

REASONING VERSUS RULES AS FACILITATORS
OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT IN FOUR- AND FIVE-YEAR-OLDS:
AN EXPLORATORY STUDY

by

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ABSTRACT

Children at age five are viewed as emerging from egocentrism to rule-orientation. It has been observed, however, that moral reasoning -- eliciting consideration of others' interests by induction -- can be effective in eliminating disruptive behaviours and establishing willing cooperation in primary students so that academic achievement is enhanced.

The works of R. S. Peters and Jean Piaget and recent empirical studies are examined in relation to the hypothetical assumption that moral development can be promoted in primary students through reasoning. Some possible explanations for conflicts in research findings are provided.

The present substantive research investigates (i) what attitudinal differences, if any, may be found between students involved in a reason-oriented program of moral instruction and students involved in a rule-oriented program and, if applicable, (ii) whether explanations for the observed effects may be suggested by the data.

The study was conducted in a naturalistic kindergarten setting. Ten children similar in age and socioeconomic background were randomly divided into two groups of equal size. Each group met for a two-hour period two mornings per week for five and one-half weeks. Instruction for the two groups was the same except that when disruptive behaviour occurred, the teacher-researcher intervened with rule sanctions in the first group and reasoning in the second. All sessions were recorded on audiotape and transcribed in random order to avoid bias. Voice

registration of such states as excitement or distress provided for detailed study of responses. Moral learning was assessed according to students' verbal and behavioral responses in class and student interviews. Observations are reported in anecdotal and descriptive form.

Interpretation of observational data suggests that:

1. reasoning facilitated progression from egocentric behavior to other-directed behavior and an increase in rational enquiry during study periods;
2. reasoning in accordance with universalizable principles promotes development of the valence aspect of self which is foundational for moral development; and
3. task achievement promotes effectance; they become mutually reinforcing, but do not appear to significantly influence the development of valence.

The tentative findings indicate need for further investigation.

... a large percentage of children (may not be) capable of education before a serious and sustained attempt has been made to provide the necessary conditions without which talk of education is a pious hope.

R.S. Peters in Authority, Responsibility and Education, page 84.

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RATIONALE

During the past several decades awareness of the importance of moral development has increased among educators. Jean Piaget and Richard S. Peters have pioneered in providing, respectively, outlines of moral development as it proceeds in the child and definitions for moral education. Both see the child between the ages of five and seven in stages of egocentrism and rule-following, lacking the ability to reason.¹

While teaching primary students in an isolated northern community, the author observed that students responded positively to inductive moral reasoning as indicated by moral treatment of peers and a highly positive attitude to academic work. This appears to contradict Piagetian theory.

Research was planned (i) to assess whether students in an urban community with a different socioeconomic background would respond similarly to the inductive instruction and (ii) to refine the hypothesis, if supported, that early moral development can be fostered by reasoning. To accomplish (i) and (ii) above, a control group was given the same instruction in the same manner as the experimental group, with one excepting set of independent variables: students in the control group were not engaged in moral reasoning as was the experimental group.

A descriptive naturalistic study form was selected to explore and develop the hypothesis. Since no previous research has been conducted in this specific area, it was not known

whether variables other than reasoning, e.g. teacher 2.

attitude might mediate the effect of moral development.

With descriptive data ... in field studies it is possible to revise hypotheses and procedures ... as one gathers data and learns more about a given situation. ... considerable time (is spent) in sorting out relevant variables, discovering how phenomena operate in detail, and identifying significant hypotheses ready for precise experimental testing. This is an important step in the overall development of a science. ... Phenomena often operate differently within the vastly more complex matrix of a real-life setting than within the narrow confines of the laboratory where many important forces may not be allowed to vary.²

The significance of the problem is that it addresses the paradox of moral education described by R.S. Peters:

given that it is desirable to develop people who conduct themselves rationally, intelligently, and with a fair degree of spontaneity, the brute facts of child development reveal that at the most formative years of a child's development he is incapable of this form of life and impervious to the proper manner of passing it on.³

ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

In the first chapter the hypothesis is discussed in the context of central tenets in the theories of Jean Piaget and R. S. Peters: that moral development proceeds in an invariant age-related sequence,⁴ and that children must be taught moral habits prior to the onset of reasoning ability.⁵ Definitions of moral terms are provided.

The second chapter reviews empirical findings regarding moral development in young children. Since excellent surveys are available,⁶ exhaustive coverage is not undertaken. The studies which are most relevant to the present hypothesis are examined.

The third chapter details study method. The instructional

strategy of the study is elaborated since information in this area is vital to interpretation of the data. Operational definitions of terms used in subsequent chapters are given. 3.

The main source of the data presented in the fourth chapter is the transcript of the audiotaped sessions. Statements made by the students are reported verbatim to indicate: (i) the nature of the verbal behavior of students in the two groups at the onset of the study, (ii) the immediate verbal responses of the students to the two types of instruction, (iii) individual attitudinal development, and (iv) developments in group behavior. Data obtained from student interviews conducted at the onset and conclusion of the primary data gathering period are summarized. To conclude, a ratings report is given.

In the final chapter the findings and questions they generate are discussed. Limitations of the study are assessed and areas where further research is needed are outlined.

DEFINITION OF MORAL TERMS

Providing definitions of moral terms is complicated by the fact that such definition requires considerable exposition. Definitions of principles are given, for the sake of economy of expression, as they relate to use with young children; stipulation is not intended.

Moral: Showing regard for others in word and behavior in accordance with the universalizeable principles of (i) fairness, (ii) truth-telling, (iii) freedom, and (iv) consideration of others' interests. "A principle is that which makes considerations relevant."⁷

- i) Fairness: Commodities including time must be equally⁴ shared barring excepting circumstances of special need, if interests of each and all are to be served.
- ii) Truth-telling: This is a necessary condition of meaningful discourse. The principle has significance in matters of contract between persons and trust.
- iii) Freedom: The rights of the individual must be respected by others, not interfered with, where personal choice is legitimately involved.
- iv) Consideration of Others' Interests: In the broad sense, this principle subsumes i) to iii) above. Narrowed, as a distinct integral component of morality, it consists in concern for the welfare of others. The principle uniquely distinguishes morality from the judicial-legal system which has entrenched i) to iii) above. The pivotal importance of this principle is illustrated in Chapter 4.

Moral development/learning: That which subscribes to any/all of i) to iv) above since the child cannot be expected to show total understanding and commitment in word and deed to i) to iv) inclusive as the result of a brief period of instruction. In general 'moral learning' is used to imply specific advances; 'moral development' to suggest learning in the broader sense of consistency and/or durability.

Moral instruction:

- a) Rule-oriented: Teaching of the principles i) to iv) above by defeasance into rules. For example, the

principle of truth-telling is presented to students as 'don't cheat', 'don't lie', 'don't deceive', 'don't gossip'. Whether or not explanation is provided, there is insistence on observance of "rules", referred to as such by the teacher.

b) Reason-oriented: Teaching of the principles i) to iv) by induction, i.e. drawing attention to a particular action which violates a principle, leading students through questioning to assess why the action is wrong (usually mediated by consideration of interests), and through questioning, guiding students to perceive the importance of the covering principle.

The two methods and the matter of giving instruction in a moral manner are discussed in Chapter 3.

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Considerable effort has been invested by R. S. Peters in defending the notion of habit formation in accordance with rules (see Appendix B) as vital in the early years for moral learning. Arguments he presents in the third chapter of Moral Development and Moral Education are cited here in conjunction with counter claims.

"First, a fair amount of evidence has accumulated to demonstrate the decisive importance of early learning on later development."⁸ To repeat, he believes that "at the most formative years of a child's development he is incapable of this (rational) form of life and impervious to the proper manner of passing it on."⁹ This raises concern: how can moral learning

be imparted "in a way which does not stultify the development of a rational code ... at a later stage"?¹⁰ Nevertheless his conclusion is firm: "Children have to start off their moral life with some kind of habit training."¹¹

In Reason and Compassion, he describes the infant as follows:

i) There is an (a-rational) level of life at which young infants live all the time ... (not having) reached the level at which experience is structured by categories of thought. ... ii) (a) form of thinking ... which (interferes with and distorts) their more rational judgments and performances ... iii) (they do not observe) principles non-contradiction, causality, and those defining a sense of reality ... iv) Classification is based on affectively loaded similarity without regard to identity ... v) The contrast ... is between a level in which determinately conceived objects are wanted and realistic means taken to obtain them ... and thinking structured by some unconstrained thrust toward affinity of feeling. vi) ... There is a singular absence of 'will' and of those virtues such as determination and integrity which are connected with it. ... vii) The infant cannot delay the satisfaction of his wish.¹²

Peters describes infancy as an amorphous existence. That position is not defensible. i) Infancy is a time of intense structuring in categories:

Postnatal development involves mostly differentiation of parts within subsystems, since normal babies are born with all of their systems developed primarily.

Brain differentiation (development of neural associations and pathways) is partly due to maturation but also to stimulation from and interaction with the environment.

Reflexes form the basis for the development of schemas (units of knowledge) which begin immediately (at birth).¹³

iii), v), vi), vii): That this structuring does involve thought - roots of principles of non-contradiction and causality, determinate goals and means taken to achieve them, will, determination and integrity - is shown in the intensive, carefully controlled research reported in Emotion and Early Interaction published

in 1982:

Early infant-caregivers' social exchanges (present) a dyadic system in which affective messages are exchanged between the partners for the purpose of one of the partner's achieving his or her own goals in coordination with those of the other partner. The infant's behavior meets criteria usually advanced for goal-directness: persistence, use of multiple means to the same end state, observance of a "stop rule" upon achievement of the goal, and appropriateness of actions as judged by an outside observer. ... by three months the infant is goal-directed in the context of social exchange. ... The infant's affective displays coordinate social exchanges. The displays convey an emotional evaluation of the partner's action, the state of the interaction, and also signal the infant's direction of action. ... With development (the) social-emotional system becomes a stable individual characteristic that is increasingly influenced but not replaced by the cognitive adaptive system.

By six months the infant has accumulated sufficient experience in the interaction such that his or her competence is stabilized, as is ... effectance ... the sense of what can and cannot be accomplished.

(At three months) There is clear demonstration of ... regulatory capabilities in the infant ... not only as self-regulation, but also ... of regulating with the adult's behavior.

Mothers who fail to respond to infant signals or intrude on infant-initiated activities distort the interactive structure. The infant may initially attempt to redirect the interaction, but with repeated failure the infant gives up and withdraws. With repeated experience in such interaction, the anxiety may become a stable characteristic.¹⁴

"Lack of maternal responsibility or insensitivity makes the infant insecure about his or her ability to affect the environment"¹⁵: with regard to Peters' statement ii) above, the form of thinking which acts to interfere and distort may be that largely of the caregiver. Regarding iv), classification without regard to identity, the infant responds differentially to its mother within the first days after birth, etc. With reference to vii) the following rationale is relevant. As the attentive caregiver learns, "wishes" of the infant are centered on needs which the infant is incapable of satisfying unaided: food,

treatment for digestive disturbances, dryness, communication, and affection. Immediacy of response to infant "wishes" is an important factor in caregiving; gastrointestinal disturbances and rashes are painful. Furthermore, if the caregiver promptly heeds the call of the infant (s)he communicates caring to the infant - that the infant and his needs are not held unimportant. The infant state of dependency is functional since it calls for frequency of contact and communication between infant and caregiver.

The reasons Peters' concept of infancy has been examined in detail are: 1) If his assessment of the ability of the infant is wrong, it is plausible that his assessment of subsequent early childhood abilities which develop from those of infancy is also wrong. This matter is discussed in detail under PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. 2) The importance of early learning, in accordance with Peters' suggestion, is established. 3) If the infant is acutely sensitive to adult response as is stated in recent research studies, it may be very important to provide moral instruction in a "proper manner"¹⁶ - from the start (see Appendix C).

Various in Peters' exposition, pieces of the puzzle which must be assembled to form a theoretical base for reasoning with young children are to be found. "Concern for others develops (early) in a child's life."¹⁷ a) "At the first (egocentric) level of development the child ... is acquiring the general apparatus for reasoning."¹⁸ He details the complexity of rule-following with an example of parents teaching their child not to steal.

- b) What makes an action a case of theft is that it must be conceived of as appropriating, without permission, something that belongs to someone else. A child ... (must have) developed the concept of himself as distinct from others, of property, of granting permission, etc. ... To learn to act on rules is necessarily an open-ended business requiring intelligence and a high degree of social sophistication. For the child has to learn to see that a vast range of very different actions and performances can fall under a highly abstract rule.¹⁹

If the child has reached this level of abstraction and complexity of thought, he is capable of understanding moral principles as well as the derived rules.

- c) In the early years parents may think that they are teaching their children not to steal, whereas ... They may be teaching something else, e.g. to inhibit actions of which authority figures disapprove, or to inhibit a narrowly conceived range of movements.²⁰

Precisely.

If c) in the first years the child is incapable of grasping the moral significance of rules and b) in order to act on rules the child must be capable of complex abstract thought, why not a) provide moral instruction to the child through reasoning when at the first level the child is acquiring the "apparatus" for it? Wherein lies the necessity of teaching children 'moral habits'?

Peters writes:

(the) lack of importance assigned to habit goes against a whole tradition of thought about moral development stemming from Aristotle. He too assigned a central place to ... the gradual emergence of practical reason. But he conceded a major role to habits in morals and moral education.²¹

Gilbert Ryle says "the Greek words (Aristotle) used were quite grossly mistranslated when rendered merely by such words as 'habit' and 'habituation'."²² Furthermore, Peters fails to account for Aristotle's words in The Nichomachean Ethics Book III:

in the case of the virtues, a man is not said to act justly or temperately if what he does be merely of a certain sort; he must also be in a certain state of mind when he does it i.e. first of all he must know what he is doing; secondly he must choose it and choose it for itself; ... the virtues are a kind of deliberate choice or at least are impossible without it. ... Our particular acts are not voluntary in the same sense as our habits: for we are masters of our acts from beginning to end when we know the particular circumstances, but we are masters only of the beginnings of our habits.²³

The virtuous (moral) act then is the result of a person's choosing it "for itself" - it cannot result from subscription to habit. Does the term 'moral habit' not express a contradiction?

In order to be characterized as moral, an action must involve deliberation, choice, for no two sets of human circumstances responded to are identical, though if circumstances are similar they may evoke a similar response. The value of establishing habits lies in being able to act without deliberation. C. M. Hamm states the case well:

If the child has not at the time of action ... made a moral judgment, it seems doubtful that we can ascribe moral goodness to the agent. And it sounds distinctly odd to ascribe moral goodness to the habit, for there is nothing intrinsically good about the habit qua habit ... Virtue is primarily attached to the mind or character of the agent. ... The moral quality is related to the judgment and the decision, not to the tendency and capacity to make the judgment.²⁴

To justify his use of the term, Peters extends the meanings of both 'moral' and 'habit'. He refers to tidiness and cleanliness as moral (?) habits²⁵ and writes that "Habits need not be exercised out of force of habit."²⁶

In addition to Aristotelian theory, Peters finds credibility in the Piagetian theory that children after experiencing an egocentric stage of thought must pass through a rule/authority-

oriented stage. He believes moral development is too important to postpone until the stage of formal operations is reached. The Aristotlean and Piagetian theories are mutually reinforcing in Peters' explanation of the importance of 'moral habits'. It seems, however, that his interpretation of both Aristotle and Piaget is somewhat restricted.

Peters expounds the importance of reasoning in moral education. He is an advocate of a rational morality based on principles.²⁷ He insists that moral education must involve knowledge and understanding.²⁸ "(Education implies 'initiation') into the content of (an) activity or forms of knowledge in a meaningful way, so that (the learner) knows what he is doing."²⁹ "Willingness and voluntariness on the part of the pupil" are important; "educating people commits us ... to morally legitimate procedures" writes Peters.³⁰ In addition to emphasizing rationality, he indicates that concern for others beyond considering others' interests in a purely legalistic sense is important.³¹

Education also "must involve the kind of commitment which comes from being on the inside of a form of thought and awareness" according to Peters.³² The notion he has difficulty with is: how can the pupil find his way to the "inside" without having been there - without understanding the goal? It is the responsibility of the teacher, one "inside", to show the student the way. Paul Hirst writes of concept formation:

learning a concept is not an all or nothing business; for one can know some of the criteria for a concept without knowing them all, and one can build up other higher order concepts on this particular knowledge.³³

Induction in the sense of ... teaching children rules (?) will obviously be effective. But ... to indicate the reason for rules, it will be effective only when they have reached the appropriate level of cognitive development.³⁴

The age at which reasoning becomes effective as a method of moral instruction must be determined by research. As A. C.

Kazepides observes in The Alleged Paradox of Moral Education:

The problems of moral education ... result from, among other things, ... lack of knowledge about the way children develop, and ignorance of the proper ways of initiating the young into moral thought and action.³⁵

PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The suggestion that inductive reasoning may enhance moral learning in students four to five years of age is based on classroom observation and, by coincidence, the writer's observation of her own preschool children. An attempt is made here to explain the phenomenon of early reasoning in relation to Piagetian theory. Two considerations pertain: 1) Observation of the phenomenon is in an exploratory phase; resolution, in general, is precluded. 2) Piagetian theory is based on development as it proceeds in the child without the intervention of negotiated reasoning, but with that of adult constraint. To be investigated are: reversibility, the ego, and the role of affect. If children are actually capable of moral development much earlier than Piaget indicated, the first years should reveal potentialities and preparatory development.

Reversibility and reciprocity are central in certain classes of moral behaviors such as sharing. Piaget described reversibility as an operation of intelligence in an early life

context:

Before language develops there is behavior we can call intelligent. ... (Intelligence is a) form of equilibration; ... equilibration (is) principally a compensation for an external disturbance.

When there is an external disturbance, the subject succeeds in compensating for this by an activity ... compensation is the annulling of a transformation by an inverse transformation. The compensation which intervenes in equilibration implies the fundamental idea of reversibility, and this reversibility is precisely what characterizes the operation of intelligence.³⁶

Piaget went on to explain intelligence according to infant manipulation of objects:

Sensori-motor intelligence (up to two years) rests ... on movements and perceptions without language ... coordinated under ... schemata of action. These schemata can be generalized in actions and are applicable to new situations. (The infant explores) the object, trying to understand it by assimilating it into schemata already known. ... (The incorporation of) this new object into each of his already developed schemata, which function as practical concepts ... is a structuring of intelligence.³⁷

These definitions will be referred to in several contexts; first that of reversibility.

It is interesting to note at the sensori-motor level the beginning of a reversibility, not in thought, since there is not yet representation in thought, but in action itself. ...

At the same time that symbols appear, the child acquires language ... (at this preoperational stage: two to seven years) representation of thought is superimposed on the sensori-motor stage. (This is) not a simple extension.³⁸

Reversibility, according to Piaget, disappears after the sensori-motor stage. "Actions are centered on the body. I used to call this egocentrism; it is better thought of as lack of reversibility of action."³⁹ Reversibility - only where manipulation of objects is involved - becomes possible again at around age seven, the beginning of the stage of concrete operations.⁴⁰ Finally, at the stage of formal operations

(onset 11 to 12 years) reversibility as reciprocity which¹⁴. leads to another combination, instead of merely annulling a transformation, develops.⁴¹

The importance of the following observation demands its inclusion here. The writer's preverbal son up to age 2.1 was very active in object manipulation. Rolling a truck back and forth, he suddenly uttered "back!" From that point, he used "back" to indicate he would return from a walk to the adjoining room, drawing a bare wrist toward his eyes, his symbolic gesture of observation of time i.e. that he would return at a particular time. He continued to use "back" in his play with toys. Furthermore, his play with his sister indicated a new understanding: that when she promised to "give a toy back" to him, he would soon have repossession. This understanding marked the beginning of a new relationship of explicit cooperation with his sister; sharing had acquired added definition in his mind instead of continuing to exist exclusively as a sacrificial gesture.

The illustration raises several questions for Piagetian theory: 1) Reversibility has produced reciprocity in this case at the onset of the preoperational stage instead of disappearing. 2) The symbolic element - the nonverbal communication of observation of time was carried over from the sensori-motor stage. Preverbal children develop a vast complex repertoire of gestural symbols "to invoke objects which are not present, to reconstruct the past, etc."⁴² Contrary to what Piaget said, the youngster in the sensori-motor stage does give evidence of representation of thought. The above provides one example of

continuity in development which has been specifically denied¹⁵.
by Piaget.

