SPEAKING WITH DIANE BROWN: AN INVESTIGATION OF TESTIMONY PRESENTED BEFORE HIS HONOUR, MR. JUSTICE HARRY MCKAY IN THE SUPREME COURT OF B.C., NOVEMBER 6TH, 1985, IN THE MATTER OF WESTERN FOREST PRODUCTS LTD. AND DEMPSEY COLLINSON, CHIEF OF THE SKIDEGATE INDIAN BAND, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SKIDEGATE INDIAN BAND, MILES RICHARDSON, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE HAIDA TRIBAL COUNCIL, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL OTHER MEMBERS OF THE HAIDA TRIBAL COUNCIL, GARY RUSS, GARY EDENSHAW, JOHN DOE, JANE DOE AND PERSONS UNKNOWN.

by

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B.A., University of British Columbia, 1968.

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Speaking with Diane Brown: An Investigation of Testimony Given Before His Honour Mr. Justice Harry McKay in British Columbia Supreme Court in the Matter of Western Forest Products and Dempsey Collinson et al of the Haida Nation

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ABSTRACT

This thesis analyses discourse and transcultural communication in terms of the clash between Haida Indian and Eurocanadian modes of knowledge and speech. In particular, this work interprets testimony given by Diane Brown of Skidegate, Haada Gwaii, before His Honour, Mr. Justice Harry McKay in British Columbia Supreme Court in the matter of the application by Frank Beban Logging, Ltd. and Western Forest Products, Ltd. for an injunction to prohibit Haida picketing of logging roads in consideration of aboriginal claims.

The thesis proceeds from the premise that, like any major European literary/philosophical text, Diane Brown's testimony constructs local culture-specific meaning which it is necessary for "foreigners" to translate via some kind of code or communication bridge that would allow meaning to flow between the two cultures. The thesis argues that Diane Brown's testimony in fact constructs such a bridge (at the same time as it moves local meanings across it), and in this way reaches beyond the traditional boundaries of local discourse.

The analysis is informed by the interpretive methodology of Clifford Geertz, and draws extensively on the theoretical/ methodological approach to discourse proposed by William Leiss' work. My operative theory of culture/economy is adapted from Marshall Sahlins, and my understanding of what Diane Brown's words

"might" mean in Eurocanadian terms is informed by Neil Evernden. I draw on Lewis Hyde's key distinction between "gift cultures" and "commodity cultures" to construct my argument that the testimony considered here can flow as meaning if it is received as a gift, and becomes distorted when interpreted as commodity.

The thesis argues that Diane Brown's testimony offers a "way of speaking" based on equality between the two cultures, instead of the sovereignty of one over the other, and that it is thus able to communicate transcultural meanings more successfully than is the traditional Eurocanadian mode.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my friends Brian Shein and Janice Peck for invaluable discussions and criticisms at crucial stages in the development of this thesis. Without them it would not have been completed. I'd also like to thank Susan Benson, whose unwavering sense of and trust in the self has taught me more than I'm sometimes aware of. My other teachers--those at the University and those from Haada Gwaii--are named in my text; one who isn't is Martin Laba, and I'd like to thank him here for his help in initiating me into the modes and wiles of academic discourse.

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INTRODUCTION

What follows is a reading or interpretation of text material transcribed from oral court testimony given by Diane Brown of Skidegate B.C., Haada Gwaii, before the Honourable Mr. Justice Harry McKay (here called Kilsli) in B.C. Supreme Court, November 6, 1985, in the matter of the application by Frank Beban Logging and Western Forest Products Ltd. for an injunction to prohibit Haida picketing of logging roads on Lyell Island, South Moresby, in Haada Gwaii.(1) The injunction was granted two days later and 72 Haida, including Diane Brown, her 80-year old father Watson Price, and other Haida Elders were subsequently arrested, tried and convicted for ignoring it and continuing their blockade.

The Haida claim Lyell, South Moresby and the Queen Charlottes (here called Haada Gwaii) as their ancestoral homeland to which aboriginal title has not been extinguished. Their fight for jurisdictional recognition has been going on on a political and bureaucratic level since at least 1913, but has been largely ignored by the media and the public. It took the civil disobedience acts of Oct. and Nov. 1985 for the issue to receive attention. The B.C. Government refuses to recognize aboriginal title; Ottawa does (rhetorically, at least) and, in response to a massive public campaign established the southern part of Moresby Island, Haada Gwaii, as a "National Park Reserve" in July, 1987.

government $106 million in "compensation" for lost resource revenues in the area.

The issue of Haida aboriginal claims was not addressed in the protracted Federal-Provincial negotiations, and the confusion over what the designation "National Park Reserve" actually means on Haada Gwaii persists. The Haida and their supporters are calling South Moresby a "Tribal Park," to give emphasis to the aboriginal interest; the B.C. Government insists on calling it a National Park "like any other."(2)

Clearcut logging by Western Forest Products Ltd., via their contracted agent, Frank Beban Logging Ltd., continued on Lyell Island and on other parts of the archipelago throughout the Federal-Provincial negotiations--thus rendering the concepts "National Park" and "homeland" increasingly meaningless, even as negotiations attempted to give meaning to them. This dual process, negotiation on one front--defined as "political"--and inaction on another--defined as "economic"--is part of the historical strategy by which Federal administrations have blocked Haida impulses to self administration by addressing them on the rhetorical/bureaucratic level and thereby denying their physical, practical, daily reality.(3)

I chose Diane Brown's testimony for my analysis because it was the most eloquent I encountered while reading the Haida trial transcripts. It moved me very much. By eloquent I mean that it sustains a level of duality and apparent contradiction which

would explode unity in a lesser rhetoric. Her metaphorical reach goes beyond what I have encountered so far as "public speech" in this Province.

My opening question was simple: what does Diane Brown say in her testimony about place and about self? Another way of posing this question is to ask: what does she say about living here in B.C. today? If the construction of self is, as William Leiss says, the daily task of individuals living in market industrial culture,(4) what does the Haida invocation of homeland, Haada Gwaii, have to contribute to this task?

This is the question that connects Diane Brown and me, and that makes our project a common one. I'm proposing, as I think Diane Brown is proposing, that the solution to the problem of the self might be sought by posing the other problem: that of place. Where is "here"? Where is "B.C."? Where is Haada Gwaii? By this formulation, my inquiry departs from traditional European modes which seek to address the problem of self via the (school) disciplines of psychology or sociology, for example, and tries instead to participate in a Native North American mode which addresses the issue from the perspective of geography and/or location.

An important premise underlies this approach. I maintain that a text such as Diane Brown's must be listened to, studied, analysed, heard with the same degree of intensity, care and

attention to detail that one would bestow on a major European philosophical or literary text. It has the same, or at least an equivalent claim on "truth"--insofar as this value forms the currency of the transcultural communication project. This is often easy to forget in situations where the "oral" or (what's worse) "preliterate" is represented as a rudimentary or rump form of the more standard "literate" cultural order. Such a representation participates, often naively and blindly, in the strategy which renders native aboriginal cultures "of the past" and not contemporary. This, in turn, is of course merely another strategy whereby the destruction of these cultures is ideologically accounted for and managed.

It does not follow, though, from the above premise, that one apply the same methodological criteria to an aboriginal text as one would to a European one. I began my analysis armed with an arsenal of "categories," gleaned from discourse analysis literature, and a ship's hold full of precepts gleaned from cultural and social theory. I found these useful, insofar as they enabled me to realize in part who "I" was, approaching the text, but that "I" found itself discarding them like layers of clothing the deeper it got into Diane's speaking. Indeed, the idea of "naked" is the apt metaphor for the manner of approach I have chosen: I want to approach this speaking with the same degree of nakedness, of vulnerability and passion, of risk and danger, as Diane Brown does in her speaking in court. She is, there, <u>out of her element</u> (which is <u>Haada Gwaii</u>) in the same way that I wish to be <u>out of my element</u> (ie. rhetorically at sea) in my rendering,

my listening/speaking of her text.

This stance suggests a second premise: that this naked-and-shipwrecked approach to analysis involves a way of listening to texts (be they "Native" or "European") and speaking about them which implicates the researcher in new kinds of ways. I take my cue here from Clifford Geertz, who said that an "ethnography" (which is not what I'm doing here) is always also (at the same time that it "renders the said," "constructs a reading," "says something about something," etc.) a confrontation, a reassessment or coming to terms (literally) with the ethnographer's notion of self.(5) It is, in this sense, a disclosure of identity.

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These mythical beings--the "Judge" who listens, the "Norbert" that speaks--are the objects of my search in this analysis. If I can find them/him (it sounds ludicrous to say it this way, but it is the image) I'm halfway there, halfway to Haada Gwaii. I can be with Diane Brown, if I may put it that way, and thereby speak with, even as I "render the said" of her testimony.

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PART I

For the privilege of doing so, it paid the British Columbia government $106 million in "compensation" for lost resource revenues in the area.

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PART I

PART I

"Mrs. Brown, I understand you want to speak in the Haida way as well."

"Yes, I do. Kilsli, Kilsligana, Kiljadgana, Taaxwilaas. Your Honour, chiefs, ladies held in high esteem, friends. I thank you for this opportunity to speak today. I was aware that I could get a lawyer, but I feel you lose if you go through another person.

"My first language is Haida. My second language is English. Therefore I can express myself better in English. I feel through another person, a lawyer, they also speak another language, and I would have lost what I hope to help Kilsli understand and feel."

The Haida have asked His Honour, Mr. Justice Harry McKay, at the start of the Hearing whether they may call him "Kilsli," the Haida appellation for a respected, honoured, important person. The strategy here is quite simple: if the project is to transform "The Queen Charlotte Islands" (a place) into "Haada Gwaii" (another place) via the medium of a third place (the courtroom), then it is strategic to transform "His Honour," the "respected person" in the discourse of that third place, into a respected personage (title) of the place one is trying to achieve or construct. The "Courtroom" thus becomes not (or not only) a place

where Canadian law and justice (read: power; authority) are rendered and reinforced, but also a place where Haida transformation (of persons into their masks, their "naming") can occur. By "naming" Kilsli, Diane Brown makes room in something as alien as a Canadian courtroom for a Haida way of speaking.

The procedure can be schematized as follows:

Project: To construct "Haada Gwaii" out of "Queen Charlotte Islands, Canada" (one place out of another place).

Strategy: Construct "Kilsli" out of "His Honour, Mr. Justice Harry McKay" (an authority or respected person from place A out of one from place B).
(Concealed in this is an intermediate step--the construction of "Diane Brown" [English] out of the "Haida" person who is "actually" speaking here. I'll pursue this point later in my analysis.)

Proposed Consensus: Respected person <u>equals</u> respected place. Ie. this courtoom can be a common, respected "place of speaking/listening" (discourse) because a respected personage from both sides is present. Or: I will agree to speak and be spoken to in this third place of your choosing ("your place") if you agree to be (also) a person of our choosing.(1)

Thus a person-place relation is offered, proposed, in which person ("His Honour/Kilsli") is allowed to serve as a metaphor, or, more properly, act metonymically for place--ie. to be privileged in a way that (I suspect) is counter to conventional Haida discursive practice where place, Haada Gwai, would normally be the reigning metaphor and persons--"the people," Haada Laas--emanate from there.

So already here, in her first utterance, Diane is "caught" translating from one cultural/linguistic system to another--with all the danger to "truth" that this entails. I want to argue in this analysis that it is by the power of its translations that the Haada Gwaii project either succeeds or self-destructs. In the site chosen, a Canadian law court, Diane and the other Haida cannot do otherwise than operate at this level of risk and contradiction.

Note then how the other (Haida) respected persons present are brought into the discourse and aligned with Kilsli; made "like" him (and he like them) by contiguity. Kilsli is then, in a reverse or reciprocating gesture, reintroduced as "Your Honour"--to secure his own, independent agency in the discourse, I presume, and at the same time bound this agency within the now established convention of "Kilsli." "Chiefs" then comes in to buttress this: "Chiefs" is white man's language for respected Indians in the same way that "Your Honour" is white man's language for Kilslis. Thus, syntactically, Diane "respects" the classification "white

man's language" while at the same time requesting that it respect the classificatory convention established by her intitial salutory string of Haida namings.(2)

It is this back and forth naming, this reciprocal movement across what appears like a bridge--connecting persons and places on the one hand, languages and cultures on the other--that I want to observe closely in my analysis. I want to see if it is possible to chart when a speaker crosses it, and in which direction, etc.(3)

"Ladies held in high esteem" appears at first glance like an enigma. It breaks both court convention and, by its placement in the "English" part of the salutation, suggests it is not normal Haida usage either--at least not in this form/translation. On the other hand, Haida traditions are matrilinealy received, and I think it is the attempt to put this idea on the agenda--and specifically on the English agenda--that is behind this gesture. Ladies held in high esteem directly confronts the male hegemony associated with Canadian court procedure.

Diane then thanks the assembled persons named for the opportunity to speak. The point to note here is that, in opposition to court etiquette, where the judge alone confers the right to speak, it is here requested of and felt to be given by the entire assembled community (Haida named respected persons; Anglo generic categories of males; ladies held in high esteem; friends). A

listenership and a co-authorship is proposed, and a transcultural, transethnic/linguistic community is hypothesized in which Diane's discourse can "take place." In this placing we discover who Diane is talking to and about and for and with. We begin to discover what I described in the introduction as the "inscribed reader" of this text.

She knew she could get a lawyer, but feels "you lose if you go through another person." It's worth, in view of the metaphors Diane will employ later in her speaking, taking this construction quite literally. You--not "I," or "one," but the generic second person--lose by going through another person. The image given is a physical one of being born--the only time in life you literally "go through" another person--and Diane simply states here, I think, that she does not wish to be born through the words of a male. If the lawyer's words are the normal route (body; "code") by which one travels from one's place (Haada Gwaii) to this place of speaking (the court), and if speaking is a bit like being born, then "lawyer" (man) is the wrong vehicle. "You"--all the assembled--lose something, ie. your collective and personal body. It is impossible to be born (move from one plane of speaking/being to another) in this manner.

There's a risk, in conducting this type of "close" analysis of a text, of going too far into detail and exploding the meaning instead of rendering it. Diane Brown spoke to this point in the trial which followed the hearing from which the current text is

taken. She said how difficult it was to say her words, her most intimate words, in front of a man and a judge and a white man in a court of Canadian law.(4) These words, she says, are normally spoken only among women when they are working together; or by women to themselves. She speaks (spoke) them in public, and in the alien context of the courtroom only because she felt the extreme gravity of the Haida situation (the gutting of their homelands by multinational logging corporations) and the need to make this known. The courtroom is the only "place" where the authorities responsible for this violence might still listen.

I'm conscious that my analysis invades a privacy, a privacy made public only by dint of extreme and violent economic and political circumstances. It is entirely possible that these intimate words can only "mean" in situo, so to speak: only within "the woman talking to herself," or "among other women working," or "only in Haada Gwaii." It is entirely possible that the project of trying to make these words mean in the context of a Canadian courtroom is already doomed to failure--and that my attempt to analyze the resulting "testimony" only extends and exacerbates that failure.

"My first language is Haida. My second language is English."

This phrase addresses me as an immigrant Canadian. I too have a first language and a second that I learned here. Except I usually phrase it another way: "My first language was my European one, but now it's English because I can speak it better." Linguistically,

thus, I have arrived at a different "place" with my second language than has Diane. This is only to be expected, in view of the fact I am an immigrant and she is not. For me the "here" of language is "English" (better second), and I reveal myself therefore as a displaced European, rather than an indigenous person for whom the "here" is still Haida (first language).

"Therefore I can express myself better in English."

So a turnaround of my normal construction. What I hear in it is the gap, the silence that occurred in Haida culture when children were shipped (right up to the present generation) to residential schools and forbidden to speak their language. This strategy of the church and the Canadian state of annihilating the culture by cutting it off at its roots, at its vocal cords, so to speak, is a form of cultural genocide not often discussed or understood in the Canadian body politic.(5) Diane expresses its pain in the syntax of her sentences. I discover here why the category of syntax is a key tool by which one can, as a Eurocanadian, analyse aboriginal discourse. In the gap between "first" and the "better second" languages speaks the silence of someone whose language has been once removed from their body--and for whom memory thus becomes always partly an act of imagination, of reinventing.(6)

The idea of the second or "other" language is then curled around to include the other person, the lawyer, who is normally the keeper or speaker of second languages (and second guesses about

language) in this place. What's notable here is the movement of agency in the sentence--from "I" through "another person" to "a lawyer" to "they," and then back to "I" and "Kilsli" who are the true "dialogic" partners (to use Bakhtin's term). What I think the sentence means is that even though English is a second language for her, Diane, into which she must translate from Haida, this is okay because lawyers translate too, from the street to the courtroom. They translate from English to "legalese"; and if the lawyer were to make this kind of translation for her, Diane, it would be a false one because it comes from a different place. Diane and lawyer share the idea of "second languages," and the idea that second (ceremonial) languages have to be spoken here, in other words, but their second languages do not translate symmetrically into each other because they refer to different first languages. It would be wrong, morally and semantically and logically, to try and translate them into each other.

Thus the idea of regional/spacial separateness of languages, both "first" and "second," is maintained, while the paradigm of translation--between places and between languages--is acknowledged and upheld. In a sense, "lawyer" is constructed very much like "I," "Norbert," the "reader" of this text am here--as an immigrant. He is one who replaces first languages with second ones, rather than maintaining the traditional sequence. Diane Brown constructs a link between herself and "lawyer" by this method in order to gain the authority to speak for herself in the courtroom. This two languages theme becomes a key one in my

analysis.

Note then the important connection between understanding and feeling--which for Europeans, of course, are separate moments: one hypothesizes separate "selves" in order to appropriate them. For her project to succeed, Diane Brown must reconnect these in the construction of "Kilsli": in order to make him understand, she must also make him feel. It is in this sense that it is vital she not "lose" herself.

"Since the beginning of time--I have been told this through our oral stories--since the beginning of time the Haidas have been on the Queen Charlotte Islands."

