

THE POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN EDUCATIONAL POLICY-MAKING:
THE CASE OF THE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL ACT

by

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to develop a framework for the analysis of the exercise of political influence in policy-making. The examination applies the framework to the processes and stages of policy-making, at the legislative level, in British Columbia, Canada. The contributions are ascertained that detailed empirical knowledge of the politics of policy-making in British Columbia, in the field of education, can make to the existing knowledge base in politics and policy-making.

The framework was examined through a system model; it was tested through a pilot study. The study commences with the system model and pilot study as a foundation. It moves to independent school, pre-process activity, as a focal point. Then it examines the policy-making processes of Bill 33, the British Columbia School Support (Independent) Act, 1977. The data, upon which this study is based, were collected from thirteen individuals involved in British Columbia policy-making processes.

The general research questions asked are:

1. Who are the important influencers at each stage of the policy-making process? How and why did they exercise influence? With what effects?
2. Who are the potential influencers at each stage who did not attempt to influence the outcome? What are the implications of this?

The principal conclusion of the study is that the legislation came about as a result of persistent, consistent, and effective lobbying of two principle influencers. Significant impact was found from the effects of the actions of Gerald Ensing, of the Federation of Independent School Associations lobby, and the Minister of Education, Dr. Pat McGeer. McGeer was found to be a major influencer on this legislation, but not necessarily a leader. Ensing was not a visionary with a goal for total education. It is also arguable that there were not provided the conditions required for

the making of a democratic policy decision. It was found that those who did not attempt to influence, unwittingly influenced the outcome.

An implication of this study is that researchers may be provided with a strong understanding of how the roles of individuals, lobbies, political parties and bureaucrats interact in the policy-making process. It is found in the study that legislators can have significant impact and influence on the policy-making process. Generally speaking education, in British Columbia, may require the direction of strong influencers. Further studies are needed to determine whether the implications of this study will stand up to other legislative, policy-making, processes in education, in British Columbia.

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CHAPTER ONE

THE PROBLEM

INTRODUCTION

Until 1970, little research had been conducted and published concerning politics in education. During the 1970s, a proliferation of material surfaced in North America. Those materials reflected the changing environments in education. Communities moved into a recognized pluralistic society which caused related significant stresses and resulting demands on the educational system (Bowman & Hampton, 1983; Coleman, 1977; Robinson, 1981). These demands were translated into policy at all levels of government. Considerable research began into the *conversion* and *feedback processes* of such demands into policy (Wirt & Kirst, 1982). The *conversion process* refers generally to the political action of converting community demands into decision-making at a government level. The *feedback process* is used to indicate community reaction arising from the defending, by government, of new policy. This reaction is then fed-back to a government unit for further processing into the ongoing decision-making process that is an integral part of political policy-making. A policy-making process is one of stages. Each stage in the process can be segregated and identified by using system models that facilitate analysis (Downey, 1982). Conversion and feedback represent just two of the potential stages in a political policy-making process.

Within a community, there is opportunity for an individual to be involved in the politics of education, whether elected or otherwise, and to have a profound effect on legislative policy. Leaders in the policy-making process have been identified as *power-holders* and *influencers* (Housego, 1964). For the purpose of this study, the term *power-holders* will be used for any individual who holds official, legitimate power to influence policy-making. Likewise, the term *influencer* will characterize the individual that may or may not hold power officially or legitimately,

but does influence policy-making. From this simple definition, it is intended to convey that *influencers*, though not always, develop from *power-holders*.

This study examines the political influence of the individual in processes and stages of policy-making in education, at the legislative level, in the Province of British Columbia. It identifies key *power-holders* in the educational policy-making process, as they related to a particular piece of legislation. This is a case study of The British Columbia *School Support (Independent) Act 1977*.

THE PROBLEM

A personal perspective of influencers in educational policy-making: a retrospective glance by individual power-holders.

Purpose of Study

The purpose of the study is to examine personal perspectives of influencers in educational policy-making. It does so in relation to policy-making stages. It does so in order to identify key power-holders in policy-making (vis-a-vis a particular piece of legislation). This is done in order to determine, through such persons, the nature of the influence exercised. This is accomplished in three parts:

To develop a framework for the analysis of the exercise of political influence in policy making.

To apply the framework to a B.C. policy-making process in education (*Bill 33*).

To ascertain the contribution that detailed empirical knowledge of the politics of policy-making in B.C. in the field of education can make to the existing knowledge base in politics and policy-making.

By reviewing previous research and news clippings, *power-holders* were identified. These people were then interviewed to take a retrospective glance back and provide the human perspective of who and what influenced a certain piece of legislation. Two general research questions were stimulating the study:

1. Who are the important influencers at each stage of the policy making? How and why did they exercise influence? With what effects?
2. Who are the potential influencers at each stage who did not attempt to influence the outcome? What are the implications of this?

Legislation Studied

An important piece of legislation was sought. The legislation had to fit the following criteria:

- i. have a major impact on education
- ii. involve significant community inputs
- iii. require all major elements of legislative debate
- iv. represent meaningful lobbying efforts
- v. involve measurable individual influences.

The British Columbia *School Support (Independent) Act 1977*, originally *Bill 33*, met these criteria. The legislation represented a reversal of an ideological stand by successive British Columbia governments and personally, by a former, long-term Premier, the Honourable W.A.C. Bennett. This stand was for a unitary, public educational system. Bennett publicly supported this historical stand with the statement :

...people have the right to go to private schools if they want to, but public policy is to encourage people to go to public schools. Our policy is integration not segregation, and make no mistake about it. (Downey, 1982, p. 35)

A succeeding Social Credit government, through *Bill 33* , recognized the need to fund alternate, non-public education with public revenue.

The Policy-making Process

This study analyzes the process that led to the new legislation. By examining the roles that *power-holders* and other individuals took in initiating, articulating, presenting and interpreting demands, *influencers* of the policy-making were identified. To identify the *power-holders*, previous academic research was examined to supplement the news clipping research that had been undertaken upon commencement of this study . Another major study of the Act - entitled *The Anatomy of a policy decision Bill 33 - the BC Independent Schools Act* (Downey, 1982) was commenced in 1979. That study represented one aspect of a larger study: *The Consequences of Funding Independent Schools* , Erickson & Manley-Casimir, (1979), which was supported by grants from the National Institute of Education (USA) and the Province of British Columbia.

A dissertation by Ian Housego (1964) was examined in order to understand the nature of *power-holders* and *influencers* in Canadian legislative policy-making. His study represents a look at a specific piece of educational legislation in the Province of Saskatchewan. It is an attempt to determine the influences on the legislation and the reasons.

Downey's study provided the background information in which to conduct the necessary interviews and thus, primarily establish the *power-holders* and their roles. Housego's study provided a framework with which to set up the interviews and pose relevant questions that would flush out potential *influencers* and their characteristics. Both studies assisted in understanding system models and the many stages through which policy-making goes. To fully identify the roles and characteristics of *influencers* , certain sub-problems had to be resolved.

The System Model

The sub-problems were derived from applying a system model that was originally developed by Easton (1965), further incorporated in analysis of educational politics by Wirt and Kirst (1972, 1982) and adapted by Downey (1982). There are three major aspects of the model. The model is diagrammed in Chapter three:

- i. *Inputs* to policy-making from an environment outside the legislature;
- ii. *Withinputs* from the ministry and the *conversion* process of both inputs and withinputs to policy;
- iii. *Outputs* representing defense of the policy and the *feedback loops* from the outside environment re-creating the cycle of inputs.

Pilot Study

An examination of the system model was conducted through a pilot study. A model was necessary to set the foundation for the study. The pilot study assisted in determining if a particular model would be effective for accumulating and analyzing all necessary data under the main study. Three British Columbia legislators were interviewed in the pilot study. The questions asked of them are represented in the first set of sub-problems in this research.

Research Questions

Three specific research questions developed from the initial research and preliminary analysis of material. The study commences with a systems model and pilot study as a foundation. It moves to separate school, pre-cursor activity, as a focal point. Then, in order to frame and conclude the major study, it examines the policy-making processes of *Bill 33*. The following three sets of sub-problems were addressed through a series of interview questions. The specific

nature of the actual sub-problems and all the interview questions is discussed in subsequent chapters.

- i. The legislator: What role generally does a British Columbia legislator play in educational policy-making?
- ii. Precursors: Which individuals were involved, prior to when the *Bill 33* policy-making process commenced, in articulating the stresses that led up to the legislation?
- iii *Bill 33* : What was the nature and stages of the policy-making process?

The research question has three sub-sets represented by each stage:

- i. *input* stage
- ii. *withinput* stage
- iii. *output* stage

All the sub-problem sets examine certain questions regarding political processes in a system. The first set encompasses the pilot study. It asks of three legislators their perception of roles British Columbian legislators play through various stages of policy-making in education. The stages and nature of the questions are determined by applying the framework of the systems model. The answers to the questions determined whether the system model format would effectively produce the data required for the major research. The interview questions, data, analysis and findings of the pilot study are presented in chapter four.

The second set of sub-problems builds on the foundation established under the pilot study. They were primarily studied through news-clipping research initially. Subsequently, they became questions of the main group of interviewees. The second set establishes a focal point in which to examine original *stresses*. *Stresses* represent the particular force in a community which

"critically impinges upon the basic capacities of a political system - its ability to allocate values for society and induce most members to accept such decisions as binding" (Wirt & Kirst, 1982, p. 31). This set of sub-problems introduces individuals and community stresses as a combined *precursor*, a forerunner to later demands, that led to independent school funding in British Columbia. This data and the relevant findings are also presented in chapter four.

The third set of sub-problems covers the actual legislation of *Bill 33*. It is further broken down into sub-sets that represent certain stages of policy-making. The same system model examined under the pilot study is used and interview questions, derived from both the pilot study and the precursor analysis, are included. These interviews are described, herein, as the main group of interviewees. With respect to *Bill 33*, it has been stated that as "...the ideology of the independent alternative began to take a clearer form ... the demand for genuine freedom of choice became a demand to which *Bill 33* was ultimately to become the response." (Downey, 1982, p.3) The final set of sub-problems address this observation by seeking characteristics of those who made demands for choice. From this perspective the final set of sub-problems covers both the policy-making process of *Bill 33* and the ultimate community response. The system model is used for accumulating data on the policy-making process. The stages of policy-making are also focussed upon in the system model. In each stage, during interviews, questions are asked about the individuals, their roles and characteristics. The search for *influencers* is narrowed and facilitated with these questions. The analysis of the stages of policy-making (the sub-sets) is presented in chapters five, six and seven. Each of these chapters represents one stage in the policy-making process as set-out in the system model.

NEED FOR THE STUDY

During the seventies and subsequently, researchers have stressed that politics in education concerns the demands made upon a political system, the articulation of those

demands, and the accumulated interests behind the demands (Archer, 1980; Common, 1985; Harman, 1979; Wirt & Kirst, 1982) . There is also a significant importance to the human factor of demands. Politics in education is "the process of exercising power or influence over people's opinions and behavior"(Thomas, 1983, p. 2). Power, in relation to influence, may be is defined as:

...when someone intentionally desires to make another act in a specific way where there are perceived alternative ways for the other to act... power is potential; when used successfully it becomes influence (Housego, 1964, p. 217).

A political system is "any persistent pattern of human relationships that involves, to a significant extent, control, influence, power or authority"(Dahl, 1984, p. 10). Individuals ally with special interest groups in order to consolidate and achieve the power they require (Dahl, 1984; Thomas,1983). This can detract from the factor of the individual if research concentrates on the group and the policy-making process itself. Dahl (1984) admits to a broadness in his definition and in attempting to clarify he reveals that his definition "... says virtually nothing about human motives" (p.11).

This study attempts to examine the human motives in making demands upon a political system. It is hoped that this knowledge will build on the increasing research in the politics of education that has been prevalent during the seventies and eighties. It should assist researchers to evaluate the effectiveness of making and articulating demands that influence policy-making. It should also provide another perspective to the effects of lobbying in policy-making. It may provide a road-map for individuals and special interest groups that will point out the way to effective influencing of policy-making in education. It will ascertain the contribution that detailed empirical knowledge of the politics of policy-making (in the field of education in British Columbia) can make to the existing knowledge base in politics and policy-making.

In concluding the need for this study, a noted education researcher believed that a concentration of research into the politics of education would be beneficial in tackling crucial educational problems:

As a field of research concentration, the politics of education promises to increase our understanding of political life, educational institutions and processes, and the interaction between education and politics in different societies. But it also promises to provide substantial help in tackling some of the crucial problems in education today ... (Harman, 1979, p. 39)

The *promise* in Harman's statement requires not only an interpretation of research data but also an understanding of the roles that all individuals play in educational politics and policy-making. Harman describes the politics of education for the 1970s as a new and exciting field for research concentration which is still in its infancy. In order to assist the breaking-out of this infancy and as a contribution to the research, this study examines the importance of the human factor in decision-making .

OVERVIEW

Chapter one explains how a specific piece of educational legislation, meeting certain research criteria, was analyzed through a system model. This system model was first subjected to a pilot study. Subsequently, key *power-holders* were interviewed to determine *influencers* and their roles in the policy-making process of the specific legislation. Sub-problems are identified as related to understanding, through the pilot study, the general involvement of *legislators* in British Columbia. The sub-problems further identify *precursors* to the specific legislation and, most importantly, pose a comprehensive set of questions related to the policy-making process of the specific legislation, identified as *Bill 33* . Chapter two gets behind the problem to the human element following the history of British Columbia independent school issues. Findings of other researchers and an introduction to policy-making are presented. These discussions are summarized. Chapter three presents the research methodology. It outlines and diagrams the

systems analysis format and the selection of subjects interviewed. The chapter includes the potential sample, the criteria for interview-question development and the procedure used in collating and analyzing the data. Chapter four presents the set of interview questions, the data recovered and the analysis of the pilot study and the *precursor* activity. Chapters five to seven present the analysis of the main problem. Each chapter represents the questions, data and discussion of one set of sub-problems as they relate to *Bill 33*. Each set of sub-problems represents a stage in the policy-making process. Chapter eight concludes the study with an overall summary plus the implications of the study.

CHAPTER TWO

BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

One of the most fascinating and perhaps significant educational developments of the seventies was the increase in enrollment in Canadian private schools in the face of declining public school enrollment. While public school enrollment dropped from 5.6 million in 1970 to 4.9 million in 1979, enrollment at private schools climbed from 142,000 to 195,000 in the same period. (CBC-Television special report, Sept. 2, 1980)

INTRODUCTION

Radical changes have occurred in education in British Columbia since the province entered Confederation in 1871. This chapter identifies the several researchers who have provided ample detail of those changes, including the history of both public and independent schooling and the politics of education in the province. Historical stresses are evident and relevant in current demands for a freedom of choice in schooling. Independent school research covers these stresses plus the wide extremes from a Royal Commission that is silent on the matter of independent schools, to the strong, general Catholic influence. In between these extremes there have been several reported involvements by legislators and special interest groups. The politics and policy of the organization of the Federation of Independent School Associations (FISA) runs parallel to the behaviour of the many individuals involved both within and without the legislature, and is touched upon herein. As a postscript to the historical research, there is now considerable reported impact from the passing of *Bill 33*, on the public, and independent education system in British Columbia.

Policy-making in a legislative setting also has been researched by others. Certain systems analysis tools, concepts and ancillary concepts have been utilized by those researchers. In particular, stages of policy-making are identified (Downey, 1982; Housego, 1964). This chapter gets behind-the-scenes and includes a background focus on individuals, motives and influences

in the process of policy-making. The question of whether policy-making is democratic has been discussed by researchers. Leaders in policy-making are often identified as special interest groups. The nature of these groups is particularly relevant in policy-making processes and is presented herein.

Downey's study (1982), provides the background information necessary to collect the data for this research. That information introduces the *power-holders* and analyzes the logistics of the policy-making. Housego's dissertation (1964), provides a framework for the structure. This chapter concludes with a summary of the individuals involved, the competing ideologies and the impact of stresses and demands.

INDEPENDENT SCHOOL MOVEMENT IN BRITISH COLUMBIA

The background information on the independent school movement is extensive. Details of that information is presented following under the headings: available research; early history of education in British Columbia, 1872-1952; history of education and politics in British Columbia, 1952-1988; independent schools development; postscript to independent school legislation.

Available Research

Several researchers trace the history of education in British Columbia. Public schooling in the colonial period of the province is reported. The findings identify the "revolution in education (that) occurred ... in the nineteenth century" (Watts, 1986, p. iii). Watts is referring to the trend toward a state-controlled, free, non-sectarian school system. He explores the historical reasons for the trend toward public schooling in the nineteenth century. A history of both the private and public school sectors provides an assessment of the attitudes of parents to both systems (Barman, 1984). A comprehensive analysis of the establishment of the public school system in British Columbia is also available (MacLaurin, 1936). A complete history of the public school

system of British Columbia is provided by Johnson (1964). The political history of education in British Columbia dating back to pre-confederation is reported extensively (Downey, 1982; Robinson, 1985).

For this study the terms, private schools and independent schools, are used interchangeably to mean non-public schools. The difference between the two is only historical as the term, private, was used in the early years of schooling in British Columbia up to the late 1960s. The term, independent, replaces the previous term and is currently generally used in the province to mean non-public schools of any type.

History of Education In British Columbia: 1872- 1952

The province commenced with a non-sectarian system of education. The issue of independent schools is rooted in the province's history and ideology. In 1869, the *Common School Ordinance* settled, in the colonies of Vancouver Island and British Columbia, the matter of a unitary school system. Schools sponsored by the government were to be non-sectarian. Because no denominational schools existed, by law, when British Columbia entered confederation, it became the first and only province to have a non-sectarian system of schools. Since that time, Roman Catholics periodically have complained about paying taxes to public schools. This represents a frustration when they send their children by choice to a parochial school and have to pay for that schooling also. However, they were a small segment of the population and had little influence. The denominational schools grew, following confederation, reflecting the value of religious doctrines in education. In the years from 1849 to 1939, they expanded from 2 to 49.¹ In 1872, the *Public Schools Act of British Columbia* was proclaimed law,

¹ Following World War II to 1978, they increased to 180 schools and 24,000 students (Downey, 1982).

incorporating non-sectarianism into public education. The foundation for today's system was laid. What followed, was that the nature of Canadian educational decisions over the next one hundred years was formed within a mosaic of interest groups and paralleling the shifts in their values (Stoloff, 1983). New groups emerged, exercising power and creating demands on the education system. Political leaders in British Columbia, as in the rest of Canada, reacted to those demands. Policy development spread throughout the educational system. "By changing the school system, politicians and educators have been able to accommodate the wishes of interest groups" (Stoloff, 1983, p. 235). However, throughout all those years the British Columbia government did not change in its ideology to stay committed to non-sectarian public schools (Downey, 1982). The non-public school interests remained frustrated.

Prior to the 1950s there were three major groups representing non-public schools: Catholics, Christians and private. The major denominational group was the Catholic School Trustees Association (Downey, 1982). The Roman Catholics felt discriminated against due to the inability to form their own publicly-supported system that was provided for in some other provinces by the constitution. There were also schools included in the Society for Christian Schools: the Seventh Day Adventists, the Mennonite Educational Institute and other fundamentalist groups. Supporters of grammar school education formed their own schools at burdensome costs to themselves and their clients. From this latter group, following the second World War, an Independent Schools Association was formed from ten private non-denominational schools. These three groups preceded the Federation of Independent School Associations.

History of Education In British Columbia: 1952 - 1988

In the 1950s the Catholic resentment started to show itself. They commenced their quest for power. The political parties in British Columbia since 1952, have been: the Social Credit party (Socreds), an original coalition of Progressive Conservatives and Liberals; the New Democratic

party (NDP), a left-wing, social-democratic political party, formerly the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) party; and the Liberal and Progressive Conservative parties, organized under similar beliefs of their Federal counterparts. In 1951 the British Columbia Catholic Education Association (BCCEA) reorganized and became a very effective provincial lobby group under a new President and former union organizer, Mr. Pat Power. Active in the BCCEA were Mr. Ray Perrault, later to become leader of the British Columbia Liberal Party, and Archbishop William Duke a reportedly very outspoken education critic (Downey, 1982).

The Sacred government yielded to pressures in the small rural community of Maillardville, B.C., when both the folding of the Catholic Health Services and the problem of inadequate transportation services became a strong political issue (Downey, 1982). Maillardville became the focal point of political confrontation as two Catholic schools were closed, by the administrators of the schools, to make forced demands on the public school system. The 840 students attending these two schools were instructed to enroll in the public school system. The public schools were already overcrowded and had to expand their staff and facilities. The pressure was semi-effective as two of the several demands were met. The government provided textbook concessions and certain health services. In 1952, after 18 months, the schools were reopened. Later in 1953, 1954, and 1955, the Maillardville Catholic schools refused to pay their municipal property taxes. These schools had the precedent of Vancouver non-public schools that were exempt, due to a clause in the Vancouver City Charter which granted exemptions to "incorporated seminaries of learning" (Downey, 1982, p.31). A demand for exemption of private school properties from municipal taxation was granted in 1957 by amending the *Municipal Act*. This provided some relief to the operations of private schools. This amendment did not come easily as the Legislative Committee on Municipal Affairs had rejected previous attempts to exempt private schools. Both the committee and the caucus were bypassed, which was "a very unusual procedure" (Downey, 1982, p. 32). The CCF opposed the amendment strongly and continued their opposition to

public funding of private schools. Although the Socred party showed a split in support, with six backbenchers voting against the amendment, the Liberals came out in favour and maintained that position throughout the 1960s and 1970s. At the same time, the public school system came under criticism. Downey reports that, by then,

...society, on a binge of multi-culturalism, became increasingly prepared to see and to support alternatives in all social services - particularly alternatives which were conceived and developed by individuals and groups - rather than the state (1982, p. 23).

Robinson (1985) reported on other non-denominational groups that also made complaints paralleling, in part, those of the Roman Catholic schools. In particular, the native Indians and the Doukhobors did not want to be educated in a public school system and demanded special status. In trying to protect their distinctive culture, both groups lost. The public system, thus, was strengthened and opposition was channeled into the denominational schools. However, in the 1970s the native Indians established band schools independent of the church and the provincial school system:

In 1975 in northern British Columbia in the Nass River country the Nishga School District was created ... a public school district like all other school districts in the the province (and) ...95 per cent native Indian" (Robinson, 1985, p.19).

This creation of a separate system within the public system becomes particularly relevant, as will be shown, in researching the potential options of the independent school movement.

Independent Schools Development

By the 1960s, alternative forms of education were showing up in public schools, and the concept of alternative education was challenging some supports of non-public schools. There are several aspects to the history of independent schools development discussed in the following sections. Commencing with the impact on the Royal Commission of 1960 and spanning

the influence of FISA, Catholics, legislators and opposition, the history wouldn't be complete without comment also on the politics and policy aspect.

Royal Commission

The results, of the 1960 British Columbia Royal Commission on Education, did not give any recognition to the concept of private schools. The information on private schools in the précis of the act were the following four paragraphs:

No accurate information is available regarding enrollment in private schools, but the enrollment has increased in recent years.

Transfers from private to public schools occur largely in Grade VI and IX; in the reverse direction, in Grade IV.

The Department has little contact with private schools, yet many school-age pupils are permitted to absent themselves from public schools to attend them.

It is therefore recommended that 'the curriculum of such schools be submitted to the Department for approval and that, failing approval, school-age pupils be not permitted to absent themselves from public schools to attend such a school; and that periodic inspections be carried out. (British Columbia 1960a, p.8)

In the main commission report, the commissioners inferred that the Department of Education had little direct contact with the private and parochial schools in the province (British Columbia, 1960b). There appeared to be little interest from the government as long the independents weren't at the public trough. The Honourable William Bennett, the Premier of the Province of British Columbia throughout the 1950s and 1960s, reportedly never wavered from the stance that public funds were for only public schools.

The Federation of Independent Schools Associations

In 1962, a founding committee of many private school organizations met and formed an organization that would eventually become representative of most independent schools in the province (Downey, 1982). The BCCEA, at that time, had lost credibility due to the Maillardville

incidents, even though certain concessions were won. As a result, they also lost their leadership position. This founding committee of private school organizations slowly took up the leadership.

Under the British Columbia Societies Act in 1966, the Federation of Independent School Associations (FISA) was formed from the following groups: the National Union of Christian Schools, the Independent Schools Association, the Catholic Public Schools Association, and Associated Member Schools. This latter group represented such varied denominational groups as Mennonite, Lutheran and Jewish. Within the year, the group was making its first representation to the government. The objects of the Federation are stated in the FISA constitution as:

- i. to support and encourage high standards in the independent schools in British Columbia.
- ii. to make known to the public the rightful place and responsibility of the independent schools within a democratic and diversified society.
- iii. to strengthen understanding and cooperation between the independent school associations and other educational institutions, and between the independent school associations and the government. (FISA, 1969)

Gerard Ensing was appointed Executive Director and became a recognized spokesperson and very effective lobbyist. FISA consolidated the decades of arguments and political activity representing economic equality in taxes, fees for educational services, and for government recognition and accreditation.

It was not until Nov. 1967 that the first formal brief of the Federation of Independent School Associations was presented to Hon. L.R. Peterson, Minister of Education. Failure to obtain a meeting with the whole Cabinet was an indication of the long upward road FISA was to travel. (The British Columbia Catholic, 1977)

By the early 1970s, the government was facing a well organized institutional force from FISA. They felt a national awareness of the new alternatives to traditional educational thinking. In summary, Downey (1982) believed of the independent school movement, that:

though their ultimate aim, their ultimate 'ideological alternative' had not yet taken form, they were clearly penetrating the consciousness of the educational system, of the people, and of the government (p.28).

Catholic Influence

There were many involved Catholics in the legislature, in the political parties and behind the scenes. They all had some degree of influence. In 1967, Social Credit MLA Herb Capozzi, a known Catholic, criticized his own government for neglecting Catholic children. An official opposition member of the legislature from the NDP, Robert Williams, opposed Capozzi's request for aid to private schools thus reaffirming the NDP's position against any kind of support for non-public schools. A Liberal legislator, Pat McGeer, supported Capozzi. In 1968, McGeer called for grants to independent schools, thus reaffirming the Liberal's position in support of funding for non-public schools. The nature of the many other Catholics, who took roles similar to that of Capozzi, is discussed in subsequent chapters.

There were two other events of importance in the sixties. First was the 1967 public funding granted to a Catholic University - Notre Dame. Then, in Alberta, John Olthius, at only 26 years of age and a former president of the Christian Action Foundation, succeeded in a campaign to get provincial aid for private schools. A sum of \$400,000 was included in the Alberta education budget for support of private schools that met certain qualifications (Globe and Mail, July 29, 1967). Olthius' role is described in chapter four. He did have considerable influence on FISA and assisted, unwittingly, the Catholic element through some of his Christian arguments. Both of these events foretold future developments for independent schools in British Columbia.

In British Columbia, Downey (1982) analyzed the competing ideologies and Catholicism, in the support-for-independent-schools movement:

...two conflicting ideologies. One, reflecting the values of the Catholic church ... essentially a common man, grassroots organization, employing promotional tactics not unlike the tactics of a labour union. The other ideology, reflecting

elitist values (cultural, if not economic) was promoted, initially by the Independent School Associations, as an alternative to mass, secular education (p. 34).

One ideology was based on "religious imperatives", the other was based in "cultural alternatives". The "cultural alternatives" were often ascribed to certain legislators, in particular the Liberals, as motives for their support of independent schools.

Legislator Involvement/McGeer

There were several legislators who took up the call for recognition of independent school needs. In 1971, Social Credit MLA Dudley Little introduced a private member's bill to give support to independent schools. In 1968, 1971, and 1972 Liberals Pat McGeer, Garde Gardom and Dave Anderson all publicly called for grants to private schools. However, W.A.C. Bennett remained intransigent. Downey referring to the 1972 election, speculates:

the intransigent position (of Premier W.A.C. Bennett) despite the shifting mood of his party and of society, no doubt contributed to his (party's) defeat (1982, p.35).

Legislator, Pat McGeer, published a book representing his Liberal views of the politics of British Columbia and WAC Bennett (McGeer, 1972). This includes his vision for education. In his chapter on education, he states that his objective was to open up the educational system. He discusses realistic financing and encouragement of outstanding people to come to British Columbia to work with educators. He recommends providing an adequate number of student-places fairly distributed around the province. He believes that the advances in education will come from enlarging points of entry into the system. He discusses programs for adults including part-time programs not just for the labour force, but also for artistic, cultural and leisure pursuits of a more advanced society. Finally, he describes educational television as the greatest untapped educational resource of all. He discusses the financial turmoil, and there, makes his only independent school comment:

...unfairness in school taxation has bred resentment amongst farmers, and those supporting children in independent schools. It remains the view of the Liberal party that education is a service to people, not land, and should be taxed accordingly. The role of the independent schools in the province needs to be studied and re-evaluated. (McGeer, 1972, p. 39)

He gave no other mention to independent schools. He also did not mention it as one of his priorities for his government, if elected. Yet it became an immediate priority in 1975, when he became a member of the Social Credit party. This apparent anomaly in values or priorities is explored in subsequent chapters, as is the role of those in opposition to independent school funding.

Opposition Involvement/BCTF

The British Columbia Teachers' Federation (BCTF), in the 1972 provincial election, campaigned hard against the Socreds and openly supported the NDP.

...no doubt this action generated lingering resentment among Socreds toward 'the public school establishment';... also the BCTF's attempt to flex its political muscle in 1972 no doubt aggravated a growing public disillusionment with the public schools and corresponding public tolerance for a 'non-public alternative' (Downey, 1982, p.39).

Downey speculated that the relationship between the BCTF and the NDP may have weakened both in the public's eyes. The NDP were successful and formed the government, breaking nineteen consecutive years of Socred government. The NDP were re-thinking their own positions. With the Honourable Dave Barrett as the new Premier of the Province, they allowed certain concessions to FISA. Private schools were granted permission to negotiate federally for bilingual education support. In 1973, the Socred Party's policy was reversed at its convention:

In the same year, 1973, the Social Credit Party made an apparent about-face by accepting a policy favouring recognition and funding of independent schools. It is possible that the change in leadership of that party made the change in policy possible (BC Catholic, 1977, p. 3).

Politics and Policy

Politically, the province was changing. There was a dramatic decline of the provincial Conservatives and Liberals.

For the two parties, the seeds of political disaster were sown by the 1972 election of the New Democratic Party for the first time in the history of the province. Moreover, the NDP won with an overwhelming majority of 21 seats. ...Consequently, during the years following the 1972 election, public pressure on the three parties to merge became quite strong. ...Due to personality clashes and individual self-interest, the option never had a strong chance of success...two prominent Progressive Conservatives, Peter Hyndman and Hugh Curtis, and one Liberal, Bill Vander Zalm, switched to Social Credit in 1974. Subsequently Garde Gardom, Pat McGeer and Allan Williams, all prominent Liberal MLAs quit their party and, after a period of sitting in the house as Independents in 1975, joined Social Credit. (Boyle, 1982, p. 25)

On May 10, 1975, the provincial Liberal caucus split in half as MLAs Pat McGeer and Allan Williams resigned. They said they would quit the party altogether. Without Williams and McGeer, the Liberals had 3 members in the legislature, NDP had 38, and Socreds 11. On Oct. 4, 1975 an announcement was made by McGeer that Williams and Garde Gardom had decided to join the Social Credit party.

On December 11, 1975, the Socreds were returned to power. They have remained in power up to the present day. The policy reversal was now a plank in the Socred's political platform. The party was augmented with the influential individuals who had defected from the Liberal and Conservative Parties, except for Peter Hyndman. New Liberal leader, Gordon Gibson, went on record as endorsing funding for independent schools. One of the ex-Liberals, Dr. Pat McGeer, later became Minister of Education and played a leadership role in shepherding the legislation through all of its stages.

The Bill was introduced for its first reading in the Legislature on March 30, 1976. In May 1976, FISA presented a brief suggesting two alternative channels of funding. The aim of FISA was to bring into operation the government's policy to assist independent schools and to preserve their independence (Downey, 1982). He also suggested that many of FISA's ideas

contributed to the policy-making process. A non-public school committee formed by the government comprised four senior ministry officials and four local school superintendents. It studied the FISA brief and considered the options available to the government. The committee accurately predicted the opposition from the BCTF and the British Columbia School Trustees Association (BCSTA) to certain proposal alternatives. The non-public school committee inputs also contributed heavily to the policy-making process. In the autumn of 1976, senior ministry staff, including members of the Minister's committee, attended a retreat at Duncan, British Columbia to review the FISA brief and the committee report. The attendants at this retreat were selected, particularly, for their expertise to rationalize government policy. An integral team in generating this rationale was the office of the Minister's Policy Advisor, serving as the communication link between the Minister and all the participants. (Downey, 1982)

The Lieutenant-Governor's throne speech, in the spring of 1977, stated that legislation was to be introduced which would lead, eventually, to the provision of financial support for non-public schools. The initial opposition to the proposed Bill was voluminous and well articulated. It had, however, little effect on the final form. The thrust of the opposition, from the BCTF, BCSTA, school boards and concerned citizens, was largely to the basic principle of public funding of private schools, not to any specifics of the Bill itself (Downey, 1982). In the summer of 1977, the BCTF commissioned a public opinion poll on provincial aid to independent schools. The results were that a slight majority supported the government as long as conditions were attached to the funding (Downey, 1982). The BCSTA and an ad hoc committee of organizations opposed to *Bill 33* pleaded to halt the bill on principles of funding equity. However, unsolicited responses to the government's actions were reported as almost unanimously supportive. The government took this as grassroots support. Predicted opposition to *Bill 33* did not mount.

On September 9, 1977, the bill passed, as the British Columbia School Support (Independent) Act, 1977. The Social party had changed the policy of the government and

enacted legislation recognizing and funding independent schools. W.A.C. Bennett's son, the Honourable William (Bill) Bennett, was then leader of the Social Credit party and Premier of the province. Prior to its passage Eilleen Dailley, education critic and former Education Minister for the NDP, described the Bill as one "which is going to bring about the most major change in education in a whole century..." (Downey 1982, p.68). Yet, even with this strongly worded caution, throughout the legislation's five month process, the NDP was divided on their strategy. There were no reported public statements of their position and they boycotted the second reading session of the legislature - on a matter of procedure. The minor opposition staged by the NDP after that proved to be an embarrassment to them in subsequent legislative sessions.

In 1978, the British Columbia Government set aside \$9 million to aid the independent schools. These funds waited the inspections, certifications and the administrative waiting-period before they were disbursed. The administrators of the act were appointed by the government. Joe Phillipson became the inspector of independent schools. He was a former, public school teacher, principal, district superintendent and Deputy Minister of Education.

In 1981, Socred Education Minister Brian Smith is reported by the British Columbia Government as making amendments to the British Columbia Schools Support (Independent) Act. They reflected the input he received during a provincial tour that he took in 1980 asking for community inputs on all education issues in the province. In 1982, it was reported that:

the legislature voted to increase the funding to independent schools by \$5 million to \$17.5 million. Bennett defended the action saying that independent schools, by providing alternative education, will save the public treasury, therefore the taxpayers of the province, \$40 million annually (The Sun 1982).

By 1987, the movement was being nationally recognized. According to the Federal Government:

Private schools have experienced considerable enrollment growth in the past 15 years. This growth becomes significant when compared to public school enrollment, which fell during the same time period. As private enrollment increased by 92,000 students, public enrollment decreased by over one million....Private School enrollment reached 234,000 in 1985-6, an increase of 64% since 1970-71. Public enrollment decreased 18% over the same period to 4.6 million students (Stats Canada, 1987).

RESEARCH, *Bill 33*

In 1979, Lorne W. Downey embarked upon an inquiry into *Bill 33 - The Independent Schools Support Act* (1977). The inquiry entitled, *The Anatomy of a Policy Decision*, looked at the natural and political history of the independent school movement. On completion in 1982, the study had covered the historical aspects of this legislation from early colonial times up to the current date. It also covered the ideological shifts and political forces associated with the independent school movement. Downey had access to all the education ministry's files and records applicable to the legislation. In addition, his team interviewed, extensively, the majority of the applicable interest groups and players.

The inquiry covered a complex story of political policy-making. The term, political, is not used here to focus on legitimating, perfunctory, processes or internal initiation that may be bereft of politics, but the human relationships described by Dahl (1984). These involve the control, influence, power and/or authority in decision-making. In examining policy, researchers are traditional in their examination of power and control. Policy researchers feel that although the power aspect is important, equally as important is the examination of the timing, stages and impact of the policy (Mitchell, 1988). Downey introduced the players and their roles, particularly in an organizational sense. These players were the special interest groups that held or had the potential to hold the power in the policy-making.

POLICY-MAKING IN EDUCATION

Introduction

Downey (1982) researched and summarized policy-making generally in a legislative setting. He discussed formats of systems analysis to assist in researching policy-making and he suggested the several stages that policy-making goes through. He also offered ancillary concepts that create a framework within a systems analysis. This section touches on conceptual systems plus these other aspects and brings in findings from other researchers. These researchers cover also the topics of stages in policy-making and introduce arguments regarding democracy in policy-making. Downey's ancillary concepts, in particular that of the role of special interest groups, are supplemented with suggestions from these researchers. Discussion of these systems and concepts will provide a basis of understanding for this study.

Conceptual Systems

There are several comprehensive conceptual systems in which an actual policy-making process can be analyzed, plus a number of ancillary concepts that would be more useful in the analysis of *Bill 33* (Downey, 1982). The systems provide a researcher with tools to understand the environment, the players, the issues, and the directions affecting policy development. No single model of the policy-making process was adequate to analyze *Bill 33* (Downey 1982). Downey proffered a mixture of models that coincided with the shifting nature of the policy development as it went through all its phases. The concept of system analysis is discussed in detail in chapter three.

Ancillary System Concepts

Ancillary concepts create a framework within a system model for evaluating micro aspects of the policy-making. In this case, the ancillary concepts assist in evaluating roles played by *power-holders* and *influencers*. Three ancillary concepts that are relevant to this study are:

Language in policy-making - where language is described as a vehicle of the human interaction that is accepted as a given in the theory of policy-making.

Leadership in policy-making - where the leader interacts well with other classes of society; making oneself understood; being able to adjust and cope with opposition is critical.

Interest groups - where the nature of special interest groups are looked at as more than just advocates of competing interests (Edelman, 1964)

By investigating who makes up the language, the leadership, and what is the role of the specific interest groups in policy-making, Downey unraveled the complexity of *Bill 33*. For this study, under *interest groups*, a particular focus is raised with the comment that:

time and ability to engage in long-range policy planning are two things that most politicians do not have in abundance ... politicians not infrequently, turn to special interest groups - and in fact begin to depend upon them to 'do their homework', as it were (Downey, 1982, p.15).

This reference introduces several points. It takes the scope of policy-making outside of the bureaucracy and the legislator. It recognizes the potential for increasing the influence of special interest groups. It focuses on the need for the policy-maker to get constructive assistance and reduce specific reliance. It also brings a particular focus to other sources of individual motives.

To understand motives, research has to investigate the ways in which private citizens and public officials affect government decision-making. Housego's research into a Saskatchewan educational issue investigates just such interactions. His dissertation provides a suitable opportunity to focus on the system of influence. It is a study of the behaviour of influential persons and groups (Housego, 1964). Little other research appears to be available in Canada in educational politics on the behavioural aspect of influential persons in policy-making.

Stages in System Model Analysis of Policy-making

Both Canadian researchers, introduced, have provided significant descriptions of the various stages in policy-making and their importance to analysis. Their comments will be presented here, first by Downey and followed by Housego.

Downey

Downey (1982) described the shifting phases of policy development. These phases subsumed five unique time periods and each phase was characterized by a distinctive policy-making activity. Those five phases were:

- i. Pre-policy
- ii. Mega-policy setting
- iii. Development and refinement
- iv. Enactment
- v. Implementation and fine tuning.

Downey's summary of the model analysis, offers clarification of the importance of stage identification and helps understand the complexity of the policy-making process of *Bill 33* :

As the issue emerged and took shape, and as the policy-making process began to move, (it would be) a perfect illustration of ... *disjointed incrementalism*² and *demand-processing*. But as it moved to another phase and as it became a major value issue of concern to the whole society, it took on new characteristics and began to unfold as ... *-socio-political activities, bargaining, and influence-trading*. Then at stage three, the process became *rational choice*; at stage four, *the exercise of power*; and at stage five, *a return to incrementalism*. (Downey, 1982, pp 120-124)

Housego

Housego's analysis offers another view-point of the stages of decision-making in education (Agger, Goldrich & Swanson, 1961). He described the following stages³ :

- i. In the first stage it is necessary to discover who influences whom.
- ii. In the second stage wide public or media knowledge is not necessarily intrinsic to the process. "A valid picture of the power processes can be had because the actions are known to a sufficient number who have taken part in the decision-making process" (Housego, 1964, p. 219).
- iii. The third stage in the analysis is the process involving "marshalling maximum influence for a proposed policy or against a proposed policy" (Housego, 1964, p.220). Obtaining wide public support is described as an integral part of this stage.
- iv. The fourth stage is a *policy selection* stage. With respect to commitment to a particular policy alternative, "by dominating one or more of the stages ... private citizens can dominate the decision-making process" (Housego, 1964, p. 220). Even if the policy has arrived despite private

² For clarification, the word 'incrementalism' is used in the sense of "muddling through" - a mixture of choices, decisions, problems, solutions and demands. It is adapted from Lindblom C. (1959). The science of muddling through in Downey (1982)

³ From Politics and power: Theoretical considerations. Agger Goldrich & Swanson's six stages in political decision-making are: *policy formulation, policy consideration, organization of policy support, policy selection, promulgation of the authoritative decision, policy effectuation*. Housego relates different activities to each stage and states that the activities are intended, by those involved in them, to have different consequences for the political process.

opposition, the bureaucracy still give up their constitutional authority of policy selection to the power of special interest groups when official authority is not exercised.

The final two stages refer to the publishing of the policy decision and the defense of that decision in the community. This multi-stage model was used to describe individuals, organizations and agencies. The description included those who exerted influence, those who withdrew, and in both cases - with what success (Housego, 1964).

Democracy In Educational Policy-making

A primary thrust of Housego's dissertation was to ask if decision-making in a department of government, in particular education, is democratic. He states that decision-making tasks are so complex that the involvement of legislators is minimal and that the "control legislators exercise has become general rather than specific" (Housego, 1964, p. 235). He also touches on the pluralistic nature of today's society which is so relevant to this study. He states that those in the government are cognizant of this nature and that pressure groups are allowed to affect the decision-making process as a result of this pluralistic nature. "The official decision-makers...were prepared to react to pressures and develop a policy on the basis of the conflict and consensus which surrounded and grew out of (an) issue"(Housego, 1964, p. 235).

With respect to the conflict, certain organizations were found to act as a source of restriction on the government. "They served as channels for involving people in politics"(Housego 1964, p.236). He names the various teachers' associations and other similar organizations and concludes that they were "mechanisms for creating and maintaining consensus -- the kind of consensus necessary for a democratic society." (Housego, 1964, p.236) As an aside, he terms the need to achieve consensus as a peaceful "play" of power. That need is facilitated through a channel of communications with a non-government organization.

The problem raised is that there may not be an organization strong enough to oppose the government. This suggests that the role of the government should be "to provide the arena in which the conflict occurs and out of which the consensus develops" (Housego, 1964, p. 237). His dissertation also suggests that bureaucrats are crucial in the outcome of the policy because they have definite views. The crucial importance of administrators in policy-making is suggested. But, the inability of "organizational elites" to create the conditions for joint decision-making on matters of joint concern is also recognized. It is due to this, he argues, that public officials become more than "brokers amongst competing interests" (Housego, 1964, p. 237). They themselves become an "elite, able to declare in fact what the policy should be, to determine the nature of the consensus arising out of conflict amongst organizations over a policy issue" (Housego, 1964, p. 238). Housego concludes with a suggestion that there is a need for other issues to be studied in education departments for comparative purposes.

Influence Aspects of Educational Policy-making

Influence is an essential aspect of policy-making. This section presents the nature of influence under the sub-headings of: Bureaucratic influences, Lobbying influences - general, Lobbying influences - interest/pressure groups.

Bureaucratic Influences

A less democratic view point than Housego's, on federal policy-making, is that initiatives originate with the bureaucracy (Kernaghan, 1985). There is then, a prominent role for bureaucrats in government-pressure group interaction. Canadian bureaucrats are a more common focus of attention by pressure group leaders than either Cabinet ministers and legislators in Canada, or bureaucrats in the United States. Kernaghan offers the comment, from an Ottawa civil servant, that the new ideas begin deep in the civil service machine. New policy slowly works its way

through the civil service. Special interest groups have to attempt to influence the policy "before it becomes enshrined in a Cabinet memorandum, which is very difficult to have changed" (Kernaghan, 1985, p.314).

Lobbying Influences - General

In order to influence policy, individuals and special interest groups need to consider who to lobby. In the USA, most legislative decisions are decided by groups of people numbering less than twelve and in some cases as few as two or three individuals will be involved. (Mitchell, 1981). "Very few individuals in the policy-making process get involved in deeply analyzing the issues and interpreting the evidence or judging its consequences" (Mitchell, 1981, p. 144). There also exists an obligation to lobby ministers, in order to influence the Cabinet and its committees:

Cabinet ministers have enormous power in all stages of the policy process - if they decide to exercise that power. In practice, they have neither time nor inclination to participate actively in the post-legislative stage; rather they tend to leave policy implementation to the bureaucrats (Kernaghan, 1985, p.314).

Thus, Kernaghan (1985) concludes:

It is tempting for group representatives to aim their *initial* lobbying efforts at Cabinet ministers...before other appropriate avenues of influence have been exhausted (p.315).

Lobbyists are advised to maintain a close contact with every step of the policy-making process and are frequently advised to "leave no stone unturned" (Kernaghan, 1985). The backbencher is looked upon as having opportunities to influence decisions in caucus meetings and in communications with Cabinet and civil servants:

Opposition members are anxious to receive representations from pressure groups so as to understand better the groups' problems and to obtain ammunition to be used against the government (Kernaghan, 1985, p. 315).

Finally, like Mitchell, Kernaghan touches on the role of the individual legislator by stating that:

...if they (the legislator) had more influence on the formulation and implementation of public policy, pressure groups could usefully spend more time and effort lobbying the legislature. At present it is knowledgeable, pressure groups will spend comparatively little time trying to influence public policy during the legislative stage of the policy process. (Kernaghan, 1985, p.316)

Once the policy-making process reaches the stage of house debate, it is determined that it is no longer beneficial to lobby the legislators (Mitchell, 1981) . If the lobbyists haven't done their job by then, it may not have much effect if the individual legislator has been determined to be ineffective in influencing further the policy.

Lobbying Influences - Interest/Pressure Groups

With respect to interest or pressure groups, they can be classified broadly as *institutional* groups and *issue-oriented* groups:

Institutional groups are characterized by organizational continuity and cohesion; they are highly knowledgeable about the policy-making process and how to get access to public officials; their membership is stable; they have concrete and immediate operational objectives but their ultimate aims are sufficiently broad that they can bargain with government over achieving particular concessions; and their long-run credibility with government decision makers is more important than any single issue or objective. Issue-oriented groups, however, tend to be poorly organized; they have little knowledge of government and of how to contact public officials; there is constant turnover in their membership; they have trouble developing and sticking to short-run goals; and they are not usually concerned about long-run credibility with public officials. (Kernaghan, 1985, p. 309)

Although most lobbying groups will fall between these two extremes, the independent school movement, represented by FISA in the 1970s, had all the characteristics of an *institutional* group. Prior to that it had many attributes of an *issue-oriented* group .

