doom a woman to stay developmentally as a child in moral reasoning. In other words, the sociomoral experiences

arising through interpersonal relationships with family and friends may impede growth while "real participation in the economic, political, and legal institutions" enhance it. This may or may not be true, but it seems reasonable to assume that females also learn something from their experiences, be it as a housewife or as a professional. From different experiences one would learn different things (Langdale, 1983), and Kohlberg's stage sequence, developed from an exclusively male sample, may simply not relate as well to the female as to the male experience.

Langdale (1983) argues that "explaining away" gender differences in terms of "background variables" such as occupation, education, social class, etc., do not explain away gender differences at all. Instead, the findings call attention to the interrelationship between moral thinking, experience and gender. Lyons (1983) and Langdale (1983) included professional women in their studies and matched the male and female subjects on education, occupation and social class (all held at high level). In both studies, women were found to use considerations of care more frequently than rights in the resolution of moral conflicts. This supports Gilligan's hypothesis that women consistently demonstrate a morality of care regardless of their profession. Also, Langdale (1983) found that females had more stage 3 presence scores across the life cycle than do males. She reports that the scores of adult males were consistent with what would be expected in an age-related developmental sequence in a

life-cycle sample, while the scores of adult females were not. Stage 5 was for example found in 45.2% of the adult males and only 23.3% of the adult females. Thus her findings contradict Walker's and Kohlberg's and his associates' conclusion that what appear as gender differences in moral development research actually reflect differences in the variables of education, occupation and social class. Matching males and females on these variables, the general pattern in Langdale's (1983) female data still replicated the pattern previously reported, i.e. the gravitation of the scores of females toward stage 3 in Kohlberg's developmental sequence.

Finally, it should be noted that Walker (1984) in his metaanalysis pooled together all the studies reviewed, those involving children as well as adolescents and adults. This may explain his non-significant results as research on children generally show a different pattern than research on adults, i.e. girls have been found to score higher than boys (e.g. Biaggio, 1976; Blatt & Kohlberg, 1975; Krebs & Gillmore, 1982; Turiel, 1976). In fact, due to their different orientation (care), young girls may tend to be overscored as stage 3 (the only stage in Kohlberg's scheme related to the care orientation) just as adult women tend to be underscored. In support of this suggestion, it can be noted from Walker's Table 1 that in a study on 13 year old children by Saltzstein, Diamond, and Belenky (1972), the girls tended to be at stage 3 while boys tended to cluster at lower stages. It is recommended that a separate metaanalysis be

done on studies involving older or adult samples. A significant difference may then be found when the studies on young children are not included. It would also be interesting to do a metaanalysis on the studies involving children, testing the hypothesis that young girls tend to score higher than boys in order to further investigate the suggestion of possible overscoring. In other words, females irrespective of age may tend to gravitate toward stage 3 due to their different orientation. As noted by Langdale (1983), a qualitatively different moral orientation (i.e. care) may have been confused with a qualitatively different stage within the justice orientation (i.e. stage 3) in Kohlberg's coding scheme.

In conclusion, in spite of Walker's (1984) claim that there is no inherent sex bias in Kohlberg's theory, it appears that there is enough evidence in the moral development research findings to suggest that females may in fact think differently from males about moral issues. In light of the discordant female data found in several studies, it is important to further investigate Gilligan's (1982) claim that moral development has not one, but two paths and that women represent the care orientation.

Gilligan's Theory of Moral Development

In her research over the past several years Gilligan began to notice "two ways of speaking about moral problems, two modes

of describing the relationship between other and self"

(Gilligan, 1982; p. 1). She observed that women appear to have different perspectives, different notions of what is of value in life, and different constructions of moral problems. Women are concerned about relationships and responsibilities rather than individual rights and justice. It is Gilligan's (1982) opinion that women's "morality of responsibility" or "ethic of care" represents a different moral conception that provides an alternative conception of maturity.

Given the difference in women's conceptions of self and morality, women bring to the life cycle a different point of view and order human experiences in terms of different priorities... And because women's sense of integrity appears to be entwined with an ethic of care, so that to see themselves as women is to see themselves in a relationship of connection, the major transitions in women's lives would seem to involve changes in the understanding and activities of care. (pp. 22 & 171)

While women traditionally are urged toward a "morality of responsibility", in contrast, men are socialized toward a "morality of rights", a concern for autonomy in judgment and action as well as for freedom and non-interference with the abstract rights of individuals. Furthermore, Gilligan argues that these two patterns of rights or justice vs responsibility or care as foci are distinct and independent approaches to moral judgment. Only at the most mature levels of development is an integration or a greater convergence of these orientations presumed to be undertaken or even possible (Gilligan, 1977; 1982). Attempting to account for the sex difference in these orientations, Gilligan (1982) refers to the analyses of Nancy Chodorow and Jean Baker Miller. Chodorow (1974) attributes the

differences that characterize masculine and feminine personality and roles to the fact that women, universally, are largely responsible for early child care. Thus, being parented by a person of the same gender, girls come to "experience themselves as less differentiated than boys, as more continuous with and related to the external object-world, and as differently oriented to their inner object-world as well" (p. 167). Consequently, relationships and particularly issues of dependency, are experienced differentially by women and men. Similarly, Miller (1976) calls for "a new psychology of women" that recognizes the fact that "women stay with, build on, and develop in a context of attachment and affiliation with others ... women's sense of self becomes very much organized around being able to make, and then to maintain affiliations and relationships" (p. 83). Gilligan proposes that since masculinity is defined through separation while femininity is defined through attachment, male gender identity is threatened by intimacy while female gender identity is threatened by separation. Thus men tend to have difficulty with relationships while females tend to have problems with individuation. This is consistent with the findings of Schiedel and Marcia (1985) regarding the relationships among gender, sex typing and intimacy and ego identity development. According to Gilligan (1982), for both men and women maturity represents a convergence of the justice and care orientations.

Although Gilligan's message is clear and persuasive (i.e. women are different, not deficient), her theory has not been operationalized and there is little empirical research to support her assertions. However, she does state that her Abortion Decision study (Gilligan, 1982), revealed the following three female moral perspectives which denote a sequence in the development of the "ethic of care":

First Perspective

Focuses on caring for the self in order to ensure survival.

Transitional Phase 1

This judgment (i.e. caring for self) is criticized as selfish. The criticism signals a new understanding of the connection between self and others which is articulated by the concept of responsibility.

Second Perspective

Characterized by an elaboration of the concept of responsibility and its fusion with a maternal morality that seeks to ensure care for the dependent and unequal. At this point, good is equated with caring for others.

Transitional Phase 2

When only others are legitimized as the recipients of the woman's care, the exclusion of herself gives rise to problems in relationships, creating a disequilibrium that initiates this

second transition. The equation of conformity with care, in its conventional definition, and the illogic of the inequality between other and self, lead to a reconsideration of relationships in an effort to sort out the confusion between self-sacrifice and care inherent in the conventions of feminine goodness.

Third Perspective

Focuses on the dynamics of relationships and dissipates the tension between selfishness and responsibility through a new understanding of the interconnection between other and self. Care becomes the self-chosen principle of a judgment that remains psychological in its concern with relationships and response, but becomes universal in its condemnation of exploitation and hurt.

In summary, according to Gilligan (1982), the development of an "ethic of care" consists of a progressively more adequate understanding of the psychology of human relationships, an increasing differentiation of self and other and a growing comprehension of the dynamics of social interaction.

Essentially, the "ethic of care" reflects a cumulative knowledge of human relationships, evolving around the central insight that self and other are interdependent. The three perspectives and their transitional phases represent different ways of thinking about or apprehending this connection. The end product is presumably the recognition that because of such interconnection,

violence or hurt is in the end destructive to everybody just as the activity of care enhances both others and self.

There is some recent research supporting Gilligan's theory. In an experimental study based upon the Milgram obedience paradigm, females were found to resist pressures to violate a norm against harming others to a greater extent than males (Kilham & Mann, 1977). Hoffman (1980) notes that this finding is the more remarkable since "females typically conform to a greater degree than males in a variety of experiments having nothing to do with moral issues" (p. 329). On a measure of personal values, Hoffman (1975) found that females revealed a consistently more positive orientation toward humanistic concerns, e.g. going out of one's way to help others. By rewriting certain of the response issues on Rest's (1979) Defining Issues Test (a written Kohlbergian measure) based on Gilligan's hypothesized distinction between a morality of rights and responsibilities, Pratt and Royer (1982) assessed individual differences in the tendency to prefer items of these two different types. They report partial support for Gilligan's (1982) proposed distinction between a morality of rights and a morality of responsibility, primarily in their older age group (24 - 40).

Consistent with Gilligan's hypothesis regarding women, Pratt and Royer (1982) found that a more feminine ideal self on the Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI) was associated with a greater responsibility focus vs right focus in moral judgment.

Correlations of orientation and the real self concept were not significant. For men, there were no significant correlations with either ideal or real self sex role scores. They concluded that women with traditionally feminine ideal self-conceptions tend to respond to moral problems in terms of responsibility considerations rather than rights considerations. Interestingly, in this study individual differences with regard to moral orientation appear to be more closely related to sex-role linked conceptions of the self than to gender per se. Ford and Lowery (1986) investigated the differential use by men and women of the justice and care orientations in real-life moral conflicts. They found that the care orientation was a consistent consideration for women and the justice orientation was a consistent consideration for men. Using the Interpersonal Disposition Inventory (Berzins, Welling & Wetter, 1977) to examine the effects of psychological sex role, it was also found that males with high scores on the femininity scale were more likely to report the use of the care orientation than less feminine men. Levels of masculinity had no significant influence for men or women. It is interesting to note that in contrast to Pratt and Royer's (1982) findings, in this study there were significant sex role effects for men only.

Lyons (1983) offers interview data from female and male children, adolescents and adults, in support of Gilligan's assertions that there are two distinct modes of describing the self in relation to others - separate/ objective and connected -

as well as two kinds of considerations used by individuals in making moral decisions - justice and care. Lyons developed a methodology for systematically and reliably identifying these modes of self-definition and moral judgment through the use of two coding schemes. With regard to moral judgment, it was found that individuals use both kinds of considerations in the construction, resolution and evaluation of real-life moral conflicts, but usually one mode predominantly. Lyons (1983) reports that while women use considerations of care more frequently than rights and men use considerations of rights more frequently than care, in some instances the reverse was true. In light of Pratt and Royer's (1982) and Ford and Lowery's (1986) findings, perhaps sex-role conceptions of the self are more important than gender per se for both men and women.

While Lyons (1983) distinguished between the two modes of moral judgment on the basis of real-life moral conflicts, Langdale (1983), using Lyon's coding scheme, investigated the relationship between gender and moral orientation in both real-life conflicts and researcher-generated dilemmas (i.e. the Heinz, Kathy and Sara dilemmas). In support of Lyons and Gilligan, Langdale found that there are two moral orientations - justice and care, both of which appeared as distinct frameworks for understanding morality systematically across the life cycle. Again, the thinking of females was found to be primarily within the care orientation and the thinking of males primarily within the justice orientation. Langdale also distinguishes between

"closed-question" dilemmas, i.e. participants are asked to judge a specified resolution (e.g. stealing, abortion) and "open-question" dilemmas, i.e. the resolution is left open to the participants (e.g. the subjects are asked "what should Sara do?"). In her study, Langdale (1983) used two "closed" and two "open" dilemmas and found that both "closed-question" dilemmas (Heinz and Kathy) pulled for the justice orientation, while the subjects' responses to the "open-question" dilemma (Sara) were more like their "spontaneous" moral orientation represented by their discussion of a real-life moral conflict. Consequently, Langdale argues that Kohlberg's representation of moral development, being based solely on "closed-question" dilemmas, is a misrepresentation of moral development, particularly the development of women who tend spontaneously to use primarily the care orientation.

Consistent with previous studies (e.g. Haan, 1978; Holstein, 1976), Langdale found that on Kohlberg's scheme, the scores of females gravitated toward stage 3. She argues that the care orientation is confounded with the justice orientation in stage 3 in Kohlberg's developmental sequence. As evidence for her position she cites her findings that:

1. There is a significant and positive relationship between the presence of the care orientation in females as identified with Lyons' coding scheme and the presence of stage 3 as identified with Kohlberg's coding scheme across the life cycle.

2. There is not a significant relationship between the presence of the care orientation and the presence of stages 1, 2, 4 or 5.
3. Individuals (86.4% females, 13.6% males) with care represented in their predominant moral orientation score have significantly lower "justice reasoning" scores than do individuals (68.6% males and 31.2% females) with care unrepresented in their predominant moral orientation scores.

Langdale (1983) also found that stage 3 was the only stage not related to age. She states that the evidence that the care orientation is related only to stage 3 provides an explanation for the absence of a significant relationship between stage 3 and age, "for whatever the age of a person with the care orientation, their care orientation thinking will be categorized in stage 3" (p. 254). This is consistent with Holstein's (1976) observation that adult female reasoning is often categorized with children's.

