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DISCOURSE MARKERS IN CONSTRUCTED DIALOGUE

by

Karen Leslie Saxton

THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF

THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

in the Department

of

Linguistics

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ABSTRACT

An examination of transcripts of recorded conversation reveals that a significant number of 'direct quotations' used in conversations contain a discourse marker such as *well*, *oh*, *okay*, *look*, *y'know*, and *hey* as the initial item. Direct quotation in conversation differs structurally from the norm of the text, thus drawing attention to that part of the discourse and acting as an evaluative device which reveals speakers' attitudes toward what they are saying. When speakers take the floor in order to tell a story, provide explanations or give advice, they may leave out details of the quotation's context in favour of evaluative aspects. Direct quotations, being pieces of dialogue abstracted from another context, are in particular need of contextualization since understanding in discourse depends on relations between utterances and other interactional moves. If the details of such relations are (at least partially) left out in favour of evaluation, a certain amount of contextualization is necessary if hearers are to effectively interpret the evaluative aspects of the quotation. Discourse markers, by revealing the general tenor of a speaker's underlying thought at some sequential point in an exchange, contextualize quotations by indicating relational aspects between the response given (i.e. the quotation) and some prior move to which it is a response.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The use of direct quotation is frequent in spontaneous conversation, and the occurrence of a discourse marker such as *well*, *oh*, *okay*, *look*, *y'know*, and *hey* as the initial item in these quotations is notable. Since discourse markers are tied to the original speech situation and depend on an original speaker's perspective, they occur mainly in direct, and not in indirect, quotation.

The characteristics of such direct quotation must be examined before the use of discourse markers within them can be understood. First, there is reason to believe that much of what speakers quote was never actually uttered as such in the 'original' speech situation. Rather, its impact appears to lie in the fact that, in having a different form from the rest of the text, it draws attention to itself and thus acts as an EVALUATIVE DEVICE, giving the crucial personal or social information, or in other words, the POINT of the discourse.

The nature of discourse markers must also be examined before their occurrence in direct quotation can be analyzed. Markers are often thought to indicate a speaker's attitude; I believe this is because they are EVINCIVE in nature, that is, they indicate the covert thought of the speaker at the time of utterance. Each marker evinces a different 'tenor' of underlying thought, thus mediating between covert thought and overt behavior. Because evincives are SEQUENTIALLY placed in an exchange, they have a relational function, and, in this sense, they are CONTEXTUALIZATION CUES, which show how each utterance relates to what precedes or follows. In other words, by evincing the general

tenor of underlying thought at some sequential moment in an exchange, discourse markers indicate a speaker's covert mental reaction to either what has preceded (reference) or what follows (response).

In direct quotation, there is one context (the 'original' context) embedded in another (the 'ongoing' context). Since certain details of the original context are inaccessible to hearers, it may be advantageous for speakers to include certain contextualization cues in direct quotation so that hearers can arrive at the relevant interpretation of the quotation. Hearers need to 'reconstruct' an original reference-response relation from whatever details they are given, and fit this into the ongoing context in order to assess a speaker's evaluative intentions. I suggest that discourse markers within quotations allow hearers to reconstruct such a reference-response relation by indicating the general tenor of an original speaker's underlying thought and thus mediate between the reference (which is often not explicitly stated) and the response (i.e. what is included in the quotation).

In this thesis, each of the above ideas will be examined in greater detail. The remainder of Chapter 1 deals with the concept of CONSTRUCTED DIALOGUE, which has the form of direct quotation but which may be (wholly or partially) 'invented' by speakers in order to provide their discourse with EVALUATION. In Chapter 2, I examine discourse markers in general, and then suggest why they occur so frequently in constructed dialogue. Chapter 3 offers a more in-depth analysis of particular discourse markers used in the constructed dialogue of my data. Finally, in Chapter 4, I conclude my discussion by summarizing and linking together the above-mentioned ideas.

1.2 CONSTRUCTED DIALOGUE IN CONVERSATION

In English there are two ways a speaker can quote the speech of another, directly and indirectly. Banfield (1983) lists four general grammatical differences between direct and indirect speech: (i) a subordinating conjunction introduces indirect speech; (ii) the verb of indirect speech undergoes sequence of tense rules; (iii) the grammatical person of pronouns with the same referent in the main and embedded clauses of indirect speech is identical; and (iv) the demonstrative elements which refer to the time or place of the quoted speech differ in direct and indirect speech (p. 3). Note the differences between the following sentences:

(1) a. Yesterday at the station Mary told me, "I will meet you here tomorrow."[1]

b. Yesterday at the station Mary told me that she would meet me there today.

Furthermore, she notes that "certain 'expressive' or 'emotive' elements are found only in direct speech" (ibid, p. 6).

Coulmas (1985) elaborates on this, listing five elements which can occur in direct speech, but which do not normally appear in indirect speech:

- expressive elements, e.g. interjections, curses, etc.

  (3) #He said that hey, it hurt.[2]

- terms of address

  (4) #He said that sir, he would like another drink.

- sentence moods, e.g. imperative, hortative, interrogative

  (5) #He said that be quiet.

- elliptical sentences

  (6) #He said that if he only had money . . .

- discourse organizing signals, e.g. starters, pause fillers, hesitation signals, tags, etc.

  (7) #He said that so, he's going to the game tomorrow.

Besides being in conflict with the grammar of complementation (i.e. they cannot occur after "that"), the above elements do not occur in indirect speech because they are tied to the original speech situation and depend on the original speaker's perspective (ibid, p. 48). More important, however, is that these elements show the highly interactive nature of direct speech (Macaulay 1987, p. 29).

Another element that can be manipulated in direct quotation but which is pragmatically odd in indirect quotation is IMITATION. Amplitude, speed, pauses, voice quality and accents are examples of elements which a speaker can imitate when using direct quotation.

Given these differences, the use of direct quotation enables speakers to express the speech of another in many interesting ways. Before going on, however, I would like to address the idea that much of what appears to be directly quoted speech in conversation was never actually spoken as such, or at all, in the original situation. Tannen (1989) refers to this (wholly or partially) 'invented' direct discourse, i.e. the type that occurs in much of casual conversation, as CONSTRUCTED DIALOGUE, and gives eight diagnostics to show

that what looks like reported speech was never actually spoken in the form in which it appears (pp. 111-118):

a. DIALOGUE REPRESENTING WHAT WASN'T SAID

The speaker explicitly states that something WASN'T said:

(8) You can't say, "Well Daddy I didn't hear you."

b. DIALOGUE AS INSTANTIATION

The dialogue is offered as a representation of a general phenomenon by one concrete instance:

(9) That's when I start to say, "Well, I don't think I'll go into the water this time."

c. SUMMARIZING DIALOGUE

The speaker casts a summary of another's argument, etc., in dialogue:

(10) And this man is essentially saying, "We shouldn't be here because Imelda Marcos owns this restaurant."

d. CHORAL DIALOGUE

The dialogue is attributed to more than one speaker:

(11) And then all the Americans said, "Oh, in that case, go ahead."

e. DIALOGUE AS INNER SPEECH

Speaker's thoughts are represented as words:

(12) And then I thought to myself, "Oh my God, if I am going to get someone's slightly psychotic attitude on perverts I really don't feel like riding this train."

f. THE INNER SPEECH OF OTHERS

Another's thoughts are represented as words:

(13) You could just see him draw back like, "Man, I'm going to knock this thing to Kingdom Come."

g. DIALOGUE CONSTRUCTED BY A LISTENER

A listener supplies a line of dialogue animated in the role of a character in someone else's story:

(14) A: The minute the kids get old enough to do these things themselves, that's when . . .

B: "You do it yourself."

h. VAGUE REFERENTS

(15) "Go get this and it looks like this and the other."

Furthermore, the notion of 'verbatim reproduction' is not entirely clear. Clark and Gerrig (1990) mention two differing criteria for verbatim reproduction: a) "actual words spoken", and b) "surface structure of the original sentence" (p. 795). For example (ibid, p. 795), the original utterance:

(16) I . . . I've only been . . . we've only been to like . . . four of his I . . five of his lectures, right?

might be reported in any of the following ways:

(17) a. Sidney says, "I . . . I've only been . . . we've only been to like four of his I . . . five of his lectures, right?"

b. Sidney says, "We've only been to, like, five of his lectures, right?"

c. Sidney says, "We have only been to five of his lectures."

Of the above, (17a) is 'actual words spoken', (17b) is 'surface structure of the original sentence' and (17c) is a more formal rendering of (17b).

In a study by Clark and Liittschwager (unpublished research, cited in Clark and Gerrig, ibid), ten people each listened to 72 brief recorded exchanges (usually two sentences long) extracted from spontaneous conversations. Immediately after listening to each exchange, they reported what they had heard to a partner who hadn't heard it. One exchange consisted of Sidney uttering (16), followed by Stan uttering "no we've been to more than that something like seven eight". Below are four subjects' reports on the first part of the exchange:

(18) a. Sidney says, "We've only been to what, five of his lectures?"

b. Sidney goes, "Well, you've been to like, four or five of his lectures."

c. Sidney said, "Well, I've only been to like four or five of his lectures."

d. Sidney says, "Oh, I've only been to like, what, four or five or something like that of his lectures.

Of the 720 reports collected, none was precisely verbatim by either the 'actual words spoken' criterion or the 'surface structure of original sentence' criterion. Clark and Gerrig suggest that speakers were trying to give a "general picture of or feel for" what Sidney said, not the actual MANNER in which he said it (ibid, p. 796). (Note also that in three of the four reports in (18) above, a discourse marker occurs as the initial item, whereas there was no marker in the original!) They also suggest that speakers and hearers tacitly recognize this 'reporter's licence', and give an example from Livia Polanyi's data (see Polanyi, 1979) where a speaker gave two differing quotations for the same event in a story:

(19) a. I remember saying to myself, "There is a person over there that's falling to the ground." And that person was me.

b. I said my awareness was such that . . . I said to myself, "Gee well,

there's a person over there, falling down." And that person was me.

Finally, Clark and Gerrig suggest that speakers may not reproduce an utterance verbatim even when they could (1990, p. 797). In an unpublished study by Wade and Clark (cited in Clark and Gerrig, ibid), sixteen people memorized a brief scene from a movie until they could recite it word for word. Eight of the subjects were then asked to recount the scene to a partner as accurately as possible. Here, 99% of the words in their quotations were verbatim repetitions of the original. The other eight subjects were asked to simply tell the story of the scene to a partner, and produced verbatim quotations only 62% of the time. The evidence suggests that speakers are not COMMITTED to reporting the actual words spoken. All that appears to be necessary is that the reports RESEMBLE their referents (i.e. the original) (Sperber and Wilson 1986, Clark and Gerrig 1990).

Moreover, even if speech is 'reported' accurately, its repetition in another context fundamentally changes the nature of the utterance. It becomes the creation of the current speaker, who is not merely doing a passive act of reporting, "but rather an active one of creating an entirely new and different speech act, using the 'reported' one as source material" (Tannen 1989, p. 108). In other words, it is impossible to separate the contribution of the person reporting the speech from the contribution of the original speaker. Bakhtin comments (1981, p. 340):

> . . . the speech of another, once enclosed in a context, is—no matter how accurately transmitted—always subject to certain semantic changes. The context embracing another's words is responsible for its dialogizing background, whose influence can be very great. Given the appropriate methods for framing, one may bring

> about fundamental changes even in another's utterance accurately quoted . . . For this reason we cannot, when studying the various forms for transmitting another's speech, treat any of these forms in isolation from the means for its contextualizing (dialogizing) framing—the one is indissolubly linked with the other. The formulation of another's speech as well as its framing . . . both express the unitary act of dialogic interaction with that speech, a relation determining the entire nature of its transmission and all the changes in meaning and accent that take place in it during transmission.

Not only is the context (i.e. participants, time, place, purpose, etc.) of the current speech situation important for the interpretation of meaning, but also the context of the original speech situation must be taken into account, especially, it would seem, the original speaker. Again, from Bakhtin (ibid, p. 347):

> For certain kinds of internally persuasive discourse can be fundamentally and organically fused with the image of a speaking person . . . While creatively stylizing upon and experimenting with another's discourse, we attempt to guess, to imagine, how a person with authority might conduct himself in the given circumstances, the light he would cast on them with his discourse.

This notion applies even when the original speaker happens also to be the speaker doing the reporting in the current context. From Goffman (1974, p. 545):

> The speaker can add further variety by reporting statements made by others than himself . . . and when he does cite himself, when he does use 'I', this I is likely to be different in some respects from the speaker himself-at-the-moment, thus ensuring that he will be speaking with reduced weight and in a special frame, parenthesizing himself from the cited figure in his own reporting of his own experience.

Goffman adds that the key is to be found "in the relation of the speaker himself as someone about whom he is speaking" (ibid, p. 512). Listeners, then, "must actively assess which relationship to the speaker is most salient" (Robinson 1981, p. 72). In other words, not only is a synchronic perspective (i.e. current situation) necessary for interpretation, but also a diachronic perpective, which reflects the speaker's stance towards his or her personal past, must be taken into account (ibid, p. 61).