Special interest groups may be influenced by individuals to a considerable degree. Legislators may take individual stands based on values to which they have a commitment. Understanding the nature of the individual motives and influence becomes essential in

understanding policy-making. In measuring influence, "power consists in affecting attitudes, (they) affect actions, which in turn affect decisional outcomes" (Housego, 1964, p. 222). Some persons have more success than others in influencing behaviour and attitudes. The question is then to be asked - how does one measure these influences? "To measure power, one must assess the extent to which the citizenry at large, and particular categories or groups of citizens do have real access to officials" (Agger, Goldrich & Swanson, 1961, p. 222). With respect to Housego's educational issue in Saskatchewan, "only those organizations invited to take part in the agitation and settlement of the issue in fact exercised power...were influential" (Housego, 1964, p. 231). Cabinet was the decisive factor in concluding the issue, "the decision-making process was not affected because of the exercise of power from outside the halls of government" (Housego, 1964, p. 232).

SUMMARY

Stresses in preceding decades led to trends in the 1970s, for independent schooling. An unfairness in taxation and education costs was repeatedly articulated to the government. In the 1970s, *demands* developed from large, more organized groups of parents and other interested parties. These demands were for equity in taxation and for a share of public funds to support private schools, thus reducing the financial burdens facing them.

The original stresses commenced with the Catholic Schools. They faced the only province that was unitary and non-sectarian in its education funding policies. By the mid 1970s, the Federation of Independent School Associations that was formed in the late 1960s, had achieved some success in its lobbying efforts. *Bill 33* passed into law in September 1977. It provided to qualifying independent schools certain provincial grants as a percentage of public school operating costs.

The history of the independent school movement was traced from pre-confederation to the enactment of *Bill 33* and including a postscript of certain events following the legislation. Many of the individuals involved in the decision-making process were traced, starting with a young lawyer in Ontario who articulated across Canada his personal values for funding of Christian schools. Members of political parties, religious orders, teacher groups and independent school supporters were also identified. Included in this list are the bureaucrats and the backbenchers, from leaders to legitimators.

An independent research study was conducted of the *anatomy* of the policy decision enacted through *Bill 33*. The inquiry covered a complex tale of political policy-making. In order to look behind the scenes of that inquiry and examine the motives and influences of the individual, a systems framework was adapted in which to collect data. It was determined that policy-making takes place in stages or phases and is influenced by a small number of individuals. The democratic aspect of the policy-making was reviewed. It was suggested that the more connected to an *institutional* group an individual is then the more political power he has to influence policy. Finally, the competing ideologies in supporting independent schools were introduced. The changing values of not only society but of the politicians were presented. The trends are supported by the statistics, both of which subtly underscore the mood of the province and the nation throughout the seventies and the eighties.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

The research behind this study is, by its nature, both behavioural and political in its concern. The research began in July, 1986, when non-specific legislators were interviewed for their views on the general policy-making process in education in the British Columbia legislature. In March, 1988, a second set of interviews were conducted of specific legislators and others. To collect the data from these interviews two sets of research questions were devised. The first was used for the July, 1986 interviews and the second for those of March 1988. The nature of the interviews was based on one particular systems model, described later. The identification of the interviewees came from news-journal research plus data provided by Downey's study. The potential sample covered a large group of people who had the potential to influence the policy-making. The actual sample is limited to thirteen individuals.

STEPS INVOLVED IN THE METHODOLOGY

Identify Specific Legislation to be Analyzed

The legislation was chosen partially due to a recommendation and, in part, it represented an area of particular knowledge and experience to the author. The legislation met all the criteria set out for selection except for the criterion of requiring all major elements of legislative debate. However, this particular point provided an unexpected challenge in determining why all major elements of debate were not present.

Identify Power-holders In the Policy-making Process of the Legislation

Through a comprehensive literature review, historic newspaper research and supported by data in Downey's study, a certain number of individuals consistently were identified. These individuals represented educators, legislators, bureaucrats, lobbyists, special interest-group leaders and affected-group executives. These were *power-holders* that either had a significant role in the conversion process or could have had such a role.

It is important to clearly understand the differences between the terms influencers and power-holders. Housego (1964) refers to leaders as *power holders* (formal leaders) and *influencers* (informal leaders). He states that "if a researcher is to understand the operation of power and influence he must be concerned with the ends and means of both the formal and informal leaders" and describes the formal leaders as "official, legitimate visible power holders"(p.28). The following discussion will cover: definitions of leaders, ends and means of leaders and nature of influencers.

Definitions

The terms *power-holders* and *influencers* in this study are described in chapter one. Housego's characteristics of an informal leader are "those who influence and determine the power process unofficially, indirectly and sometime extra-constitutionally" (1964, p.28). The terms are used whereby an individual could be both a formal leader and an influencer. However, it does not necessarily mean that a formal leader is always, or often, an influencer, nor does it mean that an influencer has to be a formal leader. Or, as Housego (1964) says: "...power is potential: when used successfully it becomes influence" (p.217). In examining the *potential* , the *influence* . may be determined.

Ends and Means of Leaders

Housego's comment above, on understanding influence, focussed on the "ends and means of both the formal and informal leader". The focus of the interviews sharpened around these *ends and means*. It provided examination of the motives and experience of the leaders. At the same time the focus encompassed the personal values, interpretations and understanding that the leaders held while performing their role; and in their assessment of the roles of others. The actions of the interviewees and their perceptions of the actions of others is investigated through each stage of the policy-making process.

Nature of Influencers

In order to further examine the nature of *influencers* the categorizations of another researcher has been employed. Thomas states that a way to identify the effects of *influencers* in the education system is to group them under three categories:

- i. Influence over the support of, and the access to, education.
- ii. Influence over the content and procedures of education.
- iii. Influence over the latitude of social and political action permitted the people who inhabit the schools. (1983, p. 8)

These categories have been considered as an ancillary concept similar to those provided by Downey. They provide further focus on traits of influences that may otherwise be overlooked if the Easton model was used on its own with no modification. Within the various stages analyzed through the system model, *inputs* for public funding of independent schools in British Columbia were examined in light of the above categories.

Determine a Systems Model to be Used as Analysis Tool

In order to analyze the policy-making and development of *Bill 33* a systems model was adapted. Researchers have offered many models that systemize policy-making. These models describe some order by which analysts can be reasonably sure that they are covering, not only all facets of policy-making but receiving also, the data in an order that makes it understandable. It is therefore necessary to understand the workings of a political system. Easton (1965), Massialas (1969), Wirt and Kirst (1972, 1982) all identified the components of a political system as processing demands from various interest groups and individuals plus issuing orders, laws and regulations. The need for a conception of how policy-making takes place and whether or not the process can be modelled is stated by Downey (1982), about *Bill 33* :

In a complex case such as this, it seems more reasonable to assume*first*, that it is, indeed, useful to attempt to develop conceptual and explanatory models of the policy-making process. ...*second*, that it is not reasonable to assume that any one mega-theory or master-model can be developed to explain the totality of any complex case — instead, conceptions need to be developed for each of its constituent parts (p.8).

When considering the several models outlined by Downey for policy analysis it is understood that it may be possible to choose another model or a combination of models and obtain similar research results. The Easton model was adapted for this research. The Easton model, adopted by Wirt and Kirst (1982), is, by description, adaptive to changing environments. It also provides an awareness of outside environments, stresses and feedbacks. It works particularly well with this research on individual inputs to policy-making, due to the stresses and the changing environment surrounding the legislation. The following section will describe the systems model and each of its components: stresses, demands, supports, withinputs and feedback loops. The shortcomings of the model will conclude the section.


Description of Model

For Wirt and Kirst (1982), the model identified the conditions under which communities, which they described as *subsystems*, interact with the political system and create demands in changing environments. They elaborated on these demands by stating:

...Stress in other subsystems of the social environment generates inputs of demands and supports of the political system (which)... then reduces or converts these inputs into public decisions or outputs, which in turn feed back allocated values into the society whence the process began (p.28).

The following is a simple diagram of the essentials of the model. The diagram has been adapted by adding the elements of *community stress* as a forerunner to *inputs* of demands and perhaps in many instances to supports also. Also added is the notion of *withinputs* and *conversion process* and the descriptive word *policy* rather than actions as described by Easton. The phrase, *feedback loop*, has been attached to the line from output to input to indicate that the loop is not a programmed process but rather a natural human element of response. When Easton developed the model his concern was "... not merely with how the political system operates, but with how it persists through time by adapting itself to the host of demands made on it" (Wirt & Kirst 1982, p. 28). Similarly, the concern in this research is how adaptable the model is to the many demands that preceded the legislation of *Bill 33*. This study employs the model specifically to evaluate the "control and influence, political behaviour and socialization.. " that it is said this system model may not have represented when it was first presented (Wirt & Kirst, 1972, p.231).

A simplified model of a political system



Source: Adapted from A systems analysis of political life by David Easton, in Wirt and Kirst (1982).

The essential elements of the system model are stresses, demands, supports, withinputs and feedback loops.

Stresses

Stresses in the social environment are described as "critically impinging upon the capacities of any political system"(Wirt & Kirst, 1982, p.31). Those capacities are seen as the ability to obtain acceptance from society of the allocation of values. When the stress moves into the political policy-making process they become part of the process of not only making new policy, but also of changing those values. *Stresses* play the part of affecting *inputs* which the

Easton model describes as *demands* and *supports*. Stress in the community can be worsened or ameliorated by, firstly, the perception that something is, or is not being done and secondly, by the results of policy-making arising from the political system that deals with the stress. The job of policy-making is not just to relieve the stress by capitulating to the demands, but also, by gaining acceptance from the community that the scarce resources are being fairly allocated.

This allocation of resources is what is meant by *values*. The values of one political system or ideology will mean different priorities in such allocation over that of another system or ideology. The government must have the ability to obtain acceptance for their values or must change their values in response to the *demands*.

Demands

Demands are most often associated with pressures upon the government for justice or help, reward or recognition. Behind these diverse demands lies the common presence of wants, the human condition of longing for that which is in short supply. (Wirt & Kirst, 1982, p. 31)

With the scarce resources available to governments, there is never enough to satisfy all claims. The claims reflect the desire for improved conditions. The improvements are allocated by the authorities in response to *demands*, knowing that it will not ever be possible to satisfy them all. The demands are as different as the groups, the individuals, the characteristics and the personalities involved. The motives of those making demands, usually will be reflected in the nature of the input. The nature of the input will be a deciding factor on whether a leader is an *influencer*.

Supports

Supports represent the acceptance of policy by the electorate as well as the ways and means that individuals have of encouraging policy such as taxes, party donations, campaign

assistance, communications and such (Wirt & Kirst 1982). In the formation of the independent school policy there also existed, ideological supports in society. These represented multi-cultural and multi-religious pockets within society and acceptance by others. *Supports* are necessary as a continuous and steady flow "if any political system is long to maintain its legitimacy," described as the "accepted sense that the system has the right to do what it is doing" (Wirt & Kirst 1982, p. 32). Chapter four provides a supplemental description of *supports* as recognized in the British Columbia legislature.

Withinputs

The inputs are received by the political system and processed. They are affected by *withinputs*. The combined inputs may be converted into policy. The interaction between individuals that make *demands*, those that give *supports* and the authorities that process them, form the patterns of roles that can change and adapt at every stage of the policy-making process. These interactions "generate inside the political system certain pressures, or *withinputs* that shape the conversion process and its products." (Wirt & Kirst, 1982, p. 33). These inputs from within come from legislators, bureaucrats and others closely connected to the legislative process. The nature of *withinputs* may be restricted only by the access individuals have to the policy-makers.

Feedback

After the policy has been released to the public as a paper for reading, discussion, or as law, there develops a *feedback* process. The policy is defended and this *feedback* from the defense is "the interaction of output with its administration which becomes in time established behavior and its effects - an *outcome*." (Wirt & Kirst, 1982, p. 33). The outcome has the possibility of changing the educational stress that precipitated the legislation in the first place. On

the other hand, outcomes can also regenerate that original stress or generate new stresses. If so, then the whole process is repeated.

Shortcomings of Model

Wirt and Kirst provide an explanation of a shortcoming to this model. That explanation is as follows:

It is said (of the system) that little is heard...about control and influence...political behaviour...or socialization... any analytical framework excluding them would be poverty-stricken. ...
It is possible that this general critique is premature... The development of Easton's ideas has been slow, but research employing them has recently developed a body of research knowledge which challenges this critique. (Wirt & Kirst, 1972, p. 231)

The important aspect of this recognition is that Easton's model needs to be employed to assess both its effectiveness and/or shortcomings.

To examine the stresses, the human behaviour and motives behind the influencing of the policy on public funds for independent schools, a series of interviews was designed. This would enable the researcher to follow the organization of the system model described above.

Conduct a Pilot Study of a BC Legislator Sample, Using the Systems Model

The information describing the pilot study and the interview questions has been described briefly in chapter one. The pilot study was undertaken as a preliminary research step many months before the primary research itself. The three interviews were chosen randomly from a number of legislators who were accessible to the interviewer. The only criteria used in the selection process were that both the major parties, Social Credit and New Democrats, be represented; that both current sitting and non-sitting members be considered; and that both Cabinet Ministers and backbenchers be represented. It was not deemed necessary to have a

legislator who had served, or did serve, in the Education Ministry as this would be covered extensively in the main group of interviews.

Examine Precursor Activities and Individuals to the Legislation

During the initial research phase, and prior to the main group of interviews, a search was conducted for signs of activity that preceded the ordinarily visible and identifiable stresses and resulting demands. It was considered that such activity, or the individuals connected to the activities, may lead to a greater understanding of motives underlying the intensive demands. In the main group of interviews a question was asked to further identify sources and motives. The name, precursor, was given to this activity to identify it with actions arising from initial stresses in the environment outside of the Legislature.

Develop Interview Questionnaires to be Used on Main Group of Interviews

All questions in both sets of interviews were developed from the system model identified herein. The questions focussed on the stages in policy-making, the feedbacks during those stages and the roles individuals played in the stages. An emphasis was given to structuring the questions in order to facilitate both primary responses to a direct question and to solicit commentary on both other participants in the policy-making process and also solicit opinions that may reflect on the nature of involvement or motivation of the individual interviewed. (See Appendix A and Appendix B)

Determine Interview Sample from Power-holders

Potential Sample

In total, those identified in step 2, as either having a significant role in the conversion process or could have had such a role, numbered approximately forty. Some were listed and

followed up and others put aside as redundant or not sufficiently relevant to the scope of the research. Sociometric¹ techniques were adapted as another form of ancillary system concepts. That is to say, in addition to the systems model adapted, certain ancillary actions were necessary to ensure that all the principle power-holders and influencers were identified. The individuals in the actual sample were asked to designate other individuals who in relation to themselves influenced or could have influenced the policy-making of *Bill 33* . The techniques were utilized to expand the search and capture any individuals that would have not been researched by normative techniques under the systems model.

Actual Sample

The data upon which this study is based was collected from thirteen individuals:

- three with no involvement in the process; they were or had been legislators in the British Columbia assembly. One was NDP and two were Social Credit, spanning three decades of office.
- three former legislators in Education roles: Two NDP; one Social Credit. The NDP members were both in office in the late 1960s and the 1970s, one prior and during the legislation and one prior, during and subsequent. The Socred member had spanned a period of over 15 years on either side of the legislation. All three had held cabinet posts.
- one former Social Credit backbencher supporting independent school issue. His office had expired prior to *Bill 33*.

¹ Housego (1964 p.32) describes sociometric technique from P.H.Rossi, Theory and method in the study of power in the local community , as meaning that "individuals are asked to designate those other individuals who stand in some sort of relationship to themselves." He states that the use of the technique is based on two assumptions by Rossi: "1. That influence and power are wielded by specific individuals and 2. that those involved are valid and reliable sources of information upon the relationship."

- one former legislator of the Liberal party, supporting independent schools. His office had also expired prior to the legislation.
- two bureaucrats, both of whom had joined the government in the mid 1970s. Neither are civil servants at present.
- two lobbyists, one for the independent schools and one for the BCTF, neither is actively involved with his/her respective associations, both commenced their activities in the 1960s.
- one out-of province lobbyist for a separate school movement.

Selection Process

These individuals were selected in the following manner:

i. three randomly selected members of the legislature (MLA) were identified for interviews solely on the role of the MLA in British Columbia and to examine the applicability of the system analysis model used in this research. That is to say, to test the Easton demand-model described herein.

ii. as a result of newspaper research, an individual was identified in the 1960s as being a forerunner or a precursor of the independent school movement actions of the 1970s in British Columbia.

iii. stemming from the data collected by Downey and acknowledged herein, certain individuals in and out of the legislature were identified as playing a role in the policy-making process of *Bill 33*.

The individuals involved in *Bill 33* had the characteristics of leadership, individuality and/or support. It was determined that these traits would be essential in collecting the appropriate data to determine the *human factor* behind *Bill 33*. It was also determined that both the

protagonists and antagonists would be well represented if MLAs from three of the four parties active in provincial politics in the 1960s and 1970s were included.

The Conservative party was excluded. From researching the newspapers of those decades, it was determined that this party's role was minimal in the advocacy or opposition of alternates to public school education. Although, they did on several occasions address the issue in response to questioning of their policy. The party has had little or no legislative representation in the last two decades.

The bureaucrats identified were active during the mid-seventies and the lobbyists chosen were directly involved with Bill 33. One lobbyist was active in support of the policy-making and the other, an educator, was in opposition and representing the BCTF. No other principal opposition was identified in the research or the interviews. Secondary opposition came from school trustees. However, no trustees were interviewed due to the minimal impact and influence of their arguments.

The decision on specific individuals was aided primarily by Downey's 1982 study. The information of individuals contained therein was comprehensive in many instances. With the help of news clippings, some of those individuals were either dismissed as having a minimal influence or potential or were identified as representing similar ideologies, values and characteristics. For example, there were several formal leaders in the BCTF. It was decided to choose one who had shown an ongoing and continuous interest in the legislation. The Liberal party had several leaders and outspoken legislators before, during and after the policy initiation. One Liberal was chosen who represented a balance of views of all the chronological periods encompassing the legislation. The NDP party had several legislators who were involved, in detail and in caucus, with the legislation. Two of those were chosen, for their reported involvement and principles as well as for their reported differences in ideology. It was intended to have representation from both camps of the NDP as it was reported that the party had a dichotomy in opinion on this matter. It was deemed

important to have interviewees that represented specific time periods. Accordingly, legislators were chosen to represent each of the three decades involved. A strong representation of legislators and cabinet ministers plus bureaucrats and lobbyists also affected the choices. Finally, it was essential to interview the primary leaders or someone very close to them to represent their input and motivation.

Collect Data Via Interviews

Two sets of interview questions were designed. They were to represent the sub-problems as outlined in chapter one. The first set was for the pilot research and are outlined in chapter four. The second set was to gather data regarding the behavioral and influence analysis behind *Bill 33*. It is reproduced in Appendix A to this study. All these questions related directly to the sub-problems in the study and were designed in order to obtain the maximum and most useful data necessary to answer the sub-problems. Also, all the questions were designed to ensure confidentiality of the interviewees.

Pilot interviews were conducted with three subjects. The subjects were all members or previous members of the Legislature representing both major parties. They were asked to define roles in decision-making through the various stages of the policy-making process. Each of the interviewees was requested to comment on the instrument and the transcript of the interview. Suggestions were solicited. From this pilot, the focus of the study was generated and the questions were refined to incorporate suggestions and to meet the sharpened focus of *Bill 33*.

Under the final three sets of sub-problems, the interviews and questions were concerned with the individuals who represented the widest possible spread of influence on the *Bill 33* policy-making. The questions posed were an attempt to determine the extent that *stresses* were evident prior to demands being made upon legislators; the nature of the *demands*

and *supports*; the role of individuals in the *conversion process* , including the *withinputs* ; and finally the role individuals played in the *feedback* loop on defense of the policy.

Analyze Data

Analysis of the data was carried out by careful examination of the responses of each of the subjects. Each interview was transcribed from tape into written text. Each of the interviews was then examined in light of all sub-problems originally conceived. Specific answers were scrutinized for applicability and reasonableness with respect to the perception of the question in the eyes of the interviewee. Other answers and discussion by the interviewee were read with respect to the context of all sub-problems. Some of the data required a second discussion with an interviewee. This assisted in clarifying certain comments and gathering more information.

Where data on one sub-problem was supportive of other sub-problems, they were synthesized. Once collated, the quotations were then condensed. Redundancy and non-applicable or non-appropriate personal comments were removed. Original sub-problems were consolidated to produce a more concise and focussed flow through the stages identified by the system model analysis. The final set of sub-problems were then organized and a final synthesis was performed by scrutinizing all quotations and reorganizing the responses into the sub-problem most applicable to the response. Considerable cross-over was anticipated and experienced and has been dealt with in the chapters. Finally, all quotations were again scrutinized to ensure the confidentiality of the interviewees. All obvious references that would hint at specific identification of the subjects were removed.

Concluding Steps

The final steps in the methodology are to ensure that the data generated are reliable and valid, to determine characteristics of *influencers* from that data, and then to conclude and

determine implications of study based on those characteristics. Ensuring that the data were reliable and valid was done by taping all of the interviews and then having transcripts typed from the tapes. All of the transcripts were sent immediately to the supervising committee members for their review. Reference was made back to the tapes on several occasions where the nature of a quote was in question.

LIMITATIONS AND DELIMITATIONS

Limitations (those imposed by external factors)

This research was limited externally by certain factors of: time, availability of interviewees, research material and broadness of the underlying issue. The time factor was simply that twelve years had passed since the legislation was enacted. Some of the interviewees were initially reluctant to bring up what was an issue perceived to be "water under the bridge". Related to this was the fact that there were many uncomfortable memories. On the other hand, there was also a realization that the issue of the 1970s is still an issue today and, therefore, there is a relevancy and perhaps a practicality to the study. Certain individuals, identified as having played a significant influencing role, are deceased, notably: the former Premier of British Columbia, WAC Bennett; advisor, Hugh Harris; and legislator, Dudley Little. Civil servant Frank Levers, was very ill and in a nursing home. A former Premier was contacted, but getting a timely interview was not possible. One strongly influential individual legislator consented to an interview but did it over the telephone and limited the scope of the questions and the time of the interview. His attitude was one of reluctance. His input was critical and, accordingly, much more in-depth answers had to be sought from others.

The research material was limited in that, although there is considerable research on independent schools and many news items clipped regarding *Bill 33*, there was little scholarly research data on the legislation outside of the studies of Downey (1982) and Erickson (1979).

The final limitation was on the breadth of the project. By its nature, it examined and included political and sociological as well as educational contexts and fields. This led to a specific delimitation. It was not possible under the scope of time and issues to cover these other faculties in literary research.

Delimitations (those imposed by the researcher)

Due to certain factors the research had to be limited purposely. One of those factors was the broad scope of academic faculties covered by this study. It is tempting to examine studies under the nature of sociology or political science for their applicability. Instead, it is limited to educational aspects. It is also tempting to expand the number of individuals interviewed and branch off from the system model into innuendo, supposition and circumstantial evidence of matters that are like loose threads to the issue. For example, in researching the influencers to the legislators, it becomes apparent that there were influencers to not only political parties and constituencies, but also to the parochial interests, elite schools and other organizations. The extent of these influences are limited to those that affected directly the independent school issue. Also, the questions asked of the interviews had to be limited to those that provided data relevant to the system model format and analysis. They also had to be limited to those relevant to the problem of individual characteristics and behaviour. Questions could have been asked of the actual *anatomy* of the policy-making in order to obtain more detail than that provided by Downey's 1982 study. This would be, particularly, in a chronological sense, where new information has the potential to surface, or individuals are less reluctant to make statements twelve years after the fact. The religious background or faith of some individuals has been identified. However, it is not in the scope of the research to identify in-depth or to analyze the nature of behaviour in for instance: Catholics versus non-Catholics. Finally, the nature of the interviews from the beginning was confidential. There are many instances where very personal comments were offered. There were

also in depth personal analysis' given by several of the interviewees. Each of the individuals was given assurance that their comments would be kept confidential. In several cases, particularly personal comments were removed, at the discretion of the author, in attempt to eliminate any discomfort that may otherwise have been produced. Although such removal may have reduced the effectiveness of sometimes deep emotional comments it is not felt that they have any significant effect on the overall quality of the data reported on herein.

SUMMARY

This chapter describes the nature of formal and informal leaders, specifically in the context of how they are used in this study. It identifies the systems model. The basic elements of that model are described and diagramed. The potential and actual sample and the instrument used in all interviews is described. An explanation is provided of the reasons for choosing the actual sample. Those excluded are also explained. The methods of data collection and data analysis are presented. The analysis of data consists of an examination of the applicability of the Easton system model to the British Columbia legislative processes. An explanation of the synthesizing of the data is given. The final condensed analysis embraces the five sets of sub-problems of the research. The limitations and delimitations intrinsic to this research is described and explained.

CHAPTER FOUR
ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM
PART ONE

INTRODUCTION

Legislative decisions are often decided by small groups, with very few individuals deeply analyzing the issues. In this and the following three chapters, an analysis of the data is presented. Each of the chapters is divided into two main sections related to the sub problems of this study. These sections are:

- | | |
|-------------------|---|
| <u>Findings</u> | A summary of the findings as they relate to the sub-problems. |
| <u>Discussion</u> | An analysis of the findings. |

Two specific research questions are explored, as sets of sub-problems, in this chapter. They are as follows:

1. legislator roles (what role generally does a B.C. legislator play in educational policy-making?)
2. precursor roles (which individuals were involved, prior to Bill 33 policy-making process commenced, in articulating the stresses that led up to the legislation?)

These represent general issues that are not specifically related to independent school legislation. *Part two* of the findings commences in the following chapter and includes additional research questions represented by three further sets of sub-problems, these, related to independent school legislation.

In this chapter, the first set of sub-problems represents an examination of the system model under a pilot study. The general format of the questions used as a basis for the related interviews is outlined in this chapter. Essentially, all the questions were focussed at determining each respondent's knowledge of human factors related to each sub-problem. The second set of sub-problems covers an examination of stress-related activity in the community acting as a *precursor* to the issue of public funding of independent schools.

BACKGROUND

The two purposes of the three pilot interviews with British Columbia members of the Legislature were:

- i. to initially explore particular questions related to the *conversion process* in education policy-making in British Columbia.
- ii. to observe the responses related to perceived *inputs of demands and supports* and the role the legislators played in both *withinputs of conversion* and *outputs of defense*.

Of the three members of the Legislature interviewed, two were sitting Social Credit (Socred) legislators (July, 1986). One was a former New Democratic Party (NDP) legislator. Two had ministerial experience; one as a Socred legislator and the other as a NDP legislator. All three had been with a government in power and one, the NDP, had served in opposition. All three had strong political socialization in that they had experienced considerable political and community activity prior to running for the legislature. This experience went back to their school days. None of them had been in the Ministry of Education or had served as an education critic. The set of sub-problems posed to them is as follows:

1. Legislator roles (what role generally does a B.C. legislator play in educational policy-making?)

- 1.1 What is the nature of *demand-inputs* received by legislators in British Columbia with respect to educational policy-making?
- 1.2 What is the nature of *support-inputs* received by legislators in British Columbia with respect to educational policy-making?
- 1.3 What role does the legislator play in the *conversion process*?
- 1.4 What role does a legislator have in *defending* legislation?

The second set of sub-problems did not form part of the pilot study interviews. The first sub-problem was initially researched through news-clippings and informal discussions in the education community. Both sub-problems were posed to the main group of interviewees.

2. Precursors (which individuals were involved, prior to Bill 33 policy-making process commenced, in articulating the stresses that led up to the legislation?)

- 2.1 Was there any indication of individuals involved actively in articulating public-funding demands, for non-public schools, prior to the B.C. independent school movement?
- 2.2 What characteristics were noted by legislators, bureaucrats and lobbyists of precursor activity.

ANALYSIS

Legislator Roles

What role generally does a British Columbia legislator play in educational policy-making?

Sub-problem 1.1

What is the nature of *demand-inputs* received by legislators in British Columbia with respect to educational policy-making?

A. Findings

The *inputs* mentioned by all three legislators are: mail, briefs, telephone calls, lobbies and public meetings. Mail is the most significant single item. The NDP member mentions mail from teachers, home and school associations and alumni associations. The Socreds include in their comments, mail from parents of school children and school staff committees. The Socred backbencher comments on the particular impact of the restraint period. "During the (restraint) crisis over one half of my mail was educational....".

The well thought-out lobby is indicated by all three as a potentially effective instrument:

The most effective lobbying we saw in education ... FISA - kept us under a lot of pressure - the aid to the independent schools was given as a purely political decision because of heat from the lobby... teachers had the money and their lobby was for issues that were less substantial (than the independent school movement) on the surface... (NDP).

Research papers (of universities) are looked at by the government. The University of Victoria is very effective in lobbying, once faculty writes you, they get you out there (they make you aware of their position)... (Socred backbencher).

Citizens can have an amazing effect if they get to know a MLA... (Socred Cabinet minister)

On the other hand, there are some strong comments on ineffective lobbies:

People who stand in the hallways and have a mission and then go back and say 'I saw many MLAs' - they are not effective at all. MLAs can be used, to set up the meetings that might be more effective... They feel that you believe in what they are saying and that you are going to be able to change the mind of a minister et cetera. (They do not realize the practicality of such anticipated consequences)...(Socred backbencher)

Trustees were good at lobbying but were difficult to deal with because of set policy, finances, et cetera...Unless you are close to the minister or have an entrée to the senior civil servants - it is difficult to have any effect; MLAs can be used for this entrée...(NDP)

Five hundred teachers run the BCTF - the rest do not care or do not go - it is not representative. However it is (democratic) and we must respect it...(Socred Cabinet minister).

Some of the representation (of the BCSTA) ... has been small groups that dominate and are not representative. MLAs are aware that they are not and tend to ignore them. Petitions can be effective... (but) you have to judge them and qualify them - do not accept at face value...(Socred Cabinet minister)

Often *demand-inputs* are scrutinized by legislators, in particular for the makeup of those behind the main thrust. "Education is a motherhood issue, people get emotional, not thoughtful... At public meetings - the same two or three hundred people attend..." (Socred Cabinet minister).

Overall, the MLAs believe inputs can have significant effect "if done properly". They feel that educational inputs tended to be emotional, particularly during recent terms of the Legislature. One Socred MLA states that education became a strong issue to him as a backbencher because he had children in school. The other said it was because his community involvement was with particularly needy and special children. The communications from one's own children attending school was one of several inferences to indirect *environmental inputs* that are received by legislators. The MLAs have responded primarily to visible and direct demands/inputs.

Briefs are inferred by the NDP member to be ineffective as *demand inputs* as there "is no price tag on them". He describes teachers briefs as "self-serving". To be effective, he is saying, briefs need to contain vision and look into the consequences. A Socred uses a pun in stating that they needed to "be brief" and to have substance. He also feels it is important that briefs be presented through a meeting set up with the caucus or committee. The MLAs all agree that courtesy should always be extended to consider the time requirements of the legislators.

People would come over unannounced - that gives them two strikes against ... I would take their briefs but I usually would not have time to read them... (Socred backbencher).

There is a feeling expressed by all the interviewees that people must understand the role of the MLA. They must win his/her confidence, build a rapport and most importantly realize their

limitations on affecting policy-making. As one Socred says, "we told them (lobbyists) that backbenchers do not hold up legislation (we have no power to do that)". Briefs, like all inputs, according to the NDP member, must be done properly. He states that they must be, "cogently" presented, "lucid... like an abstract". He states that they must be with "philosophical underpinnings". A Socred member says that they must "start somewhere, finish somewhere, meet in the middle". The overall reaction is that briefs have to effectively get the attention of the minister. The other indication, particularly from the NDP legislator is that as *support inputs* rather than *demand inputs*, "briefs were educational and good speech writing material".

Lobbies are described as including both petitions and special interest groups. It is expressed that they are not usually effective in educational matters. The NDP respondent makes the exception of the independent school lobby.¹ Unions are looked at by one of the Socreds as important for inputs and are not treated lightly.

Unions ..their leaders are important for inputs. I made sure that I communicated with them, sat down and discussed commonalties. I went on a tour of plants in my riding with leaders and made sure I brought other MLAs along. (Socred Cabinet minister)

The NDP member describes his own party as a significant source of inputs. Overall, there is a concession by a Socred that lobbyists can be effective. However, in education, outside of FISA, there is not "what I call the professional paid lobbyist (like) the private sector which is very effective". The lobbyist that would be effective is described by a Socred as:

One that knew the education system, the financing and all the intricacies of the education system, would be available to talk to the MLAs and lobby them on a one-to-one in such a way that suppose you wanted to do something new, then that person would over a period of two to three weeks lobby every MLA saying 'look, here's a brief and I want you to look at it and if you have any questions...'(Socred Cabinet minister).

¹It is relevant to note that the FISA response from the MLA was spontaneous and unsolicited, as independent schools were not being mentioned or inferred at this time, in any way, in this pilot interview process .

Essentially the lobbyist in education is described by the Social Credit members as an individual that could provide "proactive, non-confrontational understanding" to the MLAs so that they could represent the issues on a well-informed basis at caucus and committee. The NDP member sees it as "political", stating that once a government has seen a brief or listened to a lobby it then becomes political. He feels that it all reduces to asking: "What are the political ramifications?"

B. Discussion

(i) Stresses

In chapter three, the political system components are described, in part, as processing demands from interest groups and individuals. *Demands* and *supports* upon the political system are generated by stresses described as elements critically affecting the capacities of the political system (Wirt & Kirst, 1972). The stress of restraint on education is obvious from the interviews, but not in an episodic sense. Wirt and Kirst (1972) describe historical public school policy as developing out of nineteenth century financial problems with private schools. The scarce allocation of financial resources is a continuous stress in educational decision-making processes. It was certainly a factor over the last decade in British Columbia and there is some evidence from the interviews that historically it has always been recognized as being fairly close to the surface even in good economic times. Accordingly, the interviewees take the stress for granted as a well recognized and given fact. However, other *stresses* are identified directly and indirectly. These are: unfairness for the disadvantaged and handicapped, inequalities in teaching, lack of facilities, and other matters not directly related to funding.

(ii) Demand/Support Relationship

An unexpected relationship develops from this data showing a strong link between certain *demands* and *supports*. A legislator states: "Briefs were educational and good speech writing material". This is an unusual perspective for brief-givers. They may not have thought of it as being a support. Certainly they would not have imagined the *support* aspect as the primary utility of the document. It put the brief's role as a *demand* instrument in a different light. The interviewees explain the necessity for being fully informed in order to be effective as MLAs. Therefore, the brief becomes a *support* to the MLAs, in the process of decision-making, because it is inferred that the document would be used to increase the knowledge of the legislators for a better *defense*. Since defending policy is the way an MLA supports governments policy, it is reasonable to conclude that the document has its identity transferred in the *conversion* process.

Finding 4.1

Demands recognized by one party can be supports to another party.

(iii) Nature of demands

The nature of *demands* is as different as the individual, groups, characteristics and personalities involved (Wirt and Kirst, 1972). However, according to the interviews, the effectiveness of *demands* is based not so much on the nature of the those making them as it is on the manner in which they are presented. All the legislators emphasize the importance of knowing MLAs, cogently presenting information, and understanding how the system works. There is an implication that, although some demands will strongly affect policy-making as a direct result of the argument, there is also considerable effect attributable to the relationship between those making the demands and the Legislature as a whole.

Finding 4.2

The nature of demands plays second to the manner in which they are presented.

The fact that the independent school lobby is identified as the only effective lobby in education also supports the necessity of understanding all relational aspects of particular policy-making processes.

Finding 4.3

With the exception of FISA, the role of the effective education-lobbyist, according to legislators interviewed, does not exist in the British Columbia Legislature.

(iv) British Columbia Teachers' Federation (BCTF)

A significant relational aspect of these interviews is the reflection on teachers. They were once education's most powerful lobby group in British Columbia, and are still the most knowledgeable and potentially effective organization. They are organized under the British Columbia Teachers Federation (BCTF). Both parties criticize the organization's inability to understand how to present demands and their lack of understanding of the roles in policy-making processes. This important aspect of understanding roles in demand processing will be called *relational demand processing* throughout this study. It refers to the aspect of making demands where it is imperative to understand the human motives and characteristics of all relationships involved.

The NDP member calls teachers' demands as self-serving. There is a possibility that the stresses behind those demands are being fed by political or personality issues. The issues may

not come from demands of an association acting as a transfer agent for educational and community stresses. This is an argument that can not be ignored by educators. This study demonstrates that the effective articulation of *stresses* into the political process can be effective in producing policy that can reduce that stress. It is argued here that, as some, or many, of the BCTF demands are not representative of *stresses* and do not consider the *relational demand processing* aspects, they may result in failure.

A *Socred* describes the substance and understanding needed to be an effective lobbyist. Although the NDP member feels that lobbies are *political* after being received, it does not take away from the fact that it is the understanding of that political nature and its human characteristics that is so essential to an effective interpretation. This study shows that the independent school movement had such a lobby and met all the criteria outlined. They had the necessary understanding of not only the issue but also the people and the politics. This supports the argument that the *Socred* puts forth. The BCTF apparently did not have such an understanding.

Finding 4.4

An aspect of making demands where it is imperative to understand the human motives and characteristics of all relationships involved, relational demand processing, is integral to the policy-making process.

(v) Application of findings to main group of interviews

With respect to the sub-problems on the specific issue of *Bill 33*, certain changes had been made to the main interview questions because of data provided from these pilot interviews. For example, the MLAs did not, without prompting, readily comprehend the possibility of indirect inputs. Most of their responses were on direct, visible demands. Therefore, the question of

indirect environmental inputs was stressed in the subsequent main interview process. This explains why, in this pilot study, there are few indirect inputs such as the effects on educational decision-making of cultural and value changes in society.

Sub-problem 1.2

What is the nature of *support-inputs* received by legislators in British Columbia with respect to educational policy-making?

A. Findings

The MLAs see *supports* each in their own way. The responses are individual and different, unlike the responses *ondemands* that all have a general common denominator. For instance, one of the Socred MLAs describes supports as the "good feeling" he gets. He describes how proud kids are of their schools at graduation, and how that affects him, and how motivating it is when talking to professionals in education. With respect to the latter, he gives examples of discussions with teachers and professors:

... for the new president of UBC to tell me what he was trying to do (showing his) concerns ...asking for my input as an MLA and then to meet with some of his key people in an open frank discussion... that was supportive of what we are aiming for in education... The support of the (public) tours of the house (Legislature) ...the caucus room ... letting them ask questions - they would support, in that they left, (including) the teachers - thanking and making me feel good and worthwhile (Socred backbencher).

When university students got involved in the broader aspect of issues, the Socred Cabinet minister feels support:

... from (university) students we feel supported through their understanding of broader issues. ..they understood the plight of other students and reached out in a constructive way using the political system...

The same MLA again comments on the unions as he does under sub-problem 1.1 :

...unions have to be brought into discussions and supported themselves. We get elected with Teamsters et cetera we do not have enough business leaders as voters... (Sacred Cabinet minister).

He then plays the role of a caveator to other MLAs :

When looking for supports the MLA has to understand that the legislative assembly is not representative of average people; over one half of members have a degree or more.

The other Sacred describes obtaining supports as "ordinary everyday MLA work". The NDP interviewee states that "support of legislation by party members is imperative". There are a couple of notable differences in the responses of the three. The backbencher relies a lot on his community and friends:

I have many friends that I bounce things off of - coming from a true friend, I take their (critiques) in a very supportive way...(Sacred).

This reliance on friends is not mentioned by the two who had served as Cabinet ministers. The NDP interviewee looks to his political party and members for supports. He also indicates that the responsibility is on the MLA to go to the constituents to obtain support:

An MLA needs financial support of dollars or financial implications to briefs or demands ... within the party and the party caucus ... Support of legislation by party members is imperative...Support from constituents is available, but a member must go to the constituency...(NDP former Cabinet minister).

The issue of looking to the party for supports is not raised as an issue by the Sacred. Lastly, the NDP former Cabinet minister indicates that certain mail could be as much as *support* as a *demand*:

...the mail on educational issues from ...continuously: University Alumni Association, trustees, teachers.

B. Discussion

(i) General

The notion of supports as being "acceptance of policy" and "encouraging policy" is offered in chapter three (Wirt & Kirst, 1972). These apply to all the responses to a varying degree. Certainly the idea of legislative-house tours as being supportive may not cross everyone's mind, but it demonstrates the legislators' need for acceptance in their role. Perhaps more significantly it gives a forum for students and teachers to encourage policy and express their recognition of stresses. The Sacred Cabinet minister indicates that the "understanding of broader issues" is a notable support which is another way of saying *acceptance*, as implied by Wirt and Kirst. On the other hand the same legislator indicates a need for the MLA to understand the "common man", noting that the average MLA is not representative of the average person. For a political system to maintain its legitimacy, it is theorized that supports would have to be a steady flow (Wirt & Kirst, 1982). There is no doubt that, from this data, the British Columbia system has a "...right to do what it is doing", which is how the authors define legitimacy (Wirt & Kirst, 1982, p. 32). This is partially evidenced by a legislator when he describes *obtaining supports* as the daily work of a MLA; a definite indication of continual flow.

The three respondents discussed a few personal *supports*, that may not have represented a clear understanding of the nature of supports in Easton's sense. None mention *votes*, other than as an oblique reference, as to why it is important to patronize union leaders. Union leaders represent large numbers of voters. Perhaps one of the more difficult things for a politician to express is his dependency on the voter. He will, most always, have a need to be re-elected. This is a strong all-encompassing support. This represents one of the ways and means that individuals have of encouraging policy (Wirt & Kirst, 1982). The NDP member's personal comment is brought up under other discussion. The issue is of cohesion in party ranks having a significant effect on the role of the MLA.

(ii) Application of findings to main group of interviews

The issue of party and caucus solidarity is focused upon in the main interviews, with respect to its impact on the policy-making process for *Bill 33*.

Sub-problem 1.3

What role does the legislator play in the *conversion process* ?

A. Findings

The three principal roles explored are those of the backbenchers, the opposition, and the minister. These roles are all within the political system. *Withinput* interactions cause stresses inside the political system and thus help shape the conversion process (Wirt & Kirst, 1982). This is not dissimilar to the findings evidenced in the British Columbia Legislature. *Stresses* apparently take many forms. There is for instance, the roles of new backbenchers versus experienced ones. There are roles with the bureaucrats that include internal lobbying behind the scenes. There are also accepted roles of the opposition, formal and informal relationships of government to caucus, size of the Legislature, and political reactions to demands and supports. Out of these roles, there is general agreement that the backbencher role provides little opportunity to influence debate in the house:

It is not often that a MLA as a backbencher will make a great change in government, in education - it flows down through the bureaucrat. (Socred backbencher)

With regards to backbenchers, the NDP member describes the difference between legislative power and constituency power. He emphasizes the necessity of staying informed:

The backbencher has no power in his first term; he has 'constituency' power in his second term; you are a nonperson as a backbencher...The legislator ... must stay with issues (that he knows) only then does he have a probability of being effective in conversion role if at all...

He states well the theme of all the interviewees about backbenchers:

Members' amendments are rarely accepted in the Legislature by any party (NDP Cabinet minister)

However, there is an underlying theme of certain results and consequences from backbenchers 'working behind the scenes'.

...if you work the system right as a lobbyist does (bring in the community) - it works...bringing up points in caucus that were reconsidered by the minister (brings results)...(Sacred Cabinet minister).

A comment is made about the dedication and continuous work to which a legislator would have to commit, in order to stand a chance of affecting policy-making. Here, there is an observable parallel between the challenge to a legislator and the challenge earlier ascribed to a lobbyist, if he or she wishes to be effective. There is, however, little difference in the perceptions of the role of the backbencher. The remark, by the Sacred Cabinet minister, "... a legislator will have effect in direct relation to his earned reputation...", sums up the perceptions of the other interviewees. They are couching it in words such as: lobbying for constituents, having constituency power during a term, and staying with issues known. The Sacred Cabinet minister has the final word on roles:

Government formulates policy, MLAs defend policy. ...once an educational matter enters the house as a bill there is little effect a legislator can have...It does happen where ...a backbencher gets the chance to make a positive effect.

The opposition, it is felt, has little effect on introducing new policy:

The role of the opposition is to oppose and if they brought forward a bill - the best bill in the world - we as the government would oppose it (Socred backbencher).

The same Socred backbencher comments on how the government can treat opposition attempts at legislative changes and also how he would act if in opposition:

...we would give away a piece of the pie in order to get most of the pie...If I was in opposition and I had a point that I thought was valid I would probably request a meeting with the minister (versus a fuss in the house).

The former NDP Cabinet minister comments on the opposition roles by emphasizing relationships with civil servants and differentiating between policy changes and legislative changes:

In order for things to happen (with respect to influence of opposition members) good people must have relationships with the civil service...opposition would attempt to affect policy changes rather than legislative changes - members amendments are rarely accepted in the Legislature by any party.

The role of the MLA as a Cabinet minister is concurred by all three interviewees. However, the Socred Cabinet minister adds a reference to the Cabinet culture and to the respect and harmony in caucus as being a salient issue to consider when judging the roles of the Cabinet:

... a minister creates opportunities ...must see what is significant. In Cabinet there are meetings of committees that I now attend that I did not as a backbencher. There is a certain amount of respect and harmony created out of meetings of cabinet that resulted in, for us, a degree of success that we can be proud of. The relationship of government to caucus is a formal structure vs informal structure; we are very cohesive - so information is transmitted freely. Size of legislative Assembly makes a difference. If caucus is cohesive then they are strong. If there is a leak in caucus then cohesion breaks. A minister can be affected by lobbying representation, for instance... (he can as a result, delay legislation in one's ministry).

The Socred backbencher brings up the issue of internal lobbying and politicking between ministers. In researching *Bill 33* both of these points are deemed to be essential in understanding the conversion process. The Socred's perception of the role, and how certain individuals in education have fit in it, is as follows:

... though you are making a decision in caucus ...Cabinet has the final say...If you are in the Cabinet - that is where you really do your lobbying on your subject (a Cabinet minister can really work his colleagues). You can say to a colleague: 'look I need financing for my ministry and if you support me I will support you...'. Some ministers are effective and others are just figureheads. Regarding education: (one minister) was a leader, he understood and tried to get a hAndel on what was happening in very difficult times; (another) - all show and no go and (another) looked at it from a purely academic point of view. (They all) are effective in their own way and leave a stamp on the ministry.

The NDP Cabinet minister simply states that "the minister ... has more power ... somehow one must get a minister's attention".

B. Discussion

The interviewees express several areas where they feel an individual legislator can affect policy changes or legislation. This discussion reports those areas as:

general legislator role, legislator's role in cabinet, caucus or committee, legislative role versus constituency role, government role, legislator's role in opposition and then application of findings to the main group of interviews.

(i) General legislator role

The Sacred Cabinet minister feels that "legislation is affected when it is being written - not on the floor" and that influence can be exerted at the level of the bureaucrats. It could include, for example, dealing with bureaucrats by ensuring that they receive *supports* from him or her as a legislator. These data lend support to Kernaghan's postulate that Canadian bureaucrats are a more common focus of attention by pressure groups, than in other jurisdictions (Kernaghan, 1985, p. 314).

The NDP member does not think that debate has any influence on legislation and states that "often legislation has little resemblance to initial principle of intent - legislation cannot at

present be written in simple language". With respect to whether a legislator stands a chance of getting into policy, something to which he is committed, it is commented that it is definitely possible. However, the Sacred MLA says a legislator would have to be "awfully dedicated and have to believe in it". The legislator would have to continually keep working on it. The same legislator comments that he had seen that kind of commitment. He cautions though, that in education, it should be kept in mind "the MLA has a lot of subjects to cover - not just education". He summarizes by saying that education is complex, massive and very difficult for a legislator to handle. One would have to play much more of a role of "going out and trying to become knowledgeable than he would in perhaps lesser ministries".

