

INTELLECTUALS AND DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT:
THE CASE OF MODERN INDIA

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis concerns the relationship between intellectuals and democratic development. Although this relationship is viewed among scholars with some controversy, a theoretical model which systematically explains this relationship is yet to be developed. On the one hand, theories which examine the role of intellectuals in modern political development explain the emergence or recurrence of assimilative, technocratic, or radical tendencies among intellectuals without fully relating these to major democratic processes. On the other hand, modern democratic theorists clarify the nature of democratic processes without adequately relating these processes to political roles performed by intellectuals.

Based on a case study of modern India, the present analysis attempts to show the need for examining the relationship between intellectuals and democratic development in terms of a "prescriptive -operational" model. In the model it is argued that this relationship is best understood in the context of three closely related democratic processes in which intellectuals perform prescriptive, operational, and radical roles.

First of all, a movement toward political democracy

involves a process in which large numbers of social groups acquire broad support for abstract democratic values such as citizen participation, political equality, and a representative, responsive, and accountable political elite. In this process, as exemplified by the views and actions of Nehru, Gandhi, and their numerous associates in the Indian Nationalist Movement, intellectuals perform an important prescriptive role through formulating, legitimating, and popularizing these values.

Second, when these values acquire institutional support, an operational process develops in which attempts are made to further a realization of abstract democratic prescriptions in practice. This involves an expansion in political participation, an increase of political equality, and a movement towards greater competition -- thereby promoting greater representativeness, and accountability -- among political elites. As political advisors, activists, and critics, intellectuals perform a contributing operational role in this process. In the immediate Post-Independence period of India, for example, this contribution was evident among planners inside government and among political organizers and critics outside.

Third, democratic development may also involve a radicalization process in which basic democratic values and practices are intensively re-examined by large numbers of citizens. This occurs in the context of a faulty operational process and widening gaps between abstract democratic values and

actual political practices. Intellectuals perform an important radical role in this process: Moral criticism is directed at a faulty operational process and a number of movements may be formed promoting reform or political change. The importance of this role was clearly evident in India during and immediately preceding the recent State of Emergency (1975-1977).

To a considerable degree, the extent to which intellectuals perform these three roles is a measure of democratic development in a society.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The relationship between modern intellectuals and democratic political development is viewed from sharply diverging perspectives among scholars. According to Edward Shils, for example, the role of intellectuals is of primary importance to democratic processes and to political development, in general: "The intellectuals have created the political life of the underdeveloped countries; they have been its instigators, its leaders, and its executants". (1971:250) Opposing this view, Barrington Moore Jr. argues that their role is much overemphasized: "Without at least some favorable structural conditions, the ideas <of intellectuals> could scarcely have been more than literary playthings". (1967:354)

The controversy over the relative political importance of intellectuals in democratic development extends to a number of related issues as well. Perspectives vary, for example, over each of the following theoretical and conceptual questions. Is the political role of intellectuals of a positive nature in all stages of democratic development? What conceptual approach should be adopted in examining their political roles? Should it be assumed that intellectuals perform a number of ongoing roles or should their roles be examined in relationship to specific

political periods of time or to specific democratic processes? Finally, how may their political roles actually be described?

In addressing these issues, this thesis attempts to show the need for examining the relationship between intellectuals and democratic political development in terms of a "prescriptive-operational model". Based on an analysis of intellectuals in modern India, the model contains the following three assumptions. First, intellectuals do perform contributing roles in democratic development which are largely positive in nature. Second, in terms of a conceptual approach, these roles are usefully examined in relationship to three overlapping democratic processes which are analytically distinct and logically sequential. Third, the roles which intellectuals perform may be described as prescriptive, operational, and radical and may be related to these three processes as follows.

In its earlier stages, democratic development involves a prescriptive process in which large numbers of social groups acquire broad support for abstract democratic values. These include such values as citizen participation, political equality, and the representative character of political authority* together with its responsiveness and accountability. The prescriptive role of intellectuals in this process involves the formulation and adoption of democratic values as well as their legitimation and popularization. In modern India, this role was performed during the Nationalist Movement by such

leading intellectuals as Jawaharlal Nehru and Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi as well as by numerous journalists, lawyers, academics, students, and literary intellectuals associated with the Movement.

In later stages, when prescribed democratic values acquire institutional support, the movement towards democratic development then involves an operational process: Attempts are made at furthering the realization of abstract democratic values in actual practice. More specifically, the process involves an expansion in political participation, an increase in political equality, and a movement towards greater competition for power among political elites. These are directed at providing citizens with more opportunities for articulating political preferences and at promoting a greater degree of representativeness, responsiveness, and accountability on the part of those who occupy public positions.

Intellectuals perform an important operational role in this process by acting as political advisors: providing advice which favors the promotion of democratic goals; by acting as political mobilizers: organizing less privileged and "under-participating" social groups for political involvement; and by acting as a "surrogate citizenry": acquiring and disseminating political information, evaluating policies, and clarifying issues for the politically less attentive members of society. Immediately following Independence in India, these roles were performed with

varying degrees of success by the political advisors who were involved in framing the Indian Constitution and in formulating Five Year Plans; by political mobilizers who gathered public support for putting into practice new and unfamiliar institutions and processes; and by large numbers of journalists, academics, and literary intellectuals who jointly constituted a surrogate citizenry.

Democratic development, however, is obviously not an unilinear phenomenon. Gaps widen at certain times between prescribed abstract values and the movement towards realizing these values in practice. Political inequality, for example, may greatly increase or elites may attempt to usurp political power. When an awareness of a gap develops among large numbers of social groups, this provides a context for the emergence of a radicalization process. As the original meaning of the term radical implies, the process involves an examination of the roots, origins, and fundamentals of democratic values and practices.

Intellectuals perform an important role in this process as political moralizers. In examining the widening gaps between values and practice, they reaffirm the importance of central democratic values; express considerable concern over a flawed operational process; and seek political reform. If reform does not occur, they may then provide leadership roles in political mobilization activities. Some groups may become involved in

protest and reform movements; others may adopt an alternative set of political values and participate in movements aimed at promoting an authoritarian or revolutionary model of political development.

A radical role was performed by Indian intellectuals during a period extending from the late 1960s to the mid 1970s. In the context of severe political and social problems, this role involved political moralism and, eventually, involvement in a number of emerging political movements. These included protest and reform movements in Gujarat and Bihar; a revolutionary Naxalite movement; an authoritarian movement of Indira Gandhi supporters; and, during the Emergency Period (1975 - 1977), an underground movement aimed at the restoration of democratic institutions and practices.

This thesis is organized as follows. The remaining sections of this chapter focus on clarifying the terms most salient to the thesis viz., intellectuals and democratic development. Chapter II discusses general theories of intellectuals in politics, and theories of democratic processes as the basis for the development and elaboration of the present prescriptive-operational model. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 discuss the prescriptive, operational, and radical roles, respectively, as performed by intellectuals in the case of modern India. Finally, an integrative conclusion is offered.

Intellectuals are largely defined by scholars either as a group of particular personality types, as producers of culture, or as formulators of ideas. For purposes of this thesis, however, not all of these are helpful definitions. According to personality theorist G. Eric Hansen, for example, intellectuals are viewed as a group of contemplative and detached personalities who "manipulate and interiorize the symbolic rather than the material environment as the principle means of ontological self-affirmation". (1969:314) In other words, intellectuals have an internal need to affirm their existence through contemplative activity.

This definition, however, is problematic. It is not clear, for instance, that all intellectuals are motivated by an internal psychological need for contemplative activity. Other factors may be involved such as historical or social conditions. In nineteenth century India, for example, as will be discussed in a later section, large numbers of middle class groups turned to intellectual professions and interests due to lack of opportunities in other occupational areas. Another problem with the definition is that it does not account for the well-known phenomenon of intellectuals who are obviously concerned with involvement in the material environment as well as with contemplative activity: Notable examples include Jefferson, Nehru, Lenin, and Mao Tse-tung. Finally, the definition does not provide a more specific understanding of what is involved in

contemplative activity or intellectual enterprise.

Problems are also evident in definitions which depict intellectuals as producers of culture (what is learned by members of society through socialization). Parsons, for example, defines intellectuals as "cultural specialists" (1969:11); Lipset, as "those who create, distribute, and apply culture" (1960:333); and Shils, as those who preserve, modify, and transform cultural traditions. (1969:39) Culture, however, is a very broad concept open to ambiguity of interpretation, and as such, attenuates a clear understanding of the specific nature of intellectual enterprise. Furthermore, a culture-based definition does not sufficiently distinguish between those who directly influence culture (e.g. newswriters and political theorists) and those whose contribution is simply the dissemination of that culture (e.g. media technicians and publishers).

More specific definitions are offered by scholars who argue that what is central in intellectual enterprise is a concern with the formulation of ideas or broad perspectives on the human condition in a society. Coser, for example, emphasizes a formulation process concerning "the core values in a society"; (1965:viii) Nettl, concerning criticism and dissent; (1969:81) and Baran, concerning efforts to "interconnect" aspects of the "entire historical process". (1961:12) These definitions, however, are too specific and do not accord with commonsensical notions of intellectuals: In all fields of inquiry and at all

times, all intellectuals are not necessarily value-oriented, critical, or for that matter, inclined towards explaining particular phenomena in terms of a broad historical process.

Nevertheless, excluding his historical emphasis, the definition given by Baran is analytically useful and closest to a commonsensical notion of intellectual enterprise. This enterprise involves a concern for interconnecting particulars, for relating parts to wholes, for generalizing, for forming abstractions, or, simply, for theorizing. On this basis, then, intellectuals may be defined as those whose concern is the formulation of sets of theoretical perspectives on the human condition in a society. These sets of perspectives involve such fields as art, science, religion, ethics, and, of most relevance to this thesis, politics.

This definition is helpful for a number of reasons. On the one hand, with the emphasis given to the importance of theoretical enterprise among intellectuals, a basis is provided for their location in society. They tend to occupy a domain relatively conducive to theoretical inquiry: universities, media, churches, literary circles, advisory bodies in government, and, under certain conditions, political movements. The focus of this thesis, therefore, concerns the theoretical political perspectives of groups occupying this domain: academic intellectuals, journalists, religious thinkers, students, literary intellectuals, and advisors in government. For

analytical purposes, those groups whose concerns are of a more immediate and particular nature (e.g. politicians and power, corporate executives and profit, career bureaucrats and security) are generally not considered as members of the community of intellectuals in this study.

On the other hand, the definition is sufficiently general to accommodate the different sources and results of intellectual motivation as well as the diverse nature of theoretical enterprise. Intellectuals in a society, for example, are concerned with broad theoretical formulations -- a concern which may arise from a number of motivational sources, psychological or socio-historical in nature. At the same time, this concern may result in a number of different intellectual activities: the creation, dissemination, legitimation, and popularization of political theories; or greater involvement among intellectuals in social and political life.

Apart from accommodating the different sources and results of intellectual motivation, the definition also takes into account the diverse nature of theoretical enterprise. In terms of political perspectives, for example, the theoretical efforts of some intellectuals may involve a concern for abstract values, criticism and dissent, radicalism, and new normative theories. Theoretical enterprise among other groups, however, may be more pragmatic in nature. This may involve the formulation of perspectives directed at the attempted realization of abstract

values in actual practice.

The other major concept in this thesis, democratic development, evades precise definition: Difficulties arise due to the complex and multi-dimensional nature of various democratic processes. The concept, however, does imply the development of support among large numbers of social groups for certain political values, on the one hand, and development of certain political practices, on the other. Major values associated with democratic development include the desirability of widespread citizen participation in politics, political equality, and the presence of a representative, responsive, and accountable leadership.

The movement towards political democracy, however, also involves a movement towards the realization of these values in practice. This includes an actual expansion in political participation, greater political equality, and increased competition for power among political elites -- competition which promotes more opportunities among citizens for articulating political preferences and an increasing concern among elites for the representative character of political authority together with its responsiveness and accountability. The democratic processes associated with these values and practices will be more fully discussed in a later section on democratic theory.

The following chapter will be concerned with examining the relationship between intellectuals and democratic development in terms of what was previously discussed as a prescriptive-operational model. This model will be developed on the basis of contributions provided in two theoretical traditions: theories of intellectuals in politics -- drawn largely from political sociology and political development literature -- and modern democratic theory.

II. THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Theories which examine both the role of modern intellectuals in politics and the nature of democratic processes may each be fruitfully analyzed with reference to the phenomenon of social mobilization. As defined by Karl Deutsch, social mobilization refers to a process -- occurring with the breakdown of traditional agrarian societies -- in which "major clusters of old social, economic, and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior". (1961:494) In the first stage of this process, persons are set loose from old habits, values, and settings; in the second, they are inducted into new patterns of social organization and commitments.

These two stages thus go through a process of fission and fusion. First of all, a fission occurs within the bonds of traditional social relationships, viz. those involving kinship, religion, and village. This is followed by a process of fusion: secular collectivities are formed such as political parties, unions, and voluntary associations which serve specific interests. This fusion into secular collectivities, however, depends on a number of intervening and mediating forces, the most important of which is social mobilization.

According to Deutsch, the indices of social mobilization are numerous: In simplified form, (Coulter 1975:15) these include communications development, urbanization, educational development, industrialization, and economic development. The political results of the process are two-fold: On the one hand, as social mobilization proceeds, there is an expansion of groups who are more politically articulate and active; on the other, there is a development of a sense of nationalism among these groups, particularly if their societies are under colonial rule. Further elaboration on the political results of the process, however, are provided by theorists of modern intellectuals in politics and by theorists of democratic processes. Each focus on different aspects of these results. Theorists of intellectuals in politics, for example, view social mobilization as a necessary condition for the emergence of groups of influential and relatively autonomous intellectuals in modern societies. Democratic theorists, on the other hand, view the process as a threshold condition for democratic development.

Theories Of Intellectuals In Politics

In examining the relationship between social mobilization and the emergence of modern intellectuals, a large number of theorists including Mannheim, Schumpeter, Coser, Shils, and Parsons, generally agree on the following three points. First of

all, in pre-mobilizing or traditional societies with little or no experience of social mobilization, the intellectual stratum is relatively limited in terms of size, autonomy, and influence. Restrictions are due to a number of conditions: widespread poverty, low levels of communications development, educational limitations, the system of aristocratic patronage, the influence of religious monopolies, and the absence of a strong middle class. These conditions, in turn, are reflected in their views on politics: Perspectives tend to be based on the desirability of political hierarchy -- a hierarchy sanctioned by sacred texts or by philosophical conceptions of a "natural" political order.

Second, as social mobilization proceeds, conditions are created whereby intellectuals acquire much more autonomy and influence. Several factors are responsible: the emergence of an urban middle class, the availability of the printing press, the increase in literacy, the administrative machinery of the modern state, and the development of a market system. As a result, modern intellectuals acquire a greater degree of what Mannheim terms "unattachedness". (1959:157) They are relatively free to formulate and "market" their ideas and perspectives to an expanding middle class audience; indeed, they have a guarantee to do so: As stated by Schumpeter, "in defending the intellectuals as a group ... the bourgeoisie defends itself and its scheme of life". (1962:150) Thus, social mobilization promotes not only the expansion of a new stratum of

intellectuals but the "mobilization of thought" as well.

Third, in the institutional domain where the "marketing" and "mobilizing" of ideas occur - coffeehouses, salons, universities, literary circles, publishing houses -- intellectuals assume greater political importance. They challenge traditional political views and formulate perspectives which base political authority no longer on the "few" but on the "many": on those undergoing the social mobilization process. The "many", however, are conceived in a variety of new ways: as a group of individuals with inalienable rights; as a people or nation in need of independence and unity; as a proletariat or class alliance with an historical mission; or as an ultra-nationalist community or folk with potential for self-aggrandizement. These perspectives, in turn, provide the normative underpinnings for a number of political movements directed against traditional values and the monarchical or colonial institutions which embody these values.

Thus far, these theorists are in general agreement. However, in terms of the later stages of social mobilization and political development, they view the political importance and roles of intellectuals differently. These differences may be analyzed in the context of three theoretical arguments which may, in turn, be explained with the help of assimilation, technocracy, and radicalization models.

Assimilation Model. Proponents of this model argue that in the later stages of social mobilization and political development -- when new values such as nationalism, economic growth, democracy, or equality acquire institutional support -- modern intellectuals are assimilated and lose their relative political importance. Several reasons are suggested for this occurrence. According to David Apter, for example, the reason is normative: As intellectuals proclaim the values of nationalism, democracy, or equality in the name of the people, they implicitly downgrade their own importance and lose credibility as a result. (1967:75-77) In some countries such as India, Shils adds a cultural consideration: the traditional withdrawal and alienation of intellectuals from mundane, routine, and civil politics. (1971:266)

Generally, however, the assimilation theorists view the incorporation of intellectuals into expanding state and private institutions as the most important reason. As careers become more dependent on these institutions and as power within becomes more centralized, intellectuals gradually lose their "unattachedness", their autonomy, and their capacity for dissent and criticism. (Coser 1965:354-361; Nettl, 1969:113-122) There is a long-term shift, therefore, from broader concerns and critical outlooks towards privatism, careerism, and professionalism. The implication of this trend for democratic development, however, is viewed among these theorists from

different perspectives. According to Shils, (1972:135-195) for example, the trend is positive: Intellectuals tend to adopt more moderate positions on politics. For Coser and Nettl, however, the result is negative: The vitality required for democratic development is stymied as the older critical intellectual gives way to the conforming professional and sterile technocrat who acts as an apologist and servant of power.

This argument is not without some merit. In later stages of political development, when institutions are established to embody the values which were previously supported by intellectuals, the trend towards assimilation, professionalism, and privatism, indeed often is evident. In the immediate Post-Independence period in India, for example, these tendencies were evident among a large number of groups of intellectuals: academics and journalists, (Shah 1965:527-532) novelists, (Coppola 1975:3) students, (Rudolph and Ahmed 1971) and political activists. (Brewer 1976) Moreover, as will be more fully discussed in a later section, the trend was related to normative and cultural factors as well as to the expansion of bureaucracy.

These tendencies, however, are to be understood in context. Intellectuals as a group are obviously less critical and normatively concerned -- at least for some period of time -- when democratic values actually do acquire institutional support. But this does not suggest that they lose credibility

and status or that the critical capacity of all groups of intellectuals diminishes. Indeed, after a certain period of time, when gaps widen between democratic values and the movement towards realizing these values, intellectuals as a group may in fact become more critical, more normatively concerned, and more politically important.

In the case of India, for example, intellectuals have retained a large measure of credibility, status, and influence after democratic institutions were established in 1947. Although other elite groups often viewed intellectuals in negative terms (Taub 1969:168; Shils 1972:418-419) -- just as they did each other -- intellectuals generally have received favor in Indian society. As shown in a number of studies, this has been evident among media intellectuals in Gujarat, (Somjee, Note 2) Andhra Pradesh, (Rao 1966) and Uttar Pradesh; (Vajpeyi 1973) among academics and scientists in Punjab; (Deb 1973) among film-makers in Tamil Nadu; (Hardgrave 1973a) and among teachers in many parts of North India. (Malik 1978a)

Furthermore, the critical capacity of Indian intellectuals has generally not diminished. In academic life, for example, although state governments have interfered in university and college affairs in matters of patronage and linguistic issues, professors have rarely been removed from positions for their political views or criticisms of policy. (Shils 1974:214) Similarly, in the press, despite the presence of large

monopolies, the big business bias of the large chains, and the dependence of small newspapers on the financial support of the state, journalists have generally remained free from outside political constraints. (Mulgaokar 1971; Moraes 1971) Indeed, the principle of a free press, as supported in the Independence movement, the Constitution, the Supreme Court, and the actions of Nehru, has remained a cardinal principle in Indian political life. (Rau 1968; Noorani 1971)

The capacity for criticism has also been evident in Indian literature, films, and recent political movements. In North India, for example, small but influential groups of Marxist and Gandhian novelists have frequently condemned Congress as a excessively corrupt and regressive political party. (Malik 1975) Similarly, film-makers in the south have been openly critical. In the Tamil areas where one-quarter of all cinema houses are situated, major and influential themes have included corruption, social reform, and Tamil separatism. (Hardgrave 1973a) Further indications of the capacity for dissent and criticism have been the pre-Emergency protest movements in Bihar and Gujarat, the separatist movement in Tamil Nadu, the perceived need of Indira Gandhi to impose censorship in 1975, and the underground literature movement during the Emergency.