At a theoretical level, if reversibility does cease with the sensori-motor stage to reappear in a limited way (rather conspicuously confined to object manipulation) during the stage of concrete operations, how is that phenomenon explained? Does the pressure of adult constraint on the toddler necessitate suppression of his potential to begin to develop relationships involving reciprocity? According to Piaget, reciprocity can only develop when children are able to free themselves from the influence of adult constraint at the stage of formal operations.⁴³ If the explanation presented here is correct, the child at age five may welcome the opportunity granted by the teacher to engage in inductive reasoning, especially if it is morally oriented since it will present release from the constraint described above and will open new avenues of interpersonal understanding.

In Judgment and Reasoning Piaget wrote: "Logical reasoning is always a demonstration. If therefore the child remains for a long time ignorant of the need for demonstration, this is bound to have an effect upon his manner of reasoning."⁴⁴ The Tronick, Ricks and Cohn report on mother-infant interaction (see page 5) describes both reversibility and a rudimentary type of logic e.g. if the infant is unable to capture the attention of the caregiver after repeated attempts it withdraws; after mutual goal attainment is realized, the infant presents a stop signal. Frank and Theresa Caplan write: "Twenty-one month olds often try to make a stand for their own rights and

attempt to make decisions on their own."⁴⁵ At age two 16.
there is defiance of adult authority which seemingly begins abruptly. Does the youngster react to what may appear to him purely arbitrary control, because the specific logic of requirements imposed on him is not explained?

Piaget has referred to "the habits of childish thought ... discontinuous and chaotic in contrast to the deductive style of the adult."⁴⁶ Orders are imposed on the child discontinuously, by fiat, instead of being presented organized in the form of reasoning. "The 'whys' bear witness to a need to explain and justify (specific phenomena) ... far rather than a wish to ... deduce or demonstrate anything."⁴⁷ Piaget's account does not explain why the youngster persists, wanting to know more after the specific phenomenon in isolation has been explained.

It may be hypothesized that after a considerable time of "taking account of successive displacements, to order them, then reverse them, etc."⁴⁸ in the sensori-motor stage, the youngster rebels against the adult who has failed to encourage reciprocity or interconsideration of goals. The potential to reason deductively may exist within the child much earlier than Piaget ascertained; the adult may impose the prolonged delay in development. When at the age of two his refusal to cooperate results in increased adult constraint, the child may simply acquiesce to superior strength and turn inward (egocentrism). It may be that consequently and concomitantly inner mechanisms such as reversibility and reciprocity are switched off. The only way to assess this hypothetical construct is to subject infants to reason-oriented rearing techniques and to monitor

development by means of longitudinal profiles. R. S. Peters¹⁷. sees need for a positive theory of early moral instruction. Most of the 'don'ts' imposed on the two-year old may be unnecessary if reasoning is exercised. "Too little thought has been given to the positive conditions of training which are likely to produce a strong ego."⁴⁹

It has been shown repeatedly that the ego - the concept of self - is influenced by interaction with the environment, human and material. The Tronick, Ricks and Cohn report indicates that infant withdrawal resulting from failure to establish interpersonal affective exchanges can result in "feelings of ineffectance in the infant ... (which) may become a stable characteristic."⁵⁰ Piaget elaborated his theory of early intellectual development on the basis of infant manipulation of objects; he postulated that the entire period from two to seven years is egocentric.

An examination of the Piagetian concept of the development of the ego may be useful. His formulation of 1932 is: "The younger the child, the less sense he has of his own ego. ... he yields to every suggestion, and if he does oppose to other people's wills a certain negativism ... this only points to his real defencelessness against his surroundings."⁵¹ Does this provide an adequate explanation of the rebellion at age two, an accurate description of the child?

The only way of avoiding individual refractions would lie in true cooperation, such that both child and senior would each make allowance for his own individuality and for the realities that were held in common ... but equality and reciprocity are not brought about by unilateral respect as such ...⁵²

The mixture of coercion and subjectivity ... from two to seven years does seem to us less social than cooperation

which is the one determining factor in the formation 18.
of the rational elements in ethics and logic.⁵³

Piaget viewed the establishment of cooperation between adult and young child as unattainable since such "presupposes minds that know themselves and can take up positions in relation to each other."⁵⁴ Does the rebellion at two not illustrate possibility of cooperation, though by negative demonstration? If the youngster is capable of deliberate refusal to cooperate, may he not be able under suitable conditions to cooperate as well?

Piaget did not examine effects of reasoning with his own children, or other children. The writer's son persisted in head banging when frustrated from eight months to age 1.2. With adult elicitation of his cooperation by means of reasoning, the head banging abruptly ended. Exclusively at those times when behavioral imperatives were presented to him without consideration of his reaction or feeling, without eliciting cooperation, from 1.2 to 2.2 years his response was a harsh bark and refusal to comply with requirements imposed by the caregiver. With consistent application of reasoning, he shows cooperation and loyalty atypical at his age (2.3). In this response and other behaviors (see Appendix C), the existence of self as a separate entity, and the child's consciousness of self as distinct from others, is evident.

"Toddlers like to help with housework and should be encouraged to do so; this great spirit of cooperation, unless nurtured, soon shall pass."⁵⁵ This common characteristic of toddlers may also inform us about ego development. Being allowed to help may have significance for the child in that:

1) his capability is being recognized by the adult; 2) the development of positive self concept is further enhanced by means of task attainment.

Piaget wrote:

Egocentrism and imitation are one ... An egocentric mind will assimilate everything to itself and its own point of view. ... This assimilation deforms its objects, it has no respect for their specific nature. ... The child has not the feeling of his own ego; consequently he is always imitating things and people, owing to ... confusion between self and others.⁵⁶

The only explanation possible for the contradiction inherent in the foregoing passage is that it was important to Piaget to observe developmental processes in his children as they occurred without, or with minimal, adult intervention. Did he actually believe that typically early imitation is not imitation but rather a confused distortion of reality on the part of the child? What purpose could be served by such? Since early imitation is a universal phenomenon, it would seem it must have special significance for the developing organism.

Piaget stated that "By showing that logical contradiction is the result of the conflict of imitation and assimilation, we have at least a picture of the psychological structure of thought."⁵⁷ "The two antagonistic poles (are those of) deforming assimilation due to egocentrism, and imitation devoid of assimilation."⁵⁸ Instead of antagonism this seems to suggest a complementary relationship between the two which in effect results in little or no assimilation taking place until the onset of socialization (at seven or eight). According to Piaget, there is a "momentous factor" at that point, a transformation of imitation and assimilation; solidarity is established between

them.⁵⁹ This entire elaboration must be questioned: the 20.
period between two and seven years is one of intense socializa-
tion.

Children's imitative play shows direct representation of adult activity. The fact that "the egocentric mind" has its "own point of view" indicates differentiation of self from the other. Young children may become acutely upset if the adult intervenes with suggestions during imitative play; they show very definite representation as to how activity must proceed. Cooperation among peers during imitative play is common instead of unattainable. Imitative play allows the child to enact potentialities - planning and task related - free from adult constraint. In this way it serves to build a realistic concept of self as defined by both capabilities and their lack, while simultaneously affording the opportunity to gain social skills by rehearsing (learning) appropriate mature behaviors. It assists in ego development, then, instead of serving narrow indeterminate ends and revealing absence of self concept. It is, rather, a highly functional, highly adaptive behavior, a conception which must be elaborated elsewhere.

If we juxtapose the stage of cooperation with the sensori-motor period we get a picture of what the experience of childhood can be. Piaget says: "The average ages at which (the stages) occur may vary with ... intelligence or with the social milieu," though he insists that the "order of succession is constant."⁶⁰ Social change - or change in our attitude to the child - may produce more dramatic variation in development than Piaget allowed. Stage-related unilateral respect and "mysticism" has

undergone evolutionary erosion since 1932; an observation 21. which might be investigated.

Piaget described the evolution of social and affective interactions:

The appearance of representation, as a result of semiotic function, is just as important for the development of affectivity and social relations as it is for the cognitive functions. ... With the mental image, the memory of evocation, symbolic play, and language, however, the affective object may be present and active even in its physical absence. This fundamental fact results in the formation of new affects in the form of lasting sympathies or antipathies toward other people and of permanent awareness and valorization of oneself as regards the ego.⁶¹

We find here an account of affectivity as well as cognition. Piaget generally referred to affectivity as concerned with "energetics"; the cognitive and affective aspects are "inseparable and complementary"; there is a "marked parallelism in their respective evolutions."⁶² If this is so, it might be posited that the reversibility of the sensori-motor stage is accompanied by affectional exchanges which presume rudimentary ego development in the infant. Piaget denied this because he believed that representation in thought did not occur at this stage. We refer again to the passage quoted on page 9: "equilibrium is ... compensation for an external disturbance." Can early affectional needs be attributed to external disturbance? That intrinsic altruistic motivation is innate has been suggested by Sebastian and Wren.⁶³ Martin Hoffman also reports the existence of altruism in the first three months. He postulates that empathy is an involuntary experiencing of another's emotional state and that it requires nurturance.⁶⁴ Empathy and altruism may involve response to an external disturbance, however the early need for affection remains unexplained.

Is it possible that the affectional need of the infant is associated with ego development, for example that the positive valuations implicit in maternal displays of affection are foundation blocks of ego development? Murphy writes: "the mother not only meets nutritional and other bodily needs ... but also supports the development of the specific ego functions."⁶⁵ Ego development during the first years is described explicitly and implicitly in the work of Dr. Berry Brazelton who is involved in both infant research and interpretation in texts on infant development.⁶⁶

Medical research in the current decade shows the following orientation stated by Tronick and Adamson in Babies as People: New Findings on Our Social Beginnings:

Our traditional theoretical orientations led us to observe babies in isolation from their social partners and to dwell on the problem of how sophisticated adults make them into human beings. The revolutionary insight was to put babies back into their natural context - to view them as human beings with (a) ... heritage of social interdependency and as social people who already possess the ability to influence and be influenced by others.⁶⁷

Piagetian theory is not based on observation of development in instructional contexts. If further understanding of abilities of primary school students is to be gained, educational research must address that matter. For example, if "valorization of oneself as regards the ego" occurs in the period from two to seven years, since such appraisal involves the self in relation to others, the first years of school may be optimal for moral learning. It may free the child from the constraint which Piaget believed precludes moral development until the stage of formal operations is reached.

In his final publication, Intelligence and Affectivity,

When another person becomes an independent permanent and autonomous object, self-other relationships are no longer simple relationships between the subject's activity and an external object. These relationships start to become true exchange relationships between the self and other ... valuations indicate the beginning of interpersonal "moral feelings".⁶⁸

Piaget placed the onset of this development at 11 to 12 years.

At the lower levels values result simply from projecting feelings onto objects ... (at the most advanced level) schemes arising from interpersonal relationships are internalized and subsequently applied by the individual to himself.⁶⁹

Again, according to Tronick, Ricks, and Cohn (see page 12) it appears that sophisticated internalization of schemes may begin in the first year. It appears that Piagetian theory must be re-considered in the light of precocity and the continuity of development.

In The Moral Judgment of the Child, Piaget provided clues which seem to anticipate the Tronick and Adamson orientation to research. In addition to allowing for variation in rates of progress through the stages, as has been noted, he wrote:

Most of the moral rules which the child learns to respect he receives from adults, which means he receives them after they have been fully elaborated, and often elaborated not in relation to him and as they are needed.⁷⁰

The child is from his first year onwards in the grip of a coercive education which goes straight on and ends by producing ... a veritable 'short-circuit' ...

Cooperation alone can shake the child out of its initial unconscious egocentrism; ... constraint acts quite differently and strengthens egocentric features.⁷¹

how much more precious a little humanity than all the rules in the world.⁷²

the child's behavior toward persons shows signs from the first of those sympathetic tendencies and affective reactions in which one can easily see the raw material of all subsequent moral behavior.⁷³

It is this aspect of Piagetian exposition which R. S. Peters seems to have overlooked, and which gives support to the present exploration.

As D. W. Hamlyn writes in "The Logical and Psychological Aspects of Learning":

there is (required) proper reflection on what learning and education are, and what they involve in consequence ... only in (that) way can we be rid of misleading models which inhibit our understanding of intellectual development and education ... (Empirical developmental) findings presuppose our present educational and cultural set-up; there is no reason to suppose norms are unalterable.⁷⁴

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Focus of attention in psychological research has shifted largely from 'socialization' to 'moral development'. In many studies it appears that what is being assessed is socialization retitled as prosocial behavior or as moral development.

It has been suggested in Chapter 1 that reasoning is desirable as a means of promoting moral learning; however, according to Piaget the child between five and seven years does not understand reasoning to be guided by it.

This review introduces medical and psychological studies in which findings contrast with the Piagetian description of early life. In the second section ethical questions regarding the testing of young children are raised. To begin, what may, in part, constitute the early foundation for moral development is discussed.

EMPIRICAL STUDIES

The approach being taken to infant studies by the medical profession shows heuristic value. In Psychobiology of the Human Newborn, the study of individual differentiation among newborns is discussed as having 'its own justification, founded on the intrinsic value of the neonate ... as a person.'⁷⁵ Research indicates that:

The infant is a highly complex being, superbly adapted to a particular ecology, showing a range of sophisticated functioning we have only begun to explore. ... (the infant) is entitled to treatment appropriate to an independent, sensitive, and cognitively aware being.⁷⁶

The infant prior to the age of two engages in cooperative play: "peers often seem more ready than parents to follow through on a child's playful overtures."⁷⁷ "There is no reason not to assume that (the concept of self) develops from birth and that even in the early months some notion of self exists."⁷⁸ It is argued that this concept develops from "actions and their outcome in the world. ... immediacy, simultaneity, and regularity of action and outcome produce differentiation and self."⁷⁹ Assisting in this process, "the highly directed energy of the caregiver (touch, smile, look, etc.) is contingent and specific to infant action."⁸⁰ Infants "show positive affects to themselves": at four months they prefer to see mirror images of themselves to seeing motion pictures of other babies.⁸¹ Infants show gender perception preferentially, differentiating female strangers from males; they make child-adult distinctions: a three-year-old does not elicit fear response, an adult does.⁸² The research provides evidence of continuity in early development.⁸³

From infancy to early childhood the prediction is that the child with a secure, effective attachment relationship will later exhibit competent more autonomous functioning in terms of both affective involvement and problem-solving style.⁸⁴

From the following passage by Mussen and Eisenberg-Berg, it appears that early ego development and "secure effective attachment" do serve as a foundation for continuous development until age five.

Strong predispositions to prosocial behavior in nursery and elementary school children are also associated with high ego strength, self-control, and good personal adjustment. Substantial support for this statement is derived from a broad-based, ongoing longitudinal study in which the

personality characteristics of the nursery school participants were assessed by means of their teachers' Q-sort items. Those who were rated high in the characteristics "helpful and cooperative," "concerned with moral issues," and "considerate of other children" also scored high on an index of ego resiliency (ability to recover after stressful experiences) and low in tests of undercontrol (that is, they were *not* lacking in self-control). Adequate personal adjustment and ego strength at the age of four also predicted generosity (sharing and distributing rewards) at the age of five. Those who were generous at five had been described by their nursery school teachers a year earlier as bright, reasonable, generous, cooperative, considerate, playful, reflective, attentive, creative, dependable and responsible, calm, relaxed, and tending to recover readily after stressful experiences. In contrast, children low in generosity at the age of five were judged, at the age of four, as aggressive, unable to delay gratification, active, emotionally labile, restless and fidgety, afraid of being deprived, tending to overreact to frustrations, and⁸⁵ behaving in immature and rattled ways after stress.

The children described as "low in generosity" exemplify Piaget's preoperational egocentric stage in which self concept is not developed. The comparison between these children and those "high in generosity" suggests that development, described by Piaget as a matter of genetic necessity, is also determined by caregiving. The process which he denied as occurring during the first five years - that of ego development - is shown here as significantly established, a predictor of prosocial behavior. If the picture of infants' positive response to self at four months is viewed in adjacence to the picture of maladjustment given above, the exigent need for further investigation of early ego development becomes apparent.

The significance of the early years to age five or six was posited by Sigmund Freud: "neuroses are acquired only in early childhood; the ego ... is feeble, immature and incapable of resistance".⁸⁶ He relates trauma to "early injury to the

ego".⁸⁷

John Bowlby incorporates these Freudian ideas in his theory of early infant-mother attachment.

Near his mother, or at least accessible to her, a child feels secure and has confidence to explore the world and its dangers. ... Studies of this sort raise practical questions. ... As time goes on the best solutions will become clearer. Meanwhile, we are wise to be wary. Any move that separates young children from their mothers needs scrutiny, for we are dealing here with a deep and ancient part of human nature.⁸⁸

In a study of rule violation during a teacher's absence, testing five to seven-year-olds, Siegal and Francis found that "mother identification can importantly account for level of reactive rule violations. The mother, it is suggested, is a source of "ego-strength associated with children's ability to resist others' provocation directed toward breaking rules in the absence of adult authority". Children showing ego-strength reported perceptions of their mothers as "warm, affectionate individuals, who use reasoning as a disciplinary technique".⁸⁹

If the first years are important for ego development, given increased rates of maternal employment and increased multicaregiving experiences in children during the preschool years, it is possible that the role of school instruction at the primary level may be very important in making compensatory provision for positive ego development. Also, the vicissitude of early caregiving experience may influence empirical research results in spite of controls for social class.

Herbert Zimiles, in 'Cognitive - Affective Interaction: A Concept That Exceeds the Researcher's Grasp' writes:

... The huge volume of Piaget-related research ... has contributed little to an understanding of affective

influences on cognition.⁹⁰

... principle features of the self system - the solidity of the self, the sense of self-worth, and its accessibility to the individual - call for the focus of thought on feelings and ideas, which lie at the core of an individual's affective system.⁹¹

Jerome L. Singer relates the following incident in The Child's World of Make-Believe:

A bright 3½-year-old I know came back from his first day at nursery school quite downtrodden ... at the close of the session he had asked the teacher if he was now a lawyer. The teacher said that he was not ... (the child had) overheard his father telling about how he had gone to school and had become a lawyer.

... the child ... attempts to assimilate a snatch of adult conversation into a limited schema of knowledge with the result of a gross distortion of reality, albeit ... a "cute" one.⁹²

Three observations: (1) The child is abstracting and generalizing a principle: if one goes to school, one becomes a lawyer. (2) The child desires to know truth. He is keenly disappointed because he accepted what his father told him as true. The father, by his omission of detail, is the conveyor of the distortion. (3) Having listened to his father, having accurately remembered what his father said, having applied the principle, and having experienced disillusionment, the child is laughed at.

Alan Fogel says:

The child's cognitive processes ... according to Kagan are ... somewhat less versatile, somewhat shorter in attention span, but essentially no different from those of the adult. This concept of sameness facilitates ... the adult's ability to identify with the child ... to empathetically tune in to the child's personal experiences.⁹³

This perception of similarity facilitates communication between child and adult, which Piaget thought unattainable.⁹⁴

Perret-Clermont indicates:

Cox showed that the age at which children make responses which are no longer egocentric on ... (the) three mountain test varies as a function of the experimental procedure. ... Cox obtained better performances ... in the condition where the child had to predict the viewpoint of an adult, rather than a doll.⁹⁵

Again we see the child's need for total functional truth.

Anne B. Smith describes cooperation in early play:

Bower argues that there is evidence of reciprocal play from quite early in infancy. Rubenstein and Howes studied 19 month old toddlers in free play while their mother was present at home. When a peer was present, the toddlers spent an average of 50 per cent of the time engaged in social interaction with the peer - talking, offering or exchanging toys, playing, imitating, or being aggressive. Aggression occurred less than 3 per cent of the time. The repertoire of skills was better elaborated in the content of peer interaction than in the mother's presence, and (the toddlers) showed more high level play.⁹⁶

The fact that the toddlers preferred interaction with the peer to interaction with the mother during the peer's presence indicates that developmentally meaningful exchanges were taking place.

