

THE ROLE OF THE ELITE IN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT:
THE CASE OF SAUDI ARABIA

by

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B.A. Simon Fraser University 1979

THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
in the Department
of
Political Science

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SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY

October, 1982

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The Role of the Elite in Political Development:
The Case of Saudi Arabia

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the establishment and growth of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the part played by different kinds of elite in its evolution. The elite has also been in the center of the peculiar political development of Saudi Arabia. The conceptual backgrounds of the terms "elite" and "political development" are reviewed, and their respective relevance and significance in the contexts of Islam and the developing Third World are considered, as are the specifics of their application to Saudi Arabia.

The importance of Islam as both religious and social ideology is discussed, along with the importance of its position within the culture of the Arabs. Particular attention has been paid to the political significance of the fundamentalist revival of Islam commonly referred to as the Wahhabi movement. Arabic society within the Arabian Peninsula, the pre-existing condition subjected to the nation building process, is described and specific attributes of its culture and organization which were retained in the new nation's polity are identified.

The history of the birth and growth of the Kingdom is briefly described from the recapture of Riyadh by Abdul-Aziz ibn Saud in 1902 to the assassination of King Faisal in 1975, and the subsequent character and degree of political development in Saudi Arabia are analyzed. The fortuitous discovery and development of oil in the Kingdom is seen as a stimulus to the nation's development. It will also be argued, however, that the

stability and strength of the newly established monarchy, and the particular political development of the kingdom itself, was largely derived from the strong personality and vision of its founder Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, the religious political ideology of the traditional elite, the integration of the modern elite in charge of various organs of government, urban and technological development, etc. in the society itself. These three initial segments of society operationally functioned with minimum disruption and effectively served the growing needs of one of the most important countries of the world.

Dedicated to my husband,

Philip,

and to my sister

Nancy

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to give special thanks to my supervisory committee: Dr. A. H. Somjee and Professor A. Ciria for their encouragement and guidance. I am deeply indebted to Dr. Somjee who has been an inspiration to me as he is to the many students he comes in contact with.

No thesis is produced without the help of others. Particular thanks are due to my Saudi friend, Habib, who shared the insights he had developed of his society, clarifying nuances which otherwise might have been misread. I am, also, grateful to Ms. Cheryl Dawson and Ms. Cheryl Mansell for their efforts in proofreading and to Barbara Barnett for her willing help, beyond the call of duty, in typing the final changes and ensuring the computer behaved.

Special acknowledgement must go to Mrs. Ruth Baldwin for her artistic creation of the map of Saudi Arabia.

Finally to my husband, Phil Hancock, for without his patience, understanding, encouragement and interest this thesis would never have been done.

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NOTE ON NAMES AND TRANSLITERATION

Through typographical necessity Arabic words have been spelled without any diacritical marks. Except within direct quotations, where I have tried to remain letter-perfect to the originals, place and personal names have been rendered in simple, modern spellings. My guide has been contemporary English-language publications relating to Saudi Arabia.

In each section the first reference to a given individual gives his name as fully as historians have found it necessary to identify him (King Abdul-Aziz ibn Saud, whose full name was Abdul Aziz ibn Abdul-Rahman ibn Faisal ibn Turki al-Saud, was preceded in the 18th Century by an almost equally famous namesake Abdul-Aziz ibn Muhammad ibn Saud, and Philby's index to his book Saudi Arabia names two more as Abdul-Aziz ibn Saud). Subsequent references to an individual within each section will be by way of the commonest short form used for that person, except where possible confusion makes a longer form necessary.

Arabic words requiring definition are defined either in context or by footnote at first occurrence, and collected in a Glossary appended to this thesis.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

This thesis is about the part played by the elite in the political development of Saudi Arabia. The Saudi political development was deeply influenced by the culture, tradition, and history of the region, on the one hand, and the changing role of its elite, over the years, on the other. In the following pages we shall analyse the particular nature of the Saudi political development and the contribution of its elite at the various stages of its evolution.

In scholarly literature a number of approaches have been adopted in order to understand the complexity of the phenomenon of political development. Invariably, as we shall see in this thesis, the approaches do not adequately explain the peculiarities of political development of non-western societies and in particular those of Saudi Arabia. In them one unmistakably notices an attempt to validate a theory or an approach which has been developed without sufficient prior understanding of non-western societies. Elite in developing societies play an extraordinary role. And in the case of Saudi Arabia, in particular, such a role needs to be identified in its various complexities and manifestations.

Saudi Arabia is of particular interest for a study of this kind for several reasons. While several authors have written in

detail on the founding of the kingdom, and, on the reign of its founder, King Abdul-Aziz Ibn Saud, those works have largely been of the nature of travellers' tales, history and biography. Saudi Arabia has made the transition from a preindustrial society, in a state of arrested development, to a rapidly modernizing developing nation in less than fifty years. Part of the territory subsumed into the state had been a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire, but that territory was not the origin of its drive to nationhood. Another part of the territory incorporated into the new state had received minimal attention from the British colonial administration, but again that area was not the main source of the drive towards nation-building. The force that built the nation arose from a native religious ideology in the almost barren heartland of Arabia, an area viewed by the great powers as a buffer wasteland, of interest only to bands of marauding brigands, the Bedouin.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, with the Qur'an, the revealed holy book of Islam, as its constitution, is a theocratic state with the values of the Bedouin, the desert nomads, underlying its political institutions. The importance of this new nation, in world affairs, may be viewed in two ways. (1) The great wealth which oil has brought allows the Saudi government to play a major role in international politics related to the Middle East. Also, such vast wealth permits the Saudis to give aid to other developing countries of the Third World and thereby exercise influence on them. (2) Saudi Arabia is the spiritual

homeland for millions of Muslims throughout the world. That too helps it to exercise a good deal of influence on Muslim countries. (See Appendix A, p. xx, for further details)

While not being a member of either of the two major power blocks, and having sympathy for the developing nations, sympathy which it backs up with aid, it has become one of the leaders of the Third World. Apart from its growing influence very few studies are available, on the nature of her society, polity, and the role of its elite in them.¹

Framework for Analysis

This thesis examines the processes of political development in Saudi Arabia and the part played by its elite in stimulating these processes. "Processes of nation building and of national development are elite-centered from the outset." (LaPalombara 1974:494) Therefore, those who have the power to introduce and bring about change are the key to understanding the kind of change that occurs.

"Whether a new state can maintain both stability and development hinges, to a large extent, on the integration of its political elite." (Seligman 1966:240) On the question of integration of political elite it is necessary to make a distinction between traditional elite and modern elite. "The

¹ In 1981 two books were published, The Kingdom, by Robert Lacey and, The House of Saud, by David Holden and Richard Johns, which seek to present for popular consumption a picture of Saudi Arabia's history and her role in the contemporary world.

more traditional the society, the more prominent is descent likely to be in the identification of the elite; the more modern the society, the more prominent are skills likely to be in its identification." (Tachau 1975:16) It is in the transitional phase of development that problems arise between the traditional ways and the new ways learned by those who have obtained a secular education outside their country. During the transitional phase of development the traditional elite must rely more and more on those members of society who have attained a secular education. It takes time for new nations to develop the necessary modernized infrastructure to educate their own people.

The process of modernization cannot be separated from political development. Modernization means the introduction of new methods of doing things; e.g. a closer relationship between citizens and the state; specialization of skills and a professional group; increased literacy; the introduction of communications media, television, radio, newspapers; modern methods of medicine; the creation of jobs in education; and, travel. "Modernization must be thought of, then, as a process that is simultaneously creative and destructive, providing new opportunities and prospects at a high price in human dislocation and suffering." (Black 1975:27) Modernization, or even political modernization, is, however, not necessarily equivalent to political development; the idea of development implies a forward moving change for the improvement of the system, while modernization carries merely the idea of embodying the latest

technological changes available.

In order to understand how political development has occurred in Saudi Arabia we shall see it from the point of view of the part played in it by elite both traditional and modern. Moreover, in Saudi Arabia, in particular, the traditional elite has been responsible for her modernization. This thesis seeks to analyse the positive and negative results of it on Saudi political development.

Organization of the Thesis

Chapter II reviews the literature on elite, political development and modernization. It is contended that the existing tools of conceptual analysis become inadequate for the understanding of the complex processes of change in Saudi Arabia. There are many complex issues involved in the development of such a society, one of which is the role of Islam. As can be noted by reviewing the historical development of Islam there have been many revivals seeking to purify the faith and bring Muslims back on the path that was intended by the Prophet. As a religious ideology, which also serves as a constitutional base, it becomes important in giving direction to the state's political development. Consequently, it is not always possible to use effectively some of the western concepts to understand the peculiarities of the religio-political development of Saudi Arabia. Chapter III undertakes an historical review. The historical review is important because

"...history has taken into her service a number of ancillary sciences which formulate general laws not about primitive societies but about civilizations, for example economics, political science and sociology". (Toynbee 1946:64) It is through this study of the historical evolution of Saudi Arabia that the growth of the Islamic State and its elite can be identified and an understanding of what happened and what caused change in the past can be analyzed against more recent history. The development of Wahhabism in 1744, and the coalition between Al-Wahhab and the House of Saud laid the foundation of Saudi Arabia. In this chapter we shall also examine some of the external influences such as the Ottoman impact and the British role in Arabia. Chapter IV begins by concentrating on the traditional elite and its role in political development. Developmental changes are looked at under the leadership of three kings, beginning with Abdul-Aziz Ibn Saud (the first king), his son Saud, and finally Faisal.

Chapter V analyses the roles played by the elite in the political development of the Saudi state. A prefatory review covers the establishment of the House of Saud against the endeavours of the Hashemites. This period is important as it is the transition phase between loosely connected but independent tribal, village and town groupings and the subsequent nationhood. The first stages of Saudi political growth and technical innovation, to make the Desert Kingdom a nation-state able to meet the world as an equal, are then identified and

analysed. Subsequently various aspects of political development in conflict with traditional methods and ideas are reviewed, and the involvement of the elite in the acceptance of those changes is examined.

In Chapter VI two questions are addressed. The first is the changing character of the power elite in the country; the second the comparability of the Saudi experience with other Arab nations. It is noted that, while the governing elite has expanded in response to the growing complexity of the state, membership of the power elite remains restricted to the royal family. The character and educational background of the elites have changed, with technical and western style educations becoming predominant in the developing Saudi technocracy. The power elite, the politically-active members of the al-Saud, are seen to have changed themselves to fit the changing needs of the government system they head and operate. In comparing the elite structure of Saudi Arabia with those of Egypt and Lebanon it is found that the elite structures are quite different despite some common historical and religious experiences. Membership in the Saudi elite and sub-elite is seen to be dependent on a modern version of the traditional criteria, functional competence in the required skills.

Finally the questions and problems raised by the examination of the political growth of Saudi Arabia are placed into the broader context of developmental analysis. Weaknesses in commonly used theoretical concepts are noted, particularly

the handicap of ethnocentricity inherent in trying to apply a model industrialized Western Christian state as a paradigm of development for Third World nations. Also noted is the problem faced by the developing nations in trying to achieve modernization without adopting western culture. These points are then placed in context of the contemporary Saudi situation.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Saudi Arabia is one society where most of our existing tools of conceptual analysis become inadequate. This is because it is in the throes of a transition from a preindustrial tribal society, with a highly egalitarian ideology which is implicit in the fundamentalist¹ view of Islam, to a complex modern nation-state which, nevertheless, formally preserves that religious ideology as its constitutional base. The two kinds of society require different social organization, theological and legal systems, and a particular elite structure to sustain them. While some of the forms of the tribal power structure have been retained within the modern state to legitimize the ruler's power, the persistence of those tribal power structures hamper the centralization of authority that the state is seeking. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the transition

¹ "We may define Fundamentalism as the reaffirmation, in a radically changed environment, of traditional modes of understanding and behaviour. In contrast to conservatism or traditionalism, which assume that things can and should go on much as they have for generations past, Fundamentalism recognizes and tries to speak to a changed milieu, an altered atmosphere of expectations. Fundamentalism is by no means a blind opponent of all social change, but it insists that Change must be governed by traditional values and modes of understanding. In an Islamic context, Fundamentalism asserts not only the literal truth of the Qur'an but also that its commandments, legal as well as ritual, are fully incumbent on modern man." (Humphreys 1979:3)

has been initiated by military conquest. Such a conquest justified itself by means of a need to bring about a revival of religious fundamentalism to which the tribal society acknowledged its only allegiance. Moreover, in analysing Saudi Arabia, students of Political Science face additional difficulties. This is because Islam is considered to be the most political of the world's great religions, and that the Qur'an, its holy book, and the Sunnah, the oral traditions of Mohammed's statements and actions, contain within them the basic concepts underlying the idea of nationhood, the problem faced by the political scientist in order to understand and explain them becomes enormously complex. Thus not only our conceptual tools of analysis but also our manifold assumptions, which underlie social and political systems, do not help us very much in understanding the complexities of political development in Saudi Arabia.

This chapter examines the conceptual tools, developed by political scientists and sociologists, which have acquired a degree of acceptance and authority but which are partially applicable to this study. The very use of the terms "elite" and "political development" in the title of this thesis indicates my acceptance of the importance of these concepts in political analysis; nevertheless, these terms should be examined, explained and defined to avoid ambiguity due to preconception and misunderstanding.

I shall first of all examine the term "elite" and the explanations associated with it. Among those explanations is the need to identify the members of the elite within a society under examination and the way in which such identification may be made. Many studies have been done on elite by such scholars as Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto, T. B. Bottomore, and others. All agree that there are those who rule and those who are ruled; with this there can be no argument. However, a major problem arises when one goes to its sub categories such as social elite, a political elite, a sub-elite, a power elite, a ruling elite, and then proceed with the assumption that therefore there must exist an upper class, a middle class, and a lower class from which such elite originate. Such an assumption does not help us very much in the analysis of Saudi social and political organization. Consequently, even when we use the term elite in understanding Saudi Arabia it will be with reference to the actual role that it plays rather than what social and political theories attribute to it.

The second part of this chapter looks at the problems encountered in determining what political development is. This concept is frequently linked to the processes of modernization and democratic development in Third World countries. Scholars, in writing about political development, offer many approaches and proposed indicators that should help the student of political development. However, in reviewing the literature one finds that there is no consensus on approaches and proposed

indicators which give evidence that positive political development is taking place. Moreover, such approaches often try to refer to the self-idealized characteristics of the industrialized western democracy. The questions that need to be raised are: whether or not political development is an ongoing process? And, are not all countries in a constant state of social and political development of some sort at all stages in their history? It would have to be agreed that development can be slow, moderate or very rapid, but that the pace of development hinges on the degree to which human and natural resources can be mobilized to improve the living conditions of the society. In studies done on political development, economic modernization is often seen as playing a major role. If modernization is not taking place fast enough in certain societies does this mean that its political development is not worth noting? What is the causal relationship between modernization and political development? By what criteria is the pace of modernization to be judged, and to what extent can the leadership of the society affect that pace?

It must be recognized that without leadership, human and natural resources, and stability, a political system will register a slower degree of all round development. However, if competent leadership is present then change at the social, economic, and political levels becomes rapid. This thesis will refer to the political stability provided by the Saudi elite which then became the basis and condition of development in

other compartments of life.

Elite

A) The Role of Elite

A cursory examination of human organizations leads to the identification of a basic division: the leaders and the followers, the teachers and the taught, or, as Gaetano Mosca puts it: "In all societies ... two classes of people appear - a class that rules and a class that is ruled" (Mosca 1939:50). Mosca acknowledges a debt for the concept to Claude Henri de Saint Simon whose writings in the early nineteenth century first put forward the concept of elite in social organization (Mosca 1939:329), but he then also traces the idea back to Machiavelli's assertion that "... in all republics, however organized, there are never more than forty or fifty citizens who attain a position that entitles them to command." (Machiavelli 1950:163) Other writers, such as H. D. Lasswell, note the ideal of an elite as being inherent in Jewish and Christian theology, while T. B. Bottomore contends that such a notion was present in the ideas of the Greek philosophers and in the ancient Indian caste system.

B) The Identification of Elite

Studies done in the early part of the twentieth century by Gaetano Mosca and Vilfredo Pareto put forward the concept of "political elite". To Mosca the ruling group was what he called a "political class", while Pareto labeled this group a "governing class" to separate it from what he felt existed in parallel, that of a "nongoverning elite". Mosca went into some detail when he noted:

"The first class, always the less numerous, performs all political functions, monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages that power brings, whereas the second, the more numerous class, is directed and controlled by the first, in a manner that is now more or less legal, now more or less arbitrary and violent and supplies the first, in appearance at least, with material means of subsistence and with the instrumentalities that are essential to the vitality of the political organism."
(Mosca 1939:50)

Mosca's concept of the "first class", essentially refers to the group that wields power over the masses. Such a power is enjoyed by this class because of the balance of political forces within the society. The balance of political forces, then, determines the nature of its ruling class. (Mosca 1939:65) Taking Mosca's concept of the ruling class one step further, Pareto introduced the idea of what he called the "circulation of elite".

In so doing he implicitly acknowledges the existence of at least one other elite or potential elite within the society:

"Let us assume an elite A, which is in control; another elite B, which tries to replace it; then C represents the rest of the population, comprising the inept, the people lacking energy, character, intelligence ... an army without leaders which acquires importance only if led by either A or B. As a rule, the B's will lead them while the A's are lulled by a false sense of security or

underestimation of the C's. ... However, sometimes the A's will try to out bid the B's by offering the C's concessions more apparent than real ..." (Meisel 1965:12 - 13)

Group "C" may be referred to as a "counter-elite" by virtue of its preparedness to supplant the existing "power-elite", but Pareto's assumption also raises the question of how the alternate elite "B" comes into existence. In his discussion of Pareto's work Raymond Aron notes:

"If every elite confronts in the masses a minority which would be worthy of belonging but does not belong to the elite, what then can the elite do? According to Pareto, it has a fundamental choice of two methods that it can use simultaneously in variable proportions: to eliminate those candidates for the elite (who are normally revolutionaries) or to absorb them." (Aron 1970:183 - 4)

Should the elite fail to do what Pareto suggests then they are in danger of losing their power. Of course elimination of the "counter-elite" or absorption of it is dependent on the make-up of the society in question. If the ruling elite of society are unable to keep in check the counter-elite, then it may be to their advantage to absorb them. If, however, the society is stratified racially or culturally as a result of conquest, has a sufficiency of personnel for government from within the ruling elite, and is generally authoritarian, the members of a potential counter-elite may find themselves threatened with exile or execution. Both approaches may be taken within one society during the same regime, to different members or factions of the counter-elite. The method of recruitment, therefore, is very important in sustaining the power elite. Saudi Arabia, a developing country with a rapidly growing

bureaucracy, functional and not just administrative, generally absorbs its counter-elite almost in embryo, and has not hesitated to exile or execute potential leaders opposed to the goals and policies of the rulers.

Those who become members of the counter-elite are generally drawn from a stratum of society which Bottomore refers to as a "sub-elite". He says

"... the elite is not simply raised high above the rest of society; it is intimately connected with society through a sub-elite, a much larger group which comprises, to all intents and purposes, the whole 'new middle class' of civil servants, managers and white collar workers, scientists and engineers, scholars and intellectuals." (Bottomore 1964:11)

It is this sub-elite which is the source of the greatest threat to a ruling elite, since it is the body of administrators which serves as the rulers' tools in the running of the society. Because of its closer communication links with the masses it controls the flow of information for the rulers and on which their decisions are based. Such an action, if and when it occurs, is not necessarily the result of conscious conspiracy. The sub-elite is a non-cohesive group in deriving its status from its function. The individuals and subgroups within it, some of which may be mutually antagonistic, may be assumed at all times to be serving their own interests as they perceive them. So long as the sub-elite serves, directly or indirectly, the interests of the elite and does not challenge the tenure of the elite in power, its survival is likely to be less precarious. Only when the results of the sub-elite's actions run counter to

the purposes of the power elite is the dominance of the power elite threatened. Such a threat would not lead to the supplanting of the power elite unless the power elite, by failing to take corrective measures, demonstrated that it was no longer able to rule. This would imply that the stability of a regime would be dependent on two factors:

- a. the extent to which it ensured that the sub-elite's interests are identical with those of the power elite; and,
- b. the power elite's ability to take corrective measures, of whatever sort, when a threat develops.

The kinds of techniques used by A and B, as we saw earlier in Meisel's discussion, may serve to characterize the society and its ruling regime. For example, in Canada and the U.S.A. accountability is so broadly dispersed that the entire society's perceptions of its needs may be quite readily kept attuned to the power elite's goals (and vice-versa), and an extreme challenge, such as Quebec's October Crisis, may be limited to a small group and met with a minimal show of force. On the other hand, despite having a nominally similar democratic system, Northern Ireland was ruled by an elite whose goals were greatly at variance with those of the masses, its sub-elite served its own ends, and together they tried to implement policies which have eluded peace and harmonious relationships among the various segments of the community.

Finally, for the purposes of analysis of the elite, particularly with reference to the countries of the Middle East, we shall take into account the views of certain scholars who have worked in that field. Phebe A. Marr, in examining Iraq, dealt with just the people actually making decisions on national policy, while James A. Bill, examining Iran, found it necessary to carry his study to include the national and provincial elite families (Lenczowski (ed.), 1975; 109ff, 17ff). Most writers, rather than using the concept of a ruling elite as a means to the understanding of a given society's political system, confine themselves to seeking to analyze the composition of the elite itself as a method of understanding the society. (Rustow, 1966) In reviewing the establishment and subsequent development of Saudi Arabia I shall indicate that elite are quite identifiable at the various stages of the nation's growth. It is for this reason that I intend in this thesis to focus on the elite both as agents of broad social change in Saudi Arabia, and, as that development makes for a more complex polity, as effective managers of the new political system.

Political Development

"Most of the concepts of political development that one finds in the scholarly writings have been formulated either in advance of sufficient knowledge of the complexities of the actual growth of political societies of the nonwestern world or by means of an exploratory exercise to extend and seek the

validity of the western concepts, grounded in its history and political traditions, to the understanding of the nonwestern world." (Somjee 1980:1) However, it is here that the problems begin for the student of political development, for one of the first objectives of any study is to define one's terms as clearly as possible since these definitions in turn provide the framework of analysis. As indicated at the beginning of this chapter we are provided with concepts of and approaches to political development which reflect milestones in Euro-American development. However, like people, not all countries have the same social, economic, or ideological bases on which to build. This point is rarely given more than formal acknowledgement by western political scientists examining developing or underdeveloped nations, and their studies demonstrate that they have found it difficult to set aside the preconceptions inherent in their own value systems often resulting from their own national culture.

James A. Bill noted and criticized this parochialism and lack of objectivity in the selection of analytical tools in his 1972 article "Class Analysis and the Dialectics of Modernization in the Middle East", wherein he remarks (1972:418):

"Such prominent Orientalists and Islamic historians as Hamilton A.R. Gibb, W. Montgomery Watt, Bernard Lewis, Gustav E. von Grunebaur...and Jacques Berque have sporadically analysed the Middle East in terms of class. Yet, none of these scholars have endeavoured (1) to examine systematically the meaning and relevance of this concept within the Islamic setting; and, (2) to define rigorously and reshape the concept according to the area under consideration and the problems at issue."

This remark is applicable more broadly than just to the use of class analysis, and may also be applied, word for word, to the use by western scholars of the conceptual tools of elite, political development, and modernization in their attempts to analyze and understand nonwestern societies. A part of the failure to eliminate culture-based preconceptions often results from their inability to pay sufficient attention to the definitions of terms.

To understand the meaning of a term, one has to begin with the dictionary meaning of it. The Oxford English Dictionary defines politics as "The science and art of government" and political as "of or belonging to the state or body of citizens, its government and policy, especially in civil and secular affairs...of or pertaining to the science or art of politics". Development is defined as "The bringing out of the latent capabilities (of anything)" or "gradual advancement through progressive stages." (Oxford English Dictionary 1971:2228-707). Drawing solely from the meaning of the words, then, political development would appear to relate to the gradual advancement through progressive stages of a state, its government and its polity. This idea may be more useful if restated as: political development is the changing or reshaping of governmental structures, systems, and institutions of a society in order to better serve the perceived needs and effect of goals of that society.

In a superficially similar way A.F.K. Organski (1965:7) defines political development "...as increasing governmental efficiency in utilizing the human and material resources of the nation for national goals". This definition, however, implicitly presumes the pre-existence of a nation-state as a prerequisite for political development. But, in the development of the same topic in his book, The Stages of Political Development, he identifies the first stage as "the politics of primitive unification...that which attends the birth and childhood of nations". Further, his discussion makes it clear that changes must take place prior to the formal creation of a nation-state which, properly speaking, are an integral part of political development. Such a position, however, does not cohere with the definition of political development which he has proposed.

Other writers define political development in terms of the ability of the political elite to handle demands through political institutions, (LaPalombara, 1974:48-49) or by reference to certain conditions that are evidences of political development, for example

"...as the acquisition by a political system of a consciously-sought, and qualitatively new and enhanced, political capacity as manifested in the successful institutionalization of

- A) new patterns of integration regulating and containing the tensions and conflicts produced by increased differentiation, and
- B) new patterns of participation and resource distribution adequately responsive to the demands generated by the imperatives of equality." (Coleman 1965:15)

Such definitions imply that political development means greater

participation and equality. These terms are western concepts and not necessarily the goal of the elite who are themselves in the process of change. Political elite may be involved in handling demands through changing political institutions, or they may be faced with demands generated by drives towards equality and participation. But in all such cases symptoms and consequences of political development no more define the concept than does fever define the disease pneumonia.

