A MORE SUBTLE POLITY:

THE PROVINCIAL STATE AND PARTY

POLITICS IN BRITISH COLUMBIA,

1871-1903.

by

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A MORE SUBTLE POLITY: The Provincial State and Party

Politics in British Columbia, 1871-1903

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Abstract

British Columbia's late nineteenth century political situation is frequently referred to by proponents of the 'particular province' approach to provincial history. During this era local parliamentary factions were not identified along Dominion party lines, as was the case in other provincial jurisdictions, and this structural anomaly is commonly cited as proof of the province's unique political nature. Of late, there has been some reassessment of this position in studies of labour, women, and education in the province which suggest that British Columbia's experience may be less unusual than previously allowed. This study is intended as a political variation on the revisionary theme, and specifically questions whether local provincial politics during the last three decades of the nineteenth century were as unusual as others have suggested.

The approach taken is based on a functional study of party systems in western democracies and the operation of the democratic state. Theoretical examination of this question, which comprises the first section of the document, is derived from secondary studies in the fields of political science and history. The remaining chapters apply a functional model of party systems to the British Columbia situation, and conclude that while obvious structural distinctions existed for a limited period of time, party politics quickly evolved in response to challenges to the provincial state that occurred in the late 1890s. These chapters are drawn from a combination of primary sources such as manuscript collections, government publications and contemporary newspaper accounts, and a selection of relevant books and articles.

Acknowledgements

Robin Fisher's supervision of this rather drawn-out effort, particularly his patience, enabled me to finally complete this project and is much appreciated. He was also a willing and frequent employer during my term at SFU, which as any graduate student will concur, is no small matter. Examining Committee members Douglas Cole and Patrick Smith made a number of helpful comments that I have tried to incorporate in the final draft, and Allen Seager was always willing to discuss my topic and the wider subject of Historical discourse. Allen also reminded me that participation in the political process goes beyond writing about it.

John Belshaw of Cariboo College allowed me to scrounge ideas from his research and has always been encouraging, as have my colleagues in the program, David Roth, Peter Parker and Jim Quilty. Robin Anderson, another of my colleagues, demystified the intricacies of the University computer system and taught me how to play squash, but most importantly, remained my friend throughout. My parents - 'back on the prairies' as they say out here - have, as always, been very supportive.

Finally, Helen Ward intervened in this project just at the time that I was losing incentive and wondering if it would be completed. Without Helen, this thesis would not have been finished.

Dedication

For Otis, Gypsy, and Rudy and the girls who let me stay at their place on Denman Island.

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INTRODUCTION

Unlike the four charter members of Canadian Confederation or the other subsequent additions to the federal union, British Columbia alone failed to emulate federal party lines in its provincial legislature. Much has been made of this anomoly by historians, particularly proponrents of the 'particular province' school of historiography which emphasizes British Columbia's dissimilarities to, and isolation from the rest of Canada. Pat Roy, for instance, has argued that "because of their physical and psychological isolation from the rest of Canada, British Columbians are inspired to seek their own identity."[1] Physical separation from the rest of the country is a fact of geography, but the effects of this isolation, and the significance attributed to it in some circles, have come under scrutiny by Gordon Hak in a review of recent provincial history. Citing social histories that emphasize the common, or the national over the particular, Hak argues that the historically unique nature ascribed to the province may be exaggerated, an evaluation that holds true for its political development.[2]

Absence of party lines during the 1871-1903 period does set the province apart from similar jurisdictions, but concentration on this specific structural aspect of political culture has overshadowed functional similarities. Specifically, questions of what role parties play in society, and how different the operation of local politics was without party systems have been ignored in favour of studies that emphasize unusual

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[1] Pat Roy, "The Company Province' and Its Centennials: A Review of Recent British Columbia History," Acadiensis 4, 1 (Autumn 1974), 159. Other examples include Margaret Ormsby, British Columbia: A History (Toronto: Macmillan, 1958); Martin Robin, The Company Province (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1972).

[2] Gordon Hak, "Workers, Schools and Women: Some Recent Writing on the History of British Columbia," Acadiensis, 19, 2 (Spring, 1990), 185.

events or eccentric personalities. Part of the misconception arises from the significance attributed to political parties as vehicles of conflicting ideologies, when party systems are in fact more effective as instruments of competing interest groups. In Canadian history all party discourse has taken place within parameters defined by liberal-democratic values calculated to contain social and political protest within acceptable boundaries. Party systems in liberal democracies legitimate political debate and the operation of the state, whether at the national or provincial level, to argue that one province spawned a political culture that was truly unique is only possible if the demands of national political economic forces are ignored.

This is not to suggest that variations on a basic theme are impossible. The essays on provincial politics in Martin Robin's edited collection, for example, all deal with what is unusual, or at least specific to political development in each jurisdiction.[3] British Columbia's 'no party' era is one obvious example of local political expression straying from the national model, but studies of other provinces suggest that party labels at the provincial level have been of variable significance. In Nova Scotia, resolution of the Confederation debate "meant the submergence of the one issue which had permitted meaningful cleavage of the electorate along party lines," while politics in Prince Edward Island were marked by factional instability - despite use of party labels - in the 1860s and 1870s that gave way to long periods of one party dominance of the House. Party labels were also the norm in New Brunswick, but the "people spoke of 'Government' and 'Opposition,' rather than of Liberal and Conservative, and party discipline came only with the twentieth century."[4] In central Canada, competitive party systems were similarly unremarkable for any fundamental distinction.

[3] Martin Robin, ed. Canadian Provincial Politics: The Party System of the Ten Provinces. (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1972).

[4] J. Murray Beck, The Government of Nova Scotia (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957),156; Frank McKinnon, The Government of Prince Edward Island (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1951), 243-44; Hugh G. Thorburn, Politics in New Brunswick (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961),13.

Christopher Armstrong suggests that any concept of ideology was virtually absent in Ontario, where provincial government agenda was dominated by an obligation to protect local interests against federal interference. Quebec's electorate, according to Ralph Heintzman, traditionally harboured a "profound cynicism" toward a political system based on patronage and marked by corruption, and party distinctions were of little consequence, apart from the pragmatic concerns of who was to receive government contracts.[5]

In late nineteenth-century Manitoba, perhaps a more comparable province to British Columbia constitutionally, competitive politics were secondary to a common dissatisfaction with Ottawa over railway policy and local development, and parties, as defined federally, were less important than provincial issues such as freight rates and federal disallowance of provincially chartered railways. John Norquay did head a Conservative administration, but his allegiance was based on a shaky alliance with the federal party in which support for federal railway policy was exchanged for increased federal financial subsidies. This arrangement lasted only until Norquay's submission to local public pressure, and subsequent defiance of federal disallowance legislation, which convinced John A. Macdonald to drive the Manitoba Premier from office in 1887. Parliamentary factions were identified along Dominion party lines during this era, but in spite of the "apparent life-and-death tone of their rhetoric and their electoral contests, the two parties did not differ significantly. Both were dependent on British Canadians for leadership, both were laissez-faire in economic policy, and both were loyal to the British Empire...".[6] Party division was not solidified until 1900, when Hugh John Macdonald, Premier for ten months, was succeeded by Rodmond Roblin in

[5] Christopher Armstrong, The Politics of Federalism: Ontario's Relations with the Federal Government 1867-1942 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 5; Ralph Heintzman, "Politics, patronage, and the state of Quebec," Journal of Canadian Studies 9, 2 (May 1974),1-2, 56-59.

[6] Gerald Friesen, The Canadian Prairies: A History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), 341.

October of that year. Once ensconsed, Roblin's Conservative government held power until defeated by a reformist Liberal opposition under T.C. Norris in 1915. Manitoba, like British Columbia, exhibited electoral loyalty to the party of federal patronage that oversaw its entry into Confederation. Conservative candidates were routinely returned from both provinces until 1896, with the exception of the 1882 federal election in Manitoba.

The two provinces carved out of the North West Territories by Laurier in 1905 maintained a long period of loyalty to the Liberal party. Conservatives in Alberta were "closely identified with urban manufacturing and financial interests," while the Liberals were considered the party "of the farmer, of free trade, and of the great migration boom."[7] In his study of Saskatchewan, David Smith describes an essentially homogenous political culture that featured "overwhelming support among elected officials for autonomy and virtually no partisan division. This was in keeping with the tradition of non-partisanship......which had existed since the achievement of responsible government." The rationale for non-aligned local politics was the need "to maintain a united front in their dealings with Ottawa."[8] Prairie voters rewarded the Liberal party by returning it to office from 1905 until 1921 in Alberta, and until 1929 in Saskatchewan, and the two provinces loyally sent Liberal MPs to Ottawa until the 1917 Unionist campaign.

If recognizable party distinctions represent competing interest groups within a political culture, - the "identifiable mixture of attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments that a people hold over some extended period of time and that broadly governs their political behaviour" - then absence of party lines in nineteenth century British Columbia should

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7 Thomas Flanagan, "Stability and Change in Alberta Provincial Elections," Alberta Historical Quarterly 21, 4 (Autumn 1973), 2.

8 David E Smith, Prairie Liberalism: The Liberal Party in Saskatchewan 1905-1971 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), 3.

not come as a surprise.[9]   With few exceptions, British Columbians were committed to

the completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway, and rapid immigration and settlement

of the province.   And until the 1880s, most progress-minded residents lived in or near

Victoria, in a relatively small society undivided by reformist impulses (once

Confederation was achieved) directed at a small oligarchy as in Ontario and Quebec, or

by religious issues that had caused considerable animosity between rival sectarian

groups in other parts of Canada.

This general concordance of opinion made British Columbia's political culture

more stable than is generally allowed; this was particularly true of the 'Smithe dynasty'

of the 1880s and 1890s. The five premiers that made up this political line were pro-Tory

federally, pro-business locally, and until the late century, their management of the

provincial state met with little substantive opposition, apart from a series of labour

disputes. The period of greatest political instability, 1898-1903, was a product of rapid

demographic changes that followed the CPR's arrival in 1886. Subsequent importation

of political allegiances and ideas from eastern Canada and Britain, and the resulting

fragmentation of provincial political culture was accompanied by Vancouver's eclipse

of Victoria as the province's leading financial and commercial centre, and created

challenges to the traditional political hierarchy from the burgeoning middle class of

the mainland. The numerous factions that appeared on the electoral landscape

reflected these challenges, which combined with questionable constitutional edicts by

the Lieutenant-Governor to make creation of aworkable government virtually

impossible.

The genesis of party politics in British Columbia was not, as has been suggested,

an exaggerated fear of labour and socialist political gains in the 1890s that convinced

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[9] This definition is taken from S.J.R. Noel, Patrons, Clients, Brokers: Ontario Society and
Politics 1791-1896 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 2-3.

other political groups to adopt party labels in 1903.[10]   By the late 1880s, middle class

interests on the mainland strenuously objected to traditional political practice and

pushed for electoral redistribution and, by the turn of the century, for party lines.

Labour's political gains, whether the election of Labour men or influence over

mainstream candidates, were cause for concern for many resource capitalists,

particularly during the Semlin administration, but the fragile coalitions constructed

from disparate interest groups during this period were as commonly condemned for

ignoring the growing importance of the mainland. Party divisions did not simply

appear suddenly in response to these conditions. Rather, the machinations of local

political actors, the influence of federal parties on the local situation, and importation

of eastern Canadian political values contributed to a process that culminated in party

lines in the 1903 general election. Despite the close results in that election, the local

Conservative party enjoyed virtually complete domination of the House in ensuing

years that lasted until the First World War. Party divisions may have arrived in British

Columbia in 1903, but like other western provinces it was not until later that a viable

opposition could legitimately challenge the party in power in the early twentieth

century.

Historical analysis suggests that traditional response to challenges to efficient

operation of the state includes creation, or refinement, of a political system able to

accommodate dissent within acceptable boundaries. Most frequently, this has meant

adoption of party lines as was the case in British Columbia. This project was

accomplished relatively easily, specifically because the province was not functionally

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[10] Martin Robin, The Rush for Spoils (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1972), 85; John
Malcolmson, "Politics and the State in British Columbia," in Rennie Warburton and David
Coburn, eds, Workers Capital and the State: Selected Papers (Vancouver:UBC Press, 1988); Edith
Dobie, "Some Aspects of of Party History in British Columbia," Pacific Historical Quarterly, 1, 2
(1932), 235-251.

different from the rest of the country, as evidenced by the importance of patronage dispersal and political manipulation of the local media.

The contribution this study is intended to make to British Columbia political historiography is a discussion not of personalities, or of who voted how in the House, but of the function of parties in liberal democracies, and why one province deviated from the political patterns in other regions of the country. The first section deals with theories of party including the various methodologies employed in relevant literature, and with the historical development of party systems. The remaining sections examine the British Columbia situation, particularly local political culture, and argue that party lines did not develop in British Columbia until the late nineteenth century because there was minimal opposition to the administration of the provincial state, or to those entrusted with its management.

CHAPTER 1

POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE DEMOCRATIC STATE

As tempting as it may be to settle on Disraeli's description of party as 'organized opinion', a study of the evolution of a provincial party system must proceed from a more precise definition of party structure and function, and from an understanding of the historical context in which it evolved. There are, however, two main obstacles to this project. One is the variety of methodologies found in the literature - a list that includes behavioural, functional, historical, ideological, and structural analyses - which often work within such narrow parameters of analysis as to become of limited value in constructing a broad description of "party". The second is that like other subjects of historical inquiry, studies of party are the product of individual bias, and agenda.

Whatever methodological approach is taken, most studies make some reference to Edmund Burke, whose famous definition of political party - "a body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavors the national interest, upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed" - is cited as the first positive assessment of an institution that had been more frequently criticized by contemporary observers. In his departure from accepted wisdom, Burke suggested that if a disciplined organization could overcome the instability of eighteenth-century parliamentary politics and gain control of the Legislature, political instability could be moderated. Dominance of parliament was the singular aim of his party model, to the exclusion of any other

considerations: "the function of party men was not to nurse their untainted virtue in opposition, but by every constitutional and legal means, to seek power."[1]

Without questioning the importance attributed to Burke's theories, it is worth noting that he was as much a practical politician as a political philosopher. MP for a rotten borough, and in the employ of the Marquis of Rockingham, the aristocratic leader of one of the Whig factions in parliament during the 1770s, Burke considered the most pressing issue of the day to be the political attacks on traditional authority and the aristocracy, a situation he believed could be resolved by greater discipline in the House. Specifically, Burke believed that if it could broaden its base of support and gain control of parliament, the Rockingham caucus would be able to break the existing factional stalemate, and preserve the institutions he considered essential for the survival of traditional English society. There was nothing radical in his prescription for alleviating the political ills that threatened the country, and party in particular was an inherently conservative concept. As O'Gorman notes, it was impossible for Burke "to conceive of a ministerialist party, independent of the king, resting upon a parliamentary majority, representing the body of the nation."[2]

Burke's distinct political philosophy was the product of an historically specific context, which suggests a second element that must be considered when assessing relevant material on party systems. If Burke's statements on the matter are a constant in later literature, so too is the primacy of ideological perspective, agenda, and the historical context in subsequent studies. Party, like most topics of historical inquiry, is not, therefore, given to any simple, objective analysis, or definition. This cautionary point is borne out by an examination of some of the various methodologies employed in the study of party systems.

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[1] Frank O'Gorman, <u>Edmund Burke: His Political Philosophy</u> (London: Allan & Unwin, 1973), 31.

[2] O'Gorman, 32.

There are those studies which, rather than concentrate on one methodology, attempt an all-encompassing definition. William Chambers, for instance, distinguishes party from less sophisticated affiliations by emphasizing structure, function, ability to harness widespread support, and a coherent ideology.[3] In Chambers' model, structure includes a "relatively durable" pattern of connections and communication between party leaders and local level organizations intended to facilitate fund-raising and publicity. Function refers to candidate selection, campaigning, ability to govern, and maintenance of internal unity. Public support and ideology are connected elements. Electoral viability depends on appeasing the greatest possible number of diverse groups, most typically done through brokerage and compromise intended "to bond disparate interests and individuals into a working coalition," and by creation of a recognizable ideology. Party ideology - a broad set of identifiable, but frequently contradictory, policies - is essential to electoral success, and most important for its symbolic function, and ability to command loyalty.

Chambers' work also operates within the confines of a particular context. His definition is more than an analytical template applicable to various political organizations to determine if they meet his criteria for party status. It is also an integral component of his assessment of the American Revolution, and the particular political culture it engendered. Attributing unique qualities to the American liberal democratic experience is a hallmark of what one observer describes as the *first new nation school* : an interpretation that portrays the Revolution as "the world's first successful revolt against colonialism. To them the revolutionary tradition is not only alive in America, but highly relevant for all mankind."[4] Political bias

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[3] William Chambers, Political Parties in a New Nation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963). This discussion is taken from pages 44-55.

[4] John Murrin, "The Great Inversion, or Court versus Country: A Comparison of the Revolutionary Settlements in England (1688-1721) and America (1776-1816)," in Three British Revolutions 1641, 1688, 1776 J.G.A. Pocock, ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 369.

notwithstanding, Chambers' definition of party remains important for his effort to incorporate some of the variety of approaches to party development. There is, however, little explanation of these specific methodologies, or of their evolution; factors that should be taken into account when investigating party systems.

John Hoadley has created a similarly far-reaching definition of party, but argues that studying the development process is more revealing than a static model.[5] To this end, he has constructed a four stage 'continuum' of party growth based on a wide reading of relevant literature. Factionalism the first stage is marked by the formation of minimally organized groups centred around single issues or personalities. At the second level - polarization - previously loose factions stabilize and become increasingly cohesive, generally in reaction to some "single issue of overriding importance or by the culmination of several cleavages."[6] The absence of mass electoral participation at this stage precludes defining it as a party system. The final steps of the process, expansion and institutionalization, include characteristics more commonly associated with modern party politics; an extended franchise, increased public involvement, greater coordination and communication between central and constituency organizations, and creation and dispersment of policy and ideology. Hoadley's efforts to construct an all-encompassing definition provide a useful framework upon which various ideas about party can be hung, but provides only minimal insight into the causes of party formation.

Of the various analyses employed, the most relevant to this study are ideological and functional, and the debate that exists between adherents of the two disparate approaches. Ideology-based studies focus on either voter behaviour - the relationship between platform and voter response for instance - or investigate the concept and place

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[5] John Hoadley, <u>Origins of American Political Parties: 1789-1803</u> (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1986).

[6] Hoadley, 17.

of ideology in the general political process. An example of the latter approach is Christian and Campbell's *Political Parties and Ideologies in Canada*, both a reply to what they claim to be the pervasiveness of brokerage theory in Canadian political studies, and their assertion that ideology has been of greater consequence in the country's political history than brokerage theorists concede.[7] At a practical level, ideology explains complicated concepts to the public, and binds people to different parties. Its power is ostensibly so great that moving from one ideology to another is described as a "phenomenon analagous to a religious conversion."[8] This may be true in some cases, but the number of Canadian voters, in contemporary society at least, who change their allegiance between elections, or vote for different parties at different levels of government suggests that ideology may be little more than individual perceptions of self, or group, interest.

As theoretical concepts, socialism, liberalism, and conservatism are clearly distinct, but their relevance to economic and political functions in liberal democracies, where all options fall within distinctly liberal political economic parameters, is questionable. A recent study of Canadian political leadership emphasizes this point, and suggests that the notion of the three national parties as representative of three distinct ideologies is misguided. Rather, "they represent changing varieties of liberalism appropriate to an essential liberal polity."[9] Ideology as motivating factor in party politics is also criticized in Gordon Stewart's work on the late nineteenth -early twentieth century, which emphasizes the singular role of patronage in Canadian political life, both as a means of holding parties together, and as a method of securing

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[7] William Christian and Colin Campbell, <u>Political Parties and Ideologies in Canada</u>, 2nd ed. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1983).

[8] Christian and Campbell, 15.

[9] Ron Graham, <u>One-Eyed Kings: promise and illusion in Canadian politics</u>. (Toronto: Totem Books, 1986), 17.

public allegiance, particularly in the era before the First World War. Stewart argues not only that patronage-based politics was institutionalized by John A. Macdonald, and refined by his Liberal successor Wilfrid Laurier, but that patronage was more fundamental to Canadian politics than was the case in other countries.[10]

Disparity of interpretation draws attention to the problem of defining ideology itself, and determining its significance to party systems. Clearly, ideology exists in a real and important sense; socialist, liberal, conservative, nationalist, and various religious movements have distinctly different perspectives on how society should be administered. Outside of the realm of party systems, ideology can be fairly described as a "systematic and all-embracing political doctrine, which claims to give a complete and universally applicable theory of man and society, and to derive therefrom a program of political action."[11] In orthodox Marxist theory, ideology has a more specific definition: "it denotes any set of ideas and values which has the social function of consolidating a particular economic order ... it therefore has three principal functions: to legitimate, to mystify, and to console."[12] Another interpretation argues that while still tied to the economic order, ideology is not entirely an instrument of oppression. Rather, ideologies are "more or less coherent systems of symbols or representations of the society and its political objectives, which draw their coherence from their relationship to the interests of the class or group which support them, and form the basis for a program of collective political action."[13] Terry Eagleton agrees that ideology is integral to social relations, and unavoidable in terms of response to social hierarchies;

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[10] Gordon T. Stewart, "John A. Macdonald's Greatest Triumph," Canadian Historical Review 63, 1 (1982), 3-33; The Origins of Canadian Politics: A Comparative Approach (Vancouver, UBC Press, 1986); "Political Patronage Under Macdonald and Laurier, 1878-1911," American Review of Canadian Studies 10 (1980), 3-26.