1.3 USE OF CONSTRUCTED DIALOGUE IN CONVERSATION

The question that remains is why a speaker would use constructed dialogue in a conversation. It has been noted by Longacre (1983) that constructed dialogue occurs in narrative, expository, and hortative discourse, where its function is to mark some kind of peak within that discourse. Larson (1978) says: "The rhetorical function of reported speech is primarily one of adding vividness, highlighting certain events, and in various ways making the story more interesting" (p. 59). It would seem that highlighting a certain event, or marking a peak, is a matter of contrast (ibid, p. 71), and any structure which departs from the norm of the text can accomplish this function. So, for example, in a text composed mainly of statements about events, a piece of constructed dialogue will stand out and thus draw attention to itself.

Another reason that constructed dialogue may be used is to create INVOLVEMENT, an observation noted by Chafe (1982) and elaborated on by Tannen (1986, 1988, 1989). Tannen claims that involvement is created by: (i)

IMMEDIACY (portraying action and dialogue as if it were occurring at telling time); and (ii) FORCING THE HEARER TO PARTICIPATE IN SENSEMAKING (1986, p. 324).

Goffman (1974) comments on the notion of immediacy in his discussion of REPLAYS, 'dramatizations' where conversationalists reproduce a 'scene' of past, conditional, or future events (p. 504):

> A tale or anecdote, that is, a replaying, is not merely any reporting of a past event. In the fullest sense, it is such a statement couched from the personal perspective of an actual or potential participant who is located so that some temporal, dramatic development of the reported event proceeds from that starting point. A replaying will then, incidentally, be something that listeners can empathetically insert themselves into, vicariously reexperiencing what took place.

Not only must the listener be ignorant of the outcome of the event until it is revealed, but also the protagonist in the story must be ignorant of it if any sort of "structured suspense" is to be maintained (ibid, p. 506). To quote Goffman (ibid, p 508):

> The point is that ordinarily when an individual says something, he is not saying it as a bald statement of fact on his own behalf. He is recounting. He is running through a strip of already determined events for the engagement of his listeners. And this is likely to mean that he must take them back into the information state—the horizon—he had at the time of the episode but no longer has.

The use of constructed dialogue is a useful strategy for creating such immediacy. According to Tannen, casting thoughts as dialogue allows a dramatization based on a speaker's understanding of events at that time, "rather

than the clarity of hindsight" (1989, p. 116). Schiffrin (1981) also comments (p. 58):

> Direct quotes are frequent in narrative: They increase the immediacy of an utterance which occurred in the past by allowing the speaker to perform that talk in its original form, as if it were occurring at the present moment . . . It is through a combination of deictic and structural changes that direct quotes have this effect: the narrative framework replaces the situation of speaking as the central reference point—becoming the locus for time, place, and person indicators, as well as the arena within which speech acts are performed. Because indirect reports of past utterances do not involve the same deictic and structural changes, the same effect of immediacy is not created.

The second way to create involvement is to force the hearer to participate in sensemaking. The use of constructed dialogue creates PARTICULAR scenes and characters, which allows listeners to imagine a scene, a drama where "characters with differing personalities, states of knowledge, and motives are placed in relation tc and interaction with each other" (Tannen 1989, p. 118). From Tannen (ibid, p. 133):

> Dialogue is not a general report; it is particular, and the particular enables listeners (or readers) to create their understanding by drawing on their own history of associations. By giving voice to characters, dialogue makes story into drama and listeners into an interpreting audience to the drama. This active participation in sensemaking contributes to the creation of involvement.

Indeed, what goes on in conversation is a great deal of INTERPRETATION of events. Frake (1980, p. 57) comments: "A talk, then, exemplifies a

conceptual unit whereby we organize our strips of experience in formulating accounts of what is happening, our memories of what has happened, and our predictions and plans for what will happen." Speakers propose, defend, and negotiate interpretations of such past, present and future events (ibid, p. 50). They provide "evidence for the fairness or unfairness of [their] current situation and other grounds for sympathy, approval, exoneration, or amusement" (Goffman 1974, p. 503). Listeners, then, must actively interpret speakers' interpretations.

The key to this interpretation is the concept of EVALUATION. According to Labov and Waletzky, evaluation is "that part of the narrative which reveals the attitude of the narrator towards the narrative" (1967, p. 37). In other words, evaluation "identifies the narrator's interpretation of the incident, his personal reactions, and the consequences of the incident for himself or significant others" (Robinson 1981, p. 63). Narratives must have a POINT in order to make the story interesting or TELLABLE (Labov and Waletzky 1967). Without evaluation, hearers have only a mass of detail, and no way of understanding what the story is about, WHY the speaker provided this particular interpretation (Polanyi 1979, p. 209). The onus, then, is on the speaker to "evaluate states and events so that it is possible to recover the core of the story and thereby [allow listeners to] infer the point being made through the telling" (Polanyi 1985, p. 200). Polanyi adds that this 'point' is often "some sort of moral evaluation or implied critical judgment . . . about the world the teller shares with other people" (ibid, p. 187). Robinson (1981, p. 63) comments:

> . . . personal narratives must have a point, and that will typically be an explanation of the narrator's subjective reactions to the events described and specification of the relationship

> of the events to significant values and beliefs. The presence of evaluative statements is one of the features that distinguishes STORIES from REPORTS.

Labov and Waletzky (1967) list three functions of evaluation: (i) to emphasize the strange, unusual, terrifying, dangerous, crazy, hilarious, etc. character of the situation; (ii) to place the narrator in the most favourable light (SELF-AGGRANDIZEMENT); and (iii) to emphasize the point where the complication has reached a maximum. While (i) and (iii) above are fairly self-explanatory, (ii) deserves a little elaboration, especially since Labov and Waletzky's concept of self-aggrandizement plays a large part in my analysis of the social functions of evaluation. As Robinson comments, it is an important means of "reaffirming both one's personal identity and socially sanctioned beliefs and values, particularly those that ascribe responsibility, hence blame or praise" (1981, p. 64). On the same subject, van Dijk (1985b, p. 4) notes:

> One pervasive strategy in everyday life, and hence also in dialogues, is the optimal display of one's social self for other participants . . . Not only is the well-known protection of self-esteem involved here, but also the presentation of preferred roles or relationships.

If, as Goffman (1974) suggests, when speakers use direct quotation they mean to stand in a relation of reduced personal responsibility for what they are saying, then the use of constructed dialogue is a socially effective device for the realm of self-aggrandizement. The use of constructed dialogue allows speakers to convey information IMPLICITLY that might be awkward to express EXPLICITLY. Macaulay (1987, p. 29) suggests:

> . . . the speaker can quote someone else as saying things in a way that present the speaker in a favourable light, whereas in summarized form that information might be lost, unless stated explicitly in which case the speaker might be perceived to be boasting.

Polanyi (1979) lists evaluation as one of three types of contextualizing information found in stories. The EVENT STRUCTURE provides the temporal context, the DESCRIPTIVE STRUCTURE gives information about environment and characters, and the EVALUATIVE STRUCTURE provides the crucial (personal or social) information. The evaluative structure is "composed of devices which may be either integrated into the telling of the story itself [internal evaluation] or included in comments made by the narrator from outside the frame of the story [external evaluation]" (p. 209). Constructed dialogue is one of many EVALUATIVE DEVICES used for internal evaluation (Labov and Waletzky 1967, Polanyi 1979, Tannen 1982, Schiffrin 1984, Tannen 1986). Other devices include repetition of key words and phrases, increased use of modifiers, historical present tense, and suspension of the action. There are no 'absolute' evaluative devices, rather, "anything which departs from the norm of a text can act evaluatively by drawing attention to itself" (Polanyi 1979, p. 209).

While most discussions of constructed dialogue as an evaluative device appear in studies on narratives, I believe that it may occur in other types of discourse as well. Longacre (1983) has noted that it occurs in expository discourse (speaker is holding forth on a topic for the purpose of giving information or explaining something) and hortatory discourse (speaker urges strongly, or gives warnings or advice). In both cases, there is some type of struggle involved. In the case of expository discourse, the speaker must

'struggle' to clarify the main outlines of a topic (which listeners must actively interpret in order to get the point), and in hortatory discourse the speaker must struggle to convince listeners of the soundness of the advice (ibid, p. 39). Indeed, wherever persuasion of any sort is involved, evaluative devices may come into play (Britton 1970, p. 122).

1.4 SUMMARY

We have seen that much of what looks like direct reported speech in casual conversation may have been constructed by a speaker in order to highlight that section of the current discourse. Constructed dialogue contributes to listener involvement by portraying events and dialogue as if they were occurring at telling time (immediacy) and by forcing listeners to participate in sensemaking. Constructed dialogue creates particular scenes and characters, where characters with differing personalities, states of knowledge and motives react to and interact with each other. There is normally some kind of conflict, struggle or unusual circumstance involved which makes the story tellable or reportable. Speakers give their interpretations of such events, evaluating them so that listeners can infer the point being made. Constructed dialogue is one evaluative device which speakers can use in evaluating what they are talking about. It contributes to the overall evaluative structure of the story, providing the crucial personal or social information that listeners require in order to infer the speaker's intended point.

In the following chapter, we will see how discourse markers are used in constructed dialogue; in particular, how they CONTEXTUALIZE a piece of

constructed dialogue and thereby contribute to the speaker's overall evaluation of the event that she is describing.

CHAPTER 2

DISCOURSE MARKERS IN CONSTRUCTED DIALOGUE

2.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, some general properties of discourse markers are examined. I will discuss how markers contextualize utterances, and then suggest why they occur so frequently in constructed dialogue.

2.2 DISCOURSE MARKERS

In past literature, what are now commonly called DISCOURSE MARKERS or DISCOURSE PARTICLES have been variously referred to as 'interjections', 'starters', 'hedges', and 'pause fillers', among others. When researchers began to take a greater interest in natural conversation, these 'pause fillers' were examined more carefully and found to have regular uses in discourse. Two characteristics of these items are generally noted. First, they seem to serve a RELATIONAL FUNCTION, linking utterances in a continuative role within a discourse (James 1983, Stubbs 1983, Zwicky 1985). Second, they are often thought of as indicators of a speaker's ATTITUDE or STATE OF MIND with respect to what is being said (James 1983, Zwicky 1985). Östman (1981) comments that markers "'implicitly anchor' the utterance in which they function to the speaker's attitudes towards aspects of the ongoing interaction" (p. 5). ("An act of communication is said to be anchored to a context if some of its elements cannot be interpreted, or given a meaning without explicit reference to the ongoing situation. Typically, this is characteristic of deictic elements in an

utterance . . . " (ibid, p. 6). Schiffrin (1987) also comments on the deictic properties of markers.) Östman concentrates on the interactive aspects of markers, i.e. Face-Saving (i.e. the ego-centric perspective of the speaker) and Politeness (i.e. focusing on the addressee's point of view) functions, including the "expression of relative certainty about the acceptability of the propositional content of an utterance; the speaker's emotional involvement in the subject matter, and in the particular utterance of his speech turn; the speaker's attitudes to each other, to the world in general, and the subject matter under discussion; mutual expectancies, etc." (ibid, p. 7).

Schourup (1985) focuses on the cognitive aspects of markers, analyzing *like, well, y'know, oh,* and certain 'interjections' as EVINCIVES, where evincive is "a linguistic item that indicates that at the moment at which it is said the speaker is engaged in, or has just been engaged in, thinking; the evincive item indicates that this thinking is now occurring or has just now occurred but does not completely specify its content" (p. 18).[3] The function of evincives is to respond to the problem of DISCLOSURE: "Current undisclosed material in the private world [the covert thinking of the speaker] and the other world(s) [the covert thinking of other conversants] may be communicatively relevant to what the speaker is now doing, or has just done, or will just now be doing, in the shared world [talk and other behavior that is on display and is thus available to both the speaker and hearers]" (ibid, p. 8). Furthermore, since evincives are tied to the moment of utterance, they mark the real time moment of occurrence of undisclosed thinking and thus establish the timeliness of a speaker's reaction (ibid, p. 21): "Covert reactions occur at some sequentially present moment and must be placed, or at least evinced, in the shared world if they are to be jointly

known about and responded to" (ibid, p. 143). For example, consider the following exchange:

(1) A: What time is it?

B: *Well*, Bob just finished lunch.

We will assume for now that the evincive function of *well* is to indicate that the speaker feels that there is an insufficiency in her upcoming response (this will be expanded upon in the discussion of *well* in Chapter 3.2). Evincing this insufficiency is communicatively relevant, at this sequentially present moment, because A will then be aware that B's response is not DIRECTLY the information sought, and that he may have to infer the answer from whatever information is given.

Now consider what might happen were B to fully specify the contents of her undisclosed thought:

(2) A: What time is it?

B: Bob just finished lunch, and, as you well know, Bob finishes his lunch every day at 12:30, so I infer from this that it must be somewhere around 12:30.