Technocracy Model. Among another group of theorists, the political role and importance of modern intellectuals is viewed from a different perspective. On the one hand, it is assumed by these theorists that in a number of fields including politics, intellectual concerns are generally changing: Technical considerations such as means, efficiency and performance are increasingly more central while concerns for political ends and normative issues are more marginal. It is assumed, on the other hand, that on the basis of their technical expertise and advanced education, modern intellectuals -- rather than becoming assimilated -- are gradually exercising a determining influence in policy-making processes. The logical result of this development, argue these theorists, is technocracy (government by technically-trained and efficiency-oriented specialists).

Depicted by Parsons (1969) as functionally indispensable experts, by Bell (1973) as a "knowledge class", and most forcefully by Gouldner (1979) as the "New Class", modern intellectuals are thus viewed in this model as seriously challenging other elites for political power. In terms of democratic development, the implication is clear: The role which intellectuals perform is largely negative in nature. Due to their command over expertise and to their concern with efficiency, they may undermine the influence of democratically elected officials and, under certain conditions, when the goals of participation and equality are perceived to conflict with

efficiency, democratic development itself.

No doubt, as greater expertise is required in government, as scientific disciplines increase in scope and importance, and as research and development budgets expand, large numbers of modern intellectuals do increase their influence in policy-making processes. At the same time, technocratic perspectives are often adopted and, under certain conditions, the movement towards democratic development may be undermined. This is clearly evident in many developing nations where technocrats are noted supporters of authoritarian regimes and models of development which favor rapid economic growth, efficiency, and governmental repression, if necessary, at the expense of political participation and democracy. (Huntington and Nelson 1976:23) Shortly before the Emergency in India, for example, ambivalence towards democracy and inclinations towards technocratic goals were noted in a number of studies of Indian public administration. (Taub 1969:116-117; Bhambhri 1971; Heghinbotham 1976:81) Indeed, during the Emergency period (1975-1977), government became what has been referred to as a "technologists' paradise": technocrats were given wide powers at this time in order to promote the transformation of the Indian economy. (Somjee 1977:69)

Technocracy theorists, however, generally overestimate both the degree of influence of intellectuals in policy-making processes and the extent to which they adopt technocratic

perspectives. As noted by a number of analysts of American bureaucracy, intellectuals in government are often restricted to the roles of "mean-selectors"; (Merton 1966:223) "option-merchants"; (Draper 1977:56) or "tactical decision-makers". (Straussman 1978:141) In other words, intellectuals in advisory positions often simply select the best means, options, or tactics in order to achieve broad political objectives already formulated by political elites.

Restrictions on the influence of intellectuals in government are due to a number of factors. Political elites, for instance, generally select advisors whose perspectives coincide with their own. If conflict develops, other advisors may be chosen. Other factors involve bureaucratic constraints and the influence of special interest-groups. In India, for example, intellectuals entering government as advisors and experts have often been hampered by the "bureaucratic culture" of career civil servants: With concerns for regulations, security, status, and power, the latter tend to resist advice not coinciding with their own narrow, self-serving goals. (Verma 1978: 190-196) With the partial exception of planners, the autonomy of experts has in fact been reduced in many areas. Scientists, in particular, who remained independent of bureaucratic interference in the Nehru period, were made directly accountable to the political executive after 1970. (Bhaneja and Gibbons, 1976)

In the formulation of policies, Indian politicians and civil servants have been much more receptive to the influence of powerful interest-groups than to experts -- with the partial exception of the Emergency period when the goals of politicians and experts coincided. The structure of advisory bodies in the federal government and the nature of policies are both indications of this. On the one hand, committees of experts have comprised only 17 percent of advisory bodies while committees of interest-group representatives have constituted 71 percent of these bodies. (Maheshwari 1968:109) On the other, the interests of these groups -- particularly the wealthy agriculturalists -- have been clearly favored in policies for political reasons. Basic land reform measures have generally not been implemented; wealth and landholding in rural areas have become more concentrated; and, as a specific illustration, wealthy peasants have even been granted immunity from income tax on agricultural income in many areas in India. (Bhambhri, 1977:159-163)

Moreover, technocracy theorists overstate the technocratic inclinations of scientifically-trained intellectuals: Significant numbers often oppose technocratic emphases and favor support for political democracy. In the early Nehru period, for example, advisors in the Planning Commission were committed to promoting not only the goal of rapid economic development but also democratic goals such as local self-government, participation and equality. Later, when planners gave precedence

to economic growth, at the expense of democratic goals, many social scientists outside government opposed the trend. In their view, technocratically-inclined economists and statisticians were too influential in the Planning Commission. Instead, they argued, more attention should be given to social scientists to furthering democratic development. Accordingly, more contributions should be made towards clarifying policy-making processes and conditions favourable for democracy; (Kothari 1971) towards promoting greater socio-economic equality and "planning from below"; (Mukerjee 1970:198-201) and towards providing more citizens with information, alternatives and choices. (Bains 1971)

Finally, the phenomenon of recurring radicalism among intellectuals is given insufficient attention by technocracy theorists. Obviously, in certain periods of time, particularly after political values which are advocated by intellectuals are given institutional support, intellectuals as a group may become less politicized and less normatively concerned. Professional, pragmatic, or technocratic concerns may indeed become dominant. However, as evident in other periods, a re-emergence of radicalism may occur together with an increased concern among intellectuals for broad normative issues -- the subject of which is to follow.

Radicalization Model. A third group of theorists emphasize the radical inclinations of modern intellectuals in politics. Rather than becoming assimilated or technocratically-inclined, intellectuals are viewed as a group subject to recurring radicalization. Radicalism, according to these theorists, involves not only an examination by intellectuals of the fundamentals of political values and practices -- in the original sense of the term radical -- but their inclination to adopt extreme views as well -- its current meaning. In terms of the movement towards political democracy, particularly in developing nations, intellectuals are viewed in this model as generally impatient with the piecemeal processes associated with democracy and -- when opportunities are presented -- supportive of movements advocating alternative political values and practices.

A number of explanations are offered in accounting for intellectual radicalism. The reason, as suggested by Hansen, (1969:324) is personality: the general inclination among modern intellectuals to seek certainties and to advocate comprehensive and total political solutions. For Schumpeter, the cause is their social situation: the exposure to market uncertainties, unemployment, and malemployment. (1962:151-154) Huntington offers a normative explanation: the awareness by intellectuals in developing nations of great gaps between conditions in the West and in their own countries and of the need for radical

solutions in reducing the gaps. (1968:371) Democratic development, according to these theorists, occurs in spite of rather than because of the activities of intellectuals. For Schumpeter, this is due to a process of pluralism and competition among politicians and political parties; (1962:269) according to Huntington, the adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence of political institutions. (1968: 12)

This model, however, is satisfactory only in part. Obviously, periods of radicalism are apparent at particular times in the course of democratic development. The New Left, Radical Right, and student movements of the 1960's in the West and in Japan bear testimony to this phenomenon. However, in explaining the recurrence of radicalism, the reasons which these theorists offer appear insufficient. If certain personality traits, for example, are the reason -- the craving for absolute solutions and certainty -- why do so many intellectuals continue to be attracted to the piecemeal -- and often contradictory -- approaches of social democracy, Gandhism, or liberalism? Indeed, contrary to the assumption of unilinear radicalization, there are numerous instances -- among individuals and among groups -- of intellectual "deradicalization". These instances, as we shall see later, were exemplified in the changing perspectives of such intellectuals as Nehru, Lohia, and Narayan, among others, in Pre-Independence India (Prasad 1974: 65-133) and of numerous Marxists in the fields of literature (Coppola 1975:3) and party

politics (Brass 1973:38) during the Post-Independence period.

To some extent, a more plausible explanation of radicalism is related to the social situation of intellectuals. As a number of studies show, for example, the unemployment or malemployment of intellectuals in Europe contributed to the emergence of radical movements preceeding the Revolutions of 1848, the Paris Commune, and the Russian Revolution. (Brym 1980:15-16) However, in examining the deteriorating situation of intellectuals in India during the 1950s, such an explanation is unsatisfactory: Large numbers of academics, novelists, journalists, and students were poverty-stricken, unemployed, or malemployed but were not to any great extent radicalized (Shils 1972:395; Khatkhate 1977:257)

Equally inadequate is the third explanation of radicalism, namely, the awareness among intellectuals of the need to resort to extreme solutions in reducing the gaps between developing and Western nations. Although this may explain, for example, the advent of extreme ultra-nationalist views at turn-of-the-century Japan and India, it does not explain why Indian intellectuals later adopted perspectives which sharply differed from those of Japanese intellectuals. Indeed, Japanese intellectuals were concerned with closing the gap between socio-economic conditions in their homeland and relatively more favorable conditions in Western nations. In order to reduce the gap, they emphasized "Fukoku Kyohei" (rich nation with strong army) and adopted

undemocratic and radical (extreme) political solutions: authoritarianism, militarism, and, to some extent, fascism. Indian intellectuals, however, generally did not support these solutions. In their perspectives, the gap could be reduced through the more moderate and piecemeal approaches of social democracy and Gandhism.

To explain intellectual radicalism in terms of a single cause, therefore, is a questionable undertaking. More plausibly, for different groups of intellectuals, personality, social, and normative factors may each be involved in the process. With respect to democratic development, what is also involved in the process is the perception by large numbers of intellectuals of widening gaps between abstract democratic values supported in their own societies and the movement towards realizing the promises which these values imply in practice. In the process, intellectuals re-examine the fundamental political principles and practices associated with political democracy. This re-examination does not necessarily result in general support among intellectuals for extreme political solutions -- as implied in the radicalization model -- although specific support for these solutions is likely among some groups. It may simply result in an increase of political moralism, a reaffirmation of abstract democratic values, and the emergence of reform movements.

Intellectual radicalism, however, is to be understood in context. In attempting to further the realization of abstract democratic values, a certain period of time is required for putting into practice a group of public policies before these attempts can be radically examined, criticized, or doubted. Contrary to assumptions in the radicalization model, intellectuals during these periods are not simply "dormant radicals". With varying degrees of success, they often perform positive contributing roles in democratic processes. For example, they may provide political advice designed to promote participation and political equality; they may mobilize less privileged social groups for political advancement; or they may clarify issues, provide political information, and evaluate government policy on a day-to-day basis.

In each of these three models, therefore, the arguments which are offered in explaining the political roles of intellectuals in democratic development are unsatisfactory. Although each model succeeds in identifying the development of certain perspectives and tendencies among intellectuals -- inclinations towards privatism, radicalism, and technocratic viewpoints -- they mistake these tendencies for long-term trends and generally neglect positive and contributing roles performed by intellectuals. In attempting to avoid these problems, an approach adopted by a number of other theorists is to assume

that intellectuals formulate a variety of political perspectives which provide the basis for two key and ongoing political roles: the roles of integrators and innovators; (Lipset and Basu 1976) or more colorfully, priests and jesters. (Kolakowski 1969) On the one hand, the approach is useful in that the political roles of intellectuals are depicted in more positive terms and in relationship to their general perspectives on political development. On the other, however, it is to state truisms and to gloss over the relative importance of different roles in different periods of democratic development and the conditions which promote changing political perspectives during these periods.

A more fruitful approach to the problem, therefore, is the development of a more dynamic theoretical model which attempts to explain the conditions which promote changing perspectives and political roles of intellectuals in the course of democratic development. Brym, for example, argues that these changes are due to changing social affiliations of intellectuals. (1980: 13) As their attachments to social groups and classes change -- in the movement from family settings to educational institutions and occupational situations -- their perspectives change and, in turn, reflect the interests of the social groups with whom they come in contact. This, however, is but one factor; it does not account for the well known phenomenon of socially secure middle class intellectuals supporting the interests and causes of less

privileged groups.

In an alternative and more useful model suggested by Mannheim, the changing perspectives and political roles of intellectuals are the result of normative as well as social factors: the effect of modern education in promoting empathy for other groups and diverse political views, the differing experiences of changing generations; the changing opportunities for social mobility; and the extent to which intellectuals are involved in social movements or are assimilated into large-scale institutions. (1962: 104-170) Modern intellectuals, according to Mannheim, are "relatively classless" and formulate political perspectives which are in a constant state of flux. However, although Mannheim does allow for normative factors and greater complexity in his model, he does not systematically explain why intellectual perspectives are in greater state of flux at certain times than at others in the course of democratic development. Moreover, the model does not fully explain the relationship between changing intellectual perspectives -- tendencies towards normative concerns at certain times, towards pragmatic and professional interests at other times, and towards radicalism under certain conditions -- and the political roles performed by intellectuals in a democratic society.

As evident in previous theoretical models, a major problem in the model proposed by Mannheim is that the perspectives and political roles of intellectuals are not examined with reference to the development of specific democratic processes. What is necessary, therefore, is a clarification of these processes. In this regard, contributions are made by a number of scholars in the field of modern democratic theory.

Democratic Theory

Recent developments in empirical democratic theory may be examined in the context of these three lines of inquiry: (a) "What is the relationship between social mobilization and the establishment of democratic values and institutions in a society?" (b) "What is the nature of processes associated with attempts to further the realization of democratic values in practice?" and (c) "What is the relationship between these processes and the emergence of periods of radicalism in democratic society?"

A Prescriptive Process. In terms of the first line of inquiry, a number of democratic theorists argue that social mobilization is directly linked to democratic development. They disagree, however, as to which social mobilization index or combination of indices -- educational development, urbanization,

communications development, industrialization, or economic development -- is more important to such a linkage. For Lipset, it is economic development; (1960: 45-72) for Almond and Verba, education; (1965: 315-324) for Lerner, the sequence of urbanization, education, and communications development; (1958: 60) and for Coulter, economic development, educational and communications development. (1975: 42-43)

As these theorists realize, however, the above indices of social mobilization, regardless of their importance, do not in themselves provide sufficient conditions for democratic development. In this century, for example, nations with relatively high levels of social mobilization such as Japan, Germany, Argentina, and Chile -- as measured in the above indices -- have turned to different forms of authoritarianism while movements towards democratic development have occurred in nations with relatively low levels of social mobilization such as Sri Lanka and India. As noted by Deane Neubauer, social mobilization provides only the "threshold condition" for democratic development; (1969: 23) other factors are also necessary in the process.

Some theorists argue that it is the historical sequence of political processes promoted by social mobilization which is the crucial factor in democratic development. Robert Dahl, for example, suggests that a successful movement towards democratic development is more likely when a tradition of political

competition among elites is established prior to an expansion in political participation. (1975: 33-47) This theory, however, reflects the experiences of a number of Western nations; it does not reflect the experiences of Sri Lanka and India where competition among leading political elites has intensified well after a broadening of political participation. Due to the requirements for political unity during the Independence movement, the perceptions of charismatic qualities in certain Nationalist leaders, and the long continuation of patron-client networks after Independence, turnovers of government parties at the national level, for example, did not occur in Sri Lanka until 1956 and in India until 1977.

Huntington, on the other hand, argues that what is crucial in the sequence is the development of political institutions which exhibit the features of adaptability, autonomy, complexity, and coherence prior to an expansion of participation. (1968: 1-92) Particularly important is the capacity of parties to contain cross-cutting cleavages or social divisions within their organizations in order that the political forces generated by social mobilization are properly absorbed. However, in the cases of Sri Lanka and India, the broadening of participation accompanied rather than followed the development of democratic institutions. Electoral participation in Sri Lanka, for example, steadily increased from 61 percent in 1947 to 85 percent in 1970; (Jupp 1978: 189) in India, from 46

percent in 1952 to 61 percent in 1967. (Eldersveld and Ahmed 1978: 4) Democratic-oriented leaders in both nations responded to these increases by transforming movements and personalistic parties into mass parties with extensive organizations, pragmatic policies and programs, and memberships cross-cutting social divisions. What is important for democratic development, therefore, is not only the features of the institutions, themselves, but the skills of political elites and the normative framework within which these elites operate -- a framework supportive of the democratic values acquired and legitimated in political movements preceding the establishment of democratic institutions.

The most forceful argument emphasizing the importance of historical sequences in democratic development is the explanation presented by Barrington Moore, Jr. (1967) According to Moore, democratic movements result from the development of groups in a society -- from among the landed upper classes, middle classes, and peasantry -- who acquire, singularly or in combination, independent economic bases of support, capitalist orientations, and beliefs that economic modernization of a capitalist variety is best facilitated by a democratic institutional framework. Alternatively, in the absence of these conditions, a reactionary Fascist movement favoring a conservative coalition of landed and middle class elites directed against the lower classes or a revolutionary Communist

movement favoring the interests of the peasantry is more likely to succeed.

In the case of India where capitalist orientations were initially weak, Moore suggests that reactionary or Communist alternatives were prevented by the presence of the British colonial system. While suppressing Marxist opposition, the British bolstered the position of the landed upper classes through land and tax policies at the expense of the middle classes and peasantry thereby preventing the possibility of a reactionary coalition. (1967: 370-372) These actions allowed for the later growth of a democratic movement under the leadership of Gandhi who, for a number of reasons, "struck a responsive chord in Hindu culture". (1967: 373) The middle class was responsive due to Gandhi's program of "buy Indian" and goal of political and economic Independence; the peasantry, Gandhi's program of reviving traditional village India; and social groups in general -- even sectors of the landed upper classes -- Gandhi's toleration of private property and emphasis on non-violence and peaceful change.

However, in relating the adoption of democratic values directly to "responsive chords" among social groups, Moore's argument is problematic. During the different phases of the Nationalist movement in India, major social groups were quite capable of responding to different "chords" and supporting different values. Between 1905 and 1918, for example, educated

and lower middle class groups were very receptive to the Hindu revivalist and ultra-nationalist perspectives of Tilak, Pal, and Aurobindo. (Desai 1966: 328) After 1934, these traditionalist perspectives, as well as Fascist views, remained significant minority tendencies in the Nationalist movement. Conversely, large numbers of workers and peasants were responsive to the organizational efforts of Communists and Marxist-inclined Socialists between 1918 and 1934. The numbers of working class unions and peasant organizations increased substantially during this period. These orientations also remained important minority tendencies in the Nationalist movement after 1934. (Desai 1966: 438-439)

In the later stages of the Nationalist movement -- as British political power diminished and as the social basis of the movement broadened -- the capacity of social groups for adopting Communist or Fascist alternatives was certainly not inconceivable. During the same period in China, for example, large sectors of the peasantry did turn to Communist leaders skilled in the art of combining traditional, Nationalist, and Marxist values for party purposes. (Johnson 1962) In Germany, important sectors of the upper and lower middle classes supported Fascism as a solution to economic crises, social unrest, and the threat of revolutionary movements from lower class groups. (Kitchen 1976) Such conditions were not entirely absent in India.

