

**A STUDY OF TEACHER STUDENT INTERACTION IN TWO  
MODELS OF MORAL EDUCATION**

by

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A Study of Teacher Student Interaction

in Two Models of Moral Education

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## Abstract

Several models of moral education have been developed, implemented, and tested in schools. Two that have received much attention are the Moral Development Theory of Lawrence Kohlberg and the Values Clarification Model developed by Louis Rath and others. Research on these models has looked at their differences, similarities, and their relative curricular effectiveness. This study is a comparison of the sorts of teacher-student interactions that each model promotes and an evaluation of these interactions in the light of the theories of Carl Rogers on the relationship between interactive styles and moral development.

Sample interactions between moral educators and students found in the literature of both these models were randomly selected, given identifying numbers, and mixed. These interactions were then coded using scales based on Rogers necessary and sufficient criteria for successful counseling as modified by Robert Carkhuff. Similar scales have been used in other research in an educational context.

The overall level of facilitative responding in moral discussion was examined using frequency charts. Then the ratings were grouped according to the source of the samples. Significant differences in level of response in the sources and in the two models were tested for using *F*-tests and Scheffe poc hoc tests where appropriate. A chi square test was used to assess differences in question and reflective response categories.

The most frequent level of response was found to be level two. It was also found that over half of teacher responses were not codeable on scales

assessing facilitative responding. Significant differences in level of responding were found on a summative measure of overall response level and on respect ratings. Scheffe tests did not show differences between different sources of Moral Development interactions nor between Moral Development and Values Clarification batches. Incidental findings about the use of questions and confrontation in discussion were also reported.

On the basis of this study it was concluded that both models of moral education contain a low level of facilitative responding measured by criteria referenced scales. A further conclusion was that there was no significant difference between the level of responding in the two models.

Among the implications drawn from this research are:

1. The quality of facilitative interaction in moral discussion needs more study to make further comparisons;
2. Neither model of moral education shows high level facilitative interactions in moral discussion in the transcripts studied.
3. Modifications of moral discussion practices to incorporate facilitative styles of interaction should be developed and tested.

To my father and mother.

Schoolrooms are not and should not be the place where man learns only scientific techniques. They are the place where selfhood, what has been called "the supreme instrument of knowledge" is created. Only such deep inner knowledge truly expands horizons and makes use of technology, not for power, but for human happiness.

*From The Firmament of Time*

*by Loren Eisely (1960).*

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# CHAPTER ONE

## Introduction

*If I just look carefully over my arm, I can see her paper—and her answers! Should I cheat?*

*Well, his skin is a different colour and he does smell weird like spices or something. Everybody else calls him names.*

*Why shouldn't I have an abortion? Or why should I?*

Whether through the necessary establishment of working norms for behavior in the classroom or in the explicit presentation and discussion of moral issues, it is inevitable that students and teachers will face choices that involve morals or values (Purpel and Ryan, 1976). Educators, recognizing this inevitability, have developed models that hope to ensure optimum development of the students' abilities to face independently the moral challenges of life. This study looks at a key aspect of two of these models of moral education.

## **Chapter Objectives**

This study uses a theory of moral development and teacher student interaction developed by Carl Rogers to examine two models of moral education—Moral Development Theory and Values Clarification. The selection of these two models for study and the need for a study of their style of interaction is discussed in the first section of this chapter. This chapter then defines some of the concepts of moral education and develops a working definition of this area of schooling that encompasses the two models examined.

Following consideration of the need for the study and the basis of selection of two models is a statement of specific research questions in this study.

Because there is some concern about the justification or propriety of teaching morality in public schools, some attention will be given to considering the appropriateness of using these models in the public school system.

Finally, the decision to make the comparison of these two models is addressed, the limitations of this study are outlined, and the arrangement of the remainder of the thesis given.

## **Need for the Study**

Faced with the unavailability of moral education (Purpel and Ryan, 1976), and perhaps by what seems to be an increasingly evident failure of students to develop acceptable moral character, educators and researchers have sought to develop effective means of promoting moral growth in students. Many different models have been developed. In addition to the



values clarification model developed by Raths, Harmin, and Simon (1966) and the moral development model developed by Kohlberg (1966, 1971, 1975) other models of moral education have been developed and researchers have also begun the comparison and evaluation of these models (Chazan, 1985; Colby, 1975; Lockwood, 1978).

Professional educators have a responsibility to base their practice on the best information used with appropriate skills. Yet when faced with a great variety of models that might be employed, a choice is not easy to make. Criteria and comparisons are needed.

Models of moral education may be selected on the basis of theory or type of morality that they encourage and by their compatibility with a teacher's style or philosophy of education. However, as the next section will show, even by narrowing in this way the operational definition of a model of moral education, educators are left with problems of choice. Curricular effectiveness, in cases where research reveals clearly one model is more effective, may provide additional guidelines for choice. However, other guidelines also exist.

### Importance of Interactive Style

Both of the models of moral education that are to be evaluated here depend to a great extent for their effect on teachers talking with students about moral issues. Teachers ask questions and respond to students comments in order to stimulate and develop students' moral judgment or their valuing skills. One difference between these two models may be the sort of teacher student interactions that each proposes to be most effective in promoting student development.

There is research which looks at styles of interaction which promote moral growth (Rogers, 1983). This research has developed from roots outside of education; there is no theory based model of moral education developed from Rogers' theory. However, there is other evidence showing the importance of the interaction styles developed by Rogers and other researchers to the practice of education (Aspy and Roebuck, 1977,1983).

Rogers, through his experience counseling young offenders (and others), developed a style of psychotherapy called client centred therapy. Central to this style is the working hypothesis that, given the right sort of relationship between the client and the counsellor, the client would change in ways that would result in a more satisfying way of living for the client that was also more socialized and acceptable to society. The relationship between the counsellor and client in client-centred therapy is characterized by certain types of interactions.

Chapter Two will examine research where these same types of interactions produced positive outcomes for students when teachers used them in the classroom.

Within the body of moral education research, researchers have theorized that gains students made on moral development scales could be attributed to the way the teacher responded to them during moral discussion (Fraenkel, 1976; Rest,1974; Sullivan and Beck,1975). Within the work of researchers investigating client-centred therapy, and the work of others looking at moral education, then, there is speculation about the role of the style of interaction between teacher and student plays in promoting moral development.

In short, there is a strong likelihood that the nature of teacher student interaction during moral learning is as important as the nature of teacher

student interaction during other types of learning. Indeed, if moral learning is as Rogers characterized it, deep essential learning where the individual is looking for meaning in life, then the presence of facilitative conditions in interaction will be important. Kohlberg has also recognized this likelihood (Reimer, Paolitto, Hersh, 1983). Because of this probability, educators should examine and evaluate the nature of the teacher student interactions encouraged by models of moral education and consider whether sufficient levels of these facilitative conditions are part of their methodology.

This study begins that examination and evaluation.

### **Definition of Terms**

To generalize, models of moral education can be coarsely divided into two groups: those that focus on the maintenance of social values and habit training and those that focus on student development of individually derived values (Chazan, 1985; Kohlberg, 1970). The contrast is that between indoctrination on the one hand and individual development of unspecified and perhaps unique values on the other. Indoctrination sets out to infuse a specific set of doctrines or values. Some models make explicit that they are not concerned with teaching a specific set of values, but rather with teaching a valuing process or a structure of moral reasoning. It is with models of this latter variety that this study is concerned.

With models of this sort, the idea of moral standards becomes problematical. How can teachers be teaching morality if they are not telling students how they ought to behave, or if they are insisting that students must make up their own minds about what is right and wrong? Such models may

be accused of teaching nothing or of being relativistic, teaching that any moral choice is acceptable.

Models of this latter type do, however, exhibit great concern with two goals that might be considered to balance the problematical moral standards they teach. They are generally directly concerned with individual student development and with promoting more thoughtful and reflective behaviours.

Given these very general distinctions, then, it is possible to define moral education and the sort of model of moral education with which this study will be concerned.

### Moral Education

Moral education involves a systematic focussing on developing children's moral concepts and reasoning in ways that affect their behavior and with the goal of producing autonomous and mature moral agents.

This definition is appropriate for a look at models of moral education where the concern with moral development is overt. It bears some similarities to Purpel and Ryan's (1975) definition:

Moral education is the direct and indirect intervention of the school which affects both moral behavior and the capacity to think about issues of right and wrong.

However, the definition given in this study is more explicit in looking for a developmental approach to moral education, that is an approach that seeks to develop what is inherent in the student, and its statement of purpose also suggests the nature of moral choice that must be preserved. In common with Purpel and Ryan (1975), though, is the idea that moral education seeks to make the process of teaching students morality or promoting their moral

development conscious in the minds of educators and students. It seeks to make the moral learnings that must go on in school effective and appropriate.

### Model of Moral Education

A model of moral education is a systematic approach to teaching moral education that has a rationale, goals, specific objectives that can be observed and evaluated, and materials and techniques that are used to achieve its goals and objectives. In other words, a teacher adopting a model of moral education knows why he or she is teaching with that model, what he or she is hoping to achieve, how to recognize the degree to which it has been achieved, and what to do to accomplish the teaching task.

### Values Education

Though in some cases these terms are used synonymously, "values education" is sometimes distinguished from "moral education." The distinction is based on the idea that the concept "values" is distinct from the concept "moral principles;" that is, making a choice based on values is different from making a choice based on moral principles. In ordinary language, that distinction does not exist. However in the technical language of education for values or morals, the distinction has been made real.

Kohlberg (1975b) has drawn a sharp line between values education and moral education. Values education is opposed to the idea of universally applicable principles guiding behavior; instead it holds that in the general area of personal choice, an area encompassing what is usually thought of as moral choice, all choices are personal and relative only to what a person wants or prefers. Kohlberg also holds that values educators do not want to influence student behavior. Moral education, on the other hand, is concerned

with the development of an understanding of universal moral values, and desires to influence student behavior in certain directions. In addition, moral education states that moral choices are not simply relative to one person or culture.

This distinction is excessively dialectical and specific to be of general use. In this study, the term "moral education" will be generally used to refer to this area of education and "values education" will be considered to refer to the same area of education with the understanding that "values education" may also involve education in choosing in areas that would not usually be considered moral areas.

### Moral Choice

What is or is not moral, is a question that has defied definition. Perhaps two approaches to definition can be tried: one might attempt a definition based on some variety of philosophical reasoning, from first principles or from "ordinary language," or one might attempt a sociological or empirical approach such as begun by Thomas, Clermont, and Maimbolwa-Sinyangwe (1984). Rather than attempt anything definitive, this study will rely on a common sense idea of morality that might tentatively be described as follows: Morality concerns those beliefs and attitudes that are generally supposed to guide behavior towards ends considered to be for the good. A moral choice is therefore making a choice in which one employs, or ought to employ, morality.

### Selection of Models

The two models selected for this study are Lawrence Kohlberg's model of moral education, which is based on his theories of cognitive moral

developmental stages, and the values clarification model primarily described in Values and Teaching (Raths, Harmin, and Simon, 1966, 1978).

There are several reasons for this choice.

First, these models were selected because both are comprehensive models that have received field testing, have been developed for use in schools, and have had some success in altering the behaviours of students. They are both complete models with rationale, goals, methods and techniques, and proponents of both have claimed each model's superiority.

Second, both are generally compatible with the idea of a progressive education as stated by John Dewey (1938), though some object to these claims (Greene, 1976). Both also claim to have important consequences for student development, and both explicitly claim to be free of indoctrination. Taken at face value, these claims qualify both models to fit the operational definition of moral education in this study, and qualify each as a fully developed model of moral education.

Both have also, as may be inevitable among competing academic theories, been thoroughly criticized by supporters of the opposing theory on both practical and philosophical grounds.

## Research Questions

The concern of this study is to investigate two models of moral education that are commonly known and that match the basic criteria for models of moral education set out above, and to determine whether these models promote in practise a high level of facilitative teacher student interaction.

In order to answer these questions, the methods of each need be evaluated to determine which promotes desirable styles of interaction between teacher and student. To do so, Carl Rogers' hypothesis that high levels of empathy, congruence, and positive regard in a helping relationship promote the development of new, internally judged values will be used in several ways:

1. to focus attention on the degree to which each model promotes teachers to interact with students using basic facilitative styles of response
2. to establish an overall criterion of evaluation of both models—if both models rate low or high on interaction scales they could be rated as classroom practices
3. to establish a criterion of choice—the model which promotes higher levels of facilitative interaction would be recommended for use
4. to establish a working hypothesis for modification—interactions in the models could be modified to promote higher level interactions.

Sullivan and Beck (1975) and Rest (1974) have already speculated about the importance of the teacher's facilitative skills. By studying the



recommended and exemplary interactions in each model, this study may provide evidence to support these contentions that the teacher's presentational skills may be as important as other aspects of the model being used.

Specifically the following questions will be considered in this study:

1. What level of facilitative teacher student interaction is characteristic of discussion in the moral development model and values clarification?
2. Are there significant differences between the models' level of teacher student interaction?
3. Are there differences in facilitative level of teacher student interactions in different presentations of each model?

### **Moral Education in Schools**

Debate over whether it is appropriate for schools to intentionally set about the moral education of students has been of some importance in America where schools are seen as vehicles of the state and morality largely as the province of the church (Sullivan and Beck, 1975). Many believe that because of this division, that it is inappropriate for the state to interfere with the church's business. The situation in Canada is somewhat different (Sullivan and Beck, 1975) for in this country there is no constitutional separation of church and state and perhaps morality is not seen as being so strictly an ecclesiastical matter. The view in Canada is generally simpler; it is more often suggested that the school should not meddle in matters that are more appropriately taught in the home. Morality, like sex, is often viewed as one of these matters (Sullivan and Beck, 1975).

Other than acknowledging this point of view, little further space will be devoted to this topic. The inevitability of moral education occurring in schools makes debate over this issue irrelevant; the very fact that schools are social institutions where children are gathered together in groups to work and learn under the care and supervision of adults requires some sort of social or moral learning. Pure indoctrination or a purely authoritarian system can not be considered in a democracy (this is to be taken as axiomatic in this study) and absolute individual freedom is not without its own moral lessons.

Still when implementing a course of moral education, or when moral education is to be made a focus of a school or classroom, consultation may well be necessary, particularly where time is to be devoted specifically to such a course in the curriculum. In order to gain the acceptance and support of those affected, the views of parents, teachers, and others involved in the decision to implement moral education in the schools must be heard and considered. For the purpose of this study, it will be assumed that moral education is an unavoidable responsibility of the schools, and that it is also a responsibility educators are justified in spending time and effort in discharging effectively and humanely. This responsibility is part of educators' overall responsibility to contribute to the development of mature and fully functioning citizens in a democratic society.

## Decision to Do Study

The decision to expend energy on any study rests on considerations of utility, feasibility, propriety, and accuracy. This study meets those conditions.

### Utility

The study was intended to provide information for an informed choice between two models of moral education based on research based criteria for selection. It was also intended to result in suggested modifications to the practice of moral education that could increase its effectiveness. Finally, it was intended to provide direction for continued study of the role of facilitative teacher student interaction in the practice of moral education.

### Feasibility

The criteria for selection have received considerable research backing and the models of moral education themselves present enough data for useful preliminary findings.

### Propriety

The models stand to benefit from conclusions of this study and it is also possible that further research based on this preliminary examination could lead to new insights into effective moral education. No human subjects are needed and the models are being considered only in the light that analysis of their published reports will shed on them.

### Accuracy

As a preliminary study, there are enough data available to draw tentative conclusions. The evaluation itself is based on clearly described criteria that are sufficient for their described purpose. As no theory of moral

development is being tested here, but only the implementations of such theories, the accuracy sufficient to promote further development does not threaten theory nor require the long term, large scale study that would be necessary for such an undertaking. Sufficient accuracy to establish the nature of the verbal teacher student interactions can be achieved, and that accuracy will be enough to recommend programmes for further study.

### **Limitations of Study**

This study encounters several problems of generalizability. As the data used in this study are all collected from published transcripts and examples (see Table 1), several features of the source of the data must be considered. First, the published accounts will have been put through some selection process by those publishing them. It is likely that the published sources reflect what the authors of the various publications regard as somehow exemplary or ideal representations of their models at work. All sources present their examples to help readers understand and emulate proper methods. As such, it is not possible to generalize to the average performance of teachers in the field using these models. However, as this study looks at the models themselves and not individual teacher performance, beyond being noted, this limitation is not of great importance.

## **Key to Source of Data Batches**

---

Batch One----- Blatt and Kohlberg, 1975

Batch Two-----  
----- Reimer, J., Paolitto, D. P., & Hersh, R. H. (1983)

Batch Three -----  
----- Colby, Kohlberg, Fenton, Speicher-Dubin, Lieberman, 1977

Batch Four----- Raths, L. E., Harmin, M., & Simon, S. B. (1966)

(Samples collected as they occur throughout these works.)

---

**Table 1**

Second, and of greater import, selection of the published examples from which the samples were collected for this study may have been made using criteria that deliberately excluded example of certain levels of facilitative interaction. In other words, the criteria used by those choosing examples for publication in their presentations of each model, could have biased the domain from which data for this study was selected. This bias could have resulted purposefully, to make a transcript reflect the best interactions than actually occurred, or it may have resulted unintentionally as the authors selected passages to represent a particular aspect of discussion. This study assumes that the sample interactions used for analysis are representative of the level of facilitative interaction in discussions produced by each model. It further assumes that any bias in selection shown by those publishing the interactions would only serve to raise their facilitative ratings. These assumptions may not be warranted.

The final limitation imposed by the data is that it may not be possible to generalize from the models' interactions to the interactions that teachers use in the classroom. This study is not based on a sampling of actual teacher student interactions but on a sampling of interactions that reflect the choices of authors of books presenting models of moral education. Therefore the conclusions of this study are limited to conclusions about the presentation of a model's interactions, and may be generalized further only to consider the interactions of the model generally. Individual teachers may use different styles of interaction, and instructors of moral education may present the interactions used in these models in different ways.

Other limitations of this study arise from the rating procedure. The rating of teacher student interactions for facilitative level of response requires

Careful training and suitable experience. Interaction rating scales are high inference instruments. A summing procedure was used in this study to control for leniency and other rater biases, but after this exploratory stage of research more focused rating would be required to assess specific details of teacher student interactions.

Though the implications that can be drawn from this study are broad in their application for the examination, modification, and selection of models of moral education, they must be regarded at the same time as very preliminary. The combination of facilitative styles of interaction and moral discussion may indeed prove powerful, but such a combination may be incompatible with the methods of the models presented. It may be impossible to incorporate modifications and retain the integrity of each model. Problems of teacher training may well be increased as the necessary skills to implement successfully a programme of moral education become more complex.

Due to these limitations, this study must primarily be regarded as exploratory and suggestive of further research. Any evaluative component is formative rather than summative.

### **Organization of Thesis**

This chapter has provided an introduction to the study of teacher student interaction in moral education and the need for such a study. It further argued for a definition of moral education that would restrict its scope to certain models and selected two of those models for specific examination. The justification for such research was examined, and limitations of the present study presented.

Chapter Two examines the research background of the study of facilitative teacher student interaction in schools and the two models of moral education in more detail. Other comparative research will be presented along with other studies that look at qualities of effective moral discussion.

Chapter Three details the procedures of this research, while Chapter Four presents the statistical methods and findings of the study. Chapter Five discusses these results, presents conclusions, and looks at implications for further research and development.



## CHAPTER TWO

### Chapter Objectives

This chapter examines the research in the three areas of direct concern to this study: facilitative interaction as it developed in client-centred therapy and the development and extension of this idea to classroom interaction; and the two models of moral education considered in this study. Each of these latter sections on the models looks at their theoretical background and central teaching techniques, particularly the discussion and interaction required. Developments occurring after the model's introduction are presented together with major criticisms and responses to those criticisms. Finally, studies evaluating the curricular effectiveness of each model of moral education are reviewed.

The models of moral education are presented in depth to show the path of development that has occurred in them and the role that teacher student interaction plays in each. This chapter attempts to develop a clear picture of facilitative interaction and the distinctive sort of interactions in each model of moral education. Additionally noted are skills teachers require to be effective with each model as expressed by the developers.

## **I. Facilitative Classroom Interaction and Evaluation**

### Carl Rogers and Client Centred Therapy

Carl Rogers has long held that significant student learnings, that is learning of a deep personal nature such as the learning of values, is best promoted in an atmosphere of freedom that results when students are trusted and respected by their teachers (Rogers, 1951, 1961, 1977, 1983). In addition to this trust and respect, teachers who can provide clear empathic understanding of their students and act in a genuine or authentic manner, create conditions that lead to personal growth and development. Part of this development will be the development of socially concerned, personally productive values:

One of the ultimate ends, then, of an hypothesis of confidence in the individual, and in his capacity to resolve his own conflicts, is the emergence of values systems which are unique and personal for each individual and which are changed by the changing evidence of organic experience, yet which are at the same time deeply socialized, possessing a high degree of similarity in their essentials. (p.524)

One effect of client centred therapy is the development of this powerful, socialized, personal set of values.

Client-centred therapy is a learning process in itself, where clients learn to view themselves in different ways and to act based on these new perceptions:

1. the self is seen as more capable
2. the person is more open to "experiential data"

3. the locus of judgment is internalized

4. and the experiential field is increasingly differentiated.

Part of the change brought about by successful therapy is that the clients' values change from an imposed value set, seen as imposed from without by individuals or by society, to an "experienced" set of values, seen as arising from within individuals in response to their experience. (p.150).

The process of learning values discovered in client centred therapy has important consequences for learning in general. Specifically Rogers maintains that student-centred learning, that is learning where freedom exists and the relationship between teacher and student is based on the facilitative conditions of therapy, is a teaching method suited to achieve democratic goals, to promote significant learning, and to enhance student creativity (Rogers, 1951, 1961, 1983).

Significant learning is, in Rogers' view, learning that is primarily concerned with the students discovering meaning instead of remembering information, where information is related to the self, and is characterized by being involving, self-initiated, pervasive, self-evaluated, and essentially concerned with the discovery of meaning or personal significance. It involves the whole student in the sense that it combines logic and intuition, intellect and feeling, concept and experience, idea and meaning.

This sort of learning occurs where the teacher can develop a certain type of relationship with the student. This relationship is characterized by three primary qualities:

1. The teacher is genuine, that is the teacher is evidently him or herself and does not play a role—the student sees the teacher as human and alive.

2. The teacher accepts and likes the students for who they are; he or she displays a warm regard for the student.
3. The teacher responds to the student with empathy, that is, he or she understands the students and displays an understanding of what the students express intellectually and emotionally without judging these expressions.

The parallel between these conditions and the necessary and sufficient conditions of personality change in a therapeutic relationship is very strong (Rogers, 1957). Rogers (1961) states:

To the extent that the teacher creates such a relationship with his class, the student will become a self-initiated learner, more original, more self-disciplined, less anxious and other-directed.  
(p.37)

Under these conditions the student learns an internally judged, experientially derived value set that is sharply distinguished from an imposed or other directed set of values. The internally judged value set characterizes healthful maturity, while the externally judged value set "is a part of the fundamental estrangement of the modern person from his or her self" (Rogers, 1983, p. 261).

It should be noted that some psychologists have maintained that any set of values must be imposed on individuals and socially maintained by weight of training and social pressure. Freud, for example, maintained that social value standards are imposed on the individual unconsciousness and even though they may be completely internalized, there will be a resulting conflict that is inescapable (Freud, 1931/1961)

Rogers is entirely opposed to the idea that the human organism must be reined in and controlled by socially maintained conventions. It is in this reining in that he locates the beginnings of much psychological difficulty. He overtly maintains that, given the right conditions, the human organism will develop, entirely from its own experience, a satisfying and socially acceptable set of values. The key is that each person must be helped to be aware of their total experience and to process it all in their thinking. When the person is aware of their total experience, he or she is "as aware of the demands of the culture as it is of its own physiological demands for food or sex..." (Rogers, 1961, p.105). Rogers believes that each human "organism" will naturally use this awareness of cultural needs in its determination of how it will then act and what values it will then adopt. The culture, it is assumed, will make its moral needs known, but society does not then have to train individuals to respond to these cultural or social needs.

### Carkhuff and Other Theorists

Rogers' theories about education have been operationalized and modified by other researchers. Truax and Carkhuff have examined and researched the "core conditions" of the helping relationship (Truax and Carkhuff, 1967; Carkhuff, 1969) and Carkhuff, together with Berenson, has examined other theories of psychotherapy to investigate whether and how these central conditions are provided (1967). Carkhuff has also concluded that a learning or relearning model, working best in combination with the central or core conditions of facilitative interpersonal skills, is at the centre of gain in psychotherapy (1969). Such work can be seen as the beginnings of

research to pinpoint specific aspects of therapy and learning that are most effective. Rogers (1977) identifies this as necessary continuing future study.

These core interpersonal skills, operationalized and extended, are presented in The Art of Helping (Carkhuff,1980) and have also been presented especially for educators in such works as Human Relations Development: A manual for Educators (Gazda, Asbury, Balzer, Childers, & Walters, 1984). The Skilled Teacher (Carkhuff and Berenson, 1981) also presents these interpersonal skills as part of a skills oriented curriculum development and teaching model.

Whereas Rogers stipulated that there were three basic conditions for a therapeutic relationship, Carkhuff has extended those to five. In addition to providing respect, genuineness, and empathy, in Carkhuff's model of helping, the therapist also helps the client personalize perceived problems and initiate strategies to overcome these problems. Personalizing the problem entails the helper discovering and presenting those aspects of a problem that are within the client's control, while initializing means setting out a series of steps that the client can take to overcome the problem aspects. Distinct from Rogers model then, Carkhuff does not limit the therapist's involvement to reflecting with empathy the client's own expressions of his or her experience, but also helps the client towards effective interventions and new learning or training strategies. Part of this aspect of initiating directionality, to use Carkhuff's terms, may include the helper confronting the person that he or she is trying to help in such a way as to push the relationship to a deeper level where more effective helping can take place. It is not explicitly clear whether Carkhuff disagrees with Rogers' belief that the client is capable, given full awareness of his or her

experience, of creating a solution to problems, or whether he believes further intervention by the counsellor or teacher merely speeds up the development of effective strategies and personal insights in certain conditions.