One is reminded by Lucian Pye that "...the scholar's world has never been so isolated from the world of affairs. as many laymen and academics would like to pretend, his security has been violently shaken by the realization of how little is known about the dynamics of political development and the significance of political differences." (Pye & Verba 1965:5) This point is of importance when examining the diversity of conceptual approaches taken in the studies of political development. That they fail to fulfil their intended purpose has been noted by A.R. Willner, who states, with regard to literature on developing countries:

- (1) "There are major gaps in mapping out what have already been recognized as salient sectors of the field and
- (2) A latent ethnocentrism in our formulation tends to distort our perceptions of the process of change and its direction."

This brings back the question of whether a developing country is in fact developing if its political structure and political attitudes are not moving in the same direction as those of western nations. Cultural relativism poses the most dangerous problem for social scientists in that "...we are often obliged

to judge the actions of members of other societies by standards which are not theirs". (Bullock and Stallybrass 1977:535) The obligation seems to stem from the fact that the Euro-American countries industrialized first, have recently moved rapidly in terms of technology, health care, and communication techniques, have had the natural resources to sustain their growth, or obtained those needed from the now-developing world, and that their standard of living is better than that of most of the developing countries.

Scholars' attention in examining political development has generally been focused on those societies perceived to be "developing" or "underdeveloped". In such cases they may measure and compare the study subject against the cultural case of their own stable and advanced society, and so identify the stages of progress yet to be reached.

What is overlooked is that what has developed in the West took time; that while progress within any single observer's life may appear smooth and rapid the actual progress has been much slower and less trouble free. Advances which have taken place in this century in technology, medicine, education and communication--which did not always have benevolent consequences on the developing countries--have created stresses within the advanced states which may yet make for unforeseen radical changes in their politics. There is yet the possibility that an apparently necessary and inevitable stage in the change of political development may force a course which will lead to

failure and collapse for the developed nations and those states which try to emulate them, while an alternative course, perceived by scholars as less likely to serve the needs of a developing nation (as those needs are judged by the scholars) may prove eventually to be a wiser and progressive choice. That choice, however, may be denied to the new nation because the environment in which it grows is already controlled by the developed nations, and its independent survival may be conditional upon it accepting a certain amount of direction, directly or indirectly, from the established powers. As Lucian W. Pye (1966:10) says:

"Once we recognize the demands and the attractions of both the nation-state system and the world culture we can begin to appreciate the basic stresses that must underlie the nation-building process in the new states...there is a minimum level of what were once Western but are now world standards which the new states must accept if they are to survive in a world of independent nation-states. Thus the international political and cultural fashions of the day set the general direction of development for the new states. ...the diffusion of the world culture can weaken and destroy the structure of traditional societies...the consequence of the international impact has more often been chaos and tension than a new order."

As already noted at the beginning of this section, there is no shortage of literature on the topic of political development. In that useful work just cited, Pye (1966) has identified the various concepts and interpretations basic to the approaches made to the subject by most of the writers in the field. Those concepts are: Political Development as the Political Prerequisite of Economic Development; Political Development as the Politics Typical of Industrial Societies; Political

Development as Political Modernization; Political Development as the Operation of a Nation-State; Political Development as Administrative and Legal Development; Political Development as Mass Mobilization and Participation; Political Development as Stability and Orderly Change; Political Development as Mobilization and Power; Political Development as One Aspect of a Multi-Dimensional Process of Social Change. Each of these is useful, in one case-study or another, as a skeleton on which to build an analysis of a society, but each forces a particular shape on the whole study, and conclusions reached may owe more to the viewpoint taken than to the actual inherent characteristics of the society examined. None can stand as a definition of political development. Some are prerequisites, some are symptoms or effects, some are just points of view; all cannot be applied to every case. The one most universal is probably stability and orderly change, as a prerequisite for political development to occur; and while it may be observed that revolution has played a significant role in the process of building a number of nations, it should be noted that such revolutions were breaks in the course of political development. These breaks in political development slow down or halt economic growth. Stability of elite leadership is important to development.

Stability implies legitimacy of the ruling regime, a point not made central to any of the approaches listed by Pye, but a regime which lacks legitimacy is by definition not accepted by

the people it rules, and so has to direct resources to maintaining its control and preventing revolution. Stability makes both orderly change and economic growth possible, and these can lead to improvements in the standard of living of the populace, a commonly-declared goal in developing nations.

Much conceptual analysis done focuses on the development of democracy, the sharing of power and articulation of a voice for the populace in political decision making. However, not all developing nations equate their development with democracy, although many, certainly in the Middle East, declare in their constitutions their espousal of a social democratic system. The democratic process adopted does not necessarily match the usual American preconceptions of what democracy means. In order to develop, some western concepts of government are adopted and adapted to suit the traditional methods of governing. With particular reference to Saudi Arabia there developed a Council of Deputies and later a Council of Ministers to administer government affairs, both modern and traditional.

Huntington (1965:386) finds it useful to associate political development with "institutionalization and political organizations and procedures". This, however, seems limited in that political organizations and the development of institutions have to be examined relative to those of the west. In many developing countries their traditional cultural attitudes are carried into the newly formed institutions which then play a different role in the society. At the same time institutions may

come into existence before the society has a full understanding of its importance and underlying goals. This raises problems for the researcher in that change is usually measured by how modern a government has become and whether it can take its place in international affairs. Therefore, a degree of political sophistication must parallel the process of modernization of institutions, bureaucracy, and approaches to international obligations. In other words governments must take on a more formal structure that is accepted by other governments and be responsible to international laws and political agreements. Under the circumstances the accountability in external relations is taken much more seriously than in internal relations. Examples of this are seen in the case of Uganda under the rule of Idi Amin, Iran and the taking of diplomats as hostages, and, the Soviet Union's implied threat to Poland, plus its recent take over of Afghanistan. So, to be modern is to have similar institutions so that interaction with other nations can take place.

Modernization

Edward Shils (1968) notes that there must exist a "will to be modern" and that the elite of the new nations must not fear change. However change is constant in human history whether it is the acceptance of new ideals, new skills, different life styles, or the adoption of different methods of governing.

"Modernization" as a term has been used to refer to a variety of changing conditions. Scholars such as David Apter, C. E. Black, D. A. Rustow, and Samuel Huntington have provided explanations and definitions of the process. Apter (1965:1) in his approach takes a normative view equating "modernization" as "a special kind of hope", but also points out that "its consequences may be frightening". On the other hand Black (1975:7) sees modernization closely linked to the evolution of historically developed institutions which "...adapt to the rapidly changing functions that reflect the unprecedented increase in man's knowledge, permitting control over his environment, that accompanied the scientific revolution." Rustow (1967:3) also follows an environmental approach in seeking to define modernization as the "widening control over nature through closer cooperation among men." He goes on to make a further observation that modernization "transforms both man and society, but most of all man's mind". (Rustow 1967:3) This second point is important when viewing modernization in Saudi Arabia. For the effects of "modern" changes greatly interfere with the traditional ways of doing things, values and customs.

The Complexities of Definition

Since many definitions set down conditions as to the path modernization has followed in the more developed countries, a major problem arises for the researcher. One of the major shortcomings of Black's and Rustow's definition of the

environmental approach raises a question that "modern" man has to think out. That is whether he is in fact in control when it comes to the combination of high technology, science and nature. However, Rustow goes further than Black when he begins to speak of the process of modernization transforming "man's mind". This point becomes an important theme throughout this thesis. The attitude towards "modernization" in the Arab world has been extensively studied by Raphael Patai, an anthropologist. In his work, The Arab Mind, several key points are raised about the Arab response to modernization. One such is a quote from Sania Hamady which says of the Arab:

"He attributes the ills of his society, his mistakes and failures either to fate, to the devil, or to imperialism. Whenever he is blamed for passivity or corruption, the answer to the accusation is that he is forced by an uncontrollable factor about which he can do nothing. This refusal to assume responsibility in the issues of his life and environment increases the Arab's weakness and encourages his surrender, as if fate were bound to act against him and not for him. (Patai 1973:153)"

This is a very important statement regarding Arab thinking which has been reflected as part of the impact King Abdul Ibn Saud Aziz had to face when attempting to modernize his people around 1918. Patai (1973:154) contends:

"that under traditional Islam, efforts at human improvement have rarely transcended ineffectuality. In general the Arab mind, dominated by Islam, has been bent more on preserving than innovating, on maintaining than improving, on continuing than initiating. In this atmosphere, whatever individual spirit of research and inquiry existed in the great age of medieval Arab culture became gradually stifled; by the fifteenth century, Arab intellectual curiosity was fast asleep. It was to remain inert until awakened four centuries later by an importunate West knocking on its doors."

Both Hamady and Patai in their research raise important facts about the nature of the Arab which must be taken into account when studying how they react to and view modernization. The man who felt safe in the confines of his tribal community can no longer just relate to the smaller group. He is encouraged by the leaders of the newly formed state to take employment, educate his children, live in a house, and rely on the state to fulfil many of the aspects of his life that used to be looked after by the tribal unit. His world changes completely around him and there is no turning back. He automatically becomes part of the process of change. He now has a radio, television, and perhaps a car and is influenced by what he sees, and how he is expected to regulate his life in accordance with a new set of regulations implemented by his government. He adopts western clothing and western foods. There is a move away from the extended family to the western style nuclear family life. With this there arises a need for the government to supply the necessary institutions to cope with the citizen's needs which can no longer be met by the previously existing traditional life style. Thus, 'to embark on modernization' has come to be synonymous with 'to westernize'. A high degree of value transfer takes place in the imitation of the western life style and with all that it entails. That modernization implies westernization is not unreasonable, although it is not inevitable. The base definition of modern is "of the present and recent times, new-fashioned" (Oxford Dictionary, 1969), and the easiest way to meet a challenge is to

imitate those who have successfully coped with that challenge.

Samuel P. Huntington examines political development and political decay with reference to the challenge of modernization. It is argued by Huntington that the process of rapid modernization leads to ineffectiveness of institutions and therefore is political decay. If a developing society is experiencing rapid social, economic and political change there are bound to be problems. There will be those in the society who are caught between the new and the old ways and those who are too old to change from the old ways; hence conflict develops creating a sense of loss of direction. In this discussion he makes the key point relating the broad and amorphous idea of modernization to politics: "Modernization affects all segments of society; its political aspects constitute political development." (Huntington 1965:386-7).

It is the contention in this thesis that modernization and political development cannot be separated, and that the degree to which a developing country is able to change is dependent on how well the elite or those in power are able to bring about the necessary economic and political change.

In this chapter the literature on elite, political development and modernization has been examined. It was also pointed out that a number of concepts in these three areas do not adequately explain the peculiarities of a theocratic traditional-modern society like the Saudi Arabian. The elite--whether they are political, economic, or social--all

exercise influence the society. They are the trend setters; they make decisions which affect the body politic as a whole. In traditional societies they are the first to accept newer ideas, to obtain secular education and to see the benefits for the country in these novelties. Today, many of these well educated elite are reluctant to adopt the forms and standards of the established developed nations. They want to be left alone to find their own best way of dealing with change.

Political Development and its many aspects need to be broadly defined since it encompasses social, economic, and political change. In reviewing the literature on this subject, it is observed that no single concept relating to the process of political development has been presented that is universally applicable to all cases. Too often scholars approach preconceived western-style democracy as a goal, thus severely limiting the value of their own work.

The study of political development is therefore unhelpful if it is only applied to judging how well a country is developing in the western sense. If political development is to be used as a tool to measure social, economic, and political change, it should then be easily applied to any country, developed or developing. It has to be assumed that even the developed nations are involved in a continuing process of social, economic and political change. David E. Apter (1965:ixF), in his study of politics of modernization makes the point clearly when he asserts:

"Misinterpretations and failures to understand the patterns of movement and change are the errors we try to correct through constant research and analysis. Our thoughts about new nations need not be based only on superficial knowledge any more than we need remain ethnocentric in our views. What is required is a new kind of knowledge to describe connections between events different from those to which we are accustomed."

Many respected scholars recognize the problems faced in analyzing what is taking place in developing countries. But there must be a point where idealistic theorization of what should take place is weighed against the reality of what is taking place, and students of political science must be cautious to derive theories from the examinations of cases, rather than to make their studies fit the theories already presented.

CHAPTER THREE

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF SAUDI ARABIA

There can be no understanding of a society without an examination of its historical development. Societies are complex as are the many factors which affect their growth. For the Arab world the single most important factor is the role of Islam and the part it has played in the political development of the Middle East. In the seventh century of the Christian era, Islam began to change the lives of the people in the Arabian peninsula and their view of the world around them. Islam provided the basis of unity and consolidation and a set of religious guidelines for the faithful to follow.

"Without attempting a comprehensive definition of politics within an Islamic order, we can assert that the critical foci of any serious political discussion would be the following: 1) the religious identity of the political elite; 2) appropriate sources of public law; 3) acceptable forms of government; 4) the role of religious specialists in politics; 5) the political significance of Muslim solidarity." (Humphreys 1979:6)

These five points help to identify a conceptual framework by which the close interaction between politics and religion can be analysed. The fifth point has been paramount since the inception of Islam. So inspired were these people by the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad, that they began to build an Arab Muslim empire. That empire spread across North Africa and into Spain and to the east as far as China, and lasted until the fifteenth

century when it lost its momentum. Since then there have been many attempts to revive the Islamic spirit, to build a new state based on such a revival, and to try to purify Islam, which have had a far reaching effect. One such attempt (not unlike the beginning of Islam) took place in Arabia in 1744 and on the foundation of that the new Saudi Arabian state was built.

This chapter, by virtue of its size, cannot do justice to a complete historical analysis of Islam. What is sought here are the main historical factors and incidents which have given direction to the political development of Saudi Arabia..

The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part deals with Arabia before the rise to power of Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, the first King of Saudi Arabia. Here we begin by examining the peculiar place of politics in Islam. The Qur'an, the holy book of Islam, is the constitutional basis for the Saudi State just as the Sharia, the traditional fundamental laws of Islam, provide a broad framework and description for its laws. The whole foundation of the state evolves around Islam. Therefore, it becomes necessary to briefly examine the historical development of Islam itself in order to understand the present-day Kingdom and its politics. As part of this the Wahhabi Movement and the Ikhwan played an important role in the way Ibn Saud was able to rise to power and unite some forty Bedouin tribes into a nation. Tribal politics, and intrigues, and their warlike manner were not easy to bring under the control of one man. In this section we shall also examine the social structure

of the relationship between the Bedouin, the village and the town Arabs. It is here that one can begin to understand the complexities of desert life in Arabia.

The second part of this chapter deals with Ibn Saud's rise to power. He was a man who had a vision for his people; he was an astute politician who learned many lessons from the Bedouin and his very good friend Mubarak Al Sabbah, a half-brother to the ruler of Kuwait. It was from this contact that young Ibn Saud was drawn into "... a world of political intrigue on a far greater scale than that of Arab tribal rivalries." (Van Der Meulen 1957:44) The path to leadership was not an easy one: the opposition of some tribes he overcame in battle, the support of others he reinforced by marriages, and when he had gained the support of most of the Arab tribes he found he had to fight the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans had control of much of the northern part of the Arabian peninsula and of the Eastern Province, and had plans for the Hejaz, location of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. He made every effort to make use of all the available resources at hand including developing the Ikhwan movement. The Ikhwan movement, an Islamic brotherhood with membership drawn from warlike Bedouin tribes, was set up to be a dependable army when it was required to fight. However, with the advent of the First World War Ibn Saud was to have more problems with the Ottomans, the British and even the Germans who had interests in the area.

This chapter does not go into the history of Saudi Arabia during the Second World War because by that time Saudi Arabia had been recognized as a nation and the Saudi royal family were in control. It is the intent of this chapter to give a brief historical perspective as background to the political development of the newly-formed nation.

Saudi Arabia Before Ibn Saud

A) The Place of Politics in Islam:

In attempting any analysis of Saudi Arabia it is necessary to examine the nature of political organization which existed in the early days of Islam and, within the territory which now forms Saudi Arabia, immediately prior to the formation of the Kingdom. This will place in perspective the changes which subsequently occurred and the way in which such changes transformed the social and political life of the country.

As previously noted in this thesis, and declared as basic to an understanding of Islam by the various commentators, politics and religion are inextricably intertwined within Islam, forming part of a unified world-view.¹ In their discussion of this, Schacht and Bosworth point out that:

"The basis of the political structure was the 'umma', the 'community', an assemblage of individuals bound to one another by ties of religion. Within the 'umma' all were on an equal footing. There were no distinctions of

¹ For more details see: R. Bayley Winder, 6ff; Schacht & Bosworth, 156ff & 404ff; Watt, Islamic Political Thought, 1968.

rank, only of function. God alone was the head of the community, and His rule was defined and secured by a common acceptance of, and a common submission to, the divine laws and the temporal head of the community. Obedience to rulers was laid down in the Koran in the phrase 'O true believer, obey God, and obey the Prophet and those who are in authority among you'." (Schacht and Bosworth 1974: 405)

It is in that Qur'anic injunction that one can see that the believer and the community owe first loyalty to God and not to a territorially-defined, secular, state. The Qur'an contained a set of guidelines for civil interaction such that it could suffice as the constitution and legal code for the worldly as well as the spiritual life of its believers. That served as a check on the authority of those in power. The word of God, which is the divine law revealed through the Prophet Muhammad, is paramount in the life of every Muslim. Such a claim is not without its own problems. It was recognized early in the spread of Islam that this could cause problems if conflict arose between Muslims' conceptions of divine instructions and the orders of a temporal ruler. The Umayyad rulers argued that, since they were in a position to rule, their rule had been granted by God, and anyone who challenged their position was also challenging God. This attitude raised opposition and the argument was raised that "... man had power over against God, and that he was not obliged to obey a ruler who himself had disobeyed God's commands and ruled unjustly." (Watt 1968:158)

Not only were there conflicts over the source power of the rulers but there were disputes as to whether the Imamate should be elected or hereditary, and whether or how to remove an

incumbent Imam² from power. One of the manifestations of this problem was the conflicts which took place between the Sunnis and the Shi'is.³ The deeper problem which increased tensions was the interpretation of what was stated in the Qur'an; for all the arguments which arose between the Sunnis and the Shi'is they both claimed to have support from the Qur'an. This division of view regarding the Imam has been examined by many early Islamic scholars who have also disagreed or proposed concepts of what they feel the role of the Imam should be. The basic principle, however, appears always to have been that the entire community of believers, the world of Islam, formed one political entity with the Imam as the temporal head. One early Muslim political writer "... identifies the state, which had its origin in divine ordinance, with the ruler, who is placed between God and the people." (Schacht & Bosworth 1974:410) Another, Al-Mawardi (d. 1058 A.D.), was responsible for a work called the 'Principles of Government'; this work was accepted by the Sunnis as the ideal form of government to be aimed at. "The qualifications he lays

² Imam: "leader of the faithful", originally, spiritual leader, and so, same as Caliph. To the Shi'is, required to have saintly or heroic characteristics.

³ The basic differences between Sunni and Shi'i are discussed by Rogers. "Sunni: Orthodox Islam, basing its teaching upon the Koran and its interpretation, Hadith, traditions reputedly associated with Muhammad himself, and the teaching of the four orthodox Schools of Law. Shi'i: A general term for the sects who, against the traditional orthodox view, insisted upon the recognition of Ali as the legitimate successor (Caliph) to Muhammad. They exalted the spiritual and moral qualities of their Imams and rejected the claims of the Umayyads to power." (Rogers 1976:148)

down for the office of Imam are membership of the Quraysh (the tribe of the Prophet), male sex, full age, good character, freedom from physical or mental defects, competency in legal knowledge, administrative ability, and courage and energy in the defence of Islamic territory." (Schacht & Bosworth 1974:411-12) Also, those who would elect the Imam had to be of 'irreproachable character' and possess enough knowledge in order to vote for the Imam. A gap had developed between religious-political theory and mundane reality over the organization of the Islamic state. Along with this there was also a growth of a number of independent kingdoms which came into existence. These divisions multiplied and by the fifteenth century the Islamic empire had lost its drive, power, and influence in the then known world. The Qur'anic ground-rules for social interaction, being originally based, in part, on the tribal organization of the Arabs, remained effective within smaller political subdivisions, the tribes and villages of the Islamic world, with only minor departures from the purity of the revealed word.

B) The Social Structure of the Arabian Society

Having examined briefly the relationship of politics to Islam it is now necessary to look at the social structure of the Arabian society. It is here that the linkages can be found which made it possible for Arabia to develop from a collection of tribes, co-operating rarely and reluctantly, to a nation now

playing an important role in world affairs. These linkages relate to the critical foci for discussion cited from Humphreys, and are most clearly to be seen in their basic form within the nomadic Bedouin tribe. The political and organizational structure of the tribe replicates itself in the political system of the villages and towns. What also needs to be understood are the social relationships between the Bedouin i.e. the nomads, and between them and the villages and the towns. Who are the elite in these social units, what have their respective roles been in the development of the country? It is in these social groupings that the social structure reflects its values, ideals, and standards, and Islam plays an important part in the life of the people. The avowed principles and societal norms of the society define the limits of choice and degree of accountability of its leaders.

Humphrey's five points provide a framework within which those principles and norms can be examined. In the first flowering of the Islamic empire there were two classes of citizenship, with non-Muslims excluded from political involvement and subjected to discriminatory taxation. Modern states declaring their Islamic base similarly exclude infidels from participation in the political process. During that first growth of empire a body of public law was developed which was essentially based on the Qur'an and traditions of sayings and deeds of the Prophet. That body of law, codified as the Sharia, is viewed by modern Islamic states as the primary basis of all

laws, and by some as, officially, all that can be considered as law. As to forms of government, the first Islamic political community was both religious and civic, headed by the Prophet in whom rested all sovereign power. The death of Muhammed precipitated a political crisis over succession to the supreme temporal leadership position. Modern Islamic states vary somewhat in the compromises they have accepted and the authorities they depend upon to support their choice. But the most conservative or fundamentalist subscribe to the principle of one man exercising all executive and judicial duties in trust for and on behalf of the entire community, subject to a degree of consultation with and monitoring by other leaders of and spokesmen for the community. The very fact that Islam has a dual political-religious nature makes the preservation of orthodoxy in political decision-making essential, and this necessitates a formal involvement of the Ulama, the religious scholars, in the judicial and administrative functioning of the state. Since Islam presumes one community of believers, separate national identities are, theoretically speaking, temporary administrative inconveniences, and relations between Islamic states should demonstrate, on policy matters, the idea of pan-Islamic brotherhood.

Ibn Saud, an adherent of a most conservative and fundamentalist view of Islam, inspired to unite Arabia into an independent nation, and drew his support from those who shared his world-view, namely, the Bedouin. The predominant

characteristics of the Bedouins were thus incorporated into the Saudi State. With these points in mind this section will explore the nomadic tribal structure and its interrelationship with the villages and towns. It is here that one finds a distinct hierarchy of leadership, of the divisions that exist in these social groups, and the criteria of individual social status.

(a) The Bedouin

The discussion of the social structure will begin with the Bedouin. The Bedouin is described by Rogers (1976:140) as:

"Pastoral nomads tribally organized, of Arabian stock, mostly now inside Arabia. The most famous of their tribes, from whom Muhammed claimed descent, was the Quraysh at Mecca who in the mid-7th century were extensively involved in trade."

There are two important points in this quotation: 1) descent and 2) trade. These nomads of the Arabian desert developed a definite social structure based on high descent often tracing their ancestry to the prophet Mohammed or his contemporaries. Lipsky (1959:65-88) goes into great detail about the social structure of the Bedouin and points out that class consciousness is carried over to how the Bedouin feels about those who live in villages and towns. He also says (1959:62) that "Before Saudi Arabia was brought under the strong control of the present ruling family, town, village, and nomadic tribe tended to exist as quite separate and distinctive units." The villages were exploited by the towns and the nomadic tribes alike. Villagers worked the land and grew vegetables and grain. This produce was

needed by the nomads and the townspeople who would demand taxes or protection money, and obtain them in kind. If protection money was not paid the nomads would attack. These nomadic people of the desert were independent, filled with arrogance, and were not strangers to warlike activities to gain their ends. Even among those tribes, a strongly developed social structure existed.

The social structure of the Bedouins is not founded on similar lines to that of the West, where a great deal of emphasis is placed on material wealth and position. As mentioned earlier in this section, lineage is important to the nomad, as also is the occupation for which the tribe is known. For example, some nomadic tribes would engage in the raising and breeding of camels and these tribes would be considered noble. Other tribes would raise sheep and goats, which was a step down in the social structure, and as a consequence were often forced to pay protection money in order to avoid being attacked by the stronger, noble tribes. Another group of interest are the semi-nomads who make their homes in black tents (the mark of the nomadic Bedouin) but do not travel far into the desert. They raise sheep and goats and stay close to oases in the summer months. The semi-nomads would be placed in the lower class in the desert life for two reasons: they are considered only half-Bedouin by the full-blooded Bedouin; and, at some point, they have lost track of their ancestry, and so cannot prove noble descent. This group did not engage in warlike activities

but was often able to defend itself properly.

It is important to note that the lower strata of the desert groups also includes blacksmiths, swordsmiths, gunsmiths, and other skilled tradesmen who live with noble tribes. Lipsky (1959) points out that they are usually of Negroid background, being descendants of Negro slaves. These people are not permitted to marry Bedouins. They live separately in their own tents, and are not expected to fight when battles are taking place. Their ancestors, who were slaves to wealthy sheikhs, were of low social status but were often in positions of influence and were treated like members of the family. This characteristic of their treatment persists.

