

INFORMAL AND FORMAL CONTROL MECHANISMS: AN EXPLORATION
OF MINOR DISCIPLINE WITHIN POLICE ORGANIZATIONS

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Informal and Formal Control Mechanisms: An Exploration
of Minor Discipline within Police Organizations

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ABSTRACT

Police officers experience a unique employment status that is not shared by other individuals in Canada. Archival research has revealed that, as "holders of public office" and as social control agents, police officers are subjected to an elaborate public review process. Many studies have examined the review procedures for police officers who violate the public trust. Few, if any, studies have been conducted which explore what occurs when a police officer violates the terms of the relationship between him/herself and his/her employer that are unrelated to the public trust.

In order to explore this decision-making process, a four-factor model was proposed that would allow the researcher to manipulate the four variables within the model. The four variables present in this model were the police organizational structure and the characteristics of the offence, the offender and the supervisor. Together, with primary emphasis on the organizational structure and the supervisor's characteristics, these variables were explored through a research methodology which included archival research, questionnaires, case studies and a structured interview.

The study limited its inquiry to minor disciplinary matters like tardiness, sloppy work habits, and violations of departmental procedures. Supervisors who are faced with situations such as these, are asked to make a decision between proceeding under the *Police Act*, administering an informal punishment or taking no action.

The results of this pilot study indicated that while police supervisors do employ both informal and formal control mechanisms in handling minor disciplinary matters, informal control strategies are most often employed. These informal techniques, which are most often not documented, may be inequitable and are beyond appeal.

This study suggests that there are historical antecedents and systemic features originating from within the police organizational structure which explain this phenomenon. Of the four factors presented in the model, it is suggested that the organizational structure of policing is the predominant factor in the decision-making process and as such, any efforts to create a fair and equitable handling of minor discipline within police agencies should focus on these structural issues.

Acknowledgements

As with most research, there are those who contribute to the value of the work without receiving any official recognition. This page represents my thanks to these individuals.

My thanks to Chief Constables W. Marshall (Vancouver), P.D. Wilson (Delta) and D.E. Richardson (Victoria) who permitted me access to their personnel. Access to personnel remains only part of the research equation. Without the candor, attention to detail and insightful comments of the police supervisors who participated in this research, the results would not have been as rewarding.

My deep appreciation is extended to my supervisory committee. Dr. Margaret Jackson and Dr. John Ekstedt provided me with the exact mix of support and academic guidance that allowed me to move through the research process. Their assistance with some of the philosophical digressions needed in order to focus my research was invaluable.

My last comments and thanks are saved for those who are closest to me and were made to suffer my indulgence. For my son, Warren, who did not seem to mind the fact that I was distracted most of the time. For Karen, whose love and understanding allowed me to find and maintain my own sense of balance. For my family, whose support and encouragement gave me the strength to take a chance. And finally, to Chris who must now be thankful that we can discuss something else other than the thesis.

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Introduction

The following thesis intends to explore the process by which police supervisors manage their subordinates when these people commit minor disciplinary defaults. What makes this study unique from other examinations into police misconduct is that the focus will be limited to those acts which **do not** involve members of the public. In other words, the misdeeds will not relate to issues of public trust. The activities to be examined, therefore, will be similar to those experienced by private enterprise managers. Tardiness, insubordination, and poor work performance are a few examples of such behaviours.

By limiting the study to these issues, the researcher will expose the duality of the Canadian police experience. Since (at least) 1829 and the passage of Peel's *Bill for Improving the Police in and near the Metropolis*, the police were thought to hold a unique employment status. The police were "holders of office" and their position was referred to as the "office of constable". This meant that constables were not to be viewed as employees in the typical manner, that is to say the relationship between a supervisor and constable was not that of a master/servant.¹

It could be argued that this apparent employment independence would allow the constable to be free from political interference by corrupt masters and allow for the administration of justice for the citizenry. Whether or not

¹ *Attorney General for New South Wales and Perpetual Trustee Co. (LD) 1955, A.C. 489*

such a title as the "office of constable" actually assures political independence is not an issue to be explored in this document. In order to protect the public from officers who violate the public trust, legislation was passed in the form of *Police Acts* and *Discipline Regulations* which allowed for the prosecution of officers. It is this last procedure which created the employment duality referred to earlier.

The present *Acts* and *Regulations* are designed to control the actions of the officer while he/she is operating as an agent of the community. Our research question is, "What happens when the officer violates a term of employment such as tardiness or poor work performance within the organizational sphere as opposed to the public trust sphere?" After 12 years of policing, this author can offer comment that supervisors, when faced with such a problem, are faced with the task of trying to place a "square peg in a round hole". As will be demonstrated later, those actions which in private industry would be deemed to be "employer/employee" matters alone are not easily (and perhaps fairly) handled in policing. This creates, if I can be forgiven for using a Canadian metaphor, *two solitudes* for the Canadian police officer. Outside the confines of the bureaucratic structure, the officer is an independent public agent but within the walls of the organization the officer is simply an employee.

This thesis will probe what happens when a system, which was originally intended to be organizationally flat and populated by independent

"holders of public office" becomes hierarchical and is administered in a para-military manner. Some of the questions examined will be: How are the occupants of the organization supervised? Does the present system force supervisors to discipline outside the "formal" system? Are there supervisory differences created when organizational size is altered?

While these questions will be addressed, it remains clear that the responses will only have a persuasive effect since the methodology will preclude any statistically significant assertions. The present work represents a pilot effort and results will only have meaning against broad frameworks of interpretation. Once the issues have been exposed, the scholastic work of the empiricists can begin and (statistically) more convincing arguments for organizational re-structure of policing can be proffered. Studies of description are necessary, however, before proceeding to the next level of analysis.

The research questions will be addressed through the examination of three British Columbia municipal police agencies: Vancouver, Delta and Victoria. A variety of methods will be implemented to gather the data. Archival research will be utilized to provide the needed historical context for the research questions; the application of the Gibb's *Affective Job Reaction Scale* and the Hersey & Blanchard *Leadership Effectiveness Adaptability Description -- Self*; demographic questionnaire; structured interviews and case studies; and finally, experiential observations based upon the author's twelve years of municipal policing experience.

The first chapter, has as its principal focus, the evolution of policing systems, governing statutes and disciplinary processes for policing in Canada. Included in this chapter will be a delineation of the two philosophies of policing in Canada and why, as a result, the focus of this thesis will exclude one of these philosophies. In addition, the chapter will indicate at what point historically, and how, the organizational structure of policing changed.

The second chapter considers the various theoretical issues that revolve around one of the primary variables to be examined. This thesis will propose that there are four variables that determine the decision-making process of a supervisor who must address a disciplinary default by one of his/her subordinates. Given the parameters for a Master's thesis within the School of Criminology, only two of these variables will be discussed in great detail. Chapter two will focus primarily on the *organizational structure* of police agencies and the effects of *supervisory characteristics*. In addition, Chapter two will include a discussion on power and coalitions of power. The two remaining variables (*offence* and *offender characteristics*) will, except where noted, be held relatively constant since to examine them in any detail would increase the level of complexity beyond the scope of the present task. To limit the study to the principal variables will allow for a consideration of the organizational versus individual weighting of the disciplinary process. What may be answered is, "Which is more important in determining the route followed by a supervisor: the organizational structure or, the supervisor characteristics?"

Chapter 1

Historical Review of Discipline Procedures

Every police agency in Canada is governed by legislative statute, usually in the form of a Police Act and Discipline Regulations. The current *Police Act (B.C.)*² was drafted, in 1974, by Mr. Alan Grant from Montreal's Osgoode Law School, after being commissioned to do so by the newly formed B.C. Police Commission. Two core documents were referred to by Mr. Grant while writing the *B.C. Police Act: Police (Discipline) Regulations S.I. 1967 No. 185 [British]* and the *Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act 1959, c.54*. One of the conclusions of the thesis is that police discipline codes represent a mixture of employee/employer issues and measures designed to address public trust violations committed by the police. Since the foregoing statutes represent the immediate genesis of the *B.C. Police Act*, it will be informative to trace the history of these particular documents in order to show the high level of militarism present in police discipline codes.

The concept of police militarism is central to any discussion of the daily functioning of police organizations, especially with respect to labour issues. Policing is a unique profession in labour and the Canadian experience is exceptional. Canada has, within its borders, both models of policing as

². *Police Act (B.C.)* R.S. 1988 c.331.1

envisioned by Henry Fielding. Guth describes these two forms:

The municipal model (the 'blues') can be fairly precisely dated. It grew within one jurisdiction (Bow Street) in Metropolitan London from the 1750's. These were a group of constables formed by Henry Fielding and later recast as 'bobbies' in 1829, with the reforms initiated by Sir Robert Peel. Even then these municipal constables were radically new. They served on an assignment, unarmed and mainly on foot.

Canada's second historical root for police is in the 'browns'. This model, dating from the mid-1830's, was Irish based. In the conflicts peculiar to Ireland, the 'browns' achieved a special reputation as the Royal Irish Constabulary. They were a cavalry: always armed, usually mounted, and trained as a quasi-military territorial force (Guth et Vogel, 1986:3)

The Canadian counterpart to the "brown" tradition is obvious. What is less obvious is the fact that the "blue" tradition started out in the form of the municipal police constable. Regardless of the form, the common law responsibilities of the constable remained the same. The constable was seen to be: an officer of the court, accountable to the judiciary, sworn to prevent crime, a member of an horizontal constabulary, and an agent of the community (Guth, 1986). It is the latter responsibility which effectively distinguishes the identity of the "blue" from the "brown". In the "brown" tradition, the constable, while having most of the responsibilities of the common-law constable, has the appearance of being a State agent. This is emphasized in the oath of office, or rather an oath of fealty, that a member of the North West Mounted Police must have taken prior to engagement.

s.14 No person shall exercise any office in the said Force until he shall have taken the oath of allegiance and the following oath of office: 'I, A.B., solemnly swear that I will faithfully, diligently and impartially execute and perform the duties and office of _____ in the Police Force of the North West Territories, and will well and truly obey and

perform all lawful orders or instructions which I will receive as such _____, without fear, favour or affection of or towards any person or party whosoever. So help me God.³

This oath was different in tone from the oath that was taken by the beat constable:

I, _____ do solemnly swear that I will well and truly serve our sovereign lady the Queen, her heirs and successors according to the law in the office of the police constable for the City of _____, without favour, affection, malice or ill-will, to the best of my power, cause the peace to be kept and preserved, and will prevent all offenses against the persons and properties of her Majesty's subjects; and that while I continue to hold the office I will, to the best of my judgement, skill, knowledge, and ability, carry out, discharge and perform all the duties of my office faithfully according to the law, so help me God. ⁴

In Canada then, what developed were two different philosophies on policing: one which was modelled after the beat cop and the other after the mounted, paramilitary peace keeper. In the latter case, there existed a military style of discipline where punishment was harsh, swift, and direct with little concern for the sensibilities of the individual. Employment in the R.C.M.P. was seen to be "at the pleasure" of the Commissioner and the member could be "dismissed at will". Such is no longer the case.

The status of the constable was seen to be special during the drafting of both the *Metropolitan Police Act* of 1829 as well as the *Administration of Justice in*

³ *An Act respecting the Administration of Justice, and for the establishment of a Police Force in the North West Territories* c.35 1873

⁴ Note: This oath represents the typical oath sworn by new municipal constables employed in Canada today.

the North West Territories Act of 1873, since both make early reference to the constable as a holder of "office". It was not until 1955 that there was legal distinction made as to the difference between the "office of constable" and the typical "master/servant" relationship present in most employment disputes:

...there is a fundamental difference between the domestic relation of servant and master and that of the holder of public office and the State which he is said to serve. The constable falls within the latter category. His authority is original, not delegated, and is exercised at his own discretion by virtue of his office: he is a ministerial officer exercising statutory rights independently of contract. The essential difference is recognized in the fact that his relationship to the Government is not in ordinary parlance described as that of servant and master.⁵

This distinction was echoed in *Ridge v. Baldwin* 1964, A.C. 40. The importance for this document is that, from the beginning, the constable is seen to be a unique employee and that special procedures were developed in order to deal with any constables who transgress the responsibilities of this special "office". To best trace these procedures and how they have impacted upon the B.C. *Police Act*, we must commence with the history surrounding the drafting of the *Metropolitan Police Act* (1829) and the Act which established the North West Mounted Police (1873) and look for references pertaining to discipline.

The Metropolitan Police Act and Discipline Regulations

Sir Robert Peel took office as the Home Secretary in 1822 and immediately set out to improve the present police system operating at that

⁵ *Attorney General for New South Wales and Perpetual Trustee Co.* (LD) 1955, A.C. 489

time in London. He was to suffer many set-backs in his efforts to introduce a Bill into Parliament. Peel's 'Bill for Improving the Police in and near the Metropolis' relied heavily on the works of the Fieldings, of William Pitt (1785) and Patrick Colquhoun (1795). This Bill was finally passed through the House of Commons in April 1829 and almost immediately Peel set out to find two Commissioners who would establish the police force. It is through personal correspondence between Peel and those who he felt could assist him in his search for these Commissioners that we see the intent of having a police force that would be governed through strict adherence to discipline. The following excerpt represents a letter sent from Peel to William Gregory, who was the Under-Secretary for Ireland:

...I require a man of great energy, great activity both of body and mind, accustomed to strict discipline and with the power of enforcing it, and taking an interest in the duty assigned to him. ... There will be a force of between two and three thousand men ultimately under his command. With the soldier I would unite a sensible lawyer as the other magistrate (Reith, p.126).

Peel's search resulted in the eventual appointment of Colonel Charles Rowan of the 52nd Regiment. He was chosen because he brought the 52nd Regiment "to the highest state of discipline" (Reith, p.129). The second magistrate was to be Mr. Richard Mayne, a lawyer. After the *Metropolitan Police Act: An Act for improving the Police in and near the Metropolis* (1829), [10 Geo. 4, c.44] was proclaimed, Rowan and Mayne set out to write a series of *General Instructions*

to be issued to the constables.⁶ The *General Instructions* were split into three parts with Part I (authored by Col. Rowan) covering the administration of the police force along with a set of conduct rules. Part II was written by Mayne and dealt primarily with legal matters pertaining to the powers of the constable. Part III contains special police orders drafted by the Commissioners. Reith notes that a close examination of Part I will reveal that, "Every page, almost every paragraph, contains, ingeniously adapted, the *Military Training* and *Moral Training* ingredients of Sir John Moore's Army plan at Shorncliffe in 1803, when Rowan was a young lieutenant in the 52nd" (Reith, p.134).

Even the organizational structure of the police force changed. Before 1829 the force represented a horizontal constabulary (Guth 1986) where there were many constables and a High Constable or Chief Constable. With Rowan as a Commissioner, the complexion of the civil force took on a decidedly military appearance. The Metropolitan Police Force soon was organized into *divisions, regiments, and companies* and these units were to be staffed and supervised by *Superintendents, Inspectors, Sergeants, and Police Constables*.

Surprisingly, the new *Act* made very little reference to militarism and discipline. In fact, the only reference is noted in section 5 which allows justices to make rules for the general governance of the police force "... and all such other orders and regulations, relative to the said police force, as the said

⁶ A single copy of these Instructions remains in the Library of Scotland Yard. References to the Instructions is courtesy of the research conducted by Reith (1956)

justices shall from time to time deem expedient for preventing neglect or abuse, and for rendering such force efficient in the discharge of all its duties" (the *Act 1829*). Even the *Metropolitan Police Act, 1839* [the *Act, 1839*] makes only an oblique reference to discipline when, in section 14, it establishes the penalties for a constable who is "guilty of any neglect or violation of duty". The penalties are a fine not exceeding ten pounds or imprisonment, with or without hard labour, for not longer than one month. It appears then, that the actions of the constable were being controlled through documents other than the Police Act. It should be noted that records from this time are not readily available and that one is left to infer that Rowan and Mayne's *General Instructions* persisted for quite some time.

The 1910 issue of the *Instruction Book for the Use of the Preparatory Class for the Metropolitan Police Force*, set out its philosophical intent in the first section by stating that this manual was to be used as a guide for the behaviour of constables. Section 22 for example is specific in how the constable is to conduct his rounds:

He is to walk at a pace of about [two and a half] miles an hour, keeping the outer or kerb side of the street by day, with the right hand to the carriage way, and walking close to the houses by night.

Further within this document, the constable is advised that "A constable must readily and strictly obey the orders of his superiors in rank in the Police..." (s.24). This instruction booklet was meant to be used in conjunction with a much larger tome (approximately 4 inches thick in 1928) entitled the

Metropolitan Police Guide. This book contained answers to legal questions relating to the various statutes that the constable would enforce at the time but more importantly (for this thesis), it contained a set of discipline code offenses. There are seventeen discipline code offenses listed in the *Guide*. For example, a constable could be charged with a discreditable conduct if he acted "in a disorderly manner or any manner prejudicial to discipline" (s.1). Furthermore, a police officer could be charged with "insubordination or oppressive conduct" if he was:

- a) insubordinate by act or demeanour
- b) is guilty of oppressive or tyrannical conduct towards an inferior in rank, or
- c) uses obscene, abusive or insulting language to any other member of the force. (Section 2)

Other sections included:

- disobedience to orders
- neglect of duty
- falsehood or prevarication
- breach of confidence
- corrupt practice
- unlawful or unnecessary exercise of authority
- malingering
- absence without leave or being late for duty
- uncleanliness
- damage to clothing or other articles supplied
- drunkenness
- drinking on duty or soliciting a drink
- entering a license premise
- lending money to any superior or, being a superior borrowing money from any inferior rank
- committing a summary or indictable offence or being an accessory

Both of these documents demonstrate the intent to control the actions of

not only the behaviours of the police as they pertain to the public, but also to control the actions of the constables within the police force as distinct from the public. A close examination of Schedule 1 of the *British Police (Discipline) Regulations* 1952, S.I. 1952, No.1705 will reveal a set of discipline code offenses which are very similar in intent to those listed in the *Metropolitan Police Guide*. There are eighteen categories of offenses most of which include sub-sections. Total number of offenses described equals 60 offenses. Other than slight changes in wording, the *British Police (Discipline) Regulations* S.I. 1967, No.185 that was used by Mr. Alan Grant as a guide for drafting the British Columbian statute reflected the intention of the 1952 statute previously mentioned.

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act and Discipline Regulations

In *An Act respecting the Administration of Justice and for the establishment of a Police Force in the North West Territories* C.35, 1873 [the Act 1873], the only specific reference to discipline is found in section 20 whereby the Governor in Council was empowered to make regulations for "...generally all and every such matters and things for the good government, discipline and guidance of the Force...".

The 1928 version of the R.C.M.P. Regulations Book made specific references to the role and behaviours that were acceptable to the Force. Section 413 states that "[I]t has been held that a soldier (and *pari passu* a Constable) is at all times on duty while present or serving with his corps..." Should there be

doubt in the Constable's mind as to whether or not he is a soldier, it should have been removed with the reading of this section. Further in the book (s.1069), the constable is again reminded of this fact when advised that his hair will "be trimmed to what is known as a Military Hair Cut". As to how the constable is to conduct himself throughout his duties, the following sections will be illustrative.

s.390 Every member of the Force is to receive the lawful commands of his superior with deference and respect and execute them to the best of his ability, without question or comment.

s.1067 He [the constable] should always remember that obedience is the first quality required of him; it is the essence of discipline and the channel of advancement.

Included in this book were also hints for those seeking promotion and instructions on how they were to conduct themselves once promoted:

s.81 No man should be recommended [for promotion] who is not possessed of good common sense, and who does not seem to be a man likely to enforce prompt obedience from his subordinates.

s.391 Officers and N.C. [non-commissioned] Officers must be careful to couch their orders in clear and explicit terms and in temperate language; to see that the orders are properly understood by those whom they are addressed and to exact the strictest obedience and attention from those under their command.

One final note regarding the Rules and Regulations manual (1928) is that the seniority of the offending member was seen as a mitigating factor in whether the individual was to be charged:

s.394 Commanding Officers in dealing with offenses committed by men of long service, should bear in mind the effect that punishment may have on their pension.

This last guide was still present in the 1969 version of the *R.C.M.P. Regulations and Orders* (s.1238). As we will see later, for many supervisors the seniority of the offending officer remains a mitigating factor in the punishment decision-making process.

Sections 25 and 26 of the R.C.M.P. Act (1959) gave authority to supervisors to punish their subordinates for violations of any offenses listed under the Act as well as any violations of the *Commissioner's Standing Orders*. This gave free-rein to the supervisors to charge an officer with virtually any violation of any regulation. The hearings for minor disciplinary offenses were to be conducted in private and could not be appealed to any outside body, including the Courts. Things have changed dramatically since, but for the purpose of the development of the B.C. Police Act, the R.C.M.P. model as outlined above was one of the reference points used by Mr. Alan Grant.