However, it is clear that the core conditions that Rogers sees as necessary and sufficient for treatment (Rogers, 1957), are still regarded as necessary conditions for helping by Carkhuff. Carkhuff states that high levels of these facilitative conditions are directly proportional to the helpee's gain during counseling and that Rogers' responsive conditions must be integrated with any active initiative components of therapy. The most critical of the facilitative conditions of helper-helpee interaction is empathy. Carkhuff writes: "Without empathy, there is no basis for helping" (Carkhuff, 1969, p.83). These conclusions support earlier work done by Truax and Carkhuff (1967).

Carkhuff's scales for rating these facilitative conditions (modified for use in this study) and a more complete explanation of them that can be used to introduce and train raters are included as Appendices A and B. For their use, Carkhuff offers the following guidelines:

1. Scales should be modified for use with the medium in which sample interactions are recorded. For example, with video taped interactions, both visual and verbal clues could be used.
2. Stratification procedures should be used during sampling to ensure that the sample interactions come from codeable parts of beginning, middle, and later sessions.
3. The reliability and discriminatory power of the scales is independent of sample segment lengths.

4. A patient/therapist/patient pattern should be selected for each sample item to allow the rater to assess the effect of the therapist's response on the patient.
5. The most frequent response is the clearest indication of the overall level at which a therapist is responding as scale intervals are likely not equal.

Inter-rater errors may be produced due to the effects of rater leniency, "halo" effect, or contrast, and statistical procedures can be used to adjust for these effects with interjudge reliability being based on the adjusted ratings.

A complete summary of the use of these conditions in Carkhuff's model of helping or therapy is out of place here, but it should be noted that the highest levels of these conditions, as rated by Carkhuff's scales are generally reserved for middle and later stages of the process. Initially to encourage client/helpee self-exploration, only the minimally facilitative levels of responding are used, focusing on the conditions of empathy and respect (Carkhuff, 1969, vol II).

Carkhuff makes few statements that suggest that the development of a new, mature set of internally directed values are at the centre of the therapeutic process. That theoretical interest was not part of his study. Nor were any direct measurements of student moral development taken during a large scale study which determined some of the outcomes of exposing students in the classroom to higher levels of some of these facilitative conditions. One of the authors of this larger study later stated that one of the core facilitative conditions is a key to promoting moral growth (Aspy, Aspy, and Roebuck, 1986).



## Aspy and Roebuck

Aspy and Roebuck conducted a large scale study to determine whether the learning of students receiving high levels of the basic facilitative interpersonal skills is affected. Approximately 500 teachers and 10,000 students were involved in the testing of two hypotheses related to the theories and operationalized skills of Rogers and Carkhuff. The two hypotheses were tested by the studies summarized and reported in their book Kids Don't Learn from People They Don't Like (1977).

These two hypotheses were:

- 1.that teachers and administrators could be trained in large numbers to increase the levels of facilitative teaching skills which they used in their schools;
- 2.that increases in such skills would be accompanied by positive pupil changes on indices of both mental health and cognitive growth. (p.vii).

The results of their studies support both of these hypotheses. Aspy and Roebuck summarized their conclusions in this way:

Students learn more and behave better when they receive high levels of understanding, caring, and genuineness, than when they are given low levels of them. It pays to treat students as sensitive and aware human beings. (Aspy and Roebuck, 1983, p.199)

Though this large study was not intended to specifically explore moral development or growth in the valuing skills of the students being observed, several important correlations were discovered that are important to this field. As the summary above suggests, students' behaviours were affected

by the differing levels of interpersonal functioning that they were exposed to in school. Student behavior can be assumed to be a reflection of students' values and value related learning. If that assumption holds, behaviours associated with different levels of the facilitative conditions can be seen as an indication of the values students choose when exposed to different levels of facilitative interaction. Aspy and Roebuck's study indicates a possible positive correlation between high levels of facilitative interaction and students' development of socially accepted values.

Generally, Aspy and Roebuck found that a very low level of interpersonal functioning preceded and predicted dire misbehaviors among the students. More disruptive behavior occurred in classes whose teachers were low in empathy, respect, praising, accepting student ideas and asking for student thinking. The level of empathy was the single most frequently recurring predictor of teacher and student behavior in the classroom as well as a predictor of disruptive behavior. The higher the level of empathy in the classroom, the lower the level of disruptive behavior.

Without adequate controls, however, the cause of these differences in student behavior cannot definitely be attributed to the level of facilitative responding, nor can the difference in behavior be attributed to student value development. Only the possibility of these conclusions exists.

Other aspects of student learning and behavior were also found to be affected by the level of interpersonal functioning to which they were exposed. In schools where the students were exposed to high levels of interpersonal skills there was significantly less absenteeism, students showed gains in intelligence measured on the Stanford-Binet test, students showed higher achievement scores as measured by standard achievement

testing, their self concept was enhanced, and the students themselves showed higher levels of interpersonal functioning.

The first hypothesis tested also received support. Using a modified version of the method developed by Carkhuff to teach interpersonal skills, it was found that large numbers of teachers could be trained to increase their level of interpersonal skills, and the training resulted in student improvements as noted above. The level of functioning of the administrators in a school was a good predictor of the level of functioning of staff in the school generally. Other training has also shown that teachers can learn to communicate more empathy to their students. Warner (1984) reports, for example, that teachers raised the level of their responding after viewing a videotape that he produced.

Implications of the studies reported by Aspy and Roebuck (1977) were broad ranging and powerful, reflecting the results obtained by their large scale testing. Aspy and Roebuck determined that learning in a specific subject area cannot effectively be separated from learning effective interpersonal communication skills. Additional findings were that educators can train their colleagues to use high level interpersonal functioning skills and principals can model these skills for a whole school. To be most effective, therefore, teachers need training in both the subject area or areas that they teach and in interpersonal skills. To maximize their learning, students need training in the skills of the subject areas and in general learning and communication skills. Finally, the personal growth of learners is dependent on their physical, emotional, and intellectual growth.

An implication of direct importance to the practice of moral education was stated as an early conclusion: "If we want our children to recognize

and accept basic human values, we must give them the skills they need to implement these values in their own lives" (Aspy and Roebuck, 1977, p.50). This is an implication that has apparently not been directly followed up by either of the models of moral education detailed below.

### Facilitative Interactions and Questioning

As detailed below, the primary verbal interaction in the values clarification model is the "clarifying response." For the most part in Values and Teaching (Raths, L. E., Harmin, M., & Simon, S. B., 1978), the clarifying response is presented as a questioning strategy: Of the 30 clarifying responses given as examples (pp. 58-63), two, numbers 13 and 14, contain elements of paraphrase, but these two are also explicitly phrased as questions. The asking of questions has received little attention from the researchers concerned with facilitative interactions, perhaps because the asking of questions is generally held in very low regard. Carkhuff (1969) wrote that one characteristic mode of interaction for low level helpers was "... the stupid question factor, since the dominant mode of functioning ... was to ask numerous questions" (Vol II, p.32). The asking of questions seems in many ways inimical to proper responsive functioning. Carkhuff (1980) suggests that where low level helpers ask questions, high level helpers pause to review behavioral and verbal clues that they already have, and formulate a reflective response based on those instead of asking a question.

This responsive method of encouraging the helpee to explore more fully places the burden on the helper, where it should be, and tends to prevent the helpee from becoming defensive (p.119)

That is not to say that the high level helper never asks questions; he or she asks good questions, defined as those that allow a reflective response to the answer, but if two questions are asked in a row, Carkhuff recommends a return to reflective responses only.

However, in a work on human relations development intended specifically for educators, Gazda, Asbury, Balzer, Childers, & Walters (1984) complicate matters. On the whole, the attitude to questioning students remains similar to Carkhuff's, and the appropriate use of questions is limited to those few instances when the teacher requires specific information for formal or immediate use. However it is also stated that the teacher might also appropriately use a question to clarify an evasive or vague answer—to "test an hypothesis" about the student's meaning that has already been formed.

The use of questions to carry or direct a discussion or conversation is considered inappropriate, and some of the reasons given are applicable to developmental moral discussions in particular. The asking of questions can create a dependency relationship that inhibits student development; the responsibility for solving problems can become the teacher's, the student thinking, 'All I have to do is answer these questions and I am all right.' This reduction of student responsibility might even constitute a danger to the models stated aim of avoiding indoctrination. Asking questions may well lead students in ways that inhibit their own thinking, suggest teacher

sought answers, and thereby reduce student involvement and perhaps increase student resentment as they feel led along the teacher's preselected path.

This position is complicated by the assertion that open-ended questions and statements by the teacher can have almost opposite effects, increasing student involvement and self-exploration. The sample questions given seem very like clarifying responses of the values clarification model or the Socratic probes of moral development.

Overall, one can conclude that the asking of questions, even the very best of questions, is at most a minor part of high level facilitative interaction between teacher and student. An extension of this conclusion may be that the asking of many questions, whether they are "clarifying" or "Socratic probes" may be counterproductive when used in the hope of promoting moral growth. For this reason, a measure of the amount of questioning, as opposed to facilitative responding was taken when data for this study were examined.

### Implications for this Study

Based on this literature, the following characteristics were considered important to examine in teacher student interactions during moral discussions: teacher empathy, respect, and genuineness (to measure level of facilitative response), and the ratio of questions asked to reflective responses given. Carkhuff's scales were used as measurement and descriptive instruments.

## II. Values Clarification

### Description of the Model

An early pilot project, reported by J. Rath (1962), contained many of the essential characteristics of what came to be known as the Values Clarification approach. Teachers at a school determined that many of their students were not involved in their learning and showed a lack of purposefulness when approaching it. In consultation with the researchers, they determined that this state of affairs was brought about by a lack of developed values in the students. This lack they determined to remedy.

Relying on a definition of values that involved a combination of observable and internal characteristics, the intervention team set about giving the students practice in the steps of the valuing process. Evaluating after the intervention, 82 percent of the students had learned values that resulted in greater involvement and purposefulness in school. The researchers found that those students not developing values during the intervention showed a pattern of unmet emotional needs that, they hypothesized, had to be dealt with before values development could take place.

Values Clarification is a model of moral education that views itself as an intervention to help students displaying characteristic values-related behaviours to develop stronger valuing skills. Its general form is one of diagnosis, intervention, and resulting student improvement, in particular, reduced frequency and intensity of values-related behavior and learning problems. Some students can be recognized as requiring special help

developing valuing skills in order to cope with the special valuing demands of a changing and pluralistic society. These students exhibit certain characteristic behaviours. Values Clarification is an intervention that teachers can use with these students to improve their valuing skills and that will result in their exhibiting fewer of the behaviours associated with deficient skills.

### Values and Teaching

The central text of the Values Clarification model is Values and Teaching: Working with Values in the Classroom by Rath, Harmin, and Simon (1966). Because of its germinal position within this model, it warrants close attention. Though some have argued that there are two distinct forms of Values Clarification (Chazan, 1985), Values and Teaching sets forth the basic theory and practice that is largely common to both. A second edition (Rath, Harmin, and Simon, 1978) is primarily a restatement of the theory and practice of the first edition.

The therapeutic form of values clarification is set out in the opening of the text. The basic thesis states that some children's behavior problems can result from value disturbances. These value related behavior problems can interfere with learning and, from their description alone it can be inferred, other aspects of living also. The problems result from a lack of values or, as the authors might more precisely formulate it, from a weakness in using the students' use of the valuing process. Values clarification seeks to help children develop valuing skills through support and encouragement, and by so doing to reduce the frequency and intensity of their values-related



behaviours. Values and Teaching (1978, pp. 6–7) describes the behaviours which signal a deficit in valuing skills.

The concept of “values” is described in several ways in the book. By way of a descriptive image early in the book, those with values related difficulties are placed in an imaginary group of people who are “unclear about their relationship with society.” It is these people who exhibit the characteristic values-related behaviours: apathy, flightiness, extreme uncertainty, extreme inconsistency, absence of goals, overconformity, extreme dissent, extreme posturing or role playing (1978, p.7) Those clear about their relationship to society show positive, purposeful, enthusiastic and proud behaviours—behaviours indicative of strong valuing skills.

Values are described as growing from the person's experience and being affected by experience. They are the development of intelligent reflection on experience. The authors state that the most appropriate values, which may mean the most morally sound values, are the result of “persons using their intelligence freely and reflectively to define their relationships with each other and with an ever-changing world.” (Raths, Harmin, and Simon, 1966, p.39). Values clarification trusts that appropriate values will emerge from this process because human beings are capable of being “thoughtful and wise” (1978, p.38). Values development is viewed, then, as a naturally occurring process that is best developed under certain conditions that permit individuals to engage in the valuing process.

The process of valuing consists of three main activities or modes of thought, each of which has several sub—activities. The process is summarized in Table 2.

# The Valuing Process

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## Choosing

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- **Freely**—for a value to be retained, even when the individual is not under the control of any authority, it must be chosen freely by the individual without coercion. A value that is actively and freely selected will be truly valued.
- **From Alternatives**—choice can only exist when there are several elements among which to choose. It is only when the individual encounters different possibilities, that he or she can choose an alternative that is suitable to him or her in a meaningful and unique way.
- **Consideration of Consequences**—only when alternatives are there to be considered and weighed can the intelligent process of choice that is central to the valuing process occur. Informed choice is only possible within a context of understanding that requires the intelligent consideration of several alternatives and their consequences before the best is selected.

## Prizing

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- **Satisfaction with Choices**—true values are not the result of choosing the lesser of two evils, but rather the satisfaction with choosing what is positively good. People must be happy to choose what they value and not feel pressed by circumstance to take what might be poorly considered as the best only in a certain restrictive situation. If an individual is not happy with a choice then that choice does not represent a value.

•**Publicly Affirming Choices**—with true values, an individual is not ashamed to publicly affirm and perhaps champion his or her choice. A value that an individual is ashamed of is not a true value

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## Acting

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•**Acting on Choices**—nothing can be a value that does not give some direction to an individual's life. Some action in life derived from the value must take place for a value to be real.

•**Repeated Actions**—true values persist. They affect life now and repeatedly in a person's life often resulting in a recognizable pattern of behavior. If an action tied to a supposed value does not recur in appropriate circumstances, the value is not real.

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## Table 2

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The main process, choosing, is of particular importance because it contains the main application of intelligence, meaning the activity of logical, reasonable, rational thinking. This activity seems primarily to take effect in the operations of choosing among alternatives, where critical and creative thinking must be employed to think of alternatives, and in the consideration of consequences of these alternatives where such thinking skills as predicting, hypothesizing, and perspective taking must be used. It is stated that the best values are those that help a person relate to the world in a satisfying and intelligent way, and so these phases of the process where intelligence are used are important.

The other two major modes in this process seem to focus on activities other than rational thought. The prizing mode seems to focus primarily on the affective side of morality. Prizing, for example, might be considered the positive aspect of the ability to feel guilt over certain actions, that is the pride and sense of satisfaction that one feels doing what is right. The acting mode may reflect something of a common sense approach to morality as habit training, although here the repeated acting out of behavior is viewed as necessary and not sufficient for value formation.

Taken altogether, the valuing process constitutes the main definition of "value" for the Values Clarification model. When an observer can see that the subject has completed this process with some particular belief/action cluster, then that subject is said to have a value. Whatever underlies the observed phenomenon is defined as a value, and it is a value only if the complete process is gone through.

This process definition of value also applies in a negative manner; that is, when a subject merely affirms a belief, or only repeatedly acts in a certain way, it is not necessary that he/she truly holds a value to give purpose to that behavior. Unless all the aspects of the valuing process are gone through, such evidence of underlying values is considered an indicator only. Work of charity may not exhibit a value if, for example, the charity worker knew of no other way to behave, or had not intelligently considered the consequences of such action, or in some other way had not completed the entire valuing process.

Because of this strong distinction between truly values-driven behaviours and other behaviours that only are contingently connected to

values, values clarification describes these other behaviours as value indicators. These values indicators are summarized in Table 3.

## Value Indicators

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- 1. Goals or Purposes**—give direction to life. However when reflected on, the goal may be dropped or changed showing that it did not indicate a true value.
- 2. Aspirations**—a goal for the future, aspirations may again be changed or dropped when the valuing process is completed.
- 3. Attitudes**—reflect an impetus to a value, but there is not sufficient indication that attitudes are selected from alternatives and the consideration of their consequences, for example.
- 4. Interests**—an interest shows a desire to learn about something, but it may not show that a person is ready to act or affirm values connected with the interest and is therefore only an indication of a potential value.
- 5. Feelings**—reflect inner convictions about self and others but may be dissipated after reflection and so not represent a full value.
- 6. Beliefs and Convictions**—the affirmation of a belief is an indication of a value, but the belief may not be prized or it may not meet other requirements of a value.
- 7. Activities**—what an individual does often reflects what he or she truly values, however observation of actions alone is not sufficient to determine the inner motivations and patterns of choice that are a necessary part of genuine values.

8. **Worries, Problems, Obstacles**—talk of concerns may indicate real values, but it may not. Talk, thought, and action are required of true values and all must be present on examination.

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### Table 3

Examination of the table shows that in general values indicators are single or incomplete aspects of the valuing process. Values indicators are important in the model because they provide important information to the teacher using this model of education. The goal of values clarification is to encourage and help with the process of valuing. The teacher elicits and may respond to students' expressions of value indicators. Through the process, the students are encouraged to choose, prize and act on their ideas consistently. This practice and the reflection and thought brought about by the clarifying teacher's responses helps the students clarify their values. Through encouragement and help, students with values disturbances will clarify their values and their new values will be manifest by changes in their behavior. Specifically they will show less of the value-related behaviours (Raths, L. E., Harmin, M., & Simon, S. B. 1978, p. 9).

#### The Clarifying Response.

The clarifying response is a basic strategy of Values Clarification as it is presented in Values and Teaching. It is a primary means that this model uses to cause the student to reflect on and become aware of aspects of his or her life that require values processing. However, later Values Clarification writers, developing the somewhat distinct model that Chazan (1985) called VC2, place much less reliance on the clarifying response, devoting most of

their effort to developing paper and pencil tasks that might then be discussed and where teachers could employ the clarifying response although little emphasis is placed on its use. The section "Values Clarification Developments" below provides a fuller look at these writers.

The clarifying response is employed primarily in response to values indicators that the teacher sees or hears from the student. Its effect is to cause the student to think again or reflect on the value indicator he or she has just displayed. This extra reflection or awareness is at the heart of the values clarification intervention. The characteristics of a good clarifying response are supposed to be such that they permit the fullest and freest rethinking or re-experiencing by the student. This rethinking provides students an opportunity to develop the ability to clarify their own values. It is only through the clarifying response that the teacher suggests or prompts students to consider their stated value indicators from another perspective. The clarifying response often asks the student to complete a part of the valuing process that he or she may not have yet completed in connection with the value indicator the teachers has observed.

For example, a student may be telling about a time they rang some one's doorbell and then ran away. The teacher could ask, "Is that something you value?" with the intention of having the student complete the valuing process at the level of prizing or affirmation. Raths, Harmin, Simon (1978, pp. 58-63) give the above question as part of thirty responses and also describe the relationship of these responses to the valuing process.

Raths, Harmin, and Simon (1978) give this criterion for a good clarifying statement:



Ultimately the acid test for any response is whether or not it results in a person reflecting on what he has said or done, clarifying, getting to know himself better, examining his choices, considering what he prizes, looking at patterns in his life, and so on. (Page 58)

The successful clarifying response is followed by thought, then, and this reflective thinking may be shown by an immediate student response, such as "I've just thought of something else," "I've changed my mind," or "I'll have to think about that." This rethinking may also take place at some other time even days later and so cannot always be confirmed by the teacher.

Given opportunities to practise the valuing process in the classroom with the encouragement of the teacher, the freedom to make choices, and opportunities to reflect and reconsider choices, attitudes, interests and other value indicators provided by thoughtful clarifying responses, the authors believe that students will clarify values that will affect their value-related behaviours. Apathy will be replaced with commitment and positive, purposeful behaviours. Instead of being flighty, inconsistent, and uncertain, students will become enthusiastic and purposeful—and these changes will result from exposure to values clarification methods. This prediction is the hypothesis that Raths, Harmin, and Simon (1978, p. 9) offer for testing.

#### Later Values Clarification Developments

Further developments in the values clarification model have been largely of two sorts. First, many new materials have been developed for use in the classroom and elsewhere, and second, some further theoretical development has gone on. In the course of this development, one significant

change in the practice of values clarification has been implied—the core of the model has changed from moral discussion using the clarifying response to the completion and discussion of values clarification materials. In addition, there has been a reformulation of the defining characteristics of the valuing process.

Two works illustrate the first sort of development, that of values clarification materials. Values Clarification: A Handbook of Practical Strategies for Teachers and Students (Simon, Howe, and Kirschenbaum, 1972) and Clarifying Values Through Subject Matter: Applications for the Classroom (Harmin, Kirschenbaum, Simon, 1973). The first work presents values clarification as a curriculum distinct from others in school, to be taught on its own, while the latter work shows how value concerns can be incorporated in other parts of the regular school curriculum such as Social Studies or Mathematics. The bulk of both of these works is activities and materials for use in the classroom. Very little space is devoted to discussion of how these materials should be implemented or to theoretical considerations. Activities for classroom use developed by others, for example Crawley and Mountain (1981) are complementary in their approach.

Values clarification is presented as a third level of the curriculum placed at the peak of a pyramid based on learning facts, built up through understanding concepts, and topped by finding meaning and relating the other sorts of learning to personal values. In order to include learning at the peak of this pyramid, teachers must, while engaging in value clarifying activities, attempt to provide conditions in the classroom that will best allow the students to develop their valuing process.

These conditions and teaching behaviours can be broken up into two sorts: classroom atmosphere and teacher behaviours.

The value clarifying teacher must strive to develop a classroom atmosphere that is open, honest, accepting and respectful of different ideas (Simon, Howe, Kirschenbaum, 1972). To this end, the teacher should encourage students to be honest in their responses to materials and in the discussion that is based on these responses. Diversity should be encouraged, and the teacher encourages this by not moralizing or providing the "right" answer to any of the questions asked. Freedom and respect are developed by allowing students to "pass" or not to respond or participate in discussion if they choose not to do so, and by accepting whatever answers students may give, perhaps after a probing or clarifying question or two. While the teacher may, towards the end of discussion present his or her own views, these views are not regarded as better or superior, but are given as one of many answers to the questions that are asked.

The teacher models good listening skills, though these are not specified nor is it suggested that they should be taught directly to students, and asks occasional questions. Questions that can be answered with a simple yes or no should be avoided, as should questions that restrict answers such as 'either/or' questions, as they may limit thinking. But 'why' questions should also be avoided (Harmin, Kirschenbaum, Simon, 1973) because they may threaten students. The teacher should attempt to ask questions about social issues that relate to the materials being used. Specific sorts of responses that previously made up clarifying responses are not emphasized.

Though clarifying questions may be asked, they are no longer at the centre of this model, and for this reason, these later developments may be considered to be quite distinct in practice, if not theory, when compared to the original model. Also, in another work (Simon, 1974), adults are directed to do value clarifying activities as part of a larger, human development movement of which values clarification is a part. This development is also distinctly different from any suggestions in the original presentation where values clarification was directed towards children with values related behavior problems and not towards unhappy or unfulfilled adults.

These apparent distinctions from the first formulation of the values clarification model are said to rest still on the theoretical formulation of the earlier work. However, a change in emphasis in this theory seems clear and in one case a reformulation of the theory has been done.

Simon, while maintaining that values clarification is a model of values education that is free of indoctrination and able to help children cope with the many contradictory influences and hypocrisy of many moral 'exemplars' of modern time (1971), characterizes it more in terms of a helping therapy of general application. Its aims are to help make people more purposeful, to become more productive, to sharpen their critical thinking, and to have better relationships with each other (Simon and deSherbinin, 1975). Though he argues that traditional moralizing is ineffective in a pluralistic and sophisticated society, and that values clarification is an effective replacement for it, the aims of values clarification as he has stated them are clearly not those of the traditional 'bag of virtues' school, but more like those of a model of self-actualization. This connection, suggested in Simon, 1974, is made even more explicit in

Simon and O'Rourke (1977), a work detailing a combination of values clarification and Maslow's self-actualization theory applied to the teaching of emotionally disturbed children.

Kirschenbaum (1976) also emphasizes what could be called the therapeutic nature of the values clarification model. He views it as a branch of the "helping professions" directed at helping those who show "alienation behaviours", apathy and so on, by encouraging them to replace those behaviours with others more "personally satisfying and socially constructive." As such, he believes that values clarification has several advantages over other competing models. He also states that values clarification is consistent with, and might be viewed as a part of "humanistic education" (Martin, 1982).

The same author has undertaken a more basic reformulation of the valuing process that he believes better describes the set of valuing skills that students practise and develop (Kirschenbaum, 1976, 1977). His theory is also an attempt to reconcile the "relativistic" values clarification model with a "helpful" model with profound implications about the nature of human growth and development and the process of education. These implications are not stated, but they may refer to the Rogers/Dewey-like conception of human nature at the heart of this model.

