TOWARDS HEGEMONY: THE RISE OF BOLIVIA'S INDIGENOUS MOVEMENTS

by

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Abstract

Analysing the rise of Bolivia's indigenous movements from the perspective of Otero's political-cultural formation theory (PCF), this thesis focuses on the Katarista movement, in the 1970s-1980s; and on the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) which has become the country's governing party. In examining the progression of these movements through the PCF, this project considers the impact of three determining factors; regional cultural and economic processes, state intervention, and leadership types. These factors interacted to produce different political outcomes. With Katarismo, the cultural processes shaped a movement primarily based on identity, limiting its political appeal. Furthermore, its leadership was unable to unify the movement. These factors had a different impact on the MAS as it was capable of organizing around both class and identity, enabling it to broaden its support base. The leadership's use of strategic alliances also facilitated the MAS's political ascent.

Keywords:

Indigenous movement, Bolivia, determining factors, political outcome, identity, class, state intervention, alliances

To my mother

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List of Abbreviations

ADN	Acción Democrática Nacional (National Democratic Action)
ASP	Asamblea de la Soberanía de los Pueblos (Assembly for the Sovereignty of the Peoples)
CIDOB	Confederación Indígena del Oriente Boliviano, later Confederación Indígena Del Oriente y Amazonia de Bolivia (Confederation of Eastern Bolivia, later Indigenous Confederation of the East and Amazon of Bolivia)
COB	Central Obrera Boliviano (Bolivian Workers Central)
CONAIE	Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de Ecuador (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador)
COR	Central Obrera Regional (Regional Workers Central)
CPIB	Central de Pueblos Indígenas del Beni (Indigenous Peoples Central of the Beni)
CSUTCB	Confederación Sindical Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (Unitary Syndical Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia)
EGTK	Ejército Guerrillero Tupak Katari (Tupak Katari Guerrilla Army)
EZLN	Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (Zapatista National Liberation Army)
FTCLP	Federación Departamental de Trabajadores Campesinos de La Paz (Federation of Peasant Workers of the Department of La Paz)
FEJUVES	Federación de Juntas Vecinales (Federation of Neighbourhood Committees)
INRA	Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria (National Institute of Agrarian Reform)

IU	Izquierda Unida (United Left)
MAS	Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement Toward Socialism)
MBL	Movimiento Bolivia Libre (Free Bolivia Movement)
MIP	Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti (Pachakuti Indigenous Movement)
MITKA	Movimiento Indio Tupac Katari (Tupac Katari Indian Movement)
MNR	Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (Nacional Revolutionary Movement)
MRTK	Movimiento Revolucionario Tupak Katari (Tupak Katari Revolutionary Movement)
MUJA	Movimiento Universitario Julián Apasa (Julian Apasa University Movement)
NSM	New Social Movement Theory
PCF	Political-Cultural Formation Theory
PCML	Partido Comunista Leninista (Leninist Communist Party)
PMC	Pacto Militar – Campesino (Military-Peasant Pact)
UDP	Union Democrática y Popular (Popular Democratic Unity)

Foreword

In my initial proposal for this research, I had planned to conduct field research in Bolivia; however, I was unable to complete it as I had intended. This was largely because of the political turmoil that destabilized the country throughout the first six months of 2005. I had intended to travel to Bolivia in February 2005, but was forced to stay in Peru for six weeks because of the political unrest in the country. When I was able to enter Bolivia, I had difficulties adjusting to the high altitude in La Paz. Therefore, I stayed in Sucre for a few weeks as this allowed me to make a more gradual adjustment to the higher altitudes of the altiplano.

Unfortunately, when I did return to La Paz in April, I had less than a month to conduct my research before political unrest returned to the city in May. This gave me insufficient time to secure contacts within the indigenous community. I did have the opportunity to do much informal research, such as working with English as a Second Language classes in both Sucre and La Paz, in which I was fortunate to discuss political events with 50 to 60 adult students. Although these views represented a middle class perspective, they allowed me to gain an incredible insight into the relationship between the middle classes and the indigenous peoples. These conversations also enabled me to understand other aspects of Bolivian culture, which proved to be invaluable in guiding my selection of resources. One of the most valuable lessons I learned was how historical events have continued to figure prominently in the thoughts and views

of the general Bolivian public. Coming from Canada, it was essential to realize the importance of such historical events in a country like Bolivia. Canadians have never suffered a humiliating defeat resulting in the loss of significant territory to another country, whereas Bolivians have experienced two such wars; the War of the Pacific (1879-1883) with Chile in which they lost valuable coastal territory and the Chaco War (1932-1935) with Paraguay in which they also lost significant territory. Although these events happened more than 50 years ago, Bolivians discuss them as if they happened last year. Therefore, I came to fully realize the significance of the "Gas War" and understand why the indigenous groups were able to gain wide-scale public support in their protests over the government's plans to export natural gas through a Chilean port. Moreover, it was this realization that guided me in modifying my research to include events that had historical significance such as the gas protests.

In addition, the experience of witnessing the protests in May/June, 2005 gave me a valuable insight into the country's indigenous uprising. I was stranded in La Paz during the turbulent weeks when there were daily confrontations between the police and thousands of protestors, most of whom were indigenous people from El Alto as well as from the rural communities in the altiplano (highlands). As the political situation grew more uncertain, the need to follow minute-by-minute news reports on the radio grew more urgent. This included listening to the nightly broadcasts, which covered the 5 to 6 hour sessions of Congress, in which the political elites of the country struggled to find a solution to the country's impasse. In the first week of the protests, I had the opportunity to attend some of the rallies including the first MAS (Movimiento al Socialismo)

rally in La Paz that drew over 20,000 people. However, as the weeks progressed, the confrontations between the protestors and the police made life increasingly difficult in the city. When the protests ended, I had wanted to stay longer as I had made numerous contacts who would have assisted me in my research. However, I had already extended my stay in Bolivia by two months and no longer had the finances to continue. I left Bolivia soon after the protests ended, and although I was not able to carry out my formal research, I was able to experience the protests first-hand and to attend a number of significant meetings and rallies.

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Thesis Introduction

In the last two decades, Bolivia has experienced the emergence of a dynamic indigenous mobilization. Some of the Aymara communities of the *altiplano* (highlands) began to mobilize in the late 1960s with the founding of Katarismo. However, it was not until the 1980s that the indigenous movement began to surge throughout the highlands and Amazonian regions of the country. Although this mobilization weakened considerably by the 1990s, the Aymara and Quechua peoples began to mobilize once again by the end of the decade. Through consolidating their organizations and aligning with other social groups, they increasingly gained political inclusion at the national level. In Bolivia's 2002 national elections, two of the main "indigenous" parties, Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement Toward Socialism - MAS) and Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti (Pachakuti Indigenous Movement - MIP) attained 27 percent of the popular vote. In the turbulent years that followed, indigenous organizations rose to become crucial articulators of the Bolivian public's dissatisfaction with government policies (Van Cott, 2003).

In 2003, a number of prominent El Alto indigenous organizations, along with the MAS, organized state-wide demonstations against the government's plans to export natural gas to the United States through a Chilean port. They succeeded in both halting these plans and forcing the resignation of President

Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada. Carlos Mesa, who assumed the Presidency, was able to appease these groups by holding a national referendum on the issue of gas exports and promising to hold a constituent assembly. However, the referendum did not specifically address the question of nationalization nor did the government begin a process to institute a constituent assembly. In the spring of 2005, the supporters of the MAS and the organizations of El Alto began to mobilize once again in order to force the government to address their demands. Mesa resigned his position in an attempt to end the protests and an interim president was sworn in, with plans for a December election. Leading up to this election, the MAS and its leader, Evo Morales, forged strategic alliances with both prominent indigenous and non-indigenous organizations. This helped Morales and the MAS to capture more than 50% of the electoral vote, enabling him and his party to form the first indigenous government in Latin America.

In seeking to understand this new phenomenon in Bolivian politics, this thesis will focus its analysis on the rise of the country's most prominent indigenous movement, the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) and will be guided by the following key question:

Why was the MAS able to build such a powerful counterhegemonic block that in the end was successful in challenging the governing elites?

In other words, what were some of the significant factors that shaped this organization, enabling it to unite a broader group of indigenous peoples as well as gain the support of other social and political organizations? More importantly,

how was it able to use this support in its efforts to mount an effective challenge against the political elites? And why was the MAS able to expand its political support over the last ten years, whereas the indigenous movements of the past, such as Katarismo, were never able to sustain their political momentum?

In addressing these questions, I will compare and contrast the development of two prominent indigenous movements, the Katarista movement of the 1970s and 1980s and the more recent MAS movement, within a framework based on Otero's theory of political-cultural formation (Otero, 1999). In using this synthetic approach, I will demonstrate the significance of three key determining factors in the progression of the movements; regional cultural processes, state intervention and leadership types and modes of participation.

More specifically, I will argue that these factors enabled the MAS to gain the broad-based political support needed to become the country's governing party in December, 2005.

Regional cultural processes enabled the MAS, and its predecessors, the cocalero organizations, to mobilize around both ethnic and class demands. In their efforts to bridge the divide between class and identity, they were able to broaden their appeal amongst Bolivia's popular sectors. State intervention, including electoral reforms and repressive policies, also played a decisive role in the movements' growth. The electoral reforms made it easier for small, local organizations to establish themselves as political parties. With these reforms, the cocalero organizations founded a political party, the Asamblea de la Soberanía de los Pueblos (Assembly for the Sovereignty of the People - ASP), and were able to

make substantial gains in the municipal elections. They were then able to build on this support to establish a national movement and political party, the MAS. The impact of the state's repressive policies was also significant in that it both intensified the mobilizations and galvanized public support for their demands. Leadership types and their strategies in both the cocalero organizations and the MAS further enabled them to broaden and expand their support base. In both movements, the leadership forged strategic alliances with other social and political organizations. As this analysis will demonstrate, the establishment of these alliances was a key strategy in the MAS's efforts to secure votes in the 2005 election.

1.2 Methodology

The principal method for conducting this research involved surveying and analyzing literature that was drawn from both secondary and primary sources. I was fortunate to find materials at a number of libraries and bookstores in La Paz, Bolivia. In particular, I relied on the library at the Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Laboral y Agrario (Centre of Labour and Agrarian Development Studies - CEDLA), a major non-governmental organization in La Paz. I was also able to purchase many books that focussed on the country's current political events. In addition, I had the opportunity to attend a number of rallies and meetings that provided resources and insights for my research.

A qualitative approach involving the case study method was used in carrying out this research. In these case studies, I analyzed the development of two significant indigenous movements; the Katarista movement of the 1970s and

1980s and the more recent movement of the MAS and its predecessors, the cocalero organizations. Through comparing these two movements, I was able to determine the key factors that helped to explain the political success of the MAS.

Although, these case studies are concerned with indigenous movements in Bolivia, the findings of this thesis can also be used to explain the progression of indigenous movements in other Latin American states. Indigenous movements have risen to challenge political elites in countries like Mexico, Peru, and Ecuador. The indigenous peoples in these countries share a similar historical background with those in Bolivia; struggling against both the Spanish conquerors and then their mestizo or ladino rulers. The majority of indigenous peoples live in poverty and face discrimination as second-class citizens in countries dominated by mestizo or ladino elites. Despite their subordinate position, these people as a group have resisted assimilation into the dominant society. Because of these similarities between the indigenous peoples, my case studies can also be used to explain the emergence and evolution of other Latin American indigenous movements.

I have analyzed the movements from a theoretical perspective that has been applied to the study of other Latin American indigenous movements. Otero (2004) analyzed the rise of Mexico's Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (Zapatista National Liberation Army - EZLN) from the PCF perspective. Otero and Jugenitz (2003) also applied the framework to the study of Ecuador's indigenous movement, the Confederación de Nacionalidades Indìgenas de Ecuador (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador – CONAIE). In

following the same framework, the case studies in this thesis will not only further our understanding of the indigenous movements, but they will contribute to the theoretical development of the PCF approach.

1.3 Overview of the Thesis

The thesis will be presented in the following manner: Chapter Two: Literature Review discusses the social movement literature that is relevant to the study of indigenous movements in Latin America. The purpose of this review is to draw attention to the current gaps in the literature, enabling me to establish my rationale for using Otero's political-cultural framework in this analysis.

Chapter Three: Theoretical Framework provides an overview of Otero's political-cultural formation theory (PCF). This section will outline the essential tenets of this theory and explain how they will be used to analyze Bolivia's indigenous movements.

Chapter Four: Historical Background presents a brief historical review of Bolivia's politics. This chapter focuses on significant events such as the Chaco War (1932-1935) and the 1953 Revolution as the consequences of these events continue to have an impact on current events.

Chapters Five and Six present the case studies, in which two of Bolivia's prominent indigenous movements are analyzed from the perspective of the PCF framework. In the first study, the progression of the Katarista movement is examined, following its rise in the 1970s and 1980s to its eventual decline in the

1990s. The second study focuses on the development of the MAS and its predecessors, the cocalero organizations.

Chapter Seven concludes this thesis with a comparison of the two case studies. The purpose of this comparison is to determine the factors that enabled the more recent movement, the MAS, to achieve political success on a national level.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Social movement scholars have been challenged in their attempts to explain the emergence of powerful indigenous movements throughout Latin America in the last two decades. The recent mobilization of Bolivia's indigenous peoples has provided a particularly challenging research topic for these analysts. In focusing on a few of the significant factors that have driven these movements, most researchers have only managed to provide a partial analysis. Petras and Veltmeyer (2000, 2001, 2005) are two such researchers, who in using a traditional Marxist approach, have narrowly focussed on the role of class in the indigenous mobilizations. Others such as Brysk (1994, 1996, 2000) and Mallon (1992) have primarily considered the role of identity. In choosing to focus on either class or identity, these analysts have neglected the dual character of these movements, in which both class and identity have been motivating factors. Even those who have developed synthetic approaches, such as Van Cott (1994, 2000a, 2003, 2005), Yasher (1997, 1998, 2005), and Postero (2004) have focussed too narrowly on one or two frameworks, thereby failing to provide a comprehensive analysis. As will be demonstrated in this literature review, only a truly synthetic approach like Otero's theory of political-cultural formation (PCF) can fully address the complexity of Bolivia's indigenous mobilizations.

The paradigms that have been used to explain the emergence of indigenous movements in Latin America have included traditional Marxism, new

social movement (NSM) theories, the political process model, and Neo-Gramscian approaches. The two dominant approaches, traditional Marxism and new social movement theories (NSM), each emphasize a different factor as the key political determinant. Traditional Marxism emphasizes class as the key determinant, while NSM theories focus on identity. Although the other aforementioned approaches have been more recently developed, they have become increasingly popular amongst Latin American social movement scholars. The political process model focuses on the notion of 'political opportunity structure.' This structure, which is "composed of state institutions and national political traditions," is considered to be a key variable that shapes both the emergence and strategies of the social movements, thereby determining their likelihood of success (Foweraker, 1995:19). The Neo-Gramscian approach draws theoretical concepts from traditional Marxism; however, it opposes Marx's economism as it also seeks to emphasize the political. It does not exclude economic variables, but aims to include the state and civil society as areas in which power can also be exercised (Bocock, 1986:35).

Two prominent sociologists, James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer (2000, 2001, 2005) have been particularly vigilant in asserting the continuing relevance of Marxist class analysis to the study of Latin American social movements including indigenous movements while at the same time challenging the basic assumptions of new social movement theory (Otero & Jugenitz, 2003:506). In supporting this claim, Petras and Veltmeyer (2000, 2001, 2005) provide several empirical examples of contemporary Latin American social movements in which they assert that the grievances motivating these organizations are rooted in the

relations of production (and not in identity). In studying many of the indigenous movements such as the Chiapas rebellions in Mexico, Veltmeyer and Petras claim that the conditions shaping these mobilizations have been structural and that the "participants have a clear theoretical awareness of themselves- of who they are in terms of their social identity as an exploited class and an oppressed people" (2000:120). According to these theorists, the discourse of the peasant intellectuals and the mobilization of the peasant-based movements clearly demonstrates that these groups have constituted themselves as a class and see themselves as "combatants in a class war" that has been "unleashed by the capitalist class and its state apparatus" (Petras & Veltmeyer, 2001:112). Therefore, Petras and Veltmeyer are critical of the NSM view that gives primacy to the individual as the shaper of his/her identity and claims that structural conditions do not necessarily define actors in any uniform or determined fashion.

