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IDEOLOGY, SPACE AND THE DIALECTICS OF UNION ORGANIZATION: A CASE STUDY OF THE UNITED FISHERMEN AND ALLIED WORKERS' UNION

BY

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B.A.(HONS)., UNIVERSITY OF NATAL, 1986

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Ideology, Space and the Dialectics of Union Organization: A Case Study of the United Fishermen and Allied Workers' Union

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ABSTRACT

The key research question of this thesis is:

What is the relation between space and production in the formation of class ideology?

An analysis of this question allows one to consider the more important problematic of the relation between ideology and the dialectics of union development.

A case study of the United Fishermen and Allied Workers' Union (UFAWU) is used to investigate this question. Particularities of place and nature of production in the fishing industry are noted. This is followed by the selection of two episodes of mobilization which have occurred in UFAWU's recent history and the analysis of these episodes of mobilization to indicate the effects of locale- specific ideological forces on union organization and mobilization.

These episodes are contextualised in both UFAWU's overall historical trajectory and the political economy of British Columbia and Canada. The role of decisions made by individuals drawing upon locale-specific ideologies indicates their importance to the formation and development of an organization. Failure to consider the effects of the locale-specific nature of ideology is seen negatively to affect Union organization. A possible

resolution of these deficiencies in union organization and mobilization is proposed.

The thesis facilitates understanding the spatial relations and social forces in the fishing industry, indicating how these forces affect union organization and mobilization. The thesis is important in the broader social context since it seeks to understand the complex dialectics of group (in this case, union) formation, and the nature and role of locale-specific ideologies.

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ACRONYMS

BC.....British Columbia
CFIC.....Commercial Fishing Industry Council
CLC.....Canadian Labor Congress
DFO.....Department of Fisheries and Oceans
FCBC.....Fisheries' Council of British Columbia
FCRPWU...Fish Cannery and Reduction Plant Workers' Union
FPBA.....Fish Processors' Bargaining Association
FSC.....Fishermen's Survival Coalition
GATT.....General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GEB.....General Executive Board
MAC.....Minister's Advisory Committee
NBBH.....Native Brotherhood of British Columbia
PCFU.....Pacific Coast Fishermen's Union
PCTA.....Pacific Coast Trollers' Association
PRASCU...Prince Rupert Amalgamated Shoreworkers' and Clerks' Union
PTA.....Pacific Trollers' Association
UFAWU....United Fishermen and Allied Workers' Union
UFFU.....United Fishermen's Federal Union
US.....United States (of America)
TLC.....Trades and Labor Congress

INTRODUCTION

This thesis proposes to investigate the relation between locale, ideology and production relations and their effects on Union organization in the fishing industry of British Columbia(BC), with specific focus being directed at the salmon fishing sector.

The salmon fishing industry was selected due to its size and importance to the economies of British Columbia and Canada. BC salmon provide 99% by harvest volume, and 98% by processed value, of all Canadian salmon, with Canada being the fourth largest harvester of salmon in the world(FCBC (1989) p.6). BC canned salmon made up 41% of world sales in 1987 (or 47% of world sales if averaged over the period 1983-1987), making BC the world's largest producer of canned salmon and second largest producer of frozen salmon(FCBC (1989) p.8-9).

The United Fishermen(sic) and Allied Workers' Union (UFAWU) was selected for analysis since it attempts to organize and mobilize workers in this industry. Furthermore, it is the largest organization of workers in the BC fishing industry, and contains within its organization a diversity of ideological perspectives. These can be divided into basically two different, locale-specific ideologies: those of fishers and those of

shoreworkers. The organizational consequences of these differences are analyzed in Chapter Four. This analysis was felt to be important since it alerts organizers to the need for an anti-foundationalist political and organizational strategy, a theme introduced in Chapter Five.

The thesis is considered important since it attempts to go beyond identified limitations in the literature pertaining to the fishing industry of BC. This literature can be divided into the discourses of fisheries economics and fisheries sociology. Research within these fields is, on the whole, based on positivist research agendas. While a critique of positivism will not be offered here (see: Bhaskar(1986)(1989)), discussion of the research of mainstream fisheries economics and fisheries sociology will be provided in Chapter One. Links with positivist epistemology and ontology will be made. This review serves not only to contextualize the thesis in the literature, but also to indicate the need for extending fisheries economics, biology and sociology beyond positivist orthodoxies. This is pursued in Chapters Two, Three, Four and Five.

Chapter Two indicates the nature of reformulations underway in Critical Social Theory. These reformulations allow one to go beyond the analysis offered in mainstream

research. Chapter Two will consequently entail an elaboration of this reconceptualization. The position the theoretical concepts of ideology and locale will play in this thesis is indicated. This will be applied, in Chapters Three and Four, to the fishing industry of British Columbia and, more specifically, the organizational dynamic of the United Fishermen and Allied Workers' Union.

Chapter Three will provide an elaboration on the nature of production in the fishing industry of BC, as well as socio-economic and historical data on the industry, the Union and industry workers. The nature of ideology and consciousness within the industry will be indicated.

Chapter Four will discuss two episodes of worker mobilization in the industry, illustrating the dialectic of ideology and production relations in the process of union organization.

Chapter Five will provide a conclusion, indicating the relevance of the research and the method to industry workers and researchers, as well as to the discourse of Political Geography.

CHAPTER ONE: LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter will review the literature on the fishing industry of BC. Due to a 'prolific' theoretical and applied literature on the field, the review is selective and partial. The chapter must include a discussion of the concept of common property, as defined in the literature, since, as Marchak notes, '[t]he term "common property" is central to a prolific literature on the fisheries...' (1987(a) p.4). This literature effectively began with the publication of Gordon's(1954) seminal paper which offered a critique of the then current approaches to management of the fishery. It is to this literature that attention should, at the outset, be directed.

1.1 Common property and fisheries economics.

The discourse of fisheries economics developed in response to perceived limitations in the management objectives advocated by fisheries biologists (Gordon(1954)). Gordon(1954) thus indicated a difference between biological and economic objectives of fisheries research and management, arguing that earlier (biologically based) concepts of 'depletion' and 'conservation' should be supplemented by a broader concept of 'Fisheries Management'(Ibid. p.12), a concept that would have as its focus the human objective of the derivation not only of a

sustainable catch (proposed by fisheries biologists), but also the derivation of economic rents from the fishing process. In this regard, Gordon(1954) proposed the concept of net economic yield, a concept which would analyze the specifically economic factors of fisheries management. Furthermore, Gordon argued that behavioristic generalizations of fisher activity could be made 'along the lines of the standard economic theory of production'(p.12), generalizations which could be 'made into an integrated element of a general and systematic "bionomic" theory'(p.12).

By 1957, Schaefer believed there was a 'fairly large degree of confusion' (Schaefer(1957) p.670) based on misunderstandings of the basic concepts used by fish biologists and economists. He thus proposed to 'arrive at a rational basis of considering the social problem of fisheries management'(Ibid. p.670) by integrating aspects of (biologically based) population dynamics with the economics of commercial fishing, a synthesis that came to be called the Gordon-Schaefer model (Cunningham, Dunn and Whitmarsh (1985)). Theoretical work on fisheries economics continued in this tradition of indicating the existence and interaction between natural and human systems in the fishery (Cunningham(et al)(1985) p.1-2; 13).

A key problem in the fishery identified in the Gordon-Schaefer model, and argued for by subsequent researchers, was the open access and common property nature of the resource. Indeed, Matthews and Phyne(1988) argue that 'virtually every work on the fishery as a common property resource traces the origins of its perspective to the general analysis of "The tragedy of the commons" by Garrett Hardin or to Scott Gordon's [1954] economic analysis'(p.159).

Thus, subsequent applications in the field of fisheries management of the Gordon-Schaefer theoretical model were aimed at reducing this common property/open access characteristic of the fishery by proposing various forms of management (see: Cunningham (et al)(1985) p.83 et. sec.; Copes(1986)), in order to improve harvests and rents.

The concept of common property as applied in neo-classical fisheries economics is contingent upon the ontology of neo-classical economics which posits human agents as free, rational, autonomous and profit maximizing beings (Caldwell(1982); McCloskey(1985); Langdon(1982)). When applied to an open access common property resource this construct proposes that "rational fishers" will attempt to maximize their returns to inputs (Cunningham (et al)(1985) p.18-23)), a situation which leads to the depletion of

resource rents and often to biological over-exploitation (Pearse(1982) p.76). To prevent (or rectify) this situation, it becomes the responsibility of fisheries policy to assume responsibility for the resource and impose a form of management or regulatory regime on the common property resource (Cunningham (et al)(1985) p.83 et. sec.; Copes(1986)). These ontological assumptions have practical outcomes in the field of fisheries management and in the practices of fisheries biologists and economists.

For example, the assumption of rational fishers, rationally competing with each other in order to exploit a common property resource, results in the recommendation of policies that attempt to shift the resource away from its common property, open access, status (Cunningham(et al)(1985) p.147; 161-174). This, in turn, is seen as necessary to the restoration (and future extraction) of resource rents from the fishery, as well as the 'rational' management of the fishery (Pearse(1982) Ch.7; Cunningham(et al)(1985) p.83-91; 119; 125; 147).

However, in some of the fisheries economics literature there is currently underway a re-evaluation of fundamental postulates. Thus Copes(1987) argues that:

> '... there has been a tendency to attribute most of the fisheries' manifold problems to the common property condition and associated market failure. It

> is my contention that this facile explanation has been used too widely and too uncritically'(p.1-2).

Similarly Wilen(1979) argues that fisheries economists have continued with Gordon's(1954) assumptions, and have 'tended to think in terms of simple one-input models in which the input in the fishery is something seemingly well defined (for example, fishermen) or implicitly well defined (for example, effort)' (Wilen(1979) p.855). Wilen concludes by arguing that:

> '... One-input models of common property fisheries are not rich enough to provide policy guidelines relevant to modern flexible technology fisheries where effort is multi-dimensional'(Wilen(1979) p.857).

Be this as it may, these re-evaluations fail to go beyond the ontological limitations of empiricist and positivist rhetoric since they continue the rational, future-oriented, and profit/income motivated vision of the neo-classical agent, an argument that reaches back to Adam Smith (Oswald(1987))(See, for example Wilson(1988)). Calls for a progression beyond this perspective have exsisted since Ricardo. Latterly, Caldwell(1982) and Boland(1982) have criticized the ontology and epistemology of neo-classical economics by way of criticizing the Scientific Method, although they appear unable to transcend the ontological and epistemological foundations of this method(1).

However, rejection of the concepts of 'open access' and 'common property' is, in fact, unnecessary, provided the concepts are situated in a clearly specified level of theoretical abstraction (see: Sayer(1984)). Furthermore, Knight(1934) argues that:

> 'The actual interests or desires expressed in economic behavior are to an overwhelming extent social in genesis and in content: consequently they cannot be described apart from a system of social relations which itself cannot be treated in purely objective factual terms'(Knight(1934) p.147).

It is in this sense that the theoretical propositions of fisheries economics, and associated applied research in the fields of fisheries economics and fisheries sociology, need not be rejected, but extended and developed by (a) indicating their theoretical validity as abstractions of neo-classical science (see Marx(1964) p.106); and (b) situating the concepts in 'a system of social relations' (Knight(1934) p.147). This is achieved by incorporating this analysis within the critical realist framework and the spatial ontology offered by critical social theory. It is to these considerations that attention is directed in chapter two. Prior to this, however, a review of the sociological literature, followed by a review of the work of Clement, as it pertains to the fishing industry, is needed.

1.2 Fisheries sociology and the 'critique' of common property.

Within the sociological and anthropological literature, notions of the consequences of common property flow from a reliance on the neo-classical discourse of fisheries economic theory as well as the retention of similar functionalist ontological and epistemological perspectives.

Burns, for example, while keeping the notion of common property separate from the component parts of fisher work culture (see Burns(1988) p.138-169), indicates that:

> 'Fishing... is a "common property" resource. The fishery has been traditionally organized as a "common property" resource where harvesting is based upon the "rule of capture"... this common property factor is seen to have a significant impact on fishing' (Burns(1988) p.226).

Burns goes on to cite Pearse(1982 p.75-76) to further justify her perception that the common property factor has a significant impact on fishing.

Burns(1988) notes that the 'common property factor' is the subject of 'extensive' debate, indicating, for example, that common property is the 'main topic of a recent publication by Marchak(et.al.)(1987)'(Burns(1988) p.227).

Marchak((1987)(a) p.4-10) attempts to critique the concept of common property. However, she fails to transcend a positivist and empiricist ontology, resulting in a groundless rejection of the concept of common property. For example, Marchak notes (1987(a) p.3-4):

> 'following a Rousseauian metaphor of history, private property was established when a man first staked out a plot of land, declared his sole right to control it, and others accepted his claim... Locke rested his case on the premises that men's "natural right" to property took precedence over civil law and that the purpose of government was the preservation of that right' (emphasis in original).

Marchak continues by arguing:

> 'Privatization has not been a universal phenomenon. Prior to European settlement, BC Indians... allowed the environment to be owned and managed by kinship or territorially located groups. Ownership rights included allocation of access and harvest rights to fish and use of the caught fish, the exclusion of outsiders, and means required for proper management' (Ibid. p.4).

Marchak confuses theoretical discourse with empirical reality(2). In this regard, Rousseau and Locke were making theoretical and philosophical arguments. The empirical reality of native fisheries (as presented by Marchak) does not invalidate the notion of private property rights as proposed by Rousseau and Locke. Marchak thus attempts to disprove the validity of the common property thesis by indicating the non-universality of the Lockean concept of private property as private and 'natural' ownership.

Alternatively, Marchak attempts to disprove the 'common property' thesis by arguing that:

> 'If the state licences some but not all citizens, thereby granting a privilege to fish, then the right to fish becomes the private property of the fisher... Thus the term "common property" is at least technically inaccurate for the access to fish'(Ibid. p.5).

Insofar as access to fish is concerned, Marchak is technically correct. Yet the concept of common property in the literature is not applied to ownership of licences or access to fish. It is applied to the (fish) resource per se. Thus, while fishers might own their licences, they do not own the fish they seek until such time as they have caught and landed those fish. It is in this sense of fish being the common property of all fishers until capture, that the concept is utilized in the literature of fisheries economics, the literature that Marchak(1987)(a) implicitly critiques.

Marchak's critique of common property consequently extends to:

a) the rejection(3) of common property since private property ownership is not 'a universal phenomena'(p.4);

b) the rejection of the concept since 'the concept turns out to have different definitions'(p.4);

c) the rejection of the concept because of government licencing of fishers, an act that makes the term 'technically inaccurate'(p.5);

d) the rejection of the concept since with 'state management' the fisher loses 'management rights normally associated with [private] property'(p.5);

e) the rejection of the concept since fish habitat is affected by mining and logging interests(p.8);

f) the rejection of the concept since 'numerous, competing property interests'(p.29) exist, interests which 'strive to maximize their profits in volatile markets'(p.29), causing overcapitalization and over-investment(p.28) in the fishery.

Marchak's(1987(a)) critique thus rests on the assumptions of the discourse of Locke and Rousseau- on a positivist and empiricist discourse. The consequence of this is a 'chaotic' (Sayer(1984)) analysis and critique being offered, as indicated in the diversity of positions offered in a-f above, and the contradictory nature of some of her claims (see: arguments d and f). These assumptions are maintained throughout the Marchak, Guppy and McMullan(eds)(1987) text (see, for example, Guppy (1987)(a); Guppy(1987)(b))(4), and are encapsulated in the text's title: Uncommon Property.

The positivist and empiricist assumptions of Marchak(et.al.)(1987) are maintained by Burns(1988), Muszynski(1986)(1987) and the papers in the Journal of Canadian Studies(19(1)1984) special edition on fisheries.

A comprehensive review of these papers will not be offered here(5).

A critique of the ontological and epistemological foundations of the concept is not entertained by fisheries anthropologists and sociologists. Consequently, the assumptions held by fisheries sociologists and anthropologists neglect to consider the perspectives of the resource held by fishers, or the material circumstances faced by fishers that structurally encourages potential overfishing. This use of the common property concept results in mainstream sociologists and anthropologists conflating a theory and concept of human nature with an understanding of the nature of people within specific relations of capitalism (see: Geras(1983)).

Having discussed the concept of common property as applied within fisheries economics, and having noted how this concept is utilized in the sociological literature, a review of the work of Clement(1984)(1986) will now be turned to.

1.3. Common Property as Class Relation: The Discourse of Clement.

Clement criticizes the epistemological and ontological assumptions of 'official inquiries'(1986 p.69) that have been based on neo-classical approaches to the industry as initiated by Gordon(Clement(1986) p.68-71). Clement(1984) (1986), drawing upon a reading of Marxian class theory, in turn proposes an approach based on an understanding of the relations of production and ownership within the fishing industry.

For this purpose, Clement(1984)(1986) develops a notion of class that is defined by people's access to, and control of, 'property'. In this context, property is defined as 'a set of claims or rights that order the relations among people and between people and things'(p.61), and class is defined as 'relationships to property and control over labor power'(p.61). Clements' analysis is consequently based on his epistemological and methodological prefigurement of class position in access to property. This concept of class is only one possible approach to class analysis(Wolff and Resnick(1986)).

Wolff and Resnick(1986) derive an alternative concept of class which defines class 'narrowly in terms of the specific processes of producing and distributing surplus

labor' (p.112). Following this perspective, differential access to and control of surplus value by fishers, tendermen and shoreworkers, facilitates an understanding of the consciousness and perceptions of each group and their differing incentives toward organization.

The political implications of this approach allows an understanding of practical consciousness in the fishing industry. Consequently, at the individual level, utilization of Larrain's concept of ideology is justified (see Chapter Two) since this would entail a consideration of those concepts, thoughts and ideas which reconcile in consciousness contradictions experienced in practice (Larrain(1983)(1984)) by industry participants at the point of production. At the supra-individual/group level one is directed towards analysis based on Meszaros' conceptions of ideology as the practical conceptions of class societies (see Chapter Two). In short, Clement(1984(1986), while adopting a Marxian rhetoric, flounders in a functionalist concept of class and property rights. The work of Wolff and Resnick(1986) provides a more coherent analysis by directing attention to the construction of locale-specific ontologies by people active in 'specific' labor processes.

1.4 Conclusion

This chapter has indicated the relation between the literature of fisheries economics and neo-classical ontologies. It argued that the literature of fisheries sociology and fisheries anthropology fails to transcend functionalist concepts of class, culture or agency. This can be seen, for example, in Clements'(1986) 'class' analysis of the fishery which defines common property and access to that property as the causa causata of struggle in the fishery. Similarly, it can be seen in Burns'(1988) proposals of a fisher 'work culture', a 'work culture' that Burns fails to integrate into a broader socio-spatial dynamic; or in the papers in the Journal of Canadian Studies(19(1)1984) or Marchak(et al)(eds)(1987), which effectively describe the fishery, yet fail to explain the structural genesis of the differing ideologies in the industry by referring them to their differing places of material constitution. It is towards these concerns that attention is now directed.

Footnotes:

1) Caldwell(1982) proposes a programme of 'Methodological Pluralism'(p.245). Boland(1982) argues for a Popperian framework, at a time when Popperian falsificationism has been recognized as no alternative to positivist inductivism(Giddens(1976)). See also Myrdal(1954).

2) The conflation of theoretical propositions with empirical reality is a feature of positivist practice. The method of dialectical materialism overcomes these confusions by way of the clear specification between theoretical abstraction and empirical description. See Section 2.4.

3) Marchak((1987)(a) p.4) states, vis-a-vis the term "common property" and its use in the literature, that:

> 'the argument is that, because fish are not privately owned until caught, they are therefore owned in common. The derived argument is that the depletion of a common property is inevitable because no one is charged with the responsibility for conservation, and the competing users ultimately destroy the common resource'.

Marchak(1987)(a) believes, however, that the concept of common property should be rejected since, (a) '... there are issues buried rather than illuminated by that designation, and we argue here that these issues can be better understood if we treat the right to fish as state property'(emphasis added).
Similarly, since (b) 'the term, besides being incorrect, is inherently contradictory since property by definition connotes specific ownership rights'(1984 p.4)-in short, since the concept is a contradiction in terms.

4) No other chapter in Marchak, Guppy and McMullan(eds)(1987) offers an analysis of the concept of common property. It must be recognized, with Burns(1988), that the chapters provide background and contextual data on the fishing industry of BC. However, for an explanation of the data, the theoretical foundations upon which the data are developed are insufficient (see: Bhaskar(1989); Soja(1989)). Furthermore, the limited theoretical base from which the data are derived allows the obscuring of social relations and their attendant spatial structures, the explanation of which allows understanding of the forces and relations of production in the industry, and the effects therof(see: chapters three and four).

5) Burns((1988) p.228-232) provides a review of papers in Marchak(et.al.)(1987). Aspects of Burns(1988) is reviewed in chapter 3.2. Further sociological research into the fishery of BC is summarized in footnote eight of chapter

three. This work is united in an insufficiently developed theoretical agenda(see: Soja(1989)), most notably, a failure to incorporate critical social theory. Critical social theory is elaborated upon in chapter two. A focus on the concepts of ideology and space is provided. This is applied in chapter four to an understanding of the organization of the UFAWU.

CHAPTER TWO. THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH.

2.1 Introduction

This section will outline the theoretical approach taken in the thesis. An introduction to critical realism is provided. Ideology, space and production are considered to be relations in the social structure that influence and reflect the actions of agents. Consequently, a discussion of the concept of ideology is entered into. The concept is seen to be related to (a) a materialist and spatial ontology, and (b) the concept and theory of practice(Kitching(1988)). Chapter Four therefore considers two case studies of the practice of union mobilization, situating these in the social relations of the BC fishery, data on which is provided in Chapter Three.