The family is the most important unit in this part of the world, and the manner in which authority is exercised by those who lead tribes, villages, and towns is modelled on the paternal governance of the family. The role that the family structure of Ibn Saud played, extending from the centre of power to villages and towns, was critical to the formation and consolidation of the Saudi State.

(b) Villages

Lipsky (1959) points out that Arabian villages can be divided into two groups, tribal and nontribal. The tribal village is populated by members of just one tribe and looks for leadership to the leading sheikh family of the tribe. It provides that leadership in a manner that is in keeping with the

family hierarchy. The villagers may be semi-nomads, spending a portion of the year wandering with their sheep and goats in the grazing lands and staying in the village only at planting and harvest. Others may be permanently settled farmers, pasturing a few animals near the village or hiring shepherds to tend their flocks.

The nontribal villages do not have one single tribal focus but are populated by people who, if they trace their descent, come from many different ancestries. The leadership of such a village is drawn from the leading families, but the lack of tribal links means that the village is run as a territorial unit and not as a family. Such villages generally have a settled population, occasionally nomadic, but largely involved in the cultivation of land.

Whether tribal or not, the villages have strong links to the nomadic society of the Bedouin. Being located at permanent water sources they are important stops on the nomads' annual migration route. As agricultural communities they are sources of food, and as trading centres the villages' sugs (market places) were sources for all the nomads needed that they did not make themselves. Since the nomads were inclined from time to time to raid rather than trade for supplies, the villages were generally located in easily defensible positions, or fortified. However, sheikhs of even wholly nomadic tribes generally have houses and other property interests in villages, providing a permanent base and a non-portable investment for the family (tribal) wealth.

(c) Towns

While the differences between village and nomad are great, still greater differences exist between town and village. The towns were the seats of the growth of Islamic culture, and the lifestyle of the towns has remained urban, looking to the villages for just food, raw materials, and taxes. They functioned as independent city-states, ruled by an Amir or sheikh, and holding sway over the villages in the surrounding territory. Where location at trade-route junctions or in proximity to a valuable natural resource brought wealth, this was evidenced in the palaces and mansions of the rulers and economic elite. It was in the towns that the influence of the West was first felt in the field of politics.

C) The Structure of the Early Government

It is logical to expect that the rule of Ibn Saud would encompass the same kind of rule that had gone on in the desert for many centuries. According to Howarth

"Superficially, his rule was unmixed despotism but in the desert, Arab despotism, either a tribal sheik's or a sultan's was always under control, simply because life was so cheap and the Arabs so independent in spirit. A bedouin expected three things of his ruler: to keep order with a strong hand, to protect the poor against the rapacity of the rich, and to defend the grazing grounds against marauding neighbours. If the ruler was weak, and murders and robberies grew common, and the poor were oppressed and neighbours invaded the land, the people murdered the ruler and chose another without any hesitation; and if the ruler himself oppressed the poor and weak, beyond the limits of oppression which were recognized, his fate was just as swift." (Howarth 1964: 115)

However primitive this system of law and rule may seem, it suited the desert and the survival of the fittest is an important factor when harsh geography must be contended with. King Ibn Saud exercised his power through the tribal sheikhs (leader of the tribe) and in the towns the local governors were responsible to the king. The manner of selection of a tribal sheikh continued as it had been done before. The tribe elects the sheikh from the families. He is chosen on the basis of qualities such as; wisdom, literacy, integrity, religious knowledge, and age. Wealth plays little or no part in the candidate's eligibility. If a sheikh suffers a mental problem he can be replaced, and another election takes place to replace him. All of these activities are tied to the tradition of Islam. When a problem or matter arises in which there is no direction from the Qu'ran or the Sharia (Islamic Law) the sheikh works out a solution, in consultation with a tribal council.

Islamic principles guide the society in a number of ways. These principles unite those who are believers and assist them in working for a better life in this world and the world to come. Through Islam, the believers can find guidance in emotional, physical as well as spiritual matters. Great importance is placed on taking care of the body and soul.

"It is the Muslim's obligation...to be clean at the time of each prayer before facing his creator". (Al-Farsy 1978:29)

Islam emphasizes equality; those who have should give to those who have less or nothing at all. The giving of alms is therefore

considered to be an act of helpfulness and generosity. In Howarth's work, Desert King, he goes into great depths regarding the King's generosity to his subjects. Money, time, gifts of cloaks, daggers, and jewels were given to those who visited him. Those who had suffered accidents, ill health, his defeated enemies, those who were destitute all received help from the king. These actions were in keeping with Arab generosity. Generosity and accessibility were the two ways in which the King was able to maintain his power. These virtues were matched and supported by his evident pious adherence to the Muslim faith in the puritanical and almost ascetic form, namely Wahhabism. The royal household had been linked with Wahhabism almost two centuries. Wahhabism's growth reveals that even in recent times believers were still in disagreement about the course that Islam should take. This can be clearly seen in the growth of Wahhabism in Arabia and the role it played in the development of the Arabian Society.

D) The Wahhabi Movement

The beginnings of Wahhabism* in Arabia (1744) are in keeping with the birth of Islam itself. It began when Muhammad

* It has been noted by Bayley Winder (1965:1F) that Wahhabism and Wahhabi are the names given to the movement by its opponents. Winder suggests that the use of Unitarianism and Unitarian are preferable but goes on to say "Nevertheless, Wahhabism and Wahhabi are used in this work, for originally derogatory terms often stick, 'and the name "'Wahhabi'' has struck alright even in Arabia, in spite of a general aversion to the giving of credit of God's blessings to any human individual'; H. St. J. B. Philby, personal letter."

ibn Abdul al-Wahhab, born in 1703, in the Nejd, noticed on his travels that Muslims were not practicing Islamic teachings the way he believed the Prophet had intended them to be practised. Wahhab felt that it was his mission in life to bring the believers back to strict Muslim teachings and he, therefore, set out to do that. While still very young he travelled to Basra, Damascus, and later to Baghdad. "It is at Basra reportedly that he started preaching against the cult of the saints." (Lipsky 1959:10) The cult of the saints came into existence with the weakening of Islam. "... superstition had replaced the true principles of Islam at all social levels, to such an extent that many trees, caves, domes, tombs, and mausoleums had come to be regarded as possessing religious sanctity, and the teachings of Islam which governed society and held it together had become a thing of the past." (Assah 1969:1) The society succumbed to lawlessness and robbery and life in the desert became unsafe. It was this disorder in society that Wahhab sought to correct by promoting a return to the basic principles of the faith.

As his teachings began to be accepted by the people he gained the support of the Amir of his town, Uyaina, but aroused the enmity of that Amir's superior at Al-Hasa, who forced his expulsion from the town.

He was able to find a friend in Muhammad ibn Saud, who was the ruler of Dariya, and shared Wahab's vision of how Islam should be practised. This friendship marks the beginning of what is called Wahhabism.

"In essence Wahhabism was 'puritanical, vigorous, simple. ... The central theological dogma is the absolute incomparability of God. ... God is not constrained by any principle; He is purely arbitrary. What the Koran (and not what man) says about Him is all that man can say.'" (Winder 1965:9)

The legal school to which the Wahhabi's gave sole recognition was that of Ahmad ibn Hanbal, "... The most conservative of the four orthodox schools of Islamic Law⁵ and 'representative of uncompromising adherence to the letter of the HADITH'". (Winder 1965:8) Hanbal's criterion for a precedent to be accepted as an authoritative part of the Hadith (the traditions) was that there be no disagreement among the early writers on its authenticity: even a single dissent would have invalidated it.

Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and Muhammad ibn Saud together set out to extend the influence of Wahhabism throughout the land. This meant that other tribal areas would have to be conquered. As conquests took place, in the larger towns, a qadi (religious judge) and mufti (religious leader) were put in charge of making sure that those captured would be brought under the wing of Wahhabism. It was not only the towns that were being captured, but pilgrim caravans were being attacked as well. This activity of the Saudi and Wahhabi union was beginning to disturb the Turks, who after having tried to invade al-Hasa, in 1798,

⁵ "Four schools of law have survived Sunni Islam. The Hanafi School (after Abu Hanifah, 8th century) holds sway in India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Central Asia, Turkey, and lower Egypt; the Maliki School (after Malik ibn Anas, died late 8th century) is operative in North and West Africa and in upper Egypt; the Shafi'i School; (after ad-Shafi'i, 9th century) is popular in Southeast Asia; and the Hanbali School, (after Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, 9th century) is officially accepted in Saudi Arabia." (The New Encyclopaedia Britannica in 30 vols., Macropaidia Vcl. 9, 15th Edition, 1974:921)

were forced back. By early in the year of 1800, the Wahhabis had gone as far as Iraq and attacked and captured the Shiite holy city of Karvala. In 1802, Mecca was also taken. The attacks were now extending as far away as Damascus by this time and the Ottoman government decided that the movement must be stopped. They called upon Muhammad Ali, ruler of Egypt, to put a stop to the extending Wahhabi Empire. From 1813 through 1818 the first Saudi-Wahhabi empire suffered a serious territorial setback.

After that, as Lipsky (1959) points out, assassinations, personal rivalries, and intrigues took place and it was not until 1834 that another attempt was made to establish a Wahhabi state. The spark that had been kindled by al-Wahab had not been extinguished. The idea of a Wahhabi state was again very much alive in the mind of a cousin of Muhammad ibn Saud, Turki ibn Abd Allah. Turki was successful in re-establishing Wahhabism at Riyadh, but shortly thereafter, in 1838, was assassinated. Turki's son Faisal succeeded him in power. Faisal died in 1865 and his son Abd ar-Rahman was driven out of Riyadh by his brother. The problems between these two sons put the Wahhabi state at Riyadh in ruin. In 1897, Muhammad ibn Rashid died and Abdul ar-Rahman's son, Ibn Saud, made an unsuccessful effort to retake Riyadh. This son of ar-Rahman was later to become the first King of Saudi Arabia.

Ibn Saud's Rise to Power

A) The Early Conquests

The Saudi family had suffered a number of setbacks and had been exiled to Kuwait. It was from exile that Ibn Saud set out to recapture his family's holdings and the territory lost by the Wahhabis over the previous hundred years.

While Ibn Saud's family was exiled he was sent into the desert to learn the ways of the Bedouins. This included horsemanship, the customs of the Bedouin and their traditions. He understood their strengths and weaknesses and at this time gained a good grounding in the Sharia Law. In Kuwait he was able to follow the political manoeuvrings of the Great Powers, the British, Germans, Russians and Ottomans, for supremacy in the Arabian Gulf. This gave him political insight which he was able to put to use later, as his conquests brought him into a position to influence the Great Powers' aims in the region.

In 1900, at the age of nineteen, Ibn Saud took the first steps toward power. As a member of a military force under Sheikh Mobarrak al-Sabah, ruler of Kuwait, he took part in an unsuccessful war against Abdul-Aziz ibn al-Rashid. "While in the Nejd en route to Riyadh Ibn Saud had found that the people of that area would welcome the return of the Al-Saud to power in place of the Al-Rashid." (Assah 1969:21)

In 1902, Ibn Saud, with a handful of men, set out to liberate Riyadh from the rule of Ibn al-Rashid. At night Ibn

Saud and his men gained entry into the city of Riyadh and soon were in control. The reaction of the people to Ibn Saud was indeed favourable. These people were now free of the rule of the much disliked Rashidis and in his place Ibn Saud invited his father Abdul-Rahman to look after the government of the town. With this success Ibn Saud and his brother Saad went on to gain the support of the people in Southern Nejd. Al-Rashid remained unpopular among the people and the Nejdīs rallied to Ibn Saud and his Wahhabi movement. By the spring of 1904 (1322 A.H.) he had captured Djebel Shammar, the place to which Ibn al-Rashid had retreated.

At this point al-Rashid sought help from the Ottomans who by this time were also concerned with the activities of Ibn Saud. Now, for the first time, Ibn Saud was faced with the joint efforts of the Ottomans plus al-Rashid and modern arms. This combination should have been to the advantage of Ibn Saud's opponents but it was not. The Ottomans were not equipped for desert warfare in spite of their modern equipment--their clothing was a problem to them under the hot desert sun--and Ibn Saud and his men were able to defeat the Ottoman forces. In manner not unlike early Islamic battles, Ibn Saud and his men took the modern weapons together with camels, sheep, and an amount of Ottoman gold. This was of great help in providing for further battles.

In the same year Ibn Saud and his men set out to liberate Nejd and it is here that the Ottomans realized that they could

not hold out against his forces. The Ottomans now wanted to negotiate and requested that Aziz's father be sent as the negotiator. The negotiations did not go smoothly and in 1906 Ibn al-Rashid was killed in the battle of Rawdat Mohanna not far from Buraida. This further weakened the Ottoman position, but did not yet bring Ibn Saud to supremacy.

The Ottomans had been in control of the al-Hasa province since 1871. "Ibn Sa'ud was shut into the desert and, even there, exposed to attacks from north and west by enemies enjoying the support and encouragement of the Turks, while his dependence on the far from certain loyalty of the tribes and towns of his own realm was always a source of grave weakness." (Philby 1968:260) It is reported that between 1906 - 1912 (1324 - 1330 A.H.) there were frequent revolts and crop failures, and as a consequence famine as well as financial problems with Aziz's Arabia.

B) The Ikhwan Movement

Famine and revolts, however, did not deter Ibn Saud. In 1912 (1342 A.H.) he embarked on a new program for his people. This involved the resettlement of the Bedouin, placing them in permanent homes with water wells near at hand, so that they could learn to work the land. He was dealing with a people who had for generations developed a rugged individualism in order to survive in the desert, and through his program of reform he hoped to replace their independence with alliance with him and the new state that he was creating. Being a devout Wahhabi, Ibn

Saud worked to achieve an Islamic brotherhood among the Bedouin.

This brotherhood subsequently came to be known as the Ikhwan:⁶

"the brotherhood of all men who accepted the new order, regardless of their tribal affiliations and social status, canalised warlike propensities of the Arabs in the service of God and his representative on earth. Intertribal raids, highway robbery, tobacco and other amenities of the old life became taboo; and all attention was concentrated in the colonies on preparation for the life hereafter." (Philby 1955:262)

The Ikhwan was an effective strategy: it provided a loyal, dependable army available whenever he needed, in contrast to the traditional practice of calling upon allied tribes, which could frequently require days of debate and negotiation with their sheikhs. By use of the Ikhwan he was able to consolidate his hold on his captured territories and prepare to move on Hasa. The battle to liberate the Eastern Province began at Hufuf, the headquarters of the Ottoman administration. With the success of Ibn Saud in this area other Ottoman centres fell under his power. His conquest of the al-Hasa did not go unnoticed by the British. They immediately sought his friendship. The British Political Officer in Kuwait, William Shakespear, was sent in 1913 to enter into negotiations with him.

The treaty which Shakespear had drafted was sent on its leisurely way to London, and came back, months afterwards, with the British Government's approval. Ibn Saud signed the document, with some reservations; and so at last he bound himself to Britain. Nearly a year after Shakespear's death, in the last week of 1915, ... the treaty was ratified. But this event, which he had striven for so long, had lost its savour by the time it came." (Howarth 1964:88)

⁶ See Appendix B for more information on the tribes who were significant to the Ikhwan brotherhood. Also, Appendix 3-2 for their location and movement within Saudi Arabia.

It was this treaty that moved Ibn Saud into the world arena. However, he became concerned that the British did not mean what he thought they meant, since "... they did not even bother to suggest that he should use these gifts, as Shakespear had intended, to intensify his war against ibn Rashid". What is called a bribe by Howarth was a subsidy of 5,000 British pounds per month and a substantial gift of guns. It was hoped that this would keep Ibn Saud quiet.

C) The Impact of the First World War

However complex the Arabian situation was before World War I it was to become more complex as the war progressed. "In World War I the British negotiated both with ibn Saud (through Sir Percy Cox and later with H. St. John Philby) and with his rival in Hijaz, the Sharif Husain (through Sir Henry McMahon and T. E. Lawrence), for their support against the Ottomans and their allies the Rashids." (Adams 1971:273) The Treaty of Azir, 1915, which was first negotiated by Shakespear and later brought into reality with the help of Sir Percy Cox, was intended to offer support to Ibn Saud in aiding in the removal of Ottoman influence in the Eastern Province. The major problem was that the British had also negotiated with the Sharif of Mecca in the Hijaz.

The Hijaz was an important area to the Ottomans, so important that they had set out to build a railway. This was done "... to strengthen the sultan's authority in the Arabian

Peninsula, ..." (Landau 1971:13) The Arabian Peninsula was not just of interest to the Ottoman and British--the Germans also had a vested interest in the area. During the first World War the railway was used by both the Turks and Germans to move troops and supplies into the area. It is here that the famous T. E. Lawrence and his Arab friends become involved in sabotaging the link of the Turks and Germans. The railway is referred to by Landau (1971) as a "Case of Ottoman Political Propaganda", mainly because: "...the railway would assist in repopulating southeastern Syria, pacifying the nomadic tribes and halting their raids, developing agriculture, exploiting natural resources, reaffirming the Sultan's authority and enabling Muslims from all over the world to make the pilgrimage." (Landau 1971:20)

The Hijaz was not only important to the Ottomans. From Ibn Saud's point of view it was a last link in the unification of his people. The British had made a deal with the Sharif of Mecca and with Ibn Saud; however, neither of them were aware of the two separate agreements. "When the first World War ended, Abdul Aziz found himself facing peril from two sides: from ibn Al-Rashid who had obtained arms and money from his Ottoman allies, and from Sharif Hussein who had obtained arms and money from his British allies, in addition to British support which paved the way for him to proclaim himself King of Hijaz, after he had conferred on himself the title of King of the Arabs." (Assah 1969:35) An armed clash between these two leaders was

inevitable. The British government became concerned when the war between its two allies broke out. After examining the situation the British decided to back up the Sharif of Mecca on the grounds that his military strength was superior to that of Ibn Saud. Hussein had modern military equipment while Ibn Saud's forces were ill-equipped. The British backing gave Hussein confidence that he could defeat Abdul-Aziz and his men. However, Ibn Saud, making use of the members of the Muslim brotherhood he had created, was able to defeat his opponent in a surprise attack in 1919. After a long and continuous battle against Al-Rashid Ibn Saud was able to bring the area of Hail also under his control.

Using the Ikhwan, Ibn Saud consolidated his hold on his territories, proclaimed himself King of the Hijaz, and of the Nejd and its Dependencies, in January 8, 1926. Later that year, by virtue of the Treaty of Jeddah negotiated with the British, the new kingdom received recognition as a sovereign nation. In 1932 the name of the country was changed to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

In conclusion, this chapter has only sought to provide a historical framework and an understanding of the Saudi religious and social structure. Religion and government are inseparably linked in Saudi Arabia. The whole society is based on the teachings of the prophet Muhammad, the Qu'ran, and the religious laws that are provided in these teachings. From the seventh century to approximately the fifteenth century A.D. a massive

and far reaching Islamic empire made its impact on the world. Since that time there have been Islamic revivals but the one that is important for our purpose is Wahhabism. The dreams of two men--Al-Wahhab and Ibn Saud--coming together were to change the destiny of the Arab Bedouin, village, and townspeople, and alter the social and political organization of this spread out and nomadic tribal people fundamentally.

The role that the tribes played in the early stages of recent political development cannot go without comment. Bedouin tribes were important to Ibn Saud because they were natural nomadic warriors who had to protect their property and make their way in the harsh desert climate. In fact, for Ibn Saud, some of the fiercest warriors made up his Bedouin army and were for some time loyal to his goals and desires. He had sent his missionaries to convert the Bedouin to Wahhabism, and this creed became the foundation upon which the Saudi State was built in the 1900's. It is the most puritanical form of Islam which even today demands that Muslims be faithful to the rules and regulations of the Qu'ran.

It is here that the challenge to Saudi Arabian development can be identified in the conflict between tradition and processes of modernization; between new ways of government and old ways of governance through conquests and taxes; between new values related to money and material goods and old values developed through the ages of unsettled life in the desert.

CHAPTER FOUR

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE SAUDI STATE

The examination of the literature on political development provides the researcher with several major problems. For one thing there is no consensus among political scientists on what constitutes political development. Many concepts are provided but cannot be applied to all developing countries. There exists also the major problem of "...the type of trend analysis that tries to assess whether or not these countries are proceeding in the direction of democracy and/or prescribes the necessity for them to do so". (Willner 1964:473) This ethnocentric assumption is hard to avoid since scholars will always include aspects of their own value premises when undertaking analysis or evaluation. Finally, is it possible to determine in what manner the elite of a developing country see development? "Development requires the assimilation of new values, yet development will be self-defeating if it threatens the fabric of society itself or it inculcates values and behaviour incompatible with durable growth". (Seligman 1966:241) This last statement indicates the primary challenge facing all developing countries.

With these problems of political development in mind this chapter will review how Saudi Arabia has developed since Abdul-Aziz Ibn Saud became the Imam, i.e. religious leader, and later the King of his country. Also, it will examine what has

actually taken place in terms of the restructuring of the political organization from the traditional type of rule to a centralized government and the demands made on it for change. These demands may be identified: (1) as a change from insular tribal government or governments to a full fledged state among the community of nations. (2) The discovery of oil which provided the elite with money and means to introduce new methods of communication and technology into the society; (3) the need for a new kind of education to handle the growing complexities of a new state; (4) the development of new institutions and the necessary skills for the running of a modern nation-state. Because Saudi Arabia is, technically speaking, an absolute monarchy¹ the reigning king is intimately involved in the government and is responsible for the kind and degree of change occurring, with the king's strengths and weaknesses being reflected in the nation's development. This chapter, keeping in view the essential nature of such a political regime, is divided according to the reigns of the three kings who have ruled the country prior to King Khalid. It is further divided into various subsections which relate to the nation's political development.

The reign of King Abdul-Aziz is of prime importance because he is the founder of the country, and has firmly established its own unique character. His reign can be divided into the

¹ Although in a formal sense an absolute monarchy, Saudi Arabia is a closely knit group of princes who consult and share power among themselves, placing one of their numbers in the position of absolute executive authority, subject only to inter-group constraints and the laws of Islam.

following parts. The first part covers the period of consolidation and the move towards nationhood, with an examination of the legitimacy of his leadership. This is then followed by an examination of how the institutions of government altered under his rule. Gradually he introduced modern structural forms into his government, reducing the emphasis on the traditional tribal administration in effect before the foundation of the kingdom, while still remaining its absolute monarch. Without oil Saudi Arabia would have been important only for the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, and with only the pilgrimage revenues to fund its planned reforms. This then would have forced King Abdul-Aziz Ibn Saud to move even more slowly than he did. The pace and scope of changes in the country has been so much affected by oil and by the company, ARAMCO--The Arabian-American Oil Company--which developed the oilfields that the next section is devoted to the role of that company and of oil in the development of the country. During the last half of the reign of King Abdul-Aziz ARAMCO was the main source of revenue for the nation, funding the king's modernization plans. The company was also a modernizing influence in itself, creating jobs for which Arabs were trained--often the first wage-paying jobs many of the workers had ever held--and bringing in foreign technical personnel who were provided with modern western-style housing and other facilities. ARAMCO often used its drilling rigs to drill wells for water whenever it was not engaged in drilling for oil. It also built electricity generating plants

and provided medical services to the people of the neighbouring towns and villages. By so doing it softened the shock of exposure to change, easing the kingdom's task of gaining acceptance for similar advances when they were later introduced to other areas. By 1953 King Abdul-Aziz was able to provide basic services--water, agriculture, health, and communications²--and thereby had paved the way for the next step in the modernization of the institutions of government in the reign of his son, Saud.

The third section of this chapter deals with the rule of King Saud (Saud ibn Abdul-Aziz al Saud) who reigned from 1953 to 1964. This period in Saudi Arabia's development is not well documented. What is important is that it was a period of internal problems. Saud was a weak ruler and had difficulty in continuing, let alone building on, what his famous father had begun. During this period some members of the Royal Family became unhappy with Saud's rule. There were many problems such as the poor handling of finances, and conflict between the traditional ways and the increased desire on the part of some members for faster social and political changes to occur. Finally, in 1964, Saud was dethroned and his brother Faisal (Faisal ibn Abdul-Aziz al Saud) took over.

The fourth section deals with Faisal's rule. Under Faisal the economy improved and a bureaucracy expanded. He was a

² The extent to which these services were provided would be considered to be minor in modern terms. What is significant here is that new services were introduced.

popular leader and was able to bring the country back on the road to modernization and restore confidence in the Al-Saud family. He had developed an international reputation and is perhaps the best known of the House of Saud to the West.

In short, this chapter will examine the changes that had taken place under the leadership of first King Abdul-Aziz Ibn Saud³, Saud, and Faisal.

The Period of Consolidation and Nationhood

A) Legitimacy of King Abdul-Aziz

The period of consolidation, between 1902 and 1927, provides the basis on which the new Saudi State was subsequently formed. As pointed out in Chapter Three, Abdul-Aziz had to unite forty tribes by conquest or by marriage in order to achieve his goal of a Wahhabi state. One of the major hurdles after the conquest was that of legitimizing his authority over his people. The legitimacy of the House of Saud was established on what George Lenczowski (1967:98) calls:

"...a combination of tribal-dynastic and religious factors. The state is an absolute monarchy not bound by any written secular fundamental law. However, absolutism is tempered by at least three elements: (a) the paramountcy of the sacred law of Islam (Shari'a) whose

³In the last chapter, when dealing with the unifying of Arabia, Abdul-Aziz Ibn Saud has been referred to as "Ibn Saud", the most frequently used short form of his name found in the works of the orientalist dealing with that period. Henceforth, when dealing with his role and achievements as King, he is referred to as King Abdul-Aziz or just Abdul-Aziz, that being the form in which he is identified in official documents and sources.

main exponents are the religious jurists ('ulama) of the puritan Wahhabi sect; (b) the need to cultivate the tribes whose loyalty is necessary as a counterweight against certain disruptive forces; (c) the principle of consultation which, though highly informal in its operation, represents a restraining influence on any possible arbitrariness."

