

JAPANESE APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL POLITICS:

THE CASE OF POST-WAR INTELLECTUALS

by

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Japanese Approach to International Politics:

The Case of Post-War Intellectuals

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ABSTRACT

This thesis proposes to examine the intellectual basis of Japanese approaches to international affairs from 1945 to 1991. Through close examination of the major works on international politics by Japanese intellectuals, the thesis aims to discern how these approaches have been formulated and transformed through the years. The thesis also intends to arrive at some generalizations concerning the pattern of Japanese thinking in international affairs.

For the convenience of this analysis, the postwar period has been divided into five periods,

- (i) 1945-1950 Pacifism and Internationalism,
- (ii) 1950-1960 Neutralism and Nationalism,
- (iii) 1960-1970 Rise of Realism,
- (vi) 1970-1985 Interdependence, and,
- (v) 1985-1991 Japan in Search of a Role.

Detailed analysis of each period is presented in Chapter I.

In general, the thesis finds that the leading pattern has shifted from the highly idealistic theories of the immediate postwar period to the more pragmatic approaches in the high economic growth period during the 1960s and early 1970s, and then, to the theories of pluralism in the 1980s. Variations of idealistic approaches are analyzed in Chapter III; realism in Chapter IV; and pluralism in Chapter V.

However, through the entire period - almost half a century - Japanese theories of international relations can be characterized as;

- (i) mired by distorted expressions of nationalism,
- (ii) Asia-centered,
- (iii) United Nations-oriented,
- (iv) tending to be dictated by external factors, and
- (v) including heavy contributions by journalists

rather than professional academics.

This characterization of, and forecast for, Japanese theories of international politics are presented in Chapter VI.

Based on the generalizations derived from the analysis, the thesis concludes that Japanese theories of international politics in the years to come will most likely be focusing on the definition of Japan's role in the post-cold War international system. The question for Japanese intellectuals is no longer "to be or not to be," but "what and how." In other words, the theories will have to address the problems of how to transform Japan's economic power into what kinds of political influence in international affairs. This trend is already evident in the fact that the writings of political economists have become more abundant and influential in the last few years.

DEDICATION

For my wife, Miyoko Akai-Ohki, in appreciation of her
love, patience, and support.

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Chapter I

Introduction

Subject and Purpose of Analysis

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the intellectual basis of Japanese approaches to international politics from 1945 to 1991. The emergence of Japan as a major economic power has become increasingly problematic in international affairs in recent years, as friction between Japan and other advanced industrial nations has become intensified. For example, the increasing cases of "Japan bashing" in the United States and the accompanying backlash of "U.S. bashing" from the other side of the Pacific have noticeably added strain to the bilateral relationship. During the Gulf War Crisis of 1991, Japan was criticized by both the United States and European nations for its apparently lackluster commitment to the Allied effort. However, Japan is quick to point out that with an initial provision for 4 billion dollars, later increased to 13 billion dollars, it has in reality made a major contribution to the operation.

One of the reasons that these frictions persist is the nagging lack of clarity among other nations to the nature of Japan's political objectives in international affairs. This is very surprising, given Japan's

relatively stable record as a Western ally in the postwar period.

A low-key, non-confrontational approach to most controversial issues in international affairs has marked Japan's postwar diplomacy. At first glance, this might give the impression that Japan is without political objectives internationally except for the continuing maintenance of its strong economy. Nevertheless, the assessment that Japan has economic interests but not political interests is hardly convincing. The more appropriate analysis is that until recently, whatever Japanese international aspirations might have been, they were difficult to express due to the international constraints imposed on Japan. However, this situation has now completely changed because of the importance of Japanese economic power and the end of the Cold War system. Japan is now being asked to play a more active role in international politics. Therefore, a review and analysis of Japanese patterns of thought are now mandatory.

This thesis intends to provide a groundwork in increasing such an understanding. For this purpose, the thesis proposes to examine the major writings of Japanese intellectuals on international affairs in the postwar period. In essence, this thesis is an effort to retrace the postwar period through the eyes of Japanese

intellectuals. Many of the ideas presented by these intellectuals, though indirectly, would have influenced decision makers and public opinion in general. Moreover, the perceptions held by the intellectuals are at the same time a reflection of the often suppressed political ideals of the average Japanese, and also likely to form the basis of whatever political activism Japan engages in the future.

Scope of Analysis and Methodology

The writings examined in this study are the major works on international affairs written by Japanese intellectuals from 1945 to 1991. Considering the immense amount of literature by Japanese writers on international affairs, it was not realistic to examine every work published.

The writings examined have been selected for a number of reasons. One is the impact on the Japanese audience. Works that have had significant impact among Japanese readers, both positive and negative, are awarded special attention. A work is also selected for examination when it is deemed that it is representative of a group of works that form a recognizable pattern or trend of thought and behavior.

All works examined in the thesis were written by

Japanese writers in Japanese for basically a Japanese audience. These criteria were set for the reason that whatever distinctness Japanese approaches possess is likely to be formulated and enhanced through interactions in a "forum" of Japanese writers and audience. Hence English and other language publications by Japanese writers have been ignored.

Focus of Examination

The main components of this thesis are in Chapters II, III, IV, and V. The examination will attempt to define recognizable characteristics of the Japanese theories of international politics.

Chapter II will provide a general chronological overview of the various postwar Japanese writings on international affairs. For the sake of analysis, the postwar period is divided into five stages. The division is arbitrary, not necessarily coinciding with any historical period, but the distinction is justified by the existence of recognizable traits that distinguish each period in regard to our subject.

Through the historical review in Chapter II, three major patterns of thought will be identified. First is Idealism, most prevalent in the immediate and early post-war period. Realism (Pragmatism), became influential in

the 1960s and early 1970s, coinciding with the high economic growth era for Japan. More recent years have yet witnessed a general shift towards perspectives that can be identified as Pluralism. Each of these patterns of thought, throughout the period, appears in different variations. The variations of Idealism, Realism, and Pluralism will be examined in closer detail in Chapters II, III, and IV respectively.

Summary and Prospects

Chapter VI will provide generalizations of what can be considered as characteristics encompassing the different patterns of thought. The thesis finds that in general, Japanese intellectuals are relatively Asia-centered and United Nations-oriented in their outlook on international affairs. Other characteristics identified include the often distorted expressions of nationalism, and the high visibility and influence of writings by journalistic and non-academic intellectuals rather than the works of international relations specialists. Finally, the tendency of the Japanese theories to be influenced by external events and circumstances will be discussed.

The thesis will conclude with some forecasts for the direction that Japanese approaches are likely to take in the future. Recent writings by Japanese intellectuals

reveal how they are groping to define Japan's new role. The most standard role suggested by the intellectuals is the "supporter" role to the United States in the post-Cold War system, and it is quite unlikely that other more drastic approaches will gain popularity.

However, in these attempts to formulate what would be appropriate goals for Japan, we are able to get a generalized idea of what political aspirations Japan will strive for as it becomes a more active player in international politics.

The examination of the writings suggests that it is likely for Japan to put forward as its agenda the demand for a more collective and multi-lateral approach to decision-making vis-a-vis the United States and other Western nations. At the same time, the Asian region will continue to be an important area of concern for the Japanese. With the relative decline of the United States, Japan will likely shoulder more significant responsibilities in the region. However, it is less probable that Japan will develop aspirations to displace the United States as the regional hegemon. More likely, Japan will choose the strategy of involving the United States in an expanded regional scheme.

Chapter II

Chronological Summary and Examination of the Major Japanese Writings on International Affairs: 1945-1991

Pacifism and Internationalism (1945-1950)

In the immediate post-war years, the intellectual climate in Japan was that of self-retrospection. After August 15th, 1945, the Japanese people faced the inevitable question why the "indestructible Japan-the Holy Land of the Sun Goddess" ended up with the occupation by a foreign power.

It was especially difficult for the Japanese scholars and intellectuals who, after all, were the elite of the nation, to accept the responsibility of failing the nation. All intellectuals in Japan faced the unenviable task of self-retrospection if they as intellectuals had not failed miserably in the basic *raison d'etre* of their being. Understandably, before any other intellectual activity could resume, the problem had to be resolved in some way.

Shunpei Uyeyama has described the immediate postwar years in Japan as "the season of rejecting nationalism."¹ Japanese perspectives towards international politics in

¹ Uyeyama, Shunpei, *Nihon no Nashonarizumu* [Japan's Nationalism], Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, 1967, p.111. This and all subsequent quotations in the thesis have been translated from the Japanese original to English by myself.

this period were for the most part marked by internationalism and pacifism. During this period, both the Japanese intellectuals and the population in general sought to reflect on the reason as to why Japan as a nation had headed into the disastrous path of militarization that had culminated in the defeat in World War II.

The most influential of the writings in this regard were those by Masao Maruyama. In his *Chokokkashugi no Ronri to Shinri* (The Logic and Psychology of Ultra-Nationalism) published in 1946, Maruyama identified the cause of prewar Japanese failures as the particular nature of its nationalism, which he described as "ultra-nationalism."² In Maruyama's view, this ultra-nationalism of Japan was "pre-modern" in nature compared to the bourgeois nationalism of the Western nations in the 19th century.³

Maruyama concluded that the atrocities committed by the prewar regime occurred because the prewar Japanese state, compared to the advanced "bourgeois" states, was not *ein neutraler Staat*. Whereas a "neutral state" would not claim sovereignty over the internal value system of

² Maruyama, Masao, "Chokokkashugi no Ronri to Shinri [The Logic and Psychology of Ultra-Nationalism]" in *Sekai* (1946), pp.206-218.

³ *Ibid.*, pp.208-210. See also Maruyama, "Nihon ni okeru Nashonarizumu [Nationalism in Japan]" in Maruyama, et al, *Nihon no Nashonarizumu* [Japan's Nationalism], Tokyo: Kawade Shobo, 1953, pp.5-30.

an individual, the prewar Japanese state sought to base its authority on the control over these values rather than through formal legal structures. In this system of "ultra-nationalism," Maruyama explained, there existed a structure of vertical oppression downwards from those closer to the center of authority (i.e., the Emperor) to those under them, which was passed farther downwards. According to Maruyama, atrocities such as the massacre of Chinese civilians in the war should be understood from this perspective.

Maruyama's article established nationalism as something to disassociate with in the post-war Japan. At the same time, Maruyama's reasoning for the repressive nature of the prewar Japanese political system exonerated to a certain extent the sense of guilt possessed by the intellectuals towards the atrocities committed by Japan as a nation.

The reason why Maruyama's view had such a large impact on the intellectual climate was later explained by Kentaro Hayashi to be the fact that Maruyama's philosophy captured the basic sense of *danzetsu* (disassociation) of the intellectuals from the Japanese past.⁴ By placing the burden of responsibility on the nature of the Japanese

⁴ Hayashi, Kentaro, "Sengo no Imi [The Meaning of Apre-Gere]" in Hayashi, Kentaro and Yoshihiko Seki, *Sengo Nihon no Shiso to Seiji* [Thought and Politics in Postwar Japan], Tokyo: Jiyusha, 1971, pp.220-225.

state, Maruyama's article satisfied the need of Japanese intellectuals for a fresh new start.

Maruyama's view basically became the dominant view of the intellectuals in the early postwar years. Nationalism as an ideal or value became heavily suspect in this atmosphere, and thus writings in this period were overwhelmingly internationalistic in their viewpoint, with emphasis on the United Nations and pacifism.

At this point in time, ideological cleavages between the competing international principles, mainly socialism or communism on the one hand, and liberalism on the other, were not a critical issue as far as the Japanese were concerned. The world was not yet bipolarized, still rejoicing in the victory of the united front against fascism. The naiveté of the Japanese on this point can perhaps be illustrated by the fact that the leaders of the Japan Communist Party saw the U.S. troops as a "liberation army" at the onset of the Allied Occupation. The issue of Japan's security as a nation was not yet a major factor compared to the more pressing issue of parting with Japan's past of militarism. It is as though at this time Japanese were less concerned with the external threat to Japan than terminating the possibility of Japan falling back to the prewar militaristic path. Moreover, the overriding issue was that of rebuilding the domestic economy so devastated by the war. From the start

of the postwar era, it had soon become obvious that the economic reconstruction of Japan relied on whether it could gain access to the international trade envisioned to be once again booming under the new international order through the cooperation of the superpowers.

Along with this orientation towards internationalism, this period was marked by a strong sense of guilt towards Japan's Asian neighbors for prewar Japanese actions, best illustrated by the popular slogan *Ichioku Sozange* (The Whole Nation in Repentance) of this period. Combined with the rampages of the war that Japan herself had suffered, these sentiments understandably lead to the dominance of pacifist perspectives. Pacifism existed in many forms in the prewar years, but was never a significant factor in Japanese political life. In the immediate postwar years, the war-weary population embraced the idea with enthusiasm.

Pacifism in this postwar era was reflected in the new constitution in the form of Article 9 which forbids Japan from using military forces as a method of settling international disputes. From the fact that this postwar Japanese constitution was drafted and adopted under the order of the Allied Occupation, revisionists would later emphasize the fact that the new constitution was "thrust" on the Japanese. In terms of the origin and procedure with which the constitution went through, this may be an

accurate assessment. However, it is important to note that these principles of pacifism along with democracy manifested in the new constitution were widely accepted, and represented the basic leaning of the majority of intellectuals as well as the Japanese people in general at the time.

A typical example of the transformation of the general outlook of Japanese intellectuals in this period can be seen in the writings of Masamichi Royama.⁵ One of the leading political scientists throughout the prewar and postwar period, Royama was a highly idealistic and Utopian reformist early in his career. However, as he saw in the 1930s the advent of bloc economies and the breakdown of international democracy, he changed to a more nationalistic approach to international relations as he criticized "democracy" as nothing other than a thinly disguised propaganda for major Western powers that wished to maintain the status quo. Thus Royama justified Japanese international actions, especially in the Asian region as being "defensive and developmental" in nature, as opposed to the expansionist imperialism of the Western nations. Royama thus embraced the theory of power politics and shifted towards a more nationalistic view,

⁵ For a detailed examination of Royama's earlier career, see Matsuzawa, Koyo, "Minshushakaishugi no Hitobito - Royama Masamichi Hoka [The Social Democrats - Masamichi Royama and Others]" in *Shiso no Kagaku Kenkyukai, Kyodo Kenkyu: Tenko* [Joint Study: Conversions in Political Ideas], Vol.3, Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1962, pp.249-310.

emphasizing Asian regionalism and the "special role" for Japan in the region.⁶

After the defeat of Japan in World War II, reflecting back on his and Japan's failure in the prewar period, Royama renounced the nature of prewar Japanese state as pre-modern and "ultra-national," similar in tone and substance, to Maruyama. In this immediate postwar period, Royama had once again returned to an internationalist position in his approach to international politics.⁷ As a member of the *Heiwa Mondai Danwakai*, a group of Japanese scientists and scholars discussing the problem of peace, Royama became one of the advocates of pacifism and internationalism for Japan.

The espousal of internationalism in these early post-war years was reinforced by the general expectation that the post-war international economic order under the U.S. leadership would be global and comprehensive, built upon the recognition that the formation of bloc economies in the 1930s had contributed to the outbreak of World War II. The prospect of an economic system allowing unrestricted economic activities internationally offered hope for the reconstruction of the Japanese economy which had lost its traditional sphere for its market and resources. The national task, then, for Japan as a

⁶ Ibid., pp.249-256.

⁷ Ibid., pp.272-275.

defeated Axis nation, seemed to be in regaining respectability and be accepted as a member of this new global economic system. As the ideological conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union had not yet been fully anticipated, the geographical location of Japan lying between the spheres of influence of the two superpowers resulted in a reluctance on the part of most Japanese intellectuals to commit to one or the other side. Thus *Sengo Mondai Kenkyukai*, a study group of technocrats and economists, could declare in its report, *Nihon Keizai Saiken no Kihon Mondai* (The Basic Problems of Reconstructing the Japanese Economy), published in late 1945, that;

As Japan lies at the borders of two spheres, it will receive political and economic influence that are of complex nature, but at the same time it is not impossible to go one step further and assume a positive role by becoming the political and economic bridge between the two great spheres, or integrate and harmonize the two great social systems of the world in her own domestic system.⁸

Here existed a mixture of resignation to the new international order and equal amount of hope for the peace and stability that such a system would bring. Reflecting on this period, Akio Watanabe wrote that;

For the defeated Japanese nation, "one world" was both a dream and a reality. The reality part was that political unity among the Allies was expected to last for the time being, and the dream part was the hope of the world becoming truly one in terms of

⁸ Quoted in Watanabe, Akio, "Sengo Nihon no Shuppatsuten [The Starting Point of Postwar Japan]" in Watanabe, Akio, ed., *Nihon no Taigai Seisaku* [Foreign Policy of Postwar Japan], Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1985, pp.22-23.

economy and Japan being awarded ample opportunities to survive within this system.⁹

This earliest period of postwar Japan was thus marked by strong traces of idealism and internationalism. Realist perspectives were not evident as a significant force in the international approaches of the intellectuals during these years. As a result, when the international situation turned around dramatically with the beginning of the "Cold War" after 1947, the intellectual climate of Japan strongly manifested a reluctance to recognize the "Cold War" as a hard fact in international politics. Thus the discourse concerning the San Francisco Peace Treaty was dominated by writings calling *Zenmenkowa*, or for a comprehensive peace treaty with all the nations, including communist ones.