Thus Lyons and Langdale's findings support Gilligan's theory and indicate a need to construct a new concept of moral development that incorporates the care orientation as a distinct line of development. As Langdale (1983) points out, the concept of moral maturity needs to include at least both the justice and care orientations to represent the mature moral reasoning of females. Gilligan (1982) asserts that it is necessary to identify and define developmental criteria that encompass the categories of women's thought. She refers to Haan (1975) who

points out the necessity to derive such criteria from the resolution of the "more frequently occurring, real-life moral dilemmas of interpersonal, empathic, fellow-feeling concerns" (p. 34) which have long been the center of women's moral concern. According to Gilligan (1982), the conflict between self and other, between autonomy and compassion, constitutes the central moral problem for women, posing a dilemma "which the feminine voice struggles to resolve in its effort to reclaim the self and to solve the moral problem in such a way that no one is hurt" (p. 71). She also proposes that the dilemma that would test the limits of women's "care" judgment would be one where helping others is seen to be "at the price of hurting the self" (p. 66).

Current Study

While it has been fairly well-established that there are two moral orientations, justice and care, this study is the first to test Gilligan's theory that there are various levels or a sequence in the development of the ethic of care. In order to do so, the following were constructed: a set of moral dilemmas deemed appropriate for women's concern; and a manual containing descriptions of the five stages of the ethic of care embodying Gilligan's (1982) criteria. Following Haan's (1975) and Gilligan's (1982) proposals, the dilemmas involved frequently occurring, real-life situations of interpersonal concern where helping others could be at the price of hurting oneself.

This study is also the first to relate the care orientation to another well-researched variable: ego identity. Previous research has demonstrated a positive relationship between ego identity and moral development using Kohlberg's scheme (Hult, 1979; Leiper, 1981; Podd, 1972; Poppen, 1974; Rowe & Marcia, 1980). In addition, Simmons (1985), investigating the relationship between identity achievement and different measures of valuing, found high identity persons to be more compassionate and to have a more balanced concern for both their own freedom and the well-being of others than did individuals low in identity.

In order to investigate the relationship between the newly-developed care-oriented morality measure and Kohlberg's justice system and to compare them with identity status, a written Kohlbergian test (Gibbs & Widaman, 1982) was also included.

Based upon the foregoing research findings and upon Marcia's (1980) proposition of a reciprocal linkage between identity and moral development, the specific hypotheses to be tested in this study are as follows:

1. There will be a significant positive correlation between the Kohlberg-based and Gilligan-based measures of moral development.

2. Subjects high in ego identity (Achievements and Moratoriums) will score higher on the Kohlbergian justice measure of moral development than subjects low in ego identity (Foreclosures and Diffusions).
3. Subjects high in ego identity will score higher on the care-oriented measure of moral development than subjects low in ego identity.
4. The differences among the identity statuses in moral development proposed in hypotheses 2 and 3 will be greater for the Ethic of Care Interview than for the Kohlbergian measure. This expectation is based upon Gilligan's (1982) assertions that there is a close tie in women's thinking about morality and the self and that women's moral thought generally follows the care orientation rather than the justice orientation. Consequently, the Ethic of Care measure should better represent women's moral development than the Kohlbergian test and therefore be more closely related to the independent measure, ego identity.

CHAPTER II

METHOD

Subjects

The subjects were 86 female undergraduate students at Simon Fraser University who volunteered to take part in the study. They ranged in age from 17 to 26 years. The mean age was 20.6. Some of the subjects (38) were contacted in upper-level Psychology classes, while others (23) were contacted informally in the hallways of Simon Fraser University. Students who wanted to take part in the study gave their name and telephone numbers and were called at a later time to set up an appointment. The rest of the subjects (25) were first year students who had signed a "subject pool" form, giving their name and telephone number. These subjects were called to set up an appointment. All the subjects were informed that the study involved investigating women's views on various social issues.

Measures

Identity Status Interview. Marcia's extended semi-structured, standardized interview (Rogow et al., 1983) was used to assess whether or not the subject had undergone a crisis (i.e. exploration of alternatives) and made commitments in each of five areas: vocational plans, religion, politics, sex role attitudes and attitudes concerning sexual intercourse (see

Appendix A). For each area, the subjects were asked their current beliefs, how important these beliefs were to them, whether their views had changed over time or were currently changing, how their attitudes compared with those of their parents, and how these beliefs were manifested behaviorally. This interview was used to place subjects into one of four identity statuses: Identity Achievement, Moratorium, Foreclosure and Identity Diffusion. An identity status was determined for each area on the basis of the degree of exploration and subsequent commitment. Based on the pattern of these area statuses, an overall identity status was decided. Reported inter-scorer reliabilities are usually around 80% (Marcia, 1976; 1980).

Moral Judgment. The Sociomoral Reflection Measure (SRM) developed by John Gibbs is a pencil-and-paper questionnaire based upon Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview (MJI). According to Gibbs and Widaman (1982), the SRM has been designed to facilitate: 1) scoring and learning to score by eliminating the classification phase of the work; and 2) data collection by eliminating the need for individualized follow-up questions. Like Kohlberg's measure, the SRM is a production-task measure of moral reasoning whereby subjects must express their thinking with respect to moral dilemmas and associated normative values. There are two forms of the SRM, A and B, each consisting of two moral dilemmas followed by several probe questions. Form A was used in this study (see Appendix B).

The SRM yields three indices representing the overall stage ratings of the protocols. The simplest index is modal stage, the stage (1,2,3,4) most frequently represented among the protocol responses (Gibbs & Widaman, 1982). Psychometrically far more differentiated is the Sociomoral Reflection Maturity Score (SRMS) which entails a 400-point scale extending from stage 1 (lowest possible rating = 100) to stage 4 (highest possible rating = 400). Kohlberg and Gibbs differ on one major point, that is the existence and inclusion of a post-conventional fifth stage of moral judgment. A secondary index which represents the SRMS in a qualitative summary form is global stage which indicates either a pure stage or a major-minor stage combination. The global stage index summarizes the SRMS data along a 10-point scale. For example, SRMS ratings 100 through 125 = stage 1; 126-149 = transition 1(2); 150-174 = transition 2(1); 175-225 = stage 2, etc. In defining scoring discrepancies along the global scale, a "within one-third stage" discrepancy is any disparity between raters which represents at most two adjacent steps on the scale. For example, 3 and 3(4), or 3(4) and 4(3), differ by one-third stage. The three SRM indices are based on stage assessments of the subject's evaluative justifications of eight normative values: life, affiliation, law, legal justice, conscience, family affiliation, contract, and property. In summary, the modal stage is the stage most heavily represented among the stage ratings; the SRMS is the arithmetic average of the norm ratings multiplied by 100 and global stage is a qualitative summary of the SRMS.

Gibbs and Widaman (1982) state that the SRM has been subjected to a thorough psychometric evaluation with favorable results. More than 600 subjects have been tested, males and females, ranging in age from 8 to 66. They report the following test-retest and parallel-form reliabilities: exact modal agreement percentages were acceptable (mean of 71; modal agreement within one stage was 100 percent) and SRMS correlations were in the 70's and 80's (.90 and .87 respectively for the entire age-heterogeneous samples). Absolute SRMS differences averaged slightly under 20 points, and mean signed differences were negligible. Percent global agreement within one-third stage was in the 90's for both parallel-form and test-retest reliability. In general, the SRM appears to generate consistent results across successive testing administrations.

With regard to interrater reliability, Gibbs and Widaman (1982) distinguish between three types of raters: highly trained, trained and self-trained. The highly trained raters obtained a SRMS correlation of .98; exact global agreement was 93 percent, exact modal agreement was 85.7 percent and agreement within one modal stage was 100 percent. The trained raters achieved SRMS correlations in the 80's, percent global agreement within one-third stage in the 90's, exact modal agreement averaged in the 70's and modal agreement within one stage was again 100 percent. The performance of the self-trained raters was comparable to that of the trained raters. Psychometric evaluation of the SRM has also entailed investigation of its

validity. Its concurrent validity with the MJI is fairly strong. Gibbs and Widaman (1982) report modal stage agreement between the SRM and the MJI of 75.4 percent and 100 percent of the modal discrepancies were within one modal stage. The correlation between the two tests was .85 (.50 with age partialled out). Exact global agreement was only 38.6 percent, while agreement within one-third stage was 78.9 percent. Gibbs and Widaman (1982) also report highly significant correlations (in the 70's) between the SRM, age and grade. Furthermore, the SRM has been found to effectively discriminate the results of sociomoral enrichment experiences in several studies (Arnold, Ahlborn & Gibbs, 1981; Gibbs, Widaman, Colby & Fenton, 1981).

Ethic of Care Interview. This measure was constructed in order to assess women's levels of moral development as outlined by Gilligan (1982). Based upon Gilligan's research findings and pilot study interviews with 16 women, a manual was constructed containing descriptions of the five stages of the Ethic of Care embodying Gilligan's criteria, followed by sketches and sample responses. (See Appendix C for the Manual as it was at the time of the study. Some of the terms used in the body of the thesis are different than those in the Manual. The Manual is currently under revision).

The five stages are referred to both by number and by name as follows:

1. Egocentric, Self-Oriented.
- 1.5. Transition From Self-Oriented to Other-Oriented.
2. Self-Sacrificing, Other-Oriented.
- 2.5. Transition From Other-Oriented to Self-and-Other Oriented.
3. Self-and-Other-Oriented (Ethic of Care).

The Ethic of Care Interview (ECI) uses a semi-structured, semi-standardized interview format and consists of three interpersonal dilemmas plus a real-life conflict generated by the subject herself (see Appendix D). One dilemma was taken from Gilligan's (1982) Abortion Decision study while the other two were formulated by the present investigator. The subjects were presented with the dilemmas both in verbal and written format and their responses were tape-recorded. For each dilemma the subjects were asked what they think the person should do, and why, followed by probe questions attempting to ascertain the subjects' level of understanding of human relationships and the interdependence of self and other. It is assumed that people at different stages of the ethic of care construe the dilemmas and their solutions differently and vary with regard to their comprehension, care and consideration of the needs and rights of the various individuals involved in the dilemma. The subjects were given a stage score (1, 1.5, 2, 2.5 or 3) on each dilemma.

For example, with regard to the "Betty" dilemma (see Appendix D), the following represent two stage 1 (Egocentric, Self-Oriented) responses:

If it was me, I would commit myself to Steven (laughs). The children are old enough to handle and understand a divorce. Before it is too late, I would leave my husband probably. She is not happy with her husband. I believe in happiness for everyone (laughs). She does not have much to lose by it, except the children, but they are a decent age, they can comprehend that mom and dad don't get along. Divorce is fairly common these days. It is not a stigma or anything.

Betty should get rid of the husband and find out if she really does care about this Steven guy and if that will go anywhere, if that will give her any kind of satisfaction, if he will supply her with what she didn't get from her previous husband, so to speak. I think she should go with Steven. She should definitely not stay in the marriage if she is totally unhappy with it. Maybe I shouldn't go so far as to say that she should leave her husband and go to Steven but someone like Steven. If she finds that kind of man, then yes, she should. Because she has to be happy. She's got to do what is good for herself. She shouldn't suffer because of him. She shouldn't be forced into living like that. If he is not going to be a good guy, then she should leave. (WHY DO YOU THINK IT IS IMPORTANT FOR BETTY TO BE HAPPY?) It is not much point in going through 10 - 20 years or however long she has been married to this guy. I mean, that's part of living, being happy. That's what you are aiming for.

These women mainly consider their own wants and needs and do not reflect much on the needs of the other people in the story, i.e. the husband or the children. The primary concern is their own survival and happiness without any serious caring for others. They are also very pragmatic, evaluating the decision to leave for example in terms of "not having much to lose by it". Women at the egocentric stage tend not to experience much conflict about what is right or wrong. In comparison, a person at stage 1.5 (Transition From Self-Oriented to Other-Oriented)

appears to struggle more with the issues and answers. Although also likely to think that Betty should leave her husband in order to take care of herself, she will show more concern and considerations for the children and the husband.

Get a separation from the husband. But first of all, she has to get a job. It would take time, this way she would find out if this guy was willing to wait for her. Lots of people have a really good marriage for many years and then just grow apart. There's nothing wrong with that. It is probably better for the kids. They may both be better apart. Maybe she is not going where his life is going, maybe he's an executive, successful and she's not his idea of a wife right now. If they decide they are happier apart then they can get a divorce. Lots of people who get separated get back together again.

Three stage 2 (Self-Sacrificing, Other-Oriented) females responded to the same dilemma as follows:

I don't believe in divorces or extramarital flings. She could try other ways to make her husband realize that she wants a bit more out of the marriage, possibly volunteer work or take a part-time job. The kids are old enough to be left alone some of the time... She has been married a long time. She should try a bit harder to get through to her husband. She has children, divorce is hard on children. I believe in marriage and staying together. Marriage is a commitment, you should stay married.

She should take her husband to marriage counselling. I would work at my marriage and stick to that. Because they have been married for so long and have a family. It only makes sense to work on it. (WHAT IF HE REFUSES TO GO FOR COUNSELLING?) Hopefully, I would stay with him because it would be right. You have a responsibility to your husband and your family. I would try to, it would be hard.

As a Christian I would not get involved with the other man, it is adultery. I would flee from temptation. First thing to do is talk to my husband and try to talk things out. It is the only rational thing to do. The husband probably doesn't know how she feels about the whole thing. I would pray about it and keep on trying to talk to him. Perhaps try to get him to see a counsellor... If he won't go I would say that his attitude has disappointed me. I might go away for a few days. I would

not leave him, because the Bible says they should stick together through thick and thin.