This combination of elements has provided the traditional elite with a stable basis from which the process of modernization could begin to take place, stability being one of the key factors needed for modernization and political development. In the early stages of Abdul-Aziz's struggle for consolidation of the many tribes in Saudi Arabia there remained "certain disruptive forces" which could have ended his dream of a unified country. There was the Ottoman presence (before World War I) in the Hejaz area including the Northern area and the Eastern Province. The most dangerous threat to his legitimacy was the ruler of Mecca (Sharif Hussein) who aligned forces with the Ottomans and proclaimed himself King of the Hejaz. Also the British during World War I saw Sharif Hussein of Mecca as an important link in pushing the Turks out of the area and the rest of the Middle East. He was promised by the British that he would become King of the Arabs. These are just a few of the many problems which faced Abdul-Aziz.

In the case of Saudi Arabia, once the consolidation of political power had taken place, and its legitimacy recognised, the government could then embark on programs of development. Before examining what programs for development were initiated by King Abdul-Aziz (1881-1953) it is necessary to look at the personality and goals of the man who created the Kingdom of

Saudi Arabia.

(a) The Man

The success of King Abdul-Aziz can be found, as Hudson (1977) notes, in his personal, ideological and structural approach to the problems with which he dealt. His ideology was firmly rooted in puritanical Wahhabism. This, combined with the fact that he was an astute politician, made him a strong personality. Sheikh Hafiz Wahba* describes King Abdul-Aziz as a tall man, well over six feet, well built with broad shoulders; this physical make up was combined with magnetic charm. There were several aspects of his personality that are worth noting. He was generous and gave help to those who sought aid from him, his disposition was kind and he had a well developed sense of humour. "It goes without saying that this great warrior, hero of a hundred and one battles and aptly called the genius of the desert and the Napoleon of Arabia, was an accomplished horseman, marksman and swordsman." (Wahba 1964:166) The training for this he received when his father had sent him at an early age to live with the Bedouin and learn their ways. This background was excellent for the many battles which were to confront him. Of him H. St. John Philby says, "Like the Prophet Muhammad, 'Abdul-'Aziz ibn Sa'ud was a man of destiny'". (Philby 1955:xiF) This becomes very clear as the changes that were to take place are examined in the context of Saudi development.

* Sheikh Hafiz Wahba was the Saudi Arabian Minister to the Court of St. James', London, England.

(b) Early Form of Government

The early form of government in Saudi Arabia was very much based on informal structure lines. Once a degree of stability was gained, King Abdul-Aziz "...had to face the needs of a more highly developed society, and he immediately began to think of setting up a rudimentary government machine". (Assah 1969:58) To do this, according to Assah, he made use of Arabs (non-Saudi's) who had expertise, gained in their home countries; some of these men were made ministers in the new government. An example of this is Sheikh Hafiz Wahba who was an Egyptian--he was the King's first minister of education and later Ambassador to the Court of St. James's. Others who assisted came from Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria. Since those early days Saudi Arabia has relied on foreign personnel to continue its development. King Abdul-Aziz began to consolidate an internal administrative structure in Saudi Arabia and to play a role in world affairs. Under his rule "The people of Saudi Arabia actually enjoyed a very high degree of personal liberty, unhampered except in regard to the commission of crimes, the payment of taxes and military and civil duties". (Lebkicher, et al. 1952:78) It is important to note that King Abdul-Aziz held court for his people. They could visit with him and tell him their news or troubles and found that he was prepared to do what he could to help them. Such a practice, the Majlis, a consultative get together, was a part of the Bedouin tribal government and also justified by Qur'anic reference. Both the present king and his

brother princes still hold open Majlis whenever possible.

This kind of care was also there for the Sheikhs of the many tribes in the land. He held regular meetings with them and it is through this highly personalized touch that King Abdul-Aziz was to rule his country. However, in the mid 1920's King Abdul-Aziz came under attack from the very movement he had created, the Ikhwan, which had assisted him in bringing about the Wahhabi State.

"Although ostensibly religious in motivation, Ikhwan activities, like the Crusader's were brutal and politically self-serving." (Hudson 1977:173)

The Ikhwan were displeased with the manner in which King Abdul-Aziz was dealing with the British and the Hashmites. Many of the Ikhwan turned against their own Muslim brothers and sided with King Abdul-Aziz and the troubles were brought under control by the King's army. In spite of this "...it is well to remember that the Ikhwan represented a deep current of legitimacy in Saudi political culture, and that the family was vulnerable to attack from the religious right wing before as well as after the onset of oil wealth and social modernization". (Hudson 1977:173)

The task that faced King Abdul-Aziz and his new nation was immense. The changes that were needed were indeed complex and could not be easily brought about. These changes are very clearly itemized by Smithers (1966:18-19)

1. kinship to citizenship
2. isolated camp life to community life
3. nomadic pastoralism to modern life
4. individualism to cooperative participation
5. traditional technology to modern technology
6. tribal participation as a kinsman to national

participation as a citizen."

These six points observed by Smithers clearly identify the kind of reorientation of people that is necessary to succeed in both economic and political development. The first was that of getting people, who had for centuries related to each other on a kinship basis, to think in terms of a larger political unit--a country. This involves changing their loyalty from tribe to central government, for their citizenship and loyalty, which would look after their needs. Secondly, the growth of urban centers plays a major role in modernizing a country. Cities become the focus of industry, jobs, cultural activities, educational institutions, hospitals, and so on.⁵ The task of getting the Bedouin out of the desert and into the cities to work and accept city life, with all its implied discipline and constraints was not and is still not an easy one. It is difficult to change social and life patterns that have been established for centuries. In order to achieve this transition there must be introduced the idea that individualism or tribal collectivism must give way to cooperative participation in a larger unit--that of the national society.

In order to develop it, it is imperative that, what Smithers calls, "traditional technology" be replaced by modern technology. However, problems arise when traditional societies must catch up in areas of education and skills to fill newly created jobs which aid in the continued development process.

⁵ See Appendix G for population distribution in Saudi cities of 100,000 or more -- 1981 figures.

These are the main problems which had to be faced by King Abdul-Aziz in order to set his country on the road to modernization.

B) The Road to Modern Government

"When one bears in mind that Saudi Arabia has previously had little contact with the outside world, practically no experience in modern political administration, and hardly any tradition of self-government on a broad nation scale, the rapid strides taken by her administration toward efficiency and order are little short of miraculous."⁶ (Twitchell 1958:173)

It is here that we shall look at the development of the Saudi government, by reviewing the structure established by King Abdul-Aziz when first he delegated authority to formal organizations.

(a) The King

The King remained the central focus of leadership for the new Kingdom. He had the roles of a religious leader, a tribal leader, and at the same time he also acted as the head of a modern state. Since he was the religious leader, according to Islamic law, he also acted as the supreme judge. He did not make laws because these are provided for in the Qur'an. However, "...he issues the decrees necessary to regulate situations not

⁶ Twitchell was the American geologist who discovered oil in Al-Hasa and gold in the Hejaz. His work on Saudi Arabia was written in collaboration with Edward J. Jury and R. Bayley Winder.

provided for in the Sharia Law". (Fitzsimmons 1959:116)

(b) The Royal Court

The Royal Court was made up of administrators who looked after the private affairs of the King. The diplomatic affairs of state were handled by the Royal Court. Within this body existed a number of royal counsellors who dealt with more specialized affairs.

(c) The Council of Deputies

The Council of Deputies was established by a decree promulgated in December, 1931 and was the prototype for the Council of Ministers. It established the sub-divisions of the Council of Deputies--the formation was:

President

Deputy of Foreign Affairs

Deputy of Finance

Vice-President of the Consultative

Council

This make up of the newly formed government was to play an important role in the running of the affairs of state.

"The Council issued all instructions to government departments whether the instructions originated in the Council or were decrees promulgated by the King. This authority was spelled out as being delegated directly by the King." (Harrington 1958:2)

It must be noted that this Council of Deputies was set up by King Abdul-Aziz for improving his rule of the Hejaz after its

conquest.

By the late 1930's and the early 1940's the government became more centralized and the Council of Deputies began to decline. The decline took place as a result of increased complexities of running the whole country and increasing complexities in government affairs. Harrington (1958) points out that the change occurred as a direct result of the extension of government services such as schools, hospitals, post offices, and telecommunications systems, railroads. The result was that the previous government institutions were no longer adequate. Also, from the end of the first World War external factors began to play a role in the affairs of the new country creating a need for a separate, expanded, and dynamic Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

(i) Ministry of Foreign Affairs

In the early stages, before 1925, the foreign affairs of Arabia were handled on a personal level by Abdul-Aziz himself. He dealt directly with British representatives such as Sir Percy Cox. By 1925, however, it became necessary to handle foreign relations differently. At this time a Directorate of Foreign Affairs was set up. In 1930, it was turned into a Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and his son, the Amir Faisal, then the Viceroy of the Hejaz, was given these additional duties.

It is interesting to note that the Soviet Union was the first country with which Saudi Arabia established formal

relations, in 1926. It was not until May 1931 that formal relations were established with the United States. Since 1926 the Saudi Government has accepted diplomatic representation from many European countries. Saudi Arabia entered the world of international affairs and took an active part in the founding of the United Nations and the Arab League.

(ii) Ministry of Defense

"Ever since his rise to power, Abdul-Aziz has kept the military forces of the state under his direct supervision." (Lebkicher et al. 1952:86) The state arose out of conquests, by Abdul-Aziz, and after its establishment military matters remained under the direct control of the King. By 1933-4, the Agency of Defence was set up and Sheikh Abdulla Sulaiman Al Hamdan, who was the Minister of Finance and a close and trusted agent of the King, was put in charge. Defence is an important area in that the state must be protected from external enemies as well as possible internal problems. In setting up the internal defence system "...reliance is placed on the town-people, who, rather than the unsteady and unpredictable Bedouins, form the backbone of Saudi power". (Lebkicher et al. 1952:86) A complex traditional structure was set up with different regional areas being responsible for defence.

(iii) Ministry of Finance

Prior to 1925, there were no elaborate organizations for the administration of finances. After the conquest of the Hejaz Abdul-Aziz established, in 1925, an Administration of Finance, located in Mecca. Up to the discovery of oil, the main source of revenue for the new state came from taxes and pilgrim fees. For a period after the discovery of oil the companies dealt directly with the King. "The old Turkish practice, inherited by the Saudi Government from the former Hejaz regime, of charging 11 percent ad valorem on all goods (with determination of the value being influenced by the local prices) was abandoned in 1933 in favor of a tariff schedule more in keeping with Western practices." (Lebkicher et al. 1952:89)

(iv) Provincial and Local Government

It is at the local level of government activities that the linkages by marriage and the sons of Abdul-Aziz played an important role. Crown Prince, Amir (or commander) Saud, was directly involved with the supervision and administration affairs of the Nejd area, while the second son Amir Faisal was made Viceroy of the Hejaz which had its headquarters in Mecca. The area of Al-Hasa was governed by Amir Saud ibn Jiluwi who comes from a collateral branch of the Royal Family. The Al-Hasa headquarters were at Hofuf. The governor of Asir, Amir Turki al

Sudanri was a member of a prominent family from the Nejd and related to the House of Saud by marriage.

The use of his sons as well as the use of prominent members from tribes must be viewed as an effective way by which control in the new country was maintained. However, this style of control was manageable only while the government and the affairs dealt with did not become too cumbersome for direct control. Once the affairs of government had become too large, particularly beyond the capacity of any member of the traditional Royal House to handle, help of the outsiders became a necessity in handling the administration of the government departments and regions of the country. Abdul-Aziz had "...been studying the possible application of certain phases of Western civilization to his country for many years, and it is with careful consideration that he...made up his mind to effect economic changes comparable to the political changes he has already brought about". (Sanger 1947:180) The political changes that Abdul-Aziz was able to implement were well under way before oil became a factor. Oil marks the turning point for Saudi Arabia's economy from a poor nation relying on monies from taxes on the pilgrims to Mecca, to, in the 1940's, a country with healthy prospects for a high and growing Gross National Product.

The Establishment of the Arabian American Oil Company

With the discovery of oil in Saudi Arabia, one can agree with Lieutenant-Colonel Gerald de Gaury (1944:41) that, "...the great and romantic peninsula of Arabia, is like a fly being released from amber, for since the tenth century it has taken no part in great economic or political movements". As already noted, political change came with the rise to power of Abdul-Aziz and the discovery of oil was to lead to economic change and thereby reinforcing the need for further and continuing political change. However it was not until 1938 that there was any certainty that a commercially viable amount of oil existed. Once this was confirmed the camp at Damman changed into a community. "Family cottages and dormitories and apartments for men without families sprang up and were joined by a dining hall, clubhouse and swimming pool." (Arabian American Oil Company 1968:117) Other support services were installed such as a hospital and clinic. By 1938, a storage and shipping terminal was built at al-Khobar. This was done to start the oil moving to the Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO) for refining since there were no refining facilities in Saudi Arabia at that time. However, with the onset of World War II development halted and nothing further was done until the end of the war.

For the duration of the war the employees who remained were put to work in other fields. "The company assisted the Saudi Arabian Government in solving problems resulting from shortages of transportation and food." (Arabian American Oil Company

1968:20) These workers were trained engineers and geologists and they, during this time, searched for water resources and also worked on potential for agricultural development in the area of al-Kharj, southeast of Riyadh. However, the war further stimulated the American government to build a refinery at Ras Tanura which would have the capacity to produce 50,000 barrels a day. The money for this was provided by Aramco's owner companies. This new refinery started partial production by September, 1945 and in December went into full production. Shortly, after 1945, Aramco discovered four more oil fields located at Damman, Hadriya, Abqaiq, and Qatif. With these discoveries Saudi Arabia's financial future brightened.

Aramco is important in that, as a result of its explorations for oil, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia had a new resource upon which to develop. Also it provided jobs, for "men who a few years ago were primitive Bedouins eking out a meager existence around the sparse water-holes of Al-Hasa Province are now drawing regular wages and eating new and nutritious foods". (Sanger 1947:182) It is at this point that the process of modernization and the introduction of technology combined with Western conveniences such as electricity, running water, and canned goods, set the pace of change. King Abdul-Aziz wanted to improve living conditions and try to settle the Bedouin, but he was uneasy about the impact modernization would have on his people including members of his own family. In conversation with William Eddy, in the 1940's,

"Ibn Sa'ud explained...his simple rule of thumb in dealing with our godless, materialistic West: we Muslims have the one, true faith, but Allah gave you the iron which is inanimate, neither prohibited nor mentioned in the Qur'an". (Eddy 1963:257)

King Abdul-Aziz died, in 1953, just as the problems of mixing "iron and faith" began to reveal themselves.

King Saud (1953 to 1964)

Up to 1953, King Abdul-Aziz had managed to centralize his power and control through his personal charisma and by expanding the bounds of his government. Philby (1955:xiiiF) notes, however, that "...when the signs of decline were too obvious to escape notice, there was a general relaxation of discipline and control with disastrous effects on the economy and reputation of the country." These problems were to plague Saud who became King when his father died. Although Saud had worked closely with his famous father he did not have the strong personality that was required to hold the Royal Family together and run the affairs of state. As noted by Knauerhase, he was unprepared to rule the country. This was also noted by Khadouin, who records King Abdul-Aziz's concern about Saud's lack of both experience and prudence. During the early stages of his rule, "...King Saud, ...was forced to deal with the growing political and social awareness of his people without the unquestioned authority of his father". (Walpole et al. 1971:153)

Saud faced many problems, both domestic and external. First was his own personal weakness of character--he was not a strong leader. The government structure that his father had set up

needed to be revised to meet the new challenges that oil wealth had brought. Government spending had got out of control--the country was on the verge of bankruptcy. There were members of the Royal Family who felt that Saud was too slow to continue the process of modernization. Furthermore, the oil revenues brought too much money into the government's coffers (great by the viewpoint of the time, although substantially increased by subsequent events) which caused "...the spread of appalling corruption through all levels of the Administration." (Philby 1955:xviiF)

A number of problems arose on the international scene which affected the Saudi state. Relations with Egypt were seriously strained when King Saud's complicity in an assassination plot directed at President Gamel Abdul Nasser were revealed. This led directly to much of Saud's power being taken away, and vice-regal power granted to Crown Prince Faisal, in 1958. This was a measure to save the nation's international credibility. The presence of the relatively newly formed state of Israel was a source of friction between the Arab and non-Arab world, Jerusalem housing one of the most important Muslim shrines, to which free access was now limited. There were also a number of conflicts over borders which had not been clearly defined. And, in response to the oil cartel's reduction in buying prices for crude oil, seriously affecting the national budgeting plans of producing states, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries was formed in October 1960. Saudi Arabia's oil

minister, Abdullah Tariki, played a key organizational role, and Saudi Arabia almost immediately took a leading role in the affairs of the newly established institution.

A) Internal Problems

Twitchell, dealing with Saud's poor leadership, particularly in internal problems, stated as follows: "There is no doubt that much of the annual income from oil is spent on lavish living by the prodigious royal family, but it is also true that a very real beginning has been made to spread expenditures systematically for the benefit of the whole country". (Twitchell 1958:189-190) This extravagance brought Saudi Arabia close to bankruptcy. However, much of the internal corruption had already begun before King Abdul-Aziz died.

Under the rule of King Abdul-Aziz, 1902-1953, the more informal approach to running the government worked. It was easy in the early stages of Saudi development to centralize all power in the hands of one man, who was the first Imam and later took on the western title of King. This traditional style of leadership worked well until the discovery of oil in the mid 1930's. As time passed King Abdul-Aziz found that he could no longer handle all of the affairs of state and he appointed various ministers to share the burden. Just before his death in 1953, he decreed that a Council of Ministers should be set up, to handle and divide the responsibilities of state. This was eventually implemented by King Saud in 1957. These new

ministries were in the areas of Defence, Agriculture, the Interior, Health, Communications, Education, and Finance, with the Prime Minister retaining responsibility directly for Foreign Affairs. New pressures now began affecting all the affairs of state. Although still strongly traditional, the government was now adopting more formal and less personalised structures to deal with its business. There was also a growing desire in the Royal Family for rapid modernization. King Saud's younger brother, Prince Talal, was the leader of a group of princes who were calling for an increased pace of modernization and were not happy with the manner in which Saud was running the country. Talal, who was a member of the Council of Ministers, demanded changes such as, "constitutional reform, extolling socialism as a fundamental principle of Islam". (Warpole 1971:155) Talal's goal was that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia should become a Socialistic Islamic Arab Republic. These problems started in 1960 and by 1962 Talal was living in exile in Egypt. He and three of his brothers renounced their Saudi citizenship but in fact they had lost their royal status even before that.

B) External Problems

As already noted, Saud's reputation came under attack with the report of his involvement in an assassination plot against President Nasser of Egypt. However, this was not the end of his problems in the international sphere. The Middle East has long been an area where political discontent, infighting, and

repeated shortlived wars occur between countries. When problems arose between the Arab countries the superpowers took an interest in trying to settle matters. The U.S.S.R. was very interested in the area and the United States' interest began to reveal itself from 1955 onwards. The United States

"...decided to contain Soviet influence in the area by winning the support of those Arab states whose leaders were opposed to communism and its chief ally, Nasser's nationalism. This strategy and policy, proclaimed in March 1957, was known as the Eisenhower Doctrine. ...King Saud of Saudi Arabia was the first Arab ruler to endorse the Eisenhower Doctrine openly--ironically after he had signed with Egypt, Jordan, and Syria an Arab Solidarity Agreement designed to limit British influence in Jordan". (Abboushi 1970:181)

Saud was able to handle neither the pressures of running his own country nor the pressures at the international level. In 1958, all executive powers were handed over to Prince Faisal who then took the necessary measures to restore and control the affairs of state.

Another major external problem was the founding of the state of Israel in 1948. Saud's father King Abdul-Aziz had been upset by the establishment of Israel and always felt strongly about Jerusalem and the fact that this area should remain in Arab hands. This was because the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem was the third most important place of worship for Muslims after Mecca and Medina. Israel was and still is perceived as a threat to the Arab world and its continued existence of strategic importance to the United States. "At the end of 1956, Saudi Arabian troops were reportedly in Jordan as a deterrent to the military threat from Israel, and in March 1957, in accordance

with a Saudi-Jordanian military agreement." (1951:169) In that same year the Saudi government had deposited \$14 million in Jordanian banks. The relationship between Saudi Arabia and Jordan, strained for half a century as a result of the Hashemite claims to the Kingship of Arabia, began to improve.

The final external factor that should be examined is that of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, better known as OPEC. This organization was formed in September of 1960, in Baghdad, and its founding members were: Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and Venezuela. By 1961, Qatar joined and in the following year Libya and Indonesia. Its primary purpose was to form a united front with regard to petroleum policies; to safeguard their common interests; and to build strength when dealing with the multi-national oil companies.

For the first time these countries in OPEC shared a common goal. This is important in view of the role which Saudi Arabia has played since then in the international arena.

During the eleven year rule of King Saud, Saudi Arabia began to play an important part in international politics of the region. Although not a smooth period in the history of recent Saudi development, this period revealed the many problems that can arise with enormous and sudden wealth (sudden in terms of a thirty year span). Considering

"In 1945, the wheel was scarcely being used in Saudi Arabia. The common mode of transportation was the camel, and the majority of the population earned a meager living from agriculture or animal husbandry. If an animal became ill or the spring rains failed, it was God's will. If the animal recovered or the harvest was

adequate despite the lack of rain, it was God's mercy and all praise was due then. If the animal died or the crop failed, it was also God's will, and goatherd and farmer accepted it, praying for better times." (Knauerhase 1977:6)

With modern medicine, skills and technology various facets of life in Saudi Arabia also begun to change.

King Faisal (1964 - 1975)

As noted above, under the weak rule of King Saud Saudi Arabia found itself facing the consequences of oil wealth, oil economics, and third-world political sympathies, a rapid pace of modernization, and international interest in itself and in the region. But, while King in name for eleven years, he only held power for five years. For the balance of his reign his half-brother, Crown Prince Faisal, wielded the effective power, as Prime Minister and then as Viceroy.

A) The Man

Faisal ibn Abdul-Aziz ibn Abdur-Rahman al Faisal al Saud was born in Riyadh in central Arabia in 1905 or 1906, some three or five years after his father had recaptured that town for the family and the Wahhabi's. He was his father's third son, he eventually had more than forty brothers (and uncounted sisters) who survived childhood, the fruits of Ibn Saud's practice of unification through marriage. His mother was of the Al-Sheikh family, whose ancestry included that of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab who was the founder of the Wahhabi fundamentalism

which was so important in Arabia. Her death shortly after he was born brought him under the care of his maternal grandfather, who brought him up in that family's tradition of religious scholarship. Faisal's intelligence attracted his father's attention and as the son grew the father spent much time with him, talking, visiting, playing; in later years Faisal stated that he received his apprenticeship in statecraft from his father.

His precocious intelligence and maturity led Ibn Saud to appoint him, at the age of thirteen, head of a delegation to the British government immediately after World War I,

"to discuss outstanding questions, listed by the British as follows:

Explanation and justification of Ibn Saud's attitude towards King Hussain of the Hijaz (the former Sherif of Mecca who had assumed the title of King).

The boundaries of Najd with special reference to the disputed Najd-Hijaz boundary and its demarcation.

The question of re-affirmation of the treaty made in 1906 between Ibn Saud by H.M.G.

The request for an increase in the financial assistance given to Ibn Saud by H.M.G.

Request for dispatch of an envoy to H.M.G. to discuss points arising out of above matters with Ibn Saud with a view to a definite understanding for the future."

(DeGaury 1966:24)

Although the hospitality arrangements were poorly organized and he suffered unwarranted provocations and insults, both accidental and unintentional, from the British, and deliberate, from other Arab delegations (with whom Ibn Saud was in dispute over territory), Faisal acquitted himself well. However, little was achieved on the questions under discussion. The British comment to Ibn Saud was that, since World War I was now over,

peace should prevail in the Arab world. There was no direct response to Ibn Saud's concern about the Sherif of Mecca claiming the title of King of the Arabs.

When Faisal returned from his trip, Ibn Saud gave him a military command in Asir. During this period in the 1920's, the period of consolidation and unification of Arabia, the young Faisal watched his father win battles and eventually remove the Sherif at Mecca from his self-proclaimed position as King in the Hejaz. When this had been achieved, in 1925, Ibn Saud appointed Faisal his deputy and Vicerey to govern the Hejaz for him.

There are many things which influence the growth of an individual. For Faisal, his father and his faith and personal strength of character are major factors which made him an effective King of Saudi Arabia. He had grown up facing his responsibilities and had learned a lot about politics, both internal and international. From 1958 to 1964, he worked hard to resolve the many problems facing the country. Saud and Faisal, although brothers, were not of the same mother or upbringing and this accounts for the major differences in their approaches.