In rejecting Marxism's reductionist emphasis on class as the primary determinant of political action, NSM theorists have drawn largely from European social movement theory which rejects Marxism's reductionist emphasis on (economic) class as the primary determinant of political action (Otero & Jugenitz, 2003: 307). European theory developed in the 1960s, when analysts found that the "class contradictions of industrial society were insufficient to explain the diverse and multiple social conflicts of post-modern society" (Foweraker, 1995:36). European scholars had been initially confounded by the social movements of the 1960s as these movements did not display class characteristics and they also differed from the old movements (generally characterized as the labour movement) in values, action forms, and consistency (Klandermans,

1991:24). In their search for other explanations, new movement theorists focused on social identity and identity formation. Touraine was one of these theorists who, in making a radical break from class analysis, "elaborated a social action theory in which social actors are seen to be the creators and carriers of social relations" (Foweraker, 1995:36). Modern society is viewed as being self-produced by these actors who struggle for control over their historical context. Thus, identity is no longer an "ascribed status" as it was in structural Marxism, but is "defined in terms of choice" or by "the claim to a capacity for action and for change" (Touraine, 1988:81,120).

One of the better known of the approaches that have evolved out of NSM extends the concept of cultural politics to the analysis of Latin American social movements (Alvarez, Dagnino & Escobar, 1998; Escobar & Alvarez, 1992). According to Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar (1998), cultural politics can be defined as:

> The process enacted when sets of social actors shaped by, and embodying, different cultural meanings and practices come into conflict with each other. This definition of cultural politics assumes that meanings and practices- particularly those theorized as marginal, oppositional, minority, residual, emergent, alternative, dissident, and the like, all of them conceived in relation to a given dominant cultural order – can be the source of processes that must be accepted as political (Alvarez, Dagnino & Escobar, 1998:5-6).

This definition implies that culture is political because meanings are made up of processes that implicitly or explicitly seek to redefine social power. This means that social movements enact cultural politics when they challenge the dominant cultural meanings by putting forward alternative conceptions of women, nature, race, economy, democracy, or citizenship. Therefore, the cultural

political approach to analyzing social mobilization focuses on "how the movements develop their own subjective meanings in opposition to dominant ones and through this process, articulate political responses to conditions of inequality or oppression" (Otero & Jugenitz 2003:507). Although Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar agree that contemporary Latin American social movements differ from those in the past, they claim that all movements enact a cultural politics. Throughout Latin America, popular actors are mobilizing "collectively on the grounds of very different sets of meanings and stakes," however "the collective identities and strategies of these movements are inevitably bound up with culture"(Alvarez, Dagnino & Escobar, 1998: 6).

Florencia Mallon (1992) has drawn largely from both New Social Movement theory and Gramscian theory to explain the indigenous movements of Mexico, Peru, and Bolivia. She claims that the "different political and intellectual constructions of ethnicity" in each of these countries has had a significant impact on the way in which indigenous cultures have structured the country's oppositional movements (Mallon, 1992: 40). According to Mallon, Bolivia's Katarismo movement of the 1970s, was largely shaped by both the unraveling of the country's mestizo hegemony and the emergence of a new counterhegemonic indigenous movement based on the Aymara culture. At the end of the 1970s, there was a "renaissance of Aymara culture among the students and urban intellectuals in La Paz" together with a "dynamic organization of peasant and communal groups in the Altiplano" (Mallon, 1992:47). Katarismo may have appeared as a broad multi-ethnic and multi-class alliance of peasants, students, workers, and intellectuals; however, it was essentially unified under the banner of

the Aymara culture and traditions; it did not make a direct appeal to class grievances.

Allyson Brysk (1994, 1996, 2000) also follows a New Social Movement approach in her study of Latin American indigenous movements. However, the phenomenon of globalization becomes an overwhelming context within her research, leading her to focus on the creation of transnational civil society as the area of struggle. She claims that the emergence of this new international context, in providing networks, resources, information, funds and so forth has brought new opportunities for the indigenous groups. Such opportunities have empowered them, strengthening their mobilizations.

In supporting this theory, Brysk demonstrates the impact of transnational advocacy networks on a number of key indigenous groups. Organizations such Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de Ecuador (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador - CONAIE) in Ecuador and Confederación Indígena del Oriente y Amazonia de Boliviano (Indigenous Confederation of the East and Amazon of Bolivia - CIDOB) in Bolivia were largely shaped by outside organizations. In Ecuador, the most important sources of mobilization were the Catholic Church, aid programs, and professional networks (2000:63), whereas in Bolivia, CIDOB was organized with the help of anthropologists and received financial and organizational support from a number of international organizations including Cultural Survival, the Inter-American Foundation, the South and Meso-American Indian Information Centre and the National Wildlife Federation (Brysk, 1996:44). Brysk also proposes that the growing transnational

network between the indigenous organizations themselves has also brought many new opportunities. This network has been particularly beneficial to the organizations in how it has improved their access to valuable information resources.

The political process model evolved out of resource mobilization theory and is based on the assumption that the opportunity to act is a primary requirement for the success of a social movement (see Tarrow, 1996,1998). Political process theorists therefore claim that changes in the structure of political opportunities can have a decisive impact on mobilization. According to Tarrow (1998:24), one of the main proponents of this approach, political opportunities can include the following factors: the degree of openness or closure of the polity; the stability or instability of alignments; divisions within the elite or its tolerance for protest; and the policy-making capacity of the government. The relationship between these opportunities and social mobilization is the primary focus of political process theorists and is viewed as one that involves strategic interactions between social movement organizations, the state, and other collective actors. Much of this interaction involves "various instances of repression and facilitation, as groups manipulate each other's costs of collective action, whether upwards (repression) or downwards (facilitation)" (Carroll, 1997:12).

Political opportunity structure has largely been used as part of a synthetic approach in which it is combined with other theoretical frameworks. An example of such an approach can be found in Donna Lee Van Cott's research on Bolivian

indigenous movements (2003) in which she combines political opportunity variables with those from Resource Mobilization Theory. In seeking to explain the success of indigenous political parties in Bolivia's 2002 elections, she considers the opportunities that arose from both the institutional changes that were undertaken between 1994 and 1995 and the shift in elite alignments. In drawing from resource mobilization concepts, she also considers important socio-political changes such as the "maturity and institutional consolidation of the indigenous organizations following twenty years of mobilization" (2003:753).

Yasher uses the political process approach in her comparative study of indigenous movements in Equador, Bolivia and Peru (2005). To explain the uneven emergence of these movements in the three countries, she argues that "changing citizenship regimes politicized ethnic cleavages in Latin America by challenging the local autonomy that indigenous communities had previously carved out" (2005:29). This challenge threatened the communities; however, it only caused them to mobilize when two opportunity variables were also present: political associational space and pre-existing networks. Therefore, Yasher claims that Bolivia's indigenous communities have mobilized in order to defend local autonomy from state policies associated with changing citizenship regimes. However, according to Yasher, only groups like the Kataristas have been able to mobilize, as they were able to capitalize on transcommunity networks that were forged by Aymara intellectuals in the 1960s. They also benefited from a number of political openings, such as those that occurred during the Torres military government (1969-1971). During his administration, Torres extended political

associational space as part of his attempt to gain peasant support, which further enabled the mobilization in the indigenous communities.

A number of theorists have also incorporated neo-Gramscian concepts as part of a synthetic framework of analysis. Postero (2004) relies on Gramsci's central concept of hegemony to explain the rise of indigenous activism in Bolivia. In her analysis, she focuses on the "critical moments of conjuncture" to demonstrate how diverse groups or classes can unite under particular historical circumstances "to form a collective will which might allow them to dominate other groups, enforce their interests, or take control of the state"(Postero, 2004:193). According to Postero, the indigenous uprising of 2003 came about because at this particular moment, there was an articulation between the interests of the indigenous peoples and the rest of the population. Therefore, the MAS and the organizations of El Alto were able to forge successful alliances with other social and political groups, allowing them to effectively confront the governing elites.

In his analysis of peasant mobilization in rural Mexico, Otero (1999, 2004) proposes an alternative framework that draws on Gramscian concepts while at the same time incorporating those drawn from Marxism and NSM. His political-cultural formation (PCF) theory focuses on the central question: "how can subordinate groups, communities or classes become hegemonic or dominant or at least gain the ability to push for state interventions in their favour" (2004:332)? In addressing this question, the PCF approach is concerned with the "process through which direct producers shape demands, form organizations

to pursue them, and generate a leadership to represent them before the state and other organizations" (Otero & Jugenitz, 2003:511). Therefore, this approach focuses on class structural processes, political-formation outcomes and the mediating determinations that lie between these two. Class structural processes are the relations of production, which include those relations between the exploiters and exploited, and the relations of reproduction, which refers to the relations among the exploited. The three mediating determinations include regional culture, state intervention, and leadership types. In any study of Latin American indigenous peoples, the key component of regional culture would be their relations with the dominant groups of mestizos, ladinos or criollos. State intervention would concern the impact of state policies on the indigenous organizations, while leadership types would focus on how this factor, in intimate relationship with modes of participation by constituencies, has determined the movement's relationship with the state and other social and political actors (Otero, 2004:333).

Each of these frameworks has much to offer in the study of Latin America's indigenous movements, however the approach used in this thesis will be Otero's theory of political-cultural formation (PCF). PCF is a synthetic approach that takes into consideration both identity and class issues and therefore can more fully address the complexities that are unique to the indigenous movements. Both the Marxist and NSM approaches, in focusing only on identity or class, ignore the "dual character" of the factors that are shaping these movements. The construction of a collective identity has been a "particularly crucial process for members of indigenous groups, whose legitimacy

as political actors hinges on their ability to gain recognition" of this shared identity "in relation to those of dominant groups" (Van Cott, 2000a quoted in Otero, 2003:509). At the same time, one cannot ignore the class structural processes that subject entire segments of the indigenous population to unfavourable economic and social conditions (Otero & Jugenitz, 2003). Therefore, only a synthesis like PCF can offer a more complete analysis of how indigenous organizations and their demands are shaped.

PCF also incorporates the political opportunity model as it considers state intervention as an integral part of its analysis. However, unlike other approaches, it takes into account whether the state policies are initiated by the state or have been shaped from the bottom up by the movements themselves. This differs from how other political opportunity theorists, such as Yasher and Van Cott, have analyzed Bolivia's indigenous movements. Both Yasher and Van Cott, in focusing heavily on state-directed policies, fail to fully address the contributing role of the movements. In her latest study on the emergence of Bolivia's indigenous movements, Yasher (2005) gives primacy to "political associational space" as the one variable that needs to be present for the emergence and growth of the movements. In focusing on this "de facto existence of freedom of association and expression," Yasher primarily considers the state's role in terms of whether it has trampled on the capacity to associate and to speak out (2005:76). Van Cott also focuses heavily on state-directed policies in which she considers a number of institutional changes and their impact on the mobilizations. Even when considering the maturation of Bolivia's coca-grower's organizations, she primarily focuses on the role of the government's repressive

policies in shaping these organizations. Thus, PCF, in taking into account both state intervention and the movements in shaping state policy can offer a more comprehensive analysis of the role of political opportunities in the emergence of Bolivia's indigenous movements.

PCF, like most of the approaches discussed here, fully addresses the role of historical processes in the mobilization of indigenous groups. In considering regional culture as a mediating determination, Otero has noted the contribution of significant historical factors. One of these is the development of relations between the indigenous people and the dominant mestizo groups, which needs to be included in any research on Latin American indigenous movements.

Although many of the theoretical approaches have broadened our understanding of these movements, this review demonstrates that only Otero's PCF theory can fully address their complexities. This approach considers both class and identity issues which is of paramount importance when researching any indigenous mobilization in Latin America. Class and ethnicity are intimately related throughout this continent, with a clear hierarchy that correlates proximity to Hispanic identity with wealth and privilege. "The majority of Indians are poor, and a high proportion of the poor are Indians" (Brysk, 2000:147). PCF theory also goes beyond other frameworks in considering political opportunities. Whereas Van Cott (2000a, 2003, 2005) and Yasher (2005) focus on the opportunities created by the state, PCF considers those created by the organizations as well. Finally, this approach takes into account the impact of significant historical processes on current political outcomes.

Chapter 3:
Theoretical Framework – Political-Cultural Formation

In the first part of this chapter, I will outline the propositions of Otero's theory of political-class formation along with the Gramscian concepts from which they are drawn. A review of Otero's recent analysis of Mexico's Zapitista Liberation Army will also be included as a means of clarifying the key concepts within his theory of Political-Cultural Formation (PCF). I will then briefly discuss how this approach will be applied to explain the rise of Bolivia's indigenous organizations, introducing some highlights of my two case studies in light of PCF concepts.

PCF proposes that there are three mediating determinations between "class structural processes" and political formation-outcomes: regional cultures, state intervention, and leadership types. Class structural processes refer to both the relations of production, which are the relations between exploiters and the exploited; and the relations of reproduction, which are those among the exploited. Regional cultures as one of the mediating determinations are closely related to the relations of production and reproduction; they form the basis from which demands are articulated. State intervention shapes the character of the organization, determining whether it will become "bourgeois-hegemonic" "oppositional" or "popular democratic" (Otero & Jugenitz: 2003:511). Leadership types shape the particular alliances of the organization, which then affects its

ability to maintain its independence from the state and /or ruling class (2003:512-513) and its autonomy from other political organizations. Leadership types are intimately related to the modes of participation of constituents and the extent to which they are democratic or not. In this analysis, I have focused on all three mediating factors as each one has played a decisive role in shaping Bolivia's indigenous movements.

In developing his theory, Otero turned to Gramsci's classic work (1971) on hegemony and revolutionary strategy in the West. One of the key concepts upon which his theory is based is Gramsci's expanded definition of the democratic state. Instead of restricting the definition of the democratic state to juridical and political structures, Gramsci saw the state as the " sum of political society, or the realm of domination, plus "civil society or the realm of hegemony" (1971:263). According to Gramsci, "the less democratic a state, the more it relies on domination or force" and therefore "the more a state is democratic, the more it relies on hegemony, or the consent of its people" (1971:40). In this conception, hegemony is dynamic, allowing for the emergence of alternative hegemonies to take hold.

It is within this conception of radical democracy and the state that Otero poses the central question in PCF; "how can subordinate groups, communities and classes become hegemonic or dominant or at least gain the ability to push for state intervention in their favour" (Otero, 2004:332)? In addressing this question by focusing on the three mediating factors, PCF provides a valuable

framework from which to explain the rise of subordinate groups such as Latin America's indigenous peoples.

In examining the regional cultures of Latin American indigenous peoples, Otero (1999, 2003, 2004, 2005) claims that both types of relations, those between the exploiters and the exploited and those among the exploited, have played a role in the formation of indigenous identities. However, it has been the relations between the indigenous groups and the dominant groups of mestizos or criollos that have been particularly significant. The asymmetrical nature of these relations, whether they have taken place through the market or through production have tended "to either reinforce ethnic identities or to force the subordinate ethnic groups into assimilation" (Otero, 2004:332). However, in many of the recent indigenous movements throughout Latin America, these relations have served to strengthen indigenous identities. Given the strength of this identity, a central material condition for its maintenance and enhancement is regaining or retaining control of land and territory. Hence, indigenous demands include both the assertion to the right of indigenous culture and the right to have access to land and territory.