The Development of the B.C. Police Act and Discipline Regulations



In examining B.C.'s first police act, we see that the final product relies far more heavily on the British than the R.C.M.P. model. The discipline code contains 14 disciplinary defaults [see Appendix A] --- with the exception of some minor wording changes, the disciplinary offenses list in the 1975 Act do not vary substantially from that of the current 1988 Act. The categories of

disciplinary offenses remain: Discreditable conduct, Insubordination, Neglect of Duty, Deceit, Improper Disclosure of Information, Corrupt practice, Abuse of Authority, Improper Use of Firearms, Damage to Police Property, Misuse of Intoxicating liquor, Improper Dress or Untidiness, Criminal Conduct, Being an Accessory to a Disciplinary Offence, and Attempting to Commit an Offence against Discipline.

In conjunction with these offenses, most municipal police Policy and Procedure Manuals have a section set aside to allow for a prosecution of any person (under the B.C. Police Act) who commits a violation of the procedures listed within the manual. What occurs is that if a supervisor wishes to charge an individual with a violation of a "policy" or "procedure", the supervisor must somehow "fit" the violation into one of the aforementioned fourteen discipline code offence categories.

An argument that often is raised amongst union officials is that issues pertaining to "employer - employee" matters should be severed from the police acts and should be dealt with under the same procedures that govern all Canadian employees.⁷ These officials agree that there should be a special statute to protect the public against violations of public trust, but they assert that those matters relating directly and exclusively to the governance of police officers as employees should not be forced into a document originally intended

⁷ Personal conversations with Union Presidents for the Vancouver, Toronto, Montreal and Halifax police departments

to protect the public trust. As can be seen from the list of discipline code offenses, Deceit, Improper Disclosure of Information, Corrupt Practice, Abuse of Authority, Improper Use of Firearms, Misuse of Intoxicating Liquors or Drugs, Criminal Conduct and "being an accessory to or attempting to commit a disciplinary default" all relate primarily to deontological matters. The remaining offenses could be either deontological or employer/employee related depending upon the circumstances. It is these latter offenses that are used to charge an individual with violations of departmental policies and procedures.

Procedures Relating to the Application of Punishment under the B.C. Police (Discipline) Regulation Reg.330/75

The *Regulations* describe very clearly who is the responsible disciplinary authority (the Chief Constable -- s.3) and how matters are to be resolved. Section 7 severely limits the ability of the supervisor to do much other than "verbally" reprimand subordinates or to apply for an alternate punishment. Because of the importance of this section, it is reported as follows:

- 7.(1) A high standard of police discipline shall be consistently maintained throughout the Province.
- (2) All senior and supervisory ranks are expected to set an example to all members in carrying out their assignments and in displaying a strict sense of duty and impartiality in dealing with subordinates.
- (3) Any member who commits any of the disciplinary defaults included in the code shall be dealt with in the manner provided for by this regulation.

- (4) Notwithstanding subsections (1) to (3), minor breaches of discipline may be dealt with by verbal reprimand given by a member not below the rank of corporal.
- (5) Both the member reprimanded and the member giving the reprimand shall sign a record of the incident in each other's official police notebook.
- (6) A reprimand made under subsection (4) shall not be entered on a member's service record of discipline.
- (7) Where a member, not below the rank of corporal, considers that a breach of discipline has occurred which, subject to subsection (8), calls for a reprimand to be entered on a member's service record of discipline, he shall, forthwith, serve a written notice of the reprimand in Form 1 on the member reprimanded and shall forward a copy to the chief constable or his delegate.

Section 7(8) and 7(9) state that unless the disciplined member wishes to dispute the allegation, the written reprimand will be entered on the member's service record of discipline. Section 8(1) states that if the member wishes to dispute this allegation (or any other allegation), then the chief constable or his delegate will order an investigation of the event(s). The investigator will forward the evidence to the chief constable along with a recommendation of how the matter is to be proceeded with:

11(2)(a) by laying disciplinary charges

(b) by advising the member who is alleged to have committed a disciplinary default as to his future conduct, or

(c) by taking no further action

In the event that (a) is recommended, then the investigator shall further recommend the maximum penalty to be sought. The allowable penalties are:

- 33(1)(a) recommendation to the board [Police Board] that the member be dismissed from the municipal force;
- (b) recommendation to the board that the member be required to resign from the municipal force;
- (c) reduction in rank;
- (d) fine, not to exceed \$200, and with time to pay, if any, at the discretion of the presiding officer;
- (e) suspension without pay for not more than 5 days;
- (f) reprimand.

In the event that the chief constable prefers charges, then a hearing will be held with a presiding officer, a presenting officer the accused and his/her counsel. Proof of the allegation must be *beyond a reasonable doubt*. If the accused is found guilty, the presiding officer may confirm the sentence sought by the chief constable or hand down a lesser sentence [s.30(3)].

Depending on the jurisdiction, the entire process, through the hearing, can take upwards of six months. This process undermines a recognized tenet of employee discipline --- that the sanction be administered with celerity (Arvey 1980; Trenholme and Baran 1975; and Church 1963). To quote Arvey (1980):

Punishment is more effective in organizational contexts if the aversive stimuli or events are delivered immediately after the undesirable responses occurs than if the delivery is delayed (p.126).

While this may not present too much of a problem when dealing with very serious breaches of public trust, particularly if the punishment being sought is dismissal, one is forced to wonder whether or not the time delay becomes a

factor when supervisors are faced with a subordinate who commits a minor (internal) disciplinary default where the range of appropriate punishments is narrow. Another research question therefore is, as a result of the delay or other reasons, do supervisors handle the disciplinary situation in an informal manner; a manner which is beyond review, appeal and possibly, justice? One aspect of this thesis will address this question.

Summary

From the outset, policing was seen to be a unique occupation. On the one hand, men were organized along military lines, yet on the other they were established as a purely civilian body with a mission to prevent crime. This odd mixture of civilian status and a para-military organizational structure is reflected in statutes drafted to govern the behaviours of police forces. Separate from stated statute were the endless list of departmental rules and regulations established to control the behaviours of its personnel.

Therefore the special status of the constable being a "holder of office" appears to end once he/she is not conducting affairs of the State. They, like any other employee, are subject to all the effects of a "master - servant" relationship. The only exception is that if the "employer" wishes to address in-house matters, then he/she must do so through a public statute.

Chapter 2

Study of the Police Organization and the Individual within the Organization

While it may be axiomatic to assert that organizational structure affects the performance of individuals within an organization, it is another thing entirely to suggest that organizational structure *primarily* determines the behaviours of an organization's inhabitants. One of the purposes of this thesis is to explore the effect of the police organizational structure on the phenomenon of discipline for minor offenses. The present chapter will establish the context for such an exploration by discussing:

- (i) the organizational design of police structures and situational issues
- (ii) the external/internal influencers of a police organizations and the systems of power available to those within the police environment
- (iii) theories of leadership and their applicability to the study of police management

In order to explore the minor disciplinary process among police supervisors, it will be necessary to make an initial assertion and several assumptions. The assertion is that when police supervisors are presented with a subordinate who has committed a "minor" disciplinary default the optional responses available to the supervisor are:

- 1) "do nothing",
- 2) to either charge the individual with an appropriate section under the *Police Act* or make an official entry in the subordinate's *personnel file* or,
- 3) apply some form of informal or unofficially authorized sanction to the subordinate.

Examples of this latter option include temporary re-assignment to an undesirable task, denial of some privilege or unrestrained ranting at the individual. As this study will demonstrate, the range of informal sanctions is broad, with some of the actions exceeding those available under conviction for a disciplinary charge under the *Police Act*.

The research into how police supervisors address the issue of minor discipline among subordinates is limited. In response to this absence of literature, the author felt compelled to employ a compound research methodology. One of the cornerstones for this methodology was to suggest that there were four main factors that (somehow) influence the supervisor's decision. Figure 1 pictorially represents the model in which to consider the inter-play of these variables.




Fig.1: Four Factor Model for the Examination of Supervisory Decisions Regarding Discipline

With regard to the decision outcome itself, any relative weighting of the four variables is absent. Further research will be needed to elaborate and determine the validity of the model. The above model became the centre piece around which the present research was designed.


Because of the need to limit the scope of the research (to best satisfy the Master's degree requirements), it was decided to restrict the focus of enquiry to primarily two of the variables: organizational structure and supervisory characteristics. The author believes that these two variables are of primary importance in the decision-making model. Since the exemplar for the thesis is minor disciplinary defaults, the characteristics of the offence will be held relatively constant, at that level, except where noted. Also, since it was determined to be impractical to interview and match subordinate responses with supervisor interviews, there will be little discussion in the thesis about subordinate characteristics.⁸ It should also be recognized that the abovementioned factors are not to be considered mutually independent. What the research will suggest is that it is because of the interplay amongst these constructs, there may be less than an equitable handling of minor disciplinary issues in policing.

⁸ There will be some isolated variances in the offence and offender characteristics during one portion of the research. See Chapter 3 for greater detail


Police Organizational Structure

Police organizations reflect an highly bureaucratized system replete with structuralist characteristics. As will be demonstrated these organizations have pyramidal hierarchies divided by rank and held together by a strict adherence to a chain of command. Ultimate command rests in the hands of a unitary body (Chief Constable) and control is furthered by a limited span of control for supervisors. This system design is one that was heavily recommended by O.W.Wilson (1963, 1972). Whether the bureaucratic model is the best system for policing is not a relevant question for this thesis; however, what is relevant is that there be an accurate identification of the type of organizational structures employed by the three police departments to be studied in this thesis (Vancouver, Delta and Victoria). Wilson provides examples of recommended organizational charts for police departments of varying sizes. The primary difference between departments staffed with from 80-250 personnel and those over 1,000 is that in the latter, there are more layers in each vertical stream. Comparing the organizational charts of Vancouver, Delta and Victoria (Tables 1,2, and 3 respectively) we can see the increased layering in the Vancouver police department.


VANCOUVER POLICE DEPARTMENT



DELTA MUNICIPAL POLICE ORGANIZATION 1992



Victoria Police Organization Chart



As mentioned previously, one research question to be addressed in this thesis is whether organizational size affects the disciplinary decision-making process of supervisors faced with recalcitrant subordinates. In order to answer this question, organizational structure must first be examined in its core components.

The differentiation of a formal organization into components in terms of several dimensions --- spatial, occupational, hierarchical, functional --- is considered to constitute the core of its structure (Blau 1970:201).

1) Spatial differentiation represents the number of geographic offices of an organization. In policing terms, spatial differentiation is represented by the number of precincts a department has.

2) Occupational differentiation is the number of different distinct "jobs" within an organization. Langworthy (1986) suggests that in policing, occupational differentiation is limited to virtually two major categories -- police officers (regardless of position) and civilian personnel. Langworthy's point is simply that regardless of the task an individual officer has at any given time, his/her occupation remains the same.

3) Hierarchical differentiation is the number of layers (or ranks) within an organization.

4) Finally, functional differentiation refers to the number of positions or tasks available to an employee within the organization.

Blau suggests that as an organization increases in size, there is a consequent increase in structural differentiation. As mentioned in Chapter 1,

police organizations were, in the past, very flat --- with many constables and a Chief Constable. In the present study, the Vancouver Police Department is the most layered with nine layers (including the detective rank). Victoria and Delta each have eight.⁹ While the difference here seems negligible, it is when we examine the functional differentiation that we see the major differences among the departments.

By referring to the organizational charts, we notice that while each of the three departments has one chief constable, they all differ in terms of who reports directly to the Chief. In Vancouver, there exists a Deputy Chief Constable of the Bureau of Operations and a Deputy Chief Constable of Administrative Services. Even though the two Deputy positions hold the same rank, by looking at how many personnel each are responsible for, one can make a prediction as to who would hold more "power" (a term to be clarified later). In fact, at one point in the history of the Vancouver Police Department (within the last 7 years), nearly all requests from patrol division required approval from the Deputy Chief Constable of the Bureau of Operations. While there may not have been an intention to have all the decisions made by this one position, through game-playing (a technique discussed in more detail later), it is possible for certain positions and individuals to accumulate incredible power within an organization.

Victoria police department has chosen to assign the rank of

⁹ Descriptions of organizational differences are not intended to be normative.

Superintendent to the two positions that Vancouver calls Deputy Chief Constable. Delta, on the other hand, has one Deputy Chief Constable. It will be useful to continue the examination of the span of control present within the three departments; however for the purpose of clarity, brevity and relevance, we will limit our examination of span of control to that occurring in the patrol divisions of the departments. In Vancouver, a patrol Superintendent has four Inspectors reporting to him (one Inspector for each Team); each Inspector has one Staff Sergeant; each Staff Sergeant has three Sergeants and three Corporals (one Sgt. and Cpl. per Squad -- three squads to a Team); and, finally each pair of Sgts. and Cpls. have approximately 15-20 Constables reporting to them. In Delta, the patrol Inspector reports directly to the Superintendent. Below the Inspector, there are four platoon Staff Sergeants reporting each with one Sergeant, one Corporal and 15 Constables reporting. Victoria's patrol system mirrors Delta's.

There is a certain irony often present within the police organizational structure. The irony is that a system which has been designed to maximize control over its personnel has the majority of the personnel being monitored by those supervisors who have the broadest span of control. At the lowest level, the Sgt. and Cpl. have to supervise between 15-20 officers who at any given moment may be scattered anywhere throughout their team or platoon area. Therefore the detection of disciplinary problems becomes erratic at best. As will be seen later, this structural occurrence creates the environment for the

exact thing that unity of command, chain of command and a narrow span of control were designed to prevent. Consistency and uniformity in the controlling of the behaviours of subordinates suffers because of hierarchical differentiation.

The problem is further compounded in large departments when we consider functional differentiation. Large departments often create unique positions, for example, patrol, traffic, identification squad, dog squad, community relations etc. Vancouver has approximately thirteen different positions for the Constable; approximately nine positions for the Cpl; and, approximately fifteen for the Sergeant. Delta, on the other hand, has nine positions for the Constable; four Corporal positions and four positions for the Sergeant. Victoria has seven Constable positions; four Corporal positions and twelve Sergeant positions. What is demonstrated here is that as the organization increases in size, so does the tendency towards specialization. An interesting question, that will remain unanswered in this study, is, "Does an increase in occupational and functional differentiation result in an increase in the efficiency and effectiveness of a police department, given its mandate?" What can be stated in response, however, is that the increase in structural differentiation does negatively affect the ability of the organization to control the actions of the membership through formalized means. What this study will demonstrate is that there are a wide range of controlling tactics used by Sergeants and Corporals and that there appears to be no uniformity or

consistency between the different functional positions as to how constables are to be disciplined for minor offenses.

Blau develops his argument regarding the effects of structural differentiation by stating that as the organization becomes larger, "...[d]ifferentiation lessens the difficulties the performance of duties entails by reducing the scope of the responsibilities assigned to any individual or unit, but it simultaneously enhances the complexity of the structure" (Blau 1970:212). The increased numbers of divisions or sub-units "intensifies problems of communication and coordination, which make new demands on the time of managers and supervisors at all levels" (Blau:212). The responsibilities of the patrol supervisor are varied and while each organization has filled many pages with words attempting to delineate these responsibilities, there seems to be a lack of agreement from the respondents in this thesis as to what those responsibilities actually are.

To summarize the rhetoric, the responsibilities for a patrol supervisor are to respond to the myriad of requests from superior officers, administer the paper-flow of a squad or platoon, and supervise the performance of subordinates which includes discipline. Vancouver's description of the responsibilities of a supervisor includes:

Ability to train, plan, assign and supervise the work of a large group of subordinate police and/or civilian staff.

Ability to exercise effective leadership functions, inspire confidence, promote, develop and maintain discipline and sound working relationships with subordinates, superiors, other staff and the public.

The job description for the position of Corporal states:

Agreed that the Corporal duties and Sergeant's duties are basically the same with the exception that the Corporal remains 'second in command' (Vancouver Police,1991)

Victoria Police Department job description for the patrol supervisor covers virtually the same territory as noted above. Section 4 of the *Special duties and responsibilities* for the desk sergeant (same as patrol sergeant) states that he/she shall:

Maintain discipline, dress, and deportment standards as laid down for the department. Ensure all departmental policies are followed by members. Report all breaches of above to Patrol Inspector. (Victoria Police, 1991)

As noticed in the Victoria's organizational chart, there are few corporal positions. Because of the shift structure, Victoria has no need for patrol corporal positions. The Delta police department makes a similar conclusion.

In Delta, the Sergeant is asked to:

...evaluate work performance of subordinates, exercise leadership skills, takes [sic] disciplinary action as required and assists [sic] in the orientation and development of platoon members. (Delta Police, 1992)

Much of the language contained in the job descriptions provided by the departments can be reduced to a simple directive: Supervisors are to monitor the performance of their subordinates and if anything out of the ordinary occurs, they are to report it to their superiors. Policy and Procedures manuals are written to provide all personnel with detailed descriptions of routine and emergency procedures. These manuals contain details on everything from the

correct position for a tie-clip to the responsibilities of a supervisor at a man-with-a-gun call. One supervisor cynically advised the author that the size of these manuals correlates directly to the amount of [trouble] that members get into.

Another structural component of policing that directly affects the method by which subordinates are supervised is *shift systems*. Because policing is a twenty-four hour enterprise, senior police managers have experimented with shift schedules in order to maximize the operational goals. In the present study, two shift systems are in operation.

Both Delta and Victoria operate their patrol divisions based on a twelve-hour day. Each patrol officer works four twelve-hour days and then receive four days off. Vancouver operates on a ten-hour shift with each officer working 4 ten-hour shifts before receiving three days off. Two of the consequences of the twelve hour shift is that there are virtually no overlapping shifts and supervisors follow their subordinates through the on-off rotation. This latter feature of the twelve-hour shift system creates a greater potential of supervisory consistency. With overlapping shifts there is a greater possibility of surplus personnel and therefore the increased potential for the granting of overtime leave. With fifty percent of one's work week constituting a "week-end", what need is there to supplement the four days off with additional time.?

Presently in Vancouver, each patrol team operates on the ten-hour system and splits the supervisory responsibilities between two supervisors

(Sergeant and Corporal). Vancouver's ten-hour system has each officer work a shift for 28 days (including weekly leave) after which time he/she will change to a different shift start time. The supervisors for the officer will divide the seven day supervisory coverage in half with Wednesday being the only day that they have in common. Furthermore, there is no consistency as to which supervisor supervises which people. Supervisory consistency is dependent upon the correlation of the working days of the subordinate and the supervisor. At the present time there is no effort to synchronize these variables to ensure consistency of supervision. These occurrences, combined with annual leave, sick time, court time etc. all conspire to hinder the early detection of minor disciplinary issues.

While others have commented that first-line supervisors are in the unenviable position of not having enough authority to conduct their presumed mandate (Moore & Smith 1953; Brinker 1955), this thesis has been designed to explore the manner by which supervisors *do* accomplish at least the disciplinary portion of their mandate. In order to better understand how supervisors exert influence or control over subordinates in a police department, it would be helpful to understand how power and authority relate to the organizational structure. For this, we will next examine the *influencers* of organizations, the organizational power configurations and the systems of power employed by those within the organization.

Organizational Influencers and Systems of Power

According to Mintzberg (1983), any organization has both external and internal coalitions which govern the direction of the organization. The *External Coalition* is comprised of "non-employees who use their bases of influence to try to affect the behavior of the employees" (Mintzberg 1983:26). The external coalition is made up of at least one of the following:

- a) The owners who carry legal title to the organization.
- b) The associates who act as suppliers and clients to the organization.
- c) The employee associations who, despite being employees, collectively try to affect the Company's environment from outside.
- d) The public in the form of special interest groups and the media.

When determining who the external coalition is for agencies like police departments, the picture gets muddled. For example, until approximately 1973 municipalities in British Columbia had sections within their Charters which allowed them to formulate a police force and to establish a Police Board to carry out the duties normally attributed to an employer. As mentioned in the previous chapter, with the enactment of the *Police Act*, those sections of the Municipal Charters became repealed. The *Police Act* created police boards and set out their responsibilities as follows:

s.23(1) The council of a municipality required to provide policing under section 15 may, subject to the minister's approval, provide policing by means of a municipal police force governed by a municipal police board consisting of the mayor of the council, one person appointed by the council and not more than 5 persons appointed, after consultation with the commission, by the Lieutenant Governor in Council.

s.28(1) Every board shall make rules not inconsistent with this Act and the regulations respecting the

(a) standards, guidelines and policies for the administration of the municipal police force,

(b) prevention of neglect and abuse by its municipal constables, and

(c) efficient discharge of duties and functions by the municipal police force and municipal constables.

While the most visible form of ownership of a police department is the Municipal Police Board, as shall be discussed later, these boards do not wield the same amount or type of power as do the owners of private organizations. Another example of an External Coalition for a police department is the Police Commission. In British Columbia the mandate of the Police Commission is outlined in the *Police Act (1988)*:

S.42(1) It is the commission's function to:

(a) administer, pursuant to Part 9, complaints about the conduct of provincial and municipal constables,

(b) hear appeals from decisions of police boards in disciplinary matters as provided by the regulations,

(c) inspect and report upon the quality and standard of police services delivery, including without limiting the foregoing,

(i) inspecting police operations and procedures,

(ii) evaluating programs for training persons who intend to become constables, constables who require retraining and constables who are eligible for advanced training, and

(iii) evaluating standards of policing,

- (d) maintain a system of statistical records as required to carry out inspections, evaluations and research studies,
- (e) consult with and give information and advice to chief constables, boards and committees on matters related to police and policing,
- (f) make recommendations to the minister in regard to the appointment of members of municipal police boards,
- (g) make recommendations to the minister on minimum standards respecting selection and training of constables, the use of firearms and equipment and any other matter relating to police and policing,
- (h) establish and carry out, or approve and supervise, programs to promote cooperative and productive relationships between constables and the public,
- (i) assist in the coordination of policing by the provincial police force and municipal police forces, and
- (j) perform other functions and duties assigned to the commission pursuant to this Act or the regulations.