[11] Roger Scruton, A Dictionary of Political Thought (London: Pan Press, 1983), 213.

[12] Scruton, 213.

[13] Reg Whitaker, "Writing About Politics," in John Schultz ed. Writing About Canada (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1990), 16.

it is "a largely concealed structure of values which informs and underlies our factual statements ... the ways in which what we say and believe connects with the power structure and power relations of the society we live in ... particularly those modes of feeling, valuing, perceiving and believing which have some kind of relation to the maintenance and reproduction of social power."[14]

Ideology, if defined as principle, is not synonomous with platforms and policies of Western-style political parties, but these latter considerations in effect define the ideological identity a party presents to the electorate. Again, this is not to suggest that there are no differences in policy of various parties, but that this is more the result of adherence to a specific *philosophy* - that is, ideas which organize and regulate practice - than to real ideological distinction. Chambers suggests that ideology plays its most crucial, if less noble, role in the party system when it presents simplified versions of complicated issues to the electorate in an effort to gain its support. This definition seems to be that which Christian and Campbell employ, which allows them to admit that Canadian party ideology is not doctrinaire. Whatever ideological commitment exists in Canadian parties, it is flexible enough to respond to economic, electoral, social, and other pressures, hardly the stuff of religious conversion.[15] In fact, the more supple a party's ideological identity is, the greater its effectiveness as an instrument of popular appeal: "the goal of ideologies is to arouse feelings and incite action, and the power of an ideology derives from its capacity to capture human imaginations and mobilize human energies."[16]

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[14] Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory: An Introduction (London: Basil Blackwell, 1983), 14-15.

[15] Christian and Campbell, 16; 4.

[16] Reo M. Christenson et al, eds., Ideology and Modern Politics, 3d ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1981), 4. As noted previously, Chambers suggests that ideology, as vehicle of political communication, and symbol should not be underestimated.

Party ideology then, is flexible and constantly repackaged depending on the current electoral climate, and the exigencies of electoral competition in liberal democracies ensure that parties will bend their philosophies in order to secure the greatest possible share of the popular vote. R.M. Dawson argued in his seminal text on national politics that this commitment to electability compelled parties "to modify their principles and their policies, to favour the neutral shades rather than the highly satisfying - but politically suicidal - brighter colours."[17]

Ideology as pragmatic political instrument is also a concern of functional studies, which focus on the role of parties in political systems and society. Notwithstanding the critique by Anthony King, who questions the importance assigned to parties in western democracies, or of Frank Sorauf who was among the first to suggest that political parties have been supplanted by lobby and single issue lobby groups as the most effective vehicles of political expression, functionalist studies raise significant questions not only about party evolution, but also about the roles they actually perform.[18] Much of the earlier functionalist literature was premised on the assumption that the primary role of party systems was the preservation of democracy, effected through its capacity to offer alternative plans for administration and rule. A popular scenario had the party system marshalling public opinion, and channelling it to centres of political power, an interpretation that, while accurate to an extent, fails to take into account its function as broker, or intermediary between competing interests. Brokerage theory, a liberal-pluralist concept, maintains that the blurred ideological distinctions which existed on the political landscape of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century democracies compelled parties to preserve the liberal equilibrium by

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[17] R.M. Dawson, The Government of Canada, 5th ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), 430.

[18] Anthony King, "Political Parties in Western Democracies: Some Sceptical Reflections," Polity 2, 2 (Winter 1969), 111-41; Frank Sorauf, Party Politics in America, 2nd ed. (Boston: Little Brown, 1972). For a Canadian study that corresponds with Sorauf see A. Paul Pross, Group Politics and Public Policy (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1986).

balancing the demands of numerous competing social groups, thereby creating a reasonably harmonious political culture. In short: "*party in a democracy institutionalizes channels and socializes conflict over control of the regime.*"[19] The assumption that political confrontation exists within narrowly defined ideological boundaries is also the basis of a second functional approach that views parties as little more than electoral coalitions which debate issues only at a symbolic level. Leon Epstein, for example, suggests that "all that is required for a political organization is a collective, labelled appearance before the electorate" and that "size, structure and ideology are relatively unimportant in defining a party."[20]

The function of party systems has also been the subject of considerable debate in studies of the democratic state. Rather than sift through the voluminous amount of work on the state for specific references to political systems, it is more economical, and instructive, to summarize the principal themes, emphasizing the two prevalent lines of inquiry - pluralist and marxist - in an attempt to arrive at some understanding of the relationship between state and party. Most pluralist analyses owe some debt to Max Weber's work, particularly his rebuttals to Marx's portrayal of the state as the instrument of the dominant economic class. Based on his assumption of the inefficient nature of direct democracy in an increasingly complex economic and social order, Weber argued that a centralized state administered by a professional bureaucracy that which was buttressed by legal authority and, most importantly, by legitimate recourse to violence could best manage society's affairs.[21] The threat of increasing, and increasingly self-interested, bureaucratic power was to be offset by strong, competent

[19] Theodore J. Lowi, "Party Policy and Constitution in America," in The American Party System: Stages of Political Development, W.N. Chambers, Dean Burnham eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 238. Italics in original.

[20] Leon Epstein in R.C. Macridis, ed. Political Parties: Contemporary Trends and Ideas (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), 126.

[21] Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation" in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, H.H. Gerth, C. Wright Mills, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), 78.

parliamentary governments, based on a competitive party system. This combination of the bureaucracy's concern for its own survival, and the counterbalance provided by parliamentary government, Weber maintained, worked to ensure that no single group could expropriate state power.[22] Rather than class struggles within states, as postulated by Marx, the main field of competition was between nation states, a situation which preserved the need for state institutions.

In the post World War II era, a school of American political scientists, arguing from a distinctly pluralist perspective, stated that in liberal democractic societies the state functioned as an arbitrator that balanced the demands of contending interest groups. Robert Dahl, the best known proponent of pluralism, asserted that "all the active and legitimate groups in the population can make themselves heard at some critical stage in the process of decision."[23] In this model, competition is regarded as natural and beneficial, and despite the spectrum of often contradictory interests such as business, labour, and welfare organizations, pluralists held that "the democratic state was an arrangement by which rational, well-intentioned citizens, who indeed had a wide variety of different interests but also a sense of common interest or even a 'general will' could and did adjust their differences in an active, rational, give-and-take of parties and interest groups and the free press."[24] By the 1950s, pluralism achieved the status of ideological justification of the American system of government, but had also attracted considerable criticism.[25] C.B. MacPherson, for example, argued that the ostensibly non-normative nature of liberal pluralist theory was in fact the political

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[22] David Held, "Central perspectives on the democratic state," The Idea of the Modern State, Gregor MacLellan, David Held, and Stuart Hall eds. (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1984), 65.

[23] Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), 137-8.

[24] C.B. MacPherson, "Do We Need a Theory of the State?" in Archives Europeenes De Sociologie 18, 2 (1977), 228.

[25] David Nicholls, Three Varieties of Pluralism (London: St. Martin's Press, 1974), 25.

equivalent of free market economics wherein "the party leaders are the entrepreneurs, the voters are the consumers. The voters' function is not to decide on policies but merely to choose one set of politicians who are authorized to decide the policies."[26] As others showed, often citing C. Wright Mills' work on linkages between economic and political elites, there were considerable discrepencies between ostensibly egalitarian democratic institutions, and increasingly obvious levels of social and economic inequality. Dahl would later acknowledge some of the more apparent shortcomings of pluralist theory, most notably inequality of influence and power, but remained loyal to the fundamental premise that all groups ultimately received a hearing from the state.[27]

Another trenchant critique of pluralist theory was Ralph Miliband's *State in Capitalist Society* which not only challenged Dahl, but reinvigorated the debate on the nature and function of the state by bringing traditional, often reductionist Marxist inquiry into question. Until Miliband entered the fray, Marxist theories of the state rarely strayed far from the view "that in capitalist society the state was above all, the coercive instrument of the ruling class, itself defined in terms of its ownership and control of the means of production."[28] One reason for this analytical *ennui* was that Marx himself had left no coherent, definitive theory of the state, apart from fragments of ideas scattered throughout his work such as the passage from the *Manifesto* which identified state administrators as "a committee for managing the affairs of the whole bourgeoisie."[29] Despite the absence of a conclusive statement, David Held argues that a general theory of the state can be constructed through study of a variety of Marx's

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[26] MacPherson, "Pluralism, Individualism, and Participation," in The Rise and Fall of Economic Justice and Other Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987),94-95.

[27] Dahl, "Pluralism Revisited," Comparative Politics 10 (1978), 191-203.

[28] Ralph Miliband, State in Capitalist Society (New York: Basic Books, 1969), 5.

[29] Marx and Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986), 36.

writings. While portraying the state as coercive, and working in the interests of capital, it is allowed a degree of autonomy from direct manipulation by the capitalist class.[30]

Reductionist theories of the state also ignored the work of the English Marxist E.P. Thompson which emphasizes the historical role of human agency.[31] That members of the lower classes did respond to their circumstances, just as their circumstances acted upon them, is widely accepted by many historians, but as one recent study suggests, there remains a reluctance on the part of some state theorists to accept Thompson's findings.[32] Corrigan and Sayer's historical-sociological account portrays a coercive state founded on, and exercising virtually complete domination; any concessions won by the working classes are no more than closely-regulated handouts designed to co-opt and control. Even if allowing that definite parameters on expression and protest exist, and that piecemeal reform intended to mitigate potential unrest are part of the historical class experience, demands made of the state by social and labour bodies have not been wholly futile. Gregor MacLellan, for one, claims that the "logic of reductionism has led some Marxists to underestimate the strength and depth of electoral democracy in advanced capitalism, and to overstate the revolutionary potential which is thought to reside in the working class."[33]

Again, definition is essential. Miliband describes the state as a set of institutions; the government, parliament, the bureaucracy, the judiciary, the military, and sub-central levels of government which combine to maintain capitalism.[34]

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[30] Held, 55-56.

[31] E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980).

[32] Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer, The Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural Revolution (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985).

[33] Gregor MacLellan, "Capitalist State or Democratic Polity? Recent developments in marxist and pluralist theory," in The Idea of the Modern State, 103.

[34] Miliband, 49-55. Leo Panitch in "The Role and Nature of the Canadian State" in The Canadian State: Political Economy and Political Power, Leo Panitch ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), 6, emphasizes the importance of sub-central governments in Canadian federalism.

Intertwined with, but separate from state institutions is the political sytem, including parties, the media, and the Church. While influential, these latter concerns are not "actual repositories of power", and are ultimately external to the state. Although Miliband's is not the state of reductionist theory, his instrumentalist definition emphasizes the linkages between economic upper classes, and state personnel - "the men who have manned *all* command positions in the state system have largely, and in many cases overwhelmingly, been drawn from the world of business and property, or from the professional middle classes."[35] There was, however, room for the state to operate outside of direct class control, and the state institutions retained some measure of autonomy.[36] The political system was similarly afforded a degree of independence, which allowed for class-based protest and expression "through the voluntary associations of the working class."[37] Miliband's description of state functions has been refined by James O'Connor into two main categories: ensuring continued capital accumulation, and the legitimation of this process.[38] In this less instrumentalist analysis the state can, and often does, act in ways inimical to short term demands of capitalism to protect and legitimate its longterm accumulative interests. Rather than working at the behest of the economic elite, the state described by both Miliband and O'Connor operates on its behalf by recognizing and guaranteeing its long term interests.

Accentuation of direct class linkages was challenged by Nicos Poulantzas, a structuralist Marxist whose *Political Power and Social Classes* resulted in a lengthy

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See also Garth Stevenson, "Federalism and the political economy of the Canadian state," in Panitch, 71-100.

[35] Miliband, 64; 5

[36] Paul Craven, <u>An Impartial Umpire: Industrial Relations and the Canadian State 1900-1911</u> (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), 159.

[37] Panitch, 9.

[38] James O'Connor, <u>The Fiscal Crisis of the State</u> (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973), 6.

debate between himself and Miliband.[39] Poulantzas argued that the state was not a

blunt instrument of the ruling class, as he suggested was implied in Miliband's work,

but was always 'relatively autonomous' of direct capitalist control. Yet, however

autonomous the state appeared, its functions were determined by the class structure of·

capitalist economic relations: "by being removed from direct capitalist control and

thus open to class struggle 'from below', the state actually succeeds more

comprehensively to serve capital in general."[40]

That Miliband did, in fact, allow for considerable state autonomy was only one

of his objections to Poulantzas. He also criticized Poulantzas' objective structuralist

theory, and emphasized the necessity of concrete analysis. Attempts to fashion a

general theory of the state were also rejected on the grounds that such formulations

were, he argued, divorced from empirical evidence to the point they existed only at a

theoretical level.[41] Significantly, Poulantzas' later works conceded the importance of

specific historical development of individual states, and allowed that this development

was determined not by objective class relations to production, but by historical class

conflict.[42] Criticism of attempts to construct a universal state theory has subsequently

gained support. Reg Whitaker, for instance, emphasizes that state studies "must be

made concrete in the historical specificity of particular nations and particular

political economies."[43] Relinquishing the search for a comprehensive theory has led to

a less stridently ideological perspective which has, in turn, led to a convergence of some

elements of Marxist and pluralist analysis. This has resulted in a definition of the

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[39] Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes, first pub. 1968, trans. Timothy O'Hagen (London: Verso, 1978). See the New Left Review, nos. 58 (1969); 59 (1970); 82, (1973).

[40] MacLellan, 94.

[41] Miliband, "The Capitalist State: Reply to Nicos Poulantzas," New Left Review 59, (1970), 55.

[42] Martin Carnoy, The State and Political Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 126.

[43] Reg Whitaker, "Images of the State in Canada" in The Canadian State, 28.

state which allows for both the place of class, and working class expression and dissent. The state, now generally accepted to be at least partially autonomous from the power elite, is cast as a 'plurality of institutions' that reproduce themselves not only to protect capitalism, but also to protect various bureaucratic and administrative agencies, a presumption which echoes Weber. MacLellan agrees that the idea of *all* states being solely instruments of class oppression must now be doubted: "there are no inevitable or logical functions which the state comes into existence to serve," rather, these are "contingent questions to be decided by historical analysis not philosophical assumption."[44]

The relevance of this extended detour in the discussion of party development is not only to examine one variant of functional analysis, but also to show that Marxist analysis has, by re-assessing the state, allotted greater significance to political dissent and protest. Despite this, the authority wielded by the capitalist state in the service of the economic elite should not be underestimated, nor should the acute appreciation of this power relationship on the part of its opponents. Those who repudiated the revolutionary message of socialist movements looked to alternative, albeit often limited, responses to their situation, most commonly the labour movement and the party system. If earlier Marxist analysis overstated the revolutionary potential of the working classes, contemporary observers less frequently "underestimate the strength and depth of electoral democracy in advanced capitalism...the electoral realm may be limited, but it cannot be discounted without inconsistency."[45] Whatever opportunities were derived from franchise extension and the party system, it is fair to say that neither of these institutions was installed with the intent of creating political equality. As historical analysis of the franchise, political affiliation and organization reveals,

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[44] MacLellan, 99.

[45] MacLellan, 104-5.

the new politics was instituted in a manner, and at a pace calculated to mitigate

working class discontent and expression simultaneously.

Modern party organization emerged from the factional politics of the English

parliament which, due to a variety of circumstances and influences, became relatively

more disciplined during the seventeenth-century. Although generally representative of

like-minded men of similar financial status, parliamentary factions did reflect a

growing conflict between elements of the bourgeoisie over parliamentary authority,

that differed markedly from pre-Civil War antagonism between monarchs and the

bourgeoisie. [46]

Factional politics may have been played out on ideologically level terrain, but

there was real competition for control of patronage and policy implementation that

reflected the growth, both in size and influence, of first commercial, and then

industrial interests. Yet, political stability was threatened less by this engagement

over parliamentary authority between competing factions than by societal crises such

as economic depression, war, or popular insurrection that were sufficiently alarming to

compel political rulers to initiate modifications in the system intended to moderate

discontent. In the wake of industrialization, the growth of secularism, socialism,

labourism and popular dissent reflected a fundamental dissatisfaction with the

established order that was not underestimated by the upper class. Issues of

participation and legitimacy forced a dramatic shift in attitude among segments of the

traditional elite, and by the early 1800s perceptions of political culture had come to

include the "idea that the mass public must participate or be controlled."[47]

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[46] Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (LondonNLB, 1974), 142. See also J oseph La Palombara and Myron Weiner, "The Origins and Development of Political Parties" in Political Parties and Political Development, La Palombara and Weiner, eds. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966.), 25. Christopher Hill states that bourgeoisie control of parliament was finalized by the outcome of the Glorious Revolution in "A Bourgeoisie Revolution?" in Three British Revolutions, 215.

[47] La Palombara and Weiner, 3.

Participation most commonly meant extension of the franchise, a concept that stirred considerable debate within the ranks of the political establishment, many of whom feared the spectre of a working class government. Despite growing polarization outside of Parliament, factionalism in the House was only slightly altered and there continued to exist "large areas of common ground between government and opposition, especially those bearing upon social hierarchy, the protection of property and the preservation of law and order."[48] But Whig leaders, conscious of the public mood, were contemplating the benefits of a more antagonistic critique of the Tory ministry in the hope of riding popular discontent from the opposition side to the government benches. The Conservative Liverpool administration capitulated not to the demands of the middle class, but to those of the ruling class, and passed legislation in line with their interests. The Corn Law in 1815 , for example, protected aristocratic landowners while aggrieving middle class merchants and importers, and the urban poor who were most adversely affected by rising bread prices. Sensing the depth of popular discontent, the Whigs finally moved, and attempted to take the lead in protesting the repressive legislation. But they were neither friends of middle class radicals, nor of the labouring poor, their intention was to exploit the situation to their own ends, and to guide and moderate these popular movements.[49] Within two years, the first of a series of reform bills was passed through the House.

Earlier fears that franchise expansion would result in a working class government had been alleviated by two elements crucial to the process of democratization: controlled expansion of the electorate - which was so closely regulated and complex that it served to disenfranchise and discourage many potential working class voters - and the advent of the party system.[50] Ostensibly enacted to

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[48] O'Gorman, 81.

[49] Michael Brock, The Great Reform Act (London: Hutchison & Co., 1973), 41.

[50] Standish Meacham, A Life Apart (London: Thomas & Hudson, 1977), 204.

broaden the democracy, liberalized voting requirements were more an exercise in

formalized consent, while the party system defined strict parameters on political

expression. Weber described parties as "the children of democracy, of mass franchise,

of the necessity to woo and organize the masses, and develop the utmost unity of

direction and the strictest of discipline."[51] MacPherson elaborated upon this

relationship: "the reason that the equal manhood suffrage did not bring about the class

government....was the extraordinary success with which the party system was able to

tame the democracy."[52]

As electoral democracy became entrenched in industrial-era political culture,

opponents of the new orthodoxy were faced with a choice between participation in an

increasingly refined political process, or mounting a direct, revolutionary challenge to

a state determined to uphold the party system. For many, change became synonomous

with gradualism. Improved working conditions, higher wages, and a better standard of

living could be achieved, many thought, by engaging the political process. Party

politics did, as MacPherson maintains, effectively institutionalize popular protest, but

this did not preclude working class dissent, no matter how narrow the confines of

acceptable protest may have been: "participation by working class parties in the

democratic electoral process also provided the political means whereby members of the

subordinant classes could exploit the institutional structures of the capitalist state to

effect substantial social and economic reform."[53]

MacPherson argues that electoral reform was augmented by the dependent

position of labour in the new industrial economy, which made the urbanized worker

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[51] Weber, 102.

[52] C.B. MacPherson, The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 67.

[53] David A. Wolfe, "Mercantilism, Liberalism and Keynesianism: Changing Forms of State Intervention in Capitalist Economies," Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory 5, 1-2 (Winter/Spring 1981), 75.

increasingly dependent on the new technology for employment, while imperialist expansion enabled governments to provide 'handouts', which combined to reduce demands for fundamental restructuring of the political system.[54] Confronted by an unwillingness on the part of many of their enfranchised colleagues to betray their loyalty to either the increasingly reformist Conservative, or Liberal party, working class political activists were unable to create anything resembling a united front representative of a majority of workers. By the time universal manhood suffrage was achieved, the incipient party system had been able to "smooth over a conflict of class interests .... and to save existing property institutions and the market system from effective attack."[55]

With numerous other exports, British parliamentary tradition informed much of Canadian development but, as Stewart has shown, the particular evolution of Canadian politics, to a greater extent than elsewhere, was devoid of any ideological imperative. This style of politics originated with the 1791 Constitution Act, which vested complete colonial authority in the Governor's office in an attempt to withstand the "corrosive levelling tendencies of North America" that had led to the situation in the American colonies.[56] Combined with Loyalist influence, British immigration, and the perceived threat posed by American republicanism, the Constitution created a homogenous society which offered little criticism of a strong central government based on the English model. In Lower Canada, the hierarchical traditions of the Catholic Church and the seigneurial system created a general acceptance of executive authority.[57] Whatever opposition did exist prior to the 1830s emanated from members

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[54] MacPherson, Life and Times, 67.

[55] Ibid, 65-66.

[56] Gordon Stewart, The Origins of Canadian Politics: A Comparative Approach (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1986), 23. For a discussion of the interpretations of American independence agitation and the development of political movements see Murrin, "The Great Inversion."

