STATE SOCIETY RELATIONS: MOVEMENT TOWARD

INCORPORATION OR DISENGAGEMENT - THE

EXPERIENCE OF GHANA AND TANZANIA

by

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the political experiences of Ghana and Tanzania since independence, to ascertain whether the state in each country has succeeded in establishing close relations with society, or whether the society remained disengaged or moved toward further disengagement from the realm of the state.

The thesis begins with an examination of some of the historical perspectives concerning the concept of the state. Particular attention is given to the idea of the autonomy of the state. The issues of incorporation and disengagement will be considered from a state centric rather than from a societal point of view.

To establish a framework for discussing the two particular countries, it is necessary to review the development of the post independent state in Africa, with particular attention paid to the colonial legacy and some of the dominant characteristics which developed following the acquisition of independence.

The period from Ghana's gaining independence to the arrival of J.J. Rawlings is also examined to clarify how Ghanaian society had moved into a situation of disengagement from the state. The primary focus is on the period of J.J. Rawlings' rule, attempting to determine whether his economic and political actions have improved the possibility of incorporation or have failed to prevent movement toward disengagement.

The critical period of Tanzania's history begins with independence and continues through the time when Nyerere was leader of the party and the country. Nyerere's leadership and the functioning of the state apparatus are examined to determine whether the Tanzanian society has been incorporated or has chosen to remain disengaged.

This thesis argues that J.J. Rawlings has been able to improve state/society relations and that society has become more incorporated into the realm of the state. In Tanzania's case, this author concludes that Nyerere's plans and actions as well as those of his government did not result in the incorporation of the majority of Tanzanian society.

DEDICATION

To Mom and Dad, Eva, Heather and Shannon

QUOTATION

If God wants to put his angels to a test, all

He has to do is send them to govern a newly

independent country.

S. N. Eisenstadt

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INTRODUCTION

It is the goal of this thesis to examine the relationship between the state and society in the countries of Ghana and Tanzania. A brief examination will be made of the state society relations that existed prior to each country gaining independence, as well as an assessment of the state in general in sub-Saharan Africa.

The emphasis of this paper is on the period of Ghana's history since J.J. Rawlings became the leader and in Tanzania, the focus is on the period of Julius Nyerere's leadership. These time periods were chosen because both leaders were dynamic, both began their terms in office with popular support and both held strong ideas concerning changing the political and economic situation in their respective countries. They both attempted to create a closer relationship between state and society in their countries.

The state and society are intertwined in the sphere of political and social life with few situations where either is fully autonomous from the other. This thesis will examine this relationship with an emphasis on the state's perspective rather than that of society. This perspective is taken because of the personal interest of the author. Secondly, because there is more material available regarding state/society relations from the state's

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perspective and thirdly, considering the scope of this thesis, it was not possible to do a comprehensive job of analyzing the topic from the point of view of two complex cultures.

There is much discussion surrounding the question of whether the post independent state in Africa has become weak or whether it has developed into a strong functioning body. The thesis will work with the assumption that at the end of the colonial period, the state was generally a viable functioning institution. The colonial powers had bequeathed to the newly independent countries a political structure that would enable the state to continue functioning after the colonial power exited. The structure was based on the experience of the mother country. It may have been foreign and imposed on the newly independent country, but nevertheless it was a system and structure that was proven to function in Europe and was considered viable for the independent countries.

The focus of this thesis is aimed at establishing the way in which the relationship between the state and society has changed as a consequence of the divergence that developed between the expectations of society and the capacity of the state to meet those expectations after independence. The interplay between increased expectancy and diminishing capacity led to a series of problems in state society

relations. In this paper, the post independent state in Ghana and Tanzania will be examined to see if the relationship between state and society has been characterized by incorporation or disengagement. According to Victor Azarya:

"Incorporation is the process by which large segments of the population associate themselves with the state, identify with the state and take part in state activities in order to share its resources." [1]

The state is seen as the centre of action and authority and also as the superior means of distribution. In the incorporation process, traditional structures and authority figures such as local political parties and associations move toward closer association with the state. This process may occur as a result of voluntary initiatives by the traditional leader and structures or it may be initiated by the state organ and occur through co-opting. Incorporation manifests itself in several possible ways. There may be an increase in the migration from the rural areas to the urban. There may be an increase in the number of immigrants from other countries. Other manifestations may be a greater receptivity by the general population to the mass media, an increase in the production of goods and services, greater

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[1] Victor Azarya, "Reordering State-Society Relations: Incorporation and Disengagement," D. Rothchild and N. Chazan, eds. The Precarious Balance State and Society in Africa, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), p.6.

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commercialization of agricultural products, and the emergence of new forms of entrepreneurship encouraged and subsidized by the state.[2]

Disengagement is the tendency of members of society to withdraw from the state, to disassociate themselves from the realm of the state and to keep a distance from its channels of power. This disengagement occurs as a hedge against the state's diminishing capacity and dwindling resource base.[3] Disengagement is often a response to the decreasing capabilities and penetrative capacity of the state. The process of disengagement usually involves the by passing of formal networks and legal constraints. This is manifested most in the economic sphere where smuggling and the development of an informal economy are signs of disengagement. This by passing of state based networks is a sign of a tenuous relationship between the state and specific social groups within that society.[4]

Other forms of disengagement involve voice, or people speaking out against the government or government policy. A more drastic or final manifestation is that of exit, when the people leave and migrate to another country. Disengagement may also involve people moving from public to

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[2] V. Azarya, " Reordering State Society Relations," p. 7.

[3] Victor Azarya, "Reordering State-Society Relations," p.7.

[4] D. Rothchild and N. Chazan, eds. p.127.

private employment and/or a subsistence economy and parallel markets. Disengagement does not include a desire to take over or control the government, it is an act of keeping distance from the sphere of the state.[5]

It is generally felt that an atmosphere of incorporation fortifies state society relations while disengagement fractures and weakens them. Disengagement ultimately undermines the state's ability to control resources and exert authority while incorporation allows or is used by the state to penetrate further into the periphery.[6]

Another factor to be considered, is whether the state in Ghana and Tanzania can be characterized as "soft"; that is, unable to deliver the goods and services that it has promised or led the population to expect. Myrdal is credited with coining the phrase "soft state". By soft state he was referring to states where the government requires extraordinarily little of their citizens. This is coupled with the fact that due to the low capacity and/or coercive capability of the state, even the few obligations the state does impose on society are inadequately enforced.[7]

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[5] V. Azarya, p.8.

[6] D. Rothchild and N. Chazan, eds. p.15.

[7] G. Myrdal, Asian Drama, (New York: 20th Century Fund, 1968), p.896.

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Ghana and Tanzania provide an interesting comparison. Both countries are former British colonies and both have elements of socialism in their approach to governing. Finally, both of these countries have charismatic leaders, Rawlings and Nyerere.

Ghana is generally portrayed as an African country which experienced incorporation around the time of independence. Since independence, and prior to the commencement of Rawlings' regime, society has generally moved in the direction of disengagement from the state. The gradual reduction in state capacity left the remnants of the state void of clear cut attachments to other than haphazardly selected social formations. [8] Rawlings has made changes with the expressed goal of gaining back the support and confidence of society in the state apparatus. This paper will examine whether Rawlings and the state have been successful in moving society towards incorporation.

Nyerere's goal of achieving a Tanzanian brand of socialism included democracy and participation by the people. In the context of the Arusha Declaration, many programs were instituted with the secondary purpose of incorporating society into the new state. This thesis will examine

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[8] N. Chazan, <u>An Anatomy of Ghanaian Politics: Managing Political Recession 1969-1982</u>. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), p.69.

whether Nyerere and the state in Tanzania have been successful in achieving this goal. It is generally accepted that at the time of independence, the majority of society in Tanzania, the peasants, were quite independent of the activities of the state and, as Hyden suggests, were uncaptured by the state.[9] Has the peasantry remained uncaptured or have Nyerere and the state achieved success with the incorporation process? In this thesis an effort has been made to determine whether the state, as an institution, is working with the support and participation of society at large or whether society has set up alternative systems to circumvent state programs, or has simply been able to ignore the state.

The thesis begins with a general overview of theories of the state and its relationship with society. What is the state? Is the state autonomous? Whose interests does it serve? The author has chosen three views as presented by Otwin Marenin as the basis for discussion.

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[9] For further discussion on this topic, see G. Hyden, <u>Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania</u>, (London: Heinemann, 1980).

CHAPTER 1

THE STATE

i> VIEWS OF THE STATE:

In this thesis the author wishes to focus on the relationship between the state and society after independence in two African countries, Ghana and Tanzania. By examining this particular relationship one may be able to explain some of the social and economic situations that prevail in the respective countries today. Following independence, much of the power that was previously held by the colonial metropole was transferred to the new state. One of the critical questions is whether the power of the state increased over the years or weakened as major portions of society withdrew from the state realm. The author will be looking at the state/society relations as Chazan suggests, as "two intersecting and potentially independent variables with the political process as dependent." [10] The subject will be approached from a state

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[10] D. Rothchild and N. Chazan eds. The Precarious Balance (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988). p.123.

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centric viewpoint, stressing the centrality of the state
and as Chazan also points out, looking at the state as "the
key collective agent of the macropolitical process."[11]

While focusing on Ghana and Tanzania, an attempt will be
made to point out through analysis of the state / society
relationship, where the centre of power lies. Has the state
been able to sustain or increase its role as the key
collective agent? Has the state simply remained an
authoritarian centre of power as it was during colonial
times? How has the state shared power with local structures
which have the capacity to control resources and have
varying degrees of legitimate authority? Independence
followed colonial rule and with independence came an
increasing list of expectations and demands by society on
the state. An analysis of the state / society relations
will determine whether the state has been able to meet the
demands of society and thereby consolidate its position, or
whether it has failed to some degree and gone into a
position of declining capacity and power. If the state has
declined in resources and/or capacity, then the state may
be playing a lesser role in the African social life than

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[11] D. Rothchild, and N. Chazan, eds. p.121.

was previously assumed.[12]

As a consequence of independence and the formation of a sovereign civil state, Geertz argues that there was an increase in sentiments of parochialism, communalism and racism. He suggests that these developed because the new "state" introduced into society a valuable new prize to fight over and a frightening new force with which to contend.[13] The new "states" found themselves in a novel situation of enjoying juridical statehood on the international level while having to work out the details of empirical statehood within each of the respective societies. By examining the state / society relationship this author wishes to determine whether Ghana and Tanzania have been able to move beyond a juridical existence to one in which society has been incorporated into the state realm, thereby giving more empirical legitimacy to the state.

Has the state been able to fulfill its potential as expressed at the time of independence or has it developed and remained in a soft condition with low capacity and with major resources remaining outside its realm? Has society moved closer to participating with the state or has it

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[12] A. Kazancigil, ed. <u>The State in Global Perspective</u> (Gower: UNESCO, 1986) p.23.

[13] C. Geertz, ed. <u>Old Societies and New States</u> (New York: Free Press, 1963), p.120.

disengaged itself and distanced itself from association with the state?

Before articulating the role played by society in the relationship, some time needs to be given to the concept of the state and to a review of the variety of views and perspectives on the state. An understanding of what constitutes the state is crucial for an analysis of society's changing response to the state in both Ghana and Tanzania.

When one considers the term "state", several phrases come to mind: sovereign, autonomous, power, bourgeoisie, government, bureaucracy, representation and even abstraction. From this melange one has to decipher what best describes the state as we see it today. One general description is: " the state is the concentration of social powers in the hands of certain individuals who come to personify the interests of society at large." [14] Even this will not be fully acceptable to all; in particular those with Marxist interests. Rather than attempt the impossible and define the state, this thesis will begin by briefly reviewing some of the historical and varied opinions regarding what constitutes the state.

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[14] M. Godelier, "Processes of the Formation, Diversity and Basis of the State," International Social Science Journal, Vol. XXXII, No. 4 (1980), p.601.

Much of the understanding of the state comes from the European experience and has been directly applied to the African situation. It is only recently that specific attention has been focused on the African experience of state formation.

When the state was being formed, or in the process of state formation, there was usually a centralization, consolidation and expansion of power. This power was generally utilized to regulate and control society and external groups in order to protect and fulfill the ideological and material interests of society. The state acquired a monopoly on decision making on certain issues that affected the whole territory and population. There was a general penetration of society by a direct and central administration. This in effect lessened the capacity and legitimacy of alternative sources of power within society, whether operating from a political or economic power base. [15] The state and its administrative bodies are seen and accepted by society as having power and authority not granted to other key factions within society. What develops is a situation in which, depending on the state / society relationship, the state will possess a varying degree of autonomy from society. As various viewpoints of the state are reviewed, the common theme of the analysis will be the

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[15] T. Callaghy, The State Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), p.85.

issue of state autonomy. To what degree is the state autonomous from society?

To begin the analysis the author will utilize Otwin Marenin's three views of the state in relationship to society.[16] In the first view the state is seldom seen as a totality but rather as a set of real actors who must be organized into statehood. The degree of stateness varies and bears the imprint in norms, structures and interests of the coalitions which produce and reproduce it. This state may be seen firstly as separate from society, "simply doing what needs to be done." In this scenario, the state is represented by all the people and agencies that carry out the particular functions and responsibilities of the state. The state is responsive to various groups and has as one of its goals the protection of the long range interests of capital and the incorporation of the economy into the world system. This viewpoint assumes a world capitalist system in which even the "non - capitalist" states must participate.

The second view perceives the state as:

"being the dominant group within society that has the rights and powers to make decisions binding upon all of society."[17]

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[16] Otwin Marenin, "The Managerial State," Z. Ergas, ed. The African State in Transition (London: Macmillan Press, 1987), p.62-63.

[17] Otwin Marenin, "The Managerial State," p.63.

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In this view, the state, while reflecting the dominant group, rules society through appeals to legitimacy, welfare incentives and rational persuasion - all backed by coercion. The second view stresses the concept of domination of the state over society. Within this view it is understood that to rule:

"the state needs resources, organizations, control, and foresight. It needs to organize and reproduce both itself and its support linkages with society." [18]

Thirdly, some see the state as a unitary actor standing separate from and at times even in opposition to society. Marenin argues that:

"the state can act as a state only if it has a purpose and unity distinct from the wishes and interests of pressure groups both domestically and internationally."[19]

Marenin is working from a self confessed abstract definition of the state, seen as:

"a social agency which manages domination in order to meet functional needs which no other social agency can or will serve. By doing what it does, the state perpetuates itself, social formations and their integration into the world system." [20]

Marenin states that these three characteristics or categories of state are not mutually exclusive of one another. It is also difficult to examine all aspects of the state and have them fit neatly into one of the three

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[18] Otwin Marenin, "The Managerial State," p.63.

[19] Otwin Marenin, "The Managerial State," p.63.

[20] Otwin Marenin, p. 63.

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categories.

The author would now like to take a brief look at some historical perspectives on the state, looking first at views expressed by Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Bentham and Mill. These writers focus on the issue of sovereignty of individuals and a contractual arrangement between the state apparatus and individuals within society that allows the state a degree of autonomy. This will be followed by an examination of the views of Miliband, Marx and Poulantzas. These writers do not view state autonomy as the key issue but rather focus on the role of class particularly the ruling class, in state/society relations.

For both Hobbes and Locke the state developed as society entered into a social contract. Society was seen as a private sphere - personal, family and business life. The social contract resulted in the transfer of sovereignty from the people to the state and its representatives. If individuals surrender their rights by transferring them to a powerful authority which can force them to keep their promises and covenants, then an effective and legitimate private and public sphere, society and state, can be formed. There is one condition, everyone must participate

and do the same.[21]

Hobbes saw this single authority as the "sovereign" and the individual as the subject. The sovereign's subject had an obligation and duty to obey the sovereign, for the position of sovereign is the product of their social contract and "sovereignty" is above all a quality of that position rather than of the person that occupies it.[22] For Hobbes the state was preeminent in both the political and social sphere. It is important to note that Hobbes did not see the state as simply a reflection of socio-economic reality. Instead, he felt the state entered into the very construction of society by establishing its form and codifying its forces. The state, once established, was an indivisible power necessary to control the individual behaviour of its citizens. In fact the state as sovereign had the right of command, but this was the result of consent by the subjects. In fact the people ruled through their representative in the sovereign or the state. Hobbes also argued that all that the state did, must be seen as or considered as legitimate.[23]

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[21] David Held, et al eds. <u>States and Societies</u>, (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1983), p.6

[22] David Held, et al eds. <u>States and Societies</u> (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1983), p. 6.

[23] D. Held, p. 6-8.

Locke did not find Hobbes's suggestion credible. It was not credible that individuals who didn't trust one another would place their trust in an all powerful ruler or sovereign that would look after their interests. For Locke the state was an instrument for the defence of the life, liberty and property of its citizens. That is, society existed prior to the state. The state has been established to guide society. The state's reason of being is the protection of individual rights as laid down by God's will and enshrined in law. The state was seen as an institution representing or reflecting the views of the citizen. Authority is bestowed by individuals in society on government for the purposes of pursuing the ends of the governed. This consent of those represented could be revoked if the government failed to sustain the general good for its citizens.[24] The formation of the state did not signal the transfer of all subjects' rights to the state. The power granted to the state was conditional upon the state adhering to its essential purpose: the preservation of life, liberty and estate. [25]

For Rousseau the issue of sovereignty was unnecessary with regard to the state institution. He saw no need to transfer government from the people to the rulers. Government originated with the people and he felt it should remain

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[24] D. Held, p. 10.

[25] D. Held, p.11

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there.[26] Rousseau saw individuals as ideally involved in the direct creation of the laws by which their lives are regulated. All citizens should meet together to decide what is best for the community. The governed in effect should be the governors. The affairs of the state are integrated into the affairs of ordinary citizens. Rousseau favored a political system in which the legislative and executive functions are clearly demarcated. The legislative function belonged to the people and the executive function to the "government". The people represented the authority of the state and the government executed the laws of the people. The government is seen as the result of an agreement among the citizenry and is legitimate only to the extent to which it fulfills the instructions of the general will.[27]

For Bentham and Mill the state's main function or ultimate goal was to gain the greatest achievement of the greatest happiness for the greatest number of its citizens.[28] The state was to have the role of the umpire or referee while individuals pursued, according to the rules of economic competition and free exchange, their own interests. The enactment and enforcement of law, backed by the coercive powers of the state, and the creation of the new state

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[26] D. Held, p. 21.

[27] D. Held, p.21-23.

[28] Z. Ergas, p. 5.

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apparatus was legitimate to the extent that it upheld the general principle of unity.[29] Mill recognized the need for some regulation and interference by the state in the individual's life but was also concerned to protect the autonomy of the individual.

The previous writers focused on the sovereignty and rights of the citizen and the degree to which these had been transferred to the state. For Hobbes, the state acquired both autonomy and authority while for Locke, Bentham and Mill the state had authority but the ultimate power rested with society. For Rousseau, the state had authority but only to the extent it fulfilled the instructions of the general will. Only Hobbes gave autonomy to the state, the other writers wanted to limit the autonomy of the state and allow society to retain control. The state was a tool to benefit and be responsive to society. The following writers often working in the Marxist tradition focus not on the rights of the individual but rather on the relationship between certain classes within society and the state. The state/society relationship is seen not in a hierarchical position but rather as intertwined and linked to particular class interests.

Writers such as Held argue that Marx held two positions on the state. The first saw the state as not necessarily

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[29] D. Held, p.17.

linked to or under the control of the dominant class at least in the short term. In this view the state retains a degree of power independent of the ruling or dominant class. In the second position, by far the most prevalent in his writings, and the one he is most remembered for, the state and its bureaucracies are class instruments which emerge to coordinate a divided society in the interests of the ruling class.[30] Miliband points out that the very starting point of the Marxist theory of politics and the state is the categorical rejection of the view of the state as the trustee, instrument or agent of society as a whole. The state should be seen as an essential means of class domination. The state is not a neutral entity but is deeply partisan.[31]

The state was not seen as an independent structure or as an autonomous structure or set of institutions placed above society as the holder of public power. Instead, the focus was on the class struggle and division within society. The state was an institution deeply embedded in socio-economic relationships and linked to and with particular class interests.[32] Marx saw the state as existing merely as a committee for managing the common affairs of the

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[30] D. Held, et al eds. <u>States and Societies</u>, p. 25-26.

[31] R. Miliband, <u>Marxism and Politics</u>, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p.66-68.

[32] D. Held, p. 21.

bourgeoisie.[33] The state and the bureaucracy are then seen as a class instrument which emerges through history, to coordinate a divided society in the interest of the ruling class.[34] While some scholars regarded the issue of state autonomy as important, Marx dismissed the subject by saying that any sense of autonomy of the state from society was an illusion.To Marx the state remained the instrument of the dominant class with its purpose, content and policy all focused on and subjected to the interests of the dominant class.[35] Miliband adds that the state's intervention into the affairs of society is " crucial, constant and pervasive." This intervention is closely conditioned by the most fundamental of the state's characteristics; it is a means of class domination. The dominant class, under the pretense of the state, uses its vast resources to bring its own weight to bear on the rest of society.[36]

If one takes this view, one also quickly realizes that the state cannot remain above or sovereign to society.If one contends that the state is autonomous from society and can impose values, programs and policy on a society which

[33] B. Badie, and P. Bernbaum, <u>The Sociology of the State</u> (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), p.3-6.

[34] D. Held, p.26.

[35] D. Held, G. McLennan, and S. Hall, eds. <u>The Idea of the Modern State</u> (Philadelphia: Open University, 1984), p.23.

[36] R. Miliband, p.67-68.

includes the ruling class, then one cannot simultaneously argue that the ruling class is in control of the state. If the state is seen as above society and the ruling class is part of society, then one can conclude that the ruling class has lost its ability to rule and is therefore no longer a ruling class. If there is a ruling class, then it is not possible for the state to be totally above society because the state would be subject to the interests of the ruling class, which is part of society.[37]

Some writers contend that Marx left an ambiguous heritage, never fully reconciling his understanding of the state as an instrument of class with his acknowledgement that the state might also have significant political independence. Miliband is one of the current Marxist thinkers who has tackled the issue of state / society relations.

Miliband contends that the capitalist class in Western societies is highly cohesive and constitutes a formidable constraint on government and state institutions, thereby ensuring that these bodies remain instruments for the domination of society. Miliband argued that the state was not a neutral arbiter among social interests. He argued that in Western societies there is a dominant ruling class.

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[37] R. Fatton, "Bringing the Ruling Class back in: Class, State and Hegemony in Africa," Comparative Politics Vol.20, No.3 (1988), p.255.

This dominant class has close powerful links to institutions, political parties, the military, media etc. It has disproportionate representation and influence at all levels of the state apparatus, especially in the key positions. The one limiting factor on the control of this dominant group occurs when there is conflict between different sectors of capital - domestically and internationally.[38] Then, the level of control or dominance exerted by this group may be lessened. Even with internal conflicts this economically dominant group applies pressure on the state and limits the state's autonomy from society. The state must be able to separate itself routinely from the ruling class factions and is capable of a high degree of independence from class interests, for example in the case of a national crisis or war.[39] For Marx the autonomous nature of the state was nothing more than an illusion. He argued that the degree of autonomy of the state was determined by the constraints and parameters tolerated by the dominant class and therefore was not true autonomy, but at best relative autonomy.[40]

This idea of the state being a political actor autonomous from society and the degree to which it is autonomous, is a major dividing line in many writers' concept of the

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[38] D. Held, States and Societies, p.32.

[39] D. Held, p.32.

[40] R. Miliband, p.74-90.

state. Poulantzas contends that the degree of autonomy the state acquires depends upon the relationship among classes and the class factions,and ultimately on the intensity of the social struggle. Relative autonomy evolves on the state as a consequence of the class struggle.[41] Godelier sees the state not as autonomous, but rather as one of the key players in the class struggle arena. In this struggle the dominant minority misappropriates the product of the community's labour for its own benefit. The surplus ends up being used to the benefit of this dominant minority. This dominant minority represents the larger community with regards to external and international situations, regulates the circulation of commodities, goods and services and also controls the use of resources.[42] What evolves is the minority dominating the majority in the guise of the state. The state as an institution is not autonomous from society, rather it represents the interests of a powerful minority.

