National Library of Canada
Bibliothèque nationale du Canada

Canadian Theses Service
Services des thèses canadiennes

Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0N4

CANADIAN THESES

THÈSES CANADIENNES

NOTICE

The quality of this microfiche is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us an inferior photocopy.

Previously copyrighted materials (journal articles, published tests, etc.) are not filmed.

Reproduction in full or in part of this film is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30.

AVIS

La qualité de cette microfiche dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise au microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

S'il manque des pages, veuillez communiquer avec l'université qui a conféré le grade.

La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer, surtout si les pages originales ont été dactylographiées à l'aide d'un ruban usé ou si l'université nous a fait parvenir une photocopie de qualité inférieure.

Les documents qui font déjà l'objet d'un droit d'auteur (articles de revue, examens publiés, etc.) ne sont pas microfilmés.

La reproduction, même partielle, de ce microfilm est soumise à la Loi canadienne sur le droit d'auteur, SRC 1970, c. C-30.

THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED

LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ MICROFILMÉE TELLE QUE NOUS L'AVONS REÇUE

NL-339 (r. 86/06)

Canada

NUCLEAR TEXT

by

Nicholas Witheford

B.A., Simon Fraser University, 1981

THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF

THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

in the Department

of

English

© Nicholas Witheford 1987

SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY

April 1987

All rights reserved. This work may not be
reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy
or other means, without permission of the author.

Permission has been granted to the National Library of Canada to microfilm this thesis and to lend or sell copies of the film.

The author (copyright owner) has reserved other publication rights, and neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without his/her written permission.

L'autorisation a été accordée à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de microfilmer cette thèse et de prêter ou de vendre des exemplaires du film.

L'auteur (titulaire du droit d'auteur) se réserve les autres droits de publication; ni la thèse ni de longs extraits de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation écrite.

ISBN 0-315-36265-0

APPROVAL

NAME: Nicholas Caspar Witheford

DEGREE: Master of Arts

TITLE OF THESIS: Nuclear Text

EXAMINING COMMITTEE:

Chairman: Dr. Harvey De Roo

Dr. Chin Banerjee, Senior Supervisor
Associate Professor of English

Dr. Michael Steig
Professor of English

Dr. Margaret Benston
Assistant Professor
Computing Science/Women's Studies, SFU

Date: February 26, 1987

PARTIAL COPYRIGHT LICENSE

I hereby grant to Simon Fraser University the right to lend my thesis, project or extended essay (the title of which is shown below) to users of the Simon Fraser University Library, and to make partial or single copies only for such users or in response to a request from the library of any other university, or other educational institution, on its own behalf or for one of its users. I further agree that permission for multiple copying of this work for scholarly purposes may be granted by me or the Dean of Graduate Studies. It is understood that copying or publication of this work for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

Title of Thesis/Project/Extended Essay

Nuclear Text

Author:

(signature)

Nicholas Witheford

(name)

13.4.51.

(date)

ABSTRACT

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the nuclear issue exploded into North American and British culture. After nearly two decades of invisibility, the Bomb reappeared in journalism, fiction, and film. This reappearance was initiated by the propaganda of nuclear states anxious to justify a new acceleration of the arms race. But official "nukespeak" aroused dissent and the sudden growth of a vigorous peace movement. From 1979 to 1984 the discourses of nuclear state and anti-nuclear protest contended for a common cultural space, each working to affirm its representations of the Bomb, and to cancel out those of its rival.

This discursive struggle was waged across the three fields of nuclear signs, nuclear subjectivity, and nuclear speculation. Nuclear signs are the words, metaphors and images by which we name the nuclear predicament. These signs designate the identities of writers and readers in relation to the Bomb, and hence define their positions, of acquiescence or revolt, as nuclear subjects. Nuclear subjects are mobilized for action according to the speculative narratives by which we forecast our nuclear future, or lack of one.

Individual texts can be read as interventions on this contested terrain. General Sir John Hackett's The Third World War translates official discourse into the idiom of popular fiction and develops a bipolar antagonism between "our side" and "the enemy" to legitimize the concept of "limited" nuclear war. In contrast, Jonathan Schell's The Fate of the Earth exemplifies the apocalyptic doomsaying by which the peace movement aroused opposition to official policy in the name of planetary human survival. The conjugation of feminism and disarmament so powerfully demonstrated at Greenham Common is articulated in several writings by women who connect anti-nuclear activism with critique of phallogocentricism. Finally, the popular identification of President Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative with George Lucas' Star Wars suggests how the advent of real-life space-weaponry

has been mediated to the North American public through the images of Hollywood science-fiction.

These texts' engagement in the conflict between state and protest is displayed in their contradictions--literally, contrary utterances. Such contradictions are, on the one hand, intertextual, in that the signs, subject-positions and speculations proposed by one text write-out or write-off those of another. They are also intratextual, in that texts display within themselves inconsistencies and ambiguities that betray the dilemmas of nuclear politics. Reading these contradictions from a Marxist and feminist perspective we can trace the contending forces that produce our culture's fissioned nuclear text.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The cohabitants of thesis writers deserve to have their names on the title page of the finished document. Certainly this is true of my non-nuclear family--Colleen Wood, Adrienne Witheford and Miranda Witheford--who have shared so extensively and so supportively in the labour of this text's production. My thanks also to the fellow graduate students--Jeff Berg, Peter Cook, Simon Dalby, Wendy Frost and Michelle Valliquette--who have at various points offered criticism and encouragement, and to Laurine Harrison, co-worker and fellow trades unionist, who helped with nuclear film.

DEDICATION

For Colleen.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Approval ii

Abstract iii

Acknowledgements v

Dedication vi

I. Nuclear Text 1

1. Nuclear Text 1
2. Nuclear Signs 4
3. Nuclear Subjects 7
4. Nuclear Speculations 11
5. Writing on the Wall? 15

II. Nukespeak's Novel 18

1. Rumours of War 18
2. Official Signatures 19
3. The Image of the Other 21
4. The Unchanging Face of War 24
5. The Nuclear Exchange 26
6. "To Make Children Behave Better" 29
7. Deconstructing the Other 32

III. Doomsaying 36

1. The Discourse of Doom 36
2. Representing the Unthinkable 37
3. Extinction Fictions 40
4. The Planetary Subject 43
5. The Unspeakable In The Unthinkable 46
6. Doom Depoliticized 49

7. The Appropriation of Apocalypse 52
IV. Writing Greenham 56
1. Greenham Text 56
2. Nucleophallogocentricism 57
3. On the Wire 60
4. Breaching the Peace 63
5. Web Weaving 66
6. Greenham Women 71
7. Common Ground? 74
V. Naming Star Wars 77
1. "A Long Time Ago, In a Galaxy Far, Far Away" 77
2. Special Effects 80
3. The High Frontier 82
4. Sky Fathers 84
5. Cyborgs and Real Men 86
6. The Force 89
7. Time-Warps 91
8. Closing Shots 93
Notes 98
Works Cited 128

CHAPTER I

NUCLEAR TEXT

1. Nuclear Text

When the atomic bomb detonated over Hiroshima, the flash was absorbed by a man sitting outside the the Sumitomo bank, three hundred yards from the epicentre of the explosion, and his shadow imprinted on the granite steps and walls. This shadow, the only trace of a victim vaporized in an agony of heat and light, is now preserved under glass. Viewed by thousands of tourists, photographed as illustration to scores of books, reproduced world wide in the pavement art of protestors, its blackened shape has become an emblem of the atomic age. It has been made part of the play of symbols by which we grasp at our identities and our futures in a situation of unprecedented danger: nuclear text.

This study concerns more recent, and more literal, examples of nuclear text. It deals with representations of nuclear war and nuclear weapons in fiction, journalism, and film from Britain and North America between 1979 and 1984. It is thus about works produced during the recent confrontation between the NATO nuclear states and the international peace movement. And it is in terms of this conflict--a struggle which had at issue global arsenals with an accumulated destructive capacity equivalent to some one and a half million Hiroshimas--that these texts are discussed here.[1]

It was during this period that European and American culture suddenly remembered the Bomb. For a generation, the danger of nuclear war had undergone the process Roland Barthes terms "ex-nomination," by which the naming of disturbing, central, features of the social order is tacitly tabooed.[2] After the anti-nuclear protests of the late 1950s that lead to the Atmospheric Test-Ban Treaty, Western governments had discreetly hidden

overkill in circumlocution, secrecy and expert reassurance.[3] Mainstream media signally failed to question or challenge this official silence.[4] As a result, the Bomb enjoyed a protracted period of what Robert del Tredici terms "cultural invisibility," during which nuclear dangers became:

> Just a swirl of abstract ideas . . . The only thing that comes to mind is a mushroom cloud, a cooling tower, and a little pointy weapon. Sometimes the deformed people from Hiroshima: that's about the extent of the imagery.[5]

Or as Peter Watkins, the director of The War Game, wrote in 1980:

> Though we have heard and read in the media about the possibility of nuclear war, most of us, including those in the media who have produced the word have only a vague comprehension as to what the words mean in their full context. We sit, and the words slip past, meaningless.[6]

In this context, the words "nuclear war" became subject to what Barthes calls a "haemorrhage of meaning," as significance "leaked out of them."[7]

The advent of the 1980s saw shock-treatment for this condition. These were apocalyptic years, or at least, as Raymond Williams has pointed out, years in which the term "apocalypse" suddenly became popular and synonymous with nuclear destruction.[8] The immediate cause for this crisis atmosphere was the United States' attempt to reassert a waning nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union.[9] From the late 1970s, successive US administrations embarked on massive programs of nuclear armament: Trident, MX, Pershing, and Cruise missiles, B-1 bombers, and neutron bombs were developed or deployed; nuclear command, control and communication systems renovated; civil defence plans reintroduced; arms control treaties abrogated; recalcitrant allies whipped into line. At the same time, announced nuclear policy underwent an ominous shift. Amidst the tensions of a New Cold War, the traditional doctrine of deterrence was more and more frequently displaced by reference to the possibility of "winnable," or "survivable," nuclear war.

These developments provoked alarm and opposition on both sides of the Atlantic. The climate is precisely captured in Sarah Kirsch's "Year's End":

This autumn the nuclear mushrooms became
So commonplace a sight in the papers
That when contemplating the photos
Aesthetic categories began to form.
The fate of the blue planet was forseeable.
The word *neutron bomb* appeared frequently,
As did its brothers--petrol prices, weather forecast--
It became as everyday as appeals for peace.[16]

Catalysed by the belligerent rhetoric of the incoming Reagan administration, nuclear protest, dormant for nearly twenty years, underwent an unexpected revival. Starting in Europe, where NATO plans to install new forward based American missiles provided a focus of resistance, dissent spread to the United States itself, and deepened from opposition to specific policies to challenge the underlying premises of the arms race. Military bases became the sites of mass civil disobedience and arrest; refusals to participate in civil defence planning, referenda calling for nuclear disarmament and declarations of nuclear-free zones invaded local politics; on the banners and placards carried in the largest popular demonstrations ever seen in Western capitals there reappeared one of the most ubiquitous of all modern oppositional symbols--the inverted trident, white on black, of the "ban-the-bomb" sign.

American and European society became an arena for the opposed nuclear discourses of state and protest.[17] These discourses constituted distinctive and antagonistic ways of speaking or scripting the nuclear condition. Each possessed its own repertoire of concepts and statements, its characteristic terminologies and images, its typical positionings of authority and audience, all variously reshaped and recoded as they were mediated through the spheres of politics, journalism, popular entertainment and other branches of culture. The dominant discourse was the official "nukespeak": a set of representations, disseminated by an enormously powerful state ideological apparatus, inscribing nuclear weapons within the iron logic of "national security."[18] Challenging it was an emergent "discourse of dissent," initially marginalized and confined to capillary networks of activists, but increasingly

interjecting itself into broader channels of communication.[11] This dissenting discourse was extremely heterogenous. It collated voices which were in many ways profoundly incongruent--liberal, socialist, feminist, pacifist, christian. Yet at the intersection of these disparate perspectives appeared a set of shared figures and themes: an idiom of urgency and fear, foretelling impending disaster in a world at "four minutes to midnight," repudiating the calculus of realpolitik and demanding an end to "nuclear madness."

For some four or five years, nukespeak and the discourse of dissent contended intensely for a common cultural space--each working to affirm, elaborate and amplify its representations of the Bomb and to deny or cancel out those of its rival, often only to find its efforts recuperated or annexed by its opponent. The texts discussed here are symptoms of, and interventions in, this flux. They are therefore read here with special regard to their contradictions (literally, contrary utterances): intertextual contradictions--the way in which texts write-out or write-off the assertions of their rivals, and intratextual contradictions--the way in which political struggle marks texts internally with inconsistencies, ambivalencies, and gaps. These conflicts are traced across three superimposed fields of nuclear textuality--fields of nuclear signs, nuclear subjectivity, and nuclear speculation.

2. Nuclear Signs

At stake between nukespeak and dissent was control of the nuclear sign. The nuclear age has generated new words and new metaphors, giving us, for example, "megaton," "overkill", "the balance of terror," "nuclear freeze," "nuclear winter." It has changed the meaning of old ones, drastically altering the sense in which we speak of "war," "survival" or "defence." It has spawned an amazing iconography of towering mushroom clouds, futuristic weaponry, peace doves and devastated cities. Both state and protest attempted to direct this semiosis. They worked to invent nuclear signs, to fix their

range of reference and regulate their usage. Competing to ensure that it was their words and their images which mediated our conception of the nuclear condition, nukespeak and dissent fought to "set the terms" for a post-Hiroshima world.

Each discourse *named* the nuclear predicament differently, circulating rival signifiers for the same referent. A missile might be a "device" of one, ten or twenty "megatons" with "prompt hard kill capacity" in the jargon of the strategists who target it, and "a dozen Auschwitzes" in the letters of the activist imprisoned for taking a pneumatic drill to it. In various governmental texts it might be identified by an acronym: "ICBM," "SLBM"--or by the name of a god or a hero: "Poseidon," "Pershing." Public relations officers might even go so far as to christen it "part of the West's life insurance." But in the CND pamphlet distributed outside its base, that missile was simply "the Bomb," an "it," a monstrous "thing of menace." In nukespeak, the missile was carefully allotted its place across an opposition between the forces of "defence" and "threat"; in the discourse of dissent, it was a component in an indiscriminate "doomsday machine." Depending on which discourse "spoke" the missile, the system which required and supported it might be designated as "deterrence"--or "exterminism"; the eventuality of its use might be a "nuclear exchange"--or a "holocaust"; its effects on human beings may be described as "collateral damage"--or illustrated with the infernal drawings of the A-bomb survivors.[14]

The official signs invested nuclear weapons with an aura of scientific rationality and technological clinicism; linked them with patriotic values and superhuman powers; emptied them of horror. The signs of protest made those same weapons connote madness, terror and monstrosity. Each lexicon wove around the arsenal a different web of associations and distinctions. Thus the opposed discourses implied within their very language a different ordering of nuclear assumptions and premises, taboos and possibilities: one was a sign-system for thinking what the other signified as "unthinkable."

Moreover, as the intensity of conflict between state and protest deepened during the 1980s, signs became more and more polarized. Even the previously neutral term "nuclear weapon" became problematic. On the one hand, the distinction between "nuclear" and "conventional" weapons was subject to an energetic official deconstruction in favour of doctrines of "flexible response," which strategically attenuated the significance of the atomic threshold. President Reagan announced that he considered an "enhanced radiation weapon," the neutron bomb, as "conventional."[15] On the other, peace activists such as Jonathan Schell declared that the prospect of a conflict from which no meaningful victor could emerge--a massacre rather than a war--made the term nuclear "weapon" an utimate misnomer.[16] Increasingly, to speak was to take sides.

This crisis of nuclear discourse resulted not only in the fission of signs into rival vocabularies, but also in the fusion of multiple and contradictory meanings around signs claimed alike by state and protest. Crucial words and images were made objects of capture and recapture beween nukespeak and dissent. They assumed the condition of "muiltiaccentuality" described by Volosinov, in which a single signifier becomes the crossing place for conflicting usages determined by "differently oriented social interests within one and the same sign community."[17]

Thus both nukespeak and the discourse of dissent claimed to speak for "peace." But the "peace" spoken by President Reagan when he referred to the MX as a "peacemaker" and the "peace" of the "peace movement," that of "Peace Is Our Profession" and that of "Give Peace A Chance," that of "Peace Through Strength" and "World Peace Council," signified very different things. Each of these usages laid claim to a nebulous core of commonly accepted, denotated meaning--something vaguely to do with the absence of war. But the term's connotations--the conditions and imperatives attached to "peace," what it is opposed to, or associated with, how absolute or relative a term it is, whether it is global or particular (did it suggest an absence of war for Americans? for

Russians? for Afghanis? for Nicaraguans?), how it ranks amongst other, equally contested, terms such as "freedom" or "democracy," whether it is a state which includes or excludes nuclear missiles--had been torn down the middle. The word became more and more politically polysemous, radiating multiple, partisan meanings.[11]

Nuclear texts are semiotic chain-reactions. In their pages, nuclear signs are set in motion in the sequences of association, differentiation, substitution and displacement which determine the meanings we give to the nuclear predicament. The readings offered here ask how such texts consolidate, extend or challenge the lexicons of nukespeak and dissent. What vocabularies, figures of speech and illustrations do they develop to notate nuclear phenomena? How, in light of the nuclear fact, do they redefine time-honoured words like "war,", "peace," "survival," "weapon"? What neologisms and unheard of metaphors do they coin to formulate the atomic era's awful novelty? How do texts erase nuclear signs? What euphemism, circumlocution or self-censorship do they employ? What revealatory silences make it possible to glimpse the alternative signs of some suppressed counter-discourse? These questions will be asked with an eye to the consequence of nuclear signs for nuclear powers--to the connection between denotations and detonations.

3. Nuclear Subjects

Nuclear discourses produce nuclear subjects. The most critical nuclear signs are those which mark our positions--of aquiescence or revolt--as inhabitants within a weapons system capable of exploding every human identity that falls beneath its shadow. Defining their chosen image of a nuclear world, the texts of state and protest simultaneously formulate self-images for their authors and audiences. They offer constellations of identification and opposition within which we, as readers or writers, are invited to insert ourselves. They specify who we are in relation to the Bomb.

We can elaborate these propositions by considering the workings of "nukespeak." The position typically occupied by the enunciator of official discourse was that of *nuclear authority*. The speaker or writer presented himself (for this position is usually defined as male) as an expert, possessing nuclear knowledge too complex for general comprehesion. He also asserted for himself a representative status: the discourse was being spoken "on behalf of" the nation, democracy, the free world, or perhaps even the divine will. These claims might be made explicity or implicitly, in outright statement, listed credential, esoteric jargons, modes of condescension and disparagement, in myriad subtle and not so subtle codings of class power and paternalism. Sometimes they might be expressed merely by a voice, whose bureaucratic anonymity implied a power so established, impersonal and "natural" as to defy question. Authoring its discourse, the state thus simultaneously authorized itself to pronounce unanswerably on issues of nuclear life and death.

Inseparable from this establishment of nuclear authority was the positioning of the *nuclear enemy*. This required that all nuclear considerations take place under the sign of a world-dividing bipolar opposition between a positive "us" and a negative "them." Author and audience, already ranked in a hierarchical relation of superiority and subordination, were also bound together in collaboration against a common antagonist--a menacing nuclear "other." We are dealing here with the motif of "the Soviet threat," with a choice offered beween being "dead" and "red," with the globe-crunching Russian bears looming out of the cover of Time magazine, with "missile gaps," "bomber gaps" and "windows of vulnerability," with an image which could, according to the needs of official policy, be modified into a regulated condition of "detente" or a xenophobic hostility toward an "empire of evil," but which unfailingly provided the nuclear state with its strongest legitimation.

Plotted between the vertical command of nuclear authority and the horizontal opposition to the nuclear enemy was the position of the *nuclear citizen*. This was the

place designated for nukespeak's audience. Official discourse fabricates the image of a public which is loyal, patriotic, safe under the state-held nuclear umbrella, and yet, at the same time, stoically self-sacrificing. Its listeners and hearers are constantly solicited with these representations of themselves. This process of address, or hailing, which Althusser terms "interpellation," produces a pattern of (mis)recognition, in which people learn to see themselves in the way prescribed by the dominant discourse: as the "fellow Americans" to whom the President directs his speeches, as the "we" who are assured by think-tank pundits of the enlightened rationality of "our" military policies, as the "general public" who must be alerted to the enemy's propaganda campaigns, as the "you" named in the the civil defence pamphlet--a "you" who will, "if deterrence fails," dutifully evacuate your home and drive down the highway to your appropriate crisis relocation centre.[19]

To the extent that individuals internalized and identified with positionings offered in nukespeak, they were constituted as nuclear "subjects" in the notoriously ambiguous sense of the term: "subjected" or subordinated to the policies of the nuclear state, yet "subjectively" reconciled to this situation, accepting it voluntarily, as if it were arrived at by their own independent, autonomous choice. In this way official discourse integrated people into military and political structures for whom they would be, in the event of war, totally expendable.[20]

The problem for the movements of nuclear dissent was to discover alternatives to these entrenched syndromes of authority and otherness. Disaffiliation from state-stipulated identities was colorfully displayed in the spray of buttons and banners carried at anti-nuclear demonstrations: "Better Active Today Than Radioactive Tomorrow," "Greenham Women," "Physicians For Social Responsibility," "Youth Against the Monsters," "Hell No, We Won't Glow." But the substantiation of these new subject-positions demanded a web of symbols and texts, elaborating and amplifying slogans into a sustained sense of new social identity.

Typically, the discourse of dissent tried to shatter the confidence of the nuclear citizen with the spectre of the *nuclear victim*. It confronted the populace with graphic stills of Hiroshima, with the whitened faces and inert bodies of symbolic die-ins, with maps of towns superimposed by concentric circles showing the effects of blast, fire and radiation. It replied to the official image of the nuclear enemy with that of *nuclear humanity*, invoking a supra-state species solidarity, the unity of planetary life, or of the rights of future generations. Or it skewed or inverted the state's bipolar logic, declaring that the real enemy was not Moscow, but the Pentagon, or the patriarchy, or the Bomb itself. And against the established status of the official expert dissent set the voice of the *anti-nuclear activist*, asserting different credentials, and different communities of interest, announcing the validity of knowledges about the Bomb as varied as those claimed by doctors, clerics, witches, renegade scientists, or even by the nightmares of potential casualties. To the extent that these counter-identities were lived out, individuals were prepared to write letters, march in demonstrations, commit civil disobedience or sabotage, and face fines or imprisonment, despite the state's accusations that these were acts of either well-meaning naivety or outright treachery.

Brecht wrote that "A man is an atom--he perpetually breaks up and forms anew."[21] Periods of social crisis throw into crisis the normal circuits of social identity, and accelerate this splitting and reshaping of subject-positions. In the encounter between nuclear state and nuclear protest, women and men were traversed and played upon by discourses threatening catastrophic dangers and appealing to powerful symbols of communality and power in an effort to recruit the population to their cause. Tracking the binding and loosening of identities effected by nuclear texts, these readings ask: in whose name do texts purport to speak, and by right of what knowledge? Who is the reader that they at once address and construct? Who is the "we," the "I" and the "us" that they identify? And against who, or what--against what "them" or "it"--are these identities

maintained? How do the nuclear-age identites which they propose alter or confirm traditional subject-positions embodied in stereotypes of gender, class and race? What mutations is the Bomb breeding in these texts?

4. Nuclear Speculations

Nuclear texts tell nuclear stories: scenarios, options, catastrophes, utopias, armageddons. Such stories are by definition speculative. Not only are they stories about the future (or the lack of one), they are also about the possibility (or impossibility) of an event--nuclear war--which is unprecedented. As Derrida puts it:

> Unlike the other wars, which have all been preceded by wars of more or less the same type in human memory (and gunpowder did not mark a radical break in this respect), nuclear war has no precedent. It has never occurred itself. It is a non-event. The explosion of American bombs in 1945 ended a "classical," conventional war: it did not set off a nuclear war. The terrifying reality of the nuclear conflict can only be the signified referent, not the real referent (present or past) of discourse or text . . . For the moment, today, one may say that a non-localizable nuclear war has not yet occurred: it has existence only through what is said of it, only where it is talked about. Some might call it a fable, then, a pure invention: in the sense in which it is said that a myth, an image, a fiction, a utopia, a rhetorical figure, a fantasy, a phantasm are inventions. It may also be called a speculation, even a fabulous specularization.[22]

Yet some speculations win more crediblity than others. Certain "signified referents" are invested with the status of "real referents": these are the warnings, forecasts and reassurances which actually direct the conduct of nuclear policy. Others are pronounced phantasmagoria--the stuff of B-movies, science-fiction or utopian vision. The most powerful agency in this ordering and ranking of nuclear speculations is the state. In the period under examination here, the official apparatus decreed stories of limited nuclear war plausible and those of nuclear extinction alarmist; reclassified "Star Wars" weaponry virtually overnight from Buck Rogers fantasy to pragmatic orthodoxy; and made it semi-respectable to cite the Book of Revelations in support of armament programs. It is this narrative

control, this power to define the nuclear story-line which we collectively attempt to live out, that dissent attempted to seize from nukespeak.

In the early 1980s there were several "official stories" about the Bomb. Declining from a long established ascendancy was the "deterrence" story, a sophisticated, paradoxical construction, in which the Bomb figures as a device which perpetually functions to defer its own danger. This was the narrative of strategic equilibrium, of the balance of terror, and of mutually assured destruction. Assuming increasing prominence was the "war" story, which inserted new, highly accurate nuclear weapons into an old narrative pattern of conflict, defeat and victory: this was the story of the nuclear-use theorists, with their doctrines of "protracted," "theatre," or "limited" nuclear conflagrations. And appearing abruptly in 1983 was the "Star Wars" story, presenting a vision of salvation from nuclear peril by a high-tech, "high frontier" space-shield. All these speculative narratives co-existed uneasily within nukespeak; it was in part their inconsistency, suggesting either confusion or deception, which prompted public alarm.

Dissent told a different story. It might be better to call it a non-story, or an anti-narrative. It was the vision of a nuclear "end." This declared, contra "deterrence," that nuclear arsenals, if not abolished, would eventually be used, and, contra "war," that their use would be terminal, putting a full stop to history. Here too there were variations: the proximity of catastrophe (were we at eight, five, or two minutes to midnight on the doomsday clock?); the privileged mode of destruction (would radiation, ozone depletion, or climatic catastrophe provide the most lethal effect?); the exact degree of finality (were we talking of the end of "Western civilization," of the species, or of planetary life itself? would there be "survivors who envy the dead"?)--all these altered from text to text. But the central elements remained constant: explosions of exterminating incandescence; all-engulfing firestorms; an ashy rain of death: numberless corpses amidst limitless ruin. These motifs were compiled into a representation of an annihilation so absolute as to

amount to a zero-point of negation, a story, that is, of a catastrophe truly exorbitant to any narration; one that could only be gestured at with the signifiers "unimaginable," "unutterable," "unspeakable."

These speculations all claimed to be "realistic" projections of the future. Each asserted its status as an atomic oracle. Selecting from amongst the multiple possible unfoldings of the nuclear predicament, they chose specific curves of crisis, escalation, and closure to impress upon our imaginations. And each developed gambits for refuting, ignoring or subsuming the alternatives articulated by their rivals. Nukespeak and dissent both attempted to present seamless representations of the future, in which an array of scientific studies, historical analogies, verisimilitudinous depictions, or appeals to common sense drove inexorably toward predetermined conclusions. Such narratives functioned as what Fredric Jameson calls "strategies of containment," which "allow what can be thought to seem internally coherent in its own terms, while repressing the unthinkable which lies beyond its boundaries."[23]

But these narratives were constantly challenged one by another. Each strategy for containing the hazards of the future was disrupted by counter-speculations foregrounding the very eventualities which it preferred to occlude. In this contest even the hardest nuclear "fact" became susceptible to conflicting interpretation and enlistment. Nothing could seem less speculative than the appalling testimony of the survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Yet even the witness of the *hibakusha* could be assimilated within completely contradictory narratives of nuclear war. They became part of T.K. Jones' prophecy that "with enough shovels everyone will make it through," ("in about thirty days after the blast there were people in there, salvaging the rubble, rebuilding the houses . . ."), as well as of Jonathan Schell's warning that "a full-scale nuclear holocaust could lead to the extinction of mankind."[24]

These rival speculations were, in the fortunate absence of their "real referent," unverifiable, but not inconsequential. They were themselves active in constructing the future they attempted to foretell. For it was through speculation that nukespeak and the discourse of dissent mobilized their subjects. Characteristically, nuclear speculations exhort intervention. They define choices--bifurcating paths: "arm--or the Russians will come"; "disarm--or the world will end"; "do so-and-so--or we are doomed." State and dissent alike both achieved today's deployments--of missiles or marchers--on the basis of tales about tomorrow. Their prophecies might be designed, like Schell's cautionary "awful warnings," as self-cancelling. Or they might be intended as self-fulfilling, normalizing and beckoning on the events they describe: many believed this to be case with the Reagan administration's cavalier references to "limited" nuclear war. And they may have produced effects quite contrary to these intentions: nuclear doomsayings perhaps made as many supporters for defence spending as for protest, while official speculations about nuclear victory certainly helped resurrect the peace movement. But in either case, nuclear stories intercept, accelerate or deflect the very trajectories they narrate.

