EDUCATIONAL ENGAGEMENT:

Assumptions, Misconceptions and Unintended Consequences

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Educational Engagement: Assumptions, Misconceptions and Unintended Consequences

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ABSTRACT

R.S. Peters and P. Hirst claim that ". . . the opposition between approaches to education *represents an artificial polarization*, a caricature of the alternatives open to teachers in performing their tasks." Given the contemporary debates between liberal and child-centred views about educational priorities, it is clear that this 1970 claim has not been sufficiently acknowledged by educators. Therefore, this thesis addresses the question, "What is it that perpetuates the illusion of polarity?"

The thesis is intended to substantiate Hirst and Peters' claim and redress the problem of artificial polarization by making explicit some pervasive assumptions and misconceptions that have served to perpetuate the illusion of polarization. The artificial nature of the polarization is made explicit through an analysis of the concept of *educational engagement* which is central to the debate.

The thesis takes the position that an artificial polarization exists between liberal and child-centred approaches to education. The polarization is misconceived, because each view, in fact, responds to a categorically distinct and essentially necessary question about education. Therefore, the views are not in opposition, rather, they are complimentary, interdependent approaches to education which answer two essential questions, namely, *What is worthwhile knowledge and understanding?* and *How is it best achieved?*

The thesis does not attempt to debate either question. The purpose is to make explicit the artificiality surrounding the polarization debate by demonstrating

the irrevocable distinctions between the two essential educational questions and their necessary substantive and pedagogical responses.

The artificial polarization has perpetuated the illusion that *either* pedagogy *or* substance should be an educational priority, thus excluding the alternative possibility that both approaches are essential educational priorities. The alternative possibility investigated by the thesis, that of the compatibility and necessity of both views, has profound implications for educational policy, curriculum and teacher practice.

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The opposition between approaches to education represents an artificial polarization, a caricature of the alternatives open to teachers in performing their tasks.
The Logic of Education

INTRODUCTION

For several decades, a debate over what ought to be the priority in our educational endeavours has been waged by educators in the educational literature and in staffrooms across North America. The positions believed to be involved in the debate are held by, on one hand, educators who hold a position referred to as Liberal,[1] and on the other hand, those who support a Progressive or Child-centred position. The liberal view is concerned primarily with the substance of education, that is, *what* it is that ought to be taught to students. Progressive education is concerned with educational pedagogy, that is, *how* best to teach children. Although both views clearly address the central question, "what ought to be our educational priority?" they have historically been perceived as exclusive alternatives in priority debates.

This thesis argues that the misperception is due to confusion about the nature of 'educational priorities'. In everyday conversation, people rarely question what is meant by the term 'educational'. Yet, the term is, in fact, used to refer to several different kinds of activities, such as schooling, socialization, training, etc. Michael Oakeshott points out that education is not something to talk about in terms of its uses, rather, it is something "to be thought about" in the light of two particular topics. According to Oakeshott:

> The first is concerned to distinguish this transaction, to discern what is going on in it, to identify the relationships it involves . . . The second is the consideration of the procedures, methods and devices believed to be appropriate to the engagement. *The second of these topics is clearly subordinate to the first*, and all who have thought profoundly about it have recognized this subordination.[2]

In other words, if worthwhile knowledge and understanding are deemed to be essential criteria for education, then the essential *educational* questions are first, a substantive question - *What is educationally worthwhile?* and from that answer comes a pedagogical question - *How is this best achieved?*

This thesis will argue that the two educational questions are not only categorically distinct questions, but also that both are necessary parts of the same general question that has engaged educators for decades, namely: "What ought to be our educational priority?" It will be shown that the alleged 'opponents' in the debate each respond to a different question. The liberal position responds primarily to the substantive question, namely, what it is that is worthwhile. The progressive position is primarily a response to the pedagogical question, namely, how the worthwhile is best achieved.

In his discussion of the two important educational topics noted above, Oakeshott observes that:

> In recent times procedures and devices have broken loose from this subordination and have imposed themselves upon our understanding of the transaction itself, with unfortunate consequences. [3]

Oakeshott's point is substantiated by the fact that the child-centred approach to education and the corresponding developmental theories of educational psychology provide the philosophical and theoretical underpinnings

for contemporary practice and beliefs regarding what it is that constitutes educational engagement.[4] In other words, for the last fifty years pedagogical questions have been the educational priority favoured by most North American educators and the theories of progressive child-centred educators have provided the pedagogical 'answers'.

Given the necessary priority of the substantive question, why is it that substantive questions and the liberal response have not been the subjects of educators' attention? Why do educators continue to believe that liberal education *is* an alternative in the priority debate? Why are both topics not perceived as two necessary responses to the two essential questions of educational policy? Why is it that we must be concerned with *either* the substance of education *or* the pedagogical approach to it and not acknowledge that both are required?

Several of the many possible answers to such questions come immediately to mind. A likely possibility is that educators are unaware of the distinction between the questions and their respective answers. Another is that these questions have not yet been raised in the debate. A third possibility is that the debate has been nurtured by confusion resulting from ambiguity, category mistakes and from the misuse of language to support particular theories or points of view in educational literature. If this is, in fact, the source of the problem, clarification ought to come from an examination of educational literature on these issues. Is the failure to distinguish between the two views due to misrepresentation or misinterpretation on the part of their advocates? Do the

advocates of the two positions clearly articulate their respective positions in precise, unambiguous language?

The notion of 'educational engagement', a phrase lacking precise definition in educational literature,[5] plays a significant role in the priority debate. Advocates of a liberal education hold that education is the pursuit of knowledge and understanding through the historical traditions of distinct forms of knowing or 'disciplines'. Thus, knowledge and understanding are the objects of a purposeful, intrinsically worthwhile pursuit on the part of the learner. Learners are *educationally engaged* when they are engaged *in* the human enterprise of attaining knowledge and understanding.[6] Liberal education, then, is an approach to education that responds to the prior substantive question about what is educationally worthwhile.

Late in the 19th Century, education reformers claimed that education must be centred around the child. The critics maintained that knowledge alone fails to engage the learner, that learning is something to be "engaged in by cooperative experiment" [7] and ought to respect children's interests and playful activities. The claim regarding the lack of 'engagement' in a traditional education gave credibility to new theories of education advocated by child-centred progressive education movements in Britain and the United States, particularly John Dewey's theory of education framed by "the organic connection between education and personal experience".[8]

Both liberals and progressives acknowledge that educational engagement is essential for students to achieve some level of knowledge and understanding. Both views claim to achieve educational engagement in a particular, distinctive fashion and use that claim to justify their respective positions. And most significantly, both views claim that the opposing view does not, in fact, attain educational engagement. Clearly there is confusion concerning the notion of 'engagement'. It is here that one may find a fertile 'common ground' for investigation with the hope of clearing up the confusion.

What exactly is educational engagement? Why is it so significant to each position in the priority debate? Are advocates of each view talking about the same thing? How can two distinct educational questions be answered using the same language? Is the use of a common language connected in some way to the confusion surrounding the priority debate?

This thesis will address these concerns. The first concern is *to investigate the language of engagement*, as used in both the liberal and the progressive views, in an attempt to find answers to these questions by clarifying the concept of 'educational engagement'. The language of engagement is used to illustrate the distinctions between the two important educational questions and the educational theories that respond to them. The thesis points out the assumptions and misconceptions of 'educational engagement' that may have led to unintended educational consequences.

The second concern is *to point out three problem areas* related to the language of engagement that have contributed to the confusion surrounding the priority debate. One problem is the tendency of the progressives to wed the substantive question to traditional pedagogy. As presented by Dewey and the progressives, traditional education's lack of 'engagement' was primarily a problem of pedagogy, and as such, was not necessarily linked to the liberal notion of worthwhile knowledge and understanding, but linked rather, to some problems in 'traditional' teaching practice. However, the misconception that liberal education is linked to traditional teaching practice is still held by many contemporary educators. Consequently, the debate over educational priorities has been exclusively pedagogical, that is, between 'traditional' and 'progressive' pedagogy. The substantive question has rarely, if ever, been accorded its due recognition as an essential element in the educational debate.

Another problem area is the failure of progressive reformers to acknowledge that the educational engagement must be within the traditions of knowledge and understanding. The progressive view of educational engagement, while it may solve the problem of relevance for the learner, has been misconceived to the extent that contemporary students have become 'disengaged' from the traditions of knowledge and understanding that are the substance of education. Thus, the view that the progressive approach alone leads to 'educational' engagement is unfounded and potentially harmful.

The third problem is the lack of understanding that the notion of educational engagement presupposes a disposition or attitude of inquiry on the part of the learner, exemplified by a delight in and a desire for understanding. The *acquisition* of such a disposition has not been accorded sufficient recognition by educational theorists. Consequently, the activities of contemporary educators are governed by the assumption that, if the requisite conditions are in place (i.e., curricula, pleasurable learning activities and 'good' teaching practices), the learner will in fact, become educated, irrespective of intrinsic, dispositional considerations. Common sense would indicate that this cannot be the case. Some account must be given of the learner as an 'active' agent who values coming to know and achieving intrinsic satisfaction from worthwhile understanding. This disposition or state of mind on the part of the learner surely must be a prerequisite for any form of *educational* engagement.

The third concern in the thesis is *to provide an argument that the concept of educational engagement is not only essential to education, but necessarily requires that both the substantive and pedagogical questions be answered.* This can be achieved by combining the substantive answer advocated by liberal educators with the pedagogical answer advocated by progressive educators in such a way that the learner's experience constitutes an 'invitation' to pursue knowledge and understanding within the historical traditions of the disciplines of knowledge. The thesis further argues for the importance of attending to the acquisition of a prerequisite disposition or "non-instrumental" attitude on the part of the learner.

Thus, the thesis uses the analysis of 'educational engagement' to clarify the confusion surrounding the debate over educational priorities and to offer a fresh perspective for educational theory and practice.

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The first chapter of the thesis begins with an analysis of 'engagement', its terminology, distinctive features and entailments. The analysis is followed by an examination of the relationship between engagement and education and the link between educational engagement and the disposition to value and consequently commit oneself to worthwhile knowledge and understanding. The chapter concludes with a summary of the distinctive ways in which the language may be legitimately used by educators to answer the two essential questions in the educational priority debate.

Chapter two discusses the theoretical foundations underlying the liberal position on educational engagement. Particular attention is given to Michael Oakeshott's notion of engagement as an element in "human conduct" and to the account by R.S. Peters of a learner's non-instrumental attitude, deemed to be necessary for educational engagement. The language of educational engagement is investigated for distinctions and connections governing its use. In this context, additional references are made to Paul Hirst's and Israel Scheffler's accounts of teaching and learning and the connections between these concepts and educational engagement. The chapter concludes with a summary of the liberal account of

educational engagement, its underlying assumptions and its application to the substantive educational question.

Chapter three discusses the Progressive Reform Movement's criticisms of 'traditional' educational practices as found in John Dewey's philosophy of education and experience. The confusion between 'traditional' pedagogy and the traditions of knowledge and the consequent misconception of liberal education are explored. The theoretical foundations underlying the child-centred progressive position on educational engagement are explicated, specifically the view that engagement is fostered by 'relevance' in the experience of the learner.

Chapter four reviews the substantive and pedagogical positions on educational engagement and traces the unintended consequences resulting from the apparent assumptions of liberal educators about societal views regarding the value of knowledge and understanding and the misconceptions of educational engagement by progressive educators, limiting engagement to relevance in the experience of the learner.

The consequences of the assumptions and misconceptions are illustrated by contemporary examples from the field of creative writing and from the B.C. provincial curriculum guide. The chapter summarizes the argument for educational engagement and its significance to the priority debate. Educational implications arising from the assumptions and misconceptions about educational engagement are discussed. Of particular interest is the significance of a dispositional prerequisite for educational engagement, namely the learner's

'non-instrumental' attitude. The chapter concludes by offering a fresh perspective for educational discourse, the notion that both pedagogical and substantive questions and the educational positions that respond to the questions are not only mutually compatible but essential educational priorities.

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INTRODUCTION NOTES

1. The position believed to be in opposition to the child-centred view is rarely defined by its critics. It is referred to by a variety of names, (e.g., Liberal, classical, traditional, subject-centred, content-based). John Dewey calls it "cultural" in Democracy And Education (1916). Advocates of Liberal education add to the confusion when they defend what might appear to be different positions. For example, Hirst and Peters are advocates for "education" in Logic and Education (1970), and for "Liberal" education in Philosophy of Education (1973). Consequently, the nature of the opponent to child- centred education is one of the central problems in the confusion surrounding the priority debate.

2. Michael Oakeshott, 1990 The Voice of Liberal Learning, 63, T. Fuller (ed) (italics added)

3. Ibid.

4. The progressives were particularly influenced by the theories of three educational psychologists; Piaget, on growth and development of the child; Jerome Bruner, on programmic instruction and; Vygotsky, on learning theory. For Piaget's theory, see Science of Education and the Psychology of the Child (1969), for Bruner's theory, see Beyond the Information Given (1973), for Vygotsky's theory, see Thought and Language (1962).

5. See, for example, M. Oakeshott's (1975) use of engagement in On Human Conduct, 3 Oxford University Press. ; R.S. Peter's use of " to engage in, engaging in" and "being engaged in": "Aims of Education - A Conceptual Inquiry", in Philosophy of Education, 1973, 11-57; versus W.H. Hadow's reference to "engaged in learning by cooperative experiment": London School Board (1931) "Report of the Consultative Committee on the Primary School"; or J. Dewey's reference to experiences that "engage his (student's) activities, engage the thought of, engaged in the learning process": Experience & Education (1938); and B.C. Ministry of Education's use of engagement as a phase of "active learning", reference to activities "that engage and extend skills" and experiences that "engage students": "Learner - Focused Experiences", The Intermediate Program, 97-99, 1991.

6. This particular phrase is employed by Liberal advocates such as Michael Oakeshott in his essays contained in The Voice of Liberal Learning(1989), by Paul Hirst and R.S. Peters in The Logic of Education(1970) and Israel Scheffler in The Language of Education(1960). Exact quotations containing the phrase are cited in Chapter Two.

7. The "Hadow Report", in R. J. W. Selleck, English Primary Education and the Progressives, 1914-1939, 125, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1972 Leaders of the British reformers include Holmes, Montessori, Lane. See, for example, What Is and What Might Be (1911); The London School Board's Hadow Reports (1931). For an overview, see R.J.W.Selleck, 1972 English Primary Education and the Progressives, 1914-1939,Routledge & Kegan Paul. For John Dewey's criticisms of traditional education, see Experience and Education (1938), Democracy and Education (1916).

8. John Dewey, 1938 Experience and Education, 25 Macmillan Co. N.Y.

A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a clear view of the use of our words. Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. Wittgenstein

CHAPTER 1

ENGAGEMENT

Since the notion of educational engagement plays such a significant role in the debate concerning educational priorities, it is imperative that the notion be free from conceptual confusion and potential misuse. Following the Wittgensteinian view that the meaning of words may be found only in the way we *use* our language, several philosophers strongly advocate using the 'grammar' of the language to eradicate misconceptions, ambiguity and confusion in educational discourse.[1] On this point, John Austin notes that:

> Our common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have found worth drawing, and the connexions they have found worth marking, in the lifetimes of many generations: these surely are likely to be more numerous, more sound, since they have stood up to the long test of the survival of the fittest . . . than any that you or I are likely to think up.[2]

Thus, a discussion of 'educational engagement' should justifiably begin, as Austin suggests, with the grammar properly associated with the term, that is, the rules that govern how we use the term in our everyday language. In what is commonly called philosophical detective work, our ordinary language must be examined for "distinctions" and "connexions" which may help to clarify the confusion surrounding the educational priority debate.

Both liberal and progressive educators claim that engagement is necessary to education; both claim to obtain educational engagement in a different way; and

both claim that the opposing view fails to achieve educational engagement. It would appear that either the phrase 'educational engagement' is used ambiguously (and is, therefore, subject to interpretation) or that it has been misused by one or both of the groups. A third alternative exists, namely that the term 'engagement' may be used in two distinct, yet legitimate ways and that each view is, either wittingly or unwittingly, employing it in a different way.