[57] Stewart, 23.

of the legislature excluded from patronage positions by the Tory Family Compact, or by the *Chateau Clique*: the most influential families in colonial society. Opposition factions represented similar economic interests and concerns, and conflict over political power was for the most part "a struggle between warring conservative ideologies" that was commonly settled by government appointment.[58] This is not to deny the significance of Reform agitation for responsible government, which was, at least partly, the result of obstinant refusal by a succession of Governors and their councils to consider growing demands for redistribution of political power.[59] Of its two variants, American-style republicanism as preached by William Lyon Mackenzie, was considerably less popular among Reformers than the moderate movement led by Baldwin and La Fontaine, who stopped short of advocating fundamental restructuring of government or abolition of patronage practices, proposing instead an increase in the power of the elected assembly, and achievement of responsible government.

In the wake of the Rebellions, Lord Durham's Report, and the Union of 1841, a modest redistribution of power was affected that demanded the Governor choose his executive council from the majority group in the assembly, essentially completing the process begun eight years earlier by granting the assembly the power to name the executive council, set government policy and dispense patronage. But achievement of responsible government was less the result of reform efforts than of Britain's adoption of free trade and the growing perception of the colonies as economic liabilites.[60] Events of 1837-1848 also narrowed the ideological consensus among those groups vying for power. On the right, remnants of Family Compact Toryism were increasingly

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[58] Graeme Patterson, "Whiggery, Nationality, and the Upper Canadian Reform Tradition," Canadian Historical Review 56, 1 (March, 1975), 44.

[59] Noel, 85.

[60] J.M.S. Careless, "Robert Baldwin" in Careless ed. The Pre-Confederation Premiers: Ontario Government Leaders, 1842-1867, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), 133-34.

irrelevant to the political system, a situation that was repeated at the opposite end of the political spectrum where radical Reformer leaders had been marginalized by the moderate leadership of Baldwin, and then of George Brown who moved the Reform coalition closer to their political centre.[61] While the Grits under Brown may have exhibited some oppostition, or 'Country' tendencies, his role in moderating the movement has been noted in a number of studies.[62] In this ideologically homogenous environment, the importance of patronage as a means of welding together coalition governments in the House took on considerable importance, but it was not until the Conservative-*Bleu* coalition that controlled power for much of the last half of the nineteenth century that dispensation of political office and other favours was systematically employed to create a party organization. The success of John A. Macdonald's reliance on patronage as political currency entrenched its use not only in his own organization, but in the country's political system.[63] When propelled into power on the back of the Pacific Scandal, Alexander Mackenzie's Liberals did make some attempt to avoid the excesses established by their predecessors.[64] Whatever his aversion to Conservative practice may have said about his commitment to principle, Mackenzie's unwillingness to use all tools at his disposal to strengthen his support undoubtedly contributed to his defeat in 1878. When the Liberal party next held power, Wilfrid Laurier displayed none of Mackenzie's reticence, and employed a political management style that owed much to Macdonald.[65]

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[61] Norman Penner, "Ontario: The Dominant Province" in Martin Robin ed. Canadian Provincial Politics (Scarborough: Prentice Hall, 1978), 209.

[62] Careless, 9; Penner, 209.

[63] Stewart, "John A. Macdonald's Greatest Triumph," 22.

[64] See Brian Beaven, "A Last Hurrah: Studies in Liberal Party Development and Ideology in Ontario, 1878-1893." Ph.D. Thesis, University of Toronto, 1981.

[65] Stewart, "Political Patronage Under Macdonald and Laurier 1878-1911," American Review of Canadian Studies 10 (1980).

The federal model of political management had some considerable impact on provincial governments in Canada. Lacking the economic scale of the United States and Britain, civil service opportunities were of greater consequence in nineteenth century Canada, and most major construction projects in the country - canals and railways especially - were government sponsored, and another source of appointments for party loyalists. This situation had implications for the operation of the nineteenth century provincial state, which was "far too poorly organized, far too ridden with political patronage and inefficiency, and far too enmeshed with the private sector, to allow for an autonomous role in direct economic activity."[66] Rather, the state's role was to create and oversee the operation of a system that allowed for private capital endeavor. The national model of patronage-driven politics and state legitimation of private accumulation was to be replicated at the provincial level.

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[66] Reg Whitaker, "Images of the State," 42.

CHAPTER 2

STABILITY LOST

Diverse political principles constitute the only
true basis of party; and where they do not
exist party degenerates to mere faction.

-John Robson, 1871

Provincial political development in Canada displayed many common traits; to

suggest British Columbia's evolution was unique is to downplay those similarities that

existed. Absence of party politics in the local provincial legislature was one

distinguishing structural feature of British Columbia, but this was less important than

the functional similarities of the political process. As in other jurisdictions, political

administration of the provincial state centred on local issues, especially those associated

with capital investment and accumulation. Such distinctions as existed in British

Columbia were the result of the province's relatively delayed modernization, and

adoption of institutions common to other provinces. This process was not simply a

product of physical isolation, but also of the sluggish economic and population growth

created by the national depression that began in the 1870s.

This is not to ignore the structural variations between respective political and

economic situations. Unlike the three other western provinces, for instance, British

Columbia was given jurisdiction over natural resources upon entering the union,

eventually allowing the province some greater degree of autonomy. There were also

fewer cultural and racial tensions in British Columbia, as Coats and Gosnell observed:

"to make the obvious comparison with the eastern colonies, there was here no feud of

ruling forces to allay, no Clergy Reserve to divide, no complicated fiscal policy to

arrange."[1] In his essay on provincial administrative history Gosnell states that 1881

amendments to taxation legislation which introduced school tax assessments and the

ensuing protestation by the Roman Catholic community were "the nearest to an

agitation for a separate school system to which the people of British Columbia ever

came."[2] The obvious rejoinder to this portrayal of provincial society as racially

harmonious is the overt racism experienced by Chinese and Japanese immigrants, and

the Native community, but there was little dispute regarding their status among the

voters: the province's white population. The only 'support' came from capital - the

Dunsmuir family for instance - who hired Chinese men as cheap labour and

strikebreakers, and those members of the middle class able to afford domestic help. If

a contentious point in industrial relations, the widespread anti-Oriental sentiment,

whether racially or economically-based, was not the stuff to split the hegemony of

European and Canadian dominated nineteenth century opinion.[3] Attitudes towards

Natives were similarly unsympathetic, and as unlikely to create any important

divisions in white society. In assessing the differences between contact and settlement

era relations between the two cultures, Robin Fisher argues that as the "Europeans

consolidated their hold on the country ... Governmental action constituted an attack on

Indian cultures and reflected the fact that the Indians had become largely irrelevant to

the development of the province by white settlers."[4] Undoubtedly, racism existed in the

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[1] R.H. Coats and R.E. Gosnell, Sir James Douglas cited in Allan Smith, "The Writing of British Columbia History," in W. Peter Ward and Robert A.J. McDonald eds. British Columbia: Historical Readings (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1981), 21.

[2] Gosnell, "Public Administration," in Adam Shortt, Canada and Its Provinces V. XXII (Toronto: Glasgow, Brook, 1914), 374.

[3] W. Peter Ward, in White Canda Forever: Popular Attitudes and Public Policy Towards Orientals in British Columbia (Montreal: McGill-Queen's Press, 1978) argues that racism was the dominant feature of pre-W.W. II provincial society. Pat Roy agrees that racism was prevalent, but also cites economic insecurity, and fears of inassimilability; "British Columbian's Fear of Asians, 1900-1950," Histoire Sociale/Social History 13, 25 (May 1980), 161-172.

[4] Robin Fisher, Contact and Conflict: Indian-European Relations in British Columbia, 1774-1890 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press Press, 1987), xiv-xv.

province, but those groups victimized by the dominant society were politically powerless, and posed no threat to the local political hierarchy. British Columbia was remarkably free of the sectarian disputes and racial disharmony - as opposed to institutionalized racism - that characterized the "bitterest debates in Canadian politics."[5]

Until 1886 and the concomitant urbanization and economic boom, provincial political culture was dominated by a small cadre of Vancouver Island merchants, resource interests, bureaucrats, and a smattering of journalists. These happy few controlled the provincial legislature, dominated the provincial economy, and presided over an immature, and almost unabashedly accumulative provincial state. There was little opposition to this hegemony, notwithstanding Amor De Cosmos' reformist appeals, or the sporadic rebukes to government policy from John Robson, whose later patronage appointment as CPR paymaster, and land speculation in Coal Harbour considerably diminish the reformist aura attributed to him in some studies.[6] Administration of the province met with, and reflected the wishes of a majority of the provincial electorate. British Columbians had little time for reform, or for the Liberals, and their demonstrable allegiance to the federal Conservative party was tied explicitly to John A. Macdonald's transcontinental railway project, which was widely held to be the key to provincial prosperity. "The people feel well" the Victoria *Daily Standard* remarked in 1871, "the railway, when commenced, will literally turn the country upside down. Population will be increased, trade and industry will flourish, and speculation will be rife in every direction."[7]

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[5] Desmond Morton, The New Democrats 1961-1986 (Toronto: Copp Clark, Canadian Reprint Series, 1986), 7.

[6] Ormsby, 309-311; John Antak, "John Robson: British Columbian." Unpublished MA Thesis, University of Victoria, 1972.

[7] Victoria Daily Standard, June 23, 1871.

That British Columbia's political culture in the nineteenth century differed structurally from other provinces is nowhere more evident than in the provincial electorate's choice of legislators. One apparent deviation was that, unlike other administrations, where members of legal profession held an inordinant number of places, politicians in British Columbia were overwhelmingly drawn from a small circle of men that encompassed the business community, resource interests, and large landowners.[8] Admittedly, there were usually enough legally-trained men in the House to fill the Attorney-General's portfolio, but their relatively small number does differentiate the local legislature from comparable institutions. A recent popular history perpetuates this misconception by overlooking the significance of this anomaly. When Theodore Davie was promoted to the ranks of the judiciary in 1895 Woodcock suggests that "the succession of lawyer premiers came to an end, and appropriately enough, with one exception, the next five premiers were linked to powerful primary industries of the province."[9] The implication that J.H. Turner's assumption of power marked a shift in political management misses the connections that traditionally existed between legislators and the commercial, merchant and resource capitalist clique that held sway over post-Confederation British Columbia.

This occupational anomaly is of more consequence than might be thought. In "Politics as a Vocation," Max Weber argued that the preeminence of lawyers in western politics was neither inexplicable nor accidental: "management of politics through parties simply means management through interest groups ... the craft of the trained lawyer is to plead effectively the cause of interested clients."[10] And, as John Porter

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[8] See Appendix 1.

[9] George Woodcock, British Columbia: A History of the Province (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 1990), 165.

[10] Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation" in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 94-95.

suggests, societies lacking an independent, wealthy aristocratic class which gives its
time to public service, traditionally look to their legal community to fill the void. This
is one reason there were fewer lawyers in British politics than in Canada, where just
under fifty per cent of all federal cabinet ministers between 1867 and 1940 were
lawyers. This preponderance has significantly affected who manages the state, "the
extension of democracy has brought about not a widening, but a further narrowing in
the occupational background of the political directorate."[11] At a pragmatic level, a
legal career lends itself to a political diversion of some length, and may well be
advanced by some stint in public service. J.E. Hodgetts offers further historical insight
into the legal-political community, specifically citing the advantages of partnerships
which allowed one member of a firm to pursue a political career and business contacts
in the local legislature while his partner oversaw daily management of their
establishment. Legal education also trains lawyer-politicians to construct and deliver
persuasive arguments designed to win support, a skill of considerable benefit to
ministers who possessed little knowledge of their portfolios.[12] Finally, lawyers are
expert in mediation and compromise and unlikely to defend a principle to the death;
men who had "enlightened views but no conviction," Hodgetts suggests, made good party
men.[13]

Such good party men were a rare commodity in nineteenth century British
Columbia. The 1881 census reported a legal community of thirty-one; twenty-five of
whom resided either in Victoria or New Westminster, the proportionately small

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[11] John Porter, The Vertical Mosaic: an Analysis of Class and Social Power in Canada (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1965), 395, 392. A similar historical situation exists in the United
States where 70% of Presidents, Vice-Presidents, and Cabinet members were legally trained; See
Heinz Elau and John D. Sprague, Lawyers in Politics: A Study in Professional Convergence (New
York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964), 11.

[12] J.E. Hodgetts, Pioneer Public Service: An Administrative History of the United Canadas, 1841-
1867 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1955), 66-67.

[13] Hodgetts, 64.

number of lawyers was reflected in the provincial legislature and cabinets of the era which unlike the situation in other provinces were not dominated by legions of legally trained men.[14] There were, however, a number of large landowners, resource industrialists, and merchants and businessmen to fill the various cabinet posts.[15] The majority of all professionals lived in or near the town, as did most merchants and administrative officials, giving the capital undisputed dominance over virtually all aspects of provincial life. Victoria was the "business metropolis of British Columbia during the period of coastal ascendency, and its entrepreneurs formed the core of the province's business power," and "their interests were represented in the provincial legislature by "British Columbia's most influential politicians."[16]

Absence of disagreement on any major political or economic topics allowed the unusually obvious overlap between business and politics in the House to function reasonably efficiently, particularly in light of restrictive electoral requirements. Qualifications established in 1871 which allowed literate British subjects twenty-one years of age, resident in the province for six months to vote in the initial provincial election proved to be relatively liberal in light of subsequent legislative revisions. Native and Chinese voters were disenfranchised in 1874; two years later the number of required months of residency was doubled. In 1888 Japanese residents were added to the list of the ethnically proscribed, which was further expanded by the 1897 Provincial Elections Act which excluded "Chinamen," Japanese" and "Indians" on a racial basis instead of by birthplace or citizenship. As late as 1886 just over 7,200 residents of the province were registered to vote.[17]

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[14] Canada. Dominion Census 1881, V. II, 316-18.

[15] See Appendix 2.

[16] Robert A.J. McDonald, "Victoria, Vancouver and the Evolution of British Columbia's Economic System, 1886-1914," in Town and City, Alan Artibise, ed. (Regina: Great Plains Research Centre, 1981), 36.

[17] Electoral History of British Columbia, (Victoria: Queen's Printer, 1988), 465, 511-514.

Contesting political office was similarly proscribed by voting qualifications, and by the $200 deposit required on the part of all candidates, refundable only to those participants able to garner half of the votes cast. There were also unofficial, but significant, financial constraints. Campaign material, most commonly newspaper advertisements, was costly, and an occupation that allowed time and a secure, sufficient income were necessary elements of parliamentary participation. An 1872 plebiscite to consider an indemnity for members was rejected by an almost two to one count, and members were not compensated for their time until 1882 when a $400 annual allowance was made available. Considering the job insecurity that affected much of the provincial labouring class, the demands of the MLA were more suited to men in business partnerships, journalists, or ranchers. Public service was not a career for the majority of the population, no matter how public spirited one may have been.

The Census record indicates another demographic figure which sets the province apart; the disproportionate ratio of men and women. In the first decade after Confederation there were 29,503 men in the province compared to 19,956 women. During the next ten years the imbalance was increased, new figures showed 63,003 men and 35,170 women, or 64.2% versus 35% of the population. This ratio changed imperceptably over the next ten years during a period of dramatic population expansion.[18] Only the North West Territories approached this level of disparity, established provinces hovered much nearer an even split. Gender-based disenfranchisement was not, of course, restricted to British Columbia, but as Jean Barman notes, the social reform movement was "in its origins a largely female and middle class enterprise." In British Columbia "early efforts at social reform were shaped, just as in the workplace, by imperatives unique to British Columbia. The small number of females, and more specifically of servants, played a role."[19]

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[18] Canada Year Book, 1902.

[19] Jean Barman, The West beyond the West: A History of British Columbia (Toronto: University

The relevance of all of this to the issue of British Columbia's transition from factional to party politics is that, if political culture is reflective of society, then the fascination with British Columbia's early political theatre is misleading. The focus should rather be on the larger question of how the changing values and interests of provincial society affected the local polity, or, to bring Miliband back in, how the composition and management of the sub-central state shaped provincial political culture. Whatever regional affront British Columbia presented to Canadian political antecedents, there was, until the 1890s, little public outcry or opposition to politics as practiced in the province, apart from a largely disempowered labour constituency. In this environment the provincial state was relatively free to concentrate on its accumulative function and, if necessary, resort to coercive tactics with minimal fear of widespread protest. It was not until a dramatic shift in the demographic and economic foundations of the province occurred that a greater need for more subtle operation of the state functions was engendered.

The concept of party politics was obviously not unknown to British Columbians in the 1870s, but at the provincial level it remained largely irrelevant for a number of years. Yet, in 1871 a debate on the role of party in provincial politics was waged in the Victoria press that for a short time suggested that the province might reproduce the political trappings common to other Canadian jurisdictions. Amor De Cosmos, Victoria *Standard* editor and political opportunist, made appeals to local partisan sentiment and reminded opponents of the ministry of John McCreight that it was "the duty of the Liberal members to rally around their old leaders - the men who have year after year fought their battles and have in no instance deserted the popular cause."[20] The Liberal presence, as such, was not an organized body affiliated to the federal party,

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of Toronto Press, 1991), 204; 209.

[20] Daily Standard, November 21, 1871.

nor was it a harbinger of the provincial association that emerged in the century. To some extent local Liberal support "existed chiefly in De Cosmos' vivid imagination."[21] but it was also part of his ongoing project to muster support for his own political career which had been stalled by his exclusion from the inagural provincial cabinet. De Cosmos had in fact run on a fairly elaborate platform that included an appeal to party designed to appeal to his pro-confederation supporters. His definition of, and commitment to party was conveniently loose. Members of the legislature would be united by "personal influence of individual ministers, or by political principles, or by both, the majority will be the governing party of the day." Party labels during the actual campaign were of less significance than during his later attempts to rouse public opposition of the government: "the moment a number of 'independents' unite to form a government, they would become a party."[22]

Following the general election, De Cosmos continued to promote party lines in local politics, which frequently drew critical rejoinders from John Robson of the *Daily British Colonist*, who disagreed with the *Standard* editor's assertion that responsible government necessarily entailed formation of partisan lines. De Cosmos was dismissed as little more than a "chronic obstructionist, and a "political fungus" who would appeal to the public "in the various plausible guises of the times such as 'Liberals', 'Progressives' and the like, with the vain hope of ingratiating itself into public favour and confidence."[23] More significant than Robson's opinion of his political and journalistic colleague was his assessment of the local political climate as the province

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[21] Walter N. Sage, "Federal Parties and Provincial Groups in British Columbia, 1871-1903," British Columbia Historical Quarterly 12, 2 (1948), 155.

[22] Daily Standard, July 1, 1871.

[23] Victoria Daily British Colonist, May 21, 1871.

prepared to join confederation:

> there are not two distinct sets of political opinions
> and principles in the Colony....There are not, therefore,
> any political parties to meet the new Government under
> the new dispensation and it is to be hoped that the policy
> of the new Government may be of such a character as
> will not give good reason for the immediate formation
> of two political parties, the one hostile to the other."[24]

"An intelligent public," De Cosmos countered, "expect to be governed by party, and they expect that the party in power will give any office that may be vacant or that may require to be filled, and other patronage at its disposal, to those who may be attached to that party." His vision of party reserved little room for principle: "The Ins will try to retain power,- to hold the offices and dispense the patronage of the country. The Outs will make all *constitutional* efforts to turn the Ins out - and in turn become the Ins." Nor was principal a necessary qualification for membership: "Office and patronage will be chief elements in keeping party together."[25] While reasonably descriptive of Canadian parties in practice, De Cosmos made no allowance for the different interest groups they represented at some level. Nonetheless his predictions regarding the operation of provincial political competition proved to be accurate.

If pre-Confederation reform agitation could have perhaps served as the foundation of a Grit, or Liberal oppositionist mentality, resource capitalists, personified by the Dunsmuirs were, at least outside of Nanaimo, generally not perceived as a western equivalent of the Family Compact or *Chateau Clique*. Nor was their political influence a lightning rod for the sort of middle class unrest that had been the focus of eastern Canadian Reform. Philosophical differences, even at the symbolic level that defined the federal political model, were conspicuously absent from the local political dynamic, and Robson was able to report that no "serried phalanx" of Liberals

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[24] Colonist, July 4, 1871. De Cosmos frequently linked responsible government and party politics in his editorials. See the July 29, and November 11, 1871 issues for examples.

[25] Daily Standard, July 7, 1871.

emerged from the political woodwork to "bear down upon and overturn a common enemy" in the first provincial election.[26] The two editors had been successful in their own ridings, and sat in opposition to the McCreight ministry, and both initially proclaimed the election results as a positive achievement for the province. Robson described the outcome as a grand victory for Victoria Reformers, including McCreight, James Trimble, Robert Beaven and Simeon Duck, while the *Standard*, which made no reference to Liberal fortunes, approvingly noted the inclusion of "two of the best barristers at our bar, two editors with considerable legislative experience, and three representatives of the "commerce and manufacture of the Island."[27] The latter group was of considerable consequence to the new administration: "men of great energy,- having a large stake in the country - are practical men whose votes will ever advance the material interests of the Province."[28]

Such positive assessments of the political situation in either paper were rare in ensuing months. Particular criticism was levelled at the Premier, and Lieutenant-Governor Joseph Trutch, who also served as John A. Macdonald's agent in the province. The incompatibility of responsible government and Trutch - whose intimate involvement in the political process included his attendance at cabinet meetings - was often singled out, but much of the criticism made by the editors of the Victoria dailies stemmed from their own exclusion from power. The new cabinet, Robson intoned, was "as weak as could well be constructed out of the material supplied by the electors."[29] All

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[26] Daily Colonist, July 20, 1871.