The second mediating factor, state intervention, can take three main forms, with each having a different impact on the organization's development. In the first form, the initiative aimed at addressing the organization's demands comes from the state itself and as a result, the organization usually becomes co-opted and loses its independence from the state. The more the state is able to co-opt opposition movements, the more it is able to maintain the prevalence of

bourgeois hegemony. In the second type of interventions, the state imposes negative or repressive policies which may temporarily immobilize a movement, however these "usually involve the loss of state legitimacy and a decline in bourgeois hegemony"(Otero, 2004: 333). In the final form, the intervention comes as a result of independent pressure from below. According to Otero, the more an organization can manage to both influence state policy and maintain its independence from the state, the more likely it is to become popular-democratic. It is this development that has the potential to strengthen the subordinate groups, communities, and classes in civil society.

Leadership types as the third mediating factor shapes the alliances and relations of the organization. Like state intervention, leadership can affect the organization's ability to maintain its independence from the state and its autonomy from other social groups. Leadership can also determine whether the organization will become popular-democratic, which could then bring about policies that truly respond to the needs and demands of the organization's constituents (Otero & Jugenitz, 2003).

In his study of Mexico's Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN), Otero (2003, 2004, 2005) demonstrates how all three mediating determinations of PCF affected the organization's political-cultural formation. In considering the impact of regional cultures, he traces the developments in the EZLN and relates them to the growing influence of the region's local indigenous culture. When this organization first emerged in 1994, none of its demands focused on indigenous culture and rights. Its aim was to confront the state with economic and political

demands concerning such needs as housing, food and health care (Otero, 2004). However, in responding to the overwhelming support from indigenous peoples from all over Mexico, the organization restructured its program and placed indigenous rights and culture at the forefront of its demands. It was this focus on indigenous identity that became the organization's main rationale behind its fight for autonomy and control over natural resources (Otero & Jugenitz, 2003:516). Therefore, the local indigenous culture figured prominently in the shaping of the organization's demands and objects of struggle.

In examining the role of state intervention, Otero (2004) found that the EZLN had succeeded in influencing the development of state policy that was favourable to the organization. He argues that the EZLN, in exerting pressure on the political system, helped to bring about Mexico's transition to an electoral democracy in 2000. This pressure forced parties to change electoral rules, allowing a fair democratic election to take place, which then paved the way for a change in government. Before 2000, the opposition parties were largely dominated by the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (and therefore they only passed legislation that supported the continued rule of this party). Not only did the EZLN contribute to a democratic transition in Mexico, it also brought about a new relationship between the political parties and civil society organizations. Within Mexico's "new" democratic system, parties now have to consider the views of these organizations and their constituencies if they want to be re-elected.

In his examination of the EZLN's leadership, Otero (2004) found that it had managed to maintain the autonomy of the organization without being co-opted by the state or other political groups. The leadership was also continuing to practice a democratic form of participation, however, as of 2000, the organization had not succeeded in attaining any of its central demands. Yet, the very fact of strengthening its organization may be seen as a success, as it enables the EZLN to continue mobilizing other civil society organizations for deepening Mexico's democracy and, perhaps, to eventually succeed in achieving its central demands.

More recently in June, 2005, the EZLN launched its Sixth Declaration, in which it came out of its isolation as an indigenous movement and declared that it was now an "anti-capitalist movement." In its struggle against neoliberalism, it is now promoting an alliance with other like-minded subordinate groups, classes, and communities in civil society. Over the last five years, the EZLN has increased its area of influence as a municipal organization and this has allowed it to gain more control over its education system.

In analyzing Bolivia's indigenous movements from the PCF perspective, I will focus on all three mediating determinations. First, I will consider the impact of regional cultures on Bolivia's indigenous mobilizations, examining both the relations of production and relations of reproduction as both have contributed to the formation of indigenous identities. In particular, I will consider the relations between the indigenous groups and the dominant mestizo group in the country, with the goal of demonstrating how this highly polarized relationship has served

to reinforce ethnic identities. I will then trace the development of both the Katarista movement and the MAS, focusing on how their particular bases of support influenced the development of their central demands and objects of struggle.

State intervention in the two periods of mobilization took on similar forms, but there were some policies such as the electoral reforms that were particularly beneficial for the cocalero organizations. I will examine the impact of this intervention along with that of the repressive policies that were particularly instrumental in fuelling both the Katarista and the MAS mobilizations. On several occasions, the government's repressive measures had a galvanizing effect throughout Bolivian society in which many previously divided indigenous groups united in opposition to the state. As well, these policies helped the movements gain sympathy from non-indigenous groups. Examples of these state policies include the Sánchez de Lozada government's killing of 70 indigenous peasants who were protesting the government's plans to export gas through Chilean territory in 2003 (Assies and Salman, 2003). This violent, repressive policy angered the broader public and as a result, many non-indigenous groups joined in the protests. The unification of these groups not only convinced the government to abandon its plans to export gas but it also forced the resignation of Sánchez de Lozada.

In the subsequent five years, the state's policies, whether they consisted of ignoring indigenous demands or repressing the organizations, have led to several instances in which the broader public has united in its support for the indigenous

groups. This type of outcome, in which civil society becomes strengthened on the basis of subordinate groups and classes, is what may be regarded as popular-democratic. One of the key organizations that has benefited from this growing support is the Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement Towards Socialism - MAS). With this support from other civil society groups, the MAS has been able to shape state intervention in its favour. Yet, it has also managed to maintain its autonomy, enabling it to eventually challenge the power of Bolivia's traditional political elites

Leadership types have also had a significant impact on Bolivia's indigenous mobilizations. In this analysis, I will demonstrate how the leadership factor played a decisive role in the failure of the Katarista organization to maintain unity within its membership. The leaders of the Kataristas were unable to resolve many of the differences within their organizations such as the conflict that arose between those members who wanted a more class-based movement and those who wanted to focus on identity.

Another key component that will be considered is the leadership's ability to form strategic alliances with other indigenous and non-indigenous groups. In the earlier mobilizations, the Katarista leadership was not as successful as the MAS and the cocaleros in forming strategic alliances with other indigenous and non-indigenous organizations. In fact, the Katarista's attempts to establish alliances with national political parties had a mainly negative impact on their movement (Van Cott, 2005:57). The Katarista leaders were attracted to such alliances because of the financial resources and political expertise offered by the

national parties and at the same time, these parties were keen to recruit indigenous leaders who had a large following. However, once the alliances were formed, the Katarista leaders frequently complained that the "parties refused to engage them in a dialogue of equals and openly discriminated" against them even though they were allies (Ticona Alejo, 2000: 136-7; Ticona et al., 1995: 194 as quoted in Van Cott, 2005:57). Thus, the alliances resulted in vertical relations – from the political parties down to the campesinos and as a result, the co-opted indigenous leaders often lost their support base (Van Cott, 2005:56).

In contrast, the MAS and the cocaleros have usually benefited from their strategic alliances with both indigenous and non-indigenous groups. They have never aligned with a major national political party, and have only pursued alliances in which they can retain their dominance and independence. This factor enabled the MAS to gain public support and in the end attain more than 50% of the electoral vote in the December 2005 elections.

Chapter 4:
Historical Background

The goal of this chapter is to provide a historical context from which to analyze the current mobilization of Bolivia's indigenous peoples. In the first part of the review, I will discuss the country's traditional latifundia system and its impact on indigenous farmers. Then, I will focus on the consequences of the Chaco War (1932-1935) and the 1952 Revolution as these events spurred on radical changes, which brought about the destruction of the traditional oligarchic system. The oligarchic system was typical in Latin America at the time and was one in which all political power rested with a small group of white Spanish-speaking elites. In Bolivia, these elites were a small group of wealthy landowners, whose political power over the Indian non-Spanish speaking peasantry was based on violence rather than consensus (Klein, 1992:231). In discussing the changes to this system and the new relationship that evolved between the indigenous peoples and the state, this chapter will further our understanding of the current indigenous-state relationship and the role it has played in the country's indigenous mobilization.

The struggle of Bolivia's indigenous peoples pre-dates the establishment of the Bolivian state. Even before Spanish colonization, one of the region's dominant indigenous groups, the Aymara, resisted attempts by their Inca rulers to assimilate them into Inca society (Klein, 1971:25). They were the only

conquered peoples in the Inca Empire that were allowed to retain their language and cultural identity. However, they had to accept a large influx of Quechua-speaking immigrants into their territory as part of a deliberate assimilation policy imposed by the Inca conquerors. During the Spanish colonial era, both the Aymara and Quechua fought against the Spanish conquerors and their exploitive policies which included the mining mita (forced labour drafts), the tributes, and the reparto de mercancías (forced distribution of goods) (Albó, 1987:381). After Bolivia won its independence from Spain in 1825, the country underwent a series of "agrarian reforms" in which the governing elites attempted to address the "Indian" problem by putting more land into the hands of the latifundia, thereby forcing greater numbers of indigenous peoples from their traditional territory. From the time of independence until the 1952 revolution, there were numerous indigenous uprisings, in which the communities struggled to defend their lands. These "uprisings invariably ended in massacres carried out by the armies at the service of the landowning oligarchy" (Albó, 1987:381).

The agrarian reform act of 1874 is one such example in which the government directly supported the acquisition of land by the latifundia owners. The act was driven by the principles of liberalism, in which the state believed that those who could make the land more productive should control it. Thus, the reform act made it easier to expand the latifundia sector as the government considered it to hold the greatest potential for increasing agricultural production. Consequently, greater numbers of indigenous farmers were forced from their land (Albó, 1987:381).

Reform policies like those of 1874 only exacerbated the social issues in the agricultural sector. By the middle of the twentieth century, Bolivia had one of the most unjust and uneconomic land distribution patterns in Latin America. "The 6 percent of the landowners who owned 1,000 hectares or more of land controlled fully 92 percent of all cultivated land in the republic (Klein, 1992:228)." In possessing most of the country's productive land, the landowners had almost complete control over rural labour, which enabled them to obtain free labour from the Indian farmers in exchange for the use of their land (Klein, 2003:233-234). These farmers also had to supply the seeds and tools and even transport the final crop. With agricultural inputs being inexpensive and a protected agricultural market, there was little incentive for the landowners to invest capital in their haciendas. In fact, the majority of the hacendados began living in urban centres and pursuing urban professions. The prevalence of absentee landowners and the lack of capital investment contributed to the further deterioration of the haciendas. By the middle of the twentieth century, the agricultural sector had become highly unproductive. In the 1920s, food was only 10 percent of Bolivia's total imports, but this had grown to 19 percent of the total by the 1950s (Klein, 2003:234). Thus, the country was increasingly unable to meet the traditional food needs of its expanding population.

In creating a more backward and exploitive agricultural system, the reform policies brought further hardship and misery to the indigenous peoples. Since colonial times, estate Indians had been obligated to provide free personal service to the hacendado and his family. These personal service obligations, known as pongo service, even required that the peasants travel great distances at their own

expense to the urban homes of the hacendados (Klein, 1992:229). With the reform policies, more Indian farmers were not only forced to work the hacendado's land under exploitive conditions, but they also had to take on the much-hated pongo service.

The Chaco War (1932-1935), in provoking a national crisis, set into motion changes that over the next twenty years would eventually destroy the country's oligarchic system and its exploitation of the indigenous population. Bolivia declared the war against Paraguay because of a territorial dispute in the Chaco region. Many observers thought that the war should have been an easy victory for the German-trained army of Bolivia, but it ended in a humiliating defeat in the summer of 1935 (Hahn, 1992:61). Instead, the Paraguayans won the battle as they "out-thought, out-fought, and simply out-lasted the bewildered Bolivians, most of whom were fighting in an environment so foreign as to be another world" (Malloy, 1970:73). For Bolivia, the three years of bloody conflict and the ensuing loss brought on a national crisis. Although, Bolivia lost more valuable territory in its war with Chile (1879-1883), the fighting in that war had been minimal and the impact on the population itself slight. In the Chaco war, the losses for the country were phenomenal with over 65,000 men either being killed or having deserted during the conflict. This number out of a total population of "about 2 million persons created war losses equal to what the European nations suffered in World War I" (Klein, 1992:194). The war and its losses were a shock to the Bolivian public, but even worse was the "much publicized corruption and incompetence of the upper class officers, which led to the whole-sale destruction of troops through starvation, death and capture" (Klein, 1992:198).

In their frustration, many Bolivians began to question their country's entire social, economic, and political system, which they believed had made such a humiliating defeat possible (Alexander, 1982:66). As a consequence of this self-evaluation, the ideas and propaganda of the radical left began to find greater acceptance in the general public. Before the war, Salamanca's government had tried to suppress this leftist anti-war movement, but during the war, this movement was able to maintain an active presence in opposing the conflict and supporting the desertion of troops. In the early post-war years, few accepted all the arguments put forward by the radicals, but eventually their arguments became a major ideological force, framing the ongoing public debates that questioned the country's traditional political and economic structures. The radical left's themes such as the nationalization of the mines and the rights of the Indians came to be widely accepted by many Bolivians (Klein, 1992).

In the era of military governments that followed the Chaco War, the radical groups continued to influence the debate and the development of reform policies. Most of these governments were led by the younger Chaco War officers, many of whom had experienced first-hand the incompetence and corruption of upper echelon officers in the war (Hahn, 1992:61). In blaming both the army leadership and the political leaders for the country's humiliating defeat (Alexander, 1982:66), many of these officers shared the public's sentiment about the need for state reform. Therefore, many of the government leaders, such as Toro and Saavedra, took on reformist policies and at the same time allowed for the development of new left-leaning political parties (Klein, 1992).

The political changes brought on by the Chaco War also shaped the demands and protests of the indigenous communities. In being influenced by leftist ideology, their uprisings now took the form of social protest movements, in which pan-Indian rights became the prime issue (Klein, 1992:198). In questioning the very legitimacy of the political system, they began to forge relationships with the newer political parties. In these alliances, they began working for a "revolutionary change", one that would more fully incorporate the Indian into Bolivian society. The Villarroel government of 1945 was one of the first administrations to put indigenous concerns at the forefront. It undertook a massive organization of peasant unions, in its efforts to gain the support of indigenous groups and enable their integration into mainstream society (Albó, 1987:381)

When the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario – MNR) came to power in 1952, it further expanded the role of the peasantry in the Bolivian state. In its efforts to modernize the state and at the same time solve the "Indian problem," the MNR initiated a massive state project aimed at "assimilating the Indians and eliminating their autonomous cultures and living patterns" (Strőbele-Gregor, 1994: 108). The most fundamental part of this project was the ideology promulgated by the MNR government. The glorification of the "creole-mestizo identity" that was a part of the MNR's party ideology became the ideology of the state. The "Indian" was now to be called the campesino (Strőbele-Gregor, 1994:108). The banning of the term "indio" in the directive of the new Ministry of Campesino Affairs (Van Cott, 2000a:126) provides a clear example of how this new ideology influenced state policy. The

banning of this term, effectively buried the ethnic dimension of this group in the eyes of government elites, transforming them into an economic class. Silvia Rivera (1983: 130 quoted in Albó, 1987: 382) best summed up this revolutionary project:

> The country of Indians governed by Lords would disappear with the revolution. The lords would turn into democrats, bourgeoisie, and the Indians into citizens, integrated into an independent and egalitarian sovereign state, founded on the solid ground of the internal market, and the recovery of the export economy by the state. The Indian would also disappear in the process of mestizaje, Hispanization of language, migration, and the parceling out of the communities.

In its goal of incorporating the peasant into the electoral process, the educational system and the market place, the MNR established universal suffrage and education along with the Agrarian Reform Act of 1953. Once assuming power, this government moved quickly to eliminate the literacy requirements that had long prevented the overwhelmingly illiterate Indian population from voting, an expansion that resulted in a fivefold increase in the number of voters (Klein, 1992:232). In contrast to its decisiveness in this area, the government was much slower in promulgating the Agrarian reform act. However, when several indigenous groups began taking over the haciendas on their own, the MNR responded by enacting the land reform. The government, in realizing the value of this policy as an election strategy, continued throughout its administration to support the indigenous groups in their land acquisitions (Albó, 1987:383).

