

SOCIETY, CRIME AND GEOGRAPHY

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ABSTRACT

An examination of geographical studies of crime reveals that they have typically been based upon the data produced by official agencies. It is argued that these data represent the processes which compiled them, rather than an accurate record of the amounts of crime actually committed. Further to this, it is noted that the data employed represent only seven categories of crime, and that these seven categories represent varying proportions of the amount of crime committed.

The techniques of analysis have been largely statistical, and have used police or census data to provide a static picture of the relationship between crime and socioeconomic status, for example. The techniques employed - regression, factor, and canonical analyses, - typically require highly accurate data in order to maintain predictive or explanatory value. Police data are not highly accurate, and thus any predictive or explanatory results must be viewed with extreme caution, as they only refer to a selection of crimes known to the police. Further to this, it is noted that space - as an ordering concept - does not provide research avenues which lead to an understanding of social phenomena, in this case crime. It is argued that most social phenomena occur in space or have spatial outcomes, but that social processes and not space are responsible for the existence of these phenomena.

Geographers appear to have almost ignored law in their studies of crime; a major omission, for it is law which defines criminal acts. It appears also that they have evaded discussion of the values which law represents, and the conflicts and power relationships it signifies. It is suggested that law is an attempt to resolve or contain conflict within certain limits, and that although its existence is functional to society, this is not an explanation of how it came into existence. It is noted that economic, political, social and historical processes are responsible for producing law, and therefore crime, as it exists today, so it is to the study of these processes which geographers should direct their attention.

Geography has attempted to achieve the status of science by using the methods of natural science; however the major problem for geographers has been the production of theory. Geographers have generally operated with, at best, only partial theories of society or social phenomena, and these have, in the case of crime, often been implicit rather than explicit in their work.

In this context, theories of crime and deviance, as produced in other areas of the social sciences, are examined critically. Major trends in theorising, from consensus to conflict are scrutinised, and it is concluded that the Marxist approach to the study of crime is the best available, because even though it does have difficulty with the explanation of some non-economically motivated crimes, or with the existence of

psychopaths or sociopaths, it does offer explanations for the propertied nature of law, and the distribution of power in capitalist societies.

It is concluded that the explanation of crime offers many complex problems for theorists and researchers, for it is necessary to explain simultaneously large-scale political and economic processes and small-scale social and psychological processes. However, at present there remain many areas where research may be carried out in order to resolve existing problems within Marxist approaches. Amongst the areas for further research, it is suggested that the processes by which the dominant groups in society influence the legislative process in their own interests, and the historical origins of the laws protecting persons be examined.

For my family and friends

"The analysis of particular forms of crime, or particular types of criminal, outside of their context in history and society has been shown, in our view, to be a meaningless activity; and the analysis of propertied crime without reference to the demands placed by a propertied society on its members especially diversionary."

Ian Taylor, Paul Walton and Jock Young, 1975.

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I. Chapter One

Some considerations

Since the early 1960s, there has been a growth in the study of crime by geographers. One of the earliest references, in English, to a "Geography of Crime", was by Cohen (1941), but articles under this heading did not appear in geographical publications until Kaplan's (1960) article on crime and climate, and only on a regular basis in the 1970s. Today the subject figures in textbooks; there have been many articles, theses, and papers presented on the subject of crime; and there have been at least three books (Harries, 1974; Harries and Brunn, 1978; Harries, 1980.) on the subjects of crime, law, and justice by geographers. In using the term "geographical", I am referring to materials, written by geographers, which have appeared in geographical or other social science publications.

However, there have been many articles published over the last one hundred years or so, in other areas of the social sciences, dealing with the spatial aspects of crime and deviance. In fact most of the methodological developments have taken place outside of "geography", and certainly no explicit theorising about the nature of crime and society is apparent in

studies produced by geographers. This lack of theorising by geographers is not peculiar to studies of crime and deviance.

The growth in geographical interest in crime as a subject for study may be interpreted as the result of a variety of factors. It is possible to single out social and academic conditions which may have prompted the study of crime. Keith D. Harries has played a major role in the growth of the study of crime - he has produced at least eight articles and three books on the subject - but the subject was not his own creation. The so-called quantitative revolution of the mid-1960s had provided geographers with the means to process data and arrive at conclusions about the nature of the relationships between sets of data in mathematical form. At about the same time, a concern with social welfare, and a desire for carrying out relevant and useful work in order to relieve social problems, may also have acted as a spur to research. Undoubtedly, the social unrest of the late 1960s and the early 1970s, and a disenchantment with state and other crime control agencies acted as a catalyst in changing the focus of the studies carried out in criminology and sociology. The goal of much work was to improve the existing law enforcement system in order to reduce crime. This may also be interpreted as being a supportive move by academics as they attempt to prescribe "cures" for social ills, but do not look for the sources of those ills. In this light, in fact, the role adopted by geographers has been largely uncritical. However it

has also been argued that the social welfare motive, along with a desire for relevance, using new techniques, played the greatest part in stimulating geographical research into crime.

This research by geographers has persistently avoided any explicit social theory, and has relied upon officially produced data. It is the object of this study to examine the conceptions of society implicit in geographical studies of crime, to confront problems of crime, deviance, and social theory in sociology and criminology, and to suggest alternative research directions for geographers.

In this introductory chapter, the problem, the scope of the thesis, and the methods of examination of the problem will be outlined.

The problem

The basis of this thesis is to ascertain the value, role and purpose of social theory in geographical explanation, where it is applied to crime. How may social "facts" be understood out of the context of the processes which gave rise to those facts? Human geography has no theory peculiar to its own view of the world. Geographers have no specific concepts peculiar to their discipline; all that they have is a number of tools and concepts borrowed from physics, biology, mathematics, ecology and psychology (see Rimmer, 1978). It may be claimed that space or spatial distribution is the the foundation upon which geography

is built, but founding concepts of disciplines are usually a key to understanding the particular subject in a chosen way. Thus in history, for argument's sake, causality may be assumed to operate, and therefore history may be studied as a coherent whole, rather than as a set of random events. However, space is not a causal factor, the forces which govern humanity's use of the earth's surface and therefore distributions upon it, are political, social, and economic. It is to a study of these forces that geographers must direct their attention if they are to understand the spatial distributions of social phenomena.

Spatial relationships do not explain why a particular distribution of phenomena exists. The geomorphologist, for example, does not examine drumlins from a purely spatial point of view and then induce some relationship or theory in order to account for the perceived pattern. The phenomenon being examined is placed into the context of glaciation. Drumlins are common to most areas that have been glaciated, and so it is concluded with the aid of other forms of evidence, that drumlins are a product of glaciation. The same may not be said for subjects such as housing and crime. Crime, in particular, has been explained out of its context; geographers have treated crime as though it may be understood by its spatial distribution alone, with no reference at all being made to the context of crime - historical, social, political and economic forces.

All processes, economic, social, and historical, have some spatial manifestations; it is one way in which we know that they have taken place. This "knowing" is not an understanding, theory, or explanation of how the spatial distribution which we see, came into being. A crime is an act which (was and still) is deemed harmful to group or societal interests. To consider only the surface and directly observable spatial aspects of crime is to avoid the discussion and examination of the particular root reasons that lie beneath that spatial distribution of crime.

Geographical analyses of crime have taken a static view of law, crime, and society. Society is seen as inflexible, there is no give and take between institutions. Law is treated as a constant over time and space, yet law is a product of social processes, and it helps to create social processes. To date, most forms of social organisation appear to require some rules to ensure social continuity. Thus law, or its equivalents, would appear to have to exist always. Whilst the existence of law may be a constant, its form, over time and space, is not. Law represents a protection of interests central to maintaining a particular form of social organisation, and it may also demonstrate that there is an unequal distribution of power in society. The attempted explanation of crime at one time and at one place, removes it from the circumstances which define it, and which it defines. There are reasons for a particular pattern of crime existing, but these are not to be found at one time and

in one place.

Facts used by geographers to study crime, housing or medical provision, for instance, represent measurable parts of continuing processes. These "facts" are abstractions from the whole which gives rise to those facts. Mathematical devices may demonstrate that there is some form of relationship or association between the facts. Is this not an explanation of those facts? Clearly not, because a statistical process did not give rise to those facts, it represents only the possibility of a deeper relationship. The facts may be explained in terms of their apparent spatial relations, but spatial relationships did not give those "facts" their position upon the earth's surface. Gray (1976:38) states that,

the major task faced by geographers is to make the intellectual leap from assuming spatial forms can be adequately interpreted in terms of descriptive spatial processes, to grasping that the former can only be fully explained if we have a comprehensive knowledge of how society functions.

Looking at crime specifically then, a spatial pattern does exist - of course it does. Why does that particular pattern exist? If geographers are to understand the social, political and economic (as well as group and individual psychological) reasons for the spatial patterning of crime, then they need to look beyond the surface manifestations of these processes - the facts - and place the study of crime into its total context, rather than remove it from all but one aspect of its context.

The particular problem addressed by this thesis may be seen within the context of the preceding discussion. What conception of society are geographical writings on crime based upon, and what are the problems of theory and research in the study of crime and deviance? It should be apparent that these two questions are related, and this subject has been dealt with briefly by Peet (1975, and 1976), but, as yet, there has been no coherent attempt to integrate geographical studies of crime and deviance into an explicit overall theory of society; there has been little geographical work to test or to prove existing "theories" of crime in society.

The literature

The literature of the geography of crime has many unusual features. The literature reviews available, the most recent of which appeared in 1975 (Harries 1975a), show that geography or geographers have not been responsible for most of the spatial studies of crime. Phillips' (1972) review, although brief, does not cite the work of any geographers. There are citations from statistical and law journals, and sociology journals such as American Sociological Review. Scott's (1972) review contains only three references to articles which appeared in geographical journals, out of a total of seventy-nine articles cited. In Harries' (1975a) review, there were fifteen geographical works cited out of a total of forty-seven references.

A brief temporal analysis - excluding theses, dissertations, and papers at conferences - shows that up to Scott's (1972) analysis, there were indeed only three articles published in geographical journals. However, by 1980, the total had increased to more than forty articles and three books. Some of the more recent undergraduate textbooks, e.g. Smith, (1977); feature sections dealing with the geography of crime. The peak years of production appear to have been 1973 to 1976 inclusive,

Yet sociologists and criminologists have long been interested in the spatial aspects of crime and deviance, studies being carried out from the nineteenth century until the present, e.g. Schmid (1926), White (1932), Lander (1954), Gastil (1971), and Singh (1980). The work carried out by geographers has been based upon these and other studies, but unlike sociology and criminology, there is little debate over the nature of society and crime in geography. It would be useful at this point to review briefly the trends and techniques employed in the spatial analysis of crime and delinquency. <

The spatial analysis of crime: a brief history

There could be no spatial analysis of crime until data became available which lent itself to spatial interpretation. Data did not become available until accurate means of recording crime were developed. These "accurate means of recording" were initially far from consistent, different procedures being used

from town to town. Police forces gradually came into being, starting in the major cities, and then spreading to other regions. As reporting methods, recording, and legislation all changed, there appeared to be an increase in the amount of crime being committed. Engels (1958) wrote about this "rising tide" of crime which threatened to "wash away" the bourgeois class, without realising that this increase was probably due more to effective policing and improved recording of criminal activity, than to a real increase in the amounts of crime committed.

The early interest in the spatial distribution of crime occurred in Europe in the first half of the nineteenth century. Guerry, in France, based his work upon a series of national crime reports which had been compiled from 1825. He found that for all of the districts for which he had data, the levels of crime remained the same from year to year. Guerry's other findings included one that education did not appear to have a depressant effect upon the levels of crime, which he had expected. This finding was similar to that made by Fletcher (cited in Phillips, 1972), who, like Guerry, found that crime rates increased with population density. Fletcher also found that crime rates were higher in rural areas than they were in areas dependent upon industrial manufacturing. The approach adopted in these early studies was cartographic - simple maps showing the crude rates and their distributions. Tobias (1972;298-302) discusses the nature of the data available in

Victorian Britain.

The next major development in the areal analysis of crime and delinquency came from the Chicago "School" of sociology. The approach of this school was to view the city as an ecosystem in which the forces of nature controlled the social equivalents of processes such as invasion, succession, adaptation and survival. This approach attempted to demonstrate that crime and deviance, like other social phenomena, were patterned according to the concentric zone pattern hypothesised by Burgess.

Shaw and McKay (1942) produced sets of maps of Chicago and other large cities in the U.S., which showed that there appeared to be some form of relationship between the location of the residences of delinquents and the distribution of certain phenomena, such as population decline, insanity, and tuberculosis. Large correlation coefficients were found between delinquency and these other phenomena, which, according to Phillips (1972) and others, "...allowed them to reach .. significant conclusions." These conclusions were that areas remained "delinquent" despite the complete change of the population in that area. This led to the conclusion that areas themselves contributed to delinquency; social disorganisation was the hypothesised precipitating factor.

The statistical techniques employed by Shaw and McKay were relatively simple compared with those which were to follow. However, there are good grounds for criticising their work in

terms of method alone, although they have also made some questionable assumptions about the nature of society which will be examined in chapter three. Jonassen (1971) criticised Shaw and McKay's work in detail, claiming that they had fallen into the trap of according group characteristics to individuals, and that they had used inconsistent age-range categories for their study population. Aside from all of this, they had also ascribed their subjective interpretations of society to the statistical relationships that they had produced.

Lander (1954) used factor analysis to assess the possibility of the existence of an underlying relationship between delinquency and other social phenomena. Lander was trying to discover the nature and existence of social processes by using a statistical device, and arrived at the conclusion that "anomie" and "economic" factors were related to delinquency. These two factors happen to fit very neatly into R. K. Merton's Anomie "Theory" (see chapter three).

Chilton (1964) found that Lander had reversed the positive and negative signs on half of the variables that he had used, although Lander still managed to lend empirical "support" to Merton's "theory". Chilton carried out his own study and compared it with those of Lander (1954) and Bordura (1958), and despite methodological errors, he found some important similarities.

