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CAMPAIGN BY COMMERCIAL: A STUDY OF ADVERTISING STRATEGY AS REFLECTED IN
POLITICAL ADVERTISING BROADCAST DURING THE 1988 CANADIAN GENERAL
ELECTION

by

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B.A. (Special), University of Alberta, 1983

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THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
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of
Communication

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Campaign by Commercial: A Study of Advertising Strategy
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ABSTRACT

Televised election advertising provide politicians and political parties with the best opportunity to disseminate their message to a vast number of people during the short period of time of an election campaign. Ads not only provide politicians with the best opportunity for associating images with emotional appeals, but also supply the voter with information as to leadership and issues.

However, these communicated packages of information are not based, concretely, on what issues may be of national importance for debate during a campaign. Rather, voters' projections of the meaning of leadership, and information identified by marketing specialists as important in a campaign are processed and packaged to voters. The marketing and advertising professions have fused with election campaigns and politics, in general.

This thesis is a study of the interwoven relationship between politics and marketing which results in image politics. More specifically, this thesis is an attempt to show the extent to which the 1988 Canadian general election campaign ads embody the advice of professional strategists. The initial chapters provide the theoretical background to marketing concepts which are then applied to image politics: The image/ marketing/ advertising/ strategist concepts are studied within a Canadian context. This thesis will attempt to show the relationship between the strategy and the aired ads through interview material, an analytical discussion of the ads tying the strategy to the produced ads and, finally, survey results based on a sample's impressions of the ads.

Through the final chapters, the thesis will discuss three basic marketing concepts as applied to political strategy (market plan), the design of ads

(implementation), and response (sales). The thesis will reflect the argument that the ads from the 1988 federal election campaign embody the strategy of professionals as derived from marketing techniques.

QUOTATION

Image and content of television political ads becomes increasingly important when it is realized that the viewer is constantly in a political election. Politicians and their strategists are concerned with image as the electorate watches, not listens and sees Stanfield stumble, Diefenbaker shake, Clark quake -- politics has become a spectator sport. (Camp,1981:xii)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This thesis has been an exercise by which to satisfy an immense curiosity about the interwoven relationship between politicians, the electoral process, and marketing techniques within the context of a national election campaign. This curiosity dates back at least ten years: There are many individuals -- journalists, political friends and challengers, campaign co-workers, professors, and colleagues -- who have whetted my interest in this topic.

This thesis has satisfied this curiosity to a degree but, like political advertising, it just "didn't happen." This work could not have been accomplished without the support of individuals within the Department of Communication. In particular, I would like to thank Professor William Leiss who allowed me the liberty to explore the topic, and provided support for opportunities that seemed unreachable. As well, I wish to thank fellow graduate students and friends who shared frustrations and triumphs during our time here.

As well, I am appreciative of the students who participated in my sample study. Their comments became "my window" through which to view the political ads during the final stages of this thesis.

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CHAPTER I

THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN: A RACE AMONGST LEADERS

In politics image and reality are two strands of a single cloth. The greatness of political leaders rests on how well they perform their ritual roles. Further, the need for performance is not what distinguishes the honest politician from the dishonest politician. Voters need to guard against unscrupulous politicians who have no true commitment to their own performances, yet we need to remember that all politicians must be concerned with style and image. (Meyrowitz,1985:279)

Introduction

Federal election campaigns are political "horseraces" (who's ahead) in which debates over substantive policies lag behind the emphasis parties place on developing positive images of their leaders in the public mind.

Canadian political scientists have long felt that understanding the image which individuals hold of political parties and other political objects can contribute significantly to the ability to comprehend the fundamental elements of electoral behaviour in Canada. Of the 1968 election, John Meisel argued that party images might be "the key" which separates long term, more stable components of the vote in federal elections from less traditional practices of electioneering (Clark,et al.,1980:171). Clarkson indicates that analysts of Canadian voting patterns have established that a majority of the electorate is composed not of loyal partisans who vote for their party through "thick and thin" but of flexible and new voters who make up their minds in response to short-term considerations of issue and image (Clarkson,1981:152).

The significance of party leaders in Canadian electoral politics is seldom disputed. Political scientists have traditionally attributed considerable importance to party leaders: Electoral campaigns which focus on the personalities and styles

of party leaders provide a means by which parties can build broadly based coalitions while avoiding potentially divisive discussion of issues (Clark,1980:207). Occasionally, the party leader possess such a commanding personality (as did Pierre Trudeau) that the image supersedes that of the party platform. At such times, it is to the party's advantage to call as little attention as possible to its traditional policies and to put as much emphasis as possible upon its leader (Beck & Dooley,1967:76). At present, however, relatively little is known either about individuals' perceptions of party leaders, or the actual impact of party leaders on voting behavior.

Political parties have customarily built their electoral appeals around their leaders, but only with television did the focus on leaders reach the level where individual candidates for parliament become relegated to a relatively insignificant role in media election coverage (Soderlund,1984:128-9). Election campaigns have focused on the words and actions of party leaders, which is reinforced by the media's judgement of "newsworthiness" of comments by leaders in campaigns (Clarkson,1981:183). The media do not simply refer to leaders by name; rather, the media describe and evaluate the conduct. In doing so, the media help to establish a climate of opinion that influence voters' judgements of them.

Still, what the ideal leader must be is articulate and expressive in ways acceptable and effective on television. The leader needs to be able to stress the appearance of competence, rather than the fact of it. He needs an ability to appear assured and confident, because that is the impression he will leave with viewers long after his words and pictures have faded (MacNeil,1968:140). For example, Gary Hart, a contender for the 1988 U.S. Democratic leadership race, tried to give the impression that he was a happily married man when he was not. New York producer Tony Schwartz calls that "image retouching": people

cannot be told something when they know the opposite is true (Jamieson,1984:xxi). When images in a leader's ads differ from those seen elsewhere opponents often focus on exposed weaknesses. Ads are constrained, as well, by the national agenda of issues and themes.

The image specialist/ media advisor/ political strategist deliberately place leaders in settings that present a selective view of the leader's most attractive attributes. The advisor exploits the best features of the leader's personality to form "television personality." Through research, rehearsal, and controlling and staging events the party leader is never allowed to expose his "naked" personality. The television personality is a composite of how he performs on the medium, his political role and his personal qualities (Nimmo,1970:144).

The key element in a national campaign in Canada has become the leader's public performance, the effectiveness of the campaign ads and the quality of the party organization, especially with respect to the leader's tour (Fletcher,1987:367). The media and party professionals have given the leaders emphasis at the expense of other factors, such as policy. The choice for the voters is one between leaders judged as television performers and how well advertising experts and campaign managers have strategized, rather than between discussions about the country or of policies.

Research conducted to date suggests that images of party leaders have an impact on electoral behavior in Canada. Fletcher suggests that leadership has been among the ten most frequently mentioned issues by both television and newspapers since 1974, peaking in 1979 and 1984 when it was the most frequently mentioned single issue (Fletcher,1987:359,360). The proportion of voters who moved to the winning party cited leadership as having the greatest impact

on their decision and this determining factor has been growing. Those voters who shifted between 1972 and 1974 was 20 percent; between 1974 and 1979, 31 percent; between 1979 and 1980, 44 percent; and, between 1980 and 1984, 49 percent.

Political leaders must, therefore, create the impression that they deserve to be voted for. Even the term "leader" evokes an ideal type which public officials try to construct themselves to fit. In this sense leadership is dramaturgy, for regardless of the consequences of politician's actions, the ability to create oneself as the ideal type draws support.

Harold Clark in Political Choice in Canada suggests that personality and style are the most salient factors in assessing leadership image. These characteristics far outweigh a leader's position on issues and policies in the final image implanted in the mind of the voter. The desire of political parties in Canada to make leadership the key issue in Canadian general elections since 1979, especially, has resulted in building of short-term strategy on an issue of style rather than policy (Gilsdorf,1981:66). By the time the 1988 election was fought image-based politics was firmly entrenched.

Television is a visual medium, and to use it effectively, the leader must project the proper "image" or picture of himself to the voter. The importance of leader image relative to other information may be greater for voters who depend on television. Television presents the leader as a person, and information obtained through television seems more credible (Keeter,1987:345-6). The form the image takes depends on what the party leaders represent -- what party they belong to, what actions they have taken, and what policies they advocate. Image also depends on how the voter feels about the leader's party, past actions and

future policies (Patterson,1976:72).

The question, "What influences the development of political image?", is one of the most interesting controversies in political communication. The debate is whether images are results of what the leader has projected (message or stimulant determined) or a result of what a voter projects onto the candidate (receiver-determined) (Kaid,1981:255). Nimmo suggested in 1976 that neither approach is sufficient alone and that a combination offers the most useful explanation of candidate image formulation (Kaid,1981:255).

Political images are a specialized application of image-making: They serve as devices of short-term identification, distortion, appeal and illusion. Images, in a commercial sense, are fabricated in order to produce results in the marketplace. Similarly, political images are most effectively applied in the marketplace of politics, campaigns and elections (Melder,1986:8). The voter supports the kind of leader who seems to represent the values the voter holds. Ultimately, whether true or misleading, leader images are projections of faith and belief. The "great" leader image depends on mystification and careful management of public impressions. Mauser indicates that the key to political image planning is the leader concept which takes into consideration personal leadership style, ideology, or partisan affiliation. For maximum effect in campaigning the candidate concept should be used as a central theme and basis for planning entire campaigns. It should indicate why the voters should support the leader and should shape positions taken on issues (Mauser,1983:15).

Whether or not they make a difference, aspirants and incumbents present themselves as unique choices, offering something different from their rivals in style, personality, policies, empathy or intelligence. A high proportion of their

publicized actions and language bear the "I'm different" message. Incumbents have their own special needs, particularly ones who have attracted the voters by making unpopular decisions or breaking campaign promises. The "apology" strategy is one tactic that has been used successfully in campaigns (Sabato,1981:128).

A prime minister has automatic access to the news media the years leading up to an election campaign and has the "trappings" of office at his disposal for use in the campaign: appointments to positions and special committees during the campaign period; visits with world leaders; opportunity to manipulate domestic issues by diverting or lessening the impact of news with pseudo-events which results in stories covering other parties getting "buried" in the news; surrogates used to campaign for the leaders; a message that reelection will communicate to the world a sense of stability; and, emphasis on administrative accomplishments. But the disadvantages include records and actions which must be explained and justified: the media creates a climate of expectation and conflict during a campaign.

Challengers to the incumbent must take the offensive position and question every action, issue and stance of the incumbent, call for change in direction and leadership, create constituency groups and always claim to speak for the forgotten, silent majority and mid-groups (Devlin,1982:88). In every federal election in which a challenger faces an incumbent, advertising in some form argues that the promises on which the incumbent was elected have not been met by performance (Jamieson,1984:118).

For many years researchers have consistently found that public perceptions of a leader's image acts as a significant factor in voting behaviour; yet,

researchers are not yet able to delineate precisely what qualities constitute the ideal candidate in the public mind. One reason for this failure is that voters' priorities can change from election to election (Trent & Freidenberg,1983:75).

Candidate image consists of the subjective impressions voters have. The impressions can be of any type: that is, they can be thoughts about a candidate's issue positions, political philosophy, family or background, personality and leadership or even campaign style. Focus group experiments have shown that respondents select the most attractive candidate of the available alternatives and impute worse motives and capabilities to less attractive individuals (Sabato,1981:145). Voters acquire a mental picture of an ideal leader and use it as a gauge in evaluating the acceptability of the actual leader (Trent & Friedenber,1983:74). Viewed from this perspective, the reason for two common campaign activities becomes clear. First, one of the most crucial tasks facing candidates, especially during the initial stages of a campaign, is to determine what attributes in a political leader voters believe are ideal for the office sought. Second, campaign activities in later stages are designed to attempt to illustrate that the leader possess these qualities (Trent & Friedenber,1983:74).

The changing image of political leaders is much more than a surface change in style: Political reality and political ritual are closely interwoven. As Ferdinand Mount notes in The Theatre of Politics, "the idea that there is a real (efficient, useful) politics which is masked by an unreal (superficial) sham show is one of the most potent delusions of our time" (Meyrowitz,1985:276). When politicians and journalists speak of a difference between political realities and political images, examination of campaign discourse and political actions reveals that some manipulation is required even to create the image of "honesty" and that often a "stand on the issues" is itself an image (Meyrowitz,1985:277).

The advisors to party leaders emphasize image not issues because they believe, whether correctly or not, that most voters judge leadership more on feelings about personality than on issues. Voters are presumed to want to know what kind of person the candidate is, whether he is likeable and of good character, whether he is honest and sincere and whether he appears effective, authoritative and knowledgeable (Sabato,1981:145).

Thesis Format: Dissecting the Image

The intent of this thesis is to study television political advertising as a form of leader-centered campaign communication. As Kaid and Nimmo suggest, images are a result of what leaders project based on political strategy, and these images are in turn based on the voters' projections of the meaning of leadership. Thus, to those planning a campaign it becomes important to discover the "impressions" voters have of leaders, and then project these images back to the voter via the leader via television ads. This definition of image will be utilized in the latter chapters of this thesis. Political images reflect exchanges between party leaders and voters in which the leaders not only project selected attributes but must define an image the voters will believe.

Televised election advertising provide politicians and political parties with the best opportunity to disseminate their messages to a vast number of people during the short time period of an election campaign. The commonality of the election ads from the 1988 Canadian General Election by the Progressive Conservative, Liberal and New Democratic parties was the utilization of strategists who based their proposals for campaigns and campaign communication on results gained through marketing techniques.

This thesis is an attempt to show the extent to which the 1988 election ads embody the advice of professional strategists. The thesis will attempt to show the relationship between the strategy and the aired ads through interview material, an analytical discussion of ads tying the strategy to the produced ads and, finally, survey results based on a sample's impressions of the ads. Are the impressions gathered from the sample linked to the intended strategies?

The genre of television ads was selected for two reasons. Firstly, the medium of television is utilized to a far greater extent than other media by parties to disseminate information and is utilized by voters to gain information. Television is able to reach geographic areas that political leaders may not physically reach during a campaign. Secondly, in political advertising the messages disseminated and, thus, the images of the leaders are controlled, for the most part, by the parties. The news media does not control the content of the party paid message. However, it is noted that opposition parties do, just as fiercely, produce ads aimed at the opponents.

Chapter II provides the theoretical background to marketing concepts which are then applied to image politics, as defined in Chapter III. Election campaigns and the political arena gather voter impressions of issues and politicians. Favorable impressions or popular opinions or beliefs are then communicated back to voters in the attempt to gain support.

Chapter IV places the political/marketing/strategy relationship in a Canadian context. As this chapter will attempt to show, the relationship is not new. In the 1940s, for example, both the Liberal and Conservative parties employed advertising agencies to assist in planning election campaigns.

Chapters V, VI, and VII present the argument of the thesis through interview material (Chapter V), analytical discussion of the aired ads (Chapter VI), and survey results based on a sample's impressions of selected 1988 election ads (Chapter VII). These three chapters will attempt to provide a progressive argument showing the ad strategies as discussed by the strategists, discuss the strategies apparent in the ads, and the impressions of the ads by a sample. These three chapters encompass two basic questions: Is the strategy apparent in the ads? Is the strategy apparent to the consumer? Specifically, the discussion within these three chapters is as follows.

Discussion in Chapter V as gathered through interviews with the strategists will attempt to show the emphasis by all three parties placed on party leaders and the importance of party leaders to "deliver" the party's positions. The discussion of each party strategist defines the importance of marketing research in defining the election communication.

Chapter VI will attempt to present an analytical discussion of the 1988 ads. The chapter will attempt to demonstrate the correlation between the strategy and the produced ads. The discussion within the chapter will present a broad overview of the content of the ads (evident themes, types of ads used, evident symbols, and the use of leadership).

Chapter VII will, first, discuss six specific ads which were selected for the sample based on criteria as to presence of leader, and whether the ad was judged to be negative or positive. The chapter will then attempt to discuss the impressions of selected ads gathered from a sample. Is the planned strategy reflected in responses from participants?

What these three chapters attempt to discuss, then, are three basic concepts which could be defined in marketing terms -- strategy (market plan), the designed ads (implementation), response (sales). Is there a correlation between the three concepts in the election ads?

The conclusion, Chapter VIII, will attempt to reflect the argument of the thesis which is that the ads from the 1988 federal election campaign embody the strategy of professionals as derived from marketing techniques.

CHAPTER II

MARKETING TECHNIQUES: AN INTRODUCTION

The relationship between citizens and their political leaders has been the relationship of persons to packages: packages with human faces and form and somewhere in the wrappings, no doubt, a winning but fallible human personality. But it's a package put together by pollsters, image-makers, pulsetakers, and speech writers. Voting for such candidates is not a choice. It is buying a product. (Westbrook,1982:145)

Political advertising does not "just happen." The creation of political communication is based on a process of creation, tests and re-creation: this creation of political communication "marries" the fields of marketing, which includes advertising and polling, to politics.

Advertising strategies have replaced party platforms as the basis of election campaign communication and with an increase in the use of advertising strategy, there has been a decline in the role of political parties which used to be the vehicle for disseminating information about party leaders in a federal campaign. Many of the "campaign management" experts hired by parties have come from commercial advertising and marketing professions, who have helped shape commercial political advertising. The politician's "image" must be promoted via some avenue. With the decline of partisanship and the atrophy of party organization, a new style has emerged in election campaigns -- a style which relies on marketing which, in turn, relies on appeals directed at voters through the communication media by experts skilled in the techniques of mass persuasion (Westbrook,1983:152). Experts in marketing and advertising were initially hired because party politicians lacked the skills to run a commercialized campaign.

Although there is considerable debate about the types of advertising used in political campaigns, political parties must utilize ads. The compacted election period in Canada of eight weeks creates a hectic campaign, which, in turn,

encourages a belief in the need to do at least as much advertising as the other side is doing within the legal limits. Television commercials are not tailored to the presentation of policy alternatives, but have become vehicles of attack.

With the importance of commercials, it was initially difficult to educate party authorities and members to the function of advertising and marketing agencies, and to convince them of the legitimacy of campaign costs. The advertising agency creates the advertising for the client and pays the media for the cost of publishing or broadcasting the advertising, less fifteen percent which the media allow the agency to keep. The client pays the agency the cost of the advertising, which is the total cost plus the fifteen percent (Camp,1970:287).

In spite of the increased use of advertising by leaders and their political parties, the value and impact of televised political ads remains largely unknown. Shyles identifies concerns about their rightful role (if any) in the political process which has led to controversial debates: Is the electorate informed by 30 and 60 second ads? Have these tightly structured "mini-extravaganzas" presented leaders so that, the electorate can significantly better judge issues, positions, and candidates personal qualities than they could without the ads? (Shyles,1986:111).

Media strategists for elections focus on attributes which preelection polls indicate as attracting the voter. Through television commercials, the politician¹ has the best opportunity for associating his image with certain objects, products or individuals. Campaign advertising may also provide the voter with issue coverage and information: This type of ad may be particularly effective if used by opposing parties to "refresh" the memories of voters of scandals and government overspending, for example. And through commercials, the party and

¹The terms "candidate" and "leader" are used interchangeably in this thesis.

the leader are in control of the message disseminated.

Media strategists utilize marketing techniques, such as polling and focus groups, to formulate the leader's image and television commercial. The key to creating successful advertising, political or not, is a comprehensive survey research. Before the ads are developed, strategists must decide what the advertisement will contain and what issues are emphasized. Among the questions political advisors need to answer in creating campaigns are defined by Nimmo as the following (Nimmo,1978:112-13):

What motivates audiences? The stronger a voter's party identification, the less likely the success of the opposition's appeals. Thus, political advertising focusses upon identifying weak partisans and independents. Individuals respond to/prefer positive rather than negative stimuli.

What are the personality and social characteristics of the audiences? Some researchers argue that persons with particular clusters of personality traits are more susceptible to persuasion than people with other traits.

In today's campaign, ad creators rely on the results of public opinion polls to formulate an election campaign, as well as to develop and evaluate candidate's messages. Although candidates have always been concerned about the interests, preferences and desires of the electorate and the likely impact of campaign messages on the electorate, the amount of systematic probing of these attitudes has undergone huge changes.

Political polling was relatively new in Canada in the early 1960s, but it was already an accepted fact of political campaigns. Issues were determined by the pollsters in rank order of public concern and parties were rated on their performance on each issue. In any campaign, strategists seek to find the issues of least resistance to the voter and then develop the tactics best suited for that issue. Recent campaigns have been crafted to enhance the strong point in the

images of each party and leader and to draw attention to the weak point of the opponent. By 1984 even the NDP, who previously had not conducted extensive polling campaigns due to financial considerations, hired a company to conduct sophisticated polling and marketing. The advertising campaigns of all three parties were carefully targeted to particular regions, usually expressing concern for regional issues and promising general solutions (Fletcher,1987:355). The television ads were targeted at the switch voter and used themes that had been successful on the leaders' tours. In 1979 and 1980 the television ads were frequently negative attacks by the leader of one major party on the leader of the other, reflecting the leader-oriented and generally negative tone of the campaign. The freetime broadcasts were often expanded versions of the ads and were only marginally more informative.

During the 1988 campaign Allan Gregg, the Conservative party pollster, brought a new discipline to polling. He found it was possible to create the issue. Gregg indicates that:

It used to be that an election was won by ability to determine what the question was in the minds of the public. Now, through the technology of polling and television, it makes it increasingly easy to set the question in the moods of the electorate ... what they believe they'll be deciding on election day. (Lee,1989:41)

This fundamental change in election strategy was made possible by the research techniques developed for product marketing. Rather than merely monitoring voter intentions, pollsters found that they could conduct research that "unearthed the underlying fears, hopes and emotions of the public" (Lee,1989:41).

Any campaign comes down to one major issue -- leadership. In political advertising polling not only helps determine a candidate's strengths and weaknesses, but it also probes voter's perceptions of how those strengths can be enhanced and weaknesses remedied. A strategist must know what people will

react to. Pollsters collect intensive information on voters' concerns, their perceptions of the candidate, the extent of their political knowledge and the attributes they think a politician should possess.

One such type of polling is through focus groups, which helps the pollster determine what is on the voter's mind and what feelings issues and, specifically, ads can appeal to. Sabato defines the role and formation of focus groups as groups comprising of ten to fifteen individuals from predetermined population subgroups who are asked to join the sessions in random selections providing they fill the prescription (Sabato,1981:138). The individuals are paid a nominal amount for their participation by the firms that organize the focus group. Once gathered together, the group is shown the advertisements and asked a series of open-ended questions by a trained discussion leader to probe their reactions to each ad. The media consultants watch the dialogue behind a two-way mirror: the group discussion is always recorded for later analysis. Despite the nonrandom nature of the focus groups, the advantage of focus groups is that they can be more thorough than most polls, and the responses can be more unstructured than surveys permit.

With the survey data, campaign planners decide what they want their advertising to do for them. Depending on what the polling reveals, any or all of the information may be the basis for ads. Predicting reactions to advertising is a major challenge for strategists. No infallible process exists, but survey data can provide some good basis for such predictions. Political advertisers, Nimmo argues, are interested in the social characteristics of audiences because there is the possibility that communication patterns are influenced by demographics. An advertising appeal to a particular demographic group must employ the symbols and be programmed through media suitable for that audience. Political advisers

depend upon the opinion of individuals as the basis of campaigns.

Politicians, in a sense, can be seen as products competing against each other, as well as perceived to being similar to each other. Thus, challengers must appear like leaders and leaders must act like leaders. Mauser argues that the following communication strategies are most effective (Denton and Woodward,1985:83):

Stress important features of the leader which are most attractive to the target electorate

Avoid, or state euphemistically, the features that are deemed to be undesirable

Coordinate all information and advertising to reinforce the most important features of the candidate

If possible, attempt to move the candidate along those dimensions that can place him in an advantageous position

Mauser indicates that the problem facing the political adviser is quite similar to that facing the typical marketing manager (Mauser,1989:27). They are both competing for the support of a specified, target group under the constraints of time, money and personnel. Further, in both the political and marketing areas there is a set of organizations (companies or political parties) competing with one another for the support of the members of a target audience (consumers or citizens) by fielding various alternatives (products or candidates). Each organization (company or political party), in order to command a significant share of the market (the vote), must develop a comparative advantage over its competitors. And, consumers and citizens have virtually identical roles to play in each of their domains -- that of an individual decision-maker. Finally, the channels of communication that are available to candidates in most western democracies are basically identical to those used in modern marketing. Thus,

media campaigning is mediated communication, communication by means of a technology that permits the consultant to control, to a degree, the packaging and the content in which the leader will be presented to the voter (Westbrook,1983:167). Mauser states that the key to effective political communication, then, is to use control over image to package the commodity so that it constitutes a "projective field" that will reflect back to the consumer images of well-being to be achieved in consumption (Westbrook,1983:167).

But can a politician be treated like a product? Sabato argues that the comparison of politician with product advertising can be carried too far. Sabato indicates that viewers pay significantly more attention to political advertising while less than 20 percent of viewers can recall the average television product ads. The average political ad is remembered by 79 percent of those who see it and 56 percent can give a full description of the commercial (Sabato,1981:176). However, as Sabato indicates, there are a number of similarities between product advertising and political advertising: the advertiser must "know his product", then he must "look at the competition", and he must "understand his audience." The packaging is then adjusted to suit all three conditions (Sabato,1981:174). And, do not political advisors use these techniques, as well as product advertisers?

Politicians do utilize marketing techniques and research techniques, and are doing so, to an increasing extent. One reason for this increase is that marketing is characterized by two distinct methods for changing behavior: persuasive communications, and adaption of the personal communications to fit existing patterns of behavior (Mauser,1989:26). Marketing's principle contribution to politics lies in its professional approach to analyzing and managing behavior through a "sales concept" (persuasion) and the "marketing concept" (adaption) (Mauser,1989:45).

Voters decide who to support based on "images" of leaders. A leader should think of himself as a product, formulating an image to meet his target population needs and expectations and taking into account his competition (Mauser,1989:14). Most product advertising is based on a simple assumption about consumer buying habits -- people make purchases for emotional, not practical, reasons. Efforts at candidates' image-making rest on similar assumptions. The voter is "basically uninterested in making an effort to understand ... emotions are more easily aroused, close to the surface, more malleable. [The candidate] has to come across as a person larger than life, the stuff of legends" (Patterson,1976:101). This assumption about human behavior also dictates the content of product advertising.

Political advertising follows the same practise for the same reasons: it tries to associate, on emotional level, the voter with the position of political leader. The key to political image-making is the candidate concept. Personal leadership style, ideological position, and partisan affiliation build voter interest. Candidate concept reflects candidates thinking about why voters should support him, and should shape positions on issues to voter groups the leader appeals to. The party leader has to go through many of the steps that occur in product marketing: develop a personality (brand image), get the approval of an organization (company image), enter a race for the leadership (market test), carry out a vigorous campaign (advertising and distribution), get elected (market share) and stay in office (repeat sales) (Kotler,1985:85).

Mauser argues that marketing and advertising cannot offer formulas for success, for there are none: "All marketing can offer is heuristics, that is, useful procedures that may help to solve problems but contains no guarantees" (Mauser,1989:30). Marketing dares to make public what political leaders would

prefer to keep private. While marketing aids those groups who can best make use of marketing to "sell" their ideas and values to the public, to be effective, strategies for marketing political candidates must accommodate the values of the general electorate (Mauser,1989:20).

The Role and Purpose of Televised Political Advertising

Because television influences election campaigns it is important understand the television message that political leaders transmit, and to better understand the structure of the messages aimed at voters. Political advertising is different from product ads in one crucial way: the voter must select the candidate by casting a ballot on a particular day. From an advertising standpoint a political campaign culminates in a "one day sale" (Seib,1987:145).

In the age of "jolt television", the audience does not have the patience to listen to lengthy discussions or presentations, nor can political issues be treated in depth on television because of the cost of television broadcasts and advertising to political parties and broadcasters. Ads, now, provide information and insights to the voter: Political ads have replaced political speeches. Campaign ads provide, in capsule form, the basic issues, strategies and tactics of the campaign. The ads form the "psyche" of the public -- their likes and dislikes, their concerns and worries and their hopes and dreams (Denton and Woodward,1985:59-60). Ads must also fit within a general set of cultural norms and values as determined by the voters.

Since the 1960s, basic Canadian election advertising formats have changed little. Politicians continue to use testimonials and on-the-street interview formats. What has changed are the techniques used to create visual interest, to give the

audience a sense of participation, and to provide effective video entertainment (Nimmo,1970:150). In the 1950s ads usually featured the candidate in some formal pose: in the 1960s entertaining political ads became common. Yet, political advertising continues to provide an important channel of communication for candidates and a source of useful information for voters. Advertising strategy has replaced party platforms as the most important aspect of an appeal to the public. These ads do not sell a product the viewer can actually buy to take home: All they can do is create a favorable image to entice the voter to vote for the party airing the ad.

From the earliest days of televised politics it has been acknowledged among professional party workers, campaign managers and politicians themselves that the individual who makes the best appearance on television has a better chance of being a candidate in the first place, and the candidate who makes the best appearance has more of a chance of being elected. Obviously, there are other factors -- incumbency, ability to raise money, familiarity of a name -- but a face and personality that televise well are important qualifications to become a leader of a political party.

Television's most significant political characteristic is its ability to present an image of a politician, providing an indication of his character and personality. Most of recent research (Nimmo, Joslyn, Kaid) has indicated that "candidate images" are powerful short-term forces in the electorate's decision-making. It seems plausible that ads contribute at least as much as other media to the creation of an informed electorate. The very design of political ads is to advocate a particular point of view: to be persuasive rather than accurate (Joslyn,1980:98).

The electorate has a better recall of the content of "image" commercials compared with issue-oriented advertising, and recall is vital considering the intense competition for the attention of the voter not just among candidates but by commercial advertisers (Sabato,1981:145). The use of symbols and imagery was part of pre-television politics, but television added a sort of "technological temptation to be expansive"(Sabato,1981:147). To a television audience, pictures inform more than words. Television advertising must be articulated such that it appeals to both the conscious and the subconscious feelings of the voter. Political advertisements are used to impact on the voter's positive perceptions of the candidate and the negative perceptions of the opponent at the conscious and subconscious level. The ads focus on the politician's character, personality, record and programs -- whatever the theme and techniques of the ads, all ads are image ads or ads of perception.

Yet, explicit definitions of "political advertising" are not prevalent in the political communications literature. Kaid indicates that perusal of the literature indicates that most scholars and practitioners use the term to mean simply "advertising whose content is political": this may be the most convenient definition. In order to highlight characteristics of political advertising, Kaid suggests that political advertising might be considered, "the communication process by which a source (usually a political candidate or party) purchases the opportunity to expose receivers through mass channels to political channels with the intended effect of influencing their political attitudes, beliefs and/or behaviors" (Kaid,1981:250).

Media consultants recognize that political advertisements have a number of distinct purposes (Sabato,1981:121). Commercials can be used to establish name identification and draw attention to a candidate, increasing visibility. The

candidate's personal image may be developed, evoking certain feelings about the candidate based on selected personality characteristics. Not only can political advertisements stimulate participation in a candidate's campaign and attract new adherents for him, but they can also reinforce and motivate existing supporters. Finally, campaign commercials can be used to attack opponents in negative ads or used to defend the candidate after an opponents attack.

Political advertisements are one of the few forms of television programming which are completely under the control of campaign consultants and managers that develop them. These ads optimize creation of a particular type of personality and the particular "issues mix" that is desired. The ads are designed to maximize the best features of one's own candidate and campaign, or the worst features of the opposition candidate and campaign, or both. Campaign ads are explicitly designed to manipulate the public by creating desired association. Campaign ads are also used to set agenda and create a secondary reality that works to the advantage of a candidate (Buss and Hofstetter,1976:85).

Campaign communication, such as ads, do not act upon an unsuspecting, defenseless populace; rather, it interacts with a variety of social and psychological phenomena that protect individuals from manipulation. The fact that the public in general has fairly negative attitudes towards politicians indicates that candidate image is far from completely successful. Joslyn argues that even if the conclusion was that ads are typically effective, it is doubtful that the conclusion could also be reached that they contribute to public understanding. The typical ad is too simple, too vague and too misleading for the voter to equate perceptual change with learning (Joslyn,1984:203).

While the goals of political advertising are generally acknowledged, there is hardly any consensus about the best ways and means to achieve the goals: Political commercials differ in format. Some of the first paid political broadcasts were of candidates delivering speeches to rallies, but this proved dull to the audience. Sabato notes that one political consultant indicated that, "the television audience does not expect others to deliver speeches in their living rooms, particularly political speeches" (Sabato,1981:123). Witherspoon identifies six general classifications of the types of ads used (Witherspoon,1984:6-20):

(1) The Talking Head: the camera is aimed at the candidate and he talks. In the case of charismatic and photogenic candidates this is probably the most effective and definitely the least expensive type of ad. It can also be the duller for the viewer. Flags and bookshelves are common props used to give atmosphere to a talking head ad.

(2) The Candidate in Action: Not all candidates are trained actors. Although a politician may speak for himself he may not speak in a particularly viewer-appealing manner. Nothing can be more frustrating to campaign workers than a qualified candidate that just does not come across on the air. To show the candidate at work (a candidate among senior citizens) is one way to target voters and issues. The candidate is relieved of the one-on-one with the camera situation.

(3) Person-on-the Street: This is a version of a testimonial. It is risky in commercial advertising and because of the time constraints is much riskier in politics. The problem is credibility, due to the odds of getting an honest individual on the street whose opinion is worthy of building into a television commercial are far too high.

(4) Slice of Life: The practise of using paid performers and on camera announcers may be one area where commercial and political advertising do not mix. It is not the fact that the actors or announcers do not perform believably. It is that the viewer will correctly perceive it as a person getting paid to say something nice about the candidate. It is also expensive, using professional talent, sets, makeup and wardrobe.

(5) Attack and Compare: The result of this type of production, at its best, is to create distinctions with, for example, candidate A on the left of the screen and candidate B on the right side of the screen. In many cases, when the facts of voting record, experience or accomplishment justify it, this comparison can show the voter the alternatives. At its worst, this type of commercial is negative campaigning, ranging from mild innuendo to slander. The challenging part is to attack the opponent without sending a message to the voters that your motivations are not petty, vindictive or greedy.

(6) The 11th Hour Media Blitz: It is in this category of ads that is most likely to turn mean. It is the closing hours of the campaign and the most hotly contested races are the ones in which the 11th Hour Blitz are necessary.

Most media consultants consider the "talking head" uncreative but Sabato indicates that some studies indicate it has a high recall by audiences and is a good method of communicating both information and personality characteristics (Sabato,1981:123). All three political parties utilized this type of ad in the 1988 campaign. While the Tories integrated cuts of Mulroney in action within the Talking Head Ad, the Liberal and the NDP ran ads of Broadbent and Turner, respectively, only speaking to the camera. The "person-on-the-street" ad was first used in politics by U.S. Governor Thomas E. Dewey's 1950 reelection campaign in New York. The "person-on-the-street" style of ads have become increasingly popular because of their effectiveness. It generates the highest audience recall of all the standard commercial formats and is helpful in communicating with targeted subgroups (Sabato,1981:123). Only the Progressive Conservatives used this type of ad in the campaign.

The Tories utilized the "candidate in action" type ad which shows Mulroney in a variety of situations -- factories, international conferences, speaking to audiences and mingling with crowds. Predictably, the Liberal and the Tories attacked each other, disregarding the NDP: Both parties utilized the "attack and compare" ad format. Mulroney was attacked as being two-faced on the issue of pension cuts to senior's (In 1984 he said he would not cut pensions and then proposed to do just that), and indicated that he would not want free trade for Canada (although it was the Tory government which initiated trade talks with the United States). Turner was attacked for his lack of leadership and his inability to have a "team" -- a reflection of dissention within the Liberal Party.

In formulating ad content, name identification is the goal of political ads. Challengers facing incumbents need to become quickly known, and past accomplishments stressed. Thus, in addition to the ad the campaign biography, the poster, the badge, the press release and all publicity is aimed at a "magical transformation" of political image. Voters do come to understand better where the candidates stand on election issues from watching televised political commercials so much so that political ads have overtaken program time-buys and all other investments as the campaign organization's single largest broadcasting expense.

The paid aspect of political advertising gives the campaign organizers the right to control the form and content of the messages. Kaid identifies that this characteristic of political advertising has resulted in a strong distinction between "advertising" and "news" in the political arena: The distinction is described as a dichotomy between paid and unpaid media, purposive and nonpurposive communication, controlled and uncontrolled media, intentional and unintentional communication (Kaid,1981:250).

A candidate cannot use television if for no other reason than self defense, to neutralize what will undoubtedly be coming from the other side. Duplicitous ads are also minimized by the needs of campaigners to synchronize the images they present in ads, news and debates. Political managers believe that political ads require simple themes due to two assumptions. Firstly, many voters are uninterested and uninvolved in electoral politics; secondly, news reporting requires simplification and condensation. Politicians believe they can more successfully influence the content of campaign news by limiting the messages the media attempt to convey to voters (Arterton,1984:108).

Advocates of political advertising argue that because news coverage is dominated by superficial "media events" which are covered in the news, campaign advertising often presents insights into a candidate's character and more substantive discussion of issues than news reports do. Political ads are a invaluable source for candidates seeking to readdress the balance of the press/politician relationship when they think the news media have achieved an advantage (Seib,1987:122-23). But the advertising image must be a credible extension, not a contravention of the image of the candidate shown elsewhere whether that image is presented in newsclips or whether the candidate is seen "in person" by the voter (Jamieson,1984:xx).

The Influence of Political Ads on Voter Behaviour

Political scientists Thomas E. Patterson and Robert D. McClure have indicated their theory regarding electoral effects of political advertising, through an extensive study of the media during the 1972 U.S. Presidential election (Sabato,1981:18). They found that while commercials have no effect on voters' images of presidential candidates, they do have substantial influence on voters' perceptions of the candidates' images and platforms. The electorate apparently learns a great deal from political advertisements, enough so that the researchers could conclude that political ads educate rather than mislead voters. Conversely, advertisements are far more selective in content. The only issues raised by a candidate in paid commercials are those that will help him or hurt his opponent (Sabato,1981:118). Paid television ads are also proven "morale boosters" for a candidate's workers, and give volunteers material to use while campaigning. The major focus of political advertising research has been on the receiver and on the effects, with very little attention to source credibility, status or attractiveness

although considerable attention has been paid to candidate image as it is perceived by voters or as it is affected by messages. Kaid indicates that speculation on this topic indicates that political television advertising has created the attractive, movie-star type candidates (Kaid,1981:253).