2.2 Critical Realism and Social Science.

Bhaskar(1989) indicates that a principal difference between the natural and the social sciences is the (admittedly somewhat limited) possibility in the natural sciences of delimiting a 'closed' system. Bhaskar(1989) argues that positivist and empiricist approaches to the social sciences attempt to reproduce the experimentally and empirically verifiable 'closed' systems of the natural sciences in the social sciences through an attempted

programme of hypothesis formation and law generation. Bhaskar(1986 p.224-292; (1989) p.15-16) rejects this approach and proposes instead that of 'critical realism' (Bhaskar(1989) p.190 et sec), which 'conceives the world as being structured, differentiated and changing'(ibid. p.2). To facilitate understanding of this world, critical realism argues for a concept of 'ontological depth'-a view of the world as consisting not only of events and experiences, but also of structures, relations and contingent conditions. A focus in this approach consequently lies in the identification of causal mechanisms and relations (achieved through 'intensive' research) (Sayer(1984)), or the identification of empirical regularities (achieved through 'extensive' research) (Sayer(1984)).

The identification of causal relations serves to (a) indicate the interrelations between structures and events, and (b) explain the specific and contingent conditions in which events arise. The object, therefore, is not to predict events but to explain them since in open systems events cannot be predicted, because of the multiplicity of possible causal variables. In explaining events, critical realists develop a 'Transformational Model of Social Activity' (Bhaskar(1989) p.78), which proposes that social structures are social products and hence are 'possible objects of transformation'(ibid. p.78). In this regard,

Bhaskar argues that society consists of an articulated ensemble of tendencies and powers which exist as long as they are being exercised through the intentional activity of human beings(ibid. p.79). In effect, therefore, the 'laws' of positivist science are rejected, to be replaced by the contingent conditions, possibilities and relations of Bhaskar's transformational model of social activity.

The transformational model of social activity proposes a methodological distinction between the social sciences, (which have as their object of analysis social structure(s)), and the social psychological sciences, (which have social interaction as their object of analysis)(ibid. p.93). These distinctions are linked in the study of society 'identified as the system of relations between the positions and practices agents reproduce and transform, which is the subject matter of the social science of sociology!'(ibid. p.93). In this regard, this thesis will study the system of relations existing between ideology, space and production in the fishing industry of BC. It is argued that a spatial ontology allows a theoretical convergence of the concepts of ideology, space and production. This is achieved through the method of dialectical materialism.

A comprehensive exegesis of the concepts of ideology, production, space, and the method of dialectical

materialism goes beyond the confines of this thesis. The remainder of this chapter will be restricted to the elaboration of, and working definitions for, these concepts and the method of dialectical materialism(1).

2.3 On Ideology.

In the social sciences, the concept of ideology is:

> "... perhaps one of the most equivocal and elusive concepts one can find... not only because of the variety of theoretical approaches which assign different meanings and functions to it, but also because it is a concept heavily charged with political connotations and widely used in everyday life with the most diverse significations' (Larrain(1979) p.13).

Likewise, within Marxist approaches, there is:

> '...no single Marxist conception of ideology or agreement as to which version should be considered the properly Marxist one... there is no question therefore, of aspiring to the uniquely correct Marxist conception of ideology'(Larrain(1983) p.1).

Larrain (1982)(1983)(1984) does, however, point out that we can identify Marx's concept of ideology, as well as Marx's use and application of this theoretical term to his particular social objectives, a notion that, Larrain argues, was both negative and restricted.

Larrain argues that, for Marx, ideology was seen as a negative concept since it involved a distortion, or misrepresentation in thought by people of 'contradictions'

experienced in their material lives (Larrain(1983) p.29-30; Larrain(1984) p.156). Furthermore it was a restricted concept since it did not refer to all the errors and distortions of human thought, but, specifically, to those that misrepresented contradictions of human existence (Larrain(1983)(1984)). Ideology was therefore a specific kind of distortion, a distortion that:

> 'conceals contradictions and stems from their existence. Hence it can only disappear when the contradictions which gave rise to it are resolved in practice' (Larrain(1983) p.30).

Similarly, Urry(1981) argues that:

> 'the term "ideology" is reserved to apply to a fairly specific kind of <u>effect</u> which is present within practices of very different sorts, in which the causes or consequences of that practice or of some other practice <u>are concealed</u> (p.7; emphasis added).

Larrain argues that Marx's concept of ideology therefore emerges out of, and is part of, his critique of Hegelian dialectical idealism and Feuerbachian materialism and forms part of an elaboration of a wider theory concerning the formation of ideas developed by Marx (Larrain(1983) p.19). Other elements of this theory were commodity, individual and societal fetishism; alienation; the development of social and historical consciousness; and Marx's theses on being human (Fromm(1961); Geras(1983)).

From Marx's original 'negative' formation, the concept of ideology in Marxism 'began to acquire new meanings' (Larrain(1983) p.30) and a shift occurred towards using

the concept in a positive sense, referring to the totality of forms of social consciousness or to the political ideas of social classes. This usage was far broader than Marx's original definition and has been the predominant use of the concept in western Marxism (Larrain(1983)).

In this regard, the 'first wave' of Marxist thinkers (Kautsky, Plekhanov, Lenin (see: Kolakowski(1978)) were influenced by two factors. Firstly, they had no access to Marx's early works in which many of his ideas concerning ideology, consciousness and being human were elaborated (Larrain(1983) p.54; Fromm(1961)) since these writings remained untranslated or unpublished (Larrain(1983) p.54; Fromm(1961)). Secondly, and as a consequence of the first factor, the 'first wave' were mainly concerned with the economic analysis of capitalism, its effects on their social formations, and the consequences of this for their respective organizational strategies (Larrain(1983) p.46; Ryan(1982); Meszaros(1989)). Furthermore, the interpretations of the first generation of Marxists (for example, those of Labriola, Mehring, Kautsky, Plekhanov and Lenin) became the established understanding of Marxism (Larrain(1983) p.54), an understanding based on a materialist understanding of capital and a Hegelian understanding of dialectics (see: Dunayevskaya(1973)).

From this basis, Marxist thought on ideology developed in essentially two directions. The first, as expounded by the first generation of Marxists and largely adopted within the First International was based on an economistic and Feuerbachian materialism. This tradition was incorporated into the orthodoxy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, reaching the pinnacle of its influence under Stalin (Kolakowski(1978)). The second direction was a reaction against the economism of the First International and had, as its earliest protagonists in Western Marxism, Antonio Gramsci and Rosa Luxemburg (Femia(1981)).

The development of these traditions has stimulated two different interpretations of ideology, one epitomized in the work of Althusser, and the other epitomized by Lukacs (Hall(1979)). Larrain indicates that this '... may easily lead one to believe that there is no alternative but to choose between an historicist and a structuralist interpretation of Marxism' (Larrain(1982) p.5), a situation which generally 'results in Marx being seen through the eyes of Lukacs or Althusser' (Larrain(1982) p.5), with no attempt being made at understanding Marx's work, or his method, per se (Larrain(1982)(1983)(1984)). The consequence of this, in both perspectives, allows the concept of ideology to become '... reified as itself descriptive of a supposed real entity, a noun which sails

through history innocent of any reference to real individuals and the lives they lead' (Sayer(1987) p.87).

However, with the increasing availability of Marx's work in English (see, for example, Fromm(1961)), and a reaction (see Ryan(1982)) against (a) the tendency in western structuralist thought towards nihilist readings of modernism (Harland(1987); Meszaros(1989)), or (b) the rejection of limitations inherent in Lukacsian analysis, a re-reading of Marx's work has emerged, based on the unifying concept of what has come to be called Marx's theory of practice (Kitching(1988); Sayer(1987); Cleaver(1979); Bernstein (1971)).

The proponents of this interpretation do not form a 'school' of, nor share a common approach to, Marxist theory. Indeed, the term is not even recognized by all who follow the approach. Wood, for example, refers to 'Political Marxism'(Wood(1987) p.76). What is shared, however, is a commitment to practical social action. Thus, according to Kitching:

> The logic of the philosophy of praxis(practice) in marxism ... is, first and foremost, a commitment to doing something, namely to realizing, or helping to realize, a certain vision of human liberation' (Kitching(1988) p.229),

or, following Wood,

> '... the object of this theoretical stance is a <u>practical</u> one, to illuminate the terrain of struggle by viewing modes of production not as abstract

> structures but as they actually confront people who must act in relation to them´(Wood(1987) p.77. Emphasis in original).

Their reading is consequently based on Marx´s frequent injunctions of practical social action directed at transforming social and economic structures. This starts with Marx´s conception of ´being human´ (see: Fromm(1961)). Thus, production and production relations are presented and analyzed not as a theoretical abstraction but according to:

> ´... their political aspect, that aspect in which they are actually contested: as relations of domination, as rights of property, as the power to organize and govern production and appropriation´ (Wood(1987) p.77 Emphasis in original).

Most significantly, this approach suggests an understanding of ideology as a negative and restricted concept (see, for example, Dupre(1983)), an interpretation that is supported by Larrain(1979)(1982)(1983)(1984) and Urry(1981).

Larrain argues that Marx´s notion of ideology is that of a rigidly defined concept that refers to the concealment of contradictions in social life. By this understanding, ideology is not an error of thought, nor is it false or distorted consciousness (as would be argued for by proponents of a Lukacian analysis); it is the concealment or explaining of contradictions in society by ways other than an analysis and explanation of their structural genesis. In short, for Larrain, for thought to be

considered ideological it must explain away contradictions of society (Larrain(1983); (1984) p.153); ideology, and its correlate, ideologic thought, is therefore produced by people, acting in determined social environments, as part of their conscious attempts to solve in consciousness contradictions that cannot be overcome in practice (Larrain(1984) p.153).

Problems with Larrain's reading exist, not least in its overly theoreticist slant (see, for example, Larrain's critique of Schaff (Larrain(1983) p.152)). Further, when attempts are made to apply his concepts, the reading can rapidly degenerate into an empiricist behaviouralism or a nihilistic functionalism(2) through a focus on the (bourgeois juridical) individual (Meszaros(1989); Cornforth(1980)). In short, Larrain's attempt to analyze and define ideology in terms of an individual's resolution of contradictions in consciousness fails to indicate the relationship of an individual with other people, or the nature of social being (Geras(1983); Fromm(1961)). These, the most pressing problems in Larrain's work, can be overcome if one follows the approach of Meszaros(1989).

Meszaros(1989) argues that ideology entails both positive and negative elements, and defines ideology as 'the inescapable <u>practical</u> consciousness of class societies' (p.391. emphasis added). For Meszaros therefore, while it

is important to understand practical consciousness in class societies, the:

> ´practical mediations ... required for going ´beyond ideology´ could only be conceived ... as [being] organically linked to the long term objectives of emancipatory ideology´(p.392. Emphasis in original).

Ideology can thus entail both positive and negative elements. Positive, insofar as the ideology is emancipatory (p.174), and negative insofar as it corresponds with ´the objective requirements of the social reproduction process of which ideology itself is an organic constituent´(p.393. emphasis added). In this correspondence, Meszaros correlates ideology in the negative sense with a ´pacificatory ideology´(p.257), which constitutes a part of the social structure(p.257)(3).

Nevertheless, for Meszaros, the question is not ´what are the components of this pacificatory ideology?´, but rather, ´will the individuals, armed with the ideology of the class to which they belong, side with the historically unfolding cause of emancipation or line up against it?´(p.255). In this regard, it is the inseparable existential realities of class experience from the material determinations of the social order (Meszaros(1989) p.265) that will in the final analysis

determine on which side of the class divide individuals will choose to make their stand(4).

Meszaros thus argues that Marx is concerned not with individual ideologies or individual resolutions of contradictions in thought (See however: Larrain(1983) (1984)), but with 'dialectically grasping the concrete articulation of social being in its "intrinsic contradictoriness"' (Meszaros(1989) p.383; emphasis in original), a contradictoriness that emerges out of an attempt to explain the 'strife and intrinsic contradictoriness' (Marx(1970) p.12) of daily life.

In this regard, Meszaros argues that an analysis of ideology and 'its' effects can only entail an analysis of the

'concrete determinations of social being, [that are manifest] under the prevailing historical circumstances in the form of antagonistically opposed social forces' (p.383)(5). It is this conception of ideology that was felt to be most consistent with Marx's method (Sayer(1983)) and theory. Furthermore, it is this concept that facilitates an understanding of the dialectic of union organization in the fishing industry, since it demands an understanding not of individual ideologies, but of social beings. It is to such considerations of method that attention is now directed.

2.4 Dialectical Materialism and Ideology.

In Preface to a Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy, Marx argues that:

> '... consciousness must be explained ... from the contradictions of material life, from the existing conflict between social productive forces and the relations of production' (Marx(1955) p.363)(6).

This approach is superior to the phenomenological or existentialist explanation of consciousness (see, for example, Buttimer(1976)) since it allows one not only to understand the nature of consciousness as being materially determined, but also to act practically with the goal of the resolution and overcoming of contradictory thought.

Similarly, Marx states:

> 'The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of [people] ... [people] are the producers of their conceptions, ideas etc- real active [people], as they are conditioned by the definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these ... Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of [people] in their actual life process' (Marx(1970) p.47).

This understanding brings with it the methodological injunction that:

> 'Empirical observation must in each separate instance

> bring out empirically, and without any mystification and speculation, the connection of the social and political structure with production' (ibid. p.46)(7).

Marx therefore proposes no behavioralist or functionalist laws of human or social existence (Cornforth(1980)), but indicates that for each historical or social context 'empirical observation must... bring out empirically... the connection of the social and political structure with production'(Marx(1970) p.46). In this regard, Marx argues that our empirical observation should be of a social structure that is:

> '... continually evolving out of the life processes of definite individuals, ... of individuals, not as they may appear in their own or other peoples' imagination, but as they <u>really</u> are, i.e., as they operate, produce materially, and hence as they work under material limits, presuppositions and conditions independent of their will' (Marx(1970) p.46-47, emphasis in original).

In short, social structure <u>is</u> (continually evolving out of) the 'life processes of definite individuals'(ibid.).

Consequently, for Marx:

> 'It is above all necessary to avoid postulating "society" once again as an abstraction confronting the individual. The individual <u>is</u> the <u>social being</u>. The manifestation of [this] life ... is therefore a manifestation and affirmation of <u>social life</u>. Individual human life and species life are not <u>different things</u> ...(Marx(1961) p.130, emphasis in original).

With this in mind, it can be seen that following a dialectical materialist method one cannot assume a separation between objective researcher and subject of research (Scott(1987)), or claim (as do positivist

approaches) that objectivity is possible in social or natural scientific research (Meszaros(1989); McCloskey (1985)).

However, what should be attempted in the elaboration of the dialectical materialist method is the 'all sided consideration of relationships in their concrete development' (Lenin, cited in Cornforth (1980) p.169). This conception was echoed by Dupre who, after a discussion of Marx's base/superstructure model, notes:

> '... in their actual analysis of... events Marx and Engels pay little attention to the base-superstructure model. Instead, they view social life in its totality as a complex web of relations in which all factors remain interconnected'(Dupre(1983) p.88)(8).

This is not a rejection of the base/superstructure model by Marx or Engels. Rather it is an application of the model and its associated concepts to concrete instances. In this regard, Sayer argues:

> 'Marx makes clear that... transhistorical categories [9] are abstractions: they do not in themselves immediately or adequately describe any empirical realities. This is the corollary of their very generality'(Sayer(1987) p.128).

The dialectical materialist method, following Marx and Lenin, can thus be seen to entail two elements. On the one hand, it entails the elaboration of and passage from 'empty abstractions' to 'concrete study'. And on the other, it entails the 'all sided consideration of relationships in their concrete development'. It is at

this conjuncture, of relationships in their concrete development that materialist concepts of space assume importance.

2.5 Dialectical Materialism and Space.

Soja(1987)(1989) attempts to develop a concept of space based on a dialectical materialist philosophy. He notes:

> 'The materialist interpretation of spatiality, in its demystification and politicisation of the production of space, is integrally linked with a historical materialism broadly aimed at demystifying and politicising the making of history (Soja(1987) p.91, emphasis in original).

For Soja(1987), a materialist concept of space portrays space as a social product and as an integral part of the material constitution of social life (ibid. p.92; 94)(see also: Soja(1989)). Such an understanding goes beyond the interpretation of social space as physical or relative space, considering instead the societal (and hence personal) construction of space (Soja(1989) p.126-137).

Gidden's(1984) concept of locale effectively portrays this societal/individual construction of space. Giddens argues:

> 'Locales refer to the use of space [by people] to provide the settings of interaction ... Locales provide for a good deal of the 'fixity' underlying instutions ... Locales are typically internally regionalized' (Giddens(1984) p.118, emphasis in original).

In this concept, locales can extend over a number of operational scales. Thrift(1983) argues that a locale

'does not have to be local'(10), and hence can incorporate spaces of varying operational scales which provide settings of interaction. Soja(1989 p.148) extends this conceptualization by arguing:

> '... the most fundamental contextual generalization about the spatiality of social life [is] that the intelligible lifeworld of being is always and everywhere comprised of a multilayered system of socially created nodal regions, a configuration of differentiated and hierarchically organized locales. The specific forms and functions of this existential spatial structure vary significantly over time and place, but once being is situated in-the-world[,] the world it is in becomes social within a spatial matrix of nested locales. The ... structure is mutable and permutable, but it is always there to envelop and comprise, to situate and constitute all human action, to concretize the making of both history and geography'.

It is these concepts of locale that were employed as the operationalizing concept for space in the thesis since it incorporates a concept of materially based ideology through a focus on human interaction. Furthermore, through the concept of regionalization, it allows the identification of a number of locales of interaction each of which is 'nested' within the other. As far as this applies to the UFAWU, the Union is seen to consist of a number of overlapping and intersecting locales, each constituted by individual agents, or groups of agents, depending on the level of analytical scale and abstraction. Thus, at the broadest level, the UFAWU's locale is confined to BC. This can be subdivided into the locales of shoreworkers, fishers and tendermen, locales

which can in turn be further subdivided. Specific ideologies associated with these locales will be investigated in Chapter Four(11).

Having discussed the concept of ideology to be applied in this thesis and the relationships this encompasses, and having outlined the dialectical materialist method, we can now turn to a consideration of relations of production in the fishing industry, and the nature of their concrete development.

Footnotes

1) A distinction should be made between the dialectical materialist method and the concept of the dialectic in Marx and Engels. Thus, as Dupre((1983) p.145) points out, 'the entire nature of [the] Marxist dialectic as it has been traditionally interpreted' has, as its central focus, Engels' three fundamental laws of the dialectic.
An analysis of this aspect of Marxist philosophy goes beyond the confines of this thesis. Cornforth(1980), drawing on Marx, indicates the nature of laws in the social sciences, distinguishing these from laws in the natural sciences. Furthermore, the propositional laws of the social sciences(Cornforth(1980)) fall within what Lenin called 'empty abstractions'(cited in Cornforth(1980) p.169), abstractions which must be transcended by, we have noted, the concrete study of concrete relationships.
Kitching(1988 p.37-44) discusses Marx's concept of laws, relating this to Marx's concept of history(p.44-60).

2) This is concluded after attempting to apply Larrain's reading to fishers and workers in the fishing industry of BC. It was noted that Larrain's concepts could be applied at the level of personal, in-depth analysis, as a supplementary theoretical tool to an analysis utilizing techniques of time geography as developed by Gregory(1985), Giddens(1985) and Pred(1985). Such analysis, while useful in its own right, would not facilitate an understanding of the dialectic of social place, production and consciousness, and the affects of this on, in our case, union organization. For further elaboration on the concept and techniques of time geography see Johnstone(1987) p.135-138.

3) For this reason Meszaros argues that it is 'unthinkable to go <u>beyond ideology</u> by postulating the possibility of an effective critical position somewhere <u>outside</u> ideology' ((1989) p.390; Emphasis in original)).

4) Chapter Four investigates the process of this dialectic in the context of two episodes of Union mobilization.

5) Emphasis in original.

6) See also Marx(1970) p.47.

7) Elaboration of Marx's understanding of production, or of the base/superstructure <u>model</u>, will go beyond the confines of this thesis. On production see Marx(1970) p.124-138. On the base/superstructure model and its relevance to Marx's work, see Sayer(1987); Kitching(1988).

8) See also Sayer(1987).

9) Such as labor, means of production, value and use value. See Sayer((1987) Ch.Two); Cornforth(1980).

10) It is this characteristic that distinguishes locale from the concept of locality, a concept that has been associated with the sphere of the concrete (Cox and Mair(1989) p.121-122). Cox and Mair(1989) attempt to break this association by integrating the concept of locality into a realist framework.

11) See Appendix Two for further methodological notes.

CHAPTER THREE: STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE B.C. FISHERY.

This chapter will review (a) the nature of the BC fishery; (b) the prominent conceptions or world views held among BC fishers; (c) the material standard(s) of living of fishers and (d) the history and organization of UFAWU.

This will be related, in chapter four, to a consideration of the events leading up to, and the outcomes of, (a) the formation of the Fishermen's Survival Coalition in 1984, and (b) the 1989 industry-wide strike.

3.1. Structural elements of the BC fishing industry.

The fishing industry of BC can be divided into four main sectors: fish harvesting, fish processing, sportfishing, and aquaculture (Price Waterhouse(1988)). Attention will be directed at the fish harvesting and fish processing sectors since it is out of these two sectors that UFAWU draws its members. Section 3.1.1 will therefore discuss fish harvesting, while section 3.1.2 will turn to a discussion of the processing sector, indicating its relations with the harvesting sector.