The 'usefulness' of evincives is related to one of Grice's general restrictions on conversational behavior, the Maxim of Quantity (Grice 1975, p. 45):

(i) Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the purposes of the exchange).

(ii) Do not make your contribution more informative than required.

As to (ii) above, since both participants are already aware of Bob's lunching habits, such detail is not necessary in this exchange. However, for the purposes of fulfilling (i), B may have to inform A that her reply is not directly the information sought, so that A is aware that he may have some inferring to do.

Each marker, by evincing the general tenor of undisclosed thought, mediates in a specific way between undisclosed (covert) thinking and overt behavior (e.g. talk). What I take to be the basic, evincive use of each marker will be given in my discussion of particular markers.

The way that markers accomplish this 'specific mediation' is through the BASIC or CORE (evincive) use that each marker has. Recent studies in discourse markers have concentrated on isolating one, specific use for each marker. Schourup (1985, p. 65) comments:

> [There is a] single basic or core use and . . . in particular discourse contexts this core use can lead to a variety of interpretations based on the interaction of the basic contribution of the item with the contexts in which it occurs.

Schiffrin (1987) notes: "What differs is not the function of the marker—what differs is the contexts in which a particular verbal or non-verbal move is to be anchored by the marker" (p. 327). Markers, through their core use, "SELECT a meaning relation from whatever potential meanings are provided through the content of talk, and then display that RELATION" (ibid, p. 318).

This approach differs from, for example, James' 1974 article "Some Aspects of the Syntax and Semantics of Interjections", where she gives two different uses for *oh*. Oh_1 always occurs inside a sentence, and indicates that

"the speaker is making a deliberate decision or choice as to what to say next" (p. 162), for example:

(3) I saw . . . *oh* . . . twelve people at the party.

Oh$_2$ occurs sentence-initially or by itself, and indicates that the speaker has just noticed or realized something (p. 163), for example:

(4) *Oh*, you're leaving tomorrow.

However, if *oh* is assigned one basic use, the different interpretations of *oh*$_1$ and *oh*$_2$ can be explained as being the result of the different contexts in which they occur. Schiffrin's (1987) basic use for *oh* is marking changes in information states, either recognition of familiar information or the receipt of new information (p. 95). In (3) above, *oh* marks the speaker's recognition of familiar material, and (4) could be either, depending on the context.

I believe that the basic use of markers is cognitive, along the lines of Schourup's 'evincive' concept. Any interactional effects of markers are the result of the interaction of the basic cognitive use of the marker and the context in which it occurs. Schiffrin (1987, p. 100) comments:

> . . . although *oh* is a marker of information management tasks which are essentially cognitive, the fact that it verbalizes speakers' handling of those tasks has interactional consequences. Thus, the use of *oh* may very well be cognitively motivated. But once an expression makes cognitive work accessible to another during the course of a conversation, it is open for pragmatic interpretation and effect—and such interpretations may become conventionally associated with the markers of that work.

An example from Schourup (1985) exemplifies this idea very well:

(5) a. I didn't make the phone call you asked me to.

b. *Oh*, I didn't make the phone call you asked me to.

He explains that to say (5a) can be quite different from saying (5b) since *oh* in (5b) "can be used to indicate that a thought expressed in the sentence following *oh* just entered the speaker's mind and thereby implicate that the speaker's failure to make the call was due to forgetfulness, not malevolent intent" (p. 21). The interactional effects here are clear.

In my analysis of markers in constructed dialogue, I will give what I believe to be the cognitive (or evincive) function of each marker, and then explain the interactional effects as being a result of this function and the context.

2.3 DISCOURSE MARKERS AS CONTEXTUALIZATION CUES IN CONSTRUCTED DIALOGUE

The high frequency of occurrence of discourse markers as the initial item in constructed dialogue has been largely overlooked in past research. Schourup, however, did notice and comment on the preponderance of markers in this position (1985). In the speech materials used for his study, he found that *well*, *oh* and other evincives/interjections[4] occur more frequently in quotation-initial position than in non-quotation-initial position, and that the differences were statistically significant (p. 24). In my data (approximately 40 minutes of recorded informal conversation), I counted 87 instances of utterance-initial

markers (*well*:35, *oh*:25, *okay*:10, *y'know*:8, *hey*:6, *look*:3), and 33 of these occurred as the initial item in pieces of constructed dialogue (*well*:11, *oh*:6, *okay*:8, *y'know*:3, *hey*:3, *look*:2)![5] I counted a total of 89 instances of constructed dialogue (77 pieces of more than one word, 12 pieces consisting of one word (e.g. "What?") or expression (e.g. "Holy shit!") only), and, as mentioned above, 33 of these contained a discourse marker as the initial item.[6]

Schourup suggests that the preponderance of discourse markers in constructed dialogue is due to the fact that quotations are in particular need of CONTEXTUALIZATION, and that markers (or evincives) may help to fulfull this need (ibid, p. 25):

> One feature of these items is that they establish the existence of the speaker's undisclosed thought without displaying it in detail. This aspect of evincives makes them potentially quite useful in contextualizing quotations, which, as pieces of nonpresent situations, stand in particular need of contextualization. Evincives situate the quotation and the quoted speaker by portraying that speaker as 'with thought' and specifying the general quality or cast of the speaker's thought at that point. It is to the reporting speaker's advantage to prepare the ground on which a quotation can have its desired force by establishing the quoted speaker as present in and mindful of the (recalled or imagined) proceedings as integral, that is, to the situation from which the quotation is drawn.

He also notes that markers and interjections are "tied to the particular present moment of utterance of the QUOTED speaker" (my emphasis) (ibid, p. 27). The use of markers in constructed dialogue, then, is an excellent way of contributing to an effect of immediacy.

Let me return to the idea that constructed dialogue is in particular need of contextualization. Integral to the notion of contextualization is SEQUENTIALITY, "the order in which information is introduced in the positioning or locating of a message in the stream of talk" (Gumperz 1982, p. 159). Schegloff (1984, p. 34) comments:

> Most centrally, an utterance will occur some-place sequentially. Most obviously, except for initial utterances, it will occur after some other utterance or sequence of utterances with which it will have, in some fashion, to deal and which will be relevant to its analysis for coparticipants.

In other words, we need to look at "interpretation as a function of the dynamic pattern of moves and counter-moves as they follow one another in ongoing conversation" (Gumperz 1982, p. 153). Gumperz (ibid, p. 154) comments:

> One indirectly or implicitly indicates how an utterance is to be interpreted and illustrates how one has interpreted another's utterance through verbal and non-verbal responses, and it is the nature of these responses rather than the independently determined meaning or truth value of individual utterances alone that governs evaluation of intent.

Schegloff (1984, p. 52) argues that it is through such sequential placement that utterances are contextualized:

> . . . the very composition, construction, assemblage of . . . sentences is predicated by their speakers on the place in which it is being produced, and it is through THAT that a sentence is context-bound, rather than possibly independent sentences being different intact objects in or out of context.

It is this type of sequential interpretation that extablishes LOCAL COHERENCE: "coherence that is constructed through relations between adjacent units in discourse" (Schiffrin 1987, p. 24).

Matters of sequentiality are often talked about in terms of ADJACENCY PAIRS, such as question-answer, request-compliance/non-compliance, etc., where the first part make relevant a particular action to be done in the second part. Schegloff (1984, p. 37) states:

> Adjacency pairs are especially strong constraints, a first pair part making relevant a particular action, or restricted set of actions, to be done next. When speakers do such an action, they not only comply with the requirements of the particular adjacency pair initiated; they show in their utterance their understanding of what the prior utterance was doing . . .

Goffman (1981, p. 52) argues that the widely-accepted notion of adjacency pairs is misleading, and prefers to analyze conversational moves in terms of REFERENCE-RESPONSE, an interactional unit:

> . . . our basic model for talk ought not to be dialogic couplets and their chaining, but rather a sequence of response moves with each in the series carving out its own reference . . .

Goffman defines the scope of REFERENCE as simply "all the things that could be responded to" (ibid, p. 50), and RESPONSE as any 'move' (linguistic or non-linguistic) inspired by a prior 'move' (linguistic or non-linguistic). MOVE is defined by Goffman as "any full stretch of talk or of its substitutes which has a distinctive unitary bearing on some set or other of the circumstances in which

participants find themselves" (ibid, p. 24). In these terms, a conversation is seen as a series of response moves, for example, in the following exchange:

(6) A: Hello.

B: Hello.

A's "hello" is a response to the reference of the sudden availability of participants to each other. B's "hello" is a response to A's move, a greeting. The advantage of analyzing conversation in terms of reference-response is that it does not rely on things actually SAID, rather on units of things actually done or occurring, linguistic or otherwise. Goffman (ibid, p. 47) comments:

> If a respondent does indeed have considerable latitude in selecting the elements of prior speaker's speaking he will refer to, then surely we should see that the respondent may choose something non-linguistic to respond to. Respondent can coerce a variety of objects and events in the current scene into a statement to which he can now respond . . .

Consider the following exchange:

(7) A: [enters wearing a hat] Hello.

B: [shaking head] No, I don't like it.

Here, B's response clearly indicates the reference to which it is a response: A's hat, or rather, in terms of 'moves', A's wearing of the hat.

In simplified terms, the reference establishes a 'conditional relevance' upon the response. The speaker must show that she has discovered the

relevance of the reference, and must show that her response is a relevant reaction to the reference. Schegloff (1984, p. 37) comments:

> It is that coparticipants in conversation operate under the constraint that their utterances be so constructed and so placed as to show attention to, and understanding of, their placement. That means that utterances, or larger units, are constructed to display to coparticipants that their speaker has attended a last utterance, or sequence of utterances, or other unit, and that this current utterance, in its construction, is placed with due regard for where it is occurring.

Therefore, it is possible to "[locate] in what is said now the sense of what it is a response to" (Goffman 1981, p. 33). This is often done through the use of CONTEXTUALIZATION CUES, the "means by which speakers signal and listeners interpret what the activity is, how semantic content is to be understood and HOW each sentence relates to what precedes or follows" (Gumperz 1982, p. 131). Cohesive elements (e.g. pronouns, adverbs, conjunctions, etc.) can then be seen as types of contextualization cues since they indicate an interpretive link between two parts within a text. Schiffrin (1987, p. 91) comments:

> And although we can recognize a cohesive element by its surface appearance in a clause, what such an element actually displays is a connection between the underlying propositional content of two clauses—the clause in which the element appears and a prior clause. In short, the cohesive link is established because interpretation of an element in one clause presupposes information from a prior clause.

In principle, each 'detail' of talk can be made meaningful for others. As van Dijk (1985b) comments, hearers have only what they see and hear, along with their background knowledge, in order to make sense of any utterance. They will, therefore, make use of all given 'details' in order to arrive at the relevant interpretation. For example, in (7) above, one contextualization cue is B's shaking her head. Contextualization cues allow for CONVERSATIONAL INFERENCE, the "situated or context-bound process of interpretation, by means of which participants in an exchange assess each others' intentions, and on which they base their responses" (Gumperz 1982, p. 153). Cohesive devices in particular aid in conversational inference by indicating an interpretive link between propositions. Schiffrin (1987, p. 9) comments:

> . . . studies of cohesion indicate that the meaning conveyed by a text is meaning which is interpreted by speakers and hearers based on their inferences about the propositional connections underlying what is said. Cohesive devices do not themselves create meaning; they are clues used by speakers and hearers to find the meanings which underlie surface utterances.

Contextualization cues are not the only elements that aid listeners in conversational inference. Other contextual factors such as personal motivations, goals, interests, tasks, obligations, and social aspects of the communicative setting also play a part in the interpretation of a text (van Dijk 1985a, p. 107). In (7), the contextualization cue of B's shaking her head and B's uttering "No, I don't like it" aid A in recognizing B's intended message (i.e. that it is the <u>hat</u> that B doesn't like). However, in a true, contextualized interaction, other factors also come into play, for example, aspects of participants' personalities, the relationship between participants, etc.

Discourse markers fit nicely into the class of possible contextualization cues, aiding participants in the interpretation of conversational inference. By signalling the general tenor of a speaker's mental reactions at some sequential point, markers signal how semantic content is to be understood and how each move relates to what precedes (reference) or follows (response). The notion of SEQUENTIAL POINT deserves some elaboration here. Schiffrin (1987) suggests that markers occur at the BOUNDARIES of units of talk, e.g. tone groups, sentences, actions, verses, etc. They can thus be said to BRACKET units of talk. Discourse markers typically occupy INITIAL brackets, that is, they occur at the beginning of units of talk. Initial brackets appear to do different kinds of work in discourse than terminal brackets. Goffman (1974, p. 255) suggests:

> . . . the bracket initiating a particular kind of activity may carry more significance than the bracket terminating it. For . . . the beginning bracket not only will establish an episode but will also establish a slot for signals which will inform and define what kind of transformation is to be made of the materials within the episode.

However, it is the SEQUENTIAL PLACEMENT, i.e. initial, that is relevant to this discussion. Schiffrin (1987, p. 37) comments:

> Despite the significance of opening brackets, it is important to note that brackets look simultaneously forward and backward—that the beginning of one unit is the end of another and vice versa. It is this anaphoric AND cataphoric character of discourse markers that I want to capture by including in their definition the property of sequential dependence.