Indeed, after 1947, peasants responded in large numbers to the electoral and organizational efforts of politically skillful Communist leaders in West Bengal, Kerala, and Andhra Pradesh. (Brass 1973: 13-16) Conversely, in the immediate pre-Emergency period, large sectors of the middle class did develop an ambivalence towards democracy and a serious inclination towards quasi-Fascist or technocratic forms of authoritarianism. (Somjee 1977) These groups, therefore, were clearly capable of responding to different sets of political values. In terms of the Nationalist movement, what was important was not simply the presence of predetermined "chords" among social groups but the presence of democratic political values, themselves, and of those who formulated and articulated them.

Consequently, if social mobilization is to be considered an important "threshold condition" for democratic development, the process in which large numbers of social groups acquire support for democratic values may be viewed as a crucial "take-off" factor in the movement towards political democracy. This may be broadly referred to as a prescriptive process. Together with social mobilization, its importance in democratic development is recognized by a number of theorists. Lipset, for example, emphasizes the importance of a process in which democratic values gain acceptance and legitimacy in a developing society; (1960: 77) Almond and Verba, the development of an appropriate "political culture" or civic culture in which the value of

participation is highly regarded among other political values; (1965: 29-30) and Coulter, the evolution of an appropriate political tradition in which the secular values of individualism, bargaining, and pragmatism are established as attitudinal prerequisites for successful party politics in a democracy. (1975: 65)

These analyses, however, do not adequately explain the relationship between the development of a favorable political tradition, political culture, or legitimation process and the manner in which social groups initially adopt and accept principles of democracy. On the one hand, there are often several traditions, political cultures, or bases of legitimacy in a developing society. Nandy, for example, as will be more fully discussed later, identifies five major political cultures in traditional India and four modern political traditions; (1973) Varma, two broad traditions in the modern period with a number of variations; (1967: 509-519) and DeBary, six different political traditions or cultures in modern India. (1966: 877-931)

On the other hand, the abstract values and principles embodied in these diverse traditions are the concern of relatively few individuals. Those who are -- the intellectuals -- perform key roles in the normative, direction of modern political movements in a number of ways: by choosing suitable features from indigenous political cultures; by borrowing

selectively from foreign traditions; by formulating new political principles; and by legitimating and popularizing desired values. In terms of democratic development, the prescriptive role performed by intellectuals in this process is crucial. This involves their adoption of values such as citizen participation, political equality, governmental responsiveness, and political accountability and, in order to mobilize support for their views, the legitimation and popularization of these values.

An Operational Process. A second important process in democratic development, which may be referred to as an operational process, involves a movement towards furthering the realization of abstract democratic values in actual practice. This in turn involves the presence of three major sub-processes: (a) an expansion of political participation; (b) a movement towards greater political equality; and (c) an increase in competition among political elites. Greater opportunities for the articulation of political preferences among citizens and greater representativeness, responsiveness, and accountability of political elites are expected to result. Again, the analyses of democratic theorists are useful in providing a basis for an understanding of these processes.

In explaining the conditions promoting an expansion of political participation in developing societies, for example,

Huntington and Nelson identify the developmental strategies adopted by political elites as the central factors in the process. (1976: 28-41) Accordingly, in the context of social mobilization, political elites may decide that increased participation is a desirable end in itself, or more frequently, that it is instrumental for the realization of other goals. As one consideration, elites may increase political participation in order to accumulate and maintain political power. On the other hand, if the strategy is the promotion of rapid economic growth, participation may become the anti-goal of elites.

Political strategies, however, are adopted in context. One context is the normative commitment of intellectuals who perform advisory roles inside government and critical roles outside. In the immediate Post-Independence period in India, for instance, advisors and critics generally favored the expansion of participation along democratic lines. However, as the cases of prewar Japan and Post-Independence Indonesia illustrate, weak commitments to such values result in democratic decay. In the period following the Meiji Restoration of 1868, Japanese democratic theorists only favored citizen participation and democratic development for instrumental rather than intrinsic purposes -- for reasons of strengthening the state; at the same time, advisors favoring more authoritarian theory borrowed appropriate constitutional models from Europe, particularly from Germany. (Quo 1972) In the later Taisho period, intellectuals

who were critical of Japanese political development and supportive of democratic values tried to simply adapt democratic theory to authoritarian principles without attempting to completely replace these principles with new democratic theories. Consequently, in the absence of strong normative support, the drive towards democracy and full electoral participation became reversed in the economically depressed 1930s. (Scalapino 1962: 116; Quo 1972)

In Indonesia after 1965, intellectuals also provided inadequate support for a system of citizen participation along democratic lines. Borrowing theories from Western Social Science, large numbers of intellectuals used such concepts as modernization and integration to defend the Suharto military government and to criticize democratic party politics and parliamentary institutions. (Liddle 1973: 180-186) On the one hand, parties were viewed as disruptive: They exacerbated ideological tensions, reinforced ethnic and religious cleavages, and bolstered irrational customs. The role of the military, on the other hand, was seen as positive in that the goals of rapid economic modernization and national integration could more easily be achieved through authoritarian politics. As in the case of Japan, the normative commitments of intellectuals were more favorable to authoritarian than to democratic political development. Obviously, the perspectives of political elites are of major importance in determining whether or not citizen

participation and democratic goals are to be promoted in a developing society. However, as advisors in government and as critics outside, the commitments of intellectuals are also a contributing factor.

A second operational process in democratic development is the movement towards greater political equality. Verba, Nie, and Kim (1978) examine the nature of this process by first considering the conditions which promote political inequality or unequal participation. Their analysis is as follows. Other considerations being equal, unequal participation is the product of the unequal distribution of socio-economic resources: Individuals with higher education, higher status, and higher income tend to out-participate those lacking in these resources. This tendency, however, may be modified in a democratic society through the organizational activities of political parties, interest-groups, or unions. Accordingly, these activities may result in "interference" with the above tendency: Depending on the social basis of support within these organizations, participation may further increase among social groups with more socio-economic resources, or, if less-privileged groups are organized, an equalization of participation may occur.

The extent of this interference, according to Verba, Nie, and Kim is dependent on the structure of social cleavage in a society and the expression of cleavage in political

organizations. When social groups perceive themselves to be in "clear conflict" with others, these groups are more likely to mobilize, to form interest groups or unions, and to affiliate themselves with political parties. Consequently, if these are lower socio-economic status groups, an equalization of participation or greater political equality may then take place. As in the case of an increase in participation, however, intellectuals may also contribute to political equalization. As advisors and planners, policies may be designed to facilitate an increase in socio-economic equality and thus political equality; in roles as political mobilizers, under-participating groups may be organized for greater political participation.

A third operational process in democratic development is the movement towards greater competition among political elites. In examining the conditions which promote elite competition, Dahl argues that pluralism and the unequal distribution of political resources among elites are central factors. The extent to which elites may accumulate political power, according to Dahl, is limited not only by the presence of abstract democratic values in a society but, more concretely, by inequalities among elites of social status, economic standing, information control, personality appeal and political skills. (1966: 305-325) Some elites, for example, may be able to exert political influence on the basis of high social status and economic standing; others,

on the basis of a high degree of political skill. When these resources are unevenly distributed, competition among elites occurs thereby promoting democratic development and diminishing the possibility of the emergence of authoritarian politics.

For Dahl, the importance of inequalities and the dispersion of power are clearly evident in political decision-making. As decisions by elites in government generally involve gains for some groups of citizens but losses for others, oppositional elites are able to mobilize political resources and gain support for alternative views. This, in turn, tends to make elites in power more competitive and consequently more attentive of the political preferences of citizens generally. In this context, greater governmental representativeness as well as greater political responsiveness and accountability are more likely to result.

Dahl, however, limits his analysis to the role performed by professional politicians in this process. Important also in promoting elite competition is a group whom Rosenau refers to as the "attentive public". (1974: 4) Because politics is generally of only an outside interest for the majority of citizens -- even in a democratic society -- this group performs an important role as a "surrogate electorate" between elections. (1974: 12-16) They follow public affairs closely, criticize decisions of elites, provide political information, clarify issues, and act as opinion-leaders for politically less attentive members of

society.

However, the concept of a surrogate electorate provided by Rosenau is too limited in scope. Although citizens tend to be relatively more involved in politics during elections, the above roles of an attentive public are obviously performed during these periods as well: Candidates are evaluated, election issues are clarified, and party platforms are discussed. Therefore, the more general concept of a "surrogate citizenry" may be more useful. A central group in this surrogate citizenry are specially-trained and politically concerned intellectuals in the media and universities. In preparing background information, political commentary, and critical analyses of elite decisions, these intellectuals perform a key democratic role: They provide alternative sources of political information -- which may be disseminated by other members of the surrogate citizenry -- and thereby contribute to the development of a relatively more informed and evaluative citizenry in general. This then facilitates a movement towards greater political competition among elites.

A Radicalization Process. Finally, another process of major importance in democratic development involves a movement towards radicalization -- a process in which fundamental democratic values and practices are re-examined by large numbers of citizens at a particular time in the political development of a

society. This involves an increased concern among citizens with the relationship between abstract democratic principles and operational processes which attempt to realize the substance of these principles in practice. On the basis of an examination of political movements in the history of the United States -- the Jacksonian, Progressive, New Deal, and New Left movements -- Huntington provides a general analysis of radicalization which is helpful in part. (NOTE #1)

Those involved in radical movements, according to Huntington, are strongly motivated by their perceptions of widening gaps between previously prescribed abstract Principles and actual political practices. In these movements, there is a renewed interest in broad normative issues and a large degree of political moralism viz., moral criticism of the discrepancy between political values and political development in practice. This then leads to demands on the part of a number of groups for reform, political change, and a removal of this discrepancy. In terms of effects, three results are possible. On the one hand, political reform may result as occurred in the aftermath of the Jacksonian movement in the early history of the United States. On the other, movements may eventually emerge which seek to promote alternative political values and practices -- rare in the United States but obviously evident at particular times in other nations. In the absence of the above, according to Huntington, a gradual reduction in the intensity of radicalism

is a third result: Political moralism dissolves into cynicism, complacency, and greater acceptance of political hypocrisy or gaps between values and practice -- a common sequence in the later stages of a radicalization process.

Although this analysis is helpful to some extent in terms of democratic development, further elaboration is necessary. For example, the dimension of leadership in radical movements is largely neglected by Huntington. Obviously, not all citizens are concerned with the development of radical analyses which examine fundamental aspects of political values, institutions, and practices. Central participants in this process are intellectuals and -- with increasing regularity in modern times -- important groups of radical students. They become involved in forming political movements and in promoting radicalism among other groups at particular periods of democratic development. During the 1960s and early 1970s, this was evident in Japan; (Krauss 1974) the United States; (Beck and Jennings 1979) and India. (Barik 1977; Jones and Jones 1977)

Furthermore, Huntington gives insufficient attention to the context in which radicalism occurs. Radical movements are related not only to the perceptions of widening gaps between values and practice but to the nature of the operational process in democratic development and to the contributing roles which intellectuals perform in this process. When intellectuals are unable to effectively promote democratic goals such as citizen

participation, political equality, and elite competition, or values which may be associated with these goals such as economic growth or national integration, the potential for radicalization is made possible. This may more readily occur in the absence of political cooptation: When political support is not given to intellectuals as a group -- support such as the availability of positions in government, or of sufficient funding for groups outside government -- radical perspectives are more likely to develop.

Finally, in terms of the later stages of a radicalization process, radicalism may diminish for reasons other than Huntington suggests. As will be shown in the case of India during the mid-1970s, the intensity of radicalism diminished only when intellectuals were actually presented with an anti-democratic political alternative -- the authoritarian government of Indira Gandhi during the Emergency -- and when they were eventually successful, through an underground movement, in restoring political democracy in India.

A Prescriptive-Operational Model

On the basis of the foregoing analysis, a number of conclusions can now be made. Theorists of intellectuals in politics contribute to an understanding of the relationship between intellectuals and democratic development by identifying

and analyzing important intellectual tendencies in modern politics relevant to this relationship. While agreeing on the importance of normative tendencies among intellectuals in earlier stages of democratic development, these theorists emphasize different tendencies in later stages: according to some theorists, a tendency towards assimilation, pragmatism, and privatism; according to others, technocratic concerns; and others, recurring radicalization.

However, they mistake these tendencies for long-term trends and fail to provide a theoretical model which encompasses all of these tendencies and explains the relationship between them and with democratic development. Some analyses are indeed developed in this direction. Brym, for example, explains changing intellectual tendencies in terms of social factors; Mannheim, in terms of educational, generational, and normative factors. These analyses, however, are neither systematically developed nor related to specific democratic processes.

Democratic theorists, on the other hand, make contributions through identifying and clarifying the nature of these democratic processes. These include what may be referred to as prescriptive, operational, and radicalization processes. In a prescriptive process, broad support is acquired among large numbers of social groups for abstract democratic values; in an operational process, attempts are made to further citizen participation, political equality, and elite competition; and in

a radicalization process, democratic values and actual practices are intensely re-examined. Although these processes obviously overlap in time, they are analytically distinguishable and are logically sequential. For example, prescribed values are necessary in order that an operational process can proceed; an operational process, in order that the relationship between values and practice be radically re-examined.

In their analyses of these processes, however, democratic theorists give insufficient attention to roles performed by intellectuals. In terms of the prescriptive process, for instance, factors such as social mobilization, social structure, political traditions, and political cultures are emphasized without examining the roles which intellectuals perform in moulding these traditions and cultures as well as in mobilizing support among social groups for a democratic approach to political development. The participation of intellectuals -- as advisors, activists, and critics -- tends also to be ignored in the operational process. Instead, attention is given to factors such as elite perspectives, the extent of political organizational activity, and the presence of inequality of political resources among elites. Finally, in terms of the radicalization process, although the central importance of a discrepancy between values and practice is examined, this is not related to leadership roles performed by intellectuals in the process.

On the basis of these conclusions, then, a theoretical model may now be presented which attempts to explain the relationship between intellectuals and democratic development. It may be termed a prescriptive-operational model because of the major importance of prescriptive and operational processes in democratic development and because of the context which these processes provide in terms of radicalization. In this model, the political roles of intellectuals are viewed in relationship to the development of the three above processes. These processes and roles may be described as follows.

First of all, in a prescriptive process, intellectuals adopt, legitimate, and popularize democratic principles thereby providing the normative underpinnings for political democracy. Second, as policy advisors, activists, and a surrogate citizenry, they make contributions in an operational process. Finally, when the operational process becomes faulty, they perform a radical role. Moral criticism is articulated and movements are formed promoting political reform or change. These three major roles will now be discussed at length in reference to democratic development in modern India.

III. A PRESCRIPTIVE ROLE

Central to the establishment of independent democratic institutions in India was a prescriptive process in which large numbers of mobilizing social groups acquired broad support for democratic values and principles. The participation of Indian intellectuals in this process was of major importance: By adopting, legitimating, and popularizing democratic values, intellectuals were able to mobilize support among large sectors of Indian society for a democratic approach to future political development. This prescriptive role, however, occurred in the context of two important conditions in India: the British occupation and the process of social mobilization.

The British colonial system functioned as a catalyst to the process of social mobilization in Pre-Independence India. For example, in accordance with the administrative and commercial requirements of the British, policies were formulated, as early as the mid-nineteenth century, which provided a basis for educational and communications development. A basis for urbanization, industrialization, and economic growth was also provided, but due to the exploitive nature of a colonial system, developments in these areas were relatively slow, uneven, and not always to the advantage of the subject people.

Nevertheless, British policies eventually achieved two significant -- although unintended -- political results. On the one hand, with social mobilization, both older and newly emerging social groups acquired a new sense of political consciousness: Increasingly aware of political, economic, and cultural deprivation, and of the need for new political solutions, these groups became responsive to nationalism as well as to new political values generally. Indeed, as social mobilization proceeded, more of these groups became politically active thereby broadening the social basis of the Nationalist Movement. At the turn of this century, for example, the movement largely involved industrialists, merchants, and educated middle class groups. However, after 1905, it also involved sections of the lower middle class; after 1918, working class groups; and after 1934, large sections of the peasantry. (Desai 1966: 433-440)

On the other hand, an infrastructure was established which facilitated the emergence of a new stratum of intellectuals in India. With the development of an educational system, together with increasing literacy, the availability of the printing press, and the growth of publishing industries, intellectuals acquired a large measure of influence in nineteenth and early twentieth century Indian society. Often educated in the West, particularly in England, they adopted and disseminated new political values, formulated a variety of influential perspectives on the colonial

situation, and provided leadership roles in the growing Nationalist Movement. Their importance and numbers were further increased as large segments of the middle class -- who were prevented from entering business careers due to uneven rates of economic growth, the privileged position of the British in commerce, and hence, a general lack of opportunities -- turned to the professions, intellectual preoccupations, and political concerns. (Misra 1961:343)

In increasing numbers, Indian intellectuals before 1947 became highly politicized (concerned with the normative issues of politics). Beginning with the reform movements of the nineteenth century which included the Brahmo Samaj, the Arya Samaj, and the Theosophical movement, intellectuals grew more critical of traditional values -- particularly those associated with cast, hierarchy, and inequality -- as well as with the social organization and colonial institutions embodying those values. In the process, five major political perspectives were formulated in the course of the Nationalist Movement, each with significant followings. As will be briefly outlined in the following section, these included Ultra-Nationalism, Liberalism, Social Democracy, Gandhian decentralism, and Revolutionary Socialism.

Pre-Independence Perspectives

Ultra-Nationalist views in India developed towards the end of the nineteenth century in the context of the earlier reform movements which strongly emphasized Hindu revivalism. In the Arya Samaj movement, for example, leaders were involved in glorifying the heritage of Hindu culture, religion, and classical texts, particularly the Vedas. At the same time, Theosophists such as Annie Besant were engaged in idealizing and reviving an interest in the organic and corporate character of traditional Hindu village life. (Prasad 1974: 27-28)

By incorporating this emphasis on Hindu revivalism with the imported concept of nationalism, the Ultra-Nationalist perspective was developed further by intellectuals such as B.G. Tilak and Sri Aurobindo at the turn of the century. (DeBary 1966; 705) With a strong stress on Indian history and languages, and through the use of religious symbolism, Tilak and Aurobindo endeavored to foster pride among Indians in a glorious Hindu past. By instilling a sense of national self-respect among a wide number of groups, their efforts were successful in strengthening the basis of the Nationalist Movement. Between 1905 and 1918, for example, they were able to mobilize large numbers of supportive lower middle class groups into the movement. (Desai 1966: 328) However, they also alienated the Muslim community of India in the process -- an event which

ultimately resulted in Partition and the creation of Pakistan after 1947.

In terms of the content of their political thought, Tilak and Aurobindo were largely concerned with a theory of political community. A fully developed sociological analysis of political change or a normative theory of ideal political institutions was absent. As a basis for the Indian political community, they argued in favour of a strong sense of nationalism. Nationalism, according to Tilak, should be encouraged for three major reasons. (Varma 1967; 212-228) First, an independent Indian nation would be more prosperous, economically. Second, nationalism would promote psychological unity within the individual: Nationalism fulfils a need among individuals for a sense of identity, attachment, and commonality. Third, nationalism would cultivate the spiritual growth of the Indian political community: By encouraging patriotism and an interest in traditional Hindu culture, the community would be provided with spiritual energy and moral enthusiasm.