Instead of three basic processes, Kirschenbaum's reformulation of the valuing process has five dimensions. They are:

1. Thinking—this includes all levels of thinking as well as moral reasoning and creative or divergent thinking.

2. Feeling—this dimension encompasses the subject's self concept and his or her awareness of what emotions she or he experiences.
3. Choosing—freely choosing considering alternatives and consequences
4. Communicating—effective listening and speaking including empathic understanding of others and the ability to resolve conflicts.
5. Acting—repeatedly, skillfully, competently acting on the beliefs that are arrived at through this process.

Each of these processes has received the attention of other researchers, for example, the first process, "Thinking," includes moral reasoning as studied by Kohlberg. Kirschenbaum assembles all of these processes together as sub-processes of a unified valuing process. Values clarification is determined to teach this process and to help students skillfully apply it, however that teaching does not break the process down into its atomistic skills, but relies on the materials and techniques already developed under the old formulation.

Another strand of values clarification development, one that is more closely tied to the original formulation of the model, is Values in the Classroom written by Volkmor, Pasanella, and Raths (1977). It focuses on a definition of a value as something chosen freely, prized dearly, publicly affirmed, and acted on repeatedly, and makes explicit a connection between learning valuing and the idea of experiential learning developed by Rogers. The authors of this work point out the need, as explained by Rogers, for such learning to occur in an atmosphere of trust, freedom, and respect. The

teacher's task is to encourage choice and help students examine the choices they make, suggest students reflect and consider what they do, have them develop alternatives and look within themselves, give them opportunities for affirmation, reconsideration of repeated behaviours, and actions in accord with their own beliefs. In this work, the clarifying response is still considered an important method to achieve these goals.

### Criticisms

The Values Clarification theory and model has received a great deal of scholarly and in some cases (Eger, 1981) parental criticism. The theory has been criticized for its inconsistency, its moral stance, and its lack of substance. The criticism of practise in the classroom is based largely on the moral stance of ethical relativity that is apparently encouraged. Many of these criticisms have been categorized and presented by Baer. in a series of articles (1977, 1980, 1982a, 1982b).

### Ethical Relativism

The first series of objections relate to the apparent ethical relativism of values as defined and developed by the values clarification model. These objections are of two families: those that state that the teaching of relative values is philosophically contradictory (values cannot be relative), the result of an arbitrary and unjustifiable definition of values, and not desirable or even moral; and those that find values clarification to in fact indoctrinate students with the meta-ethical view that all values are purely personal and therefore relative, that is outside of reference to standards or criticism. This latter family of criticism is presented first.

Even though values clarification supporters explicitly state that they intend to avoid any indoctrination of values in students, some object that values clarification does, in fact, undertake to indoctrinate values, some of which are undesirable or in some view immoral. Baer (1977) examined what he called the assumption that values clarification is non-indoctrinative, and found that such an assumption is not in fact supportable. He claims that values clarification does in fact indoctrinate students in one particular view of what a value is, specifically saying that a value is strictly a matter of personal choice, that people are free to choose their values, and that any value that people select using the valuing process is acceptable. To permit only this view and to promote it is, in Baer's view, to indoctrinate students because it ignores the many alternative views that exist such as St. Augustine's or Freud's (Baer, 1982b).

In addition to indoctrinating a specific meta-ethical view, through the teaching behaviours of the model, the teacher also works to change behavior, or indoctrinate attitudes and behaviours, by focusing on certain statements and accepting only repeated behaviours as truly showing values. Such an education is in truth indoctrination in "radical ethical relativism" as both a meta-ethical view and as a practice (Baer, 1980).

Stewart, in his reviews, like Baer, has also noted a strong degree of, if not indoctrination, then coercion to believe specific things. Through peer pressure and the focus on public affirmations, Stewart believes that the values clarification model limits the values students come to hold values because those students holding unpopular or unusual positions are not likely to openly affirm them, perhaps thereby letting them go or at least losing opportunities to have them clarified and accepted or recognized.



Not mentioning any meta-ethical indoctrination, Stewart suggests that values clarification preaches a specific bag of virtues through its insistence on affirmation, consistency of behavior, productivity, purposefulness and so on. Values statements not living up to these virtues are met with critical and judgmental questions: "Are you doing anything about that idea?" (1975, 1976).

So while apparently presenting a view allowing personal selection of values, values clarification methods result in that seemingly contradictory objection that on both the meta-ethical and the ethical levels, values clarification indoctrinates students in specific "virtues" and in a specific view of what morality is.

The second family of criticism finds the relativistic position taken by the values clarification theory and by the teacher in the classroom unacceptable not because it presents a specific view of morality, but because it presents a mistaken or undesirable view of morality. Parents object that teachers are telling children they can believe anything they want to (Eger, 1981), and moral philosophers object that moral values are not really being taught, perhaps even prevented from being taught, with the insistence that absolute moral principles do not exist.

This "ethical relativism" of Values Clarification has concerned many reviewers of the theory who regard it as a theoretical or philosophical weakness (Lockwood, 1975, 1976, 1977; Kazepides, 1977; Stewart, 1975, 1976; Boyd and Bogdon, 1984). This apparently relativistic position of values clarification invites concerns of several sorts. Baer, for example, believes that such a relativistic position puts each individual in the position of a moral "god" and hence trespasses on the territory of the church and is

hence forbidden in American schools. He criticizes values clarification for teaching this "religion" in public schools. Parts of this "religious" system of belief contain assumptions about human freedom and human nature which some may find objectionable or false. Finally, he argues, a purely relativistic morality may undermine the absolute ethical principles required of a democratic society—tolerance and others (Morril, 1982)—by preaching that they, too, are not absolute and might therefore be discarded at individual whim.

Others object that by apparently making values simply matters of preference, and so purely personal and relative, values clarification collapses the distinction between values and morality in an arbitrary and mistaken way (Lockwood, 1975, 1976, 1977; Stewart, 1975). In addition, others argue that by redefining values in a purely relativistic way, this theory makes the belief/action complexes it happens to call values unavailable to necessary rational examination (Kazepides, 1977; Wagner, 1981; Suttle, 1982). Boyd and Bogdon (1984) point out this "rhetorical" shift that the theory makes between real values and "whatever results from the valuing process".

Finally, the relativism of values clarification, that is its stated role of not teaching any specific values comes under fire from those who believe that schools ought to teach specific values, whether they be democratic, Christian, or some other. Rokeach (1975), for example, is critical of values clarification because he believes schools should directly teach "educational values" and also an assortment of values that students might, in their own way, compare with values they hold. The school should not focus on students' values but should present them with alternatives for comparison

and analysis. Values clarification clearly does not do this task. An article by Harrison (1977) extends a like criticism, finding an inherent contradiction in a theory that professes to help while at the same time stating that it will not teach a particular content. Apparently a moral curriculum must have factual and theoretical content and not just skills to be adequate. Cromer and Loebe (1978) state that the values of the value clarification process should be defined by the schools as goals to achieve.

### Other Objections

*values clar.*

By stressing the consistency of actions required for a person to truly demonstrate the action of a value in their lives, Lockwood believes that the values clarification theory is incapable of working with the idea of intrapersonal value conflict. He argues (1976) that the theory does not even permit the idea of such conflict, saying that if there is conflict between two apparent values, then there cannot be consistent behavior and they are not values, or if one is consistently acted on, then the other, however seemingly a value, would not be considered so. The conflict would be between a value and something of another kind. Such a view, Lockwood suggests, does not do true justice to those who face such conflicts, nor does it prepare students for such conflicts in their lives.

Casemont (1983) makes another philosophical case that neither values clarification nor the moral development model have sufficiently dealt with the real problems of making a moral choice, one of which Lockwood has pointed out above, and suggests that the theorists go back to the drawing board, with the help of professional philosophers, to deal with this issue

The remaining objections pertain more to the actual implementation of the values clarification model in the classroom and refer both to the materials used and the teaching behaviours that make up the model.

First, Baer (1980, 1982b) points out that the materials used by values clarifiers such as question sheets or values continuums sometimes are biased against the preferences of traditional morality. For example, a sheet seeking to discover students' thoughts about marriage may offer alternatives such as divorce or premarital sex that are not traditionally accepted. In other cases, possible actions may be restricted, where, for example, a values sheet on pregnancy may offer only choices between abortion or adoption of the unwanted child and no other more traditional options such as acceptance of the child into the family.

Lockwood (1978b) points out that clarifying questions can be of a very personal nature and, with any coercion to respond by peers or teacher, could be considered an invasion of privacy by many as questions about knowledge of peers, personal behavior, religion, family affairs and emotions are outside the conventional "privacy contract" within which the school operates. The statement that a student may always pass answering any of these questions does not acknowledge the realities of peer pressure or of some students' desire to please the teacher.

Lockwood (1975, 1976, 1977) argues strongly that there is an almost exact correspondence between client-centred psychotherapy and values clarification on certain key assumptions and methodological approaches. These assumptions and approaches are: the conditions which produce a need for treatment; the outcomes of successful treatment; aspects of the

treatment process; and the role of the therapist/teacher. The correspondences are summarized in Table 4.

These correspondences are enough for Lockwood to claim that values clarification is in fact, despite claims to the contrary, a form of client-centred therapy. The implications of this, he states are:

1. Values clarification advocates must clarify their position.
2. Values clarification should not be characterized as rational-intellectual, but as emotional-affective.
3. As therapy, the range of objectives, issues and questions that can be considered are too restricted to encompass a proper values curriculum (Kohlberg's model, among others, is given as an example of an appropriate model.)

Baer (1980) adds his view that such "therapy" should not be done in schools supported by tax payers money.

### Curricular Effectiveness

Finally, the curricular effectiveness of values clarification interventions has been assessed in a number of studies (Stewart, 1975; Lockwood, 1978a; Leming, 1981). Stewart found methodological concerns about the studies that he considered gravely compromised their conclusions. Looking at later studies, both Lockwood and Leming applied stringent filters to the studies they considered and selected studies of appropriate design, sufficiently large sample, and clear statistical treatment. After this filtering, the results of the remaining studies were tabulated and evaluated. The following paragraphs summarize these conclusions.

# **Values Clarification and Client-Centred Therapy**

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## **Condition Producing the Need for Intervention**

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### **Client-Centred Therapy**

Modern Society with its array of value positions makes it difficult for people to choose a satisfying way of life.

### **Values Clarification**

Modern Society with its array of value positions makes it difficult for people to choose a satisfying way of life

## **Outcome of Successful Intervention**

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### **Client-Centred Therapy**

Persons learn to value themselves as worthwhile, and become able to function productively, evaluate themselves, and become more congruent, acting and expressing themselves as they are.

### **Values Clarification**

Persons become more productive and proud of themselves. They learn their role in choosing their own values, and their actions and statements become more consistent and congruent.

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## **Key Aspects of the Intervention Process**

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### **Client-Centred Therapy**

An atmosphere of trust and acceptance is established in which the clients examine their own feelings and experiences and accept responsibility for themselves and their own judgments.

### **Values Clarification**

An atmosphere is established in which students are able to express their ideas and feelings freely. The clarifying response is nonjudgmental, helping the students recognize their own confusions and their responsibility to make their own decisions.

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## **Role of the Therapist / Teacher**

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### **Client-Centred Therapy**

The therapist is intimately related to establishing the process through a therapeutic relationship. He or she must be nonjudgmental, accepting, trusting, empathic.

### **Values Clarification**

The teacher must be nonjudgmental, not "moralizing," and accepting of the student's views. He or she must provide a setting and seek to draw out the students' feelings and ideas.

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**Table 4**

Few of the studies that Lockwood considered were directly concerned to evaluate the classic values clarification hypotheses that values clarification effects that number and intensity of values-related behaviours that students exhibit. Most studies were concerned with looking at other results of a values clarification intervention such as effects self-esteem, self-concept, personal adjustment, and other measurements of psychological stability and development. Some studies looked at attitudes to subject matter, value change, and reading ability. On the basis of studies evaluated, Lockwood found that values clarification programs are likely to have no effect on psychological growth or stability. Such programs may promote reading ability and they may positively effect classroom values related behaviours. In other words, although there was no evidence to support some of the ancillary claims of values clarification theory, the basic hypothesis received some tentative support.

Lockwood recommended that further research look more closely at the teacher variables in the implementation of the values clarification intervention in an attempt to further understanding of which teacher behaviours are responsible for the observed effects.

In his later review, Leming specifically set out to examine values clarification's ability to consistently produce its claimed results. He focused on studies done in the classroom, that featured controls or pre/post testing, that were replicated, and whose results were calculated to show chance results in no more than one out of twenty ( $p \leq .05$ ).

Interestingly the only models of moral education that had studies to be evaluated after this screening were values clarification and moral development.



Leming found some support for the claim that values clarification intervention could produce changes in behavior at the elementary school level. It was his contention, however, that the central effect of values clarification was too diffuse for accurate measurement, many studies relying on teacher reports and other not easily quantifiable data to measure their effect. In studies that looked for other results, Leming found no support for hypotheses that values clarification would produce changes in values, self-concept, self-actualization, thinking, or dogmatism. Overall, there were too few studies that survived the rigours of Leming's selection procedure to permit him to make any further conclusions about existing support for the effectiveness of values clarification.

Leming went to pains to point out that curricular effectiveness is only one of the criteria that must be assessed when evaluating a model of moral education. Ethical and educational philosophy must be considered as well as the more practical concerns of implementation. What works, sometimes, may not be what is desirable overall.

### Responses

In a response to Baer (1980), Knapp (1982) presents arguments to counter each of Baer's criticisms. A strong rebuttal written by McAninch (1985) is also noteworthy for the close attention it pays to the original text, Values and Teaching, and the strong and closely argued reading it gives of that text. The argument that the sense of "value" defined by the values clarification movement is a legitimate one, derived from Dewey, contained in this rebuttal is also important for a balanced view of the theory. It makes

a case for a more "organismic" or "experiential" view of values than the cognitive, rational view that many criticisms are based on.

In the conclusion to her article, McAninch asks for educational philosophers to combine with researchers, presumably values clarification researchers in particular, to "help children live more thinking and meaningful lives." Such a request is characteristic of a considerable amount of the writing in response to critics of values clarification theorists. Convinced of the value for children and the ease of use of their model, values clarification theorists sometimes tend to brush aside criticism as impeding the implementation of their model.

For example, Kirschenbaum (1977) lists nine advantages of the values clarification model such as its practical strategies, ease of use, compatibility with subject matter, and does not choose to directly address concerns about the model even though a companion article is critical of it (Lockwood, 1977).

This section of the review looks at the responses from values clarification writers that most directly address the concerns of their critics. Kirschenbaum (1975, 1977) and Kirschenbaum, Harmin, Howe, and Simon (1975) have assembled the experimental evidence in support of the theory, many of the studies mentioned not meeting Lockwood's or Leming's criteria for inclusion in their studies. For the most part these writers have attempted to clear up misunderstandings that they have found implied in much of the comment directed against their model. The best source of these attempts at clarification is the Kirschenbaum (1975) work mentioned above, but in Advanced Values Clarification, Kirschenbaum (1977) addresses many of these concerns in a didactic question and answer format.

Values clarification theorists believe that they have an acceptable theory derived from Dewey, among others, a clear hypothesis that has been tested, and a working and workable intervention with demonstrated beneficial effects on students. The values clarification intervention does not merely lead to individual happiness whatever the consequences to others, but helps produce socially adjusted and personally active individuals working towards self-selected goals. Rather than being moral value free, as claimed by some, the values of life, liberty, equality, and freedom are inherent in the approach even though they are not indoctrinated into the students. Rationality is clearly valued and critical thinking found more desirable because it is asked of everyone regardless of their stated value position. Instead of being without moral principles of their own, values clarification theorists believe that they are strong advocates for certain democratic values and that their model of intervention in the classroom is as effective in developing those values as it is in helping children live more satisfying lives.

It may be that confusion has arisen because Value Clarification is definite in stating that values are only truly obtained through individual, reflection, and that for this reflection to take place, students must be free to talk about, reflect on, act on, and believe whatever they want within the bounds of individual teachers' concerns with classroom management and student safety. Only by allowing this relative freedom of action and absolute freedom of thought, it might be argued, can students come to learn and accept moral principles that might be described as absolute. The confusion does seem to lie between what must be done to learn the valuing process and to develop personal values on the one hand (allowing for "ethical relativism"

in the classroom), and how what is learned as a result of this process might be described. Values clarification theorists seem to believe that at least a subset of the values produced by their model might best be described as principles of freedom, justice, and equality. Such thoughts as these may explain the reconciliation of “relativistic” with “helpful” of which Kirschenbaum wrote (1976) with its “profound implications about the nature of human growth and development and the process of education” (p.116). Kirschenbaum is explicit in claiming that values clarification is concerned with morality and producing moral agents (Martin,1982) and that the values and methods of this model are consistent with educating for a democracy (Kirschenbaum, 1982).

### Implications for this Study

In its original conception, Values Clarification was seen primarily as interactive—teachers asking clarifying questions of students—though pen and paper tasks were also part of the model. Later developments emphasized more and more written exercises that were less dependent on teacher responses. Because this study is concerned with teacher student interaction, it focuses primarily on the earlier conception of the model found in the two editions of Values and Teaching. Of particular interest is the degree to which the emphasis on questioning or the “clarifying response” will show in coding the interactions.

This model has received a great deal of criticism arguing that what it teaches is not actually moral, arguing that values are not moral and that this model could be considered amoral or even antimoral. This study does not intend to address the question of what is moral in greater depth than

given in the definition of terms, and regards the ethical relativity of Values Clarification as not sufficient to bar its inclusion as a model of moral education.

Lockwood compared values clarification and client-centred therapy using a conceptual frame and found many similarities. His intention was to use these similarities as an argument against using values clarification in the classroom. It can be assumed that Aspy and Roebuck would derive the opposite recommendation from the same evidence. If the actual interactions of Values Clarification actually do resemble high level interactions characteristic of any effective counselling (Carkhuff, 1969), this study would consider that resemblance a recommendation. However, no evidence has been found to indicate that the teacher responses to student statements actually resemble a counsellor's facilitative responses. This study investigates that possible similarity.

### **III. Cognitive Moral Development**

#### **Theory and Development**

Moral development theory is a model of moral education based on a psychological theory of moral development. This theory, developed by Kohlberg and based on the earlier work in developmental psychology of Piaget, states that moral development takes place in a series of stages. The intention of the teaching interventions in this model is to promote the progress of students through these stages towards higher and more complete development. Development occurs because each intermediate stage of moral development, characterized by moral reasoning of an distinct

sort, is not adequate to fully deal with moral dilemmas. Only the highest stage consists of reasoning that can handle all the thinking to resolve any moral dilemma satisfactorily.

Students exposed to reasoning at a higher level than their own present level of development are thrown into cognitive conflict. They respond by attempting to incorporate these new forms of reasoning into their own. As a lower stage cannot incorporate the more complete reasoning of a higher stage, the students must respond by moving to the higher stage to deal with the conflict of ideas. By exposing students to moral reasoning at one stage higher than their immediate stage of development, development to the next stage is encouraged.

For the most part, in the original model, the sort of moral reasoning that students are exposed to is principled, logical, intellectual moral argument. The arguments are based on discussion of moral dilemmas presented by the teacher. Development occurs as long as the students are exposed to arguments characteristic of a higher stage of development whether these arguments are presented by the teacher or by other, more developed students in the discussion group.

A number of assumptions and definitions are necessary in order to understand the theory. First, Kohlberg has a rationalistic or formalistic view of morality. Morality is something that is necessarily thought out: it results from cognitive activity of a formal, thoughtful, rational kind which results in principles that inform behavior. Like Plato and Socrates, Kohlberg believes it is necessary to know good in order to act in a morally good way. There is, therefore, a connection between advanced moral reasoning and advanced conceptual reasoning. Because advanced moral

reasoning is a specific form of advanced abstract reasoning, advanced moral reasoning can only be achieved after the subject is capable of advanced abstract reasoning. Kohlberg (1975a) states that "advanced moral reasoning depends on advanced logical reasoning." No comment is made about how strategies to advance students' logical reasoning might be made a part of a strategy to raise levels of moral functioning. This theory is restated in several different places (Kohlberg, 1966, 1971). The essentially intellectual view of moral development is clear in Kohlberg's (1973) statement that the "developing human being and the moral philosopher are engaged in fundamentally the same moral task" (p. 633).

As a second assumption underlying the theory, Kohlberg believes it is possible to separate moral content from moral reasoning. The distinction is made between moral content and the structure of moral reasoning. Moral content is any particular moral action or judgment that relates to a specific situation. Moral reasoning is the form of the argument that provides support for moral content. This distinction is central to the theory, which states that moral stages are characterized by distinct forms of moral reasoning, not content, and also central to the practice of moral education by this model. Because of philosophical and legal objections to indoctrinating students with particular values, Kohlberg points out that his theory does not promote specific values (1971, 1975).

An example of this distinction in use is provided by way of an argument that cognitive-developmental approaches to moral development are not models for indoctrination. Kohlberg (1975a) states that no particular moral content is taught; rather, certain "moral structures" are regarded as more developed and better. Moral content is an individual's particular

moral choice in a situation while moral structure is the form of reasoning that an individual uses to support their particular choice. Kohlberg states that his model does not indoctrinate specific moral content, while at the same time it does support the idea that some forms of reasoning are more adequate than others (Kohlberg 1975).

A third assumption underlying the theory is that moral development, that is the development of moral reasoning, occurs necessarily through the interaction of an individual with others. The forms of moral argument seem to be part of the make-up of humanity, part of the "innate unfolding of the nervous system" (Kohlberg, 1971b, p.42), but this unfolding can only occur with opportunities to interact with other members of mankind. The right sort of interactive stimulation is necessary to ensure the child undertakes this moral restructuring of his or her experience that, as more and wider ranging moral questions are considered from different points of view, will eventually ensure complete development. Moral development is essentially a dialectical enterprise (Scharf, 1978).

With these assumptions clear, the theory of specific stages of moral development that constitute this unfolding of the nervous system can be understood.

### Cognitive Moral Developmental Stages

Stages of moral development have three characteristics. First, they are structured consistent wholes. That means that within a stage of moral development, the arguments are consistent and without internal contradiction and they share an identifiable logical structure. The reasons given for particular moral choice are of a type that is characteristic of that



stage of reasoning. Second, moral stages form an invariant sequence, that is, individuals pass through all stages in sequence progressively from first, lower stages, through to the higher stages of moral reasoning. Levels are not skipped, nor, except under conditions of extreme stress, does a person regress to a lower stage of reasoning. (Fenton, 1976; Kohlberg and Efenbein, 1975). Third, the stages are hierarchical, with the mode of reasoning of a higher stage containing and surpassing the mode of reasoning of all lower stages. There is a tendency to function at the highest level of development (Kohlberg, 1971b, 1975). This theory is explained in many places by various researchers (Kohlberg, 1980; Reimer, Paolitto, and Hersh, 1983; Scharf, 1978). Recent studies examine these three characteristics of stage theory controlling for other confounding factors (Walker, 1982; Walker, deVries, and Bichard, 1984).

Kohlberg sees his theory situated at a unique, overlapping intersection of philosophy and psychology, such a powerful position that it is able to surpass the limits of each. By looking to philosophy to define morality, Kohlberg, who believes that philosophy has defined morality as something like the search for universal principles of justice and reciprocity between people, is able to turn away from the conventional "learning model" of morality used by psychologists like Skinner, or the idea of the inculcation of social norms talked about by Freud and Durkheim, and so discover the "real morality" in forms of reasoning about justice. Having found that moral reasoning in fact developed in a certain way, moving from particular to increasing levels of generalization, Kohlberg is then able to turn back to philosophy and state what the end point of moral development was and what it ought to be. The theory of the universal progression of moral stages

both describes and defines what morality is and what it ought to be (Kohlberg, 1971a, 1973).

These very strong claims serve to justify moral development intervention in the schools, giving it a claim to be teaching the objective truth about moral development and the moral good for mankind at the same time.

Students at one stage of development have trouble understanding and accepting the form of reason of others at higher stages. The theory predicts that students will select as best the highest level of moral reasoning that they can understand, and various studies have shown this to be reasoning one stage higher than the students' present stage of development (Rest, Turiel, and Kohlberg, 1968; Turiel, 1966). At one stage above present development the students understand enough of the reasoning to recognize its superiority. Rather than positing a pre-existent internal order of reasoning awaiting recognition, the theory supposed that a self-constructive process or organism-environment interaction produces these effects.

The six stages of moral development that Kohlberg has described are divided into three levels which mirror Piaget's levels of cognitive development. Each level contains two stages. Starting from a study of ten to fourteen year old boys, may have led Kohlberg to miss some of the first aspects of moral development. Other researchers, most notably Damon (1975) and Selman (1975) have further divided stage one into pre-stage one steps in younger children. These pre-stage one steps occur as children develop the ability to distinguish other people from themselves. Other pre-stage one levels occur as children start to put themselves into the shoes of

these newly distinguished people and learn that they have their own feelings and thoughts. Finally, children start to imagine what others might feel in different situations. This role-taking ability may be central to moral development at all stages (Kohlberg, *passim*).

Tables 5 to 7 show Kohlberg's stages and levels, and have been developed from the presentations of this theory found in works already cited.

### Moral Reasoning and Action

The development of moral reasonings is not sufficient on its own to determine the sort of actions that individuals might take (Fenton, 1976). Moral reasoning is only one determinant of moral action, a necessary but not sufficient determinant. Other factors that influence moral behavior are social and emotional factors, and ego strength or strength of will. However, Kohlberg maintains that without moral reasoning, actions cannot properly be regarded as moral. Moral actions are those that follow moral principles and these principles must be understood and articulated (or be potentially articulable) by the moral agent. "One cannot follow moral principles if one does not understand (or believe in) moral principles (Kohlberg 1975, p.181). Presumably understanding or belief can only be shown by principled moral reasoning.