[27] Colonist, October 17,1871. D.W. Higgins, owner of the Colonist and Robson's employer had signed McCreight's and Duck's nomination papers. Standard, October 30, 1871.

[28] Standard, October 30, 1871.

[29] Colonist, November 15, 1871. Robson temporarily moved around to support the Ministry, possibly at the behest of Higgins, but by 1872 had resumed his earlier critical position. See Sage, "Amor de Cosmos," British Columbia Historical Quarterly, 8, 1944. Trutch's role in the ministry is discussed by John T. Saywell, in "Sir Joseph Trutch: British Columbia's First Lieutenant-Governor," British Columbia Historical Quarterly, 19 (1955).

of the new ministers had opposed responsible government, and none had significant legislative experience, traits that Robson considered inimical to good government. The subtlety of his competitor's editorials was lost on De Cosmos, whose theories on political appointment were markedly less disingenuous. Government positions, he argued from a position of considerable self-interest, should be dispensed among those who had "spent their time and money to make Confederation a success."[30] Victorians paid scant attention to the call for party lines, particulary when the most vocal proponent of their institution dropped his campaign the following year when named to replace McCreight as Premier.[31]

The short-lived De Cosmos ministry subsequently became the Walkem ministry when the former decamped for Ottawa to sit as one of the two Victoria MPs. His successor, G.A. Walkem was left in charge of the province at the onset of a national depression that caused a series of almost annual deficits, and smaller than anticipated immigration levels. What optimism remained hinged entirely on completion of the CPR, an increasingly distant prospect in the wake of the Pacific Scandal and subsequent installation of Alexander Mackenzie as Prime Minister. Unfortunately for the federal government and railway-obsessed British Columbians, the national economy was entering a series of economic downturns, "the first of which coincided roughly with the Mackenzie tenure of office,"[32] which, combined with Liberal *laissez-faire* economic philosophy ensured that Mackenzie would embark on a program of strict retrenchment. No project was more expendable, or expensive, than the transcontinental railway. In its place Mackenzie proposed a piecemeal plan of water

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[30] Standard, July 13, 1871.

[31] Saywell, 81. The succession of De Cosmos following McCreight's resignation, according to Saywell, marked the final achievement of responsible government. This echoes Sage's earlier assessment in "From Colony to Province, the Introduction of Responsible Government in British Columbia," British Columbia Historical Quarterly, 3 (1939), 1-14.

[32] Canada. Dept. of Finance. Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion Provincial Relations, Book I (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1940), 60.

and rail transport systems that would be built gradually as the economy allowed, was proposed, but the plan had few supporters, if any, in British Columbia. None of the six provincial MPs dared speak out in favour of railway construction delays, and Lieutenant-Governor Trutch's continuing loyalty to Macdonald made him an unlikely ally. Robson had been something of a Mackenzie confidante for a number of years, and was one potential source of support, but his decision to leave provincial politics and journalism to accept a patronage post as CPR paymaster had diminished his possible effectiveness as a diseminator of Liberal policy.[33]

British Columbians were unmoved by the federal government's justifications of economic caution, and local political discourse was dominated by an all but universal 'Fight Ottawa' mentality that informed provincial dealings with the capital. Howay attributed the province's hard line to the 'Island influence,' "the same small local interest which for years retarded the growth of the country and prevented its unification,"[34] but as Ormsby argues, the geographic distinction was not so easily made. Regional animosity existed, but Victoria's dominance of the province was still unchallenged, and Walkem was in fact able to use anti-Ottawa sentiment to reduce regional factionalism. There was also a considerable degree of affinity between the economic interests of the capital and the Cariboo that was reinforced by their common interest in the selection of the Bute Inlet route for the railway."[35] Provincial aggrievement was intensified by the return to the federal cabinet of Edward Blake, the embodiment of Protestant Ontario's vision of Canada in which "the Ontario heartland

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[33] For this phase of Robson's career see Antak, 115. The Colonist made some attempt to counter growing dissastisfaction with the Liberal party, mostly by criticizing the Conservatives. See the October 10, 1874 issue for one example.

[34] F.W. Howay, British Columbia From the Earliest Times V. II (Vancouver: S.J. Clarke, 1914), 355.

[35] Ormsby, 264; In "Victoria, Vancouver and the Evolution of British Columbia's Economy," MacDonald notes the connections between Victoria businessmen and the Interior that existed.

always came first."[36] This attitude, and the more pragmatic consideration that his wing of the Liberal party controlled government railway policy, ensured suspension of the transcontinental which not only earned Mackenzie the lasting enmity of British Columbians, but also demonstrated that no matter how isolated the province believed itself to be, its future was inextricably bound up in the machinations of federal politics and the national economy.

The Premier had other administrative responsibilities, most notably contending with financial problems that were largely the result of the province's limited sources of income. Confederation had given Ottawa most important fiscal responsibilities, including jurisdiction over tariffs, railways, and banking, and until the transcontinental railway was completed, or so many believed, British Columbia would be in thrall to the federal administration.[37] This assumption had considerable merit; of the1875 provincial revenue of $321,240, nearly two-thirds came from federal grants and subventions, which suggests the limitations of Victoria's 'Fight Ottawa' rhetoric. Compounding a ten per cent decrease in revenue from 1874 was increased expenditure from $583,355 to $647,310, most of which was interest payments on loans taken to service the public debt, and 'General' public works projects undertaken to alleviate unemployment.[38]

Walkem's defeat by a slim margin in the House in 1876 had no impact on provincial budgetary problems. The new Premier, A.C. Elliott, is variously described as part of the 'Fight Ottawa' movement, or as part of the 'Smithe dynasty', due largely to the presence of future premiers William Smithe and A.E.B. Davie in his cabinet. In

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[36] Mary Vipond, "Two Ontario Liberals," Acadiensis 6, 1(Autumn, 1976), 140-141.

[37] British Columbia. British Columbia in the Canadian Confederation: A Submission Presented to the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations by the Government of British Columbia (Victoria: King's Printer, 1938), 243.

[38] Ibid, 250.

contemporary Victoria, however, Elliott was considered weak, particularly on the CPR question. When Mackenzie announced within a few months that future railway construction would follow the Fraser River route, and that Esquimalt would not be the terminus, infuriated Islanders turned on the Premier. One of the few exceptions was the *Colonist*, which, driven by its opposition to Walkem, attempted to deflect the responsibility from Victoria to Ottawa.[39]

Victorians were incensed by these decisions, but to portray parliamentary factions as simply Island versus Mainland ignores Elliott's base of support which was comprised of seven and six members from the two regions respectively. In the absence of party discipline, factional loyalty - generally determined by voting patterns listed in provincial *Journals* - often depended on strictly personal ties, or on promises of patronage in exchange for support.[40] Among Island members who had voted with Walkem's opposition forces was A.E.B. Davie, who bolted for the government benches in1877 when offered a cabinet position in Elliott's administration. His new-found allegiance was frustrated, however, when he was defeated in the ensuing by-election by Walkem's hand-picked candidate, who benefitted considerably from his sponsor's ability to marshall support in the riding.[41] Another MLA who defected to the government benches was J.W. Douglas, son of James Douglas, who switched sides to avoid a potentially awkward situation when his engagement to the Premier's daughter was announced.[42]

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[39] Ormsby, 277-8.

[40] Division lists can be suspect when attempting to identify factions in the House. A general sense of how individual MLAs voted can be gained, but the numerous readings, that were not voted upon, and unrecorded votes make this an inexact science. Divisions in Committee went unrecorded, as did other divisions unless demanded by at least three members. See British Columbia. Rules, Orders, and Forms of Proceeding of the Legislative Assembly (Victoria: King's Printer, 1910), 37.

[41] Electoral History of British Columbia, 26; 533. Members appointed to cabinet posts were required to resign their seats and contest a by-election until 1929.

[42] S.W. Jackman, Portraits of the Premiers (Sidney, B.C. Gray's Publishing, 1969), 48.

As the Davie-Walkem confrontation suggests, an unstructured partisanship based on personal affiliation and patronage dominated provincial politics. Localized political fiefdoms did not readily lend themselves to the creation of disciplined, co-operative groupings in the House they were, nonetheless, reflective of provincial society. Before geographically isolated communities were connected by widespread communication networks there was little sense, other than the railway, of a provincial political agenda in many districts. Apart from Victoria and its sphere of influence, the characteristics of provincial society "were rooted in geographic isolation and locally bounded patterns of interaction and influence."[43] This pattern was reproduced in the provincial legislature as members continued to cross the floor, or unexpectedly vote against their erstwhile allies in response to some regional or personal agenda.

In this climate of political instability, Elliott made some real attempts, at considerable risk, to increase provincial revenues. Borrowing from various private sources continued to be a staple practice - the government added a $350,000 loan to the provincial deficit in 1876 - but a series of direct taxation measures marked a departure from previous revenue raising philosophy. Until 1876 British Columbia's only tax-based income was derived from a levy on wild land; Elliott added a personal income tax, the first in Canada, a personal property tax, and a school tax that combined to add $33,996 to provincial coffers in that year, and $59,511 in the next. Added income derived from this experiment in fiscal management was insufficient to stem the growth of the deficit which stood at $772,302 in 1877.[44]

However ineffective the provincial state's efforts to deal with deficit problems may have been during this period, local government could act forcefully when

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[43] R. Jeremy Wilson, "The Impact of Communications Development on British Columbia Electoral Patterns, 1903-1975," Canadian Journal of Political Science, 13, 3 (September 1980), 512.

[44] British Columbia. British Columbia in the Canadian Confederation, 105, Table 124; 178, Table 95.

confronted by a situation that was perceived to be a threat to the province's capitalist

elite. The clearest example of this occurred during the 1877 miner's strike against

Dunsmuir, Diggle and Company at Wellington. Howay's description of the strike as

"some dispute about weights and measures" touches on only one cause of the walkout,

and suggests the common attitude of contemporary bourgeois observers.[45] Charges by

miners that faulty company coal scales were undervaluing their output was only one of

a list of grievances that included low wages, poor living arrangements, and dangerous

working conditions in the mines.[46] The company countered that rates of pay were

pegged to slumping market prices for coal, addressing one complaint, but miners

complained that when the slump ended no recalculation was forthcoming. As the two

sides became increasingly polarized, the miners formed a Mutual Protection Society

intended to raise money for striking workers and pay for transportation of potential

strikebreakers off the Island.[47] In response to this basic level of organization,

Dunsmuir refused to countenance any suggestion of arbitration, instead serving

eviction notices on strikers living in company houses; the situation further escalated

with the miner's refusal to vacate. Defiance was met by the combined forces of the

Company, a Royal Navy ship (Lieutenant William Diggle combined his naval

connections with his entrepreneurial endeavors), the militia, and the provincial

government which underwrote the $18,000 cost of the military expedition against the

strikers.[48] Responding to questions in the House, Elliott stated that the provincial

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[45] Howay, <u>British Columbia From the Earliest Times</u>, 388.

[46] Report of the Minister of Mines, British Columbia. <u>Sessional Papers</u>, 3d Parl., 2nd Sess., 1877, 408-409. Dunsmuir reported that Wellington Collery white miners earned between $3 to $4 per day, at the Vancouver Coal Company's Nanaimo wages of $2.75 to $5 per day were reported. There was no breakdown provided as to number of workers at various wage levels.

[47] Paul Phillips, <u>No Power Greater: A Century of Labour in British Columbia</u> (Vancouver: BC Fedederation of Labour/Boag Foundation, 1967), 6-7.

[48] This figure comes from Phillips, 7. Elliott claimed the amount involved had "merely been the cost of the coal" or $63.80. British Columbia. <u>Journals of the Legislative Assembly</u>, 2nd Parl., 2nd Sess., March 15, 1877, 24.

outlay had been minimal, and that the government had "considered it prudent to send the *Rocket* to Nanaimo, at the request and on the representation of Messrs. *Dunsmuir and Diggle*, who apprehended a breach of the peace by the miners on strike."[49]   Howay noted the militia's involvement approvingly, claiming that the "demonstration of power had the desired effect and the first strike in British Columbia died away."[50]

In the aftermath of the confrontation it was clear that the miners had suffered a serious setback, and that Dunsmuir's antipathy to employee organization was unwavering. It was equally apparent that for capitalists of Dunsmuir's stature at least, the provincial state would intervene at their behest. Bowen's contention, that the "'armed force'" involved at Wellington "was purely symbolic", a conclusion based on the vintage and limited military potential of the *Rocket*, fails to recognize that coercion is most often symbolic.[51]

The strike had little bearing on Elliott's removal from office. Rather, it was his taxation policies and perceived inability to handle the CPR situation effectively that ended his political career. The unpopularity of increased taxation, and the heavy political toll exacted, was summarized by the *Colonist* in the wake of the government's rout in the 1878 general election: "any government imposing direct taxation on a young country has for the nonce much to contend against. Direct taxation always militates for the time being against the minister who finds it to be his imperative duty to introduce the system."[52]   Combined with the ongoing CPR imbroglio, and the government's inability to pass an electoral redistribution bill - that included reduction of representation in the "rotten borough" of Kootenay from two to one MLAs for its twenty-

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[49] Ibid.

[50] Howay, British Columbia From the Earliest Times, 388.

[51] Lynn Bowen, Three Dollar Dreams (Lantzville, British Columbia: Oolichan Books,1987),159.

[52] Colonist, May 26, 1878.

nine eligible voters - were more than enough to drive Elliott from office.[53]

Upon his subsequent return to office, Walkem found his second term no less tempetuous than his first. John A. Macdonald's return to office assured resumption of the CPR, but his decision to stay with the Fraser River route, and the commencement of construction at Yale caused considerable consternation on the Island. Walkem was blamed by many. Railway troubles were compounded by charges of mismanagement and cost overruns on public works, but the Premier was rescued from his increasingly awkward situation by an appointment to the Supreme Court that salvaged his public career, but left the provincial House in disarray. Without a single lawyer in the House to fill the Attorney-General's portfolio, Robert Beaven, the newest Premier, was forced to look to private practices for a replacement. Spurned by established practicing lawyers such as Montague William Thyrwitt-Drake of Victoria, and W.N. Bole of New Westminster, Beaven turned to his cousin, John Roland Hett whose political career proved to be short and ignominious. His only electoral victory, in the 1882 general election, was controverted by the Supreme Court, and his Esquimalt seat awarded to C.E. Pooley, an opposition candidate.[54] Beaven was also left with the unenviable task of leading an administration elected on a 'Fight Ottawa' platform in a society that had steadily become less confrontational after the ressurection of John A. Macdonald in 1878. Not surprisingly, only four government candidates were returned in the ensuing election, but in the absense of party discipline Beaven was afforded the opportunity to form a new ministry, an endeavor that proved to be singularly unsuccessful. Beaven's untenable position finally forced his resignation in 1882, which marked the beginning of a period of relative political calm in the province.

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[53] This was the Colonist's description of the Kootenay riding, a Walkem stronghold. By comparison Nanaimo's 535 eligible voters in the 1878 general election returned one member to the House. Electoral History of British Columbia, 464.

[54] Electoral History of British Columbia, 37; 528.

British Columbia's apparent distinctiveness in the years immediately following its entry into Confederation was more the product of its relatively retarded development than of any inherent attributes. Its political culture may have been less subtle than that of other provinces, particularly in the composition and operation of the Legislature, but this was an accurate reflection of a society that was comparatively underpopulated, and economically undeveloped. Constitutional change had resulted in only moderate alteration to colonial society, but as the CPR debate and federal financial stipends indicated, the province was, like other provinces, all but inextricably linked to the federal union. Until the late 1880s, administration of the provincial state remained a relatively simple task in the absence of any substantive divisions within capital for control of government.

CHAPTER 3

PARTY POSTPONED

It is notorious that every opportunity for
satisfactory investment, every enterprise
which promises profitable results is seized
by a little clique around the Government...

-*News-Advertiser*, June 6, 1894

The early years of the Smithe to Turner era, 1882-1898, were the most stable in

nineteenth century provincial political culture. Despite the continued absence of

recognizable political parties, other elements of Canadian political culture were readily

apparent, particularly dependence on patronage appointments, and acquisition and

control of provincial newspapers. These devices would remain an integral part of local

political management, but traditional post-Confederation political culture,

particularly the small, Victoria-based governing elite would prove to be unable to

contend with the enormous economic and social changes that followed the CPR to the

province. Traditional administrative technique and political practice came under

increasing criticism from a variety of interest groups, and within a decade the old

system of political management was about to be replaced by a more subtle polity

reflective of eastern provinces.

The stability of the 'Smithe dynasty' years is easily overlooked if too much

emphasis is placed on the number of 'different' administrations that ran the province

during this fifteen year period. Frequent changes in the Premier's office were not

politically driven, but the result of an unusually high mortality rate among government leaders: three of five premiers died in office. Yet the perpetuation of the 'dynasty' was ensured by the continuity of cabinet ministers and government MLAs during this time. The small coterie of MLAs, and even smaller group of cabinet members, that administered the province between 1882 and 1898 shared numerous social and business connections that reinforced their common perspective on how British Columbia's affairs could most efficiently be managed.[1] The eventual erosion of the 'dynasty' was the product of external pressures, almost all of which arrived in the wake of the CPR's arrival in 1886, particularly the emergence of Vancouver as the centre of provincial commerce.

A reasonably stable succession of cabinets did not translate into anything resembling progressive management of the state. Throughout this period class relations were strained, and the provincial deficit continued to escalate. In the fifteen years Smithe and his 'lineal descendents' held office the deficit mushroomed from $891,724 to $6,102,955, largely the result of continually limited sources of income.[2] Most revenues, outside of federal grants, were derived from provincial resource extraction, but low prices and tax rates, combined with the ongoing depression and reticence of investment communities kept potential income at a low levels. Resource-based taxation, licence fees, and sale of land and timber were the major sources of provincially derived income, but federal subsidies remained the largest single revenue until 1887-88.[3] The best-known government economic enterprise of this era was wholesale chartering of railway schemes, particularly after 1886. Numerous charters were granted in hope of stimulating resource exploitation, immigration and settlement,

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[1] See Appendices 3-4. These charts are by no means exhaustive, but are meant to suggest the connections between the Vancouver Island business and political communities.

[2] British Columbia. British Columbia in the Canadian Confederation, 178, Table 96.

[3] Ibid, 243, Table 124.

and turning profits for various railway consortiums which often included provincial

cabinet ministers, leading businessmen, and MPs. From 1883 until the end of the

Turner administration in 1898, provincial governments chartered eighty-four railway

schemes, and another twenty-five received Dominion subsidization. Rather than

vehicles of settlement and transportation, however, provincial railway endeavors

proved in most cases to be little more than speculative ventures that benefitted

directors of various companies, and tied up reserves in charter agreements that

thwarted settlement of arable lands. Of the two hundred and ten companies chartered

to 1913 only thirty-four constructed some portion of proposed lines, and only five

earned their land grants. Alienated land was also tax exempt in most cases, depriving

the provincial treasury of considerable potential revenue.[4]

Involvement of government officials in many of the most ambitious proposals

was commonplace. An early example was the Shuswap and Okanagan which in 1887

received not only federal land grants, but a $200,000 provincial bonus to open up the

Interior. Among its directors were MLAs J.H. Turner, D.M. Eberts, R.P. Rithet, Forbes

Vernon, MP J.A. Mara, and Senator James Reid.[5] Another was the Canadian Western

Central Railway charter - granted in April 1889 when Robson had effectively replaced

the ailing A.E.B. Davie as Premier - which included 14,000,000 acres of land, presaging

what Gosnell described as "a perfect orgy of bonusing railroads" that saw sixty-four

companies gain provincial charters by 1898.[6] Indicative of changing entrepreneurial,

investment, and demographic patterns in the latter part of the century was the number

of railway companies controlled by mainland interests. The Vancouver, Northern and

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[4] Robert Cail, Land, Man, and the Law (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1974), 153-167.

[5] British Columbia, Statutes 1889, 62 Vict, c. 82. Lists of some shareholders and directors of railway schemes are included in various years of incorporation in British Columbia.

[6] Gosnell, Making of a Province, 223. The Canadian Western Board of Directors included R.P. Rithet, MP Thomas Earle, F.S. Barnard, E.G. Prior and James Reid. See Cail, 156.

Yukon Railway was a product of the collaborative entrepreneurial efforts of Vancouver

businessmen Isaac Oppenheimer, John Hendry and Adolphus Williams, and C.O.

Wickenden, the architect who designed Vancouver's Christ Church Cathederal.[7]

Interestingly, the five railway proposals that received full land grants were the Nelson

and Fort Shepherd, BC Southern, Great Western, Kaslo and Slocan, and the Columbia

and Kootenay. The last enterprise involved more prominent legislative members,

including James Baker who was also Chairman of the Select Committee on Railways,

Edgar Dewdney, and R.G. Tatlow the provincial legislative secretary.[8]

A largely uncritical appraisal of provincial railway policy written in the mid-

twentieth century suggested that "the boom conditions which result from vigorous

railway construction financed by capital outside the province have often been the aim

of those able to influence political decisions," and with the exception of the later Pacific

Great Eastern undertaking maintained that "no heavy burden has fallen on British

Columbia taxpayers as such."[9] Lost taxation revenues and impediments to settlement

would seem to undermine this evaluation, as does the fact that the greatest beneficiary

of frenzied railway speculation in British Columbia was the Canadian Pacific which

acquired over 5,000,000 acres of land in the province by buying out or leasing

provincially chartered companies, including all the major lines constructed in the

Kootenays.[10]

Of the men who oversaw railway grants, and other administrative demands of

the provincial state in this era, one of the outstanding personalities was John Robson,

whose varied careers in nineteenth century British Columbia are the subject of

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[7] British Columbia, Statutes 1889, 62 Vict, c. 89.