Although Tilak and Aurobindo were broadly supportive of a democratic institutional framework, a number of later Ultra-Nationalists leaned towards authoritarianism and Fascism -- views more commonly associated with militant Nationalism. Hedqewar, for example, emphasized the need for Hindu supremacy in India and organized the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sanqh (R.S.S.) in 1925 for that purpose. The party was intensely chauvinistic

and organized along semi-fascist lines. At the same time, a theory of Hindutva was propounded by Savarkar in which Hindu solidarity was to be strengthened and racial homogeneity among Hindus preserved.

Finally, in the 1940's, S.C. Bose attempted to combine Ultra-Nationalist views with elements of Fascism and Communism. (Varma, 1967: 430-436) In his program for political action, he advocated the supremacy of the state, rule by a militaristic party and strong leader, the eradication of parliamentary democracy, and the suppression of dissenting minorities. During the Second World War, this program provided a basis for the Indian National Army, a semi-Fascist military organization which was formed by Bose in Japan to combat the British in Asia.

Another important perspective in Pre-Independence India was liberalism. Contributing to the development of this perspective in India was the influence of the English liberal tradition as well as the Brahma-Samaj movement in the early nineteenth century. A central figure in early Indian liberalism was the influential Bengali and leader of Brahma Samaj, Ram Mohan Roy, who attempted to accommodate liberal views with perspectives in the Hindu classics. Of particular importance to Roy was the traditional concept of "Lokasamgraha" or "common social good" to which he added the Lockean theory of natural rights as well as the liberal emphases on individual freedoms, political equality, social reform, and the importance of education. (Varma 1967:

19-20)

Turn-of-the-century liberals such as Gokhale, Ranade, and Naoroji continued the tradition of Roy but added new dimensions. Gokhale, for example, emphasized the importance of constitutionalism as a political method in contrast to the terroristic methods employed by a number of Bengali and Punjabi nationalists or to the mass organization and agitational techniques used by Tilak. (Appadorai, 1971: 27) These thinkers also argued that the state should be given a greater role in society -- a new dimension in Indian liberalism and a contrast to the laissez-faire liberalism then prevalent in the West. For example, in the analyses of social and economic inequality presented by Ranade and Gokhale, in the "drain theory" proposed by Naoroji, and in the examination of British land policies undertaken by R.C. Dutt, the British colonial system was held primarily responsible for socio-economic problems and the under-development of India. (Prasad 1974: 20-24) In each of these views, a strong state would be required to address these problems.

Social democracy was a third perspective of major importance in Pre-Independence India. The strongest proponents of this view were Nehru and Asoka Mehta, although to some extent, Jayaprakesh Narayan, Sampurnanand, Narendra Deva, and Ram Manohar Lohia, shared social democratic perspectives as well. (Prasad, 1974: 65-139) In the development of this

perspective, Indian liberalism, European social democracy, Fabianism, and Marxism were important sources of influence. Liberalism, for example, contributed the values of individual freedom, constitutionalism, and a strong state; European social democracy and Fabianism, the importance of gradualism and parliamentary methods; and Marxism, a broadly accepted theory of class conflict and economic imperialism. In terms of political practices, Indian social democrats were strongly influenced by the non-violence approach of Gandhi and by the socialist planning experiment in the Soviet Union.

Individual freedom was a "corner-stone ideal" among socialist intellectuals in India. (Prasad 1974: 168-174) In supporting this ideal, Nehru and others emphasized traditions in the Vedanta in which the individual is to be recognized as a sacred entity by himself. The state, therefore, was not a positive value in itself but a means to end of promoting individual welfare. In achieving this objective, the state was to be based on democratic principles and to be an instrument for implementing plans, removing poverty, and securing a just distribution of socio-economic resources.

Associated with these views, in the social democratic perspective, was the emphasis on democratic planning and parliamentary methods. (Prasad 1974: 207-229) According to Nehru and Mehta, for example, democratic planning was an approach which would avoid the extremes of Soviet centralization, on the

one hand, and Gandhian decentralism, on the other. A number of values would be accommodated in the context of Indian planning: economic development, industrialization, national integration, socio-economic equality, and some measure of decentralism. As a political input to planning, Nehru and Mehta advocated parliamentary methods. In their view, this method would involve a desired peaceful approach to political change and would best harmonize the goals of democracy and socialism.

Another major perspective in Pre-Independence India was Gandhian decentralism. The political thought of Gandhi was influenced both by Indian political traditions and by philosophical anarchism in the West as developed by Tolstoy, Ruskin, and Thoreau. According to Gandhi, political institutions should promote "sarvodaya" or the "welfare of all". (Appadorai 1971:90) This involved the establishment of politically and economically decentralized communities in which material goods were limited but shared. The wealthy members of society were to act as "trustees" for these communities by voluntarily sharing their surplus with less privileged social groups.

In achieving this broad objective, Gandhi advocated the use of a political method known as "satyagraha" or "truth attainment". (Bondurant, 1965: 108-114) In broad terms, this involved a search for truth through moral commitment, active goodwill and tolerance; "ahimsa" or non-injury and non-violence to others; and "tapasya" or suffering and sacrifice in the

service of a correct cause. Central to the Gandhian method was the view that means and ends are inseparable and that non-violent is preferable to other methods.

Although the tactics associated with satyagraha varied according to time and place, the method involved a number of general steps. (Bondurant 1965: 194) First, the character of the situation was to be analyzed and the objectives of participants clarified. Second, in achieving objectives, persuasion, publicity, and propaganda were to be used extensively. Third, if these tactics were not fruitful, participants were then to engage in civil disobedience and non-cooperation. This would involve contravention of specific laws, non-violent strikes, discriminate fasting, hartals (closing of businesses) and darnas (sit-ins).

A final perspective of major importance was revolutionary socialism or Marxism. To some extent, this perspective was influential among social democrats such as Nehru, Deva, and Narayan. Nehru, for example, accepted in broad outlines the Marxian theory of class conflict and the Leninist theory of imperialism. At the same time, Deva argued that the Congress organization should be developed as an instrument of social revolution. (Prasad 1974: 80-95)

More important proponents of revolutionary socialism, however, were self-acclaimed Communists such as M.N.Roy. In his India in Transition (1922) and Future of Indian Politics (1926),

Roy emphasized the exploitive nature of British imperialism -- as indicated in British tariff, tax, and land policies -- and the necessity and inevitability of social revolution in India. (Varma 1967: 441-444) At the same time, Roy argued that what was required in India was a vanguard "peoples' party" to lead the National Independence Movement. This party in turn would be led by the proletariat in alliance with intellectuals, students, artisans, and peasants. These orthodox viewpoints, however, were later abandoned by Roy in favour of what he referred to as "radical humanism", an outlook which emphasized the importance of gradualism, human will, and political decentralism.

The Adoption of Democratic Values

In terms of these five major perspectives in the Pre-Independence period, a broad normative consensus emerged among a majority of Indian intellectuals in which democratic values were adopted as central political principles. On the one hand, certain aspects of liberalism, social democracy, and Gandhism were included in the consensus; on the other, the major views of Ultra-Nationalists and Marxists were rejected together with the utopian aspects of Gandhian decentralism.

The Ultra-Nationalist perspective, for example, was criticized by Gandhi and Nehru for the divisiveness which it created in Indian society and for Muslim alienation. In contrast

to the emphasis on Hindu revivalism, their own conceptions of nationhood were more moderate, secular, and inclusive of Indian cultural diversity. Gandhi, for instance, viewed the nation as a community "organized for the benefit and service of humanity at large". (Appadorai 1971: 138) Nehru, on the other hand, in observing the destructive effects of nationalism in Europe as well as in India, was a well known supporter of internationalism.

Although a number of intellectuals such as Deva, Narayan, and Nehru were earlier attracted to the principles of Marxism, they later developed serious reservations as the result of Bolshevik policies in Russia. Nehru, for instance, could only accept the broad outlines of Marxist theory; he could not accept the practical implications in terms of Soviet central planning and the regimentation of Russian social life. (Prasad 1974: 80) In the aftermath of the Bolshevik purges, other intellectuals adopted similar views. As stated by Prasad, "Bolshevism got a very bad image into their mental vision, and the inner repulsion against violence, that germinated in the minds of the Indian socialists, threw them back to enclasp the individual". (1974: 174) In the 1940s, even M.N. Roy abandoned his support for Soviet Marxism and turned towards a more social democratic and humanist outlook after a period of disillusionment. (DeBary 1966: 906)

At the same time, however, the utopian features in Gandhian decentralism were rejected. The notions of self-sufficient communities and trusteeship were viewed by Nehru and his associates as impractical, naive, and even regressive. (Prasad 1974: 73) A certain measure of decentralization was desirable, according to Nehru, but only in the context of parliamentary politics and planning programs. This context was to facilitate a balance between the objectives of rapid economic development through the role of the state and the democratic goals associated with decentralization.

What was generally accepted among Indian intellectuals in politics were democratic principles and the associated values of individual freedom, equality, and political gradualism. Although agreement was not precise, democracy was generally viewed by Indian intellectuals to be superior to other forms of government. For Nehru, democracy was "an attempt at the solution of problems by peaceful means"; for Gandhi, it was the mobilization of resources "in the service of the common good of all". (Appadorai 1971: 96)

Among almost all Indian intellectuals, individual freedom was regarded as a cardinal principle of democratic development. According to Nehru, it was most essential that political institutions promoted the well-being of the individual; for Gandhi, the development of individuality lay "at the root of all

progress". (Appadorai 1971: 76) Reacting to the Bolshevik purges in Russia, the emphasis on individual freedom was given additional support by a number of other intellectuals including Jayaprakash Narayan, Lohia, Deva, and Mehta. (Prasad 1974: 174-175)

Although the views on means to be adopted varied, the desirability of greater political and socio-economic equality was also generally supported by Indian intellectuals. For example, Gandhi and his associate, Vinobe Bhave, argued that equality was a positive goal and should be achieved through the development of small-scale communities, ascetic life styles, and the trusteeship principle in which wealth was voluntarily redistributed. Nehru, on the other hand, favored the role of the state and planning in promoting the goal of greater equality. By facilitating increased scientific and economic development, the state would acquire the capacity for removing poverty and for redistributing wealth. (Appadorai 1971: 78-80)

The importance of political gradualism to democratic development was a central value among Indian intellectuals as well. According to Gandhi, political and social change was to be accomplished through purity of means, persuasion, and education. Influenced by both the Gandhian and Fabian emphases on gradualism, Nehru argued that in the long term, positive political development could result only through an evolutionary approach rather than through revolutionary changes. (Appadorai

1971: 86) According to Nehru and his associates, the principle of political gradualism was best accommodated through methods and institutions such as constitutionalism, parliamentary governments, a competitive party system, democratic planning, and -- only under certain conditions when other methods were shown to fail -- satyagraha.

Legitimation and Popularization

In Pre-Independence India, intellectuals performed a prescriptive role in democratic development through not only adopting democratic values, themselves, but -- in order to mobilize support -- through legitimating and popularizing these values. Legitimation, on the one hand, involved the process of acquiring support for desired democratic principles through (a) the selection of favorable political values in both Indian and Western political traditions; (b) through the use of traditional concepts and symbols; and (c) through the accommodation of other modern values within the framework of democratic principles.

In response to the British impact on India, a major intellectual enterprise in the Pre-Independence period involved the reinterpretation, synthesis, and modification of older political traditions. The objective of this enterprise was essentially to legitimate a set of new values adopted during the Nationalist Movement. (Varma 1967: 513; Aiyar 1972; Nandy 1973)

In the words of Nandy, it was a process of choosing "to remember different features of its past and to emphasize different elements of its culture"; (1973: 117) according to Aiyar, of reinterpreting older traditions in order "to evolve a democratic society capable of preserving the cultural diversities of India". (1972: 401)

Gandhi, for example, legitimated his ideas and leadership through deemphasizing Hindu traditions which defined politics as amoral, ruthless statecraft, on one hand, while supporting other traditions in which politics was viewed as government by moral and self-controlled rulers leading ascetic life-styles, on the other. (Nandy 1973: 130) To this tradition, Gandhi added the democratic values of citizen participation and equality together with the anarchistic principles of voluntarism, community, and decentralization.

Legitimation also involved the use of traditional symbols for the support of democratic and associated modern values. For purposes of mobilization, for instance, Gandhians used the loin cloth as a symbol of equality, caste reform, and the emancipation of the untouchables; the khadi and spinning wheel, of economic and political independence; and the cow and fasting, of religious toleration, national unity, and political harmony. (Parel 1969) After Independence, party theoreticians continued the use of traditional symbols for legitimation purposes. As indicated in one study, for example, electoral campaigns were

identified with religious festivals while party symbols -- the bullocks of Congress and lamp of Jan Sangh -- were given religious and social meanings for political purposes. (Agrawal 1971)

Another means of legitimation in the Pre-Independence period was the incorporation of other modern values within a framework of democratic principles. The most important immediate value to be associated with democracy was national independence. However, this was to be extended to others as well. In particular, Nehru and others argued that the values of economic development, national unity, planning, scientific development, socio-economic equality, and decentralization were best accomplished in the context of a democratic institutional framework. (Prasad 1974: 80) By accommodating these other values, democratic principles were given greater support. This approach was also continued in the Post-Independence period. As indicated in two major survey analyses, for example, the majority of intellectuals which were sampled favored a similar synthesis of values. While supporting the accommodation of modern and traditional values with democratic principles, they rejected a strong emphasis on either revivalism, social revolution, or complete Westernization. (Malik 1975a: 72; Srivastava 1978: 64-68)

A final aspect of the prescriptive role involved the popularization of democratic values. This role was performed by both Western-educated and traditional Indian intellectuals. As students in Western universities, Indian intellectuals assimilated the values of democracy, liberalism, nationalism, and socialism, and transmitted these values to educated strata during the Nationalist Movement. Influenced by such major thinkers as Harold Laski at the London School of Economics, they tended to develop a sense of mission in communicating the vision of an independent and democratic India to others. (Desai 1966: 161-200; Shils 1971: 254-272) In acquiring mass support, however, the central link in the Nationalist Movement were the traditional intellectuals. Using the vernacular languages, mass media, and traditional communication channels, these intellectuals transmitted the new values to local Indian communities in familiar forms. National symbols were popularized, national heroes were created, and democratic leaders were glorified. (Malik 1977: 566)

Journalism was a major medium of popularization for both the Western-educated and traditional Indian intellectuals. With the exceptions of English language dailies such as the Statesman, the Times of India, and the Pioneer, the Indian press made significant contributions to the Independence Movement. They were involved in disseminating the ideas and arguments of Nationalist leaders and in providing almost daily criticism of

the British Government. These activities, particularly in the vernacular press, influenced public opinion decisively. The impact of Gandhi, for example, was in large part the result of the distribution of his weeklies, Young Indian and Harijan. As early as 1923, the circulation of Young Indian reached 45,000. (Lohman 1971: 91) Later, as the Nationalist Movement gathered momentum, the circulation and numbers of Indian newspapers, in general, steadily multiplied. By 1941, 4000 newspapers and magazines were published in 17 different languages. (Desai 1966: 229)

Another important medium for the popularization of democratic and associated values was the novel. As observed by Coppola, for example, the basic theme to pervade the Pre-Independence novel was "Indian aspirations for freedom and independence from Britain". (1975: 2) Together with journalists, Indian novelists became increasingly politicized prior to Independence and concerned with disseminating democratic and nationalist values. To a large extent, they propagated their views by emphasizing plot at the expense of characterization. On the one hand, plots tended to be developed in the context of political movements and the heinous activities of the British and their collaborators. On the other, characters were depicted as either idealized heroes or stereotypical villains. With this emphasis, novelists were able to popularize the values of the Nationalist Movement in a familiar form and thus to make

important contributions to the prescriptive role of Indian intellectuals.

IV. AN OPERATIONAL ROLE

In the immediate Post-Independence period -- a period extending from 1947 to the mid and late 1960s -- the movement towards democratic development in India involved an operational process in which actual attempts were made to furthering a realization of prescribed democratic values in practice. More specifically, the process involved a movement towards expanding political participation, increasing political equality and furthering competition among political elites.

During this period, a change was observable in the set of political perspectives of Indian intellectuals -- a change which provided a contrast to their intensely normative emphases prior to Independence. Although broad support for basic democratic values was continued, intellectuals tended to become relatively less politicized as a group and, at the same time, more oriented towards private, professional, or pragmatic interests. The tendency was evident among intellectuals engaged in a wide variety of fields including journalism, education, literature, and politics. Among those directly involved in the operational process -- advisors, political activists, and critics -- attention shifted from the level of abstract prescription to a concern with concrete and practical measures associated with

promoting democratic goals.

Post-Independence Perspectives

An important factor underlying the general depoliticization of Indian intellectuals in the Post-Independence period was the actual achievement of the immediate political goals set forth as objectives in the Nationalist Movement. With the removal of the British political presence in 1947, and with an operational process yet to develop, the interest in political prescriptions and ideals among intellectuals declined in relative terms -- particularly among the younger generation who were inclined to simply take Independence and associated democratic values for granted.

As noted by scholars such as Shils, (1961: 20-101) Khatkhate, (1977: 256-258) Jha, (1977: 57-72) and Srivastava, (1978: 27) this trend was related to a combination of political, economic, and cultural factors. For example, with the emphasis given by Nehru to the role of the state in socio-economic development, large numbers of talented intellectuals were absorbed into the expanding bureaucratic apparatus. In a situation of dependence, the interests of this group tended to be pragmatic rather than normative. Pragmatic inclinations were also evident among many groups of intellectuals outside government. In a generally unfavorable economic situation,

large numbers engaged in a "politics of scarcity": a program of competing with other segments of society for the limited resources of government. The press, for example, competed for government advertising and subsidies; the universities and research institutes, on the other hand, for higher budgets. For some groups of intellectuals, depoliticization involved a cultural factor: the traditional disdain among Indian intellectuals for the mundane and routine aspects of practical politics. With the attainment of Independence and subsequent preoccupation with party politics and five-year plans, this group simply withdrew from political life and turned to other concerns.

The trend was reflected in a number of studies of political attitudes among specific occupational groups during the period: journalists, academics, novelists, students, party activists, and public administrators. In studies of political perspectives among journalists, for example, Shah (1965: 530-532) and Lohman (1971: 93-97) have both noted a contrast between the normative and critical inclinations of journalists before Independence and the tendency towards pragmatism and conformism in the immediate Post-Independence period. As discussed by Lohman, a major reason was related to the generally precarious financial position of the press (excluding the monopolies) and, in many cases, their heavy dependence on big business or governmental advertising. The priorities of the press, therefore, tended to be based

simply on increasing circulation and advertising revenue, on avoiding unnecessary political controversy, and on minimizing costs (including the costs necessary for comprehensive training programs and detailed investigative reporting). Consequently, articles were less oriented towards critical, normative analyses than towards sensationalism, homilies, and simple reproductions of government explanations of political events and policies.

Pragmatism was also visible in the universities and colleges. As observed by Shah, (1965: 526-530) academic intellectuals tended to display an easy adaptability to the new political situation after 1947. Extreme caution, for example, was evident in their public pronouncements on politically relevant issues. When controversial books were banned by the government, opposition against the curbing of free speech and expression was almost absent in the academic community. Furthermore, at academic conferences, political issues such as linguistic reorganization of states and nationalization of industry were often not addressed until after political decisions had already been made by the government, and then to merely rationalize those decisions.