M. Marion summarizes the relationship between age and pro-social behavior as follows:

The relationship becomes positive for children from 4 to 13 (Mussen and Eisenberg-Berg). ... Ruben and Schneider, working with 7 year old boys and girls, ... found that the less egocentric and self-centered child is more willing to share things and cooperate with others. ... It would be a mistake, however, to say that just because a child gets older and reaches new cognitive levels, she or he automatically will become more cooperative. The willingness to rescue another person (may decrease). Madsen has found a similar trend with cooperation. ... Whether one becomes cooperative or helpful depends on a number of other factors.⁹⁷

One such factor according to Marion is the use of induction as a discipline technique.⁹⁸

M.L. Hoffman's research shows that:

31.

... reasoning by the parent, pointing out to children the consequences of their behavior on others, including its effect on the parent, (is) the most important antecedent of internalized moral values and corresponding behavior. Hoffman ... found that parental induction ... (is) associated with positive social behavior among preschool children.⁹⁹

Citing empirical studies, Marion writes: "Nurturant adults, relying on induction, support the development of self-control, positive self-esteem, cooperation, and helpfulness."¹⁰⁰

Jerome Kagan conducted a longitudinal study of personality development in 45 girls and 45 boys from birth to early adolescence to assess "the selective stability of behavior from childhood through early adulthood."¹⁰¹ Passive withdrawal from stress, dependence on family, ease of anger-arousal, involvement in intellectual mastery, and social anxiety were found to be related to behavioral tendencies during the early school years, some to the age three to six period. Sex-role stereotyping influenced results: preschool girls' involvement in achievement tasks successfully predicted concern with intellectual mastery in adulthood. Three-year-olds frequently asked whether objects and activities were masculine or feminine, desiring to give gender-appropriate responses to test questions - indicating ego development not explicitly discussed by Kagan.

Kagan writes that the establishment of relationships with other children is an important feature of development between ages six and ten which:

forces the child to accommodate himself, at least to some degree, to the values and expectations of his peers. In some children, this strengthens tendencies toward dominance, social spontaneity and positive self-evaluation; in others, such as those whose peers reject them, it can lead to

social anxiety, social submission, and a sense of ineffectiveness. Some children in the latter group try to compensate by developing their competence in areas that do not require interaction with other children. Those who are unable to do that continue to anticipate failure when faced with challenges of various sorts.¹⁰²

Kagan's study indicated continuity in development. It clearly points to the need for moral instruction in the first years of school to effect fundamental changes in students' attitude to peers. If the failure described is to be avoided, these attitudinal changes must take place between ages five and seven; by the time the stage of formal operations is reached, the effect of ego injury which has accrued has stabilized.

To recapitulate, medical research regards the infant as showing cooperation and ego development in a continuum of learning. Secure attachment and ego-strength seem to be predictors of prosocial development. Maturation alone does not predict prosocial development; prosocial behavior can decrease with age. Peer rejection in the early years of school can predict generalized failure. It may be hypothesized that this mutually reinforcing rejection and failure are part of a larger syndrome which begins to develop in infancy. It appears that the child is capable of prosocial behavior between the ages of five and seven, and that fostering prosocial development is important at this time, e.g. to influence attitude to peers.

We shall consider, in what follows, whether empirical testing has produced any consistent findings regarding how, and at what age, specific prosocial behaviors develop. Regarding sex differences, Mussen and Eisenberg-Berg provide extensive evidence to support their statement that "investigators have

failed to find any significant sex differences in prosocial orientations or responses".¹⁰³ Lawrence J. Walker in "Sex Differences in the Development of Moral Reasoning: A Critical Review" says "sex differences in moral reasoning apparently are rare early in the life span".¹⁰⁴

Lawrence Kohlberg, following Piaget, has developed a stage theory of moral development. The six moral stages as described by Kohlberg are not definitive; young children commonly show development characteristic of a number of different levels simultaneously. If development is promoted by providing exposure to the level one higher than the child's current level, we must in accordance with Level I² encourage the child to follow rules only when it is in his immediate interest to do so and to let others do the same - when he is already avoiding breaking rules backed by punishment and avoiding physical damage to persons and property at Level I¹.¹⁰⁵ Is much to be gained? More important, if Kohlberg's advice is followed, the instructor must change his instruction as the child progresses, and so provide a continuum of inconsistency.

The work of Kohlberg and his collaborators is highly contrived; as they conduct research, and as external criticism is advanced, they revise details, instead of making the needed general revision. The persuasive appeal of their presentations casts doubt on integrity. Galbraith and Jones in Moral Reasoning: A Teaching Handbook For Adapting Kohlberg To The Classroom indicate that Kohlberg dilemmas give students these opportunities:

- a. To consider genuine moral problems.

- b. To experience genuine social and cognitive conflict during a discussion of a moral problem.
- c. To confront their own inconsistencies in reasoning over a variety of moral issues without someone stressing a right or wrong answer.¹⁰⁶

What is meant by "genuine" in a. and b. above? Prima facie, genuine moral problems are those the students are dealing with in their personal lives. In b., is the purpose of discussion to stimulate social and cognitive conflict among peers, instead of to promote moral learning? Only in that case is "genuine" used meaningfully. Regarding c., students of all ages confront their own inconsistencies in reasoning continually. What purpose can this serve unless a teacher who is mature in knowledge and experience guides students to establish right and wrong according to universalizable moral principles?

The fact that there is much empirical evidence to support Kohlberg's theory that level of cognitive development is a necessary though not sufficient precondition for the achievement of a parallel stage of moral development¹⁰⁷ is readily understandable since Kohlbergian instruction emphasizes cognitive development through verbal discussion. Since the subject of discussion is justice as formally defined by Kohlberg, development is labelled "moral". Whether concern for the welfare of their peers, demonstrated in behavior, becomes operative in students is not established.

There are ... some major differences in children's thinking about these two domains (prosocial dilemmas and dilemmas involving constraints - laws, rules, obligations). ... Thus in dealing with Kohlberg dilemmas, children of ten or younger resorted principally to Stage 1 reasoning, oriented toward authority and punishment¹⁰⁸, but this kind of explanation was scarcely apparent among even the seven year old subjects solving prosocial dilemmas ... empathy played a more significant

role in making judgments about prosocial issues.¹⁰⁹ 35.
These findings lead Eisenberg to conclude that, in general,
young children's conceptions and moral judgments regarding
prosocial issues are more advanced than their judgments
about moral constraints.¹¹⁰

It is just here that the present exploration has relevance.
The effects of a positive approach to early moral development
are investigated.

Mussen and Eisenberg indicate:

given the data on age changes in moral reasoning, we might
predict that altruism and sharing among nursery school
children are likely to be motivated by expectations of
reward or social approval or adherence to stereotypical
notions of "good" and "bad".¹¹¹

It is the observation of the writer that between the ages five
and seven reasoning is effective in influencing cognition and
behavior so that children's 'prosocial behavior' is motivated
by moral principles without external reinforcement.

Margaret Donaldson in Children's Minds describes how minor
modification of task-related Piagetian questions facilitates
children's understanding of those questions so that, at ages
three to four, their ability to decenter, to test hypotheses,
and to make deductive inferences can be observed in testing.¹¹²

Finding methods of assessment appropriate to children's
verbal understanding has helped to bring consensus to studies
during the '80s. Strayer has found that children (mean age 59
months) "sought to justify their evaluations by the actor's
motive as well as by outcome" in a study of perspective-taking
skills.¹¹³ Nelson reported that three year old children "use
motive information for making judgments when this information
is explicit, salient, and avoidable."¹¹⁴ Smetana found pre-
school children to evaluate all moral transgressions

as more serious and more deserving of punishment than all conventional transgressions."¹¹⁵ Tisak and Turiel have learned that for young children "a violation of a rule involving physical harm to others was always more wrong than a violation of a rule involving property loss".¹¹⁶ Sophian and Huber studied causal judgement in three and five-year-olds. They found reasoning in five-year-olds to be more logical, involving "greater reliance on abstract causal principles that enable children to interpret even unfamiliar events".¹¹⁷ The child by age five, apparently, engages in abstract reasoning.

Dickstein explores early moral development in the context of research studies, in Biological and Cognitive Bases of Moral Functioning. Having cited induction as a parenting technique which fosters development of role-taking skills and consideration of others, she writes:

There is now evidence that role-taking skills exist as early as 2.5 years, and undergo great improvement during the age range of 3.5 - 5 years. ... There is evidence for the existence of genuinely flexible empathy in very young children. ... Studies have demonstrated the influence of role-taking on moral judgement. Other studies have provided empirical support for the existence of an important relationship between role-taking skill and moral behavior. ... (These studies have) challenged Piaget's timetable.¹¹⁸

Hoffman writes "rudiments of role-taking competence may be present in some children by age 2 years or earlier, although performance varies with setting and cognitive task complexity."¹¹⁹

Damon writes:

Associated with activities like sharing, taking turns, helping, etc., concerns of positive justice have been observed to be central to the social and moral behavior of children as young as 2 or 3. Such concerns seem to arise out of day to day interpersonal contacts of the

young child ... children who were diagnosed at a nonmoral level (stage 0) by Kohlberg's measures nevertheless showed consistent patterned reasoning about positive justice.¹²⁰

With regard to reasoning in preschool children, Jensen and Hafen found that five-year-olds picked up concepts more readily in a discussion group than four-year-olds.¹²¹ Eisenberg-Berg and Neal indicate:

labelling of others' needs when those conflict with one's own needs intercorrelates with and loads on the same factor as empathetic, sympathetic moral reasoning, and is unrelated to, or negatively correlated with Kohlberg's stage 2 hedonistic reasoning. Furthermore, preschoolers' needs-oriented reasoning has been correlated with a naturalistic measure of sharing in the preschool class.¹²²

It appears that a negative relationship between need for approval or self-concern and prosocial behavior exists.¹²³

Finally, Wellman and Somerville have shown that:

by 5 years most children understand an array of moral criteria ... If anything the data provide an underestimation of young children's developing knowledge. ... In their explanations children spontaneously mentioned further criteria, including sacrifice, remorse or lack of it, restitution, and deception.¹²⁴

It may be hypothesized that the development of positive self concept during the first years of infant-maternal interaction results in ego-strength, to provide the base needed for prosocial development during the preschool years. It appears that children by age five possess a variety of moral criteria and that they are beginning to give priority to certain of these in making judgements.

ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The young child is impressionable and vulnerable. Teachers and researchers shape attitudes through interaction whether

explicit or implicit. It is important to evaluate goals and means taken to achieve them according to ethical standards. Is prosocial behavior elicited at the expense of the child at times?

To a child of six, the violation of a rule involving physical harm to others is always more wrong than the violation of a rule involving property loss (e.g. theft). Children eight to ten judge violations of both as equally wrong.¹²⁵ We see the sensitivity of the child as he predominantly values the human being, then as property acquires equal value in his mind. Is the question comparing harm to a person and theft, in a forced-choice situation, appropriately addressed to children who have not, and will not, receive instruction from the experimenter in the matter of the value of human life?

Is it right to provide (1) praise/rebuke and (2) pennies to purchase a prize to elicit help-giving and then to ask a seven-year-old why he gave help without supplying any moral guidance? Children in this situation predominantly remembered the material consequences of their help-giving.¹²⁶

Subjecting children to modelling procedures during which they learn to imitate prosocial responses exhibited by a model attractive to them should be questioned on ethical grounds. The tendency to imitate an attractive model may be generalized to result in the imitation of undesirable behaviors. An appeal based on glamour is not likely to result in more than superficial learning.

In a study of 'Egocentrism, Empathy, and Altruistic Behavior in Young Children', Buckley, Siegal and Ness indicate

children who exhibited altruistic behavior had significantly higher scores on the measures of perspective-taking and empathy than children who did not display altruistic behavior. ... There appears to be a significant cognitive component in altruistic behavior.¹²⁷

In this study egocentrism was assessed by means of a perspective-taking test involving material displays in various placements; altruistic behavior was assessed on the basis of children's helping another child pick up pegs and sharing a cookie.¹²⁸

Can egocentrism be meaningfully tested by a visual perspective-taking task, or altruism by sharing and helping in children? Reasons for the sharing and helping behavior were not determined in this study. Unless terms are carefully defined and unless the effects of procedures on children are carefully considered, we cannot expect to learn about development through empirical study; we can only confuse our subjects and ourselves.

With regard to the current interest in altruism and empathy, is it thought they may be elicited to endure in young children in a materialistic society - before the children have developed a moral value system? Research has placed emphasis on overt prosocial behaviors, frequently indiscriminately classifying them as moral, e.g. observing children sharing cookies and labelling this as altruism, instead of focussing on the examination of native ability to determine when and how the child becomes capable of moral learning.

Nancy Eisenberg-Berg shows awareness of these issues. In "Children's Moral Reasoning About Their Own Prosocial Behavior" she observes:

... the labelling of others' needs when those needs conflict with one's own needs intercorrelates with and loads on the same factor as empathetic, sympathetic moral reasoning, and is unrelated to or negatively correlated with Kohlberg's stage 2 hedonistic reasoning ... empathetic concern was often conveyed to the experimenter via the child's nonverbal behavior and tone of voice.¹²⁹

Michael Siegal in Fairness in Children exemplifies the comprehensiveness of approach vital to the study of moral development:

1. A picture of fairness as a rational attribute in children is incomplete without an examination of the ... context of the family.
2. This context is associated with the nature of the affective-conative strivings underlying identification.¹³⁰

Objectives and strategies must be weighed ethically with precision if exploration involving the moral development of young children is, in the final analysis, to help instead of hurt. To begin, a clear distinction needs to be drawn between prosocial behavior and moral development by empirical research.

Kieran Egan cautions in Education and Psychology: Plato, Piaget, and Scientific Psychology that:

"What seems foolhardy at present is the borrowing of insecure psychological theories ... permitting them to usurp the proper place of educational theory, and allowing their insecure claims to serve as constraints on educational practice."¹³¹

It has been shown that empirical research is producing findings which contradict fundamental tenets in Piagetian theory. There is confusion, however, in psychological studies as to what constitutes morality; content validity must be questioned - and, in many cases, denied. Augusto Blasi suggests, referring to this state of affairs:

"Perhaps avoidance rather than neglect, or even deeper incapacities are operating here. ... Integrity and its

failure cannot be studied without taking seriously 41.
into account the self and related constructs ... (this)
requires a substantial shift in emphasis and a careful
rethinking of concepts and relations."132

CHAPTER 3

THE STUDY METHOD

A brief introduction to the present method of investigation has been provided in RATIONALE, pp. 1-2. One clarification, in addition, must be made. This study holds the naturalistic assumption that: "intrinsic orders exist ... and that these regularities will organize and drive events even though our theories take no notice of them."¹³³ Further reference to this statement will be made in Chapter 5.

Naturalistic measures:

- a) do not require the cooperation of the subject,
- b) do not permit the subject's awareness that he is being measured or treated in any special way, and
- c) do not change the phenomenon being measured.¹³⁴

Guba however asserts that:

"Naturalistic study is always a matter of degree."¹³⁵
 "The naturalistic inquirer makes every effort to understand context instead of screening it out so that he can assess its meaning for and impact on the elements being studied."¹³⁶
 The natural investigator "is concerned with description and understanding".¹³⁷

Since this latter characterization in particular applies to the present study, which was conducted in a naturalistic kindergarten setting, and since reasoning and rules were used only in naturally-occurring contexts requiring such exercise, the term 'naturalistic' has relevance to the study as a whole.

In Appendix A, THE PROPOSED STUDY OUTLINE, the study is shown as originally conceived, described in quasi-experimental terms. Rules were used in Group 1, the 'control group', in accordance with the following rationale. What is novel in this study is the notion of engaging in morally principled reasoning

with 4 to 5 year old children. If it is to be shown that this reasoning is especially conducive to moral development, comparisons must be drawn between developments in children who have experienced the instructive reasoning, and those who have not. Non-intervention in a classroom with children of this age would be not only unpractical, but also unethical since some children are apt to inflict cruelty on their peers and since non-intervention itself holds implicit messages. The control group, then, must receive instruction of a different kind. Rule-oriented instruction was selected since it is probably the most commonly used method of maintaining discipline and/or providing moral instruction among parents and teachers. Further, it was considered of independent importance that the effect of rules on the thinking and behavior of children of this age be studied.

In work with the children, the teacher perceived the value of:

'slice-of-life' episodes documented through natural language and representing as closely as possible how people feel, what they know, how they know it, and what their concerns, beliefs, perceptions and understandings are." 138

This is naturalistic inquiry. Test questions were administered (testing is not uncommon in classrooms); however, increased emphasis was given to observation as described above.

In this Chapter an outline of the components of the study is presented under THE METHOD; instructional strategy is described in THE INSTRUCTION: BOTH GROUPS/GROUP 1/GROUP 2.

Participants: Ten children of middle class socioeconomic status who volunteered to participate in an "instructional play program", which was brought to their attention by means of a posting on a North Vancouver library, were recruited during the early summer. The age criterion applied was eligibility to enter kindergarten that year.

Age: The average age of participants in Group 1 was 4.10; in Group 2, 5.1.

Mental Ability: All participants were able to express their ideas clearly verbally, as indicated by their responses to a set of questions (p.57,p.105). The ten students showed similarity in their responses; initially no difference in mental ability between the two groups was detected.

Group Formation: To avoid bias, the five students who first applied to enter the program were assigned to Group 1; the last five to Group 2. The difference in sex ratio which resulted is explained by the fact that one boy in Group 1 had to be excluded due to age ineligibility. He was replaced by the one additional girl who applied to enter the program.

Sex Ratio: One boy participated in Group 1; 3 boys in Group 2. It might have been hypothesized that this difference would result in greater inclination to academic achievement in Group 1; however the difference in sex ratio produced no noticeable effects.

Setting: All sessions were conducted in a large room approximating a kindergarten setting. Work projects were completed at tables; otherwise participants were free to utilize space.

Recording Procedure: All 22 sessions were recorded on tape. Three microphones were suspended at each of 3 activity centers to maximize coverage of verbal behavior.

Duration: Each of the two groups met for a two hour period twice each week for 5½ consecutive weeks i.e. each group met for eleven sessions.

Instruction: The instructional style of the researcher was the same for both groups. The researcher gave individual help to students during their project work, showed moral consideration of students, e.g. responded to their initiation of communication, and was generally supportive and encouraging. However when morally required, the teacher provided rule-sanctions to students in Group 1, and elicited student reasoning in Group 2. The two groups received the same lessons and did the same project work,

outlined in Appendix D. Since the study began one week later than anticipated to accommodate student holiday schedules, the activity outlined for the first two weeks was combined during the first week.

Assessment: 1. Test Questions: Three test questions (pp. 57-60, pp. 105-7) were administered to all students in both groups at the onset of the study to indicate to the researcher the nature of students' thinking about moral matters prior to receiving instruction and to indicate whether any student had difficulty understanding and/or answering the questions so that major differences in mental ability which would hold implications for comparison of behavior in the two groups could be detected. The same set of test questions was administered at the end of the study to determine whether changes in thinking had occurred on individual and/or group levels as a result of the instruction. Fourth and fifth questions were introduced in the final interview session: the time period between interviews was only 5½ weeks; this gave students an opportunity to respond to new (unrehearsed) issues. 2. Ratings: Two raters evaluated: a. 10 ten-minute segments of tape, to determine whether rule or reason-oriented moral instruction was being given by the instructor; b. 10 ten-minute segments of tape, to rate student behavior on a scale of 1 to 7 in the following categories: I-orientation, other-orientation, competitiveness, echoing behavior, and moral behavior. 3. Student Projects: One set of projects completed by the students was retained for inclusion in this presentation to illustrate the similarity in general task ability which the students revealed and to indicate their ability to work profitably without the use of pre-printed materials. 4. Researcher Absence: The researcher absented herself from the classes in a separate room for an 8 minute period during each session while students had their snacks. The behavior of students during her absence was recorded as an indicator of the integrity of the development she observed during her presence with the students. 5. Audiotapes: Assessment was preponderately based on the auditioning of tapes by the researcher to ascertain developments on individual and group levels in the categories listed in 2b. above. Anecdotal evidence of development was gathered by transcribing the sessions, including details of tone of voice, in random order and then reading the transcripts in sequence.

DEFINITIONS

Group I: Students 1 ... 5: Rule-oriented instruction.