[8] Ibid, c. 21.

[9] F.W. Howay, W.N. Sage, H.D. Angus, British Columbia and the United States (Toronto: Ryerson, 1942), 263.

[10] Cail, 167.

considerable historical investigation. This is largely due to his longevity as a principal

performer in the provincial political drama; as journalist, pre-confederation reformer,

politician, and as inventor of an imaginative settlement scheme to bring Scottish

crofters to the West Coast to populate fishing villages.[11] His significance to this study

lies in his constant presence in cabinet during the decade starting in 1882, as Finance

and Agriculture Minister, and as Premier for the last three years, a period that

encompassed both the stability of the Smithe era's early years, and the later challenges

to the political hierarchy.[12] Robson has been touted as a reformer, largely on the

strength of the 1884 Land Act which was meant to put an end to outright sale of

provincial timber land, and his temperance advocacy. He was also a model politician

of post-Confederation British Columbia, embracing patronage politics, and exhibiting

little ethical uncertainty when mixing business and public service. His reward for

service as correspondent and provincial agent for Alexander Mackenzie and pro-

Liberal editorials in the *Colonist*, was a federal patronage post in 1875 at a time when

his provincial political career had stagnated. As Paymaster Purveyor for the

Engineering Parties of the Canada Pacific Survey, Robson was responsible for the "the

subsistance and paying of all labour organizations which the Department may form in

connection with that work within that division."[13] The position proved to be as short-

lived. The Liberal government's defeat in 1878 meant that Conservative loyalists

[11] See Antak, Ormsby, and Eleanor Mercer, "Political Groups in British Columbia 1883-98." Unpub. M.A. Thesis, University of British Columbia, 1937; W.N. Sage, "Federal Parties and Provincial Groups in British Columbia" British Columbia Historical Quarterly, 22, 2 (1948), for examples. The immigration proposal is examined in Jill Wade, "The Gigantic Scheme: BC Studies, 53 (Spring, 1982), 28-44.

[12] Premier from 1889 to 1892, Robson is generally acknowledged to have run the provincial cabinet during A.E.B. Davie's long incapacitation. The Mainland Guardian argued that Robson was also the real leader during Smithe's premiership; see Antak, 156.

[13] F. Braun to Robson, April 16, 1875. John Robson Papers, British Columbia Archives and Records Service Add Mss 525, Vol. 2, File 10.

replaced Liberal patronage appointees, including Robson, who complained of "being fired without a moment's notice."[14]

With little prospect of work from the new government, Robson returned to provincial journalism - purchasing the *Dominion Pacific Herald* in 1880 - and to provincial politics in 1882.[15] While serving in Smithe's cabinet, his financial status was considerably enhanced when the CPR decided on Coal Harbour as its western terminus instead of Port Moody, at least partly in response to the provincial administration's inducement of 6,000 acres of land. The value of Burrard Inlet land soared, and among those land speculators who prospered were MP Edgar C. Baker - an associate of H.J. Cambie the CPR's chief engineer in the province - Vancouver Mayor and prominent business figure David Oppenheimer, and Provincial Finance Minister John Robson.[16] Robson's political fortunes matched his financial gains when William Smithe became the first of the eponymous dynasty's premiers to expire in 1887. His cabinet and government policies, however, remained largely intact. In turn, Smithe's successor A.E.B. Davie fell ill shortly after taking office, and missed the entire legislative session the following year, making Robson Premier in practice. His consolidation of power was so complete that by 1888 he was making cabinet appointments without consulting his erstwhile leader, who was recuperating in Colorado: "How is it," the elected Premier wrote to Robson, "that my brother Theodore has been taken into the ministry. What is the history of it. Was he invited or did he request to come in. How is it that in so seriously important a matter I was not consulted,

[14] Robson to Braun, February 18, 1879. Robson Papers, Vol. 2, File 10.

[15] Antak, 124-27. Robson changed the name of his new enterprise to the <u>Daily British Columbian</u> in 1882.

[16] For discussion of the CPR decision and its consequences see G.W.S. Brooks, "Edgar Crow Baker: An Entrepreneur in Early British Columbia," <u>BC Studies</u> 31 (Autumn 1976), 23-42; Norbert MacDonald, "The Canadian Pacific Railway and Vancouver's Development to 1900," in Ward and McDonald, eds. <u>British Columbia: Historical Readings</u>.

not even a telegram to tell me that such a step was thought of or even asking my opinion."[17]

Absent Premiers, a lack of party discipline, and of any obvious political debate led many from outside the province to conclude that "Politics are unknown, that is to say Eastern party politics."[18] When made in 1892 this assessment was accurate enough, but simplified the situation by emphasizing the structural over the functional, thus overlooking a number of important similarities between British Columbia and the rest of the country. As with the eastern Canadian experience, provincial politicians relied heavily on dispersal of patronage and control of local newspapers to cement allegiances, win over opponents, and maintain electoral support. Requests for patronage came from diverse sources, including the Roman Catholic Bishop of New Westminster: "Our Catholics are complaining," he wrote to the Premier's office, "and with just cause that too few Catholics are employed in your Government. They expect in return for their support given to you that you will appoint some of their party to offices now vacant."[19]

Without party lines, patronage was an extremely important method of maintaining discipline in the House. Some legislative 'loose fish' such as J. P. Booth purported to switch affiliation without inducement, and for pragmatic reasons: "I saw that Beaven was a failure" he explained to Robson, "and the government after him was worse. I have just been waiting for someone to come to the front and show some capacity for leader."[20] Booth became a solid government man, and despite the selfless tone of his earlier correspondence, accepted an appointment as provincial Speaker in 1898.

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[17] A.E.B. Davie to Robson, January 21, 1888. Robson Papers, Vol. 2, File 3.

[18] Charles Mair, cited in Barman, 102-3.

[19] Paul Durien to Robson, June 25, 1890. Robson Papers, Vol. 1, File 1.

[20] Booth to Robson, May 30, 1890. Robson Papers, Vol. 1, File 1

Others were less circumspect. W.J. Armstrong, formerly a Beaven stalwart in the Legislature, resigned from his New Westminister City seat when appointed Sheriff of that district in 1884 by Smithe. With the incumbent eliminated, James Curry, the government candidate, won the ensuing by-election, increasing the government's mainland presence in the House. Curry, however, was subsequently accused by Beaven of profiting from government contracts while sitting as a member, and defeated in the 1886 general election. Determined to increase the government's mainland representation, Robson pursued a similar course as that established by Smithe and looked to move W. N. Bole out of the House by having him named to the Supreme Court. Macdonald's conciliatory response to the acting Premier's inquiries regarding jobs for Bole and the ailing Davie - "I have spoken to the Minister of Justice and have no doubt that he will carry out the suggestions."[21] - suggests both the cooperation that existed between the two levels of government, and the political rehabilitation of Robson, the one time Mackenzie supporter. As had been the case in the previous New Westminster City by-election the government candidate, Thomas Cunningham on this occasion, was returned by the local electorate.[22]

Simeon Duck's political career offers another example of the manipulation of political patronage. Given the Finance portfolio in March 1885, Duck endured a close by-election campaign in Victoria, eventually prevailing by seven votes over Robert Williams, a Victoria printer who soon found he had lost government contracts as well as a close decision. Duck's tenuous hold on the seat was lost when he was defeated by *Times* publisher and Victoria Mayor John Grant who had argued, ironically, during the campaign that his opponent would be unable to meet his dual commitments as Victoria city Treasurer and cabinet minister. Duck's defeat, however, did not mean he had flown

[21] Macdonald to Robson, June 4, 1888. Robson Papers, V. 1, File 7.

[22] Electoral History of British Columbia Press, 27-41; 46-52.

the political scene permanently. In 1888 he succeeded E.G. Prior in Victoria, again

defeating the hapless Williams in a by-election that had been far from predictable.

A.E.B. Davie's response to the outcome suggested that the government had some real

fears that Williams' persistence might finally be rewarded: "I received today Theodore's

telegram of Duck's success. It is the most signal victory the Government has ever had

and the most overwhelming defeat the opposition ever sustained and that too in the

very place I thought was a stronghold of the enemy."[23]

John Grant's overlapping journalistic and political careers were not uncommon

in late nineteenth century British Columbia. Paul Rutherford's claim, that the

"newspaperman-cum-politician" was much less common in post-Confederation

Canada is applicable to British Columbia to some extent, but the ranks of those who

persevered in their dual role were augmented by a significant number of provincial

politicians who bought journals to further their political aspirations.[24] Rutherford's

brief assessment of the provincial press, "where party politics were not introduced until

the late 1890's, newspapers could shift, apparently at leisure, from one group to

another"[25] is misleading, as federal party allegiance and patronage militated against

the situation he describes. The Victoria *Colonist*, published by MLA D.W. Higgins, a

Smithe line stalwart, was distinctly pro-Tory, while few papers were "more willfully

Liberal than the *Times*."[26] And few publishers received more patronage from Wilfrid

Laurier after1896 than William Templemann.

Absence of Dominion party labels notwithstanding, local journals were tightly

aligned with various political cliques, and many papers were published, edited or

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[23] A.E.B. Davie to Robson, January 28, 1888. Robson Papers, Vol. 2, File 3.

[24] Paul Rutherford, A Victorian Authority: The Daily Press in Late Nineteenth Century Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982), 212.

[25] Rutherford, 216-217.

[26] Douglas Fetherling, The Rise of the Canadian Newspaper (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1990), 101.

owned by provincial MLAs, in rural as well as urban centres. The *Ashcroft Journal*, established in 1895, was controlled by a syndicate that included Charles Semlin; the *Inland Sentinel* of Kamloops was purchased by Theodore Davie in 1893, Liberal Hewitt Bostock in 1898, and two years later by MLA F.J. Deane who also controlled the *Nelson Daily News* with Nelson MLA John Houston; Vernon Conservative Association President J.A. McKelvie joined with Okanagan rancher and MLA Price Ellison to buy the *Vernon News* in 1893; and future MLA R.F. Green held shares in the *Slocan Star*.[27] Political alignment of urban papers is well-documented. D.W. Higgins, for instance, defeated *Times* founder, and Esquimalt incumbent Hans Helgesen in 1886, and remained a supporter of the Smithe line - serving as provincial Speaker - until his break with John Turner in 1898. The *Colonist's* support for the government was strengthened when it was purchased by James Dunsmuir, earlier than the 1902 date often cited.[28] R.E. Gosnell intimated to Vancouver Tory organizer George Cowan that Dunsmuir was still looking for an editor for the paper in September 1898, after attempts by Conservative stalwart Charles Hibbert Tupper to convince Maritime journalist and party loyalist Snowdon Scott to take the job had failed. Scott had turned down the offer despite Tupper's assurances of the *Colonist's* sound financial foundation: "We are going to organize in good shape. Dunsmuirs own the paper. Keep this confidential."[29] Gosnell, the Premier's personal secretary, eventually took the *Colonist* position himself, following Dunsmuir's resignation as Premier in 1902.

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[27] Henry Boam, British Columbia: Its History, People, Commerce, Industry and Resources (London: Sells, 1912); Canadian Parliamentary Guide, 1871-1905.

[28] D.A. McGregor, "Adventures of Vancouver Newspapers," British Columbia Historical Quarterly, 10 (April, 1956);   Paul Rutherford, The Making of the Canadian Media (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1978),70.

[29] R.E. Gosnell to George Cowan, September 2, 1898. Cowan Papers City of Vancouver Archives Add Mss 800. Vol. 1, File 6. Charles Tupper to Scott, May 5, 1898. Snowdon Scott Collection, Special Collections Division, University of British Columbia. Vol. 2, File 5.

Indicative of the inexorable changes of late century, mainland newspapers were carving out an increasingly influential place in provincial political discourse. Among the most important was Francis Carter Cotton's *Vancouver News-Advertiser* which supported the federal Tories, and was famous for its attacks on the provincial administration. Carter Cotton also used his paper to attack the municipal administration, prompting the targets of his editorials to create an ultimately unsuccessful amalgation of provincial and civic forces that launched the *Daily Telegram* in 1890 to counter the *News-Advertiser's* influence. David Oppenheimer was instrumental in the project, enlisting the financial support of Vancouver business leaders J.W. Horne and D.C. Rand, and hiring *News-Advertiser* foreman W.J. Gallagher to manage the operation.[30] Financial backing and expertise were not enough to make the *Telegram* a succesful venture, and it limped through a series of financial crises. Its perceived importance as a political counterbalance to the effectiveness of the *News-Advertiser* resulted in numerous futile, and expensive attempts to salvage it. In 1892 Premier Robson headed an attempt to resucitate the flagging journal, convincing Yale MLA F.G. Vernon to contribute $5,000 to the cause, and making overtures to Oppenheimer to increase his stake: "You have lots of money, enormous local interests, and an ardent desire to brush Cotton out of your path," the Premier wrote to the Mayor of Vancouver, "Go another $5,000 like a good fellow. That will give you and myself a controlling interest and there is no telling how important it may be to have the press of Vancouver operated on right lines."[31] Robson's efforts notwithstanding, Carter Cotton's arrangement with the CPR gave him a monopoly hold on the company's telegraph news service and proved to be an insurmountable obstacle to making the *Telegram* a viable competitor. Unable to convince J.W. Van Horne to break the CPR contract, "that

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[30] Robert A.J. McDonald, "Business Leaders in Early Vancouver, 1886-1914," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of British Columbia, 1977.

[31] Robson to David Oppenheimer, January 2, 1892. Robson Papers, Vol. 2, Letterbook. Private.

abominable sheet, the 'News-Advertiser'" continued to be a successful and influential concern.[32]

Mainland agitation for political reform foreshadowed the waning of Victoria's dominance of provincial business, financial, and manufacturing sectors. Provincial politics mirrored this evolution, but the Island *elite* showed little inclination to relinquish their accustomed levels of influence. Despite their obstinance, demands of mainland political agendas - from Vancouver-based business interests, labour, and an emerging Liberal presence - combined to effect fundamental changes in provincial political culture in the last decade of the century. Before these challenges arose, the provincial state had presided over an electorate concentrated in or near the provincial capital, and had met with minimal substantive criticism. By the 1890s, the essentially unsophisticated operation of the sub-central state was challenged by a series of events that combined to undermine traditional political culture, and in its place install a more subtle system of state functions that initiated greater stability, and provided definite parameters for legitimate political and social protest.

The population explosion that precipitated this situation is well documented, but comparatively little exists on the types of occupational groups that arrived after 1886. A recent effort in this direction analyzes elite migration - generally leading businessmen, financiers, and professionals - to the province, and shows that by 1911 the ranks of the professional classes in British Columbia had, as part of the general increase in population, grown substantially.[33] Many of these people had come from other provinces and Great Britain to work in the banks and other financial institutions that proliferated in Vancouver after 1886, and they were joined by 'true' professionals, particularly in the fields of medicine, engineering, and law. By 1911, 45

[32] Robson to Van Horne, March 29, 1892. Robson Papers, Vol. 2, Letterbook. Private.

[33] Robin Anderson, "1911 British Columbia Elite Analysis Report." Unpublished Report, Simon Fraser University, 1989.

per cent of those arriving from Canada, and 38 per cent from Britain had higher

education and worked as professionals, and important to this study, 82 per cent of

migrating lawyers hailed from other Canadian provinces.[34] As studies of immigrant

workers have argued, newcomers to the province brought cultural and political baggage,

and the same, presumably, can be said for newly arrived members of the professional

classes. In the latter case, these included traditions of a more stable, and less openly

confrontational political system that was made ostensibly more accountable to the

general population by the democratic institutions of the franchise and the party

system.[35]

Mainland dissatisfaction with traditional political assumptions had increased

to the point that pressure for electoral redistribution was the predominant issue

leading up to the 1890 general election. Robson's attempt at appeasement was the

enactment of minor electoral revisions, arguing that the anticipated results of the

Census of 1891 would provide a more accurate basis for redistribution. The initiative

did nothing to mollify mainland critics, and British Columbia remained "the most

skillfully gerrymandered jurisdiction in Canada."[36] Theodore Davie, Robson's

successor and penultimate Premier of the Smithe line, made similar attempts to delay

recognition of the changing political landscape. Belieing his predecessor's belief that if

removed from office before passing redistribution legislation, "his colleagues might be

depended on," Davie held off meaningful redistribution, while ensuring that Victoria

would retain some of its prestige and power by legislating its status as provincial

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[34] Ibid.

[35] A. Ross McCormack, Reformers, Rebels, amd Revolutionaries: The Western Canadian Radical Movement 1899-1919 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977); David Jay Bercuson, "Labour Radicalism and the Industrial Frontier: 1897-1919." Canadian Historical Review 58, (June 1977).

[36] Allen Seager, "Socialists and Workers: The Western Canadian Coal Miners, 1900-21," Labour/Le Travail, 16 (Fall 1985), 36.

capital and committing the government to construction of new parliament buildings in the city.[37]

Despite these controversies, a contemporary observer described Davie's only election campaign at the head of government as unremarkable, with "no principle at stake-no great issue involved."[38] R.E. Gosnell, local journalist and the Premier's personal secretary, took a markedly different perspective on the election, arguing that the appearance of special interest groups on the political horizon was more significant than the parliament building debate or calls to redraw the political map of the province. His condemnation of "those minor political combinations for specific objects" which "for selfish purposes array themselves against governments, good and bad alike" was directed specifically against organized labour, which, in his view, had fallen into the thrall of outside influences and threatened the general peace of the preceeding era when capital and labour had "worked very harmoniously together."[39] Behind this amicable relationship was the impartial provincial state: "the various governments of British Columbia, as governments, have recognized the claims of labour in a variety of ways, and the legislation affecting its interests have been liberal and fair, and practical in its character." Gosnell could happily report that it was this precedent, and Davie's populist platform that had prevailed over those whose efforts would "antagonize the investing classes, and drive away capital," a course described as "unwise, unpatriotic and suicidal."[40]

Canadian Magazine subscribers were not told that this perspective on industrial relations was not universally shared in the province, although examples of

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[37] News-Advertiser, April 24, 1890.

[38] Howay, British Columbia From the Earliest Times, 493.

[39] Gosnell, "The Moral of the British Columbia Elections." The Canadian Magazine 3, 5 (September 1894), 474.

[40] Ibid, 477.

the provincial administration's willingness to take a direct role in labour disputes were readily available. On three occasions involvement had meant calling out the military to resolve disputes at Dunsmuir operations, including the infamous Wellington confrontation four years before publication of his analysis. Wellington had, in fact, threatened more than a local colliery of Dunsmuir operations. As the confrontation escalated, it became a challenge to the efficient operation of the provincial political hierarchy, and legitimacy of the state: "the reaction of the Robson government to the strike demonstrated a determination to preserve its hegemony, to uphold the status quo, and to deflect any challenge to its authority."[41] Wellington, and the demonstrable alliance of capital and the state reinforced a growing perception in the labour movement that direct participation in the political process had to accompany industrial action, a decision that resulted in increasing numbers of working men either running as labour candidates, or attempting to exact concessions from mainstream politicians in exchange for voting support. In 1894, Miners' and Mine-Labourers' Protective Association candidates ran in three Nanaimo area ridings, and while none were successful, two of the three came close to winning their seats. In South Nanaimo, Tully Boyce came within twenty-six votes of W.W. Walkem, brother of the former Premier and a Dunsmuir colliery doctor, while Thomas Keith was beaten by an even smaller margin in Nanaimo City by Nanaimo merchant James McGregor.[42]

In Vancouver, the emergence of the Nationalist party marked an alliance of some segments of urban labour and Francis Carter Cotton's middle class opposition to a provincial administration "which would not exist for a day did the people have the opportunity to give full and free expression to their wishes."[43] Carter Cotton had

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[41] Jeremy Mouat, "The Politics of Coal: A Study of the Wellington Miner's Strike of 1890-91," BC Studies, 1977 (Spring 1988), 29.

[42] Electoral History of British Columbia Press, 63-65. Ralph Smith, the third labour candidate lost decisively to John Bryden, Manager of the Wellington Colliery.

[43] News-Advertiser, June 24, 1894.

considerable credibility with Vancouver labour during his early political career, and his opposition to the Oppenheimers and other members of the Vancouver business elite made him popular with smaller businessman and other white collar constituents that would come to dominate civic politics in the 1890s.[44] All three Opposition candidates who ran under the Nationalist banner in Vancouver- Carter Cotton, Adolphus Williams and carpenter Robert MacPherson - were successful, suggesting the unpopularity of the government in the lower mainland, and the short-sightedness of Gosnell's class analysis. Continued viability of the labour-business coalition was uncertain despite the results, in large part because of labour's disapproval of some non-labour groups within the organization which were deemed to be "unsympathetic to its objectives."[45] Following the 1896 federal general election, the Nationalist Party disappeared from the political stage.

British Columbia's growing political instability was exacerbated by the Liberal victory in that election. The results not only legitimated the few hardy loyalists in the province, but local Liberals also gained access to federal patronage, so long the domain of the rival Conservative organization. As Stewart has shown, dispensation of patronage was as important to Laurier's execution of his political agenda as it had been to that of Macdonald's.[46] Among the more prominent beneficiaries of the change in government was William Templemann, Victoria's most renowned Liberal, and editor of the *Times*. For his past efforts, Templemann was named to the Senate (replacing T.R. McInnis who became Lieutenant-Governor) a year after the election, and was later given

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[44] Thomas Loosmore, "The British Columbia Labour Movement and Political Action, 1879-1906." MA Thesis, University of British Columbia,1954, 64. The description of Vancouver city politics is from McDonald, "Business Leaders in Early Vancouver," 294.