3.1.1. Fish harvesting.

In 1987 16,555 fisher licences and 8,107 vessel licenses were issued in BC (Table 3.1). DFO data indicates that in 1987 there were 4,481 fishing vessels licensed for salmon (DFO(1988) p.50). Using DFO data indicating average crew size of 2.2 fishermen per boat, Price-Waterhouse indicate that in 1987 there were approximately 10,000 active salmon fishermen (Price-Waterhouse(1988) p.6) many of whom also participate in the halibut, groundfish and herring fisheries. Consequently, in addition to the above numerated 10,000 fishers, Price-Waterhouse(1988) estimate that a further 1,000 active fishers can be allocated to the halibut, groundfish and herring fisheries(1), and a further 3,500 commercial fishers were active in the crab, shrimp and other shellfish fisheries (Price-Waterhouse(1988) p.6), giving an approximate total of 14,500 active fishers in 1987. Data on the commercial value of the fishery were obtained from annual Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) statistical tables, DFO commissioned research (see: DPA Group(1988)), and Fisheries Council of British Columbia (FCBC) commissioned research (see: Price-Waterhouse(1988)). DFO data provide information on landed and wholesale dollar values of fish landed (Table 3.2), as well as information on landed and wholesale dollar values for BC salmon (Table 3.4). This

data can be disaggregated by species (Table 3.6) and gear (Tables 3.3; 3.5).

In the salmon fishery the organization of the fleet breaks down essentially to three gear types: trollers, gillnetters, and seiners (Burns(1988); Clement(1986); Gladstone (1959)) (see: Table 3.7). With advances in technology one finds the increasing appearance of combination vessels (Clement(1986) p.42; DPA Group(1988)).

What is significant for our purposes is the fact that, depending on the nature of techniques utilized by fishers, one finds a greater or lesser propensity toward union consciousness. Trolling, a highly independent fisher operation, ensures, through the nature of fish capture(2), a high quality fish which commands a high price. Such fish, mainly the species of coho and chinook (yet, increasingly, sockeye and pinks), have a high market value and are, due to their freshness and quality, usually sold to the public via a licensed wholesaler (See: Table 3.5; 3.6). Fishers within this category are generally anti-union (Clement(1986), consider themselves to be small business persons (Current: Newsletter of the Pacific Coast Trollers' Association. 5(4)1989 p.19; Meggs: interview), and are represented in area and gear specific associations (Marchak(1987(b)).

Table 3.1
Commercial Fishing Licences issued,
1977-1987

Year	Number Vessel(1;2)	Number Personal(3)
1977	6516	13753
1978	7264	16785
1979	7487	19835
1980	7356	18871
1981	8320	17454
1982	8179	17298
1983	8168	14690
1984	8149	14160
1985	8142	15121
1986	8135	15800
1987	8107	16555

Notes: 1) Represents total of limited entry licences.
2) Does not include licensed packing and processing vessels.
3) Denotes one year licenses only.
Source: Fisheries Production Statistics of BC.

Table 3.2
Landed Value of Fish and Wholesale Value of Fish Products in BC, 1976-1988

Year	Landed Value ($'000)	Wholesale Value ($'000)
1976	138820	294590
1977	165005	359905
1978	243731	510667
1979	330019	563181
1980	180529	402191
1981	232358	523754
1982	235519	461159
1983	203094	465090
1984	236028	460036
1985	372324	722243
1986	394525	759341
1987	443203	797541
1988	560736	987406

Note: Excludes landings at US ports and direct sales to foreign processors.
All species.
Source: Fisheries Production Statistics of BC.

Table 3.3
Salmon Landings by Gear,
1976-1986

Year	Gear Type					
	Gillnet		Seine		Troll	
	Tonnes	%	Tonnes	%	Tonnes	%
1976	17746	30.88	24925	43.38	14790	25.74
1977	22028	32.29	24661	42.92	18893	27.70
1978	19102	27.06	34337	48.63	17165	28.04
1979	13430	21.94	24717	40.38	23067	37.68
1980	14084	26.14	24796	46.03	14991	27.83
1981	18153	23.00	40994	51.94	19774	25.06
1982	17742	27.00	26952	41.02	21010	31.98
1983	12100	16.21	43225	57.90	19334	38.34
1984	12761	25.30	20514	40.68	17157	34.02
1985	25218	23.44	58676	54.55	23669	22.00
1986	26130	25.14	53156	51.14	24652	23.72

Source: Fisheries Production Statistics of BC.

Table 3.4
Landed and Wholesale Value of Salmon, 1968-1986

Year	Landed Value ($'000)	Wholesale Value ($'000)	Average Landed Price ($/kg)
1968	44.887	99.956	(1)
1969	27.810	57.982	(1)
1970	45.076	99.597	(1)
1971	44.476	96.926	(1)
1972	50.341	114.349	(1)
1973	99.998	221.642	1.21
1974	73.998	165.841	1.15
1975	96.913	99.748	1.29
1976	91.942	187.045	1.77
1977	109.176	229.835	1.81
1978	158.686	304.019	2.26
1979	161.113	289.627	2.76
1980	117.149	289.107	2.24
1981	158.226	373.678	2.41
1982	165.207	315.338	2.32
1983	111.097	284.289	1.97
1984	144.814	276.241	2.92
1985	246.696	512.243	2.64
1986	265.778	536.223	2.61

Note: (1) Data not available.
Source: Fisheries Production Statistics of BC; Various Years; Pg. 12-13.

Table 3.5
Salmon Landings by Gear and Value,
1976-1986

Year	Gear Type						
	Gillnet Value ($'000)	%	Seine Value ($'000)	%	Troll Value ($'000)	%	Total Value ($'000)
1976	25825	28.09	26712	29.05	39405	42.86	91942
1977	34416	31.65	29697	27.31	44612	41.03	108725
1978	38687	24.46	57796	36.54	61681	39.00	158164
1979	34796	21.68	42522	26.49	83215	51.84	160533
1980	31042	26.53	41854	35.77	44107	37.70	117003
1981	39222	24.81	63864	40.40	54984	34.78	158070
1982	41387	25.07	51818	31.39	71897	43.55	165102
1983	20586	18.53	48443	43.61	42056	37.86	111085
1984	35674	24.64	38399	26.52	70725	48.84	144798
1985	67387	27.32	72381	29.34	106902	43.34	246670
1986	67689	25.47	96113	36.16	101972	38.37	265774

Source: Fisheries Production Statistics of BC.

Table 3.6
Negotiated Minimum Price, Landed Price and Wholesale Value of Salmon by Species, 1968-1989.

Species/ Year	Neg. min. price ($/lb)	Neg. min. price ($/kg)	Landings in Metric Tonnes (000 Kg)	Landed Value ($'000)	Ave. Landed Price ($/kg)	Wholesale Value ($'000)
SPRINGS						
1968	(1)	(1)	6909	6798	0.98	10519
1969	(1)	(1)	6400	7041	1.10	10512
1970	(1)	(1)	6513	8082	1.24	11577
1971	0.17	(1)	8702	9203	1.06	13896
1972	0.43	0.19	8352	10028	1.20	14768
1973	0.62	0.28	7556	13986	1.85	20533
1974	0.65	0.29	7637	13803	1.81	18864
1975	(1)	(1)	7289	12172	1.67	20270
1976	0.88	0.40	7776	22919	2.95	29314
1977	0.88	0.40	7522	23589	3.14	36832
1978	1.10	0.50	7887	29461	3.74	35897
1979	1.35	0.61	6845	31159	4.55	40475
1980	1.38	0.62	6540	24307	3.72	38427
1981	1.55	0.70	5916	25731	4.35	38051
1982	1.55	0.70	7092	31205	4.40	41490
1983	1.15	0.52	5378	17614	3.28	29489
1984	1.15	0.52	6254	37318	5.97	45864
1985	1.15	0.52	5469	25564	4.67	41435
1986	1.15	0.52	5007	19658	3.93	31206
1987	1.15	0.52	5249	30527	5.82	41489
1988	1.35	0.61	5921	43795	7.40	57979
SOCKEYE						
1968	0.37	0.00	18625	15630	0.84	30645
1969	0.38	0.00	10862	9343	0.86	20263
1970	0.39	0.18	11333	9960	0.88	21773
1971	0.39	0.18	17329	15910	0.92	33335
1972	0.42	0.19	9517	8983	0.94	20673
1973	0.50	0.23	21526	26497	1.23	69009
1974	0.52	0.23	21694	29841	1.38	65221
1975	0.62	0.28	5681	8184	1.44	19538
1976	0.70	0.32	12339	20656	1.67	45701
1977	0.78	0.35	17388	32218	1.85	65579

1978	0.88	0.40	22321	55181	2.47	107817
1979	0.88	0.40	14532	43307	2.98	81008
1980	1.05	0.47	7727	18222	2.36	47416
1981	0.89	0.40	21000	54577	2.60	122073
1982	1.08	0.49	30143	78860	2.62	155363
1983	1.06	0.48	14326	36617	2.56	83988
1984	1.00	0.45	12877	45976	3.57	84191
1985	1.05	0.47	31586	120428	3.81	206810
1986	1.06	0.48	29811	143000	4.80	237871
1987	1.11	0.50	15041	92000	6.12	147997
1988	1.12	0.50	11943	96408	8.07	150134

COHO

1968	0.28	0.13	15021	10448	0.70	19695
1969	0.29	0.13	7956	6355	0.80	11930
1970	0.30	0.14	13540	12563	0.93	19622
1971	0.30	0.14	14092	10630	0.75	19586
1972	0.32	0.14	10533	11052	1.05	16642
1973	0.40	0.18	11250	18910	1.68	27863
1974	0.42	0.19	10378	13834	1.33	24375
1975	0.45	0.20	7737	12401	1.60	19783
1976	0.51	0.23	9322	21331	2.29	29906
1977	0.56	0.25	9857	22671	2.30	35431
1978	0.62	0.28	9152	27269	2.98	41023
1979	0.72	0.32	10342	44063	4.26	57203
1980	0.72	0.32	9025	23078	2.56	43645
1981	0.75	0.34	7514	22009	2.93	38433
1982	0.75	0.34	9299	26139	2.81	42595
1983	0.66	0.30	10461	22504	2.15	39306
1984	0.66	0.30	10089	35532	3.52	59624
1985	0.66	0.30	8977	26555	2.96	48762
1986	0.66	0.30	11666	39000	3.34	66090
1987	0.69	0.31	8436	41000	4.86	61803
1988	0.71	0.32	7077	37688	5.32	59134

PINKS

1968	0.124	0.00	25020	6996	0.28	22050
1969	0.14	0.06	6222	2225	0.36	6774
1970	0.145	0.06	23823	8018	0.34	26044
1971	0.145	0.06	17630	6528	0.37	20017
1972	0.16	0.07	18141	6636	0.37	20642
1973	0.20	0.09	13306	7882	0.59	27220
1974	0.22	0.10	11207	5791	0.52	22215
1975	0.24	0.11	10239	6900	0.67	21040
1976	0.30	0.14	17056	12124	0.71	37085
1977	0.34	0.15	24723	22262	0.90	59217
1978	0.36	0.16	15331	12835	0.84	39544
1979	0.43	0.19	24696	29685	1.20	76867
1980	0.43	0.19	13718	15118	1.10	58655

1981	0.48	0.22	38253	45822	1.20	128553
1982	0.35	0.16	3978	3195	0.80	17813
1983	0.26	0.12	39538	26651	0.67	103767
1984	0.28	0.13	12059	10742	0.89	38195
1985	0.31	0.14	37701	38979	1.03	135376
1986	0.32	0.14	29264	26000	0.89	96812
1987	0.33	0.15	26942	32000	1.19	102293
1988	0.35	0.16	32217	49303	1.53	160956

CHUMS

1968	0.125		16429	4950	0.30	13362
1969	0.15-.165		6028	2803	0.46	5624
1970	0.15-.175		16637	6416	0.39	15924
1971	0.155-.17		5419	2150	0.40	5128
1972	0.17-.20		30192	13571	0.45	30840
1973	0.235-.26		32762	32670	1.00	56554
1974	0.245-.27		12479	10680	0.86	22350
1975	0.30	0.14	5389	7206	1.34	11588
1976	0.36	0.16	10922	14835	1.36	27075
1977	0.40	0.18	6032	7905	1.31	16676
1978	0.48	0.22	15855	33336	2.10	50878
1979	0.62	0.28	4751	12243	2.58	21262
1980	0.64	0.29	16809	36197	2.15	64608
1981	0.64	0.29	6157	9781	1.59	22271
1982	0.71	0.32	15094	25534	1.69	42887
1983	0.63	0.28	4899	7605	1.55	14735
1984	0.28-.65		9003	14938	1.66	34835
1985	0.30-.67		23646	34755	1.47	76705
1986	0.30-.67		24922	38000	1.52	77904
1987	0.30-.67		11076	24000	2.17	55926
1988	0.30-.67		30297	84621	2.82	145581

Notes: 1) Data not available.

Source: Canadian Fisheries Annual Statistical Review.
Fisheries Statistics of BC.
Fisheries Council of BC(1988).
UFAWU. Convention Minutes.

Table 3.7
Vessel Composition of the Salmon Fleet, 1970-1985

Year	Seine	Gillnet	GN/TR(1)	Troll	Total
1970	375	2615	910	2200	6100
1971	410	2390	900	2000	5700
1972	415	2285	800	1990	5490
1973	440	2160	820	1680	5100
1974	500	2190	810	1610	5100
1975	490	1910	1000	1620	5020
1976	500	1850	1060	1690	5100
1977	510	1790	1100	1710	5110
1978	510	1490	1200	1800	5000
1979	515	1285	1000	1975	4775
1980	515	1185	1300	1700	4700
1981	520	1230	1240	1560	4550
1982	515	1285	1100	1600	4500
1983	510	1240	950	1700	4400
1984	515	1085	1200	1450	4250
1985	510	1490	800	1500	4300

Notes: (1) Gillnet/troll combination vessels
Source: Calculated from DPA Group (1988).
Indicates vessels reporting salmon landings

On the other hand, fishers on gillnetters and seiners, catching predominantly pinks, sockeye and chum (with some chinook and coho also being taken) have a greater propensity towards union consciousness because of the need for gillnetters and seiners to deal collectively with the processing companies. This has been due to: firstly, the higher volume of fish caught by gillnet and seine fishers, amounts which are caught in the duration of a few openings during a nine-week season (as opposed to the annual nature of the troll fishery). These higher volumes are bulk processed, an operation performed by the processor companies. As a consequence of the terminal nature of the gillnet and seine fisheries(3), operators are therefore forced to dispose of irregularly arriving, yet large quantities, of fish. Processor companies with mechanised processor (notably canning) capacity are the only operators with the facilities to dispose of such net-caught fish. Secondly, the fact that net-caught fish were generally of poorer quality than troll-caught fish. These fish were purchased in bulk by the processing companies and were processed into smoked and frozen products (higher quality fish), or canned (poorest quality fish). These factors combine to make net fishers dependent on processor operations. In this regard, Table 3.3 shows aggregate salmon landings by gear, and Table 3.7 shows vessels active in each sector. If this data is integrated with Table 3.8, which shows crew size by gear category,

approximate data on active fishers in the industry can be calculated (Table 3.9), and union membership as a proportion of the fleet can be estimated.

This section has drawn on DFO data to show (a) how many fishers work in the BC salmon fishing industry; (b) what species they harvest; and (c) the gear types they use. Attention will now be directed to the fish processing sector.

3.1.2. Fish Processing.

Price-Waterhouse(1988) provide data on employment in fish processing; on sales revenue of domestic and exported fish products; and on wage and capital expenditures in the industry (See also: Fisheries Council of BC(1989); StatsCan. Cat.#32-216: Fish Products Industry).

The data (Price-Waterhouse(1988)) show, for example, that in terms of direct employment, the sectors of fish harvesting, processing, sport fishing and aquaculture employ 25,570 persons at the height of the salmon season. Of these, Price-Waterhouse(1988) p.18) estimate that 8,000 are employed directly in the fish processing sector. These data allow the FCBC to make the case that:

> '...the BC fishing industry is a significant contributor to the economies of BC and Canada... [a]s

such, the industry deserves public support in its continuing efforts to maintain its economic performance' (Fisheries Council of BC(undated)).

An indication of corporate concentration and foreign ownership in the industry is provided by Lee(1983), Wadhwani(1984), amd Shaffer(1979). Concentration and ownership extends not only from processing to retail sales (Shaffer(1979); Wadhwani(1984)), but also from processing to the harvesting sector (Wadhwani(1984); Pinkerton(1987)) through equity and portfolio investment (Wadhwani(1984)).

The largest processor, BC Packers, in 1980 directly controlled 42% of BC salmon processing, or, if its acquisition of most of the Canadian Fishing Company (Canfisco) is included, 49% (see Table 3.10: Concentration in Salmon Processing). In turn, George Weston Ltd., a food retailing company based in the United Kingdom, owns an 85.7% share in BC Packers (Wadhwani(1984)), a situation that gives BC Packers' products a guaranteed retail outlet through Weston's control of the Loblaw retail group (which owns, amongst others, SuperValu, Foodmaster, Pick 'n Pack and Economart). This retail integration extends, through Foodwide of Canada, into the Provigo and the IGA-Safeway groups, allowing BC Packers' products privileged access to

Table 3.8
Labor Input(1) Per Vessel, By Gear Type,
1981 - 1985

Year	Seine	Gillnet	GN/TR(2)	Troll	Total Salmon Fleet
1981	5.11	1.54	1.76	2.13	2.17
1982	5.03	1.57	1.77	2.11	2.16
1983	4.97	1.56	1.79	2.11	2.21
1984	4.96	1.57	1.81	2.13	2.24
1985	5.03	1.58	1.79	2.11	2.22

Notes: (1) Denotes crew size. Includes captain.
(2) Gillnet/troll combination vessels.
Source: DPA Group (1988), various tables.

Table 3.9
Fishers Active in Salmon Harvesting, By Gear Type,
1981-1985

Year	Seine	Gillnet	GN/TR(1)	Troll	Total Salmon Fleet
1981	2657	1894	2182	3322	9873
1982	2590	2017	1947	3376	9720
1983	2534	1934	1700	3587	9724
1984	2554	1703	2172	3088	9520
1985	2565	2279	1432	3165	9546

Notes: 1) Gillnet/troll combination vessels.
Source: Calculated from Tables 3.7 and 3.8.

IGA, Provigo and Safeway stores (Globe and Mail. 13/3/1983. UFAWU(1984)).

A representative trade organization, the Fisheries Council of BC (FCBC), has been constituted by the processor companies. The FCBC acts as lobbyist to provincial and federal departments on behalf of the nine major processing companies. As of September 1988 the Fisheries Council of BC consisted of: BC Packers Ltd.; Bella Coola Fisheries Ltd.; Canadian Fishing Company(Canfisco); J.S.McMillan Fisheries Ltd.; Lions Gate Fisheries Ltd.; Nelson Brothers Fisheries Ltd.; Ocean Fisheries Ltd.; Trans-Pacific Fish Ltd., and Prince Rupert Fishermen's Co-operative. Of these, Nelson Brothers and Canfisco are, in turn, owned by BC Packers. Furthermore those companies involved in collective bargaining with UFAWU form a sub-group, the Fish Processors' Bargaining Association (FPBA), which engages in collective negotiation with UFAWU over minimum fish prices, as well as wages and ancillary benefits for union members in the processing sector.

Data on the harvesting and processing aspects of fish production in BC have been provided. These data form a backdrop against which the outlook and world views of BC fishers can be investigated.

3.2. BC Fishers: Outlook and Worldviews.

Burns(1988) analyses the relationship between 'work culture' and work organization in the BC fishing industry. Similar data are presented by Guppy(1986)(1987), Muszynski(1986)(1987) and Warriner(1987). The work of Burns, supplemented by that of Guppy, Muszynski and Warriner will be reviewed in order to facilitate an understanding of BC fisher consciousness. Burns'(1988) research provides a source of secondary data. After an extensive review of anthropological and sociological research on the fishing industry, Burns went on to interview 81 owner-operators in the BC fishing industry. This was followed up by interviews of fishers operating during the 1982 salmon and herring seasons, interviews conducted while Burns was engaged in participant-observation on the grounds. The data are consistent with findings reported by Warriner(1987) (Burns(1988) p.261), and with findings reported in broader social and anthropological settings such as the data of Andersen and Styles(1973) and Andersen(1972)(4).

Based on her interviews and participant-observation of the fishery, Burns criticizes earlier research into the BC fishing industry, and argues that earlier researchers:

> '... have ignored the heterogeneity, the rich and textured lived experience of fishers. In so doing

Table 3.10
Concentration in Salmon Processing.

	All(1)(2)	Frozen(3)	Canned(4)
1975			
Single Largest(5)	29	27	37
Two Largest	42	38	57
Four Largest	59	55	74
1979			
Single Largest	31	29	38
Two Largest	45	38	63
Four Largest	59	49	80
1980			
Single Largest	41	42	46
Two Largest	49	54	59
Four Largest	62	63	76
1983			
Three Largest	56	47	74
Four Largest	62	54	81

Notes: 1) Data in percent of total salmon produced.
2) Denotes firms active in smoking, freezing, and canning operations.
3) Denotes firms active in fresh and frozen salmon production only.
4) Denotes firms active in salmon canning operations only.
5) Denotes size of companies active in fish processing in BC.

Source: Wadhwani (1984) p.76.