# Kohlberg's Definition of Moral Stages

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## I. Preconventional Level

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At this level, the child is aware of the rules by which people act and the labeling of actions as good or bad, right or wrong. These features of morality are interpreted in a very concrete or instrumental way, either in terms of the power of those placing the labels to punish, or the likelihood of good actions to have some sort of pleasurable payoff in exchange.

### **Stage 1: Punishment and Obedience Orientation:**

At this stage the goodness or badness of an action is determined solely according to the physical consequences of the action. Physical power and the ability to punish are valued because these together determine what is right. There is no awareness of an underlying order that is supported by power and punishment, only of the power itself.

### **Stage 2: Instrumental Relativist Orientation:**

Right actions are those that satisfy the needs of the person making the action and occasionally someone else. Fairness and equality are interpreted in terms of an "if you scratch my back, I'll scratch yours" sort of bargaining, but they are present. Justice is a matter of these concrete notions of balance, not principles of loyalty, gratitude, or fairness.

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Table 5

# Kohlberg's Definition of Moral Stages

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## II. Conventional Level

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At this level, the first notions of some actions being good in their own right, apart from their immediate, personal consequences begins to be understood. Actions which are loyal to the group which is given allegiance, the group setting the standards—the family, friends, or nation—and which maintain and support that group and its order of right and wrong are seen as inherently valuable.

**Stage 3: Interpersonal Concordance Orientation ("Good boy, nice girl"):**

Moral behavior is seen as that which helps, pleases, or is approved by others who set the standards. There is much conformity to what is seen as the "obvious" or "natural" way to behave among the select group, which at this stage is often the family or a peer group. What a person intended to do becomes important, as in "he didn't mean to hurt anyone."

**Stage 4: "Law and order" Orientation:**

The group that sets moral standards is generalized to the level of the law setting powers of society, the authorities who have set up the fixed rules that are in place to maintain social order. Doing right consists in doing one's duty, showing respect for authority, and maintaining social order for its own sake.

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**Table 6**

# Kohlberg's Definition of Moral Stages

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## III. Postconventional or Principled Level:

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At this level there is a clear effort to define the idea of the good, or morally right actions, in terms of principles that have value apart from power or the authority of a group or of feelings of loyalty to a group or society. That is moral principles that are justified in their own right are sought.

### **Stage 5: Social-contract Orientation:**

Values and ideas of morality are seen for the first time as matters of individual choice and opinion, and the reconciliation of these individually relative values through fair means of reaching consensus marks a just society. The social good is determined by carefully devised and maintained procedures that result in laws to which most agree and from which the maximum benefit to the individuals in society can be derived. These laws are not supported absolutely but might be changed if an order bringing more benefit can be devised.

### **Stage 6: Universal Ethical Principle Orientation:**

Right actions are determined by the actions of individual conscience working rationally through ethical principles that appeal to logical comprehensiveness, that are universalizable and consistent. These principles are abstract principles to guide action, not specific rules, such as the Ten Commandments, that prohibit or promote certain actions absolutely. At their centre, these principles are concerned with the ideals of justice, reciprocity and equality of human rights, and the respect of human beings as valuable individuals.

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Table 7

There are still connections and correlations between stages of moral reasoning and behavior. In one study (Haan, Brewster-Smith, Block, 1969), researchers examined the relationship between college students' and administrators' stages of moral reasoning and their arguments about a protest at administration buildings in support of freedom of speech. Administrators at Stage Five of moral reasoning argued that students had accepted a social contract on coming to the school and that they were breaking this contract by protesting. Stage six students protested in support of the general principle of freedom. For the most part, Stage Four students, those in the law and order stage, did not join the protest. Principled Stage Six students were found to be more likely to protest, show discrepant behavior from their parents, be more active politically, and have more parental conflict. Kohlberg quotes these results as illustration and support for his theory and to point out that higher stages may not always be seen as better by people in general (Kohlberg, 1971).

Other studies have also found the moral stage predicts to some extent moral behavior. Bear and Richards (1981) found support for their hypothesis that lower, pre-conventional levels predict more behavior problems in the classroom and more variable behaviours. However only ten percent of the variation in behaviours was explained by level of moral reasoning with many other variables accounting for the rest of the spread. Results are therefore mixed as to the effect of moral development interventions on behavior, but Masterson (1980) makes this tentative conclusion: "If development in the way the student thinks and feels is promoted by education, qualitatively different and more mature behavior seemingly will follow." Educators, looking at this seemingly tautological

statement, would be hard put to deny it, stating as it does one assumption underlying all educational practice, but it was made as support for Kohlberg's program in the schools specifically.

### Encouraging Moral Development

There are three important conditions that enable students' moral reasoning to mature fully and freely:

1. Exposure to the next higher stage of moral reasoning. It is important that students are exposed to only the next higher stage because arguments two stages higher are generally not understood (Rest, Turiel, Kohlberg, 1968; Turiel, 1966).
2. Exposure to situations posing problems and contradictions for the current moral structure. It is this condition that moral dilemmas are intended to fulfil.
3. An atmosphere of interchange and dialogue where the first two conditions are allowed to function.

These three conditions were supplied in the classroom by a structure designed and tested by Blatte (Blatte and Kohlberg, 1975). Moral dilemmas were presented to a class for discussion. One often noted example of these dilemmas is that of a man whose wife is dying for need of a drug produced by a pharmacist. The pharmacist is selling the drug for ten times its cost of production and the man cannot afford to pay this amount. The pharmacist refuses to lower his price, so the man must decide whether he should steal the drug to save his wife's life. Students are asked to argue for what they believe the man should do. The teacher "supports and clarifies" (Kohlberg, 1975a) the arguments at one stage above the stage of the lowest level of



moral reasoning of students in the group. When there is general understanding of arguments at that stage, with the next dilemma, the teacher repeats the process, this time supporting and clarifying arguments at the next higher stage. This process was effective in raising the stages of moral reasoning of the students exposed to it (Blatte and Kohlberg, 1975).

However, several later researchers could not replicate this change in moral stage when they attempted to replicate Blatte's method in their studies (See the section Criticisms below). Mean stage changes were often of the order of one third stage rather than Blatte's one stage change. Reimer, Paolitto, and Hersh (1983) in their recent presentation of this model, incorporating recent findings, suggest that lack of moral development may be a characteristic of a period just prior to stage change, that the students are measured in the midst of cognitive conflict while in transition from one stage to another. The alternative explanation, that some undiscovered variable in Blatte's implementation of the theory actually effected the moral development in his study, is now being considered in more recent research. Rest (1974) suggests that the role of the teacher as group facilitator and discussion leader needs to be further specified and studied. Further work has also been done looking at leaderless peer interaction, which has also shown an ability to promote moral development (Damon and Killen, 1982).

Replications have been done, with even shorter intervention time, that showed some of the so called "Blatte Effect". One done by Hayden and Picker (1981) was in particular marked by the teachers insisting that all subjects understand and appear, at least, to accept plus one reasoning—that is moral reasoning at one higher stage than their own. Such discussion, which must have been very teacher directed, showed moral development

occurred. Students answered with the modes of reasoning clearly preferred by their teacher when retested. With this sort of intervention, it can not be clear how much of the effect was due to moral development of a personal and lasting nature, and how much was due to the researchers obvious "teaching to the test." This enforcement of higher level reasoning is not what is intended by most moral development interventions. The following section discusses openness and acceptance in discussion generally, and looks at more generally accepted programmes, such as that by Allen (1975), where stage levels guide application but do not enforce specific modes of reasoning.

#### Developmental Moral Discussions

Much further work has been done in an attempt to identify and develop the aspect of the Moral Development intervention, as pioneered by Blatte, that proved effective in promoting moral stage change.

The process that students go through in moral discussion was stated by Galbraith and Jones (1975) as a four part process. First the student must confront a moral dilemma, and, second, he or she must state a position with regard to that dilemma consisting of content, an action or specific response stating what should be done, and reasons to support that action or response. This reasoning must then be tested in discussion and the student, in reflecting on the results of the test and the other arguments and positions taken on the dilemma, is challenged to expand his or her moral reasoning to encompass and comprehend other reasons and ways of thinking.

As a consequence of this idea of process, the teacher's role becomes less that of someone supplying additional arguments, and more of a facilitator of discussion: "However, the teacher should not present additional reasoning as 'the best reason' or as 'the answer' to a moral dilemma (p.22)." Beyer (1976) says that the teacher should work to promote student interaction and to keep the discussion focused on the moral issues by making sure the facts are clear or do not interfere. Probing questions, which do not threaten the students, can be asked. The need for plus one discussion, still emphasized by Hersh and Mutterer (1975) is reduced.

Specifically the teacher is responsible for focusing the discussion on the moral aspects of the dilemma, and encouraging discussion and interaction among students. This is done by listening, specifying that there is not a correct answer to the dilemma and that differing forms of reasoning are valuable, "clarifying" student answers and responses and asking for or providing a summary of the discussion to encourage reflection.

Mixed results led other researchers to further attempt to refine and identify the variables responsible for promoting moral development. As a result of their study, Sullivan and Beck (1975) again placed more emphasis on the human qualities of the teacher, suggesting that more "human" teachers would be needed to effectively promote development, meaning teachers ready to admit to their own difficulties at resolving moral dilemmas. Teachers, they suggested, should be at a highly developed moral level themselves, and they should respect and show respect for the students attempts at moral reasoning. In addition, a school structured in a non-authoritarian way, by also modeling respect of student choices, would best

promote moral development—an idea that becomes the just community approach discussed further below,

Mosher and Sullivan (1976) further developed the idea of a specific sort of “human” interaction promoting moral development and suggested that students should be taught counselling skills to reduce a tendency to superficial judgment and to increase the ability to role-take or to put themselves in another’s frame of reference. To meet these goals, they taught their students interaction skills using the Rogers/Carkhuff model. Discussion of moral dilemmas alone was not effective in their view.

The importance of the development of empathy and other complex social competencies is echoed by Hersh and Paolitto (1976) with this additional statement: “The ability of the teacher to take the perspective of each student is a vital ‘skill’” (p.26). So not only is student empathy regarded as important but also teacher empathy in the sense that a good teacher of moral development is able to take on the perspective of each student. Rest (1974) had suggested that one benefit of knowing the stages of development was that teachers could more easily understand and summarize student discussion at a level that would be understood—a procedure that could approximate empathic responding.

Further research by a team including Kohlberg found that exposure to arguments at a level one stage above the mean stage level was not sufficient to promote development. Analyzing the classrooms and teaching behaviours in two schools using the moral development model, Colby and others (Colby, Kohlberg, Fenton, Speicher-Dubin, and Leiberman, 1977) found that several other variables were associated with significant moral development. These variables were:

1. Variety of stage levels in the classroom—greater variety of student moral development stages was associated with greater success in raising moral reasoning during the intervention.
2. Length of intervention—more sessions, more development.
3. Teacher skills in eliciting discussion—these were defined as the ability to use “Socratic probes” to elicit reasoning from the students.

In their 1983 work, endorsed by Kohlberg in the Introduction, Reimer, Paolitto, and Hersh, present their state of the art version of the moral development teaching model . This model summarizes and integrates these earlier findings for teacher training and use in the classroom.

The teacher’s role in this elaborated version of the model is twofold: to create cognitive conflict in the students, and to stimulate their perspective taking. Students must be confronted with moral situations that their present stage of development has difficulty handling. Their stage consistent reasoning must be confronted with reasoning that challenges the sufficiency of their own thought. In this conflict they must be encouraged to put themselves in other people’s shoes, that is to look at these situations with the eyes of others. This role playing or look from another person's perspective is called role taking. Together, these two factors encourage the student to develop reasoning less characteristic of early stages (the egocentric reasoning of Stages One and Two) and more incorporating the views of other individuals or of a generalized group or society (Stages Three and Four).

In order to effectively create these conditions, the teacher requires certain skills and areas of knowledge. First, the teacher requires a

knowledge of the theory and background of moral development in order to recognize and tailor instruction to suit the moral stages of students. Second, the teacher must be able to listen to and identify the moral stage in practice: "The ability of the teacher to take the perspective of each student is a vital skill." (Reimer, Paolitto, and Hersh, 1983, p.148) Through application of two modes of questioning, the teacher focuses student attention on the moral dimensions of the situation being considered, encourages student to student interaction, and challenges student thinking. These two modes of questioning are appropriate at different stages of the discussion: when the discussion is started, the teacher begins to highlight arguments at the next higher stage of development than is common in the group. He or she may also start to clarify and summarize the discussion as it proceeds. Then at a later time in the discussion the teacher will stimulate perspective taking and reflection by asking probing questions.

That the discussion takes place at all, requires careful training in listening and speaking for all students in the group—they have to know how to discuss—and for the discussion to be of such a nature as to allow the students freedom to doubt and change their thinking, a climate of trust and acceptance must be developed in the class. The development of this climate depends somewhat on the arrangement of the class, the desks must be arranged so as to encourage discussion, but also on several teaching behaviours.

The teacher must model acceptance of the students and their values. This modeling results from teachers not giving clues that suggest that students are wrong or bad for thinking as they do and by close, active listening to students talking. The description of the listening and

communication skills required to create this sort of atmosphere resembles closely the facilitative factors of client-centred therapy:

An accepting classroom atmosphere in which trust, empathy, respect, and fairness are intentionally fostered is necessary if development is to occur because students need to feel they can take risks, listen to others, and be listened to in turn. (Reimer, Paolitto, and Hersh, 1983, p.178)

A distinct overlap in the effective conditions of implementing both Values Clarification and Moral Development Models is readily apparent here.

### Sources of Moral Development

The sources of moral growth are described by Kohlberg (1975a) as the following:

In the cognitive developmental view, morality is a natural product of a universal human tendency toward empathy or role-taking, towards putting oneself in the shoes of other conscious beings. It is also a product of a universal human concern for justice, for reciprocity, or equality in the relation of one person to another. (p.189)

This quotation is an elaboration of the interactionist idea of the innate unfolding of the nervous system. Given the proper sort of opportunities for social interaction, individuals of any culture will develop as predicted by this theory. The empirical basis for this claim is presented in summary in Kohlberg (1971).

Because Kohlberg believes he has discovered both what morality is in all cultures, as well as what it ought to be, he affirms that his theory conclusively refutes the arguments of social scientists and others who hold that moral principles are relative to cultures or individuals and not

absolute. The theory is also explicit in maintaining that higher stages of development are also better stages of development, meaning *morally* better. A student at a lower stage of development may be perfectly well emotionally adjusted, but holds moral beliefs that are not as good as another student's beliefs who is at a higher level. The claim made that higher moral stages are better or more morally acceptable stages is justified by reference to certain theories of moral philosophy, to a tradition of moral philosophy that Kohlberg identifies as beginning with Kant and leading to Rawls (Kohlberg, 1971, 1975). This tradition is naturally enough concerned with the universality of certain principles of justice.

This claim is supported by arguments that higher moral stages permit reasoning that allows proper consideration of moral dilemmas in ways that lower stages do not. For example, at stage three, moral choices are supported by reference to how a specific, often identifiable, group of people will respond to a choice: "My friends would think I'm a fink if I told." At stage four, the reference is widened to include a generalized notion of society's response to a certain choice: "That's against the law because our society knows it's wrong to steal." Reference to society as a whole to support moral choices is morally more adequate than referring to one's friends in Kohlberg's view. And referring to universally generalizable principles of justice is the ultimately "adequate" moral position.

### The Just Community Approach

Some consideration has been given to how effects outside of the classroom may affect moral development. Specifically, Kohlberg (1970) suggested that the moral atmosphere of the school may play an important



role in determining how the students in that school develop. Mosher and Sullivan (1976) have also suggested that the justice structure of the school will have an effect on the moral development of its students, and Fenton (1975) credits the structure of the school as affecting attempts at civic education adversely. Kohlberg describes this moral atmosphere or justice structure in terms of aspects of the hidden curriculum as follows.

One main sociological function that schooling has is to accustom children to looking at living in a larger social context, larger than themselves and larger than the family. Two important aspects of this larger social context are living as a member of a group of same age and same status peers and living with an impersonal power or authority that could be called the state. How the school deals with these issues determines the moral climate of the school. The crowds, the praise and the power, define this unavoidable aspect of schooling (Kohlberg, 1971).

Kohlberg refers to two schools of thought on the hidden curriculum: one the school of Durkheim and Dreeben, where the school works to habituate in a concrete, nonrational way the student to a new position as a member of a group; and another school championed by Piaget, Dewey and Kohlberg where the acceptance of authority is understood in terms of learning, understanding and accepting reasons for the purpose of authority in society. Kohlberg's position, reflected by others (Sullivan and Beck, 1975), is "The teaching of justice requires just schools" (Kohlberg, 1970, p. 213). What a just school is, has been stated in very broad terms, but has also been operationalized in several schools as a form of participatory democracy. The developments and difficulties of these democratically structured schools constitute a major part of the later development of this theory.

Kohlberg himself has written of an apparent collapsing of moral development in the time he has been studying it (Kohlberg, 1980). Longitudinal studies have failed to produce adults functioning at stage six, and stage six individuals seem to have become rarer—if they ever actually existed. Over the years, Kohlberg has come to see the work of civic education as promoting development not to stage six, but ensuring a solid bulk of development to stage four where the death of society by “privatism” might be avoided. This development can best be achieved, in this later view of Kohlberg’s, by giving those who might not otherwise have them opportunities to participate in democratically running their school. Kohlberg believes that low stage reasoners who do not get an experience of democratic power and participation in school will never meet this interactionist requirement of development.

These later developments of the Kohlberg model include a different appreciation of the individual's relationship to the group as it affects his or her moral development (Kohlberg, 1980). Perhaps stemming from his experience of life and education on an Israeli kibbutz, Kohlberg has changed from his focus on individual development to a greater concern with the passing on of specific, group determined norms of behavior. Reimer, Paolitto, and Hersh (1983) and Power (1981) describe these changes and their genesis. This approach is known as the Just Community approach and reflects Kohlberg’s new idea of the necessity at some point of the group’s controlling and being supreme over individual desires.

The kibbutz presented an acceptable compromise between a more purely developmental approach and the supremacy of the collectivity that Kohlberg had described as a powerful, but unacceptable form of training.

The difficulties of operating a participatory democracy, a stage five system, with stage two and three participants, have been many (Mosher, 1980; Wasserman, 1976) but to some thinkers these difficulties are an essential challenge that must be met (Scharf, 1976). Power (1981) and Reimer (1981), in separate articles, describe opportunities for discussing and acting on real issues current in school life during democratic school meetings as correcting a lack in the original model with its hypothetical dilemmas. These opportunities for action allow students to develop competence and moral performance skills.

Reviewing the work done in the model, particularly the work done in the Just Community Approach, Higgins (1980) wrote:

... the most powerful interventions for stimulating moral stage change are those that involve discussion of real problems and situations occurring in natural groups, whether the family or the classroom, in which all participants are empowered to a say in the discussion. (P. 96)

Of particular note, she also suggests that the teaching of listening skills may facilitate moral learning, just as it is valuable to incorporate deliberate psychological education. The probable conditions for optimal moral development include a climate of trust and openness in discussion, use of active listening, and such other conditions that enable personal growth—a prerequisite for moral growth.

These changes in the system represent a change from the moral and political model of Socrates to that of Plato's Republic. Teachers become a force of guardians overseeing the development of a mass of students to an acceptable level of law abidingness. From the mass, a few may be chosen for

further development to again oversee the maintenance of the group. The goal is a Neo-Platonic kibbutz. (Kohlberg, 1980).

Though still presented as primarily a rational, or thinking, approach to moral development where individuals choose freely their values, several key developments must be noted. First, the conventional stage of moral development is recognized as an acceptable goal of a moral development programme. Conformity to society's rules becomes more sought after than the awareness that such rules are one set of many rules that might be chosen and that there may be universal moral principles that deserve greater allegiance. Second, the moral teacher becomes more concerned with imparting the norms of the group as content, as opposed to developing student formal reasoning without a concern for specific content. Third, the affective and cognitive domains are less strictly separated, that is, the students' will to behave according to social norms is as important as the students' form of reasoning. And finally, the clear distinction that Kohlberg earlier made between unacceptable indoctrination and strict concentration on individual development is no longer so clear. Concerned with conformity to certain social strictures, the teacher of moral development must aim to develop a "thinking" conformity by pushing for conformity while allowing in some way for the primacy of individual choice.

### Criticisms

Criticisms of the Moral Development Model have been directed at both the theory supporting it and at the specific effective teaching behaviours that make up its implementation. Different aspects of the supporting research have been challenged, and the changing nature of the model,

particularly the apparently contradictory developments concerning the Just Community Approach have also resulted in confusion.

Theory. Peters (1971, 1975) has focused criticisms on several areas of the theory. First, he has pointed out that the philosophical models of morality that Kohlberg uses to structure his theory, aspects of Kant's idea of universalizability or Rawls conception of fairness and justice, are not the only models of morality that exist. Other models, Peters refers to D.H.Lawrence's ideas and the various theories of the Utilitarians, are also models of morality and quite different than the models referred to for justification and explanation by Kohlberg. Fraenkel (1976) also mentions this objection. Not recognizing other ideas of morality has meant that Kohlberg has concentrated solely on one idea and has generalized his findings about it to cover morality in general—a procedure which is empirically invalid and conceptually restrictive. One result is that many moral phenomena, feelings of guilt or remorse when faced with difficult decisions, or the effects of repression and sublimation as described by Freud, are not explicable within a system that recognizes only principles as its domain.

Second, Peters points out that Kohlberg focuses entirely on a rational morality and so ignores the important affective side of morality, such as feelings of duty and guilt. Peters believes that such moral feelings also require consideration in a model of education. This concern is also developed by Falikowski (1982) who claims that a rationalistic morality fails to consider the important moralities derived from tradition or religion and cannot deal with the idea of intrapersonal conflict, perhaps because such a conflict is at least partially not a conflict of principle but one of affect.

Finally, Peters believes that Kohlberg does not take the conventional level of morality "seriously," especially in light of findings that most people do not develop past this level. As a consequence, and as a matter for additional concern, Kohlberg does not include sufficient "habit training" for the majority that will not develop beyond a reliance on "good boy/bad boy" morality. This is also a concern of traditional moral educators such as Wynne (1986). The later change to the Just Community Approach which sets its goal as development to Stage four, the "Law and Order" stage, may lessen the weight of these criticisms, though even this approach contains nothing like direct behavioral habit training. And as Lockwood (1982) points out the Just Community Approach places the theory in a curious position of "flux", not to say contradiction, when its legitimacy as an educational intervention has been justified by appeal to the sufficiency of stage six reasoning and its new goal is development to only stage four.

Also, an examination of the empirical support for the moral adequacy of the higher stages has lead Siegel (1981) to conclude that moral development intervention cannot be supported by this criterion alone.

Quite a different criticism is leveled by Carlin (1981). Though Kohlberg states that his model is compatible with Dewey's philosophy of valuing and education, Carlin believes that it is in fact incompatible in several ways. Where Dewey describes growth and development in an open ended way, Kohlberg has described an end and highest stage of growth. Where Kohlberg has described development as learning one's duty, Dewey described it as learning to be happy and satisfied that a thing "will do" in the way it connects the learners life to others and society. And where Kohlberg describes a series of stages that may be somehow inherent or available a

priori (Kohlberg may be Platonic in his thinking here), Dewey was profoundly empiricist, relying thoroughly on the primacy of experience and its ability to write differently on each blank human chalkboard.

These philosophical objections echo in some ways the empirical objections raised against the theory. Fraenkel (1976) has pointed to weaknesses in the empirical foundation of moral stage theory, suggesting that it is not as culturally independent as Kohlberg holds. Bouhmama (1984) raises this same objection. Additionally, Fraenkel points out that so few stage six moral subjects have been found (Jesus, Martin Luther King, Jr., Kohlberg, and one other—a graduate student of Kohlberg's) that there is hardly an empirical basis for holding this stage to exist as a general end to development. He also raises concerns about the effectiveness of the model in practice.

A range of concerns have been expressed about the means of measurement used to assess the moral stage of the subjects studied. Kurtines and Grief (1974) expressed early concerns, echoed by later writers (Rest, 1975; Lockwood, 1978a), about Kohlberg's interview based test, the Moral Maturity Scale. This test has undergone various reformulations over the years, but has been criticized as not being a valid measure of moral development, not having standard administration or scoring schemes set out, as being sexist, showing too little interform reliability, and using dilemmas on the same form that are not independent. As the results of moral development interventions are usually measured only with this instrument, weakness in it casts doubt on many of the results of this model.

Criticisms such as these, considered in the light of sophisticated and controversial methodological criteria, have lead Phillips and Nicolayev

(1978) to conclude that Kohlberg's model of moral development remains current only as a degenerating research program protecting itself from empirical findings that provide it insufficient support. This conclusion has been itself critiqued by Kohlberg supporters (Lapsley and Serlin, 1984).

Practice. Some studies have suggested that the power to promote students' development through the stages of moral reasoning is at least partially outside of the effects of being exposed to higher levels of moral reasoning Rest (1974) provides an early example. Sullivan and Beck (1975) in studies conducted in Ontario found mixed results to a curriculum of plus one moral discussions with no significant moral development occurring in one trial and with significant growth occurring in another only one year after the original intervention. They made several proposals to explain these outcomes. One referred to the non-authoritarian structure of the school where growth occurred after the intervention, and the others referred to important teacher variables.

The teacher behaviors to promote development mentioned were:

- teachers should admit to humanness and mistakes
- teachers should exhibit respect for their students as persons
- teachers should themselves be at a high level of moral development.

The development that occurred in the group in the more democratically structured school has lead these researchers to focus more on the Just Community approach in later work. The first two teacher behaviours above seem likely to be similar to teachers expressing genuineness and respect in their interactions with students.