Accordingly, this discussion will begin by examining the various uses of the terms related to engagement, followed by an analysis of the notion of educational engagement. The examination will be directed toward exposing ambiguities and disparate interpretations that may have caused confusion in both the literature and public discourse. The discussion should shed some light on how both a substantive and a pedagogical question could be answered using the same language.

The Grammar of Engagement

The noun 'engagement' is commonly taken to mean a voluntary pledge or binding promise made by two individuals, signifying commitment to a particular undertaking. The pledge is often accompanied by a token such as an engagement *ring*, as in the case of "an engagement to be married", signifying the serious commitment and sense of obligation on the part of both parties. That such a commitment is valued by our society is obvious in the degree to which we celebrate engagements through various rituals including engagement parties, gift-giving and congratulatory greetings.

'Engagement' is also used to denote a state of being "meshed in" or interlocking as in the case of the engagement of automotive gears. Interestingly, the noun is used in this sense to refer to a sort of meshing or interlocking which occurs when rival military groups conduct battles or tactical manoeuvres. For example, particular battles may be referred to as military "engagements". In the military sense again, an individual would conceivably be obligated and committed to the task at hand. However, it would appear that no particular value is granted to the engagement itself in the military case, rather, what is valued is the winning or losing in the specific engagement.

The participle 'engaged' is used to describe or modify the individual who is involved in the engagement. We say, for example, "*Jones* is engaged to be married" or "*She* is engaged in her dancing", meaning that the 'engaged' person in the former case is "pledged to" and in the latter case is "occupied within" an engagement.

As a verb, 'engage' may be used to make a promise, to busy oneself "within", to employ someone's services, to occupy, or to persuade or win over. Thus, for example, we may "engage in a particular task", i.e., busy ourselves within the task or we may "engage someone in a conversation", i.e., occupy someone else in a conversation . We may "engage the services" of a particular individual to perform a task, a contractual arrangement, secured by either a verbal or written pledge.

Although the verb 'engage' may at first glance appear to be necessarily related to the noun engagement, a closer look reveals that this is not always the case. Two distinct uses of the verb can be discerned. The first is strictly a *substantive* act, signifying an individual's personal involvement as in "to make a promise" and in "to busy oneself within", thus directly related to the noun engagement. The second is a more *transactive* act, involving at least one other person as in "to employ someone's services", to "occupy, compel attention of" or to "persuade, win over" someone else. In the transactive act, the emphasis is on whoever or whatever is the 'engager'. Thus, there is no obvious reference to the private commitment of the one who is thus 'engaged'.

That there are two distinct uses is not particularly surprising, given the etymological basis of the term. The earliest use of 'engage' dates back to the fifteenth century when the term meant "to pledge or secure by a pledge", thus an engagement. It was not until the seventeenth century, fully two hundred years later, that the notions of hiring for employment or coming into conflict were associated with 'engage' and 'engagement'. A further hundred years had passed when, in the eighteenth century, the idea of attraction or charm became a semantic entailment.

Two important aspects of the noun engagement, the substantive act of the verb 'engage' and the participle 'engaged' should also be noted. The first aspect is the exclusive use of the prepositions 'in' and 'to'. That is, one is either engaged *to* be married, engaged *in* a task or involved *in* an engagement. The

second aspect is the necessary entailment of value to an engagement, i.e., a promise. For example, it is difficult to imagine anyone in our society being engaged to someone or engaged in something that they do not value. Although the value need not necessarily be positive, (although that is most commonly the case), nevertheless, the object of our engagement must be deemed to be important, significant to us in some way or it could not conceivably involve our commitment, which it must do, in order for us to be *engaged in* it in this sense.

The meaning is different when we use the adjective 'engaging' to say that a particular individual has an engaging smile or personality, suggesting that such an individual possesses the ability to be persuasive, to attract, to preoccupy the attention of, or otherwise "win over" an alternatively dispassionate observer, in accordance with the later eighteenth century etymology. Significantly, in the case of 'engaging' there does not appear to be a sense of commitment on the part of the person being engaged. The emphasis is, rather, on the 'engager', who must *cause* someone else to be attracted. The attraction is in some sense temporary, that is, it may be sustained only by the degree to which the individual's smile or personality continues to be attractive, preoccupying, or persuasive.

A second difference is evident in that there is no value attached to the notion of engaging per se. We value, in this case, the 'quality' of the individual's smile or personality. Similarly, when we refer to the transactive act of the verb 'engage' to say that someone or something "engaged a person's interests", this usage, like the adjective engaging, suggests an attraction or

preoccupation sustained by the degree to which someone or something continued to be 'interesting'. Again, there is no sense of commitment nor significant value ascribed to having one's interests engaged. One is not *necessarily* committed to whatever engages one's interests, as it is conceivable that a person's interests could be engaged by, for example, a particular song on the radio, which might temporarily distract them from a task to which they are otherwise committed. One's interests might be engaged by a variety of things - a painting, a melody, a hobby, none of which require commitment. This observation gives rise to a third distinction, that unlike the participle 'engaged', which modifies the individual, the adjective 'engaging' and the transactive sense of the verb engage describe or modify *external entities* which are deemed to be attractive, eg., a painting, a melody, a person's smile, a hobby.

When we talk of engaging smiles and personalities or of engaging someone's interests, a fourth distinction becomes evident. The person or the person's interests thus engaged are said to be engaged *by* someone or something, rather than *in* something as was the case in talk of engagement and the individual.

The examination of our ordinary language yields several important distinctions and "connexions". Categorical distinctions are evident between two groups of words. On one hand, are the noun 'engagement', the participle 'engaged' and the verb 'to engage', when we use it to refer to the internal, substantive act of involving oneself in a personal undertaking. On the other hand,

are the adjective 'engaging' and the verb 'to engage' when we use it to refer to the transactive act of engaging someone else by means of an observable entity.

The items in the first group refer to a personal pledge made by an individual, whereas the items in the second group refer to the ability of physical entities to attract, to compel the attention of someone else. The items in the first group refer to a meaning fully three hundred years prior to the meaning referred to by the items in the second group. Value is ascribed to the engagement by the items in the first group, which is not an attribute of the items in the second group. The items in the first group employ the prepositions *in* and *to*, whereas the items in the second group employ the preposition *by*. To clearly distinguish these groups in further discussion, the former will be referred to as 'substantive' (referring to the individual's commitment to worthwhile things) and the latter, as 'transactive' (referring to the transaction in which others are engaged through external means).

Clearly, there are two distinct uses of the word 'engagement' corresponding to the two positions involved in the priority debate over education. The substantive use, concerned with the individual and connected to notions of commitment to something deemed to be worthwhile, expresses the views of liberal educators who respond to the substantive question; "What is worthwhile knowledge and understanding?" The transactive use on the other hand, concerned with attracting or occupying others, expresses the views of progressive educators who are responding to the pedagogical question; "How is it best achieved?"

Educational Engagement

Given two distinctive uses of 'engagement', it logically follows that there are two distinct ways of talking about *educational* engagement. The liberal position would incorporate the noun 'engagement', the participle 'engaged' or the verb 'to engage' referring to the substantive act. When these terms are paired with 'education', the combination of terms (i.e.,"educational engagement, educationally engaged, engaged in education") necessarily refers to an individual's commitment to a personal undertaking which is educationally valuable. When we say "Jones is engaged *in* educationally worthwhile activities", we necessarily *mean* that he is committed to a personal undertaking, a commitment to becoming an "educated person".

In the transactive sense we say, "Jones' interests were engaged by the science activity" or "Jones finds her art class engaging". Thus, the transactive use of 'engaging' is clearly *pedagogical*, the domain of the progressive educators, as it is concerned with *how* the substance of education is best achieved.

Significantly, in the transition from the substantive act to the transactive act we have eliminated the notions of individual commitment, ascriptions of value and most importantly, we have eliminated the significance of 'what' education entails, i.e., worthwhile knowledge and understanding. The emphasis in the transactive act is rather on the *best means* of attracting, preoccupying or getting the attention of students.

A dramatic consequence of this distinction follows from considerations of an individual's responsibility and agency within an engagement. In the substantive sense, an individual comes to value educationally worthwhile activities. This places the would-be participant in an 'active' role, that is to say, there must be a voluntary commitment to the engagement, presumably due to the value accorded to the knowledge and understanding. In the transactive or pedagogical sense, however, an individual would necessarily occupy a more passive role, for in this type of engagement the *responsibility or agency has shifted* from the individual as agent to whatever or whoever is doing the engaging.

Thus, a fifth difference emerges, that is, we are faced with two distinct types of participant in engagement. On the liberal view, we have the *active* agent, who values knowledge and understanding and is committed to something deemed to be valuable. On the progressive view, we are required to look at the learner as a *passive* observer, conceivably committed to some other purpose, who may or may not be attracted by whatever or whoever is doing the engaging. Clearly, these are significantly different kinds of participants.

To summarize, we have two views of educational engagement. On one hand are the liberal educators advocating a substantive engagement which involves worthwhile knowledge and understanding and an individual's active agency, that is, commitment to a valued personal undertaking. On the other hand are progressive educators, advocates for a transactive or pedagogical engagement,

which involves engaging the interests of children through a variety of pedagogical techniques. Each group uses the notion of educational engagement to justify its claim. An analysis of the language reveals that there are two distinct, yet necessary ways to talk about educational engagement.

The analysis raises several thought-provoking questions. Are these differences clearly pointed out in the literature of education? Is the distinction clearly articulated in educational discourse? Why are these two views perceived to be in *opposition*? Why have educators historically chosen to select *either* one *or* the other view as the educational priority? Why are the substantive and pedagogical questions not perceived to be both compatible and essential dimensions of educational activities? Arguably, the deeper, more fundamental question to be considered is to what extent either type of educational engagement meets the necessary and sufficient conditions for an 'educated' person?

To answer these questions it is necessary to examine the writings of liberal and progressive educators in order to see how they defend their claims, substantiate their arguments, and critique the arguments of others. The language of educational engagement, common to both views, must be examined to determine whether or not it is the source of the confusion.

The following chapters will 'engage' in that particular task. Given the categorical distinctions between the substantive and pedagogical use of the terms which refer to education, specifically, *engagement*, *engaging* and *engaged*, both the liberal and the progressive child-centred views will be examined to ascertain

which terms they employ and their respective manners of employment. The investigation is intended to reveal what each view means by educational engagement, why it is deemed to be essential to education, and how each view claims to achieve it. An account will be given of the theoretical foundations and underlying assumptions related to educational engagement in each case. Finally, problems and questions arising from the analysis will be discussed.

***

CHAPTER 1 NOTES

1) See, for example, Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (1953) para.122; J.L.Austin's justification for grammatical distinctions in "A Plea for Excuses", Philosophical Papers(1961), 175-204; R.S. Peter's distinction between aims and purposes in "Aims of Education - A Conceptual Inquiry", The Philosophy of Education, 11-57; T.Kazepides' comments on the"contexts" of words, in "Indoctrination, Doctrines and the Foundations of Rationality", Proceedings of Philosophy of Education Society, 1987, 230-231; David Carr on the distinction between the active and passive voice when comparing product to process in "Education, Learning and Understanding: the process and the product", Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vol. 26, No.2, 1992.

2) J.L. Austin (1979) Philosophical Papers,182, J.Urmson and G.Warnock (eds)

Material without ideal interests are empty, but ideals without material interests are important. Max Weber

CHAPTER 2

ENGAGEMENT AND LIBERAL EDUCATION

The achievement of liberal education is an ideal only, that is to say , it is what we aim for but never expect to achieve. We judge our success or failure in terms of the degree to which we have attained the ideal.

This chapter will begin with a discussion of what is meant by liberal education, thus providing a framework for an analysis of educational engagement within that context. The discussion is not intended to provide a detailed historical account of liberal education, nor does it purport to offer a definition of the concept of liberal education. The purpose is simply to provide a description of the necessary context for a discussion of educational engagement. An examination can then be directed toward whether or not the notion of educational engagement within the context is coherently articulated and used in such a way that it is consistent with the fundamental principles of liberal education.

The way 'engagement' is used will be examined in terms of the categorical distinctions established in the preceding chapter, that is to say, whether the terms are used in the substantive or the transactive sense. Depending on the category, the usage will then be assessed in terms of meaning, grammatical limitations, ascriptions of value and agency or role of the individual to ascertain what, in fact, legitimately is entailed by educational engagement in liberal

education. The investigation will make explicit any assumptions or evidence of ambiguity which might contribute to the illusion of polarity.

The work of Michael Oakeshott will be used to provide an account of the fundamental principles that provide the philosophical underpinnings for a liberal education. Several highly respected writers would be appropriate sources for a theoretical synthesis of the liberal education view.[1] Of these, Michael Oakeshott has been chosen as an exemplar, due primarily to his extensive reference to the notion of educational engagement and his seminal account of the theoretical foundations of Liberal education.[2] Where applicable, Oakeshott's position will be elaborated by references to other writers, specifically R. S. Peters, P. Hirst and I. Scheffler.

Theoretical Foundations

Oakeshott views all human conduct as a series of *engagements*, of which the most fundamentally important is the engagement to understand "what is going on". According to Oakeshott, the engagement of human understanding is an "unsought" condition, a necessary part of being human.

Thus:

> Understanding as an engagement is an exertion; it is the resolve to inhabit an ever more intelligible, or an ever less mysterious world. This unconditional engagement of understanding I shall call 'theorizing'. It is an engagement to abate mystery rather than to achieve definitive understanding. [3]

Oakeshott posits four features of theorizing, which he credits to the ancient Greek vocabulary which delineated the engagement of understanding namely;

from THEA, a *going-on* attended to; from THEOROS, a *theorist* or reflective consciousness; from THEORIA, *theorizing* or an inquiry in which the theorist seeks to understand what is going on; and from THEOREMA, a *theorem*, which emerges from the inquiry.[4]

The engagement of human understanding begins with a state of reflective consciousness, with awareness of a fact amid confusion. This is the starting-place of a critical inquiry to interrogate what is "going on".[5] Oakeshott points out that the reflective consciousness itself is recognized "as a 'going on' distinguished in this same confusion". Thus an individual begins a "continuous, self-moved, critical enterprise of theorizing" to abate mystery and eliminate confusion, which Oakeshott describes as the "unconditional engagement to understand".[6]

In other words, the engagement to understand is a continuous activity of learning to understand our own theories about the world and our relationship to or with it. Oakeshott notes that the activity is one of constant self-interrogation. We always ask for justification, i.e.,"*why* do I hold this to be what is going on?" The answer to the question is always in the form of a new theorem, which is then interrogated accordingly.

Thus, the engagement to understand is an exertion in which an individual moves from one temporary conditional platform of understanding to another in a limitless quest in which understanding is an end in itself, in other words, a 'lifelong engagement'.[7]

Oakeshott maintains that the nature of human conduct is to "become by learning", and that:

> The learning we are concerned with is a self-conscious engagement. It is . . . a self-imposed task inspired by the intimations of what there is to learn (that is, by awareness of our own ignorance) and by a wish to understand. Human learning is a reflective engagement in which what is learned is not merely a detached fragment of information but is understood or misunderstood and is expressed in words which have meanings. [8]

In this sense Education, according to Oakeshott, is a necessary part of the engagement to understand, a specific transaction between a teacher and a learner in which the learner comes to understand and eventually participate in a metaphorical 'conversation' with generations of human beings engaged in historical traditions of understanding. Liberal education includes a considered curriculum of learning, which is designed to provoke distinction and discrimination. Education is, therefore, an *engagement* to learn by study, through effort and surmounting difficulties, in a personal transaction between the learner and the teacher concerning something of worth.