In contrast to the previous stages, these women primarily consider Betty's responsibility to other people, in this case the husband and children. They see it as wrong for Betty to break the marriage commitment as it might negatively affect others, e.g. the children. A stage 2 person will typically see it as Betty's responsibility, not only to stay in the marriage to take care of the husband and children, but also to improve the situation by "trying harder" and by changing her behavior, e.g. by becoming more attractive and pleasing to her husband, communicating with him in a different way, etc. Betty's own needs or the husband's responsibilities are secondary, if considered at all. For scoring purposes, it is important not only to note the emphasis these subjects place on responsibility and commitment, but also their reasons for wanting to keep a commitment. One stage 2 subject, when asked why she would not want to break a commitment, replied: "you would be letting people down and then they would not like you. Everybody wants to be liked and loved". Stage 2 women follow "external" rules and regulations, mainly to obtain or maintain acceptance by others which they require in order to feel safe and secure.

While stage 2 subjects tend to emphasize goodness and self-sacrifice, women at stage 2.5 (Transition from Other-Oriented to Self-and-Other-Oriented) are concerned with truth and honesty. More options are now being considered and compared to the rather "black-and-white" world-view of Stage 2,

the "grey" is discovered. This discovery leads to conflicts and uncertainties which are frequently illustrated in these women's struggle to resolve the dilemma.

Communication doesn't seem to be too good between her and her husband. But if she finds herself in that situation, I... (long pause) her happiness is important because it affects the way you raise your children. If you're not happy in a situation I think you should resolve it. Maybe she should tell her husband that she likes someone else now or, I guess, divorce or something like that. Whichever way she feels she is more confident about herself... I think it has a big influence on the kids. Divorce would as well. But if you weigh out the two, an unhappy marriage could be worse for the kids... If he is not going to listen, obviously she does not have a good relationship. You can't have a family if you can't communicate to each other. I think it is best that she get out of it then. Put herself into a family where she is more settled and relaxed and the communication is better. Communication is one thing that holds the family together. So, if she doesn't find this happiness she should get out of it. (WHY DO YOU THINK IT IS IMPORTANT FOR HER TO BE HAPPY?) Happiness has an effect on the children. The environment you're in. If it is a tense environment where there is no communication, it is not a good environment for the kids to grow up in. It should be open and good communication... If she finds she would get more of that with Steven, she should go with him. I think she would be wasting her time with a guy who doesn't even want to listen to her.

That's hard. (long pause) She should tell her husband or she should try and go to marriage counsellor or something. But it seems her husband won't even listen. So she should tell him that she is seeing another man. Well, not sexually or anything, but that she has been seeing this guy and he is kind of coming on to her. And kind of warn him that if he doesn't smarten up, she might leave him. (WHY SHOULD SHE DO THAT?) Because she shouldn't have to stay. The kids I feel sorry for, but... she shouldn't have to stay with a man like that. She has even tried telling him about it and he won't listen. So there's not much else she can do. She can't just stay at home and keep being married and be unhappy for the rest of her life... She should do something about it... make him know that she is serious. I think she would have to leave him or tell him to leave (long pause). It would depend. I am assuming that if he is this insensitive to his wife, he is also not that nice to his kids. Grumpy people are grumpy to everyone,

usually. So I think it would be better for her to stay at home and make him leave. And if he didn't do it, I am sure she could get it done legally somehow, wouldn't she? I don't know... She can't be unhappy the rest of her life. She has tried.

Finally, the following excerpt demonstrates a stage 3 (Ethic of Care) person's demand for equality and honesty rather than acceptance and security. At this stage, the woman appears to be in control of her life and able to make difficult choices and decisions with care for both self and others. Compared to stage 2.5, she is no longer confused or in conflict about selfishness and responsibility. She can, therefore more readily take care of herself as well as others, attempting to minimize hurt and exploitation.

She should approach her husband and explain in no uncertain terms what is going on, and ask if he has any intention of helping her change the situation. If not, I think she should get a divorce... Also, she should make sure that the children understand what is happening and that although it is not very much fun to have a divorce, it is sometimes better than the consequences of avoiding it. If she were to go ahead and advise her children in that manner and be careful about how things progress, she could probably divorce him without too much problem. (WHY DO YOU THINK SHE SHOULD GET A DIVORCE?) I believe in having a happy life, but I don't believe in hurting people to do so... It's going to be a decision between hurting your husband and getting a divorce and maybe the children and the fellow who you are intimate with. If her husband really cares for her, he'll change and the divorce can be avoided and the hurt of other people can be reduced to a minimum. But if he refuses to change, then her own personal hurt would lead to something worse. If you have thought about divorce once and things don't change and you don't get a divorce, it is almost inevitable that the topic will come up again... People really don't change often, but when they do, it's a significant change. I think you have to deal with that.

This woman considers how all the people involved in the situation may be affected and is concerned about reducing the hurt of other people to a minimum. She believes in "having a happy life, but I don't believe in hurting people to do so". Yet, she realizes that hurt is at times unavoidable and takes the responsibility for making what she considers to be the best choice in the long run. Thus she attempts to take care of both self and other, condemns exploitation and hurt while acknowledging and accepting the reality of choice, all of which fulfill stage 3 scoring criteria. She is also treating others as equals, expecting and demanding that her husband take an active part in improving the situation. In comparison to the stage 2 women's responses, it is no longer a one-way street, with Betty having to make all the sacrifices.

Pilot study

In order to determine whether Gilligan's (1982) proposed stages of the ethic of care could be reliably rated, 16 female undergraduate students at Simon Fraser University were interviewed using the four above-mentioned dilemmas. The subjects volunteered to take part and ranged in age from 18 to 23. The mean age was 19.9. Two independent raters, the writer and a senior level clinical psychologist, scored independently the 16 tapes. The descriptions of the five Ethic of Care stages appearing in the Manual (Appendix C) were used as criteria. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the total scores for the two

pilot study raters. The following correlations between these two raters were all significant at $p < .0001$.


Real-life	.79
Lisa	.67
Betty	.78
Kristine	.65
Total	.84

The Ethic of Care Interview manual was then constructed. The sketches in this manual are based upon an examination of pilot study data and some of these subjects' responses were used as samples.

Interviewers and Raters

The interviews and ratings were done independently by two trained women, the writer and a senior undergraduate student. These two women had been trained in ego identity interview procedures by a senior level clinical psychologist. The undergraduate student had also been trained for one month in the ECI by the writer through discussion of the stages and listening to the 16 pilot study tapes. Each person conducted and rated half of the identity interviews and half of the Ethic of Care interviews. In addition, for the ECI each person rated the other person's interviews. Hence, there were two ratings per interview for this measure. With regard to ego identity, 20 tapes were randomly selected (10 from each interviewer) and rated

Figure 1. Scatterplot of the Ethic of Care Total Scores for the Pilot Study Raters



independently by both persons. Discrepancies in ratings were resolved by a third rater. A male graduate student and a male senior undergraduate student who both had worked through the SRM self-training materials (Gibbs & Widaman, 1982), scored independently all the SRM protocols.

Procedure

Each subject was seen individually by two female experimenters. If the SRM was administered first, the identity interview was then given by the same experimenter and the subject was administered the ECI by a different experimenter in a different room. If the ECI was given first, the subject was administered the identity interview and the SRM in a different room with a different experimenter. Thus there were four different test conditions. The subjects were administered the measures in one of the following ways:

1. The SRM and the identity interview by Experimenter 1, then the ECI by Experimenter 2.
2. The SRM and the identity interview by Experimenter 2, then the ECI by Experimenter 1.
3. The ECI by Experimenter 1, then the identity interview and the SRM by Experimenter 2.
4. The ECI by Experimenter 2, then the identity interview and the SRM by Experimenter 1.

Two subjects were run simultaneously. The order of presentation was changed as frequently as practically possible, usually after every second pair. No time-limit was imposed for the tasks.

CHAPTER III

RESULTS

Average time for completing the tasks was approximately two hours. One subject did not complete the SRM. Thus the number of subjects were 86 for the analysis of the relationship between ego identity and the ECI and 85 for analysis of the relationship between identity and the SRM as well as between the SRM and the ECI. All correlations reported are Pearson's correlations and all significance tests are two-tailed.

The possible effect of the four test conditions was tested by two-way analysis of variance using identity status and condition as independent variables and the SRMS and the ECI as dependent variables. There were no significant effects involving condition.

Inter-rater Reliabilities

Ego Identity

An interscorer agreement of 80 percent (chance agreement = .32, Kappa = .71) was obtained for the ego identity interview, which is within the range of acceptable reliability established by previous studies (Bilsker, 1984; Marcia, 1976; 1980).

Gibbs and Widaman (1982) report that minimal standards for acceptable interrater reliability are as follows:

1. 100 percent modal stage agreement within a one-stage interval.
2. 67 percent exact modal stage agreement.
3. .70 SRMS correlation.
4. 25 points mean absolute SRMS discrepancy.
5. 80 percent global agreement within a one-third interval.
6. 50 percent exact global stage agreement.

Employing two independent raters, the following interrater reliabilities were obtained in this study:

1. 100 percent modal stage agreement within a one-stage interval (chance agreement = .61).
2. 72 percent exact modal stage agreement (chance agreement = .45, Kappa = .49).
3. .75 SRMS correlation.
4. 17 points mean absolute SRMS discrepancy.
5. 98 percent global agreement within a one-third interval (chance agreement = .64, Kappa = .94).
6. 58 percent exact global stage agreement (chance agreement = .30, Kappa = .40).

It was noted that there were large discrepancies in the SRMS scores (more than 50 points) in only two protocols. These differences were resolved by discussion as recommended by L. J.


Walker (personal communication, October, 1985). For purposes of analyses, the mean of the two raters were used. In addition, a third rater scored independently 13 randomly selected protocols and obtained SRMS correlations of .86 with rater 1 and .96 with rater 2. In these cases, the mean of the three raters were employed for purposes of analyses.

Morality-Skoe/Gilligan (ECI)

Two trained female raters scored independently all the 86 ECI tapes. For each subject every dilemma received a stage score (1, 1.5, 2, 2.5 or 3) according to the manual. Sometimes quarterscores (e.g. 1.75, 2.25) were given if the subject seemed to fall between stages. In addition, a total score was obtained by adding the four scores. Thus, there were five scores for each subject from each rater. For purposes of analyses, the average of the two raters' total scores were used and are referred to as "average total scores". Figure 2 shows the distribution of the total scores for the two trained raters. The correlations between the two raters' scores for the four dilemmas were as follows:

Real-life	.95
Lisa	.93
Betty	.95
Kristine	.95
Total	.96

Figure 2. Scatterplot of the Ethic of Care
Total Scores for the Trained Raters



In addition, 30 randomly selected tapes were given to an untrained female rater, a senior undergraduate student, who independently scored these interviews according to the manual. Figures 3 and 4 present the distribution of total scores for the untrained rater and the trained raters. The correlations between the untrained rater and the two trained raters were as follows:

Real-life	.87 with Rater 1 and .87 with Rater 3.
Lisa	.86 with Rater 1 and .89 with Rater 3.
Betty	.81 with Rater 1 and .79 with Rater 3.
Kristine	.91 with Rater 1 and .87 with Rater 3.
Total	.90 with Rater 1 and .89 with Rater 3.

All of the above correlations are significant at $p < .0001$. Thus it appears that the ethic of care levels can be determined with a fair degree of inter-scoring agreement.

Moral Development and Age

The Sociomoral Reflection Measures (SRM)

The correlation between the SRMS and age was significant ($r = .24$, $t(83) = 2.25$, $p < .05$).

The Ethic of Care Interview (ECI)

As expected, the correlation between the ECI average total scores and age was highly significant ($r = .44$, $t(84) = 4.49$, $p < .0001$).

Figure 3. Scatterplot of the Ethic of Care Total Scores for Rater 1 and the Untrained Rater





Figure 4. Scatterplot of the Ethic of Care Total Scores for Rater 3 and the Untrained Rater



Care and Justice-based Measures of Moral Development

As hypothesized, a significant positive correlation was found between the ECI average total scores and the SRMS ($r=.37$, $t(83)=3.63$, $p<.001$), thus providing some concurrent validity for the new morality measure. Table 1 presents the joint classification frequencies of global SRM and ECI average total scores divided by four (referred to as ECI stage score). In order to take a "purer" stage approach, each subject was categorized by using the predominant stage score. This was done by assigning the scores of the two raters to the nearest stage for each dilemma. For example, scores of 2 and 2.25 were assigned stage 2, scores of 2.5 and 2.75 were assigned stage 2.5. Then the overall predominant stage score was determined. For example, someone with scores of 2, 2.5, 2.5 and 2.5 was assigned 2.5. A random sample of 20 subjects was categorized in this manner. Only one diverged from the stage score that would have been obtained by dividing by four. Hence, the method of obtaining stage scores by dividing by four was retained.