In examining the political content of Post-Independence novels, a number of scholars have also noted a general change of attitude among Indian novelists. Preceding Independence, novelists had been intensely concerned with themes, issues, and plots which were closely related to political values and

programs. (Coppola 1975: 2; Apte 1975: 80; Gopalan 1975: 108) After 1947, however, the literature was relatively less political in content with an "art for art's sake" perspective increasing in importance: Novels in Bengal, (Gupta 1975: 88) Mysore, (Mokashi-Punekar 1975: 137) and Hindi areas of North India (Malik 1975: 42) were generally less concerned with political prescriptions than with themes such as aestheticism, humanism, existentialism, or regionalism. For the most part, ideology-oriented novels were less numerous with the orthodox Gandhians, Revivalists, and Marxists in minority positions -- in some cases, even these intellectuals turned from their traditional political critiques towards an "art for art's sake" perspective and towards less political themes such as humanism. (Malik 1975)

Studies have also indicated a marked decline of interest in broad political issues and values among university and college students after Independence. In one national study, for example, Rudolph and Ahmad (1971) have noted that student politics between 1958 and 1966 was primarily addressed to specific issues and interests such as the quality of libraries, teacher-student ratios, and the cost of books -- interests which were not generally related to larger normative issues. Similarly, in a case study of student politics between 1959 and 1964 in Mysore, Ross (1969) has observed that student concerns were related specifically to issues such as overcrowding, administrative

corruption, and defects in the educational system which, again, were not related to broad normative considerations.

Pragmatic orientations, however, have been most visible among party activists and among those in public administration. In a national study of the political attitudes of party activists in the 1967 general elections, for example, Brewer (1976) has noted that only five percent in his sample (1000) were motivated by strong normative commitments. Twenty-four percent were inclined towards extreme opportunism; the remainder, towards moderate pragmatism (adherence to a few set values but willing to compromise others). One reason for this outlook was the changing membership pattern of political parties. In the composition of the Congress Party, for instance, normatively-inclined Independence leaders were gradually displaced after 1947 by pragmatically-oriented agriculturalists and businessmen. Another reason was related to the changing political strategies of party elites. The Communist Party, for example, which had previously advocated the use of revolutionary tactics, was, relatively speaking, deradicalized between 1951 and 1967. (Brass 1973: 36-55) With their failure in the 1950 insurrection at Telengana in South India and with the perceived threat of the emergence of a strong reactionary and anti-Communist movement, the Party adopted a more pragmatic program. Accordingly, greater support was given to Nehru; revolutionary tactics were de-emphasized; and greater emphasis

was given to the activity of the Party in electoral and parliamentary politics.

Finally, as concluded in studies by Khare (1974: 168-171) and Verma (1978), a preoccupation with professional and pragmatic concerns was also apparent among public administrators. In broad terms, public administrators tended to emphasize the need for more law and order, a stronger Indian nation, and a greater role for bureaucracy -- a role in which bureaucrats, themselves, were given increased financial resources, political power, and social status. On an individual level, as discussed by Verma, (1978: 196) their priorities were largely centred on private interests such as career opportunities, promotions, permanency of tenure, and guaranteed pay-scales.

Although, as these various studies have indicated, a general trend towards pragmatism, professionalism, and privatism was evident among a number of groups after Independence, studies have also shown Indian intellectuals continued to be broadly supportive of basic democratic values. For example, in an analysis of the political perspectives of intellectuals in the early years of this period, Rosen (1966: 121-124) has noted that the political views of Nehru were largely representative of the views of Indian intellectuals generally. These views entailed a developmental strategy in which democratic and

democratically-related social goals were to proceed in concert with a program of rapid economic growth. Accordingly, attention was to be given equally to the goals of political participation, land reform, and socio-economic equality, on the one hand, and those of large-scale industrialization and technological development, on the other. Basic support for these democratic goals was evident among those involved in the media; (Narashimhan 1956: 15-18; Somjee, NOTE 2) among planners; (Price 1967: 50-51; Frankel 1978: 115) among activists involved in the mobilization of less privileged social groups; (Keer 1962: 388; Ostergaard and Currell 1971: 231-234) and even among Marxist intellectuals. (Brass, 1973: 37-38; Karunakaran 1978: 39)

This support was also visible in the second decade of Indian independence (the mid and late 1960s). In a 1966 national survey, for example, Khare observed that while Indian intellectuals were critical of the centralizing aspects of planning, they continued to subscribe to basic democratic principles and to favor a movement towards greater participation and political equality. (1974: 164-175) Similarly, in another survey conducted during the same period, Srivastava noted that although intellectuals perceived Indian politicians to be generally conservative and apathetic, on the one hand, and bureaucrats to be corrupt and inefficient, on the other, they nevertheless remained committed to the view that developmental goals such as economic growth and national integration were best

achieved within a democratic institutional framework. (1978: 64-72)

In supporting democratic development, an operational role was performed by three groups of Indian intellectuals, each attempting to contribute to the realization of democratic principles in practice. These included (a) political advisors, a group of major importance in framing the Indian Constitution and in formulating the developmental goals of the Planning Commission; (b) political mobilizers or activists, a group engaged in organizing less privileged and under-participating social groups; and (c) a surrogate citizenry, a group active in providing political information, clarifying issues, evaluating policies, and communicating their perspectives to the politically less attentive members of Indian society. As will be discussed in a later section, these roles were performed with varying degrees of success.

Political Advisory Positions

In 1946, a Constituent Assembly was elected to draft the Indian Constitution. In the course of the proceedings -- which extended into 1950 when the Constitution was eventually adopted -- the Assembly relied strongly on the recommendations of an advisory committee and, particularly, on the views of a key

group of intellectuals in that committee. These included legal scholars and constitutional experts B.N. Rau, K.T. Shah, T.T. Krishnamachari, and, most notably, the former untouchable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, who was later considered the chief architect of the Indian Constitution.

In framing the Constitution, these advisors attempted to combine the objectives of democratic development with the goals of accommodating cultural diversity, of maintaining political stability, and of preserving national unity. With reference to democratic objectives, a number of articles were adopted which favored a broadening of political participation, an increase in political equality, and a movement towards greater competition among political elites. (Palmer 1961: 215-216; Gopal 1977: 316-330; Frankel 1978: 77-84) A basis for participation, for example, was provided in Article 19 in which individual rights such as the freedom of speech, the freedom of association, and the freedom of assembly were incorporated. These rights were coupled with provisions for adult suffrage, regular elections, and an Election Commission in Articles 324 - 329.

The movement towards political equality was also supported in the Constitution. Article 14, for instance, provided for equality before the law. Article 15 contained clauses in which discrimination on grounds of religion, race, and caste was made unlawful. Untouchability was explicitly abolished in Article 17. Finally, in Articles 330 and 332, a specified number of seats

was reserved for former untouchables in both the national and state legislatures. These seats were to be reserved, initially, for a 10 year period with the option of an extension at the close of the period.

The Constitution also favored competition among political elites -- competition which was to hopefully result in a limitation on the accumulation of political power, in more alternatives for citizens, and in greater representativeness and accountability on the part of elected officials. For example, in supporting freedom of association and assembly, adult suffrage, and a system of elections, the Constitution implicitly provided a basis for the development of a competitive party system. At the same time, articles were adopted which attempted to prevent a political monopoly over the interpretation of law and over the flow of information: On the one hand, an independent judicial system was to be established in order to protect individual freedoms and to safeguard the Constitution; on the other, a free press was to be maintained thereby ensuring alternative sources of information. In contrast to the principle of an independent judiciary, the principle of a free press was not explicitly guaranteed under the Constitution. However, it was interpreted as an extension of Article 19 which provided for freedom of speech and expression. This interpretation was endorsed by the Supreme Court who later upheld the principle of a free press in a number of key court decisions. (Noorani, 1971: 24-25)

The framers of the Constitution also attempted to promote competition among political elites by adopting a federal system of government. In this system, power was to be divided between elites at the national and state levels as follows: The national government in New Delhi was to be responsible for the areas of defense, foreign affairs, communication, postal service, and trade; state governments, for the areas of health, education, welfare, public order, and the administration of justice. In a number of other areas, such as agriculture and planning, both governments were to share powers. It was hoped that these measures would both accommodate regional diversities and developmental goals, on the one hand, and prevent the monopolization of power, on the other. However, as will be more fully discussed later, these and other measures in the Indian Constitution were not without problems in the furthering of democratic political development.

Another important advisory role performed by Indian intellectuals after Independence was in the area of planning. In 1950, a National Planning Commission was established in which political leaders and special advisors were appointed to assess the available resources of India and to formulate a developmental strategy based on this assessment. In the process of formulating the plan, the Commission was to confer with the various government ministries, with research institutes when

necessary, and later with specially appointed bodies such as the Central Committees for Community Development, the Central Committee for Land Reforms, and the National Development Council -- a body which was composed of politicians and planners from both the federal and state governments. (Hanson 1966: 58-66) The plan was then to be recommended to the Federal Cabinet for approval.

In the various stages of this process, intellectuals held key positions. They acted as consultants in research institutes, as advisors in national and state ministries, as staff specialists in the National Planning Commission and State Planning Boards, and, most importantly, as members of the National Planning Commission, itself. In the early 1950s, the Commission had only six members -- all of them politicians -- with Nehru as chairman and G. Nanda as vice-chairman. However, by the mid and late 1950s, the composition was changed: The membership doubled with specialists -- mostly trained as economists, statisticians, and scientists -- occupying one-half of the positions. These included such individuals as J. C. Ghose, Thacker, Khosla, V.K.R.V. Rao, S. Narayan, and, most notably, P. C. Mahalanobis, the major architect of the Second Five Year Plan. (Hanson 1966: 52-58) Expertise was given greater weight not only in the membership of the Commission but in its organizational apparatus and in the planning bodies associated with the Commission.

In broad terms, the development strategy of planners was two-fold in the immediate Post-Independence period: to achieve rapid economic growth, on the one hand, and to accomplish democratic and social goals, on the other. (Price 1967: 50-51; Mathur 1974: 195; Frankel 1978: 25-26) In terms of economic growth, priorities varied although a general commitment to a mixed economy remained constant. Attention in the First Five Year Plan (1951 - 1956), for example, centered on agricultural development, transportation, and communication. These received 66 percent of available funds in contrast to the 13 percent available for industry, power and mining. (Hanson 1966: 89) In the Second Five Year Plan (1956 - 1961), greater consideration was given to the public sector and to large-scale industrialization. To the relative neglect of agriculture, heavy industry was emphasized receiving an increased 34 percent of the budget. (Hanson 1966: 124) Priorities in the Third Five Year Plan (1961 - 1966) were similar to those of the Second although planners were relatively more attentive to agriculture and to the acquisition of foreign aid.

In terms of democratic and social goals, the general strategy of planners was to promote conditions at the local level which could result in increased participation, greater political and socio-economic equality, and, on this basis, local pressure for social and economic change. By favoring the development of pressure for change at the local level, the

strategy accommodated the view among Indian intellectuals, generally, that democratic and social goals were best facilitated through the peaceful and piecemeal processes of political gradualism rather than through revolutionary or authoritarian measures. In attempting to peacefully overcome the obstacles of caste, hierarchy, and inequality, the political involvement of a demanding citizenry was perceived to be of utmost importance.

Four major decisions were made by planners in promoting these goals. First, in 1950, a decision was announced in which ceilings were to be established on land holdings. Accordingly, the upper limit on holdings was not to exceed three times the size of a family holding then in existence in a given state. (Frankel 1978: 100) At the same time, those with limited land were encouraged to pool their resources and form agricultural cooperatives for greater efficiency and increased output. The objective, according to planners, was to facilitate land redistribution and reform, greater socio-economic equality, and indirectly, greater political equality and demands for more social reform.

Second, in 1953, planners decided to establish a Community Development Program. The objective of the program was to encourage the active participation of citizens in promoting social and economic developmental projects at the village level. For administering the program, development blocks were

organized on an All-India basis -- totalling 5,268 by 1966 -- which were responsible for coordinating projects in an area covering 100 villages. These blocks were given a budget and access to credit as well as material assistance in the form of seeds and fertilizers. (Frankel 1978: 109) In the long-term, the program was designed not only to ensure the implementation of specific development projects but to increase economic and political awareness among the citizenry at large. This, it was believed, would result in greater political participation and pressure for political and social change.

Third, in 1956, a decision was made to promote the expansion of agricultural cooperatives on a large scale. According to planners, these were to eventually become the basic units of economic organization in the rural areas of India. (Frankel 1967: 624) Indeed, by 1964, a network of cooperatives was extended to include 80 percent of Indian villages and 24 million members. Operating on the basis of obtaining a supply of credit and assistance from the government and of mobilizing local manpower and resources, these cooperatives were expected to raise productivity levels in the rural sector of the economy. At the same time, however, they were expected to indirectly promote the long-term democratic and social goals of increased participation and equality.

Finally, in 1959, a decision was announced in which a Panchayati Raj system of local government was to be established

across India. Based in large part on the recommendations of the Balwantray Mehta Study Team in 1957, each Panchayat (village council) was to be given considerable political and administrative autonomy. These institutions, it was thought, would promote greater political awareness and a channel for increased participation and equality. At the same time citizens would be given the opportunity, through their representatives in the Panchayat, of becoming more involved in the formulation and implementation of Five Year Plans, themselves. (Mathur, 1974: 196-197) The concept of democratic planning, therefore, would be given greater substance.

These, then, were the major political advisory roles which Indian intellectuals performed immediately following Independence. While the constitutional advisors promoted the adoption of a number of democratic principles in the Indian Constitution, the planners formulated a developmental strategy which encompassed democratic as well as economic and other goals.

Political Mobilization

An operational role in Indian democratic development was also performed by intellectuals involved in the political mobilization of less privileged and under participating social

groups. Aside from the organizational efforts of Indian political parties, the two major groups to be engaged in this process after Independence were the associates and followers of Vinobe Bhave, on the one hand, and of those of Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, on the other.

Broadly considered to be the heir and political successor to Gandhi in the field of non-violence theory and practice, Vinobe Bhave was the principle leader of the Gandhian-inspired Sarvodaya movement after Independence. Organizationally based in the Sarva Seva Sangh, essentially a social service agency, the long term objective of the movement was the non-violent transformation of Indian society along the lines of democratic decentralization. According to Bhave, the political development of India involved the progression of three stages. In the initial stage, political life would be dominated by the activities of political parties and the state. Movements such as his own would attempt to promote participation, equality, and reform at the local community level. In the future second stage, parties would cease to exist although the state would remain in effect. Finally, in the distant third stage, the state would be replaced by a network of decentralized and self-governing institutions throughout India. (Osterquaard and Currell 1971: 40)

These political changes were to be based not on authoritarian or revolutionary socialist measures but on the

efforts of Sarvodaya leaders in changing the social and political attitudes of both the less privileged and elite members of Indian society. The less privileged were to be encouraged to involve themselves more in the political life of the village and to seek greater equality and reform; the wealthy, to be persuaded to donate land and other resources to the movement for purposes of redistribution. Thus, moral change at the individual level, according to Bhave, was to be the prerequisite for political change at the societal level.

In achieving these goals, the Sarvodaya strategy involved the development of three major programs. As most fully articulated at an annual conference in 1963, these included land redistribution, Kahadi or economic and political decentralization, and the establishment of Shanti Sena (Peace Army) -- an organization whose purpose was to prevent the outbreak of violence among social groups in the course of the Sarvodaya movement. (Osterquaard and Currell 1971: 51-60) In terms of land redistribution, the program centred on the promotion of three specific movements. Established in 1951, the first was the Bhoodan (land-gift) movement in which wealthy landowners were encouraged to donate one-sixth of their land for redistribution. This was then distributed to landless peasants on an individual basis. In the early 1960s, this was followed by a second and more ambitious Gramdan (village-gift) movement in which attempts were made to encourage landlords to donate their

complete holdings to whole villages. This objective, however, was modified in the later Sulabh Gramdan movement in which expected contributions were considerably reduced.

Aside from the very limited results of the Gramdan movement, Sarvodaya efforts at redistributing land achieved a certain measure of success. (Osterquaard and Currell 1971: 10-13) By 1957, for example, 4.2 million acres of land were donated for redistribution through the Bhoodan movement. By 1965, with the assistance of 5,000 full-time and 20,000 part-time recruits, one-half a million landowners made donations to the Bhoodan movement which were of assistance to another one-half million landless peasants. In terms of the Sulabh Gramdan movement, success was achieved in 140,020 villages by 1969 -- one-quarter of all villages in India. In promoting greater equality and participation at the village level, then, Sarvodaya leaders made contributions to social reform and Indian democratic development; however, as will be discussed later, serious problems were evident in their program as well.

Another major effort in the mobilization of less privileged social groups after Independence was the movement led by Dr. B. R. Ambedkar and his associates for improving the political and conditions of former untouchables in India. The guiding principles of this movement involved the promotion of democratic values and, in its later stages, associated Buddhist values as

well. Democracy, according to Ambedkar, a former untouchable himself, was related essentially to a certain attitude of mind -- an attitude which reflected a strong sense of equality and respect among social groups. The manifestation of this attitude was the presence of a social organization which was free from rigid social barriers, particularly from the continuing, although outlawed, practice of untouchability. (Keer, 1962: 388)

Buddhist values were also emphasized in the movement. Although Ambedkar had been attracted to these values early in his career, his actual conversion to Buddhism occurred in 1955, shortly before his death. It was only after his conversion when the movement, led by his son Yeshwant Ambedkar and associates D.T. Rupwate, R.C. Rattu, and B.K. Gaikwad, fully endorsed the program of promoting Buddhism among former untouchables. In the view of Dr. Ambedkar, Buddhism was to be favored for the following reasons. On the one hand, despite the development of democratic institutions and practices in India, the Hindu religion remained a strong force in the continuation of attitudes associated with casteism and inequality throughout Indian society. Only by turning to another religion could former untouchables free themselves from the influence of this force. On the other hand, Buddhism represented the traditional revolt against Hinduism. Opposing Hindu values, Buddhism strongly emphasized moral equality among individuals -- a value which was inherently conducive to the acceptance of the ideas of democracy

and equality. (Keer 1962: 478-502; Fiske 1972: 113)

In furthering the objectives of the movement, the strategy of Ambedkar and his associates involved the establishment and operation of three major organizations. First, in 1945, a Peoples Education Society and affiliated Siddharth college were founded in Bombay. These institutions were organized to educate former untouchables for leadership roles in the movement and to provide resources for the education of untouchables generally. (Keer 1962: 379) Second, in 1955, the Bharatiya Bauddha Mahasabha (Buddhist Society of India) was established to promote Buddhist conversions among untouchables. The activities of this society were mainly concentrated in the state of Maharashtra although extensions of the society were found in Gujarat, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, and after 1967, other areas of India as well. (Fiske 1972: 118) Finally, in 1956, a Republican Party was organized for seeking election in the seats reserved for former untouchables in national and state legislatures. An outgrowth of the Pre-Independence Scheduled Castes Federation, the electoral activities of the Party were mainly confined to Maharashtra and western Uttar Pradesh.

