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SELFISH INCENTIVE, MORAL CHOICE, AND MORAL JUSTIFICATION

by

Jeremy Ian Maxwell Carpendale

BA (Honors), Simon Fraser University, 1988

THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
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of
Psychology

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APPROVAL

Name: Jeremy Ian Maxwell Carpendale

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Justification

Examining Committee:

Chair: Dr. W. Krane

Dr. D. Krebs
Senior Supervisor

Dr. C. McFarland

Dr. M. Chapman
External Examiner
Department of Psychology
University of British Columbia

Date Approved: _____

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ABSTRACT

This study compares two approaches to the relationship between moral justification and moral choice. In Kohlberg's structural approach moral stage-structures are assumed to lead to moral choice. On the other hand, the interactional approach suggests that moral choice may be influenced by factors such as self-interest, and moral justifications may be constructed to support the choice. This study evaluates the two models by giving 40 male subjects a moral dilemma involving selling defective merchandise (the Selling dilemma) and two dilemmas from Kohlberg's test. Subjects were asked to choose how much to disclose about the article's deficiencies, and this choice was linked to the price they could charge. Subjects justified both pro and con disclosure choices. Half the subjects made hypothetical decisions. The other half of the subjects made consequential decisions; they kept the money from the sale. Colby and Kohlberg's (1987) recently revised scoring system proved effective for scoring the Selling dilemma. As predicted, moral maturity was significantly lower on the Selling dilemma than on the Kohlberg dilemmas. Also as predicted, within the Selling dilemma, con-disclosure justifications were significantly lower in moral maturity than pro-disclosure justifications. In addition, on pro-disclosure justifications, subjects justifying their preferred choice scored significantly higher in moral maturity than subjects justifying their nonpreferred choice. The consequential manipulation influenced

choice in the opposite direction to that predicted. The group making consequential decisions disclosed significantly more of the article's deficiencies than the group making hypothetical decisions. The results are consistent with an interactional approach that includes factors such as self-interest in a model relating moral justification to moral choice.

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DEDICATION

To Caroline and Hannah

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this thesis is to compare two general approaches to the relationship between moral justification and moral choice. In Kohlberg's structural approach it is assumed that individuals develop structures, or general patterns of thought, through which they interpret all moral conflicts. This approach implies substantial consistency across situations in the principles individuals invoke to resolve moral conflicts.

An alternative to this structural approach to morality is more interactional. This approach views moral reasoning as an interaction between the cognitive structures available to individuals, social expectations surrounding situations, and individuals' goals. The interactional approach assumes that most people have a range of stage-structures available, and that in some situations self-serving objectives influence the moral choices individuals make, and moral reasoning serves the function of justifying the choice. J. Pierpont Morgan illustrates this approach when he says, "a man [*sic*] always has two reasons for doing anything--a good reason and the real reason." Unamuno (1921) tells us that "our ethical and philosophical doctrines in general are merely the justification *a posteriori* of our conduct. . . . What we believe to be the motives of our conduct are usually but the pretext for it" (p. 261). Similarly, Kagan (1987, p. xv) suggests that, although

philosophers tend to assume that morality is a product of rationality, rational explanation may be "an afterthought required to make the behavior appear more reasonable."

Kohlberg's Structural Approach

The late Lawrence Kohlberg has advanced an influential theory of moral development that is concerned with developmental changes in the structure of moral judgment (Kohlberg, 1969, 1976, 1984; Colby & Kohlberg, 1987). Building on the pioneering work of Piaget (1932/1965), Kohlberg has described six stages of moral development through which individuals are assumed to pass in an invariant sequence. The structures that define these stages form general organizing principles or patterns of thought with which individuals resolve moral dilemmas.

Consistency of Moral Judgment in Kohlberg's Structural Approach

Kohlberg assumes that moral judgment is organized in "structures of the whole." Two other closely related assumptions are that "human beings construct meaning for themselves" in terms of "their current developmental stage" (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987, p. 4), and that "higher stages displace (or, rather integrate) the structures found at lower stages" (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987, p. 7). These three assumptions predict structural homogeneity of moral judgment. In other words, individuals are expected to interpret the moral conflicts they encounter in terms of the principles that define their current

stage of moral development. Of course, since moral dilemmas may differ in content, so too may the content of people's moral judgment. However, Kohlberg expects the underlying structure of moral judgments to be consistent across varying content. Thus, Kohlberg's theory emphasizes internal factors (moral structures) rather than external, situational factors in determining moral judgment.

Although Kohlberg's theory predicts substantial consistency, it is also developmental, and therefore, perfect stage consistency cannot be expected. During periods of transition, people are expected to base their judgments on both the stages they are in and on the stages they are moving toward. Thus, Kohlberg expects moral judgment to fall within adjacent substages (e.g., Stage 3 and Stage 3/4).

Although the study of moral judgment is interesting in itself, it is especially important because of its expected relationship to moral conduct. The assumed relationship between moral judgment and moral conduct has been supported empirically in the majority of studies that have investigated the relationship by positive correlations between level of moral maturity on Kohlberg's test and moral behavior (see Blasi, 1980). However, Blasi points out that "cognitive-developmental theory, as articulate as it is in its specific domain, offers only the vaguest guidelines for approaching the relations of cognition and action, simply hypothesizing a positive correlation between the two" (p. 1). Kohlberg and Candee (1984)

have attempted to remedy this situation by proposing a model of the relationship between moral judgment and moral behavior, based on Kohlberg's theory.

The Relationship Between Structure and Choice in Kohlberg's Structural Approach

In Kohlberg's structural approach it is assumed that moral judgment plays a role in governing moral choice and moral action. Kohlberg and Candee (1984) propose that an individual's current developmental stage-structure is invoked in interpreting situations involving moral conflicts. In this model, moral structures are assumed to influence behavior through judgments of what is morally right, or "deontic choices." Kohlberg and Candee adduce evidence of a consensus among Stage 5 subjects about the morally correct course of action in most situations. In addition, they review studies showing a monotonic increase in choice of the morally right action (that chosen by Stage 5 subjects) with each higher stage. In an earlier study, Candee (1976) concluded that "persons at each higher stage of moral structure more often made decisions in moral dilemmas that were consistent with human rights and less often chose alternatives which were designed to maintain conventions or institutions" (p. 1299). Since moral stage-structures are assumed to influence behavior, Kohlberg and Candee expect a monotonic relationship between stage and moral behavior. Kohlberg and Candee's full model of the relationship between moral judgment and moral behavior includes judgments of responsibility and nonmoral

skills, termed ego controls, that are necessary for moral action.

The Interactional Approach

Theorists within the interactional approach do not share Kohlberg's rational conception of morality. Whereas Kohlberg assumes that people's unbiased interpretation of situations will follow from their current moral stage-structure. Backman (1985), for example, assumes that people will interpret reality to their own advantage. Gerson and Damon (1978) suggest that children may "reconstruct their understanding of what is right or what will be in their best self-interest in order to resolve the conflict". And they report that many of their subjects "reverted to lower-level reasoning ... because such reasoning allowed them to more easily justify their self-serving objectives" (p. 50). This approach considers the influence of peoples' objectives in a situation on their moral judgment and the defensive reinterpretation of the situation when the costs to the self become apparent (Rest, 1984; Schwartz, 1977).

Consistency of Moral Judgment in the Interactional Approach

Models in the interactional approach do not share Kohlberg's assumption that moral judgment is consistent. Rather, people are assumed to have a range of stage-structures available, and to invoke them to their advantage. Rest (1983) and Levine (1979) have proposed models that depart somewhat from Kohlberg's

approach. Rest (1983) has advanced a "layer-cake" model in which individuals are assumed to have access to developmentally earlier stages. Levine (1979) endorses an "additive-inclusive" model based on the assumption that "higher stages include components of earlier stages but do not replace these stages" (p. 155), and the stage used will depend on the moral-structures available, person characteristics, and the situation.

Harré (1984) and Backman (1985) take approaches that emphasize the situation more than Levine (1979) and Rest (1983). They assume that structures of moral justification tend to be associated with situations, or dilemmas. Harré (1984) argues that "moral orders" in the social environment structure moral judgment. According to Harré (1987, p. 219), a moral order is an organized "system of rights, obligations, and duties obtaining in a society, together with the criteria by which people and their activities are valued." Harré's notion of moral orders is similar to Backman's (1985) concept of the normative background--consisting of shared understandings, rules and beliefs. In other words, types of reasons are acceptable in some social circles, whereas they may be less acceptable in others. For example, Stage 3 reasoning may be acceptable in the moral order of the family and personal relationships, while Stage 2 reasoning may be acceptable in business deals (Carpendale & Krebs, under review).

In support of an interactional approach, Carpendale and Krebs (under review) found that some strong situations

consistently evoked certain stage-structures, while weaker situations, which were more ambiguous or would lend themselves to alternative interpretations, were more open to contextual cues. Krebs, Denton, Vermeulen, Carpendale, and Bush (under review) suggest that "moral judgment results from an interaction between the interpretive structures available to people, the interpretability of the information they process in terms of these structures, and individuals' motivation to interpret information in particular ways" (p. 26).

Research on the Consistency of Moral Judgment

Kohlberg's assumption of the structural homogeneity of moral judgment implies that moral judgment should remain consistent across dilemmas other than those on Kohlberg's test. Sixteen studies have examined this question by comparing moral judgment to Kohlberg's dilemmas with moral judgment to non-Kohlberg dilemmas. Eight of these studies employed out-dated versions of Kohlberg's test and scoring system that correlate only weakly with the current system (Gilligan, Kohlberg, Lerner, & Belenky, 1971; Gilligan & Belenky, 1980; Haan, 1975; Higgs, 1975; Kohlberg, Scharf, & Hickey, 1972; Leming, 1978; Lockwood, 1975; Smetana, 1982; see Candee and Kohlberg, 1987, for a rescoring of the Haan, 1975, data). Studies employing Kohlberg's current scoring system have found mixed results. Three studies supported Kohlberg's assumption that moral judgment is structurally homogeneous (Higgins, Power, & Kohlberg, 1984; Linn, 1987a; Walker, de Vries, & Trevethan, 1987). The five remaining studies

found that subjects scored significantly lower on the non-Kohlberg dilemmas than on the Kohlberg dilemmas (Carpendale & Bush, 1989; Carpendale & Krebs, under review; Krebs et al., under review; Linn, 1984, 1987b).

In his recent work, Kohlberg acknowledges that "people do not always use their highest stage of moral reasoning" (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987, p. 5). In accounting for evidence of stage heterogeneity, Kohlberg draws on the distinction between competence and performance, and states that his theory applies to level of competence in moral judgment, but not necessarily to performance. Variables that reduce the stage of moral reasoning below that demonstrated on Kohlberg's test can be conceived of as "performance variables". Colby and Kohlberg (1987) note that "although we do distinguish between competence and performance in moral judgment, we hold that lower levels are used only in situations with a significant downward press" (p. 8).