[45] Loosmore, 84.

[46] Stewart, see chapter 2 above.

a cabinet post, despite his singularly dismal record as a federal candidate.[47] Similarly, requests from the *Times* were more favourably received in Ottawa when contracts were divided among provincial newspapers; between 1896 and 1901 the paper received $786 worth of federal contracts, compared with the $37.25 doled out in the years 1892-96.[48]

There were also attempts by the new government to establish a presence in Vancouver, where Conservative allegiance was not as deeply entrenched as it had become in Victoria after two decades of Tory patronage. Vancouver businessmen had shown a general predisposition to the Tories, but as MacDonald has shown, Laurier made considerable efforts to improve the Liberal profile by awarding exclusive fishing licenses, for example, to party loyalists at the expense of long time opponents such as R.P. Rithet.[49] Labour's political activity was also affected by the federal situation, certainly in those constituencies where Liberals decided not to run candidates. In Vancouver-Burrard for instance, Robert Maxwell was elected with Liberal and labour support. More generally, labourism became associated with the Liberal party, a situation that would take on considerable significance in the political disputes within the movement at the turn of the century.

During this period the provincial administration was headed by John Turner, arguably the least suited of his ilk to contend with the growing unpopularity and isolation of the traditional political elite. Long-standing financial problems continued to plague the province, and the deficit reached new heights under Turner who as Minister of Finance and Premier, was held responsible for the economic malaise. Much of the local economic situation was still attributable to the national condition,

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[47] History of the Federal Election Ridings 1867-1980 V. 1 (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, n.d.). Templemann lost federal election contests in 1891, 1896, and a by-election in 1896 in Victoria. In 1906 he was given the Victoria City seat by the Liberal incumbent who resigned in his favour, but lost that seat in 1908, and again in 1911.

[48] Rutherford, 219.

[49] McDonald, "Business Leaders," 313-14.

but Turner's government did little to inspire confidence either in the investment community or the electorate. Government members - prominent among those singled out were the Premier and House Speaker C.E. Pooley - were accused of showing more interest in profiting from the Klondike gold rush than managing the provincial economy. Provincial Secretary and Minister of Mines James Baker was also censured for his close association with the CPR which enabled him to secure a branch line through Cranbrook, which he owned, at the expense of the original route.[50] CPR ties were also part of an involved transaction among both levels of government, the British Columbia Southern Railway, and the Crow's Nest Pass Coal Company in 1897 that saw the CPR assume control of the provincially chartered line, and its 20,000 acre per mile land grant. As chief promoter of the BC Southern, and President of Crow's Nest Coal, Baker's stake in the dealings was readily apparent. In exchange, the CPR gave Baker $85,000, and, more importantly, 250,000 acres of land, 50,000 of which were coal bearing.[51] Baker denied conflict of interest charges from legislative opponents, and the *British Columbia Mining Critic*, which warned: "above all things, essential that a Minister of the Crown should, in British Columbia as elsewhere, ever refuse to allow his public action to be subordinated to private interests."[52] Questionable railway policy also attracted the attention of the *Monetary Times* of Toronto, specifically a provincial grant of $1,000,000 to Mackenzie and Mann for a line from the Interior to the Coast, made without first considering other bids. Whatever the merits of the proposal itself, the business acumen of the provincial government was doubted by the *Times* editor who questioned the circumvention of normal market procedures:"To what occult

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[50] John A. Eagle, The Canadian Pacific Railway and the Development of Western Canada, 1896-1914 (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1989), 52-55.

[51] Eagle, 115-17.

[52] British Columbia Mining Critic, August 26, 1897.

influence", he mused, "is the extraordinary feat of granting a million dollars to two men without competition due?"[53]

The perception that leading members of the government were apparently more interested in personal aggrandizement than matters of state did little to aid efforts of promoters to attract investment, yet American, British and Canadian capital did flow into the province during the twenty-five period starting in 1890 at unprecedented levels.[54] Most studies concur with this assessment - not only for British Columbia but for the country in general - but emphasize the nuances in the general trend, particularly the acceleration of investment after 1900. Aitkin, for instance, states that twice as much foreign capital entered Canada in the 1900 -1913 period as had been the case from 1867 -1899.[55] The economic recovery of the 1890s was initially fuelled by American investment in the mining industry. Marshall calculates that of the $61,000,000 of American capital in Canadian mining, one half was invested in British Columbia, dominating the local market at the outset of the boom. By late decade, American capital was joined by increasing amounts of British and Canadian investment.[56] British investment was of primary importance to British Columbia, but was also especially mercurial. Having been "rather slack" in the early 1890s, British capital "in the years just before the First World War went to heights probably never reached in the most booming years of the nineteenth century."[57] As well as the depression of the 1870s

[53] Monetary Times,Trade Review and Insurance Chronicle, April 29, 1898.

[54] D.G. Paterson, "European Financial Capital and British Columbia: An Essay on the Role of the Regional Entrepreneur," BC Studies, 21 (Spring 1974), 34.

[55] Penelope Hartland, "Factors in Economic Growth in Canada." Journal of Economic History,15,1 (1955), 15. Hugh G.J. Aitkin, American Capital and Canadian Resources (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), 31.

[56] Herbert Marshall et al, Canadian-American Industry: A Study in International Investments (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1936), 89; Howay, Sage and Angus, 281.

[57] William Ashworth, An Economic History of England: 1870-1939 (London: Metheun, 1960, Reprinted 1982), 156.

and '80s, Hartland argues that some of the reticence in the later nineteenth century can be traced to a "healthy caution on the part of British investors burned in the late 1850's", a caution that no doubt informed the editor of the *London Truth* who warned potential CPR investors that however local boosters promoted British Columbia, it remained "a barren, cold, mountain country that is not worth keeping."[58] Yet, whatever misgivings investors may have harboured, levels of investment in the province, particularly in mining ventures, continued to rise in the 1890s.

The speculative frenzy that erupted after 1895 was accompanied by predictable problems. Many of the companies created collapsed within a few years when their promotional claims were found to be more rhetorical than real, and by the turn of the century, the boom had begun to dissipate due to lower than predicted returns.[59] Speculation and over-capitalization were not entirely the result of the absence of government regulation according to the *BC Mining Critic*. Newspaper owners were indicted for their uncritical response to prospectuses which, the *Critic* claimed, resulted from the practice of accepting company shares as payment for advertising space.[60] English promoters were similarly censured for their willingness to overcapitalize companies, as were underwriters who inflated originally moderate prices which meant that British investors were "consequently asked to take too large risks for the benefit of a rapacious middleman."[61] The harshest criticism was reserved for the provincial government which was negligent both as promoter and regulator of the mining industry: "selfish and short-sighted policy would almost lead one to believe that those in whose hands the fortunes of the province mainly rest have no belief in the

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[58] The January 1, 1881 editorial is contained in <u>Alberta Historical Review</u> 12, 4 (Autumn 1964), 25-26.

[59] Patterson, 61-62.

[60] <u>British Columbia Mining Critic</u>, April 29, 1897.

[61] Ibid, May 29, 1897; October 23, 1897.

future, and are too busy lining their own pockets at the expense of an ill-informed public."[62] However corrupt and incompetent the government may have appeared to the editor of the *Mining Critic*, the province was experiencing an enormous inflow of investment capital.

Fiscal mismanagement, corruption, a seeming inability to adminster provincial affairs, and the increasingly apparent social and economic changes that had arrived in the CPR's wake combined to end the rule of the Island political elite in the watershed election of 1898. Ormsby's contention, that the cynical politics of special interest practiced by Turner led to his inability to gain the Smithe dynasty's traditional support is accurate to the extent that the election results, and McInnes' subsequent foray into constitutional interpretation, forced him from office.[63] But the returns also suggest that the government had remained popular in longstanding strongholds, particularly on the Island, where Turner candidates won ten of fourteen seats, including all five in Victoria, and one of two in Esquimalt. James Baker held his seat in East-Kootenay, albeit by a significantly reduced margin, but on the whole it had been the mainland that defeated the government.[64]

Party discipline in the local legislature was five years away, but traditional provincial political culture had been irreparably altered by the pressures created by massive immigration, and closer ties to the federal political and economic union that had been delayed by the depression. Transition from the post-colonial society of the 1870s and early 1880s, was not an easily affected process, largely the result of the intransigence of those historically accustomed to wielding power. Despite their obstinance, modernization was inevitable, and a few months before the 1903 election,

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[62] Ibid, October 14, 1897.

[63] Ormsby, 318.

[64] Electoral History of British Columbia, 71-73. Including Baker, seven candidates were returned from mainland ridings.

even the *Colonist* recognized that introduction of party lines was only the articulation

of the changed reality: "in the recent political history of the province, say within the

last eight years, the question of Conservatism or Liberalism has been, in very many

cases, the determining factor."[65]

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[65] Colonist, September 14, 1902.

CHAPTER 4

STABILITY REGAINED

It seems indeed more like a nightmare,
or a chapter from the turbulent politics
of one of the mushroom states of Central
America than a fragment of the history
under the British flag.

-Vancouver *Province*, June 11, 1900

The 1898 general election marked a significant shift in political power away

from the historically influential Vancouver Island clique, but also caused considerable

uncertainty in the short term. As the *Monetary Times* noted: "the Government does not

claim a victory, but only a tie, while the Opposition claims a majority. The Government

cannot live on a majority of nothing, and the Opposition, even if it were certain that it

had a bare majority of one or so, could not set up Official business."[1] In an effort to

break the constitutional stalemate, McInnes called upon Cariboo rancher Charles

Semlin who led a fractious caucus that included the bitterly antagonistic Joseph

Martin and Francis Carter Cotton. Semlin was no progressive political thinker, but the

composition of his cabinet reflected changing demographic realities, and middle class

and labour political agitation.

If the future of the province lay unmistakably with the mainland, sectionalism

still retained a powerful rhetorical hold on provincial politics, as the new Premier was

made aware in by-election campaigns called following the resignation of five members

found to be in conflict of interest. The two most important ridings for the government

were Cowichan, where A.W. Neill was hoping for the forgiveness of local voters, and

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[1] Monetary Times, July 22, 1898. The constitutional controversy is addressed by John Saywell in "The McInnes Incident in British Columbia," British Columbia Historical Quarterly, 14 (July 1950).

Alberni, which was contested by the Premier's Secretary C.W. Sword, who was challenging the Opposition incumbent. His slim majority in the House, and the uncertainty of the results caused Semlin considerable anxiety: "The result in either district is not very certain as they are raising the sectional cry and shouting that the present Government are a lot of mainlanders who will give the island no consideration. This cry is very potent and may cause much trouble."[2]

Following Neill's re-election, Semlin's embarked on a course of legislation that for pragmatic reasons was "of a much bolder type than any previous one, and embraced such novelties as the Alien Exclusion Bill and the Eight-Hour Bill."[3] The reformist philosophy suggested by Howay is somewhat misleading. Certainly the indignant cries that emanated from Kootenay mine owners attest to the controversial nature of Semlin's labour legislation, but pro-labour bills were more the product of political expediency on the part of a Premier reliant on labour and labour-supported MLAs to hold his government together: "I am no labour agitator and I think our miners are well off indeed" he admitted in an assessment of his government's labour legislation.[4] Semlin lacked personal commitment to meaningful reform, and the energy of his government was drawn from Carter Cotton, Martin, and the caucus of labour supported members that included Nanimo Labour MLA Ralph Smith, and Vancouver labour representative Robert MacPherson. In the Interior, J.F. Hume and R.F. Green had been publicly supported by local labour bodies in West Kootenay ridings.[5] Hume, the

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[2] Semlin to J.C. Barnes, December 3, 1898. C.A. Semlin Papers, University of British Columbia Special Collections Special Division. Box 1, File 1, Letterbook. Neill was re-elected, as was W.R. Robertson who defeated Sword.

[3] Howay, "Political History, 1871-1913" in Shortt, 224.

[4] Semlin to Joseph Irwin, September 7, 1899. Semlin Papers, Box 2, Letterbook.

[5] Electoral History of British Columbia, 71-73. MacPherson is variously cast as an Independent or Opposition candidate, but his labour connections were unquestioned. See R.A.J. McDonald, "Working Class Vancouver, 1886-1914: Urbanism and Class in British Columbia," BC Studies 60 (Spring - Summer 1986).

Minister of Mines, was particularly beholden to labour voters who supported him in both the general election and in a subsequent by-election, called following his resignation over conflict of interest charges, in return for favourable mining legislation.[6]

Traditional power brokers, particularly mineowners, were unsympathetic to Semlin's attempts to maintain his fragile coalition. The *British Columbia Review* expressed the considerable misgivings many felt toward the new government, describing it as "doubly dangerous, in as much as, being for the most part men without any substantial private means, their first interest is for their own private coffers."[7] The threat the new administration posed was the economic and political uncertainty caused by questionable labour legislation that could have on the confidence of investors; the *Review* warned that "the timorous money-bags look askance at unconstitutional and irregular procedure in the local Legislature."[8] W.A. Carlyle, Chief Engineer at the British America Corporation's Rossland operation expressed similar misgivings toward new mining legislation, particulary the Eight Hour amendment to the Metaliferous Mining Act: "The Miner's Union is becoming more and more aggressive, and the fact that two or three of their members were able to secure passage of the Bill bodes ill for the mining industry."[9] Carlyle informed the Mines Minister that his company was considering wage cuts, among other measures, but also revealed a cognizance of the realities of electoral politics: "I am sure that in this matter we have

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[6] Electoral History of British Columbia, 75-78. As noted previously, Hume's indiscretion was not unique. Two other members of the Government, and four from the Opposition were similarly forced to stand fo re-election. All seven were returned by sympathetic constituents. On labour's electoral practice in the Kootenays see Jeremy Mouat, "The Genesis of Western Exceptionalism: British Columbia's Hard Rock Miners, 1895-1903," Canadian Historical Review, 71, 3 (1990), 319-321.

[7] British Columbia Review, February 2, 1899.

[8] Ibid.

[9] W.A. Carlyle to Fred Hume, April 14, 1899. Sessional Papers, 8th Parl., 2nd Sess., 1900, 472-3.

your sympathy, as you will fully understand the conditions that exist in the Kootenay, but as I know you were standing for re-election at the time this law was passed, you were unable to give us your support."[10] The question of political debts was also raised by Sandon Miner's Union Secretary William Donohue, who advised the minister that the union was "entirely in favour of an eight-hour day, and trust you will do your utmost to enforce the law as it stands, and impress upon the Government the necessity for its adoption in the Slocan" while the legislation was before the House.[11] Hume prevaricated while considering the correspondence he received regarding the proposed legislation, prompting his cabinet colleague Robert MacPherson to clearly articulate the debate: "...Seeing that your objection to the enforcement of the Act till the miners were heard from, has been met by the resolutions in your possession, I want to know if you have now ordered the law to be enforced, or has a handful of mine owners succeeded in calling it down."[12]

Regardless of the Premier's own misgivings -"For good or for ill I think the eight hour law has come to stay and I trust the parties most interested will take a sensible view of the matter" - the Bill was passed through the House and was met, predictably, by condemnatory editorials in financial journals. The legislation had rudely shaken "the faith of English capital interested in the Province," according to local opinion, while the *Monetary Times* pointed to the injudicious nature of government policy when it observed that "mining in the Kootenay cannot be said to be experiencing the wave of prosperity that prevades the rest of the business world."[13] Despite such unfavourable reviews, and Semlin's own lack of commitment to improved mining legislation, the

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[10] Ibid.

[11] Donohue to Hume, May 3, 1899. Ibid, 482.

[12] Robert MacPherson to Hume, May 4, 1899. Ibid.

[13] British Columbia Review, August 5, 1899; Monetary Times, February 2, 1900.

pragmatic demands of holding power remained paramount. Responding to suggestions that he modify the controversial Acts, Semlin suggested that survival of his coalition government was paramount, and that "any such proposal will have a very disintegrating effect."[14] Responsibilty for legislation favourable to labour, and shaken investor confidence was placed squarely with the government; speculation and overcapitalization were less frequently cited as reasons for reduced investment. That provincial labour legislation was not wholly responsible for declining investment rates is shown in national figures that indicate between 1900 and 1901 nominal capital of British investment in the Canadian mining sector dropped precipitously, as did the number of new companies registered.[15]

Aside from the immediate pressures created by mining legislation, Semlin was confronted with the exoteric concerns of an escalating provincial debt, but brought few new fiscal ideas to office. Standard policy included securing a loan of almost $3,000,000, curtailment of public works - specifically bridges and other major projects - and reductions in the University grant, and general administrative costs. These measures decreased the annual debt relative to previous years, but had little impact on the deficit. Discomfort with the deficit extended to the Premier's relatively responsible, but politically damaging dispensation of patronage: "The finances are in such a state", he responded to one of many office-seekers, "that for the present we have to cut a small garment owing to the narrowness of the cloth."[16]

C.B. Sword, Semlin's secretary and generally unsuccessful election contestant, turned down a number of requests for government jobs on the Premier's behalf. The Deputy Attorney-General's post was a frequent target of patronage requests, but J.J.

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[14] Semlin to M.S. Wade, August 31, 1899. Semlin Papers, Box 1, File 1.

[15] D. G.Paterson, British Direct Investment in Canada, 1890-1914 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976), Appendix A.

[16] Semlin to J.B. Leighton, February 2, 1898. Semlin Papers, Box 1, File 1.

Wilson of Port Haney, A.Wilkie of New Westminster, and James Kennedy of Sapperton

were fended off by Sword who replied that the decision had been delayed pending Joseph

Martin's consideration of the matter.[17] Ex-MLA A. Maitland Stenhouse's request for a

constable's post for an associate was denied, as was Alex Henderson's application for

the position of Dykes Inspector.[18] During its short tenure the government also

curtailed a number of extra-legislative positions as part of its economy drive, including

the much sought after Agent-General's post in London, which Semlin hoped to privatize

once he had found "some business firm who will be willing to look after it for little or no

cost to the province."[19]

Financial problems that threatened the government were joined by the

internecine struggles between Martin and Carter Cotton, both of whom openly coveted

the premiership, and favoured introduction of party lines. Semlin, however, remained

opposed to any radical alteration to the political norm, and was unable to comprehend

how isolated his position had become: "Neither myself, nor, so far as I know, any of my

colleagues have any use for Dominion lines in Provincial politics. I am of your

opinion," he wrote to confidante Joseph Irwin, "we can divide well enough on strictly

Provincial issues."[20] The editor of the *Rossland Record* was among the growing

number that disagreed with the Premier:

> the other provinces have a party government, and
> until our provincial affairs are conducted on party
> lines we cannot hope for a business-like, progressive,
> and stable administration in keeping with the growth
> and advance of British Columbia. It is true that the
> idea of party lines meets with considerable dissatisfaction
> but it is confined almost wholly to those who have
> travelled in the old rut so long that a change in political

[17] Sword to Wilson; Wilkie; Kennedy, September 28, 1898. Box 1, File 1 Letterbook.

[18] C.B. Sword to Stenhouse, October 25, 1898. Semlin Papers, Box 1, File 1 Letterbook; Sword to Henderson, October 26, 1898. Box 1, File 1, Letterbook.

[19] Semlin to J.B. Leighton, September 27, 1898. Semlin Papers, Box 2, Premier's Letterbook.

[20] Semlin to Joseph Irwin, November 21, 1898. Box 2, Letterbook.

line would seriously affect their personal interests.[21]

The provincial Conservative Association took a similar position and 'business-like' Tories were already organizing outside the confines of the Legislature. William Bowser, a recently defeated candidate who had run on the Citizen's ticket - a loose coalition of Vancouver business interests - took a particularly active part in Conservative organization.[22] As the 1899 party convention approached, Bowser made plans to introduce resolutions calling for party lines, and election of an official party leader. Pre-convention work included pushing local associations to submit a list of candidates for the proposed job. Only some responses are available, but those contained in Bowser's papers suggest support for his plans in general, and for two men in particular to take on the leadership. A.E. McPhillips replied that while support for party lines did not have unanimous support in Victoria, his association, reflective of local ties to the federal party, was fully behind Charles Tupper who was "unquestionably the man if he will only take it."[23] Of six other responses, five from the mainland backed acting leader Charles Wilson, while Tupper was a popular second choice. Archibald McGregor, defeated candidate in 1898 and head of the Nanaimo chapter, reported his association was unable to reach consensus, and content to support decisions reached at the convention.[24] Nanaimo Conservatives' indecision was an exception, and Bowser's efforts were rewarded at the convention when provincial Conservatives voted to adopt party lines in local politics, and elected Wilson leader. Anticipating the political direction the province was following, local Conservatives had begun to organize a political machine like those in the east; their project was

[21] Rossland Record, October 14, 1899. Clipping in Cowan Correspondence, Vol. 1, File 1.

[22] Colonist, August 8, 1898; Electoral History of British Columbia, 72-73.

[23] McPhillips to Bowser, October 14, 1899. W.J. Bowser Papers, Add Mss 228, British Columbia Archives and Records Service, Box 1, File 2.

[24] Replies cited, all of which reached Bowser between October 14 - 25, 1899 are from: J.F. Robinson, Kamloops; J.A. McKelvie, Vernon; R.L. Reid, New Westminster; D. McGillivray, Sumas; A. McGregor, Nanaimo; John Sibbald, Revelstoke. Bowser Papers, Box 1, File 2.

delayed, however, when the Lieutenant-Governor conducted his second experiment in constitutional politics.