Another power broker in many organizations is the union or association which operates on behalf of non-management staff. Mintzberg states that because unions operate for the membership and negotiate against management for collective agreements, they should be considered more of an external than internal coalition. The right to strike or conduct massive work slow-downs generates an immense amount of power for many unions in Canada. Police unions do not operate in the same manner that other large unions operate. Police are limited in their capacity to obtain power in this manner because of "back-to-work" legislation. Another influencing factor that limits the capacity of the police union to accumulate power in order to oppose management is a

strong occupational ideology. At least initially, most officers tend to view their occupation as a "calling". Recruits, when asked why they entered the law enforcement profession, often make statements like, "I wanted to feel that I was making a contribution to society.", "It's not right for criminals to get away with their crimes --- I wanted to help.", and "I don't want a 9 to 5 job pushing paper. I want some excitement. I want to help people."¹⁰ While there have been police strikes in Canada, it is this author's experience that the police unions in British Columbia rely more on their ability to negotiate agreements rather than threaten management (and public) with strike action or massive work slow-downs.

The Internal Coalition

"The Internal influencers are the full-time employees who use voice, those people charged with making the decision and taking the actions on a permanent, regular basis; it is they who determine the outcomes, which express the goals pursued by the organization" (Mintzberg 1983, p.26). There are six categories of internal influencers:

- a) The CEO or his/her equivalent
- b) The operators: those who produce the product or service
- c) The managers: including everyone in the hierarchical chain from just below the CEO to the first level supervisor

¹⁰ Personal conversations with police recruits by the author while the latter was seconded to the Justice Institute of B.C. from 1986-1989

d) The analysts of the technostructure: those individuals responsible for research and planning

e) The support staff: from janitorial staff to legal counsel

f) The ideology. While admittedly inanimate, organizational ideology is an almost palpable entity which strongly governs organizational behaviour.

In policing, the CEO is represented by the Deputy Chief Constable.

While the ultimate authority in a police department is the Chief Constable, he/she is typically involved in too many meetings with various public committees and government agencies to get involved in the daily operations of the department. Large departments, like large corporations, have a cadre of individuals who sit as an executive board providing direction for the department. In the Vancouver Police Department, the Executive consists of the Chief Constable, a Deputy Chief Constable in charge of the Bureau of Operations, a Deputy Chief Constable in charge of the Bureau of Support Services, and the five divisional Superintendents. The question concerning the location of the "power base" within each of the departments was addressed in the thesis and while the results will be explored in more detail in Chapter 4, it is interesting to note that the respondents clearly identified two sources of power: *formal* and *informal*. This delineation will help explain the controlling mechanisms utilized by supervisors when they are challenged by disciplinary concerns.

As any organization's structure becomes more and more complex, control within the structure similarly increases in complexity. According to Mintzberg's model, control is maintained through a series of Systems: A System of Ideology; of Authority, and of Politics.

The System of Ideology

Organizational ideology is made up of the beliefs, traditions, myths and culture which breathes life into the Company. Organizational ideology begins with the identification of a mission. In corporations, the mission can be linked to the founding person and what it was that he/she wished to accomplish. Goldstein (1977) summarizes the police mandate as the need: to protect and control conduct threatening to life and property; to assist those at risk of physical harm or who cannot assist themselves; to protect "constitutional" guarantees; to facilitate the movement of people; to resolve conflict and identify problems; and, to create a sense of security and freedom.

As the organization grows, the stories (and myths) of key individuals and events take on a meaning — a sense of history develops. It is easy to see evidence of the roles that history and tradition play in policing especially in such large police organizations like the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Even in smaller departments, certain characters (past and present) hold legendary status and become, if not a source of pride, a source of conversation.

Selznick (1957) suggests that when this occurs, an organization transcends from an expendable entity to an institution with a life of its own. Perrow (1972) adds that employees not only identify with the ideology, they begin to build their lives around the company. In policing, a strong and very normative sub-culture develops which acts to standardize performance within the organization. Whether or not this process works to the benefit of the public is a matter of conjecture.

The System of Authority

In private industry, one of the initial actions of a new CEO is to establish a superstructure which will facilitate his/her exercise of authority. At times this will entail wholesale changes to the organizational structure. Authority is then re-delegated down the hierarchical chain to those who have clearly stated spheres of influence. Public organizations, particularly bureaucracies, are not as open to such restructuring because the superstructures are often institutionalized. Regardless of the organization, the CEO must establish his/her authority and this is accomplished through "bureaucratic" control and "personal" control.

In policing, the only formal means of controlling the errant behaviour of officers is through the *Police Act* and the *Discipline Regulations*. Section 3 of the *Police (Discipline) Regulations* (Reg.330/75) states that "The chief constable shall be the disciplinary authority for his municipal force." Furthermore, Section 4

and 5 limit who may formally control the officers within the department:

s.4 A report or complaint respecting internal disciplinary matters arising in a municipal force shall be filed with the chief constable, or an officer not below the rank of inspector delegated for the purpose by the chief constable, and the chief constable or other officer shall determine what action should be taken.

s.5 The chief constable may hear and decide internal disciplinary matters personally or may delegate an officer, not below the rank of inspector, to hear the charge.

Essentially then, supervisors below the rank of Inspector are virtually impotent when it comes to administering formal sanctions. Any power they have is dependent upon their ability to mount a persuasive argument to either the "disciplinary authority" or his designate. It would be very difficult to determine the degree to which the argument was strengthened by rank and/or political influence obtained outside the rank designation.

Another method of control that the Chief Constable has access to is the ability to transfer police officers to any division within the department. This presents a unique legal question, especially if the purpose of the transfer is punitive. In private industry, individuals cannot be transferred to other positions for punitive reasons. Doing so is termed *constructive dismissal*.

Constructive dismissal can best be explained as follows:

"Whenever the employer unilaterally changes a fundamental term of the employment contract, such as salary level, job responsibilities, level of status or prestige, fringe benefits, or hours of work, the employee may treat the contract as having been repudiated by the employer and seek

the available legal remedies." (Anderson 1989:48)¹¹

The application of this concept to policing means that while a Chief Constable may have the authority to deploy his personnel as he chooses, he can still be subjected to a grievance if such relocations fall under the definition of constructive dismissal. The difficulty for the arbitrator in such a grievance is that in large departments there are many positions for a "constable" and there is great difficulty in determining what the actual job description of a police constable is. This difficulty allows for the use of relocation for punitive purposes to escape the legal ramifications presented above in all but the most blatant case. For this reason, it is the position of this author that such relocations can be a form of informal sanction. Whether punishment transfers originate from the Chief Constable's office or from first-line supervisors, they can represent an example of political control.

The System of Politics

Prior to focusing on the effects of organizational politics on the individual police officer, it is important to examine the structural bases for

¹¹ See also:

O'Grady v. I.C.B.C. (1975) 63 D.L.R. (3d) 370;

Burton v. MacMillan Bloedel (1976) 4 W.W.R. 267;

Baker v. Burns Foods 74 D.L.R. (3d) 762;

Lesuik v. B.C. Forest Products Ltd (1984) 56 BCLR 216

power within an organization. Hickson, Hinings et al (1971) state that the power of a sub-unit depends on its ability to handle *uncertainty*, the degree of *substitutability* of the unit and the degree of *centrality* or interlinkage the sub-unit has with other units.

Police patrol units are designed to cope with all levels of uncertainty. When an unusual event occurs, there are procedures previously drafted that merely need implementation. For example, disaster situations like plane crashes are not something that constables are trained for in police academies. However, they are trained to take orders. As long as someone of authority is in a position to give the order, then the *uncertainty* of the situation will be eliminated. In one sense then, patrol units control uncertainty very well and should therefore be accorded a significant amount of power. But, because police officers are "generalists", *any* patrol unit will be capable of handling the situation well, thus nullifying any advantage with respect to dealing with uncertainty.

The power of *substitutability* can be described best using Crozier's study of French tobacco plants. Managers of the tobacco plants attempted to control all forms of uncertainty within the work-place in an effort to ensure that business would not be interrupted. The only area that they could not control was machine break-down. Because of the unique nature of the machinery, only a small group of individuals within the company had the knowledge to repair the machinery. As a result, the machine engineers wielded an incredible

amount of influence in the organization despite their low position on the organizational ladder (Crozier 1964:129). The police constable does not share the advantage of the tobacco machinists. Evidence of this inability is prevalent in all three departments studied. Members are transferred between sub-units with little requirement to attend to their actual qualifications. As one respondent to the study commented, he wished that the department would consider the sensibilities of the members more, especially when the department conducted, what he termed, "drive-by transfers" --- where members were transferred between sub-units with virtually no warning.

Centrality remains the only possible advantage that the patrol sub-unit has in the power game. Since a vast majority of the work in a police department is generated by the officers in the patrol function, the work of the constable becomes critically important. As stated earlier, the only way that the patrol sub-unit could take advantage of the power available to them because of their *centrality* would be if they embarked on some job-action or strike. At present, this seems unlikely.

Organizational Politics and Game-Playing

Organizational politics involves those activities taken within the organization to acquire, develop, and use power and other resources to obtain one's preferred outcomes in a situation in which there is uncertainty or dissensus about choices (Pfeffer 1981, p.7).

Organizational politics therefore, becomes a valuable weapon to achieve personal and departmental goals. At times the use of political influence can be

extremely subtle and difficult to identify and at other times the use is flagrant. Mintzberg's definition of politics, while similar to Pfeffer's in intention, tends to highlight politics' divisive nature.

...politics refers to individual or group behavior that is informal, ostensibly parochial, typically divisive, and above all, in the technical sense, illegitimate --- sanctioned neither by formal authority, accepted ideology, nor certified expertise (though it may exploit any one of these) (Mintzberg 1983:172).

Often referred to as "political games" by participants, its potency in the corporate structure is legendary. Table 4 represents the essentials of Mintzberg's chart outlining characteristics of the political games played in organizations. Of the games described in Table 4, *insurgency*, *counter-insurgency*, *strategic candidates* and *young turks* are political games that appear to be difficult to be implemented in police organizations. These four require either wholesale takeovers or massive organizational changes in order to be successful. Such manoeuvres would not be possible without a very strong power base and the only people that would be in a position to have that much power would be members of the Executive. These individuals are usually close to retirement and perhaps would feel that the cost of the attempt would be too great for the benefit obtained. The remaining games however, can be practised throughout the organization. The following section describes some of the remaining strategies and how they may be played within police organizations.

GAME	MAIN PLAYERS	POLITICAL MEANS of INFLUENCE	REASON PLAYED
Insurgency	Unskilled operators and low level managers	Political skill, privileged information	To resist authority or legitimate power
Counter-insurgency	Senior managers	Privileged information; exploitation of authority	To counter resistance to authority
Sponsorship	Any subordinate, usually managers	Privileged access	To build a power base with superiors
Alliance-building	Line managers	Political skill; exploitation of legitimate systems of influence	To build a power base with peers
Empire-building	Line managers	All, but especially privileged access	To build a power base with subordinates
Budgeting	Line managers	Privileged access and information	To build a power base with resources
Expertise	Operators and staff specialists	Exploitation of expertise or skill to feign it	To build a power base with real or feigned knowledge
Lording	Unskilled operators and managers	Exploitation of authority (or expertise or ideology)	To build a power base with authority, especially bureaucratic rules
Line vs. Staff	Line managers and staff analysts	Exploitation of authority and expertise; privileged information	To defeat rivals
Rival Camps	Middle line alliances	Privileged information; exploitation of legitimate power	To defeat rivals
Strategic Candidates	Line managers, CEO, professional staffers	Political will; privileged access	To effect organizational change
Whistle-blowing	Low-level operators or analysts	Privileged information	to effect organizational change
Young Turks	Usually high level line managers; sometimes professional operators	Privileged access to information and political skill	To effect organizational change

Table 4: Characteristics of the Political Games of the Internal Coalition
(adapted from Mintzberg 1983:214-215)

Sponsorship and Line vs. Staff

Police promotional systems are fraught with political game-playing. Because of the relative infrequency of promotions (given the number of applicants) promotional systems that are based on a combination of merit and recommendation are vulnerable to manipulation. *Quid pro quo* arrangements between departmental supervisors may not be uncommon. For example, several police supervisors have advised the author that during promotional competitions, secret discussions are sometimes held between supervisors of competing sections within the organization where Supervisor Y will support a promotional candidate put forward by Supervisor X in return for similar support for one of Supervisor Y's candidates. At times this practice could extend to promises for support at future competitions (a risky manoeuvre since, due to departmental transfers, there is no guarantee that either supervisor will be in a position to provide that support the following year). The benefit of such an arrangement is that Y's candidate is elevated to a position in the promotional competition which he/she would not likely have achieved without the benefit of the secret deal.

Such arrangements have a ripple effect in that while no one advises the vaulted candidate of the "deal", he/she readily acknowledges a debt to the supervisor. Both parties quietly carry-out their respective roles as mentor and mentored with benefits accruing on both sides. Sometime in the future, the bequeathed candidate may be in a position to return the favour, discreetly. It

becomes easy to see how this practice could become a very powerful weapon in a supervisor's arsenal of control mechanisms.

Alliance-Building

In any large organization there are those who are adept at securing important "contacts" in and outside of the company. One officer explained that contacts must be continually *worked*. Even though a contact may not be the type of person that he would normally socialize with, social engagements occurred purely for possible future benefits. For very important people, even birthdays were remembered! Regardless of the Machiavellian nature of this exercise, it does produce results. The skill is in not crossing the boundary into syrupy obsequiousness. While my informant was relating a practice which occurred on an individual basis, there is no reason why a modified practice could not occur between sub-units. Insider information and friendly contacts become very valuable for obtaining perquisites for subordinates. Access to training courses, preferred transfers, and special assignments are among the benefits that a subordinate can receive if he/she remains in the favour of his/her superior.

Empire-Building, Lording and Rival Camps

There are limited occasions in policing for individuals at the lower levels to build any empires; however it can be accomplished at the Executive level. Probably the two greatest assets for managers are good personnel and information. Divisional commanders are in a better position than most to

control the distribution of these two valuable commodities. It is possible for one divisional commander to retain bright, industrious and ambitious officers within his division. With highly productive personnel, the manager is certainly going to be regarded well by his superior. At the lower level, managers are less able to withhold personnel; however, they are in a position to control access to information generated by the managers' subordinates. As long as the first-line supervisor is capable of keeping his/her personnel content, then any information generated by them can be withheld by the manager for use at a time when it would be advantageous to him. For example, a manager who is aware of a major cache of contraband may not, in order for self-aggrandizement or for that of his subordinates, pass the information to the division that would normally investigate such contraband. As long as the manager can deflect accusations of "withholding information", then he/she has gained political points over any of his/her rivals.

Any discussion concerning the efficacy of the use of game-playing within a police environment would be speculative and irrelevant to the purposes of this study. It is possible that there are a number of positive benefits for both the membership and the organization in the political games of the internal coalition; however, it is beyond the scope of the thesis to explore these benefits directly. It is important to emphasize that organizational politics provide the supervisor with a vehicle by which he/she can fulfil his/her supervisory mandate, especially in times of difficulty.

The importance of discussing the issues presented above is that it establishes the foundation from which more specific explorations and discussions may arise. One of the primary objectives of the present chapter has been to establish a theoretical (and to some extent, practical) understanding of the environment in which the decision-making process of the supervisor is made, relative to minor disciplinary matters. Another purpose of the current chapter is to focus on theories of leadership. It is believed by the author that the characteristics of the supervisor, as one factor in the decision-making model earlier articulated, may have significant impact on the decision-making process itself. What follows is a discussion of some of the theories as well as the research instruments utilized to determine leadership styles.

The Individual in the Organization

Over the years many discussions have ranged over the definition of a "leader". Perhaps the authors that have contributed the most to the consolidation of knowledge (in its broadest term) about leadership have been Stodgill (1974) and Bass and Stodgill (1990). Stodgill (1974) divided leadership theories into six main categories: great man, environmental, humanistic, interaction-expectation, exchange, and personal-situational theories.

Great Man theories posit that leaders are born and their gifts are inheritable. Wiggam (1931) advocated that survival of the fittest and their intermarriage (and their breeding) would result in a superior class. Leaders in

this category, are possessed with great qualities that elevate them from the masses. Other researchers believed that personality traits were the key to unlocking the mysteries of leadership, Bernard (1929), Bingham (1927), Tead (1929), and Kilbourne (1935). Many of these studies lacked empirical fortitude and were often heavily laced with biographical anecdotes.

Environmental theories stress that leadership is the product of "time, place, and circumstance" (Stodgill 1974: 18). For example, Hocking (1924) suggested that a person becomes a leader when he/she advances a solution to a problem that everyone accepts. In this case, leadership resides with the group and not the particular qualities of the individual who happened to be in the right place at the right time. As Stodgill points out, however, this definition of leadership may account for some of the recognized leaders, it does not answer the question of how many leaders were not borne from crisis?

Humanist theories stress the need for organizations to facilitate the motivation of workers. McGregor (1960) suggested that there were two types of leaders. Theory X managers assume that workers are passive and it is the job of managers to direct these workers to accomplish the goals of the organization. Theory Y managers assume that workers are self-motivated and have strong desires to assist the organization in accomplishing its goals. For Theory Y managers, the art is in channelling and guiding the innate desire of the employee so that the company goals are satisfied. While the typology of Theory X and Theory Y managers became vogue in management training

seminars during the sixties and seventies, the theory was seriously flawed by its insistence on dichotomizing a very complicated behaviour.

Interaction-Expectation theorists believe that there is a necessary inter-dependence between the actors. In the *Vertical-Dyad Linkage Model* (Dansereau, Graen et al 1975) the leader exchanges resources such as increased job latitude, greater influence on decision-making or increased communication for the member's increased commitment. While there is intuitive appeal for this theory, there is very little empirical research to support the theory's claim -- see also: Scandura and Graen (1984), Duchon, Graen & Taber (1986), Heneman, Greenberger & Anonyuo (1989) and Cashman, Dansereau et al (1976).

Another interaction-expectation theory was proposed by Evans (1970). He stated that leaders attempt to influence a subordinate's perception of goals and the paths by which the goals can be attained. This theory therefore, relies on subordinate motivation for determining leadership status and tends to ignore variables like task organization, skill level and resource levels (Yukl 1989). Fulk & Wendler (1982) stated that the leadership styles are highly complex and sometimes have contrasting effects. Schriesheim & DeNisi (1981) pointed out that the research on path-goal theory has been limited to examining the task structure component of the theory and that even this research has been methodologically flawed. Finally, Path-goal theory relies heavily on *expectancy theory* and this has been shown to be a tenuous base (Schriesheim & Kerr 1977).

One of the first contingency theories was developed by Fiedler (1967). Fiedler stated that position power, task structure, and the relationship between the leader and his/her subordinates act as moderating influences. Fiedler developed a complicated scale to assess the differences between the leaders: a scale he called the *Least Preferred Co-worker* scale (LPC). In essence, "[T]he socially distant (work-oriented) leader tends to be more effective in very easy and very difficult situations. The highly sociable (interaction-oriented) leader tends to be more effective in situations that impose moderate leadership demands." (Stodgill 1974:21). The strength of the Fiedler Contingency Theory is that for the first time someone attempted to view what transpires in the workplace in anything other than dichotomous terms. This theory attempts to link three critical aspects of the work environment (task structure, positional power and leader-member relations) in an effort to explain the highly complicated process of leadership. Rice (1978) noted construct validity problems with the LPC scale. Other criticisms come from Vecchio (1983) and Yukl (1989) who state that there is ambiguity on what the LPC scale actually describes and there exists a question as to the range and appropriateness of the three contingencies.

One of the better situational theory models of leadership comes from Vroom and Yetton (1973). The Vroom-Yetton model of decision making applies best to those managers who are seeking what not to do when faced with a major decision (Yukl 1989). Managers are asked to normatively assess the

quality of their decisions at various stages throughout the decision-making process by simply answering "yes or no" to relevant questions. Included in this normative process is an attempt to assess the acceptability of the decision by the subordinates. There are two leadership styles optioned by the managers (autocratic or participative) and this polarity, as well as the "yes/no" response set tends to simplify the decision-making process faced by managers. The result for a manager participating in this process is a highly complicated decision-tree which may be very useful in certain situations, but from this author's perspective would not be useful for managers who are faced with disciplinary situations in which some form of punitive action is seriously contemplated. There is great value in the Vroom-Yetton model for routine management problems, providing there is room for using the participative approach; however, the present study presumes that some form of participative approach has been attempted prior to the manager feeling the necessity to "take action".