The Charlottes were named thus in July, 1786, by Captain George Dixon, after his ship the Queen Charlotte, trading sea otter furs in the area for the King George's Sound Company.(7)

"That was our place, given to us."

It's unclear here by whom the "place" is given. Its placement directly after the English nominalization makes it ambiguous. The Haida creation story says that Haada Laas, the people, were born from a clam shell discovered by Raven on Sandspit Beach. Lavinia Lightbown tells it this way:

"Raven is the symbol of the creator in our tradition and our

culture. We have a legend that says when Raven finished creating the world he found he was lonely so he wandered out on Rose Spit. And while wandering out on Rose Spit he found a clamshell with people in it and enticed mankind out of there." (Nov. 7/85 transcript, p. 43.)

Lavinia Lightbown also confirms, as do Eurocanadian anthropologists, that the Haida notion of "God" or "The Creator" was, already at the point of first contact, so intertwined (as consequence of Indian preachers and prophets) with the European one that to try to divide the two would be a meaningless exercise.(8)

For a good discussion of the "time immemorial," "beginning of time" theme, see Hugh Brody's Maps and Dreams.(9) He discusses there the conflicting evidence, scientific vs. mnemonic, and the resulting stories, those told by scientists vs. those told by oral historians, and how objectionable White theorizing on this subject is to many coast Native People. He indicates clearly that the Bering Sea migration theory, proposed by white archeologists and prehistorians, is seen by many aboriginal Coast people as just another in a string of discursive efforts by which white Eurocanadians try to "assimilate" Indians into the former's immigrant culture and thereby deny them the very idea of aboriginal rights or title. More importantly and cruelly, it takes away the Native Peoples' right to speak about their own past--to tell their own creation story--and in this aspect

participates in the cutting of vocal chords mentioned earlier. Another way of putting this is to say that in denying the Haida a way of legitimating their past in their own culture and language, Canada compells them to imagine one.

"We were put on the islands as caretakers of this land."

Again, I think this construction demonstrates the almost seamless join (to use a Christian image here) the Haida have achieved between ancient local and imported Christian traditions. The idea of "caretakers" is a key value here. It offers a bridge by which to travel or translate between the two languages, cultures, localities under discussion. It welcomes the European reader/ listener. On the issue of caretaking, Guujaw/Gary Edenshaw had this to say to Justice McKay:

"I don't think our people ever tried to say that we thought that the land couldn't survive without us if it were just left alone. Like, say if we don't live on Lyell Island, it would survive, the salmon, eagles, everything would survive. But I believe that today it wouldn't survive without the Haida Nation because those people (logging companies) would just go down there and do whatever they wanted to, with all the blessings of the government of the day." (Nov. 7/87 transcript, p. 28)

So here is the first time in Diane's text that an action is proposed which directly connects self and place in time. Note then how "history," European time, enters in the immediate next

sentence:

"Approximately 200 years ago foreigners came to that land."

"This land" has changed to "that land" in one sentence, concommitant with the arrival of the "foreigners." A first meeting. A first transformation of time directly into speech, one might say:

"The Haida are very hospitable people. The people came."

Clock time begins to interact with narrative/myth time. Note the tense change: already we don't know who is coming and going here. The Haida "are" in the perpetual present, but "the people" came in historical time. A translation/transformation, occurs--not only between people and languages but between orders of time. The image is that of the Haida people coming to the beach, then as now, to greet the foreigners who are also coming (who came and are still coming); a joining-in-the-place-of-the-act-of-coming (almost impossible to say in English). This is a welcoming ceremony in which one people is transformed (syntactically here) into the body of another--in an attempt to join and become "the" people. "Hospitable" is the key value here.

"They were welcomed. We shared."

This close musical movement of pronouns bringing "we" and "they"

together in vocal alignment without forfeiting independent agency. The strategy is rhythmic (as opposed to syntactical). The balance of passive and active voice has the effect of moving the pronouns, the "selves," even closer together. "Welcoming" and "sharing" are the key joining ideas.

"They told us that perhaps there is a better way to live, a different religion, education in schools. The Haida tried this way. The potlatches were outlawed. In many schools my father attended in Kokalitza, the Haida language was not allowed to be spoken. He was punished if he used his language. To this day, Watson Price, my father, understands every word of the Haida language, but he doesn't speak it."

So the two-language-theme again. Haida and English. Watson Price, my father: note the naming sequence. One hears a silence where the other name should be, the Haida Watson Price. Note how closely the naming-language question is linked with the outlawing of the potlatch. Potlatches were the places where you received/were given names: with their outlawing, naming is silenced. Language is outlawed at its base. The vocal chords which connect self with place are torn.(10)

This silence is on the one hand that between a father and a daughter, a gap between bodies connected through kinship, and on the other, a silence within the man, Watson Price, himself. It is a silence or gap, one might say, between a man who listens and a man who speaks:

"..understands every word of the Haida language, but doesn't speak it."

I want to listen closely to this silence. When I do, it opens and I discover that it is in fact two men I am listening to. Or it is a body split in two.

Watson Price speaks only English (second language) but understands (hears) every word of Haida (first language). He says, and his daughter says, "Watson Price," but he hears, and I imagine she hears, his (unspoken) Haida name. (She does not mention it, speak it, out of respect for that silence, I think, substituting the generic "my father.") This rupture between speaking and listening self (between word and its absence; between a name and its unravelling) corresponds, on the level of physiology, I think, to the rupture on the geographical plane between "Queen Charlotte Islands, B.C., Canada," and Haada Gwaii. One hears one place and speaks another: one speaks one name and hears another--is another way of conceptualizing this in terms of the place/self dichotomy.

My thinking here is informed by Soundscape theory, which proposes that the listening (that is, aural) self orients itself in space or location partly by way of the "echo" which it receives from the environment in which it (ie. the self) speaks or makes sounds. The metaphor here is that of the bat or the blind person

tapping her cane (or using her voice) to achieve self-location.(11) It's useful, I think, to this investigation because the speaking/listening dyad offers itself as a medium or parallel opposition by which to understand the primary opposition being hypothesized between self and place. I will explore this line of argument further in Part II of this analysis.

"So the people came."

Ambiguity here about who "the people" are at this point. Or rather: we are transported back to the welcoming ceremony described earlier, by which the boundary between the two types of "people" was negotiated and made fluid. Bodies blending into each other in the place of meeting and coming, etc. It is interesting to note in this connection how the original Haida structuring of society into two "sides" or moieties which "meet" during the potlatch is echoed in Diane's rendering of this first contact story. Potlatch meetings were the locations/places where separate "kinds" of persons (one is almost tempted to think of them as species) met, talked, danced, gave gifts and therewith negotiated social, spiritual and economic boundaries and continuities.(12)

In reiterating this structure here, Diane Brown attempts to place the Contact Story into the larger aboriginal frame of "time immemorial," I think. She accommodates the "newcomers" within the tradition. She welcomes them, we might say, into her speaking.

"We tried their way. Their language. Their education. Their way of

worship."

Historical time is on the horizon now and the effort is to accommodate it (welcome it into) a native (ie. local) way of speaking. One could formulate it this way: with the arrival of the Europeans in her narrative, Diane Brown needs a way of structuring their narrative time--ie. "history"--into the aboriginal narrative time--ie. "myth." She doesn't want to continue telling a story about "time immemorial" unless she can incorporate clock time into it.

I recall the story of Watson Price. Watson Price, her father, accepted historical time, European time, but in so doing--ie., in "welcoming" the newcomers' account of how things are and were--he cut his vocal chords. Or rather, he forfeited the connection between what he heard--his first (ie. Haida) language--and what he could speak--his second (ie. English) language. A silence, as I have said, occurred in the centre of the man. It interposed itself between his mouth and his ears, we might say, on the one hand, and between his body and the land on the other. The theory of soundscapes, discussed earlier, helps us to understand this rupture between a speaking and a listening "self" as a relation to geographical locus.

Watson Price, because he accepted and welcomed the language of the foreigners into his world, his being (his ears and his voice), became unable to tell himself the story of how he came to live in

Haada Gwaii. Thus he is also unable to tell the story of how he still lives there/here. He is cut away from his place and his time, and functions, in the portrait Diane provides of him, as a kind of mute inhabiting an alien world. It is this mute "otherness" that Diane wishes to undo with her current speaking.(13)

We might state it this way: if Diane wishes to keep the "myth of origins" (how people and places were first connected) alive, and thereby keep alive the very concept of myth as a theory about time, she must discover or unearth (I'm tempted to say) a way to "speak" these ideas in English. She must find a way, in the "second" language, by which these "first" language concepts can come alive. If she adopts the strategy of her father and simply discards the first language, these ideas will die--and the person becomes severed from his or her place. If, conversely, she refuses to speak the "second language" on the grounds that it cannot or will not contain--or, worse yet, will destroy--these first language ideas, she will not be understood in this courtroom where she has chosen to speak. She will become a mute.

Her task, therefore, becomes the construction of a "place" in the second language where the first language ideas can occur and be "heard" (recalling the Soundscape distinction), and a "self" that can "speak" those ideas in that place. Since this self must speak in the "second language," it must constitute or "speak itself" in that language--even as it recognizes or "hears" the first place ideas in her speaking. She must bring Watson Price's two selves back together, is the metaphorical way of saying this.

What appeared at first glance, therefore, to be a problem of translation--language A into language B--reveals itself more and more to be a problem of transformation. What Diane Brown must "bring over" from one linguistic system to another is not words but ideas. She must carry meanings. In the case of Haada Gwaii, "history" (the story of Watson Price) has shown that these meanings cannot be severed from the persons and places in which they occur and that they represent without a rupture or loss (of self and place). They are inviolably connected in part of their being with the persons and landscapes they articulate. It is thus not a matter of translating "language" A into "language" B, but a matter of transforming persons and places whole, so to speak.

"It is clear to me that they are not managing our lands well. If this continues, there will be nothing left for my children and my grandchildren to come. I feel that the people governing us should give us a chance to manage the land the way we know how it should be."

This way of speaking is sometimes derisively called "personal history" in European parlance: time--past, present, future, from time immemorial to forever--conceived as a succession of kin, rather than, say, a succession of dates or wars. It is a kind of history often associated with "female" modes of speech and thought, rather than with high sounding male dramas.

"It seems other cultures don't see trees. They see money. That's not the way it is in my mind. It's take and take and take from the earth."

An earth-mind bridge being built here: the medium is trees or money--what you "see"; and then the very important rhythmic repetition of "take"--to emphasize the opposition between this and the welcoming/sharing value conceptualized earlier, and the resulting difference between how it is in Diane's mind and how it is in "other cultures." The rhythm underscores the increasing "orality" of the testimony: Diane's speaking body begins to become involved and involve itself in the pain of the taking, because it feels also its opposite: the joy of giving. She begins, as speaker, to resonate with the ideas she is speaking. The symbolic construction is clear: you take from the earth (trees) in the same way as you take from my mind (money). I'm reminded of Guujaw's earlier discussion of how, originally, Lyell Island did not need the Haida to survive, but how now it does.

"On Lyell Island--I want to address Lyell Island and South Moresby, the injunction being served on us."

Notice two things being addressed here: Lyell Island and the injunction--a place and a piece of paper. What's alluded to here, I think, is the history in Canada of pieces-of-paper-acting-as-places that take away Indian land: the treaty game, or the trail-

of-broken-treaties, as it's also known. It marks both the contact point and the points of disjunction between Natives and Europeans. Notice how the rupture in syntax signals this break/continuity: it is almost as if Diane's voice, in marking the point "Lyell Island," tries to leap over the barrier imposed by these opposed ways of speaking about it.

"I want to say why that concerns me. To me it is a home of our ancestors. As Lily stated, our ancestors are still there. It is my childhood. Every spring come March my father and mother would take me down to Burnaby Narrows. We stayed there till June. It's wonderful memories I had."

So mythic time again--from the beginning of time to forever--located now in historical geography while still receiving authority from the ancestors who live there--today, and always. A succession of bodies, kin, proposed as that which combines bodies and landscape even in clock time. Lyell Island <u>is</u>, exists: it is the place where the ancestors <u>are</u>. It is their home our home and "we" are still there, in the story and in the place. A reconsolidation, here, of the strategy which connects self and place via aboriginal narrative frame, but now occurring "within" history: "It <u>is</u> my childhood." The movement of tenses between past and present affects this consolidation of the two time frames.

"I am thankful to my parents for bringing me up the traditional

way. There was concern on the Indian agent's part that I missed too much school. But how can you tell them that I was at school?"

How indeed--can you translate "Burnaby Narrows, "wonderful memories" and a childhood that's still there into the concept "school"; the dismemberment of childhood implied in this term? The narrative frames collide again in the last sentence: even today it seems impossible to say "I was at school" and, "I am at Burnaby Narrows with my ancestors," and mean the same thing--be in the same breath/ person. We see how the translation problem becomes insurmountable.

The reference to "school" goes back, I think, to the Watson Price story and the removal of Haida children from their homeland, Haada Gwaii, to a "school" located somewhere else: the removal of children from a local to a "foreign" location to acquire culture.

Elder Lavinia Lightbown describes the problem this way in her testimony to the Hearing:

"In our culture things aren't separated and we find it difficult to deal within your area....Our education system has been one that has worked for us from the beginning of time, and the educational system that has been imposed on us has been a very difficult system for our people. I speak of this because Lyell Island is part of that. Our children are taught right from the

very beginning that they must harvest in order to survive. Lyell Island in your words, is a classroom. We are a culture that has lived with nature since the beginning of time." (Nov. 7/85 transcript, p. 43.)

Guujaaw is terser:

"From my sitting with the older people and learning the stories and stuff, it would give you a lot better understanding of where we are if you could know some of our deeper history and some of the stories that relate to us but it would be almost hard for you to understand it wherein these stories it's almost quite often you can't tell if they are talking about an animal or a human being and there is the ability of the human being to transform into animals and the animals to transform into human beings and that is because the people were so close to that land and still are." (transcript, November 7, pp. 27-28)

I suggest that it is not possible, yet, for a European-educated man to say this sentence in one breath, in one meaning, as Guujaw does here, without losing all sense of self and location.

I'll repeat the argument in my own terms: if education (school) takes place, is located, in a building, there will be a tendency on the part of the educated to see the world as a building; if education (school) takes place on Lyell Island, there will be a tendency on the part of the educated to see the world as Lyell

Island. The differences in world view, and communication distortions that result, would seem to evolve--if I dare say it this way--naturally from the above dichotomy.(14)

"Because of that upbringing, because I was brought down to Lyell Island area, Burnaby Narrows and living off the land, I feel--that's why I feel the way I do about my culture and the land."

Note again the rupture in syntax. It signals the inability of translation strategies to work as rhetorical tools. The "school of nature"/"school of Lyell Island" argument can only be made with a shift to a new rhetorical frame. Diane must take us there, we might say, with her voice. She must transport or transpose us bodily to "Lyell Island," the new "school," or transport it bodily "here" for us to understand her meaning. I recall my earlier discussion of some things being able to "mean" only <u>in situo</u>: we must "go there" to understand; as we do so, "it" comes here.

The next part of her testimony enacts, I think, this physical movement. It works by way of the transformation of a body into a place, and then the reciprocal transformation of a place into a body. The resulting "discursive location" becomes a site where <u>meaning</u> is said and heard, and <u>heard</u> to be said and heard. It's a place of witnessed speech, we might say. Again, it echoes the Potlatch as a place of witnessing.(15)

In giving this testimony, in turning a place into a body (and

also vice versa), Diane Brown pushes to the very edges of the discursive regimen she is here operating under. She transforms the "courtroom," as site of speaking, I will argue, into another kind of place.

By speaking thus at the boundaries of what, in Canadian law--and tradition--is "permissible" evidence or testimony, she bursts these and initiates a transformation that will see Justice Harry McKay and the courtroom audience transported to a place their imaginations haven't taken them before.

In order to hear how she makes this leap, I'm going to jump forward myself to the point in her testimony where I think she engages this new kind of speaking directly. The intervening section serves, I think, partly as a hiatus by which to prepare the ground.

I'll preface this with a short discussion of Marshall Sahlins' conception of the "site of symbolic production" because I think it offers a conceptual tool by which to retrace, from within a European tradition, the arc or bridge Diane Brown is trying to describe with this new way of telling. I will be using Sahlins' conceptual model from here on in my analysis, and so will introduce some of his key ideas now.

Sahlins begins his discussion, in Culture and Practical Reason, with a critique of Marxist theory that privileges the economic "realm" at the expense of the cultural as the site of inquiry.

His argument, restated simply, is that in focussing on production in his analysis of capitalism, Marx and subsequent marxists became insensitive to the theoretical assumptions which underly this separation of material production from culture. In a sense, he argues, they fall victim to the very ideology of scientific empiricism which they are trying to critique; they begin to share the assumptions which made it possible to separate out the economy in the first place and enable it to appear as metonym for the whole culture.

He insists that the realm of human "needing," which for Marx was "unproblematic," must be reconsidered as being in its own right (I'm tempted to say "rite") a site of production; albeit one of symbols rather than commodities (or of commodities as symbols). His discussion insists that we do not eat simply food, ie., material substances, but that we eat specific foods (salmon as opposed to wheat) in specific settings and that this eating is a form of symbolizing by which we designate and understand social groupings and ourselves in the world. The symbolic choices we make are arrived at via the medium of "culture" which acts, structurally, as a "code" for production and consumption--for the total process or project of turning the world into the self and vice versa.

The site of symbolic production is thus, as I understand it, the site where meaning in a culture is made; the institutional locus where "nature" is transformed and appropriated as "culture"--with

the understanding that both ends of this continuum are composed of a material and a symbolic equivalent.

> In other words, the cultural scheme is variously inflected by a dominant site of symbolic production which supplies the major idiom of other relations and activities.(16)

This site becomes privileged because it is given the authority to act as metonym for the entire process of cultural meaning production. From it emanates a "classificatory grid" which inflects and accents the entire culture.

