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**COPING WITH COMPLEXITY: THE LIMITS OF OBJECTIVITY AND
UNDERSTANDING IN THE POLICY PROCESS**

by

Scott Stewart

B.A., Simon Fraser University, 1989

**THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS**

in the Department

of

Political Science

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SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY

February, 1992

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ISBN 0-315-83723-3

Canada

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TITLE OF THESIS: Coping with Complexity: The Limits of
Objectivity and Understanding in the
Policy Process.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis looks at a critical problem in policy analysis--- limits in objectivity and understanding which hamper policymakers' and social scientists' ability to cope with complex public policies. Increasing global interdependence and overlapping issue areas have resulted in a policy process which reflects chaos, conflict and confusion over the causes and effects of different policies. A reliance on outdated positivistic assumptions has not helped at all. If anything, it has made matters worse. Instead of positivism's rationalistic, mechanical and linear view of social dynamics which falsely suggests that perfect objectivity and understanding are possible, new insights from post-positivism and an emerging science of complexity emphasize the impossibility of objectivity, limits in understanding, mutual causality, circular relations, and interaction within one's environment. Similarly, by drawing parallels with the dynamics that are at work in natural systems, we uncover a new understanding of the forces affecting political systems. Essentially, this thesis is methodological in nature.

In this context, by incorporating new ideas and concepts of social dynamics to the recently developed policy community model, we develop a better understanding of how different public policies affect and are affected by one another. What is a policy community? Generally, it is a policy area where various actors may converge or have an interest in a certain issue-area. In this context, this thesis looks at various policy areas, but particularly, the Canadian immigration policy community to synthesize the elements discussed above. With the apparent end of the cold war and the relative decline of defence and military-related issues, more research is needed in the contentious area of immigration policy. Unfortunately, political science has been slow to pick up on this fact. My analysis

is meant to be a starting point. However, at the same time there are implications for a better understanding of the dynamics at work in all policy communities. By offering a series of recommendations and alternative points of view, my examination points toward a more participatory policy process and a better ability to overcome our limits in objectivity and understanding and therefore cope with social complexity.

This thesis is dedicated to Mary Stewart.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are many people who have contributed in a number of ways to the development of this thesis. The patience and guidance of my supervisory committee, Dr. Laurent Dobuzinskis and Dr. Martin Robin, have made the arduous task of conducting research most bearable. In particular, the stimulating discussions with Dr. Dobuzinskis provided me with many interesting ideas from which to build upon. Similarly, I am very grateful to Dr. Ted Cohn who has provided me with continuous encouragement over the last three years. My association with him has been a pleasure.

I would like to acknowledge the debt that I owe to my family. Through both good and bad times they have always been there to offer support and encouragement. Individually, each family member has contributed in his or her own way. Writing this thesis was made possible by the patience and supportive atmosphere offered by my wife, Jeannie. Jeannie's criticisms and understanding (especially at the beginning of the M.A. program) made a difference.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this thesis is to focus on the problems of social complexity relating to modern public policymaking. Two separate (but overlapping) aspects of complexity--- the problems of objectivity and the limits of understanding social phenomena hinder the social scientist and the policymaker's ability to develop governmental policy. Two epistemological questions; "can we approach societal problems rationally and objectively?"; and "if we can attain objectivity, are the details of our world too complex to understand?"---- provide the background for my analysis. However, this is not a thesis concerning the philosophy or sociology of knowledge. Instead it is an attempt to explain underlying practical problems in the formulation of public policy and, in the process, recommend alternative courses of action. Throughout this thesis I put forward various illustrations (such as Canadian immigration policy) highlighting important new concepts and ideas in understanding complexity. In this context, I propose to tear down the "ivory tower" image of policy analysis in favour of a more participatory process. We need to move from concepts of control and determinism inherent in positivism towards the notion of self-understanding exhibited in post-positivist thought. In this respect, I will be applying the new "policy community model" that is recently being developed in political science.

Coleman and Skogstad define a policy community "to include all actors or potential actors with a direct or indirect interest in a policy area or function who share a common 'policy focus,' and who, with varying degrees of influence shape policy outcomes over the long run." Similarly there exist policy networks which "characterize the relationships among the particular set of actors that forms around

an issue of importance to the policy community."¹ My task is to introduce the concepts of evolution and change (in conjunction with the policy community model) to various policy areas. For example, the immigration policy process is used in various illustrations.

The Random House College Dictionary has eight varying definitions of complexity. For example, complexity may mean "an intricate or complicated association or assemblage of related things, parts, units, etc.," or "so complicated or intricate as to be hard to understand or deal with." Perhaps Edgar Morin has the best definition: "the problem of complexity is that of phenomena which cannot be reduced to the simple thought patterns of the observer. In other words, complexity will first manifest itself, for the observer, in the form of obscurity, doubt, ambiguity, or even paradox or contradictions."² Regardless of the exact definition, complexity is increasingly becoming a serious problem for policymakers who try to "plan" in today's world. The question is how does the social scientist or political scientist (I will use these interchangeably throughout this thesis) or policy analyst deal with it?

Traditional methods in social science relied (and still do) on the Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte. Comte argued that man and society could be studied in a similar fashion to the natural sciences. He believed that there existed underlying universal laws and patterns that applied to chemistry and physics as well as sociology. Applying the scientific method of observation, testing, and verification, the social scientist could learn to objectively predict and control his social environment. Through rational and objective reasoning and logic, not only could man learn to understand his environment but then he could reorganize and change it. Translation; there could be success in public policymaking.

Rooted in Cartesian rationalism, positivism held that there existed a tangible objective reality that was within our grasp. Once the social scientist discovered the underlying laws of reality, rational action (public policy) would be possible. However, problems soon arose. Society is not like a laboratory where the scientist could separate himself or herself from his or her object of inquiry and isolate one's variables. The post-positivists (a movement born out of literary criticism and deconstructionism) attacked such "scientific" assumptions and argued that social scientists can never separate themselves from their object of inquiry--- language and culture tainted any "objective" foundation of knowledge (of which the Logical Positivists claimed to exist). Any foundation or logic was subjective because of the socialization process experienced by the observer. On another but related level, later scholars argued against any "foundation," whether it be objective or subjective--- that individuals were bound and interacted with the wider natural environment. Individuals, like other organisms, were both influenced and influential with the natural world. Objectivity was impossible, whether it was inhibited by social obstacles (language) or natural obstacles (evolutionary interaction with nature). These perspectives challenged positivist conceptions of objectivity and rationality on the part of the social scientist.

Nevertheless, even if objectivity were attainable, what about the second aspect of complexity--- limits in understanding social phenomena? Many academics argue that policymakers face the "planner's paradox"--- for every answer, there emerge more questions. Unfortunately, planning and social organization is not as easy as Plato would have had us believe. There is no Philosopher-king! In this sense, F.A. Hayek has argued that for too long, social scientists have wrongly assumed that they could grasp (in their minds) all of the necessary details to understand and re-arrange social practices and institutions. In

this context, limits in understanding seriously hinder the policy analyst's ability to comprehend the number and variety of activities that are continually shaping social practices and institutions.

Following an introduction to limits in objectivity and understanding, I look at modern attempts to cope with complexity. My discussion will revolve around concepts such as "organized social complexity" and the policy sciences. Are modern approaches (such as the policy community model) to policy analysis just altered forms of positivism or new avenues to rational action? Regardless, throughout this debate I refer to a variety of Canadian public policies (i.e., energy, foreign policy, and health) in order to show the reader the link between broad theoretical issue and day-to-day practical policy problems.

From here, I lead into a discussion of circular relations, unlike earlier positivist notions of linear causality and relationships. Linking the notion of circular relations in natural systems with the policy community model of policymaking, my analysis focuses on the problems inherent in the making of Canadian immigration and refugee policy. Essentially, how do concepts such as objectivity and limits in understanding relate to the complexities of Canada's immigration policy community? On another note, why do I use more illustrations of immigration policy and less of foreign, health, or economic policies, or federal-provincial relations? Precisely because immigration incorporates all of these issues, and more!. Traditionally, many other policies have dominated mainstream political science (i.e., defence, energy, and trade). Yet evidence suggests that immigration research is moving from the periphery to the forefront in academic (and media) circles. In this context, new approaches and analyses are indeed a welcome addition to the present literature available. Yet let it be clear that this is intended to be a thesis that is

methodological in nature, and my analysis will incorporate a variety of policy areas, not just immigration.

Today many critics charge that Canadian immigration policy is in a disarray and is not coping with the increasing rate of immigrants and refugees entering Canada. If this is true, why is it the case? One could argue that overlapping areas of jurisdiction, the post-World War II emergence of non-governmental organizations and lobby groups, the many structural (cabinet and bureaucratic) reforms that have been initiated by different prime ministers, and the domestication of Canada's foreign relations represents a very complex environment for policymakers to manage. Change and flux are constant features in the policy process. By adopting the policy community model in our analysis we see numerous policy actors with narrow and parochial interests that perceive (in "their own reality") the community in different ways. (In chapter 4 I provide evidence of this parochialism in interviews that I've conducted with various actors at different vantage points in the immigration policy process).

How do we deal with limits in objectivity and understanding immigration policy? The answer may lie in an awareness of the mutual interdependence of actors and events with one another. We may be able to cope (somewhat) but not conquer complexity if we recognize that one is just a part of the broader policy [environment] community in which one acts. Cooperation and self-understanding may lessen conflict resulting in an awareness of the bigger picture. Increased awareness (of the varied perception of problems) will help guide policy actors and social scientists. Through interpretation and dialogue rather than observation and control, we may be better equipped intellectually to intervene and deal with the numerous variables that affect immigration policy. With respect to immigration policy, Alan Nash of the Institute for Research on Public Policy argues

It is in our ability to confront and resolve these contradictions [and complexities] that workable and humane solutions will be found to the public policy dilemma now facing Canada, and it is in our ability to acknowledge these contradictions that an understanding at the issue lies.³

Although my analysis is concerning immigration problems, whether it be health, trade, or forestry policy, social complexity is the major obstacle to the policy analyst. The task of this thesis is not to denigrate the abilities of political scientists but rather to offer hope and recommendations that will enable actors to participate more democratically in policy formulation and in the process help the policymakers in coping with complexity.

CHAPTER TWO

DOES OBJECTIVITY EXIST? THE POSITIVIST - POST-POSITIVIST DEBATE

Policy analysts have not given up their security blanket--- positivistic methods and assumptions towards the study of social phenomena. In an effort to be taken seriously as scientists, it was assumed that social behaviour could be examined in a fashion not unlike the study of atoms and molecules in the natural sciences. The scientist could isolate his or her variables under observation and separate himself or herself from ones' object of inquiry. Positivism embodies the notion that the scientist could be an objective observer, simply describing the facts at hand. By applying the scientific method of observation, one would eventually come to an understanding of the underlying causes and effects of natural and social events. This chapter challenges the positivist conceptions of policy analysis and in the process describes alternative views towards objectivity and understanding. The implications of such a challenge point towards a more participatory policy process for actors in the general populace.

As an early contributor to positivist thought, Auguste Comte argued that the social sciences in general should be seen as a process building from the simple to the complex, from the bottom to the top, not unlike the construction of a brick building. The simplest of sciences (chemistry/physics) would provide the necessary building blocks for an eventual understanding of the more complex sciences (sociology). In Positive Philosophy, Comte writes:

The rational method of observation becomes more necessary in proportion to the complexity of the phenomena, amid which the observer would not know what he ought to look or act in the facts before his eyes, but for the guidance of preparatory theory; and thus it is by the connection of the foregoing facts we learn too [see] the facts that follow. 1

Comte's goal was to cut loose the historical chains of theology and metaphysics, things which could never be scientifically verified as "objective truths." Contemporary public policy can be traced back to Comte's view that "the Positive Philosophy offers the only solid basis for... social re-organization."² With positivism, rational action (i.e., public policy) is possible when the scientist unlocks the secrets of the universe and discovers the underlying causes that influence social and natural events. There existed a tangible and objective reality, that was potentially in the grasp of science.

Although Comte should be regarded as a major influence on positivism, it was the philosophers and scientists of the Vienna Circle that gave substance to it.³ Like Comte, they argued for a unified science and attempted to develop a universal scientific language. For the Vienna Circle, (also known as the logical positivists) there was science and "nonsense." By applying the verification principle (as part of the scientific method), only that which could be observed and verified was considered truth or factual. The rest was metaphysics. By merging logic and empiricism, logical positivism embodied a Cartesian outlook on the world.⁴ The Vienna Circle believed; (1). there exists an objective reality, (2). the observer can separate himself from his object of inquiry, (3). there was a need for parsimony and generalizations were not only possible but necessary, (4). causes and effects occurred in linear fashion, (5). the observer can take part in value-free research. Through a process of scientific experimentation (often described as the hypothetico-deductive model), the experiences of the observer could be translated into sense-data, which could provide the bedrock or foundation from which himself or herself and other researchers can rationally construct an objective picture of the world. From sense-data, the scientist can discover higher universal laws through induction. The logical positivists relied on Aristotle's view that "experience...

provides the starting point for... art and science."5 Carnap argued that "verification means testing on the basis of experience."6 However, isn't the process of experiencing something an individual and personal experience? Therefore, would it not be a subjective process? What role do psychological and social factors play in experiencing things? Oldroyd describes Kant's position on the matter; "... the mind brings something to the analysis... whether this 'apron' component arises within the 'ego,' the neuronal synapses, the social structure, or whatever, is not the point at issue. The thing is that it is not to be ignored."7

Faced with this dilemma, the Vienna Circle tried to develop a scientific language which would enable sense-data to be tested "inter-subjectively" between scientists. Thus subjective experiences could be "objectified." As an active member of the Circle, Morris had argued that "there are certain experiences that are defacto as far as direct experience is concerned." However, "the important point is that... potential intersubjectivity [thus objectivity is possible with] every meaning." He provides an example;

The fact that Y1 and Y2 do not stand in relation to each other's direct experience of X1 does not prevent them from both experiencing X, or from indirectly designating (and so indirectly experiencing) by the use of signs the experience relations in which the other stands-- for under certain circumstances an object which cannot be directly experienced can, nonetheless, be denoted [X made to be objective]."8

By testing experiences inter-subjectively, problems that surrounded the limits of objectivity could be solved.9

Nonetheless there are still problems present. A group of scientists from the same social environment may conduct a variety of inter-subjective tests for objectivity, yet by adhering to the same paradigm or outlook of the world are they really critically examining their assumptions? Hardly. They are constrained by their

tools of analysis-- they define science and rationality according to arbitrary standards. Polanyi describes how science approaches the study of social phenomena in an arbitrary manner; scientists too often accept each other's account of the truth. There is a definite lack of critical self-examination,¹⁰ both in the theories used and the facts espoused. Regardless, Carnap disputed that external influences affect a scientist's research. His "account of cognition and 'logical construction,' of the world was still essentially based on the assumption of a 'white paper' (or tabula rasa) theory of the mind."¹¹ Observations and descriptions could occur in a vacuum. A "schematized description of an imaginary procedure, consisting of rationally prescribed steps,"¹² provided hope for a "philosopher-king" type of role for the social scientist. Plato described this ideal as, "one who is so high-minded and whose thought can contemplate all time and all existence."¹³ Yet the logical positivists image of the social scientist as a pure technocrat seeking to verify his theories and facts was a source of concern for Karl Popper.

Although Popper held informal discussions with members of the Vienna Circle, he was not a member himself. In fact, his position in terms of scientific investigation techniques is somewhat confusing. On the one hand, he accepted their principles that there existed a tangible reality (truth) somewhere "out there." Similarly, he believed that the scientist could maintain objective and value-free research. However, on the other hand he argued that "there must be many theoretical systems with a logical structure" and that "there are a great many--presumably infinite number-- of 'logically possible worlds.'" Yet he seems to contradict himself in the same paragraph when he says "the system called 'empirical science' is intended... to represent the 'real world' [sic]... the 'world of our experience'"¹⁴ Does Popper mean that there may be multiple realities, yet empirical scientific reality is the most tangible and acceptable reality? In any event,

for Popper the objective world is "that [which] has been subjected to tests, and has stood up to tests."¹⁵ Like the Vienna Circle, he also wanted to establish a point of demarcation between science and "nonsense." Yet he differed with the logical positivists on the verification principle. For Popper, the criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability, not its conformity. Similarly, "there is no such thing as induction [only deduction]. Thus inference to theories from singular statements which are 'verified by experience'... is logically inadmissible."¹⁶ In a later article he argued that "confirming a theory means very little if we have not tried and failed, to discover refutations... For if we are uncritical we shall always find what we want; we shall look for and find confirmations, and we shall look away from and not see whatever might be dangerous to our pet theories."¹⁷ In other words, the scientist can theoretically prove that a fact is not true (falsify) but never prove a fact to be true (verify). Popper's ideas suggest that objective reality is less tangible than the Vienna Circle had originally argued.

In this context, were Popper's ideas dramatically different from the logical positivists? Hardly. Hawkesworth describes how both treat explanation, control and prediction as equivalent concepts, both are committed to scientific progress (in the study of social behaviour) dependent on the use of the hypothetico-deductive method of testing scientific claims and (most important in terms of this analysis) both conceptions of science are committed to the idea that the objectivity of science rests upon an appeal to the facts.¹⁸ Although he adheres to the notion of objective science, Popper should be credited with contributing a critical element (falsification) to the scientific method. Unlike Comte and Morris, he believed "the empirical basis of objective science has nothing 'absolute' about it. Science does not rest upon rock bottom."¹⁹ Nonetheless, he still argues that objectivity can be

attained with intersubjective testing.²⁰ Therefore, how should we characterize Popper? In the final analysis he should be described as a "pseudo" positivist.

Whether a pseudo-positivist or a logical positivist, many critical theorists charge that Popper and the Vienna Circle were scientistic in their approach towards analysis of social phenomena. What is scientism? It is described as "an addiction to science. Among the signs of scientism are the habit of dividing all thought into two categories, up-to-date scientific knowledge and nonsense, the view that the mathematical sciences and the large laboratory offer the only permissible models for success--- fully employing the mind or organizing effort."²¹ Modern policy analysis often mirrors scientism. Whether it be the economist describing exchange rate patterns or the political scientist looking at voting behaviour, policy analysts in general too often rely only on technical and quantitative aspects in analyzing policies. This isn't to deny the fact that statistical and quantitative techniques are valuable to policymakers, but there is a danger in excessive reliance on such techniques. As Richard Weaver states

Extensive use of quantitative data in policy analysis can be understood in terms of a rhetorical strategy designed to disarm the reader; for the realism exuded by the quantitative measures undermines non-experts' critical responses ('they can't argue with the facts'), while simultaneously validating highly implausible claims.²²

Scientism in policy analysis has negative implications for democracy. This is because it legitimizes the "ivory tower" positivistic image of the social sciences, and suggests the general populace are not intellectually equipped to participate in the policy process. Similarly, scientistic approaches are limited in coping with modern complex policy problems. For example, today there exist overlapping and interdependent political and social issues in policymaking (i.e., foreign policy, environmental, trade, and immigration policy). In this sense, more qualitative

approaches, such as dialogue and discussion may be more effective and democratic than quantitative techniques. Qualitative approaches accept the increasing number and differentiation of actors that are becoming involved and affecting the policy process. Different perceptions of social problems and limits in objectivity need to be investigated further.

In his analysis, Wittgenstein directly attacks positivists concepts of objective reality. Ironically, Wittgenstein's earlier thoughts were an important source and impetus for the Vienna Circle. The Vienna Circle relied on his Tractatus (a precursor to his Philosophical Investigations) as a foundation for their analysis of social phenomena. Unlike Comte and the logical positivists who sought to develop a unified scientific language, Wittgenstein came to realize that language itself is the main obstacle in observing the world in an objective manner. He wrote: "The limits of my language mean the limits of my world..."²⁴ He describes how one's perception of the world is shaped (and rationalized) by language. The problem is that words are context-bound to the language and culture of which one is speaking. For example, in the French language the pronouns "la" and "le" are used to differentiate between feminine and masculine. Similarly, in English we may say (in regard to the new automobile we bought) -- "doesn't she look great?" Although the English and French languages incorporate such a word, how do languages with no conception of the word "she" understand the meaning of "doesn't she (the car) look great?" When one speaks a language, there is always meaning attached to it by the observer. Wittgenstein elaborates further:

'You say to me' 'You understand this expression, don't you? Well then- I am using it in a sense you are familiar with- as if the sense were an atmosphere accompanying the word which it carried with it into every kind of application.'²⁵

In trying to make sense of the world, language and culture influences one's perception of reality:

One thinks that one is tracing the outline of the thing's nature [i.e., policy problem] over and over again, and one is merely tracing around the frame through which we look at it... [the frame- language and culture] holds us captive and we cannot get outside of it.²⁶

Interestingly, Wittgenstein's criticisms of objectivity has parallels with Berger and Luckmann's argument that individuals go through a process of primary and secondary socialization. Both suggest a frame through which we observe the world. This process results in the social construction of reality.²⁷ In primary socialization individuals from birth have their world filtered to them by parents or adoptive parents. The social structure and culture of the parents is passed down as objective reality to the child. Later, in early adulthood, secondary socialization involves "the internalization of institution or institution-based sub-worlds... What we have in mind here is 'specialized knowledge'... knowledge that arises as a result of the division of labour and whose 'carriers' are institutionally defined."²⁸ In other words, the individual throughout his or her life is subjected to ongoing socially and culturally determined influences. As a result, this affects his own self-understanding. The implications of this are important. Berger and Luckmann's position challenges liberal ideas that individuals can freely choose and consciously make their own decisions. Along the lines of Wittgenstein, the authors point out that although "language has the quality of objectivity," the paradox is that "language, as an objective thing, is derived from subjective elements [or experiences]." Similarly, "language provides me with a ready-made possibility for the ongoing objectification of my unfolding experiences." Therefore as an objectified thing, language can then "have meaning not only to myself but also to my fellow men."²⁹ When the logical positivists were seeking to implement

intersubjective testing in order to transform subjectivity into objectivity, they were engaged in Berger and Luckmann's socialization process. Does science have a habit of trying to turn subjective elements into objective in order to legitimize its claim to be scientific? Thomas Kuhn thought so.