The MNR also attempted to control the indigenous communities through a dense network of syndical unions. In some areas, they were able to build upon the traditional structures of social organization. These structures, known as the

Andean ayullus, had been used for centuries to maintain a cohesive social organization among traditional communities that had a discontinuous territory. In the Cochabamba Valley, where independent unions had been established following the Chaco War, the MNR was able to co-opt the union leaders. In other areas where there was less organizational structure, the MNR succeeded in imposing its own syndicatos or unions (Van Cott, 2000b:337).

In the latter years of its administration, when the government could no longer depend on land reform to maintain indigenous support, it turned to other means such as subsidized food coupons, thereby establishing a new form of political clientelism. As a result of these practices, the peasant unions became increasingly dependent on the government. Eventually the peasantry's active subordination became a passive subordination, with the peasantry supporting the MNR in times of crises, but at the same time expecting all from the government, including subsidized food, schools and even political-union posts. (Rivera, 1983: 130, quoted in Albó, 1987:384).

The MNR government successfully maintained this alliance with the peasantry throughout its twelve years in power. However, its sphere of influence was most powerful in those areas where the hacienda had been most dominant, such as in Cochabamba and Achacachi (Albó, 1987:385). In these regions, the Villarroel government (1945) had previously established alliances with the communities when it had worked with the community leaders in confronting the landowners. Because of these policies, Villarroel came to be seen as a "father who cares for his children." The MNR was able to build on this former paternalistic

relationship by distributing land, establishing universal suffrage, and building schools. The MNR was not as successful in building this kind of dependent relationship in those regions dominated by the communities. Although it existed to some extent, the relationship of dependency was much weaker than in those regions dominated by haciendas. This was partly because the regions dominated by the communities had long been governed under a different form of relationship with the state. The communities had developed their own traditional form of social and political organization and previous state governments in exchange for tributes had long respected their autonomy. Thus, it was difficult for the MNR to penetrate this structure in its efforts to increase its level of influence. Furthermore, land had never been a demand in these areas and therefore the MNR had fewer benefits to offer these communities (Albó, 1987:385).

Although the MNR government fell in 1964, the special relationship between the peasantry and the state continued until 1974. General Barrientos, who replaced the MNR in a military coup in 1964, recognized the strategic importance of the peasantry and therefore put much effort into maintaining its support. He managed to inherit their allegiance and seal the Military-Peasant Pact (Pacto Militar-Campesino – PMC) by co-opting the leadership of the peasantry and intensifying the distribution of lands (Degregori, 1998:215). In particular, it was his clientalistic ties to certain dirigentes (or leaders), such as those in Cochabamba and the Lake Titicaca region, that enabled him to build his popular base in the countryside. He used patronage to co-opt these leaders and force to eliminate others (often the rivals of his clients), while ignoring those

groups in more remote areas (Malloy and Gamarra, 1988:20). In this patron-client relationship, Barrientos provided little to the communities in terms of real investment that could have benefited the farming communities. Instead, he "doled out highly visible, but low cost gifts on a personalistic basis" (1988:20).

It was not until 1974, that a military government decided to dispense with the support of the peasantry. At the time, Bolivia's economy was doing well as mineral prices were rising and new gas deposits had been discovered. In addition, the commercial agricultural sector in the east and La Paz's manufacturing sector were also expanding. When the government imposed price increases on essential goods, peasants blocked the highways and demanded talks with the President. In the past, under the PMC, the government would have met with the peasant protestors. However, the Banzer government, in breaking with tradition, responded by sending in the army and air force to bombard the protestors (Rivera, 1984:127-128).

The breaking of the PMC ended the relationship between the indigenous peoples and the state that had been in place since the 1952 Revolution. Although Banzer attempted to repress the development of indigenous organizations, these groups began to take shape under his administration, particularly in the Aymara communities. These groups would later become part of the first wave movements that would arise in the 1970s and 1980s.

Chapter 5:
The First Wave Movement – The Kataristas

The first indigenous movement to emerge after the 1952 revolution rose up from within the Aymara communities of La Paz and the altiplano. It took its name, Katarismo, from Tupac Katari, the eighteenth century Aymara rebel. Katarismo began to take shape at the end of the 1960s, when there was a renaissance of Aymara culture among students and urban intellectuals in La Paz. They began to "proclaim the importance of their indigenous culture, identity, and cosmology" (Yasher, 2005:154). Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, they took their movement to the countryside and succeeded in mobilizing and organizing the indigenous communities into a powerful political force. Although Katarismo failed to make inroads as a national political party, it became the dominant influence in the country's largest peasant union, the Confederación Sindical de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (Unitary Syndical Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia - CSUTCB), throughout the early 1980s.

The movement lost momentum by the end of the decade, but its political discourse re-emerged in the 1990s as part of President's Sánchez de Lozada's plans to restructure the Bolivian state into a "multi-cultural and pluri-cultural" nation, one in which the rights of indigenous peoples would be recognized, respected, and protected. In attempting to build this new state, the government legislated a number of policies aimed at giving more rights to indigenous peoples

in the areas of political representation, land ownership and education programs (Postero, 2004:197). These reforms were "embraced by many indigenous peoples," however they failed to address the underlying problems that had caused hardships for the indigenous population: "massive economic equality, the absence of political representation, and racism that pervaded the country's institutions in daily life"(Gustafson, 2006:2).

Some of these government policies can be considered to have been initially driven 'from the bottom up.' In the late 1980s, the lowlands indigenous organization, CIDOB had begun to mobilize and pressure the government for greater economic and cultural rights. In 1990, an affiliate of CIDOB, the Central de Pueblos Indígenas del Beni (Indigenous Peoples Central of the Beni – CPIB) organized a March for Territory and Dignity. They marched to La Paz and were joined by thousands of marchers from both the lowlands and highlands organizations. This "march dramatically raised awareness of the existence and contemporary demands of Bolivia's indigenous peoples in a way that gained more sympathy and support from white and mestizo (mixed race) Bolivians than had the more violent, radical action of the highland movement" (Van Cott, 2005:61). At the same time, many government elites feared the kind of indigenous uprising that was taking place in Peru, where an "indigenous" organization, Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), had destabilized the country (Mesa Gisbert as quoted in Van Cott, 2000a:144). Whether it was because of a new kind of "awareness" of indigenous rights or whether it was an attempt to prevent a more violent uprising, the government did address the demands of some of the indigenous groups such as granting land rights to the CPIB.

However, the overall planning and implementation of the government's reform programs were driven by the state, resulting in the co-optation of some of the indigenous groups, which then had the effect of dividing the movement as a whole. In 1995, CIDOB and the CSUTCB unified in a march to La Paz in their demands for a more radical version of the government's land ownership program, known as the Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria (National Institute of Agrarian Reform - INRA). This program had been implemented as part of the government's land reform program. In winning favour with the government, CIDOB and the lowland peoples were able to use the INRA law to apply for both individual and collective land holdings. However, the Andean communal lands remained largely unaffected and in the end the highlands indigenous groups including the CSUTCB and the cocalero unions gained very little. Through its willingness to grant more land rights to the lowlands peoples, the government was able to co-opt their organizations including CIDOB. This led to an eventual division between CSUTCB and CIDOB (Gustafson, 2002:280-282).

From these examples, it is evident that the Lozada government did not intend to implement a reform program aimed at fully addressing indigenous demands. It did take some concrete measures aimed at increasing the political participation of the indigenous population (Calla, 2000:79). Nevertheless, in the end, the reforms that had included much of Katarismo's central discourse, failed to accomplish what the Kataristas had been demanding throughout the previous twenty years; the creation of a truly multi-ethnic state in which indigenous peoples would have the same cultural and economic rights as the dominant mestizo population.

In analyzing the rise and decline of Katarismo, I will first discuss the beginnings of the movement as it emerged among the Aymara students and intellectuals in La Paz and then spread to the countryside. I will trace its progression through the framework of political-cultural formation, first considering the regional culture of the highlands and how it shaped both the demands and early development of the Katarismo movement. Following this, I will focus on state intervention and leadership types in attempting to explain the successes and eventual decline of the movement.

5.1 Regional Cultural Processes

Katarismo began as a movement grounded in the Aymara identity and culture. The young leaders who first took its message to the countryside sought to gain greater autonomy for their communities as well as legitimize their indigenous practices and customs. In understanding the factors that shaped these early demands, this analysis will first consider the early organizing that took place in La Paz. In following its expansion into the Altiplano communities, the primary focus will be on the cultural processes that shaped and strengthened the collective identity of the Aymara people.

The Katarismo movement was actually founded in the city of La Paz. It was here that a group of Aymara youth who were attending the Villarroel Secondary School began meeting to discuss their experiences as indigenous peoples living in the mestizo-dominated city. Their daily encounters with racial discrimination and segregation reinforced their need to proclaim the importance of their Indian culture and heritage (Rivera, 1991). They began envisioning a new

society founded upon the fundamental principles and beliefs of the Aymara culture. In developing their proposals, they "drew on Aymara oral traditions, the writing of Fausto Reynaga, a prolific and marginalized writer of Indianist themes. as well as the memory of the anti-colonial rebellions" of the 19th century (Rivera, 1991:19). In asserting the importance of their indigenous culture, they founded the Fifteenth of November Movement (the date of Tupak Katari's immolation in Peñas). When a group of these students went on to attend the Universidad San Andrés de La Paz, they joined with other intellectuals in forming the Movimiento Universitario Julián Apasa, (Julián Apasa University Movement – MUJA). (Julián Apasa was the birth name of Tupak Katari).

The young Katarista leaders began to take their movement to the countryside in the mid-1960s. Raimundo Tambo was one of the first of these leaders to return to his home community where he assumed a leadership role in the local peasant union. He was followed by another prominent Katarista, Jenaro Flores, who quickly ascended the leadership ranks to become the executive secretary of the Departmental Congress for the entire La Paz district. Soon after Flores's election, he and Tambo began working together to transform the peasant union, the Federación Departamental de Trabajadores Campesinos de La Paz (Federation of Peasant Workers of the Department of La Paz – FTCLP) into an organization that truly represented the demands and needs of its indigenous membership. According to Albó (1987), the new leadership under the Kataristas did not radically alter union structure and policy. However, the Kataristas did give more support to certain initiatives such as the land invasions that were taking place on some of the haciendas, which had been established since the

Agrarian Reform of 1953. Such a policy was previously unheard of in the altiplano in the years following the Agrarian Reform. Evidence of the Katarista's influence was also made apparent in the workers' traditional May Day procession in La Paz, when a large group of peasants in the march carried a picture of Tupak Katari and cheered his name (Albó, 1987:393).

In explaining the appeal of Katarismo in the indigenous communities of the altiplano, it is essential to consider the economic and cultural processes that would have enabled the movement to gain wide acceptance in the region. In particular, I will focus on the strength of the Aymara collective identity that would have made the communities more receptive to the ideologies and demands of the identity-based Katarismo movement. This sense of a collective indigenous identity was made possible by the endurance of the Aymara's traditional community organizations that had long resisted government efforts to assimilate them into the state's organizational structures. In maintaining their independence from the state, the traditional organizations had continued to dominate the Aymara's day-to-day life, reinforcing a pattern of community social relations that was separate from that of mainstream Bolivian mestizo society. The independence of these local organizations also enabled the Kataristas to continue their mobilization efforts in the communities despite the state's efforts to suppress the movement.

In 1953, the MNR initiated a massive project aimed at assimilating the indigenous citizenry; however, it did not eliminate their non-capitalist relations of production (Hahn, 1992). Nonetheless, the majority of the indigenous

population did participate in the marketplace, but the extent of this participation varied from region to region. The Quechuas of the Cochabamba Valley tended to be more involved in the market place than the Aymaras of the altiplano (Hahn, 1992:89). However, for both groups, the key relational factor in production and the market place was their asymmetrical relation with the dominant mestizo population. Despite the efforts of the 1952 Revolution to address this asymmetry, it remained a potent force in the reinforcement of the Indian's collective identity (Rivera, 1984).

For the Aymara, their collective identity was further reinforced through the strength of their community organizations that had long defined their social relations. Since the time of the Spanish conquest, the dominant community organizations known as the ayllus, have managed the political and social affairs of the Aymara community. These structures existed throughout the Andes when the Spanish first arrived in the region (Albó, 1987; Rivera, 1991). The ayllus are interlocking kinship groupings in which communities, some of which are great distances apart, are linked through intra- and interethnic relations of redistribution and reciprocity. "This structural aspect of Andean society has been compared to a Chinese box toy," in which the ayllus are linked on "many different levels by ritual and symbolic relations, which bestow a high degree of legitimacy on the increasingly vertical differentiation among them" (Rivera, 1991:19).

Although colonization dramatically altered Andean society, it allowed for the survival of many of its traditional communal structures (Rivera, 1991). Throughout their rule, the Spanish enacted laws that effectively separated the

Andean Society into two entities, the 'Republic of the Spanish' and the 'Republic of the Indians,' each with its own separate courts, laws and rights (Rivera, 1991:20). The 'Leyes de Indias' enabled the indigenous communities to maintain their cultural and political traditions and in return for these rights, they obeyed the forced labour edicts (mit'a), paid the tribute, and even worshipped the foreign gods of Spanish (1991:20). In the years following independence, the indigenous peoples continued in their struggle to retain both their traditional territories and the autonomy of their community organizations. However, the state's continued expansion of the hacienda system in some areas such as the Cochabamba Valley significantly altered the indigenous cultural practices and traditions in these regions. Having been incorporated into the hacienda system, the Quechua campesinos of Cochabamba were subjected to a much longer and more intense process of "mestizaje" than the Aymara peoples of the altiplano (Rivera, 1983 quoted in Hahn, 1992: 103). In contrast to the Quechua, the Aymara were more successful in retaining their independence from the state, allowing their traditional organizations to continue functioning as they had for centuries (Albó, 1987).

It was the strength of these communal organizations that blocked the MNR's attempts to assimilate the Aymara into the state's mestizo hegemonic project (Hahn, 1996). As part of this project, the MNR had attempted to organize the indigenous communities into peasant sindicatos. The unions were to assume the role of mediators between the peasants and the state, enabling the state to increase its control over the indigenous communities (Dunkerly, 1984:74). However, the degree to which the union structure took hold varied by region

(Riviera, 1984). In those areas where the haciendas had been most prevalent such as in Cochabamba, the unions simply replaced the hacienda patrons as the mediators between the state and the peasants. However, the state was less successful in imposing its union structure in areas where the haciendas had not been as prevalent, such as in the highlands of the Altiplano. In these regions, the state could not rely on a malleable organizational structure to facilitate its efforts. Its efforts were also hindered by the existence of strong communal organizations such as the ayllus. Over the years, the ayllus had decreased in size and become territorially fixed, but many had retained their autonomy as well as their dominance over community affairs. There were communities in which the MNR was able to impose its sindicatos; however, these structures only functioned as external institutions with no real connection to the pre-existing community organizations. It was the ayllus with their traditional organization and leadership that continued to manage the internal matters of indigenous and community affairs (Healy, 1996:256 as quoted in Yasher, 2005:162).

The Kataristas began to mobilize at a time when the state had been controlled by a succession of military administrations. These governments had continued to impose the peasant-state union structure, but like the MNR administrations that preceded them, they also failed to gain control over the altiplano's traditional organizations. The military peasant organization that existed in the region was in name only and was not the state-controlled institution that the military had intended it to be (Rivera, 1984). Therefore, Katarismo emerged during a period when the community organizations were largely independent of the state, enabling the Aymara to maintain social relations

of production that were separate from those of the mestizo-dominated society at large (Hahn, 1996:96). These social relations provided the basis for the ethnic distinction between the indígena and blanco. The enduring strength of this distinction was at the heart of the Aymara self-identity and it was the sharing of this "separateness" together with their shared social relations that would have provided the basis for a collective identity. In having this strong sense of collective identity separate from that of the dominant mestizo identity, the communities would have been more receptive to the ideology and demands of the identity-based Katarista movement. At the same time, the ongoing evolution of these ideologies and demands would have also been influenced by its indigenous supporters. The early leaders of Katarismo may have begun their movement in La Paz, but they were originally from the Aymara communities of the Altiplano. They would have had a more intuitive understanding of the Aymara's shared identity, enabling them to further shape Katarismo's demands and ideologies to enhance its appeal throughout the indigenous communities.