Sahlins goes on to argue that capitalism, although it appears and wants to see itself as having become emancipated from this kind of symbolic totalizing activity, is also a cultural specification, and not "merely a natural-material activity."(17) It's symbolic character, however, "goes behind the backs," as he says, (and Marx said) of participants.

Capitalism presents itself as a universal (for our purposes we can read here: "mythical") system of meaning in the same way that quaint primitive or aboriginal cultures do, except that it does so under the cloak or mask of a simple material exchange, rather than a symbolic one. It exchanges "money," rather than "kinship," to use Sahlins' famous formulation,(18) and simply has amnesia about the fact that money is a symbol and not a thing.

Thus it is able to universalize (make mythical) the "realm" of

the economy and have it stand for the whole system, a privilege which in aboriginal culture, Sahlins says, is reserved for the institution of kinship.

As a result of this, he goes on, we capitalists are no longer able to make meaningful distinctions between culture and nature, between things and people, between natural and cultural "series." Because the meaning in the system flows from symbol to object, and because we mistake a symbol (money) for an object, we are not able to construct accurate meanings.

> For by the development of market industrial production, that is, the institutional dominance given to the economy, the traditional functional relation between the cultural series and the natural series is today reversed: rather than serving the differentiation of society by a differentiation of objects, every conceivable distinction of society is put to the service of another declension of objects. Fetishism and totemism: the most refined creations of the civilized mind.(19)

I'm reminded here of Diane Brown's depiction of money as the medium of "take, take, take"--from Haada Gwai, from her self--versus trees as the medium of giving. Sahlins goes on to make a compelling argument for the essential sameness of aboriginal and industrial market cultures--as "anthropological types"--and our--ie. Euroman's--need to recognize this...kinship: "We are just as logical, philosophical, meaningful as they are."(20) He suggests that we try to dominate aboriginal cultures because they have discovered "...ways of achieving an end that still eludes us: the mastery by society of society's mastery over nature."(21)

Having thus listened to Sahlins, we can now return to Diane's text. If it is true that in market industrial culture meaning flows from symbol to object while being said to flow from object to symbol, if it is true that the "discourse through and about objects," as William Leiss puts it, "speaks with a forked tongue" in this way,(22) how does Diane Brown respond?

"I want to touch on a very important area of my life as a food gatherer. It is my job, my purpose, to insure that I gather certain foods for my husband and my children, and I want to share one part."

She touches an area of her person (self) which is food gathering, and wants, like food, to share this.

"It's called gkow. That's herring roe on kelp."

Gkow does not mean herring roe on kelp: it is herring roe on kelp (and not somewhere else).

"In the spring, the herring come and they spawn on kelp. For many years now I have been harvesting that and putting it away for the winter."

Story begins like a fairy tale, in time immemorial--each spring, forever, the herring come, and I come...etc.

"But so far I haven't heard what--why is food-gathering spiritual?"

This is very important. The rupture (again) in syntax must be listened to with great care. Begin like a fairy tale: my life is a fairy tale, but so far I haven't heard...what?

She hasn't heard the fairy tale about her life, is I think what she's trying to tell here. Or, more profoundly: my life is <u>not</u> a fairy tale because it doesn't, or hasn't yet told itself--itself or the world--the story about what it means. The fairy tale idiom as a narrative mode stops short here. It can't work.

The meaning is not: life is like a fairy tale; the meaning is: my voice is taken away. In the rupture in syntax we hear again (as a kind of echo) the "story" of Watson Price; the physical discontinuity between a person and his/her life, experienced now as a speech hiatus or jump in the speech act of the story-teller, the hero's daughter. We hear the silence that has placed itself at the centre of their connection.

How is food gathering spiritual? What is the story of that? The profoundly simple point here is that "English," the second language which Watson Price and the other Haidas of his generation welcomed into themselves and tried to share, has not been able to tell that story. It has not found a meaningful way

(to use Shalins' terminology) to connect cultural and natural "series" in a way that would show "spirituality." Thus, in speaking it, the Haida have been cut off from themselves and from their land.

In the testimony that follows, Diane Brown will try to heal the rupture by retelling that story. She will use English, her (better) second language, to reconnect the cultural and natural first language series in a way that re-establishes contact between people and places, humans and their things.

"It's a spiritual thing that happens. It doesn't just happen every year. You can't take that for granted. We can't take that for granted because everything in the environment has to be perfect."

I recall Sahlins' point that meaning in the system cannot be made because meaning flows from symbol to object while being said to flow from object to symbol. The reason market industrial culture engages in this distorted communication (to use Leiss' term) is that it does not recognize itself as a culture, but merely as an economy. The culture "masquerades" as an economy, as Leiss, Kline, Jhally argue, and social reality becomes a "masked ball."(23)

In this masked ball, meaning constantly flows, as Sahlins and Leiss, et al argue, from objects to people, rather than the other way around. Hence the "culture" can only create distortions--

commodities and their masks.

Another way of conceiving this is to say that market industrial culture cannot control the flow--because it does not have a language for the flow--of the meaning energy in the system. It has no way of becoming "conscious" of (structuring consciousness about) how meaning moves as social energy.

If I substitute the word "spiritual" for the word "energy" in this context, I begin to understand how Diane Brown's text connects with the Leiss et al/Sahlins discussion. More precisely, if I substitute the words "food-gathering is spiritual" for this concept "energy," (which, as I have said, is simply another way of saying "meaning"), then I can begin to appreciate the elegance and strength of the meaning bridge Diane Brown is here constructing for me:

"It's a spiritual thing that happens. It doesn't just happen every year. You can't take that for granted. We can't take that for granted because everything in the environment has to be perfect."

Note how this language accosts the boundaries of what we normally think of as testimony or legal evidence. To bring up something as lofty as the word "spiritual" in a Canadian courtroom questions the bounds of its discourse; to connect this concept with the notion of a "perfect environment" leaps over them.

"The climate has to be perfect. The water temperature. The kelp have to be ready, and the herring have to want to spawn."

We are asked to believe, in this story, that there is a perfect place in the world where herring have desires--ie., they are willful creatures, a bit like humans are--and where kelp can exist in alternative states--one of readiness and one of unreadiness.

"But I want to share what goes on in my spiritual self in my body come February."

Earlier we heard a break, a silence before the idea of food-gathering-as-spiritual could be spoken:

"But so far I haven't heard what--why is food gathering spiritual?"

In the new formulation, the voice moves over the rupture easily, smoothly, joining the ideas in one breath or motion.

"But I want to share what goes on in my spiritual self in my body..."

"In-my-spiritual-self-in-my-body" is one place, one time, one-body-and-voice come February. I'm reminded of the earlier place

of meeting and coming, the welcoming and sharing ceremony constructed when Diane retold the First Contact Story. Here, I discover, I am also hearing a Contact Story, albeit one that tells of a person meeting her place, a land sharing its body. Note how the ideas (persons/places) are separated rhythmically, vocally, while being in every other way--syntactically, semantically, logically--joined.

"And I feel it is an important point. That's what makes me as a Haida different from you, Kilsli. My body feels that it's time to spawn."

What makes her different as a Haida is that her body spawns--"feels" the place and the story and the time of spawning. This piece of testimony is the transformation I spoke about earlier. It is the discursive moment where Diane Brown transforms herself--and thereby the courtroom--into a Haida place or way of speaking.

Let's recall briefly how she moved to this point.

--she touched an area of herself which is food gathering. ie., which <u>equals</u> food gathering;
--she shared this part (her <u>self</u> as <u>food gathering</u>);
--she called it, named it something--<u>Gkow</u>;
--first in Haida (first language),
--then in English (second language);
--transformed it thereby into "Herring-Roe-on-Kelp."

In this naming, this "placing," the location, "Canadian Courtroom," is transformed, (rhetorically) into part of Haada Gwaii--which is also, as I have said, a part of Diane Brown's person (body). The "courtoom" becomes, at least in part of its being, "Herring-Roe-On-Kelp-Place"--at the same moment, in the same gesture, as it is a Haida woman speaking. There is no separation, in other words, between body and place in language.

Note how she observes the "correct" sequencing of first and second languages I described earlier--first language becoming better second one, rather than the immigrant sequencing where second languages replace (and thereby partly dislocate) original ones. In the new sequencing, we "hear" both languages, (first-in-second) as we speak, and we "speak" both languages (second-in-first) as we hear. In this way the rupture of sense and self experienced by Watson Price and his generation is assuaged.

For, in the immigrant sequencing we can already hear the silence, the rupture that disconnects words from their places, people from their meanings when original first languages are lost or pushed aside. This "rupture" corresponds, incidentally, to the period in Haida/Canadian history during which the Federal government pursued a dual policy of segregating Native cultures from the mainstream by locating them on reserves on the one hand, and trying to assimilate them into the mainstream via European

("school") education on the other.(24)

When first languages are abandoned or confused in this way, original meanings (spirits) begin to wander and lose their hold on real places. The language "forks," we might say, away from its landscape, and we are unable to perceive local meaning. I touched on this problem earlier when I outlined how certain words might be able to "mean" only in situo, only in the landscape which first produced their meaning.

The point is that Gkow, which is one thing, one place, one activity-and-time in Haida (in Haada Gwaii), can only be spoken in English (in this courtroom) as a sentence. It can only "be" a relation between a subject and a predicate, in other words. Gkow becomes not a place or a name at all, but simply a semantic relation, a verbal construct.

To get around this problem and "translate" the subject back into the object (and vice-versa) in correct order, Diane takes the bull by the horns (or the gkow by the seaweed, so to speak) and makes this semantic relation a place. Gkow is, becomes, "Herring-Roe-On-Kelp"--a named place. Haida and English. This is the new verbal ground Diane offers as a basis of speech in this courtroom. Naming-as-transformation, rather than semantic translation, becomes the rhetorical practice.

In giving this new name, this "English" place, Diane heals a rupture between things and their names, people and their culture,

time frames and their "stories," etc., that opened during the original Haida-European encounter, and has been structurally replicated in subsequent Haida-European(Canadian) relations.

"It gets ready in February. I get a longing to be in the sea. I constantly watch the ocean surrounding the islands where the herring spawn. My body is kind of an edge of anticipation. Finally the day comes when it spawns the water gets all milky around it."

Note the flow of meaning or "spirit":

--"it" gets ready
--"I" get a longing
--"sea"
--"I" constantly watch
--"ocean," "islands"
--"My body," "an edge"
--"finally the day comes"
--"it spawns the water gets all milky around it"

Here the transformation is consolidated. The day spawns, the place spawns, the body spawns, the water spawns grammatically and logically in this sentence--all in one continuous movement and transformation of semantic energy. The rules of English grammar and sentence structure (so dear to courtroom etiquette) are suspended, and a way of speaking emerges that is "pure Haida."

The speaking of "Finally the day comes when it spawns the water gets all milky around it" leaves us as European "native" speakers of English breathless and concerned about sense of place. It is as if an earthquake had suddenly come and transported us, by the sheer force of Diane's language, to a different location, a different "hearing" or perception--of our own language. I recall here Guujaw's earlier "performance" of the school-of-nature argument.

In this new hearing, people and places, subjects and objects, names and their places, are connected by a different logic than the one I have been taught to become used to. Instead of subject-verb-object, I witness a pure display of transformative verbal energy that has no apparent need of or regard for proprietary rules of English grammar. It is as if, indeed, I had been transported in my "hearing" to another location, where everything participates in this act, this place or event of spawning--"Herring-Roe-On-Kelp-Place":

"Finally the day comes when it spawns the water gets all milky around it."

In this "place" I experience a pure tension, a pure force of oscillation between apparent contradictions. The energy released by this oscillation of meanings excites me. Its release, in the centre of Justice Harry McKay's courtroom, gives room to breathe and imagine a way of speaking--about land and people, about Haidas and Europeans--that has not been spoken or heard there

before.

It is this excitement--it is located right inside the oscillating energy of the "it" which spawns--that I would like to follow up in the second section of my analysis. What I hope to find there is a way of speaking with her text that would connect me even more intitmately--even as she has connected herself--to the place in which she and I speak.

PART II

PART II

Diane Brown's argument so far has proceeded by positing and then resolving a series of oppositions. The process can be charted as follows:

> --language 1 becomes language 2 (and vice versa)--"in my spiritual self in my body" spoken without breath or syntax break;
> --spiritual becomes physical (and vice versa)--"my body feels its time to spawn";
> --skin of person becomes skin of place and vice versa--"get a longing to be in the sea," "constantly watch," "edge of anticipation";
> --skins of persons blend or "go over" into each other--mediated by the oppositions water/kelp on the one side, and roe/milt on the other;
> --"finally the day comes when it spawns the water gets all milky around it"--ie., the "water" gets all milky around the "day," and this metaphorical construction consolidates the transformation of the material world (things/places) into the spiritual world of time and language.

The ambiguous "it" oscillates at the centre of this speaking and releases an energy--a "space," as it were--in which Haida meaning

can occur. The initial question, how is food gathering spiritual, is narratively accounted for. In the final step of her transformation the opposition between languages--first language/better second--is resolved by being addressed at the level of geography: gkow becomes, is transformed into, Herring-Roe-On-Kelp (-Place).

Diane retells the Contact Story (people and places coming and meeting and sharing) in the form or the discourse of a contemporary narrative, might be a way of understanding (and feeling) this. It is a second Contact Story happening right here and now, in British Columbia, in the court and in Haada Gwaii, and spoken in English. In this retelling or relocation of the story the opposition food-gathering/spiritual (which echoes for us Sahlins' material/symbolic opposition) begins to resolve, and the rift or wound that opened during First Contact (and in subsequent stories about First Contact) finds a point of healing.(1)

This healing between first and second cultures, first and second language places, etc., also heals the personal or generational rift that opened between Diane Brown and her father, Watson Price, as a result of his unwillingness to speak (but insistance on hearing) Haida.(2) On this level, therefore, "personal" or "family" history is joined up again with the history of Princes and Kings I mentioned earlier, and another rift between lands and cultures is healed.

I have called this way of speaking "testimony." I don't mean this in the narrow legalistic or courtroom sense--where language and speaking tend to be mined or listened to with an ear cocked only for "evidence" or factual data. I mean it in the much broader sense of testimonial or a "bearing of witness." Testimony in this sense involves a kind of speaking that listens, even as it speaks.

I have tried to describe this duality in terms of a metaphor taken from Soundscape Theory, where the listener/sound-maker is depicted as being like a blind person who locates herself in geography (in the soundscape) by "listening back," even as she soundmakes. Another description is given by Neil Evernden, when he invokes the term "testimonial" to indicate the moment when a person concerned (and pained) about environmental destruction stands up to speak:

> When a gap appears between what one experiences as real and what is officially recognized as real...it requires the individual to bear witness to his own personal experience of the world.(3)

Evernden calls this method of testimony a "protest on behalf of meaning," which corresponds, on the level of person, to an environment perceived as a "set of meaningful distinctions."(4) It is in this way, or with such an ear, that I have tried to hear and feel (and in my own way bear witness to) Diane's speaking.

One way to describe the kind of meaning that flows from this way

of speaking is to hear it as myth.(5) I have argued that Diane's project is, in part, to join Haida myth time (time immemorial) with European clock time (history): she must find a way to speak Haida myth time while hearing European clock time, and at the same time (keeping our Soundscape metaphor in mind) speak European clock time while hearing Haida myth time.

On reviewing this formulation, I discover a flaw in logic, however. In order to hear European clock time while speaking Haida myth time, her strategy cannot be to speak the former. This would lead her into the same logic trap that Watson Price fell victim to: the loss of her vocal chords, as a result of a split between a listening and a speaking self--and a corresponding split in the environment between a body and a place.

For the speaking/listening dyad to work as a theoretical tool by which to approach the Haida myth-time/European clock-time opposition, one should rather formulate it this way:

Speak Haida myth time -- hear European clock time;

Speak Haida clock time -- hear European myth time.

By this formulation, a balance is achieved between the two ways of speaking/listening, and a way is opened to join the two theories about time, rather than have one destroy (by trying to

replace) the other.(6)

This is the strategy Diane Brown in fact uses. I'll repeat my formulation of her project:

Project: Transform one place into another place via the medium of a third place (Queen Charlotte Islands into Haada Gwaii via discourse of the "Courtroom");

Strategy: Transform respected person from place A into respected person from place B via medium--and we see now how the previously concealed step, the construction of "Diane Brown," moves into the foreground--of a third person.

I have said that Diane's "naming" of Kilsli is a resiting: to "place" him into language, she had to physically transport him to Haada Gwaii--or, more specifically, to Gkow/Herring-Roe-On-Kelp--otherwise meaning, or the spirit of place would be lost, and Kilsli would not understand and feel her words.

Diane Brown did this by transforming her body into that place. She brought Haada Gwaii (as gkow) to the courtroom in the sounds and resonances of her speaking voice. By telling the story of the transformation of gkow into Herring-Roe-On-Kelp, she simultaneously told a story about the transformation of Diane Brown into Haada Gwaii. She demonstrated how food gathering is spiritual by constructing a narrative "place" on her body ("touch an area of my life"), constructing a "Diane Brown" there ("what

goes on in my spiritual self in my body") and in so doing she produced a metaphor of Haada Gwaii.

In this metaphor a narrator/heroine emerges whose speaking and way of meaning flows directly from Haada Gwaii. The meaning flow can be charted as follows:

Haada Gwaii Gkow/Herring-Roe-On-Kelp Courtroom

And I note here that the movement or "way" of the self takes the form of a discourse about place: the "self" that speaks and is spoken about emerges (is "born") in the exact moment/location where gkow is transformed into Herring-Roe-On-Kelp. It draws its being and its sustenance from that named/translated place.

*

"Finally the day comes when it spawns the water gets all milky around it."

It is time now to explore this remarkable sentence in more depth. I have said that Diane's argument proceeds by way of an ascending series of oppositions, culminating in the ambiguous oscillation of meaning or spirit released by the "it" which spawns. This "it" carries the transformative energy of the spawn (it becomes quite

easy here to imagine it as a spirit) and completes, almost by magic, the renaming of gkow as Herring-Roe-On-Kelp. In this renaming the transformation of Diane Brown--into a speaking self--truly completes itself in that "she" is able to appear as a discourse about place.