Shevky and Bell (1955) developed a technique which they called Social Area Analysis. Essentially this technique involved the aggregation of certain variables taken directly from the census. When the aggregated value of these variables was of a particular magnitude, it was claimed that this would indicate that the area to which they applied was already, or about to become, "criminal." This method falls also therefore into the trap of the ecological fallacy - crediting individuals with group characteristics.

White (1932) studied 638 crimes in Marion County, Indianapolis, and found a characteristic pattern of distance travelled from residence to offence, for different types of offence. Similar work has since been carried out by Capone and Nichols (1975) and Brantingham and Brantingham (1978).

Boqqs (1964, 1965) and Phillips (1973) have both suggested that studies of crime should employ crime rates based upon the risk of crime, and not upon the number of people resident in the area. It was argued that rates should be based upon the possibilities for committing crime, which in some cases have little to do with the size of the resident population.

This brief history has shown the developments which had taken place in the spatial analysis of crime and delinquency prior to the geographical interest in the subject. The first article to appear in a geographical publication was Kaplan's (1960) article upon crime and its apparent relationship to

climatic factors. The next geographical article to appear on this subject, was one in a similar vein by Miller (1968), on the apparent relationship between Santa Ana Winds and homicide in Los Angeles. It was only in the 1970s that geographers began to produce studies on the subjects of crime law and delinquency.

The method

The thesis will take the form of a critical review of geographers' attempts to explain crime, and similarly at attempts in sociology and criminology to formulate a coherent theory of crime in society, since geographers have borrowed - often without question - from these other disciplines.

The second chapter will take the form of a review of the geographical literature on crime and delinquency. In particular, the implicit assumptions about the nature of criminals, society, law, and the police (for example) will be examined. It is hoped to show that crime and law may not be treated as objective measures, and also to show that there has been little concern over the nature of theory in geography. Theory in geography has usually been of secondary importance, to the extent that technique has often taken the place of theory; of greater importance has been the "technical practice" of geography. Generally, a statistical relationship is elaborated upon by subjective hypothesising. Thus, a typical conception in the literature of the geography of crime, is that people of low

socioeconomic status commit the most crime. This empirically arrived at statement highlights some of the problems of the study of crime. Fact and value are assumed to be separate, as are method and philosophy of the study of the subject. The chapter will examine problems within the study of crime by geographers; data, techniques, and the ontological status of space; and problems of concern to geography and the other social sciences; the nature of law, and the meaning of the term "theory".

The critical review of the literature will focus upon these points. A state of society is implied in the literature which is open to conjecture, or refutation by empirical methods. It will be shown too - by reference to empirical studies - that the official data used in geographical studies have many imperfections, because of the methods used in compilation, and because of the nature of society and conceptions of criminals.

The third chapter will consist of a critical review of attempts to theorise in sociology and criminology in order to explain crime and deviance. For the sake of ease of organisation, these "theories" have been dealt with as though they existed at points along a conflict-consensus continuum. It is hoped to be able to extract some salient points from this discussion, which are considered relevant to the study of crime and deviance by geographers.

The fourth chapter will consist of a discussion of problems posed for existing theories of crime and deviance by the nature of crime in society, in the light of the discussions contained in chapters two and three. It is hoped to be able to point out some of the problems likely to be encountered in studying and theorising about crime and deviance, and to suggest tentatively how research should be carried out into the particular areas outlined.

The concluding chapter will be a summary of the major arguments of the thesis, and will, in the light of the foregoing discussion, outline the relevance of the study for future enquiry.

II. Chapter Two

Introduction

The studies of crime carried out by geographers have, in a sense been a triumph for positivistic description in geography. There have only been two written attacks on the study of crime (see Peet, 1975, 1976), which were quickly dismissed by the leading workers in the field (see Harries, 1975c; Phillips, 1975; and also contrast with Lee, 1975.) It is difficult to assess the value of mainstream geographical research into crime. If one were to do so within the terms of positivism, it would be necessary to look for some evidence of geographical work leading to more arrests or a decrease in the amounts of crime being committed. However, there are so many people working in this area that it would be difficult - to say the least - to isolate the contributions made by geographers from those made by criminologists, for example.

The major criticism of the study of crime (and other social phenomena in geography) is that, true to positivist roots, there has been a total disregard for the existence of values, and the interests that they represent. Fact and value, and method and philosophy, have become separated. The method supposes that the

subject and object of study may be treated as separate and independent of each other, whereas one has to exist in order for the other to exist. Major problems of the study of crime come from the divorcing of fact from value and method from philosophy. These problems may be classified, for the purposes of this chapter as internal, i.e. within the study of crime by geographers, and external, i.e. of concern to geographers and to other social sciences. The internal problems are; the quality of the data employed, the methods of analysis employed, and the ontological status of space. The external problems are; the nature of theory, and the origins and nature of law.

Officially produced data: objective facts?

Positivism deals with measurable facts. That a crime has been committed is a fact. A crime is also a value judgement, a particular act is judged to be harmful for certain reasons. Crime, a crime, is therefore simultaneously a fact and a value. Positivism may be able to handle values, but in this case they may not be readily measured. It is therefore not surprising to note that positivists in sociology, criminology, psychology, and geography have all chosen to ignore the fact that a crime is a value judgement. This has been highly functional as it it has allowed positivists to use official data without examining the interests and values represented by those data. <

Geographers and other social scientists have realised that the data that they have been using for studying crime are less than perfect. It has been long acknowledged that not all offences are noted by the police and that there have, from time to time, been individuals sufficiently unfortunate to have been arrested, tried and convicted only to have later been released when the real criminal was apprehended, or evidence unearthed to prove the innocence of the wrongly incarcerated individual. To complicate matters for the positivists, reporting rates vary from offence to offence. Murder, for obvious reasons, has a fairly high reporting rate, whereas rape is only reported about one time in five incidents (see Ennis, 1967). Business crimes have very low reporting rates; they are often dealt with internally by the organisation concerned and never make their way on to police records. Harries has noted that the Index of Crimes prepared by the F.B.I. only represents twenty percent of the offences recorded by the police departments which report to the F.B.I. Harries (1974), Harries and Lura (1974), and Harries and Brunn (1978), have all noted that the judicial systems of the U.S. - and presumably other advanced capitalist countries - are characterised by a large degree of regional heterogeneity, in the sentences which they serve, in the acts which they class as crimes and so on. There are variations between regions in the amounts of money allocated to policing and justice, and consequent effects upon the amounts of crime detected, the

treatment of suspects, and eventually on the amounts of crime which make their way into reports.

Crime is a widespread phenomenon. In the U.S. the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice report, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, notes that , "...about 40 percent of all male children now living in the United States will be arrested for a nontraffic offense during their lives. An independent survey... found that 91 percent (of the surveyed population) admitted they had committed acts for which they might have received jail or prison sentences." (1967:v) In the light of such evidence and predictions, why is it, asks Gordon (1973), that the police and penal systems focus upon a small group of individuals? The point here is that crime is a widespread phenomenon, but it is treated as a deviation from normal behaviour.

Wolfgang (1963), in a criticism of the Uniform Crime Reports, found that in addition there were many ambiguities in the categories used. In one case, the definition of the word 'seriousness' was a key issue. For example:

"as many as 28 percent of the bodily injury cases, classified by the U.C.R. as simple assaults, were as serious or more serious in terms of the resultant harm than 76 percent of those cases classified as aggravated assaults (1963:719-720).

Wolfgang also noted that there were problems with the ways in which property crimes were categorised, the nature of automobile thefts, and in particular with the categorisation of multiple

offences.

The data base employed by geographers in studying crime has been typically narrow. The sources of the data employed are official agencies, such as the F.B.I., or prison and probation services. In the U.S. the Index Crimes of the Uniform Crime Reports of the F.B.I. have formed the data base for most studies. These are the most serious crimes (see Table 2.1), and only comprise about twenty percent of all of the crime known to the police in the U.S. In Britain, although less work has been carried out than in the U.S., there is a similar categorisation. Harries (1975b;264) notes that police departments in the U.S. are not obliged to report to the F.B.I., and consequently only ".93 percent of the U.S. population is covered by the U.C.R. The 7 percent unaccounted for involves over fourteen million people!"

Wolfgang (1963;724) states that, "the U.C.R. classification system was constructed after much deliberation but without any underlying criminological theory, (and is) based upon assumed administrative utility, and presumed uniformity in the collection of statistics." This is a point made by many authors. Kitsuse and Cicourel (1962;135), for example, argue that official data are a social construction, reflecting ".the actions taken by persons in the social system which define, classify and record certain behaviours as deviant." Similarly Davis (1975:144) states that, "official data are social

Table 2.1 - Categories of serious crimes in the United States and England and Wales.

United States	England and Wales
Homicide	Violence against the person
Rape	Sexual offences
Assault	Burglary
Robbery	Robbery
Larceny > \$50	Theft and handling of stolen goods
Burglary	Fraud and forgery
Auto theft	Criminal damage
	Other offences

Sources: Harries, K. D. 1974. p. 10.; & Thompson, E. J. 1979. p. 258.

products," whose production is regulated by structural, legal and societal pressures, "...that involve only a half-hearted attempt to measure criminal or deviant activity accurately." Harries deplores this state of affairs (1975b:264), in writing that, "as a society, we are saying that we are more interested in the ownership levels of colour TV than we are in the various characteristics of crime."

Official data are products of the procedures which compiled them, as much as they are a product of the events which brought them to the attention of the agency concerned. Take, for example, an act which may be defined as a crime. Categories of criminal behaviour are ambiguous - how is the act to be classified? Was it an intentional act, or the result of an error of judgement? Did the officer at the scene read out the rights to the individual(s) he was arresting? Was there deemed to be sufficient admissible evidence for a trial to take place? Are

files not lost, fingerprints forgotten, or cases dismissed as 'no crime recorded' because the arrested person's family is influential? All of these factors, and many more, will cause a wastage at many levels of the administrative process, a wastage which devalues the final product as material suitable for use in positivist science, and which reflects the " operation of organisations which deal with with such actions and on the activities within these organisations." (Miles and Irvine, 1979;116)

The foregoing indicates that the police data employed by geographers in the study of crime are the highly inaccurate < products of social processes. It is therefore nonsensical to employ methods of analysis common to the physical sciences which presume and, indeed, require a high degree of accuracy in the data which they use. However, officially produced data have been widely used in all empirical studies of crime carried out to date by geographers. As most of the work has been carried out in the United States, the Index Crimes of the Uniform Crime Reports have formed the data base for these studies. Harries (1971, 1973a, 1974a, 1976a, 1976c,), Pyle (1974, 1976), Corsi and Harvey (1975), and others have used U.C.R. data to show the distribution of crime at the intra-urban, urban, state, and national levels, with full knowledge that their data cover only about one fifth of all of the known crime committed. This factor is played down: Harries only mentions it in passing in a

nongeographical journal, although the inaccuracy of the data is mentioned.

Harries' (1973a) article, concerned with the relationship between certain aspects of urbanism and crime, concluded that violent crime was indeed a large city phenomenon. In view of the nature of the errors to be found in the data, and the fact that he did not carry out any form of control "experiments" on non-urban areas, his conclusions are of little value. This must always be the case with any conclusions produced from such an inaccurate and limited data base. The magnitude of the sources of error will increase with property crimes because they are not reported as frequently as are offences against the person.

It should be noted that there has been a concern with the the mapping of spatial distributions of violent crimes - murder, assault, and rape - by geographers. The reporting rates for murder and assault are quite high compared with rates for property offences. Harries (1973a), Lee and Egan (1972), Lee, Leung and Lyles (1974), and Miller (1968), have all studied violent crimes. Miller (1968), for example investigated the supposed relationship between Santa Ana Winds and homicide. He believed his results to be indicative of a positive relationship between Santa Ana Winds and murder, but (1968;26) "...there is no positive assurance that findings are not in part attributable to other currently unidentified factors." Harries (1974) in discussing the "Southern violence phenomenon", notes that the

southern states - Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Texas and Florida - had much higher murder rates than the rest of the U.S. This southern violence had also been noted by other authors e.g. Gastil (1971), Hackney (1969), and the attempts to explain this phenomenon have ranged from identifying a culture of violence, through frustration of blacks by political and social conditions, to environmental determinism - the equivalent of Quetelet's "thermic law of deviance". Harries (1974:36) suggests that "...prolonged frontier conditions and adherence to a set of violence-related norms, generally acceptable in earlier times, that have become outmoded in other regions," are the source of Southern violence.

Property crimes - larceny, burglary and auto-theft have been dealt with by many authors. Haynes (1973), Sheerin and Barnett (1978), Capone and Nichols (1975, 1976), and Phillips (1973) have all studied property crimes. Phillips calls for the use of risk-related crime rates to be used by geographers, because the rates used have been based upon the population size, i.e. the murder rate in Carolina is 16.6 per 100,000 people. Phillips (1973:221) suggests that "a true crime rate is a risk statement which compares the number of targets victimised to the number that could have been victimised." Phillips then goes on to demonstrate that risk related rates are indeed different from population based rates. Capone and Nichols (1975) examine the "journey to crime" by robbers. Early work in this area was

carried out by Lind (1930), and White (1932). Capone and Nichols (1975:46) have as one of their hypotheses the statement that the "...distance travelled by offenders is directly related to the value of the property realised in the robbery." This statement bears many similarities to the "fact" that people - if they behave in an economically rational manner - will only travel long distances if they are buying expensive articles. Capone and Nichols never question people's motives for robbing, or indeed why robbery is an offence. In their 1975 study, their conclusions amount to little more than saying that people will travel further to rob a bank than they will to rob a convenience store. Such notions are directly related to Christaller's work on central places, with all of its assumptions about rational economic behaviour. <

Techniques of analysis

There are two major issues involved with the techniques used to analyse crime data; the appropriateness of the technique to the desired goal, and the relevance of the techniques in view of the subject matter. The statistical techniques that have been used by geographers in the study of crime are Spearman's rank correlation coefficient (Phillips 1973; Harries 1974), regression analysis (Harries 1974), factor analysis (Harries 1974), canonical analysis (Harries 1976; Corsi and Harvey, 1975) and centrophraphy (Stephenson 1974).