Group II: Students 6 ... 10: Reason-oriented instruction.

- I-orientation: Self-centered statements, usually beginning with "I".
- Other-orientation: Statements referring to others ("We ...", "You ...") or indicating observation without reference to self.
- Echoing: The immediate repeating of the response of one student by other members of the group.
- Competitiveness: Verbal attempts to establish personal superiority, with reference to ability and/or possessions, at the expense of others e.g. "You don't even have a two-wheeler; I do."
- Moral behavior: Behavior extended to peers which shows fairness, truth-telling, consideration of others' interests or application of rules (see Appendix B).

THE INSTRUCTION: BOTH GROUPS

Moral Treatment

Objective: To extend moral treatment to students in both groups; to show consistency between behavior and instruction.

Method: The researcher behaved, in working with students, in accordance with principles of: i) fairness: equal treatment was extended to students insofar as was appropriate e.g. certain students required more assistance with their project work than others. The researcher gave students, on a group basis, equal opportunity to ask questions and to express ideas, e.g. if any student did not speak during the opening sharing period, the researcher asked the student if (s)he wanted to do so. Initially in the study, to decide which student was to be first in activity requiring the taking of turns, the child's game Eenie Meenie Minie Mo was played. Word

substitution was applied: "Catch somebody by the toe". If any student repeatedly failed to come out first in accordance with this decision-making by chance, the researcher said "Let's give ___ the first turn; (s)he has not had a first turn yet," thereby illustrating the principle of fairness. ii) freedom: Where possible, the researcher encouraged students to exercise decision-making e.g. whether to go to the park or not, which illustration to complete for a mural. The researcher did not give the students a set of rules to be complied with at the onset of the study; only when their exercise of freedom interfered with the freedom of others was restriction applied, e.g. students were allowed to use the entire floorspace unless a particular space had been selected for work use by a student. The researcher planned class activity in accordance with the tenet that moral significance attaches to making provision for freedom to exercise abilities creatively as well as constructively. iii) truth-telling: This principle was observed by the researcher in answering questions posed by students. It was held that though it may be in the interest of the child that not all details be supplied in response to certain questions, what is said must be truthful. If a student should learn that a teacher whom (s)he has come to trust has lied, damage could result e.g. the student might find it difficult to trust other teachers or the student might have to accommodate this knowledge by redefining truth-telling as unimportant. iv) consideration of interests: The researcher was sensitive to the individual needs of students: needs to communicate, needs for approval, etc. The ability to extend consideration in a

nonpreferential manner regardless of the personal characteristics of students rested on the awareness that each student has genetic characteristics and a home environment not of his choosing, but which influence his behavior.

The researcher sought to influence student behavior, by means of rules or reasoning, toward moral orientation; however the researcher was not hasty to eliminate certain outward behaviors which suggested the existence of deeper problems, so that understanding of the problems could be gained and the roots of the problems could be dealt with. Examples of these problems were exaggerated snobbery and obsessive talking. Failure to perceive individual needs and interests coupled with imposition on students of a new set of prescribed behaviors may invite antagonism instead of cooperation.

Another major characteristic of the instruction: When an offense was committed, focus of class attention was diverted by the researcher from the offender to the offense by means of referring to relevant rules or reasoning in a universal context. The researcher typically addressed the class after an offense was committed as follows: "What's a good rule to remember when you bump into someone, even if it was an accident?" (Response: "Say you're sorry.") or "What do you think you should do if you bump into someone else, even if it was an accident?" (Response: "Say you're sorry.") "Why?" (Response: class discussion.) This was done so that the offender need not be needlessly embarrassed in the presence of his peers and so that his mental energy might be invested in considering moral solutions instead of in disliking himself.

The researcher avoided labelling students as 'good' or 'bad' according to their behavior. In the case of applying 'good' the student may develop a sense of personal pride which operates independently, and may conflict with moral orientation. This type of pride can distort perspective e.g. 'I do this because I am a good boy' instead of 'I do this because it is important to help others'. Referring to students as "bad" may foster peer rejection so that fellow students are not inclined to extend helpful behavior motivated by consideration to the offender. The expectation effect may become operative with added deleterious consequences in the negative application: the 'bad boy', developing a negative self-concept, may come to behave consistently in accordance with that negative conception. To draw attention to a wrong action and to discuss why it is wrong is different from describing the offender as "bad"; it does not intensify self-rejection in the offender. In addition to imposing psychological and moral consequences on the child, the 'good/bad child' orientation illegitimately generalizes from action to actor, where the behavior under consideration is that of a young child who is just beginning to learn to make moral distinctions and to behave in accordance with them.

Project Tasks

Objectives: 1) To promote learning, interest in learning, and a sense of accomplishment in students and ii) to learn whether task accomplishment would observably influence specific types of ego development and, if so, whether that development would influence moral behavior. The original conception was: where parents have not made provision for development of positive

self-concept, the primary teacher, by communicating confidence^{50.} in the student's ability to succeed in task-related activity to the student, and by devising tasks to promote a sense of achievement, may facilitate compensatory ego development, to establish a base for moral development and for learning in general.

Method: Projects were planned to illustrate to students that even everyday phenomena such as rain become fascinating when examined; learning opens new vistas to the mind. By means of the projects, concepts in math, physics, geography, history, social studies, natural science, law, and health care were discussed with the students. Instead of teaching a predetermined number of facts or items in each lesson, concepts were elaborated in detail according to the interest and comprehension of the students.

At the end of each lesson period students drew project illustrations by referring to a chalkboard model, a process requiring intense concentration and perseverance as well as visual perception of linear relationship and coordination between eye and hand. The researcher praised small gains in skill at the onset of the study; as students developed the competencies demanded by this exercise, encouragement was given less frequently to students. When students completed their illustrations, they were invited to explain them to the researcher as a review of learning. At the end of the study the students compiled their illustrations; each made his own project book for future reference. Extra blank sheets were included in the books so students might illustrate projects of their devising after the program ended. It was anticipated that meeting the

challenges this work involved and making books which contained exclusively their own work would be highly gratifying experiences for the students.

Midpoint Observation

Objective: To give students in both groups an opportunity to exercise empathetic reasoning.

Method: The Carrot Seed, a recording for children in which the speech of the actors holds moral significance, was played for students in both groups in Session 5. The researcher asked the students to describe their empathetic responses to the plight of the main character. An attempt was made to elicit empathy in both groups, to gain knowledge of the effect of the instruction to that midpoint in the program.

Time and Frequency

Objective: To teach moral thinking and behavior in the directly functional context of interpersonal interaction.

Method: Time: Instead of scheduling a class period for moral learning, the researcher provided moral instruction in naturally occurring situations which required it, i.e. when a student violated a rule or principle and thereby infringed on the rights and/or well-being of another student. Intervention occurred when students pushed one another to obtain an item first, when one student intrusively attempted to do project work for another student, when students monopolized use of time with excessive talking. Further exemplification is provided in Chapter 4.

Frequency: The researcher did not intervene with instruction on all occurrences of student failure to behave in morally

appropriate ways. To have done so during this initial period of instruction would have been to set an unattainable standard for performance, to discourage students from learning. Instruction was given in the situations most requiring it: those in which the student'(s) freedom to engage in the various forms of learning which were represented was jeopardized. There were 18 instances of intervention in Group 1, 12 instances in Group 2. The amount of time spent giving verbal rule instruction was, in aggregation, approximately 25 minutes; in eliciting reasoning, approximately 45 minutes. This difference is explained by the fact that though the researcher gave students in both groups the opportunity to respond to instructional statements, responses when given in Group 1 were brief; responses in Group 2 called for continuation of discussions.

Rewards/Punishment

Objective: To study the effect of rules and reasoning as facilitators of moral development without the use of extrinsic, material rewards in a non-punitive context.

Method: Since it is held that moral learning has intrinsic worth, the researcher did not use material rewards to promote the display of moral behavior. It is suggested that the use of material reward is inappropriate to the study of moral development due to its ability to confuse children in the matter of material versus non-material values and due to its confounding effect on the interpretation of results. Discretion was applied in the giving of praise in response to morally desirable student behavior so that the possibility of praise operating as an extrinsic reward was precluded: praise was given as outlined

above 4 times in Group 1; 4 times in Group 2, in distribution.

One instructional aim was to provide encouragement toward morally desirable attitudes and behaviors rather than discouragement from undersirable attitudes and behaviors. If punishment had been required, it would have been applied in the form of denial of a privilege associated with showing moral responsibility after the offender had 1) received instruction at the class level and, continuing to commit the same offense, had 2) received personal counselling, persisting in the same offense thereafter.

THE INSTRUCTION: GROUP 1

The instruction for this group made use of the rules listed in Appendix B, as predominantly required in actual behavioral contexts during the sessions. The instruction was given in a non-authoritarian manner as communicated by tone of voice (to be described in Chapter 4).

The rule-based instruction was presented sequentially as follows:

1. Direct application with use of the term "rule" e.g. "Use decent language; that's an important rule".
2. Direct application without use of the term "rule" e.g. "Don't interrupt others".
3. Indirect application: rule implicit e.g. "You had better let C have a turn".
4. Rule elicitation e.g. "Can you think of a rule to remember so that you can ...?"
5. Rule evaluation e.g. a. "Is 'help others' a good rule?"
b. "Is 'help others' a good rule? ... Why?"

One important distinction must be drawn. It might be suggested that in 5b. moral reasoning was being elicited. Though the adult, in response to this question, may focus thought

on the content of the rule i.e. what it purports, the young child may focus thought on 'rule' as a constraint on behavior.

The instructional strategy outlined above was not elaborated prior to the conducting of the study, but rather during the study when the ineffectiveness of 1. to 3., above, became apparent, as described in Chapter 4.

The researcher gave one order which was unrelated to moral behavior.

THE INSTRUCTION: GROUP 2

The direct elicitation of inductive reasoning proceeded as follows:

- i. Researcher: "Do you think it's important to (X: moral behavior)?"
- ii. Students: "Yes."
- iii. Researcher: "Why is (X) important?"
- iv. Students: (Y: specific reasons.)
- v. Researcher: "Why is (Y) important?"
- vi. Students: Statement containing (Z: moral principle).

It may be noted that an abstract discussion is outlined. In addition, the researcher frequently negotiated reasoning on the basis of personal response, from: "How would you feel if X happened?" to: "What can be said in general of the occurrence of X?" to the conclusion that Z is important. This was done to give students freedom to discuss their feelings as opposed to concealing them, to teach them that to experience feelings is legitimate, and to teach them to channel their feelings in accordance with reason ("The purpose of thinking is to arrange the world so that our emotions can be applied in a valuable manner")¹³⁹.

To elicit reasoning, the researcher posed 'why's', pro-

longing the process involving i. to vi. above sufficiently to promote student learning (as indicated by their verbal responses) but with caution to avoid instigating student boredom.

The researcher upon receiving a number of responses to a given question generally: a. acknowledged the responses with "That's right", then b. selected one response for further probing, and/or c. added detail or proposed an additional consideration for further probing, to direct thought to moral principles.

On five occasions the researcher provided admonishment, indirectly encouraging reasoning, e.g.: "When we're talking, let's consider others -- they might want to talk too."

On one occasion the researcher issued an order unrelated to moral behavior.

On no occasion in Group 2 did the researcher use the term 'rule'; on no occasion in Group 1 did the researcher attempt to elicit reasoning without explicit use of the term 'rule'.

This discussion of the method of instruction concludes with the provision of two additional details. First, quantitative assessment is largely precluded by the following: study involving a small number of students, the substantive and exploratory nature of this study, and the theory of instruction as elaborated to this point. According to the method which has been outlined, the number of times moral instruction is provided and the duration of each instance of instruction must vary according to the aptitude of participating students.

Secondly, in the following chapters student responses presented descriptively. Since so little is known about early moral learning, it is held that stage classification involves drawing arbitrary distinctions. Instead of being given designation in accordance with any stage theory, then, student responses will be referred to as moral or nonmoral. The ascription of immorality to a four or five-year-old student who lacks a thorough understanding of what constitutes morality is considered unjustifiable, though the consequences of immoral actions per se will be discussed in the forthcoming chapters.

CHAPTER 4

THE OBSERVATIONAL DATA

In this chapter discrete data in the form of statements made by students are provided to describe the behavior of students at the onset of instruction, the responses of students to specific items of instruction, attitudinal development in individual students, and developments in group behavior. To conclude, independent ratings of the behavior of the students in the two groups are indicated.

INITIAL STUDENT BEHAVIOR

INTERVIEWS were conducted with students during the first session in both groups so that general knowledge of the nature of the students' thinking regarding moral questions, and of the students' ability to understand and answer questions might be gained. The interviews were conducted privately with each student. Tape recording of the activity of the remaining students in another room gave evidence that those students did not discuss the test questions among themselves.

Test Question I: Consideration of Interests

Imagine you are at a picnic with other boys and girls. Each child is supposed to bring (her/his) own lunch. Your mother made your favorite sandwiches for you and you are hungry. What would you do if you saw that one (boy/girl) forgot to bring (his/her) lunch and had nothing to eat ... would you share your lunch? Why (not)?

Student 1: Yes. It would be rude if the other one didn't have its lunch.

Student 2: Yeah. Because otherwise she would go hungry.

- Student 3: Yes. Because she doesn't have any lunch.
- Student 4: Yes. I don't know (why).
- Researcher: If you think about it, why would you share your lunch?
- Student 4: He doesn't have anything to eat.
- Student 5: Yes. Because I'd be friendly.
- Student 6: Yes. Otherwise he wouldn't have any lunch.
- Student 7: Two of my sandwiches if I had four - so she wouldn't be so hungry.
- Student 8: Yes. Because she forgot her lunch. I'd want to be friendly.
- Student 9: Yes. Because he has no sandwiches.
- Student 10: Yes. Because he'd be hungry.

Observations: All children gave moral responses showing consideration of interest. In addition, student 1 implicitly applied the moral sanction against rudeness to support her response. Student 7 showed observation of equality.

Test Question II: Truth-telling and Intention

You and your friend are playing with a ball close to the house next door. Your friend throws the ball too hard and it breaks a window in the next house. No other person has seen what has happened - only you and your friend. When you and your friend go to your place, your mother asks why you look so unhappy.

a. What would you tell her? b. Should anyone be punished? Why? c. What if your friend broke the window by accident?

- Student 1:
- That he broke the window.
 - They would have to go to their room. The children should get a spanking because it's rude to crash the window.
 - The children are to blame because they weren't looking what they were doing.
- Student 2:
- Because we broke a window.
 - I don't know ... probably my mother would tell me to stay in the house.
 - A person shouldn't really be punished, but

sometimes. My mom would punish me. That would be alright. If I did it on purpose, she should punish me.

- Student 3:
- a. Kate threw the ball and it broke a window.
 - b. No. It was an accident. My mother would say "Kate come here. I want to talk to you. Why did you throw the ball so hard?"
 - c. If she did it on purpose, she should get a jail punishment.
- Student 4:
- a. That my friend broke the window.
 - b. My mother would tell her to buy a window. What is a punishment? (Explanation provided.) Yes, she should be punished.
 - c. No.
- Student 5:
- a. I'd say I'm sorry.
 - b. No. If she did it on purpose, yes.
 - c. No.
- Student 6:
- a. I'd tell her what I did.
 - b. Yes. He's got to pay for it for me. If he had lots of money and I just had a few dollars, he should pay for it ... do you know why? Then I wouldn't have any money.
 - c. If it was an accident, he shouldn't be punished.
- Student 7:
- a. Because I broke the window ... my friend broke the window.
 - b. No. My mother would say "sorry that I broke your window" to the person that got his window broken - that's what she would say to the person who did it. If my friend broke the window on purpose, she should be punished.
 - c. No.
- Student 8:
- a. That my friend broke the window.
 - b. Yes. My mother would ask the girl to buy another window if she had enough money.
 - c. If it was an accident, she shouldn't be punished.
- Student 9:
- a. Because I hit the window ... because my friend hit the window.
 - b. Yes. He should get a spanking.
 - c. He shouldn't be punished.
- Student 10:
- a. My friend threw the ball too hard and it broke the window.
 - b. What does "punished" mean? (Explanation provided.) If he did it on purpose yes.
 - c. If it was an accident, no.

Observations: Though some students had difficulty remembering the question accurately i.e. that a friend broke the window, all students in both groups verbally indicated truth-telling. Student 1 again referred to rudeness as a negative sanction. She indicated that the offender should be punished even if the offense was accidental, however she supported her opinion. The children all indicated that an intentional offense should be punished; an accidental offense should not. All children provided realistic suggestions for expiation or punishment, with the exception of Student 3, who suggested "a jail punishment". The children showed understanding of motive: accident versus intention, and generally proposed relevant consequences.

Test Question III: Consideration of Interests/Truth-telling

At the park do you get off the swing to give another boy or girl a turn if all the other swings are taken? Why? (The investigator will observe whether or not the child answers this question truthfully.)

- Student 1: Yes. Because they really want it. Because they need things too. Because I thought about it.
- Student 2: Yes. Because it's not fair not to give them a turn.
- Student 3: Yes. Cause she wouldn't have a swing (otherwise).
- Student 4: Yes. Because he didn't have a swing.
- Student 5: Yes. She would want to have a turn too.
- Student 6: Yes. Or else he wouldn't come back another day when the place was crowded.
- Student 7: (Pause.) Yes. Because so I could go on something else.
- Student 8: Yes. So she'd be my friend.
- Student 9: Yes. Because he wants to use one.
- Student 10: Yes. Because she didn't have a turn yet.

Observations: All students in Group 1 verbally indicated consideration of interests. Student 2 based her response on the principle of fairness. In Group 2, student 9 and student 8 gave self-oriented responses.

Regarding truth-telling in both groups, no incidents of sharing without prompting were witnessed on the playground during the first two weeks of the study.

When the researcher probed for further detail in the first question all of the students indicated they did not have anything to add to their responses. They appeared unwilling to give additional thought to the questions after providing, according to their own estimation, adequate answers.

Student responses to the three questions were, in general, very similar. No students explicitly based their decisions on rules. All students verbally indicated consideration of others' interests. It was interesting to note that when students applied sanctions, they appeared in negative form: "it's rude to", "it's not fair not to". The only differences between the groups which might be cited were that students in Group 2 had slightly more difficulty remembering questions accurately, or did not listen to the questions as attentively as did students in Group 1, and that several students in Group 2 showed some measure of self-orientation in responding to the third question. These differences, if considered significant, point to Group 1 as slightly advanced in terms of instructional purposes at the onset of the study.

CLASSROOM BEHAVIOR is related on the basis of detailed transcribing of tape recordings of students' verbal behavior which included information relayed by tone of voice. The behavior of students in both groups suggested the following categorization, which is elaborated by means of representative data from the first instructional session.

I-oriented behavior: Almost all statements made by students in the two groups indicated I-orientation, e.g. "I can touch a speaker", "My family has all of those books". All students provided running commentaries of their activity as they worked: "That's not right, there now I got it, now I have to draw this line ...".

Other-oriented behavior: Very few instances of other-oriented behavior were recorded. One student in Group 1 tattled, and criticized another student repeatedly. Personal needs rather than a desire to help the other student may have been at the base of this behavior to be discussed under INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT. One student in Group 2 made a comment about a friend. There was no substantial evidence, then, of other-orientation with the exception of instances given under Moral behavior.

Echoing behavior: In Group 1, five instances of echoing behavior were recorded; in Group 2 there were 6, e.g., all students echoed the imaginative statement: "It's snowing, it's snowing!".

Unrelated statements: There was one occurrence in each group of a statement totally unrelated to the general topic of discussion.

Competitive behavior: There were four instances of other-demeaning competitive behavior in Group 1, six instances in Group 2, e.g., when one student was pleased about having given a correct answer in response to a question put forward by the researcher, another student said (falsely), "I said it first". In addition almost all I-statements' made, exclusive of the 'running commentaries', were responded to with a full compliment of I-oriented statements which expressed, increasingly, the superiority of the speakers, e.g., "I can jump a yard": "I can jump two yards", ... "I can jump a mile".

Moral behavior: In Group 1, one student offered to share items twice, and another student commented: "My little sister is always unkind to me, but I am never unkind to her". In Group 2, one student gave a peer a helpful suggestion regarding project work.