Educational Engagement

Oakeshott's view of what is *meant* by educational engagement is the commitment by an individual to the self-imposed task of furthering his or her understanding. In this sense the term 'engagement' is consistent with the 'substantive' use explicated in Chapter one, that is to say, Oakeshott refers to education as an engagement 'in' something. The 'something' or the *object* of the engagement, according to Oakeshott, is the understanding of the historical traditions of knowing, deemed to be important, significant and valuable to both

the individual and to society as a whole. Further, the individual is *necessarily* preoccupied with the understanding entailed by the engagement, as Oakeshott stipulates that the need to understand is a necessary part of being human. On this view, it follows that an individual 'engaged' in education would be an active agent, i.e., involved in a self-imposed task, committed to and preoccupied with the knowledge and understanding embodied in education, deemed to be valuable and worthwhile.

In the matter of agency, however, Oakeshott does not strictly adhere to the conventional usage of the term engagement, thus allowing for the possibility of confusion and misinterpretation. For example, on one hand, it might be taken that an individual's commitment to the engagement is not exactly 'voluntary', in the sense that voluntary means 'to choose'. That is to say, Oakeshott describes the commitment to understanding as an "unsought" condition, a necessary part of being human, that the "price of being human" is learning.[9] The implication then, is that knowledge and understanding are inherently engaging, that we have no choice but to engage in lifelong learning which presumably includes what he means by education. Yet, on the other hand, Oakeshott talks about exertion and resolve, choices and self-imposed tasks. The confusion might result from Oakeshott's reference to three distinct terms, namely, understanding, learning and education, each of which is an engagement. The engagement in understanding is involuntary in the sense that it is an "unsought condition" of being human. The engagement in learning is also involuntary inasmuch as any changes in our

understanding must in some way constitute learning, whether voluntarily sought out or not. However, there is a voluntary aspect to learning as well, in the sense that we can choose to *extend* our understanding through the further particular learning that constitutes the engagement in education. In other words, according to Oakeshott, we must all necessarily be seeking understanding, but not necessarily seeking it in the same way or from the same sources.

Further, we could conceivably reach a particular level of understanding and choose not to explore it further. According to Oakeshott's theory of understanding, it is at this point that the "self- moved, critical enterprise of theorizing" enters the equation. An individual may choose to answer the question, " Why do I hold this to be the case?" with "Because I accept this to be the truth, or because I can no longer be bothered with seeking answers or because I have what I consider to be more valuable pursuits with which to be concerned." On the other hand, individuals who are aware of their ignorance and who wish to understand, continue their inquiry by engaging in education.

That Oakeshott is aware of the value entailed by the engagement becomes obvious when he points out that the engagement to understand through education is inhibited:

> Unless there is a contingent belief in the worth of what is to be mediated . . . and unless this conviction is somehow also transmitted . . . [T]his world of meanings and understandings will be transmitted only where it inspires the gratitude, the pride and even the veneration of those who already enjoy it, where it endows them with an identity they esteem. [10]

Awareness of societal influence on what is perceived to be valuable is also evident in Oakeshott's work. He describes the "current project" of substituting 'socialization' for education which eliminates a curriculum and a progression of learning what is worthwhile and includes rather, "projects" of individual interest and experiments to "discover" things. The "project" advocates shielding the child from the "humiliation" of ignorance, teaching as "hesitant suggestions" akin to that of interior decorators, and seeing and doing rather than thinking and understanding. Oakeshott points out the absence of standards and notes that individual "conduct" has been replaced by impulse and persuasion by others.

Oakeshott defines contemporary schools as institutions which are "alternatives to education". [11] This notion might contribute to the illusion of polarization if Oakeshott's use of irony is not recognized. However, he goes on to say that the problem *is* that such views see themselves as alternatives, a problem which has serious educational consequences:

> Thus, the destruction of an educational engagement proceeds behind a veil of conceptual nonsense and historical rubbish . . . Consequently, education is not to be confused with that accommodation to circumstances in which a newcomer learns the latest steps in the *danse macabre* of wants and satisfactions and thus acquires a 'current' value in the world.[12]

Oakeshott claims that the 'alternative' is the reason why we are now "strangers to the human condition." He points out that by allowing ourselves to be "provoked to see [ourselves] clearly in the mirror of the current world" *without* understanding, we are involved in the engagement of "teaching

nothing."[13] If we continue in this enterprise, we will "annihilate" man by destroying Education, the "essence" of what it means to be human.

R.S. Peter's "Non-Instrumental" Attitude

According to R.S. Peters, the ideal of liberal education, which has its roots in early Greek culture, re-emerged in the nineteenth century as a contrast to 'training'. Peters notes that:

> Traditionally the demand for "liberal education" has been put forward as a protest against confining what has been taught to the service of some extrinsic end such as the production of material goods, obtaining a job, or manning a profession. In other words it has been a plea for education rather than vocational training or training of hand and brain for utilitarian purposes. [14]

Peters' distinction between education and training is reminiscent of Oakeshott's distinction between education and the 'alternative'. According to Peters, education is distinguished by the following criteria:

> "education" implies the transmission of what is worth-while to those who become committed to it;
>
> "education" must involve knowledge and understanding and some kind of cognitive perspective which are [sic] not inert;
>
> "education" at least rules out some procedures of transmission, on the grounds that they lack wittingness and voluntariness on the part of the learner. [15]

In his essay The Justification of Education, Peters, following Oakeshott, describes the "educated person" as one whose concern for knowledge and understanding gives rise to an attitude of determination to search for justification for his or her theories about the world. Such a person constantly queries what

is out there, why do this rather than that, is never satisfied and always wonders how this or that ought to be conceived.

This kind of understanding, according to Peters, is not "specialized" or confined to any particular sort of knowledge, it is rather, a "breadth" of understanding, the recognition that experience can be reacted to in more than one way. Thus, through theorizing, an individual develops a "cognitive perspective" which is continually adjusted by forging new connecting links or relationships between different forms of knowledge and theories about the world.

According to Peters, there are two distinct kinds of value connected to this kind of understanding. On one hand, it has "instrumental" or practical value in that it improves our everyday lives, ie., securing jobs, acting appropriately in a particular situation, making decisions and the like. On the other hand, it has "non-instrumental" value in that it is satisfying, rewarding to the inquiring individual to achieve a new, if temporary, level of understanding (i.e., to see the world from an enhanced perspective that has been refined by new knowledge).

The non-instrumental value of knowledge and understanding is demarcated by the following three criteria. First, it is worthwhile for the reason that it is absorbing and results in a grasp of 'truth'. Secondly, it eliminates boredom through the joy found in the mastery of rules. An individual is "transformed" by knowledge and understanding and the consequent alteration of his or her cognitive perspective. It is a source of interest to discover a new perspective or to falsify an old perspective. The final virtue is the value of reason. Peters acknowledges

that this view is based on the assumption that we value a state of mind that is neither deluded or prejudiced, a state where error matters. Thus, we value the *attempt* to find 'truth'.

The "key" to the non-instrumental attitude, according to Peters is that "regard, respect, or love" is shown for the "intrinsic features of activities." In other words, one does things for reasons that are "reasons for doing this sort of thing." Such reasons are "internal to the conception of the activity" and include caring about "the standards which are related to its point", valuing "clarity" and examining evidence carefully in an "attempt to eliminate inconsistencies." [16] The educated person, then, on Peters' view is an inquirer, an individual who is engaged in the pursuit of knowledge and understanding that continuously transform the individual's cognitive perspective of the world and his or her relationship to it.

Peters talks about "*engaging in*" the activity of justification,[17] a reason to "*engage in*" a disinterested inquiry [18] and "*engaging in*" those activities by which a person becomes educated.[19] Significantly, in Ethics and Education, Peters talks about the *commitment* that must be made by the educated person. He comments:

> It must involve the kind of commitment that comes from being on the inside of a form of thought and awareness . . . All forms of thought and awareness have their own internal standards of appraisal. To be on the inside of them is both to understand and to care. Without such commitment they lose their point.[20]

The notion of being "on the inside of a form of knowledge", interrogating the assumptions and justifications of its fundamental principles, illustrates the

essentially substantive nature of this type of engagement. The individual in this sense is "enmeshed within" the forms of knowledge, seeking to enhance his cognitive perspective. The engagement is a personal undertaking, not for selfish interests, but rather of a disinterested nature, that is, for non-instrumental purposes, mainly the need to know "what is going on".

Peters distinguishes between being merely 'knowledgeable' and being 'educated'. The former is to say that one is in possession of a body of unrelated facts, whereas in the latter case, an individual has, by virtue of understanding the interrelatedness of the facts, been transformed in the way in which he or she views the world. This understanding, or cognitive perspective, is incomplete in a narrowly 'specialized' approach to education characteristic of training.

The substantive imperative is obvious. The question, "what is worthwhile knowledge and understanding?" is central to the individual engaged in education, when education is viewed in this way. What *is* it that is necessary for one to know in order to understand better the world and one's relationship to it? This is a substantive question, a personal quest, made pedagogical only when the individual needs guidance, requires further direction from an outside source, from someone else who is involved in a similar undertaking. At this point and not before, the pedagogical question becomes relevant. At this point the substantive engagement takes on a pedagogical aspect. However, the pedagogical undertaking does not *replace* the substantive one. It simply provides the required

means which may aid the individual to continue to pursue the personal undertaking, ie., developing a more sophisticated cognitive perspective.

Peters comments:

> Children start to develop character only when they are presented with conflicting standards and have to choose their own. But this does not come about only in the manner beloved of progressives - by learning through experience in the performance of common tasks. It also develops if adults are at hand who themselves have character and who can give practical reasons for their principles.[21]

The 'Substance' of Engagement

The 'forms of knowing' are central to the individual engagement of understanding, that is, the 'forms' are the answer to the substantive question, "What is worthwhile knowledge?" which is answered by liberal educators. What does one need to know in order to better understand the world and one's relationship to it? What answers can be found in the traditions established by those who have travelled the same route, by those who have gone before?

Paul Hirst describes and defends these forms in his essays concerning liberal education and the nature of knowledge. According to Hirst, traditions of forms of knowing have their roots in the seven Greek liberal arts. These forms have distinguishing features such as;

(1) They each involve certain central concepts that are peculiar in character to the form.

(2) In a given form of knowledge these and other concepts that denote . . . certain aspects of experience, form a network of possible relationships in which experience can be understood. As a result, the form has a certain logical structure.

> (3) The form, by virtue of its particular terms and logic, has expressions or statements . . . that in some way or other . . . are testable against experience...in accordance with particular criteria that are peculiar to the form. [22]

Hirst classifies the forms of knowledge as mathematics, physical sciences, human sciences, religion, aesthetics, philosophy and ethics. Each form, then, contains cognitive structures which allow one to discriminate one's experience, explore methods of justification and thereby achieve further understanding. Thus, one can develop a more sophisticated cognitive perspective by *interrelating* the understanding gained from exploring one's experience within each of the various forms of knowledge.

Hirst points out that learning which involves understanding is " an *engagement* with the beliefs, practices and sentiments of others so that one comes to think, believe, feel and imagine for oneself . . . " [23] and that, "After a period of practice . . . they [the students] may come to enjoy maths and reading for their own sake and *engage* in them without any extrinsic incentive." [24] He describes teaching as an "enterprise *in which a person may be engaged* for a long period."[25]

Hirst alludes to the polarization problem in a discussion of the nature of teaching activities. He distinguishes between indicative or substantive features of activities, that is, between what it is that is being learned and the learning state or pedagogical features of the activities. Hirst comments, "What is important is that we come to realise that in all teaching activities *both these necessary features need the fullest responsible consideration*".[26]

Israel Scheffler views educational engagement as a "triadic" transaction between the teacher, the learner and what it is that is being learned. In other words, according to Scheffler, "someone" *teaches* "something" *to* "someone else". In this transaction, the teacher provides a role model for the learner. The teacher exemplifies the quest for understanding, articulates the value of coming to know and is a source of guidance for the learner within the forms of knowledge. The teacher shares the distinctive language, methodology and particular questions related to whatever form or forms are being discussed, pointing out assumptions, justifications and fundamental principles related to the form. In this way, the learner gains vision or new insight into his experience. Scheffler says:

> Teaching is consummated in the student's own insight . . . For, having acquired this learning not merely by external suggestion but through a personal *engagement* with reality, the student can appreciate the particular fit which his theories have with real circumstances, and, hence, the proper occasions for them to be brought into play.[27]

Scheffler employs the terms related to engagement in the substantive sense whether he is talking about teaching or learning. For example, he views learning as "a personal *engagement* with reality". Scheffler uses the preposition 'in' when he discusses engagement, e.g., "Jones is *engaged in* teaching", "Teaching is *engaged in*, directed toward a goal"[28] and ". . . *engaging in* an activity involves trying".[29]

Scheffler further distinguishes between statements which may be true or false (knowledge) and activities of inquiry. For example, he notes:

> Statements are not done or engaged in . . . inquiry is itself another of the practical arts . . . It too, is something *engaged* in, aimed at the development of adequate theories. [30]

Educational engagement on the liberal view is a substantive act, a self-imposed undertaking to inquire into what is going on. It is an extension of the human engagement to understand, which involves education when it becomes necessary for the individual to further his or her understanding through the forms of knowledge in order to develop a more sophisticated cognitive perspective. The engagement is of a substantive nature in that it is necessarily concerned with knowledge deemed to be worthwhile in the quest for understanding. One is 'engaged in' or committed to the quest for understanding, one chooses to 'engage' in such an undertaking and the engagement is 'with' the beliefs, practices and sentiments of others as expressed 'within' distinct forms of knowing. The undertaking is not for personal gain in the sense of instrumental reward, it is rather a non-instrumental pursuit to satisfy the inquiring mind, to find out what is going on.

The emphasis in the liberal view is primarily on the individual learner and his or her pursuit of knowledge. The role of the teacher is specified to a certain extent by this view. That is, the teacher must also be a learner, one who values worthwhile knowledge and understanding and one who is also developing an increasingly sophisticated cognitive perspective. Thus the teacher may offer the learner the benefit of his or her experience, may direct and guide the learner through the various forms of knowledge, and may aid the learner in interrogating

the forms of knowledge. The main issue for the teacher in this case is a substantive one, that is, what the learner already knows, what he or she needs to know in order to further his or her understanding, or what questions the learner should next address. The pedagogical concern, that is, the question of 'how' this guidance or direction should best proceed, may in fact differ according to the preference and level of the cognitive perspective of the individual learner. What is important is the 'manner' in which the teacher transmits knowledge and understanding. The teacher ought to be cognizant of the learner's quest, to be supportive of both the learner's need to know and the value of worthwhile knowledge and understanding, and to be seeking to aid the learner in developing a more sophisticated cognitive perspective.

Distinctions and Assumptions

Within the liberal context of educational engagement, there are several opportunities for misinterpretation or misconceptions which could conceivably perpetuate the illusion of polarization . For example, given their precise use of the terms of engagement in the substantive sense, it is curious that liberal educators do not acknowledge that the terms could be used in a transactive sense and do not distinguish between the two uses. This would not be 'stipulating' a particular use, in the strict sense, rather it would be a conscientious attempt to avoid confusion by explicitly justifying precision in language.

The possibility of misinterpreting Oakeshott's notions of voluntariness and 'alternatives' to education was discussed earlier in the chapter. Peters' reference

to the rise of liberal education as a *protest* against a narrow 'specialized' approach to education could add credibility to the idea that there are alternative approaches to education. That would be faulty thinking, however, as it must be noted that this point distinguishes between education and training, not between different approaches to education. A further area of contention may arise from the fact that liberal educators appear to pay an inordinate amount of attention to the individual's undertaking, to what it is that is worthwhile for an individual to understand, i.e., the forms of knowledge, thus by inference, liberal education could be presumed to be not explicitly concerned with pedagogy. This inference is problematical on two counts. First, it is not the case that liberal education is not concerned with pedagogy, as attested to by Peters, Hirst and Scheffler in their accounts of the role of the teacher. Rather, it might be said that advocates of liberal education do not fully explore the role of the teacher. Secondly, the priority in the substantive question is, correctly, on what it is that is worthwhile. The priority emphasises the categorical distinction between the two questions and underscores the necessity of the pedagogical question and answer. Again, however, the problem is that the distinction is not made explicit.