B) Faisal's Accession to Power

"The leadership of Faisal should be viewed as a continuum in which the period of his premiership with full powers and the subsequent period as king constituted but phases of the general process of governing, the aim of which was to modernize the country in administrative and technical sectors while adhering

to the traditional principles in the religious, cultural, and to some extent, social sectors." (Lenczowski 1980:598)

Faisal became the de facto ruler in 1958, when Saud's ill health and incapacity to rule had to be dealt with. Later on Faisal was made viceroy and prime minister. At this time Saud was left with the title of King, but he made frequent attempts to exercise his lost power. The situation came to a head in 1964.

In most absolute monarchies when a ruler proves incompetent, factions develop, civil war may break out and rival claimants to the throne seek to assassinate each other. In the Saudi case, Faisal had promised his father before he died that he would be loyal to his brother Saud. He took no steps to push him aside or out of his role as King, but undertook to save the legitimacy of the House of Saud and push for modernizing his country.

"One Arab correspondent writing from Riyadh, pointed out that the two key elements in the government of Saudi Arabia were firstly the King, the Crown Prince and the administration and secondly, the Higher Council, composed of the princes and the Ulama. When the first fails to operate properly, the second automatically steps in to correct the situation. This was precisely what happened during the four weeks preceding Faisal's accession to the throne." (DeGaury 1966:131)

Faisal's accession to the throne was brought about through the decision of the Royal princes and the Ulama. According to DeGaury, Saud was given the option of living in Saudi Arabia or moving to another country. He moved to Athens, Greece, where he died in 1969. "Of the two royal brothers, Faisal was more

progressive in his outlook and was endowed with superior intelligence and strength of character." (Lenczowski 1967:100) Although the period from 1953 to 1964 was fraught with internal problems and pressures from the international arena the country had embarked on the process of modernization.

C) Faisal's Role in Political Development

Faisal, like his father, sought to improve the social and economic conditions in his country. He was not educated in the formal sense but his traditional education combined with his intelligence made him a progressive leader, and he had learned much about international politics as they affected Saudi Arabia. "Inevitably Faisal's progressive policies planted the seeds of impatience, higher aspirations, and resentment against the stringent taboos on liquor, dress, and a wide range of Western consumer goods." (Bird 1975:12) No matter how radical Faisal's policies for change seemed he was a stickler for holding close to the puritanical ways of Wahhabism.

By the time Faisal had become King much in the way of modernizing development had already begun. His father, King Abdul-Aziz, found it necessary to first seek aid from secularly educated Arabs of other countries and then set up a more formal government structure, the Council of Deputies (prototype for the Council of Ministers, 1957) to deal with increasing government business.

New techniques for communication such as the telegraph were installed in the 1920s despite a lot of objections from the Ulama, who feared that Satan might be living in the system making it a tool of the devil and not of God. Then came the automobile which replaced the camel. King Abdul-Aziz moved to build schools, introduced modern medicine, and found new water sources with the aid of ARAMCO. These necessary reforms were well under way by the time Faisal became King in 1964. Without these steps taken earlier, the intellectual and administrative skills which Faisal had would have been hamstrung by his need to deal with these matters before proceeding to the areas his own inclinations dictated.

Faisal's role in development had begun, as already noted, before he became King. On November 6th, 1962, Faisal, then Crown Prince and Prime Minister, issued a ten point draft plan for reform which included statements such as:

1. ...system of government in any state should be a true reflection of the development achieved by the community, His Majesty's Government has been anxious to develop the Saudi Community educationally, culturally, and socially, so that it might reach the level that would be truly represented in the form of a unified system of government calculated to achieve the ideals of the great eternal goals set in our Sublime Shari'a. ...

2. His Majesty's Government...has also undertaken various studies for the purpose of drawing up legislation that will regulate the system of local government in the various provinces of the Kingdom. ...this legislation will not be long in coming and will, when promulgated, constitute an efficient factor in pushing forward the wheels of the administrative, political, and social progress of our youthful state.

3. His Majesty's Government is anxious for the Judiciary to enjoy immunity and high standing, for it is the touch

of right and the symbol of justice, and whenever we elevate it and make it more sacred we achieve one of the basic objectives of Islam.

4. ...it has become imperative for us to give greater attention to jurisprudence and for our jurists and Ulema to play a positive and effective part in the discussion of important matters of State...

5. His Majesty's Government is fully aware of its duty to work in earnest to spread the call of Islam, strengthen it, and protect it by word and by deed.

6. The prime characteristic of this glorious Islamic nation is that it is the best nation ever known to promote good and shun evil.

7. His Majesty's Government feels that one of its most important duties is to raise the nation's social level; the State has played an important part in this field.

8. His Majesty's Government believes that the economic, commercial, and social development that has reigned in our society over the years is still ... in dire need of regulating...

9. Financial revival and economic development are the Government's prime concern...

10. The attitude of the Shari'a towards slavery and its keen interest in liberating slaves is well known...The Government now finds a favourable opportunity to announce the absolute abolition of slavery and the manumission of all slaves. The Government will compensate those who prove to be deserving of compensation. (DeGauey 1966: 147-151)

This "Ten Point" proposal of Faisal's is an indicator that, as a leader, he had defined his goals and objectives, and had done some thinking on the general direction his country should take. In his first point we find this traditional leader referring to the governor and the governed. Implied in this section is a notion that the citizen should have basic rights that are "within the limits of Islamic belief and public policy". These aspects of the proposal are important in that they do not remove

the basis on which this society has evolved over the centuries and that is the strong fundamentalist religious Wahhabism. "It has not been the intellectuals, the military, and the bureaucracy which have provided the inducements and impetus for change; it has been a highly traditional, tribally-oriented, patriarchal Muslim elite which, despite an occasional seeming threat (e.g. the military plot of 1969) has managed to retain almost completely undiminished control over the progress and process of change." Tachau (1975:181)

While holding fast to religious traditions, the traditional elite have established as part of their goal, not only the preserving of Islam, but "...to work in earnest to spread the call of Islam..." DeGaury (1966:151). The kind of leadership offered here through the religio-political basis extends far beyond the border of Saudi Arabia.⁷ It must be noted that just a few years before Faisal's death an Islamic Development Bank (1972) was set up by the Saudi Arabian government to give aid to other developing Muslim countries. This is one way to ensure continued growth of Islam in other parts of the world. The growth of a world Muslim Brotherhood with many common goals does mean that Islam could develop as a third alternative to the West's "democracy" and the Soviet Bloc's "communism". Faisal, like his famous father, Abdul Aziz, was a man of vision. He was also keen on preserving the fundamental framework of Islam

⁷ See Appendix C for World Muslim population by country. It should be noted that although there is no real Islamic solidarity it is possible for Muslim countries to apply pressure in the U.N. over issues of concern.

within which changes could be pursued provided they did not go against the basic tenets of the religion. Faisal saw change taking place by way of developing and implementing heavy and light industry and also that the country should become self-sufficient in the area of agriculture.

The final point in his program related directly to social change. Slavery had been a fact of life in Saudi Arabia through the ages and the move to abolish it appeared to indicate a willingness on the part of the Saudi elite to draw the country into more modern times. The abolition of slavery was brought about with reference to the provision of the Shari'a.

While King, it is said by Vincent Sheean that "...Faisal has gone far beyond his brother and father who preceded him. The regular ministries which line the airport avenue in Riyadh, the royal capital, bear witness to the birth of a bureaucracy which, however recent, is already well established and functioning better than some of the older systems on which it has been modeled." (Sheean 1970:3)

This bureaucracy functioned, providing an administrative framework for the implementation of the government's programmes and an effective interface with the affected citizens. Under Faisal experts from abroad were still being used to aid in setting up the government's modernizing programmes, but more and more foreign educated Saudis were being involved in the process.

Lenczowski (1967:98-104) in his article, "Tradition and Reform in Saudi Arabia", notes that around 1965, the Saudi

government established a state-owned television station which caused concern among the Ulema. However, the government persisted in its policy knowing full well that it will have its own impact. For one thing it will create expectations for modernization in various sectors of economic and social life. Higher education by this time also had a role to play in the development of the country. Until now technical education had to be obtained in other Arab countries or in Europe, Britain or the United States. Those students who were sent abroad were exposed to societies where the advance of technology, science, and industrialization were no longer new. Such students wanted Saudi Arabia to be as advanced as the western world. Western style universities and colleges were founded, technically oriented, since the king perceived engineers and scientific agriculturalists to be the country's primary need. The order from King Faisal was, "A hundred new schools a year ..." (Sheean 1970:4) Also, education for girls began in 1964. There were many innovative moves taken during the period Faisal was King, 1964 to 1975. During his rule:

"...Faisal was capable on a political level of bridging the ideological gap to the Saudi "left"--that growing middle-class group of Western educated commoners--engineers, military officers, construction contractors, government administrators, and teachers. The educated commoners in the kingdom have increasingly espoused the more secular doctrines of Arab nationalism; they are not socialists in any sense of the word, except insofar as they see themselves in opposition to the representatives of traditional Wahabi Islam, the ulemas." (Bird 1975:12)

Although Faisal was a capable leader and statesman it takes time and energy both human and natural resources, to effect change.

D) The Beginning of the Seventies

Knauerhase, an economist who has studied the economic growth in Saudi Arabia, makes some interesting observations about the state of the economy at the beginning of the 1970's. He states (1976) that although there exists tremendous wealth it has been unevenly distributed, and major cities have been the beneficiaries. This has raised the standard of living in cities but not much has been done to improve the lot of the average Bedouin. Also, he says that it is difficult if not impossible to get a Saudi to do menial or labouring jobs which constituted in the early 1970's about 45 percent of the labour force. This still to some degree applies to positions which require higher education for government jobs. However, it takes time to adjust educational needs to fit a rapidly changing economic condition. Saudis are sent abroad for higher learning and these people are slowly replacing the foreign educated and skilled workers.

There were other problems, such as the levying and collecting of taxes:

"Since 1950, only one major attempt was made to levy a graduated income tax on Saudi citizens. This was repealed because Saudi nationals argued that they already paid ZAKAT--a religious tax--and thus income taxes represent double taxation." (Knauerhase 1974:138)

The government during that time, in the 1950s, was in a difficult position with these attempts at taxation. The religious tax only amounts to about four percent of a citizen's income. Moreover, the government had to encourage the citizens

to work hard, get education, and acquire new skills. For all this the government had to give a lot of aid before it could expect returns.

This chapter has sought to examine what political development has taken place with regard to the building of a modern nation-state: its administrative apparatus and services that have taken place in Saudi Arabia from 1902 to 1975. This time frame has been used since the purpose of the thesis is to look at the role the elite have played in the development of the new nation.

The first period, from 1902 to 1953, under the leadership of Ibn Saud, later King Abdul-Aziz, was devoted to nation building. It brought about: (1) a period of consolidation of tribal groups to form a nation; (2) the introduction of modern technology such as the radio and the motor car; (3) new methods of medical care and medicines; (4) the arrival of engineers exploring for oil and the development of ARAMCO in Saudi Arabia along with other oil companies, thus affecting social and economic conditions in the area; (5) involvement in international affairs; (6) a changing governmental structure from a more traditional form to the inclusion of a Council of Deputies; and, (7) the use of foreign educated Arab and non-Arab people to assist in needed changes.

The second phase, a period of turbulence, 1953-1964, with Abdul-Aziz's son King Saud as ruler, marks the beginning of corruption and weak leadership. During this time a number of

incidents occur that could have destroyed all that for which King Abdul-Aziz had worked. These were (1) corruption and extravagance within the Royal Family; (2) Saud was not a statesman and was not an able actor with regard to international matters; (3) after five years of his rule much of his power as King was transferred to Crown Prince Faisal, who was to later become King; and, (4) the development of the Council of Ministers.

The third phase, 1964 - 1975, was a time of idealism and steady growth under the rule of King Faisal: (1) the foundations for social and economic change were well underway by the time he became King; (2) Faisal may be viewed as a statesman, faithful to puritannical Wahhabism; (3) his policies were progressive and encouraged modernization; and, (4) slavery was banned in accordance with the teachings of Islam.

After the wasteful assassination of King Faisal, wasteful because it removed from the nation's role in international affairs its well known and highly respected statesman-spokesman, and because it served no credible purpose for any political faction, he was succeeded by his half-brother Khalid. King Khalid, modest, self-effacing, had played important roles as conciliator in family disputes. His health, however, was poor. He appointed his half-brother Fahd as Crown Prince and Deputy Prime Minister, retaining for himself the post of prime minister, as had King Faisal. Prince Fahd, one of the sons of King Abdul-Aziz by his wife from the Sudairi family, a very

prominent group within the government of the kingdom, is a strong personality with extensive political experience and a political outlook very similar to that of the late King Faisal. The two worked well together as a team, in contrast to the difficulties experienced between Saud and Faisal. Developments during the reign of King Khalid appear to indicate that the political institutions brought into full operation during King Faisal's reign have matured. It appears that the complexity of the Saudi Arabian state has now reached the point at which, as in more developed nations, the bureaucracy⁸ is playing a major role in making and executing public policy. This the bureaucracy does under the watchful eye of the king and his ministers and is always mindful of the basic tenets of Islam. Both in the running of the day-to-day administration and in launching new projects and policies the increasingly professional bureaucracy of Saudi Arabia has learned to work within the firm constraints: the major political concerns of the king and his powerful ministers, and those tenets of Islam which have received official and demonstrated social support. These firm constraints, nevertheless, leave to the proliferating bureaucracy a wide scope for professional and, in certain fields, technocratic roles and performance. The more it succeeds in such roles and performance the greater is the inclination of the decision-makers to entrust it with additional responsibilities.

⁸ See Appendix D. This table shows the establishment of Ministries in the Saudi government.

CHAPTER FIVE

ANALYSIS -- DEVELOPMENT AND THE ELITE

In the previous chapter we examined the social, economic and political changes that have occurred in Saudi Arabia since 1902. By reviewing the part played by the traditional elite in political development their successes and failures become evident. However, one factor remains constant in how that change is implemented, that factor being the role of Islam as an ideology. For it cannot be denied that, "Tradition dies hard and tradition reinforced by ideology is all but indestructible". (Malone 1966:295) In this ideology lies the key to the understanding of the drive and motivation behind Saudi development. It is here that the conflict between tradition and modernity has to be understood.

The challenge facing modern social scientists, dealing with modernizing nations bound by tradition, is in the approach to analysis. Before any attempt is made to analyse political development there must exist some understanding of the historical developments of the society that is being studied. This understanding must take into account the goals and objectives of that society within its own social and cultural framework.

This chapter is divided into five parts, the first of which deals with developments leading to nationhood. In this part the

main factors which assisted in the fulfilment of Ibn Saud's goals will be examined. The time frame for this part is from 1902 to 1932, which may be called the formative years. Secondly, we shall examine the role of the elite in setting into motion the related processes of "modernization" and "westernization" in the initial stages of political development. Once modern techniques were introduced there arose a series of problems that had to be overcome to some degree in order to facilitate development. Thirdly, the period in which Arabia becomes the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This is important in that there exists, as of 1932, a nation in the formal sense, a new nation with its own set of goals and a role to play in international politics. The fourth part involves an analysis of the problems encountered by the traditional elite in the process of modernization. This includes the need for the traditional elite to seek the aid of those Saudis who have had a secular and technical education in areas in which no traditional elite expertise was available. Finally, we shall analyse Saudi Arabia as an Islamic nation and the role it plays in world politics. As already noted in chapters three and four, this Arab country is the home of one of the most puritanical forms of Islam. Finally, Arab Islamic solidarity, which has been one of the objectives of the Saudi elite for many years, has, as we shall see, far-reaching implications for international politics.

Developments Leading to Nationhood

A) The Bedouin and the Ikhwan

Prior to 1902 the populace of Arabia consisted of autonomous nomadic Bedouin tribes, a number of villages and towns of varying degrees of independence, and the two holy cities under Ottoman rule. Tribal warfare was common. The Bedouin lived by the law of the desert and the desert is a harsh master. T.E. Lawrence (1940:38-9), describes the character of the Bedouin this way:

"The Bedouin of the desert, born and grown up in it, had embraced with all his soul this nakedness too harsh for volunteers, for the reason, felt but inarticulated, that there he found himself indubitably free. He lost material ties, comforts, all superfluities and other complications to achieve a personal liberty which haunted starvation and death. He saw no virtue in poverty herself: he enjoyed the little vices and luxuries--coffee, fresh water, women--which he could still preserve. ...The Bedouin could not look for God within him: he was too sure that he was within God."

In this passage Lawrence gives a good description of the character and nature of the Bedouin. It is necessary to understand this character for, under Ibn Saud's leadership, the nation of Saudi Arabia emerged with the assistance and, to some extent, the transformation of the character of these people. "The first thirty years of his leadership were a time of constant warfare and military engagement, and it was these years that made Ibn Saud a legend." (Bill & Leiden 1974:131)

His great skill as a desert fighter, combined with his faith in Wahhabism was to make him a leader among leaders.

Philby (1955:260-62), makes the point that the idea of a Wahhabi revival "...had for some time been germinating in Ibn Saud's mind as an important instrument of policy". This revival caught hold among Bedouins and soon became known as the Ikhwan movement, mentioned earlier in this thesis. His "...brotherhood of all men who accepted the new order, regardless of their tribal affiliations and social status, canonized the warlike propensities of the Arabs in the service of God and his representative on earth". (Philby 1955:263) The Ikhwan became a powerful force and ready army at the command of Ibn Saud. However, loyal though the Ikhwan were at the beginning, they were later to become a major problem for Ibn Saud. Problems arose when "Many devoted themselves to learning to read and write and to memorizing parts of the Koran and the Haddith". (Wahba 1964:126) This new learning coupled with a change in life style gave the Ikhwan new courage. They began to reject the Bedouin who had not joined the movement and regarded them as still living in the "Days of Ignorance or Jahiliya". (Wahba 1964:126) As time passed they even began to turn against Ibn Saud because of his attitude towards infidels, clothing and many other matters which they felt were in conflict with what they had learned. In 1925 at a conference of the Ikhwan problems were discussed:

"...what to do with the Shi'a sect in Hasa and Qatif, and had freely criticized the King on the following grounds. He had sent his son Saud to Egypt, which they considered a land of 'infidels'. He had sent his son Faisal to London, even worse. He had employed motor transport, telegraphs and telephones. He had levied

taxes in the Hejaz and Nejd. He had allowed tribes from Iraq and Transjordan to pasture their herds in 'True Moslem' territory. He had prohibited commerce with Kuwait, when, in the Ikhwan's view, he should either have declared war on it as an 'infidel' country or not boycott it at all." (Wahba 1964:134)

These were burning issues with the Ikhwan and in the next several years they increased their push to keep their faith pure. By 1929, strong actions had to be taken by Ibn Saud to bring the Ikhwan under control. There were still problems facing the House of Saud before nationhood could be attained, one of which was the turmoil in the Hejaz.

B) The Challenge of the Sharif of Mecca

Although Ibn Saud had built a strong position for himself in most of Arabia, he could not, however, bring under control the territory of Hejaz which was occupied by Sharif Hussein Ibn Ali of Mecca. That the Sharif of Mecca was selfproclaimed King of the Arabs, backed by the British and working closely with the famous T.E. Lawrence, meant that Ibn Saud was not the leader of all Arabia.

There were problems in the Hejaz under the rule of the Sharif. The people were not happy with his leadership and requested that he step down and let his son Ali take over. Hussein did not want to give the leadership over to his son. However, he was replaced by his son.

"Following his investiture as constitutional King of the Hejaz, King Ali left Jeddah for Mecca, where he was to be assisted by a provisional body of controllers to monitor the work of the Government. At the same time, King Hussein left Mecca for Jeddah where he shut himself

up for six days, refusing to see anyone. Before sailing for Agaba he sent a telegram, not to his son King Ali, but to "His Excellency the Chief Controller of the Hashemite Arab Government" protesting against a constitutional Government because "constitutional Government, particularly in the two Holy Cities, means rejection of the terms of the Book of God and the Tradition of His Prophet." (Assah 1969:46)

In an attempt to sort out this problem of rule in the Hejaz, the first Moslem Conference was called. It in fact did not occur until after Ibn Saud had taken over the Hejaz with the help of the Ikhwan. Finally, when the conference was held, as Wahba says it was not a success because all those who came were in agreement that there was a need to improve the conditions in Mecca for the sake of those who lived there and those who came on pilgrimages. "The attention of those who came to the conference from abroad, however, was more on politics than on religion, and although they agreed that the Moslem world needed reform and that it was the duty of Mecca, as the seat of Moslem legislation, to give the lead, they insisted that as the world had changed completely in thirteen centuries, the most pressing need was for a movement to bring all Moslems together to consolidate their efforts towards gradual progress." (Wahba 1964:157) Those who attended the conference did not represent all of the Moslem world and the suggested programs were premature and even financing for those programs was not available. During all of this the British remained impartial but kept an eye on what was going on.

"On December 23rd, ibn Sa'ad entered Jeddah and two days later announced officially that the Najd-Hedjaz War was ended. On January 8th, 1926, the notables of the Hedjaz pledged allegiance to ibn Sa'ad and proclaimed him King

of the Hedjaz and Sultan of Najd and its Dependencies. Within the next three months, he was recognized by Great Britain, the USSR, France and the Netherlands, the chief non-Moslem powers who ruled Islamic peoples." (Troeller 1976:231)

C) The Legitimacy of the House of Saud

After the capture of the Hejaz, Ibn Saud became the ruler of Arabia. His leadership combined with the puritanical Wahhabi influence of Islam had laid the foundations of the form of government and ideological basis of the new country. His legitimacy was founded in the teachings of Islam.

"Inasmuch as the legitimacy of an Islamic state arises from the people's voluntary agreement on a particular ideology and is, moreover, conditional upon their consent to the manner in which the state is administered, one might be tempted to say that "sovereignty rests with the people"; but inasmuch as in a consciously Islamic society the people's consent to a particular method of government and a particular scheme of sociopolitical cooperation is but a result of their having accepted Islam as a Divine Ordinance, there can be no question of their being endowed with sovereignty in their own right." (Asad 1961:38)

God is all important to the Muslims, and through the teachings in the Qur'an it is incumbent upon each individual to practice his faith in accordance with God's laws.

Therefore, loyalty is first to God, through Islam, secondly to the family, and finally to the tribe. To the Arab of Arabia the concept of loyalty to a state with distinct boundaries, and a more centralized form of government did not exist. As a direct result of Muhammad's teachings, "...religion replaced kinship as the ultimate basis of corporate identity and loyalty; it either supplanted or sanctified custom as the law of the community".

(Schact, Bosworth 1974:158) The foundations of a religious ideology were already in place by the time Ibn Saud began his goal of consolidation of the Bedouin tribes. Ibn Saud, through his conquests, marriages, and the work of his Wahhab missionaries became the Imam of his people, the leader of the faithful.

Without the aid of the Bedouin and specifically the Ikhwan Ibn Saud would never have risen to be the powerful leader that he was. His initial dream was that of a larger political unit instead of the loosely connected Bedouin tribes. "With the conquest of the Hejaz he had unified the greater part of the Arabian Peninsula and laid the foundation for present day Sa'udi Arabia." (Troeller 1976:236) At this time, the mid 1920's, his newly conquered land faced many problems at the social and economic level.

The first of these was the lack of funds to carry out any major reforms. As has already been noted, the main source of revenue was from taxes on the pilgrims to Mecca. There was also the problem of the safety of the pilgrims. Furthermore, Ibn Saud wanted to stop prostitution, alcoholism, and smoking. Secondly, after his consolidation of the Bedouins and the conquest of the Hejaz it was much harder for Ibn Saud to administer the affairs of state. He had already developed a close relationship with H. St. John Philby, who became a Muslim, and acted as an aide in many matters. Troeller (1974:237) notes the addition of advisors who were not from Arabia.

"...his original advisers had been with him for at least a few years...In 1928, Faud Hamza, a Palestinian, took charge of the Sa'udi Foreign Office. In 1929, Abdullah Sulaiman, a Najdi, became head of the Treasury. In 1930 Hafez Wahba, an Egyptian, became Sa'udi representative and later ambassador to London. Yusif Yasin, a Syrian, was appointed Political Secretary and later became Minister of State. In these early years ibn Sa'ud wisely refrained from appointing members of his own family to important administrative posts until they were more prepared to assume these responsibilities."

Most of these people were in Ibn Saud's government until he died in 1953.

This period of challenge and change was important in that consolidation of the peninsula took place. Also, Ibn Saud recognized that he could no longer rule without the aid of others and was wise enough to incorporate the aid of foreigners who could lay the foundations of a governmental infrastructure which was less traditional and more bureaucratic. This occurred out of necessity. Bill and Leiden, in their book, THE MIDDLE EAST POLITICS AND POWER, are wide of the mark when they say that Ibn Saud "...did not concern himself with increased political participation and institutionalization".

Political participation and institutionalization were concepts to which the Arabs of the time could not have related even if there had been educators available to inform them. They recognized themselves to be the subjects of a strong, devout king. They valued this and fully made use of his accessibility at open majlis. They saw him participate, as an ordinary believer in an honoured position of trust, in religious activities. But they would no more have felt themselves to have the right to participate in formulating government policy than

they would have allowed their daughters to select their own husbands. That degree of personal sophistication could come only in the help of widespread education, the absorption of the concept of state or nation, and the transition of self-image as a political entity from subject to citizen, a transition which has not yet fully been achieved even after fifty years. Forcing the pace of that change, making the unsophisticated and uneducated become involved in political affairs of which they have, at best, a hazy understanding, opens a nation to the dangers of demagoguery and mob-rule, rather than advancing the cause of democracy. Can one, then, fault a wise traditional leader because he has failed (or chosen not) to institute greater political participation within his lifetime?