Moral Development and Identity

The Sociomoral Reflection Measure (SRM)

Means, standard deviations and frequency distribution for the SRMS are given in Table 2 and Figure 5. The hypothesis that the subjects high in ego identity (Achieved and Moratorium) would score higher on the Kohlbergian measure than subjects low

Table 1

Joint Classification Frequencies:

Global SRM and ECI Stage Score

ECI	SRM					Total
	4	4(3)	3(4)	3	3(2)	
3	1	6	3	1	0	11
2.5	4	9	2	3	0	18
2	0	6	0	2	0	8
1.5	1	15	6	20	1	43
1	0	1	2	2	0	5
Total	6	37	13	28	1	85

Chi-square (16) = 23.35 $p < .1047$

Figure 5

Distribution of the Sociomoral Reflection Maturity Scores
Averaged Over the Two Raters for Each Identity Status

Score	IDENTITY STATUS			
	<u>Achieved</u>	<u>Moratorium</u>	<u>Foreclosed</u>	<u>Diffused</u>
400		*		
392		**	*	
384	*	*	**	
376		**		
368	**	***		***
360	*****	**	*****	***
352		**	***	****
344	**		*	***
336	***		*	**
328	*		*	**
320		*	***	*****
312		*	***	
304			****	*****
296			*	*
288				
280				
272				
264				
256				*

Table 2

Sociomoral Reflection Measure Identity Status Statistics

	Mean	S.D.	N
Achieved	353.67	16.37	15
Moratorium	360.65	22.04	13
Foreclosed	338.43	26.24	27
Diffused	331.05	26.90	30

in identity (Foreclosed and Diffused) was tested by one way analysis of variance. This analysis revealed significant differences among the identity statuses on the SRMS ($F(3,81)=5.85, p<.005$). The mean differences between Achieved and Diffused as well as between Moratorium and Diffused were significant at the $p<.01$ level. There were no other significant mean differences. Table 3 gives the joint classification frequencies of identity and global SRM.

The Ethic of Care Interview (ECI)

Means, standard deviations and frequency distribution for the ECI average total scores are given in Table 4 and Figure 6. Differences among the ego identity statuses in the ECI average total scores were also determined by one way analysis of variance. As hypothesized, there were significant differences among the identity statuses. Subjects high on the ECI were higher in identity than subjects low on the ECI ($F(3,82)=111.71, p<.00005$). The mean difference between Achieved and Moratorium was significant at the $p<.05$ level while all the other mean differences were significant at the $p<.001$ level. The greatest difference was found between Moratorium and Foreclosed. Table 5 presents the joint classification frequencies of identity and ECI stage score.

Table 3

Joint Classification Frequencies:

Identity Status and Global SRM

SRM	Identity Status				Total
	Achieved	Moratorium	Foreclosed	Diffused	
4	1	3	2	0	6
4(3)	8	8	11	10	37
3(4)	5	0	2	6	13
3	1	2	12	13	28
3(2)	0	0	0	1	1
Total	15	13	27	30	85

Chi-square (12) = 23.89

$p < .05$

Figure 6

Distribution of the Ethic of Care Interview Total Scores
Averaged Over the Two Raters for Each Identity Status




Table 4

The Ethic of Care Interview - Identity Status Statistics

	Mean	S.D.	N
Achieved	11.22	0.85	15
Moratorium	9.93	1.04	13
Foreclosed	7.01	1.49	28
Diffused	5.64	0.53	30

Table 5

Joint Classification Frequencies:

Identity Status and ECI Stage Score

ECI	Identity Status				Total
	Achieved	Moratorium	Foreclosed	Diffused	
3	10	1	0	0	11
2.5	5	10	3	0	18
2	0	2	5	1	8
1.5	0	0	19	25	44
1	0	0	1	4	5
Total	15	13	28	30	86

Chi-square (12) = 101.95

$p < .0001$

Comparison of the Moral Development Measures with Identity

In support of hypothesis four, analysis of variance showed that on the ECI all the mean differences were highly significant. In comparison, on the SRM, there were no significant mean differences between Achieved and Moratorium, Achieved and Foreclosed, Moratorium and Foreclosed, or Foreclosed and Diffused. Thus it appears that the ECI discriminates better among the identity statuses than does the SRM. This is illustrated in Figures 5 and 6 which present the distribution of SRMS and ECI average total scores for each identity status. In addition, point biserial correlations between ego identity and SRMS, ECI average total scores and age were calculated. Ego identity was split into high (Achieved and Moratorium) and low (Foreclosed and Diffused). This was done for each of the five identity areas and also for the Overall identity status. The following correlations are significant at the $p < .01$ level or smaller. (There is no available test of significance of the difference between two correlated point biserial correlations).

	Occup	Religion	Politics	SexRole	Sexual	Overall
ECI	.61	.80	.74	.79	.77	.86
SRMS	.33	.39	.43	.39	.42	.40
Age	.44	.43	.42	.31	.40	.42

N for ECI = 86

N for SRM = 85

CHAPTER IV

DISCUSSION

The Ethic of Care Interview

The results indicate that Gilligan's (1982) proposed alternative stage sequence for women's moral development can be reliably measured using the manual developed in this study. Employing four independent raters, three females and one male, most of the inter-rater reliabilities were in the .80's and .90's. Not surprisingly, the lowest correlations were obtained in the pilot study. At this point, the manual had as yet not been developed. The highest correlations (in the .90's) were obtained by the two trained female raters, suggesting that the manual as well as training enhance reliability. Training, however, may not be crucial as correlations in the high .80's were obtained with an untrained female rater.

As expected, a relatively strong positive correlation was found between the ECI and age. Given that age-relatedness is a central criterion for placing a phenomenon in a developmental sequence (Langdale, 1983), the relationship between the new measure and age is important to note.

In addition, as hypothesized, there was a significant positive correlation between the ECI and the SRM, providing some concurrent validity for the care-oriented morality measure. The age group investigated in this study was limited to late

adolescence/young adulthood. It is possible that there will be a higher correlation between the two morality measures if a larger age spread is used.

Moral Development and Identity

As hypothesized, subjects high in ego identity (Achievements and Moratoriums) scored higher on the justice-oriented measure (SRM) than did subjects low in identity (Foreclosures and Diffusions). However, the differences were only significant between Achievements and Diffusions and between Moratoriums and Diffusions. Theoretically, one would expect there to be a significant difference also between the high identity statuses and Foreclosures. Interestingly, Moratoriums scored on average higher than the Achievements which is consistent with previous studies on males examining the relationship between Kohlberg's morality measure and ego identity (Marcia, et al., in preparation).

In comparison with the justice-oriented measure, on the care-oriented measure (ECI), the Achievements scored higher than the Moratoriums and all the differences among the ego identity statuses were significant. The largest split was found between Moratoriums and Foreclosures. Theoretically, this is where one would expect the largest difference as Moratorium represents the first stage where a person begins to question and think independently about issues in life. "Just as one's identity

ideally undergoes revisions when it is inadequate in dealing with aspects of the real world, so should one's level of moral thought undergo revision when challenged by new issues unresolvable within old forms" (Marcia, et al, in preparation, p. 20).

Overall, as expected, the findings suggest that the ECI is more closely related to ego identity than is the justice-oriented measure. The distributions of the SRMS and the ECI average total scores for each identity status as presented in Figures 5 and 6 as well as the reported point biserial correlations illustrate that the ECI discriminates better among the identity statuses. The point biserial correlations between identity and the ECI were considerably higher than the correlations between identity and the SRMS.

Not surprisingly, it appears from the point biserial correlations between the ECI and identity that the new care-based measure is more closely related to the interpersonal, affiliative areas such as religion (.80) and sexrole attitudes (.79) than to occupation (.61). The ECI essentially measures a person's moral development in terms of understanding the interconnection of self and other, the importance of taking care of both, and the universal destructiveness of hurt. Consequently, one would expect this measure to be more highly correlated with the identity areas dealing with interpersonal, philosophical issues than with the more practical, achievement-oriented aspects of identity such as choosing a

vocation and earning a living (occupation). Also, it is interesting to note that the correlation between the overall identity status and the ECI (.86) is higher than between any of the five areas and the ECI. The overall status can be seen as a more stable, comprehensive indicator of a person's ego development or maturity. Its strong relationship with care-oriented morality supports Gilligan's (1982) opinion that women tend not only to define themselves in a context of human relationship but also to judge themselves in terms of their ability to care. In her research, Gilligan found that women's moral development centers from the beginning on the elaboration of the importance of intimacy, relationships and care rather than on rights or rules and principles of justice. She links identity to morality by noting that a woman's crisis of both identity and moral belief centers on her struggle to "disentangle her voice from the voices of others and to find a language that represents her experience of relationships and her sense of herself" (p. 51). If this is the case, then one would expect a very strong overlap between identity and moral development when the latter is defined and measured in terms of the care orientation. In fact, it would seem necessary for a woman to be beyond stage 2 (Self-Sacrificing, Other-Oriented) before she can achieve an identity. Perhaps only as a woman begins to question, think independently and learns to take care of herself as well as others and to take her own as well as others' needs and wishes seriously, can she make firm choices and commitments. The data support this suggestion as all of the

Achieved subjects were at stage 2.5 or higher. In addition, Gilligan (1982) postulates that a convergence of the justice and care orientations represents maturity and is only possible at maturity. In support of this, the results of the current study show that 18 of the 20 people who scored high on both morality measures were also high in ego identity.

Ego identity and moral development involve to a large extent similar processes. Growth in both areas occurs through exploration, conflict and commitment. Both are affected by the underlying cognitive developmental processes of assimilation, disequilibrium and accommodation. As noted by Hoffman (1980), all cognitive transformations involve a phase of conflict or disequilibrium during which the existing mode of thinking is reevaluated and a new mode is constructed. Moratorium is essentially a phase of cognitive and affective disequilibrium (crisis) wherein a person is in a state of tension, struggling to make decisions and commitments, ideally leading to Achievement. With regard to morality, Kohlberg stresses the process of cognitive disequilibrium, hypothesizing that such conflict (arising for example from exposure to levels of moral reasoning moderately higher than one's current level) is tension-producing and stimulates moral growth by motivating the person to make sense out of the experienced contradiction, thereby generating movement to the next stage (Hoffman, 1980). Hence, disequilibrium leads to developmental growth in ego identity as well as moral reasoning. Both involve a change in

structure. Through awareness of the contradictions or inadequacies of the existing structure (e.g. both identity Foreclosure and ECI stage 2, Self-Sacrificing), the logic of that structure is rejected and a new structure is created. The new structure or stage is qualitatively different in its form or organization, not simply in the information or element it contains (Kohlberg, 1973). That crisis not only reveals, but also creates character is the essence of a developmental approach (Gilligan, 1982). An interview with a 20 year old woman in the pilot study illustrated how development occurs through an encounter with stress and how conflict provides an opportunity for growth. The responses of this woman to the various dilemmas very clearly represented the highest stage of the Ethic of Care, which, due to her young age, surprised the writer somewhat. In an informal discussion after the interview, this subject disclosed that she was dying of cancer. Faced with the imminence of her own mortality, she had gone through much soul-searching regarding her values, beliefs, sense of self and of her relationships to other people.

Care and Justice-based Measures of Moral Development

It is hypothesized that similarly to Kohlberg's scheme, each higher Ethic of Care stage is more differentiated, more integrated and more general or universal. Thus each step of development is a better cognitive organization than the one before it, taking account of everything present in the previous

stage but making new distinctions) and organizing them into a more comprehensive or equilibrated structure (Rest, 1983). The ECI scoring is based not on the action-choices selected by the subjects (content) but rather on the reasoning she gives in support of her judgment as well as her ways of defining conflict situations. It is also hypothesized that the Ethic of Care stages are invariant and irreversible. However, this remains to be demonstrated by future research.

In agreement with Kohlberg (1976), it is proposed that both cognitive and perspective-taking development (Selman, 1976) are necessary but not sufficient conditions for development in the Ethic of Care. This hypothesis is derived from the cognitive-developmental assumption of structural parallelism (Piaget, 1950) which posits the fundamental unity of development across various domains of cognition (Walker, 1980). It implies that the processes that are basic in one domain (e.g. disequilibrium, accommodation) are also basic in the others. Thus attainment of a perspective-taking stage is seen to require the prior or concomitant attainment of the parallel cognitive stage, and attainment of a moral stage similarly requires the attainment of the parallel cognitive and perspective-taking stages. As noted by Walker (1980), these lags in development across domains may be explained by differing degrees of complexity which each involves. While cognitive development refers to an understanding of the objective environment, perspective-taking can be seen to represent a further

development in that it involves an understanding of persons as possessing subjectivity. Perspective-taking refers to how people do think and act toward each other, while moral reasoning represents a further development involving an understanding of how people should think and act toward each other. Walker (1980) found that attainment of both "beginning formal operations" (a substage of Piaget's formal operations proposed by Colby and Kohlberg) and Selman's perspective-taking stage 3 were necessary but not sufficient for the attainment of Kohlberg's moral stage 3. It is expected that Walker's (1980) findings regarding the significant relationships among cognition, perspective-taking and justice-based morality will hold true for care-based morality as well. In fact, perspective-taking may be more closely related to care-based than to justice-based morality.

In summary, the new morality measure is compatible with Kohlberg's system. However, it provides an alternative stage sequence for the development of women's moral reasoning where the conception of the moral domain is defined in terms of relationship and responsibility rather than rights and rules. Gilligan (1982) states that

"Since moral judgements pertain to conflicts in the relation of self to others, a difference in the construction of that relationship would lead to a difference in conception of the moral domain...If women's moral judgments reflect a different understanding of social relationships, then they may point to a line of social development whose presence in both sexes is currently obscured. (p. 201)

In other words, due to their different social experiences women may tend to conceptualize, understand, emphasize and verbalize

something that men tend not to, that is the importance and value of love and care. The following SRM excerpt from a 22 year old woman who scored high on all three measures (Achieved in Identity, stage 3 on the ECI and stage 4(3) on the SRM) illustrates this point. Her response to why it is important for children to help their parents was as follows:

It is very important. Joe should not refuse out of a sense of duty, but out of a sense of caring and unselfishness. It is very important for family members to be able to depend on each other for help. This is how family relationships and communication grow and get better... this brings the family members closer and makes them feel like it is a team effort and not an obligation on either part.