The regression technique may be used to show the relationship between two sets of variables, to predict one set of variables from knowledge of the other, and to uncover anomalies in the relationships between paired variables. Hammond and McCullagh (1974;218) state that regression analysis is ".of limited value..unless the variables in question are highly correlated." Haynes (1973) uses regression analysis to test the assertion that crime is a function of opportunites, which is directly related to the population size. He concludes that population size appears to predict crime rate, but does not entertain the notion that the relationship may be due to the presence of an unidentified variable. Haynes has achieved prediction, it should also be noted that his equation would provide similar results if it was used to help predict the amount of business carried out by shops. The regression tool can be used for prediction (see Mark and Peucker, 1978), so in this instance it has been used correctly. In this case it is plausible that population size predicts crime rates, but to assert the existence of causality is to use the regression tool for a purpose for which it was not designed.

Regression analysis has also been used by Herbert (1976b), Harries (1973b) and Lee and Egan (1972). Lee and Egan (ibid;59) studied the distribution of serious crime in Denver, in the hope that they would be able to ".lay the foundation for the formulation of theories in the area of the geography of crime."

They do not state what they understand by the term "theory", nor what theoretical position directed their research. Their conclusions are that the variables employed in the regression analysis account for eighty-five percent of the variation in the rates of violent crime in the city of Denver. They state that the central business district is the prime area for crime due to small night-time population, ease of access and the large number of lucrative targets. They hold that crime and poverty are closely correlated. This is evidently the case, as many studies have shown, but this does not explain crime anymore than correlations between race and crime explain crime or race.

Harries' (1976:383-384) use of canonical analysis leads him to suggest that the statistical associations which he has derived "...tend to confirm the stereotypical view that low income places with young, transient populations are criminogenic." Harries is here ascribing causality to account for the relationships between two sets of variables. The word "criminogenic" implies the existence of a causal relationship.

Poole and O'Farrell (1971:148) state that each value of the dependent and independent variables should be measured without error. This is clearly not the case with crime data employed by geographers. Ennis (1967:21) shows evidence of the sizes of error which may be expected to exist in police data. The crimes examined by Harries (1976) were robbery, assault, burglary, and auto theft. Ennis shows that real robbery rates were at least

three times those recorded by the police in the northeastern U.S. In view of the sizes of the errors involved, Harries' conclusions are worthless from a scientific point of view. His success in confirming stereotypical views of the criminal, does little more than point to the absurdity of using grossly inaccurate data in techniques which require an accurate data base. The media manage to produce the same stereotypical view without all of the spurious lip-service to notions of science.

Clark (1975;29) states that in using canonical analysis it is difficult to meet "...all of the relevant requirements in most operational designs." Despite shortcomings with victimisation surveys (see for example Harries 1976b, and Nettler 1974), sufficiently large errors exist to render police data inaccurate, especially where property crimes are concerned. Clark (1975;29-33) outlines in detail the deficiencies of canonical analysis.

Another problem in the use of statistical techniques involves the selection of variables. Why are certain variables selected in preference to other possible variables? To reduce society to an atomistic association of thirty or so variables is a vast simplification and it also shows that some preconception, construct, or notion about the nature of crime and society helped to choose those variables in preference to a large number of others which could have been selected. Certainly police and census data are convenient and useful to a degree, but they are

7 - see Baldwin & Bottoms - The Urban Criminal

not compiled for the purposes of any particular experiment. Harries (1973b;97) states that "...thirty-two social indicators (were) selected on the basis of their theoretical potential relationship to crime rates," but nowhere does Harries indicate the nature of this "theory" which aided selection. Any selection of data, even a random selection is made upon the basis of some "theory" or construct. If this were not the case, each time an experiment is carried out, it would be necessary to eliminate literally thousands of variables which are really inconsequential (see for example Chalmers 1976;ch.3).

Although the techniques employed by geographers have largely been employed in the "correct" manner, the data used are so inaccurate as to destroy the reliability of the statistical techniques in predicting or explaining variation in or between variables. It should also be noted that non-statistical forms of analysis have also been used in studying crime, deviance, and justice, e.g. Harries and Lura, (1974); Harries and Brunn, (1978); and Miller (1968).

Miller (1968) merely publishes climatic data - related to the Santa Ana Winds - and homicide data, the number which actually occurred on each day, the expected number for each day, and the departure from expectations for each day. The tables contain many contradictions, for example the weather data for 23rd of October and 4th of December, 1965, are similar, but on the former day there were five homicides, and on the latter

there was one, giving departures from the normal of +3.6 and -0.4 respectively. Miller did not test to see if deviations from the expected number of homicides were significantly different depending upon whether or not the Santa Ana Wind was blowing.

Cartographic approaches to the study of crime have been used in quite a few studies (see Harries, 1971, 1974; Harries and Lura, 1974; and Harries and Brunn, 1978;), but these have been of quite a low standard as it is not possible to state, from a map only, what is responsible for spatial discontinuities. An example of the ascribing of totally subjective reasons in order to account for patterns appears in Harries' (1971;206) discussion of rape in the U.S. The reason, he suggests, for the high incidence of rape in Alaska is the ratio of males to females in the population; "...Alaskan males have some form of excuse for this form of deviant behaviour - in 1960 there were about 132 males per 100 females in the state."

Harries and Brunn (1978;10-15) suggest that one reason for spatial variations in "justice" in the U.S. is the existence of different regional social philosophies, which they identify as individualistic, moralistic, traditionalistic, and individual-moralistic. Each one of these social philosophies they argue, has influenced the development of statutes throughout the U.S. The philosophies, they assert, have their origins in the cultures of the different groups which migrated to the U.S. The maps published do indeed show that there are

different cultural regions in the U.S., but how these cultural values came to be incorporated into the system of statutes is never really explained. How certain values are chosen over others is never stated.

There have been a few attempts to study the problem of juvenile delinquency by geographers (Stephenson, 1974; Herbert, 1976, 1977a, 1977b.). These have relied often upon officially produced data, the use of statistical techniques, e.g. Herbert's (1976) use of stepwise regression, and Stephenson's (1974) use of centrography. For the greater part, the broader social contexts of delinquency were not considered, and there appears to have been little concern at all with the fact that many adolescents just pass through a delinquent phase in their growth and development. Delinquent forms of behaviour are, of course, socially defined, but at certain stages of their development people may suffer from motor problems and hormonal imbalance which incline the individual to delinquent forms of behaviour which in a few months time he or she may no longer display (see for example Mussen, Conger, and Kagan, 1979; Sandstrom, 1966; Sants and Butcher, 1974).

In conclusion then, in their studies of crime, geographers have had to cope with grossly inaccurate data. Their techniques have unearthed some statistical relationships, but these have not prompted further research into the reasons for crime. Rather they have usually led to the suggestion of environmental design

changes, or change of patrol patterns for the police. The data employed represent selected points in social processes. The suggestion of policy implications shows that geographers have a desire to reduce crime, but they have not made any attempt to understand the forces which contribute to the production of the data which they employ. Although most geographers know what correlates with crime, they do not show much evidence in their work of attempting to understand how the correlates are related to crime other than in statistical terms. Few authors have expressed a concern over this. Ackerman (1976:38) wrote that "...too much attention has been given to what correlates with crime and not enough study to what really causes crime." Herbert (1977a) and Peet (1975, 1976) have shown concern over the wider societal setting of crime. Herbert's (1977a) discussion of explanations of crime and deviance is the most extensive to date by a geographer, but he does not consider all possible points of view. If there is no appreciation of the complexity of the reasons for crime and deviance, how may geographers hope to help at all in reducing crime?

The ontological status of space

Space, as a key to understanding the distribution of crime is not a very useful concept. "Crime" is the infringement of rules central to maintaining a particular form of social organisation. The private appropriation of property is of

central importance in maintaining capitalism, therefore we find that most crime occurs where most property and people are found. The Index Crimes in the U.C.R. are divided into property and violent offences. Rape, homicide, and assault are directed against the person, although the last two may be the result of an attempt to gain materially. Robbery is also a crime against the person, but the motive is material gain. Burglary, larceny, and auto theft are all offences against property. Thus in the Index Crimes it seems that the greater concern is with property crimes, and certainly the greater proportion of recorded offences are concerned with property (see Table 2.2).

Common to most systems of understanding, is the notion that physical proof is necessary to show that certain constructs are not just flights of fancy and that they are at least as plausible as other constructs in the same arena of ideas. Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity, although mathematically and logically feasible, required some test in the reality which it purported to explain. Part of this proof came with the observation that light rays are bent by strong gravitational fields. Proof has to happen in space, but the processes which yield that proof may not be sensible. We cannot sense that uranium atoms decay into thorium, lead, and barium atoms and emit radiation, without measuring all of these changes. Similarly with crime; we cannot see the processes which produce crime, but we must be able to account for the total pattern of

Table 2.2 - Totals and proportions of Index crimes, 1971.

Crime	Total	Percentage
Murder	17630	0.3
Assault	364600	6.1
Rape	41890	0.7
Robbery	385910	6.4
Burqlary	2368400	39.5
Larceny	1875200	31.3
Auto theft	941600	15.7

Source: adapted from Harries, 1974.p. 10.

crime with theoretical constructs which relate the pattern to all aspects of social organisation.

Eliot Hurst (1980;11) writes that "far from being a "separate", distinct object, "space" is simply one aspect of a single relationship in which unevenly developed concrete patterns on the earth's surface can direct us to that abstraction, space, not vice-versa." Space is ubiquitous, economists consider it in terms of the costs incurred in order to cross it, physicists in terms of its relationship to time, and so on. Everything that does not happen in space we may only speculate about, we have no ultimate proof that it has taken place. Why, then, elevate space to the position of a "founding concept" for a discipline? The answers to this question may be found in the historical development of the discipline, which is elsewhere documented (see for example, Peet, 1979; Hudson, 1977; Eliot Hurst, 1980.)

The attempt to understand or explain crime from its spatial

manifestations is limited, because space does not give rise to crime, nor does it "cause" crime. Crime takes place in space, but the use of space by humans is governed by the economic and political imperatives of social organisation. Thus crime does not just "exist", it exists because a particular set of power relationships and dominant values have helped to define certain acts as crimes. The power relationships did not just "appear" either, they are the product of many hundreds of years of development. In order to understand or explain crime, it is to this wider context which geographers should direct their attention.

Harvey (1973:289) notes that society is a totality of structures which interact and influence the form of each other. Thus legal structures must be seen as interacting with political, ideological, economic and social structures, in order to effect the preservation of the whole. This is not a static situation, for it may be seen in the case of capitalism that although certain features of society persist - wage labour, class structure, etc. - changes in the distribution and concentrations of wealth and power have taken place. Thus law is not independent of society; it is a construction of groups in society whose form and content helps in preserving features central to the maintenance of a particular social formation. To examine crime in space is as likely to produce an understanding of it as if we study it in time. Such facts are of use only to

insurance companies and law enforcement agencies. Of course crime occurs in time and space, but who defines acts as crimes, why are certain acts given "criminal" status? It is through attempting to answer these questions that geographers will come to an understanding of crime. The final two sections of this chapter consider the nature of crime and the meaning of the term "theory".

What is crime?

Crime has been studied by geographers, psychologists, sociologists, anthropologists, philosophers, and criminologists. The last four groups have considered, in depth, the nature of crime and what it represents. A typical dictionary definition of crime would involve notions of breaking rules, laws or perhaps not upholding customs. The general conception is that some form of behavioral boundary has been overstepped. Of course, all of the groups would mention this, but only the last four groups have gone further than this in their attempts to understand crime. The laws which exist, do so in order to protect interests, and this is where divisions in philosophy occur.

Broadly speaking, it is possible to view the origin of law in three ways. Social contract theorists after Cesare Beccaria (1804), held that humans united under law to rid itself of constant war and struggle. Everybody was seen as entering into a contractual relationship which enabled society to run smoothly.

Social continuity was maintained by legal punishment. It must be apparent that there are quite a few defects in this view of law. For example, Taylor et al (1973;4) state that it does not resolve the conflict "...between the defence of equality and the emphasis on property," added to which, nobody ever signs a contract, agreeing to abide by the rules laid down in antiquity.

The role allocated to law by the structural-functionalists is similar to the one allocated to it by the believers in the social contract, although its origins are somewhat mysterious. Law - after Durkheim - is an embodiment of the "common conscience". Durkheim (1933;74) states that "...the rules which prohibit... (crimes) are graven in all consciences." Durkheim continues (1933;74-75): "every written law has a double object: to prescribe certain obligations, and to define the sanctions which are attached to them." The defining of laws appears to follow democratic procedure, wherein an individual surveys the population to see which acts shock the common conscience, and may therefore be classed as crimes. Law is thus an expression of consensus.

The conflict approach to law views law as existing to contain conflict between groups. These conflicts arise because of the relationships of particular groups to the means of production in society. It contains the notions of unequal power distributions in society, and therefore the ability of some groups to impose their wills upon other groups in society, in

see
H. Davies
"Justice"

order to maintain a particular form of social and economic organisation. Marx saw laws as being a legal expression of property relations in society. Law in this context is not the means by which conflicts may be resolved - as in the social contract approach - but is itself an expression of the conflict between productive forces in society and the relationship of workers to the production of the requisites for social continuity.

This approach may be viewed as being unable to handle consensus, which does exist between and within many social groups in society. In order to explain the existence of consensus, it is necessary to have individuals, in a system which generates conflict, believe that they have common interests. Thus individuals may collectively believe that it is necessary to maintain their standards of living, and take action to this effect. In order to do this they have to act en masse, and in doing so will often have set aside individual differences which appear in many realms.