While this was a result of the dominant idealist view of not accepting the inevitability of a divided world, the criticism towards the "one-sided" approach to the peace treaty contained objections from an economic standpoint as well. This can be seen in the Declaration by the *Heiwa Mondai Kenkyukai* in April 1950 (published in *Sekai*);

The trade with China and Southeast Asia has crucial significance for the economic independence of Japan. Yet *Tandokukowa* would deprive Japan of the opportunity for this economic independence by making trade with these regions either impossible or extremely difficult. Therefore, a total peace treaty with all the nations is an absolute necessity for

⁹ Ibid., p.15.

economic independence of Japan.¹⁰

Tandokukowa, or peace treaties with only the non-communist nations was seen here as a threat to the economic well-being of Japan. In this period, along with the sense of liberation from the oppressive old regime, the Japanese people had been forced to go through the struggle to rise from the devastation of World War II. At a time when words like *yakeato* (burnt remains) or *yamiichi* (black market) was to be found in day-to-day conversation, a treaty that excluded potential trading partners, especially China, and made trade with the communist nations difficult was considered a huge blow to the Japanese economy in the long-run.

As can be seen above, in this period when Japan was under occupation, and had no real independent relations with the world, the concerns of intellectuals were directed inward. Discussions centered on how Japan was "backward", both politically and economically. Hence, there were not many efforts to articulate Japan's position in the world or relationships with other nations. The pacifism and internationalism of this period were to a certain extent results of the preoccupation with the domestic political system.

¹⁰ Quoted in Yamada, Shiro, *Sengo wo Kangaeru* [Reflecting on the Postwar Period], Tokyo: Seikeisha, 1978, p.89.

Neutralism and Nationalism (1950-1960)

The orientation towards internationalism and pacifism underwent transformation as the world lapsed into bipolarization through events such as the birth of the People's Republic of China in 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. The emergence of the "Cold War" benefited Japan insofar as it led to an earlier return to independence than most had predicted, but the failure of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951 to include the communist-bloc nations and the simultaneous signing of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Agreement (MSA) left a sense of incomplete independence in the eyes of many Japanese. Caught between the conflict between two superpowers each espousing universal and international principles, ideological cleavages in Japan became more apparent, and nationalist views which had hereto been suppressed began to resurface in this period.

The outbreak of the Korean War brought about the rearmament of Japan in the form of the National Police Reserve, later to become the Self Defense Force. Against this background, intellectuals ideologically adverse to communism became increasingly willing to accept the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Agreement. Masamichi Royama had once again accepted the reality of power politics in international relations. He wrote that he had in the preceding period been ruled by the psychological weight

of Japan having lost the war, but had now regained the sense of power politics. The optimistic view of the immediate postwar years that he had given to the establishment of international democracy through the workings of the United Nations had retreated into the background. Among intellectuals who came to similar conclusions as Royama and voiced their support for the Mutual Security Agreement arrangement included names such as Masamichi Inoki, Yoshihiko Seki, and Kentaro Hayashi.

However, this view was still in the minority. The popular opinion among Japanese intellectuals was that the Mutual Security Agreement was contrary to the ideals of the postwar Constitution, and actually increased the threat of war. Yet there was no denying of the severe disappointment towards the Cold War situation. As Uyeyama Shunpei observed, "internationalism had revealed itself in this period to be a slightly disguised form of nationalism of the superpowers."¹¹ In this context, pacifism in the previous period transformed itself into neutralism as many Japanese writers rejected the internationalism of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. A leading international relations scholar, Yoshikazu Sakamoto wrote that "as long as Japan is bound by the

¹¹ Uyeyama, Shunpei, "Shiso ni okeru 'Heiwa Kyozon' no Mondai [The Philosophical Problem of Peaceful Coexistence]" in Iwanami Shoten, ed., *Iwanami Koza: Gendai Shiso* [Iwanami Lectures: Modern Philosophy], Vol.11, Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1957, p.216.

(U.S.-Japan Security) Agreement, we must accept the fact that we will perish with the Americans."¹² In Sakamoto's view, nullification of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Agreement, thus neutralism, was the only viable option for Japanese security and the maintenance of peace in the Far East. Sakamoto's view was shared by many Japanese intellectuals at the time, especially those belonging to the left of the ideological spectrum, but also intellectuals not necessarily in tune with socialist ideals. Here we witness the emergence of a longing for an independent course for Japan moving away from internationalism. Shunpei Uyeyama wrote:

The leadership of the United States and the Soviet Union began to decline when the war dead-locked and no peace settlement was found. It was at this juncture that China and India emerged as new leaders.¹³

Writers such as Uyeyama saw the principle of Peaceful Coexistence advocated by China and India at the Bandung Conference in 1955 as the "basic principle in international politics to be supported by the whole world."¹⁴ The neutralism of Peaceful Coexistence was seen here as a positive effort towards peace. Moreover, the acceptance of pluralism inherent in the principle appeared as appropriate to the Japanese who were not

¹² Sakamoto, Yoshikazu, "Churitsu Nihon no Boei Koso [Defense Plan for a Neutral Japan]" in *Sekai*, No.164 (1959), p.38.

¹³ Uyeyama, "Shiso ni okeru 'Heiwa Kyozon' no Mondai" p.217.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p.218.

willing to commit to either side of the ideological dispute. That this principle was advocated by two major Asian powers appealed to the emotional Asian regionalism of many Japanese, now that internationalism was in decline.

Along with neutralism on one hand, this period can be characterized by the reemergence of a nationalist perspective in international politics on the other hand, basically reflecting different responses to the same concern over the autonomy of Japan in international politics.

Kentaro Hayashi gave a new theoretical justification to Japanese nationalism by introducing the concept of "national interest." Hayashi defined "national interest" as a synonym for *kokka risei* (*ragione di stato*), or the reason of state.¹⁵ In Hayashi's view, the traditional nation-state was not necessarily evil. Even the "balance of power" theorem had merits in maintaining international peace. For Hayashi, the individual sovereignty (including the right to use military force) of nation-states was justified as long as each nation had sufficiently democratic political systems.¹⁶

The nationalist perspective revived in this period

¹⁵ Hayashi, Kentaro, "Kokkateki Rieki no Kannen [The Ideals of National Interest]" in Iwanami Shoten, ed., *Iwanami Koza: Gendai Shiso*, Vol.3, p.140.

¹⁶ Ibid., pp.149-151.

had also contributed to the development of an atmosphere antagonistic to the Mutual Security Agreement in the late 1950s. It is important to note that while the movement was by its nature unavoidably anti-American, it also contained strong elements of anti-Soviet, and even anti-Communist China elements as well. By the late 1950s, the Japan Communist Party had lost its control over the student leaders at the forefront of the movement when they had broken away from the party mainly over concern for *taikokushugi* (superpower-ism) of the Soviet Union as exemplified in the invasion of Hungary. The mixture of neutralism and nationalism, or rather the longing for a more independent posture, is apparent from the following passage from Ikutaro Shimizu, one of the intellectual gurus in the anti-MSA movement of the period:

If we resign ourselves to the fact that Japan and the Japanese are mere objects to be bounced around by the flow of world events, or just passively hope to have neutrality recognized by our neighbors, we could never become neutral anyway, and even if it did happen, it would be only as a tool of the superpowers.¹⁷

This was also a period when the discipline of international relations (international politics) began to assert itself as a distinctive field of academic inquiry. *Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai* (Japan Association of International Relations) was established in December 1956

¹⁷ Shimizu, Ikutaro, "Koremade no Junen Korekara no Junen [The Last Ten Years, the Next Ten Years]" in *Sekai*, No.162 (1957) p.50.

with the specific idea of infusing scientific arguments into the debate over the Mutual Security Agreement. The first issue of its annual journal *Kokusai Seiji* (International Relations), published in 1957, not surprisingly bore the title of "Senso to Heiwa no Kenkyu" (Studies on War and Peace). The volume contained articles from various perspectives, from realism on the one hand, and idealism or Marxism on the other.

The Rise of Realism (1960-1970)

Having gained independence, and with its economic development well under way, Japan in the 1960s was faced with the task of defining its role in international politics. After the Mutual Security Agreement was revised, the recognition that Western European nations, too, sought autonomy in their diplomacy led to the rise of a perspective calling for stronger activism by Japan in international affairs.

Nationalism resurrected in the previous period began to assert itself furthermore, as the maximization of the Japanese "national interest" was actively sought. Some nationalist intellectuals sought to offer a "revision" of history. Fusao Hayashi, for example, caused considerable stir by the publication of his sensationally titled *Daitoa Senso Koteiron* (In Defense of the Great East Asian War) in 1964. Though recognizing the mistake

Japan made in having engaged in World War II, he gave partial justification to the war effort by claiming it to be a part of the long "liberation struggle for Asia."¹⁸ Most intellectuals refuted Hayashi's claim,¹⁹ but misgivings among Japanese intellectuals towards the two victorious superpowers of World War II gave cause for the rise of the notion that perhaps Japan should not be alone in taking the blame for the tragedy in Asia.

Though nationalist sentiments had once again gained considerable footing among the Japanese, it was the more moderate realists, or pragmatists, that took center stage in this period. As opposed to realism in the United States, where Hans Morgenthau criticized the American involvement in Vietnam from the viewpoint of "national interest," realism in Japan basically provided a reasonable justification for the actual international strategy of the Liberal Democratic Party's conservative government.

Authors such as Masataka Kosaka, Yonosuke Nagai, and Fuji Kamiya, came to the conclusion that the Mutual Security Agreement was in fact in accordance with the national interest of Japan, and therefore a realistic and acceptable option for Japan. These authors criticized the

¹⁸ See Hayashi, Fusao, *Daitoa Senso Koteiron* [In Defense of the Great East Asian War], Tokyo: Bancho Shobo, 1964.

¹⁹ See, for example, Uyeyama, Shunpei, *Daitoa Senso no Imi* [The Meaning of the Great East Asian War], Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, 1964.

generation of scholars preceding them for being caught too much in idealism or basing their arguments exclusively on ideologies.

Masataka Kosaka was one of the first postwar Japanese scholars not shying away from the "realist" label.²⁰ In Kosaka's view, as Japan can no longer rely on military supremacy, the future for Japan in international relations lay exclusively in the path towards what he describes as both "oceanic state" and "mercantile state." Kosaka accepted the "Cold War" and power politics as an unavoidable reality of international politics. Therefore, as Japan by itself lacks the power to escape from the conflict between the East and the West, a certain amount of dependence on the United States is unavoidable. As such, Japan will be forced to form a part of the U.S. sphere of influence, but the benefits of such an alliance are sufficient in terms of Japan's national interest, especially economic interest, to justify the loss of autonomy in international affairs.²¹

Fuji Kamiya analyzed the expansionist policies of the Soviet Union against the peace maintenance capabilities of the United States, while at the same time

²⁰ See Kosaka, Masataka, "Genjitsushugisha no Heiwaron [A Realist's View on Peace]" in *Chuo Koron*, Vol.78, No.1 (1963), pp.38-49.

²¹ See Kosaka, Masataka, "Kaiyo Kokka Nihon no Koso [Designs for Japan the Oceanic State]" in *Chuo Koron*, Vol.79, No.9 (1964), pp.48-80.

establishing that there are limitations to the U.S. capabilities. In this context, Kamiya proposed that it would be in the "national interest" of Japan to take over some of the burden of the United States, as it would strengthen Japan's political position vis-a-vis the United States.²²

Yonosuke Nagai, though originally not an expert on international relations, began to publish articles frequently on international politics and Japanese diplomacy from the late 1950s, and along with Kosaka, can be considered one of the leading realists of the time in the field of international politics. In Nagai's view, Japan lacked the objective conditions for the pacifist neutralism advocated by the idealists. Nagai suggested that this kind of neutralism in Japan would just create a power vacuum unacceptable to any of the three superpowers surrounding Japan, and hence was not a plausible option.²³

Nagai also refuted the nationalistic neutralism which in many cases advocated the nuclear option as well. Writing in response to calls for nuclear armament in the

²² See Kamiya, Fuji, "Nichibei Kankei no Gendankai ni Omou [Thoughts on the Present State of Japan-U.S. Relations]" in *Chuo Koron*, Vol.80, No.12 (1965), pp.50-60, and "70 Nendai Nihon no Kokusai Kankyo [The International Environment for Japan in the 1970s]" in *Chuo Koron*, Vol.84, No.10 (1969), pp.96-113.

²³ See Nagai, Yonosuke, *Heiwa no Daisho* [The Price of Peace], Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, 1967, pp.69-136.

mid-1960s, Nagai criticized this strategy in favor of remaining under the U.S. nuclear umbrella.²⁴ In Nagai's view, the postwar Japanese success was due to the concentration of all efforts on economic growth. From this viewpoint, Nagai argued that heavy militarization would be against Japan's own national interest. Not unlike Kosaka, Nagai wrote that "Japan should not be ashamed of its rather lop-sided economic diplomacy."²⁵

Interestingly enough, as the United States muddled through the Vietnam War, realists began to question retrospectively the U.S. occupation policy from the viewpoint of the Japanese "national interest."²⁶ Later, as the United States shifted to the policies of multipolarization, as witnessed by the Kissinger diplomacy, it appeared to be a reaffirmation of the traditional theory of balance of power and the recognition of the validity of national interests. Japanese realists saw this as an opportunity also to maximize the Japanese national interest.²⁷

²⁴ Ibid., pp.132-202.

²⁵ Ibid., p.108.

²⁶ For example, see Hayashi, Kentaro, "Heiwa no Ideorogi to Heiwa no Seisaku [The Ideology of Peace and the Policy of Peace]" in *Jiyu*, Vol.7, No.4 (1965), pp.10-24.

²⁷ Kentaro Hayashi declared in a symposium that "in terms of diplomacy, all that matters is whether it is in our interest or not. If it is beneficial for Japan to side with the U.S. (on the Vietnam issue), then we should." Quoted from Hayashi, Kentaro, et al, "Naniga Nashonaru Interesutoka [What is National Interest?]" in *Jiyu*, Vol.7, No.2 (1965), p.37.

These perspectives and interpretations put forward by the realists were criticized by those adhering to more idealistic views.²⁸ Yoshikazu Sakamoto, as opposed to the realists, saw in the economic development of Japan an opportunity for the nation to become more active in promoting the United Nations principles, where all nations cooperate in the maintenance of international peace. His position inherited and expanded upon the ideals of the intellectuals who opposed the "leaning to one side" approach to the peace treaty back in the early 1950s. Sakamoto wrote:

It has been said that the negotiations for the Peace Treaty was conducted under American Occupation and thus there were not many options open for the Japanese government and people. But even if those restrictions were considerable, was the possibility for choosing Zenmen Kowa (comprehensive peace treaty that included the communist nations) really that miniscule? In other words, is it totally meaningless to question the political responsibility of our government having going through with only a partial peace treaty? These questions must be examined. Even more so, we must realize that our options have opened up considerably since the time of MSA renewal.²⁹

²⁸ For an idealist criticism of the "national interest" concept, see for example, Taguchi, Fukuji, "Kokuekiron no Taito no Haikei to Imi [The Meaning Behind the Rise of the 'National Interest' Theory]" in *Chuo Koron*, Vol.81, No.8 (1966), pp.218-237, or Shibata, Takayoshi, "Nihon Seiji no Bunkyo to Togo [Polarization and Integration in Japanese Politics]" in *Gendai no Me*, Vol.7, No.9 (1966), pp.44-53. The latter two articles both argue from the viewpoint that "national interest" is merely class interest (of the bourgeois).

²⁹ Sakamoto, Yoshikazu, "Nihon Gaiko no Shisoteki Tenkan [The Philosophical Transformation of Japanese Diplomacy]" in *Kakujidai no Kokusai Seiji* [International Politics in the Nuclear Age], Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1971, p.298.

Responding to challenges from the realists and the changes in the international climate surrounding Japan, idealists began to show adjustments on their part. It is important to note that in the 1960s, international relations as a discipline achieved some degree of maturity in Japan.

In contrast to the earlier postwar period where the debate on international affairs was often led by the so-called *bunkajins* (roughly translated as intellectuals or opinion leaders) not necessarily experts in either political science or international relations, as the discourse became more specialized, writers who can be genuinely called experts became more visible and influential. This is both a reflection of the growth of the international relations as a discipline, and also suggested a move away from the heavily ideological discourse of the earlier period.

The international relations experts with idealist tendencies who became influential after this period included names such as Kinhide Mushakoji, Hiroharu Seki, Tadashi Kawata and Jun Nishikawa. These writers were united in their common adherence to peace as the primary value and their recognition of a need for more objective and empirical research, while avoiding overtly ideological polemics. Together, they constituted a

formidable group of scholars who found common grounds in *Heiwagaku* (Peace Studies). There were two trends in these idealists. Kinhide Mushakoji and Hiroharu Seki concentrated their efforts in mostly criticizing the realist concepts such as the balance of power theorem and the validity of the notion of the centrality of nation-states as actors in international politics. On the other hand, Tadashi Kawata and Jun Nishikawa sought to outline the economic aspects of the Cold War conflict and the problems it posed for the world and Japan.

As an international relations scholar with a strong idealist orientation, Kinhide Mushakoji emphasized the necessity to establish a discipline "apart from ideologies" and based on scientific research.³⁰ Mushakoji's writings were basically non-ideological and multi-valued. In Mushakoji's view, the ideal or principle that Japan as a nation should subscribe to was described as "multi-dimensional internationalism."³¹ Although the United Nations had basically failed to resolve international conflicts, Mushakoji still expressed some hope for the United Nations as a conflict resolution *mechanism*. He did not envision it as an apparatus uniting the world under one universal ideal; but rather,

³⁰ Mushakoji, Kinhide, "Nihon ni okeru Heiwa Kenkyu no Kadai [The Problems for Peace Studies in Japan]" in *Jiyu*, Vol.7, No.7 (1965), p.26.

³¹ Mushakoji, Kinhide, *Kokusai Seiji to Nihon* [International Politics and Japan], Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1967, p.154.