According to the SRM manual, this woman would have received the highest possible score (4) if she had emphasized obligation or duty. Instead, she denies the importance of family cooperation as an obligation and goes beyond obligation or duty to value caring. For this she is "penalized" according to the justice scheme and gets scored lower (3/4). She is obviously aware of the role of obligation and duty, but sees caring as "the better way". Undoubtedly, this is because she values close family relationships, improved communication and because she understands the interconnection ("team effort") of self and other. Thus her frame of reference and priorities appear to be different from that of the SRM manual. The justice system values obligation, while she values caring.

It may or may not be true that the legal sense is far less developed in girls than in boys (Piaget, 1965) and that women show less sense of justice than men (Freud, 1961). However, it

is time to take notice of what they perhaps have developed "far more". Gilligan (1982) notes that the development of caring in human relationships may presently be obscured. One possible reason for this is that women are reluctant to "speak publicly in their own voice, given the constraints imposed on them by their lack of power and the politics of relations between the sexes" (Gilligan, 1982, p. 70). Erikson (1968) makes a similar observation stating that

it seems to be amazingly hard for many women to say clearly what they feel most deeply, and to find the right words for what to them is most acute and actual, without saying too much or too little and without saying it with defiance or apology. Some women who observe and think vividly and deeply do not seem to have the courage of their native intelligence, as if they were somehow afraid on some final confrontation to be found out to have no "real" intelligence. Even successful academic competition has, in many, failed to correct this. Thus women are still tempted to go back to "their place" wherever they feel out of place". (p. 263)

In addition to women's persistent difficulty in listening to themselves and stating publicly what they believe and value, there is the lack of specific research on the female experience and moral conception. Discussing the representativeness of Kohlberg's model, Walker (1984) states that "it is impossible to determine whether the same stages and sequence would have been derived if females had been studied originally" (p. 677). The results of this study suggest that, in accordance with Gilligan's (1982) theory, women's moral care judgments provide an alternative stage sequence of moral reasoning and an alternative conception of maturity. The development and implications of this alternative need to be further researched

in both men and women.

Limitations of the study

The limitations of this study should be borne in mind while interpreting the results. Firstly, the sample was restricted to college women, age 17 - 26. This limitation may account for there being relatively few Ethic of Care stage 2 (Self-Sacrificing, Other-Oriented) subjects who may be less likely to be interested in furthering their own minds and careers than the other stages. It is possible that there would be more stage 2 women in a different sample, e.g. housewives, secretaries or nurses. Also, the sample was self-selected (volunteers) which may have introduced a positive bias in the distribution of morality scores. Stage 1 (Egocentric, Self-Oriented) women are not likely to volunteer helping other people. Thus the generality of the findings is reduced. There is a need to extend this research to samples that include a representation of different educational, occupational and social-class backgrounds as well as different cultural and ethnic groups.

Secondly, the study used two interview measures (ego identity and care-based morality) and one written measure (justice-based morality). The high point biserial correlation between identity and the ECI is possibly due in part to the similar format, both being semi-structured, standardized

interviews. In addition, the two interviews followed each other immediately and may therefore have influenced each other. In order to reduce such possible influence, the two interviews could perhaps be administered one week apart. Also, the Kohlbergian measure was in a written format. Perhaps if it were in interview form, the relationship between it and the interview-based identity statuses would have been higher. It is recommended that future researchers use Kohlberg's Morality Interview in order to control for a possible format effect.

Thirdly, as this study for practical purposes involved women only, it cannot answer any questions about sex differences. Future studies need to include both men and women. It is Gilligan's (1982) theory that "women perceive and construe social reality differently from men and that these differences center around experiences of attachment and separation" (p. 171). Women define their identity through relationships of intimacy and care (attachment) while for men, separation, individuation and natural rights are critically tied to gender identity. Similarly, Chodorow (1974) states that "feminine personality comes to define itself in relation and connection to other people more than masculine personality does" (pp. 43-44). While the results of this study support Gilligan's and Chodorow's theory about women, it remains for future research to examine the differences between men and women. If Gilligan's theory is correct, one would expect that for men there would be a stronger relationship between ego identity and Kohlberg's

justice measure than between identity and the care measure.

In summary, an improved research design might include both male and female subjects, a wider age range, a more representative sample and Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview rather than a written justice measure.

Summary and Suggestions for Future Research

The results indicate that Gilligan's (1982) proposed stages of the Ethic of Care can be reliably scored using the manual developed in this study. The new care-based measure of morality is related not only to ego identity, but also to age and to Kohlberg's justice measure. In addition, as hypothesized, the care measure differentiated better between the identity statuses than did the justice measure. Thus the findings support Gilligan's theory that women represent a morality of responsibility and care and that women's conceptions of self and morality are intricately linked.

Future studies need to include both male and female subjects in order to investigate sex differences in moral development and to further establish the relationship between Kohlberg's justice scheme and the care-oriented measure. Also, it is important to investigate the effect of sex-role orientation as it may be more important than gender per se. Further validation of the new care measure should include discriminant validity, e.g. between ego identity and the ECI, an examination of the relationship between

the ECI and Loevinger's ego developmental scale and between the ECI and intimacy. Other factors to be investigated are the role of cognitive prerequisites and socio-moral experiences in facilitating development as well as the relationship of care-oriented moral reasoning to moral emotions and behavior.

Finally, while this study suggests that there is a sequence in the development of care, longitudinal and cross-sectional research is required to further establish whether changes in the Ethic of Care follow a pattern of stepwise, invariant sequences and whether the stages are irreversible.

More than 30 years have passed since Kohlberg began his moral development research on males. A major, longitudinal investigation of the female moral conception is long overdue. It now seems necessary to investigate longitudinally the development of the two moralities - rights and responsibility - in both males and females. Adult maturity involves a resolution of the conflict between integrity and care for men as well as women; for both, a successful resolution may require an integration of justice and care. Piaget (1965) observed that "apart from our relations to other people, there can be no moral necessity" (p. 196). At any age, in any relationship, we do well when care seasons justice.

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IDENTITY STATUS INTERVIEW

Introduction:

What year are you in?

Where are you from? Living at home?

How did you happen to come to (name of school)?

Did your father go to college? Where? What does he do now?

Did your mother go to college? Where? What does she do now?

Occupation:

You said you were majoring in ____? What do you plan to do with it?

When did you come to decide on ____?

Did you ever consider anything else?

What seems attractive about ____?

Most parents have plans for their children, things they'd like them to go into or do - did yours have any plans like that for you?

How do your folks feel about your plans now?

How willing do you think you'd be to change this if something better came along? (If S responds: "What do you mean by better?") Well, what might be better in your terms?

Religion:

Do you have any particular religious affiliation or preference?

How about your folks?

Ever very active in church? How about now? Get into many religious discussions?

How do your parents feel about your beliefs now?

Are yours any different from theirs?

Was there any time when you came to doubt any of your religious beliefs? When? How did it happen? How did you resolve your questions? How are things for you now?

Politics

Do you have any particular political preference?

How about your parents?

Ever take any kind of political action - join groups, write letters, participate in demonstrations, anything at all like that?

Any issues you feel pretty strongly about?

Any particular time when you decided on your political beliefs?

What did you think of the past election?

Sex Roles

I'd like to find out something about how you think and feel about yourself as a male (female).

What characteristics do you associate with masculinity (femininity)?

Do you think that there are psychological differences between men and women? If so, what are they? If not, do you see any differences in behavior between the sexes? If so, how do you account for them?

How does all this apply to you? What difference has it made in things that you do? Can you give me some examples?

Have they always been pretty much the same?

How about your parents, what do they think? Do you discuss this with them?

Are there any areas of uncertainty remaining for you? What do you think may resolve them?

Can you see your ideas changing substantially in the future or are they pretty stable?

Sexual Intercourse

Finally, I'd like to ask you about your beliefs regarding your own sexual behavior. (Check on sexual preference and frame questions appropriately.)

What are your attitudes concerning sexual intercourse, when do you think it's all right? When not?

How do these ideas apply to you yourself? Does it make a difference in what you do? How?

How about your parents, what do they think?

Do you discuss your views with them?

How likely do you think you are to change your views in the future?

In this interview, we've covered 5 areas: occupational plans, religious beliefs, political attitudes, sex role attitudes, and personal standards for participation in sexual intercourse. Which of the areas do you think is most important in defining who you are? That is, if you could pick only one area upon which to base your identity, which would you pick? Which would be next in importance? Which is the least important? Which is next least in importance?

SOCIAL REFLECTION QUESTIONNAIRE

Instructions

In this booklet are two social problems with questions for you to answer. We are asking the question not just to find out your opinions about what should be done in the problems, but also to understand why you have those opinions. Please answer all the questions, especially the "why" questions. Feel free to use the backs of the pages to finish writing your answers if you need more space.

Name: _____

Age: _____

Sex: (circle one): male/female

Date: _____

PROBLEM ONE

In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist wanted people to pay ten times what the drug cost him to make.

The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about half of what the druggist wanted. Heinz told the druggist that his wife was dying and asked him to sell it cheaper or to let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No. I discovered the drug, and I'm going to make money from it." So the only way Heinz could get the drug would be to break into the druggist's store and steal the drug.

Heinz has a problem. He should help his wife and save her life. But, on the other hand, the only way he could get the drug she needs would be to break the law by stealing the drug.

What should Heinz do?

should steal/should not steal/can't decide (circle one)

Why?

Let's change things about the problem and see if you still have the opinion you circled above (should steal, should not steal, or can't decide). Also, we want to find out about the things you think are important in this and other problems, especially why you think those things are important. Please try to help us understand your thinking by WRITING AS MUCH AS YOU CAN TO EXPLAIN YOUR OPINIONS--EVEN IF YOU HAVE TO WRITE OUT YOUR EXPLANATIONS MORE THAN ONCE. Don't just write "same as before." If you can explain better or use different words to show what you mean, that helps us even more. Please answer all the questions below, especially the "why" questions.

1. What if Heinz's wife asks him to steal the drug for her? Should Heinz:

steal/should not steal/can't decide (circle one)?

1a. How important is it for a husband to do what his wife asks, to save her by stealing, even when he isn't sure whether that's the best thing to do?

very important/important/not important (circle one)

1b. WHY is that very important/important/not important (whichever one you circled)?

2. What if Heinz doesn't love his wife? Should Heinz:

steal/not steal/can't decide (circle one)?

2a. How important is it for a husband to steal to save his wife, even if he doesn't love her?

very important/important/not important (circle one)

2b. WHY is that very important/important/not important (whichever one you circled)?

3. What if the person dying isn't Heinz's wife but instead is a friend (and the friend can get no one else to help)? Should Heinz:

steal/not steal/can't decide (circle one)?

3a. How important is it to do everything you can, even break the law, to save the life of a friend?

very important/important/not important (circle one)

3b. WHY is that very important/important/not important (whichever one you circled)?

4a. What about for a stranger? How important is it to do everything you can, even break the law, to save the life of a stranger?

very important/important/not important (circle one)

4b. WHY is that very important/important/not important (whichever one you circled)?


5. What if the druggist just wants Heinz to pay what the drug cost to make, and Heinz can't even pay that? Should Heinz:

steal/not steal/can't decide (circle one)?

5a. How important is it for people not to take things that belong to other people?

very important/important/not important (circle one)

5b. WHY is that very important/important/not important (whichever one you circled)?



6a. How important is it for people to obey the law?

very important/important/not important (circle one)

6b. WHY is that very important/important/not important (whichever one you circled)?

7. What if Heinz does steal the drug? His wife does get better, but in the meantime, the police take Heinz and bring him to court. Should the judge:

jail Heinz/let Heinz go free/can't decide (circle one)?

7a. How important is it for judges to go easy on people like Heinz?

very important/important/not important (circle one)

7b. WHY is that very important/important/not important (whichever one you circled)?

8. What if Heinz tells the judge that he only did what his conscience told him to do? Should the judge:

jail Heinz/let Heinz go free/can't decide (circle one)?

8a. How important is it for judges to go easy on lawbreakers who have acted out of conscience?

very important/important/not important (circle one)

8b. WHY is that very important/important/not important (whichever one you circled)?

9. What if Heinz's wife never had cancer? What if she was only a little sick, and Heinz stole the drug to help her get well a little sooner? Should the judge:

jail Heinz/let Heinz go free/can't decide (circle one)?

9a. How important is it for judges to send people who break the law to jail?

very important/important/not important (circle one)

9b. WHY is that very important/important/not important (whichever one you circled)?

PROBLEM TWO

Joe is a fourteen-year-old boy who wanted to go to camp very much. His father promised him he could go if he saved up the money for it himself. So Joe worked hard at his paper route and saved up the \$40 it cost to go to camp and a little more besides. But just before camp was going to start, his father changed his mind. Some of his father's friends decided to go on a special fishing trip, and Joe's father was short of the money it would cost. So he told Joe to give him the money Joe had saved from the paper route. Joe doesn't want to give up going to camp, so he thinks of refusing to give his father the money.

