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Managing the Development Assistance Issue: The International Telecommunication Union and its Structure of Influence

by

Paul R. Irwin

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NAME: Paul Irwin

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TITLE OF THESIS: Managing the Development Assistance Issue: The International Telecommunication Union and its Structure of Influence.

EXAMINING COMMITTEE:

CHAIR: Dr. Patricia Howard

Dr. R. S. Anderson
Professor
Senior Supervisor

Dr. Jan Walls
Professor
Supervisor

Mr. Andrew Dymond
Examiner
President, INTELICON Research and Consultancy Ltd.

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Abstract

The following study examines the role of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) in managing the emergence and evolution of the development assistance issue within this international governmental organization (IGO). Unlike other post-War specialized agencies, the ITU was not created with any constitutional mandate to address the development needs of its member-states. Yet, during the past forty years, the ITU has successfully expanded its original focus from that of a technical forum for the industrialized countries to become a full fledged aid organization under the auspices of the United Nations. Although this process was not accomplished over night nor without dissension, the ITU has been able to accommodate the divergent agendas of developed and developing countries, thus avoiding major disputes or withdrawals which might ultimately threaten the survival of the organization.

How has the ITU managed to remain an effective international organization despite the pursuit of two clearly divergent agendas by its member-states? The thesis seeks to address this primary research question using several methods of investigation. Document analysis and archival research was employed to examine the historical evolution of the ITU and its management of the development assistance issue. This was augmented by interviews and correspondence with a wide range of players intimately knowledgeable with the organization's more recent development assistance activities. In particular, these techniques were used to investigate how the organization's structure of influence has unfolded with respect to one specific initiative established under the aegis of the ITU, namely, the Centre for Telecommunications Development.

Based upon this investigation, the study concludes that the ITU has been an effective manager of the development assistance issue, adequately incorporating the distinct agendas represented within its membership. Several factors can account for

this success. The first concerns the ITU's constitutional arrangements and decision-making procedures, which have been flexible enough to accommodate changes in organizational orientation in response to the demands of its membership. The second pertains to a situation of complex interdependence which informs the ITU's organizational dynamics. In essence, both developing and developed countries accept that the success of their respective agendas is ultimately tied to the continued presence of the other. Interdependence is also encouraged by the technology which the ITU seeks to address. Telecommunications technology relies on harmonization and standardization for its successful operation, a factor which assists in promoting compromise and cooperation instead of intransigence and withdrawal.

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Introduction

The growth of international organizations represents a significant development in the conduct of intergovernmental relations in the twentieth century. Their presence on the stage of global politics has been especially evident since the Second World War, during which time the number of international governmental organizations (IGOs) alone has swelled from less than 100 to present totals of well over three hundred. The presence of these international institutions has provided another fora for the debate amongst nations, one which emphasizes the role of multilateral communication to augment the efforts of bilateral diplomacy.

As the subject of academic inquiry, the IGO has traditionally been approached as a forum through which individual national governments seek to pursue their own divergent foreign policy objectives. Utilizing a state-centric model of international relations, studies of particular international organizations most often consisted of a static analysis of structure and operating procedures. More recently, however, research has recognized these institutions as active participants in their own right within the discourse of international relations. Intergovernmental organizations are seen to contribute to the discussion of ideas and the formulation of solutions on issues of concern to a wide variety of constituents within the international community. Imbued with its own personnel and resources, the international organization becomes a participant in shaping international debate, along side the efforts of various external interests

Viewed as an integral part of a dynamic geopolitical system, research into the role of international organizations must take into consideration more than simply an agency's organizational structure and operating procedures. An effort must be made to understand how these bodies seek to address the ongoing issues facing their

memberships as these emerge and evolve over time. From this perspective, the international organization can be seen to be performing the role of an 'issue-manager'. Input is received in the form of demands by different interest groups, which are then incorporated to varying degrees into the agency's response to a particular issue. This response may come in the form of resolutions, declarations, special commissions, reports or programs. Through this process, the international organization seeks to manage potential sources of conflict, thus allowing it to continue performing its other duties effectively. An international forum's long-term survival is thus determined in part by how successfully it can respond to changes in its geopolitical environment.

Obviously, not all of the concerns and points of view expressed within these fora have an equal chance of being incorporated into an organization's response to a particular issue. Determining which groups and individuals are most successful at shaping the agenda of an international organization requires an understanding of how influence is exercised within the institution's operating structure. In other words, it necessitates an inquiry into the means available to various interest groups and individuals through which they can seek to achieve their objectives.

The following study applies the concepts of issue-management and influence to the study of one particular international governmental organization, namely, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). Instead of presenting a static analysis of its organizational structure and operating procedures, however, the thesis explores the ITU's role as an active 'issue-manager' within the global system of transnational relations. It seeks to examine how the ITU, through its structure of influence, is able to address and modify the often-conflicting demands of its membership. The study attempts to show that an organizations' ability to adapt to changes in its geopolitical environment, and to meet the evolving demands of its membership, is closely linked to its chances for long-term survival.

The ITU presents a particularly interesting case study for analysis. Established in 1865, it is the oldest IGO within the present system of United Nations specialized agencies, testifying to its ability to adapt to ongoing changes in the international political environment. In addition, it enjoys near-universal membership amongst the countries of the world, incorporating the participation of both governments and the private sector. This factor gives some indication of the myriad of differing interests which the Union must seek to address.

Despite its long history, the greatest period of upheaval for the organization did not occur until the 1950s and 1960s. The process of decolonialization brought an influx of newly-independent countries to many of the UN specialized agencies, including the ITU. Along with these new entrants came a new set of issues for the organization to tackle. Principally, in fulfilling its task of coordinating international telecommunications activities, the Union found itself in the challenging situation of seeking to meet the demands of countries with highly sophisticated telecommunications systems as well as those with extremely limited and often-outdated technology.

Unlike other post-War specialized agencies, however, the ITU was not created with any constitutional mandate to address the development needs of its member-states. Instead, through such factors as its flexible amending procedures, the ITU has worked to expand its focus from that of a solely technical forum to become a full fledged aid organization under the auspices of the United Nations. This process was not accomplished over night nor without dissension. Studying the means through which the ITU has attempted to incorporate the contentious question of development assistance provides an interesting case study of how an international organization seeks to manage issues through a structure of internal and external sources of influence.

The organization of this study follows the basic chronology of the ITU's experience with the development assistance issue. The first two chapters of the thesis are of an introductory nature. Chapter 1 presents an overview of the different academic approaches to the study of international organizations. For the purposes of analysis, it concentrates on three general roles which these institutions are seen to fulfill, namely, instruments of national policy, autonomous international actors and modifiers of state behaviour. Drawing from this body of literature, the chapter then introduces the conceptual tools which will be employed in this study of the ITU, particularly the concept of influence and how it has been applied to the study of international organizations. Chapter 2 provides a brief introduction to the International Telecommunication Union, including its functions, organizational structure and operating history. The chapter also discusses the arrival of the developing countries and the changing nature of the international telecommunications environment in terms of their impact on the Union's operations.

Chapter 3 traces the emergence of the development assistance agenda within the ITU, showing how this new set of demands has had an increasingly significant impact on the organization. The new agenda's presence has extended from the wording of the ITU's basic instrument, to its resolutions, and finally, to its structure and programs. This dynamic is discussed first within the larger framework of ITU's Plenipotentiary Conferences, then within the more specific context of the ITU's Consultative Committees (CCIs). The development assistance agenda's incursion into the CCIs is particularly significant, as these operating structures have traditionally been dominated by the major industrialized countries.

Chapters 4 and 5 deal more specifically with the structure of influence within and surrounding the ITU and how this has shaped recent developments concerning the issue of assistance to the developing countries. Chapter 4 discusses the 1982 Plenipotentiary Conference as a turning point in the history of the Union and its

traditional patterns of influence. It focuses on how the ITU's new structure of influence is manifest in the Report of the ITU-sponsored Independent Commission for World-Wide Telecommunications Development, entitled *The Missing Link*. Chapter 5 extends this analysis by examining the implementation of one of the Report's key recommendations, namely, the establishment of the Centre for Telecommunications Development (CTD). Studying the case of the CTD provides an interesting example of how internal and external interests can coalesce to determine the success or failure of an international organization's programs and initiatives.

The final chapter of the thesis examines the results of the most recent Plenipotentiary Conference in terms of how these latest developments represent the culmination of a process whereby development assistance has come to enjoy equal organizational status with the Union's other technical functions. Chapter 6 also contains speculation about the future of development assistance activities at the ITU. Finally, the conclusions of the thesis are presented in two sections: first, as they pertain to the ITU's management of the development assistance issue, and secondly, regarding the exercise of influence within international organizations.

This thesis is not without its limitations. Most of these stem from the difficulty of tracing and measuring sources of influence within an international forum like the ITU. Despite its importance to the outcome of any political enterprise, influence does not easily lend itself to quantitative analysis. Based upon such factors as reputation, perceived knowledge or expertise, it exists most commonly in the form of hear-say and personal opinions. Even when influence seems to appear in written form -- in transcripts of conference proceedings or minutes from committee meetings -- the researcher must proceed with caution. For instance, ITU conference delegates are often given an opportunity to decide how their comments will be recorded in the final version of a proceeding's documentation.

Financial limitations, as well as the limited scope of this study, did not permit travel to the ITU's headquarters in Geneva, although efforts were made to contact relevant people within the organization. Unfortunately, initial correspondence directed to the CTD's staff, and then-Secretary-General Richard Butler met with no response. Mr. Butler's views were eventually incorporated into the analysis through a third-person interview with the former Secretary-General.

Despite these obstacles, the thesis seeks to present a useful portrait of the ITU's structure of influence, pieced together through document analysis, interviews and correspondence with a wide range of players intimately knowledgeable with the organization's development assistance activities. The study hopefully contributes to a fuller understanding of the workings of this important organization and, more generally, to understanding the role of influence within the international organization.

Chapter 1

International Organizations

If asked to consider the term "international organization", many people would no doubt think of the United Nations Organization. One can imagine the UN General Assembly with its rows of delegates from around the world, anxious to voice concerns, issue condemnations, engage in political rhetoric and vote on a never-ending series of resolutions and declarations. While the UN is perhaps the most familiar international organization, it is not representative of all the associations which are placed within this category. For example, while the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) shares with the UN the characteristic of near-universal membership, the former agency's activities center on a specific area of international activity as opposed to the latter one's broad scope of concerns. Some international organizations do not possess a worldwide membership but instead, draw their members from a particular geographic region, such as the European Community or the Arab League. Still others, like the International Olympic Committee and the World Council of Churches, bring together non-governmental representatives. With associations as diverse as the World Confederation of Labour, the Caribbean Free Trade Association and Amnesty International all being termed "international organizations", there is an obvious need to clarify this concept and establish some boundaries for its usage. It will be the task of the first section of this chapter to provide a working definition of an international organization by seeking to identify the essential characteristics of these entities.

After establishing what international organizations are, the second section of the chapter will examine alternate approaches to the study of international organizations, discussing how various writers have interpreted their role within the international political system. Three main categories of theoretical approaches are

explored: namely, those that view the international organization as an *instrument* of national policy; those which stress its role as an autonomous international *actor*; and those that examine its function as a *modifier* of state behaviour.

The final section of the chapter will identify which conceptual elements from the literature on international organizations will be adopted for this examination of the International Telecommunication Union. As the section explains, this thesis is primarily concerned with exploring the role of the ITU as a *modifier* with respect to the issue of the organization's ongoing development assistance mandate. More specifically, it will focus on the concept of *influence* within international organizations and how it can be applied to a study of the ITU's development assistance activities. Various studies will be introduced which have attempted to explore how internal and external interests seek to influence an international organization's agenda, thus modifying originally divergent state objectives.

In studying the ITU's anatomy of influence as it applies to the historical evolution of the development assistance issue, this thesis will attempt to address the key question: how has the ITU managed to remain an effective international organization despite the pursuit of two clearly divergent agendas by its member-states? As subsequent analysis will attempt to show, the answer to this question lies in the ability of the organization to act as a modifier of international telecommunications policy as it relates to the question of telecommunications development. Through its organizational structures and products, it has been able to achieve an effective level of integration amongst the demands of developing and developed countries, thus allowing the Union to continue to function effectively.

International Organizations: A Working Definition

A good place to start in seeking to identify the essential characteristics of international organizations is the Yearbook of International Organizations. Published by the Union of International Associations, the yearbook lists eight criteria for inclusion under the rubric of international organizations. These can be summarized as follows:

1. The aims of the organization must be genuinely international with the intention to cover at least three states.

2. Membership must provide for individual or collective participation, with full voting rights for at least three states. No one national group can control the organization through its voting procedures.

3. A constitution must provide for a formal structure giving members the right periodically to elect governing bodies and officers. Provision should be made for continuity of operations and a permanent headquarters.

4. Officers should not all be of the same nationality for more than a given period.

5. There should be a substantial contribution to the budget from at least three states with no attempt to make profits for distribution to members.

6. Those organizations possessing an organic relationship with other organizations (such as the UN and its specialized agencies), must show it can exist independently and elect its own officials.

7. There must be evidence of current activities.

8. Finally, size, politics, ideology, nomenclature, fields of activity or geographic location of headquarters are irrelevant in deciding whether a particular set-up is in international organization.[1]

Different writers have sought to assemble their own lists of criteria which distinguish an international organization. Bennett includes the following characteristics in his definition: a permanent organization to carry out a continuing set of functions; voluntary membership of eligible parties; a basic instrument stating goals, structures and methods of operation; a broadly representative consultative organ; and a permanent secretariat to carry on administration, research and

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[1] *Yearbook of International Organizations* (1976-77), 16th edition, (Brussels: Union of International Associations), pp. 4-5.

information functions.[2] Wallace and Singer propose three features that distinguish international governmental organizations (IGOs).[3] First, the organization must consist of at least two qualified members of the international system and should be "created by a formal instrument or agreement between the governments of national states". Secondly, it must hold more or less regular plenary sessions at intervals not greater than once a decade. Thirdly, a permanent secretariat should be established within a permanent headquarters to perform ongoing tasks. One final definition by Pierre Gerbet succinctly summarizes the qualities common to all international organizations.

> The idea of an international organization is the outcome of an attempt to bring order into international relations by establishing lasting bonds across frontiers between governments or social groups wishing to defend their common interests within the context of permanent bodies, distinct from national institutions, having their own will and whose role it is to perform certain functions of international importance.[4]

Using the above definitions and lists of criteria, how can one summarize the essential characteristics of international organizations? At least three main ideas form a common theme throughout the writings cited. The first concerns membership. An international organization draws its membership from at least three or more sovereign states, though these may consist of governmental and/or non-governmental representatives. An international organization is also distinguished by the fact that it is established with the purpose of pursuing an area of common interest to its members. The interests of the entire membership may not receive equal attention all the time, but it does not have the express aim of pursuing the objectives of only one member, regardless of the desires of others. Finally, an international organization should manifest a formal, continuous structure. This

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[2]A.R. Bennett, *International Organizations: Principles and Issues*, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall, 1977), p. 3.
[3]M. Wallace and D. Singer, "Intergovernmental organization in the global system, 1815-1964", *International Organization*, 24:2, 1970, pp. 245-7.
[4]P. Gerbet, "Rise and Development", *International Social Science Journal*, 29:1, 1977, p. 7.

includes such structural elements as some form of constitutional document which establishes the organization, identifying its aims and methods of operation, and a permanent headquarters to carry out on-going functions. By combining these three essential criteria, an international organization can be defined as *a formal, continuous structure, consisting of members (governmental or non-governmental) of three or more sovereign states, established for the purpose of pursuing an area of common interest.*

Other factors already alluded to often characterize international organizations, including regular plenary gatherings of the members, various consultative bodies, and a group of officials with executive powers. The proviso of the *Yearbook of International Organizations* that excludes those organizations established for the expressed purpose of making a profit for its members is also a useful distinction. This helps to distinguish international organizations as defined from international business corporations, cartels and transnational or multinational enterprises. Many organizations within this latter category could also be excluded on the grounds that decision-making power is held by members from one sovereign state, regardless of the fact that it carries out its operations in a number of countries.

Alternate Approaches to the Study of International Organizations

There is no shortage of written material on the subject of international organizations. Especially since the Second World War, there have been a long series of books and articles devoted to their observation and analysis. In addition, there exist two periodicals, *International Organization* and the *Yearbook of International Organizations*, and several bibliographies.[5] It is not the intention of this section to provide a thorough exploration of the writings on international organizations, as this

[5]see A.L. Atherton, *International Organizations: A Guide to Information Sources*, (Detroit: Gale Research, 1976) and R. Yalem, "The study of international organization, 1920-65: a study of the literature", *Background*, 10:1, 1966.

has been accomplished elsewhere.[6] Instead, it will introduce the major schools of thought relating to these institutions in order to provide an overview of this field of study and a means of situating this study within it. Since this thesis focuses on the activities of a particular international governmental organization (IGO), the following review will concentrate on studies which examine the IGO in particular.

While writers have approached the subject of international organizations from many different ideological perspectives, they all seek to address in some way a similar question: what is the role of the international organization in national and international politics? Different theoretical approaches have produced differing evaluations of this role. Some theorists see international organizations as active participants in addressing worldwide ecological and social problems. Others stress a more modest role for international organizations, namely, that of providing forums for the coordination of specialized activities amongst nations. Still other theoretical approaches focus on these agencies as instruments of national policy, particularly those of the wealthy, industrialized countries.

Reflecting on the alternate approaches to the study of international organizations, Charles Pentland identifies three major roles which these institutions play in the operation of international politics. These include:

1. international organizations as instruments of national policy;
2. international organizations as systemic modifiers of state behaviour;
3. international organizations as autonomous international actors.[7]

While these roles do not exhaust the functions played by international organizations, they do serve as a way to organize the alternate approaches to evaluating these

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[6]see J.M. Rochester, "The rise and fall of international organization as a field of study", *International Organization*, 40:4, 1986, and *International Organization: A Conceptual Approach*, P. Taylor and A.J.R. Groom, eds., (New York: Nichols Publishing Company, 1978).

[7]C. Pentland, "International Organizations", J. Rosenau, K. Thompson, G. Boyd, eds., *World Politics: An Introduction* (New York: Free Press, 1976), pp. 621-659.

institutions. From this basic framework, the researcher can attempt to formulate a conceptual typology of international organization studies and consider the different types of analyses which these various theories sustain.

International Organizations as Instruments of National Policy

In studying international organizations, some theorists begin with the premise that these entities exist primarily as *instruments* of the foreign policies of member-states. Many would assert that the primary reason for representatives of various nations to enter into such associations is ultimately based on achieving a particular set of national policy objectives. Theories which focus on international organizations as instruments pay less attention to an institution's sphere of independent activity, since this is viewed as marginal compared to studying the political interests of the member-states. Whether studying the actions, policies or regulations undertaken by an institution, these organizational products are viewed in terms of the objectives of member-states.

The most prominent theoretical perspective within this first category of approaches to the study of international organizations is the body of works known as political realism. Writers within this tradition began to consider the role of international organizations in the 1930s and their ideas became increasingly influential during World War II and the Cold War. Represented by E.H. Carr, Georg Schwarzenberger and Reinhold Niebuhr, these writers became known as realists or the Power Politics school.[8] Their work grew out of a general disillusionment with the League of Nations and its failure to prevent the invasion of Manchuria or the conquests of fascist states in Europe.

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[8]E.H. Carr, *Nationalism and After* (London: MacMillan, 1945); G. Schwarzenberger, *Power Politics*, (London: Cape Publishers, 1941); R. Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics*, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936).

Perhaps the most famous of these writers was Hans Morgenthau, whose *Politics Among Nations* contains the main elements of the Realist school.[9] This included a belief that nation states are the most important actors in international relations, that there is a clear distinction between domestic and international politics and that international relations is predominantly about the struggle for power and peace.[10] Given Morgenthau's emphasis on the state and his rejection of "internationalism", it is not surprising that he envisioned a limited role for international organizations in world politics. He placed these institutions within the context of general intercourse between states and their governments and was careful not to overestimate their importance in the search for power and peace.[11] While Morgenthau conceded that some international organizations could introduce a balance of national powers and focus attention on issues of international law and morality, even the United Nations was credited within this context as simply "a new setting for the old techniques of diplomacy".[12] With statements such as this, Morgenthau and the political realists emphasized the position that international organizations were essentially forums through which states attempted to achieve their own particular national policy objectives.

Although emphasis on the nation state and its struggle for power was challenged by later theorists stressing international cooperation and integration, political realism experienced a period of renewed interest during the 1980s. The arrival of the Reagan Administration in the United States brought with it a tougher, more consciously "national interest" approach to world politics. This, along with criticisms levelled by the U.S. and other western countries against specific international agencies, led to renewed scholarly interest in the state and the exercise

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[9]H.J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960).
[10]Archer, p. 78.
[11]*Ibid.*, p. 81.
[12]Morgenthau, p. 497.

of national power.[13] This group of writings has been labelled "neo-realist" and represents a reaction to predictions of the demise of the nation state associated with such theories as globalism during the 1970s. Like Morgenthau and other realist writers of the fifties, neo-realists shun liberal internationalism, instead emphasizing the "essentially conflictual nature of international affairs" and "the primacy in all political life of power and security in human motivation".[14]

Neo-realists offer the "hegemonic stability theory" as a prescription for the maintenance of international order. According to this theory, neither collective security nor a balance of power will promote international order. Instead, this is achieved when a preponderance of power rests in the hands of one country who can then promote multilateral cooperation through a combination of coercive threats and positive inducements.[15] While these hegemonic mechanisms may be exercised within international organizations, this has become an increasingly unlikely prospect due to the erosion of Western influence in many of these institutions.

At the opposite end of the political spectrum is another group of theorists who also approach the international organization as essentially an instrument for national policy and the exercise of state power. Although the works of Western neo-Marxists does not reveal one single, homogeneous approach to the study of international organizations, the literature does exhibit common themes. Principal amongst these is the argument that particular international organizations have as their purpose and consequence maintaining the dominance of industrialized states within the present global political system.[16] Neo-Marxist theorists tend to be less concerned with the mechanics of these organizations in themselves but rather, approach them as

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[13]see S.D. Krasner, "Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics", *Comparative Politics*, 16:2, 1984, pp. 223-46.
[14]R.G. Gilpin, "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism", *International Organization*, 38:1, 1984, p. 290.
[15]Rochester, p. 800.
[16]Jacobsen, p. 78.

products of the present system which necessarily reflect its characteristics. Other neo-Marxists writers focus on charting the relation between government action within international organizations and the wishes of transnational corporations, thus seeking to show how certain international organizations serve as instruments for keeping relatively less developed countries in a dependent position.[17]

The theme of dependency is also taken up by many Third World writers studying the role of international organizations. Many Afro-Asian and Latin American writers have adopted the neo-Marxist framework, examining how many of these institutions are used as tools of exploitation of the Third World and pointing to alternative organizational arrangements as agents of liberation. As a distinct body of literature, these writings have often been called the dependency school.

In his study of developing countries' experience with international organizations from 1945 to 1975, for example, Yves Tandon exemplifies many of the views of the dependency school.[18] Tandon points to the failure of international organizations to adequately solve the twin problems of underdevelopment and imperialism. This is because the petty bourgeois "nationalist" regimes in developing countries failed to understand that development is not simply an economic category, promoted by importing capital and technical skills, but a political category that must involve the transformation of relations of production. Secondly, these regimes have no understanding of imperialism and how it operates within such international organizations as the World Bank and the IMF.

Tandon distinguishes the perspective of the petty bourgeois nationalist governments from that of the masses when considering the role of international organizations. The former group view them as perfectly suited for the task of

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[17]see R. Jenkins, *Exploitation*, (London: Paladin, 1971), and D.W. Nabudere, *The Political Economy of Imperialism*, (London: Zed Press, 1977).

[18]Y. Tandon, "The Interpretation of International Institutions From a Third World Perspective", *International Organization: A Conceptual Approach, op. cit.* Ref 6, pp. 357-80.

"mobilizing collective pressure on their imperialist mentors so that periodic political and economic concessions can be extracted from them to appease the masses".[19] For the masses, however, international organizations must necessarily be viewed as peripheral to their struggles as long as these institutions continue to reflect the existing balance of class forces in favour of imperialism.

In opposition to the position of the dependency theorists are other Third World writers, loosely known as developmentalists, who argue that international organizations offer the potential for their countries to achieve a greater level of development. Developmentalists stress the need for a more united effort on the part of developing countries to ensure that their demands are heard and addressed within existing international institutions. They insist that real progress toward lessening the disparities between rich and poor countries can be achieved within the present regime of international organizations. One key similarity between developmentalism and dependency theory, however, is a basic conceptualization of the international organization as an instrument for achieving national objectives.

An example of the developmentalist approach is offered by Raul Prebisch, an Argentinean economist and Secretary-General of UNCTAD from 1964 to 1968. Prebisch, in studying the question of economic dependency, points to the problem of unequal terms of trade between the industrialized states of the "center" and the less-privileged non-industrialized periphery.[20] Unlike the dependency school, however, he maintained that this could be overcome by political action initiated, in part, through international organizations. He cites as examples trade preferences favouring the periphery, commodity agreements, international aid, and efforts to encourage foreign investment in the periphery.

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[19] *Ibid.*, p. 377.
[20] Archer, p. 120.

In his study *Food and Poverty*, another developmentalist writer, Radha Sinha, also focused on the role of international organizations in achieving a fairer sharing of world resources. In accomplishing this goal, he believed that the more aggressive attitude displayed by Third World countries within international organizations could help bring about a shift in attitudes:

> The recent change in the attitudes of the richer countries is largely due to the increasing militancy of the Third World countries. It is almost certain that the magnitude of future 'concessions' in the course of GATT and UNCTAD negotiations will depend mainly on the continued solidarity of the developing countries.[21]

In addition to solidarity, Sinha advocated a major restructuring of international organizations and their negotiating machinery in order to provide a greater say for poorer countries in international trade, investment and monetary organizations.

In summary, those theories which see the international organization as an instrument of national goals also tend to assert that the organization itself is largely an inert forum within the international political spectrum. Their primary focus lies, therefore, in studying the behaviour of the nation-state within this arena. Regardless of political orientation, such theories are useful in identifying how particular countries pursue their foreign policy objectives in a multilateral setting. At the same time, by focusing strictly on 'national interests', such theories often overlook the myriad of other interests which seek to exert their influence within an international organization.

International Organizations as Autonomous International Actors

While the first group of theories ascribe a limited role for the international organization in inter-state relations, a second perspective asserts that not only do international organizations influence world politics, they in fact exercise a degree of

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[21]R. Sinha, *Food and Poverty: The Political Economy of Confrontation*, (London: Croom Helm, 1976), p. 116.

independence which allows them to be considered autonomous *actors* on the stage of global politics. This does not mean that an organization is impervious to external demands, since its actions are certainly influenced by the aims and wishes of its members. Yet once an agency is established with its own bureaucracy and endowed with a capacity to pass resolutions, recommendations and orders, it has the ability to act contrary to the wishes of some members and influence the actions of others. One must concede that it has gone beyond being strictly an instrument of its membership and has achieved its own sphere of autonomous action.

Early theories of international organizations as actors were of a utopian or prescriptive nature, focusing on their role in the future world order. The origins of such studies can be traced as far back as the 14th-century writings of Dante, and his vision of a unified world state, and Pierre Dubois, who advanced a plan for the organization of "Christian states" in Europe.[22] Within the context of the modern state system, the writings of Jeremy Bentham, Henri de Saint-Simon and Immanuel Kant all discussed models for supranational institution-building.[23]

In the early twentieth century, many writings on international organization centered on the notion of "international government" and how this could be realized through international law. One prominent writer on the subject was Leonard Woolf, a founder of the Fabian Society, a reformist discussion group within the British Labour Party.[24] In 1916, Woolf claimed that "if war is to be prevented, states must submit to some international control and government in their political and administrative relations".[25] He envisioned a supranational dispute-settling mechanism in the form of a court or tribunal, which would decide the outcome of

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[22]Rochester, p. 779.
[23]J. Bentham, *Plan for a Universal and Perpetual Peace*, (London: Grotius Society, 1927), pp. 26-32; H. de Saint-Simon, *Social Organization: The Science of Man and Other Writings*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), pp. 46-50; I. Kant, *Eternal Peace and Other International Essays*, trans. W. Hastie, (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1914); cited in Rochester, p. 779.
[24]Archer, p. 73.
[25]L. Woolf, *International Government*, 2nd ed., (London: Allen & Unwin, 1916), p. 228.

conflicts between states. Parties to the dispute would be constrained from warlike action by a system of sanctions and the agreement of all states "to make common cause, even to the extent of war, against any constituent state which violates this fundamental agreement".[26] Woolf and his colleagues were practical and intellectual supporters of the League of Nations during the inter-War period.

Building on the tenets of international government theorists, later writers introduced the concept of federalism to the study of international relations. Unlike Woolf and his colleagues, federalist writers did not naively assume that nation-states would automatically defer their powers to a supranational authority. Instead, by establishing international organizations, states were making a pragmatic decision to give up some of their autonomy to achieve a purpose that could only be gained by aggregating their authority under the aegis of a new international actor.[27]

According to Clark and Sohn, American lawyers whose work is central to the federalist tradition, the principal purpose of federalism was peace. In *World Peace Through World Law*, they explain that "the powers of the world organization should be restricted to matters directly related to the maintenance of peace. All other powers should be reserved to the nations and their peoples".[28] Clark and Sohn's federalist plan built on the UN, calling for the transformation of the General Assembly into a popularly elected body with final responsibility for disarmament and the maintenance of peace. Other recommendations included the creation of a new world security and development organizations to supplement the present work of the United Nations.[29] In this and other federalist plans, the success of these new international actors was dependent upon succinctly and narrowly defining their scope

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[26] *Ibid.*, p. 233

[27] G.A. Codding, Jr., "Federalism: The Conceptual Setting", *International Organization: A Conceptual Approach*, p. 326.

[28] G. Clark and L.B. Sohn, *World Peace Through World Law*, 3rd ed., (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. xvii.

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 331.

of activities within a basic treaty or constitution that could not be changed easily by either level of government.

Later prescriptive theories which focus on the international organization's role as an autonomous actor include those of the globalists. Their "whole world approach" did not place emphasis on the discrete requirements of groups, states or individuals but rather on the well-being of the ecosystem in which these function: namely, the planet Earth. An example of globalist concerns is put forward in a book by Barbara Ward and Rene Dubos entitled *Only One Earth: The Care and Maintenance of a Small Planet.*[30] The authors believed that global problems such as pollution, disease and starvation required global solutions. They envisioned a network of world-wide, functionally-based organizations (both IGOs and INGOs) that could take on much of the responsibility for dealing with these dilemmas that were now being inadequately or inconsistently addressed by national governments. This global system would also include "non-violent settlement of disputes with legal arbitral and policing procedures on an international basis".[31]

Although motivated by a genuine concern for the survival of the planet, many elements of the globalist vision for international organizations have been dismissed as too impractical in their institutional formulation. A similar criticism can be applied to other theories which approach the international organization as an autonomous international actor. In concentrating on the potential of these agencies to achieve such objectives as world peace or development, they frequently overlook or underestimate the influence of nationalism and domestic interests in restricting plans for supranational institutions

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[30]B. Ward and R. Dubos, *Only One Earth: The Care and Maintenance of a Small Planet*, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972).
[31]*Ibid.*, p. 298.

International Organizations as Modifiers of State Behaviour

Between the first two perspectives -- instrument and actor -- is a third means of conceptualizing the role of the international organization. In this third role, the international organization falls short of being a completely autonomous actor in global politics, and yet must be recognized as having more influence than simply that of an instrument of state policy. Instead, the international organization is seen as an intermediary amid a wide variety of national interest groups, acting as a *modifier* which seeks to moderate conflicts and facilitate cooperation. In discussing this role, Pentland describes international organizations as "institutional channels, obstacles, and aids collectively created by states which modify the traditionally *laissez-faire* character of their relationships".[32] Therefore, while states remain the predominant actors in the international system, they are not wholly independent of the influence of international organizations and their processes. As a result, the direction of analysis within this perspective tends to be a reversal of that conducted within the 'instrument' approach. Rather than examining the effect of the nation-state on the international organization's agenda, this approach asks the primary research question: "what is the impact of the international organization upon state behaviour?"

One theory which seeks to address this question is functionalism. David Mitrany, the originator of the functionalist approach to international organizations, believed that any attempt to fix an ideal international order -- such as the ones advocated by the federalists -- was doomed to failure. Instead, functionalism emphasized the importance of allowing interrelationships and interdependencies to develop according to the requirements of the task to be addressed.[33] Mitrany envisioned a world system in which the functions of everyday social life -- transport,

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[32]*Ibid.*, p. 640.

[33]P. Taylor, "Functionalism: The Theory of David Mitrany", *International Organization: A Conceptual Approach*, p. 238.

health care, communications, agriculture, industrial development -- were not carried out autonomously within the confines of each sovereign state but were undertaken across borders on a regional, continental or universal basis. These activities would be overseen by international organizations which would resemble boards of management.

Aside from accomplishing their specific tasks or functions, these international organizations would indirectly contribute to the goal of world peace.[34] Links of international cooperation would serve to enmesh governments and their citizens to such an extent that the cost of severing these ties would be assessed as unacceptably high by all countries involved. Thus, the international organization was seen to be influential in modifying state behaviour.

Functionalists firmly believed that the establishment of international organizations should be governed by "technical self-determination".[35] The nature of the problem should determine the nature of the institutions created, the powers they would possess, and the states that would be members. This tenet is summed up by the functionalist adage that "form follows function". Furthermore, they believed that specific purpose institutions should be staffed by technical specialists rather than diplomats. To Mitrany and the functionalists, the presence of diplomats meant the introduction of political issues such as sovereignty and prestige which could only be roadblocks to cooperation.

The incorporation of political considerations into the functionalist interpretation of international organizations was the task of the neo-functionalists. In so doing, writers such as Ernst Haas and Leon Lindberg focused on developments in Western Europe following the launching of the Schuman Plan.[36] In May 1950,

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[34]Taylor, p. 242.
[35]H.A. Jacobsen, *Networks of Interdependence*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), p. 68.
[36]E. Haas, *Beyond the Nation State*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964) and L. Lindberg, *The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963).

French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman advanced the idea that European states should establish a "high authority" with powers to administer their coal and steel industries. The neo-functionalists saw this as an indication that not only could specific functions be carried out at a subcontinental level rather than a national level, but the political decision-making concerning these activities could also be transferred to a supranational authority.[37] Transference to a regional policy in one sector was expected to spill over, encouraging "community policies" in related areas of the economy. As regional institutions were given more power, the demands, expectations and loyalties of groups and parties would gradually shift to these new centres of decision-making. European economic and political integration continues to be a focal point for neo-functionalist analysis, particularly as these countries approach the new Europe of 1992.

A key element in the neo-functionalist interpretation of the role of international organizations is international integration. As the number and variety of transnational institutions performing this function grew, researchers began to explore the concept of integration more closely, eventually producing a number of integration theories. Among the literature to emerge was the work of the interdependence school, who focused their attention on how increased transnational activity was modifying traditional patterns of international relations. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye saw global relations entering a period of "complex interdependence" which possessed three characteristics. First, multiple channels now connect societies, consisting of ties between both governmental and non-governmental elites and transnational organizations. Secondly, there is an absence of hierarchy amongst the issues addressed amongst states, with military security no longer dominating any

[37]R.J. Harrison, "Neo-functionalism", *International Organization: A Conceptual Approach*, p. 256.

agenda. Finally, military force is not used toward other governments within the region, or on the issues, where complex interdependence prevails.[38]

International organizations play a key role in a system of complex interdependence. In a world where multiple issues are randomly linked and coalitions are formed transnationally and transgovernmentally, these institutions are an intricate part of the international political bargaining process.[39] In particular, they help set the international agenda and act as arenas for political action by weaker states. Thus, choosing the appropriate organizational forum in which to present an issue, and possessing the ability to mobilize votes within it, become important political resources.

The "complex interdependence" theme developed by Keohane and Nye eventually led to the study of international organization in a different form. Instead of discussing global political and economic interconnections within the traditional context of international agencies and institutions, theorists developed the broader concept of "international regimes". Regimes have been defined as "recognized patterns of practice around which expectations converge" that "may or may not be accompanied by explicit organizational arrangements".[40] According to Keohane and Nye, they consist of "governing arrangements" -- widely accepted norms, rules, procedures and institutions -- that allow the international community to function and cope with various concerns in the absence of world government.[41] Examples of regimes include the operation of the European Monetary System, the enforcement of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and arrangements governing such international

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[38]R.O. Keohane and J.S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*, (Boston: Little Brown, 1977), p. 25.
[39]*Ibid.*, p. 37.
[40]O.R. Young, "International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation", *World Politics*, April 1980, pp. 332-3.
[41]Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, p. 5.

activities as deep-seabed mining or the conduct of transnational corporations.[42] Regime theory focuses on how these governing arrangements come into being and how they are successful in maintaining their ability to modify individual state behaviour.

One final integration theory which stresses the modifying role of international organizations in international relations is the 'world society' approach. Developed as an alternative to traditional approaches to international organizations, this theory does not espouse some form of world government as its name might suggest. Instead, the concept of 'world society' seeks to understand the totality of international relations as a "cobweb of systems of transaction".[43] These involve all manner of functional dimensions, a diversity of actors, and a variety of types of relationships from the conflictual to the legitimized within and between systems. Like the theory of complex interdependence, the 'world society' approach emphasizes the influence of non-state actors such as multinational corporations or the Churches on the world scene, and the impact of such processes as the international division of labour.[44] At the level of the international organization, analysis is based on a cybernetic model which examines the patterned interaction of input, process, output and feedback. 'World society' theorists stress such notions as authority, legitimacy, conflict, integration and development as nodal points in seeking to explain the modifying influence of international organizations within the global political system.