Fatton also argues that if one is to understand the state, one needs to understand the ruling class. The ruling class and the state are seen as almost synonymous.

To be absent from the state is to be excluded from power - and relegated to an inferior position. Fatton agrees with

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[41] D. Held, <u>States and Societies</u> p. 32.

[42] M. Godelier, p. 612.

Miliband that class power is state power – the two are fused and inseparable.[43] The author of the thesis would like to qualify the statement by saying that class power may lead to state power, but the degree of state power they attain will be dependent upon the ruling class's ability to impose their intellectual and moral leadership on the rest of society and command obedience without the pervasive use of force.[44] The ruling class has its eyes fixed on selfish interests and its hand on direct control of the reins of the state apparatus. The extent to which the state can protect the position of the ruling class is the extent to which the state is an effective state , and that will depend primarily on the degree of hegemony the ruling class has acquired.[45]

Another aspect in the continuation of the discussion on state autonomy involves focusing on the issue that pits the state as an impersonal autonomous constitution of power on one side and the sovereign rights of the subject on the other.[46] This issue is particularly important when one begins to examine the state from a liberal democratic stance. How can a "sovereign state" relate to a "sovereign

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[43] R. Fatton, p. 254.

[44] Robert Fatton, p.258.

[45] R. Fatton, p.253-255.

[46] D. Held, States and Societies, p.44.

people"? How is the concept of the state as an independent supreme authority with the power to declare and administer laws over a given territory, balanced with the concept of rights of the individual to determine the nature and limits of the state's authority? As both states and society struggle that optimum balance may in fact not be the ultimate goal of either side.

In the formation of a state, the state is searching for a degree of autonomy from both internal and external factors.

It is a quest by the state for separation, autonomy and a diminished dependence vis-a-vis internal societal interests and external groups in the world political/economic environment.[47] Even though the state may seek autonomy one surely has difficulty visualizing how the state can rest wholly outside the play of social forces and be able to move exclusively on its own impetus. A more realistic view might have the state arising out of society, being powerfully shaped and at the same time, constrained by the social and economic relations which surround it. At the same time the state constitutes a condensed point of power which, many would contend, reflects the interests of a particular group or class. This point of power is sufficiently separate from society to be able to act back

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[47] T. Callaghy, p. 82.

on, intervene in, and actually shape and mold society towards its interests.[48] The state leaders and government organs animate the state as a self interested organization and they have the potential to act autonomously on its behalf.[49] This brings about a state that cannot be seen as standing totally outside of society and at the same time its rule and power cannot be wholly reducible to society. There appears to be a certain degree of autonomy while at the same time there is also a degree of accountability to a particular class of people or to society in general. The state interacts and coexists with formal and informal organizations within society.

The state is not simply an abstraction but is distinguished by its seeking of predominance over all other organizations and once in this position of predominance, it attempts to institute binding rules regarding the other organizations. The state thus competes with the other organizations within society for the same resources, but has a degree of autonomy as it sets the rules by which societal conflicts are played out. One can continue to argue that the state as an institution acquires sovereignty and power only to the degree permitted or tolerated by the dominant class or

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[48] D. Held, G. McLennan, S. Hall, eds. p. 23.

[49] V. Olorunsola and D. Rothchild, eds. State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), p. 253.

coalition within society. In a liberal democratic system, the dominant class would continue to be a major factor but the state as an institution must also be responsive to the general will of the people as expressed through general elections.

Lastly, attention will be focused on Weber and his concept of the state. Weber's concept did not focus on autonomy per se. For Weber the state had four basic characteristics: first, an administration and legal order; second, a bureaucratic apparatus; third, a binding control over population and territory and fourthly, a monopoly over the legitimate use of force.[50] Weber's concept of a state centered around a bureaucratic organization of authority and domination. Society is envisaged as being made up of differing social organizations. These differing social organizations also have varying degrees of resources which are used for competition and dominance of each other. As the central political organization, the state is first and foremost the dominant organization of society.[51] A Weber like definition of the state would be that the state is an organization, comprised of numerous agencies led and coordinated by the state leadership. The state has the

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[50] Lee, Su-Hoon, _State Building in the Contemporary Third World_, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), p.12.

[51] Lee Su-Hoon, p.12.

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ability and the authority to make and implement the binding rules for all the people as well as setting the parameters of rule making for other social organizations in a given territory, using force if necessary to have its way.[52] The state or administering agency, can claim to have the monopoly on the legitimate use of force within the particular territory.[53]

Looking again at Marenin's three views of state autonomy, we see the state as standing separate from society yet participating in the long range interests of capital. Secondly, the state may be dominant over society and thirdly the state may be a unitary actor, functioning distinctly on its own. This author has examined some writers who argued that society has relinquished certain powers to the state. This has resulted in partial state autonomy. Others have stressed the role of class and its importance and predominance in any state/society discussion.

This author contends that the state is to varying degrees autonomous from society. Society has relinquished or given the state power in certain aspects of life over which the

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[52] Joel Migdal, <u>Strong Societies and Weak States</u>, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p.19.

[53] B. Badie and P. Bernbaum, p.20-21.

citizens previously had control. The degree of autonomy will differ depending upon several factors such as, the accountability of the state apparatus to society and the relative position of power and legitimacy of the ruling class to the rest of society.[54]

This author has attempted to give an overview of writings regarding the whole concept of the state. In conclusion one may be able to accept the general statement that stateness and the degree of stateness a country attains is the result of the successful process of organizing three key elements; unity, rule, and autonomy. Unity is important as people identify with a particular territory and claim it to be their own. Rule is significant, that the population accept the authority of the state as binding on society. And concerning autonomy, states will not tolerate resistance to the supremacy of their laws nor accept challenges to their ultimate authority over territory and populace.[55]

ii> THE SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN STATE:

These factors will come to light as we now turn our attention to the African situation and Ghana and Tanzania

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[54] R. Miliband, p.84.

[55] D. Rothchild and N. Chazan eds. Precarious Balance. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), p. 31.

in particular. Many would consider it a true statement to say that the governments of many African countries act for the state and may in fact actually act inconsistently with the interests of society . When this occurs the aspirations of the people can then be served only by non-government actors who seek to correct the course set for the state by the government.[56]

A collage of terms have been employed by various writers in an attempt to describe the African state - overdeveloped, fragile, modal, soft, elitist and juridical are just a sampling. Myrdal is acclaimed as the originator of the term "soft state". In the African context this refers to a state characterized by an inability to deliver the goods and services that it has promised or led the population to expect. Chazan uses the term soft state in her analysis to denote a situation where a particular group or class is not in control or "dominant enough to ensure the reproduction of a given macroeconomic system," in short, where a group does not have the capacity or the coercive power to both develop and implement an economic plan of action for the particular country.[57] This term is frequently used to describe the condition of many states in sub-Saharan

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[56] H. Lentner, "The Concept of the State: A Response to Stephen Krasner," Comparative Politics, Vol.16, No.3 (1984), p.368.

[57] D. Rothchild and N. Chazan, eds. p. 134

Africa.

Marenin refers to the state as extensive yet fragile, lacking a strong institutional core or the supporting means which would allow it to function as a state. Though involved in everything and central in the lives and thoughts of the people, the state is nevertheless vulnerable and easily overturned, overwhelmed by public demand and taken over by factional interests. The state is also seen as unable and/or unwilling to protect itself as a state.[58]

Others like Joseph have referred to the African state as a modal state that squats on its people like a bloated toad simultaneously overdeveloped and underdeveloped, captured and used for private interests and unwilling and unable to serve any conception of the public good.[59] What's in it for me rationality tends to be the norm for those in power. According to this line of reasoning, control over state agencies can and should be used to enrich oneself and the resources used to reward relatives and supplicants for favors rendered.

Marenin contests the view that the African state is in transition. The picture of a ship traversing uncharted

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[58] Otwin Marenin, p.65.

[59] Otwin Marenin p. 65.

waters is not an accurate analogy. A more accurate picture, according to Marenin, would be that of a ship that is sinking but kept afloat by acts of some of the crew members and passengers. At the same time, others are tearing it apart for materials to build another ship.[60]

Rosberg and Jackson argue that many African states exist on a juridical level even when there is little or weak empirical evidence for their continuance. They contend that:

"the international postimperial ordering devices for the new states in Africa froze them in their inherited juridical forms and thereby blocked any post independence movement toward self determination."[61]

It was the experience of most sub-Saharan states to acquire juridical statehood before there was evidence of or an opportunity for the empirical state to develop.

By juridical Jackson and Rosberg mean the acceptable rules and regulations regarding states as practiced and observed by the international community. By empirical they mean, the tangible structures and processes that allow a state to function effectively in relationship to society, as well as an understanding by society of the role and terms of reference of the state.

Rosberg and Jackson argue further that on the international

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[60] Otwin Marenin, p. 68.

[61] R. Jackson, and C. Rosberg, " Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood," World Politics, (1982), p.21.

front there is an image of international accord and unity
among the states on many issues. Internally, on an
individual basis the picture is often different with
violence and discord being the norm rather than the
exception. Within the international community there is a
framework of rules and conventions governing the relations
of the states in the region. These conventions have been
founded and sustained for more than two decades.
Unfortunately, far less institutionalization and political
order has been evident during the same period at the level
of national society. The state may be seen in its hegemonic
position as a mere geographic expression, a conjecture, a
bundle of identities which are held together and thrown
into contact and competition within internationally
accepted borders and yet, produce very little empirical
evidence of being a state.[62]

Often the African state offices and apparatus have been
seen as the prize or ticket to resources, power and wealth.
The state is seen as the prime instrument with which a
class or ruling group can hope to become a ruling class.
Fatton argues that the experience of African states has
been that the ruling class has failed to obtain the
spontaneous consent of the masses to the general direction
the ruling class wishes to impose on society. As a

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[62] Otwin Marenin, p.69.

consequence of the nonhegemonic status of the ruling class and their incapacity to transform class power into state power, there has been much violence between factions vying for the position of domination.[63]

K.A. Ninsin argues a similar point. The state has typically suffered from a "hegemonic vacancy." The state has seldom been able to practice a definite ideology or to institutionalize definite state political organizations, processes and practices that would confer credibility on the state apparatus. The state is bereft of any significant economic capacity; it also lacks the moral authority to demand obedience to its laws as well as loyalty and support for the public. The result of this hegemonic vacancy is the widespread use of political violence against the people.[64]

The state in Africa is autonomous from society to the degree its coercive powers or coalition with various factions or its patron/client arrangements allow it to remain in power. Often lacking political institutions and established support structures, the state is as strong and as stable as the coalitions that are formed among various segments of society. In this regard, the state becomes what Marenin refers to as a "managerial state". The state acts

[63] R. Fatton, p.258-259.

[64] D. Rothchild and N. Chazan, eds. p.272.

as part of society and society acts within the state. Participants in the coalition are at the same time an agent of the state and a member of a social grouping. The state thus becomes an expression of interests and an autonomous manager for society.[65]

The African state has frequently been the domain of personal rulers who through coalitions and/or coercion, have held onto power. The state in these instances is not necessarily reflecting the wishes of society in general or looking after the common good. The state becomes a tool used by the ruling person, family or clan to retain power and accumulate wealth. In these instances the state has a high degree of autonomy but its linkages with society are usually weak and/or coercive in nature. Ultimately, the state extracts resources for its own self interests rather than for the long term development of the country. Ghana during General Acheampong's regime is a sterling example of such a situation.

This section will conclude with a reference to a concept developed by Naomi Chazan. She has concluded that the centralization of power, proliferation of the state apparatus, personalization of the state with a blurring of the civic and the private realm and finally, the increased

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[65] J. P. Nettl, "The State as a Conceptual Variable," <u>World Politics</u>, Vol.XX, No.4 (1968), p.73.

social inequality, have hampered the effectiveness of the state machinery. She adds:

"The over concentration and monopolization of power at the core is the most prominent by product of the statist propensities exhibited almost universally by the first generation of African leaders." [66]

Before one begins to analyze this tension between state and society in present day Ghana and Tanzania, let us consider the condition of the state at the time of their respective acquisitions of independence. What did they inherit from their colonizers and as the independent states developed, what was the relationship between state and society?

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[66] D. Rothchild and N. Chazan, eds. p.327.

CHAPTER 2

THE COLONIAL LEGACY FOR GHANA AND TANZANIA

This section will focus on the post colonial state in
Africa and the transition toward independence. The post
colonial states of Africa were based on the colonial state
with the boundaries of many countries arbitrarily drawn by
colonial powers and not encouraging frameworks of unified,
legitimate and capable states.[67] The post colonial states
had their roots in the colonial state. It is not surprising
that to a large extent, the administrative agencies
retained a remarkable continuity during the transition from
imperial rule to self government.[68]
Independence for both Ghana and Tanganyika came about by
peaceful means. The transition from colonial status to
independence was a relatively smooth operation for both
countries with their colonial rulers willingly transferring
control over their ex-colonies to the indigenous political

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[67] G. Carter and P. O'Meara, eds. <u>African Independence, The
First Twenty Five Years</u>, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1985) p.46.

[68] N. Chazan, R. Mortimer, J. Ravenhill and D. Rothchild,
<u>Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa</u>, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner
1988) p.41.

elites.[69]

In both Tanganyika and Ghana, the emphasis of Nyerere and Nkrumah was the gaining of independence for their respective countries. In Ghana, in 1947 Kwame Nkrumah began to create an effective political organization to promote Ghanaian independence. 1948 saw a series of strikes and boycotts that gave vent to a widespread feeling of political frustration, economic dissatisfactions, social malaise and general impatience with British rule.

By 1949 there was a split in the anti-colonial movement in Ghana and the resultant creation of the Convention Peoples' Party (CPP) with Nkrumah as leader. Nkrumah set out to make the CPP into a political vehicle capable of achieving its goals quickly. Although the leadership of the CPP was still drawn from a narrow group of western educated and colonial sponsored elites, Nkrumah pressed for a broader mass based support. The CPP stressed the importance of structural cohesion in the nationalist effort and utilized both formal and traditional modes of information dispersal - press, radio and talking drums.[70]

What the nationalists had to deal with were contradictions between populist and elitist interests, between the local and national levels, between reformist and conservative

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[69] S. Gellar, State Building and Nation Building in Africa, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972), p.28

[70] Deborah Pellow and Naomi Chazan, Ghana: Coping with Uncertainty, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), p.29.

impulses and between parochial and universal outlooks.[71]
The desire to shed the colonial rule was a goal that gave
a common focus to very different groups. The seemingly
unified movements within the countries were a result of
discovering a common enemy, the colonial powers. To fight
this enemy the divergent groups were willing to work
together and establish a common goal of independence.

One has to be prudent and not overstate this aspect of
unity. Shortly following independence, it became clear how
superficial this unity was, and the various factions and
ethnic groups began vying and struggling for access to the
state with its resources and power. In particular this
unity should not be mistaken for any sense of nationalism.
The "nationalistic" movements at independence were
supported by people expressing primarily anti-colonial
sentiments and aspirations for autonomy, rather than
nationalistic feelings.[72]

Seldom did African nationalism result in the creation of a
new national identity as a basis for the internal
legitimacy of the new state. To the contrary, nationalism
had the paradoxical effect of raising ethnic consciousness
and conflict at the same time that it promoted

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[71] D. Pellow and N. Chazan, p.26-35.

[72] S. Gellar, p.31.

independence. Some writers such as Hopkins and Temu would argue that Tanzania's experiences were the exception. They could point to the widespread grass root support of the Tanganyika African Association (TAA) and the later Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) and suggest that these were expressions of nationalism that led to independence.

According to Crawford Young, the colonial African state differed from other imperial state formations in three specific areas. First, the conquest of Africa was much more competitive, concentrated and intense than in any other area such as the western hemisphere or Asia. In fact there were often multiple competitors for a given territory. Africa had become one of the final colonial frontiers and there was a scramble by imperial powers to stake a claim. Secondly, the colonizers had a more pronounced conviction of their own cultural, biological and technological superiority over the African people. Thirdly, the European states were more comprehensive and elaborated than were those of previous centuries.[73] These factors played a significant role in developing the state/society relations during the colonial period.

Ghana and Tanzania both endured their colonial periods

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[73] D. Rothchild and N. Chazan eds., p.40.

under British rule. As with their fellow colonizers, the British were interested primarily in the prosperity of the motherland, not that of the colonies. As a result they governed and traded for their own benefit while the aspirations and development of the colony were secondary, if they were considered at all.[74] Colonial governments were not known for their innovations and progressive thinking; rather than being adventurous or constructive they tended to be governments of restraint that preferred the conservative status quo.[75]

As a result, the legacy that the colonizers left to the newly independent states was a centralized hierarchical administrative structure whose purpose was two fold: to keep the physical peace and to extract surplus.

The colonial state had responsibilities that focused primarily on the organization and direction of African labour. This included extraction of resources through production and/or through the collection of taxes. The collection of the head tax was a constant preoccupation.[76] Another product of this system was a demobilized peasantry. By maintaining a demobilized peasantry, the colonizers

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[74] Donald Ray, Ghana: <u>Politics, Economics and Society</u>, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1986), p.80.

[75] F.A. Ajayi and M. Crowder, eds. <u>History of West Africa, Vol.2</u>, (London: Longman, 1974), p.779.

[76] D. Rothchild and N. Chazan eds., p.47.

taught the lesson that government was a tool of and for the centre, the elite, not for the people.[77]

The colonial government was predominantly an administrative office representing the colonial masters or metropole. The state that existed at independence was not based on the newly independent country and its traditions and needs. The state was in fact based on another society, the former imperial power. As such the state was autonomous from society, and had complete authority over it. The state was very authoritarian, dominating and regulating what the society of the colony could do. While there were some linkages made between the state and the traditional leaders within society, these linkages reflected an authoritarian system. All authority, monopoly on the legitimate use of force, all legislative and executive functions rested with the state. The views and rights of the subjects were negligible if existent at all. The colonies were there for the benefit of the colonizers.[78]

Reflecting back to Marenin's three views of the state , one

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[77] Louise. Fortmann, "Peasants, Officials and Participation in Rural Tanzania. Experience with Villagization and Decentralization," <u>Centre for International Studies</u>, (New York: Cornell University, 1980), p.22.

[78] Crawford Young, "The Colonial State and its Political Legacy," D. Rothchild and N. Chazan, eds. <u>The Precarious Balance</u>, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988). p.41-52.

could say that the colonial state represented all three views combined. It stood separate from society, interested predominantly in protecting the long range interests of metropole capital. It was at the same time very dominant, having the power to make decisions that were binding on society. Thirdly, the colonial state in sub-Saharan Africa acted in a unitary fashion, standing separate and often in opposition to the society it governed. The state/society relations of colonial Africa, were one sided. The state was there to rule, dominate and extract resources. Society was obliged to accept the rule and provide the resources. It is interesting to note that while the colonial state had a hegemonic status regarding power and control, the actual size of the state apparatus was very small. State power was based on the coercive forces within the colony as well as those available from the metropole. Since the development of the colony was not a priority, the only institutional apparatus necessary was that required to maintain peace and perform administrative and extractive functions. [79]

One of the first changes that occurred following independence was the expansion of the state apparatus and in particular the bureaucracy. There was an immediate need

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[79] Crawford Young, "The Colonial State and its Political Legacy," p. 41-52.

for systems to be put into place.[80] Prior to independence, there was no need for a large bureaucracy and /or government body because the majority of the decision making and power remained in the metropole. Added to this is the fact previously mentioned, that the colonial governments were not interested in developing the colonies, and therefore needed very little infrastructure to perform their task of peacekeeping and extraction of resources. Following independence this situation changed with the state as an institution blossoming into an increasingly large government body. Immediately, there was a need to fill the vacancies created by the former colonizers, at the same time in the midst of the euphoria of independence, came an accompanying increase in the demands and expectations of the people upon the state and government. The focus of the population on the centre through increased demands/expectations, afforded the centre an opportunity to increase its position of power. At independence, the centre was viewed as the focal point of power and resources and thereby was the dominant allocator of funds. It was natural that the centre would tie the distribution of these resources to reciprocal support for the ruling party/elite and the existing state structure. This allocation of resources rendered policy and available policy procedures

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[80] R. Hopkins, <u>Political Roles in a New State:Tanzania's First Decade</u>, (London: Yale University Press, 1971), p.41

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an indispensible instrument for governing and garnering support for the existing government.[81]

As the state apparatus expanded there was an increasing opportunity for the state and its representatives to use the availability of these positions as a tool to build and expand linkages within society. A major goal of public policy was the allocation of public resources in a manner that would increase support for the state apparatus.[82] Rothchild uses the term "proportionality" to express the planned allocation of resources, funds or government posts, according to ethno-regional interests. He states that the use of proportionality by dominant political elites suggests a willingness by them to enter into regular informal political exchanges with sub regional leaders, allocating public resources according to the principles of proportionality in order to ensure local support for and compliance with central regulations.[83] Rothchild points to Ghana as an example. In an analysis of the ethnic composition of the central government's senior staff in 1972, there was a remarkably close parallel between the

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[81] S. Mozaffar, Dimensions of State Society Relations in Africa, (Boston: Boston University, Working Papers #102 African Studies Centre, 1985), p. 10-13.

[82] S. Mozaffar, Dimensions of State Society Relations in Africa, p.13.

[83] Z. Ergas, ed. p.123.

ethnic proportions in the civil service and society at large. [84]

Was society's increased attention, directed at the state, representing a desire for incorporation? Following Independence, society looked toward the state to distribute the resources for the benefit of the citizenry. If the state had the capacity to meet these demand/expectations and gained popular support, then increased incorporation would be a natural consequence. From the state's perspective, it generally favored incorporation and fostered it as a means to penetrate further into the periphery. At the same time greater incorporation increases the burden on the state and may cause an over extension of its capabilities as the input from incorporated groups may not match the resources allocated to them.[85] While society may have been willing to be incorporated with the state, the frequent low capability of the state to meet the demands/expectations caused society to resist moving closer as the benefits become less apparent. The increase in demands on the state by society meant the post independent state had to add development and the welfare of the population to the list of state functions. These increased

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[84] G. Carter and P. O'Meara, eds. <u>African Independence: The First 25 Years</u>, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), p.85.

[85] D. Rothchild and N. Chazan eds. p.15.

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expectations spurred large rates of growth in the state apparatus. In Tanzania the number of established government posts within the Tanzanian civil service rose from 65,708 in 1966 to 295,352 by 1980. [86] One might question whether the large increase in the civil service was a response to the needs of society or a response by the centre to garner support through job creation and allocation.

Since the precedent of state centrality in the political economy was well established before political independence, it is not surprising that the state apparatus grew rapidly after independence. Unfortunately, growth is not automatically equated with efficiency and more often than not the state expanded without improving its ability to reach its stated goals and objectives.[87] In Ghana the Cocoa Marketing board offers an example. In the early 1980's the Cocoa Marketing board employed 105,000 people to handle a crop half as large as that which 50,000 employees had managed more effectively in 1965.[88]

The newly independent governments faced an increasing array of challenges while at the same time finding fewer

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[86] R. S. Mukandala, "Trends in Civil Service Size and Income in Tanzania, 1967-1982." Canadian Journal of African Studies, No.2 (1983) p. 254.

[87] D. Ray, p.48-49.

[88] D. Rothchild and N. Chazan, eds. p.27.

resources at their disposal. They were in a different position than were the former colonizers who could rely on the metropole to back them up in times of financial difficulty.[89]

However,it was not simply a lack of economic resources that hampered the new governments. Many struggled to gain legitimacy with large segments of the population. Another aspect that created difficulty for the new governments was the immediacy with which many of these issues had to be faced.