Mushakoji idealized a world where various conflicting values could somehow coexist. Combined with his view that Japan as a nation is in an awkward position of being an Asian nation but joining the ranks of advanced industrialized nations, Mushakoji suggested a more autonomous role for Japan, which he viewed to be possible by designating Japan's role in international relations as that of a bridge between the advanced countries of the West and the Third World, especially Asia.

Tadashi Kawata was another example of the newer international relations specialist with idealist leanings. Like Mushakoji, Kawata rejected an ideological approach in research, and as his academic background was originally in economics, he became one of the first Japanese writers to emphasize the economic aspects of international relations. In Kawata's view, to emphasize Japan's relations with Asia was logical from economic rationale as well. Kawata perceived Japan as a nation heavily dependent on overseas resources and markets, which reliance on the United States alone will ultimately fail to provide, due to the economic structures of the respective nations. Kawata argued that Japan will have to strengthen its autonomous position vis-a-vis the U.S. by establishing economic and political interdependence that goes beyond just U.S.-Japan relations, and encompassed

the entire Asian and Pacific region.³²

While Mushakoji and Kawata were examples of a newer trend in the idealist camp, there were writers with idealist tendencies such as Masamichi Inoki and Yoshihiko Seki who had gradually come to a position similar to the realists on security issues. Inoki pointed out that Japan needed to maintain a certain amount of harmonious relations with Communist China and the Soviet Union due to Japan's geographical location. But as Inoki was firmly committed to anti-communism in terms of ideology, Inoki was ultimately forced to advocate a cautious position in terms of security issues.³³ While regarding American world strategy somewhat wearily, especially in regard to its Asian policies, and cautioning Japan against being drawn into it, Inoki ultimately had to accept the U.S.-Japan Security Agreement as desirable and become its advocate. In Inoki's case, hope of autonomy for Japan was placed in the "comprehensive security" scheme.³⁴

³² See Kawata, Tadashi, *Teikokushugi to Kenryoku Seiji* [Imperialism and Power Politics], Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1963, pp.3-17, and also *Gunji Keizai to Heiwa Kenkyu* [Military Economy and Peace Research], Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1964, pp.69-134.

³³ See Inoki, Masamichi, "Marukusushugi to Boryoku [Marxism and Violence]" in *Sekai*, No.115 (1955), pp.64-73.

³⁴ See Inoki, Masamichi, "Nanboku Mondai to Sekai Heiwa [North-South Problem and World Peace]" in *Jiyu*, Vol.6, No.12 (1964), pp.37-47, and also "Tonan Azia ni Okeru Nihon no Shorai [Japan's Future in Southeast Asia]" in *Jiyu*, Vol.7, No.5 (1965), pp.42-51.

Interdependence (1970-1985)

From the 1960s onwards, Japan developed into one of the leading industrial nations in terms of its economic power. With this prosperity, the basic dissatisfaction with the political system often advanced by the intellectuals in the earlier years began to lose its validity. The stability of Japan as a liberal democracy in the Western mode became fully entrenched and increasingly difficult to refute.

However, the incidents in the 1970s, the two so-called "Nixon shocks" and the oil crises, gave the Japanese a strong impression that despite their economic success, their economic power was heavily dependent on international conditions, thus their "vulnerability" was high. The realization that the American hegemony was in decline led to a review of the basic strategy of depending heavily on the United States. In this context, the development of phenomena such as multi-polarization and interdependence were viewed by some authors as a positive factor for Japan's survival and for a more autonomous role in international politics.

This was also the period when Japan's economic dependence on the United States would begin to overshadow other aspects of the relationship. Realists such as Kosaka continued to advocate the Yoshida Doctrine of

economic-oriented foreign policies and non-activism in "high" politics issues. What they emphasized was the fact that the international situation that was favorable for Japan's postwar economic prominence was in itself, partly due to the specific political situations of the Cold War. Moreover, since the nature of the Japanese economy was highly dependent on foreign countries for both resources and markets, the exercise of significant political power was considered a questionable policy. Kosaka had characterized Japan as a *Tsusho Kokka* (Trading Nation), a nation whose reliance on a stable trade flow discouraged political adventurism.³⁵ Kosaka's views were in tune with the mainstream of the technocrats in the Japanese bureaucracy. Naohiro Amaya, a former bureaucrat in the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), labeled the reality of the Japanese nation as being a "merchant state" that cannot afford to be confrontational. Thus, in Amaya's view, Japan had to accept the fact that it could not become politically active in the way nations such as the United States could.³⁶

While the mainstream realists could not envision a

³⁵ See Kosaka, Masataka, "Tsusho Kokka Nihon no Unmei [The Fate of Japan the Trading State]", in *Chuo Koron*, Vol.90, No.11 (1975), pp.116-140.

³⁶ See Amaya, Naohiro, *Nihon Chonin Kokkaron* [The Merchant Nation], Tokyo: PHP Kenkyujo, 1989, pp.17-96, 143-164. Originally published in 1982 under the title *Nihon Kabusiki Gaisha: Nokosareta Sentaku* [Japan., Inc.: The Remaining Option] by the same publisher.

politically active role for Japan, others viewed the changes in the international situation as an opportunity for a stronger involvement for Japan. From the idealist perspective, Hiroharu Seki, for example, criticized the mainstream realist approach as failing to understand the transformation of the world taking place. In H. Seki's view, the development of interdependency had so dramatically altered the nature of international politics that the traditional Westphalian notion of a society of nation-states needed to be seriously adjusted. Seki's approach included the criticism that the classic international order based on power politics was Eurocentric, and was incapable of meeting the demands of the non-Euro-American nations. Thus, Seki upheld Japanese pacifism by emphasizing that "the birth of (postwar) Japan as a nation itself was a new phenomenon which could not be fully grasped through the notion of legitimacy of power of the traditional sovereign states."³⁷ Seki attempted to safeguard Japanese pacifism by linking it to the larger context of the transformation of global politics.

In Tadashi Kawata's view, Japan should and now did have the possibility of drawing up its own autonomous role by creating strong relations with many Third World

³⁷ Seki, Hiroharu, *Chikyu Seijigaku no Koso* [Designs for a Global Political Science], Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha, 1975, p.34.

states. Kawata viewed the appropriate principle as being non-military oriented so as not to aggravate the fears of Japan's neighboring nations. Kawata, as a political economist, basically approved of Japan's economic-oriented diplomacy towards Third World countries, especially Asia, but criticized the lack of ideals that accompanied economic aid, for example. Kawata emphasized that the major issues in international politics had shifted from Cold War conflicts to North-South economic disputes.³⁸

Apart from disagreements on the appropriate economic aid strategy, Kawata's view shared much in common with the principles described in "The Ideals of Economic Cooperation" published by Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1981. In this publication, economic cooperation was justified in terms of both humanistic and moralistic considerations, as well as in defending the Japanese national interest in the interdependent world. The paper asked the Japanese public to share this burden as a necessary cost for Japan both as a pacifist nation and an economic superpower, pointing to aid as a necessity to supplement Japan's heavy economic dependence overseas, and also emphasized Japan's history as a non-Western nation.

³⁸ See Kawata, Tadashi, *Nanboku Mondai* [The North-South Problem], Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1977, pp.52-76, 132-159.

Debate over the security of Japan became more of an issue as the reliability of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Agreement for Japan's defense became questionable. Strategic Studies became more visible and influential as writers such as Makoto Momoi and Hisahiko Okazaki pushed for "strategic thinking" in Japanese foreign policies.³⁹

Whereas these writers were apparently more concerned with the military aspects of security, there were efforts to define national security in terms of economic security as well. One of the outcomes of this was the "comprehensive security" scheme proposed by Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira. This scheme aimed to secure the precarious security of Japan by envisioning a pan-Pacific regional cooperation system, which in addition to Asia included the United States as well. The basic tenet of this scheme was to encourage interdependence among the nations of the region, resulting in a situation where the "vulnerability" of Japan would be lessened.

In Search of a Role (1985-1991)

The annual report published by the Japanese Ministry

³⁹ See Momoi, Makoto, *Senryakunaki Kokka wa Zassetsusuru* [A Nation without Strategy Will Suffer], Tokyo: Kobunsha, 1984, and Okazaki, Hisahiko, *Senryakuteki-Shiko towa Nanika* [Introduction to Strategic Thinking], Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, 1983.

of Foreign Affairs, *Waga Gaiko no Kinkyō* (On the Current Situation of Japanese Diplomacy)⁴⁰ has for most of the postwar period continuously proclaimed the three major principles of Japanese diplomacy as being, first, *kokuren-shugi* (adherence to the principles of the United Nations), second, *taibei-kyōcho* (the maintenance of harmonious relations with the United States), and third, *Azia to no rentai* (the solidarity with the Asian nations). Although these might seem to be the usual generalized proclamations expected of such documents, they are surprisingly indicative of the competing perspectives that the Japanese hold for international relations. The three slogans respectively represent the ultimate ideal, the uneasy but unavoidable reality, and the possible alternative that never seems to materialize.

The decline of American hegemony became increasingly apparent in the mid-1980s as the U.S. fell from creditor nation to debtor nation. At the same time, the reform policies of Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union created a strong sense of emergence of a new, but yet uncertain international order. In this period, more pressures were applied to Japan from abroad calling for "burden-sharing." The confrontational "Japan bashing" in the U.S. flared up nationalist sentiments in Japan, exemplified by Shintaro Ishihara and Akio Morita's *Japan That Can Say*

⁴⁰ Routinely referred to as *Gaiko Seisho* [Diplomatic Blue Book], Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

"No".⁴¹

Within the Japanese intellectuals, there had been an increasing amount of debate over the nature of the role that Japan can (or must) play in international politics, especially in economic terms. Tadashi Kawata now declared that "Japan is in some ways a *forerunner of the South*."⁴² Kawata gave a certain amount of justification to Japan's economic success by regarding it as having the positive effect of shifting the core of the world economy into the Asian/Pacific region. Although he cautioned Japan to avoid arousing fear of a renewed "Great East Asian Co-prosperity Scheme," Kawata envisioned a leadership role for Japan that would facilitate economic growth for the developing nations of the region.

Takashi Inoguchi proposed that Japan must change its postwar international approach, which had been based on ideas that were now not in tune with the reality of international circumstances. T.Inoguchi pointed out that Japan had to move away from "the idea that the stability of the international society is a given for Japan as long as it refrains from disruptive actions, and that Japan

⁴¹ Morita, Akio, and Shintaro Ishihara, *"NO" to Ieru Nihon* [Japan That Can Say "NO"], Tokyo: Kobunsha, 1984. The controversial book created uproars on both side of the Pacific with its accusation of, among other things, racism in American attitude towards Japan.

⁴² Kawata, Tadashi, *Shin Keizai Masatsu* [New Economic Frictions], Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1987, p.316.

can benefit infinitely from such a stable international order."⁴³ T.Inoguchi designated the appropriate role for Japan in the new era as a "supporter nation." This was derived from the recognition that despite the decline of its hegemony, no other nation is capable of usurping the leadership role of the United States. As Japan now had a responsibility to maintain the stability of the international system, Inoguchi called upon Japan to perform this "supporter" role by increasing its share in providing international "public" goods. T.Inoguchi discouraged confrontations in Japan's relations with U.S., as he emphasized the enormous cost to both nations if conflict became full-fledged.

Kuniko Y. Inoguchi saw in the decline of American hegemony a move towards a new international order where Japan was envisioned as playing a larger role in "the transformation from a centralized international system to a horizontal global community operated by joint leadership that is determined by the principles of policy coordination."⁴⁴ In a new era where "nations compete with its talent for coordination and harmony," Japan was seen possessing the capability to be a major player in international relations. In realistic terms, K.Inoguchi

⁴³ Inoguchi, Takashi, *Tadanori to Ikkokuhanei Shugi wo Norikoete* [Overcoming Free-Riding and Begger-Thy-Neighbor Philosophy], Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1987, p.134.

⁴⁴ Inoguchi, Kuniko Y., *Posuto-Haken Shisutemu to Nihon no Sentaku* [The Emerging Post-Hegemonic System and Japan's Choice], Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo, 1987, p.34.

proposed that Japan should become a more active proponent of the principle of peace and non-violence which it espouses silently. For K.Inoguchi, the question of whether Japan is a Western or an Asian nation did not really exist as she accepts the reality of Japan as an advanced industrialized nation. Therefore, the economic-oriented policies of Japan were basically not questioned, and accepted as a basic condition for Japanese existence. While K.Inoguchi acknowledged the basic relationship between the U.S. and Japan as a major essential for Japanese international relations, she foresaw an independent and more active role for Japan in the years to come.

In K.Inoguchi's view, the decline of American hegemony provided a chance for the creation of a new international order where Japan can have a more active and positive role to play. In this sense, K.Inoguchi inherited the approach to international relations held by earlier realists in the 1970s who saw the decline of the two superpowers as a chance for Japan to maximize its national interests.

The characteristics of writings in this period was that they now generally accepted the stability of the liberal democratic political system in present-day Japan, and were in favor of maintaining the status quo in that regard. On the other hand, they envisioned a more active

and autonomous role for Japan in the international arena, distinct from American policies. Yoshinobu Yamamoto, who has many publications concerning the interdependence phenomenon, acknowledged the importance of U.S.-Japanese relations for Japan, but still suggests a need for a "paradigm shift" in Japanese diplomacy.⁴⁵ Kuniko Y. Inoguchi called for Japan to participate in efforts to create a multi-valued, decentralized world system in the aftermath of what she saw as the general decline of the American hegemony, where Japan was portrayed as playing a supportive but autonomous role.

Summary

The early postwar years in Japan saw the flourishing of idealist perspectives. This was due to the prevalent attitude among intellectuals never to repeat the mistakes of prewar Japan. The prominence of idealism resulted in the general attitude among intellectuals of not accepting the Cold War as an unavoidable reality. However, as the Cold War dichotomy became obviously entrenched, idealism found itself increasingly at odds with the realities of the international circumstances and lost much of its credibility as a viable approach to international affairs for Japan.

⁴⁵ See Yamamoto, Yoshinobu, "Kokusai Shisutemu no Dotai to Nihon [The Dynamics of the International System and Japan]" in *Kokusai Mondai*, No.301 (1985), p.63.

Although idealism continued to be one of the major Japanese approaches, its significance was replaced by realism which emerged as the leading pattern of thought in the 1960s. Pragmatic in their approach, realist writers accepted the realities of the Cold War and the constraints it placed on Japan internationally. Recognizing that Japan lacks the power to shape its own destiny, the realist perspectives emphasized what Japan could gain in terms of "national interest" within that constraint.

Changes in the international environment that became evident in the 1970s onwards have placed on Japan a demand to assume a more active role in international politics. In this context, various attempts to define Japan's role have emerged. Neo-realists viewed the acceptance of more security responsibilities to be the answer, while idealists have come to emphasize foreign economic policies as the appropriate direction. As efforts to find a way to translate Japanese economic power into political influence continue, pluralist perspectives are aiming to define the appropriate role for Japan in more universal terms.

Chapter III

Idealism

Though the influence of idealism has eroded considerably over the postwar period, nevertheless it continues to mark the Japanese intellectual outlook concerning international relations. This chapter analyses the development and transformation of Japanese idealism in these years, and the impact it has put on the political debate in Japan.

Early Idealism

Postwar Japanese idealism was a direct reflection of Japan's wartime experiences. It goes without saying that the damages that Japan itself suffered and the atrocities that Japan committed against her neighboring Asian nations lead to a strong longing for pacifism and the negation of power politics.

The Japanese postwar period began in a climate where the idealism of pacifism and internationalism was predominant. This was primarily due to the wartime experience that Japan had just been through, but as mentioned before, also was backed by the somewhat optimistic view towards the international order. In this sense, the early Japanese postwar idealists attached great deal of hope towards the organization of United

Nations.

The domestic reforms carried out in Japan during the earlier part of the Occupation was seen, in this sense, as basically positive in terms of eradicating the premodern elements in Japanese society and state, thus transforming Japan into a "democratic" nation.

From this viewpoint, when the United States changed its Occupation policies due to Cold War concerns in the later part of the Occupation, these actions were often perceived as a "reverse course" culminating in the return of the prewar establishment and pushing Japan back to its military past. The idealism of the immediate postwar period was reflected directly in the preamble of the postwar constitution;

We have determined to preserve our security and existence by trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world.⁴⁶

Article 9 of the new constitution which forbade Japan from possessing the military for offensive purposes was based on this ideal. The radicalness of the content surprised even many of the war-weary Japanese. But there were comments hailing the new constitution for its grand ideals and the necessity of it. Law professor Kyou Tsunetou commented that;

The political system of Japan which exists under the present constitution (i.e., Meiji Constitution)

⁴⁶ *Nihonkoku Kenpo* [Japanese Consitution], *zenbun* [preamble].

permitted the existence of an irresponsible government lacking inclination towards peace which caused the Pacific War to break out. Therefore, a total reform of the constitution should be demanded, and as the deepest desire of the Japanese people is for Japan to rehabilitate itself and once again become an independent nation, this constitutional reform is not only a responsibility put on the shoulders of the Japanese people, but also a phenomenon which would have occurred naturally.⁴⁷

Given this perception, it is understandable why the linkage between domestic politics and international politics was emphasized by many intellectuals at the time. The development of a "democratic" political system was seen as a prerequisite for Japan to rehabilitate itself internationally and become a nation of pacifism.

Hence, as can be seen in Masao Maruyama's case, the outlook of the early idealists were characterized by their need to disassociate themselves with the prewar Japan. For the objective of eradicating the pre-modern elements of Japan and establishing a more democratic political system for Japan, a grand coalition of ideologically disparate intellectuals encompassing Marxists on the left to liberals on the right were able to form an "alliance" at the time. That such a coalition was possible demonstrates how the focus of attention in this period was fixed on the urgent need for the domestic transformation of Japan. Though, perhaps the influence of

⁴⁷ Tsunetou, Kyo, "Kaisei Kenpo no Kakumeiteki Seikaku [The Revolutionary Nature of the New Constitution]" (1947) in Chikuma Shobo, ed., *Sengo Shiso no Shuppatsu* [The Beginning of Postwar Philosophy], Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo, 1968, p.277.