The practicality of having teachers reply to student arguments at a level one higher than the students' own (the plus-one convention) has also received criticism (Fraenkel, 1976; Wonderly and Kupfersmid, 1980). Some question whether it is practically possible for a teacher to evaluate student statements for stage level and then formulate a response at an appropriately higher level in the classroom. The procedure would require more time than is available in discussion and with a distribution of stage level to be expected in a normal class, each response would not be theoretically appropriate for all the students.

The efficacy of responding at a stage one higher than the student has itself been critically examined. M.W. Berkowitz (1981a) has reviewed the studies supporting the plus-one convention and concluded that they provide little support to that teaching method. He reported that even the researchers who completed the early studies (Rest, 1974; Turiel, 1966) have become very critical of them. The important Blatte study (Blatte and Kohlberg, 1975) is also problematical; in a personal communication to Berkowitz, Kohlberg suggested that careful analysis of the transcripts might be necessary to reveal what Blatte actually did to help promote student development.

Berkowitz began undertaking a careful analysis of moral discussions, looking at effective discussions between pairs of college students and examining the transcripts of those pairs that exhibited significant moral development. He found that the discussions of these effective pairs consistently exhibited the characteristics of what he termed "transactional discussion." Transactional discussion is characterized as dialectic, where the participants directly confront the antithetical reasoning of the other in an ongoing attempt to actively engage it. Dialectical does not necessarily

mean confrontational, however. Working either in agreement or disagreement, effective pairs overtly demonstrate their engagement through paraphrase and reflection of each other's moral choices and justifications. They actively work to keep discussion going, to represent their understanding of the other person's position, and to elicit further elaboration and explanation. Berkowitz concludes that students should be taught the skills of transactional discussion to maximize the benefit of moral discussion in terms of their own moral development.

Berkowitz concludes his examinations of the plus-one convention critically (1981a, 1981b) stating: "Teachers are there as models and facilitators rather than simply as producers of moral reasoning (1981b, P.489)". This conclusion is based on his own observations (Berkowitz, Gibbs, Broughton, 1980) that in peer dyad discussions a difference of approximately one third stage best promotes moral development, and also on studies finding moral development occurring as a result of peer discussion in a heterogenous group. He recommends that moral growth might be best promoted by ensuring heterogenous student grouping, training students in speaking and listening skills, and by having teachers concentrate primarily on facilitating student interaction.

Accepting Kohlberg's premise that moral discussion is exclusively an intellectual pursuit, Berkowitz and his team, did not look at how expressed or implied emotions are handled in effective moral discussion.

Interestingly, Blatte himself reported (Blatte and Kohlberg, 1975) that one of his main concerns during his study was "to establish an atmosphere in which there was protection of freedom of expression and in which understanding of alternate views was encouraged" (p.133). This aim is

strikingly similar to Berkowitz's (and others) general recommendation to facilitate peer interaction.

### Curricular Effectiveness

In two studies introduced above looking at values clarification's curricular effectiveness, Lockwood (1978a) and Leming (1981) also reviewed the literature supporting the moral development model, the plus-one moral discussion model specifically, and using the same selection techniques, drew conclusions about that model's effectiveness. Their conclusions are briefly summarized here.

Recognizing that the Moral Maturity Score used to determine moral development is not beyond reproach, Lockwood determined that there is sufficient evidence to conclude that direct moral discussion generally works to promote moral development. Studies where development did not occur could have their negative results attributed to inadequate testing. However, Lockwood points out that increases generally occur in the raising of stage two to stage three, as opposed to higher stage changes, and that not all subjects change. Many research problems plagued studies of the deliberate psychological education model, but Lockwood noted tentative support for its effectiveness.

Leming also noted support for the Direct Discussion Model. Teachers using it could expect changes on the order of one seventh to two thirds of a stage for an intervention ranging from 12-32 weeks long. However, the effect is pronounced only from Grade Four up and again 30 to 50 percent of the students do not show any development. Why this model works with some and only some older students remains in need of explanation.

One additional study (Enright, Lapsley, Harris, and Shawver, 1983) looked at the effectiveness of the moral development interventions in early adolescence with results similar to the two above studies. The plus-one intervention received some support, though perhaps it produced no real structural change; flawed studies support deliberate psychological intervention, and the just community model suffers from unclear results. As summative comments the authors say that it is unclear to some parents that stage five principled disobedience from their children is a sign of development when that stage is compared to law and order stage three obedience. They also suggest that the cognitive focus of this model generally is blinding to the affective or additudinal side of morality.

### Implications for this Study

Moral development theory has focussed throughout on the importance of the moral discussion as the key aspect of promoting moral growth. Characterizing accurately just what good moral discussion is has proved to be difficult.

The plus-one convention of the original model has been modified and challenged. The trend overall has been to design discussion to be between people responding at nearly the same level. This strongly suggests that facilitative responses may be more effective at promoting moral growth than challenging responses at a higher level. To examine the level of confrontation between teacher and students in moral discussion this study uses Carkhuff's scale to determine to what degree teacher questions or responses are confrontative.

A concern with the climate or atmosphere of a moral education classroom is made more explicit in this model, even generalizing to the school climate in the Just Community Approach. Several studies trained their students in unspecified counselling skills as part of their moral development intervention. The teacher's use of counselling skills to facilitate a trusting and open climate, though mentioned and hypothesized as important, were never measured. This study examines the interactive level of several of the published transcripts as a beginning to such an exploration.

## CHAPTER THREE

### Research Design

#### Overview

This study looked at a sample of teacher student interactions found in the literature of two schools of moral education. The method of collection of these interactions and the sampling procedures are described in the first section of this chapter.

These interactions were coded for their level of facilitative interaction using standard coding scales modified for use with moral discussion transcriptions. These scales, the training of coders, and the procedure of coding and data collection are described in the next section of this chapter.

The purpose of collecting this information was to measure the facilitative level of teacher response to student statements during discussion, compare the relative levels of facilitative interaction in the four sources of data, and finally to compare the level of interaction in the two models being investigated.

### Collection of Verbal Interactions

#### Data Population

All interactions used in this study were taken from published samples and transcripts. The sources of these interactions were presented in tabular form in chapter one. Published transcripts and examples of teacher student interactions were found in the literature on moral development theory and values clarification. In these sources, in some cases, transcripts of actual

discussions were published in their entirety and in others excerpts of transcripts or specific interactions used as examples were included in the works found. These transcripts and examples made up the population from which sample interactions were taken. No interaction samples were collected from individuals implementing either model as the intention of this study was to examine the models as presented.

### Selection Procedures

To reduce the number of interactions taken from each source, every third suitable interaction was selected. As the interactions in a source were encountered the first interaction meeting criteria of suitability for coding was recorded. The next two interactions were skipped over before recording the next sample for coding. Samples were taken from the data population in this manner to reduce the amount of coding that would be required, to select interactions appropriate for coding, and to ensure that interactions randomly spaced through a session or source would be coded. As some of the interactions were selected from extended transcripts and other were selected from groups of shorter examples selected to illustrate a particular point in the original publication, selecting randomly in this manner would also have served to guarantee selection from different points in a discussion. The collection of interactions from throughout a session is also discussed in the section on stratification below.

Suitable interactions were those that met certain criteria for coding and appropriateness to a study of moral interactions. The criteria used are discussed below.

1. Suitability for coding. The excerpt selected had to contain a student statement, teacher response, and student comment. This form of interaction is necessary for proper coding. When coding the teacher response, two sorts of information must be available to the coder. First, the coder must have the original student statement and the teacher's response to determine if the meanings are interchangeable, that is that each has the same cognitive and affective content. Interchangeability is the first characteristic of a facilitative response (Aspy, 1975). Second, the student's comment in response to the teacher must be available to determine whether the student has accepted the teacher's response and is using it to further develop his or her thinking. This functional quality of a facilitative response can only be determined by the student's comment resulting from a teacher's response (Aspy, 1975).

To be suitable for coding, then, a sample interaction must be of the form "student statement, teacher response, student comment."

2. Part of Moral or Values Discussion. In cases where transcripts were published verbatim or apparently verbatim, it was necessary to select samples where the content was overtly concerned with moral or values issues. There were cases where mechanically selecting the third response of a discussion would have selected a teacher response that focussed on other concerns, for example, classroom management. Where this occurred, the interaction immediately following that was back on overtly moral or value concerns was selected.

This form of selection was used to isolate the forms of teacher response used in moral discussion from those responses used in other situations as the focus of this study is on specific models of moral discussion. However, it



must be noted that there is a strong possibility that students' moral development is affected by the way they are responded to at all times in the classroom and throughout their lives. Classroom and school management styles may also significantly affect students' moral development (Smith and Brett, 1980).

### Stratification

Carkhuff (1969) has stated that to gain an accurate indication of the level of facilitative response a patient in therapy has received it is necessary to stratify the selection procedures to ensure that responses are selected from beginning, middle and later sessions of therapy. Because of the sometimes fragmentary nature of the data available, this condition could not be met in this study. Where extended transcripts were available, the selection of every third suitable response ensured that teacher responses were taken from the beginning, middle and end of each transcript. Where briefer examples only were available, it was felt that using the same sampling procedure would also result in a fair selection of interactions from that data. Where briefer examples of interactions were available, it is possible that the authors presenting them would have done extensive selection of these example for their presentation. By selecting only every third interaction, the preselection biases of the authors of the material may well have be ameliorated or diluted so that the resulting sample is a more general representation of the model as a whole.

## Preparation for Coding

In arranging the samples for coding, two sources of coder bias were controlled. First, to control for any halo effect that coders might be inclined to give to samples from a favourite model, the sources of sample interactions were concealed. By assigning coded numbers to interactions, and randomly mixing the interactions from different sources, the coders would not know which source the interaction they were coding came from by label or by position in the list to be coded. In this way, the "halo" that values clarification interactions might have in the coders' minds, their tendency to distort a response and assign it an inappropriately high level, would be controlled.

Second, coders of interactive responding can also be influenced in their ratings by the momentum of the session. Where teachers' responses are seen proceeding one after another, coders can develop an overall sense of the teachers' style and fit their ratings to their overall impression. The result is another kind of halo developing that may distort the rating of individual responses, this time on the basis of a bias towards a particular teacher instead of a model. The rating of individual responses may be coloured by the coders' understanding of that response's place in the session. To control for coders developing this sense of momentum, as these responses were not taken consecutively from single sessions, the order of the responses was randomized and the coders informed of the random assignment in the series to be coded. Training emphasized that each interaction was independent of the others. The specific randomizing procedures used are described below.

Identifying Numbers. Each model was given an identifying two digit number, randomly selected from a random number table. Each source of sample interactions was given a similar randomly selected two digit number. Then as each interaction was selected and recorded from its source, it also was given a randomly selected, identifying two digit number. When these three, two digit numbers were combined the resulting six digit code identified a specific interaction taken from a specific source belonging to one of the two models under study. People coding the interactions were not given a key to these number codes and so did not know the origin of the interactions they were coding.

Randomization. Any order of the sample interactions was destroyed before presenting the information for coding by ordering the collected samples by their identifying numbers. As these numbers were randomly assigned, and as the model and source two digit codes were buried in the six digit numbers, the initial, random numbers assigned to individual interactions effectively randomized the order in which they were presented for coding. Those coding the information knew that the interaction they were assigned occurred in no specific order from a number of sessions and this awareness, together with the random order of the sample assured that coders focused on each interaction independently.

### Coding Procedures

#### Measurement Instruments

The scales used for coding the selected interactions were developed by Carkhuff (first published in Carkhuff, 1969) when he was operationalizing the effective interaction skills of counsellors based on the original

descriptions of Truax (Trux and Carkhuff, 1967). Interactions are coded on five point scales where a rating of one is least facilitative and a rating of five is most facilitative. In this study, four of the scales of effective helping interactions were used: empathy, genuineness, respect, and confrontation. The first three qualities match those hypothesized by Rogers (1957) as being necessary and sufficient to promote development in counselling therapy. They are also the qualities measured in the Aspy and Roebuck (1977) studies. These three qualities taken together in this study served as an indication of overall level of facilitative interaction.

Confrontation was included as a measure of the extent to which the interaction samples challenge students to go beyond their present level of thinking. This sort of challenge might be a result of the Kohlbergian model's emphasis on the plus-one convention in discussion.

Each of the scales used characterizes responses at each of the five levels first in terms of the teacher's statement and then in more general terms of the teacher's listening behavior. In some cases, the functional facilitative quality of the response is characterized in terms of how the student responds in his or her term to the teacher's response.

Accurate use of these scales requires discriminating coders trained to recognize the interchangeability of the teacher's response with that of the student and of judging the effect that response has on continued student thinking and conceptual and affective exploration. Training in accurate use of these coding scales is often the first step in training in the use of these facilitative interactive skills themselves. Selection and training of coders in this study is described in later sections of this chapter.

### Reliability and Validity

Carkhuff's scales are based on the scales first developed by Truax (Truax and Carkhuff, 1967). In over twenty studies conducted using them, it was found that they offered in all cases a moderate to high degree of reliability whether used to measure interactions in counseling or therapy sessions, both group and individual. Their face validity claimed at that time has since been reinforced by continued use to teach the skills that they describe. The relationship to outcomes claimed has also been reinforced in other settings including classrooms (Aspy and Roebuck, 1977). In 1977, Carkhuff and Berenson restated that these rating scales remained "important instruments" (p. 7).

In order to achieve this accuracy, the scales must be modified to make them appropriate to both the setting of the discussions being coded and the manner in which these interactions are presented to coders. The modifications made for this study are detailed in the following sections.

### Modification for School Setting

To make the scales directly applicable to the school setting of these discussions, several terms were changed. Where the original scales referred to "helper" the modified scales used in this study refer to "teacher," and where the original scales refer to "client" or "helpee" the modified scales refer to "student" or "students." No other modifications were necessary to make the scales applicable to the setting of classroom moral discussions.

However, a more important modification of the instructions to coders was made for this study. Ordinarily questions in response to student

comments, unless abusive or otherwise destructive of communication, are coded at a level two on the empathy scale. In instructions to coders (Appendix B) for this study, it was stated that some questions could be coded at level three, the minimally facilitative level of empathy, where those questions also contained an implicit understanding of the student's earlier statement. For example, where a student has said, "I really don't think that he should be allowed to do that," the teacher could reply, "Why do you feel so strongly that it would be wrong?" Implicit in this response is the interchangeable statement, "You feel that it was wrong." In this case, a question could be coded as level three.

This direction was given to coders to accommodate the emphasis in both models on the need to question students. Whereas the use of questions in counselling is not encouraged, in both models of moral education studied it is considered a central technique. The direction that questions should not automatically be coded at level two was made to more accurately assess the facilitative nature of the questions asked. An interchangeable response that functions to extend student thinking may be formed as a question.

#### Modification for Use with Samples

No modification was required to make the scales applicable for use with the interaction samples as the samples were selected with the requirements of these coding scales in mind and as the scales were devised for use with transcribed counselling sessions. There was no need to accommodate the extra visual information that filmed or video taped discussions would provide.

### Coding Interactions on Facilitative Scale

The coders were given the randomized list of interactions sampled from each source. In addition, they were provided with coding guidelines and modified scaling instruments. Details of the selection and training of the people coding the interactions in this study, the data collection forms, and the collection of the data are given in the following sections. This section will briefly outline the procedure of coding and directions given to coders.

Coders were instructed that their main task was to describe the interactions they would be seeing in terms of the categories and scales used in this study. Their purpose was collect information to characterize each interaction as accurately as possible using these scales and categories. In keeping with this purpose, a teacher response coded at a level one on a facilitative scale was no better than a level five. It would be different from a level five and an accurate description was most important.

The first discrimination that the coders were required to make was between a reflective and questioning response by the teacher. A reflective response is one where the teacher repeats or paraphrases the content of the student's response. A questioning response is one where the teacher seeks additional information from the student. As mentioned above, where the teacher includes an interchangeable response in a question, the coders were directed to categorize the response as a question and to code the facilitative aspect of the response appropriately relying on its functional facilitative qualities as gauged by the student's continued exploration and thinking.

Where coders found that a response did not fit either the question or the reflective categories, they were directed to leave neither checked. In cases where the teacher's response showed clear elements of both question and reflective responses, both categories were checked. In this way, if the teacher's response was judged to be other than questioning or reflective, it would have no checks in those categories; if it was exclusively questioning or reflective, it would be checked only in the appropriate category; and if it showed clear elements of both, it would be checked in both categories.

After categorizing the teacher's response as questioning or reflective, the coder then considered the content of the response itself. Where the main information in the response was about the student as a person, the response was coded on the Respect Scale. Where the teacher's response said more about his or her own attitude or thoughts, it was coded on the Genuineness Scale. Where contradictions in the student's behavior or thinking were raised by the teacher's response, it was coded on the Confrontation Scale. And finally, when the teacher's response showed some level of understanding of the student's meaning, it was coded on the Empathy Scale.

The Empathy Scale was considered in many ways to be the default scale, that is when it was unclear how the teacher's response related to the student's statement, the Empathy Scale was used. There are two reasons for this. First, empathy is the central or most important facilitative condition (Carkhuff, 1969); in many ways, it is a measure of the extent that the teacher is responding to the student. Second, when it is not clear to a trained coder how the teacher's response relates to a student's statement, then it can safely be assumed that it would not be clear to the student either;



and when the student is not clear how the teacher's response relates to a statement, the resulting confusion is characteristic of a low level empathic response.

Because of the complexity of natural discourse, some responses contained elements of several of these facilitative conditions. To meet this complexity, coders were instructed to code all of these identifiable elements in a response. So a response could be coded on the Empathic Scale and the Respect Scale; the coder would not have to judge whether the empathy or respect was a more important part of the response, but would code both elements. This procedure was adopted in order to gain as complete a picture of the response as possible. The absence of a coding in any of these categories was a statement that the teacher's response did not show any characteristics of that category.

Having judged which scale or scales were appropriate to a response, the coders then judged at what level the response would fit. This judgement was based on two criteria: the interchangeability of the teacher's response with the student's statement, and the function of the teacher's response in facilitating or inhibiting the student's continued thinking and exploration of the conceptual or affective material being discussed. Interchangeability, that is, where the content of the teacher's response can be substituted for the content of the student's statement without loss of meaning, is a requirement of a minimally facilitative, or level three, response. A response that contains more information than the student's statement, and where that information is accepted by the student and used to further his or her understanding is a higher level, or level four or five response. Where the

statement and response are not interchangeable or where student thinking is inhibited, the teacher's response is coded at a lower level.

### Selecting and Training Coders

As the preceding section shows, coders were required to make a number of high level inferences in following the coding procedure. Because of this, the selection and training of coders was especially important. Coders were selected who had had interaction skills training. The discrimination of different levels of response is a first skill developed in this training. Discrimination skills are developed by demonstrating and discussing the central skill described in each scale, for example, responding with empathic understanding. Transcripts, video, and audio taped examples are used to show concretely the skills in action. To finally develop discrimination skills, people being trained are then given transcripts to code from the scales themselves and their coding is checked and discussed until it is clear that they are discriminating accurately between responses at different levels.

The coders in this study had all received training of this nature. In their cases, it was not considered necessary to repeat this original discrimination training. Instead, only an abbreviated training was done. Coders were first provided with copies of the four scales used in the study. As they all were familiar with the concepts and skills that these scales measured, the scales served as a review of the qualities to be coded. Through discussion and questioning, the coders' familiarity with the scales and their use was assessed.

After this review, a specially prepared training manual (Appendix B) was used to relate the specific type of interactions that they would be coding to the scales. The manual recapitulated the concepts and levels of the scales themselves and provided example of interactions using the concept at each of the five levels on the scale. Additionally, the training manual gave guidelines on the coding of questions and on elements that must be included in a response for it to contain one of the qualities being measured. In sum, the manual gave examples and guidelines appropriate to the coding to be done in this study. Again discussion and questioning was used to assess each coder's ability to accurately use the scales to code the interactions in the study.

Further instruction was given in the specific tasks and procedures of coding as described above. Further discussion and questions from the coders were encouraged to clarify coding procedures and several examples were worked through to ensure uniformity and thoroughness. The coders were given the data, which they rated using copies of the scales, recording their ratings on data collection forms.

### Data Collection

The ratings of the sample teacher student interactions were collected on an electronic spreadsheet and sorted into four batches according to the source from which they were collected. As there were three sources of data from the Moral Development Model and one for the Value Clarification Model, there were three batches from the Moral Development Model and one batch from the Values Clarification Model. All three coders ratings were preserved on the spreadsheet to allow inspection of all ratings for each

response. The electronic spread sheet was divided into the same categories as the coders' sheets, with three separate columns under each category to record separately each coder's data. The coded identification numbers allowed easy electronic sorting into batches and models.

### Data Analysis

Frequency charts were constructed to examine the overall level of response in the sampled interactions. The total number of ratings for all interactions were counted on the empathy, genuineness, and respect scales. Also counted were the spaces for each coder where no rating was assigned. These *no codes* reflected the rater's judgement that no element codeable on that scale was found in that item. The number of ratings at each level were recorded, and divided by the total responses on that scale including no codes. This procedure provided a percentage figure showing what part of the total each level contributed.

To give a measure of overall facilitative level the number of ratings on each level of the three facilitative scales, that is empathy, genuineness, and respect, were added to each other. These sums were then divided by the total of all ratings, including no codes on all three scales. These answers were again expressed as percentage figures. In this standardized form, comparison between scales was made easier.

Histograms of the overall facilitative level and of the three contributing qualities of response were constructed from these frequency charts to allow easy visual inspection of results. In this way the contribution of each sort of facilitative response to the overall level of response could be evaluated. The

histograms were standardized as percents of total ratings to make comparison between them easier and intuitive.

A different procedure was used to calculate scores to compare levels between data batches. On each of the three scales used to measure level of facilitative response, the individual coder's ratings were summed for each item. This procedure provided a simple method of controlling for varying degrees of rater leniency. By combining lenient ratings with more stringent ratings an automatic adjustment to the overall rating was made.

All empty spaces on the coders' forms encountered in this summing procedure were given the value of zero. For example, when the ratings on the empathy scale for a response were two, three, and no code, the summative value assigned would be five. If the ratings were five, no code, and four, the summative value would be nine. This procedure ensures that a response that had some element of a facilitative response, at any level, even non-facilitative levels, would receive a higher value than a response that showed no elements of facilitative responding and so received no ratings. The procedure also ensures that facilitative responses at higher levels will receive higher summative scores.

For each batch of data, these sums were used to compute batch means, standard deviations, and the other statistics used in testing and graphing. Exploratory graphing was done using extreme values, quartile values, and medians. Exploration also involved testing for outlying values using methods found in Erickson and Nosanchuk (1977). Box and dot plots based on these exploratory statistics were completed and used to assess batch shape and possible transformations.

An overall score of facilitative level was produced for each item coded by summing all the ratings on all three scales. These scores were then treated in the same way as scores on individual scales.

Scores for comparison of confrontation were calculated in the same fashion and received the same treatment.

Comparison between the models' level of response was done using an analysis of variance (ANOVA) procedure. Where the ANOVA showed a significant difference in mean levels, post hoc questions looking more specifically at the different levels of pairs of batches and groups of batches were tested using the Scheffe Method for Post Hoc Comparisons.

The ANOVA procedure is a robust test for significance that can be used with batches of unequal size, or with unmatched batches, and the Scheffe method, while applicable to batches of unequal numbers, is also robust with respect to requirements of normal distribution and equal variance. It is suitable also for any sort of comparison (Hays, 1973).

Finally, the data on questions and reflective comments was examined. A Chi Square procedure was used to analyze the data on questions and reflective responses to determine whether there was a significant relationship between the two models and their pattern of using questions and reflective responses. The Chi Square is appropriate to analyze the relationship between categorical variables such as these.

Findings and charts resulting from these procedures are presented in the next chapter, and their implications are discussed in Chapter Five together with ideas for further research.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### Findings and Conclusions

#### Hypotheses

##### Level of Response in Both Models

The first question considered was: What is the characteristic level of response in moral discussions promoted by these two models of moral education, Values Clarification and Moral Development. Analysis of the ratings given to the collected interactions gave this answer.

Carkhuff (1969) in designing the scales used in this study stated that the intervals between categories on each scale should not be seen as identical. In his view there was likely a larger interval in effect between a level two response, which was considered non-facilitative, and a level three response, which is minimally facilitative, than between a level three and a level four response, which are both facilitative in different ways and appropriately used at different stages of therapy. Because of this non-continuous nature of the scales, Carkhuff stated that the modal response best characterizes the level of response when these scales are used.

To find the overall level of facilitative responding in this study, the ratings on the three scales determined by Roger's hypothesis of the interactive conditions promoting moral growth, which correspond to those interactive conditions tested in schools by Aspy and Roebuck, were combined. These scales are Empathy, Genuineness, and Respect. An

overall measure of facilitative response is the total ratings on these three separate scales

The level of response characteristic of ordinary discussion, where those discussing are civil to each other but not particularly concerned with or skilled in facilitative interactions is Level Two. With this in mind, the hypotheses showing no elevated level of facilitative response in these models of moral education are:

1. The modal level of overall facilitative response is Level Two.
2. The modal level of response on the Empathy Scale is Level Two.
3. The modal level of response on the Genuineness Scale is Level Two.
4. The modal level of response on the Respect Scale is Level Two.

These hypotheses will be tested by an examination, then, of the overall frequency of response at different levels on the facilitative rating scales.

#### Comparison of Sources of Interactions and Models of Moral Education

This study also examines for any differences in level of facilitative responses shown by the separate source of interactions and for any differences between the two models of moral education. Again the three scales are used and a union of the three scales' data is used as a measure of overall level of facilitative response. The appropriate null hypotheses for these comparisons would therefore be:

1. There is no relationship between the separate sources of interactions and the level of facilitative interaction measured.



2. There is no relationship between the two categories of Moral Development and Values Clarification and the level of facilitative interaction measured.