Kuhn suggests that science is an irrational and subjective enterprise. At each period in history, scientists have held certain perceptions of objectivity and the reality of the world. The scientific perception of the day is considered to be normal science. Scientists adhering to the normal science of the time (for example, when individuals held an Aristotelean view of the universe) will defend their positions tenaciously. In contrast to the logical positivists, Kuhn believes that science should not be perceived as a linear, step-by-step process, building up from the simple to the complex. Rather, he argues that scientific knowledge is anything but cumulative and linear. Change in normal science occurs only when it goes through a "crisis." A crisis occurs when traditional theories and methodologies cannot cope with emerging problems and inconsistencies for the scientist. Somebody else comes up with a better idea of how science should explain and provide order to the laws of the universe. What results is a new scientific paradigm. Kuhn remarks

The transition from a paradigm in crisis to a new one from which a new tradition of normal science can emerge is far from a cumulative process, one achieved by an articulation or extension of the old paradigm. Rather it is a reconstruction of the field from new fundamentals, a reconstruction that changes some of the field's most elementary theoretical generalizations... When the transition is complete, the profession will have changed its view of the field [and world], its methods and its goals.³⁰

Galileo's scientific discoveries did not build on Aristotle's theory, he destroyed it.³¹

In the context of modern policymaking, do the policy analysts of today practice a form of normal science? Are relatively recent trends in post-positivism (to

be discussed further on) and critical theory reflective of a paradigmatic "crisis" in policy analysis? Many scholars³² indeed argue that social science, more than ever, may be going through a crisis, in that traditional notions of objectivity and limits in understanding are inappropriate in today's world. If we do move towards a new "normal science," the analyst "who embraces a new paradigm is like the man wearing inverted glasses. Confronting the same constellation of objects before, and knowing he does so, he nevertheless finds them transformed through and through in many of their details."³³ Furthermore, when we confront our basic assumptions, if one compares the innumerable cultures and societies in the world, there are definitely many different "lenses" through which to see reality.

Somewhat related to Kuhn's thoughts, yet on a more subconscious level, Michael Polanyi also raises contentious questions regarding the legitimacy and objectivity of social science. For Kuhn, the "lenses" or paradigms can be consciously changed, however Polanyi argues that the "lenses" are fixed. In Tacit Dimension, he describes how all individuals possess tacit knowledge. Tacit knowledge means that "we know more than we can ever tell."³⁴ Scientists take for granted as truth what other scientists (of whom he or she may have never known) claim is true. Thus:

We have seen that the tradition of science induces its own renewal by bearing on a reality beyond [individual] experience; now we find likewise that each scientist's knowledge of his own neighbourhood bears on the whole of science far beyond his own experience. This is how he controls the standards of science indirectly, on the same footing of independence as all others do, while submitting to their control of his own work in return. [Thus] we have seen that the scientist can conceive problems and pursue their investigation only by believing in a hidden reality on which science bears."³⁵

If scientists tacitly accept and rely upon knowledge that they do not possess, are they not flirting with metaphysics? As the scientist accepts the truth and objectivity

of fellow scientists, from which he may (unconsciously and/or tacitly) incorporate into his own analysis, the general populace in turn unquestionably accepts the legitimacy of that scientist's conclusions. What are the implications of this? Does the concept of tacit knowledge contribute (in an indirect way) to the elitist character of policy analysis?

On a broader theoretical level, the university degree does not guarantee objectivity, but it can legitimize power relationships in society. Critical theorists such as Michel Foucault identify this as a major criticism of positivist epistemology. Concepts such as rational control and prediction contribute to forms of (anti-democratic) social engineering by a centralized authority. In claiming to be value-free and neutral in their inquiry, social science has historically legitimized its hierarchical position in society. But as I have shown, serious questions surround "value-free" research. Multiple languages, different socialization processes and perceptions call into question the Cartesian idea that there exists one tangible and accessible objective reality. In acknowledging the limited nature of positivist social science, the policy scientist soon realizes that

he is no longer alone, but in a world populated by other actors, decision-makers, staff and clients, where skills and insights may vary, even though they may still be assumed to be fully cooperative. The decision-maker's setting is no longer the single office but now includes several offices, each inhabited by a relevant person, all connected by telephone, mail or computer services. The setting is now socially differentiated, a division of labour creeps in. Interpretations of the problem are also differentiated now: Clients [i.e. other actors in the policy community] are likely to perceive the problem differently than the staff does and the decision-maker no doubt appreciates aspects of the situation that neither clients nor staff do (and vice versa). Information is now not only imperfect but is also of varying quality... Time now becomes a socially precious resource. Not only is it limited, but different actors will also have different amounts of time to devote to the decision or problems at hand.³⁶

The above statement by Forrester reflects a battle similar to that policymakers and analysts face in their effort to cope with the complexities of Canadian immigration policy. Reiterating Morin's position on complexity (from chapter one), the problems faced by policy actors manifest themselves in obscurity, doubt, ambiguity, paradox and contradiction. Increased forms of participation on the part of the general populace would help in coping with complexity. Yet how easy will it be to tear down the "ivory tower" and technocratic image of the policy process? Will technocracy acquiesce to post-positivist proponents and less powerful and influential policy actors? Or is social science in for a prolonged intellectual battle? A key issue at stake is the relationship of *knowledge to power*. Michel Foucault has argued that traditional forms of knowledge, whether it be Aristotle's physics or the ideas of the Vienna Circle, have kept down and classified other forms of knowledge as "nonsense." Knowledge and power go hand in hand. Normal science must be maintained. Foucault argues that although neutrality may be the desired ideal, it is nonetheless naive and false. The emerging post-positivist movement strives for understanding society rather than controlling and engineering it. It questions objectivity on the part of all actors and asserts that complexity can only be dealt with when dialogue and mutual interaction (on a level playing field) take place. As such, the implications for policy analysis cannot be ignored any longer.

(2). THE POST-POSITIVIST MOVEMENT: MULTIPLE REALITIES AND MULTIPLE CAUSES

In part , post-positivism emerged out of the post-modern movement of literary criticism. It can be described as inverted Cartesianism--- it turns earlier notions of science upside down. The task of the social scientist is to de-construct "texts,"

whether it be literary, philosophical or social text. However, to the lay person, what is "de-constructionism?" How is it related to policy analysis? Stephen Cox provides a good definition;

De-construction is purportedly able to demonstrate that all ideologies are without ultimate 'ground' and that no text can totalize itself in the sense of offering a complete view of the truth.... The de-constructive attack on totalization normally entails an attack on all those pretensions to be objective understanding traditionally associated with the liberal study of philosophy and literature. 37

[Champion adds that a literary or social] text can be described as the intentional product of a creative individual, or it is better seen as the product of social, historical, linguistic or some other non-individual determinants. [Most importantly, he asks] can we ever hope to approach some consensus in our descriptions and evaluations? Or does the richness and complexity of literary texts generate an infinity of interpretations which defy any claim that some descriptions and evaluations are better than others.38

Unlike the natural scientists who observe atomic and chemical reactions, the political scientists, when observing social phenomena and human interaction, must interpret the meaning of behaviour and then interpret it in the context of the language and culture which it takes place. [There is no need to re-hash Wittgenstein, Berger and Luckmann, Kuhn, and Polanyi arguments here]. For this reason the social sciences are more akin to literary criticism . "Human actions, like texts, have meaning for both the persons who perform them and for those witnessing the performance. Yet, some of these meanings may not cohere with or correspond to others.... And so human actions, like texts--- characteristically require interpretation in order to understand them."39 In order to interpret text, one has to de-construct, take apart and, analyze. This approach challenges fundamental assumptions concerning liberalism's positive views of the individual's power of choice, intention and rational understanding.40 Yet how does all this tie in with political science and policy analysis? Precisely because it tries to understand the

relationship between knowledge and power. As Patti Lather notes, "post-modern thought and practice open up a new avenue for unmasking the politics of intellectual life."⁴¹

A major impetus behind post-positivist thought was Michel Foucault. For Foucault, knowledge and power could not exist without one another. Traditionally the knowledge-power structures in societies "kept down" and subjugated other knowledges.⁴² It encouraged an elitist and technocratic (i.e., positivistic) approach towards knowledge. As Gibbons argues "the development of any particular discourse of knowledge and truth makes a particular set of power relations, and the existence of any set of power relations makes some discussions of truth possible while excluding others."⁴³ Michael Polanyi would agree. Reiterating Nancy Hartsock, Lather points out "the diverse and disorderly others [are] beginning to chip away at the social and political power of the theorizer, creating a plurality of sites from which the world is spoken."⁴⁴ Gibbons adds that any given objective truth predominates not because it is more truthful than others, but because of its relationship to power relations.⁴⁵ Is there any parallel to policy analysts who consult or hold prestigious positions at the top of Canada's Department of External Affairs or Employment and Immigration, or tenured university professors who receive grants from government? Does the fact that policy analysts play a predominant role in the inner circle of policy communities (a concept more fully discussed in chapter four) parallel Foucault's concept of knowledge and power? Is the knowledge espoused by lobby groups on the periphery of government kept down or less "scientific" than others? One could argue that policy analysts in the inner circle of the policy process are coping with their own weaknesses by increasingly creating networks with other individuals who possess other knowledges.⁴⁶ In effect, the hegemonic power relations of the past may

slowly be breaking up towards a more participatory policy process. It could be argued that the various interest groups, associations, municipal and provincial governments, and business organizations, may be the emergent "subjugated" knowledges of which Foucault speaks. This suggests that there are indeed a variety of perceptions of social problems, and that limits in objectivity and understanding may be overcome with the help of "emergent" (previously subjugated) knowledges. As Foucault points out, when we look at relationships in the policy process, power should be examined "where it becomes capillary, that is, in its more regional and local forms and institutions."⁴⁷ Leslie Pal supports the view that a more pluralist model of policymaking is emerging, in that all western democracies in recent years have seen an explosion of think tanks, centres, and institutes.⁴⁸ For example, in examining the proliferation of women's groups involved in policy issues, Sandra Burt outlines the change that has taken place between from the years 1965 to 1989.⁴⁹ Similarly, in the Canadian immigration policy community, the federal and provincial governments have come to rely on such groups as the Laurier Institute, Hastings Institute, Fraser Institute, Institute for Research on Public Policy, as well as numerous others. Limits in objectivity and Foucauldian concepts of knowledge and power are important in terms of recent trends in the policymaking process. Thus "definitions of problems in a pluralist environment [have] become multiple."⁵⁰ Furthermore, the "hired gun" image of the social scientist⁵¹ is slowly being replaced by post-positivist conceptions of social science.

The Changing Community on Status of Women Issues at the Federal Level




Figure 2-1. "The Changing Community on Status of Women's Issues at the Federal Level." Source: Sandra Burt, "Organized Women's Groups and the State" in William D. Coleman and Grace Skogstad's Policy Communities and Public Policy [Copp Clark Pitman, Mississauga, Ontario, 1990] p. 193

According to Lincoln and Guba, 52 the fundamental differences between positivists and post-positivists are;

<u>POSITIVISM</u>	<u>POSTPOSITIVISM</u>
(1) Single	Multiple
(2) Hierarchy	Heterarchy
(3) Mechanical	Holographic
(4) Determinate	Indeterminate
(5) Linearly Causal	Mutually Causal
(6) Objective	Perspective [subjective]

(1). From the simple to the complex: No longer can one part of society be seen and entirely separated, isolated and, examined (in a 'black box' fashion) as if it were not part of a larger environment.

(2). From hierarchy to heterarchic concepts of order: If there exist social/cultural orders, they may exist side by side, not one on top of another. There is growing doubt that real orders exist at all, that they are composed by human thinking rather than legitimated by the Law of Nature.

(3). From mechanical to holographic imaging: Previously social scientists perceived the laws of the universe in terms of Newtonian mechanics. However, Olgilvie and Schwartz argue we find that information of the world "is distributed throughout--- that at each point information about the whole is contained in the parts. In this sense, everything is interconnected like a vast network of inference patterns, having been generated by the same dynamic process and containing the whole in the part."53

(4). From determinancy to indeterminacy: Social Scientists had previously assumed that events and human behaviour were deterministic and predictive. In contrast, post-positivism suggests that social and natural events may be described at times as chaotic and cannot be pre-determined. Flux is inherent in the system.

(5). From linear to mutual causality: No longer accepting an "A causes B resulting in C approach," observers are now aware that there is mutual causality--- numerous variables interact and mutually affect one another. (For example, this is why it's often very difficult to predict economic cycles).

(6). From objective to perspective: Objectivity is an illusion. Socialization, language, professional status, biological constraints and, other factors affect a persons' perception of reality. As Graham Allison once said, "where you stand depends on where you sit" on an issue. As Dgilvie and Schwartz point out "we see a shift from the 'absolute' truth discovered by the 'right' method toward a plurality of kinds of knowledge explored by a multiplicity of methods."⁵⁴

Rita Mae Kelly adds that; "the move away from positivism and the developing consensus that we live in a socially constructed reality poses sharp challenges to the rational-actor model of decision-making and raises questions about the utility as well as accuracy of linear, instrumentalist, deterministic policy studies."⁵⁵ This new methodology focuses on "symbolic interactionism" whereby individuals involved in the policy community construct their own meanings and reality of what the problems and what the solutions should be.

Traditionally, the main task (or obsession) of the political scientist has been to master certainty and predictability and not be vulnerable to chance. Positivists believed that chance and unpredictability de-legitimized the scientific, objective and rationalistic nature of their profession. (Comte and Popper wanted science to

avoid becoming another form of metaphysics or "nonsense"). Unfortunately they missed a key point. As purposive beings that often behave unpredictably, individuals should not be considered as acting in a certain and rational manner. Instead, individuals attach emotion and meaning to their behaviour. Therefore this upsets the political scientist's ability to predict and control. In this sense, our efforts need to focus on understanding the meaning that is attached to behaviour, rather than naively trying to predict behaviour.

In this context, post-positivist policy analysis suggests a more educated rather than social engineering approach to social and political problems. On a practical level policy analysis "derives its justificatory force from its capacity to illuminate the contentious dimensions of policy questions [my emphasis], to identify the defects and to elucidate the political implications of contending prescriptions."⁵⁷ In this process, analysts must interpret the meaning and perceptions of those involved in the policy community. Essentially, one must practice the art of hermeneutics.

In trying to interpret "social texts," the policy analyst tries to discover the meaning that people attach to their interaction with others. Hermeneutics, also known as interpretive social science, aims to "uncover the internal coherence amongst ideas, beliefs, intentions, actions, and practices, to show how the understanding of participants makes sense in terms of the institutions and relationships within which they are located."⁵⁸ The analyst has to interpret the personal meaning behind an action. When an individual votes, what is his motivation? Loyal support for the opposition party? A desire to have a prime minister or certain member of the legislature elected? Similarly, when individuals voted in East Germany for German re-unification, the meaning of their vote may have differed from someone's in West Germany. Whatever the case at hand, the

social scientist's ability to understand political actors depends upon his or her ability to capture their reasons and rationales for acting as they do in a given situation.⁶⁰

If policy analysts (practicing hermeneutics) are better able to help policy actors understand one another, a more cooperative policy process will emerge. Without mutual understanding and adjustment among actors there results conflict, mistrust, poor communication, resentment and a suppression of certain knowledges. There are numerous examples in Canadian history where an adversarial and hostile policy environment (because actors did not understand or misperceived the actions of others) made problems worse rather than better. For example, a variety of conflicting interpretations surrounded the Trudeau Administration's National Energy Program in the early 1980's. Similarly, the June 1990 failure of the Meech Lake Accord was interpreted many different ways. In this context, a policy analysis that can interpret the actions of policy actors,

creates the conditions for mutual understanding between different members of the same social order or between the members of different social orders, which is to say that it makes possible communication between them where none existed before, or where it did exist, such a communication was distorted [by parochialism and self-centeredness] The aim of interpretive social science is to make possible a successful dialogue in speaking and acting between different social actors or within oneself.⁶¹

Forms of interpretive social theory include Farr's situational analysis and Fay's educative model.⁶² Both approaches point toward a self-understanding of actors. In this respect they offer opportunities for what Hawkesworth describes as the applied pluralist model of policymaking (in contrast to the traditional social science model). Additionally, policymakers are better able to cope with increasing social complexity. For example, the policy analyst may be able to facilitate better dialogue and understanding between actors at the Ministries of Employment and Immigration and External Affairs with respect to conflicts over foreign and immigration policy.

Ever since Employment and Immigration's foreign offices have moved under the control of External Affairs in the early 1980's, immigration officials have often felt a sense of alienation and distrust for their External superiors. An interpretive social scientist could offer hope to this situation.

Regardless, the role for the policy analyst points toward new forms of self-understanding. "The setting for most social problems is highly interconnected. Overlapping interactions among elements, positive and negative feedback control loops, and non-linear relationships inhere in social systems that are in a continual state of change."⁶⁴ These concepts dispel the former positivist single (and linear) dimensional approaches to political behaviour and add a second dimension. However, there is yet a third dimension that has implications for objectivity in the policy process. The notion that social systems are capable of self-producing/self-organizing also poses serious epistemological questions to social science. As Daneke stated, "Another and perhaps more isolated attempt at escaping the static-mechanistic world view of traditional science has been the adoption of the methods and concepts of biology."⁶⁵ In other words, to what extent do biological and societal evolution correspond? Are there relevant metaphors or ways of thinking which can be imported from evolutionary biology into policy analysis to make sense of a multidimensional process of change? Does biology provide us with the concepts we need to move away from a "static-mechanistic world view?" In the following section I touch on some of these emerging ideas, and how they relate in a practical manner to policy analysis.

(3). A DOUBLE DILEMMA: NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE SEPARATE
BUT OVERLAPPING PROBLEMS OF OBJECTIVITY AND
UNDERSTANDING

"Men do not like to think that they are bound by the same necessity as other natural phenomena." Emile Durkheim

Modernity is predicated on the notion that individuals are the masters of their own fate. However, one could argue that man is an ambiguous creature acting in an ambiguous environment. On the one hand we are natural beings, yet on the other hand we are purposive, in that we attach meaning and intention to our actions. Do social systems compare with natural systems? Essentially, the process of evolution and change is similar in both situations.

Summarizing Prigogine and Stenger's Order Out of Chaos, Daneke describes that

all systems contain subsystems which are continually 'fluctuating.' At times, a single fluctuation or combination of them may become so powerful, as a result of a positive feedback that it shatters the pre-existing organization. At this revolutionary movement-- the authors call it a 'singular movement' or a 'bifurcation' point -- it is inherently impossible to determine in advance which direction change will take: whether the system disintegrates into 'chaos' or leaps to a new, more differentiated, higher level of 'order' or organization which they call a 'dissipative structure.' Order and organization can actually arise 'spontaneously' out of that disorder and chaos through a process of self-organization.⁶⁶

Using Prigogine and Stenger's process as an analogy, policy communities (also described as sub-systems) fluctuate in an unpredictable and powerful manner where at certain bifurcation points (for example, when two ministries clash at the highest levels over a specific issue) a new form of organization occurs (meaning one ministry has pushed the other aside and now dominates policy in a certain policy community). As sub-systems, policy communities interact with one another in the context of overall government policy processes, resulting in a system

continually threatened by chaos. Bureaucrats often describe the chaotic and barely manageable nature of the policy process. Finally, the notion of "spontaneous orders" is noticeable when events and organizational and departmental alignments change within policy communities, neither by planning or conscious design.

"Order out of chaos" adds a new angle in policy analysis. Instead of determinism or randomness, social change may occur in an evolutionary manner. In a circular fashion, we continually alter our actions to fit into the changing environment of which we are a part of. Therefore, *as an interactive being within our object of inquiry-- objectivity is impossible.*

In his analysis of self-organizing political systems, Dobuzinskis suggests that:

Political life is an evolutionary process... Political life... involves a subtle dialectic of invariance and change. The recursive interaction of autonomous political activities and sub-groups of the community to which they belong delineate a field within which living systems [or political systems] of a new order emerge from time to time, develop, and evolve into still newer forms.⁶⁷

Such an approach implies a "recursive exploration of organized complexity, along a paradigmatic 'loop' linking physics to biology to political anthropology."⁶⁸ Rooted in cybernetic theory, self-organizing systems are recognized as containing positive and negative feedback mechanisms which allow for continual adaptive behaviour within the broader environment *which the self-organizing systems themselves constructed*. What do these abstract ideas mean? In effect, "when external disturbances-- even unexpected ones-- excite a given sub-system, the others will adapt to this change, and stability is thus restored."⁶⁹ This happens in the political process. When external disturbances such as social and political crises occur, they may excite and stimulate actors in the immigration policy community.

Positioning and movement in that community may affect the positioning of actors in other communities, such as foreign policy or industrial policy. These communities will attempt to adapt to the changes that occurred in the immigration community. Stability is thus restored. Therefore, in an evolutionary process, policy communities engage in a continual adaption to the environment which they help to create. As Morgan argues, "an understanding of the autopoietic nature of systems requires that we understand how each element [whether it be specific individuals or other policy communities] simultaneously combines the maintenance of itself with the maintenance of others. It is simply not good enough to dismiss the large part of the chain of interactions as 'the environment'"⁷⁰ We are the environment.⁷¹ Objectivity is impossible, unless we can somehow view circular social/natural interactions through a telescope from Mars!

This dimension helps in understanding the epistemological and practical day-to-day complexities that policy analysts must face. As part of the process of circularly interacting relations within our broader social/natural environment, social science needs to re-direct its energies. Too often, policy analysts and policy communities "encounter great problems in dealing with the wider world, because they do not recognize how they are a part of this environment. They see themselves as discrete entities that are faced with the problem of surviving against the vagaries of the outside world."⁷² A move toward self-understanding would help social scientists cope with overlapping policy issues and contradictions in the policy process.