(ii) Legislator's role in cabinet, caucus or committee

Specifically, the legislators interviewed are in agreement that a legislator, whatever his style, would have significant effect if he were in Cabinet. Also, potential effect on policy-making can come in the caucus and committees or by working on a subject well-known to the legislator that deals, one-on-one, with the ministry, minister and Cabinet. This perspective offers some change to researched descriptions of the role of the individual legislator. Legislators reportedly have little influence or interest on formulation and implementation of public policy (Mitchell, 1981; Kernaghan, 1985). However, Mitchell (1981) does state that legislators have an opportunity to influence if they wish to take it (p.316). The NDP interviewee offers a look at this opportunity in the following section.

(iii) Legislative role versus constituency role

The NDP member believes that the legislator, whether as a government backbencher or opposition, has a *legislative role* of support and opposition, and a *constituency role* of representation. He believes that if a legislator stays with issues that he knows, and is effective in

his constituency, he has the opportunity to be effective in policy conversion. Policy could be affected by the legislator who is assisting the community in bringing their concerns to the policy-makers. It is, however, important that the issue, concerns, principles, and consequences are all well understood.

(iv) Government role

It is suggested by the NDP member that the government looks for high ground on any issue and evaluates "first the political decision" in order to achieve power and secondly, "looks at dollars - how do we finance"? He infers that it used to be an "ideological principle that governed legislative decisions" not a political decision. His suggestion is that, unless a legislator can assist in the conversion process leading to political solution and financial justification, his role is limited. From a *relational demand processing* point of view it offers a perspective on an individual legislator's frustration and attitude with the legislative house. This research continually supports finding 4, in demonstrating that the frustrations or attitudes in dealing with *inputs* and the relationships to the individuals need to be understood in analysing the policy-making process. Similar attitudes are demonstrated in later chapters, to have been pervasive within the NDP party throughout the policy-making of *Bill 33*. The relationship of government to caucus is described by a Social Credit legislator as a *formal structure* versus *informal structure*. A formal structure is defined by the legislator as a structure where, due to the cohesiveness, information is transmitted freely. He states that the "size of a legislative assembly makes a difference. If caucus is cohesive then they are strong - if a leak (sic) then cohesion breaks". This also is supported, in the main group of interviews, by a Liberal legislator who has served in both provincial and federal houses. He states "compared to an MP there is much more input mainly because of the (fewer) numbers in the house".

(v) Legislator's role in opposition

With respect to the opposition, although there appeared to be an overall perception of little influence on legislation, it appears that the remarks were mainly aimed at house debate influence. Both the NDP and the Socred think that influence, particularly at the bureaucratic level, could affect policy. The intriguing aspect of these comments is that they grasp for some measure of an opposition's ability to affect legislation by doing some act or making some representation. Yet, none of the members considered the aspect of affecting legislation by doing virtually nothing.

(vi) Application of findings to main group of interviews

The aspect of a legislator affecting the conversion process by doing nothing is of vital consideration in assessing the policy-making of public support for independent schools. The question is focussed on through the main group of interviews. The focus is that, if the opposition does nothing, or if a legislator can contribute but does not, then what is the affect of that non-action on the legislation?

The implications of non-involvement in the independent school issue is dealt with in chapter six.

Sub-problem 1.4

What role does a legislator have in *defending* legislation?

A. Findings

Legislators describe themselves as having primarily, a role representing their constituency. The NDP legislator describes it as "keeping informed" and suggests that: " 30% of action is keeping up; 30% is contributing new ideas; and 40% is looking after constituency". To be effective in his role, a Socred MLA states that a legislator must "believe in what he is saying",

another Socred states "...the more knowledge you have on the policy the better you can defend it". The NDP member suggests that "...a legislator needs vision to play an effective role"; he feels that major inputs for that vision came from teachers/parents. He also feels that the MLA "needs to specialize in order to be listened to". He summarizes by saying, "if an MLA is a strong personality and knows what he is talking about, then if he pounds the table - people will listen - many MLAs just go through the paces." He also describes the role in relation to a Premier. He offers his personal insight into the present situation that MLAs find themselves in with current Premiers:

We would get marching orders to defend legislation - certainly no MLA would want to do his party harm...The Premier has absolute power - accordingly support of the legislation is imperative...Polls are a serious problem ... now it is a one man show with 56 appendages (referring to present 56 member legislature in BC).. access to public is being closed off, fewer decisions are being made by legislators; it is being made by a Premier...Information retrieval is shaping opinion; intuition versus super technology of retrieval is a government dilemma of the future (Former NDP Cabinet minister).

In these roles of representing, keeping informed and understanding, an MLA goes out into his constituency and defends policy drawn by his government. However, the NDP member states that, although the effectiveness of the legislator can be utilized by a minister for his role in the community, "now the government uses shadow ministers and executive assistants".

The point is raised by a Socred that MLAs, even if sensitive to opposition points in debate, still must stand up and put the opposition down:

If it's government policy you have to defend it...You are in the house more often than the ministers, you have to speak on a lot of things (to be knowledgeable)...It is the opposition's role to be critical and ours to say they are wrong (Socred backbencher).

This does have an effect on MLAs particularly where he/she goes out to the community. Also, where friends are involved in providing salient and reasonable points, it is difficult to acknowledge without harming the *defense* of the legislation. It is suggested also by a Socred, that during

defense of legislation and through the dealing with constituent *inputs*, that MLAs can take a considerable leadership role in dealing with individual problems and concerns:

A legislator has considerable responsibility; we must attend public meetings and lead in communications in order that constituents can understand the legislation and the reasoning behind it... When defending legislation it is important for us to communicate our belief and commitment that as humans we want to make things work... in order for people to understand the reasoning behind my government's actions (Socred Cabinet minister).

Small changes can be affected by the legislator. All government members are described by the NDP interviewee as being part of a plan that has them as both a party member and a community member. In defending policy, the legislator "must be part of contributing to that plan". Though, it is suggested by the same legislator, this *plan* may be changing as the government relies less on the feedback from its MLAs and more on polls.

B. Discussion

There appears to be a dichotomy, between the two represented political parties, in the perceptions of the role of legislators in defending legislation. The separate perceptions are described below under the following headings: legislative role, information retrieval role, defense role, constituent role, leadership role.

(i) Legislative role

The Socreds represent the attitude that it is the culture or the protocol as a legislator to accept government policy and find the means to defend it. The NDP member looks at it more of being a duty as dictated by the Premier and that the Premier has the absolute power. This may be a simple reflection on the lack of experience the NDP had in formulating policy and forming the government, but it also underscores more concern by the NDP member than that of the Socreds.

The NDP feel that there is some futility as legislators' roles are being reduced through polling and other unelaborated factors.

(ii) Information retrieval

Dr. Norman Robinson, a professor of educational politics at Simon Fraser University, offered in a private discussion that he believes "the declining influence of the MLA is due to the reliance on polls where the feedback of the community is not as essential". This, given the research experience Robinson has had in polling throughout British Columbia, is very supportive of the NDP concern. However, there is no indication of concern from the Socreds interviewed. More importantly, the NDP member's concern went further in stating that, the intuition of the legislator is being replaced by the modern phenomena of reliable information retrieval. Information retrieval will be only as reliable as the question asked to obtain the information. Therefore, it is perhaps fair to state that the human factors emphasized in this study are integral to understanding the information. To be an effective member of the Legislature or an effective lobbyist, one would have to understand fully the process of information retrieval, the human element in such retrieval, and the consequences. The NDP member's comment and Robinson's supportive analysis may be a warning that should be heeded by policy-makers. However the caution expressed could be mitigated by strong party input to augment or replace polls and other non-personal techniques. It is not unreasonable to assume that in fact, the political parties do act at present, as a conscience in offsetting some of the potential concerns to information retrieval reliability.

Finding 4.5

Understanding fully the process of information retrieval and consequences is imperative to a legislator or lobbyist.

(iii) Defense role

The *feedback* process arises out of the defense of policy (Wirt & Kirst, 1984, p.33). Interaction with the environment outside of the political system becomes, over time, an effect that changes educational stress. This stress is often what caused the need for the policy in the first place. The concern, with MLAs not defending and the government relying on polls, is that the amelioration of stresses, or the causing of new stresses, is dependent upon second hand interpretation of the policy. With first hand and knowledgeable interpretation, legislators can act and the community has an opportunity to understand. The analysis in later chapters, of the defense of the independent school legislation, demonstrates clearly the advantage of a knowledgeable, informed and committed defense. The argument, that the act of opposing policy is difficult if knowledge and understanding of the legislation and policy-making is minimal, can be strengthened by applying it to *defense* rather than to opposition. That is to say, the aspect of opposition parties not understanding clearly the role of defending policy and trying to oppose the defense, would be as equally futile as trying to oppose policy-making without understanding the role of policy-makers. The NDP, with their lack of experience in government, certainly could not be called experienced in *defense* of their own policy. Accordingly, their understanding of the role they could take in opposing that defense would be severely limited. This may explain the reason that the Sacred interviews reveal a greater faith in the procedure, whereas the NDP member struggled with it.

Finding 4.6

Understanding the role of defending one's own policy may be as essential for effective opposition in the policy-making process as is understanding the role of policy-making.

(iv) Constituent role

The Socreds broadly describe their role in the community and the necessity to have a thorough understanding of that community. They seem more in tune with their constituents, whereas the NDP legislator again expresses more concern with his party members. This is an intriguing aspect of analysis. If the NDP misreads the community and the cultural shifts in society due to their focus on party solidarity, even to a minor degree, it does not augur well for democratic policy-making and opposition. The NDP would always be one step-behind. It is at this point that Housego (1964), as detailed in chapter two, believes the government has obligations in providing a forum for democratic debate. The government can play that role. However, is it their responsibility to see that the opposition is also well-informed? That, of course, is unreasonable. On the other hand, there is the argument that a party represents a cross-section of the community. Therefore, the mood of the community is well represented due to the close relationship and the "plan" of the party and community as described in the data. However, the constituency would not be well represented if the ideological bias of any party group would, by its nature, detract from fair community representation.

(v) Leadership role

There is an unexpected comment by the Socred Cabinet minister that a legislator must "lead in communications in order that constituents can understand....". This comment strongly supports the notion that a legislator has a leadership role that can be taken. No matter what his role in the Legislature is or how little influence he has in Cabinet or caucus, there is a strong implication of opportunity that may be the tip of a huge challenge. If, as this study has logistically set out, the stresses in the community precipitate the demands that seek a legislative-policy answer, then the legislator's role in shaping and affecting the environment around the issues can, and will, have

considerable impact on the stresses themselves. Perhaps more importantly than the legislation itself, in many cases, that influence could affect serious change in the underlying stress. An example of this is a current, reported demand for feeding chronically hungry children in British Columbia schools. Without proper understanding of the issue, it is possible that legislation could be enacted from an emotional point-of-view. It could allocate resources to a program that would create even more stresses due to its inadequacy or its universality. These would be the two extremes. A strong understanding of the issue, plus leadership in community education of the issue, could cause the media and professional administrators to understand the precise need. Subsequently, this could be inculcated into the consciousness of the community thus enabling acceptance of legislation or policy. That in turn, would result in only the precise need being addressed, leaving little or no residual stress in the community. This different perception of leadership has many such implications. It also provides a different perspective on the previously reported comment, in chapter two, that the outcome of policy-making has the potential of altering the initial stresses and that such outcomes can regenerate the original stress or start the process all over again (Wirt & Kirst, 1982) .

Finding 4.7

Legislators do have the opportunity for influence in the legislature; more importantly they can have significant influence in the community. In particular legislators can have impact on the underlying stresses behind legislative issues.

(vi) Application of findings to main group of interviews

Housego (1964), believes the government has obligations in providing a forum for democratic debate. The question is asked above: is it the government's responsibility to see that

the opposition is also well-informed? This question is explored generally in this chapter but receives a much greater focus in the analysis of the main group of interviewees. The focus stems from the concern that if the opposition does not represent community interests through misreading or any other cause then there is more of a reliance on the government to ensure democratic process in policy-making.

Precursor Roles

Which individuals were involved, prior to the *Bill 33* policy-making process commenced, in articulating the stresses that led up to the legislation?

Sub-problem 2.1

Was there any indication of individuals involved actively in articulating demands prior to the BC independent school movement?

A. Findings

As the study commenced, news-clipping research focused on identifying individuals and small groups that had taken a significant role in deciding the independent school policy. It became apparent that certain individuals played significant roles long before the most current demands were converted into policy. These people represented particular religious interests in education in many provinces of Canada. In British Columbia, names of Bishops and Archbishops, leaders of parochial schools and political leaders were put forward, The following are names of individuals active in British Columbia in the 1950s and early 1960s. Several of them are commented on in subsequent chapters:

The Roman Catholic hierarchy and the British Columbia Catholic Education Association
(BCCEA):

Archbishop Duke, Roman Catholic church, British Columbia

Bishop Carney, Roman Catholic church, British Columbia

Pat Power, President of the BCCEA (1951)

Reg Paxton, Executive-secretary of the BCCEA (1951)

Al Blesch, later (1978) to become Superintendent of the lower
mainland (Vancouver and districts) Catholic schools.

Gerry Ensing, representative of the National Union of Christian
schools (NUCS), later (1968) to become Executive director FISA

John Busch, executive of the BC Catholic School trustees Association.

Politics:

Ray Perrault, a Roman Catholic - active in BCCEA affairs, a former
leader of the Liberal party; now a senator in Canada.

Bob Wenman, Member of Parliament, Progressive Conservatives.

Education:

Ned Larsen, headmaster of Shawinigan Lake School (private),
Vancouver Island, B.C.

Thomas T. Menzies, headmaster of King's Edgehill School in Windsor,
Nova Scotia; first president of the newly-formed Canadian
Association of Independent schools.

Bryan Peat, headmaster of York House School, Vancouver, BC

Mrs. (Mickey) Sendall, St. Margaret's School, Victoria, BC

D.E. (Doug) Harker, former headmaster of St. George's private school

Vancouver, BC

Walter van der Kamp, Principal of William of Orange School,

Burnaby, BC.

Hugh Harris, campaign organizer of the Social Credit party; later to

become principal secretary to Bill Bennett Jr.

Dutch Reformed:

Rev. Van Andel

Case Pel, later (1960s) to become board chairman of FISA

Dr. John Waller, veterinarian; later (1960s) to become

President FISA

John Friesen, executive Christian schools Association.

One particular national name stood out as receiving an inordinate amount of media coverage in British Columbia in the late 1960s. His name was John Olthius. He, at the time (1968), was a 26 year-old lawyer and president of the Christian Action Foundation in Ontario. He was active in other provinces in Canada and played a role in advocating recognition of the stresses in the Canadian education system that related to separate schools, particularly Christian schools. Olthius authored a pamphlet entitled, *A case for public funds for ALL public schools*. There is a very important distinction to what Olthius was crusading for and what was developing in British Columbia:

I am unalterably opposed to having public funds allocated in support of private schools. Public funds must be used for public purposes. The crucial point, is that public funds should support *not one or two but all public systems of education*.

... It should be obvious that the state violates its role in education when it uses public tax dollars to finance one public, or if you will, private view of education and refuses to finance other public, or if you will, private views of education. (Olthius, 1968 pp 7-8)

Olthius is referring to Ontario's Christian schools as schools that wanted to be public and publicly funded , but with the "moral freedom" to teach their children a particular educational philosophy. He argues that the public school system is recognized as not being a neutral, value-free system:

If one labels Christian public schools as religiously biased schools, he must in fairness also label public schools as religiously biased schools, as both advance the religious value judgments of their respective supporters (p. 7).

Olthius also quotes the United Nations charter of rights that later became a strong argument of the independent schools movement in British Columbia. In the main interviews in subsequent chapters, a bureaucrat in the Socred government is quoted as stating how important that the charter of rights argument was in the debate on *Bill 33*.

B. Discussion

The individuals active in British Columbia in the 1950s and the early 1960s demonstrate a significant core group of people that were concerned about the community stresses over funding for separate schools. They represented a sizeable community that needed only organization and leadership to make effective demands.

Olthius was active in British Columbia during the 1960s as a speaker to groups that later became major players in the policy-making process under this research. He apparently had a certain amount of influence intended or otherwise. It is notable that certain *power-holders* , that later became the official government opposition and as such, *influencers* to *Bill 33* , did not apparently have the luxury of either foreseeing the trend for independent school funding, or attending the seminars where the trends were being discussed. It was reported, as indicated earlier, that Olthius succeeded in a campaign in Alberta to get provincial aid for private secular

schools. He argued financial savings to government rather than costs. An NDP interviewee, in the pilot interviews, indicates that one of the problems of *briefs* was that no price tag was on them. Olthius' people put a price tag on their arguments by arguing how it saved the government money. This in turn, later became a strong argument within Cabinet of the British Columbia government when *Bill 33* was being sold to the government members. The evidence of this is in the findings of subsequent chapters. As to the Socred interviewee in the pilot study, who asks for inputs to be with a start, a middle and a conclusion with meat in the middle, Olthius made his inputs into a very readable and cogent booklet (Olthius, 1968). He was reported and quoted in local media as he attended conferences and seminars in British Columbia and gave interviews to local media. His role as one of the forerunners to the stepped-up demands over the next decade was significant. His voice represented the vernacular of a new ideology spread by more than just one man across Canada. It apparently fueled some of the demands.

(i) Application of findings to main group of interviews

All of this activity precipitated the inclusion herein of John Olthius. The inclusion provides a look behind-the-scenes at the human element of one individual that articulated well the stresses in the community. An interview question about the Olthius influence is included in the main group of interviews with the identified players in the policy-making process of independent school funding. Few give any recognition to him. This may well be in part due to the fact that he, ironically, represented a considerable threat to the pending legislation if his broad views became public knowledge. They did not. The British Columbia media described his successes in Alberta and gave little attention to his contributions otherwise. Later in the findings, of those interviewed directly for their influence over *Bill 33*, data is introduced to prove Olthius' contribution as a remarkable aspect of the ability to influence. It is shown that many arguments were needed by the opposition in order to effectively counter FISA and the Socreds. These were in fact available

through Olthius' written arguments. The opposition missed the opportunity. It will be concluded that the opposition was totally ineffective in countering the arguments of FISA. Yet, in one pamphlet, Olthius cogently sets out the reasons for not funding private schools with public funds and how separate schools can and should be public schools (Olthius, 1968).

Sub-problem 2.2

What characteristics were noted by legislators, bureaucrats and lobbyists of precursor activity?

A. Findings

The characteristics initially sought would have covered all or many of the individuals that were were, or may have been, *precursors* to public funding of independent schools. However, that was not the result. Few, if any, of the interviewees recognize many of the individuals described in sub-problem 2.1, as having particular characteristics that would represent their inclusion as *precursors*. Most of the individuals are described, in the interviews, as having behind-the-scenes roles that were, at best, alluded to rather than reported on. Due to the inadequacy of the response, it is decided to focus on Olthius as he has a specific role that is identifiable. He was active in more than one forum and he represented more than just the Christian schools for which he spoke.

Olthius is described by an NDP legislator and former Cabinet minister as "in-group lubrication; you always hire your own evangelist to come and speak to your converted to keep them oiled up". Olthius describes himself as active early in University politics and the law society. He became involved with the Christian Schools Society where the notion of addressing the public on the need for public funding of Christian schools came out of committee in the early 1960s. He found that public speaking was natural and he was personally committed to the values that he

espoused. He believes that there was an unfairness and inequity in funding of education. There was a definite problem in values taught generally in many public schools that could be resolved by having a parental choice of different values in a different system. He found many others who supported this view at that time and found that there had been many before him. He felt the time was right. He sensed "a mood in Canada that indicated the time was coming". A lobbyist for the independent school movement describes his involvement and contribution as follows:

He formulated the ideas that drove the Christian - protestant section of the FISA; he did not have that much influence on the rest of the people in the FISA; he put in words very effectively, the idea of freedom of choice;... he certainly was successful (in Alberta) though I'm not sure that was a one man show there. ... Alberta pre-dated British Columbia and so did Quebec, in giving public funds to private schools - British Columbia was unique in the sense it had only a public system and we were the first to have one system - that made monies available to alternative schools. He had a minor impact on that Christian section. He would not ring a bell on federation people. (FISA spokesperson)

His impact on the FISA organization (or lack of) is a factor in the concluding remarks of this study in chapter eight. John Olthius offers the following reasons for his involvement:

I personally had gone through a Christian day school...It was important to make people understand that the private school phenomena was not just for rich kids...Democracy should be cherished; you build with variety... Multiculturalism and Quebec were coming to the fore...I had a religious commitment to pluralism...When we started in early 1960s we publicly articulated that government has a role to play in all educational systems - standards, right of parents for choice, neutrality - there is a bias in the public system towards western materialist lifestyle; no such thing as a value-free education...If we're going to be a mosaic society - a variety of education needs to be cherished... I was hired as a consultant by FISA...

B. Discussion

In the discussion regarding *inputs* it is noted that a Sacred Cabinet minister suggests that, in education issues, people get emotional not thoughtful. One of the aspects of Olthius, through his background, research, publication and commitment, was that, notwithstanding the

emotion, he appears to be thoughtful. His arguments are on fairness and equity and democracy. He recognized the multicultural phenomena and the impact in Quebec. He recognized *pluralism* in the sixties, even though it may be fair to say *pluralism* was not coined universally into the lexicon of the country until the seventies. Olthius articulates the well thought-out argument of government involvement in all educational systems. Even his arguments of bias in the public system, still challengeable as emotional today, might prove prophetic tomorrow if the intuitiveness of his other arguments can be used as evidence.

Olthius recognized the education stresses personally. He felt it inside a community, instinctively knew the need for articulation and commitment, and moved. He had patience and he had influence. Wirt and Kirst (1982) had said that "the ability to obtain acceptance from society of the allocation of values" (p.31), is reflective of the capacities of the political system. Olthius and others set out to prove that a large community did not accept certain allocations of values in the educational system. He was a prime influencer. He held power. He is introduced to indicate that he is representative of the *influencers* that did more than just grumble about inequity or stress. He and others did something with a community of people and representing a community of people. The political system took it from there.

(i) Application of findings to main group of interviews

Few, if any, of the points raised here in this discussion are introduced as data by the *power-holders* in the main group of interviews. The NDP, as reported above, state that Olthius was "in-group lubrication" for FISA, not realizing he could have been an influencing ally for the NDP, BCTF and others. FISA on the other hand, also as noted above, knew instinctively that he was not a proponent of their cause, which was public funding for private schools only. They apparently used him to their advantage, for the Christian side of their movement. They took the arguments that were of benefit to their debate and then put his remaining influence and presence

aside. Therefore there are, unfortunately, no other data presented to indicate other motives related to the Olthius' influence.

SUMMARY

The pilot sample is invaluable, notwithstanding its small size, in probing the policy-making steps in the British Columbia Legislature and examining the applicability of the *Easton system model* to the local Legislature and environment. Several results of the pilot model assisted in the preparation of the major data research interviews to follow in the next chapter. Some of the Findings are directly related and integral to the conclusions reached in this study. Also, the potential influence of Olthius to challengers of *Bill 33* is described. Other Findings, though indirect, are valuable in understanding the conclusions.

CHAPTER FIVE
ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM
PART TWO - INPUTS

INTRODUCTION

In this and the following two chapters, *part two*, an analysis is presented of data gathered from the main group of interviewees. This group was involved in the policy-making process of funding for independent schools. The research questions analysed under *part two*, address the question of *Bill 33*: what is the nature and stages of its policy-making process? Each of the chapters represent one of the three sub-sets of sub-problems of this study:

- Chapter five *Inputs:* What was the nature of demand and support inputs received by legislators with respect to Bill 33 ?
- Chapter six *Withinputs:* What roles were played by legislators and others in the conversion process?
- Chapter seven *Outputs:* What roles were played in defending legislation?

The chapters include the responses and the analysis of the interview questions related to the sub-problems of each sub-set. The general formats of the questions used as a basis for the interviews is provided in Appendix B. The questions were adapted and modified for each interview depending on whether the interviewee was a legislator or a lobbyist. The independent school policy-making involvement of the individual at either the *demand* stage or the *conversion* stage was considered when making modifications to the questions. As in the previous pilot interviews, essentially all the questions stayed within a prescribed format to determine each respondent's knowledge of human factors as they related to each sub-problem.

ANALYSIS

In analyzing the data there was noted a preponderance of information volunteered throughout the interviews that crossed lines of various stages of policy development. Accordingly, it will be noted that some comments, though selected as pertinent to one stage, could have pertinence to another. Also, the authors of the quotations conveyed feelings that often related to more than one stage of their involvement. Those feelings would include attitudes arising from their past and current roles and involvement.

Roles of individuals in policy-making can provide a perspective on issues; the time involved may shape their views. Therefore, to better understand those views, interviewees will have a legend bracketed with their identification. This legend will determine the political party of the individual at the time of the interview and the time-frame in which each interviewee was involved officially in the Legislature and/or their respective association:

Lib	= Liberal party MLA
NDP	= New Democratic MLAs
Socred	= Social Credit MLAs
Bur 1	= First bureaucrat in ministry of education
Bur 2	= Second bureaucrat in ministry of education
BCTF	= Spokesman for British Columbia Teachers' Federation
FISA	= Spokesman for the Federation of Independent Schools
P	= prior to legislation;
L	= during term of office in which legislation introduced;
S	= subsequent to term of office in which legislation introduced.

For example, a quote expressed as:

(Socred: PL) Indicates a Social Credit member of the Legislature (as described in chapter three) who was a legislator prior to, and during, the term of office when *Bill 33* was introduced.

(Socred:PLS) Indicates the MLA who held positions in first the Liberal and then the Social Credit party (as described in chapter three). However, he is referred to only by his latter, Socred party identification and the fact that he was a legislator before, during and after *Bill 33*.

The bureaucrats are numbered (Bur 1:LS), (Bur 2:LS) in order to preserve a sense of individual identity as the time legend was the same for both of them. There were two self-identified Catholic interviewees. They are identified as (Socred:P) and (NDP:PLS).

The research question covered in this chapter represents the policy-making stage of *inputs*. It examines the early stresses that would have created *demand* and *support inputs* from the environment outside of the Legislature and the individuals that first created those *inputs*. It asks: who articulated the demands as the *influencers* started to come into perspective? Finally, the roles are identified of those who interpreted the demands. The period covered is up to, and including, direct presentation to the legislators. With respect to *support inputs*, the research covers those recognized by legislators and then those recognized by non-legislators, including the bureaucracy. With respect to all *inputs*, there is an analysis of those who interpreted and presented the *inputs* to the Legislature either directly or through the members. The questions conclude with an analysis of how the individual bureaucrats reacted to the *inputs*. The analysis focusses on individual legislator's reaction to both *demands* and *supports*. None of this analysis includes actions related to the *conversion process* stage.

The data in this chapter are reported under several categories. Within the *inputs* stage, there are: four categories of *demands*, five specific categories of *supports* and four primary *power-holder* groups. Each of the categories or groups provides an outline for the findings. All of these coincide generally with Downey's (1982) report. In some cases the categories are

inferred by Downey rather than directly identified. The following analysis provides that identification and a focus .

The sub-problems posed to the interviewees regarding *inputs* are as follows:

1. who or what created the demand for choice?
2. who articulated the demand?
3. who or what was recognized by legislators and non-legislators as supports?
4. who played roles in interpretation and presentation of inputs to the Legislature?
5. how did individual bureaucrats and legislators react to the inputs?

Sub-problem 1

Who or what created the demand for choice?

A. Findings

In chapter one it is stated, that a political system definition involves persistent patterns of certain human relationships, but it says virtually nothing about human *motives* (Dahl, 1984). This section commences with a realization of which motives can be attributed to the individuals who created the demands. It also commences an accurate, behind-the-scenes look at the reactions of legislators, lobbyists, and bureaucrats including their involvement or lack of participation. The pattern of responses reflected four main categories of demands. These are: independent school demands, political party demands, public system criticism, and, ideological/ paradigm shifts in the community. In the latter category, the shifts include environmental aspects such as the cultural mix of the community. They also include value aspects and new perspectives upon which citizens desire their country's culture to be based. The phrase, paradigm shift, is used in this study with respect to these new perspectives. It is used to convey a new way of thinking about old problems.

The findings of each of the four main categories of demands are presented and discussed separately:

(i) Independent school demands

Downey (1982), the legislators, and the bureaucrats are all in agreement that fairness and financial issues of independent schools were the most significant stresses. It was these primary stresses that led to the first significant demands. The data confirmed that the decades of arguments and political activity representing economic equality in taxes, fees for educational services and other issues led to the formation of the Federation of Independent School Associations (FISA). With respect to who created the demand, the FISA respondent explores early history of the organizations that eventually became FISA. He suggests names and motives of individuals that had a voice in creating the demand. He covers what form the demand should take and how it could be made effective. The spokesperson for FISA described how the demand arising from these issues was created, though there is little of this detail given by the others:

The Roman Catholic schools for many years (created the demand)... the issues were out there all the time...In the 1960s all the groups that had made their pitches individually finally came together... other groups were establishing: ... society of Christian schools; the Protestant schools were increasing and(were) running responsible educational institutions; (late 1950s and early 1960s)...At a meeting called by the Christian reformed, Ralph Loffmark (a Sacred Cabinet minister)... gave us political advice ... (it) drove us ever since: 'You have an idea; you want us to legislate that into law. we will do that. but you have to go out and convince the public that they want it.' ...we then knew what to do...Dave Barrett (leader of the NDP party) gave us some advice at one time ... "You are not going to get the NDP to support any ideas favouring (independent schools) unless you have people joining the NDP who will work ... not on one issue but on many things." We expanded on this. We told the Catholic crowd - look, you make up 18% of the population - you could take over every single political party if you wish, but you have to join the political party of your choice ... lots of people did join, not just Catholics but many others that helped to change the political climate in British Columbia; ...An influence in our organization was ...Tom Griffiths, a lawyer ... he advised us with respect to the attitude we should take: convince them on the basis of principle etc. ...Whether we should be confrontational became an issue at our conventions. Tom never joined (FISA) as an officer. He was a Catholic. He was given the honorary title of being on our advisory council. He was never paid....(FISA:PLS).

With the exception of the FISA lobbyist, the responses are primarily indicative of what created the demand, rather than who created it. The other exception, in the data under sub-problem 2.4, is from one of the NDP respondents, who states that behind FISA and its executive director, Gerry Ensing, was considerable power in the Catholic hierarchy, particularly Bishop Carney. The comments suggest that Carney surrounded himself with a powerful group of individuals that acted for him or provided him with supports. One NDP reaction is of awareness of the formal power of the Roman Catholic hierarchy in FISA, but not of the informal power of the grassroots. The Liberal sees it as a switch from a religious group to one that was populist and thus acceptable to many Socreds and to others:

It switched from ... private schools and the Catholic schools ... it also affected the Dutch Reformed church and.. included the Pentecostals... Support (was) in the (Fraser) valley... Instead of it being an elitist or religious group which is not Social Credit, it was populist and essentially the dissenting religions...(Lib:P).

One Socred is upset at the unfairness as it affected him personally. He relates the *power-holders* to elite-school demands:

I went to [a BC parochial school] ... was upset that they were not getting many of the basic programs that children should be getting ... (demands) came from within the St. Georges' family. If one goes back to various members of their boards and to the days of Parker and Brown - the headmasters; - there were people who wanted to strengthen St. George's and wanted to raise funds - and were frustrated - having to dig up the money themselves. I think that someone expected to be able to turn to the public purse because there was independent funding in other parts of Canada. ...There were people behind York House and its growth and development; I did not get the feeling there was any political pressure coming out of Crofton House, but there was out of Shawinigan on the island (Socred:P).

The other Socred saw the unfairness as it touched his constituents and those of other members and played down the importance of the Catholic church:

They (constituents) did not have the money...these people were being unfairly treated... paying their taxes ...also paying for their schools - it was unfair...it is reasonable to say it was just the Catholic church ...obviously many people

...(were) trying hard to make ends meet and send their children to these independent schools. ...The people were suffering financially ... having to pay more than they could afford ...to send their children to these schools (Socred:PLS).

The FISA spokesperson indicates that, behind the organization, there was a large number of volunteers who worked continuously on behalf of the organization:

A lot of people ... volunteered, ... created publicity, influenced parties ...(We) went on open-line shows , speaking to parents, service groups, having interviews arranged ... by local people to local press, television service clubs, public meetings with parents, private meeting with local independent school boards ...trips across the province every second year ... So we got publicity that way. ... to make the public aware of the issues and the reasonableness of the issue and ...to get people involved in the party of their choice. ..we said 'you all must join - you must work within the party to change the political stance within the party...we need political activists - do not identify yourself as single-issue activists'... We wanted to have a high profile for the ideas and not wish to confront people (FISA:PLS)

FISA was not referring to the same power-block as the NDP member alluded to above. FISA wanted their members to give the appearance of being interested in other issues to deflect from the primary focus. This reflects the reported high level of organization developed by FISA. It also offers evidence of the strong individual grassroots support behind the formation of the association. This represented a large community, apparently larger than some others recognized.

The FISA representative explores fully the individuals involved in creating the demand. There are primary difference between the Socreds, Liberals and the NDP. The former recognizes the stresses within the independent schools and those of the elitist concerns. The NDP focusses primarily on the elitism, as they describe it, and the developmental aspect of independent schools:

Finances and to get more students. ...they wanted to enlarge their systems ...the more financing they could get the better programs they could offer...stress was entirely...the independent schools themselves (NDP:PL).

The form of elitism that was being reinforced by the Independent Schools Association was this creaming of the best students from the public education

system ... lowering the standards ... had a circular effect -that was a pressure there (NDP:PLS).

On the other hand, the bureaucrats look pragmatically at the issues of the day. This included the present argument of the UN charter, the present financial condition, and the present covert lobbying of the elite schools. The bureaucrats take for granted the overt lobbying of the independent schools, as a historical continuum:

The UN charter of rights 'it is the parents right to choose the nature of education.' ...There were failing independent schools ...there were increasing numbers threatened...The taxation issue, the constant point of double taxation (Bur2:LS).

... St. Georges and St.Michaels lobbies - sort of board room lobbies (Bur1:LS).

The BCTF voice reflects a moderate respect for the historical stresses of the parochial schools. He also shows a disdain for the private schools that represented elitist carpetbagging in the domain of other, perhaps more deserving, independent schools:

People associated with Vancouver College were true (honest) ...other private schools, the more well-known ones - it was ... a desire to have the public pay for an elitist ..education ... (BCTF:LS).

Most of the interviewees were officially involved and dealing with independent schools prior to the legislation. The only two that were not were the bureaucrats. They demonstrate the least effect from the independent schools' historical demands. It is also found that only two individuals interviewed were not involved during the legislation, a Liberal and Socred member. The Socred was involved heavily as a legislator because he had been enrolled in a Catholic boarding school and had a strong interest in the issue. The Liberal, however, had no similar interest and later in the findings confesses to realizing that if he had the luxury of seeing the consequences he may have been able to challenge the policy, at least within his own party. Neither of them felt any part of a cohesive group creating this demand, nor did they feel there was an organized group making demands. Regardless of this, one made individual demands based

on his feeling as found in the section on Ideologies that "the thing that motivated all of us to speak out (was) the belief that is right". He faced the ideological opposition of W.A.C. Bennett and made demands despite that opposition. The other, as found under sub-problem 5, legislators' comments on reactions to inputs, states that "there was not really any effort to take issues in a monolithic government (W.A.C. government) and coordinate opposition. Not feeling any unified forces of demand equal to the values of W.A.C. Bennett, he opted to stand aside from any participation, including within his own party. It was later that the independent schools formed an association to establish that unified force.

(ii) Political Party Demands

The second category of *demands* is the political party and focuses primarily on the Liberals. For the decade prior to the legislation, the Liberals were recognized as supporting independent schools. Much of the data throughout this study points to this. The Liberal party apparently had many demands made to it from its convention floor. These demands covered years that reflected the heavy Catholic element in the party and the stresses that the Catholics had articulated over many decades. The Liberals had endorsed the demands, partly due to losing voter support:

It pre-dates me (1968). There was certainly a heavy Catholic element; there always is a heavy Catholic element in the Liberal party. We had no formal links with Bishop Carney; but surveys told us that we had more of the Catholic vote than would be normal in the circumstances and more educational [votes]. ...We (Liberal's) had lost so much mainstream support, (so)...ardent and convinced groups had much more effect upon our conventions and our policy ...if we had 16 people in a room to discuss policy in education it (was not) hard to get 12 of them who (were) supportive of independent schools...(Lib:P).

The BCTF recognizes the Liberal influence and the caution by independent schools in associating with the Socreds in the early years:

They (independent schools) brought their own backgrounds and beliefs and values about being treated fairly. It seemed to be focused within the Liberal party. ...Because of the reverence with which W.A.C. was held, both within the Conservative party and the Sacred party ...it never generated there (BCTF:LS).

The Sacreds who had heard demands over the years were feeling the effect of Fraser Valley constituents (a strong religious community in B.C.) who were joining the party and electing members. The Sacreds had historically always rejected the demands:

They (separate school constituents from the bible-belt) were starting to elect more reps in the house; ...The separate schools were organized better. The liberals had been more in favour of helping the separate schools (Sacred:P) .

These people ...who were suffering financially ...would be members and turn up at the conventions to state their case...(Sacred:PLS).

The NDP was aware of the increasing demands and started to hear from their constituents due to the broad cross-section of representation of independent school interests over all parties. They were feeling the effects of the lobbying rather than the original demands:

Some of us began to hear from NDP constituents who had their kids in independent schools, particularly the increasing immigration population. ... a constituency that was pro-aid to independent schools which we had to respond to (and we did not want to lose) (NDP:PLS).

The FISA spokesperson gives an indication of how the NDP were looking at the demands as a means of getting new voter support, perhaps as a condition to considering policy: "... (Barrett) was making a pitch for membership in the NDP. ... (asking for independent school supporters to join)" (FISA:PLS).

(iii) Public System Criticism

This is an area where cross-over factors were most prevalent. For instance, where one legislator would see the criticism of the public system as a *demand* , another would see it as a

support. Below are comments from three interviews that shows public education dissatisfaction as being a *stress* in the political process. However, later in these findings the Socreds and a bureaucrat see the dissatisfaction as a *support* for policy that they were implementing or considering. The bureaucrats give their comment under sub-problem 5, bureaucratic comment on MLA reaction to inputs, wherein they describe how they reacted to the *inputs*.. The following comments also serve as a specific vantage point to introduce the community and ideological shifts as a potential cause of the *demands* :

The student unrest of 1968 had major implications ... failing ability to educate kids; ... a crowd of illiterate (agitators) ... being churned out. They knew everything and could learn nothing from the masters. The public education system had failed to turn out socially adaptable, integratable people. ...The public said: ' ... our faith in public education system has been shattered; its not working' (Lib:P) .

There was a general feeling of discontent with the education system. It had not changed. The factors contributing to those stresses were: ... class sizes were increased, (with) - postwar, an ever increasing number of people who were not ... equipped or prepared to do senior grades at a senior secondary level, and on to post-secondary level ... It put a lot of pressure on teachers in the classroom on those students who were planning a university education ...The teachers ... made the demands of the Fed. (BCTF) to make demands of the government to make smaller class sizes - (saying) 'we can not cope with this kind of thing.' The public looking back and watching this felt a sense of crisis with respect to public education. Sub-standards was the view (NDP:PLS).

...a lot of people would have sent their kids to independent schools if there had been not the financial disincentive. It was the general dissatisfaction of that era regarding the performance of the public school system (Socred:PLS).

(iv) Ideological/paradigm Shifts in the Community

The Liberal, Socred and BCTF comments reflect the multi-cultural changes, the inter-provincial migration, and ideological/paradigm shifts penetrating the education system:

The community was becoming richer...those who were Pentecostal or Dutch reformed church could contemplate setting up their own schools...Newer immigrant groups were ... interested in the culture that was lost, ... values ...being lost. .. the public school (put) people into a Canadian mold. ... John Diefenbaker was a classic proponent of 'I'm an unhyphenated Canadian.' Now (it is) a multi-cultural concept ... If you were (ethnic) and you were concerned about your

(children being with those) who are not (ethnic) - it makes sense to think about a (private) school system ...when you're wealthier as a community you can afford to contemplate 'a something other'. (not just) on Saturdays and Sundays; (not just) after the regular school system (Lib:P) .

...the increase and build up of the ethnic groups was creating schools as separate schools ...protecting and having an educational system that catered to something that was not just mainstream. Bilingualism factors... (were contributing) to a different meaning of ... separate school ... the change which allowed you to choose (your child's school). ... The ... idea of ...one school for everybody (was challenged) ...people (coming in from other provinces) tended to look down their noses at W.A.C. as a bit of a ... hardware farmer who got into power; they brought in some of that out-province bias...(Sacred:P).

Trudeaumania, ...hippies ... a sudden awakening of challenging things and questioning things... When that sweep went through the western world articulated by Trudeau - I think it caused a lot of people to discuss it and to think. There were funding of schools in other parts of Canada. ...(much migration to a prosperous province) ... people who moved out here from Quebec ...who had come from ... separate schools there equally funded. A similar ...situation was happening in Alberta ...(BCTF:LS).

The bureaucrat's view is practical, seeing the problem succinctly voiced by newcomers to British Columbia:

(Out-of-province people) wanted to send their kids to a parochial school - 'how come it is not supported?' - migrant groups could never understand this - it was alien to the rest of Canada (Bur1:LS) .

The NDP view is divided between, non-awareness of the general community groundswell and stresses to an impact centered around the public education system itself. This includes multi-languages, fewer drop-outs and different university values. Accordingly, they see the stresses as political and logistical rather than an emphasis on ideological:

I did not find any major stresses coming from the community. It came strictly from the lobbyists ... if you're talking ... a groundswell from the public of British Columbia - no, I knew when there was a groundswell for other things - people would write to me and say 'we want things changed ...but very few saying: 'we want funding for independent schools...(NDP:PL).

The demands for people to finish high school ... changed; drop out rates had gone to a minimal figure. (teaching) a broader cross-section of kids...some not so equipped to deal with some subjects that say as a teacher in the 1950s you had

an easier time dealing with. Not any more! ...The increasing knowledge and technological advancements made in the last 25 years were immense to the extent where whole text-books ...were changed ... demands for higher standards on people who were less equipped to achieve those higher standards...English was a second language for some ...higher education was a not a factor...as a goal ... or as much of a value. ...people who otherwise would have gone into the workforce by now ...sitting in Grade 12 or first year university waiting to see what diplomas they are going to pick up. ...The ... immigrant population within urban centers having increased to the extent, where the ESL (English-as-a-second language student) became a problem and the pressures particularly upon the upwardly mobile, high-achieving, goal-type families like the Chinese particularly, put a lot of stresses on the classrooms as well...Historically the pressure from the Catholic Church to aid independent schools had always been resisted in British Columbia. ...because it was a largely Anglo-saxon, Protestant, anti-Catholic control system. ...It was a religious battle that was largely diffused and eliminated by the second world war. (with) everybody together in a public education system it was more difficult when those people took their adult places in society, to convince them that these grave religious issues were of any significant importance. ... So you had a ... reduction of the old battle lines...All of these factors pressured and strained an education system which was invented a hundred years previous, with very little changes (NDP:PLS) .

FISA's representative expounds on the proliferation of religious diversification and a search for the values that were embraced by independent schools such as alternatives, and minority views:

The swing to more individualization and ...more subject choice at secondary levels, made education expensive and (was related to) people ... looking for alternatives...The Protestant Christian schools started in 1949 and the others came on as the wave of immigration swept the country in the 1950s and early 1960s ... that time which changes took place; ...the whole spin-off of the ... hippie movement created in society a respect for alternative lifestyles, points of view, minority views (FISA:PLS).

B. Discussion

(i) Independent School Demands

In chapter two, the nature of educational decisions throughout the history of Canada is described as being formed within a "mosaic of interest groups and paralleling the shifts in their values" (Stoloff, 1983). This section looks at who or what, behind those groups, created the demands for choice that were answered by *Bill 33*. Stoloff's assertion that emerging groups exercise power and create demands is fully supported herein. FISA emerged, according to the findings, as a result of community stresses that had no ready solution. The data show that these stresses had been recognizable over a long period of time. They were localized within certain elitist or religious groups who were making demands reflecting their own specific stresses. The groups lacked overall cohesion and a wide enough purpose to attract the positive reaction of legislators. FISA was formed to overcome the weaknesses of splintered demands. The government had not shown any empathy to those creating the demands.

W.A.C. Bennett's polemic argument that government policy was for integration not segregation, subtly attacked the beliefs of these special interest groups. It was accepted by the majority of the Legislature because it answered the question of whether integration for the time was reasonable. It did not answer the emerging controversy of whether segregation was, or may be, unfair in a community of changing ideologies. It did not satisfy the constituents who felt they were unfairly and unequally being treated with respect to education costs. Perhaps it was felt that there was no need to answer those questions because, effectively, prior to the formation of FISA they were not being asked. It is stated, in chapter two, that ancillary concepts of *language in policy-making* create a framework for evaluating roles played (Edelman, 1964). Bennett's controversial argument, as it turned out in the mid 1970s, demonstrates an unusual twist to this theory. Bennett showed that language from a base of power can affect the decision of whether

policy-making is necessary. Initially, he effectively shut out the special interest arguments with his slogan. Later it became his downfall as he was unable to "maintain the support of his party"(Downey, 1982, p. 86). He felt his slogan appealed to the argument represented by the general public. It was also, reportedly, often fed-back through quotes of others. As this effectively disarmed the non-cohesive, unorganized, specific groups and individuals that were making demands, there was probably no reason for the government to consider policy. Edelman considered his theory as a framework for evaluating policy-making at the level where it was in-process, at the demand processing stage, the articulation stage, or later. It also may be of considerable value in assessing the nature of individual debate at the stage of stresses being recognized. There may be, in educational policy-making, issues that do not get past either the stress recognition or the demand articulation stage due to the language of individuals responding to those inputs.

Finding 5.1

Edelman's concept of language in policy-making may be of considerable value in assessing the nature of individual debate at the stage of stresses being recognized.

This finding is supportive of the assertion that the timing and stages of policy-development is critical, including the embryonic stages (Mitchell, 1988, p.459). Downey (1982) referred to this stage as the "pre-policy" stage whereas Housego (1964) described it as the "policy formulation" stage. In this research, without examining the pre-policy stage, this aspect of W.A.C. Bennett's influence may have been missed.

The pre-policy stage also includes the interaction of the various sub-systems that form integral parts of the system model. The conditions under which systems interact reciprocally is reported in chapter three. Stresses are described as critically impinging upon the ability by a

political system to obtain acceptance from society of the allocation of values (Wirt & Kirst, 1972). The story of FISA appears to be their ability, within the political system, to obtain that acceptance and then articulate it to the government. This is nowhere better introduced than in the section on Independent School Demands by the FISA spokesperson who accepts the Sacred Cabinet minister, Ralph Loffmark's advice to "convince the public that they want it". Shortly after that advice, FISA adopted it as their own policy and followed it to the letter. They made sure that the public and the legislators were in a favourable mood to accept the allocation of values as FISA saw them.

In chapter four it is found that legislators in British Columbia believe the allocation of resources, particularly scarce financial resources, is a sustained stress in the field of educational policy-making. Other matters identified were unfairness, inequalities, and lack of facilities. Although those legislators are identifying specific matters, the generality of the same issues persists throughout the independent school issue as well. How individuals deal with each of these stresses appears to be a most crucial aspect of policy-making. If the stresses are generally similar, why do some issues convert into policy and others do not?