A cohesive tie is thus established when a discourse marker is used; the interpretation of the response presupposes information from the reference, and,

by relating that information to the information given in the response in a specific way, that response is contextualized. Discourse markers REFLECT underlying connections between propositions, and it is these CONNECTIONS that are indicated by speakers and inferred by listeners (ibid, p. 61).

For example, in (1), the contextualization cue *well* displays a speaker's attention to and understanding of the preceding utterance and signals that the semantic content of the response is to be understood as being incomplete with regards to the information sought in the reference. In (5b), *oh* signals that the semantic content of the response should be understood as being due to forgetfulness (versus, for example, malevolence). The 'move' that is the reference, then, is the fact that the speaker was supposed to make the phone call. By evincing *oh*, the speaker makes it known that she has just remembered this fact. The reference (the fact that she was supposed to make the phone call) and the response (admission to not making the phone call) are MEDIATED by the contextualization cue *oh*, which allows the listener to arrive at the RELEVANT interpretation, i.e. that non-compliance was due to forgetfulness. The utterance is CONTEXTUALIZED in a particular way through evincing that the speaker has just recognized something. As van Dijk (1985a, p. 120) comments: "semantic relations between sentences or propositions may be used strategically in order to convey precise meanings or to prevent wrong inferences." (Here, the relation is between reference and response.)

Of course, the signalling of how semantic content is to be understood has interactional effects. In (1), B shows, by using *well*, that she REALIZES that her response is incomplete, but is still attending to A's question in some relevant

way. In (5b), the interactional effects are rather clear; forgetfulness is more likely to be excused than malevolence.

In constructed dialogue, there is a context (CONSTRUCTED-CONTEXT) embedded in the ongoing context (CURRENT-CONTEXT). CURRENT-HEARERS have all the textual, contextual and cognitive information of the current-context at their disposal for interpretation, but they are missing many details about the constructed-context. Robinson (1981, p. 64) comments: "The shift of emphasis [in stories] from description to evaluation is so essential that many descriptive details are omitted because they are judged to be irrelevant to the purpose of the story." Pieces of constructed dialogue, as evaluative devices, may have to contain certain contextualization cues to 'make up for' whatever details are missing so that hearers can effectively interpret the relevant evaluative intent, i.e. the CURRENT-SPEAKER'S point of view. The CONSTRUCTED-RESPONSE, i.e. the piece of constructed dialogue, IS given, but exactly WHAT it is a response to (i.e. some CONSTRUCTED-REFERENCE) and HOW it is a response to some reference may not be so explicit. If the signalling of reference-response relations (and how semantic content is to be understood in these relations) is crucial to understanding in discourse, and discourse markers accomplish such signalling, the fact that they occur so frequently in dialogue 'abstracted' from another context is not so surprising. By evincing the general tenor of underlying thought, the general tenor of the reference-response RELATION can be imagined, or 'reconstructed' by hearers, thus giving them the contextualization they need in order to better understand what the response is a response to.

In other words, when listeners hear a piece of dialogue abstracted from a context, they are missing many contextual cues of the meaning and structure of

the discourse in which it supposedly occurs. Meaning and structure are negotiated over the entire course of a discourse. When utterances are heard WITHIN their contexts, the potential meaning relationships between them is already fairly constrained by that context (Schiffrin 1987, p. 318). In these contexts, a discourse marker acts more to DISPLAY the relationship, since it is already constrained by the sequence of utterances, intentions, and redundant cues such as lexical repetition, reiteration, and other devices which give structure to a discourse. In other words, the more the discourse works towards conveying its own meaning and structure, the more likely it is that discourse markers will be absent (ibid, p. 322). Pieces of constructed dialogue, however, are abstracted from contexts, and therefore cannot rely on the contextual, negotiated meaning and redundant cues for their interpretation. In fact, pieces of constructed dialogue most often display rather short turns. Macaulay (1987) comments that there are few coordinate clauses in the constructed dialogue of his data, while adjacency pairs such as question-response are frequent. The small size of the discourse unit along with the lack of redundant cues may then partially account for the frequency of discourse markers in initial position of constructed dialogue. The discourse marker 'makes up for' whatever contextual meanings would be negotiated over the course of a longer, contextualized discourse in which potential meaning relationships between utterances are already fairly constrained by that context. In constructed dialogue, the meaning relationship will often have to be indicated more explicitly. Since only one meaning relation is possible when a discourse marker is present, a piece of constructed dialogue is (at least partially) sequentially contextualized. Without a discourse marker, a piece of constructed dialogue may be ambiguous as to the meaning relation that is intended to be displayed in the response, since

listeners do not have the entire text at their disposal to aid in their interpretation. Schegloff (1984, p. 50) talks about ambiguity and the sequencing of utterances:

> Talk being designed by conversationalists for what the other does and does not know . . . , such design can be expected to avoid in advance much of the potential ambiguity for the coparticipants. Hearers for whom it has not been designed will find ambiguities at points at which their knowledge is not isomorphic with that of the party for whom the talk was designed. Of course, an important part of what a coparticipant knows is what has already been said in the conversation, and so one getting a snatch of it is almost guaranteed to be able to find an ambiguity.

In sum, discourse markers make EXPLICIT a relation between a reference and a response. Such relations, when utterances are embedded in a context, may be inferred through other types of contextual meaning. However, when utterances are abstracted from a context, the relation needs to be displayed more explicitly in order to prevent any ambiguity.

For the sake of illustration, I will construct a story using Schourup's 'phone call' example as a piece of constructed dialogue:

(9) A: Did you get a chance to see The Barber of Seville when it was in town?

B: No! I wanted to see it so badly, but I only found out about it on the last day, and by then, tickets were only available by charging them over the phone.

A: So why didn't you then?

B: Well, I was out of town all day, so I asked my boyfriend to call for me. Anyways, I get home around 6:30, all excited about seeing the show, right? So I'm running around, making dinner and getting ready and all, and as I'm eating, he looks up from his paper and says, "*Oh*, I didn't make that phone call you asked me to." Can you believe it?!

In this conversation, a descriptive detail (e.g. "He forgot to make the phone call") is left out in favour of an evaluative device, the piece of constructed dialogue. If there were no contextualizing *oh* here, the relevant, intended interpretation (i.e. that non-compliance was due to forgetfulness) would not have been as easy to ascertain. By using *oh*, the aspect of recognition of familiar material is evinced, which is then followed by an admission of non-compliance. The *oh*, then, tells us something about the general tenor of the 'inaccessible' constructed-reference, i.e. that is is something 'just remembered'. It therefore mediates between the reference (something the speaker was supposed to do) and the response (admission of non-compliance) in such a way that hearers can infer that forgetfulness (as opposed to malevolence) was the cause of non-compliance. This type of contextualizing information is important in B's current-context evaluation of the situation. B had already indicated how important it was for her to go to the play, and by using a piece of constructed dialogue (with *oh*) as an evaluative device, has emphasized the 'ridiculous' aspect of the story, i.e. that the reason she couldn't go was due to her boyfriend's forgetfulness. If B had wanted to emphasize a malevolent aspect of the situation, *oh* would likely not be used, since a 'just remembered' link between a reference and a response does not usually indicate malevolent intent. The *oh*, then, works to prevent any potential ambiguity.

Thus, if certain descriptive details are missing, hearers need to reconstruct a constructed reference-response relation in order to arrive at the relevant interpretation of the evaluative device, and fit this interpretation into the current-context in order to assess the current-speaker's evaluative intentions. If, as Schiffrin (1987) suggests, markers select a meaning relation from whatever potential meanings are provided through the response, and then display that

relation, they can be particularly useful for contextualizing the constructed-response. As we will see in the following chapter, this contextualization and its interactive consequences are important if hearers are to effectively assess a speaker's evaluative intentions.

2.4 SUMMARY

In this chapter I have analyzed discourse markers as being evincive or cognitive in nature. At the moment of utterance, they indicate the general tenor of the speaker's covert thinking at that moment. They mark the real time moment of the underlying thought, establishing the conversational relevance of that thought in regards to what is being overtly said and done. Each marker has a basic or core use, which can be thought of as the 'particular' general tenor of thought that it evinces. By virtue of being a sequentially placed indication of partially undisclosed thought, markers mediate between a reference and a response by showing in what way a response is responding to the reference. They are thus a type of contextualization cue which allows listeners to infer a speaker's intentions. Evincing the general tenor of underlying thought has interactional effects when considered in conjunction with the context.

When a speaker provides an interpretation of an event, many descriptive details may be left out in favour of evaluation. Pieces of constructed dialogue, being evaluative devices, may have to contain certain contextualization cues in order to 'make up for' whatever details are missing so that current-hearers (who were often not present in the original or 'constructed' situation) can effectively interpret the current-speaker's evaluative intent. Pieces of constructed dialogue

are constructed-responses to some constructed-reference. The inclusion of discourse markers in the constructed-response (i.e. the piece of constructed dialogue) contextualizes that response by mediating between it and some constructed-reference, which may not be fully accessible to hearers in the present situation. This allows current-hearers to reconstruct a (constructed) reference-response relation (keeping in mind that these relations are crucial to understanding in discourse), fit it into the motives of the current-context, and effectively assess the current-speaker's evaluative intentions.

In the following chapter, I examine how particular markers contextualize constructed-responses by virtue of their basic uses in interaction with the constructed-context, and how these contextualized pieces of constructed dialogue fit into the current-context and indicate the current-speaker's intentions.

CHAPTER 3
ANALYSIS

3.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter offers a more in-depth analysis of particular discourse markers in constructed dialogue, namely *well, oh, okay, look, y'know,* and *hey,* the most frequently used markers in the constructed dialogue of my data.

The data used for this study comes from two sources. The first is a recorded conversation of approximately 40 minutes which was made around the beginning of 1990. There were four participants (including myself); all had been quite close friends for a minimum of four years. The gathering had not been arranged for the purpose of recording it; rather, it was suggested by me and agreed upon by all soon after I arrived at Jade and Evan's home. The second source of data is a small corpus of naturally occurring pieces of constructed dialogue, collected from around October 1990 to March 1991. As soon as a relevant piece of constructed dialogue was uttered in my presence, I immediately wrote it down word for word, and then noted the context and participants. However, I tried to use the first source whenever possible, as it is more explicit with regards to the utterances which preceded it.

3.2 *WELL*

Lakoff (1973) noted that *well* is a marker with which "a participant may indicate that he considers his own (forthcoming) response incomplete in any of several ways or that he considers someone else's response either insufficient or inappropriate" (p. 466). A response may be prefaced by *well* if, for example, the reply is not directly the information that the question sought (but the questioner can deduce that information from the reply), if the reply is somehow incomplete (e.g. there may be extenuating circumstances, or certain details may be omitted in the reply), or if the speaker senses an insufficiency in the entire utterance or action (i.e. move) to which she is responding (ibid).

Later analyses of *well* do not differ greatly from Lakoff's. The notion of 'insufficiency' is ubiquitous. Schiffrin (1987) states that *well* is a response marker which "anchors its user in a conversational exchange when the options offered through a prior utterance for the coherence of an upcoming response are not precisely followed" (p. 127). For example, when responding to a question, speakers may preface their response with *well* if they are unable to choose an option because they lack the requisite knowledge, if they find the question inapplicable because of an inaccurate questioner-assumption, if the circumstances themselves are doubtful, or if the speaker somehow delays the main portion of her answer (ibid). *Well* may also be used to reinvoke the relevance of a temporarily bypassed question, or to propose continuing relevance of a question even after the questioner's expectations of an answer have been satisfied (ibid, p. 111). The insufficiency notion also fits request/

compliance pairs: ". . . non-compliance with a request [e.g. for action, confirmation, evaluation, etc.] is more likely to be marked with *well* than compliance. Again, the argument will be that the options which the first part (a question, a request) have opened for a second part (an answer, a compliance) have not been actualized" (ibid, p. 114).

Following these analyses, I take the basic evincive use of *well* to be:

> WELL: At the time *well* is uttered, the speaker indicates that she senses an insufficiency in either the reference or her upcoming response.

I take the term 'insufficiency' to encompass any of the concepts discussed above, i.e. indirect or incomplete information, inaccurate speaker-assumption, doubtful circumstances, delay of the main portion of the answer, non-compliance, etc. Whether the insufficiency is felt by the speaker to be located in either the reference or in the response is open to contextual interpretation.

I'll illustrate this with an example from my data. Jade and Mike are discussing a car accident which Jade's husband, Evan, had recently been in. Evan has not yet made a report to the police because he was not familiar with the procedure:

(1) Jade: It was his first accident; he was in shock and there was the fire . . . the witness and the fire chief who would attest to that.

Mike: And you can always plead ignorance and say, "Well, I thought the fire [unintelligible] guys were enough."