In Inquiry and Change Lindblom describes how social and biological impairments to inquiry require a more pluralistic policy process. Corresponding to the idea of self-organizing systems, Lindblom suggests the self-guiding model for coping with social complexity. This approach brings ordinary individuals into the

process and leaves only a limited role for the "policy expert."⁷³ Lindblom's analysis implies the existence of multiple realities of social existence. The self-organizing society deals with policy problems incrementally.⁷⁴ In doing so it rebuffs rationalistic assumptions that the solutions to problems can be found at the top of the ivory tower of academia-- in the self-guiding society the role of the social scientist is supportive. With global interdependence, each person can only observe a fraction of any problem. For example, the political scientist who studies international agricultural relations has little time to study in-depth the domestic policy processes of Canada and the United States. Yet these may indirectly influence international agricultural relations. Therefore the self-guiding society assumes that the policy process "requires the participation of vast numbers of people, most of whom bring significant but greatly limited competence to their inquiries... Multiplism requires pervasive sustained inquiry at many levels of competence broadly distributed in society."⁷⁵ In this respect, the self-guiding society incorporates Foucauldian emancipatory concepts in that it recognizes the importance of previously "subjugated" knowledges. It stresses de-centralization. It recognizes the need for mutual adjustment of actors and organizations, not unlike natural organisms, in coping with the limits in objectivity and understanding the true causes and effects of events (or "spontaneous transformations").

In Positive Philosophy August Comte wrote:

In the inorganic sciences [chemistry/physics], the elements are much better known to us than the whole which they constitute: so that we must proceed from the simple to the compound. But the reverse is necessary in the Study of Man and Society. Man and Society as a whole being better known to us, and more accessible objects of study than the parts which constitute them. In exploring the universe, it is a whole that is inaccessible to us; whereas, in investigating Man and Society, our difficulty is in penetrating the details.⁷⁶

The question is, can we ever know or comprehend the "details" of which Comte speaks? David Hume and F.A. Hayek are sceptical of the possibility of individuals ever being able to understand the underlying causes and patterns of our behaviour. Positivists argued that through observation, cause and effect can be empirically verified. But did they prove verification or correlation of events? Post-positivism suggests "B" will not always follow "A" in a linear fashion. As Hume noted; "For the same reason that 1737 cannot occur in the present year, 1738, every moment must be distinct from and posterior or anterior to another."⁷⁷ This reminds one of Prigogine and Stengers "order out of chaos" where at certain singular moments or bifurcation points, the direction that subsequent events will follow is unknowable. Will it emerge into a higher spontaneous order or will the cause, "A," spiral into a downward chaotic process? "The scenes of the universe are continually shifting, and one object follows another in an uninterrupted succession; but the power of force which actuates the whole machine is entirely concealed from us and never discovers itself in any of the sensible qualities of the body."⁷⁸

Every answer or solution gives rise to new questions--- reminiscent of the "planner's paradox." There is no tangible component in the cause itself that we can grasp. For example, economists often try to argue that government overspending causes inflation or crises in foreign investment. They correlate, formulate and use many ingenious statistical techniques to argue their case. Whether their predictions are sometimes correct or sometimes not is not the point. At issue is the fact that whatever occurs, how do they prove the link of cause to effect? I argue that they are engaging in scientistic behaviour--- they intimidate non-economists with their complicated statistical formulas and mathematical techniques. When their predictions are wrong, they "explain away" effects as

"unforeseen circumstances." As Max Weber pointed out, "the number and type of causes which have influenced any given event are always infinite--- and there is nothing in the things themselves to set some of them apart from meriting attention."⁷⁹ Being in a constant state of adaption to the wider world, economies and polities are in a continual state of uncontrollable flux. As such, our efforts to observe and understand causes and effects of public policies is very limited. "Human blindness meets us at every turn, in spite of our endeavour to allude or avoid it."⁸⁰ Hume's point challenges the Cartesian belief that humans can construct in their minds social institutions. Adding to this, Hayek suggests (in his examination of spontaneous orders ⁸¹), that "civilization rests on the fact that we all benefit from knowledge we do not possess...[the entirety of knowledge cannot be known to one individual, but is]...widely dispersed among individuals"⁸² with their own specialized knowledges. This has implications for public policy analysis.

Neither Hayek, nor I, accept that policy actors are at the total mercy of social complexity. Rather, a middle (incrementalist) approach may be possible. Hayek uses the analogy of comparing the growth of a garden to social change. We plant the seeds and nourish the garden, and let the natural course of growth occur. We can't directly control or predict growth. Some flowers and plants will survive, some not. If we try to control growth we only endanger the overall spontaneous natural order of the garden. This parallels how political institutions and social practices evolve. Do they take their natural course, or do we determine through a centralized ivory tower the course they are to take? Is it an "either or" question? In fact there is a middle course--- subtle guided change is possible:

Though we may never know as much about certain complex phenomena as we can know about simple phenomena, we may partly pierce the boundary by deliberately cultivating a technique which aims at more limited objectives--- the explanation not of individual events but merely the appearance of certain patterns or orders.⁸³

More specifically, "piercing the boundary between the simple and complex" means identifying the bifurcation points where change or adjustment may occur in the system. We can recognize these points only when there exists an effort at mutual understanding and adjustment on the part of policy actors--- solutions to problems flow back and forth from different vantage points in the system.

At this point I have suggested that humans are inherently limited in objectivity and understanding. The purpose of this chapter was critical in nature--- to attack the false assumptions that have legitimized positivist epistemology. From here my task changes--- my aims are constructive. Chapter three looks at fairly recent contributions of the policy sciences to policy analysis, also it analyzes new and innovative contributions to understanding the underlying nature of complexity and social dynamics. Chapter four provides a synthesis in the form of an illustration--- the problems and complexities that actors face in the Canadian immigration policy community.

CHAPTER THREE

NEW INSIGHTS IN UNDERSTANDING PROCESS, SOCIAL DYNAMICS AND INTERDEPENDENCE

Harold Lasswell's call for a new supra-discipline in 1951 pointed towards new attempts at understanding the various obstacles and complexities involved in the policy process. He named this discipline "the policy sciences." As a relatively recent contribution to academia, Lasswell's policy sciences definitely added a much needed stimulus to the on-going epistemological debate between the positivists and the post-positivists. In this chapter I look at the policy sciences contributions to the debate. Secondly, by synthesizing more recent material in understanding process, social dynamics and interdependence, I develop a typology which will provide for an outline of the elements that are involved in the development of new approaches to understanding complexity. In effect, this chapter is the launching pad for my final chapter --- looking at the Canadian immigration policy process as an illustration in order to gain an understanding of the problems and complexities in the making of policy communities.

The policy sciences could be interpreted as an attempt to reconcile the positions of the positivists and the post-positivists. Was Lasswell searching for a middle ground? Or was he just adding some fancy new terms and concepts in order to maintain the fallacy that social inquiry was a "science?" Let's find out. The policy sciences can be described in a series of ways. For example: (1) Policy Sciences constitutes a supra-disciplinary effort focusing on public policymaking. (2) Policy Sciences is based on the behavioral sciences and on analytical approaches; it also draws from decision theory, general systems theory, management sciences, and similar modern areas of study. (3) Fusing pure and

applied research, policy sciences is concerned mainly with improving policymaking through use of systemic knowledge, structural rationality and organized creativity. (4) ...It is concerned with means and intermediate goals rather than absolute values. But it is also aware of the difficulties of achieving 'value-free' science and tries to contribute to value choices by exploring value implications.... (5) ...It emphasizes meta-policies (i.e., policy on making policies). (6) While the main test of policy sciences is better achievement of goals through more effective and efficient policies, it does not deal with discrete policy problems per se, but provides methods and knowledge for doing so.¹

In effect, Lasswell had two aims in mind: improvement in the policy process, followed by an improvement in policy substance. He believed that the "normal sciences" of the time (i.e., sociology, political science, and psychology) alone by themselves couldn't ameliorate society's social and economic problems. Thus an integration of academic disciplines was needed. A sceptic would charge that this was just another form of scientism, reminiscent of earlier attempts by the Logical Positivists to create a unified science. Was there much of a difference between Lasswell's position and the position of the Logical Positivists? Pointing to Lasswell's own words, sceptics could argue such a point:

"If the possibility of prediction is regarded as the criterion of the scientific method, the social sciences can be made as scientific as the physical sciences, without requiring any logical principles other than those which have brought the physical sciences overwhelming success."²

There was no doubt that the policy sciences was to be scientific in its orientation, yet Lasswell also questioned many of its positivistic and elitist assumptions.

Although striving for a science of policymaking, Lasswell and many of his supporters recognized the concerns countered by the post-positivists. With

respect to the question of rationality, he stated that "our greater understanding of the human psyche and social dynamics taught us to discount the earlier postulate of a perfectly rational world." Also, "we have learned...to recognize the importance of the irrational in human behavior."³ From the point of view of the "objective" scientist "it is untenable to assert that scientific activities are value neutral."⁴ Diverging from the traditional "ivory tower" and "hired gun" images of the social sciences, Lasswell argued that democratic principles are not to be forgotten and that the ultimate goal of the policy sciences was "the realization of human dignity in theory and fact."⁵ Whether he meant a more participatory role in the policy process for the average citizen, the case is not exactly clear. The point is that traditional positivism has considered anything other than objective scientific data as "nonsense." On a related level, he argued for a middle road in social science; one which recognized the limits in objectivity and an awareness that social scientists had a very limited understanding of complex social systems.⁶ By calling for an integration of the various academic disciplines, he was aware of the "multiple realities" and multiple approaches towards understanding human phenomena.

In this context, what specifically did Lasswell and his supporters advocate in a policy sciences approach towards improving policymaking? For the most part they called for a "contextual, problem-oriented, and multi-method approach." These three features provide the solid foundation that is necessary for the development of a new policy approach.

(1). LASSWELL'S STRATEGY FOR ANALYSIS

(A) CONTEXTUAL: "...it is important to consider the entire context of events which may have an impact upon the future problems of policy. Hence the world as a whole needs to be kept at the focus of attention."⁷ Similarly, "every group and

individual is interdependent with every other participant, and the degree of interdependence fluctuates through time at the national, transnational, and sub-national level."⁸ Taking a holistic view of social dynamics Lasswell argues that "as living forms, human beings interact by taking one another into account ... interdependence is indispensable to enlightened public policy."⁹ Constant change and flux are inherent in social and political institutions and continually alter the context of the various policy areas (and communities). This aspect has implications for limits of objectivity on the part of actors in those institutions. Similarly, the issue of multiple realities and perceptions in a variety of situations is implicitly recognized.

(B) **PROBLEM-ORIENTED**; As a stepping stone to analysis a series of intellectual tasks must be taken. (i). Goal Clarification; What future states are to be realized? How far away are we? (ii). Trend Description; To what extent have past and recent events approximated the preferred states? What discrepancies are there? How great are they? (iii). Analysis of Conditions: Lasswell states, "What factors have conditioned the direction and magnitude of the trends described?" (iv). Projection of Developments; "If current positions are continued what is the probable future of goal realizations or discrepancies?" (v). Invention, Evaluation, and Selection of Alternatives; "What intermediate objectives and strategies will optimize the realization of preferred goals?"¹⁰ Essentially, these five questions create an agenda whereby the context in a certain policy area is allowed to emerge.

(C) **MULTI-METHOD (DIVERSITY)**; By integrating various academic disciplines, policy analysis escapes its traditional narrow and limited focus. The policy sciences sought to blend elements from the behavioural sciences, decision theory, along with the traditional social sciences. However, by drawing on features from engineering, and the physical and life sciences, Lasswell pointed towards

more innovative ideas that would become quite popular in mainstream policy analysis in the late 1980's and 1990's (i.e., self-organizing systems and quantum physics).¹¹ Similarly, the policy sciences (contrary to the position of the Logical Positivists) recognized the contributions that qualitative analysis could make towards social inquiry. Forty years later in The Science and Praxis of Complexity Ploman argues that "it seems clear that the study of complexity cannot remain within the confines of a single discipline; that it demands a cross- or trans-disciplinary approach, and even leads to what are by some scholars perceived as artificial or reductionist barriers caused by the 'arbitrary' classification of knowledge represented by the traditionally defined disciplines."¹² Lasswell wanted a diverse approach because he recognized there could be multiple (disciplinary) interpretations of the causes and effects of social and political events. In this sense, perhaps an early believer in the practice of hermeneutics?

In the courtroom of epistemology, were Lasswell and his supporters guilty of engaging in positivistic thought, yet shrouded in fancy new terminology ("meta-policies," "decision seminars")? Perhaps it would be a hung jury? However, I believe there is enough evidence to suggest an innocent verdict and that there are valuable links between the policy sciences and more recent academic literature. Daneke argues that Lasswell "supported both the new [behavioral] quantitative emphasis, while maintaining the importance of qualitative research as well." Similarly, "he proposed an objective science of policy, with general propositions which would also be highly contextual."¹³ Paraphrasing Torgeson, Daneke believes that Lasswell "fully anticipated many of the arguments being made by newly arrived post-positivists, especially those who invoke critical theory."¹⁴ Yet there remains an important question to be answered. Why did it take so long

(since 1951) for mainstream political science to recognize Lasswell's contributions?

One could argue that:

...forces within the policy science movement itself became quickly embroiled in ... the synoptic vs. anti-synoptic debate. Other debilitating debates such as , 'rational vs. incremental decision-making', 'politics vs. analysis', 'individualism vs. holism', ... effectively forestalled paradigmatic progress. However the pressure for a new paradigm of policy inquiry was greatly dissipated by the widespread adoption of neo-classical economic theory and method.¹⁵

Although recognizing the various contributions of the policy sciences, why has it not become a permanent tool in solving complex policy problems? As a test of its practical usefulness, how well does it cope with complexity? Did it empower policymakers and bureaucrats with the necessary tools to deal with increasing global interdependence and overlapping policy areas? As an advocate of the policy sciences in the 1960's and 1970's, Yehezkel Dror noted (in 1986) that "the policy sciences continues to lack adequate concept packages and significant theoretic conjunctures"¹⁶ to manage complex policy problems. Lasswell and his students themselves recognized the need to have a policy sciences approach that could cope with complexity.¹⁷ Yet in the context of this thesis, Lasswell's contributions are still important: (1). The need to improve our understanding of the policy process, before improving policy substance, and; (2). The importance of a "contextual, problem-oriented, multi-method approach" in analyzing political phenomena. These are considered essential first steps in developing a new approach at coping with complexity. The next step is to look at the nature of "complexity" itself.

(2). NEW APPROACHES TO UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL COMPLEXITY

In 1975 Todd La Porte developed a framework for trying to understand social complexity: $Q = (C, D, I) \times \{RATE\ OF\ CHANGE\}$. Essentially, he argues that complexity Q is a function of the number of system components C (this could be individuals or groups), the relative differentiation or variety of these components D , and the degree of interdependence I among these components. Then, by definition, the greater C , D , and I (multiplied by the rate of change), the more complex the system.¹⁸ He believed that "our lives are bounded by agencies, organizations, coalitions, and associations: networks of hundreds of connected groups and persons."¹⁹ Therefore as the number of connections increases, so to does the complexity. In today's world, complexity faces us at every turn and every level-- from the global, to the national to the sub-national.²⁰

(A). FROM LINEAR TO CIRCULAR RELATIONS AND "LOOPS"

For the most part, the notion of "thinking in lines " is being replaced by the idea that we should think of social, political, and economic dynamics in terms of "loops." "Loops" and "lines?" Mutual causation puts an end to linear causation. What are the implications of this? Essentially, *it is an important element of our new understanding of the complexities and dynamics of social and political processes.* What does it have to do with finding solutions to practical day-to-day policy problems? My answer is that before we solve policy problems *we need to re-conceptualize the environment that they are operating in.* More specifically, to what extent does the complex "nature" of the system affect each problem? With a proper conceptualization, the political scientist or policy analyst is better able to create better solutions. Rather than engaging in traditional linear thinking, we need to think holistically and identify the circular relationships that characterize

interdependence. Below, Morgan illustrates how thinking in loops rather than lines provides a richer picture of the causes and effects of inflation: 21




Figure 3.1 "Price inflation as a system of mutual causality." Source: Gareth Morgan, *Images of Organization* (Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, C.A., 1986) p. 250. For a detailed explanation of Morgan's example see 22.

When looking at any policy area, be it immigration or health policy, one notices how mutual causation, positive and negative feedback control loops, indeterminate interaction of innumerable elements (this could be individuals and groups) creates quite a chaotic environment. Too often in the social sciences, simple causes have been arbitrarily attached to complex problems. We need to replace the idea of mechanical causality, (for example, "A causes B, resulting in C), with "the idea of mutual causality, which suggests that A and B may be codefined as a consequence of belonging to the same system of circular relations."²³ Morgan discusses how...

Numerous cyberneticians have attempted to develop methodologies for studying this kind of mutual causality, and hence how systems engage in their own transformations. One of the most notable methodologies is found in the work of Magorah Maruyama, who focuses on positive and negative feedback in shaping system dynamics. Processes of negative feedback, where a change in a variable initiates changes in the opposite direction, are important in accounting for the stability of systems. Processes characterized by positive feedback, on the other hand, where more leads to more, and less to less, are important in accounting for system change. Together, these feedback mechanisms can explain why systems gain or preserve a given form, and how this form can be elaborated and transformed over time.²⁴

With this approach "we invariably arrive at a much richer picture of the system under consideration. There are many levels at which a system can be analyzed, and the choice of perspective will very much depend on the nature of the problem with which one is dealing."²⁵ This approach is an improvement from earlier approaches which analyzed events in a de-composed fashion. Although "it may not always be possible to map the loops defining a system with the degree of certainty and completeness that one might require," it must be remembered that "the mode of thinking in this kind of analysis can be of considerable benefit. We have here a new epistemology for the management of complex systems that shows how we can grasp a better understanding of the processes that shape

organizational life. Even though this understanding is neither complete nor perfect, it provides a powerful tool for guiding decisions and interventions."²⁶ As Soedjatmoko argues, "we are... involved in a major process of both mental and social restructuring due, among other factors, to the impact of science and technology, to ecological considerations, and to shifting values and attitudes."²⁷ The central point is this: thinking in terms of loops and circular relations is a prerequisite in understanding dynamics that influence policy communities.

In general, the development of cybernetics has greatly contributed to our understanding of social and political processes. However, we must not be euphoric--- early cybernetics stressed certain concepts and ideas that are today regarded as highly problematic. As Dobuzinskis argues, "cybernetics has considerably enriched our conceptualization of the physical, biological, and social aspects of complexity. Because we can hardly do without it, we must also be keenly aware of its limitations..."²⁸ In particular, the emphasis was too mechanistic and dealt too much with only negative feedback processes. The notion of an external regulator maintaining control over an environment was an inappropriate image of the reality of social complexity. In contrast, Dobuzinskis states that the new generation of cybernetics

suggests that man, being the most complex and adaptive living system, is a fully autonomous subject. In unpredictable ways, man actively contributes to his reproduction and also to that of his natural and social environments, or the biosphere or 'noosphere.' The biosphere is itself conceived as a complex field of interactions among self-organizing systems; and the noosphere, by [i.e.]... the sphere of communicative action, including language and culture, also follows a developmental logic of its own. The implications of this perspective for political inquiry are varied and challenging. 29

Similarly, he argues that "if the first cybernetics did not make good on its original insight concerning the emerging autonomy of self-regulated systems,

emphasizing, as it did, control rather than autonomy, the second cybernetics takes up that challenge."³⁰ The idea that political systems are continually evolving with the [chaotic and unpredictable] environment suggests the importance of how internal self-organizing processes (ie., individuals) affects development. (Related to this, we recognize how positive feedback patterns can add to the chaos and complexity of the political environment). Therefore, although there will be references to concepts such as "negative feedback" and "homeostasis," in the context of this thesis, it is important to keep in mind the newer aspects of cybernetics--- self-organization, internal evolutionary mechanisms and parallels that can be drawn with natural and ecological systems.

(3). DRAWING PARALLELS WITH INTERDEPENDENCE IN NATURAL SYSTEMS

There are definite advantages in relating and comparing the dynamics of natural systems with social systems. As everything is interdependent and overlaps, Morgan argues how it is difficult to separate social and natural systems--- they are part of the same evolving environment. Morgan points out that all systems

engage in circular patterns of interactions whereby change in one element of the system is coupled with changes elsewhere, setting up continuous patterns of interaction that are always self-referential. They are self-referential because a system cannot enter into interactions that are not specified in the pattern of relations that define its organization. Thus a system's interaction with its 'environment' is really a reflection and part of its own organization. It interacts with its environment in a way that facilitates its own self-production, and in this sense we can see that its environment is really a part of itself. [Thus when social scientists] attempt to understand such [social and political] systems by drawing an artificial boundary between system and environment....[they end up breaking] the chain of circular interaction. An understanding of the autopoietic nature of systems requires that we understand how each element simultaneously combines the maintenance of itself with the maintenance of others. It is simply not good

enough to dismiss the large part of the circular chain of interaction as 'the environment'.³¹

It sounds as if Morgan is speaking of natural living systems and ecosystems. Yet political and social systems also possess autopoietic qualities. Ecosystems contain elements (i.e., plants, animals, algae, and forests) that on their own are purposive--- they aim to survive in the broader environment. Inadvertently, their individual goal of survival helps contribute and makes possible the homeostatic maintenance of the overall ecosystem. Are social systems similar? They also possess elements (i.e., individuals, organizations, and institutions) that on their own are purposive--- they also aim to survive and co-exist in the broader environment. In fact, their individual behaviours contribute to the growth and homeostatic nature of the social system.. The key point to grasp is that a healthy social and political system requires similiar elements found in natural systems. With this in mind, Dobuzinskis points out; we are now "witnessing a new understanding of science as a dialogue with nature and democracy as an alternative to technocracy."³² John S. Dryzek contributes to this dialogue with his proposal that policy analysts and policymakers should adhere to a form of "ecological rationality." By applying the various mechanisms that ensure the proper functioning of ecosystems, to social and political systems, we invariably uncover many important and often ignored aspects of the policy process.