Researcher absence: In Group 1 the following exchange was recorded:

Initiator: "Mush up your drink!"

Response: "No! You mush your head up!"

Initiator: "Mush your leg."

Response. "Split your own leg open!"

In Group 2, high-pitched competition over who had finished his snack first occurred:

Originator: "I'm the first one to finish - you're alone eating."

Response: "I am not!"

Originator: "You are so!"

Response: "I'm the first one!"

In this situation the student accused of being the last to finish his lunch resorted to falsehood to defend himself. Consistently the students in both groups revealed highly egocentric behavior, and showed very little moral concern for their peers.

With regard to group dynamics, the two classes were well matched. At the onset of the study each group contained: one student who was extremely aggressive in attempts to prove personal superiority over the other students, and who spoke almost constantly (see INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT); one student who spoke very little; one student advanced in mental age e.g. was able to read; and, as was to be learned, one student who was very frequently absent from sessions.

An independent rater indicated behaviors in both groups as high in I-orientation and competitiveness; low in other-orientation and moral orientation at the onset of the study.

RESPONSE TO INSTRUCTION

In this section the instruction which was provided and the responses of students to the instruction are outlined under the following headings: Project Tasks, Rules, and Reasoning.

Project Tasks

During the lesson which preceded project work, the researcher explained the subject matter in detail for the students in both groups e.g., that very tiny particles of water, smaller than drops which we can see, gather around dust particles, and that as they grow larger and heavier, they fall as rain — the drops we see. The researcher paused frequently to ask questions to insure that the students were listening, and were understand-

ing the instruction.

Initially the students in both groups were reluctant to attempt to do the project work. The assignments involved printing words and drawing illustrations of the lessons — demanding work for such young students. Students objected with statements such as "I can't do this" or "I can't draw straight lines". (To this the researcher replied: "Would using a ruler be helpful?") The researcher assisted students individually, and extended praise to them for their success in even small details of task completion: "You've made a good start", "That's well done; you need to draw an arrow to show that rain is falling, don't you?" In a pleasant and relaxed manner as suggested by tone of voice, confidence in their ability was communicated to the students.

The experience of task completion was exhilarating to the students, e.g. student 4 repeated four times: "I'm finished mine!" The researcher told the students that they were doing equally well in that each of them was completing work entirely on his/her own and doing his/her best — as they were.

The examples of project work on the following pages indicate that the students in both groups showed remarkable similarity in ability to do the assigned work — accomplishment which they initially thought was impossible. The illustrations included here, reduced 50% in size from the original, were drawn during the fourth session by the eight students present. The two members who were absent from the two groups had shown task competence equal to that of their peers.

When the students were asked to explain their illustrations

they almost invariably revealed good recall of the morning's lesson.

The students in both groups strove for perfection while completing tasks: "Are these letters small enough?", "Should I do the 'J' again?". If they were not satisfied with the quality of their work, they erased it and repeated it. The manner in which the instruction was presented - the patient attention given to detail - may have produced this effect. One student remarked: "It's easy to fix up; there's lots of time".

In both groups task accomplishment promoted effectance (the sense of one's ability to be effective). The students worked on their projects with progressively less apprehension about their ability to do the work and less need for assistance: accomplishment and effectance became mutually supportive.

A difference between the groups, however, began to appear in Session 3 and was clearly evident by Session 5. Students in Group 1 showed their work to the researcher and asked whether it was good, seeking approval after task completion - unlike students in Group 2 - in spite of the fact that praise was being distributed equitably among members of the two groups.

The researcher, especially during the first six sessions, attempted to express verbal instruction so as not to suggest to the students that they were showing inadequacy or failure during their project work, but rather so as to communicate respect for their work to them. Instead of saying "Draw another arrow there", for example, the researcher said: "Are you planning to draw another arrow to show that rain is falling?" Verbal responses of students indicated that the ego, in its state of

immaturity, is sensitive to such consideration. In Session 3, when the researcher told the students in Group 1 to draw a round sun, student 4 asked: "What happens if we don't draw a round sun?" in a tone of voice which suggested that he was testing limits, or competing for decision-making power. The researcher, in a non-competitive manner replied: "Then you won't have a round sun in your picture - that's all. The sun we see in the sky is round, only it's so bright that we usually don't see that it is shaped like a ball". When the researcher advised student 7 in Session 8 that "Crayon doesn't erase" so that the student would not blur a carefully drawn image, student 7 said, in spite of the failure she was experiencing in her attempt to erase the coloring, "It does, kind of", to counteract the humiliation she was experiencing, as communicated by tone of voice and facial expression.

Though students 5 and 10, who were absent from 8 and 7 sessions, respectively, initially showed task ability equal to that of their peers, their need for task-related assistance and encouragement did not progressively decrease, as did that of their peers.

At the conclusion of the program when the students completed their project books, the four students in Group 2 who had been present during almost all sessions showed excitement at the prospect of showing their work to their parents, pride in their accomplishment e.g. "I sure did good work!", and respect for their books, handling them with care. Only student 2, in Group 1, showed such excitement and pride upon completing her book.

Further task-related observations will be provided under

INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT and GROUP DEVELOPMENTS.

Rules

The first instance of instruction, which consisted in direct rule application, occurred when student 4 used a reprehensible word during Session 1.

Researcher: "We have to use decent language; that's an important rule."

Student 2: "No saying bad words."

The example indicates rule-orientation in the researcher and in at least one student who, in essence, restated the rule in its negative, prohibitive form.

The second occurrence of instruction, in Session 2, supported the negative sanction of rudeness which student 1 applied during the initial (test) interviewing.

Researcher: "Let's all listen to student 1. It's rude to interrupt someone, isn't it. Take turns talking is an important rule". (Tone of voice suggested admonishment.)
Response: Silence.

The students did not contest this rule application.

Later in the same session when students began to interrupt one another in conversation, the researcher applied the relevant rule without use of the word "rule" in an attempt to cause students to think of the content of the rule.

Researcher: "Don't speak now, student 1. We have to take turns talking."
Response: Silence.

In Session 2 the students asked the researcher to explain the slogan on a poster: 'The smallest good deed is better than the grandest good intention'. The researcher provided this explanation: "It is much better to help someone else than just to plan or to think about helping someone else". The researcher

gave an explanation of the meaning of the slogan as was requested instead of translating the slogan into rules.

In the third and fourth sessions, rules were presented directly and implicitly. When student 1 persisted in trying to use an item which was not intended for student use (a reason for the disallowance of its use had been provided), the researcher said, in a mild but serious tone of voice: "One rule in school is that students must heed or listen to their teacher when she tells them certain things cannot be used." When students persisted in interrupting the speaker during the sharing period, the researcher said "Don't interrupt (name of student)".

It became apparent that though rules had been directly and indirectly applied - the message had been clearly stated that adherence to certain rules (i.e. taking turns, not interrupting others) was required, the instruction was not effecting change in student behavior as was the instruction in Group 2. Students were quiet after receiving rule instruction. They conformed to the requirements imposed by the instruction, however their conformity was of short duration, not lasting from one session to the next, nor, in some cases, enduring within one session. There did not appear to be a problem in the general relationship between the researcher and the students: the students felt free to communicate and to exchange humour with the researcher at all times exclusive of those involving rule-giving.

In the context of this apparent impasse between rule-giving and learning, the researcher decided to give the students

in Group 1 as well as in Group 2 an opportunity to experience empathy and to exercise reasoning. This was done to suggest to students that the researcher was not opposed to their expression of feelings and ideas regarding moral matters. In *The Carrot Seed*, a recording, derision is directed at a little boy. The small boy's brother repeatedly harrasses him as follows: "N-ya, N-ya, your carrot seed won't come up - I told you so - nothing's coming up." After the recording was played, the students immediately began to relate their planting experiences. There was no indication that they had experienced empathy for the little boy they had just heard about.

Researcher: "How would you feel if you had planted a carrot seed and everyone in your family talked to you the way the boy's family talked to him?"

Response: Silence

Researcher: "Do you think his brother was being kind?"

Students 1 and 3: "No."

Student 2: "They were wrong; it would come up."

Student 1: "Once my mommy ..." (unrelated nonmoral comment)

Researcher: "I would like to know what each of you thought about this record."

Student 3: "I think it's mean for his family to talk the way they did."

Researcher: "Why?"

Student 3: "Because they didn't know the carrot wouldn't come up."

Researcher: "Student 2?"

Student 2: "His brother shouldn't talk like that and his whole family."

Researcher: "Why not?"

Student 2: "Because it really will come up."

Researcher: "Student 1, what did you think when you heard about the little boy?"

Student 1: "Nothing."

Researcher: "You didn't think anything when you heard the boy's family speak to him?"

Student 1: "No."

Researcher: "What did you think, student 4?"

Student 4 shook his head; he had no comment to make.

Even though attempts had been made to elicit empathetic responses, no such responses had appeared in the students, i.e.

no student indicated that the derision might hurt the boy's feelings or make him feel sad. When "meanness" was ascribed to a character by two students, it appeared to be based on a confused notion involving knowledge and truth-telling. Since the students in Group 1 as well as in Group 2 had shown consideration of others' interests in their responses to test questions, the researcher framed the following question: had rule-based instruction effected student refusal to experience feelings, to exercise thought in moral matters? The researcher decided to attempt to elicit reasoning about rules - to encourage students to think about the content of rules - throughout the remainder of the sessions.

In Session 6, when the students pushed one another to obtain crackers, each wanting the first, the researcher asked:

"Can you think of a rule which might help you to remember not to grab for things?"

Student 2: "Just wait."

Student 4: "Don't interrupt."

Student 2: "Say thank-you; don't hit; don't push."

The students called out these rules in quick succession. The second response of student 2 suggested repetition devoid of thought as conveyed by word (one of the three rules she mentioned was not directly related to the offense, one was totally unrelated) and by tone of voice which communicated flippancy. The unrelated rule supplied by student 4, in like manner, provided evidence of concentration of thought on the notion of 'rule', rather than on the content of rules.

Rule instruction promoted a legalistic attitude to peer behavior e.g. the instruction was not effective in influencing the immoral responses involved in incidents of tattling. On

72.
five occasions when one student reported the misbehavior of another student to the researcher, the offender denied the misbehavior, thereby adding untruthfulness to the offense. On one occasion a student revealed honesty in response to researcher questioning about an infraction.

It was clear that the students were familiar with rules. When student 4 repeatedly called student 1 "copy-catter", the researcher intervened:

Researcher: "Name-calling is unkind. Be kind to others is a good rule, isn't it?"

Student 2: "And no saying bad words."

Student 1: "And no being rude. At my playschool you couldn't do anything (wrong); if you did, you had to stand and do nothing."

The notion of punishment was operative here in addition to relevant (negative) rule application. However within 10 minutes all students were putting forth physical effort in competition to obtain the best spot in order to view a demonstration being given by the researcher, mindless of their rudeness.

On occasions in the remaining sessions when attempts were made to elicit rule evaluation, students showed lack of interest, e.g., when the researcher asked: "Is 'help others' a good rule?", one student nodded affirmatively in a half-hearted manner. There was no response to "Why?"

Rule-based instruction, as provided in this study, produced only short-term effects on immediate behavior. It did not observably enhance ego development or the development of moral attitudes in students.

Reasoning

The first instance of reasoning occurred in Session 2 when

student 6 monopolized the use of time with his speaking during the opening sharing period. Other students attempted to break in with contributions, however student 6 kept talking.

Researcher: "Do you think it's important to take turns talking?"

Student 9: "Yup. Because someone might interrupt you."

Researcher: "Why is it important not to interrupt others?"

Student 9: "Because then they might stop talking."

The circularity evident here did not serve to advance the argument, however, it did serve to reverse the direction of the thinking of students (from an egocentric base to an other-oriented base).

Student 7: "So the other person can talk too, so you get to hear the other person."

Student 8: "So they won't get mad."

Student 6: "That's what (K: not a member of the group) does. He gets mad and then I get mad."

Student 9: He made an unrelated comment - to change the topic of discussion.

Researcher: "Is it important to think about how others feel when you are talking?"

Student 9: "You might have to wait." (to talk)

Student 8: "People shouldn't talk too long."

Researcher: "That's a good point."

Student 8: "You have to give others a turn, or else they won't remember (what they wanted to say)."

At this point student 6 referred to an offense he had committed and justified it on the basis of the action which had reportedly instigated the offense. He protracted his self-defense by referring to other offences he had committed, all instigated by K.

Though the discussion had been brought to a premature end by student 6, it revealed that students were able to remember questions posed by the researcher and to provide directly related responses - as student 7 did; that students were able to make generalizations about behavior - as the second response of

student 8 indicated; and, most importantly, that they were able to consider behavior from a non-egocentric base.

In Session 2 the researcher told the students that the clay dishes they had modelled were equally valuable since each of them had done the work involved him/herself without assistance. Student 8 related a kind deed performed by student 7 to the researcher. There were no incidents of tattling. Three other-directed statements were made. The students began to make reportive instead of competitive statements about their work e.g. "I made a good 'J'" instead of "I made my 'J' the best". Competitive behavior began to occur increasingly in the last half of the session as the moral discussion was distanced.

Student 10 had been absent from the second session. Throughout Session 3 he spoke almost incessantly. The other four students were strangely silent throughout the session. It seemed that having discussed taking turns in conversation and having exercised consideration of others' interests during their reasoning, they were stunned by his loquacity - his lack of consideration. During the absence of the researcher student 10 attempted to draw other members of the group into conversation without success. Ostracism appeared to be operative.

During the sharing period in Session 4, student 6 again monopolized time with his speech. He perpetually claimed to have had personal experience of events, e.g., "I've already done a science experiment." No experiences related by other students were exempt from his (verbal) superceding. The students began to interrupt one another in conversation with exclusively I-oriented statements. The researcher asked: "Does anyone

here remember the discussion we had about taking turns when we're talking?" The students became quiet, serious, and attentive to instruction.

For the first time student 6 showed other-orientation: "I know what we could have done." He offered to share his snack when he learned that another student had forgotten his. Student 7 also spontaneously shared an item. During the absence of the researcher, the students had a disciplined, non-competitive discussion about beverages. One student had brought a soft drink. Though student 9 was opposed to drinking soft drinks: "Coke is bad for teeth - it has too much sugar", he indicated this in a pleasant non-offensive tone of voice. He asked another student for information, showing other-directedness. It appeared that the one moral discussion, held in Session 2, and recalled in Session 4, might be influencing showing consideration for others not only in conversation, but also in other matters, e.g., in showing respect: asking for another's opinion, in showing unselfishness: praising another, and in sharing. The behavior of student 6, however, contrasted with that of the other students, as will be explained under INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT.

After hearing The Carrot Seed recording, students in Group 2, as in Group 1, related their planting experiences.

Researcher: "How do you think you would feel if you had planted a seed and people in your family talked to you the way the boy's family did?"

Student 9: "Bad." All students in turn, in a thoughtful and serious manner, said "Bad".

Student 9: "When people say they don't like you, that hurts your feelings too."

It was evident that the students were exercising empathy.

Once again the discussion was diverted by student 6. Since the behavior of student 6 had indicated that a discussion centering on problems he was trying to cope with was needed, this opportunity was welcomed.

Student 6: "Like K. I tell him something, then he imitates me, then I jump on him and kick him."

Researcher: "That's not right either, is it? Then aren't you both doing wrong?"

Student 6: "Well, he always does stuff like that."

Researcher: "Don't you think it's important to do what's right yourself?"

Student 6: "That's what I do, but he makes me angry sometimes." (Defensiveness and a sense of guilt was communicated by tone of voice.)

Student 9: "If someone is being mean to you and you don't want them to be mean, one thing you can do is walk away."

Student 7: "Or you can ignore them."

Student 6: "But he keeps coming at me."

Researcher: "What about discussing the problem with him?"

Student 6: "That's what I'm doing!" (Highly frustrated.)

Researcher: "You could say 'That hurts my feelings'."

Student 9: "Then he wouldn't want to be mean."

Researcher: "You could say 'Don't you think it would be better to be friends?'"

Student 6: "Sometimes me and K are good ... ". (Brightening - in a more cheerful tone of voice he related pleasant experiences he had shared with K.)

Student 9: "It's no fun to be angry, because then there's nobody to play with."

Researcher: "Imagine you were unkind to someone, student 6 - I'll use you for an example, O.K.? If you have been unkind, and he says: 'I really like you. It hurts my feelings if you are unkind. Don't you think we can be friends?', how would you feel, student 6?"

Student 6: (Softly, without hostility) "Nice." ...
Sometimes I want to see my friend and my mom won't let me."

Researcher: "Maybe she has a good reason."

Student 6: "He's only four years older than me."

Researcher: "Mothers often have good reasons for what they say."

Student 9: "Even if you get sand in your eyes, you can still walk away - or you can talk to them."

Student 6; "Someone pushed sand at me. He said it was an accident, but he did it on purpose. I didn't do anything, I just wanted the truck real badly because I needed it."

Researcher: "Some people have never thought about these things - about being kind and considering others."

Student 6: "That's my brother. He laughs at me when I say 'You're making me wet and I don't like it'."

Researcher: "I had a class of students who refused to be naughty like the children in another class. They tried to

help the other children by explaining that it's important to be kind so that everyone can play happily. If that didn't work, they walked away to play somewhere else. When you do that you can respect yourself because you know you are doing what is right.

Student 6: "It takes a couple of days or months or years for seeds to come up." (The students eagerly related planting experiences.)

Researcher: "To finish our discussion, if someone is unkind and you walk away thinking nasty thoughts about that person, are you really doing any better than he?"

Student 9: "No."

Student 7: "Yes, because they are nasty and we are nice."

Researcher: "If you're thinking unkind thoughts about the person who was mean, you both have unkind thoughts, don't you?" ... You might feel sorry that the person was mean and try to help him to start being kind - right student 6?"

Student 6: "Yeah."

Researcher: "Then you don't have unkind thoughts do you?"

Student 6: (Voluntarily) "No. You have nice kind of thoughts."

Student 9: "You know what I did nice for my mom? ..."

Student 6: "You know what me and K. did?" (He reported a helpful gesture.)

Student 8: "If someone is unkind, you know what you can do? Tell them 'I love you. Jesus loves you and He can forgive us for being naughty so that we can be friends'."

Student 7: "There's one very bad thing: to be mean, because it hurts the other person."

This very lengthy discussion, which illustrates the ability of children to concentrate on a topic of discussion when their thinking is elicited, concluded with a statement which implied the importance of consideration of others' interests. The main observable result of the discussion was the marked change it produced in the behavior and attitude of student 6, to be described under INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT. The discussion, further, appeared to bring freedom to all of the students. They interacted quietly and happily, and shared items. Student 7 offered his chair to another student. Comradery was evident in the group as members settled for their snack.

In view of the length and comprehensiveness of the discussion which has been reported, other instances of instruction

and student responses which occurred during subsequent sessions will be summarized in what follows.

A more abstract discussion proceeded in Session 8 when students failed to express thankfulness in response to bestowal of a favour:

Researcher: "What should a person do when he receives something from someone else?"

Students: "Say 'thank-you'."

Researcher: "Why is that important?"

Student 8: "Because they did something nice."

Researcher: "What else does it tell the other person?"

Student 7: "That you're pleased."

Researcher: "You might be pleased though you don't say 'thank-you'. If you make sure to tell the other person that you are thankful, what are you doing?"

Student 9: "Thinking about his feelings - about him."

Researcher: "That's right."

Praise for moral behavior was given with caution (in the same manner and with the same frequency as in Group 1, though praise has not been mentioned under Rules. The author apologizes for inconveniencing the reader in this matter). Examples of praise were: "That's very kind, student 6", "I notice that everyone has been taking turns this morning". Exhortation was used as follows: "If you think of others as well as yourself, you might want to share your crayons when someone else needs them."

Ego development became increasingly evident, as will be described under GROUP DEVELOPMENTS. By the ninth session, the researcher felt confident that the students could assay reproof. During that session, when the students were very eager to play a new game, they rushed forward to obtain the playing pieces which appeared most desirable. The researcher said, in a mild tone of voice, "Nobody will be able to enjoy playing

this game if everyone is selfish." This instruction produced a change in atmosphere, e.g. students offered to take the last turn. Kindness and cooperation pervaded throughout the remainder of the session.