Jade: <u>*Well*</u>, not just that . . . just, y'know, he was in shock. He'd never been in an accident before and the guy like . . . the witness and the police . . . excuse me, the fire chief would be witnesses to that fact . . . that you were acting irrationally and kind of spaced out.

Well here indicates that Jade senses an insufficiency in the reference, Mike's suggestion that Evan plead ignorance. Current-hearers understand that this insufficiency is in the REFERENCE because Jade adds the 'extenuating circumstances' in her response, i.e. that Evan had been in shock.

Now let's examine *well* where it occurs in constructed dialogue. In the first example, Jade and Mike are again talking about Evan's car accident, specifically, the fact that Evan hadn't reported it to the police even though he had a witness who could confirm that it hadn't been his fault:

(2) Mike: . . . but the thing is, it's holiday season, [the insurance corporation] could be swamped with reports. Things like this, like I say, it might not happen . . . they happen internally . . . they might not get back to Evan for, y'know, up to three weeks.

Jade: But then . . . then what? Then . . . Evan would go to . . . court or . . . if he told the insurance . . . like if the insurance guy came to him and said . . . whatever. . . could Evan not say, "*Well*, I have a witness to the accident"?

First, it is obvious that this piece of constructed dialogue was never spoken since it refers to a conditional event. But how does the use of *well* here contextualize the utterance? Indeed, Jade could have said simply "I have a witness to the accident." The use of *well*, though, indicates HOW Evan is responding to some reference by evincing that he senses an insufficiency in that reference-response relation. Current-hearers are left to infer what this reference might be, keeping in mind that there is an insufficiency somewhere. We might imagine, for example, that an insurance agent had reproached Evan for not having made a report, or even for having caused the accident in the first place. Evan's constructed-response, "Well, I have a witness to the accident", then, alludes to the constructed-reference as somehow being insufficient. But

how do we interpret that it is the constructed-reference which is insufficient and not the constructed-response? The answer is to be found, I believe, in the orientation and goals of the participants in the current-context. The four participants in this conversation were Evan, his wife, and two good friends. All were, so to speak, on Evan's side. The purpose of the conversation was generally to defend Evan's innocence in the whole ordeal and to decide what his future course of action should be. Given that these current-hearers believed that Evan was innocent and that his witness was credible, they are left to infer that the insufficiency of the interaction was on the part of the antagonist, the insurance agent. Aggrandizement (in this case, of a significant other) is clearly involved here. This type of evaluation may not have been so clear had Jade said only "I have a witness to the accident." Using *well* contextualizes the utterance by situating it as a constructed-response to some insufficiency in the mind of the constructed-speaker. Current-hearers, thus involved, are prepared to interpret Jade's evaluative intent. Of course, this intent could have been implied without the use of *well*, but without such contextualization, participants would have had to 'work harder' to infer this intent, since the notion of insufficiency would not be explicitly expressed.

In the same conversation, *well* was attributed to the other driver in the accident through constructed dialogue. The other driver had offered Evan money in order to settle things without going to the insurance company, confirming participants' belief that even HE knew that he was to blame, even though he SAID that he had already told his insurance company that it was Evan's fault:

(3) Tegan: He promised you five hundred?

Evan: Well, he said . . . um . . . I said . . . these are my words. I said, "Well, it's really too bad you told your insurance company because there's a little damage on my car . . . and uh . . . it's gonna cost me around five hundred dollars . . . and I figured if you hadn't gotten in touch with your insurance company we could have just settled this right now" and he said, "Oh, well, don't worry about a thing. Are you . . . are you doing anything this evening?" I said, "No." He said, "*Well*, five hundred dollars . . . I can do that."

Here, listeners do not have to reconstruct the verbal interaction because Evan has already provided it for them. How, then, does *well* contextualize the utterance? It is because *well* indicates that the speaker senses an insufficiency somewhere in the reference-response relation that it is useful. The *well* here evinces that the other driver feels that there is an insufficiency in the entire situation of having to pay the $500. Evan has made it sound like the other driver was reluctant to give him the money (but would probably do it anyways). *Well* contributes to the overall evaluation of the situation by emphasizing the other driver's reluctance to pay. Current-hearers, though, already know that the other driver was completely at fault (and that the other driver also knew that it was his own fault), and therefore this reluctance aspect will further their evaluation of the other driver as a shady person (i.e. people are not normally so reluctant to pay for such things when it is their own fault to begin with).

Let's take one more example. Jade and Mike are discussing what Evan should say to the authorities about not having made a report earlier:

(4) Jade: I'm just thinking if he didn't call the police or make a report 'til the next day . . .

Mike: So Evan . . . Evan could get in shit from the police, [unintelligible], "You should have made a report", like that . . . but you can just say, "Well, for one, the guy took off and . . . "

Jade: It was his first accident; he was in shock and there was the fire . . . the witness and the fire chief who would attest to that.

Mike: And you can always plead ignorance and say, "*Well*, I thought the fire [unintelligible] guys were enough."

As in the first examples, *well* contextualizes the utterance by evincing insufficiency in the reference-response relation. Based on the information that *well* gives us (i.e. insufficiency), we might reconstruct a question (constructed-reference) such as "Why didn't you report this earlier?", or a challenge such as "You should have reported this right away." In either case, *well* indicates that the constructed-hearer had made an inaccurate assumption about Evan's knowledge, i.e. an assumption that Evan KNEW that he should have reported it earlier, but didn't. We get this interpretation again because of the participants in the current-context (i.e. all are on Evan's side) and because of the purpose of Mike's current discourse, which is a suggestion that Evan could plead ignorance. The constructed dialogue is Mike's interpretation of how Evan might go about pleading this alleged ignorance. It is evaluative; it attempts to persuade Evan to accept Mike's proposal of what a confrontation might be like, with EVAN taking the upper hand by pointing out the insufficiency on the part of the questioner (or challenger).

3.3 *OH*

Oh is a marker which is "used to propose that its producer has undergone some kind of change in his or her locally current state of knowledge, orientation or awareness" (Heritage 1984, p. 299). Heritage proposed that *oh* occurs in two major types of conversational environments, INFORMINGS and

REPAIR. In both cases, *oh* is used to mark the receipt of information delivered by prior talk.

Schiffrin (1987) refers to *oh* as a marker of information management, used when "speakers shift orientation during a conversation . . . as they respond affectively to what is said . . . as they replace one information unit with another, as they recognize old information which has become conversationally relevant, and as they receive new information to integrate into an already present knowledge base" (p. 74). Furthermore, *oh* is more likely to be used when the information provided does not correspond to a speaker's prior expectations (ibid, p. 90). For example, with regard to ANSWERS (ibid, p. 86):

> Answers to questions are prefaced with *oh* when a question forces an answerer to reorient him/herself to information—that is, when the question makes clear that information presumed to be shared is not so, or that a similar orientation toward information was wrongly assumed. At the same time, answers with *oh* make explicit to the questioner the violation of a prior expectation about information.
>
> Such re-orientations may be caused by a mismatch between the information that the questioner assumed to be shared; the questioner may have assumed too much or too little to be shared, or the questioner may have made a wrong assumption.

The information does not necessarily have to be provided by prior TALK. Schiffrin (ibid, p. 95) comments:

> . . . *oh* marks two changes in information states: the recognition of familiar information and the receipt of new information. Either change may be conversationally triggered by something that

> an interlocuter says (although the contribution need not be something that explicitly prompts the change), cognitively triggered by the speaker's own processing of information, or contextually triggered by an event.

In addition to the recognition of old information and the receipt of new information, orientation to information also involves the EVALUATION of information; *oh* can be used when speakers display shifts in subjective orientation (ibid, p. 95). Such shifts can be observed when speakers strengthen their reactions to what is being said, when they commit themselves to the truth of a proposition, etc. (ibid).

Following these descriptions, I take the basic evincive use of *oh* to be:

> OH: At the time *oh* is uttered, the speaker indicates that the orientation of her state of knowledge is changed, either by recognition of familiar information, by receipt of new information, or by a shift in subjective orientation.

Again, whether the information is old, new, or 'subjectively oriented' is open to contextual interpretation.

To illustrate, I give here an example from my data. Jade is suggesting that Mike accompany Evan to Evan's meeting with the 'other driver' (since Mike used to be an insurance agent) in order to be a witness to the conversation in case the other driver tried to do anything shifty. However, Mike has recently had a major career change, and is now a computer graphic artist:

(5) Jade: Yeah, just be, like I say, an independent witness . . . uh . . . ask questions like just a concerned friend, y'know.

Mike: And if he does come down to it, I'll just say, "Look, I was an insurance agent."

Jade: Don't tell him who you are or what you do.

Tegan: [laughing] "Oh, I'm a computer graphic artist!"

Jade: *Oh*, I know, like . . .

Oh here indicates that Jade recognizes familiar information, i.e. that Mike is no longer an insurance agent. She now has to reorient her information state as to the fact that Mike's telling the other driver what he does for a living will not harm the meeting in any way. (Note also that in this example, *oh* could indicate a shift in Jade's subjective orientation, i.e. her level of commitment to the proposition that she DOES already know.)

Now let's look at *oh* as it occurs in constructed dialogue. Mike and Tegan are talking about people who drink and drive, have an accident, and then abandon their vehicles in order to avoid confrontation with the police:

(6) Mike: But then again, they might as well go home anyways 'cause if the cops catch them there, while they're impaired, they get an impaired charge. So . . .

Tegan: Oh yeah . . . of course! Wouldn't you do the same?

Mike: Oh yeah. If I was in an accident and I'd had like two or three beers . . . yeah, I'd go away for awhile and say, "*Oh*, I was in shock and I wandered off into the bushes."

The *oh* here contextualizes the utterance by indicating that, because of the reference, there is a change in Mike's state of knowledge or orientation. Current-hearers can then reconstruct a typical police officer's question (constructed-reference) based on this reference-response relation, for example "Why did you leave the scene of the accident?" By the use of *oh*, Mike

emphasizes the fact that he would have to reorient himself to the information provided by the officer's question, and that a similar orientation towards this information was perhaps wrongly assumed. For example, Mike may have considered the question "Why did you leave the scene of the accident?" to be a sort of accusation, since most people know that this is precisely what you are NOT supposed to do. By using *oh*, Mike is emphasizing that he is now orienting himself to the content of the officer's question, and that the officer had wrongly assumed that a similar orientation was already shared. The police officer's orientation was towards finding out why Mike did not stay by his car when he KNEW that he was supposed to. Mike's orientation was that this had not been previously relevant, since there were extenuating circumstances (i.e. he had been in shock), but now he has realized that this information is indeed relevant, and is now going to provide an answer. *Oh* here contextualizes the utterance by pointing out this discrepancy in orientation. Current-hearers, because of their background information and orientation towards Mike (i.e. all were good friends), can interpret Mike's utterance as a defense, moreover, as a defense where Mike is evaluating his position of control in a potentially sticky situation (by pointing out a discrepancy to an authority figure).

Now let's see what happens when *oh* is attributed to an 'antagonist'. We are now back to the discussion about Evan's accident:

(7) Jade: And the other thing too is [the other driver] told ICBC it was [Evan's] fault and then when Evan said "Oh, that's [unintelligible] bad. I was gonna work it out with you" he said, "*Oh*, don't worry about it. I can still clear . . I can change it with my insurance company."

Here, the constructed verbal interaction (i.e. explicit verbal reference and response) is already provided by Jade. *Oh* contextualizes the utterance by indicating a change in the other driver's state of knowledge or orientation. In this case, it looks like he is intensifying his commitment to the proposition that Evan has no need to worry. By emphasizing the other driver's commitment in this way, this piece of constructed dialogue works to further evaluate the other driver's shiftiness. People do not, under normal circumstances, accuse someone of having caused an accident and then agree to change their position after hearing that the accused would like to work it out privately. By portraying the other driver as being committed to the truth of what already seems like a fabrication to current-hearers, the moral character of the other driver is being evaluated.

The final example of *oh* that I would like to give is, unfortunately, not recorded on tape, but I feel it merits an examination. Tegan had been planning a trip to South Africa, and was telling Mike about a phone call she had received from a friend of a friend (whom Tegan had never met) who was also going to South Africa. This person had, however, waited until two hours before she had to be at the airport before calling Tegan. When describing the phone call to a friend, Tegan attributed the following piece of constructed dialogue to the caller's opening line:

(8) Tegan: "<u>Oh, I'm leaving for South Africa in two hours.</u>"

The *oh* contextualizes the utterance by pointing out that there is an aspect of change in her state of knowledge or orientation in the reference-response relation. The reference appears to be somewhere in the caller's own

processing of information, i.e. as if she had just noticed that this information was now conversationally relevant. This is, of course, far-fetched. Such an event is not normally 'just noticed' by a speaker as relevant; it is the main purpose of the interaction (here, the sole purpose of the phone call was to arrange to meet in South Africa). What is being emphasized is the fact that the caller phoned two hours before she was to leave the country. The use of *oh* here contextualizes the utterance by suggesting that the caller had just become aware of the relevance of the fact that she was leaving in two hours. *Oh* helps in the evaluation of the utterance by indicating a discrepancy between what the caller had just noticed to be conversationally relevant and what should have been conversationally relevant all along, thereby emphasizing the overall unusual and sudden character of the interaction.