The final theory to be discussed is Hersey and Blanchard's situational leadership theory (1982). These authors argue that subordinate maturity greatly affects leader task and relationship behaviour and therefore, leader effectiveness. Task and relationship behaviour are defined as:

Task behavior --- The extent to which leaders are likely to organize and define the roles of the members of their group (followers); to explain what activities each is to do and when, and how tasks are to be accomplished; characterized by endeavoring to establish well-defined patterns of organization, channels of communication, and

ways of getting jobs accomplished.

Relationship behavior --- The extent to which leaders are likely to maintain personal relationships between themselves and members of their group (followers) by opening up channels of communication, providing socioemotional support, 'psychological strokes,' and facilitating behaviors (Hersey & Blanchard 1988:116-117)

The *effectiveness* dimension occurs when the leadership style matches the situation hence, it is the environment that determines the ultimate suitability of the leader's approach to the problem. Table 5 describes the relationship between task structure, relationship behaviour and effectiveness.

<i>Basis Styles</i>	<i>Effective</i>	<i>Ineffective</i>
High Task and Low Relationship Behavior	Seen as having well-defined methods for accomplishing goals that are helpful to the followers.	Seen as imposing methods on others; sometimes seen as unpleasant and interested only in short-run output
High Task and High Relationship Behavior	Seen as satisfying the needs of the group for setting goals and organizing work, but also providing high levels of socioemotional support.	Seen as initiating more structure than is needed by the group and often appears not to be genuine in interpersonal relationships.
High Relationship and Low Task Behavior	Seen as having implicit trust in people and as being primarily concerned with facilitating their goal accomplishment.	Seen as primarily interested in harmony; sometimes seen as unwilling to accomplish a task if it risks disrupting a relationship or losing "good person" image.
Low Relationship and Low Task Behavior	Seen as appropriately delegating to subordinates decisions about how the work should be done and providing little socioemotional support where little is needed by the group.	Seen as providing little structure or socioemotional support when needed by members of the group.

Table 5: How the basic leader behavior styles may be seen by others when they are effective or ineffective. (Hersey & Blanchard 1988:120)

Hersey and Blanchard drafted the *Leader Effectiveness and Adaptability Description* (LEAD) instrument in an effort to measure the dimensions they proposed. The LEAD-Self was used by management trainers to assess the leadership styles, leadership style range and leadership adaptability of candidates. The LEAD-Other does much the same thing, however, the respondent is typically the manager's subordinate. Since the present study used only the LEAD-Self, there will be no further discussion on the LEAD-Other.

The LEAD-Self uses twelve brief management scenarios and the respondent is forced to select what he/she would do in response to the situation from a pre-set series of four responses. Table 6 provides an example of one of the scenarios (see Appendix B for further examples).

1. SITUATION	ALTERNATIVE ACTIONS
<p>Your followers, usually able to take responsibility, are not responding to your recent redefining of standards.</p>	<p><i>You would...</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> A. Allow group involvement in redefining standards, but not take control. B. Redefine standards and supervise carefully. C. Avoid confrontation by not applying pressure; leave situation alone. D. Incorporate group recommendations, but see that new standards are met.

Table 6: Sample LEAD Scenario (Hersey & Blanchard)
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Each response represents a leadership style and each style, when linked to the situation will determine the adaptability quotient of the respondent. Each scenario is rated on a *group readiness* scale. This scale ranges from 1 - 4 and depicts the levels of maturity or readiness of the leader's group to accept responsibility for the task. For example R1 means that the group is "unable and unwilling or insecure"; R2 means that the group is "unable but willing or motivated"; R3 means they are "able but unwilling or insecure" and R4 means that they are "able and willing or motivated".

The scenario in Table 6 has a *Readiness* level of R2. According to the scoring sheet for this situation, if A were chosen, the candidate (for this scenario only) would have a *participating* style. B would indicate a *telling* style; C would be a *selling* style, and finally D would be a *delegating* style. According to Hersey and Blanchard, the leadership style of a candidate can be split into *primary* and *secondary* styles. While most leaders have a primary style, they may not have a secondary style. For these leaders, their leadership style range is rigid. Should the situations the leader is presented with clash with his/her primary style, then the extent to which the leader is able to adapt to another style is referred to as the leader style adaptability index. It should be noted here that the ability of the leader to accurately diagnose the situation correctly is paramount. Given an "appropriate" diagnosis, the leader's ability to adapt the appropriate leadership style is more important than having a broad range of leadership styles.

Returning to the above example, the most effective style that a leader could use would be one that best matched the group's reluctance to participate in the task with the situational variables. According to Hersey and Blanchard, the best *alternative action* would be D – a selling approach. The second best style would be either a telling or participative approach represented by the actions in B or A. The least effective style would be C which translates into a delegating mode (in a sense, a transfer of power to the group).

Hersey and Blanchard's theory is not without its detractors. Like other self-ratings such as the *Leadership Behavior Description Questionnaire* (Weisenberg & Kavanagh, 1972), Haley (1983) found that there was response bias, low reliability scores and low correlation scores between the LEAD-Self and LEAD-Other scores. More specific criticism comes from Blake and Mouton (1981), who reported that task and relations orientation tends to be interdependent with behaviour rather than uncorrelated with each other as Hersey and Blanchard suggest. Blake and Mouton (1981, 1982) modified the range of alternate actions available to the respondent and then administered the LEAD-Self to 100 experienced managers. The researchers merely added a fifth alternative. The following is a sample of the change along with the noted differences in responses.

A group is not responding favorably to our friendly conversation and concern for their welfare. Their performance is going down quite quickly.

a) Stress and apply uniform procedures and the need for accomplishing the task.

- b) Keep yourself on hand for discussion, but don't pressure subordinates to involve you.
- c) Set goals for subordinates after talking with them.
- d) Demonstrate your intentions by not interfering.
- e) *Initiate a critique session with the entire group to diagnose the underlying problems responsible for this rapidly declining production to decide what to do about it. [italics added]*

According to Hersey and Blanchard, the preferred answer is (A). The Blake and Mouton study asked the 100 managers to rank the choices offered from most effective to least effective. Of the 12 situations presented, the managers chose the fifth alternative between 72 and 90 percent of the time. This fifth solution represented an integration of the task and relations orientation. It could be, however, that as in the above example, the fifth solution states more precisely the *actions* that a manager would do as opposed to the general *intentions* as represented in the previous four alternatives. Criticisms like those raised by Blake and Mouton dramatically indicate the need for precision in language when drafting testing instruments. Some managers may have indicated the correct (Hersey-Blanchard) response because they intended to act in ways consistent with the Blake-Mouton alternative. Another aspect of the LEAD model that researchers have criticized is the role that subordinate maturity plays.

Blank, Weitzel and Green's (1990) study does not support the assumption that a subordinate's maturity moderates the relationship between

leader task and relations behaviours and leadership effectiveness. Since the concept of maturity is a central point in the work of Hersey and Blanchard, the findings of Blank et al represents a serious concern regarding the empirical use of this situational leadership model.

However, as Slocum (1984) suggests, the maturity component of the LEAD scale is of minor importance compared to the other variables present in the scenario --- variables like, technology involved, communication systems present, types of managerial control systems, the information required and the particular subordinate task involved.

While the Hersey-Blanchard work has been criticized for its apparent paucity of empirical support, it warrants further rigorous exploration because it seems to tap into dimensions which practising managers find intuitively appealing. In the present study, many managers have commented on the importance of employee "maturity", task behaviour and leader-subordinate relationship behaviour as key factors in their decision-making process. Whether the supervisors are experts in personality assessment is not as important as their perceptions concerning the research instruments they are asked to use.

Police organizations have often adopted a siege mentality when it comes to being the subjects of research. While this researcher is not intending to act as an apologist for police behaviours, it is my assumption that in view of the siege mentality sometimes present, it is important that any research instrument

be non-threatening and also refrain from any obvious attempts to "psychoanalyze" the police respondent. Coupled with these requirements is the need for the measuring instrument to be brief and have apparent relevance (in this case, to discipline). From personal experience, I have noted that police officers have refused to respond to some questionnaires because it was felt that the questions lacked relevance.

Since this researcher felt it necessary to measure the style of management practised by the respondent and because many of the research instruments currently used are either too lengthy or without apparent research relevance, it was decided that the LEAD-Self would be administered. The average time for completion of the LEAD-Self was fifteen minutes. Also the LEAD-Self contains situations which contain the potential for the supervisor for taking disciplinary action even though discipline may not be among the choices presented in the questionnaire. For example, questions 1, 5, 9, 10, and 12 (see Appendix B) describe situations which could result in a disciplinary action being contemplated by the respondent if his/her first action selection fails. During the data collection process, several of the respondents advised this researcher that they "recognized a situation". This was taken as partial confirmation of the LEAD-Self's research "relevance" in the eyes of the respondents.

The final topic to be discussed in this chapter is "power". At least connotatively, "power" is related to supervisory rank. How "power" is defined

and measured is the focus of the remainder of the present chapter.

Personal Power

When examining personal control, the interdependence between the actors cannot be ignored.

The dependence of actor A upon actor B is (1) directly proportional to A's motivational investment in goals mediated by B, and (2) inversely proportional to the availability of those goals outside the A-B relationship (Emerson 1962, p.32)

As one increases the hierarchical distance between A and B, the motivational interest becomes more and more difficult to define. For example, if a first level supervisor makes a request of a subordinate and there is no legal requirement for the subordinate to accede to the request, then the chances of the subordinate carrying out the task may only be even. If, on the other hand, the subordinate is about to request something from the supervisor (which the supervisor could legitimately refuse) then the subordinate's motivation to comply with the supervisor's request increases.

Motivational interest need not be as immediate as in the above example. To return to a police analogy, if a constable is asked by a Superintendent (or some other high ranking Officer) to carry out a task (one which allows the constable the right to refuse) the likelihood of the constable actually refusing is slim. Because the constable is aware of the degree of influence that the Senior Officer may have over a constable's career (or the constable merely wishes to hedge his bet), the motivational interest intensifies dramatically to the point where the constable is not likely to refuse the request. While the idea of

motivational interests is powerful, what is more pertinent to the thesis is how personal power (or lack of) relates to the discipline situation.

In the present study, efforts were made to identify where the power base is located within the departments; how much power each respondent believes he has; and, within the context of discipline, how power was implemented. In an effort to determine how much power each supervisor *perceived* he/she had within the organization, each respondent was asked to complete the Gibb's *Affective Job Reaction Scale* (see Appendix C).

Gibbs' scale is a unidimensional instrument which measures the degree of *perceived* power individuals have within their organization. The respondent is asked to indicate on a 7 point Likert-type scale the degree to which they agree with each of thirteen statements. The respondent score is then achieved by adding the scores for each statement and dividing the aggregate score by the number of questions. The result is a score indicating the degree of *perceived powerlessness* of the respondent. For example, a score of 7 would suggest that the individual perceives that they are virtually *powerless* in the organization. Cronbach's alpha for the scale is 0.79. As a result of the low alpha coefficient and the fact that the samples are small and non-random, there is not anything that can be statistically proven by the administration of *Gibbs'* scale in this study. The scale was adopted for use in the thesis in anticipation that the sample size would be sufficient to make meaningful use of the statistical results obtained from using the Gibb's scale.

Chapter Three

Methodology

Previous research into police discipline has almost exclusively focused on police violations of public trust. By focusing on the practices surrounding the decision-making process in minor disciplinary cases, the behaviours of and the influences on a supervisor are placed in relief. It should thus be possible to make inferential statements about the police organizational milieu.

The research design for the thesis is limited by the fact that there are no external and independent sources of information on minor disciplinary matters available in the three police agencies under study. Neither the police department executive nor the Police Commission retain statistical information on minor disciplinary matters. Almost by definition, the matters that the researcher is interested in are clandestine and therefore beyond review by disciplinary or regulatory authorities. In the strictest sense, the phenomena being examined is within a closed system.

It is contended that because of historical antecedents, the presence of separate statutes designed to control the conduct of the police, and the uniqueness of the occupational environment, that a combination of theoretical perspectives need to be employed in order to adequately explore the minor disciplinary process in policing. The historical and legal contexts were discussed in Chapter 1 and the organizational perspectives were outlined in

the first half of Chapter 2. The remaining portion of Chapter 2 discussed those issues that related to police leadership. The current chapter will describe the methodology employed to determine the disciplinary decision-making process. Discussion will focus on the following research components: (1) sample population and selection criteria, (2) research design and instruments, (3) research process, (4) data collection and, (5) research limitations.

Sample Population and Selection Criteria

Municipal policing in British Columbia is divided between twelve municipal departments and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the latter operating on contract with municipalities and the provincial government. The R.C.M.P. were excluded from this study because they are governed by a separate statute and their organizational philosophy is distinct from the municipal forces (see Chapter 1). Of the remaining twelve departments, it was decided that three would be chosen: Vancouver Police Department, the Delta Police Department and the Victoria Police Department. These three departments represent the largest three municipal departments in British Columbia with authorized strengths of 1119 (Van.), 130 (Delta) and 167 (Victoria) and therefore represent the best opportunity to obtain a sufficiently sized sample population. While the study could have been conducted using one department, it was felt that in order to deflect criticisms that the situation described was anomalous, other points of reference would be needed. It was

also felt that there may be some organizational dynamics related to the size of the departments that could be better explored if three departments were utilized.

Subject selection was governed by some initial parameters set by the researcher. The population had to satisfy two criteria:

- (i) the respondent had to be either a Corporal or Sergeant (and not someone who had the rank temporarily)
- (ii) the respondent was required to have five years of supervisory experience and that this experience be recent (within last two years).

The first criterion was chosen because the Corporal and Sergeant rank represents the first rank in which authority is officially given to a member to discipline another officer¹². Ranks above Sergeant are also given this authority; however they were not interviewed because they are not considered to be *first-line* supervisors.

The second criterion was established because one portion of the research required the respondent to recall personal supervisory experiences and it was not believed likely that supervisors with less than five years supervisory experience would have encountered many situations that were both minor in nature and were resistant to on-the-job counselling. While the question relating to personal experiences asked for experiences that occurred within a two year span, experiences that occurred outside the two year limit were accepted, as an

¹² Temporary ranks of Corporal and Sergeant can be assigned individuals and while they are in this *acting* capacity, they are given the authority to discipline. Normally such an assignation is transient and the *acting* supervisor treads very carefully while in this position because every action that he/she undertakes is under careful scrutiny by both senior management as well as the constables.

exception, only if the supervisor seemed "clear" on the details. While it is true that the population could be deemed "professional" witnesses, they too can succumb to the vagaries of memory.

With the above criteria set, letters were sent to the Chief Constable of each department. There was a total of 111 potential subjects identified from the departments: 91 identified in Vancouver, and 10 subjects each from Delta and Victoria. There were no women in the target population. While the departments examined do have women officers beyond the rank of constable, none met the thesis criteria (an observation worthy of a future thesis).

Once potential subjects were identified, each was sent a brief (two page) letter identifying the researcher, the purpose of the research and the amount of time required of the respondent (Appendix D).¹³ The letter of request was distributed to the potential respondents in July 1992. The rate of response was very slow. The researcher then contacted each of the potential respondents from Delta and Victoria by telephone. Because of the difficulty in contacting the 91 individuals in Vancouver by telephone, it was decided that a "Second Notice of Request" would be mailed to each respondent. This too proved to have a disappointing return rate even though the second request implored the respondents to phone and leave a message even if they wished not to participate. Finally it was decided to contact the remaining potential subjects

¹³ The original letter stated that the research would be conducted in a two-pronged fashion. This was changed because of time constraints and because initial respondents suggested that due to work loads, there would be a greater chance of subject participation if the research was conducted in one sitting. Average time for data collection was 1 hour 45 minutes

by telephone. Some were reached and messages were left for others. The end result was that out of a population of 91, only 21 (23%) individuals from the Vancouver Police department expressed a willingness to participate. The participation rate from Delta and Victoria was: eight (80%) from Delta and five (50%) from Victoria. The end result was that there were 34 individuals in the sample population representing 30% of the total population.

Research Design and Research Instruments

The research design for this thesis contains the following stages:

- (i) Completion of a Demographic questionnaire
- (ii) Distribution of the Hersey Blanchard *LEAD--Self* questionnaire
- (iii) Administration of the Gibbs *Affective Job Reaction Scale*
- (iv) Distribution of three Case Studies followed by a series of questions relating to each case
- (v) Completion of a structured interview which included probing questions into the respondent's personal experiences as a supervisor¹⁴

Demographics

Subjects were asked their age, education, years with the department, years in policing, years as a supervisor, number of weeks supervisory training they had received, and the number of subordinates they presently had. During the design stage of the thesis it was felt that this information would prove useful in establishing a profile of the sample population as well as delineating

¹⁴ Imbedded in sections (i), (iv) and (v), are questions which focus on organizational structure

differences between the groups.

Leadership Effectiveness Adaptability Description -- Self (LEAD-Self)

Hersey and Blanchard's LEAD-Self was used to determine the supervisory styles of the respondents. As discussed previously, the LEAD-Self represents the best instrument currently available, given the parameters of the thesis. The LEAD-Self was administered to each of the respondents and the average completion time was 15 minutes

Affective Job Reaction Scale

This scale was administered in order to obtain an indication of how much "power" each of the respondents perceived they had within their organization. It is possible that supervisors are not given any formal level of authority and that any power they do have originates from their ability to manage informally.

Case Studies

Three case studies were developed by the researcher with each case controlling the effects of the offence and offender characteristics. Each of the cases was designed to represent examples of the type of issues faced by police supervisors. The scripting of the scenarios was based on personal experiences during the researcher's policing career. The following provides an explanation for the rationale behind each of the three case studies.

Case Study 1 represents an officer with a moderate amount of seniority (8 years), who is considered to be a moderate worker and who has been

continually reporting for work late (the fourth time in six weeks). This case was designed to represent the moderate employee who has suddenly been arriving for work late. It would be expected that most supervisors would treat the tardiness as symptomatic of some causal issue the substance of which must be determined through an interview. The researcher expects that this case study would receive a relatively low "seriousness" rating (approximately 3-4) from the supervisors and that the typical response would be to interview the constable and give him a stern, and final, warning.

Case Study 2 represents an officer who has twelve years seniority and who is continually submitting poor quality reports despite his ability to do better. Coupled with this is an apparent "attitude" problem relating to his work ethic. It seems as if the constable could not care less about his work. The constable's attitude is demonstrated in a statement made to his supervisor when asked about a report he has written. The constable demands contemptuously, "What the hell's wrong now?" In this case study, the constable represents a veteran officer whose attitude is contaminating his work. As in Case Study 1, the supervisor's task is to determine the underlying problem. At twelve years seniority the problems may be: burn-out, lack of promotional opportunities, feeling undervalued, or there may be a myriad of personal issues unrelated to police work. The supervisor's problem is complicated by a response bordering on insubordination (a clearly understood disciplinary default -- see Appendix A). It is believed that some supervisors

may seize upon the "contemptuous comment" and rate the event more seriously (than Case Study 1, for example). The researcher also believes that this scenario would be rated more serious than Case Study 1 because of the effect that poor work has on other members of the criminal justice system which rely on this constable's thoroughness.

Case Study 3 was designed to represent what could be considered a nuisance offence. In almost every work-place there are those individuals who make the work environment unpleasant. Most of the time peer pressure handles the problem but in some cases, the offending worker seems immune to the subtle (and not so subtle) hints of his/her fellow workers. Case Study 3 has a male officer (with unstated seniority) who spends the entire shift driving around his zone while smoking cigars and eating sunflower seeds. The consequence is that when the car is returned, it reeks of stale cigar smoke and is filled with the husks of hundreds of sunflower seeds. To complicate matters, a departmental directive states that the cleanliness of patrol cars is to be monitored by the shift supervisors. Despite repeated monitoring of this constable, his behaviour continues. This case study should spawn humorous recollections from the supervisors because from experience there is usually one "slob" somewhere in the department. The problem is how does a supervisor handle the event? Any mention of the constable's seniority was purposely left absent because the researcher wanted to see whether seniority was a mitigating factor. It was felt that if seniority was a factor, then supervisors would request

this information -- very few did.

After each case study was read by the respondent and the case was assigned a measure of seriousness. *Seriousness* was calculated by asking the respondent to indicate on a seven-point Likert-type scale how serious they felt the case to be. A score of one (1) indicated that the respondent believed the case to be "not very serious" while a score of seven (7) indicated that he/she believed the case was "extremely serious". After the respondent indicated the level of seriousness he/she attached to the case, the researcher would then ask a series of questions relating to the supervisor's decision in the case.

The questions were written to determine: the action to be taken by the supervisor; information that may have been absent that the supervisor would have wished to have; who would have to be consulted prior to the supervisor taking any action and why it was considered necessary to consult with this person; what would the supervisor prefer to do with the subordinate in the absence of the *Police Act* and *Regulations*, and what actions would be taken if the constable had less than 4 years seniority, between 5-14 years service and finally, greater than 15 years service?