In the data, certain individuals are identified with the stresses, and as creating the demand. They help in answering this question for the independent schools issue. Firstly, it is noted that individual legislators, interviewed, differed markedly in their perception of stresses and community groundswell. The NDP does not have the same perception as others. Secondly, there are specific *influencers* suggested. Camey is one name referred to as representative of perhaps two or more religious leaders.

These leaders had a certain agenda, representing their specific stresses, covering a long period of time and were searching for a vehicle to carry that agenda. FISA became the vehicle. Ralph Loffmark, Dave Barrett and Tom Griffiths, all identified in the data of this section, became *influencers* to that agenda. Individually, they saw the stresses as an important issue. They saw

that it was crucial to convert the demands from a *pre-policy* stage to the *mega-policy setting* stage. Volunteers became the support to the vehicle and the fuel to keep it going. It was they who had the ultimate access to the officials. It is the influence of all of them that took it to the next stage. This was, perhaps, a stage to which much potential policy never arrives. FISA had a power that came from more than just the organization or one man. It came from knowledge, analysis and the ability to synthesize the opinions and suggestions of the individuals into one strong cohesive plan that gave them power. To measure power it is recognized that one has to assess access to officials (Agger Goldrich & Swanson, 1961). The data of this section shows, with respect to this first stage of policy formulation, that there were certainly some individuals who had considerable power through access to the senior officials of FISA. The data related to the Roman Catholic hierarchy is indicative of this power. On the other hand, it is also shown that the officials of FISA had power through access to their grassroot interests. The interests represent the stresses. Without grassroot support the officials of FISA may not have had the influence that was necessary to give power.

Finding 5.2

Power, in this case, is not just measurable through access to officials by individuals; It is also measurable through access by the officials to the grassroot organization.

Volunteers are described as taking the roles of individuals. Contrasted to organized strikes and protests where the group acts in concert and in lock-step to directives, these volunteers were told, as reported in the section on Independent School Demands to go as individuals and to join the party of their choice. They were told to make issue as they see fit, but to make issue on more than just independent schools. Therefore, a corollary to Agger et al, may be

that to measure power, one must assess the extent to which citizens take organized individualistic roles in creating demands. Certainly in this case the role that they played within FISA was notable. Perhaps as notable as the role FISA played within the process.

Finding 5.3

In lobbying, the roles of grassroots, organized individuals is as important, and perhaps more so, than an organized group acting in conformity to established policy.

(ii) Political Party Demands

The political party findings represent the initial first stage of *relational demand processing* as discussed in chapter four. Prior to FISA, with no organization to represent the demands, it fell upon the political parties to be the natural vehicle. This is the stage of *disjointed-incrementalism* where the government and parties are pressured incrementally with a series of demands (Downey, 1982). This is also referred to as the "muddling through" stage (Lindblom, 1959). It is a stage where cohesion is being sought. Perhaps groups or individuals believe they have it. In the long run they find it has been an exercise of muddling through it all. However, the data show that the separate schools were organizing better and the demands on the political parties were getting larger and more representative. As previously analyzed, values were shifting and creating demands on the education system (Stoloff, 1983). The relationships involved in demand articulation were beginning to form and take effect. It was the point where those, who in the future would have to take a role in the policy-making process, become aware of the stresses and issues surrounding them.

In chapter two, it is reported that a valid picture of power processes can be had without a wide public or media knowledge as long as the actions are known to a sufficient number who have

taken part in the process (Housego, 1964). Considering the roles taken by the public, as detailed in the data, it appears that a general knowledge was not evident. However, a strong, influential, public knowledge was acknowledged. That knowledge was translated through the many volunteers and constituents, particularly through the political parties. It would be appropriate to suggest that Housego's comments are supportable. It would take recognition that although wide public and media knowledge is not necessarily intrinsic to the process, it is however important that the influential public have both knowledge and understanding of the issue.

Finding 5.4

In the policy-making process, where the general public may not have wide knowledge, it is important that the influential public have both knowledge and understanding of issues.

This is reinforced by the data of sub-problem 3, wherein Barrett's comments are discussed in recognizing supports. The public first attempted to influence the political parties and only later found the vehicle to go directly to the Legislature. However, probably more due to accident than planning, when the demands did reach the Legislature, many of the legislators were then knowledgeable due to the initial demands on the party itself, at conventions and in policy making sessions. This also meant that many of the arguments had been effectively heard.

The political party actually performed in a manner similar to that found in chapter four with the test-pilot of British Columbia legislators. The members of the Legislature state that policy can be affected by a legislator assisting the community in bringing their concerns to the policy-makers in a manner where the issue and concerns, principles and consequences are well understood. In this case, it is roles of certain individual legislators, that will later be described, who affect policy through the knowledge they acquire initially from their party influence. The significance of Barrett

making a pitch for NDP membership and for the Liberal stating that they had more of the Catholic vote than would be normal, is that the Liberals showed, throughout the findings, a good grasp of the stresses and demands. This is perhaps, primarily and only, due to their heavy Catholic and elite school constituents. The NDP, on the other hand, apparently needed the members in order to give them that grasp. This leads to the question of whether it is important for the opposition to monitor demands made upon other parties that are not being made strongly upon their own party. Without monitoring, perhaps there is advantage to the party that is subject to the demands.

Finding 5.5

In policy-making processes, opposition members may monitor the demands being made upon other parties. With the knowledge and understanding gained from such monitoring, the opposition members can increase the effectiveness of their own influence.

(iii) Public System Criticism

The public school system dissatisfaction was just as influential as a *support* as it was as a *stress*. Stress in other subsystems of the social environment are described as generating inputs upon the political system (Wirt & Kirst, 1972 p.14). Up to this point of the analysis, the stress has reflected the inequities and unfairness aimed at the separate schools. Now, the stress of those evaluating the public school system becomes a focal point of generating inputs. Certainly, it does not seem to matter where the stresses come from. It is perhaps the nature of the stress, not the origin, that appears to be critical in this situation. The nature of the original stress is not enough by itself to move it into the next stage of policy-making. This added dimension though, now gives an answer to W.A.C. Bennett's long-standing ideological commitment. No longer could his argument stand alone. The issue of loss of confidence in the public system generated a major support for

independent school funding. The interesting application of this issue is that it is the same issue facing the separate school parents. That issue is, simply, one of lack of good education for one's children. The perception is different, the stress is the same. It may be that the analysis of stresses over many educational issues would reveal certain common denominators underlying them all.

(iv) Ideological/paradigm Shifts in the Community

Ideologically, the human factor identified is pluralism. It represents the tide of immigrants in Canada and in British Columbia from other countries and other provinces. They dominate this stage of the stress recognition. Immigrants represent the movement to new rights (Robinson, 1985). They represent the growth of denominational schools (Downey, 1982). The Liberal interviewee reports that he was trying to, not only protect their distinctive culture as Robinson had reported with respect to Native Indians and Doukhobors, but also to recover their culture. The data in this section support Downey's (1982) conclusion that society's binge of multi-culturalism promoted awareness of alternatives. These data add the reference to paradigm changes best exemplified by the hippie movement and the respective changing values of youth and family. Also introduced, is the changing demographics of the country. For example, there were major shifts of population from rural areas to urban centres. There were migrations from province to province and from the French language areas to English speaking locations and vice-versa. The NDP member introduces the concepts of assimilation/reduction of "old battle lines" and of anti-Catholic voice, into the mainstream, through integration of non-Catholics and Catholics in the public school system.

The nature of shifting values representing the entirety of the 1950s and 1960s needs to be analyzed to understand the roles that individuals played in this policy stage. The NDP member states that all these factors "pressured and strained an education system which was invented a

hundred years previous, with very little changes". There is an irony, that in looking behind the motives of this particular NDP legislator, identified at the beginning of this chapter as a Catholic, he also was pressured and strained to accept a system that might re-draw the old battle lines. Yet, if he argued against it, he would be denying his Catholic loyalty and commitments.

These are the stresses, persistent patterns of human relationships, and the individuals that created the demands. These are the individuals' motives and thoughts. This is the beginning stage of *relational demand processing*, as introduced in chapter four. The next process is the articulation of those demands.

Sub-problem 2

Who articulated the demand?

A. Findings

The schema that developed from the interview-responses includes five principle categories of demand articulation: early individuals 1950s and 1960s, Ray Perrault, Liberals post Perrault era, and independent schools/Ensing/FISA.

Represented are those who did articulate the demand plus certain commentary on those who could have and did not. A period is covered up to, but not including, the presentation of those demands to the Legislature. The emphasis in the data, although focussed on individuals, is primarily concerned with the characteristics or motivations of those individuals where possible. The bureaucrats do not show any significant recognition of individuals outside of those who would have legislative access.

(i) Early Individuals 1950s and 1960s

Recognition of individuals who articulated any *demands* was not an easy task for any of those interviewed. Most of the individuals identified were legislators: Phil Gagliardi, Dennis Cocke, Dudley Little, Hugh McDermitt, Ernie Le Cours, Jim Chabot, Don Phillips. Of these Cocke, McDermitt and Little were NDP, the others were Socreds. Also mentioned is Hugh Harris and Pat Power, described in chapter four. Ray Perrault, also previously described, is the subject of the last category in this section. Several others are described throughout the remaining data.

The NDP legislators recognize only those that would make their demands via a direct approach to a legislator. They give no recognition to the speeches of Socreds in the Legislature as being significant articulations of the demands and stresses:

Fred Moonen, he is a lobbyist for McMillan Bloedel and a prominent Catholic; he did not bring in the MacBlo. clout but did have the clout of being a lobbyist. He was relatively popular among MLAs on all sides so he would be listened to whenever that subject came up...I do not think (Herb Capozzi) was influential at all in terms of the Independent Schools Act (NDP:PLS).

The Socred, who left office prior to the legislation, gives full recognition to the efforts, potential and otherwise, of other legislators:

(Gagliardi) ...if he had been far more forceful in his demands -he could have made an inroad ...He had a lot of influence within the Cabinet but not as much with W.A.C. Bennett.... (He had a) religious background and he was a very public figure. He had a good stage to speak to it...Dennis Cocke and (the late) Dudley Little (as a Catholic), his wife ... put a lot of pressure on him; the Liberals; and Dr. McDermitt because he was a little more conscious of it. He was a Doctor out of Tofino, and had dealt with a lot of the (Catholic) schools up there and he felt there was a need for them to have more support. Jim Chabot (and Don Phillips) who was more outspoken than Don Phillips... (Ernie Le Cours) ... was sympathetic to the cause but certainly not as outspoken as others ...We (Socreds) were getting ready for the next election, 1972 and FISA wanted to know if I would work for them. I made a few speeches in certain areas for them...(Socred:P).

The Socred who had left the Liberal party does not identify anyone who articulated the demands.

He makes a general reference to constituents:

No, I can not really think of any. But that is not to say that there were not many individuals who felt the same way; ...I can think of a couple of dozen ...from (a particular) riding cause there were two or three schools in that riding (Socred:PLS).

The Liberal member who had left office prior to the legislation gives acknowledgement to two legislators but is not able to recall any others:

McGeer was supportive.... Capozzi was outspoken and fairly frequently mentioned it, but (W.A.C.) Bennett was not going to go for it ideologically (Lib:P) .

The FISA spokesperson concurs with the Socred member and gives added depth from his knowledgeable advantage. One of the bureaucrats introduces the influence of Hugh Harris:

(Pat Power) ... in the early struggle in the early 1950s when the textbooks were given and so called access to bussing ... That was confrontational and a lesson we did not want to repeat...There are antecedents ... of course, that mainly started off in the Catholic school movement. It was certainly articulated most strongly by McGeer, Gardom ... in the 1960s and early 1970s. But there were others like Little, Capozzi, Chabot, Phillips ... involved in the early attempts of the Federation (FISA) to get moving. ...Dudley Little went as far as proposing a private-members bill and certainly Herb Capozzi did not endear himself strongly to W.A.C. when he spoke out very strongly in favour of aid to independent schools...(Hugh Harris) was so convinced that Catholic education was good for his kids. And he was so convinced of the rightness of freedom of choice in education. I remember running into him and his wife on my tours - they were always there and very supportive of the work that the federation was doing (FISA:PLS) .

Hugh Harris - he was party secretary, I think at that stage. He absolutely had the ear of Bill Bennett... and very influential... The superintendent of the Catholic schools ... usually bureaucrats within their own systems. Not the bishops they were behind the scenes but they were not present (Bur2:LS).

(ii) Ray Perrault

The identification of this individual is made only by the FISA lobbyist and the one Socred. The BCTF opinion doubts Perrault's involvement. However the identification leads to further comment on the Catholic influence with Archbishop Duke and Bishop Carney. This is a linking not made by the others:

I think it started with Ray Perrault - I do not think Pat (McGeer) was the initiator (Perrault) was getting pressures from the individuals in the religious background.

Archbishop Duke... was pretty iron-handed in his way and was not much of a diplomat; it was not until later that Bishop Carney became much more of a diplomat and worked with it (Socred:P).

(Ray Perrault) ... He was certainly very much involved and very supportive (FISA:PLS) .

Ray Perrault - that would be inconsistent with his view point; he is primarily a federal politician who was dumped into British Columbia. (BCTF:PLS).

(iii) Liberal Party- McGeer

There is no disputing the early Liberal role in articulating the demand. McGeer, and to a lesser degree Gardom, were involved continuously both in and out of the legislator and are identified by the FISA spokesperson as supportive enough for them to approach:

(the demand was)...articulated most strongly by McGeer, Gardom - those two - to what degree they reflected what they saw already building out there (I do not know). ... We approached them and they let it be known that we were very interested in what was happening and they were very interested in our ideas. ... McGeer ... it was just before he came leader (1968) ...town-meetings were being held ... Pat spoke at several of them and invariably would bring up this point of independent schools and so we began to talk to him obviously... The Liberals were using it in their publicity. I was not aware that they had passed resolutions (in the 1960s) ...I was not aware that it was adopted party policy at the time but may well have been (FISA:PLS) .

Other Liberals post-Perrault, are mentioned for their party support. The BCTF are the only ones to recognize Bill Vander Zalm's articulation and probable motivation. Vander Zalm is described in chapter two as one of the Liberals who crossed over to the Socreds. He also left the Socreds in the late 1970s and returned to take the leadership of the Socred party. He subsequently became Premier of the province, a position he holds at present:

Vander Zalm got active in the Liberal party in the late 1960s ...I have no reservations about Bill Vander Zalm being a strong influencer... Vander Zalm belonged to that group (of Liberals that went over to the Socreds) . For two reasons:

- i.. the church base that is part of his constituency, the Christian movement that wanted the funding and
- ii.. his small businessman approach.

...the conviction for funding independent schools came from unnamed people that never held a public position. They were power people ...they were likely contributors. None that had the courage to take a public position (BCTF:PLS).

The remaining comments support the earlier contention that the Liberal party was receiving pressure from supporters. The comments also demonstrate the nature of the Liberal party's internal dealings of the demands:

The (Liberal) party (spoke up often) was getting pressures from its supporters to a greater degree than the social credit or conservatives were (Socred:P).

McGeer was committed probably for reasons of battles in the Liberal party provincially, when he was leader or leading up to be leader (Lib:P).

It was clear that McGeer's Liberal rump group was primarily motivated (NDP:PLS).

(iv) Independent schools /FISA/Ensing

The Socred member analyzes carefully and then acknowledges the roles that several of the independent schools played prior to their association:

I do not think St. Georges was very prominent at all ... I am sure they were pushing for funding ... They were established to be independent of government not to be supported by them. The College was a school that never wanted to be private they were forced to be private....St. Georges, and Shaughnessy and Brentwood were schools that never wanted to be public, they always wanted to be private. ...they always fought the battles of costs versus incoming revenues and they could have used any bit of money but they would have been satisfied with aid rather than some sort of actual financial contribution based on a more direct involvement. The Dutch reformed were involved to a great degree (saying) 'yes we are entitled to it and want our children to go the school and think some of our taxes should go to it' (Socred:P).

The Liberal-turned-Social Credit gives no such acknowledgement. The NDP while not delving into the historical growth of the movement, does provide information about the influence of the Roman Catholic church and also considerable data on the techniques of articulation by the association (FISA). They also detail Ensing's tireless role:

(FISA) would be in your own riding ...(they) ...put on a campaign at the PNE ... prior to the 1972 election, ...they had the names of every MLA at that time who supported independent schools. They ...were going to put us on the spot ...he's

(Ensing) a single-minded and tireless worker. Every damn panel on education in the province he showed up for. ... He steeped himself in what was going on. He prepared himself very well for any debate he got into. He never refused to show up and he became exceptionally clever in putting forth his views in the debate ... when they (MLAs) got back to their constituencies they got a strong lobby group from (FISA). ... Ensing had them organized with letters ... I know that a number of our own members had strong Catholic schools in their ridings. Strong individual pressures were put on these members (NDP:PL).

Carney ... Ensing ... I would attribute to Ensing a large measure of that success - if the Catholics and Carney were left alone they never would have succeeded. The Catholic church ... Ensing by himself did not have credibility and legitimacy without more than just a token of the Catholic sector ... Carney ordered through the hierarchy to get rolling ... Carney had a great deal of influence and has today, which is remarkable because he ... I always say this about people who do not appear to be very bright - if they can choose the right people to advise them maybe they are that bright ... he has always had very clever people around him, priests and highly educated - multi-lingual, historians, politicians and so forth together with a very healthy and active and intelligent lay group (NDP:PLS) .

FISA describes how they articulated the demand, how the association came together, some of the individuals and the motives of many:

... we did not (lobby) civil servants. We felt that this was a policy decision ... to be made by politicians... We made ourselves known to the bureaucrats ... provided them with information our purpose was to keep people informed... not to answer vitriolic attacks because they killed themselves. We often chose not to answer those because it called to attention for a second time something that was unreasonable... The Vancouver Christian school and the British Columbia group (15 schools) ... had struck a committee to ... get a federation together. (They) had written already an outline on what basis such a group could operate ... when this letter from Ned came... timed perfectly . Ned Larsen (was) the headmaster of Shawinigan Lake school, - there was a bit of collusion there - as the Catholics wanted to get something (going) and they did not want to be the pushers up front ... the Protestant group brought in this set of guidelines which many were taken over word for word into the (FISA) constitution later. They were developed by the Protestant group committee including Gerry Ensing, Rev Van Andel, Harry Antionitus... Those different school groups got together as a federation and it took them all of a year to agree on a constitution. A lot of those decisions were made by people behind the scenes that are not visible ... the Catholic bishops took considerable part in that. The prime motive ... was to ...truly represent the freedom of choice argument ...that was more important than the funding. The Catholics realized they would never get funding on their own - so there was an alliance - a political power block. The bishops were extremely interested that this group be successful no divisions in the schools, iron out differences at local level and consolidate one overall position to be brought to the government... We had among us lots of ... immigrants ... a lot of them were ... Dutch Catholics, Protestants, Calvinists ... We remembered a similar situation in Holland where the Dutch and the Catholics worked together and it took a long time to convince the politicians ...we said: ' well this is North America ...we'll give ourselves 10 yrs'. ... That's when they said 'Gerry (Ensing is) our man' ! Our board chairman Case Pel and Dr. John Waller, a vet who later became president of FISA who became the best president we ever had and Mike Vanadraken those are the guys who were behind the scenes (FISA:PLS).

The BCTF member, like others outside of FISA knows of the FISA effectiveness, but is not aware of the internal roles played in demand articulation:

The Catholic priests would call for (funding) because they were having to cut back on services for the parish in order to keep the school going. So you would have these sporadic calls through the newspapers and the occasional editorial.... the confluence that resulted in the decision to fund independent schools and to bring Ensing to do that was a political marriage (BCTF:PLS)

The BCTF, NDP and FISA spokespeople all identify the hierarchy of the Catholic church as being very influential in articulating demands. Throughout the findings the NDP touch on the elitist aspect of *influencers*. This comes to be a recurring theme of the the NDP and some other interviewees.

B. Discussion

In tracing the history of demand-articulation, Downey (1982) describes the lost credibility of the BCCEA after the Maillardville incidents, the founding of a committee of private school organizations and the founding of FISA. He describes well, the role of FISA and gives credit to firstly, both Archbishop Duke and BCCEA's Pat Power and then, FISA's Ensing, MLA Capozzi and MLA Williams as all having played significant roles in articulating the demands. The data in this study builds on that description. This section discusses not only, who as individuals articulated the demand, but also, what were their motives. With the articulation of demands, the policy-making moves solidly into the *demand-processing* stage as described by Downey (1982). The relational aspect of this process now becomes clearer.

(i) Early Individuals 1950s and 1960s

In the 1950s and 1960s individuals stood up in the Legislature in spite of the reaction they may have got from their caucus or leaders. They spoke up in representation of their understanding of stresses that affected their constituents. Where Phil Gagliardi, a minister of the

government, could have used his position and personal values to articulate the demands, he did not. On the other hand backbencher Capozzi did. He stood to lose the possibility of influence in the Cabinet by going directly against the Premier. The former had Pentacostal church roots in his career; the latter Catholic roots in his life and education. One spoke out and one did not. Gagliardi had a reputation as being extremely political. Capozzi was reported as feeling the unfairness of it all stemming from his childhood. Others got up in the house: MLAs Cocke, Little, McDermitt, Chabot, Phillips, Le Cours. More were to follow when the legislation was being considered.

The hierarchy of the Roman Catholic church was reported to have had considerable influence. Similar influence came from Hugh Harris, active in the Socred party ranks, and Fred Moonen, a businessman lobbyist. The former was an influence on FISA. The latter was an influence on legislators and the premier. With many of these, it is reported, their motive was simply their allegiance to the church and a commitment to the Catholic cause. Gagliardi was not a Roman Catholic nor was he known to be of the religions that were involved in the FISA organization.

Under sub-problem 3, a Socred supporter is quoted as saying "the thing that motivated all of us to speak out (is) ... the belief that it is right". The question of, what influenced these people to believe it was right, needs to be answered. Their stresses were real and believable. Often a legislator may take a stand on behalf of his constituency with respect to a government-supportable issue. However, in this case, legislators were articulating an issue that was known to them to be against the government's policy and a Premier's personal values. It is not unreasonable to surmise that they felt the issue was strong enough to take the risk. It is not unreasonable to assume that they were not doing it just for the votes or the favours at that time. They would not have had the pressure, yet to come, that would have forced them to accept the demands as substantial potential votes. If that pressure had been there, there would not be the

comments from the NDP and one of the Socreds that they could not think of anyone that articulated the demands. The demands would have been heavy and/or well recognized.

(ii) Ray Perrault

and

(iii) Liberal Party- McGeer

There was also a general acknowledgement that the Liberals owned the strength of votes in this arena. The comments on Ray Perrault and Pat Power also seem to reflect the motives of commitment to the Catholic cause. On the other hand, there is McGeer, and to a degree other Liberal legislators. There was no recognition of commitment to or understanding by them of the demands. However, there was a recognition of the supports. Even the FISA group were in doubt as to how much the Liberals recognized the groundswell. It is suggested that perhaps they saw a building-up of the *inputs* in the environment. The FISA executive curiously states on two occasions that he did not quite understand the role of McGeer and his Liberal running-mate Garde Gardom. He was surprised to find that they were out speaking in favour of independent schools and wanted to get together with them to discuss it. He was also surprised to find that the Liberal party had actual policy on the issue. These provide evidence that Liberal activity was not strongly related to the church involvement. Yet there is substantial evidence that the Socreds and Liberals recognized well, the inequities and unfairness. There is however more substantial evidence throughout the data of this research that they saw a failing public system as the major demand. The NDP consistently suggests the motives were primarily elitist based. One Socred who may not fit the elitist mold is Vander Zalm. His influence does appear to have church/religious motivations. Vander Zalm however, on the political scene, is not well recognized by the media as a synergistic Socred or representative of them at the time.

(iv) Independent schools /FISA/Ensina

The first signs of Ensing's considerable influence starts to show in the data. It is the influence of a man who is single-minded, well-versed, knowledgeable, organized, tireless and patient. This is a man who clearly takes the advice of those around him and carefully assists in developing policy that would prove to be very effective. He was apparently motivated by his loyalty to the organization that he served and the influencers behind that organization. Many influencers are mentioned by name. Bishop James Carney is consistently mentioned. The NDP states that the credibility and the legitimacy came from the Roman Catholic hierarchy, specifically Carney.

With respect to Housego's (1964) focus on power in decision-making, the aspect, of who influences whom, becomes clearer. Where Downey (1982) identifies the two groups of church and the elite, these findings identify some of the power-holders behind those groups. But did they have influence? The theory, alluded to by the interviewees, is that there was influence behind both Ensing and McGeer, provided by at least the private school headmasters Parker and Brown, plus Archbishop Duke and Bishop Carney. There may have been many who attempted to influence McGeer and Ensing. Accordingly, it is fair to assume that they, McGeer and Ensing, had considerable power through that influence. However it may be that their influence is only as strong as the combined power and leadership. In support of this argument, is the fact that the BCCEA had similar power in its ranks as did the elite schools. It was not until they found the leadership of McGeer and Ensing to articulate their demands that their power had an effective voice. Similarly with McGeer, although he had a forum as a legislator, it was with the assistance of Ensing and FISA and later the Sacred party that he was able to blend his skills into an influential instrument for making policy. This again supports the assertion that it is important to examine the timing and stages of policy development (Mitchell, 1988). The examination of power at the pre-policy stage uncovers the behind-the-scenes leaders. The examination of power at the *demand-*

processing stage identifies the influence of those articulating the demands. When the analysis of the whole process is complete the real influence is decided to have been in the hands of several individuals, through certain stages.

Finding 5.6

The influence of an individual, in a policy-making process, may not be complete without the synergistic power of another or others.

This stage also is characteristic of the process where the maximum influence for a policy is "marshalled" (Housego, 1964). As importantly, the nature of the influence reflects the nature of the personalities and the motives of those individuals.

(v) General Comment

The data, at this stage, show that much of the power, as limited as it has been to this point, is centred around ideological issues and values. Starting to emerge is the awareness that the personalities of Ensing and McGeer have a considerable impact on the direction of the policy-making. Not dissimilarly, the personalities of Duke, Carney, Capozzi, Little and Harris have shown so far to be instrumental in going up against the odds and across the mainstream of public thought. Others could, with a similar commitment, have made a major impact on the policy development. The data show that the commitment referred to was a special characteristic of only a few.

Finding 5.7

In order to articulate demands effectively, one must have commitment to some fixed value, ideology or principle.

W.A.C. Bennett and Capozzi show this commitment by going against the mainstream, even though Bennett was clearly with public opinion for most of his political career. Perrault, on the other hand, is reported to have minor influence due to his position and support of Catholic causes. However, he lacked the commitment to go against the flow of public acceptance. The NDP, BCTF and BCSTA, as shown later, could not find an individual who had that singular commitment. They suffered in leadership because of it. They did little in the articulation of demands. Few were involved at all, but relationships were important in understanding the lack of involvement. These become clearer in chapter seven. On the other side there are several *supports* that made the demands more receptive to the legislature. This is covered in the next section.

Sub-problem 3

Who or what was recognized by legislators and non-legislators as supports?

A. Findings

The data are divided into the two groups of individuals identified in the question: legislators and non-legislators.

(i) Legislators

Supports are presented in the context of supportive of actions by a legislator, whether that legislator be a government member or an opposition member. They are supports of the roles taken in the debate towards public funding of independent schools. The time period covers from the earliest debates in and out of the Legislature up to and including the debate on *Bill 33*. The types of supports recognized by those interviewed come under five specific categories plus a

general category. These categories, defined as supports in someone's evaluation, could well be demands in another's evaluation. They are: ideologies, lobbies, money, public system, votes and other.

(a) Ideologies

The Socreds, during the policy-making process represented the *support* of independent schools. They were the pro-faction. The Socreds reflected the values of the individuals that were making the demands. This included both the religious concerns as expressed by a Catholic Socred to elitist attitudes as ascribed to Pat McGeer:

(Dudley Little) felt there was an unfair distribution and that the majority of provinces had something for Catholic schools...I fought the battle that youngsters should be able to go to other schools ...bus people from the east-end schools to the west side schools. (public schools were unfairly distributed) One of the advantages of growing up in a small town was that all the kids went to the same school therefore the teaching level was the same for everyone. You had the stimulus of children with a better background and raised the standard of the education given...this is something that is not going to go away. It is going to get worse rather than better unless you tend to it...I went to (a parochial boarding school) ...the government owed an obligation to provide to these students... There are certainly a lot of things that they are entitled to like medicare or so on that they did not provide But surely all of the other benefits - the books for the libraries etc. should be a part of what is provided... The ... thing that motivated all of us to speak out ...(was) the belief that is right - that it is not right to separate, that there should be support - that they were penalizing the wrong people. ...people were getting a slightly less standard of education because they did not have the money for some necessities whether it was books or how exams were done (Socred:P).

The Liberals do not see the religious aspect as a legitimate *support* by McGeer:

I do not think religion entered into it. I do not think McGeer could care less who his allies were. McGeer is not necessarily interested in the overall he is just interested in what it does for the elite (Lib:P).

The NDP represented *supports* against certain aspects of independent schools. As the Socreds represented generally the pro group, the NDP represented the con group. The NDP analyze the dogma and ponder the negative consequences without showing any overt empathy

for the religious stresses, despite the Catholic ties of the NDP interviewee. One NDP member raises the issue of the battle lines between anti-Catholics and Catholics as having been dropped.

He uses that as a support for

keeping the status quo. He also sees, with some resentment, the right-wing element in both the elite schools and in the religious perspective:

You can not analyze the likelihood of success for public aid to independent schools post-war in the same context as pre-war...you could not whip up a majority of people to that kind of anti-Catholic or anti-Protestant feeling, post war... the public education system had done a lot to change that... It is a right wing point of view is to take people out of similar economic status and background and place them in these elite schools. ...the religious right wing point of view which is the Dutch reformed and to some extent the Catholics who did not want the little minds of their children corrupted by the public school system (NDP:PLS).

The BCTF representative gives his opinion on involvement of legislators from W.A.C. Bennett's days including Bennett's supports for his ideology. He suggests that a support of Bennett's was also the fact that in the past demands had come only from the Catholic schools and old private schools. Fundamental Christian schools had not been a factor in the demands of the past:

..W.A.C. was absolutely hostile to having a cleric hired as a substitute ...even lay preachers were in difficulty getting a position. ... it was well rooted and came out of that fear of church control...W.A.C. said there would be no public dollars for private schools and I'm sure there were strong religious overtones to that. The predominant independent schools were Catholic except for the old schools - but the fundamental Christian schools - there were none (BCTF:PLS) .

(b) Lobbies

The Socreds see Ensing as a person to provide information to legislators and give reason to the pro-active arguments. The NDP see the lobby as an effective campaign to convince the legislators. They see supports as mail and campaign involvement:

(they were) a new breed who were around the house ...throughout the session ...they were very friendly with most ... MLAs - they were not seen as pariah's or threats ...most who were prejudiced about it were at least kept informed on it. Gerry was strong (Socred:P).

As far as the caucus there was always extensive letter writing campaigns - they were very extensive... There was not a campaign that I was in that I was not asked for my stand on independent school aid (NDP:PL) .

(c) Money

This support was recognized but not given much acknowledgement in comparison to other supports for strongly influencing the process:

(government) spends half the amount for someone in the separate school system than ... for someone in the regular school system...Saving them money in teachers salaries, and the schools (they) do not have to fund (Socred:P).

(d) Public System

There is no dissenting opinions on the effect of the public attitude to the public school system. Blame is placed on the system, the teachers, the BCTF, the students and their parents. The Liberal sees it as a 'values' problem. The times were changing and the public education system was falling behind. He criticizes the BCTF:

(legislators') unease about the public school system....the various studies coming out in times of sputnik ... Johnny can not read, does not know his Science, ... did not know his basic three R's ... popular press portrayal of a system that was not working ... People did not ... know what their particular school system was doing... The BCTF ...was another problem - the radicalism of the teachers. Apparent or perceived radicalism. ... Because those people had a monopoly - they had power and there was a desire to break that ... a desire by the MLAs ... These principals... if asked why they could not do a better job in the schools it was an easy cop-out to say: 'well we have very little control ... like the old days when I could fire teachers and get rid of the dead wood' and if somebody said: 'why do you have so and so teaching' they'd say 'well its very difficult these days to get rid of a teacher'(Lib:P).

The NDP also criticize the radicalism of the BCTF and recognize that its own members shunned the public system to some extent. Their concern over the credibility of the BCTF reflects the resignation, that Socred attacks on the public system would be supported if the Socreds were uncomfortable with the BCTF:

Almost of all the Cabinet members were sending their kids to private schools. ...and many NDP MLAs were sending their kids to private schools...The teachers fed. directly and indirectly - they were putting pressure on the NDP and on the first term to lower class sizes. ... the effect of that was to reinforce the attack on the public education system by elitists such as McGeer (that with large class sizes the teachers were saying the system was poor) ...Larry Kuehn who was President of the BCTF - ...a very radical.. destructive and disrespectful. .. difficult for me ... to deal with a personality like that.... I do not think he has served the teachers federation at all. I do not think too many have over the years. I think that it has been a sad commentary on an extremely powerful organization that has frightened the wits out of every political party I know of (NDP:PLS).

The Socred recognizes a support within every teacher voice of distress at the public system and understands the support of parent options. He gives no recognition of credibility to the BCTF:

... I know many teachers that became so distressed by what they considered to be the deterioration of the schools that they simply left the teaching profession... There was no counter pressure on behalf of the BCTF to recover standards, discipline and indeed the pressures were all in the opposite direction... I think there an awful lot of parents that would send their kids to public school but they knew they had a safety valve if things got worse (Socred:PLS) .

The BCTF spokesman, now a decade later, looks behind the scenes and represents the broad picture from one legislator's eyes:

(legislators probably felt that) by bringing in funding of independent schools you could strengthen them, and that would increase the competition for the public schools and would cause them to clean up their act or lose students (BCTF:PLS).

(e) Votes

The Liberal view is one of strategy. He sees the need for the Socreds to clean up their image. He sees it as a fear that the NDP were unbeatable:

In an attempt to win what people envisaged as the centralist liberal voter, who was not really Socred, the Socreds had to change. ... that message did not have to be sold to McGeer and Gardom, although ...they had to have some concessions to salve their consciences and to keep a good number of other Liberals with them to the Socred ranks...the question of development of the Social Credit - trying to shed the image of the populist, backwoods-inspired Social-Crediter...This was a new crowd, urbanized, sophisticated people and so this (new policy) was part of it...there was ...considerable concern that the NDP was in an unbeatable position. Unless the Socreds bought the Liberal vote...surveys told us that we had more ... Catholic votes than would be normal in the circumstances and more educational votes (Lib:P).

The independent school issue fits into that image according to his conjecture. The Liberal also sees strong Catholic supports through votes in his own party. The NDP opinion covers the possibility of coalition building (the Liberal calls it 'concessions') in order to garner votes. Like the Liberal, they saw it as a means of keeping out the socialists. The NDP also recognize the support-building strategy within the Socred ranks and the electoral support in the constituencies for the Socreds. They do not allude to any similar support for themselves:

It could have been (coalition building). I do not think it was likely. ... I'm not saying it was not discussed and Bill Bennett did not promise some action on it, I just do not think it was pivotal to the Liberals crossing the floor and joining the Socreds and some rejuvenated Social Credit party. I think what was pivotal was re-election. Like it always is with politicians...the Socred leadership was convinced or actively supporting the aid to independent schools. ...aid to independent schools was an alliance...Bennett Jr. sold his ... backbench on the idea simply that it was an agreement to bring in the Liberals and keep out the socialists. He might have argued that... The flagship independent schools were St. George's, Shawinigan lake and so forth. ... schools that nobody thought needed to be funded but ...have really benefited ... part of the cocktail, oak-panelled study type set that McGeer was appealing to ... his friends (NDP:PLS).

(f) Other

The NDP also see a major support for McGeer in Bill Bennett. This support links McGeer's need for a pro-active forum in which to expound on his views:

Pivotal in McGeer's mind was that he was tired of sitting in the opposition he saw an opportunity where he could join a Socred coalition and save face reasonably. ...It was not the old Cece Bennett party and he negotiated the entrée of these Liberals and it was a tremendous accomplishment for Bill Bennett (NDP:PLS).

(ii) Non-legislators

Supports are presented here, in the same context as in the section on Ideologies. However, just as there are some non-legislator comments in that section as they relate to legislators, there are comments from legislators on their perception of what was recognized as supports by non-legislators. Some of the perceptions recorded are of influencers other than bureaucrats or lobbyists. The types of supports, recognized by those interviewed, came under

five specific categories. These categories are the same as for legislators and similarly supports in someone's evaluation could well be demands in another's. They are: ideologies, lobbies, money, public system, and votes. Other supports are discussed at the end of this section.

(a) Ideologies

The Liberal see the supports through the eyes of a Catholic layman: "I saw a good number of Catholic laymen that took it as an article of faith that this (Independent school support) would be done "(Lib:P). FISA interpret the public mood and allude to an expanding pluralism in the country. They describe shifting values particularly as they effect education and give support to alternatives:

At the time just before the act the BCTF had a poll - 57% were in favour of independent schools...our biggest supporters ... we would not have been as successful as fast if it had not been the hippies; they created an atmosphere of tolerance in society ...a respect for minority views - alternative ideas etc... The Protestant Christian schools started in 1949 and the others came on as the wave of immigration swept the country in the 1950s and early 1960s (FISA:PLS).

A bureaucrat exposes his thoughts on the Bennett era and compares them to the Barrett government to show why they both saw supports of their position:

W.A.C. had come out of New Brunswick...a Protestant - separation of church from state ...His son did not have any views one way or the other ... the Barrett government for ideological reasons they basically believed in public systems period (Bur2:LS).

The BCTF spokesman recognizes the shifting populations. He offeres an acceptance and understanding of the movement's objectives and stresses. All the interviewees see ideological supports in very individual ways:

People who had come to the west-coast from Ontario or Montreal where they had come from a private school background. ...substantial people who were active in that party at that time...products of Upper Canada College... Independent schools were not inherently bad - nor were they inherently good, but they were a fact of life in British ColumbiaThe great majority of private, or independents (schools) ...really do walk amenably into the fold including many

who can or cannot pay their fees. Many are small church schools that will even accept fees in kind, through labour (BCTF:PLS) .

(b) Lobbies

The BCTF sensing a sincerity in some of the lobbies, were doubting that there was any considerable public support through a groundswell. The NDP made a similar comment about the lack of groundswell previously in discussing demands and stresses. A bureaucrat however did sense the support:

I never had the sense that there was a well organized groundswell that was presenting briefs to the government in a well organized process. I felt the approach that the government took was to cater to basic instincts ... The independent school movement people were trying to advocate that position; but I did not think that they had been at it for long enough. I did not see any signs at that time there was anywhere near a majority support for it...the people who represented the parochial schools and Christian Fundamentalists were sincere in their advocacy. I do not think they were setting out on the basis of superiority or wanting to put down or attack or damage or weaken the public system (BCTF:PLS) .

The groundswell was that it is right and fair and that the majority of schools were not (Bur2:LS).

c) Money

A bureaucrat identifies an argument that he had no difficulty in accepting as a support for funding of independent schools:

Students coming out of independent schools had been full tax-subsidized students; would not it make some sense to give them ... a percentage of what the public schools cost and help them to stay open; ...that allows for fewer students to share the public education tax dollar; so ... I was not fixed in opposition to the idea of support for independent schools (Bur2:LS).

d) Public System

The BCTF opinion carries on a theme previously articulated by members of the Legislature that there is something attractive about the private system over the public system. The bureaucrat, despite his many years as an educator and active in the public school system and

teacher organizations, spoke of his acceptance of independent schools as an answer to increasing problems with the public school system:

How you can have teachers and principles who are working in public schools...send their kids to private schools. ...that has been hard for me to rationalize. I respect their right to do it ...and in their situation can understand why they do it. So the fed (BCTF) had to steer a pretty middle course... This idea of introducing competition, they saw a lot of dissatisfaction in education ...god there were some appalling things going on around the province in the disguise of education!....there was good ground for dissatisfaction (BCTF:PLS).

I have never had any hesitation doing the things we've done in education ...re-imposing of ...discipline on the system ... re-entrance of government examinations ... other things ... clear curriculum, were the important steps to take (Bur2:LS).

e) Votes

Again, the Liberal attempts to see the non-legislative role. This time he does it through the eyes of a particular constituency:

(McGeer's) constituency ... saw it not so much as the small religious schools struggling as it is in Newfoundland - keep the little religious school alive at all costs - they were thinking of it in terms of St. George's.- an effective, independent school with an elite population to draw on and a high level of achievement produced for the student (Lib:P).

The NDP knew how important the need to be re-elected was and articulated that:

(Ensing) also knew something that I did not completely understand at the time - that politicians ...if you push them hard enough and if you are single-minded enough they'll give in to you. They are wimps. Most of them. They just want to be re-elected. They want issues and people who bring them to their attention to just go away (NDP:PLS).

FISA mention party involvement and power as it relates to votes and indicate, not only how non-legislators see supports, but also how party leaders see them from the point of view of how they can be exploited by lobbyists. They also recognized the strength of active or vocal constituents:

(Barrett) made the comments ... 'about 2% of the population are actively involved in politics ...political decisions are being made out there not necessarily by people who vote and put the government in power - those who attend the conventions... those people will give advice to the governing party or even to the opposition ... So ... get involved in the party structure ... also put up people for election.' ... The riding that McGeer represented was well stocked with the kind of people that would benefit ...that would support him...in terms of votes (FISA:PLS).

The bureaucrats mention the oft-quoted rumour that there was a coalition-building 'deal' between McGeer and Bill Bennett. The deal was supposed to have been in order to facilitate the independent school funding legislation and fulfil commitments Bennett had made to those that supported him. This is touched upon in sub-problem data. Also, in chapter six, sub-problem 3, the rumour is again brought up in the context of why other legislators did not get involved:

That bill was ...Pat operating independently or ... he said: 'this is part of my payoff for making the shift' ... there are pieces of circumstantial evidence: W.A.C. opposed to funding, ... not a campaign issue of any significance, ...one of the first things (they) do. ... McGeer was the driver ... Why Bennett Jr. would make such a radical shift if he had not made a deal (Bur2:LS) ?

Pat had made commitments he thought it was right to do ... to private school groups that he would support ...an Independent School Act (Bur1:LS).

The BCTF also comment on the 'payoff' and suggest an elite support. But their emphasis is on a political reality faced in every election: the argument that a vote withheld from the Socreds is a vote for the socialists:

(McGeer's) kids went to private school; he travelled in that circle... It was a Billy Bennett payoff to join the coalition... Independent schools funding would (not) have happened if Bill Bennett could have formed the government without the Liberals ...independent schools funding is (not) the only reason why the Liberals joined ... I think an overriding fear was the socialist hordes...If Bennett Jr. had been able to whip together an effective coalition without Patrick McGeer - they would have been successful but there still would not have been funding for independent schools. ... it only happened because of the need to attract the support of the Liberal party to keep the NDP out of power. That was the main force for having the legislation and the price that had to be paid (BCTF:PLS).

(f) Other

Other supports include a Socred thought on a bureaucrats view:

(Bureaucrats) were very opposed ...saw it as a weakening of their powers - a separate system would not be encompassing them to the same degree. They saw it as more work, more turmoil more everything but not more money (Socred:P).

A Liberal describes the academic makeup of his party as being supportive of the movement due to its relation to academia:

There were ten degrees among the Liberals and one for all other members of the opposition ...we were criticized ...as the 'pointy-heads' . We had gone as far as we could in ... support and credibility (Lib:P).

FISA mentions a previously unnamed legislator who was supportive outside of the house. A more than professional relationship between FISA and other legislators is described and Hugh Harris is again mentioned. Harris is focussed on under sub-problem 5, as a strong influencer of Bill Bennett:

Bob Wenman was an individual who did not say much in the Legislature but was very supportive of us outside the Legislature... On a personal basis there was a lot of friendship with Capozzi and Bennett.... Running into (Hugh Harris) and his wife on ... tours, they were always there and very supportive of FISA (FISA:PLS).

A bureaucrat outlines that he, "used the Universities", as a support in research that was of importance to both him and the ministry (Bur2:LS). Details are provided in chapter six. The BCTF comment provides an insight into how they felt about support of the constituent versus the party member: "the responsibility of the MLA is to represent the needs and views of his constituency ... (not) to represent the needs and views of his party "(BCTF:PLS). A bureaucrat describes the role of the NDP with implications that, knowing the NDP were ineffective, it was not hard to put the policy past them:

Eileen Dailley had tried to set up a policy division - she hired ... Stanley Knight....They let that policy business all report to the minister and they got political and unmanaged (Bur1:LS).

B. Discussion

This discussion does not follow the outline as given in the findings section as previous discussions have. The breakdown between legislators and non-legislators, sub-divided into various types of *supports* is useful in attempting to discern if there are major differences between the individuals from one support to the next. However, there are several specific issues related to *supports* generally that become more important to discuss, rather than focussing on the breakdowns. The following discussion will provide an analysis of the nature of *supports* as seen through the data provided.

Firstly, when studying the influencers in educational decision-making, motives of individuals may be understood by studying what influenced those individuals. *Supports* are an integral part of that influence. An important aspect of supports is, as a *proof of legitimacy* in the political system, where if there is a steady flow of supports the system has "...a right to do what it is doing" (Wirt & Kirst, 1982, p. 32). Chapter four confirms this criterion for legitimacy in general British Columbia policy-making. The question must then be asked if *Bill 33* was *legitimate* under the same criterion. Were the legislators receiving a continuous flow of supports?

These findings demonstrate a marked difference in what supports influenced legislators versus the types of supports attached to a specific policy-making process. Generally speaking, supports are looked at as those that involve the day-to-day affairs of the legislator, such as communications. With regard to the independent school movement, the data identify specific supports as had been suggested by Wirt and Kirst (1982). These were taxes, party donations, campaign assistance, et cetera. What this research provides is perhaps a more extensive listing of *supports*. The actual form of ideologies, lobbies and public system criticism expands the examples given. All of these still fall under the definition of *supports* as: "acceptance of policy" and "encouraging policy" (Wirt & Kirst, 1982). It points out though, that looking for acceptance or encouragement is in the eye of the *power-holder*. For example, a *Socred* saw the lack of

"counter pressure" by the BCTF to recover standards and discipline as a *support* of setting up a counter educational system!

Finding 5.8

The definition of *supports* as acceptance or encouragement of policy is subject to the perception of the individual who recognizes and uses the supports in a policy-making process.

It also demonstrates that supports, by their nature, will be as different in every issue, as the influences are different.

The issue of *supports* is also determined by the different values of the individuals involved. Where Dudley Little reportedly felt there was an unfairness from a religious bias, the Catholic-Socred describes the unfairness from a small town bias. The Socred sees the issue as growing and supportive of policy development. The NDP on the other hand does not see it as a growing demand. It is noteworthy to ask: is the difference in perception due to the unfairness that the individuals saw in their own upbringing? The NDP Catholic, though very outspoken does not mention a personal feeling of unfairness; his is one of cynicism. He believes the right-wing point of view was intrinsic not only to other political parties but also to the church and FISA. The Liberal does not see it cynically, but recognizes pragmatically that McGeer had elitist intentions rather than religious sympathies. The data do not, at any point, indicate any situation where McGeer considered the religious supports, other than those embraced by FISA as a whole, as a factor in his policy-making.