Reading nuclear texts, this study asks how assertions of an authoritative "realism" about nuclear war mask or contain their own uncertainty--their unavoidably hypothetical nature. In what ways do such claims depend on fictional or literary devices--on the simulation of an atomic *vraisemblable*? And what is the practical valency of such simulations? How do they promise to alter or confirm their own auguries? In telling their nuclear stories, how do these writings deal with forks in the road--with the junctures when there are perceivable within the narratives the possibility of somehow different endings? What choices do they allege, and which do they suppress? Where do they insist on the transition from text to politics, from speculation to action?

5. Writing on the Wall?

So far, this study has sketched out its own project as a nuclear meta-text--a commentary on nuclear texts. It has indicated an historical context for such texts; set up a theoretical apparatus to apply to them; proposed questions with which to interrogate them. These moves establish a distance between this writing and those it takes as its object. And it can be seen as implying the occupation of a privileged vantage point somehow above or beyond their situation.

That implication should be subverted. This is principally because of the nature of the nuclear situation itself--a situation which we are all-too-apparently still in, and one whose global scope denies any exemptions. It is also because of the historical proximity of these texts. Since 1984 some aspects of the nuclear scene have changed. The peace movement, having first showed itself far stronger than anyone dared hope, then failed--defeated in Europe by the NATO governments' successful installation of Cruise and Pershing missiles, and, in America, all but swept away by the frenzy of electoral patriotism that bought Reagan a second term. But how to punctuate this episode of protest--whether as a definitive triumph for the US nuclear empire over its domestic opposition, or as merely the first phase of a long, rolling struggle, or as the last act before a final nuclear curtain--is at present uncertain. Meanwhile, it has become increasingly apparent that the US administration actually intends the Strategic Defence Initiative "for real," thus dwarfing every previous military venture in the history of the planet. The photo-opportunities of Geneva have, for a while, diplomatically veiled the accelerating pace of the arms race. But if none of the catastrophes depicted in the nuclear texts treated here have yet arrived, those possibilities, and the political choices they demand, are still very much in play.

There are other reasons why it would be false to pretend too much detachment. I conceived this text during an involvement, started in the late 1970s, in the Canadian

disarmament movement. It therefore issues from much the same context as the texts it discusses. Some of the early drafts were produced literally alongside pamphlets and posters protesting the testing of Cruise missiles. And the writing of the final version has in a way become part of the review and revaluation which necessarily follows a political effort thrown back in defeat. So it pursues internally the same conflicts it describes. Insofar as it works to unravel official nuclear texts, it intends an extension of the critique of nukespeak already powerfully developed by the discourse of dissent: insofar as it does the same for certain texts of the peace movement, it manifests the contradictions which exist within the discourse of dissent itself--contradictions which require analysis and discussion if the disarmament movement is to deepen and broaden itself.

For my premise is that reading is not a passive process, in which the producers of nuclear texts unilaterally impose meaning on their audiences. Rather, the production and reception of texts are linked in an active, reciprocal, and potentially political process. Habitual use of and exposure to a dominant discourse--such as nukespeak--will make the world that discourse constructs seem obvious, natural, and inevitable. Readers will tend to accept its interpellations, and adopt the identities its texts define for them. But readers who have engaged with other, alternative discourses, may learn to deconstruct and reconstruct these dominant texts, and refuse the subject positions they propose. One task for anti-nuclear intellectuals is therefore to produce texts that encourage oppositional readings of nukespeak. This text works to construct Bomb-resisting readers.[25]

It thus attempts some transgression of the academic practice Edward Said has termed "noninterference."[26] "Noninterference" describes the condition by which, in North America, the institutional humanities have been content to occupy a depoliticized and sequestered space, filled with an increasingly rarefied discourse, in which they fulfill the function of representing "humane marginality"--while at the same time tactfully abstaining from criticism of the state and corporate powers whose surplus funds their very existence:

> Very broadly stated . . . noninterference for the humanist means laissez-faire: "they" can run the country, we will explicate Wordsworth and Schlegel.[22]

As Said points out, the Age of Reagan has made the price of this arrangement apparent.

It is particularly obvious in regard to nuclear weapons. A recent report by the Council for Economic Priorities states that the rapid increases in US defense funding have made American universities as dependent on the Pentagon for research support as they were at the height of the Vietnam war.[23] The huge influx of "Star Wars" research contracts means that there are probably very few academies, north or south of the forty-ninth parallel which are not complicit in the American arms build-up, as part of what has accurately been called the "military-industrial-academic complex." Against this tendency are ranged the far less heavily capitalized efforts of student disarmament groups, dissenting academics and struggling "peace education" programs. The alternative to "noninterference" is to recognize the university itself as part of the terrain fought across by nuclear militarism and dissent--and to interfere accordingly.

Forty years after the first atomic bombing, the probability that nuclear weapons will be used again makes it easy to suspect that nuclear texts and meta-texts alike are only "writings on the wall"--mere prefaces to catastrophe. Whatever hope this work has of rejecting that dismal status lies in the support it offers to a resistance symbolized by a different kind of wall-writing--the writing that has inscribed, on the concrete of missile silos, defence ministries, military camps and nuclear bunkers across Europe and America, in spray paint and in chalk the most imperative of all nuclear texts: "No More Hiroshimas!"

CHAPTER II

NUKESPEAK'S NOVEL

1. Rumours of War

As the 1970s passed into the 1980s, Britons and Americans read the approach of a new era in nuclear terror. The doctrine of deterrence, which had rationalized four decades of nuclear armament, was being retired. From the upper reaches of state power issued an innovative discourse on "limited," "protracted," "survivable," "winnable" nuclear war.[29] It permeated through every level of culture. In 1980, amidst crisis in Iran and Afghanistan the White House leaked to the press portions of the secret Presidential Directive 59, outlining plans for the nuclear defence of Middle Eastern oil. In the same year, the British government published a new handbook--Protect and Survive--instructing its population in what to do "if deterrence fails."[30] Rising nuclear academics published hawkish articles bearing encouraging titles such as "Victory Is Possible."[31] Think-tank pundits appeared on television talk shows to explain the superiority of NUTS (Nuclear Use Theory and Strategy) over MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction), while public awareness of a shift in the atomic wind was reflected by a sudden upsurge in the popularity of the verb "to nuke."

But for many, the first intimation of this change came, not in a presidential press-conference or civil defence pamphlet, but in a paperback picked from a drug-store book rack, a text with the ominous name of The Third World War.[32] Published in Britain in 1978, it was to sell three million copies world wide, occupy the New York Times bestseller list for twenty-six weeks, and receive the endorsement of NATO heads of state. In 1982, a sequel appeared, The Third World War: The Untold Story.[33] In these two texts (which I shall treat as forming a single, continuous whole) nukespeak invades the arena of popular culture. For they offer, in the form of a bestselling novel, a legitimation of the emergent official doctrine of "limited" nuclear war. What I want to discuss here is how

this depends on the manipulation of an enormously powerful image--that of the nuclear enemy.

2. Official Signatures

The Third World War is an example of contemporary "faction," a genre that hybridizes "fact" and "fiction."[34] Indeed, its entire strategy of persuasion depends upon a systematic erosion of the boundary between these categories. The text purports to be an account by senior NATO commanders of a global conflict between the Warsaw Pact and NATO which breaks out on August the fourth, 1985 and ends three weeks later, composed two years after the event. Appearing in 1978, such a story would seem obviously fictitious. What complicates this designation, however, is that The Third World War is written by real NATO commanders. The title page announces it as the work of "General Sir John Hackett and Other Top-Ranking Generals and NATO Advisors." Hackett was already in 1978 a minor British military celebrity, wounded at Arnhem, Aide-de-Camp to the Queen, former Commander-in-Chief of NATO's Northern Army Group and of the British Army on the Rhine. His co-authors included a retired Air Marshal, a Major General, a Vice Admiral, a British diplomatic representative to NATO, and an editor of the Economist.[35] An Afterword to the text acknowledges the collaboration of several senior serving officers, and thanks both the Ministry of Defense and NATO's European headquarters for "invaluable advice."[36] The fictional, "1987" narrator thus appears as a very thinly veiled projection of the actual, "1978" authors.

Moreover, The Third World War uses the "real-life" expertise of its authors to invest its fantasy with an authoritative verisimilitude. It imitates official history. The narrator's imposing military voice unfolds the grand sweep of events, punctuating its account with frequent citations from imaginary generals' memoirs, political memoranda, interviews and regimental diaries. Statistics, maps, tables, and detailed data on the minutiae of armaments

and military organization, clearly drawing on intimate knowledge of actual, contemporary, armies, bristle from every page. There is even a visual supplement, "The Third World War In Pictures," presenting photographs of NATO and Warsaw Pact manoeuvres recontextualized as "the real thing." Diegetic and extra-diegetic reality, authorial identity and narrative personae, fiction and fact, slide in and out of one another in a calculated confusion.

This effect was heightened by two exceptional, and well publicized, moments in the text's reception. In 1979, British Prime Minister Callaghan took the occasion of a state visit to the USA to formally present President Carter with a copy. The dust-jacket of subsequent editions ostentatiously cites a Newsweek report that Carter kept the book in the Oval Office, "under the Holy Bible."[37] Four years later, President Reagan, asked by the New York Times to specify the most important books he had read for work and pleasure, named The Third World War, indicating that it fell in the category of texts significant for his "work."[38] These endorsements reinforced the impression that Hackett's fiction in fact inscribed an ascendant official realism.

The implications were frightening. What was ostensibly a chronicle written from the vantage point of 1987 about a war that has already happened, read from the position of 1978 as prophecy of a war that was going to occur. Simulated post-nuclear retrospection reversed itself to appear as authentic pre-nuclear prospectus. And while the authors diplomatically disclaimed any view that war was inevitable, the dustjacket was franker, promising "a dramatic account of the coming global conflict."[39] The Third World War is, as Hackett put it, a "scenario"--an extension of the war-games, defence exercises and computer drills of the West's military establishment.[40] It is a rehearsal that sets the scene and scripts the roles for the enactment of "theatre" nuclear war.

3. The Image of the Other

All wars demand *otherness*--antagonistic difference.[41] The Third World War's fiction hinges on the division of "our side" from "the enemy." Although its narrative is indeed global in scope, mapping "future history" from the Horn of Africa to Cambodia, the entire world of The Third World War is structured around a binary opposition which poses "the West" against "the Soviet empire."[42] And the venom with which it draws the distinction between these geopolitical entities provides a classic instance of what George Kennan has aptly termed the "demonization" of the Soviet Union. [43]

For the text's dualism is nothing short of Manichean. Where one side is positive, vital and pacific, the other is negative, moribund and malevolent. The West is a "politically attractive" and "open society," representing democracy and freedom.[44] Its opponent is "brutal," "implacable," "savage," a "grim totalitarian system" founded on the "murderous overthrow of a democratic elected government by a fanatical authoritarian minority," a "land of privilege and hate and police state cruelty."[45] The West is the norm, the Soviet Union a nightmarish deviation, ruled by "dialectical materialist usurpers" who impose on their subjects "a gigantic and cruel swindle."[46] Although these Soviet leaders possess a vast capacity for "maladroitness and miscalculation" and "ineffective muddling," they are imbued with an iron determination to gain their "uncompromising" goal of a globally "dominant position." They plan their "ultimate triumph"--the destruction of capitalist democracy.[47] The West, by contrast, is passive and benign, ruled by a "perennially dove-like establishment," its diplomacy directed merely toward ensuring "security" and "stability," and to "managing" and "containing" crises--crises invariably produced by the "powerful, restless, baleful, expansive, intractably dogmatic imperialism of the Soviet Union."[48] NATO is "the defensive alliance": the Warsaw Pact is constituted by forces of "enormous offensive capacity."[49] And while the Soviet Union believes it can "fight, win

and survive a nuclear war," the West has merely "relied on its continuing technological superiority to check any Soviet confidence that this was possible."[50]

The Soviet Union is thus produced for the Western reader as alien, opaque and monstrously menacing. It figures as the opponent whose iniquities and barbarism at once define "our" culture's virtues and excuse its minor failings. It is the aberration that disturbs the otherwise tranquil surface of the planet. Above all, it is "the Soviet threat," defined almost exclusively in terms of its capacity to subvert or attack the ethical and economic plenitude represented by capitalism. This holds despite the fact that in The Untold Story a significant portion of the narrative is recounted from the position of a fictive Soviet lieutenant, one "Andrei Nekrassov." For Nekrassov is merely a cipher, set up to confirm the iniquities and incompetence of socialism. Dazzled by the technological and moral superiority of his Western opponents, hounded by the KGB, his troops ignorant and disaffected, he is eventually expediently killed-off, having performed a role analogous to those female characters in pornography fabricated solely to corroborate male fantasy. In the NATO generals' fiction, "Russia" is an entity endowed with existence only to be destroyed.

"Our side" is defined primarily by shared opposition to the Other. The British state and the Western alliance are depicted as the proper objects of collective allegiance. This allegiance, however, entails the acceptance of a hierarchy. To be on "our" side, as it is represented in The Third World War, is to be part of a vast, pyramidal structure of state power, devoted primarily to organizing defence against the Other. The chain of command runs from the head of state--benign but remote figures--to the senior staff of the military establishment, down through the junior officers in the field and the police and civil defence authorities at home, to the anonymous and expendable non-military masses.

The text's most vicious invective is in fact reserved for those who to any degree dissent from this structure. It is levelled against trades unionists, the British Labour Party, and the European left. But above all, it is bestowed upon those who question the reality of the Soviet threat. In the world of The Third World War, these people could only be fools or traitors. They figure as, at best, hopelessly naive--"infantile," "hysterical," "far out philosophers" inhabiting a world of "total make believe."[51] At worst, they are agents of the enemy--Lenin's "useful fools," part of the "so-called peace movement," "unobtrusively orchestrated and largely paid for by the USSR."[52] For the story is told from the position of NATO generals, (at once its authors, narrators and heroes), who pose themselves as protectors from the menace of the Other, and it is on the credibility of that menace that their claim to speak in "our" name as defenders of a community imperilled by awful danger rests.

The readers of The Third World War thus find themselves addressed or "hailed" in a position at once unified with and subordinated to the military voice that narrates the text: united in opposition to the Otherness of the foe; subordinated in acknowledgment of the narrator's authority and expertise as guardian of the common good. Proposing a planet irrevocably divided between two hostile camps, the text works to construct an ideal reader who identifies with the official spokesmen for "our" side, and suppresses doubt or dissent as tantamount to treason. Submission to authority, discipline, obedience, stoicism and self-sacrifice are portrayed as essential for preservation against the menacing designs of the enemy. In this way, bestseller readers find themselves interpellated as subjects of the nuclear state.

4. The Unchanging Face of War

The consummation of the opposition between "us" and "them" is, of course, war. The Third World War hypothesizes that the Soviet Union, pursuing its goal of global domination, determines to seek diplomatic and military victories over a US administration newly elected in 1984. After a series of superpower skirmishes in the Middle East and Africa, Russian armies invade Yugoslavia. The US sends in the marines, hostilities escalate, and the Warsaw Pact launches a full scale tank offensive into Europe--and "the war that everyone had said could never happen had begun."[53] It is to the representation of "war," and its vindication as an admirable and intelligent human activity, that the text is centrally devoted.

The Third World War's war is waged in the language of generals, the jargon of military professionalism. "Units," "formations," and "troop concentrations" engage in diagrammatic move and countermove according to "options," "plans," and "operational" situations.[54] "Weapons systems"--vast arrays of tanks, aircraft, ships, missiles and electronic equipment--are scrupulously catalogued, named and numbered in their full range of lethal competencies.[55] An arsenal of acronyms (some one hundred and forty of them listed in a glossary) strips away all emotive connotation with deadening economy. Battle is plotted as the intersection of impersonal kinetic vectors, a contest between "armour and firepower" or "firepower and countermeasures."[56] High explosive, napalm and nerve gas are notated as "neutralizing," "attenuating," "degrading," "removing" or "taking out" the capacities of reified structures of military power from which every human feature has been effaced.[57] Mass death is abstracted and quantified for swift manipulation. In this terminology, "war" cannot be absurd, grotesque, futile or chaotic. Rather, it appears as a field for expert decisions and control, an arena where "necessary losses" are carefully balanced against "assets" in pursuit of a goal whose rationality is never subject to question--"victory."[58]

Interspersed with this are more lurid episodes, the tactical scenes within the strategic overview, culled from imaginary memoirs granted titles such as Black Horse and Red Star: American Cavalry At War, Micks in Action: With the Irish Guards in Lower Saxony or The Veld Aflame: South Africa's Fight for Survival. These passages are written in a style which draws simultaneously on authentic war memoirs and popular war fictions (genres which are already deeply and mutually indebted to each other). Here there are portrayals of extreme violence, bloody wounds and the confusion of the battlefield. But these horrors are eclipsed by an overriding emphasis on the valour, camaraderie, skill and excitement of combat. Courageous NATO infantrymen stand firm or go down fighting against the Russian hordes; gallant officers die at their posts; exuberant RAF pilots skim on treetop raids across Russian airfields; lonely generals make momentous decisions; and all is done amongst a barrage of plucky smiles, nonchalant thumbs-up signs, and "one down and three hundred and two to go"isms that relentlessly occlude all thought of terror, madness or bereavement.[59]

But the most apparent feature of The Third World War's war is its *nostalgia*. For it is quickly evident that World War III is, as the very name implies, a repetition. It is World War II with the Soviet Union substituting for Nazi Germany. Here is the humiliating prelude of "appeasement." Here is the Battle of Britain refought by supersonic jets. Here is a chapter entitled "The Battle of the Atlantic." Here are British and American tanks disembarking for a second Liberation of Europe. And at the end of it all, with the destruction of the USSR, the world will have "come out of a bad dream, just as it did out of the Nazi nightmare."[60] The text thus reassembles and projects into the future the image of a past episode of Western triumph already carefully mythologized in official archives and popular culture. Despite all its futuristic detail of nuclear, electronic, and chemical weaponry, the premise of The Third World War is that the next war will be a re-run.

Indeed, the text's fundamental assertion is encapsulated in the caption to one of the photo-supplement which accompanies the the text: "War's Unchanging Face: A Young Soviet Infanryman Evacuated After Fierce Fighting Near Duisberg."[61] The black and white picture shows a (quite cheerful) young man being carried on a stretcher with his head bandaged. Nominally, the photo and caption acknowledge war as regrettable suffering; in practice, they attenuate and dismiss that thought. This is partially because their pathos is immediately cancelled by the breathless excitement of the "action shots" in the rest of the sequence: "'Shovel this is six! Oh my God!' The war begins. Soviet T-72's in unopposed water crossing west of Munchen"; "Target! Soviet T-80 explodes in flames under fire from NATO armour"; "Dogfight!"; "The scramble for the seas"; "The Counter-Offensive rolls on."[62] But the photo does not merely trivialize suffering: it eternalizes it. It insists that *nothing can, or should, be done about war.* War, it announces in a message underlined by the whole text, is unchanging and unchangeable. World War III will be much like World War II, and, in essence, much like Waterloo or Agincourt--a matter of generalship and valour. And this despite the fact that the penultimate photograph of the series shows an intercontinental ballistic missile arcing a trail of white vapour through the sky, and the final one a Poseidon submarine bursting from the surface of the ocean to launch its rockets: the unchanging face of war, gone nuclear.

5. The Nuclear Exchange

In The Third World War the dropping of the Bomb is not the end of the world. The novel incorporates nuclear weapons within a traditional war story, assimilating their use as merely one, albeit climactic, episode in an epic of battle, victory and defeat. It can in fact be seen as an attempt to undo the enduring influence of a long lineage of "doomsday" films and fictions, such as On The Beach, Level-Seven, The War Game, or Dr. Strangelove, which established itself within popular culture in the late 1950s and early

1960s.[63] Against these apocalyptic visions, which represent nuclear war as universal death, total mayhem, or suicidal absurdity, The Third World War asserts a counter-image: that of the Bomb as a winning weapon. In its flat, acronymic prose, doomsday is circumscribed by the terse initials which signify local civil defence preparations: BREMCO, BREMPLAN. Nuclear weapons--the "SS-17," the Cruise missile, which "with its astonishingly accurate guidance and relative cheapness caught the imagination both for its theatre conventional role and as a potential nuclear weapons carrier," and the "SSBN (Submarine, Strategic, Ballistic, Nuclear)" are divested of any special horror, incorporated amongst a repertoire of conventional military devices, nominated as suitable for "selective strikes," "flexible response" and "Hiroshima-type demonstrations."[64] And in the climax of The Third World War, these weapons are made the agency of the West's triumph over its Soviet enemy.

The text is careful to place the onus for its speculative nuclear exchange on the enemy. To do so, it has to evade NATO's well known policy of dependence on a first-use of nuclear weapons to stop any Soviet attack on Europe. It therefore proposes that, although NATO forces suffer heavy casualties from the Soviet tank offensive, they are, because of an eleventh-hour rearmament program conducted in the early 1980s, able to stall the invasion and even mount a counter-attack. Thereupon, the Soviet leaders, to demonstrate the earnestness of their intentions, obliterate Birmingham with a single nuclear warhead. Nuclear war is begun by the Russians, confirming the contrast between an aggressive "them" and a defensive "us."

But what this event also signifies is the West's capacity to *survive* nuclear attack. The obliteration of Birmingham is narrated from the perspective, not of the victims, but of the military and civic authorities. Terse descriptions of the "extraordinary destruction" are firmly bracketed between scenes affirming the immoveable solidity of the British state.[65] The city's demise is prefaced with images of imperturbable radar officers "well used to calming their adrenalin flow" efficiently tracking the incoming missile ("It sure is going to

be hot in Birmingham, England," remarks an American major).[66] Vast and gruesome casualties are sternly acknowledged, but the emphasis is on the problem confronting the civil defence and police as they struggle, with eventual success, to regain control of the situation in the devastated area. The episode culminates in the Prime Minister's Churchillian rallying of the populace with the broadcast news that "the enemy has been struck by nuclear attack, with even greater force than that used on Birmingham" and the reassurance that "Her Majesty the Queen with her family . . . would remain in London, and she, the Prime Minister would of course do the same."[67]

The West's retaliatory destruction of the Soviet city of Minsk, launched "if only to avoid a catastrophic decline in civilian and military morale," is not described at length in The Third World War.[68] Whatever sense of nuclear terror *is* conveyed by the account of Birmingham's end appears as an atrocity "they" inflict on "us": what "we" do to "them" in return is quickly glossed over. But the sequel, The Untold Story, improves on this strategy. Here, Minsk's annihilation is actively celebrated, in almost epiphanic terms. Four nuclear warheads explode over the Russian city with "dreadful majesty," creating a "beacon of light" and a "pillar of fire":[69]

> The epicentre of the attack, above which the missiles had been set to detonate, was the grandiose building of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belorussia, built in the late 1930s in the style then current to emphasize the power, extent and modernity of socialism. In front of it stood a full size statue of Lenin. Within a few seconds of the first detonation, this immense structure was no more than a great pile of rubble. Somewhere in there the statue of Lenin, the principal architect of all this disorder, lay pounded into dust.[70]

The dehumanization of the enemy, who is literally "objectified" in the crude architectural symbolism and the image of Lenin's statue, permits an uninhibited expression of enthusiasm at the imaginary immolation of fifty thousand Russians. Moreover, the effects of this fictional explosion exceed merely the destruction of a Soviet city: it gives the West decisive victory. Minsk's incineration destabilizes the entire Soviet system: Eastern Europe bursts into revolt; the Ukraine and Urals declare themselves autonomous; the Politburo is

overthrown by a popular uprising in the streets of Moscow, a global *Pax Americana* is established, and the world is saved--by the Bomb.

The Third World War thus makes a remarkable attempt to vindicate the concept of "limited" nuclear conflict, which is depicted as following the same logic that informs conventional war: the side mustering the greatest strength emerges as the victor. Leadership, patriotism and discipline are the key factors: "we" win because when the Russians atomize Birmingham, no one panics, while when NATO vaporizes Minsk, the Soviet Empire collapses in mutiny. With adequate civil defence preparation and public discipline, The Third World War promises, Britain can endure nuclear attack, just as it endured the Blitz. Losses--even in the scores of thousands--are a necessary and acceptable price for triumph. The nuclear exchange measures "our" worth against that of the enemy, establishing one side in conclusive dominance over the other.

6. "To Make Children Behave Better"

In an article in The Times, General Hackett disclosed that his novel's first draft had in fact ended with the defeat of NATO. This conclusion had been abandoned on the advice of American military colleagues, who felt it would merely inspire despondency amongst the Western public. As the General explained, "If it is to make children behave better, it is a mistake to pitch it so strongly that it only makes them wet their pants."[71] And it is as a text designed to "make children behave better"--that is, as a cautionary tale told by a paternalist authority to coerce the populace into compliance with its wishes--that The Third World War needs to be understood.

For the traces of Hackett's original draft remain clearly, and purposefully, visible within the final version. The text insists on keeping on its surface the possibility that "things might have turned out very differently," reiterating that the West's victory "was a

close run thing."[72] It persistently stresses that if NATO had not conducted the military preparations which it imagines being undertaken in the early 1980s, the alliance would have gone down to defeat before the Soviet assault. And in The Untold Story, the spectre of defeat is given even greater prominence in an appendix which sketches an "alternative ending."[73] Here, the authors "change the assumptions" of their story: the peace movement forces the unilateral nuclear disarmament of Western Europe.[74] As a result, when War breaks out the West is militarily overwhelmed. Germany, France and Britain become Soviet satellites, and the Royal Family has to flee to the ex-colonies. The narrator closes this portrait of national humiliation on a note of grave exhortation.

> My outline of an alternative ending will end here. It fills me, as it stands, with alarm and sadness and I can only hope and pray that this may turn out to be no more than a bad dream. But it may take more than a simple flick of a TV channel change switch to prevent this from becoming real. It may want more than that, a very great deal more. Let us hope it can be done in time.[75]

The prescription for what is to be done is given in the depiction of events preceding the onset of war. In the US, one "Governor Thompson, a conservative Republican who had campaigned energetically against the soft-centred international liberalism of the Democratic candidate" is elected President.[76] In Britain, a "sudden awakening of public opinion" results in a "return to comparative prosperity and a conservative government" headed by a certain "Mrs. Plumber."[77] Under these regimes, military budgets are increased. The West builds up both its conventional and nuclear forces. "Realistic, discreet and thorough planning" for war gets under way: civil defence and evacuation are prepared, military reserves augmented, and a variety of emergency powers approved.[78] The US "comes out of its post-Viet Nam trance," reintroduces the draft, and firmly asserts its leading position in NATO, where "the initiative and example of the United States began at last to be followed."[79]

These measures are, however, only part of a comprehensive economic and social transformation designed to increase military efficiency, "reawaken a sense of national identity" and put the West on a war footing.[16] In Britain, the trades unions--a "massive burden" of "unimaginative Luddism," previously tolerated only out of "blind benevolence"--are stripped of their powers; "total addiction to redistributive economic and fiscal policies" and a "general reliance upon state provided welfare" are replaced by "more sensible attitudes"; there is "less and less support of what had previously been known as progressive education" and a return to "old-fashioned discipline"; the "instinct for service" revives and voluntary recruitment to the Scouts, Guides, University Officer Training Corps, army reserves, and civil defence flourishes.[17]

The text conceives of itself as a catalyst to this right-wing mobilization. From the fictional vantage point of 1987 the narrator speaks of how the world has has been "on the edge of destruction" but

> Under providence, through a gradual but significant shift of public attitudes and the work of growing numbers of men of forsight and good sense in the last few years before the outbreak--work often done in the face of vociferous and passionate opposition--it has been held back.[18]

The actual authors of The Third World War, it is to be inferred, number themselves amongst these "men of forsight and good sense," and see their novel as an agency promoting the "change in public attitudes" which it fortells.

The Third World War was thus written as self-fulfilling prophecy; and many of its prophecies were fulfilled swiftly. The book was a contribution in the election of the real-life avatar of "Mrs. Plumber" in the British general election of 1979, and, more distantly, of "Governor Thompson" in America in 1980. Under the regimes of Thatcher and Reagan policies recommended in The Third World War proceeded apace. The prodigous expansion of military budgets at the expense of social programs, the renewed drive for Western nuclear superiority, and the events in Grenada, Lebanon, the Falklands

and Nicaragua were to rapidly demonstrate how consonant The Third World War's militarist fantasies were with the realities of neoconservative power. The question that hangs over this era is precisely that of the limits of Hackett's prophetic self-fulfillment. He himself tried to discount the accusation that his text was pre-war propaganda by insisting that his prediction was "only an imaginary concept . . . the investigation of a possibility in the hope of contributing to its prevention."[13] Yet it is all too easy to see it as an exercise not in prevention, but preparation--a text that beckons on the very conflict it names.

7. Deconstructing the Other

Because of this danger, it is peculiarly critical to question the fabric of assumptions that informs The Third World War's "faction." Indeed, instead of reading the text as a display of authoritative realism (as it seems intended to be received), it might be better to reverse the operation and ask whether its claims to realism do not betray some of the fantastically fictive elements in official discourse. In attempting this exercise, I want to focus upon the text's production of the Other--its image of the Soviet threat. This image is, of course, a lynchpin of of right-wing ideology, and one which in the 1980s enjoyed an extraordinary revival in every genre of discourse, from Reagan's presidential speeches to the film Red Dawn and the televison show Amerika.[14] And as we have seen, it is the pivot on which the whole of Hackett's war story turns.