One of the key questions in each interview was, "Ignoring any constraints presented by the *Police Act* and *Regulations* or the departmental regulations, how would you have preferred to handle the subordinate?" If an argument were to be made to either expand the range of penalty options available to a police first-line supervisor or, to sever matters relating to the

relationship between the employee and the employer from the *Police Act*, then it would be helpful to know what types of actions supervisors would contemplate. Implications for future supervisory training of police are obvious.

Another area of interest in this section is to determine if the subordinate's seniority is a mitigating or intensifying factor in the decision-making process for the supervisor. Questions were asked regarding the effects of seniority based on the knowledge that the seniority ranges chosen represent various stages within a police officer's career. In British Columbia, a police constable becomes *certified* after he/she has completed all requisite recruit training at the Justice Institute of B.C. (Block 5).¹⁵ Block 5 is completed after two and a half years of training. During the initial stages of training, the police constable is on probation for the first eighteen months. It is reasonable to suggest that individuals will be treated either more leniently (because they might not know better) or more harshly (because bad habits need to be broken early) by their supervisor if they are found to be committing minor disciplinary defaults.

The second seniority range (5-14 years service) represents the stage where a constable begins to shape his/her career. Most departments have a policy that internal transfers to positions other than patrol require that the applicant have a minimum of five years experience. This stipulation also

¹⁵ Rules regarding training, certification and registration of municipal constables under section 26 of the *Police Act* (s.1) B.C. Reg 109/81 revised June 1989

applies to those seeking promotion. This stage also represents the peak years for promotion to first-line supervisor or detective. In essence then, it is during these years that the constable has the most to lose if he/she commits any disciplinary defaults, since conviction may certainly impede career transfers or promotions.

The final seniority range (greater than 15 years) was used to capture that group of individuals who, for whatever reason, are going to remain in the patrol function for the duration of their career. For many of these individuals, the "system" represents no real threat. Experience has taught them how to either stay out of trouble or how to extricate themselves from any difficulties. It is possible that some supervisors would treat these individuals with far more leniency because of their very senior status.

Structured Interview

This section was designed to explore a supervisor's personal experiences with respect to minor disciplinary issues. While one of the purposes of this section was to further explore some of the structural issues raised in Chapter 2, the primary purpose was to either support or not support the findings from the previous case studies by moving from fiction to reality. In this section, supervisors were asked to recall events within the preceding two years.¹⁶ Respondents were asked to describe the event, the actions taken, the major

¹⁶ Events were recorded if the respondent recalled the event "clearly" and if that event fell within a five year span (subsequent to 1986).

factors in their decision, the effect of seniority, and any preferred actions.

Because of the contextual importance of the opening question in this section, it is worth examining at this point. (See Appendix F)

"In the last two years, how many times have you, as a supervisor, been in a situation with a subordinate where you felt that your back was *up against the wall* and you had to decide whether to charge the individual or informally administer some punishment?"

The purpose for phrasing the question in this manner was to indicate to the supervisor that we were exploring only those situations where the subordinate was **not** responding to the normal series of "fire-side" chats and counselling sessions. This would then place the supervisor in a position where he/she must decide on which of the three courses of action (mentioned earlier) he/she would follow. Despite the fact that the sample populations represents 170 years of police supervisory experience, the number of events recounted were thirty-two.¹⁷

Supervisors were further asked to:

- (i) define their actual versus expected role in the organization
- (ii) describe the control mechanisms utilized by supervisors who are faced with recalcitrant employees
- (iii) determine where the power base was located within the department
- (iv) estimate the length of time needed to process a charge under the *Police Act*

¹⁷ While total years of supervisory experience was 320, I only considered events within last 5 years therefore, $5(34)=170$

(v) describe what changes they would make to the organizational structure

(vi) describe what actions they would take in the absence of the *Police Act* or *Regulations*

(vii) describe the effect of a subordinate's seniority on the discipline process

The purpose of these questions was to determine how the respondents viewed their role in the organization, and the tools that they used when they were faced with problem employees.

The first question was intended to explore the differences between the official and actual mandate of the police supervisor. From an exploratory viewpoint, it is important to uncover any disparity between actual and official supervisory mandates. The second question was meant to obtain from the supervisor all of the control mechanisms utilized including the informal (that is, unsanctioned) methods. Obtaining a list of control mechanisms is of great value in that it illuminates what may be the primary method of behavioural control in police agencies despite the fact that legal statutes were drafted with control as their main purpose.

Power and its locus within police departments is the purpose of the third question. It is possible that police supervisors feel *powerless* in their ability to deal (officially) with disciplinary matters. However, the location of power within the organizational structure may directly affect the ability of supervisors to address minor disciplinary matters. By asking the respondents

to locate the power base within their department, some light may be shed on the disciplinary phenomena.

The fourth question is intended to provide a quantification of the typical delay between the time the supervisor decides that a charge under the *Police Act* is warranted and the eventual time that the punishment was proclaimed (assuming the defendant plead "not guilty"). It was felt that if this delay were exceedingly long, given the nature of the offence, then supervisors would seek alternate means to address the situation.

The fifth question represents an opportunity for the supervisors to construct a "wish-list" for organizational change. If there was anything he/she could change concerning the relationship between subordinates and supervisors or in how the department was structured, then these questions allowed the respondent free rein. For policy advisors in the departments or the government who wish to address the matter of minor discipline within police organizations, questions like these should be asked.

The Research Process

Each interview began with the subject responding to a series of demographic questions followed by the administration of the two, self-explanatory, research instruments.¹⁸ After completion of the questionnaires,

¹⁸ The Hersey & Blanchard *Leadership Effectiveness Adaptability Description* -- Self and the Gibb's *Affective Job Reaction Scale*.

the interview portion of the study was introduced by reading, to each respondent, a description of the research assumptions (Appendix E, bottom page 1). One of the beliefs guiding this thesis is that informal sanctions are used by supervisors to address minor disciplinary issues. It is assumed that, at least some of these informal procedures would not receive official departmental endorsement. As such, it was felt that if the researcher began by stating that some informal procedures may occur, the respondents might then feel more at liberty to express what typically does transpire. Furthermore, the researcher is in a position of having intimate knowledge of the working environment from his twelve years of experience as a police officer. With the respondent recognizing this fact, it was hoped there would be less of a tendency to deliver a sanitized version of reality. It should be noted here that none of the respondents denied the prevalence of informal methods of control.

Each respondent was then handed the three case studies in numeric order. They were instructed to read each case study and indicate on the seven-point scale the degree of seriousness they would apply to the case. Following the rating of the seriousness of the case, the respondents replied to a series of structured questions (Appendix E for details).

Data Collection

Data were gathered initially by a combination of tape-recorder and note-taking. The tape-recorder was included because it was felt that it would be less

obtrusive than continuous note-taking and that the quantity of information forthcoming would be too great to record simply using pen and paper. After the first twelve interviews, the tape-recorder was abandoned. Many of the initial respondents kept focusing on the tape-recorder and some even requested that the device be switched off while they recounted some observation. No objection was made to the fact that the researcher was still recording the information in written form. After reviewing both methods and determining that there was no difference in the quality of the information recorded, the tape-recorder was abandoned. The entire interview process took approximately 1 hour and 45 minutes. Because of the pre-arranged nature of the interview and the fact that the subjects were aware of the approximate time required, interruptions were extremely rare.

Research Limitations

Virtually every style of research is subject to limitations and the present study is no exception. Despite the ease with which the department executives agreed to allow the researcher permission to interview the respondents, the real difficulty was in communicating with the respondents, particularly those in the Vancouver police department. This latter difficulty came as a surprise to the researcher since he had spent close to thirteen years as "one-of-them" (and had not left in disgrace!). I fully expected to receive some resistance from the Delta and Victoria police departments, solely because the researcher did not

have as great a previous working relationship with the potential respondents as he did with Vancouver.

There are some reasons for the low return rate in Vancouver. Many of the respondents stated that they were "researched-to-death". Prior to this study, there was a massive undertaking by a local research firm (at the behest of the new Chief Constable) in which many of the supervisors were canvassed. Others stated that the Vancouver Police Department has been vilified by researchers in the past and the members chose not to risk a repetition of the event. Another reason given was that, since the executive insisted that the research be conducted on "member's own time", some individuals chose not to participate.¹⁹ Other individuals, including those from Delta and Victoria, simply refused for unstated personal reasons.

Another limitation to the methodology is that it is difficult to determine the degree to which the sample population represents the total population of first-line police supervisors. Under normal sampling procedures, it would be safe to conclude that if 30% of a population is chosen *at random* they would be considered to be a representative sample. In the present case however, the 30% represents a group who have chosen to participate in a study where some potentially threatening inquiries could be made. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, a perception to overcome in police research is that the respondent or the department will be harshly criticized for behaviours or statements

¹⁹ Delta and Victoria made no such stipulation

uttered during the research. Since this particular study was exploring the managerial styles of the respondents, it is conceivable that some of the population excluded themselves from the study for fear of professional repercussions.

While guarantees of anonymity would allay some of the fears, the question remains as to whether the sample population actually represents the population at large? There are two observations to be made. The first is that from my experience as a police officer (1977-1989), and through personal conversations with literally hundreds of first-line police supervisors during that time, I believe that the entire spectrum of police supervisors is represented in the sample population used in this study; and, as will be noted in the analysis chapter, this spectrum may not be that broad. The second point is to restate simply the fact that this is a pilot study which has set out to examine the minor disciplinary process in police agencies. This one component therefore, as with the use of the case studies, was not intended to be a complete study unto itself. The variety of methods chosen represents a "sampling" of technique which can be tested further in more systematic ways in subsequent work. It is unfortunate that we were unable to acquire the requisite numbers in order to explore some of the potential differences between the respondents; however, the following discussion of results will greatly illuminate the path for future research.

Research Strengths

The primary strength of this research is that a variety of research techniques were employed to explore a prevailing phenomenon occurring within police organizations. The value of the various strategies, however, is not equal. The archival method merely established the historical context but did not provide much insight on the interactions between the inhabitants of the police organization. Similarly, the use of questionnaires did not reveal very much about the dynamics occurring between the supervisor and the organization. The structured interview provided slightly more information concerning the decision-making process explored but it too fell short of the most useful research technique employed in this thesis. The case study method provided the researcher with the best insight into the process by which first-line supervisors arrive at a decision when they are faced with a subordinate who commits a minor disciplinary default.

The case study method allowed the researcher to control many of the facts and some of the nuances presented to the research subject. It is very difficult to retain this control if the research technique relied upon is limited to recollections of personal experience. For future research, a more elaborated version of the case study method should provide researchers with more specific and complete data concerning the discipline process and organizational dynamics within police departments.

Chapter 4

Data Analysis and Discussion

Data collected from the various techniques described in the section on methodology will be described in the present chapter. As well, there will be some preliminary discussions concerning the interpretation of these results, however, the implications of the results will be reserved for the section entitled *Conclusions* near the end of the chapter. The data analysis and discussion will be outlined by first describing a profile of the subject pool. Pertinent demographic results will be described as will a description and discussion of the leadership profiles of the respondents.

The discussion will move from an individual perspective, towards a description of the supervisory role and the various informal and formal control mechanisms that are employed in dealing with minor disciplinary matters. This latter exploration will included discussions arising from the case studies and the personal experiences recounted by the supervisors. The final topic of discussion included in this section is that which includes the supervisors' "wish list" for future change. As participants in the working environment under study, they are in a position to provide informed input into any areas which may require change or modification. Finally, as mentioned previously the concluding remarks are designed to put the entire research into perspective, to make inferences, to outline implications for the future and to

point in the direction for new research.

Subject Profile

As described in Chapter three, the thirty-four subjects represented those who satisfied criteria established by the researcher. The twenty-one subjects from the Vancouver Police Department originated from a total population pool of 263 sergeants, corporals and detectives. Of this pool, only 91 satisfied the criteria. The remaining officers were either recently promoted, had insufficient supervisory experience or their supervisory experience was not current. The same reasons for exclusion applied to the Delta and Victoria Police population pools.

The "typical" police supervisor in this study is 43.2 years of age; has 19.3 years policing experience of which 9.3 were spent as a supervisor; he has received 6.9 weeks of supervisor training and has 1.3 years of post-secondary schooling (University).

While this describes the *average* police supervisor in this study, there were departmental and individual deviations worth noting. Policing experience amongst the sample population ranged between 13 and 29 years. Consequently there was a substantial range in supervisory experience -- between slightly less than five²⁰ and fourteen years. Another interesting variation is that while the

²⁰ A candidate from Victoria had four and a half years of supervisory experience and was included because of the small sample size from that department

average number of weeks of supervisory training received was 6.9 weeks, individual departments ranged dramatically. Vancouver's average was 5.4 weeks. Delta's was 8.8 weeks and Victoria's was 10 weeks. The difference cannot be accounted for by comparing either the policing experience averages for the departments nor the supervisory experiences. As can be seen from the following table, the differences in these statistics is minimal.

Department	Policing Experience	Supervisory Experience
Vancouver	19.6 years	10.6 years
Delta	17.7 years	7.3 years
Victoria	20.4 years	7.5 years

Table 7: Comparison between years of policing seniority with years supervisory experience

One possible explanation for the difference may be simply economics. Vancouver, with the larger contingent of supervisors, may feel financially restricted in their ability to provide the level of training that the smaller departments seem to be capable of affording. If one is to assume that supervisory training is an asset for both management and staff, then the relative difference in training supplied to the Vancouver supervisors is an area worthy of further exploration.

Another aspect that surfaces when we examine the above data is that with few exceptions, the supervisors have the same profile. Each has been steeped in the police organizational culture for almost half of their lives. As well, the majority of the supervisors spent, on average, ten years before they

were promoted to a supervisory position. One is left to consider whether there is acculturation to organizational expectations that will pre-determine a response or approach to supervisory problems as opposed to individual attributes guiding the decision-making process. The question is, "Is it the socialization within the structured organization (as an entity) that influences the disciplinary situation or is it the supervisor acting independently of the entity?" If the answer to this question is that it is the organization that influences the response primarily, then personal attributes should not matter greatly.

Unfortunately the research tools utilized in this pilot study were not precise enough to reveal the answer to the above question. What can be inferred, however, from the above data and that which will be described later, is that police supervisors, on average, tend to manage the same way, no matter what their individual attributes may be. Whether police officers are cut from the same cloth or fashioned into the same cloth will have to remain an unanswered question within this thesis. Certainly in the present study, the pre-determined criteria did contribute to the *sameness* phenomenon but only to the extent that the subjects were required to have five years of supervisory experience. As mentioned previously, most officers who are promoted are promoted after they have been with the department for approximately ten years, and so, if acculturation occurs, then it would be reasonable to assume that it will have been accomplished by this time.

Another interesting statistic to be inspected is the amount of post-secondary education each supervisor has. The Vancouver average was 1.76 years; Delta was 0.5 years and Victoria's was 0.8 years. While these scores represented the averages, the more interesting statistic is the following: 52.3% of the Vancouver supervisors interviewed for the thesis had in excess of two years university compared with 0% for Delta and 20% for Victoria.

Vancouver has included in their promotional plan the assignment of points for any post-secondary training received *after the member is employed* by the department (0.5 points per full university course). When one considers that promotional competitions are won and lost on the basis of half-points, then attending university becomes an occupational incentive. Smaller departments like Delta and Victoria, having far fewer promotional moves in any year, have not seen the need to provide for the allocation of points for post-secondary education. In fact, their promotional systems are quite different from Vancouver's. The degree to which the promotional system affects the discipline system remains to be explored, as well as the effect of education on both of these systems.

Leadership Style Profile

Hersey and Blanchard's LEAD-Self was utilized to determine the leadership styles of the supervisors. As will be demonstrated, the leadership styles of the respondents are not subject to huge variances either intra-organizationally or inter-departmentally. What follows will be a description of

the results from the current study, alongside the results from the Kuykendall and Unsinger (1982) study. The latter study explored the leadership styles of 155 police managers (first-line supervisors). The similarities are remarkable.

Table 8 shows the number of styles utilized by the respondents in this study. The italicized numbers indicate the frequencies in the Kuykendall study. These results indicate a high degree of flexibility in the leadership styles utilized in responding to the LEAD-Self scenarios.

# of Styles Used (at least twice)	N	Percentage	Kuykendall & Unsinger
4	3	8.8%	<i>0%</i>
3	18	52.9%	<i>54%</i>
2	12	35.3%	<i>43%</i>
1	1	2.9%	<i>3%</i>

Table 8: Comparison of the number of styles used by police supervisors

In the present thesis, the respondents utilized three or more styles 61.7% of the time thus indicating that, at least for the purposes of the LEAD-Self, they were very flexible in their leadership styles.

If we focus on the number of times that each style was utilized by the group, we again obtain results remarkably similar to those obtained in the Kuykendall and Unsinger study.

Style	Vancouver	Delta	Victoria	Cumulative	Kuykendall
Tell	17.8%	13.5%	15%	16.4%	17%
Sell	45.6%	45.8%	53.3%	46.8%	51%
Participate	27.7%	32.2%	30%	29.2%	28%
Delegate	7.9%	8.3%	1.6%	7.1%	4%

Table 9: Frequency of Style Usage for police supervisors utilizing the LEAD-Self

A pattern is now beginning to form. Combining the results from tables 7, 8, and 9 it is very possible that police supervisors have become generic in leadership style and profile and who are, in broad terms, interchangeable. It is highly unlikely that the current study utilizes the same managers as in the Kuykendall and Unsinger study. One is therefore left with three possibilities: 1) the LEAD-Self instrument is incapable of discerning managerial styles, 2) what is represented above occurred by chance, or 3) that police managers manage with similar styles. If we suggest that the LEAD-Self instrument is incapable of discerning managerial styles, then we would expect to find a more random distribution of styles utilized by the police managers in both this

study and that of Kuykendall and Unsinger. If the third possibility is true, then the argument that the organizational structure of police departments pre-determines managerial styles becomes stronger. Unfortunately this thesis was unable to resolve this inquiry.

Another result from the present study was that the *selling approach* was identified to be the dominant style²¹ (32%). This frequency should not be confused with the frequency listed in Table 9. Table 9's frequencies refer only to the frequency that any particular style was used throughout the study. The dominant requires that a style be used a minimum number of occasions before it can be deemed a "dominant". In the Kuykendall and Unsinger study, the selling style was identified to be the dominant style in 51% of the cases. Whether this means that police managers tend to be more *persuasive* in their approach rather than dictatorial because of choice or necessity remains to be determined.

The final result from the administration of the LEAD-Self instrument was an *adaptability* score. As mentioned in Chapter two, the adaptability score reflects the degree to which the respondent is willing to vary his/her managerial style in order to match the subordinate's maturity or readiness level. Leadership style adaptability scores can be interpreted using the following table.

²¹ Dominant style is one which the respondent utilizes it in at least 6 of the twelve scenarios without utilizing any one of the remaining styles more than 25% of the time.

INTERPRETATION

- 30-36 Scores in this range indicate a leader with a high degree of adaptability. The leader accurately diagnoses the ability and willingness of the follower for the situation and adjusts accordingly.
- 24-29 This range reflects a moderate degree of adaptability. Scores in this range usually indicate a pronounced primary leadership style with less flexibility into secondary styles.
- 0-23 Adaptability scores less than 23 indicate a need for self-development to improve both the ability to diagnose task readiness and to use appropriate leader behaviors.

Table 10: Leadership Style Adaptability (excerpted from *LEAD Directions: Directions for Self-Scoring and Analysis*. Copyright 1989 Leadership Studies Inc.)

Table 11 describes the adaptability scores for the three departments.

	Vancouver	Delta	Victoria	Average
Adaptability	24	26	25	25

Table 11: Leadership Style Adaptability Score

What can be concluded from the above series of tables therefore, is that the managers in the present study, while they utilized many of the management styles, and while they tended to favour the *selling* style more than any of the others, were not that successful in adapting the appropriate style for

the readiness or maturity of the follower(s). This poor result may be caused by, amongst other things, the organizational culture, inappropriate supervisor training, or a pervasive organizational structure which restricts or suppresses innovative managerial practices.

One of the lines of inquiry during the thesis was to explore the responsibilities of the supervisor as he/she saw them with those outlined by each department. It was felt that if there were discrepancies, then they might illuminate the decision-making process employed by supervisors faced with disciplinary matters.

Supervisory Responsibilities

As noted in Chapter two, the responsibilities presently assigned a first-line police supervisor are couched in a vague and imprecise language. For this reason, the author asked each of the respondents to describe what he believed was the role of the police supervisor. Table 12 represents paraphrased and selected comments from respondents describing what they believe is the role of the patrol supervisor in their department.

Several comments should be made concerning the above descriptions. First, all of the supervisors agree that they are responsible for the training, education and monitoring of their subordinates. This is consistent with their official job descriptions.