Although Kohlberg does acknowledge the existence of performance factors, he has not clearly indicated what constitutes a performance factor, and, closely related to this ambiguity, the implications of performance factors for the core assumptions of Kohlberg's theory have not been worked out. The integrity of Kohlberg's "structure of the whole" assumption can be maintained only if the performance factors that influence moral judgment are extraordinary, such as the example Colby and Kohlberg give of the "low-level 'moral atmosphere' of a traditional prison" (p. 8). However, if all situations influence

moral judgment, Kohlberg's fundamental assumptions would need to be revised. Also, performance factors do not play a role in Kohlberg and Candee's model, although they clearly would be very important in predicting moral behavior.

In recognition of the importance of performance factors, Colby and Kohlberg (1987) state that "the performance variables that determine fluctuation of stage use have only begun to be delineated, and this represents a particularly important direction for future research" (p. 8). From the interactional approach, the notion of "performance variables" is a basic assumption, that, if valid, would undermine Kohlberg's strong structural position.

The Relationship Between Structure and Choice in the Interactional Approach

In Harré's (1984) and Backman's (1985) positions, choices tend to be associated with stage-structures. In other words, choices are related to the reasons used to justify the choice. This expectation of an association between type of choice and stage of justification was confirmed by de Vries and Walker (1986) who found that, on the issue of capital punishment, the choice a subject justifies tends to limit the structures available to justify the choice. Arguments against capital punishment were of a higher level of moral maturity than arguments for capital punishment. Consistent with de Vries and Walker, Nisan and Koriat (1989) found that on eight different

moral dilemmas one choice was "consistently better justified than the other in terms of level of moral reasoning *regardless of its congruence with the subject's choice*" (p. 221, emphasis in original). By "better," Nisan and Koriat (1989) mean of a higher stage in Kohlberg's hierarchy.

From the interactional approach, moral choice is not thought to be derived from current moral stage-structure, nor are people necessarily expected to endorse the choice justifiable at the highest stage. Rather, moral choice is assumed to be influenced by self-serving objectives as well as self-presentational and self-enhancement concerns. As Kohlberg acknowledges, his interview may encourage people to present themselves in the best possible light by using their highest stage (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987). However, in some situations (with practical consequences), decisions that could be justified with high stage arguments may have a material cost for the individual. Damon (1984) notes the pull of self-interest (practical consequences) when children make decisions about the allocation of real candy bars compared to cardboard candy. While young children might say "because I want all these", to justify their action, older children use either the principle of equality or equity, depending on which principle will allow them the largest share. Watanabe (1989) reported the influence of self-interest on young children's reward allocation. The children tended to favor themselves more in a real situation than in a hypothetical situation.

Self-interest also has a role in social psychological theories of prosocial behavior. Piliavin, Dovidio, Gaertner, and Clark (1981) have proposed an arousal:cost-reward model that was developed from research on emergency intervention, but has broader applications. In this model, the observation of an emergency creates an unpleasant emotional arousal state in the bystander that is related to the severity, time, distance, of the emergency, and involvement with the victim. In selecting a response to reduce the arousal it is assumed that the costs and rewards associated with helping and not helping will be considered. Costs for helping include effort, danger, or foregoing other rewards, while rewards for helping include feelings of efficacy and admiration from others. Piliavian et al. distinguish two types of costs for not helping: personal and empathy costs. Personal costs for not helping include self-blame or public-blame. Empathy costs are related to the knowledge that the victim continues to suffer.

The studies reviewed by Piliavin et al., tend to support the expectation that as the costs for helping increase, helping will decrease. Conversely, as the rewards for helping increase, helping will increase. Also, as the costs to the victim for not receiving help increase, helping will increase. However, costs and rewards can be influenced by "cognitive reinterpretation." For example, if the costs for helping are too high, the bystander may reinterpret the situation as one not requiring help. Piliavin et al. point out the difficulty of making

predictions from a model that considers costs and rewards as perceived by subjects, because they are not objective.

The economic model of persons implicit in a cost-reward model leads directly to the idea of manipulating financial costs or rewards, yet surprisingly little research has examined the effect of this variable on prosocial behavior; perhaps because it seems so obvious. In an early study, Wagner and Wheeler (1969) manipulated perceived financial costs and found that subjects donated more in a low perceived cost condition (\$25 deducted at the rate of \$1 per biweekly paycheck) than in a high cost condition (\$25 deducted from the subject's next paycheck). Schaps (1972), studying the effect of rewards foregone, found a nearly significant main effect for number of customers in a shoe store and the helpfulness of the salesclerks. However, another explanation for this marginal effect is that the salesclerks were truly trying to be helpful--not just after their commission--and thus tried to divide their time among all the customers. Bleda, Bleda, Byrne, and White (1976) reported that subjects were much less likely to turn in a cheater in a cooperative condition when the subjects would lose money than in an independent or competitive relationship, in which they would not lose money. However, in this study loss of money is confounded with type of relationship; people may turn in competitors, but not cooperators.

The Present Study

The most general purpose of this thesis is to evaluate Kohlberg's structural approach and the interactional approach to moral justification. An important difference between these two approaches can be summed up in the question: do moral decisions follow from individuals' level of moral understanding (their Kohlbergian stage, which means they should employ the same stage-structure to resolve moral conflicts regardless of the situation), or is moral judgment more flexible, and do people invoke the stage-structures that best justify their preferred choices?

The present study builds on past research in which Carpendale and Krebs (under review) compared moral judgment to Kohlberg's test with moral judgment to two dilemmas involving business decisions. They found that the business dilemmas evoked moral judgments that could be stage-typed with Kohlberg's scoring system. Although the business dilemmas evoked moral reasoning, it was of a lower level than the level of competence displayed on Kohlberg's test. Carpendale and Krebs concluded that a strong moral order is associated with the business world in which Stage 2 justifications are acceptable. In addition, there was an interaction between the business dilemmas and the type of audience with which they were associated. A business dilemma involving selling a business proved to involve a strong moral order and consistently evoked Stage 2 judgments. The other

business dilemma, involving social as well as financial consequences, proved to involve a weaker moral order and was interpretable from two different perspectives, depending on the context. This dilemma tended to evoke Stage 2 judgments when it was associated with a business audience, and higher stage judgments when it was associated with a philosophy audience.

In the present study, subjects responded to two types of moral dilemma: two dilemmas from Kohlberg's test and a moral dilemma with which virtually everyone has had some experience involving selling used merchandise. The specific dilemma employed in this study was reported by a subject in a study of moral judgment in everyday life (Carpendale & Bush, 1989). Subjects were asked to make a moral decision concerning how much to disclose about the defects in used merchandise, which was linked to the price they could charge. Based on Carpendale and Krebs' study, it was predicted that subjects would make moral judgments to the selling dilemma that were scorable with Kohlberg's recently revised scoring system (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987). Other studies have successfully scored non-Kohlberg dilemmas by structurally matching interview judgments with judgments from Colby and Kohlberg's (1987) scoring manual (Carpendale & Bush, 1989; Carpendale & Krebs, under review; Krebs, Denton, Vermeulen, Carpendale, Bartek, & Bush, 1989; Walker, et al., 1987).

The dilemma involving selling used merchandise differs from Kohlberg's dilemmas in a number of ways. One of the most

important differences is that Kohlberg's dilemmas pit one moral norm against another, whereas the selling dilemma involves a moral norm pitted against self-interest. As Kohlberg claims, resolving a dilemma between two moral norms may assess competence. However, conflicts between a moral norm and self-interest are much more common in everyday life, and thus, should assess performance. Also, Kohlberg is interested in conflicts involving self-interest when he links moral judgment to moral behavior. According to Kohlberg and Candee (1984, p. 522), in studying moral behavior they are "concerned with studying action in which the subject gives up something or takes risks where not doing so would appear to be to his or her more immediate advantage."

Also based on Carpendale and Krebs' study, it was hypothesized that subjects would use significantly lower levels of moral maturity on the selling dilemma than on the Kohlberg dilemmas, due to the Stage 2 moral order associated with business decisions. In contrast, Kohlberg's structural approach predicts that subjects should interpret both types of dilemma with their current moral stage-structure, and thus, they should not differ in moral maturity for the two types of dilemma.

Nisan and Koriat (1989) and de Vries and Walker (1986) found that different stage-structures tended to be associated with alternative positions on moral dilemmas. To assess the relationship between alternative choices on the selling dilemma and stage-structures used to justify the choice, subjects were

required to justify both pro- and con-disclosure choices. Following Carpendale and Krebs (under review), it was expected that this dilemma would lend itself to two types of interpretation. Subjects could interpret this dilemma in terms of the Golden Rule, and the notion that concern should be shown for the welfare of others. This Stage 3 justification was expected to be associated with the choice to disclose the defects in the merchandise. The second interpretation of this dilemma would be to argue that in business deals buyers should look out for themselves. This draws on the "moral order" (Harré, 1984) of the business world with its shared expectations (e.g., "buyer beware"). This type of argument is based on the Stage 2 structure and would justify not disclosing the defects in the merchandise to the buyer. Since the justifications expected to be associated with alternative positions differ by a whole stage (Stage 2 and Stage 3), a much greater difference in moral maturity for justifying alternative choices on the selling dilemma was predicted than that reported by de Vries and Walker (1986).

According to Gilligan (1982), females tend to be oriented toward care and response, whereas males tend to be concerned with justice. This difference in orientation could lead to a gender difference on the selling dilemma. If females are oriented toward care, they may interpret the selling dilemma in Stage 3 terms, while males, in their concern with justice, may tend to interpret the selling dilemma in Stage 2 terms. If

gender differences exist, the effects predicted may be larger for males than for females; thus, given limited resources, only males were included in the present study.

Nisan and Koriat (1989) found that higher stage-structures tended to be associated with preferred choices. This result is not compatible with a strict structural approach, since all justifications should be based on the same stage-structure. However, Kohlberg's scoring system does implicitly involve this assumption because scores for preferred choices ("chosen issue scores") receive a greater weight in the overall score than scores for nonpreferred choices ("nonchosen issue scores"). Consistent with Kohlberg, Nisan and Koriat's (1989) interpretation of the relationship they found between stage and choice is that subjects tend to prefer the choice for which they can construct the highest stage justification. An alternative explanation in situations involving self-interest, consistent with the interactional approach, is that subjects prefer a particular choice for self-serving reasons, and then construct a more sophisticated, higher stage justification for their preferred choice than for their nonpreferred choice, to avoid undermining their preferred position. From the interactional approach, it is assumed that preference for higher stage justifications is only one of the factors individuals consider in moral decisions. In this study, subjects were expected to prefer the choice justifiable at the higher stage only when no other motivational factors were present.