Joe has a problem. Joe's father promised Joe he could go to camp if he earned and saved up the money. But, on the other hand, the only way Joe could go would be by disobeying and not helping his father.

What should Joe do?

should refuse/should not refuse/can't decide (circle one)

Why?

Let's change things about the problem and see if you still have the opinion you circled above (should refuse, should not refuse, can't decide). Also, we want to find out about the things you think are important in this and other problems, and especially why you think those things are important. Please try to help us understand your thinking by WRITING AS MUCH AS YOU CAN TO EXPLAIN YOUR OPINIONS--EVEN IF YOU HAVE TO WRITE OUT YOUR EXPLANATIONS MORE THAN ONCE. Don't just write "same as before." If you can explain better or use different words to show what you mean, that's even better. Please answer all the questions below, especially the "why" questions.

1. What if Joe hadn't earned the money? What if the father had simply given the money to Joe and promised Joe could use it to go to camp--but now the father wants the money back for the fishing trip? Should Joe:

refuse/not refuse/can't decide (circle one)?

1a. How important is it for parents to keep their promises about letting their children keep money--even when their children never earned the money?

very important/important/not important (circle one)

1b. WHY is that very important/important/not important (whichever one you circled)?

2a. What about keeping a promise to a friend? How important is it to keep a promise, if you can, to a friend?

very important/important/not important (circle one)

2b. WHY is that very important/important/not important (whichever one you circled)?

3a. What about to anyone? How important is it to keep a promise, if you can, even to someone you hardly know?

very important/important/not important (circle one)

3b. WHY is that very important/important/not important (whichever one you circled)?

4. What if Joe's father hadn't told Joe to give him the money but had just asked Joe if he would lend the money? Should Joe:

refuse/not refuse/can't decide (circle one)?

4a. How important is it for children to help their parents, even when their parents have broken a promise?

very important/important/not important (circle one)

4b. WHY is that very important/important/not important (whichever one you circled)?

5. What if Joe did earn the money, but Joe's father did not promise that Joe could keep the money?

Should Joe:

refuse/not refuse/can't decide (circle one)?

5a. How important is it for parents to let their children keep earned money --even when the children were not promised that they could keep the money?

very important/important/not important (circle one)

5b. WHY is that very important/important/not important (whichever one you circled)?

6. What if the father needs the money not to go on a fishing trip but instead to pay for food for the family? Should Joe:

refuse/not refuse/can't decide (circle one)?

6a. How important is it for children to help their parents--even when it means that the children won't get to do something they want to do?

very important/important/not important (circle one)

6b. WHY is that very important/important/not important (whichever one you circled)?

THE ETHIC OF CARE INTERVIEW MANUAL

The objective of rating each interview is to locate the individual in one of the Ethic of Care stages for each dilemma. Each stage represents a different mode of resolving conflicts in human relationships and a different apprehension of the central insight that self and other are interdependent. The five stages represent a progressively more adequate understanding of the psychology of human relationships, an increasing differentiation of self and other and a growing comprehension of the dynamics of social interaction. Thus the Ethic of Care reflects a cumulative knowledge of relationships and evolves around the central insight that self and other are interdependent and that the activity of care enhances both others and self (Gilligan, 1982).

The five stages are:

1. Egocentric (Self-Oriented).
- 1.5. Transition Phase (From Selfishness to Responsibility).
2. Self-Sacrifice (Other-Oriented).
- 2.5. Transition Phase (From Goodness to Honesty).
3. Ethic of Care (Self- and Other-Oriented).

In determining the stage of a subject's response, it is important to note whose needs and concerns she considers and the reasons why she would or would not do or say something. "What"

she would do is of much lesser importance. It is therefore essential for the interviewer to ask sufficient non-directive probing questions in order to bring out the subjects' structures of thought around the various dilemmas. A subject may initially give a superficial response indicating care for others, e.g. stating that she would take her lonely mother in. However, further questioning may reveal that her reason for doing so was that mother would not make a scene and thus give her a bad reputation. On the other hand, the interviewer should not give the subjects ideas by pushing too hard for responses or additional considerations. In summary, the subject should be given ample opportunity to express her views and values on each dilemma without the help of any suggestions from the interviewer.

Instructions for Rating

The following is a description of the various stages, embodying Gilligan's (1982) criteria, and a short sketch of how each stage might respond to the different dilemmas, followed by sample responses.

1. Egocentric (Self-Oriented)

This stage is characterized by caring for self in order to ensure survival. Her concern is pragmatic and the issue is survival. "Should" is undifferentiated from "would" and other

people influence the decision only through their power to affect its consequences. The question of "rightness" emerges mainly if her own needs are in conflict, then she would have to decide which needs should take precedence. Morality is a matter of sanctions imposed by a society in which one is more subject than citizen.

The woman focuses on taking care of herself because she feels that she is all alone. She feels disconnected, independent, a loner. The self, which is the sole object of concern, is constrained by a lack of power that stems from feeling disconnected. Relationships are for the most part disappointing. As a result, women in some instances deliberately choose isolation to protect themselves against hurt.

Sketch

Real-Life: She may or may not be able to generate a moral conflict. If she does, it is frequently some very personal, pragmatic dilemma, e.g. "what major to choose", "whether to drink and drive", "whether to sleep with my boyfriend or not". Her reasons for deciding what to do are also pragmatic, e.g. "I might lose my licence", "my parents may give me trouble", "I may lose my boyfriend", "I may get a bad reputation". Her concerns are basically to protect herself, ensure her own happiness and avoid difficulties. There is little, if any, concern for other people and their lives and feelings. Also, there is no consideration of any higher principles or values.

I was going to see an old boyfriend of mine. I didn't know whether I should tell my boyfriend about it or say that I was doing something else. I told him I was doing something else and the next day he found out what I had been doing...I considered what had been happening that evening, we had been arguing, things weren't going well. I thought we might be getting into another fight, so I decided to tell him I was going to see a girlfriend. It would not hurt him. I did not know he was going to find out.

We were going away for the week-end skiing, there would be boys there. I knew my parents would not like it...It was a difficult decision because if they found out, I would be grounded for ever and ever...Drinking and driving... I might lose my licence.

Deciding whether or not to sleep with my boyfriend. I was considering whether I really wanted to or not, what the consequences would be, what would happen if my parents found out... getting pregnant. I was glad I didn't because things did not work out.

Lisa: She may or may not think that abortion is the best solution. Again, her considerations are pragmatic and selfish. For example, if she is against having the baby, she may consider: will she lose the job, get a bad reputation, will people wonder who the father is, will she lose the relationship. If she decides to keep the baby, the reason is likely that she really wants a baby. Again her concerns will be selfish. There are little, if any, considerations for the baby, e.g. will she be able to properly take care of it, or for the father and his wife/family.

She could tell the father to see what he would say. If she could support herself, then she could keep it. But if she is going to starve, then she has to have an abortion. The kid would die anyway.

Probably have the kid and give it up for adoption. It's her own choice. If it wasn't feasible to have the child and still have the job and her future would be destroyed by it, she should obviously have an abortion. It makes sense. If she had it and her future was wrecked, she

would not be pleased with herself or the child. The child would not be helped by it any. Might as well stop it before things happen that will destroy more than one life.

Betty: She is likely to think that Betty should leave her husband as she is not happy in the marriage. She may at first suggest talking to the husband, or marriage counselling, but then very quickly be ready to leave if things do not work out. If the children are mentioned, they are likely to be dismissed with statements such as "the children are old enough, divorce is common these days, they can probably work things out". The husband or the other man Betty is attracted to are not considered except for selfish reasons, e.g. Betty should commit herself to Steven because he makes her happy, the husband should "shape up or ship out".

If it was me, I would commit myself to Steven. The children are old enough to handle and understand a divorce. Before it is too late, I would leave my husband probably. She is not happy with her husband. I believe in happiness for everyone. She does not have much to lose by it, except the children, but they are a decent age, they can comprehend that mom and dad don't get along. Divorce is fairly common these days. It is not a stigma or anything.

I would go with the new man instead of being in an unhappy, frustrating situation. The children are old enough to understand.

Kristine: In all likelihood she will say that Kristine should not take mother in because Kristine enjoys and needs her independence, they do not get along anyway, mother should stay with people her own age, etc. She may briefly suggest some kind of help to mother, e.g. help her find another place, spend more

time with her, but the overriding attitude is that of wanting to get rid of the mother as quickly and easily as possible. There is little, if any, attention paid to the needs of the mother and no real effort to talk to the mother and to work things out or come to an agreement benefiting both people.

Tell her mother to go home. If they don't get along, there wouldn't be any hard feelings. Her mother would not expect to be welcomed. It is only natural to say no. If she likes living on her own and likes her privacy, she sure doesn't want her mother there. I can't see how the daughter would invite her to stay.

Say no, definitely, no way. Maybe offer her mother some kind of friendship. Say, I'm not going to help you and you are certainly not going to help me by living here. I am just starting to like my independence. This is important. Sorry, I do care about you, but I don't think this will work out.

General Comments: She is basically seeing and evaluating things from the self's point of view and does not experience much conflict about what is "right" or "wrong". This question would only emerge if her own needs are in conflict, in which case she would have to decide which needs should come first, e.g. she really wants a baby, but also wants her freedom to work, meet people, etc. Generally, self-interest serves as the basis for judgment.

1.5. Transition Phase (From Selfishness to Responsibility)

The transition issue is one of attachment or connection to others. Concepts of selfishness and responsibility first appears. Caring for the self to ensure survival is criticized as

selfish. The woman can now criticize her own judgment, e.g. as "selfish" and "unrealistic". This criticism signals a new understanding of the connection between self and others. There is a shift from selfishness to responsibility, a move toward social participation.

Sketch

Real-Life: Similarly to stage 1, she will have difficulty thinking of a dilemma and she is more concerned with her own feelings than with principles of "right" and "wrong". However, she will be somewhat more concerned with other people and their opinion and she can criticize her own actions as "selfish". Although aware of what other people may want or need, she will still decide to do what she wants, what "feels good" or what will best protect herself.

Being with a group of people that will be drinking, and you don't want to be. Depends on how I felt, I guess. There had to be someone to drive home and I decided to be the one... Difficult to decide because everybody else was doing it and I didn't want to, peer pressure. You want your friends to accept you and be like everybody else. I decided to drive home. I'm glad I did. Nobody else remembers it, because it didn't mean anything to them, but it meant something to me.

Deciding whether or not I should have my boyfriend stay at my place for a week-end when he was down here or with someone else... Just the way it would look to other people, what my parents would think. He ended up not staying with me. It would make things easier in the long run if he didn't, just to keep things safe and easy. My parents or anybody else could never use that against me, because they wouldn't agree with it.

Lisa: Initially, she may or may not think that Lisa should keep the baby but upon further questioning is likely to think

that an abortion or adoption is the best. Although she will give some considerations to the welfare of the baby, her reasons for deciding will basically be selfish, e.g. can she still keep the job, does she really want a baby. There will be little if any consideration for the father or his wife/family.

Just depending on her background and stuff, she should either take the job and have the baby and forget about the married guy or put the baby up for adoption. Take the job and move on to something else... It depends on whether she can support the baby, it depends on whether she wants it or not. It depends on how much money you have and where you are living. I don't know whether I would keep the baby or not. I would try to think about the future, the baby would only have a mother, never know his dad. I actually don't think I would keep it, have an abortion or something. It would not be fair to the child, it would be an only child unless maybe I would marry somebody else.

Does she feel she can support a child on her own and work at the same time, or does she feel the child could be in the way or it is not she wants right now, then I feel she should have it and give it up for adoption. I would give it up for adoption. I'm certainly not prepared to have a child, emotionally. I still live with my parents and go to school.

I think she should tell him, ask him if he want a baby. I wouldn't ask him to divorce his wife and marry me. It depends on the man's reaction too. If he is not being very responsible about the whole thing, I would probably get an abortion. If he wants the baby, then perhaps we could work out some other ways to take care of the baby. If he doesn't want the baby, I would have an abortion and have nothing more to do with him. It depends on the lady too, whether she wants a baby for herself. If I really loved the man, I would keep the baby. If he didn't want a baby then I would become really bitter about it, and I would probably get an abortion. It is the only way of getting rid of a baby, if I didn't want a baby myself.

Betty: Like stage 1 she is likely to think that Betty should leave her husband, but she will give more considerations to trying to save the marriage and show more concern for the

children and husband.

Get a separation from the husband. But first of all, she has to get a job. It would take time, this way she would find out if this guy was willing to wait for her. Lots of people have a really good marriage for many years and then just grow apart. There's nothing wrong with that. It is probably better for the kids. They may both be better apart. Maybe she is not going where his life is going, maybe he's an executive, successful and she's not his idea of a wife right now. If they decide they are happier apart then they can get a divorce. Lots of people who get separated get back together again.

Kristine: She may be willing to take mother in for a short while and extend some help. However, she basically wants to get rid of the mother, and may use the argument that they don't get along anyway. There is no real effort to take mother's point of view.