Geographer's statements about the nature of law, crime, and morality have generally been incomplete, but they serve to legitimate positivistic studies of crime. It is hoped to be able to show that the conceptions of crime and society held by geographers are simplistic. Some of the most explicit statements concerning the nature of society are to be found in Harries' (1976a) article on urban crime. Crime, according to Harries,

acts as an inhibitor to prosperity. "Cities with crime rates that are known to be high may repel potential migrants and discourage the establishment of economic activities."

(1976a;369) Here the existence of crime is seen as disrupting economic activities and thus the livelihood of the region or nation. Harries concludes the (ibid;385) article by writing that, "the economic benefits of mobility are so great that therapeutic action can only be considered in the context of continuing freedom to migrate." Harries is here talking about those people who are active in the economic life of society, and it is the freedom of these people which should be protected so that they may continue to contribute to the well-being of society. Here the conception is similar to that of Durkheim (see Chapter Three); there are two groups in society, the law-abiders and the law-breakers. It is desirable for the former group to use whatever means are available in order to bring about an environment which is conducive to migration and the establishment of economic activities. Harries (1974;85) lists five elements which could be incorporated into the designs of cities, for example, "Inner-city affluent populations would live in expensively fortified compounds." This has overtones of 1984 and shows little desire to come to terms with the causes of crime or to attempt to eradicate crime from society.

Harries also suggests that there is in existence a national consciousness, a concept which echos Durkheim's notions of a

common conscience. Harries (1975b) criticises the media - the means by which he sees a national consciousness being produced - because all it does is produce anxiety and paranoia over the issue of crime. For Durkheim as for Marx, this fear of crime was one of the means by which social cohesion was produced; but for Harries (1975b;262) it is seen as being divisive, it is a reason to, "...batten down the hatches, lock up daughters, and immediately install the latest security equipment.."

There is also in the literature the conception that crime is a product of socioeconomic pathology. In order to be able to define a state of abnormality, it is necessary to be able to state what normality is. A state of socioeconomic normality is never outlined, but it is possible to build up a picture of the "pathological" areas in cities from the weightings given to the variables used in factor analysis. These areas are characterised by high population densities, and high levels of municipal or state spending in order to compensate for the poverty of the area. There is a rapid change-over of population, a large black population, high birth rate, high unemployment, high divorce rate, and the main form of employment is in manufacturing. How all of these factors are related to crime is never explained, all that we are told is that these factors and crime often appear together and not why they appear together.

The superficial consideration of the nature of crime and society and the lack of research into deeper problems of social

structure, law, and so on, has left geography unable to offer any solutions for reducing crime.

The geographical study of crime has treated law, to all intents and purposes, as though it were a constant, objective measuring device, employed by the police and courts in a manner similar to the way in which natural scientists employ scales of temperature, resistance, or energy. This is obviously not the case, because the police are selective, the law affirms a system of value judgements, imposed in order to maintain a particular form of social and economic organisation. Geographers have treated the law as though it were sacred, and must not be mentioned, although it is permissible to admit the fallibility of data collection procedures, if not too heavily stressed. Geographers have not made explicit their political and philosophical standpoints with regard to crime (with the exception of Peet, 1975, 1976), but it is apparent that their policy implications and suggestions for further research (see Winchester, 1978) are not apolitical in that they suggest measures which are supportive of the existing political, social, and economic order. Thus they aim, at least in the short-term, to support the capitalist system, without ever apparently wondering whether it is the capitalist system itself which produces the crime that they are trying to curb.

What is theory?

Geographers have not made explicit what they understand by the term "theory". They have implicitly conveyed the impression that the existing order is "right", which is an ideological stance, but as a theory of society this is inadequate. This will be discussed in more detail in chapter three - for now, it is necessary to consider what a "theory" is.

Scientists in general, and social scientists in particular have difficulties with the construction and testing of theories used in their disciplines. What should a theory possess? What should its properties be? Chalmers (1976:1) states that a popular view is that,

"Scientific theories are derived in some rigorous way from the facts of experience acquired by observation and experiment...Personal opinion or preferences and speculative imaginings have no place in science. Science is objective."

In the physical sciences a general statement or theory is often derived by inductive methods. To Isaac Newton, observed facts tended to suggest that force, mass and acceleration were related in some way. Experiments to ascertain the existence of a relationship yielded consistent results, and Newton was able to show that force was a product of mass and acceleration. The relationship, $F=ma$, was not arrived at by pure observation, Newton already suspected the existence of a relationship, otherwise he would have had to eliminate thousands of factors which were totally irrelevant, e.g. weather conditions, building

materials, the colour of the walls etc.. No physical scientist speculates wildly (this does not deny the use of creativity in physical science); theories have to be plausible. It was possible that the earth was the centre of the universe, because all of the evidence pointed to that, the sun, stars and moon did (and still do) appear to orbit around the earth. The reason why we know this not to be the case today is that there has been much evidence produced to falsify this view. However, new theories which have been produced to account for the apparent motion of the stars, and sun, still account for all of the phenomena observed by the ancients, while explaining the existence of contradictory evidence which was the downfall of the old theory.

A falsificationist's view of a theory is that the theory must be an accurate depiction and explanation of events, and it must also be falsifiable. This view of knowledge holds that there is no absolute knowledge, and that the accumulation of knowledge is an evolutionary process, "stronger" theories lasting longer than weaker ones. A theory is a statement connecting a series of events or phenomena in a plausible manner, and falsifiability is one desirable property. The statement: "a body totally or partially immersed in a fluid experiences an uplift equal to the amount of fluid displaced", is logically falsifiable; whereas the statement "Ipswich either will or will not win the First Division Title in 1981", is not

logically falsifiable.

This view of science, proposed by Karl Popper (1959), suggests that the strongest theory would last the longest, even though it was falsifiable, because it resisted most attempts to falsify it. Thus the task for post-Newtonian physicists was not to marvel at his creations, but to try to prove them inaccurate. That task took two and a half centuries. The falsificationist view is that the sole object of theory is to explain phenomena, and that theories are never judged upon criteria other than scientific, such as utility for members of non-scientific communities. Even in the physical sciences this has not been the case; the Catholic Church's dealings with Galileo provide one example of this. Theories may be adhered to, revised, or upheld as accurate depictions of reality because they are the best available (see Chalmers, 1976:62-63), or because it is politically expedient.

Theory is only useful insofar as it is able to relate a given set of phenomena by a logical set of processes given certain (usually unquestioned) premises. "Theories" of the social world tend to be produced by those in privileged social positions such as universities, or research institutes. The theory produced is coloured by the theorist's view of society, socialisation experiences and so on. A theory based upon the notion that humans are basically bad or good, is religious, because there is no evidence that shows that humans are either

bad or good, just that they have the capacity to be bad and good as variously defined. The use of terms bad and good belie the existence of value judgements, which cannot be falsified, although this does not deny that logic or falsifiability may be properties of theories premised upon such values.

The falsificationist view is inadequate in its treatment of the social sciences, because "theories" of society or social behaviour do have a utilitarian value, because they may serve to legitimate the behaviour of certain groups. Viewing society as a mass of people who need to be policed, lest they indulge in all sorts of socially damaging types of behaviour, legitimates greater control of the population. In the social sciences, it is necessary to look past the ability of a "theory" to explain phenomena, to the history of that theory, the institutions it has been built into, and how it continues to exert an influence upon behaviour and institutions today.

Another problem with the falsificationist view is, which phenomena are relevant, and which irrelevant, to the phenomena being explained? The social pathologist's view of crime was that it was committed by individuals who were ill in some way. As a theory, this is quite easy to falsify, because not all criminals are mentally ill or abnormal. As a theory it is totally inadequate because it does not explain the existence of law, which is the major factor in the criminal process.

Further to this, falsificationist's view science as the result of the practice and attitudes of individuals, rather than as a practice influenced by social, political and economic conditions. Chalmers (1976; chapter six) discusses some of the major problems with the falsificationist approach to science and concludes that it is idealistic. Althusser's (1971a) approach to science appears to be more coherent than Popper's, for he places science in its defined and defining contexts. He states that science is a practice which operates upon conceptual systems, and which has a functionally interdependent relationship with other forms of practice (political, economic, ideological). Whereas Popper attributes significance, importance, and rationality to the aims of individual practitioners of science, Althusser argues that research or theory grows or dies because of a particular scientific practice, and not as the result of attempts to falsify them. Being an elaboration of Marx's writings, Althusser's approach sees theories existing not as parts of autonomous worlds of ideas, but as parts of the scientific practice which is related to the other "worlds" of practice. From the materialist point of view, science exists not in order to pursue truth - as in Popper's scheme - but because it has a function in society. Unfortunately cause and function are not the same things, the origins of scientific practice must be sought in history.

Philosophies of society, social change and social structure, are all grounded in the reality which they seek to portray. The reality in which philosophies are grounded may be only a narrow section of the "real world". A philosophy of society grounded in the contradictions which exist within society emphasises those contradictions and views consensus as being produced in order to reduce the conflicts produced by the contradictions in society. The belief that society may be studied as a totality formed by atomistic associations of facts, will lead to the study of society as a set of factors which may be correlated. These factors combine in some way to "explain", "predict", or "account for" a particular pattern of events, or distribution of phenomena. Facts here are viewed as static, not points in processes, as ends in themselves. These facts are understood out of the context of processes. A belief in society as a totality undergoing continual transformations as a result of interactions between structures trying to maintain themselves and the totality, will lead to the study of facts as just parts of social processes, the other parts not being measurable, but discernable by watching their operation.

The point here is that all theories are grounded in the reality which they seek to portray. Theories may be validated by testing or implementation, but in order to do this it is necessary to be able to operationalise the concepts used in the theory, and the theory must be stated in a sufficiently precise

form that it may be tested. For all theories physical proof in the concrete world is the most desirable form of validation. Thus a person who believes that criminal behaviour is the result of genetic malfunction, seeks only evidence of that. A person who believes that the sole motive for criminal behaviour is to be found in rational economic approaches will seek economic causes.

A theory of society is not complete until it views society as a totality; a set of institutions, values, and processes, engaged in the (unconscious) act of self-preservation. In order to understand how society "works", it is not possible to view it as a set of facts which correlate with each other. Whilst correlation may indicate the existence of a relationship, it is not itself a process. If geographers are interested in trying to curb crime, they have to see crime as the existence of processes - consensual or conflicting in nature - and not simply as something which correlates with socioeconomic variables. Such a view of crime will rarely lead to suggestions for policy which will produce reductions in crime, because the complex web of relationships which produce crime have not been understood. Crime is just treated as another facet of capitalism which may be dealt with by administrative processes, or greater expenditure. The roots of crime are too diverse to allow any but the most extreme administrative solutions to have any effect, so it is only through viewing social processes as being producers

of crime that we may come to a position where our understanding of crime is such that we may be able to effect a reduction in the amounts of crime committed.

Other areas of the social sciences have theorised about crime and some of the constructs produced are valuable to geographers, others are not. Chapter three will be a discussion of the major trends in theory formulation in the other areas of the social sciences, in particular in sociology and criminology.

III. Chapter Three

Introduction

The main objective of this chapter is to examine the attempts which have been made in sociology and criminology to explain crime and deviance. Each of the constructs, some of which may also be labelled theories, has a particular range of convenience. Some are concerned solely with the individual as the source of crime, others with laws and the individual, and yet others with processes which operate within groups. Geographers have for the most part, ignored the efforts of sociology and criminology in attempting to explain the existence of crime in society. In contrast to many of the perspectives to be examined here, geographers have taken a largely administrative approach - they have used official data, studied crime "objectively", and have used the results obtained to suggest ways in which policing may be improved or the environment designed in such a way as to reduce crime. Whilst some sociologists and criminologists have been "guilty" of this approach, concern has been expressed as to what causes crime and not just with its correlates.

For organisational purposes, and for the sake of

continuity, "theories" of crime and deviance will be examined as though they exist at different points along a conflict-consensus continuum. This regime is restrictive in some respects; it accords little of the respect due to some of the approaches, but it does give a suitable point of reference when comparing one approach with another.

Sociology and criminology are closely related; there are sociologists who study criminal behaviour, and criminologists who study topics in sociology. Gibbons (1979:3) calls criminology "...a subdiscipline of sociology," and to support this statement, he notes that there is a section of the American Sociological Association which is primarily concerned with the study of crime, penology, etc. The interest in crime and law has existed for thousands of years, the Greek and Roman philosophers having examined some of the major problem areas that now fall under the label of "sociology". The "founding fathers" of modern sociology and criminology lived in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, e.g. August Comte, Cesare Beccaria, Jeremy Bentham, Cesare Lombroso, Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Emile Durkheim, to name but a few.

August Comte - living at the time of the industrial revolution coined the term "sociology", and he was the first person to attempt to systematise the study of society. Comte was a positivist, believing that the methods of physical science could be applied to the social world in order to eradicate

problems which he perceived as illnesses in the body of society. Comte viewed society as a collective organism, with interdependent parts which helped to maintain the health of the whole. He believed that society was united - Aron (1965:59) describes him as "...the sociologist of human and social unity," - and that social ills e.g. crime, poverty; could be eliminated by scientific techniques, and not by relying upon the intervention of God. Comte was not a revolutionary, nor was he a liberal, he simply believed that positive science could help to relieve the problems of a society in crisis - the one which he observed. Positivistic studies of crime appear in the geographical literature, and also from time to time in the sociological and criminological literature. The approach to the study of crime which has its roots in the methods and philosophy of Comte, is that of the social pathologists. However, the discussion of attempts to account for crime and deviance in society will begin at the consensus end of the continuum, with the functionalism of Durkheim.

Durkheimian Functionalism

To label Emile Durkheim as a consensus theorist is to understate the complexity and depth of much of his work. Durkheim is one of the few theorists who manages - in a plausible manner - to integrate crime into society. According to Durkheim (1966:122) "man is naturally inclined to the political,

domestic, and religious life, to commerce etc.; and it is from these natural drives that social organisation is derived." Just how "natural" these inclinations are is open to debate, because functional necessity dictates that without these "drives," social life would not exist.