The leadership had to face insurmountable obstacles on three fronts. First, they had to figure out how to meet the increasing list of expectations with the meager resources at their disposal. Secondly, they had to grapple with a continued dependence on the metropole for financial support. Although this varied from state to state , it was a thorn in the flesh of the newly "independent" states. Thirdly, the new rulers had to devise a plan to incorporate and/or unify a diverse population and make an attempt at creating a nation state; at least to the extent that they could gain adequate legitimacy to remain in a position of power.[90]

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[89] S. Gellar, p.49.

[90] D. Pellow and N. Chazan, Ghana: Coping With Uncertainty, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), p.37.

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Legitimacy is a concept that implies the degree of consensus about the rules of the game and the bases of political power. Legitimacy is a process involving the incorporation of power relations into a system of beliefs about how things ought to be done. Legitimacy involves more than simple compliance by those under the authority of government. There is an appropriate order that declares how authorities should and should not validly wield power. There are rules constraining those in authority from the arbitrary use of their power. According to Ronald Cohen, all human societies contain inequalities fostered by authority relations that are culturally approved and moral. The study of how and why this develops and changes is encompassed in the concept of legitimacy. [91] Legitimacy is the delegation of authority from society to the state. The state becomes an office of authority to set the rules and conduct business on society's behalf. The state is permitted to use force to enforce the rules which means that this relationship reflects some degree of compliance by society. If the state doesn't perform in an acceptable manner or simply becomes an imposing power apparatus, then it loses its legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens.[92]

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[91] R. Cohen and J. Toland, eds. <u>State Formation and Political Legitimacy</u>, (New Brunswick:Transaction Books, 1988), p.2-3.

[92] R. Jackson and C. Rosberg, "Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and Juridical in Statehood," p.7.

The crucial issues relating to legitimacy are those of power and rights in the state/society relationship. What are the powers exercised by the state or government and what and who gives the state the power and/or the right to exercise such powers over the citizens? What situation or relationship develops that obliges the citizens to obey the state?[93]

During the colonial period the state did not need legitimacy from the people as they were merely subjects and not citizens. Following independence, the state became a free agent that represented power and resources that were available to whomever could capture the positions. At the same time the former subjects became citizens with expectations of what the state should do for them. Some who gained control of the state after independence were simply interested in retaining power and continued the authoritarian model that had been well taught by the colonizers. Ironically, some of the colonizers tended to promote a more liberal democratic model on the new states than they themselves practiced during the colonial period. This led to the legitimacy of the government becoming an issue and state / society relations moving into a new era. Legitimacy meant that society needed to have a voice in

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[93] R. Scruton, <u>A Dictionary of Political Thought</u>, (London: Macmillan Press, 1982), p.264.

government and that the government could not arbitrarily impose its wishes on society. [94]

Although it is understood that legitimacy must ultimately originate from the people, Cohen focuses on four key components of legitimacy. Legitimacy is:

"partially determined by the coercive capacity of a centralized government. As long as the central government can maintain sufficient powers of enforcement of its rules and a willingness to use its force, a subordinate group will comply. Secondly, legitimacy is partially determined by benefits accruing to the polity under conditions of compliance. A precondition for the growth of support or even the continuing compliance is the widespread belief that a practical state operates for the benefit of its citizenry as well as its elite groups. Thirdly, legitimacy is a function of the moral validity of the political order. Coercion and benefits aside, the inequalities of statehood, of power differences between those in authority compared with those they govern, place an emphasis on whether or not such a system is deemed right and proper. If a majority of those in the polity believe that its organization and its ruling class privileges are legitimate then the system is legitimate and compliance is a predictable pattern of behaviour. Fourthly, legitimacy is a function of the aggregated decisions of actors in a polity who accept authority because it can be argued to have maximized their rewards under certain conditions."[95]

By gaining this legitimacy, usually through the election process, the government would obtain a political obligation from the citizens to obey the state. This legitimacy could be accomplished without the use of force and opened the possibility of increased and important linkages between the state and society. A partnership that was not viable during

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[94] D. Rothchild and N. Chazan, eds. p.48.

[95] R. Cohen and J. Toland, eds., p. 17-19.

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colonial times was now possible.

For the state to be able to say that it was representing or serving society, there must be some degree of voice permitted by those who are governed. Without the legitimization of the regime, the state has no basis upon which they can claim to be representing the wishes of society and may simply be serving the interests of those who wish to retain power. Legitimacy was of importance to both Nkrumah and Nyerere's regimes as both emphasized a new relationship with the state as an important political goal. The issue of legitimacy is particularly relevant to the present situation of Jerry Rawlings' leadership in Ghana and will be examined at a later stage in this paper.

Two critical questions faced the new independent states. What were they to become? And who was to control and direct them? It was not so simple as going back to some previous arrangement since at independence few of the African states reflected the pre existing African socio-political boundaries and therefore there were few traditional states, coinciding with existing boundaries, to which sovereignty could revert. At independence, the African leaders had to accept the entities created by the colonial powers.[96] The new African states were sanctified in juridical terms by the European masters. The new states were in effect frozen

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[96] R. Jackson and C. Rosberg, p.18.

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in their colonial jurisdiction and the various societies were effectively blocked from post independence movement toward self determination.[97] The boundaries had little if any relationship to ethnic and kinship boundaries. An example may be seen in the experience of Somalia. Its boundaries were established in such a manner that it divided up the people leaving some in the neighboring countries of Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti.

Many states found themselves in the novel position of working through the development of the empirical conditions for statehood - dealing with incorporating society, going through the process of legitimization with society while the juridical conditions of the state already existed.[98] The legitimacy of a government in the eyes of its citizens must be distinguished from its legitimacy in the eyes of other states.

As mentioned earlier, in contrast to the European experience, where empirical or functional statehood preceded juridical statehood; the formation of the African states was in exactly the reverse manner.[99] Control of the new states in most instances was handed over to a group

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[97] R. Jackson and C. Rosberg, p.21

[98] S. Gellar, p.50.

[99] O. Aluko and T. Shaw eds. p.35.

that Gellar refers to as the "inheritance elites".[100] This
term refers to a small number of elites who at the time of
independence were trained and educated in the ways of the
colonial administration. It was to these people that the
reins of power were given. As a result of their background
and training, there remained a strong colonial component in
the post colonial state. This was particularly reflected by
the high degree of continuity in institutions and their
basic goals.[101] The original inheritance elites rarely made
radical changes in the legal and bureaucratic apparatus
that was handed down to them, in fact maintaining a stable
status quo was one of their prime objectives. While the new
states were independent, the inheritance elites with their
ties to the colonial political structures and economy, made
it a very neocolonial relationship. As Gellar points out,
the inheritance elites continued to maintain ties and often
cordial relationships with the ex-metropole.[102] Nation
building was not the prime aim of the inheritance elites,
instead they focused their energy and resources on empire
building, that is, increasing the resources and power
available to their particular family, group, or clan.
Their goal was precisely the expansion and consolidation of

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[100] S. Gellar. "State Building and Nation Building in West
Africa," Building States and Nations, eds. S.N. Eisenstadt and S.
Rokkan (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1973), p.395.

[101] S. Gellar, p.45.

[102] S. Gellar, p.28.

state authority. Generally speaking this focus on consolidation of state authority rather than nation building was true for most of the states in sub-Saharan Africa and particularly true for states that had several ethnic groupings all attempting to gain control of the state apparatus.

The state apparatus that was handed over to the inheritance elites gave them command and control over coercive forces and resources. Therefore, these elites had a strong interest in not dismantling the inherited state apparatus and the relationship with the metropole.[103] On a practical level the inherited elites realized that they needed to continue the flow of foreign capital into their respective countries since royalties from the investments were quickly the most important and reliable source of income for the state .The new independent governments generally continued on with the apparatus bequeathed to them. This apparatus acted coercively toward the population in order to generate a climate of tranquility and not frighten the foreign investors. Where innovations were made, they were often superimposed upon the existing legal and bureaucratic structures handed down from the colonial period. Despite much rhetoric to the contrary, the new African state modified rather than took revolutionary action in its

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[103] S. Gellar, p.28

disassociation efforts.[104]

Control of the apparatus of the state gave a group instant recognition as the intermediary between the international and domestic arenas, and allowed them to control the state resources.   For some leaders the state apparatus became their sole base of power. The position of authority and having control over the state as an apparatus of power was a consequence of their having control of the armed forces and they were in a position of control concerning the utilization of resources. Control of the military and the country's resources were their claims to power. Legitimacy among the population was not a necessary prerequisite.[105] It is not surprising that many of the inheritance elites and those who followed were concerned primarily with a consolidation of power through the expansion of the state. The general population's aspirations for societal and economic reform were more often than not relegated to second place.

Needless to say this did not foster a sense of nationhood as the state was soon seen as a prize to be captured by the most powerful groups. The general public soon realized that the state was not interested in universal policies and

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[104] S. Gellar, p.396.

[105] O. Aluko and T. Shaw, eds. p.33.

general development, instead they saw the state as often being devoted to particular ethnic and regional interests.[106] The inheritance elites could be considered as the "governing class". The inheritance elites were in a strong and powerful position having the continued contact and support of the metropole. They were in charge of a system with which they were familiar and they had access to if not control over the resources.

As the state apparatus grew, so did the concentration of power within the state. The state became paramount and the party secondary. In the case of Ghana, the CPP continued to exist but more and more power was being concentrated in a few government posts, especially that of the leader, Nkrumah. It did not take long following independence for society to see that the new state apparatus was not bringing about significant changes from colonial times. Few of the expectations concerning economic growth or increased goods and services were met. Inflation increased rapidly and economic conditions declined. Society realized little benefit from this new state/society relationship. More power and control was concentrated at the centre with less benefit for society. The process of disengagement had begun. This process will be examined later in the thesis

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[106] G. O'Donnell, "Comparative Historical Formations of the State Apparatus and Socio Economic Change in the Third World," International Social Science Journal, Vol. XXXII, No. 4 (Nov. 1990), p.720.

and in further detail, looking at the specific cases of Tanzania and Ghana.

The colonial powers bequeathed much to the African states, some of which was rejected soon after independence and some that remained an inherited legacy such as the colonial state set up, the inheritance elites and the shape of the economy. Most sub-Saharan states, like other Third World countries, found themselves between two conflicting pressures.

The first pressure came from the world capitalist system to which they had been introduced by the colonial powers and in which they were now somewhat independent players - with all of the conditioning effects. The other pressure came from the internal desires as independent states to have more self expression and direction. These desires for national self assertion were difficult to accomplish as the new states continued to remain so tied to and economically dependent on their ex metropole and the world capitalist system. The state often found itself attempting to juggle many balls; maintaining vital links with the metropole and attempting to meet some of the expectations of society. At the same time the state often found itself with limited resources and a diminishing capacity for implementation. In attempting to satisfy these variables, the new states were often stretched to the limit in both social and economic

resources. In cases such as Ghana, the state apparatus became increasingly unable to fulfill the expectations of society. The state began to focus on self preservation and society responded by relying on systems and structures other than the state for its survival.[107]

How Ghana and Tanzania rose to these challenges is the focus of the next section of this paper. A brief overview will be given of the time period in Ghana from independence until J.J. Rawlings came to power; then I will concentrate on the period of Rawlings' rule. For Tanzania I will look at Nyerere and his Arusha Declaration as well as its aftermath and the transition from Nyerere.

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[107] D. Pellow and N. Chazan, p.199-209.

CHAPTER 3

INDEPENDENT GHANA: NKRUMAH – LIMANN

i> NKRUMAH

Immediately following Ghana's independence there was a
period of euphoria and great expectations surrounding the
new government and the anticipated potential of the country
to move ahead on its own chosen path. The 1956 Ghanaian
elections brought victory for the CPP as they gained 54% of
the popular vote. Pellow and Chazan explain why the CPP
were able to win. First, the CPP was seen as the primary
group leading in the anti-colonial struggle and they were
pushing for immediate independence. Secondly, the CPP had
already held office and they could use their position to
garner further support. Finally, the CPP's leader:
Nkrumah's charisma and support was unmatched by any of his
opponents. Pellow and Chazan also point out that the small
margin of victory highlighted the fragile basis of the
CPP's support.

While the 1956 elections showed Ghana's pride and desire
for independence, it also exposed the ethnic and regional
rifts that existed within the society.[108] Ghana's 12.25

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[108] D. Pellow and N. Chazan, p.34.

million people are divided into a variety of socio-cultural groupings. The primary group is the Akan peoples (subdivided into the Asante, Fante, Akwapin, Brong, Akim, Nzima and other smaller units). This group makes up 44.1% of the population. The Mole-Dagbani constitute 15.9%, the Ewe (Rawlings' group) 13.0%, the Ga-Adangme 8.3%, Guan 3.7% Gurma 3.5% and other groups 11.4% [109]

The challenge was whether Nkrumah could take his popularity and support and make Ghana the "show piece" of Africa as many hoped and expected him to do. Unfortunately neither Nkrumah nor the Ghanaian leaders that followed him were able to meet the expectations people held at the time of independence. The period of history between independence in 1957 and J.J. Rawlings' take over in 1981 was fraught with discouragement and disappointment. The discouragement and frustration were brought about by the lack of progress made by the various regimes to utilize the potential that was available to the country at independence and to establish meaningful links with society.

The first disappointment came with the failure of the CPP under Nkrumah. Nkrumah was a teacher by training. He had been to the London School of Economics and Political Science and in 1947 had returned to Ghana with the goal of building a mass political party whose aim was to bring

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[109] D. Pellow and N. Chazan, p.3.

about independence for the Gold Coast as it was then called. That independence was achieved in 1957, Nkrumah became the country's first President and ruled until his overthrow in 1966. Nkrumah was a dynamic leader not only for Ghana but for all of Africa.

Despite his dynamic leadership, Nkrumah and the CPP succeeded in shutting down most means of incorporation between state and society and effectively moved Ghana back to a colonial model.

As the first post independence government in sub-Saharan Africa, it would be beneficial to examine some aspects of "Nkrumahism" and see what effects they had on incorporation/disengagement.

Nkrumah had a vision for Ghana to construct a type of socialism that would link all other African countries into some form of Pan African relationship. Nkrumah's socialism was based on a commitment to the Marxist aim of state ownership of productive property and had a vangardist concept of the party as a means to move the masses toward socialism. [110] One critical problem with Nkrumah's socialism was that the party, the CPP, was not revolutionary or vangardist. The CPP contained very few people who had an effective grasp of Marxism.[111] In the

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[110] W. Friedland and C. Rosberg, eds _African Socialism_. (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1964) p.131-135

[111] Donald Ray, p. 14.

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1950's the CPP had become a broadly based party, consequently there was a large faction among the leadership who while they agreed on independence, also sought to promote their own economic interests by nurturing the full flower of capitalism. They did not want socialism. [112] The party also suffered from disunity. Party purges and attacks so weakened the CPP that there were few people on whom Nkrumah could rely for efficient and sensible administration and government. Even with the disappearance of any real party opposition by 1964, there continued to be political conflicts among rural leaders and factions within the CPP. [113] Linkages with the state at large were not encouraged nor were the existing ones well maintained.

According to Pellow and Chazan, Nkrumah's form of socialism was not consistent. It drew haphazardly from Marxism, Leninism and Fabian Socialism. It was far removed from Ghanaian realities and became an abstract vision which was unable to provide concrete guidelines needed to help Ghana overcome the economic and political difficulties it faced.[114]

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[112] Donald Ray, p.14.

[113] R. Jackson and C. Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), p.54.

[114] D. Pellow and N. Chazan. p.42.

Shortly after gaining independence, creating a one party system became a real option for leaders such as Nkrumah. For some leaders it came following a realization of the weak base from which they worked and the need to build an alternate base. For Nkrumah and later, Nyerere, the one party state allowed them increased control and less resistance from possible opposition. Both Nkrumah and Nyerere wanted to institute a new ideology, a type of socialism within their country. Considering the low coercive capacity of their newly formed governments, the one party system gave them a better opportunity to implement the necessary changes. The one party system was also a reflection of the increasing concentration of power and resources around the state apparatus. By concentrating the power and resources around the state apparatus it was hoped there would be a reduction in both social and intraelite competition. [115]

Nkrumah and the CPP not only created a one party system but also outlawed all other political organizations, declaring local political parties illegal and contrary to national interests. The general rationale or explanation of the necessity of a one party system has been the quest for consolidation and the need for unity within a newly formed country. It was felt that political competition had to be

[115] N. Chazan, R. Mortimer, J. Ravenhill, D. Rothchild, Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa. (Boulder:Lynne Rienner,1988) p.45.

controlled and some monopoly of the government political apparatus assured.[116] Nkrumah defended his government's move to a one party state by suggesting that the multiparty system was divisive and antithetical to the needs of economic development and national integration. However, Nkrumah and the CPP did not use the one party state to foster incorporation of society. Its primary purpose was used to further consolidate power and authority within the state apparatus.

Another characteristic of the post independence period was a rapid increase in the growth of the bureaucracy and with it a corresponding burden on the state resources. In each year during the 1960's the civil service in Africa grew by an average of 7%. By 1970, in sub-Saharan Africa, 60% of the wage earners were government employees. By 1980 at least 50% of the government expenditures were allocated to paying salaries. In some countries a full 80% of the government revenues were spent on supporting the civil service. [117] The relative distribution of income deteriorated badly. In Ghana's case, in 1965 the upper 6% of earners accounted for 12.9% of Ghana's total national income, whereas by 1968 the upper 4.6% accounted for 24.7%

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[116] N. Chazan, R. Mortimer, J. Ravenhill and D. Rothchild, p.46.

[117] H. Bretton, The Rise and Fall of Kwame Nkrumah, (New York: Praeger, 1966), p.152.

of the total. [118] The result of such a sudden growth was to skew expenditure patterns and also to create a privileged group. The manner of bureaucratic expansion enhanced the civil service status and gave them opportunities for personal aggrandizement at the expense of others.

Along with the bureaucratic growth was the phenomenal growth of the parastatal sector. During Nkrumah's rule, parastatals coexisted with privately owned companies, but the parastatals dominated every major sphere of macroeconomic activity in the country.[119] During the early years following independence, the state apparatus came to be viewed as a band wagon upon which everyone wished to climb. This clamour for positions within the state apparatus based on self interest, desire for access to resources and security made a mockery of the political ideals of sacrifice and struggle for the common good, that were being expounded by the leadership.[120]

The above mentioned growth in the state apparatus was further aggravated in the Ghana's case as Nkrumah created two sets of bureaucratic networks. The situation was

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[118] D. Pellow and N. Chazan, p.103.

[119] N.Chazan, R. Mortimer, J. Ravenhill D. Rothchild, p.52-53.

[120] Jackson and Rosberg, p.202.

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further complicated as these two networks often had overlapping responsibilities. The first network was the civil service. The second was a parallel political administration that received instructions and directions directly from Nkrumah's operational centre. [121]

Although independence did little if anything to alter the state/society relationship in Ghana, one significant difference was that post independence African leaders were interested in gaining support from certain sections of society. This should not be mistaken as a desire by the state to gain legitimacy and represent the general population. This support was sought as a basis from which those in power could remain in power and look after their own self interests. Of particular concern was the use of the patron/client relationship, also referred to as clientelism, and defined as:

"a personalized and reciprocal relationship between an inferior(client) and a superior (patron) commanding unequal resources."[122]

In state/society relationships, the "patron" generally has access to state resources and gives them to the "client" in return for favours and/or political support. This

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[121] D. Pellow and N. Chazan, p. 42. See also H. Bretton p. 99 for additional information.

[122] Naomi Chazan, Robert Mortimer, John Ravenhill, Donald Rothchild, Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1988), p. 106.

patron/client relationship is based on the control and distribution of state resources.

There were advantages of being in proximity to the state resources. The state was the repository of tremendous resources, obtained not only from local sources but also from foreign sources in the form of aid, loans, capital, military and political support. Since the post colonial government was highly centralized, obtaining a government post often meant not only proximity to resources and power but also some degree of accessibility to their use. Not surprisingly, it became quite common to tie the acquisition of a government post to political support. In fact this patron/client relationship became the most common form of political exchange in Africa, and Ghana was no exception.[123]

The ethnic/kinship tie also affected who acquired what position. This relationship was especially prevalent in multiethnic countries like Ghana. Those in power often realized a concomitant need to gain a broader base of support through some sort of proportionality of representation in government. At the same time they felt a need to respond to kinship pressure. Often the ethnic tie would supersede national links and often the kinship

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[123] Naomi Chazan, Robert Mortimer, John Ravenhill and Donald Rothchild, Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa, (Boulder:Rienner, 1988), p. 172

demands constituted a force that may not have been reconcilable with state obligations.[124]

According to Chazan and Pellow, Nkrumah and the CPP used the patron/client relationship extensively. The CPP was a highly authoritarian and centralized government. They soon developed into an increasingly narrow group of devotees to Nkrumah and his ideology. These devotees benefited from the government patronage. [125] Patronage had its effects on the state run industries as well. It is commonly accepted that the state run industries were eminently unsuccessful. Experimentation with state farms, industries and controls went awry. The cause? The CPP used these organizations not to increase production and enhance the economy, but as instruments of patronage and corruption.[126]

Nkrumah's one party state, socialism and patronage did little good for the economy of Ghana. The first few years of independence saw dismal results. The Nkrumah years saw the disappearance of a substantial reserve fund. At independence the reserve fund stood at 200 million pounds. Five years later it was replaced by a national debt of 349

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[124] N. Chazan, An Anatomy of Ghanaian Politics: Managing Political Recession, 1969-1982. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983) p.349.

[125] D. Pellow and N. Chazan, p.41.

[126] D. Pellow and N. Chazan, p.149.

million pounds. [127]

Ghana's problems began in 1961 as imports and government expenditures rose while exports leveled off. The resulting balance of payments deficit was further aggravated by a growing recurring debt. The overall budget deficit was 7% of GDP in 1961. This figure increased to 9.4% in 1962 and further to 9.9% in 1963. It reached 10.9% in 1965. Government revenues increased by only 42% from 1961 to 1965, the increase in government expenditures for the same period was 63%, recurrent expenditure increasing by 53% and development expenditure by 79%. During the first five years of the decade, the internal public debt increased five fold and the external debt increased thirty fold.[128] According to Bretton, Nkrumah was at the base of Ghana's economic chaos. Nkrumah lacked the necessary skills and know how, and Ghana ended up in a position of gross economic overextension. The projects selected by Nkrumah promised little in the way of returns for the country. Many of the projects became "white elephants" - the steel plant, textile industry, cocoa processing plant and the meat processing plant. [129]

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[127] H. Bretton, p.152.

[128] M.M. Huq, The Economy of Ghana, (London: MacMillan Press, 1989), p.13.

[129] H. Bretton, p.154-155.

Nkrumah's use of the one party state did not foster the incorporation of society. The one party system removed any opposing political parties and this gave society less opportunity to voice its views and participate in the political process. The increased size of the bureaucracy did not mean an increase in the services provided to society. What it did mean was an increase burden on the resources of the state.

Economically, Ghana was spending far above their capacity to generate a matching income. Nkrumah spent freely on large high cost and high profile projects that didn't necessarily generate a return for society. Economically Ghana was in a mess. Services had to be cut, and the capacity of the state to meet the demands of society diminished.