Palmer (1973:31), in writing of the Dilemmas of Political Development, argues that:

"Traditional elite, for example, benefit from the existence of minimal demand and expectation levels. They further benefit from the integrated, self-regulating aspects of traditional societies...There are no labor unions, firms, political parties, and similar groups to teach individuals conflicting myths, values, or ideas or to provide rallying points for oppositions."

The question must be raised--are traditional elite really different from their counterparts in secular countries? Do elite, everywhere, not try to hold on to their power, wealth and status, and maintain control over those whom they rule and by whatever means necessary? What differs is the approach to the interaction of citizen and state between the developed and developing countries. "The fundamental framework of non-Western

politics is a communal one, and all political behavior is strongly colored by considerations of communal identification." (Pye 1958:469)

The Initial Stages of Political Development

A) Conceptual Problems in Theoretical Analysis

The various concepts of political development mostly presuppose that a developing society has, as part of its goals, the intent of becoming a western style parliamentary democracy. Since modern Western societies have been the trend setters in development and technology, there is unavoidably a strong link between modernization, whenever undertaken by a developing country, and westernization. However, this westernization is generally mixed with strong traditional elements which cause developing countries to become neither western nor traditional. So the final outcome of the development process cannot be presumed to be "western". An Arab economist strongly makes the point that "...many radical social thinkers have acquired resistance to 'modernization', particularly inasmuch as it has come to be understood as a way of life and of doing things by 'superior', Western societies which other societies are urged to emulate". (Sayigh 1978:15)

If what is being measured is the success of how well developing countries can emulate western societies then it becomes easy to note infrastructural changes that resemble the

west. However, if analysis seeks to note the relationship between change related directly to the cultural, social, and economic position of a developing country, then what is required is a different approach, one that aids in understanding the society and its leadership and the goals that it sets forth for itself.

B) Introduction of Modern Technology and the Traditional Elite

While seeking to introduce more modern methods for his country, Ibn Saud made every effort to hold close to the puritan teachings of Muhammad. Many of the new methods were met with suspicion and opposition by the Bedouins and the Ulema. The Ulema, who form part of the traditional elite, had to be consulted by Ibn Saud before the adoption of new techniques was allowed. These religious scholars would study the Qur'an to ascertain if there were any statements in the Holy Writ that could be interpreted to relate to the particular thing proposed, and if so, whether it could be regarded as the work of the Devil. No matter how innovative this traditional leader was he had to defer on these questions to the Ulema. Many examples of this are to be found in the observation on this period of rule by Ibn Saud.

"Things move slowly in the Middle East, but Ibn Saud ...prepared by one means or another to push worthwhile projects over the objections of his more conservative advisers. ...His elder advisers objected to the innovation by saying that a radio must be the work of the Devil to carry words through the air. Nothing daunted, the King assembled his wise men and had them

listen to a reading of the Koran over the radio. This satisfied them because their religion expressly stated that the Devil cannot pronounce or transmit the Holy Words of the Koran, no matter what the method or the means." (Sanger 1947:181)

This problem of accepting modern methods and technology still can be found in Saudi Arabia, in 1981.

"Out in the Saudi Arabian wilderness, nomads still live the traditional life. But these days a four-wheel-drive is likely to be parked next to their camels and goats. Encountering a Westerner for the first time recently, one family proudly displayed its new Toyota--and at night solicitously laid out food for it." (Baird 1981:19)

It takes a long time for change to be accepted and internalized by those who have held close to tradition. Modern methods of communications and transportation were at first viewed as containing the soul of the Devil. Although Ibn Saud was able to see the need for change he could move no faster than his people would allow as a result of their combined traditional lifestyle and religious ideology. "Because of the isolation of the peninsula from the outside world, the social structure and mode of living of the people changed little over the centuries until the discovery of oil in the peninsula in the 1930's." (Walpole et al. 1971:3)

Until the discovery of oil Ibn Saud's attempts at economic development were hindered by two factors, the role of the Islamic scholars, as already mentioned, and the lack of funds needed in order to embark upon major programs. However small were his efforts to settle the Bedouin in 1912, and to get them to learn to farm, in the Ikhwan settlements, it was a start on the long road to social and economic change.

C) Saudi Arabia Becomes a Kingdom

The years leading up to the proclamation of a Kingdom in 1932, were not easy for Ibn Saud. His goal was to unify and consolidate Arabia into a single political unit. The ideology which gave a cohesion and purpose to its different components was Islam. Ibn Saud's key to leadership and power lay in his revival of the puritanical Islam of Wahhabism mentioned earlier. But, with his leadership and power, and the proclamation of a Kingdom, had he created, by 1932, a nation state as understood and accepted by western political science?

From the philosophic standpoint, Harold J. Laski, (1935:21), in his analysis of The State in Theory and Practice, says, "...a society is a state when the way of life to which both individuals and associations must conform is defined by a coercive authority binding upon them all". The key terms here are the words "must conform" and "a coercive authority". This process of having to conform is developed within a society by a number of means. In the case of Saudi Arabia Ibn Saud had drawn his people together through conquest and marriage and those who did not conform were handled either militarily or by social and religious sanctions, including the operation of the Shari'a courts. Laski provides the researcher with one definition of a state that, however philosophic, relates to reality.

On the other hand Pye (1966:37-38) in his collection of concepts of political development, refers to political

development as the operation of a nation state. Here the level of political organization is related to the modern nation state. It is clear that in order for international trade and diplomatic relations to be possible there must exist a stable governmental system which can handle the affairs of the state, particularly, to make and honour long term agreements. However, the idea that is proposed later in Pye's comments, on this subject, that nation states become so only by "international courtesy" (Pye 1966:37), implies that if the international community does not like what is taking place, in terms of political development or otherwise, then attempts may be made to remove the privilege of being recognized. How well political and economic development occur is linked by Pye to the development of nationalism among the people. The existence of nationalism, however, does not always contribute to political development. The opposite may well happen if narcissistic nationalism becomes a strong factor in the society's self-perception. Such a discussion does not deny that nationalism can play a positive role in political development, for a nationalistic feeling can bind a society together in working towards a common goal.

These ideas, when considered in the context of Saudi Arabia, do not fit well for a number of reasons. Its society consisted of loosely linked tribal groups whose loyalty was not to a nation but to God, the family and then the tribe. Even after consolidation these tribal attitudes continued. Also, there are a number of tribes whose nomadic territories crossed

national boundaries, for example the Shammar who wander between Saudi Arabia and Iraq. To which nation would they give their allegiance? It takes time for the members of a society that is developing to internalize the idea of a central government which maintains controls over their lives. This government in effect replaces, eventually, the previous ties to the family in terms of needs and social controls. For some members of the traditional society (usually the young) the transition appears to have occurred quickly but the old social controls through the family and the tribe continue to exist. Finally, while it may be recognized that religious nationalism exists in Saudi Arabia it must be noted that when the west refers to the King of Saudi Arabia, to his people he is the Imam and his role is both secular and religious.

D) Government Expansion

Power remained centralized in the hands of Ibn Saud for the early part of his rule. After the 1930's and the new role Ibn Saud began to play in world affairs it became necessary for him to delegate some of his authority, and he sought advice from foreigners who had the necessary expertise. While he obtained the assistance of these experts it must be remembered that the elite, the royal family and Ulema particularly, as well as Ibn Saud himself, wished to keep out western influence so that puritanical Islam would continue to prevail. "Since the Muslim community was sound spiritually, morally and socially and was

weak only economically, it must borrow from the West only its economic techniques and must guard itself generally from the socio-moral evil of the modern West, with the exception of modern education--more particularly technological education--and the West's attitude to work." (Rahman 1970:319) This was the idealism of Ibn Saud and as he was later to realize he could not stop the economic changes from changing society and the new expectations which came with new technology.

The influence of change is perhaps best reflected in the changing structure of government. However sound spiritually and morally the Muslim community and its leaders were, the pressure of change began to force Ibn Saud to delegate authority. Thus was formed the Council of Deputies, made up of trusted foreign advisors, and this was the prototype for the Council of Ministers developed later, first in the Hejaz, in 1931 with expansion to other areas afterwards. Most of Saudi Arabia's formal modern government structure began to emerge in the early 1930s.

With the discovery of oil in the late 1930s which began to change not only the economic structure of the Kingdom but also the social life of the country, Ibn Saud's role in international affairs grew. Diplomatic relations with many other countries began in this period. While he allowed foreign diplomats into Saudi Arabia it was some time later before Ibn Saud sent abroad diplomats to represent Saudi Arabia. Negotiations were necessary with Aramco and Ibn Saud took part in the founding of the United

Nations in June 26, 1945. He had recognized that the iron of the west, a term used for industrialization and technology, could not be borrowed without changing the structure of the fabric of society and government as well.

Under Ibn Saud's rule education, roads, telecommunications, medical services, cars, etc were introduced. His rule laid the foundations for later changes which were to cause problems for his son Saud when he became King in 1953. In Ibn Saud's later years he recognized the need and developed a Council of Ministers whose members could take on more responsibilities than its predecessor the Council of Deputies.

A New Role in International Politics

"Shortly before his death in November 1953, King Ibn Saud ordered that a Council of Ministers be formed to divide the responsibilities in the governing of his rapidly developing state." (Twitchell 1958:177) By 1957, nine ministries were formed and five advisors were appointed. These ministries were, The Prime Minister, who acted as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Communication, Education, Agriculture, Health, Commerce & Industry, Interior, Defence and Aviation. These posts were held by members of the royal family and a few important Saudis. The establishment of the Council of Ministers marks the beginning of a bureaucracy that has grown in size and complexity to this date. As the burdens of government have become more complex additional ministries have been formed.

The development of first the Council of Deputies and later the Council of Ministers indicates several important points that should be noted. Ibn Saud was able, in spite of being a traditional leader, to see the need for change. Also, in an effort to bring about that change, he sought the advice and help of those who were qualified to do the job--although these advisors he first relied upon were not Saudis. He delegated administrative responsibilities using a Western concept of ministers responsible to him. Furthermore, Ibn Saud was an astute politician in dealing with the west.

"At the outbreak of World War II, Ibn Saud adopted a policy of neutrality...The king's friendly neutrality was by no means a negligible asset to the Allies, especially to Great Britain. Had he succumbed like some Arab extremists to pro-Axis temptations, he might have preached a holy war on the West. Such a call coming from the guardian of the holy places might have caused much embarrassment to the British, both in the Middle East and in India. ...The most significant political development affecting Saudi Arabia in wartime was, however, the growth of close cooperation with the United States." (Lenczowski 1980:580)

Despite his position of neutrality, Ibn Saud had to seek financial aid since the War limited the tax income from pilgrims to Mecca. His aid came from the United States, via Great Britain, and this marks the beginning of a new and closer relationship in the long friendship between the two countries.

This friendship had begun long before the war, and before the discovery of major oil reserves. Once it had become apparent that Ibn Saud had effective control over the peninsula the United States had recognized the desirability of a friendly relationship with his regime, and had taken steps to encourage

such a relationship. With the development of the oil reserves by American companies, and in view of the United States position as industrial and technological leader in the world, the links were strengthened by initiatives from the Saudis. Ibn Saud recognized the growing importance of the United States as a world leader, and sought to impress upon his good friend, President Roosevelt, the need to settle the Palestinian problem in a way which was fair to its indigenous people.¹

Another step towards political development more suited to modern times was the development of the Board of Grievances. This was established May 10, 1955 by Saudi Royal Decree. This Board of Grievances' chief duty is dealing more with administrative matters than with grievances of the citizen. It is through this board that matters were dealt with concerning commerce and industry. David E. Long, in his article on the board, notes what functions it was to perform.

"...The decree gives the Board wide jurisdiction over complaints involving government administration. ...the Board has been given appellate jurisdiction over certain administrative decisions of the Minister of Commerce concerning the investment of foreign capital. ...a) Execution of Certain Foreign Judgements ...b) cases under the Anti-Bribery Decree ...c) cases under the Israel Boycott Law." (Long 1973:73-74)

This board is an important addition to the running of affairs in Saudi Arabia. Although concerning itself with secular matters it

¹ For details of the growth of this relationship, see the series "Documents in the History of Saudi Arabia", edited by Ibrahim al-Rashid, in five volumes published in 1976 and 1980 by Documentary Publications of Salisbury, N.C., U.S.A. This series draws particularly on U.S. government documents, now declassified.

functions within the framework of the classical Islamic tradition.

To conclude this point, as we saw, change and progress in Saudi Arabia was started by Ibn Saud. Initially, he was able to take total control over the affairs of his new state but as time passed new pressures internally and externally made one man rule impossible.

The introduction of modern technology brings about changes that cannot be reversed. For example, the use of the car will not be voluntarily surrendered in favour of the camel; electricity which provides for light, radios, and refrigeration will not be willingly abandoned. Technology affects the social and psychological nature of mankind. A dependence develops upon the technology and as such the process is irreversible. Although Ibn Saud sought to carefully guard his puritanical religious beliefs the very introduction of western technology meant the influence would continue because technology without secular education would render useless the adoption of new methods.

Modern technology was introduced very early in Saudi development. This, coupled with the many political changes that occurred before the country became a full fledged nation-state in 1932, provided the foundation of modernizing this traditional society.

Development and the Traditional Elite

A) Traditional Elite and Power

This thesis has examined the changes that have occurred in Saudi Arabia since 1902, when Ibn Saud launched his military campaigns to unite Arabia. In order to examine the role of the elite in political development the time frame was broken down according to each king's rule. Structural and functional changes, relative to political development, have been identified throughout the thesis. Power had become centralized in the hands of the House of Saud, and that subsequently proved to be useful to the traditional elite.

"Power is a complex phenomenon. ... Suffice it to say that power is a relationship between or among individuals or groups 'such that the behavior of one actor(s) alters the behavior of another actor(s)', in an intended direction." (Tachau 1975:5)

Under the leadership of Ibn Saud changes were set in motion that were to affect the lives of the people as well as pose problems for his sons who succeeded him to the throne. With the increasing complexities of ruling a nation the traditional elite had to rely on outside expertise until members of their own society had gained enough education to assist in running the country.

The outside expertise included Palestinians, Lebanese, Jordanians, Syrians, and Egyptians. These people worked as teachers, clerks, and small merchants, providing services that were needed to carry forward the processes of change in

modernizing Saudi Arabia.

By 1953, Saudi Arabia was generating sufficient revenues from oil production, consequently, it was able to implement major development projects, hiring major western consultants and engineers and bringing in the most modern equipment and tools. Saud's son Saud was not a strong leader and there developed many problems during his rule. "The powers of the King are not defined but practically are limited by the fact that he must retain a consensus of the Saudi royal family, the religious leaders Ulema, the chiefs of the important tribes, the armed forces, and the bureaucracy." (Nyrop et al. 1977:2) Saud's incompetence as a ruler led to pressures from these factions of the elite structure on the royal family that led to the granting of extended powers to Faisal in 1958 and to Saud's forced abdication in Faisal's favour in 1964. This change of leadership showed that power could change hands and not cause a civil war, a sign of strength of public support for the regime and strength and stability of the new nation's institutions not yet achieved by some older nations, such as those of Latin America.

Faisal, unlike his brother Saud, had progressive ideas about change and how to bring it about. For example, Faisal saw the necessity of having his sons educated in secular schools and universities in Europe or America, while Saud had his sons educated in Riyadh in the traditional manner. Faisal also gave more independence and authority to the new body of foreign educated Saudi technocrats.

"During Faisal's ten-year reign commoners like Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani, Minister of Petroleum, Abdel Hadi Taner, Chief of the government-owned oil company, Petromin, and Hashem Nazer, head of the Saudi Central Planning Organization, rose to unprecedented positions of power. Not only were inept royal family members barred from decision making roles, but royal family allowances were cut." (Bird 1980:12)

Faisal's ten point program was also innovative. Slavery had existed in Arabia since before the time of the Prophet, and it was abolished by King Faisal. Also, during his rule the bureaucracy increased and with regard to

"...the delegation of authority--Faisal has gone far beyond his brother and father who preceded him. ...There are others who can be trusted to carry out work once it has been well begun." (Sheean 1970:3)

This delegation of authority marks the beginning of the development of a sub elite group working with the traditional elite to implement new policy.

B) Conflict Between Tradition and Modernization

The major source of conflict in developing countries is centered in the traditional and modern ways of doing things. The process of modernization in itself is not the main problem. The central problem is that Westernization penetrates the very social fabric of the society along with modernization. Modernization places stress on the family, on religious beliefs, on social interaction, and on the whole way of life.

The traditional elites in Saudi Arabia have done much to bring about a modern life style for Saudi citizens. Shils, speaking on "The Will To Be Modern", makes a number of bold

statements concerning the attitudes of elite.

"To be modern an elite, as the elite of the new states see it, must not fear change; on the contrary, it must strive to bring it about. It does not wish to remain as it is. It is against the ancient regime; even where it affirms the past of the country, it stresses its adaptability to the needs of the present. ...The elite pride themselves on their dynamism and they claim that the mass of the population demands it of them." (Shils 1968:7)

It can be argued that some new states may fit Shil's description, but the "mass of population" are still suffering from a form of modern culture shock. Also, only recently has there been a mass population gathering in urbanized centres of many developing countries. In the case of Saudi Arabia, with the bulk of its population deeply rooted in Bedouin nomadic roots, there still exist large numbers of Bedouin who prefer to pitch their tents up outside the cities. When they are finished with whatever they came to the city for they leave for the desert again. Although striving to bring about change the Saudi elite, the royal family, and the ministers in government, cannot reject the value premises of ancient regime or go against Wahhabism. An example of this appears in a recent article in Fortune, where it is reported that:

"The government supports the kingdom's religious activities with regular allocations from the budget, and has a special ministry for spiritual affairs. Nonetheless, the ulama represents an independent force in Saudi society that rules with, not for, the royal family. In fact, in extreme cases concerning personal behavior the ulama can censure the royal family. In 1964, it declared King Saud unfit to rule because of his wanton corruption, and he was replaced by Faisal." (Tinnin 1980:49-50)

As much as the government and the royal family want to push for

rapid change, that change will only take place with the advice and consent of the Ulema. Conflict between tradition and modernization will, therefore, continue in Saudi Arabia. The question remains:

"Can the Saudis meet the challenges and opportunities now facing them as a nation over the course of the next 20 years up to the year 2000? Even more importantly, can the Saudi people finish their fourteenth century, which starts in the Christian year 1980, in better shape than when they entered it? Whatever the answer, either for good or for bad, Saudi Arabia may well be a model for the rest of the Middle East and even for the rest of the world." (Crane 1978:5-6)

C) Education as a Key Factor in Political Development

Ibn Saud recognized that the education of his people was important. Education in the western sense of the word takes time especially since "...there was almost universal illiteracy throughout the Peninsula". (Wahba 1964:47) The first two schools were opened in Mecca and Jedda in 1908. Wahba reports that Ibn Saud had many problems with the Ulema over education. From a non-Islamic education, the Ulema feared, all kinds of evils would descend on society. Their objections are listed by Wahba

"Drawing, for instance, is the same as painting, which is unquestionably prohibited. Languages are a means of learning the religious opinions of unbelievers and their ungodly sciences, with all the consequent evil effects on the beliefs and morals of our children." (Wahba 1964:49-50)

These are two of the many objections of the Ulema. It took time to get the Ulema to see the need for any education other than the traditional religious schooling given through the home and

the mosques.

Education is a key factor because it "...is a means of arousing awareness of modern goals and hence of raising aspirations within a society". (Finkle & Gable 1966:597) When people obtain more knowledge they are better able to adjust to new technology and methods of health care, and they develop a world view instead of a tribal view limited by area and education gained through the family.

The dangers that lie in education are that those members of the developing society who are able to attain higher degrees abroad will form a new class. This new class can turn from a supportive sub elite to a counter elite if their goals and expectations are not met. However, this does not appear yet to be happening. The only real challenge to the established government came, in the early 1960's, from traditionally educated princes and not secularly educated commoners.

D) Role in World Politics

This thesis has already emphasized the important ideological role of Islam and its inseparable link with politics. Although there exist different sects within Islam, such as the Sunni, the Shia, and the Ismaili, Mecca is the earthly focus of prayer. As head of the government of the state within whose territories lie the cities of Mecca and Medina, the King of Saudi Arabia is viewed by the Umma of Islam as "Guardian of the Holy Cities", and by virtue of this position of trust

holds especial influence throughout the Islamic world.

In addition to its role in international politics among the Islamic nations and the Third World, as an exemplar, aid given, and a voice of moderation, Saudi Arabia has another, very different, role among the industrialized, oil-using, nations.

According to Adam Smith (1981:221)

"The Kingdom, in terms of oil, is roughly one-third of OPEC. Together with its neighbours, and in-laws up and down the coast of the Gulf, it is one-half of OPEC. Unlike the other half of OPEC, this half does not need all the money it can earn from oil. Venezuela, Algeria, and Indonesia need all the money they can get. The Kingdom does not. So its decisions are not economic, they are political."

Saudi Arabia earns so large a surplus from oil sales, a surplus beyond the billions of dollars it is spending on its own development, and as aid to developing Islamic and other Third World nations. Such a spending potential can threaten the stability of the industrialized world's banking and financial systems. Through such a potential, moreover, it has the power to influence changes in other countries' foreign policy. In 1973 the organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) embargoed oil shipments to nations supporting Israel, because of the occupation of the West Bank area of Jordan. Both the limitations on oil production and the financial power will be used again. Saudi Arabia is a conservative society and needs stability, both internally and on its borders. It is also considered to be moderate in its views on Middle Eastern problems. Its sizeable Shi'a minority, concentrated as it is in the Eastern Province near the oilfields, has been affected by

the rise to power of the Ayatollah Ruhullah Khomeini. The war between Iran and Iraq perpetuates a climate of turmoil which influences the kingdom's internal stability at the source of its wealth. With its high population of Palestinian workers, the lack of a Palestinian homeland and the continuing wars and terrorist activity is another disturbing influence. At the Third Islamic Conference, hosted by Saudi Arabia and held at Mecca and Taif in January 1981, a number of resolutions were passed. With regard to the Iran-Iraq conflict,

The conference announced that an Islamic force will implement the ceasefire if necessary, in accordance with the recommendations of the Conciliation Committee." (Saudi Gazette, Jan 31, 1981:1)

"...In one of its most important political resolutions, the Summit decided on a basic action programme to confront the Zionist enemy. It resolved to liberate Arab Jerusalem and make it the capital of the Palestinian state and called on the nations of the world to respect the U.N. resolutions which bars dealings with Israeli occupation authorities.

The Summit also decided to use all the economic potentialities and natural resources of Islamic nations for weakening the Israeli economy. It also decided to work for changing the international political thinking in favour of the Palestinians and in support of the P.L.O.

...IT PROHIBITED ARAB AND ISLAMIC NATIONS FROM MAKING separate or individual deals over the issue of Palestine and other occupied territories." (Saudi Gazette, January 31, 1981:1)

Saudi Arabia's rulers recognize the domestic pressure for democratic forms, and the potential for revolution on a basis similar to that which overthrew the King of Iraq in 1958 or that which overthrew the Shah of Iran in 1978-1979. So long as there is conflict among its neighbours, revolutionary rhetoric being broadcast from across the Gulf, Palestinian refugees fighting

for the return to their homes and implicitly blaming the neighbouring Arab states for not carrying a Jihad² against the imperialist Zionists, there will be a mood of expectation of radical political change among the peoples of the Middle East. Such a mood carries a potential threat against Saudi Arabia's ruling elite. So it is politically imperative for the Kingdom to use its influence in international politics to try to calm or resolve these problems which, directly or indirectly, threaten its own political stability.

From the time when the Kingdom first found itself able to participate in international politics, it has done so, aligning itself on the side of peace, stability, and justice. It was a founding member of the United Nations Organization. It opposed the foundation of Israel, feeling that justice lay in reparations and guarantees of security for Jews in their European homelands rather than in displacing the peoples of Palestine. But it has recently, and in an indirect manner, accepted the right of Israel to exist, within the boundaries set by the U.N. resolution, and now works for the establishment of a Palestinian state and the freedom of Jerusalem from Israeli control. While the Arab League was an effective international organization it was actively involved in Arab causes. Since the decline of the League and of pan-Arabism, Saudi Arabia has

² Jihad: Usually used to mean "Holy War", but literally meaning "striving"

promoted the foundation of the Islamic Conference Organization,³ (I.C.O.) which is increasingly showing its potential as the voice of the Islamic world.

Islamic solidarity is important to Saudi Arabia both ideologically and pragmatically. A tenet of the Muslim faith is the idea that all Muslims are part of one community and, since Islam is a political ideology as well as a religion, that community is, or should function for its members, as a united political force. Since Muslims comprise, by I.C.O. claim, about one-fifth of the world's population, the achievement of such unity, even on a few key matters, would create a major international power bloc offsetting the communist and western blocs. Pragmatically, Islamic solidarity magnifies Saudi Arabia's influence in the world, because of its financial muscle together with its leading and influential role within a community of Islamic states.

Saudi Arabia also has the potential to serve as a communication bridge between the Third and Islamic worlds and the West. In referring to the economic relationship between the country and the west, Adam Smith says:

"Some lucky factors, for the West, were operating in Saudi Arabia. Because the Wahabis who rule the Kingdom are so fanatically opposed to communism, they sought out the West. Because ARAMCO was relatively enlightened, it did not generate ill will as times changed. Because the United States was never a physical presence in Saudi society--as, say, the French were in Algeria--a "special relationship" could flower.