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[42]For an analysis of these regimes, see W. Feld and R. Jordon, *International Organizations: A Comparative Approach*, (New York: Praeger, 1983), pp. 259-92.

[43]A.J.R. Groom, "International Organization in World Society", *International Organization: A Conceptual Approach*, p. 436.

[44]Examples of 'World Society' writings include J.W. Burton, *World Society*, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1972), and A.J.R. Groom, C. Mitchell and A. de Reuck, *The Study of World Society: A London Perspective*, (Pittsburgh: International Studies Association Occasional Paper No.1, 1974).

Approaching this Study of the International Telecommunication Union

Reflecting on the various analytical approaches to the study of international organizations, one can discern how different characterizations of these agencies can lead the researcher on divergent paths of inquiry. Each of the three groups of approaches mentioned above provide distinct analyses of the international organization and how it interacts within the larger sphere of international relations. With regard to this study of the ITU and the question of development assistance, the concepts of instrument, actor and modifier each provide some explanation for how events related to this issue have unfolded within the organization.

Applying the role of instrument to a study of the ITU, for example, the political realist approach would portray the Union as a vehicle which evolved to coordinate the telecommunication activities of the Western European countries. Although no single country had the power to control the Union single-handedly, all of its original members shared similar objectives. This limited, tightly-defined mandate curbed the ITU's organizational growth since members were unwilling to lose control of their own telecommunication policies. With the gradual introduction of developing countries, however, it became increasingly difficult for the industrialized nations to use the ITU solely for their own purposes. The advent of the development assistance issue can be seen as an attempt by these new members to accomplish their own foreign policy objectives through the organization. Today, the struggle continues as both developing and developed nations work to establish and maintain their own agenda for the ITU, thus seeking to influence its activities to their benefit.

Federalism, in contrast, would accentuate the ITU's role as an international actor, showing how the management of the development assistance issue was more than simply the result of persistent developing countries or benevolent industrialized countries. While these external pressures provided the initial and continuing impetus for action on this issue, subsequent activity has been generated from within the ITU

itself -- by the Secretary-General, the Administrative Council and the Union's various committees and departments. Federalists would point to the commissioning of ITU studies, the sponsorship of special international commissions and the creation of development centres as examples of how states have given authority to this organization and have agreed to follow its initiatives. Through these various activities, the ITU itself has contributed to the international debate over communication technology and its role in development.

Applying the role of modifier to an examination of the ITU and the development assistance debate, however, reveals the most balanced means of analysing the evolution of this dynamic over the past thirty years. This is because the concept of modifier, particularly as developed by integration theorists, incorporates and considers both internal and external interests and how they are played out within the international organization. From this perspective, one can conceive of the ITU as an organization composed of several "interest blocs" which divide member states along economic and political lines. The two principal external interest blocs are represented by the wealthy industrialized countries with highly sophisticated telecommunication systems and, in contrast, the poorer developing nations whose telecommunication facilities remain at a minimum. Both of these groups of nations bring to the Union a distinct set of objectives, a situation which results in the pursuit of quite different agendas within one organization. Neither bloc, however, is capable of imposing their will on the organization to the complete exclusion of the other. As a result, the history of the development assistance issue is a story of the gradual incorporation of both sets of interests to varying degrees, emerging from the modification of a traditionally rigid agenda.

The ITU's organization and structure of interests assists in managing the inevitable conflict created by divergent agendas and in facilitating cooperation amongst its member-nations. The ITU, in Pentland's words, represents a system of

"institutional channels, obstacles and aids" which help to defuse the potentially explosive nature of this issue, thus allowing the Union to continue its functions. Some of these channels are inherent to the organizational structure of the ITU; others stem from resolutions passed by the Union's membership over the years. It should be noted that the notion of the ITU as modifier does not presume that the organization has been able to achieve an equal balance of interests amongst its membership. Rather, it can be stated that the nature of the ITU's organizational structure dictates that one group's agenda (i.e., technical standard-setting) cannot be pursued in total disregard of the interests of other countries (i.e., telecommunications development).

This thesis is primarily concerned with exploring the role of the ITU as *modifier* in the debate over the issue of development assistance. This does not mean that its role as instrument of members' foreign policy or its initiatives as an autonomous actor will be ignored. Indeed, a knowledge of the objectives and interests of both Union members and Union staff is fundamental to a clear understanding of the dynamics of the debate. The key concern, however, is to analyse how the organization, in response to these external and internal demands, has undertaken initiatives regarding development assistance which attempt to incorporate all of these interests to some degree, thereby managing this source of conflict and allowing the ITU to continue to function effectively.

It should be noted that while the term *modifier* may most accurately describe the relationship between the ITU and its various member states, the organization possesses a rather unique set of circumstances which encourages this modifying role. Principally, the sheer size and economic strength of the international telecommunications market insures that the ITU remains a robust organization that is able to secure the ongoing participation of all nations and also modify divergent national positions as these arise. Other IGOs, without the benefit of a mandate

possessing such significant political and economic ramifications, may more often fit into one of the other two categories mentioned above. International organizations which are perceived as having "less at stake" may be more susceptible to becoming a policy instrument for one particular nation or groups of nations as dissenters simply withdraw. Conversely, such organizations may be able to develop a greater sphere of autonomous activity because their initiatives are not seen as a threat to individual national sovereignty.

Exploring the ITU's role as a manager and modifier of divergent interests is informed by integration theories of international organizations, principally Keohane and Nye's analysis of "complex interdependence".[45] As later chapters will attempt to show, interdependence (or mutual dependence) is a significant factor in the successful integration of the ITU's development assistance activities. In fact, acceptance of the ITU's two agendas is due in large measure to the fact that the success of each groups' objectives is contingent on the continued participation of the other within the organization. Integration theories also explore patterns of agenda formation, coalition building and issue linkage within international organizations. All these are useful concepts in analysing the ITU's evolving experience with the development assistance issue.

One means of testing the hypothesis that the ITU is a modifier of international telecommunications policy, as it relates to the issue of development assistance, is to examine the *products* of the organization. Just as the legislation passed by a national government can be seen to reflect the concerns of various interest groups within a constituency, the resolutions, reports, commissions, and centres established by an international organization can be studied as a reflection of the interests of its members. For this reason, a large portion of the thesis is spent

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[45]R.O. Keohane, and J.S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*, 2nd ed., (Boston: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1989).

analysing the progressively larger role that development assistance has played within the ITU as revealed through the Union's documentation. By studying whose interests have been best represented in the ITU's various studies, commissions, and departments, it is possible to draw some conclusions about how this modification process has taken place within the organization.

Studying how telecommunications policies have been modified within the ITU also implies studying another factor: namely, influence. Influence can be defined in this context as the ability of one actor to affect the behaviour of another actor in some particular sphere of activity or issue-area. It should be distinguished from the notion of power which implies capability, or the sum of the political, economic or military resources available to an actor. For instance, while industrialized nations may possess ultimate technological and economic power with regard to telecommunications, developing countries are nonetheless capable of influencing the process of telecommunications development within the context of the ITU. This thesis will therefore investigate the ITU's structure of influence as another means of exploring its role as modifier.

Understanding how influence is wielded within the ITU involves analysing how the Union is organized and how decisions are made. What are its component parts and how is institutional influence distributed? What decision-making mechanisms exist and how are they used by internal and external interests alike? Answering such questions requires an analysis of the ITU's structure of influence which not only describes structure and operations but also seeks to explain how these features direct its overall management of important issues like development assistance.

Turning to the literature on international organization for examples, one discovers that there are not an overwhelming quantity of studies which focus on the

concept of influence and how it informs organizational decision-making and issue management. Of the studies which do focus on influence, some examine particular nodes of influence which are common to most international organizations while others research individual organizations, seeking to understand all relevant sources of influence upon them.

Robert Cox's investigation of the position of executive head is a good example of the former category of study.[46] Cox contends that the executive head plays a key role in international integration through his or her ability to bring about changes in national policies so that they conform more with the decisions and interests of the international organization. Cox identifies a number of factors which can help to determine the scope of the executive head's influence in this regard. These include access to actors having influence within the domestic political system, adequate intelligence of the goals and perceptions of these groups, and an ability to communicate a sense of common purpose with domestic elites.[47]

Ernst Haas also contemplates the influence of executive leadership within international organizations in *Beyond the Nation State.*[48] Haas views the international organization as a structure that receives input in the form of demands and expectations of states and other organized interests within the global political environment. The executive head is in a key position to influence these sources of input, maximizing the opportunities created to bring about an expansion of tasks and authority for the organization. Haas identifies three critical variables in determining the influence of the executive head.[49] The executive head must define an ideology which gives clear goals to the organization and prescribes a method of attaining these

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[46]R. Cox, "The Executive Head: An Essay on Leadership in International Organization", *International Organization*, 23:2, Spring 1969, pp. 205-230.
[47]*Ibid.*, p. 230.
[48]E. Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964).
[49]*Ibid.*, pp. 119ff.

goals. Secondly, he or she must build a bureaucracy committed to this ideology and having a sense of its own independent international role. Finally, Haas believed that influence was contingent upon assembling coalitions and alliances and maintaining the support of these constituents over a period of time.

In conjunction with its executive head, an agency's bureaucracy is another focus of influence within the international organization. William Ascher's examination of the World Bank and its adaptability to new development approaches provides a good example of studying influence within an international secretariat.[50] Beginning from Keohane and Nye's assertion that "international secretariats can be viewed both as catalysts and as potential members of coalitions", Ascher attempts to isolate certain factors that can determine the degree of influence held by members of the international bureaucracy.[51] In studying the resistance of senior officials within the World Bank to adopting new development criteria, Ascher also highlights the critical influence of *bureaucratic immobilisme* with respect to any initiatives undertaken by an international organization. The author concludes that a greater margin for influence by senior staff members exists in international organizations which lack clarity in the priorities of organizational objectives. In the absence of clear-cut priorities, the signals from the organization's leadership are more likely to be ambiguous, leaving greater scope for staff discretion and greater importance in choosing among alternative options.[52] Other factors which contribute to an assessment of an international secretariat's influence include the complexity of accomplishing the organization's mandate, organizational size, the number of decision points, and the reputation of personnel as specialists versus generalists.

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[50]W. Ascher, "New Development Approaches and the Adaptability of International Agencies: The Case of the World Bank", *International Organization*, 37:3, Summer 1983, pp. 415-39.
[51]R.O. Keohane and J.S. Nye, "Transgovernmental Relations and International Organization", *World Politics*, 27, October 1974, pp. 39-62.
[52]Ascher, p. 437.

One of the most comprehensive studies of overall influence and decision-making within particular international organizations is found in Robert Cox and Harold Jacobsen's *The Anatomy of Influence*.[53] Their work provides a valuable description of influence in eight international organizations as well as a useful framework for inquiry into their practises. The purpose of Cox and Jacobsen's study is to explain how influence is acquired and exercised in international organizations. They do not attempt to assess the value of these agencies or the impact of their activities upon the global community. Instead, they are concerned with better understanding the process whereby their actions are determined. This entails investigating how decision-making occurs within the institution.

To study the structure of influence, Cox and Jacobsen devise a taxonomy of decision-types based on the subject matter under consideration. They differentiate seven categories of decisions made by international organizations: representational, symbolic, boundary, programmatic, rule-creating, rule-supervisory and operational.[54] The authors then seek to determine who is most influential in determining the outcome of these decision-types. This involves identifying the various actors in the international organization -- both within the bureaucracy and as representatives of external interests -- and their means of influencing decisions. Cox and Jacobsen also distinguish sources of influence which are attributable to general and specific environmental variables. The general environment is conceived in terms of the economic and political characteristics of nation-states and their patterns of alignment and conflict. Specific environmental variables are more directly related to the international organization's particular sphere of activities. Technological developments in telecommunications would be an example of a specific environmental variable affecting the ITU.

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[53]R. Cox and H. Jacobsen, *The Anatomy of Influence: Decision-making in International Organizations*, (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974).
[54]*Ibid.*, p. 9.

Among the eight international organizations included in the Cox and Jacobsen study is the International Telecommunication Union.[55] Applying the above framework for analysing influence, Jacobsen provides an overview of the ITU's various decision-making mechanisms, its complex web of actors and patterns of alignments and conflicts within the organization. Although it furnishes the reader with a thorough description of the ITU's structure of influence, the chapter is limited in several respects. First, Jacobsen presents a static description of the Union's anatomy of influence, instead of showing how it has been played out with regard to a specific issue-area. Secondly, since the publication of *The Anatomy of Influence*, the range and scale of the ITU's activities have expanded, increasing the stakes in the contest to exert influence. Developing countries have become increasingly vocal in their demands that the Union's budget and activities more accurately reflect their concerns. At the same time, interests within the developed world want to see the ITU devote increasing time and resources to planning for integrated digital networks of telecommunication services, a phenomenon which was only in its infancy in the mid-seventies.

A later study of influence and the ITU was undertaken by George Codding at the 1979 World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC 79) in Geneva.[56] On the basis of interviews and conference data, Codding attempted to rank participating countries on the basis of three components of actual influence: reputational, positional and behavioural.[57] Reputational influence referred to the standing a delegation was perceived to have among other delegates at the conference. Positional influence involved identifying the number and seniority of offices held by the members of various delegations at the conference. Measuring behavioural influence

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[55]H. Jacobsen, "ITU: A Potpourri of Bureaucrats and Industrialists", *The Anatomy of Influence*, pp. 59-101.
[56]G. Codding, "Influence in International Conferences", *International Organization*, 35:4, Autumn 1981, pp. 715-24.
[57]*Ibid.*, pp. 718-19.

entailed identifying controversies or conflicts as shown in the conference proceedings, and then attempting to ascertain which delegations were most often successful in winning their desired position. Codding's formulations ranked France and the U.S.A. highest in overall influence, followed by the U.K., Australia, Canada, Germany, India and the USSR.

Although limited in numbers, the studies mentioned above provide a useful point of departure for this present study about the structure of influence within the International Telecommunication Union. Cox and Jacobsen's concept of an organizational "anatomy of influence", for example, is most applicable to an examination of the ITU and the development assistance issue. The words and actions of the ITU, or any other international organization, are intimately linked to the structure of interests which surround it. Thus, one can better explain the Union's response to the development assistance question by exploring how it is linked to this overall anatomy of influence.

In studying the ITU's anatomy of influence as it applies to the historical evolution of the development assistance issue, this thesis will attempt to address a key question: how has the ITU managed to remain an effective international organization despite the pursuit of two clearly divergent agendas by its member-states? The issue of aid for the development of communications infrastructure has proved very divisive within other international organizations and has the potential to result in the break-down of international cooperation within an agency. The ITU, however, has survived intact and remains the primary international body for the coordination of international telecommunications. As subsequent analysis will attempt to show, the answer to this question lies in the ability of the organization to act as a modifier of international telecommunications policy as it relates to the question of telecommunications development. Through its organizational structures and products, it has been able to achieve an effective level

of integration amongst the demands of developing and developed countries, thus allowing the Union to continue to function effectively.

Summary

This chapter has introduced those entities within the global political system known as international organizations. After establishing a working definition of the international organization, it has provided an overview of the literature studying their role in international politics. For purposes of analysis, theories of international organization have been divided into three main groups: those which view these agencies as instruments of national policy; as autonomous international actors; and as modifiers of the interests of member-states. Having shown how other authors have conceived of their role, the chapter went on to establish the conceptual framework for this study of the ITU: namely, approaching the Union as a systematic modifier with respect to the divergent external and internal interests represented within its staff and membership.

In order to better understand how the ITU has performed this role, subsequent chapters will examine both the products and structures of the organization over the past forty years which have been used in the management of development assistance. The following chapters will also attempt to outline the organization's structure of influence and determine how this has shaped debate and action on this often-divisive issue.

Chapter 2

The International Telecommunication Union

The International Telecommunication Union is a paradoxical organization. Although it is the oldest international organization in existence, outdating the United Nations by some eighty years, it remains one of the smallest. Resisting the pressures of organizational growth and bureaucratic complexity, it has remained structurally similar for most of its history. The ITU is also one of the least-known specialized agencies of the United Nations family. Yet at the same time, it draws its membership from almost every sovereign state in the world and discusses matters of great economic and political significance.

Despite its size and anonymity, the ITU is an extremely important international organization. Its work directly affects the flow of information around the globe, influencing the conduct of international trade and commerce, diplomacy, national defense and the safety of life. Through a myriad of global and regional conferences, study groups and workshops, the Union takes on the task of coordinating the world's international telecommunications activities. This chapter will provide an introduction to the International Telecommunication Union, describing its functions and the organizational structures which have been established to meet them. Secondly, it will provide an overview of the Union's one hundred and fifty year history, examining the ways in which the organization has evolved to meet the demands of new members and new technology.

The ITU's Functions

The Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union, established as the basic instrument of the organization at the 1989 Plenipotentiary Conference, lists four general purposes of the Union:

a. to maintain and extend international cooperation between all Members of the Union for the improvement and rational use of telecommunications of all kinds, as well as to promote and to offer technical assistance to developing countries in the field of telecommunications;

b. to promote the development of technical facilities and their most efficient operation with a view to improving the efficiency of telecommunication services, increasing their usefulness and making them, so far as possible, generally available to the public;

bb. to promote the use of telecommunication services with the objective of facilitating peaceful relations;

c. to harmonize the actions of Members in the attainment of those ends.[1]

From the terminology used in these general purposes, one can find initial clues as to the envisioned role of the organization. The ITU is to "maintain and extend" cooperation, "promote" development and "harmonize" the actions of nations. All of these terms, as Gerd Wallenstein notes, would be appropriate in describing the responsibilities of high-level *staff* functions in a commercial organization.[2] Absent from these purposes are any indication of *line* responsibilities with direct authority which might be described by such words as "control", "direct", "manage" or "supervise". Clearly, it is not the intention of the Union's membership to endow it with any significant management powers over international telecommunications. Instead, the ITU is designed to carry out the coordinating and facilitating activities of a staff organization.

In order to fulfill its stated purposes, the ITU Constitution lists nine more-specific objectives for the organization:

To this end, the Union shall in particular:

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[1] Article 4, *Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union, Nice 1989*, (Geneva: ITU, 1990).

[2] G.D. Wallenstein, "Development of Policy in the ITU", *Telecommunications Policy*, March 1977, p. 139.

a. effect allocation of the radio frequency spectrum, the allotment of radio frequencies and registration of radio-frequency assignments and any associated orbital positions in the geostationary-satellite orbit in order to avoid harmful interference between radio stations of different countries;

b. coordinate efforts to eliminate harmful interference between radio stations of different countries and to improve the use made of the radio frequency spectrum and of the geostationary-satellite orbit for radio-communication services;

bb. facilitate the world-wide standardization of telecommunications, with a satisfactory quality of service;

c. foster international cooperation in the delivery of technical assistance to the developing countries and the creation, development and improvement of telecommunication equipment and networks in developing countries by every means at its disposal, including through its participation in the relevant programmes of the United Nations and the use of its own resources, as appropriate;

d. coordinate efforts to harmonize the development of telecommunication facilities, notably those using space techniques, with a view to full advantage being taken of their possibilities;

e. foster collaboration among its Members with a view to the establishment of rates at levels as low as possible consistent with an efficient service and taking into account the necessity for maintaining independent financial administration of telecommunication on a sound basis;

f. promote the adoption of measures for ensuring the safety of life through the cooperation of telecommunication services;

g. undertake studies, make regulations, adopt resolutions, formulate recommendations and opinions, and collect and publish information concerning telecommunication matters.

h. promote, with international financial organizations, the establishment of preferential and favourable lines of credit to be used for the development of social projects aimed at extending telecommunication services to the most isolated areas in countries.[3]

Based upon these objectives, it is possible to identify three main functions which the ITU seeks to carry out. These can be described as a distributive function, a harmonization function, and a development function.

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[3]Article 4(2), *Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union, Nice, 1989.*

The ITU's distributive function is to oversee the effective and equitable allocation of the radio frequency spectrum amongst the nations of the world. Soon after the development of radio communication, it became obvious that such a role was necessary if the technology was to operate efficiently. Since radio propagation did not respect national borders, one state's use of the spectrum would interfere with that in another. Worldwide agreement was therefore necessary to minimize mutual interference. To alleviate this problem, the ITU's ongoing responsibility has been to help coordinate spectrum use through the registration of the national frequency assignments of its member countries.

Traditionally, the assignment of frequencies to users is based on the principle of "first-come, first-served". If disputes do arise between nations concerning a particular frequency assignment or a charge of harmful interference of signals, the ITU may be asked to help the parties reach an agreeable settlement and can act as arbitrator in exceptional circumstances.[4] In addition to maintaining an international frequency registration list, the ITU facilitates the allocation of particular telecommunication services to specific segments of the frequency spectrum. This is accomplished at administrative radio conferences, where ITU members come together to decide what portion of the spectrum will be reserved, for example, for mobile maritime services or direct broadcasting satellite services.

With the advent of communication satellites, the ITU's distributive function has expanded to encompass another shared national resource, the geostationary orbit. Located approximately 36,000 km above the equator, this circular band of space allows communication satellites to orbit at the same velocity as the earth's rotation, thus rendering them stationary over a particular portion of the earth's surface. The

[4]For an explanation of the ITU's limited role in conflict arbitration, see D.C. Gregg, "Capitalizing on National Self Interest: The Management of International Telecommunication Conflict by the International Telecommunication Union", *Law and Contemporary Problems*, 45:1, 1982, pp. 37-52.

Union keeps a record of the hundreds of communication satellites in orbit and seeks to coordinate the allocation of orbital slots to future "birds".

Although the allocation of both the geostationary orbit and the radio frequency spectrum would appear to be mundane, technical tasks, they constitute an intensely political matter. The principle of "first-come, first-served" in the use of these resources soon comes into conflict with the principle of "equitable access". Technologically-advanced nations often claim that their immediate spectrum and orbital requirements are being curtailed by developing countries who are seeking to protect their access on the basis of projected future needs. Balancing calls for advance planning in the allocation of these resources with the arguments of those favouring an *ad hoc* approach ensures that the ITU's distributive function remains a continuing challenge.

The ITU's second task, one of harmonization, involves the coordination of international technical standards and plans for the international telecommunications network. Indeed, this function was the *raison d'être* of the original International Telegraph Union, when a hodgepodge of standards and planning approaches threatened to cripple the fledgling European telegraph network.[5] Basic principles for the operation of the telegraph network were established in the form of the *Telegraph Regulations*. Subsequently, *Telephone Regulations* and *Radio Regulations* have been drafted by the ITU's members. In addition to developing operating and administrative principles, the ITU, through the work of its consultative committees, carries out the vital role of establishing technical standards. Such activity is essential if the international telecommunications network is to enjoy world-wide compatibility. In keeping with the staff nature of its functions, observance of these standards is

[5]G.A. Codding and A.M. Rutkowski, *The International Telecommunication Union in a Changing World*, (Denham, MA: Artech House, 1982), p. 5.

voluntary. Due to the necessity of interconnectivity, however, they enjoy near-universal acceptance.

In addition to standard-setting, the ITU's harmonization function involves planning for the future international telecommunications network. Through its consultative committees, the ITU produces World and Regional Plans which forecast expected "traffic" increases and discuss future intercontinental and interregional services.[6] Here again, the goal is not to establish a centralized planning authority for telecommunications but rather, to coordinate and reconcile the national plans of member countries as they impinge on the international network.

Just as the allocation of frequency and orbital resources can be contentious, the ITU's harmonization efforts involve high political and economic stakes. For example, the adoption of a technical standard may effectively eliminate a particular technology from the international telecommunications system, and could result in a loss of millions of dollars to a nation's telecommunications industry. With the rapid advance of technological innovation, these economic and political ramifications are becoming increasingly intense. In order to keep pace, the ITU is under pressure to devote more of its resources to its harmonization activities.

The ITU's third function is also its most recently adopted. In response to the demands of its newer members, the ITU has taken on the task of helping these developing countries improve their telecommunications equipment and networks. This is particularly noteable since the ITU was established by a small group of European countries at a time when concerns about the Third World were a moot question. By contrast, most of the other specialized agencies of the United Nations were created after World War II, when the process of decolonialization had already began and development assistance provisions were enshrined in their founding

[6]Wallenstein, p. 141.

Charters or Constitutions. Instead of being a purpose that was taken for granted, the ITU's development function has evolved gradually from something that was not even considered forty years ago to become an accepted, integral part of the Union's activities.

The ITU's development function is accomplished in a variety of ways. As a specialized agency of the UN, it participates in the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to which developing countries may apply for assistance regarding telecommunications projects. Such requests were handled by the ITU's Technical Cooperation Department (TCD) and are now the jurisdiction of the newly-created Telecommunications Development Bureau (known by its French acronym, BDT). The BDT provides a number of services, including professional training seminars, expert analysis and appraisal of project plans, and the preparation of preliminary studies to assess the telecommunication needs of a particular country. These activities are supplemented by the work of the ITU's Centre for Telecommunications Development which seeks to provide information and advice to developing countries in the formulation of telecommunications policies and the preparation of project plans.[7] Other ways in which the ITU fulfills its development function include the publication of handbooks dealing with specific aspects of telecommunications of interest to developing countries, and the administration of both a Training Fellowship Programme and a Special Voluntary Programme for Technical Cooperation.[8]

Organizational Structure of the ITU

The structure of the ITU has evolved gradually over the years to meet the demands of its functions. While it may appear more complex than other

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[7]J.C. Delorme, "An International Center for Telecom Development", *Telephony*, August 25, 1986, p. 11.

[8]Resolutions 30 and 19, respectively, *International Telecommunication Convention, Nairobi, 1982*.

international organizations, it is much less complex in comparison to many national telecommunications administrations. Except for periodic adjustments in the size of some of the ITU's organs, today's organizational arrangements have changed little since the ITU's reactivation following the Second World War. In the nomenclature of international organizations, the ITU would be considered a hybrid IGO. Since the ITU allows participation from the telecommunications industry, it cannot be strictly defined as an international governmental organization (IGO). Yet at the same time, it was established by a convention between governments and conducts its affairs through a system of "one nation, one vote".

The ITU consists of a combination of conferences and permanent organs (see Appendix A). The former category includes the Plenipotentiary Conference, administrative conferences, and the Administrative Council, which meets once a year. All these can be considered short-life organisms of the Union. In addition, four permanent organs complete the ITU's structure. These include two International Consultative Committees, the International Frequency Registration Board, and the General Secretariat. The 1989 Plenipotentiary Conference in Nice, France resulted in the creation of a fifth permanent organ, the Telecommunications Development Bureau.

The Plenipotentiary Conference is the supreme organ of the International Telecommunication Union. Equivalent to a General Assembly, it consists of delegations of all members and associate members of the Union. Its main purpose is to determine the ITU's general policies through a review and, if necessary, a revision of the organization's governing documents, namely, the Constitution and Convention of the International Telecommunication Union. The Plenipotentiary Conference also establishes the basis for the Union's budget, determines a fiscal limit for its expenditures and provides directives for the staffing of the Union. Its other major responsibility is the election of the Secretary-General, the Deputy Secretary-General,

the Directors of the Consultative Committees, and the members of the ITU who serve on the Administrative Council and the International Frequency Registration Board.[9] The Plenipotentiary Conference meets irregularly, roughly every seven years. It met twice during the past decade: once in Nairobi, Kenya in 1982, and again in Nice, France in June of 1989.

The second major category of ITU conferences are administrative conferences. These may be either global or regional in scope and are usually convened to consider specific telecommunication matters. For example, delegates may come to a World or Regional Administrative Conference to discuss the allocation of a particular segment of the frequency spectrum or plan for the introduction of a new telecommunications service. The other main purpose of World Administrative Conferences is the periodic revision of the ITU's Administrative Regulations, which contain the gamut of rules and regulations concerning the operation of radio, telegraph and telephone communications.[10] The last general World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC) was held in 1979, at which time delegates rewrote the Radio Regulations. A major restructuring of the Telegraph Regulations and the Telephone Regulations took place at the World Administrative Telegraph and Telephone Conference (WATTC) in Melbourne, Australia in November 1988.[11] Although only member states have voting privileges at administrative conferences, non-members are able to attend and offer input. This latter category includes recognized private operating agencies, such as Teleglobe Canada, AT&T, or Japan's Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation.

The ITU's other non-permanent operating body is the Administrative Council, composed of forty-three members of the Union who meet each spring at ITU

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[9]A complete list of the duties of the Plenipotentiary Conference is found in Article 6 of the *Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union.*

[10]G.A. Codding Jr., "The ITU in the 1980s", *Intermedia*, 8:5, September 1980, p. 14.

[11]see W.J. Drake, "WATTC-88: Restructuring the International Telecommunication Regulations", *Telecommunications Policy*, September 1988, pp. 217-233.

headquarters in Geneva. As the organization's governing body acting on behalf of the Plenipotentiary Conference, the Council is responsible for the ongoing work of the Union between Conferences. This includes supervising the ITU's permanent organs, acting as a point of contact with the appropriate United Nations agencies, and carrying out any special tasks given to it by the Plenipotentiary Conference.[12] A great deal of the council's time is also spent on budgetary and personnel matters affecting the work of the secretariat.

Turning to the permanent organs of the ITU, one discovers a unique component of the organization's structure, namely, the International Consultative Committees. These two organs are responsible for the study of technical and operating questions concerning the international telecommunication network and for issuing recommendations on standards, as appropriate. The International Radio Consultative Committee (known by its French acronym, CCIR) fulfills this mandate as it relates to radio communication, while the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (CCITT) focuses on all other aspects of telecommunications, including telegraphy and telephony. The CCIR and CCITT operate through *ad hoc* working parties, Study Groups, World and Regional Plan Committees and Plenary Assemblies. The end product is a series of Recommendations which, although not obligatory, are generally adopted as standards by all the world's telecommunications administrations.

All members of the Union are entitled to participate in the work of the consultative committees but in practice, active participation has been mainly limited to some 30 or 40 administrations from the most developed countries.[13] Private telecommunications operating companies and scientific or industrial organizations may also participate in the work of a committee, provided they can obtain

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[12]For a full list of the Administrative Council's duties, see Article 3 of the *Convention of the International Telecommunication Union.*

[13]Codding, "The ITU in the 1980s", p. 15.

sponsorship by a member of the Union.[14] Given the important implications of the committees' standards to their continuing operations, participation by private companies is quite extensive. Private representatives often take on responsible roles within the CCIR and CCITT including the chairmanship of important study groups.[15]

In contrast, participation by developing countries in the work of the Consultative Committees (CCIs) has been limited. Most of these countries lack the expertise needed to participate effectively in the highly technical discussions and the necessary finances required to attend the many study group meetings.[16] In order to make the consultative committees more accessible to these nations, Special Autonomous Working Parties (referred to as the GAS groups in French nomenclature) were set up to study problems and publish handbooks specifically related to the delivery of telecommunication services in developing countries.[17] A more detailed examination of the CCIs and developing countries is provided in Chapter 3.

Another permanent organ of the ITU with notable characteristics is the International Frequency Registration Board (IFRB). The Board is comprised of five experts in frequency management who are elected by the Plenipotentiary Conference from candidates sponsored by members of the Union. Its main task is to ensure an orderly recording of radio frequencies assigned by national administrations to their radio stations and the geostationary positions allotted to their satellite communication systems. The Board can also furnish advice to administrations on how to use radio frequencies so that the least amount of interference to other stations

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[14]Article 16(2), *Convention of the International Telecommunication Union, Nice, 1989.*
[15]Codding, p. 15.
[16]Codding and Rutkowski, p. 104.
[17]G.D. Wallenstein, "Handbooks of the Consultative Committees: Bridges between International Standardization and National Telecommunication Development", *Telecommunication Journal*, 43:10, October, 1976, pp. 635-6.

will occur, and how to ensure "the equitable utilization of the geostationary-satellite orbit".[18]

Given the socio-economic and political values attached to frequency and orbital resources, it is not surprising that the IFRB's powers are limited to the staff functions of recording allotments and furnishing advice. The only time when the Board is able to exercise any significant influence is in the investigation of charges of harmful interference. At the request of one or more interested administrations, the IFRB can facilitate communication between them and make recommendations as to how the problem can be solved.[19] In such cases, Board members must act as "custodians of an international public trust", and not as representatives of their respective countries.[20]

The fourth permanent organ of the ITU is the General Secretariat, headed by a Secretary-General and a Deputy Secretary-General. Similar to secretariats in other international organizations, this organ provides support services for the ITU's conferences and meetings of the Administrative Council and Consultative Committees.[21] It publishes all types of information dealing with the work of the ITU and about telecommunications in general, including the widely-circulated *Telecommunication Journal.* Until 1989, the General Secretariat also administered the Union's technical assistance program through its Technical Cooperation Department. While most development assistance was and still is tied to the ITU's participation in the UNDP, the General Secretariat offered administrative support to the Centre for Telecommunications Development which operates within the

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[18]Article 10(4(d)), *Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union, Nice 1989.*
[19]Article 11, *ITU Radio Regulations*, (Geneva: ITU, 1982). For further description of the IFRB's role in conflict resolution, see D.C. Gregg, *op. cit*, Ref 4.
[20]Article 10(4), *Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union, Nice, 1989.*
[21]The duties of the General Secretariat are listed in Article 9 of the *Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union* and Article 4 of the *Convention of the International Telecommunication Union.*

framework of the Union.[22] Finally, in coordination with the Administrative Council, the General Secretariat looks after the ongoing management of the ITU's personnel, finances and external relations.

The responsibility for development assistance activities of the Union has shifted, as of 1989, from the General Secretariat to a new permanent organ created specifically for this purpose. The Telecommunications Development Bureau (BDT) is still in its infancy, but consists of the organizational structures and personnel formerly administered by the General Secretariat's Technical Cooperation Department. Established in Article 11A of the ITU's new Constitution, the BDT is expected to "facilitate and enhance telecommunications development by offering, organizing and coordinating technical cooperation and assistance activities".[23] The creation of the BDT is significant in that it represents the culmination of a long struggle by developing countries to have the ITU's development function elevated to an equal status with the organization's standard-setting function, represented by the Union's other permanent organs, the CCIs.

In addition to these eight temporary and permanent organs, it is worth mentioning the ITU's Coordination Committee. Composed of the Secretary-General, the Deputy Secretary-General, the Directors of the two Consultative Committees and the Chairman of the International Frequency Board, the Committee seeks to offer all organs a voice in the management of the Union. Specifically, the Coordination Committee "shall advise and give the Secretary-General practical assistance on all administrative, financial and technical cooperation matters affecting more than one permanent organ, and on external relations and public information".[24] As its name would imply, the Committee works to coordinate the federation of organs which have

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[22]"Establishment of the Centre for Telecommunications Development", *Telecommunication Journal*, 53:2, February 1986, p. 67-9.
[23]Article 11A, *Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union, Nice, 1989.*
[24]Article 12(2), *Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union, Nice, 1989.*

evolved over the years, in response to the demands of international telecommunication users, to create the modern ITU.

Historical Overview of the ITU

The origins of the present-day ITU stem from the development of the electrical telegraph in the mid-nineteenth century. This new system of communication employed electricity and wires to send messages at a velocity of 300,000 kilometres per second, offering a vast improvement over the visual telegraphy systems in use at the time. The advantages of rapid and efficient communication were quickly recognized by railroads, news services, industry and governments, and the new technology flourished.

Soon after its introduction, it became obvious that the telegraph could not be contained within national borders. All of the users of the growing number of domestic telegraph systems had a strong interest in seeing it extend to neighbouring countries, whether to keep in closer contact with embassies and consulates, collect foreign news or facilitate international trade. Thus, the telegraph began to cross national frontiers, necessitating a bilateral treaty at each breach. The first of these was signed in 1849 by Austria and Prussia, providing for the linking of their telegraph lines.[25] As the number of such independently negotiated treaties grew, a hodgepodge of arrangements resulted that made the international telegraph service confusing and difficult to use.[26] There was obviously a need to achieve some uniformity on various aspects of telegraph use, including technical standards, codes and tariff structures. Initial attempts at collective action produced the Austro-

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[25]H.K. Jacobsen, "International Institutions for Telecommunications: the ITU's Role", *The International Law of Communications*, E. McWhinney ed., (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y: Oceana Publications, 1971), p. 52.

[26]For a detailed account of early efforts to regulate the telegraph, see G.A. Codding Jr., *The International Telecommunication Union: An Experiment in International Cooperation*, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1952), pp. 13-20.

German Telegraph Union and the West European Telegraph Union, but neither group was able to provide a level of standardization that would allow the technology to attain its true potential.[27]

In light of this dilemma, Napoleon III hosted a conference in Paris in 1865 to draft a treaty that would eliminate the discrepancies between the practices of the two telegraph unions. Delegates from twenty European countries attended and, within two and a half months, had drafted and signed two documents: the International Telegraph Convention and an annexed Telegraph Regulations.[28] These two instruments created both an inter-European telegraph network and a new international organization -- the International Telegraph Union -- to monitor the network and make necessary modifications to it as the need arose. The International Telegraph Union did not initially make provisions for a permanent secretariat. In fact, a suggestion at the 1865 conference to create some sort of permanent research arm for the Union was hastily rejected by France's neighbours for fear that if such a decision were made in Paris, it would be difficult not to agree to base such a commission in the host country.[29] At the ITU's second conference in Vienna in 1868, however, the decision was made to establish an International Bureau in neutral Berne, Switzerland to carry out administrative responsibilities.