Marxist thought in Japanese social sciences needs to be emphasized. Marxism was introduced fairly early into Japan. Maruyama summarized the cause of Marxist influence among Japanese intellectuals as follows;

(With Marxism) the intellectual world in Japan first gained a methodology to analyze social realities not just individually, but comprehensively, in relation with each other; and also the task of looking for the basic factor that is the prime mover of various historical phenomena.⁴⁸

Therefore, in the case of Japan, intellectuals were fairly familiar with Marxist thought already in the 1930s. Thus, when Shinzo Koizumi wrote *Shakaishugi Hyoron* (Critiques on Socialism) for the *Asahi Hyoron* in 1948, it was considered to be a sensational event since it was the first time that a major journal had published an article containing strong criticism of Marxism.⁴⁹ The high esteem Marxism held in the early post-war period is evident in this episode.

The prestige of Marxism was further elevated after the war by the fact that only Marxists, especially the Japan Communist Party (JCP), was able to maintain anything resembling continuous resistance to the militarization process of Japan in the 1930s. Even those who objected to Marxist ideology nonetheless held them in

⁴⁸ Quoted in Hayashi, K., "Sengo no Imi," p.222. See also Maruyama, Masao, *Nihon Seiji Shisoshi Kenkyu* [Studies in the History of Japanese Political Philosophy], Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1952, p.374.

⁴⁹ See also Koizumi, Shinzo, *Kono Ichinen* [This Year], Tokyo: Bungei Shunjusha, 1959, pp.205-211.

certain amount of awe. Thus in the postwar period, Marxism was regarded as a mainstay of idealism for many Japanese intellectuals.

Many intellectuals considered themselves somewhat at fault for the mistakes of prewar Japan, being in the position of the national elite, but yet not being able to mount serious resistance to the process of militarization that took place in the prewar period. Since many intellectuals had in the end been co-opted in varying degrees into the euphoria and ideals of *Shinkoku Nihon* (Japan the Holy Land), the resolve not to make the same mistake was understandably strong in the immediate postwar years. Shunsuke Tsurumi, a postwar generation student of Japanese political thought, thought that the failure of the intellectuals in the pre-war period was not so much due to their misplaced perceptions, but rather due to lack of courage in acting on their own convictions.⁵⁰ Indeed, the following comment by Masamichi Royama seems to validate Tsurumi's observation:

The most serious defect in Japanese political thought is the strong Japanese adaptability to situational changes. Japanese moral and judgment and ethical values can shift easily according to change of circumstances.⁵¹

This question as to why the Japanese, especially the intellectuals, failed to mount an effective resistance

⁵⁰ See Tsurumi, Shunsuke, et al, "Sengo Nihon no Shiso no Saikento [Reevaluating Postwar Japanese Thought]" Part 5, in *Chuo Koron*, Vol.73, No.11 (1958), pp.123-163.

⁵¹ Quoted in Matsuzawa, "Minshushugi no Hitobito," p.274.

against the trend towards militarization loomed large in these idealists' minds. It was Masao Maruyama who also made the term *shutaisei* (initiative) fashionable among the intellectuals. Maruyama emphasized the need for intellectuals to establish *shutaisei* in relation with reality. This was based on the recognition that the failures of prewar Japanese intellectuals lay in the fact that they were overwhelmed by the circumstances, and were thus prone to lose their objectivity. Maruyama thought that the maintenance of *shutaisei* could effectively safeguard against such problems.

Kentaro Hayashi later complained that Maruyama was responsible for what Hayashi considered an undue influence of Marxism and the Japan Communist Party in the early postwar period. In Hayashi's view, though Maruyama was not a genuine Marxist, his emphasis on this *shutaisei* prompted many Japanese intellectuals to join the JCP. Hayashi reasoned that since the Japan Communist Party was the only political organization of note to have totally resisted the militarization of Japan in the prewar years, Maruyama's emphasis on *shutaisei* inadvertently suggested activism through party membership.⁵² Validity of Hayashi's claim is debatable, but there was obviously a need for action and almost a religious belief in the need for upholding convictions and ideals despite the

⁵² Hayashi, K., "Sengo no Imi," pp.220-225.

circumstances.

The popularity of the perception that generative ideas create new realities is understandable in this regard. Maruyama would later write in criticism of "realists" who accepted the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Agreement that;

Reality is in basic something that is given... at the same time it is something that is created everyday. But it seems to me that only the first aspect comes forward in the discussion.⁵³

Similarly, Ikutaro Shimizu would write amidst the high days of the anti-MSA movement in the late 1950s that, "what is needed is the *shutaisei* for Japan to progress to the point of neutralism against all odds."⁵⁴ In other words, for Shimizu, neutralism was not a strategy based on the realities of the international situation, but rather an ideal that Japan must protect at any cost.

The early idealists also had a strong sense of rejection of the state. This was quite understandable, perhaps, as the state was seen by many as the culprit for the sufferings of the Japanese and Asian people. In this regard, Japanese idealism included a transnational aspect, at least in the normative sense. Thus, idealism tended to put forward a confrontational approach against the existing government and political system. This would

⁵³ Maruyama, Masao, "Genjitsushugi no Kansei [The Pitfalls of Realism]" in *Sekai*, No.77 (1952), p.123.

⁵⁴ Shimizu, "Koremade no Junen Korekara no Junen," p.63.

intensify after the reversal in U.S. Occupation policy towards Japan due to the Cold War. SCAP policies such as the "red-purge" and the order to halt the scheduled General Strike in 1946 intensified the perception among intellectuals that the U.S. was forcing Japan into a "reverse course" which strengthened the already significant anti-U.S. sentiment stemming from the years of Occupation.

The early idealists were not willing to accept the Cold War conflict as a reality of the international politics at the time. For example, in the *Mitabi Heiwa ni Tsuite* (Thrice on the Problem of Peace), a plea published by Japanese intellectuals and scientists, the idealist position of "how one thinks relates dramatically to the problem of peace" was emphasized.⁵⁵

Neutralism

The predominance of the Zenmenkowaron in the debate over the San Francisco Peace Treaty can be traced to the sense of strong dissatisfaction at being thrust into the Cold War dichotomy. The idealists were more sympathetic to the communist bloc at least in the earlier postwar period. The occupation had created a certain amount of anti-U.S. feeling, which became fueled by the imposition of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the U.S.-Japan

⁵⁵ Quoted in Yamada, *Sengo wo Kangaeru*, p.63.

Mutual Security Agreement.

Objection to the imposition of the Mutual Security Agreement fueled the sentiment against the United States. In such an intellectual climate, the Leninist assumption that from the viewpoint of the social sciences, "it is a common understanding that socialist nations are more pacifist"⁵⁶ than liberal democracies had initially more credibility than one would suppose now. This view was seriously discredited by the actions of the Soviet Union as in its invasion of Hungary. The universalism of Soviet communism lost much of its prestige and legitimacy in the eyes of most Japanese. The optimistic internationalism of the previous period became questioned. Shunpei Uyeyama would write in criticism of Maruyama's internationalism that;

Though his position might seem international at first glance, his internationalism seems to lack thoroughness, as evidenced by the fact that he adopts a criteria of values that is based on the civilizations of the Western part of Eurasia, and thus is prone to regional prejudices.⁵⁷

In such a context, a general atmosphere of sympathy for the nationalism of the Asian nations became evident. The Bandung conference in 1955 was greeted with unusual enthusiasm by many Japanese intellectuals.

⁵⁶ Shimizu, Ikutaro, "Watashitachi nimo Nanigotokawa Nashiuru [We Too Can Do Something]" in *Sekai* (July 1963) p.73.

⁵⁷ Uyeyama, Shunpei, *Nihon no Shiso* [Japanese Thought], Tokyo: The Simul Press, 1971, p.308.

Dissatisfaction with either of the universalisms offered by the two superpowers lead to a call for neutralism. This satisfied both the pacifism and the sense of guilt to the Asian neighbors stemming from the World War II. At the same time, those who viewed the Mutual Security Agreement as being detrimental to Japanese pacifism sought alternative security arrangements that would not lead to Japan's militarization. Yoshikazu Sakamoto's proposal for Japan to be protected by a United Nations Peace Keeping Forces was one such idea. But as the presence of either of the superpowers' forces would be uncomfortable for not only Japan but also for the superpowers themselves, Sakamoto recommended that this Peace Keeping Force be composed in general by the non-superpower forces. Sakamoto also proposed that the existing Self Defense Force be incorporated into this Peace Keeping Force, whereby Japan would be able to contribute to its own defense efforts without the stigma of possibly violating Article 9 of the Constitution.⁵⁸

Peace Studies

With the advent of the high growth era of the economy in the 1960s, ideological debate over the

⁵⁸ See Sakamoto, "Churitsu Nippon no Boei Koso," pp.34-47.

desirability of either communism or liberal democracy for Japan lost much of its relevance to the situation. With the end of the 1960 anti-MSA movement, the influence of the old idealists such as Masao Maruyama, Shunsuke Tsurumi, and Ikutaro Shimizu as opinion leaders became greatly diminished.

In their stead, the emerging crop of international relations scholars came to occupy the center stage of the idealist camp. Writers of this generation are differentiated from the earlier idealists in that they gave theoretical sophistication to their argument. The influence of the behavioral science revolution had reached Japan in this period, and these new idealists utilized these new analytical tools, such as game theory, perception models, and the bureaucratic politics model in their study of international politics. Whereas the pacifism and neutralism of the earlier generation were often a reflection derived from the war-time experience of the Japanese, these "new" idealists aimed to establish peace research, with its emphasis on peace as the value to be prioritized, as a scientific discipline. They included writers such as Sakamoto Yoshikazu and Takeshi Ishida, who already had become leading figures in the earlier period, as well as new names such as Kinhide Mushakoji, Hiroharu Seki, and Tadashi Kawata.

Neutralism for Japan as a desirable goal was still

espoused by most idealists, but the emphasis shifted towards the advocacy of disarmament, especially with regard to nuclear weapons. In this period, the idealist concerns were mostly directed towards preserving the pacifist ideal of the postwar Japanese constitution, at least for Japan domestically. In the context of Japan's position in the Cold War system, the idealists tried to minimize the inevitability of the conflict between communism and liberal democracy. The idealists often criticized the extension of the Cold War conflict into Asia as being a misguided Eurocentric application of the traditional Westphalian system to the Asian region.

Perhaps Kinhide Mushakoji best represented the change in this era by his call for the establishment of peace research that was not mired by overtly ideological discourse. Domestically, he hoped for the emergence of "pluralistic diplomatic attitudes, rather than a powerfully homogenized consensus, which would be able to relate to the rising pluralistic tendencies in the international environment." He also criticized the often intuitive and sentimental arguments put forward by *Bunkajin* and others. Mushakoji warned that "sentimental pacifism" had the possibility of suddenly transforming itself into "sentimental jingoism". He pointed out that there were nationalist forces who opposed the existence of the Mutual Security Agreement, and therefore merely

voicing concerns over MSA was counterproductive to the establishment of rational discussion of the matter. Thus he proposed for the Japanese a scientific approach to the problems of peace similar to that of the works by Kenneth E. Boulding.⁵⁹

Though accepting that "Japan does not have the same range of options that the United States has," Mushakoji nevertheless proposed a change in Japanese security policies based on his assessment that the system of deterrence was increasingly losing much of its effectiveness with the emergence of China as the third pole. His strategy for Japan in the multi-polar world involved "non-military security" policies. He emphasized that Japan needed to "make the maintenance of peace in the East Asian region the primary policy objective, rather than concerns about its reputation or economic interests in East Asia and Southeast Asia."⁶⁰ In order to achieve this objective, Mushakoji thought that Japan needed to adopt a strategy of striving for "changing the situation from one dangerous game to a somewhat less dangerous game."⁶¹ Mushakoji called this the "multi-stage-game" strategy. An abrupt action that disrupted the present balance suddenly was considered by Mushakoji to

⁵⁹ Mushakoji, "Nihon ni okeru Heiwa Kenkyu no Kadai," p.22.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p.25.

⁶¹ Mushakoji, Kinhide, *Takyokuka-Jidai no Nihon Gaiko* [Japanese Diplomacy in the Multipolar Age], Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1971, p.68-82.

be dangerous in international politics.

The effectiveness of the Mutual Security Agreement to safeguard Japanese security in the nuclear age was also questioned by these idealists. Yoshikazu Sakamoto and Hiroharu Seki were representatives of this school. At this point, the focus was on East-West relations and the effort to minimize the possibility of nuclear war between the superpowers was the overriding issue for the idealists.

Yoshikazu Sakamoto continued his advocacy for nuclear disarmament. In his article *Kenryoku Seiji wo Koete* (Beyond Power Politics) published in 1966, Sakamoto challenged the realist assumptions of power politics. In his view, the nation state cannot be the ultimate actor-unit in international politics. Nor is the international society dictated by laws of the jungle. Applying the mini-max theorem in the Prisoner's Dilemma to the arms race, he criticized the realist approach as irrational and unrealistic. His pacifism was derived from Charles Osgood's idea of "a graduated unilateral initiative for peace." The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, according to Sakamoto, was resolved due to a certain willingness on Khrushchev's part to trust Kennedy's pledge not to invade Cuba. Similarly, Sakamoto saw the unilateral initiative in Kennedy's willingness to halt nuclear testing in the

atmosphere in 1963.⁶²

Similarly, Hiroharu Seki questioned the rationality of nuclear deterrence by postulating that a balance of power does not necessarily prevent an arms build-up. In Seki's view, the balance of power system has the possibility of ever-increasing its instability because the "objective" balance of power more often than not differs from the "subjective" image of balance of power held by the actors involved. Thus, he notes that peace is not achieved when a balance of power is realized. Rather, peace occurs only when one of the protagonists has definite superiority over the others. From this assessment Seki questioned both the wisdom and morality of the balance of power approach to international politics.⁶³

The new Mutual Security Agreement of 1960 went further than the original MSA in incorporating economic aspects into the security arrangement. From this viewpoint, Tadashi Kawata criticized the Japanese economy for functioning as an "outpost for American imperialism."⁶⁴ Thus Kawata stated that "the *shinshutsu*

⁶² Sakamoto, Yoshikazu, "Kenryoku Seiji wo Koeru Michi [Beyond Power Politics]" in *Sekai*, No.256 (1966), pp.66-76.

⁶³ Seki, Hiroharu, *Kiki no Ninshiki* [Perception of Crisis], Tokyo: Fukumura Shuppan, 1969, pp.46-95. See also Seki, Hiroharu, *Kokusai Taikeiron no Kiso* [The Basics of International System Theory], Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1969, pp.42-57.

⁶⁴ Kawata, *Gunji Keizai to Heiwa Kenkyu*, p.304.

(advance) of private firms to developing nations has the possibility of leading to the road towards imperialism."⁶⁵ Kawata also warned against the rise of "expansionist nationalism" that accompanied the success of the Japanese economy.⁶⁶ Pointing to the small amount of Chinese trade with Japan, he called for active measures to rectify the situation.

The transnational perspective had appeal for the idealists with their leaning towards peace research and the placing of priority on peace as a value in international politics. Thus, in this line of thought, the emphasis on normative aspects preceded the sophistication of theory. Indeed, the normative aspect of emphasis away from the nation-state had already gained considerable footing in the Japanese perspective dating from the immediate postwar period. Remember that Maruyama's theses included a strong indictment of the state. Of the later idealists, Takeshi Ishida was probably one of the strongest advocates of the peace movement from the citizen's level. Through the examination of the efforts by Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Ishida sought the possibility of introducing

⁶⁵ Kawata, Tadashi, "Keizai no Kokusaika to Nihon no Shihon Shinshutsu [The Internationalization of the Economy and the Advance of Japanese Capital]" in *Sekai* (1977), p.41.

⁶⁶ Kawata, Tadashi, "Keizai Kyoryoku toiu Nano Keizai Shinshutsu [Another Name for Economic Cooperation is Economic Advance]" in *Sekai* (November 1969), p.25.

non-violent tactics for the pacifist movement at the grassroots level.⁶⁷

New Emphasis on the Economy and North-South Relations

The situation for the idealists went through change in the 1970s, as did the realists. With the establishment of Japan as an economic power and the relative decline of U.S. hegemony and the advent of multipolarization, the Cold War situation transformed dramatically. The transformation of the Cold War system validated many of the idealists' claims. Giving the economic oriented policies of the Liberal Democratic Party certain amount of credit, the idealist camp nevertheless pronounced the traditional realist approach as being obsolete. But, idealists, too, were now involved in debate over the apparently increasingly significant role of Japan in international politics.

Against the argument put forward by the Neo-realists that Japan was no longer a "small state," and therefore must accept "burden-sharing," including greater responsibility for its own security, idealists countered by emphasizing the economic irrationality of an arms build-up. The idealists also began to emphasize the North-South problem in the 1970s. One of the works in

⁶⁷ See Ishida, Takeshi, *Heiwa no Seijigaku* [The Politics of Peace], Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1968.

this area was Hiroharu Seki's *Chikyuu Seijigaku no Koso* (Design for Global Political Science) in 1977.⁶⁸ This perspective had already been put forward in earlier idealist writings by Mushakoji and Kawata, but it became more apparent in this period.