Vancouver

keep people happy

train and monitor subordinates

administrate paper-flow

act as father confessor

*act as buffer between
Constables and management*

maintain morale

*ensure productivity
babysitter, classroom
monitor*

*enforce the Procedure Manual
deal with street emergencies*

Delta:

monitor attendance

train, educate & motivate

*buffer between Constables
and Executive*

keep shift happy

disciplinarian

administer paper-flow

Victoria:

organize social activities

ensure their safety

*buffer between Management
and Constables*

motivate, educate and train

Table 12: Paraphrased descriptions of the role of the First-Line Police Supervisor

Secondly, not all agree that acting as a disciplinarian is part of their responsibilities. Some have stated that the most that they could do was to administer a verbal reprimand and that (*official*) disciplinary action lies in the hands of superiors much further up the line than they were. As indicated in

Chapter 1, the *Police Act* is fairly clear in stating that the most that a supervisor can do is serve the member with a Form 1 (written reprimand). If the member accepts the reprimand, then it becomes a matter of record. Should the member not accept the reprimand, then the Chief Constable will order an investigation into the matter as well as a hearing. Control over the supervisor's decision-making process is further controlled by Policy and Procedure Manual directives advising the supervisor that the chain of command must be adhered to.

Thirdly, many of the respondents felt that the supervisor was more of a glorified babysitter than a first-level manager. While this may appear to be condescending, it could be conjectured that the role of a supervisor is largely redundant because of the increased professionalism within the constable rank.

Fourthly, many referred to the immense requirement to complete administrative paper-work. Upwards of thirty percent of their time was spent answering "petty" requests from superiors while the supervision of their subordinates was left undone. As a former acting supervisor I can attest to the accuracy of these time estimates and to the seemingly trivial nature of the requests. This observation is consistent with an earlier point by Blau where he predicted that with increased structural differentiation there would be an increase in the level and complexity of the communication up and down the chain of command. The increase in the frequency and complexity of these requests, particularly when those receiving the request are kept ignorant of the

need for the information, was cited by a majority of respondents as being extremely frustrating.

The final comment that should be made is that many of the supervisors felt that they acted as a buffer between the constables and those superior officers above the rank of Sergeant. This comment hints at a siege mentality. Culbert and McDonough (1985) suggest that conflict at the top of an organization will result in a trickle-down effect. While it is beyond the scope of this document to examine whether or not these conflicts do exist and the effect they might, in turn, have on the lower echelons, personal experience allows me to confirm the stated perceptions that power struggles exist within police departments and that often the weapons used in the battle are information and physical or human resources. Supervisors are in a position to act as a screen for some of these conflicts. At other times, first-line supervisors have interfered with the implementation of policies that they feel are unworkable, given the exigencies of the work environment. It should be noted that the thwarting of departmental policies is not limited to supervisory personnel. One supervisor recounted an example in which the police department decided to reduce the work-load of one group of constables by re-locating certain demands onto another group of officers. This latter group so objected to the increasing of their work-load that they covertly sabotaged the task they were required to accomplish. The administrative fall-out and subsequent repetition of the task by another group caused the policy to be rescinded.

Determining whose responsibility it is within an organization to accomplish which task can be a contentious issue. Related to supervisory responsibilities are matters centering on control and power.

Power Base and Measures of Powerlessness

In the present study, respondents were asked, "Where does the power base lie in your department?". Table 13 represents the breakdown of responses:

	Van	Delta	Victoria	Total
Executive (Inspector and above)	18	4	2	24
Staff Sergeant, Sgt. Cpl.	1	1	2	4
Constables	1	2	0	3
Abstentions	1	1	1	3

Table 13: Location of Power Base within Police Departments

One of the issues that was to be explored in this study was where the power base was located within police departments. It was felt that if the formal power base was firmly in the hands of a few individuals near the top of the organization, then those near the bottom, who were responsible for the management of personnel at a line-level, might resort to informal mechanisms to control subordinates. Often the daily exigencies of supervisory life cannot

wait for the chain of command to be obeyed. Managers may also resort to the use of covert and informal methods of control so that they themselves will appear to their supervisors as people who have their shift "under control and producing". Regardless of who used informal control methods, many of the respondents located the seat of power to be at the executive level. Others qualified their responses by stating that while the Executive *may* have the power to initiate policy, it is still left to the rank and file to implement. Other respondents commented that the Executive would be powerless without an effective and willing constable rank. As will be demonstrated later, asking where the formal power base rests and where the informal power base rests are two very different questions. Informal power bases imply subversion; however, this may be the only method to accomplish certain tasks. Referring back to Table 13, it may be that the respondents who felt that the patrol constable held the reins of power understood the concept of centrality and its importance in the power structure within an organization.

The results from Table 13 are to be compared with those from the administration of the *Gibbs Affective Job Reaction Scale* (Table 14).

Department	Range	Average
Vancouver	3.30 -- 4.76	3.9
Delta	3.69 -- 4.84	4.06
Victoria	4.07 -- 4.30	4.16

Table 14: *Gibbs'Powerlessness* Score for Non-Commissioned Officers
 Note: Scores approaching 7 indicate perceptions of *powerlessness*

While any statistical interpretation from this scale is severely limited by the sample size, one can state that some of the respondents believe that they have more control over their environment than the mean score of 3.5 would indicate. Table 14 represents the range and averages for the three departments. To help explain the discrepancy between where they believe the power base is located and their perceptions of personal power, we must turn to the types of controlling mechanisms that are typically used by police supervisors.

Formal and Informal Control Mechanisms

With the subject of discipline as the context, the author had each of the respondents reply to the following:

Supervisors control subordinates in a large number of ways. What sort of ways do you see first-line supervisors as controlling their subordinates?

The variety of responses fell into two categories: formal and informal methods.

A formal method is defined by the author as one where the action would be authorized by the department, example, such as a performance appraisal entry or a procedure under the *Police Act* or *Police Discipline Regulations*. An informal method would be one which the supervisor employs to either punish the subordinate or "motivate" him/her into addressing the disciplinary issue.

The category entitled "Other" includes: the denial of certain privileges like selection for training courses, plainclothes assignments, partnerships, free overtime leave as well as, the utilization of peer pressure, verbal harassment and other forms of intimidation.




Figure 2: Histograms representing percentages of respondents who indicated disciplinary practices utilized within Department.

The original question to the respondents was framed in a way that would allow them to divulge the disciplinary practices used in the department without implicating themselves in what might appear to be unethical supervision. The preceding histograms only represent the frequency with which the respondents from each department mentioned the various techniques and do not indicate the frequency of actual use within each department. Another important note regarding the graphs is that since

Victoria's sample size was so small (5) the figures of 20% indicate that one respondent identified a control mechanism. There are some structural occurrences within the departments that help explain the variances in the percentages listed in the histograms.

Beginning with the use of the *Police Act*, we notice that with the exception of Victoria, a high percentage of the respondents recognized the *Police Act* as a control mechanism. While this was readily identified as such, all respondents stated that it was the mechanism of "last resort". Reasons for this will be expanded upon shortly. It appears that the respondents from Victoria were not in agreement with their colleagues from Vancouver and Delta regarding the viability of the *Police Act* as a control mechanism. Keeping in mind that there were only five respondents from this municipality it should be noted that two of the respondents had "bad experiences" when using the *Police Act* and as a result stated that they were leery of implementing the *Act* to control behaviour in minor disciplinary cases. In both cases the negative experiences originated from within their department as opposed to the *Act* itself. Since one respondent from Victoria represents a percentage of 20%, the effect of the two supervisors who had negative experiences greatly affects the statistic.

The fact that performance appraisals were not identified as a controlling mechanism by many of the respondents was curious especially since all three departments rely heavily on performance appraisal entries when a constable is

considered for transfer or promotion. It may be that the respondents are reluctant, in the face of the power of the performance appraisal entry, to document anything negative about a constable fearing that to do so may jeopardize his/her career for longer than necessary. As we will see later, a more reasonable explanation may be that there is such an enormous latitude or tolerance for organizational misbehaviour that most transgressions become resolved before they ever get to the point where there is official documentation. If the transgressions are to become resolved in a manner other than formally, then the method of resolution is dependent upon the creativity of the supervisor.

One supervisor related the story about a couple of constables that he had who were assigned to walk a *beat* in their area. For the squad involved, *beats* were considered to be prestige assignments. Within the squad there was an "unofficial" directive that each patrol officer was to submit a minimum of four traffic tickets per month. Even for beat constables, this would be an easy objective to meet. After several months in which these two officers did not meet the objective, the supervisor drafted a fake probation order describing the two officers, their misdemeanour, and the punishment --- removal from the beat. The officers involved received a great amount of teasing from their fellow squad members not to mention the loss of revenue from court appearances²².

²² Beat constables in this municipality tend to make more drug arrests than other patrol officers. Since an officer must occasionally attend court while he/she is on weekly-leave, frequent court appearances translate into an economic windfall for the officer.

Another controlling option open to supervisors is the constable's overtime bank. Each officer in the department can accrue overtime. The overtime may be dispensed in cash or time-off. In the latter case, officers will submit a request for overtime leave to their supervisors who, at their discretion, may grant the overtime leave request. Usually the parameters for granting the overtime leave request are well understood --- there must be sufficient personnel remaining on the shift to cover the predicted call-load for the time of day. However, discretion still lies with the supervisor. Another manner by which overtime can be used as a control method is that sometimes constables will be allowed to leave work a couple of hours early (without submitting an overtime request) as a reward for their past efforts. As a control mechanism, the use of overtime can also act as a reward mechanism (as can most of the other informal mechanisms). Therefore, if a supervisor is having trouble with a particular constable, the supervisor could deny requests for either official overtime requests or gratuitous overtime leave.

When we examine the frequencies listed in the histogram for the use of overtime as a control mechanism, we see that only one person in Victoria mentioned it as a control mechanism and that both Delta and Victoria fell behind Vancouver in the frequency of its mention. It is felt that this can be easily explained by examining the shift systems of the three agencies. Both Delta and Victoria base their patrol divisions on the twelve-hour day. Vancouver utilizes the ten-hour shift. In the ten-hour shift system there can be

personnel commencing their tour of duty at the following times: 7 a.m.; 9 a.m.; 10 a.m.; 4 p.m.; 5 p.m.; 6 p.m.; and 9 p.m. Other variations are possible. The result of this structure is that there is a considerable over-lap in the numbers of personnel available at any given time of the day. This immediately increases the possibility of a member's request being approved because of the sufficiency of on-street personnel. Both Delta and Victoria do not have the over-lap (or the number of personnel) to implement many, if any, overlapping shifts. Once again we see that the manner in which a supervisor addresses his/her disciplinary problems is affected by organizational size (structure).

Another structural distinction that surfaces when examining Fig.2 is that the promotional systems for the departments determine whether promotion becomes a control mechanism. Because the Vancouver police department has larger divisions, has a detective division, which can only be accessed through promotion, and more layers to its organizational structure, there is more room for supervisory positions. Annual promotions in Vancouver from constable to either corporal or detective are between 15-25. The annual number of promotions in Delta and Victoria are approximately 2-3 each. Therefore direct promotional sabotage does not become a viable control mechanism in the smaller departments. One of the features of small departments is that, like small towns, everyone knows everybody else's business, good or bad. It would be a major digression at this point to compare promotional procedures between the departments but it is certainly possible to conclude that there

could be a greater chance of having one's career sabotaged in a small department because of the internal intimacy, than in a large department where a member can become lost in another division. This, coupled with the small number of promotional opportunities, may have caused some of the respondents from Delta and Victoria to overlook the potential of using the promotional system as a controlling mechanism.

Another result to examine from the histogram is that there are departmental differences caused by structure that affect the use of transfers as a control mechanism. As with most police jurisdictions, some geographical areas are more desirable to work than others. In Delta, members can be transferred to or from these patrol areas by the first-line supervisor without affecting another supervisor. In Vancouver, this is more difficult because the patrol areas are much smaller (therefore resisting sub-divisions) and the transfer of personnel must first receive the approval of both the Staff Development Officer and either the two divisional superintendents involved in the transfer and/or the Deputy Chief Constable of the Bureau of Operations. A technique that can be readily employed in all of the departments is that requests for transfer can be blocked by the first-line supervisor. Unless the recommendations of the first-line supervisor are overruled by a superior officer, then the subordinate remains in place. While there appear to be differences between the departments concerning the opportunities available for supervisors to transfer unwanted or recalcitrant subordinates, there seems to

be an equal opportunity available to assign constables to less than desirable tasks for punitive purposes.

Temporary re-assignments such as working the jail, the front desk, driving the paddy-wagon, guard duty at a hospital (when a prisoner has been injured and requires hospitalization) etc. are available in all three departments. While the tasks themselves may not be unpleasant, the threat of being assigned them when one is *supposed* to be in patrol can be seen by some constables as a punishment. The abovementioned tasks are usually reserved for the rookies.

The list of formal and informal sanctions presented in Fig.2 represent the range of control mechanisms that the respondents stated were utilized by some supervisors. This list is helpful only in so far as it makes public practices which many officers have known for years. The real question becomes then, how frequently are these practices utilized and what is the rationale for using the informal practices over the formal methods?

Formal versus Informal Control Mechanisms

Many of the respondents had difficulty thinking of the *Police Act* as a viable alternative for minor disciplinary matters. When asked what percentage of the time the *Act* would be used to address minor disciplinary issues the average percentage was 7.9%. This percentage was inflated somewhat by one respondent stating that the *Act* was utilized approximately 40% of the time. Many of the respondents stated that the matter wasn't "serious enough" for the *Act*. This suggests that there might be two standards being applied to

discipline: 1) those matters that were *very* serious and were therefore worthy of the procedure of the *Police Act* and, 2) those that were not. Evidence for this indication was available from two sources.

As noted in Chapter one, the process by which a charge under the *Police Act* may be proceeded with is not one controlled entirely by the supervisor. In addition, there is a trial where the burden of proof is that beyond a reasonable doubt and both sides are allowed to be represented by counsel. The procedure is time consuming. When asked to approximate the amount of time that would elapse between a decision of the supervisor to formally charge an individual with a minor disciplinary default and adjudication (assuming the subordinate plead "not guilty") respondents from Vancouver estimated 5.7 months; Delta estimated 3.3 months and Victoria estimated 5 months. Again the increase in structural differentiation would predict these results since increased time would be required for all the officers superior to the requesting officer to authorize further movement of the request vertically through the chain of command. For minor disciplinary defaults, this time delay may be too much. Arvey and Ivancevich (1980) suggest that in order for punishment to be effective in organizations it should be of moderate intensity and be delivered contemporaneously with the event by a close supervisor. Proceeding under the *Police Act* would result in inordinate time delays and the penalty would often be seen to be administered by the presiding officer who would not be considered a close supervisor.

Supervisors, when asked if there were any reasons why they would not process a disciplinary matter through the *Police Act* responded with the following comments.

They [the informal methods] are more direct and effective in changing behaviour

They don't officially label an individual

People are afraid of the confrontation [present with the Police Act]

The informal methods are more effective because they are immediate

The Police Act requires political backing from one's bosses

The Act is too complex for a problem like this [minor discipline]

The Act should be used for more serious cases

Under the Police Act the supervisor loses control

The Act is too severe and too slow

The penalty range isn't appropriate for minor matters

There isn't enough consistency in supervision to gather the needed evidence

The Police Act is a crutch [for those who can't solve their problems]

The list continues but the overall sentiment remains virtually the same.

The *Act* is seen to be draconian, cumbersome, and inappropriate for minor disciplinary matters. Furthermore, using the *Act* seems to cause many supervisors to lose control over the situation. One of the more disturbing observations made was that in some cases, it is the supervisors themselves

who are being judged by their superiors when a charge is laid in minor disciplinary matters. To paraphrase one respondent, '[To lay a charge of] insubordination would have meant a loss of face for a supervisor.' If supervisors believe that they themselves will be judged negatively if they use the *Police Act* to manage their subordinates, then the practice of using these informal control mechanisms will likely continue. Blau (1970:203) suggested that with an increase in organizational size we could expect structural fracturing. In the police example we would therefore expect to find evidence of a decrease in the reliance of formal control mechanisms in large departments. The data only marginally support this hypothesis. The respondents estimated that the *Police Act* was utilized to control minor breaches in discipline as follows: Vancouver 5.6%, Delta 11%, and Victoria 8%. The department of Delta statistic is inflated because one of the respondents indicated that the *Police Act* was used 40% of the time. If his response is removed, the Delta estimate becomes 6%.

One of the problems in pursuing inquiries into estimates of *Police Act* use (in minor disciplinary matters) is that despite the wealth of supervisory experience present in the sample population (320 years), there was considerable difficulty in even conceiving that an event would go so far as to require the use of the *Act*. Many of the supervisors stated that the matter would be resolved long before it even got to the point where they would record anything officially (performance appraisal entry). The supervisors stated

that most constables will respond to a "fire-side" chat with the supervisor. This author's experience supports this statement. A vast majority of constables are professional and accomplish what is requested of them without much fuss. Those that do waiver are given a certain amount of latitude and if they do not "self-correct", then a consultation with the supervisor usually brings about the required change.

Another issue that arises from the "fire-side" chat is that while the conversation may not be either a formal action (i.e. it is not officially recorded) or an informal action, the effect can be the same. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine the subtleties of counselling; however, suffice to say that the techniques of reminding a subordinate of potential consequences (professional or personal) for non-compliance are varied. One method by which the discipline process could be explored in greater detail, rather than hypothetically, is by utilizing case studies. Such a method would allow the researcher to focus the respondents on certain aspects while controlling for potential contamination of other issues.

Case Studies

As described in Chapter three, the case studies were designed to represent reality while attempting to control for the effects of offender and offence characteristics.²³ It was expected that there would be a variance in

²³ For details on how these variables were controlled, see Chapter 3

how supervisors rated each case. In fact, the variance was minimal.

	Seriousness
Case Study # 1	4.35
Case Study # 2	5.0
Case Study # 3	4.11

Table 15: Perceived seriousness of Case Studies²⁴

The following discussion analyzes the results from the individual cases.

Case Study 1

Despite the repetitive nature of the offence (tardiness) and the fact that an officer not reporting for duty on time has serious consequences for the others on his/her shift, only 38% of the supervisors (13) took any formal action. Three chose to make a performance appraisal entry; three chose to issue the constable with a Form 1 under the *Police Act*; seven chose to administer a Verbal Warning. As noted in Chapter one, a Form 1 represents an official entry on the member's service record. The verbal reprimand represents an official documentation of the event that is not part of the constable's personnel record and is restricted to a signing of each other's official police note-book. The remaining 55.8% of the respondents chose to interview the candidate again (n=19) or apply some form of informal sanction (n=2). In both of the latter

²⁴ Scores based on 7 point Likert-type scale with 1 indicating *not very serious* and 7 indicating *extremely serious*

cases, the constable was to be transferred.

Curiously, when the respondents were advised that despite their "action" the constable repeated the offence, suddenly 67.6% chose to take formal action. It is possible that this large swing in action-plans was prompted by the author's presence. The respondents might have felt that they would be in a less defensible position if they decided to take no formal action on what would now be the fifth occasion the constable was late.

When the respondents were asked what it was they would *prefer* to do with the subordinate (in the absence of any departmental or legislative controls), 41% (n=14) stated they would conduct themselves in the same manner; 50% (n=17) stated they would apply some informal measure; 8.8% (n=3) stated they would apply a formal sanction. In eleven of the seventeen informal actions, the supervisors stated they would deduct pay from the constable. The three formal actions were dismissals. It seems then, that when the restrictions are removed (at least in this case), the supervisors seem to treat the matter more seriously than the first mentioned rating would indicate.

Case Study 2

This case represented an employee who was not completing Crown Counsel²⁵ reports properly, despite the fact that he had demonstrated his

²⁵ These reports are ones which every officer completes when he/she is applying for a charge under the *Criminal Code*

ability to do so before. The case was complicated slightly by having the constable commit a minor act of insubordination. The supervisors rated this case at 5.0. Thirty-one of the respondents (91%) identified the issue in the case to be requiring education. Some sent the officer on a report-writing course, some assigned him with a more senior partner and some spent endless hours monitoring and reviewing each report with the individual. This despite the fact that in the scenario the supervisor knew that the problem was not competency based. Even if the offence continued, many were reluctant to take official action. Only one (2.9%) respondent took formal action. Ten of the respondents (29%) continued to monitor the individual and twenty-three (67.6%) chose to apply some informal control mechanism.

When asked what they would *prefer* to do, 50% of the respondents changed their action-plan. Thirteen chose an informal route and four chose a formal route. In the latter, two chose dismissals, one sought a demotion to the rank of probationary constable and one chose to issue a Form 1.

In responding to this case study, a majority of the respondents stated that the offence was serious because so many other people both inside and outside the department relied on the accuracy and completeness of the Crown Counsel Reports. There may be an increased tolerance being applied in this case because historically there has been concern over the differing standards for police reports and Crown Counsel reports. Several supervisors stated that there has been many arguments with Crown Counsel representatives over

what is actually required to be included in these reports.

Regardless of whether there exists a debate between Crown Counsel and the police, what is missed by a majority of the supervisors is that this individual is **willingly** neglecting to fulfil his occupational obligations. The issue is not competency. The only reason for education therefore, would be to cover one's bases in case more drastic action is contemplated in the future.