It was expected that preferred choice could be manipulated by linking it to a financial incentive. It was predicted that a financial incentive would encourage subjects to conceal defects in merchandise and charge a high price for the merchandise. On the other hand, when the moral choice did not have a real financial cost, subjects were expected to disclose the defects. From the interactional approach, a financial incentive was expected to influence moral choice, which, in turn, was expected to be associated with a particular stage of moral justification. On the other hand, there is no role for motivational factors in Kohlberg and Candee's (1984) structural model, and thus, from this perspective no difference between the groups is expected.

Past research has found a "self-righteous attributional bias," in which subjects attribute more moral behavior to themselves than to others (Denton & Krebs, in press; Denton, Krebs, & Carpendale, 1989; Krebs, Denton, Carpendale, Vermeulen, Bartek, & Bush, 1989). Consistent with the interactional approach, a self-righteous bias was expected in this study. On the other hand, Kohlberg's structural approach would not predict a self-righteous bias.

Both Kohlberg's structural approach and the interactional approach acknowledge individual differences. Kohlberg distinguishes two types of people. Type A people are externally oriented towards rules and authority, while Type B people are autonomous and oriented internally. According to Kohlberg and Candee (1984), lower stage subjects at Type B are more likely

than subjects at Type A to make principled (Stage 5) choices. In the present study, the self-monitoring scale (Synder, 1987) and the Self-Consciousness Scale (SCS) (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975) were used to assess subjects' internal versus external orientation. Low self-monitors value congruence between what they believe and what they do, whereas high self-monitors tend to adjust their behavior to fit the situation (Synder, 1987). The Self-Consciousness Scale measures individual differences in the tendency to focus on public or private aspects of the self. The SCS has two separate dimensions. ¹ Private self-consciousness is the tendency to be aware of self-aspects that are personal. Individuals high on this dimension tend to behave in a manner consistent with their own values. Public self-consciousness is the tendency to be aware of the self as a social object. Individuals high on this dimension are aware of the values held by others around them and tend to behave in accordance with these externally held values (Carver & Scheier, 1985). Thus, from Kohlberg and Candee's (1984) model it would follow that internally oriented subjects (assumed to be related to Type B) should accept more responsibility to behave morally than externally oriented subjects (assumed to be related to Type A). The interactional approach also predicts that internally oriented subjects will be more aware of their personal values, and thus, will tend to chose the moral course of action more often than externally oriented subjects.

¹The SCS has a third subscale that measures social anxiety.

CHAPTER II

METHOD

Subjects and Procedure

The subjects were 40 male university students ranging in age from 18 to 37 ($M = 21$). They were paid ten dollars for participating in the study, which involved filling out a questionnaire. The questionnaire consisted of a moral dilemma involving selling defective merchandise (the Selling dilemma, see Appendix A and B) in which subjects were required to choose how much to disclose about defects in an article of merchandise. The Selling dilemma was followed by two dilemmas from Kohlberg's test (Form A, dilemmas III and III', see Appendix C). In Dilemma III a character named Heinz must decide whether or not to steal a drug to save his dying wife. In Dilemma III' a judge must decide whether or not to sentence Heinz for stealing the drug. In addition, the subjects completed the self-monitoring scale (Snyder, 1987, see Appendix D), and the self-consciousness scale (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975, see Appendix E).

On the Selling dilemma, the choice of how much to disclose about the defects in the merchandise was linked to the price that could be charged. If the subjects disclosed all the defects, they could only charge \$2.00, whereas if they did not disclose any of the defects, they could charge \$20.00. Subjects were told they had a partner in the study (the buyer), and a

scale showed the corresponding amount of money the buyer would acquire from the transaction. The more the subject decided to charge for the merchandise, the more extra money he acquired, and the less the subject believed the buyer (his partner in the study) made. Half the subjects were randomly assigned to the "Hypothetical group," in which their decisions were hypothetical; no real consequences followed from the subjects' decisions on the Selling dilemma (see Appendix B). The other 20 subjects were assigned to the "Consequential group", in which real financial consequences followed from their decisions: they kept the money from the sale of the article (see Appendix A).

After the subjects decided how much to disclose, they were asked what considerations were involved in their decision, what the main issues in the dilemma were, and whether any moral issues were involved. The responses to these questions were used to determine whether the subjects considered their choice moral in nature. Subjects also were asked to indicate what the right thing to do in the situation would be. ¹ Subjects were asked to justify the morality of both the pro- and con-disclosure choices. The order of these two sets of questions was counter-balanced. In addition, subjects were asked whether their decisions would be different if the buyer were a friend, an acquaintance, or a stranger. Subjects were also asked how well they could imagine the buyer on a scale from 1 (not very well) to 7 (very well).

¹Data are not available for 20 subjects.

After the subjects answered questions about the Selling dilemma, they were asked how representative their choices were of what they would do in real life, and what they thought most people actually would do in the situation described in the Selling dilemma. In addition, subjects were asked to indicate the nature of the division of responsibility for uncovering defects in the merchandise on a scale from 1 (all the buyer's responsibility) to 7 (all the seller's responsibility). For payment, subjects were asked to fill out a receipt to be returned with their questionnaire. To reduce fear of evaluation and to insure that their responses were anonymous, subjects were informed that their questionnaires would be coded so that their names would not be associated with their decisions, and a secretary would mail them a cheque.

Scoring the Kohlberg Dilemmas

The moral dilemmas were scored in accordance with Colby and Kohlberg's (1987) scoring system. The scoring manual outlines a 17-step procedure which involves identifying prescriptive ("should") "interview judgments," classifying them by issue, norm, and element, and finding a "criterion judgment" with matching stage-structure in Colby and Kohlberg's (1987) scoring manual. Subjects' judgments for both choices ("Issues") on the dilemmas are scored. Dilemma III involves a conflict between saving a life (Life Issue) and upholding the law (Law Issue). Dilemma III' involves a conflict between letting Heinz go free

(Morality/Conscience Issue) and sentencing Heinz for stealing the drug (Punishment Issue). The score for subjects' preferred choice ("chosen issue score") is given a weight for 3 and the score for their nonpreferred choice ("nonchosen issue score") is given a weight of 2 in their overall score. Colby and Kohlberg describe several procedures for deriving moral maturity scores from a set of interview judgments matched with criterion judgments. The most frequently used measures of moral maturity are Weighted Average Scores (WAS) and global stage scores; these measures were used in this study. Weighted Average Scores range from 100 (Stage 1) to 500 (Stage 5), and global stage scores are on a 9-point scale (Stage 1 followed by Stage 1/2, Stage 2, etc.). The moral maturity scores for the two Kohlberg dilemmas were combined according to the instructions in Colby and Kohlberg's (1987) scoring manual to yield a WAS and a global stage score for each subject.

Scoring the Selling Dilemma

Since this study seeks to compare moral maturity on the Selling dilemma with moral maturity on the Kohlberg dilemmas, it is important to insure that the Selling dilemma is validly scored. Interview judgments to the Selling dilemma were matched with criterion judgments based on the same stage-structure from Colby and Kohlberg's scoring manual. These matched judgments were then converted to WASs and global stage scores. This method of scoring non-Kohlberg dilemmas has been successfully used in

other studies (Carpendale & Bush, 1989; Carpendale & Krebs, under review; Krebs, Denton, Vermeulen, Carpendale, & Bush, under review; Walker, de Vries, & Trevethan, 1987).

All the dilemmas were scored separately, blind to the subject's condition.

Reliability

For interrater reliability 10 (25%) of the Selling dilemmas, and 10 (25%) sets of the Kohlberg dilemmas were randomly selected and rescored by another trained rater, blind to the hypotheses. The reliability for the Kohlberg dilemmas was 100% agreement within 17 WAS points, and 90% (9/10) exact agreement on global stage scores on a 9-point scale (the only disagreement on global stage scores was a difference of 6 WAS points). The reliability for the Selling dilemma was 90% (9/10) agreement, both within 25 WAS points and on global stage scores, for both justifications pro- and con-disclosure.

CHAPTER III

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The results are discussed in seven main sections. These sections deal with: (a) the ability of Colby and Kohlberg's (1987) scoring manual to stage-type judgments to the Selling dilemma, (b) the consistency of moral judgment between the Selling dilemma and Kohlberg's dilemmas, (c) the consistency of moral judgment between alternative choices and preferred/nonpreferred choices within Kohlberg's test, (d) the consistency of moral judgment for justifications pro- and con-disclosure and preferred/nonpreferred position within the Selling dilemma, (e) the effect of real versus hypothetical financial incentive on moral choice, (f) the relationship between moral competence and moral choice, and, (g) individual differences and moral maturity.

The Structure of Moral Judgments to the Selling Dilemma

To justify using Colby and Kohlberg's (1987) scoring manual to score judgments to the Selling dilemma, it is important to establish: (a) that subjects made moral judgments to the Selling dilemma, and (b) that the moral judgments subjects made are structured in terms of Kohlberg's stages. The results revealed that the vast majority of the subjects (90%) stated that moral considerations influenced their decision on the Selling dilemma. Thus, according to the subjects, the Selling dilemma was in the

moral domain. In addition, subjects made enough prescriptive judgments to assign them to stages.