What did factor reportedly, in McGeer's policy-making, was the support that the perceived failing of the public school system was providing him, the Liberals, and ultimately the Socreds. This negative consequence to education being considered as a support in another arena is a

significant finding and was touched upon generally by Downey (1982). It leads to a reconsideration of the theory that *supports* are of acceptance and encouragement of policy (Wirt & Kirst, 1982). Although it is possible to consider the criticism of the public schools as encouraging policy for independent schools, it seems more appropriate to call it justifying policy, or to give it an identifiable name such as, *justifying-supports*. . A *justifying-support* would be any perceived support that is in reality an argument used by power-holders to defend policy initiatives rather than representing public acceptance.

This definition gains importance and credibility when we consider non-legislator comment of the FISA representative that, "57%" who are reportedly supporting independent schools, including many outside of the actual movement, are not doing to it destroy the public school system. They are doing it because of the language used by *power-holders*, whereby, they are offering an alternative based on a presumption that little can be done for the good of the public school system. They argue: if something could be done, what would stop it from returning continually to a system of dubious quality and effectiveness? If that presumption was proved incorrect, then the *support* of the independent schools would fall away. This indicates then, that the support in *encouraging policy* is only in form, but not in substance. This lends support also to the previously discussed theory (chapter two) that *language in policy-making* is intrinsic to understanding policy development (Edelman, 1964). It may be argued that the language of McGeer was more the inducement for support, than the desire by the general public to have independent schools.

The ancillary concepts provided by Edelman (1964), also provide for an analysis of interest groups, where the nature of special interest groups are looked at as more than just advocates of competing interests. Edelman states that this tool, among others, gives the researcher the opportunity to understand the environment, the players and the issues affecting policy development. In this case a look at one specific interest group, the BCTF, provides just

such an opportunity. McGeer, Ensing and the Socreds were able to use the disarray, the leadership problems and the lack of credibility of the organization as a support for their policy initiatives. This kind of support would perhaps be well described as a *reinforcing-support*.

A *reinforcing-support* would be a factor that capitalizes on the weakness of opposition and gives an effect of encouraging policy. In this example, not only was the *support* for reinforcing the lack of faith in the public school system but it also was setting up a question of teachers' competence in general. This particular example of a *reinforcing-support* was found throughout several of the interviews.

Supports can be broken down into direct and indirect encouragement or acceptance of policy by the public. Indirect supports can be either *justifying-supports* or *re-inforcing supports*.

Finding 5.9

A *justifying-support* is an argument used by power-holders to defend policy initiatives rather than represent public acceptance. It is in place of, and gives the appearance of, public acceptance.

A *reinforcing-support* is an argument used by power-holders that capitalizes on opposition weaknesses rather than to encourage policy. It is in place of, and gives the effect of, encouraging policy.

Another issue of supports, related to the teachers, is the analysis of the teachers association. The BCTF contribution is imperative in understanding some of the principal issues, as once again the human element is underscored. It was not just the association that was focussed upon, it was individual leaders in the organization. In fact, the vitriol expounded or alluded to by some of the interviewees was aimed at specific individuals who led the BCTF and led legislators to "desire to break that (monopoly/radicalism)..". The fact, that the usually perceived

supporters of the BCTF organization, one of their own executives and the NDP, were heavily critical, provides an insight into the nature of the damage that was being left in the wake of some of the organizations' communications and programs. Was this radicalism an example of the same student dissent that marked the 1960s as mentioned by the Liberal leader and the FISA representative? Was it part of the pluralistic and paradigmatic shifts whereby, individuals wanted alternatives and changes and recognition of their minority views? Was it a backlash to the hippie values of tolerance and respect for minority views? The evidence in the data appears to support reported theory that the Socreds were fearful of another socialist win at the polls and were perhaps vindictive for the way the BCTF had conspired to defeat them in 1972. The BCTF may have been still basking in the heady experience of once being instrumental in that defeat. The data stated that the Socreds may have recognized that "re-election was pivotal". This was probably the greatest *support* of bringing the Liberals in to the fold and taking on a new image. Perhaps supporting independent schools was part of that new image or perhaps it was part of the well-rumoured coalition-deal.

However, vindictiveness is an attitude. Just as the hippie era was a set of attitudes. Attitudes can be the mother of motives. This research is attempting to explore some of those motives that are essential to the roles played. The attitudes towards the BCTF, as a special interest group, are shown in the data to be instrumental in discerning motives of those both for and against the proposed legislation.

With respect to the comments on hippies, it is significant that this shift in community and national values is not introduced specifically by Downey (1982). It is, however, supported by three of the interviewees. Downey refers generally to the new expression of rights of individuals and groups to be different, as a *cultural pluralism*.. Perhaps he means that phrase to embrace the hippie culture. He states that "inevitably this new cultural pluralism struck education" (Downey, 1982, p. 126). By focussing on one similar aspect of the expression of new rights of individuals,

that of the hippie generation, we see more closely the age group that affected education immediately rather than "inevitably" as Downey states. Similarly, the possibility of a coalition-deal is not covered by Downey.

Both of these potential motives arise out of the analysis of questioning through the focus of personal influences and supports. This certainly lends justification to the use of the system model and the focus on influence in this research. This study suggests that one of the most significant weaknesses of the opposition was that they did not consider several of the nuances of motives in policy development. Accordingly, they were unprepared. In addition to the unpreparedness, the NDP also were resigned to an inevitable breaking-point with legislators. It is reported in chapter two, that "government will move only as the public pushes the government to move"(Phillipson, 1979). An NDP legislator in the data states that he learned of politicians: "if you push them hard enough and if you are single-minded enough they'll give in to you". The former comment provides the first perception that the pushing is a significant and demanding task. However the second comment tends to introduce a weak-point in the legislative process: if hammered at persistently, it can be opened. This is certainly significant in analyzing the effectiveness of legislators in policy-making.

FISA quoted the NDP's Barrett as stating that, the percentage of individuals actively involved in politics is only approximately 2% . This re-introduces a sub-problem 1 concept of *supports* , that may be ancillary to the theory of Wirt and Kirst (1972). That is, although supports are measured by their ability to generate acceptance or encouragement of policy, there is a degree that is equally important. If Barrett was correct, then it is not necessary to generate acceptance at all times from the vast majority. If the support can be acquired from the 2% then a decision is made for the relevant policy. This was first introduced under sub-problem 1, in a discussion of the *influential public*.

Finding 5.10

In the policy-making process, where the general public may not have wide knowledge, if supports can be received effectively from the influential minority, then policy can be affected without generating wide public acceptance or encouragement of policy.

One aspect of previous research is that a significant stage of policy-making is the obtaining of wide public support (Housego, 1964). The above finding challenges the perception that the stage is always a necessary part of legislative policy-making.

The final issue with respect to supports is that of the bureaucrat. In chapter two, it is postulated that in federal policy-making, initiatives originate with the bureaucracy and that new policy works its way slowly through the civil service (Kernaghan, 1985). Therefore, lobbyists are advised to maintain a close contact with every step of the policy-making process. In this issue, the bureaucrats are seen as opposed to the policy from the start. But, this policy did not apparently originate with the civil service. It originated through two power-holders, McGeer and Ensing as is evidenced throughout the data. Bureaucrats who did not agree with the policy were bypassed and new bureaucrats were hired who did support the policy or support the minister. The lobbyists were not only maintaining a close contact with the new bureaucrats through every step and stage, but they were doing it because of their relationship with the minister and the Legislature. It was one stone among many that Ensing and McGeer did not leave unturned. It was perhaps their way of supporting and influencing each other. These can be called *relational supports*. Relational supports can be defined as those inputs that arise out of *influencer* relationships, created in order to provide effective and efficient acceptance of policy in all environments, whether or not the acceptance is based on fair understanding of the issue.

Finding 5.11

Acceptance of policy can be directed through *relational supports* ; those direct supports, where two or more *Influencers* combine to create an effective and efficient acceptance, whether or not the acceptance is based on a fair or complete understanding of the issue.

In all this data, Wirt and Kirst's assertion that continuing supports represent legitimacy, is questioned sharply. The concepts of indirect *justifying-supports* , and *reinforcing-supports*, plus direct *relational-supports* are concepts that do not lend themselves to affecting legitimacy. That is, if these indirect supports are the essential composition of the "continuing supports". In other words, it should not be assumed that manipulation of supports, to give the appearance of public acceptance, is either legitimate or providing an element of legitimacy.

Sub-problem 4

Who played significant roles in interpretation and presentation of inputs to the Legislature?

A. Findings

This stage of the conversion process represents the end of demand-creation and demand-articulation in the outside environment. The inputs are now identified as they pertain to both legislators and non-legislators. The legislators and bureaucrats felt the effects of these inputs and were facing the potential policy-making stage that would convert the inputs into legislation. However, before that stage was reached the interview process enabled the seeking of data that would clarify how the inputs were being officially presented and how they were being interpreted at the legislative level. This sub-problem concludes with a look at how the bureaucrats

and legislators reacted to the inputs. It is then followed by the sub-problem of the conversion process. In analyzing the data, the following individuals or groups are identified as playing significant roles in presentation and interpretation: McGeer, FISA - Ensing, BCTF, Bureaucrats, NDP and others.

(i) McGeer

The various interviewees are all unanimous in their understanding of the effectiveness of McGeer's role. However, the opinion on what motivated the man to take the role in presenting the inputs to the Legislature is divided. The former Liberal MLA focusses on the rumour about coalition-building. "... (McGeer) was definitely supportive (of the independent school cause). But I do not think in any way that he would make that a condition of joining the Social Credit " (Lib:P). The NDP MLAs give strong opinions on McGeer's politics and his relationship with Bill Bennett. They also offer insight into McGeer's leadership role in the Cabinet and offer a similar opinion on the possibility of coalition-building:

It was a straight political move by Pat McGeer. Pat was determined ... to have independent schools. I do not think Bill Bennett could have cared less ... Pat was ... the intellectual. Bill looked up to him and respected him. ... I think McGeer knew he had a winner (NDP:PL) .

McGeer was always politically naive ... an elitist, he might well have thought that Bill Bennett ... would not have the skills to maintain this coalition... he would have to call upon McGeer to take the leadership ... McGeer was the number two man for the first two terms of that government... (Re: coalition building) I do not think it was likely. ... I'm not saying it was not discussed and Bill Bennett did not promise some action on it I just do not think it was pivotal to the Liberals crossing the floor (NDP:PLS).

The FISA interviewee praises McGeer's efforts and his values. He also comments on the coalition-building rumour by reservedly disagreeing with the Liberal member:

(Pat McGeer) is - I think - a true small 'l' liberal who believes in the freedom of people and freedom of choice in many things; he just does not think that a monolithic system was the answer for the good of society in the long run... It certainly needed someone to keep the issue in front of the house; I considered

Pat as an invaluable asset to the cause of the independent schools - I do not think it would have been as successful as quickly perhaps ... We were told that Pat, when he crossed the floor, said 'I will join you but this will have to be one of the issues that you deal with quickly.' ... If it had not been for Hugh Harris (influence described below) I do not know that McGeer would have made his bargain (FISA:PLS).

One bureaucratic response is supportive of both McGeer and Ensing equally. He praises the tactics used by McGeer. Unlike previous commentary, he lends conjecture to a 'deal' between McGeer and Bennett. However, the other bureaucrat, who has on a previous discussion given little credit to Ensing at this level, labels McGeer as a rare, *proactive* minister in education, as well as on this issue. He offers no comment on the 'deal' issue. His definition of *proactive* is the trait of being visionary and acting on that vision:

As good as Ensing was he needed McGeer and McGeer needed Ensing. No others had fire in their belly like McGeer did; if (others) had been minister of education my guess is that they would have referred it and asked the bureaucrats to give it some counsel; so you had to have someone with a fire in their belly, a good lobbyist and then an instrument or facilitator like (Jim Carter) ... If it had been turned over to Walter (Deputy Minister, Hardwick) by say, Williams (MLA) or Gardom (MLA) and Walter had asked his bureaucrats 'what do you think about this?' the answer would have been zilch---- and Gardom or Williams would have said 'who needs this' and it would have been shoved aside... (Re: coalition building) ... perception as to what could have happened: when you cross (over) to a party you get ... deals. (e.g.) I want an unfettered hand to implement - 'right you've got it' - and so with the dollars, the how, the legislative committee process were all just managed by Pat. ... it may have been Pat's style and there was not a deal, but now we go through very formal processes (through many committees)...From my knowledge it went from McGeer to 'yeh that looks OK' to (only) the Legislative committee (Bur2:LS).

McGeer was one of three proactive ministers in that Government ... the majority of people who run for public office have few agendas....(they are) there as surrogates to pass judgement (Bur1:LS) .

The BCTF member scorns the lack of leadership of McGeer compared to his perceived potential as an educator and again refers to Vander Zalm's behind-the- scene role in interpreting some of the inputs:

...people that I thought that should have shown more leadership ...were very self-centered. ... (e.g.) McGeer, is an educational snob ...the iceberg (independent school problems) that is rapidly surfacing today is more the vision that Vander Zalm had (than McGeer's)... I do not think Pat was motivated by funding for the

small parochial schools...I do not give Patrick the credit or the blame for the initiation -it's ...more of the practical politician recognizing that he had to go with that constituency (BCTF:PLS) .

(ii) FISA - Ensing

Both the Liberal and the Socred of the same era comment and agree on the toned-down inputs of the Catholics through Ensing's efforts:

Ensing... had a great ability to bring a cause forward without bringing the antagonisms forward that many had brought

before... a job rather than a pilgrimage...able to tone down the religious aspects... stressed ... independent schools ... a good word to be using... It was not the Catholics that brought it thru in the Social Credit party it wasunited reformed churches (Socred:P).

Ensing would bring along his executive. I did not see the concerted organization of the Catholic church which one would have expected (Lib:P) .

The NDP are not generous with the comments on Ensing. One of the respondents is very critical of Ensing's tactics and grudgingly talked of respect and effectiveness. The other NDP member similarly talks of Ensing's formidable and effective nature but has few warm words for him:

I always made it clear that I appreciated (the arguments)... I went to a Catholic school ...I just did not believe on principle... I found (Ensing) arrogant ...we had a grudging respect for each other ...he was under a lot of pressure to get it and he was terribly upset that the NDP would not move on it ...he was a pain in my side. ... Obviously, he was effective ...you can imagine the way he must have worked over the Socreds that might have been wavering...(he was) an exceptionally strong advocate but he ran the risk of being unpleasant about it...determined...not exactly ruthless but abrasive (NDP:PL).

Ensing ...very right-wing ... fundamentalist Christian values...very bright man. ...very cold...I have never been able to figure out how people can believe in the fundamental interpretation of the bible and have an I.Q. over 30 or 40 ... extremely clever and single-minded...brighter than McGeer...so bright that he allowed McGeer to patronize him. That's how effective Ensing was - a formidable impact on this issue...would never let it go, Ensing worked everybody day and night.. Ensing (was) humorless ... dangerous. He would be shocked to hear this (NDP:PLS).

The FISA commentary offers an inward perspective. It explains the nature of the presentation from their point of view and gives another insight into the character of the man who did the influencing on behalf of FISA. It also hints at some of the specific successes of FISA's presentations to caucus and committees:

The strong people (MLAs) that brought their influence to bear on caucus ...tend to speak out also in committees.... a lobbyist would pay attention to every single individual ... it was very valuable to do that as an individual...trying to influence ... weak members would take every opportunity to make their views known within caucus ...(to) be perceived as contributing to something...it builds them in the perception of other caucus members... (We pushed for this being a separate act and this not be a sub-section of the public school act. We were successful in that. We were asking for specific per pupil grants that were related to public school costs so that they would go up when other costs went up. We were successful. We did not want the word non-public or private used (FISA:PLS).

The former Liberal, who turned Socred, identifies Ensing's role and gives credit only to his interpretative role and input of the conversion-process stage or, subsequently, at the drafting and defence of the legislation. He does not acknowledge a presentation role and hesitates to offer comment on his style or characteristics:

(Ensing) ... met (subsequent to the legislation) with all the organizations ...to try and keep their school systems healthy... Workable legislation had to be drafted that would satisfy ... public...and ...meet terms that the independent schools could manage...Gerry was the coordinator ...a number of very sensitive issues would have been discussed (with the individual schools). (Ensing) was a reasonable personbeyond that he was a hardworker I guess (Socred:PLS) .

One of the bureaucrats feels that the act would not have been written even if it were not Ensing and his organization that were involved. He offers a strong insight into Ensing's style. He links McGeer to Ensing rather than the other way around. This was the opposite interpretation of the other bureaucrat as found in other sections of the data. The first bureaucrat brings up a strong question, linked to certain data in chapter 6, on the concept of *feed-forward* people. He explains that like the *feed-back loops* in the Easton model, good leaders are *feed-forward* people who have a vision and act in order to see the vision a reality. He calls these people, *proactive* . The

bureaucrat's rhetorical question is whether Ensing was such a person for education as a whole or was his vision just a mission for a select constituency?

Is Gerry Ensing a 'feed-forward person'? and I do not know ...that argument had been going on (many years)...(Bur1:LS)

I don't think the act would have been written if hadn't been for FISA and Gerry; the consciousness and the presence of Fisa and Gerry was something that McGeer linked his star to and completely agreed with and supported what they were saying but it was sustaining interest and enthusiasm and always being there - Gerry was very good at being there - always in his quiet mild manner, pressing home his points and doing it in a non-offensive manner which everyone could accept whether you were in opposition or in favour - he was a superb lobbyist. He just kept pressing his position and pressing and pressing. ..always so reasonable and trying to find resolution...never dogmatic ...trying to work with (us). ... easy to work with in the time of negotiations which we did a lot of ...He was his own man...It was clear that FISA had set the course (Bur2:LS).

Like the first bureaucrat, the BCTF opinion of Ensing is warm and strongly interpretive. He also offers analysis of Ensing's presentation skills techniques and characteristics:

Gerry ...kept things in perspective - ... solid person...read the policy - literally ...good sense of the (BCTF) ...of our tendency to the centre - he talked to a number of us...so did not have to worry about the great extremes that were getting a lot of press ...did a good job of keeping the independent schools on line and pretty well in the middle. ...he was ... temperate and middle of the road... showed a lot of maturity ...quiet, .. perceptive, well-prepared, articulate, thoughtful, willing to listen, ...but not a practical politician (BCTF:PLS).

(iii) BCTF

In sub-problem 1, certain stresses , pertaining to the lack of confidence in the public school system and arising from paradigm shifts and related changing values which were affecting the educational system, are identified. In subsequent sections, those same concerns about the public system are described as being strong supports to certain decision-making. Now we look at the role those concerns play in interpretation and presentation to the legislature.

The early Liberal member brings to light the aspect of the "teacher defeat" of W.A.C. Bennett as an important factor in determining how the BCTF would be received in making

counter-demands and interpretations. The description gives an indication of how one MLA saw the credibility of the NDP as effective interpreters:

Jim McFarlane (BCTF) ...(represented a) scare technique at work ...he came to symbolize the...teachers (who) in 1972 defeated W.A.C. Bennett. ...NDP were basically incompetent in comparison ...every place that you had 30 kids you had a teacher... intellectual leaders in ...communities ... influential people...all on one side ...(there was) concern of the Socreds that they could hAndel the NDP... they (the NDP) will ignore fundamentals in politics...to screw up. -But you can not count on the teachers not to ...do again what they did in 1972 (Lib:P).

On the other hand, one NDP comment focusses on Jack Gilmour's excellent debating skills, while the other NDP legislator focuses, with the Liberal, on the legitimacy of the BCTF. He provides a graphic example:

Jack Gilmour - ... an excellent debater ...a good match for Ensing because they were both single-minded... a passion about this (NDP:PL).

Larry Kuehn and the president (of the BCTF) before him. ...it (BCTF) has a legitimacy, (but) it does not have the legitimacy that BCTF executives had in the past. Governments know that. ...(e.g.) screaming that you have brought your two big brothers ... and I can see for miles (no) ...big brothers ...(I'm) not going to take you seriously. ...it is the same with the government (and BCTF) (NDP:PLS).

The Liberal-turned-Socred echoes the negativity factor of the BCTF:

BCTF ... extremely negative factor. ...performing like a classical trade union. ... teachers (perhaps) generally disapproved of the Federation ... they support activities that get them higher salaries ... they do not necessarily respect...professional attitudes (Socred:PLS).

One of the bureaucrats reduces it to a relationship with the BCTF and himself and comes out on the negative side of the BCTF providing some apt examples. The resulting overall description of the effective role that the BCTF did, or could have, played is comprehensive:

BCTF and I were not the greatest friends...last president ... I could deal with was Bill Broadley...after that ... it was hard slogging. ...We met monthly with the BCTF and BCSTA ...they kept saying government was continually hiding things ...coercing them... Henry Armstrong (Executive Director of BCSTA) took things into his own hands...would not bring his elected executives as requested. ... they were good sessions. ...With McGeer's blessing he wanted the system to run...education was the top public issue ...we wanted to seriously get the public education system into the public education business and off a lot of the hobby

horses... After Broadley, McFarlane came ... who hired Kuehn and ... Marxists ... The last people that they want to deal with are liberal minded people who are problem solvers ... They can keep power ... by being able to create ...right-wing scapegoats ... If they ... ever let the membership know that there were major attempts at reconciliation going on then their power base would slither(Bur1:LS).

However, the BCTF interviewee, who took a moderate stance throughout the interview and voiced the experience of several decades within the teachers association, again looked at the broad picture and sees what could have been if they had been taken seriously. He firmly believes that some results came out of BCTF involvement. These, he then describes. He acknowledges the awkwardness the federation was having with its leadership:

The fed (BCTF) at that time was more of a central position ... (Jack) Gilmour tends to take a stronger position ...There were some things that were adopted by the government: the inspector of schools ...the concern of quality control ... admissions ...studies on how the kids performed in the first year of university... outcomes of our concerns, identification of means of funding ...some effort to check on how the money is spent. ...The committee of the (BCTF) tried ... Gil Johnston tried to write properly a report ... it was not successful. ...It did not do the job that was asked to be done... The leadership (was) operating from fear: McFarlane ...or Adam Robertson in that period. I do not have any sense of ...any kind of a campaign to make it a debatable issue. We were ...shifting from ...where people of all values and all parties could sit at one table and work together for education to... where the leadership was more politicized (BCTF:PLS).

(iv) Bureaucrats

Through the vision of the Liberal legislator, a glimmer of recognition is given to the friendship that existed between McGeer and Hardwick. " Hardwick could have had more of an impact than I know- he was a good friend of McGeer's "(Lib:P). The NDP states that: "Hardwick did not strike me on as supporting it (the legislation) "(NDP:PL) The bureaucrats also do not think Hardwick supported the legislation: "Walter was (not) too excited ...did not want too much ...closeness to it. ...it was on principle that he did not think it was great" (Bur2:LS). Joe Phillipson is seen by the NDP as in favour of the movement. Comment on other bureaucrats in general, with particular reference to their attitude on Ensing, is offered:

Joe Phillipson...was very much in favour of independent schools. ...never outspoken about it, but I can almost assure you that he was quite happy to see it He had a philosophical attitude generally - that was not mine on many issues (NDP:PL) .

No (individual bureaucrats) were involved in the interpretation. ...(there was) sincere concern over the independent schools act ...they threw up their hands because they were exhausted. McGeer ... Ensing ...elected politicians ... governors wanted it; and this guy (Ensing) is eating away at their systems constantly bugging them - Ensing, wore them down... (bureaucrats) were a match for Ensing but Ensing likewise was a match for them. The circuitous routing and re-routing and buckpassing and paper-pushing was put up with by Ensing and his group and they just ate it and kept moving relentlessly towards their goal. I know that he was constantly in touch with them, constantly talking with them until finally there was this sort of hands thrown up in the air and say: 'what harm will it do to give him a few cents a year?'(NDP:PLS).

The FISA member and one of the bureaucrats can not tell whether the bureaucrats were for or against the independent schools. The other NDP opinion is that no bureaucrats were involved in the interpretation but were involved in thwarting the presentation. One of the bureaucrats describes how the other bureaucrats in the ministry negatively interpreted the policy individually. FISA recounts some of their interactions with the officials that helped them mold their presentation style. Jim Carter's style and positive interpretation is also confirmed:

I spoke to Jim Bennett ... assistant of McGeer: '...I certainly hope that the words non-public and private are not going to be used because the word independent should be used...' Jim (consulted with McGeer) said: '..its taken care of'. ...If it had not been for that chance conversation it might have been the Non-public school support act ... Les Canty ... with the minister of education, ...I talked to him ... perhaps early 1970s ... about bussing... I thanked him for being so kind and complete and helpful and he said, 'yes, well that's what I see my duty to be as a civil servant to help the public when they have needs but remember that sometimes civil servants are asked for advice by their political masters and I know that you are about more than just bussing and I will do everything in my power to prevent independent school's from getting money, even though my own child is enrolled'. ...' I think that people should have the freedom to chose and then should have to pay for ... the choice'. This is the only time one of the people in the ministry plainly said that we do not want it and I'm going to fight it...we did not want to talk to the civil servants because ...we did not want any enemies...we always did not know which side of the fence people were on. So whether Joe Phillipson was for or against the independent schools ...John Meredith ... Levers - we did not know... Phillipson changed ...he told us later; from not too enthusiastic to more enthusiastic (FISA:PLS).

Within the educational bureaucracy was a great deal of hostility ...(Phillipson) was not too excited ...Jim Carter had a great affinity for some of the things that some of the independent schools were doing... made speeches at Notre dame .. had no mental block to the work of independent schools (Bur2:LS).

(v) NDP

The Liberal legislator comments that:

...an NDP member speaking out was Gary Lauk. ... Lauk (later) realized that NDP took this cohesion business enormously seriously - much more serious than he had thought... he changed his tune... Other NDP?... maybe Gablemann or D'Arcy - there were some who were really thoughtful(Lib:P).

One NDP spokesperson gives little credit to any one in the party or caucus:

Not the NDP party or (its) caucus...made an issue ...our policy was ... mixed, but by the time I got in to the legislature there was general acceptance that the NDP did not believe in it (independent schools). So nobody touched it. But we had so many things on our mind... (NDP:PL).

FISA and BCTF give a an explanation of the NDP role that represents generally the same opinion:

The split in the NDP was caused by the split in ideology... by their opposition to the elite schools... Barrett saying: '..what can be done to eliminate aid to the elites - cause we are not really so thrilled to see money going to Catholic schools, and so on, but it does trouble us to see money going to the St.Georges and the St. Michael's ...'(FISA:PLS)

The NDP at this time really did not know which way to go... a lot of people that support the NDP ... send their kids to parochial schools (BCTF:PLS).

(vi) Others

With respect to other individuals who played significant roles in interpretation and presentation of inputs to the Legislature , Hugh Harris is identified by FISA as the person who interpreted the stresses for, and to, Bill Bennett.:

(The late) Hugh Harris, the Socred executive director... a strong ardent Catholic, a campaign manager for Bill Bennett. ...(was) convinced that Catholic education was good ... convinced of ... freedom of choice in education. ...This particular person ... persuaded Bill (FISA:PLS).

A bureaucrat names the Seventh-day Adventists as making effective presentations: "7th day Adventists...wanted to make sure there was space for them to stay out and not receive funding. Their superintendent represented them and the lobby was sustained" (Bur2:LS). The BCTF

identifies: "John Friesen...of the Christian schools ...(he) wrote a paper and presented it at a commission "(BCTF:PLS).

B. Discussion

In this stage of the decision-making process, the *influencers* step back and the *power-holders* take the front line.

(i) McGeer

First and foremost, as playing a significant role in interpretation and presentation of inputs to the Legislature, and identified by Downey (1982), is McGeer. However the data provided on McGeer by Downey's research is not in-depth and focuses primarily on his leadership skills while shepherding through the legislation. This is covered in chapter six on *withinputs* . The debate on whether McGeer entered into a deal with Bennett for his role in the Liberal/Socred coalition, is not concluded. The rumours were ubiquitous. Some feel it was possible; others think it is not. The NDP, BCTF and Liberal continued to stress McGeer's elite attitude as his personal motive for influencing the legislation. As supportive of McGeer as FISA wanted to be, they still reserved judgement on his power. They stated that there would not have been success if it had not been for, either a deal between Bennett and McGeer, or if it had not been for the influence of Harris on Bennett. A supportive bureaucrat states that McGeer could not have done it without Ensing and vice-versa. This is a viewpoint that is not hinted at by Downey in his study. The BCTF spokesman is able to see from a 1988 vantage point, the emerging parochial school consequences of the legislation. He states that he does not think McGeer was motivated by the needs of the small parochial school. McGeer, in a role as a presenter of the inputs, was not seen to be representative of the broad stresses in the community. His motives may, in fact, have been fairly narrow. His determination though, seemed as single-minded as Ensing's.

(ii) FISA - Ensing

Ensing is given little attention in Downey's (1982) research. He is described as an effective lobbyist, single-minded, persistent and reasonable. He is described as an individual that chose not to protest to government or be confrontational, but to be part of new initiatives in education. Downey (1982) describes him as a "partner and confidant of Government" (p. 97). This is similar to the description in some of these findings. However, a bureaucrat asks the question as to whether Ensing was a "feed-forward" person in education. Did he have vision for the good of all education? The same question is asked of McGeer in chapter six discussion. The evidence, through the data, is that Ensing had all the qualities that Downey attributes to him, but he also had other disarming aspects to his personality. The NDP found him abrasive, arrogant, determined in a pejorative manner, humourless, cold and dangerous. The Sacred MLA, at the time of the legislation, refers to him grudgingly, as reasonable and a hardworker. A bureaucrat and the BCTF seem almost charmed by him. None of this offers much of a clue except that Ensing seems to be more than what he appears on the surface. However, in the FISA interview, there is a quotation that FISA/Ensing "pushed for this being a separate act and this not be a sub-section of the public school act." In the interview of Olthius, it is determined that Olthius was not a proponent of public funding of private schools. He crusaded for fairness and equity through the public school system for the cultures, the religions, the pluralistic values that were alive in all communities. Ensing had this choice also. He chose, through FISA, to seek a vehicle that would embrace primarily the parochial schools that made up the bulk of the membership. He was his own man, as described, but was single-minded about the objectives of FISA. Those objectives do not appear to be, primarily for education in general in the province, but singularly for the independent schools that made up its membership. Even that membership is described herein as being factional and with competing interests. Ensing is reported to have kept those factions together and out of the limelight. The evidence does not show that Ensing had any different objectives

than those articulated by FISA. It may have been that Ensing found in McGeer, and vice-versa, a singularity of purpose that was opposite but complementary. This would have paralleled the situation within FISA for Ensing, and within the Socreds and some hand-picked bureaucrats, for McGeer. The bureaucratic aspect is explored further under the bureaucratic analysis of this sub-problem (the section on Bureaucrats). The seeking of these parallels may have been unintentional, but certainly appear to be a major factor in the legislation proceeding with such little opposition and debate. It also is a considerable factor in both effective policy-making and lobbying. This technique, of wittingly neutralizing dissent within an organization or party, is demonstrated, in these data, to be absent within the opposition organizations of the NDP, BCTF and BCSTA.

Finding 5.12

An integral factor in the political policy-making process is neutralizing opposition and dissent. Such dissent may come from within or without the group of influencers of power-holders.

(iii) BCTF

With respect to the opposition, Downey (1982) summarizes the role of the BCTF. He reports that there was a new balance of political power with the BCTF on the outside of the new Socred government, and that the first response of the BCTF to the independent school policy suggested that:

...the (BCTF) did not have a good grasp on its own position; it seemed not to anticipate the lingering resentment toward it in the Socred party - hence, the Government. It seemed not to realize that its political influence was significantly diminished from what it had been; it seemed not to appreciate the depth of the ideological exchanges characterizing society; and it seemed unaware of the growing influence of the competing lobby group represented in (FISA) Add to all of this the fact that the BCTF did not know - or if it did know, did not appear

concerned - that at that very time, *Bill 33* was being shaped and prepared for introduction in the house by a technical committee, with the advice of FISA, and no one else (Downey, 1982, p. 98).

What Downey's study does not represent is the lingering resentment with some of the NDP at the role of the leadership of the BCTF. Downey touches only on the relationship with the Socreds. He does say, that as a result of dissatisfaction of the NDP by the BCTF during their term of office, they had tried to take a neutral political position (Downey, 1982). It seems that the BCTF upset all parties and did not realize it. One bureaucrat offers the opinion that, the motives behind the BCTF were not simply left-wing, but Marxist, and therefore unable to deal with liberal viewpoints that offer reconciliation. Apparently the BCTF sought scapegoats as a tactic or it was, perhaps, a personality trait of their leadership. This is ironic, in that today, the BCTF spokesperson sees the organization, in those days, as moving back into a middle road position. It certainly does not appear to come across as such in the data. A current educational researcher provides a detailed view. Beamon (1986) traces the history of lobbying strategies of the BCTF from its formative years up to 1930 and its "impatient" years after 1930:

The unwillingness to be patient with the slow rate of change in legislation relating to teachers and education, that had originally surfaced in the 1930s, was manifested in 1971. In that year the first province-wide strike of teachers in British Columbia occurred. The strike lasted only one day and it centered on the displeasure of teachers over government decisions relation to pensions. ... (in 1972) the BCTF adopted an anti-Social Credit position and planned a campaign of publicity and political action in an attempt to defeat the government in the forthcoming election (p. 69-70)

Beamon summarizes that a lobbyist can not let emotion, caused by defeat on an issue, interfere with future negotiations. He stresses the importance of a willingness to compromise. With respect to the independent school movement, the BCTF, from this data, were apparently unwilling to temper the emotion or to compromise, as the BCTF interviewee had indicated they were trying to do. On the other hand, he also indicates that the leadership was politicized. This behind the scenes look at the only other potentially effective power-holder in opposition, provides detail as to

why they were neutralized as opposition. It is not unreasonable to assume that McGeer and Ensing took advantage of this situation. Certainly there was no apparent positive influence asserted by the organization. It seems that the negative influence was a tremendous support to McGeer and Ensing, as indicated previously. The effect of this was reflected in the free-hand that McGeer/Ensing and the bureaucrats had in this policy-making.

(iv) Bureaucrats

The data on the bureaucrats support the finding that Hardwick was picked as a deputy-minister by McGeer, and that Hardwick did not apparently support the act or its principles. It is remarkable though, that although this has in 1988, been confirmed to FISA, they had no inkling of Hardwick's feelings before, during, or after the legislation. This is a side of Hardwick that may well have been known to McGeer. A side that, speculatively, would be one of integrity and loyalty to the process and to the minister. It is another human side to the very effective and efficient dealing with this legislation. If Hardwick could have been effective opposition to the legislation, he was neutralized by his position. This is another aspect of Finding 5.12 as presented above. It is speculation to say that throughout this research it seems that nothing was left to chance. The political process was well orchestrated.

Another significant aspect about bureaucratic personalities is Phillipson's attitude. He apparently was opposed to the policy; at least he was not "excited" about it, as a bureaucrat said. He was recognized as such by those around him. However, the NDP who were in just as close a position to judge him, seemed not to be able to read accurately his motives and his principles. The Socreds were able to use him and his talents and his values. The NDP were not able to do the same.

(v) NDP

When it came down to needing to know as much about the policy as possible, the NDP had burned a bridge of communication. They were at a disadvantage. Also, the NDP talk about the amount of paper-pushing and circuitous re-routing perpetrated by the bureaucrats. However, the evidence is that the majority of the bureaucrats were pushed away, again neutralized, from the policy right from the start and as it came in. A select team of bureaucrats was brought in. This is also confirmed in Downey's data. Why did not the NDP realize or see this? The data show the NDP as new, awkward and adapting. They have many things on their mind, there is a split in ideologies within the party. This may be the simple answer. It may also be that much of what was going on was kept from them. The only evidence of this is the data from Downey, stating that the policy was being kept secret (1982). There is data, later in this study, indicating that the roles of the select few in the ministry were apparently handpicked, molded and programmed.

(vi) Others

The *influencers* stepped forward. Others, that could have been, did not have the means to keep up with Ensing and McGeer. Accordingly, the BCTF, BCSTA and the NDP fell behind at this stage. They never were able to take a position of power again. This stage was before the conversion process had started.

Sub-problem 5

How did individual bureaucrats and legislators react to the inputs?

A. Findings

The data is divided into two sub-sections representing the individual parts of the sub-problem: individual bureaucrats and individual legislators.

(i) Individual Bureaucrats

In this and the following sub-section, there is a focus on thoughts, feelings and motivations of those individual that had to deal with the inputs. To set the stage for this section, an NDP legislator expresses doubts as to the importance of bureaucrats: "they are really not that important particularly in the British Columbia context. Politicians like to hide behind them sometimes" (NDP:PLS). In a previous section, the FISA spokesman acknowledges that officials do play an important role. In order to balance these points, two general comments from the bureaucrats are presented. These comments precede the bureaucrats personal perceptions of the independent schools policy. They detail: firstly, how the senior bureaucratic role is seen in the policy-making process; secondly, what is a bureaucratic perception of *inputs*. With respect to their individual perceptions of the inputs and arguments, the two officials differ markedly in their interpretation of the policy. One sees the interest as 'latent in the Sacred party', respects the arguments of McGeer, shows concern about the elite focus, and plays down the role of FISA. He also examines the system, as it is now, as a result of the inputs and historical systems, and policy and procedures. He is not generally supportive of the independent school funding. The other official sees the ideological changes and the fairness of the arguments. He understands, but realizes he was dealing with a bureaucracy that was substantially against the initiative. Accordingly, he describes the need to have on staff those that could or would want to deal with the inputs. This official also comments on the public system demands that helped shape his values that led to acceptance of the policy:

a) Role of the bureaucrat

Deputy ministers are... the Chief Operating Officers of the ministry and of the system. Education is ...not a line ministry ...it is a (co-managed) system in which... in the sense that, school boards, districts, university boards all have statutory rights... you work out the relationships ...we had something like over 100

agencies ...to work with. The second function is as principle advisor on educational matters...a staff role in the government. ...(Traditionally) the deputies play the C.O.O. (Chief Operating Officer) role... in the W.A.C./Dailley years, the government ... went outside the bureaucracy to get policy direction and guidance(Bur1:LS).

Deputy ministers...put forward options...you make sure that they get enough information on all the options ...usually minister and/or Cabinet or one of the social policy committees makes ... choices ...design the legislation so that it will be technically correct and ... would not embarrass government ...carries out the wishes of government... (A bureaucrat) contends there is a ... position that needs to be returned to education that deals with curriculum standards ... I contend that education is no different than anywhere else and that the curriculum , ... should be subject to the legislator ... People are elected to set those things and as times change so should standards and curriculum(Bur2:LS).

(b) Bureaucratic perceptions of inputs

There was a latent interest in ...the Socred party ... W.A.C. would never tolerate it. Pat came along and said that this what we were going to do...I am not oblivious to the arguments. But ...we have gone through ... talk, about rights, but not much talk about responsibilities. ... We have a community responsibility to maintain a reasonable consensus ...those need equal if not greater weight ... I am not unsympathetic that people have the right to call on the public purse: ... for those things that must be taught, ... that sufficient funds... go to schools to provide the operating funds to deal with ...core curriculum. It is a defensible position. I understand it... there may be some validity (to ideological shift theory) ... it ... had been there for a long period of time ...they had to find someone to catch the ball... Pat came along ... he believed that the elite private schools were doing a much better job than the public schools. Pat has an enormous conviction for the cultivation of excellence in education. He was wrong, and I was able to demonstrate that ...Nevertheless ... elite private schools are doing a good job... Ensing's (people like Ensing) ... used to come and lobby the government and sit in the house and meet with the MLAs. ...But they were one of... many educational lobbies ...there was the faculty association, universities, BCTF, Superintendents' associations, BCSTA... Ensing would be just another one of the lobbyists...complaints ... always there ... If ... Catholics had the lead it (the legislation) would not have gone. ...it's because the independent (secular) schools, the St. Georges... took the more pre-eminent position that it probably was easier to get through...someone may have strategized 'let's let the secular side take the lead rather than the religious independents'. The tragedy is where we are now. ...what are going to be the attitudes of the kids coming out of this ...turmoil. ... goals were largely oriented toward education...learning needs ...the school act used to say that 'the teacher is acting as a kind, firm and judicious parent.' Eileen took that out. Eileen told the colleges that they ...could go and compete in a competitive... certain world. What she did not say is that ...has to be managed as ...an open system, there is a need for collaboration and cooperation ...that is not part of the ethos of this province ... every school board had full access to Mrs Dailley...she could make a decision because there was not any better information. ...there had been no modern management of the system as you would understand it (Bur1:LS).

(It gave) a sense of the right to choose - that we were a multi- dimensional society and as long as there was adherence to the British Columbia curriculum and that it

could be delivered in some diverse ways - in the broad sense it seemed to be fair.... but I do not know if that really was a groundswell ...or ... a justification of sorts ... (bureaucrats) thought it was a sellout ...and (would cause) damage to the public school system... Frank Levers ...thought there was a philosophic merit to funding - although he had been very much a part of the public system... (John Meredith) did not like the idea but was very understanding that if the government wanted to go that way we got to go that way...It was clear that if we tried to use (the bureaucracy) that we would have been blocked and crossed and fought and debated and researched to death. So we just pulled in with (us) and those three and ... always McGeer....one of the motivations that I came into government, I had been through the kind of 'free-er' approach to education and ... the early seventies I was saying this ...simply does not work properly. All around me the supports and standards and the structures had been removed (Bur2:LS).

(ii) Individual Legislators

This section breaks the comments regarding individual legislators into several sub-sections as follows: FISA comments on legislator reactions, legislators' comments on reactions to inputs, bureaucratic comment on MLA reaction to inputs, and BCTF comment on MLA reactions to inputs.

(a) FISA comments on legislator reactions

This sub-section commences first with a commentary from the Federation of Independent schools starting chronologically with their own, initial inputs. They comment on the reaction of the political parties, then the members and finally the minister of education at that time. All of this preceded the hiring of Ensing:

In the 1960s all the groups that had made their pitches individually finally came together in the federation (of independent schools). That helped turn things around as far as the politicians were concerned... in the mid 1960s none of the parties had a plank about independent school's ... By 1975 all the parties had very definite planks in their platform ... (In 1967 FISA prepared its first brief) which was short and sent a year later. The first reaction of Les Peterson was 'well, now you are going to go someplace - because now you are together' (FISA:PLS).

FISA introduces the concept that Carter was brought in for interpretation specifically of the independent school demands and the coordination of policy. They analyze the reaction of the

NDP opposition subsequent to the organization of FISA. They point out the NDP disbelief that the independent school *inputs* were being dealt with:

They (NDP) did not know it was coming. ...Dennis Cocke - (I had) a corridor chat ...to update him on what was happening with the drafting of the legislation ... and he just laughed ... They just felt it was too early or whatever. ...I said 'look it was in the throne speech ...Jim Carter was hired ...to bring a private school act'. ...They did not want to know. ...unprepared ...disarray.... did not want to deal with it...they had RC's (Roman Catholics) in their caucus and they knew it would be a divisive issue.

FISA's comments on the Socreds' and McGeer's reaction is detailed in previous sections.

(b) Legislators' comments on reactions to inputs

The early view of the Socred member presents first the MLAs opinion on the effectiveness of the individual legislator and then explores the W.A.C. Bennett philosophy in dealing with inputs. The Socred then describes a few of the early reactions, as he recalls them, including a comment on the principal Liberal motive. He concludes firstly, with his own personal interpretation and then from his 'retired' vantage point, to Bill Bennett's reaction:

The MLA really has little effect on education. ...usually ... no background in education ... or ...very limited ...their contribution is very emotional instead of a practical ...they are really hampered ...where it has to be filtered to get into the system. ... they do not tend to look at the broad picture nor they do know how to translate ... W.A.C. Bennett told me: 'A political party is not as strong as its weakest link - it is only as strong as its brightest minds.' .. he kept saying ...that we are responsible...not representing the individual ...we must make the decision...decide what they want ... we are elected because we say 'I am going to do this and that' and then ...if it is not what they want then they will throw you out. Our whole government is based on that. ... The whole government. system is designed not to let ideas carry on too quickly - it is ponderous... It very rarely leads, it follows behind what people expect and what people want. So, there is a certain ineffectiveness about government operations particularly with W.A.C. - he had a very small and obedient Cabinet and he was very definitely the man who made the decisions and there was basically no argument or discussion to any great degree ... people would ...speak in the Legislature ...that we could not have the state and the church involved... Gagliardi - he would never support the funding - he seemed so frightened of Bennett. ...Catholic schools operating ...(in McDermott's riding) ...needed more support. (Little) was a Catholic and his wife ...put a lot of pressure on him. The liberals had been more in favour of helping the separate schools. They were moving along because they felt it was a fairly good vote-getter in a lot of areas... the increase and build up of the ethnic

groups was creating Chinese schools and Sikh schools as independents and people saw this as ...having an educational system that catered to ...not just mainstream. ...people who sent their children by choice to bilingual schools ... a different meaning of what an independent school was. ...the change which allowed you to choose which school you wanted to send your child ...idea of ...one school for everybody (was being abandoned). (Bill Bennett) was getting more pressure from ... within his group ... he was not as singular in his background of the Protestant ethic ...his Cabinet were flexible. Probably ...wanted to show his father that he was his own man....a great way to cut down on educational costs (Socred:P) .

Next, from an MLA that was not in the Legislature at the time of the introduction of the legislation, a Liberal explains the W.A.C. era including the input of one major influencer. He does not basically differ from the Socred analysis. He then moves to NDP values versus the Socred values in reacting to the inputs:

There was not really any effort to take issues in a monolithic government (W.A.C. government) and coordinate opposition... Capozzi ... doing the right thing .. outspoken and fairly frequently mentioned it, but Bennett was not going to go for it ideologically...(NDP) concerned ... about public school system. ... a feeling that it was good to encourage schools to be models, role-models...no one was giving cane... and no one was reciting prayers. For ... Socreds ...this was one way of getting off of their general unease and concern over the public school system and the relatively liberal values that it inculcated (Lib:P).

An NDP interviewee reflects on the same issue that the Socred brought up, of individual MLAs being Catholic, facing their constituencies and reacting accordingly. A personal analysis by the NDP member of McGeer's motives is presented, plus those of the NDP party as a whole including their philosophy. The other NDP opinion traces the effects of the vote, pluralism, money, BCTF and other supports discussed in previous sections. These opinions are very personal and reflected the emotion, not only of the individual, but of the time, for the NDP party. He then concludes with his comments on the effectiveness of the individual legislator:

Lorne Nicholson ...went to Catholic schools ... could not refuse the aid... (McGeer) ...an elitist attitude towards education...he knew that in giving aid to St. Georges and St Michaels that he had to give (to other independent schools) I do not think there was any other intent...philosophy of NDP ...was to encourage...

individuality and diversity within the system ... alternate schools ...that demand of the late sixties...we were aware of but we did not ...did not get an overall feeling that the public wanted it.... very little effect on us but obviously had an effect on the Socreds (NDP:PL).

Ensing knew research very well the Socred point of view ...(that) the anti-Catholic vote ... was a pro-Socred vote and had shifted ... since the war. ...They already controlled Dutch reformed...big numbers...Elite like St. George's and so forth, the Point Grey and Shaughnessy types...a money count for political party. ... it increased the money rolling in to Socred coffers ...through the McGeer/Gardom group..(Bill Bennett) appreciated the elitism. ... (legislators) do not usually think of too many issues as priorities; it takes ...to get behind an issue and push ...more energy than we have and still get elected. ...they spend ...time irritating their constituents, polling ... talking ...sending them brochures .. Most say: ...' if you start asking me to think about issues that ...may not be ... my priority ...you are losing my support'...It was not a 'freedom of choice' question - it was a question of disrupting seriously society... (legislators) did not ...understand the causes for the stress on the public education system ... can not plug it into ...philosophy ... value system to find out what the answer is. What they did was to avoid the question...NDP ...traditionally ...anti-aid to independent schools because of the anti-egalitarian effects of private school education ...always count on the NDP... with a negative response to this. ... Ensing had been working ...hard on us...did not have horns and a tail... a sectarian with a smiling face...that neutralized us emotionally (NDP:PLS) .