From the description of the models developed in Chapter Two, it is possible to hypothesize that there is likely to be a lower level of facilitative responding used in the Moral Development Model. The reason for this probability is the emphasis on the plus-one convention of this model. This convention may well mean that teachers in discussion are not as concerned to respond interchangeably with their students, but rather to reply at a higher level of reasoning that the student must struggle to understand. A response of this type could well be coded at a lower level on the empathy scale, and if the teacher is perceived as providing an "artificial" response, it could well be coded at a low level of genuineness, too.

These comparisons were tested using the ANOVA procedure followed by the Scheffe method for post hoc comparisons.

### Description of Results

#### Overall Level of Response

All facilitative ratings given by the three coders were collected in a frequency table (see Table 8). Included in the table is a calculated percentage which is the percentage of each particular rating compared to the total number of ratings. Included as ratings are instances where coders did not assign a rating, indicating that the characteristic measured by that scale was not present. These instances are referred to as *No Codes* in this study. Each sample interaction could receive nine ratings: one from each of the three coders on each of the three scales. Where an interaction did not

exhibit any elements that could be coded on these facilitative scales, it was given no coding. These no codes comprise the most frequently occurring rating.

## **Facilitative Ratings**

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### **Frequency of Response at Coded Levels**

No Code	328	56%
Level 1	25	4%
Level 2	126	22%
Level 3	70	12%
Level 4	35	6%
Level 5	1	0%

N=585

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
**Table 8**

Carkhuff (1969) points out that the most skilled facilitators' responses will not always be codeable at high levels on all scales, that it is appropriate at some stages in counseling to purposefully lower the level of response on the respect scale, during confrontation, for example, or when moving into an initiating phase when action is expected. In short, the absence of a rating is not always an indication of an absence of skilled facilitative responding by the teacher. However, when responses do not receive codings on the three scales, that must indicate an absence generally of facilitative responding.

Figure One is a histogram derived from the frequency chart. Using these data it is possible to state some of the features of teachers' responses to

students in moral discussions conducted in ways that exemplify Moral Development or Value Clarification.

### Facilitative Ratings




**Figure 1**

The longest bar of this histogram shows that 56% of the time, coders did not find elements of facilitative responding that could appropriately be coded by the three scales in use. In other words, in only slightly less than half of the opportunities to rate these interactions did coders find elements of facilitative responses.

When the No Codes are removed from consideration, it is possible to look at the frequency of facilitative ratings that were received. Figure 2 is a histogram based on these new calculations.

## Facilitative Ratings—No Codes Removed




**Figure 2**

This histogram makes it clear that the most frequently coded level of facilitative response was level two. This supports the hypothesis that the modal level of teacher response in moral discussion would be level two, the level of response of ordinary, polite conversation. Level two responses are not considered effectively facilitative.

It is possible to examine further the level of facilitative functioning in these models of moral discussion by looking at the frequency of rating on each of the scales separately. Figures 3 to 5 present this data.

## Empathy Ratings




**Figure 3**

Two features of this chart are immediately apparent. First, there is a sharply reduced number of No Codes as compared with Figure 1 (18% compared to 56%). The most ready explanation of this is that empathy was considered in this study as the “default” scale: Any interaction that did not code on other scales was to be coded on the empathy scale as a measure of the level of effective listening. And as empathy is in the first place a measure of the interchangeability of a response with the student’s statement, ratings can be given on this scale even when the relationship of response to statement is not apparent.

Second, the level two empathic rating is clearly the most frequent code given, indicating that teacher responses to students in discussion are most often subtractive, that is, they tend to take away from the students’

meanings or lead the discussion away from the students' expressed thoughts and feelings. Students are likely to feel that they were not quite understood or that the discussion somehow gets away from the concerns and issues that they were discussing.

### Genuineness Ratings



**Figure 4**


Figure 4, the histogram of genuineness ratings shows a very different pattern of ratings again. The coders found virtually no elements of genuineness in the interactions they rated. The small bar at level four represents 4% of the ratings (8 out of 195). The large number of No Codes shows that in the interactions coded, the teachers showed very little of themselves at all, not just little of their personal thoughts and feelings but little of their "official" selves as teachers. Official statements would have received level one or two ratings. One explanation of this absence of self

disclosure may be the concern of both models to avoid indoctrination when discussing moral topics: the teacher is constrained to not reveal personal or official opinions on the matter discussed so students are not, consciously or unconsciously, directed to mimic the teachers opinion This possibility is discussed in Chapter Five.

Examination of the individual responses getting the highest genuineness ratings show they are taken from discussions about immediate personal circumstances: in one case the policy on cheating on tests in the classroom, in another problem solving a student's repeated tardiness. In both cases, the discussion did not involve an abstract or imaginary situation, but a situation in which both teacher and student were actively involved. It may be that the general lack of genuineness results from the topics under discussion which may not be of such immediate concern to both participants.

Ratings on the Respect Scale shown in Figure 5 have one particularly noteworthy feature. Of the three scales this is the only one which shows level three responses as being more frequent than level two responses. Both of the models considered here make explicit the importance of allowing students the freedom to discuss moral questions in an atmosphere conducive to discussion. A large part of this atmosphere is the respect shown for students' thinking and points of view. It appears that this attitude has to some extent successfully transferred to practice, with teachers in this sample responding to their students in ways that communicate acceptance and respect.

## Respect Ratings



**Figure 5**

However, it must be pointed out that approximately twice as often as these teachers show facilitative levels of respect (29% of their ratings were level three and higher), they respond in ways that were not codeable on this scale (56% were No Codes).

### Conclusions

The interactions that teachers of moral education using these two models use to respond to students during discussion are, for the most part, not coded on the three scales of facilitative responding associated with the Rogerian hypothesis for promoting student development. Those interactions that can be coded are most frequently rated at level two, one level below the minimally facilitative level.




There are considerable differences in the patterns of coding on the three scales used to assess facilitative responding. Most striking is the virtual absence of genuineness in the teachers' responses. The only scale which showed a level of response one level higher than the hypothesized level of ordinary conversation was the Respect Scale, but this result only depends on removing from consideration those interactions receiving No Code on this scale. When teachers respond in ways that can be coded on the scales for facilitative conditions, they generally do so at level two.

### Comparison of Sources of Interactions and Models of Moral Education

The first step in analyzing the summed scores for each batch of coded interactions and comparing them to each other was the preparation of a box and dot plot. This plot allows visual examination of the data using robust indicators of level and distribution such as median and difference of quartiles. The box and dot plot of the original data is presented as Figure 6.

In the box and dot plots used in this chapter, extreme values are marked with an "X," and outlying extreme values are labelled as "Outliers." Outliers are values whose distance from the mid point of the batch is great enough to put them outside of what might be expected of a normal distribution. The box in the centre of the plot is bounded by the upper and lower quartile values while the line in the box itself indicates the level of the median value. In some cases, particularly in batches of data with a small number of coded interactions, and where some clumping of ratings has occurred, there is no median line. This absence indicates that the median is equal to one of the quartile values, the two lines being superimposed. The

median value in these cases can be confirmed from the chart of values under the plot itself.



**Figure 6**


In Figure 6, the data are presented in the four batches or groups according to the source from which they were collected. Groups 1, 2, and 3 were collected from moral development sources, while Group 4 comes from the value clarification model. These same batches or groups of data will be

retained in the charts and figures presented in this chapter. A key to the specific sources of data is given as Table 1 in Chapter 1. Examination of the plot reveals some difference in level of the medians of the four groups, but with a great deal of overlap of the bulk of the data contained in the midboxes. Particularly in Group 2, and to a lesser degree in Groups 3 and 4, there is upward straggle of the data indicated by a median line below centre in the midbox. The upper outlier value in group one may also indicate upward straggle in the data.

Direct examination of the upper most items in each batch showed that their high scores were a combination of higher level ratings being assigned by the coders and greater number of ratings assigned in several coding categories. In other words, all three raters tended to assign higher levels on several rating scales to these interactions. The result of these rating effects, multiple ratings on multiple scale, is to multiply the rating level of the highest rated items. To confirm this hypothesis about the shape of the data, the scores were transformed by taking the square roots of each score. The plot of the transformed data is given as Figure 7.

The square root transformation somewhat reduced the upward straggle pattern in Group 2, and quite effectively produces the shape of a normal distribution in Groups 3 and 4. For these reasons, this transformation was considered appropriate for these batches. The upper outlier in Group 1 persisted, indicating that it came from an unusually highly rated response even when the effect of multiple ratings was removed. Looking at the coder's rating showed that response to have received high level ratings on all three scales. A lower outlier in Group 2

was created by transforming the data. The ratings of that item showed that no elements of facilitative interaction were identified or coded for it at all.



Facilitative Scores—Square Root Transformed Exploratory Graph

Figure 7

Because of the more nearly normal shape of the transformed data, the F Test for Significant Differences between Means was done on the transformed scores. Batch information and the F Test Array are given in Table 3.

The F-Test information in Table 8 shows an F-score greater than the critical value. Therefore the null hypothesis was rejected: there was a significant difference between the mean facilitative scores of the four batches of teacher student interactions ( $p < 0.05$ ).

Four questions were prepared for the Scheffe Method for Post Hoc Comparisons in order to investigate the hypotheses concerned with differences between sources and between the two models. These questions were:

1. Is the difference between the means of Group 1 and Group 2 large enough to be significant when  $p < 0.05$ ?
2. Is the difference between the means of Group 1 and Group 3 large enough to be significant when  $p < 0.05$ ?
3. Is the difference between the means of Group 2 and Group 3 large enough to be significant when  $p < 0.05$ ?
4. Is the difference between the average of the means of Group 1, Group 2, and Group 3 and the mean of Group 4 large enough to be significant when  $p < 0.05$ ?

The Scheffe Method involves calculating a critical value of difference for each of these comparing questions: The absolute value of the comparison of means for each question must be equal to or larger than the calculated critical value for the comparison to be significant at the indicated level of probability. Table 4 presents the results of these calculations. The table shows that none of the differences of means tested is sufficiently large to reach the required difference. The differences tested are not significant using the Scheffe Method when  $p < 0.05$ .

**Transformed Facilitative Scores —  
Batch Data**

	GROUP 1	GROUP 2	GROUP 3	GROUP 4
Group Size	14	23	8	20
Mean Rating	3.18	2.80	2.54	3.34
Standard Dev	0.65	0.89	0.43	0.75

**F-Test Array**

Source of Variance	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Squares	F-ratio
Between Groups	5.34	3	1.78	3.11
Within Groups	34.90	61	0.57	
Total	40.25	64		

Critical Value = 2.76 (p = .05)

**Table 8**

The comparisons made, as inspection of Table 9 indicates, were not sufficiently large to be significant. The differences in mean level between the three sources of data comprising the Moral Development model were not large enough to be significant (Questions 1-3). Question 4, which compares the mean of the Moral Development model with the mean of Value Clarification came closest to the required difference. In this comparison, the Moral Development model shows a lower level of general facilitative functioning than the Value Clarification model.

### Scheffe Method Comparisons

	Difference of Means	Required Difference
Question 1	0.38	0.74
Question 2	0.64	0.96
Question 3	0.26	0.89
Question 4	-0.50	-0.60

Table 9


Further comparisons of levels of functioning were made independently on the three facilitative conditions that comprised the overall level of interaction in each batch. Those results are presented in the following sections.

## Empathy

The empathy scores for the four batches were plotted in a box and dot chart which is given here as Figure 8. The overlap of the midboxes in the chart is virtually complete indicating that the bulk of data in each batch is at the same level. The difference shown between the medians is to some extent accentuated by the different shapes of data in each batch. For example in Group 2, the downward straggle leaves the median in the upper part of the midrange while in Group 3 the median is equal to the lower quartile—an extreme example of upward straggling data.

Transformation will not help move these batches toward a more normal distribution because of the difference in batch shapes, so the F Test was done on the untransformed data. This test is robust with respect to normality in any case. The F Test result is reproduced as Table 10. The resulting F-Score is far from significant and so confirms the appearance of the exploratory plot. The null hypothesis was retained. There were no significant differences in level between the mean empathy scores of these four batches of data.





Empathy Scores  
Exploratory Graph

Figure 8

### Empathy Scores—Batch Data

	Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4
Group Size	14	23	8	20
Mean Rating	5.86	5.74	4.63	5.20
Standard Dev.	3.08	2.78	0.92	2.61

### F—Test Array

Source of Variance	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Squares	F-ratio
Between Groups	10.93	3	3.64	0.52
Within Groups	429.22	61	7.04	
Total	440.15	64		

Critical Value = 2.76 (p = .05)

**Table 10**

#### Genuineness

Of the 65 interactions coded, only seven received a genuineness score—too few to make exploratory plotting of any use. An F—test was done to determine whether the data warranted any consideration beyond the striking feature of its absence. Test information is included as Table 11. The

null hypothesis was not rejected: There are no significant differences among the mean scores.

### Genuineness Scores—Batch Data

	Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4
Group Size	14	23	8	20
Mean Rating	0.43	0.00	0.50	1.75
Standard Dev.	1.16	0.00	1.41	3.77

### F—Test Array

Source of Variance	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Squares	F-ratio
Between Groups	34.67	3	11.56	2.34
Within Groups	301.18	61	4.94	
Total	335.85	64		

Critical Value = 2.76 (p = .05)

**Table 11**


The most striking feature of the coding on genuineness is the abundance of No Codes received. Group 2, as its mean of zero shows, received no genuineness ratings whatsoever.

## Respect

The final facilitative rating data considered was that from the respect scale. Its exploratory plot revealed fairly closely spaced medians again, larger differences in range, and quite different shapes in the four batches of data. Groups 2 and 3 display fairly similar shapes, with Group 2 in particular exhibiting a clumping of scores at zero, both the lower extreme and the lower quartile value being zero. Group 3 also shows some compression of the upper values with the upper extreme and upper quartiles equally valued at three. Groups 1 and 4, on the other hand show upward straggle; Group 1 is quite extreme with the lower quartile and the median both being the score three. The medians of these batches indicate fairly similar levels, but the very different shapes of the batches produce quite different means.

With such differing shapes, transformation did not help to normalize the batches so the F—Test was done on the original data as shown in Table 10.

The critical value of F was exceeded in the confirmatory test indicating a significant difference ( $p < 0.05$ ) between the batch means. Both Group 1 and 2 have had their mean values elevated above the median values by their upper values. Group 2, though containing high upper values, has its mean depressed by clumping at zero as does Group 3 without high upper values to compensate. It may be that the difference confirmed here was more a result of shape than different batch levels.



Respect Scores  
Exploratory Graph

Figure 9

### Respect Scores—Batch Data

	Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4
Group Size	14	23	8	20
Mean Rating	4.21	2.87	1.50	4.75
Standard Dev.	2.46	2.83	1.31	2.63

### F—Test Array

Source of Variance	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Squares	F-ratio
Between Groups	79.22	3	26.41	4.04
Within Groups	398.72	61	6.54	
Total	477.94	64		

Critical Value = 2.76 ( $p = .05$ )

**Table 12**

The Scheffe Method was used to explore batch comparisons as for overall facilitative level. The four questions posed were identical to those used in that instance to test for differences between batches from the Moral Development model and to test for differences between that model and Value Clarification. These questions were:

1. Is the difference between the means of Group 1 and Group 2 large enough to be significant when  $p < 0.05$ ?

2. Is the difference between the means of Group 1 and Group 3 large enough to be significant when  $p < 0.05$ ?
3. Is the difference between the means of Group 2 and Group 3 large enough to be significant when  $p < 0.05$ ?
4. Is the difference between the average of the means of Group 1, Group 2, and Group 3 and the mean of Group 4 large enough to be significant when  $p < 0.05$ ?

Table 13 shows the differences between the means of each comparison above and the required difference to be significant at this level of probability.

### Scheffe Method Comparisons

	Difference of Means	Required Difference
Question 1	1.34	2.49
Question 2	2.71	3.26
Question 3	1.37	3.02
Question 4	-1.89	2.04

**Table 13**

None of the comparisons tested showed a large enough difference of means to be significant at  $p < 0.05$ . Coming close to significance was Question 4, the test between the mean of the batches from the two models. Further study, with a larger number of interactions, may show that differences between the two models suggested here are significant. The power of this relationship is not likely to be great given the close level of the medians in the data explored in this study.

## Conclusions

There are significant differences between the mean scores of facilitative level of the four batches tested in this study. However, the differences between means were not found to be significant for the comparisons between the several sources of interactions in the Moral Development literature, nor were there significant differences between the interactions from the Moral Development model taken together and the Value Clarification model.

Further examination of the data from the individual scales of facilitative interaction showed that significant differences between batches existed only on the Respect scale. In this case again, there were no significant differences found specifically between the sources of interactions from the Moral Development model or between the means of those interactions from that model compared with those from the Value Clarification model.

No significant differences in mean scores were found between the batches on either the empathy or genuineness scales.

This study shows no significant differences between the facilitative interaction level of these two models of moral education. Suggestions for further research to follow up suggestive patterns in the data are discussed in Chapter Five.



## Other Findings

### Use of Questions

As an incidental task, coders were asked to categorize teacher responses as either questioning or reflective. In cases where neither category was appropriate, they could leave the interaction uncoded. As the Values Clarification model can be described as relying heavily on questions, in the form of "clarifying responses," and the Moral Development literature speaks of the use of "Socratic probes," investigating the use of questions in the interactions, and testing for differences between the models was done using these categorizations.

Calculating a measure of coder agreement in these categorizations by dividing actual pairwise agreements with total possible agreements showed an 87% agreement categorizing questions and an 83% agreement categorizing reflective responses. The actual agreement patterns are presented in Table 14. A Chi-Square test was done to test for significant relationships between the column variables, moral development and values clarification, and the categorization of teacher responses as reflective, questioning, or receiving no category. That test and the observed values it is based on are given in Table 15.

## Rater Agreement Patterns

Pattern	Question	Reflection
YYY	45	7
YYN	11	10
YNN	2	6
NNN	7	42

Table 14

## Chi Square Analysis of Questioning

### Actual Values

	Moral Development Value	Clarification	Total
Questioning	106	50	156
Reflective	36	12	48
No Code	8	3	11
<b>Total</b>	<b>150</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>215</b>

### Chi-Square Calculation

	Moral Development Value	Clarification	Total
Questioning	0.07 (—)	0.17	0.24
Reflective	0.19	0.43 (—)	0.62
No Code	0.01	0.03 (—)	0.05
<b>Total</b>	<b>0.28</b>	<b>0.64</b>	<b>0.91</b>

Chi Square= 0.91

Critical value=5.99 (p= 0.05 and df = 2)

**Table 15**

The row totals in the array of observed values show that overall, interactions in these models are coded 73% of the time as questions, while only 22% of the time are they coded as reflective, the predominant mode of responding in client-centred therapy. The chi-square calculations show that deviations from the expected values are so small between the two models that there is no significant relationship between the rows and columns in the table. The predominant mode of responding to students in both Moral Development and Values Clarification is to question them, with reflective responses being identified approximately once in five responses on average.


### Use of Confrontation

Confrontation was the final element of communication style rated in this study. From the descriptions of the workings of Moral Development and Values Clarification, it was suggested that in some ways these models confronted students, either with probing questions or with different, higher levels of moral reasoning. Data were collected to determine whether there was a difference in the level of confrontation in the coded interactions.

Confrontation itself is considered a part of the counseling process by Carkhuff (1969). As such it is usually reserved for the later stages of therapy when a working therapeutic relationship has already been established between counsellor and client. High levels of confrontation are usually marked by a lower level of the other facilitative elements of verbal interaction.

The box and dot plot of the confrontation data is shown in Figure 9. A strong floor effect is found in the data with many of the values clumping at

zero. The plot shows this as four of the batches have zero as their lower quartile value and two have zero as their median value. This is an indication that many of the coded interactions were not seen as having any elements of confrontation.



Confrontation Scores  
Exploratory Graph

Figure 9

Transformation of the data was not attempted. So many of the values were clumped at zero that any transformation would not have spread them out. The clumping at zero is almost certainly a floor effect resulting from

No Codes being assigned the value of zero. The F-test was performed on the data as presented. The batch data and F-test results are shown in Table 16.

### Confrontation Scores—Batch Data

	Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4
Group Size	14	23	8	20
Mean Rating	3.36	2.43	4.88	1.35
Standard Dev.	12.55	12.17	16.13	4.56

### F—Test Array

Source of Variance	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Squares	F-ratio
Between Groups	81.31	3	27.10	2.62
Within Groups	630.29	61	10.33	
Total	711.60	64		

Critical Value = 2.76 (p = .05)

**Table 16**

The F-ratio was not sufficiently large to show a significant result; however, it was sufficiently large to suggest that a larger study might return a significant result. The level of confrontation in these models of moral education could warrant further research.

The following chapter offers some discussion of these results, summarizes conclusions, and examines the level of facilitative responding

found in these models. The possibilities of modifying moral discussion and further research arising from suggestions in these results are also discussed.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### Discussion, Implications and Suggestions for Further Research

#### Overview

This study has begun the task of examining the ways in which teachers have been encouraged to interact with their students by two models of moral education with the goal of promoting development in these students of healthy, personally rewarding moral or values beliefs. The two models selected for study both claim to be part of a tradition of liberal, progressive education, and aim to develop students' moral abilities without imposing a teacher selected code of behavior. Much has been written comparing, contrasting, supporting or criticizing each model, and the two are often seen as competitors for acceptance.

The theories behind these moral development and values clarification models are not totally divergent, however. Both insist that values and morality are primarily a cognitive concern and hence they both focus on students' thinking about these sorts of issues. Though the two models have distinct and incompatible ideas about what an acceptable moral process is, both focus on developing students' abilities to use a process to achieve increased clarity and understanding about what they think and believe about moral issues.

The goals of the two models are also similar in some respects. Values clarification is concerned with helping students develop their values and come



to know and accept themselves, becoming purposeful and more fully functioning learners and persons; moral development is also concerned with helping students develop their innate capabilities, learn what moral principles they hold, and critically evaluate these discoveries from a moral point of view. These similarities are discussed by Colby (1975).

The theoretical differences between the two models stem mainly from conflicting descriptions of what morality is, the philosophical justification for declaring that what each model promotes is actually moral education—that is education in what is good and desirable. Crucial to this debate is the moral developmentalist's claim to develop universal moral standards as opposed to Values Clarification's ethical relativism.

In practice, however, the differences between the models becomes harder to identify, especially as the moral development method has expanded from its discussion of imaginary situations and moral dilemmas to include more open and immediate discussion of student experience with the acceptance of the just community approach. With this expansion, moral development has come to resemble values clarification with its emphasis on getting students to reflect on their "value indicators," actions, interests, goals, and so on. In both models the discussion of moral issues and verbal interaction with the teacher are a central part of the intervention

Focusing specifically on the level of facilitative interaction in the two models has shown little to distinguish the two. Neither model presents examples of teachers interacting with students with high level facilitative skills. The domain of moral discussion represented by these two models functions mainly at a level below that considered by educational theorists such as Carkhuff to minimally facilitate human growth and development.

Findings resulting from the data collection and analysis of this study have been included in Chapter 4 of this report. They will be summarized here in the following section before being discussed in the remainder of the chapter.

### **Summary of Conclusions**

1. The majority of teacher responses to student statements in moral discussion do not contain elements of the facilitative responding as hypothesized by Rogers to promote human moral growth and development.
2. When those responses not containing elements codeable on the three scales appropriate to facilitative responding are removed, the most common level of teacher response coded on these scale is level two. This level is one level below that considered to be minimally facilitative.
3. The most common level of response coded on the empathy scale is level two, one below minimally facilitative.
4. There is a virtual absence of responses codeable on the genuineness scale in moral discussion promoted by these two models.
5. In those responses codeable on the respect scale, the most frequent rating assigned is level three, the minimally facilitative level.
6. There are significant differences between the mean level of facilitative response from the four sources of interactions coded in this study. The differences between sources of the Moral

Development data and the differences between Moral Development and Values Clarification were not found to be significant.

7. There were no significant differences between the mean levels of empathic response in the four source of interactions.
8. There were no significant differences between the mean levels of genuine response in the four source of interactions.
9. A significant difference between the level of respectful response was found between the levels of the four groups analyzed. But again no significant difference was found between the source from the Moral Development model nor between the Values Clarification model and Moral Development.
10. No significant relationship was found between the two models and the use of reflective and questioning responses. In both models teachers responded with questions approximately 7 out of 10 times.
11. No significant difference between the level of confrontation used in the four batches of data was found.

Based on these results, there is no conclusive evidence to choose between the two models based solely on the criterion of level of facilitative functioning.

## Discussion of Results

### Level of Facilitative Response

Assessing the overall level of facilitative response in short teacher student interactions is a difficult process. Two aspects of it are particularly difficult: coding the interactions and summarizing and dealing with the separate pieces of data.

Coders in this study mentioned the difficulty of assessing short interactions from written transcripts alone. The difficulty comes from the lack of nonverbal clues to the intent and effect of the interactions being considered. Several instances were mentioned where the coder could imagine a sentence said in one tone of voice being rated at a level 1 or 2 while said in another tone rating level 3 or 4. Tone of voice, body posture, proximity to speaker all provide clues that trained coders use to discriminate between and identify different levels of response. The absence of these clues may account for some of the interactions being coded as not exhibiting facilitative qualities in this study.

Application of the coding scales to transcripts was difficult, and when ratings were obtained, other difficulties dealing with the data arose. As no other studies have undertaken this sort of examination, it was difficult to determine what to expect of the interactions and what scales would appropriately be used to evaluate their level of interaction. Using three scales to measure facilitative level was selected in order to provide an opportunity to characterize what characteristics might be available. Using three scales simultaneously complicated both the rating and assessment procedures. Coders had to make complicated decisions about which scales to use for each

interaction coded. Handling the data was complicated by the many interactions that received no code on one or more scales.