The appeals made by candidates in televised ads constrain the learning that the public is apt to experience during an election campaign. There are at least three notable ways in which the content of the ads, described in a study by Joslyn, which delimits the public's political understandings (Joslyn,1984:45-6). First, the vast majority of ad appeals are candidate rather than party-oriented. This means that the public is being asked to judge a candidate as a person rather than as a nominee or representative or a political party with a political history and enduring philosophical bend. Consequently, it is hardly surprising that public opinion researchers have found that partisan cues and perceptions are decreasingly involved in citizen evaluations of candidates for public office and choices between them. Secondly, most of the candidate-oriented appeals focus on the personal characteristics, issue concerns and group linkages of the candidate. Such appeals are typically symbolic. In each case the appeal is a norm or value that is a cultural consensus, such as, "the candidate is an experienced politician." Hardly anyone would disapprove of any of these appeals: they are all attributes that the public considers "good." What the citizen is left to question, then, is not whether the appeal is good, or makes sense, or is correct, but whether or not it is believable. Thirdly, the appeals used by candidates that relate to public policy questions are not likely to assist the public in forming attitudes about future policy alternatives or the policy preference of candidates. Appeals that reveal policy intentions of the candidate are rare; rather, issues they care about are (vague) broad goals they approve of

(prosperity, efficiency, economic growth). Such policy discussions may reassure the public that the policy viewpoints are acceptable, but they do little to allow voters to choose a candidate on the basis of expected future policy actions and choices. And who is not in favor of prosperity, efficiency and economic growth?

Yet, the purpose of these ads is to affect voting behavior -- that is the ultimate test. Seib identifies elements that define "good" political advertising (Seib,1987:148):

The ads appearance: Is it striking enough to attract and hold attention? Does it measure up to standards set by the best nonpolitical ads?

The ad's message: Is the candidate's appeal presented so it can be easily understood by its target audience? Are appropriate issues and themes stressed?

The ad's penetration: Is the ad presented often enough? Does it use the form of media that will best reach the desired audience?

Seib argues that truly effective political advertising passes all of those tests. Such ads are the ones voters will remember and politicians will use as models for future campaigns.

Factors that govern the types of ads a media advisor will create include Seib's elements as well as the following which Jamieson identifies: strengths and weaknesses of the candidate and the opponent; what has worked in the past; finances; circumstances such as the public's need for certain types of assurances; the nature of the news coverage of the campaign; and, the aesthetic inclinations of the media advisor (Jamieson,1984:37).

Devlin summarises that the purpose or function of political advertising which establishes the interaction of political candidates with marketing techniques (Devlin,1986:22-24). Devlin indicates these functions as being:

Ads make an unknown candidate a better known candidate.

Ads are often aimed at late deciding or uninterested voter who account for 10 to 20 percent of the electorate. They are normally reached only through television in the last stages of the campaign.

Ads are used to reinforce supporters and partisans. As partisans' feelings are reinforced, they may contribute financially to the campaign.

Ads can be used to attack. A mix of positive and negative ads are increasingly used to convince voters why they should vote in a specific way. It has become vital in campaigns that the reasons why people ought to vote for the candidate be presented as well as why they should not vote for the opponent. A mix of positive and negative ads are increasingly used to convince voters why they should vote in a specific way.

Ads develop and explain issues. A sixty second ad has, on average, five times as much issue information about the candidate than a 60 second news clip on the evening news.

Ads can soften or define an image.

Ads are used to target particular demographic groups. Polling helps to indicate where potential voters are and how to reach them through advertising.

Ads cost money but they can also be used to raise money.

Ads are adaptable. They can be made, revised, and discarded as the necessities of the campaign change.

Ads are used because the competition uses them. Ads must be used to counter attack claims made by the competition.

State-of-the art advertising, as is used in national campaigns has proved to be an exceptionally potent tool, although it is used more for strengthening already existing attitudes than for building support. An effective campaign has a specific message, is aimed at a specific audience, is designed to provoke a specific reaction, and is well enough produced that it will stand out amidst the barrage of advertising on television (Seib,1987:123).

Diamond's four basis phases to advertising strategy could be coupled with Devlin's functions of political advertising as the functions needed to be activated into a strategic plan. Diamond indicates there are four basic phases to

advertising strategy: identification ads, argument ads, attack, and "I have a vision" (Diamond,1986:302-344):

The first stage of Diamond's advertising strategy ensures that the voters have some "sense" of the candidate. At the most basic level this means establishing name identification as a fundamental on which to build subsequent information. Name identification ads are frequent among the most simplistic of the political ads. The ad traces a narrative history of the candidate's life. These ads show the passages of childhood, school, family and life in politics. They may also include interviews with people the candidate knows. Incumbent leaders, their names, faces and voices familiar after the term in office, frequently use the props of their position (positioned with leaders of other countries) in these ads.

Phase two is the argument stage. The audience has been told who the candidate is: Now the audience is told what the candidate stands for. The content can be as varied as the kinds of candidates who run for office. Diamond's study of 250 argument ads shows three common patterns of rhetoric. Firstly, most argument ads do not get too specific. This is especially true of argument ads in general elections when the candidate is seeking wide support. Secondly, appeals to emotion are more likely to be used than arguments. The thirty and sixty second ad does not allow for extended development of ideas. Thirdly, and most important despite both the vagueness of the content, many argument ads make serious issue-oriented advertising. These ads take aim at some individual policy or interest group.

Phase three is the attack phase. Once the candidate's name, history and something of his personality and ideas are known, the campaign enters the negative advertising stage. Because attack advertising produces mixed results, media consultants have mixed feelings about using them. What is referred to as negative advertising is fundamentally inferences, innuendos, and half arguments. Some negative advertising is constructive, some is not, and the second kind has proliferated. It is much easier to produce and in a short time segment, it is much easier to say something bad about a person than something positive.

Phase four, the "I have a vision" phase, allows the candidate the opportunity to sum up, to appear on camera in repose, thoughtful and dignified without the overpowering visuals and the strident noises of the campaign.

But campaign ads do not change voters' minds. Rather, the political ad is a reinforcement, a nudge to the voter who is already committed, or at least leaning to one candidate (Seib,1987:123). The ad can strengthen the level of support and make it more likely that the voter will go to the polls on election day.

* * *

In many respects political ads are an effective way to communicate political messages. As Joslyn indicates, the appeals in ads are brief, simple and well-illustrated, and they are presented in a context that is less cluttered and distracting than a news story. In addition, exposure to ads is involuntary; consequently, the audience exposed to ads is usually both large and more representative of the electorate than is the audience for a newscast. Finally, since the ads are shown repeatedly, the chances are good that the message will be seen more than once by large segments of the audience. Frequent exposure to ads presumably increase the chances the public will become aware of their intended message. Consequently, although the public may discount the content of ads because they are advertisements under the control of the candidate, it is at least plausible that the public learns something from the exposure (Joslyn,1984:196).

It appears that campaign ads contribute to the electorate learning about candidate issue positions in certain circumstances. Ads are more effective when their content is credible and when they are consistent with other forms of communication. For those who are moderately informed or interested, and in those cases in which the advertising campaigns are making conflicting concerns, the effect is minimal (Joslyn,1984:199). If the perceptions gleaned from ads are accurate, if the citizens affected by these portrayals would have remained uninformed otherwise, Joselyn argues, that ads actually contribute more to the electorate than does either television news or newspaper coverage: however, these are two big ifs.

This chapter has defined the processes of marketing the image to voters. The American-orientation of the literature reviewed in this chapter is indicative of the "big business" the marketing of politicians is in the United States. Despite the orientation of the literature, the marketing of politicians is also implicit in the Canadian electoral process, as defined in Chapter IV.

Chapter III, "Image: A Question of Definition", attempts to define the "image" of a politician which the strategists utilize, as defined in this chapter, to market the politician to voters in the attempt to gain support.

CHAPTER III

IMAGE: A QUESTION OF DEFINITION

All television viewers, to a greater extent than they might suppose, would seem to have mental picture galleries in their heads, the walls of which are hung with portraits of heroes, lovers, villains, stooges, fathers, statesmen, politicians, comedians, and other stereotypical characters in television commedia dell'arte. With little conscious effort -- or perhaps in spite of conscious effort -- viewers probably match the images in their mental picture galleries against the images of candidates seen on television and derive an impression of the candidate, accordingly. (Wyckoff,1968:208)

Images are the conception of qualities that people associate with certain objects, products or individuals. Advertisers employ "image" in their efforts to sell products. A brand image is a "constellation of feelings, ideas and beliefs associated with a brand by users and nonusers mainly as a result of experience of its advertisers and performance" (Nimmo & Savage,1976:4). Similarly, advertising and marketing techniques enable voters to perceive, in political candidates, the qualities they really want to see in themselves: The candidate does not project desired qualities but serves instead as a suitable receptacle for "elements of projection that reside in the viewer rather than in the person viewed" (Nimmo,1970:144). Image advertising combines pictures and messages to highlight selected qualities of a product. The viewer "draws from" the candidate the concepts that are self-applicable and reflective.

There have been numerous attempts to define "image," and some of these discussions will be presented in this chapter. In the formal sense the word "image" means "to imitate". In its simple form "image" may be defined as follows: "to create a representation of; to create or produce a suggestion" (Webster's Third New International Dictionary).

The "image" concept is used in two legitimate but different ways in political campaign communication literature. In one sense image refers to the visual likeness of the candidate or how the candidate looks, for example: Here image is a visual impression, a graphic representation. The other sense of image, quite different from image as graphic display, is when the term is used to refer to the character attributes of candidates (Shyles,1986:113). Another, more frequent, usage of the term refers to character attributes of candidates. The image of a candidate, in this sense, refers to the candidate's perceived or projected personality traits and character attributes. Most research pertinent to candidate image has focused on this latter usage of the term.

The theories of "image" as defined by two widely quoted writers from the 1960s, Daniel J. Boorstin and Kenneth E. Boulding, will be briefly discussed here prior to a discussion of political image.

Boorstin, in The Image: A Guide to Pseudo Events in America, defines image to be an "artificial imitation or representation of the external form of any object, especially of a person" (Boorstin,1961:197). Boorstin's discussion of image in his book is widely quoted, even today. Boorstin identifies certain characteristics of the image -- it is synthetic or contrived, constructed to achieve certain goals. It is unbelievable, appealing to the common sense and values of its audience; it is passive, vivid and concrete, simplified and ambiguous (Melder,1986:185--93). Images offer information from which observers supply interpretations and draw conclusions.

He describes, for example, an image as individual interpretation of events and individuals. An image, as defined by Boorstin, is something we have a claim on and is a means made to order and to tailor each individual

(Boorstin,1961:197). If an image is not useful, it is discarded by the audience. Further, Boorstin distinguishes ideal-thinking and image-thinking. He defines an ideal as something already there created by tradition, by history or by God. It is not ambiguous: an ideal is what we actively work toward, not what we fit into.

But what determines image? Kenneth Boulding argues in The Image that each of us possesses a store of subjective knowledge about the world, a collection of ideas we believe to be true: This knowledge constitutes our image. The image is built-up as a result of all past experiences. A message consists of information in the sense that it is structured experiences: The meaning of a message is any change which it produces in the image based on information acquired. (Boulding,1961:6). Boulding's theory claims that when a message collides with an image one of three things happen (Boulding,1961:7-11): Firstly, the message may remain unaffected. Secondly, it may change the image in some rather regular and well-defined way that might be described as a simple addition. Thirdly, a message hits some sort of nucleus or supporting structure in the image and the whole message changes drastically. Further, Boulding indicates that the subjective knowledge structure or image of any individual or organization consists not only of images of "fact" but also images of "value."

The image of value is concerned with rating various parts of our image of the world, according to some scale of betterness or worseness. The development of image is part of the culture or the subculture in which it is developed, and it depends upon all the elements of that culture or subculture. Each person has an image not only of his own role, but of a great many roles around him. These images are constantly being changed by the messages received (Boulding, 1961:105). Boulding indicates that the political image is essentially an image of roles.

To Boulding, then, an image is a person's storage of subjective knowledge. An individual's image governs that person's behavior. Images come from our experiences and are unique to the persons who hold them, and are reflective of reality. The theories of Boorstin and Boulding imply that an individual's perception of, for example, "a tree" is dependent on past experience and influence. Further, how the tree is presented would also be influential in an individual's perception of the tree. (Another of Boorstin's theories will be discussed later in this chapter.)

Role of Political Symbols

As discussed, images are mental representations that influence how people see political, as well as other, concepts: Images help people to achieve tangible goals, to make judgements, and to express themselves. Persons exchange images by using symbols in both interpersonal and mass communication. In communicating images people create in their minds the content of the messages of others; sometimes they do this successfully but often they do so only imperfectly (Nimmo,1974:51).

Dan Nimmo defines political imagery as interpretative behavior, such that people do not simply respond in predetermined or conditional ways to flags, anthems, political advertising, patriotic and/or revolutionary appeals (Nimmo,1970:7). Instead people interpret political signs and sometimes arrive at meanings shared by most members of the community and at other times reach different, even conflicting, images. In any event, each sign does not simply "stand for" something -- it becomes a symbol with an image of its own to each citizen, a meaning apart from the visible referent (Nimmo,1970:7). Nimmo's

theory discusses images as the concepts of qualities that people associate with certain objects, products or individuals.

Nimmo's definition of "image" is that it is a subjective, mental construct; is influenced by projected messages; and affects how things are perceived. The party leader's image consists of how he is perceived by voters, based on both subjective knowledge possessed by voters and the messages projected by the leader (Nimmo&Savage,1976:8). The content of image contains the aspects of cognition (what is known about the candidate), affect (how the voters feel about the leader), and conation (what a voter proposes to do about a leader; that is, behavioral intentions).

Negative Connotations of Image

But "image", as used in the political arena, often evokes negative connotations. Audiences associate image with "manipulation of existing characteristics or the conjuring up of new ones" (Hahn,1972:60). Public figures are known primarily for their images, images that somehow mask the "true" or "real" nature of things. Dan F. Hahn argues in "Political Myth: The Image or Issue" that the negative view of image and image manipulation may be associated with the so-called image-makers (those who attempt to shape message dissemination through association and control) who may conceal "all" about their candidates they want concealed, reveal "all" that they want revealed, and "sell" a largely nonexistent person to the voter (Hahn,1972:60). Hahn further argues that images of political candidates are composed of at least five elements: personality orientation, views of leadership, political and personal ideology, epistemology (human knowledge), and axiology (ethics) (Hahn,1972:61). These elements are

evident in leader-oriented political campaigns.

However, Thomas Patterson notes that, as a candidate's image develops, people's impressions of the candidate become progressively more general, but the overall focus of those impressions remain constant. These abstract opinions that develop are more likely to concern candidate's personality than his leadership if voters are primarily exposed to and informed about his style (Patterson,1980:138).

The Role of the Audience

The professional campaign manager or image-maker relies heavily on two cornerstones of behavioral science: attitude psychology and survey research (Westbrook,1983:160). The strategy of the campaign manager is to consider voter attitudes. He attempts to use existing voter attitudes and make them work for him, firstly by reinforcing the attitudes held by voters favorably disposed toward the leader; secondly, by creating a perceptual environment that will make it appear to the undecided voter that a vote for a particular candidate (or against a particular candidate) is the best way to express his attitude at the polls (Westbrook,1983:165). A voter's image of a candidate is the result of a process of interactions, including symbolic interaction, between the voter and the candidate, through which the voter selects some of the candidate's attributes, processes them in his mind and uses them as symbols for further interaction with the candidate; that is, whether or not to vote or support that candidate. This implies that the process by which the voter favors his image of the candidate includes several main stages: attribute selection, attribute processing, evaluation, behavior, and feedback (Shama,1974:10).

There are a number of ways in which the bond between campaign messages and target audiences can be conceptualized. One way of approaching communication with an audience is in terms of the public's partisan predispositions. Partisan predispositions are tendencies developed out of "habitual preference for the candidate of one party and habitual rejection of opposition party candidates, sought and favorably interpreted information leading to impressions of favored candidates and to avoid misinterpretation, distortion or forget information and impressions of opposition candidates" (Wyckoff,1968:205). Many voters have a psychological attachment of loyalty to a party. Closely related is the idea of dividing the population based on predispositions towards a particular candidate. Here the goal is to communicate with those who are supportive of or undecided about a candidate and to ignore, if possible, those who already have negative feelings (Joslyn,1984:58).

The extent to which voters' impressions concern a candidate's style, however, depends on how well formulated the candidate's image was before the campaign began. While it is difficult to change the public's fixed image of a candidate it is much easier to create an image where none previously existed (as for a new candidate) or through selective emphasis on personality characteristics and issues to cause a preexisting image to be viewed in a new context (Sabato,1981:144).

The "image" of a party leader, then, is determined by the interaction of his personality and orientation to the world with ours. Foremost in media campaigns is candidate image in which the campaign organization stresses human qualities of the candidate, his association with key issues and his competence for the job. Two theories of political imagery become evident. One is that image is something a politician, or his aides, creates, projects and sells: if the image has

no consumer appeal, the politician simply creates a new one. The other view is that the mass mind is not so easily manipulated, that images of politics reside instead in the minds of people and political leaders adapt to them (Nimmo,1970:vii).

A candidate's appearance and demeanor appear to provide viewers with the most substantial clues to his character. The rational import of what the candidate says on television, as long as it is not blatantly offensive to a large sector of the electorate, appears to have very little influence on viewers' perceptions of image (Wyckoff,1968:217).

The Political Image and Television

Michael Noval argues in Choosing Our King that it is impossible for a politician to avoid having an image: "A candidate has only limited exposure; he must reach over 200 million citizens in the United States, no one can look into his soul" (Meyrowitz,1985:278). Further, notes Noval, there is naivety and hypocrisy in pretending not to depend on image. Public office is "liturgical" in nature: a politician "does not act, should not act, is not expected to act solely in his or her private persona. He or she acts chiefly, and perhaps solely, as a public official, representative of the people, in a role marked out by law and tradition".

Television does more than just present political candidates. Television transfigures candidates into personal images or characterizations. Thus, it is necessary to have a term to describe this image: the term is "image candidate" (Wyckoff,1968:216). The image candidate is a leading character in the political "drama" presented on television before an election. The characterization tends to

be universally perceived regardless of viewers' political predispositions due to viewers' media predispositions in terms of television's stereotyped desirable and undesirable characters, stereotypes that may in themselves be projections of characters valued or detested (Wyckoff,1968:217).

To "measure" the value of image content in televised political commercials is difficult, in part, because the "image" concept has been used in two legitimate but categorically different ways (as defined previously) -- as either the "visual likeness" or the "visual impression" of the candidate.

Traditionally, the study of voter perception of political candidate images has been treated as falling into two broad categories: the candidate's political image, and the candidate's personal image (Husson,1988:397-8). The preferred candidate is defined in terms of two dimensions. A "personal" image factor (cheerfulness, reliability), and a "similarity" factor (to like or dislike the candidate) are both fundamental aspects of the relationship between voters and party leaders.

Studies have been conducted on the levels of positive or negative affects on feelings of "like" and "dislike" that individuals develop towards politicians. In 1969, for example, Norman H. Anderson of the University of California, San Diego published his research findings in an article entitled, "Likableness Rating of 555 Personality-trait Words." One hundred college student rated 555 personality-trait words on likeableness as personality characteristics, based on the hypothesis that the subject forms an impression of a person described by a set of personality-trait adjectives. The impression was then measured by having the subject rate the likeableness of the person, for instance, or by describing the person in his own words (Anderson,1968:272). The words were rated by the one-hundred subjects using the numbers 0 to 6 with 0 defining "least favorable

or desirable" and 6 as "most favorable or desirable." The subjects were told to think of a person being described by each word and to rate the word according to how much they would like the person. The top fifteen words in order of priority were: sincere, honest, understanding, loyal, truthful, trustworthy, intelligent, dependable, open-minded, thoughtful, wise, considerate, good natured, reliable, mature. The bottom fifteen words from 540 to 555 were: greedy, spiteful, insulting, insincere, unkind, untrustworthy, deceitful, dishonorable, malicious, obnoxious, untruthful, dishonest, cruel, mean, phony, liar. Words such as the above appear in the political ads from the 1988 Canadian general election. In the party produced ads promoting the leader words within the top fifteen category are utilized, whereas "negative" ads produced use the bottom fifteen to describe opposing parties and, particularly, the party leaders.

Most such research concludes that "trustworthiness" is a factor common to the image of all candidates rated as a preferred candidate (Shyles,1986:113). Terms found most often to describe favorable candidates in addition to trustworthiness are honest, experienced, intelligent, wise, strong, active, serious, true and optimistic.

Pseudo-events in Politics

A second theory of Boorstin's from The Image combines the image and political events and defines them as "pseudo-events", which Boorstin defines as "the new kind of synthetic novelty" (Boorstin,1961:9). "Pseudo" is derived from the Greek work meaning false, or intended to deceive. Boorstin defines the "pseudo-event" as having characteristics which are not spontaneous, but are planned, planted or incited events. The event is planned primarily for the

immediate purpose of being reported or reproduced: its relation to the underlying reality of the situation is ambiguous and it is intended to be a "self-fulfilling prophecy" (Boorstin,1961:11,12).

Pseudo-events are planned for dissemination, are easy to disseminate and to make vivid. Participants are selected for their newsworthiness. Nimmo and Combs define a variety of pseudo-myths/events which construct the election campaign -- pseudo-qualities, pseudo-associates, pseudo-issues, and pseudo-events (Nimmo & Combs,1983:112-16). Pseudo-qualities is the manufacture of myths about the personal qualities or professional qualifications of the candidate. Pseudo-association associates celebrities as explicit or implicit endorsers and, more directly, use them to prove that the candidate has famous friends of the candidate. Pseudo-issues are hyped "controversy" in a campaign that creates a myth that there is a major difference between candidates. And pseudo-events are mythical environments for candidates such as conventions and rallies which are choreographed for maximum possible media effect. The image in this sense becomes a distinction between what is seen and what is really there.

A question which arises is, "Is a campaign representative of real candidates, real issues, et cetera?" Images play an important part in getting people to accept the election of one candidate rather than another. Through "identification" with symbols, a candidate seeks to symbolize what he believes are the principle aspirations of the people (Nimmo,1970:101). The overshadowing image covers up whatever may really be there: The image can always be more or less successfully synthesized, doctored, repaired, refurbished and improved apart from the original of which the image is public portrait (Boorstin,1961:186).

Dan Hahn indicates in "Political Myth: The Image and the Issue" that voters are more strongly influenced by images than issues, to a surprising degree (Hahn,1972:57). He exemplifies this position with a study conducted by the American Institute for Political Communication which asked voters in the 1968 U.S. Presidential election the question, "If you had to name just one factor or thing which most influenced your voting decision in the Presidential race, what would that one thing be?" Despite the fact that voters tended to overemphasize the importance of issues, the results showed that:

. . . 41% of the respondents said one of the Presidential candidates or a characteristic of the candidate was the factor "which most influenced" their Presidential vote. Some 25% said an issue or issues was most important. And 13% opted for party affiliation and another 13% for the desire for a change in national leadership and 8.5% specifically referred to one or more of the media [a TV appearance, an editorial, a series of articles, et cetera]. (Hahn,1972:57)

Image Projection Strategy in Campaigns

Fact or fantasy, the image becomes the thing. Its very purpose is to overshadow reality. Thus, a leader's image consists of all the subjective impressions voters have. The impressions can be of any type; that is, they can be thoughts about a candidate's issue position, political philosophy, family or background, personality and leadership or, even, campaign style. Moreover, these impressions are then compared in the voter's mind not only to those of competing candidates but to the overall vision of an "ideal candidate." Although research has consistently found that public perceptions of a candidate's image act as a significant factor in voting behavior it has not yet been found what qualities constitute the ideal candidate in the public mind (Trent and Friedenber,1983:74-5).

One reason for this failure is that voters' priorities can change from election to election. However, there is an indication in much of the literature in the field of political communication that indicates the existence of three overall dimensions or major determinants of a voter's image of ideal candidates (Trent and Friedenber,1983:75-6). These dimensions are composed of three equal determinants. The first is credibility, in such qualities as high ability, good character and energy. The second is interpersonal attraction, which can be thought of as a candidate's social and physical attractiveness. The third is homophily, the similarities in personalities, social class, education background, or beliefs voters believe they share with the candidate. There has also been evidence which indicates that these dimensions may be overemphasized as they relate to the total image of a political candidate. However, Trent and Friedenber argue that creation and maintenance of image play a dominant role because voters have a whole series of impressions regarding those who seek elective audience that are compared with a personal vision of an ideal candidate (Trent and Friedenber, 1983:75).

Nimmo echoes Trent and Friedenber's position on image (Nimmo, 1970:129-30). He likens a candidate's image to the impression voters have of inner character, an impression constructed from physical appearance, style of life, bearing, conduct and manner. Any individual displays an image by assuming a role in life. Selective aspects of personality suitable to that role are emphasized and permitted public exposure: Those not so suited are underplayed, or compensated for by revealing other sides of the candidate, or are simply ignored. The image is not, therefore, that of the "whole candidate" but of dimensions of personality appropriate to the role and its setting (Nimmo, 1970:130).

Nimmo also argues that:

"all serious political pretenders (this writer's emphasis) must at least act as though they have the necessary attributes which means the candidate must select and emphasize the most appealing of his qualities, publicize them widely and repetitiously, and at the same time play down any limitations (Nimmo,1970:13).

This process of selectively publicizing desirable attributes is what professional campaigners term "image projection" (Nimmo,1970:13).

Controlling political images is a primary goal of politics. Lance Bennett writes that the symbolic component of an image is so simplistic, abstract and free of detail that the only way it can make sense is for people to add their own interpretations, fantasies and concerns. Thus, an image is an impression of something that is anchored partly in a symbolic suggestion and partly in the feeling and assumptions that people have in response to that suggestions. He indicates in News: The Politics of Illusion that most public relations experts agree that successful image-making involves three components (Bennett,1983:36-40):

Message Credibility: Composing a simple theme or message for the audience to use in thinking about the matter at hand. Political messages generally begin with a key phrase, idea or theme that creates a convenient way for people to think about a political issue, event or person. Political themes and slogans can get an image started by encouraging people to imagine things about a situation. The image is not some concrete entity that exists "out there" in the world but is the product of human imagination shaped by the suggestive symbolism of political messages.

Message Salience: Saturating commercial channels with messages so that messages will become more salient than competing messages. Images come into being only when the symbolic component or message becomes a frequent point of departure for the popular imagination. The need for a message to capture attention explains why the second goal of image-making is to saturate commercial channels with the message.

Message Credibility: Surrounding the message with the trappings of credibility so that, if it reaches people, it will be accepted. Arguments are more credible when they include sound logic, solid evidence, or reference to authority. Most political images make use of logic,

evidence or authoritative endorsements.

These three components reflect that the goals of image-making are fairly straightforward: Select a theme or message to spark the imagination; make sure the chosen message dominates communications about the matter at hand; and, surround the message with the trappings of credibility (Bennett,1983:40). The kind of image created for a political situation depends on what the image-makers want the public to do with the situation.

The image-makers work, then, with concepts like "charismatic", "likeable", and "youthful". And they strive to keep the candidate moving through shopping centers, schools, and factories. They utilize visual information on television to communicate the designed image. Candidates are also "improved" by association with symbols of desired qualities or favored groups. To emphasize warmth and sincerity the fireplace is utilized, and a living room with filled bookcases signify wisdom and competence. To stress a candidate's power or patriotism, the symbols of democracy such as the flag are evident (Sabato,1981:146). Symbols communicate more than the time would allow with words.

Rather than avoiding issues entirely, most political consultants are selective in articulating positions: "I tell a candidate never to lie about his position on an issue if asked, but if it's an issue that is going to cost him votes, he just should not publicize it... There are limits to even a consultants magic" (Sabato,1981:44). A live candidate is simply not as flexible or predictable a product as a bar of soap.

The "Composition" of Political Campaigns

Mauser indicates there are three concerns in communication strategy: target audience, message content and fixing the communications mix or media use (Mauser,1983:13). In developing strategy it becomes crucial for prospective candidates to identify the strengths and weaknesses of their competition and to understand the wishes of the electorate. Mallory suggest that at any given time only one party is truly in tune with a national mood and that party is likely to stay in power until the mood changes and leaves it politically "high and dry" (Mallory,1967:28-9). Nimmo and Savage identify effects of a campaign on vote intention -- it activates the indifferent, reinforces partisans, and converts the doubtful (Nimmo & Savage,1976:16). Voters must respond on the basis of subjective know.edge they are able to assemble from secondary accounts such as news reports, and the candidate's personal and televised appearances. In short, voters select candidates, form images of them and on election day those images help them make up their minds.

Politicians seek to persuade so voters need to be exposed to persuasive arguments. Well-known candidates have relatively little choice in selecting campaign themes; either they continue to develop images consistent with their past public life or they attempt to eliminate preestablished images (Arterton,1984:132). The immediate goal of candidates and campaigners is to devise messages that will motivate voters to vote for the candidate. Toward this end, campaigns develop communication strategies, themes and a specific message and attempt to convey them. In developing the messages, consideration is given to the leader's own experience and opinions; what messages other officeholders have used; messages that signify political actors (campaign contributions, party

leaders, other opinion leaders); and, consider messages they, themselves, would feel comfortable delivering (Joslyn,1984:21).

In a situation where the electorate is volatile and open to persuasion, campaign strategy is likely to become more important, but also more risky. If a campaign can entice a potential voter, it can also alienate that voter. (Frizzell,1985:98). Thus, campaigns seek to communicate messages to a variety of audiences: potential voters, contributors, party activists, and even their own staff members. Campaigns are efforts at persuasion to develop and maintain support (Arterton,1984:107). It is necessary, then, for a campaign to be highly structured and managed.

Joslyn identifies four types of appeals used in successful campaigns (Joslyn,1984:36-38). These appeals reveal a candidate's assumptions concerning what a voter needs or wants to know as a guide in choosing candidates. One type of appeal a candidate might use is a partisan appeal. This might involve identifying other members of the same party. This type of appeal assumes that voters are motivated by partisan loyalties. A second type of appeal concerns the personal characteristics of the candidate. This type of appeal attempts to convince voters that the candidate possesses qualities such as leadership, experience, honesty and intelligence -- or that the opponent does not. The third type of appeal involves the transmission of information regarding the demographic group which the candidate then identifies with. The candidate is portrayed as understanding and sympathizing with the problems, goals, needs or outlooks of certain groups in society.

The fourth type of appeal that a candidate typically transmits is concern for issues or matters of public policy. This type of appeal is more complex

than the other three since there are a number of different ways in which candidates discuss policy questions. One type of issue-related appeal deals with the candidate's issue or policy concerns. This usually involves an expression by the candidate that he cares about some issue. Such an appeal may not necessarily include any indication of what the candidate would propose doing about the issue or problem: It may focus primarily on who should be held responsible for a social problem. A second type of issue related appeal reveals a policy preference of the candidate, but only in the most vague ambiguous or symbolic way. A third type of issue related appeal involves the articulation of more specific policy proposals. What separates this appeal from the previous one is that it is possible for the public to anticipate a fairly precise legislative or bureaucratic action consistent with the appeal.

With these appeals, the way candidates approach campaigns have changed. Agranoff's study of U.S. Presidential campaigns from the 1930s to 1972 illustrates four changes in modes of campaign communication (Agranoff,1976:4-6). Firstly, the candidate, rather than the party tends to be the chief focus of present campaigns. Secondly, the party professional has given way to a different type of professional -- the advertising and public relations specialist, the management specialist, the media specialist, the pollster -- who perform services for candidates based on the skills acquired in non-political fields. Thirdly, these new professionals have brought to the campaign methods of obtaining systematic research about products, markets and audience prior to making important decisions, and have made electorates the new objects of their research. Fourthly, the new style of campaigning includes communication through a variety of media, but television has become the surrogate party worker and the vehicle for conveying candidate style, image and issues.

But it is pre-campaign polls which help uncover a theme for an image campaign. To appeal to the voter, it is necessary to know what voters "want". Campaign professionals contract pollsters to determine what the electorate is looking for in both ideal and acceptable candidates. Michael Kirby, television strategist for the Federal Liberal party in the 1988 Canada Federal election, indicates that values of the candidate, the leader and the party are more important than the issues (CBC Radio, October 1988). Kirby indicates that what the voter asks himself is, "Who is the person that is most inclined to make decisions of yet unknown situations? Whose set of values do I most trust?" Further, Kirby indicates that elections have become races of images, tactics and strategies: The parties know what the public wants to hear and the parties are in competition to make the public believe them when they say it.

Images are reflections of reality that carry information about things that lie outside the mind. Image-making, thus, is what the candidate runs as: candidate image is the sum of the perceived personal and characteristics of the candidate. The mechanics of political campaigns -- polls, ads, television -- are used in the attempt to convince the voter of the "right decision."

The "Image" as the Issue: The 1988 Canadian General Election

Can the discussion presented in this chapter be applied to the 1988 Canada General election? It should be noted that as the three key party leaders were "on the political scene" prior to the 1988 election, it is probable that voters had pre-election images of the leaders. It is also suggested here that despite pre-election images, the media handlers and strategists focused on attributes which pre-election polls indicated as attracting the voter. Furthermore, it should

be considered that while party officials were image-building their own party leaders, the other parties were, just as fiercely, attempting to discredit the image.

In the 1988 Canadian general election the Boorstin and Boulding definition of "image", which relies on the concept of individual interpretation based on past experiences and values, is applicable to the Progressive Conservative, Liberal and New Democratic election campaigns. Within the commercials, for example, the word "Canada", the use of the first four notes of "O Canada", and reference to national sovereignty were used in an attempt to appeal to the emotions of Canadians. The Liberal and Tory use of Canada "tied" the parties to the country, the implication being that this party is the party for Canadians. The New Democrats made reference to Canada as a country for all peoples and this reference became one that implied, "The NDP is the party for all peoples of Canada." Interpretations are individual, as Boorstin and Boulding note but, generally, a resident of a country feels inclined to feel positive about one's country, particularly when positive images (prosperity, happiness) reinforce the interpretation. The issue of poverty, for example, was not made reference to directly in the 1988 campaign.

Boulding's thesis that political image is an image of roles works to reinforce the "roles" played by Mulroney, Turner and Broadbent during the campaign. Mulroney "played up" his roles as leader and statesman which were reinforced through video clips from conferences and public endorsements. Turner's role, quite simply, was to not make errors during the campaign. Turner also played the role of the leader who would protect Canada from being signed over to the Americans. Broadbent's role was to persuade voters that he was a sincere, honest, and trustworthy leader.

Despite roles defined for leaders drawn from pre-election polls, individual interpretation is, again, important. Crucial to defining "an image" for any one of these three leaders is the fact that all three of these leaders were politically active since (or before) the 1984 election. What "image" was created in the public's minds during the four intermittent years, or longer periods of time as in the cases of Broadbent and Turner? It is suggested here that individual impressions created over the past four years cannot be "magically erased" in an election campaign. However, as is indicated by Patterson, images become more general over time and serve to positively or negatively reinforce/remind the voter of events in which the leader was involved (the positive image of Mulroney at the Tokyo Summit, for example).

The campaigns of the three leaders also attempted to express the commonality between the candidate's world and the voters, as suggested by Nimmo. Mulroney's moving through crowds, Turner's meeting with seniors, and the New Democrat's pro-Broadbent advertisements which included the words "we", "us" and "our" all worked to reinforce the image that the leaders are not only leaders, but people as well. For, if the voter is left with the image that the leader is "too above" the ordinary people (to use an NDP phrase), how is it likely that such a leader could understand problems about taxes, pensions and unemployment?

Hahn's notion of candidate image-composition, personality, leadership, political and personal ideology, epistemology and axiology are evident in television commercials produced by, and news events (pseudo-events) staged by, the respective parties which emphasized the party leader. Further, Nimmo's theory of selectively publicizing desirable attributes is also evident the campaigns of all three parties.

Further, Bennett's three components of successful image-making -- media composition, message salience and message credibility -- are key components in the television advertisements. These same features are suggested by Nimmo, and, farther, are interwoven with Trent and Friedenbergs dimensions or determinants of voters' image of ideal candidates -- credibility, interpersonal attraction and homophily -- are reflected in the "presentation" of Mulroney, Turner and Broadbent during the election. As was exemplified earlier, Turner's personal popularity increased after his credibility as a leader was substantiated in the debate. The dimension of credibility was used by the Liberals to attempt to discredit Mulroney in Quebec by airing an ad "reminding" Quebecers of the Quebec MP's who had resigned from Cabinet between 1984 and 1988 for government wrong-doings. However, the fact that the Tories gained seats in Quebec (while the Liberals lost seats) in the 1988 election may indicate that voters supported the party, despite wrong-doings of individual members.

"Image" itself was an issue in the 1988 election. Articles such as "Political leaders polish image" and "Votes can hang on the image-maker's skill" were devoted to defining the way in which the "images" of the three leaders changed. One article quotes Dian Brownell, a Toronto Communications consultant, as saying, "With any leader, image is 99 per cent of the perception." Other stories noted changes in image. CBC's "The Journal" broadcast a program on November 11, 1988 which focused on the media and on the image-making in the campaign.

The Progressive Conservative campaign presented Brian Mulroney as the experienced statesman, a leader, and a concerned politician. Visuals such as Mulroney speaking at the Tokyo Summit or speaking with factory workers implied his leadership in various social circles. The Progressive Conservatives presented issues in the campaign such as the Free Trade deal and emphasized

the government's announcements (between May and late September 1988) of seventy federal projects, totalling more than \$8 billion (Maclean's, December 5, 1988:21). Mulroney's campaign was referred to as a Presidential style campaign, referring to Reagan's style in 1984 in which Reagan stuck to scripts, avoided impromptu encounters and kept reporters and camera crews at a distance. This campaign style emphasizes the leader rather than the party and/or other candidates.

Mulroney's election announcement created a tone to set his campaign style: At the start of the election he was the government leader and intended to maintain that position. He announced the November 21st election "the way he wanted the public to see him; that is, looking very prime ministerial." ("Image is everything in this campaign '88"). Mulroney walked out of Rideau Hall, the Governor General's residence, to a lectern and to an audience of reporters and camera crews who had his full attention: subsequently, the audience was the Canadian voter.