Yet The Third World War's portrait of the West's terrifying adversary is disturbed by curious contradictions. What at once tends to subvert the text's differentiation between "them" and "us" is the similarity between its own logic and that which it ascribes to the enemy. For The Third World War asserts that the USSR, engaged on a vast arms program, and rigorously repressing all domestic dissent, believes it can fight and win a nuclear war against the West which will establish the global domination of communism. But it simultaneously purports to demonstrate that if NATO engages on an equally vast

arms program, and squashes the left, the trades unions and the peace movement, then *it* can win a nuclear war which will establish the global dominion of capitalism. All the symptoms The Third World War imputes to the enemy as signs of aggressive intent--denial of the legitimacy of opposed ideologies, support for covert destabilization of hostile powers, speculation on the feasibility of limited nuclear war, planning for the establishment of a comprehensive world hegemony, belligerent propaganda--are unblushingly displayed within its own pages.

This uncanny resemblance between the designs The Third World War perceives as "theirs" and those which it reveals as "ours" undermines the rigid binary opposition on which its story turns. Indeed, it is hard to avoid the thought that one is witnessing a classic exhibition of projection, whereby violent intentions are ascribed to an intended victim of attack. Hackett's fable is, after all, a prophecy of Western victory. Behind all the general's cautionary tremblings appears the perennial right-wing fantasy of a triumphant nuclear roll-back of communism.

This is not to suggest merely a simplistic sign-reversal, reading "us" as malign, and "them" as virtuous. To switch terms between competing propaganda systems, substituting positive for negative in a constantly implausible world-historical melodrama, is not enough. Rather, the Manichean dualisms of Otherness demand deconstruction in favour of greater complexity. Subverting General Hackett's myth requires a description of the dyadic interactions of nuclear superpowers in unsettling, recursive categories such as "mutual simulation" and "self-fulfilling animosity."[15] This would open the possibility of a reading of The Third World War in which, rather than one of the opponents being seen as intrinsically aggressive and the other innately pacific, both might be perceived as engaged in a bizarre process of reciprocal mirroring. One has only to speculate how Hackett's text could be interpreted in the Kremlin as conclusive verification of West's aggressive intents to see the NATO general's war prediction feeding into a perceptual spiral, in which the

pugnacious gestures and rhetoric of one side return inexorably reflected in those of its enemy.

The potential consequences of such a process are, however, far worse even than those represented in The Third World War. The eventuality which it imperturbably inscribes--the nuclear destruction of two cities, as well as innumerable "conventional" casualties--are appalling enough: the text exercises every resource of euphemism and abstraction to avoid recognition of their enormity. But in order to maintain even this image of limited nuclear war, The Third World War has to impose an iron limit on its own speculation. It has to debar from its fictional future the chance of global nuclear catastrophe. In order to propose that the enemy can be defeated (or in Cold War jargon "contained") by the use of nuclear weapons, and that nuclear war itself can be controlled (or "contained"), the story has to be organized to exclude that eventuality--a feat which, in itself constitutes an intricate, literary "strategy of containment."

This strategy necessitates that The Third World War truncate the nuclear battle it imagines as quickly as possible. It has to cut short the chain of retaliation and counterretaliation set in motion by the tit-tor-tat of Birmingham and Minsk. As the Times Literary Supplement put it, "To duck discussion of . . . the theoretical inevitability of escalation, is a grave defect in a serious work."[16] What allows this "ducking" is of course the *deus ex machina* of popular revolt in the streets of Moscow. It is vital that the the Soviet Union be presented as collapsing, literally overnight, upon the nuclear destruction of one of its cities. Otherwise, the possibility of an accelerating sequence of nuclear "exchanges," ending only in the mutual obliteration, would have to be squarely confronted.

Seen from this perspective, the logic of the text undergoes a strange reversal, cause changing place with effect. Rather than limited nuclear conflict being required to bring

about the collapse of the USSR, as The Third World War appears to argue, the collapse of the USSR stands revealed as necessary to preserve the hypothesis of limited nuclear conflict. But this means that the figure of The Third World War's monstrous "enemy" must unite in itself two contradictory aspects. It must be at once enormously strong--capable of launching a global and nearly triumphant asault on the West, and confident enough to initiate nuclear war--and, simultaneously, enormously weak--vanishing away at the first atomic shot. This ambigous image of the Soviet threat as at once prodigously powerful and pathetically fragile, appears as a *device* to allow the assimilation of the Bomb into a traditional narrative of war. The alleged strength of the foe motivates the start of the story; his purported weakness permits its conclusion. With this inconsistency, the image of the Other unravels--a badly cobbled-together support for The Third World War's program of massive military expenditure. And once this is perceived, there can be seen the possibility of a different nuclear narrative, an anti-war story in which, as Peter Bruck has put it, "the real opposition is . . . not between the enemies who fight the war but between the the war-makers and the war-victims."[17] But this is what nukespeak has to suppress at all costs.

To accomplish this suppression, The Third World War has to hold its hand over the prospect of nuclear extermination. It acknowledges that an "unrestricted nuclear exchange" would be unfortunate--"disastrous," a "nightmare," a "catastrophic future"--but, as we have seen, it does all it can to prevent sustained thought about the prospect.[18] For such an event would explode the text's war narrative. It would "empty the concept of resolution of all meaning,"[19] erase the division beween "our side" and "theirs," and cancel the all important distinction between "victory" and "defeat," leaving friend and foe alike mingled in radioactive ash. It is to a representation of this apocalyptic end, whose possibility The Third World War works so hard to deny, that we now turn.

CHAPTER III

DOOMSAYING

1. The Discourse of Doom

Nukespeak's war-fighting rhetoric catalysed a counter-discourse of catastrophe. As texts like The Third World War stirred alarm across Europe and America, there spread from the leaflets and speeches of protestors into the mass media an image that for two decades had been uneasily repressed, excluded from the public sphere and driven inward to the netherworld of private anxiety--an image of the world's nuclear end. Texts such as Nigel Calder's Nuclear Nightmares and Louis Rene Beres' Apocalypse, Helen Caldicott's Nuclear Madness and her impassioned documentary, If You Love This Planet, medical and scientific reports ranging from the Physicians for Social Responsibility's video The Last Epidemic to Carl Sagan's studies of the "nuclear winter" effect, films like Testament, The Atomic Cafe and War Games, and, eventually, the hugely publicized television programs Threads (in Britain) and The Day After (in North America) saturated culture with nuclear horrors.[90] Mushroom clouds, incandescent fireballs and astronomical statistics of mass death exploded off the screen of every home entertainment centre and from the page of every Sunday supplement.

These images were crucial to the growth of the peace movement. Chilling city maps, showing zones of destruction stretching from ground zero downtown to the outer suburbs, made protestors from millions of previously loyal citizens. Fear built the massive peace marches in London, Amsterdam, Bonn, Athens and Barcelona. On 12 June 1982, New York saw over half-a-million rally in the United States' largest-ever political demonstration. As doctors, clergymen and lawyers flocked to the cause of disarmament, bringing it an overnight respectability, it briefly seemed as if dread of nuclear hellfire might rock the national security state. And yet within a few years this apocalyptic mood,

and the public mobilization it inspired, ebbed and subsided--without any apparent diminution of nuclear danger.

It is in this context that I want to discuss what is probably the most celebrated of doomsayings, Jonathan Schell's The Fate of the Earth.[91] No single text has more eloquently announced an atomic eschatology, or been more closely identified with the peace movement. Its appearance during February of 1982 in three consecutive issues of the New Yorker--a magazine that, as one reviewer remarked, "comes close to being a national arbiter of public respectability"--was a clear sign that the wave of nuclear anxiety begun in Europe several years earlier had crossed the Atlantic, and that the Bomb was moving from periphery to centre as an issue in American politics.[92] A few months after The Fate of the Earth's publication, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist was writing that, "For better or worse, both admirers and critics have tended to treat it as the voice of the movement against the nuclear arms race."[93]

My reading of this exemplary peace movement text examines how its description of nuclear catastrophe opposes official euphemism and challenges authoritative mythology. But I also want to suggest that such description can itself becomes a site of mystification, and paralyse the very protest it seems to invoke. I treat The Fate of the Earth as an instance of how these conflicting tendencies cohabit within a single text--a demonstration of the doubleness of doomsaying.

2. Representing the Unthinkable

The Fate of the Earth begins at the end of everything, with a depiction of the very possibility The Third World War seeks to deny--full-scale nuclear war. In fact, Schell says, to call such an event "war" is simply a misnomer that could only "mislead and confuse us."[94] It would be a "holocaust," in which human life and civilization would be consumed

as if they were "nothing more than a mold or a lichen that appears in certain crevices of the landscape and can be burned off with relative ease by nuclear fire."[95] The rest of the text argues backward from this terminal disaster: the nuclear closure of human life is the point of departure, the visceral and logical foundation, for all The Fate of the Earth's subsequent reflections on the nuclear predicament. It thus bids everything on the representation of an event which it has become conventional to term "unthinkable." As Schell acknowledges, nuclear holocaust is not only an event we have never experienced, but one whose magnitude seems to exceed the capacity of imagination. Its contemplation numbs the mind, and evokes every resource of psychological denial.[96] To overcome this "unthinkability," his text resorts to a synthesis of devastating scientific data and harrowing historical memories.

Not the least remarkable of The Fate of the Earth's achievements is its popularization of nuclear science. It appropriates the language of the weapons-experts: familiarizes its readers with "fission," "fusion," "rems," "yield," "ground bursts," "air bursts," "overpressures," and "megatons"; categorises the main effects of nuclear explosions, "radiation," "thermal pulse," "blast," "radiation," and "electromagnetic pulse"; discriminates between the "primary" and "secondary" results of detonations, and explains their "local" and "global" manifestations. The sources for this work are six recent scientific studies on the effects of nuclear weapons by organizations such as the National Academy of Science, the US Office of Technological Assessment, and the US Department of Defense, supplemented by numerous interviews with prominent physicists, biologists and ecologists. From these texts, Schell takes his information about how many would live and how many would die and how far the the collapse of the environment would go.

Yet he also insists that scientific studies are inadequate to convey the "human truth" of nuclear war.[97] Technicisms and data alone may, he warns, simply desensitize us further. To prevent this, The Fate of the Earth juxtaposes with its scientific evidence the testament

of the *hibakusha*--the survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki--the only people with experience of nuclear attack. It cites John Hersey's Hiroshima (itself a piece of New Yorker journalism, and a notable forerunner of The Fate of the Earth), Robert Lifton's Death in Life, and also the *hibakusha*'s own writings--the anthology Unforgettable Fire, and Michihiko Hachiya's Hiroshima Diary.[98] Here, the effects of the Bomb appear, not as statistical calculus, but as a monstrous theatre of agonies: a child repeatedly offering water to its dead mother; another with a head "like a boiled octopus"; people buried and abandoned, screaming with formal politeness "Help, if you please," as the firestorm advances toward them; figures whose skin hangs in tattered veils around them as they walk like ghosts out of the devastated city; a man standing by his burning house, holding his eye in the palm of his hand.[99] The Fate of the Earth reviews this literature of mutilations, burns, haemorrhage, diarrhoea, thirst, vomiting, leukemia, cataracts, abortions, deformations, madness and death: then it reminds us that Hiroshima represents only one-millionth of the current power of world nuclear arsenals.

Fusing the discourse of the *hibakusha* with that of the atomic physicists, The Fate of the Earth names the nightmare nukespeak occludes. Schell shows us what "collateral damage" means; debunks civil defence; rewrites official abstraction with graphic depiction and precise calibration; speaks doom and makes it signify. In sentences whose careful measure underlines the horror of their content, his text maps ever-expanding vistas of imaginary devastation, examining the effects of holocaust on each of three levels--those of "the individual life, human society and the natural environment."[100] It anatomizes the multiple ways one person might die: incineration, crushing, irradiation, starvation, cold, or epidemic. It creates surreal visions of the annihilation of great cities: Manhattan melts and burns under the dazzling white light of a nuclear fireball, skyscrapers collapse into the streets below, the skyline falls "from south to north" under a four-hundred-mile-an-hour wind, while overhead a vast mushroom cloud twelve miles in diameter "blocks out the

sun and turns day to night."[1] From there the text progresses to what it considers the most serious danger of multiple nuclear explosions, a disintegration of the planet's ecological fabric which would "devastate the natural environment on a scale unknown since geological times."[102] In particular, The Fate of the Earth dwells on the possible partial destruction of the earth's ozone layer, leading to a an influx of blinding, carcinogenic ultra-violet radiation. Having discussed all these terrors, and many more besides, Schell makes his ultimate, apocalyptic, announcement:

> Bearing in mind that the possible consequences of the detonations of thousands of megatons of nuclear explosives include the blinding of insects, birds and beasts all over the world; the extinction of many ocean species, among them some at the base of the food chain; the temporary or permanent alteration of the climate of the globe, with the outside chance of "dramatic" and "major" alterations in the structure of the atmosphere; the pollution of the whole ecosphere with oxides of nitrogen; the incapacitation in ten minutes of unprotected people who go out into the sunlight; the blinding of people who go out into the sunlight; a significant decrease in photosynthesis in plants around the world, but especially in the targeted zones, and the attendant risk of global epidemics; the possible poisoning of all vertebrates by sharply increased levels of Vitamin D in their skin as a result of increased levels of ultraviolet light; and the outright slaughter on all targeted continents of most human beings and other living things by the initial nuclear radiation, the fireballs, the thermal pulses, the blast waves, the mass fires, and the fallout from the explosions; and considering that these consequences will all interact with one another in unguessable ways and, furthermore, are in all likelihood an incomplete list, which will be added to as our knowledge of the earth inceases, one must conclude that a full scale nuclear holocaust could lead to the extinction of mankind.[103]

3. Extinction Fictions

Extinction, Schell observes, presents at once too much and too little to comprehend. In its "boundlessness, its blankness, its removal beyond experience," it is a concept with a "tendency to baffle human thought and feeling."[104] It exhausts language:

> Even the words "blankness" and "emptiness" are too expressive--too laden with human response--because, inevitably, they connote the experience of blankness and emptiness, whereas extinction is the end of human experience.[105]

It is a zero-point beyond which there is no more story to tell, a catastrophe that collapses narrative--for what narratorial point-of-view is adequate to recount the death of all

spectators? Nevertheless, The Fate of the Earth strives to overcome this semantic aporia. Its entire second chapter is devoted to an attempt to "think meaningfully about extinction."[106] To do so, Schell argues, we have to conceive of it not merely as the death of everyone alive, but a "second death," that of everyone not yet born.[107] Grasping to convey the enormity of this concept, he now turns for historical analogies, not to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but to Auschwitz and Treblinka, then switches from nuclear physics to metaphysics. Drawing on Hannah Arendt, Kant and Hegel, he screws his language to higher and higher pitches of rarefication, defining and redefining extinction as the "foreclosure of life," the "loss of birth," the "death of death," an act which "destroys mankind as the source of all possible subjects," as if the sheer multiplication of synonyms might somehow permit

> . . . an apparently extreme effort of imagination which seems to require one first to summon before the mind's eye the countless people of future generations and then to assign those incorporeal multitudes to a more profound nothingness.[108]

The text moves from incandescence, firestorms and blazing ultra-violet rays to still, chill and eternal darkness.

The thesis that nuclear war could end all human life is crucial to The Fate of the Earth's entire argument, and was to prove violently controversial. In its extremity, Schell's prediction exceeded even those of other disarmament activists, who generally limited themselves to warning that nuclear war might destroy life in the Northern Hemisphere, or merely wipe out Western civilization. And it was anathema to the Reagan administration. Vice-President Bush had asserted his belief in the survivability of full-scale nuclear war; officials of the the Federal Emergency Management Agency were busily engaged in persuading recalicitrant American townships to participate in civil-defence preparations; FEMA's director, General Luis Giufreda, had opined that, while "nuke war" would be a "terrible mess," it should not prove "unmanageable."[109] Deciding whether The Fate of the Earth's speculation was a matter of fact or fiction was therefore a matter of some

political import.

Schell himself tries to clearly differentiate his text from works of fiction that "assign to the imagination the work that investigation is unable to do."[110] Yet at the same time, he concedes it is inescapably speculative. Given the unprecedented nature of global nuclear war, the complexity of computing its consequences, and the changing data on nuclear effects, the precise consequences of holocaust are, he admits, fundamentally undecidable: "To say that human extinction is a certainty would be a misrepresentation."[111] There is an irreducably fictive element in all inscription of the unthinkable.

Yet in an adroit manoeuvre, The Fate of the Earth capitalizes on this very fictivity, and the uncertainty of all nuclear prediction, to invest its own forecast with the practical status of fact. For, allowing that that nuclear arsenals may never be used, and that their use need not inevitably escalate to the level of full scale holocaust, and that holocaust might not necessarily produce ecological collapse, Schell nevertheless gives the image of species death the weight of unarguable verity because:

> . . . although the risk of extinction may be fractional, the stake, humanly speaking, is infinite, and a fraction of infinity is still infinity. In other words, once we learn that holocaust *might* lead to extinction we have no right to gamble, because if we lose, the game will be over, and neither we, nor anyone else, will ever get another chance.[112]

The Fate of the Earth therefore proposes a nuclear version, or inversion, of Pascal's famous wager on the existence of God, and concludes that "we have no choice but to address the issue of nuclear weapons as though we know for a certainty that their use would put an end to our species."[113] In this way, The Fate of the Earth achieves a diametric reversal of the strategy of containment practised in The Third World War: where Hackett's war-narrative works to exclude nuclear escalation, Schell's apocalypse disqualifies any outcome short of absolute disaster, and enstates extinction as the central and overriding reality of his nuclear story.

4. The Planetary Subject

It is on this vision of total nuclear destruction that The Fate of the Earth predicates its appeal for total nuclear disarmament, an appeal issued in the name of a universal subject--"mankind as a whole," "the human enterprise" or "common humanity."[114] The narratorial "we" with which the text enfolds its audience is global and all-embracing. It is imminent doom that sanctions such an address:

> For nothing underscores our common humanity as strongly as the peril of extinction does: in fact, on a practical and political plane it establishes that common humanity.[115]

The Fate of the Earth thus interpellates its audience, not as patriotic citizens and soldiers but as terrestrials bound together by common nuclear danger.

This ecumenical humanism contrasts sharply with the bipolar, adversarial logic of nukespeak: in place of The Third World War's epic of Otherness, The Fate of the Earth proposes a saga of Sameness. The difference is strikingly illustrated by the way each interprets the image of the planet photographed from outer space. The Third World War perceives "the military application of this extended area of man's domination over his environment":

> Especially dramatic was the space photography of such high resolution that soldiers marching on earth could be counted in their columns. In the event of war, the Russians would be particularly interested in seeing what was going on in the Atlantic and the Eastern seaboard of the United States.[116]

In The Fate of the Earth, such extra-terrestrial photography provides a metaphor for "our two roles in the nuclear predicament":

> These pictures illustrate, on the one hand our mastery over nature, which has enabled us to take up a position in the heavens and look back on the earth as though it were just one more celestial body, and, on the other, our weakness and frailty in the face of that mastery, which we cannot help feeling when we see the smallness, solitude and delicate beauty of our planetary home. Looking at the earth, as it is caught in the lens of the camera, reduced to the size of a golf ball, we gain a new sense of scale, and are made aware of a new relation between ourselves and the earth: we can almost imagine that we might hold the earth between the giant thumb and forefinger of one hand. Similarly, as the possessors of nuclear arms we stand

> outside nature, holding the instruments of cosmic power with which we can blot life out, while it is at the same time we remain embedded in nature and depend on it for our survival.[117]

For one text, the view from outer space signifies improved battlefield surveillance: for the other, it gives a glimpse of "the oneness of mankind with the oneness of nature."[118]

Indeed, as its title suggests, Schell's text narrates a destiny larger even than that of the human species. "Earth" is a term that moves through the book from cover to final sentence, accumulating a deepening play of resonances. It signifies, in its simplest sense, the planet itself, a "celestial body."[119] But Schell's earth is an animate body, at once the progenitor of life, its "mother" or "parent," its habitat, a "support system" or "house of unimaginable intricacy," and, ultimately, a unified, organic entity--a "single living being."[120] This inscription of the globe as a living entity is, in one aspect, a scientific thesis that Schell substantiates with research into the the ecosphere's "interconnected web" of life.[121] But it is also, as he observes, an idea "that has only recently proceeded from poetic metaphor to actual scientific investigation."[122] His celebration of the living planet is suffused with a romantic lyricism and underwritten as strongly with citations from Rilke's Duino elegies as with environmental data. At moments, it even assumes a quasi-religous aura as a "compound mystery" that is at once "unique" and "sacred," synonymous with "God or nature or whatever one chooses to call the universal dust that made, or became us."[123] Humanist belief in the brotherhood of man, environmentalist concern with the stewardship of the planet, and a theological concept of nuclear war as an offense against divine order, are all bound together in the symbol of "the earth."

Indeed, the position voiced by The Fate of the Earth can be summed up by one of the most venerable of all anti-nuclear slogans: "One World or None." It is the threat of nuclear extinction that compels recognition of the unity of the earth. The solution to that threat is the creation of a new global order that gives political expression to this unity. For Schell defines the basic problem of the nuclear era as nothing less than the

system of sovereignty that divides the earth into the territories of antagonistic, nuclear-armed governments. To avert doom, The Fate of the Earth demands the world-wide abolition of the very institution celebrated by The Third World War--the security state:

> On the one side stands human life and the terrestrial creation . . . on the other side stands a particular organization of human life, the system of independent sovereign states.

In its place, it revives the "world government" answer to the Bomb favoured by some American liberals in the aftermath of Hiroshima:[124]

> What everyone is now called on to do is to sink all the ships, and also ground all the planes, and fill in all the missile silos, and dismantle all the warheads. The second aim, which alone can provide a sure foundation for the first, is to create a political means by which the world can arrive at the decisions the sovereign states previously arrived at by war.[125]

The menace of nuclear catastrophe is proposed as a lever for the transfiguration of the planet: the task, Schell writes, is "nothing less than to reinvent politics: to reinvent the world."[126]

Judged in the terms set by nukespeak, this is the ultimate in unrealistic proposals: Schell would undoubtedly stand as a prototypical example of the "far out philosophers" on whom The Third World War heaps scorn. But The Fate of the Earth uses doom to subvert the official appropriation of "realism." This appropriation, Schell argues, depends on suppressing awareness of the danger of extinction. Advocates of "limited" nuclear war have to hold their hand over the chance of holocaust. Deterrence theory, with its aura of balance and rationality, sustains itself only by irrationally blinding itself to the possibility of its own failure. Once this is recognised, the nuclear state's claim to represent "realism" against the "delusions" of nuclear disarmament abruptly reverses itself:

> In this timid, crippled thinking, "realism" is the title given to beliefs whose most notable characteristic is their failure to recognize the chief reality of the age, the pit into which our species threatens to jump; "utopian" is the term of scorn for any plan that shows a serious promise of enabling the species to keep from killing itself (if it is "utopian" to want to survive, then it must be "realistic" to be dead); and the political arrangements that keep us on the brink of annihilation are deemed moderate and found to be "respectable," whereas new arrangements, which might enable us to draw back a few feet

from the brink, are called "extreme" or "radical." With such fear filled, thought stopping epithets as these, the upholders of the status quo defend the anachronistic structure of their thinking, and seek to block the revolution in thought and action which is necessary if mankind is to go on living.[127]

5. The Unspeakable In The Unthinkable

It is thus by looking into the nuclear abyss and confronting the *very worst*, the ultimate horror, that The Fate of the Earth challenges nukespeak. And in an era when the full resources of official discourse were devoted to a most sinister trivialization of nuclear war, nothing should detract from the importance of this project. But it is also critical to ask whether The Fate of the Earth itself, in turn, shows any traces of nuclear repression. Is its representation of holocaust itself constructed only at the expense of certain denials and avoidances? Does its project of demystification implicate itself in a reciprocal mystification? Is there, in Neil Schmitz's inimitable phrase, "an Unspeakable that lurks within Schell's Unthinkable"?[128]

In her general criticism of nuclear doomsaying, Gayatari Spivak has pointed to precisely such a possibility:

> One of the strongest appeals of the anti-nuclear movement is that in the face of the nuclear threat we are all equal. This would no doubt be true in the event of a nuclear war. But while the resistance mobilizes, this appeal allows the liberal humanists often politically committed to the social (not to say psycho-sexual) relations of society, to forget that some of us are perpetrators and others victims.[129]

Extinction seems to mandate a universalization of the nuclear predicament. But this elides the very distinct powers exercised in this predicament by different actors. It conflates the roles of, say, a Caspar Weinberger (who directs, justifies and profits from nuclear deployments), an unemployed Detroit bus-driver (who rarely thinks about the Bomb), and a Central American or Middle Eastern peasant (who has barely heard of it, but every day feels the historical effects of nuclear hegemony).[130] The legitimate observation that nuclear war might kill us all easily slides into a facile "we're-all-in-the-same-nuclear-boat'ism."

Nuclear doomsaying occludes nuclear domination. In this way, apocalypse itself becomes a site of obfuscation.

The Fate of the Earth demonstrates precisely such a slippage, from description of global consequences to ascription of global responsibility. For, having given his shattering portrayal of holocaust, Schell then asserts that "all of mankind threatens all of mankind."[131] In order to maintain its global perspective, his narrative scrupulously avoids identifying the parts played by particular empires, classes, and elites in creating the nuclear threat. Rather, it take the magnitude and generality of extinction as a licence to vault over such details. Although the "special responsibility" of the "twin superpowers" is parenthetically noted, the The Fate of the Earth's basic assumption is that the species *as a whole* is not only the potential "victim" but also the "author" of nuclear doom.[132] It tells the tale of a suicide attempt by *homo sapiens* against itself. Annihilation always finally figures as something "we," the species, collectively, inflict upon ourselves, a construction that complacently masks the particular interests propelling the arms race. Each specific contribution to the nuclear predicament is emptied of significance by the general sign of global death.

Moreover, The Fate of the Earth represents nuclear destruction as something "we" menace ourselves with unconsciously and virtually unintentionally--by omission rather than commission. The preparation of doom is described as a "kind of inadvertence," a consequence of "numbness," "inertia" or "indifference," a "mistake," the act of "sleepwalkers" or, at worst, "mass insanity."[133] These metaphors are, again, familiar within peace movement discourse: hardly an anti-nuclear speech omits mention of "the insanity of the arms race," or "nuclear madness." And no one reading Schell's first chapter could doubt that full-scale nuclear war would be an irrationality. Yet these phrases, sanctioned by the enormity of doom, actually disguise the full monstrosity of the situation. For to speak of the arms race as a psychopathology, amnesia or mistake is to overlook how rational (in a narrow and immediate sense) it is from the point of view of certain corporate and

imperial interests--how consciously and calculatingly it is pursued. ~~It suppresses the material~~ causes of our predicament. Such figures of speech can, as we will see, become a support for the idealist-liberal hope that, if only everyone were adequately informed, knew the facts, and strenuously thought the unthinkable, the wielders of the Bomb would spontaneously "awaken" and stop preparing nuclear war.[134]

We can see better what is being obscured in The Fate of the Earth by considering the place of the United States in its narrative. This is a strategic point for critical incision because, despite (it is so tempting to write "because of") The Fate of the Earth's claim to speak "on behalf of the earth and mankind," it is a manifestly *American* text, written by an American author, published in a prestigous American magazine, and angled in numerous ways towards reception by an American audience. New York is, after all, the city selected to illustrate the nuclear ending of civilization, and the chapter depicting planetary devastation is entitled, in a specifically American allusion, "A Republic of Insects and Grass."

Yet it is precisely the role of the United States and its military-industrial complex in the nuclear predicament that Schell avoids naming. In one of the only critical reviews in the American left press, Schmitz nailed this point, and advanced the counter-narrative The Fate of the Earth tries to evade:

> Sceptical readers will perceive within the culpable system of independent, sovereign nation states, the basic problem as Schell sees it, the preeminent nuclear power in that system, a bristling imperial nation state, the one that has determined the nuclear arms race from the beginning; and they will wonder about the reluctance to designate in this text. . . . The fate of the earth, after all, is still pretty much in certain American hands.[135]

To the extent that The Fate of the Earth fails even to acknowledge this particular interpretation of the world's nuclear problems, Schmitz went on, it is "parochial in its vision, not at all disinterested, even self-serving."[136] His analysis is unjust, but only minimally so. In fact, those "American hands" *are* represented in the text: global nuclear

empire is too bulky to hide completely. The Manhattan Project and Hiroshima, John Foster Dulles and the strategy of massive retaliation, Hermann Kahn and the RAND Corporation, Admiral Rickover and his nuclear submarines, NATO and its policy of nuclear first-use, President Carter and the nuclear defence of Middle Eastern oil all, briefly, appear. But they appear only to be taken away again. No sooner is America's unique historical contribution to the nuclear predicament identified, than it is reabsorbed as mere example of a common condition, an illustration of universal guilt. It flickers in and out of view, at once present in the text and absent from it, always threatening to disrupt the generalized "human" narrative and yet constantly recuperated. Now you see it, now you don't: the planet hides the Pentagon.

6. Doom Depoliticized

The consequences of this repression become painfully apparent when The Fate of the Earth attempts to articulate a program of action. "Extinction," Schell asserts "is not something to contemplate, it is something to rebel against."[137] Like The Third World War, The Fate of the Earth points its readers toward a bifurcating future. The options it offers, however, are very different--not "victory" or "defeat," but "survival" or "extinction." Unlike Hackett's self-fulfilling prophecy, Schell's aims at self-cancellation, and steps for calling-off doom are outlined in the text's third chapter, appropriately entitled "The Choice." Unfortunately, it is at this point that the narrative disintegrates.