5.2 State Intervention

Although there were a number of state policies that shaped the progression of the Katarista movement, this analysis will focus on the state intervention of the Banzer administration and its impact on the early development of Katarismo. For the MNR and the previous military governments, the indigenous unions were their main strongholds of support. Therefore, they strove to maintain the special alliance between the state and its peasant unions, primarily relying on the co-optation of key leaders in the peasant organizations

(Rivera, 1984). When General Banzer came to power through a military coup in 1971, he chose to dispense with the support of the peasantry, ending the special relationship that had existed for almost two decades.

In the initial years of his administration, Banzer attempted to crush and disperse the independent peasant organizations and institutions that had evolved under the previous military government. Many of the leaders of Katarismo, including Flores, were forced into exile. Of the initiatives of the former period, only the Tupak Katari Cultural Center remained open, as it was able to use its cover of being a "cultural" institution rather than one involved in political organizing. This allowed the Kataristas to continue their mobilization efforts through the centre, using it for their educational and organizational activities (Albó, 1987).

Banzer's regime attempted to rein in the peasant organizations, but his efforts were not as successful in the altiplano. He succeeded in gaining greater control over the national and regional peasant organizations, but once again, it was the resilience of the traditional community organizations that blocked state efforts to dominate them. This allowed many of the former Katarista leaders to sneak back into the countryside and continue organizing through their local peasant unions (Hurtado, 1986: 58 quoted in Yasher, 2005: 175).

The one event that helped Katarismo gain momentum was Banzer's brutal repression of Quechua protestors in Cochabamba (Rivera, 1984). These peasants, along with some of the Aymara peasantry, had been protesting the government's recent economic package, which mandated a 100 percent increase

in the price of food staples such as sugar, rice, and flour (Dunkerly, 1984:209-210). In protesting against the increases, some 20,000 peasants had blocked several main highways. At one of the major blockades near Cochabamba, there had been a dialogue with the military in which the peasants demanded to meet with the President. The peasants' trust in the government was such that when they were warned about the approaching troops, they did not flee as they thought they were the president's escorts (Rivera, 1984:127-128).

After the 'massacre of the valley,' the government was able to defuse the tensions in the Cochabamba Valley through combining repression with clientalist gifts (Yasher, 2005:166). However, the government was not as successful in quelling the anger and resentment in the Aymara highlands. The victims of the massacre may have been Quechua peasants, but the incident also had a profound impact on the Aymara peasantry (Rivera, 1984;2004). For them, the military response not only signalled the complete rupture of the Military-Peasant Pact (PMC), but it destroyed any legitimacy the government may have had previously. Therefore, the response reaffirmed their need to mobilize autonomously.

The Banzer regime became more repressive in the following years. During this administration (1971-1978), a minimum of 200 people were killed, some 14,750 were jailed for "offences against the state," and a further 19,140 were forced into political exile. This regime not only placed severe restrictions on political participation, it also strictly censored the press (Dunkerly, 1984:208). However, the rupture of the PMC and the resentment it incurred among the

peasantry helped the Kataristas to continue mobilizing despite strong government oppression (Rivera, 1984;2004).

5.3 Leadership Types

The Kataristas attempted to influence government policy through their efforts to establish a viable national political party and become the dominant force in the country's largest peasant union, the CSUTCB. Although, the movement failed to establish a presence in electoral politics, it did gain control over the CSUTCB. However, it soon lost its influence within the organization and by the end of the 1990s, the movement as a whole had lost momentum (Calla, 2000:91). In this analysis, I will focus on the factor of leadership in an attempt to explain the decline of the movement. Specifically, I will trace the struggles of the Kataristas to establish a unified political party as well as discuss the failures of the Katarista leaders to maintain their influence in the CSUTCB.

It was not until the years of democratic transition (1978-1982) that Katarismo began to regain its public strength. Although Katarismo had been one of the leading social movements struggling against the military regimes during the transition period, it failed to consolidate its support into one unified political party (Degregori, 1998:217). It was weakened by numerous divisions and as a result, was never able to win more than 3 percent of the national vote. Leadership played a significant role in this failure to attain electoral significance. Specifically, it was the inability of the Katarista leaders to overcome their movement's internal divisions, as well as the leaders' decisions to align with the traditional parties that in the end caused further divisions within the movement.

In explaining the significance of these factors, it is impossible to fully reconstruct the sequence of political events throughout the transition years. During this period, there were three general elections, six bloody coups and a total of thirteen presidents. However, I will review the Katarista's attempt to align with political parties in the elections of 1978 and 1979 as well their struggle to form their own party in the 1980 election.

In each of the three elections, the country's main political parties usually attempted to gain peasant support by co-opting their key leaders. The two main parties of this period were the Unidad Democrática Popular (Popular Democratic Unity - UDP) of Siles and the MNR party led by Paz Estenssoro, which had aligned with the peasant branch of the "pro-Moscow" Partido Communista Leninista (PCML). In the first election in 1978, one of the key leaders of the Katarista movement, Flores, formally supported the UDP. However, the Kataristas gradually withdrew party support throughout the following two elections as many of the peasants felt the UDP was too paternalistic and authoritarian in its dealings with the peasant groups (Albó, 1987:400). According to Albó (1987), this was largely because the UDP's leaders had been accustomed to the subordination of the peasantry that existed in the past and they did not realize that they were dealing with a new generation that was no longer the "peasantry of 1952." The same two parties dominated the second election in 1979, however this time the Kataristas were more divided in their support. Some openly supported the UDP of Siles or the MNR of Paz, while others such as Flores did not align themselves. The result of this division was that Katarismo lost some of its important leaders, including Macabeo Chila and

Mario Gabriel, who in choosing the losing party, the MNR, faded from the political scene (Albó, 1987:400).

It was the experiences of these elections that convinced many of the Katarista leaders of the need to form their own political party. The first party to become established was the Movimiento Indio Tupak Katari (Tupak Katari Indian Movement - MITKA). This party was formed shortly after the election of 1978, when a group of Katarista leaders began discussing the need for an indigenous party with a focus on identity. This party was founded on the idea that the main problem for the indigenous peasantry was the Spanish conquest of the "Indian peoples" and therefore they should not be aligning with the descendents of the Spanish conquerors. However, once this new party was formed, internal divisions within the movement began to surface. Many of the disputes resulted from leadership struggles and access to funding that had been provided by North American and European Indianist organizations. By the 1980 elections, the MITKA had sub-divided into two separate parties, MITKA and MITKA-1, with each putting forward their own candidate for the national elections.

The third party founded by the Kataristas was the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupak Katari (Tupak Katari Revolutionary Movement – MRTK). Although it shared with MITKA the idea that there was a need for a national party that truly represented the peasantry, it was focused more on the "class struggle" and was therefore more open to aligning with non-indigenous parties. However, it was these alliances that created further divisions in the party, particularly in

the 1979 election when some of its members supported the UDP while others supported the MNR. Furthermore, the MRTK's choice to support Lechin as a leader in the 1980 election significantly hurt the party's chances of gaining electoral votes. The indeciveness of Lechin added to the instability of the party as he withdrew from his leadership position several times during the lead-up to the election (Albó, 1987).

Although the Katarista movement failed to establish a national presence as a political party, it did become the leading force in Bolivia's peasant union movement, the CSUTCB. The Kataristas "viewed the peasant unions as the most important arena for building a multi-ethnic society," one in which the indigenous culture would be respected and accepted (Rivera, 1991:19). From the beginning, the Katarista leaders tried to gain recognition within the country's dominant labour organization, the Central Obrera Boliviana (Bolivian Workers Union – COB) (Degregori, 1998:217). They finally succeeded in convincing the COB of their authenticity as a major political force in the peasant community and were invited to the COB's Fifth Congress in 1979, where they united with the other peasant groups in forming the Confederación Sindical de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (Unified Sindical Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia - CSUTCB). The Katarista's influence was further reinforced when one of their prominent leaders, Jenaro Flores, became the executive secretary of the organization, a position he held until 1987.

From the very beginning, the Kataristas held a commanding position within the CSUTCB, enabling them to push for the political and cultural

recognition of Indian peoples through various initiatives. As early as 1979, they began calling for a plurinational state and introduced the concept of "unity in diversity" into public debates (Van Cott, 2000a:135). This concept was "developed and radicalized through intensive debate among campesinos and intellectuals" (Van Cott, 2000a:135) in the following years and was then incorporated into the CSUTCB's 1983 Political Manifesto:

> We the current leaders, refuse to accept and will never accept class reductionist ideas, which transform us to the status of mere "peasants." Nor do we accept ethnic reductionism, which transforms our struggles into a confrontation between "Indians" and "whites." We are the heirs of great civilizations. We are also heirs to a permanent struggle against all forms of exploitation and pressure. We want to be free in a society where exploitation and organized oppression do not exist, in a state, which, recognizing all national groups, develops our different cultures and authentic forms of self-government (Rivera, 1987: 191, quoted in Yasher, 2005:179).

In the same year, the CSUTCB also drafted an Agrarian Reform Proposal which sought to update the reform law of 1953. The central demand of this proposal was that the state recognize the campesino communities as the principal form of social organization and the basis of self-government. This proposal was first submitted to Congress in 1984 and then presented to President Siles Zuazo in 1985 (Van Cott, 2000a:136). Although the Congress or President Siles did not seriously consider the proposal, it highlighted the importance of communal autonomy for Bolivia's indigenous movements. These initiatives as well as several others did help the Kataristas to educate the broader union movement as well as the general public on the demands of the indigenous peoples. However, the

initiatives failed to have any impact on state policy and therefore these demands were not addressed.

The Kataristas continued their struggle for indigenous rights throughout the early 1980s, but by the end of the decade, their movement along with the CSUTCB in general had lost ground. Many social movements and labour organizations were considerably weakened by the economic and political turmoil of the 1980s. Although the CSUTCB was also impacted by these events, several analysts have focused on the factor of leadership in explaining the movement's decline (Strőbele-Gregor, 1994; Hahn, 1991, 1996; Rivera, 1991).

In explaining these divisions, Strőbele-Gregor (1996) considers the tensions that arose between different currents of thought within the CSUTCB and how this affected the leadership of the organization. The Katarista movement alone represented many diverse ideologies and forms of organization, including the Indianist ideologies, left political currents of thought and the world view of the Aymara and Quechua peasants. The CSUTCB, in being designed as a western political organization, also had distinctive ideologies and forms of organization that then had to coalesce with those of the Katarista movement. In discussing how this led to internal strife, Strőbele-Gregor considers how such tensions affected the behaviour of one of its national leaders, Jenaro Flores. Although he was the leader of an organization that represented many communities, Flores gave greater priority to his community and region. To an outside observer, his relationship with his local base would have been seen as clientalism, but according to Strőbele-Gregor it could also be interpreted in "Andean logic as the

fulfilment of his duty as an authority with respect to his local base" (1996:76). In other areas of practice, Flores chose to follow the western standards of behaviour that were appropriate for a leader of a labour federation such as when he refused to abide by the Andean custom of a limited term in office. However, this particular decision to ignore Andean custom fuelled the growing opposition against his leadership and he was eventually forced to resign in 1987.

In his analysis of the declining influence of Katarismo in the CSUTCB, Hahn (1996) focuses on the union's leadership structure and how it failed to connect with the pre-existing peasant organizations at the local level. As a result, the CSUTCB and its leadership under Flores failed to truly represent and defend the needs of the indigenous population. In supporting this claim, Hahn considers the differences between the western models of leadership and the non-western models in the indigenous communities. As a western political organization, the CSUTCB had a leadership structure that differed dramatically from those in the communities. The Aymara's communal decision-making structure provides strong examples of these fundamental differences. This structure consists of general assemblies that meet at least once a month and is made up of heads of families rather than individuals of equal standing. In contrast to Western models of democratic leadership, "characterized by minimal active political participation and a professionalization of parliamentary democracy," the Andean peasant community follows a concept of communal self-administration and requires that every family head assume office at least once in his lifetime (Strőbele-Gregor, 1996:78).

The Kataristas within the CSUTCB failed to address these differences. Instead, they relied on the union model for organizing the indigenous communities as they assumed that this structure would easily merge with the pre-existing indigenous patterns of organization. In so doing, they attempted to impose "top-to-bottom control of the indigenous population through the rhetoric of indigenous ideology and an elitist notion of working-class political organization" (Hahn, 1996:91). From the PCF perspective, this mode of participation, a top-to-bottom approach, would have stifled the democratic process. In moving away from a popular-democratic mode of participation, the CSUTCB would have become less democratic and accountable, increasing the likelihood for cooptation and corruption. In the end, the Kataristas failed to connect with the local community organizations and as a result, they began to lose legitimacy as an authentic representative of the peasant population. In her research, Strőbele-Gregor (1996) discusses the rejection of the CSUTCB in the Potosi region, where the indigenous communities rejected the union because of its refusal to accept the community's traditional system of communal organization.

Rivera (1991) also focuses on the union structure as a factor of the Katarista leadership that limited its ability to connect with local community organizations. By accepting the union model as the forum from which to organize and represent the peasantry, they "had to deny, in practice, the cultural and organizational pluralism of the existing native societies" (1991:22). In their failure to restructure the union model to recognize traditional authorities and practices in the various communities, the CSUTCB under the Katarista leadership

became increasingly isolated from the indigenous organizations in the Amazon, northern Potosi, western Oruro, and even in some of the highlands and valleys around La Paz and Chuquisaca. In these regions, the union's presence was artificial, limited by the clientalistic practices that were inherited from the mestizo-imposed union organization of the post-revolutionary years (1991:22).

Rivera (1991) places much of the blame for the CSUTCB's increasing isolation from its indigenous membership on the influence of the Left and its ability to block the initiatives put forward by the Kataristas. The Katarista leadership did attempt to restructure the CSUTCB to address ethnic diversity and recognize traditional ethnic authorities but the Leftist wing of the organization managed to block these attempts. This division between the Kataristas and the leftist organization within the CSUTCB began to emerge at the 1983 Third Congress. The Kataristas had wanted the CSUTCB to be rooted in its indigenous identity while the Eje de Covergencia Patriotica (ECP) wanted it to be based on its class identity, reflecting the traditional leftist ideology of the MNR (García, Chavez & Costas, 2004:118). The Kataristas at the Third Congress eventually lost this struggle for control in 1988, when the ECP gained control of the organization and forced Jenaro Flores from his leadership position. With the removal of the most prominent leader in the Katarista movement, the Kataristas lost their dominant influence within the CSUTCB.

Although, the Kataristas lost their dominant position in the CSUTCB, they did rise to prominence briefly during the government of Sánchez de Lozada. In the June 1993 elections, Lozada chose Victor Hugo Cárdenas to be his running

mate. Cárdinas was an Aymara linguist and a leader of the largest Katarista party in Congress, the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupak Katari de Liberación (Tupak Katari Revolutionary Liberation Movement - MRTKL). This was a "controversial choice that capitalized on the growing popularlity of indigenous themes in the 1990s" (Van Cott, 2000a:146). However, the leaders of the MNR came to support this choice because of the emergence of the indigenous movements in the early 1990s. In the years prior to the election, there had been a new surge of indigenous mobilizations, particularly among the lowlands indigenous peoples. They had begun a "March for Dignity" in 1990, which was later joined by the highlands organizations including the CSUTCB. According to CIDOB, this march began with 2,000 people but culminated with 30,000 arriving in La Paz (CIDOB quoted in Yasher, 2005:217). For the political elite this event helped to re-awaken the importance of addressing the constitutional claims of the indigenous peoples. It has also been suggested that at the time, the Bolivian elite feared an Indian-based uprising in the country if there was no effort to address the indigenous demands (Van Cott, 2000a:144). This concern was inspired by the misguided conclusions about the origins of the Shining Path movement in the Indian highlands of neighbouring Peru. These fears were further reinforced by the emergence of small-armed movements in the Bolivian highlands that had taken on Katarista-sounding names. In a 1993 interview, Sánchez de Lozada also referred to this concern when he explained his choice of Cárdenas as a running mate. In referring to his choice of a prominent Katarista leader as a running mate, Lozada stated that Bolivia would not have to "fear an uprising like the

Shining Path because his government would respect linguistic and cultural diversity" (Mesa Gisbert quoted in Van Cott, 2000a:144).