Although untouchables continued to suffer discrimination as well as immense social and economic hardship after Independence, the movement achieved a certain measure of success. As a result of agitations in the early 1950s, for example, an Untouchability

Offences Act was adopted in 1953 which declared that offences involving discrimination against untouchables were to be punishable by law. (Keer, 1962: 448-449) Punishments had previously been neither specified nor enforced. Apart from measures promoting political equality, political participation among former untouchables was also increased. This was evident particularly at the local level where upper caste dominance in large numbers of villages was tempered through the effects of universal adult suffrage. (Mahar, 1972: 25-29; Mencher 1972: 55)

In terms of the Buddhist conversion program, over 3.5 million former untouchables were successfully persuaded to adopt Buddhism by the late 1960s. (Fiske 1972: 113) Although the political effects of these conversions have not been fully researched, there have been indications that the program has produced democratic benefits. In a study of converted college students in Poona, for example, A. C. Paranjpe has noted that former untouchables have acquired a greater sense of self-esteem, competence, and social efficacy through conversion to Buddhism. (NOTE 3) As discussed in the literature on political participation, the sense of efficacy and competence has been related to higher levels of political involvement generally. (Almond and Verba 1965: 186-207)

A Surrogate Citizenry

Groups of Indian intellectuals also performed an operational role as a surrogate citizenry after Independence. Although less politicized than in the Pre-Independence period, these groups tended to participate in Indian political life as the citizenry depicted in an ideal version of democracy: politically knowledgeable, critical, attentive, and active. In acquiring and disseminating political information, evaluating governmental policies, clarifying issues, and communicating their perspectives to politically less attentive members of Indian society, these intellectuals acted as a surrogate citizenry for those who were relatively more concerned with private and non-political interests. Those most active in this role were journalists although academic and literary intellectuals were involved to some extent as well.

As discussed by Shah (1965) and Lohman (1971), journalism, in the years immediately following Independence, was characterized by a relatively high degree of conformism and a relatively low degree of critical and comprehensive political information content. Although the potential for a surrogate citizenry role was present, the critical capacity of the press was limited due to widespread financial insecurity and -- in many cases -- dependence on government advertising and subsidies. Despite these limitations, however, the development

of a politically more evaluative and informative press was evident by the 1960s. This was indicated most clearly by expressions of dissatisfaction of the central government over the critical viewpoints of journalists and editors on a number of policies. (Mulgaokar, 1971: 14) The most dramatic indication of the degree of journalistic criticism and of resulting government dissatisfaction was the later decision by Indira Gandhi to impose press censorship in 1975.

The development of a critical press in the Post-Independence period occurred for a number of reasons. On the one hand, in reaction to British attempts to censor the press before 1947, the principle of a free press was established as a cardinal value in the Independence Movement. On the other, the principle received the strong endorsement of Nehru. Although Nehru was often critical of the press, himself, he recognized the contributions which a free press would make in furthering democratic processes. Consequently, in 1954, he supported the establishment of a Press Commission which was to promote newspaper autonomy and to protect press freedom. (Rau 1968) Furthermore, the principle of a free press was also favored in the Constitution and by the Supreme Court. In Article 19 of the Constitution, for example, the right to freedom of speech and expression was interpreted by the Courts as inclusive of the right of freedom of the press. Although this was not regarded as an absolute right, the Supreme Court generally supported press

freedom as indicated in key decisions in 1950 1958, and 1962. (Noorani 1971)

Another factor in the development of a critical press was the growing availability of professional training programs for journalists after Independence. Journalism programs, for example, were established at the University of Madras in 1947, at the University of Calcutta in 1950, at the University of Mysore in 1951, at Hislop College in 1952, and at Osmania University in 1954. In addition, the Bombay College of Journalism was opened in 1961. The courses which were generally offered in these programs provided journalism students with a broad background knowledge of politics, economics, and history as well as with specific information on feature writing, investigative reporting, and editorial writing. (Wolseley 1964) Moreover, in some of the major newspapers such as the Times of India, comprehensive training programs were established after 1963 in order to familiarize journalism recruits with the techniques of reporting, editing, and feature writing. (Sarkar 1971: 130-131)

Through the support given to the principle of a free press and to new training programs, the development of a surrogate citizenry role was evident in many parts of India. In a study of Gujarati intellectuals, for example, A. H. Somjee has observed a strong commitment on the part of large numbers of journalists to building an informed citizenry, defining political issues, and

providing critical assessments of government policies and programs. In performing these roles, Gujarati journalists were able to exert a substantial degree of influence in the political life of the state and in the promotion of democratic processes.

(NOTE 2) As will be discussed later, contributions by journalists to democratic development were evident not only in Gujarat but in many other areas of India as well.

Although influential among a more select audience, academic and literary intellectuals also performed a surrogate citizenry role in Post-Independence India. This was evident in discussions at academic conferences during the 1960s, in academic publications, and in the political content of Post-Independence novels. Among many groups of academics, for example, the conformism and caution, which was much in evidence immediately following Independence, (Shah 1965) was less visible in the following decade. Instead, as indicated in the general content of articles presented at major Sociology and Social Science Conferences during this period, perspectives among scholars were much more critical. (Saksena 1961; Mukerjee 1970)

This was clearly evident, for example, in discussions at an important Social Science conference at Lucknow in 1965. It was concluded by those present that economists and statisticians were too influential in the Planning Commission and that too much attention in planning was given to rapid economic growth

and industrialization at the expense of other considerations. Instead, they argued for greater participation among citizens in the planning process and for greater emphases on agricultural development, socio-economic equality, and administrative reform. In order to promote these goals, they suggested that social scientists other than economists be given a greater role in the Planning Commission. In their view, plans facilitating democratic development required not only sophisticated models of economic growth but knowledge of social structure, culture, village traditions, and political attitudes and process. (Mukerjee 1970: 198-201)

Criticism, however, came from a number of Indian economists as well, the most prominent of which was the influential D.R. Gadgil. In a series of speeches, articles and books, Gadgil strongly emphasized the presence of numerous defects in the planning process during the late 1950s and 1960s. Economic and political power, according to Gadgil, were becoming more -- instead of less -- concentrated in the industrial and agricultural sectors of Indian society, and this was undermining the goals both of economic growth and democratic development. On the one hand, capital formation was hampered as agricultural, business, and administrative elites were able to use their political power for evading taxes and for preventing reform -- including the much required land reform. This in turn restricted economic growth. On the other hand, as argued by Gadgil, the

power of these elites was a major factor in constraining the efforts of planners in promoting democratic and related social goals. These constraints were evident in the limited funding given to cooperative societies, in restrictions on the degree of decentralization, and in the trend towards greater socio-economic inequality. These, in turn, together, hindered democratic development. (Gadgil 1972)

Along with the journalists and academics, another major group to comprise the surrogate citizenry in Post-Independence India were novelists. Although novels after 1947 tended to be less political in content, a significant measure of social criticism was nevertheless apparent. Centering on questions such as socio-economic inequality, corruption, and widespread poverty, unfavorable social conditions were portrayed in strongly realistic terms. In attempting to raise awareness of these conditions and to promote reform, many novelists viewed themselves as important social critics of Indian society and as effective agents of social change. As shown in a number of studies, this was evident in Gujarat; (Somjee, NOTE 2) in Bengal; (Gupta 1975: 88) in Punjab; (Dulai 1975) and in Hindi areas of North India, generally. (Malik 1975: 42)

As political advisors, activists, and a surrogate citizenry, these then were the operational roles performed by Indian intellectuals in the immediate Post-Independence period. Their participation in the operational process of democratic development was of major importance. What was also very vital was a favorable context in which these roles could be performed. In this regard, the supportive views and actions of Nehru were central. As Chairman of the Planning Commission, for example, Nehru took a strong interest in the planning process, himself, and provided the much required political support for decisions made by advisors in the Commission. Moreover, the efforts of political activists outside party politics were also endorsed by Nehru. In fact, the land redistribution program of Sarvodaya leaders was incorporated into the formulation of Five Year Plans. In addition to this, Nehru also supported the development of a surrogate citizenry. He ensured, for instance, that the drafts of Five Year Plans were well publicized and that intellectuals outside government were given an opportunity to criticize these drafts and to suggest modifications before final decisions were made. More generally, he strongly favored the principle of a free press in India and provided support for its preservation.

Political Results

In the movement towards political democracy in India, the operational process and the roles which intellectuals performed in this process were of a mixed success. On the one hand, there was a significant expansion of citizen participation, a relative increase of political equality, and greater competition among elites for political power. On the other hand, however, participation was accompanied by a large element of cynicism among citizens, the extent of political equality was limited, and socio-economic inequality was in fact increased. As will be later discussed, these negative tendencies were strongly related to administrative factors and to political conditions.

Positive Results. One indication of success of the operational process was a large expansion in political participation. As discussed by Eldersveld and Ahmed, for example, electoral participation increased from 46 percent in 1952 to 61 percent in 1967. (1978: 4) During this period, moreover, the Indian electorate became relatively more informed of political issues and more evaluative of government policies. (Sheth 1970; Palmer 1975) In electoral decision-making, the influence of notables and local elites on average voters was becoming less apparent.

The development of an active and evaluative electorate resulted in part from the presence of a surrogate citizenry. This may be inferred from a number of studies which have shown a strong relationship between high levels of evaluative participation and exposure to education and media. In terms of education, for example, these studies have indicated that the more an Indian citizen was exposed to education, the more likely he/she was to actively participate in politics. This was noted in two national studies (Goel 1975: 196-202; Eldersveld and Ahmed, 1978: 65) and in a case study of Uttar Pradesh. (Vajpeyi 1973: 136) An exception to this relationship was the tendency of some highly educated citizens to show signs of political alienation and withdraw from politics. (Goel 1975)

An even stronger relationship was evident between high levels of citizen participation and exposure to media. Accordingly, greater exposure to media was shown to promote greater political awareness among citizens, a greater sense of political efficacy and competence, and on this basis, greater involvement in politics. This was noted in national studies; (Goel 1975: 108-119; Eldersveld and Ahmed 1978: 220) in case studies of Uttar Pradesh; (Vajpey 1973; Atal 1971) and in case studies of Andhra Pradesh. (Rao 1966: 106-110; Seshadri and Reddy 1974: 187) What was also noted was that, although illiteracy continues to be prevalent in India and the penetration of mass media limited, those indirectly exposed to

media also tended to be more involved in politics. In villages and rural areas, for example, there were indications of a "filtering effect": Those directly exposed to media acted as intermediaries and disseminated information learned in the media to more illiterate social groups with the result that these groups tended to participate more in politics as well. (Dube 1964; Rao 1966: 111-114; Atal 1971)

Apart from citizen participation, political equality was also increased after 1947. As discussed previously, Indian intellectuals contributed significantly to this movement. Constitutional advisors, for example, ensured that articles were adopted in the Constitution which favored greater political equality. Moreover, political activists such as Vinobe Bhave and B. R. Ambedkar led movements which mobilized less privileged social groups and which resulted in a relative increase of political equality. On the one hand, the Sarvodaya movement led by Bhave not only redistributed millions of acres of land but smoothed the way for government planners by focusing attention on the land question and the need for democratic decentralization, cooperative programs, and greater socio-economic and political equality. On the other hand, the political movement led by Ambedkar raised the level of political awareness among former untouchables which resulted in their greater involvement in politics. This in turn, provided a basis on which at least some degree of equality could be achieved.

Finally, greater competition for power among political elites was also evident in the immediate Post-Independence period. As one indication, for example, there was a gradual increase in the number of turnovers of government parties at the state level. As another, the dominance of the Congress party at the national level gradually diminished -- narrowly avoiding defeat in the 1967 general election -- although a turnover did not occur during this period.

A further increase of competition among elites occurred after the decision was made by planners to establish the Panchayat system of local government in India. As discussed by A. H. Somjee, (1971) for example, this decision was of major importance in stimulating democratic development and competition among political elites at the village level. With the introduction of suffrage and representative government in villages, traditional political relationships based on ascriptive criteria of socio-economic position and status were changed. An oligarchy of caste elders, for instance, was no longer always dominant in village politics although their influence continued to be evident in social matters related to maintaining caste cohesion. In their place, younger leaders from different caste backgrounds emerged to compete for positions in the Panchayat. Their success tended to be based more on political skill than on birth and on their ability to compete for office by building bases of support across social divisions

rather than by simply relying on upper caste endorsement. This increase in political competition, therefore, provided a basis for greater representativeness and accountability -- not only for a small social elite but for a much larger number of citizens as well.

Unfavorable Results. Several problems, however, were also apparent in the operational process during the immediate Post-Independence period. For example, although citizen participation increased after 1947, this participation was associated with a number of negative aspects as well. One indication of this was a strong presence, at certain times, of cynicism and alienation among Indian voters. In a national survey of political attitudes during the 1967 general election, for instance, Eldersveld and Ahmed observed that 58 percent of voters were cynical about democratic politicians, 71 percent were sceptical of their political competence, and 83 percent were distrustful of the value of party conflict. (1978: 215) Similarly, in a survey of political attitudes during the 1969 state election in Andhra Pradesh, Arora noted that although a large majority voted in this election, large numbers also expressed strong feelings of powerlessness and viewed political campaigns and party competition with skepticism and cynicism. (1969) This sense of cynicism and alienation, moreover, often led to violent forms of participation. India, for instance,

ranked second on a global basis between 1948 and 1967 in terms of the number of internal riots. (Eldersveld and Ahmed 1978: 4)

Another negative aspect to citizen participation after Independence was in the area of democratic planning. According to planners, it was desirable that citizens at the local level participate in both the formulation and implementation of Five Year Plans. Involvement, however, was very limited in practice. This resulted in part from perceptions among citizens that planning decisions had already been made, before consulting them, by politicians and professionals. They tended, therefore, to lack interest in the plans and to not feel a responsibility for becoming involved. (Hanson 1966: 398-443; Draper, 1976) In some cases, another factor was the failure of the media and local administrators to adequately publicize information and clarify issues related to plans. (Draper 1976)

Problems were also evident in attempts to increase political and socio-economic equality. Despite the efforts of Ambedkar and his movement, for example, former untouchables continued to suffer discrimination in Indian society and, as a result, severe social and economic hardship. Similarly, despite the efforts of Bhave and the Sarvodaya movement, the problems of inadequate land reform and associated inequality continued to be present. For instance, although Sarvodaya leaders were able to persuade wealthy landowners to redistribute 4.2 millions of acres to landless peasants by 1965, 1.85 million of these acres

were either uncultivable or under legal dispute. (Osterquaard and Currell 1971: 13-19) Moreover, a large number of landlords simply signed "declarations of intent" to redistribute land without following these intents with action.

The efforts of planners to promote greater political and socio-economic equality was hampered as well. As indicated in a number of studies, for example, land reform measures were not effectively implemented; the Community Development and co-operative programs were hindered in a number of ways; and consequently, the concentration of land ownership in India was essentially unchanged. (Hanson 1966: 170-171; Frankel, 1967: 632-634; Bhambhri 1977: 160-163) This, in turn, provided serious obstacles to the achievement of democratic and social goals thus contributing to a sense of frustration among less privileged social groups and to the element of negative participation already discussed. Reasons for these problems in planning were related in large part to administrative and political constraints.

In terms of administrative constraints, two major problems were evident. On the one hand, in order to promote their democratic, and social goals, planners required the resources of a large bureaucracy. These resources, however, were limited in India. In establishing the cooperative programs after 1956, for example, funding was required for loans to cooperatives as well as for the training of 70,000 workers annually to coordinate and

implement the program. (Frankel 1978: 169) As these costs were shown to be too high, many aspects of the program were later abandoned. Cooperatives, therefore, were required to rely more on their own resources. Although some were successful, many others were not due to an inability to generate sufficient savings and capital at the local level for re-investment purposes. This lack of administrative resources and thus the inability to adequately implement plans were serious problems in a number of other programs as well.

On the other hand, the democratic and social goals of planners were hindered by the general attitudes and behavior of large numbers of career bureaucrats in the administration. Historically, bureaucratic elites in India were frequently hostile to democratic and egalitarian goals, even in the later stages of the Nationalist Movement. Nevertheless, they were favored and given rights in the Constitution and were given an important role in effectively implementing the developmental goals of planners. As shown in a number of studies, however, the general attitudes of bureaucrats, themselves, became obstacles in the attempt to achieve these goals.

Bureaucratic elites, for example, tended to be recruited from highly privileged backgrounds in which concerns such as status, education, and wealth were of major importance. (Verma 1978: 197-198; Singhi 1972) Moreover, as observed by Verma in a general analysis of the values and goals of career bureaucrats,

these elitist tendencies were strengthened with entry into the administration. (1978: 195-196) Values tended to centre on personal status, wealth, security, and power; goals, on prestigious positions, promotions, and permanency of tenure. In this context, the personal goals of bureaucrats were often given priority over organizational goals such as promoting participation and equality.

This in turn posed a serious problem in programs designed to promote democracy at the local level. Bureaucrats were generally unable to identify with less privileged social groups and were often in conflict with democratic politicians. This was evident in general studies of democratic decentralization; (Panandiker, 1973; Chauhan 1977) in a case study of Rajasthan; (Singhi 1972) and in a case study of Andhra Pradesh. (Haraqopal 1978) When attempts were made to resolve the problem through giving greater influence to outside experts and specialists, bureaucrats were generally able to resist these attempts and maintain administrative supremacy. (Sakendra 1975; Verma, 1978: 199-200)

The democratic and social goals of planners were also subject to serious political constraints. These were in part related to certain provisions in the Constitution. With other freedoms, for example, the freedom of property was guaranteed under Article 19 which posed a potential obstacle for land reform and the movement toward greater equality. As property was

subject to "reasonable restrictions" in the public interest under the same article, however, this in itself was not the major problem. What became a major problem were provisions in the Constitution which provided the states with powers over matters related to property rights such as land reform, taxation of agricultural income, and agricultural credit. (Frankel, 1978: 77-84) As rural elites opposing land reform were often a dominant political influence in the states, national plans promoting greater equality were considerably hampered.

On the other hand, the Constitution did provide a remedy which unfortunately was an even greater problem for democratic development. Under Articles 352 - 360, a "state of Emergency" could be proclaimed if India was threatened by external aggression or internal disturbances. Accordingly, important amendments could be made to the Constitution, rights such as freedom of property could be suspended, and sweeping powers for reform could be given to the executive at the expense of the national and state legislatures as well as the courts. (Gopal 1977: 187-197) This could -- and did in 1975 -- promote sweeping change but at the expense of other democratic goals.

In the immediate Post-Independence period, however, these authoritarian measures were not attempted. Nevertheless, in the context of other provisions in the Constitution, the goals of land reform and socio-economic equality were seriously hindered in a number of ways. Rural elites, for example, were able to

resist land reform through using loopholes in state laws to their advantage. They ensured that relevant legislation for reform was often postponed and, in some cases, that land records required for redistribution were not available. Through state governments, they were also influential in resisting taxes and in restricting the supply of funding and credit to cooperative societies and to Community Development programs. As a result, despite the efforts of planners, great inequalities continued to be present in large rural areas of India.

These political and administrative constraints, therefore, were important factors in promoting a faulty operational process in the democratic development of India. Although citizen participation, political equality, and elite competition in politics was increased, a number of negative results were evident as well. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, these results, along with problems arising from slower rates of economic growth, population pressures, and war with Pakistan, provided a context for the development of a radicalization process. Intellectuals, in this process, performed an important radical role which will now be examined.

V. A RADICAL ROLE

In June 1975, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi proclaimed a state of Emergency in India which was to result in a highly authoritarian approach to government for almost two years. An actual emergency, however, was in effect much earlier. In Indian democratic development, as previously indicated, a flawed operational process was evident by the late 1960s onwards. Associated with this were severe social and economic problems which together provided a basis for the emergence of a strong element of radicalism in Indian political life. The emergency period, therefore, may be considered to be dated from that time (the late 1960s) to March 1977 when Gandhi was eventually defeated at the polls.