For, having urged the reinvention of the world, Schell abruptly signs off:

> In this book I have not sought to define a political solution to the nuclear predicament . . . I have left to others the awesome, the urgent task, which, imposed on us by history, constitutes the political work of our age.[138]

It is no accident that this resignation occurrs at the very point the text confronts "the political work of our age." The Fate of the Earth's strategy of universalization demands that it speak from a position above or outside politics. It is in the name of a cause

allegedly *beyond politics* that it appeals for disarmament. Whenever politics appears in Schells text, it is subsumed by something higher: "the point is not to make life a scene of political protest: life is the point": politics, along with the world, has to be "reinvented."[139] What mandates this lofty position is, precisely, doom:

> For while the events that might trigger a holocaust would probably be political, the consequences would be deeper than any political aims, bringing ruin to the hopes and plans of capitalists and socialists, rightists and leftists, conservatives and liberals alike.[140]

This is a position reiterated in Schell's later writings, where he attempts to disavow even the term "peace movement," "because the word 'movement' suggests something of a political character."[141]

Yet this claim to escape politics undoes even as it is uttered. Merely in naming doom, Schell differentiates himself from and opposes himself to the speakers of nukespeak. The presence of these formidable political opponents is in fact detectable within The Fate of the Earth: they are the "upholders of the status quo" against whom the text speaks. What is notable, however, is that these figures are never precisely identified. They are visible only in ~~an~~ abstract, generalized way: Schell shadow boxes. For to name the actual executants of the arms race would compel The Fate of the Earth to discover itself caught up in the very clash of "capitalists and socialists, rightists and leftists, liberals and conservatives" it purports to transcend, not situated above the fray, looking down from an extra-terrestrial perspective, but irretrievably implicated in a field of implacably political contention. The cost of this pretended transcendence, however, is to forgo the possibility of action, with the elegant gesture of "leaving to others" what has to be done.

The abdication is not quite total. The Fate of the Earth is neither straightforwardly political, nor totally depoliticize : it wobbles. Having resigned politics to others, it then immediately follows this with a synoptic, six-page prospectus for a global peace movement

It urges "a phone call to a friend, a meeting in the community."[142] From the the level of the individual--as a "first, immediate step, each person make known, visibly and unmistakably, his desire that the species survive"--it skids abruptly to the global--"world government,"[143] stopping on the way only long enough to support, as an intermediate step, the idea of a a nuclear freeze.

In the context of the American press's long quiescence on the nuclear issue, even this call to action is remarkable. Yet, given the severity of Schell's nuclear prognosis, his prescription is astoundingly mild. The movement he wants will be non-partisan, for everyone, and against no one. It will not "bend the rules" of "decent political life."[144] And it will have "no enemies"--"For who," Schell asks blandly, "would be the enemy? Certainly not the worlds political leaders, who, though they menace the earth with nuclear weapons, do so only with our permission and at our bidding."[145] Moreover, its program is marked by a number of telling absences. The Fate of the Earth's willingness to contemplate the end of all things is matched by its unwillingness to consider interference with the political economy of the United States. It suggests no specific changes to the military-industrial complex, the global empire that demands nuclear defence, nor the anti-communist ideology that has always fuelled the arms race. Such questioning of American profits, policies and attitudes would presumably transgress the text's non-partisan stance. Schmitz's "sceptical reader"--who earlier noticed the virtual invisibility of America in Schell's narrative--might begin to suspect that deferring disarmament until the advent of world government is a tactic to recoup protest within the safe boundaries of liberal thought, and that its injunction to "Atlas-like . . . take the world on our shoulders" figures as a surrogate for shouldering change closer to home.[146]

The Fate of the Earth closes with an inspiring peroration:

One day--it is hard to believe that it will not be soon--we will make our choice. Either we will sink into the final coma and end it all or, as I trust

> and believe, we will awaken to the truth of our peril, a truth as great as life itself, and, like a person who has swallowed a lethal poison but shakes off his stupor at the last moment and vomits the poison up we will break through the layers of our denials, put aside our faint hearted excuses, and rise up to cleanse the earth of nuclear weapons.[147]

Stirring as this is, it cannot hide a serious void in the text. The major weakness of The Fate of the Earth lies in the disproportion between the length, detail, and systematic intensity of the depiction of the world's end, and the cursory, vague, and gestural quality of the plans for preventing it; two hundred pages on how to think about extinction, six on what to do about it. Indeed, the imbalance threatens to completely invert The Fate of the Earth's intended cautionary effect. For the reader finds the position of nuclear victim inscribed with immeasurably greater credibility than that of anti-nuclear activist: one world seems so much less plausible than none. As several writers have recently argued, the unintended consequence of such doom discourse may well be to paralyse, rather than to mobilize, scaring people stiff rather than scaring them into action.[141] What is less acknowledged is that this is the psychological consequence of depoliticizing doom.

7. The Appropriation of Apocalypse

The Fate of the Earth's doomsaying works in two, contrary, directions. On the one hand, it surfaces and exposes the horrors of nuclear war. On the other, it submerges the identities of the actors and agencies who push us toward those horrors. It names doom, but--in Barthes' term--"exnominates" the doommakers; speaks against nukespeak, but is silent about nukespeak's speakers. Its mesmerizing focus on the image of uncontained catastrophe thus actually serves to carefully circumscribe its narration of the nuclear predicament. This narrative implodes, however, when the text's avoidance of politics frustrates its attempt to articulate a credible solution to an inescapably political dilemma.

These contradictions are, as I have already suggested, not peculiar to Schell. That a text such as The Fate of the Earth should win acceptance as the "voice" of contemporary

disarmament activism is a symptom of the dilemmas confronting the American peace movement in the 1980s. This movement was populist and diverse. But its most influential recruits were white, affluent, professionals--the very members of Schell's New Yorker audience. To oppose the Bomb while ostensibly standing "beyond politics" accurately expressed the self-interest of this group, keen to avoid nuclear war, not anxious to radically change America. Reinforcing this desire not to be overtly "political" was the massive force of anti-communist ideology, and the deep-rooted fear of accusation as "un-American." The Reagan administration's attempts to incite red-baiting witch-hunts against disarmament activists shows that such fears were well-founded.[149] But the net effect was to produce a movement which, albeit with numerous courageous exceptions, won a limited respectability to the very degree that it forfeited challenge to fundamental institutions of American society.

Insofar as the movement did coalesce politically, it was around the the concept of a nuclear freeze--an eminently moderate, balanced, "middle-of-the-road" proposal. Under the influence of an increasingly conservative leadership, the priority of this measure was regularly invoked to exclude from the agenda any "radical" content, such as campaigns of civil disobedience, criticism of specific weapons systems, or denunciation of American foreign intervention. As one commentator wrote:

> Seeking to rise above politics, the freeze tried to annul politics, shutting off debate on matters that had previously been of grear concern to the coalition that makes up the freeze movement.[150]

The same writer sardonically termed the discourse of this campaign "free(ze)speech": "Everyone can subscribe to the idea, without necessarily having to to take some demanding political decision or initiative. Its like saying you are for free speech. . . ."[151] The nadir in this process was actually reached on what most observers took to be the peace movement's hour of triumph, the June 12 rally in New York. As the Israeli army, armed and encouraged by the United States, smashed into Lebanon, attacked Syria and

precipitated crisis in the nuclear powder-keg of the Middle East, organizers agreed to censor all mention of the attack from the podium, lest the demonstration appear too partisan.[152]

Depoliticized doomsayings such as The Fate of the Earth, or its televisual counterpart, The Day After, were the natural centrepiece of this "free(ze)speech." But the inadequacy of such cautionary warnings were demonstrated by the speed with which they were co-opted by the authors of nukespeak. Talk of "prevailing" in nuclear war was generally discredited--but only in public. The Reagan administration swiftly fell silent about its actual nuclear plans, and learned to ritually intone that nuclear war was unacceptable. The President himself developed an uncanny knack of imitating Schell, even as he solicited extra funds for first-strike missiles:

> Carl Sandburg . . . in his own beautiful way quoted the Mother Prairie, saying, "Have you seen a red sunset dip over one of my cornfields, the shore of night stars, the wave lines of dawn up a wheat valley?" What an idyllic scene that paints in our mind--and what a nightmarish prospect that a huge mushroom cloud might someday destroy such beauty.[153]

The ultimate example of this co-option was to come with the announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative. For the President's concept of an invulnerable "peace shield" against nuclear attack actually capitalized on the dread stimulated by the peace movement. "Star Wars" was, indeed, explicitly described by one of its publicists as an attempt to "take over Jonathan Schell."[154] And while SDI's promise of nuclear safety was technically undeliverable, its ideological effect was devastating. Peace activists watched in dismay as their trump card--fear of holocaust--was played back against them by the President. By the election of 1984, the nuclear freeze campaign had been virtually swept away.

Since 1982, nothing has invalidated The Fate of the Earth's claim that nuclear war might mean human extinction. Indeed, recent studies of the "nuclear winter" effect make Schell's wager on species death seem a substantially safer one than its author could have known at the time of writing.[155] Nor is it even necessary to accept the terms of this bet

to oppose nuclear war: the prospect that a major conflict might, as Reagan's civil defence experts assert, cause "only" twenty to forty million deaths hardly makes it a palatable prospect. But those who share Schell's aspiration for a nuclear-free earth must go beyond the universalizing appeal of doomsaying. To take up the "political work" of the atomic age is to unravel the differentiated structures of nuclear domination--to subvert the hierarchies of gender, class and race that uphold, and are upheld by, the Bomb. We have to speak, not just of the end of the world, but of the end of much, much more besides.

CHAPTER IV

WRITING GREENHAM

1. Greenham Text

To write about "Greenham" is to write about a place that has become an emblem of anti-nuclear revolt, and about events that already constitute a text. The signifiers in this original Greenham text are the banners carried by "Women For Life On Earth" on their 120 mile march from Cardiff to Britain's first Cruise missile base outside Newbury; the pictures, photographs and letters expressing fears of nuclear war with which they decorated the base's perimeter fence; the webs they wove around its gates; the peace signs they painted across its control towers, silos and spy planes in their nightly trespasses; and the scores of sentences handed down to them by magistrates of the nuclear state for the ironic offence of "breaching the peace." It is a text written by thousands of women's acts of symbolic protest.

Yet these acts only won global attention through a series of re-textualizations. The Peace Camp at Greenham Common attained its celebrity through the mediation of journalism, television news, films, and books. And it is through such images that the "Greenham Women" were constructed as objects of public admiration or hatred. This chapter examines four accounts of Greenham produced by these women themselves. On the Perimeter is the work of a journalist commissioned by an American magazine to write a story about "the defeat of the Women's British Peace Movement," whose narrative in fact records her growing sympathy for, and virtual recruitment by, the protestors.[156] Greenham Women Everywhere and Greenham Common: Women At the Wire are collections of anecdotes and statements by numerous women describing the Peace Camp's growth and explaining its philosophy.[157] Keeping the Peace attempts a similar project from a wider-angled perspective: it is an anthology of international pieces about feminist

anti-nuclear protest in 1980s, edited and introduced by a long-time Greenham activist.[158] It thus situates the camp at Newbury within the broader discourse of the women's peace movement. I also refer to certain pamphlets and articles by women and women's groups associated with Greenham. For convenience, I call all these works collectively "Greenham texts."

One of them opens with the statement "Putting this book together has not been easy. It has been an action to which many women have given much."[159] The word "action" has, in this context, a special connotation: it was the omnibus term used by the Greenham women for their astounding variety of symbolic protests, ranging from mass blockades to individual trespass. It is as an "action," a literary extension of feminist insurgency, that the Greenham texts are read here.

2. Nucleophallogocentricism

For the Greenham women, nuclear weapons are symptoms of patriarchy:

> Patriarchy literally means father rule--and once you spot it it never goes away: the percentage of men who are involved in the military, the government, positions of power: and, of course, there is God the Father--supposed creator of all life--the life force itself given masculine gender, I think that it is very important--the language that we have, the labels we use, they permeate our thinking.[160]

Patriarchy and militarism are seen as systemically related. Soldiers are traditionally expected to personify approved "manly" qualities--toughness, discipline, aggression. In their commanders, these are coupled with the more cerebral but equally conventionally virile attributes of authoritative control, cold logic, and abstract rationality. Perceived by this light, nuclear holocaust figures as the catastrophic outcome of a destructive "*men*tality"--the catastrophic product of "male dominated society, male dominated institutions, and stereotypic male values."[161] Many of the Greenham texts see patriarchal violence institutionalized not only in war but also in the technocratic domination of nature, and

the industrial despoliation of the environment. All find its paradigmatic expression in the male exercise of power over women through economic exploitation, pornographic objectification, domestic subjection, battery and rape. One pamphlet cites Robin Morgan:

> The violation of the individual woman is the metaphor for man's forcing himself on whole nations (rape as the crux of war): on non-human creatures (rape as the lust behind hunting and related carnage): and on the planet itself.[162]

From this perspective, the missiles at Greenham are, as On the Perimeter bluntly puts it, a "great phallic symbol,"[163] and it becomes appropriate that the name "Cruise," which at first seems so disarmingly innocuous, at second glance betrays a revealing association with predatory male sexual behaviour--"cruising."[164]

Patriarchy cannot be understood solely in terms of brute coercive force. It is also involves a symbolic system--"the language that we have, the labels that we use." Feminist critics have named this symbolic system "phallogocentricism."[165] Like other peace movement discourses, Greenham texts contest the propaganda of the nuclear state. But they read it as an extreme expression of phallogocentricism. Since, as one nuclear critic has put it, "ugly things need ugly names," the order they protest can be termed *nucleophallogocentricism*: the cultural order of nuclear patriarchy.[166]

The Greenham texts cite numerous examples of nucleophallogocentricism. But for illustration, I will apply their critique to a text we have already read, and glance back quickly at The Third World War. Its powerful authors are, of course, all male, providing a striking illustration of "the percentage of men who are involved in the military, the government, positions of power." And what is immediately notable about the nuclear future that they portray is that it is almost exclusively masculine. Women presumably constitute half or more of the atomized victims of Birmingham and Minsk, and of the bombed, rocketed and nerve-gassed cities of Western Europe described in Hackett's fiction. But their fate is unnoticed. On a stage crammed with eminent and heroic men, there are only two named women. One is Margaret Thatcher's avatar, "Mrs. Plumber": we will return

to her case, and the anomaly it presents from the perspective of Greenham, later. The other is "Janet." "Janet"--"a tall, good looking brunette"--is the wife of an American military astronaut, killed in the first moments of Hackett's hypothetical war by a Soviet laser attack.[167] She is dutifully caring for the children at home when she receives news of her husband's death:

> Suddenly a wail came from deep within her, as from a dying animal. "I hate you all," she shouted, and then in floods of tears snatched her children to her and held them close.[168]

And that is all we hear of "Janet." The Third World War's representative woman, isolated within the bosom of the nuclear family, condescendingly stigmatized as less than fully rational, her expression limited to what Nancy Houston has termed "non-language, inarticulate cries . . . deformed and discarded echoes of the fait-accomplis by men."[169]

Nucleophallogocentricism appears not only in war-stories but also in anti-war stories. What made Greenham especially scandalous was that while challenging nuclear militarism, the protestors also identified patterns of patriarchal exclusion within the mainstream peace movement. For illustration, we need only turn back to The Fate of the Earth. Schell narrates the nuclear destiny of the species as the story of "mankind." The practical implicitations of this patriarchal peacespeak are graphically described by a Greenham protestor writing of the dilemmas facing women who decide to become politically active:

> Maybe she thinks "I'll go along to my local CND meeting"--that's if they know one exists. They find that it is a very bureaucratic set up, basically run by blokes. There's a table at the top of the room and rows of seats. We all sit down and we are informed and find ourselves talking to the backs of each others heads. In that atmosphere, if you're a woman with no background to the peace movement, no political background at all, you go in and you sit at the back. You think, what I'm feeling is fear, panic, terrible distress. I want to express what I'm feeling, but there's no place for me to do it here. What are those blokes going to say? I can't stand up and cry. I can't stand up and scream. I can't even ask what I can do.[170]

It is from a context of such experience that the Greenham texts are produced. One of the editors of At the Wire writes:

> It is crucial that women speak as loudly and as often as we can. We must create our own actions and shape our own herstory to shape the identities that we ourselves desire.[171]

Outside the gates of Newbury's missile base, "Janet" was transformed into anti-nuclear activist. Greenham women wailed, not in private anguish, but in massive defiant choruses as police arrested them by the hundreds. The Peace Camp became a site of symbols, signs and stories repudiating the "language and labels" of patriarchy, contesting the construction of history as what one Greenham text pithily terms "a series of men-only demonstrations."[172] The spirit of inventive audacity that characterized this challenge is caught in a famous poster made from a photograph of one of Greenham's "actions." It shows two women practicing civil disobedience. They are lying on the ground, festooned with a strange web-like entanglement they have woven over themselves. Four uniformed police officers survey them, utterly dumbfounded. Over this image are printed the words from Virginia Woolf's Three Guineas:

> We can best help you prevent war not by repeating your words and following your methods but by finding new words and creating new methods.[173]

3. On the Wire

The new words and new methods of Greenham disrupted nucleophallogocentric narrative by asserting the nuclear significance of gender. Rejecting both the official dualisms of Hackett and the undifferentiated liberal humanism of Schell, they proposed a counter-difference, the difference between patriarchy and feminism. On Greenham's symbolic terrain, this differentiation was marked out by the "menacing grey of the steel perimeter fence with its nine mile circumfrence and its concentration-camp-coils of barbed wire."[174] The wire formed a border between militarized masculinity and feminist pacifism. Keeping the Peace displays on its cover a photograph of three women huddled beneath its huge barbed loops: it is immediately designated in the title of Women At the Wire; On the Perimeter opens by citing the dictionary definition of a "perimeter": "The boundary of a

fortified position: the outer edge of any area."[175] Along this frontier arose what _On the Perimeter_ terms:

> The curious situation . . . where British men and women spent night after night so very close to each other and yet remained on such different ideological sides of the fence that although both sexes saw themselves as defending their country, they feared and despised each other as destroyers and traitors.[176]

The "herstory" of Greenham was thus shaped as an encounter between "Two opposing value systems right next to one another but on opposite sides of the fence"--a struggle of powerful "insiders" against marginalized "outsiders."[177] The insiders are predominantly male: British soldiers, American airmen, Ministry of Defense officials, police. The outsiders are female: professional women, punk women, mothers, grandmothers, housewives, doctors, lesbian feminists, socialist feminists, witches. Inside is the domain of war, housing missiles each equivalent in lethality to fifteen Hiroshimas. Outside is the zone of pacifists and disarmers dedicated to non-violence. Inside is hierarchy--command, rank, discipline and uniforms. Outside is anarchy--protestors with no-leaders and no-spokespeople, purple hair and strange clothing, chaotic comings and goings, dispersals, regroupings, and spontaneous "actions." Inside is technology--an installation of concrete and steel, blast-proofed nuclear silos and hardened aircraft hangers, control towers, barracks, and a vast panalopy of military hardware. Outside is nature--where the protestors camp amongst woods and gorse in frail shelters immersed in mud, open to the weather, short of even the most elementary amenities, learning a "gypsy knowledge" to endure.[178] The inside is, in the protestors' narrative, a place of alienated ratiocination--the world of megadeath calculus, where "'reason' and 'science' are glorified and slavishly followed at the expense of feeling, intuition and spiritual insight."[179] The outside is the sanctuary of vital emotion: a place of laughter, tears, dreams, rituals, and anger. To the insiders, the outsiders seem subversive, irrational, or hysterical. But in the eyes of the outsiders, the insiders are oppressors, expropriators, and destroyers.

The perimeter fence thus became a site of perpetual confrontation. Greenham Women Everywhere cites the definition of "confrontation" to indicate the spirit of non-violent protest:

> To meet face to face; standing facing; be opposite to; face in hostility or defiance; bring face to face with accusers.[110]

This face to face encounter was the core of the events called "Greenham." On the one hand were the attempts by the male insiders to remove and silence the accusatory female outsiders, whose very existence constituted an increasing embarrassment to them, by an escalating series of evictions, arrests, prosecutions, harrassment and violent attacks. On the other were the amazing sequence of raids, demonstrations pranks and rituals by which the outsiders repeatedly defied the authority of the insiders and forced the missiles they guarded to the world's attention.

These actions included *envelopments* of the fence, such as the "embrace the base" demonstration of December 12, 1981, in which thirty thousand women linked arms around the entire nine mile circumfrence of the base, as if to show that the power of war and men was exceeded by, or existed in an unacknowledged dependence on, the resources of peace and women. There were *transformations* of the fence, in which women hung it with pictures, photgraphs, poems and letters expressing fear of war and hope for peace, aiming to "transform the fence from a negative, destructive purpose into a gallery of women's work . . . to show what was at stake for all of us threatened by nuclear war."[111] There were acts of *trespass*, such as the famous incursion of New Years Eve, 1983 in which forty women scaled the fence and danced on the missile silos, acts immediately intended to demonstrate the incompetence of the base's security system, but also symbolising the failure of the entire ideology of "national security":

> What we learnt, by going inside the base, is about crossing artificial barriers. By overcoming our fear of the authority the fence represents, the fence itself becomes useless as a form of security.[112]

There was also *deconstruction* of the fence. On Halloween, 1983, two thousand women

took wire-cutters to four miles of the base's perimeter, and thereafter sections of the wire were regularly removed in mass actions or nightly raids. At the Wire punningly describes this tactic as "De-fencing"--"the removal of barriers that divide us and thereby accommodate conflict."[113] Taking down the fence thus became a figure for the dismantling of defence ideology, and a metaphor for the overcoming of feminine marginalization.

4. Breaching the Peace

These disruptions of nucleophallogocentric boundaries were pursued with an energy that was *carnivalesque*. "Carnival" is the term, coined by the Soviet critic Michael Bakhtin. for that form of popular symbolism which overturns all the pretensions of official, authorised culture, a discourse of:

> Changing, playful, undefined forms . . . symbols of renewal . . . a continued shifting from top to bottom, from front to rear, of numerous parodies and travesties, humiliations, profanations, comic crownings and uncrownings.[114]

Terry Eagleton describes it as a semiotic process in which "power structures are estranged through grotesque parody, 'necessity' thrown into satirical question and objects displaced or negated into their opposites."[115] The Greenham was carnival in that it irreverently set out to overturn the "basic assumptions" of nucleophallogocentricism, as one protestor's poem makes clear:

Let us assume
that the basic assumptions
are wrong

the assumptions
that our leaders
and politicians
are right
and we
are wrong
that we are many
that they are good
and Grown Up and Wise
and we are bad
and Stupid Children
needing to be

Let us assume that
This is
not so
and let us
turn those assumptions
on their heads
til they rattle and groan
and beg for mercy
and for our forgiveness
and let us remind ourselves

who often go unheard

who join hands
who sing songs

put down
put right
and shown
How to Behave

who write the words
who play the music
who surround the barracks
who clown with children
who weave coloured ribbons
between the barbed wire.[186]

The symbolic protests of "Women For Life of Earth" were, precisely, characterized by "a continued shifting from top to bottom, from front to rear, of numerous parodies and travesties," designed to disconcert masculine authority. Greenham women demonstrated their rejection of militarism by, literally, turning their backs on the army during the "Women Turn Their Backs on War Action" at the Falkland victory parade. They reversed patriarchical wisdom about penis-envy with slogans such as "War is Menstruation Envy"; mocked military pride with signs saying "Take The Toys Away From The Boys"; and beside the sign reading "Welcome RAF Greenham Common: 501st Tactical Missile Wing. Commander: Col. Robert M. Thompson. Poised to Deter: Quick To React," they posted a counter-sign: "Welcome: Women's Peace Camp Greenham Common. No Commanders: Poised With the Truth. Quick To Stop Pretending."

What makes the term "carnival" peculiarly appropriate is that many of the Greenham actions were very funny. As a protestor wrote:

> There is a ludicrous side to it too: it is hard to take seriously a top security base in which women hijack buses, sit inside nuclear missile launcher cabs, rollerskate down runways and cycle inside the perimeter fence. It's not surprising they pretend we don't exist. It's one way of hoping the embarrassment will go away.[187]

Playful subversions of nuclear authority sometimes approached the level of high comedy; some entries in At the Wire's diary of the camp read: "7 Feb. Over 100 Women enter base as snakes"; "1 April. 200 women enter the base disguised as furry animals to have a picnic"; "27 April. Citadel locks action: all gates padlocked by women."[188] This last entry perhaps has to be seen as it is recorded in the documentary film Carry Greenham Home to be fully appreciated.[189] A small group of women shut Greenham's main gate from the outside with an unbreakable "Citadel" padlock, imprisoning the military within their own

fortifications. After initially good-humoured attempts to remove the lock with successively larger pairs of bolt cutters, increasingly irate security forces determine to resolve the issue by *force majeure*. A dozen policemen hurl themselves against the gate in a running charge. The lock holds--but the entire gate falls off its hinges, leaving Britain's most thickly defended security installation open to the world: a moment, not just of carnival, but of pure Keystone Cops.

Yet this carnivalesque protest was staged by women motivated by dread of an appalling holocaust. And against any tendency to romanticize the Camp's utopian verve has to be tallied the sheer hardship of life on the wire: inadequate shelter, wet, cold, lack of privacy, excruciating boredom, physical and verbal attacks from soldiers and local youths, hit-and-run tactics by army drivers, "zapping" by sickening and disorienting low-level microelectronic beams, and constant legal prosecution.[190] Indeed, what sharply distinguishes Greenham's protest from Bakhtin's carnival is that it was punishable. Carnival is licensed disorder--what Eagleton terms "a permissible rupture of hegemony."[191] Greenham was rank revolt. Nucleophallogocentricism ultimately protected itself with the rigour of the law, and the women who defied it faced confiscation of their personal property, fines, restraining orders, and jail sentences.

Paradoxically, it was this legal punishment that allowed the protestors to stage their most effective subversions. In trial after trial, women continued their flamboyant contestation of patriarchal logic at the very moment they, and the British public, were meant to be most impressed by the gravity of their crimes. Greenham protestors produced a series of courtroom scenes that repeated the drama played out at the base. Women refused to take the oath, saying that they would swear only "by the Goddess." Some read poems aloud:

> What do you do with someone like me
> the animal called human who, all gut, intestines, wings,
> flies screaming in the face of official logic

unrepententantly and happily dissident
to join her friends who were occupying that sentry box
at the entrance to this monster
that all my life has breached my peace.
What do you do when I admit that I did nothing wrong
and tell you that after two men got hold of me
and dragged me back to the gate,
I ran to the side gate laughing
slid the latch and ran right in again
and that the only way I can be stopped is to silence me by death
for I am the early warning system
because I've seen too much.
What do you do with a revolutionary
who carries no gun
and admits to having fun.[192]

Some of these irruptions of carnival atmosphere into the courts (such as the repeated trials of one "Bridget Evans," whose name was adopted by many otherwise anonymous Greenham women) simply spoofed the legal system. But at other moments, the trials gave the protestors a public forum to announce the the deadly seriousness which underlay all the ingenious clowning. Charges of "breaching the peace" and sentences that had women "bound over to keep the peace" provided a rich opportunity for semiotic reversal. As one Greenham woman asked her judge:

> What are you doing to keep the peace? The power you are using is supporting nuclear weapons. It supports binding women's voices, binding our minds and bodies in prison so our voices cannot be heard. So our warning of death is being repressed. But we cannot be silenced. And I cannot be bound over. I am asking you to keep the peace. We are not on trial . . . you are.[193]

5. Web Weaving

The feminist order Greenham opposed to nucleophallogocentricism was symbolized by the spider-web. Greenham Women Everywhere carries at each of its chapter-headings a small black-and-white graphic of a web, and states that "The symbol most closely associated with the women's peace movement is the weaving of webs."[194] Photographs of the peace camps show webs made from wool and twine festooned everywhere: trailing from the trees and gorse near the shelters; woven into the mesh of the wire fence and across the

gates of the base; carried overhead in demonstrations; cast over police and soldiers during acts of civil disobedience; and flown above the base attached to helium balloons. These webs, which in their frailty, organicism, complexity, and colourfulness stood in such contrast to the steel-grey, rigid linearity of "the wire," assumed a radiating mutiplicity of meanings, themselves becoming the focus for a dense "web" of associations invoking both the means and the ends of the Greenham protest.

This symbolism was strange and disconcerting even to some Greenham supporters. On the Perimeter records how:

> At Green gate, I saw my first web. It was tiny and made of blue wool and attached to the branch of a tree. This was what the young girls apparently loved. It had been very cleverly woven, but it still seemed a bad peace symbol. Many people have a terrible fear of spiders. Webs are sticky, and you get caught in them. Once caught in a web, metaphorically, you die. The peace women saw the web as a symbol of strength. Although composed of feeble strands, each added strand adds strength to the web. The explanation was all right, but as so few people knew it, the web seemed a very unfortunate peace symbol.[195]

Such criticism ignores the depth of feminist tradition drawn together in the web symbol. Aracnophobia is closely connected with mysogny: in a phallogocentric culture, fear and loathing of spiders and fear and loathing of women have gone hand in hand. Mary Daly's Gyn/Ecology traces the mythic roots of this identification.[196] Arachne, Daly observes, was transformed into a spider by Athene (the archetypal man-made woman, born from the head of Zeus) for weaving tapestries which showed the errors, rather than the triumphs, of the patriarchal Olympians. She points out that within numerous Amerindian mythologies the "Cosmic Mother" takes the form of a spider. The association between femininity and spiders is reinforced zooologically, by the mating behaviour of female arachnids, and socially, by the status of spinning and weaving as traditionally female occupation, with "spinster" originally serving as a generic term for all unmarried women. The "terrible fears" about spider-webs which allegedly make them a "bad peace sign" thus appear as a displaced version of men's "terrible fears" about women, uncannily echoing the the

traditional litany of mysogynist accusations: sticky, entrapping, deadly. Seen in this light, the reclamation and revaluation of spiderliness is an appropriate metaphor for the revaluation and redefinition of gender roles attempted by the Greenham women.