Effects of reasoning with the students were not restricted to immediate responses. The instruction appeared to promote a variety of behaviors beyond the immediate instructional context. The students asked one another questions, thereby showing that they were developing respect for their peers. Whereas they originally ostracized student 10, they extended patient consideration to him when he rejoined the group in Session 10, to include him in their conversation in spite of his relative moral insensitivity e.g. his interruption of others' speech. There was a marked increase in statements beginning with "we", which evidenced not only the growth of group spirit, but also of consideration of others. All the members of the group were included in conversation. The students shared books and work supplies. They praised one another's work, and gave and received helping behavior freely. They responded to instruction, including non-moral instruction, quickly and willingly.

The behaviors mentioned in the preceding paragraph, exclusive of sharing and helping, were never discussed with the students by the researcher; hence it appears reasonable to conclude that the instruction had a generalized effect on the behavior of students i.e. that it promoted moral development. The moral learning of these students appeared to be durable since differences between student behaviors during the presence

and absence of the researcher began to disappear by the third session and did not appear after the fourth session, and since the positive effects of specific items of instruction continued to appear in sessions after the session in which the instruction was given.

INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT

The provision of a complete description of the development of individuals throughout the instructional program would have required that ten observers be engaged, and that ten volumes be written. Such description must remain a suggestion for the present. It is hoped that the briefly sketched profiles provided will convey information sufficient to facilitate further interpretation of results by the reader. Since knowledge of the sequence in which developments occurred is so important here, descriptions are presented sequentially rather than under behavioral headings.

Student 1

What was most noticeable in the behavior of student 1 at the onset of the study was her extreme affectation. The question in the mind of the researcher was whether understanding of the reason(s) for her behavior might be gained within the limited time period of the study so that instruction might be provided appropriately.

Student 1 was verbally aggressive at the onset of the study; she spoke incessantly in I-oriented statements. In those statements she placed prolonged and exaggerated stress on the personal pronoun ("I") - she frequently engaged in other-demeaning

competition. She was unable to concentrate on items of instruction sufficiently to remember them, e.g., unlike the other students who remembered the significance of Canada Day as related by the researcher after one explanation, student 1 after a third explanation provided for her benefit said: "Because this is the last day and then June, July, August and September and then it's my friend's birthday." Student 1 tattled. She behaved in a critical, overly protective manner toward other students - in particular toward student 5. She attempted to do project work for student 5, saying: "Oh, oh, you need to make this longer ... Oh, oh, want me to do it? ... Don't - you're wrecking it! ... Let me do it." In response to her bragging, the other students began to reply, with haughty disdain, "Who cares!"

The researcher explained to student 1 that other students had to be allowed to do their own work. When this explanation did not effect the required change in behavior, the researcher pointed out, in a kind manner, that to give instruction was a function of the researcher. In the following session, student 1 was quiet: was this a sign of sensitivity in this student - had the remark regarding instruction-giving produced this effect? During the session student 1 offered to help the researcher.

In subsequent sessions the researcher exercised patience and showed kindness to student 1, e.g., appointed her to monitor an activity, enlisted her help in the preparation of materials. The assigning of tasks which required responsibility seemed to curb her bossiness. Her tattling and censoring of

other students' work continued, but diminished in frequency. Her displays of snobbery became less pronounced, though her I-orientation and competitiveness continued.

In Session 5 student 1 admitted in a defeated tone of voice that she did not know how to do her work, and she remarked in a non-competitive manner to another student: "We're going at the same speed!", indicating that she was beginning to accept herself and others without resorting to mechanisms of her artificing for self-enhancement.

Student 1 did not engage in empathetic reasoning when The Carrot Seed was played. Her response to questioning about her reaction was: "Nothing." (You didn't think anything when the boy's family spoke to him? "No.") Was it possible that ego injury had accrued in her early experience so that to think about feelings in greater depth than was permitted by the defense system she had elaborated was too painful? Observation of the caregiving she was receiving elsewhere and of her treatment of peers supported this idea. Later in the session student 1, in a commanding tone, ordered the other students to join a line-up.

In Session 8, when she remarked, "I can do that all by myself" to a peer who was receiving assistance with his work, the students again echoed "Who cares?" in response. Student 1 usually participated in verbal exchanges among the students.

On one occasion in Session 9, student 1 said: "I remembered that" in a non-competitive manner. Tone of voice indicated that she was sincerely pleased about her recall of instruction. When the researcher praised another student, "You made that so

well", student 1 said: "Even me" in a voice which implied honest self appraisal and sincere confrontation of her low self-esteem.

The following event was recorded during the absence of the researcher. Immediately after answering test questions in an adjoining room, student 1 burst into the presence of her peers with the suggestion that they all "play doctor". What was surprising was the spirit of personal liberation and the tone of unrestrained caring, or affection, with which she made this suggestion. (Had the questioning produced some sudden moral insight?) Her peers responded as follows:

Student 2: "Not me. You have to play by yourself. You have to be the patient and the doctor."

Student 4: "Yeah, cause we're not going to play."

There was a pause, then student 1 said slowly, and with most extreme affectation: "Who cares? I'm going outside." Student 1 did not participate in any class activity after this event; she became totally withdrawn.

In Session 11, when student 3 indicated that he couldn't do his work very well, student 1 said in a brassy tone of voice, "Well I can." Later in the session student 1 indicated that she wanted to make "something special" for the researcher. Though interaction with her peers did not appear to promote ego-development in this student, it seemed that the consideration exercised by the researcher had been meaningful to her; she wanted to say thank-you. The signs of self acceptance which had begun to become noticeable in student 1 earlier in the study and the concomitant decrease in her artificial behavior seemed to suggest that moral treatment of students e.g. consid-

eration of their personal needs may ease the pain of ego injury at age four to five.

Student 2

This student showed effectance (competence and sense of competence) at the onset of the study. She expressed independent thinking with confidence. Though she found the egocentric displays of her peers amusing, she did not express ridicule. Her behavior was generally appropriate in the classroom setting.

Student 2 had knowledge of rules and displayed rule-governed behavior, however it appeared that she had not given much thought to moral matters beyond rule observation. When the researcher praised student 1 for helping, student 2 said: "Instead of helping you, I help my parents; everyone here offers help first." The researcher replied: "You could help others here too, couldn't you?" Student 2 responded with: "I do", wavering thoughtfully. It seemed she realized that in defending herself she had contradicted the statement she had made earlier.

Initially student 2 took pride in the uniqueness of her work e.g. her drawings. She did not engage in echoing behavior, in unkind competition, nor in aggrandizement of her abilities. She told the researcher that though her sister was unkind to her, she was never unkind in return. Her manner was not boastful, but truthful as she relayed this information. She showed concern for her sister: "When she goes to school she'll get into trouble." A representative sketch is given of the changes in her behavior which were observed during the course of

instruction.

Student 2 responded to rule-based instruction as follows. Twice during the sessions she provided a string of unrelated rules in response to rule elicitation. She began to show very close rule observation, even at the expense of kindness, e.g., when the researcher told student 4 that he could use a musical instrument, student 2 objected: "It's student 1's turn; she came here next." This was unusual behavior as compared with her behavior at the onset of the study.

Student 2 experienced pressure to conform to the standard of egocentric assertiveness which was operative, e.g. student 4 repeatedly insisted that she paint her clay dish, after she unoffensively told him she had done that. Though the egocentrism of her peers was at first annoying to her - she told one member: "Nobody knows everything!" - it may have appeared to this student that she must conform or suffer. In session 8, she ridiculed student 1: "You don't know how to count, do you", and, in answer to the response of student 1, she said with haughty disdain, "Who cares?" She began to participate in echoing behavior. She began to strive to produce work identical to that of her peers. In the final session she proceeded, from one to another, to evaluate the project work of her peers, telling them in a definitive and superior manner how much work remained for them to complete.

According to the changes in behavior which were observed in student 2, it appeared that both rule following and peer pressure contributed to produce conformity in student 2, and that conformity can have a generalized effect on behavior within,

and among students.

Happily, student 2 retained her enthusiasm for her project work. As she completed her project book, she said with ebullience, "It has to be perfect - or it should be" and told the researcher she would continue to work on projects after the program ended.

Student 3

Little record of the activity of student 3 is to be found on the session tapes, for reasons which will become evident. Student 3 very seldom spoke, unless the researcher asked her a question. At such times her speech was quiet, relaxed, and truthful.

Upon reading the tape transcripts, the researcher perceived that the speech of student 3 suggested advanced ego development. As she did her weaving, she commented happily - not boastfully - "I don't even need any help!" When she had woven her mat, she asked the researcher: "Is this work nice?" The response she received was: "You did that so well." Instead of boasting competitively during the sessions, on one occasion she showed the class a banana which she had ingeniously sculpted. In session 6, during the absence of the researcher, the students in Group 1 engaged in an intensely competitive discussion of their street-crossing privileges; student 3 made a brief, truthful statement regarding her rights. In the final session, she said, seeking assistance: "I can't do this very well" in a tone of voice which communicated self-acceptance rather than disappointment or discouragement. Her ego maturity explained the fact that she did not repeatedly require assistance

and encouragement from the researcher, and the fact that she had not conformed to the egocentric behavior of the group - which accounted for her quietness.

At this point a question arises: Why did the students in the group apply pressure to student 2 to conform, and not to student 3? It is suggested that since student 3 was so quiet she posed no threat to her peers vis a vis their insecurity. The intellectual superiority of student 2, though not flaunted, may have been experienced as threatening.

Student 4

When the class was asked what clouds are made of, student 4 replied: "Wool". Student 5 then said, slowly: "They can make rain and snow". Student 4 found her response upsetting; he rudely told her: "Think before you talk!" His impatience with student 4 could well be understood as being characteristic of egocentrism, however more than impatience may have been operative here. Physical stature was important to student 4. He claimed to be the "tallest in the class", though he was the shortest, with the exception of student 5. She 'knew more' than he? That was insufferable.

It was difficult to find any non-egocentric behavior represented in statements made by student 4. His speech was impulsive: he spoke when an idea came to mind, heedless of whether others were speaking at the time, and he expressed his thought without censoring it for potential ill effect on the listener. His behavior suggested thoughtlessness beyond a narrow range of selfish interests. His operation within that range was clever.

To illustrate that description, behaviors he persisted in were interruption of others in conversation, name-calling, echoing, and intense competitiveness. If another student showed merit in word or deed, he retaliated as mentioned above. He found fault with student 3's sculpted banana: he said that she had ruined the banana. When the researcher asked whether he thought a peer had done well in making an item, student 4 was silent. Pressed, he said "Yeah" grudgingly, then supplanted that acknowledgement with: "But she didn't do the nose very well." He shifted allegiances to suit his purposes: he cajoled student 1 in order to 'gang-up' on student 5 and on other occasions, by means of ingratiation, gathered allies to present a united front against student 1. He was the hero in the fantasies he elaborated. He contested statements made by the researcher three times in Session 11, showing the lack of cooperation which is characteristic of egocentrism. On two occasions when he committed an offense which was reported to the researcher, he denied the offense.

Student 4 punctually attended the sessions though he had to sacrifice his swimming lessons to do so. Task attainment brought him pleasure. He was successful in coping with frustration related to tasks, e.g., tying a shoelace. Effectance appeared to be developed in this student; his immaturity seemed to lie in the area of valence (self worth).

Student 4 ceased from his unkind speech when rules were applied, however the rule instruction did not produce durable effects, or, to appearance, influence his egocentric orientation.

Student 5

89.

Student 5 was absent from eight sessions due to change in familial circumstances which occurred after the program began. This profile, for that reason, is based on a limited amount of information about the student.

Student 5 responded intelligently to questions asked by the researcher. She joined in the 'echoing' of her peers, however unless she was verbally attacked, she was non-aggressive in her speech, i.e. she did not initiate unkind competitive exchanges. When attacked, she defended herself with little retaliation e.g. when repeatedly called "copy-catter", instead of responding with similar behavior, she said: "Im not a copy-catter".

She was the youngest and smallest member of the class, which may explain the fact that she was repeatedly 'attacked' by students 1 and 4. It seemed that student 1 viewed her as vulnerable for purposes of scapegoating, and that student 4 was intimidated by her.

Though she engaged in conversation with the other students during the first session, she became quiet as the second session progressed. In the final session, which she attended, she spoke only once to say, again, "I'm not a copy-catter".

Student 6

During the first sessions, student 6 did much talking. His speech was 'I-centered', and he evidenced what seemed to be an insatiable need to relate personal experiences to the researcher. He monopolized the use of time with his speech. When he did engage in conversation with his peers, he expressed his own superiority of ability and experience so as to

make their claims appear insignificant.

It seemed that student 6 was struggling with a moral problem. He often spoke in a defensive manner, as reported on pages 73 to 77, however behaving thus, he could not experience peace. To blame someone else for his offenses as he did was wrong; he may have had an underlying awareness of this fact. The discussion referred to above reveals the resistance of egocentric thought to dissolution. At the time of the discussion, it seemed as though egocentrism was binding the student against his will. When, finally, student 6 'gave in' - when that bind was severed - the freedom he experienced was observable.

For the first time, immediately after the discussion, student 6 described an experience truthfully, without boasting. He and student 9 engaged in a friendly conversation, the first free, non-competitive, mutual exchange that had been observed in the two groups. Student 6 offered to get craft papers for the researcher, singing! He showed enthusiasm regarding the work which student 9 was doing, and was happy when it was successfully completed. He showed interest in the work of student 8. During their snacktime, he offered student 9 a cookie. Whereas he had rudely ignored the existence of student 9 in earlier sessions, e.g., he had paid no attention to his speech, he began to extend help, and, on occasion, empathy to student 9. His new happiness affected the group. Comraderie began to develop.

In subsequent sessions student 6 revealed ego-development. When he made an unrelated comment during the discussion of a lesson, the researcher said: "That's not about the topic we are

discussing, is it?" He received this criticism without showing signs of ego-loss. When he showed lack of consideration during the playing of a competitive game in Session 6 and the researcher told him that his action had been unkind, he immediately showed willingness to share the playing pieces with his peers, and he later offered the researcher his turn to play.

In Session 10 student 6 offered to share his seat with another member of the group. Student 10 attended the session. Student 6 had not evidenced verbally dominating behavior during Sessions 6 to 9. The researcher wondered whether he would be drawn back into self-oriented competition by the verbosity of student 10. The fact that this did not transpire supported the impression of the researcher that a fundamental change had occurred in his thinking. When student 6 and student 10 completed their projects at the same time, and student 10 called out: "I finished mine first!", student 6 remained silent.

Student 7

Student 7 exhibited 'conventional morality'. Good behavior, in her opinion, consisted in doing that which is approved, in obeying authority, in observing very strict equality, in being a 'good girl'. She refrained from nonmoral behavior (she observed 'don'ts') though she did not reveal consideration of others' interests beyond adherence to rules. She regarded her mother as the supreme source of all authority. Three times she answered questions during the early sessions in this manner: "My mommy thinks that I think what my mommy thinks". Her behavior was well controlled; no instances

of unkind competition were observed in her actions or speech.

Student 7 felt superior. She told the class: "I can read. Not many children my age can read" with smugness. Though she occasionally joined the 'echoing' she more typically distanced herself from her peers and their activity. She had developed an ideal image of herself and held herself to behaving appropriately in accordance with it.

Her conduct did not reveal egocentrism. She was able to acknowledge successes of peers. Her behavior showed effectance: she approached tasks with confidence in her ability; she was sure that her mother would like the clay dish she made. She freely admitted to error when she herself detected it. She did not need always to be right. One excepting incident occurred. When the researcher commented on her attempt to erase crayon marks she made a defensive remark. It appeared that stupidity was a disappointment to her vis a vis her ideal self. When she engaged in game competition, she did not celebrate victories with loud acclaim; she expected to do well. Her facial expression seldom changed from that of self-complacence.

During Session 7, student 7 began to become slightly more relaxed. She looked at a book with student 6. In Session 8 she began to answer questions put forward by her peers and by the researcher in a more spontaneous manner. In the last two sessions she spoke more frequently and was able to experience the 'give and take' of relationships, e.g., when student 7 said: "You can choose a crayon", she responded "Yeah!" enthusiastically. Earlier in the study her response would likely have been: "Who is she to give me permission?" From her interaction with

them, it appeared that she had come to accept the other members of the group as peers. Whereas she formerly completed project tasks in an emotionless and complacent manner, in Session 11 she literally danced with joy and excitement over her success.

Student 8

In Session 1 the behavior of student 8 was conspicuous when she said during an intensely self-centered discussion: "Sometimes I'm last" (to finish).

Student 8 desired a relationship of friendship with others as she indicated in her response to Test Question 1. She was generally a peaceable person. At times, however, the behavior of her peers vexed her and she lost the ability to show kindness to them. Such incidents upset her since she experienced a sense of failure. When student 10 persisted in playing with her hair, she said "Stop that!" in an unkind manner. She told the researcher: "I didn't want to be mean, but he was bothering me so much". On one occasion she indicated: "Student 10 started talking so I stopped. I don't like being interrupted."

In Session 5, instead of being unkind to an offender, she showed her project to the researcher, indicating where he had pulled out a strip. She showed disappointment, but not anger. Increasingly, her ability to refrain from unkindness, regardless of circumstance, became apparent.

Student 8 was told stories about Christ in her home. Her speech during the discussion on page 77, and elsewhere, indicated that she was familiar with the teaching: "Love your neighbour as yourself". The behavior of this student clearly illus-

trated the gap which may exist between determining in mind what constitutes the right, and being able to behave in accordance - to do what is right. Since inability to deal with vexation caused by others in the way in which she believed she should was not observed in this student after the discussions reported under Reasoning took place, it seemed that the instruction had promoted new understanding which helped her to behave in accordance with her convictions.

In Session 9 she pointed to her mural illustration and said in a happy manner: "Mine's different!... Those (the illustrations of her peers) are nice too!"

Student 9

Student 9 was the youngest student in the group. During the first sessions he was often ignored by his peers, who were preoccupied with their self-aggrandizing competition.

In spite of this, he did not evidence resentment for them. Of the members in the group his speech was the least egocentric in orientation. He showed moral sensitivity in word: e.g., "One thing is very bad: to be mean", and in behavior, e.g., though he was frequently interrupted in an unkind manner when he spoke, he did not respond with unkindness.

The one area in which it seemed that the self-oriented competitiveness of his peers affected him was in the playing of games. During the first five sessions he refused to participate in games. When the researcher asked why he did not want to play, he was silent. Later, during the analyzation of results, the following possibility occurred to the researcher. All of his peers engaged in verbal competition; students 6 and

10 in other-demeaning competition. Student 9 may have noticed that as the students presented claims regarding their ability, the claims grew increasingly absurd - far beyond the ability of the speakers to actualize. Game playing, however, gave them an opportunity to exalt actual achievements. Further, if student 9 experienced intimidation when he heard the boasting of his peers, he may have begun to fear revealing inadequacy in playing. This description makes comprehensible the fact that though student 9 did not reveal a sense of inferiority at any other time, he refused to play games. If the explanation is correct, we see exemplification of one way in which egocentric behavior in a peer group can have subtle damaging effects on a student of this age.

As the sessions progressed, the students in Group 2 began to show consideration for student 9. They tried to persuade him to join their games. In Session 7, their collective effort resulted in acquiescence. They played a ring toss game. Student 6 proclaimed his successes with increasing loudness. He frequently anticipated his turn prematurely. He exhibited a raw, totally self-centered competitive spirit. Student 9 who was not scoring, withdrew from the game. Student 7 noticed this and said: "Come and play", in a voice which communicated caring and concern. The attention of all members present became focussed on student 9. They forgot about the game in order to give support to student 9. They consoled and encouraged him over a period of ten minutes. Student 6 ardorously showed his concern; he persuaded student 9 to be instructed in the method of tossing. In Session 8, when student 9 deserted

a game, the researcher asked him to return since another player was needed. Though on previous occasions persuasion had been ineffective, he obliged. In the remaining sessions student 9 did not absent himself from games.

When student 10 returned to the class after a long absence, student 9 responded to his annoying behavior with tact. Student 10 pestered student 8, then began to thump his foot, calling: "Yahoo!". Student 9 reprimanded him by saying, simply, "that's making noise" in a mild reportive tone of voice.