But during the election campaign, Tory organizers attempted to control the news and Mulroney's image by allowing limited access to Mulroney, going so far as "fencing" off the media from Mulroney with a white plastic chain. This was later explained by party strategists as necessary due to filming taking place, footage which was to be used in the television ads. The media's choice was two-fold: cover the event as best they could, or ignore the story. Any news outlet could hardly afford the latter, but the "white plastic chain" became a story in itself.

Mulroney's eyebrows became an image debate: Does he or doesn't he pluck his eyebrows? ("Political leaders polish image"). The article, indicated previously,

discusses, with professional image-makers the image of the three party leaders. Some image-makers (Dian Brownell, and Gabor Apor, Turner's former media advisor and advisor to Ontario Premier David Peterson) believe that Mulroney's image has been calculated: to look more prime ministerial via the halfmoon glasses, more trustworthy (thinned eyebrows to give him a softer, less scowling appearance), and more approachable (casual sweaters rather than suit jackets). Brownell and Apor also suggest that Mulroney has lowered and softened his deep voice to exude a man who has quiet, commanding authority and a man who is unflappable and in full control.

But personal and physical appearance not only played a role in image-making. The location of the media event is also important. Images and pseudo-events such as Mulroney making his way through a crowd, smiling and shaking hands depicts to the voter Mulroney's popularity and public support (although the "crowd" was a gathering of party supporters packed into a hall or gymnasium). But Brian Mulroney and the Progressive Conservatives were not the only party to use "image" tactics during the campaign.

John Turner and the Liberal Party were in a difficult position at the start of the campaign. Turner and the Liberals were fighting an "uphill" battle from the start of the campaign. The Liberals were divided on issues such as Meech Lake, and Turner started the campaign off badly by contradicting Montreal Liberal MP Lucie Pepin's figures for the establishment of daycares (Laver & Mackenzie,1988:15) Turner was depicted in the media (and in the minds of those polled) as an incompetent leader; but, Turner was not only fighting an election campaign, he was also fighting the image of himself created between the 1984 and 1988 elections which saw repeated challenges to his leadership and his inability to keep the party united.

In terms of image Turner underwent the least noticeable change. However, Turner employed Henry Comor, a former physician, actor and broadcaster to help him get over the staccato speech patterns and nervous, throat-clearing laugh which resulted in jokes at Turner's expense during the 1984 campaign. ("Political leaders polish image"; "Votes can hang on the image-maker's skill"). Comor and Gabor Apor concentrated on getting Turner to relax and sound more confident in front of television cameras:

It was mid-afternoon and the leader of Her Majesty's Loyal Opposition was lying on the floor ... At 59 John Turner was learning how to breathe properly ... Dr. Henry Comor, [is] the media guru who taught him how to breathe ... Comor watched Turner videotapes, lots of them. What struck him the most was Turner's eyes would bulge and he would wave his arms as he tried to make a point ... "He's not breathing," Comor concluded. And it turned out that Turner really wasn't. Instead, he was concentrating so hard on making his point that he was forgetting to inhale ... So Comor set out to solve the breathing problem. ("Dr. Death' took Turner's gasp and gave him a smooth delivery")

The result was a less wooden delivery and the laugh surfaced only occasionally. The annoying sound he used to make as he cleared his throat had been eliminated ("Political leaders polish image").

Turner began his campaign at Liberal party's headquarters in Toronto, surrounded by candidates and supporters (a pseudo-event). The idea was to create an image of Turner as a party leader around whom support was deep, despite the opposite being true ("Image is everything in this campaign '88"). Setting was also used to emphasize the affects of free trade on Canadians. For example, Turner toured a number of old-age homes to make the point that free trade would adversely affect elderly Canadians.

Ed Broadbent and the New Democrats took on a "softer approach" than previous campaigns. In party television advertisements, Broadbent spoke in a soft, medium-tone voice. Since 1968, when he was first elected, he has gone from

shaggy hair and rumpled jackets to styled hair and tailor-made suits. He also had a gap between his two front teeth closed ("Political leaders polish image"). Broadbent developed his own comfortable television style, but Broadbent performs better before a small group of reporters in a close, intimate setting in which he sounds capable, sincere and competent: his handlers steered him away from "barn-burner" speeches, in which he tends to shout and gesticulate ("Political leaders polish image"). Prior to and during the initial stages of the election campaign Broadbent was the most popular leader, more popular than his party. An Angus Reid poll taken during the week of October 3, 1988 indicated that 60 percent of those sampled approved of Broadbent's performance in politics; Mulroney had an approval rate of 41 percent; while, Turner's performance was endorsed by 27 percent of the respondents (Laver, October 10, 1988:11).

Broadbent's campaign was based on the issues of family life, pensions, daycare and the affects of free trade on these issues. The phrase "ordinary Canadians" peppered his speeches and media campaign to the extent, however, that reporters began counting the number of times the phrase appeared in his presentation. Broadbent opened his campaign, in a "no frills" manner, in the press theatre in Ottawa because it suited his purpose. Broadbent is seen as a "regular guy" and his asset is the image of a "regular guy" ("Image is everything in this campaign").

Despite Broadbent's strong individual popularity and television ads which emphasized "Ed" talking about the issues to the "ordinary" Canadian, the failure of the party to rise to second place or better is related to strategists who hired American pollster Victor Fingerhut, of Fingerhut/Madison Opinion Research in Washington, D.C. which indicated that the free trade issue was a negative one for the NDP. Voters viewed free trade as an economic and managerial issue and

they did not believe strongly in the NDP's ability to manage the economy or international affairs (Janigan, December 5, 1988:21). The NDP in the early stages of the campaign dropped all references to free trade.

Three leaders, three parties, three images, one prime ministerial chair. In an election in which the parties' showings in the polls are as close as they were during the 1988 campaign -- Tories 45 percent; NDP 27 percent; Liberals 26 percent (Laver, October 17, 1988:12) as indicated during the first week of the campaign -- none of the parties can afford errors. The Tories needed to maintain their position, while the NDP and the Liberals had to run error-free campaigns to improve their standings.

Despite attempts by all three parties to conduct pre-election polling on which to develop election issues, and despite handlers' attempts at image-making, or remaking in some instances, only one party wins, ultimately. This chapter has developed the argument that it is the image of a party leader which is emphasized, as the leader is the "messenger" for that which the party represents.

Chapter IV, "The Development of Political Advertising in Canada", places the marketing/image relationship in a Canadian context. The chapter will attempt to show that the relationship is not new. In the 1940s, for example, both the Liberal and Conservative parties employed advertising agencies to assist in planning election campaigns.

CHAPTER IV

THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL ADVERTISING IN CANADA

In Canada, government and political advertising are inextricably linked: the specific techniques of political advertising are therefore developed within the same agencies whose multifaceted communication techniques are required for general government advertising as well. (Whitaker,1988:219)

Image-making or packaging is not new to politics and elections in Canada. John A. MacDonald, Prime Minister for nineteen years between 1867 and 1891 was presented as the "perfect expression of the national spirit in the 19th century -- ruffish, careless, tough and pliable" (Mallory,1967:29). MacDonald was presented on a campaign poster in 1891 wrapped in the national flag and representing a "symbol of patriotism." Sir Wilfred Laurier, Prime Minister from 1896 to 1911, combined an "eloquent and elegant idealism" with the promise of healing the scars of conflicts of race, religion and region which he grew up with in Quebec (Mallory,1967:29). For the most part, in the early years of Canadian politics, Canadians seemed content with party leaders chosen in caucus rather than in national conventions. Soderlund argues that charisma was a quality largely lacking at the leadership level of federal politics from 1911 when Sir Wilfred Laurier left the office of prime minister until John Diefenbaker arrived in the late 1950s (Soderlund,et al.,1984:129).

The arrival of advertising in national elections in the inner circles of both the Liberal and Conservative parties presaged the use of pollsters. At first, through newspapers, then through radio and finally through television, the techniques of "selling" -- of creating demand where none had previously existed -- spread through the political system. This chapter examines the organizational aspects of political advertising, the links between advertising and marketing agencies and political parties and the effects of these agencies on political

organizations. The relationship between government and advertising/ marketing/ public relations agencies is largely two-fold: political patronage in government contracts and election communication. This chapter is a historical perspective of the utilization of the "message makers" by political parties culminating in the importance television ads now play in elections.

It must be recognized that the agencies and political parties have utilized the technology available at the historical moment have adapt to the technology, communicating through newspapers, then radio and then television. Concentration solely on image in politics overlooks the importance of the technologies that carry that image to the voter. Technologies have altered the strategy, conduct and usefulness of campaigns and have changed the way in which leaders run for office. Party leaders may physically never appear in a certain geographic location, but are seen in countless newsclips and television ads. The primary tools in a modern campaign -- public opinion polls and advertising -- have been utilized since at least the 1930s.

K.Z. Paltiel has noted that the decline in the influence within parties of press barons, like the Siftons, and their replacements by advertising professionals occurred along with the rise of radio and television: "The advertising agency and the public relations consultants have taken the editor's place in the counsels of the parties" (Whitaker,1977:220). At the outset, the effects of the ad professionals was to focus the attention of the voter on the party and its ideas and programs. The ad agencies were, in another sense, akin to the press barons. The rise of mass advertising techniques in politics coincided with the decline of traditional, localized, patronage-oriented politics. This also coincided with the rise to party prominence of advertising personnel such as Senator Keith Davey, the former national Liberal organizer, and Senator Allister Grosart, who performed a

similar function for the Conservatives during Diefenbaker's rise to power (Whitaker,1977:220). And it was the Liberal party, from the 1930s through the 1950s, that led the way into political advertising.

Research material which documents the increase use of advertising, polling and, subsequently, television in Canadian politics is scant. Reginald Whitaker documents the relationship between the Liberal party and Liberal governments and ad agencies from 1920 to the 1950s (the Liberal party dominated federal politics during these thirty years). Politicians, political advisors and academics such as Keith Davey, Dalton Camp, Peter Newman and Fred Fletcher make reference to media and campaigns in their books but, until recently, advertising and politics has been an "aside" in importance in Canadian political campaign literature. And what has been written recently, particularly of the 1988 election, briefly refers to the political broadcast ads, but without much critical assessment.

The 1920s to the 1950s

As early as 1917 an ad agency was used to explain the terms of the Military Service Act to the public, after which the agency was contracted the job of preparing the publicity campaign for the Union Government of Sir Robert Borden in the election of 1919 (Whitaker,1977:221). The First World War gave a major impetus to the development of advertising and to the involvement of advertising agencies in the preparation of government propaganda appeals to citizens on such issues as the sale of government bonds. Following the introduction of conscription, ad agencies found their way into government as well.

Whitaker indicates there is very little evidence on the extent to which advertising agencies were utilized by parties in political campaigns of the 1920s and 1930s, but the roots for the relationship were in place in the 1930s. The dalliances had begun in the 1930s when the advertising agency Cockfield, Brown placed radio advertisements for the Liberal party and assisted in organizing a special dinner commemorating the twentieth anniversary of Mackenzie King's leadership (Simpson,1988:143). By the 1935 federal campaign, slightly over \$50,000 was spent nationally on radio publicity for the Liberal party through the Cockfield, Brown agency and a further \$17,000 was spent on billboards and weekly newspaper advertisements through the agency of R.C. Smith (Whitaker,1977:221). In preparation for the election expected in 1939 the National Liberal Federation office worked on a wide variety of special publicity projects including preparation of the Speaker's Handbook which provided quick information for the use of candidates: The production of leaflets and folders and the development of a uniform poster and banner campaign arranged for national appeal was worked out in cooperation with Cockfield, Brown (Whitaker,1977:97).

In the 1940s both the Liberal and Conservative parties employed ad agencies to help plan their campaigns. For the election of 1940, radio and other media publicity were used extensively, because Mackenzie King knew the opposition parties lacked the funds which the government party could spend on media advertising. A series of radio broadcasts by the prime minister were produced, a billboard and leaflet campaign was conducted, as was a newspaper campaign in dailies, weeklies, farm papers and the ethnic press. All this preparation was conducted in conjunction with Cockfield, Brown (Whitaker,1977:120).

Cockfield, Brown and Company of Montreal, Toronto, Vancouver, and Winnipeg was the largest advertising agency in the country when it became the agency of the Liberal party and the Liberal government in the 1940s. Beginning with a merger of a Toronto and a Montreal firm in 1928, Cockfield, Brown began with over \$2 million in billings. One of the agency's special assets was its research department, apparently the first such department in a Canadian agency.

Brooke Claxton was the organizational genius of the national Liberal party in the 1940s and early 1950s, a period of some of the Liberal's greatest electoral achievements (Whitaker,1977:226). Part of Claxton's concern with government and electoral work was an interest in efficient packaging and selling. Claxton, Whitaker indicates, seems to have been one of the first federal politicians to take advantage of the services of the ad agencies to advance his own career, as well as the fortunes of the party.

In 1943 a formal arrangement was made between the National Liberal Federation and Cockfield, Brown which became the party's agency on a continuing basis (other agencies might work on the provincial campaigns). Whitaker indicates that what the precise terms of the agreement are not clear from documentary evidence available. H.E. "Bob" Kidd was a member of the Cockfield, Brown agency who had worked with and in the Liberal organization since 1925, first in Vancouver and later in Montreal where he moved within the agency. Kidd put his advertising and public relations skills into the service of Liberal politics and by 1949 was the secretary of the National Liberal Federation. Outside of elections the national advertising agency was employed to continually cultivate the media for the Liberal image day-to-day. Kidd monitored the press, planted stories, and watched for opportunities to put the best Liberal image forward.

The Cockfield, Brown research department was sometimes contracted to supplement information into the party's fact files from the civil service, helping to provide favorable data for party speakers. Opinion surveys in constituencies were also done, although at this time it seemed that reliance was placed on the Gallup polls (Whitaker,1977:238). The agency also handled the distribution and advertising of the CBC "Nation's Business" broadcasts by cabinet ministers. And special occasions, such as national conventions, national summer conferences, or special testimonial dinners for prime ministers, which required press liaison and public relations services, found Cockfield, Brown in charge of the arrangements. In the period of growing media emphasis, ad/public relations professionals were beginning to displace the old style of political organizers who had traditionally looked after these matters.

The Second World War gave an even greater impetus to advertising agencies than previously. By 1944 almost \$37 million was being spent nationally on advertising through agencies (about one-half of the total amount was spent on advertising), and the agencies were earning about \$6 million in fees. Significantly, two-thirds of the total billings were going to eleven agencies each making more than \$1 million per year in gross revenue (Whitaker,1977:222).

The Conservatives, in preparation for the 1945 election, commissioned McKim Advertising Limited to plan the campaign themes in discussion with party headquarters (Granatstein,1967: 190). Advertising (radio free time and advertising paraphernalia) featured party leader John Bracken as "The Man", "JB -- the worker", "The Farmer", "The Progressive". (Granatstein,1967:190). The Liberal charged that the Tories were selling their leader as if he were a new breakfast food or a new brand of soap.

The Liberal party retained Cockfield, Brown of Montreal for the election and the agency became responsible for publicity, as well as preparation of polls and the testing of slogans. The emphasis of the national advertising campaign was on plans for postwar reconstruction, and the avoidance of a return to the 1930s through a new role for the state in economic life. Appeals were targeted at specific sectors of the population -- to farmers, union workers, returned soldiers, small business owners and housewives -- with a dual emphasis in each case on the actual achievements of the government with regard to the special interests of the recipient, and on the plans the government had for future action (Whitaker,1977:154). All this was summed up with the slogan, "Vote Liberal for a New Social Order."

During the Liberal party dominance in the 1940s and 1950s, the Tory agencies were inefficient in selling their product. The Liberals had a saleable product in Louis St. Laurent who was the paternal, authoritative, kindly figure of "Uncle Louis." Cockfield, Brown carefully cultivated this image and in a real sense the elections of 1949 and 1953 were the first Canadian elections dominated by a consciously manipulated media image of a party leader (Whitaker,1977:237). Dalton Camp indicates that the agency was subtly changing the nature of campaigning and the Conservatives scarcely understood what was happening. As Camp recalls:

The Liberal party seized the new instruments of communication and used them [to promote St. Laurent] confidently, deliberately, and efficiently. While this was happening in the campaign of 1953, none of us at Tory headquarters seemed aware of it. While the advisors and strategists pored over every published word uttered by the Prime Minister and his cabinet, no one looked up to see that the Liberal leader had changed his clothes. (Whitaker,1977:237)

Subsequently, the Liberal party-agency relationship became closer. After the 1953 election a cabinet subcommittee on publicity began regular meetings as an

institutionalized link between the cabinet and National Liberal Federation. The relation between the Liberal party and Cockfield, Brown was the classic agency-client type: Cockfield, Brown packaged and sold what the party produced.

The concerns about political advertising were much the same in the 1950s as they are in present campaigns. Camp relates that in the 1950s the trouble with most political advertising was that:

Most of it is unread, unheard, and unnoticed ... Yet political advertising is not the same as advertising which only promotes the sales of products or services. At least, when it is, it is a failure. What political advertising must do is create a sense of immediacy or urgency and participation. Soap and cereal and insurance can be bought any day, as everyone knows. Elections occur infrequently. (Camp,1970:58)

Documentation which refers to election in the 1950s indicates that politicians valued the use of radio broadcasting during election campaigns. Broadcast regulations for radio, radio being the only wide-audience reaching medium then, guaranteed that political broadcasting would be dull, unimaginative and sterile, compared to political advertising today. Impromptu conversations or dialogue were forbidden. All broadcasts had to be scripted and texts submitted in advance: spokesmen for political parties who appeared on local stations were obliged to leave a copy of their remarks at the station. All this was done to avoid political "dramatization" (Camp,1970:118).

1953: Ad Agency Ties

The Conservative Party's ties to advertising agencies must also be noted. George Drew, the Conservative party leader during the 1953 federal election campaign, "sensed" the value of the media, and the power of advertising, and explored ways by which they could be used. However, his enthusiasm was quashed as his advisory councils were dominated by lawyers who saw the

electorate as "a jury and election campaigns as great debates" (Camp,1970:138). Dalton Camp was invited to Ottawa by the federal Conservative party to give advice on advertising strategy for the 1953 election campaign.¹ Another member of the Conservative election planning committee was Allister Grosart, who represented McKim's Advertising. Grosart intended to conduct a survey of public opinion at that time: Camp's response to this was that he suspected that parties, not the public created issues. Camp had a "low opinion of political polls and a healthy respect for their cost" (Camp,1970:99).

The election in Canadian history frequently referred to when discussing leader image is the election of 1953. The Liberal party used the instruments of communication and used them confidently, deliberately and effectively. The Liberal strategy was to display the image of their leader, Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent, as that of a kindly fatherly figure. The transfiguration of St. Laurent was achieved by the, then, modern techniques of advertising and publicity, and the process was accommodated and confirmed by the press, and in newsreels. St. Laurent appeared in newsreels with his children, and in factories wearing a hard hat -- techniques still used in political promotion today. The Liberals transformed an austere corporate lawyer and Prime Minister to the national "Uncle Louis."

¹Camp ran communication programmes for numerous Conservative provincial elections during the 1950s (1952: New Brunswick; 1953: Nova Scotia; 1956: New Brunswick and Nova Scotia; 1957: Federal election in which Camp assisted with national communication strategy and oversaw the communication strategy in Atlantic Canada) (Graham,1985:18,20).

1957: The Arrival of Election Television

Between 1956 and 1957, with another election on the horizon, the Liberal communication committee was expanded to include Cockfield, Brown staff to plan the strategy of the campaign. The combination of the regional power brokers of the cabinet, a representative of the prime minister, the National Liberal Federation and Cockfield, Brown was a summation of all the important organizational forces in a national campaign (Whitaker,1977:248). The party-agency relationship meant advance knowledge of election dates was entrusted to the agency. As with the 1953 election only the Cockfield, Brown officials were allowed to see the advance plans for the election: The ad agency was privy to the type of information normally reserved for the inner circle of cabinet.

Television was making its first appearance in Canada in 1953 but not significant in the national election of that year, apart for some CBC freetime, for which the CBC provided technical assistance. However, some preliminary investigation of the use of television in the United States was undertaken by Cockfield, Brown in 1953 which the National Liberal Federation paid for. The first extensive use of television in a general election campaign occurred in 1957.

Introduction of television to politics brought together the visible personality of the party leader and/or prime minister and the image which the party wished to project to the voter. By 1957 television had become a more important medium than radio. A challenge was presented to the parties by television -- How was television to be approached? The first reaction of politicians and their managers to television was to resist it. The Liberal and Conservatives mutually agreed not to use television in American border cities for election campaign purposes. The CBC was the only television outlet and had limited facilities. Camp

indicates that, "none of [us] clearly saw what was coming, which was a medium that would profoundly change politics, campaign reporting and politicians themselves ... we considered television as a kind of extension of radio which was important, of course, but not nearly so important as the printed word" (Camp,1970:209). But the 1957 campaign, as Camp recalls, marked the "dawn of television as an influence in election campaigns."

With the appearance of television, to be successful, political leaders had to demonstrate at least a minimum degree of "stage presence" in addition to their political skills, and their party's acceptability on the basis of traditional support (Soderlund, et al.,1984:129). One of the Liberal party's first steps was to convert a garage attached to Liberal headquarters in Ottawa into a studio and set up a closed-circuit television unit (Meisel,1962:70). Liberal headquarters had, thus, acquired its own radio and television workshop for Liberal Members of Parliament. However, many Liberal candidates approached the new medium in the campaign without adequate preparation and many Liberals were not relaxed before the camera.

The entire publicity programme planned by the Liberal and the ad agency, and the resulting image of the party in the minds of the voters, was in many respects a pre-television, print media phenomenon (Newman,1973:54). It has been shown that television was an unmitigated disaster for the Liberals, for of the two leaders, one (Diefenbaker) was comfortable with the medium and the other (St. Laurent) was not. St. Laurent told a reporter at the start of the campaign, "I will be more interested in seeing people than talking to cameras" (Newman,1973:54). St. Laurent's public relations advisors were trying to utilize (as they had in 1953) the fashionable father-image. But like many silent movie stars who could not make the change to the "talkies", St. Laurent was unprepared for

the introduction of television. He disliked the new medium, feeling that political broadcasts were contrived and staged. How these "contrived and staged" broadcasts differed from the newsreel images, in St. Laurent's mind, can only be questioned. St. Laurent's broadcasts were not effective. Even the use of a teleprompter failed to make his performance more relaxed. He was unable to feel really at ease before the television cameras (Meisel,1962:163).

Politicians from all parties knew nothing about political advertising, but they began their appraisal of advertising campaigns with suspicion. Elections, they felt, were too complex for the public and politicians would rather contest them by conventional means -- the emotional rallies, noisy parades and partisan rhetoric. The problem with advertising was that it threatened a political system that was fundamentally a private matter. It introduced new circumstance -- it had the capacity to publicize everyone and everything including those who wished to be anonymous and who preferred to conduct their politics in secret (Camp,1970:281). Advertising also meant there was less room in the "club house" as the hierarchy was obligated to make room for "young men with arrogant manners, full of self-assurance and incomprehensible jargon, demanding large sums from party campaign funds for doubtful enterprises in publicity" (Camp,1970:281). Yet, the Conservative party hired a number of ad personnel: Allister Grosart (McKim's Advertising), Art Burns (Burns Advertising), Mickey O'Brien (O'Brien Advertising), and Hank Loriaux, Bill Kettiewell, Jim Mumford and Dalton Camp (Lock Johnston and Company) (Camp,1970:280). The Tories recognized the impact that television could have. Election campaigns became electronic campaigns, shifting the emphasis from "What was said" to "What was seen": from oratory to image, information to illusion (Camp,1981:xiii).

Dalton Camp was enthusiastic about the prospective use of television in 1957, limited though it was to a "talking head". In preparation for the election, Camp wrote a memo regarding the campaign promotional strategy. With regard to television he wrote:

The ideal end product of political advertising and publicity is that it be effective in persuading voters to support candidates of the party ... Elections are won by qualities of leadership, public attitudes toward political issues and party organization ... The lack of one of them cannot bring success ... It is to the distinct advantage to the party that uses [television] resourcefully and disastrous to the party that doesn't ... [The Leader] ... can reach directly a larger audience personally by its use than through any other medium... What [television] does is create an impression and it is always possible to leave a good impression, whereas it is difficult to leave a message. The question that begs at every occasion of a political television broadcast in the viewer's mind is, "Do I like and do I trust him?" (Camp,1970:261-2)

The Conservative campaign strategists were aware of St. Laurent's dislike of television and intended to use this to their advantage. John Diefenbaker, the Conservative leader, had no objection to being made-up for television and was prepared to adopt any measures or device which would contribute to the effectiveness of his performance (Meisel,1962:163). Diefenbaker's television broadcasts were as convincing to his viewers as his personal appearances had been to those attending his meetings. Conservative organizers thought that Diefenbaker's television appearance were a huge asset in the campaign (Meisel,1962:163). The O'Brien Advertising Agency suggested that any advertising should first concentrate on the leader, Diefenbaker, then on the national leader and his team, and finally on the individual as a candidate. The Tories' television portion of the campaign presentation was a series of five-minute films on various subjects such as agriculture, industry and natural resources. The method used was Diefenbaker interviewing the "average" citizen with a screen background to give variety and proper location (Camp,1970:272-3). Diefenbaker appeared in all of the broadcasts for he was presented to be the young crusader, the energetic

champion and the dedicated lawyer. Diefenbaker proved to be the major impact of the Conservative's television broadcasts.

Responsibility for producing the free television and radio time provided by the CBC rested with the advertising specialists, not party personnel. The importance attached to television in the Conservative campaign was found in the fact that Diefenbaker's appearances were prepared and produced by Grosart, with the advertising background, who assumed the position of campaign manager and national campaign director (Meisel,1962:81). Five fifty-second television ads were made by Diefenbaker in addition to the freetime national broadcasts, in which he urged voters to support the local Conservative campaign.

The 1957 election was a disaster for the Liberals as Diefenbaker and the Conservative party won the election by a "landslide." At dissolution the make up of 265 seats in the House of Commons was as follows: Liberals 171 seats, Tories 51, CCF 23, Social Credit 15. After the election the standing in the House was: Tories 112 seats, Liberals 105, CCF 25, Social Credit 19 (Beck,1968:286,308). This marked the end of an era in more than one way -- it also signalled the beginning of the breakup of the relationship between the Liberals and Cockfield, Brown as the party was no longer in a position to grant government advertising contracts to the agency. Within a month of Diefenbaker's accession to office in 1957, there was a shift from Liberal to Conservative ad agencies such as McKim's (the agency of Tory president Allister Grosart); Foster, Locker, Johnson (Dalton Camp); and, O'Brien of Vancouver (headed by a personal friend of John Diefenbaker's) (Whitaker,1977:251).

The 1960s Elections: Progressive Changes

After the 1957 election, Lester Pearson became leader of the Liberal Party. The job of creating a favorable public image for Pearson was left to public relations and television specialists. Unfortunately for him, Pearson's political ascendancy coincided with television becoming the most important medium through which politicians could communicate with voters. Pearson could not cope with the medium. His image-makers' diagnosis of his problems emphasized his high-pitched voice, his persistent lisp and total absence in him of his role (Newman,1968:72). While Pearson was in opposition (1957 to 1963), he seemed willing to put up with practically any attempt to create some type of rapport with his television audience (Newman,1968:71). A voice coach from Toronto was hired and writers were hired to remove as many sibilants as possible from his scripts so that he could hide his speech problem. Toronto's MacLaren Advertising Company tried to improve his television manner: television advisors tried different settings (intimate soirees, crowd scenes, living room shots, interviews with academics) but nothing worked (Newman,1968:71-2). Near the end of his time in office, when the image-makers had given up, Pearson was talking to a friend about the problem: "It's just too late to make any changes in me", he said, "The best thing would be is for people to accept me as I am, strengths and weaknesses and to stop trying to make me into something I am not" (Newman,1968:74). Pearson left office in 1968 with the image in the public mind of a good, kindly man, but a man without political strength.

Diefenbaker believed during the election campaigns of 1962 (in which the Conservatives were not returned to power), 1963 (which they lost), and in 1965 (which they lost again) in his own political invincibility. One of the objectives in

the 1962 Conservative campaign strategy was to institutionalize him in the office of Prime Minister. In the age of political image-making, Newman wrote, Diefenbaker was the greatest political pretender of them all. Yet, Diefenbaker failed to win power in any of the elections between 1962 and 1965. The suggestion has been made that voters, particularly young Tories, became disenchanted by what the party had become and was seen by voters as an old-fashioned, thoughtless, rural and sectarian political party (Graham,1985:21)

During the 1962 campaign Diefenbaker took over all but two of the party's CBC freetime television periods. But his appeal misfired because he left voters with the impression that he no longer really cared whether voters were bestowed on him with passion or indifference (Newman,1973:331). During the 1963 election Diefenbaker felt that he was bound to win because he was somehow meant to have power. In planning their campaign strategy the primary concern of the Conservative leader's chief political advisors Dalton Camp and Roy Faibish was to revive the "mystic bond" between Diefenbaker and the "average" Canadian, which had been forged in the 1957 and 1958 campaigns. This meant that the Diefenbaker's claim for re-election would have to be based not on the authority of his office as had been attempted in 1962 when he was Prime Minister at dissolution, but on a direct, emotional appeal to the people (Newman,1973:383).

During the 1965 election campaign Diefenbaker decided to transform himself into an incarnation of the Canada he knew. He became a "figment of his own imagination, a man for whom nothing was impossible, and a politician without rivals" because he saw himself as personifying the national will (Newman,1968:318).

The Early 1960s: Arrival of "Image Politics"

The Canadian federal campaigns of 1957 and 1958 used television extensively, but image politics did not "arrive" in Canada until the 1960s when the national parties turned, for the first time, to private polling and the use of advertising agency specialists from the United States (Fletcher,1987:348). Liberal Keith Davey had read in American political literature about new techniques used in the "engineering of comment" that were being developed in the United States, principally the techniques of mass polling and television advertising (McCall-Newman,1982:41). At Davey's urging Lou Harris, Kennedy's pollster, was hired as an advisor to the Liberal party for the 1963 Canadian general election. Harris was hired to take a poll on the state of Canada's electorate's psyche.

Davey knew that to be effective in the short duration of an election campaign, the Liberals would have to concentrate on dealing with just a few points -- these were the concerns on the public's mind which a pollster could quickly identify and an advertising team could turn into slogans to be used in political advertising as well as in candidate's speeches (McCall-Newman,1982:42). Harris, from Kennedy's Board of Advisors, polled Canadians and provided the Liberals with the results. Harris was replaced in 1965 by another American, Oliver Quayle, who was in turn replaced by a young Toronto market researcher, Martin Goldfarb who developed a friendship with Keith Davey, the party's strategist (Lee,1989:33-4). As Davey recalls: "There is no secret to winning elections ... Having determined the best issue, then that becomes the issue of the campaign. Polling is extremely useful in making this determination" (Lee,1989:34).

Davey placed the pollster in a position previously occupied by the party machine -- between the populace and the leader. The choice of which policies

to emphasize in an election had fallen out of the control of regional party organizers and into the responsibility of pollsters. Similarly, the pollster replaced the party as tactical advisor (Lee,1989:34). Keith Davey also established a communications committee which developed the party's new direction in campaign strategy. One-half of its members were politicians and one-half were professional advertising people. The national communications committee included people such as George Sinclair, Hugh Horler, Richard O'Hagan, Alan Scott, George Elliott and Robert Smiley all with MacLaren Advertising; Robert Gourd, President of a Quebec broadcasting company; John deB. Payne of Interprovincial Public Relations; Mike McCabe, a marketing executive with Lever Brothers; Joseph Clark who was with a Toronto public relations firm; and, Royce Frith and Don Jamieson who had extensive broadcasting experience (Wearing,1981:32). The committee oversaw the work of George Elliot at MacLaren's and made recommendations on such questions as what public opinion surveys should be done, how Pearson should be prepared for television, and why advertising decisions should be centralized in Ottawa.

The use of television eroded and eventually eliminated the usefulness of the party in campaign strategy development, as specialists dictated the development of campaign direction. Television enhanced the role of the leader, and compressed time and eliminated geographic distance. Image became power and the leader and strategy groups needed control of the image (Lee,1989:31,37). The leaders had to be seen as being no less dynamic as their major opponents, least they risk becoming liabilities to their parties' electoral fortunes.

In the early 1960s while the Liberal turned heavily to pollsters for campaign advice, the Conservatives continued to stress advertising in their campaigns. The Tories were slow to "pick-up" on the techniques used by the Liberals. Of the

1962 election campaign Richard Gwyn wrote:

Sociologists, statisticians, advertising experts and pollsters, and mass communication experts may be as decisive as the age-old talents of politicians. Two completely new weapons are being brought into the fray: intensive, privately hired, public opinion surveys and sophisticated, probing statistical analysis, to these are added the latest techniques of advertising and mass communications ... Five major advertising firms will handle the Conservative party account. The Liberal are making an intensive statistical study of every marginal riding in the country.
(Gwyn,1967:121)

Financial difficulties for the political parties arose from the rapid succession of five elections between 1957 and 1965 (1957, 1958, 1962, 1963, 1965) and although the major parties usually gathered sufficient fund for election campaigns each election seemed costlier than the last, a process accelerated by the use of television advertising (Seidle & Paltiel,1981:229).

Where was the CCF/NDP during this transitional period? Due to financial constraints the party relied on "traditional" campaign practises until 1979 which was the first year in which the party utilized media extensively. During the new party's first three general election campaigns (1962, 1963, 1965) the NDP strategy was one of mass rallies in major cities largely to draw media attention to the new party. Desmond Morton indicates that for the 1963 general election the NDP's central campaign "had barely \$70,000 to spend and even a meager national advertising campaign was scrapped" (Morton,1986:62). In 1963 Terry Grier became the NDP Federal secretary, in time to take on two federal elections.

With Grier's guidance, a limited national advertising campaign and a federal leader's tour for the 1965 election were designed to give selected ridings as much help as possible. Grier retained an advertising agency to help with the campaign, much to the shock of older socialists who felt the party had "abandoned its virtue in a corrupt rash of affluence" (Morton,1986:62). Party

leader T.C. Douglas announced that an estimated one million dollars would be spent on the campaign. The ad agency was a small Montreal agency headed by Manny Dunsky. Dunsky and Grier put together a low-budget campaign designed to present a few carefully chosen messages. One slogan -- "Let's give the two old parties a well deserved rest - this country needs it" -- was regularly repeated.

Peter Newman analyses that the 1968 Liberal leadership convention changed the political environment because of the importance given to television during the campaign:

The candidates which included Pierre Trudeau, Paul Hellyer, and John Turner, "bathed" in the beam of lights, their faces taking on that incandescent glow which [transformed] modern politicians into stars or [snuffed] out their careers in one ninety-second take ... Trudeau stood to gain most from the television coverage. Throughout the convention eight camera crews clustered about the [then] Justice Minister, ignoring most of the other candidates much of the time, giving Trudeau the advantage of built-in excitement and bathing him in a constant halo of artificial light. (Newman,1968:415)

The election of 1968 proved to be a disaster for the Tories, partially due to Trudeau's popularity as leader of the Liberal party. The Conservatives had poorly planned the election campaign: there had been no centralized budget, no polling, and no goals for the execution of party leader Robert Stanfield's election tour (Graham,1985:22). Print ads, radio commercials and pamphlets had been produced without reference to each other and no one knew how to use television.

The 1970s: "Modern" Politics

By 1970 a Conservative campaign planning committee produced a working document integrating the realities of modern politics -- polling, television, systematic touring -- with a general strategy by means of an efficient organization (Graham,1985:22). The innovation was to link communications with

organization, organization with strategy and strategy with opinion research. No one had previously linked the various organizations together. Graham indicates that campaign logistics were becoming as important as policies: images were supplanting ideas and a single poll could silence ten "political philosophers".

During the 1972 election campaign, of the Conservatives \$3,850,000 election budget, \$1,300,000 (34%) was spent on media advertising. About 75 percent of the media budget went to buy airtime on radio and television, for which ads were heavily aired in the last few days of the campaign in most parts of the country (Stewart,1973:195-6). The NDP's David Lewis fought an intensive campaign which, for the first time, gained serious media coverage and recognition for an NDP leader. The focus of the campaign ads was on the cost of living and on the activities of the major food store chains, but the NDP failed to generate much support (Penniman,1975:131,139). After the 1972 election the Liberals decided to take a different approach to advertising. MacLaren's was held responsible for creating for the party the slogan, "The Land is Strong" which was intended to reinforce the basic message that "problems, frustrations and anxieties remain but we have the will, the energy, the ability to deal with them" (Wearing,1981:197). The party felt it had not participated enough in advertising decisions were made by the ad professionals. Red Leaf Communications was established and Jerry Grafstein, a lawyer, worked with ad professionals through all stages of copy, design, and layout to ensure the party's advertising adhered closely to the campaign committee strategy. The purpose of Red Leaf was to give the party increased control over its campaign advertising.

New Election Broadcast Regulations

Between 1974 and 1979 important changes in the Canadian system of campaign communication were made. Although the essential features of freetime broadcasts, paid advertising and leader tours aimed at obtaining favorable new coverage remained unchanged, the interelection period saw significant amendments to the election laws and substantial alternations in the media systems, as well as changes in party communication strategies.

The new campaign relations were designed to provide registered political parties with a reasonable opportunity to communicate their appeals directly to the public. The new rules restricted paid advertising to the final half of the eight-week campaign, regulating the allocation of paid and freetime ads, and provided for reimbursement from the federal treasury of one-half the cost of radio and television commercials purchased by registered parties. All broadcasters, including the CBC radio services, which are normally non-commercial, are required to sell primetime rates (radio: 6 to 9 am, noon to 2 pm, 4 to 7 pm/television: 6 pm to midnight) to the parties up to a total of 6.5 hours, divided among the parties according to a formula based on seats held in the House of Commons when the election is called and the number of seats contested in the election. Freetime is allocated on much the same basis. The new election rules allowed the parties to reach a substantial number of voters without risk of journalistic distortion.

1974

The establishment of the Liberal party's Red Leaf Communications drew on a consortium of Canadian advertising agencies which would send the Liberals their best professionals. This company, purposely structured for the 1974

campaign, would be a non-profit organization (Davey,1986:165). This structure is still used by the Liberal party.

Prior to the 1974 campaign the Conservatives conducted a national survey which confirmed that Robert Stanfield, party leader since 1968, was still thought of as he had been during the election campaigns of 1968 and 1972. Stanfield was thought of as considerably less strong, competent and intelligent than Trudeau, and most respondents thought these qualities were very important for a prime minister (Penniman,1975:109). The Tory strategists planned that Stanfield should be the central focus of the 1974 campaign. The analysis of the 1972 election indicated the party's disadvantage in polls at the beginning of the 1974 campaign in terms of the relative strength of the personal images of Stanfield and Trudeau. It was agreed in 1972 that there was not sufficient time to develop a strong positive image for Stanfield as prime minister: the objective in 1974 would be to convince voters that Stanfield possessed the qualities to be prime minister (Penniman,1975:109).