Confusion could also arise from the fact that the liberal view takes exception to both the progressive and what is called the 'traditional' view of education. Given that liberal education is often conflated with traditional education in educational literature, it is understandable that the 'unenlightened' would find such an exception untenable. Finally, confusion conceivably results

from the fact that a liberal education makes certain assumptions about education, not apparent in our contemporary 'educational' discourse, which are fundamental to the substantive question.

First is the assumption that all individuals are, in fact, capable of valuing worthwhile knowledge and understanding. That is, that all individuals do, in fact, abhor falsity and value the attempt to seek truth. Thus, worthwhile knowledge and understanding would have intrinsic or non-instrumental value to all individuals. Following this, a second assumption is that our culture or society recognizes and advocates the value of developing a sophisticated cognitive perspective through worthwhile knowledge and understanding. Thirdly, given the former two assumptions, there is the assumption that what educators understand to be education is necessarily associated with worthwhile knowledge and understanding. Finally, this view presumes that teachers are able and willing to transmit the value of worthwhile knowledge and understanding to their students.

These assumptions are not sufficiently explicated in the literature of liberal education. Given the illusion of polarization, that is, that educational approaches are alternative approaches to education, the assumptions of liberal educators obviously cannot be taken for granted. For, if the substantive question is *not* considered to be essential to education, then there is no warrant for the last three assumptions. Consequently, even if it is true that individuals abhor falsity and value the attempt to find truth, it would not necessarily be the case that their inquiry would be furthered by their 'education', it would not necessarily be the

case that society recognizes and advocates the development of a sophisticated cognitive perspective, and it would not necessarily be the case that teachers were either able or willing to transmit the value of worthwhile knowledge and understanding to their students.

The strength of the liberal view of engagement lies in its attention to the achievement aspect of education. The substantive engagement is an engagement with *the knowledge and understanding that one must gain* in order to become an educated person. The substantive engagement responds to the educational question "what is it that is worthwhile?" Further, the substantive engagement describes the criteria which govern the role of the individual learner within the engagement, e.g., commitment to something deemed to be worthwhile.

A problem with this type of engagement, however, is that education, on this view, could be seen simply as 'self-education'. In other words, the substantive engagement may not appear to satisfy the pedagogical criteria which govern the environment within which students become educated. The substantive engagement provides the 'something' which is to be taught in Scheffler's triad, but it could be taken to lack a sufficient explanation for both the role of the 'someone' who teaches and for the circumstances under which the 'something' is appropriately taught.

Summary

When liberal educators talk about educational engagement they are talking about a substantive sense of engagement in which an individual seeks to extend

his understanding of the world and his or her relationship to it through historical traditions of knowledge. The engagement is exemplified by the development of an increasingly sophisticated cognitive perspective which is intrinsically rewarding to the individual in that it satisfies the inquiring mind that needs to know what it is that is 'going on'. This attitude toward knowledge and understanding is referred to as a "non-instrumental attitude". The engagement has a substantive imperative, that is, it is necessarily concerned with *what* must be known in order to transform the way in which the individual sees the world.

The liberal view of educational engagement employs language which distinguishes the particularly substantive 'type' of engagement which was discerned in Chapter one, i.e. the noun 'engagement', the verb 'engage' (referring to the individual's act) and the participle 'engaged'. The terms are used exclusively with the prepositions *in* and *to*, in accordance with the rules governing the use of the terms. Teaching is viewed as a triadic transaction between the teacher, the learner and what it is that is being learned. The role of the teacher is that of an exemplar, one who has 'gone before.'

An investigation of the literature on educational engagement reveals several sources of confusion that could conceivably perpetuate the illusion of polarization. Although the advocates of this view use precise language to explicate their notion of educational engagement, they neither justify their usage nor acknowledge that the terms can be used in more than one way. The underlying assumption, therefore, is that the terms could not and would not be

used in any other way to talk about education. Liberal advocates occasionally refer to alternatives to education or take exception to opposing views, thereby suggesting that a polarization does, in fact, exist.

The assumptions underlying this view of education are not made explicit in the literature, thus they appear to be taken for granted, an erroneous assumption in itself. Most importantly, the liberal advocates of educational engagement, while properly emphasizing the substantive imperative within their educational question, nevertheless do not sufficiently acknowledge the other essential question and the approach to education that responds accordingly.

That the assumptions of liberal educators cannot be taken for granted is aptly illustrated in the criticism that was directed toward them by the Progressive Reform movement in Britain and by John Dewey's theory of a "new" education based on children's interests and relevant experience. These criticisms will be explicated in the following chapter. The criticisms are particularly relevant to the discussion of educational engagement, in that it appears that the progressive view of engagement is based on what was perceived to be the weakness of the traditional view, namely, its supposed 'lack' of engagement.

***

CHAPTER 2 NOTES

1. See, for example, R.S. Peters, P. Hirst, I. Scheffler, D.W. Hamlyn, R. Pring, R.F. Deardon, J.P. White and John Passmore.

2. Oakeshott's Experience and Its Modes, first published in 1933 by Cambridge University Press, provides the framework for his theories of understanding. For example, "Knowledge, in the view I have suggested, is not the extension of a mere series, or the enlargement of a mere collection of ideas; it is the achievement of the coherence of a given world or system of ideas by the pursuit of the implications of that world." 41 Oakeshott discusses the notion of engagements as peculiar to human conduct in On Human Conduct. The idea of educational engagement is a recurrent theme in Oakeshott's essays on liberal education, "The Universities", 1949; "The Idea of a University", 1950; "Political Education",1951; "Learning and Teaching", 1965; "Education: The Engagement and its Frustration", 1972; "A Place of Learning",1975.

3. Michael Oakeshott (1975) On Human Conduct 1,(Oxford University Press) (italics added)

4. Ibid., 3. Oakeshott justifies this use, "This vocabulary has the virtue of distinguishing 'theorizing' from 'theorem' a distinction obscured in its English counterpart where the word 'theory' is used indifferently for the enterprise and its outcome. And it centres our attention upon the engagement, thus suggesting that we may more profitably ask ourselves what is theorizing?"

5. Ibid., 2

6. Ibid.

7. Michael Oakeshott (1989) The Voice of Liberal Learning 23 (Yale University Press)

8. Ibid., 22

9. Ibid., 20

10. Ibid., 67

11. Ibid., 90

12. Ibid., 93

13. Ibid., 94

14. R.S. Peters (1966) Ethics and Education 18 (Scott, Foresman and Company)

15. Ibid., 20

16. R.S. Peters (1973) The Philosophy of Education 245 (Oxford University Press)

17. Ibid., 258

18. Ibid., 259

19. Ibid., 266

20. Peters, Ethics, 9

21. R.S.Peters (1960) Authority Responsibility and Education 115 (Paul S. Eriksson, Inc.)

22. Paul Hirst (1973) "Liberal Education and the Nature of Knowledge" 102-103 in The Philosophy of Education, R.S. Peters (ed) (Oxford University Press)

23. Ibid., 8

24. Ibid., 38

25. Paul Hirst (1973) "What Is Teaching?" 164 in The Philosophy of Education R.S. Peters (ed)

26. Paul Hirst (1974) Knowledge and the Curriculum 112 (Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.)

27. Israel Scheffler, (1967) "Philosophical Models of Teaching" 127 in Concept of Education, R.S. Peters (ed) (Routledge and Kegan Paul)

28. Israel Scheffler, (1960), The Language of Education, 61, (Charles C. Thomas)

29. Ibid., 63

30. Ibid., 72

Mankind likes to think in terms of extreme opposites.
It is given to formulating its beliefs in terms of Either-Ors,
between which it recognizes no intermediate possibilities.
John Dewey

CHAPTER 3

CHILD-CENTRED ENGAGEMENT

Child-centred education, like liberal education, is an ideal that we aim toward, but do not expect to achieve. The child-centred ideal is embodied in the aims of what is known as the progressive reform movement which, in its educational context, seeks to replace the non-educative practices which were employed by 'traditional' educators late in the nineteenth century. Some of the concerns of the advocates of child-centred education, broadly construed, are that practices which are based on rigid discipline, the unquestioned authority of teachers and passive obedience on the part of students are not only non-educative, but are in fact, a denial of the fundamental 'human rights' of children.

Due to the fact that child-centred education is primarily a reaction to traditional education, this chapter begins by describing the major concerns of progressive educators about traditional education, followed by an examination of the notion of educational engagement within the context of child-centred education. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the nature of the child-centred engagement and its relationship to the polarization problem.

The main concerns of child-centred education are pedagogical in nature, that is, they are concerned with what it is that constitutes an appropriate 'educational environment'. Although several important child-centred educators

in Europe and North America have dealt with the subject of pedagogical theory,[1] arguably the most representative and most widely accepted theory of child-centred education is that of John Dewey. Therefore, Dewey's work has been chosen as the exemplar both for a description of the main concerns of progressive educators about traditional practices and for an examination of educational engagement in the child-centred context.

As was the case with liberal education, the discussion is not intended to provide a thorough account of the theoretical underpinnings of child-centred education, nor is it intended to be an analysis of Dewey's philosophy of education. Rather, Dewey's views are used to provide a framework within which the child-centred notion of educational engagement can be examined to determine its relationship to the categorical distinctions established in Chapter one and its relationship to the principles of child-centred education. Further, as was the case in Chapter two, the investigation will make explicit any assumptions or misconceptions that may have contributed to the illusion of polarity.

It could be argued that Dewey predicted the artificial polarization that has clouded the vision of educators for the last fifty years. For example, in 1938 Dewey noted that:

> Mankind likes to think in terms of extreme opposites. It is given to formulating its beliefs in terms of *Either-Ors*, between which it recognizes no intermediate possibilities . . . At present, the opposition, so far as practical affairs of the school are concerned, tends to take the form of contrast between traditional and progressive education. [2]

Dewey is vehemently opposed to any form of distinction that leads to duality (i.e., mind/body, individual/society). He warns of the dangers inherent in reform movements and advises educators to be wary of basing theories and practices solely on the strength of their opposition to that which they seek to replace. He points out that:

> There is always a danger in a new movement that in rejecting the aims and methods of that which it would supplant, it may develop its principles negatively rather than positively and constructively.[3]

It is curious that, inasmuch as Dewey's views have been widely accepted and provide the basis for much of our contemporary educational theory, these particular admonitions have not, in fact, been heeded.

Traditional Education and Engagement

Child-centred educators could be described as being concerned with the 'practices' of education. Thus, their criticisms of traditional education lie in the non-educative practices that they seek to replace. The major criticisms of traditional education can be generally categorized as criticisms of the non-educative 'manner' in which traditional education was conducted and criticisms about the non-educative or artificial 'nature' of the traditional education 'experience'.

The Problem of Manner

Dewey argues that traditional *methods* of learning and of behaving are foreign to the existing capacities of the young and are beyond the reach of the experience the young learners already possess. He points out that traditional

educators 'transmitted' information to students by means of authority, routinization and strict discipline. For example, Dewey comments:

> The traditional scheme is, in essence, one of imposition from above and from outside. It imposes adult standards, subject-matter, and methods upon those who are only growing slowly toward maturity. The gap is so great that the required subject-matter, the methods of learning and of behaving are foreign to the existing capacities of the young . . . Consequently, they must be imposed. [4]

Dewey holds that the school should be a natural extension of the child's experiences in the home rather than a hostile environment in which children are expected to accept unfamiliar routines, rigid discipline and unrealistic standards of conduct. Thus:

> One reason why much of elementary schooling is so useless for the development of reflective attitudes is that, on entering school life, a break is suddenly made in the life of the child, a break with those of his experiences that are saturated with social values and qualities. [5]

The Problem of Artificial Information

The "artificial" nature of the information transmitted by traditional educators is of serious concern to Dewey. He believes that, because knowledge of the past is not relevant to the present experience of young children, it is rendered meaningless to them. He notes that:

> There can be no doubt that a peculiar artificiality attaches to much of what is learned in schools. It can hardly be said that many students consciously think of the subject matter as unreal; but it assuredly does not possess for them the kind of reality which the subject matter of their vital experiences possesses . . . that it should remain inert for the experiences of daily life is more or less a matter of course.[6]

The notion of the *child's* experience is central to Dewey's theory of education. Given his concern with the non-educative 'nature' of traditional experiences, Dewey notes that, "traditional education did not lack experiences", rather, "the experiences were of the wrong kind", resulting in the learner's disengagement because of the *impersonal way* in which learning was supposedly experienced. Dewey comments:

> The trouble with traditional education was . . . that they did not consider the other factor in creating an experience; namely, the powers and purposes of those taught. It was assumed that a certain set of conditions was *intrinsically desirable*, apart from its ability to evoke a certain quality of response in individuals. This lack of mutual adaptation made the process of teaching and learning accidental.[7]

Dewey's criticisms of traditional education are not always in the strictest sense pedagogical. Some criticisms point out problems with the way that education is actually conceived in the 'traditional' sense, particularly the absence of an appropriate social environment within which learning can take place. For example, in traditional schools:

> An idealized past becomes the refuge and solace of the spirit; present day concerns are found sordid, and unworthy of attention; But as a rule, the *absence of a social environment in connection with which learning is a need and a reward* is the chief reason for the isolation of the school; and this isolation renders school knowledge inapplicable to life and so infertile in character. [8]

Dewey opposes the notion that educational value can be attributed to knowledge without first considering the different stages of a child's growth and the appropriateness of certain kinds of knowledge at certain stages. He criticises traditional forms of education, i.e., 'cultural education', that view knowledge

itself as "intrinsically desirable" rather than viewing knowledge and understanding in relationship to the child's growth and development. For example, Dewey asserts that:

> There is no subject that is in and of itself, or *without regard to the stage of growth attained by the learner*, such that inherent educational value can be attributed to it. Failure to take into account adaptation to the needs and capacities of individuals was the source of the idea that certain subjects and certain methods are intrinsically cultural or intrinsically good for mental discipline. *There is no such thing as educational value in the abstract* . . . the notion that some subjects and methods and that acquaintance with certain facts and truths possess educational value in and of themselves is the reason why traditional education reduced the material of education so largely to a diet of predigested materials.[9]

Theoretical Foundations

Like liberal education, Dewey's theory of child-centred education is an 'ideal'. However, Dewey's ideals are those of the 'scientific method' and a 'democratic society'. In his introduction to John Dewey On Education, R.D. Archambault points out the significance of science:

> Dewey's whole conception of science and its methods and its aims is directly relevant to education . . . Scientific method serves as a direct model for educational methodology at every stage of instruction . . . . Dewey's broader *conception* of science as a total and unique mode of thought bears on all of his educational ideas . . . It defines the relation between freedom and discipline, emotion and control, interest and effort. And above all, it offers a method for determining the aims of education and the relation between means and ends in the educative process.[10]

On Dewey's view, one major mode of knowing ought to be applied consistently in all areas of thought. This requires a political structure that is, in itself, an implementation of the scientific mode of thought. Dewey sees democracy as the political manifestation of scientific method.

Dewey's philosophy of experience is an extension of his psychological views. Dewey's "reflex arc" theory describes the psychological relationship between a stimulus, a "decision to re-direct activity and re-construct the environment", and the "influence of the decision in future stimuli".[11] Schneider describes the relationship between Dewey's psychology and his philosophy:

> The human art of adapting the environment to the organism as well as the organism to the environment gave Dewey the psychological analysis that he needed for a general theory of the reconstructive power of intelligence. This reconstruction takes place both in the reformation of the habits and character of an individual and also in the reform of institutions. He now had a psychology that implied a philosophy of science, of education, and of democracy.[12]

Dewey, following the Darwinian theory, views humans as biological organisms that survive and evolve through adaptation to, and control over, their environment. However, in a more Rousseauian tradition, Dewey holds that human nature is shaped more by custom, habit, and institutions than by an order of nature. Dewey claims that "habits give control over the environment, power to utilize it for human purposes". This is accomplished in two ways, namely, by "habituation" (adaptation to surroundings) and "readjusting" to meet new conditions. Habituation and readjustment provide the necessary fundamentals for Dewey's *theory of growth* which, when simplified, states that habituation "furnishes the background of growth" and that readjustment "constitutes growing".[13]

Dewey holds that the human brain is "essentially an organ for effecting the reciprocal adjustment to each other of the stimuli received from the

environment and responses directed upon it." [14] Thus, it is not surprising that Dewey's view of the nature of human inquiry is an extension of his reflex arc theory. That is, he views inquiry as a *process* of "reflective thought", a process wherein an individual is stimulated by "real" doubt and responds to the stimulation with a form of scientific deliberation.