The students in Group 2 came to show consideration for student 9 generally: they listened when he spoke and shared items with him. Instead of having to experience increasing intimidation in a group of aggressive peers, he received increasing acceptance and support.

Student 10

Since student 10 was absent from Session 2 and Sessions 4 to 9 inclusive, he did not have the opportunity to participate in the discussions involving reasoning.

In the first session student 10 revealed a penchant for vexation of others. He spoke obsessively; when, for moments, there was a lull in his speech, he hummed.

He missed a discussion regarding the exercising of consideration during speech which was held in Session 2. When he rejoined the class in Session 3, the other members were silent in response to his loquacity. Only one comment was made regarding his behavior: student 8 said: "Student 10 started talking, so I stopped. I don't like being interrupted."

Student 10 may have begun to feel ostracized; during the absence of the researcher he attempted to elicit responses from the other members of the group, however they remained silent. Student 10, unlike the other students, required encouragement from the researcher to develop confidence in his ability to do his project work, and he required more assistance than they during its completion.

After this session, he was absent (on holiday) until Session 10.

The behavior observed in student 9 in the 10th session was inconsiderate and uncouth. He made whooping sounds. He tampered with student 8's project. During the absence of the researcher he related: "My mom said 'shut-up' to a dog". Student 9 responded, unoffensively, "That's not a good word". Only student 10 interjected during the presentation of the lesson, e.g. "You know what happened to me?" Unlike that of the other students, his speech was I-oriented. He indiscriminately interrupted his peers when they spoke, however they showed no unkindness in response to his annoying behavior.

An interesting change was noticed in the behavior of the other students. They were not silent as they had been in Session 3. During their conversing, if someone interrupted a speaker, the speaker stopped talking. They treated student 10 differently however. When he interrupted a speaker, as he frequently did, the speaker continued to talk. There was an atmosphere of seriousness in the class in response to the intrusive behavior of student 10.

Toward the end of the session, it seemed student 10 was noticing that something was different in the class. He seemed bewildered, he became thoughtful; he spoke less. When he and student 8 began to speak simultaneously, he abruptly stopped speaking.

The following incident, which occurred earlier in the session, suggests the pervasively extenuating effect which egocentrism exerts on self-concept. When student 10 mentioned having a sister, the researcher inquired as to her age. He replied: "She's only 11. She's bigger than me - but she's even bigger than my mom". This effect will be discussed under EGO-DEVELOPMENT.

During the reading of a booklet which had been given to the students by a visiting police officer, student 10 remarked: "I know that rule". This was the one instance in which "rule" was used in Group 1.

In Session 11, student 10 spoke less and directed fewer competitive statements at others. When he commented: "Student 9 is taking a long time to do his work!", student 7 replied: "Except he's doing the best work". The students began to include him in their activity.

The behavior of student 10 was conspicuous during the final sessions of the study, though not at the onset. Progressive changes were observed in the treatment he received from his peers.

Summary

Student 1: Low self-esteem appeared to underly artificial

behavior. Artificial behavior persisted under peer treatment.

Student 2: Creativity decreased and I-oriented competitiveness and conformity began to develop.

Student 3: Ego maturity facilitated resistance to conformity.

Student 4: Egocentrism persisted without decrease.

Student 5: Verbal participation decreased due to peer treatment.

Student 6: Egocentrism decreased under reasoning; empathy and consideration for others developed.

Student 7: Interaction with peers as equals replaced self-isolation imposed by an attitude of superiority.

Student 8: The ability to show unconditional kindness to others developed.

Student 9: Participation in games in spite of incompetence increased under peer treatment.

Student 10: I-orientation began to decrease due to peer treatment.

GROUP DEVELOPMENTS

DEVELOPMENTS in student behavior during the study facilitated further elaboration of categories of description. Group developments are discussed accordingly in this section.

I-orientation/other-orientation: In both groups the frequency of 'running commentaries' decreased as effectance developed.

In Group 1, almost all statements made by the students throughout the study showed I-orientation. Other-oriented

statements were made infrequently.

In Group 2, I-oriented statements declined dramatically in frequency; the incidence of other-oriented statements concomitantly increased.

Echoing behavior: Echoing behavior persisted in Group 1. In Group 2, echoing behavior ceased after Session 4.

Other-demeaning competition: This behavior continued throughout the sessions in Group 1. No incidents of peer praise were recorded.

Other-demeaning competition progressively declined and ceased after Session 8 in Group 1. Mutual admiration developed: students praised one another for achievements.

Egocentric bias (inability to consider viewpoints other than one's own): In Group 1 egocentric bias was evident in individuals throughout the study, with the exception of student 3.

Egocentric bias increasingly diminished in Group 2 as cooperation developed among students.

Conformity: Conformity was increasingly sought in Group 1. The students began to strive to produce identical work at all times. Students urged others to agree with them on trivial matters regardless of objections submitted, e.g. one student chanted: "Who has an apple?" and coerced all the other members to respond: "I have an apple". Attempts were made to establish unanimous agreement on how to do things regardless of objections put forward by individuals.

In Group 2 conformity was not elicited among peers. Oppositely students came to value the uniqueness of their work,

and that of others. They came to respect individual thought as evidenced in their conversations: they began to make unique relevant contributions and to listen attentively to one another.

Unrelated statements: Disorientation of thought appeared infrequently. Thought focused competitively on ability and possessions in Group 1.

In Group 2, one unrelated statement was made during a lesson. Focus of thought shifted from personal matters to more cognitively stimulating topics, e.g., the visit of the ambulance attendant.

Dominating behavior: This was shown by students in Group 1 in conversation, in the coercion toward conformity which was exercised, and in the phenomenon of 'ganging-up'.

In Group 2, the operation of equality became increasingly evident, e.g., deliberate attempts were made to include all members equally in activity, students ceased from exercising domination over others.

Rational inquiry: At the onset of the study questions were not asked by students in either group. In Group 2 only, as competitive behavior decreased, students began to ask questions about the subject matter of lessons. This enriched study, e.g. gravity was discussed in one lesson as a result of student questioning.

Self-centeredness: Behaviors were confined within a narrow range of self-oriented interests; personal alliances were established and abandoned accordingly in Group 1.

In Group 2, comradery and mutual supportiveness appeared.

Students began to promote the interests of others as well as their own.

Researcher absence: In Group 1, secret matters were discussed on three occasions, e.g., a secret act of disobedience was related. Unkindness in speech and action intensified observably during the absence of the researcher.

In Group 2, no difference was observed between behavior during the presence and absence of the researcher after the first two sessions.

Ego development: Though effectance appeared to develop in relation to tasks in both groups, i.e. the students progressively required less reassurance regarding their ability to do assigned work and they were pleased with their accomplishments, effectance did not influence egocentric orientation in Group 1.

In Group 2, it appeared that valence (sense of worth) in addition to effectance developed since the need to establish personal superiority by means of verbal self-aggrandizement during interaction with peers was evidenced with progressive infrequency from Sessions 3 - 8, and was not evidenced in Sessions 9 - 11.

Further discussion of ego development as it was observed in the study is provided in Chapter 5 under the appropriate heading.

Moral development: In Group 1, students referred to external sanctions against failure to comply with rules, e.g., having to stand in a corner, on three occasions. When attempts were made to elicit rules in actual behavioral contexts, the students tended to 'rattle off' a succession of rules mind-

lessly. None of: direct application of rules, indirect application of rules, rule elicitation or rule evaluation served to effect behavioral changes beyond immediate compliance. There was no observable evidence of moral development.

In Group 2, students indicated ability and willingness to engage in moral reasoning. Behaviors were observed to change in response to instruction as described under the preceding categories, and as follows:

Fairness: Instead of fighting for the first turn and the most desirable playing pieces in games as they did originally, students increasingly shared items and insured that fairness was exercised in taking turns sequentially.

Freedom: As self-orientation evidenced in speech and action decreased, students were liberated to make provision for the freedom of others, including freedom from intimidation. When one student realized that his behavior was threatening to another, he immediately and voluntarily ceased from it, and extended helping behavior to the student who had been offended.

Consideration of interests: Increasingly, from Session 3 to Session 11, the operation of this principle was observable in the behavior of students. They began to be attentive to the speech of their peers, to share items needed by others without being asked to do so, to exercise kindness. The principle of consideration served as a base from which students drew inferences about the appropriateness or inappropriateness of behaviors, since the students readily agreed that thoughts and feelings of people are important. Prior to the negotiation of reasoning, the behavior of students did not indicate observa-

tion of this principle. As reasoning was negotiated, moral orientation increased, so that in the final sessions it was observed to influence all behavior. A possible explanation for the dramatic effect which was observed is put forward in Chapter 5, under EGO DEVELOPMENT.

FINAL TEST QUESTIONS: Student responses to test questions at the conclusion of the study were, in essence, the same as their initial responses in both groups. The differences recorded are described below.

In response to Test Question 2: Truth-telling and Intention, student 3 proposed a "spanking: rather than a "jail punishment" (as she did initially) as a suitable form of punishment. Student 4 indicated that he did not think an accidental offense should be punished. In response to "Why not?", he said: "I don't know. I never did that yet." This statement was interesting in its suggestion of the impact which actual experiences has on the thinking of the child; student 4 was not able to generalize in the absense of actual experience.

Regarding Test Question 3, Consideration of Interests and Truth-telling, on the basis of observation of student behavior during the second half of the program, it was assessed that all students in both groups responded truthfully, with the exception of student 2. It is possible that providing moral instruction in a non-punitive context effected an increase in honesty.

The fourth and fifth questions which were submitted to students follow in the text.

Test Question IV: Theft

Have you ever taken something that doesn't belong to you from someone else? What do you think about someone taking something that doesn't belong to him/her from someone else?

- Student 1: a. No. Just my brother does.
b. Just that I couldn't share my toys or anything anymore and I would tell them that they couldn't play with my things any more.
- Student 2: a. No.
b. I don't think that's right.
(Why not?)
Because it's rude.
- Student 3: a. No.
b. I would go and tell my mommy so we could take it back to our house.
(What do you think about someone taking something that doesn't belong to her?)
They are bad. They would have to return it.
(Why are they bad?)
They had taken something of mine. I would tell them I want to keep it and I would go with my mommy to get it back.
- Student 4: a. No.
b. I don't know. I don't like people to take anything.
(Probing did not produce further response.)
- Student 5: a. No.
b. It's not nice to take things.
(Why not?)
It's just not very nice for them to take my things.
- Student 6: a. No.
b. It isn't very nice.
(Why not?)
Someone might want to play with his things and he wouldn't have them.
- Student 7: a. No.
b. It's wrong because people might want to use their things.
- Student 8: a. I don't think so.
b. You wouldn't have the things you really want.
- Student 9: a. No.
b. They might want to play with it and they can't if someone has taken it.

- Student 10: a. No.
 b. It's wrong to take something that isn't yours.
 The person might want to use it and it's gone.

Observation: Four students in Group 1 indicated self-orientation in their responses; they answered the question, which had been expressed with impersonal referents, as though the offense had been directed against them. Four students indicated other-directedness/consideration of interests in their responses in Group 2.

Test Question V: Affective Response

Imagine that you have a new truck/doll and when another boy/girl visits you, you give it him/her to play with. How would you feel if he/she tossed it back to you in an unkind way?

- Student 1: I'd not let her have it any more.
 (How would you feel?)
 If it was metal, I would be hurt.
- Student 2: I'd just throw it (unclear on tape).
 (How would you feel?)
 Alright.
- Student 3: I would go and tell my mommy. I wouldn't feel very happy.
- Student 4: Tell my mother. My mother would tell him not to do it again.
 (How would you feel?)
 It's okay if he misses me.
- Student 5: I wouldn't play with her.
 (How would you feel?)
 I don't know.
- Student 6: I'd say 'don't throw it'.
 (How would you feel?)
 Hurt. I'd tell him that hurt my feelings.
- Student 7: I would ask my mom what to do, and then I would do it.
 (How would you feel?)
 Bad. I would tell her she shouldn't do it.
- Student 8: I would say 'don't do that'. I would tell her 'that's wrong'.
 (How would you feel?)

I'd feel rather bad. But I would still be kind to her.

Student 9: I'd say 'don't play'.
(How would you feel?)
Quite hurt.

Student 10: I would still play with him.
(How would you feel?)
Oh, I don't know.

Observations: In Group 1, one student (student 3) described an affective response; in Group 2, four students described affective responses. A possible reason for the difference in responses will be discussed under EGO DEVELOPMENT.

The students in both groups asked the researcher prior to the final testing whether they would be "getting the same questions". The researcher responded in both groups: "Some questions will be the same, and some will be new questions". The only explanation which can be made of the fact that the students in both groups gave almost identical responses to the first three questions during initial and final testing, is that they vividly recalled the three questions and their responses, and thought of that part of the assignment as having been completed in the past.

THE RATINGS

Two raters were engaged to evaluate instruction and student behaviors in the two groups. Rater 1, on the basis of hearing 10 ten-minute segments of tape, identified 5 segments as indicating rule-oriented instruction, and five segments as indicating reason-oriented instruction with 100% accuracy.

Rater 2, on the basis of hearing 5 ten-minute segments of

tape recorded in Group 1, and 5 ten-minute segments of tape recorded in Group 1, rated student behaviors in the two groups on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 indicated absence of the behavior, and 7 indicated exceptionally high frequency of the behavior. I-orientation, other-orientation, competitiveness, echoing, and moral behavior was assessed.

The ratings (see Appendix F) generally indicate that:

- i. I-orientation progressively decreased in Group 1, though not in Group 2.
- ii. Other-orientation increased in both groups, then stabilized in Group 1, though not in Group 2, where it continued to increase.
- iii. Competitiveness remained high in Group 1, though not in Group 2.
- iv. Echoing ceased in Group 2, though not in Group 1.
- v. Moral behavior increased significantly only in Group 2.

The ratings were supportive of the observations regarding group development provided in the text.

What has been suggested in this chapter is that though two groups of students provided very similar answers to a set of moral questions at the onset of the study, though their behavior in the classroom was very much the same at the onset of the study, though their task-related ability was the same, and though they received moral treatment from the same instructor, moral behavior developed in one group, in which reasoning was used to convey moral instruction, and not in another, in which rule-oriented instruction was given.

Under rule-based instruction:

1. Rules did not 'bite' into behavior: behavior indicated compliance with rules at the time when the instruction was given, but did not indicate compliance after the event.
2. Rules remained external, students 'rattled off' rules without, to appearance, thinking about them.
3. Tattling and criticism of others was perceived; students appeared to use rules, at times, as a vehicle for levelling accusations at others regarding insignificant events.
4. Conformity appeared and was generalized in behavior.
5. Cooperation failed to increase; I-orientation continued.
6. Students generally failed to show empathetic response, even when such was elicited.
7. Students did not exercise reasoning, either in moral matters, or otherwise, e.g. to settle disputes.

Under reasoning as a method of instruction:

1. Behavior was observed to change durably, to show a progressive increase in moral orientation.
2. Tattling and criticism of others was replaced by praise of others.
3. Students came to value the uniqueness of their work, and that of their peers.
4. Cooperation increased; other-orientation increased.
5. Students indicated empathetic responses verbally and in their treatment of a peer.
6. Students engaged in reasoning during instructional periods, and otherwise, e.g. as a means of solving problems among themselves.

In the following chapter, explanations for the divergence

which was observed in developments in the two groups are suggested.

CHAPTER 5

THE DISCUSSION

Dramatic differences have been described. Reconciliation of those differences is proposed in this chapter by means of a closer examination of ego development in the young child, and a discussion of the possible effects of moral instruction on such development.

Initially, to indicate the tentative nature of the findings presented here, the limitations of the study are discussed. Secondly, the inadequacy of moral stage theory is discussed in order to 'clear the air' for consideration of the substantive theory which follows. To conclude, possibilities for further exploration are suggested.

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

Since the researcher performed, in addition to planning the study, as instructor, observer, and reporter of events, this study is open to criticism regarding bias. The engagement of two raters who also observed the phenomena described in this study, and the use of tape recordings to analyze events were arranged to offset such criticism, though the context is discovery. The researcher provided instruction in Group 2 as the person familiar with the method of instruction to be examined. It was considered important that the same person provide instruction in Group 1 for the following reason.

During a year of teaching primary students in which reasoning was utilized as a form of instruction, marked and durable

behavioral changes indicating moral development were observed. Though it seemed that the behavioral changes had been effected by reasoning, it was not known whether moral treatment which had been extended to the students by the teacher might have produced the observed results. It was decided, therefore, that moral treatment should be extended to students in both experimental groups by the same person, to further account for the effects of teacher personality. Suggestions for improvement in the design of the study will be provided at the end of this chapter.

Another criticism of this work which might be put forward is that it is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain whether reasoning - and not the absence of rules - was responsible for effects observed in Group 2, and whether rules, rather than the absence of reasoning, produced the results in Group 1. In this regard, strategies which were applied and their effects may be recalled.

Responses to test questions administered at the onset of the study were similar in the two groups. The responses indicated that the students had knowledge of what constitutes morally appropriate treatment of others. After the two types of instruction had been applied in the two groups, students in both groups were encouraged to exercise empathetic reasoning in a midpoint test. Though the students in Group 1 had shown consideration of others' feelings during the initial testing, they failed to do so in the midpoint test. Since the initial test consisted in anecdotal input as related by the researcher, and the midpoint test consisted in the playing of a childrens'

record (the student heard the voices of the little boy and his offenders), it seems likely that students would be more motivated to exercise empathy in the second situation than in the first. Absence of reasoning in itself could not have produced the effect which was observed. The situation suggests that something mitigated strongly against engagement in empathetic reasoning. Since attempts were made during and after the midpoint test to elicit reasoning (about rules) in Group 1 to no observable effect, it is suggested that presence of rules may have produced failure to respond empathetically and failure to exercise reasoning in Group 1. In Group 2, the dissolution of egocentric thinking in direct response to reasoning was observable during the discussion which has been reported on pages 76 to 77; it appears safe to suggest that presence of reasoning produced observed changes in attitudes and behaviors.

One problem which was encountered when the student program was in progress was the frequent absenting of two students. It was not possible to anticipate this problem in advance of its actualization, since the parents of all students had assured the researcher that their children would attend the sessions regularly. Absenting in both cases was apparently due to the occurrence of unforeseen events. Examination of transcripts after the completion of the program suggested some benefit might be gained as a result of student absence in this particular study, since the two students were absent approximately the same number of times and since they both attended the initial and final sessions, but not the intermediate sessions, during which the major instruction was given. Their absence facilitat-

ed making additional comparisons, e.g., between the types of peer treatment the two students encountered upon their return to the program.

Findings which have been presented and which are to follow should be regarded as tentative due to the small number of students on which the specific observations were based, and due to the short duration of the instructional program. Since the researcher has observed effects of reasoning and rule-based instruction elsewhere in classrooms, findings are presented with a certain degree of confidence, though not as verificational.

Many uncertainties remain, e.g. would discussing rules with students, i.e. explaining their importance, result in a greater degree of moral orientation? In the ensuing discussion of ego development and moral development, the confines which have been mentioned become particularly prohibitive; explanations are advanced as highly tentative.

In many cases, in the preceding chapters, a single example or incident has been cited to support an observation. Attempt has been made to provide examples which are appropriate as descriptors in accordance with actual events, and to cite only such observations as were well substantiated by proceedings in the classroom. It was estimated that to provide further exemplification would be to produce needless fatigue in the reader in this exploratory study.

MORAL STAGE THEORY

To be discussed in this section are, first, certain obser-

vations of early development, secondly, theoretical implications of those observations, and thirdly, the significance of the present findings for moral stage theory.

Jean Piaget described egocentrism as a stage of development which endures between the ages of two to seven. Eight of the ten children observed in this study revealed egocentric thought and behavior, as described by Piaget, at the onset of the study. Of interest here is moral development. Piaget studied childrens' attitudes to rules in the context of games of marbles. Research studies indicate that children draw distinctions between moral and nonmoral rules (see Chapter 2). It is not possible to accept the Piagetian description of early moral development which is provided in The Moral Judgment of the Child due to the confusion it represents - the admixture of childrens' responses to rules of the game and their moral thinking.