This differs substantially from the Socred view that a legislator is ineffective due to his inability to see the broad picture in education versus the NDP opinion that MLAs just do not have the energy because they waste time. Where the Socred and NDP do agree, is in recognizing the difficulty legislators have in understanding educational issues and stresses. The Socred concludes with a comment on the effectiveness of Ensing and FISA. The other Socred who had been in the Legislature before, during and after the legislation describes his own personal values as they relate to the inputs. He describes the issue in comparison to other non-independent school issues. He comments on the public school system dissatisfaction. Unlike many others interviewed, he does not see that pluralism or shifting ideology was a factor in the policy development:

If the independent schools are clearly doing a better job one would hope there would more than (a 50% component of independent schools)... the larger that independent schools (get) the better the public schools (will) do. ... there should be competition; ...an alternative ...if you do not do your job well then somebody else can ... its important for consumers ...important thing is for the student to get the best benefit...it's better for a society that they can be challenged to the maximum...people were being unfairly treated...had to pay twice for schools.

...the public schools went through a dark period ...there was ...parental dissatisfaction ...with values of the schools ... I do not rate that as something reflecting a pluralistic society...it was important for the people involved but it was not ... for the province ...the province faced ...lack of confidence on the part of business in government... undermining the economy ...that dominated ... Nothing else came even close (Socred:PLS).

(c) Bureaucratic comment on MLA reaction to inputs

The bureaucrats give their interpretation of the legislators in general and Pat McGeer in particular. One of them, again, comments on the public school dissatisfaction as the Socred had done:

Lauk had gone to Catholic schools... basically favoured it ...they ... were a split opposition...(legislators) felt that independent schools did a better job ...wanted government to assist ..their existence and put the heat on to public schools for lack of standards. ...BCTF were saying ...teachers do not need to teach reading - kids will learn ... teachers should be free to teach whatever they want to teach. McGeer and ... others were absolutely distressed ...you have their desire to say - 'hey these schools are doing it right and we'll put some money to them because they have standards, examinations and discipline'... we are going to ... show the public system ... another view (Bur2:LS).

McGeer... believed...there is a sense of fairness ...if people choose to have their children educated privately for religious or elitist excellence...a lot of people in the Socred caucus that believed ...Pat was not alone... anyone .. Catholic or evangelical or fundamentalist Christian...had sympathy (Bur1:LS).

(d) BCTF comment on MLA reactions to inputs

The BCTF representative focuses on Bill Bennett and his characteristics in response to the inputs. Instead of looking at the BCTF confrontation, he looks at the background of the individual Socred MLAs that would treat education in a cavalier fashion arising from their own lack of education. He sees the dissatisfaction in the public system as a political tool used, by the Socreds, as well as a symptom. This view coincides with several of the opinions of the NDP up to this point. It moves the speaker away from the relatively moderate position taken throughout so much of his interview:

Bill Bennett (was) vindictive ...gave undue credit to the BCTF for defeating his father... a motivation ... people that were elected ..were self-made men ...believed 'look-at-me, I'm a high school drop-out ...what do I need education for -

if I made it everyone else can make it'..the government ... denigrate(d) the public school system... it was to their political advantage (BCTF:PLS).

B. Discussion

Up to this point, the discussion has been on the early stresses, the demands arising from them and the individuals who articulated them. The supports that merge with those demands form a basis for articulation that present, not only the *power-holders* , but also the emerging *influencers* and those that could have been. Prior to analyzing the *withinputs* , as the conversion process commences, the reaction of the bureaucrats and the legislators to the *inputs* is critical. It is described that, in Easton's system model of demand-processing, analysis of each of these stages provides a comprehensive understanding of the policy-making process. But, equally important in the demand-processing and stage-analysis is the *feed-back* concept of the model. It is described as "the interaction of output with its administration which becomes in time established behavior and its effects - an outcome" (Wirt & Kirst, 1982, p.33). This description is not of an interaction that is apparent before the output. Yet, in this study, the *feedback loop* is presumed to take place throughout the various stages of the model. The model is treated as a series of *feedback loops* . It is not sure from Wirt and Kirst's research whether they see feed-back loops as integrated throughout the policy. If it is not inferred by them, then this study suggests that continuous feed-back throughout the process be an integral part of educational research in policy-making.

Finding 5.13

Where feedback processes are recognized in policy-making, it is essential that they be realized throughout the process and not just as an aspect of the *outputs* of the process.

A criticism, of the model by Wirt & Kirst, is that individuals are ignored. This is detailed, in part, in chapter three. At this stage of the findings and analysis, it is relevant to point out that Wirt & Kirst answer their own criticism with the belief that further use of Easton's model would prove the criticism of individuals being ignored to be not valid. This research, it is hoped, provides the proof that the system model can deal with the individual aspect. The final findings and discussion to this sub-problem reflect strongly on both the feedback nature and the nature of individuals at this first and most appropriate stage of policy-making.

(i) Individual bureaucrats

The perception of the role of bureaucrats compared to the actual description by officials is notable. Earlier, the other NDP legislator is shown to have perhaps misjudged the role of an official, his philosophies and his attitudes. The data in this research demonstrate that the NDP were awkward in their role of governors. It was, perhaps, having considerable effect on their role as *influencers*, particularly with respect to this policy-making. The actual roles of the officials in this policy development was unusual historically. The data suggest that Carter was brought in to facilitate the independent schools legislation. It is suggested, earlier in this chapter, that perhaps Hardwick was brought in through, at least partially, a motive of neutralizing an effective voice. He certainly was brought in as a friend of McGeer's and because of the respect and understanding they mutually enjoyed. Other officials were shunted aside and by-passed for this potential legislation. The roles defined by the bureaucrats were certainly complimentary to the role that Ensing had taken with FISA. It also appears that one bureaucrat was brought in because of his systems experience and his understanding of the needs to have effective organization in the ministry. It is suggested, by that same official, that Dailley and W.A.C. Bennett did not have that expertise and suffered because of it. This could also be, in part, the explanation why the policy was received so effectively and efficiently by the political system. An interesting comment, by the

other bureaucrat, is that he believes in the right of the elected representative to set policy in all areas. This is contrary to his colleague who believes some areas, such as curriculum and standards, should be initiatives of a specialized bureaucrat. In some areas, one official supports the postulate and the other disagrees. This challenges the theory that federal policy-making initiatives originate with the bureaucracy (Kernaghan, 1986).

With respect to the interpretation aspect, one of the bureaucrats supports an earlier NDP comment that there may not have been a real groundswell. He feels that it was a "justification of sorts". This partly explains the reason why, what was obviously a groundswell to some was not to others. Some would have interpreted demands as coming from the community as a whole. Others would have seen it for what it might have been, a political lobby by FISA. On the other hand, a more supportable argument would be that those seeing it as a lobby and justification only, were allowing that bias to obfuscate the reality of the paradigm shifts and the emerging pluralism. The introduction of the data regarding the hippie generation and the search for alternate lifestyles and options can not be ignored as evidence of what is now recognized as substantial shifts in community values. The motives of those that supported this policy-development, those who articulated the demands, and those who presented and interpreted, could have been, singularly, as a response to these pluralistic stresses. However, the data show that the motives were more than that. For example, two bureaucratic colleagues were working together. Their motives as reported were dissimilar. Their public school background was similar. Neither was strongly religious nor owed allegiance nor loyalty to a parochial or elite set of values. They both interpreted, as did others, the *inputs* within a framework of personal values. It is these personal values that this study continues to examine.

(ii) Individual legislators

(a) FISA comments on legislator reactions

The FISA *inputs*, from their own point of view, were being well received by the legislators. It appears that this was so with the Socreds, but not with the opposition. FISA, at this point, had all the characteristics of an *institutional* group. They were well organized, cohesive, well-researched and becoming very knowledgeable about the policy-making process and how to get access to the officials. Most importantly, their long-run credibility with government decision-makers was more important than any single issue or objective. This is supported in the data where FISA describes their goals and methodology. The parties were adopting policy in their platforms and they were getting an audience with, the then minister of education, Les Peterson. FISA was gaining very strong access to the officials and legislators and was gaining in power, influence and effectiveness. This is precisely as Agger Goldrich and Swanson (1961) describe the process. This is also as predicted in chapter four by the Socred legislator in his description of what he felt it would take to be an effective lobbyist.

(b) Legislators' comments on reactions to inputs

The legislators describe their own roles as relatively ineffective with respect to education issues. This coincides with data from the trial interviews in chapter four. However, the FISA spokesperson states that part of their methodology in lobbying was to ensure that information was presented at all times to all legislators. In particular, they focussed on those that would be vocal in caucus or committee and those that were dissenting due to misinformation. Comments from legislators were recognized in chapter four stating that legislators can be *influencers* in caucus or committees. FISA attempts to make these influencing legislators comfortable and not challenged. Thus, even though the legislators doubt their specific effectiveness, a significant lobbyist sees their potential role in delaying or fettering the process as substantial enough to coordinate a great

deal of time in legislator relations. This is despite the apparent acceptance of the legislation at both the ministerial and hand-picked bureaucrat level. This may also provide an indication of the vulnerability of power-holders; that the "battle is not over until its over". Again, the theme is repeated: no area was apparently left unprotected by this lobby and/or government.

A particular significance of being so single-minded is that the process, as is seen later, focusses on the *output* stage with just as much diligence as other stages. This ensures that the public understood and accepted the policy. W.A.C. Bennett herein is quoted as saying that if policy is not what the people want, they will throw you out. According to the data, he missed that stage in 1972 and did not give the people what they wanted. The 1977 Socreds were not missing anything. From this data, W.A.C. Bennett's personality certainly was a decisive factor in all decisions made regarding independent schools prior to his defeat. It appears that, despite the growing demands being made on prominent legislators in his time, he chose to ignore them. It is also suggested that his personality affected the motives of his son. However, these findings are sparse. The BCTF spokesperson gives evidence that the motive of Bill Bennett lay in his vindictiveness to the BCTF leadership. His most notable characteristic, reported by the early Socred and Liberal legislators, was that he had a good grasp of the demands being made on his fellow legislators both within and outside his party. This does not seem to be the case for W.A.C. Bennett and many of the NDP. The NDP provide data that support this by stating that the demands had little effect on them. The NDP continue to focus on the elitist aspect of the demands. They certainly down-play, and they do not believe that it was a freedom of choice question. Up to this point, Downey (1982) claims that the forerunners of FISA were "clearly penetrating the consciousness of the educational system, of the people, and of the government"(p. 28). He clarifies it by stating that their "ideological alternative" had not yet taken form. At this point, where that alternative had taken form was still not clear. From these findings, the NDP, if they were penetrated, were not penetrated far. It seems more accurate to say that the

unconscious was being reached. An NDP expresses it well by stating that they were being neutralized, a term that has been adopted in this research. This is an important consideration when looking at the self-proclaimed attitude of the party members as "egalitarian". This attitude that was affronted by independent schools had to be neutralized by someone and it appears as if FISA was doing it rather effectively.

The attitude of some Socreds as reported earlier is again reflected through the Socred legislator who mentions the possibility of independent schools making up a component greater than 50% of the school system. He touches on the aspects of competition, alternatives, challenge and benefit. Clearly, he is expressing motives of specific benefit to a specific class of student in a specific type of school. It is left to argue as to whether his opinion would encompass the full spectrum of students in a community. He also does not see the emerging pluralism that is described by Downey and also found often in data of this study. This again supports the theory that the Socreds may not, at one level, have been reacting to the demands, but to an agenda that was specific in nature, and perhaps as alleged - elitist.

(c) Bureaucratic comment on MLA reaction to inputs

An agenda is specifically described by one bureaucrat who makes the statement that some legislators wanted to "put the heat on to public schools for lack of standards". The other bureaucrat steps in with his first comment on the elitist aspect of McGeer. He lends support to this private agenda of McGeer that is alluded to or alleged by all the other interviewees. The BCTF spokesperson concludes the findings with his perception of the personal agenda of a few in government. He states that the denigration of the public school system was simply because it was for political advantage. This ties into his opinion that Bill Bennett was vindictive and that the Socreds wished to teach the teachers a lesson. This argument ignores the aspect of McGeer's and Ensing's roles that they would have little reason to feel the same alleged vindictiveness. McGeer and Ensing are now clearly established as the front-line influencers. The BCTF, NDP and

others are now perfunctory to the process, as will be shown. Yet the political process of policy-making continued relentlessly and methodically to a quick and complete finish for the moment and apparently with another agenda for the future.

GENERAL DISCUSSION ON INFLUENCERS AND TIMING

Related to the sub-problem as a whole, of the nature of demand and support inputs received by legislators, are certain concepts that are more appropriately discussed generally, than as a particular sub-aspect of the nature of either demands or supports. In this section firstly, the *influencers* are identified, by name. Then the discussion shows how individuals and organizations have continuously influenced the opinions and behaviour of legislators and non-legislators. From major stresses identified by not having public funding of independent schools, demands arose that carried with them significant influence. The nature of this influence is analyzed. Secondly, the timing aspect of the influencers is analyzed. Those interviewed, represented various spans of time from pre-legislation to post-legislation (*re Bill 33*). The perspectives of those different views are discussed.

A. Influencers

In previous sections, the process of exercising power or influence to affect opinions and behaviour is discussed. It is stated that a way to see the effects of influencers and to understand their motives, usually is reflected in the nature of the input and it is suggested to group them under three categories that represented that nature (Thomas, 1983). These were introduced in chapter 3 of this study as: influence over the support of, and the access to, education; influence over the content and procedures of education; and influence over the latitude of social and political action, permitted the people who inhabit the schools. The nature of the *informal leaders* can thus be analyzed. This analysis is as follows:

(i) Influence over the support of and the access to education.

Those identified are looked at through the question of whether they influenced the support of education and the access to education. Firstly, with respect to influence, it is established that, to have influence, is to be successful in the use of power (Housego, 1964). Secondly, the access to education in this problem is clearly the access to alternative education for those that do not wish to attend a public school. The identities of the *power-holders* that influenced, through articulation of demands and certain supports for alternatives are given in the data.

i.. Individual *power-holders* in the 1950s and/or 1960s included Pat Power, Reg Paxton, Pat McGeer, Garde Gardom, Herb Capozzi, Dennis Cocke, Dudley Little, Lyle McDermitt, Jim Chabot, Don Phillips, Ernie Le Cours, Fred Moonen, Hugh Harris, Ray Perrault and unnamed superintendents of Catholic schools. Behind Perrault were identified the Archbishop Duke and Bishop Carney, plus other unnamed Bishops. In the Liberal party, Bill Vander Zalm's name was introduced.

ii.. In the 1970s, and prior to introduction of the legislative bill, many of the above names were still active in influencing the possibility of legislation. Also, new names were coming to the fore: Gerald Ensing; separate-school headmasters, in particular Ned Larsen; also named were Messrs. Parker and Brown from St. George's; unnamed parochial school leaders; civil servants, in particular, a bureaucrat in the ministry of education Les Canty; the Protestant group committee, Rev Van Andel and Harry Antionitus; Calvinists Case Pel and Dr. John Waller; and within FISA, in addition to Ensing, was their president Mike

Vanadraken. The Liberals had David Anderson and Gordon Gibson as respective leaders continuing their party's support.

Two findings arose out of these identifications. Firstly, it is noticed that out of the groups that produced *formal* leaders came the *informal* leaders, described as the *influencers*. The power-holding groups identified are: the Legislature, the political parties, and the lobbyists. The lobbyists are represented by the : BCTF, BCSTA, and FISA. The most significant *influencers* identified in the group of *formal* leaders are Pat McGeer, representing the Cabinet and Gerry Ensing, representing a lobby group. Secondly, there are some *power-holders* that had a particular influence that were not leaders in the sense of leading by their overall actions or intended results. For example, Ralph Loffmark, although a Cabinet minister, gave off-the-cuff supportive advice to the lobbyists that was heeded. Also, Tom Griffiths molded the attitude to be taken in lobbying. Dave Barrett, like Loffmark, gave advice that was well taken. This second group does not fit into the general category of influencers for reasons that will be explained. They are a sub-category of influencers which I name *non-patronizing*. These would be one of two categories of influencers, the other being *patronizing*. These two types of *informal* leaders would encompass the dichotomy of natures inherent in those that provide influence as leaders:

Apatronizing influencer ("PI") would be a community leader who demonstrates his or her support of the values and principles of the interest or pressure group by either belonging to the group, owning the same principles, or actively involved in the groups activities. Plus, the individual would have a vested interest in the outcome.

A *non-patronizing influencer* ("NPI"), may or may not own the same principles, be involved in the groups activities or belong to the group. Regardless, the person definitely would not have a vested interest in the outcome.

Finding 5.14

Influencers can be patronizing, owning similar values of a special-interest group, or non-patronizing. A non-patronizing influencer will have no vested interest in the policy but may still have significant influence.

Accordingly, Loffmark or Barrett would be NPIs in that they may share similar values, but they had no absolute interest in the outcome of their particular influence at that stage. Similarly, Tom Griffiths, who belonged to the FISA organization, did not do it for remuneration, had no direct involvement in independent schools, and did not have a parish or a constituency to to which he was accountable. Therefore, given the brief information provided herein, he may also be a NPI.

Understanding the nature of patronage to influence assists us in supporting the theory that private citizens can affect decision-making processes by dominating one or more stages of that process (Housego, 1964). Ensing and others were involved in more than one stage. It has been demonstrated that Ensing moved from a non-dominating role to an *influencer* role. It is there, that his domination was felt within the policy-making process. This is reflected in the data discussing the interpretation and presentation stage. He may not have been able to dominate if he had not the background in various stages of the process. This background would have been in, not only the stresses that *Bill 33* answered, but also the knowledge of how to lobby, as given to him by Loffmark, Barrett and Griffiths (the NPIs), who played very significant roles in support of Ensing's and FISA's quest.

Finding 5.15

Domination of a stage of a policy-making process may often be a result of strong involvement in, and background understanding of, embryonic stages and stresses related to the policy.

Researching the patronage, or the favouring of support, gives us a more finite breakdown of the influences and allows us to seek out motives that may otherwise be obscured by the vested interests of those influencing. For instance, Herb Capozzi had vested interests in satisfying demands that belonged to his church. He had vested interests of his constituents and had other political motivations. All of these may easily be recognized, not only by researchers, but also by other participants in the policy-making process. Ralph Loffmark, on the other hand, may not have had vested interests. He may have had political interests but his influence in giving advice that was generic to the legislative process was perhaps motivated more by a desire to assist the process than any belief in the ideals of the organization. Barrett, also knew his party could not support easily the interests of FISA, so gave advice that was generic to more than just the legislative process. He may have been interested in the whole political process. The difference between the motives of their influences and those of Ensing is that they wished only to accommodate a process, whereas Ensing wanted results. This introduces, for research, a minimum of two types of motivators that can be attributed to educational leaders: *result-oriented* motivators and *process-oriented* motivators. It would be reasonable to deduce that domination of stages of decision-making by private citizens could not be done by individuals who did not want results. Also, the search for NPIs can provide the researcher with individuals and motivations that otherwise may not be readily identified.

Finding 5.16

Motives in individuals can be *process-oriented*, that is, related to the political process or they can be *results-oriented*, that is related to the results of a particular legislative process. To be an effective influencer it may be that one must be *results-oriented*.

(ii) Influence over the content and procedures of education.

Thomas' second aspect of influence is that of the influence of "content and procedures of education". The roles of the informal *patronizing influencer* have been reviewed. It was readily apparent that each one of the PIs were attempting to affect changes to the "content and procedures of education" as well as influence "support of education and access to education". It is not apparent, when looking at the informal *non-patronizing influencers*, that they provided influence in either of the first two categories. NPIs were not influencing in order to see results. This has been already indicated. Therefore, if we look at Loffmark's actions, as perhaps intended by him, solely under the criterion of Thomas' first and second guideline he clearly would not be classified as an influencer. He does, however, fit under the second guideline in another aspect. This is that, although an agenda of results may not have motivated the influencing remarks, certainly the influence did provide a consequence to education. Loffmark or Barrett may not have intended to support the independent school funding but because of their advice to an influencer they provided a tool that, in consequence, did influence under one or both of the first two sub-sections. The implications of this are explored in the final sub-section.

(iii) Influence over the latitude of social and political action

Thomas' third guideline covers the social and political action permitted the people who inhabit the schools. It is found in this research that many of the initial demands came from

individuals who may not have seen the vision of a *Bill 33* but were interested in social equality and fairness. They, like Olthius, represented the grassroot stresses that caused political actions to be taken within the schools. They were taken in order to articulate the consequences of actions that continued the stresses. For instance, Olthius describes (chapter four) that he had a religious commitment to pluralism. If he was to be judged as an influencer at a stage where he was articulating demands based only on that commitment, he would fit only into the third guideline. That is to say, he would not at that time have had influence on access to education, support of education, or content and procedures of education. His influence was over the social and/or political action. There may have been several leaders before the 1960s who fell into this category. These leaders would have roles in influencing the later informal leaders. This analysis supports continuously that through the various stages of policy-making, individuals change their roles. They move with their increased knowledge and influence to eventual power. They are, or can be, significantly influenced by others.

There is, however, another aspect of an influencer being judged at a particular stage of the policy-making process and not at the conclusion. This is where the identification of the NPIs is most important. It is argued that NPIs did not fit into the first two categories unless the consequence of their influence was taken into account. Now in applying the third category of Thomas' guidelines we find that NPIs do not fit here either. A Loffmark or Barrett remark does not by its intent or its immediate application influence the latitude of social and political action permitted the people who inhabit the schools. It only affects the political actions of those who represent those who inhabit the schools. Therefore, the identification of NPIs provides us with a category of individuals that, when judged solely on their immediate influencing and intended comments, and not on the eventual results and/or corollary results, is not represented in Thomas' guidelines. The new category of NPIs is required to catch this identifiable leader. When the categories include those leaders that influence others, then the categories are able, under this

research, to categorize all the influencers. Again, to use the example of Barrett, he did not directly influence under any of the three categories proposed by Thomas. However, he did influence Ensing and FISA, who were at least formal leaders. Thomas argued that a way to see the effects of influencers and to understand their motives is reflected in the nature of the input. With this fourth category we now have a proven way of identifying all the influencers to *Bill 33* and specifically to see the effects of the Loffmarks, Barretts and Griffiths.

B. Timing - from *issue-oriented* groups to *institutional* groups.

The other aspect of this research is the span of time involved in interpreting the demands and articulation. Most of the interviewees, as mentioned earlier, were officially involved and dealing with independent schools, prior to the legislation. It is found, in the second section, that the Liberal can not recall, outside of McGeer and Capozzi, any other individuals that articulated the demands. This lends support to the argument that the issue was not a major one in the public's or the Legislature's view until FISA was created. Then, Ensing and McGeer took the issue upon themselves. It also brings into shape the theory of Downey described herein (chapter 2), that politicians may turn to special interest groups, and in fact, depend upon them to do their homework. Downey provides the supporting facts, that politicians do not have time or the ability to engage in long-range policy planning (1982). It also represents Kernaghan's classification, described in the same chapter, of interest groups being *issue-oriented* or *institutional*. It is obvious that, initially, the demands were represented through relatively ineffective, *issue-oriented* groups that later became one strong, effective, *institutional* group. Had the *issue-oriented* groups been more cohesive and highly knowledgeable about the policy-making process and how to get access to the public officials, then it is logical that the Liberal member who demonstrated strong knowledge of the issue in all of its stages, would have readily identified others representing that cohesion and articulation. This is also supported under sub-problem 2,

by the findings regarding Capozzi and Perrault. Although Capozzi is readily identified by several, he was dismissed as having little influence by one of the NDP members. Perrault is identified only by the FISA lobbyist and one Socred. The BCTF doubts Capozzi involvement. Neither of them are seen as part of a cohesive demand articulation.

Two aspects of considering the influence of special interest groups is: whether they are needed in articulating demands and whether the influence must come solely from the group. Kernaghan's research has shown that the *institutional* group is effective. But what about the role of the individual outside of those groups? One individual is named by the bureaucrats, by FISA and by the Socred. This influencer is Hugh Harris. He was highly involved in the Socred party, Premier Bill Bennett's constituency and as an official advisor to the Premier. FISA, under sub-problem 2 of the findings, describe Harris as an active supporter of the federation and visible in many forums. The FISA member states that Harris "was ... convinced of the rightness of freedom of choice in education." A bureaucrat talks of Harris' role as party secretary, "he absolutely had the ear of Bill Bennett...very influential". Under sub-problem 4 the FISA representative asserts that "I think it was this particular person that persuaded Bill." These data demonstrate the possibility of this one man having the influence to do what all the other influencers in total were trying to do. That is, to influence the Premier. There is the possibility that this one man had the influence power of an entire *institutional* group. On the other hand, it may well have been that if it was not for the demand build-up, the articulation of those demands, the informal leaders, the formation of FISA, and the development of the power-holders over this issue then Harris may not have been motivated to 'bend-the-ear' of Bill Bennett. It may be more appropriate to describe Harris as a transfer-agent of the demands and a strong supporter.

With respect to *institutional groups*, there is the matter of how FISA was organized and how they articulated their demands. One of the most significant aspects of this group in comparison to say, the BCTF lobbies in education, is their non-confrontational aspect. According

to the FISA spokesperson, under sub-problem 1.1, it was decided early that they wanted "to have a high profile for the ideas and not wish to confront people". This is where Tom Griffiths is reported to have played such an important role, as there was not initial unanimity in adopting this position. This, as suggested previously, is where it is so important to identify all the *influencers* and the individual traits and motives in the policy-making process. It may be that without Griffiths the nature of the FISA lobby could have been substantially different in approach and consequences. FISA, also under sub-problem 1 (the section on Political Party demands), are reported to have adopted other policies as follows:

i.. Not talking to the civil servants. They said that they "made (them)selves known to the bureaucrats and knew them by name and discussed things with them and provided them with information ...our purpose was to keep people informed".

ii.. Not answering vitriolic attacks "because it called to attention for a second time something that was reasonable".

iii.. "To form an alliance that would truly represent the freedom of choice argument".

iv.. "To consolidate one overall position to be brought to the government"

One thing they agreed on was to settle any divisions or differences at the local level. This kept any squabbles internal. The aspect of not answering "vitriolic attacks" was very much out of character to the climate of general educational politics over the last decade in British Columbia. Their position on forming an alliance to represent the freedom of choice argument is reported to be more important to them than the issue of funding.

Would FISA have been so successful if they had adapted a confrontational role, or if their policies had been different? The findings in the fourth section show that what impressed the legislators and bureaucrats the most was that the lobby was friendly, informative, informed, low-key, perceptive, and middle-of-the-road. They had the "ability to bring a cause forward without

bringing the antagonisms forward that many had brought before". FISA chose their words well, calling the schools 'independent' rather than separate or private. Ensing was reported to be clever, intelligent and "...was always so reasonable and trying to find resolution". This sounds like the kind of lobbyist that would be successful on any issue. However, those views represented only one bureaucrat, part of the NDP comments, one Socred and the BCTF representative. The Liberal is neutral calling him "effective" and he only seemed impressed. But then, he was not in the Legislature when Ensing was most active. The others see him in a much different light. The Liberal-turned-Socred offers only that he was a "reasonable person ...and a hardworker". He offers no other superlatives or compliments. The other bureaucrat states that Ensing was a spokesman and a lobbyist and declines any further comment. The NDP are very critical, although they respect his single-mindedness and his strong advocacy. One finds him "arrogant and cheeky...not exactly ruthless but abrasive". The other calls him cold, "humourless and dangerous". The NDP comments could have been due to their embarrassments at the perceived hands of Ensing. The Socred lack of comment could be one of desiring acknowledgement that the initiative came from the government ranks, not from a lobby.

Needless to say, the BCTF spokesperson, under sub-problem 2, sees differently the lobby as a whole. He feels that the results were due to a "political marriage". He recognizes only sporadic demands and does not recognize any groundswell from the community. He also reports the BCTF as being very surprised when the legislation came in and said that they were not prepared for it. This research, contrary to the BCTF opinion, recognizes the groundswell. It also recognizes the 'political marriage". The tasks of the new ministry of education, according to a bureaucrat were formidable and onerous. There was much to be done as already indicated in changing the very antiquated and reportedly ineffective management and information-retrieval systems. There were also many other educational priorities that were occupying McGeer's and his deputy-minister's time. Under sub-problem 5, the Socred member, who was in the Legislature at

the time of *Bill 33*, states that the issue was important for the people involved but, there were many other pressing issues for the government. We discussed earlier, Downey's comments on legislator's time and ability to engage in long-range planning. The ministry would have needed as Downey states, to turn to special groups. These groups, in turn, would do all the groundwork and research and other tasks that a politician would not have the time to do. That assumes he or she felt, as the Sacred and one bureaucrat says, that there were many other important issues. At this point, the data reviewed, supports Downey's comment that politicians need to "turn to special interest groups and in fact begin to depend upon them -to do their homework ...".

Coincidentally, another 'political marriage' also came out of the historical stresses, the loose-coupling of groups making demands, and the responsible burden on power-holders. This marriage was between the Catholic interests and the other religious and separate schools. Under sub-problem 2, the FISA executive describes the involvement of Ned Larsen, not as a leader or influencer, but as another transfer-agent of demands being made by the Catholics. He is described as, part of "a bit of collusion there - as the Catholics wanted to get something (going)". The Catholic hierarchy would not want nor did they have the time to get involved. They also recognized the need to have a cohesive, more representational group. This was not unlike the McGeer 'political marriage' where, not only was the initiative coming from someone who did not have the time to get into the detail, but also, there was a need for an *institutional* group to represent effectively the demands that McGeer had been representing loosely up to that point.

Just as there are similarities between McGeer and his eventual organization and Ensing and his organization, as described above, there are also similarities with other demand organizations and the independent school issue. The BCTF had, according to all the parties involved, a difficult transition over time from being an *issue-oriented* group to being what was perceived to be a strong influential *institutional* group. They had apparently returned to an *issue-oriented* group and at this date, according to data, still are. They had demands, that they

represented, that came from the classroom. They became more organized and more cohesive. But, they also broke down or lost their institutional effectiveness by apparently losing their focus. Throughout the findings, the interviewees consistently identify the organization as causing more stresses, than articulating the stresses, for the educational system. Under sub-problem 4, a whole part is devoted to comments on the influence of the BCTF and its leaders. It is not complimentary, except for an isolated remark of Jack Gilmour's personal effectiveness as a debater. The organization is well described by a NDP legislator as not having a "legitimacy" and accordingly is not taken seriously. It is cited, in chapter two, that Downey speculates, with respect to the BCTF, that their campaigning against the Socreds had generated lingering resentment in the Socred caucus toward the public school establishment. This is refuted directly by the BCTF representative in the findings, but is strongly supported or inferred by the Socred legislator, and bureaucrats and one of the NDP legislators. Whether Downey is correct in his speculation is not as important as the loss of legitimacy alleged by the NDP member. As the BCTF were the spokespeople for the public school system, loss of legitimacy over time meant loss of an effective advocate. Therefore, the public school system lost another advocate just as it did when Hardwick was brought into the ministry to support the legislation, and also when public-system supporting bureaucrats were moved aside.

Although the BCTF were organized as an *institutional* group, they actually reverted to becoming *issue-oriented*. The BCTF member himself supports this not only by lending his criticism of the leadership, but also by detailing some of the perceived changes that did occur in the independent school legislation due to BCTF issue-oriented demands from committees within the organization. The BCSTA is also described as having difficulties due to its leadership, when Henry Armstrong was reported, in the data under sub-problem 5, to have turned off a bureaucrat. These examples of individuals, who brought in negative inputs that turned into supports for the government and took away supports from the opposition, can not be ignored in

determining the roles that people played in this policy-making process. It also points out the importance of timing the organization of demands.

The FISA organization and McGeer were consolidating their power, organization and their cohesiveness at the time that the NDP, BCTF and BCSTA were losing theirs. This supports Downey's theory, discussed in chapter two, that the coalition between the NDP and the BCTF may have weakened them both in the public's eye. This also demonstrates the importance of analyzing the nature of the organizations and the individuals within them if one wishes to comprehend fully the effects on policy-making.

Finding 5.17

The cohesiveness and organization of issue-oriented groups is vitally important to policy-making processes.

It also supports strongly the theory of Housego (1964) that is described in chapter two. Therein, Housego states that knowing "who influences whom" is necessary on focussing on the power in decision-making in Canada. He emphasizes that the effects of media or wide public knowledge is not "intrinsic to the process". The data above have repeatedly demonstrated that the power lies in the influencer. Data in the *output* section by a bureaucrat also show that media attention was not significant. This is also part of Housego's theory; that media attention is "not necessarily intrinsic to the process". He states that the power-processors can be identified because "the actions are known to a sufficient number who have taken part in the decision-making process" (1964). His theory forms a basis of this study, wherein reliance is made on the interviewing of the few that had taken part in the decision-making process. There is little cause to reflect on others who could have contributed other significant data.

SUMMARY

The most significant data derived from the interview process applies to the initial stage of inputs in the political policy-making process. This chapter has detailed those data, analysed and discussed the nature of the demand and support *inputs*, and presented the relevant findings. Chapter six moves to the second stage, of *withinputs*, where the *conversion process* of *Bill 33* is analyzed and discussed.

CHAPTER SIX
ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM
PART TWO - WITHINPUTS

INTRODUCTION

The individuals responsible within the educational system for policy-making, interpretation, recommendation and consultation constantly interact in the *conversion process* with others inside and outside the system. The stresses realized by these individuals, that affect the process, are in the system stage called *withinputs*. This chapter analyzes the results of interview questions that called for the further identification of *influencers* in this second stage, and the roles played in interpreting the *withinputs* in the conversion process.

The same group of individuals, as in chapter five, are the subject of the interviews behind these findings and continue throughout chapter seven also. The chapter is subdivided into two main sections: findings and discussion. As in previous data presentation, a legend is used to identify the association of the individual interviewed.

The research question covered in this chapter represents the policy-making stage of *withinputs*. They examine the inputs received by the political system and processed, and the individuals that created those *withinputs*. The interactions, from the inputs to the authorities that process them, "generate inside the political system certain pressures, or *withinputs* that shape the conversion process and its products." (Wirt & Kirst, 1982, p. 33). The research question asks: what roles are played in the conversion process?

The nature of this question is the examination of the *conversion process* stage. The inputs, discussed in the last chapter, are now brought into the legislative process of drafting a bill. In affecting this policy-making process of *withinputs* from the legislature, ministry officials, other bureaucrats, government members and opposition are all potential agents.

ANALYSIS

The roles of the initial *influencers* are identified in chapter five. Now some of those individuals are removed from the process and others take a stronger role. New *influencers* also surface. Although there is theory on how the process could work, and policy on how it should work, it is now, that the reality of the personalities involved becomes apparent. The hinted motives and idiosyncrasies of the leaders become clear, determining the direction and shape of the legislation. As described in the analysis of the Easton model, the stresses in the community generated inputs of demands and supports upon the political system. We now look at that system and see how it "reduces or converts these inputs into public decisions or outputs", and then, in turn, how these outputs "feedback allocated values into the society whence the process began"(Wirt & Kirst, 1972). The outputs and feedback are presented in the next chapter.

The questions posed to the interviewees regarding *withinputs* are as follows:

1. Who were the legislators and officials involved in the process and what were their characteristics?
2. What impact did the demands and supports have in determining roles played by legislators and officials?
3. Who did not get involved and why?

Sub-problem 1

Who were the legislators and officials involved in the process and what were their characteristics?

A. Findings

The respondents identify several personalities, or groups of individuals, that reoccurred consistently. They are as follows: Barrett, Bennett, Carter, Dailley, Hardwick, Lauk, McGeer, Williams, Adamson, Levers, bureaucrats generally, and legislators generally. The names represent five NDP legislators and only two Socreds. The bureaucrats named are only four, as is suggested in a bureaucrat interview in the data of chapter five, sub-problem 5. Personal commentary from certain interviewees concludes this section.

When analyzed, the only legislators and officials given any substantial credit for involvement in the legislation, are McGeer and Dailley. Two bureaucrats are strongly singled out by another bureaucrat that was in a good position to judge. They are Adamson and Levers. All the interviewees are strangely silent with respect to involvement of bureaucrats. There is either little knowledge of their actions, little respect for the roles they play, or perhaps their roles are taken for granted and the interviewees are considering, in their remarks, the leadership aspects of involvement. However, the interview questions were fairly specific with respect to asking about bureaucratic involvement. The roles of legislators, however, are more specific.

(i) Dave Barrett

Barrett was not portrayed as being committed to dealing with the issue. His reasons for staying behind the scenes are reported as a desire "to be all things to all people":

He wanted to be all things to all people. He would not do anything radical (Lib:P) .

... always pretended that he was not a supporter ...pushing me to neutralize ... did not want to take the heat; he was on our side of that issue if there were such sides in the NDP caucus (NDP:PLS)

Barrett did not speak to it very much; he had a couple of shots at it but he did not really take a lot of time... (Bur2:LS).

(ii) Bill Bennett

Similar to Barrett, Bennett's role is perceived to be minimal. He apparently left the issue with McGeer, perhaps believing it to be "correct":

Bennett could (not) have cared less frankly ... Bennett did look up to (Pat) and respect him (NDP:PL).

(Bill) Bennett, on down; they considered it correct (Socred:PLS)

...Bennett never understood what McGeer what was up to. He just tolerated McGeer ...(Bur1:LS).

...recognized his own limitations ...brought ... powerful ... intelligent senior people to work with him ... ran it ...without checks and balances ...(BCTF:PLS).

(iii) Jim Carter

Unlike the comment on Barrett, Carter was described as a strategic person with a commitment:

... it was important that a contemporary leader be brought into it;... perceived of as a leader. Jim fit that role. ...had held offices with the teachers federation. ... a team player...likes the fight. (We were not) looking for (vision) ...looking for senior counsel (Bur1:LS).

...(He was) the strategic person between FISA and the ministry ...a central facilitating role as opposed to a major role (Bur2:LS).

... sincere ... worked very hard ...seldom listened to ...never given opportunity to bring into his ministry the calibre of people (as those) who were retiring. ... (He was) capable...more a political animal than educator (BCTF:PLS) .

(iv) Eileen Dailley

With respect to Dailley, although some comments may be disparaging, they do offer some clues to the form of disorder underneath the NDP caucus ranks, in particular with respect to the independent schools act:

... (She was) a classic school marm... not ... interested in discussion. ... Criticism of Dailley among ...NDP that she was not ... well-disposed towards people. Once she had made up her mind - that was the Minister deciding. She discouraged debate on the issue..education generally ... (was) her bailiwick ... (she) was not ..interested in others leaping in (Lib:P).

... (she was) decent ...not ... fanatic(ally) union ... very committed to BCTF concepts of a school system; (she was) controlled publicly... (had) very deeply held convictions (Socred:PLS).

Dailley was strong ... saw everybody, but ...never made any decisions. She met with delegation after delegations (Bur2:LS) .

...tried to set up a policy division ...she did not know quite what she was doing. They (NDP) let that policy business all report to the minister and they got political and unmanaged (Bur1:LS).

(v) Walter Hardwick

The comments on Hardwick reflect the respect that the individual had earned in education and the special relationship that he had with McGeer:

He and McGeer were the perfect pair always breaking all the rules...(Bur2:LS)

Hardwick, I consider to be one of the great saviours of education in British Columbia - without him it would have been a disaster (BCTF:PLS).

(He was a)...superb deputy, an outstanding individual...would do anything well. ... a competent individual. He was a professor... the family were teachers. He had an ideal background (Socred:PLS).

(vi) Gary Lauk

Lauk was given little mention, other than the recognition of his Catholic background and presumed support to the cause:

I do not know if Gary would be as single-minded about it (as Ensing was to the legislation); it was not his nature (NDP:PL).

... he had gone to Catholic private schools, and my understanding was that he basically favoured it (the legislation) ... (Bur2:LS).

(vii) Pat McGeer

McGeer is perceived by all as either an elitist or driven by principles of excellence or competition. This nature apparently fueled his determination to bring in the independent school legislation:

...by nature, elitist ...(I have) great difficulty in pretending that discussion with McGeer is easy if you think you are on an intellectual plane with him ... a very arrogant person(Lib:P) .

...determined ...to have independent schools. ... thought that when old Bennett disappeared and the NDP disappeared..(then) he had a winner (for independent schools)...a good strong proponent of aid to independent schools (NDP:PL).

.. always politically naive ... an elitist ... was the number two man for the first two terms of that government...the most offensive (to) most of his colleagues ... McGeer's attitude toward education, entirely, was ...pseudo excellence ... a vacuum cleaner kind of excellence...a scientist, but not a comprehensive intellect...did not seem to understand that: the definition of excellence is quite normative;... broadly based popular agreement about what is excellence is not achievable, it is just thought to be achievable. ...He used this as sort of universal (theory) (NDP:PLS) .

(He was an)...absolute individualist who did not suffer his colleagues gladly (or) let them poke at his policies ... (e.g.)first day ... about 47 delegates lined up,McGeer said: ' I'm here to deal with policy I'm not here to (listen to them)'. McGeer would not do (what Dailley did by seeing everybody) unless it was ...a major policy issue and then he would sit and listen to them all and snip at them...(He was) very perceptive...could ... demolish marginal debaters...quite prepared ...on the major issues .. did not want...other stuff (Bur2:LS).

He wanted the facts...wanted substantive outputs ...managed by the deputy minister. ...The commitment McGeer had was, for an.. Independent Support Act...had (no) clear idea about what the framework would be...(not)wedded to any particular ideas....very open process to find out ...alternatives (Bur1:LS).

.. political animal.. very competitive ..hated to lose ...hated not to be number one in his marks ...same kind of instincts drove him in politics (BCTF:PLS).

(viii) Bob Williams

The comment on Bob Williams is another support to the argument that there were conflicts in the NDP caucus:

...one of the problems of the NDP(He) an incredible amount of power...negative about education ...a very dangerous man...very hard to talk to ...dogmatic...didactic...'my way or the highway' ... approach...of 'let's destroy and start over again.'(BCTF:PLS)

...had this thing about the whole public school system is rotten...into Ivan Illych...went to the extremes...very strong person and impassioned speaker ...on education (NDP:PL).

(ix) Other

With respect to other less active MLAs, Lorne Nicholson was a long-term NDP backbencher, who was also a teacher, and well-known for his strong view-points and ability to

articulate well his principles. The others are the Liberal leaders before and after McGeer and the two Liberals that crossed the floor with McGeer:

Lorne Nicholson,..Catholic background. ..Williams and Gardom, ... nervous ... followed McGeer's leadership... committed to it... I do not think Anderson was significant. ...Gordie Gibson, ...(not)opposed... supporting...(but) not major (NDP:PLS).

Cocke was strong (Bur2:LS).

Three individual civil servants were singled out, by the two bureaucrats interviewed, as being essential to the efficiency of the legislation:

Bob Adamson

.. a brilliant young lawyer ..solved problems... a very simple piece of legislation, but ... (Adamson was) extensively consulted ... great influence .. in drafting... made sure it was legally correct (Bur2:LS).

Frank Levers

...of the old school...very thorough... not hostile ...detail thinking through of things... Superb at knowing ... bureaucratic pitfalls that exist in lousy legislation... absolutely perfect bureaucratic mind to make sure it was educationally and technically correct (Bur2:LS).

John Meredith

Director of curriculum...very bright ...member of our ministerial committee ...did not like the idea (of independent schools) but..understanding that if government wanted... (then) got to go that way...(he) came up with Lever's name (Bur2:LS).

(x) Bureaucrats and legislators in general

In addition to comment on bureaucrats and legislators, specifically, there is comment on the legislators and civil servants in general. The general bureaucrat comments show two sides. The first, is that of the internal workings of the department with respect to the independent schools legislation:

...The deputy minister committee ... dealt with ... about twenty initiatives; ... independent schools act was just one... Decisions could not be made on any kind of a rational basis.... Information overload ...was going through the Ministers office... It was probably the most aggressive, pro-active, period in public education

in the last decade...so much ...enormous...reorganizing the Ministry, et cetera.(Bur1:LS).

The other side is that of, representing all that was going on in the ministry, at the time and taking some of the focus away from the potential legislation on independent schools:

Policy came from the Government and McGeer - but we put up numerous concepts...the tax approach ...voucher system... full range of options...it slowly shook down to ...the act today ... shaping ... drafting were by Frank and Bob. ...it was charting uncharted waters and we were public school people trying to make a system that would work ...with respect to standards and what kinds of things would be acceptable (Bur2:LS) .

... during the Bennett years...the deputy Ministers did not even report to their Minister and that is terrible....We've lost the John Merediths (BCTF:PLS).

The general comments of the legislators reveal that the Liberal and the NDP, plus one bureaucrat, realize that the legislation could have had unforeseen and perhaps undesirable consequences in the future.

Most thought it (would be) just, funding what was existing; (not) really thought through - that this might be a ground for major expansion and a fracturing of the public school system (Lib:P) .

We were not able to inform the public ...that: they were going to divide up our education system, ... that this diversification could be taken care of in the public system, ...going to end up with segregation of children according to sex and religion and money. ...They did not care...because ...it never became a strong issue. ...Terrible dilemma in our party frankly, what we were going to do with this legislation. ...the political question was, for the people who had not thought ahead what the future is going to bring: ... vote against this ...is it really going to hurt that much? (NDP:PL) .

The NDP and bureaucrats further expound on their internal dilemma.

After ...the collapse from the NDP position there was ...anger and resentment from NDP membership. ...analysis from the leaders of the BCTF ...perhaps they had failed ...their activities had fueled the negative attitude toward the public education system. Unfortunately , that re-analysis was not wide spread.... We lost a lot of credibility in our own supporters who traditionally thought that independent. schools disrupted society. ... That traditional feeling was not articulated sufficiently for the public to understand....we did not gain votes. ...we could have deeply wounded the Bennett government..could have taken votes away ...because in the bottom line the whole major middle-swath of people could

not care less ...(yet) for years they did. ...The vocal activists - 20% ... wanted ...independent schools and have their tax money support that decision (NDP:PLS) .

The contrast is in the remarks of the two major parties: the NDP were caught in a cross-fire of values; the Socred sees the principles and arguments clearly. The NDP are more concerned apparently with the consequences to their party and the influence of the BCTF:

The NDP were very much under the influence of the BCTF and that side was a straight teacher operation (Socred:PLS) .

...NDP focussed their anger on...details ...stayed away from the principle..did not want to offend...NDP supporters ...(who were) sending their kids to private schools... MLA's ...may get a briefing on the broad policy direction... The day, ...before the matter goes to the house, they may get a fairly detailed briefing. If (an MLA) stands up on principle, it gets drummed out; rarely are they looked upon to enhance policy. ...they are there to serve constituencies...deal with individual problems; they understand and contribute to debate; now I am talking principle not clause by clause...that is accepted and desired; ...an MLA spotting ...trouble down the road will quietly whisper in a Minister's ear.The opposition was in a dilemma. ... they did not want to oppose it in principle and they did not want to support it so you had ... the walk out (Bur2:LS).

Both the FISA spokesperson and one Bureaucrat comment on the perceived ineffectiveness of individual legislators:

If, you are driving at specific ideas that found their way in to the act,... (then),I do not think Legislators work that way ...broad ideas ...they will push for...but will not suggest specific clauses... They did not know it was coming. ...They just felt it was too early or whatever... they did not want to know! ...the BCTF took the same line ...did not believe it ...took their cue from the NDP...were unprepared...total disarray...they realized how embarrassing it would be because they had RC's in their caucus and they knew it would be divisive issue (FISA:PLS).