According to Dewey, the scientific method can be applied to individual inquiry in a process involving the formation of ideas, acting on ideas/hypotheses, observing consequences/conditions which result and organizing facts/ideas which follow from the conditions. Dewey claims that:

> The development of the experimental method as the method of getting knowledge and of making sure it *is* knowledge, and not mere opinion - the method of both discovery and proof - is the remaining great force in bringing about a transformation in the theory or knowledge.[15]

Dewey's theory of knowledge is governed by what he calls criteria of experience, namely, the *principle of continuity* and the *principle of interaction*.

The principle of continuity of experience (also called experiential continuum or category of continuity) is, simply put, the fact that we are shaped, changed, or in some way modified, by each of our experiences. To that extent, we are never quite the same person upon exiting an experience that we were upon entering it. The principle of interaction, again simply put, acknowledges equal "rights" to both internal and external conditions governing a particular experience.

Although he acknowledges equal rights to both internal and external conditions, Dewey holds that external 'acts' have temporal priority over internal acts. Dewey asserts that:

> The active side precedes the passive in the development of the child-nature; that expression comes before conscious impression; that the muscular development precedes the sensory; that movements come before conscious sensations; I believe that consciousness is essentially motor or impulsive; that conscious states tend to project themselves in action. . . . ideas (intellectual and rational processes) also result from action and devolve for the sake of the better control of action. What we term reason is primarily the law of orderly or effective action. [16]

Knowledge, according to Dewey, is shaped by behaviour and is *necessarily* active. Intellectual understanding achieved as a result of inquiry is insufficient for 'usefulness', it must be transformed into action. If not given meaning by use, Dewey holds that knowledge "drops out of consciousness entirely" or becomes an "object of aesthetic contemplation". The function of knowledge is "to make one experience freely available in other experiences". Dewey's reasoning on this point is that:

> The word "freely" marks the difference between the principle of knowledge and that of habit. . . habit, apart from knowledge, does not make allowance for change of conditions, for novelty. . . . knowledge is a perception of those connections of an object which determine its applicability in a given situation. [17]

Knowledge is made instrumental, on Dewey's view, through "purposes" or "ends-in-view". Purposes are formed through a "complex intellectual operation " which involves observation of surrounding conditions; knowledge of what has happened in similar situations in the past; and judgement which puts together what is observed and what is recalled.[18]

Dewey claims that:

> What he [the child] has learned in the way of knowledge and skill in one situation becomes an instrument of understanding and dealing effectively with the situations which follow. The process goes on as long as life and learning continue.[19]

Thinking is not a "separate mental process", but rather a matter of habits of mind which are directed by objects, subjects or topics which stimulate or evoke response. Dewey believes that thought can be indirectly "trained" in an "environment" under "conditions" which cause correct habits of mind to be developed. The "habits", namely, *directness, open-mindedness, single-mindedness* (or wholeheartedness) and *responsibility* are features of what Dewey calls the "method of knowing" or "the reflective situation". [20]

Theory of Education

The significance of the "new" philosophy, according to Dewey, lies in the "intimate and necessary relationship" between "the processes of actual experience and education".[21] Dewey's theory of education, like his general philosophy, is related to the ideals of science and democracy. That is, Dewey holds that the application of the scientific method 'to' education and 'by' education is the ideal *means* of attaining the ideal *end*, namely that of a democratic society. Further, Dewey's pedagogy presumes both his reflective arc theory of knowledge and his biological theory of human nature and growth. He points out that, "Since growth is the characteristic of life, education is all one with growing . . . The criterion of the value of school education is the extent to

which it creates a desire for continued growth and supplies means for making the desire effective in fact.[22]

According to Dewey, the experience of learning must begin within the scope or level of the child's experience and from there, develop progressively to richer and more organized forms. Thus, the process is a "constant spiral" in which *connectedness in growth* must be the "constant watchword." [23]

The experience of learning is determined by the 'quality' of the experience. Dewey posits two aspects of experience, namely, agreeableness or disagreeableness, and the influence upon future experiences. When governed by the principles of continuity and interaction, learning is necessarily a part of the child's present experience. Dewey points out that:

> Any normal experience is an interaction of these two sets of conditions. Taken together, or in their interaction, they form what we call a *situation* . . . The conceptions of *situation* and of *interaction* are inseparable from each other. An experience is always what it is because of *a transaction taking place between an individual and what, at the time, constitutes his environment,* [24]

Dewey frames his educational theory by contrasting it to traditional education. That is, he stipulates that the "new education" offers "expression and cultivation of individuality; free activity; learning through experience; acquisition of skills and techniques as means of attaining ends; and making the most of the opportunities of present life", *in contrast to* the traditions of "imposition from above; external discipline; learning from texts and teachers; acquisition of isolated skills and techniques by drill; and preparation for a more or less remote future."[32]

The educator, on Dewey's view, should be primarily concerned with the

conditions under which learning takes place. It is the business of the educator to arrange the conditions in such a manner that children will have experiences that develop the correct habits of mind. These conditions might be called 'learning situations'. Thus, according to Dewey:

> The immediate and direct concern of an educator is then with the *situations in which interaction takes place*. The individual, who enters as a factor into it, is what he is at a given time. It is the other factor, that of objective conditions, which lies to some extent within the possibility of regulation by the educator.[25]

Dewey's theory of education presumes a holistic view of the nature of education. That is, he holds that distinctions should not be made between the "what" and the "how" of the enterprise. The relationship between the how and the what, he concludes, presents a problem:

> If the how and the what, the psychological and the social, method and subject matter, must interact cooperatively in order to secure good results, a hard and fast distinction between them is fraught with danger. We want a method that will select subject-matter that aids psychological development, and we want a subject-matter that will secure the use of methods psychologically correct. We cannot begin by dividing the field between the psychology of individual activity and growth and studies or subject-matters that are socially desirable , and then expect that at the end in practical operation the two things will balance each other.[26]

Dewey asserts that if such a distinction is made the reaction upon the learner's development and habits is overlooked. In such an event, Dewey maintains that the psychological account of the process of personal learning is "deficient and distorted." However, Dewey acknowledges that experience has demonstrated that methods devised to master skills in isolation do not necessarily

lead to the development of desirable attitudes, namely those that "decide the uses to which the ability is to be put". Dewey concludes that:

> The consideration of how one learns . . . in its connection with its effect upon future personal development and interests demands attention to desirable subject-matter. The social question is intertwined with the psychological.[27]

Dewey recognizes the two essential questions about education, namely, 'what' it is that is worthwhile and 'how' it is best achieved. However, he resists attempts to make them categorically distinct, justified by virtue of his opposition to duality. Further, Dewey resists the subordination of the pedagogical question to the substantive question. That is, he does not acknowledge that 'what' it is that is worthwhile can be determined independently of 'how' it is achieved. To the contrary, in Dewey's holistic view, what is worthwhile i.e. knowledge, *is essentially a part of the means of achieving it and of its end or ultimate utilization*:

> I have taken for granted the soundness of the principle that education in order to accomplish its ends both for the individual learner and for society must be based upon experience - which is always the actual life-experience of some individual.[28]

Dewey states that education is by its very nature an "endless circle or spiral". He notes that in "its very process", education sets more problems to be studied which then "react into the educative process to change it still further". Thus, according to Dewey, 'education' demands "more thought, more science, and so on, in everlasting sequence". [29]

Educational Engagement

Given his predilection to view actions as methods or processes, it is not surprising that Dewey describes educational engagement as a *process*. For example:

> Under normal conditions . . . children do not set out consciously, to learn walking or talking . . . [The child] learns in consequence of his direct activities. The better methods of teaching a child . . . do not fix his attention on the fact that he has to learn something and so make his attitude self-conscious and constrained. *They engage his activities, and in the process of engagement he learns;* [30]

Archambault notes that the central concepts in Dewey's educational theory are the aim of the activity, the agent responsible for the activity (the teacher), the subject of the activity (the pupil), and the means by which the aim is achieved (curriculum and method). [31] If Archambault is correct, a Deweyan view of education entails a significantly different emphasis from that of liberal educators on the *role of the individual learner* within the engagement. That is, in Dewey's view, the learner is not the agent primarily responsible for his or her own learning. That responsibility, if Archambault is correct, falls upon the teacher. Further, on this view, the student (subject of the activity) is more of a passive recipient within the process of engagement.

Significantly, Dewey was preoccupied with the theory of "transactional activity" in the final decade of his career. Schneider comments:

> Dewey agreed that the usual conception of the "interaction" of organism and environment failed to do justice to his theory that "activity" is a single process of which organism and environment are merely factors; and he welcomed the term "transaction" as recognizing the partnership. [32]

Again, is it not particularly surprising that the process of educational engagement on the Deweyan view is a 'transactive' engagement, in which an individual responds to all the stimuli or conditions in his personal environment that meet the criteria of fostering 'growth'. For example:

> Objective conditions includes equipment, books, apparatus, toys, and games played. *It includes the materials with which an individual interacts, and, most important of all the total social set-up of the situations in which a person is engaged.*[33]

Inasmuch as the concept of pedagogy can be taken to be the 'science of teaching', Dewey's notion of educational engagement is essentially *pedagogical* in nature and responds to the educational question "how is the worthwhile best achieved?".

Pedagogical engagement entails the idea of social interaction and joint activities conducted by means of transactions between the child and the teacher, the child and its peers and between the child and the "situation" in which the process of engagement is being transacted. For example:

> The effort at isolated intellectual learning contradicts its own aim. We may secure technical specialized ability in algebra, Latin or botany, but not the kind of intelligence which directs ability to useful ends. *Only by engaging in a joint activity,* where one person's use of material and tools is consciously referred to the use other persons are making of their capacities and appliances, is a social direction of disposition attained.[34]

The object of the pedagogical engagement, that is, what is engaged 'in', on the pedagogical view, is a "joint activity" directed toward "useful ends". The process of engagement is carried on under "objective conditions" which are designed to produce the useful ends.

The role of the teacher is to both initiate and participate in the engagement. Dewey points out that:

> We do not usually take much pains to see that the one learning *engages in significant situations* where his own activities generate support, and clinch ideas-that is, perceived meanings or connections This does not mean that the teacher is to stand off and look on; the alternative to furnishing ready-made subject matter and listening to the accuracy with which it is reproduced is not quiescence, but participation, sharing in an activity. [35]

The "business of the educator", on Dewey's view, is to arrange for the establishment of useful or meaningful contacts with educational resources, eg., conditions of the local community, so that they lead to "growth" without violating the principles of experience (e.g., environing conditions). The role of the teacher is to create conditions that will arouse curiosity and cultivate the development of attitudes that are favourable to the "best methods of inquiry" (i.e., correct habits of mind). In other words, the teacher should:

> Arrange for the kind of experiences which, while they do not repel the student, but rather *engage his activities* are, nevertheless, more than immediately enjoyable since they promote having desirable future experiences.[36]

Dewey notes that the phrase "objective conditions" covers a wide range, including "what" is done *by* the educator and the "way" in which it is done, words spoken and the tone of voice in which they are spoken. "Objective conditions" includes equipment, books, apparatus, toys, and games played. In fact, according to Dewey:

> It includes the materials with which an individual interacts, and, most important of *all* the total social set-up of the *situations in which a person is engaged*.[37]

Dewey links the notion of pedagogical engagement to "fruitful" experiences by distinguishing between such experiences and the idea of "absorbing knowledge directly". He notes that:

> In schools, those under instruction are too customarily looked upon as acquiring knowledge as theoretical spectators, minds which appropriate knowledge by direct energy of intellect. The very word pupil has almost come to mean *one who is engaged not in having fruitful experiences* but in absorbing knowledge directly. Something which is called mind or consciousness is severed from the physical organs of activity.[38]

Dewey's criticism is then, that *'fruitful' educational engagement* cannot be achieved solely through the traditional means of "acquaintance with facts and truths which had educational value in and of themselves" and that educational engagement can be better achieved, when the *learner's 'activities' are engaged*, that is, when experience is both the means and goal of education.

Differing Views of Educational Engagement

The child-centred view of educational engagement is pedagogical in nature and meets the criteria for what was identified in Chapter one as a *transactive* engagement. That is, it involves the ability of an agent (i.e., the teacher) to attract or preoccupy someone (i.e., the student) by means of observable entities (i.e., objective conditions) according to the later (18th century) etymology. The student is the object or recipient of the activity embodied in the engagement. Value, in the transactive or pedagogical engagement, is attached to the 'quality' of the objective conditions, the social interaction and the useful ends, to the extent that they are, in fact, engaging. The teacher is responsible for initiating the engagement and the objective conditions are responsible for sustaining it.

The priority in the transactive or pedagogical engagement, then, is on the *quality of the objective conditions* within the engagement. The preposition 'by' is not used in the manner that would be expected in this type of engagement i.e. 'engaged by', a teacher, a topic of interest, etc. However, given the way in which the engagement is described (the student's "activities are engaged", the student is engaged in "situations", "experiences" and "joint activities") the student *is* nevertheless, attracted or preoccupied *by* the situations, experiences and joint activities in the strictest sense.

The child-centred notion of engagement differs from that of liberal educators in several ways. First, the liberal concept is that of a substantive engagement, and as such, is governed by what is educationally worthwhile. The child-centred concept, on the other hand, is that of a pedagogical engagement. As such it is, ideally, governed by how the worthwhile is best achieved. Secondly, according to the categories distinguished in Chapter one, the liberal concept employs the substantive sense of engagement, whereas the child-centred concept employs the transactive sense of engagement. In other words, liberal engagement and child-centred engagement *mean* two different things. Thirdly, the two types of engagement differ in terms of their fundamental constituents such as the role of the teacher, the role of the learner and the purpose of educational activities.

Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the substantive engagement assumes the necessary priority of the substantive question, whereas the child-centred view of pedagogical engagement assumes that what is worthwhile is

necessarily a part of the pedagogical and can not be distinguished from it.

Further, the child-centred view of what is worthwhile (i.e., the utilization of knowledge) is *determined by its end*, namely, the construction of a democratic society. This is substantially different from the view of liberal educators who hold that what is educationally worthwhile (i.e., increasingly sophisticated human understanding) is achieved through the traditions of knowledge. Education, in the child-centred view, albeit holistic, is a means to achieve a particular end. Education on the liberal view, however, is an end in itself, inasmuch as it can ever be achieved.

The strength of pedagogical engagement lies in its emphasis on the 'business' of teachers and the articulation of what might be called the 'optimal learning conditions within an educational environment'. These necessary elements of the educational triad may not appear to be addressed sufficiently by the notion of a substantive engagement.

The problem with the child-centred notion of pedagogical engagement is that it does not, by itself, lead to *educational* engagement. That is, pedagogical engagement does not sufficiently acknowledge the substantive element of the educational triad, namely, 'what' it is that must be learned in order for someone to become educated. Further, the pedagogical emphasis on the individual is that of the individual in an interactive social environment (i.e., as a member of a group). This emphasis differs from the substantive emphasis, which is on the relationship between the individual and worthwhile knowledge and

understanding. It follows that, if pedagogical engagement is not viewed as the means by which the substantive engagement may be achieved, it becomes a 'means' without educational 'substance' and consequently cannot legitimately claim to be *educational engagement*.