Observations of his daughter Jacqueline, reported in the above-mentioned text may be examined. Piaget reported a number of incidents in which Jacqueline committed offenses, then cried, e.g. she pulled threads out of a blanket against the wishes of her mother. In spite of the fact that attempts were made to prevent her from experiencing guilt, and though she was assured that she had not done wrong after committing offenses, she cried. Though Jacqueline smiled in an "ill-concealed" manner -testing limits- in one instance cited, Piaget believed that the egocentric child is incapable of understanding intentionality; the child's moral realism is based on material consequences.¹⁴⁰ If this is the case, the child is incapable

of moral learning during the egocentric stage.

Observations of her own children (see Appendix C) and present observations do not support the idea of moral realism, e.g., why did students in Group 1 indicate intentionality and show consideration in responding to initial test questions, then fail to show empathy during the midpoint observation? Piaget's theory can explain the second phenomenon only if it is disassociated from the first.

Piaget believed that the young child experiences "confusion of the ego and the external world,"¹⁴¹ that the child is not conscious of the ego as a separate entity. It is impossible, therefore, for him to cooperate. In response to the extreme affectation which student 1 displayed, perceiving ego injury in this student, the researcher gave her special opportunities to exercise responsibility. Affectation began to diminish. Briefly, on one occasion (observably), the child confronted her own base estimation of herself in a situation permitting it - one in which she had performed well. Affectation served to hide her lowly (as self-appraised) self from others.

In Group 2, dramatic changes in behavior occurred suddenly in student 6 as a result of the discussion reported on page 77. He appeared to gain insight which released him from the domination of self. Cooperation was observed in this student immediately, increasingly, and durably after the discussion. In response to moral discussion, this student, and his peers, showed increasing moral orientation in their behavior. It seems that there may be "intrinsic orders" which Piaget did not perceive. The matter is discussed under EGO DEVELOPMENT.

If children are capable of understanding and being governed by moral principles when they are encouraged to reason about behaviors and their moral significance, as observations which have been reported appear to suggest, instruction in accordance with principles of stage theory represents a total wastage of the ability of the child to think and feel in such a manner as to experience the dignity of human existence. The freedom which students experienced increasingly in Group 2 enabled them to exercise their intellectual abilities and their affections in constructive and creative ways, for example to ask questions which anticipated cognitive stimulation, to further exercise creative thinking during their work on projects, to think how they might effectively help a peer in distress.

Are any of the stages described by Kohlberg, other than stage 6, moral? The stages may be briefly described as follows:

I. Preconventional level:

Stage 1: Punishment and obedience orientation.

Stage 2: Instrumental-relativist orientation.

II. Conventional level:

Stage 3: 'Good boy - nice girl' orientation.

Stage 4: Law and order orientation.

III. Postconventional, autonomous, or principled level:

Stage 5: Social contract, legalistic orientation.

Stage 6: Universal, ethical principle orientation.

Children who participated in the present study, being assessed at a preconventional level, would be given instruction so as to promote their learning from stage 1 to stage 2 in accordance with stage theory. Children in Group 2 revealed that they were capable of understanding - and being guided by - stage 6 oriented instruction. If present findings are verified, stage theory will have to be reevaluated. It is suggested that

reevaluation is further called for by the fact that only the sixth stage, ultimately, is moral in orientation.

EGO DEVELOPMENT

The following discussion of ego development is based on comparisons which were drawn among and between the behaviors of the students who participated in the instructional program.

At the onset of the study the assumption was entertained that the ego is a system of interacting elements in which compensatory mechanisms may operate. If self-esteem is low in a child, being granted the opportunity to engage in tasks which maximize the use of his ability, and so being able to experience success, he may develop increased self-esteem. As has been indicated, the original naive formulation was as follows: Where parents have not made provision for development of positive self-concept or ego development, the primary teacher by means of affirmation of the student's ability and the assignment of appropriate tasks must compensate for the lack. Such compensation must be provided to establish a base for moral development, and for learning in general.

Why did task accomplishment not hold more significance for students in Group 1? Like students in Group 2, they strove for perfection. Initially they required encouragement from the researcher to tackle what appeared to them as impossible tasks. With assistance, they were able to succeed in task-related activity. This produced a sense of competence in the students so that they were able to embark on tasks thereafter with confidence. Though students developed competence and the sense of compe-

tence, they continued to seek approval after completion of their work, unlike the students in Group 2. Even though the researcher was extending moral consideration to these students, their achievement did not observably influence ego development; their egocentric behaviors persisted.

Egocentrism, according to Piaget, consists in lack of individual identity. During the observation of the ten children, it did not appear that they lacked self-concept, but rather that they were extremely insecure, that they were lacking in all aspects of ego development. Their intense efforts to prove superiority over their peers in almost all situations, and their I-orientation, seemed to portray a self struggling vainly, and hence repeatedly, to establish its worth. The child in this situation is very vulnerable - so many situations are threatening: he may not be the tallest (student 4), not be able to count "the farthest" (student 2), etc. The route to self worth did not appear to be ability (students 2 and 7) or having possessions (student 6). Yet the self, in need, persisted to struggle. Students 1 and 4 competed over identical coloring books they had received from the visiting police officer: "Mine's the nicest", "No, I have a better coloring book", (to the amusement of student 2).

The behavior of student 2 was interesting in that she did not display egocentrism at the onset of the study, then began to do so in the final sessions. When self-concept has developed in the child, can it be forgotten i.e. can the self forget its own existence? According to Piaget's theory, this is what transpired. Such appears improbable; student 2 was not amnesic.

Since student 2, who initially appeared to be 'well-adjusted' began to engage in I-oriented competitiveness, why did student 3 not do so? She must have wanted to participate in activity with her peers - her behaviors were otherwise normal, e.g. she was not withdrawn. Upon rereading her statements on the transcript, the researcher realized that the statements of student 3, though few, suggested self-acceptance throughout, e.g. she was not ashamed - she did not experience defeat - if she made an error. She never boasted.

Comparisons were drawn between the behaviors of students in the two groups in response to instruction. Each set of behaviors contained mutually supporting items; there was consistency among the items. At the base of behavioral items in Group 1 was self-orientation; in Group 2, moral orientation.

The researcher turned to the example of student 6. During a lengthy moral discussion, his thinking had changed. Behaviors which followed the discussion had revealed dissolution of egocentrism. His responses to the instruction had suggested that he wanted to have "nice kind of thoughts". In response to the suggestion that he say to his warring friend: "Don't you think it would be better to be friends?", he had brightened. Egocentrism, however claimed his brief optimism. As the discussion progressed, the point made was that: "If you do what is right, you can respect yourself". It is noteworthy that, though Piaget denied this possibility, the sense of what is right and what is wrong was well established in this student. In order to alleviate himself of blame, he had to assign mal-

sciousness of intention to his friend. Doing this, he was (visibly) disturbed. It appeared that this student escaped from bondage when he was told how he might gain self-respect. The situation suggests the operation of valence. Student 6 appeared to perceive the moral value of doing what is right, since he did not proceed thereafter to show a 'good-boy' orientation, but rather to treat his peers with consideration.

In searching for an explanation of the development which had occurred in Group 2, the researcher had guessed that valence might be involved. The case of student 6 posed yet another question however. Why did his behavior change so suddenly ... why did all the students in Group 2 engage in moral discussions so willingly and begin to show moral orientation during so brief a study?

The illustration involving Jacqueline was recalled. If the child at 2 knows when she has done something against the wishes of another (Jacqueline knew her mother did not approve of her pulling threads from the blanket)- if she knows that she has done wrong, and the adult provides no route for expiation (Piaget typically told Jacqueline that wrongdoings were not her fault at this age, since he believed the egocentric child cannot understand intentionality), the child may feel that the adult is incapable of sharing her experience - or worse, unwilling to do so. Jacqueline, then, experiencing isolation from which there was no escape, cried.

The explanation given above, if correct, can explain why students responded so readily to moral reasoning. If the child has a naive moral sense at a very early age, the child

may experience the failure of the adult to communicate in depth with him as unjust, hurtful. He may appreciate not only the consideration and understanding which is shown if the adult reasons with him, but also the opportunity to obtain guidance in moral matters. The students indicated a high degree of readiness to receive moral instruction.

Examination of the behaviors of students 2 and 7 seemed to indicate that knowledge of self is insufficient to provide a base for moral learning. It also appeared possible that the only way in which the child can come to perceive his own worth is if the notion is conveyed in the relational context of the value of self and others. Such value is implicit in universal moral principles.

If the child is a morally sensitive being from the first years, behaviors in Group 1, as well, find explanation. When the students were asked moral questions at the onset of the study their responses indicated moral awareness i.e. knowledge of what is morally right. The researcher then introduced rule-based instruction. If rules represent constraint which they do not understand to children - and indicate gross insensitivity on the part of the rule-giver - children may be able to 'shut-off' certain affective response mechanisms. If the children in Group 1 were themselves feeling hurt, they may have not had the resource to enter empathetically into the situation of the little boy in the recording.

The inner isolation and pain which has been referred to can explain the need to develop defense mechanisms, e.g., affectation, 'ideal self', obsessive talking. Lack

of valence makes understandable the continued need for approval which students in Group 1 experienced. Their drive for conformity may have represented another coping mechanism, an attempt to find externally the security they internally lacked. (Conformity, further, can help to ward off the threat which peers may represent to the child who is insecure.)

It may be the case that absence of rules combined with the presence of reasoning produced moral development in Group 2, and that imposition of rules exerts such a negative influence on students that even if they are encouraged to reason about rules as they were in this study, they find the imposition too oppressive to be able to do so, in the absence of the unilateral respect which Piaget referred to.

Egocentrism has been described as a condition which exerts tenacious control on thought. In early infancy, egocentrism may serve vital purposes. If allowed to persist beyond its usefulness, however, it may produce undesirable consequences, e.g., students 4 and 6 denied offenses, lacking the ability to admit to error. Results in this study suggest that the ability to cooperate can be developed at an early age if reasoning is presented and elicited.

Finally, if valence developed in Group 2 students in response to reasoning based on universal principles, we find the disappearance of egocentric behaviors explained. Students no longer had to compete to try to prove their worth; they could value themselves and others freely.

In this section, a new hypothesis has been detailed. Reasoning in accordance with universal moral principles may

foster the development of valence in the young child. Development of valence may facilitate the dissolution of egocentrism so that the child becomes capable of moral development.

MORAL DEVELOPMENT

To begin, several additional comments are made regarding rules and reasoning in this section. Its main purpose, however, is to suggest the importance of moral development to learning in the primary classroom.

Edward de Bono writes:

The spotting of faults - regardless of its usefulness in debate or argument - is only one aspect of thinking. (It) concludes no generative, constructive, or creative elements. The avoidance of faults does not improve one's ability to plan or to make decisions.¹⁴²

His observation has relevance in the matter of 'don't' sanctions supplied to children to promote moral learning. Though the adult may understand the social benefit of rule observation, the young child may find that concept remote, irrelevant to his needs. The notion R.S. Peters expresses (see Chapter 1) is that children can understand rules sooner than they can understand reasoning. The converse, however, may be true. When reasoning is elicited cooperation is elicited; moral reasoning opposes egocentrism directly, with a second type of ammunition.

To return to Edward de Bono's suggestion, need for positive approaches to instruction are required. In the present study the effect of positive instruction was directly observable during the lengthy discussion with student 6. He wanted to be able to think "nice kind of thoughts", to do what is right, to

build self-respect. The results of the study are optimistic. Children upon entering kindergarten, it appears, are amenable to moral learning.

A number of effects observed in Group 2 suggest the importance of fostering moral development in the primary classroom. First, it promoted personal freedom so that students were able to exercise their abilities unrestrained by egocentric concerns. Secondly, it established an atmosphere of mutual respect in which instructor and students could work together in cooperation. Thirdly, it resulted in peer supportiveness. Students did not have to fear, or suffer from, peer intimidation. Fourth, and most important, it appeared to promote a sense of personal worth. To summarize, it gave the students freedom to engage in the adventure of education.

SUGGESTIONS

It is hoped that this work has suggested possibilities for study to the research-oriented reader. The description of group developments under the two types of instruction, and all of the interpretive suggestions made under EGO DEVELOPMENT require further exploratory investigation.

A study might be designed to compare the effects of rules with the effects of moral reasoning on students over the period of a year of classroom instruction. Use of tape recordings which facilitate observation of tone of voice is essential in an enterprise of this sort: "I can do this myself" can mean: "I am pleased that I have learned how to do this", or it can suggest: "You can't do this, you're inferior" hurled at a peer.

It might be possible to make computer-assisted assessments based on tape recordings, though such an undertaking would have to be approached with caution due to the communicative power of tone of voice. Students themselves might be able to supply information about their learning if given the opportunity to listen to tape recordings depicting their earlier reasoning. Such a study might include longitudinal assessment based on yearly interviews with students subsequent to the primary data gathering period. Though an increase in rational inquiry in response to reasoning was observed during the conducting of the present study, it was not possible to describe this phenomenon on the basis of short-term observation. It is important that research address this matter.

Another suggestion is that reasoning (and/or rules) and behavior feeding into each other be studied. Research possibilities are limitless, since so little is known about early moral development.

Statements which have been accepted, which appear innocuous or even self-evident, may have to be examined. "Self-esteem depends enormously on the messages which children read ... from the way in which they are treated."¹⁴³ The present research suggests that extending moral treatment to very young students may be insufficient to promote self-esteem. There is an exigent need for further research regarding the development of valence; sense of worth may be the most fundamental of the "conditions" of education.

APPENDIX A

THE PROPOSED STUDY OUTLINE

Two groups of five-year-olds will be recruited to participate in a program described to parents as a naturalistic study of early social interaction in an educational play setting. The vagueness of the study title, which appears on the parental consent form, was deliberately planned since it is vital to the purpose of the study that parents remain uninformed of the different approaches to instruction which are being applied in the two groups to insure that program intervention and not parent intervention is responsible for results obtained. Parents were informed that the social interaction of children in the two groups would be observed and recorded on tape.

The strategy may be defended on the following grounds:

1. the rules to be submitted to children in group one are common and general in nature - see Appendix B;
2. participants in group one will attend an extra session in which the reason moral rules are observed is thoroughly discussed;
3. if a participant in group one asks why it is important to observe a particular rule (s)he will be supplied with a reason;
4. both approaches - rule-oriented and reasoning induction - are used variously by kindergarten teachers in regular classrooms.

The two groups will be matched according to age, sex and social background. The two independent variables involved are rule induction and reasoning. The dependent measure is cognitive as well as behavioral development. At the first sessions, test questions will be submitted to participants in both groups. All 12 instructional sessions will be recorded and transcribed. In the final session, the same set of questions will be submitted to participants. Final responses will be compared with the original responses of each participant.

The study will examine the effect of the two approaches on a. the incidence of moral behaviors, e.g. sharing, taking turns, truth-telling, helping others; and b. the participants' understanding of moral principles of consideration of interests and truth-telling as indicated by verbal responses to test questions.

APPENDIX B

LIST OF RULES

- Form queue
- * Take turns
- * Don't talk out of turn
- Don't hog conversation
- Don't take what isn't yours
- * Obey impartial judges (umpire, parent, teacher)

- Don't bully
- * Don't interfere
- Respect others' privacy
- Don't use (manipulate) people
- Don't coerce or force others

- * Don't be selfish, greedy
- * Help others in need
- Don't insult or degrade others
- * Be kind
- * Be thoughtful of others
- Be generous

- Don't physically or mentally hurt others
- Don't fight
- Don't be mean
- Don't steal
- * Don't damage property
- Don't mess needlessly

- Don't cheat
- Don't lie
- Don't "cook" evidence
- Don't deceive
- Don't be a hypocrite
- Don't gossip

Asterisk: The rule was referred to in Group 1.

INFANT OBSERVATION

Several representative observations are indicated regarding early thinking as evidenced by the writer's son.

1. Awareness of right and wrong/Intention (16 months-preverbal):

a. If Anthony committed an offense, and was told: "It's not right to ... , is it?", he hung his head; experience of guilt became visible. This was followed by discussion of the offense, guilt did not stabilize. Changes in behavior resulted.

b. A second response to implication of wrongdoing was a soft crying indicating injury. When the wrongdoing was reassessed in terms of intentionality, e.g., "You didn't know that? I'm sorry. Mommy didn't realize you didn't know about that. Now you know, right?", harmony was restored.

2. Delay of gratification/Consideration of interests (16 months):

Anthony woke up wanting an orange. The orange was prepared. He pointed to one half and said "Neenie" (he wanted his sister to have that half), then proceeded to take the orange to his sister who was still asleep. Upon the suggestion that he wait until she awoke to give her the orange, he deliberated, then put the plate of oranges on a table. Though he was hungry for the orange, he waited for 30 minutes until his sister awoke; then he gave her the first half.

3. Cooperation (24 months): When Richard, a new neighbour his age visited, Anthony did not let Richard play with his toys, which he values highly. When Richard left, Anthony was admonished: "Maybe next time you'll let Richard play with your toys". Prior to Richard's next visit, Anthony was asked: "Do you think Richard will be happy if he has no toys to play with?" Anthony allowed Richard to play freely, without any intervention.

4. Self concept (25 months): Asked to cease from a behavior, Anthony said: "All done" to protect self. (27 months): He weighed alternatives in decision-making. If he failed to take account of a relevant consideration, and it was mentioned to him, he smiled and said: "Oh yes!" in a manner which implied: 'I forgot that', and indicated self-acceptance. At 15 months, he insisted that he be referred to, without exception, as a "boy" instead of a baby. At 26 months in imitative play he was a daddy, big man, or boy as distinct from himself; he showed a definite conception of determinate identity. At 32 months, strength of self (stability of self concept) has developed so that he accepts all of: "baby", "big boy", "little boy", according to the context of their use, as applied to him.

5. Consideration (32 months): Before using something his sister has used, he assesses whether she is finished with it, e.g., he begins to play, saying, "Neenie all done", smiling contentedly. He moves a chair to the kitchen sink to eat an orange (which has never been suggested) saying: "No make mess ... mommy" in a kind manner (I don't want to make a mess for mommy). His speech indicates more other-oriented than I-oriented statements.


APPENDIX D

STUDENT PROJECT SCHEDULE



- Week One: Kite Project
- making a kite: learning measurement, manual dexterity.
 - flying the kite: studying air currents.
- Week Two: Weather Project
- cloud formations: study of cirrus, stratus, nimbus clouds.
 - weather: study of rain, sun.
- Week Three: Clay Project
- science experiment: study of air, evaporation.
 - molding a clay object ; a further study of
 - painting the dry object ; evaporation
- Week Four: Weaving Project
- basket weaving: measuring and cutting the form accurately.
 - weaving the basket: to be integrated with a social studies lesson.
- Week Five: Nature Study
- nature hike: study of coniferous and deciduous trees
 - art project: spatter prints, making covers for project books.
- Week Six: Community Study
- ambulance visit.
 - police station visit.
- The purpose of this project is to broaden understanding, to depict helpfulness of hospital and law enforcement staff. The children will make murals to illustrate their learning.
- Week Seven: Concluding Activities
- completion of science project books.
 - surprise project and picnic.

Stories, music, art, rhyme, physical movement will be used to promote learning and to evoke special interest in learning.


EVAPORATION



Evaporation





Rain





Aains

Student 1


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
Student 4



Student 3




evaporation




rain

Student 7



evaporation







rain

Student 6

evaporation



Evaporation



RAIN



RAIN

Student 8

Student 9

APPENDIX F: RATINGS OF STUDENT BEHAVIOR

Session	Behavior	Group 1					Group 2				
1	I-orientation					X					X
	Other-orientation	X					X				
	Competitiveness					X				X	
	Echoing				X				X		
	Moral	X					X				
3	I-orientation					X					X
	Other-orientation		X					X			
	Competitiveness					X		X			
	Echoing		X				X				
	Moral	X						X			
5	I-orientation				X			X			
	Other-orientation	X							X		
	Competitiveness				X		X				
	Echoing				X		X				
	Moral	X							X		
7	I-orientation					X	X				
	Other-orientation	X								X	
	Competitiveness					X	X				
	Echoing			X			X				
	Moral	X									X
9	I-orientation					X	X				
	Other-orientation	X								X	
	Competitiveness					X	X				
	Echoing				X		X				
	Moral	X									X

- 1 Peters, R. S. (1981). Moral Development and Moral Education. London: George Allen & Unwin. p. 180.
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