The early ITU was a cautious organization, adopting only limited regulations regarding the operation of the telegraph system. This same approach was employed when a new technology of international communication was introduced in the early 1880s. The telephone, it was argued at the 1885 Berlin Conference, was so new that strict regulation would hinder its development.[30] As a result, administrations were

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[27]Codding, *The International Telecommunication Union*, pp. 14-16.
[28]G.A. Codding and A.M. Rutkowski, p. 5.
[29]G.A. Codding, "Politicization of the International Telecommunication Union: Nairobi and After", *Policy Research in Telecommunications. Proceedings from the 11th Annual Telecommunications Policy Research Conference*, V. Mosco ed., (Norwood, N.J: Ablex Publishing, 1984), p. 436.
[30]Codding and Rutkowski, p. 9.

given almost complete freedom to interconnect with other telephone services, determine the technical characteristics of the apparatus to be used and fix the charges that were to be levied.

Yet even with its lenient stance, the Union was unable to meet with the approval of all the industrialized countries. Both the United States and Canada refused to join the new organization, claiming that communication services were provided by private enterprise in their countries and therefore, the government was not at liberty to become involved in an international organization that would set limits on these activities.[31] Both nations sent observers to ITU meetings until 1908, when sufficient changes to the structure of regulations made it possible for them to accept the general aims of the organization without being bound by provisions they felt were impossible to apply.

While the United States and Canada moderated their initial position, they exemplified an attitude toward the ITU which has persisted to the present day: namely, a reluctance on the part of its members to relinquish any significant control over their telecommunication systems. From its inception, the functions which the founding members were willing to assign to the ITU were limited to facilitating connections among systems and to preventing these systems from interfering with one another. The Union was to be a forum organization where its members came to settle such matters by bargaining amongst themselves; it was not conceived as an independent, rule-making agency. Because of its members' ambivalent commitment, the ITU's growth was constrained. After the decision to create an International Bureau for the Union in 1868, no new organizational features were added until 1925, when two International Consultative Committees for telegraph and telephone were established.

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[31]Codding, "Politicization of the ITU", p. 437.

Even though its scope of operations remained small, the membership of the International Telegraph Union grew steadily as additional countries established domestic telegraph and telephone systems and connected them to the international network. The twenty original members had become 48 by 1914, and grew to reach 56 by 1925.[32] While it now included countries in Asia, South America and the Middle East, the organization remained firmly in the control of its founding European members, particularly the colonial powers. The influence of this latter group was incorporated into the rules of the Telegraph Union in the form of "colonial voting", whereby colonial nations could obtain additional votes in the Union's meetings for their various territorial holdings. Britain initiated the practise by sending two delegations to the 1871 Rome Telegraph Conference (one for itself and one for British India), and demanded that each be given a vote in the deliberations.[33] By the Paris Conference of 1925, Britain, Italy, Portugal and France all had six additional votes.[34]

Also at the Paris Conference, members were asked to consider the feasibility of a merger with the signatories of the International Radiotelegraph Convention. Until this point, the regulation of radio communication had developed separately, but in parallel to that of telegraph and telephone. Initial attempts at coordinating the international use of radio had begun in 1903, when the German government hosted the first radio conference, aimed at stemming the monopolistic practises of the Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company.[35] While the nations in attendance were unsuccessful on this point, they did produce a Final Protocol which contained guidelines for communications between ships and shore stations, and sought to apply portions of the Telegraph Convention to wireless communication.

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[32]Codding and Rutkowski, p. 10.
[33]Codding, *The International Telecommunication Union*, p. 39.
[34]*Ibid.*, p. 41.
[35]Codding and Rutkowski, p. 12.

Three years later, the Final Protocol was used to draft the International Radiotelegraph Convention at a second conference in Berlin.[36] This new document was patterned after the Telegraph Convention and contained many of the fundamentals of radio regulation still adhered to today. These included the allocation of certain bands of radio frequencies to specific radio services, and the coordination of different countries' station operations in order to minimize interference amongst signals. Rather than create a new secretariat, the International Bureau of the Telegraph Union was asked to provide such support duties as the 1906 Convention would require.[37] This included keeping a record of the radio channels in use in each country and acting as a repository for information relative to radio technology.

During the First World War, the use and development of radio communication proceeded at a rapid pace. This momentum continued during the twenties with the production of better equipment, the use of higher frequencies and the debut of radio broadcasting. In this new environment, the provisions of the 1906 Radiotelegraph Convention were clearly recognized to be insufficient and a Radiotelegraph Conference was organized in Washington in 1927 to draft new, more comprehensive radio regulations. The conference achieved its goal, and a new International Radiotelegraph Convention was signed by all of the major developed nations with the exception of the Soviet Union.[38] Other accomplishments of the 1927 Conference included the creation of an International Technical Consultative Committee for Radioelectric Communication, and the decision to convene the next Radiotelegraph Conference in conjunction with the first future meeting of the International Telegraph Union.

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[36]Codding, *The International Telecommunication Union*, p. 88.
[37]*Ibid.*, p. 92.
[38]Codding and Rutkowski, p. 16.

In 1932, the 13th International Telegraph Conference and the 4th International Radio Conference met simultaneously in Madrid to work out the details of a merger of the two bodies. This was accomplished by creating a single convention which contained the major elements of both the Telegraph and Radio Conventions. Attached were the respective Telegraph, Telephone, and Radio Regulations, at least one of which the signatory nations were obliged to be bound by.[39] Along with a new convention, the combined organization chose a new name -- the International Telecommunication Union -- which embodied the concepts of both wired and wireless technologies of communication. The new International Telecommunication Union met only once more before the outbreak of World War II to address such questions as the operation of the consultative committees, voting rights, languages of debate and the ongoing problem of allocating frequencies to radio services.[40] For the duration of the war, the ITU's Bureau continued to operate in Berne with a reduced staff.

Just as World War I had stimulated rapid development of communication technology, the Second World War ended with a considerably expanded radio frequency spectrum. This, coupled with a post-War spirit of cooperation, led to prompt initiatives to reactivate the ITU. Following a Preliminary Conference in Moscow, the United States issued an invitation to the Union members to meet in Atlantic City in 1947 to revise the ITU Convention and solve the major problems brought on by the expansion of radio technology. Of the Union's seventy-eight members, seventy-six countries were in attendance, sending a total of 600 delegates.[41]

The Atlantic City Conference of 1947 is often considered the first meeting of the modern ITU. It was here that a new Convention was drafted which established the present organizational structure for the organization. Structural adjustments and

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[39] *Ibid.*, p. 19.
[40] Codding, *The International Telecommunication Union*, pp. 160-70.
[41] Codding and R kowski, p. 21.

additions were made on the basis of a decision at the Moscow Conference that the ITU should become a specialized agency of the United Nations.[42] This meant that the International Bureau in Berne, which had been financed and staffed by the Swiss government, would be replaced by an international secretariat. The new General Secretariat would be headed by an elected Secretary-General and staffed by nationals from various member countries. Its home would be moved from Berne to Geneva.

Besides the General Secretariat, a new body of government delegates was created to manage the affairs of the ITU during the period between its all-member organizational conferences. The eighteen elected members of the new Administrative Council would meet annually between Plenipotentiary Conferences, to supervise both the internal operations of the Union and its liaison with the United Nations and other international organizations. In order to cope with the tremendous increase in the use of radio communication, the Conference resolved to draw up a completely new international frequency list and create an impartial, expert organ to process all future additions and changes to that list. This new body, the International Frequency Registration Board, was originally composed of 11 members elected on a regional basis. In addition to its notification and registration duties, it was initially envisioned as a kind of international court of justice for disputes concerning the use of the radio spectrum.[43] This role never truly materialized, however, again illustrating the reluctance of nations to relinquish control over their telecommunication systems.

The 1950s was a very active period for the newly-reorganized ITU. Numerous radio conferences were held to work out the details of the international frequency list and to plan for high frequency broadcasting and aeronautical radio services. The

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[42]Codding, *The International Telecommunication Union*, p. 200.
[43]See H.K. Jacobsen, "The International Telecommunication Union: ITU's Structure and Functions", *Global Communication in the Space Age: Towards a New ITU*, (New York: The John and Mary Markle Foundation and the Twentieth Century Fund, 1972), p. 49.

Union's consultative committees were also busy and soon became important mechanisms for the development of international technical standards. The International Radio Consultative Committee held four plenary assemblies during the decade and its study groups grew in number from eight to fourteen.[44] Standards and operating practises were drawn up and adopted with increasing frequency and significance. The Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committees (CCIT and CCIF, respectively) also gained prominence. In 1956, the two committees were merged to create the present International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (CCITT).

While radio conferences and the consultative committees functioned mainly to meet the technical requirements of the industrialized nations, some effort was made by the Union to accommodate its newer members from the developing world. In 1951, the Administrative Council adopted a resolution regarding the participation of the ITU in the United Nations Expanded Program for Technical Assistance. Noting the "strong desire and ability of the ITU, as expressed by its Administrative Council", the UN Economic and Social Council approved its request to become a participating organization.[45] Thus during the following year, the Union embarked on an entirely new function: providing technical assistance in the telecommunications field to developing countries. At the 1959 Plenipotentiary Conference, this function was added to the ITU Convention. Article 4, the Purposes of the Union, was amended to include the objective: "to foster the creation, development and improvement of telecommunication equipment and networks in new and developing countries by every means at its disposal".[46]

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[44]Codding and Rutkowski, p. 35.

[45]Administrative Council, *Report on the Activities of the International Telecommunication Union*, (Geneva: ITU, 1952), p. 31.

[46]*International Telecommunication Convention, Geneva, 1959*, (Geneva: ITU, 1960), p. 4.

Despite the resolute wording of this amendment, the direction of the organization remained virtually unchanged. The ITU continued to meet the needs of its original members, managing the radio frequency spectrum and preparing for new technology and services. In 1963, the Union faced the challenge of a new frontier in international telecommunications, holding its first conference on the use of artificial space satellites for radio communication.[47] Other conferences were convened to address issues associated with maritime mobile services and an expanding aeronautical frequency allotment plan.

While the 1960s was a period of relative calm for the ITU, it marked a distinct turning point in the organization's history. During the early sixties, many former colonies gained their independence and applied to become members of the ITU. The result was a sharp increase in the Union's membership: from 96 in 1959, to 129 in 1965.[48] All of these new entrants were developing countries and together, they now composed the majority of delegations to the ITU. This was particularly significant in view of the fact that decision-making at ITU conferences was based on the system of "one nation, one vote". Clearly, the stage was set for considerable changes as the Union celebrated its centennial in 1965 and commenced its second century of operations.

Recent Developments within the ITU

The past two decades in the ITU's history has seen the continuation of many of the trends which began in the sixties. Membership has continued to swell, reaching 146 nations in 1973, and 157 a decade later.[49] In 1991, the total stands at 166 member countries. The status of telecommunications technology and services in

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[47]R.E. Butler, "The ITU: A Pioneer in Space Law", *Space Communication and Broadcasting*, 2:4, 1984, p. 304.

[48]Codding and Rutkowski, p. 44.

[49]G.A. Codding, *The 1982 ITU Plenipotentiary Conference. A Pre-Conference Briefing Paper*, (London: International Institute of Communications, September 1982), p. xxiii.

many of these nations differs dramatically from the level of sophistication found in the major developed countries. Therefore, it is not surprising that the ITU has come under increasing pressure from the majority of its membership, who claim that the organization's agenda should more accurately reflect their present and future telecommunication needs.

The influence of the developing countries has been felt in a number of ways. First, they have made sure that their concerns are addressed at ITU conferences during the planning process for future telecommunication services. This was first made clear at the 1974 Maritime Conference where developing countries voiced their claim to the radio resource and worked to ensure that the allotment plan reflected their present and future needs.[50] The debate shifted from radio frequencies to the geostationary orbit (GSO) at the World Administrative Radio Conference in 1979. With considerable success, the developing nations argued that this orbit was a "limited natural resource" and, as such, there should be measures taken to ensure that all countries may have "equitable access" to it.[51]

After lengthy debate and considerable private diplomacy, a resolution was adopted to hold a Space WARC to guarantee "in practise for all countries, equitable access to the geostationary satellite orbit and frequency bands allocated to space services".[52] At WARC-ORB-85, a mixed planning agreement was reached which established an *a priori* frequency/orbit allotment plan for new fixed satellite services or "expansion bands" and regulatory procedures which encompassed a multilateral planning process for the "conventional bands" already in use.[53] In July of 1988, a

[50]Codding and Rutkowski, p. 49.
[51]Space-WARC 1971 officially recognized that the GSO was a limited resource (Resolution No. Spa 2-1). The principle of equitable access was first established in the International Telecommunication Convention at the 1973 Malaga-Torremolinos Plenipotentiary Conference (Article 33). See M. Naraine, "WARC-ORB-85: Guaranteeing access to the geostationary orbit", *Telecommunications Policy*, June 1985, pp. 97-108.
[52]Resolution 3, *Final Acts. 1979 World Administrative Radio Conference*, (Geneva: ITU, 1980).
[53]H. Hudson. "Mixed Planning Approach at Geneva", *Telecommunications Policy*, December 1985, pp. 270-2.

second session of the WARC-ORB Conference was held to put the principles agreed on in 1985 into workable planning procedures and methods.[54]

The developing countries have also made their presence felt in the various organs of the ITU. With their voting majority, they have achieved greater representation within the Administrative Council at each successive Plenipotentiary Conference. From its original 18 members in 1947, the Council has grown to a present total of 43 members, with equitable distribution of seats among all regions of the world.[55] Because of the Administrative Council's key role in steering the ongoing work of the Union between Plenipotentiary Conferences, increased representation on the Council has meant that developing countries have a better chance to monitor the results of Conference resolutions, especially those dealing with technical cooperation issues.

The ITU's Consultative Committees, once solidly the domain of the industrialized countries, have also felt pressures to address the concerns of developing nations in a a more systematic manner. The CCITT's original Special Autonomous Groups (GAS), established in 1964 to study problems and publish handbooks regarding telecommunications in developing countries, have grown in number from five to eleven.[56] In addition, a special CCITT Committee was established in 1985 to "advise the Plenary Assembly on measures to be adopted by the CCITT in the area of technical assistance to developing countries" and consider the use of its staff for short-term technical assistance missions.[57]

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[54]For a discussion of the geosynchonous orbit as a collective resource and the ITU as a managing body, see *Our Common Future, Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 274-79.
[55]Article 8, *Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union, Nice, 1989.*
[56]J.C. Renaud, "The ITU and Development Assistance: North, South and the dynamics of the CCIs", *Telecommunications Policy*, June 1987, p. 186.
[57]*Ibid.*, p. 186.

Finally, the ITU's newer members have worked to enhance the organization's development assistance programs administered by the General Secretariat. In 1973, the Plenipotentiary Conference passed a resolution establishing a Special Fund for Technical Cooperation.[58] At the 1982 Plenipotentiary, this effort was reinforced by resolutions calling for the creation of a Special Voluntary Programme for Technical Cooperation and the establishment of an Independent International Commission for World-Wide Telecommunications Development.[59] Based upon the subsequent recommendations of the Independent Commission, the ITU announced the establishment of a Centre for Telecommunication Development in 1985, to supplement the Union's other development assistance initiatives. At the most recent Plenipotentiary Conference in 1989, the General Secretariat's Technical Cooperation Department was expanded and elevated to the status of a permanent organ, becoming the Telecommunications Development Bureau (BDT).

Even with the increased involvement of the developing nations, the ITU has continued to perform its traditional functions relating to the coordination of international telecommunications activities. If anything, its planning and standard-setting role has increased in importance during the past decade as telecommunication technology continued to develop at a swift pace. The 1980s witnessed the wide-spread use of higher frequencies, more powerful satellites, digital transmission systems, optical fibers and a multitude of new data and information services. This was further complicated by the arrival of a multitude of new market entrants as the industrialized nations deregulated large parts of the telecommunications industry. The task of providing technical harmonization in this new telecommunications environment ensured that the ITU remained a vital international organization for developed nations and the public and private operating agencies within them.

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[58]Resolution 21, *International Telecommunication Convention, Malaga-Torremolinos, 1973.*
[59]Resolutions 19 and 20, *International Telecommunication Convention, Nairobi, 1982.*

The technological innovation which has possibly had the greatest impact on the activities of the ITU is the emergence of the Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN). ISDN can be defined as "a public end-to-end digital telecommunications network providing the capacity to transmit voice, data, facsimile, telemetry and slow-motion video, either simultaneously or separately, on a single telephone line, twisted-pair wire or optical fiber".[60] One can envision a gigantic information highway through which all kinds of data can be digitally packaged and swiftly channelled. Upon reaching their respective destinations, these "information packages" exit as computer data, messages, phone calls, signals or pictures.

The success of ISDN centers around the concept of end-to-end connectivity -- something which cannot be achieved without standardized interfaces at both the hardware and software levels. It is not surprising that the task of accomplishing interconnectivity has fallen in large measure to the ITU's CCITT, the international body responsible for studying technical and operating questions relating to telephony and related technology. In preparation for its standard-setting role in ISDN, the CCITT reorganized its study group structure in 1980, giving Study Group XVIII jurisdiction over most ISDN matters. By 1985, further reorganization had oriented most of the CCITT's 18 study groups around ISDN.[61] In so doing, the CCITT has become the paramount organ of the ITU for the developed countries and their telecommunication administrations, manufacturers and suppliers.

Given its vital importance, members from the developed world will make every effort to ensure that the ITU continues to carry out its coordination function efficiently and without disruption. This has been manifest in recent years by a greater willingness on the part of these countries to recognize the concerns of developing nations and the ITU's role in their development. As Renaud explains:

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[60]R. Wigand, "Integrated Services Digital Networks: Concepts, Policies, and Emerging Issues", *Journal of Communication*, 38:1, Winter 1988, p. 23.

[61]A. M. Rutkowski, *Integrated Services Digital Networks*, (Denham, MA: Artech House, 1985), p. 7.

> Developments occurring in this decade [the 1980s] tend to substantiate the contention that, as the industrialized countries rely increasingly upon sophisticated global telecommunication networks, they will accommodate the demands for technical assistance of their less well-endowed counterparts in the Third World, in order to maintain the instrumentality of the ITU.[62]

How far the wealthier nations are willing to go to address development concerns, however, remains uncertain. If the organization's resources continue to be channelled from the consultative committees to furnish increasingly-costly development programs, the industialized countries may conceivably turn to alternative international standard-setting fora.

The International Telecommunication Union today can best be summarized as an organization struggling to accommodate two distinct agendas. On the one hand, the developed world would like to see the ITU continue to operate as a technical coordinating body, where members can meet to solve problems relating to the international operation of telecommunications. On the other hand, the developing nations maintain that the Union must play a greater role in assisting them to develop their domestic telecommunication equipment and networks, thus allowing them to participate more equitably in international communication. While both groups recognize the legitimacy of the other's concerns, disagreement exists over how the ITU's time, expertise and financial resources should be divided to meet these two sets of objectives. Exploring the tension between the two agendas, and how it has been played out within the organization and its programs, will be the task of the following chapters.

Summary

This chapter has provided an introduction to the International Telecommunication Union, describing its distributive, harmonization and

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[62]Renaud, p. 186.

development functions in the realm of international telecommunications. A description of the organizational structures used to carry out these functions was included to illustrate the means through which the Union's members can attempt to influence the agenda of the organization. Finally, the chapter contained an historical overview of the ITU, with particular emphasis on the changing dynamics both within the organization and in its surrounding environment. As the ranks of the developing countries swelled, these nations have worked to reshape the Union's structures and agenda. At the same time, fundamental changes in telecommunications technology and operation have placed new demands on the organization's already-crowded work schedule.

Chapter 3

Development Assistance and the ITU (1952-1982)

Development assistance, an issue so hotly debated at the 1982 Plenipotentiary Conference, was quietly introduced into the ITU's institutional framework exactly thirty years previously. In June 1952, the Administrative Council approved Resolution No. 224, which committed the ITU to the role of "participating organization" in the United Nations Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance (EPTA).[1] Unlike other post-war UN specialized agencies, the ITU's "modern convention" of 1947 did not include any provisions for the administration of development assistance efforts. Instead, from its initially modest commitment, the Union's efforts to fulfill this newest function underwent a series of gradual modifications and expansions, which placed increasing demands on the organization's staff, structure and activities.

This chapter will trace the evolution of the ITU's development assistance program, from the time of its introduction until the 1982 Plenipotentiary Conference. Meetings of the Plenipotentiary Conference provide convenient junctures in the development assistance story, since it is here where the activities of the Union are reviewed and new initiatives are discussed. The majority of the ITU's efforts to assist its less-developed members were coordinated by the General Secretariat based upon the resolutions passed by the Plenipotentiary Conference and the Administrative Council. Analysis of these efforts will therefore comprise the largest part of the chapter. As pressure from developing countries became more intense, however, the Union's other permanent organs were obliged to consider their role in development assistance. The chapter's second section will examine the efforts of the

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[1]G.C. Gross, "Technical Assistance in the International Telecommunication Union", *Telecommunications Journal*, 21:9, September 1954, p. 156.

ITU's most important organs, the International Consultative Committees, in the provision of development assistance.

The Emergence of the ITU's Development Assistance Agenda

When the ITU joined the United Nations Programme of Technical Assistance, the program had already been in operation for several years. Established in 1949 by Economic and Social Council Resolution 222, the EPTA's purpose was to help developing countries "strengthen their national economies through development of their industries and agriculture with a view to promoting their economic and political independence... and to ensure the attainment of higher levels of economic and social welfare for their entire populations".[2] To this end, both Members and non-Members of the United Nations were invited to contribute funds which would then be circulated amongst the UN and its specialized agencies, enabling them to provide technical assistance to "under-developed" countries on the basis of requests received from them.[3] In its first financial period, ending in 1951, 56 governments pledged contributions equivalent to US$ 20,070,260.[4]

Although the International Telecommunication Union was invited to participate in the EPTA in 1949, along with the other specialized agencies of the United Nations, the invitation was not accepted at that time by the General Secretariat. This initial lack of interest in the Expanded Programme can be explained by the fact that the ITU had traditionally defined itself as a *forum* organization rather than a *service* organization. In other words, it was conceived by its members as a framework in which to negotiate aspects of international

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[2]ECOSOC Resolution 222(IX).
[3]The original organizations involved in the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance, along with their allocated percentage of funds, were: United Nations (23%), International Labour Organization (11%), Food and Agriculture Organization (29%), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (14%), the International Civil Aviation Organization (1%), and the World Health Organization (22%).
[4]Gross, p. 150.

telecommunications policy as these impinged on each others' systems. The ITU was not seen as an organization which provided any actual services to its members. This type of initiative was perceived as one which would be best administered by the newly-established "aid-oriented" organizations like Unesco, FAO, and WHO. Therefore, it was not until late in 1950, in response to a request by ITU Secretary-General Leon Mulatier, that an observer from the organization was sent to participate in the meetings of the EPTA's Technical Assistance Board. The following year the matter was raised before a meeting of the ITU's Administrative Council, and at that time instructions were given for the ITU to take a more active part in the Programme.

Once resolutions were passed establishing the ITU as a participating agency of the EPTA in 1952, the Union began to consider the form its "technical assistance" would take. Three main ways were cited whereby the organization could fulfill its commitments to the Expanded Programme:

1. Sending experts to countries with under-developed telecommunication systems in order to make plans for extending or modernizing the telegraph or telephone networks, or to organize the training of local staff engaged in the maintenance or operation of telecommunications equipment;

2. Granting scholarships to telecommunication specialists which would enable them to continue their training in one of the technically advanced countries, so that they could eventually work for the improvement of telecommunications in their own countries;

3. Supplying measuring equipment necessary to experts, or material for demonstration or instruction required in professional training centres.[5]

All three initiatives were designed to facilitate the sharing of technical expertise between developed and developing countries, an assistance function which was compatible with the other aims and objectives of the organization.

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[5]J. Persins, "Some Reflections on Technical Assistance", *Telecommunication Journal*. 23:3, March 1956, p. 51.

Defined in such a manner, "technical assistance" was not seen as a threat to the ITU's operations but rather an extension of its present role as a forum for the exchange of views and information in international telecommunication. If anything, its participation in the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance was seen as a way of maintaining its dominance as *the* international telecommunications forum. As Persins explained,

> Although the term *Technical Assistance* was not used in the ITU until 1951, its beneficent principles were already being applied in generous measure, and it was therefore only natural that the ITU should associate itself with the work which has now assumed so much importance under the title "Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance". In doing this the Union was merely assuming its traditional responsibility in the field of international telecommunications and thus avoiding occasional trespass of other organizations in a field which it jealously guards as its own.[6]

While stressing the positive aspects of the ITU's new undertaking, Persins did recognize that technical assistance was "gradually investing the organization with a new character". Yet, at the same time, he expressed confidence that the ITU's participation in the EPTA would not significantly affect its Convention or structures. This assertion was based on the fact that "political and administrative problems arising out of technical assistance" would be handled by the Technical Assistance Board of the EPTA. This would relieve the ITU of "duties which it is not equipped to handle", allowing it to devote itself exclusively to solving scientific and technical problems.[7] Secondly, the ITU's participation in the EPTA was based on a principle of the sovereign rights of countries, whereby "each government is given the freedom to formulate its technical assistance requirements, without any intervention from the organs of the Union". The organization's role would thus be a passive one, limited to responding to requests for assistance from the under-developed countries.

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[6]Persins, p. 51.
[7]*Ibid.*, p. 53.

One final reason that participation in the EPTA was not seen to pose a threat to the organization's structure and operations was offered by G.C. Gross, a future Secretary-General of the ITU. He argued in 1954 that "because of the budgetary limitations imposed by the (1952) Buenos Aires Conference upon the ordinary budget of the ITU, there is of course no room at all for expansion in this field within the ordinary budget".[8] Since the ITU was contributing none of its own funds to its technical assistance program, the future of the ITU as a forum organization -- as opposed to one providing assistance services -- was assured. It is worth noting that the struggle to exclude development assistance funding from the ordinary budget of the ITU is one that continues to the present day, led by the major industrialized countries which bear the largest portion of the Union's financing. Up until the 1989 Plenipotentiary Conference, these efforts were largely successful.

The 1959 Plenipotentiary Conference in Geneva marked the beginning of the process whereby development assistance moved from an isolated endeavour to an integral part of the ITU's structure and operations. At the Geneva Conference steps were taken which moved the Union toward this end in both word and deed. In the former category, the conference added to the ITU Convention, as one of the seven specific methods by which the ITU could achieve its primary aims and purposes, the duty of "fostering the creation, development and improvement of telecommunication equipment and networks in new or developing countries by every means at its disposal, especially its participation in the appropriate programmes of the United Nations".[9] While this addition did not signal an overnight departure from the Union's traditional program, it was significant in that it represented an acceptance by the membership that the ITU did have some obligation to address the needs of its newer, less-developed members. Securing such a provision in the ITU Convention also indicated that this function was seen as more than simply a temporary measure.

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[8]Gross, p. 159.

[9]Article 4. 2(e), *International Telecommunication Convention, Geneva, 1959*, (Geneva: ITU, 1960).

At the same time, ITU historian George Codding notes that the decision to add a development assistance clause to Article 4 of the Convention "appeared to be more a gift from the Western-dominated majority rather than a victory won by the Third World".[10]

Besides the addition of Article 4 of the Convention, the Plenipotentiary Conference passed several resolutions which brought assistance activities more directly under the control of the Union. Of particular significance was Resolution 27, which authorized the General Secretariat of the ITU to take over the administrative work associated with the Union's involvement with the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance. Under this new arrangement, the organization would no longer be sheltered from the administrative "problems" associated with technical assistance as identified by Persins several years earlier. Instead, for the first time in its history, the ITU was formally taking on some of the qualities of a service organization. None of the costs of administering its assistance programme were derived from the ITU's ordinary budget but according to Resolution 28, these costs would now be shown in the regular budget along with compensatory payments from the Expanded Programme.[11] At the time, this adjustment seemed justified in the interests of more efficient accounting. Several decades later, however, these compensatory payments would not always be sufficient to cover the ITU's administrative costs and funds would sometimes have to be allocated from the regular budget, much to the annoyance of the developed countries.

Finally, Resolution 29 provided for the participation of the ITU in the newly-created United Nations Special Fund for Economic Development. Created in 1958, the Special Fund was designed to complement the short-term advisory assistance

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[10]George A. Codding, "The New Nations and the International Telecommunication Union: Some Policy Implications for the Future", in *Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Telecommunications Policy Research Conference*, H.S. Dordick, ed., (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1978), p. 362.

[11]Compensatory payments would cover the costs of assistance projects (expert missions, fellowships, training, etc.), plus an additional 13% to cover "overhead" or administrative costs.

provided by the EPTA with longer term institution-building projects.[12] Although the scope and time frame for Special Fund projects was different, the ITU's advisory role remained much the same. The organization conducted pre-investment surveys, designed pilot projects to solve specific technical problems and established permanent telecommunications training institutions in developing countries.

The early sixties saw a marked increase in the importance placed on development assistance by the ITU. This was due to the sudden leap in membership it experienced between 1960 and 1965, during which time 33 countries joined the Union. Many of these newly-independent nations promptly made requests for assistance in modernizing their telecommunications facilities, all of which were handled by the Union's newly-created Technical Cooperation Department (TCD). Formed as a result of Resolution 27 of the 1959 Plenipotentiary Conference, the TCD now handled all the administrative and financial aspects of the work in connection with the Union's participation in the Expanded Programme and the Special Fund. This included examining requests from countries, selecting experts for field missions, organizing the placement of fellows and procuring the necessary support equipment for the different projects.[13] The TCD was placed within the organizational structure of the General Secretariat and thus came under the direction of the Secretary-General. No sooner had the Department been established than the scale of its activities rose dramatically. The Union's participation in the EPTA rose from US$ 324,500 a year in 1960 to US$ 1.2 million annually in 1964.[14] Correspondingly the number of countries receiving assistance rose from 22 to 60.

The early sixties also witnessed a rise in the prominence of the Secretary-General in the administration of development assistance. In 1960, for example,

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[12] *Report of the Administrative Council to the Plenipotentiary Conference, Montreux, 1965*, (ITU Geneva, 1965), p. 112.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 76.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 17.

Secretary-General Gerald Gross undertook to explore various means by which technical assistance in kind could be rendered under the aegis of the Union without such services being supported by the budget. As a result of the Secretary-General's inquiries, 20 countries indicated their willingness to accept trainees in technical institutes the following year, and the first seminar in the history of the Union was organized by the Administration of Japan under this scheme.[15]

Closer contact was also initiated between the General Secretariat and various field missions and Member administrations. In 1962, a total of nineteen countries were visited by the Secretary-General or members of his TCD staff, in an effort to help government officials to understand the procedures of the different programmes and the possibilities of obtaining help through them.[16] Along with his other duties, the Secretary-General was now acquiring the role of "director of development assistance". This role was not easily neglected since developing countries now held a voting majority within the organization and could use this to "assess" the performance of the Secretary-General at the following Plenipotentiary Conference. The new influence of the developing countries and their insistence that the position of Secretary-General reflect their concerns was clearly illustrated at the 1965 Plenipotentiary Conference, when retiring Gerald Gross of the U.S.A. was succeeded by Manohar Balaji Sarwate of India.[17] Following Mr. Sarwate's untimely death the following year, the position of Secretary-General went to Mohamed Mili of Tunisia.

Also at the 1965 Montreux Plenipotentiary Conference, efforts were made by the developing nations to further expand development assistance activities. While a resolution calling for the creation of the ITU's own Special Fund to respond to urgent requests for assistance was defeated, the Plenipotentiary did pass a resolution

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[15]Administrative Council, *Report on the Activities of the International Telecommunication Union, 1961*, (ITU: Geneva, 1962), p. 33.

[16]*Report on the Activities of the International Telecommunication Union, 1962*, p. 37.

[17]George Codding and A.M. Rutkowski, *The International Telecommunication Union in a Changing World*, (Denham, MA: Artech House, 1982), p. 166.

calling for the recruitment of four telecommunication specialist engineers. Their job would be to "advise quickly and constructively on practical questions" posed by Member administrations whether directly or through the International Consultative Committees.[18] These four resident experts, known as the Group of Engineers, came on staff in 1968 as a division of the Technical Cooperation Department. Although their appointment represented a continuation in the ITU's defined assistance role -- that of offering technical expertise and advice -- it was a departure from the policy of not funding development assistance from the ITU's own budget. Unlike its participation in the United Nations assistance programmes and its various "in kind" initiatives, the costs of the Group of Engineers' services would be drawn from the annual budget.

The addition of the Group of Engineers was not the only change to take place within the Technical Cooperation Department. In 1967 and again in 1969, its staff was augmented and its operational structure reorganized. A Training Division was created to study the standardization of telecommunication training methods worldwide. Its activities included the organization of seminars on teaching aids and equipment and a comparative study of more than 700 manuals issued by various telecommunication training institutions in developing countries, with a view to a possible standardization.[19] The TCD's Expanded Programme Division and Special Fund Division were also reorganized to produce three regional divisions, one for Africa, one for the Americas and one for Europe and Asia.

Changes within the Technical Cooperation Department were undertaken in response to changes within the United Nations two development programmes. In 1966, the General Assembly of the United Nations decided to consolidate the two

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[18]Resolution 29, *International Telecommunication Convention, Montreux, 1965*, (ITU: Geneva, 1966).

[19]Administrative Council, *Report of the Administrative Council to the Plenipotentiary Conference, Malaga-Torremolinos, 1973*, (ITU: Geneva, 1973), p. 5/14.

programmes into the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). After the merger, the UNDP was still divided into two sectors, entitled the Technical Assistance Component and the Special Fund Component, until the introduction of new "country programming" procedures in 1972 brought about their full amalgamation.[20] Under these new procedures, UNDP regional representatives would work with government planning authorities in each developing nation to produce a UNDP Country Programme. This document would include a broad identification of the needs which arose out of the country's objectives in particular sectors, within the framework of the country's overall development objectives; a precise indication of inputs (both internal and external) available to meet these needs; and a preliminary list of projects to be subsequently worked out for financing by the UNDP over the following 3 to 5 years.

As the UNDP's procedures evolved, so did the ITU's administration of development assistance. During the early years of the Union's involvement, it had adopted a rather random "project-by-project" approach based on requests received from developing countries. By the 1970s, this was being replaced by a more coordinated "programme" approach within the telecommunications sector, assisted at the regional level by ITU advisors. Financed through the UNDP, these regional advisors helped recipient governments in planning their requests for aid in the telecommunications sphere on the basis of longer-term development plans.[21] The focus of the ITU's training efforts also shifted. Earlier initiatives had been directed at the senior echelons of the administrations of developing countries, advising them on general telecommunications development and awarding them fellowships. By the late sixties, however, after recognizing a very serious lack of technical expertise within

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[20] "ITU's technical assistance to new and developing countries under the UNDP and other related aid programmes", *Telecommunication Journal*, 40:8, August 1973, p. 455.

[21] *Report of the Administrative Council to the Plenipotentiary Conference, Malaga-Torremolinos, 1973*, p. 5/7.

the middle levels of the Administrations, the emphasis began to shift progressively toward the training of middle-level technicians and engineers.[22]

Finally, the ITU began to collaborate with a number of other agencies in the implementation of assistance projects. For example, in 1968 the Union worked with the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to prepare a pre-investment study concerning the telecommunications network in Latin America. During 1970-71, it participated in a feasibility study for a regional satellite television system in South America headed by Unesco, and collaborated with the Universal Postal Union (UPU) in the establishment and running of training centres in Afghanistan, Cameroon and Malawi.[23] Through such initiatives, the ITU's development assistance programme was not only displaying greater internal coordination and planning, but was also becoming more closely integrated with the development efforts of the overall community of international organizations.

Administering assistance was not without its problems, however, even after the above rationalizations. The most persistent difficulty faced by the Union was finding qualified candidates for expert missions to developing countries. A number of reasons were cited for this continuing shortage of personnel, including a genuine scarcity of expertise in new sophisticated fields, language requirements (French and Spanish) and difficult environmental conditions at some posts.[24] Perhaps the most significant factor, however, was the fact that the ITU found itself competing for staff with bilateral aid programmes independently operated by member countries. Often telecommunications administrations from the developed countries would make initial commitments to their own country's foreign aid initiatives and were thus unable to release additional personnel for multilateral efforts like the ITU/UNDP programme. Furthermore, bilateral programmes were often more attractive to expert personnel

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[22] *Report on the Activities of the International Telecommunication Union, 1966*, p. 39.
[23] *Report on the Activities of the International Telecommunication Union, 1972*, p. 54.
[24] *Report on the Activities of the International Telecommunication Union, 1971*, p. 57.

since they included incentives with regard to leave, allowances for difficult duty stations, and housing and schooling facilities for experts' children.[25] The ITU/UNDP system was unable to offer many of these incentives.

This predicament is particularly noteworthy because it points to an underlying struggle between bilateral and multilateral initiatives in international development. Essentially, the commitment of financial and human resources to one means of assistance may reduce the ability of a country to offer aid through the other means. Often a decision is made by a particular government to favour one form of development assistance over the other, based on its assessment of which method is more effective in meeting the needs of developing countries, as well as its own foreign policy objectives. If a decision is made in favour of bilateralism, multilateral efforts like the ITU/UNDP programme may find it difficult to secure necessary staff and financial backing. The ITU would face this same dilemma a decade later, when attempting to launch the Centre for Telecommunications Development.