Therefore, it can be concluded that the distinct concepts of engagement differ in meaning, entailments and ultimately, in what it is that is meant by education. Given this distinction, it is no wonder that educators see the two views as polarized opponents, as alternative approaches to education. At the very least, it is clear that the two views of engagement could lead to confusion and misinterpretation on the part of educational theorists and practitioners.

Distinctions and Misconceptions

Four problems arise from the progressive reformers' criticisms of traditional education. First, by criticising traditional education and seeking to replace non-educative teaching practices, the progressive reformers initiated what has come to be an "artificial polarization".

Secondly, the reformers *misconceived* the fundamental relationship between the two essential questions about education. That is, rather than pedagogical considerations being viewed as *necessary, but subordinate* to substantial considerations, the reformers imply that both questions can be answered by each of two mutually exclusive and opposing approaches to education.

Thirdly, the criticism of 'traditional' education for its emphasis on the unquestioned authority of teachers, rigid discipline and passive obedience on the part of children is a criticism of the *non-educative practices* of 'traditional' educators. Traditional 'methods' of teaching (e.g., students seated in rows, memorization and recitation of facts, discipline), have *no logical link* to the 'substance' of education (i.e., worthwhile knowledge and understanding) advocated by Liberal educators. However, the criticism of 'traditional' education could be taken to be directed specifically at the liberal 'traditions' of knowledge and understanding, and incorrectly suggests that traditional pedagogy is, in fact, linked to liberal education.

Finally, the critics created an 'ambiguous opponent' for child-centred education. The 'opponent', variously labelled 'traditional, classical, cultural, and later, subject-centred and content-centred', could easily be associated with liberal education.

As Dewey warns, a philosophy which proceeds on the basis of replacement may run into serious difficulty. In fact, Dewey's conceptual replacement for education gives rise to three additional problems related, directly or indirectly, to the artificial polarization problem.

First, when Dewey argues against the artificial nature of knowledge of the past, it is not immediately obvious that he is actually arguing *for* an instrumental view of the nature of education. That is, Dewey's reasoning in this case is that knowledge is only meaningful if it is both relevant and useful for practical

purposes. However, what is not made explicit is that this is not an either/or situation, to use Dewey's terminology. If Dewey's argument is valid, then there are other options for resolving the problem of artificiality of the traditions of knowledge, by connecting such knowledge to contemporary issues, for instance.

Dewey might argue that this is exactly what he is advocating, namely, the 'instrumentality' of knowledge. However, there is a significant difference between making the traditions of knowledge relevant and advocating that they be eliminated from educational pursuits by virtue of their artificiality. Further, although Dewey does state that the past is a means for understanding the present, he does not offer any suggestions for structuring a study of the past beyond the point of seeing in it, the causes for present social problems. He acknowledges that the "weakest area of progressive education is in the selection and organization of subject matter" but goes on to say that "this is to be expected" and is "no ground for fundamental criticism." [39] It might be argued that, in as much as the selection and organization of subject material <u>is</u> an integral component of education, there are ample grounds for fundamental criticism.

The second problem is Dewey's criticism regarding educational value, namely that "there is no subject that is in and of itself, or without regard to the stage of growth attained by the learner, such that inherent educational value can be attributed to it." This statement is clearly mistaken in three important respects.

First, Dewey is forced to accept, on this view, that there is some 'educational' value in all kinds of growth, albeit undesirable or desirable growth. Secondly, if value were to be linked to *stages of a child's growth*, then the substantive question (i.e., what is worthwhile) would be made subordinate to theories of child development which purport to designate what those stages are. This view would turn the priority relationship between the two essential education questions on its head. That is, if the substantive question becomes subordinate to the pedagogical question, that relationship could lead to methodology which, as was noted previously, is devoid of worthwhile educational content.

Thirdly, on this view, education becomes a series of discrete stages of growth yielding a mature product analogous to a mature oak tree. Dewey's notion of growth is problematical in that 'growth' can lead to any sort of development as long as it is "natural". Natural growth, such as that of trees and flowers, is directed by innate design rather than conscious development. To view education as analogous to natural growth, then, is to imply that notions of autonomy, understanding, choice, judgement and value as they are commonly understood, are irrelevant.

To the objection that "growth may take many different directions" or that growth may be "good" or "bad", Dewey responds with a series of questions about the relationship between growth and education (e.g., whether growth in this direction promotes or retards growth in general, whether this form of growth

creates conditions for further growth). Dewey leaves educators to answer these questions, stating "simply that when and only *when* development in a particular line conduces to continuing growth does it answer to the criterion of education as growing." [40]

The final problem is that the child-centred view of pedagogical engagement confuses the essential questions about education. Pedagogical engagement is a response to the 'task' aspect of education. The notion that the 'means' of education (i.e., the pedagogical engagement) *are* the ends of education (i.e., the substantive engagement) is a denial of what is entailed by the concept of education. The child-centred view of pedagogical engagement appears to be a contradiction, not of terms but of two activities that appear to be at cross-purposes. That is, the noun 'engagement' entails the notions of an individual undertaking and something deemed to be valuable or worthwhile. Yet in the child-centred version of pedagogical engagement, which is by nature transactive, the individual is not *primarily* responsible for initiating or sustaining the engagement. Nor is there a necessity for the individual to value the substance of the engagement beyond its instrumental potential.

Dewey maintains that the fundamental issue is the question of "what anything must be to be worthy of the name education." [41] This assertion regarding the question of the nature of education is important. His theory of experience suggests that education for the sake of knowledge alone is an insufficient end. On the other hand, education as a means of social control based

on the experiential model has been demonstrated to be a problematic alternative.

An alternative to what may appear to be an "either/or" dilemma is the recognition that, like the two types of educational engagement, both the liberal and child-centred views answer an essential question about education. Further, each view answers a distinctly different, yet equally important question. The two views are, in fact, complimentary if they are conceived in the light of what we ultimately value. Dewey posed the right question, the question of what anything must be to be worthy of the name education. Oakeshott, Peters, Hirst, Scheffler and countless contemporary educators have recognized the folly of pursuing opposing ideals. Our contemporary 'educational' context is proof positive of the validity of their concern.

Summary

The progressive reform movement, which began as a protest against 'traditional' pedagogy, plays a significant role in the construction of the illusion of polarization which confounds contemporary educators. The position of the progressive reform movement is defined by its *opposition to 'traditional' non-educative practices*. The criticisms of the Progressive reformers, in defence of child-centred education, often consist of broad generalizations and appear to be directed at an ambiguous opponent. Such generalizations are easily misinterpreted or misconceived and may lead to confusion in discourse and may perpetuate the illusion of polarization. Given the criticisms directed specifically toward "traditional education", "the inherent value of subjects" and "literary

products", and given the emphasis by liberal educators on the 'traditions ' of worthwhile knowledge and understanding, it is conceivable and highly probable that liberal education would be construed to be an opposing educational approach to that of child-centred education.

The pedagogical claims made by child-centred educators imply that they either *preclude* or *include* substantive claims. Consequently, they blur the category distinction between the substantive and pedagogical questions about education and thereby foster confusion and the illusion of polarization.

The concept of educational engagement is an integral component in the debate. For, in the process of reforming the institution of traditional education, the reformers lose sight of the necessary priority of the substantive question answered by the liberal concept of educational engagement and *replace* it with a pedagogical concept of engagement which is categorically distinct. In other words, the reformers, either unintentionally or intentionally create the illusion that the substantive question (i.e., what is worthwhile) rather than being a necessary prior question, is viewed either as an alternative to the pedagogical question or as being opposed to the pedagogical question (i.e., how it is best achieved).

Thus, the polarization appears to consist of two distinct types of educational engagement. On one hand is the substantive liberal engagement, which is an engagement *in* the achievement of worthwhile knowledge and understanding. On the other hand is the child-centred view of pedagogical

engagement, which is an engagement *by means of* a learning environment within which knowledge is made relevant to children's personal experience.

The distinct views of educational engagement illustrate the artificial nature of the polarization, in that they describe two distinct types of engagement, each of which answers a different, yet essential question about education. Therefore, they are not necessarily in opposition but rather, essentially complimentary responses to the two important educational questions.

History illustrates that particular ideals are usually pursued at the expense of equally important opposing ideals, leading inevitably, to unintended consequences arising from a lack of attention to the values implicit in the opposing ideal. The assumptions and misconceptions of both liberal and child-centred educators in pursuit of their respective ideals have, in fact, resulted in unintended consequences, not the least of which, is the illusion of polarization.

The consequences of the assumptions and misconceptions are evident in contemporary societal attitudes and expectations of education, in educational curricula and in the context of contemporary classrooms. Accordingly, the next chapter will discuss the relationship between the assumptions, misconceptions and their unintended consequences.

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CHAPTER 3 NOTES

1. R.J.W. Selleck, (1972) English Primary Education and the Progressives, 1914-1939 80, (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.)
   Selleck is a rich source of historical background for the progressive reform movement in Britain. Selleck notes that although advocates of the "new education" differed in their views about methods of improvement, the reformers were, nevertheless, "united ... by their opposition to the old ways", and "inspired" by Edmund Holmes. Selleck particularly refers to J.H. Simpson, E.S.Smith, Edward O'Neil, A.S. Neil, Caldwell Cook, Norman MacMunn, Homer Lane and Maria Montessori. 25-8

2. John Dewey,(1938) Experience and Education 17 (New York, Collier Books)

3. Ibid., 20

4. Ibid., 18

5. John Dewey, (1933) "School and Training Thought" 241, in John Dewey On Education, Archambault (ed) (New York, Random House), 1964

6. John Dewey, (1916) Democracy And Education 161, (New York, Macmillan Pub. Co.)

7. Dewey, Experience 45 (italics added)

8. Dewey, Democracy 359 (italics added)

9. Dewey, Experience 46 (italics added)

10. Archambault (ed) (1964) John Dewey On Education xviii (New York, Random House)

11. H.W. Schneider, (1970) "Dewey's Psychology" 6 in Guide to The Works of John Dewey, Boydston (ed)(Southern Illinois University Press)

12. Ibid., 7

13. Dewey, Democracy 52

14. Ibid., 336

15. Ibid., 338

16. Archambault, Dewey 435

17. Dewey, Democracy 339-340

18. Dewey, Experience 69

19. Ibid., 44

20. Dewey, Democracy 173

21. Dewey, Experience 20

22. Dewey, Democracy 53

23. Dewey, Experience 75

24. Ibid., 44-5

25. Ibid., 45

26. John Dewey, (1929) The Sources Of A Science Of Education 61, (Horace Liveright, New York, out of print)

27. Ibid., 65

28. Dewey, Experience 89

29. Dewey, Sources Of A Science 77

30. Dewey, Democracy 169

31. Archambault, Dewey xxii

32. Schneider, Psychology 11-12

33. Dewey, Experience 45 (italics added)

34. Dewey, Democracy 39

35. Ibid., 160

36. Dewey, Experience 27 (italics added)

37. Ibid., 45 (italics added)

38. Dewey, Democracy 140 (italics added)

39. Dewey, Experience 78

40. Ibid., 36

41. Ibid., 90

If we once start thinking no one can guarantee where we shall come out . . . Every thinker puts some portion of an apparently stable world in peril and no one can wholly predict what will emerge in its place.

John Dewey

CHAPTER 4

ASSUMPTIONS, MISCONCEPTIONS AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

"Clashing views on controversial educational issues" is the subject of a recent publication in which the editor, James Noll, comments:

> Controversy is the basis of change and, hopefully, improvement. Its lack signifies the presence of complacency, the authoritarian limitation of viewpoint expression, or the absence of realistic alternatives to the existing circumstances. An articulate presentation of a point of view on a controversial matter breathes new life into abiding human and social concerns. Controversy prompts reexamination and, perhaps, renewal.[1]

In the postscript to a debate on whether or not schooling should be based on social experiences, Noll poses the question, "*Can the 'either/or' polarities of this basic argument be overcome?*"

This chapter is a response to Noll's comment on the benefits of controversy and his question regarding the possibility of overcoming polarity. The chapter consists of two parts. The first part examines how the assumptions and misconceptions about educational engagement are related to a number of unintended consequences, not the least of which is the polarization problem and the perpetuation of that illusion. The second part discusses the potential for achieving worthwhile educational engagement within an educational context which is free from the illusion of polarization.

Assumptions About Educational Engagement

The concept of educational engagement within the ideal of liberal education was examined in detail in Chapter two. The ideal presumes certain basic attitudes toward education. First is the assumption that all individuals are, in fact, capable of valuing worthwhile knowledge and understanding. Thus, worthwhile knowledge and understanding would have non-instrumental or intrinsic value to all individuals. Following this, a second assumption is that our culture recognizes and advocates the value of developing a sophisticated cognitive perspective through worthwhile knowledge and understanding. Thirdly, given the former two assumptions, there is the assumption that what educational policy makers and teachers understand to be education is necessarily associated with worthwhile knowledge and understanding. Finally, this view presumes that teachers are able and willing to transmit the value of worthwhile knowledge and understanding to their students.

The problem is that, although the liberal view of engagement includes two of the three elements of the 'educational triad', namely 'what' it is that is being taught and the 'someone' to whom it is being taught, this view of engagement may seem to pay insufficient attention to the third essential element, namely, the 'someone' who is doing the teaching. Consequently, it may appear to be insufficient for 'educational' engagement. In other words, liberal engagement provides the logical 'substance' of education but may not appear to provide the psychological 'means' of achieving it.

Universal recognition of the ideal of a liberal education seems to have been taken for granted by its advocates. An unfortunate consequence of taking such recognition for granted lies in the fact that liberal educators were not prepared for what might be called the 'pedagogical revolution' brought about by the progressive reformers. Further, due to the fact that liberal educators emphasize the importance of worthwhile knowledge and understanding and do not *explicitly* acknowledge the importance of child-centred pedagogy, the ideal of liberal education could, consequently, be perceived by many educators to be opposed to the ideal of child-centred education.

Misconceptions About Educational Engagement

The misconceptions of educational engagement held by progressive educators were described in detail in Chapter three. Although the criticisms of traditional education are both accurate and warranted, they may have led to the *misconception that answers to both educational questions are not, in fact, necessary*. That is, rather than claiming that pedagogical engagement is necessary *in addition to* a substantive engagement, criticisms of traditional education could be taken to be claiming that pedagogical considerations and substantive considerations are mutually exclusive and opposing views about education.

The criticism of traditional education for its emphasis on passive obedience to the unquestioned authority of teachers is a criticism of the *pedagogy* of 'traditional' educators. However, the criticism could be taken to be directed specifically at the liberal traditions of knowledge and understanding and implies

that traditional pedagogy is, in fact, linked to liberal education. Such an implication is a *misconception of liberal education.*

The critics of traditional education created an 'ambiguous opponent' for child-centred education. The opponent has often been associated with Liberal education. Thus, the criticisms may have led to a *misconception of the opposition* to child-centred education.

The notion of pedagogical engagement is taken to be the means by which 'what is worthwhile' is achieved. However, on the child-centred view, pedagogical engagement could be taken as a means to an end. The 'end-in-view' need not necessarily require engagement with the worthwhile knowledge and understanding entailed in the substantive type of engagement. Linking pedagogical 'ends' to education then, could lead to a *misconception of the substance of education.*

Dewey's criticism regarding educational value, namely that "there is no subject that is in and of itself, or without regard to the stage of growth attained by the learner, such that inherent educational value can be attributed to it" can lead, as described in Chapter three, to the *abandonment of what is educationally worthwhile*. Dewey acknowledges that the "weakest area of progressive education is in the selection and organization of subject matter". Inasmuch as the selection and organization of subject material <u>is</u> a necessary component of education, Dewey's view of growth does not guarantee an educationally worthwhile curriculum.