Although the criterion judgments in Colby and Kohlberg's (1987) scoring manual are based on judgments to Kohlberg's dilemmas, it is nonetheless possible to match interview judgments to non-Kohlberg dilemmas with criterion judgments in the scoring manual on the bases of their underlying stage structure. In this study, trained scorers were able structurally to match prescriptive judgments to the Selling dilemma with criterion judgments in Colby and Kohlberg's scoring manual. A sample of common interview judgments and matching criterion judgments is displayed in Table 1. Consider two examples. First, several subjects referred to the Golden Rule--"do unto others as you would have them do unto you"--as a reason for disclosing deficiencies in the article. This is scored at Stage 3, and structurally matches the criterion judgment: "[Louise should keep quiet] because she'd realize that if the shoe were on the other foot, she wouldn't want Judy to tell on her" (Form B, Contract, #19, p. 541). Second, several subjects stated that concealing the defects in the article would be justified "if the buyer had cheated you previously" or "if they were just trying to rip me off." These judgments structurally match the criterion judgment from Colby and Kohlberg's (1987) scoring manual: "[Heinz should steal the drug] to get back at the druggist; OR because the druggist was asking for it or was trying to rip him off" (Form A, Life, #5, p. 16). Note that although the Stage 2 judgments

may not seem moral, they fall in the moral domain on Kohlberg's criterion because they match Kohlberg's criterion judgments, even though at a low level (Stage 2).

insert Table 1 about here

Consistency of Moral Judgment between the Selling Dilemma and the Kohlberg Dilemmas

Establishing that moral judgments about selling are structured in terms of Kohlberg's stages does not establish that moral judgment is structurally homogeneous--that is, that subjects invoke the same stage in response to the Selling dilemma and Kohlberg's dilemmas. A 2 (Consequences: Consequential/Hypothetical) x 2 (Dilemma: Selling/Kohlberg) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor and WASs as the dependent variable revealed a highly significant main effect for dilemma ($F(1,38)=534.05, p < .0001$). Mean moral maturity was significantly lower on the Selling dilemma (241: Stage 2/3) than on the Kohlberg dilemmas (342: Stage 3/4). There was a significant main effect for consequences ($F(1,38)=4.90, p < .05$), but no significant interaction ($F < 1$).¹

¹ The main effect for dilemma is still highly significant if only subjects' highest stage justifications on the Selling dilemma--those in favor of disclosure--are compared to justifications on the Kohlberg dilemmas ($F(1,38)=198.08, p < .0001$).

insert Table 2 about here

The structural inconsistency between global stage scores on the Selling dilemma and the Kohlberg dilemmas (on a 9-point scale) is shown in Table 3. None of the subjects scored at the same substage on the Selling dilemma and the Kohlberg dilemmas. Eleven subjects (27.5%) based their judgments on a lower adjacent substage, and twenty-nine (72.5%) of the subjects scored a stage or more lower. Not one subject scored higher on the Selling dilemma than on the Kohlberg dilemmas.

insert Table 3 about here

The expectation derived from Kohlberg's theory that subjects solidly in a stage on Kohlberg's test would show more consistency in moral judgment than subjects assumed to be in transition between two stages was not supported. None of the subjects was consistent in his stage of moral judgment, and the 20 subjects obtaining a "transitional" score (Stage 3/4) on Kohlberg's test (assumed to reflect transition between Stages 3 and 4), were no more inconsistent than the twenty subjects who scored solidly in a stage (Stage 3 or Stage 4) on Kohlberg's test (see Table 3).

Although subjects used lower levels of moral maturity on the Selling dilemma than on the Kohlberg dilemmas, there was a significant positive correlation between moral maturity on the Kohlberg dilemmas and on the Selling dilemma ($r(40) = .55, p < .0001$).

In this study, Kohlberg's test appeared to assess subjects' level of moral competence, as Kohlberg claims, since no subjects scored higher on the Selling dilemma than on Kohlberg's test. However, Kohlberg's "structure of the whole" assumption was not supported. Rather, the observed structural heterogeneity of moral judgment is more consistent with Levine's (1979) "additive-inclusive" model, Rest's (1983) "layer cake" model, and Krebs et al.'s (in press) interactional model, than with Kohlberg's structural approach. Kohlberg's test may help to predict moral judgment to other dilemmas, but it appears that a range of stages is available to most subjects, and moral judgment is not necessarily consistent across dilemmas. This raises an important question, namely, what causes people to perform below their level of competence; what caused subjects to invoke Stage 2 structures on the Selling dilemma? It was hypothesized that position justified and position preferred would influence moral maturity on the Selling dilemma. The effect of these factors will be examined first on Kohlberg's test and then on the Selling dilemma.

Consistency of Moral Judgment Between Alternative Choices and Preferred/Nonpreferred Choices within Kohlberg's test

Dilemma III from Kohlberg's test was examined first. In this dilemma subjects must chose to preserve life or to uphold the law, and they must justify both their preferred choice and their nonpreferred choice. A 2 (Preferred Choice: Life/Law) x 2 (Choice Justified: Life/Law) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor and WASS as the dependent variable failed to reveal any significant main effects or interaction ($F_s < 1$). Thus, on this dilemma the justifications for alternative choices did not differ in level of moral maturity, nor did the justifications for preferred and nonpreferred choices.

A similar analysis was performed on the second dilemma from Kohlberg's test. In Dilemma III' subjects must support morality/conscience or punishment, and they must justify both their preferred choice and their nonpreferred choice. ² A 2 (Issue Preferred: Morality/Punishment) x 2 (Issue Justified: Morality/Punishment) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor and WASS as the dependent variable failed to reveal any significant main effects. Thus, on this dilemma as well, the justifications for alternative choices did not differ in level of moral maturity. However, the interaction between choice justified and choice preferred was marginally significant (F

² The two dilemmas from Kohlberg's test did not differ significantly in moral maturity (Dilemma III = 343, and Dilemma III' = 342).

(1,36) = 3.65, $p = .064$). Although the cells means do not differ significantly, moral maturity was consistently higher when subjects were justifying their preferred choice. This marginally significant result is consistent with Nisan and Koriat's (1989) findings and with the assumptions implicit in Kohlberg's scoring system. It is inconsistent with a strict structural approach.

Consistency of Moral Judgment Between Pro- and Con-Disclosure Justifications and Preferred/Nonpreferred Choice within the Selling Dilemma

It was hypothesized that the Selling dilemma would be interpreted in two ways: either in Stage 2 terms, associated with con-disclosure, or in Stage 3 terms, associated with disclosure. Subjects also were expected to invoke different stage-structures to justify their preferred and nonpreferred choices. Thus, moral judgment to the Selling dilemma was not expected to be homogeneous within the dilemma.

A 2 (Preferred Choice: Pro/Con)³ x 2 (Order) x 2 (Choice Justified: Pro/Con) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor and WASS as the dependent variable failed to reveal any significant main effect or interactions for order of questions on the Selling dilemma ($F_s < 1$). Therefore, order was not included in further analyses.

³ Subjects were grouped on choice preferred by splitting them at the mean into high and low on the amount of disclosure they endorsed.

A 2 (Preferred Choice: Pro/Con) x 2 (Consequences: Hypothetical/Consequential) x 2 (Choice Justified: Pro/Con) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor and WASs as the dependent variable revealed no significant main effect for consequences ($F(1,36) = 2.99, p = .09$), or interactions. The 3 way interaction was also not significant. However, there was a highly significant main effect for choice justified ($F(1,36) = 254.39, p < .0001$). As predicted, pro-disclosure justifications were significantly higher in moral maturity (279: Stage 3) than con-disclosure justifications (204: Stage 2). A main effect for preference ($F(1,36) = 6.24, p < .02$) was qualified by a significant interaction between choice justified and preference ($F(1,36) = 6.28, p < .01$). Con-disclosure justifications were quite uniformly Stage 2 in both groups (see Table 4), while pro-disclosure justifications were significantly higher in moral maturity in the group that was justifying its preferred choice (295: Stage 3) than in the group that was justifying its nonpreferred choice (263: Stage 2/3) ($t(38) = 3.59, p < .001$).

insert Table 4 about here

The close association between form and content in choice justified is similar to that reported by de Vries and Walker (1986) on arguments pro and con capital punishment. However, the difference of 75 WAS points--almost a full stage--between pro and con positions found in this study is much greater than the

difference of 17.2 WAS points--less than 1/5 stage--found by de Vries and Walker. This suggests that differences in moral maturity of justifications for alternative choices will depend on the dilemma. Certain choices on dilemmas, especially those involving business decisions, tend to elicit Stage 2 justifications (Carpendale & Krebs, under review). Other dilemmas may be fairly well balanced in the stage of justifications available to support either choice, such as the two dilemmas from Kohlberg's test.

As predicted, virtually all the con-disclosure judgments subjects made (93%) were Stage 2. One of the most common justifications for failing to reveal the defects in the article was that the seller was "just trying to survive," or "to maximize your net financial profit." This type of judgment matches the criterion judgments: "[Heinz should steal the drug] because his wife needs it or will die without it" (Form A, Life, #3, p. 14), and "[Joe should refuse to give his father the money] if (or because) Joe wants to go to camp" (Form A, Contract, #5, pp. 197-198, both Stage 2). Since subjects were required to justify lack of disclosure even if they did not endorse this choice, the level of moral maturity they displayed in support of these justifications is not considered representative of their level of moral competence, but it is considered representative of the stage of arguments that are available in support of the position that deficiencies in damaged merchandise should be concealed.

Four subjects advanced Stage 2/3 judgments against disclosure. For example, one subject justified concealing the defects if there was "a desperate need on the seller's part to get as much money for the article as possible." This type of judgment structurally matches the criterion judgment: "[Heinz should steal the drug] if he is desperate; OR because he wouldn't have much choice" (Form A, Life, #8, p. 19). The highest stage judgment that subjects made against disclosure was Stage 3. Two subjects stated that lack of disclosure could be justified if the seller could not "make enough money to support his family." This type of judgment structurally matches the criterion judgment: "as a captain it's his job or his duty to protect his men" (Form C, Life Quality, #16, p. 633).

Also as predicted, most judgments in favor of disclosure (62%) were Stage 3. For example, many subjects stated that the defects in the article should be revealed to avoid feeling guilty or "to make yourself feel good." This type of Stage 3 judgment structurally matches the criterion judgment: "[It is important to keep a promise] because it makes a person feel good inside; OR because if you don't you'll feel bad inside" (Form A, Contact, #19, pp. 210-211). As noted above, another common Stage 3 justification for disclosure appeals to the Golden Rule.

Although most pro-disclosure judgments were scored at Stage 3, they ranged from Stage 2 to Stage 4. For example, a Stage 2 judgment stated that the deficiencies should be disclosed "to guard against future liability," or "[because lack of

disclosure] could lead to court action, or loss of customers." This type of judgment structurally matches the criterion judgment: "[Louise should keep quiet] because ... if she tells, she may get into trouble with her sister and/or mother" (Form B, Contract, #8, pp. 532-533). The highest stage justification for disclosure was scored at Stage 4. The subject who gave it argued that:

If the seller were to be dishonest and give unfair exchange to the buyer, he/she would be adding to the general distrust and ill-will felt between most members of society at large ... [and] he/she will be contributing to the decay of his/her society. Individuals cannot be bound together for long on the basis of distrust and inequity.

This Stage 4 judgment structurally matches the criterion judgment: "[It is important to keep a promise] for the sake of the orderly or smooth functioning of society, or so that society can survive or be productive; OR because otherwise social order is disrupted or society is destroyed" (Form A, Contract, #30, p. 223).