3.4 *OKAY*

Utterances like the following lead me to believe that *okay* as a discourse marker (in contrast with its function as an indicator of assent or agreement) has more uses than as a possible "pre-closing" marker (Schegloff and Sacks 1984), as a marker which closes previous discourse and focuses on following discourse (Svartvik 1979), or as a marker which serves to "signify that the speaker suggests the termination of the phase that has just preceded and agrees to take initiative with the next phase (or be satisfied with termination)" (Merritt 1984, p. 144):

(9) Rob: Things are really rough here. I lost my job, my girlfriend left me, I was kicked out of my apartment, and I got hit by a car all in the same week.

Dan: *Okay*, the worst is over; now it can only get better.

I suggest that in addition to the above uses, *okay* has an evincive meaning. We can take Merritt's notion that the speaker agrees to take initiative with the next phase as a starting point. If the speaker wishes to take initiative with the next phase, there may be undisclosed thinking involved which causes the speaker to make this decision to take the floor. In the above example, there is no major change of topic. The speaker does, in a sense, 'close' the previous speaker's contribution and start in with his own ideas. The marker *okay*, then, would seem to mediate between the reference and the response in some way.

Tentatively, I suggest the following basic evincive use for *okay*:

> OKAY: At the time *okay* is uttered, the speaker indicates that, as a result of the acceptance of some situation, there is a sort of goal-oriented 'planning process' going on in her current thinking.

In (9) above, Dan indicates that he has accepted the fact that Rob's situation is bad, and that he is now working towards a goal, i.e. that things will be better from now on. By using *okay*, Dan is evincing that he is planning out how to obtain that goal, that he is 'reasoning things out' in order to show Rob 'the lighter side'.

Interestingly enough, this analysis of *okay* does not necessarily exclude previous analyses. For example, Schegloff and Sacks (1984) give an example of *okay* as a "pre-closer" (here, a caller is initiating the closing of a telephone call):

(10) A: *Okay*. I letcha get back tuh watch yer Daktari.

The speaker has accepted a situation (i.e. that she is now finished with whatever she wanted to get from the phone call) and is working toward the goal of terminating the phone call. *Okay* evinces a covert planning process; the speaker wishes the hearer to realize that she is planning out how to obtain the goal of getting off the phone.

In my first example of *okay* in constructed dialogue, Jade suggests that Evan write down what the other driver says during a private meeting they are about to have for the purpose of discussing the accident:

(11) Jade: And afterwards . . . when you come out . . . when you come home you should write down everything he said . . . all the points he brought up.

Mike: Too bad you couldn't take Ken's little tape deck.

Tegan: Yeah, that would be great.

Jade: And just tape. . . because, y'know, he could be contradicting himself and. . . couple days you'll forget exactly what he said. But at least if you come home and you write down, "*Okay*, he said that he did this and this and this and this. . ."

Okay helps to contextualize the utterance by indicating that the speaker is responding to some situation (reference) which requires some kind of planning. Given this information, current-hearers might reconstruct a reference such as the necessity of having some record of the meeting with the other driver (whose shiftiness has already been established by participants in the current conversation), and which is working towards the goal of having such a record. The speaker and hearer in this piece of constructed dialogue are the same (i.e. Evan responding to himself). By using *okay*, Jade indicates that Evan would

have a planning process in mind as a result of an acceptance of the necessity of having a record of what the other driver would have said at the meeting. Current-hearers can interpret Evan's constructed-response in this situation as one which is 'well thought out', not the product of a whim, and therefore as a generally intelligent move on his part. It is the evaluative part of Jade's whole suggestion to Evan that he write down the other driver's main points; it evaluates by appealing to the concept of intelligent, rational thought. Again, there appears to be a sort of aggrandizement of a significant other involved here, understood by other participants because of their background information and their personal orientation to Evan.

In the next example, *okay* is attributed to the other driver. Evan has told his interlocuters that the other driver had already told his insurance company that the accident was Evan's fault, and Jade and Tegan agreed that this was suspect, especially considering that the other driver KNEW that Evan had a witness. Mike, however, suggests that it is possible, since the insurance company works at a notoriously slow pace:

(12) Mike: But remember, Evan, these things happen internally. No-one will get back to you for about three weeks. Finally ICBC will call you up and say, "By the way, we're giving you six points for going through a red light, plus we're gonna knock off your safe driver's discount twenty percent."

Evan: Wouldn't the . . . wouldn't the police have investigated it because he would've had to have said . . .

Mike: He'd have . . . no . . . what he. . . what he might have done . . .

Evan: See, the damage on his car and stuff. If he went to . . .

Mike: He might have gone to the police and said, "*Okay, the guy hit me, went away, I didn't get his licence plate*", because he needs a police report to go to ICBC, right?

The *okay* here evinces that the other driver is responding to some situation which requires planning. Current-hearers might reconstruct this reference as the other driver's desire to report his story accurately. The other driver wishes his constructed interlocuter (a police officer) to accept his explanation as valid, and in his constructed-response evinces planning and gives the details fo his explanation. The planning again indicates that something is being thought out, and therefore the response should be thought of as intelligent, rational, credible, etc. But, considering that the other driver is the antagonist, how do current-hearers interpret this evaluation made by Mike? I suggest that participants use their background knowledge (i.e. that the other driver is a shifty liar) to interpret this as further evidence of the other driver's shiftiness. He has gone so far as to present a 'planned-out' lie to the police. This piece of constructed dialogue is thus pointing out the other driver's response as being shifty; *okay* aids in the evaluation by emphasizing the planning aspect of the lie.

Okay is frequently used in constructed dialogue where speakers are 'talking to' themselves. (The next example is, unfortunately, not recorded.) Tegan and Mike are talking about the trials of dating someone whose style (of dress, of music, etc.) is very different from one's own. Mike is worried that he and his new girlfriend may run into problems because of this, but Tegan disagrees, since she recently had the same experience and it had turned out well in the end, despite the difficulty of adjusting in the beginning. The following piece of constructed dialogue was given:

(13) Tegan: . . . and you reach a point where you've decided, "*Okay*, the dress doesn't really matter to me."

Again, *okay* contextualizes the utterance by indicating that as a result of some reference, some kind of planning is required. Using this information, current-hearers might reconstruct a reference such as Tegan's discomfort about being with someone whose style is not consonant with one's own. *Okay* evinces that some sort of planning, or thinking out, was involved before the goal (i.e. the decision that style is not really so important to her as to break up the relationship) was reached. Tegan is thus evaluating her response to the whole situation, emphasizing (by the use of *okay*) the fact that after the acceptance of the situation (i.e. that differing styles may be uncomfortable), some logical planning or thinking out was involved in order to reach the goal of deciding that the style is not really THAT important to her. Some sort of self-aggrandizement would also seem to be involved, i.e. that she was intelligent enough to reach this conclusion herself through reason.

3.5 *LOOK*

Surprisingly little has been written about *look*, a marker which strikes me as being rather widely used in English. Fries (1952) grouped *look*, *say*, and *listen* as "attention-getting signals" which begin conversations (p. 103). Schiffrin (1987) comments that *look* and *listen* are "used in repeated directives and challenges, as well as in preclosings" (p. 327).

As with *okay*, I feel that a useful way to analyze *look* is as an evincive. Tentatively, I propose the following use:

> LOOK: At the time *look* is uttered, the speaker indicates that she has a very strong or determined opinion or idea regarding the reference.

This includes the notions of challenges (which always seem to involve a strong opinion!) and repeated directives (if the directive had to be repeated, the reference was non-compliance, about which the speaker would definitely have a strong opinion!). As for pre-closings, let's imagine that two students are standing around talking, and one says to the other:

(14) A: *Look*, I gotta go. I have a class in three seconds.

Our evincive use also applies here. The speaker has a determined idea (i.e. that she REALLY has to leave) regarding the reference (i.e. standing around and chatting).

In the first example of *look* in constructed dialogue, Jade and Mike are discussing the advantages of Mike's accompanying Evan to his meeting with the other driver, since Mike used to be an insurance agent and would also be able to witness the conversation:

(15) Jade: Yeah, just be, uh, like I say . . . an independent witness. Ask questions like just a concerned friend . . . y'know.

Mike: And if it does come down to it, I'll just say, "*Look*, I was an insurance agent."

Look helps to contextualize the utterance by indicating that Mike would have a strong opinion regarding the reference. It contributes to the effect of immediacy; it brings current-hearers right to that point where the other driver has said something about which Mike has a strong (and contradictory) opinion. Given

the participants' background information, they might imagine that the other driver has said something which is not consonant with the laws of insurance, or perhaps has somehow contradicted himself, or the like. Mike, having previously been an insurance agent, would naturally have a determined opinion about such a constructed-reference. This piece of constructed dialogue, then, first evinces the strong nature of this opinion and then starts to justify why Mike might have that opinion. A type of self-aggrandizement is going on: Mike is evaluating his intellectual power over the incompetence of the other driver.

Other instances of *look* in constructed dialogue do not differ much from the above. All have to do with one participant taking control of the situation (usually, over another participant). In the following (unrecorded) example, Hazel is telling Tegan that she wants her roommate to go off the tranquilizers that he had been on for a few years. The roommate did NOT want to do this since he always felt terrible whenever he tried to stop taking them. Tegan suggests to Hazel:

(16) Tegan: You gotta say to him, "*Look*, you may not feel so good for the next few days."

Look contextualizes the utterance by indicating that Hazel would have a strong opinion about the constructed-reference, which current-hearers might then reconstruct as the roommate's fear or unwillingness to go off the tranquilizers. *Look* aids in Tegan's evaluation of her suggestion to Hazel by emphasizing the fact that Hazel must be strong in her opinion, no matter what the roommate says or does.

Look is also used when speakers 'talk to' themselves. In this (also unrecorded) example, Mike is telling Tegan about how he had wanted to buy a painting easel for a long time, but had changed his mind every time he went into an art supplies store. Mike is describing the one day when he was in an art store and finally bought an easel:

(17) Mike: I said, "*Look*, I've got the cash; why don't I just buy the stuff?"

Look contextualizes the utterance by indicating Mike's strong opinion regarding the reference. Given this information, current-hearers might reconstruct this reference as Mike's previous inaction. As Goffman (1981) might put it, there are TWO Mikes involved here: the Mike of the constructed-reference (the one who thinks but does not act) and the Mike of the constructed-response (the one who has a strong opinion about this inaction). *Look* aids in Mike's evaluation of the situation by emphasizing that he really had to be determined with himself in order to take control over his previous inaction. This evaluation might be seen as having some form of self-aggrandizement in it, since he was pointing out this control over the situation.

3.6 *Y'KNOW*

Studies of *y'know* show that it is a marker which manages speakers' and hearers' presumably shared background knowledge (Östman 1981, Schourup 1985, Schiffrin 1987). Östman (1981) offers the following "prototypical meaning" of *y'know*: "The speaker strives towards getting the addressee to cooperate and/or to accept the propositional content of his utterance as mutual background knowledge" (p. 17). According to Schourup (1985, p. 102), *y'know*

indicates that the speaker feels that there is "no communicatively significant discrepancy" between her and hearers' mental contents with regards to what is going on in talk (and other overt behavior). Schiffrin (1987) says that *y'know* marks metaknowledge about what the speaker and hearer share and metaknowledge about what is generally known (p. 268).

Following these analyses, I take the basic use of *y'know* to be:

> Y'KNOW: At the time *y'know* is uttered, the speaker indicates that she expects no communicatively significant discrepancy between her state of knowledge and the hearer's state of knowledge.

I'll illustrate this idea with an example from my data where *y'know* occurs in utterance-initial position (as it does in constructed dialogue).[7] Participants are discussing the pros and cons of the religious aspects of Christmas:

(18) Mike: *Y'know*, I don't . . . this might sound weird but I don't really want to celebrate Christmas because, for one, I don't believe in God . . .

By using *y'know*, Mike indicates that an aspect of what he is about to say will be regarded as mutual background knowledge. That is, that hearers might think that "this sounds weird", and Mike already knows that what he is about to say will "sound weird" to listeners. Mike can then 'ask' listeners to PRESUPPOSE THE TENABILITY, and therefore accept the propositional content, of the 'controversial' information that follows, even though he admits that it might sound weird. *Y'know*, then, by evincing mutual background knowledge, has clear interactional effects of facilitating verbal interaction.

Interestingly, in the data for this study there were very few examples of *y'know* as the sole marker initiating constructed dialogue; it usually co-occurred with some other marker. Because I would like to examine at least one example where *y'know* is used alone, I am forced to use the following (which may be offensive to some readers). Mike is describing someone he works with:

(19) Mike: Fuck he's a . . . he's a dink. Total colonial British guy. He explained to me one day he goes, "*Y'know*, I may sound chauvinistic . . ." The word chauvinistic means sort of . . . love of one's country. . . in reality . . .