The webs' represent an alternative to the divisive, fence-like barriers of patriarchy. At the Wire cites the words of two women peace activists from Hartford, Connecticut, who wove a web around the headquarters of the largest US defence contractor and, when police cut the wire with knives and arrested them, made this statement:

> "Women have traditionally made connections, and men have consistently torn and destroyed them. We hope they will learn to make connections.[197]

Web weaving became a metaphor for numerous different, but overlapping kinds feminist connection-making.

One level of this connection-making was organizational. The web symbolized a strategy for subverting nuclear arms by linking together multiple points of opposition. The authors of Greenham Women Everywhere write:

> Each link in a web is fragile, but woven together creates a strong and coherent whole. A web with few links is weak and can be broken, but the more threads it is composed of, the greater its strength. It makes a very good analogy for the way in which women have rejuvenated the peace movement. By connections made through many diverse channels, a widespread network has grown up of women committed to working for peace. Greenham Common's women's peace camp has been one thread in the formation of this network. . . . [198]

The process of political "networking," repudiating hierarchical, top-down organization in favour of lateral ties between autonomous groups, was to become a hallmark of Greenham and the entire women's peace movement. It was realised at the base itself, where the protest coordinated itself without formal leadership, and extended from Newbury nationally and internationally. Metaphoric web-weaving (the multiplying of lines of support and communication) also multiplied literal (wool and twine) web-weaving as nuclear bases all over America and Europe found themselves decorated with the spidery insignia of feminist pacificism. At Comiso, NATO's Cruise missile site in Sicily, Greenham activists

joined with Italian women to weave a huge multi-coloured woolen web that was thrown over the Carabanieri guarding the base.[199] And Greenham's own webs were partially inspired by the Womens Pentagon Action of 1982, during which members of SONG (Spinsters Opposed to Nuclear Genocide) succeeded in weaving shut the doors of the United States' Department of Defense. In this way the webs hanging on the wire at Greenham Common both derived from and were copied in a proliferation of women's peace actions, and themselves became the strands in a much larger planetary web-weaving exercise.

At another level, web-making represented not only strategy but tactics. Alluding to the example of the Women's Pentagon Action, Greenham Women Everywhere suggests that the web is important emblem,

> . . . partly because it sets up such a clear opposition. Police . . . are trained to deal with force and aggression, not to extricate themselves from woolen webs. Thus the confrontation that develops is very direct yet non-violent and on women's terms. Images of gates shut with wool rather than iron bolts, and women being lifted out of webs are graphic expressions of polarized philosophies: those planning nuclear destruction, and those determined to pursue life.[200]

The soft resilience of spider threads signifies the practice of civil disobedience pitting pacificism, flexibility and patience against coercive force.

At yet another level, the web signifies the reconstruction of a fragmented social order. Anti-nuclear feminism ties together issues which are conventionally separated--rape, the economic exploitation of women, ecological despoliation, nuclear miitarism--into an overall critique of patrarchy.[201] It insists that "the personal is political." The web can thus be taken as signifying a radical conviction that it is the whole system of phallocratic domination, rather than merely isolated aspects of it, which has to be undone. Conversely, the web also stands for the integrated and healed culture which the Greenham protestors hope feminism can produce. One Greenham protestor associates herself with the Amerindian "Cosmic Mother" that Daly writes of:

> We are all interdependent, we are all responsible for each other, how delicate the strands, how strong the web. The ancient spider goddess weaving tirelessly the web of life, again and again, as often as it is needed. Never stopping, never hesitating, working to tirelessly to build again what was broken or torn or destroyed . . . . We will remove whatever lies of force or violence have got caught, we will unravel and weave again whatever holes were torn in it. . . .[202]

Many of the Greenham protestors evidently share the identification Adrienne Rich proposes in her poem "Natural Resources":

> This is what I am: watching the spider
> rebuild--"patently," they say
>
> But I recognize in her
> impatience my own--
> the passion to make and make again
> where such unmaking reigns[203]

Daly points out that the word "text" finds its origins in the Latin "texere," to weave, as does "textile," and comments on the "irony in this split of meaning": "In patriarchal tradition, sewing and spinning are for girls: books are for boys."[204] The Greenham texts defy this split. On the one hand, they record the radicalization of sewing and spinning, and their transformation from domestic handicraft to gesture of political revolt. On the other, by publicizing these acts of insurgent weaving in writings, films, posters they intervene in the patriarchal world of "books," interrupting the male hegemony of nuclear discourse. There is, moreover, a neatly recursive quality to Greenham Women Everywhere's or At the Wire's reporting of Greenham's web-symbolism, for these texts can themselves be seen metaphorically as part of the web-weaving process. It is in these texts that the intellectual and intuitive "connections" and "links" of the feminist anti-nuclear synthesis are inscribed; their publication is part of the "networking" process by which the protestors contact sympathisers and supporters; to narrate Greenham is to "spin a yarn," or as At the Wire puts it, "an attempt at capturing moments of women's experience, during an open-ended story, with the voices of individual women woven together into the continual fabric that is Greenham."[205] Greenham writings constitute a meta-web of words

about webs.

6. Greenham Women

The most powerful symbols produced by the protest at Newbury were, however, not the wire, nor the webs, but the inhabitants of the peace camps themselves: the "Greenham Women." Photographs in At the Wire and Greenham Women Everywhere show them, densely swathed in parkers and anoraks, "made up" only with the peace signs painted across their faces, keeping vigil outside the gates, clambering over wire fences, dancing on silos, dragged by police to waiting vans--figures of a double transgression, simultaneously defying the codes of both "femininity" and "citizenship." Individually, these protestors "were just 'women' and they shared a terror of 'nukes' and that was all they had to unify them."[206] Collectively, they were to attain global stature as emblems of one of the most significant political alliances of the 1980s--the conjugation of feminism and disarmament.

At the Wire concisely states the position with which the Greenham protest was to be generally identified: "Which comes first, disarmament or feminism? It always had to be one or the other--prioritising. We say you can't have one without the other."[207] This assertion proved controversial. From within the peace movement, there were numerous accusations that Greenham's feminism was divisive or superfluous--"more anti-men than anti-missile." In the women's movement, voices were raised warning that the sudden topicality of nuclear disarmament diverted energies from more specifically feminist issues--abortion, lesbian rights, violence against women--and amounted to cooption.[208] Greenham women thus found themselves "criticized for being too feminist and for not being feminist enough."[209] On what grounds can it be said of peace and feminism that "you can't have one without the other?"

Two major, and very different, answers to this question are heard in the Greenham texts. The first proposes women are inherently more pacific than men. In one version, this position assumes that mothering and childraising are natural female activities: such procreative, nurturing functions, it is argued, makes violence instinctually abhorrant to women. Additionally--or alternatively--the case for innate female pacificism is sometimes given a metaphysical aspect, and rooted in:

> . . . a basic spiritual faith in the creative, renewing power of women, in women's energy together as a counterspell to the deadly enchantments of the patriarchy[210]

This feminist spirituality, which was to provide some of Greenham's most vivid iconography, invokes "the Goddess" in oppositon to the patriarchal God, revives traditions of witchcraft, and cultivates an interest in in allegedly pacific prehistoric matriarchal societies. In this vein can also be included writings that resort to Jungian theories of "anima" and "animus" to account for what is seen as an archetypal affinity between women and peace. Whether in its biological or mystical version, this line of thought essentialises gender identity: it posits a natural, primordial differentiation of male and female attitudes to violence and aggression.

The alternative position connects women and peace not on the basis of biology, but of socialization:

> Women are not inherently non-violent: they are traditionally oppressed and, as an oppressed group, have often turned their anger and violence in upon themselves. Nor are men inherently violent: they are institutionally and structurally dominant, and retain that dominance through the cultivation of toughness and violence. Women are not "Earth Mothers" who will save the planet from the deadly games of the boys--this too is part of the support and nurture role that women are given in the world[211]

Women, it is argued, tend to be less violent than men because they have been systemically excluded from positions of power and domination, and assigned tasks that place a premium on the development of empathy, compassion, and cooperation. This exclusion is the basis of patriarchal power--but also of the feminist challenge to its

institutions of mass destruction. As outsiders to these institutions, women, it is claimed have less to lose by their dismantlement, and a better capacity to envisage alternatives than the men who have been conditioned within them. The basis of the women's peace movement is defined, not as an intrinsic femaleness, but as a constructed femininity, not *naturally given, but culturally written.*[31] This is an of anti-nuclear feminism that has an anti-nuclear sense of gender--in that it rejects belief in a fixed core or essence to masculine and feminine identity.

Most of the texts read here contain statements representative of both positions. For the typical form of the Greenham texts is polyphonic: they are either anthologies, or narratives which, although principally authored by one or two women, knit together a series of anecdotes, analyses or poems by many others. Such texts emphasize the striking diversity of female attitudes and beliefs within the Peace Camp:

> A Nottingham miner's wife told me, while we were linking arms in front of a line of police at Greenham, that she was "fed up with webs, mysticism and menstruation." I told her that yelling "Maggie Thatcher's boot boys" at the police didn't make them any easier to deal with. [33]

Displaying this diversity, Grenham texts carefully avoid resolving it by asserting a "correct line." They inscribe not "Greenham Woman" but "Greenham Women." This refusal to impose an homogenizing, authoritative perspective on the protest reflects the political conviction that a polyvocal, decentred organization, capable of tolerating internal difference is characteristically feminist and constitutes an essential aspect of opposition to the rigid hierarchies of phallocratic culture. Moreover, it clearly embodies a choice to affirm a common ground of sisterhood rather than concentrating on divisions between women.

Yet different theories of gender identity have profound implications for both feminists and peace activists. In particular, anti-nuclear writings which suggest that such identities are naturally fixed backhandedly reinforce the very ideology they wish to oppose. For images of women as earth-mothers, witch-women and nature-godesses can actually endorse

patriarchy's tendency to represent war as the anatomical destiny of men, and the preservation of life as the biological fate of women. Greenham certainly set out to reverse the values attached to this distinction, asserting the superiority of peaceful women over warlike men. But latent within its symbolism and iconography was the danger of reifying the gender distinctions marked out by "the wire"--men/war/science on one side, women/ peace/ nature on the other--and ratifying these oppositions as organic and immutable. Representation of women as eternal nurturers and peacemakers, and the identification of femininity with "nature," leaves us, at source, with a fundamental stasis of original difference, and a biologism that has always been used against social change.

In contrast, a position which sees gender attitudes to peace and war as culturally inscribed recognizes that these oppositions may be re-written. This is a position expressed in many (probably the majority) of Greenham texts. It involves a double, movement, a simultaneous assertion and deconstruction of the difference between men and women. Gender roles are defined as historically determined, yet utimately mobile and changeable, susceptible to change and reconstruction. This on the one hand involves acknowledgement of a hazard. For it implies that, since women are not intrinsically peaceful, the nuclear state may in fact militarize femininity, a possibility highlighted by recent debate over the allocation of women to combat roles in NATO armies.[114] But it also recognizes opportunity in that it holds out hope masculine attitudes to war may be transformed.

7. Common Ground?

The view of gender identity as written, not natural, allows a better recognition of the complexity actually revealed in the Greenham texts. For as they themselves show inscription of one side of "the wire" as male and the other as female could only be approximate. Masculine and feminine attitudes to militarism always appear complicated and cross-written by codes of class and race. There was a sharp irony that the Greenham

women's arch opponent was Britain's "Iron Lady"; many of the police officers and guards who arrested protestors were themselves women; and the Peace Camp received support both from individual men, and anti-nuclear organizations, such as CND and END, which could fairly be described as male-dominated. The schematic opposition, "men and war" versus "women and peace" thus constantly became frayed and tangled, as many Greenham women acknowledged. On the Perimeter describes one protestor's perception:

> She felt that at heart, most men worshipped weapons, force and power, and it was difficult for them to understand why many women loathed and feared these particular manifestations of masculinity. She accepted that many women also supported the male ethic and were even more weapon-worshipping than their fathers and husbands. Such women would obviously loathe the whole idea of the camp. She realized there were also many men who were in complete sympathy with the peace women, and would fit in very well at Greenham, but it had seemed impossible to make an exclusive selection.[115]

The identification of femininity and peace stands: "men worshipped weapons, force and power," "women loathed and feared these manifestations." Yet at the same time, it is subject to qualification: "many men . . . were in complete sympathy with the peace camp," while "many women also supported the male ethic." It is not unassailable fact--one cannot ignore Thatcher. But nor is it fiction--for one cannot deny the overwhelming masculinity of the nuclear establishment, nor the astounding power of the feminist anti-militarism demonstrated at Newbury.

This present writing is itself implicated in these complexities. For a text that celebrates the Greenham protest and carries a masculine signature inscribes itself within an obvious double-bind. It places itself, metaphorically, on "the other side of the fence" from the British paratroopers who nightly shouted abuse at the Greenham Peace Camp. This is the very side from which men, and masculine discourse, were specifically excluded when the Camp was declared for "women only" some six months after its first establishment. Amongst the arguments advanced for this move were the fact that women have always been silenced by male authority; that it is vital for women to have spaces in which to organize autonomously; that men tend to have less tolerance for non-hierarchical

organization; and, finally and simply, that there were lots of <u>other nuclear bases for men</u> to protest at if women wanted to be on their own at Greenham. And to this writer, such reasons seem good ones. To affirm that gender differences are culturally constructed is not to pretend that they are insubstantial: "at this point in history there are differences between men and women that no amount of wanting to be 'people first' will wash away."[216]

Moreover, some of these arguments need only be slightly rephrased to constitute a critique, not only of male presence at Greenham, but of male writing *about* Greenham. For there is a real danger in a masculine voice, however sympathetic and anti-nuclear, seeking, again, to "speak for" women, represent their concerns, appropriate their activities--and hence subtly reimpose the boundaries of nucleophallogocentricism. In writing a critical tribute to the Greenham protest, awareness of this problem has made it peculiarly easy for me to identify with the male supporters of the Greenham women described in in <u>On the Perimeter</u>, who when they arrived at the Peace Camp with various gifts,

> . . . kept a distance, looking embarrassed and clutching sets of plastic spoons and polythene . . . as if they believed that there was an invisible and magical ring surrounding the Greenham women which no male could pass with impunity.[217]

Yet there is a sense in which such deferential speechlessness is merely the obverse of the paratroopers' sexist insults. It risks lapsing into the exaggerated and insincere reverence that has always been the traditional complement of a dominant mysogny. Neither of these stereotypical attitudes seem an appropriate response to a protest which so deeply challenges established models of masculinity. A better option for the men of the peace movement is to listen to, speak to, and learn from their anti-nuclear sisters, as allies in struggles that are at once necessarily distinct, and crucially common.

CHAPTER V

NAMING STAR WARS

1. "A Long Time Ago, In a Galaxy Far, Far Away"

In February of 1986, a Washington District Court passed judgement on a suit for infringement of copyright brought by Lucasfilms Inc. against five organizations that had used the name "Star-Wars" in television commercials supporting and opposing the Strategic Defense Initiative. Judge Gerhard Gessel dismissed the case. "Since Jonathan Swift's time," he noted, "creators of fictional worlds have seen their vocabulary for fantasy appropriated to describe reality."[218] There can be few more thoroughgoing instances of such appropriation than the identification of the Reagan administration's plans for space based anti-nuclear defence with George Lucas' films. Indeed, the epic science-fiction cycle--_Star Wars_ itself, and its sequels, _The Empire Strikes Back_ and _The Return of the Jedi_, along with its many imitations, and the closely associated craze for space-war video games--can be said to constitute the nuclear text (in this case, a cinematic "text") through which popular culture has mediated the advent of space weaponry to the North American public.[219]

This mediation has been a complex process. _Star Wars_, released in 1977, actually predates SDI and the whole upsurge of nuclear concern charted in earlier chapters.[220] It can thus be claimed that when SDI was announced in 1983, the new discourse on space weaponry captured, as it were, the pre-existing imagery of _Star Wars_ and turned it to unexpected use. But equally, _Star Wars_ can be seen as an anticipation of SDI. For the film is, as I will argue, a cultural product of the very tendencies--the thrust toward domestic conservatism, post-Vietnam militarist revival, nostalgic desire for a lost era of global American supremacy--that on a political plane brought to power the Reaganite regime whose nuclear programs culminate in SDI.[221] What I want to plot here is how this

double process of anticipation and appropriation establishes a multiple set of affinities connecting Star Wars with SDI, and sets up what Edward Said would term a relationship of "affiliation"--"a network of implicit cultural associations"--between film and weapons.[222]

At first glance, the relation appears to be one between a fiction and a reality: Star Wars is airy escapism, a fantasy of war in space, mere imagination--SDI a matter of massive material investment, involving momentous decisions and millions of lives. Yet in a way, Star Wars and SDI are *both* fictions. For the latter is, in the President's words, a "vision" and a "dream," its promise of an infallible space defence against the Bomb a hypothesis whose realization depends upon not just one, but a whole series of scientific breakthroughs and as yet unattained (perhaps unattainable) technological innovations.[223] SDI is a prodigous speculation, a gamble on the feasibility of weapons that were until recently, as one advocate admitted, only "the stuff of science fiction."[224] It is a utopia--or a chimera. And it is precisely this fictive aspect of SDI that its critics meant to highlight when they first dubbed the project "Star Wars," in a derogatory designation intended to point to the fantastic implausibility, the un-reality, of the scheme.

But the allusion backfired badly. For there is a sense in which Star Wars, the film, is not less, but *more* real than SDI, the defence plan. The pervasive influence of Lucas' films on American culture, where they have had what Jay Goulding terms an "overwhelmingly anaphoric effect" on toy stores, television programs, cartoon strips, video games, popular music and breakfast cereals, has made them such a ubiquitous, quotidien component of popular consciousness that they have actually attained a familiarity and tangibility far surpasssing that achieved by the remote calculations of nuclear physicists.[225] Because of this, the designation of SDI as "Star Wars" carries with it connotations quite contrary to those intended by its opponents, and most welcome to the President, for it bestows on the as-yet-unachieved Pentagon plan all the substantiality and facticity of Lucas' cinematically "realized" fantasy.

And indeed, the title "Star Wars" was swiftly accepted by advocates of SDI, and assimilated into their propaganda. Even before the official adoption of the scheme, internal US Defense Department publications had boasted of the coming laser technologies in articles entitled "May The Force Be With You":

> Once you marveled at fictional space-age heroes and their Amazing Ray Guns. Soon it may turnabout--with Buck, Kirk and Luke smacking their lips at the prospect of looking at your tech (sic) manuals.[226]

Once SDI had become "Star Wars" James Ionson, its scientific director, said of the name, "Originally, we thought it was unfortunate: now we like it. It's almost a cult now."[227] Asked what he thought of the term, Lieutenant General James A. Abrahamson, the project's military commander, is reported as answering, "You know, its all the wrong connotation for the program": then--breaking into a grin--"Except that the good guys won and the force is with us."[228] And in 1985 Reagan himself was to conclude a speech on SDI to the National Space Club with the words ". . . in this struggle, if you'll pardon my stealing a film line, 'The force is with us.'"[229]

This last allusion is of especial interest, for "Star Wars" has been, in an exceptionally intimate way, President Reagan's own project. And the President embodies the conflation of the cinematic and the political in North American culture, his charismatic personality a tissue of celluloid allusions and identities now played back "for real" to an adoring audience. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that in Reagan's first, televised announcement of SDI it was possible to detect traces of an earlier, if more obscure, performance, in which, as the star of Warner Brothers' 1940 melodrama Murder in the Air, the speaker had figured as "Brass Banford," a young American officer entrusted with the secret of "the inertia project"--a "super weapon" whose mysterious electronic rays

> Not only makes the United States invincible in war, but in doing so promises to become the greatest force for world peace ever discovered, which is the hope and prayer of all thinking people. . . . the greatest war weapon ever invented, which, by the way, is the exclusive property of Uncle Sam.[230]

Fifty years later, "Brass Banford" had returned to play in a new, Pentagon-sponsored saga

of laser-weaponry, which was in turn to take its name from a box-office hit--thus neatly completing an uncanny circuit between Hollywood and the military-industrial complex.

2. Special Effects.

"Let me share with you a vision of the future which offers hope," said the President:

> Let us turn to the very strengths in technology that have spawned our great industrial base and that have given us the quality of life we enjoy today. . . . I call on the scientific community who gave us nuclear weapons to turn their great talents to the cause of mankind and world peace to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obselete.[231]

No more striking illustration could be asked for Ernest Mandel's thesis that "Belief in the omnipotence of technology is the specific form of bourgeois ideology in late capitalism."[232] And while SDI offers space weapons as a technological fix for the nuclear threat, *Star Wars* creates an aesthetics for that technology, the aesthetics of "special effects."

The very opening shot of the film, in which the vast bulk of an Imperial space-cruiser slowly looms over the audience, gradually engulfing the entire screen as it advances from right to left, establishes its spectacular celebration of futuristic military technology. The relation with SDI here is, at one level, immediate and obvious: the space-cruisers, star-fighters and death-beams of *Star Wars* are displaced and extrapolated versions of a real-life Pentagon wizardry of space-shuttles, hunter-killer satellites, pop-up submarine-launched interceptor weapons, infrared aerosol sprays, orbital relay mirrors and nuclear pumped X-ray lasers. Indeed, it is likely that the animated graphics with which the US Defense Department assiduously supplied television news networks, showing lasers effortlessly shooting down whole fleets of Soviet missiles, appeared to many in their audience as merely crude versions of scenarios already brought to them by Lucasfilms.

But the affinity extends deeper than this. As Robin Wood has argued, the experience of viewing Star Wars invites simultaneous awareness of two levels of technology--the technology on-screen, and the technology off-screen, "the diegetic wonders within the narrative, and the extradiegetic wonders of Hollywood's special effects department."[233] The on-screen technology is military: the off-screen technology cinematic. But the two are not unrelated. The latter, an elaborate studio deployment of computerization, miniaturization, laser-beams and electronic imaging devices, is itself largely derivative from high-tech military research, a "spin-off" of the real-life armaments programs of which the on-screen technology provides an imaginative representation.[234] Star Wars connection with SDI is thus not merely thematic, but formal, the means of production employed in Lucasfilms special effects department and Lawrence Livermore's weapons-laboratories not all that far apart.

What the off-screen technology of special effects produces on-screen is a militarized "machine ambience."[235] A whole range of devices--the 70mm film, the overwhelming volume of Dolby quadrophonic sound, the illusions of extreme speed, abrupt acceleration, gigantic size, dazzling light, and planet-consuming explosions--all work to impose on the spectator the sense of being situated within the control rooms of space-ships and death-stars, positioned inside an environment of interstellar war. They create, as Don Rubey puts it,

> . . . an illusion of power and control, of the ability to escape the limitations of our bodies . . . to take on the nature of our machines and share their power and relative invulnerability. . . . Star Wars is the first movie of an age of electronic combat, a prediction of what war will feel like for combatants completely encapsulated in technology, like the soldiers of Robert Heinlein's Starship Troopers.[236]

Writing in 1978, Rubey correctly related this depiction to the historically recent episode of air warfare over Vietnam, and the experiences of omnipotent exhilaration and control glowingly described by the pilots who devastated South East Asia from the safety

of their electronic cockpits. But the advent of SDI obliges us to update this reference, and acknowledge the direct relevance of Star Wars' outer-space setting to contemporary militarism. For what SDI offers is, on a grand scale, the very sense of technological power and invulnerability simulated by Star Wars' special effects. It is a scheme by which not merely individual pilots, but entire populations will be encapsulated within the shield of automated defense systems. In this light, Star Wars can be read as offering a metaphoric representation of the humanly inexperiencable event of nuclear combat in space, romanticized by the anachronistic addition of single-combats and chivalric adventure. Even the expense of Lucasfilms' special effects, the sense of reckless, prodigal extravagance which is, as Wood notes, essential to the spectacular appeal of Star Wars, underlines the connection with SDI: if North America can afford $30 million to simulate space war, and $350 million to watch it, surely we will pay $300 billion for the real thing?[237]

3. The High Frontier

An early version of SDI bore the name "High Frontier," and although the plan itself was rejected for a more sophisticated variant, the metaphor has remained central to the discourse of space-weapons. To inscribe space as the West's new "frontier" is to project onto it one of the most potent images in North American culture, designating it as territory available for violent appropriation and colonization, as an arena for martial and heroic deeds, and as a line of defence. It at once associates the interstellar vacuum with the Indian Frontier of the Old West, and etches across it the East/West polarization of the New Cold War. The new frontier is "high" because it is lofty and distant, because its exploitation requires the development of "high"--that is, advanced--technology, and also because it constitutes the "high ground" that must be controlled to ensure military command of the planet. A set of resonances are thus established between nukespeak, Western and space-opera. The Soviet enemy whose nuclear attack must be beaten back

from the astral ramparts of Fortress America connotatively assumes the attributes of both Red Indian and alien: the Nuclear Other, whom we encountered in The Third World War, reappears wearing the composite features of commie, savage, and bug-eyed monster.

Star Wars can be seen as the culture industry's technicolour amplification on the official metaphor of space as "frontier." As Lucas himself writes, his film's genealogy, "Came all the way down through the Western."[238] In its fictional world, outer space appears, as Goulding puts it, "not much different from the wild, unconquered Western US of the 1800's," complete with saloons, shoot-outs, strange aboriginals, and intergalactic bounty hunters.[239] And, as so many reviews attest, the plot requires little more summary than that that conveyed in the time-honoured phrase "white hats versus black hats." But superimposed on this "Western" narrative are lightly encrypted allusions to contemporary geopolitics. The grey uniforms of the evil Empire's commanders invoke Soviet military styles; Darth Vader draws heavily on the conventional Hollywood depiction of the ruthless KGB commissar; and Hans Solo and Luke Skywalker--capitalist individualism and liberal idealism personified--are quintessentially American. The tidiness of the Cold War analogy at first seems disrupted by the film's celebration of guerilla warfare: the heroes are "Rebels", and their jungle base resembles Managua or the Mekong more than Washington. But Lucas presents a fictional anticipation not only of SDI, but also of the Reaganite doctrine of Low-Intensity-Conflict as applied in Nicaragua, Angola and Afghanistan. It appropriates the glamour and efficacy of irregular warfare for use against the symbolic representatives of the Soviet Empire. Solo and Skywalker may be "freedom-fighters," but they are intergalactic contras, not space-age Sandinistas.[240]

In a dazzling sequence of ideological gymnastics Star Wars thus recasts superpower conflict in the idiom of frontier adventure, displaces it into outer space, projects America's identity as a repressive imperial power entirely onto its opponent, and represents "our side" as the plucky, outgunned underdog struggling against a gigantic enemy Behemoth.

The affinity with official anti-Soviet discourse was not lost on the White House: even before the film gave its name to SDI, Reagan's aides had reportedly nicknamed the notorious address in which the President denounced the USSR as the "focus of evil in the modern world" as the "Darth Vader speech."[241] As David Trend has observed,

> Narrowing the gap between futuristic fantasies and complex world events permits the reduction of complex international issues to a realm of simplistic figuration: Manichean battles of light against darkness, tales of wilderness conquest and Manifest Destiny.[242]

What highlights Star Wars' link with SDI, however, is its underlying strain of nuclear anxiety. For the whole plot revolves around the annihilatory, metaphorically nuclear, menace of the Empire's Death Star. "I thought I heard a million voices cry out in agony," muses Obi-Wan-Ken-Obi as the Millenium Falcon hurtles through the debris of the atomized planet Alderaan. Yet at the same time as the film obliquely articulates the terror of planetary extinction, its melodramatic, upbeat narrative denies and dissipates these fears. Like the advocates of "high frontier" weaponry, Star Wars assures its audience that the extermination issue can be brought to a happy ending, not by negotiation, but by nimble extraterrestrial warriors prepared for a showdown in outer space.