However, this position also allows Durkheim to view society as being entirely natural, and therefore any social forces which constrain individuals are entirely natural. In a natural world, everything has a function, usually in helping to maintain a balance of some sort, and thus it is not surprising that Durkheim should devote some attention to the subjects of crime and deviance. Deviance has as its function, the advertising of behavioural boundaries. Durkheim (1933;74) circumnavigates the problem of who decides what is criminal or deviant behaviour, by stating that:

"..the rules which prohibit these acts (crimes)...are graven in all consciences, everybody knows them and feels that they are well founded..."

It follows from this that legal codes derive from some form of opinion poll, compiled impartially. This view does not account for changes in the law. Criminals existed to reinforce the common conscience of society. Crime caused non-criminals to unite, and was therefore a source of social cohesion. For Durkheim, crime was normal, because a society which did not have crime did not exist.

Durkheim (1966;67-70) argues at length for the inevitability of crime - stating that because of human diversity and the fact of social organisation, that crime must exist - but concludes that "...crime is, then, necessary; it is bound up with the fundamental conditions of all social life.." According to Roshier (1977;310) Durkheim's arguments have failed to distinguish between the inevitability and necessity of crime. In the strict functional scheme of things inevitability does imply necessity, but Durkheim's arguments at this point in the discussion are not strong, and the necessity-inevitability relationship is axiomatic.

The boundary-maintaining function of crime and deviance suggests that society has a need for criminals. Erikson (1965) argues that agencies which supposedly "correct" criminals, actually exist in order to nourish deviant forms of behaviour. Roshier (1977;316) states that this view of agencies "...seems to require that we are guided by some form of "collective unconscious" since this is the exact opposite of the ostensible aim of agencies of social control." In Durkheim's scheme, deviants and criminals exist in order to show the rest of society what forms of behaviour are not permissible, and to "cause" cohesion. Durkheim also saw crime as having an adaptive function; each society had to contain forms of behaviour which would be functionally vital for the development of that society. Roshier (1977;320) states that Durkheim's position is that "the

existence of crime ensures sufficient diversity of behaviour and belief to allow society to adapt to new conditions." Of course, to prove this case it is necessary to show that acts which have been decriminalised are now central to the maintenance of a particular form of social organisation in the future. Further to this, Roshier (ibid) states that "...we must show that it was necessary for such behaviour and beliefs to have formerly been defined as crime," in order to prove that crime does serve an adaptive function in society.

There are problems with Durkheim's analysis, for he does not develop his arguments concerning inevitability and necessity, nor does his discussion of the adaptive function of crime prove that crime does have a role to play in future societies. Crime or deviance was not seen as being a result of individual pathology here, it existed merely because humanity naturally organised itself, and thus behavioural limits were set and broken. There was no contention that law existed to protect or further the interests of certain groups in society, or that the order which existed may have been an imposition.

Social Pathology

Durkheim's consensual society accorded the criminal or deviant a definite function. This is very different from the view of society and criminals held by the social pathologists.

The methods of the social pathologists were derived from the works of Comte. Like him, they believed that society was an integrated and unified organism, its natural state one of harmony. The positivists saw their role in society as regulating the social system "...by inculcating fixed principles of social conduct," (Davis, 1975;36) into the whole of the population. The social order was viewed as being rational, and people who did not conform to this order were seen as irrational.

Thus it was that the individual was seen as the source of deviance, because she or he did not conform to a rational social order. This approach directed attention away from any search for structural causes of crime and deviance, whose existence was suspected although not substantiated, in the mid-nineteenth century (see Tobias, 1972;180-87.).

This situation was complicated by the introduction of Herbert Spencer's doctrine of Social Darwinism, which was used to legitimate the position of the newly emerging "middle class", and the emerging industrial order, and to negate responsibility for poorer social groups and individuals. People became rich and powerful because it was part of their natural make-up.

Crime was not defined in legalistic terms; how could a determined aspect of human behaviour have a legal definition? Punishment was viewed as being in accordance with the sources and strengths of motivation which produced the deviant act. The prison was viewed as a type of hospital, the length of stay

being determined by the type and duration of treatment necessary to rehabilitate the individual.

One of the most influential of the early positivists was Cesare Lombroso (1835-1909). Lombroso was interested in psychology, and he was influenced by the writings of Comte. Despite approaches which emphasise the social determinants of crime, there remains to the present, a belief that all people's behaviour is influenced by genetic factors. The behaviour of individuals is also influenced by social factors, but it is not unreasonable to assume that there have always been those individuals who have been compulsive or antisocial in some aspects of their behaviour. Arguments upon emphasis continue (see Eysenck, 1970; Little, 1963; Hoghuqi and Forest, 1970.) as to how much of human behaviour is attributable to drives or instincts, and how much to socialisation processes. These are difficult questions to answer, but there is substantial evidence (see for example, Jeffery, 1979; Delitz, 1978; Schulsinger, 1972; Inkeles, 1970.) to suggest that some individuals behave in manners classed as criminal, as a result of heredity or biological factors. It is not being suggested that this explains the law, but it does explain why some people do habitually break the law. Nor is it being suggested that all criminals or deviants are sociopaths. The suggestion is that there is a small group of criminals who are not the victims of social processes, and who cannot help behaving in ways which have been classified

as deviant or criminal.

An overemphasis upon individual psychology had a detrimental effect upon the development of criminology and sociology. Matza (1969;143-44) wrote that:

"the criminological positivists succeeded in what would seem the impossible. They separated the study of crime from the workings and theory of the state."

This helps to explain the lack of state involvement in the provision of planning institutions and social services, and the research emphasis upon upon casework - sick individuals were difficult to conceive of as an oppressed group.

Ecological perspectives

The next "stop" on the consensus-conflict continuum requires that a rather different view of society be taken. Durkheimian functionalists and the social pathologists took static views of society. The ecological approach, developed in Chicago in the 1920s and 30s viewed society as a thing of nature in which change occurred naturally, and as a result of invasion, succession, and competition, groups of people were positioned in the city.

The emphasis of the Chicago School was the interplay of groups, processes and institutions. This approach to the study of society viewed people's lives as being determined by physical location, and deviance was seen as the result of social

disorganisation. Competition and selection worked continuously to position and displace human populations. As spatial relationships changed, it was assumed that social problems would arise, but that after time these problems would work themselves out of the system and harmony would be achieved once more.

Thus delinquency was a normal response to a particular set of environmental conditions. If the only way in which the individual could survive was to adopt deviant forms of behaviour, then she or he would do that. The only help which the Chicago School could give to politicians and planners was to suggest a policy of nonintervention, because they believed that the crime was just a transient feature which would work itself out of the system, as that system worked towards a new equilibrium.

The major work in this tradition is that of Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay (1942), who found that the spatial distribution of delinquent residences correlated with factors which were supposedly indicative of the existence of social disorganisation. Suffice it to say that these factors were the kind of things not to be found in the cosy middle-class milieu of the academics. Shaw and McKay did not see deviance or diversity as persistent patterns, but as ones which would eventually work themselves out of the system. They did not intimate whether they thought that new problems would arise and disappear continually.

Crime in this scheme of things did not have a function, nor was it seen as an irrational response to a particular set of social and economic conditions. It was, in fact, seen as a rational response to social and economic conditions, and a stage through which individuals would pass, and which would work itself out of society.

Anomie Theory

The next "theory" along the continuum requires that deviance be viewed as a normal response to conditions produced by, or prevalent in, society. Robert Merton (1957) was theoretically concerned with functionalism, but his revision of this approach to the study of crime and deviance bring to light some of the problems crucial to the study of crime by geographers. Merton's approach removed the emphasis from the individual to the social structure as a reason for crime. Merton assumed that all individuals accepted the ideology that stated that opportunity, under North American capitalism, was in no way restricted. In "theory" anybody could make it to the top. The reality was and is quite different from this. It was supposedly this disparity between the cultural imperative of success and the structural means by which it could be achieved, that led to a condition Merton called "anomie", and which led individuals to commit crime. The legitimate channels to success were closed,

therefore the illegitimate ones had to be used. Merton did not specify how some channels became illegal ones by which to achieve success, nor did he question the origins of the ideologies which stressed success and achievement.

This approach - called Anomie Theory - stressed the importance of one cultural factor, when, according to Gibbons (1979;70) "...American society can more accurately be characterised by cultural diversity and cultural pluralism..". Taylor, Walton and Young (1973) argue that Merton does not come to terms with the origins of a maladjusted opportunity structure, nor did he address the problem of white collar crime, which ran counter to his explanation of crime. Merton's approach cannot be called a theory because it did not attempt to address some of the central problems concerned with the origins of law or ideology. In addition, it does not explain all crime, or crime against the person. Anomie theory was based upon officially produced data, and because of this it only managed to "account" within its parameters, for the crime recorded by the police and other official organisations. Taylor et al (ibid;107) state that: "Anomie theory stands accused of predicting too little bourgeois criminality and too much proletarian criminality."

Conflict revisions

Anomie theorists had, in a sense, moved away from the consensual view of society; they at least admitted the existence of imperfections in the society they were studying. The next step along the consensus-conflict continuum would entail a move away from Merton's position to one which incorporated a greater degree of conflict. This brings us to Value Conflict Theory, the product of Edwin Sutherland. Sutherland viewed crime as conflict, but it was also part of the process ".of which law and punishment are other parts" (Cohen, Lindsmith and Schuess, 1956;103). The "process" starts in the conflict which is to be found in all communities, which prompts the formulation of laws, which are of little value as deterrents because they were not requested by the groups against whom they were enacted. Cultural pluralism is recognised as the starting point for this approach. Davis (1975;158) argues that this is the case because Value Conflict Theory had its roots in the time of the Depression and the Second World War, when it became difficult to explain social trends in terms of consensus.

This attempt incorporated diversity into an essentially consensual model of society, was inadequate because it did not acknowledge the political and economic origins of conflict which gave rise to the laws. It was designed benignly or intentionally to protect the assumption that the natural state of society is

one in which conflicts over resource distribution had to exist.

Sutherland (1934) stated that people learned behaviour socially in groups which would come into conflict with the behaviour learned by others in different groups. This conception is the basis for other conflict views in that law was explained as an instrument of this conflict, and it thus assumed the differential power of one group to make laws.

Sutherland elaborated upon his basic assertions to produce nine propositions which explain his essentially social learning based view of crime. This "theory" has its detractors, Davis (1975;165) lists ten counts on which this theory has been criticised, amongst which are: its limited scope, its non-predictive nature, and its inability to account for the compulsive criminal. Sutherland's work does show a definite move towards the conflict end of the continuum, although it is only conflict on the small scale, about which Sutherland attempts explanations. This approach did emphasise aspects of the criminal's life; the types, duration and intensity of social contacts, in trying to account for the individual becoming deviant, but Sutherland's approach was narrow in that he did not question the origins of the power which one group had over another, which enabled that group to produce and enforce laws in its own interests.

Labelling perspectives

All of the positions discussed so far, have seen the deviant as defined by a consensual society, although later attempts to find explanations have admitted the existence of structural imperfections of unequal distributions of power. The social system was never viewed as being worse than benign. However, by the late 1950s and early 1960s, it was appreciated that the social system in North America was at least worse than benign. Processes could be seen to be operating whereby individuals, once labelled criminal, had difficulty in breaking away from the stigma that the label produced. Gibbons (1979:146) states that institutions

".. stigmatise individuals, seal them off from opportunities to withdraw from deviance, and create other social impediments to rehabilitation."

This state of affairs led researchers to examine the processes by which individuals became labelled "deviants". This approach was called "Labelling Theory" and it diverted attention away from the individual as a source of deviance. This approach had its roots in the development of the bureaucratic state, and the emergence of large and impersonal institutions which appeared to have the power to label individuals as "they" pleased. The focus was upon the state and the institutions which it employed in attempting to control crime and punish criminals. Howard Becker, amongst others, was a proponent of this view (see Davis,

1975:197-234, for others who have adhered to this position.). The types of questions asked within this perspective were: "Who applies the deviant label?"; "Under what circumstances is the label successfully and unsuccessfully applied?" This approach did accept that the deviant act was socially defined, and that the label was applied to acts deemed harmful to particular interests within society.

The labelling arguments were popular, for here was a way in which sociologists and criminologists could argue with psychiatrists and psychologists over the nature of crime and deviance. However, as an approach it was unable to account for the distribution of power in society, and it did not relate all of the aspects which go to make up the criminal "process". It was thus largely a descriptive position, unable - for instance - to get around the "Catch 22" situation of prisons reinforcing deviant forms of behaviour.

Bonger, Engels, and Marx

From the mid-1960s onwards a new or radical criminology emerged. This was supposedly rooted in the student unrest of the sixties, black militancy, U.S. involvement in Vietnam, decreasing faith in government, and mounting evidence of the prevalence of white-collar or business crimes. Platt (1975:95) states that the radical approach "...has begun to challenge the hegemonic domination of the field by liberal scholars. The roots

of the radical approach are to be found in political struggles - the civil-rights movement, the anti-war movement, third world liberation struggles." This may have been the case in the U.S., but radical-critical perspectives had been developed in Europe fifty to one hundred years earlier, by Bonger, Engels and Marx. The approaches of these three scholars takes us to the conflict end of the continuum of "theories" which are to be examined in this chapter.

Willem Bonger (1876-1940) placed more emphasis upon the causal chain of events leading to crime than did other workers. He attempted to explain "middle" as well as working class crime. In Bonger's criminal there is a "criminal thought" - the desire to achieve by forbidden means, greater wealth. The criminal thought manifested itself as an egotistical act, this form of behaviour being encouraged by capitalism. Taylor et al (1973) state that there is a contradiction here, capitalism encourages certain forms of behaviour, some of which "it" also forbids. Bonger also argues that capitalist forms of production are based upon deception, since surplus value is extracted from the labour of individuals, and since people like to strike a "bargain" when they buy or sell articles or labour. If the notion and practice of deception are so widespread under capitalism, is it surprising that there is so much crime at all levels of society?