But who or what is spawning? Since I can't trace the meaning in the logic of English grammatical syntax--the day and the body and the water and the place all spawn--I try another kind of logic. What does the word "spawn" suggest to me here? What do I intuit upon hearing it in this context?

It suggests two things. One is birth--this spawning is a form of or metaphor about birth. I'm reminded of Diane's earlier discussion of how you can't "go through" a lawyer because this would be a false form of birth, and the person would "lose" herself. Here, too, we are "going through" a person, but this time it's through a self. By participating in her discourse about gkow, we, the listeners, are born through Diane Brown into the world of her speaking. We "go through" her words as if into another realm.

This type of ceremonial birth into language is familiar to me from Christian mythology, for example, and I use that background to construct my "reading": in this sentence Diane is telling how one is "borne" (to bring in the pun) from one place to another by the power of the word. This is how food gathering--gkow--becomes

spiritual: it releases a power, or spirit into speech by which one can move from one place to another. It is like eating and being (re)born at the same time--to complete the Christian reading.

But this does not exhaust the discussion. We are not only being born here. We are also copulating. The sexual imagery is unequivocal and transparent--"my body feels"; "edge of anticipation"; "longing"; "milky around it"; etc.

Thus what (for most European males, at least) are separate erotic moments, invoking different selves in order to appropriate them, are here presented as a single event, an unbroken movement of sexual transformative meaning.

This has an initial unsettling effect--at least on this European male reader. It is as if two worlds and ways of being, up to now meticulously kept apart, had suddenly collided--without, however, releasing the conflagration or meaning implosion that, by one's education, one has been taught to fear from such collisions. The two worlds are simply and magically joined by the eloquence of the meaning bridge "finally the day comes when it spawns the water gets all milky around it."

This bridge, I discover, is what makes Diane Brown, as a Haida, "different" from Kilsli. She can experience and speak these two moments and selves and places in the same moment and place and self. Her speaking of the key phrase without breath or syntax

break leaves the European (male) listener breathless. He is removed from his self and his place. There is a transformative logic at work here that I would like to know more about.

*

What does Diane do with this "difference," this ability to bridge two worlds in a way that European males cannot? She shares it ("share what goes on"). She gives it to Kilsli. By taking him to gkow/Herring-Roe-On-Kelp and showing him the way of the spawn, she proffers the possibility of a transformation he has not experienced before. She offers a bridge--made in English, in his language--by which he can travel to a kind of self and a kind of place that so far has been available only to Haidas.

It is important for us to understand the dramatics of this. What Diane offers or gives is a way of meaning, a meaning bridge, I have called it. By joining the ideas of copulation and birth, she opens a way of being/thinking by which His Honour, Justice McKay, might become (travel to) a different person. She does not force this new self on him, however. He cannot become that person until he crosses the bridge. He cannot participate in the Haida "difference" unless he accepts the image/metaphor of the bridge and the discourse that it suggests.

Diane's testimony can be understood from a European perspective, therefore, as a kind of gift offering. It is something given

without immediate expectation of return. We could visualize it this way: her testimony as a whole is the package, the box and wrapping, and inside, when we open it, is the gift, the metaphor of the "it" that spawns.

Having seen it from this perspective, it also suddenly becomes possible for me to interpret this testimony-as-gift in the narrower legalistic sense of giving evidence. If Diane's speech, her testifying, constitutes the "giving," the ceremonial offering of the package, then the metaphor of the bridge becomes the "thing" located inside. "It" is the factual evidence, the exhibit offered.

I suggested that Diane's reconstruction of the courtroom as a Haida place of speaking is reminiscent of the place of meeting and sharing constructed in her earlier retelling of the Contact Story:

"The people came. They were welcomed. We shared."

We can see how in her current retelling, the ideas of welcoming and sharing are offered again as possible values by which to move meaning across cultural boundaries. The proposition is simple: if we, the Europeans (here respresented by Kilsli), accept the metaphor, the discourse of the gkow, we might learn to share in the Haida way--which is coming and welcoming and sharing.

The value "sharing" repeats, on the social, that which on the physical plane is expressed by the gkow, is a way for us to "receive" (understand) this--and it is not difficult here to imagine how Captain George Dixon and his sailors would, upon sharing the gkow during First Contact, have missed this crucial symbolic ingredient.

I suggested also that Diane's discursive strategy in retelling the Contact story here/now contains structural elements from traditional Haida potlatching. In the Potlatch, the giving of gifts, I recall, is the fundamental "way" or bridge by which meanings are transferred between opposing types or kinds of people, and continuities and differences negotiated between them.(7)

Marjorie Halpin has said that potlatching is practiced by Haida people today with the same end in mind that it always had: the manufacture of prestige. The difference today, she says, is that the witnesses have changed. Rather than potlatching to opposing moieties, the Haida are now "potlatching as a people to the world."(8)

Mary Lee Stearns makes a similar point in her discussion of the 1969 Robert Davidson Pole Raising Potlatch held in Masset/Haada Gwaii. She calls this type of contemporary potlatch a "media event" in which the Haida, as always, play host, and "bear witness to the world" of the existence of their living culture.(9)

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I am extremely tempted to try to develop this important and probably key line of argument, but unfortunately I do not have space here to do this adequately. I have tried to suggest or invoke it by making my earlier connection between the idea of bearing witness and the idea of testimony. My key point of argument is this: if Diane Brown's testimony is offered as a gift--and I am arguing that it is--then its meaning can become apparent if we examine its effect on the intended receiver. How, we might ask, does her offering of the bridge as a transcultural metaphor "move" Kilsli? Or rather, how, in being offered this gift, does His Honour Justice Harry McKay begin to move in his own right (with part of his being) to the new cultural self/location designated by the name "Kilsli"?

I'd like to begin answering these questions by recounting a few key ideas from Lewis Hyde's remarkable book, The Gift, because many of my own ideas from here on in the analysis are inspired by it.

Hyde distinguishes, first of all, between two kinds of human economies: those based on gifts and those based on commodities. He says that gifts, because they "move in a circle," create a circle of human relations and obligations that define a "gift community." The moving gift generates a spirit or hau (he uses

the Maori term) which identifies the group as a whole, and the gift thereby becomes a physical mark or emblem of the group's unbroken existence through time and in geography.(10)

A commodity, by contrast, moves in a line between individuals (or between corporate bodies conceived of as individuals) and its time/space dynamic is managed by way of contracts and written emblems/documents. These emblem/documents come, over time (recalling the school of nature vs. school as building argument) to "replace" geography as the source of symbols and as the "code" by the which meaning is judged.

Hyde argues that gifts function as "total social phenomena" because they bring together "economic, judicial, moral, aesthetic, religious, and mythological forces" that in commodity-based cultures are divided.(11)

The gift, he says, creates a personal or "erotic" bond between people, rather than a rational or legal one. It "moves toward the empty place," the place of lack in a society, and fills it and brings that "place" (which threatened to become an absence) back into the circle of the group.(12) He likens this empty place or vessel, in a beautiful metaphor, to the open, receptive shape of the mendicant friar's begging bowl located at the centre of Christian society--and thereby carries the gift idea over into the commodity culture realm.(13)

Gift cultures and commodity cultures, says Hyde, can be conceived

of as two regions separated by a boundary. A gift, when it moves across this boundary "either stops being a gift, or abolishes the boundary."(14) A commodity, on the other hand, "can cross the line without any change in its nature; moreover, its exchange will often establish a boundary where none previously existed."(15)

Hyde makes a key distinction between "logos trade," which "draws the boundary" between the two regions, and "eros trade" which "erases it."(16) He says the gift community is based on the notion that "truth" moves by way of "contracts of the heart," and that to replace these with codified contracts (of the head or of paper) might diminish life. Societies based in and organized around such contracts of the heart will tend to "oppose any codification that encourages separation of thing and spirit by abandoning total social phenomena to a supposed primitive past and thereby enervating felt contract."(17)

The "separation of thing and spirit" is a key idea here. Commodity cultures make it, gift cultures don't. The two regions argument means there are fundamentally different notions about what "things" are in each, and that they work to create bonds between people and to landscapes in different ways. In commodity regions, the spirit is removed from physical circulation (it takes the form, says Hyde, of profit or surplus value); in gift regions it moves with the gift as its "gain" or "increase." Meaning thereby remains bound up in the material form of the

object, and by the force of this duality (thing and spirit) "total social phenomena" are maintained and held in balance.

We can hear the ghost of Sahlins walking in these words, and Hyde indeed roots his argument in Sahlins' book, Stone Age Economics. So we hear again the echo of how in commodity cultures meaning flows from symbol to object while being said to flow from object to symbol--with the key problem area being that tricky thing/symbol, money. Money, in the commodity region, inserts itself at the "heart" (to carry Hyde's metaphor forward) of meaning; the "economy" becomes linked, by this metaphor, to the flow of human blood, and that monumental confusion between people and objects which Karl Marx already diagnosed steps into the forground of the truth construction process, creating a crisis of meaning that can only be met by increasingly frenzied production of commodities.(18)

Towards the latter part of his discussion Hyde makes the observation that gift cultures work on "the assumption that it is not when a part of the self is inhibited...but when a part of the self is given away that community appears."(19)

This is of great importance to my discussion. I have argued that Diane Brown's testimony is in fact a strategic gift of self--she offers or gives that part of her that was transformed by the gkow/Herring-Roe-On-Kelp translation into place, into Haada Gwaii--and it's important to understand, I think, how this action proposes a community.

I have suggested that in her renaming/resetting of His Honour/Kilsli (which takes the form of a transformation of her self) she brings into being a "new" Haida place or way of speaking which becomes a transcultural site of meaning. I've also suggested that in her use of traditional potlatch idioms (creation of witnesses, bestowing of respect, prestige, etc.) she implies a social grouping that is not the one which normally negotiates continuities and differences between persons in Canadian courtrooms. I've indicated that already in her salutation she proposes a community or co-authorship/listenership for her text which challenges the way consensus is normally constructed in such locales. This "inscribed readership" is the transcultural community--with a "Kilsli" at its centre--that Diane's text addresses.

If Diane's gift is accepted, her testimony will succeed in "abolishing the boundary" between the two regions or cultures present in the courtroom. If it does not, it will suffer a transformation into commodity, and thereby reaffirm those boundaries--is a simple way of conceiving this using Hyde's terms.

If the "erotic bond" of testimony proposed by Diane's gkow/Herring-Roe-On-Kelp ceremony prevails, His Honour Justice McKay will "agree" to become (accept the name) "Kilsli" and take up his position at the centre of the proposed community. If he

does not, the "empty place" now designated by that name will remain empty and contract will not be "felt." The community or circle proposed by the gift will not come into being because total social phenomena is denied.(20)

Diane's discursive task, therefore, can be seen as the creation of a transcultural "respected person/Kilsli" who can stand at the centre of this new community and receive the gift of her testimony. If she can "fill" that empty place, her project succeeds and the gift arrives. If she can't, the gift fails and the "spirit" of community is transformed into commodity.

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To find out how His Honour accepts the gift I have to make an imaginative leap. I must, in a sense, become he. I have to go down into the water, the gkow/Herring-Roe-On-Kelp Place of Diane's speaking and discover how that transformation "feels."

I made a connection between Harry and myself earlier when I suggested we were both the "inscribed readers" of Diane's text. He is the listener and I am the reader. This connection becomes more poignant now. I begin to "read" as if I were Harry listening. I want to "hear" Diane's written text as if I were His Honour, there in the courtroom, being orally transported/transformed to gkow/Herring-Roe-On-Kelp. If I am to be a witness also to this "potlatch," I must appear as His Honour, Harry, in order to feel the deconstruction and reconstruction of self that I feel Diane's

speaking of the gkow text makes him (me) undergo.

I'll review the formulation:

"Finally the day comes when it spawns the water gets all milky around it."

I again experience the unnerving conflation of syntax and meaning, sense and sound, which brings together the ideas of birth and copulation in the oscillating moment of the "it." I realize the "it" is what carries the hau, the spirit of "total social phenomenon" described. "It" is erotic and moves toward me now--I become the "empty place"--with a force that seems almost overwhelming. The "body" of gkow = Herring-Roe-On-Kelp, this transformative equation, carries an oscillation of spiritual and physical energies which challenges my sense of physical location.

I try to listen more closely. Diane's formulation confronts me now, the European male, as a conundrum, an enigma. I hear it suddenly as a kind of riddle:

"What comes and spawns and gets all milky around it when the day comes?"

Hearing it this way, I begin to experience the transformation that European males undergo when they meet riddles. Riddles, as we know from our folklore, confront heroes at key junction points in

their journey (meaning) quests. They mark those points or boundaries where the body, to proceed, needs to be transformed (via an animal or a Sphinx or a geographic oracle) into another place or plane of being. I recall Bruno Bettelheim's note on riddles in The Uses of Enchantment to help me along here.(21) I recall also Guujaw's admonishment that it will be "almost hard" for me to understand because

"...it's almost quite often you can't tell if they're talking about an animal or a human being and there is this ability of the human being to transform into animals and the animals to transform into human beings..." (transcript, Nov. 7, p. 27-28).

"Finally the day comes when it spawns the water gets all milky around it."

As I move down into the water with Diane to experience this spawn, I "become" His Honour. "Norbert/Kilsli"--the "Norbert" that is being transformed into "Kilsli"--begins the deconstruction process.

It proceeds in stages. "His Honour," in this deconstruction narrative, becomes "Mr. Justice"; "Mr. Justice" becomes "Harry McKay"; "Harry McKay" becomes simply "Harry," as in "Tom" and "Dick"--and suddenly there I am, a man, naked in the water.

It's useful to recall here the transformative oppositions by

which Diane Brown made her own deconstruction/recomposition, the dualities by which she "moved" from Haada Gwai to here (by bringing "it" here as her person):

--language 1 becomes language 2 and vice versa--"in my spiritual self in my body";
--spiritual becomes physical and vice versa--"my body feels its time to spawn";
--skin of person becomes skin of place and vice versa--"longing to be in the sea," "constantly watch," "edge of anticipation";
--skins of persons blend or "go over" into each other--mediated by the oppositions water/kelp on the one side, and roe/milt on the other;
--"finally the day comes..."

In reviewing these, I share them. I become "Kilsli" in the sense that I become that part of Haada Gwaii which Diane Brown "touched" and wanted to "share" when she touched a part of her person. I am touched by the gkow and the spirit of the gkow which flows out from her to me now in my own language and asks me to participate in the transformation of body/place. I "cross" the metaphor of the bridge.

"Finally the day comes...the water gets all milky around it."

I'm recomposed, so to speak, in Haada Gwaii--down in the water, down there among those oppositions of roe and kelp, of water and

milt, as a kind of raw sexual energy. An energy that is "born" at the same moment that it "spawns."(22)

Hence the answer to the riddle--what comes when the day comes and spawns, etc.--is found, as are the answers to all riddles, in the reconstructed self. I spawn. The self that has become the new place spawns. It has "gone over" the bridge. It is into this new body that the meaning or spirit or hau of gkow = Herring-Roe-On-Kelp flows and shares itself.

In this sharing, a new kind of connection (I am arguing that it is a gift connection, a contract of the heart) is made between "His Honour" and "Diane Brown." It is a connection between selves and place on the one hand:



and between two selves on the other:



The name/location "Diane Brown" becomes a key siting. It is the "place" (on the level of "person") where the meaning contract gkow = Herring-Roe-On-Kelp is made. It is the "body" (conceived

here as the site of a name) where the spirit or gift flow, described earlier on the level of geography, occurs.

I recall my sketch:



If this drawing sketches the movement or "way" (spirit, hau, etc.) of "Diane Brown," conceived of (as we said) as a discourse about place, then the corresponding drawing sketching out the movement or way of gkow--conceived as a discourse about persons--would go like this:



We note here how the way of the place is given the form of a discourse about selves. The "place" that speaks and is spoken (named) is born (or "borne") at the exact moment where "Harry" is translated/transformed into "Kilsli" in the same way as earlier gkow/Herring-Roe-On-Kelp marked the transformation/translation point of Haada Gwaii into "Courtroom."

By these symmetries, a transcultural logic emerges--equating places and places, persons and persons, and place and persons--

and we begin to see the shape of the "it" which is the substance of Diane's gift. "It" implies community. "It" gives a meaning bridge that balances first languages/second languages, first places/second places, etc. in such a way that meaning can flow between previously discontinuous cultural groups.

We see now how Diane's offering of "herself" as a third person, a bodily location of speaking where His Honour is transformed into Kilsli, operates. "Diane Brown," as site of discourse, becomes the "self," the medium or bridge by which the "spirit" of Kilsli flows into--spawns with, ie., is born through and simultaneously copulates with--His Honour Justice Harry McKay.

By this secondary (strategic) transformation, the primary one, that of transforming Queen Charlotte Islands into Haada Gwaii via the "third place" medium of the courtroom, is reciprocally addressed: if "courtroom" is the site where "Queen Charlotte Islands" will be transformed into Haada Gwaii, then "Diane Brown" is the site where His Honour is transformed into "Kilsli."

The proposed meaning flow can be written as a set of logic equations:

1. Haada Gwaii is to "Courtroom" as Herring-Roe-On-Kelp is to gkow;
2. "His Honour" is to Diane Brown as "Kilsli" is to Harry.

In other words:

1. Herring-Roe-On-Kelp/gkow = Haada Gwaii/Courtroom;
2. Kilsli/Harry = His Honour/Diane Brown.

Note that in each of the above equations the transformation (place into place; person into person) is set in motion by a translation. An idiom--translation as (re)naming--emerges, in other words, by which the transformation of one place into another can occur via the transformation of one person into another. In this way, Diane Brown constructs rhetorical authority for her project, the transformation of lands via persons, without forfeiting traditional Haida modes whereby tranformations shall be made by moving meaning in the other direction--from lands to persons.