Trained as an economist, Kawata had already tried to incorporate the economic perspective into international relations in the 1960s. For Kawata, the demise of the Cold War system was none other than the trend towards the negation of a world order that centered on the superpowers. The end of the Vietnam War and the rising "oil nationalism" in the Middle East symbolized for Kawata the emerging victory of the principles of self-determination and anti-hegemonism. As military power began to lose its effectiveness as a political tool, Kawata noticed a trend to use economic power such as natural resources, capital, and technology as a tool in international politics. In such a context, Kawata predicted that the world would face stronger demands from the nations of the Third World for a more equitable distribution of wealth. These demands, justified in Kawata's view, would be put forward in the agenda. This meant for Japan that the important international conditions that enabled the high growth of the Japanese economy was increasingly being eroded, as access to cheap

⁶⁸ See Seki, H., *Chikyuu Seijigaku no Koso*, pp.74-111.

resources was no longer guaranteed. The oil crises had exposed Japan's vulnerability to conflict between the North and the South.

From this viewpoint, Kawata argued that it was logical for Japan to make serious attempts to accommodate the demands put forward by the Third World nations. This made sense, not only from the moralistic point of view, but also from the management tactics of the Japanese economy. Therefore, Kawata proposed an economic diplomacy that contributes to the transformation of the international economic order, that takes into account Third World demands such as the eradication of North-South disparity in wealth, and that establishes economic independence for the developing nations.

Kawata stressed that "Japan should never engage in a role that heightens the tension in Asia." In Kawata's eyes, the Mutual Security Agreement was not only "a typical leftover of the Cold War diplomacy of the past," but also smacked of a bilateral military alliance that was itself tension-creating. Thus Kawata called for replacing the MSA with an equality-based and non-military "U.S.-Japan Friendship Treaty." In the long run, Kawata proposed, the final objective for Japan must be the establishment of a multi-lateral security arrangement, based on the principles of self-determination and anti-hegemonism, which he calls the "Asian Peace Keeping

Organization."

From his perspective of the negation of power politics, Yoshikazu Sakamoto saw the calls for military activism espoused by some Neo-realists as a "rising possibility of Japan reverting to a *zairaigata* (traditional-style) nation." In his view, the system of superpower dominance over the smaller nations was beginning to crumble because of the high cost to the superpowers. Citing the Soviet and Chinese role in the Vietnam-Cambodian conflict as an example, Sakamoto stressed the "rising possibility of counter-maneuvering of the smaller nations over the superpowers."⁶⁹ According to Sakamoto, both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China were drawn into the conflict rather unwillingly. Sakamoto thought that the smaller nations had become more important actors rather than mere subjects of international relations.

In this context, Sakamoto designated Japan as a *chukan kokka* (middle nation). The two aspects of the "middle nation" involved Japan's roles as both a military middle power and an economic superpower at the same time. The first aspect meant for Sakamoto that Japan, too, had the possibility of assuming an independent course in

⁶⁹ Sakamoto, Yoshikazu, "Nihon no Ikikata: Chukan Kokka no Kokumin no Ichi [How Japan Should Exist: The Position of the People of a Middle Nation]" in *Sekai*, No.398 (1978), p.37.

international relations without building up military capabilities. The second aspect warned of the possibility of Japan itself becoming an "economic invader" for the smaller nations. Sakamoto wrote;

The people of Japan must assume the attitude that the responsibility of resistance finally rests with the citizens themselves rather than the government or the Self Defense Force.⁷⁰

Sakamoto warned against the transformation of the Cold War military system into what he described as "the new international military order."⁷¹ Under the détente-type arms build-up, the hierarchical system of oppression by the superpowers on the top over the Third World nations at the bottom is either maintained or intensified.

Takehiko Kamo is another idealist now teaching at the University of Tokyo. Where Kamo's priority lies is clear in the following passage;

It is true that Japan has become an influential power among the advanced industrial nations, as evidenced by the recent Summit meetings, and has to shoulder appropriate responsibilities. And it is true that the significance of the Japan-U.S. relations for Japanese diplomacy has not basically been shaken. But, even then, it is not wise for Japan to keep on making diplomatic choices that consequently results in heightening the arms race between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.⁷²

⁷⁰ Ibid., pp.44-45.

⁷¹ Sakamoto, Yoshikazu, *Gunshuku no Seijigaku* [The Politics of Arms-Reduction], Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1982, pp.25-40.

⁷² Kamo, Takehiko, *Henkaku no Jidai no Gaiko to Naisei* [Diplomacy and Domestic Politics in the Age of Transformation], Tokyo: Seibundo, 1987, p.189.

Kamo sees the world as undergoing a structural change from the Cold War System to the Interdependence System. The Cold War System and the Interdependence System have qualitative differences in the level of power structure. He believes that the old dichotomy model between the "free world" and the "communist world" has lost its validity due to the pluralistic network that has economic relations at its center. Kamo also views the prescriptions by the military realists for up-grading Japanese military capabilities as "a political stance which tries to isolate itself from the interdependence of world politics."⁷³ The U.S.-Japan frictions are seen by Kamo as more of an "economic problem." For example, in regard to the U.S. criticism of Japan as a "free-loader" in security matters, he points out that the American intention is not to have a qualitative level-up of Japanese military capabilities.⁷⁴

At the same time, traditional pacifist argument that the Self Defense Force is unconstitutional is seen by Kamo as counterproductive. The appropriate goal for Kamo is to reduce the size of the SDF. For Kamo, the "potential threat" to Japan is not from any external forces, but from the rise of the "philosophy of arms

⁷³ Kamo, Takehiko, *Gunshuku to Heiwa no Koso: Kokusai Seijigaku kara no Sekkin* [Designs for Arms-Reduction and Peace: Approaches from International Political Science], Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha, 1982, p.183.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.188-194.

build-up" that is a result of the "ambivalent economic nationalism" within Japan. Kamo calls this economic nationalism ambivalent, because it is based on the recognition of Japanese economic power which more or less was able to withstand the Oil Crises in the 1970s, but at the same time continuously contributed to anxiety over the supply of overseas natural resources.⁷⁵

Having defined the goal of Japanese security policies as "defending the quality of life for individual citizens," Kamo asserts that Japan needs to apply the idea of interdependence "to secure the quality of life for citizens of other nations, too, which ultimately will lead to the security of our own citizens." Kamo stresses the need for Japan to have a peace strategy that involves both "intellectual design and material costs."⁷⁶

Kamo realizes that the negotiation for arms reduction has the potential to collide with the U.S. world strategy, especially in the Far East. As Kamo recognizes the significant level of economic interdependence between the U.S. and Japan, he argues that Japan should adopt a two-phase plan for arms reduction; 1) continuation of the alliance but with the withdrawal of American troops from Okinawa and other bases and 2) the transformation of the Mutual Security

⁷⁵ Ibid., pp.207-210.

⁷⁶ Ibid., pp.229-235.

Agreement into a non-military treaty.⁷⁷ Kamo sees the need for economic concessions to the United States, such as the opening-up of the Japanese domestic agricultural market. This is necessary in order to reconstruct the declining world order. He sees the present day as the "age of negotiation."⁷⁸

Summary

The idealism in postwar Japan had as its starting point the strong anti-war feeling of the immediate postwar period. It had at its center, the strong resolve not to repeat the mistakes of the wartime Japanese international action, as evidenced by the emphasis put on *shutaisei*. However this resolve was challenged seriously by the changed realities of international circumstances surrounding Japan.

In this context, idealism in Japan first gravitated towards the direction of neutralism, which was an effort to distance Japan from the Cold War divisions. However, the international circumstances surrounding Japan made it difficult for neutralism to become a plausible policy for Japan. With the revising of the U.S-Japan Mutual Security Agreement in 1960, and the economic growth of Japan as a member of the liberal democracies, the question of whether Japan should reside within the American sphere of

⁷⁷ Ibid., pp.201-206.

⁷⁸ Ibid., pp.137-140.

interest became increasingly irrelevant. Idealism in the 1960s became more or less concerned with the problems of deterring war in general, as seen in the flourishing of peace studies in this period. These idealists was concerned about how the potential nuclear war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union might devastate Japan as well.

Idealism in these two periods were considerably inward-looking in the sense that the focus of attention was how to preserve the ideals of pacifism at least in Japan. Ironically, the existence of the Mutual Security Agreement itself enabled Japan to preserve the pacifist ideal domestically, as it was spared the responsibility of shouldering its own defense.

This inwardness was challenged in the 1970s and 1980s as Japan came to occupy a significant position in international affairs, and thus Japan assuming more international responsibility was increasingly called for. The idealism in this period had to face the dilemma that an increased role for Japan might mean that Japan must become to a certain extent a military power, as espoused by the Neo-realists emerged in this period. This was unacceptable for the idealists, and challenged to define Japan's possible contribution on their own terms, the idealists of this period began to emphasize the economic aspects of international relations. This was logical from the idealists' viewpoint of safe-guarding pacifism in

Japan, and expanding the inward-looking pacifism to the international level by relating it to the problems of North-South dichotomy.

The question for idealists in Japan remains that of how to formulate plans of action that are acceptable internationally. In this regard, they are being asked to reconsider some of their hitherto rigid positions. In this sense, those idealists looking for such venues are increasingly likely to assume positions similar to that of the pluralists.

Chapter IV

Realism

The mainstream of postwar Japanese approaches to international politics, at least in terms of actual policy input, has been realism and its variants. This chapter will analyze the emergence and development of Japanese realism and attempts to characterize it.

Precursors of Realism

The emergence and development of Japanese realism occurred in the mid-1950s and the 1960s. However its forerunners can be found in the *tandokukowaronjas*, or those who accepted the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which excluded settlements with the socialist nations, and the accompanying U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Agreement. In fact most of these writers, such as Masamichi Royama, Masamichi Inoki, Yoshihiko Seki, and Kentaro Hayashi, would gravitate in the later period to positions similar to the realists.

However, the leading *tandokukowaronjas*, in general, belonged to the liberal/social democrat school of thought in terms of prewar lineage, and had in the immediate postwar period formed a part of the grand idealist coalition aiming to eradicate the "premodern" nature of Japan, in line with the Maruyama thesis. Therefore, in terms of theoretical orientation and

initial starting-point in the postwar period, their outlook was more idealistic than realistic. But the rising tension of the Cold War gradually forced them to modify their idealism in the direction of a more realist approach to international politics.

Writers like Royama and Inoki accepted the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the accompanying U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Agreement as a matter of political expediency. With the breakout of the Korean war, Royama, for example, thought that the possibility of achieving a comprehensive peace treaty had evaporated, or at least seriously worsened. In Royama's view, with a "heated war" now becoming a real possibility, Japan had to choose between either "the free world" or "the enslaved world."⁷⁹ Royama had determined that the issue concerning the peace treaty came down "to which camp will Japan be included."⁸⁰ On this point, Royama had decidedly been in favor of the liberal democracies of the West. As a social democrat, he thought that "the activity and the actions of the Communist party have prevented the merging of honest, moderate nationalism with democracy."⁸¹

⁷⁹ Royama, Masamichi, "Reisen no Shosan toshiteno Heiwa Joyaku [Japan's Peace Treaty - A Result of the Cold War]" (1950) in Royama, *Nihon Gaiko to Kokusai Seiji*, [Japanese Diplomacy and International Politics], Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo, 1963, p.200.

⁸⁰ Ibid., p.194.

⁸¹ Ibid., p.198.

Royama had now moved away from his negation of power politics in the immediate postwar period. Royama wrote that: "even if we changed to absolute pacifism due to our experience of war defeat, that is merely a psychological reaction and does not conform to the realities of world politics."⁸² Royama now once again accepted the balance of power theory.

Faced with the Cold War situation, Royama reasoned that Japan needed a certain degree of defense arrangements. "I cannot agree with this characterization of the Mutual Security Agreement as totally irrational or unfair," he wrote.⁸³ Against the claim that the MSA would make Japan dependent on U.S., Royama argued that there were really no other choice at the moment, as Japan lacked the domestic consensus to offer the United States reciprocal guarantee for a full and independent partnership in matters of security. Thus, the MSA had "the role of a temporary stop-gap measure until the time when Japan can really occupy a legitimate position in international relations."⁸⁴ On the future of MSA, Royama wrote that "it is not that

⁸² Royama, Masamichi, "Sekai ni okeru Nihon [Japan in the World]" (1953) in Royama, *Nihon Gaiko to Kokusai Seiji*, p.7.

⁸³ Royama, Masamichi, "Anpo Joyaku no Paradokusu [The Paradox of the Mutual Security Agreement]" in *Chuo Koron*, Vol.72, No.6 (1957), p.57.

⁸⁴ Royama, Masamichi, "Kokusai Josei no Jishuteki Haaku wo [What We Need to Do is Grasp the International Situation in Our Own Terms]" in *Sekai*, No.157(1959), p.47.

the long range policy is unclear, but just that the conditions for implementing such a long range policy is non-existent."⁸⁵ Considering the disparate opinions among Japanese on security policy, Royama thought that neither can anyone realistically hope to rewrite the Constitution so that Japan can rearm, or on the other hand, guarantee that militarism would not reemerge.

Royama saw the rising Cold War conflict in Asia as a serious moral issue for Japan. Though as a social democrat, he took the view that communism was irreconcilable with Japan's future as a liberal democracy, nevertheless he refused to apply the simple communism vs. liberal democracy dichotomy to the situation in Asia. Royama wrote, "Japan has a historically grave moral responsibility towards the present-day East Asia situation, especially the situation in Korea." In Royama's view, "Manchuria and North Korea came under the rule of communism because of the mistakes committed by Japan."⁸⁶ That is, instead of these nations being able to evolve into true nation-states, the demise of Japan had created a political vacuum which was filled by communism. Royama also thought that the situation was to a certain extent a

⁸⁵ Royama, Masamichi, "Anpo Joyaku no Teiketsu to Nihon no Unmei [The Mutual Security Agreement and the Fate of Japan]" (1951) in Royama, *Kokusai Seiji to Nihon Gaiko*, p.230.

⁸⁶ Royama, "Reisen no Shosan to Shiteno Nihon no Heiwa Joyaku," p.204.

result of the mistaken postwar settlement policy by the Allies who did not grant any role for Japan in postwar East Asia.⁸⁷

The ideological objection to communism that was common among most of these writers manifested itself as the Cold War situation became a quasi-permanent situation. Royama and Yoshihiko Seki, among others, became the theoretical leaders of the breakaway Democratic Socialists formed in 1960, which sought to establish a centralist alternative to the ideologically separated two major parties, the Liberal Democratic Party and the Japan Socialist Party. Yoshihiko Seki, reflecting back on the dominant view of international politics among Japanese intellectuals in the earlier period, criticized that it was mired by "wishful speculation," "the overestimation of the power of morals in international politics," and "confusion of neutralism as a strategic position in international politics with neutralism as an ideology."⁸⁸

⁸⁷ Ibid., pp.204-205.

⁸⁸ See Seki, Yoshihiko, "Churitstushugisha no Kokusai Seijikan [The Neutralists' View of International Politics]" in K.Hayashi and Y.Seki, *Sengo Nihon no Shiso to Seiji*, pp.11-47, and Seki, Y., "Shakaishugi to Kokusai Seiji [Socialism and International Politics]" in *Jiyu*, Vol.7, No.11 (1965), pp.10-27.

Pragmatists

Whereas the earlier *tandokukowaronjas* moved towards realism guided by their ideological loyalties, the realists that emerged in the 1960s, such as Masataka Kosaka, Yonosuke Nagai, Shinkichi Etoh, and Fuji Kamiya, downplayed ideology in exchange for emphasizing the functional, especially the economic, benefits of the U.S-Japan Mutual Security Agreement. In a sense, political commitment to liberal democracy was really not the issue for this new generation of intellectuals. These realists criticized the early idealists for their almost religious adherence to absolute pacifism, but these criticisms were more scientific than ideological. These intellectuals are best described as pragmatists.

Masataka Kosaka criticized the idealists for "their strong emphasis on the role of morality in international politics, and their ignorance of the power politics that still dominates international society today."⁸⁹ In Kosaka's view, the idealists were making the mistake of forgetting this fact by their overt emphasis on the role of morals in international society and the evils of nuclear weapons. Kosaka did acknowledge the "high sense of purpose" of the "idealists," warning that "realism which does not

⁸⁹ Kosaka, "Genjitsushugisha no Heiwaron," p.38.

ponder on the nature of values a nation should pursue, has the potential danger of blindly reacting to circumstances, or turning into mere cynicism."⁹⁰ Kosaka nevertheless felt that the idealist goals were unattainable and unrealistic for the present time. Kosaka agreed that the absolute pacifism of Article 9 of postwar Constitution was a "national principle," but for him this was a "value" which one should strive for in the future, not something which was attainable at present time.⁹¹

As a pragmatist, Kosaka was in favor of the Mutual Security Agreement, and was pro-West in this sense. However, Kosaka also noted that the complete integration of Japan militarily, politically, and culturally with the West was not plausible. In Kosaka's view, the precarious position of Japan in international politics was recognized in his description of Japan being "neither Asian nor Western."⁹² As a realist, Kosaka acknowledged the validity of the balance of power, and proposed maximizing Japan's independence within that context.

Yonosuke Nagai wrote that the absolute pacifism of Article 9 "was a direct reflection of the international

⁹⁰ Ibid., p.41.

⁹¹ Ibid., p.41-42.