Apart from those few who were able to be part of the state apparatus and glean some of the financial benefits, there was little done by the government to enhance or create greater linkages with society. The linkages that were made were primarily for the self interests of the state. The potential that society had expressed at the time of independence had not come to fruition. As the capacity of the state diminished and corruption increased, society began to look elsewhere for its survival. Society began to pull back from interaction and involvement within the

sphere of the state.

ii> SUBSEQUENT REGIMES PRIOR TO RAWLINGS

From 1966 to 1969 Ghana was ruled by the National Liberation Council headed by Lt. General J.A. Ankrah. Ankrah came to power on an anti-Nkrumah, anti politics theme and set out to rectify the problems of the preceding years and to lay the foundations for a return to civilian rule. Although the regime was military in nature, the military and the police interests were balanced. The National Liberation Council (NLC), had a broad based support but its ethnic composition was skewed toward the Ga and Ewe people and away from Akan representation. This ethnic misrepresentation may have been one of the influential variables in the government's take over by Dr. Kofi Busia in 1969. The ruling backbone within Busia's Progressive Party (PP) was composed of the middle class establishment that had been excluded from the CPP. Busia's government was both ethnically elitist and slanted with the key party positions all being filled with professionals from the Akan region.[130]

While having decentralization as one of his goals, Busia continued to keep the PP party as a key component of his program and in fact he made the party more elitist and

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[130] D. Pellow and N. Chazan, p.48.

ethnically slanted than it had been under Nkrumah. Not surprisingly, this generated more ethnic and social tensions among the general population. As it had been during Nkrumah's rule, the party structures remained underdeveloped with a lack of internal cohesion. Neither Parliament nor the party became the instruments of power. The state had yet to establish links with society in general. This left the leader in the strategic position of being in control of key sections of the state apparatus. In the case of Nkrumah, he had at his disposal an effective arsenal of economic and political weapons. By 1965 he had the control and power over any and all of the following: passports, visas, export and import licenses, foreign exchange licenses, land allocation, foreign and domestic contract allocations, loan and credit facilities and foreign and domestic scholarships.[131]

The state was preoccupied with entrenching its own position of power and with the accumulation of resources rather than looking after the long term interests of the country. The state's capacity began to decline as resources became scarcer and the economy failed to improve. While the state may have dominated society through coercive means, the actual linkages between state and society were both lessened and weakened. As the state lost its capacity to

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[131] H. Bretton, p.105

meet the demands and expectations of society, society responded by disengaging itself from the state apparatus and looked to developing alternative means for survival - smuggling, the black market, the informal economy. Many chose to utilize the exit option and migrated to other countries.

During Busia's term in power the bureaucracy lost its independence and any sense of operational standards as access to official positions gave way to favoritism on the basis of kinship, ethnicity and friendship.[132]   This nepotistic style garnered opposition from the public. Charges of corruption and elitism that had been leveled against the Nkrumah government were now being faced by Busia.

As opposition grew, Busia's response was to attack it by suppressing rural agitation, quashing strikes, berating student leaders, censoring critics and even detaining opponents.[133] The political system was on a clear path of losing any degree of legitimacy that it might have previously had with the population. Respect and obedience that were once apportioned to the government were rapidly

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[132] D. Pellow and N. Chazan, p.55.

[133] D. Pellow and N. Chazan, p.60.

in decline. The goal of serving the common good in Ghana, however weak it may have been, was clearly lost within Busia's term in office.

After dealing with the civil service, the government decentralized administrative tasks and diffused the functions of the ministries. This resulted in confusion in lines of communication, inefficiency prevailed and corruption blossomed. In an effort to regulate state society relations, the Progressive Party gave preference to its own supporters and allowed them a free hand to implement policy.[134]

Chazan and Pellow argue that the role of the state and state apparatus had degenerated to that of a market place; a framework within which individuals who were fortunate enough to be members, could fulfill their aspirations. Col. Acheampong's regime from 1972 to 1978 did little to stem this downward spiral of economic difficulty and discouragement of the population with the direction and lack of capacity of the government. Acheampong, while having the most ethnically balanced cabinet in all of independent Ghana, continued to keep tight control through a rigid military like hierarchial structure. There was continued suppression of the opposition through strict controls on the freedom of speech. Acheampong was

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[134] D. Pellow and N. Chazan, p.55.

intolerant of dissent . He harassed his opponents, issued decrees prohibiting criticism of the regime and stifled the press.[135] The political trend of this period was anything but a move toward attracting a broad base of public support. Instead, there was a focus on the power and centrality of each of the leaders and an insulating of the state leaders from the reality of society. Each of the leaders surrounded themselves with "yes men" who generated access to the state resources. These "yes men" or confidants set themselves up as the main intermediaries between the various societal groups and the government---reaping the benefits of the arrangement. While Nkrumah and Busia had some subtlety in their methods of handing out favors, with Acheampong, all subtlety disappeared. He openly handed out licenses, built houses and distributed money to his friends.[136]

During the 1970's the rate of inflation averaged 70-100% annually. Food went up 450% and consumer prices 200%. Rather than move toward a program of austerity, the government continued to spend. In fact government expenditures rose 42.8% each year during the 1970's.[137] Rawlings' first coup took place on June 4, 1979 and

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[135] D. Pellow and N. Chazan, p.66.

[136] D. Pellow and N. Chazan, p.50.

[137] N. Chazan, "Development, Underdevelopment and the State in Ghana," Working Papers #58, African Studies Centre, (Boston: Boston University, 1982), p.2.

according to Chazan:

" he advocated a housecleaning operation that would erase all manifestations of corruption, profiteering, or malfeasance associated in any way with the previous regimes. Second he wished to bring about a moral turnabout, to reinstitute a norm of public accountability, and to awaken the masses to their rights and duties. Thirdly, he pronounced his irrevocable commitment to facilitating the peaceful return to civilian rule." [138]

Following Rawlings first coup in 1979, Limann was installed as the leader of the country with the multiple task of moving the government away from military rule to civilian rule, beginning to regain the confidence of the population and doing away with corruption that was rampant within government operations. Unfortunately, Limann and his civilian government, was unable to resolve the economic crisis that he inherited and he was also unable to curb the political corruption that had become accepted as a norm of operation in the government. [139]

By the time Rawlings and the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) took control in 1981, Ghana was in the midst of both political and economic chaos. The government had lost credibility with the people and was seen as the home of greedy power mongers.

Economically Ghana was continuing on a disastrous downward

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[138] Naomi Chazan, An Anatomy of Ghanaian Politics, p.281

[139] Donald Ray, p.21.

slide. As an example, by 1981 the cocoa farmers were receiving in real value only 14% of the price they had received in 1963.[140]

In the eyes of society, the state had lost any semblance of looking out for the development and advancement of the country. The state and its accompanying apparatus were viewed as an oasis in a desert of economic insecurity, chaos, poverty and unemployment. Every attempt was made to develop a link with a state position in the hope that some of the resources, dwindling as they might be, would come one's way. The state had become an arena where people fought to gain access to its resources and power. When all the government appointments were made, feelings of dissatisfaction and discontent were quick to rise among the majority that had been left out. As resources and capacity of the state diminished, society realized that it could not look to the state to meet its needs and expectations. The state had moved into a focus on self preservation and society had to devise new systems to look after itself. Administratively, the government officials generally wanted to cling to the centre of power in Accra. Rural postings were viewed as difficult, unrewarding and an impediment to

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[140] Jon Kraus," Coup Master Rawlings: The Second Coming,"New African, Vol.173 (1982), p.5.

one's career.[141] To be distant from the centre was to be distant from both resources and power. Contrary to the political rhetoric of sacrifice and struggle, there was not an eagerness by those in government to go out and establish and cultivate linkages with society in general.

It is not surprising given this state of affairs, that within the government services, there was a general incapacity to penetrate the general population. This dwindling capacity of the state coupled with a highly centralized system, resulted in the grinding to a halt of most of the government activities by the late 1970's. Indicative of this situation, the bureaucracy had become so weak that it was unable to force compliance to directives within the state apparatus let alone among the general population. The government system was rapidly crumbling. The period from 1975 to 1978 was characterized by a continued economic crisis, administrative breakdown and civil disorder.[142] In the six years from 1975 to 1981 the wholesale price index rose 800%, consumer prices increased 3000% while during the period 1978 to 1981, the money supply doubled thereby fueling a continued high rate of

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[141] N. Chazan, Development, Underdevelopment and the State in Ghana, p.5.

[142] N. Chazan, An Anatomy of Ghanaian Politics: Managing Political Recession 1969-1982, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), p.1.

inflation.[143]

Society and the general population were discouraged. Rather
than moving up in their standard of living, twenty five
years after independence, many found themselves moving from
dealing with scarcity to actual suffering of poverty. A
general fatigue and pervasive disappointment permeated many
segments of society.[144] During the period 1969 to 1975,
formal participation devices at the state level virtually
disappeared. Any acceptable mechanism for participation or
representation was sporadic and/or haphazard at best. This
led to poor institutional links between the state and
societal groups in general. There was not a concerted
effort on the part of the state to incorporate society into
the political life of the country. In fact, during Busia's
and Acheampong's regimes, there was little or no policy
formulated with the goal of incorporating and utilizing the
structures of traditional society to generate economic
development. Any reference to tribes or villages was seen
as hindering government operations. [145] State decision
making remained in and reverted almost exclusively to the
head of state and was thereby subject to his idiosyncratic

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[143] Donald Ray, p.3.

[144] N. Chazan, An Anatomy of Ghanaian Politics, p.4

[145] N. Chazan, African Studies Centre, Working Papers #58
(1982), p.18.

whims.[146]

When Rawlings stepped into the leader's position in 1981 he inherited a system that was in the advanced stages of economic deterioration and mismanagement. According to Lancaster, the country suffered from chronically high rates of inflation, a grossly overvalued currency, a declining volume of exports and a consequent drop by one-third in imports, widespread smuggling , and a 30 % decline in per capita income since 1970. Economic deterioration was hastened by a serious drought, a sudden increase in the price of oil and the return of an estimated one million Ghanaians expelled from Nigeria.[147] The state institutions were weak and malfunctioning policies were poorly formulated and even in the case of good policies, the institutional network was inadequate to handle the process of implementation.[148]

Rawlings faced an incredible challenge to revive not only the economy of Ghana but to also revive the people's faith in government. He had to correct a pattern that had begun more than a decade before, of society disengaging itself from the state. Whether he has been able to turn the

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[146] N. Chazan, An Anatomy of Ghanaian Politics, p.54

[147] Carol Lancaster, "Foreign Exchange and Economic Crisis," Z. Ergas ed. The African State in Transition, (London: MacMillan Press 1987), p.230.

[148] N. Chazan, African Studies Centre, Working Papers #58 (1982), p.5.

country around and incorporate the population into the state policies and goals is the focus of the next section of this thesis.

CHAPTER 4

GHANA AND RAWLINGS

i> RAWLINGS AND THE PNDC: PHASE ONE - ECONOMICS

The following section will focus on the country of Ghana and examine whether the leadership has been able to incorporate society or whether society has chosen to disengage itself from the state and create a distance between the state and society.

A reiteration of what is meant by incorporation and disengagement would be appropriate at this time. Incorporation is the process by which large segments of the population associate themselves with the state , identify with the state and take part in state activities in order to share its resources. Disengagement describes the tendency of society to withdraw from the state and to keep a distance from its channels of power. This disengagement

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occurs as a hedge against the state's instability and diminishing resource base.[149]

Following the June 1979 coup in Ghana, Rawlings and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), developed a three pronged approach to attack the problems facing the country. Their overriding objective was to correct the disengagement that had developed between the state and society. Rawlings wanted to rebuild a positive image of both the government and the military in the eyes of the general public. Firstly, Rawlings advocated a house cleaning operation that would erase all manifestations of corruption, profiteering, or wrongdoing associated with previous regimes. Secondly, he wanted to bring about a moral turnaround, to reinstate a norm of public accountability; to awaken the masses to both their rights and responsibilities. Thirdly, he expressed a committment to facilitating a peaceful return to civilian rule. To some degree Rawlings was successful in accomplishing his goals as a civilian government, headed by Dr. Limann was elected into power.

When Limann came to power he faced three primary challenges. First he had to reconstruct a state apparatus that had been deformed by preceding periods of military

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[149] Victor Azarya, "Reordering State-Society Relations", p.7

rule. The military had ruled Ghana since the overthrow of Nkrumah in 1966 except for the 1969 to 1972 government of Dr. Busia. At the end of General Acheampong's rule there was a general feeling that the senior officers of the armed forces and police and their civilian counterparts were no longer fit to rule. Society saw a general picture of decadence and greed that had ramifications far beyond the self-satisfaction of any one corrupt official, or businessman.[150] Secondly, Limann's government had to attempt to rehabilitate an economy shattered by years of misguidance and abuse. Thirdly, they had to attempt to revive public confidence in the national government, dissipated by years of exclusion, exploitation and impoverishment.[151] Significant numbers of those who ruled and administered had become tainted by a context of greed and corruption.

Limann's government, (1979 to 1981) the Third Republic of Ghana, had an executive presidency elected by the majority of the voters. The republic had a National Assembly with a strong committee system and an independent judiciary. One of the first actions that Limann's People's National Party (PNP) took was to send the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council leadership abroad for lengthy periods of study, or

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[150] Donald Ray, p.23.

[151] N. Chazan, <u>An Anatomy of Ghanaian Politics</u>, p. 306.

force them to retire, as did Rawlings. [152] Limann was well aware of Rawlings' popularity and thus his potential power, and he wanted to keep it in check.

Unfortunately, Limann and the PNP did not rise to the challenges before them, resulting in a growing dissatisfaction among society with their performance. Limann's government quickly fell prey to many of the temptations that had plagued the previous regimes. It was not long before Limann's team was perceived as squalid leaders competing for the spoils of office. This perception by the public was further aggravated by rampant inflation, and prolonged shortages of consumer goods. These facts gave the PNP government scant legitimacy and in response to the continued economic failures and political corruption of the PNP, Rawlings launched a genuine political and social revolution that began with a coup on New Year's Eve 1981. [153] This coup can be considered a political and social revolution because Rawlings intended not only to replace those in power but also wanted to make major changes within the political system and called upon society to help make the changes. The expressed long term goal was the restructuring of the political system, to institute a

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[152] N. Chazan, <u>An Anatomy of Ghanaian Politics</u>, p. 309.

[153] Jon Kraus, "Revolution and the Military in Ghana," <u>Current History</u>, Vol. 82 (1983), p.117.

system that was tailored to reflect the history and culture of Ghana.

Rawlings' second coup was initiated by himself and some ex-AFRC associates outside the military. He also drew support from military men from the same units that had helped him launch the June 4, 1979 coup. This second coup or "second coming" as some have referred to it, was not an officers' coup, rather it was an iron surgeon's coup with a twist. A clarification of what is meant by an officers' coup may be helpful. An important distinction must be made between the senior officers and the junior officers. Senior officers may perform a coup because they are fearful that the existing government is infringing on or taking away their status and/or power. Junior officers may perform a coup because they feel second class, left out of any status or power, or may be fearful of what might occur if the senior officers were to usurp control over the government.

Rawlings' second coup was performed by the junior officers and lower ranks within the military. It was an iron surgeon's coup by the fact that it was military led and its goal was to oust a failing civilian government. According to Joaquin Costa, the man of iron is called upon to perform drastic surgery needed to "amputate the gangrenous elements of the existing system." Lacking belief in the will or the ability of those in power to solve the existing problems,

a country may welcome an "iron surgeon" who seizes power and offers to solve the problems.[154] Rawlings' return and the establishment of the Provisional National Defense Council, (PNDC) entailed the removal of a government apparently helpless to prevent Ghana's deepening economic regression.[155] The twist in this iron surgeon's coup was the fact that the military regime came not only to clean house, but also to set up house. The coup was not only a cleaning act, but very much a political act by the military. Rawlings was not interested in reasserting hierarchy and discipline within the armed forces. His concern was to widen the authority and political base of individual leaders by appealing directly to the rank and file soldiers and by establishing territorial and work place committees to bolster the authority of the leadership. [156]

Rawlings told the people, "I ask for nothing less than a revolution- something that will transform the social and economic order of the country." [157] He told the people that

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[154] Feit Edwards, "The Rule of the Iron Surgeon:Government in Spain and Ghana," Comparative Politics. Vol.1, No.4 (1969). p.485.

[155] Jon Kraus, "Rawlings' Second Coming," Africa Report, Vol.27, No.2 (1982), p.60.

[156] Henry Bienen, "Populist Military Regimes in West Africa,"Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 11, No.3 (1985), p. 363.

[157] Jon Kraus, "Rawlings' Second Coming," Africa Report, Vol.277, No.2 (1982), p.60.

he was asking for their help. "You the people must do it,
no one can do it for you."[158] He also stated that he would
continue to wage his "Holy war" against corruption.
Rawlings as an African leader was unique in two significant
ways. While many African leaders have put the cause or
blame for their economic problems on their former colonial
landlords or some neocolonial power, Rawlings did not
follow this pattern. Instead, he pointed a finger at and
blamed Ghanaian citizens for the economic and social
failure of their country. In particular, Rawlings was
critical of the ruling elite, those who had positions of
power in the military and the government and used their
positions for self interest, exploiting Ghanaians and
ignoring the broader interests of Ghana. Secondly, Rawlings
was the first military leader in Africa to instigate a
successful second takeover of the government.

One important distinction to be made between the first and
the second coup was the fact that the AFRC had been
constructed on an exclusively military foundation, while
the PNDC strove to incorporate civilians from the onset. It
should also be noted that while the AFRC assumed control of
the state for a limited time period, the PNDC seemed
determined to remain in power for an unlimited period of

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[158] Jon Kraus, "Coup Master Rawlings: The Second Coming," New
African, Vol.173 (1982), p.12.

time.[159] Bienen points out that Rawlings and the PNDC were taking an unusual approach. They were not insulating the armed forces from society, in fact, they were deliberately eroding the autonomy of the armed forces.[160]

Immediately after the takeover of the government, in January 1982, Rawlings began to take action by suspending the Third Republican Constitution of Ghana. He dismissed the President and the Vice President as well as all the ministers of the state and their deputies. Parliament was dissolved, the council of state was abolished and all political parties were banned.[161] This coup was truly more like a revolution, a restructuring and reorganization was to occur. Rawlings had launched a populist anti elite revolution. Rawlings' popularity and initial core constituency was built around the leftist intellectuals, political activists, the workers, trade unionists, and the military, particularly the lower ranks and the junior officers. Rawlings had the support of the New Democrats, the Pan African Youth Movement, the Peoples' Revolutionary League, the African Youth Command and the Social Democratic Front.

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[159] N. Chazan, An Anatomy of Ghanaian Politics, p. 321.

[160] Henry Bienen, p.373.

[161] Jon Kraus, "Coup Master Rawlings: The Second Coming," p.11.

As in Liberia and Upper Volta (later Burkina Faso), this
coup marked a turning against the established elite of
powerful government and military leaders who had used their
positions for personal gain and had done little to
redevelop the economy of Ghana. A function of his holy war
was to purge this group. In addition, the coup makers
clearly posed themselves against the established senior
military leaders.[162] Rawlings' goal was to begin reforms
that would benefit the average person from whom he was
gaining increased support. Students, workers, rank and file
soldiers and the urban dispossessed viewed Rawlings as the
only person capable of providing salvation. At the same
time, it should be noted that many Ghanaians were wary of
the effects of another prolonged campaign against political
abuses while still others were concerned for the possible
international repercussions of the military takeover. Would
another military takeover signal instability to Ghana's
international trading partners and effect Ghana's trade
and financial arrangements? The overthrow of the Limann
administration was seen by many Ghanaians as an unfortunate
event. For these people it was seen as the end of democracy
in Ghana. On the other hand, it seemed inevitable because
of the nonchalant attitude of the Limann government toward

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[162] Henry Bienen, "Populist Military Regimes in West Africa,"
Armed Forces and Society, Vol.11, No.3 (1985), p.361.

the socio-economic problems of the country.[163]

What did Rawlings and the PNDC inherit? When they took over the country, the state had become over centralized and extremely inefficient. During the previous years, the autonomy of the bureaucracy and coercive network from the decision making structure inhibited the ability of the latter to supervise the activity of the former. According to Chazan, Ghana suffered from institutional failure to such a degree and the rot was so pervasive that it was beyond the remedial power of any institution to reform.[164] Rawlings was intent upon not simply changing the players but said the whole game had to be restructured. The state apparatus had to be overhauled to lessen the focus of power on the military and make the government more responsive to the participation of the people.

Ghana's economic deterioration during the 1970's and the means devised to adjust to the situation hinged on a variety of factors related to uses and abuses of power. The state gradually came to tackle a contracting range of topics and even these were tackled with diminishing effectiveness.The net result was that the government in Ghana lacked salience either symbolically, communally, or

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[163] West Africa, February 8, 1982. p.374.

[164] N. Chazan, An Anatomy of Ghanaian Politics, p. 57-60.

functionally and thereby lost its relative autonomy.[165]

Since the state as an institution was still perceived by many within society as a remote and alien institution imposed by colonialism, they watched passively as corruption permeated every level of society and the economy reached the point of disintegration.[166] Corruption had become pervasive throughout the civil service. Formal organizational rules and networks were regularly being circumvented. Since it was known that government officials were profiting from illegal trade, the population came to take extensive public service dishonesty for granted. This led to a natural spinoff, a decline in the credibility of the state.

In the 1970's prior to Rawlings' take over, two significant factors reflected the state's relationship with society. There was an increasing movement of people and goods across the borders of Ghana and her neighbors. Secondly, political violence was becoming more commonplace.[167] These two actions pointed to growing disharmony between the state and society at large. Not only was disengagement being expressed through the voice of the people, through the

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[165] N. Chazan, African Studies Centre, Working Papers #58, p.29.

[166] Donald Ray, p.24.

[167] N. Chazan, An Anatomy of Ghanaian Politics, p.339.

development of the informal economy and through smuggling, but they were also exercising the final option of exit and leaving the country. This increased problems for Rawlings as many professional and intellectuals decided to leave Ghana creating a "brain drain" and a vacuum of skilled people at a crucial moment when their skills and talents were desperately needed to rebuild the country.

Rawlings and the PNDC faced several major obstacles that warranted urgent attention. Of primary concern was the need to restore the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of Ghanaian society. Rawlings also needed to make efforts to repair the social incoherence that had developed during and as a result of the former regimes, especially that of General Acheampong. Rawlings needed to curb the corruption that had infiltrated all levels of government and the military and to begin to reverse the process of detachment of the government from key sections of society. At the same time there was a dire need to rescue the economy from the bankrupt state which Rawlings inherited. Rawlings had to initiate programs that would result in economic growth. In short, Rawlings had to work immediately on two fronts, the economic and the social.

Rawlings entered the political arena suddenly and was able to obtain widespread support. In his early years in power

he was looked upon as a "saviour" or "Robin Hood" of the Ghanaian people. The ambitions of the PNDC and Rawlings did not include creating another military regime in Ghana. Rawlings desired an anti bourgeois, anti-imperialist regime based on the mobilization of the ordinary Ghanaian.[168] By anti-bourgeois and anti-imperialist, Rawlings wanted to replace the existing governing class with people who would be responsible to the ordinary Ghanaian. Rawlings saw that nothing short of a revolution would purge the country so he and the PNDC made a sustained attack on the wealth and power of the Ghanaian elites while at the same time, making major efforts to legitimize populist powers and norms. As Rawlings commented, no one wishes a return to military dictatorship. Everyone wants a prosperous Ghana. The government therefore must be able to inspire confidence, not apathy and resentment.[169]

The first revolution had to occur in the economic sphere. Economically, Ghana was a disaster. In the six years 1976-1980, the wholesale price index had risen by 800% [170] Inflation was 53% in 1976, 115% in 1977, 79% in 1978 with

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[168] Jon Kraus, "Ghana's Shift from Radical Populism," Current History, Vol.86 (1987), p.228.

[169] West Africa, March 16, 1981. p.536.