Case Study 3

This scenario was designed to be the one taken least seriously but still contain sufficient annoyance that some action would be warranted. The constable in the case was a slob and as a result made the work environment very unpleasant for others. During the administration of this case study, most of the respondents laughed and wondered whether the author had culled the facts from their personnel records. The seriousness rating for this case study was 4.11. Only eight (23%) took formal action -- seven verbal reprimands and one performance appraisal action. The rest chose to apply some form of informal action, usually designed to embarrass the constable into correcting his offending behaviours. For these latter individuals, this case did not represent a disciplinary problem. Even if the offending behaviours continued, 58% (n=20) chose to apply an informal mechanism.

Until this point, the issue of seniority has remained unaddressed. The overall effect of a member's seniority (at least when applied to the case

studies) is mixed. Of the total number of cases (102), 35% of the respondents stated that they would address the matter sooner and use a more forceful tone with persons with less than four years service. Others stated they would treat everyone the same. Approximately 20% of the respondents indicated that senior constables (in excess of fifteen years service) would be given a bit more latitude. In these latter cases, some chose acts of benevolence by asking the officer if he would like to be transferred to a less stressful position, while others felt that they should not force the issue too much in case the member chose to submit for medical leave. The philosophy applied here was that the supervisor must attempt to get the best production out of his/her subordinates given their capabilities. Therefore, the trend suggests that junior constables (less than four years service) receive attention sooner and in a more forceful tone than senior constables (greater than fifteen years' service). The latter group are given more latitude with respect to minor disciplinary defaults.

At the completion of each set of three case studies, each respondent was asked whether the scenarios represented "reality" as he knew it. Without exception, each replied affirmatively. Therefore, if the cases represented reality, then several things can be stated about the process by which supervisors arrive at a decision with respect to minor disciplinary matters.

Firstly, there is a very high degree of tolerance for misconduct occurring within the organizational structure. The most frequent action taken is to interview the individual, this despite the repetitive nature of the offence in the

case studies presented. Seriousness to these supervisors meant that something needed to be said (again), not done. Table 16 represents an overview of the actions taken by the supervisors.

	Actions (n=102) ²⁶
Formal	22 (21.5%)
Informal	51 (50.0%)
Interview	29 (28.4%)

Table 16: Break-down of actions taken by supervisors in all case scenarios

To further add to the above table, the 22 formal actions are comprised of fourteen *verbal warnings*, five performance appraisal entries and three Form 1's. The difficulty with this level of tolerance is that when a supervisor decides to take a formal action he/she must do so as if this were the first occurrence. To do otherwise allows for the defence that, by the employer not acting on previous misconduct then, the employer has established new standards for behaviours in the work-place. By condoning the misdeeds over a prolonged period of time, the supervisor sabotages efforts to dismiss the constable at a future date (for the same misdeeds).

Secondly, the use of informal control mechanisms employed by the

²⁶ 102 equals 3 times 34 respondents

supervisors includes: unilateral transfers, verbal threats, depriving the constable of some privilege, deducting pay from the constable, temporarily assign the constable to a task he/she would not enjoy, ordering the officer to clean cars, public embarrassment, denying access to departmental training courses, and refusing to support the constable in any promotional bid.

Thirdly, the characteristics of the offender did not seem to affect the decision-making process very much. A few members decided, in a fit of pique, that they had had enough of a particular individual's reluctance to change his behaviour and decided to initiate the formal process at the lowest level. For the wise constable, knowing exactly where the threshold of tolerance is for each supervisor can become an art form. Those who have seniority are more likely to have this knowledge than rookies.

Lastly, the offence characteristics represented in the scenarios had very little effect on the decision-making process. By definition, the offenses by themselves were considered trivial -- it was only their repetitive nature that imbued them with any sense of urgency. Even then, no official action was taken by the supervisors in 80% of the time. It will be important to compare this figure with supervisor recollections of personal experiences.

Personal Experiences

As mentioned in the methodology chapter, the parameter for recounting personal experiences was that the event had to involve a minor disciplinary

breach and was to have occurred within the last two years. The researcher soon had to modify slightly the time stipulation because very few events were recalled. It was decided that if the subject could recall an event that occurred within the last five years (with apparent clarity) then it would be recorded. Despite this modification, out of 170 years²⁷ of police supervisory experience (34 subjects times 5 years) only thirty-two experiences could be recounted. The departmental break-down is as follows: Vancouver 20; Delta 8; Victoria 4.

The supervisors recounted the following list of offenses:

<i>failure to comply with department directive</i>	<i>insubordination</i>
<i>liquor on breath upon arrival for work</i>	<i>sloppy work habits</i>
<i>poor deportment</i>	<i>drunk on-duty</i>
<i>extending lunch-break</i>	<i>malingering</i>
<i>tardiness</i>	<i>poor work performance</i>
<i>uncooperative attitude</i>	<i>fights between constables</i>
<i>failure to back-up fellow officers</i>	

²⁷ Total years of supervisory experience for the sample population was 320 years. This portion of the thesis restricts the number of eligible years to five.

The supervisors' responses to these occurrences are tabulated below.

Formal Action	34.3% (11)
Informal Action	34.3% (11)
Interview only	25.0% (8)
No Action	6.2% (2)

Table 17: Frequency of response for personal experiences

One of the questions that each of the respondents was asked, after they recounted their personal experiences, was for them to identify the *major factors* that influenced their decision-making process. If we focus on those examples where some form of action was taken **other** than an interview, then some interesting results surface. The factors cited were split into mitigating and intensifying factors.²⁸

Mitigating Factors:

Constable was contrite

Constable previously acted in good faith

Constable was senior, therefore benevolence

Police Act felt not to apply

On three occasions the supervisor felt he was too inexperienced to act

²⁸ List of factors does not equal the number of cases cited since some of the supervisors failed to identify a major factor

Intensifying Factors:

Constable had a "bad" attitude (4 cases)

Offence exceeded tolerance "limits" of supervisor (3 cases)

One case was an on-going problem

Constable was senior and should have known better (2 cases)

Constable was deceitful during interview

Constable caused public embarrassment

Inspector ordered that a charge be laid

In exploring the above list of influencing factors we note that a majority of the time the predominant factor mentioned had to do with the characteristics of the offender, particularly his/her attitude. This finding is not intended to diminish the salience of the organizational structure as a factor. In fact, it is likely that when the supervisors were recounting individual episodes that it was the characteristics of the offender that became the proverbial "last straw". Therefore, when the supervisors were asked to describe the *major factor* in their decision-making process, they simply recounted the final factor which precipitated an action. By focusing themselves in this manner, other (perhaps more important) factors could be overlooked. Despite this, the second most frequently mentioned factor was the characteristics of the offence followed by structural and supervisory factors.

In summary then, the following statements can be made concerning the

decision-making process utilized by police first-line supervisors when faced with subordinates who commit minor disciplinary breaches. If the offender has a record of being a good worker, is contrite, respectful and accepts responsibility for his/her actions then any formal action by the supervisor is avoided. If the violation greatly exceeds the boundaries of tolerance for the supervisor, if there is an audience for the transgression or if the attitude of the offender is anything other than contrite and respectful, then some form of formal action is undertaken.

Clearly these guidelines are highly subjective. Further inquiries, subsequent to the present study may clarify the organizational norms that set the tolerance boundaries for the supervisor and operationalize, more precisely, those aspects of the offender's attitude that the supervisor finds objectionable. In any case, there appears to be a great level of tolerance by the supervisors for minor disciplinary misconduct. It is as if a great gulf must be crossed before any direct action will be undertaken by the supervisor. Whether this gulf increases or decreases the efficiency and public service capabilities of the police remains unknown at this time. If an analogy can be drawn, to the organization as a machine, complete with many integral components, then a certain amount of slippage must be permitted between the working parts otherwise the system will simply seize. Where the boundary lies between slippage and seizure is dependent upon the load and task of the machine.

Changes for the Future

In an effort to locate where in the police organizational machinery improvements could be made, the respondents were asked to comment on changes that they would like to see occur within the organizational structure.

Table 18 describes the responses.

	Frequency of Subjects Reporting
Flatten the organization	67.6%
Increase communication the Executive and the lower ranks	29.4%
Increase responsibilities of Sergeants and Corporals	29.4%
Change the promotional system	23.5%
Reduce the needless paper-flow	8.8%
Increase the role of Staff Development	8.8%
Have the Executive focus on the future rather than the details of today	5.8%
Change the <i>Police Act</i> to give power to the supervisors	2.9%

Table 18: Frequency of responses regarding organizational change desired in policing

The above responses indicate a strong desire by the supervisors for senior management to divest itself of some of the control over the working lives of the supervisors and their subordinates. The supervisors want to be more involved in the decision-making process of the organization. They want an end to the needless paper chain, particularly concerning trivial matters which should be beyond the concern of the senior executive. And finally, the supervisors want validation for their promotional accomplishments --- if they are titled supervisors/managers then they feel entitled to be allowed to act as such. According to the respondents, they do not feel empowered. This latter statement came across very clearly throughout this research and, on the face of it, seems at odds with the results cited earlier with respect to the *Gibbs Affective Job Reaction Scale*.

The *Gibbs Affective Job Reaction Scale* is a somewhat blunt instrument. The instrument does not allow the respondent to separate "formal" from "informal" sources of power. After administering the scale, some of the respondents indicated that they perceived that they were more powerful than neutral. The actual sentiments articulated (in Table 12) indicate that the respondents in this study feel powerless. The answer, I believe, lies in their use of informal power bases in order to accomplish tasks demanded of them in the absence of official authority to act. This thesis has provided a demonstration of the frustration endured by police first-line supervisors.

Summary

This chapter demonstrated the difficulties faced by supervisors who are asked to oversee the behaviours of their subordinates. Presented in this chapter, was a discussion concerning the various aspects that were felt to impinge on, or shed light on, the disciplinary process. Profiles of the *average* supervisor were presented along with their styles of management. An exploration was conducted into their perceived level of power, the structural conditions which erode their power base and the subsequent counter-measures taken by the supervisors to re-establish a power base. The disciplinary process was further explored by examining a series of case studies where offender and offence characteristics were manipulated. In order to determine whether the case studies represented reality, a comparison with the personal experiences of the supervisors was made. Finally, the supervisors were asked to provide a prescription for organizational change. Their responses confirmed the overruling effect of the organizational structure on the working environment.

The demographics of the supervisors revealed that the typical police supervisor was 43 years of age with one and a third years of university education and 19 years of policing experience. He has been a supervisor for nine years and has received seven weeks of supervisory training. The number of years within the organization certainly prior to obtaining a supervisory position will certainly permit the organization to have a powerful influence on the managerial style of the candidate.

The managerial style of the supervisors in this study was predominantly a combination of a selling and participatory approach. Absent is any evidence for the stereotypical dictatorial and autocratic police manager. It may be that these managers have learned that they can obtain more with negotiated manipulation (of both the system and the subordinates) than they can with "bluster and venom". There is also evidence presented in the thesis that police first-line supervisors are a generic group.

The tasks that the supervisors are asked to perform by the Executive is very different from what the supervisors see as their "real" role in the organization. Many described their role as a clerk, a glorified baby-sitter and buffer between senior management and the constables. Various structural examples were cited that mitigated the formal power base of the supervisor. With respect to discipline, the *Police Act* severely limits the opportunities for the supervisor to do anything other than request that a subordinate be disciplined. Others commented on the necessity of having too many routine requests requiring written approval by senior management. Despite this, the supervisors believed that they had an adequate amount of power given the parameters of their job.

As a partial explanation for the disparity between the *Gibbs Affective Job Reaction Score* and comments of powerlessness, the use of informal control mechanisms was examined. This revealed an extensive list of unofficial methods that supervisors employ to ensure that order is maintained within the

organizational walls. What was also noted were the differences between the use of various informal methods between the police departments included in this study. These differences were, in part, explained by structural differences between the departments. The result of the use of informal methods is that there is rarely any official recording of subordinate transgressions until after a prolonged period of tolerance has been endured.

The use of the case study method allowed for a further examination of the amount of tolerance within the system. Despite the repetitive nature of the offence (and at times the mild insubordination by the offender) described in the case study, formal action was administered only 21.5% of the time. Another aspect which surfaced from the case study method was that subordinate seniority only slightly affected the decision-making process of the supervisor. This last aspect, despite the suggestion (from the recounting of personal experiences) that offender characteristics were important.

The results from the case study method were supplemented by findings from the personal experiences of the supervisors. In essence, if the subordinate was remorseful, respectful and took responsibility for his/her actions then there was a considerably greater chance for the event not to be officially recorded. If the event was very serious, involved an audience or the subordinate was disrespectful ("bad" attitude) then the chances of an official record increased.

Lastly, the prescription for change suggested by a majority of the

respondents was simply for the organization to become less hierarchical, and for those at the Executive level to devolve themselves of some of the control. These two actions would empower the supervisors and allow them to fulfil their official mandate.

Whether the thesis results have any implications for the administration of discipline concerning matters of public trust remains speculative. It would be dangerous to conclude that, because there is a wide latitude given to police officers who commit minor breaches of (internal) discipline, that there is a corresponding level of tolerance for public trust violations. The purpose of this thesis was to explore the decision-making process **only** in the former case. To the extent that the purpose was so narrowly defined, some powerful implications for the future of police management were revealed.

Chapter 5

Discussion and Future Implications

The present thesis revealed systemic features within police organizational structures which appear to govern the actual disciplinary outcomes for minor, non-public trust offenses. By examining the disciplinary procedure in a systematic way, those processes revealed themselves to be constrained by structural antecedents from within the organization.

Historically, policing was conceived to exist as a flat, non-hierarchical entity. With the changes brought on by Colonel Charles Rowan and Mr. Richard Mayne, policing became hierarchical, militaristic and consumed by a passion for strict discipline amongst its membership. In part, this desire to have a disciplined machine was in response to the public's demand for accountability of its police officers. Various police acts and regulations were drafted throughout the years. Through archival research, it has been shown that very little has changed in the intent and detail of the disciplinary codes. Changes that have been made to these statutes have largely been in the area of procedural fine-tuning as they pertain to *public trust violations*. Minor disciplinary matters were left untouched and supervisors who are faced with subordinates who commit violations of the employee/employer contract must attempt to remedy the problem(s) through a public document poorly designed for that purpose.

Therefore, the options available to a supervisor faced with a "problem"

employee are threefold: (i) the supervisor may choose to ignore the event entirely, (ii) the supervisor may try and charge the subordinate with an offence under the *Police Act*, or (iii) the supervisor may become creative and develop his/her own informal disciplinary solution to be invoked outside the "system". As described in Chapter One, a four factor model was proposed that would aid in the discovery of the decision-making process. The thesis methodology was constructed around this model. It was believed (by the researcher) that the decision-making process would be determined by the inter-play of four variables: the characteristics of the offence, the offender, the supervisor and the police organizational structure.

In the formulative stages of the research, consideration was given to the benefit of including control groups in the study. These groups would allow for comparative analysis between selected police agencies and private industry organizations. It was decided that this level of research be reserved for a more elaborate study and that the purpose of this study remain an exploration of the decision-making process *within* police organizations.

The present study controlled the effect of the offence characteristic by limiting the "seriousness" of the offence. All disciplinary matters reviewed for the thesis were restricted to those occurrences that took place between the employer and the employee (therefore excluding public trust violations) and were deemed to be of a minor nature. The only characteristic of the offence that was varied was the frequency of the transgression. What has been clearly

demonstrated in this study is that police organizations have a very high degree of tolerance for minor violations of discipline. By controlling the effect of offence and offender characteristics during the case study portion of the thesis, it was found that despite repeated transgressions, police supervisors declined to take any formal action against subordinates 80% of the time²⁹(See Table 16). This statistic came close to being repeated when supervisors were asked to recount personal experiences. Using "real-life" events as points for analysis, it was determined that supervisors declined to take formal action against subordinates 65% of the time (See Table 17). Whether this conclusion has implications for violations of public trust, can only remain speculative at this point.

The response that many of the supervisors had to these events was simply to re-interview the subordinate. The determinant of action at this point became a subjective interpretation by the supervisor of the offender's attitude. If the offender was contrite, respectful and assumed responsibility for his/her actions, then the chances of having the event officially recorded was greatly reduced. If there was action taken, then the preferred choice was to apply an informal penalty to the constable. These latter actions took the form of denials of privileges, temporary transfers, blocked transfers, re-assignments to unpleasant duties, verbal harassment, and promotional sabotage. While some

²⁹ Formal action was defined to be either an action under the *Police Act* or an official recording of the default in the subordinate's personnel file

of these penalties are relatively benign in their long-term career effect, many (particularly promotional sabotage) can carry long-lasting effects. At times, these effects can exceed those resulting from an appropriate charge and penalty under the *Police Act*.

It appears that there may be an inherent unfairness present in the above informal proceedings. The subordinate must determine, not only which rules are being applied, but the characteristics of the supervisor as well, in order to determine what his/her response will be. If the supervisor is utilizing an informal process, then the subordinate is left with very limited avenues of appeal. He/she is forced to decide whether to accept the penalty or, to demand that the event be dealt with formally where, at least during the trial process, he/she expects to be treated fairly and with certainty. Of course, with either route the subordinate is left quietly praying that the event will not come back to haunt him/her at a later date. As noted previously (Chapter 2), the ability of an individual or group to control *certainty* in the work environment is directly related to perceptions of power. Supervisors therefore, would appear to be very powerful (in the eyes of the subordinate) because they have the ability to remove the *certainty* of the disciplinary process.

The above description implies that police first-line supervisors are powerful figures within the police organization. However, this power base is probably illusory as far as possession of "formal" power. Of the respondents who identified a power base within their organization, over three-quarters

stated that power rested solely in the hands of the department's executive. By comparing the official job descriptions of the supervisor with their personal understanding of their role in the organization it has been demonstrated that there are substantial inconsistencies. Generally, police supervisors are officially empowered to do very little without receiving authorization from individuals much further up the rank structure. The degree to which there must be an adherence to the chain of command for minor matters remains a contentious issue amongst police management. A majority of the supervisors interviewed for this study wished that the department executive devolve itself of some of the decision-making ability.

Supervisors are in a Catch-22 position. They are held accountable for the actions of their subordinates but not given the power to address the supervisory problems with an adequate range of solutions. Therefore, when supervisors encounter a subordinate committing a minor misconduct, the supervisor must decide whether to raise a *hue and cry* to alert senior management or to administer some form of covert informal justice. Of course there is always the option of ignoring the event entirely but wilful blindness cannot be tolerated forever.

On the basis of the findings from this thesis, the reason that minor disciplinary matters are administered in this convoluted manner seems to emerge primarily from the organizational structure. The indications are that the characteristics of the offence, the offender and the supervisor play

relatively minor roles in the decision-making process. The organizational structure has shown itself to be a powerful and pervasive factor of the four-factor model initially put forward.

To return for a moment to the supervisor, the research presented in this study suggests that supervisors can be moulded, and their decision-making processes pre-determined, by the organizational structure. Supervisor demographics and styles of management appeared homogeneous in this study. The *system* itself is perpetuating supervisory characteristics and practices. To the extent that organizations desire consistency in the supervision of personnel, this finding is positive. If, however, this level of consistency results in a laxity in supervision or an atmosphere where the subordinate must be uncertain of which rule structure is being applied, then consistency (as has been described in the thesis) becomes an organizational detriment. From a broader viewpoint, the entire police structure becomes regulated through the use of its reward/control mechanisms.

This currently calls into question the utility of supervisory training courses, especially those where progressive management techniques and creativity are fostered. With respect to minor discipline, the only creativity that seems to be applied is in finding innovative methods for unofficially controlling subordinates. Does the management structure of the police impede the application of progressive management techniques? Certainly the strict adherence to a formal chain of command restricts innovative thinking by those

at the line level. This, combined with the complex organizational structure (as depicted in the organization charts) tends to restrict the need for any one person to take responsibility for problems occurring within their organizational sphere. Responsibility can be deferred to those further along in the chain.

Blau predicted that with an increase in structuralization, there would be a fracturing of divisional responsibilities. In other words, the tasks of those with the organization would be subdivided into smaller and smaller segments and each mini-task would be accompanied with explicit instructions on how to be officially conducted. The result of the removal of authority from the police supervisor and the "need" for all those above the rank of the supervisor to provide input into the decision-making process, was that disciplinary hearings require from between 3.3 months to 5.7 months to be resolved. For the police supervisor, this can become an intolerable situation especially for minor disciplinary matters where the chances are high that during this waiting period, the behaviour is still occurring. Solutions to this supervisory dilemma become dependent on the size of the police department. As explained in the previous chapter, promotional systems, the availability of perquisites, and career opportunities are more accessible for use by supervisors in larger departments than in smaller departments. Similarly, with more layers in the command structure, larger departments seem to reduce the authority of the first-line supervisor.

A contrary feature is that in small departments, the business of the

individual is known by all, therefore reducing the ability of someone becoming "lost in the system". This is a form of peer pressure recognized by supervisors as one of great value in motivating an individual to correct their errant behaviour. The use of peer pressure and other informal control techniques act to empower the supervisor and provide him/her with strategies to cope with the exigencies of supervisory life. The fact that acculturation is a primary form of organizational education creates a condition whereby the existing supervisory practices will not be easily altered.