Two procedures were adopted: the use of a frequency chart to look at overall level and the use of a summing procedure to achieve a measure for comparison. The frequency chart was useful at exposing results such as the virtual absence of genuineness ratings and the summative procedures allowed consistent comparisons and confirmatory statistical procedures between batches. But both tend to hide an ambivalence in meaning of a high level of interactions receiving no rating on the scales.

While it is true that teachers using interactions that consistently receive no code on the scales used in this study would theoretically not be functioning in a facilitative way, it is also true that interactions consistently rating at level 1 or 2 are also not functionally facilitative. It can be argued that a response that cannot be coded is a better, that is less harmful response, than a response that is codeable at level 1 or 2 on the empathy scale, for example. In the summative procedure, a large number of no codes, given the value of zero, served to depress the mean score of the batch so that a batch that contained more level 1 ratings could show a higher mean level. This might be considered a distortion of the actual functional level of response of these two batches, the batch with the lower mean functionally rating higher than the batch with the many level 1 responses.

In this study, this extreme situation did not arise. Lower ratings were the result generally of both a reduced number of codeable responses and of lower level responses. Coding of that pattern is likely to indicate a functionally lower level of responding. However, an over simplified

interpretation of a large number of responses receiving no rating must be guarded against.

### Creating a Climate for Discussion

In both models, the teacher's concern is to create an atmosphere that permits open, honest, and thoughtful discussion of important issues and personal concerns. Theoretically, both models agree that given the opportunity for thoughtful discussion, students will develop in ways that are good and desirable. That theoretical position of optimism or belief in the students' abilities to grow in the proper environment is fairly successful at creating one aspect of the environment of teacher student interaction that should contribute to growth. Both models are relatively successful at communicating respect for the student's ability to grow and find answers to difficult issues.

What these models have not done to the same extent is further deepen the atmosphere for open discussion by modeling active, accurate empathic understanding or genuineness in appropriate ways. It may be that some features of moral discussion as it is presently conceived constrain these facilitative conditions to lower levels. Two possible constraints are discussed below: how questioning can interfere with empathy and how concerns about indoctrination can effect genuine responses.

### Empathy and Questioning

A difficulty in raising the empathic level of response in moral discussion may stem from the conventional view that it is the teacher's job to ask questions. Both models emphasize this aspect of the teacher's performance. The view of questioning in the facilitative relationship is, on the other hand,

very different. The counsellor must learn to refrain from asking too many questions. Even the most open ended questions are considered to be to some extent directive and to interfere with the client's personal reflection and self-exploration.

The emphasis on questioning that has been a part of these models may prohibit raising the level of empathic responding. This restriction may be at the heart of developments that lead to the teacher functioning more in the capacity of promoting moral discussion between peers. Removing the emphasis on questioning by the teacher and replacing it with empathic listening might allow more active participation again.

A level two modal response may also result from the teacher having an agenda to follow independent of the immediate concerns of the student or from a lack of skill at framing accurate empathic responses. It could result, in other words, from attitudes or skills discrepant with Rogers' (1983) teaching model.

### Indoctrination and Genuineness

The F—score testing for difference in levels of genuineness, while not meeting the critical value required for significance, did approach significance. Further study with a larger number of coded interactions, perhaps specifically coded for genuineness, may confirm the indication that Group 4, the Value Clarification group, shows a higher level of genuineness. Of the seven interactions that received ratings on this scale in this study, four were in this group and they were the highest scores.

The suggestion of higher genuineness in the Values Clarification model is surprising considering the apparent reliance of clarifying responses on

questioning. Very little self disclosure or self expression is possible in most questions. On the other hand, the plus-one convention of the moral development model which directs teachers to respond to students with moral reasoning one level higher than the level the student is demonstrating, did not seem to result in increased levels of self disclosure or genuineness from the teachers. From the description of the model, the teacher would function in this model by thinking up moral arguments at a stage one higher than the arguments being discussed, responding at least somewhat with "the voice of authority." These plus-one interjections, common sense suggests, might come across as high or low levels of genuineness depending on how much the teacher is ready to own them as personally held. The virtual lack of genuineness ratings indicates that these interjections must be made impersonally or in other ways that indicate that they are not what the teacher actually or officially believes. This impersonal style of discussion may be a result of the model's concern with avoiding indoctrinating students with the teacher's own moral principles.

Avoiding indoctrination may translate in practise, then, to avoiding disclosing personal opinions and ideas concerning the topics under discussion for fear of exerting too great an influence on the development of each student's personal moral code.

This study provides too little data to do more than speculate briefly on the lack of genuineness in teacher responses coded. The few interactions coded showed teachers were genuine when the circumstances of the discussion demanded immediacy, when the discussion was about class rules or behavior, or when the teacher was offering to help in a problem solving situation. Perhaps the later developments in the moral development model



referred to as the just community approach developed in recognition of the need to permit genuineness in discussion. Students and teachers in discussing issues of immediate personal concern, often dealing with decisions concerning the governance of the school both work in, might respond with higher levels of genuineness.

Dealing with immediate student choices and with the rules of the class or school may offer opportunities for personal collaboration or discussion that would make genuineness apparent in the ensuing discussions. In the discussion of less immediately personal issues, or of issues where the teacher is not personally involved, it may be that genuineness is present in a negative way—in the absence of an artificial or phoney persona. The signs of genuine interest and involvement in discussion are primarily nonverbal and therefore not codeable from written transcripts. Further investigation of this facilitative condition should be based on the coding of media allowing the assessment of nonverbal attending behaviours in addition to verbal responses.

### Implications

#### Modifications

To provide an opportunity for teachers of moral education to provide interactive conditions that have been shown to result in a variety of beneficial outcomes, the values clarification and moral development practices could be modified to clearly provide opportunities for teachers to interact with their students using high levels of facilitative responding. In order to proceed with this development further research will be required to assess whether and how these modifications can be made.

### Implications for Further Research

Further research into the interactive styles of moral discussion in these two models may well reveal significant differences. This study revealed differences in overall level of facilitative functioning and in levels of respect, but post hoc examination did not show differences at the chosen level of probability ( $p < 0.05$ ). However in both cases, values approaching significance suggest that further research specifically to identify these differences could show that interactions from the Values Clarification model currently exhibit higher overall levels of facilitative responding and higher levels of respect. The exploratory design of this study and the associated use of post hoc methods may well have resulted in a Type II error occurring in the confirmatory statistical calculations—a real difference may not have resulted in a significant statistical difference.

Such continuing research would do well to focus on one aspect of facilitative responding at a time, such as the level of empathy. This procedure would simplify the coder's job and likely make further analysis more accurate. Both empathy and respect could do with further investigation of this type. To rate overall level of responding, it may well be better to use a single scale of the global assessment of responding such as that developed by Gazda, Asbury, Balzer, Childers, and Walters (1984, pp.115-116). This scale makes explicit the requirement for empathic understanding combined with other helpful modes of response. Not only would this procedure make comparisons more complete between batches of data, but it would also yield a number that could directly be related to the scale as a descriptive assessment of each groups' level of response.

Results of this course of research could indicate the one model whose methodology presently contains more elements of facilitative responding. Be that as it may, the present study suggests that both models could benefit by incorporating facilitative responses into discussion. The "transactive discussion" being researched by Berkowitz (1980), which he argues is more effective at promoting moral development than discussion based on the plus-one convention, could be analyzed for its level of facilitative response. It is possible that the training methods for facilitative responding could provide a basis for promoting transactive discussion.

This study has shown that most of the time, in the materials presenting these two models, teachers respond to students during moral discussion by asking questions. The clarifying response of values clarification is for the most part shown as being based on asking questions, as are the "Socratic Probes" of moral development theory. This emphasis on asking questions may limit the level of empathy that can be incorporated in discussion. Further theoretical work may have to be done to determine to what extent questioning is a method that could be replaced with a different style of response and still remain compatible with these models.

### Conclusion

Rogers has provided us with a theoretical basis for supposing that a certain kind of relationship between teacher and student in the classroom, characterized by certain kinds of facilitative interactions, will result in students developing socially acceptable and personally satisfying sets of values. Aspy and Roebuck have provided indirect support for Rogers' hypothesis with their findings that the level of interactive functioning in the

school is significantly correlated with student behaviours, high interactive levels resulting in better student behavior and low interactive levels predicting student misbehavior. Additional support for the hypothesis that conditions favourable to self-development and self-actualization are also favourable to moral development, is provided by Daniels (1984), where a review of research showed that there is a moderate, significant correlation between self-actualization and principled moral reasoning on Kohlberg's developmental scale.

In addition to this evidence, the consistent requirements for both values clarification and moral development that teachers facilitate discussion in a psychologically safe environment, that they model good listening skills, that they teach listening skills to their students, and that they stimulate involvement and self-exploration in values and moral areas, suggests resemblances to aspects of the communication skills developed from client-centred therapy.

As it is now possible to identify with some clarity the characteristics of interaction that are effective in individual and group therapy, it would also be possible to determine whether teachers using a particular model of moral education and high levels of facilitative interactions with their students during moral discussion, promote greater student growth and development than teachers using the same model and low levels of facilitative interactions. This work could be done with teachers using both of the models considered in this study. With the level of facilitative interaction examined, it should be possible to examine the relationship of level of facilitative interaction to moral growth and value clarification. With the level of facilitative interaction

controlled for, it would be possible to make comparisons of the models themselves.

In the interactions sampled from the models of moral education examined in this study, there were few examples of teachers using high levels of facilitative responding. The work of developing and testing the effectiveness of high levels of responding in moral discussion remains to be done.

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## **APPENDIX A**

### **Modified Carkhuff Scales for Assessing Facilitative Responding**

## **Carkhuff Scale for Assessing Empathic Understanding**

### **Level 1**

The verbal and behaviour expressions of the teacher either do not attend to or detract significantly from the verbal and behavioural expressions of the student(s) in that they communicate significantly less of the student's feelings than the student(s) has communicated him or herself.

### **Example**

The teacher communicates no awareness of even the most obvious, expressed surface feelings of the student. The teacher may be bored or uninterested or simply operating from a preconceived frame of reference which totally excludes that of the other person(s).

### **Summary**

The teacher does everything but express that he or she is listening, understanding, or being sensitive to even the feeling of the other person in such a way as to detract significantly from the communications of the students.

### **Level 2**

While the teacher responds to the expressed feeling of the student(s), he or she does so in such a way that he or she subtracts noticeable affect from the communications of the student(s)

### Example

The teacher may communicate some awareness of obvious surface feelings of the student, but his or her communications drain off a level of the affect and distort the level of meaning. The teacher may communicate his or her own ideas of what may be going on, but these are not congruent with the expression of the student.

### Summary

The teacher tends to respond to other than what the student is expressing or indicating.

## Level 3

The expressions of the teacher in response to the expressed feelings of the student(s) are essentially interchangeable with those of the student(s) in that they express essentially the same affect and meaning.

### Example

The teacher responds with accurate understanding of the surface feelings of the student(s) but may not respond to or may misinterpret the deeper feelings.

### Summary

The teacher is responding so as to neither subtract from nor add to the expressions of the student; but he or she does not respond accurately to how that person really feels beneath the surface feelings. This level constitutes the minimal level of facilitative interpersonal functioning.

#### Level 4

The responses of the teacher add noticeably to the expressions of the student(s) in such a way as to express feelings a level deeper than the student(s) was able to express him or herself.

#### Example

The facilitator communicates his or her understanding of the expressions of the student(s) at a level deeper than they were expressed, and thus enables the student(s) to experience and/or express feelings he or she was unable to express previously.

#### Summary

The facilitator's responses add deeper feeling and meaning to the expressions of the student.

#### Level 5

The teacher's responses add significantly to the feeling and meaning of the expressions of the student(s) in such a way as to (1) accurately express feelings levels below what the person him or herself was able to express, or (2) in the event of on going deep self-exploration on the student's part, to be fully with him or her in his or her deepest moments.

#### Example

The facilitator responds with accuracy to all of the student's deeper as well as surface feelings. He or she is "together" with the student or "tuned in" on his or her wave length. The facilitator and the student might proceed together to explore previously unexplored areas of human existence.

## Summary

The facilitator is responding with a full awareness of who the other person is and a comprehensive and accurate empathic understanding of his or her deepest feelings.

## **Carkhuff Scale for the Assessment of Genuineness**

### **Level 1**

The teacher's verbalizations are clearly unrelated to what he or she is feeling at the moment, or his or her only genuine responses are negative in regard to the student(s) and appear to have a totally destructive effect upon the student(s).

### **Example**

The teacher may be defensive in his or her interaction with the student(s) and this defensiveness may be demonstrated in the content of his or her words. Where he or she is defensive, he or she does not employ this reaction as a basis of potentially valuable inquiry into the relationship.

### **Summary**

There is evidence of considerable discrepancy between the inner experiencing of the teacher and his or her current verbalizations. Where there is no discrepancy, the teacher's reactions are employed solely in a destructive manner.

### **Level 2**

The teacher's verbalizations are slightly related to what he or she is feeling at the moment, or when his or her responses are genuine they are negative in regard to the student(s); the teacher does not know how to employ these negative reactions constructively as a basis of inquiry into the relationship.

### Example

The teacher may respond to the student(s) in a “professional” manner that has a rehearsed quality or a quality concerning the way a teacher “should” respond in that situation.

### Summary

The teacher is usually responding according to his or her prescribed role rather than expressing what he or she personally feels or means. When he or she is genuine his or her responses are negative and he or she is unable to employ them as a basis for further inquiry.

### Level 3

The teacher provides no “negative” clues between what he or she says and what he or she feels, but he or she provides no positive cues to indicate a really genuine response to the student(s).

### Example

The teacher may listen and follow the student(s) but commits nothing more of him or herself.

### Summary

The teacher appears to make appropriate responses that do not seem insincere but that do not reflect any real involvement either. Level three constitutes the minimal level of facilitative interpersonal functioning.

### Level 4



The facilitator presents some positive cues indicating a genuine response (whether positive or negative) in a nondestructive manner to the student(s).

#### Example

The facilitator's verbal expressions are congruent with his or her feelings, although he or she may be somewhat hesitant about expressing them fully.

#### Summary

The facilitator responds with many of his or her own feelings, and there is no doubt as to whether he or she really means what is said. He or she is able to employ his or her responses, whatever their emotional content, as a basis for further inquiry into the relationship.

### Level 5

The facilitator is freely and deeply him or herself in a nonexploitative relationship with the student(s).

#### Example

The facilitator is completely spontaneous in his or her interaction and open to experiences of all types, both pleasant and hurtful. In the event of hurtful responses the facilitator's comments are employed constructively to open a further area of inquiry for both the facilitator and the student(s).

#### Summary

The facilitator is clearly being him or herself and yet employing his or her genuine responses constructively.

## **Carkhuff Scale for Assessing the Communication of Respect**

### **Level 1**

The verbal expressions of the teacher communicate a clear lack of respect (or negative regard for the student(s)).

#### **Example**

The teacher communicates to the student(s) that the student's feelings and experiences are not worthy of consideration or that the student is not capable of acting or thinking constructively. The teacher may become the sole evaluator.

#### **Summary**

In many ways the teacher communicates a total lack of respect for feelings, experiences, and potentials of the student(s).

### **Level 2**

The teacher responds to the student(s) in such a way as to communicate little respect for the feelings, experiences, and potentials of the student(s).

#### **Example**

The teacher may respond mechanically or passively or ignore many of the feelings of the student(s).

#### **Summary**

In many ways, the teacher displays a lack of respect or concern for the students' feelings, experiences, and potentials.

### Level 3

The teacher communicates a positive respect and concern for the student's feelings, experiences, and potentials.

#### Example

The teacher communicates respect and concern for the student's ability to express him or herself and to deal constructively with his or her life situation.

#### Summary

In many ways the teacher communicates that who the student is and what he or she does matters to the teacher. Level three is the minimal level of facilitative interpersonal functioning.

### Level 4

The facilitator clearly communicates a very deep respect and concern for the student(s).

#### Example

The facilitator's responses enable the student to feel free to be him or herself and to experience being valued as an individual.

#### Summary

The teacher communicates a very deep caring for the feelings, experiences, and potentials of the student(s).

### Level 5

The facilitator communicates the very deepest respect for the student's worth as a person and his or her potentials as a free individual.

Example

The teacher cares very deeply for the human potential of the student(s).

Summary

The facilitator is committed to the value of the other person as a human being.

## **Carkhuff Scale for the Assessment of Confrontation**

### **Level 1**

The verbal expressions of the teacher disregard the discrepancies in the student's behaviour (ideal versus real self, insight versus action, teacher versus student's experience of self).

#### **Example**

The teacher may simply ignore all student discrepancies by passively accepting them.

#### **Summary**

The teacher simply disregards all of those discrepancies in the student's behaviour that might be fruitful areas for consideration.

### **Level 2**

The verbal expressions of the teacher disregard the discrepancies in the student's behaviour.

#### **Example**

The teacher, although not explicitly accepting these discrepancies, may simply remain silent concerning most of them.

#### **Summary**

The teacher disregards the discrepancies in the student's behaviour and, thus, potentially important areas of inquiry.

### Level 3

The verbal expressions of the teacher, while open to discrepancies in the student's behaviour, do not relate directly and specifically to those discrepancies.

#### Example

The teacher may simply raise questions without pointing up the diverging directions of the possible answers.

#### Summary

While the teacher does not disregard discrepancies in the student's behaviour, he or she does not point up the directions of these discrepancies. Level three constitutes the minimal level of facilitative functioning.

### Level 4

The verbal expressions of the teacher attend directly and specifically to the discrepancies in the student's behaviour.

#### Example

The teacher confronts the student(s) directly and explicitly with discrepancies in his or her behaviour.

#### Summary

The teacher specifically addresses him or herself to discrepancies in the student's behaviour.

### Level 5

The verbal expressions of the teacher are keenly and continually attuned to the discrepancies in the student's behaviour.

### Example

The teacher confronts the student(s) with discrepancies in a sensitive and perceptive manner whenever they appear.

### Summary

The teacher does not neglect any potentially fruitful inquiry into the discrepancies in the student's behaviour.

## **APPENDIX B**

### **Sample Responses and Guidelines for Coding Student-Teacher Interactions**



## **Sample Responses and Guidelines for Coding Student-Teacher Interactions**

The following guidelines, explanations, and examples have been created to help coders using the appropriate Carkhuff Scales to develop their discrimination of facilitative skills and levels of facilitative functioning. Each skill is characterized briefly and two examples of student/teacher/student interactions are given for each skill and level. The notes contain alternative characterizations and summaries of salient features of responses at each level of the skill being presented.

These guidelines are not intended to replace the Carkhuff Scales for coding interactions, and are supplemental to them only. They provide specific examples of interactions and how they would be coded using the Carkhuff Scales and notes that coders may find helpful in clarifying the concepts of facilitative interaction. All coding must be done using the Scales themselves.

Careful study and discussion of these examples and notes will help the coder develop consistent and accurate discriminations of facilitative skills and levels of facilitative functioning. Though not sufficient to develop effective levels of facilitative functioning, increased levels of discrimination help teachers acquire the skills in further training and are often used as a first step in such training.

## Empathy

Empathy is the understanding of the student's inner world of thought and feeling and the effective communicating of that understanding to the student. At the minimally facilitative level, the teacher's response is interchangeable with the student's, that is it contains the same affect and content as the student's statement. At higher levels, the teacher's statement may contain an expression of underlying or not yet stated feeling or thought. Accurate empathy is often acknowledged by students as being what they meant to say in their expression. *Inaccurate* empathic statements are *not* facilitative.

### Level 1

#### Sample A

Student: The guy's breaking the law if he steals the drug for his wife. Nobody is allowed to do that ever!

Teacher: The law has got nothing to do with this.

Student: Well, I thought it did . . .

#### Sample B

Student: It's like the time that my friends and I went into this store, once. I was going to get a chocolate bar, cause I really like chocolate, and before I could get it all my friends went running out.

Teacher: What *are* you talking about, Bobby?

Student: Nothing. It doesn't matter.

## Notes

Responses at this level are often hurtful or challenging. They are subtractive or do harm to the relationship between the teacher and student. The student may think, "Well, I won't talk to him about this again!"

## Level 2

### Sample A

Student: I don't know what he should do. He really loves his wife, but then the other guy has his rights too, you know, because it's his business that would get ripped off.

Teacher: In what way is it his business?

Student: I dunno, I guess it's the way he makes his money.

### Sample B

Student: I don't know what I'd do in his place. It's just too hard to sit here and try and figure out what to do in these stupid situations.

Teacher: Having trouble concentrating?

Student: No, I just don't want to do this stuff.

## Notes

Level two responses are inaccurate and miss the feeling or the idea that the student was trying to express. The response may focus on some aspect of the student's statement, but not on the main issue in the student's mind. The teacher may question the student without showing understanding of what has already been said.

## Level 3

### Sample A

Student: Why do we have to do this stuff?

Teacher: You're wondering what good this is doing.

Student: Yeah, all we do is talk and talk and don't learn anything.

### Sample B

Student: Well, I know what I'd do. It would be stupid to have a kid when you don't have to. I'd have an abortion for sure.

Teacher: You're certain that you wouldn't have the baby.

Student: That's right. I mean, what's the point? I wouldn't be happy and neither would it.

### Notes

This minimally facilitative response reflects both the feeling and the meaning of the student's statement and clearly indicates that the student has been understood. A question may be coded at this level if it reinforces student exploration of ideas and feelings and restates or reflects what the student has already said.

## Level 4

### Sample A

Student: Of course he should steal the drug. His wife is dying for it!

Teacher: You're angry that he would even stop to consider whether he should do it or not.

Student: Darn right, I am. People are more important than money.

### Sample B

Student: Maybe they shouldn't have thrown those guys overboard, I don't know. Lots of people would think that was a bad thing to do.

Teacher: You're confused about what you would do and think you might go along with what others think.

Student: I guess . . . that's what I usually do, I guess.

### Notes

At this level of response, the teacher is adding a deeper layer of understanding to a student's statement. Underlying and unstated thoughts and feelings are brought out. To be truly facilitative, these underlying meanings must be accepted and used by the student. If rejected, the response is level two empathy.

## Level 5

### Sample A

Student: This is one of the hardest things to think about that I've ever done!

Teacher: You're confused, but you really want to think this through on your own without my help and you think that you can, too.

Student: I guess I do. I want to know what I really believe.

### Sample B

Student: No one should ever have an abortion, believe me. It's something that you never get over.

Teacher: You're speaking from your own experience now. You've never got over your own abortion.

Student: That's right. I can't sleep sometimes when I think about what I did.

### Notes

Responses at this level show an understanding of the deepest feelings and meanings of the student's statements. The teacher is accompanying the student in the deepest self exploration fully and completely. Personal exploration at this level would usually not be appropriate in a classroom setting.

## **Respect**

The respect scale measures the degree to which the teacher is able to communicate to the students that he or she is ready to listen without judging or evaluating them. Even though, once a trusting relationship has been established, the teacher may confront the students with apparent distortions or discrepancies in their thought or behavior, high levels of respect make it clear that the teacher values the students personally and believes in their abilities to learn and grow.

### **Level 1**

#### **Sample A**

Student: That's like when my mom and I were going shopping and we saw this man begging.

Teacher: Way off topic, as usual, Darlene.

Student: (No response)

#### **Sample B**

Student: But who is supposed to decide what is right to do in this situation? I don't know who I trust.

Teacher: What makes you think we care to know that?

Student: I thought this was supposed to be a discussion.

#### **Notes**

Responses at this level are likely to be hurtful. The student will feel that her thoughts are not worth the teacher's attention. The teacher's response says that the student has nothing important to say.

## Level 2

### Sample A

Student: That's just like stealing. He took it without asking and that's just stealing.

Teacher: You think so now, but maybe you'll change your mind after others have spoken.

Student: Well, it is stealing, isn't it?

### Sample B

Student: But school is just like that—we don't get to decide what we want to do and we are always told what to do in class, and we don't get a choice.

Teacher: That's another subject for another time, Ken.

Student: Now you're telling me what to do, again!

### Notes

A level two response can work as a "brushoff". The teacher communicates that the student may have something to say, but not now, or not in that way, or that the teacher is not going to really try to understand it.

## Level 3

### Sample A

Student: It's not right that he took that drug without paying for it. It wasn't his to take.

Teacher: I want to hear these ideas.

Student: OK. They guy shouldn't have taken the prescription.

### Sample B

Student: People shouldn't be allowed to beg in the streets. The police should get them away where they can't bother other people.

Teacher: That interests me, a law against begging.

Student: For sure, because poor people don't have the right to beg from other people in the streets.

### Notes

The teacher's response shows a readiness to understand and no sign of any negative or judgmental attitudes towards what the student has to say.

### Level 4

#### Sample A

Student: Those people must be crazy if they think that they have the right to choose you can live or who can die. Everybody has the right to stay in that lifeboat.

Teacher: You've tried to understand how they might think of throwing somebody overboard, but it just seems crazy to you.

Student: Maybe I can see how they might think they should throw somebody into the water, but I don't think that it's right for them to actually do it.

#### Sample B

Student: If I was in that lifeboat and I saw that somebody had to die to save the others, then I think that I would be ready to go—if I had a life-jacket or some chance of living in the water.

Teacher: If you had some chance to survive, you would be ready to take a risk to help others. Wow!

Student: I think most people would do that.

### Notes

It is clear from a response at this level that the teacher is interested in understanding the student and that he or she values the student's expressions and the speaker, too.

### Level 5

#### Sample A

Student: These questions are impossible to answer!

Teacher: You're frustrated that there are no clear answers, but I know that you will work hard to get them sorted out in your own way.

Student: I am working at them, but it's really hard.

#### Sample B



Student: I don't care what everyone else thinks. As far as I'm concerned it is wrong to have an abortion and that is that.