The association between choice and structure was more invariant on con-disclosure justifications than on pro-disclosure justifications. As shown in Table 4 there was very little variance in con-disclosure justifications. The variance on con-disclosure justifications was significantly lower than the variance on pro-disclosure justifications ($t(38) = 8.33, p < .001$). The reasons available to justify concealing the defects were more or less limited to Stage 2. However, pro-disclosure justifications, while predominantly Stage 3,

ranged from Stage 2 to Stage 4. Within this range, the stage used was influenced by the subjects' preferred choice on the Selling dilemma. On pro-disclosure justifications, subjects justifying their preferred choice employed significantly higher stage justifications than subjects justifying their nonpreferred choice. Subjects who preferred disclosure tended to justify disclosure at Stage 3. Subjects who preferred lack of disclosure tended to use the same Stage 2 reasoning they used for justifying their preferred choice (con-disclosure) for the pro-disclosure justifications; perhaps because higher stage reasoning on their non-preferred choice might undermine their argument supporting their preferred choice. It should be noted that the subjects possessed the competence to construct higher stage justifications since they did so on Kohlberg's dilemmas.

In this study, subjects did not always prefer the choice for which they could construct the highest stage justification. As shown in Table 4, subjects preferring pro-disclosure had higher moral maturity for their preferred choice. However, this pattern did not hold for subjects preferring con-disclosure, who constructed higher stage justifications for their nonpreferred, than for their preferred choice. Nisan and Koriat (1989) found that subjects scored higher on their preferred choices than on their nonpreferred choices, and this is an assumption implicit in Kohlberg's scoring system. However, it was not supported in this study, or by de Vries and Walker (1986).

The relationship on pro-disclosure justifications between higher moral maturity and more generous moral choice ($r(40) = .44, p < .005$), raises the possibility that, as predicted by Kohlberg, higher stage moral structures lead to increasingly moral choices. On the other hand, the interactional approach predicts that other factors may influence moral choice and the associated moral justifications. In this study, the experimental manipulation was expected to influence moral choice.

The Influence of Real vs. Hypothetical Financial Incentive on Moral Choice

As expected, the experimental manipulation exerted a significant effect on moral choice; however, it was in the opposite direction to that predicted. The prediction that a real financial incentive would induce subjects to disclose fewer defects in order to acquire extra money was not supported. Indeed, contrary to prediction, the Consequential group disclosed significantly more about the defective article (corresponding to a price of \$8.50) than the Hypothetical group (\$11.95) ($t(38) = 2.34, p < .025$). Across both groups, subjects disclosed significantly less than they believed was right ($t(19) = 5.30, p < .0001$). Most of the subjects indicated that the moral course of action--the right thing to do--was to disclose virtually all the deficiencies in the article, and charge only \$4.55. Thus, contrary to prediction, the Consequential group behaved in a more moral, and less selfish, manner than the

Hypothetical group. How can this counterintuitive result be explained?

Piliavin et al., 's (1981) discussion of costs and rewards is useful in interpreting this counterintuitive finding. The predictions of this study were based on a consideration of only material costs and rewards for the self. However, when subjects had an opportunity to earn money for themselves, they also had an opportunity to earn money for another subject, or to deprive another subject of money. These two factors naturally covary, because a selfish choice involves acquiring something for the self by taking it from others. Thus, when gain to self was emphasized, cost to other was also emphasized. Piliavin et al. divide costs for not helping into empathy costs and personal costs. In the present study, the consequential manipulation could have increased the salience of the buyer and encouraged subjects to take the buyer's perspective. In Piliavin et al., 's terms, there might have been "empathy costs" in the Consequential group for not helping, because subjects would be aware that lack of disclosure would deprive the buyer of a potential financial reward.

The consequential manipulation may have increased the salience of an audience and lead to personal costs because of the increased awareness of how the buyer's conception of the subject would be affected by a selfish decision on the subject's part. In Piliavin et al., 's terms, personal costs in the Consequential group would include guilt and self-blame for

depriving the buyer of money. Also, Backman's (1985) full model includes aspects of interest to the self such as the need to maintain a favorable view of the self in one's own and other's eyes. Although subjects' responses were anonymous, they could still have been aware of the effect on their own views of themselves of making a selfish decision that would have adverse consequences for another student. In addition, increasing the salience of the audience may have increased self-awareness, which is known to increase conformity to moral norms (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). These empathy and personal costs would not be present in the Hypothetical group, since there was no real money for the buyers to lose.

The interpretation above is consistent with Latané's (1981) theory of social impact. Social impact is defined as a variety of changes in an individual's feelings, thoughts, or behavior that occur because of the actual or imagined presence of others. Latané proposes that three factors determine the amount of social pressure that an individual experiences in the presence of others--the strength, immediacy, and number of other people. In this study, the number and strength (determined by power and status) of others were constant across the two groups, but immediacy differed. Latané's theory describes a general empirical law, not the specific causal mechanisms through which social pressure has an effect. However, he has adduced support for his theory from research on stage fright and embarrassment, to bystander intervention. The consequential manipulation in

this study may have varied the psychological immediacy of the buyer, and thus affected social pressure.

Several results are consistent with the post hoc interpretation that consequential decisions increased the salience of the buyer, and the buyer's perspective, which in turn encouraged moral choice. First, the correlation between amount of disclosure and how well the subjects reported they could imagine the buyer was positive ($r(40) = .38, p < .02$). The more the subjects reported they were able to imagine the buyer who would be affected by their decisions, the more deficiencies they revealed. It is likely that subjects who could imagine the buyer very well were also taking the perspective of the buyer. This perspective-taking could influence both empathy costs and personal costs. (However, note that the groups did not differ on this variable.)

Second, when asked whether their decision would be influenced if the buyer were a friend or an acquaintance, most subjects (78%) reported they would reveal more of the deficiencies to an acquaintance than to a stranger, and more, or all the deficiencies, to a friend. (The remaining nine subjects reported that it would make no difference if the buyer were a friend or a stranger, since they would reveal all the deficiencies to anyone.) The closer the social relationship, the more the subjects said they would reveal about the deficiencies. Conversely, the more impersonal the situation, the less they would reveal. In this study, the Hypothetical group may have

been more abstract and further removed from the personal sphere than the Consequential group. Conversely, the reality of the consequences in the Consequential group may have made the situation less impersonal.

Third, across both groups, subjects said that if they actually faced the decision in the Selling dilemma, they would reveal more of the article's deficiencies than most other people would ($t(39) = 4.77, p < .0001$). This tendency for subjects to attribute more moral behavior to themselves than to others is congruent with the "self-righteous bias" in moral judgment reported in other studies (Denton & Krebs, in press; Denton, Krebs & Carpendale, 1989; Krebs, Denton, Carpendale, Vermeulen, Bartek, & Bush, 1989). This "self-righteous bias" helps explain the greater disclosure in the Consequential group than the Hypothetical group. Apparently people have an investment in viewing themselves as fair and unselfish, and it may not be worth a few dollars to relinquish this aspect of their self-concept when it is possible to imagine a buyer viewing their decision, and them, as selfish. In retrospect, it appears that, as well as the financial consequences for the self, there may also have been consequences for subjects' self-concept. Most research on bystander intervention has focused on evaluation apprehension in terms of the other bystanders, yet it seems highly plausible that the subjects could be concerned about the victims' evaluation. Since the buyer would suffer from the subject's selfish decision, the buyer's conception of the

subject might be affected.

Fourth, across both groups, there was a correlation between amount of disclosure (linked to price charged) and responsibility attributed to the buyer for uncovering defects in the article. The higher the price charged and the less disclosed, the more subjects tended to attribute responsibility to the buyer ($r(40) = .61, p < .0001$). In other words, the higher the price subjects charged, the more they justified this choice by shifting responsibility to the buyer; implying the buyer should beware. Subjects in the Consequential group attributed significantly more responsibility to the seller (5.2, on a 7-point scale), than subjects in the Hypothetical group (3.4) ($t(37) = 3.26, p < .0025$). Invoking *caveat emptor* may be acceptable in the impersonal world of business, but perhaps the increased salience of the buyer encouraged the subjects to take the buyer's perspective, allowing subjects to recognize this as an invalid excuse from the buyer's perspective.

Future research should assess the hypothesis that increased psychological immediacy, or salience, of the buyer increases moral choice. The immediacy of the buyer could be varied in both directions. The buyer could be brought progressively "closer" by: (a) informing the subjects that they would meet the buyer at a later date, (b) informing the subjects that they will be required to explain their answers to the buyer after they finish the questionnaire, and (c) having the buyer actually present. In addition, Lantané's (1981) theory of social impact predicts that

social pressure on the subject would increase with an increase in the number of buyers, or their strength (i.e., status or power).

The finding that varying the consequences of subjects' decisions influences their moral choice is consistent with the interactional approach. It appears that moral choice is not derived from stage-structure, rather, in the present study moral choice and moral justification were influenced by the experimental manipulation that apparently affected the psychological immediacy of the buyer.

An additional aspect of interest related to the counterintuitive finding is that people are commonly thought to make more moral choices in hypothetical conditions than in real conditions. In fact, Kohlberg employs hypothetical dilemmas in an attempt to measure individuals' highest level of moral competence (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987, p. 5). Yet on the Selling dilemma the Hypothetical condition underestimated moral competence more than the Consequential condition. Apparently there are aspects to the real world that encourage, rather than discourage, morality.

Moral Competence and Moral Choice

The correlation between moral maturity on Kohlberg's test and the moral choice of how much to disclose was not significant ($r(40) = .08, ns$). This lack of a significant positive

correlation between moral maturity on Kohlberg's test and moral choice does not support Kohlberg and Candee's (1984) claims. However, this result could be due to a restriction of range in moral maturity. Most of the subjects scored between Stage 3 and Stage 4 on Kohlberg's test, and there were no subjects at Stage 2 or Stage 5.

Individual Differences and Moral Maturity

Contrary to prediction, self-monitoring and private and public self-consciousness did not qualify the effects found in this study: when these three variables were added to the ANOVAs reported above only one significant interaction was revealed; the two main effects revealed are reported below as correlations. When private self-consciousness was added as a grouping variable to the 2 (Consequences: Hypothetical/Consequential) x 2 (Dilemma: Selling/Kohlberg) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor and WASs as the dependent variable, a significant three way interaction was revealed ($F(1,36) = 5.16, p < .03$). In the Consequential group, subjects low in private self-consciousness did not increase as much as subjects high in private self-consciousness on moral maturity on Kohlberg's test. A possible explanation for this is that low private self-consciousness subjects would be externally orientated, and, in the reality of the Consequential group, these subjects may have taken on the moral order of the Selling dilemma, and partially carried this over to the Kohlberg

dilemmas which they responded to after the Selling dilemma. ⁴

As predicted, moral maturity on Kohlberg's test was significantly positively correlated with private Self-Consciousness ($r(40) = .34, p < .03$). Although the correlations between moral maturity on Kohlberg's test and self-monitoring and public self-consciousness were not significant, they were negative, as predicted ($r_s(40) = -.11$ and $-.15$, respectively). As predicted moral maturity on the Selling dilemma was significantly negatively correlated with self-monitoring ($r(40) = -.33, p < .03$). However, public and private self-consciousness were not significantly correlated with moral maturity on the Selling dilemma. Although not all these effects reached an acceptable level of statistical significance, the differences were in the predicted direction, and, since these results are based on a small sample, further study would be worthwhile. Internally orientated subjects tended to score higher in moral maturity than externally orientated subjects on both the Selling dilemma and the Kohlberg dilemmas.