(A). ECOSYSTEMS AND OPEN SOCIAL SYSTEMS

Dryzek argues that "ecosystems are always open systems, to the extent that it is often hard to define the boundries of specific ecosystems"³³ The primary importance of the following concepts is that *they add to the process of re-conceptualization that I introduced with Morgan's thinking in loops and circular*

relations. Similarly, the following concepts provide a much richer picture of the dynamics that shape our political and social relations.³⁴

(i). Self-regulating/Cybernetic: "Ecosystems do possess stable 'goals,' such as production-respiration ratios, total biomass and species of diversity, and there is a (sometimes elusive) information network composed of the 'invisible wires' of nature"

(ii). Non-teleological: "...no central controller sets goals, monitors feedback, and acts in response. Instead, control devices are internal and diverse."

(iii). Homeostasis: "Self-regulation enables ecosystems to maintain their essential structure and functions in the face of exogenous shocks. This homeostatic quality means that ecosystems can, to an extent, remain intact... when confronted with the intrusions of human agricultural or industrial activity. [They are adaptive systems]

(iv). Spontaneity/Succession: "Aside from homeostasis and adaptiveness, the dynamic quality of ecosystems is manifested in the process of 'succession,' a spontaneous developmental process involving changes in species composition with time. Thus, 'pioneer' ecosystems (generally containing but a few species and interactions) gradually give way to more complex forms culminating eventually in 'climax' ecosystems."³⁵

All four of these features are characteristic of political systems. They are self-regulating in that they as a whole may not be purposive, yet the elements inside them (individuals, organizations, and institutions) have goals. They are non-teleological in that no individual at the top of a hierarchy controls and determines exactly the course that these systems are to go. They are homeostatic in that they have mechanisms that enable the systems to cope with exogenous shocks (i.e., invasion by other countries, trade embargoes, massive influx of immigrants). Finally, they are seen as spontaneous systems because social and political systems seem to evolve in a spontaneous, chaotic, and uncontrollable fashion. In this context, throughout his analysis Dryzek maintains that the most striking feature of ecosystems and societal systems is their inherent complexity.³⁶

(B). THE COMPLEXITIES OF ECOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS

Why is complexity the most striking feature? And how is it relevant to our discussion? In Rational Ecology: Environment and Political Economy Dryzek identifies the "nature" of complexity by describing the factors that cause us great difficulty in analyzing ecological and social systems:³⁷

(i). NON-REDUCIBLE: "...a system whose resolution or amelioration cannot be guaranteed through the resolution of its parts."

(ii). VARIABILITY: "The dynamic tendency of ecosystems---manifested in homeostasis, adaptiveness, and succession---ensures that the ecological context of any problem will not remain fixed. Interpenetration adds another layer to temporal variability by allowing events elsewhere in the ecosphere--either human or natural forces--- the potential to introduce exogenous shocks into the domain of any problem of interest." Drawing on new aspects of quantum physics, Gregmore and Kelly argue that dynamism in social systems results in the social whole becoming more of a process than a structure.³⁸ On a practical level, when the Canadian foreign policy community decides to create a wheat embargo against the Soviet Union, "shocks" penetrate and alter the elements (groups and interests) in the Canadian farming community. Such a situation inevitably leaves policymakers in a position of...

(iii). UNCERTAINTY "...the more complex a system, the less 'knowable' it becomes.... the more dynamic the system, the harder it is to capture its present state or predict its future course." Again, Gregmore and Kelly point out that "constant movement implies constant change, which raises the question of change to 'what' or perhaps in terms of quantum logic, change in what direction"³⁹ Policy analysts certainly shouldn't be surprised of this fact.

(iv). COLLECTIVE "Ecological problems are often collective; that is, large numbers of actors have a stake in them. A collective action problem exists whenever rational individual actions fail to produce a rational whole for society." Similarly, individuals in policy communities consciously act in a self-centered fashion--- the collective interest of the community is most often subservient to the narrow concerns of individuals.

(v). SPONTANEITY: Repeating what I mentioned earlier, spontaneous systems change indeterminately and unknowingly.

The key point here is that in light of the characteristics above, policymaking has become a form of "fuzzy gambling."⁴⁰ More specifically, Dror points out that

"policymaking as extreme gambling involves situations where the dynamics shaping outcomes of decisions are uncontrollable and take the form of indeterminacy, discontinuities and jumps."⁴¹ Fuzzy gambling in policy analysis has implications for both limits in objectivity and understanding.⁴² On a more practical level, what do Dryzek's elements above and Dror's argument have in common? The answer is that because many (if not all) public policies are variable in nature, non-reducible, uncertain, affect the collective and, arise spontaneously most often policy formulation can be described as (without being criticized of using a poor metaphor) a roll of the dice. For example, different national governments "roll the dice" when they try to make foreign policy with respect to political events in the Third World and the Middle East. Most recently, it would seem that most countries won in their gamble of not supporting the military coup in the Soviet Union--- President Gorbachev's power was restored. Such "fuzzy gambling" is seen in immigration, trade, and numerous other policy areas. J.G. Ruggie argues that

We appear to confront a seemingly inescapable series of paradoxes: in the complex modern societies, the less foreseeable the future, the more foresight required; the less we understand, the more insight is needed; the fewer the conditions which permit planning, the greater is the necessity to plan. Yet the comprehensive model is too complex for our simple minds and politics, and the incremental model too simple for our complex societies. Hence, the impossibility theorem and the dilemma of whether to attempt the impossible or do nothing at all.⁴³

Any new developmental construct or policy approach must be able to deal with the reality of Dryzek's complex elements as well as Ruggie's point that we are caught in a paradox in coping with complexity. How do we cope? The answer may lie in recognizing that we can rely on many of the same features that ecosystems use in coping with its often chaotic and disturbing environment. Dryzek describes this kind of thinking as ecological rationality. Daneke points out

that just like natural ecosystems "man can make use of rather than seek to supplant the spontaneous self-organizing and self-regulating qualities of natural [and social] systems."[my emphasis] 44 Shying away from teleological and hierarchical policymaking mechanisms, Dryzek advocates a form of social choice that is complementary to ecological rationality and democracy. Similar to Lindblom's "self-guiding society" outlined in chapter two, Dryzek's "unselfconscious social choice mechanism" is a device "for producing outcomes for a system through involuntary or automatic control-- that is without deliberation over the content of outcomes."45

(C). APPLYING ECOLOGICAL RATIONALITY TO COMPLEXITY

What does a healthy ecosystem or political system require in order to cope with all the various aspects (non-reducibility, variability, uncertainty, collectivity, spontaneity) of complexity? Necessary characteristics required for an unselfconscious social choice mechanism include:

(i). NEGATIVE FEEDBACK: Harking back to Morgan's arguments, there is a need for a mechanism or process whereby deviating movement or behaviour may be counteracted and dealt with. In other words a mechanism or series of mechanisms that tell the system that it is being disturbed and needs attention.

(ii). COORDINATION: "The parts of a social choice mechanism [or policy community] must be able to act in concert, such as that choices at any point in the mechanism are rationally adopted to choices at other points."46 An example is the failure of coordination within and among different policy communities over immigration policy's affect on other policy areas such as urban education, racism, and federal-provincial relations.

(iii). ROBUSTNESS OR FLEXIBILITY: "The quality of robustness is the ability of a mechanism [or policy process] to perform well across a wide variety of conditions. Consequently, adequate performance must not be contingent upon a restrictive set of conditions."⁴⁷ For example, the Canadian immigration policy community must be robust and flexible enough to cope with downturns in the economy (pressure from labour organizations blaming immigrants), and major foreign policy crises from time to time.

(iv). RESILIENCE: "Negative feedback, coordination, robustness or flexibility are together sufficient to guarantee the maintenance of the ecological rationality of a social choice mechanism. 'Maintenance,' though means just that, no more. If there exists a state of fundamental disequilibrium in the interactions of human systems, then these qualities are insufficient to secure attainment of ecological rationality."⁴⁸ For example, following a period of constitutional crisis, or disequilibrium and instability caused by other factors, the Canadian immigration policy community must be able to return a more compatible and stable position with its environment.

Building on La Porte's idea of complexity [{ Q = C, D, I } x { RATE OF CHANGE }] and Morgan's circular relations and loops, these non-teleological features of ecosystems are essential for devising certain criteria and approaches that attempt to manage complexity in political and social systems. In figure 3.2 Dryzek outlines the necessary criteria for social choice structures and how features of complex ecosystems are applied to complex social and political systems.

Pertinent ecosystem features	The circumstances of ecological problems	Normative judgment	Criteria for social choice structures
Interpenetration Emergent properties Self-regulation Dynamism	Complexity Non-reducibility Variability: spatial temporal Uncertainty Collectiveness Spontaneity	Maintenance of the capability of human and natural systems in conjunction to cope with actual or potential shortfall in life support	Negative feedback Coordination: across choices within choices Robustness Flexibility Resilience (contingent upon severe disequilibrium)

Figure 3.2. "Deriving Criteria for Social Choice" Source: John Dryzek Rational Ecology: Environment and Political Economy (Basil Blackwell, New York, N.Y., 1987) p. 53

(D). WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

Essentially, to cope with the complex nature of social systems we must accept that "complexity itself cannot be managed, intellectually or practically, through increased control. We will have to learn to understand and manage complex systems while respecting the autonomy of the processes and the elements within these systems."⁴⁹

Recognizing the various shortcomings and lack of ecological-type social choice mechanisms in many modern policy processes, Dror himself argues "that it may often be better to concentrate on achieving controlled imbalance, which will start movement in the desired direction, leaving detailed planning of the various facets of the new emerging reality, for later on, when uncertainty is reduced."⁵⁰ In this context, what should the role of the political scientist or policy analyst be? Like a nutritionist telling his or her client to exercise and have a balanced diet, the political scientist plays a similar role. He or she advocates certain activities and behaviours that help maintain a healthy functioning and balanced political system.

Remember, the nutritionist doesn't necessarily cure diseases, but presents guidelines and opportunities for the client (on ones' own initiative) to be healthy. The political scientist plays a similar role. The political scientist doesn't cure (as positivists hoped) complex problems, but provides a framework for society to hopefully cure itself. The role of the political scientist is to be critical of activities and behaviours that are upsetting the balance of the system (i.e., obstacles that prevent negative feedback). However, more importantly he or she must be constructive. Recognizing the importance of multiple realities, one must be a facilitator of dialogue between policy actors. As a facilitator it is the job of the political scientist to create "discursive designs of communication" within the policy community. Discursive democracy, as Dryzek describes, is based on "communicative rationality." Drawing on the intellectual thoughts of Arendt, Habermas, communicative rationality is "uncoerced and undistorted interaction among competent individuals." Related to this;

Communicative interaction is oriented towards intersubjective understanding, the coordination of actions through discussion, and the socialization of members of the community. Communicative rationality is the extent to which this action is characterized by the reflective understanding of competent actors. This situation should be free from deception, self-deception, strategic behaviour, and domination through the exercise of power. Communicative rationality is a property of intersubjective discourse, not individual maximization, and it can pertain to the generation of normative judgements and action principles rather than just the selection of means and ends.⁵¹

Communicative rationality requires an awareness of the mutual interdependence among the various policy actors within a community. The facilitator role of the policy analyst requires him or her to persuade the various actors to accept that there exist many different perceptions and realities with respect to the same problem. Relying in part on hermeneutics, "policy analysis may be defined as the evaluation of existing conditions and the exploration of

alternatives to them, in terms of criteria derived from an understanding of possible better conditions, through an interchange between the frames of reference of analysts and actors."⁵² How is it possible for such an interchange? By the creation of discursive designs or channels of communication. "A discursive design is a social institution around which the expectations of a number of actors converge. It therefore has a place in their conscious awareness as a site for recurrent communicative interaction among them." Such an institution "is oriented to the generation and coordination of actions situated within a particular problem context."⁵³

In the context of this thesis, Dryzek's "discursive designs" can be interpreted as a culmination of applying various new concepts towards understanding the nature of complex systems. Similarly, his ecological and communicative rationality add some much needed light to a social science that has been covered in dark clouds ever since the positivists and post-positivists began their epistemological battle. Lasswell's policy sciences contributes in its "contextual and multi-method (diverse)" approaches, while also recognizing that before improving policy substance, we first must improve our understanding of policy processes. The next logical step in this sense of *understanding process* builds on La Porte's and Morgan's ideas of interdependence and circular relations among individuals and groups. Additionally, drawing parallels with natural ecosystems provides more than just simple metaphors in understanding the processes that are involved in political and social dynamics. Here we really are able to contribute to our re-conceptualization of how we may be able to better cope with complexity. Building on the ideas of Lasswell to Dryzek, I've shown how each scholar contributes in the form of building blocks to a better understanding of how to approach policy analysis. After synthesizing the concepts and ideas that have been discussed thus

far, we arrive at a critical junction point. I would suggest that my typology is a very important first step in moving on to new understandings of social science. More specifically,

the basic assumptions and models in the classical scientific tradition appear, in light of... new perspectives, to be mechanistic, linear, closed, and reductionist. In the new emerging approaches, instability, openness, fluctuation, disorder, fuzziness, and creativity are built into scientific representations of reality, as are contradiction, ambiguity, and paradox. There is in these new approaches a fundamental shift from the simple to the complex, from structure to process. The new models concern... dynamic open systems, dissipative structures, the creation of order out of noise, and complexity out of disorder. The implications are far reaching. Rationality is no longer identified with certainty, nor probability with ignorance. Complexity and unpredictability are recognized as intrinsic features of systems as diverse as the world climate and the human brain. Complex systems are seen as evolving in an evolutionary process in which both stochastic and deterministic factors play a role.⁵⁴

As Soedjatmoko notes, "it should be recognized that the acceptance of new paradigms of reality by a growing number of disciplines constitutes a watershed in scientific enterprise--- one from which it may be possible to open up vast new theoretical spaces and a far greater capacity to reason with the uncertainties and instabilities of our present-day world."⁵⁵ Essentially, we see natural and political systems as evolving in a self-organizing manner, where stability somehow emerges out of an instable and chaotic environment.

In this chapter I have assembled a variety of diverse and important concepts that can provide a new and important perspective in analyzing policy problems. In particular, in applying the emerging policy community model to Canadian immigration policy, the reader can recognize the relevance of understanding the dynamics of process, change and interdependence. From here, policy actors in general will be better informed and able cope with complex policy problems.

This is precisely my strategy for the next and most important chapter. First, I apply the newly developed policy community model to Canadian immigration policy, something which has not yet been done in political science literature. But my task doesn't stop here. I also apply many of the new concepts and tools mentioned in this chapter. In the final analysis my contributions bring some much needed understanding to the general policymaking processes. In this context, chapter four builds on the foundations of the chapters two and three.

CHAPTER FOUR
CANADIAN IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE POLICY COMMUNITY
MODEL RE-VISITED

(1). INTRODUCTION

Canadian immigration policy provides an excellent opportunity to experiment with a new model in understanding and coping with complexity. Specifically, the policy community model can be developed to incorporate many of the new elements emerging in the natural and social sciences. The task of this chapter is three-fold: (1). to outline the "generic" policy community model; (2). to apply it to Canadian immigration policy, while integrating insights from new aspects of complexity [discussed in chapter three]--- thus a "policy community re-visited" approach; (3). to suggest where the policy analyst fits into the process. Before we begin our intellectual journey one might ask why have I chosen the policy community model, and why Canadian immigration policy? Let me explain.

Firstly, As La Porte points out, "in a number of areas, increasing organized social complexity erodes the value of current , social, economic and political theory ... these are essential theories of simple systems, applied now to a world in which simplicity is rapidly vanishing."¹ Brunner argues that "an adequate framework must be feasible to use within human cognitive constraints, comprehensive enough to cover the principal dimensions of the world outside, and flexible enough to use on any problem."² We need a model that incorporates Lasswell's "contextual mapping" in that it relies on a broad macro-approach to analysis. At the same time this model must allow for rich differences in political communities and policy problems. Our model must also incorporate post-positivist elements recognizing the limits in objectivity and understanding on the part of policy actors. As Paul Sabatier

states, political scientists without a policy focus have tended to neglect "the importance of policy communities/networks/sub-systems involving actors from numerous public and private institutions and from multiple levels of government."³ Political scientists have been too pre-occupied with single political institutions and legal/constitutional issues. As political and economic issues become increasingly interdependent, so do people. Thus any analysis should recognize different emerging policy communities and networks of mutual interaction.

A. Paul Pross describes a policy community:

Most policy communities consist of two segments; the sub-government and the attentive public. To all intents and purposes the sub-government is the policymaking body in the field... It consists of the government agencies most directly involved in setting policy and regulating the field of a small group of interests--- generally associations and major corporations--- whose power guarantees them the right to be consulted virtually on a daily basis. Their power wins them a place at the policymaking table, but government also needs their expert knowledge of the technical aspects of policy. The power of the inner circle is used to limit the participation of others in the policy debate. Those who are excluded congregate in the 'attentive public.' The outer circle includes those who are interested in policy issues but do not participate in the policymaking on a frequent, regular basis. [Similarly] a range of organizations and associations whose interest is keen but not acute enough to warrant breaking into the inner circle [also take part].⁴

A policy community involves a continuous interaction of government and non-governmental players who have an intent (their degree of interest may vary) in an issue-area. [See figure 4.2 for a "generic" picture of a policy community]. For example, Jeremy Wilson describes how the Department of Environment, Ministry of Forests and other major companies and pressure groups all have various levels of influence and involvement in the British Columbia forest land-use policy community.⁵ Similarly, studies of the Canadian energy policy community show how the federal cabinet, the Department of Energy, and the Department of External Affairs (being members of the sub-government) dominate the field. Various

provincial governments (particularly Alberta and Newfoundland) have struggled to pierce the boundary between the sub-government and the attentive public (a.k.a the outer circle). In the outer circle multinational corporations, pressure groups, and foreign governments have taken a policy advocacy, rather than participatory role in the community. As such, the key to "understanding the policy process requires looking at an intergovernmental policy community or sub-system--- composed of bureaucrats, legislative personnel, interest group leaders, researchers and specialist reporters within a substantive policy area--- as the basic unit of study."⁶ Before I delve into why I have chosen to analyze the Canadian immigration policy community, we need to look at Canada's political culture and examine why and how policy communities developed in Canada.

(2). CANADA'S CONDUCTIVE ENVIRONMENT FOR THE EMERGENCE OF POLICY COMMUNITIES

In Interest Groups and the Canadian Federal System, Hugh Thorburn describes how in the late nineteenth century various business interests maintained ongoing relations with the federal government as a part of a partnership in developing the country. Additionally, because section 91 of the 1867 British North America (B.N.A.) Act gave the federal government control over "general" matters of policymaking such as national defence or national economic development, the provinces were limited to control over "local" matters such as resource development, hospitals and, property and civil rights. By and large, prior to the development of the welfare state, there was relative stability between the two levels of government. However after the Second World War the provinces increasingly began to flex their muscles in areas that they recognized were crucial to provincial economic development. A series of jurisdictional conflicts would emerge over the next fifty years. Without exception "the new rivalry between the

federal and provincial governments led each side to build up its administrative and policymaking capacity [especially during the 1960's/1970's]."⁷ This diffusion of power was also reflected in the emerging pressure groups that were seeking a more activist role in the policy process.⁸ Non-governmental organizations and pressure groups "have come to occupy a more influential-- and controversial-- role in the policy process."⁹ By and large these groups have played an important role in the development of the attentive public sphere of policy communities.

By the 1960's the federal and the provincial governments had become heavily involved in numerous areas of society. Increasing interdependence meant that these departments began to encroach on one another's jurisdiction. The proliferation of government agencies reflected the governments' attempt to cope with a rapidly expanding economy and welfare state.¹⁰ Paradoxically, this attempt to cope resulted in less coordination. In this context, in an effort to move back to a centralized policy process and increase coordination, the Trudeau Administration in the late 1960's implemented a series of structural reforms. Centralized government agencies (the Treasury Board, Privy Council Office, and Department of Finance) would take policymaking power away from the line departments (such as Department of Manpower and Immigration). As a result, a power struggle emerged between the central agencies and the line departments. This struggle had implications for the role that pressure groups would play in the policy process.

In his analysis of the struggle Pross notes that:

At the centre the weight of the collective authority of the Cabinet, and the capacity to influence budget allocations weighed heavily on the side of the Privy Council Office, Treasury Board, and the Department of finance. On the departmental side, the ability to generate public support through affiliated pressure groups transformed the latter from useful adjuncts into vitally important allies whose support enhanced the legitimacy of the departmental mission. It became less and less true to argue that agency-group relations tended to be dominated by the government side. A

dependency relationship became an exchange relationship [my emphasis].¹¹

Different federal departments began to cultivate and institutionalize relationships with various organizations and associations. They would work together and lobby the central agencies for resources and influence in their shared issue-area. In essence, line departments would work with other actors in order to break into the sub-government level of policymaking. Similarly, when Prime Minister Trudeau altered Canada's foreign policy in the early 1970's (moving away from Pearsonian internationalism towards a stronger nationalist policy) in order to reflect domestic concerns, conflicts with the centre became even more ferocious (as is discussed further on). Domestic and foreign policies often became characterized as "intermestic" policies. As a consequence, policy communities became characterized as volatile and locales for the dynamic movement of actors within and among different communities.

Departing from a general discussion on the policy community model and new insights that may be added to it, we now approach my illustration of the Canadian immigration policy community. Throughout my analysis in the next section the reader has to keep in mind how such a model has implications for limits in objectivity and understanding of actors in the policy process. I construct my analysis in the context of the issues that have been discussed in chapters one and two. On this note, Canadian immigration may be characterized as a "policy community model re-visited."