1979

Given the changes in the Canada Elections Act, the growing sophistication of party aids and strategists, the increased use of marketing techniques and the increased viewing of television, television entered the 1979 Canadian general election in "full force" (Gilsdorf,1982:62). A majority of voters (52 percent) reported getting most of their campaign information from television, 30 percent mentioned newspapers and 11 percent indicated radio (Fletcher, 1981:385). The television orientation, the tendency to focus on party leaders, the concern with image and style, the obsession with polls, and the use of media consultants by the parties had all been present in 1974 but were even more evident in 1979

(Fletcher,1981:281).

Yet, the public in 1979 was dubious and aware of party efforts to increase the profile of party leaders. In the fall of 1977, a substantial media-oriented program had been launched by the Liberal government that lasted several months. It presented Prime Minister Trudeau in economic consultation with the provinces, in foreign speeches related in Canadian national unity and economy, in fighting campaign-style at a national Liberal conference and at home with his children (Courtney,1981:133). According to Conservative polling data, none of these moves helped the Liberals: The survey described the Canadian population as having grown increasingly dubious of such public relations operations as those undertaken by the Liberals. Courtney argues that the party's public relations campaign helped to do them in because the campaign was unmatched by real actions or results (Courtney,1981:133).

Still, the potential power of the mass media was not lost in the political parties. In addition to utilizing free air time provided for electioneering purposes, each of the major parties spent millions of dollars during the campaign on advertising placed in print and electronic media. In 1979, the Liberals spent approximately \$2.5 million (62% of the total reported expenditures), the Tories spent approximately \$2.7 million (71%) and the NDP spent \$1.3 million (61%) with each of the parties allocating over one-half of their advertising monies to television (Clark,et al.,1984:84,85). The television advertisements tended to be aimed more at image-making than informing although some ads, especially from the NDP, did have significant content (Fletcher,1981:288). The target audience for the ads by all parties were voters not committed to a party (estimated at approximately 10 percent of the electorate) after the first four weeks of the campaign, and voters with little interest in or knowledge of politics.

The \$2.5 million the Liberals spent on advertising was divided between a Francophone agency, Publicite BCP Ltec in Montreal, and an Anglophone communications group in Toronto where the umbrella agency, Red Leaf Communications under party activist Jerry Grafstein, made the commercials and prepared the freetime broadcasts (Penniman,1981:171,172). Television accounted for \$1,295,000 of the advertising budget. Candidates found Trudeau to be indifferent to the party's concerns and he was inaccessible. Trudeau kept himself shielded from his party; thus, the advertising teams had nothing to use but Trudeau playing "strong leader." These ads reinforced his image as the better leader, compared to Conservative party leader Joe Clark, but equally reinforced the public's own anti-Trudeau feelings. (Clarkson,1981:180). Still, Trudeau "was" the Liberal campaign. No attempt was made to build up the image of Trudeau's team of experienced cabinet ministers or upcoming new candidates, many who were of considerable stature. The freetime programs, which played for one-half hour at a time, consisted of Trudeau's public addresses in front of huge crowds: There was nothing to convey the impression that he was a politician with "compassion and concern for ordinary Canadians" (Clarkson,1981:183). The commercials showed Trudeau with other international leaders or on campaign platforms and ads always closed with the slogan, "A Leader Must be a Leader" (Clarkson,1981:183). The emphasis was on the strong, statesmanlike qualities of Pierre Trudeau and compared his qualities with the inexperience of Tory leader, Joe Clark.

The Tory campaign consisted of four components -- tour, speeches, news and media advertising. These were tied together to emphasize the "wasted potential" theme. The Tory strategy was to project a leadership alternative in Joe Clark, the Man, for the so-called "little people" (Courtney,1981:139). The strategy indicated that:

We must project the leadership image that emphasized toughness and decisiveness but, given the penchant of the latter group, and a toughness and decisiveness that is displayed for the right reasons. We must use the Trudeau record and perceived mismanagement of this country as a basis upon which to contrast the leadership styles that is sufficiently different enough from Trudeau's to attract [the voters].
(Courtney,1981:139)

The strategies and plans were based on the party's reading of the national mood by means of sampling of public opinion that continued with increased frequency throughout the campaign. Lowell Murray, Clark's campaign chairman, hired a young political scientist with experience in public opinion polling, Allan Gregg, as national campaign secretary and put him in charge of the party's polling surveys
(Courtney,1981:129).

Changes made through the Election Expenses Act made it possible, for the first time, for the NDP to compete with the Liberal and Conservative parties on a more equitable basis. Nineteen seventy-nine was the first national campaign for the NDP in which money was not a major problem. The party was able to plan the most elaborate media campaign in its history and plan a more extensive itinerary for party leader, Ed Broadbent. Further, in a manner unprecedented in socialist electoral politics, the campaign focus was on the leader. This strengthened the impression given in media coverage that there were three party leaders to choose from (Young,1981:191,199). Young indicates that the campaign was further arranged to ensure that as Broadbent enunciated each aspect of the party's policy he would do so in an appropriate setting. Not only was each policy based on careful research, but the presentation of each issue was designed as a media event which showed Broadbent to good advantage. He projected the image of a responsible political leader, but clearly a social democrat. Broadbent did not rant: his manner was confident and positive
(Young,1981:201,202).

The NDP's advertising was the party's first major venture into television advertising, and Broadbent was a powerful political asset to his party. The party retained the services of Lawrence Wolf a Toronto advertising executive. Advertising for some individuals in the party, was a "trifle discomfoting with the blatant adaption of the very tactics the NDP had vigorously disparaged in years they could not afford them" (Young,1981:199). As Fletcher states, however, it was reassuring to see their party and their leader moving into the "big league" along with the prime minister and leader of the opposition. All of the television ads featured Broadbent and had, as their primary purpose, the selling of the leader. Broadbent was presented talking directly to the voters about party positions on key issues, often in a visually appropriate setting. The strategy developed by Wolf, was to present Broadbent as an alternative leader and to underline his moderate stance (Fletcher,1981:290). One ad verbalized the following message:

A lot of Liberals and Conservatives believe that Ed Broadbent would make the best prime minister. They say if Ed Broadbent were the leader of their party, he'd win the biggest landslide in Canadian history. People don't have the same nagging doubts about Ed Broadbent they have about Trudeau or Clark. Maybe it's time to put aside the old Liberal and Conservative myths and simply vote for the best man. If enough people did that, Ed Broadbent would be the next prime minister of Canada. (Morton,1986:195)

The 1979 election saw the parties spend more on advertising, specifically television, than previous years. The Tories spent 56 percent of their ad budget on television advertising; the Liberal spent 53 percent on television advertising, and the NDP spent 58 percent (Fletcher,1981:289).

The 1980s

For the 1980 election all of the political parties returned to their traditional advertising teams: the Conservatives to Media Services Buying, the Liberals to the ad hoc Red Leaf Communications for English language advertisements and BCP for French language ads, and the NDP to Lawrence Wolf. The Tory campaign returned to its 1979 focus on the unpopularity of Trudeau. One ad showed Trudeau surrounded by former Liberal cabinet ministers whose pictures disappeared, one by one. An announcer said, "Let's face it. If you vote Liberal, you're getting Trudeau and nothing else" (Penniman, 1981:369). Liberal advertising was equally negative, though not personally against Clark. The advertising was directed against his policy "flip-flops", and against his budget. The NDP campaign was not negative but was critical of both major parties. The focus of the campaign was on the party leader speaking in very common-sense terms about particular issues of concern. The belief was that major party advertising would anger voters. Its advertising focused on economic and energy issues but also encouraged voters to support the NDP to avoid another minority government.

During the 1980 federal election, the three major parties declared expenditures totalling \$11.3 million for "advertising, travel and office costs" (Camp,1981:xiv). Of this total, the largest single expenditure went toward television advertising (Camp,1981:xv).

Changes to the Canada Elections Act

Significant changes to the Canada Elections Act contained in Bill C-169, an Act to Amend the Canada Elections Act, was given Royal assent in November 1983. These changes linked the expenditure ceilings to variations in the Consumer

Price Index since 1980. This permitted a sharp rise in spending at both the party and candidate levels as reimbursements were fixed as a proportion of the totals spent by those who qualified. The permitted spending in 1984 by a registered party with a full slate of 282 candidates during the formal campaign increased by forty per cent to \$6,391,497 (Penniman,1988:151,152). The method of allocating and administering purchasable and freetime on the electronic media was spelled out in legal terms: equal weight to both the percentages of seats won in the previous general election and the percentage of votes received and one-half of the weight of the above factors to the party's percentage of the total number of candidates at the previous election, with no party to get more than one-half of the total time available (Penniman,1988:142). The former subsidy of radio and television time costs for registered parties was transformed into a refund of a portion of registered party expenses (Penniman,1988:142). The amendment converted the reimbursements of broadcast costs into a general refund of up to 22.5 percent of election expenses for any registered party provided they had spent at least 10 percent of the party's allowed limit.

1984

Of the 1984 election Frizzell wrote that, "increasingly elections are being seen as contest between leaders rather than as confrontations between policy stands or ideological positions. This reflects the reality of the increasing power of leaders in their own parties and of changes in campaign strategy" (Frizzell,1985:97). By the campaign in 1984 it was evident that the leader "had to perform" before television cameras in order to succeed in appeals to voters. The commonality between the campaigns of the three parties was that they focused on the respective leaders, used sophisticated polling and regionally targeted their messages (Penniman,1988:165).

The Liberals found themselves on the offensive for most of the campaign. Turner was caught between the clear need in English Canada to establish himself as the candidate for change, requiring that he distance himself from the Trudeau legacy and the continued popularity of that legacy in Quebec (Penniman,1988:166). In television terms, John Turner suffered from the handicap of being "hot", with his laser blue eyes that nearly burned a hole in the television screen" (Macdonald, 1985:287). He also appeared ill-at-ease on camera, which tended to dissipate the impression that he was more competent than Mulroney. To most Canadians, Turner was no more than an image, a good-looking man, affable in public, and skilled in politics.

The Liberal campaign, overall, was poorly organized. There was no clear Liberal strategy as a result of the "snap" election call by Turner, and the campaign was one which tried to respond to the Conservatives. During the 1984 election the ad agencies Vickers and Benson, Ronalds-Reynolds, MacLaren Advertising, BCP Advertising and Planicom PNMD supplied the professionals to staff Red Leaf Communications. During the campaign William Lee, in charge of the overall election campaign, demanded full accountability from Jerry Grafstein, who oversaw Red Leaf, concerning his budget and his program. The infighting delayed the production of the commercials. Finally, having initially ruled out negative advertising as unacceptable, Turner concurred when the Keith Davey-Grafstein team decided to air ads that enraged Conservative supporters by their negativism. One ad, for example, showed a shopping cart being heaped by a Mulroney-like shopper with packages that were identified as Tory promised but which had no price tag until, at the cash register, the shopper was forced to admit he could not pay (Penniman,1988:117).

A factor that contributed to the increased strength of the Conservative election organization in 1984 was the development of a cadre of campaign professionals who learned how to apply the new techniques of polling and marketing through their activities in provincial election campaigns. Mulroney persuaded Norman Atkins, who was the first to use the new technologies in the Ontario party organization, to become national campaign chairman. Atkins was president of Camp Associates Advertising in Toronto and had run successful campaigns outside of Ontario for Richard Hatfield of New Brunswick and Brian Peckford in Newfoundland. Atkins was also brother-in-law to Dalton Camp, who had organized communication campaigns for the Conservatives since the early 1950s: Atkins worked closely with Camp through Camp's advertising agency. The campaign crafted by Atkins incorporated daily tracking of public opinion through a rolling national poll (different targeted constituencies each night) which was used to form the broad national strategy. This was paralleled at the local level by intensive polling of specific constituencies and the use of data gathered in this way to support direct mail and computer assisted telephone campaigning to key groups in targeted ridings (Penniman,1988:85). The Tories relied again on the results of Allan Gregg's polling. Gregg's numbers revealed that Canadians wanted changed but were more concerned with changing the process of government than with major new directions or even radically different policies (Graham,1985:27). The broad dimensions of Conservative strategy for the 1984 campaign was defined by evidence from party polls as early as 1982. Gregg concluded from analysis of a series of surveys that voters wanted change "in the way government works", and it was around this theme that the Conservatives decided to build their campaign (Penniman,1988:84,85).

Despite his success in managing the party, Mulroney's own image had not been clearly defined in positive terms of a prospective prime minister: His personal image was not strong enough to compensate for doubts about the party. Mulroney's personal image and style had a central role in the campaign as he attempted to convince the voters of his sincerity. Rather than "A new man with a new plan", the message the voters wanted to hear was "We can do better!" That was the idea that permeated Mulroney's campaign. It was translated into speeches, policy positions and advertising slogans. It was woven into two main objectives of the communications strategy: to shatter any expectation that Turner could be the "agent of change", and to turn the inclination to vote Progressive Conservative into a determination to do so (Macdonald,1985:312).

The television campaign was constructed around Mulroney and the positive aspects of his image became the focus of the party's message. Macdonald states that these objectives were addressed in the advertising in which Mulroney spoke directly and simply to the camera as a way of removing any doubts that voters may have about him. The campaign handlers wanted the voters to start thinking of Mulroney as Prime Minister and they wanted him to look laidback and prime ministerial. They implored him to lower his voice and let the microphone work to pick-up his voice. The Tories attempted to persuade voters that there were some important differences of personality and outlook between Turner and Mulroney, of how each saw the country and from where. Against Turner, the Tories and Mulroney decided to play "the Boy from Baie Comeau [Mulroney] against the candidate from Bay Street [Turner]" (MacDonald,1985:311,279). Backing up the television and newspaper coverage of the campaign was a heavy television advertising budget. Mulroney's ads emphasized both his "aw shucks" charm (at first); then after the televised debates, his forcefulness and "prime

ministerial" image were presented at a cost of about \$4 million in television advertising (Frizzell,et al.,1985:37).

Mulroney's working class background was also used to show his understanding of the concerns of "average Canadians" and to establish that a Conservative government would be in touch with the people, while his record as a successful negotiator for business in labor relations was used to give credibility to the Conservative claim that the party would bring a more conciliatory approach to the style of government (Penniman,1988:88) The Conservative's leader tour and advertising strategies were essentially similar. The central themes were (Penniman,1988:88):

(1) A contrast between Mulroney as the agent of real change and Turner, who was portrayed as "yesterday's man"; (2) Mulroney as concerned with the problems of Canadians; and (3) Mulroney as a man with a "prime ministerial image".

In Quebec the ads stressed Mulroney's Quebec roots and promised change without direct attack on the Trudeau legacy. In English Canada there was more stress on change but the major focus was on promoting the "star quality" of the leader. In both ads and public appearances Mulroney was to appear dignified: he was photographed, for example, against a row of law books.

Planning for the New Democratic campaign started in November 1983 with polling results taken by Larry Ellis. The results indicated that the NDP needed to focus its campaign on reversing the negative public perception the public had of the NDP with regard to a low credibility rating on economic management issues, but had considerable approval and greater believability for its perceived stand on fair taxation, poverty and welfare issues (Penniman,1988:129). Due to disagreement by the party with the findings from Ellis' poll the Election Steering Committee hired a new polling firm from Washington, D.C. The firm, headed by Victor

Fingerhut, conducted some polling for the Democrats in the United States and for the Canadian Union of Public Employees in Vancouver (Penniman,1988:129). The decision was made not to keep trying to pursue the economic policy credibility tactic but to orient the campaign to portray the party and its leader as the champions of "ordinary people." By emphasizing a theme rather than specific, concise proposals would not only downplay the negative associations people had for NDP economic policy but would also permit greater regional flexibility in the overall campaign. The strategy the NDP opted for was a survival strategy. The party began the campaign stressing the essential similarity of the two major parties and argued that it was the only party that offered a distinct approach to national problems. The second theme, which was emphasized in the ads throughout the campaign and which became the primary theme, admitted that there was going to be a large Conservative majority, freeing voters who wanted the Liberals out, from having to vote Conservative and stressing that ordinary Canadians would need active representation in a House dominated by Conservatives (Penniman,1988:166). Broadbent kicked off the campaign on Bay Street denouncing Turner and Mulroney as the "Bobbsey Twins of Bay Street" for their neglect of ordinary people in favor of friends in Bank Towers (Penniman,1988:133). From this point on the NDP strategy was simple: Broadbent and others who spoke for the party kept repeating that the NDP stood for ordinary Canadians while the Bobbsey Twins could do nothing other than reward their rich friends in the banks and corporations. Party ads were tied to this theme.

Extensive discussions of the 1988 election campaign are contained in Chapter III and Chapter V; therefore, such discussions are not repeated here.

Chapter V, "The 1988 Television Advertising Strategy", contains discussion of election strategy by key strategists from the Conservative, Liberal and New Democratic parties. The discussion of each strategist indicates the importance of market research in defining election communication.

CHAPTER V

THE 1988 TELEVISION ADVERTISING STRATEGY

The real difference between a Conservative and a Liberal these days is that a Tory believes in polling and in advertising, but only a little. A Liberal believes in the Power of Advertising -- in the power of the pollster, the copywriter and the one minute commercial ... If you asked a Conservative to renew the Canadian Constitution, he'd call a press conference: if you asked a Liberal, he'd call his advertising agency. (Camp,1981:36)

Through the outlet of television commercials, the politician has the best opportunity for associating his image with certain objects, products or individuals. Campaign advertising may also provide the voter with issue coverage and information: This type of ad may be particularly effective if used by opposing parties to "refresh" the memories of voters of scandals, and government overspending, for example. And through commercials, the party and the leader are in control of the message disseminated. For the 1988 election the three political parties utilized the information gathered through marketing techniques to plan their campaign communication strategies.

This chapter presents extensive excerpts from interviews conducted with campaign strategists of the three main political parties. The discussion by the strategists emphasizes the importance of image and marketing to the 1988 campaign.

Political Advertising from the Users Point-of-View

The purpose here is to "marry" previous discussions of image, political advertising, marketing techniques, and ad strategy; that is, it connects the theoretical with the practical aspects. From interviews conducted in April 1988 with key political strategists from the Progressive Conservative, Liberal and New

Democratic parties, this section demonstrates how the methodical aspects of campaign planning contribute to the final product which is the portrayal of leaders in political advertising. Unless otherwise noted the information provided is drawn extensively from the interviews with the strategists. The interviewees were:

- * Senator Norman Atkins who was the Chairman of the Progressive Conservative party's national campaign in 1984 and 1988
- * Peter Connolly, Principal Secretary to the Rt. Hon. John Turner and who was the key organizer of the 1988 campaign "machinery."
- * Robin Sears, who was the NDP's Deputy Campaign Manager for the 1988 campaign.

The Progressive Conservative Campaign

The Progressive Conservative Party spent at least \$2 million in the final week of the campaign on television advertising, bringing their total spending on radio and television for the entire campaign to an estimated \$4 million -- half of their permitted expenses. The two opposition parties, in contrast, each had only the \$1 million allocated in their campaign budgets for a final media blitz (Gray, March 1989:16).

The role of the Tory television ads combined a number of aspects. At the outset of a campaign a lot of what is done is research-driven. From the research commercials were designed that presented the party's position: the attempt was made to create an impression with the viewer that the party had a vision planned, had the support of people, and had the leadership. Atkins believes that every election is decided based on leadership, which not only encompasses

the leader but also the party's programs and the team. Canadian politics has been somewhat influenced by the United States because of the nature of their system in which one votes for the President separately from voting for members of Congress or members of the U.S. Senate.

In planning the communication strategy for the 1988 election, the Tories had a communications group, one based in Montreal for Francophone Canada and the other based in Toronto for English Canada. The two worked together but they also dealt with each market. The strategies were different in Quebec because the message was different: In Quebec the question raised was, "Who can best represent the French or Quebec-Canadians' interests in Ottawa." In English Canada the question raised was, "Who are the people who can best deal with change, who has the best team, and who has the best program for the future." Those were the subtle differences in presentation.

When the election was called the Tory organization was designed so that it had the flexibility to make adjustments to the campaign as the campaign went along, and these adjustments were based on information received from focus groups and research.

Atkins indicates that the preferred type of commercial used was what could be called the leadership-type of commercial. These commercials answered the questions, "Who do you think can best represent the country?", "Who has the best plan for the future?", "Who can best implement that plan?" After the Leaders' Debate the whole voter mindset began to shift based on voter personal perceptions as to who won or lost the debate, and the media's perception of who won. The Tories then had to make some adjustments to their advertising. What the Tories realized was that the people in many parts of Canada were

living in fear that what free trade meant in the negative context was that it was going to take away their social programs and more generally they were afraid of change.

The content and production of the ads are controlled by the party and the people responsible for the communication aspect of the election who are the people involved in party politics and who understand party politics. They, in turn, put together a support group of professionals who implement the strategic objectives of the Communication Chair. But there is tremendous integration between the leadership, the communication, and the strategy for the campaign. All of the communication material, from the print ads to the television commercials, are tested before the strategy committee sees it so, generally speaking, what is finally used is a matter of opinion. The committee might have four posters that have been tested and tested well. They will be shown to the leader so that he can decide what he feels comfortable with. There might be one he does not like and if he does not like it, it will not be used, even if it tests well.

As former president of an advertising agency for eighteen years, Atkins ran focus groups. He acknowledges that a lot of how commercials are planned is based on polls and focus groups. What the Tories show the focus groups are rough cuts of ads that are being developed. A scenario is set-up and then the ads are shown to the group. Impressions are received of each segment of the ad the same way as if the ads were selling a product. In preparing a commercial focus groups can give an impulse or reaction on each segment of the ad. Four out of five of the ad segments may get high ratings and a low rating may be indicated for one segment: that is the segment that is changed. The people who are producing the ads can take that one segment out that does not gain the right impulse and make it better. That is why the commercials

today, whether they are made in the United States or Canada, are made with certain deliberate effort and, generally speaking, this results in better quality ads.

The type of information that is removed because there is not a positive response would be visual or verbal elements that people are uncomfortable with. The visual could be a specific piece of footage of the leader's tour where he is meeting with someone but whoever that person is for some reason, they just do not think it is a good shot. Or, it could be a voice-over which is talking about issues: the way it is phrased could make someone uncomfortable, so it is rewritten.

Freetime television ad strategy is different from the paid ads. The production assignment is different because more time is being filled which means that a shooting schedule and requirements for visuals is greater. Freetime also gives the party more time to make a case than with a thirty-second paid commercial. But it probably does receive less viewership than a paid commercial. Some of the ingredients are the same -- the music and the theme -- but the ad is broadened and developed. In 1988 the freetime ads were an extension of the commercials and, like the commercials, they were not produced before the writ was dropped.

The Tories had a regular polling program that is continuous but the concentration of polling becomes more frequent the closer the election call comes. In preparation for 1988, when the party was in the prewrit period, which can be one year to six months, the planning committee had concepts leading up to the actual writ but no commercial development was done until after the writ was issued. Shooting was not done prewrit either because shooting against a broad script that may or may not be used is cost prohibitive. The

communications planning committee works towards a precise storyboard, and they have got to know what they are doing. Once a rough commercial is put together, it is tested on focus groups, and then it is refined. The ads have to be done on a regional basis as attitudes shift from one region to another and what is necessary is to ensure that the ad is compatible to each region. Some of the commercials aired in British Columbia, for example, were aired across other regions. But some commercials aired in Atlantic Canada which included Robert Stanfield were not aired in British Columbia. Where a lot of region work was done was in the radio commercials and these ads were directed specifically to regional issues: this approach is less costly.

The Tory campaign, on the basis of polling information provided by Decima Research, adjusted the commercials to address those specific problems. The Tory ads, post-debate, focused on destroying John Turner's credibility and the ads worked (Gray, March 1989:17). The Tory polls showed belief in Turner's sincerity dropped 28 percent in ten days. During the last week the Tories abandoned two-thirds of the commercials they had brought to pre-production stage in the prewrite period and produced new commercials very quickly. Tory Strategist Hugh Segal indicated that, "We went from concept through production to distribution in eighteen hours" (Gray, March 1989:16). The two ads produced were aimed at undermining confidence in Turner's competence and his team's strength. The Tories picked up all available television and radio time slots in a saturation buy for the campaign's final days. The new post-debate commercials were designed for the last two weeks of the campaign. The campaign then reverted back to "leadership" commercials that posed the dilemma of leadership another way: The question was, "It takes you four seconds to decide who you want to run this country for the next four year."

Since the debate had "crowned" Turner with public acclaim, the primary goal of the Conservative campaign was to shatter that "King for a Day" image. In the first phase of the attack, Mulroney personally led the charge against Turner's credibility and included all the ministers and allies he could. The new series of ads continued the assault on Turner, while the image of Mulroney reverted to the role of high-minded, forward-looking statesman. The attack during the first week after the debate had been designed to get to people who had been influenced by the debate and to throw them back into a state of confusion. In the next phase, negative attacks by ads and allies tried to prevent a relapse into Liberal sympathies while Mulroney tried to lure the new undecided into a more appealing Tory camp (Caplan, et al., 1989:187-8).

The primary issue of the campaign was free trade but the ultimate question, Atkins believes, that voters had to deal with was the leadership question -- Did they really want Brian Mulroney, John Turner or Ed Broadbent as prime minister? Atkins analyses that Broadbent was "out of the game" when the leadership debates were over because he did not do well in the French debate which unhinged him in the English debate. The Tories went through this period of the campaign of making adjustments that dealt with the free trade issue that they were confronted with a bad Gallup poll. The poll indicated popularity percentages of 43 Liberals, 31 Tories and 28 NDP. The Tories own polls indicated 34 percent Liberal and Tories, and 28 percent for the NDP but the Tories re-pollled and found out they were right. Atkins indicated that Gallup franchises its polling and the poll which resulted numbers was an omnibus polls that included questions that had nothing to do with the election. Gallup indicated that the Tories were losing in Quebec while the Tory poll indicated that the party was up 20 points. But the fear that struck the people who were running the campaign is when a

Gallup comes out like that, it cannot be stopped. Atkins does not have any problems with polls being published during elections but feels that there should be certain rules and guidelines that should be adhered to so that the criteria for polling is the same regardless of who does it. The results would then show an accurate reflection of the public opinion, and the people hearing the results of the polls would be informed of the criteria of the polling. The criteria includes how the question is phrased, how the sample is chosen, as well as whether it is a personal or telephone interview. All of these factors have an impact on the results.

The ads, themselves, were aimed at the party's own core of support and at those switch and undecided voters. The ads have to satisfy the party's own people and make them comfortable with the commercials. If they are not comfortable with the commercials what results is a counter reaction at the riding level which makes people uneasy and party workers lose their enthusiasm. The Federal party has to make sure that whatever is produced satisfies the grassroots but goes beyond that and reaches out to the switch or undecided voter. But Atkins indicated that with television the party has to broaden its appeal to more than just the switch or undecided voter. The power of television cannot be underestimated. One group only cannot be targeted resulting in the alienation of other groups: a balance has to be found. In finding the balance you have to find some "ground" that puts out the specific message but is also an ad that the party's own core support can live with. The core support must feel that television is backing up their efforts in reaching out to the undecided voter. Atkins indicated that he likes to run emotional ads that make people really feel comfortable: comfortable with the music, the lyrics, the content and the visuals.

Controversial issues, such as abortion, are not dealt with in ads produced by the Conservative Party as these issues are too "hot". Controversial issues are dealt with "on the stump" (political rallies or interview situations), or on the leader's tour or in media scrums. With regard to negative advertising, Atkins believes that Canadians, generally speaking, are more uncomfortable with negative advertising than Americans because Canadians tend to be more moderate in their views towards politics. In the U.S., negative ads have become part of the political electoral process. Atkins position on the negative advertising during the 1988 campaign is such that commercials developed in communication strategy are based on dealing with the circumstances as they are.

Ads the Tories ran in the middle of the campaign, Atkins indicated, said John Turner was deceiving the public on the issue of free trade: The Tories made it clear that John Turner "wasn't telling the truth." Atkins indicated that whether Turner was telling the truth or not was not an interpretation: he was not telling the truth so the Tories had to set the record straight on free trade. The Tory free trade ad in which the border is drawn in to counter the Liberal ad in which the border is erased was produced to, "Correct what, in the Tory view, was misrepresentation by the Liberal commercial. The Liberal commercial was trying to create a feat in the public's mind about free trade which was dishonest." The Tories "set the record straight" with statements from Michael Wilson, who is "probably the most credible and respected politician regardless of what partisan view is held", according to Atkins, as well as statements from Emmett Hall, Simon Reisman and Robert Stanfield. All of these people, in their own way, have a tremendous amount of credibility in the public's mind so who is right and who is wrong is a decision the public has to make.

In the final analysis, Atkins believes the ads worked because they did the job they were intended to do. The Tory ads helped the party win the election and that was what they were designed to do. Atkins does not care whether people now think the ads were "nice or not." The process of making ads is basically the same from election to election although the one thing that is changing significantly and will change even more so every year now is the technology process. The technology is less cumbersome than previously with the disappearance of big cameras and power packs. A national tour and election is like a television studio: Once the leader walks out the door he is in a studio. Atkins concludes that the world is a studio and the way in which material is transmitted across the country now is instant media: That is the new phenomena that is taking place and that will effect ad strategy for elections to come.

The Liberal Strategy

Peter Connolly's role in the Liberal election campaign was to ensure there was a campaign organization which was broken down into tasks: people were identified and appointed to perform those tasks. The two individuals who chaired the National Campaign Committee were Senator Allister Graham and the Hon. Andre Oulette. For the first time, the national Liberal party ran a national campaign rather than run a campaign for Quebec and a campaign for the rest of Canada. It was decided that the party would run one campaign with sensitivity to regional considerations. Graham and Oulette divided the work in the campaign such that Oulette's responsibilities centered on organization and Graham's responsibility was communications, but they worried about it all as co-chairs of the National campaign.

David Morton was responsible for the design and production of the advertising in consultation with the campaign committee. Morton is Vice-president of marketing and sales for Quaker Oats of Canada, the largest or second largest advertiser in Canada depending on the year. Connolly describes Morton as a relatively young, very energetic individual who has a commitment to the political process: his work on the campaign was done voluntarily. (Morton is also a Liberal party member.) But Morton was more than a production head, as he was a member of the campaign committee and was involved in the Election Readiness Committee. The Election Readiness Committee (ERC) became the Campaign Committee: Preparation before June 1988 was done by the ERC which were the same people as the, eventual, Campaign Committee. The ERC was in place for over a year in advance of the election. Morton's involvement right from the beginning guided him in formulating his preliminary work in terms of recommendations for commercials used by the Liberals during the campaign. He was involved to such a degree deliberately: He had the environment of the party instilled in his mind over the previous year and particularly so in the last six months. Morton was able to come up with ads that were representative of the prevailing views of Turner, of the committee, and of the subcommittee on communication and advertising. Morton was so involved with the process for so long that he was not far off from the intentions of the party in the first cut of the commercials.

All of the planning was done in consultation with the party leader, John Turner, and with Connolly. But Graham was anxious that the campaign express a regional perspective so he struck an advisory committee to the communications committee that had representatives from Ontario and Quebec, and from western and eastern Canada. Graham sensitized everyone who was going to be involved

in the production of the advertisements to the issues and to the regional perspectives of the issues over the period of nearly a year. The value of all of this work that Graham did and the direction he was able to provide, particularly after January 1988, was that he sensitized everyone in the process so that when the Liberals anticipated the call the real work had been done. The television ads had been produced and, for the first time, the Liberals had their commercials "in the can" when the campaign was called. This also proved to the party's detriment during the campaign as the Liberals did not have the funds to produce new ads once the Tories began their attack on Turner. The ads were not substantially revised in terms of approach and concept, thereafter. In the last week of the campaign the Liberals took four days to create a new commercial and could not afford to abandon any of the ads that had been prepared pre-writ.

Slightly before the election call Morton said to the Campaign Communications Subcommittee on Communications, "Here's what the Liberals ought to do." Everyone had something to say but basically what Morton had put together was representative of what other individuals in the party had in mind: this was due, again, to the tedious work Graham had done previously to ensure that not only the regions, but that caucus had input into the election process. Michael Kirby, as co-chair, and Connolly comprised the Leader Strategy Committee. Kirby and Connolly's link with Martin Goldfarb, who was the pollster, was very useful in the planning process as well. Goldfarb, Morton, Connolly and Graham worked very closely together. Kirby brought in the strategic view which was reinforced by the polling information to the content issues. Graham designed the process, massaged it and made sure it kept going. Kirby was responsible for the content and Morton was the person responsible for doing it. That is the sort

of "chain" that developed. Connolly oversaw all that occurred and offered an "amateur's" perspective whenever asked and sometimes when not asked. The remarkable thing, in Connolly's words, about the process was that Morton walked into the room and said, "I've been listening to you people for six months, reading the data and reading analyses of the data: here's what I think the party ought to do. Here are some storyboards." He was "in tune" with the process and the party that everyone was basically in agreement. It indicates that it is worth taking time and effort to involve people in the process, and Graham gets a lot of the credit for this.

For any federal election the Liberal party forms its own advertising agency (Red Leaf Communications) so that the party can recover the 15 percent from advertising costs. What Morton did was persuade three or four leading ad agencies to lend him creative people: this comprised the personnel of Red Leaf. Connolly's opinion is that some excellent creative work was done and the only time there was any suggestion that the commercials be altered was when the Tories started their negative ads. It was felt that the Liberals should retaliate because there was certainly enough material with which to do so. The suggestion was taken to Turner and he said no. Some will argue that that decision might have hurt the party's chances but it comes down to, "you've got to be who you are."

The Liberal Party has adapted election strategy over time: The party has gone from pamphleteering to newspapers to radio to television, and television is married to very sophisticated target polling and targeting. As a party the Liberals "had better adapt or get left behind." The polling information the Liberals had told the planning committee that people wanted to know about free trade and leadership. The Liberals tried to wind the two together with "Canada wrapped in

the flag." The Liberals found that "people are pretty fond of their country" and the Liberal party played on that. Turner, particularly, had a good sense prior to the writ and during the election of the kind of situation that Liberals were going to face in the next four years in Canada, Connolly indicated. Turner looked at what the government was saying and found it inconsistent with what he thought the government should know.

The Liberal campaign focused all possible attention on Mulroney as an individual rather than on the Conservative party, tried to exploit the people's dislike of the Prime Minister's personality and his perceived lack of honesty (Caplan, et al.,1989:83). The emotional level of the message was particularly important on the fear issues of free trade and tax reform. On the free trade issue, the Liberals focused on fears both of potential job losses and of the way the agreement might affect Canadian sovereignty or make the country more like the United States. The free trade deal was also turned back on Mulroney as a trust issue: The deal was portrayed as a perfect example of why Canadians should refuse to believe anything Mulroney had to say. On taxation, for example, the party exploited the (accurate) public feeling that income taxes had risen sharply since the Tories came to power in 1984 and the message was that a Tory government could mean four more years of rising taxes.

Today's television-dominated politics is related to the relationship that develops between the politicians and the voter, and the level of comfort that the voter has with the politician. The Liberal party had a lot of polling results that indicated to the party that Turner was "hot" on television. What the party tried to do in the Fall 1987 was to create conditions where some of the "heat" came out of Turner's performances. The party tried to create an environment around him that was less stressful and less hectic. Connolly notes that does not mean

he did not work as hard, he worked much harder but some very simple things were done around the office. For example, during the last moments before a television performance, the staff endeavored to reduce the stress level and the result was a calmer, more apparently confident Turner. Further, Henry Comor was hired, and Comor is not only a media consultant but also a medical doctor. He observed that Turner did not breathe properly. He did not breathe in when he was talking and after anyone does this for a while you gasp for air: eyes bulge and you look a little desperate and your nervous system tells you that you are dying. Comor's contribution was impressive and necessary over the year prior to the election.

The party made a deliberate effort to feature Turner. Connolly indicated that as a party, "We ran John Turner." The idea of a team was rejected as were the ideas of having senior people across the country accompany him, do some of his speeches, and make some of the announcements. In the ads Turner was featured where appropriate because the tour was going to feature him, and all of the election announcements were going to be made by him. Connolly indicated that Turner was mentioned in every ad deliberately. The party decided that Turner was the problem and he had to be the solution. The image of Turner in 1984 was the problem and the only way the Liberals were going to change that was if the party wiped out that view: the party had to convince the electorate that he had improved. The party was not helped in the early stages of the campaign where the old image caused people doing the newsclips to pick up on any error. He delivered a speech in Toronto and received seven standing ovations but the CBC ran a newsclip which showed him saying "birth rate" instead of "birth right." The old image was stereotyped into every mistake until finally the debate caused the media to say, "He isn't the same." And, finally, the public too, in the

debate, saw what he was really like. The party tried to present, in the ads, the message that John Turner was calmer and less strident than what people saw of him in newsclips from Question Period in the previous two or three years. And in the advertising the calmer John Turner was reflected, was present and was pictured. The party did not want people to be scared of him: some of the feedback the party received was that people were frightened of him. The shot the Tories used of Turner in which his arms are raised and his eyes are "bugged" was a shot from two-and-one-half years before the election. At that time voters would have seen Turner do that. The Tories and the Liberals were thinking along the same lines but they were at one end of the spectrum and the Liberals were at the other. The Tories tried to portray the worst of the "old" John Turner characteristics, while the Liberals tried to minimize them.

The real proof of the work was in the polling and information with respect to people's views of the party's ads. The focus groups the Liberals did indicated that people liked the ads. The ads were representative of the way they felt, and that was the goal of the campaign -- to reach people on an emotional level on the issue of free trade.

The New Democrats Campaign

In past elections the NDP was expected to lose, but not this time. The New Democrats expected to replace the Liberals as the number two party, but it did not happen. The New Democrat's Election Planning Committee made a serious error: it did not anticipate the passions that the fight over free trade would arouse, even though it was the NDP that initially mounted the sharpest attack on the Mulroney-Reagan trade deal. When the election was called, the NDP had no

effective strategy to disrupt the Tory-Liberal, Liberal-Tory campaign. Toronto advertising executive Larry Wolf, who worked on previous NDP national campaigns, believes the New Democrats entered the race at a disadvantage of their own making, "The problem was a lack of professionalism in advertising and media management. They hired party hacks out of misplaced loyalty. They were preaching to the converted."(Steed,1988:xv). The Wolf, Richards, Taylor advertising agency, had the NDP account in 1979 and 1980 so, in a sense, Wolf's words must be "weighed" cautiously.