> they have rendered invisible the very fishers they seek to explain... Once we accept and understand the ethos of being a fishermen(sic), we have come a long way to understanding the persistence of the petite bourgeoisie in the fishery...' (Burns(1988) p.253-254).

Burns(1988) therefore identifies four main themes around which fisher 'work culture' (Burns(1988) p.138) is constructed. These emerge out of the organization of the fleet into gillnet, troll and seine sectors and out of the physical and technical conditions of work in the fishery. These themes are, for Burns, a sense of occupational community (p.140-144); a sense of occupational enculturation (p.145-152); a feeling of job satisfaction (p.153-161); and finally a sense of uncertainty with regards to the future of the industry and dissatisfaction with DFO policy (p.162-168), themes that serve to define a unique 'work culture' among fishers (Burns(1988) p.138-139; 169-170; 193-199).

This unique 'work culture' existent in the fishery contributes to 'the persistence of the petite bourgeosie in fishing' (Burns(1988) p.222), a situation which is reinforced by the:

> '... common property factor (which) is seen to have a significant impact on fishing'(Burns(1988) p.226)(5).

Burns(1988) categorizes various aspects of fisher thought and belief into these four primary themes. Thus, for example, fisher 'self image' and 'peer evaluation' becomes integrated into the theme of 'occupational community' (p.140-145); likewise does fisher 'love of adventure, and gambling'(p.144) fall within the theme of 'occupational community' (p.144); fisher choice of 'tools, boats, and other gear, how they are used, when they are used, and how they are taken care of...' (p.146) are seen as aspects of the theme of 'occupational enculturation' (p.145-153).

Similarly, Burns(1988) argues that the generalized use of jargon, which Burns indicates as being both gear and grounds specific (p.149-150) falls within the theme of 'occupational enculturation', as does the 'joking behavior' (p.151-153) exhibited by fishers.

However, fisher belief in, and perception of, the Common Property nature of the resource (Meggs: interview; Cox: interview; Rahn: interview; Sheehy-Culhane: interview. See Footnote 5) is not noted. For Burns, therefore, the notion of common property appears as an aspect of management or ownership (see: Burns(1988) p.226-232) -as a variable that affects 'fisher culture', 'occupational enculturation' and 'occupational community'- and thus falls within 'the sociological literature on fishing... [and which]... has become the subject of some debate' (p.226). Burns fails to

enter this debate or indicate which notion of common property she subscribes to.

Burns fails to realize that in her discussion of 'work culture' and 'occupational community' she is speaking not of consciousness, but of the commonsense notions of the fisher community (Nowell-Smith(1974); Hall(et.al.)(1978)). It is through an understanding of commonsense that we come to an understanding of the production of ideology in the fishery.

Nowell-Smith(1974 p.16) argues that:

> 'The key to commonsense is that the ideas that it embodies are not so much incorrect as uncorrected and taken for granted. Common sense consists of all those ideas which can be tagged onto existing knowledge without challenging it. It offers no criterion for determining how things are... but only a criterion of how things fit with the ways of looking at the world that the present phase of class society has inherited from the preceding one'.

Commonsense is thus a form of pragmatic reasoning based on direct perception of and experience in the world(Nowell-Smith(1974)) and includes general understandings, conceptions and beliefs of the world. As Hall(1978 p.154) observes:

> 'Although the structure of commonsense is therefore often directly in touch with the practical struggle of everyday life ... it is also shot through with elements and beliefs derived from earlier or other more developed ideologies which have sedimented into it'(6).

This can be observed in the fishery where fishers recognize a crisis in the industry, yet maintain gear and intra-industry divisions (See: Chapter Four).

Burns' analysis leaves untouched further dimensions of 'fisher culture'. For example, the literature (Muszynski(1986)); Knight and Koizumi(1976)) indicates that racism is rampant in the industry. This was confirmed by Drouin, who argues:

> "There is a lot of ignorance among fishermen. Racism's a big problem - most of the guys are racists. They really hate Indians, even when we fish together and might have Indian friends. Then they'll say their friend's OK but all the others are savages. Thats the attitude" (Pers. Comm. 24/8/89).

In discussing attendance at Union local meetings Drouin states:

> "About 10% of the guys in our local (local 1) show up for our monthly meetings; generally, not always, the same people. That's pretty average across all the locals. But on sports nights, especially hockey... when it's on TV or there's a big game in town, its much less. So we try not to meet on hockey nights." (Pers. Comm. 24/8/87).

Drouin hereby indicates the relationships between commonsense and ideology as well as the permeability of the "membranes" separating them. Furthermore, Drouin is showing us that commonsense and ideological conceptions held by fishers emerge out of, and are a part of, their daily life paths and the patterns of socialization and acculturation existent in society (Meszaros(1989); Chapter Two).

This integration of lifepaths with commonsense and ideology is reiterated by Drouin's reference to persons who use fishing as a supplement to incomes derived from other sectors of the ecomomy(7). For example, Drouin states:

> "Remember also that many of these people aren't fishermen. Often they just come in when it's looking good and crew a bit".

This was returned to when, in discussing his co-workers, Drouin indicates:

> "One of the guys on my boat (the boat I crew on) is a plumber, in the plumber's union, but he does'nt support UFAWU! The brother of the skipper is also crew. He doesn't want to fish. Hates fishing. But was told by his old man he had to fish or be cut off from the family. The family's got bucks - they used to own some fishing company, but sold it last year".

In spite of the diversity of lifepaths in the fishery, Burns (1988 p. 137) argues:

> '... the data presented... indicate that Canadian Pacific Coast commercial fishing is a unique adaptation to physical conditions... (T)hese unique conditions provide the basis for the occupational community and work culture of fishermen.'

This is reiterated on p. 171 where Burns states:

> 'Work culture is grown in the fertile soil of the organization of work... The core proposition... is that some industries and occupations exhibit particular technical and environmental constraints which in turn generate specific work organizations and develop unique cultures' (see also, for example, Burns p. 125).

Indeed, this echoes Marx(1970) when he states:

> The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of [people]. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of [people], appear at this stage as the direct efflux of their material behaviour... [People] are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc- real active [people] as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these... ´(p.47).

In short, if interpreted as part of a materialist ontology and epistemology Burns´ conclusions reinforce Meszaros´ ´negative´ concept of ideology as practical consciousness, or what is referred to by Hall(1978) and Nowell-Smith(1974) as ´commonsense´. On the other hand, if Burns´ conclusions are interpreted within the rubric of functionalist theory, her generalizations are disputed by Drouin who indicates that people come to the fishery from a diversity of life paths and individually based locales, many of which are not necessarily related to a fisher based ´occupational community´ or ´work culture´. This is reiterated by Meggs(interview) who states:

> "I just dont go along with this romantic notion that fishermen[sic] are different, special, or somehow think differently",

as does Sheehy-Culhane, who argues:

> "I get sick when I hear the romanticism stories- they´re basically academic. You´re out there for three or four weeks, on a tiny vessel, that´s heaving around. It´s highly competitive. Friends and groups who say they´ll work together and help each other never did-they all fought for the catches. So there are hundreds of superstitions. But there´s nothing special about us".

Summarizing, this section has served to review fisher consciousness. It has been shown that the fishers' world view emerges from their life paths and is a composite of divergent conceptions. Burns' functionalist approach, while effectively describing elements of fisher 'work culture', fails to explain the motivations for fisher organizational actions, nor does it explain the source of fisher and shoreworker ideologies. A Marxian analysis goes beyond these limitations by situating the concepts held by individuals in a broader social and material matrix, refusing to separate the individual from that matrix (Marx(1964) p.137-8). With this injunction in mind, Section 3.3 will review the material standards of living of fishers and industry workers. This will emphasise the heterogeneity evident in the industry; emphasise the integration of workplace and home ideologies; and verify Meszaros'(1989 p.391) concept of ideology as the 'inescapable practical consciousness of class societies'.

3.3 Standards of living in the BC fishery.

The fishing community exhibits disparities of wealth and income (Burns(1988); Guppy(1987)(a); McMullan(1984)(1987)) (see: Table 3.11; Table 3.12). Furthermore, the DPA Group(1988) indicates that between the years 1979 and 1983:

'... the fleet had experienced income levels significantly less than the levels necessary to service debt and provide a reasonable return on investment. Financial institutions began to restructure or partially forgive loans so that many enterprises could continue to operate... aggregate analysis does not capture necessarily the circumstances under which many enterprises experienced severe financial difficulty. These vessels were not able to meet their financial obligations. That is, the cash flow was not able to service debt and interest' (p.27).

The DPA Group study concludes by noting:

'The reduction in earnings, the high debt levels and escalating interest rates which peaked at close to 25% in the summer of 1981 resulted in severe financial difficulties for 10-20% of the fleet. These operations were insolvent- they could not meet their principal repayment and interest obligations' (ibid. p.41).

The situation is so volatile that two commissions of enquiry have been constituted to investigate the nature of and causes for this condition. Thus Pearse begins his commission into the Pacific fisheries by stating:

'...the economic circumstances of the commercial fisheries are exceptionally bleak...' (Pearse (1982) p.vii).

Again, on p. 3, Pearse notes that:

'... many commercial fishermen are near bankruptcy.'

Guppy(1987)(a) shows that whether the historical pattern or any single temporal moment in the industry is considered, conditions of economic insecurity and economic disparity can be found, a situation that leads him to conclude that:

'... disparities in the earnings of current fishers underscore much of the tension so evident between industry participants' (Guppy(1987)(a) p.181).

Disparities between gear types (see Tables 3.11; 3.12; 3.13) exacerbate tensions (see, for example, The Fisherman: 24/7/81. p.5. 'Gear warfare infecting the fleet'). Similarly, the UFAWU identifies intergear competition, based on intergear income disparities, as one of the largest stumbling blocks in the way of advancing fisher concerns, and repeatedly calls for unity within the fleet and between fishers and shoreworkers (Fisherman: 28/1/83: Supplement)(See Chapter 4.2). These tensions are in turn reinforced by disparities between fishers within a single gear category (DPA Group(1988))(see Tables 3.11; 3.12; 3.13)(8).

Intergear and intragear tension is reinforced by what, in the eyes of fishers, is considered to be ad-hoc and ineffectual DFO management (Meggs: interview; Rahn: interview; Cox: interview; Pearse(1982) p.205; Fisherman's Forum: Enforcement of the fishing regulations. Westcoast Fisherman: Febuary 1989)(see: Table 3.14 and footnote 9). Similarly, Burns(1988) and Guppy(1987)(a) show that fishers regard DFO as an organization that is undemocratic(9); fails to address their needs and concerns; and is not interested in the legitimate concerns of fishers (see: Fishermen's Forum: Enforcement of the Fishing Regulations. Westcoast Fisherman. Febuary 1989).

Table 3.11
Distribution of Gross Fishing Incomes, per vessel, 1984

Gross Income Class	Vessel Classification		
	Seine	Other Gears	Total
<$10,000	1%	15%	13%
$10,000-$19,999	2%	26%	23%
$20,000-$49,999	20%	43%	41%
$50,000-$99,999	38%	13%	16%
$100,000-$199,999	25%	3%	5%
$200,000 plus	14%	0%	2%
Total	100%	100%	100%

Source: DPA Group (1988)

Table 3.12
Captain and Crew Member Net Returns,
1981-1985

Vessel Class	$ Captain Return Per Week Worked(1) 1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Seine	$1,310	$1,180	$1,220	$900	$1,490
Gillnet	360	380	230	310	430
Gillnet-Troll	330	380	240	360	450
Troll	490	560	360	610	690
All Vessels	490	530	400	490	660

Vessel Class	$ Crew Member Return Per Week Fished 1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Seine	$1,190	$1,080	$1,000	$680	$1,240
Gillnet	420	450	430	430	480
Gillnet-Troll	300	340	240	310	450
Troll	410	490	350	560	670
All Vessels	650	650	570	550	850
B.C. Weekly Industrial Wage(2)	$347	$388	$424	$429	$441

Notes: (1) Weeks worked equals weeks fished plus 6 weeks pre- and post-season preparation time.
(2) Salaried plus hourly-paid workers (includes overtime earnings).
Source: DPA Group(1988).

Table 3.13
Salmon Landings by Highliners:
% Fish Accruing to Top 20% of Fishers

	Time Period(1)	
By Value	1967-1970	1978-1981
All Gears	53.60%	54.30%
Gillnet	42.90%	40.00%
Seine	36.20%	34.50%
Troll		
Ice	52.30%	43.00%
Freezer	N/A	34.50%
Combinations	42.60%	35.40%
By Weight		
All Gears	59.40%	61.60%
Gillnet	43.60%	39.40%
Seine	36.10%	34.60%
Troll		
Ice	50.20%	42.70%
Freezer	N/A	35.00%
Combinations	43.70%	36.10%

Notes: (1) Percentages are averages for the four-year time periods.

Source: Guppy(1987)(a).

Table 3.14
Perceptions of Department of Fisheries and Oceans Policies and Regulations

	Gear-Type of Respondent		
%reporting DFO policies favour certain fisheries	Gillnet 61.50%	Seine 72.20%	Troll 52.80%
Gear-Type			
Gillnet	0.00%	23.10%	5.30%
Seine	37.50%	0.00%	57.90%
Troll	56.30%	61.50%	0.00%
Sample Size	26	18	36

Source: Guppy(1987)(a)

The above noted concerns translate into differing gear and industry group agendas. As Guppy notes:

> '... these very real concerns about advantages or 'disproportionate contributions' accruing to certain groups have translated into political tension' (Guppy (1987) p.186),

tensions (see, for example, Marchak(1987)(b); Pinkerton (1987(a)) which are most manifest in the variety of interest groups in the industry (Guppy(1987)(a); Marchak(1987)(b); Clement(1984)(1986)). These tensions were, in part, transcended in the 1982-1985 Fishermen's Survival Coalition (FSC), only to be reasserted since 1985, appearing most dramatically in the 1989 strike (see: Chapter Four).

This section has drawn on sociological data, to show how material standards of living of B.C. fishers relate to gear divisions and political cleavages in the industry. Economic deprivation (shown in the DPA Group's(1988) survey of fishers and analysis of fisher audited income statements) and a sense of marginalization from government regulatory bodies (Pearse(1982)) combine to influence, through their locale-specificities (see chapter two), the commonsense perceptions of fishers (see: Meszaros(1989); Table 2.14). This is translated in turn into ideological notions of gear and/or (as Drouin, cited above, notes) racial difference. It is these ideological concepts that the UFAWU attempts to overcome. We turn now

to a brief review of the Union's history, before proceeding to analyze two case studies of UFAWU mobilization.

3.4 UFAWU: organizational structure and history.

This section will outline the UFAWU's organizational structure, before providing a synopsis of the Union's history. The UFAWU has been selected for analysis since it is the largest organization in the BC fishery (Clement(1984)(1986)), and claims to represent the interests of the majority of industry workers(10)(see also Table 3.15 UFAWU- General Membership).

3. 4. 1. UFAWU Organization.

UFAWU is structured as an industrial trade union. Thus it attempts to organize and represent all workers in the fishing industry regardless of the specific crafts they might bring as individuals to the Union, and regardless of the level of their skill.

The Union's highest body is its membership (UFAWU(1982) p.5). This membership is organized into a number of regionally based locals. A convention to which locals elect delegates is held annually. At these annual conventions Union policy is determined, Union performance

Table 3.15
UFAWU General Membership,
1979-1989

Year	Total	Shoreworkers	Fishers(1)
1979	7067	(2)	(2)
1980	5671	3326	2345
1981	6040	3480	2560
1982	5796	3188	2608
1983	5594	3137	2457
1984	5452	2977	2475
1985	6228	3157	3071
1986	6292	3404	2888
1987	5916	(2)	(2)
1988	6387	(2)	(2)
1989	6204	(2)	(2)

Note: (1) Includes tendermen. Source not disaggregate data.
(2) Data not available.

Source: UFAWU Annual Conventions: Resolutions and Summaries of Proceedings: Various Years.

conventions Union policy is determined, Union performance over the past year is debated and discussed and the Union's leadership is determined. The convention elects a general executive board that governs between conventions. The executive board is made up of 30 persons. Three of these are the Union's table officers- the Union's president, business agent and secretary-treasurer, with a further five being vice-presidents (representing the big boat fleet (seiners), the small boat fleet (gillnetters and trollers), the northern regions, the tendermen's section and the shore workers section). The final 22 members of the board represent different sections within the Union - thus four must be fishermen, eight must be shoreworkers and three must be tendermen. The convention also elects a six- member board of trustees to oversee the Union's financial activities. Furthermore, the General Executive Board (GEB) oversees several standing committees and gear conferences within the Union.

Standing committees are composed, in the main, of GEB members. They are constituted annually, and are renewed or disbanded following decisions taken at the UFAWU's annual conventions. Any Union member who wishes to participate can join a standing committee. The following standing committees are in existence:

1) Fisheries Regulations Committee

2) Safety and Navigational Aids Committee

3) Standing Committee on the Environment

4) Women's Committee

5) Indian Rights Committee

6) Troll Council

Gear conferences are annually delegated conferences of members nominated from the Union's locals, representing the gear groups of seine or gillnet. At these conferences delegates review the past season's openings and regulations, catch divisions, treaty talks and, if necessary price negotiations. The two conferences are held concurrently yet separately and usually include direct meetings with fisheries department personnel. In addition, the Union has a trawl committee that concerns itself specifically with the problems of trawl fishers.

Between conventions the GEB maintains contact with locals and the interests of locals by:

1) meeting local members and attending monthly local meetings;

2) touring the grounds on the Union's (currently chartered) M.V. George Miller as part of the fleet sign-up procedure;

3) communicating with membership through the Unions' newspaper "The Fisherman";

4) communicating with the membership through occasional supplements (on, for example: ocean

ranching; price negotiations; worker culture) of the newspaper.

A permanent environmental department and Union library have been maintained since 1976. The Union encourages political action by its members and feels that '...political activity is an essential part of trade union activity' (UFAWU(1981)p. 22). After a lengthy struggle the Union was accepted into the Canadian Labor Congress in December 1972, and is an affiliate of the BC Federation of Labor.

Summarizing, the Union members are grouped into locals. Locals elect representatives to an annual convention and/or to gear conferences. The conferences and convention determine policy. The convention elects the Union's primary steering body - the General Executive Board. The GEB strives to represent fisher and shore worker interests, concerns and demands to, on the one hand, provincial and federal government authorities, and, on the other, employer groups. This is done by way of retaining communicative links with industry workers or, where possible, building links with other industry participants such as the Native Brotherhood and other gear organizations (See chapter 4.2.).

3. 4. 2. UFAWU: historical overview.

It was noted earlier that the UFAWU is an Industrial Union. Prior to 1945 workers in the fishing industry were organized into Craft Unions or associations organized by gear type (Griffin(1974); UFAWU(1981)). We have noted that currently the Union is divided into three main sections - shoreworkers, tendermen and fishers. The articulation of these different interest groups will be further reviewed in chapter four. Their interaction in the past constitutes the Union's history. Thus Marchak(1987(b)), argues that these groups emerged out of the early industry history, indicating how this history was shaped by the needs of early canning interests (see also: Ralston(1968)). Consequently, she argues:

> 'Contemporary divisions in the fleet have long histories, beginning with competition between ethnic groups contingent on the different working conditions provided them by early canneries' (Marchak(1987(b)) p.228)(11).

Fishing in BC originated as a subsistence gatherer-hunter operation. With the penetration of capitalist modes of production, this relationship was transformed from production and consumption for need towards production and consumption within a market exchange relation. Prior to canning, salmon was exported as a dried and salted product, with the Hudson's Bay Company as the major entrepreneur (Muszynski(1986)), and with barter being the

primary mechanism of exchange. Later, reorganization during the 1880s and 1890s of firms into corporations based on new approaches to production, marketing and consumption (Muszynski(1986)) in turn affected the nature of production and consumption of BC salmon (Ralston(1968)). Furthermore, as a consequence of BC's distance from markets and the perishable nature of food, food production and its transport demanded technological innovations, innovations which were centered on (in the fishing industry) the shift to canning technologies. As Woolworth((1892), cited in Muszynski(1986 p.88)), notes:

> '... the industrialization of the food industry provided the indispensable basis of the type of urban life that was being created; and it was in the food industry that the marketing structure of the corporation... became fully developed. The canning industry had come into being in the 1840's... the expansion of this industry to embrace national and international markets did not come... until the 1870's, when further technical developments... made (this) possible.'

The significance of this technological and structural re-organisation cannot be overlooked since the expansion of factory production required a labor force to operate the canneries, a labor force that was, in the B.C. of the 1870s, difficult to obtain.

For the canning enterprises there was consequently, on the one hand, a shortage of cannery workers and, on the other, the possibility of an insufficient supply of salmon as a result of fishers selling to competing canneries. This

latter problem was resolved through the creation of cannery operated and owned gillnetters- in effect, the creation of proletarian relations at the point of capture (Reid(1975)). The former problem was resolved through plant mechanization (Stacey(1978); Muszynski(1986)). Mechanization, however, introduced the need for a skilled labor force to operate the more sophisticated machinery. In short, as Muszynski(1986. p.97) argues:

> ' ... in establishing a capitalist fishing industry, canners had to actively create a factory labor force'(12).

The development of the industry was nevertheless continually hampered by insufficient labor (Stacey(1978); O'Bannon (1983); Gladstone(1959)). For example, in the 1903 and 1905 salmon seasons, canners had to limit boat catches because of an oversupply of salmon and difficulties experienced in recruiting labor to process the fish. This situation was resolved with the introduction of the Smith butchering machine in 1912 which allowed two operators to perform the work of what previously required 51 skilled butchers (Muszynski(1986)). The wages and working conditions of shoreworkers remained unchanged from this point on until the 1930s (Muszynski(1986)) during which time changes in the fleet began to effect the shoreworkers, developments which will now be reviewed.