4. Sky Fathers

The high frontier is patriarch heaven. SDI discourse is quintessentially nucleophallogocentric, generated by a masculine military apparatus whose hierarchy descends from the patriarchal figure of the President through successive bureaucratic spokesmen to the scientists of the space-weapons laboratories, amongst whose ranks women are almost completely absent.[243] It is, moreover, a discourse that elaborates the image of the nuclear state as a fatherly authority whose omnipotent might can be exercised to protect its civilian "children" from the menace of the Bomb. This paternalism is quite explicit in a widely broadcast television commercial supporting SDI: over a crayoned picture showing nuclear missiles harmlessly repulsed by rainbow-like laser-rays, a child's voice says:

> I asked my daddy what this Star Wars stuff is all about. He said that right now we can't protect ourselves from nuclear weapons, and that's why the President wants to build the peace shield. It would stop missiles in outer space so they couldn't hurt our house. Then nobody could win a war. And if nobody could win a war there would be no reason to start one. My daddy's smart. Support the peace shield.[244]

One might apply to this propaganda for "Star Wars," the weapons project, precisely the same words Robin Wood has written about Star Wars, the film:

> The project of Star Wars films and related works is to put everyone back in his or her place, reconstitute us as dependent children, and reassure us that it will all come right in the end.[245]

For in Star Wars, the association of space-weaponry and patriarchy appears in its most atavistic form. The film's twenty-first century futurism coexists with a self-consciously "mythical" story of the restoration of the Father. The whole epic cycle revolves around Skywalker's attempt to inherit the rightful status of his lost "Jedi Knight" father. His rites of passage into the stellar patriarchy take the form of a conventionally heroic series of single combats, dragon slayings, and martial training, revolving around the mastery of the light saber, an unmistakably phallic weapon (as Rubey puts it, "You carry it in your pocket until you need it, then you push a button and its three feet long and glows in the dark") that neatly combines the sword--traditional symbol of warrior prowess--with the latest Pentagon high-tech.[246] These adventures are enacted in a universe whose primary value is manly comradeship, and conducted under the tutelage of a series of kindly father surrogates--Obi-Wan-Ken-Obi, Yoda, and, ultimately, in a sentimental resolution of Oedipal hostilities, Darth Vader himself, the evil, corrupt patriarch whose paternal affections suddenly reassert themselves to save Skywalker at the climax of the cycle. The Return of the Jedi culminates in what Wood terms:

> A veritable Fourth of July of Fathericity: a grandiose fireworks display to celebrate Luke's coming through, as he stands backed by the ghostly figures of Obi-Wan-Ken-Obi, Darth and Yoda, all smiling benevolently."[247]

All this asserts the naturalness, benignity and importance of patriarchal authority, while at the same time affirming its traditional connection to military leadership and

weapons-mastery.

This holds even though Star Wars seems to test a new *feminine* identity--that of space-amazon, or futuristic warrior princess. Superficially, the inclusion of Princess Leia as a "strong" female character might seem to give the film a progressive, even feminist, aspect. The fallacy of this proposition does not only lie in the fact that Leia, despite occasional tokenistic bursts of action, occupies a predominantly passive and subordinate role as damsel-in-distress and object of masculine desire. More subtly, it is undercut because even at her most energetic moments she embodies the premise that women want to be what men are in Star Wars--militarized zappers, zoomers and blasters. This is Pentagon feminism. Leia's initial appearance in the Star Wars cycle predates the major upsurge of the women's peace movement. But Hollywood's subsequent elaborations on the role of female space warrior (as in Signourny Weaver's performance as "Ripley," heroine of the super-militarized Aliens) might plausibly be seen as an attempt to coopt for the nuclear state the revolutionary energies revealed at Greenham, and integrate them into the familiar hierarchies of patriarchal militarism affirmed by both SDI and Star Wars.[241]

5. Cyborgs and Real Men

Within these hierarchies there appears, however, one innovative feature: some of the most important figures, perhaps even those that exert ultimate command, are inhuman--artificial entities, men/machines, cyborgs. For space weaponry demands a quantum leap in the automation that has always marked nuclear systems. It is generally admitted that the realization of SDI turns on speculative breakthrough's in the field of "fifth-generation" computing or artificial intelligence. A space defence system would be an autonomous weapons-complex, conducting vast and intricate schemes of electronic battle-management at speeds precluding human intervention. In such a system, conventional demarcations between inert tool and reasoning operator, human and machine processes, weapon and

warrior, blur and fade.[249] In their enthusiastic encomiums on the technological spin-offs of SDI, its supporters promise that these will at last allow us to develop robots as "surrogate servants, laborers and bodyguards."[250] On a grander scale, they blithely inform us that, as far as the overall control of SDI goes, "a computer has to be in charge."[251] Writing of the Pentagon research that culminates in SDI, Paul Edwards notes that,

> In an age of artificial intelligence, we are already confronting--in science fiction and military fantasy, if not (yet) in fact--the profound questions of our ultimate reducability as biological machines, of the implications of our seemingly implacable drive to reproduce ourselves in artificial form. . . . Personhood may no longer exclude those without a cortex, and a housing of skin, just as weapons may no longer be constructed only as inanimate objects.[252]

One of the crucial affinities between Star Wars and SDI propaganda is therefore that Lucas' film familiarizes us with artificial entities as central actors in space war. R2D2 and CP-30 are robots: Vader, with his sybilant synthetic whisper, inhuman mask and faceless Imperial Storm Troopers, is coded not only as commissar, but also as cyborg. These are, in fact, the "characters" on whom the film lavishes its greatest ingenuity, and who have claimed the most mesmerized fascination from its audience. And they are forerunners of a whole species of militarized robots that colonized the popular culture of the 1980s, with Transformers, Gobots and Robotechs crowding out GI Joe's from toy-store shelves in intimate reflection of actual advances in Pentagon planning.

These artificial figures complicate, but do not confound, Star Wars' nucleophallogocenticism. In this context, the formula "men/machines" denotes more than just conventional sexism. Edwards writes of the Pentagon's robots, that they are "gendered":

> . . . masculine in the full ideological sense of the word which includes integrally, the soldiering and violence for whose sake men have had to give up so much of their intuitive and emotional capacity.[253]

In part, this analysis is confirmed in Star Wars' cinematic cyborgs: they are male, and usually warriors--whether commanders like Vader, expendable infantrymen like the Imperial

Storm Troopers, or synthetic copilots to heroic space aces, as R2D2 is to Skywalker. But the film also illuminates an obverse side to Edwards' thesis: for if its machines are male, its men are mechanized. Skywalker and Solo are armaments operators, pilots and gunners, indivisible from the starfighters and lasers they "man." And when the human ideal is measured predominantly in terms of proficiency as a high-tech machine handler--cool, efficient, accurate, nervelessly destructive--the border between man and machine is pre-emptively compromised. The machine-warrior is metaphorically latent within the militarized masculinity of the organic protagonists. Indeed, this is so to such an extent that, paradoxically, the cyborgs sometimes appear more animated than the "real men"; in the robotically "effeminate" personality of CP-3O there are allowed to surface the human traits of sexual ambivalence and cowardice rigidly suppressed by Star War's stereotypically male heroes.

There are, of course, good robots and bad robots: loyal servants, like CP-3O and R2D2, and evil antagonists, like Vader. Star Wars' ongoing duel between Skywalker and Vader might even be read as a story of conflict between human and cyborg, expressing our collective fears of malign artificial intelligences. But this apparent opposition barely conceals the profound confusion between the identies of the antagonists. Vader, the cyborg-like villain, is revealed as human (indeed, as Skywalker's father), while Luke, the human hero, acquires a prosthetic hand in The Empire Strikes Back--thus himself becoming a semi-artificial entity. Conflict masks exchange; attributes circulate from instrumentalized men to humanoid instrument, and back again. Masculine robots and mechanized men are each forms of cyborg warrior, entities physically or ideologically engineered for the unutterably dehumanized war-environment of the future. Despite their occasionally dramatic clashes they are ultimately on the same side. Both are good soldiers of the space-age nuclear state.

6. The Force

In the propaganda of SDI, technological fetishism rises to mystical heights. The speeches of Reagan and Abrahamson brim with "visions," "dreams," and "faith"; acronyms and code-words evocative of the supernatural--"MIRACL" for chemical lasers, "Excalibur" for X-Ray lasers--abound; the chairman of a company involved in SDI contracting wrote that "The idea took on a life of its own, with almost spiritual overtones . . . ."[254] This starry-eyed tone is in part shrewdly calculated: marketing plans for selling space weapons advise advocates to focus on "high road themes," "recapturing . . . idealistic images and language" from the peace movement by using "an ethical approach . . . with a heavy overlay of theology."[255] But it would be wrong to dismiss it as simply insincere. The would-be possessors of "heavenly" weapons find it all too easy to assume, even in their own eyes, an almost deific authority, and to pose as celestial guardians of terrestrial order. One right-wing lobby-group's proposal for an orbiting weapons-system bears the name "THOR. . . . for it would literally give the United States the power to call down lightning from heaven upon its enemies."[256] Cynical manipulation and apocalyptic hubris combine to surround SDI with an aura of nebulous but potent religiosity.

This finds cinematic expression in "The Force," the ineffable cosmic power that sustains the exploits of Star Wars' warriors. Lucas fusion of hocus-pocus sorcery with high-tech weaponry is a classic demonstration of what Mandel terms "the irrationalism, regression to supernaturalism, mysticism and misanthropy which attends the alleged victory of technological rationalism in late capitalism."[257] Indeed, at first sight The Force actually seems to contradict the thesis that Star Wars idolizes military technology. Access to its magical power is primarily signified in terms of moral rectitude and spiritual discipline. Its rarefied energies oppose and destroy the brutal machinery of the Death Star. And because of this apparent exaltation of the mystical or intuitive over technocracy, some peace-activists have even suggested that Star Wars be interpreted as an *anti*-nuclear film.[258]

But this is to ignore the reciprocal relationship between Star Wars' gnostic mysticism and its nuclear machinery. The former is marked with the stamp of the latter, even as it seems to oppose it. The Force is not so much the antithesis of technology, as technology sublimated and apotheosized. To read Star Wars as an anti-nuclear film is to suppress the fact that the effect of Skywalker's initiation to the Force is simply to transform him into a superior space warrior. Trusting the Force, he is able to sight his weapons with greater accuracy than by using mechanical aids: he becomes a *super-efficient battle computer.* Throughout Star Wars, or at least until some belated qualms in Return of the Jedi, Skywalker's use of the Force is, as Robin Wood notes, "consistently martial, violent, and destructive."[259] Given this, The Force may be seen as representing, not so much an alternative to military technology, but as a more advanced form of that technology. Its lightening quick, ethereal, machine-destroying power is metaphoric for the all-but invisible, disembodied, incorporal technology of micro-chips, miniatiurization, and particle beams with which the Pentagon hopes to oppose the blunt and massive pay-load of intercontinental ballistic missilery. In this light, the Oriental, vaguely Zen-like, aspects of The Force fall neatly into place: contemporary American myth has it that technology, like satori, is made in Japan: Yoda, Skywalker's diminuitive, inscrutable martial arts instructor, is clearly an alien from the planet Mitsubishi. One SDI slogan is "Defense at the Speed of Light": Star Wars gives us "Defense at the Speed of Light," expediently coded as enlightenment.

Certainly the Defense Department has been happy to capitalise on The Force and on its ambiguous signification. Addressing Mitre Corporation, one of America's leading high-technology weapons companies, General Abrahamson told the assembled military and industrial leaders:

> There are some good things about Star Wars. And the thing is to ensure that everybody understands we're not on the Dark Side. This is not Darth Vader here, I hope. I hope it is Luke Skywalker. And I hope that what we're talking about here is the morality of what we're about, and that we really do have

the Force with us. And I think we do.[260]

Here, The Force is interpreted as signifying virtue--"the morality of what we're about." But a few months later, speaking at the opening of Martin Marietta's "Rapid Retargeting and Precision Pointing Facility," the general put it a little differently:

> And I know it's just awful that its called R2P2, eh, and you know that, that has gotta be the ultimate relation to the movie that we don't like to talk about and relate our program to, Star Wars. But the one good thing, and I've said this and maybe some of you have heard me say it, the one real relationship to not only that movie, but perhaps others, is that the good guys won. And the good guys won because of the force that was with them. Well you see here today, amongst the people that are working on this facility, and have created technical marvels before that, the force that is going to make this more safe, this secure world really possible. [261]

Now the Force is a matter of scientific expertise, the ability to achieve "technical marvels." Neither of Abrahamson's readings of Star Wars is wrong. Rather, the ambiguity foregrounds the film's strategic conflation of "marvels" and "morality." Like the avuncular Obi-Wan-Kenobi addressing Luke Sywalker, SDI advocates tell Americans to "trust the Force." And, as they mask their own first-strike strategies behind a pious rhetoric of peace and goodwill, they are, like Lucasfilms, happy to conflate right and might, spiritual force and armed force.

7. Time-Warps

The vocabulary of SDI is a jargon of innovation, of "breakthroughs," of of "the leading edge," of "the twenty-first century," professing a euphoric confidence in scientific expertise, corporate organization and industrial production, full of the speed and sheen of high technology, the hypnotic allure of electronic screens, and the romance of lab-coats. Yet at the same time, this propaganda is part of an ultra-conservative, reactionary discourse that plays upon hankerings for "simpler times," when America was "standing tall" abroad, and at home men were men and traditional morality was unshaken. In the folksy homilies of the President, proposals for space weaponry are linked with calls for a renewal of patriotic

virtues, the restoration of patriarchal authority, the revival of rugged individualism and the resurgence of the most primitive forms of fundamentalism. E.P. Thompson has observed that:

> Star Wars is a populist dream. Like much in American populism it ushers in a common stream of of rhetoric upon which there float and jostle incompatible elements. . . . It evokes a nostalgic utopian past, before the Bomb (before the machine got into the garden) at the same time as it appeals to generations brought up on sci-fic and computerized space war games. . . .[262]

On the one hand, the discourse of SDI inscribes a yearning for regression to a heavily mythicized vision of Americas past. On the other, it expresses a devout faith in progress toward an equally mythicized vision of a high-tech tomorrow.

This contradiction is central to Star Wars itself. It is displayed not only in the blend of archaism and futurism--cyborgs and chivalry, hyperspace and Jedi knights, lasers and sabers--that we have already noted, but also in the elaborate system of *allusion* that is integral to the film. For, despite its space-age setting, Lucas' epic is, as Fredric Jameson has put it, a "nostalgia film."[263] It reinvents, "in the form of a pastiche,"

> . . . one of the most important cultural experiences of the generations that grew up from the '30s to the '50s . . . the Saturday afternoon serial of the Buck Rogers type--alien villains; true American heroes, heroines in distress, the death ray or the doomsday box, and the cliffhanger at the end whose miraculous resolution was to be witnessed next Saturday afternoon.[264]

The film's reliance on these familiar plots, its plagiarism of old comic books, its transparent indebtedness not only to Buck Rogers and Flash Gordon but to televison shows of the 1950s such as Commander Video, Space Patrol, Tom Corbett, Space Cadet and Commander Cody are, Jameson claims, not a matter of parody of these long-dead forms. Rather, Star Wars,

> . . . satisfies a deep (might I even say repressed?) longing to experience them again: it is a complex object, in which on some first level children and adolescents can take their adventures straight, while the adult public is able to gratify a deeper and more properly nostalgic desire to return to the older period and to live its strange old aesthetic artefacts through once again. The film is thus metonymically a historical or nostalgia film . . . by reinventing the feel and shape of characteristic art objects of an older period (the serials), it seeks to reawaken a sense of past associated with those objects.[265]

Indeed, according to Lucas' biographer, the filmmaker "remembered how protected he had felt growing up in the coccoonlike culture of the 1950s, a feeling he wanted to communicate in Star Wars."[266] It is no accident that alongside its rediscovery of science-fiction, Hollywood has produced a flurry of films whose protagonists magically revisit their 1950s childhood: both genres take us "back to the future." And the homology between these tendencies in popular culture and the development of SDI is straigthtforward: for it is precisely the feeling of "coccoon-like" protection, of retreat to the shielded era of nuclear monopoly and global hegemony, that Reagan offers to Americans in his space-weapons program. But there are some computerized special-effects that cannot be accomplished off-screen, nor in realtime.

8. Closing Shots

There are, moreover, ingredients in Star Wars' obsessive recycling of old images and old scripts that open the film to readings more disquieting than Lucas might welcome. As several critics have noted, the final scene, in which Skywalker and Solo walk between serried ranks of rigid, machine-like soldiers to receive their medals from Princess Leia, clearly echoes the march of Hitler, Himmler, and Lutze to the Nuremburg memorial in Leni Riefensthal's classic Nazi propaganda film, The Triumph of the Will.[267] Reviewers sympathetic to Lucas have been quick to write this off as simply a film buff's joke.[268] And in Star Wars, the grins the warrior-heroes exchange with Leia do seem meant to reassure us that these three, at least, are not taking the military pomp all that seriously. But the visual reference to Riefensthal's film is double-edged. As Rubey puts it,

> Since the scene and its totalitarian, fascist overtones grow so naturally out of the rest of the fantasies and images in the film, it seems fair to ask whether the grins really undercut this image, or simply allow it to function for us in the same way Riefensthal's original image functioned.[269]

Indeed, this smiling moment epitomizes much of what is so troubling about Star Wars. For there is no doubt that the film is, throughout, playful--almost ostentatiously so. Lucas'

depiction of the triumph of The Force so eagerly solicits the response that "this is just fun" or "just entertainment" that it fends-off in advance as curmudgeonly or over-serious any analysis of the film's own "dark side."[270] Yet this emphatic playfulness is concocted from a systematic glorification of war, an exaltation of patriarchal authority, and a fascination with exterminatory technology, all blended with a strain of mystical, martial irrationalism. One could say that the film's assertion of its own status as "just a myth"--that is, mere fantasy--is exactly what at once disguises and enhances its efficacy as "myth" in the Barthesian sense--that is, as a surreptitious vehicle for ideology.[271] The sophisticated assurance Star Wars' offers its audience that "you can see through all this" backhandedly obscures how the spectator is nevertheless made tacitly complicit with its militarist values, propelled to vicariously identify with its starfighter heroes, and made to take pleasure in thinly-disguised scenes of space-age nuclear combat.

Given this, one might take Lucas' allusion to Riefensthal's work as a licence for a counter-allusion, and recall the critique of militarized aesthetics offered by one of the early victims of the forces celebrated in Triumph of the Will. On the eve of world war, Walter Benjamin wrote:

> If the natural utilization of productive forces is impeded by the property system, the increase in technical devices, in speed, and in the sources of energy will press for unnatural utilization, and this is found in war . . . . The horrible features of imperialistic warfare are attributable to the discrepancy between the tremendous means of production and their inadequate utilization in the process of production--in other words, to unemployment and the lack of markets . . . . Instead of draining rivers, society directs a human stream into a bed of trenches; instead of dropping seeds from airplanes, its drops incendiary bombs over cities . . . .[272]

These words seem ominously appropriate today, as the Reagan administration, propelled by the desire to revamp a declining American economy through prodigous injections of military expenditures and military technology, presses for multi-billion dollar SDI budgets, oblivious to domestic poverty or the total immiserization of the Third World. In such a situation, Benjamin observed, the tendency of imperialism is to aestheticize war--as in the

works of the Italian Futurists, whose manifestos proclaimed:

> War is beautiful because it establishes mans dominion over subjugated machinery by means of gas masks, terifying megaphones, flame-throwers and small tanks. War is beautiful because it initiates the dreamt-of metallization of the human body . . . .[273]

And it is this tendency to aestheticize war, albeit in a smoother, more totally commodified form, that is at work in the affiliation of Star Wars with SDI. On the one hand, the military project is named after the cinematic spectacle: on the other, the director of SDI research at Lawrence Livermore laboratories remarks that, from his point of view the decision betwen nuclear and non-nuclear space weaponry is a matter of "political and aesthetic considerations."[274] "Mankind," Benjamin wrote, "which in Homer's time was an object of contemplation for the Gods, now is one for itself. Its self-alienation has reached such a degree that it can experience its own self-destruction as an aesthetic pleasure of the first order."[275]

Against the aestheticization of politics, Benjamin posed the politicization of art. And the emergence of the peace movement in the 1980s has been accompnied by glimpses of a politicized and anti-nuclear art. One might think here of the photography of Robert del Tredici, quietly defamiliarizing the North American landscape by exposing an omnipresent nuclear infrastructure of bunkers, reactors, and and missile silos; of the hilariously subversive montage of old propaganda footage in Pierce Rafferty and Jayne Loaders' The Atomic Cafe; of Raymond Briggs' cartoon satire on civil defence, When The Wind Blows; of the anti-nuclear speeches, on the cusp between poetry and activist oratory, by Denise Levertov and Alice Walker; of the feminist science fiction imagery brilliantly developed by Donna Haraway in in her polysemic polemic, "A Manifesto for Cyborgs"; of protest posters plastered on walls from Budapest to San Francisco; of the poems, songs and weavings of Greenham.[276] But the example with which I want to contrast Star Wars is that of Peter Watkins' The Nuclear War Film. I have chosen this example partly because it too is cinematic; partly because its conception shows the

influence, if not of Benjamin, certainly of Benjamin's comrade, Brecht; but principally because it does not exist--or rather, exists only as work in progress, a film under construction, begun in 1983, currently still incomplete, its content known only from Watkins' occasional bulletins on its ongoing development.[277] Yet it seems fitting to end with a note on this film precisely because its incomplete status can be taken as metaphoric for the condition of the anti-nuclear movement as a whole--a movement whose project, taken up by millions of the people in the early 1980s, is today still unfinished, itself a work-in-progress which may fail catastrophically, or fulfill its promise, a project of which it can be truly said that we do not know how it will all turn out.

Moreover, this metaphor is supported by the very way in which Watkins' film is being produced. For unlike Star Wars, it is made without high-tech studios or multi-million budgets. Denied corporate or state sponsorship for any anti-nuclear film since his notorious The War Game was banned by the BBC in 1965, Watkins' new project is funded from international peace and community groups. And these groups have been not only financial donors, but active participants in the construction of the film. For rather than writing a predetermined script, Watkins has allowed his discussions with dozens of families and individuals and groups to affect and change the growth of the project, making the film's production an exchange of criticism and revision which is itself part of the politicizing process essential to the anti-nuclear movement.

Unlike Star Wars, The Nuclear War Film will be set, not in an intergalactic time-warp, but on earth. Its characters will not be synthetic humanoids and all-American interstellar heroes, but the members of ten family groupings, representing the global scope of the nuclear predicament and drawn not only from the United States, the Soviet Union and Europe but also from Polynesia, Latin America, Africa. Despite its title, the film will not show the horrors of nuclear war, for Watkins believes that these have now been depicted sufficently often, and that their repetition--particularly at the hands of

Hollywood--merely compounds audiences' desensitization and fatalism. Rather, "the essential question is how to maintain life without such a war."[278] The Nuclear War Film will, therefore, have no pyrotechnic special effects or astounding simulated explosions. Instead, it intends to portray the build-up to war during a period of international tension: the intensification of rival imperialist intervention in countries reduced to crisis by poverty and domestic repression; the manipulation of the mass media for propaganda purposes; the evacuation of cities, institution of emergency laws, and enforced civil defence preparations; the arrest of "subversives." But when it comes to the actual moment of nuclear detonation, Watkins writes, "the film will, in effect, say":

> Stop, let us consider where we are now. We are at a critical juncture. We have ahead of us two roads. One leads further along the route of the nuclear weapons state, to almost inevitable nuclear war. The other route, less easy to take . . . leads us away from our increasing dependency on high consumer societies, away from centralized technocracies, towards societies that will take the first steps towards sharing the world's dwindling resources.[279]

At this point, it will introduce what Watkins' terms "disentanglement sequences"--sequences devised by the groups supporting the film, demonstrating "how to work towards disentangling society from the matrix of militarization."[280] These sequences "will occur more and more frequently as the film proceeds, and will entirely dominate at the conclusion," and are intended to show the possibilities for movement and action that can "challenge the very social systems that spawned nuclear weapons."[281]

The conclusion of the larger, off-screen, atomic sequence, the sequence which has been relentlessly proceeding since Hiroshima, and in which we are all inescapably participant, cannot be so confidently fortold. But it is as a "disentanglement" from its apocalyptic shooting-script, and as a contribution to the production of a different collective narrative--socialist, feminist, and non-nuclear--that this text has been written.

NOTES

1. Although I apply the term "nuclear text" to works dealing with nuclear weapons, this should not be interpreted as any disparagement of the vital movement against commercial, so-called civil, nuclear power. The two struggles are, properly, indivisibly connected. See Rosalie Bertell, No Immediate Danger: Prognosis for a Radioactive Earth (Toronto: Women's Educational Press, 1985).

2. Roland Barthes, Mythologies (New York: Hill and Wang, 1983), p. 138.

3. See Paul Boyer, "From Activism to Apathy: America and the Nuclear Issue 1963-80," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 40, No. 7 (1984), 14-24.

4. Robert Karl Manoff, "Covering the Bomb: The Nuclear Story and the News," Working Papers, 10, No. 3 (1983), 18-27; Richard Pollack, "Covering the Unthinkable: The UN Disarmament Conference and the Press," Nation, 1 May 1982, pp. 516-523; Ian M. Angus and Peter Cook, The Media, Cold War and the Disarmament Movement (Waterloo: Project Ploughshares, 1984).

5. Robert del Tredici, cited in Gail Fisher Taylor, "At Work in the Fields of the Bomb: An Interview With Robert Del Tredici," Photo Communique (Spring 1984), p. 31.

6. Peter Watkins, "Media Repression: A Personal Statement," Cine Tracts, 3, No. 1 (1980), 3.

7. Barthes, p. 138.

8. Raymond Williams, "The Politics of Nuclear Disarmament," in Exterminism and Cold War, ed. New Left Review (London: Verso, 1982), p. 85.

9. The best analysis of the political dimensions of the crisis is Fred Halliday, The

Making Of The Second Cold War (London: Verso, 1983).

10. Sarah Kirsch, "Year's End," END: Journal of European Nuclear Disarmament, No. 8 (1984), p. 26.

11. "Discourse" is one of the most ubiquitous terms in contemporary literary theory. The use of it here draws heavily, of course, on Michel Foucault, especially "Politics and the Study of Discourse," Ideology & Consciousness, No. 3 (1978), pp. 7-26, and on Edward Said's appropriation and critique of Foucault in "The Problem of Textuality: Two Exemplary Positions," Critical Inquiry, 4, No. 4 (1978), 673-714. It is also influenced by the work of Michel Pecheux and C. Fuchs, "Language, Ideology and Discourse Analysis: An Overview," Praxis No. 6 (1982), pp. 3-20, by John Frow, "Discourse and Power," Economy and Society 14, No. 2 (1984), 193-213, and by Frank Burton and Pat Carlen, Official Discourse: On Discourse Analysis, Government Publications, Ideology and the State (London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1979). A collection of essays applying discourse-theory to the nuclear predicament is Language and the Nuclear Arms Debate: Nukespeak Today, ed. Paul Chilton (London: Francis Pinter, 1985). Three other important applications are Peter A. Bruck, "The Mass Production of Disarmament Discourse," Annual Meeting of the Canadian Communications Association, Vancouver, June 1983; Robert Luckham, "Of Arms & Culture," Current Research On Peace And Violence, No. 1 (1984), pp. 1-64; R.B.J Walker, "Culture, Discourse, Insecurity," Alternatives: Social Transformation and Humane Governance, 14, No. 4 (1986), 485-504. I am heavily indebted to these last three works.

12. For other accounts of nukespeak see Paul Chilton, "Nukespeak: Nuclear Language, Culture and Propaganda," in Nukespeak: The Media And The Bomb, ed. Crispin Aubrey (London: Comedia, 1982), pp. 94-112; and Stephen Hilgartner, Richard C.

Bell, and Rory O'Connor, Nukespeak: The Selling of Nuclear Technology in America (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1983); Daniel L. Zins, "Nukespeak," Kentucky English Bulletin, 34, No. 2 (1984/5), 74-84. Zins has a useful bibliography of further readings. The term "nukespeak" is, of course, adapted from Orwell's "newspeak."

13 The phrase "discourse of dissent" is taken from R.B.J. Walker, "Contemporary Militarism And The Discourse Of Dissent," Alternatives, 9, No. 3 (1983/84), 303.

14 Most of these terms are too common to need referencing, but a few are noteworthy. The designation "a dozen Aushwitzes" is adapted from a letter of Larry Cloud-Morgan one of the "Silo Pruninghooks" affinity group who received sentences of from eight to eighteen years imprisonment for entering a military base near Kansas City and decommissioning a Minuteman-ICBM with a jackhammer, hand tools, and their own blood. The letter, written from jail, states "The gates of Auschwitz and Dachau are one with the gates of Silo N-5." Peace Magazine, 1, No. 11 (1985), 5. The phrase "part of the West's life insurance" is from the front page of British Ministry of Defence's brochure on Cruise missiles, cited in Chilton, 108. "A thing of menace" is from E.P. Thompson, "Notes On Exterminism, The Last Stage Of Civilization," New Left Review, 121 (1980), pp. 3-32, an essay which has been an endless source of grim inspiration.

15 F. Knellman, Reagan, God And The Bomb (Toronto: Mclleland & Stewart, 1985).

16 Jonathan Schell, The Fate Of The Earth (New York: Knopf, 1982), p. 191.

17 V. N. Volosinov, Marxism And The Philosophy Of Language, trans. Ladislav Matejka and I.R. Titunik (New York: Seminar Press, 1973), p. 81.

18 For other discussions of the disputed meanings of "peace" see Catherine Belsey, "The Politics Of Meaning," in Confronting The Crisis: War, Politics And Culture In

The Eighties. ed. Francis Barker et. al., Proceedings of the Essex Sociology of Literature Conference, July 1983 (Colchester: University of Essex, 1984) pp. 27-38. and Bruck.

19. For "interpellation" see Louis Althusser, "Ideology And Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Toward An Investigation)," in his Lenin And Philosophy (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), pp. 127-189. I am using the concept in the manner suggested by Ernesto Laclau, Politics And Ideology In Marxist Theory, (London: Verso, 1979). For useful discussions of interpellation see Rosalind Coward and John Ellis, Language And Materialism (London: Routledge Kegan Paul 1977) and Kaja Silvermann The Subject Of Semiotics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983).