(3). CANADIAN IMMIGRATION POLICY: THE POLICY COMMUNITY MODEL RE-VISITED

Very little work has been done on immigration policy.¹² Yet, more than ever, issues concerning immigration, both on a global and national scale, are emerging

as major policy problems. Refugee crises world-wide are forcing Western governments to face the problem of immigration head on. As one commentator recently noted, in Western Europe "immigration has become a corrosive issue... it has forced itself to the top of the political agenda... everyone wants in."¹³ Europe is no doubt a major time bomb waiting to explode. "The scope of immigration is daunting. The number of foreigners seeking asylum in Western Europe as a whole... rose from 70, 000 in 1982 to 442, 000 in 1990."¹⁴ With the collapse of the iron curtain, ethnic violence among various nationalities, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and, the failure of the East European economies, pressure builds every day. On the other side of the globe we mustn't forget about refugees from Southeast Asia, Pakistan and, Africa. Pressure on Europe inevitably means indirect pressure on Canada. Similarly, as recently as September 30, 1991, the President of Mexico, Carlos Salinas de Gotari stated that unless Canada and the United States sign a proposed North American Free Trade Agreement with Mexico "there could be massive migration...economic refugees will flood into the U.S. and Canada. There is a growing distance between the developed North and the developing South."¹⁵ From all directions pressure on Canadian immigration policy is growing. In this context, a look at the Canadian immigration policy process and its ability to cope in today's complex order is definitely in order. At the same time, by applying the policy community model and new insights from the science of complexity, my analysis will contribute in a general way to help understand other policy areas.

Interdependence, overlapping policy areas, and constant change dominate the policy process. Even more so in immigration policy. As a 1974 Green Paper on Canadian immigration policy noted; "Immigration policy is a particularly complex reflection of national interests because it is geared to support the achievement of

not one, but a mixture of goals--- economic, demographic, social and cultural. Not to mention foreign policy, federal-provincial relations, economic vs. humanitarian debate, labour policy and education."¹⁶ My task in this context is fairly straightforward. First I discuss the evolution of the Canadian immigration policy community from a practical and theoretical perspective, then lead into the implications for objectivity and understanding in coping with this complex issue-area.

Historically, section 95 of the British North America Act provided both the federal and provincial governments shared jurisdiction over issues involving immigration. However in the late nineteenth century because the provinces perceived Ottawa as the nation-builder of Canada, they largely remained quiet on the issue (notwithstanding British Columbia's protests over oriental immigration). From 1867 to the 1940's, the policy was largely administered by the Departments of Agriculture, Interior, and later Immigration and Colonization--- reflecting Ottawa's concern for settling immigrants in the West. Later, policy formulation was transferred to the Department of Mines and Resources. By and large there existed very little interdepartmental conflict because the different federal departments perceived that they had firm political control over their respective policy areas. In Canada and Immigration: Public Policy and Public Concern, Freda Hawkins argues that for the most part, prior to the 1970's Canada's immigration policy process had been collectively unorganized. Additionally, with respect to the coordination and delivery of immigration services, vertical communication between government and the citizenry, as well as horizontal communication between various government agencies was very weak. ¹⁷ In terms of the policy process itself, this area "has largely been a bureaucratic prerogative... policy initiation has taken place within a very small group of senior officials."¹⁸ Goals and priorities were recognized at the

highest levels of government and bureaucracy and then presented to cabinet for final approval. Parliament had little or no role in the policy process. With respect to non-governmental organizations and pressure groups, they had little effect in the "age of the mandarins." Aside from a minor advocacy role, volunteer refugee organizations in the post-1940's had little effect on the policy process.

As Canada emerged from the Second World War as a middle world power, different domestic departments began to perceive that they had an interest in the formulation of foreign policy. And since immigration policy is tied to foreign policy, this provided the "seeds" for the growth of the Canadian immigration policy community. Essentially, three federal agencies became rivals in the immigration policy process. Different perceptions of jurisdiction poured water on the seeds of conflict. As early as 1946, the Department of External Affairs (D.E.A) argued to Cabinet that Canada (in the interests of its reputation and global influence) should be liberal-minded in allowing post-war refugees into Canada. For its part, D.E.A. wanted and expected the cooperation of other domestic federal departments. However, after consultations had taken place on an interdepartmental committee (with the Departments of Health and Welfare, Labour, and Mines and Resources [D.M.R. at this time was responsible for the settlement of immigrants]), it was concluded that "the [refugee] problem just bristles with problems."¹⁹ Dirks highlights the emerging conflict:

As Canada sought more of a role and influence, D.E.A.'s importance grew, as well as the Department of Labour. [However] the Immigration Branch [of the D.M.R.] ... had lost ground... Each of these three structures argued for an immigration policy which would best serve its own interests... External Affairs officers saw Canada's international obligation to refugees... as being vital, while Labour, for its part, wished to maintain a rate of low unemployment in Canada by only selecting immediately employable immigrants. The Immigration Branch interpreted the actions and suggestions of other departments as threats to the jurisdiction it so wanted to maintain over immigration policy formulation and administration. 20

I suggest that these conflicts began to represent the struggles that actors engage in when they try to dominate the sub-governmental level of policy communities.

In pre-World War II years the Department of Labour had only a minor voice in the immigration policy process. However, in 1945, Canada had to look ahead and compete globally in developing its manufacturing and industrialized sector. A shortage of skilled and unskilled workers meant that Canada had to look outside of its borders and rely on incoming immigrants to fill the vacuum. Thus domestic employment policy was becoming inextricably linked to foreign policy. As a result, the Department of Labour lobbied for a strong voice in the emerging Canadian immigration policy community. The Immigration Branch of the D.M.R. increasingly felt threatened. In a letter to the Deputy Minister of Labour, the Deputy Minister of Mines and Resources argued that "we feel very strongly that there is a clear demarcation which defines the duties of Labour and Mines and resources in connection with the movement of Displaced Persons to Canada. It is our view, and it has been agreed to by the government [Cabinet]... that the chief responsibility should be in the hands of the Immigration Branch."²¹

At the first meeting of the International Refugee Organization (an organization developed by the Western world to cope with the post-world war two refugee crises), one D.E.A. official commented that in the Canadian delegation "there is a feeling within the D.M.R. that Labour is attempting to gain control over immigration policy."²² D.E.A. perceived itself as the dominant player, or "father figure" that wanted to end the squabbling between Labour and Mines and Resources. For External Affairs this squabbling simply exacerbated the articulation of Canada's immigration policy. Regardless, this period saw each department operating in Europe in an independent fashion, reporting back separately to their superiors in Ottawa.

How do these events relate to an emerging Canadian immigration policy community? First of all, as power becomes diffused (and the national interest more difficult to articulate) "policy negotiations at the international level [began] to take place among sector-specific agencies and [drew] less frequently on broader political input. The internationalization of policymaking thus reinforces the importance of sectoral actors in individual states..."²³ Post-1945 began to represent the de-centralization of the Canadian state. How about the importance of non-state actors in immigration policy? Although this period was largely the "age of the Mandarin," the federal government saw a need for voluntary agencies and organizations in the area of immigration. Besides specific relief assistance in Europe and in Canada, private voluntary organizations began to play a minor advocacy role in the immigration process. One could argue that as the D.E.A., Labour, and Mines and Resources were self-organizing an inner circle/sub-government, the non-governmental associations were contributing to the emergence of an outer circle/attentive public in the community.

Recognizing the importance of non-governmental organizations, the federal government began to distribute grants to such groups in the late 1940's and early 1950's. Stimulated by financial assistance in the 1950's there was a gradual increase of actors trying to influence immigration policy. Hawkins elaborates at length on this topic.²⁴ By and large most organizations (with their parochial interests) were religious in nature and provided help for refugees at home and in Europe. But Departments such as External Affairs and Labour were suspicious and did not like the idea that "Canada's interests were being communicated in a bewildering variety of voices" abroad.²⁵ By the late 1950's there existed "a climate of mistrust... as to whether voluntary agencies could be relied upon and a feeling that they were difficult and trying to deal with."²⁶ Therefore, departmental

conflicts within the emerging sub-government level of the community along with an increasingly boisterous attentive public began to symbolize what Coleman and Skogstad identify as a "pressure pluralist" policy community. More specifically,

Pressure pluralist networks tend to arise in sectors where state authority is fragmented and the organized interests are at a low level of development... this combination of dispersed state authority and weak associational system unable to coordinate the multiple, narrow, specialized groups competing with one another, gives rise to a mode of group-state relations where groups approach the state independently, often competing for the ear of the state... 27

As policy actors in the sub-governmental level of immigration, the major departments felt increasingly threatened and reacted in a defensive manner towards the numerous vocal groups and provinces that sought to "break into" the inner circle of policy formulation. Although D.E.A., Labour and, Citizenship and Immigration (changed from Mines and Resources) were regularly in conflict with one another, there was relative stability and equilibrium in the policy process. But as organizational interests in the broader environment began to demand more of a role, these departments sensed the external dynamics trying to upset the present equilibrium. No longer were the three major actors impermeable to the outside world. The system was becoming open-ended. Interpenetration, openness and, impermeability characterized how policy actors came to influence one another. For example, as noted earlier the Trudeau Administration's centralizing reforms were an attempt take back much of the uncoordinated control lost to various line departments. Central agencies wanted an isolated system in formulating immigration policy. Yet by the 1960's there were cracks opening up in the sub-government. As a self-organizing system, the immigration community (in a non-teleological manner) is engaged in a process where it is evolving with its environment.

(A). POLICY COMMUNITIES AS "LIVING" AND EVOLUTIONARY STRUCTURES

Policy communities are evolutionary in nature. As "living" entities they react and interact with their environment. Individuals in one policy community, may unknowingly, cause perturbations and friction which affects the functioning of actors in another policy community. For example, when Canada's finance minister decides to cut transfer payments to the provinces, fluctuations are felt throughout different policy communities (such as the education, and health, and agriculture communities). This action on the part of the finance minister would cause various policy actors in other communities to mobilize and initiate actions in order to counter the minister's actions. In this context, policy communities and their members are "active." The final outcome of such an initial action is difficult, if not impossible to predict. Similarly, any affects may alter the dynamics and positioning of actors in the community, which in turn affects the evolutionary course and internal development of the policy community.

This view of human and social dynamics contrasts the mechanistic classical view of science suggested by the Vienna Circle. We now accept that time is irreversible. The temporal and spatial dynamics and social and political development are never the same--- change and flux are inherent features of social processes. The "black-box" mentality of policy analysis is out-of-date. Prigogine and Stengers argue that "the artificial [lab or classroom] may be deterministic and reversible, the natural contains essential elements of randomness and irreversibility. This leads to a new view of matter in which it is no longer the passive substance described in the mechanistic world view but is associated with spontaneous activity."²⁸ Where the logical positivists sought to discover underlying universal laws, new science suggests there is no foundation.

Everywhere we look we find evolution, diversity and instability. Policy communities reflect this fact.

On a theoretical level, policy communities exhibit a dynamic process where conflicting forces mutually interact, thus affecting one another. "We seem to have unfamiliar connections to others, ... the strength and locus of which change frequently."²⁹ Similarly, Dror regards "the policymaking system as an open-ended complex, social and political decision-making institution."³⁰ And Lasswell has argued that "as living forms, human beings interact by taking one another into account."³¹ Political systems in general and policy communities in particular, should be seen as "living and evolutionary" systems. Unlike the past which examined dormant structures (ie., parliament, laws, the constitution), new political science points toward analyzing the interconnections and relations between institutions and political actors. This in turn has implications for the emerging policy community model. As Kelly argues, "instead of uncovering the permanence and immutability that classical science has taught us to seek out in nature, we have encountered change, instability... and evolutions."³² Interestingly, the policy community model has not yet been applied to a case study where it has also incorporated many of the new insights emerging in policy analysis. Nonetheless, my critic might ask, "parallels with biology and physics? So what?!? Just metaphors, No substance!!" I counter that the new insights being developed with respect to complexity illuminate many aspects of the policy community model that have yet to be identified.

Edward Ploman briefly describes many of the new elements that I believe can be applied to policy communities. Expanding on the new science of complexity that was touched upon in chapter three, Ploman argues that the

key issues are reflected in a loose cluster of principles and emerging paradigms that are defined by concepts such as the interrelationship between order and disorder, the creation of ever-increasing complex orders out of noise, disorder, and even chaos; autopoiesis self-regulation, and spontaneous self-organization in natural and social systems... Inherent in these concepts is a reaction against determinism, a new acceptance of instability, chance, possibility, and of stochastic processes, a new emphasis on the emergence of the unexpected, the novel, the creative-- and of new significance and meaning... A focus on evolutionary patterns, from 'being to becoming.'³³

As Dobuzinskis adds, "the concepts of production and reproduction, commonly used in biology and economics, have less commonly been applied to the analysis of political life. But if we are to understand politics as a creative process through which individuals and groups seek to achieve evolutionary potentials, we need to study political activities in relation to the production, and regeneration of the various dimensions of societal order."³⁴

(i). RANDOMNESS OF MOVEMENT AND UNPREDICTABILITY

Let's compare figure 4.1 with 4.2. Without delving too far into physics and chemistry we have a chemical reaction whereby "one considers the motion of a small sphere rebounding on a collection of randomly distributed large spheres in a fixed space... Whenever we introduce the smallest uncertainty in the initial conditions, this uncertainty is increasingly amplified through successive collisions [my emphasis]. Note that chemical reactions may be the outcome of collisions."³⁵ The elements in the environment (if not artificially controlled) move in a random manner. There are important implications from this scenario. If one looks at figure 4.2, we see how such randomness and conflict between and within different communities has implications for the evolution of those same communities. The movement of "spheres" (i.e., organizations and policy actors) causes instability and volatility in the broader environment. Not being fixed, (unlike figure 4.1) when one reaction occurs (an event in a specific policy area) or action is initiated it may

cause random and unforeseen collisions with other actors and policy communities. This in turn may stimulate a counter reaction, and so on. We eventually find it impossible to distinguish between causes and effects.

In this context, making policy to cope with these complex dynamics becomes impossible--- precisely because we are unable to predict the future. Nicolis and Prigogine's diagram may not mirror social situations entirely, but there are definitely important parallels to be drawn.³⁶ As different actors and communities collide and conflict over contentious policy issues, perturbations are felt throughout the entire environment. *Non-linear movement and orbital dynamics are evident in the "generic" policy community . Both diagrams involve situations where unknown evolutionary patterns and processes exist.*




Figure 4.1. "A schematic representation of the instability of the trajectory of a small sphere rebounding on large spheres. The least imprecision about the initial position of small sphere makes it impossible to predict which large sphere it will hit after a few collisions." Source: Gregoire Nicolis, Ilya Prigogine, Exploring Complexity: An Introduction (W.H. Freeman and Company., New York, N.Y., 1989) p. 196

In more than just a metaphorical manner, Todd La Porte describes the implications of "collisions among large and small spheres" in social systems:

One consequence of these group connections... has been the rapid increase in the number of people and agencies affecting the day-to-day experiences of individuals. Closely related to this increase has been one in the number of surprises we encounter. They are generally disturbing surprises, caused by the interruption or frustration of our expectation by some hitherto unrecognized dependency. These surprises we often 'account for' with the somewhat bewildered assertion 'It's a complex situation,' implying that they are unaccountable. Somehow the unexpected occurs frequently, especially in matters of politics...37




Figure 4.2. The "generic" policy community. Source: A. Paul Pross, "Pressure Groups: Talking Chameleons," *Canadian Politics in the 1990's*, ed. Michael S. Whittington, Glen Williams (Nelson Canada, Toronto, Ontario, 1990) p.301

Dobuzinskis's point that "groups enter into shifting alliances... and that government agencies also form unstable clusters around changing issues"³⁸ is consistent with *the unpredictable nature of political dynamics that are involved in policy communities*. As these groups interact they are affected by various perturbations from both within and outside the policy community. This raises the question of the impermeability of the policy community. In the context of Canada, the dynamics of immigration continue to test the permeability of the Canadian immigration policy community in general and the sub-government in particular. Essentially; (1) policy actors from the attentive public are trying to pierce the wall of the sub-government, and (2) actors from other policy communities may seek a voice in the immigration community. As a self-organizing system, we see that the immigration community (in a non-teleo-logical manner) is engaged in a process where it is evolving with its broader environment

(B). DISRUPTIONS IN THE CANADIAN IMMIGRATION POLICY COMMUNITY : LOCAL AND GLOBAL PERTURBATIONS

In Pross's analysis he notes that in an effort to *pierce* the inner circle "organizations and individuals are constantly changing their interests, responding to new situations, developing new capacities, and shedding old ones."³⁹ These groups "spontaneous eruption into a policy field shatters the carefully contrived experience of consensus [D.E.A., Labour, Manpower and Immigration], and challenges the routinization of policy and the conventional wisdom in the sub-government. These interventions, though usually detested by long-time members of the policy community, draw attention to inadequacies in policy; force the pace of change; and to some extent, introduce new blood and new ideas. They may at times precipitate a total restructuring of the policy community--- as in the early 1970's when older communities were re-organized and combined to serve the

newly defined field of environmental policy--- but more limited interventions can also create shock waves."40 Perceiving its' interactions with outside groups often as a zero-sum game rather than a positive-sum game, inner circle members of the immigration community would experience outside voices and lobbying as unwanted perturbations and "shockwaves." It is interesting to note that in 1952 the actors in the inner circle experienced an outside influence that may have potentially disrupted the power structure in the emerging community. At this time the new United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (U.N.H.C.R.) attempted to penetrate the domestic policy process. A U.N.H.C.R. representative would assist the federal government in the processing of refugees. The U.N.H.C.R. made it quite clear that they wanted to work with the relevant department(s) in charge. Looking at figure 4.3, the U.N.H.C.R. was attempting to move through the attentive public level (advocacy role) towards the sub-government level (participation role).




Figure 4.3 The Canadian Immigration Policy Community

- (1). Cabinet and Central Policy Structures
- (2). Department of External Affairs
- (3). Department of Employment and Immigration
- (4). Major pressure groups, ie., Canadian Council of Churches, International Committee of the Red Cross.
- (5, 6, 7 8). Various research institutes, ie., Institute for Research on Public Policy, Laurier Institute, Hastings Institute, and emerging umbrella organizations.
- (9, 10, 11). Active provinces; Quebec, Ontario, and British Columbia.
- (12). International organizations, ie., United Nations High Commission on Refugees
- (13, 14, 15). Other less active provinces; Alberta, the Maritimes, and Manitoba
- (16). Other less influential individuals and organizations

*** The rotating spheres that are not numbered represent those actors who may from time to time (but not on a regular basis) try and influence the sub-government/inner circle of the policy process.

In a 1952 letter from the Department of External Affairs to the U.N.H.C.R., Ottawa "indicated that no useful purpose could be served by establishing a representative of the High Commissioner in Canada"⁴¹ In their analysis, Coleman and Skogstad discuss how policy communities can be viewed as "a protective device, limiting rather than expanding the opportunities for the public to achieve major policy changes. As well, the Canadian immigration policy community's highly restrictive membership was an attempt at "insulation from other networks" and "to keep policymaking at the routine or technical level."⁴² One could argue that in the years prior to the activism of different groups and provinces in the 1960's, the immigration community represented a highly restricted policy network "where there is shared responsibility for policy implementation and insulation from other networks."⁴³ However from the mid-1960's onwards, the process reflected a

weakly integrated network where there is "less restrictive membership, a low degree of organizational dependence, and is more open to influences outside the network."⁴⁴

As the dominant player for Canada in global affairs, External Affairs became increasingly sensitive and uneasy about the global economic, social, and political changes that were influencing Canada's immigration policy. For example D.E.A. was still upset with Canada's discriminatory policy and our unwillingness to sign and ratify the 1951 International Convention on Refugees. In its effort to lobby Cabinet to sign the Convention it sought the support of Citizenship and Immigration (the department de jure responsible for immigration policy at the time). However in a letter to the Deputy Minister of External Affairs, the Deputy Minister of Citizenship and Immigration stated " Canada should not sign the Convention... I don't believe we can reconcile our responsibilities under the Immigration Act with the open-ended interpretations of the Convention."⁴⁵ I believe that D.E.A. recognized the implications that not signing would have with other non-white countries in the Commonwealth. Similarly, by signing such a liberal document, Canada's reputation would be enhanced globally thus assisting our effort to pursue international business opportunities. Without signing, we would feel the effects in due time."