Even if qualified experts could be found to undertake field missions for the ITU/UNDP programme, it was often difficult to find suitable counterpart staff from the recipient country. Either national telecommunications employees did not exist in sufficient numbers, or they did not have the appropriate qualifications to work with the international experts.[26] This lack of basic qualifications also hampered the work of newly-established telecommunication training institutions. Candidates often had to be given preparatory courses in languages or elementary science and mathematics before regular telecommunications instruction could begin.

Not all problems stemmed from difficulties in the field. Due to the heavy workload on the TCD staff at the Union's headquarters, inadequate support and

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[25] *Ibid.*, p. 57.
[26] *Report on the Activities of the International Telecommunication Union, 1966*, p. 41.

supervision of field operations was identified as a problem in the early seventies.[27] This same shortage of staff sometimes meant that requests for assistance were not fully processed in time for programme deadlines. Also, for the first time in 1971, the Union was unable to find a sufficient number of positions in host countries for all the fellows it proposed.[28] Consequently, a number of fellowships had to be carried forward to subsequent years for implementation.

Reacting to these problems and buoyed by their ever-increasing voting strength within the organization, the 1973 Plenipotentiary Conference marked the beginning of a much more insistent and coordinated effort by the developing nations to ensure that their development needs were addressed. To this end, a myriad of innovative proposals were put forward to restructure the ITU's development assistance activities.[29] One would have created a new Deputy Secretary-General for Technical Cooperation, while another proposed a new International Consultative Committee for development assistance matters. A third advocated the decentralization of technical assistance efforts, establishing instead a number of regional ITU offices to help local administrators with their telecommunications development problems.[30] For many reasons, but mainly due to the additional costs they would entail, none of these proposals were adopted.

One proposal that was successfully adopted was a Resolution for the creation of an ITU Special Fund for Technical Cooperation to give assistance to developing countries who made urgent requests for ITU help in solving telecommunications problems. This was essentially the same proposal that had been defeated at Montreux eight years earlier. Although the creation of a Fund represented a victory

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[27] *Report on the Activities of the International Telecommunication Union, 1971*, p. 57.
[28] *Ibid.*, p. 53.
[29] G.A. Codding, *The 1982 ITU Plenipotentiary Conference: A Pre-Conference Briefing Paper*. (London: International Institute of Communication, 1982), p. xvi.
[30] This proposal was given initial approval in committee, but was later defeated by a vote of 47 to 42 in a secret plenary meeting vote.

for the developing nations, opposition by both Western and Soviet bloc countries managed to defeat a proposal that it be financed from the ITU regular budget. The developed countries argued that within the UN system, the administration and funding of development assistance was the responsibility of other agencies, notably the United Nations Development Programme. On the basis of these objections, it was agreed that the Fund be financed by members' voluntary contributions. The Secretary-General was charged with its promotion and administration. Even this compromise was insufficient for the American delegation, however, which announced that it would not contribute to the new fund.[31]

While the developed countries were successful in keeping the Special Fund outside of the ITU's regular budget, they were unable to stem further incursions in another area. To assist the Group of Engineers, established within the Technical Cooperation Department at the previous Plenipotentiary Conference, Resolution 17 allowed for the additional recruitment of specialists, as needed, for periods not exceeding six months. These short-term specialists would be supported by the inclusion in the annual budget of a "global amount" to cover the costs of their services.

A number of other assistance-related resolutions were passed at the 1973 Plenipotentiary Conference, many of which provided additional tasks for the Secretary General in this field. The Secretary General was instructed to make a study of the staff required to administer the Union's technical cooperation activities (Resolution 17); review the state of telecommunication services in the least developed countries and propose concrete measures for its improvement (Resolution 19); collect information and make recommendations regarding the training of technical and operational personnel (Resolution 23); and coordinate the organization of seminars of

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[31]G.A. Codding, "The United States and the ITU in a Changing World", *Telecommunication Journal*, 44:5, May 1977, p. 233.

interest to the developing countries (Resolution 25). With the addition of these new duties, the Secretary General's sphere of influence over the Union's assistance programs continued to widen.

Besides the development assistance resolutions which the developing members were able to vote into the Convention, a motion was passed that increased the size of the ITU's Administrative Council. Since representation on the Council was regionally proportional, the developing countries were assured of a stronger voice in the yearly administration of the Union's affairs. The ITU's voluntary contribution system was also challenged by some Latin American and African countries who wished to see it replaced by the United Nations scale of contribution based on a country's GNP. Under this system, the United States would be the largest contributor, supplying almost 25% of the ITU's annual budget.[32] Needless to say, the proposal received strong opposition from the major industrialized countries and it was defeated in a committee vote.

The 1973 Plenipotentiary was significant because it established categorically that, in the words of ITU historian George Codding, "the good old days of Western Domination of the ITU have ended" [33] This shift in the influence structure of the organization can be better understood in the context of wider geo-political challenges to the traditional order of international relations occurring at this same time. As the military pressures of the Cold War subsided and the political decolonization process ran its course, North-South issues came to dominate the agendas of many international organizations. Between 1970 and 1973, the non-aligned movement had evolved into a prominent pressure group for the re-organization of the international economic system.[34] The political influence of the Non-Aligned Countries, coupled with an oil embargo which had transformed OPEC into a powerful instrument for

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[32]Codding and Rutkowski, p. 193.
[33]*Ibid.*, p. 233.
[34]Karl Sauvant, *The Group of 77*, (New York: Oceana Publications, 1981), p. 5.

certain Arab states, served to notify the industrialized nations that "the good old days" of unchallenged Western domination were numbered in any international forum.

In the years following the Plenipotentiary Conference, the ITU's development assistance activities continued to expand. In 1975, the Union's total expenditure for project implementation amounted to US$ 18,837,775. This figure represented a 48.5% increase over the previous year, the largest single jump in the organization's history. While the majority of these funds were provided through the UNDP, approximately 250,000 Swiss francs from the ITU's ordinary budget was used to employ 17 outside specialists for short-term missions. The Training Division of the Technical Cooperation Department also undertook a new three-year project on course development in telecommunications (CONDEVTEL), designed to produce standardized core material and train instructors from developing countries.

Since allotment of Union funds for the above activities had been established by majority vote at the Plenipotentiary Conference, the developed countries could offer little resistance to their implementation. The ITU Special Fund for Technical Cooperation, however, was based on voluntary contributions and more readily illustrated their reluctance to establish multiple aid mechanisms within the ITU structure. By 1975, the liquid assets of the Fund totalled only 49,649 Swiss francs, with Barbados and Iraq the sole cash contributors.[35] In the next few years, modest donations of funds were received from the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries as well as emergency equipment from Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany. In the final analysis, however, the Administrative Council admitted that "the Special Fund for Technical Cooperation has received limited contributions,

[35] *Report on the Activities of the ITU, 1975*, p. 77.

insufficient to render any important 'effective assistance' to the Least Developed Countries".[36]

At the end of 1975, the long, continual expansion of the UNDP came to an abrupt end. Inflation had resulted in considerable price increases for expert services, fellowships, equipment and sub-contracting, leaving the Programme with a serious liquidity problem. It became evident that the UNDP had to establish budgetary ceilings for its 1976 programme delivery in order to complete the last year of its first Programming Cycle within the limits of available resources. In consultation with the Union and the other executing agencies, the UNDP began to elaborate proposals for cutbacks to be operated on a project-by-project basis. The governments of developing countries were requested to decide on priorities and the curtailment of whole projects, with the assistance of the UNDP's Regional Representatives. In 1976, the overall funding available to the UNDP fell by 14%, resulting in a 16% drop in the number of expert missions and fellowships undertaken by the ITU.[37] No activity could be carried out on thirty-one of the 236 projects being undertaken by the Union.

Not only was assistance to individual nations curtailed, but the regional efforts of the ITU also suffered losses. UNDP funding for eight ITU Regional advisors in 1976 was reduced to the level of one advisor the following year.[38] The termination of these positions represented a considerable loss of expertise at the field level and the problem of maintaining the Union's sectorial support became a matter of great concern within the Administrative Council. As a result, the Council established an Operational Fund to which various "miscellaneous incomes" were

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[36]Administrative Council, *Review of the State of Telecommunication Services in the Least Developed Countries and Concrete Measures for Telecommunications Development*, Document 48, Plenipotentiary Conference, Nairobi, 1982, p. 67.

[37]Administrative Council, *Implementation of Resolutions, etc., Relating to the Technical Cooperation Activities of the Union*, Document 46, Plenipotentiary Conference, Nairobi, 1982, p. 8.

[38]*Ibid.*, p. 9.

credited.[39] Out of this Fund, and following promises made by the UNDP of future support payments, the Secretary-General appointed two regional experts to be located in Brasilia and Bangkok.

The financial situation of the UNDP began to improve in 1978 and by the following year, the number of expert hours spent on field missions returned to its pre-crisis level. While quantitatively, efforts had returned to normal, the late seventies and early eighties were characterized by a more cautious form of development assistance. UNDP financing of development projects was returned to a year-by-year planning approach, often making it difficult to forecast the expertise likely to be requested in the future. This was compounded by the trend toward shorter term assignments (under 3 months) which rose from 20% of new appointees in 1973 to 80% by 1981. Telecommunications administrations were not as willing to release their employees for long periods of time, as their services in new and sophisticated technological fields were required in their own countries.

In the years prior to the 1982 Plenipotentiary Conference, the costs of administering development assistance continued to climb. An economic recession coupled with high inflation meant that more funds were needed to maintain the operations of the Technical Cooperation Department. At the same time, however, the amount of money received from the UNDP in the form of compensatory payments or "support costs" for the Union's participation in development projects declined. Following a decision of the Governing Council of the UNDP, support costs paid to the ITU dropped from 14 to 13 per cent of project costs. At the same time, fluctuations in the exchange rate between the franc and the dollar forced the value of payments even lower.[40] As a result, a greater portion of the TCD's operating costs had to be supported from the Union's own budget. The industrialized countries in

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[39] *Report on the Activities of the Union, 1977*, p. 81.

[40] Administrative Council, *The Future of ITU Technical Cooperation Activities*, Document 47, Plenipotentiary Conference, Nairobi, 1982, p. 70.

particular were alarmed by this situation and began to question whether or not the Technical Cooperation Department was being run efficiently. To address this concern, a 1981 Council resolution was passed instructing the Secretary-General to "review the organization and methods of the Technical Cooperation Department to ensure that the support costs incurred in carrying out the UNDP programmes are kept to a minimum".[41]

While the major industrialized nations questioned whether the costs of development assistance were too high, the developing countries continued to place greater demands on the Union's existing resources. In 1982, forty-two requests for short-term assistance were received by the Group of Engineers. Of these, eighteen requests could not be met due to a shortage of staff and funds and were postponed to the following year.[42] Such delays only served to feed a simmering dissatisfaction among the developing nations that the available human and financial resources of the ITU were not sufficient to meet their development requirements. This dissatisfaction, contrasted with the objections of the technologically-advanced nations, ensured that development assistance would be the major issue at the ITU's 1982 Plenipotentiary Conference in Nairobi, Kenya.

The Role of the CCIs in Development Assistance

From the outset, it was established that the main thrust of the ITU's development assistance initiatives would be managed by the General Secretariat. This decision seemed logical, since it was this organ that handled the Union's relations with other United Nations organizations, and thus was best suited to provide a liaison with the Expanded Programme for Technical Assistance. Over the years the centrality of the General Secretariat's role was reinforced, both through the

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[41] *Report on the Activities of the ITU, 1981*, p. 8.
[42] *Report on the Activities of the ITU, 1982*, p. 153.

establishment of a dedicated department to administer the Union's assistance activities and the assignment of further responsibilities to its executive head, the Secretary-General.

Despite this arrangement, efforts to assist the newly-admitted Members of the Union were not completely restricted to the General Secretariat. At the urging of the Administrative Council, the other permanent organs of the ITU began to consider what their role would be in accomplishing this task. It was expected that the International Frequency Registration Board (IFRB) would continue to offer advice to member countries in planning suitable frequencies for their radio services, a function which it already performed in a limited fashion.

More significant changes, however, would be needed within the International Consultative Committees (CCIs). These organs had traditionally dealt with technical problems and standards pertaining to the telecommunications technology being used in the industrialized countries. The arrival of newly-independent countries meant that the CCIs membership did not all share a comparable level of technological development, and thus threatened to introduce an entirely different set of concerns into the Committees' agendas of business.

As far back as 1956, the CCIs had taken small steps to address the challenge of the developing countries. In accordance with Administrative Council Resolution 346, the VIIIth Plenary Assembly of the CCITT entrusted a temporary joint CCIR-CCITT committee with the task of preparing specific recommendations concerning the CCIs role in the field of technical assistance.[43] The Committee's report, submitted to the Administrative Council in May of 1957, presented a number of possible options including expert study of telecommunications projects, consultation regarding plans for the development of telecommunications systems and the

[43]R. Chapuis, "The Role of an International Telecommunication Consultative Committee in Technical Assistance", *Telecommunication Journal*, 24:2, February 1957, p. 32.

organization of a "more extensive information service" on the work carried out by the CCIs.[44]

Just as the ITU's participation in the EPTA had not been met with an initial negative reaction, the introduction of a technical assistance function of the CCIs was not seen to pose a threat to their other activities. If anything, the contemplation of this new mandate was seen as a natural extension of the CCIs' work. As one French participant in the CCITT explained,

> If it is agreed that the CCIs are the depositories of the technical experience of the ITU, then questions of Technical Assistance cannot be separated from the part played by the CCIs. It is in fact the normal function and even the very *raison d'être* of the CCIs to give technical advice; in other words, to give technical assistance.[45]

By equating "assistance" with "advice", this new area of responsibility appeared to be one which would fit into the CCIs' agenda with minimal disruption.

At the 1959 Plenipotentiary Conference, the Consultative Committees' role in development assistance was officially defined in the ITU Convention. Under the terms of Article 13, both the CCIR and CCITT were required to "pay due attention to the study of questions and to the formulation of recommendations directly connected with the establishment, development and the improvement of telecommunications in new and developing countries".[46] The Conference also approved Recommendation No. 2 which encouraged the CCIs to consider the possibility of "setting up sub-groups in the appropriate study groups to be specially responsible for studying problems of particular interest to new or developing countries".

The first opportunity to consider how these provisions could be given some practical shape came the following year at the CCITT's Second Plenary Assembly in

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[44] *Ibid.*, p. 36.
[45] Chapuis, p. 36.
[46] Article 13, 1(3), *International Telecommunication Convention, Geneva, 1959.*

New Delhi. This was the first Plenary Conference of a Consultative Committee to be held outside Europe, and a number of developing countries attended and posed questions relating to their domestic telecommunication systems. One area of concern related to the design of automatic telephone networks and, on the basis of this interest, the Plenary decided to establish a Working Party to study the issue.[47] Chaired by an expert of the Australian Post Office, the Working Party examined questions relating to national network planning and the choice and supply of switching equipment. It eventually produced a manual based on its findings in 1965.

The Working Party experiment was judged favourably by the parties involved in it. It was felt that the developing countries had gained working experience within the Consultative Committees and received a useful manual that could be employed by their telecommunications administrations. Their counterparts from the developed world were encouraged by the fact that the concerns of the developing countries could be adequately addressed when separated from the regular study group's line of work, thus posing no threat to their own agenda.

Buoyed by this success, the 1964 CCITT Plenary Assembly approved the creation of five Specialized Autonomous Working Parties, known by their French acronym as GAS. Each would study a particular set of problems relating to telecommunications in developing countries and would be staffed by CCITT members.[48] Three of the groups would also draw upon the expertise and resources of the CCIR. The eventual goal of the working parties was to produce manuals which presented the findings of their study in a clear, didactic manner. It was hoped that

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[47]G.D. Wallenstein, "Global Scope at the National Level: The ITU's Contribution to Telecommunications Development", *IEEE Transactions on Communications*, 24:7, July 1976, p. 705.
[48]The five GAS groups were given the following titles: GAS 1, *National Telephone Networks for the Automatic Service*; GAS 2, *Local Telephone Networks*; GAS 3, *Economic and Technical Aspects of the Choice of Transmission Systems*; GAS 4, *Primary Sources of Energy*; and GAS 5, *Economic Studies at the National Level in the Field of Telecommunications.*

these handbooks could then serve as basic texts and reference material for telecommunication administrations in developing countries.

While the GAS groups represented a new initiative for the Consultative Committees, they remained within the ITU's overall conceptualization of its development assistance role, namely, the dissemination of technical knowledge and the sharing of expertise. At the same time, how the CCIs would achieve this end would differ from the General Secretariat's role. While the Secretariat was involved in despatching experts on field missions and the placement of trainees, the CCIs contribution was limited to the publication of technical information. According to Secretary-General Mohammed Mili, this constituted "an essential distinction between advice and operational activity" that would insure that there was no duplication of efforts between the permanent organs of the ITU.[49]

As the various GAS groups commenced their activities, they faced a number of challenges. It soon became apparent that the work of the groups had the potential of crossing the fine line between advice and advocacy in their discussions of telecommunications products and services. As one observer described,

> [The GAS handbooks'] purpose is to furnish information of fundamental importance which, without referring by name to any particular technical product or solution, can serve as general guidelines to enable administrations to solve their own technical problems. Some of the GAS had to steer a very careful course in order to avoid certain pitfalls. GAS 1, for instance, while picking its way through an immense variety of switching systems, often very different in type and the subject of very close competition, had to avoid laying itself open to any criticism which might have shed doubt on the impartiality of its work.[50]

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[49]M. Mili, "The Institutional Framework of Technical Co-operation in the ITU", *Telecommunication Journal*, 46:8, August 1979, p. 468.

[50]R. Chapuis, "The Dissemination of Technical Information by the ITU as a Form of Technical Co-operation: The Work of the CCITT Special Autonomous Working Parties (GAS)", *Telecommunication Journal*, 39:6, June 1972, p. 375.

Obviously, questions concerning the objectivity of the analysis would greatly diminish the credibility of both the handbooks and the working parties that produced them.

Between 1968 and 1970, manuals were published by each of the GAS groups. Following this accomplishment, GAS 1, 2 and 4 were rendered inactive. The group studying *Economic and Technical Aspects of the Choice of Transmission Systems* (GAS 3) and the one conducting *Economic Studies at the National Level in the Field of Telecommunications* (GAS 5) remained intact and were scheduled to produce subsequent manuals. In the case of GAS 5, work had been slow and difficult, since exploring the link between telecommunication and the national economy represented a totally new field of analysis. As the Chairman of this working party put it, "GAS 5 has found itself in uncharted territory on several occasions".[51]

Despite the considerable efforts of the GAS groups, the manuals they produced met with a disappointing reception. A CCITT official admitted that "the sales figures for the GAS handbooks are much smaller than had been expected".[52] He went on to say that "one of the main targets of the handbooks, the students at schools for telecommunication engineers or technicians, does not appear to be reached". Although the several-hundred page manuals were reasonably inexpensive (averaging 30 Swiss francs per copy), cost might have been a factor in their poor circulation. More significantly, however, the GAS manuals assumed experience and technical knowledge that was generally absent in the Third World countries. This was the result of a distinct lack of communication during the GAS exercise between those experiencing the technical problem and those charged with solving it.

The "problems" which formed the basis of the GAS groups' agenda had originated as questions posed by delegates from the telecommunications

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[51]G.E. Garbe, "3rd meeting of CCITT Special Autonomous Working Party 5", *Telecommunication Journal*, 35:4, April 1968, p. 144.
[52]Chapuis, "The Dissemination of Technical Information by the ITU", p. 375.

administrations of developing countries at CCITT and CCIR Plenary Assemblies. Unfortunately, this initial formulation of the problem was not followed up with ongoing dialogue between problem-posers and problem-solvers. As Wallenstein points out:

> For the study of tutorial needs and applications peculiar to developing countries, detailed definition of the problem and its interpretation should be shared by the people experiencing the problem. In practise, experts from advance countries must rely on their personal experience and empathy in assimilating the developing countries' viewpoint. As a result of this lack of participative dialogue, the (GAS) handbooks represent the best judgement available to the group of dedicated volunteers from advanced countries.[53]

No matter how intuitive the 'best judgement' of the groups was, the effectiveness of the GAS manuals was ultimately compromised by this lack of communication.

A number of reasons can be cited for the lack of participation by developing countries in the work of the GAS groups and, more generally, in that of the CCIs study group system. First, many of these countries lacked the finances needed to send delegates to the study group meetings. Not only were there a great number of these to attend, they were usually held at ITU headquarters in Geneva. Secondly, due to the often chronic shortage of telecommunications personnel in the developing countries, qualified people could not always be spared to regularly participate in the activities of the two Committees. Finally, the developing countries often felt that they lacked the expertise to participate effectively at the highly technical level of the study groups. Despite pleas for attendance by some Third World delegates who claimed that attending meetings at least made it possible to have a better "feel" of the issues, participation by developing countries remained low.[54]

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[53]G.D. Wallenstein, "Handbooks of the Consultative Committees: Bridges between International Standardization and National Telecommunication Development", *Telecommunication Journal*, 43:10, October 1976, p. 637.

[54]see J. Mesquita, "Developing Countries and the Work of the International Consultative Committees", *Telecommunication Journal*, 40:3, March 1973, p. 151.

Not all of GAS's problems concerned the developing countries. Similar to the experiences of the General Secretariat, the CCITT and CCIR also faced difficulties in recruiting experts from the advanced nations who would undertake to answer the questions posed by developing countries at Plenary Assemblies. In some cases, since no qualified individuals volunteered, certain problems could not be addressed. For example, while the question of automatic telephone networks led to the creation of a Working Party and eventually to GAS 1, a request for comprehensive information on the planning of open-wire lines remained on the CCITT Transmission Systems Study Group agenda for over eight years, without resulting in a publication.[55] One of the major obstacles to finding suitable staff was that open-wire systems had rapidly decreased in importance since 1960 in the developed nations. While it was relatively easy to solicit information concerning current telecommunications technology, it was more difficult to find people to write about "out-dated" systems.

This dilemma -- one which would slow the work of future GAS groups -- illustrates a fundamental incongruity in the development assistance efforts of the Consultative Committees. The study groups of the CCIs were and are made up of highly-qualified experts drawn from public telecommunications administrations and private telecommunications companies. Whether from the public or private sector, their time is volunteered on the study groups because it is deemed necessary for the good of their respective organizations' own conduct of operations. To be knowledgeable about future message handling services, for example, and to have a hand in establishing operating standards for them may represent enormous commercial benefits for the domestic telecommunications industry in an advanced nation. At the same time, study group efforts to enlighten developing countries about the technology and services available to them through the developed world may also be justified in the interests of boosting telecommunications exports to these

[55]Wallenstein, "Global Scope at the National Level", p. 705.

countries. However, when it comes to study-group work of a purely tutorial nature aimed at helping developing countries better utilize their existing telecommunications technology, the spirit of altruistic international cooperation may not prove sufficient to secure the release of qualified personnel for an extended period of time.

Besides the question of allocating their human resources to development assistance efforts, CCI members from developed countries also had certain reservations concerning the disclosure of technical information. As a CCITT expert explains,

> Time spent on tutorial questions may not necessarily seem equally justified as seen by an organization that can provide the answers. Such questions seek information in more detail than an industrially developed organization is used to making public. Too much published detail can become an impediment to change. On a new system, when does field experience justify a finalization of specifications and practises? As a consequence, work on developing countries' tutorial-type questions can go principally against the grain of the industrially strong organizations.[56]

Particularly to the private telecommunications operating companies, technical information represented a valuable commodity which, in a highly competitive environment, they were not accustomed to giving away. Furthermore, the production of "definitive" texts on technologies that were considered dated by Western standards might only serve to slow the acquisition of new equipment from these companies.

Despite these seeming cross-purposes, the development assistance efforts of the CCIs continued to expand during the 1980s as pressure from the developing countries mounted. New GAS groups were set up in an attempt to respond better to the needs of developing countries. Among these were GAS 7, which focused on rural telecommunications, and GAS 10 that attempted to provide guidance to developing

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[56]Wallenstein, "Handbooks of the Consultative Committees", p. 637.

countries on forecasting methods for long-term planning of both voice and non-voice services.[57]

At the CCITT's Plenary Assembly in 1985, Committee D (CCITT Technical Assistance) was created to "advise the Plenary Assembly on measures to be adopted by the CCITT in the area of technical assistance to developing countries". In addition, the CCITT agreed to assist the ITU Technical Cooperation Department by "considering the possibility of using the services of the CCITT Secretariat for the purpose of short-term technical assistance missions".[58] For the first time, the CCITT was contemplating the addition of a *service* function to its role as a standard-setting forum.

Although these efforts would indicate a greater attempt to incorporate less-developed nations in the work of the CCIs, the 1980s actually saw the further alienation of these countries from the Committees' study group process. The main reason for this was the accelerated pace of change in telecommunications technologies which precipitated a whole series of new "questions" for the study groups to address. Among the technical issues facing the CCITT during the 1981-1984 study period were standards for telematic services and terminals, data networks, message handling services, digital switching and transmission techniques, mobile services, and optical fibres.[59] None of these technologies were in widespread use in the developing countries.

No other technological question, however, occupied more of the CCITT's resources than ISDN. At its 1980 Plenary Assembly, the CCITT completely revamped its study group structure and agenda around the Integrated Services

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[57]"VIIIth CCITT Plenary Assembly (Part 2)", *Telecommunication Journal*, 52:3, March 1985, p. 135.
[58]*Ibid.*, p. 134-135.
[59]*Ibid.*, p. 137.

Digital Network concept, with its Study Group XVIII to play a lead role.[60] Furthermore, recognizing the tremendous technological changes that would impact the world's information networks, the assembly formally recommended that the Committee's jurisdiction be expanded to encompass all aspects of telecommunications except for radiocommunication. With its expanded agenda, the CCITT became the paramount organ of the ITU during the following decade, engaging in the most critical and greatest volume of work for the industrialized countries.

As study groups raced to develop standards for the latest digital information systems, less of the CCIs' resources could be spared to address the telecommunication problems of the developing countries. While the developing nations were still encouraged to attend, consideration of the highly sophisticated and expensive technologies of the industrialized countries brought few practical benefits. This only served to increase the gulf between the "information rich" and the "information poor" within the Consultative Committees.

To further exacerbate this situation, the CCITT and the CCIR began adopting an emergency procedure known as the "provisional recommendation" in an attempt to keep pace with the changes in telecommunications technology. Since some technical advances demanded solutions that could not wait for the next plenary assembly to be adopted formally, a provisional recommendation would enter into force immediately if it received the unanimous approval of the administrations and private operating agencies represented at the study group meeting.[61]

While easing the workload of the plenary assembly, this new procedure further relegated less-developed countries to a powerless position within the CCIs. Due to the size of their telecommunication administrations and the travel costs

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[60]A. Rutkowski, *Integrated Services Digital Networks*, (Dedham, Mass: Artech House, 1986), p. 6.
[61]M. Mili, "International Jurisdiction in Telecommunication Affairs", *Telecommunication Journal*, 40:12, December 1973, p. 746.

involved, many developing countries limited their attendance at CCI meetings to the plenary assemblies. Within this forum they would have a better opportunity to influence the activities of the CCIs through their voting majority. Yet, at the same time, their input regarding the international telecommunications network was limited by the fact that many of the CCIs recommendations had already been adopted into use by the time the plenary assembly took place.

Despite the ongoing difficulties experienced by the developing countries in accessing the work of the Consultative Committees, recent developments within the ITU would suggest that there may be some room for optimism. The recent Report of the High Level Committee established to review the structure and operations of the ITU contains a number of recommendations aimed at increasing developing country participation in the Union's standardization activities. These included grouping together issues for study which may be of particular interest to developing countries, funding developing country participation in Study Groups through the newly-established Telecommunication Development Bureau, and providing explanatory notes with new Recommendations.[62] Pressures to regionalize much of the ITU's workload may also improve opportunities for participation. African nations, for example, would no doubt be able to attend more Study Group Meetings if these were held in Nairobi instead of Geneva. Regionalization will also work to strengthen the voice of middle powers such as India and South Korea within the ITU's Consultative Committee system. In turn, these nations -- with significant telecommunications markets and production capabilities -- will be in a better position to align the agenda of these organs more closely with the interests and concerns of the developing world.

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[62] *Tommorrow's ITU: The Challenges of Change*, Report of the High Level Committee to Review the Structure and Functioning of the International Telecommunication Union, (Geneva: ITU, April 1991), pp. 32-33.

Summary

This chapter has described the genesis of the development assistance issue within the ITU and attempted to show how the divergent interests of its membership were able to influence the nature of its expansion. Early assistance initiatives were well received by the Union and its members because they were defined in a way that complemented the organization's traditional functions. By restricting its efforts to the sharing of technical expertise, development assistance was justified as an extension of the Union's current mandate and thus fit comfortably into its organizational structure. At the same time, it did not appear to threaten the concept of the Union as a forum organization for the establishment of standards and the allocation of frequencies. Therefore, the presence of this new function did not receive immediate opposition from telecommunications administrations and operating companies of the development world.

With a sudden influx of new members, the developing countries were able to exercise greater influence on the ITU's activities through their increased voting power at Plenipotentiary Conferences. Taking advantage of the ITU's amendable Convention, these countries were able to establish development assistance as one of the stated primary functions of the Union. Their voting influence within the Plenipotentiary Conference and the Administrative Council also contributed to the structural establishment of development assistance within the organization, in the form of the Technical Cooperation Department, with its Training Division and Group of Engineers. Perhaps most significantly, the developing countries were able to directly tie the administration of 'technical cooperation' to the position of Secretary-General. This ensured that the issue received ongoing attention by the ITU's executive head, and encouraged a personal stake in the fulfillment of development assistance endeavours.

In a similar fashion, the developing countries were able to push for an expanded role for the Consultative Committees in development assistance. The composition and operating structures of the CCIs nevertheless influenced the way in which these assistance activities were carried out. Given the technological superiority of the developed nations and the obstacles preventing full participation by developing countries, it was the former group that was most influential in defining development 'questions' and deciding how and when these would be addressed. This situation was reinforced by the fact that the provision of technical expertise was subject to the commercial considerations of the private companies that supplied it. Thus, as the influence of developing countries expanded at conferences and large assemblies due to their voting majority, the Consultative Committees remained primarily under the influence of the developed nations due to their expertise and financial resources.

Development assistance became a critical issue within the organization when its administration threatened to impinge upon the ITU's traditional functions of importance to the technologically-advanced nations. Rising costs and diminishing support payments for assistance placed an increasing strain on the budgetary resources of the organization and threatened to compromise its ability to perform standard-setting and frequency allocation activities. A scenario unpopular with the industrialized countries was to increase the ITU's budget to accommodate further expansion of the development assistance function. Despite these objections, however, the less-developed nations showed no sign of relenting in their attempt to have their demands for development assistance met through the organization. As the 1982 Plenipotentiary Conference in Nairobi approached, it appeared that the agendas of developing and developed nations were on a collision course which threatened to tear the organization apart. Clearly, some compromise would have to be reached if the ITU was to survive intact.

Chapter 4

From Nairobi to the Missing Link (1982-1985)

The 1982 Plenipotentiary Conference in Nairobi, Kenya represented a turning point in the history of the International Telecommunication Union. It marked the beginning of a period in which development assistance became one of the primary functions of the Union, rather than simply a peripheral endeavour. In the opinions of the developing countries, the ITU was finally recognizing its responsibilities to the majority of its membership. The industrialized countries, however, saw this as an unwelcome shift in the organization's mandate which could render it incapable of meeting their technical requirements.

Although Nairobi was the spark in the ITU's development assistance debate, the issues discussed and the resolutions passed in 1982 were actually the culmination of a decade of debate concerning the role of communication in development. This chapter will therefore begin by outlining the evolution of the communication development issue as it was presented in other international fora prior to being raised at the ITU Plenipotentiary Conference. This will be followed by a discussion of the development assistance resolutions passed in Nairobi. Finally, it will examine the most important step taken by the ITU's membership to address the development assistance issue, namely the formation of an Independent Commission for World Wide Telecommunications Development. In analysing the recommendations of this Commission, contained in its report entitled *The Missing Link*, the discussion will illustrate the ITU's role as modifier in the telecommunications development debate through its incorporation of the interests of both developing and developed countries.

Evolution of the Communications Development Issue

The decade prior to the 1982 Plenipotentiary Conference was marked by intense debate on the need for development strategies to assist the world's less-developed countries. Much of this dialogue occurred within United Nations circles. In 1974, the UN General Assembly adopted a declaration concerning the establishment of a new international economic order (NIEO). This was accompanied by a programme of action for its implementation which was aimed at changing the structures of global production, consumption and trade.[1] Among the key elements of this strategy was the transformation of the economies of developing countries by giving them a substantial share in world industrial production and the means to become technologically self-sufficient.

The growing disparities between rich and poor countries was also the focus of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues, under the chairmanship of Willy Brandt.[2] In its report, entitled *North-South: A Programme for Survival*, the commission presented a plea for change in a range of issues including food production, commodity trade and development, energy, sharing of technology, development finance and the world monetary order. "We want to make it quite clear", the Commission wrote, "that North and South cannot proceed with 'business as usual' only adding a few bits here and there. What is required is intellectual reorientation, serious steps towards structural change, and increased practical cooperation".[3]

The Brandt Commission did not specifically examine the role of communication in the development process but did point out the need for the sharing

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[1]See UNGA Res. 3343 (XXIX) "Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Development and International Economic Cooperation".
[2]*North-South: A Programme for Survival*, The Report of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues under the Chairmanship of Willy Brandt, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1980).
[3]*Ibid.*, p. 26.

of technology amongst the world's nations. While technology transfers were deemed crucial, the Commission discussed the need for "appropriate technology", acquired with the knowledge that it can affect the character and direction of development. To help in this regard, the Commission recommended that greater support be given to the UNDP and its participating agencies which provide an important channel for transmitting technology.

The real roots of the communication development debate, however, lie within the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (Unesco). It was here that developing nations began to vocalize their concerns about their lack of access and control of communication technologies both internationally and within their own borders. Telecommunications technology, however, was not the initial focus for debate. More attention was given to technologies of mass communications, particularly television, radio and newspapers.

Developing countries were reacting against the under-development of their own national communication resources and an inability to control the news and information which crossed their borders. This seeming powerlessness encompassed everything from the interpretation of domestic and international news, to foreign cultural programming, to important information on national debts, raw material resources and crop yields. Through its control of these communication media, the industrialized nations were accused of instituting a form of "information imperialism". What was needed, in the opinion of many in the developing world, was a New World Information Order (NWIO) which would correct this one-sided flow of information and allow for true participation by the developing countries.

World surveys on the use of mass media, undertaken in the late sixties by Unesco, helped to 'sound the alarm' on this growing problem. Given at a symposium held in Montreal in 1969, the surveys' report stated that "prevailing disparities made

the free circulation of news and information more of a one-way flow from the developed world towards the developing countries than a real interchange".[4] The following year, the General Conference of Unesco authorized the Director-General to "help Member States in the formulation of their mass communication policies", resulting in the subsequent publication of a Unesco series on communication policies in various countries.[5]

Although central to the debate, Unesco was not the only international organization concerned with imbalances in the world information order. At a 1973 meeting in Algiers, the Non-Aligned Countries, or the Group of 77, called on developing nations to take "concerted action in the field of mass communication".[6] This included the reorganization of existing communication channels, steps towards the collective ownership of a communications satellite, and increased contact between media planning and research bodies to promote the exchange of experience and new ideas.

Debate on the NWIO issue reached a climax at the nineteenth session of the General Conference of Unesco in 1976. Two issues in particular were raised at the Nairobi meeting. First, the dominant view of "free flow of information", as it had been understood and practised so far, was practically meaningless to the majority of countries which lacked the means to communicate. Second, information must be understood as a socio-cultural resource, not as a material commodity or merchandise. Seen in this new perspective, all countries should enjoy the same opportunities of access to information as well as participation in the communication process.[7] The final outcome of the conference was the adoption of a special resolution (Res. 100) by

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[4]Unesco, *The New International Economic Order: Links Between Economics and Communications*, Reports and Papers on Mass Communication no.98 (Paris: Unesco, 1985), p. 13.
[5]*Ibid.*, p. 13.
[6]Rohan Samarajiwa, *Access to the Worldwide Market in News: Implications for the New International Information Order Debate*, M.A. Thesis (Simon Fraser University, 1982), p. 4.
[7]Mustapha Masmoudi, "The New World Information Order", *Crisis in International News*, J. Richstad and M.H. Anderson, eds., (New York: Columbia University Press), p. 91.

which the Director-General was authorized to form an International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems. Under the chairmanship of Sean MacBride, the sixteen-member Commission was charged with undertaking a review of "the totality of the problems of communication in modern society".[8] It was agreed that the Commission's highest priority should be given to "measures aiming at reducing the communication gap existing between developed and developing countries and at achieving a freer and more balanced international flow of information".

Following an interim report in 1978, the Commission released its final report, *Many Voices, One World*, in 1980. Among the report's key recommendations were:

1. The formulation by all nations of comprehensive communication policies linked to overall social, cultural, economic and political goals.

2. Specific measures should be undertaken by developing countries to establish and develop essential elements of their communication systems (print media, broadcasting and telecommunications), along with the related training and production facilities.

3. International cooperation for the development of communication should be given equal priority with and within other sectors (e.g. health, agriculture, industry, science, education).

4. There should be increased cooperation in the field of technical information amongst developing countries and with industrialized nations. This includes the establishment of regional data banks and information processing centres and specialized documentation centres.

5. Policy instruments should be implemented to evaluate the positive and negative social implications of the introduction of powerful new communication technologies.

6. The extension of telecommunication networks through small rural electronic exchanges should be included as one of the basic communication needs to be met by developing countries.

7. In all these issues, special attention must be given to the close relationship between the establishment of a New International Economic Order and the New World Information Order.