Meaning in this new proposition flows in both directions. This is why the bridge is the proper metaphor. As gkow is renamed Herring-Roe-On-Kelp, so Harry is renamed Kilsli. The first translation/renaming moves from Diane's first language to her second language (Haida to English); the second reciprocates by moving from Harry's first to his (proposed) second (English to Haida--and we will see later how this part of the flow remains incomplete). By this symmetry, an equality of naming/translating is achieved which aligns the two cultural locations via the two speaking/listening bodies:

First language (place) is to second language (place) as Diane Brown (person) is to Kilsli (person);

or:

1. Diane Brown = Kilsli
2. first language = second language.

Diane emerges as a "respected person," a Kilsli in her own right (we've seen how this came about via the transformations of the gkow ceremony) who has authority to speak, and takes her place as Harry McKay's discursive equal in the courtroom. The reason she did not want to "go through" another person (lawyer) becomes clear to us again.

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I now need to examine more closely what the word/name "Kilsli" means. If "respect" is the value being transacted here (and we've seen how the intercultural struggle will be over whether this value is treated as a gift or as a commodity), how does the name/location Kilsli come to acquire it?

On the simple level of translation, I'm told in the transcript, Kilsli means respected person. It's the Haida name for a respected person. From the gkow ceremony I've learned something about how Haida names are given (made) and that these translations are

anything but simple.

On the issue of Haida naming, Marjorie Halpin writes that "Haida society can be thought of by Europeans as an enduring structure of names handed down to successive generations of people who, in their turn, become the ancestors."(23) She goes on:

> Ancestral names carried a family's prestige, associated crests and privileges, and rights to economic resources. The potlatch was and is now again, a public ritual performed in order to bring a new generation into the structure of names.(24)

Haida leader Miles Richardson, speaking at a 1987 gathering to preserve local homelands, said,

> Ten thousand years of our ancestors' history and the story of our people have gone into this moment. We have a huge responsibility to those ancestors to preserve their names and to preserve our homelands so that these names will not be forgotten.(25)

Note the intimate connection here--a kind of kinship--between places and names. It is extremely important, I think, for Europeans to begin to appreciate this issue. A key theme in the Haida critique of the European cultural project, for example, has been the European practice of assigning non-local names--those of ship's officers, ships or distant businessmen and aristocrats, etc.--to local places. It is a practice which initially hypnotized the Haida: a culture where name-giving was a central cultural institution could not fathom how names, dislocated so

severely from their original context, could survive and still mean.(26) It is a practice they can now no longer welcome or acknowledge because to do so would be to forfeit those very rights and privileges--prestige, local crests, resources, personal identities--which traditional names carried and still carry, and which are threatened so severely by the European renaming project.

By offering His Honour Harry the gift of the name "Kilsli," Diane invites him into the "structure of names" which Halpin describes. She thus tries to reverse this process of "foreign" naming by bringing the discussion around to local people and places again. She brings His Honour into the circle of the community (recalling Hyde's metaphor here) and offers him a "respected place" at its centre--a name/location in the structure which is currently "empty," and which "Harry" is invited to "fill." In so doing she combines, as we have seen, metaphors of birth and copulation: she makes Harry/Kilsli into a member of a "new generation."

"Respect" in this system flows, as we have noted, first from place to person--Haada Gwaii to "Diane Brown"--and then from person to person--"Diane Brown" to "Kilsli." It moves via translations from first languages to second languages which are enmeshed in physical transformations of bodies into places and back again.

A "Kilsli," we might say, having followed the deconstruction/

reconstruction of the gkow/Herring-Roe-On-Kelp ceremony, is a person who has been translated/transformed into a place and come back as a person to tell about it.

He/she is a person who (looking at it from the European perspective) has confronted the enigma, the riddle at the base of language--ie. the question of where names come from--by undergoing the metamorphosis riddles require. We can understand this, as I suggested earlier, by recalling our folklore: the hero returns from his/her meaning quest transformed and filled with the spirit of new meaning--a new "self," in fact. This new self, released as a spirit/meaning at the centre of the community as the hero/heroine re-enters it, inspires respect in those present.

Let's review our equations: if gkow equals Herring-Roe-On-Kelp, then what, we might ask, does Kilsli equal? The equation tells me he equals "Harry"--but who is Harry at this moment?

"Harry," as in "Tom" and "Dick" (our two other mythical European names) is down there naked in the water, spawning. He and they are with Diane amidst the roe and the milt, the water and the kelp, etc., in the process of being transformed--at least potentially so. I suddenly recall my methodological/theoretical confession--whereby I agreed to approach my analysis "shipwrecked and naked," uncovered by European analytical armour. My text begins to take on more of this nakedness.

Harry/Kilsli, I have said, spawns. He oscillates with the "it,"

the transformative energy (spirit) released by Diane's testimony. This "it," we have seen, binds the idea of food-gathering to the concept "spiritual." It is the energy or meaning flow that turns "my spiritual self in my body." "It" is what makes "me," (speaking as Kilsli now, as imaginary participant in the gkow) ultimately, "different as a Haida" from "you" (conceived, for now, as you, the reader of this text).

Having experienced "it" this way, I begin to understand and feel how "it" can translate into "respect." Imagining now that I return from my meaning quest, my rhetorical transformation into "Kilsli," I arrive and release "it," in the form of the value "respect" at the centre of my community. I "give" this text, for example.

Respect, I want to argue, is on the level of "Courtroom" (the "third place" of speaking) what "it" is on the level of "Diane Brown" (the "third person" of speaking). This balance of persons and places strengthens my sense of the final set of equations:

"it" = respect,
"respect" = it.

"Finally the day comes when respect spawns the water gets all milky around respect."

This value now oscillates at the centre of the courtroom imagined

by my text in the same way that "it" oscillated at the centre of Diane Brown. Conversely, the word "respect" now resonates at the centre of "His Honour" (imagining he is "I") at the same time as it resonates at the centre of Haada Gwaii. The meaning bridge connecting places to persons, first to second languages, and then persons to places again, completes its arc.

Having experienced/imagined it this way, I can see now how "it"/respect, this value generated by the conflation of physical and spiritual meanings, forms the "gain," the "increase" (as Hyde calls it) of Diane's gift to His Honour. If he accepts it as a gift, he will share in that increase and the transcultural circle will be drawn. If he does not, "it"/respect will dwindle into commodity and "draw the boundary" between regions which Diane's testimony sought to join. A proposed "contract of the heart" would revert to the contingencies of paper.

It would be valuable, I think, at this point, to listen to what two of the other Haida mentioned so far have to say on the issue of respect. Here's Lavinia Lightbown:

"Because of our strongest philosophy of sharing there has been an encroachment on our lands. Our highest lore is of respect and consent, and the consent to give permits on our land has never been negotiated." (November 7th transcript, p. 45.)

Note here the connection between the value respect and the related one of sharing, which Diane Brown has also mentioned.

These two values, wrapped together, so to speak, into the gift, are the twin pillars--let's call them houseposts--on which and by which the proposed gift community is built.

Miles Richardson describes it this way:

> Respect is something you get from things and from the land, and you in turn give it back to the land. It respects you enough to make you and sustain you with nourishment, and so you respect it enough to live in it with respect and not abuse it.(27)

Lewis Hyde makes the argument that traditional gift cultures (including those of the B.C. Coast) saw "natural abundance" as a gift given by nature to man, and thus were able to include the environment in the gift circle.(28) He describes (to extend our spawn metaphor here) how the first salmon to arrive in the local stream were treated by tribes living there as visiting dignitaries, and welcomed accordingly. Then they were eaten, and their bones were returned as a gift and mark of respect to the stream to ensure the arrival of more salmon next season.(29)

Hyde describes a "gift relationship with nature" as

> ...a formal give and take that acknowledges our participation in and dependence upon natural increase. And where we have established such a relationship, we tend to respond to nature as part of ourselves, not as a stranger or alien available for exploitation.(30)

Diane Brown gives her own description of the respect value in a section of her testimony which I skipped over when I jumped to the gkow story:

"In those early years the first lesson in my life that I remember is respect. I was taught to respect the land. I was taught to respect the food that comes from the land. I was taught that everything had a meaning. Every insect had a meaning and none of those things were to be held lightly. The food was never to be taken for granted. In gathering food it's what--the nearest I can translate I can say to gather food is a spiritual experience for me."

This level of respect for things and land is, I believe, the teaching which forms the substance to Diane's gift to us, the readers of her (and of this) text. It is something quite alien to our commodity culture, where things appear almost exclusively as items to be exchanged for symbols (money), and land is no more than a repository for such items, or itself becomes one of them. It is significant that this section of Diane's testimony follows directly upon her discussion of the "School of Burnaby Narrows" theme. Already at this point in her testimony she introduces the food gathering-spiritual connection. The idea that "everything has a meaning" constructs this connection, and it is something Europeans, with their scanty knowledge of local geography and culture, could not appreciate when they first arrived, and have yet to learn. The success of Diane Brown's Second Contact Story will depend on whether they are able now to learn it, and this,

in turn, will depend on whether they (we) are able to accept her gift of testimony.

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How is respect constructed on the European side of the cultural equation? Having gained some insight into how it is made to mean (ie. become a communication) by Diane's speaking, we might now ask how the Court constructs respect for "His Honour."

I'll recall the proposed consensus for Diane's project:

respected person = respected place.

How does Harry McKay's courtroom become a respected place? The transcript before me gives the following clue: whenever Harry, His Honour, etc. speaks, the court reporter identifies him in the transcript as "The Court." His Honour, Mr. Justice Harry McKay, becomes, as named speaker, the site of the place in which he is speaking.

Courtroom rhetorical etiquette bears out this interpretation. When "His Honour" is addressed (by either of the Counsels, for example) he is addressed either by his title--"Your Honour"--or by the name of the place in which this title is heard/spoken--"The Court." "If it please the Court," as a way of speaking, is coterminus with "If it please Your Honour."(31)

Thus meaning is made here on the basis of the rhetorical proposition,

His Honour = The Court,

which, as I indicated in the first part of my analysis, functions as a metonym. It is a part for the whole construction.(32)

This metonym's authority as a basis for meaning flow derives from a string of historical European metonyms which stem ultimately, I would argue, from the proposition,

King = Country,

which flows out of European feudalism.(33)

The basic proposition in this system (to belabour the obvious here a bit) is that a (man's) body can stand for a country, can "mean" a place. The word "kingdom" expresses this idea semantically. This proposition is the epistemological base on which European sovereignty (over lands and peoples) is built, and its meaning flow informs the historical project by which European nation states eventually colonized most of the non-European world, including Haada Gwaii.(34)

If the metonym, "His Honour" equals "The Court," derives from

the proposition, "King" equals "Country," I can express it formulaically as:

His Honour is to The Court as King is to Country;

or,

1. King ⧧ Country,
2. His Honour = The Court.

Viewed from the perspective of our person/place opposition, the metonym string, His Honour is to The Court as King is to Country, reveals itself to be based on an underlying metaphor or symbolic construction:

person = place.

The metaphorical proposition (or paradigm, to invoke the linguistic term) contained within the metonym (syntagm), His Honour equals The Court, is therefore a simple statement of equivalence between a person's body and a place, a man and a land.

What we notice immediately is that there is no mediation here by the respect value.

Respect does not flow in this system--at least not visibly or

audibly--and it is this absence, I suggest, that Diane's testimony ultimately addresses.

She offers something--her gift, a value--to that location, that "empty place" (recalling Hyde's notion), and hopes, by filling it, to achieve communication flow between the bodies convened on the question of the lands named. For "Queen Charlotte Islands" to be successfuly renamed Haada Gwaii, meaning must flow between the (named) persons "Diane Brown" and "His Honour," and that meaning must flow as an ambience or matrix of respect.

From the Haada Gwaii perspective, the proposed consensus, respected person equals respected place, is not met by the European proposition, person equals place. This proposition, as we have witnessed in Diane's gkow/Herring-Roe-On-Kelp and Harry/Kilsli transformations, cannot work as a bridge between the cultures assembled: it cannot create transcultural meaning flow because the key value, respect, is absent or invisible.

Thus the "heart," the "empty place" at the centre of the community (assuming here that the proposal is for a gift community) remains vacant. There is no Kilsli at its centre to receive the gift of testimony, hence the testimony flounders.

We can explain this absence or failure from our European perspective quite easily, of course. Harry McKay's "respect," his authority to speak in and on behalf of the court--to speak as if his body were that place--is drawn from the historical syntagm I

outlined earlier. It forms part of an unspoken European tradition (we can think of it as a narrative) by which meanings are transferred between persons and places (hence between persons and persons) and it need therefore not, so long as one is part of that tradition, be addressed.

In addressing it, Diane Brown breaks open the European syntagm and reveals the paradigm at its centre. She "exposes" the metaphor (person = place) at the core of the metonymic system by which meaning is made in the "hidden" European tradition, and thereby questions its authority.

It is in this sense I suggested earlier that she "speaks" Haida historical time while "hearing" European myth time. In speaking the Haida account of how persons and places are joined (via the gkow/Herring-Roe-On-Kelp translation/transformation) she hears how persons and places are joined (via the person = place metaphor) in (unspoken) European tradition. In showing how respect is manufactured in Haada Gwaii--here/now, today--she shows how it is rendered absent--relegated to the realm of myth--by the European proposal for that place.(35)

We discover that meaning, on the European side of the cultural fence, flows not via the value respect at all, but via another value--that of authority. Harry McKay has authority to speak in the courtroom as if he were that place, he does not necessarily have respect. Or rather, any respect he might have or receive

from his courtroom audience will derive from the other more fundamental value.

Similary, the King, when he speaks for (as if he were) his country, does not necessarily have that country's respect; nor does he necessarily speak with respect in addressing that country's (his) "subjects." The issue of respect is buried or made invisible within the larger discourse of authority, and thus does not appear as a communicated value.

This concealment is what has made it so difficult for the Haida naming institution, the Potlatch, to persevere in historical (ie. post Contact) times. This concealment also makes it nearly impossible for His Honour, Harry, to receive the gift of the name Kilsli in the "true" extent of its meaning. To do so would be to forfeit his ability to speak in (ie. "in the place of") his courtroom with the authority bequeathed by the European metonym. It would reduce him to the naked male, the Tom and the Dick who are struggling in the water with the meaning (ie., physical understanding and feeling) of the gkow/Herring-Roe-On-Kelp exchange.

It would make him vulnerable and "naked" in a way that most European males have not been taught by their schooling, I suggest, to become.

To accept Diane's testimony fully, Harry would need to accept a level or intensity of meaning whose power (to invoke another word

for the idea of spirit) he is not equipped to handle. It is a tribute, in fact, to the man, Harry McKay's sensitivity and insight and strength that he allowed the Haida and Diane Brown to give testimony in the way that they did. In allowing Diane to "go through" herself, Harry/Kilsli has already thrown himself open to a level of cultural "nakedness" which many of his colleagues on the Bench could not tolerate.(36)

Harry's "respect," ie. his "right" or "privilege" to speak on behalf or through the place he is speaking, is based, as we have seen, on a series of metonyms. He speaks "with authority" because, to put it banally, at one point a European sovereign declared his body an authority over a conquered land and thereby, somehow, magically, over the centuries, became that land.

If I insert the word "authority" into the open slot, the gap in European discourse where, from the Haida perspective, the value "respect" should be, the meaning flow in the system suddenly becomes apparent. "His Honour" draws his <u>authority</u> to speak as if he were a place--ie., to speak "magically" in this way--by virtue of his personal title, "Mr. Justice," for example. This title, in turn, he receives (recalling our gift metaphoric) via the <u>authority</u> invested in the Canadian state (the Federal Government) to appoint Supreme Court Justices. This state <u>authority</u> is based, if we look at it geographically, in "Ottawa," where, in turn, it was received, ultimately, from "London," ie., from another state capital.

Hence, on the level of place, transfer of meaning between persons and places in the European system as applied to Haada Gwaii, flows in a colonial idiom--and it reveals an unresolved contradiction at the heart of the Canadian state.

Seen from the level of persons, this colonial authority flows from the distant King (Queen), to the "Canadian" Governor (General), to the Federal Cabinet, then into the body of His Honour. We notice immediately that place does not appear in this chain of meaning. Place is conceived magically, mythically, as an "absence": it is "embodied" only in the physical beings of the named string of authorities; in other words, in a set to titles bequeathed by "higher" authority.

This, again, is what makes the Haida project such a difficult one. It is as if when the Europeans arrived in Haada Gwaii they immediately closed their senses to any trace of a local discourse about land and set about "discovering" the place exclusively in terms of their imported European one. They have been doing so ever since, it seems.

The effect of this, of course, is to make Haada Gwaii disappear as a place. It stops speaking, as it did in Watson Price's case. The resulting absence can then be named something else. The first language/second language distortion which Diane addresses occurs at this point.

Looking at the problem from the vantage point of the respect/authority opposition, I might put it this way: the European invaders, upon arriving in Haada Gwaii imposed their discourse of authority (about people and places) on the local land and thereby suppressed or displaced the local one, that of respect. They asked the local discourse to "respect" their authority, in other words, but did not, reciprocally, grant "authority" to that region's respect.

They did not come and welcome and share, to use Diane's terms, and the resulting miscommunication between Europeans and Haida about Haada Gwaii continues to haunt the transcultural project.

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The European authority discourse, as I intimated earlier, is based on the value of sovereignty. The person = place equation which underlies the project, especially in its North American colonial manifestation, flows from feudal organization of land tenure and ideas about social relations derived from it. The feudal proposition, stated most simply, is that the "sovereign" has physical authority, ie., sovereignty over his/her "Dominions" by virtue of his/her right to appropriate certain labour powers from the serfs who are "bonded" to that land. The serfs, in this construction, "belong" to the land at the same time as a part of their labour power belongs to the local Lord. They--their bodies--thus form the communicators between person and place in

this system of exchange.