Dewey further acknowledges that he takes for granted the notion that education must be based on experience to accomplish ends for both learner and society. He admits that he does not argue for the acceptance or justification of his philosophy of experience.[2] By not explicitly acknowledging the importance of knowledge and understanding, Dewey could be taken to mean that education might, then, *not* necessarily be based on knowledge and understanding. This would be a *misconception of the triadic nature of education.* That is, it would remove the necessary element of substance from the educational equation. If Dewey *were* to argue in defence of his position or lack of same in respect to the selection and organization of subject material, he might encounter several less-than-positive consequences (critically important in all decision-making, by his own admission) resulting from this view.

Unintended Consequences

1) The liberal ideal is obscured by a pedagogical 'revolution' and changes in societal expectations of education.

As noted previously, the expectation that the ideal of liberal education was and always would be acknowledged and supported by society placed liberal educators in a defensive position in the ensuing pedagogical revolution and consequent changes in society's views on schooling. This position may have contributed to the illusion that liberal education is opposed to child-centred education.

2) The emphasis of progressive reformers on what was 'wrong' with traditional education and what was 'right' about child-centred education contributed to an "artificial" polarization.

The emphasis on child-centred pedagogy and the criticism of traditional education created confusion about what is meant by child-centred 'education' and its relationship to traditional 'education'. Child-centred pedagogy was seen to be not simply an emphasis on a necessary dimension of a coherent pedagogy, but an *alternative approach to that of traditional education.* In other words, by not explicitly acknowledging the possibility of making the substance of traditional education relevant to students' experience, the reformers' criticisms have been often taken to mean that child-centred education is opposed to *everything* that is embodied in traditional education, including notions of worthwhile knowledge. These assertions may have led educators to believe that opposition exists, for example, between content-based and 'child-centred' education and that these approaches are competing or alternative approaches to education; and that a 'good school' is concerned neither with traditions of knowledge and understanding nor with content. In other words, contemporary educators may have been led to believe that, a 'good school' is *synonymous* with a 'child-centred school' and *that schools with other priorities could not, in principle, be child-centred.* Therein lies the basis of what Peters and Hirst call an "artificial polarization".

The phenomenon of artificial polarization linked to child-centred education has been noted in educational literature. For example, Harold Entwistle notes that:

> The impression that we are confronted with exclusive choices in education (for example, 'children not subjects', child versus teacher, subjects or the integrated curriculum, individual or society, freedom versus discipline, etc.) has perhaps been fostered by the strong resistance the child-centred movement has encountered. [3]

Further, liberal education, due to its emphasis on worthwhile knowledge and understanding and the value of the traditions of knowing, arguably was taken to exemplify traditional education and thus, to be opposed to child-centred education.

3) Within the pedagogical revolution, the meaning of 'educational engagement' changes from a substantive engagement to a transactive or pedagogical engagement.

Although child-centred educators use the term 'educational engagement' to describe and justify their pedagogy, their view of engagement differs significantly from that of the substantive engagement. The priority in the child-centred view of engagement, as noted in Chapter three, is on the pedagogical *means* of achieving educational engagement rather than *what* it is that may be achieved. Thus, although the child-centred engagement provides the necessary psychological element in the educational triad, it alone is insufficient for educational engagement. In other words, child-centred engagement alone is a means to an 'end' which might be 'without substance'.

The problem is that the artificial polarization between liberal and child-centred education obscures both the meaning of education and the essential questions that must be answered in order to achieve it. Rather, liberal and child-centred educators as well as society at large debate over seemingly competing views of what education is or should be. Consequently, educational debates rarely address the possibility that both views might be not only compatible, but necessary to educational discourse.

4) The notion of instrumentalism changes societal expectations of schools.

Whether or not it was intended by Dewey and the advocates of child-centred education, a consequence of the emphasis on pedagogy is, nevertheless, that many contemporary political interest groups, parents and teachers expect 'education' to prepare students for future employment and to be an agency for social reform. Further, some interest groups go so far as to suggest that, inasmuch as knowledge and understanding of the traditions of knowledge do not explicitly prepare students for employment or correct social interaction, an emphasis on such traditions is 'counter-productive'.

When education is used as a means to a particular end it creates the following two problems. First, the idea of education merely as a preparation for employment or a means of social reform confuses education with schooling or training, as noted by Oakeshott, Peters and Hirst. The second problem when education is conceived instrumentally, is its failure to achieve its 'end' or

promise, i.e., employment and social reform. Hutchins points out the danger in linking education to employment in this way:

> If we encourage [students] to believe that education will get them better jobs and encourage them to get educated with this end in view, they are entitled to a sense of frustration if, when they have got the education, they do not get the jobs. But, if we say that they should be educated in order to be men, and that everybody, whether he is ditch-digger or a bank president, should have this education because he is a man, then the ditch-digger may still feel frustrated, but not because of his education.[4]

Regarding education as an agent of social reform, Hutchins points out that, "Society is to be improved, not by forcing a program of social reform down its throat, through the schools, or otherwise, but by the improvement of the individuals who compose it."[5]

5) Pedagogy is reduced to Psychology.

The effort to improve pedagogy, a consequence of the progressive reform movement, has lead to a further consequence, namely, an increase in the development of 'theories of instruction'. Due to the belief that all methods of inquiry ought to be grounded in 'scientific' verifiability, educators have turned to psychology for 'proof' regarding the validity of theories of instruction.

This move has led to two additional 'psychological' consequences for contemporary education practice. The first consequence is the effect of the psychological theories of Abraham Maslow and Carl Rogers. The theories of these psychologists have affected the way in which teachers perceive their educational roles and their relationship to their students.

The theories advocate attitudes which separate the teacher from the 'business of education' and *replace the notion of individual autonomy which is based on reason, with a form of autonomy which is called "self-actualization".*

Maslow's theory is based on the innate "goodness" or neutrality of the human "inner nature". Maslow believes that individuals strive for what he calls "self-actualization", a psychological state which results from expressing, experiencing and sharing one's feelings with others. The focus of child development, according to Maslow, is to provide opportunities for the expression of the inner nature. Maslow defined two types of needs, specifically "deficiency" needs (i.e., food, warmth, safety) and "growth/self-actualization" needs (i.e., fulfilling of a mission, destiny or vocation). In his "hierarchy of needs", based on ascendency from basic physiological to the highest level (i.e., self-actualization), Maslow holds that the basic needs must be fulfilled before the higher ones can be addressed. Maslow claims that each person's inner nature has a "force of its own" that must be reckoned with. According to Maslow:

> The "better" culture gratifies all basic human needs and permits self-actualization. The "poorer" cultures do not. *The same is true for education. To the extent that it fosters growth toward self-actualization, it is "good" education.* [6]

Maslow's theory, in its educational application, could have led teachers to believe that education (worthwhile knowledge and understanding) is not as important as expressing, experiencing and sharing feelings (self- actualization).

Carl Rogers' theory of individual autonomy de-emphasises the importance of pedagogy. Rogers, a clinical psychotherapist, holds that individual autonomy

or self-actualization can be achieved by psychotherapeutic methods, that is, through the "immediate experience" of previously repressed emotions. According to Rogers, a "healthy person [Maslow's self- actualizer] is one who spontaneously experiences the emotions of each moment and expressed emotions freely and directly." [7] Such a person, according to Rogers, is an "authentic" person, that is a person who is open to change, if the expression of feelings and behaviour is "true" to what one actually "feels".

Leahay notes a link between the theories of Maslow and Rogers and Dewey's child-centred pedagogy:

> The value humanistic psychologists called "growth" was the openness to change Rogers hoped to bring about in his clients . . . Humanistic psychotherapists make change a basic human value, the goal of all living, whether within or without therapy. Humanistic psychologists agreed with Dewey that "growth itself is the only moral end" [8]

The psychological and moral revolution advocated by these psychologists leads to what has been called 'modern skepticism', the attitude by virtue of which one expects nothing, lives in the here and now, and distrusts reason and values other than the vague notion of personal growth and experience.

The pervasive influence of these theories on the context of education may have led to Hutchins' comment that:

> Relativism, scientism, skepticism, and anti-intellectualism, the four horsemen of the philosophical apocalypse, have produced that chaos in education which will end in the disintegration of the West.[9]

The second psychological consequence of the pedagogical 'revolution' is the disassociation of method from educational content by *replacing pedagogy*

with teaching strategies. This move has been a consequence of trying to make education more 'scientific', and thus basing it on cognitive scientific psychology, following the work of Piaget, Bruner and Vygotsky.

Jerome Bruner, leader of the "New Look" or Cognitive Approach to the study of perception, explains the shift thus:

> There is a certain familiarity that psychologists have with how one can get somebody to learn or to pay attention or to stay free from anxiety. While these are not ends in the strict sense, they shape our ends in educational policy.[10]

Jean Piaget began a study of cognitive psychology in the early 1920's. His field of study called genetic epistemology was concerned with tracing the psychological growth of knowledge in children by studying their reactions to intellectual stimulations. Piaget's conception of knowledge was a set of cognitive structures that enable a child to adapt to the environment. Piaget's work was largely ignored in America until the 1960's when his theories became critical in the effort to improve pedagogical engagement. In a 1965 text entitled The New Methods: Their Psychological Foundations, Piaget accuses traditional methods of education of "force-feeding" and using "an archaic educational approach." Piaget advocates rather, child-centred progressive education by pointing out that:

> Social life, introduced into the classroom through the agency of effective collaboration among the students and the autonomous discipline of the group, implies the very ideal of the activity we have already described as being characteristic of the new school: it is morality in action, just as active work is intelligence as act. [11]

Bruner's "New Look" approach to cognitive psychology follows Piaget in studies involving personality dynamics and individual perceptions such as those used to solve complex problems. Bruner views education as a "social invention," and claims that "Man's use of mind is dependent upon his ability to develop and use tools or instruments or technologies that make it possible for him to express and amplify his powers." [12]

The education system, according to Bruner is the "sole means of dissemination - the sole agent of evolution." Bruner is concerned by the absence of a "theory of instruction as a guide to pedagogy - a prescriptive theory on how to proceed in order to achieve various results, a theory that is neutral with respect to ends but exhaustive with respect to means". [13] He argues for a curriculum involving mastery of skills, the development of a "metalanguage" and "metaskills" for dealing with continuity in change and a theory of instruction which "must be at the heart of educational psychology . . . principally concerned with how to arrange environments to optimize learning according to various criteria". [14]

Bruner's views are in accord with those of the Russian psychologist Vygotsky. In fact, in his introduction to Vygotsky's 1962 "Language and Learning," Bruner comments, once again, "Man is shaped by the tools and instruments that he comes to use, and neither the mind nor the hand alone can amount to much." [15] The significance of Vygotsky's work to theories of instruction lies in his attention to the different ways in which a child develops

"scientific" and "spontaneous" concepts, the formulation of laws governing the development of these concepts and the psychological nature and linguistic function of written speech in its relation to thinking.

The views of these psychologists correspond with Dewey's psychological view of pedagogy and his theories of knowledge and learning. Therefore, it is not surprising that these particular psychological theories have had a significant influence on current educational practice. The influence is evident in the fact that they are used as supporting documentation in the work of Britton, Moffett, Martin, and later Emig and Graves, researchers who laid the foundation for current writing practice in British Columbia as documented in the English Language Arts Curriculum Guide. The problem created by these psychological theories is that they have given rise to 'strategies' or 'recipes' for particular '*processes* of learning' which in turn, have become 'what' it is that is being taught.

Creative Writing and Engagement

The practice of teaching creative writing provides an appropriate illustration of one of the unintended consequences which result from an emphasis on pedagogical engagement at the expense of knowledge and understanding and the attempt to improve pedagogy by means of psychological verification. The consequences (i.e., the significance granted to self-actualization, authenticity and teaching 'strategies') have resulted, it will be argued, in students' *disengagement* from worthwhile knowledge and understanding.

The Program Development branch of the B.C. Ministry of Education provides a handbook for teachers which outlines the research base for teaching and learning embodied in the current curriculum guide. According to this handbook, *Learning to write* is a language development *process* involving refinement and control that proceeds from part to whole; an active process of *hypothesis - generation*; and is enhanced through *experimentation* and from having audiences.[16] *Writing to learn* is "one of the most important *tools* students possess for understanding themselves, the world and for expressing ideas to others"; [17] and *Writing as Process* is "a complex activity, which is inextricably linked to thinking and learning." [18] Notwithstanding that these 'truths' are referenced to Britton, Martin, Emig, Graves and Moffett, they are clearly based on Dewey's philosophy of experience, the child-centred progressive view of education and the psychological theories of Piaget, Bruner and Vygotsky.

Two problems arise when psychology is used as evidence to support curriculum implementation. The first is the preponderance of theories, that is, psychological theories are usually based on previous theories which presumably substantiate their claims. These prior theories are justified by virtue of still prior theories and so on. The second problem is that if one can get to the bottom of the justification, it may be the case that *the fundamental theories underlying curriculum implementation presuppose assumptions that are not warranted.*

In the case of Creative Writing, the theories of Edward deBono are included in the 'research base' used to justify the curriculum. DeBono assumes

that creativity or creative thinking is a distinct process constituted by specifically creative modes of thought that can be fostered independently of content, knowledge or tradition.[19] Further, the theories of Emig, Graves et al., which are based on theories of Bruner et al., assume that writing is a process that can be fostered independently of knowledge, understanding and the method of inquiry of the discipline or tradition in which it is embedded.

The assumptions in either case are not, in fact, warranted, for there is insufficient evidence to support theories of creativity as a 'special' process. Evidence *does* exist which supports the notion that creativity is grounded in logical thinking leading to significant accomplishments, knowledge and understanding and the traditions of specific disciplines. For example, work by Bailin, White and Perkins indicate that there is insufficient evidence to support a theory of creativity as a distinct process. On the other hand, what we know as excellent writing, eg., the work of Shakespeare, Shelley, and T. S. Eliot indicates that creativity is grounded in logical thinking, sound judgement, knowledge and understanding of the discipline in which it is embedded.[20] Bailin et al. conclude that it is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish 'creative' writing from writing excellence. They maintain that creative writing *can* be fostered within the 'tradition' of literature using criteria for excellence. The claim that a particular strategy can foster a distinct process of either 'creativity' or 'creative writing' rests on the assumption that such a process does, in fact, exist. Therefore, in order for the assumptions to be warranted, it is necessary for theoretical creative

processes to be supported by substantial evidence, which, to date, does not exist.

If what we call 'creativity' is, in fact, grounded in knowledge and understanding of the tradition in which it is embedded, then the criteria for judgement in the case of creative writing are such elements as style, technique, use of imagery, mood, voice, etc. The particular methodology of the tradition for solving problems, the literary environment (i.e., access to materials, stimulation through discussion and activity) will, in fact, *promote engagement* and in so doing will emphasise the value of understanding the specific language and historical development of the tradition rather than the 'process' of writing. Thus, strategies that foster the traditions of a discipline using criteria for excellence can, in fact, legitimately claim to foster creative writing.

However, in the effort to improve pedagogical engagement by relying on psychological theories of instruction, which by nature are 'process-oriented', creative writing has become a 'process' or 'experience' which is an end unto itself. For example, the B.C. Ministry of Education's current curriculum guide offers no account of knowledge and understanding of the tradition of writing itself; of the elements of style, mood, character development, technique and method of inquiry. According to the curriculum handbook, learning is writing and writing is learning and neither are necessarily linked to any particular content other than immediate experience.

Current research, based primarily on results obtained from small groups or individuals with learning disabilities, offers limited evidence that the process approach is, in fact, working. Counter evidence, on the other hand, is available in the decreasing level of writing ability as observed by educators, parents, university instructors and the general public.

A further example of consequent problems, when psychology is used to justify pedagogy, is found in the B.C. Ministry of Education's Intermediate Program. Significantly, the problem is found in a discussion of engagement.

"Active Learning" and Engagement

A recent document upon which intermediate teachers are to base their pedagogy contains a three page description of "engagement" which is described as a "phase" in an example of a "framework" of active learning. Significantly, the framework is included under the heading "Learner-Focussed Experiences".[21]

The document claims that "*Experiences* that take advantage of this growing awareness *are likely to engage students* who are poised at a critical stage in the development of their learning". Teachers are advised to consider questions such as "Is there desire on the part of students *to engage in the learning experience*?"; "Will the learning experience be worthwhile and develop students' abilities to communicate, think, care, and act?"; and "Are there opportunities to collaborate?", etc. The framework for active learning offered as an example includes five stages, namely; engagement, exploration, transformation, presentation and reflection.