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[8] *Many Voices, One World*, Report by the International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems, (Paris: Unesco, 1980), p. 295.

In focusing world attention on the issue of a New World Information Order, the MacBride Report sparked considerable controversy. While developing countries applauded its recommendations, reaction from some in the developed world was hostile. Western journalists saw the Commission's recommendations regarding news gathering and dissemination as an attempt at press censorship, aimed at limiting Western media activities in developing countries.

At the Twenty-First Session of the Unesco General Conference held in Belgrade in October 1980, the final report of the MacBride Report was tabled and its recommendations debated. To help address the communication problems raised in the report, the Conference approved the establishment of an International Programme for the Development of Communication (IPDC).[9] The IPDC was to governed by a 35-member Intergovernmental Council and a sum of US$1,750,000 was made available for launching and implementing its initial phase. These funds would be used to finance projects aimed at strengthening the communication capacities of developing countries. Priority would be given to projects for the planning of national communication policies, the strengthening of communication infrastructures, the professional and technical training of human resources and the improvement and expansion of communication in support of other development activities, such as education, agriculture, health and rural development.

It is interesting to note that the establishment of the IPDC stemmed from an initiative put forward by the United States at the Belgrade Conference. By proposing the International Programme for the Development of Communication, the U.S. hoped to deflect attempts made by some developing countries to steer Unesco toward an even more strident stance regarding the perceived imbalance in information flow between developed and developing countries. This same pro-active

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[9]Resolution 4/21, *Proceedings of the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Twenty-First Session, Belgrade, 1980.*

approach was taken by industrialized countries within the ITU when, at the 1982 Plenipotentiary Conference, it appeared that developing countries might be successful in adopting large increases to the Union's budget for the purposes of development assistance.

Despite its active participation in the creation of the IPDC, Unesco's ongoing efforts to establish a NWIO coupled with its continuous criticism of American interests began to irritate the U.S. government. Ultimately, "the growth of communist and radical Third World influence, combined with a growing emphasis on policies restricting the flow of information", led to the U.S. decision to withdraw from the organization at the end of 1984.[10] While certainly not ending the NWIO debate at Unesco, the pull-out of the United States (followed by Great Britain in 1985), had a limiting effect on the organization's operating ability. Not only did the withdrawals leave a significant dent in its operating budget, the events also served to weakened Unesco's credibility as a useful forum, particularly in the estimation of some Western nations.

Despite these setbacks, the new world information order debate at Unesco was successful in advancing the issue of communications development in several ways. First, through vehicles like the MacBride Commission, the organization contributed to the enlargement of the concept of communications used in the development dialogue. Prior to this point, most studies had been more or less confined to the role of mass media in development. With its broader focus on the totality of problems associated with the transfer of information, the MacBride Commission provided an opportunity to explore the role of point-to-point communication technologies in the development process.

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[10]Michael Gardner, "Private Sector Initiatives: The U.S. Telecommunications Training Institute", *Journal of Communication*, Spring 1985, p. 23.

Secondly, the NWIO debate at Unesco laid the foundations for continued dialogue on the issue of communications development in other international organizations, most notably, the International Telecommunications Union. One of the objectives of the newly-created IPDC, for example, was "to strengthen cooperation and coordination activities of Unesco with other specialized agencies concerned, especially with the International Telecommunication Union".[11] Such initiatives served to bring the ITU closer to the center of the communications development debate in an effort to fulfill commitments to both its sister organization and its own less-developed member nations.

The ITU represented a different type of forum for the communications development debate. Unlike Unesco, the ITU's authority goes beyond simply presenting recommendations concerning the global information order. Instead, it is involved in the actual structuring of international communication -- from the adoption of standards for telecommunications technology, to the allocation of orbital positions for communications satellites. The ITU's decisions are not, in reality, legally binding and a government can choose to ignore a particular decision with which it does not agree. This may not be in any country's best interests, however, especially if one would like other countries to abide by decisions which protect one's own communication rights.

Given the network of interdependence within the ITU, contentious issues like the NWIO debate could not be so easily sidestepped in the form of withdrawals by the industrialized countries. As the ITU's 1982 Plenipotentiary Conference approached, the first to be held in almost a decade, the communications development issue had evolved to such an extent both outside and within the organization that taking further steps to ameliorate the situation seemed inescapable. The only

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[11]Annex I, Resolution 4/21, *Proceedings of the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Twenty-First Session, Belgrade, 1980.*

question remaining to be answered was "at what cost to the organization and to the agenda of the industrialized nations?".

The 1982 Plenipotentiary Conference and its Resolutions

The Twelfth Plenipotentiary Conference of the International Telecommunication Union opened on September 28, 1982 at the Kenyatta Conference Center in Nairobi, Kenya. A great deal of the delegates' initial time and energies concerned the attempted expulsion of Israel from the conference. It is ironic that the actions had nothing to do with telecommunications, but rather was the result of heightened animosity toward Israel in the wake of the Beirut Massacres that had taken place earlier in the month. The issue reached a crisis when the Head of the U.S. Delegation threatened to walk out of the Conference, informing the other delegates that the U.S. Secretary of State was on the threshold of considering his country's withdrawal from the ITU.[12] While the motion was eventually defeated, the issue raised concerns amongst the developed countries over the "politicization" of the ITU. How could the organization continue to function effectively as a technical body when it was increasingly being used as a forum for international political posturing?

As the Conference proceeded, the developing countries renewed their efforts to strengthen the ITU's development assistance role. The most conspicuous success in this regard was the adoption of an Algerian proposal which would promote "technical assistance" to one of the primary purposes of the Union as listed in Article 4 of the ITU Convention. Since the 1959 Plenipotentiary Conference, technical assistance had only been listed as one of the *activities* through which the ITU could be seen to fulfill its purposes. In 1982, however, it was strengthened to be listed as one of the

[12]Robert A. Kinn, "United States Participation in the International Telecommunication Union: A Series of Interviews", *The Fletcher Forum*, Winter 1985, p. 41.

three *purposes* of the Union, namely, "to promote and to offer technical assistance to developing countries in the field of telecommunications".[13] Although this modification might seem more cosmetic than substantive, the decision potentially cleared the way for using the ITU's regular budget to cover expenses incurred in the implementation of assistance activities. Until this point, the developed countries had been largely successful in restricting development assistance to those programmes undertaken with funds provided by the UNDP.

To reinforce this change to the ITU's Convention, the developing countries were also successful in passing a number of resolutions designed to strengthen the organization's development function. Resolution 18, for example, consisted of a list of technical cooperation and assistance activities which "could possibly be taken into consideration for funding from the ITU's own resources".[14] These included:

- Services of the Group of Engineers.
- Services of the Training Division.
- Short-term missions by specialists and the Group of Engineers.
- Logistic support for seminars.
- Fellowship programme to participate in ITU seminars.
- Regional presence.
- Services of the Head of the Technical Cooperation Department and his office.
- Special assistance for the Least Developed Countries.
- Provision of common services for technical cooperation activities.
- Identification of benefits of telecommunications for development.
- Follow-up action on the recommendations and decisions taken by conferences and meetings of the Union for the benefit of developing countries.
- ITU publications.
- World Communication Year.
- Review of ITU technical cooperation and assistance activities.
- Resources to promote technical cooperation among developing countries.
- Any other activities that the Administrative Council considers appropriate.

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[13]Article 4, 1 (a), *International Telecommunication Convention, Nairobi, 1982*, (Geneva: ITU, 1983), p. 3.

[14]Resolution 18, *International Telecommunication Convention, Nairobi, 1982*, (Geneva: ITU, 1983), p. 250.

While the resolution did not prescribe a fixed percentage of the ITU's annual budget to be set aside for technical cooperation activities, it effectively eliminated the division between internal versus external funding for development assistance.

The developed countries were successful in adding a clause to Resolution 18 stating that "increases in demands upon the regular budget of the Union that will occur from expansion of technical cooperation and assistance activities should be found, whenever possible, by effecting economies elsewhere within the budget". This was included because many of the developed nations, particularly the United States, were committed to "zero net program growth" within the ITU.[15] The proviso was somewhat of a double-edged sword for the industrialized countries, however, since allocating more funds to development assistance without increasing the regular budget meant that less resources would be available for the ITU's standard-setting bodies, the Consultative Committees. To alleviate these concerns, it was decided that efforts should be taken to review the overall organization and operations of the Technical Cooperation Department with a view to improving its managerial capacity.[16] This would include taking steps to strengthen the ITU's regional presence by moving some technical cooperation activities from ITU headquarters to the regions where projects are executed.

The issue of establishing the ITU's own development assistance fund was also raised in 1982 at Nairobi, just as it had been at Malaga-Torremolinos in 1973. Once again, a number of delegates from the developing countries argued that such a fund was necessary to bring some countries up to an acceptable standard of telecommunications development and that similar funds existed in other international organizations. Delegates from the OECD countries, maintained that such a fund was

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[15]George A. Codding, Jr., "Politicization of the International Telecommunication Union: Nairobi and After", *Policy Research in Telecommunications*, V. Mosco, ed., (Norwood, N.J.: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1984), p. 441.

[16]Ruben Naslund, "ITU Conference in Nairobi: Confrontation or Mutual Understanding?", *Telecommunications Policy*, June 1983, p. 104.

unnecessary in light of other programmes in place within the ITU and the UNDP, and that they, as representatives of their countries' telecommunications administrations simply did not have the authority to commit their respective nations to this type of development effort.

In the end, the Conference decided not to establish a development assistance fund to be financed through the regular budget, but rather to create a new voluntary plan to replace the relatively unsuccessful Special Fund for Technical Cooperation which had been created in 1973.[17] The new fund, to be called the Special Voluntary Program for Technical Cooperation, was to be based "on contributions in currency, training services, or in any other form to meet as much of the telecommunication needs of developing countries as possible".[18] The Fund was to be administered by the Technical Cooperation Department and a report on the development and management of the programme was to be submitted to the Administrative Council on a yearly basis.

The resolution of the Nairobi Plenipotentiary Conference which received the most publicity, however, was the decision to establish an Independent International Commission for World-Wide Telecommunications Development. At a point in the deliberations when it appeared that the conference might become deadlocked over the issue of financing development assistance from the regular budget, a group of industrialized countries headed by the United Kingdom introduced a proposal to give this and related development issues over to a commission for in-depth study. This initiative, in the words of the British delegates, would "provide all members of the ITU with an opportunity to identify realistic and relevant ways of meeting the needs of the developing world in a businesslike manner, tapping the resources in the OECD

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[17]George A. Codding, "Financing Development Assistance in the ITU", *Telecommunications Policy*, March 1989, p. 16.

[18]Resolution 19, *International Telecommunication Convention, Nairobi, 1982*, (Geneva: ITU, 1983), p. 253.

world to expand the global network and access to it".[19] The resolution would also provide a temporary reprieve for the developed countries, allowing the conference to move on to other business.

In a move reminiscent of their approach within Unesco, the industrialized countries preferred to anticipate the telecommunications development issue rather than face other potentially tougher resolutions put forward by the developing countries. By presenting this initiative, the U.K., U.S., Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany not only appeared actively responsive to the needs of the lesser-developed nations but also placed themselves in a better position to influence the structure of the debate within the context of the international commission.

As presented in Resolution 20 of the Plenipotentiary Conference, the commission would consist of members "of the highest international reputation" drawn from telecommunication administrations, operating agencies, major financial institutions, and industry in developing and developed countries. The Commission was charged with the following mandate:

1. to examine the totality of existing and possible future relationships between countries in the field of telecommunications involving technical cooperation and a transfer of resources in order to identify the most successful methods of such transfer;

2. to recommend a range of methods including novel ones for stimulating telecommunication development in the developing world using appropriate and proven technologies in ways which:

    a) serve the mutual interest of governments, operating companies, the public and specialized user groups in the developing world and of the public and private sectors in the developed countries; and

    b) lead to progressive achievement of self-reliance in the developing world and the narrowing of the gap between the developing and developed countries;

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[19]Jonathan Solomon, "Rejoinder: The Politics of Relevance and the ITU", *Telecommunications Policy*, September 1983, p. 244.

3. to consider the most cost-effective way in which the Union could stimulate and support the range of activities that might be necessary to achieve a more balanced expansion of telecommunication networks.

The Commission was expected to complete its work "in about a year's time", and submit its report to the Secretary-General of the ITU. The short time frame given to the Commission indicates the sense of urgency that surrounded the telecommunications development issue at the Nairobi Conference. Although it could be delayed a short while, some action to address the problems of the developing countries would have to be forthcoming or the issue would return once again to stall the proceedings of future ITU conferences.

As the delegates to the 1982 Plenipotentiary Conference left Nairobi, there was a clear sense that the success of the advanced nations' agenda was inextricably linked to meeting the demands of the developing world. As one observer explained,

> As administrations prepare for future ITU Conferences and for Administrative Council decision making, it is necessary to note that the long-term success of the regulatory and distributive functions may become more dependent on the success of the development function than was the case in the past. If the PLC [Plenipotentiary Conference] did nothing else, it did generate increased expectations on the part of the developing countries for some concrete action.[20]

The prospect of an International Telecommunication Union dominated by the developing world was not a particularly appealing one for the industrialized countries, especially as they continued to rely heavily on the organization as a key standard-setting body to guide the development of new telecommunications technology. Some administrators from the advanced countries began to question whether the ITU would be able to adequately perform both functions in light of the difficulties experienced at Nairobi. Reflecting on the conference, a member of the British delegation explained that:

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[20]Brian Segal, "ITU Plenipotentiary Conference and beyond: A case for serious foreign policy", *Telecommunications Policy*, December 1983, p. 330.

> The ITU is at a crossroads. Unless realism prevails in the years ahead, the factual divergence between the condition and prospect of telecommunications in the Group of 11 and that in the rest of the world could unleash dangerous centripetal forces which could make the ITU increasingly irrelevant.[21]

With nations like the U.S. questioning their future within the organization, and developing countries pushing for even greater measures to address the imbalance in telecommunication networks, the Independent Commission for World-Wide Telecommunications Development would have to reflect a delicate balance of interests if it was to be favourably received by both groups of nations.

The Maitland Commission and Its Report

The Independent Commission for World-Wide Telecommunication Development was comprised of seventeen telecommunications expert members from both developed and developing countries (see Appendix B). For the most part, members from the industrialized countries were executives of private telecommunications companies and top-level engineers; delegates from developing nations came almost exclusively from government post, telegraph and telephone ministries (PTTs). This fact would prove significant in accounting for the articulation of interests found in the Commission's report. Sir Donald Maitland, a British career diplomat, was appointed as chairman of the Commission, underscoring the delicate nature of the task which lay before them.

Although the Maitland Commission was charged with examining the totality of the telecommunications development issue, no original research was undertaken for several reasons. Since the Commission was expected to table its report within a year's time, embarking on any new studies would have been virtually impossible. Furthermore, given the financial constraints of the organization, the funding allotted

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[21]Solomon, p. 245.

to the Independent Commission at the Plenipotentiary Conference was insufficient to support any original research. Instead, the Commission relied upon a number of studies already in existence which attempted to chart the various links between telecommunications and socio-economic development.[22]

Principal among the materials used by the Maitland Commission was a study jointly sponsored by the International Telecommunication Union and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Originally undertaken in 1977, the purpose of the ITU/OECD study was to analyse the direct and indirect benefits of national investments in telecommunications, and to show the ways in which a telecommunication system can contribute to economic and social development.[23] The study was aimed at national and international decision-makers (planners, finance ministers, international banks, and aid agencies), who were responsible for allocating investment resources among different sectors of the economy. It was hoped that the various case studies included in the project would show that investment in telecommunications has a number of important multiplier effects. These go beyond benefits that are generally assumed to occur, such as increased operating efficiency for businesses and social services. Although originally expected to take two years, the study was not completed until 1983 (with the assistance of a special cash contribution from Unesco's International Programme for the Development of Communication), just in time to be used by the Maitland Commission .

While identifying how telecommunications could benefit various sectors of the economy, the ITU/OECD studies often had difficulty explaining how

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[22]The key studies mentioned were *Telecommunications for Development*, (Geneva: ITU, 1983), and R. Saunders, J. Warford and B. Wellenius, *Telecommunications and Economic Development*, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1983). Both these reports are actually a collection of case studies on telecommunications transfer.

[23]William Pierce and Nicolas Jequier, "The contribution of telecommunications to economic development", *Telecommunication Journal*, 44:11, November 1977, p. 533.

telecommunications was actually related to socio-economic development.[24] For example, one of the macro-economic studies which the Commission referred to could reveal a correlation between telecommunications and economic development, but not a causal relationship. One could just as easily deduce from this that economic development results in more telephones as the reverse hypothesis.[25] A second difficulty with the studies' findings pertain to the actual measurement of investment benefits. The ITU/OECD report states that it is necessary to move from a basic analysis of rates of return on investment to a broader analysis of overall benefits such as increases in gross national product.[26] While such an analysis might be justified, it also allows for the possibility that a number of other factors having a positive effect on the economy might be overlooked, or their influence wrongly attributed to telecommunications development.

One final problem with the studies' findings surrounds the question of "entailments". Edwin Levy uses the mango as a metaphor for describing this aspect of technology transfer, where a relatively neutral core of technology is surrounded by a "fibrous covering" of entailments or requirements which are necessary for its successful operation.[27] For example, telecommunications benefits to health services must be understood as dependent on medical equipment and trained personnel. Benefits to rural producers in getting their products to market presupposes the existence of roads and vehicles to transport goods, and a population involved in commercial, rather than subsistence, farming. Clearly, telecommunications transfer

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[24]For an analysis of the ITU/OECD studies see: Paul Irwin, "Research Studies on the Role of Telecommunications in Socio-Economic Development: An Examination of Content and Context", unpublished paper, 1987.

[25]see Andrew P. Hardy, "The Role of the Telephone in Economic Development", *Telecommunications Policy*, December 1980, p. 285.

[26]*Telecommunications for Development*, (Geneva: ITU/OECD, 1983), p. 1.

[27]see Edwin Levy, "The Responsibility of the Scientific and Technological Enterprise in Technology Transfers", *Science, Politics and the Agricultural Revolution in Asia*, ed. R. Anderson *et al.*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), p. 280.

does not represent a panacea for development although many of the studies used by the Commission had a tendency to overlook this fact.[28]

The Maitland Commission met for the first time in Geneva in October 1983. During the following year, the seventeen commissioners met on an additional four occasions: twice in Europe and twice in developing countries. Since the Commission did not have the financial resources to engage in a wide range of expert forums or round-tables, their analysis was based on the responses to 700 requests for suggestions and comments which were sent to heads of governments, international and regional organizations involved in telecommunications, development and financing, telecommunications administrations, equipment manufacturers, private operating agencies, and scientific and industrial organizations.[29]

On the basis of this input, the Commission prepared its report, entitled *The Missing Link*, which it formally submitted to the Secretary-General in January 1985. As might be expected, the report concluded that telecommunications are essential to the cultural growth and well-being of nations and that the present deficiency in telecommunications in developing countries was not acceptable. The report states,

> At an early stage in our work we concluded unanimously that the gross and growing imbalance in the distribution of telecommunications throughout the world was not tolerable.[30]

It continues,

> It is our considered view that henceforward no development programme of any country should be regarded as balanced, properly integrated or likely to be effective unless it includes a full and appropriate role for telecommunications, and accords a corresponding priority to the improvement and expansion of telecommunications.[31]

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[28]For an example of the difficulties involved in studying telecommunications transfer in terms of "success" and "failure" see Frans Vandendries, *Telecommunications in the Mist: Competition, Cooperation, and Technology Transfer in the CIDA Development Project Cycle in Rwanda 1973-1988*, M.A.(Communication) Thesis, (Simon Fraser University, 1989).

[29]*The Missing Link*, Report of the Independent Commission for World-Wide Telecommunications Development, (Geneva: ITU, December, 1984), p. 1.

[30]*Ibid.*, p. 3.

[31]*Ibid.*, p. 11.

The Maitland Report estimated that a total investment of US$12 billion a year would be needed to bring the developing countries up to an acceptable level of telecommunications development. While this would appear to be a daunting task, the Commission includes an ambitious objective: a telephone within easy reach of virtually the whole of mankind by the early part of the next century.

To help achieve this objective, the Report contained 30 recommendations aimed at strengthening telecommunications infrastructure in developing countries. For the purposes of analysis, these can be synthesized into seven main recommendations:

1. Developing countries should give higher priority to telecommunications development.

2. Developing countries should seek to improve telecommunications training facilities in cooperation with telecommunications operators, manufacturers and multilateral agencies.

3. Regional research and development institutes should be established with consideration given to possible regional manufacturing.

4. Manufacturers and operators of telecommunications equipment should develop systems to meet the needs of rural and remote areas.

5. When purchasing equipment, developing countries should:

    a. pool their resources,
    b. ensure that contracts make adequate provisions for supplying spare parts, training and post-installation maintenance.

6. Concerning the financing of telecommunications transfer:

    a. Development assistance programs of countries and multilateral organizations should give higher priority to telecommunications investment;
    b. Extend such financial arrangements as import/export financing, insurance covers, and guarantees against non-commercial risks;
    c. Set up a revolving fund and/or telecommunications investment trusts;
    d. In the future, create an organization to co-ordinate the worldwide development of telecommunications (WORLDTEL).

7. The creation of a Centre for Telecommunications Development which would consist of three components:

a. A Development Policy Unit to collect information and experience about telecommunication policies and make it available to developing countries;
b. A Telecommunications Development Service to provide advice at the pre-investment stage on how to run a telecommunications system (including organization, planning, training, purchasing, financing and setting up a tariff policy);
c. An Operations Support Group to provide on-going assistance in implementation of the system.

Taken together, the recommendations represent a careful balancing act which the Commission executed successfully. On the one hand, the Report had to contain strongly-worded challenges concerning the plight of telecommunications in the developing world. At the same time, however, the Commission had to be careful not to alienate the industrialized countries by being overly critical or presenting unrealistic and costly proposals for correcting the current imbalance in telecommunications. In this sense, the Maitland Commission and its Report provide a good illustration of the ITU's larger role as modifier with respect to the national telecommunications policy interests of its member-states. For this reason, attention will be given to analysing how the Report seeks to incorporate the interests of both developing and developed countries.

Turning first to the concerns of the developing countries, *The Missing Link* was careful to stress the need for improved training facilities and research and development institutes in the developing world. There was a recognition by the commissioners that effective technology transfer involves more than simply importing hardware. Rather, transfer can only be successful when accompanied by the sharing of technical information, which enables adaptation to local needs and indigenous production capabilities. As the Secretary General of Pan African Telecommunications Union told the Commission, "permanent solutions can only come from regional programmes covering among other things the creation of regional research and development and manufacturing capabilities".[32]

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[32] *The Missing Link*, p. 92.

A second example of how the Report sought to incorporate the interests of developing countries is in urging them to pool their resources, both for increased bargaining power during purchasing and to insure compatibility with neighbouring systems. This is particularly important to small island countries, such as Fiji or Barbados, both of which complained of the difficulties of small administrations in purchasing and standardizing equipment.[33] According to Maitland, encouraging this type of regional planning would be the job of the proposed Centre for Telecommunications Development.[34]

In a manner reminiscent of the MacBride Commission, *The Missing Link* was also careful to mention the need for "appropriate technology". Quoting from advice given by a major (unnamed) manufacturer, the Report states that "the most appropriate technology for any country is one that makes optimal use of existing resources -- human, material and financial". [35]In so doing, the Commission appeared to recognize that the types of equipment manufactured in industrialized countries for use in a high capacity urban market are not always appropriate for the developing country. Technology must be adapted to rural and remote locations, rugged terrain, a scattered population, and often a limited power supply. The Maitland Report recognized this, stating that "systems need to be developed specifically to enable service to be provided in the more remote areas at lower costs".[36] It goes on to say that developing countries have a role to play in convincing industry that a market exists for such technology -- one which would support the costs of developing suitable equipment.

While *The Missing Link* did attempt to address the concerns of the developing countries, equally prominent within its recommendations is a consideration of

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[33]*Ibid.*, p. 82.
[34]"The Missing Link", *Intermedia*, January 1985, p. 12.
[35]*The Missing Link*, p. 34.
[36]*Ibid.*, p. 34.

interests which stem from the developed nations. In particular, the Report gives careful consideration to the role of telecommunications suppliers and manufacturers in the development process when formulating its suggestions. This other set of interests is evident in at least three different places within the Report: in discussions about telecommunications technology, marketing and business organization.

The Missing Link is particularly emphatic about the type of telecommunications equipment which a developing country should purchase. The Report states:

> We believe that taken together, the advantages of a wholly digital network are overwhelming and that every telecommunications planning decision should now be made with the creation of such a system in mind... Although data communication or even broadband communications is not that significant at the moment to the Third World it is nevertheless considered highly important that the foundations are laid for the future expansion in that direction at a later date.[37]

Stated in another way, the Maitland Commission is advocating digitalization even where there is no immediate need for such technology.

Such a recommendation would appear to have greater direct benefits to interests in industrialized countries than it would to the developing world. Not only would developing countries have to rely on industrialized nations to provide this sophisticated equipment, there would also be less chance that technical information about it would be transferred so that countries could eventually design their own systems. Installation and maintenance are also a problem, as Vincent Mosco explains in one of the few published critiques of the Report:

> Developing countries lack the technical expertise and resources to provide their own technicians to install and maintain such systems. Instead of installing less expensive telephone equipment that would adequately serve the needs of many developing countries for some time to come and could be maintained by their own administrations, such

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 33.

> nations will be dependent on technological developments and competitive market forces at work in industrialized countries.[38]

While promising a new market for telecommunications manufacturers and suppliers, this recommendation contains the danger of technology dependence for the developing world.

Along with the threat of equipment dependency inherent in state-of-the-art digital technology comes the danger of further information dependency. Equipping developing countries with the latest telecommunications technology would facilitate the penetration of these nations' markets by transnational corporations, the majority of whose information and assets end up leaving the country. In this sense, suggestions of digitalization are fundamentally linked to the contentious issue of trans-border data flow with all of its implications.[39] Among these is the possibility that the decision-making autonomy of affiliate companies in developing countries may decrease as reliable telecommunications lines centralize power at headquarters in Europe and North America. The exit of key information for processing or storage outside the country not only leads to a loss of jobs but may also represent a risk to national security during times of economic unrest or deterioration of the international political climate.

The Maitland Commission was not completely unaware of the implications of its "digitalization" recommendation. It admitted that entities in industrialized countries "may gain advantages with respect to information on trade and world market conditions", but hopes that any potential problems can be alleviated by "closer cooperation between industrialized and developing countries in the data communication field".[40] This is in contrast to the MacBride Report's call for specific

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[38]Vincent Mosco, *Canada and the ITU: A Preliminary Investigation*, Final Report for the Department of Communication, Ottawa, 1986, p. 125.
[39]see United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, "Transnational Corporations Dominate Transborder Data Flows", *Intermedia*, May 1982, p. 54.
[40]*The Missing Link*, p. 33.

rules governing the collection, processing, and dissemination of data.[41] By advocating digital technology without any restrictions on trans-border data flow, *The Missing Link*'s recommendation could ironically lead to an exacerbation of the current World Information Order -- the very problem which it was supposed to alleviate.

A second area where the Report reflects the interests of organizations in developed countries is in its proposals for marketing telecommunications equipment. From the outset, there is no hesitation in pointing to developing countries as a vast new market waiting to be tapped:

> Given their current lack of telecommunications services and their sheer size in terms of population and surface area, the developing countries represent a vast market with enormous potential. This should encourage manufacturers to make every effort to open up this market and speed up telecommunications development in these countries.[42]

Evidently, many countries which manufacture equipment were already aware of this fact. In 1981 alone, Japan granted over US$300 million in subsidized loans for telecommunications projects in 40 developing countries. Even such a relatively minor telecommunications supplier as Italy granted an estimated US$75 million per year in subsidized loans for telecommunication equipment purchases by developing countries.[43] Manufacturers in the United States were also beginning to view the markets of the developing world as a new hope, given the increasingly competitive nature of the domestic telecommunications market. As one American telecommunications advisor explained:

> Since the United States now faces stiff domestic competition and is shut out from the markets of the other major suppliers, a possible way to preserve the U.S. telecommunications equipment industry from going the way of shoes, colour TV's, and cameras is to focus attention

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[41] *Many Voices, One World*, p. 209.
[42] *The Missing Link*, p. 58.
[43] Allen Greenberg, "Impasse?: The U.S. Stake in Third World Telecommunications Development", *Journal of Communication*, Spring 1985, p. 44.

> on the relatively open markets of the LDC's (lesser developed countries).[44]

To help the telecommunications equipment industry break into the Third World market, the Maitland Report suggests that the ITU could be used, in a sense, as a marketing vehicle for these companies. It advised the Union, in conjunction with manufacturers of telecommunications components, to compile a "comprehensive catalogue of telecommunications suppliers and systems currently in use".[45] This work would be complimented by that of the proposed Centre for Telecommunications Development which would seek to advise developing countries on purchasing decisions, presumably based on the equipment listed in the catalogue.

Here again, it is possible to question whether the marketing arrangements proposed by the Maitland Commission were motivated by the foreseen financial gains of equipment manufacturers rather than by the actual needs of developing countries. While such an arrangement would certainly assist large equipment manufacturers eager to sell their products, it might not represent the best possible situation for developing countries that run the risk of getting pushed into hasty decisions on equipment by 'salespeople' at the ITU. The proposal also raises questions concerning the appropriateness of telecommunications marketing within an international regulatory body like the ITU. As Mosco points out, such activities could increase politicization within the organization by making the precise form of telecommunications development a central agenda item at the ITU.[46]

One final example of how *The Missing Link* promoted the interests of the developed world can be found in the Report's suggestions for the reorganization of telecommunication administrations in developing countries. According to the Commission, telecommunications should be run as "a separate, self-sustained

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[44]*Ibid.*, p. 44.
[45]*The Missing Link*, p. 35.
[46]Mosco, p. 126.

enterprise, operating on business lines...separate from the structure and financial machinery of central government".[47] In advocating the separation of telecommunications and government, the Commission seems to imply that if the success of telecommunications operations is not actually *dependent* on private management, it is at least *strongly compatible* with it. Around the time that *The Missing Link* was published, the twin doctrines of privatization and deregulation were enjoying wide support throughout most of Europe and North America. In fact, both Canada and the U.K. were in the middle of privatizing major portions of their telecommunications industries.

How does "privatization" reflect the interests of the telecommunications industry in the industrialized countries? One can begin to answer this question by considering Maitland's statement that "the role of the private sector is a theme running through our Report".[48] If private sector initiative was to provide telecommunications equipment to the developing world, however, there would need to be some adjustments to the present trade environment. As Greenberg explains, "LDC telecommunications facilities are almost universally government-owned monopolies and are accustomed to dealing with suppliers that are either directly government-owned or receive substantial government backing. In this environment, trade is based on a wide variety of subsidized initiatives".[49] By pushing for the management of telecommunications as a separate enterprise, the Maitland Commission's recommendation seeks to unburden the regulation of telecommunications in developing countries, thus fostering straight-forward business transactions between these agencies and private industry in the industrialized world.

While facilitating business between suppliers and manufacturers in the First World and telecommunications administrations in the Third World, the Maitland

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[47] *The Missing Link*, p. 38.
[48] "The Missing Link", *Intermedia*, January 1985, p. 9.
[49] Greenberg, p. 44.

Commission's recommendation raises a number of questions concerning the management of the communications industries in developing countries. For example, would a privatized telecommunications agency continue to reflect the country's broader development goals, such as providing service to rural areas when urban markets are much more lucrative? Could the profits generated from this private enterprise continue to be used to support development in other sectors of the economy? Would privatization of the telecommunications industry only serve to create an economic environment conducive to increased foreign ownership? Would it be followed by a push to privatize other communication industries, or to move away from government-backed mixed aid packages? Regardless of whether these future scenarios materialized, privatization of the telecommunications sector offers considerable benefits to interests in developed countries while presenting few clearly-defined advantages for the developing world.

From this analysis of the interests represented in the Maitland Report, one can conclude that while the Commission was not unaware of the genuine needs of developing countries, it also sought to address the requirements of private industry. Unfortunately, this balancing of interests is not always successful, since the goals of developing countries often differ quite drastically from those of large telecommunications manufacturers and suppliers. In fact, suggestions of digitalization, marketing within the ITU, and privatization of telecommunication administrations may not only contain greater direct benefits for the industrialized world, but could also result in still greater "information poverty" in developing countries.

Before leaving *The Missing Link*, it is interesting to compare the Commission's conclusions and recommendations with those contained in *Many Voices, One World*. Upon initial examination, the two Reports appear to have definite similarities in their orientation. Both see telecommunications development as

strongly linked to socio-economic development and consider its uneven expansion as an obstacle to communication between developed and developing countries.[50] There is also agreement that national and multi-lateral development organizations should give higher priority to telecommunications projects, particularly in transfers of appropriate technology to rural areas.[51]

Notwithstanding these similarities, the two Reports contain divergent opinions about the appropriateness and effectiveness of technology transfer. The key difference surrounds the issue of the neutrality of the technology. In the opinion of the MacBride Commission, "technology in itself is seldom neutral; its uses even less so".[52] For this reason, decisions must be approached with careful scrutiny as to their possible social and cultural effects. As the MacBride Report explained:

> Caution is further advised because of the fact that the control of the production and utilization of these information processing and telecommunication systems is at present mainly in the hands of industrialized countries and, in some instances, a few transnational corporations. The implications of this situation for worldwide social and economic development -- and, in particular, the installation of a New International Economic Order -- require the attention of the international community as a whole.[53]

Any recognition of the complications involved in telecommunications transfer, as they relate to the World Information or Economic Order, is noticeably absent from the Maitland Commission's Report. Instead, telecommunications technology is portrayed as neutral, evenly distributing "immense benefits" to all that employ it. In the estimation of the Maitland Commission, "the interest that industrialized and developing countries share in the world-wide development of telecommunications is as great as in the exploitation of new sources of energy".[54] Indeed, one of the

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[50] *Many Voices, One World*, p. 56.
[51] *Ibid.*, p. 72.
[52] *Ibid.*, p. 215.
[53] *Ibid.*, p. 215.
[54] *The Missing Link*, p. 65.

expressed purposes of the Report was to illuminate telecommunications investment as a common interest of all nations.

In this sense, both the MacBride Report and the Maitland Report can be viewed as written reflections of their respective organizations. As a reflection of Unesco, *Many Voices, One World* is less compromising in its critical approach to the imbalances which it perceived in the world communication structure. Given its organization's emphasis on education and culture, the MacBride Report gives more careful attention to the potential socio-cultural impacts of the technology, and the need for sharing of information and training if the transfer of equipment is to be successful.

By contrast, *The Missing Link* is the product of a largely technical organization which encompasses a wide range of public and private interests. While voting at the ITU is controlled by the developing countries, its agenda is still largely dictated by the requirements of the telecommunications industry in the developed countries. As a result, the tone of the Report is more conservative, carefully seeking to establish an area of common interest between these two groups. Instead of presenting a rigorous analysis of telecommunications and its role in development, the Report offers a sales pitch to potential investors in the sector. The strategic importance of this exercise should not be overlooked, however, since the Report allowed the ITU to appear responsive to the needs of its less-developed members without alienating the expected initiators of the assistance effort, namely, the privately-dominated telecommunications industry.

Response to the Maitland Commission's report varied from cautious acceptance to whole-hearted endorsement. Public reaction from Western governments was cordial to the main ideas presented in the Report but, as expected, there were no immediate offers of funds to assist in carrying out the Commission's

proposals. Diana Dougan, the U.S. State Department's Coordinator of International Communication and Information Policy, summed up the position of many industrialized countries in her official response to the ITU: "one of the problems that we in the United States face, and a problem which we share with other donor countries, is increasing budgetary constraints. Under these circumstances, we cannot expect there will be real increases in foreign assistance funding for quite some time."[55] This response came as little surprise to the Commission who, as previously mentioned, was looking to the private sector to provide the majority of financial support for the implementation of its recommendations.

Judging from the letters of response which the Maitland Commission received, the telecommunications industry was certainly supportive of the Report which they felt drew attention to a long-neglected market for their products. Canada's Northern Telecom endorsed the Report, adding that "the less-developed nations should install digital plant on as complete a basis as possible". Erricsson of Sweden was equally positive, stating that "the most appropriate technology for telecommunications development is digital SPC switching systems and digital transmission systems."[56] An interesting exception to the whole-hearted endorsements of the telecommunications industry was the response received from Nokia Electronics in Finland. The President writes:

> New technology offers the developing countries many novel and economic alternatives to construct and improve their telecommunications network. On the other hand, more complex systems tend to increase the dependence on the supplier and make the maintenance more intricate in developing countries. These factors threaten to increase the discrepancy of know-how between developed and developing countries.[57]

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[55]Response of U.S. State Department to Maitland Report, *Journal of Communication*, Spring 1985, p. 20.
[56]*The Missing Link*, pp. 84-5.
[57]*Ibid.*, p. 80.

Nokia's response demonstrates that at least some telecommunications manufacturers realized that their products did not represent an instant cure to the Third World's communication problems. Unfortunately, this viewpoint was in the minority.