During this period, social problems in India were becoming increasingly apparent. These were generally related to inadequate land reform and dissatisfaction among large numbers of landless peasants; population pressures and widespread poverty in rural areas; and growing socio-economic inequality and continuing discrimination against groups such as the former untouchables. Coupled with these were a number of serious economic problems. Unemployment and inflation, for instance, both increased during this period while national income and the

rate of economic growth declined significantly. This decline was in part the product of a crisis in the supply from overseas of fertilizer and oil, two successive monsoon failures in the early 1970s, and, the high cost of the Bangladesh war with Pakistan. (Morris-Jones 1977)

These problems were clearly reflected in Indian politics. General dissatisfaction was evident, for example, in great electoral swings which occurred between 1967 and 1971. On the one hand, in the general election of 1967 and in the 1969 state elections, a strong anti-Congress movement resulted in an extreme reduction in the political power of the Congress Party -- a Party which had been dominant in Indian politics since Independence. On the other hand, an equally strong pro-Congress movement led Indira Gandhi to an overwhelming victory in the general election of 1971. This discontent was apparent not only in a volatile electorate but in the nature of political participation, itself. Prior to the Emergency proclamation, for instance, demonstrations, riots, and political violence steadily increased; at the same time, party identification and support for the party system declined considerably. (Bhattacharjee 1975; Eldersveld, and Ahmed 1978: 291) Associated with this decline was an approval among a sizeable minority of Indian citizens for direct political action. In a sample of political attitudes in 1971, for example, it was noted that 32 percent of citizens supported extra-parliamentary political methods such as

demonstrations and strikes and, 48 percent, the direct seizure of property when other political means were shown inadequate. (Eldersveld and Ahmed 1978:292)

In the context of these social, economic, and political problems, large numbers of Indian citizens became increasingly concerned over widening gaps between democratic goals and actual political development in practice. These concerns involved a critical assessment of -- and in some cases, a doubt over -- both the desirability and viability of a democratic approach to political development in India. In this radicalization process, intellectuals became more politicized as a group and performed an important radical role: They provided searching criticism -- often with moral overtones -- of a faulty operational process, and, on this basis, involved themselves in movements promoting reform or political change.

Emergency Perspectives

Between the late 1960s and the removal of Indira Gandhi from office in 1977, a strong element of radicalism was evident in the political perspectives of Indian intellectuals. This was in large part due to a normative factor: the growing awareness among intellectuals of a discrepancy between abstract democratic values and actual political practices in India. Social and generational factors, however, were also associated with this

trend. Unemployment among intellectuals, for instance, increased during the emergency period. As an example, almost two million college graduates were unemployed in 1971; in 1975, the figure was more than doubled. (Hart 1976:283-283) Discontent over this situation was reflected in two different samples of intellectual attitudes at the time in which over 50 percent expressed strong dissatisfaction over their lack of opportunity and also over their perceived lack of status in Indian society. (Malik 1977:575-579; Srivastava 1978:121-136) Radicalism and discontent, moreover, were particularly apparent among the younger generation of intellectuals who, coming to age in the context of growing political problems, were acutely aware of wide discrepancies between their idealism and actual political conditions in India. (Srivastava 1978:94; Hooja 1971:140-141)

For these reasons, intellectuals as a group tended to become more politicized, and, in contrast to their perspectives in the immediate Post-Independence period, more concerned with broad normative issues associated with Indian democratic development. This concern was evident among literary intellectuals, academics, students, and intellectuals in government, and, as indicated in survey analyses, among Indian intellectuals generally.

Among literary intellectuals, for example, there was a renewed interest in political themes, a concern for political reform, and, in some cases, a strong interest in political

alternatives for India such as the Chinese model of development. (Coppola 1975:3; Shourie 1972:2378) In the state of Maharashtra, for example, a resurgence of political novels was clearly apparent during the late 1960s and early 1970s. (Apte 1975:83-85) A number of biographical novels were written which drew attention not only to the ideals of past leaders such as Gandhi and Tilak but to the contrast between these ideals and the political problems of the present. Similarly, in Bengal, political themes were more salient in novels as was the element of radicalism and concern over democratic values and practices in India. (Gupta 1975:89-90) Moreover, in states such as Punjab, where the political content in novels was always apparent, political issues received additional emphases during the emergency period. (Dulai 1975:74)

This tendency was also evident among professors and students in Indian universities and colleges. As will be more fully discussed later, large numbers of articles and books written by professors during this period involved radical examinations and assessments of problems such as inadequate land reform, growing socio-economic inequality, ineffective bureaucracy, and government corruption. Greater attention was also given to problems related to democratic planning, the role of party politics, and the role of academic intellectuals, themselves, in more effectively promoting democratic and social goals.

Similarly, in marked contrast to the previous decade, students also tended to be more politically concerned and, as indicated in a number of studies, more inclined to express strong views on broad normative issues. (Hooja 1971:140-144; Tiwari and Kumar 1971; Malik and Marquette 1978) In many cases, these views involved a desire for thorough political reform and, in some cases, for a more authoritarian approach to political development.

At the same time, the need for reform or political change in India was also emphasized by large numbers of advisors in government. More than in other groups, however, there was a tendency in this group to favor a more authoritarian and technocratic approach to Indian political development. In their view, what was needed was an increase in centralized power, a greater political role for advisors, and more emphasis on the goal of rapid economic development. Moreover, it was thought desirable to limit the role of party politics in policy-making and to give lesser attention to democratic and social goals such as greater participation and equality. These views were reflected in a number of studies of political attitudes among public administrators generally (Taub 1969:116-117; Khare 1974:168-171; Verma 1978:200) and also in a study of planners receiving advanced educations in countries such as the United States. (Ilchman, Ilchman, and Hastings 1968:13-41) As will be discussed more fully in a later section, they were most clearly

evident in the actual development strategies formulated by planners in the emergency period.

This concern among intellectuals for reform or for more thorough political change was also noted in national surveys of intellectual perspectives during this period. It was evident, for example, in a survey conducted by Srivastava in the late 1960s. Of those sampled in this survey -- as one indication -- 75 percent were of the view that intellectuals should become more directly involved in politics and that politics should not be left simply to professional politicians. (1978:93) Moreover, 56 percent were of the view that social knowledge should be developed to change existing conditions in India -- and not simply for the sake of knowledge, itself, or for status and livelihood. (1978:61) Finally, although 74 percent were doubtful over the extent of their influence, 62 percent, nevertheless, expressed the view that, as critics and advisors, greater contributions could be made by intellectuals in promoting democratic development. (1978:98-99)

Similar views were observed by Malik in surveys of political attitudes among North Indian intellectuals in the early 1970s. In one survey, for example, 79 percent expressed strong dissatisfaction with present social and political conditions in India and argued in favor of reform or change. (1975a:63-72) This sentiment was expressed by 88 percent in another survey. (1979:115) As a further indication, of those

sampled in yet another survey conducted by Malik, 62 percent viewed their role as one of actual involvement in promoting social reform in India and increasing political awareness among citizens of the need for change. (1977:567)

During the emergency period, then, as indicated in these studies and surveys, a strong element of radicalism and concern over broad political issues was increasingly apparent among Indian intellectuals. In this context, as will now be discussed, intellectuals performed important radical roles in Indian democratic development. On the one hand, they provided moral criticism of a flawed operational process; and, on the other, they involved themselves in movements promoting reform or political change.

Political Moralism

Associated with the emergence of radicalism among Indian intellectuals was an increase in political moralism. Previously, the nationalist leaders of India had made a continuous use of the moral idiom while underlining political goals. Thus, intellectuals were continuing an old tradition. This involved not simply criticism of particular policies or programs -- as pertaining to activities of a surrogate citizenry -- but also a moral criticism of widening gaps between previously prescribed goals and actual patterns of political development in India.

Although this criticism was particularly evident among the younger generation of intellectuals, it was apparent among the older generation as well. Both, for example, expressed strong dissatisfaction over unfavorable trends in Indian political life, over inadequacies in the operational role of intellectuals, and over certain political methods in India such as the role of political parties and the practice of democratic planning. In some cases, this criticism resulted in dissatisfaction over the democratic approach to political development, itself.

Among the younger generation of intellectuals, disillusionment over the inefficiency of democratic processes was increasingly apparent during the emergency period. Influenced in part by New Left movements in North America and Western Europe, large numbers of this generation were strongly vocal in their moral condemnation of the hypocrisy and political failure of the older generation of elites and intellectuals. What was urgently required in India, they argued, was large-scale reform. (Hooja 1971:140-144; Srivastava 1978:94)

The element of political moralism, however, was becoming more evident in the perspectives of the older generation of Indian intellectuals as well. One indication of this was the renewed interest in the ideals and philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi. In one survey of political attitudes among intellectuals, for example, 88 percent indicated as a prime political value, the

Gandhian standard of moral and saintly politics. (Malik 1979:115) Although, as indicated in this survey, not all shared Gandhi's desire for complete decentralization, there was a near consensus, nevertheless, on the need for a return to a more moral and Gandhian-style leadership.

Apart from an emphasis on the ideals of Gandhi, political moralism among the older generation -- and among intellectuals in general -- was clearly evident in their strong criticism of unfavorable social, economic, and political conditions in India. Of particular concern was the continuing presence of considerable socio-economic and political inequality, poverty and inadequate land reform, a declining rate of economic growth, and administrative inefficiency and corruption. In not resolving these problems, the flaws of the operational process in Indian democratic development were examined and questioned -- often in highly moralistic terms and, in some cases, with a strong sense of urgency.

Among academic intellectuals, for example, criticism was strongly expressed in a number of publications by such scholars as S.K. Arora (1972), V.S. Mahajan (1974), and C.B. Bhambhri (1977) over widening disparities of income in rural areas, the growing concentration of land ownership, and the establishment of taxation policies by state governments favoring rural elites. In examining these trends and their unfavorable effect on democratic development, Indian scholars were highly critical of

the degree to which rural elites were able to exert influence on state governments and therefore to hamper goals such as land reform and greater equality. (Arora 1972:245-254; Mahajan 1974:1-40; Bhambhri 1977:160-163)

At the same time, academic intellectuals also expressed alarm over administrative inefficiency and corruption and its effect on hindering not only the rate of economic growth but democratic and social goals as well. This was evident in a number of studies of Indian public administration (Trivedi 1972; Khare 1974:168-171; Bhambhri 1974:30-37; Verma 1978) and in studies of the relationship between administration and a faulty planning process. (Singh 1972; Panandiker 1973; Chauhan 1977; Haraqopal 1978) With varying degrees of emphasis, these scholars argued that poor administrative performance was due to factors such as paucity of bureaucratic resources, corruption, and elitist backgrounds and attitudes of Indian administrators generally -- attitudes which involved distrust of democratic and social goals as well as of the interference of elected officials in the planning process.

Although from a different perspective, advisors in government, also tended to express criticism in increasingly moralistic terms. In some cases, criticism was defensive in nature. For example, in a number of speeches and in writing, D.P. Dhar, a key advisor and Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission in the early 1970s, publicly exhorted the younger

generation of intellectuals -- and critical intellectuals generally -- to abandon their unrealistic romanticism and to channel their moral fervor more constructively. In the view of Dhar, this was to involve assisting Indira Gandhi in building a more progressive, prosperous, and just social order in India. (Dhar 1976:180-210) Intellectuals were simply to examine obstacles to this process and to develop appropriate knowledge in overcoming problems.

More often, however, criticism by advisors was more condemnatory. As indicated in a number of studies of political attitudes among public administrators, strong dissatisfaction -- and in some cases frustration -- was expressed over their own political role and over conditions in India generally. Of particular concern to them was the perceived interference of elected officials and party politics in the formulation and implementation of plans. (Taub 1969:116-117; Singhi 1974:138-140; Verma 1978:200) Indeed, as noted by Malik in a general survey of political views among intellectuals, administrators were among the most critical and discontented of groups sampled. (1977:572)

Intellectuals in general, however, were critical not only of unfavorable socio-economic and political conditions in India but of inadequacies in their own role in the operational process of democratic development. As was evident in one sample of intellectual opinion in the early 1970s, for example, 41

percent viewed other intellectuals as unproductive, overly-concerned with security and status, and insufficiently involved in addressing the serious social and political problems in India. (Malik 1977:569-570) This sentiment was clearly apparent in a growing number of academic publications in which scholars often exhorted each other to perform a greater role in clarifying developmental issues and in promoting democratic and social goals. (Udgaonkar 1970; Kothari 1971; Arora 1971; Bains 1971; Bhattacharya 1971; Thathachary 1974) In this regard, arguments were made favoring greater government funding for research, more studies on policy-making in government, greater attention to monitoring and evaluating the planning process, and more involvement of intellectuals in providing political information and policy alternatives to citizens.

Criticism by intellectuals also brought into question the viability of certain political methods associated with Indian democratic development. One of these was the role of party politics. In a general survey of political attitudes among North Indian intellectuals in 1974, for example, Malik noted a high degree of negativism toward the party system. In his sample, 75 percent were strongly critical of party politics viewing the system as disruptive, overly-corrupt, and too imitative of Western institutions. (1979:152) These attitudes were also

evident in local surveys of intellectual opinion. In a study in Jaipur, for instance, 69 percent of those sampled were clearly not satisfied with the performance of the party system in India. (Uprete 1968:120) In another survey, conducted in Hyderabad and Secunderabad, 84 percent of intellectuals sampled assigned moral blame to political parties for social and political problems in India; moreover, 65 percent indicated that these problems could not be adequately addressed through a system of party politics. (Narsaiah and Rao 1977:61)

A considerable number of intellectuals also expressed doubt over the practice of democratic planning in India. According to some, centralizing tendencies were implicit in planning and thus inimical to effective citizen involvement and political equality; according to others, inordinate attention in planning was given to industrialization at the expense of rural development. Again, these views were evident in the general surveys conducted by Malik. For example, of those sampled in one survey, 58 percent expressed dissatisfaction over current trends in planning and preferred a model of development in which greater attention was given to decentralization, rural development, and citizen involvement in community decision-making. (1975a:64-66) A majority expressed similar views in a later survey as well. (1979:115-120) At the same time, doubts over the practice of planning were also reflected in a growing number of academic publications. (Avasthi 1974:10;

Hooja and Bhargav 1974:236-243; Karunakaran 1978:21; Mathur 1974:195-197; Trivedi, 1972)

Among administrators in government, on the other hand, the practice of democratic planning was also criticized but for a different reason. In their view, as indicated in studies by Taub, (1969:116-117) Singhi, (1974:138-140) and Verma, (1978:200) Indian planning was defective due to the extent of decentralization already in effect and to the interference of politicians and party politics in the formulation and implementation of plans.

However, among a significant number of intellectuals, criticism also brought into doubt the viability of a democratic approach to political development in India, itself. As previously discussed, this was evident among large numbers of administrators who tended to favor a more authoritarian and technocratic approach. Political democracy, however, was also questioned by other groups as well. In the survey conducted by Srivastava, for example, 41 percent of the younger generation of intellectuals expressed disillusionment over the inefficiency of democratic processes and a desire for other political approaches to problems in India. (1978:94) These views were also observed in studies of Indian students where sizeable minorities, (Hooja 1971:140-144; Malik and Marquette 1978) and, in some cases,

majorities, (Tiwari and Kumar 1971) preferred alternative models of political development in India.

To some extent, these views were expressed among the older generation as well. Again, as noted in the survey conducted by Srivastava, 32 percent of the older generation viewed political gradualism and piecemeal democratic processes with impatience and favored a program of more rapid -- implying a more authoritarian approach to -- developmental change in India. (1978:72) In the survey conducted by Malik in 1974 -- shortly before the Emergency proclamation -- this tendency was even more apparent. Of those sampled, 44 percent of Indian intellectuals expressed considerable doubt over political democracy; of these, 17 percent viewed democracy in completely negative terms; 17 percent, with mixed feelings. (1979:120) As an alternative, what this group appeared to prefer was simply a more authoritarian approach to Indian political development. For example, as indicated in the surveys of both Srivastava and Malik, less than eight percent of those sampled supported Marxist views or a revolutionary approach. (1978:45-46; 1975a:67-72)

In summary, then, the presence of a flawed operational process in Indian democratic development resulted in intellectual radicalism and moralistic criticism. Intellectuals in general expressed strong dissatisfaction over unfavorable

social, economic, and political conditions in India. This in turn brought into question the operational role of intellectuals as well as certain political methods such as the role of party politics and the practice of democratic planning. Among some groups, however, it also brought into question the viability of political democracy in India, itself.

In their protest against widening gaps between democratic goals and the actual pattern of political development in India, the majority expressed the need for social and political reform. Other alternatives, however, were favored among a significant minority: Of these, most supported a more authoritarian and -- as will be discussed -- technocratic approach to political development in India; some, on the other hand, favored a revolutionary approach. These views in turn were each represented in the formation and development of actual political movements during the emergency period.

Political Mobilization

The radical role which intellectuals performed in Indian democratic development involved not only the act of providing moral criticism of a flawed operational process but, in mobilizing support for political change, leadership in political movements as well. This involvement was clearly evident in the formation of reform, revolutionary, technocratic, and, in the

context of emerging authoritarianism after 1975, restoration movements.

Reform Movements. Prior to the proclamation of Emergency in 1975, a number of protest and reform movements were apparent in many parts of India. To a large extent they were meant to evoke greater response and accountability from those in public office. This was clearly evident in the development of movements in the states of Bihar and Gujarat and in their ability to mobilize support. In the case of Bihar, a reform movement steadily gained support during the late 1960s and early 1970s on the basis of growing discontent among a number of social groups. On the one hand, large sections of the urban middle class were deeply affected by inflation and, in particular, by the rising prices of agricultural goods. On the other, both inflation and unemployment were becoming severe problems for the working class. The situation, for both groups, was exacerbated by growing socio-economic problems in India generally -- problems arising from the effects of population pressure, fertilizer shortages, the 1973 oil crisis, and the war with Pakistan. (Barik 1977 1977:44-45; Shah 1977:605-610)

Discontent was also increasing among large sections of the peasantry in Bihar. This was the result of a combination of the above problems with an already unfavorable situation in rural

areas -- a situation in which indebtedness, poverty, and landlessness were widespread. As an indication of the extent of landlessness and inequality, 50 percent of rural households owned less than two acres of land. (Barik 1977:13) To a considerable extent, this was due to the effectiveness of rural elites, and their supporters in the Congress and bureaucracy, in preventing land reform. By exerting political pressure on state governments, manipulating land records, and using loopholes in state laws to their advantage, they were able to continue their monopoly over land ownership and secure economic and political benefits as a result. This in turn was a major source of peasant dissatisfaction.

On the basis of this discontent, a political movement was formed in Bihar under the leadership of prominent and highly respected Indian intellectual Jayaprakash Narayan, a former associate of Nehru and Gandhi in the Nationalist movement. Popularly referred to as JP, he attracted to the movement a number of Sarvodaya leaders and students who assisted in mobilizing support for political reform from middle class and working class groups as well as from the peasantry. The Sarvodaya leaders -- a splinter group from the Sarvodaya movement of Vinobe Bhave -- joined due to their concern over deteriorating social conditions in rural areas and also due to their disillusionment with the limited results of the land redistribution program of Bhave. Students, on the other hand,

joined due to their dissatisfaction over the defects in the Bihar educational system such as overcrowding and high costs, unemployment, and their concern over social and political problems in India generally. (Shah 1977:695-700; Barik 1977:80-81)

With the assistance of these students and Sarvodaya workers, JP was able to strengthen the social basis of the movement by focusing attention on the problems of inflation, unemployment, rural poverty, and inadequate land reform. In the process, however, he was also able to focus attention on broader issues such as administrative inefficiency and corruption, the continuation of socio-economic and political inequality, and the lack of government responsiveness and accountability. On this basis, JP made an appeal for thorough social and political reform not only in Bihar but in India as a whole.