I suppose she has to let her stay for a little while, anyway. You can't very well turn your own mother away. But after a while you have to have a heart to heart discussion about why it is not fair for the mother to dump on her daughter. Hopefully, they could figure out something, she could rent an apartment near her daughter and they could visit. Because after a while they are going to realize how little they get along anyway, so the mom is probably wanting to leave anyway, hopefully. If not, the daughter has no choice but to ask her to leave. They don't get along anyway. She is infringing upon her life and not making her any happier, so she has to go. (WHY WOULD YOU TAKE HER IN IN THE FIRST PLACE?) Because if somebody landed on your doorstep you at least want to hear the story. You don't talk to somebody through the key hole, so you have to let them in and let them stay for breakfast and then they can go.

She should talk to her mother and explain that she really values her own independence and having the apartment to herself. Maybe offer to have her mother stay for a couple of weeks, and explain that she does not feel they get along well enough to share the same apartment, that apartments usually don't have that much room. Maybe offer to have her stay for a little while until her mother does not feel so lonely. Try to help mother for a couple of weeks but explain that it can only be temporary and that mother has to work things out

for herself.

General Comments: Due to a move toward social participation and responsibility, she may appear to struggle more with the issues and answers than stage 1. She will not be quite as sure of what to do, and will be considering the needs of others to a greater extent. However, while being able to list the needs of others in addition to her own, she will basically attempt to take care of herself.

Note: A score of 1.5 should also be given when the subject appears to be between stages 1 and 2.

2. Morality of Self-Sacrifice (Other-Oriented)

The elaboration of the concept of responsibility and its fusion with a maternal morality that seeks to ensure care for the dependent and unequal characterizes this stage. At this point, the good is equated with self-sacrifice and caring for others.

The woman adopts societal values, moral judgment relies on shared norms and expectations. Consensual judgment about goodness becomes the overriding concern as survival is now seen to depend on acceptance by others. "Right" is defined by others and responsibility rests with them. The woman avoids taking responsibility for choices made. She feels responsible for the actions of others while others are responsible for the choices

she makes.

This is the conventional feminine voice, defining the self and proclaiming its worth on the basis of the ability to care for and protect others. Assumptions about feminine goodness where all the attributes considered desirable for women presume an other - the recipient of the "tact, gentleness and easy expression of feeling" which allow the woman to respond sensitively while evoking in return the care that meets her very strong need for security. The strength in this position lies in its capacity for caring; the limitation lies in the restriction it imposes on direct expression. Assertion becomes potentially immoral in its power to hurt. Conflict arises specifically over the issue of hurting.

Sketch

Real-Life: The dilemma generated probably involves a situation where she is afraid of hurting or disappointing somebody close, such as family or friends. Generally, she attempts to please, help or protect others as much as possible at the expense of asserting herself and her views and feelings.

I come from a very strong Catholic family and it is difficult for me sometimes to do what I feel like doing. I still live at home, so I know that my parents don't approve of somethings I do, so I find I have to cover up part of my life. I still have to go to church on sundays with them, so I sit in church feeling really guilty sometimes, not so much because of what I have done, but how my parents would feel about it and what the church teaches about it. It is kind of a parental fear. Here are these two people I care so much about and I have always been under their care and supervision. I have great respect for them. My major fear is to disappoint them.

It usually involves friends and their boyfriends who ask my opinion whether they should stick with their boyfriend. It is difficult for me to say because it may be misleading. If I am wrong she may end up disillusioned and I wouldn't trust myself.

Lisa: Due to upbringing or religious convictions, she is likely to be against abortion and will probably advocate keeping the child no matter what the circumstances might be. Although the job and the father might be considered (mainly in terms of whether he will be willing to help), the main focus is on Lisa's responsibility to the child.

Have the child and just bring up the child. I guess it depends on him too. She has been working, she has enough money for day care. She may have to take a year off... I don't believe in abortion, unless you want to give it up for adoption... I would keep the child, because I would want it. If I am pregnant I already have a child, I wouldn't destroy that because it is a life. It would not be right for me to destroy another life. It would be easier if the father wants to live with her because you would not be alone. But I would still have the child.

I regard abortion as something very negative. Her first major mistake was to get involved with a married man and not being careful enough not to get pregnant. It is not the child's fault what has happened. If she has an abortion she would never completely forget, and it is possible that it could really cause her problems later in life. From the point of view of the Catholic Church, if they find out you have had an abortion, it's grounds for excommunication. They put a high priority on life. I would have the baby and hope for the best. Eventually, you would be able to carry on with the career. Maybe I made a mistake. But it is not fair to make another human being pay for it.

I would tell the man and then it would have to go from there what he would want to do. If I was financially stable enough to raise a child on my own, and he chose not to marry me or see me any more, I would raise the child on my own. An abortion is not for me. If he suggested an abortion, I would terminate the relationship and raise the child by myself. (WHAT IF SHE WAS NOT FINANCIALLY STABLE?) I would not give it up for adoption either. There is always welfare programs. I

would raise the child. (WHY?) It's basically my upbringing and certain religious convictions that would prevent me from having the abortion.

Betty: Stressing responsibility and commitment to the husband and especially the children, she will probably see it as wrong for Betty to leave her husband or to have an affair. Also, she will typically suggest that Betty tries harder to communicate with her husband or to improve the situation by other means, such as getting a part-time job, new friends and activities, etc. Betty's own needs or the husband's responsibilities are secondary, if considered at all. For scoring purposes, it is important not only to note the emphasis placed on responsibility and commitment but also the reasons why a marriage should not be broken, e.g. "not to let people down, they might not like you, everybody wants to be liked and loved", or "it might hurt the children" or it would not be right according to the Bible, church or parents, etc.

She should take her husband to marriage counselling. I would work at my marriage and stick to that. Because they have been married for so long and they have a family. It only makes sense to work on it. (WHAT IF HE REFUSES TO GO FOR COUNSELLING?) Hopefully, I would stay with him. Because it would be right. You have a responsibility to your husband and your family. I would try to, it would be hard.

As a Christian, I wouldn't get involved with the other man. It is considered adultery. I would flee from temptation. First thing to do is to talk to my husband and try to talk things out. It is the only rational thing to do. The husband probably doesn't know how she feels about the whole thing. I would pray about it and keep on trying to talk to him. Perhaps try to get him to see a counsellor... If he won't go I would say that his attitude has disappointed me. I might go away for a few days. I would not leave him, because the Bible says they should stick together through thick and thin.

I don't believe in divorces or extramarital flings. She could try other ways to make her husband realize that she wants a bit more out of the marriage, possibly volunteer work or take a part-time job. The kids are old enough to be left alone some of the time... She has been married a long time. She should try a bit harder to get through to her husband. She has children, divorce is hard on children. I believe in marriage and staying together. Marriage is a commitment, you should stay married.

Kristine: Even if she may initially suggest that mother find another place, she easily switches to thinking that Kristine should take mother in "at least for a while".. The reason for this is probably that she is her mother and that you owe it to your parents to take care of them. It is likely seen as a mutual responsibility between parent-children to help each other. The main focus is mother's needs and how she can best be helped.

She should say yes to her mother, just because she is her mother. Because her mother is lonely too. Perhaps it is a good opportunity to work things out with her mother.

Try to find some other place for her mother like with an other older person. I would not want my mother there. Talk it over with her mother and tell her that she doesn't want her there. But, until they get it worked out, she should stay with her mother and try to work things out as best she can. If the mother is lonely, I could never say no to my mother. You can't just turn her away and leave her there. Because your parents have brought you up and the least you can do is help them out in a time of need. I'm sure if you were lonely and you went to their doorstep they would take you in. It is only the right thing to do to accept her. At least give it a try.

She should let her stay on a trial basis. If it doesn't work, she should ask her to leave. If they are getting along, they could live together. She should take her mother in because she is her mother. Her mother brought her up, if she asked to live there, it must be pretty important.

General Comments: There is an emphasis on responsibility, commitment and response to other people and on doing the "right thing". "Right" is basically defined by others, e.g. the church, the Bible, parents or society. Because of their reliance on "law and order" and well-defined guidelines, these subjects are often characterized by a certain rigidity. Their moral judgments tend to be absolute or "black-and-white".

2.5. Transition Phase (From Goodness to Honesty)

The transition phase that follows stage 2 is marked by a shift in concern from goodness to truth and honesty. The transition begins with a reconsideration of the relationship between self and other, as the woman starts to scrutinize the logic of self-sacrifice in the service of a morality of care. When only others are legitimized as the recipients of the woman's care, the exclusion of herself gives rise to problems in relationships, creating a disequilibrium that initiates the second transition. The equation of conformity with care, in its conventional definition, and the illogic of the inequality between other and self, lead to a reconsideration of relationships in an effort to sort out the confusion between self-sacrifice and care inherent in the conventions of feminine goodness.

The word "selfish" reappears. Retrieving the judgmental initiative, the woman begins to ask whether it is selfish or

responsible, moral or immoral, to include her own needs within the compass of her care and concern. This question leads her to reexamine the concept of responsibility, juxtaposing the concern with what other people think with a new inner judgment. In separating the voice of the self from the voices of others, the woman asks if it is possible to be responsible to herself as well as to others and thus to reconcile the disparity between hurt and care. The exercise of such responsibility requires a new kind of judgment, whose first demand is for honesty..

The woman is unwilling any longer to protect others at what is now seen to her own expense. Survival, however "selfish" or "immoral", returns as the paramount concern.

Sketch

Real-Life: The dilemmas generated will likely involve a conflict between selfishness and responsibility, between morality and survival. She feels partly responsible for other people but is also concerned about herself and wants to assert her own views and needs.

Telling a white lie to a friend. A friend of mine was getting married and had only known him for a few months. She asked me if I thought she was doing the right thing. I wasn't too sure what to say, because inside I felt I couldn't do that. So I thought it would be wrong for me but I didn't know whether it would be right or wrong for her, so I said yes. I would feel responsible if it didn't work out. I wish I had talked more to her about what I thought. In a small part I feel responsible for her activities. If I didn't give her my honest opinion, I would feel responsible.

When a friend asks for advice and you know what you want to tell them but you don't want to force them, not make

them do what you think is right. But you want to help them. I have very high morals, but I don't want to force them upon anybody. People should follow what they think is right, what they feel they should do. It is their choice. Also, I don't want her to do something that I think is right and later on find out it is wrong and blame me.

Whether to have an abortion. Being pregnant at 21, having a lot of financial and emotional problems, I decided to have an abortion. Once I made that decision, I could live with it. I don't feel any regrets because I know I could never have raised the child. I was considering what my family would say, whether I was emotionally and financially able to support the child, whether I wanted to give my life up just when I was starting to get it going. I decided I had to wait till I was married in order to be able to emotionally support somebody else too.

Lisa: Although likely to think that Lisa should keep the baby, in comparison to stage 2 she is more flexible with regard to other options such as adoption or abortion. The decision is now seen as resting with Lisa, what she wants and is able to handle. The child is a major concern, but the emphasis has shifted back to Lisa.

I don't think she should have an abortion. If she really finds that she could not support the child, I would prefer if she gave the child up for adoption. It is hard because if she is single and trying to support herself, she wouldn't want to hurt the child by not being able to support it, especially if her lover is married. I'm sure he doesn't want to leave his wife. It depends on the tenured job, if it would be totally lost if she had to take a maternity leave. Provided she could have a maternity leave, to have the child and be with it for the first 6 months, I feel that she should have the child, especially if she loves the child and the man. The only reason I think she should not keep the child, is if she can see any time when she would not want to bring the child up.

I would keep the baby. I don't agree with abortion, and I would keep up with the career. It depends if she could take care of the baby at the same time, then she should keep it. If the circumstances couldn't allow her to do

both, then she should put it up for adoption. Abortion is murder, the child is alive. If she doesn't have time to help the child grow then it is best she does not have it, but put it up for adoption. It depends on how much time she is willing to put forth for the child.

It depends on what she can deal with. The man has some input into the decision also. If she is against abortion, then I don't think the circumstances should change her ideas on this issue. If I felt that I wanted a baby, then I wouldn't want the job situation or the relationship situation to change my decision. On the other hand, if I never wanted to have a child ever, and it didn't matter whether I would lose my job over it or not or I would lose him or not, then I would probably have an abortion. I wouldn't want my job to be the factor that decided whether I have it or not.

Betty: The marriage relationship is seen as an important commitment but now also as a two-way street where both parties should be willing to work on changing the situation. If this is not happening, she will likely think that Betty should leave in order to make herself happy. There will be some consideration of the children but the main focus is Betty's fulfillment.

Of major importance in this situation is quality of life. Her life is all she's really got. If she is so unfulfilled and so unhappy in her relationship, I don't think anybody should be forced to stay in that situation. She has attempted several times to communicate how she feels and it is just not important to her husband. But she also has to watch the infatuation with the new man, that she is not just carried away and try to see what is attracting her away from her husband. I see a major problem in the fact that she has kids. That could be a deciding factor, but they can't be the reason you stay in an extremely unfulfilling relationship. It is important to get professional help. It could be possible that she is not communicating in a way that the husband understands and she may not be fulfilling to him either. The whole situation could be turned around. If it won't work then she will have to leave her husband and take the kids and try to make something with her own life, to make herself happy. She should not just drop into somebody else's arms. She should decide what she would like to do with her life and what she believes she would enjoy doing and

set out to achieve that goal. It is important for her to get out of her restricted situation.