Based on the letters submitted to the Commission, the response of developing countries to the Maitland Report's efforts can be summarized as ambivalent. On the one hand, many countries maintained that telecommunications technology represented an answer to many of their development problems. Sri Lanka's Director of Telecommunications referred to the technology as "an essential infrastructure for accelerated economic development", while the Korean Telecommunications Policy Director maintained that "communications facilities in Korea significantly contributed to economic and social development".[58] At the same time, other developing countries gave a more wary response. "Introduction of the latest technology in developing countries should be approached with due caution", according to the Executive Director of Asia-Pacific Telecommunity of Thailand.[59] It must only be implemented if it can be modified to suit indigenous needs and can co-exist with older systems. Purchasing such equipment from manufacturers in developed countries also has its drawbacks, according to the Minister of Information and Culture in Barbados. Because these manufacturers develop products to meet the needs of large national operating companies, "developing countries frequently find themselves having to purchase equipment whose size, power, sophistication and cost are greater than that which would reasonably represent their needs."[60]

Reaction from the International Telecommunication Union itself was immediately favourable. In May 1985, at the first World Telecommunications Development Conference held in Arusha, Tanzania, ITU members conducted a thorough review of the Commission's findings and recommendations. Their review

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[58] *Ibid.*, pp. 76-7.
[59] Ibid., p. 86.
[60] *Ibid.*, p. 82.

led to the Arusha Declaration, which "endorsed the main thrust" of *The Missing Link* and stressed again the need for governments of industrialized and developing nations to take serious steps to minimize, if not to close, the ever-increasing telecommunications gap between North and South.[61]

In July 1985, the ITU Administrative Council also reviewed and debated the Report of the Independent Commission and endorsed its findings and recommendations *inter alia.* Furthermore, the Council decided by a specific Resolution to establish a Centre for Telecommunications Development as outlined within the Maitland Report. The Centre had been one of the key proposals of *The Missing Link* and its swift creation was a clear indication of the organization's desire to appear active in addressing the issue of world-wide telecommunications development. Governed by an Advisory Board, the new Centre would have a "separate and identifiable budget" which was to be voluntarily funded by governmental and non-governmental sources.[62] Its expected start-up date was October 1985, in accordance with the target set by the Independent Commission.

One of the legacies of the Maitland Commission was that it set a timetable for implementation of its recommendations prior to the ITU's next Plenipotentiary Conference in 1989. This meant that its findings could not be easily ignored by the organization. As one observer explained,

> By ensuring that the success or failure of the next Plenipotentiary Conference will depend on the implementation of the Maitland mandate, the Commission has succeeded in ensuring that *The Missing Link* will be very much a political "hot potato" for the rest of this decade, however much some politicians, industrialists and diplomats may wish it to gather dust on shelves...[63]

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[61]R.E. Butler,"International Cooperation in Human Resources Management", *Telecommunication Journal*, April 1986, p. 201.
[62]*Ibid.*, p. 202.
[63]Jonathan Solomon, "The Missing Link: A Political Hot Potato", *Telecommunications Policy*, June 1985, p. 91.

In particular, the Report gave developing countries a practical means of assessing the organization's performance in the area of development assistance. This point was not overlooked by telecommunications administrations in the developed world, nor by the administration of the ITU itself. In fact, the Secretary-General of the ITU, Richard Butler, would play a prominent role in directing the execution of the Report's recommendations in the months and years ahead. Analysing his and others' roles in the implementation of the Centre for Telecommunications Development will be the focus of the next chapter.

Summary

This chapter has traced the evolution of the development assistance issue during one of the most tumultuous periods in the history of the International Telecommunication Union. It has shown how the ITU's technical cooperation activities progressed from a peripheral endeavour to become one of the primary functions of the organization. This process was examined within the larger context of the dialogue on communications development introduced in other international organizations, particularly the New World Information Order debate at Unesco. The ITU represented a different type of forum for the communications development debate, however, when this issue came to a head at the 1982 Plenipotentiary Conference.

After examining the development assistance resolutions passed at Nairobi, the chapter focused on the efforts of the Independent Commission for World-Wide Telecommunications Development. In seeking to incorporate the divergent interests of its membership, the Commission illustrated how the ITU, through such initiatives, has been able to act as a modifier in the debate over telecommunications development. By performing a delicate balancing act between the demands of developing and developed nations, *The Missing Link* served to temporarily defuse this

contentious issue, allowing the organization to continue performing its other functions.

Chapter 5

The Centre for Telecommunications Development (1985-1989)

A new international agency was created in July 1985 when the ITU Administrative Council, in its Resolution 929, decided "to establish within the framework of the Union, and in Geneva, a Centre for Telecommunications Development on the basis of voluntary funding and with its own separate and identifiable budget". Based on the proposal of the Maitland Commission Report, the Centre for Telecommunications Development (CTD) was expected to complement the organization's existing development assistance program by tapping another source of revenue and expertise, namely the private sector. Over the course of the next four years, however, the CTD was largely unsuccessful at meeting the initial expectations of its supporters. By the time of the 1989 Plenipotentiary Conference, the Centre which was once envisioned as a quasi-independent organization was virtually subsumed within the ITU's Technical Cooperation Department.

This chapter will examine the events surrounding the life of the CTD as a means of illustrating how internal and external interests were brought to bear on the administration of one specific development assistance initiative under the aegis of the ITU. The case of the CTD is particularly interesting since its fate can be traced in large measure to the influence of stakeholders within the organization, not simply those in developing and developed countries. The discussion will outline the history of the Centre from the time of its inception through to its brief period of activity prior to the 1989 Plenipotentiary Conference. This will be followed by an analysis of the reasons for the CTD's ineffectiveness and eventual demise.

Establishing the Centre

In discussing its proposal for a Centre for Telecommunications Development, the Maitland Commission had invited the Secretary-General "to carry out the necessary consultations so that the Centre can be established as soon as possible in the course of 1985". In response to this invitation, Secretary-General Richard E. Butler, who had been elected to the position at the 1982 Plenipotentiary Conference, organized four short informations meetings on the question of the establishment of the Centre.[1] Two of these meetings were held in Geneva, one in Washington and one in Singapore. In attendance were representatives of the telecommunications industry, major users of telecommunications, recognized operating agencies, scientific organizations and other institutions interested in the expansion of telecommunication networks. The purpose of the sessions was to supply the necessary information which "would enable them to carry out an evaluation of the interests which could motivate their cooperation in a Centre with separate voluntary and secure funding within the Union".[2] According to the Secretary-General's Report, "no negative remark" was registered regarding the creation of the Centre whose primary purpose would be to strengthen and expand the scope of advisory services to developing countries in the field of telecommunications. Indeed, the Secretary-General concluded on the basis of his formal and informal contacts that this objective "has been unanimously recognized and supported by a complete consensus from North and South".[3]

On the basis of such a positive response from potential donors and recipients, the Administrative Council formally established the Centre for Telecommunications Development at its annual meeting in July 1985. The Council deferred to the proposals of the Maitland Commission regarding the actual framework of the Centre,

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[1]Document 6302 (Addendum 5), Administrative Council, 40th Session, (Geneva: ITU, July 1985), p. 2.
[2]*Ibid.*, p. 2.
[3]*Ibid.*, p. 3.

indicating that the structure and working methods of the CTD should be established with reference to the guidelines contained in Chapter 8 of *The Missing Link*. To steer this process, the Administrative Council, in consultation with the Secretary-General, appointed an Advisory Board of twenty-one members chosen from various posts within the telecommunication sectors of developed and developing countries (see Appendix C). Mr. Jean-Claude Delorme, the President and Chief Executive Officer of Teleglobe Canada, was appointed as the Chairman of the Advisory Board. The position of Vice-Chairman was given to Mr. A. D. Ntagazwa, the Deputy Minister of Communications and Works of Tanzania. The Board was to adopt a system of biannual rotation which would ensure both continuity and change of membership.

The Secretary-General was also given a position of prominence on the Advisory Board of the new Centre. As *ex-officio* Vice-Chairman of the Advisory Board, the Secretary-General would be responsible for ensuring that the objectives and policy guidelines laid down by the Administrative Council were observed by the Centre. He would also seek to ensure the consistency of the Centre's activities with the general aims of the ITU in the development field, and coordinate the efforts of the Centre with those of the Technical Cooperation Department where both were involved. The position of *ex-officio* Vice-Chairman of the Advisory Board guaranteed that the Secretary-General would be a permanent participant in the governance of the Centre.

The Advisory Board of the CTD held its first (constitutional) meeting at ITU headquarters in Geneva in November 1985. In his opening address, the Secretary-General described the Centre as "an experiment of a multilateral character which is designed to mobilize new and identifiable resources in order to fill in a lacuna. In other words, the Centre is intended to bring in new partners in development which

the Independent Commission found to be for the mutual benefit and prosperity of all".[4]

With this end in mind, the Advisory Board focused its deliberations on major policy matters concerning the mandate and scope of activity of the Centre, the formulation of rules and working procedures of the Board, and the recruitment of an Executive and Deputy Director for the Centre. The meeting also provided an opportunity for the Board to meet with potential resource providers to explain the advantages which both contributors and beneficiaries could expect to derive from the Centre.

During the course of 1986, the CTD's Advisory Board met on three separate occasions to continue the task of formalizing the Centre's structure and operating principles. One of the first tasks was to articulate the mandate of the CTD. Formally adopted at the third meeting of the Board in June 1986, the Centre was organized as a new multilateral focal point:

> "to strengthen and expand the scope and extent of advisory services and technical support to developing countries with a view to remedying, through innovative effort, the imbalance in the distribution of telecommunications in the world."[5]

As Mr. Delorme explains, this statement of purpose contains both the short and longer term goals expected of the Centre. Strengthening advisory services to developing countries would be the immediate result, while contributing to remedying the imbalance in the distribution of telecommunications would be the ultimate goal.

Along with the overall purpose of the Centre, the mandate also included three strategic objectives which expressed the means to this end. These were drafted with special recognition that the Centre would seek "in general, to realize the basic

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[4]"Establishment of the Centre for Telecommunications Development", *Telecommunication Journal*, 53:2, February 1986, p. 68.

[5]Document CDT3-4, Centre for Telecommunications Development, Third Meeting of the Advisory Board, Geneva, 7 June 1986, (Geneva: ITU, 1986), p. 2.

objectives set by the Independent Commission for World-Wide Development".

These strategic objectives were:

1. To promote the importance of telecommunications as key factors of socio-economic development with a view to accelerating and to placing investments in that field, at a higher level of priority.

2. To contribute to accelerating the development of telecommunications by assisting developing countries, through advisory service or operational/technical support,

   a) in assessing their telecommunication needs;
   b) in formulating their telecommunication policies, objectives and strategies;
   c) in formulating and implementing their telecommunication development plans;
   d) in determining their financial arrangements and in obtaining adequate and timely financial resources in support of their development programs;
   e) in enhancing the quality, efficiency and effectiveness of their telecommunication facilities and services.

3. To support its strategic objectives:

   a) by seeking and securing voluntary contributions, in cash and in kind, from industry as well as from governments, through systematic worldwide resource mobilization campaigns;
   b) by eliciting support from other multilateral and bilateral agencies and organizations concerned with the development of Third-world countries, with a view to optimizing, through cooperation and complementary action, the overall effectiveness of telecommunication development assistance programs;
   c) by disseminating appropriate and timely information about its activities and purposes in order to consolidate and maintain support from contributors and beneficiaries.[6]

The strategic objectives of the Centre for Telecommunications Development are worthy of closer examination because they reveal how this newest branch of the ITU was planning to position itself within the realm of existing telecommunications development efforts.

The CTD's first objective conveys a *communication* function, namely to promote the socio-economic benefits of telecommunications among key decision-

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 2-3.

makers in the development process. According to Mr. Michael Israel, Mr. Delorme's assistant and alternative representative on the Advisory Board, telecommunication administrations in developing countries had explained to the Maitland Commission that they often had difficulty convincing their governments to place sufficient priority on telecommunications development.[7] As a result, funding for telecommunications development was under-represented in the development plans submitted to the UNDP, constituting only 4% of the UNDP's total resources.[8]

The Centre's function would be to convey to the government authorities in developing countries who are responsible for the allocation of assistance funds that telecommunications is an essential part of an overall development plan. As Mr. Delorme explains:

> Telecommunications are a means to an end and, consequently, the question is not whether they should take precedence over other priorities such as health, food and education. What must be understood, however, is that telecommunications can optimize the effectiveness of assistance programs in such areas as health, education and food. The logical suggestion follows that a national development plan is incomplete unless it makes due provision for the development of telecommunications as one among several infrastructural elements required for the development of a country.[9]

Among the other decision-makers to which the Centre would convey the message of telecommunications development were multilateral and bilateral agencies charged with the administration of assistance programs, and financial institutions like the World Bank.

The second strategic objective encompassed the majority of the intended activity for the CTD. Here, the Centre would carry out an *advisory* function,

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[7]Interview with Mr. Michael Israel, Teleglobe Canada, January 6, 1989.
[8]Ruben Naslund, "ITU Conference in Nairobi: Confrontation or Mutual Understanding", *Telecommunications Policy*, June 1983, p. 104.
[9]Jean-Claude Delorme, from text of speech given at the conference "The Maitland Report -- Two Years Later", The Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., February 24, 1987, p. 3.

providing developing countries with the necessary consultation to make informed decisions regarding the development of telecommunications infrastructure. Several policy guidelines were formulated to guide these advisory services.[10] First, the Centre would "fulfill the need for strict neutrality and objectivity (not biased in favour of any company or nation)". It would also limit its advice to the "pre-investment and pre-commercial" stages of a development project and refrain from engaging in "competitive evaluations of suppliers' products". How the Centre would go about ensuring the neutrality and non-commerciality of its activities, especially in light of its supposed private sector sponsorship, was not detailed. Finally, the Centre's services would be "available universally, as befits the status of the ITU", and "coordinated and in complementarity with the activities of the Technical Cooperation Department of the ITU".

The Advisory Board was particularly careful to indicate that the Centre would complement but not duplicate existing aid initiatives. Because its interventions were limited to the pre-commercial stage, for example, it was not expected to be in competition with the providers of consulting services on a commercial basis. According to Delorme, "a typical project would be in the form of missions of experts working in the field, assessing the situation, defining needs, identifying the priority areas, and pointing the way in which specific assistance programs should be undertaken".[11] On the basis of this description, however, the Centre would have a more difficult time differentiating its sphere of activity from that of the ITU's own Technical Cooperation Department. While it was anticipated that the CTD would work closely with the TCD, overlapping jurisdictions would eventually cause problems for the new Centre. This facet of the CTD's development will be examined in greater detail later in the chapter.

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[10]Document CTD5-3, Centre for Telecommunications Development, Fifth Meeting of the Advisory Board, Geneva, 9-10 April 1987, (Geneva: ITU, 1987), p. 1.
[11]*Op. cit.*, Ref. 9, p. 4.

The third strategic objective of the mandate dealt with the Centre's own support operations, identifying how it would carry out its *fundraising* function. While the Maitland Commission had envisioned the Centre for Telecommunications Development as primarily a private sector initiative, the mandate expanded this to include the eliciting of funds from governments. So as not to raise concerns in the developed world, however, the Advisory Board made a special effort to refer to the Centre's scope of activities as "relatively modest", with the bulk of its resources being spent on assistance in the field and administrative costs being kept to a minimum.[12]

Taken together, the mandate and objectives of the Centre for Telecommunications Development represent a careful balancing of the interests of the various stakeholders in the telecommunications development debate. It was hoped that developing countries could benefit both from the Centre's expertise and its message to their governments encouraging investment in telecommunications technology. At the same time the Centre sought to appeal to interests in developed countries with its lean structure and modest operations. Governments, telecommunications administrations and private operating agencies alike would be more likely to sanction the Centre's operations if reassurances were given that this was not another elaborate aid program to which they would be asked to contribute large sums of money.

In addition to crafting its objectives with different national interests in mind, the Advisory Board endeavoured to establish a niche for the Centre within the spectrum of international aid organizations working in the field of telecommunications development. The Maitland commissioners recognized that apart from the ITU's Technical Cooperation Department and a small nucleus of people at the World Bank, there was no centre in the world where one could go to seek advice specifically regarding telecommunications development. The CTD would

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[12] *Ibid.*, p. 4.

fill this void, acting as a new focal point to coordinate these efforts. As Mr. Delorme explains:

> The Centre must address the multilateral and bilateral agencies charged with the administration of assistance programs. Indeed, there are countless organizations, international and national, multilateral and bilateral, public and private, which administer a variety of programs designed to assist developing countries and whose programs could accommodate more significant assistance to telecommunications development. Hence the need for timely and effective harmonization of efforts so as to optimize the results of those colossal assistance programs.[13]

Although its own resources would be relatively modest, the Advisory Board clearly felt that it could play a central role in coordinating the international telecommunications development effort.

The founders of the CTD took equal care in ensuring that its mandate and objectives complemented the internal structure of interests of the ITU. Despite its similarities to the Technical Cooperation Department, the Board was careful to stress that while the two branches would maintain a close relationship in the interests of coordination and complementarity of action, there would be sufficient divergence in agendas to avoid conflict. For example, while the Technical Cooperation Department was involved in the training of technical staff and the actual execution of telecommunications development projects, the new Centre would limit itself to an advisory role. By making these differences explicit, the Advisory Board of the CTD hoped to stem any resentment or concerns on the part of the Technical Cooperation Department staff that the Centre was attempting to take on their jobs.

In a similar manner, the Advisory Board attempted to balance the issue of the Centre's independence between the original vision of Maitland and the objectives of the ITU's General Secretariat. It was the intention of the Maitland Commission that the Centre for Telecommunications Development should be operated quite

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[13] *Ibid.*, p. 2.

independently of the main structures of the ITU. This, the commissioners felt, would be most appropriate considering the strong role which the private sector was expected to play in the Centre's operations. Mr. Israel explained the Commission's reasoning:

> In the spirit of the Maitland Commission, the idea of a CTD was one that, in order to function properly, needed to be as autonomous and as independent as possible. The ITU is an organization which is mostly populated by government agencies and government administrations. The private sector is not accustomed to working in that kind of internationally formal, governmental environment. Sir Donald Maitland felt, and the Commission felt, that if this Centre had some kind of independent status, the private sector would feel more comfortable. You don't go to the United Nations agencies to obtain contracts but you can go to an independent centre whose purpose it is to provide you with information on available opportunities for development or selling equipment or obtaining major contracts.[14]

Although the Maitland commissioners wanted the Centre to be operated as an independent international institution, they recognized the need to give it a legal "home" within the immense galaxy of INGOs and IGOs. Being the main body responsible for international telecommunications, it seemed most appropriate to situate the Centre under the aegis of the ITU. Furthermore, to reflect the position of the Secretary-General as "head" of the ITU's ongoing development assistance initiatives, he was given a permanent position on the Advisory Board of the new Centre. Such a move appeared to be a necessary compromise if the CTD was to win any measure of support from the Secretary-General or his staff within the ITU.

Despite being named *ex-officio* Vice-Chairman of the CTD Advisory Board, the "quasi-independent" status of the Centre was viewed with some suspicion by the Secretary-General and his staff within the ITU bureaucracy. One reason for this less-than-enthusiastic endorsement was that the recommendation for a separate Centre could be interpreted as a form of criticism of the Technical Cooperation Department's performance in the area of technical assistance. In discussing the

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[14]Interview with Mr. Michael Israel, Teleglobe Canada, January 6, 1989.

decision that the CTD should maintain some independence from the ITU, Sir Donald Maitland mentioned that the Commission "recognized that the role the ITU has been playing in this field up to now has not been effective in narrowing this gap between industrialized and developing countries, as the ITU is the first to accept".[15]

Elsewhere, Maitland is more candid in his acknowledgement that criticism of the TCD was a contributing factor in the formulation of the Commission's recommendations. He explains:

> Member States of the ITU, whether developing or industrialized countries, were in general reluctant to comment overtly on the ITU's record in the field of technical assistance. Nonetheless, individual Members of the Commission were told privately by representatives of developing countries of delays in the provision of assistance attributable largely to bureaucratic procedures. The ITU's performance was occasionally compared unfavourably with that of the private sector. The fact that this evidence was anecdotal prevented the Commission recording it in its Report. However, these private comments were amongst the factors which led to our stress on the increased role we expected the private sector to play in this field.[16]

These comments would seem to reinforce the opinion of Mr. Delorme's assistant, Hilary Childs, that a critique of the TCD's performance is found "between the lines" of the Maitland Commission Report.[17]

While recognizing that the Commission heard criticism of the Technical Cooperation Department, Maitland does not attempt to exaggerate the General Secretariat's sensitivity to this issue. He states, "it was not my impression that the Secretariat regarded the Commission's work as a judgement on their performance, which they nonetheless took every opportunity to justify. Nor did I think that the Secretariat were more sensitive to criticism than other UN agencies with which I have worked. The Secretariat undoubtedly hoped that the Commission's Report would

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[15]"The Missing Link", An interview with Sir Donald Maitland, Chairman, Independent Commission for Worldwide Telecommunications Development, London, *Intermedia*, January 1985, p. 9.
[16]Personal correspondence with Sir Donald Maitland, June 8, 1989.
[17]Interview with Ms. Hilary Childs, Teleglobe Canada, December 15, 1987.

strengthen rather than diminish the role of the ITU and they exerted their influence in our debate to that end".[18]

In this last comment, however, Maitland identifies a second, more compelling reason for the General Secretariat's reservations about the Centre's "quasi-independent" nature, particularly on the part of the Secretary-General. As the head of the ITU's existing technical cooperation programs, Richard Butler wanted to see an enhanced role for the ITU in the field of development assistance. A new independent centre was likely to weaken, rather than strengthen, this role. This, in turn, would result in a diminished portfolio for the Secretary-General himself in an area which commanded a significant amount of prestige and influence within the international community. Michael Israel is quite candid in offering his own assessment and explanation of Mr. Butler's stance regarding the CTD:

> The Secretary-General would very much like to see an enhanced role for the agency (in development assistance). He certainly perceived the Centre as being a bit of an outcast, competing with one of his own departments. Obviously the Secretary-General would never admit that the Technical Cooperation Department does not do things right... But there is also another political aspect. For the Secretary-General, having control over an area that dispenses money is an excellent way to get votes. An incumbent that is at the top and controls a bag of money -- which can be dispensed very equitably -- nevertheless has one good way of projecting his own image and getting votes when the time comes to be re-elected or whatever. It is a powerful tool for any Secretary-General to have "give-aways" and what better way than a budget of several millions at the disposal of one individual, or rather, one department under his control.[19]

While Mr. Israel's analysis of the Secretary-General's motives may be somewhat simplistic, his comments do point to the fact that the influence of the Secretary-General and his staff should not be underestimated with regards to the administration of telecommunications development assistance. Many developing nations relied heavily on the ITU for advice concerning investments in

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[18] *Op cit*, Ref 16.
[19] *Op cit*, Ref 13.

telecommunications. As a result, through the Technical Cooperation Department and its various regional offices and training schools, the ITU Secretariat could exert considerable influence over telecommunications development projects -- even those initiated by other aid agencies. In describing the influence of the TCD, Colin Billowes, head of the Telecommunications Sector within the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), remarks, "if you're not for 'em, you're against 'em".[20] According to Billowes, CIDA (which participates in funding and supplying equipment for capital projects in telecommunications) has found that African nations in particular rely heavily on the ITU for advice. The opinions and recommendations offered by ITU regional representatives can often be a deciding factor in the success or failure of a CIDA-funded project.

Neither Israel nor Billowes suggested any impropriety or abuse of position on the part of the Secretary-General and his management of the ITU's technical assistance functions. Instead, they each identified an area where the professional interests of the ITU's head might come into conflict with the CTD's conceptualization. Clearly, the opinions and personal influence of the Secretary-General would play a key role in the Centre's future. It would face a considerable challenge in attempting to situate itself as a reputable centre of authority in light of the already-established influence of the General Secretariat in this field.

Understandably, Richard Butler vigorously objected to any suggestion that either he or his staff used their positions within the organization to inappropriately influence the CTD's course of events. Responding to an account of the Centre's history assembled from interviews with Jean-Claude Delorme's staff, Butler maintained that he never opposed the idea of a Centre for Telecommunications Development, and in fact made every effort to assist in its implementation.[21]

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[20]Interview with Mr. Colin Billowes, Canadian International Development Agency, January 5, 1988.
[21]Richard Butler's views as reported by Prof. William Melody at interview; Correspondence, Prof. W.H. Melody to Prof. R.S. Anderson, 18 February 1991.

Exercising his personal influence, he insists, was limited to trying to orchestrate the establishment and development of the Centre in such a way that it would produce tangible results. If it were pushed solely along the path of private sector control independent of the ITU's structure, he felt that the Centre's chances of success would be greatly reduced.

The former Secretary-General's analysis of the rise and eventual fall of the CTD differs quite strongly in a number of areas from the opinions expressed by Delorme's staff and by officials within the Federal Department of Communications and CIDA. These contrasting viewpoints will be explored at a number of junctures in the following account and analysis of the Centre's operations.

The Centre's Activities

The third meeting of the Advisory Board in June 1986 marked the beginning of the transition from conceptualization to implementation for the Centre for Telecommunications Development. After extensive discussion, its mandate and basic organizational structure were adopted and an Executive Director and Deputy Executive Director were appointed.

Structurally, the Centre would be divided into the same three units originally proposed by the Maitland Commission: namely, the Development Policy Unit, the Telecommunications Development Unit, and the Operations Support Unit. The Development Policy Unit would be responsible for collecting and analysing information about telecommunications policies and experience throughout the world, and to make this information available to developing countries to help them formulate policies for the evolution of their own networks. The Telecommunications Development and the Operations Support Units would provide pre-investment consultation services and advice on a wide range of issues regarding the development of telecommunications, including the organization of services, system planning and

maintenance, staff training, financing, and the integration of telecommunications in overall development programs.

Based on the mandate and in response to the strategic objectives and policies set by the Advisory Board, the Executive Directorate was charged with the development of appropriate programs of action for the Centre's three Units. It would also perform a general management function, overseeing the day-to-day operations of the Centre. Mr. Dietrich Westendoerpf of the Federal Republic of Germany was appointed Executive Director and Mr. Ahmed Laouyane of Tunisia assumed the position of Deputy Executive Director. They both began their duties in September 1986.

At its fourth meeting in Geneva in November 1986, the Advisory Board met for the first time with the Centre's Executive Director and Deputy Executive Director. Discussions concentrated on the approval of the Centre's strategic objectives, the development of administrative policies required to initiate project assistance, and the mobilization of resources.[22] Although progress was made in drafting a program budget, staffing requirements and a CTD brochure, problems were raised by Board Members that would continue to dog the Centre in the months ahead.

Much of the discussion focused on the difficulties that the Centre had in attracting funds. By November of 1986, the Centre had received only US$ 640,000 of the US$ 1,000,000 pledged by donor countries for 1986.[23] As set out in the proposed triennial budget, the total funds required for 1987 amounted to US$ 2.4 million, with an additional US$ 10 million targeted for 1988 and 1989. Several Board Members expressed concern that money was simply not forthcoming. Mr. Westendoerpf, the

[22]Documents CTD4-12,13,14,15, "Summary Record of Sessions", Centre for Telecommunications Development, Fourth Meeting of the Advisory Board, Geneva, 11-12 November 1986, (Geneva: ITU, 1986).
[23]Document CTD4-13, p. 7.

Centre's Executive Director, described the predicament as a vicious circle: the CTD was unable to start activity for lack of funds and had difficulty in raising funds because no activity had been started.[24] Mr. Delorme, the Advisory Board Chairman, recognized that funds were in short supply but reminded that Board that it was unrealistic to suppose that enthusiasm to contribute to the Centre could be generated instantly. He felt that the CTD would have to have several years of operation behind it to establish its reputation.[25]

Differences of opinion existed amongst the Advisory Board concerning the best immediate course of action for the Centre in light of its limited funds. Mr. Ben Lakhal of Tunisia emphasized the need to begin a concrete program of assistance projects. He reminded the Board that the Independent Commission had been set up in 1982 because developing countries were dissatisfied with the existing technical assistance programs. The Advisory Board was now holding its fourth meeting but so far the developing countries had not seen any results.[26] While Mr. Weiss of the Federal Republic of Germany was sympathetic to these views, he felt that the Centre must first tackle the budgeting aspect. He stated that unless a concrete budget could be presented, his own country's authorities would say they could no longer continue to provide funds if other developed countries did not do the same.[27] Mr. Vishny of the United States offered a third opinion, maintaining that a concrete plan of action for the Centre was of primary concern, since this was necessary to attract potential donors.[28]

Whatever course of action the Advisory Board and Executive Directorate were to embark upon, it became clear that a great deal of work -- both operational and organizational -- had to be undertaken before the Board's next meeting. To this

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[24] *Ibid.*, p. 2.
[25] Document CTD4-14, p. 3.
[26] Document CTD4-13, p. 4.
[27] *Ibid.*, p. 5.
[28] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

end, the Advisory Board constituted an *ad hoc* interim committee of seven of its Members to oversee the development by the Executive Directorate of the Centre's action plan, budget and long-term strategy for the mobilization of resources.

The tone of the fourth Advisory Board meeting served to underscore the fact that the pressure on the CTD to produce some form of tangible results, one which was present from its inception, only intensified as the time before the next Plenipotentiary Conference diminished. This was made pointedly clear by the Secretary-General in his position as Senior Vice-Chairman of the Advisory Board. He reminded the Board that the Administrative Council had asked for results from the Centre and that the CTD's credibility would depend on what it achieved.[29] He therefore encouraged the Centre to proceed as quickly as possible in drafting an action program, bearing in mind that the ITU would not underwrite any deficit incurred by the CTD.

By the time the Advisory Board held its fifth meeting in April, 1987, considerable progress had been made by the Executive Directorate and the *Ad Hoc* Interim Committee in establishing the Centre's policies and programs -- on paper, if not in reality. Most important among the many documents presented to the Advisory Board Members was the Executive Directorate's *Proposal For A Plan of Action* which contained a detailed breakdown of the CTD's proposed activities, based on the strategic objectives mentioned earlier.[30] Briefly, in support of the first strategic objective (i.e. to promote the importance of telecommunications as a key factor of socio-economic development), the Centre would seek to compile data, documentation and other relevant information concerning telecommunications development, as well as carrying out its own analytical research "with the view to demonstrating the importance of telecommunications as a key factor of socio-

[29]Document CTD4-14, p. 4.
[30]Document CTD5-2, *Proposal for a Plan of Action*, Centre for Telecommunications Development, Fifth Meeting of the Advisory Board, Geneva, 9-10 April 1987, (Geneva: ITU, 1987).

economic development".[31] It would also seek to communicate this information to relevant decision-makers in developing countries.

In support of the second strategic objective (i.e. to contribute to accelerating the development of telecommunications through advisory services or operational/technical support), the CTD would seek first to develop procedures for identifying, formulating, submitting and considering requests for assistance and then to carry out technical assistance to developing countries. These interventions would range from advice and counsel, to short-term consultant missions, to lengthier technical cooperation projects. Finally, in response to the third strategic objective (i.e. to support the Centre's objectives through the mobilization of resources, collaboration with other agencies, and the dissemination of information about the Centre's activities), the action plan proposed the development of comprehensive plans for resource mobilization, and communications. Steps would also be taken to develop and maintain an information database on telecommunication status, plans and projects of developing countries including data on technology, traffic, finance, investments, trade and basic economic indicators.

Based on the provisions of the action plan, permanent staff would be kept to a minimal level of twelve to fifteen, with much of the work being awarded to outside consultants. So as not to appear overly bureaucratic, the majority of the Centre's staffing expenditure would be dedicated to the implementation of field missions and "specific assistance" missions. Ranging in length from several weeks to a maximum of six months, these multidisciplinary missions would undertake an evaluation of the telecommunications sector, culminating in a detailed proposal for an action program, or quickly respond to a more specific request for technical assistance. These missions were allotted a total of 98 man/months during 1987, and an additional 200

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[31] *Ibid.*, p. 10.

man/months in both 1988 and 1989.[32] Budgeted at US$ 10,000 per man/month, these missions alone would cost the Centre close to US$ 5 million over the next three years. An additional US$ 8 million was allocated to the completion of more in-depth technical assistance projects, bringing its total proposed field assistance budget to US$ 12 million.

Along with its action plan, the Executive Directorate also introduced the first four projects which the Centre would seek to embark upon. Mr. Laouyane, the Deputy Executive Director of the CTD, reminded the Board that this should be done as quickly as possible in order to maintain the credibility of the Centre and to show that it could become operational very quickly.[33] The proposed projects included: preparation of a master telecommunications plan for both Malta and Mauritania; a plan for the improvement of maintenance in Congo; and a program to improve organizational structure and to strengthen network extension, maintenance and management in Yemen Arab Republic.

All four of the proposed projects shared a number of common features. First, partial financing for the projects had already been secured from other development agencies, including the European Development Bank, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, the UNDP, and the World Bank.[34] Secondly, each proposal was part of a larger development project aimed at modernizing telecommunications facilities in the respective countries. Both of these factors would serve to reduce the risk for the Centre that might be involved when embarking on ambitious, independent projects. In addition to their modest nature, these projects also shared a common origin. All were selected by the Executive Directorate from a list submitted by the Secretary-General to the fourth meeting of the Advisory Board. The Secretary-General explained that each project had originally been submitted to

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[32] *Ibid.*, p. 19.
[33] Document CTD5-29, *Summary Record of the Third Session*, p. 2.
[34] *Ibid.*, p. 2.

the Technical Cooperation Department of the ITU which, for various reasons, was unable to deal with them for some time.[35]

This fact once again raised the issue of the Centre's role and independence vis-à-vis the Technical Cooperation Department. Mr. Weiss, the West German member of the Board, wondered if the Centre should be engaged in too many master plans, since these were more the province of the TCD and might restrict the Centre's capacity for action. Mr. Vishny from the United States agreed, stating that at this stage in its development, the Centre must act responsibly to demonstrate a new and creative attitude to the development process, seeking out projects which would bear its own unique stamp.[36] While this might be ideal, the Deputy Executive Director replied that they had been obliged to concentrate on projects which resulted from earlier ITU assistance, since fresh investigations and negotiations involved too much time and money. In any case, he added, the Centre collaborates very closely with the TCD, which at this stage provided it with all the basic services. The Board eventually agreed that it was essential to approve the projects as a start, but to continue to improve procedures in order to enable the Centre to develop its own characteristic style.

Although presented as a brief exchange in the minutes of the Advisory Board meeting, the hurdle of developing an independent agenda for the Centre was one which clearly had to be overcome if it was to realize the expectations of its originators. It was certainly not the vision of the Maitland Commissioners that the Centre should survive on projects handed to it by the ITU's Technical Cooperation Department. Not only could this overlap of duties be a source of friction among the staff of the two departments, but it would also make the Centre's existence as a separate entity harder to justify at the next Plenipotentiary Conference.

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[35] *Ibid.*, p. 3.
[36] *Ibid.*, p. 4.

The progress of the Centre for Telecommunications Development continued to fall short of expectations in other respects as well. A shortage of funds continued to be a problem for the CTD, leading the French member of the Advisory Board to question whether the Centre would have the US$ 800,000 needed to finance the first four projects, after covering staff costs and general expenses.[37] The Deputy Executive Director admitted that the Executive Directorate would have to seek to mobilize additional funds and adjust its final commitment accordingly. With additional funds needed, the Centre was even having trouble collecting the funds that had been previously pledged by various countries. Of the 2,081,000 Swiss Francs pledged for 1987, only 166,000 S.F. had been received by 10 March 1987, from Denmark and Sri Lanka.[38]

As the CTD continued to labour without any tangible results, and the date of the next Plenipotentiary Conference loomed ever closer, criticism from various parties became harsher. During the African Telecommunications Development Conference held in Tunis in January 1987, many developing countries expressed impatience with the Centre's seemingly lack of field-oriented activities.[39] Board members had also received similar complains from some potential contributors to the Centre. Perhaps the strongest criticism, however, came from members of the Advisory Board itself. Mr. A.D. Ntagazwa of Tanzania, the Board's Vice-Chairman, submitted an open letter to the fifth meeting in which he harshly criticized the Advisory Board's failure to move from theory to practice by not entrusting the Centre's Executive Directorate with the task of taking concrete action. He writes,

> Whereas actions speak louder than words, the Board seems bent on perfectionism again in words of what it is expected to do... The Executive Directorate has to be given chance and opportunity to embark on concrete action within its limited budgetary constraints... At the moment, we seem to be obsessed with fine tuning our own empty programs. Unless we put an end to our loud but hollow words,

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[37] *Ibid.*, p. 3.
[38] Document CTD5-6, *Status Report on the Mobilization of Resources*, p. 2.
[39] Document CTD5-2, *Proposal for a Plan of Action*, p. 2.

> we are sure to lose the international community's confidence and trust plus the contributions badly needed to sustain the Centre.[40]

The Secretary-General, as Senior Vice-Chairman of the Advisory Board, was equally blunt in his assessment of the Centre's progress. His remarks are worth quoting not only for their points of criticism but also for the way in which they emphasize the Centre as an integral part of the ITU machinery, rather than acknowledging its quasi-independent status. Butler states,

> It may be pertinent to mention that after examining all the advantages and disadvantages the Independent Commission recommended and subsequently the Administrative Council decided to set up the Centre within the framework of the ITU.[sic] The reason for such a decision was to gain practical experience on the modalities of introducing a new multilateral cooperation scheme before the next Plenipotentiary Conference. This implied that the Centre should take off without too much bureaucracy and paper work using the logistics and working mechanisms of the ITU, including its field support network. Unfortunately however, the Advisory Board chose to spend a disproportionate part of its time in defining the Centre's mandate and working out its strategies for intervention. We have now less than a year to carry out field activities, obtain results, draw conclusions and give our recommendations to the Administrative Council which in turn will report to the 1989 Plenipotentiary Conference.[41]

Aside from his concern for meeting the needs of developing countries, the Secretary-General's comments reflect his own professional interests as well. As head of the ITU's technical assistance program, Mr. Butler wished to ensure that the Centre for Telecommunications Development was perceived to be making a legitimate effort to lessen the gap in telecommunications development between the developing and industrialized countries. Its failure to appear viable and responsive to the needs of the developing world might reflect poorly on his own abilities in this area, given his position of prominence on the Centre's Advisory Board.