Teacher: You have your own beliefs and you are going to stick by them. I admire you for that.

### Notes

At level five the teacher shows the utmost interest, concern and deep human appreciation of the students thoughts and of the person who is sharing them. A clear belief in the students potential to learn and grow is evident.

## Genuineness

A high level functioning teacher will exhibit genuineness in his or her relationship with the students. Instead of coming across as an impersonal professional, the person serving in the role of teacher will be presented as a living, feeling, thinking individual. At higher levels of genuineness, it is also important that the teacher, when expressing any negative thoughts or feelings about the students, does so in a way that allows problem solving and a deepening of the relationship between the students and teacher.

### Level 1

#### Sample A

Student: I don't think that it's fair that you always call on the good kids when there are fun things to do.

Teacher: As a teacher, I have important reasons for what I do.

Student: But, I don't think that it's fair!

#### Sample B

Student: But I still think that he had no right to take the medicine without the druggist's permission. It wasn't his to take.

Teacher: You're a real pain that way you keep harping on with the same ideas. It's really annoying me.

Student: (No response)

#### Notes

There is evidence from what the teacher says at this level that either the teacher is insincere and playing a role at variance with her true feelings or she is harshly and hurtful negative in what she says about how she feels about the student

## Level 2

### Sample A

Student: Why can't I keep butting in? I've got some important things to say, too, you know.

Teacher: There's lots I'd like to say to you, too, but I don't.

Student: Maybe it's because it's not as important as what I have to say.

### Sample B

Student: If they told me that I was the one who was supposed to climb into the water, I'd laugh in their faces. They'd have to kill me to throw me overboard. Or I'd kill them first.

Teacher: That's very violent talk. I don't know what to say.

Student: I'd kill you if you tried to throw me overboard.

### Notes

A level two response suggests that the teacher feels otherwise than he is letting on, or that he feels some negative emotion towards the student that he cannot use to any good effect.

## Level 3

### Sample A

Student: I'd have no problem about lying, if I knew that my lie would save a person from getting into trouble.

Teacher: In some situations, you would lie.

Student: I sure would.

### Sample B

Student: I have been told that lying is a sin at church, so there is no way that I would ever lie about anything.

Teacher: You would follow what the church says about lying.

Student: Not just lying, but that's what we're talking about right now.

### Notes

The teacher's response seems to be that of a conscientious listener although there are no positive indications of the living person apparent.

## Level 4

### Sample A

Student: Students should have more say in what they learn at school. I think that students should be able to take whatever courses they like and not take courses if they didn't want to.

Teacher: I'd be worried that some students would make bad choices.

Student: Some would, but they could always make up those courses later. They probably wouldn't learn much if they were in a course that they didn't want to take.

### Sample B

Student: I don't care what courses I take in school. The whole thing is just a joke anyway.

Teacher: I don't like hearing that this discussion is just a joke to you and that maybe, as a teacher, I'm a joke, too.

Student: This is O.K., I guess, but most of school is stupid.

### Notes

Level four responses are clearly from the teacher as person and made without pretence. There are clues as to how the teacher feels and even negative feelings are presented in a way that is not hurtful.

## Level 5

### Sample A

Student: If you can get away with it, there's nothing wrong with being a thief. People get everything back from their insurance companies anyway, so who gets hurt?

Teacher: I'm frightened hearing you speak like that. I wonder if I trust you when I know that stealing doesn't matter to you?

Student: You don't steal from people you know. You only steal from people who you don't care about.

### Sample B

Student: O.K., there may be some times when stealing is a good thing, but for most of the time, I think it is better just to say that stealing is wrong.

Teacher: I really believe that you mean that. It feels good to hear you say what you really believe.

Student: I do mean it—weird, isn't it!

### Notes

At this level, it is clear that what the teacher says is what the teacher as a person feels, and any positive or negative feelings are presented in such a way as to encourage their use in deepening the understanding between teacher and student.

## **Confrontation**

The teacher is in a position of greater experience and larger knowledge than the students. In addition, the teacher, as a separate individual, is in a position to see incongruities in the student's thought, feeling, or behavior. A high level functioning teacher will confront the student with these inconsistencies and encourage the student to deal with them in a more consistent or authentic way. When confronting the student, the more responsive dimensions may be present at lower levels only, though empathy and respect will return to aid the student to work through the confrontation when appropriate.

### **Level 1**

#### **Sample A**

Student: I know that lying is a bad thing to do—but that doesn't mean that I never lie to anybody. Don't tell my parents that I said that!

Teacher: I never take what you say here out of this room.

Student: Well, that's all right then.

#### **Sample B**

Student: I know abortion is a bad thing, and the fetus has human rights and everything, but if I got pregnant, I sure wouldn't have that kid. No way!

Teacher: I'm glad you know how you would act in that situation.

Student: You mean it's all right for me to have an abortion even if it's supposed to be a bad thing to do?

#### **Notes**

The teacher accepts without challenge any contradictions in what the student says or any discrepancies between what the student says and how he or she behaves.

## Level 2

### Sample A

Student: Sure, I can see that cheating on tests is a bad thing, but if you can't help but see an answer on some smart kids paper, then sure you'd put it down.

Teacher: Most of the time, cheating is wrong?

Student: Yeah, you shouldn't plan to cheat if you can help it.

### Sample B

Student: I can see that shoplifting is wrong, especially because it raises the price for everybody, but if somebody gives me too much change at the checkout, that's different. That's their mistake.

Teacher: You profit from their mistake.

Student: Yeah.

### Notes

The teacher does not actually seem to accept inconsistencies or contradictions, but on the other hand they are not questioned or confronted.

## Level 3

### Sample A

Student: So I lied to my parents last Friday night because I knew that it would just cause a huge hassle to tell them the truth and I knew that I wasn't doing anything bad.

Teacher: But you usually tell them the truth, don't you?

Student: Sure, but there are times when it's better to lie.

### Sample B

Student: There's no way that people should take things that don't belong to them. That guy invented the special drug, it was his, and he deserved to make money by selling it.

Teacher: But I've seen you use things that weren't your own, like your locker partner's text book, for example.

Student: That's different. I was just borrowing it.



## Notes

At this level of confrontation, the teacher raises questions about inconsistencies or contradictions in the student's behavior or talk, but does not pursue them.

### Level 4

#### Sample A

Student: If you see a crime being committed, they you had better tell about it. If people would do that, then everyone would be safer.

Teacher: But when I was asking who threw the paper airplane a few minutes ago, and you knew, you didn't say. Isn't that the same thing?

Student: But throwing paper isn't the same as a crime.

#### Sample B

Student: If that druggist has a drug that people want to save lives and they can't afford to buy it, then he should be made to give it to them.

Teacher: If he has to share, then you should have to share things like pens and paper that you have, too, right? Do you?

Student: Yeah, I do most of the time, when people really need them.

## Notes

Specific contradictions or inconsistencies that the teacher discovers in the student's behavior and talk are questioned specifically with a clear indication that the student is responsible to answer for them.

## Level 5

### Sample A

Student: In order to get along together people have to listen to one another. If they don't then everyone gets angry and fights start.

Teacher: But there are times when you don't listen to me. How do you explain that difference between what you do and what you say?

Student: I don't know. I guess I don't always do what I think people should.

### Sample B

Student: The police are just out to get kids sometimes. They searched me last night and they had no right to because I wasn't doing nothing. They just thought I had drugs on me.

Teacher: But I've seen you grab somebody you thought had something of yours and hold them, maybe even threaten them. Are there different standards for you and the police?

Student: No, no, just that, they shouldn't be allowed to do that.

### Notes

At this level, contradictions and inconsistencies are pursued with specific follow up responses that the student is expected to respond to, or indeed the student is expected to change their statement or sufficiently explain the source of the difficulty.

## **APPENDIX C**

### **Sample Interactions Used in Study**

## Data Code Sheet

### Source of Response Code Numbers

Individual Responses were assigned random numbers to identify each individual response.

### Source of Data Code Numbers

Each source of data was assigned code numbers according to the following list:

Raths, L. E., Harmin, M., & Simon, S. B. (1966) = 98

Reimer, J., Paolitto, D. P., & Hersh, R. H. (1983) = 25

Blatt and Kohlberg, 1975 = 16

Colby, Kohlberg, Fenton, Speicher-Dubin, Lieberman, 1977 = 46

### Model code numbers.

Finally, each response was given a code number to identify the model from which it was taken. The codes are:

Values clarification = 92

Moral Development = 55

Together, these three, two digit numbers make up unique six digit identifying numbers for each of the following responses. The identifying numbers may be decoded by referring to the above charts and taking each two digit number in order to represent:

1. Individual response
2. Source
3. Model.

13 98 92

- S. Oh, lots of them (changes to be made in world). Want me to name some?
- T. No, we have to get back to our spelling lesson, but I was just wondering if you were working on any of these changes, actually trying to bring them about.
- S. Not yet, but I may soon.

55 98 92

- S. I don't know. Nothing much.
- T. You don't seem much to care, Bruce. Is that right?
- S. I suppose so.

58 98 92

- S. (has indicated that he is politically liberal)
- T. You say, Glenna, that you are a liberal in political matters?
- S. Yes, I am.

20 98 92

- S. Science is my favourite subject.
- T. What exactly do you like about science?
- S. Specifically? Gosh, I'm not sure. I guess I just like it in general.

59 98 92

- S. It's not good to be lazy, you know.
- T. How do you know that it's not good?
- S. Everybody knows that. My parents always say it.

71 98 92

- S. Well, no. I don't like coming to school late.
- T. How long have you been coming to school late?
- S. Quite a while. I guess most of the time since I've been coming to school.

89 98 92

- S. Well, [feeling funny means that] I'm different from other kids. I feel embarrassed.
- T. As I get it, you feel uncomfortable about being late.
- S. That's right.

74 98 92

- S. No, I don't have an alarm clock.
- T. Could you get one? I could help you get one if that is what you need.
- S. It would be kind of fun. I'll try to get one.

35 98 92

- S. Well, I went to a supermarket that had an advertisement [for a job], but this kid with an accent got there first.
- T. And he was willing to work cheaper?
- S. Well, I don't know that for sure.

25 98 92

- S. Some day I'd like to join the Peace Corps.
- T. What are some good things about that, Clara?
- S. Oh, the chance to be of service excites me and going to faraway places does too.

43 98 92

- S. When I save up twenty dollars, I'm going to buy that guitar.
- T. Can you play a guitar, Jerry?
- S. A little, but I'm going to really learn when I get my own.

40 98 92

- S. Not too much chance [off making money right now], I'm afraid.
- T. Any chance of cutting down on what you spend and saving it?
- S. You mean give up smoking?

66 98 92

S. [Student non-participation observed]

T. June, it seems to me you very seldom talk in class discussions. Does it seem that way to you?

S. Yeah, I suppose so.

69 98 92

S1. You could be honest some of the time and dishonest some of the time.

T. Does that sound like a possible choice, class? Any other alternatives to choose from?

S2. You could be honest in some situations and not in others. For example, I am not honest when a friend asks about an ugly dress, at least sometimes.

15 98 92

S. Does that mean that we can be honest for ourselves whether we should be honest on tests here?

T. No, that means that you can decide on the value. I personally value honesty; and although you may choose to be dishonest, I shall insist that we be honest on our tests here. In other areas of your life, you may have more freedom to be dishonest, but one can't do anything anytime, and in this class I shall expect honesty.

S. But then how can we decide for ourselves? Aren't you telling us what to value?

16 98 92

S. Well, my sister is two years younger than I am, and she always is in the way. Like she argues about what TV program to watch, and she hangs around me when I'm playing, and she . . . she is just a nuisance.

T. Are there sometimes when you like having her around?

S. No, absolutely not.

54 98 92

S. One is stronger. Hate is stronger.,

T. What is the difference between hating some one and hating things that the person does?

S. Hmm, I just thought of a time when I didn't hate my sister. Once when we were walking along and someone said how nice we looked together, we were younger and were walking hand in hand. It was a good feeling. But, I don't know. If you hate enough things a person does, I guess you end up hating the person. Is that right?

14 98 92

S. What can I do [about my sister]? I know what I'd like to do . . .

T. Well, one thing you can do is keep away from her. Another is try to work things out so that there is less argument and conflict between you. What other alternatives are there?

S. I don't know. I don't know. But thank you for your questions. Can I go now?

42 98 92

S. Yes, I love Alvin [a hamster].

T. Do you think more people should own hamsters?

S. Yes, they're wonderful pets.

73 98 92

S. [Says she's planning to go swimming after school]

T. Is that something you like to do?

S. Yes.

37 25 55

S. [Nodding show that it is right to kill some people in order to save other lives.]

T. Why?

S. I guess if you save more lives in the long run, it may be all right.



28 25 55

- S1. He should just ask for a quart of milk.
- T. Stay with the situation, that the man is deciding whether or not he should steal it.
- S2. He should because the people are rich and he isn't. They have plenty and he doesn't.

11 25 55

- S1. They get four quarts a day.
- T. The owner probably does not need it as much, seeing that they get four quarts a day. The undecided people also wrote a list of shoulds and should nots that they are thinking about. What is on your list, undecided people, that is not here?
- S2. Here is one point, that it may be possible for the mother to nurse her children.

32 25 55

- S. First of all, he should not because if he does steal the milk, he will be in debt more. If they found out he stole it, he will still be in debt more. He will be fined or put in jail.
- T. Who is 'they'?
- S. If the people who owned the milk found out, then he will be in debt to them. This is the law, and if everybody stole milk from people, there would be people running around with hoards of milk and . . .

73 25 55

- S1. He should not steal from other people. These other people worked for their stuff, they worked for their money and they are entitled to it, also, and he isn't really. And it could be thought of that though he shouldn't he really needs it.
- T. So you are still undecided?
- S2. Yes.

87 25 55

- S1 He is like going according to a higher moral law, saying he has to support these people, they are my family, they are my blood and I have to keep them alive. They are people, they were born and they have a right to survive, I've got to do this for them.
- T. You are saying reasons he should. The right to live and responsibility. What responsibility does this man have, what are you thinking about?
- S2 He has the responsibility that the others have the right to live. The other responsibilities are the same thing, saying it is my responsibility because they can't go out and get the stuff, I have to get it to them, it is my responsibility to do that.

76 25 55

- S. I said he should.
- T. Why?
- S. Because he has his family that is starving. They might die and he might need some, too, iot doesn't say that he does. But I would want to keep my family alive, just like he would,

17 25 55

- S. I'm saying, some kids were saying before, he shouldn't take it. So if he did take it and got caught, then he would have less of a chance of getting a job later. But it says here that he was unemployed for some time, and if he has been unemployed for some time and on welfare and everything, it is doubtful that he will get a job.
- T. Do you think he should or should not steal the milk?
- S. I think he should.

18 25 55

- S, When he takes the stuff he will do it over and over again and then when he starts taking more stuff, he gets real . . . and gets caught and will probably be in jail for a long time.
- T. So you think he shuld not teal the milk.

S. You said he will not be able to support his family, but he is not supporting his family too well right now.

92 25 55

S. He is going to steal the milk one day, right, he takes the milk. If he takes that, it is not going to last very long and he is going to go back and take some more.

T. So what do you think he should or should not do?

S2 I think he should not and I changed my mind.

08 25 55

S. I think he should not.

T. What is the main reason in your mind that you think he should not?

S. Because of the law. Think about it, if everybody did it, what would it be like? First of all the welfare laws, in this case, if they are being unfair to them, then they should be revised, looked at, and changed. But right at the moment, he should not steal the milk.

82 25 55

S. I don't think it's fair because they should know she needs the help. I don't think they should say, "I don't want to work with her!"

T. What would be wrong with that?

S. In that situation, she needs the help.

51 25 55

S. I think she should work with the boys and then, like, if one day one of your friends didn't have anybody to work with, then you'll be used to it; you won't go, "Phew, I don't want to work with boys."

T. Why should they get used to it? [Waits] Lana, what do you think?

S. I think boys and girls should learn to work together. It's nicer that way.

01 25 55

S. Yeah, that's how I felt, 'cause when I was in the first grade I knew this lady who had her two dogs she always took to go shopping, and she said she wouldn't be back for another hour, and my mother was going to pick me up in an hour. But I had to stay there with her son. So we played records and stuff, but then he invited these three friends over who were all boys, and I had to stay in the house with three boys.

T. How did you feel then?

S. Oh, I don't know.

41 25 55

S. No, he shouldn't tell on his friend who cheated on the test. He might get in trouble.

T. What kind of trouble?

S. Well, his friend won't like him anymore. He might get back at him in some way.

65 25 55

S. He might lose his job.,

T. So does that change the situation at all for you; should you consider the milkman?

S. I don't know, it doesn't change the situation, I still don't know.

85 25 55

S. The milkman would say, "I put it down . . ."

T. That is what Irene said earlier. Do you agree with Irene?

S. ". . . left it there, I put four bottles of milk, maybe somebody else took them but I am -- I am responsible for them until they get them, but I have done my job, and it is not my fault and it is not theirs. Maybe my company should give them another bottle of milk, but I should not be fired.

99 25 55

S1 Mmmmm . . . Depends on how much the other people mean to you, like whether you want them to trust you or not.

T. So it would make a difference to you if they were really your friends?

S2 Of course, I' probably tell in either situation but I'd be more reluctant if they were my friends.

64 25 55

S. I wouldn't rat on my brother.

T. What is the difference?

S. Oh, I can't do that if it was my brother. I couldn't tell on my brother.

62 25 55

S1 I wouldn't see him either. I'd be afraid I'd tell him.

T. You'd have trouble facing it.

S2 It would bother me. I'd just stand there and start to cry if I say him. Maybe you can't hold it in any longer.

50 25 55

S. I can't answer that because I don't think I could ask someone esle to do it for me.

T. Why not?

S. I knew you were going to ask that. Why should you put that weight on someone else's shoulders? If you have enough courage to ask someone else to do it, it shouldn't take a great deal more to do it yourself.

78 25 55

S. 'Cause the chief told him to arrest drunken drivers.

T. And if you don't?

S. Because they told you to and if you don't the policeman could get in trouble.

80 25 55

S. And I'm so confused as to what is really right and what is really wrong. I feel in a sense that I know so little about what is right and what's wrong that I can't really say that Hitler was even bad. Or that we all have a right to our own lives. I don't know.

T. One thing, we are making a distinction between whether Hitler was bad or whether he was wrong.

S. I don't really know whether he was wrong. Just because I don't want to say anything definite. I'm afraid of, somebody could prove me wrong in a different way.

64 16 55

S. But a life is at stake.

T. Okay. It's not so easy. Like here is property, but here is life, so the conflict here is between life, Mike's life, or that man's car.

S. But if Mike died, then that guy could be charged with murder, because, you know . . .

62 16 55

S. Bring the kid there when he's well.

T. All right. This man, who refused to give the car was not legally wrong. You couldn't take him to court. But do you think he was wrong in any way?

S. He was just all wrong, because if that kid died, I don't know what he'd be charged with, but he be charged with something.

50 16 55

S's [Saving life more important than property]

T. Helping to save a life. But this guy refuses to help Mr. Jones and Mike out, to take them to the hospital. What is he doing? He was putting his property before someone else's life?

S's [Saving a life is more important.]

781655

- S. Well, I won't go so far as to beat him up and to take his car. He still might need it.
- T. So what you're saying is, this man's value, what he thought was most important was his property. His property was more important to him than somebody else's life. You said he was legally right. Right?
- S. [Agrees]

801655

- S. He could do anything he wanted to do with his own car. And still, he could just go along. Or he could have helped the man if he wanted to, but only if he wanted to.
- T. All right. Mr. Jones stole the car. Does Mr. Jones have the legal right to beat the man up and take his car?
- S. He doesn't have the legal right, no.

491655

- S. You got to have a reason for what you steal.
- T. Suppose you steal when you're hungry. You steal food, you're hungry, you don't have any money.
- S. There a reason for it.

751655

- S. That car may depend on that other man's life, too. He has to get a job. If he don't get it, he might die. You have to see what a person thinks is more valuable, a life or a car.
- T. So what you're saying is, circumstances don't make a difference. Stealing is stealing, no matter what.
- S's [Agree and disagree]

731655

- S1 He had a good reason, but that doesn't mean it's right.

T. What kind of reason are you talking about?

S2 A moral reason.

421655

S. So you won't do it again.

T. All right. This is one. Any other reason?

S. To make the other person feel good.

141655

S1 It's—there's not a law but—

T. What kind of law may be involved? It's not a legal law, although it may be, it doesn't have to be. What kind of law is it? What were you saying before, about your mother? What did she say?

S2 God's law.

541655

S. Cause this is the laws of this country and God has moral laws for everybody.

T. Oh, so what you're saying is—did you listen to what he's saying? Would you repeat what you said? It's very important.

S. God's law is for everyone and there's different laws in different countries, so God's law, his moral laws are for everyone.

161655

S1 But it still went outside God's law, going against the law. Thou shalt not steal.

T. So what you're saying is . . .

S2 There's a problem, it's still stealing.

151655

S. I'd give him a week [punishment].

T. What is the reason for punishment? Why do you think he needed to be punished? And should he be punished for what he did or to teach him next time not to do something like that?



S. Well, it [wouldn't] teach him to do that.

691655

S. Look, he couldn't help it that much for saving a life. He couldn't just stand there and —

T. What you're saying is to understand the situation he was in, the circumstances that he had, a boy who was dying. And you understand he didn't steal to be greedy, he did it to save a life, and you'd understand this and you'd let him off because what he was doing, saving a life, was moral. Is that right?

S. Yes.

434655

S. Justice is justice; if she wants to be on the right side of the law, she'll tell.

T. Why should she tell to be on the right side of the law?

S. It is fair. She had nothing to do with it and first of all, she should go with the law.

404655

S. If everyone stole from each other, it would be like that movie we saw. You would have no freedom. And another reason is that she does not have to take any responsibility, if she had nothing to do with it, just because it was her friend, she had nothing to do with it.

T. Doesn't she have an obligation to her friend?

S. She has an obligation more to tell, to save her friend.

664655

S. Why are we undecided. Either way it goes bad for her.

T. How does it go bad if she tells?

S. Because if she tells, then all her friends will think of her as a tattler and nobody will like her.

69 46 55

- S. Jill gave herself up. Sharon feels good because Jill is sacrificing herself.
- T. How can Jill give herself up? She has already copped out with the sweater and Sharon is left there.
- S. And Sharon was going to court and so she just gives herself up and nothing can go bad about Sharon except that she might go to court.

15 46 55

- S. I guess so.
- T. What kind of responsibility?
- S. Like what I am trying to say is that I don't think she has to say anything if she does not want to.

16 46 55

- S. Then Jill would say, I don't even know her, I just walked in the store off the street, and I don't know where she lives.
- T. Should she lie for a friend?
- S. Yes. Nothing severe could really happen.

54 46 55

- S. Jill steals, it is not justice, and if you have people you have to have justice, right?
- T. What do you mean by justice?
- S. Just the fairness of the whole, to society, otherwise we will have exactly what Greg is talking about, what Greg has been talking about.

14 46 55

- S. I have a moral that my mother told me: Do unto those who do unto you.
- T. How does that apply to Sharon here?
- S. I wouldn't tell because I have no reason to tell.

## **APPENDIX D**

### **Ratings on Four Facilitative Scales**

Table of Ratings on Facilitative Scales

<i>Samples</i>			<i>Empathy</i>	<i>Genuineness</i>	<i>Respect</i>	<i>Confrontation</i>
<i>Ind</i>	<i>Src</i>	<i>Mod</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Total</i>
14	16	55	5	0	5	0
15	16	55	5	0	3	0
16	16	55	2	0	7	0
42	16	55	4	0	3	0
49	16	55	6	0	6	6
50	16	55	5	0	2	10
54	16	55	0	2	8	0
62	16	55	7	0	3	3
64	16	55	11	0	3	6
69	16	55	11	4	8	0
73	16	55	6	0	2	2
75	16	55	9	0	3	6
78	16	55	7	0	6	6
80	16	55	4	0	0	8
1	25	55	6	0	2	0
8	25	55	8	0	3	0
11	25	55	7	0	0	0
17	25	55	0	0	0	10
18	25	55	7	0	2	0
28	25	55	2	0	4	0
32	25	55	6	0	4	0
37	25	55	6	0	0	0
41	25	55	6	0	0	0
50	25	55	4	0	6	2
51	25	55	4	0	9	0
62	25	55	11	0	3	0
64	25	55	4	0	0	7
65	25	55	2	0	5	10
73	25	55	10	0	6	6
76	25	55	6	0	0	0
78	25	55	4	0	0	2
80	25	55	4	0	0	2
82	25	55	6	0	0	0
85	25	55	5	0	6	0
87	25	55	10	0	6	3
92	25	55	4	0	3	7
99	25	55	10	0	7	7

14	46	55	4	0	2	3
15	46	55	4	0	2	0
16	46	55	4	0	0	6
40	46	55	4	0	0	10
43	46	55	5	0	3	3
54	46	55	6	0	3	0
66	46	55	4	0	2	7
69	46	55	6	4	0	10
13	98	92	3	0	6	6
14	98	92	6	0	5	0
15	98	92	2	8	11	0
16	98	92	5	0	3	1
20	98	92	2	13	4	0
25	98	92	5	0	2	0
35	98	92	7	0	6	0
40	98	92	7	0	6	0
42	98	92	4	0	0	3
43	98	92	5	0	4	0
54	98	92	6	0	6	0
55	98	92	2	0	3	6
58	98	92	10	0	5	3
59	98	92	8	0	3	0
66	98	92	7	0	3	0
69	98	92	3	7	9	0
71	98	92	4	0	3	4
73	98	92	5	0	3	4
74	98	92	2	0	9	0
89	98	92	11	7	4	0