Change of any sort within the police organization will be difficult primarily because of the vested interests held by those who are legitimately empowered. But even if individuals within the organization wish to adopt changes, the process by which change occurs will still be difficult. Because the systems of ideology, authority and politics are so firmly entrenched within the police organizational culture and that *discipline* crosses all three systems, any proposed changes to the discipline system will likely meet with resistance.

Change within the organization can only occur three ways, (i) by the consensus of all within the organization, (ii) by a complete restructuring of the organization initiated either externally or internally or, (iii) randomly. Options (i) and (ii) amount to small scale revolutions. Option (iii) represents a dismal hope for those who are frustrated by the current processes.

If all that is desired is to remedy the injustices present in the current discipline system, then minor modifications to the *Police Act and Regulations*

will suffice. By severing minor discipline code offenses from the *Act* and placing them into the labour forum, police managers would be able to make some advance from the constraints of the military model of management. Even if the organizational structure continues to exert its influence, at least the subordinates can appeal to a civilian labour board, operating under Canadian labour jurisprudence.

The present thesis set out to explore the processes by which minor discipline was administered in police organizations. Through this analysis, the organizational structure of police agencies revealed itself to be the greatest determinant of the disciplinary process. If there is to be a change, exploratory research such as the one provided in this document provide the window through which more finely tuned research instruments can be focused. No longer should the focus be purely on the *act* and *actors* --- the *stage* is the foundation for the play.

Appendices

Appendix A

Police (Discipline) Regulation B.C. Reg. 330/75

Any member of a municipal force commits a disciplinary default if he engages in any one or more of the following:

1. Discreditable conduct, that is, if he

(a) acts in a disorderly manner or in a manner prejudicial to discipline or reasonably likely to bring discredit upon the reputation of the police force,

(b) assaults any other member of a police force,

(c) uses oppressive or abusive conduct or language towards any other member of a police force, or

(d) contravenes the provisions of the Act or any rule or regulation made or enacted in accordance with the Act.

2. Insubordination, that is, if he

(a) is insubordinate by word or action, or

(b) without lawful excuse, disobeys, omits or neglects to carry out a lawful order.

3. Neglect of duty, that is, if he

(a) neglects, or, without lawful excuse, omits promptly and diligently to perform a duty as a member of the police force,

(b) fails to work in accordance with orders, or leaves an area, detail or other place of duty without permission or cause, fails to return thereto without undue delay, or

(c) is absent from, or is late for, duty without reasonable excuse.

Appendix A (cont'd)

4. Deceit, that is, if he

(a) wilfully or negligently makes or signs a false, misleading or inaccurate oral or written statement or entry in any official document or record, or otherwise pertaining to official duties, or

(b) without lawful excuse destroys, mutilates or conceals any official document or record, or alters, erases or adds to any entry therein.

5. Improper disclosure of information, that is, if he

(a) without proper authority communicates to any person any information which he has in his possession as a member of a police force to the detriment of effective operations,

(b) makes any anonymous communication to any police authority or any member of a police force, or

(c) signs or circulates a petition or statement in respect of a matter concerning the police force, except through the proper official channel of correspondence or established grievance procedure or in the bona fide performance of his duties, as a representative of a certified police union, association of federation.

6. Corrupt practice, that is, if he

(a) fails properly to account for, or to make a prompt and true return of, any money or property received by him in the course of his duty,

(b) places himself under a pecuniary or other obligation to any person in such a manner as might affect the proper performance of his duties as a member of the police force, or

(c) improperly uses his position as a member of the police force for private advantage

7. Abuse of authority, that is, if he

(a) without good or sufficient cause, makes an arrest,

(b) uses any unnecessary violence to any prisoner or other person with whom he may be brought into contact in the execution of his duty, or

Appendix A (cont'd)

(c) is discourteous or uncivil to any member of the public, having regard to all the circumstances of the case.

8. Improper use of firearms, that is, if he

(a) without proper authorization, carries, when on duty, any firearm other than one issued to him by the force,

(b) having discharged a firearm when on duty, other than on firearm training exercise, fails to report such incident to his senior officer as soon as practicable thereafter, or

(c) fails to exercise discretion and restraint in the use and care of firearms.

9. Damage to police property, that is, if he

(a) wilfully or by carelessness causes any waste, loss or damage to any police property or other property entrusted to his care, or

(b) fails to report any loss of or damage to any property as above, however caused.

10. Misuse of intoxicating liquor or drugs in a manner prejudicial to duty, that is, if he

(a) upon reporting for or while on duty, is unfit for duty as a result of drinking intoxicating liquor or the non-medical use of a drug, or

(b) without proper authority, makes any use of, or receives from any other person, any intoxicating liquor or a non-medical drug when on duty.

11. Improper dress or untidiness, that is, if he, while on duty, or while off duty but wearing uniform in a public place, is improperly dressed or is untidy in his appearance.

12. Criminal conduct, that is, if he is found guilty of an indictable offence or an offence punishable upon summary conviction under any statute of Canada or any province or territory in Canada which renders him unfit to perform his duties.


Appendix A (cont'd)

13. Being an accessory to a disciplinary default, that is, if he aids, abets, connives at or is knowingly an accessory to a disciplinary default under the code.

14. Attempting to commit a disciplinary default, that is, if he attempts, by any means, to commit a disciplinary default under the code.

Appendix B

Hersey and Blanchard *Lead-Self* Scale



LEAD

SELF

Leadership Style/Perception of Self

Developed by Paul Hersey and Kenneth H. Blanchard

Your name _____

PURPOSE

The purpose of this instrument is to evaluate your perception of your leadership style in terms of "telling," "selling," "participating," or "delegating," and to indicate whether the style is appropriate in various situations.

INSTRUCTIONS

Assume you are involved in each of the following twelve situations. Each situation has four alternative actions you might initiate. Read each item carefully. Think about what you would do in each circumstance. Then, circle the letter of the alternative action choice which you think would most closely describe your behavior in the situation presented. Circle only *one choice*.

After you have circled one choice for each situation, use the "LEAD Directions for Self-Scoring and Analysis" to score and array the data.

1. SITUATION

Your followers are not responding lately to your friendly conversation and obvious concern for their welfare. Their performance is declining rapidly.

ALTERNATIVE ACTIONS

You would. . .

- A. Emphasize the use of uniform procedures and the necessity for task accomplishment.
 - B. Make yourself available for discussion but not push your involvement.
 - C. Talk with followers and then set goals.
 - D. Intentionally not intervene.
-

2. SITUATION

The observable performance of your group is increasing. You have been making sure that all members were aware of their responsibilities and expected standards of performance.

ALTERNATIVE ACTIONS

You would. . .

- A. Engage in friendly interaction, but continue to make sure that all members are aware of their responsibilities and expected standards of performance.
 - B. Take no definite action.
 - C. Do what you can to make the group feel important and involved.
 - D. Emphasize the importance of deadlines and tasks.
-

3. SITUATION

Members of your group are unable to solve a problem. You have normally left them alone. Group performance and interpersonal relations have been good.

ALTERNATIVE ACTIONS

You would. . .

- A. Work with the group and together engage in problem solving.
 - B. Let the group work it out.
 - C. Act quickly and firmly to correct and redirect.
 - D. Encourage the group to work on the problem and be supportive of their efforts.
-

4. SITUATION

You are considering a change. Your followers have a fine record of accomplishment. They respect the need for change.

ALTERNATIVE ACTIONS

You would. . .

- A. Allow group involvement in developing the change, but not be too directive.
 - B. Announce changes and then implement with close supervision.
 - C. Allow the group to formulate its own direction.
 - D. Incorporate group recommendations, but you direct the change.
-

5. SITUATION

The performance of your group has been dropping during the last few months. Members have been unconcerned with meeting objectives. Redefining roles and responsibilities has helped in the past. They have continually needed reminding to have their tasks done on time.

ALTERNATIVE ACTIONS

You would. . .

- A. Allow the group to formulate its own direction.
 - B. Incorporate group recommendations, but see that objectives are met.
 - C. Redefine roles and responsibilities and supervise carefully.
 - D. Allow group involvement in determining roles and responsibilities, but not be too directive.
-

6. SITUATION

You stepped into an efficiently run organization. The previous administrator tightly controlled the situation. You want to maintain a productive situation, but would like to begin humanizing the environment.

ALTERNATIVE ACTIONS

You would. . .

- A. Do what you can to make the group feel important and involved.
 - B. Emphasize the importance of deadlines and tasks.
 - C. Intentionally not intervene.
 - D. Get the group involved in decision making, but see that objectives are met.
-

7. SITUATION

You are considering changing to a structure that will be new to your group. Members of the group have made suggestions about needed change. The group has been productive and demonstrated flexibility in its operations.

ALTERNATIVE ACTIONS

You would . . .

- A. Define the change and supervise carefully.
 - B. Participate with the group in developing the change, but allow members to organize the implementation.
 - C. Be willing to make changes as recommended, but maintain control of implementation.
 - D. Avoid confrontation; leave things alone.
-

8. SITUATION

Group performance and interpersonal relations are good. You feel somewhat insecure about your lack of direction of the group.

ALTERNATIVE ACTIONS

You would . . .

- A. Leave the group alone.
 - B. Discuss the situation with the group and then initiate necessary changes.
 - C. Take steps to direct followers toward working in a well-defined manner.
 - D. Be supportive in discussing the situation with the group, but not too directive.
-

9. SITUATION

Your boss has appointed you to head a task force that is far overdue in making requested recommendations for change. The group is not clear on its goals. Attendance at sessions has been poor. Their meetings have turned into social gatherings. Potentially, they have the talent necessary to help.

ALTERNATIVE ACTIONS

You would . . .

- A. Let the group work out its problems.
 - B. Incorporate group recommendations, but see that objectives are met.
 - C. Redefine goals and supervise carefully.
 - D. Allow group involvement in setting goals, but not push.
-

10. SITUATION

Your followers, usually able to take responsibility, are not responding to your recent redefining of standards.

ALTERNATIVE ACTIONS

You would . . .

- A. Allow group involvement in redefining standards, but not take control.
 - B. Redefine standards and supervise carefully.
 - C. Avoid confrontation by not applying pressure; leave the situation alone.
 - D. Incorporate group recommendations, but see that new standards are met.
-

11. SITUATION

You have been promoted to a new position. The previous supervisor was uninvolved in the affairs of the group. The group has adequately handled its tasks and direction. Group interrelations are good.

ALTERNATIVE ACTIONS

You would . . .

- A. Take steps to direct followers toward working in a well-defined manner.
 - B. Involve followers in decision making and reinforce good contributions.
 - C. Discuss past performance with the group and then examine the need for new practices.
 - D. Continue to leave the group alone.
-

12. SITUATION

Recent information indicates some internal difficulties among followers. The group has a remarkable record of accomplishment. Members have effectively maintained long-range goals. They have worked in harmony for the past year. All are well qualified for the task.

ALTERNATIVE ACTIONS

You would . . .

- A. Try out your solution with followers and examine the need for new practices.
 - B. Allow group members to work it out themselves.
 - C. Act quickly and firmly to correct and redirect.
 - D. Participate in problem discussion while providing support for followers.
-

Appendix C

Affective Job Reaction Scale

Identification: _____

Please use the scales alongside each statement to indicate how true the statements are to your beliefs about your current job. Circle the appropriate number.

	Disagree Strongly			Neither agree or disagree			Agree strongly
	•			•			•
1. I can affect changes in my work if I wish to	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. Nobody listens to my suggestions.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. I have sufficient authority to carry out my responsibilities.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. My subordinates see me as more powerful than I really am.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. I can compete effectively for the resources I need to get the job done.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6. I feel I cannot get ahead in my job.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
7. I have access to the resources I need to get my job done.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8. I am adequately recognized for the work I do.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
9. I have less status than others at the same level in the organization.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
10. I am confident of my career progress in this organization.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
11. I feel powerless in this job.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
12. I am confident that my orders will be carried out by others.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
13. I am not sure from one day to the next how my actions will be responded to.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Appendix D

Dear Corporal/Sergeant,

I am a former Vancouver police officer (Oct. 1977 -- Dec. 1989) who resigned from the force to pursue a graduate degree in Criminology. My thesis topic is an exploration of the process by which first-line supervisors (Corporals and Sergeants only) arrive at a decision on what to do with a subordinate who has committed a minor disciplinary default. The study will focus on three departments: Victoria, Delta and Vancouver.

As you know, the current *Police Act* and *Regulations* do not provide the NCO with many options. The *Act* and *Regulations* were drafted to deal with major violations of the discipline code. Most minor disciplinary breaches are handled by NCO's through conversations with the subordinate that are designed to advise the subordinate of the wrong-doing, provide him/her with notice that their actions will be monitored and that there will be entries made into the individual's performance appraisal.

Suppose this does not work? What does the NCO do with this individual and how does the NCO decide on his/her course of action? This is the thrust of my thesis and to answer these questions, I need your help.

My approach to this problem is two-pronged.

A.

i) A questionnaire will be completed that will ask you to read three case studies, decide on a course of action and then respond to a series of questions concerning your decision.

ii) Included in this questionnaire is a scale designed to determine your preferred and alternate leadership style.

Completion of this stage would require approximately 40 minutes of your time.

Appendix D (cont'd)

B.

i) An hour long interview, with this author, to explore some of your experiences with the disciplining of employees. Note: I am not interested in the identity of the individual, only the circumstances that lead to your decision in the matter.

ii) A thirteen item questionnaire which explores the amount of power you perceive you have in your organization.

Note: There is a possibility that I will consolidate Stages A and B in one sitting lasting approximately 1 hr. and 40 min. Much of this depends on the results of the pilot study.

Your participation in this study is completely voluntary and you can withdraw at any time. Should you choose to participate, I assure you that your identity will remain confidential. If you agree to participate in this study, please write your name, address and telephone number on the card included and send it to me in the stamped self-addressed envelope or, you can phone me direct and leave a message on my answering machine. I will then telephone you to set-up a time for the interview. I hope to complete all of the interviews by the end of August 1991.

As you can appreciate, the results from this study could have profound policy implications which may result in a strengthening of the role of the first-line supervisor. In order for the results to be worthwhile I need participation from virtually all of the people canvassed. I appreciate all that you can do to assist me with my study. Should you wish to ask me any questions, please feel free to contact me.

Yours sincerely,

Darrell W. Kean

Appendix E

In an attempt to categorize your responses with those of the other respondents, please answer the following questions as accurately as possible.

1. Name [confidentiality assured] _____
2. Sex M ___ F ___
3. Age _____ years
4. Education Gr. 12 only ___; 2 years post sec. ___; Univ. degree ___
5. Municipal Department _____
6. Years with present Department _____ years
7. Years with previous Police Department _____ years
8. Years as a Corporal and/or Sergeant with present Department _____
9. Number of weeks supervisor training received _____ weeks
10. Total number of police subordinates responsible for _____

In virtually all organizations, first-line supervisors are expected to manage their subordinates. This supervision includes having to deal with subordinates who are not meeting standards set by the organization. Frequently the *real* managing is conducted through informal means. For example, certain privileges can be denied, less pleasant tasks can be assigned or future opportunities can be temporarily blocked etc. in order to get the subordinate to meet the minimum standard.

When all other forms of persuasion have failed, the informal and formal means become the last resort for first-line supervisors when faced with a disciplinary problem.

For each of the following Case Studies assume that you are the supervisor for the individual involved. Read the Case Study carefully and based solely on the information provided, decide what course of action you would take.

Once you have arrived at your decision, please describe your actions and respond to the subsequent questions referring to that action.

Appendix E

CASE STUDY # 1

You are working day-shift with a start-time of 7:00. You have been advised that Constable Smith has not yet arrived for shift. Since he is one of your men, you determine that he has not booked-off sick; he has not been previously authorized to take the day off and there has been no telephone call, or any correspondence, from him to advise you of his impending lateness,

This is what you know of Smith:

- He has been with the Department for 8 years and in your squad for 2 years
- He is, by your assessment, a moderate worker
- He's a family man and you know of no problems at his home
- He has been late on three (3) other occasions within the last six weeks

(i) On the first occasion, he was 10 minutes late and you ignored the event

(ii) On the second occasion, he was approximately 10 minutes late and you made some off-hand comment to him that indicated your displeasure but it went no further than that.

(iii) On the third occasion, also approximately 10 minutes, you spoke privately with him. When asked for an explanation for his lateness, he apologized and stated that his wife did not wake him on time. He had no explanations for the previous two occasions. You then reminded him of his responsibilities to the other members as well as the Department. He acknowledged these responsibilities. You then advised him that you would be monitoring him for the next while.

This is the fourth occasion and it is now 7:30 a.m. as Smith walks in to determine his present day assignment. What are you going to do?

1. Please use the scale below to indicate how serious you feel the offence listed in Case Study 1 is: (circle the appropriate number)

Not Very Serious	Moderately Serious	Extremely Serious
---------------------	-----------------------	----------------------

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Appendix E (cont'd)

2. What is your course of action? Include briefly, your reasoning.

3. What, if any, information was lacking that you felt would be necessary to arrive at your decision?

4. Who, if anybody, would you HAVE to consult with (other than the subordinate) prior to implementing your decision?

5. If someone had to be consulted with why do you feel that this must occur?

6. IGNORING any constraints presented by the *Police Act and Regulations* or the Departmental regulations, how would you have preferred to handle the subordinate?

Appendix E (cont'd)

7. In policing, seniority often complicates the discipline process. For example, very "junior" constables are handled differently than very "senior" constables. Describe below, what your course of action would be, using the information in Case study 1, if the constable fell between the following seniority ranges. Briefly include your reasoning.

Less than 4 years police service:

Between 5 years and 14 years police service:

Greater than 15 years police service:

Appendix E (cont'd)

CASE STUDY # 2

Constable Stewart has been with the Department for twelve years and has been on your squad for six months. Since coming to your shift you have had to hand him back several of his Crown Counsel Reports because they were written in a careless manner. It is almost as if Stewart does not care about the quality of his reports. You know that the ability is present; it is his attitude that appears to be the problem. On each occasion that you have handed reports back to him to fix, he has rolled his eyes, grabbed the report and stomped-off muttering about the "system" and the "inept" Crown prosecutors.

Out of curiosity you have contacted his previous supervisor and determined that he too has had problems with Stewart's attitude. When asked if Stewart had ever been insubordinate, the other NCO replied that other than the "rolling of the eyes" and side comments, there was no direct insubordination.

During your present shift, Stewart places a completed Crown Counsel Report in front of you on your desk for your signature. After doing so, he turns and walks away. As you are reading the report, you notice glaring omissions. This report represents the worst that Stewart has submitted to you.

You call Stewart back in and before you have had a chance to say anything he demands contemptuously, "What the hell's wrong now?"

1. Please use the scale below to indicate how serious you feel the offence listed in Case Study 2 is: (circle the appropriate number)

Not Very Serious			Moderately Serious				Extremely Serious
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	

[Note: Questions 2-7 inclusive are identical to those used in Case Study 1 – see previous pages]

Appendix E (cont'd)

CASE STUDY # 3

Approximately one year ago your Department's executive re-affirmed that the policy concerning the cleanliness of patrol cars shall be the responsibility of the shift NCO. Since that time you have occasionally inspected the condition of the cars driven by the members under your command. Aside from the usual "little" reminders, most of your staff complied with the directive.

Constable Andrews represents a different problem. He has a nasty habit of spending the entire shift driving around his area while smoking cigars and eating sunflower seeds. The result has been that the car he uses is returned reeking of stale cigar smoke and the interior is littered with hundreds of sunflower seed husks.

You have spoken to him on many occasions about this and in fact have stood by and watched him clean out the car after you have directed him to do so. Regardless, Andrews has returned after a shift with yet another filthy car.

1. Please use the scale below to indicate how serious you feel the offence listed in Case Study 3 is: (circle the appropriate number)

Not Very
Serious

Moderately
Serious

Extremely
Serious

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

[Note: Questions 2-7 inclusive are identical to those used in Case Study 1 – see previous pages]

Appendix F

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. In the last 2 years, how many times have you, as supervisor, been in a situation with a subordinate where you felt that your back was *up against the wall* and you had to decide whether to charge the individual or informally administer some punishment?
2. Supervisors control subordinates in a large number of ways. What sort of ways do you see police first-line supervisors as controlling their subordinates?
3. Describe the:
circumstances
the individual
actions taken prior to the event
your eventual action
who was consulted
could the decision be made by you alone
4. What were the major factors governing your decision?
5. If you could have done things differently, what would you have done?
6. What role did seniority play?
7. Have you formally charged anyone with an discipline code offence? If so, what time lag was there between the time you officially filed the charge and the eventual hearing?
8. What do you think is the role of the first-line supervisor (cpl. or sgt.) in your police organization?
9. If you could change the process by which first-line supervisors deal with subordinates, what would you change?
10. In your experience with not only your police organization but that of others, if you could re-structure the organization what would you do?
11. Where does the power base lie in your Department?
12. As far as the management of personnel is concerned, what changes would you make?

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