Y'know contextualizes the utterance by indicating that the co-worker expects that his hearer has similar knowledge with regards to the reference-response relation. With this information, current-hearers can reconstruct a reference which contains information that both the constructed-speaker and the constructed-hearer likely share. In this case, it could be the fact that the co-worker is a boor, hinting at references such as the co-worker's own realization that he is getting on people's nerves, or perhaps some question such as "X, why are you such a dink?" The constructed-response here looks like it would be a sort of defense for his behavior. By using *y'know*, Mike emphasizes the fact that the co-worker wants his constructed-hearer to presuppose the tenability of what he is about to say, asking the hearer to accept that he has a perfectly acceptable and understandable reason for being 'chauvinistic'. The co-worker wishes his hearers (in the constructed-context) to accept this reason as mutual background knowledge, and therefore as a reasonable explanation. *Y'know* aids in Mike's evaluation of his co-worker by emphasizing the fact that the co-worker feels that his chauvinistic behavior is justified. Because current-hearers in the current situation are likely to share Mike's orientation (i.e. the guy is a dink, there is no excuse for 'chauvinistic' behavior, etc.), the co-worker's

constructed appeal to mutual background knowledge even furthers his image as a boor.

In the next example, *y'know* occurs with *well*. Jade and Mike are again discussing the consequences of Evan's not having made a report to the police earlier:

(20) Jade: I'm just thinking if he didn't call the police or make a report 'til the next day . . .

Mike: So Evan. . . Evan could get in shit from the police [unintelligible], "You shoulda made a report" like that . . . but you can just say, "Well, *y'know*, for one the guy took off, and . . ."

Here, the reference and the response are mediated by two discourse markers. *Well* indicates that the speaker feels that there is an insufficiency in the reference-response relation. Mike has already given us a possible reference, i.e. an accusation. *Well* indicates an insufficiency between the accusation and the explanation. Because of current hearers' orientation to Evan, they may interpret this insufficiency as being on the part of the constructed-reference, e.g. that the accusation is unjustified. *Y'know*, then, mediates between the reference (the accusation) and the response (the explanation) by indicating that the constructed-hearer (the police) should have knowledge similar to Evan's regarding that relation (e.g. "Given these circumstances, you or anybody else might not have made a report either."). Evan would supposedly be trying to get the police to presuppose the tenability of what he is about to say. He would be trying to justify his not having made the report by striving to get the police to accept his reasons as understandable, as mutual knowledge. *Y'know*, then, aids in Mike's evaluation of the conditional situation by emphasizing the fact that Evan's not having made the report earlier was in some way justified.

In the next (unrecorded) example, Mike is telling Tegan about a party that he had gone to where he had gotten along amazingly well with everyone, although he had not known them beforehand. At one point, he says that various people had invited him to future parties, and attributes the following piece of constructed dialogue to them:

(21) Mike: "Hey, *y'know*, come along."

Y'know mediates between a reference and a response by evincing mutual background knowledge. The response is an invitation to a party. With the information that *y'know* gives us, hearers can reconstruct the general tenor of a reference, something along the lines of the desire to have social interaction some other time. (This could originate from, for example, a question from Mike, or from his interlocuters' own processing of information.) *Y'know* mediates between the reference (the desire to interact again) and the response (an invitation) by evincing that the relation between the two is obvious; the fact that his interlocuters have invited him to another party is not very surprising considering the mutual and obvious realization of friendship. There is a type of self-aggrandizement involved: if this mutual feeling of friendship was so obvious, Mike must be a hell of a guy. This is an ideal example of the type of information that might be awkward to express explicitly, as it could be perceived to be a blatant form of boasting (e.g. "I was at a party where everyone liked me so much that they kept inviting me to more parties!").

3.7 *HEY*

The last item that I will examine (because it occurs the most frequently after the markers already mentioned) is *hey*. Traditionally classed as an interjection, it appears to have many properties of markers or evincives. Schourup (1985, p. 150) notes:

> There appears to be a fundamental identity between many of the items traditionally referred to as interjections and those considered discourse particles or markers. Many interjections represent partial intrusions from the private world and respond to the problem of disclosure. Some of these items, because of their basic use, have multiple discourse functions connected with such notions as topic development and topic change, but all share the property of being free, in interpretation if not always in placement, of the 'negotiated' time line of shared talk, and they acknowledge the existence, relevance and (most often) general tenor of undisclosed thought.

Schourup says that *hey* as an evincive "indicates that the speaker is with thought at the time of uttering *hey* and desires the addressee's attention in order to place material into the shared world" (ibid, p. 151). He points out that its traditional definition as a summons to seek attention comes into play: "The summons itself does not present thoughts but evinces them as covertly there. For this reason a felicitous summons precedes some indication, linguistic or otherwise, of the speaker's intention in issuing it" (ibid, p. 28).

Following this, I take the basic evincive use of *hey* to be similar to Schourup's, with one addition:

> HEY: At the time *hey* is uttered, the speaker indicates that she desires the addressee's attention in order to make the addressee aware of material which she finds (at least mildly) surprising or amazing.

In the following example, Jade has just surprised Mike and Tegan by showing them her new movie camera:

(22) Mike: Right on!

Tegan: Where d'you get that from?

Mike: *Hey*, you can do thrill-cams!

By using *hey*, Mike indicates that he wants Jade's attention to what he is going to say next, and that he finds this whole idea exciting or amazing.

In the first example, Tegan is talking about a hit-and-run accident which she had been in some years ago. There was a witness, but the insurance corporation had discovered that this witness was considered psychologically unstable, and therefore not credible:

(23) Tegan: Yeah, he was my witness, and he was . . they weren't gonna give me the money for awhile and they were like hedging because the guy had been . . . uh . . . seeking psychiatric advice or something.

Mike: Oh yeah! Get a looney for your witness!

Tegan: I didn't choose him! If I had known I would have chosen a witness that was sane!

Evan: (LAUGHING) That's funny . . . that they would say, "*Hey*, like what do you mean he's got drastic mental health problems?! Well, geez!"

Hey helps to contextualize the utterance by indicating that 'the insurance corporation' is responding with surprise to the reference, which is the fact that the witness was psychologically unstable. Because of current-hearers' background knowledge and orientation to Tegan (i.e. they wanted her to get the money in the end, and the fact that the witness was seeing a psychiatrist was irrelevant to his testimony in their minds), they may interpret this constructed-response as inappropriate. That is, the insurance corporation has called attention to what IT thinks is a surprising, and therefore important point, and participants in the current conversation do not agree that this point was so surprising or important. *Hey* helps in Evan's evaluation of the situation by emphasizing the importance of this point TO THE INSURANCE CORPORATION (i.e. an 'antagonist'), when in reality this point does not really seem important to participants in the current-context.

In the next example, Jade and Mike are discussing whether or not the other driver had lied about reporting the accident to the police and his insurance company:

(24) Jade: And then the other thing too is he said he told ICBC it was [Evan's] fault and then when Evan said, "Oh, that's [unintelligible] bad. I was gonna work it out with you" he said, "Oh, don't worry about. I can still clear . . . I can still change it with my insurance company."

Mike: No way! Once it's set down, they're damn suspicious. Even his insurance agent would say, "*Hey*, sorry . . . you can't change your story."

Again, *hey* contextualizes the utterance by indicating that the insurance agent is responding with surprise to some reference. Hearers can reconstruct the general tenor of a reference, such as the other driver TRYING to change his story. *Hey* mediates between the reference (trying to change the story) and the

response ("You can't") by calling attention to the fact that the agent finds the reference itself amazing (i.e. that the other driver would try to change his story once it is already sworn to be true). Since current-hearers are oriented AGAINST the other driver, they will agree with the insurance agent's appraisal of the importance of this point. By attributing *hey* to a protagonist (the agent), who is calling attention to what SHE would feel is amazing, Mike is further evaluating his own stress on the amazing character of this point, and at the same time points out the shiftiness and incompetence of the other driver.

In the next (unrecorded) example, Mike is telling Tegan about the time he and some friends rented motorbikes in Greece. One night, one of his friends drove his bike down a flight of stairs and crashed at the bottom. The town where they were staying was small, and by the end of the day, everyone knew about it, including the owner of the shop where they had rented the bikes. Mike attributes the following piece of constructed dialogue to this shop owner:

(25) Mike: He phoned the next day and said, "*Hey, bring the bikes back.*"

Hey contextualizes the utterance by indicating that the shop owner was responding with surprise to some reference. The constructed-reference appears to be Mike's friend's recklessness. Having an underlying current of amazement mediating between the reference (recklessness with the bikes) and the response ("Bring the bikes back") emphasizes the owner's stress on the importance/urgency of bring the bikes back. *Hey* aids in Mike's evaluation of the situation by emphasizing the significance of their actions to the owner of the rental shop.

3.8 SUMMARY

This chapter has dealt with particular discourse markers occurring in constructed dialogue. For each marker, I identified a basic use. Examples of each marker as it occurred in constructed dialogue were then analyzed. By showing in what way a piece of constructed dialogue is a response to some reference in the constructed-context, discourse markers contextualize that constructed-response. Markers, by being attributed by the current-speaker to particular characters in particular scenes, help current-hearers to interpret the current-speaker's evaluative intent in the current-context.

CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION

Constructed dialogue is a discourse strategy used by speakers in conversation; it is an evaluative device contributing to speakers' overall evaluation of what they are talking about. Evaluation has variously been described as that part of the discourse which reveals a speaker's attitude towards and interpretation of an incident (past, present, future or conditional), her personal subjective reactions to the incident, and consequences for the speaker or significant others. In other words, it reveals the point of the discourse. It works by contrast; evaluative devices structurally stand out over the norm of the text, thus drawing attention to and highlighting that section of the discourse.

Constructed dialogue is also used to create listener involvement. One aspect of involvement is immediacy, portraying action and dialogue as if they were occurring at telling time. The other aspect is forcing listeners to participate in sensemaking. Constructed dialogue creates particular scenes and characters, which allows listeners to imagine a scene where "characters with differing personalities, states of knowledge, and motives are placed in relation to and interaction with each other" (Tannen 1989, p. 118). Involvement is a sort of internal 'structured suspense'; speakers must bring listeners back to (or forward to) the information states of the characters in the scene in order for listeners to be involved. Although speakers already have a version of what has happened or what will or could happen, they must present events as happening

at telling time in order for listeners to 're-live' the experience and thereby create their own understanding.

Discourse markers in constructed dialogue are helpful in both aspects of involvement. Because they are tied to the moment of the utterance, they add to the effect of immediacy of the utterance. They also force listeners to participate in sensemaking by being attributed to the particular characters of the scene. Because markers are generally considered to indicate a speaker's state of mind or mental contents regarding what is said or done, they bring listeners right to the information state of that character.

Each marker has a core cognitive use which evinces the general tenor of undisclosed thought without displaying it in detail. Excessive detail in conversation may be detrimental to the conversation at hand, which was observed in the discussion of Grice's Maxim of Quantity. However, evincing the tenor of underlying thoughts may be conversationally, and therefore interactively, relevant at given points, or moves, in an exchange. We analyze conversational moves in terms of reference-response: a conversation is a sequence of response moves; each response becomes a potential reference for an upcoming response. Constructed dialogue is a sort of 'rhetorical response' to some constructed-reference. Markers mediate between the reference and the response in specific ways by evincing the general tenor of a speaker's mental contents with regards to the reference-response relation. In the response, speakers must make listeners aware of exactly what they are responding to. Markers are contextualization cues in this sense. For example, consider the following piece of constructed dialogue (which was analyzed in 3.2):

(1) Mike: And you can alway plead ignorance and say, "*Well*, I thought the fire [unintelligible] guys were enough."

Well contextualizes the utterance by indicating that the speaker feels that there is an insufficiency somewhere in the (constructed) reference-response relation. By indicating insuffiency in that relation, hearers can reconstruct the general tenor of the constructed-reference, in this case, something like an unjustified question or accusation. In other words, by displaying a meaning relation, *well* contextualizes the utterance by pointing out in what way it is a response to some reference. This is useful because hearers base their understanding in discourse on these relations, and not on individual, decontextualized utterances. This contextualization is especially important in constructed dialogue because in many cases the original reference (constructed-reference) is not explicitly expressed. In a conversation, many descriptive details may be left out in favour of evaluation. Constructed dialogue, then, is in particular need of contextualization. Contextualization cues show how a response relates to a reference, and discourse markers accomplish this by evincing constructed-speakers' undisclosed thoughts and thereby revealing their attitude towards the contructed-response (i.e. the piece of constructed dialogue) and the constructed-reference (which may not be explicitly present) in order to emphasize the evaluative aspects of what is being said.