McInnes' reasons for the dismissal of Semlin - concentration of power by Carter Cotton, and 'excessive' public spending - were suspect in light of past political practice, as was his decision not to let the Premier present a new ministry to the House which he claimed to have constructed.[25] Contemporary sources indicated that when confronted with dismissal, Semlin looked to the old guard, and convinced John Turner, James Baker, John Irving, and H.D. Helmcken to sit with him in government.[26] Semlin, it appears, was willing to jettison his pro-labour faction in favour of a more traditional, business-oriented coalition, in defiance of increased agitation for party politics. The Lieutenant-Governor was unmoved by Semlin's protestations, and Joseph Martin was named Premier, a decision that met with general criticism, and caused considerable anxiety for other political aspirants: "A crisis, entirely unforeseen, has been brought about by the actions of the Governor," Carter Cotton told George Cowan, "and must be dealt with without regard to ordinary methods."[27] Other observers were as appalled by the situation, but considerably less impressed by the new Premier's abilities. The *Nanaimo Herald* predicted his tenure would be curtailed by an imminent election call as it was "doubtful that any platform could be built which would be strong enough to support the dead weight of Mr. Joseph Martin's record," while the *Rossland Record* lumped him in with the "political charlatans and adventurers" who had undermined progressive development of the province having "formulated a scheme promising to advance personal interests."[28]

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[25] Semlin-McInnes correspondence, Sessional Papers, 1900.

[26] Monetary Times, March 2, 1900; British Columbia Review March 24, 1900. The Review also noted the Turner - Semlin agreement was a pragmatic, temporary arrangement that fell apart when McInnes named Martin Premier.

[27] Carter Cotton to Cowan, March 4, 1900. Cowan Papers, Box 1, File 1.

[28] Rossland Record; Nanaimo Herald, March 6,1900. From a scrapbook of newsclippings in Joseph Martin Papers, City of Vancouver Archives, Add Mss 232.

The 'one-man' campaign undertaken by Martin in 1900 was not waged by choice,
and was more suggestive of local Liberal fragmentation, specifically his unpopularity
with the federal wing, than of his personal political skills. Anticipating that local
splinters of Conservativism would be unable to surmount their mutual antipathies and
present a united front to the electorate, Martin had hoped to run the campaign at the
head of an organized Liberal party that promised to end political instability. The
British Columbia Review shared Martin's opinion of Conservative disarray, and
predicted that if any coalition could be affected, it would be between Wilson's old guard
Conservative Association on the Mainland and Turner's Island cabal, leaving Carter
Cotton's Provincial Party to seek labour's support.[29]

Efforts by provincial Liberal-Conservatives, particularly those of Secretary R.B.
Ellis, to construct a viable electoral coalition from the various Tory factions were, as
Martin predicted, futile. One major obstruction in Ellis' path was the outgoing Premier,
who took a curious perspective on party policy by supporting the proposed platform in
general, while still emphasizing that he had "never given countenance to that plank
which urges the introduction of Federal party lines into provincial affairs."[30] Another
impediment to Conservative union was Charles Wilson's determination to consolidate
his hold on the party leadership, a project that stood to gain momentum if he led the
official Conservative party into the election. Responding to questions regarding
various efforts to unify various factions, Wilson was adamant that "there had been no
alliances" and that his group was "not connected with the so-called Cotton or Martin
parties, but ran flatly on their platform."[31] Carter Cotton's efforts met with similar
results, partly due to his assumption that mainland Tories should join his forces in

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[29] British Columbia Review, March 24, 1900.

[30] Semlin to Ellis, February 26, 1900. Semlin Papers. Box 2, Letterbook.

[31] Vancouver Province, April 27, 1900.

"some satisfactory arrangement...whereby the Conservative party will so fit itself in with the present dominant Provincial Party as to maintain its position."[32] Unable to orchestrate any sort of union, Carter Cotton used the *News-Advertiser* to attack party lines during the campaign, betraying his anxiety over Martin's efforts to organize Liberal forces, and the splintered Tory ranks:

> Speaking from a Conservative standpoint we cannot afford
> to let Martin win, but an insistence on party lines will result
> in that. There are six seats in the Interior now filled by Liberals,
> and which will return these men again. Divide on party lines
> and all these seats will be lost to us. There are times when the
> interests of the state must be considered before those of party
> and this is one of those occasions. [33]

The Provincial Party was among a confusing number of options that confronted the electorate. Martin's government party, the 'Josephines' as the *News-Advertiser* referred to them, was challenged by Independent Government candidates opposed to his leadership, Liberal-Conservatives led by Wilson, Opposition candidates under Turner (nine of eleven ran in Island ridings), Carter Cotton's Provincial Party, Independents, Independent Liberals, Labour, and Socialist candidates. The formidable opposition to the Premier also included, according to the *Monetary Times*, federal Liberals and the CPR.[34] Ormsby suggests the circumstances surrounding the election undermined all respect in the province for constituted authority, but as the results suggest, many voters directed their antipathy specifically at the Martin government and McInnes's arbitrary gubernatorial edicts.[35] Although unsure which of the numerous factions represented in the campaign they wanted to manage the province,

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[32] Carter Cotton to George Cowan, February 22, 1900. Personal. Cowan Collection, Box 1, File 1.

[33] Carter Cotton to Cowan, March 4, 1900. Cowan Papers, Box 1, File 1.

[34] Monetary Times, June 15, 1900.

[35] Ormsby, 322.

voters engaged the existing system to "unhorse Mr. Martin before he had time to steady himself in the saddle."[36]

The Premier's personal defeat was readily apparent, as was Carter Cotton's, but the election did little to unravel the inconclusive political tangle. The candidacy of Will McClane, candidate of the United Socialist Labour Party, and first socialist to contest an election in British Columbia received considerable attention for its historic significance, but to some extent overshadowed independent Labour's showing. Ralph Smith, who contested the Nanaimo City seat to avoid a direct confrontation with James Dunsmuir in South Nanaimo, was the only straight Labour candidate to be returned, but there were other encouraging results for working voters. The *Colonist's* assertion that Dunsmuir was "backed by his employees in South Nanaimo", for instance, seemed rather hollow considering that the Nanaimo Labour Party's John Radcliffe came within twenty-four votes of his better-known competitor.[37] Vancouver Trade and Labour Congress officers Joseph Dixon and Francis Williams achieved respectable, if distant, placings and kept Martinites from taking all four city seats.[38] In the Interior, issues were more important than party labels, and miners adopted the traditional American approach of not running labour contestants, instead "supporting those candidates who would work for the retention of the eight-hour day legislation."[39] Conservative Thomas Taylor was endorsed by the Revelstoke Trades and Labour Council, and Government candidate Smith Curtis owed his support to miners' determination to defeat Conservative member C.H. MacKintosh, who had been pegged for the Mines Ministry by the *British Columbia Review*. In West Kootenay-Slocan,

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[36] Monetary Times, June 15, 1900.

[37] Colonist, June 10, 1900. Electoral History of British Columbia, 81-83.

[38] News-Advertiser, June 10, 1900.

[39] Phillips, 31.

Provincial Party candidate R.F. Green benefitted from the electoral caution that "distinguished at least some WFM locals in the province" when Sandon miners endorsed his candidacy.[40]

The strength of the labour movement was indicated by the importance accorded the labour vote by most non-labour groups. R.E. Gosnell had abandoned the hard line approach that informed his 1894 *Canadian Magazine* article in favour of a more moderate approach designed to get "the working man on our side, ... by warm and cordial co-operation."[41] Acknowledgement of labour's political clout was apparent elsewhere. Martin made numerous, largely unsuccessful, overtures to labour for support, and many individual candidates, including New Westminster-Dewdney incumbent Richard McBride felt compelled to court local labour organizations.[42] Wilson's Conservatives supported the eight hour law, albeit unenthusiastically, as did the Provincial Party which endorsed endorsed Labour candidates Dixon and Radcliffe in Nanaimo ridings.[43] However much 'support' labour's agenda elicited during the campaign, it was not sufficient to alter the hard-line political course taken by the new provincial administration led by James Dunsmuir, who, it was reported, had sacrificed his private interests due to the "gravity of the crisis and the necessity for immediately placing the government on a sound business basis."[44] The *Colonist's* editorial reaction was predictably commendatory, but also enlightening: "At a time when capital has been holding aloof from investment in this province, it is certainly highly satisfactory to

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[40] Mouat, "Genesis", 319-20; Loosmore, 112-13. British Columbia Review, March 24, 1900.

[41] Gosnell to Cowan, September 2, 1898. Cowan Papers, Box 1, File 6.

[42] Ross Johnson, "No Compromise-No Political Trading: The Marxian Socialist Tradition in British Columbia." Ph.D. Dissertation, University of British Columbia,1975, 91-93.

[43] News-Advertiser, April 12, and April 18.

[44] Colonist, June 15, 1900.

have the largest individual capitalist in British Columbia, and the most extensive employer of labor called upon to take charge of the administration of affairs."[45]

For the *British Columbia Review* and the *Rossland Record* which had both yearned for a return to the 'golden era' of Turnerism, the appointment of the province's largest capitalist was particularly satisfying. "Messrs. Turner, Baker and Eberts were of far more service to the Province than any of their successors," the *Review* intoned, adding that if the new generation of businessmen "could be induced to give their time for the welfare of the Province its progress would be rapid and the confidence of British capital would be once more restored."[46] The *Record* echoed its contemporary's nostalgic tone, harking back to the "widespread enthusiasm" of the 1890's when "the mine owner was courageous, venturesome and hopeful; the mineworker and breadwinner industrious, energetic and devoted ... "[47] The message of resource capital was clear: the notorious Semlin-Martin years had proven disasterous, but the election, more specifically Dunsmuir's ascendency promised a return to a positive business climate, and to an earlier historical era.

Others were less positive in their appraisal, particularly when Dunsmuir announced a coalition cabinet that included Turner and Eberts from the Island, Liberal lumberman W.C. Wells, Managing Director of the Western Canadian Ranching Company J.D. Prentice, and Conservative Richard McBride. The *News-Advertiser* portrayed him as a local Vanderbilt who had directed policy of both the Theodore Davie and Turner governments, and had "seized the opportunity to resume a position so desirable from the point of view of his own interests."[48] For provincial labour,

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[45] Ibid.

[46] British Coumbia Review, May 16, 1900.

[47] Rossland Record, March 11, 1900, in scrapbook, Martin Papers.

[48] News-Advertiser, June 16, 1900.

Dunsmuir was "the very epitome of repressive capitalism", and his rise to the Premier's office meant an end to the comparatively conciliatory tone of Semlin era legislation.[49] Labour's response to the changing political landscape has been subjected to considerable analysis, much of which emphasizes the level of radicalism and the eclipse of labourism by socialism. But, as recent rejoinders suggest, the 'western exceptionalism' argument runs the risk of oversimplification and generalization of labour's more varied response.[50] Jeremy Mouat's study of the Kootenay region and Robert McDonald's work on Vancouver's labour community, and Allen Seager's evaluation of Crow's Nest Pass coal miners question this interpretation, and argue that labour's response to the political and industrial situation varied by region and circumstance.[51] Seager also challenges the 'company town' argument made by Robin, countering that there was no natural predisposition to socialism among workers that resulted from these living and working arrangements, or from immigration of American and British labourers.[52]

Socialism's appeal increased only after setbacks suffered by labourism, and as a response to increasing intransigence on the part of capital and the state. Examples of the state's harsher demeanor were readily apparent. Striking Fraser River fishermen were met by the militia in New Westminster, and members of the Western Federation of Miners at Rossland were confronted by owners willing to hire spies, import strikebreakers, open the mines in defiance of provincial legislation, and take other hard line tactics. Not only were miners defeated in 1902, many of the 1,100 striking workers were blacklisted by the owners, and two of the companies involved successfully

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[49] McCormack, 27.

[50] The Western exceptioanlism argument is found in Bercuson, 474-499; McCormack; Martin Robin, Rush for Spoils.

[51] Mouat, "Genesis;" McDonald, "Working Class Vancouver;" Seager, "Socialists and Workers."

[52] Seager, 52.

sued the Western Federation of Miners for compensatory damages incurred during the dispute.[53] Vancouver Island's coal industry was also hit by strikes and lockouts, often arising from attempts to unify Island locals, or, in the case of Extension miners, a decree by Dunsmuir that they relocate to Ladysmith. In response, local miners affiliated with the WFM, only to be locked out.[54] In the face of rising levels of confrontation, labour remained defiant and between 1900 and 1903 an estimated seventy-eight strikes occurred in the province, moving the *Canadian Annual Review* to comment flatly that "there were several strikes and labour complications in the Province during the year, and the mutterings of agitation were more numerous than desired."[55]

'Mutterings' were not confined to resource industries. In Vancouver "the economic prosperity and consolidation of capital that had accompanied growing labour tension in mining communities also inspired new confidence among Terminal City workers."[56] One demonstrable example of worker defiance was the United Brotherhood of Railway Employees strike called in response to the CPR's suspension of employees seeking affiliation with the American based industrial union. Sympathy strikes spread among WFM locals and longshoremen but, as was increasingly the case, they were met by violence, government intervention, and the eventual defeat of the workers. In the midst of this unrest, the owners' harder line on labour issues was articulated by the *British Columbia Review*, which took particular aim at the unskilled white worker, who was "greatly pampered in B.C., and regarded both by local politicians

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[53] Mouat, "Genesis," 333.

[54] Phillips, 38-39.

[55] Canadian Annual Review, 1901, 57. Estimate of strike activity is from Gregory Kealey, "The Paramaters of Class Conflict: Strikes in Canada, 1891-1900" in Deian R. Hopkin and G.S. Kealey, eds. Class, Community and the Labour Movement: Wales and Canada, 1850-1930 (Wales: Llafur/CCLH, 1989), 233-34.

[56] McDonald, "Working Class Vancouver," 60.

and the press as a person of great importance and influence." The unskilled were necessary, the editorial allowed, "but to pay for this labour a sum out of all proportion to its earning capacity is an economic folly which can have but one result."[57]

Owner intransigence and broken strikes led many workers to reassess labour's political strategy. Affiliation with the federal Liberal party had contributed to an increased Chinese Head Tax, the Conciliation Act of 1900, and visits by Deputy Minister of Labour Mackenzie King, but none of these measures did much to mollify miners or other workers. This was particularly true of King's denouncement of the strikers at Rossland, and his 1903 Royal Commission on Industrial Disputes. Disenchantment with the Liberals was accelerated by Ralph Smith's defection to the federal party following his 1900 general election victory in Nanaimo on a Labour ticket, and Chris Foley's acceptance of a place on the board of a federal inquiry into Oriental immigration.[58] Frustration with 'Lib-Lab' politics and the seeming inability of labour to advance its cause won converts to Socialism, particularly when the British Columbia Socialist Party emerged from the internecine quarrels within the movement in 1901. Socialist organizers were also able to make inroads into the union movement, and WFM miners who looked to independent political action in the wake of recent strikes were particularly responsive to the message.

Socialism's ascendency in the WFM owed much to the intransigence of both capital and the state. Dunsmuir's refusal to recognize the WFM at his collieries, the UBRE and Rossland strikes, and the ineffectiveness of the short-lived Provincial Progressive Party convinced many miners that labourism was making little headway, and growing disaffectation meant that moderate leaders were replaced by militant

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[57] British Columbia Review, July 9, 1902.

[58] See Craven, 245; 250-52. Robin, Radical Politics and Canadian Labour (Kingston: Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's University, 1968), 52.

members who advocated more radical political options.[59] Mineworkers were not, however, embracing doctrinaire socialism *en masse*. Their decision was a pragmatic response, calculated to advance their interests on the political stage. Miners "came to support the 'radical' option in politics out of habit, class instinct, ideological conviction, or a combination of factors. They supported a trade union leadership that was politically engaged, or a political leadership, like the Socialist Party, that supported the miners struggles."[60] Put more simply, "Socialists did not define labour's political agenda in turn-of-the-century B.C. The miners did."[61]

Labour moderates also had to contend with overtures from provincial Liberal and Conservative associations, both of which were now wholly committed to implementation of durable electoral parties, a project only temporarily interrupted by the 1900 election. Within weeks of polling day, R.B. Ellis articulated the organization's resolution to support party candidates that would sit as "a Liberal Conservative Government, as distinguished from a Government composed of Liberals, or partly Liberal Conservatives."[62] While political associations were refining their organization, the last installment of traditional post-Confederation political rule was being played out by an awkward coalition of various factions under Dunsmuir's uninspired and unimaginative leadership. Another loan, for $5,000,000, was taken out to finance public works in a period of unrelieved deficits, and a railway policy typical of the 1890s evidenced the retrogressive nature of the administration which tried to gain public support by focussing attention on efforts to gain better financial terms from Ottawa. Dunsmuir's waning political credibility was irreparably damaged by his

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[59] Mouat, "Genesis," 343.

[60] Seager, "Miners' Struggles in Western Canada: Class, Community, and the Labour Movement, 1890-1930" in Hopkin and Kealey, eds., 178.

[61] Seager, "Socialists and Workers," 35.

[62] Ellis to Cowan, July 17, 1900. Cowan Collection, Box 1, File 6.

decision to take Martin loyalist J.C. Brown - who had previously referred to the government as the "Turner-Tory-Chinese party" - into cabinet following the Martin faction's support for railway legislation in 1901.[63]

Popular perception was that the single unifying element in government ranks was a determination to keep Joseph Martin out of power, and the Premier's actions caused considerable controversy, as did his cynical explanation that Brown's appointment was "a reward for honest support in the railway crisis of 1901."[64] Political fallout from Dunsmuir's actions added to the general climate of instability, particularly when Mines Minister McBride and Vancouver Conservatives J.F. Garden and R.G. Tatlow resigned. McBride harboured plans to wrest control of the Liberal Conservative Association from the Tory old guard and head a united provincial party in the next election, and the first step in his plan was to publicly work with Garden, Tatlow, and A.E. McPhillips for Brown's opponent, Thomas Gifford, in the by-election called to confirm the new minister's appointment to cabinet.[65] Less publicly, he enlisted the support of George Cowan: "Gifford an ex-Alderman, Liberal Chairman Brown's committee last year - strongest man in town - see you here tomorrow <u>sure</u> - very urgent."[66] Much of the success of Gifford's campaign was attributable to T.S. Annandale - a New Westminster merchant, director of the *Columbian*, and Conservative party member - who told Cowan that he had put in "ten days of the hardest work I ever did in my life."[67] Among the more demanding of his tasks was bringing in, and compensating, ineligible voters from outside of the constituency. In all, $225.50

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[63] New Westminster <u>Columbian</u>, September 7, 1901.

[64] <u>Canadian Annual Review</u>, 1901, 75.

[65] Vancouver <u>Province</u>, September 17, 1901.

[66] McBride to Cowan, September 11, 1901. Cowan Collection, Box 1, File 6.

[67] Annandale to Cowan, October 2, 1901. Cowan Collection, Box 1, File 6.

was spent on "fares and expenses" of voters from "outside points."[68] Annandale also

requested compensation for outstanding expenses he had covered, but much of the

campaign was apparently financed by Cowan's $1,350 and Tatlow's $600 investment.

Efforts by high profile politicians, including Martin, W.C. Wells, and George Maxwell

on Brown's behalf were insufficient to overcome the McBride forces, and the hostility of

virtually every major newspaper, with the exception of Dunsmuir's *Colonist*. [69] The

incumbent's narrow defeat, according to one Vancouver daily, made McBride the

"legitimate and recognized Leader of the Opposition."[70]

Brown's defeat was only the latest indication that traditional politics had

become anachronistic in turn of the century British Columbia, and Dunsmuir's

inevitable resignation in 1902 marked the end of the old regime. His successor, E.G.

Prior, simply marked time in office until a scandal involving his office in conflict of

interest charges, led to his dismissal six months later. That the subsequent election,

called by interim Premier McBride, was run on party lines, reflected widespread public

sentiment, support of numerous MLAs, and organizational work by provincial

associations, particularly the Conservatives. Neither group, however, had managed to

construct a dependable or disciplined organization. Liberals were impeded by internal

divisions, at one level between Island and Mainland members over federal patronage

appointments, and at another between Templemann's federal wing and the Martin

faction. At the party's 1902 convention federal members walked out over a credentials

dispute, allowing Martin to win the leadership contest by a narrow margin which

combined with popular agitation and Martin's personal support to ensure the presence

of a Liberal party in the upcoming election.[71] The Liberal platform included

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[68] Ibid.

[69] Columbian, September 5, 1901.

[70] Province, September 19, 1901.

[71] Canadian Annual Review, 1902, 85-86

curtailment of Oriental immigration and compulsory arbitration legislation, but was insufficient to coalesce party forces, a situation made public when Martin resigned the party leadership before the election, possibly in an attempt to call the bluff of his opponents.[72] Martin continued to manage the Vancouver campaign, while John Oliver, who hoped to be included in a coalition cabinet if McBride won, ran the campaign south of the city.[73] Lacking even a perceived leader, Liberals appeared disorganized and fractious to an electorate that hoped to end recent political chaos.

The Liberal convention was followed by Labour's, and the emergence of the ill-fated PPP. Despite substantial gains in support, Socialist organizers were unable to control the April 1902 political convention in Kamloops that attracted representatives of labour organizations including the WFM, and various political reformers. The convention's decision, over the protests of the Socialist Party of British Columbia, to create the moderate Provincial Progressive Party led the socialist party to break all ties with the new reformist association. The gulf between the reformist and socialist camps was exacerbated when an ensuing resolution of the international WFM convention to support the Socialist Party of America engendered a similar switch of allegiance in British Columbia. The miners' withdrawal undermined the PPP's validity as a representative labour body, a process compounded by the party's disorganization which was made evident when its federal candidate Chris Foley was opposed in a Vancouver Burrard by-election by honorary party president T.R. McInnes.