³ In the appendix to this thesis there is a table of the members of the I.C.O. as at January, 1981.

But we can't take these factors for granted. Libya's Qaddafi is an ascetic Muslim, and after he deposed a religious king, he called the Russians. The Soviet presence in Muslim Iraq has been pronounced. The Ayatollah Khomeini's fundamentalism in Iran has caused us great discomfort. What will the Saudis do?" (Smith 1981:225)

It seems apparent that Saudi Arabia will remain friendly to the West, and as accommodating as it can be in its oil policy. Much of its wealth is in American dollars in the banks of the West. But that wealth is power, which it will use to preserve or increase its power, by employing it for political pressure on the West and by buying support and friendship by aid programs among the developing nations of the world.

The royal family, the House of Saud, has clearly made efforts to bring about social and economic change in Saudi Arabia. The path to nationhood was not an easy one, nor is the path to modernization. Ibn Saud, although a traditional leader, laid the foundations for a stable and potentially modern state and with the continued leadership of his sons Faisal and Khalid holding fast to puritanical Islam. Saud, the second King, was not able to cope with the rapid changes taking place nor with his own power. The Ulema appear to provide a balance and check on the king and the royal family.

At the heart of Saudi Arabia's problem is the unfinished task of creating a modern state out a cluster of Bedouin tribes that were unified by Abdul-Aziz (Ibn Saud) under the present kingdom in 1932. The royal leadership is worried by the growing polarization of Saudi society; thousands of young Saudis return from the West every year with university degrees, only to chafe under a puritanical, semi-feudal system designed to appease the disparate desert tribes. 'When the graduates come back, they are given nice jobs with plenty of money,' remarks one educated Saudi. 'But how long they will remain happy

driving fancy cars and drinking whiskey at home, God only knows'." (Drozdiak 1980:25-26)

Although the royal family and the Ulema appear to provide a balance, the whole process of western education, western sciences and technology, travel and so on are producing a generation of Saudis who have been exposed to the liberal and democratic lifestyle of the West and may, in due course, seek to bring about such changes at home. The ruling elite are perhaps more accessible than are the politicians of the West. Members of the society may meet with the King or the Princes or members of the various ministries. In spite of all the steps the elite take to maintain stability there exist threats to its power internally and externally. The pressures of trying to catch up with the modern world are great.

It is necessary to educate people to new ways but more than that professionally trained Saudi's are needed in the shortest possible time. Education at a secular university, exposure to western living standards, creates conflict in the Saudi youth. In the West everything and anything is available, in Saudi Arabia the religious standards oppose alcohol, smoking, and many other western style sociabilities. Since the processes of modernization and international involvements have already begun, these will inevitably alter the drift of social and political direction and policy within the country.

With its genius for moderation, adaptation, and increasing willingness to try out new ideas, Saudi Arabia might set an example for her neighbours for change within the framework of

essential values in Islam. It remains to be seen as to how much of refinement it will be able to bring in Islamic values themselves so as to keep up with the pressures of modernization. In such a refinement the role of the new breed elite will be most crucial.

CHAPTER SIX

THE IMPACT OF MODERNIZATION ON THE TRADITIONAL ELITE IN SAUDI ARABIA, WITH A BRIEF COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF LEBANON AND EGYPT

The focus of this thesis has been an examination of the process of political development in Saudi Arabia by reference to the changing role of her elite. The human agents of social, economic, and political change form the political elites, and they are the agency through which external and inanimate factors are translated into new ideals, goals and policies. The nature of elite and its changing role also serves as an indicator of the effect of those changes in the society. Political Development has, in this thesis, been viewed as the changing or reshaping of governmental structures, systems, and institutions of a society in order to better serve the perceived needs and goals of that society. Study of the role of elite, therefore, is an effective way of understanding the political development of the country.

In previous chapters emphasis was placed on the traditional elite, particularly the kings, with a view to understanding the kind of administrative changes brought about by them. That study has provided a foundation which permits a closer analysis of the evolution of the elite structure within the Kingdom. Over the years power has remained centralized within the royal family, but the demands of government have become complex beyond the

capacity of one small and traditionally-oriented family group.¹ Consequently, it made it necessary for the rulers to delegate responsibilities, originally to non-Saudi Arabs and, later on, to Saudis who had gained modern education and through it an understanding of modern technology. Such educated Saudis were recruited as civil servants. These civil servants form a sub-elite and the theoretical considerations previously noted indicate that a sub-elite always has the potential for deviating from established policies and becoming a source of a counter-elite. There are two striking examples of young Saudis, one from the royal household and the other from outside, who because of their modern education and assimilation of external influences, challenged the status quo. Those challenges were seen as threats to the stability of the government. The forms of their dissent and the responses of the rulers are discussed later in this chapter.

Review of contemporary sources, such as the recent books by Lacey, The Kingdom, and Holden and Johns, The House of Saud, and the current edition of Who's Who in the Arab World, reveals that control by the royal family, despite the expansion of the civil service, is continuing. Who's Who, for instance has many entries

¹ The Al-Saud are estimated to presently comprise some 4,000 adult males. In the 1930s they were over 1,000 adult male members. Such a number, by any definition, is a sizable group. However, many eliminate themselves from government by opting for business, trade, scholarship or other activities. Some eliminate themselves for the lack of political aptitude. Thus, those of the royal house who are active politically may be considered to be a small group.

of Saudi natives with secular and technological education. They received their education both abroad and in the Kingdom's own new universities. Many graduates of her universities now hold positions of responsibility in the civil service. The key ministries and governorships, however, remain in the hands of the Al-Saud and related tribes.

The political development of Saudi Arabia has been described in this thesis as being distinctive and unique. In the second section of this chapter a comparison is made with the political elite development of Lebanon and Egypt. These two neighbouring Arab countries have religious and cultural similarities with Saudi Arabia, and those similarities would suggest that the patterns of elite development in the three countries would follow similar paths. However, so far they have not, and the reasons for those differences will be examined in this section, which will also help to draw out the finer points of the development of the Saudi elite.

Phases in the Growth of the Saudi Elite

Saudi Arabia is one of the few examples of a country which has not been directly affected by conquest. (As will be noted later in this chapter the influences of conquest have an effect on the pattern of elite development.) To a large degree the political elites of Saudi Arabia have maintained a "closed door" policy to outsiders to protect and preserve their society and religion from unwanted outside influences. Since the 1960s the

"closed door" policy has gradually been giving way to the pressures of modern education and economic development. The consequences of her earlier isolation was that Saudi Arabia built her governmental institutions on traditional lines, with departures from being forced on her by economic and political, rather than ideological, considerations. (As previously noted, the traditional tribal ruling structure embodied the principles of the native ideology, Wahhabi Islam.) Thus the role of the political elite in Saudi Arabia may be seen to have changed in response to such economic or world-political factors, resulting in identifiable phases in the progression and development of her elites.

This section is divided into three phases which have affected the role of the traditional elite. Phase I may be viewed as the "period of consolidation," beginning in 1902 until the mid-1930s. This phase laid the foundation for the direction and kind of political elite development that Saudi Arabia has since followed. The leadership provided by Ibn Saud was traditional; his approach was to develop strong personal ties with those around him. Bill & Leiden (1974:124) in their study, point to leadership as "... one of the most important considerations in determining the way in which societies respond to the challenge of change." The personal and informal method used by Ibn Saud still exists within the Saudi governmental system today. It is recognized, however, that it is becoming harder for the current political elite to maintain this

practice, because of the increasing complexity of even the Saudi government's functioning.

What were the major events or features of Ibn Saud's rule which were to affect the nature of the traditional elite? To begin with, the alliances established, by conquest or marriage, from 1902 until 1934 affected the attitudes of the peoples so co-opted. An important change that took place during this period was the need to gain the loyalties of the tribal leaders. They were now encouraged to look beyond the tribal community to Ibn Saud as leader and Imam, and he unmistakably demanded that loyalty from them. Therefore, the most important groups to the king, in those early stages, were the Sheikhs of leading (noble) and powerful (militarily) tribes. There were eight tribes whose co-operation and loyalty were of vital importance to Ibn Saud. These were: the Al-Shaykh, Sudayri, Ibn Jiluwi, Mutairi, Anaizi, Dawasiri, Al-Fahd, and Rashidi. (Tachau, 1975; Bill and Leiden, 1974).

Included in the influential groups, whose loyalties he had won during this phase, were the landowners in major cities and towns and the high Ulema. The role of the Ulema has always been important. They had the power to approve or reject new legislations and policies including modern education and technology. These religious leaders objected to many of Ibn Saud's new plans on the basis that they were not in line with the teachings of the Qu'ran. Sheikh Hafiz Wahba, in Arabian Days, (1964:53) makes it clear that, in Saudi Arabia, "... the

Ulema rank as equals with the Emirs, and have great influence among the population." He also points out that this religious elite does not react to issues on any cohesive basis. There are regional disparities among them, in their reactions to incidents and issues, and in their manner of dealing with them. The Ulema did not make life easy for Ibn Saud, but he did manage eventually to gain their co-operation.

The next group of note is the Ikhwan. The formation of the Ikhwan "... created a new military elite, while simultaneously reducing tribal strife and increasing agricultural output." (Edens 1974:55) They formed the first indigenous military force whose loyalty was solely to the ruler. The Ikhwan did, however, create problems for Ibn Saud. They later objected to some of his policies, particularly during the period 1926 to 1929. Three major Ikhwan leaders who were discontent with Ibn Saud's activities were Feisal al-Duwish of the Mutair tribe, Dhidan bin Hithlain of the Ajman tribe from the province of Al-Hasa, and Sultan bin Bijad bin Humaid, chief of the Utainbah. Holden and Johns (1981:91) reveal that

"By the beginning of 1927 this zealous trio was in a fever of discontent at Ibn Saud's continual retreat from the true path of piety in the Hejaz and their own inaction. In January, Ibn Saud was obliged to convoke a conference of some 3,000 Ikhwan in which the Ulema ruled on their grievances."

While the Ulema felt that some of the Ikhwan grievances were well founded they ruled that the issue of the Jihad (Holy War) remained at the discretion of the Imam, Ibn Saud. Holden and Johns report that today the name of al-Duwish seems to have

disappeared and these three are but memories of the past. However, the Ikhwan as a whole has not been forgotten.

However much Ibn Saud relied on the co-operation of the tribal sheiks, the Ulema, and the Ikhwan, political power always remained centralized. Where it was necessary Ibn Saud sought the aid of foreign advisers but, as time progressed and administrative matters became more complex, it became apparent that a more formal and impersonal administrative approach had to be adopted.

By 1931 it became necessary to establish a Council of Deputies to deal with the increasing complexities of running the state. Before long it was discovered that even this Council of Deputies was unable to cope with the increasing demands made on it. These demands arose as a result of the development of new institutions such as schools, hospitals, post offices, telecommunications systems and so on. This Council of Deputies was the prototype for the later Council of Ministers established in 1957.

The Aramco oil concession of 1933 had a great effect on the role of the traditional elite. Ibn Saud now found it necessary, in that same year, to establish a Ministry of Finance. This was set up primarily to cope with oil concessions and oil revenues. In fact it is worth noting that:

"The system of government had evolved in an ad hoc manner. It was a matter of people and their relationship to him. The 'Royal Cabinet' was an informal body which included Abdullah Suleiman, Saud bin Jiluwi, and Ibn Saud's advisers, of whom Yusuf Yassin and Khalid Ghargani were the most important in his later days."

(Holden and Johns 1981:159-60)

There is evidence (Tachau 1975:174) that Saud bin Jiluwi was part of the extended family of the Al-Saud. Then there were aides some of them from the neighbouring countries who rose to high positions. Yusuf Yassin was a Syrian Arab (Holden and Johns 1981:106) who was originally a teacher for Ibn Saud's family and quickly rose to become political secretary. Abdullah Suleiman was a Nejdî from a merchant family, who had gained the confidence of Ibn Saud. He was appointed Finance Minister in 1932 and played a major role in Saudi financial affairs until the 1950s. Khaled Ghargani was a Libyan who was one of Ibn Saud's closest advisors. These were the backgrounds of some of the men who were close to Ibn Saud and held trusted positions.

This first phase, a period of consolidation, remains essential to any discussion of the political development of Saudi Arabia. What needs to be emphasized is that, although changes in the nature of political and economic structure were occurring, power remained centered within the traditional elite group. However, the discovery of oil and its subsequent vital position in national and international economy had placed greater burdens on the traditional elite. The second phase, from the 1930s to the 1950s, may therefore be described as the age of oil. The discovery and subsequent development of the oil resources brought regular and, by former standards, greatly increased revenues to the royal treasury. No longer was Saudi Arabia totally isolated from the impact of the outside world, which came on two levels. Western businessmen, both opportunity

seekers and serious traders, became interested in Saudi Arabia to exploit its oil and to sell in return western manufactured goods. To governments of industrialized countries, Ibn Saud's area of the world became significant for the oil to fuel industry and for its strategic location.

These influences forced the traditional elite -- the King and his hierarchy -- to change, adopting and adapting new methods to preserve and strengthen its rule. These new methods involved the formalization of government by the establishment of ministries to handle the state's enormously expanding administrative functions. The first important ministry, established in 1930, was Foreign Affairs, followed by Finance in 1933, Defence and Aviation in 1944, and a number of others in the early 1950s. Despite this formalization of government, political power was retained in the hands of the royal family. In fact, until his death and despite the delegation of power implicit in a system of ministries, King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud continued to practice an effectively one-man government.

His family and other close advisors, who now had the titles of ministers, gathered staff to develop policies and implement programmes. The increased administrative personnel underlined the need for modernized administrative structure and modern education to ensure the supply of skilled manpower. In these early stages, then, of formalized government the technical expertise was embodied in foreigners, non-Saudi Arabs with western-style educations: Egyptians, Syrians, Palestinians,

Lebanese. They worked under and advised the Saudi minister-princes. However, a ruler's dependence upon foreign experts in the tasks of ruling weakens the ruler's power. The ruler is at the mercy of the advice that his advisors give, particularly when he lacks the knowledge to understand the advice and must merely accept or reject it. The foreigners do not have identity of purpose and of culture with the ruler, yet it is from his culture and depth of understanding of the needs of his people that the ruler derives his purposes. It was now seemed necessary to educate Saudis to increasingly occupy top administrative positions in their own society which were held, so far, by foreigners.

In the 1920s a few young Saudis had been sent abroad for modern technical and professional education. However, Wenner (in Tachau, ed. 1975) points out that the real breakthrough occurred in the 1940s when Saudi students were sent to Egypt for their educations. Although there is no upward mobility into the traditional elite the newly secularly-trained Saudis could pose problems by virtue of their education and the country's need for that education. Along with increased education comes mobility of travel which

"... leads to the discovery that life outside the family offers choices not dreamt of by one's father. The radio, movies, newspapers, and books allow a young man for the first time to choose his own intellectual ancestors and spiritual brothers. Modern scientific thought makes possible, indeed requires, a re-examination of all traditional relationships and structures. ... Knowledge has thus become an issue and instrument of battle."
(Halpern 1963:29)

Increased secular education creates rising expectations among those who have gained it. The traditionally educated elite maintained a hold on higher ministerial positions while secularly educated Saudis were only able to fill what Tachau (1975) calls middle-lower positions such as Commerce, Health and Communications.

The first break through into a position of power occurred in December 1954 when Abdullah Tariki became Director-General of Petroleum and Mineral Affairs. Although this may be seen as a break-through in the Western sense -- a position of prestige, power, and money -- there remained one major drawback. "While Tariki was not absorbed in the Saudi ruling class (an impossibility given its criteria) he was closely affiliated with it." (Duguid 1976:80) In other words affiliations were possible but membership in the ruling elite had to be hereditary. Tariki was an intelligent person and impressed Abdullah Suleiman, who took it upon himself to finance his education in America. Tariki was able to rise to a prominent position of power and responsibility but, as his policy proposals proved to be too radical, he ran into problems. This is noted in the next section.

The third and final phase deals with the combination of oil wealth and the "mixing of iron with faith." In this section two major examples of discontent within the traditional elite structure will be examined.

By the time Ibn Saud died in 1953, many problems had arisen in his kingdom. One outstanding example of this is with his seventeenth son, Talal ibn Abdul Aziz. He provides us with an example of how the processes of modernization and traditional rule were bound to come into conflict. Lacey (1981) reports that in 1949 young Prince Talal came to his father requesting permission to build a public hospital in Riyadh. Of course, Ibn Saud was most impressed and was very pleased that his young son had such progressive ideas. Talal later became Minister of Communications and went on to play a major role in government affairs. He was a strong-minded young man who wanted to see reforms in Saudi Arabia. Concurrent with Talal's enthusiasm for social change was the overthrow of King Farouk in Egypt by the military and the coming to power of Gamal Nasser. "Nasserite agents were known to be at work in both Yemen and in Saudi Arabia, and news of Talal's open praise for Nasser was taken in Riyadh as deliberate disloyalty. Crown Prince Faisal and those around him still resented the role Talal had played in the ousting of the Faisal government in 1960." (Lacey 1981:341) Talal was in favour of a constitutional democracy retaining the monarchy. He also wanted to see the state take initiative in modernizing the economy and its administrative structure. He wanted to move the development process too fast, and in a direction that was unacceptable to his brother-princes. "Unacceptable" not because it would weaken their power, but because it conceived of a type of government not attuned to the

traditional culture of the country, and so impossible to establish without civil turmoil. He was expelled from the family and exiled, and from his exile in Egypt he made use of Radio Cairo to continue his attacks on the Kingdom.

The second personality worth noting is that of Abdullah Tariki. King Sa'ud had aligned himself with both Talal and Tariki who were well known for their ideas on reforming the House of Sa'ud. These young reformers helped Sa'ud regain power and once back in power he ruled as he had before 1958. Tariki stayed on in Sa'ud's government as oil minister and Duguid (1976:132-33) has pointed out that

"The fragile alliance between Sa'ud and the Talal faction broke down in 1962 over the revolution in Yemen. Sa'ud supported the Inamate in both word and deed, provoking a minor rebellion in the Saudi government. ... In November 1962, Faisal was again called on to restore stability to the government, bringing to power his own supporters in the royal family. One of the conditions of his return was the dismissal of Tariki from the government. ... Tariki was not only dismissed, but was exiled from the country."

The Saudi Royal household shows in these two examples that it was capable of closing ranks in the face of threats to its authority. What is also shown in the discussion of these two Saudi's, one who was in the Royal family and the other who was not, is that although a new and more liberal elite structure was being permitted to develop, the elite cadres' freedoms were limited and subject to approval or censure by the central ruling core. These two incidents only marked the beginning of the challenges faced by the Saudi elite as they permitted a new sub-elite, with a different kind of education and influences, to

develop.

Problems had also arisen over the purity of Islamic values held by the Saudi royal family. This can be illustrated by the example of the attack and seizure of the Meccan Haram in 1979. This attack was led by two Saudi's, one who had been a member of the National Guard, and the other, a twenty-seven year old theology student. Demands made here were the same as those of the young Al-Wahhab back in the 1740s.

"The elite's perceived failure in the preservation of morality and criticism of excessive cultural borrowing from the West were among the reasons for the attack on the Meccan Haram in 1979. Suddenly a tightly controlled country, where the free public expression of dissent was nearly impossible, was shown to have a significant opposition, one willing to die for its religious position." (Ochsenwald 1981:284)

It would appear that the religious fanaticism common among the Wahhabis (and which ibn Saud had used as a tool in creating his kingdom) had been drawn to the surface, possibly at least in partial reaction to the acceleration of secular development in the country. A lot of emphasis has been placed on the new secularly trained elite but it is important to realize that paralleling and overriding this is the religious elite. Moreover, many young Saudis prefer to follow the traditional Wahhabi ways in reaction against the Western secularizing influences to which they become exposed when studying abroad. Thus it will be wrong to assume that the new Saudi technocracy is uniformly composed of secularized people. As these young, educated Saudis take their places in the kingdom's growing government, businesses, and industries, they work their way on

merit into the sub-elite and elite. They have three different choices before them: continued compliance with the old traditional ways; radical Islamic fundamentalism; and, secularism. The potential for conflict between those religiously radicalized and those secularized will continue to grow. This will put further stress on the society, and on the unifying and moderating talents of the royal family. At this stage it is difficult to say which of the three ways the bulk of her elite and subelite will turn to. Chances are that they will be divided often acting as countervailing checks on the other.

Elite Structures in Lebanon and Egypt compared to those in Saudi Arabia

The existence of a political elite is held to be common to all political systems regardless of location, time, or culture. (Bill and Hardgrave 1973:144) However, the historical factors which influence the direction of the political elite in political development are not common to all political systems.

To demonstrate this Lebanon and Egypt have been chosen for a brief analysis to bring into focus the differences of Saudi Arabia's political elites and political development.

There are major similarities. All are Arab territories, brought into the Arab and Muslim culture during the initial expansions of the Muslim Empire during the first centuries A.H. All have been subject, to a greater or lesser extent, to Ottoman

domination and rule.² All three have cities which attract visitors from many countries, so exposing them to cosmopolitan influences. In Egypt, Alexandria and Cairo are important commercial centres, and Cairo has long been important in the Muslim world as an educational centre. Lebanon has always been an important centre of trade. Its Mediterranean seaports anchoring one end of the caravan routes, and Beirut, particularly, has developed into a financial and an educational centre. In Saudi Arabia, Mecca and Medina are the destination of pilgrims from around the world. Obvious differences are the population densities, high in Lebanon and Egypt, low in Arabia, and imperial domination, frequent and pervasive in Lebanon and Egypt, almost completely absent in Saudi Arabia after it established itself as an independent state.

Lebanon, part of the Ottoman Empire placed under French mandate after World War I, was established as a state with its modern frontiers by France in 1920. Still under French control, it adopted a republican form of government in 1926. By 1943 Lebanon had achieved its independence. Although Arab, its population is not predominantly Muslim, and the balancing of power between Christian and Muslim communities has been a constant problem in its short modern history. The Lebanese

² In the territory now comprised within Saudi Arabia, only the Hejaz was properly under Ottoman rule, but that province provided a model and impetus for more sophisticated government for the new kingdom, and has continued to provide a high proportion of senior civil servants for the kingdom's government.

society is cosmopolitan and sophisticated. This is because it is a mix of communities close to European influences. Moreover, as a sea trading people for thousands of years the Lebanese acquired a susceptibility to change.

The primary example of this is in the method of government adopted which in turn plays a significant role in the manner of political elite development. Lebanon for example

"... possesses a constitution, political parties, a parliament, prime minister, cabinet ministers, a president of the Republic, and a bureaucracy; yet operating behind these and intermeshed with them is an elaborate and complex network of religious sects, sectarian organizations, political bosses and private militias. The latter are far more important in the political process than the former." (Borthwick 1980:8)

The very existence of this parliamentary system affects the role that the political elite will play. Political parties allow for competition and competition implies freedom of choice by the electorate as to who will fill government positions. Behind the formal parliamentary institution there are power brokers, consensus finders, political horse traders and political elites which have acquired finesse in the art of wheeling and dealing.

Therefore it is not surprising, as Harik's (in Lenczowski 1975:203) observation points out, that "... members of the Lebanese elite are distinguished more by occupation than social origin." Where competition exists for political power, hereditary background plays a lesser role. The main recruiting grounds for Lebanese parliamentarians are: landlords, lawyers, businessmen, and other professions. Researchers in this area of study, however, "... have emphasized the strong traditional

personal relationships under Zuama (chiefs, leaders, strongmen), a pattern which has variously been characterized as a system of "feudalism," "neofeudalism," or "feudality." (Landau, ed. 1972:140) Lebanon is a case where some of the strong traditional influences still play a role in the competitive nature of the political elites.

On the other hand the development of Egypt's political elite structure has been quite different. Modern Egyptian political movements have been characterized by a resistance to imperialism rather than by a desire to change the structure of the society. Egypt had been under foreign rule for a long period of time. King Farouk, king of Egypt from 1936 to 1952, was not an Egyptian but a descendant of Muhammed Ali, the Albanian general who established his rule over Egypt when his military force rebelled against the Ottoman Sultan. Farouk was corrupt and incompetent and did not have the interest at heart of the people he ruled.

In 1952 he was ousted from power by a military coup lead by Gamel Abdul Nasser. Political power in Egypt was finally in the hands of the Egyptians. The long period of foreign control and periods of corruption do not make for a well integrated political elite.

"Members of the elite do not pass through well-defined and rigid channels of recruitment; nor are they all personally acquainted. There are no geographically distinctive areas, no cohesive ethnic groups, and no elite schools which contribute a disproportionate and identifiable share of Egypt's top decision makers." (Lenczowski, ed. 1975:90-1)

Personal alliances developed between members of the same graduating class of universities, technical or military colleges carry some importance. This is evidenced by

"The eleven men who led the coup in 1952 ranged in age from 29 to 34 and were either majors or lieutenant colonels. All were graduates of the classes of 1938, 1939, and 1940 of the Egyptian Military Academy in Cairo. Some owned land, but not large amounts, and all owed their modest position in society to their military-scientific educations and position in the army officer corps. They clearly represented the "new middle class." (Borthwick 1980:179)

This new group is in complete contrast to the old elite who owned land and were tied to an imperialist economic structure. The economic structure, itself, was linked to textile mills in England. Springborg (1975) feels that the lack of cohesive political organizations related to economic conditions is not the only issue. He points to cultural factors which also have contributed to the lack of political elite ties. These centre around weak ethnic identities and the fact that Islam in Egypt has never been effectively institutionalized. The role of the Ulema and Sheiks in Egypt has been primarily as "... brokers between their followers and the Mamluk, Ottoman, or Albanian ruling caste." (Hourani 1972:65-72) The pattern of the Egyptian elite can be analysed on a horizontal basis noting that cliques and factions prevent the growth of a cohesive political elite structure. Since 1952 political power has been held by the military elite.