[170] Donald Ray, p.3.

the resulting compound effect of 212% yearly 1972-1979.[171]
There were inadequate marketing and distributive structures
as both rail and roads were in a state of disrepair.
Factories were operating at 30% of installed capacity.
There was wholesale smuggling of cash crops and
manufactured goods across the borders of neighboring
countries. Parallel currency and commodity markets were
firmly entrenched and fully functional.[172] The state had
lost its control over resources and hence it had
relinquished its power as a redistribution centre. Attempts
to enlarge the public sector and to ensure its
productivity, had not succeeded. Ghana had lost its status
among its own people and among those in the outside
world.[173]

Unfortunately, Rawlings and the PNDC had virtually no
resources with which to mobilize the economy. Ghana's
financial deficit had been financed by printing more money,
which simply added fuel to inflation. From 1960 to 1965 the
money supply increased 12% annually.[174] It increased
another 675% between 1974 and 1978. [175] Ghana's terms of

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[171] Jon Kraus, "Ghana's Radical Populist Regime," Current
History, Vol.84 (1985), p.165.

[172] West Africa, March 16, 1981. p.536.

[173] D. Pellow and N. Chazan, p.167.

[174] M. Huq, p.13

[175] Jon Kraus, "The Political Economy of Conflict in Ghana,"
Africa Report, Vol.25, No.2 (March-April 1980), p.9.

trade had dropped by 31% since 1980. Ghana had no foreign
exchange reserves and because of its debt arrears, it was
unable to obtain external credit.[176]

According to Jon Kraus, the sources of Ghana's economic
malaise were multiple and interrelated. Economic growth was
actually negative during 1970 through 1979 and there
continued to be a sustained balance of payments deficit.
There were major declines in the production of crucial
export commodities such as cocoa, gold, and diamonds and a
very high inflation rate which was fuelled by high
government deficits. Finally, Ghana was experiencing some
of the lowest rates of gross domestic savings and
investments of any developing country.[177]

Rawlings took drastic measures to revive the economy. For
example, by curtailing hoarding and slowing down the
smuggling, he made an attempt at lessening the influence of
the informal economy. Rawlings realized that the economy
was in desperate need of an injection of funds, so he went
to the International Monetary Fund. In March 1983, the PNDC
undertook a number of major reform measures aimed at
stimulating the economy and meeting the requirements of the
IMF. The IMF wanted to see the Cedi devalued to a more

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[176] Jon Kraus, "Ghana's Radical Populist Regime," <u>Current
History</u>, Vol.84 (1985), p.166.

[177] Jon Kraus, "Rawlings' Second Coming," <u>Africa Report</u>,
Vol.27, No.2 (1982), p.64-65.

realistic rate, a decrease in government expenditures and a decrease in the number of state run corporations. As a response to these conditions the Cedi was devalued by 1818% and as a result the cost of imported goods rose 1800%, Interest rates were raised and price controls were continued on only twenty three widely used and essential commodities. This was a bitter but necessary pill for the Ghanaians to swallow. It was particularly difficult for the average Ghanaian who in 1981 found his real wages to be only 16% of what they had been in 1975.[178] Rawlings also lowered the supply of money. The money supply was 13% of the GDP in 1983 and 12% in 1984. This was in contrast to 29% and 23% in 1977 and 1979 respectively.[179]

There was strong opposition to the government going to the IMF for funding. The most vocal objections came from the New Democratic Movement, (NDM). The NDM was a newly formed nonpartisan political organization based in Accra. The NDM felt that the ordinary Ghanaian had never been afforded the opportunity to influence the affairs of the nation to his benefit.[180] They felt that by accepting funds from the IMF and/or the World Bank Ghana was allowing international capitalism to gain control over the country's economic

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[178] Jon Kraus, "Ghana's Radical Populist Regime," p.168.

[179] M. Huq, p.17.

[180] West Africa, May 19, 1980. p.899.

policies. They also felt that this was not the solution to the economic problems facing Ghana, that ultimately this plan of action would place Ghana deeper into the hands of those the NDM felt were the perpetrators of the problems.[181]

Whether the move was popular or not, the decision to accept IMF funds of $US 600 million 1983 through 1985 and the World Bank's $US 500 million through 1985, appeared to have a positive effect on the macro economic level. Export earnings rose from $US 439 million in 1983 to $US 700 million in 1986. Cocoa production recovered from a 1983-1984 low of 158,000 tons to 215,000 in 1985. Gold exports rose sharply and timber exports quadrupled from a 1983 low to 60 million in 1986.[182]

The increase in availability of spare parts, the increase in road repairs and general improvements to the support structures greatly enhanced distributive systems for both food and manufactured goods.

Inflation was 123% in 1983. One of the major factors was the drought that sent food prices up 145%. In 1984, the rate was 40% and in 1985, 18%. The government made sharp reductions in its budget deficits and prepared to close

[181] West Africa, May 19, 1980. p.899.

[182] Jon Kraus, "Ghana's Shift From Radical Populism", p.208.

down inefficient and unprofitable state corporations. A move toward privatization began but has progressed slowly for fear of opposition from radical elements and the unions.

Unfortunately the positive changes on a macro level were not felt by the average Ghanian on a day to day basis. The government had great difficulty in raising wages to keep up with inflation. The level of poverty among even the middle class workers continued to be a cause for fraud, theft and embezzlement.[183] Even though many more goods became available in 1984, there continued to be shortages of consumer goods like soap and paraffin. Even the goods that were available were too costly for most people. In spite of these conditions people generally did find encouragement from the mere appearance of the goods on the shelves. [184] Adequate housing became a major problem. By 1989, the annual need was 70,000 new units while the yearly output was only 28,000 units. It is estimated that 137,000 units per year would be needed for the next 20 years to decongest the current occupancy rate now at 13 people per unit in urban areas to a more acceptable 7 people per unit.[185]

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[183] Jon Kraus, " Ghana's Shift from Radical Populism," p.205-207.

[184] Donald Ray, p.134.

[185] West Africa, March 27, 1989. p.472.

Rawlings acknowledged the historic debt of the whole nation to the farmer. At the same time he also renounced the way in which the agricultural workers had been exploited for the benefit of the rest of Ghana. [186] In spite of this acknowledgement there has been little change or reason for encouragement for the farmer. The economic programs had positive effect on the macro level, but on the micro level the positive effects have yet to be felt and living continues to be a struggle. Inflation was down, there were more goods available, and the infrastructures, roads and rail were being repaired. There was much room for improvement, but the economic decay that had been so prevalent the previous nine years had been abated. The economy was improving and had been turned around from a disaster to moving in the direction of growth. While the overall economy has improved it needs to be stated that the poor in the country remain in bad shape. A 1988 World Bank Report stated that the plight of the poor and the vulnerable remains desperate with limited access to health, education or good drinking water. There are also severe constraints on their ability to produce and/or earn enough to meet their basic needs.[187] While the world financial leaders are looking more favorably at Rawlings, he has to wonder whether the general public still finds his regime

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[186] West Africa, January 2, 1987. p.61.

[187] West Africa, February 1, 1988. p. 164.

their choice for leading the country.

In addition to curtailing price controls, smuggling and hoarding as well as devaluing the cedi, Rawlings' strategy to develop the country included agricultural reforms. The goal appears to have been to reform the land tenure system with the hopes of increasing agricultural productivity. There was a plan to develop communal property. Each village and town was to establish 25 acres of communal farm land. The proceeds from this operation were to be used by the community for development projects. According to Gore, it is not clear that this plan was ever actualized. Another plan involved asking chiefs to surrender some of their land to be used for agricultural production by workers displaced from redundant government jobs. Plans were also in place to downsize and decentralize the civil service. It was hoped that this action would increase the efficiency of the state apparatus.[188]

Programs such as "Operation Focus on the Grassroots" began in 1985 with the goal and expectation that government officials would meet with the people and discuss with them their problems and be of assistance in coming forward with some jointly arrived at solutions. In theory, this plan may have looked good, but in reality the national and state

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[188] Louise Gore, "The Rawlings' Regimes in Ghana 1979-1983: The Political Economy of Military Intervention," SNID Occasional Papers No.84-102. p. 30-41.

governments were unable to initiate local development. Several factors contributed to this scenario. External authority outside the local community continued to dictate programs. The selection of projects was sensitive to national priorities and thereby did not necessarily have application to the local situation. Finally, the government often concentrated on isolated projects that had little beneficial impact on the development of the local economy.[189] The failure of the rural areas to achieve sustained development has not been due to the lack of effort on the part of the farmer, but due to a lack of chaos-free planning. The problem is further aggravated by the fact that most development programs in Ghana, for the past several years have been urban biased with little or no attention paid to the rural population.[190]

On the macro level it is generally felt that Ghana had made significant economic headway, that Rawlings and the PNDC had made modest but nonetheless, real economic improvements to the overall economy.[191] The government has been able to make repayment on some long overdue loans. By 1986 all arrears in respect to debts incurred by Nkrumah were repaid. Also $US 110 million owed to Nigeria for oil

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[189] West Africa, July 28, 1986. p.1563.

[190] West Africa, December 4-10 1989. p. 2015.

[191] Donald Ray, p.138.

imports was repaid. During the same period, the country was able to increase its foreign exchange reserve and have a two month import cover.[192] The 1991 budget reflects a concern to continue the economic improvements. There is a projected US$ 90 million balance of payments surplus, a 4% GDP projected growth and a planned reduction in the rate of inflation from 37% in 1990 to 10% in 1991.[193]

Considering the conditions and accomplishments on the macro and the individual level an obvious question is whether Rawlings' populist movement of the 1980's is still viable into the 1990's? Are the economic conditions favorable enough for continued popular support? Has Rawlings been able to accomplish the incorporation process within such a social mosaic as Ghana? How has he been able to involve the grass roots? What problems face Rawlings and the PNDC in the 1990's?

ii> PHASE TWO: SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CHANGE:

While one of the urgent tasks facing Rawlings and the PNDC

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[192] M. Huq. p.281.

[193] West Africa, January 21-27, 1991.

was to revive the economy, the other need was to restore the faith of society in the state apparatus. It was necessary to increase the capacity and penetrative effectiveness of the government while at the same time incorporating more people into the realm of the state.

Previous regimes had been very elitist and Rawlings' strategy was to incorporate and co-opt a variety of people from Ghana's ethnic mosaic. Rawlings did not wish to continue the elitist and nepotistic patterns of Acheampong. In contrast he saw the need to involve and incorporate people from a variety of groups not only in key government posts but also in the general mechanics of the government. Rawlings tried to draw support from the workers and student population in an attempt to build a class base that would be in opposition to the Ghanaian bourgeoisie of professionals, bureaucrats and business men. This was a difficult task because the economy was so desperately unproductive that essential goods and food were scarce. Rawlings had only his popularity and a call to patience to offer his supporters.[194]

Following his first coup, Rawlings called upon the people to take up a challenge and stand up for their rights and

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[194] Jon Kraus, "Revolution and the Military in Ghana," <u>Current History</u>, Vol.78, No.445 (1983), p.115-119.

make the leaders of the country accountable to the people and not leave it to the armed forces or other institutions to do it for them. Rawlings was not appealing for an insurrection, rather he was calling for vigilance by society with regard to their legitimate expectations in the framework of a democratic country. The people were called upon to make their leaders both responsible and responsive to the people.[195] Rawlings was calling upon the people to actualize powers they had not utilized in decades. Rawlings had to institute or create new structures to ensure that this goal became reality and didn't remain simply rhetoric.

Populist leaders such as Rawlings may have the popular support, but they also require some organization or institutions to perform the long term tasks of delivering the political message and the goods and services to the people. When Rawlings became leader of Ghana, he neither had nor represented any political organization. The quickly formed PNDC needed to develop an organization or institution that rubbed shoulders with the people and represented the regime.

One of the first grassroots organizations that came into being was the Citizen Vetting Committees (CVC). The CVC's were given the role of overseeing public behaviour. One of their first tasks was , in the short term, to bring those

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[195] West Africa, July 30, 1979. p.1356.

involved in corruption to trial and in the long term, to begin monitoring public officials.[196] The CVC's were expected to review the existing organization of government structures and to judge the suitability of the incumbents. The CVC's examined the bureaucracy, retired troublesome civil servants, eliminated superfluous positions and established themselves as the watch dog of the state apparatus. Power was being given to the people to examine, accuse, try, and punish those in government and leaders of society that were found to have abused their position. The CVC's task was to examine the assets and bank accounts of any Ghanaian with a balance of C 50000 and over. Any money or property that couldn't be accounted for was automatically taxed, penalized or in the case of default, forfeited to the state. [197] In little over a year of operation the CVC action resulted in the collection of 166.3 million cedis. The increase of almost 500% in taxes paid by the self-employed between 1980 and 1982 has been attributed to the fear on the part of the self employed of being caught by the CVC.[198]

As part of a larger plan to mobilize the population to begin the slow process of socioeconomic transformation, the

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[196] D. Pellow and N. Chazan, p.79.

[197] West Africa, April 26, 1982. p.1127.

[198] Donald Ray, p.59.

PNDC formed Peoples Defence Committees (PDCs). The PDCs were formed under the directorate of a coordinating committee made up of representatives from all the progressive political organizations.[199] This institution was part of the plan by the government to incorporate new groups into the planning and implementation of state programs and thereby decentralize some of the government structures. The PDCs were created in every community with the goal of organizing development programs in factories, banks, institutions and universities. Based in the localities and in the work place, there were literally thousands of these committees throughout Ghana. These PDC's acted as watch dogs for the ruling PNDC. They maintained a check on existing structures, particularly the trade unions and the district councils. [200] At the same time complementary bodies called Workers' Defence Committees were established with the goal of formulating government policy. These organizations enforced price controls, curfews, supported rent controls and investigated mismanagement in both government and business. The PDC organized a wide range of self help and agricultural activities and established 5300 people's stores to distribute scarce commodities. [201] The Defence Committees

[199] West Africa, April 26, 1982. p. 1129.

[200] Jon Kraus, "Ghana's Radical Populist Regime," p.166.

[201] Jon Kraus, "Ghana's Radical Populist Regime," p.166.

were to be local agents of revolutionary control. They were to act as information trip wires against attempted coups. They were also expected to mobilize popular support and to recruit and train the most talented from the masses, turning them into a new source of revolutionary leadership. [202]

Rawlings and the PNDC had to work quickly to increase grass roots involvement and to facilitate communal integration [203] The PDC's and the WDC's allowed for increased grass root participation and they played a key role in the dissemination of the goals and fervour of the revolution. Bienen stated that these organizations aimed to bypass existing parties and the military, to create links to excluded social formations and to establish new bases for support. They were intended to and succeeded in creating popular support where no previous solid foundation existed. [204]

Soon after taking over leadership of the country, Rawlings was accused of continuing tribalism and xenophobia. The opposition claimed that he was loading his government with fellow Ewes and that Northeners, many of whom were money

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[202] Donald Ray, p.79-80.

[203] N. Chazan, An Anatomy of Ghanaian Politics, p. 345.

[204] Henry Bienen, p.366.

changers, were being singled out for harassment. [205]

Rawlings wanted to give the PNDC a better ethnic mix and thereby garner wider public support. The PNDC membership was distinctly different from that of any prior military junta, lacking significant active duty officer representation and composed of almost 50% civilians. Unfortunately, Rawlings stumbled in his first attempt and unwisely recruited unknown and unrepresentative people to join the PNDC. After one year only one of the original PNDC leadership remained. One was arrested and executed for involvement in the murder of three high court judges, others went into exile and others simply left the PNDC in protest.[206] In his search for widespread support, Rawlings included in his advisory staff people he neither knew well nor trusted completely.[207] Later he realised his error and modified his actions by soliciting support from a variety of ethnic groups within the society, such as the Ewe, Ga, Akan, and the Fante peoples. The PNDC was composed of left wing intellectuals and political activists, workers and trade unionists, university students, lower ranks and junior officers of the military and PDC and WDC workers. By mixing the appointments among various groups, Rawlings went

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[205] Editor, "Ghana's Holy War," Africa Report, Vol.27, No.3 (1982), p.12-15.

[206] Jon, Kraus, "Ghana's Radical Populist Regime," p.167.

[207] D. Pellow and N. Chazan, p.77.

out of his way to placate the regional complaints.[208]

Rawlings relied on the trade union members, students, rural wage earners and the rank and file of the military for support. These were groups of people who had been excluded from the Ghanaian ruling establishment. In contrast, the urban elites, professionals, technocrats, business people and wealthy farmers now tended to be excluded. Rawlings in his search for support had to walk a tightrope. His revolution wanted to give more involvement at the grass roots level but at the same time he had to be cautious of the existing power and resources still available to the Ghanaian elites.

While the PDCs and WDCs did allow greater participation of the people and greater penetration of the state into society, they were not without their faults. There were complaints of excesses of abuse and harassment being handed out by the PDCs, WDCs and CVCs. People were executed without a proper trial, kangaroo courts were common and market women were caned in public.[209] While allowing the public to vent their frustrations and to hand out "justice", in some cases the activities of these organizations resulted in replacing military and government corruption with a form of civilian corruption. The zealotry

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[208] D. Rothchild and N. Chazan, Precarious Balance p.242.

[209] West Africa, June 1980, p.955.

of some PDC's bordered on harassment and coercion, alienating some Ghanaians. A significant number of PDC leaders expanded their own power or took the opportunity to engage in fraud or theft while the WDC's sometimes disrupted office or factory productivity.[210]

The PDCs and the WDCs were not able to perform as well as expected for several reasons, but two stood out. The personnel lacked the skill and expertise required for the implementation of the programs and secondly, there was often confusion on an organizational level, between the PDCs, WDCs and the bureaucracy. The district and the regional PDC officials often came into conflict with government PNDC district and regional officials. There was confusion of roles, responsibilities and communication. The defense committees were reorganized several times and this created confusion in the minds of the members as to what the defense committees were supposed to do, who should be a member, who the leaders were and how they should be chosen and what their duties were.[211]

Ray argues that in spite of all these problems the committees made a remarkable contribution to the revolutionary process. By being established throughout the country, they were able to broaden the base of the

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[210] Jon Kraus, "Ghana's Radical Populist Regime," p.167.

[211] Donald Ray, p. 91.

revolution. They were involved in information gathering which was useful for the PNDC security forces. They took part in development projects and formed the basis for attempting to establish a more equitable system of goods distribution.[212]

In 1984 the PDCs and WDCs were renamed the Committee for the Defence of the Revolution (CDRs). The CDRs were envisioned as instruments of justice and social change. [213] The opposition felt that this move would result in a weakening of the peoples's power and open the door to a return of autocratic management and widespread corruption. It was felt that if the instruments of popular involvement were removed, the ground would be fertile for the return of these problems.[214] Rawlings was in a difficult position, because on the one hand he was receiving internal pressures due to the changes and on the other hand he received a favorable response from the World Bank, because the changes that occurred, transformed the PDCs (now CDRs) from being political organs into no more than units of economic production and military defence of the government.[215] The CDRs were officially seen as local organizations whose

[212] Donald Ray, p.90-91.

[213] D. Pellow and N. Chazan, p.84.

[214] West Africa, February 25, 1985, p.347.

[215] West Africa, February 4, 1985, p.201.

purpose was to ensure higher productivity and also better worker discipline.[216] This decline in the political function of the PDCs and WDCs was only one of the major changes between 1982 and 1987. There was a concerted effort to involve the established chiefs, and various other social groups that hitherto had been treated with great suspicion by the supporters of the PNDC. [217] Accompanying the entrance of Rawlings and the PNDC there had been a strong backlash against the established order and positions. Following the initial purge, it was decided to include those from the "establishment" who could be trusted and could be useful in creating a wider political base for the PNDC.

Despite his initial popularity, opposition to Rawlings and the PNDC did not take long to germinate. While there was no real organized opposition within the country, there were actions of disengagement by different sectors of the society. Opposition to Rawlings and his revolution came in various shapes and forms.Some people used the option of exit and left the country in search of employment and easier living conditions . In the agricultural sector, some reacted to the price controls on their commodities by the government by drastically reducing their production. Not

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[216] West Africa, January 12, 1987, p.66.

[217] West Africa, January 12, 1987, p.66

surprisingly, the most vociferous opposition to his regime came from the lawyers and other professionals. The Ghana Bar Association recommended that the PNDC create a broadly based government and prepare to restore civilian rule.[218]

Political opposition to the revolution ran the full gamut of possibilities. Some resigned from the revolution, there were critical editorials, critics from the church hierarchy, political movements such as the Campaign for Democracy in Ghana, and several coup attempts.[219] While the PNDC has been historically closely linked with the military, particularly the lower ranks, this has not always been a cordial relationship. In fact, according to Ray, at least nine coup attempts have been instigated by junior officers and ranks of the armed forces. Civilians played little part in this form of opposition. Interestingly, Northerners played a significant and leading role in most important coup attempts.[220]

Opposition also came from organizations that were based outside the country such as the already mentioned Campaign for Democracy, the Ghana Democratic Movement, the Ghana Movement for Freedom and Justice (MFJ) and the United

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[218] Jon, Kraus, "Revolution and the Military in Ghana," p.115-119.

[219] Donald, Ray. p.99.

[220] Donald, Ray. p.112.

Revolutionary Front. The GDM has been one of the most vocal in opposing the PNDC. They view the current government as illegitimate and they want to see the development of a multiparty system.The CDG while based in London, has active offices in Nigeria, Togo, and the Ivory Coast. Both the CDG and the GDM have members and sympathizers scattered throughout Western Europe and North America.[221] While these opposition groups make a significant amount of noise, there is little they can achieve without some base of popular support within Ghana.[222] According to Ray, the external based opposition has had a minimal effect on the PNDC. They have focused mainly in making hostile statements and making representations to Western governments.

In the early years of its existence the PNDC did not have to worry about organized opposition. Up until 1985 political opposition remained fragmented, personalized and quite ineffective.[223] Mr. Boakye Djan is one such example. At one time he was Rawlings' right hand man but now is opposing him from abroad, accusing Rawlings of seeing politics in terms of tribal advantage and saying that Rawlings represents a group of Ghanaians who would do

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[221] Donald Ray, p.113

[222] West Africa, April 27, 1978. p.798-799.

[223] Donald, Ray, p.115-117.

anything to obtain and keep control and power.[224] According
to Ray, these two men have a long history of conflict going
back to rivalry in the 1979 AFRC. Their ideological
differences are accentuated by their ethnic differences as
well as their political leanings; Boakye-Djan is supposedly
to the right of Rawlings. [225]

It needs to be remembered that while officially there was
freedom of speech, in actual fact, the media has been
controlled. In the midst of all the programs to incorporate
people and to increase their involvement in government
programs, there has been a fear even expressed by Rawlings
himself, of a return to a "culture of silence". The culture
of silence was a situation that had developed during past
regimes, where people did not express opinions and thoughts
that might be seen as in opposition to the government.[226]
Rawlings is fearful that a return to the culture of silence
would hamper the move toward increased freedom and justice
in Ghana. Unfortunately, at the same time that Rawlings has
expressed a concern, arrests and late night swoops have
occurred. There have been cases of physical abuse and
people have been slandered and branded through the
government controlled media.

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[224] New African, "Boakye Djan: My Story," December 1988, p.13.
[225] Donald Ray, p. 113.
[226] West Africa, August 10, 1991. p.1529.

While there are calls for people's participation, democratic reforms and action,there is also a fear or intolerance of opposition within the Rawlings regime. One speculates that while Rawlings expresses concern at the "culture of silence", he must be fearful that the "stability" he and the PNDC are working for is not sufficiently solid to withstand open and free opposition. This is a serious situation that fuels a return to the culture of silence and has yet to be corrected. As recent as January 1990, it was reported in West Africa that "economic liberalization has not been accompanied by greater political democracy. The laws and official practices have made independent and critical expression of the government a high risk business."[227]

There was fear by those in the media of arrest and/or harassment if views are expressed contrary to government wishes. The major media houses, Ghana Broadcasting Corporation, the Graphic and New Times Corporations are all state owned and publish nothing unfavorable to the government.[228] Actually the one way press is thought by many to have done more harm than good for the government. One writer stated that the Ghanaians have not been quiet, they have been talking, but what they say has not reached

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[227] West Africa, January 8-14, 1990. p.9.