Despite the small size of Cárdenas's party, his contribution to the MNR's election win in 1993, ensured that he would have a considerable level of influence (Albó, 1994:72). However, two other parties, the Movimiento Bolivia Libre (MBL) and the Unidad Cívica de Solidaridad (UCS) were also asked to join the government coalition and this weakened Cárdenas's influence. Some progress was made in addressing indigenous demands such as the implementation of political reforms (Law of Popular Participation - LPP). One of the goals of the LPP was to increase the political representation of the country's indigenous population. However, Cárdenas was not involved in the planning nor the implementation of this project. In fact, the planning for the LPP was carried out in secrecy by President Lozada and a team of consultants (Van Cott, 2000a: 149-152).

Cárdenas also did little to help the Katarista movement. In fact, the CSUTCB declared Cárdenas to be "an enemy and a traitor" during its 1994 VI Congress (Patzi Paco quoted in Van Cott, 2005:82). His decision to align with the MNR had left the movement divided. Furthermore, after Cárdenas became the vice president, he stifled the growth of the MRTKL, one of the last remaining Katarista parties. He marginalized its members from the government "by appointing non-indigenous, non-MRTKL advisors to important government positions, by excluding MRTKL congressional representatives from policy

meetings, and by prohibiting the party from competing in the 1997 elections" (Van Cott, 2005:82).

Chapter 6:
The Second Wave Movements:
The Cocalero Movement and
El Movimiento Al Socialismo (MAS)

Although a number of indigenous movements have emerged in the last twenty years, this section will focus on the rise of the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) and its gradual development to become the leading social movement in the country, culminating in its election to form the governing party in December, 2005. The round of indigenous organizing in the 1980s saw the rise of a number of 'new' mobilizations, including the predecessor of the MAS, the cocalero movement; the indigenous movement of the Amazon region, the Confederación Indigena del Oriente Boliviano (CIDOB); and several local movements in the highlands that had arisen to defend and strengthen the local indigenous cultures. By the end of the 1990s, internal divisions had weakened CIDOB's mobilization, while the cultural movements of the highlands had remained focused at the local community level. However, the cocalero mobilization continued to gain momentum, seizing control of the peasant confederation, the Confederación Sindical Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB), and later founding its own political party, the Asamblea de la Soberanía de los Pueblos (Assembly for the Sovereignty of Peoples – ASP). The ASP won the majority of seats in the 1995 municipal election in the Chapare and then went on to win four seats in the 1997 parliamentary elections. In 1999, the ASP chose to adopt the

name of a defunct leftist party, Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS). In the 2002 election, the MAS managed to capture 22.46% of the vote, which was less than two percentage points behind the winning party, the MNR, led by President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (Van Cott, 2003). Throughout the coming years, the MAS and its leader, Evo Morales, continued to gain broad support throughout the country. In December, 2005, the party under the leadership of Evo Morales, was able to build on this momentum and win the national election to become the governing party of Bolivia.

In examining the political ascent of Evo Morales and the MAS, I will trace the evolvement of the cocalero movement, from its beginnings as a federation of cocalero organizations to a national political party. In analyzing the rise of this movement through the political-cultural formation perspective, I will discuss the economic and cultural processes of the Chapare region and how they shaped both the content and articulation of the movement's demands. Then I will examine the effects of state intervention and leadership types on the dynamics of the movement.

6.1 Regional Cultural Processes

Although the Chapare was first colonized in the 1960s, it was the coca-cocaine boom of the 1970s that began to attract more migrants to the region (Healy, 1988, 1991). The increase in the demand for coca (to produce cocaine) from the United States and Europe helped to raise the price of coca, which then made it more profitable to produce this crop. The prices for coca fluctuated over time, but even at its lowest price levels, the coca crop generated more income

than the local alternatives and far more income than what could be earned through subsistence agriculture in the altiplano (Crabtree, 2005:35). For example, in 1985, 100 pounds of coca leaves were worth 30 times as much cash as 225 pounds of potatoes (the major highland crop) (Sanabria, 1993:57). Therefore, migrants came to the Chapare in pursuit of the economic opportunities. Between 1967 and 1987, the population of the Chapare increased nearly tenfold, from 24,000 inhabitants to nearly 250,000 (Crabtree, 2005:35).

The peasant unions were established early in the colonization of the Chapare. Beginning in the 1960s, they assumed the role of local government and took on many responsibilities including the distribution of land grants, the resolving of disputes and the building of small-scale public works such as schools and roads (Farthing and Ledebur, 2004). When the conflict began between the government and the cocaleros in the 1980, the cocalero unions had become an intrinsic part of the cocalero's day-to-day life (Albro, 2005:438).

When the state attempted to eradicate coca production in the 1980s, its policies "helped to feed a cocalero militancy, galvanizing the internal unity" of their unions" (Albro, 2005:438). This mobilization was further intensified with the arrival of ex-miners after 1985, who brought "with them their own radical union tradition, and long history of resistance to state oppression" (Albro, 2005:438; see also Albó, 2002). As a result, the cocalero unions were able to resist state efforts aimed at weakening their mobilization and become the most powerful political force in the country.

In the 1990s, the cocaleros began to articulate their movement in terms of their ethnic identity; proclaiming their rights as peasants of indigenous heritage to grow coca. However, the peasants that originally migrated to the Chapare came from different parts of the country, making it difficult to ascribe any one ethnic identity to the cocalero movement. The urban press has usually referred to them as being Quechua, however, they are a heterogeneous population, and include peasants of both Quechua and Aymara descent (Gustafson, 2002:297). The leader of the movement, Evo Morales, comes from Challapata, a Quechua-Aymara bilingual region in Oruro, and has been labelled both Quechua and Aymara.

Many of the migrants to the region were also miners who lost their work during the state mine closures of the mid-1980s. As part of its economic policies, the government closed many of its state-owned mining companies, resulting in the dismissal of 22,000-23,000 out of 28,000-30,000 miners (Conaghan and Malloy 1994:144; Healy 1997:229). These miners were not technically classified as "indigenous peasants" as they did not belong to the peasant union, the CSUTCB. They belonged to one of the country's largest labour unions, the Central Obrera Boliviano (Bolivian Workers Central - COB). However many of them did originally come from the indigenous communities (Yasher, 2005:184).

Because the cocaleros came from such diverse indigenous backgrounds, researchers have questioned their "cultural defence of coca" claiming that this defence was more of a conscious strategic decision aimed at gaining public support for their cause. However, what needs to be considered is whether there

was any basis to their claims of having a shared identity. The majority of the cocaleros were "Quechua or Aymara migrants who had retained ties to their communities" and therefore shared an indigenous heritage in which the "growing of coca was a long-standing cultural and religious practice" (Van Cott, 2003:762). Furthermore, their shared struggle in defending coca production would have helped them focus more on what they had in common as indigenous peoples (Garcia, Chávez & Costas, 2004). However, it has to be acknowledged that the success of their cultural defence strategy did help them gain national and international sympathy, thereby reinforcing their need to continue focusing on their ethnic discourse. This strategy enabled them to gain support from important social and political groups including Cochabamba's elite-based civic committee, human rights organizations, anthropologists, and journalists (Van Cott, 2003:762). In presenting themselves as an ethnic-cultural movement, the cocaleros increasingly infused their protest rallies with the widespread use of indigenous Andean languages and symbols of identity such as the 'wiphala,' which is the rainbow-checkered flag that was formerly known as the banner of Aymara nationalism (Albro, 2005:439). When they founded the Asamblea de la Soberanía de los Pueblos (Assembly for the Sovereignty of the People - ASP) in 1995, they presented it as an Indian rights party, with the intent of mobilizing the Quechua of the Cochabamba region (Alejo Veliz and Evo Morales as quoted in Yasher, 2005:186). As the MAS became established, its leader Evo Morales began to focus even more on the indigenous basis of the movement/party: "We, the original people, have organized ourselves into a political instrument for the people's sovereignty" (Morales quoted in Albro, 2005: 440).

However, the MAS, like its predecessors, the cocalero organizations and the ASP, has never focused exclusively on identity issues, but has struggled to bridge the class and ethnic divides in Bolivia's social sectors. Even when the ASP was attempting to mobilize the Quechua peasants during the 1995 municipal elections, it made concerted efforts to "disregard the artificial division between workers and Bolivia's original inhabitants" (Opinion, 1995 quoted in Albro, 2005:440). As part of this strategy, it attempted to unify the opposition movements by establishing an electoral alliance with the oppositional party, the Izquierda Unida (United Left – IU). The current leader of the MAS, Evo Morales, has continued to focus on both identity and class as a means to broaden the party's support base and forge coalitions with other oppositional groups. In many instances, he has used the MAS's indigenous discourse to promote solidarity with other organizations; "We have to practice solidarity and reciprocity, which is part of our culture!" (Morales, 2001 quoted in Albro, 2005:445).

From this brief analysis of regional culture, it is evident that both the economic and social processes largely shaped the early demands of the cocaleros. In defending their economic livelihood, they were forced to mobilize collectively, choosing to express their demands and actions through their traditional union structures. Most of the migrants in the Chapare had come from the farming communities of the Cochabamba Valley and the mining communities of Potosi, where unions had been the dominant form of organization since the 1930s. Although it is unclear as to the impact of the cultural processes, it has to be acknowledged that most of the cocaleros did come from indigenous backgrounds

and many had maintained strong ties with their communities of origin. Whether, they were of Quechua or Aymara background, they still belonged to a subordinated group in Bolivian society, one that had experienced discrimination at the hands of the country's dominant mestizo population. Furthermore, their shared cultural beliefs surrounding the sacredness of the coca leaf would have re-affirmed their shared identity (García, Chávez & Costas, 2004). It matters little as to whether or not they consciously used their indigenous background as a political tool. What is important is that the cocaleros were capable of organizing through both class and identity grievances or demands, a characteristic that became a fundamental part of the later party organizations, the ASP and the MAS.

6.2 State Intervention

State policies have profoundly shaped the movement of both the MAS and its predecessors, the cocalero organizations. The first interventions that will be considered are the Banzer government's institutional reforms, including the Law of Popular Participation (LPP), which was implemented in 1994 as part of the government's administrative package, and the constitutional reform of uninominal districts for 68 of the seats in the 130-seat chamber of deputies. When the government initiated these reforms, they were seen by some as the government's fulfilment of a promise to give the indigenous peoples a stronger political voice. This type of state- initiated intervention usually results in a co-opted organization, but in the Chapare, the cocaleros succeeded in reshaping the policies to serve their political ambitions.

The other key policies that will be examined involved state repression in which the governing elites attempted to stifle opposition from indigenous groups. Usually these types of intervention result in "temporary immobilization," but they also have the potential to "enhance the formation of independent and oppositional organizations for resistance" (Otero, 2004:333). This is what occurred when the government attempted to isolate and suppress the cocalero mobilizations as part of its campaign to eradicate coca production in the Chapare. The eradication program increased the militancy of the cocalero movement throughout the 1980s and 1990s, forcing them to organize and resist government attempts to destroy their livelihood.

In recent years, the government has employed repressive measures in its confrontations with the MAS and other indigenous groups. The usual outcome has been a loss of state legitimacy, enabling opposition groups such as MAS to gain public support for their mobilization. When President Quiroga expelled Morales from congress in 2002, effectively annulling his popular mandate, both indigenous and non-indigenous organizations united in opposing the government's actions (Assies & Salman, 2003:149). This enabled Morales and his party, the MAS, to broaden political support throughout the country at a crucial time when Bolivia was heading into a national election. Government actions in 2003, aimed at suppressing opposition to state plans to export gas through a Chilean port, provide the strongest example of a government losing legitimacy because of its repressive policies. When the Sánchez de Lozada government fired on indigenous protestors in the city of El Alto, the subsequent outrage fuelled statewide protests. Both the MAS and the El Alto organizations

became the leaders of the anti-government mobilization that forced the resignation of Sánchez de Lozada. However, the MAS was able to continue building on its leadership role in the following years.

The Law of Popular Participation (LPP) was implemented as part of an administrative decentralization plan that had been promoted by the international financial institutions, however it was also seen by some as a means of increasing the political participation of the country's previously excluded indigenous populations (Van Cott, 2003; Calla, 2000). The objective of this program was to create municipal governments that would then be responsible for maintaining and implementing local public infrastructure and services. As part of this policy, the state officially "recognized pre-existing groups or facilitated the formation of almost 15,000 grassroots organizations, including urban and neighbourhood organizations, pre-Hispanic indigenous formations and modern campesino unions" (Kohl, 2003:153). In some cases, where there were strong local organizations backed by non-governmental organizations, the LPP was able to provide more benefits and participation to previously underserved populations. However, in many municipalities, the elites managed to appropriate the new resources and responsibilities, and reinforce their dominance within the traditional power structures (Kohl, 2003:153; Calla, 2000:87).

One of the groups that was able to successfully use the LPP to its advantage was the cocalero federations (Van Cott, 2003:755-756). In creating 311 municipalities (later expanded to 314), the LPP's reforms made it easier for indigenous parties to register and participate in the electoral process. As a result,

the cocaleros were able to form their own political party, the ASP, which then went on to win 12 per cent of the vote in Cochabamba's 1995 municipal elections. Most of this support was in the Chapare, where the ASP won a total of 47 seats in local town councils and eleven mayoralties (Albro, 2005:440). Having established a foothold in the municipal elections, the ASP then went on to expand its representation at the national level. This was facilitated by the government's institutional reform in creating uninominal seats as it "enabled geographically concentrated movements to compete successfully from their geographical base" (Van Cott, 2003:756). In the 1997 national elections, the ASP elected four national deputies from the Cochabamba region with one of them, Evo Morales, winning the highest percentage of votes out of any uninominal candidate in the country. In a field of ten candidates, Morales won more than 60 per cent of the vote (Van Cott, 2003:756).

The institutional reforms may have provided the means with which the cocaleros could attain greater political representation but it was the state's coca eradication policies that intensified their mobilization in the years before they founded a political party (Healy, 1988; Albro, 2005). Although such policies had been implemented in the early 1980s, it was the "Ley de Régimen de la Coca y Sustáncias Controladas" during 1987-1988 that heightened the confrontation between the state and the cocaleros, thereby accelerating peasant union organizing in the Chapare (Healy, 1988:114). At the time, Estensorro Paz's government had endorsed the IMF and World Bank Structural adjustment programs, which included taking steps to increase the flow of US and multilateral aid. In its attempt to secure this financial aid, the Paz Government agreed to

implement a coca eradication program and pursued the US congressional target reduction of 4,000 ha. (Healy, 1988:113). As part of this program, it enacted the coca eradication law, which declared all coca cultivation in the country to be illegal except for a designated 12,000 ha. in the Yungas. In establishing coca as a "controlled substance," this legislation meant that, for the first time, the coca peasants were considered by the state to be social delinquents.

In opposing this law, the cocalero federation mobilized some 12,000 peasants to blockade Cochabamba's main roads. The government responded by sending the army and police to suppress the mobilization, killing six protestors and wounding several others. The state-peasant conflict continued throughout the following decades in which the cocaleros were forced to struggle against an increasing militarization of the Chapare. The militarization was accompanied by human rights abuses, unjustified detentions, torture, violation of women, and theft by the military (Assies & Salmon, 2003:148). By 2001, this low-intensity war had claimed the lives of 57 coca growers at the hands of security forces, with many more injured, (although some accounts run as high as 300 deaths) (Ledebur, 2002).