3.5 Fleet developments.

It has been noted how the canneries were instrumental in bringing capitalist relations of production to the gatherer-hunter operation of fishing. By the late 1930s fishers were organized into a number of gear-based craft unions (Hayward(1981); Marchak(1987(b)); Griffin(1974)). Unionists in these gear-based (and ethnically divided) unions soon realized that the effective advancement of fisher concerns could only be achieved in conjunction with cannery workers (Griffin(1974)).

Consequently, fishers, even while organized into craft based unions, were still largely powerless against the canneries since if one gear specific group attempted to gain higher prices, canneries could obtain fish from other gear-specific groups, and process those fish in their plants (James(1987)). In part(13) to change this situation (see: Frecke(1972)) early fisher unionists struggled to create an organization that united all fishers into one structure. Thus, in the 1930s fisher unionists began to encourage plant worker unionization. This became an explicit union policy with the formation of a federal fishers' union in 1941 through the merging of the Pacific Coast Fishermens Union (PCFU) into the United Fishermen's Federal Union (UFFU) (Griffin(1974) p.9). However, the Craft Union philosophy of the Trades and Labor Congress,

of which the UFFU was an affiliate, dictated that shoreworkers had to be organized under a separate charter (James(1987)).

Consequently, a charter was provided by the TLC itself which helped establish the Fish Cannery and Reduction Plant Workers' Union (FCRPWU) through the granting of a direct charter from the TLC, and creating the FCRPWU as a Local (Local 86) of the TLC (Gladstone(1959) p.188).

At the annual conferences of UFFU and the FCRPWU, members increasingly called for a merger of the two Unions (James(1987); Griffin(1974)), resulting in the formation of UFAWU in March 1945 after the conventions of both UFFU and FCRPWU unanimously endorsed merger resolutions.

In spite of the formation of an industry-wide union, differences in fisher and shoreworker ideologies continued to hamper organizational work (Muszynski(1984)(1986))(see chapter 4.2.). For example, shoreworker perception of the existence of a bias within the Union towards fleet workers has at times weakened the Union (Muszynski(1987) p.283). Thus, Muszynski((1987) p.289) argues, in reference to the 1967 and 1973 strikes, that:

> 'Struggles had to be waged not only against the companies, but also within the Union, where fishers' interests had predominated since its founding.'

The link between ideology, place and production can be noted through the division of actions and Union consciousness that exists between fishers and shoreworkers. Chapter Four analyses the specific dynamics of two episodes in the Union's history, and serves to illustrate this articulation between locale, production and the ideology of industry workers.

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed the history of the UFAWU in the context of the development of the fishing industry of BC. Contemporary socio-economic data on the industry have been provided. It is argued, following chapter two, that the ideologies of fishers and shoreworkers are dialectically, rather than causally, shaped by their nested locales within the industry. As Soja(1989 p.148) notes, the specific forms of these existential spatial ontologies vary in time and space. The failure to recognize these differences is seen as the chief defect of sociological and anthropological literature on the fishery. Against this background, the level of analytical abstraction (see: Sayer(1984)) can shift to a focus on two specific cases of UFAWU mobilization, indicating how these mobilizations were affected by, in the first case, the continually contested and fluctuating nature of ideology, and in the

second, by the contested and conflicting nature of locale-specific ideologies.

Footnotes

1) Price-Waterhouse(1988 p.6) note '[m]any more fishermen participate in these fisheries every year but a good portion of these are already counted as salmon fishermen.' Consequently Price-Waterhouse's approximate total of 14500 active fishers should be seen as a highly conservative estimate through its failure to consider fishers holding more than one licence or fishing a number of different fisheries.

2) Trolling is a method of fishing whereby several lines with numerous lures attached are dragged through the water. On striking a lure, a fish is reeled in and is immediately gutted and iced by the fisher. The fish arrive at the market fresh and in good condition.

3) Terminal fisheries are seasonal fisheries based at a river or estuary mouth to which migratory stocks return at the completion of their life cycles.

4) See also, for example, Sinclair(1988); Nemec(1980).

5) Three broad notions of 'Common Property' can be identified: a) those held by fishers (denoted as "Common Property"); b) those held by fisheries economists, fisheries biologists and sociologists and anthropologists doing research in the field of fisheries (denoted as "common property", and c) that proposed by Clement(1984)(1986) (denoted as "common-Property"). See Chapter One and Appendix One for further discussion of the concept.

6) Commonsense falls within the negative concept of ideology as defined by Meszaros(1989)(see: ibid. p.401-409). Commonsense is reinforced by the 'specialized constructs of the ruling ideology', which combines with commonsense to create Meszaros' 'negative ideology'. 'Negative ideology' can be overcome and transformed into 'critical (positive) ideology', a process which is an 'uphill struggle'(Meszaros(1989) p.404). This transformation cannot occur in consciousness alone, but must develop from, and on account of, emergent contradictions in the material world. The development of these contradictions, and their effects on ideology and organization is indicated in chapter four. Dialectically, the partial resolution of these contradictions (at least in the minds of fishers) resulted in the re-emergence of 'negative' ideologies.

7) No data on 'full time' and 'part time' fishers is available. Price-Waterhouse(1988 p.6) argue:

> 'The number of unemployment claims reflects to some extent the number of fishermen who rely solely on

> fishing for their livelihood ... seasonality and the time required in preparing for the fishing season usually does not permit fishermen to work at other substantial permanent positions.'

Defining precisely 'full' and 'part-time' fishers has inherent problems. For example, if engagement in preparation time is a criterion for definition of 'full time' fisher status, crew would be largely excluded because of their presumed "reduced responsibility" in 'preparing for the fishing season'. More germane to the thesis is not categorising persons into full time/part-time groupings, but considering the integration of ideologic notions with the existential and material reality of their life paths.

8) The highliner phenomenon largely explains intragear income variation (DPA Group(1988)). See: Pearse(1982) p.100. See also: Tables 3.11; 3.12; 3.13.

9) While the case can be made that the DFO is a state admimistrative body with a mandate to efficiently administer a state resource, and hence cannot be "democratic", primary (Cox: interview; Rahn: interview; Drouin: interview; Sheehy-Culhane: interview) and secondary (Burns(1988); Pierce(1982); Guppy(1987)(a)) research indicates that fishers believe that DFO should 'be more democratic', should respond to their needs and should be held more accountable to fishers. The material and locale-specificity of ideological notions is demonstrated by these perceptions, thereby reinforcing Meszaros's concept of ideology. With regard to material specificity, all groups feel DFO should be 'more democratic' and 'less biased', while neglecting to consider the feasibility of democratizing government administrative bodies within the rubric of capitalist relations of production, or the feasibility of democratizing government bureaucracy within liberal democratic governing structures. Locale-specificity is indicated by the ascription of bias on the part of DFO towards each respondent gear group. Gillnetters, as one nested locale-specific grouping therefore believe they are discriminated against by DFO, as do trollers and seiners. The clash of these overlapping locales, and the conflicting material needs and interests inherent within these conflicts consequently give rise to a perception of DFO bias. Table 3.14 indicates this gear-specific perception of DFO held by fishers, and shows how each gear group believes DFO is biased against their specific interests. Counterfactually therefore, it would seem that the DFO does an effective job of resource allocation among the different gear groups.

10) Marchak(1987) provides information on associations, co-operatives and organizations in the BC fishery, as does

Clement (1986)(1984). Pinkerton(1987(a)) reviews the role and place of BC First Nation peoples in the industry. Hayward(1984) and Hill(1967) analyze the origin and development of fisher co-operatives on the BC coast (see, however, UFAWU(1984) p.8-12) where the Union analyses the effective potential of co-ops in the industry). Pinkerton(1987(b)) and Warriner(1987) indicate the relationships between community, regional dependance and the development of organizations. See Table 3.15 for data on union membership.

11) See Ralston(1968) for further information on the role of canning interests in the early history of the BC fishing industry.

12) See also: Stacey(1978).

13) Other reasons for the adoption of this mobilizational strategy lie in the fact that many organizers in the industry were members of the Communist Party of Canada and were acting according to theoretical guidelines established by the Third International after its 1928 Sixth World Congress (Frecker(1972) p.101).

CHAPTER FOUR: UNION MOBILIZATION AND FISHER IDEOLOGY. TWO CASE STUDIES.

4.1 Introduction

This chapter will review the process of the transformation by people of their human geographies using as case studies two episodes of union mobilization in the fishing industry, these being the 1984 Fishermen's Survival Coalition(FSC) and the 1989 UFAWU strike. This reflects Gregory's(1978 p.172) contention that:

> "... spatial structures are implicated in social structures and each has to be theorized with the other. The result of this is a doubly human geography: human in the sense that it recognizes that its concepts are specifically human constructions, rooted in specific social formations, and capable of - demanding of - continual examination and criticism; and human in the sense that it restores human beings to their own worlds and enables them to take part in the collective transformation of their own human geographies".

Prior to a discussion of the FSC, an understanding of the Pearse commission and the nature of fisheries management is needed. It is to these topics that we now turn.

4.2 Crisis in the BC fishing industry and the Pearse commission.

The Royal Commission on Pacific Fisheries Policy was appointed by Romeo LeBlanc, Federal Fisheries minister, in 1981 under the chair of Dr. Peter Pearse with instructions to:

> 'examine into, report upon and make recommendations concerning the condition, management and utilization

> of the fisheries of the Pacific coast of Canada, excluding the arrangements between Canada and foreign nations governing fishing rights and conservation of stocks...´(Pearse commission. Terms of Reference).

The justification for the commission lay in the recognition that:

> ´Canada´s Pacific fisheries are at a crisis point. This year, following two depressed years, the economic circumstances of the commercial fisheries are exceptionally bleak´ (Pearse(1982) p.vii).

The problems, while being ´numerous, grave and very complicated´(Pearse(1982) p.3) could ´be traced to a number of causes´(Pearse(1982) p.6), of which the ´most important is the common property characteristic of the resource, which distinguishes it from most other natural resources´ (Pearse(1982) p.6).

Similarly, DeVoretz and Schwindt(1983) indicate that the commission was intended to address the ´problems associated with the exploitation of a common property fishery´(p.1), in which:

> ´too much harvesting capacity relative to resource abundance ... results in pressure on the fish stocks, dissipation of resource rents, and, allegedly sub-normal returns to fishermen´ (DeVoretz and Schwindt(1983) p.1).

Thus the existence of a crisis in the fishery had been identified, a crisis defined in terms of low returns to fishers, pressure on fish stocks, dissipation of resource rents (Pearse(1981)(1982); DeVoretz & Schwindt(1985)) and growing indebtedness among fishers (see: McMullan(1984)

(1987)). This situation has been in effect since the 1950s (Copes(1980)). Consequently, basic policy objectives of the provincial and federal governments have been directed (a) towards reducing fisher extractive capacity to allow the restoration of resource rents, and (b) towards restoring returns to fishers (Pearse(1982); DeVoretz & Schwindt(1983); Larkin(1979); Copes(1980))(1). These policy objectives stem from the a priori assumption that the pressure on stocks and low returns to fishers are the result of the common property, open access nature of the resource (Copes(1987)); Pearse(1982))(2). Thus Schwindt argues:

> 'The fisheries have for the most part been operated as a "common property resource", with open access to the fishing grounds. The result has been a classic case of market failure in that competition for the resource rent has induced substantial, chronic excess capacity in the harvesting sector'(Schwindt(1984) p. 1).

The problem for government, as regulator of a public resource, has been to reduce the common property/open access nature of the fishery through controlling access and/or shifting the resource towards private property forms of ownership (see: Schwindt(1984)). Thus in the late 1960s the federal government attempted to reduce the number of vessels in the fishery through the Davis plan. The plan resulted in increased capital expenditure by fishers on their vessels thereby increasing the value of

the fleet (Copes(1987)) as well as heightening indebtedness among fishers (McMullan(1987)).

The 1968 Davis Plan failed to achieve its goal of reducing overcapacity. In fact, initial rents generated under the plan stimulated further overcapatilization through "capital stuffing"(Schwindt(1984); DeVoretz & Schwindt(1983)), which in turn re-dissipated much of the initial fisher resource rents (Fraser(1978) p.377). Recognising the failure of the Davis Plan (Copes(1987)); Fraser(1978)), the federal government appointed the Pearse Commission.

Although Pearse(1982 p.3) indicated that 'major and fundamental changes in fisheries policy are needed', DeVoretz & Schwindt(1983 p.3) note that:

> '[t]he Pearse recommendations are clearly in the tradition of the Davis Plan since they call for a reduction in the fleet size. However, Pearse's recommendations go much further as they seek to dissuade entry through appropriation [by the federal government] of available resource rents'.

Similarly, the UFAWU argued that Pearse's recommendations were an extension of Davis's policy and would serve to deepen the crisis in the industry (The Fisherman 8/10/1982; 22/10/1982)(3).

Pearse(1981)(1982) proposed that resource rent appropriation was to be achieved through the introduction

of a royalties tax on landed fish; through the auctioning of licences for the salmon and roe-herring fisheries; and through the reduction, by 50%, of the fleet within a 10-year period. The effects of this policy would have been considerable (see: DeVoretz & Schwindt(1983)). For example, as far as fishers were concerned, the royalties tax, a tax which was to be imposed on processors, could have been passed on to fishers by the processors through reduced landings prices (Fisherman 11/12/1981). Furthermore, DeVoretz & Schwindt(1983) argue that the auctioning of fish licenses and the progressive limitation of licenses offered by the state in order to achieve its objectives of fleet reduction would serve to heighten uncertainty in the fleet (DeVoretz & Schwindt(1983) p.21-22).

It was these elements of the Pearse Commission that encouraged intra-industry mobilization. However other aspects of the Pearse Commission, and the socio-economic context of which it was a part, deserve mention.

From the outset, the Pearse Commission was attacked for the narrowness of its scope. Thus investigation of the effects of interception treaties with the US were deemed to be beyond the commission's concern, as were environmental concerns. Both of these factors, as well as the degree of corporate concentration, were considered

vital to a coherent understanding of the fishery by UFAWU (see: Fisherman 29/5/81 p.3), who argued that the terms of reference of the commission should be expanded to include these considerations (Fisherman 29/5/81).

Pearse(1982 p.45) indicates that the:

> '... Commissions' terms of reference exclude arrangements between Canada and foreign nations... [although]... Canada's arrangements with the United States bear on the management of Canadian salmon fisheries in... important respects...'.

Nevertheless, Pearse argued in 1981:

> 'I could not deal with that [the US/Canada interception treaty] question now, although it is an important and urgent problem, unless I stopped being a domestic inquirer... the whole structure of this commission would have to be changed' (cited in Fisherman 29/5/81 p.3).

Similarly, Pearse(1982) identifies DFO mismanagement as an important dimension of the Pacific fisheries crisis, and states:

> 'The hearings took place against a background of anxiety about the state of the fisheries and uncertainty about government regulations(p.viii).

Again, on p.205, Pearse indicates:

> 'Participants... repeatedly expressed serious misgivings about the DFO's performance in enforcing the laws and regulations it administers...',

and, in an indirect response to the ad-hoc administration of the fishery, referring to the recently announced 1981 regulations for sport fishers, gillnetters and trollers, Pearse indicated that:

> 'The load of work... was made particularly heavier by (recent) announcements by the fisheries department' (cited in Fisherman 29/5/81 p.3).

Finally, referring to corporate concentration and control of the resource by the processing companies, in a submission to the commission, a processor (the representative of Island Cash Buyers, John Margetis), expressed fears that small cash buyers would be unable to survive while large processor companies were able to practice 'what amounts to price fixing' (Margetis, cited in Fisherman 29/5/81 p.3). Margetis continued by arguing that:

> '... nobody is really independent today. We're all controlled by the big companies. If they want they can stamp you out any minute... (adding that)... prices paid to fishermen (are) depressed because of control by big companies' (cited in Fisherman 29/5/81 p.3)(4).

In short, Pearse was aware of the nature of fisheries administration, the importance of the salmon interception treaty, the problems with oligopsony control, and the limited structure and focus of his committee. The restricted focus of the commission ensured that Pearse's recommendations could be limited to economic and managerial considerations, and couched in the rhetoric of economic and managerial policy (see: McCloskey(1985); Meszaros(1989)).

Partly due to the narrowness of his focus and the rhetoric of his assumed scientific objectivity (McCloskey(1985); Meszaros(1989)), Pearse was unable to integrate the depth of fisher frustration into his considerations. This frustration was obvious throughout 1981 and was stimulated by:

(a) the fisheries department's threatened Fraser River closures, a situation that galvanized gillnetters into organizing to save the Fraser River gillnet fishery (See: Fraser River District Council Report. UFAWU 37th. Annual Convention. Summary of Proceedings. p.57-58.);

(b) the threatened troll area closures and fleet restrictions, which stimulated the formation of a gear-wide ad-hoc coalition to fight the closures, culminating in a sail-in and unity rally by trollers in May 1981;

(c) the resumption of US/Canada treaty talks, in the context of the aforementioned restrictions, restrictions which were seen by fishers as attempts by Canada to show good negotiating faith to the US (Hewison in Fisherman 30/4/81, p.1);

d) Environmental threats. For example, in 1981 the Amax mine tailings cover-up was revealed (Fisherman 27/3/81, p.1), further undermining the authority of Federal Fisheries minister Roneo Le Blanc and the DFO;

e) US/Canadian border disputes culminating in the seizure of two Canadian trawlers in disputed waters by the US coastguard, prompting a one hundred vessel fish-in at

Dixon Entrance south of the A-B line (see: Fisherman 1/7/81) and a blockade of Prince Rupert harbor in protest against the Canadian government response.

Consequently, with the release of the Pearse Commission proposals in November 1981, fisher response was volatile. The royalties tax and the uncertainties introduced by a fish license auction were the final items in a catalogue of grievances. In this context, fishers mobilized.

4.3 The Fishermen's Survival Coalition and the 1984 Ottawa lobby.

The Fishermen's Survival Coalition(FSC) lobby to Ottawa in February 1984 was the culmination of a 'long delicate period' (Cox: interview) of inter-industry mobilizing activity on the part of the UFAWU. The lobby was unique for two reasons: its size and its content. With regard to size, 120 industry representatives of all sectors and gear groups flew to Ottawa, making it the largest industry lobby the Canadian parliament had ever seen (Fisherman 20/1/84 p.1). With regard to content, the delegation took with it a comprehensive action programme designed to ensure the survival of salmon and the industry, a programme that had been debated and developed by fishers and shoreworkers in meetings in coastal communities. Apart from the content of the demands, the make-up of the

coalition itself was unique since a broad, multi-class cross section of industry participants was represented.

The coalition emerged out of a long period of crisis and mobilization activity in the industry, as well as in response to escalating labor tensions in BC with the introduction of the Social Credit Government's restraint programme in July 1983. Analysis of this broader social, political and economic context within which the FSC mobilization occurred will not be addressed here (see: Dalby(1984); Magnusson, Carroll, Doyle, Langer and Walker(1984); Allen and Rosenbluth(1986)); analysis will now turn to a consideration of the FSC per se.

4.3.1 The Dialectic of FSC formation

The FSC was an elected fisher and processor coordinating body mandated by the voluntary delegates to a Fishermens Survival Conference held in Vancouver on December 10 and 11, 1983. This conference was called by UFAWU in response to what it saw as a deepening crisis in the industry and state intransigence towards fisher demands.

More fundamentally, the conference call was built on the emergence within the fleet of a deepening consciousness of their precariousness, a situation most graphically illustrated by the publication of the Report of the Pearse

Commission in 1982. The publication of this report gave rise to a number of Pearse Fightback Committees, committees that were organized by fishers in the fishcamps, villages and towns along the Vancouver Island and mainland coasts and whose objectives were to educate the public and fishing industry workers as to the nature and implications of the Pearse Commission's recommendations. This activity helped to galvanize the industry into a massive resistance to the commission's recommendations, culminating, in 1983, in a gear- and industry-wide three day Alternatives to Pearse conference and, in 1984, with an industry-wide lobby to Ottawa.

In short, the FSC emerged out of the material contexts of an industry perceived by its participants to be in crisis. In response to this perceived crisis, industry participants overcame commonsense (and hence ideological) perceptions of the industry, and supported the UFAWU's call for mobilizing actions. A shift from negative to positive ideological conceptions (Meszaros(1989)) was thereby effected. A key component of the ensuing recommendations and alternatives was directed at the structure of Pearse's commission. Consequently the conference pledged itself to 'continued development of grassroots alternatives to Pearse' (James (1987) p.55); FSC(1982) p.3; 8).

The 'development of grassroots alternatives' by the FSC continued throughout 1983 and 1984 with shifts in contested issues that reflected changes in fisher/shoreworker consciousness, changes in contested issues, and new social and political dynamics. Thus, in 1983, community meetings were directed at educating fishers as to the content of the Pearse report; developing alternatives to the commission (through, for example, an 'Alternatives to Pearse' conference); and, once the decision to organize a lobby to Ottawa had been taken, to raise funds to sponsor local delegates, as well as to nominate local delegates (Fisherman 20/1/84).

By 1984, new issues had emerged. Initial 'grassroots' activity was directed at report-back meetings of delegate participants which became subordinated to the greater solidarity coalition struggle against the 1983/1984 Restraint Programme in which UFAWU members played an active role (see: Fisherman 21/10/1983; 18/5/1984; UFAWU-40th (1985) Annual Convention: Summary of Proceedings. p.34-37).