[228] West Africa, August 10, 1987. p.1529.

where it is intended.[229] To continue grass roots support and to strengthen any sense of legitimacy for his regime, Rawlings must allow a medium by which the public can express views that may be in opposition to those of the government. Rawlings and the PNDC are in the position of determining how to ensure the continuance of their popular support. While some people have appreciated the relative economic growth that has taken place, there is an increasing number who are disillusioned by what they see as Rawlings' departure from the ideals with which he seized power.[230] For many the revolution did not bring enough people into the political decision making process quickly enough. Others remained disengaged because the government's plans and/or actions did not warrant a move toward incorporation. In 1991, Rawlings finds himself after almost a decade in power, having accomplished economic reforms but facing the serious question concerning the legitimacy of his regime.

In 1983 Rawlings stated that one of the goals of the PNDC was to give meaning to the concept of popular participation in the democratic process through local elections.[231] When pressed by questions concerning a move toward general

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[229] West Africa, August 10, 1987. p.1530.

[230] Jon Kraus, "Ghana's Shift from Radical Populism," p.228.

[231] West Africa, June 12, 1987. p.65.

elections and the democratization of the central government, Rawlings responded that the goal of the PNDC is to turn the governing of Ghana over to a civilian democratic set up. Rawlings added that the first step is to ensure that the correct procedures and structures are in place.

Rawlings made some moves regarding this subject by announcing the establishment of district assemblies (DAs), but no time table for their implementation and elections was given. The DAs are intended to be the highest political and administrative authority in the district performing deliberative, legislative and executive functions.[232] While the creation of the DAs was a step in the direction of decentralizing the government, it was a cautious step by the PNDC, and an inadequate step according to the opposition. It was and continues to remain unclear, what the exact role of the DA is and more importantly what is the relationship of the DAs to the national political institutions. While the establishment of DAs may be a move in the right direction, some fundamental questions remain unanswered not least of which is, how long will the DAs be subject to national policies made by a constitutionally non accountable regime?.[233]

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[232] West Africa, July 13, 1987. p.1344.

[233] West Africa, September 14, 1988. p.1781.

Finally, the National Committee for Democracy stated that voter registration would begin by March 1, 1988 and candidates would be nominated and could begin to campaign by April 1988.[234] The elections would produce 2/3 of the members of the District Assemblies. The remaining 1/3 would be appointed officials and representatives of traditional authorities and organizations involved in the productive life of the district.

Without answering some outstanding questions regarding the functions and role of the DAs, the PNDC went ahead and held DA elections in a three phase process beginning December 6 1988 and ending February 28,1989. There was a 58.9% turn out of registered voters making it the highest turn out of the few polls that had been held in the past 20 years in Ghana.[235] One disconcerting fact remains that there was a high degree of apathy among the urban voters. In some urban areas only 20% of the registered voters turned out to vote, and in the area surrounding Akosomko, five electoral areas were without a candidate.12

[236] In view of the urban concentration of workers and national elites, this apathy must be a concern for the PNDC. One person commented that now Ghana has elected

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[234] West Africa, July 13, 1987. p.1344.

[235] West Africa, March 27 - April 2, 1989. p.510.

[236] West Africa. March 27 - April 2, 1989. p. 511.

representatives from the grass roots controlled at the national level by a constitutionally non accountable regime.[237] Rawlings may have anticipated this growing concern and has more recently stated that soon there would be both regional and national assemblies.[238]

The DAs are expected to make recommendations to the central government but their legislative powers are not spelled out.The PNDC as the revolutionary leadership continues to oversee the activities of the DAs.[239] There is also a question of how the DAs relate to the local chiefs. Under the 1971 Chieftaincy Act, the local chiefs have a recognized role in the evolution and implementation of customary laws. How the DAs relate to the chiefs and the evolution and changes within the customary laws remains unclear.[240]

Between January and March 1989 there was an inauguration of DAs in 110 districts in Ghana with an accompanying element of confusion among the 7,269 assembly members. There continued to be power struggles between elected and nominated members, presiding members and district

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[237] West Africa, September 14, 1988. p.1781.

[238] West Africa, March 27/April 2, 1989. p.511.

[239] West Africa, August 31, 1987. p.1477.

[240] West Africa, May 14-20, 1990. p.797.

assemblies. Although it is early to judge how the DAs will fulfill their mandate, there exists a high degree of skepticism about the ability of the DAs to perform their democratic and developmental roles. [241]

If the DAs actually function and are further expanded to include regional and national assemblies, there is potential for furthering the incorporation of society within the state realm. At the same time if these structures become merely puppet structures with no decision making power, then the PNDC may be perceived as continuing in an autocratic fashion and the potential for decentralization and increased legitimacy for the regime will go up in smoke. In reference to the early days of the Rawlings regime with the PNDC, Bienen states that Ghana's populist regime under Rawlings does not appear any different from many other African governments, populist based or not. Bienen states that the weakness of the current regime is the failure of the government to develop strong institutions that can discipline groups while at the same time framing and implementing policies.[242] Hopefully the development of DA's will be a move toward correcting this situation. Rawlings has and will continue to contend with problems that face all leaders of military regimes:

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[241] West Africa, May 7-13, 1990. p.757.

[242] Henry Bienen. p.358.

the issues of legitimacy and disengagement. These issues, as much as Rawlings tries to ignore them and downplay them, are like skeletons in the closet and they will continue to haunt him until he faces them through elections.

Rawlings and the PNDC are at a key juncture in Ghana's history. When Rawlings began the state of Ghana lacked any semblance of legitimacy with society. The state had no resources, little capacity or coercive power, and was corrupt through and through.

At that time, incorporation occurred only when and if there was a direct benefit to that particular social group. While the PNDC continues to be an autocratic form of government, Rawlings has been able to implement measures which have incorporated a plurality of groups within society. Economically, the country is not strong, but Rawlings has curbed the downward slide that he inherited and in the process has won favour from international funding agencies such as the IMF and the World Bank. The key policies have been the liberalization of foreign and internal trade, prices and investment coupled with a massive devaluation of the cedi and a reduction of the government's role in the economy. Improved financial management and tight fiscal and monetary policy have helped eliminate the budget deficit and eased inflation.[243] The Rawlings revolution has been

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[243] West Africa, January 8-14, 1990. p.9.

the rallying point of hope for the people. His original call was for Ghanaians to be rid of corruption and for those in authority to be accountable to the people. This call did spark hope in the people. The people are now calling for more accountability of and representation in the Rawlings regime. The pertinent question is to what degree Rawlings and the PNDC are willing to follow his original call as it applies to his regime?

Rawlings began with a state/society relationship in which the state stood apart from society. The interesting aspect is that this separateness was due to the initiative of society, not the state, striving for increased autonomy. Society had decided to disengage itself from the state which lacked capacity, controlled a dwindling supply of resources and lacked significant links with society. The state was increasingly separate from society. The autonomy that the state experienced was not because of its position of power or authority over society, quite the contrary. Its autonomy was the result of being ostracized by society as society moved further and further away from the state's sphere of influence.

The Ghanaian society had lost its faith in what the state could be. The state with its limited control over society neither gave direction to, nor was responsive to society.

The state was viewed as a body that had become totally self serving and as a result, society had disengaged itself from the state realm and set up its own contingency plans to ensure its survival.

Rawlings began by establishing better links with society, at various levels. Since he began at the head of a populist movement, he started with good grass root support. Through the establishment of the PDC's and the WDC's this support was strengthened. At the same time, the state improved its economic conditions thus increasing its resources base while it gained increasing control over the informal economy.

At present the state in Ghana is situated somewhere between the first and second categories as presented by Marenin. The first characteristic sees the state as standing separate from society in order to do what needs to be done. The second stresses the idea of domination. The state has the right and power to make decisions binding on society.[244] The state is able to stand separate from society and is beginning to look after not only the short term interests of capital but also the long term economic interests of the country. As peoples' faith in the state

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[244] Otwin Marenin, "The Managerial State," Z. Ergas, ed The African State in Transition, p. 62-63.

has returned, and there is an increasing sense of legitimacy, the areas or realms controlled by the state and its capacity have increased.

As the state's capacity has increased, so has its sense of domination over society, that is the power to make decisions which are binding upon society. The state organizations have improved and provide links and avenues into society and the recent District Assemblies at least provide the potential for these links to work in both directions not only top down. It is now to the issue of increased legitimacy that Rawlings and the PNDC need to direct attention. Increased legitimacy in the eyes of society will open opportunities for additional incorporation of society with the state. This initiative will come from society and the state will have less need to use coercion in the areas in which the state wishes to retain autonomy.

Chazan and Pellow point out that some have concluded that Ghana's state is beyond repair and is not an asset to the daily lives of the Ghanaians. They conclude that the state structures have functioned inefficiently, disrupting productive activities and have intruded unnecessarily into the lives of the citizens. These unnamed sources argue that society should totally disengage from the state, that

Ghanaians should oversee the dismantling of their state.[245]

This option is not a realistic one. While the existing state apparatus is far from perfect, it would be unwise to discard it until there is a better alternative toward which to turn. Dismantling the state leaves too many major questions unanswered. What structure or system would replace the state? This is crucial not only on the local level but on the international level where the state remains the basic political unit. Another question arises concerning how the various ethnic communities would relate. How would regional politics be redefined?

Not surprisingly, Rawlings is not moving in the direction of dismantling the state apparatus. Instead he continues to say that the PNDC is committed to developing a political apparatus that is indigenous to the Ghanaian people. Whether he and the PNDC have responded radically enough and quickly enough needs to be determined by the people.

It still remains to be seen whether the legitimacy of the government will bear the test of democratization. The salient question focuses on the provisional nature of the PNDC. Rawlings has stated that a revolution was necessary, that institutions needed to be reworked and new institutions developed that were inherent to Ghana before

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[245] D. Pellow and N. Chazan, p.208.

there could be a return to a democratic civilian government. Rawlings said that the form of democracy which Ghana would arrive at would be its own and not some alien form. Six years ago Rawlings was asked how long the provisional would remain. His reply was the PNDC was engaged in working out the democratic process which would be meaningful in the cultural and historical context of Ghana. [246] It still remains unclear what the necessary structures are, who decides what they are to be and when they are to be implemented. Hopefully the establishment of DAs and similar structures are moves in this direction. There is no question that Ghana under Rawlings' leadership has moved to a greater degree of incorporation of society with the state. The question is, when will the public get a chance to either reject or give legitimacy to the current PNDC and Rawlings? More recently, Rawlings stated that the National Commission for Democracy (NCD) would be the intermediary as the country creates various means for the population to express their views on how Ghana will move forward toward a sustainable democracy. Other changes mentioned by Rawlings included the convening of a consultative assembly to discuss the content of the next democratic constitution, the legal drafting of the new democratic constitution which will go side-by-side with the deliberations and the voters' register will be reopened as

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[246] West Africa, December, 1984. p.2634.

part of our preparations toward the holding of national elections. When asked about the schedule for these actions, Rawlings resisted being pressured into a rigid timetable and remained fairly vague.[247]

As a decade in power comes closer, the public may sarcastically wish to change the "provisional" in PNDC to "permanent"; a move that Rawlings must know to be detrimental as it would bring back memories of the past which he has worked so hard to correct.

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[247] M. Novicki, "Flt. Lt. Jerry Rawlings: Constructing a New Constitutional Order," Africa Report, (May-June 1991), p.35.

CHAPTER 5

TANZANIA

i> GENERAL BACKGROUND:

This section will focus on Tanzania and the state society
relationship both prior to and after independence.
Tanganyika was a colonial property of both the Germans and
the British. The German colonial period began in 1888 when
the Germans gained full economic and political jurisdiction
over the colony. By the time of the German defeat in World
War 1, the British had come to occupy most of German East
Africa and by 1920, they renamed the territory Tanganyika.
In 1922 the colonial organization of Tanganyika was made
legitimate by the League of Nations and Tanganyika was
consigned to the British empire. Following World War 2
Tanganyika became a trust territory of Britain under the
United Nations. The expectation was that Tanganyika would
move toward self government and independence. Independence
was granted, but not until December 9, 1961. [248]

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[248] Rodger, Yeager. _Tanzania An African Experiment_, (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1982), p.9-20.

Tanzania, although a small country in Eastern Africa, has been the object of much attention since it gained independence on December 9, 1961. The Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), its leader Julius Nyerere, and the proclaimed goals of self reliance and an African style socialism have been the cause of this attention.

This chapter has four components beginning with an historical perspective focusing on the state society relations that existed during colonial rule and the legacy that was bequeathed to the newly independent country. This will be followed by an analysis of the changes, if any, Nyerere and TANU brought about following independence. Thirdly, there will be an examination of the state society relations from the Arusha Declaration until the time Nyerere stepped down as President. The final section will speculate about the future of state society relations once Nyerere has departed from the political arena.

As we begin looking at state society relations in Tanzania it would be good to keep in mind certain pertinent facts about the country. Because there is not a predominant ethnic group in Tanzania, this could mistakenly be interpreted as a sign that the country has a homogeneous culture. In fact, although no one group is predominant, the

society is composed of 124 various ethnic traditions. [249]
Even the largest group, the Sukuma, who live south of Lake
Victoria, accounts for only 13% of the population. No other
group accounts for more than 5% of the population. The
fifteen largest ethnic groups account for only half of the
total population. This makes coopting by the ruling elite
unnecessary; as any opposition is divided, and difficult to
accomplish if a large number of groups are needed to form
a coalition. While ethnic fragmentation may be a dividing
factor, the common language of Swahili acts as a unifying
factor among the various groups. This language originates
from the African continent and is spoken by the ordinary
man and is therefore not associated with any elite group as
is the case with English. [250]

It should also be remembered that until the Villagization
Program in the 1970's, the vast majority of the population
lived in scattered homesteads not in villages. Tanzania is
a poor country and although 90% of the population make a
living at least partially from agriculture, only 35% of the
land is well suited to food and cash crop production using
low input subsistence methods. A key factor that
contributes to the vulnerability of the agricultural
producer is the divergent rainfall that Tanzania receives.

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[249] Louise Fortmann. p.2.

[250] Goran Hyden. Political Development in Rural Tanzania (Lund:
Scandinavian University Books, 1968), p.41.

Except in the highlands, rain is usually excessively abundant or insufficient. Two thirds of Tanzania is typically too dry or too wet to permit high food crop yields.[251]

As a result of these and other characteristics, Tanzanian society has and continues to be under stress. The rate of population growth is estimated to be between 3.3 and 3.8% and this increase strains the capacity of Tanzania's fragile physical environment.[252] Economically, Tanzania has yet to achieve a diversified economy and according to Yeager, in the early 1980's Tanzania was worse off economically than at any time since Independence. Inflation and fluctuating commodity prices have left Tanzania in an unfavorable international economic position thus bringing increasing pressure to bear on the government as they attempt to develop Tanzania.[253]

Following World War 1, Tanganyika was transferred from Germany to Britain under a League of Nations mandate. The methods employed by the British in administering Tanganyika were similar to the methods used in their other colonies; indirect rule. In the case of Tanganyika, the colonial administration was constrained only by instructions from

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[251] R. Yeager, p. 26-27.

[252] R. Yeager, p.31.

[253] R. Yeager, p. 25-40.

the Colonial office in Britain and the terms of the
mandate. During the British colonial period, particularly
between 1945 and 1961, two important events occurred that
are relevant to the topic at hand. The colonial government,
under international pressure, implemented changes to the
governmental apparatus. These changes involved the
introduction of Africans into positions in the
administration and the organization of elections and the
commencement of discussions with African leaders regarding
policy issues. The second important event was the emergence
of a nationalistic movement; Tanganyika African National
Union or TANU.[254] Prior to this time the state/society
relations followed the authoritarian model discussed in
Chapter 2.

The increased Africanization of the colonial apparatus -
even if a token act, was a common occurrence among the
African colonies. While Africanization was important, in
the case of Tanzania, more significant was the emergence of
TANU. TANU descended from the Tanganyika African
Association or TAA which had been active since 1929 and
emerged as a political interest group in 1947. On July 7,
1954 TAA was formally transformed into TANU which became
the first African political organization in Tanganyika.

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[254] Raymond Hopkins. Political Roles in a New State: Tanzania's
First Decade, (London: Yale University Press, 1971), p.17.

While the aims of TANU were several, the goal of making Tanganyika self governing and independent was paramount.[255]

The colonial period for Tanganyika was also characterized by the imposition of a centralized, hierarchial administrative structure. This structure had two purposes, to keep the physical peace in the colony and to extract surplus. [256] The local governor had immense power. While he was subordinate to the colonial office, he did have full authority over the entire executive and legislative apparatus of the colonial government.[257] There were moves to make the colonial rule indirect and to utilize the local traditional leaders in a system of indirect rule, but in reality this was a token act with a facade of sharing power and encouraging participation. Within the structure, the colonial office was paramount. The provincial and district commissioners instructed the native authorities concerning what regulations to design and enforced their implementation. Native authorities simply rubber stamped decisions and policies made by the colonial office. People who questioned could and would be replaced.[258]

Following World War 2 the focus of colonial policies in

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[255] Raymond Hopkins, p.18-19.

[256] Louise Fortmann, p.22.

[257] Raymond Hopkins, p.17.

[258] Louise Fortmann, p.16.

Tanganyika moved in the direction of agricultural production to meet the demands of the metropole. In fairness, even if Britain had been interested in developing Tanganyika, they were not in a strong position to do so. The depression and World War 2 had drained their resources and they were operating under an uncertain mandate regarding their position in the country. Following World War 2 Tanganyika's legal status changed from being a British territory mandated under the defunct League of Nations to a trust territory under the new United Nations. Under the new arrangement Tanganyika was expected to progress toward internal self government and eventual independence.[259] It is therefore not surprising that there was less than a keen interest in investing or developing Tanganyika.[260]

The British colonial bureaucracy was the government in the eyes of the people. The system was represented by a top down authoritarian method of government. According to Fortmann, the forms of government and administration imposed by the colonists neither allowed the old forms of traditional participation to work in the context of the new leaders, nor did they allow the development of new forms. The colonial structure served to maintain a demobilized

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[259] R. Yeager, p.16.

[260] Raymond Hopkins, p.17.

peasantry and taught the lesson that government was a tool of the centre, not the people.[261]

How did society respond? Because the peasants who made up the majority of the population were so scattered, the most common response to an undesirable program was simply to withdraw from the system or ignore its implementation. These forms of response and/or opposition were facilitated not only by the living patterns of the people but also by the limited government that the British utilized. While the governing apparatus enjoyed a hegemonic position of power, the apparatus was small, focusing on peace keeping and extractive functions.[262] This small apparatus gave the general population some freedom concerning compliance with government programs because the governing body lacked the coercive capacity over such a scattered population. In Tanganyika there was a ratio of one civil servant to 761 Tanganyikans. This was in comparison to the ratio of 1:210 people in Britain. This "undergoverning" gave discretionary powers to the population regarding compliance with the wishes of the centre.[263]

One example of society's capacity for passive compliance was seen with their response to the program between 1946-1953 which required farmers to plant certain crops and care

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[261] Louise Fortmann, p.22.

[262] Louise Fortmann, p.22

[263] Louise Fortmann, p.17.

for them in a prescribed manner. The farmers didn't endorse the program and didn't want to implement it. They resisted by simply not participating and as a result, one more program was abandoned.[264]

ii> TANU AND NYERERE:

The one organization that continued to grow in numbers and popularity was TANU. In its infancy, TANU gained in size and significance as its local branches supported and championed local grievances. This resulted in good grass roots knowledge of and support for the organization. The increasing membership and support gave TANU the base from which it grew into a broadly based national movement by the time of independence. [265] Another tactic used by TANU to increase support was to set itself up against the existing authority. This allowed TANU to fill the vacuum which had been created by the alienation of the people from the colonial administration and chiefs.[266] One of the benefits that TANU inherited from TAA was a country wide institution and movement which was nondiscriminatory with respect to African membership. However, it should be remembered that

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[264] A. Kronemer and J.H. Weaver, "Tanzania and African Socialism," World Development. Vol.9, No.9&10 (1981), p.841.

[265] Raymond Hopkins, p.21-23.

[266] I.N. Kimambo and A.J. Temu eds. A History of Tanzania, (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1969), p.207.

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TAA , the basis of TANU, was originally formed by a group of well educated civil servants concerned with the promotion of their own self improvement relative to the local Asians and Europeans.[267] While TANU was making inroads with the ordinary man, its historical base was with an elite section of society.

Colin Leys suggests that TANU's ability to politically organize the public and their move toward independence may have been accomplished too easily. Independence was gained with surprising ease and speed without a protracted period of agitation or violence. TANU faced little opposition and gained increasing support. TANU didn't suffer financially or socially. Permits were granted and there was no pressure exerted by the traditional leaders within society. People fully expected that Independence would be given to TANU. As Independence approached an anticlimactic reality set in. When the poor economic state of affairs of Tanzania had to be faced the inherent weaknesses of TANU became apparent. TANU had been a highly centralized primarily bureaucratic organization with its democratic constitution partly inoperative.[268]

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[267] Howard Stein, "Theories of the State in Tanzania: A Critical Assessment," Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol.23, No.1 (1985), p.116.

[268] Colin Leys," Tanganyika: The Realities of Independence," International Journal, Vol.17, No.3 (1961-62), p.256-258.

As Tanganyika moved toward independence the population was conditioned to a state society relationship in which the government was in charge but society could passively resist those programs they did not deem beneficial. The government was foreign, serving foreign interests. The acquisition of independence offered an opportunity for the state to change this relationship.

On December 9th 1961, Tanzania peacefully gained independence. Independence meant that TANU and its leader, Nyerere would have to change their focus from the struggle for independence and concentrate on a continued unified Tanzania and its development.[269] Nyerere's Tanzanian socialism was intended to provide a moral justification for economic equality and democratic participation. These two elements were considered essential and were expected to occur simultaneously.[270]

While Nyerere wanted to ensure unity and begin development of the country, several questions needed to be answered. One crucial question posited that assuming the people of Tanzania could provide a cohesive driving force geared toward development, would the limited resources available be utilized to provide a general improvement in the life of the masses - or would they be focused on the enrichment of

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[269] For information concerning the unification of Tanganyika and Zanzibar and the formation of the United Republic of Tanzania, see R. Yeager, Tanzania: An African Experiment, p.21-24.

[270] R. Yeager, p.46.

a particular sector or class within the nation?[271] Nyerere
wanted to see the whole of the country improve through a
Tanzanian style of socialism. As a result, Nyerere had to
devise a plan that would give rein to peoples' desire to
take control and make changes to their country, while at
the same time ensuring that such energies were in accord
with the national plans.[272]   The Tanzanian form of
socialism focused on an attitude of mind. The emphasis was
on "ujamaa" and the Tanzanians' past egalitarianism. Ujamaa
was understood to mean "Familyhood" and in the socialist
context meant socialism and self-reliance.[273]

Nyerere believed that the people could be induced to work
harder through education and the provision of better social
services. Ujamaa would involve changes but there would be
no revolution.

Nyerere's socialism was pragmatic and followed three
principles rather than a single coherent doctrine. National
life was to be organized upon the basis of promoting and
encouraging communal and cooperative activity for the
general and individual benefit. Second, private investment
was encouraged but economic activity must be promoted,
financed and owned by the government or other public
bodies. Third, there was a foreign policy approach of non

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[271] I.N. Kimambo and A.J. Temu, p.243.

[272] I.N. Kimambo and A.J. Temu, p.246.

[273] R. Yeager, p.59.

alignment and support for the United Nations.[274]

TANU was regarded as the most likely agent to carry out the goals of unity and development. Could TANU and the state apparatus continue the drive and vision for Tanzania? During the march toward independence, TANU became the vanguard of the nationalist movement and had gained positive experience as an assimilating body at the local level. Unfortunately, according to Fanon, the party that was so dynamic in leading the struggle for independence became lethargic once that goal was attained. The dynamic of the party was lost as its primary concern turned to administration. [275]

At the time of independence there co-existed two sets of institutions. The first set consisted of agencies of the colonial government and the second consisted of nationalist bodies such as TANU, trade unions, co-operatives, and women's groups, all having grassroots support and origins from the citizens.