Engagement is described thus:

> Engagement in the learning experience involves student awareness of the full meaning of the learning activity. Students express a desire to understand what is problematic in the learning experience. Students who understand their purpose intend to continue learning, to seek responses to the questions that intrigue them. In this way, students can sense that they are becoming more knowledgeable about their world and their place within it. [22]

Teachers are further advised to "pose questions, arrange situations, and present information that will encourage students to wonder and think". Teachers can learn how students are engaged in learning in such situations as "class meetings, student council, and student/teacher conferences" and "engagement in learning" may be "fostered" by means of a "thinking log" in which students write about their experiences. The document continues by noting that:

> Thinking about how and what they are learning helps students establish a purpose and engage in learning . . . Worthwhile learning experiences will nurture the student's awareness of her or his growth and capabilities.[23]

In the pages devoted to a description of engagement there is no mention of the traditions of knowledge and understanding, nor is there mention of the need for the student to be committed to such knowledge and understanding. Yet, there is attention to creating an appropriate environment, growth and worthwhile experiences.

Clearly, the type of engagement advocated by the Ministry is a transactive engagement. Thus, it would be expected that this type of engagement is concerned with *how* knowledge and understanding are best achieved. The question is, *what* is it that students in this case are learning? Ironically, the

"worthwhile" experience in this case seems to be that of writing in the thinking log, an exercise devoid of criteria or standards, substance or content, as illustrated by the previous example. It would appear to be the case, that if the student "desires" to write in a thinking log, he or she is necessarily, "engaged" in worthwhile learning. Reflective thinking about anything of interest could be taken to be the means to becoming educated.

The problem with this approach is that, *if what it is that is worthwhile is not made explicit, there is no reason for students to actively pursue it, nor is there reason for teachers to create an environment in which it may be achieved.*

Summary

Noll's comment on the beneficial aspects of controversy leads to some interesting speculations. For example, it would seem that he is correct, inasmuch as the controversy over the deficits of traditional education gave rise to child-centred education and its consequent attention to the psychological or pedagogical aspect of education which is an essential element of the educational triad.

However, that same controversy also gave rise to an over-emphasis on pedagogical engagement at the expense of worthwhile knowledge and understanding. Further, the same controversy spawned the polarization problem, the perpetuation of which has obscured the essential questions about education if not the essential nature of the concept of education itself.

Given the detrimental aspects of Noll's controversy, it appears that controversy, in and of itself, cannot be deemed to be either beneficial or

detrimental. Rather, it must be acknowledged that controversy may have unintended consequences that may be detrimental or beneficial.

An example of the bifurcation of consequences is found in the consequences of the artificial polarization between liberal and child-centred approaches to education. On one hand are the benefits to educators from the widespread acceptance of Dewey's philosophy and the subsequent emphasis on the importance of the learning environment. On the other hand are the detrimental effects resulting from an emphasis on pedagogical engagement at the expense of the substantive engagement (i.e., methods have taken priority over curriculum and content, and self-actualization and autonomy are granted priority over reason). Arguably, the most significant consequence of the polarization is that *attempts to establish a balance between substantive and pedagogical considerations are resisted by educators due to the belief that liberal education is connected to traditional education and the belief that emphasis on curriculum content would be at the expense of pedagogical considerations.*

Dewey is opposed to dualism and any practice which leads to it. [24] Thus, it is ironic that his attempts to avoid dualism lead to distinctions which are far more divisive than the duality he seeks to avoid. Either dualism is inevitable, or one must do more than just state his adversity to dualism in order to avoid it. The attempt to avoid dualism may, in fact, have contributed to the polarization problem, the separation of subject matter and strategy, the separation of

curriculum from classroom practice and the separation of education from worthwhile knowledge and understanding.

Basing the pursuit of educational 'truth' solely on *either* the contingent factors of pedagogy or the necessary factor of content can lead to unfortunate consequences. Max Weber warns of the danger of confusing *existential* knowledge, that is knowledge of what "is" and *normative* knowledge, that is, knowledge of what "ought to be." He cautions the investigator to avoid false belief, namely, that what is normatively right is *identical* with what exists, and with what will inevitably emerge. Weber points out that,"It can never be the task of an empirical science to provide binding norms and ideals from which directives for immediate practical activity can be derived." [25]

Dewey also notes the consequences of pursuing particular ideals. He points out that, "there is always a danger in a new movement that in rejecting the aims and methods of that which it would supplant, it may develop its principles negatively rather than positively and constructively". [26]

Nevertheless, our belief in the 'truth' of empirical evidence has led to an inordinate dependence upon scientific verification for educational practice. Yet the field of educational psychology from which we seek verification has yet to produce incontrovertible 'truth' that child-centred engagement does, in fact, succeed in producing *educational* engagement. In other words, if our 'progress' to date consists of believing in our scientific 'truths', then we may be failing to achieve educational engagement through progressive means while concurrently

our students are being 'dis-engaged' from the traditions of worthwhile knowledge and understanding.

'Educational' Engagement Achieved

Dewey asks the important question, that is, "what anything whatever must be to be worthy of the name *education*". When the rhetorical debris of the artificial polarization have been metaphorically 'cleared away', the concept of education can be re-examined in a fresh context. In a clarified context it becomes obvious that the degree to which we achieve the educational ideal is determined by the degree to which our society acknowledges the importance of worthwhile knowledge and understanding and the degree to which our educators are willing to and capable of making such understanding relevant to the present experience of students.

Educational engagement requires both the substantive and the pedagogical engagement. The former requires a commitment on the part of the learner to an undertaking which will transform his or her way of understanding the world and relationship to it. The latter is the transaction between the learner and the learning environment in which the traditions of human understanding are explored, considered and incorporated into the individual's cognitive perspective in the light of present experience, thus enabling the individual to achieve a quality of life unattainable in any other way. If we intend to offer the opportunity to our young to become educated, both types of engagement are necessary. Therefore, institutions of education must recognize and meet these criteria in order to "be

worthy to be called education". If the criteria are met by all our institutions of education, we have truly become a democratic learning society.

The western ideal of education as an achievement presupposes worthwhile knowledge and understanding. The achievement aspect of Education is linked to the substantive engagement. That is, it requires a personal commitment by an individual to the undertaking of gaining worthwhile knowledge and understanding. Pedagogical engagement responds to the task aspect of education. That is, the pedagogical transaction is the means by which we gain the worthwhile knowledge and understanding. When the concept of education is clearly understood and when the two necessary aspects of educational engagement are acknowledged, we can look forward to the possibility of achieving the ideal. The substantive engagement alone, while essential, nevertheless could result merely in "aesthetic contemplation," unless there are pedagogical means which provide the environment for becoming educated. Pedagogical engagement alone, while equally essential, nevertheless can lead to "the engagement of teaching nothing", unless the substantive requirement (i.e., worthwhile knowledge and understanding) is 'what' it is that is being learned.

Implications of Educational Engagement

When pedagogical engagement is properly understood as the best means to achieve a substantive engagement and when this conjunction is recognized as educational engagement, the implications for our system of education are profound. For example, public schools could conceivably become, perhaps for

the first time in history, actual 'institutions of education'. Given that authority and responsibility, schools would not be taken as agencies for dealing with a wide variety of 'social ills' in the same sense as they are today. That is not to say, however, that such institutions would not attend to the skill and knowledge development necessary to obtain employment. Such a responsibility does not necessarily lie outside the walls of institutions of education. The point is that *professional development would not be the primary purpose of such institutions.*

When we have recognized what educational engagement means, we can begin to consider educational policy and curriculum planning in which the traditions of knowledge and understanding are made relevant and appropriate to the students' level of development, personal experience and interests. Child-centred pedagogy retains all its significant contributions to a theory of education. Dewey's ideal environment becomes the means by which all students have the opportunity to know what it is that is worthwhile.

This thesis has significant implications for the role of teachers. The teacher, on this view, becomes both the experienced guide advocated by liberal educators and the expert pedagogue who understands and acknowledges the rights of children, as advocated by child-centred educators. This new role may require that significant changes be made in the 'manner' and 'matter' of teacher training.

Although this thesis argues that the concept of educative teaching meets the criteria for Scheffler's "triadic transaction", there is a sense in which something more seems to be necessary in order to become an educated person.

The something more lies in the disposition of the learner. For example, in much of his work, Dewey refers to the adage "you can lead a horse to water, but you cannot make him drink." Liberal educators, metaphorically speaking, advocate the "purest of waters". Child-centred educators, metaphorically speaking, know precisely how to get the animal situated in the "closest proximity" to the pure waters. However, what will ultimately make the horse drink is "what it is that makes the horse thirsty". This aspect of education has not been accorded sufficient attention in educational literature. The educational question on this point is, what is it that makes the young value worthwhile knowledge and understanding? Peters refers to a "non-instrumental" attitude in which the pursuit of knowledge and understanding is worthwhile by virtue of the fact that such a pursuit is absorbing, eliminates boredom and transforms an individual's cognitive perspective. Peters, as noted in Chapter two, says that the "key" to such an attitude is that "regard, respect or love should be shown for the intrinsic features of activities." In other words, according to Peters, the non-instrumental attitude is personified by the teacher who cares about what is worthwhile. The question then becomes, how is it that we come to care about things?

Oakeshott, Peters and Hirst point out the significance of societal values on the attitudes of the young. It is difficult to imagine a society in which all people value worthwhile knowledge and understanding that it could be the case that children in that society do not value knowledge and understanding.

Conversely, it is difficult to imagine a society which pays homage to power, wealth and social status in which children do value worthwhile knowledge and understanding. It seems that institutions of education could not conceivably be expected to successfully alter social values held by society at large. The educational ideal requires that all institutions of society (i.e., the home, the school, organizations and associations) bear responsibility for the education of the young. In order to achieve the ideal, it would appear that contemporary societal values must be radically altered.

A further question is in what way do children come to value this or that? Kazepides claims that certain dispositions or attitudes of the young, which constitute the prerequisites of educational development, are not 'learned' but acquired in much the same way as Wittgenstein's river-bed propositions are acquired. Kazepides and Wittgenstein hold that there is a logical link between the acquired dispositions and "sophisticated educational engagements". Kazepides points out that:

> It would seem appropriate to refer to this early teaching as initiation into a form of life as opposed to the higher level, rational engagement, which is supported by it. It seems to me that our ordinary locution 'teaching to' refers at least in part to the habits, dispositions and attitudes that constitute the prerequisites of education. A conception of teaching which omits the prerequisites of educational development must be deemed inaccurate and inadequate; it can mislead teaching practice and misdirect the study of teaching. [27]

The logical link between prerequisite dispositions and sophisticated educational engagement merits further research and attention in educational literature. The analysis of educational engagement reveals that in the substantive

engagement the individual is taken to be committed or obligated to a personal undertaking which is deemed to be worthwhile. On this view the individual is taken to be a responsible agent who is 'predisposed' to value worthwhile knowledge and understanding. The question then is, how is it that a young person comes to be so predisposed? A further question might be, what is the nature of the relationship between this 'predisposed individual' and the pedagogical engagement in which case the individual is viewed as obtaining individuality only inasmuch as he or she is a functioning member of a particular society?

Concluding Remarks

The nature of educating is such that it entails both a logical link to worthwhile knowledge and understanding and a psychological link to the conditions under which it may be achieved. It follows that the two important educational questions are, "what is it that is worthwhile?" and "how can it be best achieved?" These questions are respectively answered by liberal education and child-centred education. However, due to the problem of an artificial polarization, the questions and their respective answers have been obscured from the view of the majority of educators. The polarization has been perpetuated to the extent that the nature of education itself is unclear to many practitioners. Consequently, attempts to clarify both the concept and context of education are met with resistance due to the belief that emphasis on one approach to education would necessarily be at the expense of the other.

The polarization is an illusion. When the illusion is dispelled and it is clear that liberal education and child-centred education are not opposing approaches to education, the arguments and the resistance should be eliminated and a balance achieved between the views of both liberal and progressive educators.

The analysis of educational engagement has revealed that two distinct yet necessary types of engagement are required for *educational* engagement. Although both types are necessary, neither the substantive engagement nor the pedagogical engagement are *independently sufficient* for educational engagement.

The argument for educational engagement illustrates the necessity for theories of education to respond to both educational questions with both educational answers in order to legitimately be a theory of 'education'.

Thus, the concept of educational engagement has served as a useful analogy to clarify the confusion and provide a fresh context for discussing educational priorities. It might be hoped that future generations of educators will be sufficiently aware of the historical problem of polarization to ensure that their debates are between defenders of education and those who would propose pursuits which are non-educative.

This thesis is not an argument for liberal education. Nor is it an argument for child-centred education. For neither approach can, in fact, fulfil the promise to educate our children independently of the other. *This thesis is an argument for education.* And education *can* be attained through the necessary

conjunction of both Liberal and Child-Centred approaches to education. Only when our schools provide teachers and a learning environment which are the means by which individuals can successfully pursue worthwhile knowledge and understanding, will they truly become 'Institutions of Education'.

Entwistle says:

> *There can be no gain, least of all for children, when educational theory is conceived as a perpetual conflict. For the middle ground is not a neutral territory where reasonable men come together to fashion a treaty of peace; it is a no-man's-land where virtually nothing of rational educational theory survives at all.* [28]

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CHAPTER 4 NOTES

1. James Noll, (1993), Taking Sides i, (Conn., Dushkin Publishing Group)

2. John Dewey, (1938), Education and Experience 89,

3. Harold Entwistle, (1970), Child-Centred Education 12, (London, Methuen & Co. Ltd.)

4. Robert Hutchins, (1993) "The Basis of Education" 14 in Taking Sides, J.W. Noll (ed)

5. Ibid., 13

6. Abraham Maslow, (1962) "Some Basic Propositions of a Growth and Self-actualization Psychology", 46, in Perceiving, Behaving and Becoming, A. Combs (ed) (italics added)

7. Thomas Leahay, (1987), A History of Psychology, 432, (N.J. Prentice-Hall)

8. Ibid., 433

9. Hutchins, Basis of Education 14

10. Jerome Bruner, (1973), Beyond the Information Given, 469, (N.Y. W.W. Norton & Co.)

11. Jean Piaget, (1969), Science of Education and the Psychology of the Child, 180, (Ontario, Penguin Books)

12. Bruner, Information 470

13. Ibid., 474

14. Ibid., 478

15. Jerome Bruner, (1962), "Introduction" vii in Vygotsky, L.,Language and Learning, (Mass. M.I.T.Press)

16. B.C.Ministry of Education, (1990), Language Arts English Primary - Graduation, 37

17. Ibid., 38

18. Ibid., 41

19. See, for example, de Bono, E., Lateral Thinking and de Bono, E. Practical Thinking. London: Penguin Books, 1976.

20. See, for example, Bailin, S. Achieving Extraordinary Ends. 1992. (In Press), White, J.P. "Creativity and Education: A Philosophical Analysis." British Journal of Educational Studies. 1968. pp. 123-137 and Perkins, D.N. The Mind's Best Work, (U.S.A.: Harvard University Press), 1981.

21. See the B.C.Ministry of Education, (1990) Intermediate Program: Learning In British Columbia

22. Ibid., 98

23. Ibid., 99

24. John Dewey, (1916), Democracy and Education, 170-173

25. Max Weber, 52 in Gerth, H.H. and C. Wright Mills, eds. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, NY: Oxford University Press Inc., 1946.

26. Dewey, Experience 20

27. Tasos Kazepides, (1991), "On The Prerequisites of Moral Education: A Wittgensteinean Perspective." 267 Journal of Philosophy of Education. Vol. No. 2. pp. 259-272.

28. Entwistle, Child-Centred 211

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