In turn, in June 1984, Federal Fisheries Minister De Bane introduced the Pacific Fisheries Restructuring Act, an Act containing almost all the major recommendations of the Pearse report (Meggs: interview). The Act had as its main objective the reduction of fishing costs in order to

improve efficiency (De Bane Press conference minutes 18/6/84. See also: Fisherman 19/6/84). This was to be achieved by a programme of reducing the fleet by 45%(5) before January 1985 through a voluntary buy-back programme. Fishers remaining in the fleet were to face salmon quota allocations; gear licensing; tripled licence fees; royalties; and continued reductions in fishing times. Additional catch allocations would be made to the sport fishing sector. No further funding for salmonid enhancement was proposed and no reference to habitat protection was made in the Act.

The Act had little chance of being passed since it was introduced ten days before the end of the then current session of parliament in a federal election year. Failure of the passage of the Pacific Fisheries Restructuring Act thus cannot be attributed to the actions of the coalition alone.

However, positive effects of the coalition in affecting state policy can be seen in, for example, new Federal Fisheries Minister John Fraser's praise of the coalition for its actions in an address to the delegates of the second annual meeting of the FSC in December 1984 and, in reference to the FSC lobby to Ottawa, the acknowledgement that:

> 'What you did was a splendid example of what can be done when people think out what they want to say... the basic thrusts of our party's [6] policy were derived from it' (cited in Fisherman 18/1/85).

Yet by December 1984 the FSC, as originally constituted (as a multi-interest industry-wide coalition), no longer existed. The calling of a general election caused a split in the coalition, with the UFAWU representatives advocating support for the New Democratic Party, and the PTA representatives advocating support for the Conservative Party (Cox: Interview). It was on these grounds, of different support for different parliamentary parties, that precipitated the disbanding of the FSC.

The election of a new government in December 1984 caused, by 1985, the situation in the industry to shift once more. Thus in 1985 fisher mobilization within the FSC was co-opted by the appearance of a more conciliatory approach on the part of the federal government towards the fishery. This was evidenced by: Fraser's earlier noted remarks; through the promise of greater money to be funnelled into the Salmon Enhancement Programme; by allowing de Bane's Pacific Fisheries Restructuring Act to lapse; and by the formation in 1987 of a new fleet advisory body, the Commercial Fishing Industry Council (CFIC), which replaced the discredited Minister's Advisory Committee (MAC), and was made up of DFO and fleet-user group representatives

(Cox interview; UFAWU. 40th. Annual Convention. Proceedings. p.37-41).

4.3.2 Summary

Sections 4.2 and 4.3 have:

(a) reviewed the Pearse commission;

(b) reviewed the inter-industry milieu into which the Pearse commission was situated, and out of which the FSC emerged.

(c) reviewed the FSC.

It can be seen that the FSC was an example of fishing people breaking commonsense and ideological notions of the fishery as conceptualized by Meszaros(1989) and as defined in Chapter Two. Thus, ideological notions of gear differences were in the context of the FSC and in the interests of survival of the fleet in general, transcended (See: FSC Report to UFAWU. UFAWU 40th. Annual Convention. Summary of Proceedings. p.57-58). The fuse mechanism to this solidarity was a broadly based rejection of the Pearse Commission. Contextual issues that increased tension in the industry, such as mismanagement, troll and Fraser River closures, and interception treaty negotiations have been noted. The contested nature of ideology can be seen by this shift in the consciousness of industry participants from commonsense perceptions to a critical understanding of the industry, and subsequently

to this, the reversion to commonsense (or negative) concepts.

The FSC collapsed on account of two factors:

(a) the calling of a general election, which served to re-assert cleavages in the fleet between UFAWU and the PTA; and

(b) the multiclass nature of the alliance, a situation that, structurally, mitigated against long term effectivity (see: Meszaros(1989)) of the FSC.

The new, apparently reformist, federal government that (in 1985) adopted a less directly conflictual approach to achieve its goals, pursued policies that have been able to re-assert cleavages that had in part been transcended by the FSC. The 1989 UFAWU strike illustrates the nature of these new social forces, their effect on organization within the Union, and the impact of ideology on the actions of fishers. It is towards this strike that attention is now directed.

4.4 The 1989 UFAWU strike.

Bill Procopation, UFAWU's Secretary-Treasurer, described the 1989 strike as "... a vicious strike. This time we were battling everyone: the state, the companies, injunctions, everyone" (Pers. Comm. 25/8/89).

In November 1989, Nichol, UFAWU's president, referred to the importance of the strike thus:

> 'Many questions arise. Are we able to strike in the future, knowing of the strike-breaking capability of the non-union fleets? If we are not capable of strike action, what are the consequences, the alternatives, and so on?
> Are we witnessing the growth of a salmon fleet that is permanently beyond the reach of trade union organization?'(cited in: The Fisherman 17/11/1989 p.4).

In a report to the General Executive Board of the Union, at the height of the strike, Nichol stated:

> 'A few days ago we were taking something of a beating... we thought we might have to seek support. We might need authorization of the board to enter into an emergency interim merger document with CAW... Now the heat is off somewhat... The need for an emergency merger has receded... When you see the possibility of the Union going down, such drastic action might be necessary. It seemed so a few days ago'(Minutes. 4/8/1989).

The 1989 strike consequently was, in the eyes of the UFAWU, one of the most important the Union has fought. It is still too early to assess the full effects of the strike or predict the longer term outcomes of the strike. In this regard, Procopation states:

> 'We'll see what the effects'll be over the next few years. We took quite a beating'(Pers. Comm. 25/8/89).

A full assessment and analysis of the strike is currently underway within the Union. The Union's annual conference in January 1990 has tabled three days to discuss the strike, the strike's effects and possible changes to Union

mobilization, negotiation strategy and strike activity. Analysis in this thesis will, however, conclude with the end of the strike in August 1989, focussing on the dialectic of mobilization within the industry.

This analysis will be provided in three sections.
Section 4.4.1 will contextualize the strike, showing the importance of shifting alliances within the industry in response to the GATT dispute and the 1988 Free Trade act to an understanding of the 1989 strike.
Section 4.4.2 will indicate the process of Union mobilization, showing that different sectors of the Union supported the strike for different reasons.
Section 4.4.3 will discuss the strike, its course and its immediate outcome, indicating the effect of this differential basis on individual and group consciousness.

4.4.1 The 1989 strike: Background and Context.

In order to understand the 1989 strike one must begin with a description of the events leading up to, and succeeding, the GATT ruling of 22 March 1988.

4.4.1.i The GATT trade dispute. 1986-1989.
The GATT trade dispute began as a minor incident involving a single Canadian processor purchasing roe herring from US fishermen in Alaskan waters during the 1984 and 1985

seasons. With this pretext, on 1 April 1986 US processors filed a complaint under Section 301 of the US Trade Act alleging 'unfair trade practices' (UFAWU(1989) p.8; Cruickshank(1989))(7). The basis for this claim lay, not in the purchasing of US herring by Canadian processors, but in the fact that Canadian regulations denied US processors complementary access to Canadian stocks. It was these grounds, of unequal market access and the exsistence of protectionist Canadian legislation, that became the basis for the US GATT claim.

Two possible courses of action were possible, namely (a) a bilateral solution entailing the introduction in the US regulations mirroring those of Canada, a route preferred by fishing industry and Canadian Government representatives (Cruickshank(1989)), or (b) the referral of the dispute to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) for arbitration (Cruickshank(1989)).

In September 1986 US trade officials elected to avoid negotiations with Ottawa and unilaterally took the dispute to the GATT in Geneva. Canada could make several arguments to justify its regulations prohibiting the export of unprocessed Canadian fish, regulations that were being challenged by the Americans. These included:

1) that regulations similar to Canadian restrictions were not without precedent in other countries. For

example, New Zealand restricts the export of certain unprocessed fish;

2) Law of the Sea developments are tending towards greater jurisdiction over the management and utilization of national fisheries resources (Cruickshank(1989)); and

3) Canada's fisheries regulations were in existence since 1908, before Canada's entry into GATT, and therefore could be exempted or grand-fathered into the agreement (Cruickshank(1989)).

Finally, even if the outcome of the GATT arbitration was not in Canada's favor, Canada was not obliged to adhere to the GATT ruling since, in 1986, GATT rulings were non-binding on Canadian trade law. Non-adherence could initiate US retaliatory action to achieve compensation, action that could have entailed duties or import restrictions on Canadian goods, or export restrictions(8) on US fish.

On 3 November 1987 a GATT dispute panel, comprised of representatives of three neutral nations, upheld the US complaint and referred it to the full GATT council, where a single vote could overturn the panel's ruling. Such voting could have been lobbied for by Canada's GATT representatives. Failing this, Canada could still veto the panel ruling. Neither of these steps was taken, and on 22

March 1988, the full GATT council accepted the panel report.

At this stage, Canada was under no legal obligation to comply with the GATT ruling.

However, at the same time as the GATT dispute was underway in international trade fora, Canadian and US negotiators were developing what was to become the Canada/US Free Trade Agreement, an agreement that was concluded on October 3, 1987, subject to ratification by the US and Canadian governments. Significantly, in the context of trade and the GATT dispute, the agreement bound Canada and the United States to adhere to the regulations and rulings of the GATT (Canada(1987) Articles 501, 602, 1201). With regard to fisheries, the agreement protected legislation in the Maritime provinces controlling the export of unprocessed fish, yet specifically excluded similar controls in BC (Canada(1987) Article 1203), controls that were being challenged by the GATT ruling.

Canada could either ignore the GATT ruling or have the export controls of the East coast, protected in the Free Trade Agreement(9), extended to the West Coast.

Neither of these options was followed. The Canadian government acceded to the GATT ruling and abolished all disputed regulations. In response to a question asking why

the BC industry failed to win protection granted to the Maritimes in the Free Trade Agreement, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark rationalized:

> 'BC's fish processing industry will be a loser in the Free Trade deal with the US... It is simply the reality in any negotiations that you are not going to be able to win on every front' (Cited in Vancouver Sun. 17/12/1987).

The consequences of the GATT ruling are significant. For the processing companies, Canadian fishers were now allowed to sell fish to American, or any other, purchasers. Thus Canadian processing companies were no longer guaranteed a supply of fish, since fishers could supply fish to the highest bidder. However, if Canadian processors did outbid US competitors for Canadian caught fish, they were under no legal obligation to process those fish in Canadian plants. Processing workers were thereby faced with job loss because of the export of unprocessed Canadian fish to low wage areas. However, in the face of prior direct investment by the processing companies, it could be unprofitable for Canadian processors simply to leave Canada and establish processing facilities in low-wage areas (See: Storper and Scott(1986)). Consequently, BC's processors could either fight the GATT resolution politically by encouraging the Provincial and Federal governments to oppose the GATT ruling, or, failing this, attempt to lower labor costs.

The effect on shoreworker employment was potentially devastating, a fact recognized by both UFAWU and the processors, who estimated that between 3000 to 5000 shoreworker jobs could be lost(10). Furthermore those remaining workers would be forced to accept job retraining, skill reduction, pension and benefit cuts and reduced seniority benefits (see: FPBA 1989 Bargaining Demands). This was untenable to shore based workers who faced either job loss or massive reductions in their standards of living (The Fisherman 23/6/1989), the recognition of which initiated widespread worker agitation(11) and secured high levels of shoreworker support for the 1988 and 1989 strikes.

On the other hand, many fishers believed that the GATT ruling was to their benefit since they felt it would allow an expanded market and higher prices through purchaser competition for a limited quantity of fish(Rahn: interview). Indeed, it was for these reasons that the Pacific Trollers' Association supported the GATT ruling. Furthermore, fishers felt that the GATT ruling would strengthen their bargaining position vis-a-vis the companies. In these contexts, of shoreworker and fisher ideologies, we have concrete examples of the different manifestation of ideology caused by the differing existential realities of production and locale, and of the different manifestations thereof(Meszaros(1989)).

Similarly, UFAWU(1988(a) p.29) concedes that, in the short term, there may be advantages to fishers through higher prices offered by processors for salmon.

Not only the Union, but representatives of processing capital indicate that in the long term the GATT ruling and Free Trade Agreement will adversely affect fishers as well as processor workers. Thus Cruickshank, past President of Seafood Products Ltd., indicated:

> 'The landed value of a fisherman's catch represents only half of the wholesale value of that same catch. The shoreworkers are not the only ones who stand to lose. Are there still a few rednecks who think that they will receive higher fish prices as a result of the GATT ruling? Give your head a shake! Fishmongers, on either side of the border, have never been noted for their benevolence. You will get exactly what the buyers feel they must pay, while maximizing their profits, and not one penny more. On this topic I am considered an authority'(cited in West Coast Fisherman. October 1989 p.51).

The stage was set for an uneasy alliance. As long as it was felt the GATT dispute could be won at a political level by encouraging the Canadian government to challenge the US demands, the Union and the fish companies were united in their opposition. Furthermore, as the potential social and economic effects on BC became more apparent, the BC government increasingly became aligned with UFAWU's and the processor's position. For example, on 30 November 1987, the BC government advised Federal Trade minister Pat

Carney that BC might have to reconsider its support for free trade unless an acceptable solution to the GATT issue was forthcoming, and on 19 January 1989, fishing industry representatives met with BC Premier Van der Zalm, who gave his support to industry calls for action on the part of Ottawa. However, once it was felt that the GATT dispute could no longer be won at the political level, this alliance dissipated rapidly.

Worker resistance to the GATT ruling began with the passage of resolution L5 by the delegates to UFAWU's 43rd.convention (UFAWU(1988)(a) p.138). The resolution instructed the officers and incoming General Executive Board to 'do everything possible to prevent implementation of the GATT ruling', activities that 'shall include, but not be limited to' political action at the municipal, provincial and federal levels; educational work within the Union; and the recruitment of fisher and plant worker organizations in the struggle to ensure the Canadian government's rejection of the GATT ruling.

Drawing on these instructions, the General Executive Board adopted an 'action plan' on 19 February 1988 to defend the export regulations. This plan included submissions to municipal councils to educate them as to the effects of the ruling, an industry-wide Day of Protest to be held on 4 March 1988, and the sending of a lobby to Ottawa.

Municipal council endorsement for the Union position was obtained from Sechelt, Gibsons, Victoria, Nanaimo, Campbell River, Ucluelet, and Port Hardy as well as from Port Alberni, Vancouver, Richmond, New Westminster, Delta, Maple Ridge, Surrey and Burnaby.
Shoreworker mobilization on the 4 March Day of Protest was widespread, with over 3000 shoreworkers in Vancouver, Prince Rupert, Victoria, Ucluelet and Steveston walking off the job, protesting the GATT ruling and demanding no capitulation to US demands on the part of Canadian government representatives (UFAWU(1989); See: Fisherman 25/3/1988).

The protests and the 5-day Ottawa lobby by over 20 UFAWU members, joined by delegates from the Prince Rupert Amalgamated Shoreworkers and Clerks Union, and the Prince Rupert Cooperative Fishermen's Guild, were ineffective. On 21 March 1988 Federal Fisheries Minister Siddon, and Federal Trade Minister Carney, announced that Canada would not veto the GATT panel ruling, and would dismantle export regulations on sockeye and pink salmon and herring. However, they indicated that new regulations requiring fish to be landed, graded and eviscerated for research and management purposes would be passed. These proposals were immediately rejected by US negotiators. The following day,

22 March 1988, the full GATT Council accepted the panel report, with Canada neglecting to use its veto option.

Further worker mobilization in the fishing industry during 1988 became subsumed within the 1988 contract negotiations and 1988 industry-wide strike, and thereafter in political work surrounding the 1988 federal elections and Free Trade Agreement.

Following the re-election of a Conservative Government in November 1988, the Free Trade Agreement was rapidly passed into Canadian law, becoming the Free Trade Act. The GATT ruling on BC's fisheries, passed by the full GATT council on 22 March 1988, and not vetoed by the Canadian representatives, thereby became Canadian/United States law and legally enforceable unless challenged within the provisions of the Free Trade Act(see: Canada(1987) Articles 1905-1911).

It is this path, of contestation within the provisions of the Free Trade Act, that has, of late, been taken by Canadian trade negotiators. Consequently, the ruling has become the first trade dispute to be heard under the Free Trade Act's dispute settlement mechanisms (See: Canada(1987). Articles 1905-1911).

Returning to the question of union organization and worker mobilization, delegates to UFAWU's 44th (1989) annual convention unanimously voted further to extend the Union's programme of action by including boycotts, plant occupations, picket lines and civil disobedience to halt the export of unprocessed fish. This action programme was further galvanized by new trade minister John Crosbie's reaffirmation, on 25 April 1989, that all controls on the export of salmon and herring would be eliminated, and that any new regulations would require only the landing of sockeye and pink salmon in Canada. No further processing would be required in Canada.

The Union thought, at this point, that continued participation in Canadian government fisheries bureaucracy was pointless (Fisherman. 17/2/1989), and decided to continue their opposition through social and political action. On the other hand, the processor companies began to shift their concerns toward restructuring the industry(12).

As part of the continuation of the political struggle against GATT, in May 1989 the UFAWU launched one of the largest campaigns of its history under the banner of 'Our country, our fish, our communities'. To mark the opening of the campaign, over 2,800 Union shoreworkers downed tools and walked out of plants in Prince Rupert, Steveston

and Vancouver on 4 May 1989, in protest against Ottawa's trade and fisheries policies.

Further elements of the programme of action included an industry lobby to Ottawa (partly funded by the processor companies) on June 10 to demand not only the re-institution of effective regulations to protect industry employment, but also a programme to rebuild the industry; further appeals to coastal communities and municipalities to pressure the provincial government in Victoria to halt the export of unprocessed fish; and a lobby to Victoria to support the provincial government's demands for retaliatory action on the part of Ottawa.

In this context, the 1989 wage and contract negotiations began. It is to this that attention can now be directed.

4.4.2 The 1989 strike and the dialectic of Union Mobilization.

Two types of wage structures exist in the BC fishing industry, namely (a) prices paid by processors for fish, and (b) wages paid by processors to shoreworkers. This duality is alluded to in the 1988 report of the UFAWU's special Committee on Strike policy, when it indicates that the:

> '... diversity of members we represent makes collective bargaining in the fishing industry very complex. We not only coordinate and deal with negotiations affecting the living standards, wages and conditions for shoreworkers and tendermen, but we also bargain for minimum fish prices, shares and other conditions on behalf of fishermen' (UFAWU(1988)(a) p.90).

The determination of wages/prices is achieved through a process of negotiation undertaken between representatives of the UFAWU and representatives of the processor companies. Smaller processor companies negotiate individually with the Union, while the four largest companies negotiate together within the Fish Processors' Bargaining Association (FPBA). Within the UFAWU, negotiation is overseen by the Joint Negotiating Committee which co-ordinates three negotiating sub-committees, these being the Fishermen's Negotiation Committee, the Tendermen's Negotiation Committee and the Shoreworkers' Negotiation Committee. Separate or Joint negotiation can occur; similarly, separate or joint dispute settlements can be achieved.

Prior to the expiry of any agreement, the Union calls a conference of the workers involved. Salmon negotiations, generally involving the whole industry and resulting in coastwide agreements, demand delegated conferences in which each local sends elected representatives, the number of such representatives being determined by a formula outlined in the UFAWUs' constitution (see: UFAWU(1985)

Article 10.05). New proposals are drafted by drawing upon (a) demands of local members, or demands reflecting earlier discussion in monthly local meetings and (b) research material prepared by the Union staff. These draft proposals are circulated to the locals for further discussion and approval. Locals thereupon elect a bargaining committee, and negotiations with the processor companies begin(13).

Throughout the period of negotiations, report-back meetings of the various committees are held. For example, one such report-back meeting was held in Vancouver by the Fisher Negotiating Committee on 12 July 1989 at the Maritime Labor Center, drawing 203 fishers (Minutes. Meeting of the Salmon Membership. 12/7/1989). Similar fleet meetings were held in Prince Rupert and Steveston, organized by UFAWU's Northern Area Organizer, and in various fishing camps and communities, co-ordinated by the UFAWU's fleet organizers.

Apart from the noted problems of widely divergent interests encapsulated within the Union, the UFAWU does face particular problems of communication and co-ordination. For example, the Special Committee on Strike Policy stated:

> '... communications with the fleet are a problem, as in the holding of votes, forming of committees and

> ensuring we have sufficient members to maintain an acceptable structure of committees.
> The salmon fishermen and tendermen's negotiating committees dwindle to a few when vessels leave for the fishing grounds... when bargaining is reaching its final stages, representative attendance is extremely important. To transport members in from the grounds is expensive. Keeping shoreworkers from out-of-town plants in Vancouver is equally costly...' (UFAWU(1988)(a) p.91).

Apart from maintaining adequate committee operation, the Union must update the fleet and shoreworkers on the progress of negotiations. As far as the fleet is concerned, in the 1989 season the Union chartered a vessel to tour the grounds (see: Log of the George Miller. Fisherman. 25/7/1989 p.11). Radio-telephone and VHF open channel communication is also maintained. This supplements informal meetings in the fish camps and communities along the BC coast (see: Log of the George Miller. Fisherman. 25/7/1989 p.11). Furthermore, at negotiation times there is a higher level of interest since fishers will be wanting to know, prior to the start of the season, what prices they can expect for their fish. This is verified by the log of the George Miller where, for example, it is noted:

> 'Most of the fishermen are asking about the state of bargaining, anxious about when the strike deadline will be set. Brown and Grant [UFAWU Small boat and Vancouver Island Organizers respectively] are doing their best to explain what we know... [e]veryone knows a strike is imminent, but the uncertainty makes it impossible to plan the next few weeks...' (log of the George Miller, Fisherman, 25/7/1989 p.11).