Robin Sears indicated that the NDP pre-election planning started in the Spring 1986. The overall approach to the election was to strike an Election Planning Committee (EPC) which was comprised of forty people. Through input, the EPC involved every sector of the party. The pre-election planning peaked in the Spring 1988 and from that point the process involved refining options, which were chosen over the summer. The campaign was produced in the Fall 1988 but some of it was changed during the course of the campaign and reshot during the election itself.

The party's options were cost based. Sears indicates that "unlike the Tories who had 'bags of cash' to shoot and test anything that looked like it would 'fly'", the NDP had to be selective. The NDP did not have a lot of money so the party had to consider all of the concepts, decide how to present the campaign, present the concepts to a focus group or audience panel testing, and then during a final production stage decide what to drop out of the final production stage. The party hired Societe Nouvelle, Montreal to coordinate the creative efforts for the Quebec radio and print campaign (Sutter,1988:3). For English-language ads, the party hired Michael Morgan and Associates, Vancouver which was instrumental in changing the image of Broadbent, from wearing

corduroy suits to more "statesmanlike clothing" ("Selling the Socialists"). The Tories, as was indicated to Sears, produced three times as many spots as they used. The NDP produced less than twice as many more than what was used and used approximately 60 to 70 percent of the material that was produced. The choices of what to use had to take place earlier in the decision-making process.

The NDP did not conduct as much polling as, for example, the Tories because of finances but the NDP did a lot more polling than any previous campaign. The party did nightly tracking polls, regional polls, and riding polls all of which was at a higher level than was ever done before. The party spent less than one-half million dollars total on polling. Sears believes that there is a lot of mythology about polling, and the mythology is created deliberately by pollsters because it encourages people to think that there is something particularly "fancy" about it as a science which there is not. Polling, by Sears' definition, is somewhere between a road map and a weather forecast in terms of reliability and utility: it does not provide anyone with a road map to the future but it can point you away from some very bad directions. Further, it is really only somewhat better than weather forecasting in terms of when and to what extent and where precisely something is going to happen. Individuals have to be very cautious about the use of polling data in and of itself to make any kind of strategic decision whether it is in commercials or leadership tour planning.

Further, Sears indicated that the New Democrats use polling a great deal now for the purpose of characterising images and strategic positions of the leaders of the parties and the regional and demographic breaks within that. The party then does what Sears calls "beauty contest" polls, which means the NDP will not spend money to acquire data in the pre-campaign and campaign period

that is available for free. This includes Gallup polls which are published in daily newspapers. The information includes who is up and who is down in the polls: Gallup's polls of this type do not mean very much except on a trend basis. What the NDP does with polling is try to understand what the values are the people have, how they relate to issue conviction, whose competitive among the three leaders in presenting a position closest to the values and issue convictions of the three, what shifts there are in terms of salience of various issues and values over time with different geographic and demographic groups. This information is folded into the ad conceptualization process and then the polling is used for actual testing. The NDP will ask, "Did you see the Tory ads and what did you think of them?" This is difficult to do as people have very strange recall and people get the ads and the parties mixed-up.

The polling strategist for the NDP was an American, Victor Fingerhut, who the NDP has used for a number of years in conjunction with a variety of Canadian fieldwork companies. The party did most of the analysis and massaged the data from the first poll organized by party internal staff groups. The cycle was such that Fingerhut would be involved in the discussion over the questionnaire, field work would be done by a group of Canadian companies across the country, and this data would be assessed by the party's own staff every night. The data would then be combined with data sent to the staff by computer from across the country every night. Report generation would be done by the staff and then discussion of the report would again involve Fingerhut. Fingerhut, then, was involved at the very beginning and at the very end of the process. The big change was that the party did a lot more of the work itself which saved a great deal of money.

Ed Broadbent had a great deal of input into the campaign. He participated in the pre-election committees, but he did not have a veto on any of the decisions that are made by committee. In the opinion of Lawrence Wolf, "The New Democrats had a wonderful product, a wonderful leader in Ed Broadbent, but they shot themselves in the foot. Their commercials had no teeth, they did not sell themselves well" (Steed,1989:xv). The Vancouver communications firm, Michael Morgan Associates which designed the ad campaign, says that it responded to the wishes of its client. Wolf further criticizes that, "In Ed, the New Democrats had a very attractive guy, but he looked like hell in the commercials. He came across far more strident than he is, in fact. The ads needed to make Ed more intimate and statesmanlike but he seemed to be shouting." It is generally agreed that the NDP had an obvious asset (Broadbent) compared to a prime minister nobody trusted, according to the polls, and a Liberal leader who was going nowhere. "Never had the NDP campaign been bound so tightly to the popularity of its leader," wrote Jeffrey Simpson: "In 1988, New Democrat candidates embraced the persona of Broadbent as never before, to the point of placing his pictures on lawn signs instead of their own, and introducing themselves on the doorsteps as 'your member of the Ed Broadbent team.'" (Steed,1989:xii).

Sears indicated that the NDP's main choices as to what to use were difficult. It was really a choice on the points to promote rather than any dramatic push in one direction and to do more of the "Ed plus others" ads versus the "Ed alone" ads: the party decided to do the "Ed plus others" ads. The NDP anticipated that the Tories would start off the television ad campaign concentrating on Mulroney, which they did, and the NDP believed that the Liberal would not talk about Turner much, which again proved to be accurate. The NDP attempted to find a middle course between the Liberals and Tories. The goal of

the ad campaign was to link the image and the leader: Broadbent was the most effective presenter of the issues that mattered the most to people the party was trying to reach. The party knew the issues and the perception of Ed, and his image as a politician and as a man, made the messages carried or read much more effective. The party wanted to touch on Ed's strengths as an individual but give prominence to the issue concerns.

There were also different levels of emphasis always involving the same pairs of concerns depending on what the message or the strategy was. The ads were aired in a planned approach from soft to hard, which is fairly conventional. Regional issues are difficult to deal with on television in election campaigns because of costs but regional issues can be covered in radio and in print. Regionally, ads were given different weight but increasingly it is difficult to subdivide television by its geography. Ads can be divided more easily by demography as campaign planners can make sure ads run in the shows and the stations that young men are watching, for example. Only one commercial was created during the campaign as a result of new data. This ad was the commercial in which Ed speaks of Wall Street Mulroney and Bay Street Turner which ran at the very end of the campaign. (This ad was tested in the sample conducted for this thesis.)

The freetime ads are different from paid time ads. Freetime is, Sears indicates, less useful than paid time because people have a filter when they watch freetime which is "this is political propaganda", whereas, when they are watching a paid spot mixed between a beer commercial and a soap commercial they are not applying quite the same critical filter to the information they are receiving. What is done in freetime by the New Democrats is fill a political responsibility. What the NDP does in freetime is speak to the party's partisans,

talk to an opinion influencing elite: The freetime ads attempt to speak to and to address the party's partisans in the country whereas the paid commercials attempt to address undecided voters.

The phrase, "Ordinary Canadians" was used, as it was in the 1984 election, because it works, according to Sears. After the 1988 election it may have now outlived its usefulness. With regards to how often a piece of rhetoric is used, the party indicated to its candidates that the average person spends an average of five minutes a month reflecting on politics. The ninety-fifth time the party says something may be, for a significant number of voters, the first time that they have heard it. Secondly, repetition is the most important act in any form of marketing. The decision as to whether or not to use a piece of rhetoric or even an ad is based on whether it works with a new and changing group of voters.

Still, as Judy Steed indicates, the campaign looked "soft", and was unable to focus on the fierce emotions raised over fears about Canadian sovereignty. Robin Sears indicated in Steed's book that:

The party should have approached the issues differently, in reverse order. We said, "We need to protect the environment; here's how the trade deal hurts our ability to do that." That didn't work because the trade deal had become the number one concern. People thought we weren't tackling it. We should have said, "The trade deal hurts the environment, here's how." (Steed,1989:xvi)

Sears concluded that if the ads could be changed they would be a lot tougher, in every sense. What the Tories did, Sears added, very successfully for the first time in Canadian politics was to make negative advertising acceptable to Canadian voters. The Liberal ads, in Sears' assessment, were much less effective than the Tory ads. The Liberals were seen as being negative advertisers and the Tories were not: that was the brilliance of the Tory campaign. The

Tories did run some of the most negative attack ads ever seen in Canadian politics but they were beautifully executed and, in some respects, quite subtle. The NDP ads, quite simply, particularly in the closing days of the election, were not tough enough.

* * *

This chapter has presented an insight into the practicality of why parties adopted marketing techniques with which to promote the party leader and the strategies involved in the development of the resulting ad campaigns. Additionally, the interview excerpts have assisted in defining the philosophies of the political parties in formulating images and messages. The Tories are synonymous with polling, the Liberals are synonymous with advertising, but the New Democrats are still struggling with the application of both advertising and polling.

Similarly, the Liberal and Tories utilize the services and expertise of professionals, paid or volunteer from agencies who would receive, if the party were elected, lucrative government agency advertising contracts. The New Democrats, it is suggested in this thesis, have little faith in a "proven system" and still rely on individuals within the party. As Wolf indicates, the New Democrats had the leader but the party just did not package him right. Of course, what must be considered is the available monies to conduct polls in order to produce ads: these practises are all cost driven.

So, the polls have been conducted, the concepts decided on, the ads have been produced and the testing has been conducted. But the question that must be addressed is, "Are the strategies evident in the ads?" Chapter VI, "The Television Ads: An Analytical Discussion Discussion", will attempt to define the overall

content of the 1988 ads and will attempt to demonstrate the correlation between the strategies and the produced ads.

CHAPTER VI

THE TELEVISION ADS: AN ANALYTICAL DISCUSSION

To learn political information from the media, people must make some effort to seek it out. They must pick up the newspaper, purchase a magazine or sit down to watch the evening news. [But when] people sit in front of their television sets to be entertained, commercials intrude with political information the viewer has made no effort to discover. The political ad is sandwiched between their favorite television show and it now takes more effort to avoid the commercial than to watch it. So the uninformed watch and they learn.
(Patterson, 1976:125)

The "creation of images" in Canadian elections based on political strategy is evident in election advertising. Due to the control the parties have of disseminating their own messages to the public through televised election ads, this type of advertising has become more and more evident with each election. Under the Canada Elections Act, political advertising can take place during the last four weeks of a federal campaign ending two days before the election. And the Act's formula for allocating free and paid advertising time is based on political standings and the number of seats being contested. In the 1988 campaign the Conservatives were allocated 195 minutes of paid broadcast (radio and television) time, compared to 89 for the Liberals and 67 minutes for the NDP.

The importance parties place on television advertising is evident by the amount of campaign monies spent by the parties. Before reimbursement, the Tories spent \$2,440,503 or 30 percent of their total campaign spending (\$7,921,738) on television advertising. Similarly, the Liberal's spent \$2,024,456 or 30 percent of their total campaign spending of \$6,839,875: The New Democrats spent \$2,495,316 or 35 percent of their total campaign spending of \$7,060,563 (Report of the Chief Electoral Officer, 1988). The parties were reimbursed 22.5 percent of this spending by the government.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an analytical discussion of the television ads. This chapter will attempt to tie the political strategy as indicated in the previous chapter to ad content; that is, this chapter will attempt to demonstrate the correlation between the strategy and the produced ads. The key question is, "Are the strategies evident in the ads?" The discussion within the chapter will present a broad overview of the content of the ads (evident themes, types of ads used, evident symbols, and the use of leadership). Due to the number of television ads broadcast during the 1988 election by the three political parties, it is not feasible to discuss, specifically, all of the ads. Ads aired in English Canada, only, are discussed as these ads are aimed national audience as opposed to those voters in one specific province.

As the discussion by the strategists indicates, the focus of each campaign was each party's respective leader. And associated to each leader were "images": images specific to defining what was/is a prime minister. As Robert Mason Lee indicates, between the 1984 and 1988 elections, Broadbent had learned to moderate the pedantic pitch and swell of his speaking style, to dress casually well, to appear more comfortable himself and to become a "cool" performer for a "cool" medium. He could be anyone's uncle or employer: his image was reassuring, unspecific, non-threatening. Turner, though better looking, presented a "hot" image that was wrong for television. Lee defines Turner's speaking style such that, "Words danced out of him like spit out of a skillet; his gestures were the incoherent flailing of a wrung chicken; his eyes were "burning coal tips on the rail line from hell." Lee argues that Mulroney faded into the wallpaper. Mulroney created a magnetic field of indifference between himself and the viewer. His face on television was a blank sheet (Lee,1989:26). Thus, each leader (and the political strategists) had "barriers" to overcome in identifying each

leader as prime ministerial.

The Progressive Conservative Ads

As Atkins indicates in the previous chapter the issue of the 1988 election was free trade but the real question the voters had to deal with was the question of leadership. The Tory strategy for the television advertising was to identify the party's position and to define for the voter which party had a planned vision, had the support of people, and had the leadership: The emphasis, however, was on the leadership. With this emphasis, the ads attempted to answer the questions, "Who do you think can best represent the country?", "Who has the best plan for the future?", and "Who can best implement that plan?" And as Atkins indicates the question of leadership in the 1988 election was, "Did the voters really want Brian Mulroney, John Turner, or Ed Broadbent as prime minister?" The Tory ads were designed to answer these questions with only one possible response "that Brian Mulroney was the only party leader who had the leadership, the best representation and the best plan for the future to lead Canada as prime minister.

The commercials aired by the Tories focused on promoting specific issues within the free trade agreement and defending Liberal direct attacks on the agreement. During the first three weeks of Mulroney's election campaign, a production crew followed the leader's campaign and continually shot Mulroney campaigning. From the footage, Tory strategists selected images to be featured in the ads. These commercials intended to "reinforce the public's impression of Mulroney as a statesmanlike Prime Minister and to underline the Conservative message of prosperity and competence" (Kopvillem, 1988:20). The Tories also

inferred credibility by producing ads which included headlines from Canadian newspapers such as, "Our country has taken the biggest single step in its history towards determining its own economic future, said the Edmonton Sun ." These messages inferred endorsement of the party and its policies by newspapers across Canada.

Within the free and paid ads that focus on Mulroney, the ads clearly indicate/imply that he is a "leader." These ads focus visually on Mulroney, or his is the speaker in the ads. In the ads in which Mulroney is the speaker a voice over first announces who the speaker is: the male voice over with a tone of authority says, "Prime Minister Brian Mulroney." Clearly, before the audience has the opportunity to judge Brian Mulroney on what he has to say, Mulroney is placed in a context of importance, authority and power as the title "Prime Minister" evokes importance, authority and power. The visual during this voice over is a shot of Parliament at night. The visual reinforces the verbal, and vice versa. Throughout the ads the Progressive Conservative party was second in importance to the leader.

The party aired sixteen paid and freetime ads. Ten of these ads were paid time ads. Of the paid time ads, five were endorsements of the free trade agreement by individuals of the community (dock worker, fisherman, manager of a juice factory, fruit farmer). Three of the ads contain Mulroney speaking about jobs, and Canada's and his own role as a peacekeeper while the third ad indicates verbally and visually that Mulroney is the leader with an experienced team of managers. Two of the paid ads are negative or attack ads against Turner and his position on free trade. A third ad indicates that Turner has no team, no plan and does not hold the confidence of Canadians.

The six freetime ads also emphasize the benefits of free trade via endorsements by the same individuals who appear in the paid ads. Within the ads in which the topic is free trade, there is no mention of Mulroney or his party: the discussion is on the benefits of the agreement. Within the freetime ads, Mulroney is also defined as a leader, statesman and representative for all peoples. Mulroney speaks directly to the audience on an issue, presents a speech at a lectern, speaks in his office with the Canadian flag visible draped behind him, or is seen working his way through a smiling crowd of people. Mulroney, in one commercial on the issue of immigration, is endorsed by men and women from various economic and ethnic groups all who indicate their support for Mulroney due to his "strong presence on the international stage." In this ad Mulroney is presenting a speech to a luncheon of Small Business owners, who are represent the multethnicity of Canada.

In a second freetime ad the emphasis is on Mulroney as a statesman. The setting is among leaders of other countries and in the visuals Mulroney is "centre stage." The impression is that he is respected and that his role in international politics has placed Canada in a better position that it was in prior to him becoming prime minister. The sixth freetime ad is one in which Simon Reisman, the Canadian negotiator of the free trade deal, is endorsing Mulroney and the Conservative government for its insight into the future. The ad includes Mulroney in the latter part speaking to the same Small Business group as above: he is talking about the benefits of free trade to all Canadians.

Within the ads Mulroney is placed in positions in which he is talking with factory employees, for example. The individuals he is speaking with cross ethnic and gender lines. Again, his position as opposed to those employees in a factory is evident: He is dressed in a suit and tie while the employees are

dressed in work clothing. However, to envision that he is a leader that will listen, the clips show him asking questions and listening intently to the response. In other ads, Mulroney is surrounded by the fixtures of representing his position such as the Canadian flag, bookshelves filled with law books, and he is dressed formally in a white shirt, dark suit and appropriate tie. Granted, this is the "dress" of any businessman but placed within the setting, what is communicated is power and authority.

One ad, which aired just prior to election day, indicates both verbally and visually that Mulroney has a team of experienced and professional managers with which to run the country. Mulroney is shown, centre screen, in a meeting with his cabinet. It is clear that he is leading the discussion in the meeting. Attention is focused on Mulroney.

Clearly, the Progressive Conservatives attempted to discredit Turner after his post-debate rise in the popularity polls. This was done by saying that Turner was misleading Canadians about the agreement. The ads also referred to Turner's experience as Finance Minister in the Turner government, a time when the rate of inflation was very high. In one commercial Turner's head fills the television screen and his eyes are "bugged out." The picture of Turner is also very washed, which makes him look physically ill. The Tories also strengthened their position that Brian Mulroney was the only party leader eligible for the role of prime minister by strengthening their attack against Turner. Phrases within their negative advertising indicated:

"John Turner is misleading Canadians. He is not fighting for our future, he's fighting for his own."

John Turner will tear up the free trade agreement . . . John Turner will tear up the economic heart of Canada if we let him."

Another anti-John Turner commercial consists of so-called "people-in-the-street"

interviews with individual comments about John Turner such as:

"I have Liberal friends who say 'God help us if he wins'."

"It's quite frightening that there's a man threatening to spend \$30 billion dollars without telling us how he's going to raise those funds."

In analyzing the overall Progressive Conservative campaign the Tories realized after the televised leader's debate, when Turner's popularity increased due to his strong performance, that an "attack" on Turner had to be waged in order to strengthen their own leader's position. Had the party ignored Turner's popularity it can only be assumed that it would have resulted in the Tories loosing the election.

Do the Tory ads reflect the goals which Atkins indicated? The campaign did establish the party's goals with respect to free trade and did briefly refer to the importance of employment. Further, Mulroney was emphasized in the free and paid time ads. His leadership and statesmanship were the emphasis with his willingness to listen to all peoples strongly inferred. But was this the message that was communicated to voters? Graham Fraser offers this assessment of the ads:

The [ads early in the Conservative campaign] were developed with the aim of reassuring Canadians about Mulroney. They were relatively static commercials, quoting positive comments about Mulroney and the Mulroney government from newspapers across Canada . . . The role of the ads was to confirm the idea of Mulroney as prime minister. (Fraser,1989:316-17)

Atkins indicated that the ads worked because they did the job: the Progressive Conservative party was elected for a second term. Impressions of sample ads is provided in the following chapter.

The Liberal Ads

As Liberal strategist Peter Connolly indicated in the previous chapter free trade and leadership were wound together to form the basis of the ad campaign along with people's dislike of Brian Mulroney's personality and lack of honesty. Due to the leadership problems that faced John Turner in the four year period between the 1988 and 1984 elections the Liberals had to question whether or not to use and/or feature John Turner in the television ad campaign. Connolly indicates, however, that the Liberals made a deliberate effort to feature Turner. The party decided to "Run John Turner" as Turner was the problem so he had to be the solution. This was contrary to what the focus groups told the Liberals which was that they did not want to see Turner much, but they wanted to see Mulroney but only because they "loved to hate him" (Fraser,1989.313-14). The party had to convince the electorate that John Turner had improved and that he was calmer and less strident than what people saw of him in newsclips from Question Period. Clearly, the support that Turner gained after the debate indicated that Turner had changed.

Fraser indicates that three themes were devised for the ad campaign: integrity or Mulroney's lack of it, fear of the free trade deal, and fear of the government's proposed sales tax (Fraser,1989: 312-13). Liberal strategists indicated during the campaign that the ads were not intended to be argumentative or negative but were intended to get Canadian people to think about the issues (Kopvillem,1988:22).

Turner is prominent in most of the Liberal ads and those in which he is not he has voiced the ending tag. In the ads Turner is in he is framed in a medium shot and is speaking directly into the camera about the deal, affordable

housing or social issues. The background is a plain soft white background. Verbally, Turner is appealing to the emotions of the voters. In an ad on free trade, for example, Turner's appeal is such: "I'm not going to allow Brian Mulroney to sell out our birthright as a nation. I'm not going to let Brian Mulroney destroy the Canadian dream." All of the Liberal ads end with the first four musical notes of "O Canada" and the voice over tag, "This is more than an election. It's your future" as the Liberal logo is brought into frame. As with the Conservative Ads, the Liberal's "link" the party to the country. The voice over is that of Turner's except in the ads that could be considered negative or attack.

The Liberal ads imply that a Liberal government is needed to protect Canadian sovereignty against the Progressive Conservatives and the Brian Mulroney threat. The Liberal ads appeal to the Canadian conscience. The Liberals did not verbalize that Mulroney was lying or misleading Canadians, but the implication of this is strong in the ads themselves.

The Liberals produced fourteen free and paid time ads for the English Canada audience: only three of these ads were freetime. True to the strategy of running John Turner, the only ads which did not include Turner or his voice over was the ad in which the Canada-U.S. border is erased and the seven ads which could be considered negative ads against Mulroney's character. The positive Liberal ads focus on Turner who, in turn, speaks calmly and directly into the camera. Turner speaks to the voting public on the Liberal position on housing, taxes or free trade or on the Conservative policies. John Turner is the commercial. Further, there are no symbolic ties such as the Canadian flag as background to distract attention from Turner. In the freetime ads, the camera is used to emphasize positions and this is done through camera cuts of close-ups, medium shots or medium-long shots of Turner.

Turner's appeal in the ads is a practical and an emotional one. In an ad in which he discusses the "Tory's tax grab" he indicates in a practical sense that the "grab" will tax haircuts, dentist bills, and the purchase of a new home. This is combined with an emotional appeal as Turner indicates that the tax will hit those least able to pay. This practical/emotional approach is used in all of the "Turner-centered" ads. In another ad on the environment, for example, Turner indicates that Canadians ("We" is used) love our lakes, rivers, forests and mountains. He indicates that the Liberal party would ensure that the polluter pays for the offense and the clean up.

The only reference in the Liberal ads that indicates Turner's record is an ad that aired near the end of the campaign which compares Turner's and Mulroney's positions on protecting Canada's sovereignty and independence. The ad indicates visually that Mulroney sides with the U.S. rather than stands up for Canada. This ad contains an animated drawing of Mulroney saluting the American flag.

The Liberal negative ads are voiced by a male voice over and are direct attacks on Mulroney's record on honesty. The first free trade ad aired by the Liberals implied that Mulroney had "flip-flopped" on the issue. The ad shows a still photograph of Mulroney with a voice over indicating Mulroney's 1983 stance against free trade. The picture of Mulroney flips from facing left to facing right: the voice over is Mulroney's who is announcing the start of free trade talks with the United States. The voice over says, "Say one thing, do another. "Don't let Mulroney deceive you again."

The Liberal campaign did, very obviously, focus their positive campaign on Turner, just as the focus of their negative campaign was on Mulroney. The Liberal campaign did, to a greater degree than the Tory campaign, make its party

leader "the campaign." Turner informs voters the Liberal position and warns of the Conservative threat. Due to Turner's performance during the debate he proved to be not only a threat to the Tories but proved to be an asset to the Liberal campaign.

The New Democrat Ads

As Robin Sears indicates in the previous chapter, the campaign of the New Democratic party was bound tightly to the popularity of the party leader, Ed Broadbent. The party decided to run "Ed plus other" ads meaning that Broadbent was the focus of the television ads. Broadbent was judged to be the most effective presenter of the issues that mattered to the people the party was trying to reach. Broadbent had also placed highest in the polls as the most popular leader in the months leading up to the election and during the initial weeks of the campaign. The party strategists felt that the only area in which the party had any credibility was social programs and, in particular, medicare. Individuals (nurses, senior's, blue collar workers) endorsed firstly, Ed, and, secondly, the New Democrats.

The New Democrats produced fourteen free and paid time ads for English Canada. Five of these ads were freetime ads and four of these were testimonials of Ed and the party by senior's, union members, college students, candidates and "ordinary" people. The freetime ads also discuss Mulroney's record of trust; that is, he is a leader who cannot be trusted. These testimonials are shot in what appears to be the individual's living rooms and kitchens, with emphasizes on the theme of "ordinary" Canadians. One freetime ad concentrates on Broadbent. The ad contains close ups and medium shot of Broadbent only. He

is dressed casually and seated in a leather chair. He discusses the future of Canada and how it is the responsibility of those parties in power to work for families and for Canada. There are no shots of Broadbent with other leaders or with individuals in factories, et cetera. The message is that this is what Ed Broadbent passionately feels about the future of the country.

Although three of the nine paid commercials contain Broadbent speaking directly to the audience, all other ads refer to Ed Broadbent, moreso than Ed Broadbent and the New Democrats or the New Democrats. As Sears indicated, the aim of the ads was Broadbent, based on his popularity. In the ads in which Broadbent appears, the introductory vignette on taxes, social programs or senior's is tied to the latter part of the ad which is Ed's "personal" message. He is dressed in a suit, and is sitting on a stool in front on a draped fabric backdrop. Shots alternate between close ups and medium shots of Ed.

Yet, the television advertising campaign could be considered to have been a "soft" campaign: no hard attacks, no name calling, no visuals of the other leaders. The NDP campaign focused on "Ed" and on social issues. The commercials built on the positive image and popularity of Broadbent prior to the campaign. Broadbent himself or his name (usually not "Ed Broadbent", but "Ed") was evident in all of the commercials. The New Democrats also used "ordinary" Canadians, men and women of various income, age and ethnic groups to endorse "Ed" and the NDP.

The party attempted to emphasize Ed moreso than the party as the party "hinged [its] hopes on the belief that Canadians would implicitly trust him" (Is Ordinary Ed out of time?). The NDP's most frequently used slogan throughout the campaign was "Ed Broadbent, this time." The ads stuck to the party's

campaign themes of fairness in government, taxation policy, free trade and the environment.

The party's theme of "ordinary" Canadians as well as the image of Ed's leadership and openness to ideas is evident throughout phrases such as in the following ad:

"Ordinary Canadians are looking for someone who cares about the same thing we care about. [Ed] cares enough to stick up for us, for fair taxes, for good health care, for decent pensions for our parents and grandparents, and he's not afraid to stand up to the big corporate polluters who are ruining our air and water. This time let's vote for someone who's on our side. This time, Ed Broadbent."

This ad outlines the party's concerns, as well as indicating to the voter that Ed will stand up for individuals, and not stand with corporations. The ad is also appealing to the younger voter by using the words "our parents and grandparents" which implies that the individual to whom the speaker is addressing would still have both sets alive. The ad is also a direct appeal, indicated by "we", "us" and "our".

In the NDP's only "attack" commercial, Ed asks the voters, "Who's on your side?" and continues by implying that Brian Mulroney could not be as he "represents the interests of Wall Street" nor could John Turner as he is "completely at home with corporate Bay Street." Again the appeal is to the ordinary Canadian who has no interest or has no connection with Bay or Wall Street. This ad does not show any unflattering visuals of Turner or Mulroney and the "attack" on the two party leaders could be considered weak.

As Sears concluded the campaign of the New Democrats could have been more nasty. The party chose to approach the campaign in a professional manner; that is, present the leader and the issues and leave the "dirty work" to someone else. Yet, this approach did not benefit the party, overall. The party remained in

third place the leader's debate and after the election although the party did gain seats. Commentary made about the ads has been that Broadbent was not utilized to his potential and that the audience did not see and hear the real Ed Broadbent; rather, the audience saw and heard an over-scripted leader.

* * *

As is evident through the discussions with the political strategists in the previous chapter and through the discussion of the television ads here the strategy is evident in the ads. Atkins, Connolly and Sears each indicated that the campaigns were leader centered with the leaders acting as the "messenger" for the respective party. The degree to which each respective campaign was leader-centered varies, however, with the party. Mulroney, for example, appeared or was mentioned in fewer ads than Turner or Broadbent. In the ads Mulroney does appear in, his role (prime minister, a leader, a manager) is very evident and specific.

The discussion presented here has been a concentrated effort in defining the contents of each party's campaign. One would assume that an effort to analyze the ads by a television viewing audience (ie. voter) would not be conducted. As the paid ads are aired, primarily, in prime time, the ads are "sandwiched" between beer and car ads, for example, which are more slickly produced due to the monies involved in such campaigns. Therefore, the message communicated in the election ads must be simple and pointed, and presented by a recognizable individual ie. the party leader. Similarly, the ads play to the emotions of the electorate on issues such as patriotism, well-being and sovereignty. The obvious difference between the campaigns, then, becomes one of appeal and production values. How are the appeals to be made? What are the approaches to be taken

in making the appeals? How do these appeals affect the target audience, or do they? How are the ads produced to best communicate the message. These questions cannot be answered here due to the limitations of this work. However, what can be assumed is that political strategists have placed election advertising in a place of such importance that election campaigns cannot be designed without consideration of their utilization.

Chapter VII, "An Audience Impression of Election Advertising", will discuss six ads from the 1988 campaign. These ads were tested on a sample for impressions of the ads and their content: Is the planned strategy reflected in responses from participants?

CHAPTER VII

AN AUDIENCE IMPRESSION OF ELECTION ADVERTISING

All leaders recognize the futility of trying to correct the record, compared with the efficacy of fixing the image. All [the party leaders] had taken steps to improve their self-projection. Turner, removing his shoes, prostrating himself and practising deep-breathing exercises; Mulroney sequestering himself in a hotel room with video camera to improve his ability to convey sincerity; Broadbent revamping his wardrobe to appear better suited, so to speak, to the role of prime minister. All recognized the direct link between the image and the ability to draw voter support. (Lee,1989:27)

Chapter VI discusses the commercials from the perspective of the strategists involved in producing the ads and, therefore, the projected image. The intent of this chapter is to discuss the findings of a study conducted of six political ads broadcast during the 1988 campaign from the perspective of the audience: What impression(s) from the six selected ads does an audience have of the individual ads and, specifically, of the leaders within the ads? Do the impressions reflect the strategies?

The overall objective of the study was to provide a "picture" of the content of party leader images by a sample of voters and perspective voters. Does the focus on leaders, images of the leaders and leadership as created by the strategists and based on expensive and extensive research, impress upon voters? The objective of the study was twofold: Firstly, to inquire as to what the respondents acknowledged, from open-ended questions, as important in each ad. The purpose here was to investigate the importance of the individual leader's within the ads. Did respondents focus on the leaders, the issues, the party, production values or some other factor(s)? The second objective was to investigate what the impressions were of the individual leaders in the ads. What did the respondents focus their attentions on? Was the important factor of each ad the leader, the leader's verbal presentation, the leader's appearance, or some

other factor(s)?

The Six Ads

The six ads selected, purposely, focused on the leaders of each respective party. The six ads selected were one positive and one negative ad from the Progressive Conservative, Liberal and New Democratic party campaigns. Positive and negative, for the purposes here, were defined by the adjectives within the ads and whether the ads presented the leader in an attractive or unattractive context.

The Liberal positive ad (see Appendix B), entitled "Turner Speaks for Canada" was a two-minute freetime ad which aired throughout the campaign. The ad opens on Turner who is the focus throughout the ad with camera cuts varying from close-ups to medium shots of him. Turner is on camera for all but twelve seconds of the ad. Turner indicates that he will protect Canada as a nation from the threat of the Mulroney government and free trade. The ad emphasizes emotional issues such as what it means to be Canadian and what the Mulroney free trade deal will do to that definition. Turner isolates Mulroney as the "bad guy": Turner does not refer to the deal as the Conservative free trade deal or any other mention of the party. The ad closes with the Liberal party musical tag which is the first four musical notes of "O Canada" and a voice over which sounds like Turner saying, "This is more than an election, it's your future. Vote Liberal." Visually, the tag is an animated stylized Canadian flag with the word "Liberal" below the flag. The party is not mentioned in the commercial, apart from the tag: the focus is on Turner and what he feels and what he will do if elected prime minister. Turner is dressed in a navy suit and is seated on

a stool against a plain greyish-white background.

The New Democratic party positive ad discusses the issue of taxes: families are paying more taxes while corporations are paying less (see Appendix C). The thirty-second paid ad features Ed Broadbent as the on camera narrator and is on camera for nineteen of the thirty seconds. Broadbent is dressed in a navy suit and is seated on a stool in front of a draped soft yellow cloth background. The ad begins with the party logo opening onto a couple working at a roll top desk. As the camera zooms out the male drops his hand as if in frustration. The camera pans to Broadbent who is framed in a medium shot and who is sitting sideways facing the camera. Broadbent refers to a Mulroney 1984 election promise in which he promised to change the tax structure, but he did not in the four year span. Broadbent indicates that ordinary Canadians deserve a fair tax system and that he will make sure they get it. The ad closes with the logo and a voice over tag indicating that Broadbent will "see" to fair taxes. The party is not mentioned in the ad although the logo does appear in the opening and closing bumpers.

The Progressive Conservative party positive ad discusses that the best social policy is a job (see Appendix D). This thirty-second paid ad features Mulroney who tells voters that a job brings dignity, is fulfilling and means leadership for families. The ad opens on a night still of Parliament Hill with the words "A Social Policy" superimposed over it. The male voice over says, "Prime Minister Brian Mulroney." This establishes Mulroney as the prime minister which implies power, position and respect. The next shot is a close-up of Mulroney looking off camera. He is dressed casually in a blue pullover and plaid shirt with the collar open: he is seated in front of a stone fireplace. As Mulroney discusses the social policy the video over his voice is: Mulroney in a factory

setting, talking with a woman; a shot of a welder working; and, a shot of Mulroney listening to a male in a hardhat. Mulroney also has a hardhat on. Mulroney is on camera for almost the entire ad, in various settings, except for five seconds at the beginning of the ad, the shot of the welder and the tag which is "Canada" vocalized with the visual "P.C." logo brought into frame.

The NDP negative ad (see Appendix E) was aired during the last few days of the campaign. The ad opens on Ed Broadbent, dressed in a suit, sitting on a stool against a soft blue background with the theme under Broadbent's voice throughout the ad. The first camera shot of Broadbent is a medium shot which zooms in slowly ending in a close up. Broadbent is the focus of the ad. His message is a question which asks which party fought for fair taxes, decent pensions and medicare, and against corporate polluters. Ed says that only New Democrats represent ordinary families while Mulroney and Turner represent the interests of corporations only. Broadbent asks voters to ask themselves to think of the past before voting for the future. The ad closes on Broadbent: there is no closing voice or video tag.

The Liberal party negative ad is a thirty-second paid ad which portrays Mulroney as saying one thing but meaning another (see Appendix F). The issues in this ad are free trade, and the proposed deindexing of senior's pensions in 1984. The message the ad defines is that Mulroney cannot be "taken for his word" because he has changed his mind on important issues in the past. Due to the complexity of the ad's production a detailed description of the ad is found in Appendix F. The ad closed with the message: "Say one thing, mean another. Don't let Mulroney deceive you again." The ad closes with the Liberal logo coming in and closes with the voice over tag urging voters to vote Liberal on November 21.

The final ad shown was a Tory negative ad which aims at John Turner (see Appendix G). The Tories make the claim that Turner is spreading fears about free trade. The thirty-second ad uses headlines from national newspapers which implies that the newspapers support the free trade agreement. The ad opens with a black and white picture of a close up of Turner which is framed in blue. The male voice over indicates that medicare will not be affected by free trade: the Halifax Chronicle Herald supports the position. The next shot is of an extreme close up of a black and white picture of Turner: Turner is looking upward and he is frowning. The voice over says that the Liberals will say anything to frighten Canadians and indicates the Winnipeg Free Press as the source of information. The last shot is a medium shot of a black and white still of Turner in a media scrum. The voice over says, "John Turner is lying. The Calgary Herald." The ad closes with the message that John Turner wants to mislead Canadians and that Canada deserves better.

The Questionnaire Design

The questionnaire (see Appendix A) designed for the purpose of this study was adapted from previous similar studies by Clarke, Jenson, LeDuc, and Pammett (1980) who conducted a postelection study on the images of political parties during the 1974 Canadian General election; a study by Winham and Cunningham (1970) on the 1968 Federal election in which open-ended questions were asked about party leader images; Hofstetter, Zukin and Buss (1978) on political imagery during the 1972 U.S. election; and, a study by Keeter (1987) on candidate personal qualities. For these studies open-ended questions were asked to encourage the widest possible range of responses. While more difficult to analyze, open-ended questions do not "lead" respondents.

The ads were tested on forty-four Communication 130 male and female students at Simon Fraser University in February 1990. While participation was voluntary, this group was selected for a number of reasons: The response was important more so than the possibility of the respondent having previously viewed the ad or voted: first impressions of the ads from this group were possible. This class was selected as the makeup of the class for this required communications program course consists of students within the Department of Communication as well as students from other academic disciplines, from first to fourth year undergraduate students, of ages ranging from 18 and upward. Overall, the one class offered a wide range of individuals. Fifty-two individuals indicated interest in participating in the study, but only forty-four of the fifty-two distributed responses were returned.

The limitations to the study were such that the respondents were all university students which implies a certain income and academic level. As well, voting patterns pertaining to age and income were not considered. However, it was felt that this group would, from available testing groups, be best able to respond to the objectives which formed the basis for the questionnaire: What do the respondents notice in the ads? What are their impressions of the ads and of the leaders? Do their impressions correspond with planned strategies? What do they think they see and hear?

A further limitation refers to the ads themselves. These ads had been tested by each political party on their own focus groups prior to these ads airing during the campaign. The ads shown are the "final product" which their studies found best to air. In light of this, it was desirable to test these ads to inquire as to what a sample judges as important and impressionistic, with questions focussing upon the party leaders. It should also be noted that due to

the above factors, the results cannot be conclusive, but can only be speculative.