Reform, according to JP, was to involve a movement towards "partyless democracy" in which political life in India would be based on extensive decentralization with authority residing in a loose association of Panchayats. This change from a party system to partyless democracy, argued JP, would require a "total revolution" -- a revolution which was moral in nature, not social and political in the Marxian sense. These concepts, however, were somewhat vague and not seriously considered by most other leaders and followers in the movement. What was seriously considered was the need for immediate reform in which

government would become more representative and responsive, less corrupt and ineffective, and more attentive to goals such as land reform and greater equality. With the prestige and involvement of JP in the movement, these objectives were simply given additional support. Therefore, despite the term "total revolution", this was substantially a protest and reform movement. (Barik 1977:57-60; Shah 1977:700-705)

A reform movement was also gathering momentum in Gujarat during the early 1970s. On a similar social basis as the Bihar movement, the Gujarati movement involved issues such as rising prices, food scarcity, grievances in the educational system, and government corruption. Referred to as principally a "scholar's rebellion", academic intellectuals and students tended to provide the leadership roles in the movement. (Jones and Jones 1977) Initially concerned with educational issues -- issues related to patronage and corruption in private colleges in Gujarat -- these scholars were also able to mobilize support on more general issues and focus attention on broader social and political problems in India. As in the Bihar movement, this resulted in a general demand for large-scale reform. It was accentuated in 1974 as the result of public declarations of support and visits to Gujarat by JP and his associates.

Between 1973 and 1975, the demand for social and political reform gathered widespread support in many other areas of India as well. As the result of the mobilization efforts of JP,

pressure for reform intensified across India with demonstrations, strikes, and agitation in support of the movement becoming increasingly common. In the decision of Indira Gandhi to declare a State of Emergency in June 1975, one of the major reasons stated was the disruption and instability caused by the movement.

A Revolutionary Movement. During the emergency period, a political movement also emerged promoting social revolution in India. This was led by a group of Marxist intellectuals referred to as Naxalites. Dissatisfied with the non-violent and parliamentary approaches of the two major Marxist parties in India, the Communist Party of India and the Communist Party of India (Marxist), the Naxalites formed a third party in 1969. Named the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) or the CPML, this provided the organizational basis for the subsequent Naxalite movement. It was most prominent in West Bengal -- where it originated -- Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, and, to some extent, Bihar.

According to the Naxalites, the flawed operational process in Indian democratic development was irreparable. This was due to the emphasis in Indian development on political gradualism and a social democratic developmental strategy which, by its very nature, allowed rural elites -- through parliamentary,

federal, and Panchayati systems of government -- to preserve their privilege, and economic and political power. The efforts of activists such as Bhave and Ambedkar, and the parliamentary activities of the two major Communist parties, in the view of the Naxalites, were therefore futile. Accordingly, the political solution was social revolution -- a solution which was currently possible due to deteriorating social conditions. Based in large part on Maoist strategy, the movement was to involve the mobilization of the peasantry and armed insurrection in the countryside. To some extent, however, it was also to involve itself in urban guerrilla activity and, where conditions permit, even in electoral politics. (Brass, 1973:29-60)

On this basis, attempts were made at building a revolutionary movement in India. In West Bengal, for example, Naxalites were active in leading peasant agitation for the distribution of uncultivated land held by tea estates. After 1970, they were also involved in urban guerrilla activity. In Kerala, they were engaged in electoral politics -- without success -- and in Bihar, in isolated acts of terrorism and forcible occupation of land. (Brass 1973:30-60; Hardgrave 1973:177; Brass 1973:387-391)

However, in contrast to the JP movement, Naxalites were unable to mobilize significant support for their revolutionary program. On the one hand, as previously discussed, intellectuals in general did not generally favor a revolutionary approach to

political development despite their dissatisfaction with conditions in India. The only group, they were able to evoke response from, was that of the radical students -- which they did in sizable numbers in West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh. (Hardgrave 1973:130) This, however, was inadequate. On the other hand, Naxalites were unable to prevent factionalism within their own party and unable to gain endorsement from other Indian Marxists. In view of most Marxists, the Naxalite position was politically unrealistic. Despite the economic and political crises in India, they countered, the situation was far from revolutionary. (Hardgrave 1973:171)

A Technocratic Movement. What also emerged during the emergency period was a movement favoring a more authoritarian and technocratic approach to political development in India. Advocates of this approach argued that what was required was an increase in centralized power, a greater political role for advisors in government, and a priority on the goal of rapid economic growth. At the same time, they argued in favor of a more limited role of party politics in the planning process and of lesser attention to democratic and social goals such as participation and equality. As previously discussed, these views were supported by a large number of senior administrators and, to some extent, by intellectuals outside government as well.

This support was also evident in the change of planning goals during the emergency period and in the movement, under the leadership of Indira Gandhi, towards authoritarian government. Prior to 1964, for example, the developmental strategy of planners involved the promotion of both the goal of rapid economic development and, at the same time, the democratic and social goals of greater participation and equality. After 1964, however, the latter goals were in large measure abandoned. (Frankel 1978:201-246) One reason for this were the serious problems and limited results of the Third Five-Year Plan. Rural elites were able successfully to resist land reform and other measures and to exert political pressure at the national level for the abandonment of this strategy. Another reason was related to the increasing dependence of plans on foreign aid. In this context, as a condition for support, international aid-giving institutions strongly suggested that planners give priority to rapid economic growth at the expense of social goals. (Frankel 1978:246; Hanson 1966:171)

Indeed, after 1964, under the political leadership of Shastri (1964-1966) and Indira Gandhi (1966-1977), more attention was given to a technocratic approach in planning -- despite the promises of democratic and social goals in political campaigns. No mention, for example, was made of the goals of participation and equality in the Fourth Five-Year Plan. (Mahajan 1974:5) This was even more evident in the presence of

growing inequalities of land ownership and in income in rural areas during the late 1960s and early 1970s.

In the context of increasing social unrest and the emergence of reform and revolutionary movements, a more authoritarian dimension was added to this technocratic movement in 1975. Facing growing criticism and charges of electoral malpractice in the courts, Indira Gandhi proclaimed a State of Emergency in India. In the two years following this proclamation, censorship was imposed, political opponents were arrested and detained (including JP), and the constitution was amended giving sweeping powers to the executive. At the same time, in what has been referred to as a "technologists' paradise", political advisors and technocrats were given additional power in order to promote the goal of increasing the productive capacity of India and of achieving rapid economic growth. (Somjee 1977) The program was with considerable support among industrialists and corporate executives; (Hart 1976:293) among large groups of students; (Ghurye, 1978:272-286) and among public administrators -- none of whom resisted or resigned in protest against the erosion of democratic institutions and practices. (Heginbotham 1976:69-70)

A Restoration Movement. Actually confronted with an authoritarian alternative in 1975, large numbers of Indian intellectuals outside government, who were previously hostile or ambivalent towards political democracy, reconsidered their positions. Among those who had supported an authoritarian approach, there was the view that the price to be paid for rapid economic growth -- censorship, political arrests, detentions, a growing security apparatus -- was too high. Moreover, among revolutionary intellectuals there was the view that the current situation in India was not favorable for social revolution and that political gradualism and the social democratic approach was preferable to the authoritarianism of Indira Gandhi.

As these views gained support, both groups joined with reformist intellectuals in forming a movement to restore political democracy to India. This involved open protest, underground activities, and, later, the mobilization of support for the Janata Party in 1977. Protest, for example, was strongly expressed over attempts by Gandhi to amend the Constitution in favor of greater central executive power at the expense of the legislature and courts. Although faced with the threat of possible arrest and detention, a number of major newspaper editors and journalists openly opposed the attempt. Moreover, a petition was signed by 5,000 intellectuals across India in October 1976 stating that, although constitutional change was required, the present government was without a mandate for

promoting this change. According to their statement, what was required was wide consultation and public debate -- and thus the absence of a State of Emergency -- before constitutional change should be attempted. (Mirchandani 1977:87-89)

Together with open opposition, intellectuals were also involved in an underground literature movement after 1975. Based in Bombay and active throughout India, four major undertakings were associated with the movement. First of all, banned foreign news items and journal articles were acquired and circulated as were long lists of well-known international critics of Indira Gandhi. Second, the content of a large number of academic lectures critical of the Emergency were popularized and widely publicized. Third, information was distributed in various languages throughout India on government repression, censorship, the sterilization program, and the arrests of prominent politicians and intellectuals. Finally, to give additional support to the movement, selected writings of Gandhi, Nehru, and JP -- critical of authoritarian practices -- were circulated and publicized. (Basu 1978)

On this basis, the restoration movement gathered momentum and acquired widespread social support. Well-educated groups, for example, who had previously been equivocal over democratic values and practices, were particularly receptive to intellectual criticism of the authoritarian trend. Growing support was also evident among the younger generation,

disillusioned with the authoritarian approach, and among North Indian peasants, who were directly exposed to the sterilization program and government repression.

When elections were finally announced in 1977 and the coalition Janata Party was formed as an opposition, radical intellectuals were able to mobilize the above groups, assist the Janata, and, eventually, restore political democracy to India. Their success in gaining support was indicated in surveys of general political attitudes immediately preceding the election (Puranik and Kakade 1978:42-48) and in studies of voting patterns in the election, itself. (Narain 1978; Weiner 1977) Clearly, the major issue was political democracy versus an authoritarian approach to Indian development. Based on overwhelming support from intellectuals, educated groups in general, youth, and North Indian peasants, the decision was made in favor of the restoration of political democracy, Janata, and a program of reform.

The radical role of Indian intellectuals, despite the emergence of a two year period of authoritarian government, ultimately resulted in some measure of success. This was evident in the priorities and policies of the Janata government. Accordingly, a priority was given to the achievement of greater responsiveness and accountability of government, the strengthening of democratic institutions, and a program of political and social reform. These objectives were then promoted

in a series of governmental actions. Immediately, the structure of authoritarian control was dismantled. A free press was re-established and greater autonomy was given to media under government regulation or control. At the same time, constitutional amendments were adopted which erased the previous amendments of Gandhi and which made authoritarian trends in future more difficult. (Henderson 1979:952-956) Finally, in order to limit corruption and promote greater governmental efficiency, plans were made for administrative reform. These were to be incorporated in the Sixth Five-Year Plan in which a priority was again given to democratic and social goals. Under a specific time schedule, plans were to involve a revitalization of the Panchayat system, poverty reduction, greater social and political equality, and decentralization programs. (Gupta 1979:394-400) Attention was also to be given to more effective implementation of these plans.

Thus, as indicated in these policies and commitments, the restoration and reform movements led by radical intellectuals ultimately achieved significant success in promoting Indian democratic development.

VI. CONCLUSION

It would be a contradiction in terms to suggest that intellectuals perform a special political role in an ideal democratic society. This would assume both the importance of intellectual patronage and the presence of optimal democratic conditions: an active, knowledgeable, and evaluative citizenry; citizenship based on political equality; and representative, responsive, and accountable government. Indeed, under such conditions, the hallmark of an ideal democratic society would be the absence of intellectual or any other form of patronage.

This contradiction, however, is less of a problem when consideration is given to both the rarity and imperfection of actual democratic societies. First of all, it has only been during the last two centuries that democracy has become generally acceptable in theory and, to any significant extent, visible in practice. Furthermore, in societies which do exhibit democratic characteristics, numerous imperfections are evident. The citizenry often lack interest or knowledge on broad political issues; political equality is frequently undermined by inequalities of socio-economic and organizational resources; and participation, accountability, and responsiveness are often less than desirable. However, in viewing democracy as a series of

processes in which these imperfections are reduced and democratic goals are furthered over a period of time, intellectuals may be assumed to perform special political roles.

Indeed, this has been the central thesis of the present analysis. It has been argued that in societies where a significant movement towards democratic development has occurred, important roles have been performed by intellectuals. In summary, these have been described as prescriptive, operational, and radical roles. Each has been analyzed in relationship to the development of three closely related democratic processes.

In the first of these processes, large numbers of social groups acquire broad support for abstract democratic values. By adopting, legitimating, and popularizing these values, intellectuals provide the normative underpinnings for movements which seek to mobilize support for political development based on democratic goals. In the second process, attempts are made to promote a realization of democratic goals in practice. As political advisors, activists, and a surrogate citizenry, intellectuals perform an important operational role in this process. However, when gaps widen between abstract democratic values and actual patterns of political development, a radicalization process is likely to emerge. In this context, intellectuals perform a radical role: They provide criticism, often couched in moralistic terms, of a faulty operational

process, and form movements directed towards promoting reform or political change.

An analysis of these roles also brings into question two final considerations. One of these is an assessment of the extent to which intellectuals possess the capacity to contribute towards furthering democratic development. The other involves the question of future research strategy based on the use of a prescriptive-operational model. These will be discussed in turn.

In terms of the former, it is necessary to consider the capacity of intellectuals to perform contributing roles in view of constraints on the development of democratic processes. To neglect these constraints is an indication of unrealistic romanticism and belief in intellectual omnipotence. To view them as always decisive denotes equivocation over the importance of theory in social life and the influence of their creators.

First of all, in the development of a prescriptive process, a major constraint is the presence of a traditional society in which social structure and political institutions are based on elitist values -- values which favor the desirability of social and political hierarchy. In such societies, to use the phrase of Barrington Moore, Jr., theories which prescribe democratic goals are indeed "literary playthings". However, with social mobilization, a prescriptive process leading to democratic

development is made possible. On the one hand, mobilizing groups acquire more political importance, make more demands on government, and become more receptive to new sets of social and political values -- values which reinforce their increasing political importance. On the other, intellectuals become relatively more autonomous in society and thus more influential in prescribing new sets of values.

The degree to which intellectuals are successful in prescribing democratic values depends considerably on the nature of the social mobilization process in their society. In the West, for example, where the process was relatively gradual and where middle class and working class groups were ultimately successful in acquiring substantial political power, democratic theory was more easily developed and accepted. Hence theory tended to follow practice in a sequence favorable to democratic development. However, in the so-called Third World, democratic theory tended to precede practice and in the process to face more serious constraints. Social mobilization was relatively more rapid and more closely associated with social problems and tensions; traditional values of hierarchy remained pervasive; and the power of traditional rural elites continued to be successfully exerted in politics despite demands for change by newly mobilizing groups. In this context, authoritarian political theory was in many areas a serious competitor to democratic perspectives. To any significant extent, this tended

to be offset only by a colonial system --such as the British in India-where the colonizer was developing along democratic lines and where intellectuals from the colony were exposed to democratic perspectives.

Constraints on the development of an operational process in democratic development are major as well. This is due to a generation of high expectations -- expectations of responsiveness, accountability, participation, equality, and accomplishment of associated goals -- and numerous obstacles to their realization. One of these obstacles is simply the destabilizing effect arising from the rapidity of social change in modern times. This, for example, was a major source of doubt for de Tocqueville in his assessment of the possibility of a successful operational process in the democratic development of the United States. This problem, however, is exacerbated by numerous other obstacles in developing societies, currently. These involve population pressures, conditions of economic dependency, unfavorable terms of trade, inadequate land reform, and resulting social tensions.

Constraints are also involved in the radicalization process. This is related not to its emergence -- radicalism is more likely to emerge in democratic systems than in others -- but to its results. What may occur as an outcome is disillusionment over the viability of political democracy and support for alternative models of development. In numerous

instances, this has occurred in developing societies: In the course of radicalization, democratic approaches to political development have been frequently rejected and replaced by military or authoritarian single-party regimes. These are currently dominant in Third World nations.

These constraints provide outside limitations on the degree to which intellectuals are able to successfully make contributions to democratic development in a society. However, with other facilitating factors, the choices and commitments of intellectuals may be a force in transcending these constraints. This was clearly the case in modern India.

Prior to Indian Independence, for example, a prescriptive role was performed by intellectuals with remarkable success. Perhaps more than in any other traditional society, the principle of hierarchy was deeply ingrained in Indian social structure, institutions, and religion. The caste system was an obvious indication of the extent of its influence. Moreover, social mobilization was particularly disruptive and accompanied by serious social and political problems. In the development of the social mobilization process in the British period, class, ethnic, and caste conflict was considerable as was social support, at particular times, for an authoritarian model of development. Despite these constraints, Indian intellectuals performed a prescriptive role with a high degree of success. This was evident not only in their establishment of democratic

institutions in 1947 but in their commitment to its preservation in the following decades. Their success in transcending the constraints can be seen as a result of two factors. First, facilitating conditions were present: close association with a colonial power which subscribed in some measure to democratic principles; and thus the need of Nationalist leaders to negotiate for Independence in terms of these principles. Second, those intellectuals involved in the prescriptive process manifested a particularly high degree of commitment to democratic values -- a commitment which was to provide Indian democracy with resiliency in the course of operational and radicalization processes.

Intellectuals were also relatively successful in performing an operational role. To a certain extent, this was due to facilitating factors such as the supportive actions of politicians such as Nehru and the martyrdom of Mahatma Gandhi. However, it was also due to their own efforts. In the immediate Post-Independence period, for example, advisors incorporated democratic goals into the Constitution and into the developmental strategy of planning. Activists succeeded in promoting greater participation among less privileged social groups and, relative to the Pre-Independence period, greater political equality as well. Moreover, the activities of a surrogate citizenry were an important factor in the development of a more evaluative Indian electorate. Sources of later

problems in the operational process -- despite contributions of intellectuals -- were largely the result of political and administrative conditions: the political influence of rural elites in preventing land reform and bureaucratic inefficiency.

Democratic benefits were also the outcome of the radical role of Indian intellectuals. Despite the two year interlude of authoritarian government, intellectual radicalism eventually resulted in a reform program under the Janata government. When intellectuals were actually confronted with an authoritarian model of development, doubts over political democracy were erased. Support was consequently mobilized for democratic restoration and reform. Ultimately, this role was successful as well.

Finally, it is also necessary to consider the question of future research strategy. In the past, analyses of the political roles of intellectuals have relied on historical records of relevant publications and speeches, and on documentation of intellectual involvement in movements and policy-making. Although this has been helpful in identifying the roles of key groups of intellectuals, its usefulness has been limited in examining the political involvement of intellectuals as a whole in a given society. This problem, however, has been reduced with the recent use of empirical survey analyses. These have been

valuable for describing the overall political perspectives of intellectuals in a society together with their activities in politics.

Survey analyses, when supplemented with longitudinal studies, may identify changing perspectives and patterns of political participation among intellectuals in relationship to the development of democratic processes. At the same time, the roles of specific key groups of intellectuals in democratic processes -- groups such as special advisors or political activists -- may be more fully explained with detailed historical studies.

While studies contribute much to the explication of the roles of intellectuals in political processes, there has been a tendency to pay attention only to those roles intellectuals perform and ignore roles where they do not perform. A complete understanding of the overall role and influence of intellectuals, however, requires consideration of what roles they could be performing but are not. This may be identified and its implications examined by increased use of a comparative approach in which the contrasts as well as the similarities of intellectual roles in different societies are analyzed.

The configuration of data from these types of studies should contribute much to a better understanding of the political roles of intellectuals in democratic development. Optimal clarification, however, requires that research results

be accommodated within the framework of a systematic theoretical model. Such a model is currently absent in the literature on intellectuals and democratic development. The present thesis has been an attempt toward its development.

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