Sovereignty as institutionalized authority may therefore be viewed as authority flowing without respect. The Lord, (later the King) as we said, does not respect his serfs, nor do they necessarily respect him: a distortion--authority without respect, or authority masquerading as respect--enters the communication flow between bodies and land in institutionalized serfdom, especially when it moves to the "New World" in the form of colonialism. I use the word distortion here very much in the same sense as Leiss, Kline and Jhally use it to describe how meaning flow is "distorted" in the "discourse through and about objects" in industrial market culture.(37)

Sovereignty suggests authority over land and people rather than equality between them. It suggests not so much the equation, person = place, as the inequality, person <u>over</u> place. It is in this sense a distorted communication. It bends the discursive boundaries between people and places in such a way as to distort meaning flow between persons and persons.

Michel Foucault argues that one cannot speak of sovereignty and still denote ("hear") respect, that the two values are irreconcilable. He says that bodies of people wishing to oppose dominant social disourses must find a way around the hegemony of sovereignty.(38)

Native groups have similarly based their opposition to

colonialism in Canada on a critique of sovereignty. It is ironic and not coincidental that shortly after the Haida blocked the logging road on Haada Gwaii the "Canadian Constitution" was being prepared for yet another round of debate in the Federal House of Commons, and that Canadian Indians were again threatened with the prospect of being "written out" of that document.(39) Native groups struggling for recognition of aboriginal rights in the context of Canadian law base their claim on a series of statutes--including the BNA Act, the basic document that, in the form of a "Constitution," is to emblematically depict "Canada"--and ultimately on the British Royal Proclamation of 1763. The Royal Proclamation proclaimed that, before asserting sovereignty over the "King's Dominions" in North America, the colonial government must negotiate with the Indians.(40) Since the colonial government has not done this on Haada Gwaii, the question of sovereignty there remains contentious.(41)

Sovereignty is depicted, in the European system, by the Crown. "The Crown" is the symbolic medium by which meaning is transferred between ("sovereign") person and (his/her) place in the post feudal system of authority whereby the nation state concept expanded into colonial empires. It is the emblem by which the equation, King = Country--which stands, as we recall, at the start of our metonymic chain--is made manifest. It is its hau, its gift, its spirit of increase, we might say, recalling Hyde's terminology.

The aboriginal people living in the area Europeans renamed "Canada" have always recognized this fact. They know that their true negotiating partner on the question of aboriginal rights is the British Crown. This fundamental metonym which serves, interestingly enough, at least in my Oxford Dictionary, as the very definition of the word "metonym," is the ultimate perceivable authority (the "site" or "name") by which relationships between persons and places, and thereby between persons and persons, are constructed in the European colonial enterprise in Canada. It is not idiosyncratic to note, in this context, that even today the timber company fiefdoms which constitute 90-odd percent of the British Columbia land mass, and whose monopoly control the Haida are challenging, are still referred to legally and bureaucratically as "Crown Lands."

This positioning of the Crown has tremendous implications for the question of Canadian nationhood. The dialectics of the situation immediately become evident--and we can see why, as Noel Dyck so clearly points out, the Canadian aboriginal claim to aboriginal rights challenges the institutionalized nation state at such a fundamental level.

If it is true that "authority" in the Canadian state still flows, ultimately (despite the efforts of our current crop of constitutional nation builders) from Britain, from the institutionalized King-Country metonym symbolized by "The Crown," then the argument can be made that Canada is "still" a colony. It therefore has no right as a nation state to claim "sovereignty"

over (among other places) Haada Gwaii.

If, conversely, the Canadian state declares that it does have "true" sovereignty (and not simply colonial authority) over the "Dominion of Canada,"(42) then the symbol "The Crown," which still appears emblematically and rhetorically to give authority to courtroom discourse, for example, is drained of all meaning--and the whole metonymic edifice through which meaning in the European system flows begins to collapse from within.

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I said that the Crown-for-King metonym forms the first link in the sovereignty chain of meaning. A thing stands in for a person. We realize that this metonym is the "true" communication which the distorted one, person = place, conceals. A thing = person relation, as metonym, is the first episode in the historical narrative by which persons and places are joined. Authority for the statement, King = Country, does not flow from the equation, person = place, (which, as we discovered, is not a statement of equivalence at all, but an asymmetry) but from the equation, Crown = King. It is the latter formulation which sets in motion the flow of which the equation (distortion), person = place, is part.

The Crown symbol inserts an ambiguity into the relation between people and places. It suggests that meaning moves from object to

symbol (Country to King/Crown) while actually moving meaning from symbol to object (Crown/King to Country).

It operates on this level a little bit like the thing/symbol money does in the market-industrial context as described and criticized by Sahlins. There, money-as-communication obscured or distorted the relationship between people by presenting it as a relationship between things; here, the Crown as communicator distorts the relation between people and places by presenting it as a relationship between people.

Like money, the Crown symbol places an ambiguity of meaning at the centre of its communication project. It proposes the replacement of a person by a thing, and, in so doing, begins to erase the boundary between persons and things. The proposition King = Country, which constructs authority for meaning flow in the sovereignty system, rests symbolically on the proposition Crown = King. The Crown is the quantity, the symbol/thing by which the value "sovereignty" is expressed.(43)

If Crown = King, and King = Country, then it follows that Crown = Country--and we note the point where, in the European colonial system, the value "place" is repressed and meaning flow thereby distorted.

Place, we note again, disappears in this way of making meaning; it is replaced by the symbol/thing, the Crown. By this distortion the colonial project in the Canadian context is maintained and

perpetuated as discourse.

We can see, therefore, how, when viewed from the European cultural perspective alone, the transcultural meaning project is perpetually doomed to failure. If person is to be bonded to place exclusively via the medium of the Crown, then authority in the system can only flow in one direction--from Crown to Country. It cannot flow in the other direction, because the other half of the equation, Country, has no symbolic medium by which to express its meaning.

There is no thing/symbol which would transfer "it," ie., "Country," to the place of discourse where meaning is made.

Hence equivalence between lands and peoples cannot be achieved: after all, only the King, or Lord or Colonizer, not his serfs or his Indians are represented, ie., bonded to land in the Crown = Country formulation. The serfs or Indians or "subjects" are "disembodied" from it: their authority to participate in discourse flows from their relation (as indentured labour power) to the sovereign, not from their material/spiritual relation (as physical labourers) to the land. It flows, in other words, by means of head-felt, rather than heart-felt contract.

The King's body thus becomes the only physical/symbolic medium by which the person/place relation can be made by serfs and Indians, and it is in this substitution--body for place--that the

miscommunication of colonial sovereignty originates.

Another way of putting this, as I suggested earlier, is to say that authority's other aspect, that of respect, cannot flow in this system. Respect, which, as we have heard, must accompany authority to flow as undistorted meaning in communication, is blocked by the sovereignty proposal: like place, it becomes repressed. It is not represented in discourse because it has no symbolic entity which would make it mean.

Diane Brown's testimony, as we have witnessed it, embodies such a symbol. In making the gift of gkow/Herring-Roe-On-Kelp, she gives to the moribund Eurocanadian transcultural meaning-making process, a part of herself, a gain or increase by which the value of community--as transcultural idiom--might appear.

In place of sovereignty (authority without respect) she offers the gift of the name, Kilsli (respect with authority). In place of the Crown metonym (thing-for-place) she offers the gkow/Herring-Roe-On-Kelp metaphor (thing-as-place).

The gkow/Herring-Roe-On-Kelp translation/transformation gives a spiritual (or symbolic) equivalent to the place side of the equation and thus allows it to "speak" in the transcultural discourse. It gives to that equation the meaning, food gathering = spiritual, and thus reconnects lands and their symbols in a way that the Crown = Country equation cannot do.

In offering the gift name/translation Harry/Kilsli, Diane Brown gives the value "respect" to the person = person equation and thereby makes a bridge by which meaning can flow between equals and in both directions. She shows how to speak with authority while hearing respect, we might say, recalling the speaking/listening dyad, and to speak with respect while hearing authority.

The gkow/Herring-Roe-on-Kelp translation/transformation holds food gathering and spiritual (thing and symbol) together in the same way that the name Harry/Kilsli holds person and place together. The four components--person/place, thing/symbol--balance each other. We witnessed earlier how meaning between persons and places, then between persons and persons, flows across Diane's transcultural bridge:

place to person translation/transformation person to place
(first language/second language)

o----------->o----------->o

or,

Haada Gwaii to Diane Brown — Kilsli/Harry — His Honour to the Court

o----------->o----------->o

This symmetry, this double flow of communication, is the gift

in Diane Brown's testimony. It is the increase, the gain she offers to the truncated European model based on the simple person = place equation.

This latter equation, as we have witnessed, is built on a distortion of meaning flow between person and place. It inserts, as we heard in the Crown discussion, a symbol (posing as a thing) into the person = place formulation and hence distorts symmetry between persons. By confusing the King with the Crown, it confused the Country with the Crown and thus made the people of that country--in this case Haada Gwaii--unable to communicate with each other or with Europeans--since there was (is) no Crown on Haada Gwaii by which to communicate.

In this sense, I argued, the Eurocanadian transcultural project was and is still at its base a colonial one. The Haida call for aboriginal rights and title reveals an unresolved contradiction at the heart of the question of Canadian nationhood.

In the European (distorted) communication model paralleling the one I sketched out for Diane above, meaning could be said to flow as follows:

thing to person person/place distortion person to thing

o----------->o----------->o

It is thus a cul de sac:

Crown to King King/Haada Gwaii His Honour to ?



We note how the place, Haada Gwaii, disappears in this one way formulation. It appears only in the form of the abstraction "thing." Since the "thing," ie., the Crown, is distant, is not located in Haada Gwaii, there is no vehicle by which communication can flow back from Haada Gwaii once colonial dispatches reach it, and no vehicle by which it can flow locally without distortion. A gap, an absence occurs where a communicator should be, and meaning flow in the system is blocked. (If I were Hyde I would argue that, like profit in the commodity region, it is removed from circulation and hoarded as surplus value, etc.)

This absence, this abstract "thing," I would argue, is the force or spirit that constructs the ideological frame by which the continued exploitation of the Queen Charlotte Islands by multinational timber corporations is carried out. Recent political discourse in British Columbia gives us the terms "wilderness" and "national park"--or even "tribal park"--to deal with the inconsistency of the open slot, (and to counteract such formulations as "resource base," "timber lease," etc.) but the issue is not resolved. The absence of a mutually negotiated place name for Haada Gwaii/Queen Charlotte Islands remains at the centre of the political/ideological agenda for that place. Diane's testimony, the Hearing from which it is taken, and my

interpretation of it here, are part of that agenda.

Diane Brown's testimony, I am arguing, offers us a way, a transcultural bridge by which to negotiate a new name for Haada Gwaii/Queen Charlotte Islands. It is based, as we have witnessed, on symmetries which create, at least potentially, unhindered meaning flows in both directions between the two cultures. By proposing a discursive equality, a parallel structuring of the negotiating partners--on the level of place, and on the level of person, and on the level of person/place--she tells how meaning might move back and forth "as if" via a bridge.

Hence a metaphor, the bridge, replaces the metonym of the court as the proposed "place" of speaking. Her "Second Contact Story," as I have labelled it, proffers itself as a counter narrative by which to redress the imbalance (distortion) brought about by the First Contact Story-So-Far.

Diane offers a retelling of the story (I recall Ricouer's definition of metaphor here) in which, by replacing the symbol "The Crown" with the thing/symbol gknow/Herring-Roe-On-Kelp, we might discover a way to "understand and feel" how to connect person and place via a material and a spiritual value. We might, thereby, be able to appreciate at least some faint beginnings of what Hyde calls "total social phenomena."

She suggests that by replacing the administration of sovereignty with the act of cross-cultural naming--replacing "His Honour, Mr.

Justice Harry McKay" with "Harry/Kilsli"--and thus opening the way for a "Kilsli/Diane" formulation--we might begin to join persons and persons with authority and respect, rather than relying exclusively on the former.(44)

I might explain the metaphor/metonym distinction this way: by offering the gift of the gkow/Herring-Roe-On-Kelp, Diane offers a thing/symbol which is two-things-that-act-like-one-thing. Hence the bridge metaphor. Gkow/Herring-Roe-On-Kelp brings together a duality, a thing and its spirit, and thus offers a way of joining cultures and languages that the more simple-minded symbol of the Crown--which, when we examine it in this light, becomes the metonym, one-thing-that-acts-for-all-things--cannot.

Similarly, then, Harry/Kilsli (or Kilsli/Diane) become two-people-that-act-like-one-person--and formulates a counter statement to the Canadian (colonial) proposition whereby "His Honour" is one-person-that-acts-for-all-persons.

He speaks as a place, as "The Court," rather than as the metaphorical bridge between places that Diane suggests a person might be. She proposes a parallel or analogue construction--persons as metaphors of places, rather than metonyms of them--to answer the hierarchical construction.

Following this logic through, Haada Gwaii/Courtroom, Diane's proposed place of speaking (of meeting and coming and sharing,

etc.) becomes the bridge-site, the two-places-that-are-like-one-place which offers the alternative to the Courtroom whose traditional hegemony claim makes it one-site-that-acts-for-all-sites.

An alternative reading of the cross cultural meaning-making project is thus in place. It is based, as I suggested, on analogues, rather than discontinuities, on equalities between people and places, rather than hierarchical ordering of objects and persons. It is a metaphorical rather than a metonymical model for communication--and I can relate it now to the suggestion I made earlier that Diane's project succeeds if it speaks Haida myth time while hearing European clock time, and simultaneously speaks Haida clock time while hearing European myth time.

In replacing sovereignty with name giving she speaks Haida historical (clock time) while hearing European myth time; in replacing "The Crown" with gkow/Herring-Roe-On-Kelp, she speaks Haida time immemorial (myth time) while hearing European clock time.

She respects the European discourse, in other words, recalling our previous opposition, while speaking with all the authority of a Haida; similarly, she speaks a European discourse of authority, courtroom English, while respecting traditional Haida ways of speaking.

Like her ancestors before her, she comes and welcomes and shares, but the gifts she offers carry different meanings than they did

when her ancestors gave them during First Contact. How they are different will be determined by how they are received--and this is where we, the readers of Diane's, and you, the readers of my text, join in the transcultural meaning making process.

What Diane's gift of testimony comes to mean--in history/story, in clock time and myth time--will depend, in part, on how "we," in turn, "come and welcome and share" it. By "we" I mean the community of readers implied by this text. "It," the oscillating gift that is the heart of the gkow, asks us, in Diane's testimony, to join in its circle of meaning, in its food gathering ◘ spiritual, its increase and its name. Insofar as we are able to do so, the circle will expand and meaning will survive. At the moment where we cease to come and welcome and share, the gift meaning will shrink away again, and resort to commodity.

In resorting to commodity, it will establish a boundary where, as Hyde pointed out, none previously existed. The circle will close in front of us, and we, the immigrants who were welcomed and respected and invited to share will be stranded outside this place. Or rather, we will remain at sea because we have no language by which to make meaning of our bodies with the land.

CONCLUSION

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I have suggested, following Halpin and Stearns and others, that Diane Brown's discursive strategy at times replicates Haida Potlatch idioms, and that an understanding of this cultural form might help us Europeans construct meaning with what Diane says. To what extent her testimony in fact "potlatches" us is a fit subject for further research and enquiry that I do not have the space to pursue here.

My point, as I said earlier, is a relatively simple one: if we accept that name giving replaces sovereignty as method of constructing social meaning, and the thing/symbol gkow/Herring-Roe-On-Kelp (oscillating as the unnamed "it") replaces the Crown at the spiritual heart of the meaning transfer, then we are moving, if I recall Hyde's terms, to the border country between gift and commodity regions. We recall, on arriving, that a gift, when it touches this border, either expands it, or transforms into commodity. This is true whether the gift be testimony, or the return gift of understanding.

Michael Asch suggests that the Haida and other Native strategies for securing aboriginal political rights do not challenge the

basic ideological tenets of the Canadian nation state.(1) He cites the "French Fact" in Quebec as a model for transcultural communication in the context of Canadian statehood and suggests the "Aboriginal Fact" might be tended to in similar fashion.

Whether Asch is right or not is another subject for further debate, I think, and I won't take up the argument here. My point, again, is simple: if the Haida claim to "nationhood," (and Diane's testimony as a constituent of this claim) is understood and felt by Eurocanadian immigrants to be a gift (in Hyde's sense) there will be less tendency on their part to see it as a threat to "Canadian" nationhood than if it is received (understood and felt) as commodity.

It may in fact become evident that "nationhood," something which still seems to elude the understanding and feeling of a good many "Canadians," is something that can only be experienced or perceived if it is felt to be a gift--as opposed to, say, an imposition of sovereignty.

Haada Gwaii as name, as nationhood, might well be something shared, an increase which as hau or spirit enriches the larger, rather than drawing a boundary around the smaller concept of community. It may enable us, recalling our metaphor/metonym distinction, to see two places (names) that act like one place (or name) where up to now we have always looked for the one place that could act for all places and names.

By the same token, "Kilsli," as named, personalized location--as a person whose name is "respect"--can add to the Canadian political lexicon (certainly to its more authoritative bureaucratic entries) if it is felt to be a gift word, a name which allows two people to act as one, rather than one person to act for all.

These are delicate points, and I feel they are crucial for understanding the political context of the aboriginal rights debate. It sounds simplistic, perhaps, to say that "Canada" needs places where meanings can flow unhindered and bidirectionally between material and spiritual equivalents. It might sound far-fetched to say that the "it," the gkow/Herring-Roe-On-Kelp which oscillates as value between persons and places can function as judicial evidence. It seems silly, maybe, to insist that in renaming a person or place, you are actually transforming their being and substance.

But these points, as we know, are not silly or far-fetched or simplistic. It is part of the colonial project of denial to classify them (ie., name them) in this way, and thus neutralize their political potency. It distorts local identities. It is silly and far-fetched and simplistic, in the long run, to commend Diane Brown--as Harry McKay does at the conclusion of her testimony--for her eloquence, and then grant the court injunction against which this eloquence speaks.

I suggested that the meanings carried by Diane's gifts are different now than those carried by the First Contact gifts given by her ancestors. The difference lies not in the things themselves, but in the fact that, as Marjorie Halpin says, the witnesses of the "contemporary Potlatch" have changed.