Pieces of constructed dialogue, as evaluative devices, may have to contain certain contextualization cues in order to 'make up for' whatever details are missing so that current-hearers can reconstruct the general tenor of a reference-response relation and effectively interpret the relevant evaluative intent, that is, the current-speaker's point of view. In other words, current-

hearers will have to reconstruct the general tenor of a constructed reference-response relation from whatever information is given in the constructed-response. They can then fit this information into the current-context in order to interpret the current-speaker's overall evaluative intent. In the case of constructed dialogue, there are two contexts to consider: the original or constructed-context (including original participants and communicative intent) and the context embracing the dialogue, i.e. the current-context (including current participants and communicative intent). By embedding dialogue in a current discourse, speakers are making evaluative changes, changes in meaning and accent that reflect their interpretations of events. One part of this interpretation is evaluating the constructed-speaker's mental reactions to the events. This is exactly what markers do: they evince the general tenor of constructed-speakers' mental contents, their mental reactions towards a reference.

Let's return to our above example, "Well, I thought the fire [unintelligible] guys were enough." *Well* tells us something about the constructed-context by evincing Evan's (constructed) mental contents towards the constructed-reference. The current-context also plays an important part in current-hearers' interpretation. First, Mike's communicative intent: it is a suggestion to Evan to plead ignorance in case someone hassles him for not having made a report sooner. Second, Mike's orientation towards Evan (i.e. as friends, as being 'on his side') comes into play. Mike is suggesting that Evan can justify his inaction by pointing out an insufficiency on the part of the constructed-reference. Had Mike been personally oriented AGAINST Evan, listeners may have interpreted *well* to indicate an insufficiency on EVAN'S part. As Robinson notes, hearers

must "actively assess which relationship to the speaker is most salient" (1981, p. 72).

In all of my examples of constructed dialogue, there is some kind of conflict, struggle, or unusual circumstance being described. In most cases, the circumstances deal with an INTERACTION between individuals. Macaulay (1987) also comments that pieces of constructed dialogue usually reflect a dialogue with other speakers as opposed to some monologic utterance (at least, in his data, for the speaker who had the highest proportion of this device). In an interaction where there is some kind of conflict, struggle, or unusual circumstance involved, it seems likely that covert mental thought might be particularly active and relevant to the overt conversation. The pieces of constructed dialogue in my data 'dramatize' some turning point in an interaction. It seems reasonable to expect that such notions as 'insufficiency', 'change in state of knowledge', 'planning', 'strong opinion', 'mutual background knowledge', and 'amazement' might occur in a speaker's mental contents at these points, and be conversationally relevant. When uttering a piece of constructed dialogue, current-speakers are interpreting what constructed-speakers may have said at the turning point in the interaction. When they include a discourse marker in that constructed dialogue, they are interpreting the general tenor of constructed-speakers' underlying thoughts regarding what has just been said or done up until that turning point (reference) or at the turning point (response). Discourse markers indicate that constructed-speakers are responding in certain ways to some constructed-reference. Evincing the general tenor of underlying thought of a constructed-speaker has the advantage of providing the constructed-context with a valuable contextualization cue, especially since many details of the constructed-context may be inaccessible to

current-hearers, and given the fact that current-speakers may leave out descriptive details in favour of evaluation.

In other words, while constructed dialogue in general does have the benefit of being an evaluative device and bringing listeners right up to that point in the interaction, when a piece of constructed dialogue contains a discourse marker as the initial item, listeners are also given the general tenor of a constructed-speaker's mental reactions at that turning point. Because markers mediate between a reference and a response, their inclusion in constructed dialogue allows listeners to imagine, to RECONSTRUCT the general tenor of that turning point, thereby eliminating the NECESSITY of having to give corresponding details EXPLICITLY in the discourse. Note the difference between (2a), (2b) and (2c) below. (Here, I have constructed (2a) and (2b) from the actual utterance (2c) for the sake of illustration.) Laine is talking to friends about writing exams so fast that the handwriting is illegible:

(2) a. Laine: What you do if he [the professor] can't read it is you go up to him, get his attention, and let him know that you feel very strongly about him giving you the benefit of the doubt since he may not be able to read every single word.

b. Laine: What you do if he can't read it is you go up to him, get his attention, let him know that you feel very strongly about it, and say, "I want benefit of the doubt."

c. Laine: What you do if he can't read it is you go, "*Hey, look,* I want benefit of the doubt."

Although all three contain basically the same information, (2a) contains many descriptive details but no evaluation (assuming that there nothing 'evaluative' in the intonation, e.g. 'strategic' pauses, stresses, speed variations, amplitude variations, etc.), (2b) contains some descriptive details and a piece of

constructed dialogue (i.e. an evaluative device), and (2c) contains less detail and a piece of constructed dialogue with a discourse marker as the initial item.

An interesting point to consider is the fact that when speakers take the floor in order to tell a story (or give an explanation or advice, etc.), they are asking their interlocuters to temporarily suspend normal conversational expectations (i.e. of regular turns). The onus is on them to balance two things; they must make the story interesting or tellable (accomplished by including evaluation), but must not take up TOO much of their listeners' time in doing so. (2a) contains many details but no evaluation, and is therefore taxing listeners' attention without being especially 'interesting'. (2b) contains an evaluative device (thus highlighting the turning point in the interaction), but is still rather lengthy. (2c), however, contains the basic information of (2a) and (2b), including an evaluative device, but demands less time of listeners while still making the point. By including discourse markers in the constructed dialogue, (and keeping in mind that constructed dialogue is an evaluative device), speakers can effectively give contextualizing details which would otherwise have to be included explicitly in the telling of the narrative (or explanation, or advice), and thereby ask for more of listeners' time. The conversational implications of including discourse markers in constructed dialogue would be an interesting area of examination for future study.

The use of constructed dialogue in conversation is a fascinating reflection of the poetic in everyday life. Macaulay puts is quite nicely when he writes that constructed dialogue is a rhetorical device whose "effectiveness is a reflection of the skill which many speakers have of recreating dramatic dialogue that is appropriate to the protagonists and the scene" (1987, p. 29). More

importantly, I believe, is that it demonstrates speakers' knowledge about the interactional aspects of understanding in discourse. Schiffrin (1987, p. 17) comments:

> . . . by repeating words and phrases from prior conversation within the complicating action and evaluation of the story, [speakers] use a cohesive device to show that understanding the interactional meaning of the story requires reference to prior conversation.

The interactional meaning of a story cannot be so readily incorporated into, say, indirect quotation or a paraphrase of the scene. The fact that discourse markers occur frequently in constructed dialogue further demonstrates speakers' knowledge of the interactional (negotiated), sequential aspects of understanding in discourse, such that an utterance abstracted from an (interactional) context often still requires a link between that utterance and a prior one (or at least, a prior move) for its intended interpretation.

Such an interpretive link does not always have to be provided by discourse markers per se. An interesting case which occurs in my data (and also in Schourup's, although he does not attempt to explain it) is constructed dialogue where *hi* is the initial item. In the following example, Michelle is talking about wanting to look for a job as a production assistant, but feels foolish about applying for that type of job without having any real experience in that area. She attributes this piece of constructed dialogue to herself when talking to a (conditional) job interviewer:

(3) Michelle: "*Hi*, I'd like to get a job as a P.A."

The interpretive link that *hi* provides is one of the sudden availability of participants to each other. Because of the constructed scene (an interview), listeners will likely interpret this as their first meeting. What this piece of constructed dialogue demonstrates, then, is Michelle meeting the interviewer and then asking for a job right away. Keeping in mind that we know that this is not normally the interactional format for interviews, this 'violation' has evaluative meaning. Michelle is apparently emphasizing the 'ridiculous' aspect of asking for a job for which she has no experience. *Hi* contextualizes the utterance by indicating that the request for a job occurred immediately following the initial greeting. This is not a sequence that we would normally expect; rather, we would expect interviewees (especially ones who have no related job experience) to enumerate their good points first (not to mention that an interviewer normally asks questions as well!). In other words, by indicating the sequential aspects of her request, that request is contextualized in a very particular (and unusual) way. This piece of constructed dialogue, by portraying an unusual interaction, evaluates the ridiculous aspect of Michelle's dilemma. Recall that a similar 'unusual' interpretive link was used in (8) in Chapter 3.3 to emphasize the ridiculous character of the phone call from a stranger who was leaving for another country in two hours. In such cases, a sequential 'norm' is protrayed as being violated for the purpose of emphasizing an already unusual event.

Another element that occurs as the initial item in constructed dialogue (although it is less frequent than 'discourse markers') is *sorry*. In the following example, Steve and Tegan are discussing how disappointing it is to look at one's paycheck and see how much money has been taken off for taxes. They

hypothesize that someday it's going to get so absurd that a boss will say to an employee (while handing over the paycheck):

(4) Steve: "*Sorry*, I have to pay you now."

Sorry contextualizes this utterance by providing an EXPLICIT interpretive link of 'apology' between the response (having to pay the employee) and the reference (handing over the paycheck). Were this utterance spoken in its 'true' context, contextual factors may have allowed the listener to interpret it as an apology. Since *sorry* makes explicit an apology, it appropriately contextualizes the abstracted utterance.

An interesting follow-up to this study would be one which examines different types of discourses where utterances are abstracted from a sequential context. The first type that comes to mind is one-frame comics that include a piece of dialogue. In flipping through a collection of Gary Larson's Far Side, for example, one sees a multitude of discourse markers as the initial item of the utterances given, as well as other items such as *and now*, *and another thing*, *on the other hand*, *by the way*, *of course*, *I'm sorry*, *excuse me*, *all right*, *c'mon*, *sure*, *what?*, vocatives (including the likes of *you imbecile!*, *fool!*) and short imperative statements such as *calm down*, *watch it*, *relax*, etc. Such a study of items occupying these initial brackets might provide further support for the theory that understanding utterances abstracted from a larger, interactional context requires some kind of reference to what has preceded it in that interaction, which in turn would support the general theory that sequentiality in discourse is an important contextualizing factor which contributes to our understanding in discourse.

NOTES

[1]Where I have used other researchers' examples, I have conformed the style of transcription (as far as 'punctuation' goes) to my own.

[2]The symbol '#' denotes pragmatic unacceptability.

[3]Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1984) defines "to evince" as "to constitute outward evidence of" or "to reveal."

[4]Schourup (1985) often appears to use the terms EVINCIVE and INTERJECTION interchangeably, since one of his aims is to characterize a large number of items traditionally called 'interjections' as 'evincives' (which indicate some form of unexpressed thinking on the part of the speaker). In a way, this parallels the discourse marker/interjection dilemma, where, as more and more of what were traditionally called interjections (e.g. *well*, *oh*, etc.) are studied and found to have some regular use in discourse, they are moved over into the class of DISCOURSE MARKERS.

[5]I left certain 'fixed' expressions such as *Oh god*, *oh shit*, *oh really*, *oh yeah*, *oh no*, etc. out of these figures. Although I believe that the *oh* in these expressions is the evincive *oh* of my study, these expressions are highly routinized, and deserve special mention elsewhere.

[6]There has been some question as to the PROSODY of discourse markers within constructed dialogue. As some of the data for the study is unrecorded, only certain generalizations can be made, based on 33 recorded pieces of constructed dialogue containing *well*, *oh*, *okay*, *look*, *y'know*, and *hey* as the initial item. First, the majority of the markers in this position are ACCENTED (29/33). Second, there is usually a PAUSE after the marker (22/33). Finally, the markers are pronounced with a more or less LEVEL INTONATIONAL CONTOUR. Where there is some sort of contour on the marker, it is very slight.

As Bolinger (1989) states, intonational contrasts of markers are ADDITIVE, separate from the 'meaning' of the marker, and that the prosody of markers "cannot be studied separately from its syntax, semantics, and usage" (p. 300). For example, he comments that accented *oh* separated (presumably by at least a slight pause) from the rest of the utterance is more emphatic (ibid, p. 272), and that accented *well* may indicate a speaker's PROCLAMATION of the norm while unaccented *well* indicates a speaker's ASSUMPTION of the norm (ibid, p. 329). He also notes that terminal pitch (at least, for *oh*) may reflect a speaker's affective stance (ibid, p. 282), and that *well* often conforms to utterance type, e.g. a rising contour for a question, a falling contour for a declarative, etc. (ibid, p. 335). Considering the complexity of the matter, and the fact that the BASIC USE of each marker remains the same regardless of prosody, such a comprehensive treatment of the prosody of discourse markers is beyond the scope of this study.

[7]Schourup (1985, p. 109) notes that utterance-initial uses of *y'know* have a "general peculiarity": positing mutual background knowledge BEFORE the utterance in question has been spoken "amounts to a PREDICTION of common ground". Interactively, predicting this mutual knowledge "can be considered a type of 'intimacy ploy' . . . It is as if the speaker were saying, "We trust each other; our sensibilities are so attuned that I can count on your appreciation of essentials of what I say even before I say it.""

[8]Even when the constructed-speaker and the constructed-hearer in a piece of constructed dialogue are one and the same, it is much like Goffman's (1981) concept of 'self-talk': "To talk to oneself is to generate a full complement of two communication roles—speaker and hearer—without a full complement of role-performers . . . " (p. 80). What is said to oneself is what one might say when addressing someone else, or what someone else might say to us. "To this end we briefly split ourselves in two, projecting the character who talks and the character to whom such words could be appropriately directed" (ibid, p. 83). In this sense, we can view the 'self-talk' in such cases of constructed dialogue as a sort of interaction.

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