Bonger's view of capitalism is that it fosters egoism and hinders the development of altruism in individuals. To live in

primitive communism - where production is for the common good, and not the benefit of the few - was Bonger's (1969) solution to the problem. The moral education of the proletariat under capitalism was viewed as being unnecessary, so the proletariat adopted the values of the bourgeoisie and the economic system, so if they could not achieve wealth through work, they would do so through illegal means.

Taylor et al (1973) criticise Bonger for being positivistic, and they claim (ibid;227) that where his theory does not fit the facts, mediations of various kinds are produced in order to protect the "theory" from being falsified. Taylor et al add that Bonger's work carries threads of anomie theory, structural-functionalism, and differential opportunity theory. The general tone of Bonger's analysis tends towards correctionalism, life under socialism would be more orderly and therefore more desirable than life under capitalism. There is too, a dichotomy in his approach; at one point the individual is highly socialised as regards egoism, and at other times is undersocialised.

Engels' case, elaborated in The Conditions of the Working Class in England, was that because of the form of social organisation which had evolved under capitalism, working people led terrible lives. They had been starved of all of the self-fulfilling pleasures, and were left with only drink and sex as pleasures to be indulged. The proletariat had no respect for

a social order which did not allow a satisfactory home life, and which placed strict controls upon behaviour at work and at home (see Thompson, 1968;457-462). Engels (1958;145) wrote that:

"the clearest indication of the contempt of the workers for the existing social order is the wholesale manner in which they break its laws."

The criminal was determined by the imposition of a social order and its laws, in which he or she had little stake or interest. Engels saw the increase in crime as a manifestation of revolution when he wrote that (1958;149) criminal statistics were an indication that, "social strife is gradually developing into combat between two great opposing camps - the middle classes and the proletariat." Engels made the error of assuming that more crime reported by the police represented a real increase in the amounts of crime committed. The increase was probably due to improved reporting and data collection methods, (see Tobias, 1972), but the basic observations he makes about the quality of life of the urban proletariat were accurate.

Marx devoted much of his writing to, and was concerned primarily in his later mature writings with an analysis of the capitalist mode of production, and was not specifically concerned with crime. Where he was concerned with law, it was with the role it played in capitalist societies and the ways in which it had evolved to protect interests. There are some superficial similarities between Marx's and Durkheim's analyses. Marx (1964;375) wrote that:

"..the criminal breaks the monotony and everyday security of the bourgeois. In this way he keeps it from stagnation, and gives rise to that uneasy tension and agility without which even the spur of competition would be blunted. Thus he gives a stimulus to productive forces."

To carry this analysis a little further, Marx sees the existence of crime as functional, it helps to maintain capitalism.

However, Marx unlike Durkheim, did not see capitalism as being the only possible form of social organisation, and therefore crime was not seen as necessary for the existence of society, although this presumes that there is no function for crime in other social formations. It was necessary in some respects in order to maintain capitalism, but Marx saw capitalism as being neither necessary nor desirable.

Marx and Engels in the Manifesto of the Communist Party, and Engels in The Peasant War in Germany, identified a kind of "dangerous class" whom they called the lumpenproletariat. This group was the enemy of the proletariat, because even though they might easily be attracted by the struggle for socialism, they could just as easily be bribed by the bourgeoisie to help resist the proletarian movement. The lumpenproletariat made its living by stealing the products of labour, by prostitution, begging and extortion. The criminal was not seen as a revolutionary, as some later conflict theorists have, but as a reactionary accommodation to the capitalist mode of production.

Taylor et al (1973,1975) argue that Marx's approach to law

and therefore crime, is the only one which examines the propertied nature of law, and the social and historical origins of law. They assume that the analysis of the relations of production and the historical context of their analysis guarantees an adequate theory of crime. The central issues here are (1975;46) "...how authorities become authorities.." and in which ways they translate "...legitimacy into legality." As law has evolved over a period of hundreds of years, to analyse its product - crime - out of an historical context, is to avoid the reason for its existence. Simply stated, Marx's position is that one "...should understand legal relations as originating in the material production of society," (Taylor et al, 1975;48) for it is only through ensuring material production that societies are able to survive and sustain themselves.

Marx (1970;20) writes:

"In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production."

From these relations of production arises a particular social formation - a concrete historically determined spatially specific social reality - which contains classes which may be narrowly defined by their relationship to the means of production. Marx identified two major classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The bourgeoisie owned the means of production and controlled the reproduction of society, and the

proletariat had only its labour power to sell to the bourgeoisie. The mode of production of material life was responsible, according to Marx, for conditioning the processes which govern the social, political, and intellectual life of the classes. Society - the collection of modes of production with one in dominance - thus had a material base out of which arose the "superstructure" of political and ideological forms which supposedly served the interests of the dominant groups in society. There is a large degree of functional interdependence here; for example, legal structures are required in order to legitimate a particular distribution of property, and ideological structures exist to legitimate the form and actions of law, and power. When it is considered that the forces of production are dynamic, their needs constantly changing, it may be seen that attempts to accommodate this dynamism will strain the forces of production from time to time. If the changes in the forces of production cannot be accommodated, then a breakdown in relations occurs, and the old structure of ideologies and political structures will collapse. It is important not to overemphasise the importance of the material base of society. Engels (1934) wrote that the material base was ultimately, but not solely responsible for the superstructure of political and legal forms and belief systems. So we may see that society is an interactive whole in which the parts act upon each other in order to preserve themselves and each other, although

the parts do possess a degree of relative autonomy.

Amongst the freedoms which exist in capitalist societies, the freedoms to buy and to sell are of vital importance in maintaining the economic base of society. Also of importance to this form of social and economic organisation is the right to own exclusively a piece of property. Thus the buying and selling of labour power and commodities is vital to maintaining the capitalist mode of production. It would appear to be logical that those individuals who do not behave in ways which are supportive of the capitalist mode of production may expect to be punished in one way or another. For example, those who do not work, or who steal, are not behaving in manners which are supportive of the capitalist mode of production, and are not observing rules whose purpose is to ensure the continuity of capitalism. For those who do not sell their labour power it is difficult to obtain the material requisites for life, unless they resort to crime in which case they are liable to be punished. It should be noted that although later writers have developed many of Marx's ideas on crime and social order, Marx did not concern himself with white-collar crime. Later writers, notably Taylor et al (1973, 1975) have been concerned with the crime of the working class, rather than crimes of the rich.

Cambliss (1975), writing on the political economy of crime, states that law is produced by the dominant groups in society, to protect their position in, and a particular form of, social

formation. This assumes that the dominant groups in society have greater power because of their relationship to the means of production. Similarly, the powerless groups in society are liable to be labelled criminal if they do not conform to the values and behaviours necessary for the maintenance of the capitalist mode of production. Finally, the existence of crime is functional in that it helps to direct hostility away from the bourgeoisie and towards other members of the proletariat.

This is highly simplistic. Initial work in this vein, according to Rock (1974), took a "flatland" view of society, which from a Marxist point of view, means that society was viewed as being in a constant state of conflict. There are, of course, values shared by groups which are in conflict with each other, e.g. human life, "freedom", and so on. Young (1975;71) states that "...the ineluctable reality of a considerable consensus over certain matters cannot be wished away." There are different interpretations of the origins of consensus under capitalism. Young (1975) sees it as being enforced by Skinnerian techniques; Reich (1970), as a product of the suppression of natural sexuality; Marcuse (1964), as identification by people with the reality which is imposed upon them, Althusser (1971b) by the existence of institutions which he calls ideological state apparatuses (education, sport, the family, work, etc.), and the workings of ideology. Clearly conflict and consensus will exist within and between groups of similar interests.

Society is complex, and to state that laws are merely an imposition of a set of value judgements by one group upon another simplifies the situation almost beyond recognition. The fact that the "oppressed" class upholds law and order as defined by the bourgeoisie, against its own interests, must also be accounted for. Most Marxists would not accept the Skinnerian learning theory, and yet it is this one which Young (1975) implies in his writing. Perhaps conformity is produced by the happiness which individuals derive from the ways in which they spend their leisure time, or through providing for their families. Further speculation at this point would be fruitless, and for now it is necessary to affirm that it appears, from a functional point of view, that behaviour which does not help to reproduce capitalism, is not rewarded, or may be punished - which is a Skinnerian position. Consensus does exist, although where law is concerned it may not be as wide as is believed. The problem then becomes one of explaining how consensus is achieved against the "real" interests of the working class. This raises the whole issue of ideology and law which has recently been examined by Sumner (1979).

There have been critics of Marxist criminology. Tifft and Sullivan (1980), who are anarchists, claim that the development of Marxist criminology is a desperate attempt to up-date criminology, and preserve its standing as an autonomous academic discipline. Schichor (1980), in an extensive review of Marxist

criminology literature, outlines several areas where this approach has to "put its house in order." ¹ One of these is the notion of viewing working class crime as being a manifestation of revolution - as Engels did - which is still prevalent in the literature, e.g. Shuman, (1973). Schichor (1980;7) states that "...over-politicisation has led to the eclipse of the individual victim..., since major interest is focused on the criminal while the victim is ignored." Schichor notes that the majority of the victims of working class crime are members of the working class.

Concluding points

The theories of crime and deviance outlined here have in some cases hardly attempted to link major aspects of the criminal "process". The obvious example here is the social pathology approach, which only examines the individual, and ignores the fact that laws have been produced in order to protect certain interests. However, it does serve the purpose of directing attention to the individual, how learning takes place, how personality is formed, and so on. There are too, some individuals who are sociopathic, they do not fit into society. In earlier times these individuals may have been cast out from

¹ Schichor (1980) notes that the other areas which require clarification are; a tendency towards theoretical oversimplification; an opposition to reform measures; the nature of crime in so-called socialist states; a neglect of empirical research; and finally, an oversimplified view of capitalist society.

society, or treated to the ducking stool; today they are put into asylums, or hospitals for the criminally insane.

Differential Association "theory" directs our attention to the learning which takes place in groups, the types of contacts established in peer groups, and the types of dynamics which operated within the group. Labelling "theory" directs attention to the operation of the police, and other institutions whose task it is to label individuals as deviants.

Aside from the Marxist analysis, the most complete approach is that of Durkheim. However the basic flaw with Durkheim's approach is that it would entail accepting that for the sake of consensus and social continuity, some individuals have to live in a state of poverty, because in Durkheim's understanding, poverty would be functional in that it helped to maintain society. The Marxist analysis accounts for this anomaly in Durkheim's approach, and it accounts for the propertied nature of law, something which no other approach does, given the distribution of property and wealth under capitalism. To dismiss all other approaches as valueless would be to do them an injustice as there are still many unresolved questions, e.g. socialisation, learning, structures of institutions under capitalism, and these approaches help to focus attention upon different levels and aspects of crime in society.

This must not be taken as an advocacy of liberal eclecticism. On the contrary, it is being suggested that

although the Marxist approach does account for many aspects of the criminal process in a plausible manner, its focus is upon political economy and the political and ideological structures to which this gives rise. However, crime does not exist solely as the result of political economy. It is necessary to bear in mind that social processes on the small scale contribute towards crime, albeit defined by the particular political and economic context. Finally, it is also necessary to note the existence of that small group of individuals whose behaviour is genetically influenced. It is not being suggested that all criminals are the products of social and psychological determinants; rather the exercise of caution is being urged when trying to "fit" one diverse phenomenon into one conception of society which is based upon a particular set of premises.

IV. Chapter Four

Introduction

Having criticised geographers' attempts to explain crime, it would be desirable to indicate directions which could explain everything that has not been explained by any of the theories to date. Unfortunately there does not appear to be any ideal theory to do this; it only appears that some "theories" are better than others when it comes to explaining different aspects of the criminal process. However it is possible to work towards the building of a construct from one of two directions (at least). A theory may be built "upwards" from individual psychology to mass psychology, or we may work "downwards" from a capitalist form of social organisation to the types of behaviour which may take place in it, which are labelled criminal. What is being suggested in effect, is a social psychology of political economy, dealing specifically with crime. This may involve the extension of the works of Reich or Marcuse. Taylor, Walton and Young (1973), call for theory to move in this direction, but they do little more than point out the ways in which existing work may help to form the basis for such a "theory".

At this point in time it is possible only to outline some

of the problems of the various approaches to the study of crime, and in particular to help geographers, and other social scientists, around some of the problems and pitfalls of theory at both large and small scales. To this end, this chapter will contain some discussion of the limitations of political economy in explaining crime, and also to relevant problems of psychology. These problems may be examined in the context of scale, as different theories deal with the same problems at different scales. The chapter will work from problems of theories on the macro-scale, to problems of small-scale theories. Inconsistencies within theoretical positions will also be outlined.

Who governs society?

Involved with a particular form of social organisation is a corresponding set of values. These values are expressed in the very operation and organisation of the means of producing and reproducing the material means of existence of society. They are also expressed in the operation of political and ideological structures. Sumner (1979) develops these arguments in writing that the economic structure of society indicates the most fundamental and general features of a society's political arrangements and ideological composition. A particular mode of production requires particular ideological, political and legal forms. These forms are not static, they possess a degree of

autonomy, and each has a functionally interdependent relationship with the other forms.