Provincial Conservatives were the last to meet in convention. McBride's challenge for party leadership was thwarted by the Wilson faction, to the disappointment of federal leader Robert Borden, but a proposal to contest the next

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[72] News-Advertiser, June 4, 1903.

[73] James Morton, Honest John Oliver (London: Dent, 1933), 79. News-Advertiser, October 11, 1903.

election on party lines passed easily. Like their Liberal counterparts, Conservatives outlined a platform calculated to appeal to moderate labour men, but under McBride's influence the platform focussed on the issue of party lines.

During the campaign, Conservative efforts were compromised by disaffected traditionalists, most notably the Island Tories who had wielded power in previous decades, and who believed McBride's cadre was solely representative of mainland business interests. Their decision not to participate actively in the election at least partially contributed to the Liberal sweep of all four Victoria seats.[74] Ironically, British Columbia's first party election produced a minority government, the balance of power held by labour representatives Slocan Labour MLA William Davidson, and Socialists James Hawthornthwaite from Nanaimo City, and Parker Williams from Newcastle. The SPBC had a number of other encouraging results including two second place finishes, one by a margin of eight votes.[75] The concentration of socialist and labour votes, however, was telling. Of the 4787 votes cast for party candidates, 2284 were split between two candidates in Vancouver who came in near the bottom of the table, and 486 were taken by Hawthornthwaite. Eight Labour candidates shared 4,421 votes, and again a majority were concentrated in Vancouver.[76] The election of a minority government was the best possible outcome for Labour voters, who despite the impressive showing in terms of actual numbers, could not hope to elect enough candidates to form the Opposition.

The Conservatives ability to organize was considerably superior to that of local Liberals, a considerable advantage in that McBride's forces were able to control the House, albeit with a minority, just as the province was verging on an economic boom,

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[74] Brian Smith, "Sir Richard McBride - A Study of the Conservative Party of British Columbia, 1903-1916." MA Thesis, Queen's University 1959, 110.

[75] Electoral History of British Columbia, 91-96. In Greenwood, Ernest Mills of the SPBC got 35% of the vote in a threeway contest.

[76] Ibid, 91-96.

enabled them to campaign as the party of prosperity and progress, and dominate the local political scene until the first World War. The opposition during this era, - Liberal, Labour and Socialist MLAs - were unable to mount a serious electoral threat to the government which enjoyed both wide ranging popular support, and backing from the business and financial communities. The political implication was that valid party competition for power was delayed until the early war years, but despite the delay two party parliamentary democracy had become the norm in British Columbia after a short period of 'no party' politics, and the even shorter period of real constitutional instability.

CONCLUSION

Describing Upper Canada at the time of the 1837 rebellion, Reg Whitaker

suggests that the "border between the state system and the political system, in

Miliband's terms, is exceedingly difficult to draw in this period. The personnel of the

state and the personnel of capitalist enterprise are often enough the same. Public office

and private profit were two sides of the same phenomenon."[1] S.J.R. Noel generally

concurs with this assessment, but suggests that dual roles of state and economic

personnel were somewhat less common by the turn of the eighteenth century. The

result of Simcoe's efforts to stabilize the political system meant that although "the

official and mercantile elites would never overlap completely in personnel, and though

their interests would at times diverge, no unbridgeable gulf was ever allowed to develop

between them."[2] If an appreciable distinction exists between the two assessments, it is

that Noel's appraisal allows for a greater degree of relative state autonomy.

That the description is also apt to the immediate post-Confederation era in

British Columbia suggests an answer to the problem of explaining the province's thirty

years of government without a party system. The function of party systems, as

mediator of conflict between rival interest groups within clearly defined boundaries is

an essential component of the efficient operation of the modern democratic state. The

more complex this operation is, the greater the need for moderating influences such as

extension of the franchise to the disaffected, and a party system "to tame the

democracy."[3] In 1871, British Columbia's society and economy were in many respects

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[1] Whitaker, "Images of the State," 42.

[2] Noel, 60.

[3] This is C.B. MacPherson's turn of phrase, first cited here in Chapter 1.

less diversified and sophisticated than in other provinces, a function of the small population, limited capital and widely-shared attitudes regarding development of the province. This situation continued in the immediate post-Confederation era due to the national depression that delayed construction of the CPR project, which when eventually completed, ushered in an era of sweeping change that overtook the province in the late 1890s.

Incorporation into the national economy was accompanied by political modernization, a process that resulted in evolution of a more subtle state apparatus in response to the challenges from organized labour, particularly evident during the years of the Semlin administration and, most importantly, from the lower mainland-based middle class that quickly grew frustrated with its limited political voice. Middle class agitators in Vancouver can be described, despite the rhetoric of Francis Carter Cotton among others, as reformers only to the extent that they demanded changes to the politcal system that would benefit their specific interests, and any concern shown for labour's agenda was purely pragmatic. Carter Cotton's appeals to organized labour in the 1890s were hardly unique, as evidenced by Richard McBride's ability to successfully manage a minority government for a full term with Labour and Socialist support in the House.

Certainly, the provincial state could resort to coercion and violence when deemed necessary to protect its accumulative function, as was made readily apparent by the military intervention in the United Mine Workers strike on Vancouver Island in 1912-14. General Arthur Currie's later recollection of the confrontation indicated the state's willingness to engage challenges to its authority: "Remember me kindly to Ross and Bowser. The latter will remember that just two years ago the Nanaimo war was on..."[4] Despite the severity and longevity of the dispute, industrial unrest was hardly

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[4] Currie to Richard McBride, August 26, 1915. McBride Papers Add Mss 347, Public Archives of British Columbia.

unique to the west coast in the decade before the First World War.[5] Notwithstanding

Nanaimo, operation of the provincial state and exercise of authority became

increasingly subtle and sophisticated, and accepted thinking on state involvement in

society and the economy came to include more than simple coercive intervention in

labour disputes, or institition of regulations intended to aid railway promotion. The

relatively limited level of public services that existed until the late nineteenth century

was augmented by a public health act in 1893, that was later revised to include control

of tuberculosis, improved sanitary inspection, and medical examination of school

children by 1910. Other services included improved care of the old and infirm,

children's protection acts, and establishment of delinquent schools. Workmen's

compensation legislation was passed in 1916 that, like other social legislation, was

modelled on the example of Ontario.[6]

Politically, the province settled into what was all but a one-party system that

consolidated after McBride's first term in office, which he survived through a

combination of a voting alliance with Socialist MLAs, R.G. Tatlow's fiscal

management, W.J. Bowser's political machinations, and the national economic

recovery. Minority government was followed by a decade of Conservative dominance

and Liberal disarray that owed much to the government's alliance with a business

community that harboured anxieties regarding the electoral successes of the Socialist

Party of British Columbia, and its later incarnation as the Socialist Party of Canada,

especially in light of Liberal ineffectiveness.[7] However, the presence of the socialist

cadre in the provincial legislature suggests the limitations prescribed by the party

[5] Craig Heron, The Canadian Labour Movement: A Short History (Toronto: Lorimer, 1989), 30-51.

[6] Discussion of social legislation comes from Allan Irving, "The Development of a Provincial Welfare State: British Columbia 1900-1939" in Allan Moscovitch and Jim Albert, eds. The "Benevolent" State: the growth of welfare in Canada (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1987), 155-174.

[7] Seager, "Socialists and Workers," 40-41.

system. As a recent study has shown, their commitment to reform and social democratic strategy forced the Socialist party to accept the structures and regulation of parliamentary politics, and moved them further from the radical left.[8]

As the *Colonist* suggested in 1902, the peculiarity of British Columbia's political culture was ending after slightly more than two decades of politics without parties.[9] The impetus of the change had been the incorporation of the province into the national economy and the enormous changes wrought by the process that demanded substantial alterations in how the provincial state was managed. In short, the province came more into line with the political economy of the rest of the country, and to argue that local variations on the general theme constitute a significant provincial distinction, particularly after 1890, is to concentrate on the structural to the exclusion of the functional. Party systems, as suggested previously, are most important as vehicles of legitimation that are flexible enough to grant concessions and allow protest of its operation, but both of these projects are limited by the parameters established by the state, whether at the national or provincial level.

If party systems roughly define the parameters of allowable dissent, it is equally safe to assume that the demands of the national economic market process have considerable influence on limits of political expression in subsidiary sub-central states. By deciding to join Confederation in 1871, British Columbians ensured that local political culture would more closely reflect the Canadian experience. That local reproduction was somewhat imperfect had more to do with the effects of the national depression than any inherently unique provincial qualities.

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[8] Mark Leier, Where the Fraser River Flows: The Industrial Workers of the World in British Columbia (Vancouver: New Star Books, 1990), 91-94.

[9] Colonist, September 14, 1902.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1:   Members of British Columbia Legislature by Occupation, 1871-1903

	Members	Law	Other Professions	Merchants Business	Resource Interests	Ranching Farming	Journalist	Others
1871	25	3	3	3	1	4	2	11
1875	25	3	3	4	2	5	0	7
1878	25	3	1	5	2	7	0	7
1882	25	3	1	8	2	9	1	2
1886	27	4	1	8	3	11	2	0
1890	33	3	2	7	4	9	3	8
1894	33	3	2	6	3	14	2	5
1898	38	7	1	9	1	10	3	10
1900	38	8	3	7	9	8	1	3
1903	42	11	4	10	4	5	3	8

NOTE: Occupations are taken from listed sources, and are main source of income.
This is not an exact science, as many of those listed had numerous and varied interests.
Robert Dunsmuir for instance, is arguably best known for his collieries on Vancouver
Island, but his land holdings, the result of the Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway grant,
and his manufacturing operations such as the Albion Ironworks were more important
sources of income than was coal.
Other Professions refers to Doctors, Accountants; Resource Interests includes those
involved in timber producton, and mining enterprises.

SOURCE: Canadian Parliamentary Guide; J.B. Kerr, Biographical Dictionary of Well-
Known British Columbians (Vancouver: Kerr & Begg, 1890); F.W. Howay, F. Scholefield,
British Columbia From the Earliest Times, V. 3, 4.

Appendix 2: <u>Sample of the Vancouver Island Political and Economic Elite, 1871-1898</u>

<u>'Smithe Line' Ministers, 1883-1898.</u>

	<u>Years in Cabinet</u>	<u>Ministries</u>	<u>Constituency</u>
James Baker,	1892-1898	Education/Immigration Provincial Secretary Mines	Kootenay Ridings
A.E.B Davie	1883-1889	Attorney-General Premier	Lillooet
Theo. Davie	1889-1895	Attorney-General Premier	Victoria City Cowichan
M.W.T. Drake	1883-1884	President of Council	Victoria City
Simeon Duck	1885-1887	Finance/Agriculture	Victoria City
Robert Dunsmuir	1884-1887	President of Council	Nanaimo
D.M. Eberts	1895-1898	Attorney-General	Victoria
G.B. Martin	1895-1898	Lands/Works	Yale Ridings
C.E. Pooley	1889-1898	President of Council	Esquimalt
John Robson	1883-1892	Provincial Secretary Mines Premier	New Westminster Cariboo
Wm. Smithe	1883-1887	Lands/Works Premier	Cowichan
J.H. Turner	1887-1898	Finance/Agriculture Premier	Victoria City
F.G. Vernon	1887-1895	Lands/Works Mines/Agriculture	Yale

SOURCE: <u>Canadian Parliamentary Guide; Electoral History of British Columbia</u>.

Appendix 3:   <u>Sample of the Nineteenth Century Vancouver Island</u>
<u>Political and Economic Elite</u>

E. C. Baker   Victoria City Council 1882-1889, MP Victoria 1882-1889.
Conservative, Pres. Victoria Liberal-Conservative Association.
Mgr Hastings Sawmill Co. (Victoria). Secretary Victoria Board of
Trade. Founder Victoria and Esquimalt Telephone Co. (1880-
1899). Secretary Victoria Electric Illuminating Co. Burrard
Inlet Land Syndicate. Master, Victoria Columbia Masonic Lodge.

James Baker   MLA 1886-1900, E. Kootenay Ridings. Conservative. Rancher,
Owner: Cranbrook; Crow's Nest Pass Coal Company.
Res.Victoria.

F.J. Barnard   MP Yale 1879-1887. Res. Victoria. Conservative. Owner British
Columbia Express Co. Father of F.S. Barnard MP, and Alice
Barnard, m. to J.A. Mara. Rideau Club.

F.S. Barnard   Victoria City Council 1886 -1887. MP Cariboo 1891-1892.
Conservative. Res. Victoria. Mgr. B.C. Express Co. Pres.
Victoria Transfer Co. and Vancouver Transfer Co. Dir.
Okanagan Land & Development Co. Vancouver Improvement Co.
B.C. Mining and Smelting, Hastings Sawmill Co. Rideau
Club, Union Club.

G.H. Barnard   MP Victoria 1911-1914. Mayor of Victoria 1904-1905.
Conservative. Lawyer, partner in firm with A.E. McPhillips.
Son F.J. Barnard. Rideau Club.

Mark Bate   J.P. Mayor of Nanaimo 1875-1880; 1881-1890. Mgr. Vancouver
Coal Mining & Land Co. 1869-1884. Mason.

John Bryden   MLA 1875-6; 1894-1900. N. Nanaimo. Liberal-Conservative. m.
                     Robert Dunsmuir's dau. Mgr. Vancouver Coal Mining & Land Co.
                     1869-1881. Mgr. Wellington Colliery (Dunsmuir) 1881. Member
                     Board of Examiners under Coal Mines Regulation Act. Pres.
                     Albion Iron Works (Dunsmuir & Rithet) Vancouver.

Henry Croft   J.P. MLA 1886-1894 Cowichan. Conservative. Engineer. m.
                     Robert Dunsmuir's dau. Mary Jean. Officer British Columbia
                     Board of Trade (Victoria) 1892-1893. Sat on investigation into
                     Wellington distrubance 1877. Dir. Chemanius Sawmill Co.
                     Partner Boulier Croft and Mallette Real Estate (Victoria). Mgr.
                     Vancouver Island Investment Co. Ltd. Member Victoria Board of
                     Fire Underwriters.

A.E.B Davie   MLA Cariboo 1875- 1877; Lillooet 1882-1886. Conservative.
                     Bro. Theodore Davie. Res. Victoria. Lawyer, 1879-1889 Davie
                     and Pooley. C.E. Pooley was Dunsmuir lawyer. Law Society
                     Bencher. Union Club.

Theodore Davie   MLA Victoria City/Cowichan 1882-1895. Conservative . Bro. A.E.
                     Davie. Lawyer. Legal adviser to Robert Dunsmuir during
                     Wellington Strike 1877. Law Society Bencher. Owner Inland
                     Sentinel (Kamloops) 1883-1895. Dir. National Electric
                     Tramway and Lighting Co. Victoria. Rideau Club.

M.W.T. Drake   MLA 1882-1886 Victoria City. Mayor of Victoria 1877 -1882.
                     Lawyer. Law Society Bencher. Provincial Supreme Court Justice
                     1889. Provincial Board of Education 1872-1879. BC Pioneer
                     Society, Victoria Jockey Club, Pres. Union Club 1891 .

Simeon Duck   MLA 1871; 1882-1890 Victoria City. Accountant City of Victoria.
                     Carriage manufacturer- B.C. Express Co. (Barnard) among
                     customers. Mason.

James Dunsmuir	MLA Comox 1898-1900; S. Nanaimo 1900-1902. Premier 1900-1902; Lieutenant-Governor. Conservative. Owner Dunsmuir and Sons Coal Company, E&N Railway. Victoria <u>Colonist</u> 1898-1906. Dir. CPR. Union Club, Vancouver Club.
Robert Dunsmuir	J.P. MLA 1882-1889 Nanaimo. Conservative. Founder Dunsmuir and Sons Coal Company. Pres. Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway. Owner (with R.P. Rithet) Albion Iron Works Victoria and Vancouver, Canadian Pacific Navigation, shareholder Matsqui Dyking Co., Promoter Canadian Western Railway. Pioneer Society, Union Club.
Thomas Earle	MP Victoria 1889-1905. Victoria City Council 1885. Conservative. Wholesale Merchant, Contractor E & N Railway. and on railway projects in Puget Sound. v-Pres. British Columbia Board of Trade. Rideau Club.
D. McEwan Eberts	MLA 1890-1894 Victoria City; 1894-1903 S. Victoria; 1907-1912 Saanich. Conservative. Son of surgeon at Wellington Mines. (Dunsmuir) Lawyer. Partner Eberts and W.J. Taylor., counsel for CPR.
H.D. Helmcken	MLA Victoria City 1894 -1900. Son J.S. Helmcken. Lawyer, partnership with Brian H.T. Drake.
D.W. Higgins	MLA 1886-1900 Esquimalt. Speaker of the House 1891-1898 Liberal- Conservative. Owner Victoria <u>Colonist</u> 1871-1898. Pres. National Electric Tramway and Lighting Co. (Victoria) Victoria City Council, Board of Education. Officer British Columbia Board of Trade. Pioneer Society.
Joseph Hunter	MLA Cariboo 1871-1875; Comox 1890-1900; Cariboo 1900-1903. Civil Engineer. Chief Engineer Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway. Dir. National Electric Tramway and Lighting Co.

J.A. Mara

J.P. MLA Kootenay 1871-1875; Yale 1875-1886. Speaker 1883-1886. MP Y ale 1886-1896. Conservative. Businessman. m. Alice Barnard, dau. of F.J. Barnard, sister of F.S. Barnard MP. BC Mining and Milling . Union Club, Rideau Club. Mason.

G.B. Martin

MLA 1882-1898 Yale ridings. Conservative. Farming, Cattle raising. Union Club, BC Pioneer Society.

A.E. McPhillips

MLA Victoria City 1898-1900; The Islands 1907-1913. Conservative. Pres. Victoria Liberal Conservative Association Lawyer, firm of McPhillips Wooten and Barnard. (G.H. Barnard) m. Sophie Davie, dau. of A.E.B Davie. Victoria Board of Fire Underwriters, Board of Trade. BC Pioneer Society, Union Club (v-Pres. 1896 -1899).

George L. Milne

MLA Victoria 1890-1894 Liberal. Pres. British Columbia Liberal Association late 1880s. M.D. Pres. Vancouver Gas Co., Dir. New Westminster and Nanaimo Gas Co., v-Pres. Victoria National Electric Tramway Co., B.C. Fire Insurance Co.

C.E. Pooley

MLA 1882-1903 Esquimalt. Speaker 1887-1889. m. dau of William Fisher, former MLA and English Broker. Lawyer in partnership with A.E.B. Davie, Dunsmuir's law firm. Shareholder in Victoria Colonist. Dir. Esquimalt Water Works. Victoria Jockey Club, Pioneer Society.

E.G. Prior

MLA Victoria City 1886-1888; 1902-1903. Premier 1902-1903. MP 1888-1902; Conservative. Served as Pres. British Columbia Liberal- Conservative Association. Engineer Vancouver Coal Mining and Land Co. 1873-1878. Named Govt. Inspector of Mines 1878. Owner E.G. Prior Iron and Hardware . v-Pres. Victoria Board of Trade. Union Club, Vancouver Club. Mason.

R.P. Rithet	MLA Victoria City 1894-1898. Mayor of Victoria 1885. Conservative. m. E. Munro dau. of HBC Chief Factor Alexander Munro. Partner Albion Iron Works, Canadian Pacific Navigation Co., Victoria Canning Co. Shareholder Victoria Electric Illuminating Co. Officer Victoria Board of Trade. Dir. Victoria and Esquimalt Telephone Co. Victoria Jockey Club, Union Club.
John Robson	MLA Nanaimo 1871-5; New Westminster 1882-92; Cariboo 1890-1892. Res. Victoria. Justice of the Peace. Est. <u>British Columbian</u> (New Westminster) 1861. Editor Victoria <u>Colonist</u> 1869- 1875. Paymaster CPR west of Rockies, owner of <u>Columbian</u> (New Westminster). 1882- 1892. Coal Harbour Land Syndicate.
Joseph Trutch	Lieutenant-Governor 1871-1876. Conservative. Engineer. Oversaw construction of major pre-Confederation projects. Shareholder/Pres. Victoria and Esquimalt Telephone Co.
J.H. Turner	MLA Victoria City 1886-1901. Victoria City Council 1872-1879, Mayor 1879-1882. Provincial Agent-General in London 1901-1915. Partner Turner & Beeton Wholesalers and Dry Goods. Victoria Board of Insurance Underwriters. BC Pioneer Society. Mason.
G.A. Walkem	MLA Cariboo 1871-1882 Premier 1874-1876; 1878-1882. Res. Victoria. Named Supreme Court Justice 1882.
W.W. Walkem	MLA S. Nanaimo 1894-1898. Liberal-Conservative. bro. G.A. Walkem. M.D. Inspector of British Columbia Penetentiaries and provincial Coronor 1878-1895. Surgeon at Wellington Colliery.

SOURCES: <u>Canadian Parliamentary Guide</u>; <u>Electoral History Of British Columbia</u>; Howay and Scholefield, <u>British Columbia From the Earliest Times</u>; Kerr, <u>Biographical Dictionary of Well-Known British Columbians</u>; <u>Williams Official British Columbia Directory</u> (Victoria: Victoria Printing & Publishing, 1893-5).

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