As I said, we, as readers of Diane's text, and of this, my, text, are now the witnesses. We can choose to bestow the traditional, perhaps future potlatch meanings, ie., prestige, respect, power, etc. to these gifts, or to withhold them--as an angry or slighted moiety might have in past times. We can accept the gift, the hau, the spirit of the testimony, and thereby expand the flow of meaning between our cultures, or we can reject the testimony as rhetorical flourish, as eloquent but ultimately empty (ie., disempowered) words. The choice we make will determine whether the increase, the spirit, flows with the words, or whether it is truncated away from them to be gathered and hoarded elsewhere as profit or some kind of private gain.(2)

As contemporary potlatch witnesses (or at least hypothetical, perhaps imaginary ones), we have one advantage over the hapless sailors and sea captains and merchants who acted out the First Contact Potlatch on this coast. We live here. We do not come from Europe to trade and then skedaddle to make our profit. We come to make homes out of this place. In this activity, the Haida values of sharing and respect, the practices of gift giving and naming, and bestowing prestige, can be of great help. The Haida ability

to transform (rather than simply translate) local spiritual into material equivalents, to bestow local names on the "true" places in which they occur, is more profound, as we have witnessed, than the European immigrant practice of aping foreign practices by naming local landscapes after them.

I suggested at the start of my analysis that the Haida project and Diane's project will succeed or fail by the power of its translations. We have witnessed now how these translations succeed insofar as they become or involve or provoke physical transformations--a place into a person; a person into another person; a place into another place--and that these transformations occur if they accede as gift transformations. The translation, if it is received as gift, we have seen, provokes the transformation--the spiritual/material exchange of meaning between persons and place, persons and persons--which, if the translation is taken as commodity, is blocked. A blocked or suppressed translation becomes, then, a distortion, and provokes another kind of transformation--that of giver and the receiver into the "things" they are exchanging.

Early on in this project I was asked why I thought I could understand (and feel) Diane Brown's testimony or the Haida testimony in general more easily or strongly than other Eurocanadians living in B.C. perhaps could. I'm not sure that I necessarily can; the question nevertheless is important.

I have only one answer to it: as an immigrant I, like Diane, have made a first language/second language translation/transformation in my life. In moving as a child from Europe to B.C., I replaced or displaced my first language with a "better" second one. I explained this earlier as the direct inverse of Diane's translation process: where I displaced my first language with my better second one, transforming the latter thereby into my first one, she maintained the traditional sequence--first language, Haida, better second language, English. I speak English as better first language, having relegated my traditional first language to the status of second language. In this, I followed Watson Price's practice more than I did Diane's--and have felt some of the pain that results from a severing of vocal chords. As I indicated earlier, Diane's and my inverse position on the question of first versus second languages is logical, given our inverse relation to place as immigrant versus aboriginal inhabitant.

The inverse symmetry creates a solidarity of emotion. We have both experienced English as second language. We have both felt the weight of the Crown symbol, that authority which came not from our home and our country's language, but from another place, and thus sat awkwardly on our shoulders. We both learned to speak this symbol's language, knowing full well it could never reciprocally incorporate our "true" names into its sound and syntax.

In this sense, we have shared (to invoke the Haida term) a transformation. I do not want to appear sentimental about this.

On the other hand, I don't want to underestimate the power involved. I said earlier that His Honour, Harry, although he is offered the gift of the gkow transformation, cannot be forced to accept it. He cannot be moved, by complusion, from a first, to a second language place. Diane can "give" him the gift of her testimony, and hope that he understands and feels it; she cannot impose this understanding and feeling on him.

I suggested later that Harry/Kilsli is in fact unable to accept Diane's gift to the full extent of its meaning, because to do so would mean to forfeit the authority (with or without respect) he has methodically and perhaps painfully built up through a history of personal career-building--his own, self-transformation from "Harry" into "His Honour"--and what I described as the historical project by which, in European idioms, a person can come to "stand for," even as he stands over, a place.

Harry does not make the gkow/Herring-Roe-On-Kelp transformation. He cannot get down there in the water, rhetorically with Diane, and experience how spiritual and material, person and place values interact and exchange places. To do so would be to strip himself of inherited and socially maintainted selfhood: it would strip his court of the authority by which the Crown symbol can operate magically--as if it were that place--to continue naming the Queen Charlotte Islands.

The fact that, in spite of his praise of Diane's rhetoric, and

the strong spirit he shows in allowing this rhetoric to be heard in his court--the fact that in spite of these "personal" accomplishments which would befit a true Kilsli, he still, on the level of Harry, grants the injunction against which Diane's testimony spoke, testifies to his unwillingness to occupy the respect location which the gift name Kilsli constructs and proffers.

In describing Harry and myself initially as inscribed readers of Diane's testimony, as dual witnesses to her "Potlatch," I implied that a continuity between us existed. I enacted this connection--a possible solidarity--by "pretending" in my writing of the gkow/Herring-Roe-On-Kelp section of my text, that I was he. I imagined myself as Harry/Kilsli, down in the water sharing the roe and the milt, the water and the kelp, performing the food gathering = spiritual transformation.

I made this imaginative leap in order to illustrate my "feeling" about this transformation, as this flowed to me from Diane's text, and suggested that the transformations--place into person, person into person--were spiritual at the same time as they were physical ones. I pretended, in going to that "place," that the "spirit" of His Honour, as Harry listening, might flow into me, even as Diane's did, so that I might understand and feel how he understands and feels her text.

On looking over my shoulder now, however, I discover, that Harry, His Honour, did not join me down there in the gkow. He did not

respect or share that imagination. I discover--much as the European hero, returning from Hades or a similar forbidden realm of meaning discovers, on breaking the admonition to not look over my shoulder--that His Honour/Kilsi has turned to salt. The name/relocation was not received. The gift, the "empty place" at the centre of the community circle of witnesses, remained barren--at least as far as Harry was concerned. The proof of this lies in the fact that he granted the injunction which, at least on paper, transformed Haada Gwaii into an unnamed wilderness of timber leases.

There are, as I said, institutional and historical reasons for this denial of gift communication on Harry's part. He can not "afford" (to import the commodity term here) to receive the intimacy, the erotic "contract of the heart" communication given by Diane's speaking. Hence he cannot receive the gift of community it implies.

He also--and here I draw the finer line between Harry and myself as European male witnesses (at least imaginatively so) to the testimony--he also has not, I suspect, gone through the self/place transformation in his life that a leap from first language place to second language place requires. He has not, to bring the Underworld image forward, confronted the riddle of language at this level. Thus, perhaps, he is unable to understand and feel the level of physical solidarity which Diane's process of meaning needs to make gift meaning flow. I cannot prove this,

of course; I can only use it to construct a reading for the way in which Harry's and my path diverge in the face of Diane's testimony.

To put this another way, I, as "writer," as newly inscribed reader of Diane's text, refuse the injunction which Harry, His Honour, grants. I do not believe, pretending for a moment I am a Kilsli, that the Western Forest Products timber corporation has the legal and constitutional right to remove and sell the trees of Haada Gwaii and thereby transform it from place into a commodity. My reading of Diane's text thus puts me at odds with Harry, my erstwhile European male travelling companion, and places me closer to Diane Brown, the Haida woman.(3)

In this sense, therefore, at the very point where Diane's translation/transformation gift "fails" at the level of the Courtroom--Queen Charlotte Islands is not transformed into Haada Gwaii because Harry refuses the gift name Kilsli--it succeeds at the level of her text. At the very point where Harry, His Honour, the listening witness, refuses the gift of the metaphor, I, the writer of this text, agree to the transformation. I said at the outset that I would approach Diane Brown's text "naked and shipwrecked," aware of the many European methodologies and theories by which to interpret this (and, by implication, any) text, but discarding that privilege in favour of a desire to receive a new "self."

This idea of a new self--a new name/location, to retain the Haida

reading--is difficult to talk about in the voice of a "researcher" or "social theorist," etc., ie., from within a Eurocanadian institutional location. These names/locations, as rhetorical sites, all too easily become part of the European authority apparatus by which local meanings are suppressed because their discourses--things and spirits--are distorted. The "contracts of the heart"--between words and things, thus between places and people, thus between people and people--become all too easily transformed by such modes of writing into contracts of paper.

It is necessary, in other words, for me to discard the institutional mask which might distort my rendering of Diane Brown's text, and to give my reading from a position of nakedness and vulnerability which shares in hers. Only in this way can I begin to speak <u>with</u>, rather than for, or, what's worse, against Diane Brown.

Lewis Hyde says that teaching, the passing of a "body" of knowledge from teacher to student, can sometimes flow in gift form. It can become a gift--and thereby affect personal transformation--if "between the time the gift comes to us, and the time we pass it along, we suffer gratitude."(4)

This idea of "suffering gratitude" is, I think, a poignant way to describe the act of learning--be it from another culture, or from the teachers in one's own culture. Hyde continues:

> Moreover, with gifts that are agents of change, it is only when the gift has worked in us, only when we have come up to its level, as it were, that we can give it away again. Passing the gift along is the act of gratitude that finishes the labour.(5)

I feel that the gift of Diane's testimony has "worked in" me during the course of my writing this text, and I feel that I have been transformed by it. I also feel that I have "suffered gratitude" for the teachings I received from my own culture--its practices, methodologies, theories--but find it more difficult, now, to speak about such self transformation in the abstract language which is favoured by the learning institutions of that culture. I recall the school building/school of Lyell Island discussion to illustrate this point: to become vulnerable in my writing in the way that Diane Brown is vulnerable in her speaking I must move, rhetorically, to a place that approximates the latter more closely than it does the former.

I suggested earlier that Harry McKay and I joined company by being inscribed readers--ie., witnesses--of Diane Brown's text, and that we parted company at the point where he became the listener who was not transformed by it, and I became the listener/writer who was. To the extent that I succeeded, I, "Nobert," have been renamed. I appear as "writer" of this text, returning from the place of <u>gkow</u> and of "it," alive to tell about it. I am resited here in my text, so to speak, and have no other place than this telling from which to construct my "self." I

rely, in other words, entirely on the respect (or authority) given to my text by you, the readers/listeners.

Another way of putting this is to say that I give my text to you, the reader, as a gift. I inscribe you, (whover "you" are) in my testimony, in the same way that Diane inscribed "me." I hope, thereby, as she does, that you will agree to receive the gift and give me the return gift of your understanding and feeling: that you will witness my (re)naming, and in this way affect social, ie., mutual, transformation.

By implicating "you" thus in the act of my writing, I am doing two things. One, I am asking you to witness my renaming, to bestow respect on the teaching I have received from Diane by acknowledging the new "self" that emerges from it; two, I involve you directly in Diane's political renaming project, which is to transform Queen Charlotte Islands into Haada Gwaii.

If you agree--via my rendering of Diane's text--to witness the new name, and bestow repect on the place, then the translation/ transformation project succeeds. Haada Gwaii appears on "our" horizon as a gift region where two cultures come and meet and share and join in the gkow/Herring-Roe-On-Kelp transformation that bestows mutual respect. If you don't, then, like Harry McKay, you leave the site of the name vacant, and Haada Gwaii is thereby opened to be named "fibre," or "timber," or "resource," or "raw material," or any of a host of commodity names.

It is in this two-fold sense I argued earlier that Diane Brown's testimony might succeed outside the courtroom at the very point where it appears to fail inside it. In closing the boundaries of commodity speech, of testimony as "courtroom evidence" around her speech, and granting the injunction sought by the timber company, His Honour, Justice McKay, leaves open a crack--the court transcript itself--by which the testimony might leak beyond these boundaries and "transform" the world outside.

If this transformation in fact occurs--in other words, if you, the reader, accept Haada Gwaii as a gift, rather than a commodity region, and if you agree to give the value "respect" to the name/site "writer" whereby Diane's text locates me--then the spirit of Diane Brown's testimony survives, even as its words are constrained and commoditized inside the courtroom. The gift survives and moves on, and it might still become possible to transform a place by speaking and hearing "true" local words about it.

The Gitskan Wet'sewet'en Tribal Council of the Skeena, Kispiox and Babine Watersheds is currently (1987) presenting its land settlement and aboriginal rights claim in the British Columbia Supreme Court before His Honour, Mr. Chief Justice Allan MacEachern. MacEachern, I recall, is the same Chief Justice who convicted Diane Brown and her father, Watson Price, for disobeying Harry McKay's Court Order to stop blocking the Haada

Gwaii logging road.

In the course of a trial marked by consistent refusals on MacEachern's part to allow Gitskan Wet'sewet'en witnesses, most of them very old chiefs and elders, to give testimony in the traditional method of the area in question, the Judge at one point denied elder Mary Johnson the right to sing an hereditary song describing traditional land use and ownership into the record. He disallowed this testimony because he had, as he put it, a "tin ear," and it would therefore "do no good" to sing to him.(6)

In order to confront this continuing problem of European tin ears (I recall that the Haida's first name for the Europeans was "The Iron Men") I would like to present the concluding section of Diane's testimony--and of my analysis--in verse form, in order to give emphasis to its acoustic aspects and demonstrate how they modulate semantic ones.

Lavinia Lightbown said it would be easier for her to testify if testimony could be given "on one of our beaches," or in a Haida longhouse, instead of a Eurocanadian courtroom. Similarly, my testimony, and Diane's testimony will be more readily understood and felt, I think--especially by people who harbour secret doubts about the actual physical, as opposed to metallurgical make-up of their own auditory organ--if it is written as close to the acoustic mode as it is possible to get in a printed text.

The poem is introduced by a final argument from Soundscape Theory, and returns us thereby to our point of departure, the place/person dichotomy:

The opposition place/self as geographical designation both conceals and discloses, on the level of language, the opposition speaking/listening. If "self," to be a true designation, must extend over into place, then "speaking," to be a true rendering of location in language, must extend over into "listening." And, of course, vice versa in both cases: listening provides the echo of environment which the body needs in order to experience "true" speaking; and the environment (place), in order to "speak" (ie. become humanly inhabited) must be addressed by a speaking voice.

Speaking/listening thus corresponds, on the level of language, to the place/self opposition proposed by geography. The act of speaking/listening is the physical/physiological manifestation of "language" in the same way that place/person is the physiological/ physical manifestation of "landscape."(7)

It is on this level of understanding and intimacy that I would like to share and respect the final section of Diane's text:

Finally the day comes when it spawns
the water
gets all milky around it.

I know I am supposed to speak for myself
but I share this experience
with all the friends,
lady friends,
that we pick together
this wonderful feeling
on the day that it happens.

The excitement
the relief
that the herring
did indeed come
this year.

And you don't feel quite complete
until you are right out on the ocean
with your hands
in the water
harvesting
kelp,
the roe on kelp and then
your body feels right.

The cycle is complete
and it's not quite perfect
until you eat your first batch of herring roe
on kelp.

I don't know how to say it good
but your body
almost rejoices in that first feed.

It feels right. If you
listen to your body
it tells you a lot of things.
If you put something wrong in it
your body feels it.
If you put something right in it
your body feels it.
Your spiritual self feels it.

In order to make me complete
I need the right food from the land.

But I wanted to elaborate on the harvesting of kelp,
to give an idea
of how it feels as a Haida

to harvest food.

APPENDIX

Full text of Diane Brown's Testimony, given to Justice Harry McKay, in Supreme Court of British Columbia, November 6, 1985.

Kilsli, Kilsligana, Kiljadgana, Taaxwilaas. Your Honour, chiefs, ladies held in high esteem, friends. I thank you for this opportunity to speak today. I was aware that I could get a lawyer, but I feel you lose if you go through another person.

My first language is Haida. My second language is English. Therefore I can express myself better in English. I feel through another person, a lawyer, they also speak another language, and I would have lost what I hope to help Kilsli understand and feel.

Since the beginning of time--I have been told this through our oral stories--since the beginning of time the Haidas have been on the Queen Charlotte Islands.

That was our place, given to us.

We were put on the islands as caretakers of this land.

Approximately 200 years ago foreigners came to that land. The Haida are very hospitable people. The people came. They were welcomed. We shared. They told us that perhaps there is a better way to live, a different religion, education in schools. The Haida tried this way. The potlatches were outlawed. In many schools my father attended in Kokalitza, the Haida language was not allowed to be spoken. He was punished if he used his

language. To this day, Watson Price, my father, understands every word of the Haida language, but he doesn't speak it.

So the people came. We tried their way. Their language. Their education. Their way of worship. It is clear to me that they are not managing our lands well. If this continues, there will be nothing left for my children and my grandchildren to come. I feel that the people governing us should give us a chance to manage the land the way we know how it should be.

It seems that the other cultures don't see trees. They see money. That's not the way it is in my mind. It's take and take and take from the earth.

On Lyell Island--I want to address Lyell Island and South Morseby, the injunction being served on us. I want to say why that concerns me. To me it is a home of our ancestors. As Lily stated, our ancestors are still there. It is my childhood. Every spring come March my father and mother would take me down to Burnaby Narrows. We stayed there till June. It's wonderful memories I had. I am thankful to my parents for bringing me up the traditional way. There was concern on the Indian agent's part that I missed too much school. But how can you tell them that I was at school?

Because of that upbringing, because I was brought down to Lyell Island area, Burnaby Narrows and living off the land, I feel--that's why I feel the way I do about my culture and the land.

In those early years the first lesson in my life that I remember is respect. I was taught to respect the land. I was taught to respect the food that comes from the land. I was taught that everything had a meaning. Every insect had a meaning and none of those things were to be held lightly. The food was never to be taken for granted. In gathering the food, it's what--the nearest I can translate I can say to gather food is a spiritual experience for me.