As predicted, acceptance of responsibility was significantly negatively correlated with self-monitoring ($r(40) = -.31, p < .05$), although not with public self-consciousness. Low self-monitors (assumed to correspond to moral Type B) tended to accept more responsibility than high self-monitors (assumed to correspond to moral Type A). The correlation between private

⁴ This explanation for the three way interaction is consistent with the hypothesis that the salience of the buyer was increased in the Consequential group.

self-consciousness and acceptance of responsibility was positive, as predicted, but it only approached significance ($r(40) = .25, p = .12$). There was also a marginally significant correlation between disclosure and self-monitoring ($r(40) = -.28, p = .07$). High self-monitors tended to disclose less and charge more than low self-monitors. Disclosure was not significantly related to either private or public self-consciousness.

Private self-consciousness was not significantly correlated with either self-monitoring or public self-consciousness. However, self-monitoring and public self-consciousness were significantly positively correlated ($r(40) = .41, p < .01$).

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the results of this thesis suggest that moral judgment to moral dilemmas other than those on Kohlberg's test tends to be structured in terms of the stages that Kohlberg has outlined. Although Kohlberg's test appears to assess moral competence, this study does not support Kohlberg's claim that moral judgment is structurally homogeneous. The structural heterogeneity found in this study is consistent with Krebs et al.'s (under review), Levine's (1979), and Rest's (1983) models. Finding that subjects make use of a range of stages depending on the dilemma, the position justified, and the position endorsed supports the interactional approach, but raises the question of what influences the stage-structures invoked.

The results of this study seem most consistent with a revised model of the relationship between moral choice and moral justification that draws heavily on Backman's (1985) model. In this model, moral justifications tend to covary with moral choice, and people are assumed to have a range of stages available to justify their choices. Moral choice is assumed to be influenced by individuals' goals in situations, and these goals involve some combination of identity claims and practical aims. Often these two types of goal will conflict and some compromise must be reached, or a definition of the situation must be constructed that will allow the individual to maximize

both types of goal. In making a decision, persons weigh the costs and rewards associated with each choice. These costs and rewards can be divided into at least four types: material, social image, self-concept, and empathy. The decision-making process will include consideration of the justifications available to support the alternative choices, and the acceptability of the choices, as well as the justifications available, to themselves and the people to whom they feel accountable. The association between justifications and choices may be weaker in some cases than in others. In some cases there may be a range of stages available to justify a particular choice. Within the range of justifications available, people will construct the highest stage argument to justify their preferred decision, and, if required to discuss a nonpreferred decision, they will use lower stage arguments, if possible, in order to avoid undermining their preferred decision with more sophisticated arguments. This model also recognizes that there are individual differences in personal moral values and the desire to be consistent with these values. Internally orientated individuals (Kohlberg's Type B) will be more consistent with their moral values, while externally orientated individuals (Kohlberg's Type A) may tend to employ the values associated with the situation.

In this study, it is not possible to specify a causal direction in the association between moral choice and moral justification. Subjects may justify choices as an afterthought,

or the subjects may consider or anticipate the justifications available before making a choice. A more likely alternative is some combination of these two explanations, depending on the situation. In some situations, strong pressures may influence choices, which must then be justified. In most other situations, anticipation of the acceptability of the reasons available to justify choices may be a part of the decision-making process (Backman, 1985).

Future Research and Practical Implications

Future research should assess the hypothesis that increased psychological immediacy of the buyer increases moral choice, by varying the immediacy of the buyer in the ways discussed above. The ratio of financial rewards to self and the buyer could also be varied. For example, subjects could increase their gain while only reducing the other's gain slightly, or vice versa. Another variable that could be manipulated is the total amount of financial reward. Increasing the amount of money available might increase the pressure to make an immoral decision and shift the balance point when considering self versus the buyer.

A host of other factors may influence the strength of the moral norm to tell the truth, or, in other words, may affect the availability of explanations, or ways of excusing lack of disclosure (Backman, 1985). For example, if the buyer were poor (e.g., a single parent or an elderly person), the moral norm to tell the truth would be strengthened; lack of disclosure would

be worse than if the buyer were wealthy. In addition, the moral order, or the social context in which the dilemma is set, might influence the acceptability of particular types of justifications. For example, the Stage 2 reasoning used for con-disclosure justifications might be acceptable in a business context, but less acceptable in a family context. It is likely that these factors would interact with amount of money involved; the effect might be especially strong when a large amount of money was involved.

Another important characteristic of situations is ambiguity. If the situation is ambiguous "definitional leeway is provided and persons are more free to construct and negotiate situational definitions to their advantage" (Backman, 1985, p. 267). Finally, it should be noted that the interactional approach does not ignore individual differences. Individuals may differ in their personal values and the degree to which they refer to these values. This orientation to internal versus external values could also be experimentally manipulated by filming subjects, or exposing them to mirrors during the study (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). Also, people may differ in the audiences to which they feel accountable. It may be possible to manipulate the salience of various internal audiences (Baldwin & Holmes, 1987).

A practical implication of this research is the possibility that moral decision-making may be increased by increasing the psychological immediacy of the people affected by the decision.

In other words, decisions made far removed from the people affected (e.g., policy formed in boardrooms), may be less moral, or other-oriented, than decisions made under conditions in which the "victim" is closer. People asked to enforce, at a face-to-face level, a policy made in boardrooms, will be in a difficult position because they may be required to enforce a less moral decision than they would have made. Of course, it may be naive to expect decision-making conditions to be changed, since the purpose of making decisions removed from those affected may be to make decisions that are financially more advantageous than decisions made with the victim more immediate. As the subjects in this study showed, more money can be made when the costs to the victim are further removed.

Finally, it should be noted that merely increasing the closeness of the victim may not increase the morality of a choice, since the underlying construct assumed to be responsible is *psychological* immediacy. It is possible for people to be physically close, yet psychologically distant, because they consider themselves different in any number of ways (e.g., race, nationality, status, or even gender).

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APPENDIX A

INSTRUCTIONS

Virtually everyone ends up selling something in his or her life. In this study, we are investigating people's decisions about how much to charge for articles that are defective in various ways. As is sometimes the case in real life, buying and selling take place on paper, and that is the way it will be in this study. We will serve as the "middle person". We have given you the rights to an article, so on paper you now own an article worth \$20 new. This article broke down soon after it was purchased. The repairman who fixed it said it had a number of small problems and he could not guarantee that it would function effectively in the future. You now have the opportunity, through us, to sell this article. Your main task in this study is to decide how much to reveal to an interested buyer about the defects in the article, which is linked to the price you may charge. If you decide to reveal a lot about the defects, you may charge only a little money for the article. If you decide to reveal a little about the defects, you may charge a lot. Your options, with the consequences for you and for the buyer of the article, are listed below.

The opportunity before you is different from those you customarily experience in everyday life in three ways: first, you will not actually have the article in your hand; second, you will not actually face a buyer; and third, the buyer will be required to pay whatever you decide to charge. However, the opportunity will be similar to buying and selling exchanges in everyday life because the consequences of your decision will be real. You will actually receive the amount of money you decide to charge, and another subject in the second part of this experiment, whom we will designate as a buyer, will actually have to pay the amount you charge. We will pair you with a buyer, give this person \$20 on paper, and inform this buyer that he or she will be required to pay whatever price you decide to charge.

Please indicate your choice by checking one of the alternatives listed below, then proceed to answer the questions on the attached questionnaire. After you have made your choice, fill in, on the enclosed receipt, the amount of money we owe you for your participation in this study--\$10--plus the amount you decide to charge for the article. Write your name and address on the enclosed envelope, and a secretary will mail you a cheque for the amount on the receipt. Do not write your name on the questionnaire. We want your decision to be entirely private. When you have completed this questionnaire put everything in the large envelope, seal it, and place it in the box provided. The secretary who will mail your cheque to you has no idea what the study is about, and we will code the questionnaires by number so that your name will not be associated with your decisions.

Please read and answer the questions in the order given, and try to answer each question as fully as possible. We are particularly interested in the reasoning behind your answers, so please elaborate as much as possible in response to our "why" and "why not" questions. If you need more space than the amount provided, write on the back of the page.

1. Check a box to indicate the amount you decide to reveal about the article's deficiencies. This will determine the price for the article. (For example, if you decide to reveal all the defects in the article you can charge \$2; the buyer will pay you \$2 and keep \$18. If you reveal none of the defects in the article you can charge \$20. The buyer will pay you \$20 and keep nothing.)

	You gain	Buyer gains
<input type="checkbox"/> Reveal all the deficiencies	\$2	\$18
<input type="checkbox"/> Reveal almost all the deficiencies	\$5	\$15
<input type="checkbox"/> Reveal most of the deficiencies	\$8	\$12
<input type="checkbox"/> Reveal some of the deficiencies	\$11	\$9
<input type="checkbox"/> Reveal a few of the deficiencies	\$14	\$6
<input type="checkbox"/> Reveal very few of the deficiencies	\$17	\$3
<input type="checkbox"/> Reveal none of the deficiencies	\$20	\$0

Now fill out and sign the receipt for the \$10 payment plus the amount you decided to charge for the article, and write your name and address on the enclosed envelope. You will receive this extra money.

2. What caused you to reach this decision?

3. What are the main issues involved in this situation?

4. Are there any moral issues involved? If so, please explain what they are and why they are moral issues.

4a. What is the right thing to do? (Check one box)

	You gain	Buyer gains
<input type="checkbox"/> Reveal all the deficiencies	\$2	\$18
<input type="checkbox"/> Reveal almost all the deficiencies	\$5	\$15
<input type="checkbox"/> Reveal most of the deficiencies	\$8	\$12
<input type="checkbox"/> Reveal some of the deficiencies	\$11	\$9
<input type="checkbox"/> Reveal a few of the deficiencies	\$14	\$6
<input type="checkbox"/> Reveal very few of the deficiencies	\$17	\$3
<input type="checkbox"/> Reveal none of the deficiencies	\$20	\$0

Why would this be the right thing to do?

4b. Did any moral considerations affect your decision? Please

specify.