Saudi Arabia has not followed the more conventional methods of political development. It has not been greatly affected by

external powers which, through conquest, have had their impact on Lebanon and Egypt. The Saudi Arabian elite has protected itself against large scale foreign intervention by using the "closed door" policy. Even when outsiders have been permitted in, it has been on Saudi terms, and any social, moral or revolutionary militants soon found themselves outside the country. Consequently, the Saudi elite has been able to maintain its structure, introducing changes in it by instalments, modifying and expanding it to fit the needs of the modern government and bureaucracy required by a wealthy and modernizing state. The structure has remained basically the same, with the top leadership selected by its peers from among its number based upon competence in the skills required of a leader, and the same basic format applies in the lower echelons of the elites, eligibility based on competence in the required skills. The criteria, the required skills, have changed. In the desert, skills as hunter, horseman, marksman were been required. Today, demand is for technical competence in a particular area of science or engineering, management or administration, evidenced by relevant educational degrees. To a large extent the same families reach positions of authority: the sons of a prominent tribal leader have the incentive to acquire the new skills, and may benefit from patronage to achieve the positions from which they can show those skills. The new elite and sub-elite, save for the core group of the royal house, is functional not political -- this was the main characteristic of the elite

structure of the desert tribes, since the desert has no tolerance for the nonfunctional.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

This study has sought to analyze the political development of Saudi Arabia, and the extending and diverging role of the elite within it. The indigencous religious-political ideology, Islam, and the traditional political and elite structures have been observed to be of great significance in the style and character of the new nation's development. The main factors in the success of the nation's growth, however, have been the discovery and exploitation of a valuable national resource, oil, which has provided the financial backing for the transition from a tribal society to a modern state, and the strength of character and vision of the nation's founder, King Abdul-Aziz ibn Saud, and his son, King Faisal.

It was noted at the beginning of the thesis that Saudi Arabia has made the transition, so far successfully, from a pre-industrial society in a state of arrested development to a modernized developing nation in a time-span of less than fifty years, with little help from other political powers. And political scientists have yet to turn their attention to this important country which is destined to play a part in the industrial as well as the developing world. The conceptual tools developed by scholars for political analysis were distorted by ethnocentric biases and in reviewing the theoretical considerations an attempt has been made to develop useable

definitions free from such preconceived biases. The political character of the dominant religion of the people and their leaders, and the powerful role which the traditional elite and socio-political institutions have played in the nation's development, have necessitated a brief historical review of these pre-existing factors. In reviewing the actual political development of the nation natural chronological and developmental divisions have been noted, and the modern history of the state briefly reviewed with reference to the evidences of political development. These have then been analyzed and the progress and sophistication of that development has been identified together with its impact on the society, and the changing role of its elite.

Problems of Analysis: Theoretical Concepts

While the sociological theories of elite are sufficiently universal to facilitate the identification and description of elite and their functioning, studies of political development have generally suffered from ethnocentricity and an insufficiently rigorous definition of terms. This is typified in Monte Palmer's book The Dilemmas of Political Development in which he indicates the need "...to contrast the stability and integration of the traditional society with that of an 'ideal type' of modern society." (Palmer 1973: 10-11) Herein lies the problem: What is the 'ideal type' of modern society? Is it valid to assume, as does Palmer, that this should be modelled on those

western states such as the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which he identifies as "developed"? Is his definition of a "developed" country, equal to that which "... is able to provide its citizens with goods and services roughly equivalent to the highest level of goods and services available in any country at that time" (Palmer 1973:1) of sufficient value for use in the analysis of political, rather than economic, development? In seeking to avoid the potential pitfalls of ascribing western goals and motivations to a society with a different background, culture, and ethos a definition of political development has been derived for this thesis which related political development to the perceived needs and goals of the society itself. This limits the need for analysis of government structures, systems and institutions to their fitness and effectiveness in the governance of the country itself, rather than demanding parallel comparisons with the forms and institutions of a western country.

This approach also recognizes the increasing sophistication of the developing country's needs and goals, and that a less complex government structure may, at an early stage in the development, be better for the nation than a highly sophisticated one, which may be required later, rather than making the implicit value judgement that, so long as the country lacks democratic forms, representative government, a large bureaucracy and so on, it is somehow 'backward' and inferior.

Stability has been noted as a key factor both for political development to occur and as evidence that it is taking place in an acceptable manner. If there is stability then the leadership may be assumed to have the support of the people, its legitimacy is unquestioned, and the changes occurring are pleasing or acceptable to the population, and so may be assumed to be relatively long lasting or, at least, a positive step in the nation's progress. If the leadership lacks popular support, is corrupt, or lacks legitimacy then changes imposed will not be accepted by the populace for long, and, instability will develop and civil war, revolution or a coup d'etat may follow.

Modernization and Westernization

As has been noted, the process of modernization raises many problems for the developing country. "The modern environment tends to atomize society, depriving its members of the sense of community and belonging without which individual fulfillment cannot be satisfactorily achieved." (Black 1975:31-32) This process begins the moment modern technology is introduced, reducing the interdependence of the people, and is accelerated by the provision of western style secular education.

Shils (1968:10) argues that to be "modern" means "being western without the onus of dependence on the West". However, modernization and westernization cannot be separated. Once urbanization takes place people leave their tribe, village or town in search of jobs, although they may in fact only be

working six months in the cities and then returning to the desert. But with them they take western clothing, canned food from the super sug (market), in Saudi Arabia the camel gets to ride, in a Toyota pickup, to the desert. Those who travel abroad to get higher education are exposed to western lifestyles, with the areas of greatest contrast with their own culture (our vices, our libertinism) making the greatest impact. These bits of Western lifestyle return home with them and create conflict in the extended family, which still tries to maintain control over the young. Some of these young people go so far as to reject Islam and all it stands for.

"The convulsive impact of modernization on traditional and transitional society is merely suggested by the quantitative and structural indicators employed by social scientists to describe this transformation. Patterns of child rearing begin to change, new personality types challenge and replace the dominant position of traditional personalities, marginal men, creative and innovative personalities appear with greater frequency and assume increasingly major roles in the transitional process." (Finkle and Gable 1971:67)

These are the major problems the Saudi's face with modernization. There appears to be no way of borrowing Western technology and material goods without taking on Western attitudes, manners, social and material values.

An Example of Western Class Analysis

Applied to Saudi Arabia

In a study of the "Emergence of a New Middle Class in Saudi Arabia", William Rugh (1973) points to their class groupings, the upper class, the middle class, and the lower class. In the first group Rugh includes the royal family, some leading tribal sheikhs, high Ulema of the Al Shaykh family (connected by marriage to the royal family), and some wealthy merchant families whom he describes as having achieved an upper class life style. The middle class he identifies as including the management and technical personnel, the members of the professions, bureaucrats and so on who have achieved their positions by secular as opposed to traditional educations, and the small capitalists and other middle income groups dependent upon traditional education. The lower class, he maintains, is composed of nomadic Bedouin, seminomadic herdsmen, unskilled workers in government and the private sector.

The first two groups, the upper class and the middle class, are easy to identify in Western terminology. However, when the third group, the lower class, is examined, conceptual problems arise. These begin with the nomadic Bedouin. Twitchell's work on Saudi Arabia done in the late 1950's estimates "...that 78 per cent of the population...is nomadic and Bedouin, they would number 5,159,000, making the total 6,614,000." (Twitchell 1958:139) Therefore, the nomadic Bedouin constituted the bulk of the population outnumbering the urbanites who were estimated at

1,455,000. Does this mean that just over three quarters of the Saudi population is lower class or originates from lower class? What this does mean is that the analysis done by Rugh lifts the nomadic Bedouin out of his society's norms and has subjected the Bedouin to western analysis. This is fallacious, and evidences the limitations of applying western concepts indiscriminately in the understanding of non-western societies. The Bedouin have done much to preserve the culture on which the Saudi state is based. Ties between urbanite Saudi's and the desert society remain strong, with urbanites frequently holidaying with their nomadic relatives in the desert. Many younger Bedouin are taking advantage of the kingdom's free education opportunities to obtain higher, secular, educations. Thus the term "lower class" does not fit the Bedouin except in a very special and highly qualified way, primarily in economic comparisons with western nations, where for the purposes of argument an equivalent must be found to a western lower class. The seminomadic herdsmen are non-Arabs who are gypsies which means they cannot be included in the power structure of the society, while most of the unskilled and semi-skilled workers are foreigners on contract, ineligible for citizenship and not a part of the Saudi society.

In attempting a class analysis of a nation it is essential to establish what divisions exist in the society, and to define the premises and goals of the analysis prior to initiating it, rather than making an unqualified assumption that western type

class analysis is possible.

This thesis has examined the establishment and political development of Saudi Arabia. To do so, particular concepts of political analysis have been used: elite, political development and modernization. The theoretical bases of these concepts have been reviewed and their applicability to non-western societies considered. The historical and social background of desert Arabia has been summarized, with emphasis on Islam, the religious ideology which forms the basis of the Arab life, and which provides it with spiritual, social, and political direction. That historical summary covered also the rise to power, by military conquest, a religious revival, and tribal alliances, of Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, and his proclamation of the unified kingdom. The consolidation, growth, and development of the Saudi state is followed through the reigns of Abdul Aziz and his successors, Saud and Faisal. In analysis, the traditional basis of the royal family's legitimacy and support is noted, as are the changes forced by modernization and the increasing complexity of modern government on the traditional elite structure itself. The processes of modernization put stresses on the traditional social outlook of the people, nevertheless, they learned to adjust those changes with the overall traditional Islamic framework. The modernization of the state is observed to have created a sub-elite of technocrats and bureaucrats. Such a group, however, was excluded from direct exercise of power by the royal family's retention of executive power in its own

hands. Finally, a comparison of Saudi Arabia's elite structure, preserving traditional forms, is made with two of its neighbouring countries. Saudi Arabia is shown to have taken an approach to its political development unique in the modern world, an approach which seems to have minimized the stresses and strains of modernization.

Appendix A

In chapter one, the Introduction, it is stated that Saudi Arabia plays a major role with regard to foreign aid in the Third World. A contemporary survey done in 1979 gives a clear picture of Saudi Arabian support to the Third World. For example:

"The Arab oil-producing countries had made grants and loans totalling \$3 bn to non-Arab African countries by the beginning of 1978. The Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA), which started operations in 1975, approved just over \$261m in soft loans to non-members of the Arab League during the first two years of its operations. The Tunisian president of BADEA, Dr. Chedli Ayari, insisted that the Arabs were not helping Africa in order to repay a debt of gratitude for any support received for Arab causes, particularly that of the Palestinians. ...\$1 bn pledged by Saudi Arabia, \$850m went to the Saudi Development Fund for spending on African projects; \$120m was allocated to BADEA, \$12m AED (African Development Bank), and \$2m to the six recognized liberation movements in Southern Africa." (Legun 1979:75)

Also, the Saudi government has set up institutions to deal with the disbursement of development funds. Two examples of this are:

1. The Saudi Development Fund, located in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, which has an authorized fund of \$2.83bn. The scope of this assistance is to all countries.
2. Secondly, an Islamic Development Bank has been established in Jidda which offers non-interest bearing project financing, equity, foreign participation, foreign trade financing. This money is available to Islamic countries and communities. (See Legun 1979:78 for further information)

Appendix B

THE MAJOR TRIBES WHICH ARE IMPORTANT TO THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SAUDI ARABIA

While Ibn Saud is said to have conquered forty tribes in creating and uniting his state, five tribal groups played a major role, or were strategically important. They are:

1) Shammar (Nomadic)

The tribes of this group wander between Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Syria. They are considered to be noble among the tribal groups because they raise camels. This group was very important to Ibn Saud because of the Ottoman presence in their area. The British also tried to win over the friendship of some of these tribes during World War I. It is also noted by Troeller (1976:174) that "...From the economic stand point, the tribes of northern and northeastern Nejd, especially the Shammar, Harb, Mutair, 'Awazim, Aman and Dhafir, had from time immemorial migrated in autumn towards Kuwait and the Euphrates 'to obtain the necessities of life'. The political enmity existing between Riyadh and Baghdad, coupled with local tribal troubles, interrupted these natural migratory habits. As the Iraqi state began to take shape and the Sa'udi power increased the political issue was complicated by the economic one."

2) Mutair (Nomadic)

These tribes range into the Nejd and also as far as Kuwait and the Eastern Province. These tribes are warlike, fierce and it is with their assistance that Ibn Saud was able to launch his famous Ikhwan movement. Its beginnings are related by Philby (1955:261). "...it can be assumed that the idea of another Wahhabi revival had for some time been germinating in Ibn Sa'ud's mind as an important instrument of policy. He had however grafted a new conception on the normal type of such revivals, and had made a special point of concentrating the efforts of his missionaries on the Badawin tribes, with results which began to be apparent in 1912. In that year a mixed group of Harb and Mutair tribesmen, duly impressed by the warnings of everlasting retribution conveyed to them by the missionaries, gathered at Harma, near Majma'a, to seek further information on the matter from more authoritative sources. ...The new fraternity, soon to become known as the Ikhwan, or Brethren, ..."

3) Harb (Nomadic)

A very large tribal group located near the Red Sea. Some of this group also became members of the Ikhwan movement.

4) Ataiba (Nomadic)

Another large tribal group with main headquarters at Turaba --near Mecca. This tribe even in the 1980's lives in the desert and when it visits the cities its members just put their tents up outside the city.

5) Qahtan

A tribe that aided Ibn Saud in some battles.

OF LESSER IMPORTANCE

6) Al-Murra

A large warlike tribal group (noble camel tribe) important in that they controlled the ports of the gulf of Oman, and were in a position to affect the trading routes from India.


7) Al-Manasir (Nomadic)

Occupied the area now called the United Arab Emirates.

8) Subai (Nomadic)

This tribe raised camels and was located in central Arabia.

Major Tribes Important to Saudi Arabia's Political Development



①-⑨ Greater tribes in order of importance
 Lesser tribes
 Border

Appendix D

Members of the I.C.O.

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>POPULATION</u>	<u>YEAR</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE OF MUSLIMS</u>
1) Afghanistan (Membership suspended)	19.80 million	1976	99%
2) Algeria	17.00 million	1977	98%
3) Bahrain	275,549	1978	100%
4) Bangladesh	80.50 million	1977	87%
5) Cameroun	7.70 million	1976	55%
6) Chad	3.87 million	1973	57%
7) Comoros	290,000	1972	60%
8) Djibouti	125,000	1974	100%
9) Egypt (Membership suspended)	39.00 million	1976	95%
10) Gabon	950,000	1974	45%
11) Gambia	568,000	1978	85%
12) Guinea	5.15 million	1972	97%
13) Guinea-Bissau	800,000	1978	70%
14) Indonesia	141.60 million	1978	95%

15)	Iran	34.00 million	1977	97%
16)	Iraq	12.20 million	1977	95%
17)	Jordan	2.75 million	1976	95%
18)	Kuwait	1.30 million	1978	100%
19)	Lebanon	3.06 million	1978	57%
20)	Libya	2.63 million	1977	100%
21)	Malaysia	12.53 million	1977	52%
22)	Maldives	143,469	1978	100%
23)	Mali	6.03 million	1977	92%
24)	Mauritania	1.48 million	1977	100%
25)	Morocco	18.34 million	1977	99%
26)	Niger	4.99 million	1978	90%
27)	Oman	750,000	1977	100%
28)	Pakistan	75.60 million	1978	87%
29)	Palestine (Occupied)	1,831.825 ¹	1980	N/A
30)	Qatar	200,000	1978	100%
31)	Senegal	5.90 million	1976	95%
32)	Somalia	3.20 million	1976	100%
33)	Sudan	17.00 million	1977	88%
34)	Syria	8.30 million	1976	87%
35)	Tunisia	6.03 million	1978	95%

¹This is an estimate only since the State of Palestine no longer exists. Many Palestinians are Christian Arabs. Population shown is total registered refugees as of March 31, 1981.

36)	Turkey	40.20 million	1975	99%
37)	Uganda	12.78 million	1978	35%
38)	United Arab Emirates	655,937	1975	100%
39)	Upper Volta	6.29 million	1978	60%
40)	North Yemen	7.08 million	1977	100%
41)	South Yemen	1.80 million	1978	100%

SOURCE: Saudi Gazette, January 25th, 1981:8-9

Appendix E

The Expansion of Saudi Arabia Government from the 1930s to Present Day

- 1) King Khalad's Special Advisor Dr. Rashad Pharoun
- 2) Deputy Prime Minister HRH Crown Prince
Fahad Bin Abdul
Aziz
- 3) Commander of the National * HRH Prince Abdullah
Guard and Seccond Deputy Bin Abdul Aziz
Prime Minister
- 4) Deputy Commander of the * Prince Badr Bin
National Guard Abdul Aziz
- 5) Ministry of Interior est. * Prince Naif Bin
1953 (Minister to the Abdul Aziz
King created in 1951) Prince Fahd Ibn
Abd Al-Aziz (1965)
Deputy Minister Saudi Family
- 6) Ministry of Defence and * HRH Prince Sultan
Aviation est. 1953 Bin Abdul Aziz
(Minister to King
created in 1944)
Deputy Minister Saudi Family
- 7) Ministry of Foreign -* Prince Saud
Affairs est. 1953 Al-Faisal

- (Minister to the
King created in
1931)
- Deputy Minister B.A. (U.S.A.)
- 8) Ministry of Petro- Skeikh Ahmed Zaki
leum and Mineral Yamani
Resources est.
1960
- 9) Ministry of Education * Sheikh Abdul Aziz
est. 1953 Al-Khuweiten
Hassan Ibn Abdullah
Ibn Hassan Al-ash
-Shaykh (1965)
- Deputy Minister B.A. (U.S.A.)
- 10) Ministry of Haj and
Endowments
- 11) Ministry of Labour and Sheikh Ibrahim Al-
Social Affairs est. Angari Abd a-Rahman
1961 Abu al-Khayl (1965)
- Minister (1971) B.A. (Cairo)
- Deputy Minister M.A. (U.S.A.)
- 12) Ministry of Communica- - Mohammed Omar Tawfig
tions est. 1953 (1965)
- Deputy Minister B.A. (U.S.A.)
- 13) Ministry of Justice - Al Shaykl (before
est. 1970 (responsi- 1970)

- bilities include
 Supreme Judicial Council
 Sharia court system)
- 14) Ministry of Information
 est 1963 (Originally
 the General Directorate
 of Broadcasting,
 Printing and Publishing)
- 15) Ministry of Posts,
 Telegraph and Tele-
 phones est. 1975
- 16) Ministry of Industry and
 Electricity est. 1975
 (Originally part of the
 Ministry of Commerce
 and Industry est. 1954)
- 17) Ministry of Commerce
 est. 1975
- 18) Under Secretary of (at)
 Ministry of Commerce
- 19) Ministry of Commerce
 Minister (1972)
 Deputy Minister (1972)
- 20) Ministry of Health
 (1965) est. 1954
- Dr. Muhammed Abdu
 Yamani Jamil Ibrahim
 al-Hijaylan (1965)
- Dr. Alawi Darwish
 Kayyah
- Dr. Ghazi Al-Gosaibi
- Dr. Soliman A. Solain
- Abdul Rahman Al-Zamil
- Abid Mohamed Salih
 Shaykh
 B.A. (Cairo)
 M.A. (U.S.A.)
- Dr. Hussein Al-Jaza' en
 Yusuf Yagubal-Hajiri

- | | |
|---|--|
| Minister (1972) | B.A. (Cairo) |
| Deputy Minister (1972) | D.D.S. (Cairo) |
| 21) Ministry of Agriculture
and Water est. 1953 | Dr. Abdul Rahman
Al-Sheikh Hassan
Mishari (1965) |
| 22) Ministry of Higher
Education est. 1975 | Sheikh Hassan Abdullah
Al-Sheikh |
| 23) Ministry of Planning
est. 1975 | Sheikh Hisham Nazer |
| 24) Ministry of Municipalities
and Rural Affairs
est. 1975 | |
| 25) Ministry of Housing and
Public Works est. 1975 | Prince Mit'eb Bin Abdul
Aziz |
| 26) Ministry of Finance and
National Economy
est. 1954 (Minister to
the King created in
1932) | Sheikh Muhammed Aba
Al-Khail
Prince MUSAAD Ibn Abd
Al-Rahman (1965) |
| Deputy Minister | B.A. (Cairo) |
| 27) Ministry of Transport | Sheikh Hussain Mansouri |
| 28) Ministry of Pilgrimage
and Awqaf est. 1962 | Saudi Family |
| Deputy Minister | B.A. (Cairo) |

Appendix E con't

Governors

Governor of Qasim	Prince Abdul Elah Bin Abdul Aziz
Governor of Tabuk	Prince Abdul Majeid
Deputy Governor of Riyadh	Prince Sattam Bin Abdul Aziz
Governor of Al-Ahsa	Prince Mohammed Bin Fahad Bin Jalawi
Governor of the Eastern Province	Prince Abdul Mohsin Bin Jalawi
Governor of Makkah	Prince Majeed Bin Abdul Aziz
Governor of Medina	Prince Abdul Mohsin Bin Abdul Aziz

This information has been gathered from two sources

- 1) The Saudi Gazette during 1981.
- 2) Nyrop, R. F. et.al., AREA HANDBOOK FOR SAUDI ARABIA, 1977.

Appendix F

Glossary

- 1) Al-Hasa': The Eastern province of Saudi Arabia. Located near the Persian Gulf. The oil fields are found in this area.
- 2) Bedouin: Tribally organized Arabian Nomads. Muhammad claimed descent from the Quraysh at Mecca who were among the many tribes of the bedouin.
- 3) Emir: A title given to great commanders, Arabian rulers or princes. The commanders often became military governors of large provinces under the 'igta' system and held high positions at court.
- 4) Haditha: Oral tradition that can be traced to a companion of the Prophet or to the Prophet Mohammed. (Knauerhase 1975:xxiii)
- 5) Hejaz: A province of Saudi Arabia located near the Red Sea. This area is celebrated as the birthplace of Islam. Both Mecca and Medina are located within its boundaries.
- 6) Ikhwan: A Muslim brotherhood created by Abdul-Aziz around 1912. The two major tribal groups the Shammar and the Mutain (fierce and warlike) made up a ready army which Abdul-Aziz was able to call on at will. These tribes and the others who joined the Ikhwan shifted their loyalty from the tribe to "God", Allah, and the Imam.
- 7) Imam: Leader of the faithful. A spiritual leader, officially appointed to be the leader of prayers in the mosque. This person was required to be heroic or of saintly virtue.
- 8) Inshallah: If God wills.
- 9) Islam: A monotheistic religion whose prophet is Muhammad. Founded in the seventh century. Submission to God's will remains the primary doctrine.
- 10) Majlis: The court held by the tribal kings specifically to hear opinions of seniors. Court held by the King to hear opinions of important sheikhs.
- 11) Muslim: (Moslem) An adherent to Islam. A true believer, follower of Muhammad.
- 12) Nejd: The central area of Saudi Arabia.
- 13) Qur'an: (Koran) The sacred book of Allah, revealed to

Muhammad, by God, at Mecca and Medina. Many versions evolved among which Uthman has prevailed.

- 14) Quraysh: The tribe into which Muhammad was born. Raiser of camels, these people were thus considered of noble birth.
- 15) Ramadan: The ninth month of the Hijra year. It is the month of fasting from sunrise to sunset.
- 16) Sharif: (Sherif) A nobleman, i.e. the Sherif of Mecca, who was a descendant of Muhammad. The Sherif of Mecca served as a high Ottoman official in Mecca.
- 17) Sharia: Islamic Law.
- 18) Shiite: One of the two great sectors of Moslems. Opposed to Sunna and believing that Ali, Muhammad's son in law was rightful successor to Muhammad.
- 19) Sunnah: Supplementary to the Qur'an, these laws, based on tradition and on the teachings of Muhammad are practiced by orthodox Moslems.
- 20) Sunnis: Orthodox Islam. Its teachings are based on the Qur'an.
- 21) Ulama: (Ulema) Scholars who were well versed in the Qur'an, tradition and canon law. They were appointed to the judiciary and other substancial posts in administration and became a class of elites.
- 22) Umayyad: Based in Syria, Palestine, and Egypt the Umayyad was a Caliphal dynasty which reigned from 661 to 750 AD.
- 23) Wahhabi Movement: The Movement begun by Abdul-Wahhab to bring the Moslems back to a strict adherence to the Qur'an. Wahhabism flourishes in Arabia today.
- 24) Zakat: Obligatory alms.

Appendix G

Saudi Arabia

Population of capital cities and cities of 100,000 and more inhabitants.

Damman	127,844
Huful	101,271
Jeddah	561,104
Mecca	366,801
Medina	198,186
Riyadh	666,840
Ta'if	204,857

1/3 of population in cities assuming that the current population of the country is about 7 million. Keeping in mind that there are nearly 2 million foreigners working in the kingdom, there is no indication that these figures include or exclude the foreigners.

Source: United Nations, 1979 Demographic Year Book, Thirty First Issue, Publishing Service United Nations, N.Y.U.S. 1979.

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