Throughout this struggle, the Cocaleros became more organized and militant (Van Cott, 2003:762). By 1990, they had formed 160 local based syndicatos under the umbrella of 30 sub-federations, which in turn are organized into five federations (Healy, 1991:88-89). The sindicatos "established themselves as Bolivia's most effective, consistently active peasant groups in exerting pressure to influence government policy"(Healy, 1991:91). In 1987, they tripled the

number of delegates at the CSUTCB congress, enabling them to gain control of the country's largest peasant organization. They then formed a political party, the ASP, to "complement their strategy of massive mobilization and resistance to the eradication of coca" (Van Cott, 2003:762). As the MAS, the cocaleros were able to build on their success at the municipal level and expand their support at the national level. By the 2005 elections, they had become the most dynamic and consolidated social movement in the country (Albro, 2005).

Another form of state repression that was used against the MAS and the cocalero movement was the lifting of Evo Morales's parliamentary immunity in 2002. At the time, the confrontation between the state military and the cocaleros in the Chapare was growing increasingly violent. When two soldiers were found assassinated in the region, President Quiroga accused Morales of being the "intellectual author of the crimes" because of Morales's position as a prominent leader of the cocalero movement (Assies & Salman, 2003:148).[1] Quiroga then demanded the lifting of Morales's immunity, which led to a summary trial by an 'ethical commission.' This was followed by a members' vote in the Chamber of Deputies where 104 of the 130 members voted for Morales's removal. At the time, another Lower House member and former minister, Fernando Keiffer had been allowed to retain his immunity, enabling him to avoid facing a number of corruption charges. Thus, it quickly became apparent that the purpose of this action against Morales was to suppress the political and union expression of the cocalero movement (Assies & Salman, 2003:149).

[1] There has never been any substantial proof connecting Morales to the crimes nor any proof connecting him to the cocaine mafia (Albó, 2003 as quoted in Assies and Salman, 2003: 148, 157)

However, the government's attempt to suppress the cocaleros resulted in widespread protests throughout the city of Cochabamba, where Morales was on a hunger strike in the office of the Workers Union. Much of the Bolivian public had sympathy for the cocalero's struggle as they resented the US government's interference in Bolivia's domestic policies (Van Cott, 2003:772). When Morales was expelled, many were deeply offended as they felt that the US government had played a role in his expulsion. Furthermore, it was felt by many, especially in the indigenous population, that the government had dared to expel Morales because he was an Indian (Assies & Salman, 2003:149). As a result, the previously "divided factions within the indigenous organizations closed ranks around Morales and organized roadblocks, hunger strikes and demonstrations to demand his reinstatement" (Assies, 2002 quoted in Van Cott, 2003:772). The violent confrontations that resulted between the police and the protestors in the city of Cochabamba forced the government to negotiate with Morales and restore his political and trade union rights.

Morales was able to use this incident to his advantage in the months leading up to the 2002 national election. In raising the question of US involvement in his expulsion, he was able to feed into the popular resentment against US interference in Bolivian politics (Assies & Salman, 2003:150). The resentment was further inflamed by the US ambassador's statements in which he warned the Bolivians that they would lose US aid if they voted for Morales. These comments combined with the governments' treatment of Morales boosted electoral support for Morales's party, the MAS, enabling it to capture 22. 94 per cent of the vote in the 2002 elections. This second place finish was less than

2 percentage points behind the winner, the MNR, led by President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada. Although it is difficult to measure the rise in Morales's support that may have been caused by his expulsion and the US ambassador's comments, analysts estimated it to be around 5 percent (La Razon quoted in Van Cott, 2003:773). Morales himself acknowledged the impact of Ambassador Rocha's comments when he thanked the ambassador for his help in boosting his electoral support (BBC Monitoring Latin America quoted in Van Cott, 2003:773). In responding to these results, one of Bolivia's well-known political scientists, Rene Antonio Mayorga, commented on the role of government policy in boosting support for Morales;

> If this [Rocha's interference in Bolivian politics] had not happened, Evo Morales would have probably received the same votes as in 1997. This is the product of the bad policy of the government, and the terrible policy of the (US) Ambassador Rocha, which has been a disaster...Without US policy, Evo Morales would not exist. (Iturri, 2002 as quoted in Van Cott, 2003:772).

There were a number of state interventions that affected the rise of Evo Morales and MAS; however, this analysis will focus on the state response to the gas protests of 2003 because of its significant consequences for both the government and the indigenous movements. The gas protests in October 2003 were provoked by the government's decision to pipe Bolivia's natural gas to a Chilean port, where it would then be shipped to the United States. This pipeline project was strongly opposed not only by the indigenous groups, but by many other Bolivians as well. Bolivia had fought a war with Chile, the War of the Pacific (1879-1883), in which it lost its coastline and adjoining nitrate fields

(Orias, 2005:55). The strong feelings of anti-American sentiment also added to the opposition because the final destination of the gas was in California.

When President Sánchez de Lozada attempted to finalize the gas agreement, the indigenous organizations led massive demonstrations against what they saw as the sale of their patrimony (Postero, 2004:190). The government responded to the protests with blunt force, killing mainly indigenous protestors in the Aymara city of El Alto. The state's brutal repression of the protestors led to more anger and outrage among the opposition groups. By October 2003, the Aymara organizations of El Alto had begun a movement to overthrow the government of Sánchez de Lozada (Hylton & Sinclair, 2004, 2005). They marched through the city of La Paz, overtaking the city centre, demanding the resignation of the President. After six weeks of massive demonstrations throughout La Paz, El Alto and Cochabamba, Sánchez de Lozada resigned and fled to the United States.

The government's response to the gas protests provides another example of how repressive state policies have united indigenous groups in Bolivia. However, this time the intervention provided opportunities for the indigenous movements to take the leadership role in mobilizing the country's popular sectors against the government. Although the El Alto groups played a dominant role in this mobilization, Evo Morales and the MAS were able to attain the greatest political benefits in the years following the protests. When Mesa became the president following Sánchez de Lozada's resignation, the MAS was able to exercise considerable influence in shaping government policy, especially in

regards to the national referendum that was held on the nationalization of Bolivia's hydrocarbon resources (Hylton & Thomson, 2005:58). In addition, Morales and the MAS used their influence with the Mesa government to obtain a halt in coca eradication.

Conflicts with the state such as the gas protests also helped the MAS to publicly reaffirm their defence of coca. The MAS and its allied movements had begun to focus more on equating their defence of coca with a defence of all natural resources including natural gas (Albro, 2005:447). Furthermore, the MAS has used this central demand, the defence of natural resources, as part of its discourse on national sovereignty, one that has helped the MAS to become the leading social movement in the country (Albro, 2005).

6.3 Leadership Types

The MAS has aligned with other social and political organizations, first in its efforts to influence state policy concerning coca-eradication and then in its struggle to attain greater political representation at the national level. The predecessor to the MAS, the cocalero organizations, began forging alliances in the early 1980s as part of their defence strategy in opposing the state's coca eradication policy. When the MAS was founded, Morales continued to pursue strategic alliances, which enabled him and his party to build political momentum in the years leading up to the 2005 election. By focusing primarily on the political events of 2005, this analysis will demonstrate how the MAS's alliances were a decisive factor in the party's electoral success.

As part of their long-term strategy to gain support for their cause, the cocaleros forged alliances with other peasant groups, the clergy, diverse human rights groups, foreign NGOs, labour unions and other social movements (Healy, 1991). In particular, the alliances with other peasant organizations have been quite successful in pressuring state governments. These alliances date back to the early 1980s, when the cocalero unions began participating in reciprocal protest-actions with peasant unions from other regions. This cooperation was evident in the cocalero protests of 1983 when the union organizations from La Paz, Oruro, and Potosi together with CSUTCB organized roadblocks between La Paz and Oruro for a week. They succeeded in pressuring the government to address the demands of both the cocaleros and the other peasant organizations. In the same year, another roadblock was set up in western Cochabamba in which peasants from the Chapare and non-coca growing regions participated. Although the initial reason for the protest was to draw attention to the low price of wheat and protest the state subsidies to non-producers, the demand for the free marketing of coca was added to the protest agenda as a way of including the cocalero's interests (Healy, 1991:98-99). Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the alliances between the cocaleros and other peasant groups proved to be effective in influencing government policy.

Like its predecessors, the MAS has continued to rely on its strategic alliances as a means of opposing state policy. However, after its electoral gains in the 2002 elections, the party began pursuing alliances in an attempt to gain greater political representation at the national level. This focus was particularly evident in the year leading up to the 2005 December election, when the MAS

sought alliances in its attempt to gain broad-based electoral support. This strategy was not without its challenges for Morales as he encountered problems in his attempt to maintain his traditional base of support while trying to appeal to other sectors such as the middle classes. This struggle continued throughout the pre-election period; however, Morales did succeed in forming the alliances that eventually helped his party, the MAS, to win the 2005 election.

Morales and the MAS chose to support Carlos Mesa during his first year in power (Assies & Salman, 2003:156). Mesa was the former vice president in the Sánchez de Lozada government who then became the president when Lozada was forced to resign following the gas protests. One of the challenges that Mesa faced was the growing public demands for the government to re-visit its policies concerning the exploitation of Bolivia's gas resources. In responding to this pressure, the Mesa government, with the backing of Morales, organized a referendum on hydrocarbons, which was held on July 18, 2004 (Lemoine, 2005). Some of the indigenous organizations such as those of El Alto opposed the referendum; however, the voter turnout was about 60 percent of the voting population. As this turnout was "unusually high for Latin American referenda, most officials and media outlets" declared that the boycott movement had been a failure (NotiSur, 2004). Even in El Alto, the majority of the citizens ignored their leaders' call for a boycott and participated in the voting process (Lemoine, 2005).

By early 2005, Morales and his party began withdrawing support for the Mesa government, in part because of Mesa's refusal to support higher taxes on gas production. The Congress, in responding to growing public pressure, had

passed a law that levied a direct tax of 32 percent on hydrocarbons. When combined with the 18 percent tax already in force, the state's share of revenue from gas production was increased to 50 percent. Mesa opposed this law as he considered it abusive and confiscatory while Morales and his party supported it as they saw it as a step in the right direction (Lemoine, 2005).

However, Morales and the MAS came under increasing pressure to support full nationalization when they were faced with El Alto's growing mobilization in favour of 'reclaiming the country's gas resources' (Cáceres, 2005a:8; Chávez, 2005b:9). In May, 2005, the El Alto movements began organizing to protest the government's refusal to nationalize the country's gas resources. Many of these organizations including the Federación de Juntas Vecinales (Federation of Neighbourhood Committees – FEJUVES) and Central Obrera Regional (Regional Workers Central – COR) had urged their supporters to boycott the gas referendum of 2004 as they thought it was an attempt by the government to neutralize the opposition groups which had supported full nationalization (García, 2005:6). Even the Congress's attempt to substantially increase taxation on gas production did not appease the El Alto groups as they wanted full nationalization and no compensation to the multinationals that owned the gas production companies (Lemoine, 2005). When the Congress members introduced the new taxation law, some of the El Alto groups such as the FEJUVES and COR grew increasingly frustrated with the ensuing disagreements between the Congress members and the Mesa government as they believed that this would continue to impede the government's ability to act (García, 2005:6). When Mesa's refusal to veto the

new taxation bill enabled the Congress to promulgate it into law, the FEJUVES began leading marches to the city of La Paz to protest the new law. The FEJUVES succeeded in gaining the support of key social and political organizations in both El Alto and La Paz, enabling them to sustain a three-week long strike in the two cities. Support for the protests spread throughout the country, as indigenous communities blockaded most of Bolivia's main roads for the duration of the protests (Webber, 2005)

Although Morales and his party, the MAS, aligned with the El Alto movements in supporting the protests, Morales continued to avoid proclaiming his support for full nationalization. At the beginning of the mobilization, the MAS organized a 200-kilometre march from Caracolla to La Paz. When the MAS-led marchers met with the Altenos, many of them called out in agreement with the demands for full nationalization (Webber, 2005). However, later in the day, when Morales gave his speech to the assembly of protestors, he called for a Constituent Assembly above all else and avoided discussing the full nationalization of gas resources (Morales, 2005). Such differences made it evident that the divisions remained between the MAS and the indigenous movements of El Alto. It also re-affirmed the MAS's continued attempt to appeal to the middle classes by not fully supporting the nationalization demands of the "more radical" El Alto social movements.

Once Mesa had resigned and the new acting president, Rodriguez, agreed to call elections in December 2005, the social movements and political parties began planning their electoral strategies. In preparation for the coming election,

the supporters of the MAS called for their leaders to organize a united left front with the other social movements (Chávez, 2005a:8). However, Morales chose to pursue an alliance with the mayor of La Paz, Juan del Granado, whose party, Movimiento Sin Miedo (Movement Without Fear – MSM), was known to oppose the nationalization of gas. Many believed that this decision to unite with a more right of centre political party was part of Morales's strategy to increase MAS's appeal to the urban middle classes (Chávez, 2005a:8). Juan del Granado and the other mayors of the MSM had become the second most powerful political force in the municipal elections, capturing 8.74 percent of the votes. The MAS had received the highest percentage of votes at 18.48 percent (La Razón, 2005b). The MSM was considered to have more support among the urban middle class voters and therefore an alliance with the MSM would not only have increased MAS's support base, but it would have broadened its appeal to the urban middle classes. This strategy reflected the belief, which was held by the MAS leadership, that securing the urban middle class vote was the key to national electoral success (Chávez, 2005a:8).

One of the decisions that enabled the MAS to broaden its alliances, especially among the middle classes was the appointment of Alvaro García as the vice-presidential candidate of the party (Lemoine, 2005). Alvaro García is a sociologist who is one of the most influential academics in the country. He also served as a guerrilla with Quispe, the leader of the MIP and was imprisoned at the beginning of the 1990s for his activities in the Ejército Guerrillero Tupak Katari (Tupac Katari Guerilla Army - EGTK). Because of these credentials, he was popular with the country's social movements. After his appointment, six

peasant federations pledged their support for the MAS, along with many sections of the mining cooperatives and transport workers from El Alto. Some of the organizations such as the FEJUVES and Central Obrera Regional (Regional Labour Central – COR) also agreed to begin negotiations for an alliance with the MAS. In addition, García's position as one of Bolivia's most influential intellectuals helped to extend the MAS's influence into academia and the middle classes. Following his appointment, the MAS's popularity surged in the polls, pushing ahead of the opposition candidate, Jorge Quiroga of the Acción Democrática Nacional (National Democratic Action – ADN) (Lemoine, 2005).

Alvaro García and Morales succeeded in building a broad coalition of the left, but they failed to gain the support of some of the country's prominent political organizations including the COB; the MIP; the COR and the FEJUVES of El Alto. The COR and the FEJUVES took part in negotiations with the MAS about the possibility of an alliance, but the talks broke down shortly before the election (Fuentes, 2005; Do Alto, 2005). Both organizations had demanded that more of their candidates be placed on the electoral lists in El Alto, but this was contested by the MAS members in the city who wanted more of their own candidates to be on the lists (La Razon, 2005c; Fuentes, 2005). At the risk of losing support in El Alto, the MAS chose to break off the negotiations.

Although Morales and García were unable to include all the social movements outside of the MAS, they did succeed in building a broad coalition of the Left. Garcia's candidacy also brought the intellectuals and the "urban middle class" into the MAS campaign. In the end, the failure to align with the more

radical El Alto movements did not appear to have eroded the MAS's support in El Alto. Following the election in December, it was again apparent that Morales and the MAS had enjoyed a high level of support in the city (New York Times, 2005). Morales and the MAS received 62.4 percent of the votes in the urban areas of La Paz, which included both the cities of La Paz and El Alto (La Razon, 2005d)

Chapter 7: Conclusion

The main objective of this thesis has been to explain the emergence of a powerful indigenous movement in Bolivia, one that in recent years was able to broaden political support throughout the country, enabling it to form the first elected indigenous government in Latin America. There have been indigenous mobilizations in Bolivia in the past such as the Katarista movement; however, these movements always seemed to lose political momentum, and in the end, they never attained national significance. In the previous chapters, I outlined the development of both the earlier Katarista movement and that of the more recent Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS). In each case study, the movements were analyzed through the framework of Otero's political-cultural formation perspective, focusing on three key factors; regional cultural processes, state intervention and leadership types. In this concluding chapter, I will now compare the progression of Katarismo with that of the MAS in order to determine which factors played a key role in their political success or demise. This will allow for a more accurate explanation of the factors that facilitated the MAS's efforts to transform itself from a small-localized movement to a national political party; enabling it to mount a formidable challenge to the traditional governing elites of the country.