5. What are the reasons for not telling the buyer about the defect in the article? Please explain fully.

6. In what ways would it be right for a person in the seller's role not to tell the buyer about the defect in the article? Please explain fully.

6a. Why would this be right?

7. In what ways would it be fair not to tell the buyer about the defect in the article? Please explain.

7a. Why would this be fair?

8. Does the buyer have a responsibility to uncover the defects in an article of merchandise? Why or why not? How does this apply to the dilemma?

9. What are the reasons for telling the buyer about the defect in the article? Please explain fully.

10. In what ways would it be right for a person in the seller's role to tell the buyer about the defect in the article? Please explain fully.

10a. Why would this be right?

11. In what ways would it be fair to tell the buyer about the defect in the article? Please explain.

11a. Why would this be fair?

12. Is the seller under any moral obligation to tell the buyer about the defect in the article? Why or why not?

13. What is the nature of the division of responsibility for uncovering defects in an article of merchandise between the seller and the buyer? (Circle a point on the scale)

Definitely all
the buyer's
responsibility

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Definitely all
the seller's
responsibility

14. Would it make any difference if the buyer asked you directly whether the article were deficient in any way? Should it? Why or why not.

15. Is it important to tell the truth? Why or why not?

16. How does this apply to buying and selling? Please explain fully.

17. Would it make any difference whether the buyer were your friend, an acquaintance, or a stranger? If so, what difference would it make? Should it? Why or why not.

18. Thinking back over the dilemma, what would you say is the most responsible thing to do?

19. How well were you able to imagine the buyer who will be paying the price that you charged? (circle a point on the scale)

not very well 1----2----3----4----5----6----7 very well

What do you think most people actually would do if they faced the decisions you made?

1. Check a box to indicate the amount you think most people would reveal about the article's deficiencies. This will determine the price for the article. (For example, if you think most people would reveal all the deficiencies they would gain \$2 and the buyer would gain \$18; if you think most people would reveal none of the deficiencies they would gain \$20 and the buyer would gain nothing.)

	Seller gains	Buyer gains
<input type="checkbox"/> [] Reveal all the deficiencies	\$2	\$18
<input type="checkbox"/> [] Reveal almost all the deficiencies	\$5	\$15
<input type="checkbox"/> [] Reveal most of the deficiencies	\$8	\$12
<input type="checkbox"/> [] Reveal some of the deficiencies	\$11	\$9
<input type="checkbox"/> [] Reveal a few of the deficiencies	\$14	\$6
<input type="checkbox"/> [] Reveal very few of the deficiencies	\$17	\$3
<input type="checkbox"/> [] Reveal none of the deficiencies	\$20	\$0

2. Please briefly explain why.

To what extent do you think the choices you made validly reflect the choices you actually would make in these situations in real-life?

1. Check a box to indicate the amount you think you actually would reveal about the article's deficiencies. This will determine the price for the article. (For example, if you think you would reveal all the deficiencies you would gain \$2, and the buyer would gain \$18; if you think you would reveal none of the deficiencies you would gain \$20 and the buyer would gain

nothing.)

	You gain	Buyer gains
<input type="checkbox"/> Reveal all the deficiencies	\$2	\$18
<input type="checkbox"/> Reveal almost all the deficiencies	\$5	\$15
<input type="checkbox"/> Reveal most of the deficiencies	\$8	\$12
<input type="checkbox"/> Reveal some of the deficiencies	\$11	\$9
<input type="checkbox"/> Reveal a few of the deficiencies	\$14	\$6
<input type="checkbox"/> Reveal very few of the deficiencies	\$17	\$3
<input type="checkbox"/> Reveal none of the deficiencies	\$20	\$0

2. Please briefly explain why.

APPENDIX B
INSTRUCTIONS

Virtually everyone ends up selling something in his or her life. In this study, we are investigating people's decisions about how much to charge for articles that are defective in various ways. As is sometimes the case in real life, buying and selling take place on paper, and that is the way it will be in this study. We will serve as the "middle person". Imagine that we have given you the rights to an article, so on paper you now own an article worth \$20 new. This article broke down soon after it was purchased. The repairman who fixed it said it had a number of small problems and he could not guarantee that it would function effectively in the future. You now have the opportunity, through us, to sell this article. Your main task in this study is to decide how much to reveal to an interested buyer about the defects in the article, which is linked to the price you may charge. If you decide to reveal a lot about the defects, you may charge only a little money for the article. If you decide to reveal a little about the defects, you may charge a lot. Your options, with the consequences for you and for the buyer of the article, are listed below.

The opportunity before you is different from those you customarily experience in everyday life in three ways: first, you will not actually have the article in your hand; second, you will not actually face a buyer; and third, the buyer will be required to pay whatever you decide to charge. In addition, the opportunity will be different from the buying and selling exchanges in everyday life because no money will actually change hands. The consequences of your decision will not be real. We will pair you with a buyer (another subject in the second part of this experiment), give this person \$20 on paper, and inform this buyer that he or she will be required to pay whatever price you decide to charge.

Please indicate your choice by checking one of the alternatives listed below, then proceed to answer the questions on the attached questionnaire. After you have made your choice, sign the enclosed receipt for the \$10 that we owe you for your participation in this study. Write your name and address on the enclosed envelope, and a secretary will mail you a cheque for \$10. Do not write your name on the questionnaire. We want your decision to be entirely private. When you have completed this questionnaire put everything in the large envelope, seal it, and place it in the box provided. The secretary who will mail your cheque to you has no idea what the study is about, and we will code the questionnaires by number so that your name will not be associated with your decisions.

Please read and answer the questions in the order given, and try to answer each question as fully as possible. We are particularly interested in the reasoning behind your answers, so please elaborate as much as possible in response to our "why" and "why not" questions. If you need more space than the amount provided, write on the back of the page.

1. Check a box to indicate the amount you decide to reveal about the article's deficiencies. This will determine the price for the article. (For example, if you decide to reveal all the defects in the article you can charge \$2; the buyer will pay you \$2 and keep \$18. If you reveal none of the defects in the article you can charge \$20. The buyer will pay you \$20 and keep nothing.)

	You would gain	Buyer would gain
<input type="checkbox"/> Reveal all the deficiencies	\$2	\$18
<input type="checkbox"/> Reveal almost all the deficiencies	\$5	\$15
<input type="checkbox"/> Reveal most of the deficiencies	\$8	\$12
<input type="checkbox"/> Reveal some of the deficiencies	\$11	\$9
<input type="checkbox"/> Reveal a few of the deficiencies	\$14	\$6
<input type="checkbox"/> Reveal very few of the deficiencies	\$17	\$3
<input type="checkbox"/> Reveal none of the deficiencies	\$20	\$0

Now sign the enclosed receipt for the \$10 payment, and write your name and address on the enclosed envelope.

2. What caused you to reach this decision?

3. What are the main issues involved in this situation?

4. Are there any moral issues involved? If so, please explain what they are and why they are moral issues.

4a. What is the right thing to do? (Check one box)

	You would gain	Buyer would gain
<input type="checkbox"/> Reveal all the deficiencies	\$2	\$18
<input type="checkbox"/> Reveal almost all the deficiencies	\$5	\$15
<input type="checkbox"/> Reveal most of the deficiencies	\$8	\$12
<input type="checkbox"/> Reveal some of the deficiencies	\$11	\$9
<input type="checkbox"/> Reveal a few of the deficiencies	\$14	\$6
<input type="checkbox"/> Reveal very few of the deficiencies	\$17	\$3
<input type="checkbox"/> Reveal none of the deficiencies	\$20	\$0

Why is this the right thing to do?

4b. Did any moral considerations affect your decision? Please specify.

5. What are the reasons for not telling the buyer about the defect in the article? Please explain fully.

6. In what ways would it be right for a person in the seller's role not to tell the buyer about the defect in the article? Please explain fully.

6a. Why would this be right?

7. In what ways would it be fair not to tell the buyer about the defect in the article? Please explain.

7a. Why would this be fair?

8. Does the buyer have a responsibility to uncover the defects in an article of merchandise? Why or why not? How does this apply to the dilemma?

9. What are the reasons for telling the buyer about the defect in the article? Please explain fully.

10. In what ways would it be right for a person in the seller's role to tell the buyer about the defect in the article? Please explain fully.

10a. Why would this be right?

11. In what ways would it be fair to tell the buyer about the defect in the article? Please explain.

11a. Why would this be fair?

12. Is the seller under any moral obligation to tell the buyer about the defect in the article? Why or why not?

13. What is the nature of the division of responsibility for uncovering defects in an article of merchandise between the seller and the buyer? (Circle a point on the scale)

Definitely all
the buyer's
responsibility

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Definitely all
the seller's
responsibility

14. Would it make any difference if the buyer asked you directly whether the article were deficient in any way? Should it? Why or why not.

15. Is it important to tell the truth? Why or why not?

16. How does this apply to buying and selling? Please explain fully.

17. Would it make any difference whether the buyer were your friend, an acquaintance, or a stranger? If so, what difference would it make? Should it? Why or why not.

18. Thinking back over the dilemma, what would you say is the most responsible thing to do?

19. How well were you able to imagine the buyer who will be

paying the price that you charged? (circle a point on the scale)

not very well 1----2----3----4----5----6----7 very well

What do you think most people actually would do if they faced the decisions you made?

1. Check a box to indicate the amount you think most people would reveal about the article's deficiencies. This will determine the price for the article. (For example, if you think most people would reveal all the deficiencies they would gain nothing and the buyer would gain \$20; if you think most people would reveal none of the deficiencies they would gain \$20 and the buyer would gain nothing.)

	Seller gains	Buyer gains
<input type="checkbox"/> Reveal all the deficiencies	\$2	\$18
<input type="checkbox"/> Reveal almost all the deficiencies	\$5	\$15
<input type="checkbox"/> Reveal most of the deficiencies	\$8	\$12
<input type="checkbox"/> Reveal some of the deficiencies	\$11	\$9
<input type="checkbox"/> Reveal a few of the deficiencies	\$14	\$6
<input type="checkbox"/> Reveal very few of the deficiencies	\$17	\$3
<input type="checkbox"/> Reveal none of the deficiencies	\$20	\$0

2. Please briefly explain why.

To what extent do you think the choices you made validly reflect the choices you actually would make in these situations in real-life?

1. Check a box to indicate the amount you think you actually would reveal about the article's deficiencies. This will determine the price for the article. (For example, if you think you would reveal all the deficiencies you would gain nothing, and the buyer would gain \$20; if you think you would reveal none of the deficiencies you would gain \$20 and the buyer would gain nothing.)