⁹² Kosaka, Masataka, "Kaiyo Kokka Nihon no Koso [Designs for Japan the Oceanic State]" in *Chuo Koron*, Vol.79, No.9 (1964), pp.48-80.

environment of the time where there was a strong distrust of military Japan and a rosy belief in the people of the Allied nations."⁹³ In Nagai's view, idealists were at fault for their failure to accept the realities of the international situation. Nagai, too, regarded Japan as culturally an Asian nation distinct from its Western allies, and therefore to a certain extent was uncomfortable with the dependency on the United States. After all, he believed that "postwar Japan was thrust into the bipolar structure of American Soviet rivalry by *destiny* rather than by *choice*."⁹⁴ For Nagai, the appropriate long-term objective of Japanese diplomacy should be "to participate in the formation of a pluralistic international order and the creation of a strong international security commonwealth that guarantees lasting peace."⁹⁵ But when "the two national goals of 'security' and 'independence' pose a dilemma in the nuclear age," he was clearly in favor of maintaining the existing security arrangements.⁹⁶ At the same time, he sometimes pondered whether "the postwar Japan which was built on the antithesis of the traditional theory of the state might not have a strange adaptability in this present age of world

⁹³ Nagai, Yonosuke, "Kakujidai ni okeru Kokka to Kakumei [State and Revolution in the Nuclear Age]" in *Chuo Koron*, Vol.83, No.1, (1968), p.138.

⁹⁴ Nagai, *Heiwa no Daisho*, p.80.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p.104.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p.142.

revolution."⁹⁷ According to Nagai, the traditional nation-state which secured its independence by maintaining a strong military had become somewhat obsolete in the nuclear age.

Theoretically, the outlook of these pragmatist intellectuals was indeed that of realists, as they emphasized the nation-state as the main actor in international politics. However, in terms of guidelines for Japanese foreign policy, their basic position was to emphasize the international constraints placed upon the Japanese state. As Michio Royama has commented, these Japanese realists were ambivalent in their realism because they "defined international politics as power politics, and yet are opposed to Japan herself engaging in such power politics."⁹⁸

In this regard, Japanese realists were more or less ambivalent believers of high politics. Their acceptance of Cold War politics was a result of pragmatic concerns rather than a strong commitment to the theory of realism per se. Economic concerns were awarded priority in the definition of national interest in the Japanese realists' thinking. Their perspective matched the basic international policy of the

⁹⁷ Nagai, "Kakujidai ni okeru Kokka to Kakumei," p.139.

⁹⁸ Royama, Michio, "Kakusenryaku no Igi to Nihon no Shorai [The Significance of Nuclear Strategy and the Future of Japan]" in *Chuo Koron*, Vol.83, No.3 (1968), p.51.

mainstream Liberal Democratic Party, often referred to as the "Yoshida Doctrine," of light military spending and placing priority on economic development.

The pragmatists also took a centralist position on security issues. They neither agreed with the nationalist demands for further rearmament (often including the nuclear option), nor did they accept the idealists' insistence that Japan should fully honor the original spirit of its postwar constitution by embarking on a complete negation of military capabilities. For the nationalists, Japan must become a *tsujo kokka*, a normal nation, with the usual assortment of military forces, but for the idealists, Japan must abide by the principles of the new constitution and become a *tokubetsu kokka*, a unique nation. The pragmatists fell somewhere between, not willing to commit to either, but trying to make best of Japan's unique situation.

Another common aspect of these pragmatists was their "non-interventionism." This arose from their assessment that Japan was not in a position to assert itself politically anyway, but also from their reluctance to accept the Cold War divisions completely. A recognizable ambivalence towards the nationalisms of other Asian nations was also observable in these intellectuals as well. The Cold War, then, was accepted

as a hard reality, but a reluctance to view the Cold War solely as a result of ideological conflict between communism and liberal democracy was evident. This was especially the case in regard to the Cold War situation in Asia. To a certain extent, this was a result of the same sense of guilt towards these nations for the wartime casualties Japan had inflicted on them, similar to those possessed by the generation of intellectuals before them. Thus, for example, Kosaka occasionally hesitated to genuinely view China in balance of power terms, since it was "a country against which Japan instigated a *Shinryaku Senso* (Invasion War) as well as a nation going through a major revolution."⁹⁹

This sense that Japan should to a extent identify with these Asian nations is compounded by the fact that Japan is viewed as a non-Western nation that shares the history of being threatened by the "imperialism" of the European states. Therefore, the postwar situation in Asia is often seen through the viewpoint of nationalism rather than the Cold War. Both the Korean War and the Vietnam War are considered to be essentially civil wars turned into a "war by proxy" of the superpowers. In other words, there existed a degree of difficulty in accepting the ideological conflict of the Cold War.

⁹⁹ Kosaka, Masataka, "Chugoku Mondai towa Nanika [What Exactly is the China Question?]" in *Jiyu*, Vol.6, No.4 (1964), p.30.

Therefore, even writers who are committed to liberal democracy, are ambivalent towards these conflicts. Even the "realist" Masataka Kosaka thought that "where justice lies in the Vietnam War is unclear."¹⁰⁰ Moreover, as Masamichi Inoki observed, "Japan holds the responsibility of pushing these nations towards communism"¹⁰¹ in the first place. National aspirations of these nations were often viewed as at least understandable.

Thus, the question of communism versus liberal democracy has often been superseded by the question of the right of the Asians to national independence. This has been one of the causes for the reluctance to engage in political activism in the "domestic problems" of other nations. Shinkichi Etoh was representative of this approach when he espoused "non-intrusionary" and "non-intercessionary" policies for Japan.¹⁰² Etoh proposed as the national objectives of Japan four principles. First was the priority on the interests of the *people* of Japan. Second was the priority on the interests of the *people* of Asia. Third was the respect for the principle of self-determination, and fourth is

¹⁰⁰ Kosaka, Masataka, "Gendai no Senso [Modern War]" in *Chuo Koron*, Vol.80, No.7 (1965), p.50.

¹⁰¹ Inoki, Masamichi, "Amerika no Tonan Azia Seisaku [America's Southeast Asian Policy]" in *Chuo Koron*, Vol.80, No.3 (1965), p.68.

¹⁰² Etoh, Shinkichi, "Hikainyuu no Ronri [Logic of Non-Intervention]" in *Chuo Koron*, Vol.80, No.8 (1965), pp.50-63.

the principle of non-intrusion.¹⁰³ Etoh saw the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Agreement arrangement as being positive in the sense that it saved Japan from the financial burden of rearmament and also served as a guard against the possible militarization of the nation if Japan had to rearm. On the other hand, Etoh believed that the MSA was limited in its effectiveness. But he found no other viable alternative, and was willing to tentatively support it.¹⁰⁴

Realism Under Fire

The "Yoshida Doctrine" became the principle for the Japanese policy of concentrating on the economy in the 1960s. Despite the constant criticism that it relegated Japan to a non-active role in terms of high politics issues, its legitimacy was strengthened by the high level of economic success in the 1960s. The low-profile of non-economic aspects in international politics could be justified by the fulfillment of a long-time national goal (one could argue it has been the goal since the Meiji Restoration in 1868), that of the achievement of economic modernization. However, as

¹⁰³ Etoh, Shinkichi, "Nihon no Anzen Hoshoryoku wo do Takameruka [How Do We Strengthen Our Defense Capabilities?]" in *Chuo Koron*, Vol.80, No.5 (1965), pp.102-125.

¹⁰⁴ See Etoh, Shinkichi, *Mukoku no Tami to Seiji* [The Voiceless People and Politics], Tokyo: Bancho Shobo, 1966, pp.261-264, 273-280.

Japan was increasingly perceived to have completed its catching-up stage, this justification for the realist argument eroded both domestically and internationally.

Domestically, the achievement of "catch-up to the West" resulted in the loss of a goal that justified the low-key and non-assertive approach of the realists. The nagging sense of "not being one's own boss" had always existed in the background. With the sense of Japan having become a significant power, calls for "political activism" in the international arena was bound to increase. Internationally and domestically, the passive approach became increasingly problematic, due to the sheer size of the Japanese economy. The decline of the American hegemony led to pressures being put by the United States on Japan to shoulder more responsibilities as well.

The postwar policy based on the Yoshida doctrine had made Japan susceptible to criticisms of "free riding" in the area of security and development issues. The realist theorem encountered problems in this regard, as the presupposition of Japan as a "small state" and the insignificance of Japanese actions in international relations had to be modified. For one thing, with the apparent decline of the American hegemony, the effectiveness and validity of the Mutual Security Agreement arrangement came into question. One

of the basic understandings among the realists was that the security of Japan was adequately assured through the arrangement. This notion was challenged as the capability and the will of the U.S. to protect Japan became somewhat questionable in the minds of many Japanese. Pressures from abroad for Japan to take initiative in sharing international responsibilities, including part of the American global defense burden, intensified the debate of how to involve Japan in the international "political framework."

In this context, the mainstream realists presented the *Keizai Anpo* (Economic Security) theorem. According to this theorem, the existence of the Mutual Security Agreement was viewed as the crucial defining factor of postwar Japanese economic success. The MSA had relieved Japan of the need for heavy military expenditures, and as such it was able to concentrate its efforts and resources on economic development. From this viewpoint, it followed that Japan should be hesitant to change its policy of limited military build-up. Basically, this called for a status-quo oriented approach to the issue. As American pressures on Japan to assume some of the security responsibilities on its own mounted, this approach could not offer anything but piece-meal concessions.

Masataka Kosaka announced the "end of the age of

the dichotomy between politics and economy"¹⁰⁵ for Japan and argued that Japan must move away from the "generally self-centered and scope-limited pacifism" of the past.¹⁰⁶ Kosaka emphasized that the postwar Japanese development "had been blessed with luck despite the lack of power-base."¹⁰⁷ For Kosaka, Japanese foreign policy was all about "making sure how a superpower that lacked natural resources like Japan could exist into the future."¹⁰⁸ For Kosaka, these pressures from abroad were inevitable but must be weathered. He declared that "there is no other way for a trade nation to survive."¹⁰⁹ This assessment was similar to that of business leaders who generally viewed the issue of burden-sharing in defense spending as business expenses for doing business in the American market.¹¹⁰ Similar arguments would be put forward by Naohiro Amaya, a MITI official, who called Japan a *Chonin Kokka* (Merchant Nation).¹¹¹ Political pressures from abroad were seen as the undesirable but inevitable cost of "doing business." Since these approaches were essentially reactive, as the demand for Japan to assume a more active role in international affairs grew, more people

¹⁰⁵ Kosaka, "Tsusho Kokka Nihon no Unmei," p.128.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p.138.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p.116.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p.117.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p.139.

¹¹⁰ See Yamamoto, Susumu, et al, *Sengo Nihon Gaikoshi* [History of Postwar Japanese Diplomacy], Vol.7, Tokyo: Sanseido, 1985, pp.33-38.

¹¹¹ Amaya, *Chonin Kokkaron*, pp.145-164.

both at home and abroad increased their frustrations.

Neo-Realism

With this development, different approaches arose within the realist stream. The need for Japan to establish certain degree of defense capabilities to augment the MSA system was stressed by some. New demands for a security scheme apart from the framework of the MSA was put forward as well.

In contrast to the pragmatists such as Nagai who were reluctant to support a military buildup, Neo-realists took the position that an acceptance of increased defense responsibilities was not only unavoidable, but beneficial to Japan in the sense that it would enhance Japan's influence vis-a vis the United States, and hence, the international community itself. Many of these authors, such as Hisahiko Okazaki and Makoto Momoi were students of strategic studies, which became popular in Japan in the 1980s.

Hisahiko Okazaki, a career diplomat, made the term "strategic thinking" somewhat fashionable with his *Senryakuteki Siko towa Nanika* (Introduction to Strategic Thinking), published in 1983. In Okazaki's view, the tiny size of Japan's territory and the strategic importance of its location made it impossible

to maintain its security without allying itself with a superpower that has presence in the Far East. Through examination of Japanese diplomacy in the modern era, Okazaki concluded that historically Japan fared well in this regard when they were allied with the Anglo-Saxon nations, and had suffered when it broke of from such an alliance. In Okazaki's analysis, this was because other superpowers (i.e., the Soviet Union and China in the postwar period), with their proximity to Japan, inevitably were dangerous as well. For Okazaki, "Anglo-Saxons are the obvious, and only possible partners for Japan."¹¹² This, Okazaki asserted, went beyond mere preference for a certain ideology over others.

Makoto Momoi, who was a research director of the Defense Ministry and also a member of the brain-trust for Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, thought that Japanese approaches to international relations should be based on strategic considerations which had previously been absent in the national planning. Momoi's Grand Pacific Design Initiative also revealed him as a regionalist. He asked: "is it not necessary for Japan to have a grand design to return some of the profits it has made to the pan-Pacific states a national objective?"¹¹³ In Momoi's assessment, the United States would never risk its own security for the

¹¹² Okazaki, *Senryakuteki Siko towa Nanika*, p.235.

¹¹³ Momoi, *Senryakunaku Kokka wa Zassetsusuru*, p.34.

defense of Japan nor will the Soviet Union refrain from fighting two fronts. As a military realist, he advocated that Japanese politicians should face the issue of military security head-on instead of hiding behind the slogan of "Japan as a mercantile state."¹¹⁴

Momoi insisted on the need of a defense strategy for Japan from his belief that "the United States will not sacrifice its mainland territory for a nuclear counterstrike" for the sake of its allies.¹¹⁵ This, Momoi thought, seemed to be the logical conclusion of the Nixon Doctrine. If so, Japan should part with the "myth" that it was protected under the U.S. "nuclear umbrella."¹¹⁶ In this view, a foreign policy whose backbone was a minimum defense capability, peace diplomacy, and priority on the economy, was for Momoi simply ineffective in international relations. Momoi was also critical of the economic-oriented stratagem of Japanese foreign aid since it would lead to defacto military assistance if it is done without clear political criteria. Thus, he advocated a foreign aid scheme that targeted problem areas for international security.¹¹⁷

Momoi emphasized that trade was only one of the

¹¹⁴ Ibid., p.51.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., p.140.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., p.144.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p.175.

national policy objectives for a nation's survival. Momoi wrote, "though it is in some sense the ultimate form of pragmatism, it lacked the *ideal* of what Japan can do, and for what."¹¹⁸ He explained that "the self-perception of Japan as a trading nation and non-military superpower is not necessarily accepted in the rest of the world."¹¹⁹ He felt that both foreign aid and defense "should be considered together as a comprehensive national policy, and priority should be placed on Japanese national interest. Thus Japan should not just swallow whatever the U.S. requests on these matters."¹²⁰ Such a perspective was behind Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone's "active" foreign policies.

These perspectives gave a certain amount of satisfaction to the nationalist sentiments that had long viewed the Mutual Security Agreement arrangement with strong frustration as being *Taibei Tsuiju* (blindly following the U.S.). An extreme example of this coupling of nationalism and concerns for Japanese security was Ikutaro Shimizu's book *Nihon yo Kokkatate* (Be a Real Nation Again, Japan). Shimizu, who was one of the intellectual leaders of the pacifist and anti-MSA movement in the 1950s and early 1960s, now had reversed his position by asserting that "Article 9 had

¹¹⁸ Ibid., p.34.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., p.30.

¹²⁰ Ibid., p.238-239.

robbed Japan of its essence as a nation."¹²¹ Designating military capabilities as the "essence" of a nation, Shimizu argued that the establishment of strong military capabilities was the overwhelming objective of any nation, and as such Japan should follow this course, including the acquisition of nuclear capabilities.¹²² Shimizu even began defending prewar Japanese international actions by saying that "Japan only acted in the model presented by the Western advanced nations."¹²³ Shimizu further wrote;

When Japan possesses military power commensurate with its economic power, political power would naturally come to it. And Japan will gain a free hand in various ways in its relations with the United States, Soviet Union, and other nations.¹²⁴

However, this kind of a militaristic nationalist approach could not become popular in postwar Japan, and Shimizu was greeted with a ferocious series of criticisms in postwar Japanese political debates from all sides.¹²⁵

¹²¹ Shimizu, Ikutaro, *Nihon yo Kokka tare: Kaku no Sentaku* [Japan, Be a Nation Again: The Nuclear Option], Tokyo: Bungei Shunjusha, 1980, p.21.

¹²² Ibid., p.51.

¹²³ Ibid., p.28.

¹²⁴ Ibid., p.41.

¹²⁵ See for example, Fukuda, Tsuneari, "Kindai Nihon Chisikijin no Tenkei Shimizu Ikutaro wo Ronziru [On Ikutaro Shimizu, a Typical Modern Japanese Intellectual]" in *Chuo Koron* (1980), pp.138-171, or Inoki, M., "Kusoteki Shakaishugi kara Kusoteki Gunkokushugi ye [From Utopian Socialism to Utopian Militarism]" in Inoki, *Gunji Taikoku ye no Genso* [Fantasy of Military Power], Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shinposha, 1981, pp.3-29.

Neo-Nationalism

The fact that Japan succeeded in minimizing the damage to its own economy during the oil crises led to a certain level of hubris among intellectuals with nationalistic or static leanings. In this context, Japan as a nation, then and now, began being reevaluated in a more positive light. One of the results of this intellectual climate was the textbook controversy in 1982. The Japanese Ministry of Education had instructed changes in the description of Japanese wartime actions in high school textbooks, which minimized Japanese atrocities. Criticism from China, South Korea, and other Asian nations resulted in a reversal of this policy. But some nationalist intellectuals voiced their objection to what they considered to be interference into domestic politics. Shoichi Watanabe, for example, even went as far as suggesting that without Japanese prewar actions in the continent, Asian nations would not have gained independence in the first place.¹²⁶

Yatsuhiro Nakagawa would proudly declare that "Japan is now the most advanced nation in the world."¹²⁷ In Nakagawa's view, not just the economic performance

¹²⁶ See *Shokun*, October special issue, 1982.