One of the first steps taken by the state following independence was the Africanization of the government posts which had been inherited from the colonial state. Coupled

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[274] W. Tordoff and A. Mazrui "The Left and the Super Left in Tanzania," <u>Journal of Modern African Studies</u>, Vol.10, No.3 (1972), p.431.

[275] Michaela Freyhold, "The post Colonial State and Its Tanzanian Version," <u>Review of African Political Economy</u>, No.8 (1977), p.86.

with this was the understood need to insert party (TANU) officials into the bureaucracy in order to increase the representative quality of government and impart some degree of accountability.[276] The creation of political posts caused a certain amount of tension within the civil service. There were two groups of people – the party and the civil service. The government employees tended to be better educated Tanzanians and they tended to look down on the sometimes less competent party people. [277] Soon after independence, many of the professional officials within TANU left the party to enter the government and administration in response to the sudden demand for politically reliable people.[278] Once the party opened up its membership to government officials, party and government officials circulated interchangeably. For all intents and purposes the terms, party and government could no longer be separated as TANU became increasingly present and prevalent at all levels of government. [279] TANU consolidated its position further in 1963 as leadership groups such as chieftainships were abolished and in 1965, the Constitution made TANU the only political party in Tanzania. The Constitution barred any other group from

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[276] Louise Fortmann, p.23.

[277] Louise Fortmann, p.23.

[278] C. Leys, Tanganyika: The Realities of Independence, p.259.

[279] Louise Fortmann, p.26.

joining the political arena.[280] At the same time, it should also be mentioned that power was also being concentrated in the position of President of the Republic, because the same person was also the President of the party. So, within a few years of gaining independence, government power and control had been consolidated in the party TANU and its leader Nyerere.

Nyerere came from humble roots in a Tanzanian village. Born in 1922, he was fortunate to be able to attend school and eventually entered university in Uganda and later in 1949, went to Edinburgh, where he received his Master of Arts. Nyerere made his decision to enter politics in 1955. In 1958 he was elected as a full member to the Legislative Assembly and in 1975 was reelected for a fourth term as President of the Republic.

Nyerere wanted to develop a style of socialism that was inherent and/or suited to Tanzania but he was faced with a very perplexing situation. How was he to lead the country toward a socialist reconstruction of its institutions when there were few socialist in his country and society was bereft of a profound class consciousness among the peasantry or the urban working class. A further complication would arise regarding the socialist principle of state ownership because of the fact that 90% of the

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[280] Michaela Freyhold, "The Post Colonial State and its Tanzanian Version," p.216.

population were small scale farmers.

This situation did not dampen Nyerere's ardour. Nyerere defined a style of socialism that was more a reflection of a state of mind. He focused on the issues of equality, cooperation and freedom and argued that the Tanzanian society would become socialist to the extent that this attitude of mind or ujamaa, became prevalent and influential.[281]

This was the beginning of "the gap" and/or contradiction in Tanzanian politics. What Nyerere spoke and expounded and what actually developed were often different and contradictory. One such example was Nyerere's desire for a socialist state with nonaligned foreign policies. But at independence and for some time after, Tanzania was operating with a basically western, that is capitalistic, economic and development orientation coupled with a heavy reliance on private foreign investment and aid.[282]

Given Nyerere's desire for a Tanzanian socialism and his Fabian background, it is not surprising that the state apparatus began to increase in size and play an increasing

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[281] Cranford Pratt, "Nyerere on the Transition to Socialism in Tanzania," The African Review. Vol.5 No.1 (1975), p.64.

[282] Goran Hyden and C.Leys. "Elections and Politics in Single Party Systems: The Case of Kenya and Tanzania," British Journal of Political Science, Vol.2, Part 4 (1972), p. 407.

role following independence. As Coulson points out, Nyerere saw the state as a unifying factor, as the provider of good things and as the protector of society. In short, a very paternalistic orientation. Coulson states that this viewpoint led to a very authoritarian approach in which the state knew what was right and involved itself in social engineering and management, rather than a true participatory democratic system.[283]

Had state society relations changed significantly since independence? Several writers argue that they had not and that Tanzania simply moved from a colonial position to a neocolonial position. Although Tanzanians replaced many of the British in government positions, the role of the state and its relationship with society functioned much the same as it did during colonial times. Society remained outside the control of the state for the same reasons as during pre-independence and the people continued to resort to passive resistance when they didn't approve of state actions. The state, for its part, did little to incorporate society as those in power were concerned more with the consolidation of power and the expansion of the state apparatus.[284]

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[283] A. Coulson. Tanzania, A Political Economy, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), p.329.

[284] Howard Stein, "Theories of the State in Tanzania: A Critical Assessment," p.123.

According to Stein, the people who formed the government of independent Tanzania were heavily tied to the former colonial system and were really a bureaucratic ruling class whose goals were to maintain the status quo of the state system and/or support programs that enhanced their position as a ruling class.[285] Stein suggests that the use of socialist slogans was a rallying point, a way of legitimizing the activities of the ruling class rather than relying on the alternative of coercive force to gain legitimacy.[286] Shivji states that independence simply meant that Tanzania moved from being a despotic colonial state to being an authoritarian neocolonial state.[287] With TANU as the only political party, the ruling class, consisting of ministers, principal secretaries and general managers of large parastatals, could consolidate their power further. With any organized opposition stifled, the ruling class was in a hegemonic position regarding both the economic and political life of the country.[288]

According to M. von Freyhold, the "nizers", the people who

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[285] Howard Stein, "Theories of the State in Tanzania: A Critical Assessment," p.117.

[286] Howard Stein, p.121.

[287] I. Shivji, ed. <u>The State and the Working People in Tanzania</u>, (London: Heinemann, 1979), p.2.

[288] I. Shivji. ed. <u>The State and the Working People in Tanzania</u>. p. 37.

took over the positions in government vacated by the British, had three priorities. The first priority was to retain power, the second, to consolidate their position and the third, to maintain the inherited state apparatus.[289] This appears to be in contradiction to the goals Nyerere was expounding. Independence was meant to be more than the simple exchange of British hats for Tanzanian hats in the state apparatus. Unfortunately many who came to occupy the government posts, such as the nizers, did not desire to see real change. This was the system they were trained for and were familiar with, and they had a vested interest in the continuation of the inherited apparatus.

Nyerere was talking of a need for strong democracy and participation by the people while his government was moving toward consolidation of power and focusing on control. In some instances colonial laws were simply replaced with new laws that continued and reinforced the colonial relationship between state and society. An example of such a situation was the Preventive Detention Act of 1962. This act gave such wide ranging powers to the President that, anyone could be detained simply at the President's wish. [290] While the political slogans and rhetoric spoke of

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[289] J. Saul, "The State in Post Colonial Societies: Tanzania," Politics and the State in the Third World, ed. H. Goulbourne.(Hong Kong: Macmillan Press, 1979), p.84.

[290] A. Coulson, Tanzania, A Political Economy. p.220.

democracy and participation, power and control were systematically being consolidated into the hands of a relatively small number of people. For example, President Nyerere was not only the head of the country and head of the only political party, but also had an extensive powers of patronage. He was able to appoint civil servants right down to the assistant director level, the general managers of parastatals, judges, ambassadors, deans of universities and others.

Tanzania found itself with a similar song, the words had changed but the tune remained the same. While the slogans were different, the state apparatus as a system, continued to relate to society much as it had prior to independence. In fact the state apparatus grew following independence and moved to consolidate its position and control over society. The state moved into a position where it developed policies and dictated from the centre what was to occur.

The government did make some efforts to interact with society at the local level. In 1962 Prime Minister Kawawa established the Village Development Committees (VDC's) with the goal of providing a vehicle for the two way flow of information between the people and government.[291] The

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[291] J.R. Finucane, Rural Development and Bureaucracy in Tanzania: The Case of the Mwanza Region. (New York: African Publishing Co. 1974), p.90.

centre suffered in its inability to penetrate the periphery. The dissemination of government information suffered from technological, physical and organizational problems.[292] The establishment of VDC's was an attempt to improve the links between the centre and the periphery.

The VDC's were originally organized by the peasants themselves with the goal of tackling their own local issues. In the early years there was a high degree of participation in self help projects that were service oriented such as the construction of schools and hospitals but less enthusiasm in projects that the government saw as beneficial in the long term, such as road construction. The government progressively attempted to move the VDC's to take up projects that were in line with the national programs. At the same time there was increased pressure on programs as funding for self help projects decreased.

With increased government interference and reduced funds the interest and activity of the VDC's declined.[293] The VDC's were put under increasing bureaucratic control and thus became instruments of the state and ended in 1969. The VDC's are a good example of societal participation being swallowed up by government in its thirst for control.

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[292] Goran Hyden, Political Development in Rural Tanzania. p.51.

[293] J.R. Finucane, p.70.

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Democratic participation in decision making and initiative by the people was reduced to the formulation of aid requests for services that the government might be inclined to provide.[294] Society's role was to implement the programs that the centre decided were beneficial.

An example of the state consolidating its position and stifling opposition was manifested early after independence in the state's handling of workers' organizations. The government restricted the workers' freedom to negotiate, restricting or imprisoning their leaders and dismissing large portions of their elected leaders. As soon as workers showed interest in going beyond consultation and participation onto decision making and control of the enterprise the state interfered in favour of the owners and managers.[295] This is not surprising because those in power within the government had developed close ties with those in business and did not wish to jeopardize that relationship.

According to Pratt, Nyerere's goal was the promotion of a greater economic equality among the people. At the time of independence, there existed a very large gap between the poor and the well to do which Nyerere wanted to bridge. The

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[294] M.Freyhold, The Post Colonial State and its Tanzanian Version, p.82.

[295] A. Coulson, Tanzania, A Political Economy, p. 319.

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difference between what a civil servant or businessman received in income and that of a semiskilled worker was twenty fold.[296] Nyerere's second goal was the enhancement of democratic participation. Nyerere understood or accepted that in the process of transition, the power of the state would increase and that this could lead to an increased possibility of oppression of the many by the ruling class. He saw as a counter to this propensity, a strong democratic process where the people would retain a say. To Nyerere, his form of socialism included a strong democracy. [297]

Unfortunately, in the first five years following independence, those in power enhanced their own positions while the country made few moves toward Nyerere's goal of socialism and the state society relations differed little from what they had been during colonial times.

The increase in capitalist, acquisitive and individualistic behaviour among the ruling people, that Nyerere feared, did occur. This had a noticeable effect on the economy and could be seen by a marked growth in the modern sector of the economy, while the far larger agricultural sector that involved the vast majority of the population, remained flat. Between 1960 and 1966 manufacturing grew at a rate of

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[296] I. Shivji, The State and the Working People in Tanzania. p.10.

[297] C. Pratt, "Nyerere on the Transition to Socialism in Tanzania," The African Review, Vol.5, No.1 (1975), p.39.

16% while agriculture grew at only 4.3%. [298]

In spite of the increased size and scope of the state apparatus, it failed to capture the collective will of the people. The people remained apart from the state, passive recipients of programs from the government and demanders of goodies from the centre. According to Hyden, the general public did not exhibit strong opposition or dissatisfaction with the socialist goals presented by Nyerere. Opposition, when it came, was directed not at the values or ideology of the system, but at officials and individuals who did not practice the ideology expounded by the government. [299]

Coulson states that the country became much more conscious of authority and this resulted in an increased insecurity in the general population. People responded by being more cautious about what they said in public, and performed the minimum required to stay on the right side of authority. The new social order stressed innovation imposed from above. Initiative came from the centre, with little incentive for the people to innovate for themselves. [300] While Nyerere talked of people's participation, the opposite was actively occurring.

Nyerere and his staff must have realized that five years

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[298] I.N. Kimambo and A.J. Temu, p.254.

[299] Goran Hyden, _Political Development in Rural Tanzania_, p.45.

[300] A. Coulson, _Tanzania, A Political Economy_. p.223.

had gone by since independence, and economic life was not improving in Tanzania nor was society naturally moving toward ujamaa. In fact, the country was experiencing increased elitism, a continued dependence on foreign economic assistance and an emerging class distinction between the urban well off and the rural poor.[301]

Nyerere responded by calling upon TANU and the country as a whole to move away from their capitalistic and elitist ways. On February 5, 1967, Nyerere presented the Arusha Declaration, in which he called for the country to move toward self reliance and return to the communal ideals of pre-colonial Africa.[302] The basis for the Arusha Declaration was a belief that Nyerere had long affirmed, that traditional African values were still a reality for most Tanzanians.[303]

The Arusha Declaration emphasized small scale programs. It was felt that the people themselves had to be responsible for their own development rather than leaving the government to take all of the initiative.

It was decided that the control of major funds and

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[301] R. Yeager. Tanzania - An African Experiment. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), p.59.

[302] A. Kronemer and J.H. Weaver, "Tanzania and African Socialism," p.842.

[303] C. Pratt, "Nyerere on the Transition to Socialism in Tanzania," p.65.

resources should be retained by Tanzanian owned
organizations. As a result, banks, manufacturing outfits
and most large commercial operations were put under
complete or partial state ownership [304] Shivji makes the
observation that following independence the state played an
important role in the economy primarily as a regulatory
body. Following the Arusha Declaration, the state and its
institutions continued their former role, plus they became
predominant actors in the economy.[305] The Leadership Code
of 1967 attempted to break the link between the public
office holders and the petty capitalists and to prevent the
formation and consolidation of this elite. [306] Above all
the Arusha declaration gave Nyerere a chance to contain the
influence of those who by nature of their private wealth
had been able to nurse what Goran Hyden refers to as "the
economy of affection."[307] According to Hyden:

"The economy of affection provided opportunities for social
action outside of the framework of state control.These ties
were personalized and very difficult to change, short of an
effective transformation of the economic structures that
supported them."[308]

The economy of affection functions in such a way that the

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[304] I. Kimambo and A.J. Temu, p.254-256.

[305] Harry Goulbourne, Politics and State in the Third World.
p.79.

[306] Henry Goulbourne, p.85.

[307] Goran Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania, (London: Heinemann,
1980), p.97.

[308] Goran Hyden, p.28.

power one claimed was clearly linked to the number of followers that an individual had. The Arusha Declaration weakened the effect of the economy of affection as the focus of power shifted from the number of followers one claimed to have to the degree of loyalty one exhibited to the new ideology and its chief architect, Nyerere.[309]

While the goals of the Arusha Declaration may be honorable, one must ask whether it actually achieved the goal of greater incorporation of society in the state and greater participation in decision making. To use Hyden's phrase, the peasantry remained uncaptured. The general population was not given a vital role to play. Even the national assembly had become a puppet to the National Executive Committee of TANU. It was in the NEC that policy and programs were formulated, the national assembly simply rubber stamped programs into legislation. The peasants were left with a paucity of channels for involvement and as a result they remained disengaged and estranged from the state.

One program demonstrating this disengagement was the Transformation scheme. This was an agricultural program based on recommendations from the World Bank following a mission to Tanzania in 1960 to make recommendations regarding Tanzania's development efforts. The goal of the

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[309] Henry Goulbourne, p.85.

program was to increase agricultural production using machinery and hired labour. Two things resulted from this scheme. First it marked the first time that the post colonial government began to take a significant role in the direction of the lives of the peasants. Unfortunately, due to a variety of reasons, but primarily because of poor planning, the plan failed and the peasants abandoned it in droves. Secondly, the plan challenged the autonomy of the peasants; the usurping of peasant autonomy created resentment and resistance to the new farming methods being offered.[310] Kronemer and Weaver make the point that the Transformation Scheme involved the use of too much machinery. For small scale farmers, this was foreign to their traditional methods. The other key factor was the imposition of the government plans into the domain of the farmer. The government was setting the size of the land and how it was to be managed. This imposition generated resentment among the farmers.[311]

TANU and Nyerere ignored basic steps to implementing change. Those who were to implement the changes and those who were directly affected were not involved in the decision making process. The farmers were seldom consulted about programs that would be implemented by and directly

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[310] A. Kronemer and J.H. Weaver, p.841.

[311] A. Kronemer and J.H. Weaver, p.841.

affect them. As a result it was difficult not only for the peasants to understand why the changes were necessary but, they were also not convinced of the benefits. At the same time the farmers were the ones taking all of the risks involved in the changes. Fortmann makes reference to Nyerere's claim that Tanzania must run while others walk. The implication was that Tanzania had to move quickly on their path toward development. This emphasis was translated by the bureaucracy as a need to show quick results. This focus on quick results is incompatible with the slow uncertain approach implied by participation. Fortmann is quite critical of this bureaucratic mode of government. Rather than promoting participation it values quick results that fit into reports. Participation that is imposed on a system which emphasises immediate instrumentality is of little apparent use.[312]

Another concern of Fortmann's is what she refers to as government by operation. This was similar to the approach used by the British. Contrary to Nyerere's goal of small scale projects at the local level, government by operation is a preoccupation with large scale approaches to problem solving. This is usually based more on an appeal to mass enthusiasm and ideological committment than on technical considerations. This method of governing has three stages. 1> a problem is identified 2> a general solution is

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[312] Louise Fortmann, p.31.

designed without details of implementation. 3> the solution

is announced as government policy, effective immediately,

often with a target date for completion.[313]

As Fortmann points out, this approach does tend to focus

attention and energy on a particular problem, but this

approach to be effective, needs to have the cooperation of

all the people involved. The operations approach tends to

focus not only attention but also resources, and as a

result, funds may be directed away from other useful

programs and issues.[314]

According to Hyden, policy making based on "run while

others walk" operated in a context where public

expectations tended to exceed what could actually be

achieved.[315] This situation of public expectation exceeding

state capacity, provides fertile ground for the beginning

of disengagement of society from the state. As society

realizes the limited capacity of the state to meet their

needs and/or expectations, they may turn to other

structures. In the case of Tanzania, this operations

approach caused great confusion as one operation was

abandoned to begin another without an overall understanding

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[313] Louise Fortmann, p.31.

[314] Louise Fortmann, p.32.

[315] J.A. McCain, "Ideology in Africa: Some Perceptual Types," African Studies Review, Vol.18, No.1 (1975), p.152-153.

by those involved as to where the operations were
ultimately headed in terms of both the management and
development of the country.

Following the Arusha Declaration, the first major operation
was the Ujamaa Village Program. In 1967, Nyerere issued a
policy paper entitled, "Socialism and Rural Development" in
which he called for the establishment of ujamaa or
cooperative villages. Within these villages people were
expected to live and work together for the good of all.[316]
Everything within the government and party machinery was
done to encourage the establishment of these villages.
After six years of encouragement and several large scale
operations, only 15% of the total population was living in
a ujamaa village. In 1973, the total number of villages was
5,556 with a population of two million.[317]

Attempts to get the peasants, living on their separate and
scattered farms to move to villages were not new to the
people. Both prior to and following independence efforts
toward this goal were part of government policy. The reason
for the focus on villages was the belief on the part of the
state apparatus that by living in villages, peasants could

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[316] B.U. Mwansasu and C. Pratt, eds. Toward Socialism in
Tanzania. (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1979), p.125.

[317] Mwansasu and Pratt, p.126.

benefit from economies of scale, and from easier delivery of government services, as well as from greater involvement in the national economy and polity. From the government's perspective, it would be easier to control and influence organized villages rather than scattered land holdings.[318] When it became clear that the plan was not succeeding according to government wishes, the government decided to take more stringent action. In 1973, Nyerere ordered that all villages were to become ujamaa by 1976 and that all peasants were to move to one of these villages. Prior to 1970, the idea was based on voluntary compliance. From 1970-1973, the government adopted a policy of inducement. This approach involved the use of promises of financial and technical assistance as rewards for moving to a village. After 1973, the government's exhortations and inducements were supplemented by the use of force if necessary, to accomplish the process of villagization.[319]

In 1970, less than 5% of the population was living in villages. By 1974, following the inducements and persuasion campaign, close to 14% of the population was in settlements. After the first full year of compulsory villagization, it was estimated that 60% of the population was in villages. At the conclusion of the program in 1977, an estimated 85% of all rural dwellers, more than 13

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[318] Mwansasu and Pratt, p.128.

[319] R. Yeager, <u>Tanzania: An African Experiment</u>, p.64.

million people were living in villages.[320]

If putting people in villages was the sole goal of "Operation Tanzania", then it was a roaring success, but it came at a cost. Where was the democratic process that Nyerere talked about? Where was the input and participation of the people in Operation Tanzania?

As expressed earlier, an operations approach to governing has certain weaknesses and Operation Tanzania was no exception.

One of the problems involved the selection of village sites. For whatever reason, regions least able to provide for their residents were the ones most extensively "villagized".[321] Joel Samoff states that:

"The most affluent areas, producing the bulk of the export crops have few ujamaa villages and have successfully resisted other aspects of the rural socialist strategy."[322]

In some instances, villages were set up in the middle of nowhere without housing, good soil, and water. In other cases, people were moved away from, not closer to, existing hospitals and schools.

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[320] R. Yeager, p.64.

[321] R. Yeager, p.68.

[322] Joel Samoff, "The Bureaucracy and the Bourgeoisie: Decentralization and Class Structure in Tanzania," Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol.21, No.1 (1979), p.38.

The Villagization program failed to produce local self reliance and the desired democratic socialism. The "rural revolution" had been forced by those at the centre. According to Robert Chambers, much of the Ujamaa policy came from generalizations made from a few exceptional examples such as the situation at Ruyuma and Mbambara. These generalizations helped to mislead policy makers into a disastrous decade of trying to do what the rural poor did not want.[323]

The cost involved in Villagization became evident by 1978. Food production dropped drastically, hampering Nyerere's plan to be less dependent on foreign aid. The production of export crops fell from 403,000 tons in 1973 to only 305,000 tons in 1978.[324] In 1973 Tanzania had to import 25,000 tons of maize, between March 1974 and September 1975 the government bought $250 million worth of grain thus depleting their foreign currency reserves. Kronemer and Weaver point out that in 1980 the government had to import 200,000 tons of corn to avoid mass starvation in the country.[325]

The villagization program fell to the same fate as did

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[323] Robert Chambers, "The State and Rural Development:Ideology and An Agenda for the 1990's," Discussion Paper #269, IDS, (1989), p.13.

[324] A. Kronemer and J.H. Weaver, "Tanzania and African Socialism," p. 843.

[325] A. Kronemer and J.H. Weaver, p.840.

other operations. It was hurried in concept and those most affected were not oriented in a manner that brought them "on board" with the program. The lack of clarity surrounding the purpose and methods involved for villagization gave a great field for rumors. Rumors abounded that villagization was being used by the government as a means to collectivise family life as well as property, and that it would also result in the reintroduction of local taxes. There was no large scale effective program at the grass roots level with the purpose of educating the people as to the aims and principles of ujamaa. Hyden contends that the bureaucracy lacked the sensitivity that would attract peasants to join in the effort. His view is that ujamaa gave officials few opportunities to relate to the peasant in a constructive and positive manner. Almost without exception the officials turned to an authoritarian, managerial approach.[326] On the level of ideology, the ujamaa program convinced the political leadership only. This left the vast majority of the population with grave doubts about the soundness of the programs.[327]

Ujamaa also presented a situation of contradiction. On one

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[326] Goran Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania. p.106-123.