The procedure for the sample was such that the respondents were asked to reply to the fifteen questions in Part I of the questionnaire prior to viewing any of the ads. The impression given the respondents was that this was a general survey relating to federal politics. Part I inquired as to political party support, voting habits, television news viewing habits, and questions about the leaders and political parties from the election. Specific questions which would have no bearing on the results were also asked, such as "Where did you vote?"

Questionnaire, Part II: The "Positive" Ads

The procedure for Part II which was viewing the positive ads was such that each of the three ads was shown, with limited time allotted between each ad for the respondents to reply to the eight questions. Limited time was allotted as first impressions were sought. Therefore, an ad was shown, the response was given, the next ad was shown, et cetera. This procedure was also used for Part III (negative ads). The positive ads were shown in a predefined sequence which separated the Liberal and Tory ads. The ads were shown in the following order: Liberal party, New Democratic party, and Progressive Conservative party.

The eight questions in Part II inquired as to the impression of the overall ad; who the audience was; what was liked and disliked about the ad; if there was anything about the leader that was liked and disliked; and, whether the leader was representative of a Prime Minister. Definitions were not provided for terminology such as "like", "dislike", "message", or "representative." The same questions were asked about each ad.

Questionnaire, Part III: The "Negative" Ads

Part III of the questionnaire involved the presentation of the so-called "negative" ads. The format for conducting the test was the same as in Part II. The six questions inquired as to the impression of the ad; whether there was anything the respondents liked or disliked about the ad; who the audience was; what the message is; and, whether the ad should be aired during the election campaign. Definitions were not provided for any of the terminology. The same questions were asked about each ad.

The ads were purposefully shown in a sequence which was judged by this writer to be "least negative" to "most negative." The ads were shown in the following order: New Democratic party, Liberal ad against Mulroney, Tory ad against Turner.

Questionnaire Results

The results of Part I of the questionnaire which sampled 46% females and 54% males with an average age of 24.5 indicated that 66% of the respondents voted in the 1988 general election. Of the 34% who did not vote, 27% of these were not of voting age at the time of the election. Eighty-four per cent of the respondents were not affiliated with a political party and of these 76% do not vote for the same political party in every election. Of the 16% who were members of a political party, 57% are active members. Ninety-four per cent of the respondents indicated that they watched television news with international news being most important followed by national news.

With regard to voting patterns, the question was posed as to what is most influential in deciding how the respondent will vote. Party platforms or party issues represented the strongest influence, with the party leader the second strongest influence: Television election ads placed last as influential in the influences presented. This result correlated with a postelection poll conducted for Maclean's magazine by Decima which inquired as to the helpfulness of television commercials, television debates, leader tours, local meetings, published polls, and media coverage in deciding how to vote ("The Voters Reflect"). While media coverage was most helpful, television commercials ranked fourth in helpfulness. Individuals, themselves, perceive ads as not influential or helpful in the decision of who to vote for.

Similarly, 75% of the respondents who partook in the study for this thesis indicated that they did not remember any of the television ads from the election period: The ad that was mostly recalled was the Liberal ad which represents two men, negotiating at a map. One man is Canadian, the other is American. The American indicated that there is only one line he would like to change in the free trade agreement. He indicates that, "It's just getting in the way." He begins to erase the Canada-U.S. border. The voice over inquires as to how much Canadians are giving away in the Mulroney free trade deal.

With regard to the parties and the party leaders, most respondents preferred (undefined term) Ed Broadbent and the New Democrats as choices from the election. And 86% of the respondents indicated that the party leader does influence how they will vote. Yet, when asked, "What influences you the most when deciding how to vote" 66% indicated the political party, 20% indicated the leader, and 14% indicated the local candidate.

The respondents were asked an open-ended question as to what attributes they look for in a leader of a political party. Sixty-five per cent indicated personal qualities, 25% indicated the leader or leadership qualities, 7% indicated party affiliation, 2% indicated issue representation, and 1% indicated ideological representation. None of the respondents indicated group or geographical representation as a factor.

From this sample, and prior to discussing the responses to the ads shown to the respondents, it can be speculated that respondents do not perceive television ads to be directly influential on their electoral decisions. However, party platforms and issues, as well as the party leader are influential in how individuals decide to vote. Further, who the leader of a political party is, as well as the persona' qualities of the leader are influential on a voter's decision. It should be noted that it is possible to only speculate on the conclusiveness of impressions of leaders by the sample. As the sample was conducted two years after the election, events which have occurred since the election (government scandals, retirement of party leaders) are influential on a voter's decision.

Findings: The "Positive" Ads

Responses to the questions about the positive ads shown to the respondents were categorized for the sake of correlation: results are indicated in Appendices B, C, and D. Each written response was "dissected" : A response such as "Mulroney is promoting his party's ability to create jobs" would be correlated with the leadership, party and issue categories. Respondents were first asked what their impressions were of the overall ad. The term "impressions" was not defined for the respondents. The responses were categorized according to the

following: Issue responses, Leadership responses, Party-related responses, Personality responses, and other responses which were, primarily, comments on the production of the ad.

Responses were categorized as positive or negative responses and responses such as the following were received:

Empty of real content on an important issue
I hate the party but it's a good ad -- slick, attractive visuals
Mulroney is trying to promote his party's ability to create jobs
Broadbent is concerned about the average poor Canadian
Turner is trying to pull on our strings of national identity

The results found that 27% and 38% of the respondents indicated positive responses about Turner and Broadbent, respectively. Thirty percent of the respondents indicated negative responses towards the Tory ad with respect to production values of the ad. Respondents commented on the theme or the "stagedness" of the ad: The impression made was that Mulroney was not presented "realistically."

The leader tended to be the focus of the responses, despite the question being open-end: respondents could have responded to anything within the ad. More specifically, when asked what they liked and did not like about the ad, the responses indicated mostly negative responses to Turner's presented personality (24%), as did the Mulroney ad which resulted in mostly negative responses (29%) pertained to the "realistic" presentation of Mulroney. The most frequent response to the Broadbent ad resulted in 28% positive responses to the ad, which focused on the production of the ad; that is, "it was short", "a cheap looking set so not a lot of dollars were wasted."

With reference to the question, "What is the message being advertised?", despite the centrality of the leader in each ad, respondents focused on issues

addressed rather than on the leader. When questioned as to whether there was anything in particular the respondents liked and disliked about each party leader the responses focused upon the personality of the leaders rather than the appearance, ideology, leadership qualities, party affiliation or other categories. The respondents indicated negative responses to the personalities of Turner and Mulroney (35% and 37%, respectively) compared to 36% positive responses to Broadbent's personality. Negative responses included statements such as:

Turner stumbles over his words
Broadbent talks too quickly
Mulroney sounded insincere

Positive responses included:

Turner appears to have the Canadian interests at heart
Broadbent seems very genuine, open, honest
Mulroney is casual, likeable

And are these individuals representative of a "Prime Minister"? "Representative" was not defined for the respondents. In response to this question, personality of the leaders was the emphasis over group association, appearance, ideology, issue representation, leadership, party affiliation, and other considerations. To 21%, 31% and 33% for the Turner, Broadbent and Mulroney ads respectively, the important feature of a prime minister or potential prime minister is personality. Statements were received as follows:

Turner looks honest and willing to do the best for Canada
Broadbent seems like a leader who has a real opinion and passion
Mulroney speaks well and defends his stance

Findings: The "Negative" Ads

As with the positive ads, responses to the questions about the ads shown to the respondents were categorized for the sake of correlation: The responses

and findings are indicated in Appendices E, F, and G. As with the "positive" ads, each written response was "dissected."

The ads selected were leader centered; however, unlike the ads shown in the previous section, here the Liberal ad focused on Mulroney while the Progressive Conservative ad focused on Turner. The party's own leaders did not feature or were not mentioned in the ads of their respective parties. The New Democratic party ad featured Broadbent who spoke against the other two leaders.

When asked what their impressions were of the overall ads, respondents focused on positive production values of the Liberal ad (37%), and 57% focused on negative aspects of the production. Statements such as the following were received:

- The Liberal ad is insulting to both the P.C.'s and the Canadian public
- The Liberal ad is a smear campaign
- The P.C. ad is trying to prove Turner doesn't know what he is talking about
- The P.C. ad is too critical

The respondents with regard to the NDP ad focused positively (40%) on the appearance of Broadbent with comments such as:

- Broadbent is honest and straightforward
- Broadbent really wants the vote of the average person, because there are so many of us

When questioned about what was liked and disliked about the ads, production values were emphasized, negatively towards the Liberal and Tory ads, and positively towards the NDP ad. Responses to the Liberal and Tory ads included:

- The Liberal message is personality bashing
- The Liberal ad doesn't do political thought/decision justice
- The Tory ad has taken quotes out of context
- The Tory ad is knifing, [I] don't like party bashing

The major responses to the NDP ad included:

No superfluous surrounding, just Broadbent
The information provided shows the NDP works for the average person

Respondents indicated that the message being advertised in the Liberal and Tory ads were leadership-oriented, whereas the message in the NDP ad was group-oriented. Responses towards the NDP ad included:

The NDP works for the average person not just the elite
Ed and friends will work for you

Responses towards the other two party ads included:

Mulroney is a hypocrite
Mulroney is a deceiving and untrustworthy politician
Turner commits falsehoods
Turner is fearmongering to win the election

Yet, when asked whether or not the negative ads should be aired during an election campaign 73% agreed that the NDP ad should be, 63% agreed that the Liberal ad should be, while 50% agreed that the Tory ad should be aired. The Tory ad was "most negative" and this suggests that the more negative the ad, particularly when the negativisms are aimed at the personalities rather than the actions of the leaders, the less approval an ad receives. Respondents believed that the NDP ad should be aired for the following reasons:

It is a political message about what the NDP stands for
It's a good ad which says what the NDP stands for and why it differs from the other two major parties

The respondents felt that the Liberal ad should be aired because:

It is showing what is wrong with Mulroney
It is fair campaign strategy

And the ad should not be aired because:

It states none of the Liberal views, just condemns Mulroney
It has not "saving graces." It should not be aired at anytime

The respondents felt that the Tory ad should be aired for the following sample of responses:

It is an ad of facts, although very swayed facts but, nonetheless, facts
Sure it's more propaganda

The respondents felt that the Tory ad should not be aired because:

The ad's too poisonous and reflects the P.C.'s way of doing things
It is only derogatory and has nothing to do with promoting P.C. policies or candidates

As to which of the ads the respondents most favored and least favored (see Appendix H), the respondents most favored the Broadbent positive ad (37%) and least favored the Tory negative ad. Again, the previous suggestion that the more negative the ad, the less approval there is, is reflected here.

The respondents favored the Broadbent ad for the following reasons:

The ad seemed straightforward and sincere with evidence that could be easily refuted with support
It projected honesty and determination

The Tory negative ad was least favored because:

The party directly attacked the other with no basis of fact or reason
The ad is a negative, personal attack, rather than issue-related

Discussion

What can be speculated from a study of negative and positive leader-centered, issue-oriented ads is that, from the open-ended responses, the respondents focused on the qualities of leaders, the personalities or the way in which leaders were presented in the ads. In some ways, then, the purpose of the strategy developed by the strategists was effective.

Despite the respondents indicating in Part I that the party platform or party issue is most influential in deciding how to vote, the leader plays a crucial role in the final decision. This would reflect the rationale of parties and campaign professionals to concentrate on the party leaders in political advertising. However, it must be recognized that influences outside of this study, no doubt, have influenced the respondents and ultimately influence voters: Influences such as impressions of the leaders in the four year interval since the last federal election, as well as extensive behavioral patterns with reference to politics, politicians, and personal beliefs as to leadership, honesty, trustworthiness, et cetera. Having correlated the responses, in retrospect, it would have been helpful to ask the respondents two additional questions: (1) Did they believe the message that the ad promoted; and, (2) After the final ad was shown, the question could have been posed as to which party would they vote for after seeing the ads and why. These two questions could have provided some insight into a change of attitude or position with respect to each party. Would, for example, those that voted for Mulroney in 1988 vote for him after viewing the "Free Trade Fears of Turner" ad? Unfortunately, these questions cannot be answered but are subject for future study.

If this study is any indication as to voter feelings towards negative advertising, political parties face a dilemma in future elections: How does a party defend itself against attacks from other parties without some retaliatory measure? The negative or attack ads could be judged as ads used in defense, not ads used in attack.

It can be assumed/speculated from the findings to the question as to what attributes the respondents look for in a leader, that voters "vote by feeling" because there is not sufficient information on policies and parties, particularly in

election campaigns. This may account for ads becoming less partisan, and less issue-oriented but with significant emphasis on leadership.

Despite the sample size, the period of time from the election to the time of the sample, outside influences and personal biases, and the "mixed" sample which was not specifically and selectively representative as are focus groups, what may be concluded from the information gathered is that the strategy is not clearly evident by the responses.

Personal bias, it would seem, did influence the impressions given of individual leaders and party platforms. Respondents, for example, who indicated support for New Democrats did not respond favorably to Mister's Mulroney or Turner. The ads from the 1988 election embody the strategy of professionals as derived from marketing techniques. However to the "mixed" sample, the intended strategy did not, in all cases, influence the sample.

Therefore, there is a correlation between the marketing concepts of strategy, ad design and audience response, but within the actual responses, the "message" intended for voters was also indicative of personal bias. It should be noted, as well, that the produced ads were intended for specific voters (the committed and the undecided): The sample conducted was not such a selective group.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

It's not a question anymore of "Do we do TV [advertising]?" It's a question of "How much TV do we do?"

Thomas "Doc" Sweitzer, U.S. Democratic Media Consultant
(Meyer,1990:41)

This thesis is a study of the images of political leaders within television advertising as created by political strategists. The challenge of this thesis has been to understand the marketing process involving political and advertising strategists in the development of leadership image, particularly in television advertising, and the resulting impressions on an audience. At the time of writing this thesis two of the three party leader (Broadbent and Turner) no longer lead their parties: both leaders resigned after the election. Regardless, the process of creating political advertising remains constant, despite who the leader is. As Fraser indicates:

The language of marketing, polling and product sales [has] taken over the senior levels of all three parties. [All] the strategists, regardless of the party affiliation [talk] about the marketplace, market niche and moving numbers. (Fraser,1988: 322)

The focus of party leaders in campaigns has a long tradition and leaders will continue to be central to campaigns and television ads. The news media focuses its attention on leaders so voters' perceptions of a party is akin to that of the leader. The techniques of marketing are utilized to help the campaign professionals determine what to present as an image, as well as what not to present. Companies promote products through advertising, politicians promote themselves, their issues and their parties through political advertising. As Chapter II, "Marketing Techniques: An Introduction", argues the formulation of an image is dependent upon the results obtained from marketing techniques, such as public opinion polls and focus groups. Information obtained from voters about

politicians, such as "What makes an ideal politician?", are then "fed back" to the voter in the attempt to convince and/or reinforce beliefs of, particularly, undecided and partisan voters that this is the leader to vote for. The images in party produced ads are used to reinforce a leader's "positive" image. Opposing parties, however, promote the "negative" qualities of their opponents. To disseminate the image of the leader, political parties utilize television ads, due to the medium's capacity to reach audiences. Television is able to reach voters which politicians may not physically be able to contact within the short time period of an election campaign. Further, the party has control over the message within the ads, unlike the content of news stories, for example.

Chapter III, "Image: A Question of Definition", attempts to define the concept of image, within the context of politics. What influences how an "image" is created cannot be defined conclusively due to the multi-layered considerations involved in such a study: Considerations such as marketing techniques which involves polling, advertising and focus groups; a leader's projected image; a voter's values and beliefs; and, political events which occur during interelection periods. Two primary arguments within the chapter form the definition of image which is applied throughout the thesis. These arguments are whether images are a result of what the leader projects or are what the voter projects onto a candidate. The position supported here is that neither definition is sufficient alone and that a politician's image is reliant on an exchange between him or herself and voters. Despite the interactive relationship, the image projected through symbols and pseudo-events must be believable and be without the implication of manipulation or stagedness. As Senator Norman Atkins indicated, although image is the perception that people have of leaders in terms of personal and general characteristics based on categories such as charisma or

intellectual qualities what cannot be done is to make a leader into someone he or she is not.

The growing importance of television, advertising and marketing practises, which are necessary to successfully develop a package or produce a party's message of a leader, has influenced "party politics." The importance of information provided by marketing and advertising professionals has resulted in the decline and displacement of the traditional decision-making roles of grassroots politics and party policy. Chapter IV, "The Development of Political Advertising in Canada", which is a historical discussion of the organizational aspects of political advertising in Canada, acknowledges the interwoven relationship between advertising and marketing agencies, and political parties, as well as the growth of importance of strategists. This relationship has evolved since the 1920s in Canada. Since the 1960s and particularly since 1980 the concept, design and implementation of election campaigns is dependent upon results from public opinion polls and focus groups conducted by marketing professionals. Further, the changing technology, from newspaper to radio to television, as the means by which to disseminate campaign information has altered campaign strategy. The growth in the importance of television is coupled with the growth of importance of those individuals who know how to use the electronic visual medium.

Chapter V, "The 1988 Television Advertising Strategy", which is composed of excerpts from interviews with campaign professionals, demonstrates that the importance of marketing professionals is a reality: The Liberal party communication strategist is the vice-president for marketing and sales for one of the largest commercial advertisers in Canada and the Conservative party national campaign chairman is the former president of an advertising agency. The

discussion in Chapter V indicates the importance of marketing techniques, particularly polling, to the campaign. As the interviewees indicate the individuals responsible for "molding" the image are professionals from the fields of marketing and advertising. The campaign strategy of the three parties emphasized leadership and ads were created based on results received from polls and focus groups. The ads by all parties were a deliberate, calculated effort to emphasize leadership: The Liberal party focused on leadership to emphasize the change in Turner; the Tories focused on leadership to emphasize the statesmanlike and prime ministerial qualities of Mulroney; and, the New Democrats focused on Broadbent to emphasize and promote the popularity of their party leader.

As Chapter VI, "The Television Ads: An Analytical Discussion", attempts to show, the strategy is evident in the ads. Central to each respective party's campaign was the leader who provided the recognition factor for the parties in the short time frame of a thirty-second ad, as well as acting as the "messenger" for the party. But the degree to which the leaders appear in or are made reference to in the ads is dependent on the campaign. The Liberals, for example, decided to "Run John Turner" not due to his popularity but in spite of Turner's lack of popularity. The aim was to show the voters that John Turner was confident, competent and that he was not the "bumbling" party leader that the media made him out to be.

But is the electorate that "gullible"? As Diamond notes, the question of effectiveness of paid political television advertising (whether the ads work) depends on who is being asked and what evidence is cited. As indicated in Chapter VII, "An Audience Impression of Election Ads", the ads do not just work or just happen. The ads reflect the "feelings" of voters, as well as act to reinforce beliefs and values. Further, the voter may accept, to a degree, what is

presented in the ad, but the ad must be believable. As indicated by the sample conducted for this thesis with respect to a Progressive Conservative ad entitled "A Job", respondents did not believe Mulroney was sincere ("far too contrived", "dressed down to appeal to the plebes"). The purpose of political advertising comes down to a party's need to use ads because regardless if one party does or does not advertise, the other parties will. The television ads represent a forum by which leaders and issues (despite their brevity in ads) communicate to voters messages as they wish the messages to be presented. Further, the ads, particularly the negative or attack ads, are a form of defense against opposing party attacks. Yet, the individuals who participated in the sample indicated that they did not like the negative ads, especially when the ads attack a leader's personality rather than party policy. As one respondent indicated, so succinctly, his impression of a negative ad was, "See playground at recess, grade three, for comparable form of argument along the lines of Na, Na, Na, you started it! No, you did!" While this example may seem comical the use of negative advertising will continue to be used as the line determining "offensive" or "defensive" becomes blurred. Still, with the technology available to leaders and to their advisors it is still not known on what specific basis images are formed by voters: This can only be done through further study and through polling from election to election.

Ads may provide the decisive "nudge" for the undecided voter, but the question that must be asked is, "Is too much emphasis placed on ads by political parties?" As research indicates the percentage of election monies spent on television advertising increases with each election. The organizational aspect of political advertising as well as the interactive relationship between politicians and voters must not only be discussed here. The process of developing and

creating election ads has led to the decline in importance of "ordinary" party members who do not have the "inside track" on polling results or the latest advertising techniques, both which are the decisive aspects in formulating campaign communication. Without any campaign's constituency/grassroots level election organization elections would be lost. The ads cannot physically "drive" a voter to the polling booth, unlike a party worker. The grassroots infrastructure of any party's election organization is what, ultimately, determines who will win. An unorganized infrastructure guarantees defeat. While it is recognized that in a general election marketing techniques must be used to determine the "mood" of the electorate, the importance of party members and workers outside the core cannot be undermined. Still, what has resulted is that marketing results are predominant in election decision-making and has displaced the party faithful in the final election campaign decision-making process.

The interweaving of politics and marketing will continue, but the approaches to political advertising will change with technological advancements. It is foreseeable, for example, that in testing focus groups the electronic ratings technology under development, which involves a meter that can determine whether a viewer's eyes are focused on the television screen (Young,1990:64), will be utilized to test ads. The BBM (Bureau of Broadcast Measurement) is planning to introduce these meters in Canada within the next two years.

The approach to determining the allotted political election advertising, as outlined in the Canada Elections Act, must also be reconsidered. By virtue of its position before an election, the governing party as well as those parties who hold seats in the House of Commons have an advantage over fringe parties with respect to the amount of television advertising allotted. Why, in terms of fairness and equality, should one party or multiple parties have an advertising

advantage over other parties? If advertising continues to play an increasingly important role in the electoral process, all registered political parties should at least have the opportunity to equitable airtime, regardless of seats won or the percentage of votes received in the previous election.

The literature on leadership image in political advertising within the context of elections in the United States is sizeable compared to similar studies done in Canada. Perhaps due to the American electoral and governmental process, elections at various levels are held more frequently which allows for greater study of political election ads. If election ads are as important as Canadian consultants and professionals would have us believe, why is very little academic work done on this area? This question could be answered with another question: "How are political ads to be studied outside the context of the political culture and environment for which they were produced?" Impressions of ads can be obtained, as the sample indicates, but the political events leading up to an election have an influence on voter images of political leaders. Apart from this, there is very little historical analysis or documentation of Canadian television election ads. The point can be argued that "an election is an election and can't be redone." Elections are seen by campaign and party professionals as individual events. While establishing contacts for interviews for this thesis one problem which arose was locating individuals who had worked on the 1988 national campaign: After the election individuals return to their "normal lives." But elections form the basis of a democracy and the ads produced as part of that democratic process are as important a form of campaign communication as political debates. Ads succinctly reflect a country's culture, mood, beliefs, fears and "politics". If one were to view the ads from the 1988 Canadian general election campaign years from now the political ads, themselves, would reflect the

emotional, divisive and heated debate about free trade.

The move towards political advertising by the parties is a form of control over the election messages: political ads are designed to maximize the best features of one's own candidate and campaign, or the worst features of the opposition candidates and campaigns, or both. These messages are also a means by which to "counter" messages produced by the news media and the opposition parties. The paid aspect of political advertising gives the campaign organizers the right to control the form and content of the messages.

It is evident that the electoral system has evolved into one that is dependent upon marketing techniques, such as polling and advertising. This has led to a professionally managed election process which is less concerned with in depth discussion of issues and concerns of the electorate and, moreover, with the process that leads to winning. Yet, despite marketing techniques, political predictions and technological advancements there is no "magic formula" for electoral success. A campaign professional can only "mold" the candidate from information gathered by preelection and election polls and apply this information to political advertising. As marketing techniques are available to all parties the real race is one between campaign professionals: Who will use the information most effectively and believably? Considering, for example, that allocated budgets, and the opportunity for cabinet positions all increase when a party becomes government the "stakes are high" for parties to win elections. The ultimate goal is to win and to utilize what is available. Each party can only hope that the opponents do not do a better job by planning a more convincing communications campaign.

APPENDIX A

Questionnaire and Statistical Results

PART I

THIS IS A GENERAL SURVEY THAT PERTAINS TO FEDERAL POLITICS. REFERENCE TO POLITICAL PARTIES IN THIS SURVEY REFERS TO THE LIBERAL, PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE AND NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTIES, AS WELL AS FRINGE FEDERAL PARTIES.

1) Gender 46% Female; 54% Male

2) Average age 24.5 (Female:21; Male:28)

3) Previous Communication courses

None: 77%; One: 4%; Two: 12%; Three: 5%; Four: 2%

4) Did you vote in the 1988 Canadian Federal Election?

Yes 66%; No 34%

Did not vote because: Not of age 27%; Not in Canada 5%

Not interested 2%

5) Where did you vote?

Vancouver 11%; Burnaby 5%; New Westminister 2%; Out of Province 34%

Other 34%

6) Are you a member of any political party?

No 84% (see "6A" below); Yes 16% (see "6B" below)

Answer **ONLY "6A"** or **ONLY "6B"**

6A) If you answered "NO" to the above question, do you support any one political party?

Yes 43%; No 57%

Selected written responses:

- I tend to vote for the individual
- I vote for the party that represents my beliefs
- It depends on the leader and the issues raised
- Leaders are important in my selection
- I support the policies
- I listen to policies and party platforms
- I vote according to political ideas
- I vote on the issues as all of the parties are the same
- My opinions change with time
- I vote for the best local candidate

And, Do you vote for the same political party in every federal election?

Yes 21%; No 76%; No response 3%

6B) If you answered "YES" to Question 6) are you an Active Member (work on elections, active in the party on a constituency level, etc.)?

Yes 57%; No 29%

Are you a Supportive Member (vote for the same party each federal election but you are not an Active Member)?

Yes 75%; No 25%

7) Do you watch television news? Yes 94%; No 6%

If "yes" which aspect of television news is most important to you?

international News 54%

National News 29%

Local News 10%

Entertainment Features 5%

Sports 2%

Weather 0

Business Report 0

8) Which is most influential in deciding how you will vote? Indicate numbers 1 to 6: number 1 representing the strongest influence.

	Strongest			Weakest		
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Party platforms/issues	12.8%	1.2%	.8%	1.2%	-	-
Party leader	2.0%	7.4%	3.5%	1.6%	-	-
Candidate	.8%	3.1%	5.8%	2.7%	1.2%	.4%
Public Opinion Polls	-	.4%	.4%	.4%	6.2%	5.8%
Television election ads	-	.4%	.4%	1.6%	4.3%	7.4%
News Reports	.8%	2.0%	3.1%	5.8%	1.6%	-

9) Do you remember any of the television ads from the 1988 Federal Election campaign?

Yes 25%; No 75%

10) Which political leader of the 1988 Election did you prefer?

Ed Broadbent 47%
 Brian Mulroney 25%
 John Turner 15%
 Other 13%

Selected written responses:

Broadbent-

- He's the most honest
- He represents the NDP
- He's down to earth; not a lawyer; straight talk
- My parents voted for NDP, so I followed
- He seemed the best of three evils
- I agree with the policy issues
- I agree with the philosophical agreement
- He's very sincere, very committed to Canadian nationalism
- I dislike Mulroney and Turner is still lacking charisma
- He's a change from the other leaders
- He's the only competent and reasonably honest person of the lot
- He is the leader of the party I like
- I don't like the party, but he's an honest man
- Mulroney is a smooth talker and can't be trusted and Turner can't talk
- He seemed more open and honest than the others, presented good ideas, improved his French, likeable personality, "down to earth"

Mulroney-

- He appealed to me more than the other two
- He seems most responsible and normal
- I like him because he's Conservative
- I prefer the free trade issue
- He's the best of the bunch and the party is organized

- Turner lacked party support and I don't like Broadbent's policies
- I like Mulroney because of the personalities of the other two
- I like his presence while public speaking and his debate success

Turner-

- I agree with his vision of Canada
- I prefer the Liberal attitude
- I like his somewhat bumbling sincerity

11) Which political party of the 1988 Election did you prefer?

New Democrats 36%

Progressive Conservatives 31%

Liberals 20%

Other 13%

Selected written responses:

New Democrats-

- I agree with some of their platforms
- I don't support free trade
- I dislike Mulroney and have a lack of trust in Turner
- Party loyalty
- I like their stance on the environment and women's issues
- I agree with the aims of social democracy especially in areas of social programs, environment and peace issues
- Because I believe in the issues they support
- I hope to send a message to the other two parties
- NDP wants to pull out of NATO

Progressive Conservatives-

- I didn't like Broadbent or Turner
- They're for free trade
- I like the platforms/policies
- I am a right wing thinker
- They are the least left-leaning
- It's a disciplined, organized party, not doing much for the West but???
- Seemed like the party that was most capable of a performing government
- Completed a more complete program plan

Liberals-

- They're a compromise between the NDP and the Tories
- Anti-free trade, Conservatives are too far right
- I don't like Mulroney and don't support some of the NDP platforms

12) Does the leader of a political party influence how you vote/ would vote?

Yes 86%; No 14%

YES: Selected written responses-

- I want a good leader
- Ultimately, they influence the party
- They have to represent the country
- The leaders have a lot of power
- The leader must represent his/her party well
- The leader provides direction, order, leadership for a party
- In the Parliamentary system the leader calls the shots
- Personalities and views make a difference
- Some leaders are more credible than others
- The leader should be a reflection of the party
- Represents what the party stands for
- Leader leads and everyone else follows
- The leader is the member in the limelight, and chances are the leader may someday lead the country
- The leader not the party has the final say
- I vote for who I feel is the most honest
- The leader should be honest, credible and accessible

NO: Selected written responses-

- Party platforms are usually the same
- It's policies, not the person
- Irrelevant mostly, although they can influence the party

13) What attributes do you look for in a leader of a political party?

Personal Qualities 65%

Leader/Leadership Qualities 25%

Party Affiliation 7%

Issue Representation 2%

Ideology 1%

Group/Geographic Association 0

14) What influences you the most when deciding how to vote? Indicate only one.

Political Party 66%
Leader 20%
Local Candidate 14%

15) If the Federal Election were held today who would you vote for?

Ed Broadbent 36%
Brian Mulroney 27%
John Turner 20%
Other or none 17%

PART II

(QUESTIONNAIRE FOR POSITIVE ADS: SEE APPENDICES B, C ,D, FOR INDEPTH RESPONSES)

a) What is your impression of the overall ad?

	Liberal	New Democ.	Tories
Issue Responses:			
Positive	5%	5%	3%
Negative	4%	1.5%	6%
Leadership Responses			
Positive	5%	6%	-
Negative	4%	1.5%	2%
Party Responses:			
Positive	4%	1.5%	2%
Negative	-	3%	2%
Other (Production)			
Positive	12%	30%	24%
Negative	17%	12%	30%
Personality			
Positive	27%	38%	15%
Negative	22%	1.5%	16%

b) Who is the audience?

	Liberal	New Democ.	Tories
Low income	-	10%	10%
Mid income	3%	12%	1%
Upper income	2%	-	-
Labour/working class	2%	11%	19%
Business/Professional	3%	1%	4%
Age/group reference	-	1%	3%
Family reference	-	5%	-
Issue reference	14%	14%	18%
Ordinary/Average	9%	14%	-
Canada	40%	17%	28%
Undecided/voter	17%	8%	11%
Party reference	10%	7%	3%
Other	-	-	3%

c) Is there anything in particular that you like about the ad?

d) Is there anything in particular that you dislike about the ad?
(The results are correlated into one table)

	Liberal	New Democ.	Tories
Group:			
Positive	-	3%	4%
Negative	3%	4%	1%
Ideology:			
Positive	8%	3%	3%
Negative	3%	2%	5%
Issues:			
Positive	8%	5%	3%
Negative	6%	8%	6%
Leadership:			
Positive	3%	1%	2%
Negative	3%	2%	3%
Party Reference:			
Positive	-	1%	-
Negative	-	-	-
Personality:			
Positive	20%	16%	8%
Negative	24%	5%	19%
Other (Production values)			
Positive	5%	28%	15%
Negative	-	22%	29%

e) What is the message is being advertised?

	Liberal	New Democ.	Tories
Party	15%(+L)/4%(-PC)	18%(+ND)	16%(+PC)
Group reference	-	17%	9%
Issue reference	52%	35%	57%
Leadership	14%(+B)/16%(-M)	15%(-M)	-

(Key: +L is positive Liberal response; +ND is positive New Democratic; +PC is positive Tory party; +B is positive Broadbent; +T is positive Turner; +M is positive Mulroney; -M is negative Mulroney)

f) Is there anything in particular that you like about Mr. Turner/Broadbent/Mulroney in this ad? Anything else?

g) Is there anything in particular that you dislike about Mr. Turner/Broadbent/Mulroney in this ad? Anything else?

(The responses for f) and g) are correlated into one table)

	Turner	Broadbent	Mulroney
Appearance:			
Positive responses	10%	4%	5%
Negative responses	3%	-	4%
Ideology:			
Positive responses	12%	2%	3%
Negative responses	4%	-	7%
Leadership:			
Positive responses	1%	-	-
Negative responses	7%	-	9%
Party:			
Positive responses	-	-	-
Negative responses	-	2%	-
Personality:			
Positive responses	19%	36%	25%
Negative responses	35%	21%	37%
Other (Production Values)			
Positive responses	6%	35%	8%
Negative responses	3%	-	2%

h) Is this leader representative of a "Prime Minister"? Why or why not.

	Turner	Broadbent	Mulroney
Group:			
Positive responses	2%	8%	-
Negative responses	-	4%	2%
Appearance:			
Positive responses	3%	-	3%
Negative responses	-	-	2%
Ideology:			
Positive responses	-	6%	5%
Negative responses	5%	5%	-
Issues:			
Positive responses	-	4%	5%
Negative responses	11%	8%	2%
Leadership:			
Positive responses	17%	13%	15%
Negative responses	17%	1%	12%

Party:			
Positive responses	-	2%	2%
Negative responses	-	-	2%
Personality:			
Positive responses	21%	31%	33%
Negative responses	18%	12%	5%
Other:			
Positive responses	3%	2%	7%
Negative responses	3%	4%	5%

PART III
 (QUESTIONNAIRE FOR NEGATIVE ADS: SEE APPENDICES E,F,G FOR INDEPTH RESPONSES)

a) What is your impression of the overall ad?

	Liberal	New Democ.	Tories
Issues:			
Positive responses	3%	2%	-
Negative responses	5%	3%	11%
Leadership			
Positive responses	7%	-	-
Negative responses	6%	-	18%
Party:			
Positive responses	3%	2%	-
Negative responses	7%	-	7%
Group:			
Positive responses	3%	15%	-
Negative responses	3%	7%	-
Personality:			
Positive responses	-	-	-
Negative responses	-	-	-
Appearance:			
Positive responses	-	40%	-
Negative responses	-	2%	-
Other:			
Positive responses	37%	27%	7%
Negative responses	26%	2%	57%

b) Is there anything in particular that you like about the ad?

c) Is there anything in particular that you dislike about the ad?

(THE RESPONSES ARE CORRELATED INTO ONE TABLE)

	Liberal	New Democ.	Tories
Appearance:			
Positive responses	-	-	-
Negative responses	-	-	-
Ideology:			
Positive responses	-	1%	-
Negative responses	2%	1%	1%
Leadership:			
Positive responses	12%	1%	4%
Negative responses	8%	5%	13%

Party:			
Positive responses	2%	2%	2%
Negative responses	16%	3%	6%
Issues:			
Positive responses	5%	4%	5%
Negative responses	10%	4%	19%
Personality:			
Positive responses	-	7%	4%
Negative responses	-	7%	-
Group:			
Positive responses	-	8%	-
Negative responses	-	4%	-
Other:			
Positive responses	16%	44%	11%
Negative responses	27%	9%	35%

d) Who is the audience?

	Liberal	New Democ.	Tories
Lower income	1%	6%	2%
Mid income	4%	3%	4%
Upper income	-	-	-
Labour/working class	-	25%	-
Business/Professionals	-	2%	-
Age/Group	16%	3%	4%
Family	-	7%	-
Issue reference	10%	-	11%
Ordinary/Average	16%	34%	28%
Undecided/Voters	29%	12%	20%
Party Supporters	24%	6%	31%
Other	-	2%	-

e) What is the message being advertised?

	Liberal	New Democ.	Tories
Party reference	16%	34%	10%
Group reference	2%	41%	7%
Issue reference	9%	16%	6%
Leadership reference	73%	9%	77%

f) Should this ad be aired during an election campaign? Why or why not? (See Appendices E, F, G for indepth responses)

	Liberal	New Democ.	Tories
Yes	63%	73%	50%
No	37%	27%	50%

APPENDIX B

Liberal Party Ad: "John Turner Speaks for Canadians"

[Video is of medium shot of Turner, dressed in navy suit, sitting on a stool, facing the camera. The background is grey/white and does not distract from Turner. He uses his hand to emphasize his points]

(Turner): I'm not going to allow **Brian Mulroney** to sell out our birthright as a nation, I'm not going to let him reverse [camera starts to zoom in slowly and continues to zoom until next cut] **120 years of history that's made us unique and different, I'm not going to let Brian Mulroney destroy the Canadian dream.**

[Cut to black screen with white superimposed words, "JOHN TURNER Speaks for Canadians"]

(VO): **Spend the next two minutes with this man and you'll know how deep his commitment is to Canada.**

[Medium shot of Turner, with a lot of head room in the shot. Turner is looking directly into the camera]

(Turner): **So right now we have 80 percent free trade and what Mr. Mulroney was talking about was the remaining 20 percent. And my quarrel with Mulroney is that for that remaining 20 percent he gave away the store.**

[Cut to medium long shot of Turner] **He went farther than trade, farther than duties and trade barriers.**

[Cut to medium close up of Turner] **That's our quarrel with Mulroney's trade agreement. That it goes well beyond trade, gives away the essential levers, if you will, of our economy. Those levers that make us a nation.**

[Cut to medium long shot of Turner. Turner is moving his arms to emphasize his points] **Once you give away your economic levers, your economic ability to control your own business, inevitably you've surrendered yourself politically.**

[Cut to medium close up of Turner] **We're different, we do things our own way, we react to things in a different way, we look at ourselves differently, there's something special to being a Canadian. Our attachment to the outdoors, to our geography, our pride in our environment and our wanting to keep our environment pure.**

Our two languages, the fact that we've welcomed people from all over the globe in a very peaceful way, building a new style of Canadianism.