20. See Luckham, pp. 3-5.

21. Brecht On Theatre: The Development of an Aesthetic, ed. and trans. John Willett (London: Methuen, 1964), p. 15.

22. Jacques Derrida, "No Apocalypse, Not Now (full speed ahead, seven missiles, seven missives)," Diacritics, 14, No. 2 (1984), 23.

23. Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative As A Socially Symbolic Act (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), p. 53.

24. Robert Scheer, With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush And Nuclear War (New York: Random House, 1982), p. 21; Schell, p. 126.

25. My debt to Judith Fetterley, The Resisting Reader: A Feminist Approach to American Fiction (Bloomington: Indiana, 1978) is apparent. For an excellent discussion of the theory of interpellation that takes into account the reader's active role, see Dave Morley, "Texts, readers, subjects," in Culture, Media, Language: Working Papers in

Cultural Studies 1972-79, ed. Stuart Hall, Dorothy Hobson, Andrew Lowe, and Paul Willis (London: Hutchinson, 1980), pp. 163-173, and for a specific application of reception-theory to nuclear discourse, Gunther Kress, "Discourses, texts, readers, and the pro-nuclear argument," in Language and the Nuclear Arms Debate: Nukespeak Today, ed. Paul Chilton (London: Francis Pinter, 1985), pp. 65-87.

26. Edward Said, "Opponents, Audiences, Constituencies and Community," Critical Inquiry, 9, No. 1 (1982), 22.

27. Said, "Opponents," 23.

28. "Universities' Reliance On Support By Pentagon Is Probed In Report," Chronicle Of Higher Education, 5 Feb. 1986, p. 22.

29. For graphic accounts of this change in nuclear discourse, see Knellman and Scheer.

30. Protect and Survive (London: HMSO, 1980), n. pag.

31. Collin S. Grey and Keith Payne, "Victory is Possible," Foreign Policy, No. 39 (1980), pp. 14-27.

32. General Sir John Hackett and Others, The Third World War: A Future History (London: Sidgewick & Jackson, 1978). Notes here are from the US edition, entitled The Third World War: August 1985 (New York: Berkely, 1980).

33. Hackett, The Third World War: The Untold Story (New York: Bantam, 1982).

34. For a discussion of the importance of "faction" in contemporary representations of war, see Luckham, p. 41. This author's reflections on the production of military scenarios have also been important to me. It is important to note that The Third World War's historical line of descent runs from a genre of sensationalist British

fictions about future wars that stretches back to the nineteenth-century The Battle of Dorking and William Le Queux's The Great Invasion of Nineteen-Ten. The seminal account of this genre is I.F. Clarke, Voices Prophesying War 1763--1984 (London: Oxford University Press, 1966). For a discussion of affinities between The Third World War and The Battle of Dorking, see Martin Walker, "1985," New Statesman, 7 July 1978, pp. 22-23.

35. Hackett, "Why the General is Refighting World War III," Times, 19 June 1982, p. 10.

36. Hackett, p. 473.

37. Cited on the dustjacket of Hackett. Carter denied this report--see Ronald Dugan, "The President's Favourite Reading," Nation, 27 Oct. 1984, pp. 413-416.

38. Dugan, and "Reagan Chooses WW III," Nuclear Times, 2, No. 4 (1984), 4.

39. Hackett, dustjacket.

40. Hackett, Untold Story, p. 452.

41. See Simon Dalby, "The Soviet Threat and Peace Education," in Issues in Education and Culture, No. 2 (1986), pp. 33-34. I am indebted to Simon for several thought-provoking discussions on this topic.

42. Hackett, title, 1978 ed.

43. "On Nuclear War," New York Review of Books, 21 Jan. 1982, p. 10. Although cast in the ponderous tones of establishment admonition, Kennan's remarks on the Reagan administration's Soviet discourse are worth quoting at length:

> This endless serie of distortions and oversimplifications; this systematic dehumanization of the leadership of another great country; this routine

exaggeration of Moscow's military capabilities and the supposed iniquity of Soviet intentions; this monotonous misrepresentation of the nature and the attitudes of another great people--and along suffering people at that, sorely tried by the vicissitudes of this past century . . . these, believe me, are not the marks of maturity and discrimination one expects from the diplomacy of a great power; they are the marks of an intellectual primitivism and naivete unpardonable in a great government.

44. Hackett, p. 356.

45. See Hackett, p. 229, Untold Story, p. 28, p. 438, Untold Story, p. xii, p. 402, Untold Story, p. 411.

46. See Hackett, Untold Story, p. 26. Untold Story, p. 11.

47. See Hackett, p. 175, p. 114.

48. See Hackett, Untold Story, p. 224, p. 30, p. 402.

49. See Hackett, p. 163, p. 172.

50. Hackett, p. 33.

51. See Hackett, Untold Story, p. 17, Untold Story, p. 21, p. 167, p. 472.

52. Hackett, Untold Story, p. 19.

53. Hackett, p. 15.

54. See Hackett, p. 196, p. 208.

55. Hackett, p. 148.

56. See Hackett, p. 197, p. 202.

57. See Hackett, p. 202, p. 198, p. 191, p. 245, p. 201.

58. See Hackett, pp. 118-215.

59. Hackett, p. 234.

60. Hackett, p. 402.

61. Hackett, photo-supplement.

62. Hackett, photo-supplement.

63. Nevil Shute, On The Beach (New York: Morrow, 1957); Mordecai Roshwald, Level-Seven (New York: McGraw Hill, 1959); Stanley Kubrick, dir., Dr. Strangelove, Hawke, 1962; Peter Watkins, dir. The War Game, BBC, 1965.

64. See Hackett, p. 374, p. 150, p. xiii, p. 367, p. 148, p. 367.

65. Hackett, p. 377.

66. Hackett, p. 371.

67. Hackett, p. 391.

68. Hackett, p. 393.

69. Hackett, Untold Story, p. 392.

70. Hackett, Untold Story, p. 393.

71. Hackett, "Why the General is Refighting World War III," p. 10.

72. See Hackett, p. 313, p. 1

73. Hackett, p. Untold Story, p. 449.

74. Hackett, Untold Story, p. 449.

75. Hackett, Untold Story, pp. 465-466.

76. Hackett, p. 22.

77. See Hackett, p. 223, p. 89, p. 128.

78. Hackett, p. 320.

79. See Hackett, p. 403, p. 55.

80. Hackett, p. 56.

81. Hackett, pp. 47-49.

82. Hackett, p. 2.

83. In a television debate with Bruce Kent, Chairperson of the Committee for Nuclear Disarmament. See Kent's letter, "Hackett and Deterrence," Peace News, 3 Feb. 1984, p. 21.

84. John Milius, dir., Red Dawn, United Artists/Valkyrie, 1984; Amerika, dir. Donald Wrye, ABC, 15-19 Feb. 1987.

85. For attempts to develop such concepts, see E. P. Thompson, "Notes on Exterminism, The Last Stage of Civilisation," New Left Review, 121 (1980), pp. 3-32, the subsequent discussion in the collection Exterminism and Cold War, ed. New Left Review (London: Verso, 1982), and Paul Virilio and Sylvere Lotringer, Pure War (New York: Semiotexte, 1983).

86. Shelford Bidwell, "Fighting Talk," review of The Untold Story, Times Literary Supplement, 3 Sept. 1982, p. 948.

87. Bruck, p. 8.

88. Hackett, p. 313.

89. Hackett, p. 313.

90. Nigel Calder, Nuclear Nightmares (London: Penguin, 1981); Louis Rene Beres, Apocalypse: Nuclear Catastrophe in World Politics (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1980); Helen Caldicott, Nuclear Madness (New York: Bantam,, 1978); Paul Ehrlich, Carl Sagan, et al., The Cold and the Dark (New York: Norton, 1985); Eric Thiermann, prod., The Last Epidemic, Impact Productions, 1982; Terri Nash, dir., If You Love This Planet, National Film Board of Canada, 1982; Kevin Rafferty, Pierce Rafferty, and Jayne Loader, dirs., The Atomic Cafe, 1982; John Badham, War Games, Goldberg/Sherwood, 1983; Lynne Littman, dir., Testament, Entertainment Events, 1984; The Day After, dir. Nicholas Meyer, ABC, 20 Nov. 1983; Threads, BBC, 23 Sept. 1984.

91. Jonathan Schell, The Fate of the Earth (New York: Knopf, 1982)

92. Samuel H. Day, "Reinventing the World," rev. of The Fate of the Earth, Progressive, 14 April 1982, p. 13.

93. "The Fate of the Book," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 36, No. 8 (1982), 63.

94. Schell, p. 191.

95. Schell, p. 65.

96. Schell, p. 8. For a discussion of the problems involved in depicting nuclear holocaust, see Peter Schwenger, "Writing the Unthinkable," Critical Inquiry, 13, No. 1 (1986), 33-48.

97. Schell, p. 36.

98. John Hersey, Hiroshima (New York: Knopf, 1946); Michihiko Hachiya, Hiroshima Diary, trans. Warner Wells (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1955); Japanese Broadcasting Corporation, Unforgettable Fire: Pictures Drawn By Atomic Bomb Survivors (New York: Pantheon, 1977); Robert Jay Lifton, Death in Life: Survivors of Hiroshima (New York: Random House, 1967).

99. See Schell, pp. 39, 41, 42.

100. Schell, p. 29.

101. Schell, p. 48-49.

102. Schell, p. 23.

103. Schell, p. 93.

104. See Schell, p. 184, p. 172.

105. Schell, p. 138.

106. Schell, p. 139.

107. Schell, p. 175.

108. See Schell, p. 144, p. 137, p. 128, p. 144, p. 117.

109. Cited in Edward Zuckerman, The Day After World War Three (New York: Viking, 1984), p. 315. Zuckerman gives an excellent overview of the complex and (so far) irresolvable debate on the consequences of global nuclear war. For an example of an attack on Schell by an eminent practitioner of nukespeak, see Hermann Kahn,

"Apocalyptic Panic is No Help," in The Apocalyptic Premise, ed. Ernest Lefever and E. Stephen Hurt (Washington: Ethics and Public Policy Centre, 1982), pp. 235-242.

110. Schell, p. 25.

111. Schell, p. 94.

112. Schell, p. 95.

113. Schell, p. 95.

114. Schell, pp. 108, 226, 110.

115. Schell, pp. 225-226.

116. Hackett, p. 256.

117. Schell, p. 153.

118. Schell, p. 185.

119. Schell, p. 154.

120. See Schell, p. 77, p. 123, p. 23, p. 91.

121. See Schell, p. 83, p. 172, p. 77.

122. Schell, p. 93.

123. See Schell, p. 73, p. 178.

124. See the famous anthology of the first atomic scientists' opposition to the Bomb, One World or None (New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1972, repr. 1946 ed.), ed. Dexter Masters and Katherine Way.

125. Schell, pp. 220-221.

126. Schell, p. 226.

127. Schell, pp. 161-162.

128. Neil Schmitz, "Anxiety and its Displacement," rev. of The Fate of the Earth, Nation, 1 May 1982, p. 531.

129. Cited in Angela McRobbie, "Strategies of Vigilance: An Interview With Gayatari Chakravorti Spivak," Bloc, No. 10 (1985), p. 9.

130. To be precise: the United States has employed threats of nuclear force to secure its interests, or those of its client states, on the following occasions (amongst others): Uruguay, 1947; Guatemala, 1954; Cuba, 1962; Lebanon, 1958: Middle East, 1973: Persian Gulf, 1980. The majority of cases of overt American threat have involved crises in the Third World. See Daniel Ellsberg, "Call To Mutiny," in Protest and Survive, ed. E.P. Thompson and Dan Smith, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1981) pp. i-xxviii, and Noam Chomsky, "Strategic Arms, the Cold War and the Third World," in Exterminism and Cold War, ed. New Left Review (London: Verso, 1982) pp. 223-236.

131. Schell, p. 107.

132. Schell, p. 152.

133. See Schell, p. 184, p. 143, p. 217.

134. Schell, p. 231.

135. Schmitz, p. 531.

136. Schmitz, p. 531.

137. Schell, p. 184.

138. Schell, p. 219.

139. Schell, p. 227.

140. Schell, p. 229.

141. Schell, *The Abolition* (New York: Knopf, 1984), p. 8. In this text, a sequel to *The Fate of the Earth*, the bankruptcy of Schell's apolitical approach is fully demonstrated. Admitting that "the world government" proposal advanced in *The Fate of the Earth* is impractical, he retreats to a muted version of deterrence theory in which fear of weapons--without their actual presence--is proposed as sufficient to preserve world peace. Again, no changes in the social and economic structure of the nuclear superpowers is suggested.

142. Schell, p. 227.

143. See Schell, p. 227, p. 221.

144. Schell, p. 229.

145. Schell, p. 229.

146. Schell, p. 186.

147. Schell, p. 231.

148. See Paul Boyer, "A Historical View of Scare Tactics," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 42, No. 1 (1985), 17-19, and Peter Sandman and Jo Ann Valenti, "Scared

Stiff--or Scared Into Action?" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 42, No. 1 (1985), 12-17.

149. See Alexander Cockburn and James Ridgeway, "The Freeze Movement Versus Reagan," New Left Review, 137 (1983), pp. 5-22.

150. Alexander Cockburn and James Rudgeway, "After 'The Day After:' Why the Freeze Has Failed, or What Next For the Peace Movement?" Village Voice, 6 Dec. 1983, p. 19. These writers are unusual in having foreseen the consequences of the freeze movement's lack of a political agenda. In an article written shortly after the appearance of The Fate of the Earth, "Bomb Porn and the Apocalypse: Will the Freeze Movement Be More Than a Fad?" Village Voice, 13 April 1982, pp. 6-8, they noted that "on the surface" the swell of anti-nuclear sentiment was impressive, but then observed:

> Those with memories of the Ban the Bomb campaign in Britain in the late 1950s or who took part in the efforts toward the 1963 nuclear test ban treaty know well how quickly such swells can subside, their moral fervour finally extinguished by quotidien political reality and expendency. A lack of politics, or of clear political objectives beyond the rhetoric of hellfire laid them low.

The future of the peace movement, they suggested, would turn on its ability to move beyond the "interminable vapourings" and "diffuse moralizing" of Schell, and Caldicott's "hysterical and demobilizing preachments" to engage the economic and political underpinnings of the US nuclear state. On this would depend whether "a broad movement against the nuclear arms race can have much more fuel than a somewhat faddish preoccupation with global catastrophe." For other analyses of the conservatism of the "freeze" campaign, see Thomas Fergusson and Joel Rogers, "Big Business Backs The Freeze," Nation, 19 July 1986, pp. 43-47, and Noam Chomsky, Turning the Tide: The US and Latin America (Montreal: Black Rose, 1986), pp. 117-217.

151. Cockburn, "After 'The Day After'," p. 19.

152. See Chomsky, *Turning the Tide*, p. 176.

153. Speech, Eureka College, Illinois, 9 May 1982. Reprinted in *Vital Speeches of the Day*, 48 (1982), 484.

154. John Bosma, "A Proposed Plan for Project on Ballestic Missile Defense and Arms Control," cited in Henry Epstein, "Freeze Folk: The High Frontier Wants You," *Nuclear Times* 3, No. 6 (1985), 12.

155. See Ehrlich. Summing up the conclusions of the international scientific conference on the "nuclear winter" studies reported in *The Cold and the Dark*, he writes:

> We did not feel that we could exclude the possibility that humanity would gradually decline to extinction following such an event (p. 137).

The Soviet scientist, Nicolai Bochov, concurs:

> We should not be afraid to reach the conclusion that the conditions that would prevail would not allow the survival of human beings as a species (p. 142).

156. Caroline Blackwood, *On the Perimeter* (London: Heinemann, 1984), p. 1.

157. Alice Cook and Gwyn Kirk, *Greenham Women Everywhere: Dreams, Ideas and Actions From the Women's Peace Movement* (Boston: South End, 1983); Barbara Harford and Sarah Hopkins, eds., *Greenham Common: Women At the Wire* (London: Women's Press, 1984).

158. Lynne Jones, ed., *Keeping the Peace* (London: Women's Press, 1983).

159. *At the Wire*, Acknowledgements.

160. *At the Wire*, p. 2.

161. At the Wire, p. 2., Greenham Women Everywhere, p. 86.

162. Cited in Penny Strange, It'll Make a Man of You: A Feminist View of the Arms Race (Nottingham: Peace News/Mushroom Books, 1983), p. 17.

163. On the Perimeter, p. 56.

164. A connotation skillfully exploited by gay peace activists in the slogan "Cruise Men, Not Missiles."

165. See Domna C. Stanton, "Language and Revolution: The Franco-American Disconnection," in Hester Eisenstein and Alice Jardine, eds., The Future of Difference (Boston: GK Hall, 1980), pp. 73-87.

> Women's oppression, or more precisely our repression, does not merely exist in the concrete organization of economic, political or social structures. It is embedded in the very foundations of the Logos, in the subtle linguistic and logical processes through which meaning itself is produced. What we perceive as the real . . . is but a manifestation of the symbolic order as it has been constituted by man. Thus, only by exposing phallogocentricism . . . can we hope to transform the real in any fundamental way.

166. Jerry Zaslove Editorial, Issues in Education and Culture, No. 2 (1986), p. 4. Apart from the texts discussed here, there is an extensive body of literature on the feminist analysis of miltarism. Amongst the works I have found most helpful are: Adrienne Rich, "Vietnam and Sexual Violence," in her On Lies, Secrets and Silence: Selected Prose 1966--1978 (New York: Norton, 1979), pp. 108-116; Pam McAllister, ed., Reweaving the Web of Life: Feminism and Nonviolence (Philadelphia: New Society, 1982); Charlene Spretanak, "Naming the Cultural Forces That Push Us Towards War," in Nuclear Strategy and the Code of the Warrior: Faces of Mars and Shiva in the Crisis of Human Survival ed. Richard Grossinger and Lindy Hough (Berkeley: North Atlantic Books, 1984), pp. 43-53; Brian Easlea, Fathering The

Unthinkable: Masculinity, Science and the Bomb (London: Pluto, 1983).

167. Hackett, *The Third World War*, p. 283.

168. Hackett, *The Third World War*, p. 283.

169. Nancy Houston, "Tales of War and Tears of Women," *Women's Studies International Forum*, 5, No. 34 (1982), 276.

170. *Greenham Women Everywhere*, p. 83.

171. *At the Wire*, coverpage.

172. *Greenham Women Everywhere*, p. 86.

173. Virginia Woolf, *Three Guineas* (New York: Harbinger, 1963), p. 143. For a discussion of the relevance of Woolf's feminist pacificism to the contemporary university, see Lynne Henley, "Her Story of War: De-Militarizing Literature and Literary Studies," *Radical America* 20, No. 1 (1986), 17-28.

174. *On the Perimeter*, p. 2.

175. *On the Perimeter*, coverpage.

176. *On the Perimeter*, p. 56.

177. *Greenham Women Everywhere*, p. 5.

178. *At the Wire*, p. 5.

179. *Greenham Women Everywhere*, p. 87.

180. *Greenham Women Everywhere*, p. 65.

181. *At the Wire*, p. 89.

182. *At the Wire*, p. 159. A famous Greenham poster, headed simply "Life Against Death," shows this action. In the foreground stands the fence, with its tight mesh and spiked defences. two police cars parked beside it. On the silo rising behind it is a ring of dark silhouttes, dancing under the floodlights abruptly trained upon them. Fence and the dancers stand like two circles, one inscribed within the other, the former connoting power, exclusion , and deathly rigidity, the latter signifying subversion, linkage, and mobile vitality.

183. *At the Wire*, p. 159.

184. Mikhail Bakhtin, *Rabelais and His World*, trans. Helene Iswolsky (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), p. 11. Two essays that develop the concept of carnival in relation to anti-nuclear protest are Roger Fowler and Tim Marshall, "The war against peacemongering: language and ideology," and Bob Hodge and Alan Mansfield, "'Nothing left to laugh at . . . ': humour as a tactic of resistance," both in *Language and the Nuclear Arms Debate: Nukespeak Today*, ed. Paul Chilton (London: Frances Pinter, 1985), pp. 3-22 and 197-211.

185. Terry Eagleton, *Walter Benjamin, or Towards a Revolutionary Criticism* (London: New Left Books, 1981), p. 145.

186. *Greenham Women Everywhere*, p. 78.

187. Lynne Jones, "A Doctor Writes. . . ," *END: Journal of European Nuclear Disarmament*, No. 16 17 (1983), p. 33.

188. *At the Wire*, "Dateline," np.

189. Produced by Beebam Kidron and Amanda Richardson. Women Make Movies Inc.,

1984.

190. For information on the military's use of electronic weapons at Greenham see Kim Besley, "Electronic Warfare," Peace News, 7 March, 1986, p. 12.

191. Eagleton, p. 145.

192. At the Wire, p. 80.

193. At the Wire, p. 82.

194. Greenham Women Everywhere, p. 126.

195. On the Perimeter, p. 21.

196. Mary Daly, Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism (Boston: Beacon, 1978), p. 390.

197. At the Wire, p. 150.

198. Greenham Women Everywhere, p. 126.

199. This demonstration was an important moment in the growth of the Italian feminist anti-nuclear organization "La Ragnatella"--"the spiderweb." See Elisabetta Addis and Nicoletta Tiliacos, "Conflict, Fear and Security in the Nuclear Age: The Challenge of the Feminist Peace Movement in Italy," Radical America, 20, No. 1 (1986), 7-17.

200. Greenham Women Everywhere, p. 126.

201. In this context it is interesting to consider words very similar to those in many Greenham texts, written by Adrienne Rich during the time of her involvement in the anti-Vietnam war movement:

> Paralysed by the sense that there exists a mesh of relationships--e.g. between my anger at the children, my sensual life, pacifism, sex (I mean in its broadest sense, not merely sexual desire)--an interconnectedness which, if I could see it, make it valid, would give me back myself, make it possible to function lucidly and passionately. Yet I grope in and out amongst these dark webs.

From "When We Dead Awake: Writing as Re-Vision," in Adrienne Rich's Poetry, eds. Barbara Gelpi and Albert Gelpi (New York: Norton, 1975), pp. 96-97.

202. At the Wire, p. 92.

203. Rich, "Natural Resources," in her The Dream of a Common Language: Poems 1974-77 (New York: Norton, 1978), p. 64.

204. Daly, p. 4-5.

205. At the Wire, p. 6.

206. On the Perimeter, p. 27.

207. At the Wire, p. 4.

208. E.P. Thompson, the dean of British disarmers, while expressing a general admiration for the activities of the Women's Peace Camp, regretted the "biological reductionism" that found a "simple cause for war in male structures and male aggro. (sic)" E.P. Thompson, The Heavy Dancers (London: Merlin, 1985), pp. 189-190. For the position that there exists "an unthought out 'gap' between feminism and the nuclear issue in exactly the place I would have expected to find a whole 'web' of connections," see the proceedings of the conference "How Dare You Presume I Went to Greenham," and in particular Sara Scott, "Support These Women For Their Children's Sake: Direct Emotional Action at Greenham Common: A Critical Perspective," in Breaching the Peace (London: Onlywomen, 1983), p. 26.

209. Greenham Women Everywhere, p. 90.

210. Hilary Llewellyn Williams, "Four Hours at Greenham," Peace News, 25 Nov 1983, p. 12.

211. Strange, p. 27.

212. For the distinction between "femaleness" and "femininity," see Toril Moi, Sexual/Textual Politics (London: Methuen, 1985), p. 65.

213. Lynne Jones, "A Doctor Writes . . ." END: Journal of European Nuclear Disarmament, No. 16/17, 1985, p. 33.

214. For an excellent discussion of women in the armed forces, see Cynthia Enloe, Does Khaki Become You?: The Militarisation of Women's Lives (London: South End, 1983). She concludes that:

> In each country military strategists *need* women. They need women who will act and think as patriarchy expects women to act and think. And they need women whose use can be disguised so that the military can remain the quintessentially 'masculine' institution, the bastion of 'manliness' (p. 220).

See also the film Soldier Girls, dir. Nicholas Broomfield and Joan Churchill, USA:1981, about the training of black, female recruits for the 82nd Airborne Division.

215. On the Perimeter, p. 17.

216. Diana Shelley, "Greenham: the Women-Only Debate," Peace News, 4 Feb 1983, p. 15.

217. On the Perimeter, p. 81

218. "Star Wars: No Sequel," Nuclear Times, 4, No. 3 (1986), 3

219. Star Wars, prod. Gary Kurtz, dir. George Lucas, 20th Century Fox, 1977; Star Wars:

The Empire Strikes Back, prod. George Lucas, dir. Irwin Kershner, 20th Century Fox, 1980; Star Wars: The Return of the Jedi, prod. George Lucas, dir. Irwin Kershner, 20th Century Fox, 1983. Derivative productions include Battlestar Galactica, dir. Glen Larson, Universal, 1978; The Last Starfighter, prod. Gary Adelson and Edward O. Denault, dir. Nick Castle, Universal, 1984; Star Trek: The Motion Picture, prod. Gene Rodenberry, dir. Robert Wise, Paramount, 1979; Star Trek II: The Wrath of Khan, prod. Harve Bennett, dir. Nicholas Meyer, Paramount, 1982; Star Trek III: The Search for Spock, prod. Harve Bennett, dir. Leonard Nimoy, Paramount, 1982. For an examination of the nuclear implications of video-games, see Ariel Dorfman, "Evil Otto and Other Nuclear Disasters," Village Voice, 15 June 1982, pp. 43-45.

220. It is, however, interesting to note that 20th Century Fox's other major release in 1977 was Damnation Alley, dir. Jack Smight, one of the first of what was within a few years to become a spate of post-nuclear holocaust films.

221. Paul Boyer has also noted that the rising swell of official interest in space weapons long preceded the actual announcement of SDI, and that it is not unreasonable to suggest hints of this filtered into the realm of the entertainment industry. He records that as early as 1962, General Curtis LeMay spoke publically of "directed energy weapons" that would "strike with the speed of light" to destroy incoming missiles, and comments:

> Mass culture fantasies and government weapons programs . . . appear to be interwoven in complex ways. The fantasies lay the psychic groundwork for the weapons programs; the weapons programs in turn stimulate new fantasies. As SDI progresses, we should have ample opportunity to observe this phenomenon at work.

"How SDI Will Change Our Culture," Nation, 10 Jan. 1987, p. 17.

222. Edward Said, "American 'Left' Literary Criticism," in his The World, The Text and the Critic (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), p. 174. Said's full definition of the

term reads:

> What I have called affiliation . . . (is) that implicit network of peculiarly cultural associations between forms, statements, and other aesthetic elaborations on the one hand, and, on the other, institutions, agencies, classes, and amorphous social forces.

223. "Peace and National Security." Speech televised from White House, Washington DC 23 March 1982. In Vital Speeches of the Day, 49 (1983), 390.

224. George Keyworth, cited in Visions of Star Wars: A Nova/Frontline Special Report (Boston: WGBH Transcripts, 1986). Transcript of a program originally broadcast on PBS 22 April 1986, p. 39.

225. Jay Goulding, Empire, Aliens and Conquest (Toronto: Sisyphus, 1985), p. 77.

226. SSAM (Soldier, Sailor, Airman, Marine), No. 16 (1980), cited in Peter Moss, "Rhetoric of defense in the United States: language, myth and ideology," in Language and the Nuclear Arms Debate, p. 34.

227. John Adams, "What's In A Name: 'SDI' or 'Star Wars'?," Spectrum, 22, No. 9 (1985), 46.

228. Adams, 46.

229. Cited in Visions of Star Wars, p. 44.

230. Cited in "Reel Security," Nuclear Times, 4, No. 5 (1986), 11. See also Boyer, "How SDI Will Change Our Culture," p. 17.

231. "Peace and National Security," p. 389.

232. Ernest Mandel, Late Capitalism, trans. Jons De Bres (London: New Left Books, 1975), p. 501.

233. Robin Wood, Hollywood From Vietnam to Reagan (New York: Columbia, 1986), p. 166.

234. For a description of this technology, see the following articles in American Cinematographer, 58, No. 6 (1977): "Behind the Scenes of Star Wars," 698-702; "Miniature and Mechanical Special Effects for Star Wars," 702-706; "Composite Optical and Photographic Effects for Star Wars," 706-704.

235. Don Rubey, "Not So Far Away," Jump Cut, No. 18 (1978), p. 9.

236. Rubey, p. 10. Starship Troopers (New York: Berkeley, 1959) is a celebration of interstellar imperialism in which atomic-armed soldiers clad in fully automated combat suits rocket onto alien planets in grotesque extrapolation of American Third World search-and-destroy operations. For an important analysis of the contribution of such "hard-core" science-fiction texts to the ideology of SDI, see Thomas Disch, "The Road to Heaven: Science Fiction and the Militarization of Space," Nation, 10 May 1986, pp. 650-656, and also H. Bruce Franklin, "Nuclear War and Science Fiction," in Countdown to Midnight, ed. H. Bruce Franklin (New York: Daw, 1984), pp. 11-28.

237. Wood, p. 166.

238. George Lucas, Star Wars: From the Adventures of Luke Skywalker (New York: Ballantine, 1977), p. 101.

239. Goulding, p. 69.

240. Even before the Reagan administration's major funding of reactionary insurgency, Rubey observed that Star Wars' portrayal of the Rebels "reflects some of the fundamental contradictions in contemporary foreign policy" For the Rebels are actually loyalists, trying to support an old order that has somehow been turned into an

Empire by a revolutionary force: they can thus be represented as, at once, supporters of republican democracy and of a traditional, hierarchical order. This is, as Rubey remarks, "a nice way to have your authoritarian cake and eat it too":

> The American theoretical fondness for underdogs . . . stemming from our own revolutionary history, dictates that the good guys be rebels. However, the film's support of traditional ideas of hierarchy and obedience demands the bad guys be rebels. The same confusion is reflected in the contradiction between America's theoretical support of freedom and independence in the world and its actual support of oppressive and dictatorial regimes.