By applying Pentti Malaska's diagram (figure 4.4) one can see another dimension of how global fluctuations have an affect on the immigration policy community. Global fluctuations (refugees from Hungary in 1956 and from Czechoslovakia in 1969, and the Tamils more recently) represent external perturbations that put unforeseen pressure, and threaten to affect the equilibrium and stability of the community. Malaska's diagram exhibits a non-stop circular feedback process where the policy community affects and is affected by global fluctuations. As he points out, "In general, the onset of non-equilibrium is triggered

by comparatively small local fluctuations either originating within the local sub-systems [policy communities] or coming into them from outside. Once established, the fluctuations must become amplified and spread around in the domain of the sub-system in question. Only then can they contribute a sizeable force capable of modifying macro-behaviour."⁴⁶ Seen in this context, the immigration policy community is a "living" and autopoietic entity evolving and interacting within its broader environment. As Nicolis and Prigogine argue; "A dynamical model of human society begins with the realization that in addition to its internal structure, the system is firmly embedded in an environment with which it exchanges matter and energy." They add

our everyday experience teaches us that adaptability and plasticity of behaviour, two basic features of non-linear dynamical systems capable of performing transitions in far-from-equilibrium conditions, rank among the most conspicuous characteristic of human societies. It is therefore natural to expect that dynamical models allowing for evolution and change should be the most adequate ones for social systems. ⁴⁷

It is important to mention that in terms of global fluctuations affecting the stability of the Canadian immigration policy community, there is evidence to suggest that a global refugee regime is emerging.⁴⁸ What does this mean? Regimes require that participating countries adhere to certain international norms, rules and procedures with respect to making domestic policy, not unlike the global trade (the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs) and the N.A.T.O. defence regime. Although the U.N.H.C.R. failed to break into the community in the 1950's, a refugee regime would have profound effects on the internal dynamics of the policy process. As Hawkins argues "it is difficult for a country like Canada to establish its immigration policy without taking into account certain international facts."⁴⁹




Figure 4.4. Malaska's diagram is described as "The cultural evolution and related global problematique." Source: "Outline of a Policy for the Future." The Science and Praxis of Complexity. (The United Nations University, Tokyo, Japan, 1985) p. 340

(C). DISRUPTIONS AND INSTABILITY LEAD TO BIFURCATIONS

In order to cope with these upsetting disturbances (from outside and within) the D.E.A., as the traditional leader in immigration policy formulation, was keen, and still is, to insulate and solidify the impermeability of the sub-government. As External Affairs sought to gain acceptance as the lead agency in the immigration sub-government 50, I suggest that its officials (in the early 1970's) were sensing imminent change in the internal structure of the inner circle. The increasing stability was reaching a threshold where the policy community would spontaneously (figure

4.3) take on a new internal dynamic---ie., power relations among players would be altered. *At a certain "sensitive" and unknown bifurcation point, policy actors would be in such a configuration that any small internal or external perturbation would cause fluctuations within the community. The key is that these fluctuations must be amplified large enough in order to cause significant structural change in the power structure.*

The concept of "bifurcation points" and evolutionary change needs to be elaborated on in order to understand fully how the immigration policy community evolves with its environment. As Toffler argues, "according to the theory of change implied in the idea of dissipative structures, when fluctuations force an existing system into far-from-equilibrium condition and threaten its structure, it approaches a critical moment or bifurcation point. At this point... it is inherently impossible to determine in advance the next state of the system. Chance nudges what remains of the system down a new path of development." In this context, "once the path is chosen (from among many), determinism takes over again until the next bifurcation point is reached. Here... we see chance and necessity not as irreconcilable opposites, but each playing its role as a partner in destiny." [my emphasis]⁵¹ I suggest that the evolution of policy communities is reflected in a subtle process of people mutually interacting with their environment--- they choose certain actions, which affects their environment which may set off a chain of unintended events which inevitably returns back and affects that individual. Essentially, "the mixture of necessity [planned, purposeful behaviour, and policy] and chance [unintended local or external actions affecting the dynamics of the community] constitutes the history of the system."⁵² Although bifurcation points are more often attributed to natural sciences phenomena such as chemistry and biology, there is a need for further application towards understanding change in

social systems. Paraphrasing Maxwell, Prigogine and Stengers provide a few rudimentary analogies for the newcomer to this area:

For example, the rock loosed by front and balanced on a singular point of the mountain-side, the little spark which kindles the great forest, the little word which sets the world fighting... the little spore which blights all potatoes, the little gemmule which makes all philosophers idiots. Every existence above a certain rank has its singular points: the higher the rank, the more of them. At these points, [in policy communities] influences whose physical magnitude is too small to be taken into account by a finite being, may produce results of great importance. All great results produced by human endeavour depend on taking advantage of these singular states when they occur. 53

What does this mean for the Canadian immigration policy community? By understanding the process of bifurcation points we may be able to understand the direction and timing in which chaotic events unfold. Similarly, it will provide an understanding of the direction and shape that policy communities will take internally, as they interact with their environment. For example, in the bifurcation diagram (figure 4.5) one can see the many possible directions of growth that the immigration policy could take. At certain bifurcation points the system can "choose" (a subtle combination of chance and necessity) the next stage in its internal development.


One could argue that in the pre-1940's period, within the young immigration community the sub-government was impermeable to internal and external perturbations, and thus it was in a stable state. Coleman and Skogstad would describe the community as "state directed" comprised of "highly autonomous, coordinated state agencies and sectoral interests with a very weak associational system, possibly at a nascent stage. As such, organized interests play neither an important advocacy nor participant role in the policy process. State officials dominate policy-making and are able to impose their solutions, often without even consulting organized interests."54 Using figure 4.5, the internal power structure

during this period could be plotted along branch (a) where the Canadian immigration policy community was fairly stable with its environment. However, from 1945 to the late 1960's things began to change. As the federal government decentralized much of its policy-making (as noted earlier, previously, immigration policy was a result of ministerial discretion), there was a new reliance on pressure groups for input. As well, bitter conflicts between the line departments and the central agencies caused instability in the community. Also contributing to instability were the activist provinces seeking a more influential participatory role. This in turn resulted in internal fluctuations and pushed the policy community towards a possible threshold for structural change. It changed from a "state directed" policy community (in which government autonomy, capacity, and non-reliance on other policy actors was quite evident) to a "pressure pluralist" policy community. This period could be plotted on figure 4.5 at λ_2 ---- the branch (b) represents the turn ("choice") towards a pressure pluralist power structure. This stage remained stable for a shorter period of time than branch (a). As Thorburn has stated, "since the 1970's there has been a formalization of consultative devices, as the government attempted to augment its information coming from society to adapt to changing conditions."⁵⁵

It's possible that at present the immigration policy community is heading towards an end of the (b) branch---- moving from a pressure pluralist to another internal structural formation. There are different possible evolutionary courses of which the community may take as the community nears λ_3 . Here the branch (b) is unstable again, and two other new branches of internal evolution are possible. At the bifurcation point, the community becomes sensitive to internal/external fluctuations, and what branch it "chooses" will depend on circumstances that are unaware to us at the present time. What are the possible

courses or directions the community will take? (In their book Policy Communities and Public Policy, Coleman and Skogstad describes numerous directions that a policy community may take).⁵⁶ What will determine the branch it "chooses" or direction of development it takes? Nicolis and Prigogine argue that the evolution process is "determined at each moment by the mechanism of interactions of different actors."⁵⁷ In this sense one possible scenario would be that if the global refugee crisis puts too much pressure on the sub-government, the leading actors may attempt to try and force a change back to a "state directed" structural formation. Another entirely different possibility is that with the present constitutional crisis the federal government may further de-centralize the immigration policy process--- bringing interested provinces even closer or deeper into the inner circle. After the failure of the proposed Meech Lake Accord in June of 1990, the *Globe and Mail* noted that "Mr. Vander Zalm [premier of B.C.] said that the British Columbia government is pursuing an agreement on immigration with Ottawa and will monitor negotiations between the federal government and Quebec on the same subject." Vander Zalm said "What I am saying is, what's good for the goose is good for the gander, and we ought to be looking at what it is that might be negotiated for Quebec, and we should be negotiating on a parallel stream."⁵⁸ In fact the Mulroney Administration's most recent twenty-eight constitutional proposals (October 1991) states that (proposal #19): "While recognizing the federal role in setting Canadian policy and national objectives with respect to immigration, the Government of Canada is prepared to negotiate with any province agreements appropriate to the circumstances of that province and to constitutionalize these agreements."⁵⁹ If Ottawa strikes a deal with the provinces, the policy community could evolve from a pressure pluralist to a form of "clientele pluralism" whereby each federal and provincial immigration department struggles to attract highly qualified immigrants (from Hong Kong for example). In a clientele pluralist

community "state officials are unable to differentiate themselves from organized interests. They become dependent on interest association to supply information and expertise... and offer them an opportunity to participate in the policy process in exchange."60



Bifurcation diagram. Steady-state solutions are plotted against bifurcation parameter λ . For $\lambda < \lambda_1$, there is only one stationary state for each value of λ ; this set of states forms the branch a. For $\lambda = \lambda_1$, two other sets of stationary states become possible (branches b and b').

The states of b' are unstable but become stable at $\lambda = \lambda_2$ while the states of branch a become unstable. For $\lambda = \lambda_3$ the branch b' is unstable again, and two other stable branches appear.

For $\lambda = \lambda_4$ the unstable branch a attains a new bifurcation point where two new branches become possible, which will be unstable up to $\lambda = \lambda_5$ and $\lambda = \lambda_6$.

Figure 4.5. Source: Ilya Prigogine, Isabelle Stengers, Order out of Chaos: Man's New Dialogue with Nature. (Bantam Books, New York, N.Y., 1984) p. 170

When and if the pressure pluralist nature of the Canadian immigration policy community change does occur it will follow the following process:

the new constituents, introduced in small quantities lead to a new set of reactions among the systems components. This new set of reactions enters into competition with the system's previous mode of functioning. If the system is 'structurally stable' as far as this intrusion is concerned, the new mode of functioning will be unable to establish itself and the 'innovators' will not survive. If, however, the structural fluctuation successfully imposes itself... whereby the 'innovators' multiply fast enough instead of being destroyed--- the whole system will adopt a new mode of functioning. 61

Essentially, the players and organizations located in the attentive public are characterized as the "new constituents" or "innovators" trying to alter the "mode of functioning" in the sub-government. As Pross argues, "the attentive public is the lively part of the policy community... many of its members are excluded from the policy process... They are prepared to challenge the status quo... as a result relations within the attentive public are more volatile than the sub-government."⁶² The actions of those in this sphere will depend on their perceptions of the policy process. If actors see the power structure as fairly open, flexible, and complementary to its interests they are unlikely to act in a volatile manner. However, if there is a perception of exclusion, policy actors on the periphery will likely become more "active" in pursuit of their interests. Thus they may cause unforeseen disturbances in the community and upset its structural stability. In this environment, every actor (based on his or her vantage point in the policy community) has a different perspective and reason to act and react based on the configuration of other actors in the policy community. In Organized Social Complexity La Porte points out

with increased social complexity... diverse interpretations may seriously hinder the operation... of an institution...[or community]... involved in the system. Increasingly, interdependence implies that whatever policies are adopted, both positive and negative externalities are likely to occur. ⁶³

La Porte's suggestion also relates to the issue of bifurcation points and evolutionary change. It is possible to conceptualize how at certain sensitive nodal points of interaction between policy actors, there may be a conflict over policy direction, resulting in increased tension to the point where an unexpected change of events may arise. More specifically, depending on the force and dynamics at the nodal point (bifurcation point), characteristics of the policy problem may, as a result of tension between actors, get worse and 'break loose'--- meaning the

problem takes on more complex and uncontrollable features. As a result there are unintended consequences (shocks) sent to other policy communities. One must remember that post-positivism has taught us to accept the reality of mutual interaction and causation. As two (or more) policy communities mutually interact with one another in a rotating fashion the interaction may be fairly smooth for a period of time. At every moment the policies in each community are determined "by the mechanism of interaction among different actors."⁶⁴ Yet eventually, at certain nodal points or "sensitive" issue-areas there will be a clash of dynamics and policy momentum. Here we have bifurcation points where the dynamics and effects of the problem area will branch out and cause instability and fluctuations in the wider political environment. In figure 4.6 one can understand how this situation may occur. Imagine two policy communities (for practical reasons the immigration and foreign policy communities) overlapping one another. As conflicts arise between the two, depending on how they cope and work together in harmony, this will affect how the outside and other policy communities are affected. "As the equations are highly non-linear, it is expected that there will be several solution branches exhibiting a complicated set of bifurcation phenomena. Different initial conditions will place the system in different basins of attraction, thus switching on different evolutions and histories."⁶⁵




Figure 4.6. The temporal and spatial dynamics are never the same.

A = Canadian Immigration Policy Community B = Canadian Foreign Policy Community C = Canadian Labour Policy Community

+ Represents actors within different policy communities who see no conflict with one another. Therefore at those particular nodal points there exists stability and equilibrium between policy communities

X These are nodal points where policy communities clash over an issue or policy. Being "sensitive" (like two magnets pushing against each other) tension builds to a threshold, inevitably forcing change at the next bifurcation point.

Examples of stress at nodal points include: X1 - disagreement between the immigration and foreign policy communities over the priority of immigrants to be allowed into Canada. Immigration wants priority for business immigrants while D.E.A. wants to take in more refugees. X2 - Disagreement between the labour policy community and foreign policy community over the implications of signing a North American Free Trade Agreement.

Due to limits in objectivity and understanding, as policy actors mutually interact with each other at key (sensitive) nodal points these sites will be areas where zero-sum games take place. Egocentricity and a perception that one is separate from one's environment will cause increasing tensions between actors to build up. Eventually, the tension will reach a threshold-- something or someone has to give. The stronger force will push the weaker, forcing the threshold to break. Lets' use an analogy. Like a water dam holding off powerful waves-- the dam breaks (at the bifurcation point), sending massive perturbations throughout the surrounding environment. A small initial problem (build up of water pressure) eventually grows into an environmental catastrophe. What happened? Essentially, the water and the dam reacted to each other as hostile adversaries

rather than potential allies. In the context of figure 4.6, this is what happened at nodal points X1 and X2. As Dryzek points out "the continued interaction of each sub-system intensifies complexity by adding to the elements and interactions to be coped with by other sub-systems. The obvious escape is simultaneous multiple correction: but such action is not in the repertoire of polyarchy. Together, then, complexity and rapid change are lethal to interactive social choice."⁶⁶ In effect, what is required to avoid conflict and chaos is for actors in all three policy communities (A, B, and C) to recognize that they mutually interact and affect one another. From here there is more likelihood that sensitive issue-areas and nodal points of conflict may be identified ahead of time.

With these ideas in mind, how do conflicting perceptions within the Canadian immigration policy community affect actors attempt to cope with the constant internal and external fluctuations of the environment? To answer this one needs to look at the perceptions of those actors involved in the community. By analyzing different perceptions of how the immigration policy process works we can turn a hostile and confrontational environment into a more harmonious process. Not only will this have implications for participatory democracy but it also means empowering policymakers with better tools to cope with complexity. In the next section there are a series of interviews that show how each policy actors' perception of others affects how they interact with one another.

(4). PERCEPTIONS OF THE IMMIGRATION POLICY PROCESS: BARRIERS TO COPING AND UNDERSTANDING

As Dobuzinskis states "each policy community... 'brings forth' its own world [and] acquires its own identity. The analyst's task is to reflect upon the meaning, coherence and implications of these perceptions; to compare them; and to

generate alternative perspectives and values. In this manner, policy analysts would act neither as technocrats in pursuit of some 'mythical' objective account of costs and benefits, nor merely as advocates of special interests."⁶⁷ Instead, in a post-positivist fashion he would play an emancipatory role, empowering citizens to contribute their understanding of the dynamics that affect immigration policy. Different perceptions would help, not hinder the policy process. However there are problems to be overcome before this is to happen. To show how distorted the communication is between policy actors in the Canadian immigration policy community I have conducted a series of interviews with participants located at different points in the community. With their permission to quote them, I interviewed four individuals. The point of these interviews is to examine their conflicting perceptions of the environment that they act in, and how they perceive others. How do they perceive themselves? Do they believe we possess the knowledge but lack the political will to cope with complexities surrounding immigration policy? Let's find out.

Those interviewed include:

- (1). Representing the provincial government, John Gray, Director of the Business Immigration Branch, Ministry of Business and Immigration.
- (2). Collin Mercer, executive assistant, Immigrant Services Society of British Columbia.
- (3). David Stoller, immigration lawyer.
- (4). Gulzar Samji, member of the Immigration and Visible Minority Women of British Columbia.

Essentially, specific questions were asked regarding how each player perceived the immigration policy process, his or her (group's) role in it, the dependency each had on one another, and what problems (if any) exist in the

process. To help support my research, I have included interviews of policy actors done in 1987 by Victor Malarek. First my experience.

Representing the provincial government, John Gray was asked to give his interpretation of the policy process: "Immigration policy is generally a federal domain... I'm not sure if the government ever sets policy on its own, whether immigration or anything else. Politicians relate feedback they get from the private sector and more specifically from the voters. The various immigration societies and people who deal with settlement issues all have some degree of input into the various policy development issues that carry the day." Similarly, Gulzar Samji, as a member of a non-governmental organization, spoke of a positive attitude on the part of the federal government. She stated, "we have had a very positive response from both the federal and provincial level. We have been given money in increasing amounts as we've built up. They realize that we are an expanding organization, and a good resource for them to tap when they look at issues... they look for our input." It is interesting that while the Mulroney Administration is coping with a thirty billion dollar plus deficit, it realizes the importance of maintaining a relationship with non-governmental organizations, in particular Samji's Immigration and Visible Minority of Women of B.C. group. One could argue that this reflects the importance that the federal government places on organizations in the periphery of the attentive public in the Canadian immigration policy community. Aware that it cannot make policy (in a linear fashion) on its own, it supports the maintenance of communication networks throughout the community.

In terms of interdependence, Collin Mercer pointed out that "most other organizations see our [settlement and referral] services as essential." Asked if his organization was dependent on the system, Mercer replied "very much so, when we receive our client's [immigrants], many might need legal assistance and then we

refer them... we serve as a referral agency, helping the client know the services that are available to them." As an immigration lawyer, David Stoller believes that others' perceptions of him "depends on the case and circumstance that arises at the time."

More importantly, it's quite clear that there are conflicting perceptions of reality within the system. Asked if he recognized any fundamental problems in the policy process, John Gray noted "the question is more appropriately put to the federal level, because they are on the front line as far as basic policy goes, but I don't see any particular flaws in the process per se." However, from his vantage point in the community, Collin Mercer disagrees with the notion that immigration policy is largely a federal issue. He sees a much more complex and dynamic environment. Acknowledging that the federal government listens to his organization, he states that "the provincial government has more of a role in the policy process than it will admit to, or realize. The federal government is very responsive to get in touch with us and hear our viewpoints, the problem would be on the provincial level." Asked why the problem exists, Mercer remarked, "the provincial government doesn't see any immediate financial returns" thus it is a lower priority for them. He suggests that "things to do with medicare, social services, our education system, therefore make it very much a provincial affair... its naive to look at immigration and simply conclude that it's a federal issue." Contrasting Mercer's poor image of the provincial government, Samji earlier noted the provincial government's positive response in listening to her organization's point of view. Who is correct in describing the reality of the provincial government's role in the policy process? The answer, again, would depend on which vantage point in the community you were observing and interacting with the government. As far as objective analysis, we must remember from chapter two that all players'

objective perception is distorted by factors outlined by Wittgenstein, Berger and Luckmann, and Morgan.

Each organization (governmental/non-governmental) constructs its own social reality through the working of the internal dynamics that are inherent in that organization. Egocentricity influences how one sees the world. As Morgan argues:

Nowadays many organizations are preoccupied with understanding their environment as kind of a 'world out there' that has an existence of its own... if one really wants to understand one's environment, one must begin by understanding oneself, for one's understanding of the environment is always a projection of oneself. As an organization 'looks at' its environment or makes exploratory probes to test its nature, it should thus appreciate that it is really creating an opportunity to understand itself and its relation with the wider world...[organizations and people] encounter great problems in dealing with the wider world, because they do not recognize how they are a part of their environment. 68

Whether it be the provincial government, the federal government, or any organization, a recognition of being part of, not apart from the policy community is a necessary pre-requisite in dealing with the problems that policymakers must face.

Breaking away from the question of interdependence, those interviewed were asked to give their opinion concerning the issue of access to the sub-government. Do some groups have too much access and influence, others not enough? Representing the provincial government, John Gray remarked "no, not particularly... the lawyers are certainly well positioned to speak to problems in the immigration system that they may encounter... but I don't think it's weighted in anybody's favour." However, as an immigration lawyer Stoller offers a contrasting interpretation; "the bureaucrats in the system have the most power to determine policy... the bureaucrats are number one for input into the policy process." Interestingly, Stoller and Gray's perception is consistent with Malarek's interviews of immigration lawyers and bureaucrats. Answering a question put forward by

Malarek, Dennis McCrea (former chairman of the Immigration Branch of the British Columbia Bar Association) commented "Generally, it is very difficult to get anything done quickly. It's the same problem that has always existed with the bureaucracy. Nobody wants to be criticized and the way to avoid criticism is avoid making decisions. Always leave it for somebody else."⁶⁹ However, Gerry Van Kessel, Director of Special Projects for the Immigration Department, pointed out the difficulties of trying to listen to different lead agencies; "Whenever one program marches to two drummers [External Affairs and Employment and Immigration] you have to make sure they're in step and the question is how to make sure they can stay in step."⁷⁰

Where Stoller and Gray disagree, Stoller and Mercer agree that "there is an under-representation of external advocacy groups." in the sub-government level. Gulzar Samji adds that "there are pre-conceived myths and ideas on the part of government that form barriers for us to contribute efficiently to the policymaking procedure." Interviewed by Malarek in 1987, immigration lawyer Barbara Jackman made similar statements in that many new immigrants and lawyers believe that there are bureaucrats that "harbour racist feelings towards particular ethnic groups."⁷¹ By and large, Samji argues "some government departments are receptive, but otherwise when it comes to large input we often face problems." Samji's comments reflect the view that some government departments may be more egocentric than others in their perception of their role in the environment. Interestingly, immigration lawyer Hugh Fraser sympathizes with the bureaucrat. He states; "They feel the pressure when the system gets knocked by the media. They feel the pressure from the top when memos are fired off chastizing them when the fault is theirs'. I wonder how some of them could even interpret some of the conflicting messages they are getting in terms of policy. One day it's this and the

next day it's something else, and they have to administer it."⁷² On the whole, when David Stoller was asked if there was equal access, he remarked "no, of course not." Arguably, the different perceptions that organizations and individuals possess influences their behaviour in dealing with others in the policy community, and other policy communities. Instead of such egocentricity, "there should be more of an appreciation of systemic interdependence--- think and act systemically: more self-reflection, less self-centeredness."⁷³ As was shown in chapter three, policy actors need to think in a non-linear fashion when they perceive their environment. As La Porte points out, actors need to recognize that "there are clusters of interaction and interdependence within subsystems and varying degrees of connectedness between them... the interactions at the different levels may be, and often will be, of different orders of magnitude."⁷⁴ Figure 4.7 outlines how non-linear processes limit both objectivity and understanding inside and between policy communities.