Our sense of tolerance, our parliamentary tradition, the fact that I believe we're the freest country in the world. All this is at risk if we allow ourselves economically to become a junior partner of the United States.

[Cut to extreme close up of Turner's face. His eyes dominate the screen.] **That's why I need your vote, for the kind of Canada you and I believe in.**

(THEME AND VOICE OVER: The theme is the last four musical notes of "O Canada"; the voice over is Turner's voice; the visual tag is a stylized animated red flag. Within the flag the words, in white, say "This is more than an election. It's your future." Beneath the words is a maple leaf within a maple leaf: beneath the maple leaf is the word "LIBERAL")

(THEME AND VO): This is more than an election, it's your future. Vote Liberal.

PART II: Liberal Party "John Turner"

a) What is your impression of the overall ad?

- attempt at sincerity
- excellent
- we can't be that perfect and we don't protect the environment
- trying to be persuasive
- very wimpy
- not very favorable
- a bit overblown
- not too bad, but a little hokey
- empty of real content on an important issue
- content was strong but looked far too contrived
- poor filming, camera pans too much, Turner too mechanical
- "God bless Canada"
- Turner doesn't say what he's going to do
- He was really sucking up to the people
- Fake, he hesitates as if he is unsure
- okay
- strikes nationalistic emotions
- probably very one-sided but makes points well
- sloppy, malicious, unclear
- clear, uncluttered with production
- very ineffective, I didn't believe the speaker
- appeal to emotions
- bullshit
- Turner is trying to pull on our strings of national identity
- personal
- too melodramatic
- poorly produced
- b.s.
- very passionate, sincere plea
- good
- stilted, performed
- excellent and very persuasive
- pretty good
- jerky, hesitant, unexpressed anger
- like the message, have trouble with Mr. Turner
- overall a tasteful stab at Mulroney
- tried to project honesty, determination, and a good image
- against Mulroney more than raises own issues
- I don't like the white background
- made for the common man, no fancy words, not cut, didn't have much content, repeated ideas
- attempt at sincerity
- boring
- joke
- very personal, honest

Liberal Party "John Turner"

b) Who is the audience?

- the average Canadian
- anti-free traders
- the concerned Canadian, someone who feels threatened by the U.S.
- Canadians 19 to 70 years
- the working person
- Liberals, 2 responses
- pro-nationalistic Canadians
- Canadian voters
- all free thinking, patriotic Canadians
- Canadian nationalists
- people with tv
- Canadian public
- voting Canadians
- me: people wary of free trade - other liberals/Liberals
- hopefully young Canadians
- morons
- Canada
- the average Canadian voter who values nationalism
- me, 2 responses
- the undecided voter
- anybody who sees it
- Canadians with more nationalist interest in the form of sentiment rather than business interest
- people who aren't against Liberals
- uncommitted voter
- the voting public
- Canadian public
- Canadians for Canada - indecisive voters
- all literate Canadians
- Those who are unsure how to vote
- his supporters
- the public
- Canadians and anti Mulroney-ites
- Canadian people, somewhat business-oriented
- Canada as a whole
- potential voters presumably those with money to lose
- the voter
- patriots and people who are nationalistic and afraid of Americans
- Canadians, 2 responses
- everyone
- all English speaking Canadians
- the voting public

Liberal Party "John Turner"

c) Is there anything in particular you like about the ad?

- The focus on Mr. Turner's eyes
- straightforward approach and what was said
- I would be proud to be a part of the country of which he speaks
- "no", 7 responses
- his bluntness
- his talking about our uniqueness and nature
- straightforward
- no fancy frills or music
- the merest mention of our environment
- content, Turner is a good orator
- theme of Canadianism
- his sincerity
- the pride in Canada
- it was very personal: person to person
- contrived honesty
- plainness
- stirs up nationalistic feelings—very patriotic
- a good script
- smooth presentation that seemed uncontrived
- the style Turner talked in; very personal
- anti-Mulroney; anti free trade
- absolutely nothing
- lighting is nice
- yes, his script, whether rehearsed or not was excellent, sincere and gives me a sense of nationalistic pride
- what he has to say, the way he faces the camera
- crisp
- the angles at which the camera filmed in
- nationalistic tone
- the focus on free trade
- agree with the message, in general
- straightforward, just Turner talking to the audience
- Turner's eyes, clear not bloodshot: honest eyes
- camera shots
- one on one
- manner of speaking of nationalism
- it was quite clear
- appeals to Canadian nationality
- his delivery and the wording

Liberal Party "John Turner"

d) Is there anything in particular that you dislike about the ad?

- his delivery at the very end
- "yes"
- played on nationality and national emotions
- John Turner, 2 responses
- body posture, flow of voice, believability
- it doesn't display Liberal policy
- it was trading on our fear of U.S. invasion without clear explanation of process
- close up of face - not aesthetically enjoyable, difficult to watch
- repetition, lack of content, not very clear
- same position for whole thing
- too many close-ups, then far away, shots needed stability
- the flipping back from close up to far away, it looked edited
- John Turner always looks forced and nervous, and even edited doesn't make him look better. In fact, I think the jump cuts increased this impression
- The indistinctness of voice, focus, frame (changes back and forward)
- the way he speaks
- the his awkward glare
- "no", 4 responses
- the man's shady political career
- yes, it doesn't say anything
- the way he speaks so slowly, like he's thinking about every word he says
- Turner is a blubbering idiot
- Turner's opinion of the free trade agreement
- too many facial close ups
- Turner's performance
- Turner's voice - painful to listen too
- too much close ups and not enough background
- word choice too business oriented for average Canadian
- when he describes the Canadian mentality
- the fatuousness of the environment reference and its empty link to the candidate
- personalization of the issue : John vs Brian
- he is a poor speaker, the cuts don't make that much sense
- putting Mulroney down not necessary to make his point
- everything : portrayal especially, contents
- I don't consider all of his claims true eg. environment
- the soft sell speech

Liberal Party "John Turner"

e) What is the message that is being advertised?

- vote against free trade: vote Liberal
- vote Liberal, Brian Mulroney is a bad guy
- the other guy is a bad boy
- against free trade
- don't vote Conservative
- free trade will fuck us up
- not to vote for Mulroney
- free trade is bad, we're being sold out
- vote for Liberal party because they will keep Canada Canadian
- keep Canada Canadian, not American
- not 100% free trade
- that he is better for the country than Mulroney
- free trade will destroy Canadian culture
- vote Liberal, vote John Turner
- Mulroney is selling out Canada
- Conservatives free trade is sacrificing Canadian way of life so vote Liberal
- bad aspects of free trade
- don't sell out on Canadian freedom to self determination
- a vote for Liberal's is a vote to save Canada's uniqueness
- protect Canadian identity/political sovereignty by voting Liberal; a P.C. vote is against Canada
- stop free trade
- don't think use only basic emotions
- Canadianism how unique we are, and more importantly the consequences the risk losing to the U.S.
- Liberals will ensure that Canada stays Canadian
- vote Liberal, Mulroney selling Canada out
- anti free trade
- free trade should not happen
- free trade sells Canada
- save Canada from being sold out
- that Mulroney is selling out Canada and Turner wants to keep Canada Canadian
- vote for me or Canada will become part of the U.S. through free trade
- Turner is better than Mulroney and he wants the best for Canada
- Mulroney has sold out Canada
- Mulroney has sold out the country
- John Turner (Liberals) will keep Canada Canadian
- vote for John Turner and the Liberal party because they are against Free Trade
- John Turner's duty to Canadian nationality against free trade
- free trade is bad
- anti free trade stance
- no free trade - it will destroy Canada as a nation
- vote for Liberals or lose the country to the U.S. with a Conservative vote
- no free trade
- vote for John Turner

Liberal Party "John Turner"

f) Is there anything in particular that you like about Mr. Turner in this ad?
Anything else?

- he seemed natural like he meant what he said
- "no", 10 responses
- ads are meant to inform but you must first believe what you're told
- he is very conservatively dressed and is friendly
- national pride
- he seems to be all for Canadian identity
- appears sincere, honest, truly wanting what's best for Canada
- he looks honest and likes Canada as a distinct society
- his appearance, well groomed
- I like his tie, NAH, he's an OK guy
- he seems sincere, despite broken form of ad
- his suit
- the way he manages to change the tone in his voice to emphasize words
- straightforwardness
- his tone and apparent sincerity, his looks
- his apparent sincerity
- nice suit, haircut
- his tie, I couldn't see his shoes
- he's not Mulroney
- not particularly, 2 responses
- he is we'll scripted
- very paternalistic image
- his hesitance
- he is trying to be honest
- his voice is okay
- straightforward speech
- clean cut, appears straightforward
- his blazer
- his voice is quite resonant
- his Canadian idealistic, culture
- appears to have Canadian interests at heart
- spoke well, good content
- eyes looking straight at you

Liberal Party "John Turner"

g) Is there anything in particular that you dislike about Mr. Turner in this ad? Anything else?

- didn't feel sincere in spite of focus on eyes
- "no", 7 responses
- I'm suspicious of the perfect ideal
- he stumbles over his word
- his hair cut
- trying too hard to sway voters; over does it
- ad agency made him look unnatural
- too mechanical
- he doesn't speak well
- fake, not really the way he is
- the way he speaks, his whole demeanour
- his voice
- his speech habits
- he is a hopeless leader
- his attitude
- he doesn't say anything
- his clipping method of delivery
- I didn't like the closeups in the ad
- he has almost a grin, not serious in what he believes
- the way he speaks
- could be more articulate
- fidgety and nervous
- he seems to focus more on Mulroney's wrong doings than what he could do for Canada
- too much of him, needed a little variety, too much blue clothes made him look pale, almost sick at times
- mainly refutes other leaders (Mulroney)
- not very clear, decisive
- issues still not clear
- not very convincing
- he looks shifty to the camera angles
- the whole atmosphere
- he nitpicks his opposition without providing a better solution
- the whole ad looks insincere and staged
- "yes"
- at the end, when he tells you to vote, you feel that his only motive is to get your vote

Liberal Party "John Turner"

h) Is this leader representative of a "Prime Minister"? Why or why not.

- "no", 2 responses
- he's representative of a politician campaigning to win an election, but is no more unique/charismatic/honest than Mulroney and Broadbent
- no, he hasn't told me the things he is going to do as P.M.
- no, not as a leader
- no, he does not speak on his issues, he rebukes the Conservative stand point
- no, he doesn't have that speaking appeal that makes people believe in him
- no, perhaps he is not sure enough of himself
- no, because he was not in office for very long at all
- no, he evades facts, not a good speaker
- no, not interested in leading country for country sake, but just to refute other parties ideas
- sure, why not? He looks honest and will try to do the best for Canada
- yes, well groomed, informative the standard appearance of a P.M.
- distraction of unexpressed feeling
- yes, because he is presentable to the public
- yes, he does represent a P.M.
- "yes", 2 responses
- yes, presentable, intelligent, well spoken
- no, I don't get a sense of leadership ability
- no, Uncle Turner, he's too personal, not enough of a "leader"
- no, perhaps not enough saviour faire, self assurance
- not enough info to base decision
- no, he sounds like he is begging for votes
- no, he doesn't appear very intelligent
- no, he has poor leadership skills; he's a "yes" man to polls, backroom boys and Meech Lake. Doesn't have fortitude
- no, he hesitates and believes in tolerability
- no, he falters over French, did not prove himself in first term
- he is in the modern sense, no talk of actual issues or policies
- yes, he is trying to look statesmanlike
- sure, all the proper qualities
- I guess he appears to be committed
- he's certainly smooth enough
- yes, he's controlled by advisers and specialists. This ad reflects that like all Prime Ministers he can advocate his personal identity for the image
- yes, and no. He's attempting to associate himself with the country but not doing a good job
- almost, but lacking the finished polish
- overall, I would say yes because of the superficial image added to substantial statements
- quite clear spoken, get to the point
- possibly, yes, strong opinions
- sure
- of course, he's a Rhodes graduate
- of course, any leader of a political party is a potential representative of a P.M.

APPENDIX C

The New Democrat Ad: "Fair Taxes"

(Music opens and stays in for entire ad) [Visually, the ad opens on New Democrats maple leaf. The animated maple leaf opens onto a couple at a roll top desk. The woman is seated with her back to the camera. The man is standing behind the desk, looking at the woman and with one arm is "holding up his head". He puts his arm down and slouches his head against his other arm. The look of the ad is very "soft" with a soft yellow cloth backdrop and soft lighting.]

As the camera zooms out, it pans left to Ed Broadbent, seated on a stool in front of the same type of backdrop, and dressed in a navy suit. The shot established for the entire ad is a medium shot of Broadbent]

(Broadbent): You remember in the last election I talked to you about the large corporations and the wealthy who pay no tax. Brian Mulroney promised to change that, but he didn't. Average Canadians and their families are paying more in tax, the rich are paying less. That's not fair. Ordinary Canadians deserve a fair tax system. I'll make sure they get it.

[Dissolve to visual tag of a head and shoulders still color picture of Broadbent against a blue background. The picture is in the bottom right-hand corner of the screen. The New Democrats logo and the words "The New Democrats" is brought in to frame the top half of the screen.]

(VO): For fair taxes for you and your family, this time Ed Broadbent. (Music fades out)

PART II: New Democrats "Fair Taxes"

a) What is your overall impression of the ad?

- it was really short
- homey
- honest
- I like it
- nice, short to the point
- bull shit
- I hate the party but it's a good ad
- straightforward
- good
- Mr. Broadbent is concerned about the average poor Canadian
- sharp, to the point
- good
- appears hardworking, earnest, best for family
- homey, comfy
- I liked it, very personable
- pretty good, quick, concise, to the point
- upbeat
- neat, not complicated
- excellent, contrast of others, logo very precise and modern
- open, honest
- ok, but a bit hokey
- direct, single issue
- favorable, this is my man
- pretty good
- ok, 2 responses
- good message pacing
- it seems to run down Mulroney
- too fast, impersonal
- "I told you so!"
- direct and to the point
- rushed as if they couldn't afford much space for a paid political announcement
- simple and cheap
- not stressed out
- very to the point, well done, people oriented, simplistic
- strong, happy, natural
- kind of catchy, but too short
- pleasant
- I like it, but would Ed change things?
- boring
- candid, casual
- very appealing, nobody likes paying when corporations get off scottfree
- over produced
- warm presentation but attacking the policy of another

New Democrats "Fair Taxes"

b) Who is the audience?

- middle class
- voters sympathetic to NDP politics
- Canadians middle-working class, dissatisfaction taxpayers
- voting public who remember last election
- commies, socialists and NDP supporters
- middle class taxpayers
- family people
- lower income Canadians
- working class
- the general Canadian taxpayer
- public
- us
- the taxpayer
- all Canadians, excluding corporate leaders
- working class/blue collar
- Canadians
- middle-income Canada
- the low and middle income populace
- the ordinary taxpaying Canadian
- taxpayers
- blue collar workers who feel persecuted and alienated by big business
- average Canadians
- taxpaying voters
- the ordinary Canadian, middle/working class
- middle income voting Canadians, yuppies, families
- Canadian public, voters
- lower class
- average Canadian, lower class
- ordinary Canadians
- Canadian voters
- ordinary Canadians small business families, minorities
- NDP voters
- taxpayers, workers
- Canadians 19 to 70
- the average Canadians ie. not wealthy, those in blue collar jobs mainly
- ordinary people
- the average Canadian voter
- those not avidly against Ed
- lower and middle class
- the oppressed taxpayer/voter
- New Democrats
- average Canadian
- family
- the average Canadian

New Democrats "Fair Taxes"

c) Is there anything in particular that you like about the ad?

- "no", 5 responses
- the use of ordinary people to attempt to include you. Ed's positive attitude
- music
- smooth, quick presentation of the message
- He seems serious, determined
- it's not a P.C. ad
- straight to the point
- it addresses the common Canadian
- simple message
- Ed is honest looking
- had a warm feeling, Broadbent is personable
- overall happy tone
- the cheap looking set: not a lot of dollars wasted
- warmth in voice
- the promise to pay lower taxes as a middle-class Canadian
- the casual panning of two people at work, up music
- Broadbent casual speaking style
- addresses something concrete
- Broadbent's delivery
- nice background, music
- nice, short to the point
- it's quick and concise
- it's true
- it clearly identified taxation as an issue
- short, sounded "fair", easy to watch, listen
- short, to the point, not necessarily malicious
- angle of camera, brief, background colors
- Broadbent looks honest, hardworking, like he knows what being poor/middle class is like
- the relaxed atmosphere
- I like Ed Broadbent, the "dramatization" helps his message, I agree with his policy
- concise, clear message
- was short, 3 responses
- atmosphere
- the music, the logo
- its single thesis is clear and direct

New Democrats "Fair Taxes"

d) Is there anything in particular that you dislike about the ad?

- "no", 10 responses
- the background music
- the lack of hard facts to support the tax claims
- the backdrop behind Ed
- no, very well directed
- no reference to free trade
- music, 3 responses
- the slickness, the phrase "ordinary Canadians"
- the music wasn't all that appealing
- the orange curtain in the background against the blue suit. It bugged me, don't know why
- the beginning with the other people
- didn't provide distinct figures, percentages
- the music in the background was distracting
- he downgrades the Conservatives
- taxes, always mentioned by left-wing parties in elections
- the background music
- too fast to grasp any issue
- too family oriented, too unrealistic
- the catchy little scene, what's it for?
- quite short ad
- the fact that Ed may be lying as Brian was
- not a natural setting, fake
- the backdrop, the beginning (I don't understand why 2 other people are in it)
- too much brown
- the little staged performance at the beginning
- the clip of the two people at the desk
- too short
- everything!
- Broadbent talked too fast
- the personalization of the issue
- he does not present a complete picture of the tax structure. Poor pay less percentage individual tax
- the opening visuals are rather manipulative
- doesn't tell the other side - corporate tax breaks are great for Canadian business, economy

New Democrats "Fair Taxes"

e) What message is being advertised?

- Ed's tax view
- vote NDP, equal taxes for wealthy and corporations
- Broadbent is there to help the family
- tax the rich to death
- that big business is screwing the little guy
- a vote for NDP is a vote for lower personal income tax
- be a commie, vote NDP
- ordinary people will get a fair shake
- vote for ordinary, fair Ed
- that Brian Mulroney doesn't make the rich pay taxes
- we made a mistake the previous election (true enough) and we elected a lying sycophant to be P.M.
- the Conservatives didn't fulfill on a promise, Broadbent wants a chance to fulfill
- the bad guy is out to get you
- that taxes are unfair
- vote for NDP because they support a fair tax system
- the NDP's policy of restoring taxes for equality in Canada
- higher taxes
- Brian Mulroney didn't live up to campaign promises: vote NDP
- the tax system is unfair and the Tories haven't fixed it
- Conservatives for rich, NDP middle class
- vote for Broadbent
- equality of taxes, fairness for all
- the taxation system is unfair, Ed Broadbent and the NDP will fix this if we vote for them
- NDP will create a fair tax system for all Canadians
- Ed Broadbent is working for the people
- tax, Mulroney's failure (according to Broadbent)
- vote for me and I'll represent the "individual" instead of the big corporation
- what Broadbent will do to change the mistakes Mulroney has made
- Ed Broadbent and the NDP are fair and honest unlike P.C.'s
- NDP will create equitable tax system
- NDP proposed tax system
- ordinary Canadians pay too much tax
- the fiscal irresponsibility of the Conservatives and the promise of change by the NDP
- taxation
- to lower taxes, Mulroney didn't and he promised!
- Conservatives do not delivery promises
- that Brian Mulroney is unfairly taxing the upper middle class less than the middle class
- rich get richer, poor get poorer
- a vote for the NDP means fairer taxes and a vote for the P.C. the opposite
- lower taxes for the ordinary Canadian
- Ed Broadbent would make sure we had fair taxes
- that if elected he'll make sure the average people don't have to pay as much in taxes
- fair tax system
- fair taxes are necessary

New Democrats "Fair Taxes"

f) Is there anything in particular that you like about Mr. Broadbent in this ad? Anything else?

- "yes"
- "no", 7 responses
- he is a compelling, upbeat speaker
- what appears to be sincerity, nice tie
- seems to be interested in fairness
- honest, clear
- amusing, convincing
- nice, short to the point, not as grave as Turner
- he's likeable
- seems friendly, happy, very natural
- looks like a likeable guy
- his delivery, his looks
- he seems very genuine, open, honest
- directness
- he speaks well, clearly, concisely, informally
- his overall nature I felt that he was down to earth, comfortable, and could be a person that is accessible
- I like his suit, lighting too dark to show him off
- I liked the NDP logo, catchy, orange color
- sincerity, involved with families
- good speaker, concise, direct, personable, not malicious
- he appears to be friendly
- he appears to be speaking to you, one-on-one
- seems down to earth
- does a good job of presenting himself as down home guy

New Democrats "Fair Taxes"

g) Is there anything is particular that you dislike about Mr. Broadbent in this ad? Anything else?

- no response to question, 10 questionnaires
- "no", 20 responses
- he's too happy
- I'm not sure I'm being addressed
- He's with the NDP
- He talks too quickly, and he looks intimidating
- negative posture
- he looks awkward and very insincere
- he talked too fast
- he lacks drive, persuasion
- I hate an ad that has nothing to say
- over cooperative with ad maker-image
- the angle of which they have him at: a bit distorted to the camera ie. the people
- although I realize he is a sincere man, in this ad he doesn't seem that sincere: out of character for him
- too cheerful, I immediately put guards up and watch critically
- the mood seems forced
- he presents us with half truths

New Democrats "Fair Taxes"

h) Is this leader representative of a "Prime Minister"? Why or why not?

- "yes", 2 responses
- "no", 1 response
- it's too early to say, after just seeing him in a 30 second clip
- no more so than any other politician
- hard to tell from a 30 second ad
- possibly, he speaks with authority and doesn't hesitate
- not enough info for decision

"No" responses and Qualifications

- no, speaks of a very narrow issue, he will probably reverse the problem. Tax rich too extreme, not all Canadians can identify with his view
- no, can't tell enough from ad
- no, he appears too friendly, too likeable, too ordinary, too sensible
- no, because he is only representing a small amount of the population
- he's not firm enough: maybe too nice a guy
- no, his policies are too radical and will never be adopted by most of Canada
- he lacks aura and presence
- he should bring his party's points up first and run down the competition afterward: his policies shouldn't come as a trailer to the ad
- no strength to argument, to wishy washy
- I don't like his ideas
- lacks a certain something, does not seem strong enough

"Yes" responses and Qualifications

- yes, because he is looking out for Canadians, and has the capabilities to do it
- yes, upfront and candid
- seems more like a boss or principal than a prime minister
- he seems like he's an average Canadian and not far removed from Canadians
- good speaker, representative of the working class
- intelligent, capable, compassionate
- makes claims and will hopefully stand for them
- hard to imagine, seems too average
- he seems interested in the people and has concern with real issues
- looks decisive
- yes, in the way that he represents a fair, peaceable Canadian citizen
- image of this leader is what you would want but it is not representative of "Prime Minister" image
- he seems like a leader who has a real opinion and passion
- his convictions as the underdog
- I guess he cares about the common people, which is most of us
- as a leader yes, but this ad wouldn't change my vote towards him
- yes?? has objectives in mind, seems confident
- he's honest and quick, decisive
- yes, clear platform expressed (leader a clear transmitter)
- again, only in the modern sense. He shouldn't be unless he's prepared to talk for several hours about policy
- maybe, but he should lighten up a little, be more congenial
- he's better than the other two [Turner and Mulroney]; too bad he's NDP
- he knows his own thoughts, believes truly
- could be, shows concern for foundations

APPENDIX D

Progressive Conservative Ad: "A Job"

[Ad opens on still of Parliament Hill lit at night. Superimposed and placed in the centre of the still, in white lettering and underlined in red, are the words, "A Social Policy".]

(VO): **Prime Minister Brian Mulroney**

[Close up of Mulroney seated in front of a stone fireplace, dressed in a blue pullover and plaid shirt which is open collar. The shot is a three-quarter profile of him. He is speaking to someone off camera: Mulroney speaks for the remainder of the ad, with the exception of the closing tag]

(Mulroney): **The most important kind of social policy is a job. Because a job brings dignity and a job is fulfilling of one's worth and a job means leadership for families and leadership for communities.**

[Shot is of Mulroney, in a suit, with a hard hat on, speaking to an oriental woman in a factory setting.]

(Mulroney voice under visual): **Most of all it deals with**

[Shot of a welder welding]

(Mulroney voice under visual): **one's capacity**

[Shot of Mulroney in a factory setting pointing to something and listening to a male "blue collar" worker. Both are in hard hats, and Mulroney is dressed in a suit, while the worker is dressed in work clothes]

(Mulroney voice under visual, music brought under voice): **to contribute to the nation.**

[Dissolve to visual animated tag which are the words, "Building a Stronger Canada" beneath which is a stylized PC logo. This is all on a blue background]

(Audio is a vocalized "CAANNAADA")

PART II: Progressive Conservatives "A Job"

a) What is your impression of the overall ad?

- kind of superficial
- best so far!
- convincing
- Mulroney is trying to promote his party's ability to create jobs
- excellent
- not bad
- did not like it
- clear in what it's saying
- it's ok, but not great
- brief, jobs unify Canada
- like it, casual
- not appealing
- simplistic
- boring, doesn't say anything
- ad is staged: doesn't really say anything
- Mulroney talking to friends in front of his fireplace
- full of rhetoric
- sneaky, underhanded
- I don't like the close up
- slick selling of a motherhood issue
- I dislike him
- short, precise, vision of Parliament buildings seems as a foreshadow
- a big chin
- it seems a little fake, but reasonable
- b.s.
- slick
- favorable
- it's comforting
- I hate Mulroney so my impression is animosity
- what a joke, so many people have stupid jobs. As if he can supply us with good paying jobs we all enjoy that give us DIGNITY!
- diversity
- okay, a bit abstract
- didn't like it
- aristocratic
- it is visually effective
- over produced and untruthful
- very homey, laid back yet promising
- slick, attractive visuals
- ok
- tries to make you feel guilty
- trying to convince us on something we might already know
- bizarre to see social policy from a Conservative party

Progressive Conservative "A Job"

b) Who is the audience?

- Canadians concerned about jobs
- voting public, those who are seeking employment
- the working class, unemployed people
- working Canada
- working class
- the unemployed: people who believe employment is the panacea, business
- another person
- uncommitted voters
- Canadian voters
- corporations, business, private sector
- the gullible schmucks of Canada
- working class
- academics
- women, men, children
- ?
- others who don't hate Mulroney
- unemployed
- working people
- those who have jobs
- welfare scum or working class all can contribute to national unity on an idealistic emotional level
- all of Canada
- Canadians
- Canadian voters
- a "friend", fellow Canadians
- the voter in a time of rising unemployment and insecurity over the free trade deal
- Canadians
- voting Canadians
- every Canadian, particularly the unemployed
- working man
- the working class/corporations, but not those on income assistance
- who knows, maybe the working force
- Canadians
- ordinary Canadians, blue collar
- Canadians, 19-70
- Social Credit voters
- tries to appeal to the Canadian worker = taxpayer
- middle class
- unemployed?? people afraid of boring jobs
- P.C. voters
- taxpayer
- every person working especially unemployed
- young adults
- all classes
- out of work Canadians and social conscience

Progressive Conservatives "A Job"

c) Is there anything in particular that you like about the ad?

- Mulroney makes a point without picking on the opposition
- topic
- it portrayed Mulroney in a home setting and portrayed minorities
- the topic, the film clips
- showed Brian in an informal setting
- "no", 16 responses
- the message of job security
- did not respond to question, 2 questionnaires
- appeal to common touch
- the use of technical events captures your attention
- no suit and tie, shows P.M. working in the field (construction) "hands on"
- homey feeling, the nice guy
- it's short so I don't have to sit through Mulroney for long
- it had good colors, pleasing, calming and variety as well
- it shows other people besides Mr. Mulroney
- Brian is very fatherly trying to build people's respect
- the visuals and quick cuts, the slogan and the "building a stronger Canada"
- the jingle
- homey background, pictures of people
- catchy music
- the casual background
- nice ending music
- good physical symbols
- shortness
- bridges distance between Mulroney and workers
- nothing too fancy
- boring
- the "home" setting, music Canada tune at the end, nothing fancy
- I like Mulroney's style, the way he speaks
- vocal at the end "CAANAADA!"

Progressive Conservatives "A Job"

d) Is there anything in particular that you dislike about the ad?

- "yes", 1 response
- did not respond to question, 1 questionnaire
- "no", 6 responses
- ad is staged, Mulroney's "homey" family man image contrived
- the inferences that this man can provide jobs with no evidence in support
- his clothes and manipulative "fireplace setting"
- yes, as usual the guy speaks rhetoric until he's blue in the face. Very vague, what is his commitment?
- reference to job as only necessary social policy to exclusion of all else
- the music, the way the P.M. presents himself
- too contrived, didn't seem sincere, too much make up on Mulroney
- it is too abstract and oblique
- it was rather unrealistic
- the patriotic time that's too wishy washy
- everything, Mulroney and his economics above all attitude; the P.C. logo at the end, the lies
- ridiculous for this party to focus on social policy then to suggest there is only one social policy -- a job
- oversized chin, phony dialogue
- nothing important (an issue) really stands out
- introduction of the P.M. by authoritative voice
- too much emphasis on money job = money = self respect. Pure capitalist attitude
- didn't really say anything new
- perhaps a little too simplistic
- the visuals - could have used better ones
- Mulroney is too authoritative, too pragmatic
- the switching over to scenes with Mulroney and others, seemed kind of staged
- he seems to lecture us
- shows Parliament like a castle of Mulroney with Mulroney in the castle, seems condescending
- didn't say anything really important or new
- the slickness
- Brian tries too hard
- kind of condescending, the idea of work ethic you are lazy if you don't have a job. Jobs can only give you self respect
- yes, I disagree with the whole social attitude of jobs providing leadership and integrity
- the proximity of camera to Mulroney
- not really - maybe forcing one to get a job
- smugness, no specific appeal to Canada
- he doesn't say how more jobs will be available -- not addressed
- nothing really said
- Brian's a bit too close
- his melancholy voice
- patronizing

Progressive Conservatives "A Job"

e) What message is being advertised?

- P.C. creates jobs in Canada
- promotes jobs
- Brian is for jobs!
- vote P.C.
- some supposed connections between the P.C.'s and jobs ie. if you vote for them you'll get a job
- dignity = job (though not 'work')
- work brings freedom: we will create jobs
- want a job? Vote Conservative
- get a job
- vote for me and I'll bring more wealth and jobs into the country
- jobs are important to Canada -- Mulroney wants to make more jobs
- Mulroney/Conservatives will stimulate the economy and jobs will be the result
- Mulroney is there to build families and communities through job creation
- vote Mulroney for P.M.
- that he will develop social plans to bring Canada forward
- he is determined to keep/jobs to Canadians
- he will provide jobs for all Canadians
- jobs as centre of Canadian nations, stronger
- jobs create self worth
- "jobs"
- jobs will be created by Conservatives
- Canadian jobs: employments = self worth
- ?, didn't sink in
- provision of employment and directions for all in the country
- that Brian Mulroney can provide jobs
- that the P.C.'s bring Canada employment through confidence through money through strength, etc.
- job concern
- that he can provide us with good jobs
- that jobs are important (like we don't already know that)
- jobs, jobs, jobs
- the government is hard at work creating job opportunities
- job creation
- perhaps job creation?
- my government will give jobs and dignity to Canadians
- Conservatives are committed to job creation
- P.C.'s will fight to end unemployment
- encouraging people to get to work
- Mulroney will create and maintain jobs
- a vote for Mulroney is a vote for jobs
- job security
- that he will lower unemployment in Canada
- creating jobs is essential to Canadian growth and culture
- Canadians with jobs have security, family, etc. and Mulroney sees the importance these give to people
- jobs

Progressive Conservatives "A Job"

f) Is there anything in particular that you like about Mulroney in this ad?
Anything else?

- "no", 4 responses
- "no", "definitely not", "nothing at all", "NO!" 15
- the casual attire of Mulroney
- seemed fairly family oriented
- his delivery
- simple, well spoken
- his casual dress, his voice
- he is relaxed
- clear strong face
- his almost naive facial expression, the portrayal of family man and politician
- homey attitude, fireplace behind him
- expression, able communicator
- he appears concerned
- seems sincere
- his clear, smooth and sensitive style, his casualness
- friendly, positive, tries to unify Canada
- clarity of content, well said
- the fireplace behind him, driven quality in personality (force with which he speaks)
- good speaker
- his personal appearance "typical Canadian"
- he seems intelligent and personal at the same time, determined
- he seems to want to be personal, one to one
- he does not take any cheap shots, he's not too flashy
- the color of his sweater, at least he's not wearing a suit
- looked like he was answering a question raised by opposition
- casual, likeable
- he seems interested in the Canadian public, approachable
- down to earth on level of viewer, casual, voice easy to listen to

Progressive Conservatives "A Job"

g) Is there anything in particular that you dislike about Mr. Mulroney in this ad? Anything else?

- "yes", 1 response
- did not respond to question, 3 questionnaires
- "no", "not really", 10 responses
- yes, his whole attitude, mealy mouthed, smooth talker, he's putting one over on all Canadians
- I hate his cool, slick manner of speaking and his plush contentment as he sits and talks like some big daddy. ICK!
- I find him too authoritative, too high and mighty, almost talks down to people
- he's lying, we've got more part-time service sector jobs but not real jobs. He's full of crap; he's so distanced from reality
- his chin: his attempt at a casual appearance
- he does not give an honest impression; he seems to be trying to sell a product he doesn't believe in
- far too contrived
- his insincere setting (I'm sure he meets with his cabinet ministers around the fireplace every week!)
- I'm too biased to answer
- downed dressing to appeal to the plebes
- he does not have the same passion and sincerity as John Turner or Ed Broadbent and speaks quite vaguely of "jobs"
- his assumption that he knows exactly what I need as a Canadian and he'll tell me without my having benefit of response
- sounded insincere, staged
- patronizing
- same as the others [Turner and Broadbent], brief message designed to provoke emotion but says nothing except look at me what a caring man I am
- he hides behind different roles, not really himself
- the ascot made him look snotty, spoiled, not very responsive, sitting on his rich butt
- his voice
- his tone, sort of condescending
- didn't make any commitments
- seems to be out of touch with average Canadians, condescending
- his fat neck -- we feed him too well
- the way he was speaking, it wasn't as casual as his surrounding and dress
- his working man connotations, unrealistic assumptions
- doesn't suggest how to get jobs
- again, nothing of substance really said
- I don't trust him, he doesn't address any issues
- smugness, slickness, selective vision
- the way he speaks, repeats his message
- the angle at which his head is at: looks a bit withdrawn and uncomfortable

Progressive Conservatives "A Job"

h) Is this leader representative of a "Prime Minister"? Why or why not?

- no response to question, 1 questionnaire
- "no", 2 responses
- no, he performs the function of representing a party but the party does not represent Canada
- no, because he doesn't really take a stand
- no, but he is a representative of the ultimate politician: all talk with no substance
- no, too casual dress, P.M.'s have to have a look of authority
- no, seems like a good politician at a local level
- no more so than any other politician -- they're all trained how to present themselves in public. It is difficult to get a reading, they all seem insincere
- I don't think so in this particular ad
- no, well maybe because he is good at foreign relations but, in the ad, it just appears that his script is rehearsed and executed without much interest in the issue
- no, not my rep but he is a classic crooked politician
- yes, because he is sure about himself and his beliefs
- yes, he is the prime minister
- yes, because of reality of contrived, unnatural prime minister image
- yes, whether I like it or not
- more so than the other two
- unfortunately, because he is. He represents a paternalistic, do it my way kind of leader. I dislike him ever more after seeing this ad
- yes, only because he is the P.M.
- yes, good outward appearance, down to earth, family-oriented
- yes, well spoken, bilingual, intelligent
- yes, because he is one
- yes, determination, not so much honesty
- based on the short ad, of course not
- yes, the right image qualities
- unfortunately he has the leadership
- he speaks quite clearly, knows what he is saying
- because he does not reflect ideology of average Canadians
- sure
- too brief to tell
- I guess a lot of people think so, because he is
- he is compelling, a good speaker
- yes, he speaks well, and defends his stances without insulting the other parties
- sure, secure, confident, compassionate
- yes, because he is presentable to the public
- yes, it's hard not to when he is
- he is willing to take a chance and try to improve the economy
- yes, he brings his policies to a forefront rather than run down the competition
- yes, a good representative of Canada!
- yes, he's got most self confidence
- yes, because he speaks of something ALL Canadians can relate to -- work or lack of it
- sure, he doesn't address the real issues that makes him a great politician
- yes, strong willed

APPENDIX E

New Democrat "Negative" Ad: "Who is on Your Side"

(Ad opens with theme music and continues under Broadbent's voice)
[Ad opens on Broadbent who is seated sideways on a stool, dressed in a navy suit. He is seated in front of a soft blue background. As the ad opens Ed turns his head to face the camera. The ad opens with a medium shot of Broadbent. Broadbent is the focus of the entire ad]

Broadbent: You know what this election's all about? It's about who's on your side, [White superimposed words brought in bottom screen. The wording is, "Ed Broadbent/Leader, New Democrats"] who's fought for fair taxes, decent pensions and medicare, who's been against corporate polluters. [Super dissolved out]

[Camera starts to zoom in slowly] Brian Mulroney represents the interests of Wall Street, and John Turner is completely at home with corporate Bay Street. [camera stops on close up of Broadbent] Only New Democrats have been there year in and year out for ordinary working families. So when you're deciding who'll work for you in the future, just ask yourself, "Who's fought for you in the past?" [Music fades and video fades to black. There is no party visual or audio tag]

PART III: New Democrats "Your Side"

a) What is your impression of the overall ad?

- doesn't raise a very good argument
- I like it; convincing, makes one feel secure
- straightforward
- very favorable
- he really wants the vote of the average person, I guess cuz there are so many of us
- energy, sincere
- honest and straightforward
- very influential on voting public
- honest, straight talk
- great ad
- didn't move me to think too much
- excellent colors - blue, calm, radiated pose, honest, sensitivity
- he didn't write the speech himself
- good effective, makes you want to cheer
- ok, one sided
- good, cares about working man
- pretty good
- it's fairly well done
- sincere
- good
- persuasive
- nice, short, to the point
- set up, trying to knock the other guy
- liked it
- it is anti Liberal and Conservative
- ok, not sure it's true
- cluttered, jerky
- nice background
- directness
- divisive: us vs them. Based on a materialistic or geographic or class prejudice
- talks too quick
- straightforward approach
- concise
- ok
- good ad, not fancy but serious
- it is short, to the point
- bullshit
- attack on other two
- poorly done, very boring
- simple, to the point
- very sincere, convincing
- his concern is with the common man
- very appealing to target voters
- Nothing! It says nothing! only irritates me

New Democrats "Your Side"

b) Is there anything in particular that you like about the ad?