See Rubey, p. 11.

241. See Dan Smith, "Star Wars: The President Strikes Back," END: Journal of European Nuclear Disarmament, No. 4, (1983), 29-30.

242. David Trend, "Birds of Prey," Afterimage, 14, No. 4 (1986), 6.

243. For an interesting view of the almost wholly masculine environment of Lawrence Livermore, see William Broad, Star Warriors (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985).

244. Cited in Visions of Star Wars, p. 4.

245. Wood, p. 174.

246. Rubey, p. 10.

247. Wood, p. 174.

248. In Aliens, (prod. Gale Hurd, dir. James Cameron, 20th Century Fox, 1986), "Ripley" does indeed dominate the story as a tough, tender, emancipated, space heroine whose ultimate, and diegetically correct, wisdom on dealing with unfriendly extraterrestrials is "Let's get off the planet and nuke 'em from orbit." Her assimilation into the patriarchal-military complex attains its symbolic consummation as she advances to do final battle with the "queen" alien. Fully encased in

semi-automatic armour, a female Gobot, Ripley lets fly at her horrendous foe the ultimate insult: "You bitch!" For a provocative study of the sexism in Hollywood "sci-fi," and its nuclear implications, see Zoe Sofia, "Exterminating Fetuses: Abortion, Disarmament, and the Sexo-Semiotics of Extraterrestrialism," Diacritics, 14, No. 2 (1984), 47-59.

249. Sir Solly Zuckerman writes of SDI:

> What is critically important is that there could be no human "interface" in any part of the system. There would be no time for human judgement, no time for "no go" decisions. Once the surveillance sattellites had registered a launching, the system would be automatically triggered to execute its single option--to destroy.

Cited in E. P. Thompson, and Ben Thompson, Star Wars: Self Destruct Incorporated (London: Merlin, 1985) p. 1. For a useful summary of SDI's reliance of on artificial intelligence, see Jonathan Jacky, "The 'Star Wars' Defense Won't Compute," Atlantic, June 1985, pp. 18-30.

250. Malcolm W. Browne, "The Star Wars Spinoff," New York Times Magazine, 24 August 1986, cited in Paul Boyers, "How SDI Will Change Our Culture," p. 20.

251. George Keyworth, cited in Visions of Star Wars, p. 48.

252. Paul N. Edwards, "Border Wars: The Science and Politics of Artificial Intelligence," Radical America, 19, No. 6 (1986) 39-50.

253. Edwards, 48.

254. Cited in Fred Reed, "The Star Wars Swindle," Harper's, May 1986, p. 41.

255. John Bosma, "A Proposed Plan for Project on BMD and Arms Control." Cited in Henry Epstein, "Freeze Folk: The High Frontier Wants You," Nuclear Times 3, No. 6 (1985), 12.

256. Citizens' Advisory Council on National Space Policy, "THOR," in There Will Be War, ed. Jerry Pournelle (New York: Tom Doherty, 1983), p. 200. This passage, like much else in SDI discourse, is symptomatic of the phenomenon Robert J. Lifton terms "nuclearism," by which the apocalyptic power of the Bomb results in an unconscious tendency to sacralize nuclear weapons as awesome destructive demiurge. Because of their close association with the nuclear systems which they are allegedly capable of defending us against, space weapons participate in this apotheosis, with the Bomb's image as "Deus Irae" mixing with more benign visions of divine protection. See Robert J. Lifton and Richard Falk, Indefensible Weapons: The Political and Psychological Case Against Nuclearism (New York: Basic Books, 1982), pp. 87-99.

257. Mandel, p. 504.

258. See Strat Caldicott and Leonie Caldicott, letter, "Return of the Jedi," END: Journal of European Nuclear Disarmament, No. 6 (1983), p. 29.

259. Wood, p. 169.

260. Cited in Adams, p. 46.

261. Visions of Star Wars, pp. 38-39.

262. E. P. Thompson and Ben Thompson, Star Wars: Self-Destruct Incorporated (London: Merlin, 1985), p. 65.

263. Fredric Jameson, "Postmodernism and Consumer Society," in The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Post-Modern Culture, ed. Hal Foster (Washington: Bay Press, 1983) p. 116.

264. Jameson, "Postmodernism," p. 116.

265. Jameson, "Postmodernism," pp. 116-117. For details of the 1950s serials and their

connections to Cold War politics, see J. Fred MacDonald, "The Cold War as Entertainment in Fifties Television," Journal of Popular Film and Television , 7, No. 1 (1978), 18.

266. Pollock, p. 144.

267. See Arthur Lubow, "The 'Star Wars' War--a Space 'Illiad'," Film Comment, No. 13 (1977), pp. 20-21, and Vincent Canby, "Not Since 'Flash Gordon Conquers the Universe'," New York Times, 5 June 1977, Sec. 2, p. 15.

268. For example, R. C. Collins, "'Star Wars': The Pastiche of Myth and the Yearning For a Past Future," Journal of Popular Culture, 11, No. 1 (1977), 1-10. For a contrary view, see Wood, p. 170, who writes of Star Wars and related films that "while it would be neither fair nor accurate" to describe them as fascist films, "yet they are precisely the kinds of entertainment that a Fascist culture would be expected to produce and enjoy . . . ." It is worth noting that The Triumph of the Will is a film of intense fascination to contemporary Hollywood: the maniacally militarist and anti-communist Red Dawn *opens* with a visual allusion to Riefensthal's work.

269. Rubey, p. 11.

270. On this point, I follow the excellent discussion by Wood, p. 165.

271. See Barthes.

272. Walter Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," in his Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schoken, 1969), p. 242.

273. Marinetti, in a manifesto on Mussolini's Ethiopian war, cited in Benjamin, p. 241.

274. Lowell Wood, cited in *Visions of Star Wars*, p. 36.

275. Benjamin, p. 240.

276. For an account of Tredici's work, which appears regularly in *Nuclear Times*, see Taylor; Raymond Briggs, *When The Wind Blows* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1982); Denise Levertov, "A Speech For Antidraft Rally, D.C., March 22, 1980," in her *Candles in Babylon* (New York: New Directions, 1982), pp. 92-95; Alice Walker, "Only Justice Can Stop A Curse," in her *In Search Of Our Mother's Garden* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Jovanovitch, 1983), pp. 338-343; Donna Haraway, "A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s," in *Socialist Review*, 15, No. 21 (1985), 65-107.

277. In particular, from the pamphlet *The Nuclear War Film: A Catalyst to Public Debate* (Canada: np, nd).

278. *The Nuclear War Film*, p. 2.

279. *The Nuclear War Film*, p. 1.

280. *The Nuclear War Film*, p. 3.

281. *The Nuclear War Film*, p. 3.

WORKS CITED

Adam, John A. "What's in a name: 'SDI' or 'Star Wars'?" Spectrum, 22, No. 9 (1985), 46.

Addis, Elisabetta, and Nicolletta Tiliacos. "Conflict, Fear and Security in the Nuclear Age: The Challenge of the Feminist Peace Movement in Italy," Radical America, 20, No. 1 (1986), 7-16.

Amerika. Dir. Donald Wrye. ABC. 15-19 Feb. 1987.

Angus, Ian, and Peter Cook. The Media, Cold War and the Disarmament Movement. Waterloo: Project Ploughshares, 1984.

Badham, John, dir. War Games. Goldberg/Sherwood, 1983.

Bakhtin, Mikhail. Rabelais and His World. Trans. Helene Iswolsky. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984.

Barthes, Roland. Mythologies. New York: Hill and Wang, 1983.

"Behind the Scenes of Star Wars." American Cinematographer, 58, No. 6 (1977), 698-702.

Belsey, Catherine. "The Politics of Meaning," in Confronting the Crisis: War, Politics and Culture in the Eighties. Ed. Francis Barker et al. Proceedings of the Essex Sociology of Literature Conference, July 1983. Colchester: University of Essex, 1983, pp. 27-38.

Belsey, Kim. "Electronic Warfare." Peace News, 7 March 1986, p. 12.

Benjamin, Walter. "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," in his Illuminations. Ed. Hannah Arendt. Trans. Harry Zohn. New York: Schoken, 1969, pp. 217-252.

Beres, Louis Rene. Apocalypse: Nuclear Catastrophe in World Politics. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1980.

Bertell, Rosalie. No Immediate Danger: Prognosis for a Radioactive Earth. Toronto: Women's Educational Press, 1985.

Bidwell, Shelford. "Fighting Talk." Review of The Third World War: The Untold Story. Times Literary Supplement, 3 Sept. 1982, p. 948.

Blackwood, Caroline. On the Perimeter. London: Heinemann, 1984.

Boyer, Paul. "From Activism to Apathy: America and the Nuclear Issue 1963-80," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 40, No. 7 (1984), 14-24.

__________. "A Historical View of Scare Tactics," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 42, No. 1 (1986), 17-19.

__________. "How SDI Will Change Our Culture." Nation, 10 Jan. 1987, pp. 1, 16-20.

Breaching the Peace. London: Onlywomen Press, 1983.

Brecht, Bertolt. Brecht on Theatre: The Development of an Aesthetic. Ed. and trans. John Willett. London: Methuen, 1964.

Briggs, Raymond. When The Wind Blows. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1982.

Broad, William. Star Warriors. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985.

Broomfield, Nicholas, and Joan Churchill, dirs. Soldier Girls. USA: 1981.

Bruck, Peter A. "The Mass Production of Disarmament Discourse." Annual Meeting of the Canadian Communications Association, Vancouver, June 1983.

Burton, Frank, and Pat Carlen. Official Discourse: On Discourse Analysis, Government Publications, Ideology and the State. London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1979.

Calder, Nigel. Nuclear Nightmares. London: Penguin, 1981.

Caldicott, Helen. Nuclear Madness: What You Can Do!. New York: Autumn Press, 1978.

__________ Missile Envy: The Arms Race and Nuclear War. New York: Bantam, 1985.

Caldicott, Strat, and Leonie Caldicott. Letter, "Return of the Jedi." END: Journal of European Nuclear Disarmament, No. 6 (1983), p. 29.

Cameron, James, dir. Aliens. 20th Century Fox, 1986.

Canby, Vincent. "Not Since 'Flash Gordon Conquers the Universe.'" Review of Star Wars. New York Times, 5 June 1977, Sec. 2, p. 15.

Castle, Nick, dir. The Last Starfighter. Universal, 1984.

Chilton, Paul. "Nukespeak: Nuclear Language, Culture and Propaganda." In Nukespeak: The Media and the Bomb. London: Comedia, 1982, pp. 94-112.

__________ ed. Language and the Nuclear Arms Debate: Nukespeak Today. London: Frances Pinter, 1985.

Chomsky, Noam. "Strategic Arms, the Cold War and the Third World." In Exterminism and Cold War. Ed. New Left Review. London: Verso, 1982, pp. 223-236.

__________ Turning the Tide: The US and Latin America. Montreal: Black Rose, 1986.

Clarke, I. F. Voices Prophesying War 1763-1984. London: Oxford University Press, 1966.

Cloud-Morgan, Larry. Letter. Peace Magazine, 1, No. 11 (1985), 5.

Cockburn, Alexander, and James Ridgeway. "Bomb Porn and the Apocalypse: Will the Freeze Movement Be More Than a Fad?" Village Voice, 13 April 1982, pp. 6-8.

_____ "The Freeze Movement Versus Reagan," New Left Review, No. 137 (1983), pp. 5-22.

_____ "After 'The Day After:' Why the Freeze Failed, or What Next For the Peace Movement?" Village Voice, 6 Dec 1983, p. 19.

Collins, R. G. "'Star Wars': The Pastiche of Myth and the Yearning for a Past Future." Journal of Popular Culture, 11, No. 1 (1977), pp. 1-10.

"Composite Optical and Photographic Effects for Star Wars." American Cinematographer, 58, No. 6 (1977), 706-709.

Cook, Alice, and Gwyn Kirk. Greenham Women Everywhere: Dreams, Ideas and Actions From the Women's Peace Movement. Boston: South End Press, 1984.

Coward, Rosalind, and John Ellis. Language and Materialism. London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1977.

Dalby, Simon. "The Soviet Threat and Peace Education." Issues in Education and Culture No. 2, (1986), pp. 33-34.

Daly, Mary. Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism. Boston: Beacon, 1978.

The Day After. Dir. Nicholas Meyer. ABC, 20 Nov. 1983.

Day, Samuel H. "Reinventing the World." Rev. of The Fate of the Earth, by Jonathan Schell. Progressive, 14 April 1982, pp. 13-14.

Derrida, Jacques. "No Apocalypse, Not Now (full speed ahead, seven missiles, seven missives)." Diacritics, 14, No. 2 (1984), 20-31.

Disch, Thomas M. "The Road to Heaven: Science Fiction and the Militarization of Space." Nation, 10 May 1986, pp. 650-656.

Dorfman, Ariel. "Evil Otto and Other Nuclear Disasters." Village Voice, 15 June 1982, pp. 43-45.

Dugan, Ronald. "'The Third World War': The President's Favourite Book." Nation, 22 Oct 1984, pp. 413-416.

Eagleton, Terry. Walter Benjamin: Towards a Revolutionary Criticism. London: New Left Books, 1981.

Easlea, Brian. Fathering the Unthinkable: Masculinity, Scientists and the Nuclear Arms Race. London: Pluto, 1983.

Edwards, Paul N. "Border Wars: The Science and Politics of Artificial Intelligence." Radical America, 19, No. 6 (1986), 39-50.

Ehrlich, Paul, Carl Sagan, Donald Kennedy, and Walter Orr Roberts. The Cold and the Dark: The World After Nuclear War. New York: Norton, 1984.

Ellsberg, Daniel. "Call to Mutiny." In Protest and Survive. Ed. E.P. Thompson and Dan Smith. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1981, pp. i-xxviii.

Enloe, Cynthia. Does Khaki Become You?: The Militarisation of Women's Lives. London: South End Press, 1983.

Epstein, Henry. "Freeze Folk: The High Frontier Wants You." Nuclear Times, 3, No. 6 (1985), 12.

"The Fate of the Book." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 36, No. 8 (1983), 63.

Fergusson, Thomas, and Joel Rogers. "Big Business Backs the Freeze." Nation, 19 July 1986, pp. 43-47.

Fetterley, Judith. The Resisting Reader: A Feminist Approach to American Fiction. Bloomington: Indiana, 1978.

Foucault, Michel. "Politics and the study of discourse." Ideology and Cosciousness, No. 3 (1978), pp. 7-26.

Fowler, Roger, and Tim Marshall. "The war against peacemongering: language and ideology." In Language and the Nuclear Arms Debate: Nukespeak Today. Ed. Paul Chilton. London: Frances Pinter, 1985, pp. 3-22.

Franklin, H. Bruce. "Nuclear War and Science Fiction." In Countdown to Midnight. Ed. H. Bruce Franklin. New York: Daw, 1984, pp. 11-28.

Frow, John. "Discourse and Power." Economy and Society, 14, No. 2 (1985), 193-214.

Goulding, Jay. Empire, Aliens and Conquest: A Critique of American Ideology in Star Trek and Other Science Fiction Adventures. Toronto: Sisyphus, 1985.

Grey, Collin S., and Keith Payne. "Victory is Possible." Foreign Policy, No. 39 (1980), pp. 14-27.

Hachiya, Michihiko. Hiroshima Diary. Trans. and ed. Warner Wells. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1955.

Hackett, General Sir John, et al. The Third World War: August 1985. New York: Berkeley, 1980.

__________. The Third World War: The Untold Story. New York: Bantam, 1982.

__________. "Why the General is Refighting World War III." Times, 19 June 1982, p. 10.

Hanley, Lynne. "Her Story of War: De-militarizing Literature and Literary Studies." Radical America, 20, No. 1 (1986), 17-28.

Haraway, Donna. "A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology and Socialist Feminism in the 1980's." Socialist Review, 15, No. 21 (1985), 65-107.

Heinlein, Robert A. Starship Troopers. New York: Berkeley, 1959.

Harford, Barbara, and Sarah Hopkins, eds. Greenham Common: Women At the Wire. London: Women's Press, 1984.

Hilgartner, Stephen, Richard. C. Bell, and Rory O'Connor. Nukespeak: The Selling of Nuclear Technology in America. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1983.

Hodge, Bob, and Alan Mansfield. "'Nothing left to laugh at . . .': humour as a tactic of resistance." In Language and the Nuclear Arms Debate: Nukespeak Today. Ed. Paul Chilton. London: Frances Pinter, 1985, pp. 197-211.

Huston, Nancy. "Tales of War and Tears of Women." Women's Studies International Forum, 5, No. 14 (1982), 271-282.

Jacky, Jonathan. "The 'Star Wars' Defence Won't Compute." Atlantic, June 1985, pp. 18-30.

Jameson, Fredric. The Political Unconscious: Narrative As A Socially Symbolic Act. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981.

____________ "Postmodernism and Consumer Society." In The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture. Ed. Hal Foster. Washington: Bay Press, 1983, pp. 111-125.

Japanese Broadcasting Corporation (NHK), eds. Unforgettable Fire: Pictures Drawn by Atomic Bomb Survivors. New York: Pantheon, 1977.

Jones, Lynne, ed. Keeping the Peace. London: Women's Press, 1983.

____________ "A Doctor Writes . . . ." END: Journal of European Nuclear Disarmament, No. 16/17 (1985), pp. 33-34.

Kahn, Herman. "Apocalyptic Panic Is No Help." In The Apocalyptic Premise. Ed. Ernest W. Lefever and E. Stephen Hunt. Washington: Ethics and Public Policy Centre, 1982, pp. 235-242.

Kennan, George. "On Nuclear War." New York Review of Books, 21 Jan. 1982, pp. 8-12.

Kent, Bruce. "Hackett and Deterrence." Letter. Peace News, 3 Feb. 1984, p. 21.

Kershner, Irwin, dir. Star Wars: The Empire Strikes Back. Prod. George Lucas. 20th Century Fox, 1980.

____________, dir. Star Wars: The Return of the Jedi. 20th Century Fox, 1983.

Kidron, Beebam, and Amanda Richardson, prods. Carry Greenham Home. Women Make Movies, 1984.

Kirsch, Sarah. "Year's End." END: Journal of European Nuclear Disarmament, No. 8 (1984), p. 26.

Knellman, F. Reagan, God and the Bomb. Toronto: McLelland and Stewart, 1985.

Kress, Gunther. "Discourses, texts, readers and the pro-nuclear arguments." In Language and the Nuclear Arms Debate: Nukespeak Today. Ed. Paul Chilton. London: Frances Pinter, 1985, pp. 65-84.

Kubrick, Stanley, dir. Dr. Strangelove. Hawk, 1963.

Laclau, Ernesto. Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory. London: Verso, 1979.

Larson, Glen, dir. Battlestar Galactica. Universal, 1978.

Levertov, Denise. "A Speech For Anti-Draft Rally, D.C., March 22, 1980." In her Candles In Babylon. New York: New Directions, 1982, pp. 92-95.

Lewis, John. "Return of the Jedi: A Situationist Perspective." Jump Cut, No. 30 (1985), pp. 1-6.

Lifton, Robert Jay, Death in Life: Survivors of Hiroshima. New York: Random House, 1967.

_____________, and Richard Falk. Indefensible Weapons: The Political and Psychological Case Against Nuclearism . New York: Basic, 1982.

Littman, Lynne, dir. Testament. Entertainment Events, 1984.

Lubow, Arthur. "The 'Star Wars' War-a Space Illiad." Film Comment, No. 13 (1977), pp. 20-21.

Lucas, George. Star Wars: From the Adventures of Luke Skywalker. New York: Ballantine, 1977.

_____________, dir. Star Wars. Prod. Gary Kurtz. 20th Century Fox, 1977.

Luckham, Robin. "Of Arms and Culture." Current Research on Peace and Violence. No. 1 (1984), pp. 1-64.

McAlister, Pam, ed. Reweaving the Web of Life: Feminism and Nonviolence. Philadelphia: New Society, 1982.

McRobbie, Angela. "Strategies of Vigilance: An Interview with Gayatari Chakravorti Spivak." Bloc, No. 10 (1985), pp. 5-9.

Mandel, Ernest. Late Capitalism. Trans. Jon De Bres. London: New Left Books, 1975.

Manoff, Robert Karl. "Covering the Bomb." Working Papers, 10, No. 3 (1983), 19-27.

Masters, Dexter, and Katherine Way, eds. One World Or None. 1946; rpt. New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1972.

Meyer, Nicholas, dir. Star Trek II: The Wrath of Khan. Paramount, 1982.

Milius, John, dir. Red Dawn. United Artists/Valkyrie, 1984.

Moi, Toril. Sexual/Textual Politics. London: Methuen, 1985.

"Miniature and Mechanical Special Effects for Star Wars." American Cinematographer, 58, No. 6 (1977), 702-706.

Morley, Dave. "Texts, readers, subjects." In Culture, Media, Language: Working Papers in Cultural Studies 1972-79. Ed. Stuart Hall, Dorothy Hobson, Andrew Lowe, and Paul Willis. London: Hutchinson, 1980, pp. 163-173.

Moss, Peter. "Rhetoric of defense in the United States: language, myth, ideology." In Language and the Nuclear Arms Debate: Nukespeak Today. Ed. Peter Chilton. London: Frances Pinter, 1985, pp. 45-63.

Nash, Terri. If You Love This Planet. National Film Board of Canada, 1981.

Nimoy, Leonard, dir. Star Trek III: The Search for Spock. Paramount, 1982.

The Nuclear War Film: A Catalyst to Public Debate. Canada: n.p., n.d.

Pecheux, Michel, and C. Fuchs. "Language, Ideology and Discourse Analysis." Praxis, No. 6 (1982), pp. 3-20.

Pollack, Richard. "Covering the Unthinkable: The UN Disarmament Conference and the Press." Nation, 1 May 1982, pp. 516-523.

Pollock, Dale. Skywalking: The Life and Films of George Lucas. New York: Harmony, 1983.

Pournelle, J. E, ed. There Will Be War. New York: Tom Doherty, 1983.

Protect and Survive. London: HMSO, 1980.

Rafferty, Kevin, Pierce Rafferty, and Jayne Loader, dirs. The Atomic Cafe. USA: 1982.

Reagan, Ronald. "East-West Relations." Speech at Eureka College, Illinois, 9 May 1982. In Vital Speeches of the Day, 48 (1982), 482-485.

__________ "Peace and National Security." Speech televised from White House, Washington DC, 23 March 1982. In Vital Speeches of the Day, 49 (1983), 386-390.

"Reagan Chooses WW III." Nuclear Times, 2, No. 4 (1984), 4.

Reed, Fred. "The Star Wars Swindle: Hawking Nuclear Snake Oil." Harper's, May 1986, pp. 39-48.

"Reel Security." Nuclear Times, 4, No. 5 (1986), 11.

Rich, Adrienne. "When We Dead Awaken: Writing as Re-Vision." In Adrienne Rich's Poetry. Eds. Barbara Gelpi and Albert Gelpi. New York: Norton, 1975, pp. 90-98.

__________ "Vietnam and Sexual Violence." In her On Lies, Secrets and Silence: Selected Prose 1966-78. New York: Norton, 1979, pp. 108-116.

__________ The Dream of a Common Language: Poems 1974-77. New York: Norton, 1978.

Riefensthal, Leni, dir. The Triumph of the Will. Germany, 1932.

Roshwald, Mordecai. Level-Seven. New York: McGraw Hill, 1959.

Rothschild, Mathew, and Keenan Peck. "Star Wars: The Final Solution." Progressive, July 1985, pp. 20-26.

Rubey, Dan. "Not So Far Away." Jump Cut, No. 18 (1978), pp. 9-14.

Said, Edward W. "The Problem of Textuality: Two Exemplary Positions." Critical Inquiry, 4, No. 4 (1978), 673-714.

________ "Opponents, Audiences, Constituencies." Critical Inquiry, 9, No. 1 (1982), 1-27.

________ "American 'Left' Literary Criticism." In his The World, The Text and the Critic. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983, pp. 158-157.

Sandman, Peter M., and Jo Ann M. Valenti. "Scared Stiff-Or Scared Into Action?" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 42, No. 1 (1986), pp. 12-17.

Schell, Jonathan. The Fate of the Earth. New York: Avon, 1982.

________ The Abolition. New York: Knopf, 1984.

Scheer, Robert. With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and Nuclear War. New York: Random House, 1982.

Schmitz, Neil. "Anxiety and Its Displacements." Rev. of The Fate of the Earth by Jonathan Schell. Nation, 1 May 1982, pp. 529-531.

Schwenger, Peter. "Writing the Unthinkable." Critical Inquiry, 13, No. 1 (1986), 33-48.

Scott, Sara. "Support These Women for Their Children's Sake." In Breaching the Peace. London: Onlywomen Press, 1983, pp. 26-30.

"The Selling of Star Wars." Harpers, June 1985, pp. 22-27.

Shelley, Diana, and Nicolas Walter. "Greenham: The Women Only Debate." Peace News, Feb. 1983, pp. 14-15.

Shute, Nevil. On The Beach. New York: Morrow, 1957.

Silvermann, Kaja. The Subject of Semiotics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983.

Smight, Jack, dir. Damnation Alley. 20th Century Fox, 1977.

Smith, Dan. "Star Wars: the President Strikes Back." END: Journal of European Nuclear Disarmament, No. 4 (1983), pp. 29-30.

Sofia, Zoe. "Exterminating Fetuses: Abortion, Disarmament, and the Sexo-Semiotics of Extraterrestrialism." Diacritics, 14, No. 2 (1984), 47-59.

Spretnak, Charlene. "Naming the Cultural Forces that Push Us Toward War." In Nuclear Strategy and the Code of the Warrior: Faces of Mars and Shiva in the Crisis of Human Survival. Ed. Richard Grossinger and Lindy Hough. Berkeley: North Atlantic Books, 1984, pp. 43-53.

Stanton, Domna C. "Language and Revolution: The Franco-American Disconnection." In The Future of Difference. Ed. Hester Eisenstein and Alice Jardine. Boston: G. K. Hall, 1980, pp. 73-87.

"Star Wars: No Sequel." Nuclear Times, 4, No. 3 (1985), 3.

Strange, Penny. It'll Make A Man of You: A Feminist View of the Arms Race. Nottingham: Mushroom Press, 1983.

Taylor, Gail Fisher. "At Work in the Fields of the Bomb: An Interview with Robert Del Tredici." Photo Communique, (Spring 1984), pp. 28-44.

Thiermann, Eric, prod. The Last Epidemic. Impact, 1982.

Thompson, Dorothy, ed. Over Our Dead Bodies: Women Against the Bomb. London: Virago, 1983.

Thompson, E.P. "Notes on Exterminism, The Last Stage of Civilisation." New Left Review, No. 121 (1980), pp. 3-32.

______________, and Ben Thompson. Star Wars: Self Destruct Incorporated. London: Merlin, 1985.

______________ The Heavy Dancers. London: Merlin, 1985.

Threads. BBC, 23 Sept. 1984.

Trend, David. "Birds of Prey." Afterimage, 14, No. 4 (1986), 6-8.

"Universities' Reliance on Support By Pentagon Is Probed In Report." Chronicle of Higher Education, 5 Feb. 1986, p. 22.

Virilio, Paul, and Sylere Lotringer. Pure War. New York: Semiotexte, 1983.

Visions of Star Wars: A Nova/Frontline Special Report. Transcript of a program originally broadcast on PBS, 22 April 1986. Boston: WGBH Transcripts, 1986.

Vološinov, V. N. Marxism and the Philosophy of Language. Trans. Ladislav Matejka and I.R. Titunik. New York: Seminar Press, 1973.

Walker, Alice. "Only Justice Can Stop A Curse." In her In Search Of Our Mother's Garden: Womanist Prose By Alice Walker. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovitch, 1983, pp. 338-343.

Walker, Martin. "1985." Review of The Third World War, by General Sir John Hackett. New Statesman, 7 July 1978, pp. 22-23.

Walker, R.B.J. "Contemporary Militarism and the Discourse of Dissent." Alternatives: Social Transformation and Humane Governance, 9, No. 3 (1983), 303-322.

______ "Culture, Discourse, Insecurity." Alternatives: Social Transformation and Humane Governance, 14, No. 4 (1986), 485-504.

Watkins, Peter, dir. The War Game. BBC, 1965.

______ "Media Repression: A Personal Statement." Cine-Tracts, 3, No. 1 (1980), 1-7.

Williams, Raymond. "The Politics of Nuclear Disarmament." In Exterminism and the Cold War. Ed. New Left Review. London: Verso, 1982, pp. 65-86.

Wise, Robert, dir. Star Trek: The Motion Picture. Paramount, 1979;

Wood, Robin. Hollywood From Vietnam to Reagan. New York: Columbia, 1986.

Woolf, Virginia. Three Guineas. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1963.

Zaslove, Jerry. Editorial. Issues in Education and Culture No. 2, (1986), pp. 3-4.

Zins, Daniel L. "Nukespeak." Kentucky English Bulletin, 34, No. 2 (1984/5), 74-84.

Zuckerman, Edward. The Day After World War Three. New York: Viking, 1984.