Policy Communities/Issue Areas

- A. Immigration Policy
- B. Foreign Policy
- C. Provincial Economic Policy
- D. Federal Economic Policy
- E. Quebec Sovereignty Issue
- F. Ecological Issues
- G. Labour Policy




Figure 4.7. Circular relations of policy actors. Note that each actor is limited in what he sees in his environment. This restricts the ability to be objective and understand the dynamics of the overlapping issue-areas. As Nicolis and Prigogine argue, "the first step in modelling complex behaviour is therefore to assess the non-linear

character of the underlying dynamics and to identify a set of variables capable of showing instabilities and bifurcations."⁷⁵

The opinions of those interviewed did to some extent recognize the interdependence of policy communities, although there were different perceptions as to what variables influenced, and how much influence they had in the immigration policy process. For example, Collin Mercer argued that the "federal and provincial government tend to look solely at an economical point of view." He adds, in relation to foreign policy, "it is critical that we [Canada] be recognized as a fair and generous country... it is completely to our advantage to be demonstrating humanitarian concerns first and foremost." In contrast John Gray replied "I don't think [immigration policy] is too inward looking or outward looking; I think it serves the Canadian interest." From his vantage point in the system, David Stoller suggests that "the bottom line is that whenever government makes policy it is affected by many things." Sadly, this is the closest that any of those interviewed recognized the dynamics that are represented in figure 4.7. With respect to complex policy issues Dror has suggested that individuals possess "strong tendencies to simplify issues and see them as much more straightforward than they are disturbing. Glorification of the term 'common sense' which is diametrically converse, as well as antagonistic, to the needs of complexity handling illustrate the hold that simplistic, complexity regressing ways of thinking have on politics, policymaking and public culture."⁷⁶ Throughout the interviews there exhibited a "common sense" tone (especially from Mr. Gray who represents the British Columbia Ministry of International Business and Immigration). None of the policy actors admitted his/her limits in objectivity and understanding. Yet we see by their answers that there are a wide array of conflicting realities. And if we consider these interviews in the context of figure 4.7, policy actors "all must be in a state of uncertainty about our environment."⁷⁷ Uncertainty leads to insecurity, which in

turn results in confrontation. Here is where the interpretative social scientist may contribute his skills as a catalyst to dialogue and understanding of actors in the policy community.

(5). BRINGING POLICY ACTORS TOGETHER: REPLACING CONFRONTATION WITH COMMUNICATION

Building on post-positivist insights from chapter two, from here I suggest constructive techniques for coping with complexity. Political science in general, and policy analysis in particular, requires a broad hermeneutical approach that will reconcile different perceptions and knowledges of the dynamics involved in formulating public policy. Dryzek's "communicative rationality" provides the building blocks for the institutionalization of a discursive dialogue between actors. As a process that is oriented towards intersubjective understanding, communicative rationality requires an awareness of mutual interdependence among players and events. Acting in a facilitator role, the policy analyst needs to persuade everyone of the plurality of realities that exist in the community, and other communities. "The analyst must attempt to achieve an understanding of the practical problems and frames of reference of actors and policymakers, while simultaneously remaining capable of criticism of the practices in which these actors are engaged in. Effective discourse implies that the analyst has something to bring to these problems."⁷⁸ In trying to create an environment where limits in objectivity and understanding can be dealt with, the most important role of the analyst "would lie in the creation and sustenance of conditions and institutions for free discourse. This is more of a 'meta' role than analysts are used to. It bears some relation to the role of a third party facilitator."⁷⁹ As a "meta" role this harks back to Lasswell's original goal of creating a policy science which saw improving the policy process as a prerequisite to improving policy substance.

A discursive design "is a social institution around which the expectations of a number of actors converge. It therefore has a place in the conscious awareness as a site for recurrent communicative interaction among them."⁸⁰ Situated in a particular problem or issue-area, such as immigration, a discursive design is an educative mechanism that opens up channels for communication across relevant actors in the policy community. More interaction and communication channels between the sub-government and the attentive public would not only facilitate participatory democracy, but help us cope better. My critics will argue that this is a little utopian, but it is abstract and unrealistic. However, one would be surprised to find out how many discursive-type mechanisms and institutions are in place to bring parties together and solve confrontation over issues. Examples would include mediation of civil, labour, environmental, and international disputes. As Dryzek argues;

Although differing in nuances, these practices share the following features. First, they proceed in the context of a pressing unresolved problem of interest to all parties. Second, that context is characterized initially by a degree of conflict, indicating interaction between divergent ends favoured by the actors. Third, some neutral third party (a mediator, facilitator, or convener) generally initiates, lubricates and oversees discussions among the interested parties. Fourth, discussion among the actors is prolonged, face to face, and governed by formal and informal canons of reasoned discourse. Such canons might rule out threat, concealment of information, delaying tactics, embarrassment of another party, statement of a bargaining position, and so forth. Participation, therefore means that the parties involved reconstruct the nature of their relationship, at a minimum in the case at hand, perhaps too in their broad interactions.... Fifth, any product of the process is a reasoned, action-oriented consensus. No judgement is reached by the third party [unlike the traditional technocrat/positivist role analysts played]. The fact that agreement is purely voluntary has generally led to a high degree of subsequent compliance. Sixth, such exercises are fluid and transient, lasting no longer than a particular problematic situation. As such, they tend to involve ordinary political agents rather than professional participants."⁸¹

In a constructive manner the policy analyst would stimulate a dialogue between actors--- a discursive design or institution (in the context of immigration

policy) that would involve Collin Mercer and John Gray communicating, thus increasing their own awareness of mutual interdependence. Similarly, Gulzar would describe the process to David Stoller in a manner that he has rarely, if ever seen. The key is that this not only raises awareness and understanding among actors, but it facilitates a more participatory policy process. Those "subjugated knowledges" of which Foucault spoke of would flourish in this environment. As Dryzek states, "by [conditionally] welcoming citizen participation, communicative rationality embraces interaction across that boundary [between the sub-government/attentive public] rather than dreading it." But, he adds that "participatory democracy of itself has an ambiguous potential. Without communicative rationality it will only add to the burdens of complexity. On the other hand, communicative rationality without open participation will remain hobbled by the vestiges of control by a privileged group, and hence have a dominant instrumental rationality."⁸² Critics may argue that it is impossible to prevent the manipulation of such a discursive institution in the pursuit of private interests. This is where the policy analyst's role is so important. He must persuade actors (based on explaining the problems of limits and objectivity I've discussed in chapters two and three) that an open non-manipulative environment is essential in order to generate knowledge which helps us cope with complexity. My critic nods his head in agreement but counters back, "what about the problems with participation? Won't this type of thinking invite people from everywhere resulting in total chaos?" I accept the point that perhaps too many people can create paralysis. However, I suggest the number of participants could be held to a manageable level if we incorporate an idea from American political scientist Robert Dahl. Paraphrasing Dahl, Dryzek argues that many controversial political and social issues (immigration in particular) "could be handled by the creation of a 'minipopulus' of citizens (citizens chosen by other citizens for one year terms). This body would help

constitute informed public opinion... Its competence would be promoted by full time participation and access to advisory committees of [more] technical experts."⁸³ Similarly, the analyst could design Lasswellian decision seminars where policy actors from different sectors of the policy community and different relevant communities bring forth their concerns.⁸⁴ From decision seminars come "developmental constructs." This involves "a technique... adopted to examining the present conjuncture of events and giving full weight to the axis of time... The essential purpose is to enable the policy analyst, and hopefully the decision-maker to find their way in the complexities of the total situation in which they operate. The preparation of a developmental construct does not ignore complexity; it propose an orderly way of revealing the significant contours of reality."⁸⁵ One soon realizes that there are different routes in approaching policy problems.

Perhaps the best known application of communicative rationality was its use in the Berger Inquiry (Canada's Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry, 1974 - 1977). Thomas Berger created an open public sphere where all relevant parties could bring forth their concerns and perceptions of the project. Outside of the traditional institutions of government policymaking, free discourse was allowed to flourish. Essentially, the Berger Inquiry illustrates the potential for hermeneutic policy analysis, with the policy analyst as a facilitator of mutual dialogue and mutual understanding. The Canadian immigration policy community could no doubt use such an approach. Yet contemporary political science in many ways acts as an obstacle to such a participatory approach in policy analysis. By receiving grants and employment as advisors and consultants from the inner circle of the policy community, analysts "help legitimate dominant political and economic institutions."⁸⁶ In effect, a constructive political science would try to create openings for discourse and decrease the impermeable wall surrounding the sub-

government. This certainly will not be easy, but anything worthwhile is never easy.⁸⁷

In the final analysis, society today is kind of at a metaphorical bifurcation point. By acknowledging the importance of self-organizing policy communities and the fluid nature of political and economic dynamics--- we do have a "choice" concerning the evolution of our political institutions and our ability to deal with policy problems. Coping with complexity requires a communicatively rational framework for political action. Paraphrasing Kaufman-Osborn, Dryzek states that the ultimate goal of rational policy inquiry should be the "'generation of a community capable of taking political action' on a particular social problem. Generalizing this point, one might argue that political education, participatory action, and successful problem solving could together help constitute a [policy] community fully capable of steering its own course into the future. The distinction between expert and citizen would lose its force."⁸⁸

In the context of Canadian immigration policy Freda Hawkins points out the challenges that policymakers are faced with: "to relate immigration to the environment will require a far more wide ranging and socially oriented kind of immigration planning than we have today."⁸⁹ However, intelligent action is not based on a positivist approach to problem solving. An intelligent approach means that we accept limits in objectivity and understanding and in the process transform individual knowledges into collective knowledges. By doing this, we are better equipped to direct the course of events as they branch off from social and political bifurcation points, and cope with the complexities inherent the different policy communities.

CHAPTER FIVE

FROM SINGLE - LOOP TO DOUBLE-LOOP LEARNING

Coping with complexity means aiming toward "multi-dimensionality." Political scientists and policy actors need to recognize the diverse dimensions of policy problems. Essentially, we can overcome limits in objectivity and understanding if each person works toward "a better understanding of others." For too long social scientists have prescribed highly technocratic solutions to our social, economic, and political problems. Are we any better equipped to deal with these problems? In most cases, no. The time is now to create a better approach; an approach that has implications for both our ability to cope with complex issues and create a more democratic policy process. In earlier chapters I offered a series of recommendations for policy analysts (i.e., interpretive social inquiry, create an environment of communicative rationality, and re-conceptualizing social dynamics and interdependence). In this chapter my task changes. Here my attention focuses on offering advice to all policy actors, whether they be political scientists or volunteers working for an immigrants' support group. In this context, it provides an opportunity to synthesize the important aspects of this thesis.

Recalling the interviews from chapter four, it was shown how there are a variety of organizations and individuals with their own interests, values and perceptions as to how the Canadian immigration policy community works. Their perceptions of reality were based on their vantage point in the system. Thinking in parochial and narrow terms, policy actors interact in a manner that encourages confrontation. Too often they fail to grasp how they affect and are affected by the broader environment. This reflects the single-loop learning process that individuals engage in; monitoring oneself in order to maintain a pre-determined course of

action in coping *against* threats from the environment. Instead, double-loop learning is needed: This involves individuals monitoring their behaviour and continually questioning whether their original assumptions and perceptions are correct and conducive *with* the environment. Rather than an adversarial situation (i.e., conflicts between egocentric actors and policy communities that perceive one another as a threat), double-loop learning emphasizes the importance of understanding oneself and one's changing interdependence with others, thus opening up opportunities for actors to work with instead of against each other. Therefore, with less egocentric thinking and more systemic thinking, we achieve "a better understanding of others" who knowingly or unknowingly may affect our particular environment. Policy actors are thus able to grasp the dynamics of mutual causation and positive and negative feedback.

As Morgan argues, double-loop learning "hinges on an ability to remain open to changes occurring in the environment, and on an ability to challenge operating assumptions in a most fundamental way."¹ Most importantly, the requirements for double-loop learning incorporate many of the ideas and concepts discussed throughout this thesis. In this context, how do its requirements for individuals in the policy process relate to the emerging issues in political science? Let me explain:

Requirements for Double-Loop Learning

(1). An openness and reflectivity that accepts complexity and changing environments. This allows for uncertainty to be dealt with in a constructive way. Policy actors learn from error, rather than being punished (like bureaucrats) because of error.²

This requirement for double-loop learning implies a realistic view of the difficulties created by social complexity. By accepting uncertainty, it accepts limits

in understanding, precisely because our world is in continual flux. Similarly, it accepts the dynamics of mutual causation inherent in social systems. We have to change and work with (other actors in) the environment, rather than simply denying that complexity and change exist.

(2). Approach complex problems from different viewpoints, probe the various dimensions of situations, and "allow constructive conflict and debate between advocates of competing perspectives. In this way, issues can be fully explored, and perhaps redefined so that they can be approached and resolved in new ways."³

Firstly, multi-dimensionality assumes that all individuals are limited in both objectivity and understanding. By recognizing the importance of various dimensions of a situation, it incorporates the post-positivist conceptions of multiple realities and multiple causes. In addition, this requirement emphasizes that actors engage in an environment of communicative rationality. Here we are reminded of Dryzek's "discursive designs" where dialogue between conflicting policy actors takes place.

(3). As Morgan points out, "avoid imposing [bureaucratic-type] structures of action upon organized settings. This principle relates to the importance of inquiry-driven action. In contrast with traditional approaches of planning, which tend to *impose* goals, objectives, and targets, it is important to devise means where intelligence and direction can emerge from on-going organizational processes...[Thus] More double-loop learning can be generated by encouraging a 'bottom up' or participative approach to the planning process."⁴ As Morin states, the key point is that policy "action emerges as a result of a learning process: it is not imposed..."⁵ from technocrats above.

Again, there is an emphasis on the need for institutions, designs, and communication channels. With communicative rationality, policy can emerge as a result of on-going debate. The important point is that before we improve policy substance, we must improve the process of policy formulation. Basically, we are encouraged to build on Lasswell's earlier goals. A "bottom up" approach stresses the need for feedback on the part of actors in the attentive public and sub-government areas of the policy community. In this context, it means a more participatory and democratic policy process. Thus we are reminded of Lindblom's "self-guiding society."

(4). Do not attempt to create a "master plan" of definite targets and goals. Instead, aim for short-term goals. Each individual and organization needs to focus on the challenges and obstacles that one is inevitably faced with and wants to avoid.


Related to this, individuals should try to recognize "sensitive" bifurcation points where actors from different policy communities may clash over a certain aspect of policy. The requirements of double-loop learning emphasize a need for each person to carefully assess himself or herself in relation to others and the broader environment. Similarly, incremental policymaking dominates over rational-synoptic policymaking. With this in mind, actors are encouraged to think in terms of being proactive rather than reactive.

By touching on the idea of double-loop learning, we invariably recognize that coping with complex policy problems requires a change in attitudes and assumptions. As Ladd argues, "the core of complex thought [contains] an element of incompleteness and uncertainty. Indeed, it can only be formulated once a radical break is made with the idea of perfect knowledge."⁶ Perfect knowledge


does not exist. Therefore, coping with our limits in objectivity and understanding requires a more collective approach to policymaking. Essentially, there is a need for a more democratic policy process.

By integrating post-positivist conceptions of knowledge, the policy community model, and insights from the emerging science of complexity, this thesis has introduced an approach that at the present time is lacking in political science. But this is just a start. From here there are many branches from which political scientists can conduct future research. Although there is strength growing in the post-positivist movement, further research is needed in applying post-positivist concepts and ideas to practical policy problems. Similarly, there needs to be further work on comparing the dynamics of natural systems with social systems. Combining these ideas would no doubt provide some fresh blood and re-invigorate the discipline. Also, the use of case studies seems appropriate in terms of looking at and comparing the diversity of problem policy areas. In terms of immigration policy, while it is moving to the top of the political agenda in many countries, research is definitely lacking. Immigration policy is becoming an issue of "high politics." With the apparent end of the cold war, immigration concerns must be moved from the periphery to the centre of academic research. In the final analysis, I conclude by pointing out that political science as a whole needs to self-evaluate (in the style of double-loop learning) its traditional assumptions, place in society, and ability to change with a changing world. If not, the alternative of adhering to the status quo inevitably means the discipline will be seen as a outdated and less relevant.

Single-loop learning rests in an ability to detect and correct error in relation to a given set of operating norms:



Double-loop learning depends on being able to take a "double look" at the situation by questioning the relevance of operating norms:



Step 1 = the process of sensing, scanning, and monitoring the environment.

Step 2 = the comparison of this information against operating norms.

Step 2a = the process of questioning whether operating norms are appropriate.

Step 3 = the process of initiating appropriate action.

Figure 5.1. Single and Double-Loop Learning. Source: Gareth Morgan, Images of Organization. (Sage Publications, Inc., 1986) p.88

ENDNOTES

CHAPTER ONE

1. William D. Coleman, Grace Skogstad, Policy Communities and Public Policy (Mississauga, Ont., Copp Clark Pitman, Ltd., 1990) p. 25
2. Edgar Morin, "Complexity," International Social Sciences Journal, Vol XXVI, No. 4, 1974, p. 555 - 556
3. Alan Nash, "International Refugee Pressures and the Canadian Public Policy Response" paper, Jan., 1989, Institute for Research on Public Policy, p. 3

CHAPTER TWO

1. Auguste Comte, Positive Philosophy, (New York, N.Y., A.M.S. Press Inc., 1974) (ed. A.S. Blumberg) p. 3
2. Ibid, p. 3
3. The Vienna Circle held a series of Thursday evening meetings where they discussed epistemological issues in science. By merging logic with empiricism, they founded the methodology of logical positivism.
4. Descartes argued that the scientist could discover the universal laws and truths that affected all phenomena (both natural and social). Following this, the scientist could design an objective and rational picture of the world.
5. David Oldroyd quoting Aristotle in The Arch of Knowledge, (London, U.K., Ibid, p. 239
7. Ibid, p. 238
8. Charles W. Morris, International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Vol. 1 (Chicago, Ill., University of Chicago Press, original printing 1938) p. 124 - 125
9. Ibid, p. 125
10. Karl Popper describes this as one of his main criticisms of the Vienna Circle.
11. Oldroyd, p. 239
12. Ibid, p. 235
13. Plato The Republic, p. 485

14. Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery. (New York, N.Y., Basic Books, 1959) p. 39
15. Ibid, p. 39
16. Ibid, p. 40
17. Karl Popper, "Unity of Method in the Natural and Social Sciences," in Philosophical Problems of the Social Sciences ed., David Braybrooke (New York, N.Y., The Macmillan Company, 1965) p. 35
18. M. Hawkesworth, Theoretical Issues in Policy Analysis. (Albany, New York, State University of New York Press, 1988) p. 47
19. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, p. 111
20. Ibid, p. 44
21. Gerald Holten, quoted in Hawkesworth Theoretical Issues in Policy Analysis, p.26
22. Ibid, p. 26
23. Both Karl Popper and Wittgenstein lived in Vienna during the 1920's. Although they held discussions with the Circle, they did not consider themselves members. Ironically Wittgenstein had a considerable influence on the Circle in that his Tractatus was a major source for the development of the logical positivist's verification principle.
24. Wittgenstein from his Tractatus, quoted by Oldroyd in The Arch of Knowledge.
25. L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations. (New York, N.Y., The MacMillan Company, 1958) p. 48
26. Ibid, p. 48
27. Peter L. Berger, Thomas Luckmann. The Social Construction of Reality. (Garden City, N.J., Doubleday and Company Inc., 1968) p. 47
Berger and Luckmann describe the process; "... the formation of the self, then must also be understood in relation to both the ongoing orgasmic development and the social process in which the natural and human environments are, of course, given at birth. But the self, as it is experienced later as a subjectivity and objectivity and recognizable identity, is not." p. 47 - 48
28. Ibid, p. 12
29. Ibid, p. 37

30. Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Vols. I & II, (International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Chicago, Ill., University of Chicago Press, 1962) p. 84 -85
31. Ibid, p. 122
32. For a more detailed description concerning the periodic crises experienced in policy analysis and social science see: M. Hawkesworth Theoretical Issues in Policy Analysis, Lincoln and Guba The Paradigm Dialog, and Terrence Ball (ed.) Idioms of Inquiry.
33. Kuhn, p. 75
34. Michael Polanyi, Tacit Dimension, (Garden City, N.J., Doubleday and Company, 1966) p. 17
35. Ibid, p. 75
36. John Forrester, Planning in the Face of Power, (Berkeley, Calif., University of California Press, 1989) p. 55 56
37. Stephen Cox, "Devices for Reconstruction," Critical Review, Vol. 3, No. 1, Winter 1989, p.55 -56
38. Rafe Champion, "Toward Constructive Deconstruction," Critical Review, Vol. 3, No. 1, Winter 1989, p. 78 - 79
39. Terrence Ball, "Deadly Hermeneutics; or Sinn and the Social Scientist," in T. Ball (ed.) Idioms of Inquiry, (Albany, N.Y., State University of New York Press, 1987) p. 103
40. Ibid, (Champion) p. 81
41. Patti A. Lather, "Rescribing Otherwise: The Play of Values in the Practices of the Human Sciences," in Egon Guba (ed.) The Paradigm Dialog, (London, U.K., Sage Publications, 1990) p. 331
42. For a more in-depth analysis of Foucault see his interviews in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972 - 1977 (ed.) Colin Gordon, (New York, New York, Pantheon Books, 1980)
43. Michael T. Gibbons, "Interpretation, Geneology and Human Action," in T. Ball Idioms of Inquiry, p. 147
44. Nancy Hartsock quoted by Patti A. Lather in E. Guba The Paradigm Dialog, p. 318
45. Gibbons, in Ball (ed.) Idioms of Inquiry, p. 148