I think the role of the MLA is pretty well emasculated - the effective role (BCTF:PLS) .

(xi) Personal commentary by certain interviewees

Lastly, personal comment is provided by the two bureaucrats, the two NDP legislators and one Socred legislator. One bureaucrat offers comment on the feedback aspect of the Easton model. This is discussed further in chapter seven on *outputs* . These comments also introduce

the concept of *feed-forward* individuals and provides insight into the inner complexities of the ministry agenda at that time:

An old friend...his view is that, one of the few things that differentiate homo sapiens is the ability to imagine futures....in a sense 'feed-forward'; now the Easton model is really a set of feedback loops and ...you can not get a full understanding by a closed system model which is in a sense without recognizing the 'feed-forward' capabilities of individuals. Now that may be part of what the issue is in something like this. I mean the (governments new initiatives like the) Trade and Convention Center and Discovery Parks and the Open Learning Institute are examples of these. They were not part of a set of feedback loops reacting to a pent-up demand...pro-active people have a vision of what might be and it is their job to amplify that vision so that there becomes sufficient others in the community who are willing to support it...The committee process was something that I was initiating... so I had very clear views on how to get information out of the community on ...issues, attitudes, values and ... on alternate implementation programs (Bur1:LS) .

The other bureaucrat provides details of his involvement in researching the issue of independent school funding. His views on a bureaucrat's role are expressed:

I ... remember studying the grants to English schools and what terrible influence that had - that some of the public schools withdrew from government funding because of the influence of the changing government... We had to devise a system that moved funds to independent schools...but was not so present that it would destroy the independence; ...important understanding -to know that too much help could kill it. I ...dug out a lot of the research ...in the universities. I have not put it out as a kind of a principled argument, but rather, I really believe in the democratic process; I really believe that (MLAs) have the right to set the policies and my job is to make it work and that is the fun of it. ... (Independent School legislation) ... became a matter of ...support ...information ... pitfalls... how does that legislation provide for that. ...laying that kind of strategic work ... the writing of those arguments... I found fun. (Bur2:LS).

On the other hand, one NDP legislator expressed the frustration and conflict of being a legislator, whereas the other NDP legislator confirmed his feelings a decade later that the government made a poor decision in enacting the policy:

There was an inability of myself and ...caucus to get around ...and inform the public...I had to gear myself up for the floor fight and the caucus...on a political issue you could be ruining your party for life; but I have always felt that there are some things that you just must stand up for. And I think that people respect you for it (NDP:PL).

It was a bad decision, still is a bad decision. I was a part of that decision and accept responsibility in history for it (NDP:PLS).

A Socred provides his personal rebuttal to the NDP argument:

...there was also a need to provide a balancing factor to the public school system, that was losing...traditional values...there had to be some kind of strong influences to bring corrective action (Socred:PLS).

B. Discussion

Downey (1982) suggests that this stage of policy-making be called the *socio-political activities, bargaining and influence-trading* stage. The bargaining and influencing is strongly affected by all of the personalities and the time factors involved. This stage demonstrates the nature of the process where there has been no "stones left unturned". This expression comes from Kernaghan, as reported in chapter two. He suggests that an effective lobbyist should be so diligent as to leave nothing to chance. Certainly, from a lobbyist analysis, Ensing has fit this description. With respect to legislators and others in the Legislature, those that had to be involved were heavily involved and paid much attention to detail. Those that were not, either took themselves out, or were eliminated.

(i) Legislators

Very few legislators get deeply involved, interpreting, or judging consequences of issues (Mitchell, 1981). Few legislators, who do get involved, stay in for the legislative process (Kernaghan, 1981). Therefore, they may have little influence on the formulation and implementation of public policy. In this case, as previous researchers had predicted, those who did were few. Those few, ended up as the *influencers*. Those who were successful in their influence included, not only McGeer and Ensing, but also Williams, Hardwick and Dailley. However, whether their success matched their personal goals, or those goals of others, is relevant.

Examples are: Williams may well have wished his party to be in a dilemma on this issue, but not on looking the fools and losing an election; Hardwick may well have assisted McGeer's success, but not at the expense of the public system values he held; Dailley may have successfully defended her ministry or position, but perhaps, lost the NDP party solidarity because of her stand. Much of the influence or success was dependent upon the timing of the policy-making process, the timing of the legislation on the heel of the NDP election defeat and internal problems, and the timing of the initiation of the new Liberal-turned-Socred members.

Influence, at the first stage of policy-making, is incremental (Downey, 1982). Later, it loses that strength and becomes vulnerable to the time pressures and the strengths and weakness of legislative roles. The timing has been dealt with in chapter five. The data in this section, and from chapter five describe the legislative roles. The data show that the stage was carefully orchestrated by two civil-servant *influencers*, Hardwick and Carter, who had never performed their official roles before. It was supported by other *influencers* that were also new. If the bureaucrats had not been hand-chosen by McGeer and were not motivated as reported; if the old-term officials had not been shunted aside by McGeer and committed officials had not been specifically assigned by him or his deputies; if McGeer had not had the elite-driving motives, would the policy have been developed? The roles of other legislators, and the opposition in particular, were reduced according to the data provided. The influence of the civil service was also reduced.

Finding 6.1

Influence, at the first stage of policy-making, is incremental. Later, it can lose that strength and become vulnerable to both time pressures and to strengths and weaknesses of legislative roles.

Kernaghan (1985) talks about initiatives originating with the bureaucracy. As discussed in chapter two, he suggests that new policy ideas begin deep in the civil service machine, that new policy slowly works its way through the civil service, and that special interest groups have to attempt to influence policy before Cabinet enshrines it, making it very difficult to have changed. This is not evidenced herein.

(ii) Bureaucrats

The data on *withinputs* are not indicative of strong 'civil servant machinery' input. Did Kernaghan envision a situation where the bureaucracy would be brought in solely to support an initiative, as it was with *Bill 33* ? The evidence of chapter four demonstrates that, in fact in British Columbia, policy is looked at as definitely capable of coming from the Legislature, although not likely. Certainly the bureaucrats, from the evidence of the data, would not have brought in this particular initiative. Perhaps it is, that when policy is brought in by a legislator, there is a significant role that must be played by that legislator in dealing with the bureaucratic opposition, as has been evidenced with this legislation. Perhaps this statement is as significant as is Kernaghan's warning to lobbyists to monitor every step of the way. It appears that, analyzing the bureaucrats' behaviour has to be done hand-in-hand with an analysis of the legislators' behaviour. This may agree with the comments of the NDP, who feel that bureaucrats have little power. It is their personalities that play a significant part. From previous evidence, the personalities have more affect on the policy-development than does protocol or procedures.

Finding 6.2

In order to influence policy-making it may be essential to not only monitor the legislation and legislators through every step, but also, to monitor the behaviour and personalities of the bureaucrats.

Only two legislative personalities, McGeer and Dailley, are identified as being primarily involved and having effect in this stage of the process. With respect to influencing, there are several named who had influence on the involvement of these two. They are Barrett, Bennett, Lauk and Williams. Each of these affected the performance within their respective parties. Bennett may have been simply the *power-holder* that had to be influenced in order for McGeer to carry on in the independent manner described in the data. The others are those that could have challenged the policy or taken a definitive leadership stand.

(iii) The Role of the NDP

The NDP legislators were not cohesive in their personal stands. Barrett, reportedly, straddled the fence and tried to please his party and his constituents. Lauk, apparently, was trapped between having the time and knowledge and loyalties to his own Catholic roots. Williams is described as the spoiler, and the burr under the NDP saddle. Strachan, the former leader of the NDP, had taken a strong stand against support for non-public schools and Williams is reported to have supported Strachan (Downey, 1982, p. 36). Downey describes the role taken by the party, as a whole. He opines that the party could not make up its *collective* mind. He refers to *ideological underpinnings* deep in the party. The party's representation is described as for the working and common man. On completion of analysis of this sector, he summarizes by stating that it was not surprising that independent school policy had not been in the NDP platform. Further to Downey's research, it is necessary to ask: who were the individuals that influenced the behaviour of the NDP party and why? These data identify several original legislators that spoke out for or against the independent schools in the early stages before any notice of the policy was evident. Where Strachan, factually, is reported as able to take a stand against separate school funding, there is no essential need to see what his motives were. He was going with the tide of opinion. But with the

new NDP of Barrett, it is important to understand not only that this party was divided, and that it was because of ideological and other differences, but also, who were the caucus members that were agitating? Why was there not unity and support from within as Williams had with Strachan?

Williams is described as an individual from the old school. Dailley is described in a similar manner. Their personalities were such that changing values, to meet assumed new and emerging community values, is reported as being the antithesis of their nature. One NDP spokesperson states that he found the personality of Dailley not suited to the articulation required to make effective arguments. From a policy-making point of view, it is only assumed that the chaos within the ranks of the NDP was exploited by the major influencers McGeer and Ensing. Even if it was not, it does provide considerable insight into what is possible in terms of neutralizing opposition. Dailley is reported as committed, concerned and involved, but in the end, ineffective. Within this initial group of seven *influencers*, there remains the influence on, and of, McGeer.

(iv) The Role of Pat McGeer

Understanding the influence McGeer exerted is possible, however, it is unclear what influences there were on Pat McGeer or how any influence shaped his role in the policy-making process. For instance, Harris has already been identified as possibly influencing Bennett. But, what influence did Bill Bennett have on McGeer? The findings are inconclusive. Speculation suggests Bennett's relationship with his father and his respect for McGeer are both aspects of the influence. As Barrett and the NDP are previously described as struggling with the role of being in government in 1972, so Bennett would be struggling in 1975. The motives of McGeer, in exploiting the advantage of his crossing the floor, his own elite nature, and his particular standing as the number-two man, are all subject to the conjecture of the interviews. However, it becomes clear that McGeer had considerable personal influence through, not only his position, but also his personality and values. His positions were as a member of a coalition, a cabinet minister and an

expert in the field of education. The data suggest a fact not before reported. That is, McGeer's influence was also ameliorated as a partner-in-interest with Ensing. A partner-in-interest is used to mean that, in the absence of anyone to pick up the detailed non-legislative involvement necessary to affect the shepherding of the legislation through effectively and efficiently, an individual may seize, or be requested to take on, those functions. This would create a partnership in the interest of the same objectives.

Finding 6.3

In the absence of a Cabinet Minister's ability, or time, to absorb the micro details of policy-making, an opportunity may occur for a non-legislative individual to take on a partnership-in-interest role with a Minister in developing such policy. Such a partnership may be unofficial and would represent compatible interests or objectives.

Research has analyzed McGeer's leadership and offers proof of the leadership skills that Edelman claimed as necessary for effective leadership in policy-making (Downey's, 1982, p. 128). However, this does not give us a clue to the nature of his leadership and whether it was effective for education, overall, in the province. Much is made of McGeer's possible coalition-deal as a motive for the Socreds going along with the legislation. The NDP and others continue to suggest that elite motives, not those of equity or fairness, were major factors in McGeer's actions. Consistently throughout the data from the NDP, Liberal and BCTF, there are the references to McGeer's elitism. Even from supportive bureaucrats, there is given the picture of a man, who primarily cares for excellence and standards in education. He felt that the public was upset with public education. This is best indicated in his own government publication as Minister of Education where he states:

... I am today announcing a program for improving the performance of public school education in this Province. According to one recently published survey, education is one field where the public does not believe it is getting value for its money. The Department of Education hopes to demonstrate to the public that there is value for the dollars that are being spent by setting appropriate standards ... (McGeer 1976)

This is a Minister who may be overly concerned with the politics of the teacher's federation. There is an implication that McGeer blamed the failing public school system on forces closer to the classroom, rather than the government. He is portrayed as a man who wanted the factor of competition to correct the malaise in the public system and to be reflected in the classroom. There may have been other alternatives. A leader in education would, in all fairness to the public school system, have attempted to cure the ills with additional or alternate means. The commitment to those cures is not apparent in the evidence. In presenting and interpreting the potential policy, McGeer is shown as wanting little debate. Downey (1982, pp 40-51), describes how the policy, from the start, was developed in secret. The NDP and BCTF are continuously described in the data as not knowing what was coming. These are not the actions of a man who wishes further input or debate or to consider another opinion. Hardwick, his hand-picked bureaucrat, was potentially, one of the most effective individuals to counter McGeer's arguments. He felt strongly against the emerging policy. Did McGeer effectively muzzle him by bringing him into the ministry? It could have been a situation of McGeer knowing the right people and moving them into the right places. This also, apparently, effectively eliminated opposition within his own party as well as outside.

Evidence is introduced of strong public school values underlying Hardwick's educational motives. The circumstantial evidence that he was neutralized by working directly with McGeer is hard to ignore. The data is very clear that McGeer consistently acted in the role of an elitist. It is fair to suggest, that this motivated his actions to a considerable degree. The bureaucrats, in earlier data, describe that nature as reasonably justifiable in light of his pro-active personality. In fact, one

bureaucrat, in discussing the nature of pro-activism, offers a different insight into McGeer's leadership for education. The bureaucrat states "...pro-active people have a vision of what might be.." and it is their job to amplify that vision to the community. There is an argument though, that the bureaucrat emphasizes the amplification must be to the point of community "support". Community support should not be predicated on non-democratic elimination of opposition and use of negative or cohesive supports, as indicated earlier in this study. If it is predicated as such, then *pro-active* or *visionary* are not fair terms to describe his motivations.

The attitude as expressed by the NDP and BCTF and others towards McGeer, as one of the major influencers, is important in the analysis. It appears, often, in these data that the NDP miscalculated in their approaches. Earlier while in power, they had been criticized by their allies, the BCTF, for their education policy. Later they were criticized by the voters for their general policies. They were then put out of power. Their principles appeared to be, relative to this legislation, those of the individual and not of the party. The consequences of their actions were not for the party. The significance of these data is, that in analyzing the legislation's anatomy as Downey does, one knows what the stresses and inputs are. In many cases, the question of why the players act as they do is answered also. But, what is also required in research is to find out how the policy-making could have been changed by one personality, or one different set of motives, of a strong influencer.

Singled out herein as being essential in influence on McGeer are the roles of the bureaucrats. These are commented on, lightly, in Downey's analysis (1982). The evidence, again, appears to point to McGeer being able to hand-pick his deputies and then, in turn, have them hand-pick their respective officials. Downey, in Chapter two, is quoted in reference to politicians turning to special interest groups. There is, certainly, the evidence here that McGeer may also have hand-picked Ensing to be very closely involved with this team. This may well have been unwitting and/or not articulated to Ensing. Needless to say, it was taken and the team, or 'partner-

in-interest', was unbeatable. On the other hand, one of the bureaucrats mentions the very extensive set of programs that the ministry was involved in and over-emphasized the prolific nature of these initiatives. McGeer was intensely involved with the largess and macro nature of policy, as well his new role as a minister. If this was the case, where would McGeer have had the time to, or the interest to, involve himself in the micro aspects? The data show that McGeer did not want to get involved in the minor issues. This reconciles with Kernaghan's theory and is discussed under sub-problem 2. Therefore, it may be fair to assume that Ensing was not closely working with him at any time. It may also, well have been a marriage of convenience and chance. Ensing is described as astute enough to take the opportunity!

The next sub-problem looks at the effect the inputs had on those personalities and presents supportive evidence of the effect that individual motives, characteristics, and personalities had over the legislation.

Sub-problem 2

What impact did the demands and supports have in determining roles played by legislators and officials?

A. Findings

This sub-problem looks at the impact that the inputs have in determining the roles of the same individuals discussed in the previous sub-problem.

(i) Dave Barrett

As indicated under sub-problem 1, Barrett did not take a role. Accordingly, no data were gathered regarding the impacts on Barrett.

(ii) Bill Bennett

The views on Bill Bennett are inconclusive. A Socred and a bureaucrat feel that they recognize the inputs and understand them. They seem to empathize with Bennett. On the other side, an NDP legislator feels that Bennett would have come back to his father's principles if pushed:

...remarkably uninterested in the ultimate results (Lib:P).

Remember that Bennett was still W.A.C.'s son. When we started beating that anti-sectarian drum he would have responded (NDP:PLS).

...did not share his father's view. He saw ...problem that the rest of us saw...a difficulty in managing these schools...a question of economic justice (Socred:PLS).

(involved) for the same reason that McGeer had...to kick the public system up the rear end and say standards are important (Bur2:LS).

...without (Harris) I do not think we would have persuaded Bennett (FISA:PLS).

(iii) Jim Carter

Carter is commented on by only two individuals, and they have opposite views about his impact:

I do not think Jim had a hell of a lot to do with it (the act) (BCTF:PLS).

Carter was leading the research (Bur1:LS) .

(iv) Eileen Dailley

Dailley is grudgingly accepted as right, but inarticulate and ineffective. A Socred offers his personal views of what motivated Dailley:

...had a few moments when she talked about the major crisis (Lib:P).

There is a lot of feeling that on (Dailley's) part and others that a mixture of religion and education was bad and the Catholic school system particularly was using education as a propaganda vehicle and that would run right through society generally and become a problem of dividing society later on (Socred:PLS).

...always worried many - so nobody took her seriously - but I think she was right and I was wrong. She's not very articulate, she's.... emotional. But she was right!(NDP:PLS)

Dailley was fuzzy, ineffective (BCTF:PLS) .

(v) Walter Hardwick

The BCTF spokesman puts a lot of faith on Hardwick for having some influence over the legislation:

...tolerated it but deep down ...really does not believe in funding of independent schools from the kind of responses he gave on other issues (BCTF:PLS).

...was the most important factor in the civil service because he led the implementation (Socred:PLS).

(vi) Gary Lauk

Lauk is pictured as a man trapped between values and politics and short on time to do everything:

...a chameleon on the thing. He would say ...was expected of NDP ...in the kind of way that he would not get into trouble with the bishop (FISA:PLS) . -

...a bit shrill...(never) understood education or really developed a feeling for it...(never) took the time to become well informed so that he could articulate policy with respect to education well..education (not) one of his strengths (BCTF:PLS).

...education from .. Catholic school in St. Louis. ...he may have felt some conflict in that too (Bur2:LS).

(vii) Pat McGeer

McGeer, who by now, is described as one of the very few leaders in the process, is seen as reacting to two values. One was to strengthen one system and to promote a challenge to the other. He sees it as a competition. The BCTF interprets it as something other than leadership in education. A bureaucrat sees it as leadership through vision:

...disappoint(ing)...(had not) provided the kind of leadership that the province had the right to expect from a brilliant and very well educated man who made his living in education....allowed himself to be controlled by lesser people who had little value for education...Bennett, Vander Zalm (BCTF:PLS).

...it was just a recognition of ...he adopted it and his supporters expected him to, so he responded to it (BCTF:PLS).

In this age of existentialism here's this ...intellectual who ... used this concept of excellence to fuel this elitism of his: 'Isn't it too bad that some people can not be geniuses or that most people can not, but our system should be to train these people and the others can fall by the wayside'. The mammoth ignorance of that position is incredible and it is not based on a political-philosophical point of view (NDP:PLS) .

A policy option was presented to McGeer (by 7th day Adventists to stay out) and he said sure let them stay out and anyone else that wants to stay out can. McGeer was just outrageous...he would stand up and lash the bloody opposition...for 10 minutes and start another debate. I do not know why he did it but it was a very interesting part of the legislative process... I think he was just having fun.

(McGeer) ... probably had two visions:...to strengthen and make more healthy the independent school ...to show as a true competitive edge ...an alternate ...today, the independent school system is healthy, and it's viewed in this Province as a superior system...public schools take it as a competitive challenge to be as good or better than the independent system. ...those two primary goals are being achieved very well today.

McGeer did not waver on its principle - I remember near the end there were a few modest amendments accepted.

...intuitive who saw visions of what might be and visions of what might be that sometimes exceeded what the partial players in the advocacy saw (Bur2:LS).

(viii) Bob Williams

The BCTF and the NDP are critical of the role Bob Williams played:

Had just a negative attitude to education. ...a weight around Dailley's neck ...some of the people that surrounded her were there because of Williams. ...An advocate of destroying education and starting all over again. ...he (had not) intended it but ...he was a major source of the defeat of the Barrett government because of the conflicts he caused in the caucus, ...party and government (BCTF:PLS).

...felt there was something wrong with the public school system ...thought there would be an opportunity and diversity for something to spread up outside of the system (NDP:PL).

(ix) Bureaucrats and legislators in general

General comments on bureaucrats reflect their motives and the values brought into the system. The NDP and the BCTF appear though, to be of different judgement. One NDP suggests that bureaucrats could be rendered ineffective by attacking their security. The BCTF suggests

that the underlying principles and values of good bureaucrats have a strong effect on educational policy:

...what Ensing did was neutralize the bureaucratsaware that they provided ...cabinet ministers with information that may be detrimental to the concept of aiding independent schools he would deal with ... and counter that information and question the research...put pressure on the bureaucrats whose ultimate goal...(is) to survive...so he's always protecting his backside. ...Ensing knew that very very well....worked on them as a carrot and stick kind of thing: ...if you give you minister's this kind of information that it could come back to you...cabinet is moving in favour...which side do you want to be on?...he was identifying the bureaucrats that were constantly fighting the issue....bureaucrats work best when they are unknown...as soon as he is identified he is ... gone. Power... lies in the Cabinet...weak individual ministers ...sent into cabinet by their deputies to achieve some result seldom do. Cabinet ...is the authority...premier calls the shots (NDP:PLS) .

...day-to-day operations of the government -- translate it into what people want, because they are dealing with people all the time...great capacity to mold the policy of the government into practicalities ...by making it difficult... ponderous ... not required to make the drastic changes that...are very difficult....people like progress but they do not like change (Socred:P).

...bureaucrats can ...by not presenting major options, by blocking results, by saying it is too tough legislatively...block ... policy by simply baffle-gabbing (Bur2:LS).

...when the senior civil servants in the province left through retirement the values of both the NDP , the Bennett government...were reflected in ...their senior bureaucrats...their values towards education (BCTF:PLS).

The comments on legislators, in general, focuses again on the chaos within the NDP ranks and also does not give any credit to the legislative body, as a whole, on either side as being effective in having significant *withinputs* . :

...in essence with the independent school association's Gerry Ensing lobbying very heavily and with McGeer pushing it very hard there was almost no opposition - there could have been opposition (Lib:P)

You see, the politician's ultimate goal is to get re-elected; that's his first goal. But had the NDP made a choice to defend the public education system and use the aid to independent schools as being extremely dangerous it would have been difficult but we would have succeeded. ...Had we made the choice in judgement along Dailley's lines we could have given it the intellectual and political flesh to set up a formidable attack and expose Ensing - publicize who he was - the Dutch reformed church - got behind all of the mean little, political pieces of crap that we could get behind and start putting feces into the open wounds (NDP:PLS) .

...well the opposition was in a dilemma. ...did not want to oppose it in principle...did not want to support it ...they got hammered by their constituency. No MLA stood out in the Independent School Act (process) or to my knowledge whispered in ears. Nothing essential changed once the bill was tabled. ...if (NDP) had (debated) it ...when the bill was tabled...there could have been such an outcry that it could have an influence. The opposition could have been the springboard and then the teachers could have rallied. But ...another dynamic - who were the major contributors to bring the NDP down in 1975? Teachers...calling for Dailley's resignation... hostile. ... the NDP was ...not really warm to the BCTF. ...information fed back and forth (but) no desire from the sitting members ...to form an alliance...with the teachers federation who had been ...abandoning them in their defeat in 1975. ...it was one of the really historic, principled debates that could have occurred that did not occur! (emphasis by speaker) ...opposition was not there and by the time they realized they should have had the principled debate, the press was ticked off, the session was winding down - it was 85 degrees outside and no one was interested (Bur2:LS).

...we met with (NDP) caucus ...they would have given anything to turn their clock back and adopt our position (BCTF:PLS) .

We ...gave in ...Somebody mentioned we ...all leave the chamber and not vote and that appeared worse than staying there and voting for it - it was a cowardly and stupid act... we were...responding to those pressures. They all accumulated at once and the timing was beautiful (NDP:PLS) .

I can understand the dilemma. ...better to stick to our ...old principles that we do not support aid to independent schools. ...continue to do what Bennett always said 'Public purse - public school' he got away with it for twenty years did not he?...there was so much tension in the caucus. ...trying to work...the best of both worlds ...it just does not work (NDP:PL) .

(x) Personal Commentary by Certain Interviewees

Personal comments provide another view of the potential benefit of Dailley's arguments and legislative strategy had it been followed by the NDP caucus. Other NDP comments are reflective on, what could have been:

...Ensuing could have been derailed with a unified focal opposition attack. That was not available as the leadership of the caucus did not feel it was a major issue...other issues faced the NDP as an elected government and this one would not hurt...fraught with too many difficulties... There is the appearance of involvement by philosophical and generalized speeches but there is less involvement in that portfolio (education) than any other. ...In real effective legislative input...it is dangerous...like a balloon full of water - you press it here it comes out there. There is nothing that responds to action. ...major change to the education system in a democratic structure...requires almost a total change to the structure. Otherwise you are ...band-aiding...dangerous because your particular theory or the group of experts that you have attached to yourself could bring you down... in the eyes of the voter and traditional support ...I bought the traditional argument up to that time that it would increase sectarianism and class distinctions within society but I had forgotten that I had bought that. I began to deal with it as a

hard nose Machievellian politician looking at these constituents. It happened to all of us (NDP:PLS).

We could not arouse the public on it; for them it was not an issue of great moment. So it was hard ... to fight something where there was not a great groundswell, or great movement coming in a strong independent school lobbyist, ...a mass of people who were not for it one way or the other...not a great deal...political parties had to look at it like that (NDP:PL) .

The Socred, reflecting the apparent ease of dealing with it in their caucus, dismisses the whole legislation as simple and uncomplicated:

...can not remember (Duncan retreat or non -public schools committee) Walter would ... be orchestrating the civil service... cabinet drew up the policy... simple.. uncomplicated ...nothing ...sophisticated about legislation (Socred:PLS)..

The bureaucrats address the minutiae and detail and look at some of the specific consequences.

The legislators are looking at the politics and the bureaucrats are involved with the fine print even today - 12 years later:

...remember the dynamics of policy change (...government) wanted to fund the independents...often you can sewer a policy by trying to do a little more than what is needed to be done. When they said (to changes re: leaving some schools out) leave it alone...they did not want the schools that did not want to be involved lobbying against the bill on this corner issue... it may be right bureaucratically and structurally to have all those schools registered it would have given ...an opportunity to make a terrible alliance for those who were opposing the act for the funding part. ...I wished that we had ignored the 7th day Adventists and that we ...made every one meet a minimum standard....I was a rookie and learning; I now know how to present concerns effectively...that particular policy suffered from me being a key player and not really knowing the issue...did not think it was that big an issue (Bur2:LS) .

...I am not happy with the developments of a lot of the Christian schools ...I cringe when I go down Fraser Avenue at that Sikh school ... I say to myself what is a Canadian society going to be with those people segregated out (Bur1:LS) .

FISA sums it all up with a non-controversial and tactful comment on its implementation staying away from the principles of the legislation:

...I'm pleased with the way its being implemented...it's been done well. ...FISA did not get ...the provincial council like a school board at large - I'm not sure that would have been helpful in retrospect....the way the act is written...kind of protections...built in...things that it does not say ...a wide open act, the precedents ...are good by and large (FISA:PLS) .

B. Discussion

(i) Legislators

The demands and supports had significant impact on the roles played by legislators and officials. Initially, the data take us away from the evidence that personalities are significant in the policy. For example, it appears that Bill Bennett was just responding to the community. Like the general public, he was dissatisfied with the public system. But, in the non-legislative environment, it has already been established that the general public, while perhaps increasingly becoming dissatisfied with the public system, were not advocating an alternative to "kick it up the rear end". Perhaps then, Bennett was being influenced heavily. FISA provides a clue to this, in stating that the influence from Harris was essential to bringing Bennett around. If this was the case, then Harris was a strong support to Bennett's role. Also, Eileen Dailley is portrayed as a legislator with strong feelings about mixing religion and education. Therefore, the *inputs* would have considerable impact on her role.

As an example of the difference a personality could make, consider the role that Hardwick might have played if he was NDP education critic. He was respected, well-connected, articulate and principled. He was not fuzzy or ineffective at any time, according to these data. The NDP required a leader on the issue to synthesize the policy of the party. Lauk, according to the data, had reacted as a "chameleon". Would he have vacillated if he had a focussed leader to look up to? Would Williams have been so negative? The point here is, that despite the strong evidence of major changes affecting the education system from standards to pluralistic influences, the NDP were unable to focus on the *inputs* of the policy-making process. They did not sense any supports that would bring cohesion to their actions. Accordingly, they played a minor role, if any at

all, in the *withinput* stage. On the other hand, the Socreds appear to have seen, heard, interpreted and accepted many of the *inputs* and translated them into system, political and personal benefits.

(ii) Bureaucrats

The data, of chapter five, show that the *input* role of Ensing and his lobby were instrumental in providing all the information needed by Socreds and all of the information needed to diffuse opposition. Kernaghan (1985) is reported in chapter two as stating that because of information that *institutionalized groups* are able to provide to governments, they have greater access to officials, especially to Cabinet ministers and senior bureaucrats. This has certainly been the case in this legislation. Ensing was given unprecedented access, reportedly, to the legislative system. Except that is, to policy drafters and technicians who were sequestered away from all lobbying influence.

(iii) The Role of the NDP

The NDP lamenting, of what-could-have-been, is that they felt they could have made a difference by attacking Ensing and exposing him. Kernaghan offers an alternative of working with individuals like Ensing and understanding their organizations. The evidence, herein, suggests that the area that needed attacking was within the ranks of the NDP party, its relations with the BCTF, and its political maturity in dealing with lobby groups. Ensing demonstrated earlier a proficiency to recognize and deal with the confrontationist. A bureaucrat response supports this supposition stating that the NDP could have been more successful if they had just debated the issue. An NDP member, himself, also supports it by blaming the leadership of the caucus on not feeling it was a major issue. He also mentions the NDP relationship with the BCTF as being detrimental.

(iv) The Role of Pat McGeer

The data constantly show the complex supporting, analyzing, and organizing role that Ensing took and says little about McGeer's activities except for describing his pro-active vision, opportunistic power, elitist motives, competitive drive and determination to win, as reported in the previous discussion. McGeer is described as an individual with little time in his many educational initiatives, and with little concern for detail. This may not be particular to McGeer, if as stated by Kernaghan, Ministers are, as a rule, too short on time and tend to rely on special interest groups.

(v) General

It was also in the data where an NDP legislator lamented the time crunch most NDP government members faced in their first years of governing. Ensing apparently looked after all of the detail and had time for everything and every person. An important factor in analyzing McGeer and Ensing is looking at how Ensing handled the role of the bureaucrat. For instance, the data show what Ensing and McGeer did in their efforts upon the officials within the ministry. On the other hand, the NDP see the bureaucrats as not necessarily a power group. They fail to understand where the civil servants could be influential, such as in blocking legislation, as described by both a Sacred legislator and a bureaucrat. Ensing and or McGeer apparently knew this, and between them they rectified the situation. The evidence is that Ensing played a significant role in dealing with the bureaucrats. The BCTF appear more knowledgeable than the NDP, in this regard, as they pay a tribute to the personalities of the senior civil servants that earn the respect of the system. Such evidence gives further credibility to Finding 6.2, above.

The data keep reinforcing the importance of studying the motives and personalities of each individual influencer. The complexity of Ensing, his organization, and his relationship with

McGeer or others in the legislature - including the bureaucrats, is now more focussed. The next sub-problem looks at who did not get involved and why. The role of Ensing takes on more clarity.

Sub-problem 3

Who did not get involved and why?

A. Findings

There are several potential *influencers*. They represent the government, the opposition, and the main lobbies for, and against, the potential policy. This sub-problem looks at who did not get involved. A logical question is, why did not the potential of these groups and/or their leaders rise to the front? The data are presented in an order that represents each of these groups. Following these are two articulate commentaries from the interviewed bureaucrats, as to how they see their own personal roles, which were government-supportive first and foremost. One expresses how he participated, supported by personal values that accepted the process. The other comments on his perfunctory performance despite his closely-held principles, which he clearly articulates.

(i) BCTF

A Sacred earlier indicated that he believed the NDP moved in unison with the BCTF and that all opposition was BCTF directed. This section presents data where the NDP stated that they could not get the BCTF concerned:

...they were against it, but was there really a strong strong position taken? Did they put up a fight?...They did not look down the road. ...some of us obviously did not impress them enough. We could not get them concerned. BCTF was not strong, our party was divided and the BCSTA ...rolled over. ...no powerful... influential groups - no wonder McGeer found it so easy (NDP:PL).

The representative for the organization blames it on the leadership agendas within:

...the personal agendas of the leadership...their concern about the defeat of WAC, the problems with the people that surrounded Dailley ...and the most unforgivable sin of all - arrogance. Not placing specific priority to the item in the throne speech (BCTF:PLS) .

The other respondents cover their feelings, in previous sub-problems, about the role of the BCTF leadership.

(ii) Bureaucrats in General

With respect to the bureaucrats, a Socred legislator expresses his belief that they historically do not get involved.

...In education, for a bureaucrat to feel the right to set the agenda they are doing nothing more than setting their philosophical agenda...our job is to let those people elected by the people to set that agenda. ...too many educators ...simply do not understand (Socred:P) .

The NDP state in sub-problems 1 and 2, their opinions on the worth and role of officials. Both bureaucrats stress again the lack of commitment by the 'old guard' and one expounds on the roles of specific officials.

...the bureaucratic structure of the Ministry of Education...uninterested in helping the writing ...I quickly concluded that to try and use them as a resource...would be an absolute waste because you would find all the reasons for why you could not do things as opposed to how you could do things.
The Attorney-Generals men do not like interfacing with lobby groups - they take instructions from the ministry and they do not want...to understand the positions of the lobby group (Bur2:LS) .

..the guys that were in that system...had to be ... 'yes' men to the Victoria mafia (Bur1:LS).

The BCTF sees this seasoned group of bureaucrats in an entirely different light than do the bureaucrats who were interviewed.

...good people in education were not allowed to say anything - such as John Meredith ... just shunted aside...majority of the dedicated civil servants...were...against it (BCTF:PLS).

(iii) Walter Hardwick

Hardwick is seen by one bureaucrat and by one NDP as a strong supporter of the public system.

... did not want too much up closeness to it.... it was on principle that he did not think it was great (Bur2:LS).

...Liberal...a bright intelligent man in his own way, its very hard to say, one tends to philosophically label people...a strong strong advocate of the public school system (NDP:PL).

The FISA comment is one of recent surprise despite his close working with the ministry over several years:

...it was in the last month that I found out (Hardwick was not supportive of aid to independent schools) (FISA:PLS).

(iv) NDP/Barrett

The comments on the NDP and Barrett recognize, in the most part, the dichotomy of values represented in the party and how hard it was for them. One bureaucrat sees the whole issue in a broad sense and recognizes the historic perspective and the principles that could have been articulated. He analyzes, in depth, the reason the party failed to rise to the challenge and the time:

The NDP to a lesser extent because I do not think they ever did get their policy together on that issue (BCTF:PLS).

Barrett is such a proud person (of attending) a Jesuit school - you would have felt he would have been more inclined to put it in his policy. ...NDP got caught ...separating things out on a religious background...difficult for them. ...(Barrett) ...did not take the chance....pressure in his group to do it...(not)coming from the same ethnic background (as the Socreds)....English/ Scottish people... labour leaders ...(not) same support from the Italians, Ukrainians who were more of religious backgrounds (Socred:P) .

Dave Barrett ...had to face ...party and the public...in all fairness to him it was a tough one. ...never attempted to curry the votes...wish...caucus had been concerned (NDP:PL) ..

The NDP ran as hard as they could ...it collapsed because they looked so silly walking out of the legislature....and that was the end of it. - They gave up (Socred:PLS) .

...if they had debated the principle, when the opportunity was there early in the session, when there was press in the gallery...(later) the press was not there ... felt the NDP had blown their chance by walking ...for getting any solid reporting. ... the house rose and did not meet for six weeks, ...bill is tabled and passed 2nd reading and the session grinds on and on and on and it is the summer and McGeer leaves it...until August when everyone is gone...by timing - teachers in the middle of August are not going to mount a major campaign against the bill (Bur2:LS).

(v) Other

The other significant data were a bureaucrat's opinion on legislator roles, in general, with respect to policy-making and again on the inference of a 'deal' behind McGeer's switching parties. The BCTF concludes, the first group of findings, with an opinion that, as none of the political actors were involved, if it was not for Ensing the legislation would probably not have been implemented:

Bennett did not necessarily spend much time thinking about it (Lib:P) .

(Phillipson) had zip to do with it... a very tired, reluctant and somewhat bitter man (over demotion by former government).
...that's not what legislators do ... McGeer did it ...- virtually without reference... it may be that that's Pat's style and there was not a deal - but now we go through very formal processes of cabinet committee approval, treasury board, cabinet and then when it has gone through all of that, then it comes back to legislative committee so that all the main actors have had a piece of it - maybe even to caucus if its a critical issue. ... Press is terribly influential and it was a non-factor in this (Bur2:LS).

None of the political actors did; I think that if Ensing had not done the work that he did, the Liberals ... the government would not have had it either (BCTF:PLS).

(vi) Personal Comment from Bureaucrats

The following comments provide a personal perspective directly from the bureaucrats on roles in the Legislature. They demonstrate the commitment to process that they believe is essential to the efficient working of the civil service. In a philosophical moment one of the bureaucrats explains how he personally saw the argument of denominational versus secular

education. He explains how he was able to put aside those arguments and serve his "political masters" without frustrating them or himself:

My position has always been to present all the arguments and put all the arguments to and fro for the position and then the policy-makers should select. A few times when I've been influenced by others to limit the options because they would not be interested in that. - it does not work - you've got to present all the options. Often you can make all the arguments and present three choices and all the reasons why they should chose 1 or 2 and they will chose 3! What you're talking about in the field of education is very a philosophical issue and to believe that you have some knowledge that is superior to that of others in educational debates is often not right - that is simply a matter of the way you view the world (Bur2:LS) .

I was very clear what I was ...You're not out to frustrate your political masters but if you have not got your heart in it then there's no point in spending a lot of time in it. ... I believe in a secular public educational system. I know that where you have had denominational school systems - people come up their own streams - you can not create community where there is division...If it was the governments intent that that be done then it was my duty to ensure the process. ...The only people that had run a secular public education system within our traditions were the Scots. That goes back to the 18th Century. The scots believed that education was an emancipation for individuals....the idea was that there was equality of opportunity, then it was up to the individual and that was Scottish and then became American and all out of the same tradition. ... it is incumbent of us to pass on the combination of Greek and Judæa-Christian philosophy and history ...and so on as part of our cultural norms - and this in no way depreciates the inputs of minorities of other cultures coming into the country. But I believe that citizenship and a degree of coherence in society depends upon a common experience. Where children fight out with each of other the kind of people that they are going to work with and live with for their rest of their lives. So with that kind of idealism I was not going to get involved in supporting this (Bur1:LS).

B. Discussion

An aspect of research deemed to be important in this study, and reported on in chapter five, is to explore those *power-holders* or potential *influencers* that did not get involved and ask why. These data provide the perspectives on a *socio-metric* basis. They penetrate an insight that is revealing and informative. In particular, the personal perspectives of the civil servants provides a deep grasp of the motive and values that affect the direction of an individual's actions.

(i) The Opposition

The opinions of the NDP versus the BCTF are in some cases reciprocal. Both look at each other as not being able to address the responsibility of opposition effectively. Although one NDP member sees the difficulties Barrett had in taking a position, there is still the lingering despair that the caucus had not been unified. The BCTF executive, likewise, sees the difficulties in their leadership. Neither of them have the perspective that the interviewed BCTF member shares twelve years later. In fact, he apparently held many of his convictions at the time of the legislation, but was powerless in the circumstances of turmoil and hidden agendas that plagued his federation. It is relevant to re-introduce comments on the role of lobbyists to the opposition, initially discussed in chapter two. It is reported that the opposition are often "anxious to receive representations from pressure groups so as to understand better the groups (demands) and to obtain ammunition to be used against the government" (Kernaghan 1985, p. 315). This is a function of which the NDP, BCTF and BCSTA were unaware or did not take advantage. Another point raised, in chapter four by the Sacred legislator in the test interviews, is the statement that lobbying was important in order to create an understanding with the MLAs so that they could counteract the Minister. In the independent school policy-making, this knowledge is not reported as available to MLAs to make any opposition or be advocates. What they got, instead, was a lobby that was in concert with the Minister. Those groups that could have lobbied with counteracting information did not, as has been discussed. In fact, it appears that in some cases any information garnered was used as ammunition against themselves within their own membership.

Housego concludes, for his Saskatchewan study, that only those invited to take part in "agitation and settlement" of issues were influential (1964). These data demonstrate that similarly, in British Columbia with respect to Bill 33, the influence is from those who had been invited to participate. However, as influence can be both positive and negative, it should be

considered that those who did not participate also influenced. As suggested earlier, they influenced the policy-making process by not having inputs.

In the *withinput* stage, McGeer is again accused, by inference, of making a deal with Bennett and keeping other legislators and opposition out. If he did not, he certainly had a political manner in him, or about him, that allowed him considerable latitude when it came to bypassing the usual procedural routing of policy-making. Perhaps this is also a significant result of having no opposition. Housego (1964) said that in a democracy the role of the government should be "to provide the arena in which the conflict occurs and out of which the consensus develops" (p.237). These data demonstrate a process where consensus apparently was not on the agenda of McGeer. Having no opposition seemed to be a preferred position in this particular policy-making. The implication of this is presented in chapter seven, under sub-problem 1 dealing with: who challenged the policy?

(ii) The Bureaucrats

The role of the bureaucrat is now more sharply defined. It becomes obvious that, in British Columbia, legislators and others do not think that bureaucrats have significant say or input to the legislative process. A Socred mentions that it would be tantamount to setting their own personal philosophical agendas. There is considerable significance in the remark that too many educators "simply do not understand" this perception. The significance is, firstly, that it comes deeply from a bureaucrat's convictions. It is one of those personal comments that could have remarkable effect on policy-making in British Columbia, because it cries out for an understanding from educators of the role of a bureaucrat. The implication of this has already been discussed. Secondly, it is widely known in this province and perhaps in other jurisdictions, that educators from time to time are known to squabble internally about how one level does not understand the other. For example, the teacher/ administrator relationship or school-based educator versus the district-based official.

There are others. Beamon (1986) reports that BCSTA interviewees feel that with respect to other educational issues in this time period:

...education bureaucrats, including (Deputy Minister) Carter had no influence. Carter has abandoned his position of professional educator giving his best advice. Things have become very political... Because they have politicized their civil service... they have destroyed any ability to administer even good policy decisions. (pp 109-110)

This personal commentary draws attention to the issue of understanding the roles of all individuals in the policy-making process. Under *Bill 33*, this understanding was apparently there in the ministry. The senior officials recognize the justifiable intransigence of established civil servants. From this knowledge and understanding, comes adjustments that frustrate the BCTF to see respected officials shunted aside. But, it is effective for the policy-making agenda of the ministry.

So many bureaucrats are not involved because they are removed from participation. Another, Walter Hardwick, who in previous data is fingered as a possible dissenter to the legislation, is now identified directly by the other official and the FISA representative. He was neutralized. The question lingers as to whether it was by McGeer, Ensing, both, or by himself? His integrity allowed him to do the job that he was contracted to do and support a man that he had the utmost respect for in McGeer. His conscience would be answered only after the job was complete. On the other hand the NDP and the BCTF are not able to find that solution of neutralizing the dissenting voice. Yet, the difficulties, the ideological and pluralistic tugs that are expressed as intrinsic to the politics of the NDP, could not have been any greater than what Hardwick was experiencing.

The new bureaucrats state positions that fix them as operating from very clear standards and values that they own within themselves. There is no outward wavering of their principles. They had come the hard way from much experience and considerable pondering and analysis.

The first bureaucrat states eloquently and from the heart why he pulled out of supporting the policy development. He also states succinctly why he ensured the process. The curious aspect of these data is that, in referring to past research, there is strong evidence of success by lobbyists in being as diligent as Ensing. There is also equally supportive data describing the powerful role civil servants can have in frustrating policy. This was avoided by McGeer. What was it that gave these two men such insight into the policy-making process? Was it chance? Was it that they both represented the major strengths of influencers researched by others and they were just at the right place at the right time over the ideal issue to which they would be committed? Certainly, they had their agendas fixed. Their motives, though different, were complimentary. The opposition had no such cohesive agendas. Those who could have provided the democratic opposition did not get involved.

Finding 6.4

Legislators and others can exert influence on the policy-making process through inaction.

SUMMARY

The nature of *withinputs* may be restricted only by the access individuals have to the policy-makers. This chapter has detailed that access, analyzed and discussed the nature of the individuals who provided the *withinputs*, and presented the major findings.

Chapter seven moves to the final stage, of *outputs*, where the policy is taken from the *conversion process* and is defended in the community. The defense and the *feedback* from the community is analyzed and discussed.

CHAPTER SEVEN
ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM
PART TWO - OUTPUTS

INTRODUCTION

There is a final process, in policy-making of *output* and *feedback*. After legislation passes its final readings and is proclaimed as a statute, it is released to the public. Prior to this, governments will often release papers for reading or discussion. The papers or the policy is then defended by the government through its legislators and/or appointed spokespersons. The process of receiving public input from this defense is referred to as the *feedback* part of the process (Wirt & Kirst, 1972). This is discussed in chapter three. This chapter analyzes the *influencers* and potential influencers that were involved in this stage of the policy-making. The organization of the chapter, the interviewees and the legend are the same as in the preceding two chapters.

ANALYSIS

The previous two chapters covered *inputs* and *withinputs*. This concluding chapter of analysis covers the third and final stage -*outputs*, and probes the sub-problem: what roles are played in the defence of the legislation? The nature of this sub-problem is to examine characteristics of individuals involved deeply in the legislation after it has passed final reading through the legislature. Again, new *influencers* come on to the scene. Now, however, their influence and roles are of a different kind. No longer are they influencing the immediate nature of the legislation. In defence of policy, roles are to ameliorate the stresses in the communities. This may be original stress that caused the demand for policy, or may a new stress caused, or perceived to be caused, by the policy. Depending on the roles, there may be new demands for

changes in the policy or for new legislation. When analyzing roles of those that could have challenged, those that did not, neither prior to, nor in the defence of, the legislation, there also has to be considered added to these individuals the people that could have defended the policy, and did not. The conclusion gives us an indication of whether the process will continue with feedback of continuous historical stresses or of new ones.

Sub-problem1

Who challenged/defended the policy and why? What were their characteristics?

A. Findings

This section is divided into the three parts, those who challenged, those who defended, and personal comments of the interviewees. The first part is further divided by categories of those individuals or organizations involved in the challenge: BCTF, Eilleen Dailley, NDP and Other. The period of time commences from the moment it came to a legislators' attention and continues until the present and, therefore, encroaches upon the data of prior chapters, or uses data that equally could have been used in those chapters. However, most of the comments are applicable to the period of post-legislation. Many individuals, already named as supporting the advocacy of public funding for independent schools, were defending the legislation. The following analysis is divided into the aspects of the question, the challenge and the defense. It is followed by a personal comment section from certain interviewees.

(i) Challenge

With respect to the challengers, the BCTF, despite their own admission of ineffectiveness at certain stages, are cast in a role of having considerable influence, either real or potential. A bureaucrat sees them as making a contribution. The NDP sees them as vigorous but

not formidable. In a lengthy description, the BCTF draws out from his recollection of what did happen within the organization, once the legislation was through the house of parliament. He also introduces another individual that could have had considerable effect within the party in drawing up the BCTF challenge-policy.