	You gain	Buyer gains
<input type="checkbox"/> Reveal all the deficiencies	\$2	\$18
<input type="checkbox"/> Reveal almost all the deficiencies	\$5	\$15
<input type="checkbox"/> Reveal most of the deficiencies	\$8	\$12
<input type="checkbox"/> Reveal some of the deficiencies	\$11	\$9
<input type="checkbox"/> Reveal a few of the deficiencies	\$14	\$6
<input type="checkbox"/> Reveal very few of the deficiencies	\$17	\$3
<input type="checkbox"/> Reveal none of the deficiencies	\$20	\$0

2. Please briefly explain why.

APPENDIX C

In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money and tried every legal means, but he could only get together about half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm gong to make money from it." So, having tried every legal means, Heinz gets desperate and considers breaking into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife.

1. Should Heinz steal the drug? Why or why not?
2. Would it actually be right or wrong for Heinz to steal the drug? Why would it be right or wrong?
3. Does Heinz have a duty or obligation to steal the drug? Why or why not?
4. If Heinz doesn't love his wife, should he steal the drug for her? (In other words, does it make a difference whether or not Heinz loves his wife?) Why or why not?
5. Suppose the person dying was not his wife but a stranger. Should Heinz steal the drug for the stranger? Why or why not?
6. Now suppose that it's a pet animal he loves dearly that is dying. Should Heinz steal to save the pet animal? Why or why not?
7. Is it important for people to do everything they can to save another's life? Why or why not?
8. It is against the law for Heinz to steal the drug. Does that make it morally wrong? Why or why not? If no, on what basis should Heinz distinguish between what is legally wrong and what is morally right?
9. In general, should people try to do everything they can to obey the law? Why or why not?
10. How does this general rule apply to what Heinz should do in this particular case (when his wife needs a drug that he cannot obtain legally)?
11. In thinking back over the dilemma, what would you say is the most responsible thing for Heinz to do? Why is that the most

responsible thing for Heinz to do?

Heinz did break into the store. He stole the drug and gave it to his wife. In the newspapers the next day there was an account of the robbery. Mr. Brown, a police officer who knew Heinz, read the account. He remembered seeing Heinz running away from the store and realized that it was Heinz who stole the drug. Mr. Brown wonders whether he should report that it was Heinz who stole the drug.

1. Should Officer Brown report Heinz for stealing? Why or why not?
2. Suppose Officer Brown were a close friend of Heinz, should he then report him? Why or why not?

Continuation: Officer Brown did report Heinz. Heinz was arrested and brought to court. A jury finds him guilty. It is up to the judge to determine the sentence.

3. Should the judge give Heinz some sentence, or should he suspend the sentence and let Heinz go free? Why is that best? What should the judge base his decision on?
4. In general, should people be punished when they break the law? Why or why not? How does this general rule about punishment apply to how the judge should sentence Heinz for this particular crime?
5. Heinz was doing what his conscience told him when he stole the drug. Should a lawbreaker be punished if he is acting out of conscience? Why or why not?
6. Thinking back over the dilemma, what would you say is the most responsible thing for the judge to do? Why is that the most responsible thing for the judge to do?

APPENDIX D

These statements concern your personal reactions to a number of different situations. No two statements are exactly alike, so consider each statement carefully before answering. If a statement is true or mostly true as applied to you, place a T in the bracket beside the statement. If a statement is false or not usually true as applied to you, place an F in the bracket beside the statement.

Be honest, but do not spend too much time over any one statement. As a rule, first impressions are as accurate as any.

1. I find it hard to imitate the behaviour of other people. ()
2. My behaviour is usually an expression of my true inner feelings, attitudes, and beliefs. ()
3. At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say things that others will like. ()
4. I can only argue for ideas which I already believe. ()
5. I can make impromptu speeches even on topics about which I have almost no information. ()
6. I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain people. ()
7. When I am uncertain how to act in a social situation, I look to the behaviour of others for cues. ()
8. I would probably make a good actor. ()
9. I rarely need the advice of my friends to choose movies, books, or music. ()
10. I sometimes appear to others to be experiencing deeper emotions than I actually am. ()
11. I laugh more when I watch a comedy with others than when alone. ()
12. In a group of people I am rarely the center of attention. ()
13. In different situations and with different people, I often act like very different persons. ()
14. I am not particularly good at making other people like me. ()
15. Even if I am not enjoying myself, I often pretend to be having a good time. ()

16. I'm not always the person I appear to be. ()
17. I would not change my opinions (or the way I do things) in order to please someone else or win their favor. ()
18. I have considered being an entertainer. ()
19. In order to get along and be liked, I tend to be what people expect me to be rather than anything else. ()
20. I have never been good at games like charades or improvisational acting. ()
21. I have trouble changing my behaviour to suit different people and different situations. ()
22. At a party I let others keep the jokes and stories going. ()
23. I feel a bit awkward in company and do not show up quite so well as I should. ()
24. I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face (if for a right end). ()
25. I may deceive people by being friendly when I really dislike them. ()

APPENDIX E

INSTRUCTIONS

Listed below are a number of statements that may be either extremely uncharacteristic of you or extremely characteristic. Read each statement carefully. Then indicate the extent to which the statement is characteristic or uncharacteristic of you by circling a number on the scale below the statement. If a statement is extremely uncharacteristic of you circle a 0. If a statement is extremely characteristic of you circle a 4. If a statement is somewhat characteristic circle a 3, and if it is somewhat uncharacteristic circle a 1.

1. I'm always trying to figure myself out.
0 1 2 3 4
2. I'm concerned about my style of doing things.
0 1 2 3 4
3. Generally, I'm not very aware of myself.
0 1 2 3 4
4. It takes me time to overcome my shyness in new situations.
0 1 2 3 4
5. I reflect about myself a lot.
0 1 2 3 4
6. I'm concerned about the way I present myself.
0 1 2 3 4
7. I'm often the subject of my own fantasies.
0 1 2 3 4
8. I have trouble working when someone is watching me.
0 1 2 3 4
9. I never scrutinize myself.
0 1 2 3 4
10. I get embarrassed very easily.
0 1 2 3 4
11. I'm self-conscious about the way I look.
0 1 2 3 4
12. I don't find it hard to talk to strangers.
0 1 2 3 4
13. I'm generally attentive to my inner feelings.
0 1 2 3 4
14. I usually worry about making a good impression.
0 1 2 3 4
15. I'm constantly examining my motives.
0 1 2 3 4
16. I feel anxious when I speak in front of a group.
0 1 2 3 4
17. One of the last things I do before I leave my house is look in mirror.
0 1 2 3 4
18. I sometimes have the feeling that I'm off somewhere watching myself.
0 1 2 3 4
19. I'm concerned about what other people think of me.
0 1 2 3 4
20. I'm alert to changes in my mood.

- 0 1 2 3 4
21. I'm usually aware of my appearance.
- 0 1 2 3 4
22. I'm aware of the way my mind works when I work through a
problem.
- 0 1 2 3 4
23. Large groups make me nervous.
- 0 1 2 3 4

Table 1

Selling Dilemma Interview Judgments and Corresponding Kohlberg
Criterion Judgments

Interview Judgments	Criterion Judgments
Con-Disclosure Justifications	
"[The seller should not mention the defects] if the seller is trying to survive, OR to maximize your net financial profit."	[Heinz should steal the drug] because his wife needs it or will die without it. (Form A, Life, CJ #3, Stage 2, p. 14)
"[The seller should not mention the defects] if the buyer had cheated you previously, OR if they were just trying to rip me off."	[Heinz should steal the drug] to get back at the druggist; OR because the druggist was asking for it or was trying to rip him off." (Form A, Life, CJ #5, Stage 2, p. 16)
"[The seller should not mention the defects] if there was a desperate need on the seller's part to get as much money as possible."	[Heinz should steal the drug] if he is desperate; OR because he wouldn't have much choice." (Form A, Life, CJ #8, Stage 2/3, p. 19)
Pro-Disclosure Justifications	
"[The buyer should be told about the defects] to guard against future liability, or because lying could lead to court action, or loss or customers."	[Louise should keep quiet] because . . . if she tells, she may get into trouble with her sister and/or mother. (Form B, Contract, #8, Stage 2, p. 532)
"[The buyer should be told about the defects] because you should do unto others as you would have them do unto you."	[Louise should keep quiet] because she'd realize that if the shoe were on the other foot, she wouldn't want Judy to tell on her." (Form B, Contract, CJ #19, Stage 3, p. 541)

"[The buyer should be told about the defects] to avoid feeling guilty, or to make yourself feel good."

[It is important to keep a promise] because it makes a person feel good inside; OR because if you don't you'll feel bad inside."

(Form A, Contract, CJ #19, Stage 3, p. 210)

"If the seller were to be dishonest and give unfair exchange to the buyer he/she would be adding to the general distrust and ill-will felt between most members of society at large. . . . He/she will be contributing to the decay of his/her society. Individuals cannot be bound together for long on the basis of distrust and inequity."

"[It is important to keep a promise] for the sake of the orderly or smooth functioning of society, or so that society can survive or be productive; OR because otherwise social order is disrupted or society is destroyed."

(Form A, Contract, CJ #30, Stage 4, p. 223)

Table 2

Mean Moral Maturity Scores as a Function of Consequences
and Type of Dilemma

Consequences	Type of Dilemma		
	Selling	Kohlberg	Marginals
Consequential	249 _a SD = 15.2	350 _c SD = 31.2	299
Hypothetical	234 _b SD = 16.9	335 _c SD = 33.1	284
Marginals	241	342	

Note. Cell means with different subscripts differ significantly at $p < .05$, corrected for familywise error rate.

Table 3

Number of Subjects Obtaining Various Combinations of Global
Stage Scores on Kohlberg's Dilemmas and the Selling Dilemma

Stage on Selling Dilemma	Stage on Kohlberg Dilemmas					Marginals
	2	2/3	3	3/4	4	
2			2			2
2/3			11	20	6	37
3					1	1
3/4						
4						
4/5						
Marginals			13	20	7	40

Table 4

Mean Moral Maturity Scores as a Function of Choice on
Disclosure Preferred and Choice Justified

Preference	Choice		Marginals
	Con-Disclosure	Pro-Disclosure	
Pro-Disclosure	205 _a SD = 12.5 (C=207, n=14) (H=200, n=6)	295 _c SD = 25.9 (C=296, n=14) (H=293, n=6)	250
Con-Disclosure	203 _a SD = 8.4 (C=203, n=6) (H=203, n=14)	263 _b SD = 30.0 (C=282, n=6) (H=255, n=14)	233
Marginals	204	279	

Note. Cell means with different subscripts differ significantly at $p < .005$, corrected for familywise error rate.

In parentheses, "C" stands for the Consequential group and "H" stands for the Hypothetical group.