Sumner (1979;51) writes that, "every mode of production, once settled and established, gradually extends its tentacles into every sphere of social practice." Thus the beliefs, conceptions, images, and understandings we have of that social formation in which we exist, are conditioned by and are products of the social formation, and ultimately the material base of that social formation. Sumner argues that it is necessary to view ideology as an active force, which is a necessary and intrinsic part of all social practice. So in terms of law: law must be viewed as being more than just a coercive instrument or the expression of ideology. In part law exists in order to regulate or contain various political and economic functions and help to uphold ideologies (for an extended discussion of the above points, see Sumner, 1979). For example, under capitalism, the notion of competition is fostered in all institutions of socialisation, the family, the school, peer groups, work, university, and so on. Competition is vital to capitalism, it is engendered by, and it nourishes the capitalist mode of production. If one does not compete one is not punished, or put into gaol, but one does not enjoy success as defined by "the system". It appears that behaviour which is vital to maintaining a particular form of social organisation is preserved by the constant reinforcement of the populace by the media and everyday

institutions. If people do not work or are happy with their lot, then they are neither punished, nor rewarded. If, however, they violate directly the laws which are central to the maintenance of capitalism, they are punished. If, for example, they steal or burgle, they may expect to be arrested and prosecuted. If they defraud a bank or stock broker, they may escape, but they may also end up paying a fine, or even spending time in gaol. Why then, are not all social values legalised? One reason is that all individuals need some form of clothing and shelter, and without working these things are difficult to come by, since under capitalist relations of production these are commodities to be bought and sold like any other. Thus it is not necessary to criminalise some forms of behaviour. However, predicatability is a desirable quality in order to help maintain a form of social organisation, and legally defined values, the non-observance of which may initiate the punitive process, are one way of helping to contain behaviour within limits which will help to maintain a particular form of social organisation.

The point is that there are many means of maintaining social control, but only a small range of values which affect behaviour is embodied in laws. There have long been laws protecting life and limb, but laws protecting property have only developed in their present form since the mid-eighteenth century (see Hall, 1952). Under capitalism, and the conditions which gave rise to it, exclusive individual ownership rights have

evolved. Ownership rights have been extended to the means of production, as well as to other forms of property. Laws ensure the continued respect for private property, and also ensure that there is a healthy respect for the right of some individuals to exclusively own the means of production and therefore to ensure the maintenance of a particular set of social relationships. Law may thus be seen as a regulator of class relations - the function ascribed to it by Marx. It ensures that one group always has the right to "hire or fire", and that the worker has only labour power to sell, in order to purchase the requisites for existence.

Of course, law does not achieve this by itself, there are in existence many institutions to complete this process. To maintain the capitalist system it is necessary to have stable political institutions in order to deploy a police force, amongst whose tasks is the guaranteeing of the sanctity of private property. Added to this it is necessary to have courts of law to enforce property rights and contracts, and prisons to incarcerate the convicted. However, this necessity does not explain the processes by which these institutions came into existence. Law cannot be viewed out of the contexts which it defines and which define it.

All of this sounds a little deterministic. For example, how do the owners of the means of production actually produce laws? It cannot be reasonably argued that the members of the boards of

Ford or I.T.T. are really supreme court judges, or that they are legislators. One could argue more convincingly that because board members and high court judges are of the same social class that each has the interests of the other at heart, or that through social interaction in select social clubs that judges lend a sympathetic ear to the pleas of the board members of I.T.T.. However, it should be readily apparent that companies the size of I.T.T., General Foods etc. may quite easily operate outside of the limits of the law. This does not help to explain the means by which bourgeois values become law, a process, according to Rock (1974:144) "...frequently as mysterious to elites as to governed.."

Any successful analysis must be very subtle, because the processes by which values become law are most complex. Laws exist in order to constrain the powerful, although it must be conceded that punishment is not meted out to the powerful as it is to the powerless, whose economic crimes almost fade into insignificance in comparison. Laws preventing price fixing and excessive profit making, for example have had some effect upon the activities of corporations. The issue is complex because the law of capitalist society is a modification of the law of the mercantile period, which in turn was a modification of the law of feudal times, and so on. To credit the powerful - aristocracy, royalty, politicians or bourgeoisie - with devising capitalist law is to state that history only started in

capitalist times! Thus we may see that ideologies and political structures have been sufficiently powerful at a particular time in history to maintain the dominant mode of production, but also sufficiently flexible in order to allow transitions to occur. For example, feudal law was not abolished totally by those "in charge" of the following form of social organisation, it was adapted to meet the needs of the newly arising social order. Thus, although the material base of society determines the political and ideological structures of a particular form of social organisation, these structures may give rise to a new form of economic base. The roots of modern laws are to be found in the laws of Rome, feudal times, and so on.

Under capitalist economies (at least), the people do not make the laws, nor do they enforce them. These acts are the responsibilities of institutions established to fulfil these particular goals. People may have the opportunity to "freely" elect "representative" governments, but when it comes to producing laws only a few people in society are involved. Institutions have been created in response to social and political pressures in order to define acts as crimes, apprehend criminals, label people criminal, and treat the criminal as the definers see fit. As long as institutions do these tasks, they are fulfilling their functions. These arguments will be developed later in this chapter.

According to Rock (1974), there has been a tendency in the writings of authors dealing with crime and deviance to see society in terms of only conflict or consensus. He singles out Quinney (1972) as exemplifying this error. Geographers have fallen into a similar trap, viewing society as being in a state of consensus, troubled by crime. Rock rightly calls this a state of intellectual one-dimensionalism, because it must be apparent to the most consensus-oriented theorist that capitalist society is characterised by value pluralism. For example in the U.S. among many groups with different political leanings, we find the Black Panthers, the K.K.K., Republicans, Democrats, Communists, for example. What has to be recognised is the existence of many value systems produced by class relations, ideologies, the different modes of production and their interactions. It is probably necessary therefore to envisage the existence of relationships between these value systems at some level, all arising from different views of the same material world (see Rock, *ibid*:146).

From the material base of society and the structures to which it gives rise and with which it interacts, come many values, notions and beliefs which help to legitimate support for, or the continued existence of the status quo. Obviously behaviour which maintains the current social formation is encouraged; principally behaviour which under capitalism would be competitive, law abiding, respecting authority, altruistic,

and so on. Other types of behavior including laziness, behaviour detrimental to health, stealing, and so on, are either discouraged or prevented.

However, the enculturation of the populace goes far beyond the written law, right into the realm of entertainment, art, literature, etc. This area is obviously extensive so discussion will be restricted to popular forms of the production of images and stereotypes. The medium of television is, for example, a powerful source of imagery. Television is used to reach large essentially passive audiences, to persuade them to buy certain commodities. There has been much debate over the effects of television violence on children, and studies on this topic are by no means conclusive, but they continue. The point here is that the images conveyed by television of police, criminals, and crime are powerful and do create certain impressions in the minds of viewers, which may reinforce those presented to them by other institutions of enculturation, particularly the family and education.

The hero of these productions is never in any real danger, and is usually highly successful at his or her job. Added to this the hero is often "afflicted" with a particularly human quality or problem, e.g. Inspector Ironside's confinement to a wheelchair, Starsky and Hutch's moral agonisings to their girlfriends that they did not like to use violence, and so on. The "goodie" always discovers with consummate ease who the

"baddie" is; there is never any tedium, boredom, wrongful arrest or lack of evidence. The criminal too is hardly portrayed as being a normal person. If television cop shows were to deal with crime in the proportions in which it occurs, then Jack Lord would be chasing a youth for smoking marijuana, and Starsky and Hutch would be stopping motorists in order to administer breath tests. The television criminal is typically in a hot spot, the single mother could not meet the mortgage payments, the cop who has now gone straight has a shady past which caught up with him. More serious treatment, although dramatised, is more frightening, e.g. Dog Day Afternoon, Serpico, All the President's Men, etc., and the side with which the audience sympathises does not always "win", or wins at some personal expense.

This stereotyping is carried out in literature - the Micky Spillane-type thrillers - and creates in the mind of the reader particular notions of crime, criminals, police, law, and morality. These imply that ordinary people will not usually commit crimes, a statement hardly borne out by facts, and that the police do protect the rest of society from criminals; another contentious statement (for a lengthy discussion in this area see Palmer, 1973).

It appears that there are a few areas for research here. How does the dominant group in society manage to translate legitimacy into legality? How exactly have the laws of capitalist

societies developed to their present form? More specifically, how are the laws of capitalist society related to the economic base of society, and how do they help to ensure the continuity of that mode of production? How are researchers to account for laws which apparently run counter to this approach, e.g. anti-trust laws? Some of these problems will reappear in the next section on problems at the scale of institutions of the state and the economy.

State and economic institutions

It was noted in the previous section that within society there were particular institutions - which had arisen in response to social and political processes in history - whose function it was to label individuals as deviant or criminal, etc. It was noted that as long as these institutions fulfilled the tasks assigned to them, they were viewed as being useful. There is a contradictory element in this too. As an industry, crime control in the U.S. requires \$4 billion of public money, and almost \$2 billion of private money (see Gordon, 1973) each year. These institutions do not exist to reduce crime, or correct criminals. An example of this is provided by Gould and Namerwirth's (1971) analysis of the prison service in the U.S. At its inception the modern prison service in the U.S. was supposed to be a place where the criminal could reflect upon her or his evil ways and emerge a better person for the experience.

At the same time the notion was prevalent that the punishment should be tailored to fit the crime and the sources and strengths of criminal motivation. The latter approach - one of behaviour modification - is the one upon which the penal system was based. However, today the penitentiary is viewed as being a place where the criminal may be rehabilitated - not just punished - and then returned to society as a member of that society, and not as an outcast. The problem here is that the institution is organised to punish and not to rehabilitate. The very structure of the buildings, the rules and codes, the financing, etc. are all geared towards punishing and not correcting. The failure of prisons to "cure" criminals may thus be seen to be a result of the conflicting goals which exist within the organisation of the prison service (see Gould and Nemenwirth, 1971, for a detailed discussion of this problem).

It is possible to identify other similar contradictions. For example, it is a common assumption that greater expenditure gives a better service - a fairly natural assumption under capitalist relations of production. By spending more money on crime, or education or poverty via the institutions designed to control these phenomena, it is assumed that the quality will improve (higher educational achievement) or the problem will disappear (the eradication of poverty). However, if more money is devoted to policing, this allows the police to use more sophisticated techniques to apprehend suspects, to increase

manpower and thus will lead to a likely increase in the amount of crime known to the police. This is the opposite of the desired effect at one level. In addition, more arrests mean that more people will be imprisoned, and thus this attempt to eradicate crime has caused problems for the other parts of the criminal justice system. The very organisation of institutions renders the reduction of crime an ideal which may well never be realised.

Large corporations and small companies - unless they are producing highly specialised products in an area where there is little or no competition - have to grow or die. This "rule" appears to apply to companies of the size of Chrysler or Lockheed, as much as it does to family businesses. It is this precarious position, according to Gordon (1973), which "forces" people within the company to take risks which are criminal in nature, e.g. bribing to secure orders, fixing prices, etc.. Pearce (1973) states that the fiddling of tax returns in the U.S. in 1957 accounted for a total of \$27.7 billion, most of which stayed in the hands of the wealthiest ten percent of the population. Officials in the Lockheed, McDonnell-Douglas, and Boeing corporations used bribery in order to secure overseas orders for their aircraft in the 1970s. Sums of up to \$20 million were made available to secure contracts, and when the Federal Trade Commission discovered this, it issued reprimands in the Boeing case, and told the company that it must not do it

again!

This type of crime is not often dealt with by the police directly, and is most likely to be discovered by an accountant. The people who commit these crimes are astute, and the crime itself is not directly visible in the sense in which a murder is visible. It is probably relatively difficult to trace the source and directions of large sums of capital, especially when they are handled by computer. The non-payment of taxes is also difficult to trace, especially when there are so many tax payers in most advanced capitalist countries. Gordon (1973) asks why the state ignores the crimes of the rich, and concentrates upon the crimes of the poor; and why the state concerns itself with the crimes of the poor at all when the victims of those crimes are also usually poor.

Gordon (*ibid*) and others (see Spitzer, 1975, for example) have made the point that the police, the courts, and the prisons, in their selection of crime and criminals, correspond to the class structure of society. Goldfarb (1971) argues that prisons act as a kind of poorhouse, while the "middle-class" criminal is treated with sympathy and psychoanalysis. Tifft and Sullivan (1980;50) support this view of class bias and argue that the judicial process is designed "...as if certain realities were not possible, as if those before the bench were personally nonexistent."

There are two salient points here with which researchers should concern themselves. Firstly, the use in the U.S. of the Index Crimes of the U.C.R., has meant that most of the crimes studied have been committed by the poor against the poor - especially black working class youth in the case of cities in the U.S. The business crimes mentioned above are only a selection, and yet geographers have not studied them at all. Harries (1975) has written of the fear of crime which is supposed to pervade the national conscience but he never mentions the crimes of corporations which dwarf the crime of working class Americans in terms of the amounts of property and capital realised. Gordon (1973:179) states that:

"as long as crimes among the corporate (bourgeois) class tend in general to harm the members of other classes, like those in the "consuming" (working) class, the state will not spontaneously move to prevent those crimes from taking place."

The violation of anti-pollution laws is one example of corporate crime, exemplified by the Minimata "Incident" in Japan. It may be argued that it is difficult for researchers to come by such information, but much of the material is published in newspapers, financial magazines, and government reports. Pearce (1973:28) shows that it is possible to come by such details when he notes that "...in 1963, the Federal Trade Commission itself estimated that, when robbery netted \$55 million, DETECTABLE business fraud netted in excess of one billion dollars..." (my emphasis). The overlooking of such crimes by geographers in

attempting to account for crime constitutes academic naivete, myopia, or class bias.

Secondly, why do the police appear to concentrate upon particular groups in the execution of their duties? Obviously, the visibility of the crimes of the poor and the powerless compared with those of the rich and powerful is an important factor. Crime which takes place in the board room is much more difficult to detect than is crime in the street. Why should the police care if poor black robs poor black? The police have to be seen to be doing something, and the poor offer the most visible crimes. Spitzer (1975) argues that the police "victimise" problem populations; they appear to concentrate upon those whose economic function in society is marginal, for these people are the real deviants, they do not conform, their lives are not geared towards the reproduction of capitalism. Spitzer's analysis is based upon this approach. He notes (ibid:642) that those who do not accept traditionally productive roles e.g. homosexuals, drug addicts, dropouts, etc. are labelled deviants, although the deviant label does not necessarily carry the threat of punishment with it. Spitzer produces a list of five "rules", which if violated, will result in the application of the label of "deviant". Gibbons (1979) criticises Spitzer, for it is possible to fit nearly all of society into one or another of the categories he produces. However, crime is widespread, and it does seem "natural" that we are all "deviants" in some way. This

position is one that Tifft and Sullivan (1980) uphold. Their argument is that within an imposed social order, which is not natural, everybody is bound to break laws or rules frequently. They view this process as entirely "natural", and not appropriately subject to criminalisation by various institutions.