46. Thomas Kuhn argues how normal science copes with a crisis. There are three approaches: (1) find a solution based on present world views and thus is able to solve the crisis; (2) recognizes the failure of the normal science paradigm and puts the problem on the shelf for future generations to deal with; (3) a new world view (paradigm) emerges and results in a great deal of controversy, insecurity and debate amongst practitioners of the earlier normal science.
47. Leslie A. Pal, "Knowledge, Power and Policy: Reflections on Foucault," Social Scientists, Policy and the State, Stephen Brooks, Alan G. Gagnon (ed.) (New York N.Y., Praeger Publications, 1990) p. 147
48. Ibid, p. 151
49. Sandra Burt "Organized Women's Groups and the State," Policy Communities and Public Policy, William D. Coleman, Grace Skogstad (ed.) (Mississauga, Ont., Copp Clark Pitman, 1990) p. 193
50. Forrester, p. 57
51. Rita Mae Kelly, "Policy Inquiry and a Policy Science of Democracy," paper presented to the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1989, p. 10
52. Taken from Naturalistic Inquiry, Egon G. Guba, Yvonna S. Lincoln (ed.) (Beverly Hills, Calif., Sage Publications, 1985) p. 52
53. Olgilvie and Schwartz as quoted by Guba and Lincoln in Naturalistic Inquiry, p.53
54. Ibid, p. 55 - 56
55. Kelly, p. 15 - 16
56. Ibid, p. 16
57. Hawkesworth, p. 191
58. Michael T. Gibbons (ed.) Interpreting Politics, (New York, N. Y., New York University Press, 1987) p. 3 - 4
59. Brian Fay, "An Alternative View: To Interpretive Social Science," in Interpreting Politics, p. 83
60. James Farr, "Resituating Explanation," Idioms of Inquiry, p. 45 - 67
61. Fay, in Interpreting Politics, p. 90 - 91

62. Farr in Idioms of Inquiry and Fay in Political Theory and Praxis: New Perspectives T. Ball (ed.) (Minneapolis, Minnesota, University of Minnesota Press, 1977)
63. For a more detailed analysis comparing the applied pluralist model with the social science model of policymaking see Hawkesworth's Theoretical Issues in Policy Analysis.
64. Garry Brewer, "An Analysis of Complex Systems: An Experiment and It's Implications for Policymaking," in Organized Social Complexity (ed.) Todd La Porte (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 181
65. Gregory A. Daneke, "A Science of Public Administration," Public Administration Review May/June 1990, Vol. 50, Num. 3; p. 385
66. Daneke, p. 5
67. Laurent Dobuzinskis, The Self-Organizing Polity: An Epistemological Analysis of Political Life, (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1987) p. 8
68. Dobuzinskis, p. 8
69. Brewer, Organized Social Complexity, p.176
70. Gareth Morgan, Images of Organization, (Beverly Hills, Calif., Sage Publications, 1986) p. 237
71. Ibid, p. 238
72. Ibid, p. 243
73. Charles E. Lindblom, Inquiry and Change, (New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1990) p. 214
74. Further analysis of the 'incrementalist' and 'rationalist' approach to policymaking can be found in Braybrooke and Lindblom's Decision (New York, N.Y., The Free Press,1963). The authors argue that incremental decisions "are the decisions typical of ordinary political life--- even if they rarely solve problems but merely stave them off or nibble at them, often making headway but sometimes retrogressing... It is decision-making through small or incremental moves on particular problems rather than a comprehensive reform program. It is also endless [like the self-guiding society]; it takes the form of an indefinite sequence of policy moves. Moreover, it is exploratory in that the goals of policymaking continue to change as new experience with policy throws new light on what is possible and desirable. In this sense it is also better described as moving away from known social ills rather than as moving toward a known or relatively stable [pre-determined] goal." p. 71

75. Lindblom, Inquiry and Change, p. 233
76. Comte, p. 463
77. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, (London, U.K., Oxford University Press, 1965 (originally published 1739) ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge) p. 31
78. David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, (New York, N.Y. The Free Press 1949 translated by Edward Shills) p. 51
79. Max Weber The Methodology of the Social Sciences, (New York, N.Y. The Free Press 1949, translated by Edward Shills) p. 78
80. Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding p. 45
81. What is a spontaneous order? Hayek describes it as "a state of affairs in which a multiplicity of elements of various kinds are so related to each other that we may learn from our acquaintance with some spatial or temporal part of the whole correct expectations concerning the rest, or at least expectations which have a good chance of proving correct." p. 36 "Although there was a time when men believed that even language and morals had been 'invented' by some genius (i.e. Plato's Philosopher-King and the logical positivists of the Vienna Circle), everybody recognizes now that they are the outcome of a process of evolution whose results nobody foresaw or designed." Law, Legislation and Liberty p. 37
82. F.A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol. 1 "Rules and Order" (Chicago, Ill., University of Chicago Press, 1967) p. 12
83. F.A. Hayek, Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, (Chicago, Ill., University of Chicago Press, 1967) p. 40

CHAPTER THREE

1. Yehezkel Dror, Ventures in Policy Sciences, (New York, N.Y., American Elsevier Publishing Company, 1971) p. 26
2. Harold Lasswell, Daniel Lerner (ed.), The Policy Sciences, (Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1951) p. 128
3. Ibid, p. VII - VIII
4. Harold Lasswell, A Pre-View of Policy Sciences, (New York, N.Y., American Elsevier Company, 1971) p. 23
5. Lerner and Lasswell, p. 15
6. In Nagel's Policy Theory and Policy Evaluation: Concepts, Knowledges, Causes and Norms, (ed., Stuart Nagel) (New York, N.Y., Greenwood Press,

1991) Cahill and Overman describe that "Lasswell's call for relevant knowledge, which was explicitly normative, context dependent, and multidisciplinary, seen in the broader context of Western and American intellectual history, was not itself new. Nevertheless, it came at a propitious time for those in the academy as well as government who were dissatisfied with the role of the traditional disciplines in producing knowledge linked to decisions made on issues of public concern." p. 11

7. Lasswell, A Pre-view of Policy Sciences, p. 14
8. Ibid, p. 14
9. Ibid, p. 14
10. Ibid, p. 39
11. In Lasswell and Lerner's quest for a multidisciplinary approach they argued that "creative interchange is needed between the physicists, the social scientists, and the men of action [policymakers]. The cultivation of the technique of bringing about easy co-operation among interdisciplinary teams is one of the principal tasks of an evolving policy science." p. 14 Recent developments of quantum physics and its acceptance into social science is due in part to Lasswell and Lerner's argument forty years earlier urging such an interchange between academic disciplines.
12. Soedjatmoko, in "Opening Statement," in The Science and Praxis of Complexity, (Tokyo, Japan, The United Nations University) p. 9
13. Gregory A. Daneke, "Back to the Future II: Misplaced Elements of Policy Inquiry and the Advanced Systems Agenda," paper - The U.B.C. Policy Analysis Division-- Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration, p. 9
14. Ibid, p. 10
15. Ibid, p. 10 - 11
16. Yehezkel Dror, Policymaking Under Adversity, (Oxford, U.K., Transaction Books, 1986) p. 1
17. See Lasswell's thoughts on how complexity is becoming a recurring theme in policy analysis. Chapter 4 "Diversity: Synthesis and Methods, (pps. 58 - 64) in A Pre-View of Policy Sciences
18. Todd La Porte, (ed.) Organized Social Complexity, p. 6
19. Ibid, p.3
20. Soedjatmoko, p. 1

21. Morgan states that most political and social scientists "fall into the trap of 'thinking in lines,' searching for simple causes that lie at the root of the problem. The level of employment, money-supply, trade union power, wage rates, interest rates, and government spending have all at one time or another been identified as the root cause. This linear thinking then sets the basis for linear solutions: eg., create unemployment, reduce the money supply, reduce trade union power, introduce wage restrictions, increase interest rates, or reduce government spending. The kind of contextual analysis [in figure 3.1] offers an alternative way of thinking about the problem of revealing the pattern of relations that create and sustain inflation." p. 249 Gareth Morgan, Images of Organization, (Beverly Hills, Calif., Sage Publications, 1986) p. 249

22. Morgan describes the complexity of price inflation (in relation to figure 3.1): "When we understand the problem of price inflation as a system of mutual causality defined by many interacting forces, we are encouraged to think in loops rather than lines. No single factor is the cause of the problem. Price inflation is enfolded in the nature of the relations that define the total system. Many of the links represented in this diagram are deviation-amplifying (heavy lines); negative feedback relations (dotted lines) are more sparse. Positive feedback thus gains the upper hand. The system can be stabilized by strengthening existing negative-feedback loops and by creating others. Many government policies implicitly attempt to have this affect. For example, wage and price controls introduce negative-feedback loops that attempt to moderate the wage-price spiral. Government or media criticism of trade unions as unreasonable, greedy 'villians' attempts to weaken the positive-feedback loop between public support and union power, in the hope that it will moderate the power of trade unions to negotiate higher wages." Essentially, "in understanding this kind of mutual causality, we recognize that it is not impossible to exert unilateral control over any set of variables. Interventions are likely to reverberate throughout the whole. It is thus necessary to adjust interventions to achieve the kind of *system* transformation that one desires." Images of Organization p.250

23. Ibid, p. 247

24. Ibid, p.247

25. Ibid, p. 253

26. Ibid, p. 252 - 53

27. Soedjatmoko, p. 3

28. Dobuzinskis, The Self-Organizing Polity: An Epistemological Analysis of Political Life p.43

29. Ibid, p. 6

30. Ibid, p. 50
31. Morgan, p. 253
32. Laurent Dobuzinskis, "Science, Technology, and Bureaucracy: From the Discourse of Power to the Power of Discourse," in World Futures, (ed. Ervin Laszlo) Vol. 28 Nos. 1 - 4, 1990, p. 199
33. John S. Dryzek, Rational Ecology: Environmental and Political Economy, (New York, N.Y., Basil Blackwell Inc., 1987) p. 26
34. Ibid, p. 26
35. Ibid, p. 27 - 28
36. Ibid, p. 28
37. Ibid, p. 28 - 35
38. Peter Gregware, Rita Mae Kelly, "Relativity and Quantum Logics: A Relational View of Policy Inquiry," in Nagel Policy Theory and Policy Evaluation: Concepts, Knowledge, Causes, and Norms. p. 34
39. Ibid, p. 33
40. What is policymaking as "fuzzy gambling?" Dror uses the interesting analogy of an unstable casino "where not playing is itself a game with high odds against the player; here the rules of the game, their mixes of chance and skill, and the payoffs change in unpredictable ways during the gambling itself; where unforeseeable forms of external 'wildcards' may appear suddenly (such as a terrorist attack or distribution of diamonds by prodigal millionaires); and where health and life of oneself and one's loved ones may be at stake, sometimes without one knowing it." p. 9 in "Policy Gambling: A Preliminary Exploration," Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 12 1983/84
41. Ibid, p. 9
42. Dror lists a number of barriers which inhibit individuals from coping with complexity; (1). The human mind is poor at handling uncertainty...humans tend to an illusion of controlling chance elements, which causes grievous decision errors "most of the studies in decisional psychology clearly show inherent weaknesses of human thinking when facing qualitative uncertainty and ignorance."; (2). "political and organizational information processing stubbornly replaces objective uncertainty with subjective certainty."; (3). Senior policymakers, with some exceptions, such as in the military, tend to resist perceptions of their decisions as fuzzy gambles. In this respect, they are definitely not 'gambling professionals' who devote much effort to working out thinking, to handle chance through the application of skilled strategies." Also "even when senior policymakers intellectually accepted this image [of

fallibility], they resented it deeply."'; (4). Political culture supposes governments to know what they are doing and not to gamble with the fates of their nations, imposing facades of certainty even on central minds of governments who sometimes know better and giving a competitive advantage to the naives, who authentically fool themselves that they know for sure what they are doing."'; (5). "modern mass culture as a whole, especially in Western countries, seems to get more apprehensive about risks." p. 172

43. J.G. Ruggie, "Complexity, Planning, and Public Order," in Organized Social Complexity, (ed.) Todd La Porte (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 75) p. 137
44. Ibid, p. 33
45. Dryzek, "Don't toss Coins into Garbage Cans: A Prologue to Policy Design," p. 347
46. Dryzek, Rational Ecology p. 51
47. Ibid, p. 52
48. Ibid, p. 52
49. Soedjatmoko, p. 5
50. Dror, Ventures in Policy Sciences, p. 120
51. John S. Dryzek, Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1990) p. 14
52. John S. Dryzek, "Policy Analysis as a Hermeneutic Activity," Policy Sciences, Vol. 14, 1982, p. 322
53. Dryzek, Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science, p. 43
54. Edward W. Ploman, "Introduction," in The Science and Praxis of Complexity, p. 8
55. Soedjatmoko, p. 8

CHAPTER FOUR

1. Todd La Porte, Organized Social Complexity, p. 339
2. Ronald Brunner, "The Policy Sciences as a Policy Problem" Policy Sciences Vol. 24, p. 71

3. Paul Sabatier "Political Science and Public Policy: An Assessment" Paper prepared for presentation at the Special Conference of the Policy Studies Organization "Advances in Policy Studies, 1950-1990" Held in conjunction with the 1989 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia, August 30 - September 2, 1989. p. 8 -9
4. A. Paul Pross, "Pressure Groups: Talking Chameleons" Canadian Politics in the 1990's. ed., Michael S. Whittington, Glen Williams (Nelson Canada, Inc., Toronto, Ontario, 1989) p. 299
5. See Jeremy Wilson, "Wilderness Politics in B.C.: The Business Dominated State And The Containment of Environmentalism" Policy Communities and Public Policy pgs. 141 -169
6. Sabatier, p. 10
7. Hugh Thorburn, Interest Groups in the Canadian Federal System (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, Ontario, 1985) p. 4
8. Ibid, p. 42
9. Ibid, p. 42
10. In 1946 there were 17 federal departments, contrasting 27 in 1980. Derived from The Collins Dictionary of Canadian History: 1867 to the Present, David J. Bercuson and J.L. Granatstein (Collins Publishers, Don Mills, Ontario, 1988) Similarly, in Group Politics and Public Policy (Oxford University Press, Toronto, Ontario, 1986) p. 23 Pross notes the historical differences in influence and participation of pressure groups in the policy process: (1). Pre-1867- Little institutionalization. Chiefly voluntary groups. Only a few effective nationally. (2). Late 1800's to 1930's (the Depression)- "Executive dominance. Groups begin to develop an institutionalized structure (ie., Canadian Manufacturers Association), but they are still predominantly local in orientation. (3). Mid-1930's - early 1960's - "Age of the Mandarins." Groups are now more influential, but in a tutelage relationship with the bureaucracy. Some are publicity-conscious- issue oriented groups, but most groups' influence is exercised privately through sub-governments, contained government agencies, and institutionalized groups. (4). Mid-1960's to present- "Diffusion of Power." Increasingly active and numerous. Considerably freer of agency tutelage. Tendency to form policy communities. More publicity conscious.
11. Pross, p. 70
12. As a side note, two recently published books on the problems with Canadian public policy reflect the general trend in avoiding any analysis of immigration policy. In Canada At Risk? Canadian Public Policy in the 1990's (ed., G. Bruce Doern and Bryan B. Purchase) policies discussed include health, education, cultural and social. Similarly, in Coleman and Skogstads' Policy

Communities and Public Policy, forestry, banking, and fisheries are discussed. However, neither book mentions immigration policy.

13. As stated on on the Public Broadcasting Corporation news program "The McLaughlin Group," October 6, 1991
14. *Time* magazine August 26, 1991, p. 19. Also in the August 17 , 1991 issue of *The Economist*, it was noted that "In 1990 some 1.3 million people moved west from the ex-Comecon countries. An estimated 2 million could quit the Soviet Union itself when its new emigration laws take effect in 1993. Meanwhile, a mounting influx of job-poor, people-rich North Africa threatens to overshadow all such East European flows." p. 12 As a result of these external pressures "Last year Europeans were gripped by widespread paranoia over speculation that hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of Soviets fleeing a bleak winter would overrun first Poland and Czechoslovakia before crossing into the European Community." *Time*, August 26, 1991, p. 20
15. *Vancouver Sun* October 1, 1991, p. D4
16. Immigration Policy Perspectives, 1974 Green Paper on Immigration Policy, Vol. 1, p. 37
17. Freda Hawkins, Canada and Immigration: Public Policy and Public Concern, (McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal, Quebec, 1972) p. 294
18. Ibid, p. 347
19. Gerald Dirks, Canada's Refugee Policy (McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal, Quebec, 1977) p.139
20. ibid, p. 149
21. Cited in Ibid, p. 171
22. Ibid, p. 171
23. Coleman and Skogstad, p. xi
24. Hawkins, p. 304
25. Dirks, p. 61
26. Hawkins, p. 307
27. Coleman and Skogstad, p. 28
28. Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, Order Out of Chaos (Bantam books, New York, N.Y., 1984) p. 9

29. La Porte, p. 332
30. Dror, Ventures in Policy Sciences, p. 210
31. Lasswell, Pre-View of Policy Sciences p. 14
32. Rita Mae Kelly, "Policy Inquiry and a Policy Science of Democracy" Paper presented for the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Atlanta, Georgia, August 31, 1989, p. 17
33. Edward Ploman, "Introduction" in Science and Praxis of Complexity, p. 9
34. Laurent Dobuzinskis, The Self-Organizing Polity: An Epistemological Analysis of Political Life, p. 7
35. Gregoire Nicolis and Ilya Prigogine, Exploring Complexity: An Introduction, (W.H. Freeman and Company, New York, N.Y., 1989) p. 195 - 196
36. Ibid, p. 195 - 196
37. La Porte, p. 3
38. Laurent Dobuzinskis, "Science, Technology and Bureaucracy: From the Discourse of Power to the Power of Discourse" in World Futures Vol. 28, Numbers 1 -4 , 1990
39. Pross, Group Politics and Public Policy, p. 104
40. Ibid, p. 105
41. Dirks, p. 185
42. Pross, p. 107
43. Coleman and Skogstad, p. 26
44. Ibid, p.26
45. As discussed in Dirks, p. 186,
It is interesting to note that in 1952 the Immigration Branch of the Department of Mines and Resources was elevated to equal partner status in the new Department of Citizenship and Immigration.
46. Pentti Malaska, "Outline of a Policy for the Future" in Science and Praxis of Complexity, p. 339
47. Nicolis and Prigogine, p. 238

48. As well as co-ordinating economic policy, the European Community is in the process of harmonizing and co-ordinating members' immigration policies. This is just one example of an emerging global refugee regime. As David Matas points out in Closing the Doors (Summerhill Press, Toronto, Ontario, 1989 p. 265), there is increasing co-ordination between the U.N.H.C.R., Western Europe and North America. "The U.N.H.C.R. and European governments meet in consultations structured around an annual series of confidential meetings... Although Canada and the United States are not part of the European deliberating bodies, they participate in many European meetings as key players. Government refugee policy is being developed in a trans-atlantic manner.[my emphasis]" With this being the case there's no doubt that a global refugee regime would contribute fluctuations and cause perturbations within the Canadian immigration policy community.
49. Freda Hawkins, "Dilemmas in Immigration Policy-making: The Problems of Choice, Political Will and Administrative Capacity" in (ed.) Benard Bonin Immigration: Policy-Making Process and Results (Institute of Public Administration of Canada, 1976) p. 50
50. Royal Commission on Conditions of the Foreign Service, (Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1981) p. 76
51. Alvin Toffler, "Science and Change" in Order Out of Chaos, p. xxii
52. Prigogine and Stengers, p. 170
53. Ibid, p. 73
54. Coleman and Skogstad, p. 29
55. Thorburn, p. 12
56. See Coleman and Skogstad, pgs. 16 - 31
57. Nicolis and Prigogine, p. 241
58. Stated by Premier William Vander Zalm.
59. *The Globe and Mail*, September 25, 1991, p. A7
60. Coleman and Skogstad, p. 27
61. Prigogine and Stengers, p. 190
62. Pross, Group Politics and Public Policy p. 149
63. La Porte, p. 204 - 207
64. Nicolis and Prigogine, p. 241

65. Ibid, p. 241
66. Dryzek, Rational Ecology: Environment and Political Economy, p.129
67. Laurent Dobuzinskis, "Policy Analysis in the Post-Modern Age: From Control to Democratic Participation?" Simon Fraser University 1991 paper, p. 31 - 32
68. Morgan, p. 243
69. Quoted in Victor Malarek's Haven's Gate: Canada's Immigration Fiasco (MacMillan of Canada, Toronto, Ontario, 1987) p. 58 - 59
70. Ibid, p. 59
71. Ibid, p. 60
72. Ibid, p. 60
73. Morgan, p. 246
74. La Porte, p. 15
75. Nicolis and Prigogine, p. 218
76. Dror, PolicyMaking Under Adversity, p. 241
77. Graham P. Chapman, "The Epistemology of Complexity and Some Reflections on the Symposium" in Science and Praxis of Complexity, p. 366
78. Dryzek, "Policy Analysis as a Hermeneutic Activity" in Policy Sciences Vol. 14 (1982) p. 323
79. Dryzek, Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science, p. 126
80. Ibid, p. 43
81. Ibid, p. 44
82. Ibid, p. 72
83. Ibid, p. 73
84. Ibid, p. 73
85. Ibid, p. 147
86. Dryzek, Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science, p. 21

87. In Dryzek's Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science, he describes the barriers that a communicative rationality must overcome. As he notes, "For the foreseeable future, reform will have to proceed in a hostile environment defined by an economic system of corporate capitalism with extensive state intervention and a political system that mixes liberal polyarchy with pervasive bureaucracy." Additionally, "perhaps the most obvious danger this environment presents to discursive designs is that of co-optation... State and corporate actors may seek some association with, or even participation in, discursive forums. the door is open to manipulation by these actors. They can cloak their private interests in a rhetoric of public concern... they can make superficial concessions to opponents and thereby secure passive acquiescence on the part of troublemakers. They can offer symbolic participation in policy implementation in order to hide a low quality of service to the poor and so generate support for an unjust regime." p. 81
88. Dryzek, Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science, p. 131 - 132
89. Hawkins, Canada and Immigration: Public Policy and Public Concern, p. 335

CHAPTER FIVE

1. Gareth Morgan, Images of Organization. (Sage Publications, Inc., Beverly Hills, Calif., 1986) p. 91
2. Ibid, p. 91
3. Ibid, p. 92
4. Ibid, p. 92
5. Edgar Morin, "On the Definition of Complexity" in Science and Praxis of Complexity. p. 63
6. John Ladd, "Policy Studies and Ethics" in (ed.) Stuart Nagel Policy Studies and the Social Sciences, p. 183

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