In reviewing the summary records of the Advisory Board meetings, Mr. Butler appeared to be caught between a willingness to assist in the development of the

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[40]Document CTD5-12, *Contribution of the Vice-Chairman*, p. 1.
[41]Document CTD5-27, *Summary Record of the First Session*, p. 2.

Centre and to work for its success, while at the same time experiencing the frustration of an agency not fully under his control. Throughout the course of the Board's deliberations he makes repeated references to the fact that the CTD is part of the ITU's General Secretariat and subject to the direction of the Administrative Council. His frustration with the actions of Mr. Delorme and his Advisory Board members is evident in discussions of matters ranging from travel arrangements for the Centre's executive staff to the fate of the *Ad Hoc* Interim Committee.

At the fifth meeting of the Advisory Board, for example, the *Ad Hoc* Interim Committee proposed that the Centre's Directors should travel by Business Class on intercontinental trips. The Secretary-General argued that such a move might be unwise since ITU staff at the same level travelled by Economy Class and such a rule might be regarded as discriminatory.[42] In Mr. Butler's opinion, Mr. Delorme's insistence that the Centre's executive staff should fly business class -- when the Secretary-General himself was flying economy class -- was a clear illustration of the squandering of scarce funds by the Centre's Advisory Board.[43]

Another sharp difference of opinion between the Chairman and the Secretary-General concerned the future fate of the *Ad Hoc* Interim Committee. Formed at the Board's fourth meeting, the seven-member Committee -- which contained five members from industrialized countries -- had played a major role in the formulation of the Centre's policies and action plans. The debate at the fifth meeting centered on whether the Committee should be reconvened to assess the progress of the Executive Directorate with regards to the budgetary implications of project implementation and the priorities to be assigned.[44] Mr. Delorme, who had chaired the *Ad Hoc* Interim Committee, felt that it should be reconvened to take stock of the Centre's progress

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[42]Document CTD5-29, *Summary Record of the Third Session*, p. 10.
[43]Richard Butler's views as reported by Prof. William Melody at interview; Correspondence, Prof. W.H. Melody to Prof. R.S. Anderson, 18 February 1991.
[44]Document CTD5-30, *Summary Record of the Fourth Session*, p. 4-8.

and provide further guidance on the allocation of existing resources. This position was supported by Board members from the United States and Britain. The Secretary-General, backed by Board members from the developing countries, felt that the role of the *Ad Hoc* Interim Committee was largely completed and that responsibility for the operations of the CTD should now be handed over to the Centre's Executive Directorate. When Mr. Delorme persisted, the Secretary-General stated that the majority of members felt that the Committee should not be reconvened and that the Chairman appeared to be pursuing a course of action which went against the expressed majority.[45]

The Secretary-General's strong stance on this issue clearly comes from his opposition to what appeared to be yet another obstacle in the Centre's transition from administrative wrangling to viability and tangible results. If this was ever to occur, the Centre's Executive Directorate must be allowed to proceed without the continual interjection of the Advisory Board. Mr. Butler's opposition can also be explained at least in part as an indirect way of securing greater influence over the operations of the Centre for Telecommunications Development. By seeking to diminish the role of the *Ad Hoc* Interim Committee, which appeared to be in danger of becoming a permanent body, the Secretary-General could curtail the influence of Mr. Delorme and others on the Board who wanted to direct the Centre toward independence from the ITU's bureaucracy.

The Secretary-General was ultimately in the best position to influence the affairs of the Centre for Telecommunications Development, a fact which became clear at the following meeting of the Administrative Council in September 1987. At this time, the Secretary-General was expected to present a list of names for appointment to the Centre's Second Advisory Board, subject to the approval of the Administrative Council. While the motion itself was not unusual, given that the First Advisory

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[45] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

Board's two-year term had been completed in June 1987, the way in which the procedure was handled by the Secretary-General appeared somewhat irregular to the Canadian delegation.[46] On the last day of the Administrative Council meeting, Mr. Butler circulated a list of the members of the Second Advisory Board to the Administrative Council. Mr. Delorme's name was not on the list. He had not been notified of this in advance, nor had he or the Canadian delegation been asked to furnish an alternative Canadian representative to the new Board. Delorme was given no other option but to quietly resign. Although his term was up, the handling of the situation was seen by some delegates as a procedural snub of the Advisory Board's first Chairman.

Ironically, the new Chairman of the Advisory Board was Mr. A.D. Ntagazwa of Tanzania, Vice-Chairman and one of the most outspoken critics of the First Advisory Board. Mr. J.M. Biezen of the Netherlands, another vocal member of the First Board, was appointed the new Vice-Chairman. The Secretary-General's selections also shifted the composition of the Advisory Board away from representatives of the industrialized "donor" countries toward those from the developing countries. Representation from Canada, the United Kingdom, Sweden and France was dropped, while Indonesia, India, Mali and Costa Rica all gained seats on the Advisory Board. By increasing the representation of developing countries, the Secretary-General effectively weakened the Centre's independent orientation. Many developing nations were more inclined to trust the ITU as a source of unbiased technical assistance, rather than as an independent agency funded largely by the private sector.

One of the first tasks of the Second Advisory Board was to create a new fund-raising task force to examine all possible means of stimulating contributions for the

[46]Account based on interviews with Janice Doran, Department of Communications, January 10, 1988; and Michael Israel, Teleglobe Canada, January 6, 1989.

Centre. Although by the end of 1987 the Centre had undertaken twelve evaluation and assistance missions, available funds for the CTD continued to be modest.[47] More funds would be required if the Centre was to address the approximately thirty requests for assistance which it had received since it officially commenced operations in April 1987.

In the year and a half that remained prior to the ITU Plenipotentiary Conference in June 1989, the Centre for Telecommunications Development continued to operate below expectations. The agency seemed unable to overcome some of the fundamental problems which had plagued it from the very beginning. Funding for the Centre never reached budgeted levels, although the Centre was not completely ignored by its targeted donors. Canada, for example, contributed between $300,000 and $400,000 over the three years of the Centre's operations through a variety of agencies.[48] Aside from contributions from the federal government, donations were received by such telecommunications agencies as Teleglobe Canada, Bell Northern, Spar Aerospace, Telesat and Telecom Canada. With regards to Canadian contributions, however, Mr. Butler maintains that Canada did not contribute the amount that it had originally promised to the CTD.[49] Canadian contributors may have indeed reduced their contributions to the Centre after the unceremonious departure of Mr. Delorme, although ascertaining the scale of these reductions is difficult.

Another problem which the Centre never successfully overcame was establishing its own viable, identifiable sphere of operations apart from what was already being accomplished by the ITU's own technical assistance programs. In the months leading up to the Plenipotentiary Conference, the Centre continued to work

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[47]"Second Advisory Board of the Centre for Telecommunications Development Meets in Geneva", *ITU Press Release*, 9 November, 1987.
[48]Interview with Pierre Gagné, Department of Communications, January 10, 1989
[49]Richard Butler's views as reported by Prof. William Melody at interview; Correspondence, Prof. W.H. Melody to Prof. R.S. Anderson, 18 February 1991.

on such projects as the preparation of master plans for integrated development, national sector maintenance and management plans, extension of national networks to the rural areas, and training in network planning. The dilemma lay in the fact that these were essentially the same activities being undertaken by the ITU's Technical Cooperation Department. In fact, many of the projects originated from requests for assistance received by the TCD but subsequently turned over to the CTD.

Referring to the period after Mr Delorme's departure as Advisory Board Chairman, Mr. Israel explained that "now that there is less contention between the two (the TCD and the CTD), because they are both under the control of the Secretary-General, where they see a project coming to the TCD that would fit more in the conceptual area of the CTD, it can be handed over [to the CTD]".[50] Through such cooperative arrangements, the Centre was able to continue its operations. The only complication with this strategy is that it begged the question of the practicality of allowing the Centre to remain as a separate entity. Would it not be more efficient simply to merge the CTD with the TCD? In the months leading up to the Plenipotentiary Conference, there was considerable debate about whether the Centre should survive intact or simply be subsumed within the existing structure of the TCD.

Why Did the Centre Fail to Flourish?

Having examined the often-turbulent history of the Centre for Telecommunications Development, from its formulation through to its slow demise, one is left to ponder the reasons for its ineffectiveness. Did its fate stem from a flawed conceptualization on the part of the Maitland Commissioners? Perhaps its

[50]Interview with Michael Israel, Teleglobe Canada, January 6, 1989.

problems lay in the implementation of these ideas by the Centre's Advisory Board. What impact did the doubts among the ITU's own bureaucracy have on the project?

When attempting to account for the failure of any project or initiative embarked upon by an organization, one must contend with the existence of multiple explanations for the eventual outcome. In the case of the CTD, there exists at least two major rationalizations for why events unfolded at they did. As might be expected, each of these accounts is favoured by a major player or group of players in the CTD story. Instead of characterizing these accounts solely on the basis of who adheres to which one, however, it is useful to approach each account in terms of the sources of influence they stress.

The version favoured by Canadian interests, including Mr. Delorme's staff, officials within the Federal Department of Communications, and CIDA officials, focuses on the role of *internal* sources of influence in the fate of the CTD. These internal sources include the personal influence of the Secretary-General himself as well as the resistance of the ITU bureaucracy, particularly within the Technical Cooperation Department. Conversely, the version favoured by officials within the ITU, as articulated by the Secretary-General, focuses on the influence of *external* interests. These external influences include, first and foremost, mismanagement by the Centre's Advisory Board and its chairman. This was coupled with profound opposition by various interests within both developed and developing countries. The impact of both internal and external sources of influence will be examined in turn.

In the opinion of Mr. Delorme and his supporters, although the weight of external interests was considerable, even this was not as profound as the influence of interests within the ITU itself. It was here that they believe the most formidable opposition to the success of the Centre for Telecommunications Development was focused. In its most basic form, they argue that success for the Centre as originally

proposed would mean failure and possibly loss for those within the ITU involved in the organization's existing development assistance programs. Since, at the same time, the fate of this new rival depended so heavily on the administrative support of the ITU, those in power were eventually able to curtail this threat and render the Centre little more than another appendage of the ITU bureaucracy.

In order to fully understand how the CTD might pose a threat to the ITU bureaucracy, it is useful to return to Maitland's original conception of the Centre. As discussed previously, the recommendation for an independent and privately supported Centre to offer telecommunications advice and assistance stemmed in part from complaints of "delays in the provision of assistance attributable largely to bureaucratic procedures".[51] The ITU's performance had been compared unfavourably to that of the private sector, leading the Commission to contemplate an increased role for this sector in the provision of development assistance.

Although Maitland was realistic enough to concede that the ITU would continue to play a significant role in the provision of development assistance in the future, he did envision a situation wherein the Centre's influence would eventually eclipse that of the ITU's mechanisms. Michael Israel, together with Mr. Delorme, spent considerable time with Donald Maitland following the formation of the Centre's First Advisory Board. He explains how Maitland envisioned the future course of events:

> Sir Donald Maitland and his Commission said that after a trial period of this new autonomous Centre, there should be a good look at the possibility of merging the two [the CTD and the TCD]. Obviously, Maitland felt that the Technical Cooperation Department should be the one merging into the Centre to take full advantage of the autonomy of the Centre.[52]

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[51] *Op. cit.*, Ref 16

[52] Interview with Michael Israel, Teleglobe Canada, January 6, 1989.

In essence, Maitland's plan would result in a situation where the technical cooperation aspect of the Union's activities would be largely removed from the structure of the organization.

It is not difficult to imagine how a controversial prospect like the "privatization" of the ITU's technical cooperation activities could win both supporters and detractors. Industrialized capitalist countries might be inclined to support such a proposal, not only as a benefit to their telecommunications industries, but also as a means of removing the costly and time consuming issue of development assistance from the ITU's already crowded agenda. This would conceivably allow more time and resources to be spent in the area of standard-setting. At the same time, developing countries would no doubt oppose entrusting the entire area of telecommunications development to an agency funded largely by the private sector. Not only would this raise fears of biased advice, it would also mean surrendering a significant degree of control over the development assistance agenda. As currently structured, the developing countries were able to exercise considerable influence through the ITU's various organs, particularly the Administrative Council and the Plenipotentiary Conference.

The most immediate source of opposition to Maitland's vision, however, was concentrated within the ITU's bureaucracy. Understandably, those involved in the administration of the ITU's technical assistance efforts were not eager to see their own positions become redundant and perhaps eventually removed from the structure of the organization. The individual who stood to lose the most influence and prestige through such a reorganization was also the one in the best position to prevent it from occurring. For this reason it was the Secretary-General who spearheaded the organization's opposition to the Centre for Telecommunications Development as originally conceived by the Maitland Commission.

The Centre's first Advisory Board Chairman, Mr. Delorme, understood the main thrust of the Maitland Commission's recommendation concerning the need for a new autonomous centre of telecommunications expertise. Indeed, it was this model for the Centre which he sought to implement. Unfortunately, this strategy put him in direct conflict with the interests of the Secretary-General. As Mr. Israel explains:

> The Secretary-General obviously did not agree with Mr. Delorme's push for autonomy for the Centre. From the beginning we wanted to implement the concept of Maitland which was to have as much autonomy as possible. Unfortunately, Mr. Butler did not like the idea. We could not get some form of honourable agreement on the subject, so we agreed to disagree. He therefore considered us an enemy and in the good old style, he tried to kill the enemy and succeeded. The way he did it was by removing Canada from the Advisory Board.[53]

Controlling the appointment of the Centre's Advisory Board was one of the most effective means by which the Secretary-General was able to influence the direction of the CTD. If fundamental differences of opinion existed concerning the Centre's operations, these could be alleviated in due course through the appointment of a new Advisory Board whose views were more in line with those of the Secretary-General and his staff.

Even after the removal of Mr. Delorme and other Board members who supported autonomy for the Centre, the Secretary-General's influence was evident in the CTD's progress. Mr. Butler continued to be instrumental in directing the Centre's agenda, working to bring its program of action into alignment with that of the Technical Cooperation Department while at the same time weakening the distinctiveness of the CTD's mandate. In the opinion of Mr. Pierre Gagné, Canada's representative on the Administrative Council, this was not the original focus of the Centre as envisioned by Maitland and his commissioners:

> When the Centre was established, it was very clear that it was supposed to perform certain functions that were different than those of the TCD. One of its roles, for example, would be to work with senior

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[53] *Ibid.*

> people in developing countries to convince them of the need to develop telecommunications infrastructure. Another one was to establish a good rapport with the international banking institutions. Another had to do with the establishment of databases. These three types of activities do not necessarily require a lot of money. Unfortunately, the little money that the Centre has succeeded in getting has been used to carry out field activities. So it has not done what it was supposed to do, which in my view is why we're having problems right now.[54]

Mr. Gagné attributed the Centre's departure from its original agenda to the influence of the Secretary-General, rather than to any misunderstanding of mission on the part of the First Advisory Board. He states:

> Delorme knew exactly what the Centre was supposed to do. I suspect it was the Secretary-General who never really saw the role of the Centre as what it was supposed to be. He wanted it to more or less duplicate the TCD. He wanted duplication between the Centre and the TCD in order to increase the ITU's technical cooperation budget. If the Centre was folded into the TCD, what it means is that the portion of the regular budget for technical cooperation will increase.[55]

By supplying the Centre with assistance projects that had been originally intended for the TCD, and encouraging its focus on field activities, Canadian officials believed that the Secretary-General worked to make the Centre appear largely redundant to both donor and beneficiaries in the international community. In so doing, questions about the need for an autonomous Centre would no doubt be raised at the Plenipotentiary Conference and any remaining claims to autonomy could be eradicated.

In the opinion of Mr. Israel, Mr. Butler's stance on the fate of the CTD is best summarized as "alive, but not successful". It was not in the Secretary-General's interest to see the Centre fail completely, since this could lead to an erosion of confidence on the part of developing countries in the industrialized world's commitment to assist in telecommunications development. It would also result in greater conflict between developing and developed countries at the next

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[54] *Op. cit.*, Ref 47.
[55] *Ibid.*

Plenipotentiary Conference, thus inhibiting the organization's effectiveness. At the same time, if the CTD were to become a successfully functioning agency outside the auspices of the ITU, it would reflect badly on the performance of the Technical Cooperation Department. This outcome would certainly lend credence to Maitland's vision of an independent, "deregulated" development assistance effort.

Turning to the impact of external sources of influence, one finds a significantly different explanation for the Centre's failure, as presented by former Secretary-General Butler. As indicated earlier, Mr. Butler maintains that mismanagement on the part of the First Advisory Board -- not internal opposition -- was the principle cause of the CTD's demise. In the words of the former Secretary-General, "the Advisory Board chose to spend a disproportionate part of its time in defining the Centre's mandate and working out its strategies for intervention".[56] This left virtually no time to produce any concrete results with which to assess the Centre's value and communicate this to donors and beneficiaries alike.

This same complaint was echoed by the current Chairman of the Centre's Advisory Board, Mr. A.D. Ntagazwa of Tanzania. Speaking as Vice-Chairman of the original Advisory Board and on behalf of the developing countries, he accused his colleagues of "being obsessed with fine tuning empty programs" instead of working to achieve concrete action. A more candid evaluation of the performance of Mr. Delorme and his Advisory Board is offered by Professor William Melody, the Director of the Centre for International Research on Communication and Information Technologies (CIRCIT) in Melbourne, Australia. According to Prof. Melody, "[Delorme] spent more than 800,000 Swiss Francs in the first two years [of the Centre's existence] travelling around the world for Board meetings that led to no progress at all".[57] Prof. Melody maintains that accusations of internal resistance to

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[56]Document CTD5-27, *Summary Record of the First Session*, p. 2.
[57]Correspondence; Prof. W.H. Melody to Prof. R.S. Anderson, 18 February 1991.

the Centre's success serve as Mr. Delorme's self-justification when, in fact, he was a large part of the problem.

The impact of external sources of influence extended beyond simple mismanagement on the part of the Centre's Advisory Board, however. In fact, Mr. Butler felt that the Board displayed a profound lack of understanding of the external sources of opposition to the project, from interests within industrialized and developing countries alike. According to Prof. Melody, "[Butler] knew that if [the CTD] were pushed along certain paths, the result would be entirely hopeless".[58] From his extensive experience with administering the ITU's technical cooperation programs, the Secretary-General had a unique understanding of how best to match donors and beneficiaries to achieve telecommunications development. Clearly, he felt that pursuing the paths of complete autonomy and private sector management were not the best means of appealing to either beneficiaries or donors.

With regards to the Centre's intended beneficiaries, the developing countries, the new program's push for autonomy would undoubtedly be met with a degree of suspicion. As previously indicated, the developing countries were more likely to favour increases in the ITU's own development budget, rather than supporting an independent centre. This arrangement provided a much better position from which to influence the nature and scope of development assistance efforts by exercising their voting majority at Plenipotentiary Conferences and Administrative Council meetings. If development assistance were to be offered as a private sector initiative, control over the Centre would ultimately rest with its donors. For this reason, Butler points out that the eventual structure of the program (i.e. within the structure of the ITU) was the one desired -- and indeed, insisted upon -- by Third World members.

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[58] *Ibid.*

External opposition to the establishment of the Centre was not limited to the developing countries. According to Mr. Butler, the developed countries had made it clear from the outset that they would not support the Maitland Report's recommendations and attempts to pursue it would come to nothing.[59] The assertion of a wholesale rejection of the Report and its proposal for a Centre for Telecommunications Development may be somewhat overstated, given the support offered by a number of developed countries in the form of cash and in kind contributions. At the same time, this fact cannot mask some serious doubts on the part of public and private interests in the industrialized nations about the need for a new Centre.

Although some Western governments supported the idea of an independent Centre for Telecommunications Development, financing the new agency conflicted with their national policies for the administration of development assistance. Many nations, including Canada, support a central funding policy for multilateral aid. This means that all financial assistance to the developing countries is channelled through one UN body, namely, the UNDP. After a government has budgeted a certain amount for foreign aid through the UNDP, it is difficult to allocate additional funding to other initiatives like the CTD, especially during periods of budgetary restraint. This constraint was compounded by a reluctance on the part of some governments to add to the "bureaucratization" of development assistance efforts. Mr. Butler points out that some Northern European countries, while supportive of the need for development support, felt that a new Centre would only add to the administrative costs of assistance, rather than providing more funds in the field.[60]

Frequently, governments were also faced with the decision of supporting further multilateral initiatives like the CTD or their own countries' bilateral

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[59] *Ibid.*
[60] *Ibid.*

assistance initiatives. When competing with bilateral programs, an enterprise like the Centre might appear less attractive for political reasons. The CTD could not offer any firm guarantees that providing it with financial support would result in a specific return on investment to that countries' telecommunications industry. Bilateral assistance programs, on the other hand, could be more directly targeted to benefit one's own manufacturers and administrations, thus appealing to a government's self-interest.

This same basic conflict of interests frustrated the Centre's attempts to collect funds from its principal sponsors -- the private sector. Although the telecommunications industry was expected to provide the majority of the CTD's resources, their interest in the project was not as great as originally anticipated. A breakdown of cash contributions received by the Centre in 1986 revealed that only 44% had come from industry, while 47% had come from telecommunications administrations and 9% from development agencies.[61] Over the next three years, the majority of the Centre's funds continued to come from administrations rather than the private sector.

Several reasons account for the industry's lukewarm reaction to the CTD. First of all, private telecommunications consulting firms were strongly opposed to the idea of a new Centre offering advice on equipment and development issues. They saw this as unfair competition with their own lucrative business dealings in Third World countries and, according to the Secretary-General, were quite influential in lobbying against the CTD.[62] Aside from the opposition of telecommunications consultants, the Centre's problems in attracting interest and support from the telecommunications industry may have stemmed from a difficulty in clearly

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[61]Document CTD5-6, *Status Report on the Mobilization of Resources*, Centre for Telecommunications Development, Fifth Meeting of the Advisory Board, Geneva, 9-10 April 1987, (Geneva: ITU, 1987), p. 10.

[62]Richard Butler's views as reported by Prof. William Melody at interview; Correspondence, Prof. W.H. Melody to Prof. R.S. Anderson, 18 February 1991.

communicating its intended agenda. Mr. Israel admits that many people in the private sector who were solicited for funds were not told exactly how the money was going to be used.[63] This may have been combined with some confusion surrounding the Centre's link to the ITU. Manufacturers and others in the industry may have feared that if the CTD was to become another part of the ITU machinery, they would in fact be throwing money down an endless well of bureaucracy.

More fundamental than the issue of communication, however, is the incongruity that existed between the objectives of the Centre and the interests of the private sector. The CTD existed as a resource for developing countries, offering unbiased advice and assistance in the development of their telecommunications systems. While opportunities certainly existed for these activities to lead to the sale of telecommunications equipment, there was no guarantee that contracts would be awarded on the basis of a company's involvement with the Centre. Manufacturers seriously looking to sell their products to Third World markets were therefore more apt to develop their own direct marketing strategies with these countries, thus by-passing this "multilateral middleman". Mr. Israel explains the dilemma:

> The Centre was unable to articulate clearly how contributions would result in benefits to the manufacturing sector. It is very difficult to tell those in the private sector exactly when they will get a contract. It is very difficult to tell them how much the Centre believes they will be selling over and above what they are already selling to these countries. These manufacturers are not sitting there waiting for the Centre to tell them who to talk to. They talk bilaterally. They have the same list of countries in need of assistance as anyone has.[64]

Although an element of mutual self-interest exists between developing countries and the telecommunications industry, this was evidently not pronounced enough to attract large-scale private sector support to the Centre.

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[63] *Op. cit.*, Ref 50.
[64] *Ibid.*

Summary

This chapter has focused on the implementation of a specific development assistance initiative under the aegis of the International Telecommunication Union. By examining the events surrounding the creation and implementation of the Centre for Telecommunications Development, it has focused on the way in which three sets of interests influenced this particular development assistance program. Besides those interests external to the organization -- from developing and industrialized countries -- internal interests have also shaped the manner in which this international organization administers its assistance efforts.

Based on the Maitland Commission's conceptualization, the CTD would hopefully bridge the gap between the needs of developing countries and the objectives of the telecommunications industry. As shown in the design of its strategic objectives, the Centre attempted to cater to both of these interest groups. A third source of influence, however, in the form of the ITU's own internal organizational interests, would ultimately be a significant contributing factor in the fate of the Centre.

This analysis of the CTD's history has attempted to highlight at least two central accounts of why this initiative failed to meet original expectations. The first account concentrated on exploring the role of internal sources of influence, particularly from the Secretary-General and his staff within the ITU's Technical Cooperation Department. The second explanation for the Centre's failure focused upon the influence of outside interests from both developed and developing countries. Both rationalizations are based on the analyses of individuals who were intimately knowledgeable about the Centre's affairs.

While supporters of each of these accounts may strongly disagree with aspects of the others' analysis, the most accurate assessment of the Centre's fate may lie

somewhere in between. In other words, both internal *and* external sources of influence converged in such a way that sustaining a successful Centre as originally conceived became virtually impossible. Regarding the question of internal influence, while the Secretary-General and the staff of the TCD may not have actively opposed the Centre, they certainly disagreed with its push for autonomy. The Secretary-General and his staff were in a strong position to influence the opinions of officials within developing countries, who already relied heavily on the ITU for advice and assistance. These countries had only cautious support for the CTD from the outset, believing that they were in a better position to influence the administration of development assistance from within the auspices of the ITU rather than through a private sector initiative.

At the same time, however, the failure of the CTD was not simply the result of internal opposition to the project. Resistance from the ITU bureaucracy was compounded by influential opposition to the concept from interests in the industrialized countries. These included consulting firms and other groups within the telecommunications industry who viewed the Centre as an unwanted or, at best, unnecessary player in the international telecommunications market. Finally, Western government support for the Centre was less than unanimous. The CTD was unable to compete for assistance with more immediately beneficial bilateral initiatives, nor to convince these nations that it would not simply be adding another layer of bureaucracy to existing multilateral initiatives. Together, these internal and external factors virtually eliminated the possibility of an independent Centre, creating a situation where there was no other option but to integrate the CTD with the ITU's existing development assistance operations.

Chapter 6

The 1989 Plenipotentiary Conference and Beyond

As the International Telecommunication Union heads into the final decade of the twentieth century, it is faced with enormous new challenges and recurring dilemmas. Advances in microelectronics, the development of fibre optic systems, and ever-smaller and cheaper micro computers have produced a wide range of new "enhanced" information and telecommunication services and service providers. Recognizing these new entrants and the crucial importance of telecommunications to their economies, many industrialized nations have begun the task of restructuring this sector. Along with these national initiatives has come increased pressures for coordination and standardization of the international telecommunications networks, resulting in even greater workloads for the ITU's Consultative Committees. In addition to these new challenges, the ITU continues to struggle with familiar problems. During the years since the Maitland Commission Report, the gap between communication-rich countries and communication-poor countries has continued to increase. Consequently, the demands on the ITU's development assistance programs have only increased.

How will the ITU continue to function effectively, given the increased pressures on the organization from both industrialized and developing countries? This final chapter will examine the future of the International Telecommunication Union, focusing in particular on the prospective role of the organization in the administration of development assistance. It will begin by examining the results of the 1989 Plenipotentiary Conference, which saw steps taken to both further entrench the development assistance mandate and reform the Union's operating procedures to improve its standard-setting efficiency. This will be followed by a discussion of the most probable evolution of the development assistance agenda over the next decade

as interests in both developing and developed nations seek to realize their respective objectives through the organization.

After reviewing the recent history of the development assistance issue within the ITU, the remainder of the chapter will examine what conclusions can be drawn concerning the organization and its role in this debate. In particular, it will discuss how the organization's role as a modifier of international interests has allowed the ITU to remain effective despite the introduction of this potentially divisive issue. Finally, it will consider what conclusions may be applied to the study of influence in other international organizations and the manner in which they seek to manage the various interests of their membership.

The 1989 Plenipotentiary Conference and its Resolutions

The 13th Plenipotentiary Conference of the ITU met from May 23 to June 30, 1989 at the Nice Acropolis in France. The Conference was attended by more than 1000 delegates from 143 of the ITU's 166 Member countries and by observers from other international and regional organizations. In the six weeks of meetings, the Conference's ten Committees faced the daunting task of examining virtually every aspect of the Union's affairs and determining the best course of action for the organization's future. To this end, a multitude of resolutions, decisions, recommendations and opinions were proposed, debated and passed by the Conference delegates.

Perhaps the most significant product of the 1989 Plenipotentiary Conference was the drafting of a new Constitution for the ITU. Consisting of 47 Articles, the Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union contains basic provisions concerning the structure and purposes of the organization, and general provisions relating to the operation of international telecommunications. Accompanying the

more fundamental principles set out in the Constitution, the Conference also passed a Convention which contains more specific provisions related to the functioning of the Union, and rules of procedure for its various organs. Together, the Constitution and Convention were designed to operate as a single governing instrument of the Union.

The creation of a new Constitution and Convention was essentially accomplished by dividing the Union's former instrument, the International Telecommunication Convention, into primary and secondary provisions. While this might not appear too daunting a task, the move culminated several decades of debate concerning the advantages and disadvantages of adopting a permanent constitutional document for the organization. In fact, proposals for the implementation of a constitution date back to the 1959 Plenipotentiary Conference and were raised and debated at each subsequent Plenipotentiary Conference since.

Those in favour of establishing a constitution have argued that it would bring the Union in line with the organizational instruments of the other United Nations specialized agencies. More importantly, adopting a constitution would allow for a more efficient use of time by the Plenipotentiary Conference. Prior to the adoption of the ITU Constitution, the entire International Telecommunication Convention was open to proposals for revision from any delegation at each Plenipotentiary Conference.

Those opposed to the establishment of a more permanent instrument for the Union claimed that such a move would contribute too much rigidity to its organizational practices. They insisted that the easily amendable ITU Convention offered the necessary flexibility to deal with new issues in telecommunications as they arose. To fix the organization's purposes and orientation at a particular point in time might limit its effectiveness in the future telecommunications environment.

What is particularly interesting in the debate over a constitution was the shift in the countries which supported each position. During the sixties and early seventies, the industrialized countries were proponents of the *status quo*, preferring not to tamper with an organizational instrument which still allowed them uncontested leadership of the organization. At the 1972 Plenipotentiary Conference, for example, the United States submitted that "to fix the Union's structure on a permanent basis at a time when the volume of international telecommunications is expanding, the technology undergoing fundamental change and new institutional arrangements evolving should be carefully considered... We therefore propose only minor refinements to correct what we deem to be deficiencies in the Union's workings".[1]

As the composition of the ITU's membership shifted in favour of the developing countries, and these nations began to demand greater activity in the area of technical cooperation, those with an interest in keeping the existing Convention changed. The developing countries became the greatest supporters of the *status quo*, realizing that a flexible Convention would enable the ITU to be more responsive to their needs and concerns by allowing for continuous revision in the purposes and work program of the Union. Through their voting majority at the 1982 Plenipotentiary Conference, they were successful in establishing technical assistance as one of the Union's three purposes listed in the International Telecommunications Convention.

Recognizing that the developing nations had sufficient power to fundamentally alter the orientation of the organization, the developed countries were increasingly in favour of establishing a constitutional document which would preserve their own interests within the Union. To this end, they were successful in passing a

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[1]Document 22, "U.S. Proposal Regarding an ITU Charter", *Proceedings of the ITU Plenipotentiary Conference, Malaga-Torremolinos, 1973*, p. 3.

resolution at the Nairobi Plenipotentiary Conference establishing a Group of Experts to study the issue of establishing a Constitution for the ITU.[2]

If the developing countries held a voting majority at Plenipotentiary Conferences, why did they eventually allow a constitutional document to be passed in Nice? One major reason was that the basic instrument and operating structures of the ITU had already been altered to accommodate the interests of the developing countries. Adopting a Constitution would only solidify these gains. Secondly, developing countries were beginning to realize that the effectiveness of the Convention had reached a point of diminishing returns. The advantages of a flexible instrument which had served their purposes in the past was now becoming a disservice, slowing down the work of the Plenipotentiary Conference to the point of paralysis. Given the overwhelming workload of the recent Conferences, a constant revision of the Union's fundamental provisions would benefit none of the membership.

Another reason that the developing countries may have been willing to establish a Constitution relates to other measures adopted at the Nice Plenipotentiary to further entrench the organization's development mandate. Most significant amongst these was the establishment of a new permanent organ within the ITU's federal structure: the Telecommunications Development Bureau (BDT). The nucleus of the BDT, which will be established on a progressive basis over the next few years, will consist of the staff and facilities of the present Technical Cooperation Department.[3] Until a Director of the Bureau is elected by the next Plenipotentiary Conference, the BDT will be under the direct responsibility of the Secretary-General.

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[2]Resolution 62, "Basic Instrument of the Union", *International Telecommunication Convention, Nairobi, 1982*, (Geneva: ITU, 1982).
[3]"The Plenipotentiary Conference", *Telecommunication Journal*, 56:9, September 1989, p. 547.

The duties of the Telecommunications Development Bureau are listed in the new ITU Constitution as follows:

a) raise the level of awareness of decision-makers concerning the important role of telecommunications in the national socio-economic development programme, and provide information and advice on possible policy options;

b) promote the development, expansion and operation of telecommunication networks and services, particularly in developing countries, taking into account the activities of other relevant bodies, by reinforcing capabilities for human resources development, planning, management, resource mobilization, and research and development;

c) enhance the growth of telecommunications through cooperation with regional telecommunications organizations and with global and regional development financing institutions;

d) encourage participation by industry in telecommunications development in developing countries, and offer advice on the choice and transfer of appropriate technology;

e) offer advice, carry out or sponsor studies, as necessary, on technical, economic, financial, managerial, regulatory and policy issues, including studies of specific projects in the field of telecommunications;

f) collaborate with the International Consultative Committees and other concerned bodies in developing a general plan for international and regional telecommunication networks so as to facilitate the coordination of their development with a view to the provision of telecommunication services;

g) provide support in preparing for and organizing development conferences.[4]

The establishment of the Telecommunications Development Bureau represents a number of important precedents in the management of technical cooperation by the ITU. First, creating the BDT officially recognizes the dual responsibility of the Union as both a *specialized agency* and an *executing agency* of the United Nations. In the former capacity, the ITU is responsible for assistance activities centered on the identification of requirements and the offering of technical advice. As an executing

[4]Article 11A, *Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union*, (Geneva: ITU, 1989).

agency, it is responsible for the implementation of projects financed through the UNDP. Prior to the Nice Plenipotentiary, no distinction had been made between these two functions. Both had been performed by the Technical Cooperation Department and financed through UNDP support costs. Since these were not sufficient to cover the Union's costs, the TCD had shown annual deficits.

The BDT officially recognizes the Union's own responsibilities as an aid organization, thus opening the way for including the financing of development assistance within the regular budget of the ITU. The initial budget for the BDT will be 15 million Swiss francs for 1990, rising gradually to 22.5 million Swiss francs in 1994.[5] This certainly represents a substantial increase over the average 6 million Swiss francs available to the Technical Cooperation Department in the years prior to the Nice Conference.

The other precedent worth noting in the decision to establish the BDT was that the Bureau was given the same status and level as the other permanent organs of the Union. No longer simply a department within the General Secretariat, the organization's technical cooperation services were now on equal footing with the two International Consultative Committees. This structural readjustment symbolized the fact that the ITU's development assistance function was no longer any less important than its standard-setting function.

To further reinforce this point, the Plenipotentiary Conference adopted a total of eighteen resolutions aimed at improving the many facets of the Union's assistance efforts to the developing countries. These included measures to strengthen the ITU's Group of Engineers, human resource training programs, short term missions, seminars, development conferences, fellowship programs, and Special Voluntary Program for Technical Cooperation.

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[5]Decision No. Plen/1, "Expenses of the Union for the Period 1990 to 1994", *Final Acts of the Plenipotentiary Conference, Nice, 1989*, (Geneva: ITU, 1989).

Beside these more familiar resolutions, several resolutions dealt with the subject of the regionalization of technical cooperation efforts. Resolution 6/2, for example, invites the UNDP to consider "a sufficient increase of the allocation to inter-country projects of assistance" to the telecommunications sector.[6] Resolution 6/8 instructs the Secretary-General to carry out the necessary studies with the aim of strengthening the ITU regional presence and submit a report including recommendations to the Administrative Council as soon as possible.[7] Clearly, the developing countries were not satisfied with simply increasing the size of the organization's bureaucracy in Geneva. Through measures to increase the regional nature of its assistance efforts, the ITU's resources could be used more efficiently to address the needs of a specific group of developing countries.

The fate of the Centre for Telecommunications Development was also discussed at the Nice Plenipotentiary. Although the Centre's performance had been below expectations, many delegations from the industrialized countries were reluctant to let it die. For the developed countries, the Centre represented a hopeful alternative forum for addressing the needs of less-developed countries, as opposed to the continual buildup of the Union's internal resources. Canada's position, for example, was that the two years in which the Centre had been operational was an insufficient amount of time for it to prove its worth. The delegation also proposed alternative avenues of funding for the Centre, including the allocation of a portion of revenues from Telecom Conferences, the yearly trade fair of the international telecommunications industry.[8] After much debate, it was decided that the Centre should retain its autonomy in relation to the new BDT for a period of at least two more years. At the same time, however, its eventual merger with the BDT appeared

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[6]Resolution No. COM6/2, "Inter-Country Projects Financed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in the Field of Telecommunications", *Final Acts of the Plenipotentiary Conference, Nice, 1989*, (Geneva: ITU, 1989).