Social situations and individuals

Aside from the work of Herbert, geographers have paid little attention to the specific conditions which appear to "produce" criminals. There has been no examination of the socialisation process, or of social control in the so-called disorganised areas of cities, where most crime and criminals are supposed to be found. Studies by Rex and Moore (1967) and Young and Willmott (1957) have shown that environments which are typical of those characterised by geographers in their studies of crime and deviance are not disorganised but are in fact highly organised, and supportive of the individual both inside and outside of the family. More study by geographers into this area would be desirable, and a reading of the work carried out in this area by social anthropologists would be valuable.

The study of crime and deviance is the study of the actions of humans. These actions have been defined as crimes, by those with the power to do so, but the acts have often been learned in particular situations, and it would be an omission if the

individual was overlooked in our attempt to explain crime. If the same social and economic pressures apply to all individuals in the ghetto or in the same family, why do not all individuals become criminals? How do the Malcolm Xs and the McVicars break away from the system if they are being victimised? This is a difficult question to answer, or indeed for which to generate possible answers. Inkeles (1970:411) writes that: "Suicide, homicide, and mental illness ...are much the least ambiguous examples of the probable importance of personality in social processes since they are less likely to be patterned by some specific institutionalised requirement or arrangement."

Educational sociologists (e.g. Lacey, 1970) have shown how people of similar socioeconomic backgrounds react differently to the same institutional pressures, and how individuals of differing backgrounds react in similar ways to the same pressures. For example, in Hightown Grammar, Lacey shows quite clearly how pupils of the school react differently to the pressures of the organisation of the school. Some children had not learned to cope with the stress of examinations, others had. The point here is that the organisation of society, or institutions apart, certain differences between individuals will always exist at the biological level. It is natural that these biological factors will have some effect upon behaviour. To exclude this fact in explanations of crime is to say that the individual is totally conditioned by society. Again, this

creates problems, for how may one then argue that free will exists at all? Individuals do learn behaviour, some faster than others, and in order to account for the learning of forms of behaviour classed as deviant, it is necessary to have an understanding of the individual personality. It is suggested that other approaches to learning be examined with a view to helping to provide an increased understanding of behaviour which has been classed as criminal. Amongst the many factors which influence learning are intelligence and personality. The personality variable is the most complex, many studies having been carried out to ascertain its social and biological bases. Whilst the approach of Freud emphasised the importance of socialisation processes in early childhood, Kelly (1955) emphasised the role of intellect in personality formation. Eysenck (1973) and others have emphasised the physiological bases of personality, particularly in relation to the traits of extraversion and introversion. Inkeles (1970) calls for the use of Freud's approach to personality to help produce an understanding of the actions of individuals within institutions and society. Obviously there are some problems with Freud's approach: it is based upon research carried out on a selection of neurotic, middle-class Viennese in the late nineteenth century - hardly a group which is representative of the populations of modern cities. If one rejects Freud, which "theory" of personality is going to be chosen and upon what

merits will it be chosen over all of the others available? All of the theories of learning and of personality are based upon particular assumptions: Kelly (1955) assumed that humans were basically intellectuals at heart; they learned as they went through life, they could reason and think about the problems of life. Freud viewed people as being basically sick or neurotic as a result of the socialisation experiences of infancy. Bandura viewed learning as a social process, something which takes place in groups, rather than in solitude. This last approach appears to be one which may be useful to geographers and other social scientists attempting to explain the learning of behaviour forms which may have been classed as deviant.

There are definite problems when it comes to stating that there is a society made up of individuals who have learned their forms of behaviour. For example, caution must be exercised when attempting to explain phenomena such as crime, so that our large or small-scale explanations do not force a particular and perhaps inappropriate conception of society or the individual upon us to the exclusion of other conceptions. Marx's theory does not account for the fact that there are mechanisms, physiological in nature, which do aid in learning. Marx's approach to society is a political economic one and to assert that this approach may account for the full ranges of individual variability is to demand physiological explanations from a theory of political economy! This was not Marx's intention, his

concerns have been outlined, and they did not include the physiological bases of individual variability. A theory of crime in society has to be able to account for the sociopath or the psychopath, and people with compulsive forms of behaviour, some of which are the result of genetic malfunctions, rather than the result of the relations of production in society and the political structures to which these give rise. Few Marxist criminologists have attempted to explain the existence of crime against the person, or the crimes of those with genetic "disorders".

Conclusions

The object of this chapter has been to outline some of the specific problems to be handled by any general theory of crime and deviance. The problems have often resulted from the scope of the theory in trying to deal with certain phenomena. For instance, Marx was not really concerned with individuals, but with the overall development and transformation of capitalist society. Another problem with the Marxist approach is that at present there is no theory of learning in existence which clearly fits into the Marxist scheme of things. This problem of scope (see Wagner, 1964, for a discussion on this point) means that if one point is kept in focus, then the other salient points move out of focus. Thus if we focus upon the whole of society, we lose sight of the individual, and if we focus upon

the individual, we tend to lose sight of the wider social pattern. Wagner (1964) states that this is an issue with which sociologists have yet to come to terms. At present the best that may be asserted is that it must be borne in mind that when studying crime, it is necessary to look at both individuals and large scale social processes, for both of these things affect crime.

It is necessary, also, to escape from many of the crude statements that some Marxist criminologists have made regarding the makers of law, and the victimisation of certain groups in society. Spitzer (1975) is singled out by Haqar and Leon (1977) for having used teleological and tautological reasoning in his arguments, as well as engaging in the fallacy of affirming the consequent. Very few Marxist criminologists have developed adequate explanations of white collar crime; the most plausible explanation on this issue is produced by Gordon (1973), an economist. There are many areas here in which it would be useful to carry out some empirical research, and some of these will be suggested at the end of the next chapter.

V. Chapter Five

What the study has shown

The thesis has shown that geographers have employed narrow categories of crime and simplistic conceptions of society in their studies of crime. Further to this, they have not attempted to view crime as a phenomenon which is defined by and defines social conditions. Galois (1979;iv) notes that it is important to view "...spatial patterns as an expression of the structure of social relationships." Geographer's studies of crime have rarely looked at actual social relationships, the work of Herbert being the only example of concern with the social worlds of individuals. Geographical studies of crime have been concerned with spatial patterns of crime and their apparent relationships to spatial patterns of socio-economic variables. The relationships have usually been expressed as some form of correlation coefficient. Clearly, correlation coefficients bear little resemblance to actual social relationships which exist between police and suspect, victim and offender, judge and defendant, for example.

The work of geographers has usually ended with the production of correlation coefficients, instead of using these

as indicators for areas of further research. Geographers - like Comte - have used the methods of physical science (empirical "data", testing, results, conclusions) in studying crime. However, the conclusions produced by geographers do not exist in a political vacuum; there is a "market" for the ideas of academics. Geographers actually consider the directions that their work is going to take in terms of policy relevance (see Harries, 1976a; Pyle, 1976; Winchester, 1978.). The suggestions made are that therapeutic action must not interfere with the livelihood of the region or nation (see Harries, 1976), or that "crime discouraging structures" be made part of the environment, or that populations be desegregated (Pyle, 1976). The concern has been with maintaining "the system" as it is, in order - according to Harries (1976a;369) - that crime does not "...discourage the establishment of economic activities." The "system" itself as a possible generator of crime and criminals has never been examined by geographers.

The impression has been given by geographers that crime is something to be battled against, but no geographer (except perhaps Peet) has really considered that the existing structure of social, political, and economic relationships may give rise to crime as it exists in capitalist societies. They certainly have not considered whether institutions actually generate criminals: schools "produce" dropouts, work "produces" unemployable people, etc. Geographers have sought the sources of

crime and deviance in space or in spatial relationships, whereas other social scientists have sought the reasons for crime in the actual structure of society itself, and the social relationships which exist within society.

Implications for geography

In chapter two it was suggested that geographers (and all positivists) studying crime had separated fact from value and method from philosophy. Geographers have therefore to rectify this problem, they have to view crime as fact and value, for it is both of these things. In order to do this they will have to unite method and philosophy of study; they will not have to presume that it is possible to isolate themselves from society when studying social phenomena. Gray (1976:38) writes:

"Urban and social geography is based upon a subject matter which has specific and direct manifestations, but in reality the processes that determine these outputs are social and not spatial in origin."

In order to understand crime, rather than just describe its spatial distribution, we must not think of correlations between crime, property, and socio-economic status; we must think in terms of criminals, property owners, and social classes, and the complex web of relationships which exists between them. We must not look to strengthen a law and order which may itself be responsible for generating crime and criminals.

In attempting to deal with such topics, geographers will

have to go beyond the boundaries of their discipline (wherever they are) into the subject matters of the other social sciences. They will have to abandon libraries and computing centres as the sole places of research, and watch the criminal process in action - visit gaols, watch trials, observe police, talk with police and "deviants", and study the law-making process. In short they will have to study crime in its defined and defining contexts, as a product of social and economic relationships arising from and maintaining a particular form of social organisation.

Any individual who challenges values, notions and practices central to maintaining a particular form of social organisation is a deviant (see Spitzer, 1975;642), but this form of argument does not help in explaining the origins of deviance processing institutions, or why some values are embodied in laws and others just result in the application of labels such as hippy, dropout, etc. The law which exists in all societies today is the expression of property and human relations which have evolved over thousands of years. The apparent selectivity with which the law and punitive process are applied is the result of bias built, often unintentionally (see Hagan and Leon, 1977, for example), into the structure of institutions. Crime as a product of an historically developing law and the result of accidents and intentional actions in history, is a complex subject of study. Its complexity increases when it is realised that the

relationships between structures (social, ideological, political and economic) is constantly changing in order to accommodate the contradictions which exist within capitalist society.

The major implication for geography is that space as a superordinate concept be abandoned, and be relegated to a subordinate position. An overemphasis on space has in the case of crime (and housing, pollution, medical provision, education, etc.) obscured the fact that the characteristics of this phenomenon in any society to date, are a product of social processes. Space does not play a mystical role in the distribution of such phenomena, it is the place for the outcomes of the social, political, and economic processes which have spatial manifestations.

Research directions

There are severe problems with the work produced by some Marxist criminologists. For example, although certain authors have attempted to account for business or white-collar crime (e.g. Gordon, 1973), others (e.g. Taylor et al, 1973) have dismissed this form of crime as all that may be expected from the rich and powerful in society and after revolution this form of crime will disappear. This is a fine belief, but at present it is no more than that. White collar crime is crime, and therefore Marxists must be able to account for its existence. Marxist theorists must be careful too, to avoid "tautologous

reasoning" (Hagan and Leon, 1977:589) of the type used by Spitzer (1975). Spitzer's analysis is a functional one in which he engages the fallacy of affirming the consequent. Horowitz (1977;362) also notes that Spitzer's arguments are teleological. He describes the origin of structures as being the system's need for those structures in order to control crime, and not in the actions of various individuals or groups in society: the distinction between causes and functions is not made clear. Hagan and Leon (ibid), Horowitz (1977), and Schichor (1980), all argue that Marxist criminologists have been able to produce tedious and repetitive rhetoric, but as yet, they have produced little research to substantiate their claims. A "typical" problem with which Marxist explanation may have to deal is the explanation of crimes with a non-economic motive. This will include mainly crimes against the person. How is one to account for the "crimes" of incest, of pederasty, or sodomy, in terms of political economy without straining the bounds of credibility of the Marxist philosophy? We may also, like Spitzer (1975), believe that problem groups will be easy to control because they will be relatively atomised. This is a difficult statement to test. Research directions must therefore be open-ended, although that is not to deny that questions may not be phrased within the terms of a particular philosophy. In particular, research directions should aim to cover the areas where Marxist work has yet to substantiate its claims. Such areas may include the

following:

1. It is not possible to account for all crimes which do not have economic motivations within a Marxist framework.
2. Marxists do not have an adequate theory of learning which accounts for the learning of behaviour, forms of consciousness, and ideologies.
3. In what ways and by what means do the dominant groups in society manage to influence the legislative process in their own favour?
4. Marxists have yet to specify, other than in terms of the "needs of the system", how many deviance-control agencies came into being.
5. Given the pervasive nature of ideologies and the operation of systems of reward and punishment, why do so many people perform criminal acts?
6. Given the prevalence of crime, how is it possible that such a small percentage of the criminals is apprehended and punished?

These suggestions are necessarily broad and the list is by no means exhaustive, but it is suggested that if these areas can be examined, then the traps fallen into in the past will not be duplicated by others in the future. The work of Haqan and Leon (1977) on the origins of remand homes in Canada around the end of the nineteenth century has shown the fallacy of assuming that events are as straight forward as certain so-called Marxist explanations developed to date would have us believe.

Finally, although much work remains, the task has only just begun for geographers in making some contribution to social theory. It is important to note that learning does not only take place in academic institutions in capitalist dominated societies, in fact Illich (1970) goes so far as to argue that academic institutions actually impede the learning of useful knowledge. The validity of this statement rests upon the definition of the word useful. The following quotation from Douglas Adams (1979) serves to shed some light on the matter:

"Well, I mean, yes idealism, yes the dignity of pure research, yes the pursuit of truth in all its forms, but there comes a point I'm afraid where you begin to suspect that if there's any real truth, it's that the whole multi-dimensional infinity of the Universe is almost certainly being run by a bunch of maniacs. And if it comes to a choice of spending yet another ten million years finding that out, and on the other hand taking the money and running, then I for one could do with the exercise."

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