We are a nation of people at risk today. They say that to make a culture the language is important. I am proud to say I speak my language, but not too many more people in my age do. So you can say in a sense, if this keeps up, the language is going fast. In the past the culture was in very much jeopardy when the potlatching was outlawed. We almost lost ourselves as a people. That culture has been revived in the past few years. There is pride in being a Haida, pride in being a Native. The only thing we can hold onto to maintain that pride and dignity as a people is the land. It's from the land we get our food, it's from the land we get our strength. From the sea we get our energy. If this land such a Lyell Island is logged off as they want to log it off--and they will go on logging. We have watched this for many years. I have read records that our forefathers fought in 1913. It's been an ongoing fight. But no one is really hearing us. They said they wouldn't log Lyell Island at first and now I hear they are going to go ahead. So today I am here because pretty soon all we are going to be fighting for is stumps. When Frank Beban and his crew are through and there are stumps left on Lyell Island,

they got a place to go. We, the Haida people, will be on the Island. I don't want my children and my future grandchildren to inherit stumps. They say, "Don't be concerned, we're planting trees again. Wait for the second growth. It will be just like before." I travel all around the Island a lot with my family. I see lots of things. This summer I got to see second growth and it pained me a great deal, because I kept hearing there is second growth coming. I saw twenty-year-old second growth around Salt Lagoon. They were planted so close that the trees couldn't grow big. They were small and there was no light getting into them. They couldn't grow. You could see and you could feel that they could not grown. Therefore, I don't feel too hopeful when I hear second growth.

I want to touch now on another very important area in my life as a food gatherer. It is my job, my purpose, to insure that I gather certain foods for my husband and my children, and I want to share one part. It's called gkow. That's herring roe on kelp. In the spring the herring come and they spawn on kelp. For many years now I have been harvesting that and putting it away for the winter. But so far I haven't heard what--why is food gathering spiritual?

It's a spiritual thing that happens. It doesn't just happen every year. You can't take that for granted. We can't take that for granted because everything in the environment has to be perfect. The climate has to be perfect, the water temperature, the kelp

have to be ready and the herring have to want to spawn.

But I want to share what goes on in my spiritual self in my body come February. And I feel it's an important point. That's what makes me as a Haida different from you, Kilsli. My body feels that it's time to spawn. It gets ready in February. I get a longing to be on the sea. I constantly watch the ocean surounding the island where the herring spawn. My body is kind of on edge in anticipation.

Finally the day comes when it spawns the water gets all milky around it. I know I am supposed to speak for myself, but I share this experience with all the friends, the lady friends, that we pick together this wonderful feeling on the day that it happens, the excitement, the relief that the herring did indeed come this year. And you don't quite feel complete until you are right out on the ocean with your hands in the water harvesting the kelp, the roe on kelp, and then your body feels right. That cycle is complete.

And it's not quite perfect until you eat your first batch of herring roe on kelp. I don't know how to say it well, but your body almost rejoices in that first feed. It feels right. If you listen to your body it tells you a lot of things. If you put something wrong in it, your body feels it. If you put something right in it, your body feels it. Your spiritual self feels it. In order to make me complete I need the right food from the land. I also need to prepare it myself. I have to harvest it myself. The

same thing goes for fish, the fish that we gather for the winter. But I wanted to elaborate on the harvesting of kelp to give you an idea of how it feels as a Haida to harvest food.

I want to talk and help you people understand some more about the culture, and the best way I can do that is to use examples. We had laws, much like yours here today. Laws for adoption, laws for marriage. The potlatch is a form of law. I was adopted. Not in the courts, but it was agreed and it was more strong than any paper any of us could ever have. I was born to my father Watson Price's niece, Ada Yovanovich. My adopted mother couldn't have children. She had one, but she couldn't have more. Her uncle would ask for me when she was carrying me. She couldn't say no. So that's how I came to be in the same clan as my father.

It's not--I wanted to make it clear, because you may wonder why a hereditary chief is my father. We are a matriarchal society. You follow your mother. And if you are adopted, you follow your bloodline, even if you're adopted. I should maintain the Khisun line. However my adopted mother was from Skedans and a very strong lady and brought me up as a Skedans lady. And when she died, my father said, "Respect her way for a while, and then come back to us."

So we had appropriate ceremony for me to come back to the Khisun clan. Those are the laws we abide by.

So today since that ceremony I got a Khisun name, Kwakanat. But that law of adoption, we didn't go to court. But he is my father and there is nothing can ever say anything different.

There are more laws. I don't need to go into all of them, but, like I said, there is some laws for marrying--that's the kind of culture we have. We had everything covered.

So I want to stress that it's the land that helps us maintain our culture. It is an important important part of our culture. Without that land, I fear very much for the future of the Haida nation. Like I said before, I don't want my children to inherit stumps. I want my children and my grandchildren to grow up with pride and dignity as a member of the Haida nation. I fear that if we take that land that we may lose the dignity and the pride of being a Haida. Without that there is no--there is no way that I can see that we could carry on with pride and dignity. I feel very strongly--that's why I came down to express my concern for my children and grandchildren.

So today, if that injunction goes through and the logging continues--and there is a saying up there, they say, "Log it to the beach." Then what? What will be left and who will be left? We can't go anywhere else but the Island.

I study a lot about our brothers on the mainland, the North American Plains Indians in their history. They moved a lot because they were forced to. Some moved north, south east west,

back up against the mountains and back again.

We as Haida people can't move anymore west. We can go over into the ocean is all. So when the logging is gone, is done, if it gos through and there is stumps left, the loggers will have gone and we will be there as we have been since the beginning of time. Left with very little to work with as a people.

Again I want to thank you, Kilsli, for this opportunity to speak and share my culture. Thank you very much.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. Western Forest Products vs. Dempsey Collinson, Chief of the Skidegate Indian Band, on behalf of himself and all other members of the Skidegate Indian Band, Miles Richardson, Administrator of the Haida Tribal Council, on behalf of himself and all other members of the Haida Tribal Council, Gary Russ, Gary Edenshaw, John Doe, Jane Doe and Persons Unknown, British Columbia Supreme Court Proceedings at Trial, November 6, 7 and 8, 1985. All subsequent references to this Hearing will be given in the body of my text. The full text of Diane Brown's testimony is given in the appendix.

2. "South Morseby Park Set Under New Deal," The Globe and Mail, Toronto, July 7, 1987.

3. See Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Living Treaties, Lasting Agreements: Task Force to Review Comprehensive Claims Policy, Ottawa, 1985, pp. 63-78. Menno Boldt and J. Anthony Lang argue, in Governments in Conflict: Provinces and Indian Nations in Canada, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, (forthcoming, Fall, 1987) that the current Federal policy of negotiating "comprehensive" claims is an attempt on its part to alleviate the failure of its previous "cultural assimilation" policy for Indian Nations by replacing it with a policy of "institutional assimilation."

4. William Leiss, Stephen Kline, Sut Jhally, Social Communication in Advertising, New York: Methuen, 1986, p. 53.

5. Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books, 1973.

PART I

1. Bakhtin suggests that consensus is a key goal of what he calls "dialogic discourse." See V. N. Volosinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, trans. Ladislav Matejka and I. R. Titunik, New York and London: Seminar Press, 1973.

2. Bakhtin also points out how a "dialogic utterance" tends to have two opposing functions: 1) to create new meaning, and 2) to replicate the status quo of previous speech situations. It

is in the working out of this contradiction, according to him, that meaning and ideological power relations are constructed. See Rowan Shirkie, "Dialogic Discourse: Bakhtin and Mulkay," Unpublished paper, Burnaby, B.C.: Department of Communication, Simon Fraser University. See also John B. Thompson, Studies in the Theory of Ideology, Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 124-126, for Roger Fowler's discussion of nominalization, passification and classification as rhetorical methodologies of empowerment in language.

3. Thanks to Leiss, Kline and Jhally for metaphor of the bridge--as the location where influential social discourses cross and create a privileged site. The authors use it to describe the role the ad agencies play in mediating the flow of symbols in market industrial society. See Leiss, Kline, Jhally, pp. 97-102, 120-122.

4. Frank Beban Logging Ltd. vs. Dempsey Collinson, Gary Russ, Miles Richardson and Gary Edenshaw and Persons Unknown, British Columbia Supreme Court Proceedings at Trial, November 29, 1985, p. 73.

5. See Robert Levine and Freda Cooper, "The Supression of B.C. Languages: Filling in the Gaps in the Documentary Record," in Sound Heritage, Vol IV, Number 3 & 4, Victoria: Provincial Archives, 1976, pp. 43-76, for an excellent discussion of this issue.

6. See Neil Evernden, The Natural Alien, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985, pp.14-18, for the image of the cut vocal chords. He uses it eloquently there to describe the European strategy of "scientism," one of whose projects is to silence nature. I think it applies fully here, where the context is racism/colonialsm.

7. Captain George Dixon, A Voyage Around the World, But More Particularly to the North West Coast of America, Performed in 1785, 1786, 1787, 1788, London: George Goulding, 1789, p. 224. See also Captain John T. Walbran, British Columbia Coast Names, Vancouver: J.J. Douglas, 1971, p. 409.

8. Wilson Duff, The Indian History of British Columbia, Vol. 1: The Impact of the White Man, Anthropology in British Columbia Memoir No. 5, British Columbia Provincial Museum, Victoria: Queen's Printer, 1964, p. 88.

9. Hugh Brody, Maps and Dreams, Vancouver: Douglas and McIntyre, 1981, pp. 14-16.

10. See Forrest E. LaViolette, The Struggle For Survival: Indian Cultures and the Protestant Ethic in British Columbia, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961, for a thorough discussion of the outlawing of the Potlatch on the West

Coast. For a description of the traditional Haida Potlatch, see John R. Swanton, Contributions to the Ethnology of the Haida, Memoires of the American Museum of Natural History, Vol. V, Part 1, New York and Leiden: E. J. Brill Ltd. and G.E. Stecht Ltd., 1905, pp. 155-161.

11. "The sound made by a person takes on the characteristics of the environment through the process of reflection and absorption...Therefore, what the listener/soundmaker hears is a simultaneous image of self and environment...The feedback of acoustic information is necessary for orientation, and in the most general sense, the awareness of self in relation to others," says Barry Truax in Acoustic Communication, Norwood: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1984, p. 20. See also Don Ihde, Listening and Voice: A Phenomenology of Sound, Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1976, pp. 68-69.

12. See Swanton, p. 155-56. Also Mary Lee Stearns, Haida Culture in Custody, Vancouver and Seattle: University of Washington Press and Douglas & McIntyre, 1981, Ch. 2, Ch. 9., for a discussion of contemporary Haida adaptions of the Potlatch Institution.

13. See Stearns, Ch. 2 and 3, for a discussion of Haida assimilation strategies, and their relation to the Canadian Government's contradictory policies of cultural integration on the one hand and economic isolation on the other.

14. The theory of the "Science of the Concrete," which speaks to this issue, has been convincingly argued by Claude Levi Strauss in The Savage Mind, trans. by George Weidenfeld and Nicolson Ltd., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966. See Ch. 1. The theory is given a strong local interpretation and adaption by Wilson Duff in "The World is Sharp as a Knife," in Donald A. Abbott, ed., The World is Sharp as a Knife: An Anthology in Honour of Wilson Duff, Victoria: British Columbia Provincial Museum, 1981, pp. 209-224.

15. Soundscape theory invokes the terms "earwitness accounts" to describe this process. See Truax, pp. 17-18.

16. Marshall Sahlins, Culture and Practical Reason, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1976, p. 211.

17. Sahlins, p. 213.

18. Sahlins, p. 216.

19. Sahlins, p. 215.

20. Sahlins, p. 220.

21. Sahlins, p. 221.

22. Leiss, Kline, Jhally, p. 270.

23. Leiss, Kline, Jhally, p. 275.

24. See Stearns, Chs. 2 & 3.

PART II

1. Ricoeur says "Metaphor is the rhetorical process by which discourse unleashes the power that certain fictions have to redescribe reality." See Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977, p. 7, cited in Leiss, Kline, Jhally, p. 241.

2. Stearns' book is an excellent discussion of how this "boundary structure" resulted from Canadian policy efforts to contain Haida culture. See especially chs. 2 & 3.

3. Neil Evernden's conception of the self as a "field of caring" (Sorge--he takes the notion from Heidegger), on the one hand, and the environment as a "field of self" on the other underlies this whole second section of my analysis. The field of caring/field of self argument offers an exciting European paradigm by which to approach Diane Brown's thoughts on the place/self issue. See Evernden, pp. 35-55.

4. Evernden, p. 125.

5. I use the word "myth" here in the anthropological sense of a story of origins, and in the literary/psychoanalytic sense of a carrier of moral values. See Tim O'Sullivan, John Hartly, Danny Saunders, John Fiske, Key Concepts in Communication, London, New York: Methuen, 1983, p. 147.

6. Haida Carver Robert Davidson says there are three sides to any story: "your side, my side, and the truth." Transcript, November 7th, p. 27.

7. See Swanton and also Stearns. My understanding of the traditional Potlatch on the Pacific Coast is further informed by Boas, Barnett, Codere, Drucker. See bibliography.

8. Ulli Steltzer, A Haida Potlatch, Forward by Marjorie Halpin, Vancouver and Toronto: Douglas and McIntyre, 1984, p. x.

9. Stearns, pp. 293-296.

10. Lewis Hyde, The Gift: Imagination and the Erotic Life of Property, New York: Vintage Books, 1979, p. 13.

11. Hyde, p. 86.

12. Hyde, p. 23.

13. Hyde, p. 24.

14. Hyde, p. 61.

15. loc. cit.

16. loc. cit.

17. Hyde, p. 89.

18. Karl Marx, Das Kapital: Kritik der Politischen Okonomie, Bd. I, Frankfurt und Berlin: Ullstein, pp. 50-62.

19. Hyde, p. 92.

20. For the difference between felt and legal contract in the history of treaty-(meaning-)making between Indians and Europeans in Canada, see Michael Asch, Home and Native Land: Aboriginal Rights and the Canadian Constitution, Toronto: Methuen, 1984, pp. 55-71. See also Hugh Brody, esp. pp. 49-71, and Thomas Berger, Northern Frontier, Northern Homeland: The Report of the MacKenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry, Vol. 1, Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1977, esp. pp. 163-197.

21. Bruno Bettelheim, Uses of Enchantment: The Meaning and Importance of Fairy Tales, New York: Vintage Books, p. 86.

22. Salmon, who are a strong source of spawning imagery on the West Coast of North America, also die right after they spawn--which adds poignancy to the image here.

23. Steltzer, p. viii.

24. loc. cit. My emphasis.

25. Miles Richardson, Public Address, Stein Wilderness Festival, Brimful Lake, Aug. 1, 1987.

26. loc. cit.

27. Miles Richardson, Interview, Brimful Lake, Aug. 1, 1987.

28. Hyde, p. 26.

29. loc. cit.

30. Hyde, p. 27.

31. My information on these matters is received with thanks from Vancouver lawyer Kim Roberts.

32. I use the terms "metonym" and "metaphor" here in the standard sense they are used in literary criticism--while being aware

that writers like Jacobson, Burke, Welleck and others have considered them as the prime rhetorical figures for the construction of meaning in language.

33. It doesn't come into its own as a social force, of course, until the Post Enlightenment period of European nation building. Its basic grammar, however, is established by the feudal connection between a lord and his lands via the medium of his (and its) serfs. See Foucault, The Order of Things, ch. 6.

34. See Michel Foucault, "Two Lectures," in Colin Gordon, ed., Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Writings, 1972-1977, Michel Foucault, New York: Pantheon, pp. 78-108, for a discussion of the sovereignty theme.

35. My thoughts on myth here are influenced by Roland Barthes. See "Myth Today," in Roland Barthes, Mythologies, selected and translated by Annette Lavers, Frogmore, St. Albans, Herts: Paladin, 1973, pp. 109-158.

36. It is instructive in this connection to read the transcript of the injunction trial which followed the Hearing from which the testimony considered here is taken. There, Justice Allan MacEachern refused to allow the Haida to testify in the traditional way, and the resulting miscommunications stand as a tribute to Canadian legal bigotry and thick headedness. See transcript, Frank Beban Logging Ltd. vs. Dempsey Collinson, Gary Russ, Miles Richardson and Gary Edenshaw and Persons Unknown.

37. Leiss, Kline, Jhally, pp. 270-277.

38. Foucault, "Two Lectures," pp. 107-108.

39. The Globe and Mail, The Vancouver Sun, April-May, 1987, various issues.

40. See Asch, pp. 112-114, and Berger, p. 165.

41. See Noel Dyck, "Aboriginal Peoples and Nation State: An Introduction to the Analytical Issues" in Noel Dyck, ed., Indigenous Peoples and the Nation State, St. John's Nfld: Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1985, pp. 1-26, for a discussion of the relation between aboriginal rights and the nation state sovereignty concept.

42. As it was still called when I immigrated.

43. In semiotic terms, the Crown becomes the signifier, while sovereignty is the signified.

44. Corday McKay, among others, reports that when Captain William Douglas of the ship Iphigenia exchanged names with Chief Blakow-Coneehaw at Kiusta, near North Island, in 1788, this

contract survived in Haida lore to the extent that Chief Edenshaw, inheritor of Blakow-Coneehaw's title, retold it to George Dawson almost one hundred years later as the First Contact Story between Haida and Europeans on Haada Gwaii. See British Columbia, Department of Education, Division of Curriculum, British Columbia Heritage Series II, Our Pioneers. The Queen Charlotte Islands. Victoria: Provincial Archives, 1953, pp. 23-24. See also Dalzell, p. 25.

CONCLUSION

1. Asch, ch. 7, esp. pp. 100-104.

2. All of us living in British Columbia have observed, for example, how this latter process of private accumulation transforms local items of social and political power and worth into inert and often distant collections of "Northwest Coast Indian Art."

3. To truly "go there," ie., to Haada Gwaii and to gkow, I would have to learn Haida, of course--as I suggested earlier Harry/Kilsli would have to if Diane's first language/second language symmetries were to become fully operational. My reading, as interpretation, thus hovers on the boundary between translation and transformation: I accept the metaphor of the bridge and move half way across it, and then have to stop.

4. Hyde, p. 47.

5. loc. cit.

6. "Justice's 'tin ear' tested in Indian land claims trial," Vancouver Sun, May 30, 1987.

7. My thinking here is informed by Truax, R. Murray Schafer's The Tuning of the World, New York: Alfred Knopf, 1977, and especially by conversations with my friend and colleague, Hildegard Westerkamp.

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