- did not respond to question, 3 questionnaires
- "no", 10 responses
- "yes", 1 response
- music, color in background
- mentioning corporate looters: does not mince his words
- it's quick
- feel like someone's working for you
- his reasoning
- good impression
- the "direct" action under which Broadbent states his "practical" beliefs
- the information provided - the New Democrats work for the average person
- Broadbent's charisma
- the message is given without oration
- the emphasis on working people
- Broadbent personable, agreeable (pleasant), music
- I agree with his message, for the most part
- clear, brief, to the point
- clear, to the point
- what he says is very clever: Wall Street Mulroney tied to U.S., Turner to Canadian business
- honest, direct approach
- talk of Wall Street and Bay Street interesting
- no superfluous surrounding, just him
- nice, short to the point
- Broadbent's down to earth manner identifies with his audience
- it's probably accurate in its message
- gives lower classes a party - addresses it directly
- it is straightforward
- Broadbent's delivery
- it made his point about whose rights he works for
- straightforward, easy to understand
- piano
- basicness
- directness of message
- appeal to consistency

New Democrats "Your Side"

c) Is there anything in particular that you dislike about the ad?

- did not respond, 6 questionnaires
- "no", 12 responses
- the content
- could be more technical in holding attention, but good none the less
- too brief (for an election)
- didn't talk about major issues
- missed major points, doesn't emphasize, therefore you don't remember
- separates Canada, stratifies it
- pats himself too much on the back
- his suggestion that NDP represent "ordinary Canadians"
- nothing to say, he's just saying "how bad" the others are
- he does not make a point: he only tells us the opposition are losers
- too petulant
- music, tone of voice, hand gestures
- the "green"(?) background, not a "leader's" color
- it's NDP
- his personal attacks on Mulroney and Turner (although he's right, it's not that tactful)
- the hand movements
- doesn't say the whole platform of party to counterbalance
- I dislike his slogging Turner and Mulroney. I think his integrity would show if he concentrated on the positive aspects of his policies
- could have stated a policy rather than the NDP is for you
- Broadbent is reading cue cards
- the cutting down of the business sector
- I'm really starting to hate political ads
- it cuts down the competition outright
- end line
- Broadbent looks like he's got eye makeup on: he probably does
- music
- bad eye contact

New Democrats "Your Side"

d) Who is the audience?

- no response, 2 questionnaires
- undecided voters, 2 responses
- family, 2 responses
- ordinary Canadians, 3 responses
- average Canadians, 3 responses
- working class, 11 responses
- middle class, 1 response
- NDP voters (ordinary families)
- lower income groups
- people who can stand to listen to this crap
- Canadians 18-70
- NDP (English speaking)
- The normal working family
- ordinary working class
- voters
- me
- Canadian voters, adult, main taxpayers, lower middle income
- Canada
- Common Canadians
- voting Canadians, average worker
- "small business", families, minorities, poor/middle class
- viewers
- working class/blue collar
- people who reject or don't trust Liberal and Conservative stance on issues
- the little people
- us poor common peasants
- blue collar workers who are misinformed
- the average working Canadian
- middle class Canada
- the working/middle class
- New Democrats

New Democrats "Your Side"

e) What is the message being advertised?

- no response, 1 questionnaire
- Broadbent/NDP is the party for "ordinary Canadians"
- that only New Democrats support middle income workers
- that NDP works for the working people
- that Ed is everybody's friend
- that they support the average people
- we've always been there for family
- NDP looking out for the little people and will continue to do so
- fairness
- the NDP works for the average person not just the elite
- that Brian Mulroney and John Turner support business while the NDP supports people
- corporations back Mulroney, Turner, suckers for rich ordinary Joe good, Ed's for you
- a vote for NDP is a vote for working people's rights
- the NDP will work for the average guy instead of screwing him
- Broadbent is working for the working class
- P.C. and Liberal promote big business, NDP promotes (proletariat) workers
- consistent: the struggle continues
- New Democrats will work for you (the working class)
- the New Democrats, unlike the Liberal and Conservatives have the interests of the working class at heart
- they will help working class
- vote Broadbent
- NDP looks after people whereas others look out for corporations
- Ed and friends will work for you
- the NDP is the party that represents middle class and working class interests
- Ed Broadbent is on the people's side
- he'll work for family workers
- NDP party's duty to backing the average citizen
- good job the NDP has done for people in opposition, honest
- we're for the little guy!
- "I'll make Canada a welfare nation"
- "don't vote for them, they don't care about you!"
- vote NDP
- NDP works for the workers
- how good New Democrats are for the working man
- job opportunities, decent lifestyle for everyone
- NDP is for the ordinary families (in their interests)
- vote NDP, they represent the average Canadian
- the NDP will work hard for you personally and they won't be intimidated by big business
- NDP will be there to support you
- vote for me, and I'll represent you the individual. I'm not out for money or for the big corporations
- NDP works for working man
- a party that will continue fighting for common Canadians
- Mulroney and Turner are both the same; they look after the rich (true enough)
- fairness to Canadian people, representation of
- watch out for the bad guys

New Democrats "Your Side"

f) Should this ad be aired during an election campaign? Why or why not?

- "yes", 2 responses
- I would prefer no political advertising. I think it is mostly a waste of money
- better not to take shots at individual leaders in an election campaign ad but, yes, air it anyway

"Yes" responses and qualifications

- it shows where they stand and people should know that
- sure, why not? It's a political ad
- it's all going to come out in the end anyway, so we might as well see it and then be able to question the policy
- it should have something more catchy about it, to grab attention
- it has a clearly stated audience and intention
- it's to the point, maybe a little too cheerful
- it is a political message about what the NDP stands for
- it states the position of the party and general overview of the opposition although it is one sided
- appeals to voter segment
- it presents the leader, it is up to the voters to decide if he's cutting down the competition is valid
- direct "name calling" is a political institution. The NDP needs all the help it can get
- sure, it's an election ad
- a good quick spot, holds your attention by his words
- it's a good ad which says what the NDP stands for and why this differs from the other two major parties
- asks people to think before they vote
- even though it segments population it appeals to people who would vote for NDP. On the other hand, NDP needs votes from other areas as well. Working class is already going to vote for NDP
- it would persuade certain people to vote for the ND's
- Why not?
- I don't see the problem with cutting down the opposition if it's true
- it helps drive home parties' messages
- I think it would convince people to vote, either for them, or justify voting against them!
- maybe someone will realize that he shouldn't vote for Broadbent
- if every party is given fair time it's only another campaign strategy
- get support of one strata of people
- it's about as relevant as the others
- states other two opposition parties views then his. States name of leader and party right away (in printing)
- they're making a statement of what they're prepared to do
- provide support
- Canadians have got to realize these guys are all scumbags. Ed's a politician too though
- because it is a reminder that the NDP will still be on the ballot
- he puts forth a straight forward explanation of his true beliefs

"No" responses and qualifications

- Of course not! It's just mindless drivel
- relate to past more than future
- not convincing, too short and the points aren't clear
- TV ads should be out, print ads and debates only
- it's not informative, too vague
- there are more serious issues like free trade to be talked about
- too short, air it before campaign is called or shortly after, if possible
- doesn't say that the way to get medicare/pension, etc. is to limit private property and move towards socialism
- doesn't say anything about the party platform (empty words)
- it makes allegations and allows absolutely no time to back these up with facts or reporting

APPENDIX F

Liberal Party "Negative" Ad: "Say One Thing"

(Music and Voice over) [Ad opens on a medium long shot of Mulroney standing in the House of Commons. He turns to look over his shoulder. The shot is freeze framed]

(VO): **In '83 Mulroney said this about free trade**

[Medium shot of Mulroney sitting outdoors, background is a stone building. He is talking and he raised in hand in a fist. The shot is frozen]

(Mulroney VO): **It affects Canadian sovereignty and we** [super of the words "Say one thing '83" brought in] **will have none of it.**

[Cut to shot of Mulroney standing in the House of Commons. Shot is frozen when he turns towards the Backbenchers and is laughing]

(VO): **What he meant was forget Canadian sovereignty because** [super of the words "Mean another '88" brought in] **now he says free trade is in the national interest.**

[Medium shot of Mulroney sitting outdoors with a stone building in the background. It appears as though he is in an interview situation. Mulroney is shaking his head. The shot is frozen with Mulroney's eyes closed. The words "Say one thing '84" is superimposed over the shot]

(VO): **In '84 he said that growing old wouldn't mean growing poor.**

[Medium shot of Mulroney in the House looking over his shoulder. The shot is frozen when Mulroney smiles. The words "Mean another '84" are superimposed over the shot.]

(VO): **He meant as long as the cost of living didn't go up. He was about to deindex your old age pension.**

[Split screen with two shots of Mulroney. On left screen is a medium shot of Mulroney in the outdoors scene described above, right screen is a medium shot of Mulroney in the House. Over left screen the words "Say one thing" are supered; over right screen the words "Mean another" are supered.]

(VO): **Say one thing, mean another.** [Split screen shots are frozen]

(VO): **Don't let Mulroney deceive you again.**

[Liberal animated stylized logo of a red flag with the words "This is more than an election. It's your future." written in white within the flag. Beneath the wording is a maple leaf within a maple leaf and beneath the maple leaf is the word "LIBERAL"]

(VO): **This is more than an election, it's your future. On November 21st, vote Liberal.**

PART III: Liberal Party "Say One Thing"

a) What is your impression of the overall ad?

- no response, 1 questionnaire
- deceitful
- fairly cutting
- stupid, doesn't make a good case
- very effective, I agree
- great for making a point
- didn't like it
- malicious
- Mulroney is out to screw everybody
- it seeks to discredit Mulroney, I didn't like it at all
- it was a good tactic on the part of the Liberals
- Huh?
- good
- it is pretty good
- blaming Mulroney for free trade deal
- interesting concept to the ad
- didn't like it
- I don't like "party bashing"
- funny
- excellent
- that was 5 years ago! People change their minds
- anti-Mulroney
- bullshit
- excellent
- sly just like politics
- character ad
- don't like it
- smear campaign
- very negative
- excellent
- although the narrator is clear Mulroney does not say anything. How true are Liberal's accusations?
- for its purpose, excellent, cuts sway at Mulroney's "honest" image
- insulting to both the P.C.'s and the Canadian public
- kind of funny
- Oh boy, I'm starting to feel ill!
- scathing
- convincing, leaves an impression
- terrible
- effective
- pretty effective
- good, I like the funny facial expressions made by Mulroney: absurd
- good, shows Conservatives for what they are
- effective
- better attempt at reportage than most
- I don't like the background

Liberal Party "Say One Thing"

b) Is there anything in particular that you like about the ad?

- no response, 3 questionnaire
- "no", 12 responses
- absolutely not!, 1 response
- "nothing", 2 responses

"Yes" responses and qualifications

- it's great, people have short memories and this is a great reminder
- the freeze frames that depict Mulroney then and Mulroney now
- the way in which they stop the film to capture various expressions
- the flashing images
- interesting comparison of Brian's
- facts presented clearly
- humour in ridicule
- pointing out hypocritical statements
- the comparisons to last election, makes Mulroney seem two faced
- good, shows Conservatives for what they are
- the use of attributable quotes or rather near quotes
- the techniques of using Mulroney footage in House of Commons
- over stimulation of pictures and word: presented at too fast a pace
- I liked it a lot: humorous
- very effective at revealing Mulroney's inconsistencies
- editing looked professional and expensive
- enforces my dislike of Mulroney
- the juxtaposition
- stresses bad points in an artistic way, when bad points are shown the Commons and Mulroney is laughing. Likewise he seems sad and old in the shot about getting old
- it really hits here at Mulroney's flaws
- points out hypocrisy
- it's true
- it uses the negative impression P.M. has to the advantage of the Liberals
- the attack on Mulroney
- I agree with the message, a little humorous too
- the contrast

Liberal Party "Say One Thing"

c) Is there anything in particular that you dislike about the ad?

- no response, 1 questionnaire
- "yes", 1 response
- "no", 7 responses
- nothing about Liberals views on subjects brought up
- the message is personality bashing
- seeing our P.M. smile like a big goof
- seems low down and dirty, almost slanderous
- it really hits home at Mulroney's flaws
- it doesn't support Liberal's perspective. Therefore it splits Conservatives vs Liberals and NDP
- doesn't necessarily promote Liberals
- the slamming of another party, instead of stating what your party will do for the country
- I liked it a lot
- images and script initially too confusing to follow
- the out of context visual images linked with the attributed statements and policies are unfair and misleading but effective
- didn't mention or have a picture of Turner at all
- it doesn't do political thought/decisions justice
- negative in approach. Valid for an opposition party but platform should stand on merit
- you don't see the Liberal party leader
- negative, unclear, unfounded, stupid
- there is only negative about Mulroney, no stand or position for Liberals - why not vote for a different party?
- I admire ability of producers but do not like the idea that they show Mulroney and government acting like clowns and laughing at the public-- not aligned with reality
- who's narrating? says too much about what Mulroney didn't do and nothing about what the Liberals plan to do
- it's not vicious enough
- no statement of Liberal platforms just cutting down the Conservatives
- manipulation of events, narrow-minded view of events
- it's offensive and degrading that someone is expected to come to a decision based on that
- nitpicking, presents without better options
- they discredit Mulroney. Put him down instead of supporting Liberals
- it does not state the Liberal position it just tries to degrade Mulroney. The only Liberal part is the payments announcement
- the images and the audio are completely unrelated
- it isn't clear about what he said differently
- it lacks any of the Liberal party's policies
- it is hard to understand and it's really just a bunch of mudslinging
- that it cuts down the party in order to get votes, should concentrate on building up its own instead
- I don't like party/leader bashing; instead, tell me what you will do for me
- that was 5 years ago! People change their minds
- too much of a one way street, propaganda
- focuses on opposition rather than self
- I believe parties should strengthen their own points rather than only put down other parties

Liberal Party "Say One Thing"

d) Who is the audience?

- no response, 1 questionnaire
- whoever is watching
- Canadian voters, young and old
- voters, older pensioners
- anyone stupid enough to go for this junk
- everyone
- wide Canadian audience, appeal to honesty
- virtually everyone, we all love to see people make mistakes
- old age pensioners, those who have been affected badly since last election, pro Canadians
- dissatisfied Conservative voter
- old people
- Liberals who might jump to vote for Conservatives
- the Canadian voter, pensioners and those against Free Trade
- those who like Mulroney
- undecided voters
- average Canadian
- Canadians as a whole and seniors emphasized
- Liberal voters (English speaking)
- people who respond to images
- Liberal voters
- voting Canadian
- the people who voted for Mulroney in the last election but feel ripped off now
- everyone against the Conservatives
- voting Canadians, pensioners
- average voter
- those schmucks who were conned by Mulroney in 1984
- Canada in general, especially Conservative and undecided voters
- Canadians who once supported Mulroney
- misinformed people
- the Canadian voter
- viewers
- middle and lower class
- any voter concerned about Canada
- everybody
- Canadians
- Canada
- old age, anti-Mulroney Canadians
- uncommitted voters, particularly those leaning to Tories
- voters
- people who are against free trade
- all Canadians
- the undecided voter
- thinking, politically conscious Canadians
- middle class
- Liberals

Liberal Party "Say One Thing"

e) What is the message being advertised?

- no response, 1 questionnaire
- Mulroney doesn't know what he's talking about
- Conservatives are bad
- Mulroney is not concerned for Canadians
- Mulroney doesn't stick to his words, he is constantly changing them
- Mulroney is two faced/breaks promises
- contradictory side of Mulroney
- watch out for the bad guy
- Mulroney is deceitful
- vote for the Liberals and we won't deceive you like the conservatives did
- political contradiction
- mendacious Conservatives
- Mulroney doesn't act as he says he will
- is anti Brian Mulroney but unsuccessfully so
- Mulroney doesn't live up to his statements, should turn to Liberals
- Mulroney is contradictive, you cannot believe what he says
- not to vote for Mulroney because he's a liar
- that Mulroney says one thing and does another, he cannot be trusted
- vote Turner
- Mulroney says one thing and means another
- the image of Mulroney doesn't represent the truth: vote Liberal to get rid of him
- vote Liberal
- hypocrisy of Mulroney
- Mulroney is dishonest therefore vote for Liberals
- Mulroney doesn't know what he's doing
- Mulroney is a traitor who changes his ideas when elected
- don't vote for Mulroney, vote Liberal instead
- Mulroney says one thing and does another
- Mulroney is a liar
- Mulroney is a hypocrite
- Mulroney is two faced, 2 responses
- Mulroney is a deceiving and untrustworthy politician. Don't vote for him
- that Mulroney isn't dependable, he'll say one thing but mean another
- Brian Mulroney is a liar
- Mulroney/P.C.'s are not to be trusted
- Conservatives screw you
- you can't trust Mulroney/ the Conservatives
- don't trust Mulroney
- Mulroney is indecisive when it comes to free trade
- Mulroney is dishonest, untrustworthy
- don't believe what is said, because ultimately it means something else
- Mulroney is a liar (true)
- don't trust the Conservatives

Liberal Party "Say One Thing"

f) Should this ad be aired during an election campaign? Why or why not?

- no response, 2 questionnaires
- "yes", 1 response
- "no", 2 responses
- debatable: is very negative form however is just opposite of image producing ads which are used. If one is possible, I guess the opposite should be allowed as well

"No" responses and qualifications

- because it strengthens the Liberal's and NDP. So if it is an ad for both, yes. If it is an ad for Liberals it doesn't work
- doesn't really inform, only persuades
- I don't feel it provides any information
- seems to be a type of propaganda, much stronger more violent than any other ads shown here
- states none of the Liberal views just condemns Mulroney
- people would vote for Mulroney because they showed so much of him
- it's offensive and degrading that someone is expected to come to a decision based on that
- people don't get presented with what Turner will do to Canada
- creates a negative reaction
- it has no saving graces. It should not be aired at anytime
- it is a personal and unsubstantiated attack using quotes removed from context
- it just seeks to discredit the competition and doesn't seek to promote Liberal policies or candidates
- it is not worthy of consumption. No effort is made to say why we should choose the Liberals as an alternative

"Yes" responses and qualifications

- lets voters see who they're voting for, responsibility vis-a-vis past statements to current actions
- it is showing what is wrong with Mulroney
- discredits Mulroney and without saying why, encourages Liberal voting rather smartly
- powerful in destroying opposition
- valid to overcome bias of governing party
- damages credibility of Mulroney
- finally some (very little) facts
- it helps P.C.'s anyway
- attempts to bring stance of certain parties to light
- it shows their point of views. I mean, they all stab each other in the back anyhow, so what does it matter?
- works well against P.C. but that leaves the NDP out. There is a theory in advertising that you should not put down the competition in your ads. Cannot say yes or no to air ad
- fair, campaign strategy
- it is a bit of a smear but does get points across
- it is fair political comment
- presents a counterbalance for Conservative propaganda
- very effective, but obvious mudslinging
- why not?
- I don't feel it is would add a lot of voters for the Liberals, but why not

- I guess so since they pay for the airtime but it really doesn't effectively promote the Liberal party
- I guess as they have nothing else
- a major problem with Mulroneys has been his reversal of policies over the years which people don't realize. People should be made aware of the characteristics of those they vote for as long as they are portrayed correctly via the media
- show the faults of the opposition
- it focuses on debate; what P.M. has said and hold up to be examined
- it is an ad stating facts that will inform the public
- it should be aired because it makes Mulroneys look like an idiot. The way he seems unorganized in the ads
- yes, often and longer; and they should tell us all about his scandalous cabinet

APPENDIX G

The Tory "Negative" Ad: "Free Trade Fears of Turner"

[Ad video opens on black and white still of close up of Turner. Picture framed in blue with the following words supered below the picture, "...spreading fears about the future of of medicare. Halifax Chronicle Herald, October 31/88"]

(VO): In spreading fears about the future of medicare under free trade it is Mr. Turner who fails his own test of taking fact. "Health care is clearly exempt from the agreement." The Halifax Chronicle Herald.

[Dissolve to black and white still of close up of Turner. Picture framed in blue with following words supered below the picture, "willing to suggest absolutely anything to frighten Canadians. Winnipeg Free Press, Nov 1/88"]

(VO): "The Liberals are willing to suggest absolutely anything no matter how remote from the facts to frighten Canadians." The Winnipeg Free Press.

[Shot is black and white still of a medium shot of Turner. The shot is framed in blue with the following words supered below the picture, "John Turner is lying. The Calgary Herald, Nov 2/88]

(VO): John Turner is lying. The Calgary Herald.

[Shot is black and white still of Turner, full screen. Turner is located on right screen with a bright light pictured on screen left. There are no supers in this shot nor is the picture framed in blue. Turner is the focus.]

(VO): John Turner wants to mislead Canadians. Canada deserves better.

[Dissolve to stylized, animated P.C. logo. Words placed above the logo are "Building a stronger Canada". There is no music with this tag.]

PART III: Progressive Conservatives "Fears of Turner"

a) What is the impression of the overall ad?

- no response, 1 questionnaire
- effective
- bugs me, I don't like partial quotes out of context
- straightforward, but probably one sided to an extreme
- strong message throughout
- anti Turner
- low tactics
- not as good as previous ads seen here
- negative
- defensive
- deceitful
- it is trying to prove Turner doesn't know what he is talking about
- smear campaign
- it's a good ad
- dislike it
- doesn't particularly move me
- alright
- ad obscure
- pretty good, though a smear campaign like the Liberal ad, made Turner look stupid
- not effective
- terrible
- puts down Liberals unfairly
- these people are so immature! Why don't they spend money promoting their own party
- don't like it at all
- terrible
- not very favorable
- very effective, clever
- poor, 2 responses
- paints Turner as distrusting and devious
- somewhat persuasive: lowered my opinion of Turner
- Give me a break!
- not very good, looks too critical
- it is okay, but unfair
- ok, slanderous
- good
- bad, malicious
- not very informative
- defensive
- emphasizes bashing another party instead of focusing on the party who is paying for airtime
- well done, blue background surrounding Turner engulfs him
- well constructed
- I don't like the background
- a direct attempt to discredit John Turner
- character ad

Progressive Conservatives "Fears of Turner"

b) Is there anything in particular that you like about the ad?

- no response, 1 questionnaire
- "no", 25 responses
- "No!", 1 response
- "nothing at all", 2 response
- No, it is offensive

"Yes" responses and qualifications

- "fair is fair"
- the voice of the commentator
- well organized and represented, gets point across
- the format, newspaper quotes
- name calling is humorous
- black and white photos
- the colors, picture one has a gash of light that looked like a dagger in Turner's chest, very effective ad
- reinforcement technique
- straightforward
- the use of testimonials, that is, others can say things about Turner without the Conservatives saying them
- good photos used
- it focuses on a bad view of Turner (unflattering still photos)
- the captions, quotes
- good use of picture and word combinations, pacing allowed for fuller comprehension
- the attempt to link the ad vote with some perception of past performance and an informed choice

Progressive Conservatives "Fears of Turner"

c) Is there anything in particular that you dislike about the ad?

- no response, 1 questionnaire
- "yes", 1 response
- "no", 2 responses

"Yes" responses and qualifications

- the wildly out of context snippets of text and photos give a false impression of conveying concrete factual info
- style, so cheap and dirty tricks. Liberal ad was more tasteful
- the putdown was so blatant
- the perspective
- negative, visual attacks on someone
- it's just kind of boring
- using quotes from papers such as "John Turner is lying" to just pull this out of nowhere doesn't seem fair
- more party/leader bashing, quotes taken out of context, facial pictures are persuasive
- using uncomplimentary pictures to influence audience
- taking quotes out of context
- the way they use random excerpts to portray a person without giving the context, and how they say that since media doesn't like Turner, neither should you
- comments taken out of context
- it points out newspaper excerpts but doesn't bring in any ideas that P.C. has to deal with these situations
- how the newspaper quotes were used, not very effective
- everything because it's P.C.
- the media (newspapers) are biased, they become ever more biased when taken out of context. These quoted could be quotes taken by newspapers from the P.C.'s for all we know
- character bashing is response to P.C. ad
- the whole thing - quotes taken from newspaper articles (probably editorials) and most likely out of context to an extent. This is really low.
- quotes taken out of context
- the quotes have obviously been hand picked and selected
- don't like partial quotes, they are out of context, don't tell the whole story
- knifing, I don't like party bashing
- newspaper headings no indication especially when abbreviated
- rather than "proof" they spout "opinions" of Turner's credibility
- backstabbing of Turner instead of getting to the real issues, the unlikable picture of Turner
- the juxtaposition of unrelated audio and video
- falls in with the style of Turner's and Broadbent's campaign
- brief 3 word quotes can be used in any context
- short cuts and quotes out of context
- reference to the press for quotes (very poor strategy)
- lacked any promotion of P.C. policies or candidates
- anti-Liberal instead of pro Conservative format, quotes may be out of context
- media often express their views instead of just statements
- it merely lends credence to Turner's attack because it defends it. There is no P.C. content except for the payment tag
- it doesn't specify "why's"

- newspaper clips manipulative and out of context
- you don't see the member opposing Turner
- saying through newspaper quote what they would not dare say directly
- the quotes have no mention of Mulroney
- the commentary -- too fast, bad portrayal of facts
- extremely biased, obvious limited in scope
- the P.C. logo at the end the way it moves onto the screen

Progressive Conservatives "Fears of Turner"

d) Who is the audience?

- no response, 1 questionnaire
- "?", 2 responses
- people who voted for Liberals in the past
- non traditional voters who might lean to vote for Turner in opposition to free trade
- Conservatives
- uncommitted voter particularly those leaning to the Liberals
- the people who might vote for Turner
- Canadians
- people considering voting for Turner
- press readership? People who are influenced by images
- all Canadians
- Canada
- Turner is untrustworthy, selling out Canada
- Canadians
- the general Canadian
- people of medicare, needing health benefits
- voting Canadians
- primarily the senior voter
- people who are beginning to believe Turner
- voters
- Canadians
- Liberal supporters
- everyone, emphasizing persons in cities where quoted newspapers are from
- undecided middle and upper class voters
- those who do not like deception and liars - a universal concept
- TV audience who reads
- everyone
- the undecided voter
- everyone, it's "gossip"
- the Canadian voter
- Liberal voters, anyone uncertain or without another party
- viewers
- Canada in general: Liberal and undecided particularly
- Liberals
- all Canadians
- average voter
- all classes
- misinformed people
- those who like Turner
- Canadians who might believe Turner
- indecisive voter
- Canadian voters
- voters who are deciding based on free trade issue
- Canadian voters, payers into health care

Progressive Conservatives "Fears of Turner"

e) What is the message being advertised?

- no response, 1 questionnaire
- "?", 1 response
- John Turner is a liar
- Turner says anything to get votes
- there is an alternative to the Liberal position
- Turner doesn't know what he's talking about
- that Turner commits falsehoods
- Turner is lying to you/breaking promises
- Turner is not to be trusted
- boo Turner
- Turner is a liar
- Turner is not interested in promoting benefits (ie. concerning medicare) for seniors
- Turner is a liar who is out to deceive Canadians
- John Turner is untrustworthy
- That media don't like Turner
- John Turner lies
- Turner is untrustworthy, selling out Canada
- Turner is fearmongering to win the election : he's lying, (probably true)
- personal attack on John Turner and his "lies"
- don't trust Turner, he's a fear monger, you can trust the P.C.'s
- Turner is a liar
- Turner lies
- don't vote for Turner he's lying to Canadians, exaggerated things
- Turner is untrustworthy
- leaves out NDP ads. Should never show competition so blatantly
- he is a liar
- vote P.C. government
- vote Liberal
- Turner doesn't know what he is talking about with regards to free trade
- Turner is misleading people of Canada
- don't vote Liberals; health care
- don't listen to Mr. Turner
- contradiction of terms
- the Liberals/John Turner are desperate to win and will say anything
- Turner is not a good leader
- John Turner doesn't give they true story, vote P.C.
- John Turner is bad, Conservatives are good
- don't vote for Turner, he's a liar
- Turner is a liar, vote P.C.
- Turner is not right
- that John Turner is lying
- don't vote for Turner, he's a liar
- Turner will sell his soul to get elected
- don't trust Turner
- Turner lies, do not believe him

Progressive Conservatives "Fears of Turner"

f) Should this ad be aired during an election campaign? Why or why not?

- no response, 1 questionnaire
- "no", 1 response
- "yes", 1 response
- debatable: it is in response (or appears to be) to the Liberal ad
- if they pay for it, but really this is almost immoral!
- leaves out NDP and ads should never show competition so blatantly
- it's not very persuasive

"No" responses and qualifications

- no tv ads. Also, the criticisms of Turner are out of context bordering on libel
- no, I don't think it's very good
- doesn't present any issues of Conservatives, presents view of Liberal without proper back up evidence
- This could be slander. They use quotes without giving the context that they are used in or the credibility of the original statement
- too biased
- too poisonous, reflects on P.C.'s way of doing things
- it merely retaliates the Liberal ads and does not display P.C. platforms
- again, no ideas of party behind it suggested (how would they deal with it? Probably in the same way in reality)
- too negative
- it is only derogatory and has nothing to do with promoting P.C. policies or candidates
- it's "low blow" and not informative at all!
- only concentrates on negative and doesn't tell the promoting party's/P.C.'s stand
- does not strengthen P.C.: it strengthens Liberal and NDP
- negative, should be positive information about themselves
- Absolutely not! See playground at recess grade 3 for comparable form of argument along the lines of Na, Na, Na, You started it, No you did
- it is deceitful and misrepresents the truth
- confusing, is it for or against Turner?
- smear campaigns have no place in a democratic format
- it does not show Turner as a bleeding idiot like the Mulroney ad [the ad produced by the Liberal's]

"Yes" responses and qualifications

- but it should include a pleasant picture of Mulroney
- OK
- sure, more propaganda
- it is an ad of facts, although very swayed facts, but nonetheless facts
- sure, but I'd like to know who owns the Winnipeg Free Press, Halifax Chronicle, Calgary Herald, probably members of their P.C. 500 Club
- alter the quotes, more different pictures of Turner, more effective that way
- may swing voters opinions and votes
- Why not?
- certainly, although it should be unethical tactics
- fair campaign strategy
- it is fair enough in Canada's political climate
- break down Turner as a leader -- good for opposition, only the party (Conservative) should be more clearly stated

- points to the wrong doings of Turner (unfortunately, these ads might work against the party that runs them)
- sure, I don't like Turner
- yes, it's a valid point
- many quotes from many different sources. I don't think all of these columnists got together and said let's "bash" Turner. He probably deserved what he got
- it aids debate
- lets voters see who they're voting for, there is nothing wrong with discrediting an opponents reputation by pointing out contradictions between words and actions
- it shows the contradictions one can make over the years, therefore imperfections

APPENDIX H

Supplementary Responses

An verbal open-ended question was posed at the completion of showing the ads to inquiring as to which ad was liked most and why, and which ad was liked least and why. These questions were not written on the questionnaire due to the possibility of respondents "skipping ahead" to other pages. Part of the purpose of this section was to indicate short term recall of the ads.

The following responses were received:

LIKED MOST:

New Democrat ad ("Fair Taxes"): 37%
Progressive Conservative ad ("A Job"): 19%
Either Liberal ad: 17% each
New Democrat ad ("Your Side"): 10%
Progressive Conservative ad ("Fears of Turner"): 21%

LIKED LEAST:

Progressive Conservative ad ("Fears of Turner"): 44%
{Progressive Conservative ad ("A Job"): 18%
{Liberal ad ("Say One Thing"): 18%
Liberal ad ("John Turner"): 12%
Either New Democrat ad: 4% each

Responses: Which ad did you like most?

- I don't remember, 1 response

New Democrats ("Fair Taxes"):

- was well put together/good pacing, directness of message
- the statement is clearly unequivocal and amendable to some sort of rational factual verification
- short, to the point, positive
- Broadbent seemed so natural and real, friendly; emotional to to extent; he reached out to you
- it spent more time promoting their party, rather than knocking down the others. It also made me want to vote for them since then seem to want to cater to the category of society I fall into
- the ad pertained to how they always fight for the average working class Canadian. It seemed fairly straightforward and sincere with evidence that could be easily refuted with support
- was effective, portrayed him in an honest, straightforward way and dealing with important issues
- very personable, seems like a nice guy who is willing to help the average Canadian
- his use of the hand (just camera shots of his shoulders, etc.); mentions other 2 parties ideas, then his; more fair than others
- seemed straightforward and honest: didn't call down other leaders to a great extend
- None, but if I had to choose I would pick Broadbent's ad; concerning social issues; but I can't even remember the issue: I guess that shows the effectiveness

- like the broader perspective of issues not just a one issue ad; liked the upbeat feel, sense of action
- Broadbent comes across as the best actor. He portrays worth and kindness along with honest better than the others. Of course he is the only one that is not attacked. While the Liberal and Conservatives attack each other Broadbent is able to come across as the only decent person, but this is not a positive report for the ad. I still hate the format
- they were straightforward and stated what the NDP would be willing to do
- it projected honesty and determination

Progressive Conservatives ("A Job"):

- I liked it because it seemed to have the truest statement, with no negative attach. A statement of principle which hopefully will guide the party. To me, the most valuable ad
- he presents us with positive statements about what he's going to do. He does not put down his opposition constantly like children fighting, this gives him much more style
- because it said something about Canadian culture and its preservation
- it presented party ideology and leader without degrading the others
- it is easily identifiable
- Mulroney talked about working. He said something encouraging. The others just dealt with knocking down their opponents
- It sticks in my mind the most. The only ad where the politician is not wearing a suit. Lighting, innocent look, not trying to knock the other guy
- Mulroney was talking to the camera ie. the people
- Mulroney in casual clothes talking about unemployment; seemed more personable, felt that I could relate to him better (as a "friend?")

Liberals ("Say One Thing"):

Tied with second Liberal ad

- I like the Liberal ad basking Mulroney's character. I think his image carries him, and this ad reflects the truth about him (even though it is negative)
- I remember it; it helps bring to mind inconsistencies
- it used negative impressions we already had of P.M. and focused attention on our feelings about his honesty
- the inconsistencies with Mulroney's free trade position is important as a big issue; choice of film clips was excellent
- it confirmed my beliefs
- presented a clear argument against Conservatives; no loose ends, no holes in argument
- ad calls the scumbag a liar like he really is

Liberals ("John Turner")

Tied with second Liberal ad

- because it projected honesty and determination
- Turner seemed very sincere and made sense in what he said. Also was a very simple straightforward commercial
- clear, explicit, convincing
- Turner's script was well written and probably able to stir many Canadian emotions. It was well delivered, almost as if it had been off the top of his head. There was nothing to distract the viewer from his message
- direct, connects with audience
- it was pretty straightforward and honest
- it brought up an issue I think was the most important of the election

New Democrats ("Your Side"):

- it was personable, told what the problems were and the NDP's attitude towards fixing them
- quick, completely to the point
- his method of influence was not easily detectible; he allowed himself to "blink" normally, representing an image (common image): very human
- liked it because it was short, clear and presented all sides (with some shading)

Responses: Which ad did you like least and why?

Progressive Conservative ad ("Fears of Turner"):

- party bashing ad
- party directly attacked the other with no basis of fact or reason are the most annoying
- childish and immature tactics that have no place in the political arena of debate
- negative, personal attacks, rather than issue related
- a bit sleazy
- condescending and false
- although funny was not really relevant to the election itself. Just debased themselves as politicians
- John Turner called a liar
- obvious manipulation of sources. More deceitful than how they try to paint Turner in the ad.
- It doesn't seem very fair to just pull quotes about Turner out of context and to use them against him. I believe one's own party should be promoted in the ads
- goal was so obvious and unfairly slanderous to Liberal party
- I don't feel this is fair (excerpts from newspaper editorials)
- shows all negative media statements; some parts if quotes missing; obviously some were positive comments; media also might have loyalty to there party, so slander Liberals
- I disliked the partial quotes as well as ignoring issues
- obviously manipulated. It would be interesting to know the whole story
- party/leader bashing is poor, ad seemed very persuasive
- what does a columnist's opinion have on an election!!!! Used unflattering pictures to influence an audience by appearance; totally underhanded, scathing ad (just like the P.C.'s!)
- ran toxic negative, no basis in issue
- it was not very effective and did not make John Turner look incompetent enough
- it only talked about the unlikable qualities of Turner, tried to discredit him personally. Displayed unflattering pictures of him to subliminally make the viewer find him not at all attractive
- it was unrepresentative of the party, it was based on quotes from individuals, possibly swayed writers and focussed solely on bad points of Turner

Progressive Conservative ad ("A Job")

Tied with Liberal ad ("Say One Thing")

Progressive Conservative:

- it's condescending and false
- seems condescending; seems blind to social issues
- it is not a platform, a promise, a statement but an endorsement of motherhood
- hated the contrivance, seemed so rubber and plastic, unnaturally at its worst
- it was pure image ad: he didn't say anything
- his pompousness annoys me; he does not know what I need as a Canadian individual
- did not use the government's strengths

- was too patronizing, like some miserable job is a privilege
- a political leader who is P.M. brings his vagueness and non committal attitude into an advertisement where he at least has a chance to rehearse a sincere message

Liberal ad ("Say One Thing")

- party bashing ad
- where one party directly attacks the other with no basis of fact or reason are the most annoying
- childish and immature tactics that have no place in the political arena of debate
- negative, personal attacks rather than issue related
- not relevant to the election itself, just debased themselves as politicians
- it hits a little too hard
- it was insulting and a waste of money; there is no need to degrade the other politician
- it's only goal was to discredit Mulroneys and served no promotional purpose
- seemed very deceitful and malicious. Said more about the Liberals than the P.C.'s

Liberal ad ("John Turner"):

- was dishonest in appearance; Turner seemed to be acting
- very ineffective, looked like a home video
- the least natural of all. Facial expression is tense, not comfortable, doesn't inspire confidence
- stumbled over his words, technically poor, too long without excitement
- Turner not believable; a joker; he obviously tried to manipulate his viewers; a very commanding tone

New Democrat ad ("Fair Taxes"):

Tied with second New Democrat ad

- not very effective; doesn't show Ed in best light

New Democrat ad ("Your Side"):

Tied with second New Democrat ad

- seemed very phoney and insincere
- not interesting

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