Shoreworkers are informed of the process of negotiations by way of the shopsteward structure and organized community meetings. The 1989 negotiations occurring at the same time as the Anti-GATT campaign further ensured high levels of politicization and mobilization.

The 1989 fisher, tendermen and plantworker negotiations began on 26 May. The industry context of these negotiations has been indicated. At this initial meeting, at which traditionally contract proposals are exchanged and procedural issues settled, FPBA shore bargainer Doug Alley raised the prospect of a lockout by stating:

> 'If we don't have an agreement in all three sections by June 25 or close to a settlement we would have to review our options and one of those options is a lockout' (cited in Fisherman 28/6/1989 p.1).

This threat, together with the FPBA's initial demands, the high level of tension in the industry on account of the GATT dispute, and the need for industry workers to secure their jobs and their future security, indicated to Union negotiators that the chances for a negotiated non-strike settlement were slight. In order to pressure the FPBA, and in response to the lockout threat, the Union's Joint Negotiation Committee began to undertake preparations for a strike at a date of the Union's choosing, by calling a strike vote.

Both the Union and the FPBA attempt to obtain the maximum leverage over the other. Thus, in an attempt to pressure fishers, the FPBA can withhold negotiating until prior to the deadline of a scheduled salmon net opening (UFAWU(1988)(a) p.90), a tactic that was used by the FPBA prior to the 1986 strike.

Similarly, in 1989, the FPBA ceased negotiating after mid-June. This tactic can be used in conjunction with the issuance of lockout notices to the shoreworker sector. Thus, on 4 July the member companies of the FPBA voted (unanimously) to lock out their employees, with notice of the lockout being posted on 11 July, stating that the lockout was to take effect from 30 July.

It was from the experience of these actions in the past, and anticipating their utilization in the future, that the 1988 Special Committee on Strike Policy recommended that:

> '... a strike deadline be totally at the discretion of the joint negotiating committees to produce the maximum pressure possible on the companies to settle' (UFAWU(1988)(a) p.91).

For this reason, namely, to impose maximum pressure on the processor companies in order to bring the strike to as speedy a resolution as possible, the Joint Negotiating Committee voted to strike prior to the lockout date. Furthermore, with a sockeye opening approaching, the Joint Negotiating Committee opted to set the strike deadline for

6.00 p.m. on 21 July 1989, since this would deny the processors access to these stocks.

On 1 June the Union tabled its demands for a one-year agreement. The companies replied with their demands on 12 June, calling for a three year agreement. A further meeting was held on 23 June, after which Union negotiators decided to recommend the calling of a strike vote. At this stage negotiations effectively ceased until the strike was underway. An emergency meeting was called by the NBBH with the '... single item on the agenda [being] the state of negotiations...' (Minutes. Emergency Joint Meeting. 10/7/1989). Nothing was resolved at this meeting since no common ground between the two main negotiating parties could be found: the UFAWU's negotiators were constitutionally bound to represent the UFAWU's membership, and the membership was consistently demanding a 'fair settlement'(See Shoreworker's Negotiating Committee- Negotiating Bulletin #2. 28/6/1989). On the other hand, the FPBA negotiators were contractually bound to represent the interests of the processors, with the processors being determined '... to establish the competitive environment that free trade will thrust on this industry...' (McMillan. Letter to employees. 14/7/1989).

Following the tabling of the FPBA's demands, the UFAWU negotiators had to return to their membership in order to (a) educate them as to the content of the negotiators' demands, and (b) determine a Union response. In this regard, the recommendation of the negotiating committees was to move towards strike action, with the calling of a strike ballot. Voting was to begin on 27 June, and continue through to 7 July (see: Fishermen's Negotiating Bulletin #3. 26/7/1989). During this period, on 30 June, the Union organized a coastwide telephone conference to discuss the collapse of early season salmon prices (see: Fisherman. 25/7/1989 p.3)(14). This open channel conference linked 9 fisher organizations along the length of the Pacific West Coast, coming to the unanimous conclusion that the poor prices being paid to commercial fishers was caused by price fixing on the part of processor companies (Fisherman. 25/7/1989 p.3).

These drastic reductions in prices served to further mobilize fishers. As the log of the George Miller reports:

> '[Fisher] John Sutcliffe called in from his troller Cathy Bell, from just outside Calvert Island. Even troll-caught salmon had taken a dive in price. Springs were bringing only $1.10 to $1.20 a pound in Port Hardy, he said. Chums were going for 70 cents a pound and pinks were down to 55 cents. Brown summed up the sentiments of all the fishermen we had talked to over the past few days, saying that the companies were trying to scare everybody with low prices- but the effect was only to solidify the fishermen's[sic] resolve to fight.
> "If it takes a strike," he said, "we're ready for it" (cited in: Fisherman 25/7/1989. p.11).

The collapse in fish prices, together with the processors' failure to negotiate (for example, at the meeting on 23 June FPBA negotiators indicated that they would not have a response to union demands, tabled on 1 June, at the meeting scheduled for 28 June) and the content of the negotiators' demands ensured high fisher support for strike action (see: Table 4.1).

On the other hand, shoreworker opposition to GATT was effectively mobilized through the Anti-GATT campaign. This, with processor contract demands, was the foundation for shoreworker support for strike action. For example, the day before the strike, on 20 July, while fishing industry and community representatives held a lobby in Victoria to protest the social, political and economic effects of GATT and Ottawa's trade policy, meeting with Van der Zalm, the Social Credit cabinet and the New Democratic Party caucus, Sointula processing sector workers voted 100% to strike, and mass rallies were being held in Prince Rupert, Steveston and Vancouver to show shoreworker determination to defend their contracts.

The release of the Union strike ballot on 14 July showed overwhelming support for strike action (see Table 4.1). This, however, masks the existence of fundamentally different reasons for supporting strike action held by the different sectors of the Union.

Table 4.1
UFAWU Strike Ballot Results,
14 July 1989.

	% For	% Against
Shoreworkers	97	3
Fishers	96	4
Tendermen	93.5	6.5

Source: The Fisherman. 25/7/1989

4.4.2.i Summary

The process of strike mobilization and organization has been shown. In this mobilization and organization process it becomes impossible to separate the Union's organizational strategy and organizational interests from the varying, sectorally based interests of its members, interests that are integrated with production relations in the fishery, and that can be explained by the theoretical concepts of ideology and locale. Based on these differing interests, two major cleavages emerged within the Union in the course of the strike. One, among fishers themselves; the other between shoreworkers and fishers(15). The emergence of these cleavages will now be traced, relating them to the dialectic of ideology, commonsense and action among industry workers.

4.4.3 Division in the Union? Ideology, Union Organization and the 1989 UFAWU strike.

A day by day exegesis of the 1989 UFAWU strike will not be provided here (see: Fisherman 25/7/1989; 28/8/1989) since this will not necessarily allow understanding of the dialectic between union organization and social base. Rather a focus on the development of the 'two rifts' (Stainsby(1990)) that emerged within the Union in the course of the strike will be provided since this illustrates the relationships exsisting between production, locale and ideology.

4.4.3.i The 'First Rift' and the 1989 Strike.

The 'first rift' occurred when, on July 30 1989, the Union rejected a company settlement offer, an offer which was accepted by the NBBH executive thereby allowing release of the NBBH fleet. This decision on the part of the NBBH executive was taken in recognition of the extreme pressures their communities were placed under in the course of the strike, and the strike breaking that was occurring as a result of this community felt pressure (NBBH(1989)).

The second rift occurred when, following a company offer on August 2, the Joint Negotiating Committee recommended for acceptance aspects of the companies offer that

pertained to the fleet. The offer was consequently accepted by a narrow margin of the fleet membership in balloting held August 3 and 4, thereby allowing Union fishers operating out of Prince Rupert to participate in the next salmon opening set for 6.00pm on August 4th.

Understanding of both 'rifts' is facilitated if cognizance is taken of the difference in materially based ideologies held by shoreworkers, UFAWU fishers and Native Brotherhood fishers. Thus the 'first rift' emerged following the processors offering to continue purchasing fish from fishers who chose to ignore the Union's strike. It was this strike- breaking operation undertaken by the processors, an operation centered on the small boat fleet (gillnetters and trollers)(Cox: interview), that in part destroyed NBBH support for the strike and influenced the NBBH executive to release the Native fleet through acceptance of the company offer tabled on July 30.

In turn, release of the Native fleet, which joined the sizeable strike-breaking fleet, put additional pressure on the UFAWU Joint Negotiating Committee to achieve a settlement.

Rahn(interview) argues that fleet division, most evidenced in the appearance of the 'first rift', during strikes is based on a geographical division between northern and

southern area fishers, and the setting of strikes on migrating sockeye salmon. Northern area fishers argue that, in recognition of this migratory path, the DFO sets openings as the salmon migrate south toward the Fraser River, with the majority of southern openings occurring at the end of the season. Northern fishers, Rahn indicates, thus have felt traditionally discriminated against, and argue that the beginning of strikes is set for the beginning of the season, and strikes are over within a few weeks, thereby allowing southern area fishers the opportunity to fish.

Furthermore, the perception is held by northern area fishers that most active union fishers are based in the south and thus exercise a greater influence on the fleet negotiating committee encouraging them to 'get the strike over with' (Rahn: interview) in order to take advantage of southern area openings.

Two things need to be recognized in this context. First, that this is the expressed, commonsense opinion of northern area fishers. The existence of this commonsense perception is significant and reinforces the correlation between locale, production and ideology. Understanding the process of devising Salmon Allocation Plans (see, for example, Fishermen's Forum: Catch Allocation. Westcoast Fisherman. March 1989; PCTA(1989)) and the determination

of openings and closures by DFO disproves this ideological distortion maintained by fishers. Failing this, simply taking note of openings and closures and the spatial location thereof serves to indicate the incorrectness of this element of fisher ideology (see: Halyk(1990)(a); (1990)(b)). However, the practical consciousness of northern area fishers time and again indicates to them a spatially based bias acting counter to their interests. They interpret this as union neglect of their needs. This commonsense interpretation indicates to northern area fishers that they are:

> "sitting on the dock as their livelihood swims by, only to be picked up by the southerners when they [southern area fishers] lift the strike"(Rahn interview).

Cox indicates that this frustration is not confined to northern area fishers, but is generalized across the fleet. Furthermore, this frustration can be understood if one recognizes that it is imperative for fishers to fish during the (limited) time that is made available to them. This imperative arises from the fact that most fishers need to fish a) to qualify for unemployment insurance during the off season; b) to keep up with their vessel mortgages; and c) the season, and the limited openings during that time, is the only time available for some fishers to obtain their year's income. Consequently, for fishers, a strike during the fishing season can have extremely high stakes. As Cox (interview) argues:

"... a two week strike in the fishery is like having a gun to your head- it's like a six month strike anywhere else. We only have a limited time to earn our money".

Consequently, apart from its commonsensical validity, the second thing that needs to be recognized in this geographically based analysis is that it is a short sighted analysis that is focused on the concerns of fishers alone. Cox (interview), for example, recognizes the validity of this "geographically based argument", yet argues that while the "analysis is correct... [it]... dosen't take cognizance of the primary conflicts". Cox therefore indicates that although the fisher negotiating committee is made up of representatives of all areas, it falls within the broader discipline of a Joint Negotiating Committee. Furthermore, the object and timing of a strike is to put maximum pressure on the companies at that moment in which the optimum benefits to the Union can be achieved, in order to end the strike as soon as possible so that fishers and shoreworkers can be working with minimum loss of wages or potential revenue.

Consequently, the selection of strikes (a) on sockeye, and (b) at the beginning of the salmon season, is in itself a decision taken to maximize pressure on companies by denying them access to the highest value species (see Table 2.6). Furthermore, compromises are made not only by

northern area fishers but also by gillnetters and inlet fishers who stand to lose in any strike, as well as by shoreworkers who advocate early strikes (since this denies processing capabilities to the companies of even the earliest runs) and prefer strikes to continue for as long as possible (Cox: interview).

Cox therefore broadens the analysis from a focus on geographically confined area definitions, to a consideration of union strategy and the conflict that exists between fishers, shoreworkers and processing companies. In the context of union strategy it thus becomes necessary to compromise one's immediate (gear or sectorally based) interests in order to gain broader industry-wide advantages and ensure the continued existence of the Union (Cox: interview). Cox thus indicates that "any gear group resents having the strike settled on its back", yet the correlation between locale and strike settlement (assumed by Northern area fishers) not only is an incorrect one (see: Appendix Three) but also fails to contextualise the fleet within broader industry dynamics.

Apart from a geographically based analysis accounting for the 'first rift', one should also include consideration of the existence of a strike-breaking fleet and processor

strike-breaking capacity. Thus processors were able to take advantage of:

a) the material circumstances of mortgage bound fishers and offer them money and icing facilities to continue fishing (Rahn: interview; Cox: interview);

b) their control, through 51% part-ownership of vessel agreements, over some trollers. Through this control the companies can order vessel 'owners' out to fish or threaten to sell the vessel (Cox: interview; Rahn: interview)(16);

c) their pre-strike purchase of ice and their ownership of icing facilities. The offering of this ice to fishers during the strike, and the threat to withhold ice after the strike(The Fisherman. 28/8/89.), came as a further inducement to fishers to fish and was an additional control mechanism exercised over fishers;

d) the export of fish to the USA for processing in US plants (see: Vancouver Sun. 4/8/1989. p.A1.)(17).

Selective utilization and manipulation of these factors allowed the processors to recruit a large-strike breaking small boat fleet.

Having discussed the reasons for the emergence of the 'first rift' in the strike, and noting these reasons as lying in the (a) material realities and materially based ideologies of fishers, and (b) the corporate power of

processors as made manifest among vessel owners, we can turn now to an analysis of the origins of the 'second rift'- that between fishers and shoreworkers - which emerged on August 4, with the release of the fleet.

4.4.3.ii. The 'Second rift' and the 1989 Strike.

While the first rift was confined to the fishing sector and involved the existence and development of a strike-breaking fleet, the second rift emerged out of the different ideological beliefs held by fishers and shoreworkers. In this regard, Cox(interview) indicates that "fishers are often imbued with fishers' rhetoric and ideology... while shoreworkers have their own rhetoric". For example, fishers argue that if shoreworkers would not want high wages and benefits, processors would pay them more for their fish. Shoreworkers, on the other hand, argue that they could get more benefits and higher wages by striking for longer, thereby increasing pressure on the companies. Cox effectively summarises the Union's difficulty when he notes:

> "There are so many subjective realities and short term goals that have to be transcended".

The Union must nevertheless develop strategies for dealing with these differing interests, and the differing perception of these interests. More importantly, the failure to do this in the past has allowed the emergence

of the 'second rift'. Consequently, the rift revolves around an annually employed shoreworker's expectation for a seasonally employed fisher to engage in prolonged strike action.

This expectation is, Cox argues, misplaced since the potential loss of a season's income, or part thereof, introduces pressures of a far more intense nature on fishers when compared with shoreworkers. Fishers thus stand to lose anything up to $30,000 in the course of a two-week strike, depending on the nature of the salmon run and the timing of openings (Cox: interview).

Shorework, on the other hand, following restructuring in the nature of processing (Rahn: interview; See: Lee(1983); Wadhwani(1984)) and the increasing use of previously non-utilized stocks (Rahn: interview), is on the whole a year round occupation(18). In short, the effects of a strike on shoreworker annual income is not as devastating as the effects on seasonally employed fishers who stand to lose up to a year's income.

The failure to recognize this difference by the Union has resulted in the Union's neglect to "compensate small boat fishers for this sacrifice" (Cox: interview) and has allowed the perception of North/South favoritism to fester in the small boat fleet. Furthermore, it is in recognition

of the consequences of the differential origins of fleet and shoreworker incomes at the level of consciousness and ideology, and the financial risks and demands this makes on fishers as opposed to shoreworkers that Cox(interview) states:

"The small boat fleet will never strike again".

Indeed, it was the recognition of these ideological and commonsense differences within the fleet and between sectors of the industry that encouraged the fleet negotiating committee to release the fleet by recommending acceptance of the FPBA's contract offer, in spite of the rejection of offers made to the shoreworker and tendermen's sectors.

Releasing the fleet therefore achieved several objectives:
1) it counteracted the possibility of further divisions in the fleet weakening the strike and the Union by allowing all fishers, and not just strike breakers, to go fishing;
2) it prevented further (commonsense) perceptions of a conflict of interests between northern and southern area fishers from developing;
3) it put pressure on the FPBA to settle by having the possibility of harvested salmon stocks rotting in the holds of fishing vessels or on the dockside, or being processed in non-Union plants, or being exported to the US

and being processed in US plants, instead of being processed in BC Unionised plants(19).

4) it recognised the existence of differing locale-specific ideologies existing between fishers and shoreworkers, and the effects of these on the relative propensity towards strike support by different industry groups and sectors(Nichol to GEB; Minutes of GEB meeting; 4/8/1989. Northern Area Organizer to Nichol; Fax; 3/8/1989).

The principal risk with this strategy of releasing the fleet and thereby potentally dividing the Union lay in the possibility that fishers would perceive processing sector workers as being responsible for their catches not being processed. Stainsby(1990) acknowledges this when she states:

> 'When the fishers brought their catch to shore and the shoreworkers remained on strike, tension grew. Would there be a settlement before the fish rotted in the fishholds? Would the fishermen and shoreworkers remain on speaking terms? Just barely, the shoreworkers and fishermen remained united; and finally there was a settlement'.

This 'second rift' therefore was premised in the Union's and shoreworkers prior expectation for fishers to strike in the first instance. Cox(interview) recognizes that this expectation was misplaced and should never have been allowed to take root in the Union in the first place since it created an unfair expectation on fishers through the

inordinate nature of fisher sacrifice that was demanded. Furthermore, that this expectation emerged was due to a failure to recognize the different material bases of consciousness as well as the failure to recognize the concrete (material) effects of different employment practices and income generation processes existing between fishers and shoreworkers.

Section 4.4.3 has shown how in the course of the 1989 strike divisions emerged in the industry on account of the different lifepaths of fishers, First Nations peoples and shoreworkers. Cox(interview) acknowledges that in the past UFAWU has never recognized these differences or considered their possible effects on consciousness. The shift in Union strategy evidenced by the release of the fleet was therefore based on the recognition of these different interests, and the attempt to accommodate them.

How these differences will be accommodated in the future cannot be theorized upon here. UFAWU's upcoming annual conference in January 1990 will be debating these issues and the consequent need for new fleet negotiating strategies. These will be based on the earlier noted recognition that 'the fleet can never strike again' (Cox: interview; see also: The Fisherman. 28/8/1989. Editorial), and the development of "new strategies to deal with the new realities of the fleet, namely those of GATT and Free

Trade"(Cox: interview; see also: The Fisherman. 28/8/1989. Editorial).

Section 4.5 Summary

Section 4.4 has addressed the theme of ideology, locale and production, indicating their unity and the effects of this unity on organizational structure and organizational dynamics. The process of organizational mobilization has been analyzed noting its imbrication in the material realities of fishers and shoreworkers. The failure to recognize the ideological differences consequent upon different material realities as experienced by workers produced intense pressure on organisational allegiances held by workers.

The realization of these differences by some Union members and the incorporation of these differences in future Union strategy will be a difficult process. Yet, as the 1989 strike and, specifically, the emergence of the 'second rift' showed, it is possible for different strategies to be articulated by different worker groupings within the Union. The precise timing and deployment of these strategies must be contingent on the needs of specific worker groupings, as well as the articulation of those specific needs with those of the other sectors in the Union. How these will be articulated can be considered

only in the light of the specific circumstances of specific issues. The extent to which the Union's leader group will be able to articulate effectively and mediate successfully these differences will constitute the Union's history and geography... .

Footnotes

1) The conceptualization of this problem among fisheries managers has shifted over time from a concern (advocated by fisheries biologists) to achieve the Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) of a stock, to a concern (proposed by fisheries economists) for the attainment of the Maximum Economic Yield (MEY). See: Larkin(1979); Fraser(1978).

2) Copes(1988); Langdon(1982) offer a critique of the concept from the standpoint of fisheries economics. Clement(1984)(1986) uses the concept of common property to develop a theory of class relations, following Marxian theory. Fishers see 'Common Property' as the solution to the industry's problems (Meggs Interview; Cox Interview; Rahn Interview). See Appendix One.

3) It cannot, however, be claimed that Pearse's recommendations were an extension of Davis's proposals, since Pearse's recommendations were more wide ranging than Davis' attempts at restructuring fleet size. This accounts for the far more widespread opposition to Pearse's proposals(Marchak(1987(b) p.244-246).

4) See Pearse(1982 p.163) on corporate concentration in the fish processing sector. Pearse claims:

> 'The salmon canning industry is clearly highly concentrated. However there is no clear evidence that the existing structure is an impediment to industrial efficiency...'.

Pearse neglects to define or provide a measure of 'industrial efficiency'.

5) Pearse(1982 p.110) recommends a 50% reduction.

6) I.e., the fisheries policy of the Conservative government.

7) See also: UFAWU(1987). Submission to Standing Committee on Fisheries. 8/12/1987.

8) Such as the regulations being challenged by the US. These disputed regulations revolved around the Canadian stipulation that fish caught by Canadian fishers must be landed and processed in Canadian processing plants.