(a) BCTF

...put on some pressure but not with their fullest strength (NDP:PL)

...the teachers who helped cause policy to come about were ...vigorous but ...not formidable. Jack Gilmour...articulate but...from same source...did a good job. ... enough organizational and editorial comment against what was going on ...if (we) had chosen that ...stuff (to)repeat (we) could have made a case to kill it (NDP:PLS) ..

...it caught everyone by surprise. ...executive committee ...asked to look at it ...hired a consultant, Gil Johnston...in educational consulting ...asked him to ...come up with what the BCTF policy should be. ...a committee of the executive had wrestled with it as well. And both parties...came up with nothing ...political decision had been made to fund independent schools and therefore what the fed. should be advocating is the conditions under which they should be funded. ...that public funds should be subject to public control ...policy statements flowed from that kind of thinking; we also examined the educational side of it and considered that if public money was coming in, that independent schools should not be able to restrict their enrollment... anxiety in the independent schools that the BCTF ...would cause enough furore that the government would withdraw the funding (BCTF:PLS).

There are single comments about Dailley and NDP challenges. Overall, the comments on challenges reflect a minimal effort in the perception of all.

(b) Dailley

She (Dailley) - most consistently spoke out against independent schools and a lot of that she got from her brother (FISA:PLS).

(c) NDP

...could have been enormously effective if the minister had chosen to acknowledge them (Bur1:LS) .

...there was still debate within our party at the conventions and frankly...nothing strong enough (NDP:PL) .

(d) Other

Many criticized us ... 'look we do not need an Ireland ... you are starting to create a whole lot of division in this province' (FISA:PLS) .

...it did not come under any significant kind of attack in the macro-political scene. ...The blood letting or re-analysis was taking place in the left , the teachers federation...progressive groups in education were analyzing how they let it slip through (NDP:PLS).

(ii) Defense

The defenses reflect the Liberals first hand acceptance of party policy: "I had no real problem with it as such; it was an articulated policy but it was not in detail" (Lib:P), and then, the NDP recognition that McGeer would be the primary defender: "The policy was vigorously defended by McGeer..." (NDP:PLS). However, the FISA spokesperson introduces Vander Zalm once more, as an instrumental defender, not only then, but also following the legislation and into current policy developments in the 1980s. FISA, tactfully, as has been their nature, thanks the parents and board members of particular schools:

...Vander Zalm later on very very supportive ...expanding it and so forth; back ...when he was first elected...that's why we saw the increase this year and the reduction of the waiting period...The defenders out there were in many cases parents and board members of particular schools (FISA:PLS)

The Socred legislator questions the need for defense and then introduces Joe Phillipson as the most significant government implementor and defender. This is supported by others:

...very competent, decent man who used to be deputy minister - Joe Phillipson and he did an excellent job of implementing...
I do not remember any necessity (for defending); the policy worked very well. ... so it was just that the opposition disintegrated and there was no need (Socred:PLS) .

A full description of his role is provided by the bureaucrats:

...at first Joe was not wildly enthusiastic, but ...he moved to it and was very good. All his bureaucratic skills ...allowed for a very smooth implementation with no fuss...travelling...visiting all the independent schools...knew how to act as a statesman and ...a negotiator. He reported directly to the Minister. ...somebody that was ...not understanding of bureaucracies could have made it extremely

difficult. ...if you didn't have the right person implementing it, it could have been war over the implementation (Bur2:LS).

(Ensing) had been a spokesman and a lobbyist. But ...I think his major role was on the implementation end.....I had a high regard for Joe ... had enormous integrity... sensitive to standards in education but ...without someone to open the doors...to bring people together ...would be difficult and that is the role that Ensing found ...the facilitator to Joe's inspector role. ... Joe ...could see that there was a challenge and public service role to play...he served us very well (Bur1:LS)

The Liberal closes the discussion with a comment on his party's role in the stage preceding the policy-making:

We would raise it - it was part of our policy. Our troops required us to raise these things. But in terms of raising it and fighting it down there was no benefit, nor did I think there was something wrong. There was simply no point in going into the thing (Lib:P) .

(iii) Personal comments

The personal comments reflect primarily the individual feelings of the interviewees. Although the BCTF give credit to his organization, he also infers that a lot of his own personal principles and values are reflected in the final BCTF policy setting:

...I made a point of questioning, pointing out what was wrong, asking questions of the minister and expressing concern, particularly on aid to schools which restricted enrollment based on finances or sex (NDP:PL).

... I advocated that, if public funds were going to this broader range of schools they really shouldn't be running entrance exams to screen out kids. ...also felt that ...money shouldn't be going to a school where no instruction was taking place et cetera. ...statements that should apply to a public school. ...we met with reps of the Liberals...a couple of conservatives and 2-3 of the NDP caucus...we were asked. We shared and discussed ...Eilleen Dailley ... said she wished the NDP had the benefit of that kind of thinking before they developed their own policy. Now the interesting thing was - the socreds didn't contact us, McGeer and Hardwick knew about the BCTF policy - they didn't seem to be interested in sitting down and talking to us about it (BCTF:PLS).

B. Discussion

(i) Challenge and Defense

In this latter stage of *outputs*, the major influencers are identified, and just as new influencers come into each process stage, so new individuals are identified. Within the BCTF, Gil Johnston and Jack Gilmour are named as those who may have influenced. Johnston tries to write policy for the BCTF and is reportedly unsuccessful. If the organization had a successful attempt, if they had a leader who was able to articulate with vision the perceived consequences of concern from the legislation, if Jack Gilmour had not been identified as Eileen Dailley's brother, would the role of challenging have been any different? The Socreds linked the two organizations together through the Dailley/Gilmour connection. Yet, the NDP said earlier that they had been trying to distance themselves from the BCTF since the 1975 election. Did the NDP internally realize the potential problem in this relationship when they attempted the distancing? These types of questions, again, underscore the need to understand the motives of individuals in policy-making. Unfortunately the scope of these data, although providing the questions, do not always suggest an answer. However, when FISA comments on the sibling relationship as the source of the information that Dailley used in her speeches, it supports the theory that Ensing and McGeer would have exploited this weakness, if they had the chance, assuming they were as methodical as purported throughout these data. The significance of this is that in light of Downey's identification as the *rational choice* stage, and then the return to *incrementalism* stage, there is an anomaly. Rational choice implies the true source of knowledge and reason. How can a government enter into a rational decision-making process without the benefit of effective legislative debate and full knowledge and understanding of both sides of the argument? The evidence presented, in these data, is that major power-holders in the opposition were either not listened to or were not provided the opportunity to debate. The challenges to the policy scarcely

existed. Much of the implication for this deficiency is laid on personalities of certain *influencers* from both sides. It is particularly relevant to have a senior bureaucrat state that the NDP could have been effective if the minister had chosen to acknowledge them. There is continued reference also to the "blood-letting" within the opposition organizations. Housego (1964) talks about the need for democracy in policy-making. His point is that:

the operation of democratic politics in the field of educational administration depends upon consultation and compromise; where an issue exists, upon conflict and consensus. If democratic politics is to be a reality, there needs to be confrontations of interest groups... The conflict should occur between equally powerful groups mutually respecting each other.

As suggested in chapter two, the problem is that there was not, according to the data, a group organized enough to oppose the government. It is suggested that the role of the government should be "to provide the arena in which the conflict occurs and out of which the consensus develops" (Housego, 1964, p.237). In this case, it seems the government provided that arena only perfunctorily. This is also referred to in chapter six, sub-problem 3: who did not get involved and why? The personal characteristics of McGeer, with respect to encouraging debate, are described therein.

Finding 7.1

Democracy in decision-making for Bill 33 was lacking.

(ii) Personal Comment

In the personal comment section, an NDP member's singular role in challenging the policy is self-described. There is considerable pathos behind this effort, in light of the highly organized, effective and well-researched organization of Ensing/McGeer. It also underscores, again, the importance of the comment that politicians turn to special interest groups to do their legwork. In this case, the NDP needed an interest group desperately and, in turning only to the BCTF, failed.

It did have the opportunity to seek out the BCSTA, the Superintendents' Association, Universities and others. But, it did not. On the other hand, in other data throughout this study it is shown that the government and FISA did consult with these other organizations for support. How much effect did the sometimes intransigent and conflicting personalities of Williams, Dailley, Lauk and Barrett have on that decision? How much effect did the sibling connection to the BCTF contribute to the process? These data suggest that the effect was certainly measurable and a major factor. They suggest that influence starts from within. Influence may not be effective elsewhere, if it has not been concluded from within. This argument is also supported by examining the relationship of the Socreds and FISA. It was not until the influences within these groups were affected successfully that they were able to exert successful influence outside their groups.

Finding 7.2

Influencing starts from within an organization. Its acceptance, within, is essential to affecting influence outside of the organization.

The role of the government is well described by the Socred legislator who states that he saw no reason for defense. He sees the disintegration of the NDP. He recognizes Socred implementation, knowing they had no opposition. Kernaghan (1985) states that:

Cabinet ministers have enormous power in all three stages of the policy process - if they decide to exercise that power. In practice, they have neither time nor inclination to participate actively in the post-legislative stage; rather they tend to leave policy implementation to bureaucrats (p.314).

Joe Phillipson, as predicted by this statement and ironically, entered the process at the end to implement and defend. Indeed, if there was any defence needed. The Cabinet, as Kernaghan states, stayed out of it. Phillipson was a man spurned by the NDP and offered a balm by the Socreds. How effective was it to have an experienced, talented and respected bureaucrat on

the government side of policy, where it is known that most seasoned civil servants were opposed? The effect has to be considered, even if it is only in light of one more piece of evidence that the Ensing/ McGeer team "left no stone unturned". Even at the end, with no opposition and the policy *fait accompli*, the selection of an implementor/defender may have been the best and the most appropriate. He covertly represented behaviour that could be construed as thankful for the opportunity and, at the same time, justice for the acts against Phillipson by the NDP. This would be one last way to ensure that the NDP/BCTF were down to stay down. The indication from the interviews was that the personality clashes and resultant competition in the policy-making process were severe, important and integral.

Very few individuals in the policy-making process get involved in deeply analyzing the issues and interpreting the evidence or judging its consequences (Mitchell 1981). In chapter two, it is stated that there is no reason to assume that it is different in Canada. From the evidence in these data, for this piece of legislation in British Columbia, there were few individuals who got involved in analyzing and interpreting the issues. There may have been fewer involved in judging its consequences. This is discussed in the following sub-problem.

Sub-problem 2

Who could have defended/challenged, did not and why?

A. Findings

These data essentially cover the challenges that were available at all stages except for the *withinput* stage. It primarily covers the defense stage during and following the implementation. This section differs from chapter six, sub-problem 3. That section deals with involvement only during the *withinput* stage.

The following comments are in order of those who felt that either they, or someone else that they have identified, could have participated in a challenge or a defense of the policy: BCTF, Liberal party, NDP/BCTF, NDP, Brian Smith and Other. Following these comments there is a section for personal, concluding comments of some of the interviewees.

(i) BCTF

The comments on the BCTF by their spokesperson focus on the leadership issue within the federation:

... they are battling over survival as an organization. The health of the organization has to come first...

...few years of stable leadership in the fed. ...it will have credibility ...more than just a union ...will provide a focus of debate about ...maintaining a strong and viable public school system. If ...the more left-wing gets in ...the opportunity ...to provide credible leadership...respected by the public, is ...lost (BCTF:PLS).

(ii) Liberals

The Liberals recognize the issue of the integrity of the school system which is also brought up by the NDP, and alluded to by the BCTF in the previous section:

...another argument ...the coherence of the integrity of the public school ...we didn't ...articulate... It was the other side to do that. ...role ...in opposition is not to examine every side of an issue. ...an essentially responsive role to the government...they were (not) going to throw for us to respond ...wasn't ... which one wished to raise again in more divisive debate ... people ...thought that ...the public school system ...for all was ... desirable. ...It was an issue that ...was divisive, ...unlikely to be much advantage one way or the other to raise it again. ...Tendency of the party was to ignore it.....was a party decision ...pointless...to take a problem where none existed ...had plenty of other problems. ...Concerns over numbers ...would have to be ultimately worked in...I had no choice..... I wasn't necessarily against it. ...Multi-cultural enthusiasm hadn't reached ...point where we are questioning ...what is the basic glue of Canadianism? ...a group of collective societies living within certain common boundaries ...?concern is...that maybe these organizations and groups are becoming too divisional (Lib:P)

(iii) NDP

The Liberals, NDP and BCTF all comment that they had other problems without spending a lot of time on this particular issue. The Liberal view expands to the future and the nature of a new society, the consequences of pluralism, the search for alternates and multi-culturalism. Both the

NDP and the BCTF are given credit for raising the arguments that were applicable. The NDP also raise the issue of how legislation can be taken away when it has already been given. The NDP, as a party, look into the future and wonder why they were not able to see the arguments, then that it sees now, or at least argue them well at that time. They see the future as a destroyed public system where the Liberals see it as divisions being created in society as a whole:

...there has never been ...any great strong concern. ...its the old story: how can you take away what you have given?. ..you (could) set some limits on how that aid is given and to whom (NDP:PL).

(Ensing) provided us ...research that years later we decided was complete nonsense ...we accepted it ...too lazy to check it out. e.g. we are not here to harm the public education system... a modest this a modest that'...I made ...expedient decision ...to convince the caucus to sit on our hands...government was going to bring aid ...we had ...support from individuals that were sending their kids to independent schools ...it was becoming fashionable...we needed to get ...caucus and ...party supporting a frontal attack on the government...We failed as a party to realize... 35% - 40% of the public ...could have been made to move against aid to independent schools had they had the facts and had the NDP had the courage ...and ...resolve to fight ... it was not a 'freedom of choice' question. It was ...disrupting seriously society...only secondarily...underfunding ...eventually public education...Nobody re-cooked that argument and saw if it had any real relevance ...(NDP:PLS).

..disappointed with NDP they have not shown ...Skelley or Harcourt ...effective enough to form government (BCTF:PLS)..

(iv) Other

Brian Smith is identified as an education minister who could have foreseen some of the future problems that were perhaps covertly dealt with through the previous administration. He reportedly chose to give the appearance of caring or doing something and did little: "... a complete Machiavellian, decided ...'that the appearance of progress is much superior than actual progress'"(NDP:PLS).

Other comments demonstrate the role of the legislator which, in the case of a Sacred, is represented to be ineffective in significantly changing major policy:

(MLA's) primary role is to give the government a majority; after that ... a responsibility of ... explaining government policy rather than...a peace-maker and a carrier of the messages back if policies contrary to what people feel. ... not ...a major force ..in changing ... overall policy (Sacred:P) .

The NDP do not see the issue as one that affected the average person: "...did not become an issue; people ...accepted it. ...until the average member is touched by it it's hard to get involved as you know (NDP:PL). Another NDP member feels that almost everyone missed the opportunity to effectively challenge:

...MLA's ...capable of taking a leadership role ...none had the interest. ... BCTF, School Boards,... were very weak...leadership, and foresight and wisdom ...they missed and would never admit that they missed - they all stand up and say: ' well I tried to do something to avoid the carnage'. ...everyone missed the opportunity and everybody couldn't see the opportunity clearly. ...some of this might have come out of us having a strong PTA group again...(NDP:PLS).

The BCTF agreed and offers an opinion that it was because the public school system is not in enough trouble yet. The member looks back at the effective administration and officials of yesteryear and feels that they could have made a significant challenge, if they had stayed on:

...public school system has to get into a lot more trouble for...to speak out for more support for public school education. We're not too many years away from...there.. None of us ...and we are still doing nothing; I see nobody making any sincere effort to influence change...to build a strong underpinning for the public system. ...to provide that kind of leadership...I see no one on the horizon either...since WAC left there has been too much party control with respect to education. Education has become a device to be used at the whim of whomever the political planner is with the party in power as to what is going to get the most votes instead of what is best for education. I didn't have that feeling when WAC was in power. Great people like Les Peterson in Education - you had a great deal of confidence in that kind of leadership and we never got the kind of money we thought we should get and we never thought they responded quickly enough in terms of new developments - but you had an absolute confidence in whatever decisions they were making was based on good advice from their senior civil servants. People were well-respected in the field and in government - you had people like Peterson and Bennett who had a high value for education and I think since the end of WAC (Bennett) that kind of value has not been found in the NDP party, the younger Bennett or the current Socreds (BCTF:PLS) .

The Socred has a different point-of-view, stating that the only ones who could have challenged were those who were objecting to religious subsidization:

...there was a large disaffection of the public school system ...no one was prepared to defend it. I am talking about lay public...if this had been done in 1960 there might have been more of an outcry. The only people could have been

those who were objecting to religious subsidization- they would have been more stronger in the 1950s than in the 1970s (Socred:PLS) .

One of the bureaucrats, as discussed earlier, who had a premonition of the dangers that the legislature could bring to society, mused that perhaps those "in faculties of education" would have had the expertise and knowledge to challenge effectively. However, he did reserve his opinion by stating that "unintended consequences" are common place in all policy-making:

...faculties of education; whose job it is to deal with the sociology and cultural and philosophical natures of education; ...people like Dean Chant who would certainly have the knowledge and background or perhaps...English, Campbell or John Meredith ... You have to feel very strongly to get out and run against the grain...the only certainty in the planning process is the principle of unintended consequence. ...you can't foresee the future fully. I don't know if Pat would ever have perceived of Sikh schools and fundamentalist Christian schools and hippy schools and things of that nature. ..Maybe ... there haven't been many people who have really thought about this very much (Bur1:LS).

(v) Personal Comments

(a) Liberal

The Liberal sees things, later, that would have given him concern if he had seen them at the time of the legislation or prior to it:

In hindsight I see things that could have been done. I was concerned when I toured the Northern part of the province and saw what I called the 'flat-earth' attitudes of some of the school boards of some of these religious schools (Lib:P).

(b) The NDP

The NDP talks of how the community could have been rallied. One NDP gives a historical analysis of the potential effects on the community:

...I should have made lists of influential groups and ...names of people who supported me; ...got our finances together...a real propaganda campaign. ...have gotten the general taxpayer who's child is going to the public school and would never be able to afford one of these exclusive schools which their taxes were going for. I could put it down into simplistic base terms : money. Also, discrimination... and we could have proved it to be unfair also...the specter of the

divided - Ireland ...children being divided... when a society should be working to bring children together. ...make people as passionate and as concerned as we were (NDP:PL) .

The tremendous impact on our economy and on our future by de-emphasizing mass public education and emphasizing elitist education is incredible. You move toward a feudal system and an unproductive system. You achieve the opposite of excellence ...the privileged class that used to run England ...were totally convinced of the pre-eminent Kiplingesque position of the British aristocracy in terms of excellence , education, intelligence and achievement.. Except that ...we find that the empire was not built by the aristocracy at all but by upwardly mobile middle class ...(NDP:PLS)

(c) FISA

FISA offers suggestions of other aspects of the legislation that could have been addressed:

...we didn't like ... a third level of funding and that was killed disappointed at the level of the funding ...until last year.Vander Zalm has been very supportive of it ...the addition of the \$2 million for the special education fund ... it may relate back to the secretary he once had ...she ... could afford to send the child but the school didn't have the facilities because it wasn't getting any additional money for the handicapped; that may be in the background ...a personal initiative by the premier. The reduction in the waiting period again a personal initiative by the premier(FISA:PLS).

(d) BCTF

The BCTF member outlines the future as governed by the new legislation. He alludes to some of the arguments of which there could have been more input from the NDP and the BCTF:

Those who are in the position to send their children to a private school ...better funded...better staffing ...more select clientele. The more that happens ...the more that the government denigrates the public school system...are going to determine whether we have a very solid - widespread well organized, well-respected system or not... it was a part of the marriage vows and once the marriage took place and the legislation was in place with a minimal level of funding established with enough things to make it palatable and the NDP were incredibly inept in dealing with it and the BCTF were really no better - many months after the fact - I just don't think it was a big deal. It was a minor issue; in the long run I think it will have historical significance (BCTF:PLS).

(e) The Bureaucrats

This section includes a commentary, from a bureaucrat, on why officials must remain dedicated to their government:

I believe that segregation of the child early in life would not give the child the full range of experiences that they need to act fully and serve as citizens in the population. .. I made sure it was implemented ...that would in no way jeopardize the value of the education that children would get under that system. And I consider all that a duty even though I would not have initiated the system at all!(Bur1:LS)

The closing topic is that of a bureaucrat who had asked to be quoted summarizing his position on the effectiveness of the public school versus the independent school:

I am very troubled with the public education system - I gave a submission to the royal commission; I was uncomplimentary to the government and to the BCTF I think that they have industrialized the process, ... I think that enormous problems are being created. I think that a lot of the private school business is a reaction to the public school system. It pains me to talk to my friends who are teachers and all that they can talk about are the bargaining units, and the benefits and all the rest of it .. I don't blame people for wanting to take their kids out of the system and I'm quite prepared to be quoted: "if the private school system is thriving in part then it is because the public school system is failing." But I fault (the management) both the government and the teachers federation on that because ... most labour relations are management failures not labour failures; where you have labour failures it is where the (Bur1:LS) communists are involved. That is just about an absolute rule.

B. Discussion

In this final sub-problem, there is a concluding emphasis on motives. The study commenced around this aspect of personalities and it is fitting to end on it. In any study of personal actions, whether the analysis is of the group or of the individual, it can be taken for granted that certain motives behind active, *proactive*, or defensive behaviour will be uncovered. However, this study is also an attempt to find out: who are the precursors to the policy-making process; who are the influencers that do not normally get acknowledged; and what power-holders did not get involved. It also asks: who could have defended and did not? This in part stems from

the socio-metric analysis referred to earlier. In asking individuals about other individuals in the process, it seemed appropriate to ask about those who were not involved to see if any greater understanding of the policy-making process could be gleaned. The results were there. In chapter four, the role of doing nothing as a legislator is first touched upon. These data point out that there are several individuals that could have spoken out and challenged the policy. They were negated or pushed aside by others, or personally did not feel it was worth it to pursue. The policy went through, apparently, just as McGeer and Ensing wanted it. The non-involvement took away the democratic process.

The comment from the BCTF extends further, the concept of personality traits and motives at the leadership level. This study identifies as a prime motive of individuals in supporting independent schools, a dissatisfaction with the public school system and the politics of the teachers. The data indicate more of the same for the future. That is to say, there is a consistent theme in the data that the public school system needs confidence and support, not competition and criticism. The BCTF member sees, in its leadership, the future opportunity to provide the "credible leadership" in the public school arena. He also sees the opportunity to lose it all, depending on the behaviour and motives of the new influencers in the organization.

The Liberal spokesperson supports this future need to support the "coherence of the integrity of the public school" but does not see it as a role of the opposition in the legislature. What this also portends is that, in order for the public school system to enjoy the same advantages in legislative debate in the future that independent schools have enjoyed, there may have to be at least an *institutional group* to lead the influence. This is particularly the case if the legislative parties do not see this as their role in education. For the BCTF, BCSTA and other organizations and individuals in education they will require a leader who will have the motives of organizational continuity and cohesion. Such cohesion was not evidenced, in the opposition, throughout the independent school policy-making process. The *institutional group* will have to be: "highly

knowledgeable about the policy-making process and how to get access to public officials"; their membership should be stable; "their ultimate aims will be sufficiently broad that they can bargain with government over achieving particular concessions; and their long-run credibility with government decision-makers will be more important than any single issue or objective" (Kernaghan, 1985).

Otherwise, they will continue, as the findings indicate, to flounder as organizations that are trying to find and describe their own identities and influence . They will continue to provide supports to independent school proponents. The NDP reinforce this with the stated need to get caucus and party support and to arouse the public to the truth of the other side, another side that they suggest was not represented. The BCTF member confirms it with his current view on the ineffectiveness of the NDP today. This *institutional group* would have to search out the challenges available, just as FISA had to anticipate the challenges.

There is, in this study, a good example of the type of challenge available if the opposition had done their homework. Data indicate that the opposition could have learned from Olthius and his *institutional group* . One example of this is introduced in chapter two, wherein Robinson (1985), is quoted as stating that in 1975 the Nishga School District was created in northern British Columbia. Robinson, significantly, identified this as a "public school district like all other school districts in the province". This is exactly what Olthius is championing. This would have been a strong argument for strengthening the public school system and making separate schools into public schools. The study of this one man Olthius, by the opposition, may have made a significant contribution to the opposition role in the policy-making process. There may also have been others like him that could have helped the opposition.

Finding 7.3

In order for the public school system, in British Columbia, to enjoy the same advantages in legislative debate, in the future, that independent schools have enjoyed, there may have to be, at least, an *institutional group* to lead the influence.

The interviewees, as a group, focus on the potential divisiveness of independent schools and how legislation, once granted, can not be taken away. These opinions are as essential today, in evaluating the nature of future policy-making in education, as opinions on stress were at the beginning of the policy-making process on *Bill 33*. The NDP comment, that Ensing provided research that was "complete nonsense", gives us another look at the nature and motive of *language in policy-making* as described earlier. The data indicate that the nature of Ensing's oratory was such that, by stating harmlessly that independent schools were just asking for a "modest this a modest that" and also by stating that the debate was one of "freedom of choice", he was able to disarm and diffuse potential challenges. A final example is when FISA represents at the *withinput* stage that they had a hand in naming the act arising from *Bill 33*. They knew that even the choice of the word 'independent' over say, 'private school' or 'separate school', would have significant impact at the defense stage of the process. The NDP goes further with this concept by stating that in *defense* of the legislation, the words of a current education minister, Brian Smith, were meant to give the appearance of accomplishing something for the public school system, but actually did not. This again supports the earlier contention that not only is language important in the policy-making, but also in each stage of the policy-making process.

This brings us back to Housego (1964) and his contention that some persons have more success than others in influencing behaviour and attitudes. Housego's conclusion, explored strongly herein, is that, in measuring influence, "power consists in affecting attitudes, (which in

turn) affect actions, which in turn affect decisional outcomes" (p. 222). FISA, through their use of language, in addition to other techniques, demonstrated on several occasions their ability to affect attitudes of others that otherwise could have played significant roles. Here, it is shown that the change in attitudes effectively eliminated possible challenges. On the other hand, it is also expressed in the data, that other individuals in universities, sociology, civil servants, et cetera, could have played significant roles in affecting or counter-affecting attitudes. They never came to the political arena. There were some reported commentary but, generally, these others were not cohesive and organized.

Another aspect of these data is the personal comment on the effect of the media. It is indicated that the media took away the forum for defense by abandoning the NDP. This is blamed on the NDP who, likewise, had perhaps, in the eyes of the media, abandoned the legislative process and thus had given up the right to effective media coverage. Where Housego, as previously discussed, implies that the bureaucracy can give up their constitutional authority to the power of special interest groups when civil servants do not exercise their authority, now a similar situation is posed. It is, herein, found that the legislators may give up their right to media representation when they do not exercise their legislative authority. The media is democratically involved in political processes as a feed-back mechanism. It is apparently not their duty to ensure that they are fed, only to ensure that what they are fed is fairly reported and investigated. In this case, it is reported that the media did not continue to go after the part of the process that was abandoned by the NDP. Their duty was to report the abandoning and that they did. Again, the NDP did not appear to understand quickly enough the effects of this when they decided to walk out of the legislature during the debate.

Finding 7.4

A Legislature gives up right to media representation when their democratic legislative authority is not exercised.

The final aspect of these findings is the personal stress regarding the state of the public school system in the 1980s. This is conveyed in the personal comments by the BCTF member, a civil servant, the NDP, and the Liberal. They are articulating the stresses of today that are the consequences of yesterday's legislation. The Easton *feedback loop* can be observed and, if this study is any indication, soon there will be a demand for public school support that will have to be answered by a policy-making process. These data demonstrate that if researchers continue to monitor the stresses and the individual motives behind the demand articulation, a comprehensive understanding of the potential new process will take shape. For those who could have challenged, and/or defended a new period has begun where they or others will have the opportunities to take up the role and the *feedback loop* will have again come full circle as predicted.

Finding 7.5

Monitoring of the stresses, the individual motives and the *feedback loops*, behind community demands may provide a comprehensive understanding of potential new policy-making processes.

SUMMARY

This chapter has probed the roles played in the defense of the legislation, *Bill 33*. Equally important, it has covered the feedback processes and analyzed those who could have participated, and did not, in the defense of the policy, whether defending or challenging. The

need to understand the motives and natures of *power-holders* and *influencers* is emphasized and supported. The aspect of democracy in policy-making is summarized. A picture is starting to form of some clear direction that policy-makers, power-holders and others can take in order to influence policy. The final chapter summarizes the findings from each of these last three chapters and provides the implications of the findings and the study.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

SUMMARY

This study examined the political influence of the individual in educational policy-making. In particular, it looked at the human factor in the role of the individual in the legislative process that preceded and encompassed the legislation of the British Columbia School Support (Independent) Act 1977. Two general research questions were asked:

1. Who are the important influencers at each stage of the policy-making process? How and why did they exercise influence? With what effects?

2. Who are the potential influencers at each stage who did not attempt to influence the outcome? What are the implications of this?

Each of the important influencers has been identified with the reasoning underlying their influence and the effects of their influence. Those that did not attempt to influence and those that did so unwittingly are described in detail. Those interviewed provided data that suggested certain intrinsic facts about decision-making in education in British Columbia. Consistently throughout the findings, it was demonstrated that a focus on individual motives and characteristics provided opportunity for deeper and broader understanding of the issues.

The principal conclusion of the study is that the legislation came about as a result of persistent, consistent and effective lobbying in concert with two primary *influencers*, McGeer and Ensing, and in conjunction with two very important events. The first event was the pluralistic and paradigm shifts in society that included a greater demand for choice. The second event was the political advantages that were postured in British Columbia during the 1970s and alluded to above. These included the fear of electing socialists, the backlash against teachers in politics and

the crossing of the floor of certain Liberals. This resulted in the coalition between the Socreds and the Liberals. With respect to the specific legislation of *Bill 33*, there was undoubtedly significant impact from the effect of Gerald Ensing, the FISA lobby and Pat McGeer. Ensing was a craftsman-with-language, in his role as a lobbyist, as was WAC Bennett, as a leader in government before him. Ensing had to obtain the acceptance from a large community in order to effectively represent his organization's objectives. McGeer did not have the same broad responsibility. In meeting the challenge, FISA certainly had all the characteristics of an *institutional group* as a lobby. It obtained the power of grassroots support. It is speculated, herein, that there was a partnership of sorts, a partner-in-interest, between FISA/Ensing and McGeer. McGeer was able to spin off his interest in the policy-making process, to his bureaucrats and the special interest group, FISA. This speculation of partnership is more supportable, from the data, than is the interview-speculation, of a coalition-deal between McGeer and Bill Bennett. McGeer was a major influencer on this legislation, but not necessarily a leader. Where he advocated competition as a remedy for the public school system, he shunned it, and perhaps democracy with it, in the Legislature. He also may have ignored a cure for the intrinsic problems of the system for which the government is responsible. Similarly, Ensing was not a 'feed-forward' person, as described of McGeer by a bureaucrat, or a visionary with a goal for total education. His objective was for a select constituency. Researchers state that *supports* represent the acceptance of policy by the electorate and also the ways and means that individuals have of encouraging policy and that continued *supports* gives a political system legitimacy. It is demonstrated, herein, that McGeer and Ensing may have represented certain *indirect supports* that would not necessarily give the system legitimacy. They may in fact have rendered the process less than legitimate, which is a serious consequence to policy-making. John Olthius was described as not supporting private schools, but supporting a secular, freedom of choice. If Ensing had been an advocate for education in the broad sense of the word, perhaps he would have followed Olthius' vision of public-separate schools. This is

where Ensing and McGeer had a *partnership-in-interest*, in a select constituency. It was their motives that differed.

The initial data reports that there is not an effective, ongoing, educational lobby in British Columbia. This is vitally important to education in the province. The latter data verifies that under *Bill 33*, the potential lobbyists and opposition were ineffective. It is argued that the democratic function of policy-making does not work without rational and well informed debate.

There was suggested a strong impact on the policy-making by *non-patronizing influencers* who indirectly gave the direction to FISA and perhaps to Bill Bennett and Pat McGeer. Hugh Harris may have had a significant influence on Bennett and Loffmark, or likewise, Griffiths on Ensing. The *patronizing influencers* were numerous and each one played a significant role in each stage of the process.

The opposition was neutralized and rendered ineffective from without and within. They may not have understood the culture and nuances of the legislature and the policy-making process. They had available the resources for research. They may not have had the time or the organization to take advantage. Personalities played a significant role in the NDP and the BCTF. They were identified as the primary cause of disorganization and dissension. Today, the NDP are still recognized, and reported in local media, as lacking the cohesion and internal organization to be effective as *influencers* in legislative policy-making processes.

FINDINGS

At the outset, the research of Downey (1982) and Housego (1964) was identified as being integral to this study. It is significant to note a primary conclusion of Housego from his dissertation and its application to this conclusion:

It seems clear in this study that the Minister of Education provided the conditions required for the making of a policy decision involving outside interests. In doing so, he appears to have accepted the view that a policy should be framed by the

interests affected and not exclusively by the political head or his agents. He made it possible for the affected interests to work out for themselves, so to speak, the "best" solution -- a compromise. The Minister tried to insure that all principally affected interests were represented in the settlement of the issue that the "general public" was not completely disregarded, and that no interest suffered unduly in the outcome. (p. 237).

This was not the case with Bill 33. It seems clear that the Minister of Education, in British Columbia, did not provide the conditions required for the making of a democratic policy decision. The lack of opposition was welcomed by the Minister. The "general public" was swayed by language that included significant, political justification for the policy even in the face of rational argument that may have, by itself, withstood any debate or opposition. The accountability of ensuring "that no interest suffered unduly in the outcome" was abandoned, at least in part, by the government.

The findings of each research question and related sub-problems relates to the behavior of the policy-making system in education in British Columbia. The following points summarize those findings. It is understood, that where the words "policy-making" or "policy-makers" are used, they refer to the roles of all contributors to the development of policy, including all opposition.

Chapter 4.

1. Demands recognized by one group can be supports to another
(Finding 4.1).
2. The nature of *demands* plays second to the manner in which they are presented (Finding 4.2).
3. With the exception of FISA, the role of the effective education-lobbyist does not exist in the British Columbia Legislature (Finding 4.3).
4. An aspect of making demands, where it is imperative to understand the human motives and characteristics of all relationships involved,

relational demand processing, is integral to the policy-making process (Finding 4. 4).

5. Understanding fully the process of information retrieval and consequences is imperative to a legislator or lobbyist (Finding 4.5).
6. Understanding the role of defending one's own policy may be as essential for effective opposition in the policy-making process as is understanding the role of policy-making (Finding 4.6).
7. Legislators do have the opportunity for influence in the legislature; more importantly, they can have significant influence in the community. In particular legislators can have impact on the underlying stresses behind legislative issues (Finding 4.7).

Chapter 5.

8. Edelman's concept of *language in policy-making* may be of considerable value in assessing the nature of individual debate at the stage of stresses being recognized (Finding 5.1).
9. Power is not measurable just through access to officials by individuals; it is also measurable through access by the officials to the grassroots organization (Finding 5.2).
10. In lobbying, the roles of grassroots, organized individuals is as important, and perhaps more so, than an organized group acting in conformity to established policy (Finding 5.3).
11. In the policy-making process, where the general public may not have wide knowledge, it is important that the influential public have both knowledge and understanding of issues (Finding 5.4).

12. In policy-making processes, opposition members may monitor the demands being made upon other parties. With the knowledge and understanding gained from such monitoring, opposition members can increase the effectiveness of their own influence (Finding 5.5).
13. The influence of an individual, in a policy-making process, may not be complete without the synergistic power of another or others (Finding 5.6).
14. In order to articulate demands effectively, one must have commitment to some fixed value, ideology or principle (Finding 5.7).
15. The definition of *supports* as acceptance or encouragement of policy is subject to the perception of the individual who recognizes and uses the supports in a policy-making process (Finding 5.8).
16. *Supports* can be broken down into direct and indirect encouragement or acceptance of policy by the public. Indirect supports are both justifying-and re-enforcing where:
- A justifying-support* is an argument used by power-holders to defend policy initiatives rather than represent public acceptance. It is in place of, and gives the appearance of, public acceptance.
- A reinforcing-support* is an argument used by power-holders that capitalizes on opposition weaknesses rather than to encourage policy. It is in place of, and gives the effect of, encouraging policy (Finding 5.9).
17. In the policy-making process, where the general public may not have wide knowledge, if supports can be received effectively from the

- influential minority, then policy can be affected without generating wide public acceptance or encouragement of policy (Finding 5.10).
18. Acceptance of policy can be directed through *relational supports* where two or more *influencers* combine to create an effective and efficient acceptance whether or not acceptance is based on a fair or complete understanding of the issue (Finding 5.11).
 19. An integral factor in the political policy-making process is neutralizing opposition and dissent. Such dissent may come from within or without the group of influencers of power-holders (Finding 5.12).
 20. Where feedback processes are recognized in policy-making, it is essential that they be realized throughout the process and not just as an aspect of the *outputs* of the process (Finding 5.13).
 21. Influencers can be patronizing ("PI"), owning similar values of a special-interest group, or non-patronizing ("NPI"). An NPI will have no vested interest in the policy but may still have significant influence (Finding 5.14).
 22. Domination of a stage of a policy-making process may often be as a result of a strong involvement and background understanding of, and in, embryonic stages and stresses related to the policy (Finding 5.15).
 23. Motives in individuals, can be *process-oriented*, that is, related to the political process or they can be *results-oriented*, that is related to the results of a particular legislative process. To be an effective influencer it may be that one must be *results-oriented* (Finding 5.16).
 24. The cohesiveness and organization of issue-oriented groups, that is groups that are focussed on a specific issue rather than a process, is vitally

important to policy-making processes (Finding 5.17).

Chapter 6.

25. Influence, at the first stage of policy-making, is incremental. Later, it can lose that strength and become vulnerable to time pressures, strengths and weaknesses of legislative roles (Finding 6.1).
26. In order to influence policy-making, it may be essential to not only monitor the legislation and legislators through every step but also, to monitor the behavior and personalities of the bureaucrats (Finding 6.2).
27. In the absence of a Cabinet Minister's ability, or time, to absorb the micro details of policy-making, an opportunity may occur for a non-legislative individual to take on a partnership-in-interest role with a Minister in developing such policy, where such partnership may be unofficial and would represent compatible interests or objectives (Finding 6.3).
28. Legislators and others can exert influence on the policy-making process through inaction (Finding 6.4).

Chapter 7.

29. Democracy in decision-making for Bill 33 was lacking (Finding 7.1).
30. Influencing starts from within an organization. Its acceptance is essential to affecting influence outside of the organization(Finding 7.2).
- 31.In order for the public school system, in British Columbia, to enjoy the same advantages in legislative debate, in the future, that independent

schools have enjoyed, there may have to be, at least, an *institutional group* to lead the influence (Finding 7.3).

32. A legislature may give up right to media representation when their democratic legislative authority is not exercised (Finding 7.4).

CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this study was three-fold. Each of those aspects is concluded in turn as follows:

1. To develop a framework for the analysis of the exercise of political influence in policy-making. The Easton system model was adapted in this study. It was found that the model was enhanced by adding certain ancillary concepts that allowed for a full identification of the important influencers at each stage of the policy-making process. These concepts were: the use of socio-metric techniques in identifying the influencers; the identification of stages in policy-making; the realization that *feedback loops* can and do exist within every stage; the awareness that analysis of language in policy-making can be extended to include understanding the importance of language through all stages of the policy-making, not just the conversion process; and that influences can be identified by the lack of inputs to the policy-making process.

2. To apply the framework to B.C. policy-making process in education. The nature of motives, personalities, and individual characteristics was determined to be an integral aspect of, not only policy-making but also, understanding policy-making and the opposition and defence thereof.

3. To ascertain the contribution that detailed empirical knowledge of the politics of policy-making in B.C. in the field of education can make to the existing knowledge base in politics and policy-making. The observations and practical experiences of the power-holders and influencers provided significant findings that contribute to existing knowledge. Those principal findings are

detailed above. The significance of the empirical knowledge is that it provides the potential for understanding the application of theory in the uncertain forums of human emotions, motives and behaviors. It provides the potential for affecting policy-making processes by bringing the nature of influencers into decision-making situations regarding the conversion of inputs and withinputs plus other processes to policy-making. It supports the potential benefit of understanding roles and behavior as it applies to opposition, defense and the non-action of influencers.

IMPLICATIONS

Generally, it has been supported that legislators can have significant impact and influence behind-the-scenes and in the constituency. They can alter, exacerbate or ameliorate the stresses of a community. They can affect community understanding at all levels of the policy-making process not just at the defense/ feedback stage. It is implied that in order to be effective as a legislator, he or she may have to put in as much effort as a lobbyist. If they can not afford the time for such a luxury, then they must find the special interest group that will do their leg-work for them. It has been shown that the point of doing nothing as a legislator can be more significant than many would otherwise realize and accordingly it is implied that this factor must be considered strongly when planning for policy-making.

Specifically, with respect to public schools versus independent schools, there are lessons to be learned from this study. It is implied that, if the public school system is to be a vital component in education in British Columbia, it will require an *institutional group* and strong *influencers* to direct it.

It is hoped that the future governments of British Columbia realize the implication, to the democratic function of our society, in denying the role of effective opposition both within the legislature and in the community. This same message was delivered by Beamon (1986)

"Clearly, the government must accept the legitimacy of interest groups as participants in the decision-making process. Through an effective exchange of views and information the quality of decisions is enhanced and overall political stability is ensured." (p. 144)

RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that an individual or a group follow the many guidelines of experience examined in this study and chart a course for policy-making that will include application of some of the findings herein. It is hoped that their policy would then have a greater chance of successful implementation than would be otherwise. The study of this process could give government members, lobbyists and specifically the opposition, significant insight into the motives, individual characteristics, consequences and timing aspects of policy-making in the field of education.

It is recommended that researchers consider seriously the implications of personalities, values, motives et cetera to not only policy-making but also to the impact of research itself upon educational policies.

One of the most commonly given explanations why research has had little impact upon educational policies involves the characteristics of policy-makers that influence their attitudes towards research findings... their values and personality. (Holdaway 1983, p. 12)

This study may provide researchers with a strong understanding of how the roles of individuals, lobbies, political parties and bureaucrats interact in the policy-making process. It is hoped that the "attitudes towards research findings" will be altered a modicum, by many seeing themselves in this study and perhaps seeing the consequences of their actions. Should this particular piece of legislation be an accurate reflection of many of those roles and the postulates and principles that govern, then the results of policy-making should be more predictable.

It is recommended that those who should and could be playing effective roles as advocates for education, including the BCTF, BCSTA, universities, school boards, educational associations and other organized groups within education, glean from this study certain salient

implications and facts. These facts would then enable them to understand the personal characteristics and motives of many individuals over the last decade that have led to the consequences in education of limited advocacy and/or democratic opposition.

There is an obvious need for this study to be replicated either on another legislative Bill or as a project where community stresses are identified and then processed through the various stages using the several findings and implications of this study. Then, the both the findings and the implications could be tested in an actual policy-making environment.

APPENDIX A**INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR THESIS:**

TO: <DATA>
 FROM : GRAEME WAYMARK
 DATE: MARCH 4, 1988
 SUPERVISED BY: DR. NORMAN ROBINSON, PROFESSOR OF EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION

1. GENERAL

With respect to all question about individuals, please indicate where possible the personal characteristics, behaviour, personality and motives of the person identified.

In your opinion, what is the role of the individual MLA in the legislative process?

1.1 With respect to education do you see any difference in the role of the legislator?

2. DEMANDS

It has been stated that as the ideology of the independent alternative to public schooling began to take a clearer form in the 1970s that "the demand for genuine freedom of choice became a demand to which Bill 33 was ultimately the response".

2.1 In your opinion who created and articulated this demand for choice and when? What stresses precipitated these demands?

2.2 Who were the individuals that played significant roles in interpretation and presentation of the demands to the legislature?

2.3. With respect to the ideological shift in the community toward private schooling, how did individual Legislators react to these shifts?

3. SUPPORTS:

Prior to and during the policy-making there were recognizable supports of the independent alternative [for example: certain groups provide votes, taxes, research, favorable attitudes and other intangibles - such as willingness to accept the policy-making].

3.1 What supports of the independent alternative can you identify that existed prior to and during the conversion process of demands into policy?

3.2 How integral were the supports in determining roles played by individuals and legislators?

4. CONVERSION PROCESS:

In the process of converting these demands into the policy-making of Bill 33:

4.1 Who were the legislators involved in the process? why?

4.2 Who were the bureaucrats? why?

4.3 What characteristics of both were observed by you in the process?

4.4 How effective were the individual legislators and bureaucrats - potential vs actual?

4.5 What effect did the demands and supports have on the legislator and bureaucrat roles during the conversion process?

4.6 What individual interactions stand-out most in your mind within the Legislature during the process?

5. DEFENCE OF THE POLICY:

5.1 Who defended the policy and what characteristics of those individuals stand out in your mind?

5.2 Who challenged the policy and what characteristics of those individuals stand out in your mind?

5.3 What persons could have taken more of a defensive role and didn't? Why didn't they?

OTHER:

6. What role other than that described so far have you played in the process of the legislation?

6.1 What other people do you know that have played an important leadership role in the legislation?

6.2 How effective were they and why?

6.3 What persons could have taken a more leadership role and didn't and why, in your opinion, did they not?

7. It has been speculated that there was an element of coalition building between the Liberals and the Socreds over the legislation - what information do you have that would support or deny this theory?

8. Are there any individuals involved in this legislation that either we haven't mention or are there any data pertaining to those individuals that would in your opinion be relevant to this thesis?

APPENDIX B
SAMPLE OF INTERVIEW LETTER

<address>
 Vancouver BC
 V6L 2W8
 February 29, 1988

Mr. <interviewee>

<address>

Vancouver BC

<zip>

Dear Mr.

I am a graduate student in the Faculty of Education at Simon Fraser University and a Vancouver School Board Trustee. As part of the requirements for a Master of Arts (Education) degree, I am preparing a thesis entitled:

THE ROLE OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN EDUCATIONAL LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES: *The School Support (Independent) Act 1972 recognized the importance of private schools in providing an alternative form of education. What was the human factor in the legislative process that reversed an ideological stand of the BC Government representing over 100 years of policy.*

Lorne Downey of UBC completed an inquiry in 1983 of the "Anatomy" of the legislation, its history and the effects and possible consequences of the legislation. This thesis builds on that inquiry and looks behind the scenes to examine the roles of the individual players and the effect they can have on policy-making.

You were an integral part of the policy-making, in your role as <descriptor> and accordingly are vital to the research. If you agree to participate in this study, you will be requested to complete an interview sometime during this month of March, that asks for your opinions on various policy-making matters: *to explore particular questions related to the conversion process in education, of creating legislation and/or policy from inputs of various demands and supports; further, to evaluate effects of policy conversion processes with respect to the role the legislator plays in defending the legislation .*

Two trial interviews to date have taken approximately 90 minutes. It is not expected to take any longer than this. To the best of our knowledge this is the first research in Canada exploring the role that the individual legislator plays in the conversion process in education.

All information given will be held in the strictest confidence and will reflect only opinions and commentary that may support the thesis research. No individual results will be reported. The study is under the supervision of Dr. Norman Robinson. Should you wish to ask him any questions, he may be reached at Simon Fraser University 291-4165 [ext. 8666] or his home, <data>. I can be reached at <data> at any time.

I shall contact you within a week to confirm availability for your hoped-for participation in the study and to answer any questions you may have.

With thanks,
Simon Fraser University
Faculty of Education

Graeme Waymark CA

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