[327] H. Kjekshus, "The Tanzanian Villagization Policy: Implications, Lessons and Ecological Dimensions," Canadian Journal of African Studies, Vol.11, No.2 (1977), p.279.

hand Hyden points out, ujamaa is presented as providing an increase in agricultural production through large numbers engaged in hoe cultivation. This portrayal implied village authority. On the other hand, ujamaa was expected to achieve a revolutionary transformation of the countryside. This portrayal did not imply village autonomy, but instead a directed effort by the state. The peasants had little choice but to go along with the government policy if they wanted to avoid punishment. Where they were able to express their reluctance and opposition was in the use of their labour in agricultural production. Here they produced only what they considered desirable for their economy of affection. [328] Rather than taking time and coopting the people into the program, the hurried approach taken by the government with its poor planning, violence and inappropriate site selection, resulted in widespread resentment among the rural people.[329]

In fact, forced villagization was a blow to the autonomy of the peasant and served to pit the peasant against the state and foster disengagement rather than positively incorporating them into the state's plans.

Was the peasants' response simply not to comply? Did they

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[328] Goran Hyden, <u>Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania</u>, p.105.

[329] I. Shivji, <u>The State and the Working People in Tanzania</u>, p.119.

not speak out against the programs? Hyden states that the peasants were reluctant to use the voice option, not because they were prevented from doing so, but because they had a vested interest in not utilizing that option. It was better to force the bureaucrats to take all of the initiative. By refusing to take the initiative, or at least only in the areas that would benefit the local economy, the peasants in effect exercised their exit option vis a vis the political system at large. To the bureaucrats the peasants became deceitful and the bureaucrats were forced to go in pursuit of them. In short, the peasants remained uncaptured and unincorporated in the state planning, policies and programs.[330]

Voice and exit are options involved in the change process and are experienced in both the economic and political spheres. Voice and exit are responses by individuals and/or society to an unacceptable economic or political system or situation. Voice is any attempt to change rather than escape from an objectionable state of affairs. This is accomplished through various types of actions and protests including those that are meant to mobilize public opinion. Exit is the final act if change is not forthcoming or possible. Exit is the removal of oneself or group within society, from the physical area or sphere of influence of

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[330] Goran Hyden, <u>Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania</u>. p.148.

a particular situation, choice, or political system.[331] It is important to remember that members of society can utilize "voice" and remain incorporated within the state. If "exit" is the chosen option, then they are disengaged from the state.

A key component in the Tanzanian state society relationship was the apparent view taken by the government that it knew what was best for the people. This attitude did not encourage the bureaucrats to foster participation by the people in government programs and/or did it add dignity or respect to the people.This attitude was reflected in the role given to the party in the Second Five Year Development Plan.The role of the party was to lead the masses and the various institutions in the effort to safeguard national independence. The duty of the socialist party was to guide all activities of the masses. The time had come for the party to take the reins and lead all the people's activities. [332]

The top down approach adopted by the Tanzanian government goes contrary to participatory systems expounded by people

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[331] For further discussion on Exit see Albert Hirschman, Exit Voice and Loyalty, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970)) p. 21-54.

[332] Clause #2 of the PARTY in the Government's 2nd Five Year Development Plan.

like Robert Chambers.[333] In a participatory system, those who will be affected by the changes and will be necessary to implement the changes are involved in the process of change from start to finish. This approach is very much bottom up and listens to the needs and desires of the people and together the changes are planned and implemented. While this method is far more time consuming, the results are significant. Unfortunately, the Tanzanian officials assumed they knew what was needed and as Hyden comments, they based their actions on the pretense that the administration had leverage over the peasants to bring about development. If this leverage existed they soon found out that it was not adequate to implement the changes.[334]

Another program that occurred during the 1970's which exemplifies the centre's desire for control was the program to restructure existing rural institutions. One of the first actions taken by authoritarian regimes to establish power and control is to manipulate the defense organizations of the working class. These include trade unions, cooperatives and worker associations.[335] While Nyerere didn't annihilate or destroy the workers'

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[333] The concept of Participatory Rural Appraisal and Rapid Rural Appraisal are expounded in Robert Chambers, <u>Rural Development: Putting the Last First</u>. New York: Longman, 1983.

[334] Goran Hyden, <u>Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania</u>, p.212.

[335] R. Miliband, <u>Marxism and Politics</u>, p.91-92.

organizations in Tanzania, he did have them replaced. The key issue concerned control and power. Nyerere wanted to limit the power of any opposition. According to W. Kapinga, practically all the local institutions that had grassroots participation were overhauled and new bureaucratic ones, controlled from the centre, were put in their place. In 1972, district and town councils were abolished. In 1975, the marketing cooperative movement was dissolved by the state. The removal of these institutions further lessened the opportunities for participation by the people. While corruption and mismanagement were used to justify the need for changes, sadly the result was that the new institutions were as mismanaged and corrupt as the ones they replaced.[336]

In contrast to the moves to dismantle the local institutions, in 1982, the National Assembly passed a law re-establishing local governments. But even this act was not complete because re establishment of these bodies did not coincide with a decrease in the powers and authority of the central government over them. [337] The grass roots organizations were not seen as a medium of two way communication, rather they were institutions through which the government tried to penetrate and mobilize the

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[336] I. Shivji. <u>The State and the Working People in Tanzania</u>, p.122.

[337] I. Shivji. <u>The State and the Working People in Tanzania</u>, p.67.

community.[338]

Nyerere's plan in 1972 was to decentralize the administration and thus make it a more effective agent of development while increasing citizen's participation in the planning process. According to several writers including Hill, the articulated aims of participation became secondary to the pursuit of control.[339] Some of the difficulties encountered stem from strong biases on the part of the government officials. The bureaucrats in general were allergic to dialogue with the peasants, because of training and class interests. Peasants were regarded as ignorant, conservative and irrational. The bureaucrats' response to peasants' resistance to change was generally through energetic authoritarian action. [340]

The type of participation expected from the people by the state was the discussions of the details of a particular program, but not to question the general direction of the government policy. Despite the President's exhortations, decentralization of the administration did not bring increased citizen participation in the development process.

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[338] L. Kleemeier. "Domestic Policies Versus Poverty Oriented Foreign Assistance in Tanzania," *Journal of Development Studies*, Vol.20, No.2 (1984), p.187.

[339] F. Hill, "Administrative Decentralization for Development, Participation and Control in Tanzania," *Journal of African Studies*, Vol.6, No.4 (1979/80), p.182.

[340] Z. Ergas, "Why did the Ujamaa Village Policy Fail: Toward a Global Analysis," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol.18, No.3 (1980), p.389.

As mentioned, decentralization was carried out with the simultaneous elimination of important channels for citizens' participation.[341] Hill points out that the party constitution and the actual operation of TANU and its successor, the Chama cha Mapinduzi, (CCM), give the President powers of initiative and veto. At the same time channels to facilitate citizens' participation do not exist. Neither the ordinary party member nor the few remaining elected leaders are given the opportunity for disagreement. Participation in Tanzania increasingly came to mean that the party members and citizens were urged to agree with the President's initiatives and government policies.[342]

Apart from all the rhetoric, was participation by the people actually facilitated and increased? There is little evidence that the government made moves to incorporate the peasants into the development process beyond simple implementation. As a result the state remained alien, aloof and distant to the peasants. Even though the state was a provider of goods and services, the state's poor financial situation limited its capacity to use this as leverage towards compliance.

McHenry states that just as the average party member has

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[341] Francis Hill, p.188.

[342] Francis Hill, p.190.

limited influence on decision making within the party, so the average citizen has little effect on policies of the government. He goes on to state that he does not believe this situation was intentionally imposed by the government.[343] While this situation may be the natural consequence of a system focused on end results and control and while McHenry contends that the situation was not intentional, when it was realized that participation was not occurring, it appears that little was done to remedy the situation. This author contends that the situation whether intentional or not was a result of the government focusing on the issue of control. Control precluded participation at the village level as well as within the party and government agencies.

McHenry does conclude that popular participation has remained very limited. Most other studies have also found little increase in popular participation.[344] Holmquist adds that decentralization resulted in a better coordinated bureaucracy, but the end result remained that the government would decide what would be done and when. This also resulted in little incentive for local self help programs. A villager summed it up best by saying that it is

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[343] Dean McHenry, <u>Tanzania's Ujamaa Villages: Implementation of a Rural Development Strategy,</u> (Berkeley: University of California, 1979), p.74.

[344] Dean McHenry, <u>Tanzania's Ujamaa Villages: Implementation of a Rural Development Strategy,</u> p. 74.

better we wait for them (the government) to plan things rather for us (villagers) to plan things they do not want. McHenry adds that continuous modification of the administrative structures hampered the development of stable patterns of participation.[345]

Yeager points out that the citizens' response has been to disengage themselves from the government programs. He refers to this as a peaceful revolt, a refusal to take part in the government system . There has been a turning back to small scale subsistence farming, since production incentives do not exist and the government has not been successful in its attempts to coerce the peasants into higher productivity. [346]

Samoff reaches a similar conclusion. The coercive nature of the government programs, and the reduced power of the local elders have led to a decline in the avenues available to citizens for participation. As a result of the decentralization scheme, some power was consolidated at the regional level. The problem was that at that level there was no council elected by the people. [347] Thus power and control continued to remain at the centre.

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[345] Dean McHenry, p.71-89.

[346] Roger Yeager, p.91.

[347] J. Samoff, "The Bureaucracy and the Bourgeoisie: Decentralization and the Class Struggle in Tanzania," p.36-39.

The issue of control is a key factor for the state in Tanzania. The state has built itself up as the decision maker in all realms of society. While there may be information flow in both directions, the information that carries the power and is tied to the purse all originates from the centre. The bottom up flow does not make it into the circles where policies are formulated and decisions are made. The irony of the centre's preoccupation with control is the fact that the majority of the country has remained out of the control of the centre. Nyerere may have speculated that given the right conditions, Tanzania would "naturally" revert back to a traditional form of communalism and this could be modified or adapted to his desired socialism. What was lacking was a grassroots understanding, participation and most importantly, support for what he wished to accomplish. The people were unified in their desire to gain independence but following that Nyerere failed to take the time to win them over to his programs. Instead, the people were dictated to. One cannot conclude that the people disliked his goals for Tanzania, but they did not like the methods involved in bringing about the changes. Nyerere's "we must run while others walk", may have been an error of judgement. Slow and steady, bringing the people along with him might have been a more successful approach to the goal of developing

Tanzania.[348]

Given the advantage of hindsight, it appears that villagization and ujamaa involved more radical changes than Nyerere expected. The people did not feel that the benefits were adequate for them to make the changes voluntarily. By resorting to coercive action, the state simply made matters worse and widened the gap between themselves and the people. Rather than incorporating the people in decision making and working with them until they "owned" the changes, the state simply dictated and forced the programs on the people. This approach, no doubt, simply reminded the peasants of their former colonial days. Not surprisingly, the people responded in a familiar pattern with passive resistance. Rather than work with the people as a team, the state chose to be more like a dictator, it spoke and the people were expected to obey.

It would be incorrect to project that all state programs failed. Programs in the areas of health services, literacy and education were very successful.[349] It should be noted that these programs were all aimed at social benefits that the people wanted. The problems occurred in the programs aimed at the economy, agriculture, and therefore at the

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[348] Further discussion of this issue can be found in Goran Hyden, "Public Policy Making and Public Enterprises in Tanzania," The African Review, Vol.5, No.2 (1975).

[349] R. Yeager, p.71,82,83.

farmer's livelihood. The long term benefits may or may not have been explained, but the crucial factor for a subsistence farmer is the short term. There must be a tangible short term gain to encourage changed behaviour. Why would a peasant farmer take the risk in changing when it is very clear that he will be the one who suffers and suffers dearly, if the new program fails.

The government programs and their method of implementation were inadequate in exhibiting the benefits to those involved. As a result, the peasants , because of their size and "power" have been able to remain uncaptured.The state, with its low level of economic capacity, has little leverage to win the peasant over. Even when coercive action was employed by the state, the peasant's passive resistance in the form of withheld labour, doomed the government's programs to failure.

In conclusion, one can see the gaining of independence as a unifying point for Tanzania. However the post colonial state apparatus changed little but its size and the scope of involvement in society. Nyerere's plan for socialism included a return to traditional communalism, but the style of his government was to consolidate power at the centre and dictate programs to the people in an authoritarian and paternalistic manner. In colonial times the state lacked the coercive capacity to enforce compliance. Following

independence, the state expanded its size without
significantly expanding its sphere of influence into more
areas of society. In 1966 the number of state posts stood
at 65,708 but increased to 191,046 by 1976 and was
estimated to be at 295,352 by 1980 while the GDP expanded
at an annual rate of 3.88% between 1966 and 1976. And while
total wage employment increased at an average annual rate
of around 2.84% during the same period, the civil service
expanded at an average rate of 13.3%. This was a rate more
than treble the GDP and total wage employment. [350] Even
with the increased size of the civil service and state
apparatus, the state remained unable to control the
essential ingredient of peasant labour. The peasants,
uninvolved in the formulation of policies that directly
affected them, were able to respond to the various
government programs with various forms of passive
resistance.

Where does Tanzania fit into Marenin's three views of the
state? The second view best describes the situation in
Tanzania. In the second view, the state is seen as the
dominant actor, having the right and power to make
decisions binding on all of society. This is a situation
that stresses the concept of domination of the state over

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[350] Rwekaza Mukandala, "Trends in Civil Service Size and Income
in Tanzania 1967-1982," Canadian Journal of African Studies, 2
(1983), p.254.

society.[351] Also included in this view is the need for the state for resources, organization control and foresight. Nyerere's Fabian approach fit this situation well, the state was in the best position to know what was good for society and thereby took a domineering role. In Marenin's second view, the state has to organize and reproduce itself while at the same time supporting linkages with society. In the case of Tanzania, the state organized and reproduced itself but fell far short of developing and/or continuing these links. Links were kept among the urban and rural professional and business class, but not with the vast majority of society, the peasants.

Have state society relationships improved in the twenty years since the Arusha Declaration? While there have been some successes with Nyerere's form of socialism, the poor performance in the economic sphere has overshadowed the successes. Tanzania has acquired one of the highest literacy rates in Africa and has improved its infant mortality rate. Tanzania has remained basically peaceful and united. It is the economy which has not improved. Droughts, rising oil costs, low agricultural output and inefficient parastatals are seen as some of the symptoms if not the cause of the economic problems. The poor economic situation has kept Tanzania away from its goal of being

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[351] Z. Ergas. The African State in Transition, p.62-63.

self reliant as Tanzania continues to be one of the largest recipients of western aid.[352] In 1967/8 foreign aid to Tanzania stood at $US 10 million. By 1979 Tanzania was the recipient of $US 460.9 million in foreign financing. 30% was in the form of grants and 70% in the form of loans.[353] A period of transition began in 1985 as Ali Hassan Mwinyi took over from Nyerere as President of the country. The economic picture before him was bleak. Between 1973-1978 the GNP grew by 5.2% annually. By 1985 the economy was growing by only 2.3% [354]

The average person was severely affected by the economic distress. Real income per capita fell 8% between 1978-1982 and another 6% between 1982-1984. The standard of living in the mid 1980's was well below that of 1970. The average monthly wage was sufficient to feed a small family for only five days.[355] As a result of increased poverty and lower government resources, the capacity of the government to deliver essential social services was drastically reduced. Mwinyi is slowly trying to implement changes but Nyerere, while not holding any official post, is still very present and Mwinyi has been sensitive to Nyerere's claims that

[352] Africa Research Bulletin, September 15, 1990. #1796.

[353] M.L. Baregu, "The Paradox of the Arusha Declaration," The African Review, Vol.14, No. 1&2 (1987), p.5.

[354] Philip Smith, "Politics After Dodoma," Africa Report, Vol.33, No.1 (1988), p.31.

[355] Philip Smith, p.31.

Tanzania is leaving the path of socialism. There were moves made in 1984 to accept IMF recommendations. Nyerere had always resisted the IMF, but now Tanzania was in desperate need. In 1986 Mwinyi announced a three year economic recovery plan that focused on liberalizing the economy, devaluing the currency, raising the producer prices and fighting an anti-corruption program within the parastatal system. [356]

Problems are facing the people on several fronts. The producer sees low prices for his produce, there are fewer consumer goods to purchase, and if production is increased , especially with cash crops, a greater percentage of earnings is absorbed at the state marketing level.[357] Even when things go well, the infrastructure is not sufficient to handle the goods. Cotton production increased in a two year period from 103,000 tons to 200,000 tons, but 159,000 tons were not able to make it to the ginneries because of transportation problems. [358]

State society relations continue as before with the not surprising difference being that the peasant farmer depends upon the state for less and is returning to care for his own survival and subsistence farming. Examples of cash crop

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[356] Philip Smith, p.31.

[357] Tony Addison, "Adjusting to the IMF," _Africa Report_, Vol.31, No.3 (1986), p. 82.

[358] Philip Smith, "Politics After Dodoma," p.32.

situations such as the cotton one cited above are likely to scare people away from cash crops and back to food crop production.

Unfortunately things do not look much brighter for the 1990's. The trade deficit for 1989/90 was set at $727 million and it is expected to be $770 million for 90/91. [359] Will Mwinyi want to or have the courage to introduce reforms that were previously rejected as being anti socialist?

The glaring issue that remains is the fact that 90% of the work force continues to be involved in agriculture. Agriculture accounts for 40% of the gross domestic product and is responsible for 80% of the foreign exchange. The majority of people involved in agriculture have not been coopted or incorporated into the state plans. Mwinyi must begin the slow task of incorporating society within the state functions. Otherwise society will continue as they have before independence, uncaptured by the state and disengaged from the programs of the state.

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[359] Africa Research Bulletin, October 16 - November 15 1990. #10145.

This thesis has focused on the state/society relationship that exists in Ghana and Tanzania. An attempt has been made to distinguish state from society and to present and clarify various views and approaches to the concept of a state.

It appears that one cannot discover a definitive explanation of the concept "state". The state is far too nebulous and amorphous a creature. Some of the key concepts that did surface and highlighted state/society relations, were the concepts of social contract, sovereignty and class conflict.

Hobbes saw the state as the recipient of the transfer of sovereignty from society to the state. To Locke, the state was the protector of the interests of society and any sovereignty that the state held was conditional. For Bentham and Mill, the state was the referee that monitored the activities of society. Rousseau on the other hand, did not agree with the transfer of autonomy from society to the state. He believed that government originated with the people and felt that it should remain with society. To Marx and later Marxist writers, sovereignty was not the issue. Class conflict and domination was predominant in state/society relations. The state was seen as representing

the interests of the dominant class within society. Finally, for Weber, the state was seen as the dominant organization within a society made up of different social organizations.

From this collection of historical perspectives, the concept of state autonomy was useful in the analysis of state/society relations. Of particular interest was whether the state could claim autonomy from society. If the state could claim autonomy, had this autonomy been granted by society? Had there been a transfer of rights from society to the state or had the state become autonomous through coercive action? This author is of the opinion that generally the state does not totally stand outside and remain autonomous from society. There tends to be a degree of autonomy and at the same time an element of accountability to some section or sections of society.

Otwin Marenin's three characteristics of the state: 1> The state standing separate from society in order to protect the long range interests of capital. 2> The state as dominating society, having the right and power to make decisions binding on society. 3> The state as a unitary actor separate and even in opposition to society, provided a useful framework with which to explore the issue of the autonomy of the state and how it managed domination. This

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author found Marenin's third characteristic the weakest option. In this option the state appears to be represented in a "pure" form, defunct of linkages with and obligations to various sections of society. Application of this option to state society relations is more difficult.

Both Tanzania and Ghana experienced British domination and following independence had to deal with issues common to other African states. They had gained juridical statehood and now had to work on developing empirical statehood. Following from the colonial period and continuing in the early years of independence, both Tanzanian and Ghanaian societies had been penetrated and dominated by a direct and central administration. Following independence one of the crucial aspects of the state/society relationship that had to be addressed was the legitimacy of the state apparatus. For Nyerere and Rawlings, both of whom began with popular support, the long term strength of their regimes rested on the issue of legitimacy within the state/society relationship.

In the analysis of African state/society relations, Naomi Chazan's writings were found to be particularly useful. Both Chazan and Victor Azarya utilize the concepts of disengagement and incorporation in their examination of the African state and clearly demonstrate that disengagement

and incorporation are useful and relevant tools for this purpose.

Goran Hyden's writings, particularly his focus on the peasant farmer in Tanzania, and his concept of the "uncaptured peasant" was especially applicable to the analysis of state/society relations in Tanzania. The "uncaptured peasant" is a sterling example of society being able to remain unincorporated with the state.

In Ghana, society disengaged from the state as a survival technique. When the state was seen as corrupt and lacking capacity, society retreated to other means of existence. Rawlings has taken steps to stop this disengagement and encourage incorporation of the state and society. Rawlings and the PNDC have passed the transitional stage by making a break with the past and its characteristics of nepotism and corruption. Rawlings stated that he is committed to a democratic Ghana but the infrastructures of the system must be indigenous to Ghana. Rawlings has increased linkages between state and society but he must insure that these linkages have integrity and are not simply a showpiece. Ghanaian society's experience with the state has generally been a negative one. By allowing the people to accept or reject the PNDC and his leadership, he would gain valuable legitimacy in the eyes of the people. This author contends that Rawlings is moving in the direction of further

incorporation of society with the state. The question revolves around the state and society's respective timetables.

Rawlings' popular support was crucial in the initial stages of his "revolution" but legitimacy of his regime becomes more of an issue the longer Rawlings and the PNDC remain in power. Cries of protest are coming from a variety of circles, the students, lawyers, labour and opposition groups. People are demanding an opportunity to evaluate Rawlings and the PNDC with a vote. Is Rawlings prepared to allow more state/society involvement? Is he prepared to allow incorporation fast enough? Does his timetable for a democratic Ghana meet with society's demands? If not will he use coercion to force through his programs and risk losing the confidence and legitimacy that he has gained from society?

Goran Hyden's term, "uncaptured peasantry" is very appropriate to describe the situation in Tanzania. The Tanzanian state has not succeeded in incorporating the majority of society, the peasants. The state has and continues to represent the interests of the ruling class. Nyerere's paternalistic approach toward society did little to encourage or promote incorporation. Links and networks were established, but rather than incorporating society,

they were utilized for the purpose of control and as a channel for top down directives. The opportunity for peoples' participation, while exhorted by the leadership, was not actualized in either the state apparatus or through the functioning of its programs.

While Nyerere's aspirations for Tanzania may have been realistic, crucial errors were made that doomed his plans. The fault lies not with the final goals but in the process and implementation of the changes. Links, confidence and relationships were not established between the state and the peasants. Then as now the peasants remain "uncaptured" by the state and therefore the majority of society is very much disengaged from the state. The Tanzanian state has been a distant body that demands compliance but has lacked the desire to encourage and win the peasants over.

One essential resource that the peasants have been able to keep out of the realm of the state is their resource of labour. The peasants have retained autonomy over this resource which is a crucial factor in the economy of Tanzania. The state has not been successful in their attempts to garner their allegiance or coopt them. In Tanzania, the power of the peasant has never been won over to the goals of the state. Society in general has not been incorporated with the state. Different from the Ghanaian experience, Tanzanian society has not moved away from

incorporation to disengagement, it has simply remained outside the realm of the state. The state remains a distant non essential interference in their way of life. The soft nature of the state further aggravates the situation as the state struggles to provide even the essential social services. To peasants who have existed on an independent, subsistence economy of affection, what does the state in Tanzania have to offer? Tanzania's leadership faces a difficult task. They need to gain the favour of the farmer, not simply his/her vote but their understanding and participation. The question remains whether the state apparatus, including parastatals are so entrenched that only radical action will achieve the desired results.

Disengagement and incorporation have been very practical concepts to use in the study of state/society relations. In the analysis of state/society relations, one is attempting to determine whether the state can meet the demands of society and consolidate its position or whether it goes into a position of declining power and capacity. Disengagement and incorporation allows one to explore the process in greater detail and they appear to have universal applicability. While disengagement and incorporation have been useful in examining state/society relations from a state centric viewpoint, the full potential of the concepts would be best seen when state/society relations are also

viewed from a societal perspective.

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