She should communicate more with her husband. Make clear to him that she is unhappy and try to get things sorted out first. If that fails, then consider getting a divorce and figure out who will get custody of the children. And then she has to decide about the other man. It would not be good to jump into that while she has her children and marriage to consider. The other commitments are more important, she should figure those out first before becoming intimate with the other man. If the husband doesn't want to work on it then there is really no point. You have to think about yourself. You can't live your whole life being miserable, having the other person not being sensitive to your needs. It is supposed to be a two-way street.

Kristine: She probably will see it as important and "nice" for Kristine to take the mother in in order to help her. However, she is also taking into consideration Kristine's need for an independent life and will therefore probably suggest that mother only be taken in for a while.

It would be nice if the mother could stay and she could help her mother find her own place and friends. I would hope she would take her mother in, for a bit. I can also see the mother taking advantage of the situation and outstay and that would probably wreck the relationship between both of them. Some people can't live together, It would have to be a short-time thing. I would do that for anybody, a friend, or a mother, or sister, if they need help or need company. I have been in the same situation myself and I would hope somebody would do the same for me.

If her mother is very old and needs attention, I feel she should be taken in. Because the mother has supported the child when she was growing up. This is depending on the idea that the mother does need help. But if mother is completely selfsufficient and just suddenly feels a whim to go live with the daughter, the daughter should say "you can stay for a week or two, but I don't feel we should be living together because I want my independence". But if the mother needs help, I feel she should give it to her. It's got to do with parental devotion. My parents have always been good to me. I would look after them if they had problems. I could not

just put them into a home and just visit them. But if mother is only lonely, she could live somewhere on her own and Kristine could visit her or she should try to get involved with people her own age. She will probably cause a rift between herself and her daughter because of different values and views. It would be very hard on the two of them.

It is an opportunity for her to mend the relationship. Kristine should bring her mother in but explain it is not a permanent thing. Discover what the problem is and work it through with her mother and make sure she realizes it is only a temporary situation. If the mother is being very clingy and not making any moves to do something on her own, then I think her mother is being very selfish. Her daughter is 26 years old, wanting to live her own life. You have to respect that. You owe it to your parents to make sure they are O.K., but I could never take the responsibility of taking them in for good. That's a lot to ask. She is ready to start her life.

General Comments: She is concerned with responsibility and commitment to other people, but is more flexible and thoughtful than the previous stages. More options are considered and compared to the "black-and-white" world of stage 2, the "grey" are discovered. She is similar in many ways to stage 1.5 in terms of being more uncertain and in conflict than the other stages. Also, both stages 1.5 and 2.5 consider needs other than their own while choosing to take care of self primarily. However, stage 2.5 will typically see a need for more "selfishness" while stage 1.5 see a need for less "selfishness". In addition, stage 2.5 is more concerned with principles and commitments than 1.5 and is able to see the situation from various people's perspectives, not only from their own or the protagonist.

Note: The score of 2.5 should also be given when the subject appears to be between stages 2 and 3.

3. The Ethic of Care (Self and Other-Oriented)

The criterion for judgment has shifted from goodness to truth and honesty. The morality of action is assessed not on the basis of its appearance in the eyes of others, but in terms of the realities of its intention and consequence.

This stage focuses on the dynamics of relationships and dissipates the tension between selfishness and responsibility through a new understanding of the interconnection between other and self. Care becomes the self-chosen principle of a judgment that remains psychological in its concern with relationships and response but becomes universal in its condemnation of exploitation and hurt.

The woman claims the power to choose, accepts responsibility for choice and takes control of her life. Criteria for goodness move inward. Obligation to care extends to include the self as well as others. There is now a moral equality between self and other and both are included in the compass of care. Responsibility for care includes both self and other and the injunction not to hurt, freed from conventional constraints, sustains the ideal of care while focusing on the reality of choice.

Sketch

Real-Life: There will be little difficulty in generating a dilemma. The conflict may or may not involve interpersonal

relationships. In solving the conflict, she will follow her own inner, self-chosen principles rather than the opinions of others.

I'd been going out with a guy and running into someone else who I found interesting and wondering what to do about it and how to treat it and where I was going to go. I had a boyfriend, been going out for a couple of years. I had been very sick for an extended period of time and it led me to get a new outlook on life. I had this new idea which did not coincide with his way of thinking. His actions were getting me upset. There were more personal conflict between him and myself. I found someone who had the same way of thinking as I did. But as I was going out with somebody it was difficult for me to decide where I wanted to go. Since I was sick with my present boyfriend, he had been very good and I owe him a great deal. He had been so thoughtful and understanding. So I was trying to deal with the conflict of gratitude for my present boyfriend and a feeling of making myself feel better with this person who appealed to me. I eventually came to decide that the present was more important than the past and although I owed him a great deal, it was no basis for a relationship. So I went with the second fellow.

During the solidarity strike and deciding whether to cross the picketline and go to my classes or to stay at home and not cross the picketline. One conflict was personal. I might end up losing the semester if I did not go. The other conflict was that I agreed with a lot of what was being said. I was against the cutbacks proposed. Because I believed in what these people was striking for, I didn't want to cross the picketlines. But I also did not want to lose a semester of school. Were my principles important enough to me to lose a semester which I decided that they were. I felt it was one way of making it known what my ideas were on the situation. By deciding to go to school, it was more of a personal gain. I wouldn't lose the semester, but to me that gain was small in comparison with the long-term effect of the cutbacks. And by not making a stand on it, I was saying I only care about my short-term goals of getting my school finished, but I don't really care about the long-term things that affect everybody.

Lisa: She may or may not think that Lisa should keep the child. In making the decision she will consider the welfare and

effects on several people, i.e. the child, Lisa, the father and his family, rather than either feeling that Lisa should have an abortion to get rid of the problem (stage 1) or pay the consequences of her actions and be responsible (stage 2). The reasons for either abortion or keeping the child are more thoughtful and well-developed. Although Lisa and the baby are the main focus, she will also consider the effects on other lives, e.g. the father and his family.

It depends on how she feels about the married man. If she was more interested in her career and its advancement and wasn't really interested in marriage right away, an abortion would be the best answer. Otherwise, she would be tied down with something that was depriving her not only of a good career but something that wasn't intentional in the first place. To me that would be more regretful than to terminate the beginning of the new life which would probably be more difficult because he is married. I would abort and stick with the position. Not only are you messing up your own life, you are messing up at least two other lives too and there are more resentment. (WHICH OTHER LIVES ARE YOU REFERING TO?) The other man and his wife and children possibly. Although it is both his and her problem, it is not just affecting the two of them. It is affecting more people. To me that would be enough to say, I think we have just let this mistake go by and continue life as it was going.

Assess the situation whether she could give enough attention to the child as well as develop a career and try to do both. The fact that she is involved with a married man affects the situation. If she loves the man...it is difficult because he is married and it would be a break-up in the other family if she made him be a parent in raising the child. I would probably have it and try to combine both. If it was unsuccessful, I would leave the career for a while, take care of the child and then go back. Because in the late 20's women have a strong desire and need to have children, and I think at that time it is good to fulfill it. You would be more emotional and financial stable to support a child at that age. I think pregnancy should be planned, but if it so happens that you get pregnant at that stage in life, I think it is wise to have it. (WHY IS THAT?) Because the later consequences of having a child are more

rewarding than a job would be. But if you can combine both, it is the best of two worlds. The emotion and joy a child can give you, is more than a job can give you. And you can always go back to your job anyways after the child passes an important stage.

Betty: She will think that Betty should leave her husband after having really worked on the relationship. Again, she will consider how all the people in the situation are affected, i.e. children and husband and wife, and make a choice that is seen as being the best in the long run. She will condemn hurt but realize that hurt is at times unavoidable, and take responsibility for the choice and its consequences. Treating others as equals, the husband and his role in the situation will be considered.

She should approach her husband and explain in no uncertain terms what is going on, and ask if he has any intention of helping her change the situation. If not, I think she should get a divorce... Also, she should make sure that the children understand what is happening and that although it is not very fun to have a divorce, it is sometimes better than the consequences of avoiding it. If she would go ahead and advice her children in that manner and be careful how things progress, she could probably divorce him without too much problem. I believe in having a happy life, but I don't believe in hurting people to do so... It's going to be a decision between hurting your husband and getting a divorce and maybe the children and the fellow who you are intimate with. If her husband really cares for her, he'll change and the divorce can be avoided and the hurt of other people can be reduced to a minimum. But if he refuses to change, then her own personal hurt would lead to something worse.

One side is her opinion of the situation. I don't know his opinion of it. He may say the same thing as she, that she may not really be communicating with him. If I take it that it is the truth what she says... Marriage is a big deal and people should really try to make marriages work. But if it is not working you should not waste your life away sitting in a relationship that isn't going to work. If there is no possible way that it

is going to work or if she is tired of trying to make it work, then I think she should get out of it. But I don't believe in having the relationship with Steven while she is still married to the other man. I don't think it is fair to him or herself or the kids. You are spreading yourself out in too many different places. I think she should get on with her own life. It is better for the kids. If it is not a good relationship, it's not good for them to be in that situation, or for her or the husband. If there is no way for it to work, she should get out of it. It is not just selfish, it is probably better for everybody in the situation.

Kristine: She may or may not take the mother in. In either case, she will consider the needs of both people involved and recommend an honest communication between them. If the mother is taken in, she will put down some ground rules so that the two people can live together with respect and independence. If she does not take the mother in, she will offer help and companionship for the mother in other ways as well as explain why it is better that they do not live together.

It depends on how her mother is, if they have been getting along in the past and they respect each other's space. If the mother is sensitive or coherent enough to say "look, I really need some time by myself and we have to be a little independent" then she could probably work out some sort of a system of sharing and respecting each other. But if her mother was one who was constantly needing someone to talk to and someone to listen even if it had been repeated a hundred times a day, then I would definitely advise against it. Because she would be more unhappy putting up with that situation than if she turned her mother away. Although she would have to think about her mother as well, she has to think mostly about herself because she has to live with herself. It is a delicate balance, it has to depend a lot on how the two people are. If they didn't get along very well, I would advise against it. Because there would be fights, and the poor relationship they had before they moved in together would get increasingly worse. Then you would have two parties very unhappy.

I would probably take the mother in and definitely go over some ground rules for what is going to happen with

the restriction that if it didn't work out, the mother would have to leave. She is 26 and may be thinking about getting married and jobs, etc. You have a certain obligation to your parents. Let her know certain needs I have, how to divide up household chores, etc.

She got to chose between commitment to her mother and commitment to herself. She cannot live her mom's life. She could help her mother but not by living with her. The mother could perhaps move into the area where Kristine is living and have more communication. But living with her daughter would impose herself too much. The daughter values her independence. I think she should say no and have the mother live around her, but not with her.

General Comments: Generally, she appears to be in control of her life and able to make difficult choices and decisions with responsibility and care for both self and other. Her views and values are well integrated and expressed. Because of her self-assertiveness and unwillingness to sacrifice self, she may at times appear similar to stages 1 or 1.5. However, her statements and considerations of the various situations are much more comprehensive than stages 1 or 1.5 and she is able to consider other people's point of view and to assess the situation from various angles. Compared to stage 2.5 she is no longer confused or in conflict about selfishness and responsibility, and can therefore take care of herself as well as others, attempting to minimize hurt and exploitation.

APPENDIX D

INTERVIEW FORMATS FOR THE REAL-LIFE, LISA, BETTY AND KRISTINE DILEMMAS

The Participant-Generated, Real-Life Dilemma

The Real-Life dilemma was generated by the participant in response to a general question about her personal experience of moral conflict. The question was asked in several ways: Have you ever been in a situation where you weren't sure what was the right thing to do? Have you ever had a moral conflict? Could you describe a moral conflict? These questions eliciting a dilemma were then followed by a more consistent set of questions: Could you describe the situation? What were the conflicts for you in that situation? What did you do? Did you think it was the right thing to do? How did you know it was the right thing to do?

The Researcher-Generated Dilemmas

The general procedure used with the researcher-generated dilemmas was as follows: the participant was presented with the dilemma in a written format, then the dilemma was read to the participant and the participant was asked to respond to specific questions about that dilemma. The different researcher-generated dilemmas and the specific questions are presented below.

The Lisa Dilemma

Lisa is a successful teacher in her late twenties who has always supported herself. Her life has been centered on her work and she has been offered a tenured position for next year. Recently she has been involved in an intense love affair with a married man and now finds that she is pregnant. What do you think Lisa should do? Why?

The Betty Dilemma

Betty, in her late thirties, has been married to Erik for several years. They have two children, 8 and 10 years old. Throughout the marriage Betty has been at home, looking after the house and the children. For the last few years Betty has felt increasingly unhappy in the marriage relationship. She finds her husband demanding, self-centered and insensitive as well as uninterested in her needs and feelings. Betty has several times tried to communicate her unhappiness and frustration to her husband, but he continually ignores and rejects her attempts. Betty has become very attracted to another man, Steven, a single teacher. Recently, Steven has asked Betty for a more intimate, committed relationship. What do you think Betty should do? Why?

The Kristine Dilemma

Kristine, a 26 year old woman, has decided to live on her own after having shared an apartment with a girlfriend for the last three years. She finds that she is much happier living alone as she now has more privacy and independence and gets more work and studying done. One day her mother, whom she has not seen for a long while as they do not get along too well, arrives at the doorstep with two large suitcases, saying that she is lonely and wants to live with Kristine. What do you think Kristine should do? Why?