¹²⁷ Nakagawa, Yatsuhiro, *Chosenshinkoku Nihon: Nihon Seiji no Shindansho* [Advanced Supernation Japan: Diagnosis of Japanese Politics], Tokyo: Kodansha, 1980, p.218.

of Japan was spectacular, but the political and social systems of Japan were superior to that of any other nation.¹²⁸

Though many would not go as far as Nakagawa in declaring Japanese superiority, writings praising various Japanese idiosyncrasies, such as its management style, and even Japanese culture itself,¹²⁹ as the source for the success of the Japanese economy, became numerous in the 1980s. On the other hand, the success of the Japanese economy brought closer scrutiny to Japanese practices not fitting to the international form. Pressures on Japan to conform, as exemplified by the Structural Impediment Talks, brought anxiety to nationalists who considered that this could lead to erosion of what they regarded as the essence of Japanese culture. The conservative critic Jun Etoh was one of the main proponents of this view. In Etoh's view, the entire postwar American policy towards Japan was aimed at destroying "Japanese identity." The "internationalization of Japan" was seen by Etoh as

¹²⁸ Among other things Nakagawa considered Japan to be having an edge over other nations included its mature separation of religion and the state, emphasis on consensus in decision-making, the establishment of a politically "neutral" bureaucracy (Ibid., pp.11-30, 47-62, 95-110.)

¹²⁹ For example, see Yamazaki, Masakazu, *Yawarakai Kojinshugi no Tanjo* [The Birth of Soft Individualism], Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, 1984. Yamazaki regarded the modified individualism of Japanese society to be one of the sources for Japanese economic success.

nothing other than an attempt by the United States to "Americanize" Japan. Indeed, for Etoh, Japan and the United States had never ceased to be in a state of war even after August 1945, at least culturally, if not militarily.¹³⁰

With the fall of the United States into debtor nation status in 1985, the relative success of the Japanese economy became a source of further confidence for some intellectuals. Neo-nationalists often equated Japanese superiority in technology and economy with potential political power, and advocated their use. The economist Kimindo Kusaka was a typical example.

Although Kusaka deemed the age of economy, hence the Age of Japan, in his view, as not yet having arrived, he nevertheless emphasized the transformation taking place in international relations to be in Japan's favor. Kusaka's idea on whether or not Japan should aspire to a leadership role in international affairs was evident in his words, "the world is waiting for Japan to speak."¹³¹ Kusaka extracted the virtue of "the Japanese way of life." In Kusaka's view, Japanese practices such as "the Japanese style management" had been proven superior to Western practices. Kusaka even

¹³⁰ See Etoh, Jun, *Nichibei Senso wa Owatteinai* [The War with the United States Never Ended], Tokyo: Nesco Books, 1986.

¹³¹ Kusaka, Kimindo, *Keizai wa Kenryoku ni Katsu* [Economic Power Base], Tokyo: PHP Kenkyujo, 1991, p.87.

mused about the possibility of exporting "Japanese style happiness" abroad. Kusaka saw no merit in comparing the quality of life in Japan with that of the Western nations, because in his view, the comparison was often based on Eurocentric criteria. Kusaka foresaw a future where emulation of the Japanese way would be practiced by other nations.¹³²

Kusaka envisioned the eventual appearance of a group of nations under Japanese influence. Jokingly called the "Japan Club" by Kusaka, these nations would be induced to become members of the "Club" because of the economic advantages such as technological transfers the membership offers.¹³³ Hence, Kusaka was confident that Japan's economic power would be translated into political influence. Kusaka was impatient about the earlier lack of political initiative by Japan in world politics. In Kusaka's opinion, Japan must make its positions on matters more clear in the future. In matters of what had traditionally been considered "high politics," Kusaka agreed with the notion of "balance of power" to a certain extent.¹³⁴ The appearance of dominant military power must be checked in order to create a desirable stability for economic activities. For example, Kusaka thought that the Japanese

¹³² Ibid., pp.16-31.

¹³³ Ibid., p.91.

¹³⁴ Ibid., p.108.

government mishandled the Persian Gulf War situation in 1991 in regard to the United States. Kusaka felt that the military action against Iraq was justified only in the sense that no nation should benefit from acts of invasion. In Kusaka's view, the U.S. administration was overstepping its legitimacy by linking the Gulf War with "a new international order" or "the struggle for democracy." Kusaka asserted that the Japanese government should have voiced opposition in this regard.¹³⁵

For Kusaka, the ideal world was one that allowed the existence of Japan as it was. As such, Kusaka wanted Japan to espouse not universalism, but the creation of a multi-faceted and multi-valued international society.¹³⁶

Summary

As we have seen in this chapter, realism in postwar Japan emerged as a perspective accepting the "inevitability" of the Cold War dichotomy. The argument put forward by the *Tandokukowaronjas*, for example, was that it was "useless" to consider a comprehensive peace treaty under the circumstances. Since there were only two choices, that between the United States and the

¹³⁵ Ibid., pp.117-132.

¹³⁶ Kusaka, Kimindo, *Nihon no Jumyo* [The Economic Lifetime of Japan], Tokyo: PHP Kenkyujo, 1990, pp.119-120.

Soviet Union, they reluctantly came to the conclusion that the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Agreement was the only plausible option for Japan. Needless to say, those who took this position were more sympathetic to liberal or social democratic ideas than Marxist ideas.

The "genuine" realists, or pragmatists, that emerged in the 1960s opted to disassociate themselves from the ideological debates that had been intensified by the imposing of the MSA on Japan. In their view, Japan, at least for the time being, was not in a position to base their international actions on ideals. In this sense, their adherence to realism was more of a result of acceptance of the situation rather than a strong commitment to theory or a particular world view. Realism in this period, in its essence, meant no more than the acceptance of the constraints placed on Japan in international affairs as an irrefutable reality. As such, these realists took a dim view towards the possibility of Japanese international actions realizing any significant political goals. Hence, their emphasis was on maximizing the Japanese "national interest." That the "national interest" was defined more or less in economic terms is proof that even these realists considered the postwar pacifism of Japan as an ideal to be esteemed, if not espoused loudly.

When the changes in the international circumstances in the 1970s onwards offered opportunity and demanded responsibility at the same time for more Japanese activism in international affairs, the realist approach of "making the best out of the situation" became increasingly insufficient as guidelines for Japan. In this context, Japanese Neo-realists emerged. In comparison to the realists in the previous period, these writers were more willing to consider Japan's international actions in terms of military power. Neo-realists thought that Japan could lessen its constraints by accepting more "security responsibility" for itself. Though defining Japan as an integral part of the "West," Neo-realists shared the recognition that as long as the heavy reliance on the U.S. for the security of Japan continues, Japan could never attain an autonomous posture in international relations. In their view, Japan had to assume an acceptable degree of responsibility for its security. Since such policies would mean a significant deviance from the de facto pacifist policies of postwar Japan under the Mutual Security Agreement, this meant that the Neo-realists were to a certain extent willing to sacrifice the postwar pacifist ideals in favor of more political activism in international affairs. Some of these Neo-realist prescriptions were reflected in the policy changes of the governing Liberal Democrats, especially

during Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone's tenure.

However, these changes were minute and more significant for its "shock value" than a significant move away from the basic trend of postwar Japanese outlook on international affairs. Moreover, with the advent of Japan as the world's largest creditor nation in 1985, economic issues became much more problematic in relations with the U.S. and other advanced industrial nations in the mid-1980s. Hence, for the realists, too, the focus shifted to the interpretation of Japanese economic power.

Confident with the success of the Japanese economy, Neo-nationalists who believe in the relative superiority of Japanese economic, social and even cultural systems in comparison with the West gained considerable prominence among realists. For these intellectuals, Japan had already achieved the necessary status and power to embark on assuming a significant position in international affairs. However, their emphasis and attachment to various Japanese idiosyncrasies suggest that the political ideals advanced forward by these Neo-nationalists will meet strong objection at the international level.

Chapter V

Pluralism

As discussed in the previous chapters, the early years of the postwar were characterized by the sharp division between two competing patterns of thought: idealism and realism. But from the 1970s onwards, the pluralist perspectives have gradually bridged the gap between the two and have gained considerable respectability among the Japanese intellectuals.

Emergence of Pluralism

In the 1970s, events such as the Nixon shock and the two oil crises demonstrated to the Japanese intellectuals that Japan was in need of a new approach to international affairs. Starting from a relatively idealistic viewpoint, Kinhide Mushakoji wrote in his *Takyokukajidai no Nihon Gaiko* (Japanese Diplomacy in the Age of Multi-polarization), published in 1971, that Japan was now being asked to choose between the absolute pacifism of the Constitution on the one hand, and the one-sided reliance on the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Agreement on the other. Mushakoji saw that the emergence of the multipolarized world and the increasing significance of Japan as an economic power would lead to demands for a more active Japanese role. Mushakoji reflected that rigid adherence to neither

idealism or realism would provide an adequate answer to this challenge.

Mushakoji took the view that the transformation of the international situation, such as the emergence of the multipolar world, had changed the nature of power itself. In the relative decline of the significance of military power in international politics, Mushakoji found an opportunity for Japan to exercise political power in international affairs without the benefit of powerful military capabilities. With this change, he thought that a new type of leadership not relying on military power would now be possible and even desirable. For Mushakoji, the traditional type of leadership that relied on "control" through military power was becoming increasingly anachronistic. Mushakoji recommended that Japan aspire to types of leadership which he described as "suggestors" or "go-betweens."¹³⁷ Mushakoji wrote;

If Japan is to achieve any results in international cooperation, Japan should support (with some latitude for change) the existing relations among advanced industrial nations that show relative stability; on the other hand, in regard to the Asian nations which are still in the developing stage and cannot expect to move forward without a change in the status quo, Japan should actively take the stance of supporting changes to the status quo.¹³⁸

As the situation in Asia was totally different from

¹³⁷ Mushakoji, *Takyokukajidai no Nihon Gaiko*, p.15.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, p.16.

that of Europe or North America, Mushakoji concluded that Japan needed a different kind of guideline for international behavior. Mushakoji predicted that the balance of power theory would not work in Asia. Unlike Europe where the parity between nations made balance of power possible, in Asia, Japan might be forced by default to assume the role of a regional superpower. Yet Mushakoji preferred to avoid such a path for Japan. Furthermore, he emphasized that "the relationships between the leader and the followers should be minimized as much as possible in Asia."¹³⁹

Meanwhile, the advent of Neo-realists calling for stronger defense capabilities, had caused some concerns in the mind of one of the leading realists, Yonosuke Nagai. In Nagai's view, "despite appearances to the contrary, nationalism is strong in postwar Japan."¹⁴⁰ Nagai considered nationalism to be one of the undercurrents of Japanese approaches to international relations. And as such, the potential of gravitating towards autonomy was relatively strong.

As Nagai took the view that "autonomy" was highly incompatible with "survival" in the age of nuclear weapons and interdependence, he recommended a cautionary policy in regard to Japan assuming an active

¹³⁹ Ibid., p.50.

¹⁴⁰ Nagai, Yonosuke, *Gendai to Senryaku* [Modern Age and Strategy], Tokyo: Bungei Shunjusha, 1985, p.40.

role in international affairs. Nagai would move to a position closer to the pacifist idealists in the 1980s. A firm believer in the merits of the postwar policy of minimum defense capabilities under the Mutual Security Agreement,¹⁴¹ Nagai was willing to sacrifice political influence for the sake of maintaining the ideal of pacifism.

The possibility of Japan losing its traditional pacifism due to its rising stature in international politics was a concern for Nobuya Banba as well. From his assessment that Japan could no longer be an insignificant power, but yet rejecting the superpowers as models to emulate, Banba proposed the "middle power" concept as the guideline for Japan in international politics. Banba rejected neutralism as a reactive approach not appropriate for Japan's new status and contrary to the need to establish an identity in international affairs. Taking Canada as a role model, Banba envisioned Japan as functioning as a "bridge" or "go-betweens" between superpowers.¹⁴²

Political Economists

As the significance of the Japanese economy seemed

¹⁴¹ Ibid., pp.60-69.

¹⁴² Banba, Nobuya, "Taikoku Gaiko kara Teikei Gaiko ye [From Superpower-oriented to Cooperation-Oriented Diplomacy]" in *Chuo Koron*, Vol.92, No.2 (1977), pp.96-105.

to be demanding an answer to the question "how can this economic power be transformed into political influence, and to what extent," approaches from the political economy perspective have gained popularity in Japan. Generally, the political economists believe that the American hegemony is unavoidably declining but that no other nation will effectively challenge the United States for the leadership role, a situation which Takashi Inoguchi calls "Pax Americana Phase II."¹⁴³

Political economists such as T. Inoguchi and Yoshinobu Yamamoto emphasized the cost of being a hegemon. Although they credited American hegemony for having created a stable international environment for the most part of the postwar period, they concluded that a system which relied heavily on a single nation to provide the international public goods would not be sustainable in the future. Thus, these political economists foresaw an eventual necessity to create an alternative system that was effective. A leadership role for Japan akin to hegemonic dominance through economic power was considered too costly by the same logic that pointed to the decline of American hegemony. The appropriate strategy for Japan therefore was seen

¹⁴³ Inoguchi, Takashi, *Kokusai Kankei no Seiji Keizaigaku* [Political Economy of International Relations], Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1985, p.230.

as being a "supporter."¹⁴⁴ In other words, they envisioned Japan's role as basically supporting the existing international system.

This outlook was a result of these authors' emphasis on the constraints put on nation-states by international economic interdependence, and furthermore eventually, interpenetration. Political economists felt that the maintenance of a stable international economic order had become vital for all nations. From such a viewpoint, the possibility of American-Japanese conflict was seen as disastrous for the entire international economy. As participation in rule and regime-making becomes significant in the interdependence era, to what extent Japan could participate in the decision-making process is a major concern. The appropriate objective for Japanese diplomacy in the eyes of these political economists was to help the long-term transformation of the hegemonic system into a collective and group-oriented leadership.

Takashi Inoguchi defined the appropriate international role of Japan in two areas, peace cooperation and economic cooperation. As for peace cooperation, he asserted that it must be "the kind that

¹⁴⁴ For example, Inoguchi, T., *Tadanori to Ikkoku Han'ei-shugi wo Norikoete*, pp.15-23, or, Kumon, Shunpei, "Sekai Shisutemu no Henka to Nihon no Yakuwari [The Transformation of the World System and Japan's Role" in *Kokusai Mondai*, No.315 (1986), pp.49-71.

achieves the role of supporter, but yet does not necessarily follow the hegemon's footsteps uncritically."¹⁴⁵ Inoguchi saw the real key to Japanese security as lying in "a solid peace cooperation that takes advantage of Japan's characteristics as a nation that has not engaged in war for the past 40 years, and also as a nation that has interests in every corner of the world."¹⁴⁶

Similarly, Yoshinobu Yamamoto predicted a gradual transformation of the international system into a pluralistic and multi-layered system. In this new system, it is no longer possible for any nation to provide a leadership role in every area. Thus, Yamamoto envisioned a need to create a new system of decision-making where the leadership role in various areas is distributed among many countries. Yamamoto wrote that, "the value we are aiming to achieve is pluralistic," and that "the method to achieve this value has to be complex, and will often involve trade-offs between values."¹⁴⁷ Yamamoto also regarded the international system as dynamic, where in the long-run, a nation's position within the hierarchical structure is mobile and possibly changes.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁵ Inoguchi, *Kokusai Kankei no Seiji Keizaigaku*, p.228.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p.228.

¹⁴⁷ Yamamoto, Y., "Kokusai Shisutemu no Dotai to Nihon," p.46.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p.61.

While T.Inoguchi and Yamamoto expected and accepted that the international system would retain much of the status quo, Eiichi Shindo was more critical of the existing international system. Through similar analysis from the political economy perspective, Shindo had more or less arrived at the same conclusion as T.Inoguchi and Yamamoto. He somewhat cynically appraised the postwar LDP diplomacy as being "a shrewd conservative diplomacy drawn from the experiences of World War II."¹⁴⁹ Though he credited the Japanese postwar history as having enabled it to strengthen its international competitiveness by avoiding the pitfalls of "the economic irrationality of arms build-up,"¹⁵⁰ Shindo nevertheless criticized the postwar Japanese international policy as blindly following the *Kyoku* (pole). For Shindo, the demise of the Cold War system was proof of the "moral and systematic bankruptcy" of a system in which "poles" dominate the "non-poles". In Shindo's view, the real way for Japan to play a responsible role was in trying to give greater attention to "non-polar" perspectives.¹⁵¹

Shindo also dismissed the traditional realist

¹⁴⁹ Shindoh, Eiichi, *Gendai Funso no Kozo: Hikyoku Moderu no Kochiku no Tameni* [The Structure of Modern Conflict: To Construct a Non-Polar Model], Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1987, p.303.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., p.328.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., p.331.

theory as being "a gray theory"¹⁵² that Japan acquired from modern Europe. He argued that power politics and balance of power theories were based on assumptions that nation-states were basically homogeneous and equal, which more or less applied only to the international situation in Europe.¹⁵³

Preparing Japan for the Post-Cold War System

In the late 1980s, domestic reforms that would enable Japan to assume a role in the international system became the source of discussion for pluralists. While the relative strength of the Japanese economy made it possible for them to envision a greater political role for Japan, these pluralists tried to maintain a more balanced approach in their assessment of Japanese economic success compared to their more nationalistic counterparts. The task for Japan was seen to lie in two areas. First was the domestic effort to increase Japan's acceptability in the international society by transforming Japan's more idiosyncratic characteristics into acceptable conformity with the more universal international norm. This was seen as a prerequisite for Japan to achieve influence and participation in the process. The necessity for Japan to remove itself from a position of being alienated is

¹⁵² Ibid., p.315.

¹⁵³ Ibid., p.315.

stressed. In other words, the "exteriority" of Japan from the core of international society must be changed. The second was the continuing effort for Japan to shoulder a larger burden in supplying of "international public goods."