In using Otero's PCF approach, I considered the three mediating variables between "class structural processes" and political-formation outcomes: regional

cultures, state intervention, and leadership types. The class structural processes include both the relations of production, which are the relations of production (those between exploiters and the exploited) and the relations of reproduction (those relations among the exploited). According to PCF's framework, regional cultures are closely related to the relations of production and reproduction and form the basis from which demands are articulated. The second determination, state intervention, shapes the character of the movement, determining whether it will become "bourgeois-hegemonic," oppositional," or "popular democratic." The third variable also shapes the movement, but more in terms of its alliances, which then affects its ability to maintain its independence from the state and its autonomy from other political organizations.

The first factor that was considered in each of the case studies was the impact of regional cultural processes on the shaping of the movements' early demands and objects of struggle. Both economic and social processes were significant; however, it was the social relations as defined by their traditional community structures that were particularly influential in the forming of the Katarista's early demands. Many of the communities in the altiplano had retained their traditional social and political organizations that had long remained outside of the state's control. These structures had continued to dominate every aspect of the Aymara's day-to-day life, creating a distinctive pattern of social relations. Not only did these social relations create the basis for a strong collective identity, but they also formed an identity that was separate and distinct from that of the country's dominant mestizo population. With the rise of Katarismo, these people were no longer willing to accept their subordinated and

excluded position in Bolivian society. The leaders of this movement sought greater recognition for their indigenous cultures and traditions along with their inclusion into the mainstream of society.

Therefore, Katarismo was primarily an ethnic-based movement, which drew most of its support from the Aymara communities and as such was limited even in its appeal to the broader indigenous populations. When Katarismo became the dominant influence within the country's largest peasant union, the CSUTCB, it had difficulty coordinating efforts with the Cochabamba-based indigenous population because of disagreements over whether class or identity issues should be given priority within the organization. In the mid-1980s, the conflicts between the Cochabamba-based indigenous groups and Kataristas within the CSUTCB led to the ousting of Flores as the organization's leader. With the removal of Katarismo's most prominent leader, the movement lost its influence within the peasant organization. The class-identity struggle also divided the early attempts by the Kataristas to form a national political party. The Tupak Katari Indian Movement (MITKA) was founded by a group of Kataristas who decided to focus on the ethnic demands of the movement, while the Tupak Katari Revolutionary Movement (MRTK) was formed by another group that wanted to focus more on the class struggle. The latter was inspired by Traditional Marxist ideology.

The cocalero organizations who were the predecessors of the MAS began as a class-based movement whose main objective was to protect their economic livelihood, which was based on coca production. From the beginning, the

migrants of the Chapare came from diverse indigenous backgrounds, making it difficult to ascribe any one indigenous culture to the movement. When they began organizing in opposition to the government's coca eradication policies in the 1980s, they came together as a class, whose primary focus was to influence ethnic identity. They never focused exclusively on identity issues, but sought to "bridge the artificial division between the worker and [Bolivia's] original inhabitants" (Opinión, 1995 quoted in Albro, 2005:440). When Evo Morales assumed the leadership of the MAS, he became more vocal about the indigenous basis of the MAS (Albro, 2005: 440). However, he was careful to avoid the exclusionary ethnic rhetoric that was used by previous indigenous movements such as the Kataristas. Instead, Morales and the MAS incorporated indigenous discourse and symbols as a way of promoting solidarity with other social sectors. It was because of such efforts to bridge the class and ethnic divide, that MAS was able to expand its appeal to broader segments of Bolivian society. This is in contrast to the Kataristas, who in the end were unable to broaden their appeal to even a wider indigenous population. The Kataristas struggled with the identity versus class issues, but in the end, they were unable to move beyond their identity-focused demands. In not being able to expand their appeal to even a broader indigenous population, other groups such as the cocaleros took the lead in uniting and mobilizing the indigenous peasantry.

In both the Katarisita and MAS movements, repressive state policies played an instrumental role in fuelling their militancy, while in certain instances, co-optive policies initiated by the states also resulted in dividing the movement. For Katarismo, it was the Banzer government's decision to break the traditional

pact between the military government and the indigenous peasantry that fuelled anger and resentment in the Aymara communities. The Banzer government's decision to massacre indigenous protestors not only ended the Military-Peasant Pact (Pacto Militar-Campesino - PMC), but also destroyed any of its remaining legitimacy in the Aymara communities, re-affirming their need to mobilize in opposition to the government. The cocalero organizations faced a much longer period of state repression, which resembled a low intensity war. However, it was through their struggle against the state's coca eradication policies that they became a unified and highly organized mobilization (Healy, 1991). The state's repressive policies at critical conjunctures also facilitated the MAS's efforts to broaden its political support. However, the cocalero unions and the later MAS movement were more effective in using these government policies to gain public sympathy and support. By focusing on the US involvement in the government's repressive policies, the cocaleros helped to intensify the public's resentment against what was viewed as US interference, while at the same time building support for their cause. Morales followed the same strategy when he used his expulsion from the Congress to stir up resentment about the United States' dominance in Bolivian politics. Many analysts claimed that this was a contributing factor in the MAS's political success in the 2002 national election.

Another state policy that facilitated the cocalero's efforts to attain greater political representation was the Law of Popular Participation (LPP). This reform made it easier for indigenous groups such as the cocalero organizations to register as political parties and participate in municipal elections. They founded the ASP, which was able to capture 12 percent of the votes in Cochabamba's

municipal elections. The government creation of uninominal seats as part of its electoral reform also enabled the ASP to elect four national deputies in the national election. The MAS was able to build on these electoral gains to expand its political influence at the national level. In the past, smaller indigenous parties such as those of the Kataristas were forced to rely on coalitions with the more established national parties (Van Cott, 2005). However, in having to align with these parties, the Katarista parties were usually co-opted by the larger parties or their ethnic demands were defused, thus losing their legitimacy with their rank-and-file constituents.

Leadership factors also had a profound impact on both waves of indigenous mobilizations. However, this impact led to different consequences for each of the movements. For the Katarista movement, there were two key leadership factors that contributed to its decline; the lack of a united leadership during the movement's early struggles to establish itself as a political party and the leadership structure of the Katarista's peasant union, the CSUTCB. The absence of a unified leadership at a crucial period proved to be detrimental to the unity of the movement. The absence of this unity surfaced from the very beginning when the Kataristas attempted to form one party to represent their movement. Their efforts were hindered by the disagreements that arose between those who wanted a more "indianista" political party focussed on identity and those who were more focussed on the class demands of the movement. By the 1980 elections, the Kataristas had divided into three separate political parties; the MITKA (Movimiento Indio Tupak Katari – Tupak Katari Indian Movement), the MITKA-1, and the MRTK (Movimiento Revolucionario Tupak Katari – Tupak

Katari Revolutionary Movement). During these elections, the leadership was also divided in terms of their party alliances and this only exacerbated the divisions within the movement as a whole. From this research, one could add to the insights of the political-cultural formation perspective that leadership unification is highly correlated with the extent to which constituencies are unified around a central demand or set of demands. In the presence of various internal groups with some privileging certain demands over others, one likely outcome is leadership divisiveness and the loss of movement effectiveness.

The second leadership factor that led to Katarismo's declining influence had more to do with the leadership structure of their union organization and its internal modes of participation, which contrasted with those in indigenous communities. When the Kataristas dominated the CSUTCB, the reliance on a western union model prevented the inclusion of traditional community practices. As a result, the Katarista-dominated CSUTCB began to lose legitimacy as the true representative of the Indian-peasant population. These problems combined with the disagreements between the Kataristas and the more leftist groups of the CSUTCB led to the eventual decline of Katarismo's influence within the union.

For the MAS and its predecessors, the cocalero organizations and the ASP, leadership factors contributed to their success whether it was in affecting state policy or establishing alliances and coalitions with other social and political organizations. The leadership of the MAS has been particularly effective in its choice of strategic alliances. This factor enabled it to significantly expand its political support throughout the country. This thesis has demonstrated the

effectiveness of this strategy by focussing on the political events of the year leading up to Bolivia's recent election. Evo Morales was able to maintain his indigenous base of support while at the same time expanding his support into the middle classes. He did this by aligning with Alvaro García, who as a prominent leftist academic was able to extend the MAS's influence into academia and the urban middle class. Morales's alliance with the more right-of-centre party, Movimiento Sin Miedo (MSM), was also instrumental in broadening MAS's support into the urban middle classes as the MSM had emerged as the country's second most powerful party in the country's municipal elections.

From this analysis, it can be concluded that all three factors in PCF, regional cultural processes, state intervention, and leadership types had specific and significant impacts on both the Katarista and the MAS movements, depending on their character and configuration. Comparison of the two movements has enabled a clearer explanation of why the MAS has emerged as the more successful of the two. With its efforts to bridge the divide between identity and class, it has focused on an articulation of demands and thus has avoided the struggles that divided the Katarista movement. Many of the state interventions also favoured the growth of the movement, particularly the electoral reforms of the 1990s. However, this could not have been possible without the efforts of the leadership in the cocalero organizations to establish themselves as political party. Furthermore, leadership was also responsible for turning the repressive state policies into political opportunities. When Morales drew public attention to the involvement of the US government in his expulsion, he was able to take advantage of public resentment against the United States as a means of gaining

electoral support for the 2002 election. Finally, the MAS leadership was particularly skilful in the year leading up to the election in 2005, forming strategic alliances that ensured its eventual victory.

Since Morales and the MAS have taken on the responsibility of governing the country, they have faced many daunting challenges. Morales has acknowledged his debt to the indigenous movements that contributed to his election victory and he has publicly discussed the difficulties he is having in addressing their demands. In a recent interview with the BBC, he refers to his desire to address these demands along with the challenges he is facing:

> You want to issue a decree to help the poor, the indigenous people, the popular movements, the workers...but there's another law. Another padlock. It's full of padlocks that mean you can't transform things from the palace ...I feel like a prisoner of the neo-liberal laws. (Mason, 2006).

This comment demonstrates the difficulties that governments of developing countries face in their struggle to improve the economic conditions of their citizens. They are faced with many "padlocks" because they can't afford to alienate the foreign investment firms or countries like the United States that bring much needed investment. Therefore, Morales is having to "tread a fine line between honouring his election promises and facing up to the realities of presiding over a poor and dependent country" (Crabtree, 2006:2).

Morales's struggle to nationalize the country's natural gas resources is an example of the kind of "balancing act" he will have to engage in. The nationalization of hydrocarbons had been one of the key demands of the indigenous movements and had been at the centre of countrywide protests in

October, 2003 and May and June of 2005 (Webber, 2006:1). Although, it is still unclear as to what the nationalization program will entail, the new government law stipulates that the petroleum companies currently active in the production of gas or petroleum will be required to hand over their entire production to the state oil company, the YPFB (Yacimientos Petrolìferos Fiscales de Bolivia). During the transition period, the companies will also have to pay higher taxes than in the past.

When Morales announced his government's nationalization plans, there was an outcry from the international community, particularly from those companies and countries affected by the measures (Plummer, 2006). They were particularly concerned with Morales's plans to "break" international contracts as part of his nationalization agenda. When the nationalization plans were first announced on May 1, 2006, one of the largest foreign petroleum firms, Petrobas (Brazil) froze all further investment in the Bolivian gas industry. It had invested over one and a half billion dollars in the Bolivian sector and feared the loss of future investments. In responding to these actions, Morales claimed that the company was blackmailing his country. However, within days, there was an emergency meeting between Morales and the president of Brazil, Lula de Silva, and his counterpart, the president of Argentina, Nestor Kirchner. After being given reassurances about a continued supply of gas from Bolivia, the two leaders came out in support of Morales's decision to nationalize the gas industry (Kingstone, 2006). However, the negotiations continue between Morales and Lula de Silva in regards to nationalization and its impact on the Brazilian firm, Petrobas.

The Morales government's nationalization program will generate an additional $320 million in taxes, bringing greater benefits for Bolivian citizens (Webber, 2006:3). However, if the government hopes to reap more benefits from its hydrocarbon resources, it needs the expertise and the investment capital offered by the foreign operating companies. Therefore, Morales will have to continue with his "balancing act;" trying to please his electorate while at same time trying not to alienate the foreign oil companies.

The Morales government will also have to tread a fine line in its plans to continue with the US coca eradication program. Bolivia will have to collaborate in some form with the US government if it wants to receive much needed economic assistance. If the country is "decertified" for failing to cooperate with the United States in the 'war against drugs, not only could it lose US foreign aid, but the United States could pressure multilateral banks to suspend their lending programmes (Crabtree, 2006:3). As a cocalero union leader, Morales has supported the "coca yes, cocaine no" campaign, in which he has sought to "distinguish clearly between coca, a plant long used by indigenous peoples for health, religious, and cultural purposes, and cocaine, an illicit drug" (Ledebur and Youngers, 2006:1). The cocalero unions continue to be one of the most organized and loyal supporters of the MAS. Morales will need to tread carefully in his attempts to maintain relations with the United States while at the same time trying to appease the cocalero unions. Despite the tensions between the two countries, Morales has continued to work cooperatively with the Bush administration on drug policy efforts. However, the current drug policy efforts have consisted of a more cooperative approach to eradication, and not the "zero-

coca" forced eradication campaigns of past governments that were responsible for the violent conflict between government forces and the cocalero unions (Ledebur and Youngers, 2006:1).

Morales also has to use the same balancing act in his relations with the political interest groups in Santa Cruz. The political and economic elite of this region are demanding greater regional autonomy. However, this region contains the vast majority of Bolivia's natural gas resources. Morales promised to allow for a referendum on the issue on regional autonomy; however, he will have to ensure that the wealth from the gas industry benefits all the regions. Moreover, the Morales government will also have to consider the views of the highlands organizations as many of them strongly oppose greater autonomy for the Santa Cruz region.

This review of the challenges facing the Morales government draws attention to the greater dilemmas for movements such as the MAS when they do attain political power. From a PCP perspective, the MAS can be viewed as a popular democratic organization that has succeeded in shaping state policies in its favour, while maintaining its independence from the state and the traditional ruling elites. However, now that it has assumed political power, its leaders are struggling to fulfil the demands of their constituents.

It is from this struggle, that many new research questions arise. How can democratically elected movements, like the MAS, remain popular-democratic organizations when they are faced with the economic challenges that come with being a poor and dependent country? How have other movements faced these

challenges and are there any "best practises?" How can the MAS leadership avoid being drawn away from its "democratic" practises in its attempts to secure more investment from economic elites (especially if they have connections to international investment)?

Research also needs to focus on a recently new development in Latin America, the constituent assembly. Morales and the MAS have long campaigned for such a process as they feel it will "solve" many of Bolivia's political and social problems. The Morales government is now establishing a constituent assembly as a means of giving a greater voice to Bolivia's indigenous population. By increasing the political representation of previously neglected groups and improving the dialogue between various interest groups, the constituent assembly could provide direction and support for the government. However, this is a new democratic process in Latin America with countries like Ecuador and Venezuela only recently implementing their own constituent assemblies. Thus, research is needed to analyze the development of this process and determine its effectiveness. Will a constituent assembly enable Morales and the MAS to overcome the challenges they are currently facing? It is the hope that such a process will ensure that the MAS remain a "popular democratic" organization and that its leaders continue to give the greatest priority to the concerns of their grassroots constituents.

Appendices

Appendix 1[2]



Map 1. Bolivia: Political Divisions, Topographic Areas, and Coca-Growing Regions.

[2] Source: Léons and Sanabria, 1997:2.

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