9) The Free Trade Act states:

> 'The provisions of this part shall not apply to:...
> ...(c) controls by Canada on the export of unprocessed fish pursuant to the following existing statutes:
> (i) New Brunswick Fish Processing Act, 1982 and Fisheries Development Act, 1977;'

(ii) Newfoundland Fish Inspection Act, 1970;
(iii) Nova Scotia Fisheries Act, 1977;
(iv) Prince Edward Island Fish Inspection Act, 1956; and
(v) Quebec Marine Products Processing Act, No.38, 1987' (Canada(1987) Article 1203).

10) McMillan: Memo to Company Employees and Fishermen. 16/5/1989; McMillan: Letter to Employees. 14/7/1989.

11) In the form of work slowdowns and protest marches. See: McMillan, Letter to Employees(14/7/1989), written in response to one such slowdown.

12) An analysis of in-plant restructuring that could be undertaken by the processors in the situation of GATT induced competition would go beyond the confines of this thesis. The direction that such rationalization and operational restructuring would take can be seen in the demands tabled by the processors in the 1989 negotiations, as well as by the increased interest shown by the processors in worker productivity and the measurement thereof. See studies commissioned by the processors into worker productivity. The Fisherman. 17/11/1989; 22/4/1988.

13) This process varies in cases where a dispute occurs in a geographically specific area or gear/process specific demarcation. See UFAWU(1985) Article 13.02; Article 13.06.

14) Prices varied by location. Processors were offering between $1.40 and $1.80 per pound for early (1989) season sockeye; in 1988, between $3.00 and $5.00 per pound (again, varying by location) was offered for early season sockeye . As low as 41 cents per pound was offered for chums, below the 1988 contract minimum price of 65 cents per pound.

15) A third cleavage, between the Union and the NBBH also developed in the course of the strike. Adequate analysis of this development goes beyond the confines of this thesis since a comprehensive investigation of the social, political and cultural dynamics in the lives of First Nations People would be necessary.

16) Wadhwani(1984) and Guppy(1987)(a) provide data on the degree of fisher 'independence'. Guppy, drawing on fleet data derived from interview and survey research concludes:

> 'They [fishers] are indeed independent commodity <u>producers</u> but not independent commodity <u>sellers</u>' (1987 p.189, emphasis in original).

No numerical data indicating the extent of such part ownership arrangements in the BC fishery could be obtained.

17) BC Packers was the major exporter of unprocessed fish at this time (The Fisherman 28/8/1989 p.11), supplying a BC Packers' subsidiary in Anacortes (The Fisherman 28/8/1989 p.11). The continued export of unprocessed fish prompted an occupation of Federal Fisheries Minister Tom Siddon's Vancouver offices on August 2, in which demands for action to halt the exports were made (The Fisherman 28/8/1989). See The Fisherman 28/10/1989 p.10-11 on BC processors and their links to processing facilities in Washington.

18) See: McMillan Fisheries Ltd. Letter to employees (14/7/1989), where Barry McMillan uses this fact to attempt to influence industry workers on the eve of strike balloting.

19) The Fisher Negotiating Committee initially voted to reject the company offer. After consultation with the Joint Negotiating Committee, the Fisher Negotiating Committee voted to recommend acceptance of the processor's 'final offer' to the fleet. Voting by fishers varied spatially. Northern area fishers voted 94% in favor of returning to fish; southern area fishers were less supportive, with finally 74,8% voting to accept the final company offer.
The offer related solely to fish prices over the following three years, and included the continued support by processors/union for all earlier memorandums and letters of understanding(see: UFAWU(1990) p.8).
The Union's strategy was to force the processors to resume negotiations and end the strike(Nichol to GEB; Minutes of GEB meeting; 4/8/1989. Northern Area Organizer to Nichol; Fax; 3/8/1989), and the Union felt that this was one way to achieve these goals(Nichol in Vancouver Sun, 4/8/1989, p.A1).
Processors were under no contractual obligation to purchase caught fish, and would purchase only when they could process fish into some form of manufactured product.

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION

Two questions, noted in the abstract and in the introduction, were analyzed in this thesis. The first question, relating to space, production and ideology, was directed at the theoretical abstractions (Sayer(1984)) of space, production and ideology. Following Meszaros(1989) and Soja(1985)(1989) space and ideology were related by way of locale-specific material ontologies. Shifting the focus of abstraction, the second question considered the relation between ideology and union development and organization. In order to understand these links, a clear understanding of the industry milieu was needed. This was provided at a general, industry-wide level in Chapter Three, and in the specific context of two episodes of Union mobilization in Chapter Four.

The thesis can be seen to make three contributions to the literature. Firstly, it attempts to apply and develop empirically the concepts of locale, ideology and commonsense, concepts developed in theoretical literature of the social sciences and humanities.

Secondly, it directs the discourse of political geography toward an understanding of Bhaskar's(1979)(1989) 'Transformational Model of Social Action'(TMSA). Bhaskar(1989), using the TMSA model, proposes the

methodological seperation of agents from social structures, and the application of differing analytical tools to each domain (see: section 2.2 p.20). The focus on ideology, space and production relations in the thesis can be contextualised within Bhaskar's social scientific research, since these concepts are being used to analyse aspects of social structure. On the other hand, the use of the concept of commonsense and 'positive' ideologies, as well as the application of the concept of locale(s) allowed understanding of the different spatial ontologies of fishers and shoreworkers. Furthermore, the concepts of locale and spatial ontology can be fruitfully integrated with recent feminist research which argues for the development of anti-foundationalist politics. Butler(1990 p.15) therefore asks:

> 'Is "unity" necessary for effective political action? Is the premature insistence on the goal of unity precisely the cause of an evermore bitter fragmentation among the ranks? Certain forms of acknowledged fragmentation might facilitate coalitional action precisely because the "unity"... is neither presupposed nor desired".

This, the acknowledgement of organizational fragmentation in order to facilitate coalitional action, is what Butler(1990) defines as anti-foundationalist politics. This anti-foundationalist politics must have as its critical point of departure both the historical (Butler(1990) p.5) and the spatial (Soja(1985)(1989)) present. For the UFAWU this demands a recognition of the

differential constitution of shoreworker and fisher identities, identities that have been shown to emerge from the production/community interface as experienced in the lives of individual workers. In effect, Butler argues that identity is constructed in practice and constituted in people's needs. This concept parallels Meszaros' concept of ideology as being the 'inescapable practical consciousness of class societies'(p.391). Similarly, the focus on practical consciousness echoes Soja's(1989) integration of a materialist, and hence spatial, ontology into the social sciences. More importantly, the recognition of such differences in ideology and commonsense by the UFAWU leader group indicates a shift in union organizational strategy towards just such an anti-foundationalist politics, and towards the development of a 'separation-in-unity' mode of organizational action. the thesis hereby shows that for the purposes of analysis in political geography, use of Bhaskar's TMSA model alone is insufficient since the TMSA model fails to integrate feminist theory. At the level of agency, Butler(1990) indicates a fruitful path that political analysis and action could take in this regard (see also Ryan(1982)).

Finally, the thesis provides not just a description of events in the fishing industry during the 1980s; nor a description of production in the fishery. Through the application and development of theoretical concepts one is

able to explain the actions of fishers and shoreworkers, an explanation that revolves around the commonsense perceptions of workers who are active in hierarchised and nested locales.

Ultimately, therefore, this is the most practical aspect of the thesis since by taking cognizance of these differing perceptions, Union organizers will gain a greater understanding of the nature of the contradictory forces operating in the Union, and thus be able to propose alternative strategies. The extent to which this is possible, and can be achieved, will determine the Union's history and geography.

Appendix A. Conceptions of Common Property.

Three conceptions of common property were identified in the course of thesis research, these being,

a) those held by fisheries economists, fisheries biologists, DFO representatives, as well as those held by sociologists and anthropologists with research interests in the field (for example, Burns(1988));

b) those held by Clement(1984)(1986)(1988);

c) those held by fishers and shoreworkers in the industry (Meggs: interview; Cox: interview; Rahn: interview; Sheeny-Culhaine: interview). Perspectives presented in the literature of fisheries economics and fisheries sociology have been reviewed in Chapters One and Three. This Appendix will consequently restrict itself to a consideration of conceptions of common property held by fishers.

App.A.1. Fish: Common Property, Common Ownership.

Fishers and tendermen consider common property a saving principle of the resource (Rahn: interview; Cox: interview), a view which is based in their material ideologies and the fact that they draw their livelihoods from the sea.

Fishers and tendermen feel that "they are the custodians of the resource... they feel they have to manage the resource to the benefit of all Canadians"(Rahn: interview). Consequently, their concept of common property is based on common ownership of the resource by fishers and the state (Rahn: interview). Thus they argue that DFO should manage the resource in the interests of all Canadians, using fishers and industry workers as gatherers of the resource rents which are available in the industry. The notion of common property held by fishers thus is based on their perception of the fishery as a public resource Cox(interview), a perspective which is becoming more prevalent among fishers who see themselves as custodians and developers of the resource(1).

Footnote

1) Marchak((1987)(a) p.20) indicates that the 'ideology of common property... motivates fishers to accept state management'. Marchak fails to indicate her understanding and use of the concepts 'ideology' and 'common property'. No survey data on fisher perceptions of common property exists. Fisher understanding of the concept was therefore obtained by way of primary research (see appendix b).

Appendix B. Applied Method.

Investigation of the relationships existing between ideology, locale and production, and their relationship to Union organization entailed both primary and secondary research.

Primary research was directed at (a) gaining an understanding of fisher and shoreworker ideology and (b) gaining an understanding of the dialectics of UFAWU organization. The former was achieved by open-ended, unstructured interviews with three fishers (Rahn; Sheehy-Culhaine and Drouin) as well as two weekend field trips to the fishing villages of Bamfield, Tofino and Ucluelet. Here time was spent talking to fishers on the dockside and in the community, and observing life in these communities. The latter was achieved by open-ended interviews with two key Union organizers and activists (Meggs and Cox). Observation of the running of The Fisherman newspaper immediately after the 1989 strike gave further insights into the Union, its operation and organization.

One further interview was conducted, with D.Schutz of the DFO. The interview was directed at gaining understanding of the process of Salmon Allocation and the setting of openings by DFO. Data obtained in this interview allowed critique of the ideological notion, proposed by Rahn and Northern area fishers, that the Union favors Southern area

fishers and that Northern area fishers are discriminated against by the setting of strikes early in the season. See: Section 4.4.3.i; Appendix c.

Secondary research was directed at broadening the understanding of BC fishing. This was achieved by gaining familiarity with (a) the sociological and anthropological literature on the BC fishery and (b) the literature of fisheries economics. Critique of this secondary material from a realist ontological perspective provided the theoretical material elaborated upon in Chapter Two.

Appendix C: Ideology and Northern Area Fishers.

Northern area fishers argue that UFAWU does not adequately represent their interests since, they argue, the Union sets strikes for the beginning of the salmon season, allowing Southern area fishers opportunity to fish once the strikes have been settled.

The fact that this perception is held by Northern area fishers can be understood in terms of a materialist, locale-specific definition of ideology (see Section 2.3-2.5). The argument can be considered ideological since it fails to take cognicance of: (a) the decisionmaking process whereby openings and duration of openings are established; and (b) empirical data showing dates and place of openings (Table C-1; Maps One and Two).

With regard to the setting of dates and duration of openings, a comprehensive advisory process exists in which DFO and industry participants (through their gear-specific and non-gear specific associations, co-op's and unions) negotiate the setting of openings and the allocation of quotas to various gear types. If salmon runs are larger than expected, further openings are made available.

The salmon allocation plans released by DFO are therefore the endpoint of a negotiation process between industry

participants and the DFO. The plans are released prior to the seasons' opening to allow salmon fishers to plan their seasons and the areas of their fishing activity. For example, on 1/6/88 DFO released its document 1989-1992 Salmon Expectations(DFO(1988)), outlining expected catches of different salmon species in the different regions and statistical areas. In January 1989, DFO released the 1989 Salmon Forecasts(DFO(1989)(a)), in which the 1989 salmon forecasts were indicated. The document stated that '[f]ishing plans will be finalized and distributed this spring following a series of scheduled meetings by the Pacific Salmon Commission, Commercial Fishing Industry Council, and various advisory committees'(DFO(1989)(a) p.1).

On 14 June 1989, DFO released the 1989 Salmon Fishing Plans(DFO(1989)(b)) for the troll and net fisheries (Table C-1). The plans provide comprehensive data on areas, dates of openings, expected escapement, target escapement and expected catch for the net and troll fisheries. Furthermore, a summary of this data was provided in the DFO's Backgrounder information bulletin(DFO(1989)(c)) also released on 14 June 1989.

In short, Northern area fishers themselves, through their representative organizations, are involved in the

negotiation process which determines the allocation, areas, duration and dates of fishery openings.

Furthermore, in this context, the DFO's objective is not just to manage the fishery but also to ensure that the fleet is not spatially concentrated in any one area since this leads to overcrowding of the grounds (Schutz: interview). Consequently DFO allows late openings in the Northern area fisheries as well as early openings in the Southern areas (Table C-1; Maps One and Two). These openings are advertised in advance of the season's beginning, as noted above in the public release dates of the DFO's allocation and openings plans.

With regard to data indicating the dates of openings (see: Table C-1), the data indicates the spread of openings with both early season and late season openings occuring in both the Northern and the Southern areas (Table C-1; Maps One and Two). In effect, therefore, it is not only the Northern area fishers who, during a strike, 'sit on the dock while the fish swim by', but all fishers. All fishers, that is, barring the strike breakers.

Table C-1
1989 Salmon Net Openings: Synopsis

AREA	W/E JUN 17	W/E JUN 24	W/E JUL 01	W/E JUL 08	W/E JUL 15	W/E JUL 22	W/E JUL 29	W/E AUG 05
1						NT:1D+1D EXT	NT:1D+1D EXT	NT:1D
2E								
2W						NT:1D+1D EXT	NT:1D+1D EXT	NT:1D
3		GN:2D	GN:2D GN:1D	GN:1D	GN:1D+2D EXT GN:2D+1D EXT GN:1D+2D EXT	NT:2D NT:1D+1D EXT	NT:2D,2D	NT:2D,2D
4			GN:1D	GN:1D	GN:1D+2D EXT GN:2D+1D EXT	GN:3D	GN:2D,2D	NT:2D,2D
5			GN:1D	GN:1D	GN:1D+2D EXT	NT:2D	NT:2D,2D	NT:2D,2D
6						NT:12H+12H EXT	NT:1D	NT:1D
7					GN:12H	NT:12H		NT:12H+23H EXT
8	GN:1D GN:3H,13.5H	GN:1D GN:3H,13.5H	GN:1D GN:3H,13.5H	GN:1D	GN:1D+1D EXT GN:1D+1D EXT	GN:1D+1D EXT GN:1D+2D EXT SN:1D+1D EXT NT:1D	NT:1D+2D EXT GN:1D+3D EXT GN:1D+3D EXT	NT:1D+1D EXT GN:1D+1D EXT
9				GN:2D	GN:2D	GN:2D		GN:1D
10				GN:2D	GN:2D	GN:2D		
11							GN:2.5D	GN:2.5D+1D EXT
12				GN:1D	GN:1D+2D EXT	SN:1D GN:1.5D	SN:2D GN:2.5D	SN:2D+1D EXT GN:2.5D+1D EXT
13				GN:1D	GN:1D+2D EXT	SN:1D GN:1.5D	SN:2D GN:2.5D	SN:2D+1D EXT GN:2.5D+1D EXT
14								
16						NT:1D	NT:2D	NT:2D+1D EXT
20						SN:12H GN:12H		SN:12H,12H,12H GN:12H,12H,12H
21								
22								
23								
24				GN:1D	GN:2D	GN:1D		GN:2D

* each Day CFB - CLOSED FOR BALANCE

AREA	W/E AUG 12	W/E AUG 19	W/E AUG 26	W/E SEP 02	WE0909	W.E SEP 16
1	NT:1D+12H+2x1D EXT	NT:1D				
2E						GBNT @ 12H
2W	NT:1D+12H EXT					NT:12H
3	NT:1D NT:1D+1.5D+1D EXT GN:2D	NT:1D+2x1D EXT NT:2D+1D GN:2D+1D	NT:1D GN:1D			
4	SN:1D+1.5D EXT GN:1D+1.5D EXT	GN:2D+1D SN:1D+1D EXT SN:1D+5x1D+3D EXT	GN:1D+3x1D EXT SN:1D	GN:1D+1D EXT SN:1D+1D EXT		
5	NT:1D+12H+1D EXT	NT:1D+1D EXT	NT:1D	NT:1D		
6	NT:1D					
7	NT:12H NT:1D+1D EXT GN:12H	NT:1D+1D EXT NT:1D+1D EXT SN:12H GN:12H	NT:1D+1D EXT GN:11H SN:11H	NT:11H+1D EXT SN:11H GN:11H	GN:12H SN:12H	
8	NT:1D GN:1D	NT:1D+2D+1D EXT GN:1D+2x2D EXT	NT:1D GN:2D	GN:1D		
9	GN:1D	GN:1D				
10						
11	GN:1.5D+1D EXT	GN:3.5D	GN:3.75D	GN:2D14H	CFB	
12	SN:1D+1D EXT GN:1.5D+1D EXT	SN:2D+20H EXT GN:3.5D	SN:2D4H GN:3.75D	SN:2x10H * GN:2D14H	SN:1D GN:1D14H+1D EXT	SN:10H,10H GN:2D14H+1D EXT
13	SN:1D+1D EXT GN:1.5D+1D EXT	SN:2D+20H EXT GN:3.5D	SN:2D4H GN:3.75D	SN:2x10H * GN:2D14H	SN:1D GN:1D14H+1D EXT	SN:10H,10H GN:2D14H+1D EXT
14						
16	NT:1D+1D EXT	NT:2D+20H EXT	NT:2D4H	SN:2x10H * GN:2D14H	CFB	
20	SN:12H,12H GN:12H,12H	SN:4x12H each D* GN:4x12H each D	SN:3x12H each D GN:3x12H * +1D EXT	SN:3x12H * GN:3x12H* + 2D EXT	SN:12H GN:2x12H*+14H EXT	SN:12H GN:12H+1H EXT,12H
21						
22						
23			GN:12H+2x12H * EXT	GN:12H	GN:12H	
29	GN:2D	GN:2D	GN:1D,1D,1D	GN:1D,1D,1D		

• each Day CFB - CLOSED FOR BALANCE

AREA	W/E SEP 23	W/E SEP 30	W/E OCT 07	W/E OCT 14	W/E OCT 21	W/E OCT 28	W/E NOV 04	W/E NOV 11
1	NT:10H	NT:11H			CFB			
2E	(2)NT:@ 10H	(3)NT:@ 11H,11H (2)NT:@ 11H		(2)NT:@ 11H		CFB		
2W					CFB			
3	CFB							
4	CFB							
5	CFB							
6				CFB				
7		SN:4H,4H GN:4H+1HEXT			CFB			
8				CFB				
9					CFB			
10	CFB							
11								
12		GN:1D16H SN:1D				GN:3D SN:1DH		CFB
13		GN:1D16H SN:1D				GN:3D SN:1DH		CFB
14					GN:2D	GN:2D	GN:1D	
16								
20		SN:2x12H: • GN:2x12H •				CFB		
21	GN:2D+2D EXT		SN:10H GN:2D+5D EXT					
23								
29		GN:1D, 1D						

SALMON NET FISHING
CLOSED FOR THE BALANCE OF 1989 DEC 6/89

AREA	W/E NOV 18	W/E NOV 25	W/E DEC 02	W/E DEC 9
1				
2E				
2W				
3				
4				
5				
6				
7				
8				
9				
10				
11				
12				
13				
14				CFB
16				
20				
21	CFB			
23				
29				CFB

CFB - CLOSED FOR BALANCE

TABLE C1
1989 Salmon Net Openings: Synopsis
Abbreviations

W/E Week ending
CAS Slosed as scheduled
EXT Extended
S/A Subareas
PTN Portion
D Day
H Hour
NT Net
GN Gillnet
SN Seine
CFB Closed for balance
+ Indicates extension or continuation of a fishery
, Indicates reopening of a fishery
x Indicates number of fisheries in an area/subarea in a week

Source: Halyk(1990)(a)

READ CAREFULLY

1. Reporting of all catches to the Dept of Fisheries and Oceans is the responsibility of the fisherman and a condition of licence renewal.
2. Accurate catch reports must include the map number or numbers showing the area in which your fish were caught
3. The statistical areas shown on this map are to be used as a guide only. For more exact information refer to the Pacific Fishery Management Area Regulations.

- Dept of Fisheries and Oceans Office
- Statistical areas are divided by red lines
- Surfline

Note All areas revised February 1985

Fisheries and Oceans / Pêches et Océans

Canada

MAP 1

STATISTICAL AREA MAP

SHOWING AREAS OF CATCH FOR
BRITISH COLUMBIA WATERS
NORTHERN HALF



SIXTH EDITION FEB 1985

READ CAREFULLY

1. Reporting of all catches to the Dept of Fisheries and Oceans is the responsibility of the fisherman and a condition of licence renewal
2. Accurate catch reports must include the map number or numbers showing the area in which your fish were caught
3. The statistical areas shown on this map are to be used as a guide only. For more exact information refer to the Pacific Fishery Management Area Regulations

● Dept of Fisheries and Oceans Office

Statistical areas are divided by red lines

Surfline

Note: All areas revised February 1985

Fisheries and Oceans / Pêches et Océans

Canada

MAP 2
STATISTICAL AREA MAP

SHOWING AREAS OF CATCH FOR BRITISH COLUMBIA WATERS
SOUTHERN HALF



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