Kenichi Ohmae criticized the nationalistic praise given to Japanese styles of management or culture for being the source of Japanese advantage in industry and technology as being without much of merit. In Ohmae's view, assessments such as the Japanese being more industrious, or that Japanese employees are more loyal to their corporations, were more of a myth than a reality.¹⁵⁴ Ohmae pointed out that the economic success of Japan in the 1980s was due to the country's massive advancement into the American market, which on the other hand had created what he called "the hollowing of Japan in Asia."¹⁵⁵ Ohmae considered this to be detrimental if Japan were to aspire to a leadership role. Overseas Development Aid alone, Ohmae reasoned, was insufficient to gain support of the Asian nations. Ohmae wrote;

If Japan is to strive for the leadership role among Asian nations, the only way possible to make it happen is opening its market for their industrial products.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁴ Ohmae, Kenichi, *Sekai ga Mieru Nihon ga Mieru* [If You Can See the World, You Can See Japan], Tokyo: Kodansha, 1986, pp.39-42.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., p.266.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., p.268.

For Ohmae, "Japan has already arrived at a stage where it must consider all of Asia, all of the world."¹⁵⁷ Moreover, "If Japan is to reach out into the 21st century, we must realize that Japan is no longer maintained by us Japanese alone."¹⁵⁸ From this viewpoint, Ohmae proposes many avenues where Japan can achieve leadership status in the world, including opening its market and increasing technology transfer to other nations.¹⁵⁹

Kuniko Y. Inoguchi criticized the Japanese "policy of one-nation prosperity" as "putting one's own nation's economic interests first over the harmony of the international system as a whole."¹⁶⁰ She perceived this tendency as an unfortunate result of "the mentality of a late-comer nation."¹⁶¹ In her view, the defeat in World War II had reduced Japan to a non-active role in international politics in the first place. According to K.Inoguchi, "taking away legitimacy and ideals is the most severe punishment against the vanquished."¹⁶² Thus, "the vanquished has lost both the resistibility and the right to share the burden of providing international public goods." Hence "being the

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., p.270.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., p.271.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., p.282.

¹⁶⁰ Inoguchi, K. Y., *Posuto-Haken Shisutemu to Nihon no Sentaku*, p.22.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., p.24.

¹⁶² Ibid., p.55.

free-rider in the international order was more of a punishment than a privilege."¹⁶³ Inoguchi therefore described Japan as a "nation which was robbed of its will to be a political force, which participates in the creation and maintenance of order, and the management of the justice system."¹⁶⁴

K.Inoguchi saw this history of being a silent actor as the penance for prewar Japanese international actions, but believed that the time for a more active role by Japan had arrived. But in her view, Japan has no moral justification to assume a leadership role unless it becomes a positive influence towards the transformation of the international system into a more horizontal and group leadership, which she refers to as "Pax Diplomatica" or "Pax Consortia."¹⁶⁵ Inoguchi doubted the possibility of any nation emerging in the short run as a "challenger" nation threatening the leadership of the United States.¹⁶⁶ Hence, the transformation of the international system into what K.Inoguchi envisioned remains to a certain extent up to the United States:

The shift from Pax Americana to Pax Diplomatica or Pax Consortis might be most painful for the United States itself. But I cannot help but hope that it becomes the center of cooperation in the new era, not an angry giant raging against the decline of

¹⁶³ Ibid., p.65.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., p.66.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., p.112.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., p.67.

its hegemony. If it does, the United States would become the hero to all the world in the post-hegemonic system.¹⁶⁷

And as for Japan, Inoguchi asked:

Can it become the nation that shows understanding most to the suffering of a nation abandoning the mightiest of hegemonic rule? Can Japan react creatively to the discordance that accompanies the transformation from Pax Americana into the post-hegemonic system? ¹⁶⁸

Inoguchi considered it necessary for Japan to prepare to become a contributor to the world in non-monetary as well as monetary affairs. Inoguchi saw such possibility in the postwar Japanese ideals of pacifism:

In both the 19th and the 20th century, Japan could only be involved in the process where human society chose the values for its civilization by being followers. The question for us is whether Japan can overcome its one-nation pacifism that is satisfied with merely its own peace, and provide leadership in establishing the ideals of peace and non-violence as a universal value for all civilizations. Only when Japan can actively participate in the creation and realization of such values, will she be able to taste the real glory of being a member of the human society.¹⁶⁹

In economist Naoki Tanaka's view, it was unavoidable that there would be great constraints placed on Japan as a economic superpower, which was now expected to fulfill responsibilities worldwide, yet at the same time, maintaining U.S.-Japan relationship harmonious. The real concern for Tanaka was what Japan could do within that restriction. The unification of

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., p.72.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., p.72.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., p.40.

Europe and the era of new relations between the United States and the Soviet Union was seen by Tanaka as ushering in the age of "joint management."¹⁷⁰ Tanaka believed that Japan should make greater efforts to participate in such a "joint management" of international affairs.

Tanaka warned of the growing potential for the rise of the sentiment in the United States "to leave Asian affairs in the hands of Japan."¹⁷¹ In Tanaka's view, the withdrawal of American influence from Asia does not mean that Japan could just take over the United States' role as the regional hegemon. Rather, such a scenario would leave Japan with concerns that it could not handle. Citing Japan's frustrated attempts to resolve the Cambodian situation, Tanaka cautioned that there are limits to what a country with only economic power can do. Tanaka pondered that "it is not if Japan can simply provide money from now on and expect results."¹⁷²

Though Tanaka believed in "the economic irrationality of arms-build-up" and considered military expenditure "the biggest reason why the ability to build for the future order is being eroded,"¹⁷³

¹⁷⁰ Tanaka, Naoki, *Nihon no Bijon* [Grand Vision of Japan], Tokyo: Kodansha, 1991, p.50-53.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., p.133.

¹⁷² Ibid., p.132.

¹⁷³ Ibid., p.212.

nevertheless he took the view that efforts in areas other than economic relations were needed for Japan to establish a more influential role. Reflecting on the postwar, Tanaka wrote;

In the postwar period, we Japanese has never had any debate over what justice is. This was a result of our unfortunate history. The fact that we had started a war of invasion under the slogan of "Holy War" has left us with the tendency to shy away from debating about values, or justice.¹⁷⁴

Summary

The emergence of pluralism as a distinctive and significant perspective in the later postwar period was a result of the need to bridge the gap between the wide gulf between idealism and realism that had been prevalent in the earlier periods. In other words, the changes in the position of Japan in international relations had created a need in the minds of many intellectuals an approach that was neither inward-looking as idealism nor merely reactive as realism. While carefully respecting the constraints placed on Japan, the pluralist approach has strove to build what they consider as plausible designs for Japan in international affairs.

Ideals, or political objectives, seen to be appropriate by most pluralists for Japan to espouse

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., p.250.

internationally are those inherited from idealists. Pacifism that Japan has maintained, though not in its initial form of the earlier postwar period, is viewed as one of the few ideals considered to be universally applicable, and thus a worthwhile goal.

The major characteristic of pluralism in Japan is its emphasis on the positive aspects of the interdependence phenomenon. While acknowledging the problems that interdependence poses for nations,¹⁷⁵ Japanese pluralists mostly view the situation as enabling Japan to assume a more politically active role *without* seriously compromising its pacifist ideals through the acquisition of stronger military capabilities. Therefore, concerns such over increased vulnerability and sensitivity that results from further interdependence are greatly outweighed by the sense of opportunity for Japan to be an active player in international affairs. In their world view, the problems posed by growing interdependence are relatively insignificant compared to the possibility of escaping from the dominance of the major military superpowers.

Secondly, compared to the emphasis placed on transnational aspects of international relations seen

¹⁷⁵ For example, Hanai, Hitoshi, "Funso wo Yuhatsusuru Sogo Izon no Ronsi [Logic of Interdependence Leads to Conflict]" in *Chuo Koron*, Vol.85 (1980), pp.130-142.

in pluralism in general, pluralism in Japan tends to view phenomenon such as interpenetration from a different angle. Here, too, for Japanese pluralists, the relative decline of the nation-state vis-a-vis other actors is not as important as the relative decline of the significance of the superpowers' military capabilities. Hence, pluralists in Japan can insistently call for "grand designs" to be articulated at the nation level. In this sense, they are surprisingly nation-oriented.

In general, the Japanese pluralists foresee the future international order in the following way:

i)the decline of military power and the increase of the importance of economic power,

ii)the inevitable linkage between economic success and political influence,

iii)the inevitability of transformation of the system into collective-type leadership,

iv)continuation of the United States as at least one of the important leaders,

v)the interdependence among nations makes it necessary that the advanced industrial nations cooperate with each other, and also with the Third World, and,

vi)finally, the role of Japan in the new system will be to participate actively in the rule-making, especially in the sphere of technology and industry.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS

Characteristics of Japanese Approaches to International Relations

In the preceding chapters, we have summarized and then provided an in-depth analysis of the main currents of thought in Japanese approaches to international affairs. The analysis revealed that the leading patterns of thought have at various times been idealism, realism and pluralism. However, despite these changes in the trend, we can identify certain characteristics in Japanese theories of international relations that are common throughout the postwar period. They are;

i)the tendency for nationalism to be expressed in a distorted fashion,

ii)the importance attached to the Asian region,

iii)the attachment of relative importance to the United Nations,

iv)the high visibility of non-specialists in debates concerning international affairs, and

v)the tendency to be unduly influenced by external factors.

i)Distorted Nationalism

The perspective of nationalism and the nation-state in postwar Japan are ambiguous at best. The war experience and the resulting negation of militarism has

left a strong suspicion towards Japan's own nationalism. Maruyama's thesis had sought to locate the defects of the prewar Japanese state in its "backwardness" or its "premodernity." Regardless of Maruyama's intent, nationalism became the scapegoat for the prewar Japanese actions.

Because of this, the subsequent reemergence of nationalist perspectives tend to be defensive and irrational. As the cases of intellectuals Ikutaro Shimizu and Jun Etoh demonstrate, Japanese nationalism is often expressed in a distorted fashion. Ikutaro Shimizu had been one of the leading idealist intellectuals of the anti-MSA movement era in the late 1950s. Yet by 1980, he had become an advocate of Constitutional amendment to the Article 9, and furthermore, even championed for the nuclear option for Japan. Or, take the case of Jun Etoh for another example; he even argued that the war between the United States and Japan have never ended. In Etoh's view, the United States have continued to wage a "silent war" against Japan throughout the postwar period bent on neutralizing Japan, economically, politically, and culturally.¹⁷⁶

ii) Asian Regionalism

In spite of the increasing globalization of the

¹⁷⁶ See Etoh, Jun, *Nichibei Senso wa Owatteinai*.

Japanese economy, the Asian region continues to occupy the center of Japanese international theories. No doubt in the earliest postwar period, this special attention given to Asia reflected the deep remorse felt by the intellectuals over the wartime actions of Japan in the region, but this trend has continued. It is also true that the Japanese economy's interdependence with the Asian region remains as high as 30% in terms of trade.

The examination of writings by realists such as Masataka Kosaka and Shinkichi Etoh reveal that they too, considered Asia to have special meaning for Japan. Both of these realists accepted the Cold War divisions as unavoidable, yet were reluctant to treat the situation in Asia in strictly Cold War terms. Kosaka was cautious about applying Cold War criteria to the communist nations of Asia, and in the case of Etoh, next to the interests of Japan itself, the interests of Asian people were deemed as important.

The Asian region figures prominently in the works of idealists as well as those of realists. In the international theory of Kinhide Mushakoji, strategies maintaining the status quo are prescribed for Japan. Yet, for the Asian region, Mushakoji advocated a more active role for Japan to transform the status quo which was disadvantageous to the Asian nations. The Neo-realist Makoto Momoi also placed Asia at the center of his Grand

Pacific Design Initiative. He considered it the future role and responsibility for Japan to invest heavily in terms of money, technology and manpower in the Asian and Pacific region to facilitate and stabilize regional cooperation.

iii) United Nation-ism

Beginning with the almost religious significance attached to the organization in the immediate postwar years, Japanese intellectuals have continued to envision an important role for the United Nations. For Japanese intellectuals who took the declaration in the preamble of the Constitution "to preserve our security and existence by trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving people of the world" seriously, the United Nations was seen as the mechanism for realizing the ideal.

Thus early idealists who were reluctant to accept the Cold War conflict placed in the United Nations a high hope for international peace. As seen in Yoshikazu Sakamoto's proposal for a neutral Japan through the stationing of United Nations Peace Keeping Forces, idealists unsatisfied with the status quo often hang their hopes on the "higher" authority of the United Nations over the two superpowers.

The United Nations has proved to be less than most Japanese intellectuals had hoped, but it continued to

claim the loyalty of many Japanese writers. Kinhide Mushakoji placed high expectations on the United Nations more for the ideals it propagates than for its record of performance. Mushakoji thought that the United Nations as an ideal could embody the principles for a multi-valued international society.

All in all, the Japanese intellectuals regard the "legitimacy" of the United Nations quite highly. Thus, the fact that the Gulf War Operation in 1991 was technically carried out under the auspices of the United Nations relieved the Japanese to a certain extent of their anxiety over their first official sponsoring of any types of military action in the postwar period.

iv) The High Visibility of Non-Specialists

Another characteristic of the writings by Japanese intellectuals on international affairs is the high visibility of non-specialists. In various debates concerning international affairs, non-specialists seem to occupy the center stage just as much as trained academics of the discipline.

As the postwar period began in a wide-spread atmosphere of self-retrospection, many of the so-called *bunkajins* (intellectuals, i.e., the leaders of *bunka*, or culture), offered their thoughts on the main issues and problems in Japan. The intellectuals felt that they

needed to exercise their influence in the course of the nation so that the state would not make another mistake. Since the disciplines of international politics and international relations were still in an infant stage, debates on international affairs were often led by *bunkajins* who had more access to the media than the academics. Apparently, this tradition of intellectuals venturing into areas not necessarily their specialty and offering their opinions has endured.

The "media" factor is seen in the strong influence of the widely-read *Sogo Zasshis* (Comprehensive Magazines). Popular magazines such as *Sekai*, *Chuo Koron*, *Asahi Journal*, and later, *Bungei Shunju*, which provide relatively hard-core political articles alongside lighter readings, have traditionally enjoyed a wide following in Japan. Together, these magazines consist what is generally known as the *rondan* (forum), where thoughts on recent political events are presented by various writers. The popularity of the magazines has resulted in a situation where public opinion is often formed through articles and discussions published in these magazines.¹⁷⁷ Thus, many of the influential writings on international relations have been published in *Sogo Zasshis* rather than academic journals specializing in the subject. This has enabled some of the more academic works to reach a wider

¹⁷⁷ For example, the so-called "Seki-Morishima Debate" in early 1980 that took place in the pages of *Bungei Shunju*.

audience.

The downside of the situation is that, since these magazines by nature are intended for a general readership, journalistic flare in the articles might well be encouraged to prospective writers. Hence, we encounter articles on international affairs by non-specialists alongside those by the specialists. Some of the leading Japanese critics of international politics apparently have no formal training academically on the subjects. Two of the more nationalistic commentators on international affairs serve as examples. Shoichi Watanabe was and still is a professor of English, while Tsuneari Fukuda is a literary critic and translator of Shakespeare's dramas. Ikutaro Shimizu was a philosopher and a sociologist by training and profession. This raises questions as to how well some of these "opinion leaders" are informed about the subjects they are writing on. Some of the more distorted views expressed in the media can likely be traced to this reason.

(v) The Tendency for Theory to be Influenced by External Circumstances

In his long academic career, Masamichi Royama changed his theories back and forth between idealism and realism depending on the international and domestic circumstances. In the atmosphere of international

democracy in the 1920s and the immediate postwar years, Royama's theoretical outlook was idealistic. On the other hand, in the period of Japan's militarization in the 1930s and later during the Cold War period, he became a believer in power politics. Royama's case is not necessarily an isolated case. Other intellectuals such as Masamichi Inoki and Yoshihiko Seki have also significantly modified their idealism of the immediate postwar period to support more pragmatic theories of international affairs.

On the other side, Yonosuke Nagai had started out as one of the leading realists criticizing the absolute pacifism of the idealists and justifying the Mutual Security Agreement setup. But as the pressure from the U.S. on Japan to improve its own defense capabilities in the late 1970s and 1980s led to the appearance of more nationalistic and military-oriented Neo-realists in Japan, his posture has become that of emphasizing the value of pacifism, pushing him more into the direction of idealism.

These examples tells us that Japanese intellectuals tend to tailor their theories in accordance with the circumstance. Rather than being a character flaw, this is probably a reflection of how external circumstances impose constraints on Japan as a nation in international affairs. In contemplating the appropriate actions for

Japan, these intellectuals had to face this reality. Kiyoaki Tsuji, in describing the late Masamichi Royama, commented that;

As he was always thinking and acting in tune with the time, seen from the outside, he would often be evaluated as always changing his tune; but in reality, in his own terms, he was not changing. Since the issues of the day changed so much, it appeared that he was changing as well.¹⁷⁸

To a certain extent this is true. The changes in the approaches of these writers are reflections of the changes that have fell upon Japan.

Forecasts for the Future

The summaries and analyses in the preceding chapters, and the generalizations derived in this chapter, have given us the intellectual basis for the Japanese approaches to international affairs. Judging from the evidence presented, certain forecasts concerning the direction of Japanese theories of international relations can be made.

At the present, the Japanese intellectuals are in the midst of an intense debate over the role of Japan in the emerging post-Cold War system. As Kuniko Y. Inoguchi puts it, "the time when Japan could take for granted its criteria for action has now passed." In this context,

¹⁷⁸ Seki, Yoshihiko, et al, "Royama Masamichi: Sono Hito to Jidai [Masamichi Royama: The Man and the Time]" in *Chuo Koron*, Vol.97 (1982), p.304. A comment during a tribute for the late political scientist.

Japanese theories of international relations must graduate from the old dichotomy between idealism and realism. Perhaps, the question for Japanese intellectuals is no longer "to be or not to be" in international affairs, but "what and how."

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