[7]Resolution No. COM6/8, "ITU Regional Presence", *Final Acts of the Plenipotentiary Conference, Nice, 1989*, (Geneva: ITU, 1989).

[8]Interview with Pierre Gagné, Department of Communications, Ottawa, January 10, 1989.

to be understood as a *fait accompli*. The ultimate fate of the CTD would be left for the Administrative Council to decide at its 46th Session in June of 1991.

Taken together, the development assistance measures adopted at the Plenipotentiary Conference represent a virtual completion of the transition from a solely technical organization to one with a fully integrated development function. Any hopes on the part of those from industrialized countries, who wished to keep technical assistance activities at an arm's length from the organization's central operations, were eliminated. Even though the Centre for Telecommunications Development was temporarily spared, it was clear that this "private sector" initiative was not going to pose any threat to the ITU's own internal programs. If anything, the results of the Nice Plenipotentiary only served to further centralize the responsibility for telecommunications development with the ITU.

While the 1989 Plenipotentiary sought to address the needs of the developing countries, the Conference also took steps to alleviate the concerns of the industrialized countries. As the pace of telecommunications innovations continues to quicken, many of these nations expressed concerns about whether the ITU in its present form would be able to meet their standard-setting requirements. The Plenipotentiary Conference recognized the need to adapt the Union's structure, management practices and working methods to this new telecommunications environment. To this end the Conference entrusted the task of reviewing the structure and functioning of the ITU to a High Level Committee, similar in size and composition to the Maitland Commission (see Appendix D). Representatives were to be designated from 15 to 20 Member countries, with due regard to equitable geographical distribution, who enjoyed "the highest reputation in international

telecommunications" and possessed broad ITU expertise.[9] The mandate of the Committee is as follows:

> To carry out an in-depth review of the structure and functioning of the Union, in order to study and recommend, as necessary, measures to ensure greater cost-effectiveness within and between all ITU organs and activities by improving the situation as regards structure, organization, finance, staff, procedures and coordination with a view to ensuring that the Union responds effectively to the demands placed on it by the changing nature of the telecommunications environment.[10]

Under the chairmanship of Mr. Gabriel Warren of Canada, the High Level Committee held five working sessions in Geneva before presenting its final report to the 46th Session of the Administrative Council in June of 1991.[11] Based on the Committee's findings, an Extraordinary Plenipotentiary Conference will be held in December of 1992 to review the Committee's report and make relevant adjustments to the organization's structure and operating procedures. The extensive and far-reaching recommendations of the High Level Committee will be discussed in the following section.

The considerable attention given to the High Level Committee Report at the 1991 Administrative Council Session overshadowed another significant decision taken by the Council. Without lengthy deliberation, the members voted to incorporate the activities of the Centre for Telecommunications Development into the Telecommunications Development Bureau, thus officially sounding the death knell for the CTD. In the two years since the 1989 Plenipotentiary Conference, the Centre continued to struggle financially, with little hope of garnering any sudden increase in interest or influx of funds. If anything, the CTD faced even greater challenges in

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[9]Resolution No. COM7/1, "Review of the Structure and Functioning of the International Telecommunication Union", *Final Acts of the Plenipotentiary Conference, Nice, 1989*, (Geneva: ITU, 1989).

[10]*Ibid.*

[11]*Tommorrow's ITU: The Challenges of Change*, Report of the High Level Committee to Review the Structure and Functioning of the International Telecommunication Union, (Geneva: ITU, April 1991).

fund-raising since the 1989 Plenipotentiary Conference as it was forced to compete for limited monetary resources with the BDT -- an entity which will have a budget almost ten times the size of the Centre's by 1994. As the well-financed BDT began to establish itself, and the international sale of telecommunications equipment continued to grow more competitive, a hybrid agency like the Centre found itself falling through the gap between government and private sector support.

Of equal importance in understanding the final elimination of the CTD was its failure to cultivate and retain its own distinctive 'character' and program of activities. As discussed in Chapter 5, part of the blame for this situation may rest with the administrators of the CTD, both through their failure to communicate the Centre's distinct opportunities to donors and recipients, as well as their tendency to rely upon the ITU bureaucracy for the Centre's projects. More significantly, however, was the fact that the framing of the BDT's new mandate had the effect of duplicating the activities of the Centre, virtually eliminated any unique function which the CTD might have claimed to perform. Clearly, it seemed hard to justify the existence of two agencies, both "offering advice on telecommunications development at the pre-investment level". The Administrative Council thus felt that gains in efficiency would be achieved by merging the two bodies. All that remains to be accomplished during the balance of 1991 is the merger of the CTD's assets within the BDT's budget and the transfer of a few remaining projects to the staff of the BDT.

Speculation about the Future of Development Assistance at the ITU

Any speculation about the future of the ITU's development assistance efforts must be examined within the broader context of the recent High Level Committee's Report on the structure and functioning of the ITU. The Report, appropriately entitled *Tommorrow's ITU*, proposes some fundamental shifts in the structure and

operating practises of the Union, aimed at streamlining its operations and increasing its efficiency. The majority of the Committee's recommendations will likely be implemented at an Extraordinary Plenipotentiary Conference to be held in December of 1992.

The recommendations of the High Level Committee (HLC) are not aimed at broadening or changing the overall mandate of the Union. Instead, they recognize the fact that the ITU should play "a stronger and more catalytic role in stimulating and coordinating cooperation between the increasing number of bodies concerned with telecommunications".[12] This entails developing closer working relationships with other regional standards organizations, and other IGOs such as GATT and OECD. It also involves encouraging greater participation by non-governmental actors within this intergovernmental organization, including telecommunications operators, service providers and manufacturers. The HLC also propose the establishment by the Secretary-General of a Business Advisory Forum composed of chief executive officers or comparable top management representatives to give him the views of the private sector on the telecommunications environment and how, in light of this changing environment, the ITU's principal activities can be carried out effectively.

The most profound recommendations of the High Level Committee, however, pertain to a proposed restructuring of the Union's organs. The HLC recommends that the ITU's main functional activities be grouped into three Sectors: Development, Standardization and Radiocommunication.[13] Each of these Sectors would have their own Conference, supported by Study and Working Groups, an elected Director, a Secretariat or Bureau, and an Advisory Board or Committee. Standardization would include the standardization activities of the CCITT and some of the standards

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[12] *Ibid.*, p. 7.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 17.

activities of the CCIR. Radiocommunication would include the remaining work of the CCIR and the present activities of the IFRB. The Development Sector would consist of the Telecommunications Development Bureau (including the re-integrated Centre for Telecommunications Development).

In comparison to the restructuring required to accommodate the other two Sectors, the HLC's recommendations with respect to the Development Sector are relatively minor. This is because the Telecommunications Development Bureau has only recently been established and, in the Committee's estimation, insufficient time has elapsed to provide enough experience upon which to make proposals for change. The only significant recommendations regarding development assistance pertain to the establishment of a system of World and Regional Development Conferences, and the creation of a Development Advisory Board.[14] The role of the Development Conferences would be to stimulate discussion on topics, projects and programs relevant to telecommunications development and, through this process, to provide direction and guidance to the BDT. A similar role is envisioned for the Development Advisory Board which would consist of a cross-section of senior-level individuals with special interests and expertise in telecommunications development. Participants could be drawn from administrations, bilateral and multilateral aid organizations, financial and investment institutions, manufacturers and consultants.

The immediate future of the ITU's development assistance activities is more likely to bring changes in scope rather than any profound changes in structural framework. With the establishment of a Constitution which lists "the development of technical facilities" as one of the organization's primary purposes, and the newly enlarged Telecommunications Development Bureau, the developing countries have equipped the Union with the necessary arrangements to effectively carry out its development assistance mandate. Within this present framework, the organization's

[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 24-27.

budget for improving the technical facilities of its less-developed members will continue to expand. Since the Nice Plenipotentiary adopted budget ceilings for the years 1990-1994, however, increased funding for development assistance will have to come from cuts or gains in efficiency elsewhere in the organization.

While the future of development assistance at the ITU might be summarized at first glance as "the same, but more", it is possible to discern slight shifts in the orientation of its efforts. Ironically, these developments appear to have stemmed from the conceptualization of the ill-fated Centre for Telecommunications Development. First, the focus of the BDT appears to be shifting toward an emphasis on policy and technical advice to the less-developed nations, and away from the former TCD's emphasis on project execution. Increasingly, this latter task has been taken up by bilateral aid agencies and the telecommunications industry. Secondly, a theme running through the HLC Report is that of encouraging the involvement of non-governmental actors in the development assistance process. A good example of this direction is their recommendation for a Development Advisory Board composed of high-level representatives from business, industry, and academia. Both of these developments may alter the 'character' of the organization's future assistance efforts.

Although the basic structures for development assistance have been established at the ITU, certain issues pertaining to possible future directions for development assistance remain. One of these relates to the likelihood of increased regionalization of development assistance efforts in the coming years. Although the Union employs Area and Senior Regional Representatives, there is a growing recognition amongst the ITU membership that these measures are not sufficient to respond adequately to the growing requirements of individual countries, sub-regions and regions for information, advice and assistance in the realm of telecommunications. Addressing the new volume and variety of requests may be increasingly difficult to coordinate from ITU headquarters in Geneva.

The idea of regionalizing development assistance efforts has been proposed before. The Independent Commission for World Wide Telecommunications Development and the recent ITU Advisory Group on Telecommunications Policy both stressed the benefits of regional cooperation in the purchasing of equipment, and in the training of personnel.[15] Since such decisions would likely involve information or advice from the ITU, it would appear most efficient to coordinate these activities in the regions affected. This would help to reduce administrative delays and travel costs involved with trying to coordinate projects from Geneva. It might also serve to improve the quality of advice offered by the organization by tailoring it specifically to the requirements of that region. Finally, regionalizing the administration of development assistance would assist in the transfer of knowledge regarding telecommunications to the developing countries, allowing them to sustain their own training, research and development facilities.

Although the High Level Committee's Report dealt mainly with measures to increase the efficiency of the ITU's headquarters in Geneva, it is widely expected that these adjustments will pave the way for a significant decentralization of the Union's activities. Janice Doran, a Canadian participant within the ITU's Administrative Council, estimates that all but 15% of the Union's activities will eventually be performed regionally.[16] This will involve a sharp increase in the ITU's existing system of five regional offices which currently operate in Africa, the Americas, Asia and the Pacific, and the Arab States. In the next decade, this number could swell to a total of 12 to 15 regional offices, each seeking to address the telecommunications development needs of their particular region from within the overall framework of the ITU's Development Sector.

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[15]See *The Missing Link*, Report of the Independent Commission for World Wide Telecommunications Development, (Geneva: ITU, 1984), pp. 65-69, and *The Changing Telecommunication Environment*, Report of the Advisory Group on Telecommunications Policy, (Geneva: ITU, 1989), pp. 22-28.

[16]Telephone interview with Janice Doran, Department of Communications, Ottawa, July 22, 1991.

A second direction in which the ITU's assistance efforts may be expanded in the coming years pertains to the continuing role of Consultative Committees in technical cooperation. Traditionally the domain of the technically-advanced developed countries, the CCIs have come under increasing pressure in recent years to adopt measures to reflect the needs of the developing nations. At a time when the Committees' standards workload is extremely heavy, the industrialized countries are realizing that meeting these demands may spell the success or failure of the CCIs.

For this reason, it is likely that new Special Autonomous Groups (GAS) will be established in the coming years to respond to requests from developing nations. Also, the more insulated posture of the Consultative Committees with regards to the Union's other organs will give way to more cooperation between the new Standardization and Radiocommunication Bureaus and the Telecommunications Development Bureau. With respect to both of these points, the Report of the High Level Committee recommends that "responsibility for current GAS activities be transferred to the BDT, with technical assistance being provided in consultation with the Standardization and Radiocommunication Bureaus".[17] Other measures aimed at increasing developing country participation in ITU standardization activities may include grouping together topics for active study which may be of particular interest to developing countries, providing more details and better advance notice of meetings, and funding developing country participation in standardization work through the BDT.

All speculation about the future of development assistance activities at the ITU, however, presupposes a more fundamental issue. One must question whether the dual functions of standard-setting and development assistance can continue to be reconciled within one organization as it has in the past. The past thirty years has seen a steady encroachment on the financial and human resources of the ITU

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[17] *Tommorrow's ITU: The Challenges of Change*, p. 33.

dedicated to the harmonization of international telecommunications standards. As the costs to developed countries of fulfilling the ITU's technical cooperation responsibilities continue to rise, will they begin to outweigh the perceived benefits of the organization? Will the industrialized countries decide to leave the ITU in favour of some other international forum?

Several factors contribute to answering the question of whether the ITU can remain a viable international organization for the industrialized countries. One concerns the increasing importance of the standards work accomplished through regional standards organizations. As the worldwide telecommunications environment continues to change, the standardization scenario for its systems and participants has also been modified considerably. The ITU's almost exclusive role in global standardization is now challenged by such regional standards committees as T1 in North America, TTC in Japan and ETSI in Europe. Each was formed out of a basic recognition that telecommunication standards are an important strategic tool for national economies in securing future markets for telecommunications products and services. Waiting until such decisions can be made by the CCITT and CCIR could prove to be a costly gamble.

Although each of the regional standards organizations mentioned above is primarily concerned with the standardization of telecommunications within its own countries, their work naturally influences global standard-setting. Standards Committee T1, for example, is charged with developing interfaces, operating structures and operating procedures for the North American telecommunications system.[18] Its membership includes over 90 exchange and interexchange carriers, resellers, manufacturers, vendors, government agencies, user groups, consultants and liaisons. Where appropriate, however, the standards developed by T1 also form the

[18]Ian Lifchus, "Standards Committee T1 – Telecommunications", *IEEE Communications Magazine*, 23:1, January 1985, p. 35.

basis of positions taken by the United States and Canada to international standards fora such as the CCITT and CCIR.

Perhaps the most influential of the new regional standards organizations is ETSI, the European Telecommunication Standards Institute. ETSI was formed in 1988 as a direct implementation of the recommendations contained in the EC *Green Paper* on the future development of the European Community's telecommunications sector. Its membership is composed of administrations, public network operators, manufacturers and private service providers and research bodies of the European Community. Through its approximately fifteen Technical Committees, ETSI provides "a forum for consensus building among European technical experts in developing relevant new standards...and a focus of harmonizing a European view for worldwide standards organizations, particularly for CCITT and CCIR".[19]

It should be mentioned that ETSI is in a unique position to influence standard-setting in the CCIs because of the ITU's voting mechanisms. When the Committees' decisions cannot be reached by consensus, they are decided on the basis of "one nation, one vote". Under these circumstances, the nations belonging to ETSI represent a voting bloc of at least 17 nations, considerably more than the single votes accorded to the United States, Canada and Japan. As a result, this new European standards organization is in a unique position to influence worldwide telecommunications standards.

In addition to these regional organizations, other international standards bodies are also challenging the supremacy of the ITU in establishing international telecommunications standards. Two such bodies are the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). As information technologies increasingly blur the borderlines between computer and

[19]ETSI *Rules of Procedure*, Copenhagen, November 1988, reprinted in Wallenstein, *Setting Global Telecommunication Standards*, p. 215.

telecommunication technologies, both the ISO and the IEC have moved closer to what has traditionally been regarded as the domain of the CCITT. The ISO has taken major responsibility in the data processing field, while the IEC works to develop standards for low frequency cables and wires.[20] In both cases, steps have been taken to coordinate the work of these organizations with that undertaken by the CCITT's study groups.

Despite the erosion of the ITU's position as the sole institution responsible for the harmonization of international telecommunications standards, the usefulness of the Union to the industrialized countries is not necessarily in jeopardy. Despite the rise of alternative standards fora, these organizations will continue to rely on the overall coordinating role of one international body: the International Telecommunication Union. Both the ISO and IEC standards, for example, are intended to function at the industry self-regulating level, covering a wide variety of unrelated products in general use. In contrast, the ITU's mandate centres on interrelated services offered to the public through elaborate networks with the aim of end-to-end compatibility. Even with regional standards organization working to achieve end-to-end compatibility within their own national or regional systems, the need to coordinate these systems throughout the entire world will necessitate the continuing presence of a global body like the ITU.

The ongoing need for an international coordinating body in the form of the ITU does not mean that the organization can simply continue to operate as it has in the past. This basic realization has dominated the Union's conferences over the past several years, culminating in the recommendations contained within the High Level Committee's Report. The HLC stresses the need for greater cooperation and coordination of effort with international, regional and national organizations if the

[20]Wallenstein, p. 74-75.

ITU is to "maintain its pre-eminence in world-wide standardization".[21] This will entail, for example, an agreement with the GATT setting out GATT's and the ITU's complementary roles regarding the regulation of international trade in telecommunication services. Greater coordination efforts are also required with the regional standards organizations (ETSI, T1, and TTC) in order to ensure complementarity of work programs. Implementing these and other measures will occupy the Union in the coming years as the organization strives to maintain its relevance and importance to its members.

Conclusions about Development Assistance and the ITU

This thesis has focused on exploring the history and evolution of the development assistance issue within the International Telecommunication Union. The subject is particularly interesting because, unlike other post-War specialized agencies of the United Nations, the ITU was originally established without any mandate to assist lesser-developed nations in improving their national telecommunication systems. Despite this fact, the ITU has managed to accommodate these newer, and potentially divisive, demands. Although the necessary adjustments to the ITU's structure and operations have taken over thirty years to achieve, the process was accomplished without the degree of conflict and withdrawals that have accompanied the increased demands of developing countries in other international fora.

In seeking to explain this adjustment, the thesis has been primarily concerned with exploring the role of the ITU as *modifier* in the debate over development assistance. The key concern has been to analyse how the organization, in response to the divergent external and internal demands of its members, has undertaken initiatives regarding development assistance which have attempted to incorporate all

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[21] *Tommorrow's ITU: The Challenges of Change*, p. 32.

of these interests to some degree, thereby managing this source of conflict and allowing the ITU to continue to function effectively.

Why has the ITU been successful in accommodating these changes to its organizational mandate? How has the Union performed its role as modifier given the pressures to satisfy two divergent sets of national priorities? How has the need to develop standards for the highly sophisticated telecommunication systems of the industrialized world been able to co-exist with the need to offer assistance in improving the under-developed technological resources of the Third World?

At least three factors contribute to an explanation of how the ITU has been largely successful as a systematic modifier of state behaviour regarding the issue of development assistance. First, the organization has been able to act as a modifier through its organizational structure and operating procedures. Secondly, the ITU illustrates a condition in international relations described by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye as "complex interdependence".[22] Due to the interdependent nature of its members' different agendas, the ITU has been able to function though bargaining and compromise on both sides of the development assistance issue. Finally, the ITU is a successful modifier because of the nature of the technology it seeks to manage. The international telecommunications network relies on compatibility and standardization for its successful operation, a fact which encourages member nations to cooperate and work for the betterment of the entire global system. Each of these factors will be examined in turn.

In Pentland's terms, international organizations are "institutional channels, obstacles, and aids collectively created by states to modify the traditionally *laissez-faire* character of their relationships".[23] In the case of the International

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[22]R.O. Keohane and J.S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*, (Boston: Little Brown, 1977), p. 25.
[23]Charles Pentland, "International Organizations", *World Politics: An Introduction*, ed., J. Rosenau, K.W. Thompson and G. Boyd, (New York: Free Press, 1976), p. 640.

Telecommunication Union, these institutional channels have been flexible enough to facilitate gradual adjustments to the organization's activities as its membership and the international network expands. They have also been a key factor in determining how different interest groups are able to influence the direction of the organization.

Amongst the ITU's most influential organizational processes is its voting procedures. Its system of "one nation, one vote" has allowed countries with less technological and economic power to exercise a considerable degree of influence over those nations with vastly superior resources. This situation has injected a form of checks and balances into discussions regarding the international telecommunications network that would not exist if the ITU utilized a weighted voting scheme based on, for example, telecommunications traffic or gross national product. Instead, a monopoly of technical knowledge is offset by a monopoly of votes, allowing developing countries to use their franchise as a bargaining tool to ensure that their development requests are met.

Combined with these voting provisions, the ITU's flexible constitutional arrangements has facilitated the introduction of new measures to assist the developing countries. Until 1989, the organization's governing document, the International Telecommunication Convention, could be revised at each Plenipotentiary Conference by a simple majority vote on proposed amendments. As a result, the developing nations were able to entrench development assistance within the mandate of the organization before a more permanent document, the International Telecommunication Constitution, was adopted.

Even with its new Constitution, the ITU continues to conduct the majority of its business based on consensus and voluntary compliance. The ITU's standards, for example, are called Recommendations, indicating the voluntary nature of their adoption by member nations. The ITU's Radio Regulations and newly-revised

International Telecommunication Regulations, while binding on its member states, contain provisions for the registration of reservations by individual countries subject to their domestic laws. Although the Optional Protocol to the Constitution contains provisions concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, the organization's arbitration function is limited and members are encouraged to settle their differences through "diplomatic channels, or according to procedures established by bilateral or multilateral treaties concluded between them".[24] With such flexible arrangements, the ITU has been able to accommodate the differences of its member states, achieving a level of compliance amongst nations without threatening their national sovereignty. Because it doesn't oblige its membership to sign strict treaties which stipulate an all-or-nothing submission to rules, national governments are less likely to consider withdrawal from the organization when its decisions clash with national policies.

While certain aspects of the ITU's organizational structure and procedures clearly provide the developing countries with greater opportunities to influence the direction of the organization, the interests of industrialized countries are not completely overlooked. Indeed, the structure and operating procedures of the International Consultative Committees allows the major players of the developed world's telecommunications industry to conduct the business of standardization with minimal disruption from developing countries. The level of technical knowledge required to actively participate in the CCIs myriad study groups and the costs involved in attending their many meetings have served to hinder participation by much of the developing world.

Given the nature of the ITU's structure and operational procedures, the anatomy of influence within the organization has taken on a dual nature. Developing nations are best able to influence the Union's activities at its larger conferences,

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[24]Article 42, *Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union*, (Geneva: ITU, 1989).

where they possess a voting majority. Their contributions are particularly strong at the ITU's Plenipotentiary Conferences but are also significant at Administrative Conferences and Plenary Assemblies of the CCIs, which are usually held every four years. Another important organ where developing countries can exercise considerable influence is the Administrative Council where, once again, provisions regarding equal geographical representation of delegates ensure that they possess a voting majority.

On the other hand, the influence of the developed countries is more noticeable within the ITU's smaller decision-making fora. Here a monopoly of technical knowledge ensures that large administrations, carriers, manufacturers, and scientific and industrial organizations have the greatest input in the formulation of standards for the international telecommunications network. Although CCI Plenary Assemblies may resort to voting on administrative matters, the majority of the Committees' work has already been decided upon within its various working groups. The opportunities for intervention in this process by the developing countries have become even more limited in recent years. Resolutions passed at the CCITT's Ninth Plenary Assembly in 1988 now encourage definitive, final approval of Recommendations (standards) at any time between Plenary Assemblies, instead of only *provisional* approval until one of these major conferences could be held.[25]

Based on the anatomy of influence at the ITU, one can safely conclude that development assistance will remain an integral part of the organization's structure. Initiatives such as the Centre for Telecommunications Development may be sustainable outside the framework of the ITU but they have little chance of rivalling or taking over the Union's authority in this area. The developing countries are much more capable of influencing the scope and direction of development assistance efforts from within the organization. They are more likely to use their voting majority to

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[25]Wallenstein, p. 223.

create new internal assistance initiatives rather than relinquish this power to interests in the developed world.

In this regard, the interests of the developing countries are paralleled by those of the ITU bureaucracy, which also has a vested claim in retaining the Union's development assistance mechanisms. As discussed in previous chapters, a healthy technical cooperation budget means added prestige and influence for the senior staff of the organization, particularly the Secretary-General and the soon-to-be-appointed Director of the Telecommunications Development Bureau. It also ensures continuation and growth for the staff of the General Secretariat and the BDT who obviously wish to see their positions survive.

Although the structure and operating procedures of the ITU would appear to allow for infinite expansion of the organization's development assistance mandate and programs, the industrialized countries are also able to use these mechanisms to offset unlimited growth. Although the Union's decisions represent agreements between states, delegations to its conferences are most often composed of representatives from government telecommunications ministries, and private operating companies. While representing their nation's government, these delegations do not have the authority to endorse large increases in their country's international assistance budget. Instead most western nations favour a system of centralized development assistance funding through the UNDP, the amount of which is established in advance. As a result, the national aid policies of the industrialized countries have a strong bearing on the scope of the organization's development assistance activities.

Developed countries can also influence the organization's spending through the ITU's system of voluntary contribution units. Nations are free to choose the amount of their financial contribution to meeting the Union's expenses. This is usually roughly based on the country's GNP and is amendable prior to each

Plenipotentiary Conference. If the cost of financing development assistance initiatives from within the ITU's own budget becomes too great, industrialized countries who have traditionally supported the largest portion of the organization's budget may decide to decrease the size of their contribution.

As the above discussion would indicate, the organizational structure and operating procedures of the International Telecommunication Union are a significant factor in the organization's role as modifier of individual national interests. By themselves, however, they do not provide a sufficient explanation for the successful introduction of the development assistance mandate into the organization. Although operating procedures act as the tools through which the organization's agenda can be influenced, they do not help in explaining the political will of member states to submit to changes which are not universally favoured.

In seeking to address this issue, it is worthwhile to consider Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye's description of present day international relations as a condition of "complex interdependence". Keohane and Nye challenge the central assumptions of political realism, namely, that states as coherent units are the dominant actors in world politics, and that military force is a usable and effective instrument of policy. Instead, international relations are more accurately described as a condition of complex interdependence featuring three main characteristics: multiple channels connect societies; the agenda for interstate relationships consists of multiple issues arranged non-hierarchically; and military force is not used by governments toward other governments within the region, or on the issues, where complex interdependence prevails.[26]

The three main characteristics of complex interdependence give rise to certain distinctive political processes which translate the resources of the various

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[26]R.O. Keohane and J.S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, Second Edition, (Boston: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1989), p. 24-25.

international actors into influence or control of outcomes. These include issue linkage strategies and agenda setting as tools of influence where military force has been devalued. Such processes are perpetuated through a myriad of transnational and transgovernmental relations including, most significantly, international organizations. As Keohane and Nye explain,

> In a world of multiple issues imperfectly linked, in which coalitions are formed transnationally and transgovernmentally, the potential role of international institutions in political bargaining is greatly increased. In particular, they help set the international agenda, act as catalysts for coalition-formation and as arenas for political initiatives and linkages by weaker states.[27]

The international organization is therefore a key forum in which the political processes of complex interdependence take place.

Interdependence, more simply defined, means mutual dependence and it is here that Keohane and Nye's theories have direct relevance to explaining the ITU's role as modifier. Simply put, there exists among the ITU membership a basic recognition that each group's agenda is intimately tied to the success of the others'. Upsetting this co-dependent relationship might ultimately have the effect of limiting the realization of one's own national or regional objectives through the weakening of the organization. Both developing nations and industrialized countries display an understanding of this principle as they seek to fulfill their international telecommunications requirements within the ITU.

Turning first to the developing countries, Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis document how these newer members of the organization were successful in employing the types of linkage strategies described by Keohane and Nye to join the issue of development assistance to the Union's original mandate of harmonizing international telecommunication policy. Through their increasing voting majority, they have been

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[27] *Ibid.*, p. 35.

able to elevate this issue and its related entailments to the top of the organization's agenda.

Although in theory the developing countries are able to completely dominate the ITU's agenda, the practical reality is somewhat different. As Canada's representative on the Administrative Council, Pierre Gagné, explained:

> Developing countries hold the key to every decision that is taken within the ITU because they have a voting majority. At the same time, however, they won't go further than what they know we [the developed countries] can take. At the 1982 Plenipotentiary Conference, the developing countries could have demanded 25% of the regular budget for technical assistance -- they had the decision-making process, they had the votes -- but they didn't. We expect that they will push at the Nice Plenipotentiary also, but they will not go too far.[28]

Although what constitutes "too far" is certainly contentious, Mr. Gagné's comments point to the fact that delegations from the developing world recognize that the speed and scale of their development assistance demands must be such that they will not provoke a wholesale withdrawal by the industrialized countries. Driving the major donor countries from the organization would clearly not be in the interests of the developing nations.

On the other side of the interdependence equation are the industrialized countries. Although not dependent on the organization to provide telecommunications equipment or expertise, they do rely on the ITU for crucial standards and policy decisions, many of which also carry considerable economic ramifications. In this environment, votes can be a valuable resource, determining the success or failure of national and regional objectives. Developed countries recognize that the success of their own agenda most often relies on the endorsement of their counterparts in the developing world. This fact, in turn, dictates a necessary

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[28]Interview with Pierre Gagné, Department of Communications, Ottawa, January 10, 1989.

responsiveness on the part of these nations to the concerns of the less-developed countries.

The interdependent nature of the actors in international telecommunications is therefore a key factor in the success of the ITU as a modifier of separate national interests. Instead of one country or group of interests achieving unchallenged control over the organization's complete agenda, a symbiotic relationship exists between interests in developed and developing nations. The resulting forum is one which encourages bargaining and compromise amongst often-conflicting interests, since each group is dependent to varying degrees on the continued presence and support of the others.

The concept of interdependence thus helps to account for the existence of the political will of nations to have their policies modified through an international organization such as the International Telecommunication Union. But why does this willingness exist at the ITU when it is not as evident in other international organizations, such as Unesco? In this latter case, conflicts with the organization's orientation and the objectives of other member states caused the United States and Great Britain to simply withdraw from membership. Such threats only rarely surface at the ITU.

This point raises a third factor in accounting for the ITU's successful ability to incorporate and modify conflicting sets of national interests, and thus survive the encroachment of a divisive issue like development assistance. This important element is the nature of the organization's business or its 'product'. As mentioned earlier, what an international organization has been set up to address will have a critical bearing on the degree of allegiance of its members to that forum.

The ITU was established to manage a technology -- the international telecommunications network -- that relies for its successful operation on

interconnectivity, harmonization, and standardization. If anything, the drive toward interconnectivity and standardization has only increased in recent years, reaching beyond technology standards to encompass all aspects of the overall policy and regulatory environment for telecommunications. The need to carry out these functions is continuous and ongoing, a fact that necessitates some form of coordinating body and serves to reinforce the allegiances of the ITU membership to the organization. While regional organizations are playing an increasingly important role in the new telecommunications environment, it is unlikely that they will ever fully replace the International Telecommunication Union. This is because, in order to operate to its fullest potential, the international telecommunications network must be globally integrated, not simply regional in scope or operation.

But development and integration of the international telecommunications system is not simply undertaken to improve the efficiency of the network. Ultimately, these ITU functions can be seen to be operating in the national self-interest of all member countries, regardless of their development status. Gerd Wallenstein refers to the ITU's standard-setting activities as a positive-sum game among adversaries.[29] Under this concept, borrowed from game theory, the game's total outcome exceeds the net sum of players' individual stakes. For example, business competitors agree that adopting common standards will provide greater benefits to all players in an enlarged, homogeneous market than would be available in separate, uncoordinated market segments.

In a similar manner, the business of providing telecommunications development assistance to less-developed countries represents a positive-sum game for all of the ITU's member states. Although this situation could be termed a case of "national self-interest", it is important to recognize that this does not denote one

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[29]Gerd Wallenstein, *Setting Global Telecommunication Standards: the Stakes, the Players, and the Process*, (Norwood, MA: Artech, 1990), p. 183.

singular, monolithic interest. Instead, development assistance benefits the long-range interests of a variety of players in the international telecommunications game. For example, in concert with standards harmonization, the telecommunications manufacturing industries in all of the developed countries can expect to benefit from development assistance activities through the expansion of markets for their equipment. As competition in domestic markets becomes increasingly strong, many manufacturers have already begun to view the developing world as an enormous new market for their products.

Similarly, transnational corporations also have a vested interest in the development of telecommunications facilities in developing countries. Here, the most immediate benefit is reliable communications amongst their various operations both within the country and abroad. This could lead to improvements in operating efficiency, and ultimately to expansion of activities in that country. Obviously, the interests of manufacturers and transnational corporations are never completely aligned with those of the developing country, a fact which underscores the need for caution by developing nations when embarking on any telecommunications development project. An area of common interest does exist, however, which helps to explain the acceptance of the development assistance mandate by these powerful stakeholders as they are represented within the ITU.

Finally, the governments of the developed countries -- the official representatives of national interests at the ITU -- also secure net gains by registering at least partial support for the development assistance mandate of the organization. In this case, gains may not be of an immediate monetary nature, but rather in the form of gains in diplomacy. Support for the demands of the developing countries may serve to improve relations with these countries, securing their support for other initiatives both within the ITU and other international fora.

Reflecting on the recent loss of the U.K.'s seat on the Administrative Council, one British telecommunications analyst notes that other European nations recognize the diplomatic value of their role within the ITU and take it very seriously. He writes:

> There is much to be learned from the ways in which the more successful European countries conduct themselves overseas. The ways in which diplomatic and commercial interests in these countries intertwine and create networks in overseas countries have tended to be more successful economically than customary U.K. practice. The fact that the Germans and Swiss take the holding of their ITU Administrative Council seats seriously enough to launch well-targeted campaigns to secure votes suggest that there are returns, even if these are marginal, in putting a well-orchestrated effort to win the favour of those overseas who decide the voting patterns within the ITU.[30]

Solomon's comments are particularly interesting in light of the growing importance of Europe's own regional standards organizations. For instance, most of the important recent standard developments in cellular telecommunications owe more to ETSI than the ITU. Yet, as this quote would indicate, participation in the activities of the ITU contains an important diplomatic value in addition to its technical function. This situation provides an added incentive for the industrialized countries which helps to secure their ongoing participation and their endorsement, in some form, of the development assistance mandate.

In summary, this section has identified three factors which seek to explain the ITU's success as a systematic modifier of state behaviour regarding the divisive issue of development assistance. The first or structural component of this equation is the ITU's organizational framework and processes. These work to distribute influence and decision-making power so that both developed and developing constituencies are able to direct their particular agenda in the appropriate ITU fora (i.e. the developing nations at the Plenipotentiary Conference; the industrialized countries within the CCIs). Secondly, the concept of interdependence is crucial in understanding the

[30]Jonathan Solomon, "Should the U.K. play the ITU political game?", *Telecommunications Policy*, February 1990, p. 5.

political will of nations to compromise and bargain over the issue of development assistance, rather than remain intransigent. In its simplest form, there exists a recognition amongst members that the accomplishment of each groups' agenda is dependent on the successful continuation of their counterparts. Finally, the nature of the organization's business acts as a technological imperative, securing the successful integration of a development assistance function in order to maintain the ITU's original technical function. Not only does the international telecommunications system demand international coordination, its development represents a positive-sum game which is ultimately in all nations' "self-interest". This last point helps to explain why interests in the developed world have not vehemently opposed the ITU's role in this regard.

It is difficult to say whether these three factors are necessary or sufficient conditions in determining an international organization's ability to modify the agenda of individual nations. Nevertheless, consideration of these criteria may provide some clue as to an organization's likely success when managing potentially divisive issues or embarking on controversial courses of action. Assessing the relative importance of these factors as they apply to other international organizations will be among the issues discussed in the following final section of this chapter.

Conclusions about Influence and International Organizations

This final section will consider what conclusions may be extrapolated from this study of the ITU which relate to the administration of influence within international organizations. While the ITU's management of the development assistance issue can be viewed as a specific case history, the study may also inform research concerning other international organizations and the manner in which they seek to balance and incorporate the various divergent interests represented within their membership.

As mentioned in Chapter 1 of this thesis, it should be noted that the ITU possesses a rather unique set of circumstances which allows it particular success in modifying individual state behaviour. Due to the sheer size of the international telecommunications market -- both in terms of the number of players and the economic stakes involved -- the ITU may be in a better position than most other IGOs to secure ongoing cooperation and compromise from its membership. At the same time, because countries jealously guard their right to jurisdiction over domestic telecommunications policy, there is little danger of this organization becoming a truly strong, autonomous actor. Other international governmental organizations, whose mandates do not entail such enormous economic ramifications, may not display the same successful abilities to modify the behaviour and viewpoints of their constituents. In fact, an analysis of influence within other international organizations may point more strongly toward the organization's role as an autonomous actor or as an instrument of one nation's foreign policy agenda.

Since the Gulf War, for example, the role of the United Nations as an autonomous actor in international relations appears to be strengthening. During the crisis, the UN was the focus for intensive multilateral negotiations, the resolutions of its Security Council providing the basis of the world community's condemnation of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. There is no reason to doubt that the UN will continue to occupy a prominent position as a negotiator for peace in the Middle East and elsewhere around the globe, particularly through the person of the UN Secretary-General. This renewed interest in multilateral negotiations may, in turn, filter through to other specialized UN agencies, with member nations allowing these organizations a greater sphere of influence and autonomous action.

At the same time, other international organizations may be more susceptible than the ITU to becoming the instruments of one country's national policies. Again, the likelihood of this happening depends upon the organization's 'product' and how

crucial this may be to a nation's political and economic interests. If the domination of one particular country's agenda within the organization is not seen as a crucial threat to domestic interests, the situation may simply be tolerated or solved by withdrawal from the organization. If withdrawal is politically or economically unfeasible, other strategies, such as coalition-building and issue linkage, may be employed to acquire greater influence within the organization.

Before discussing specific conclusions, it is worth noting how the methodology employed in this thesis contributes to the study of influence within international organizations. Through policy research and interviews, the thesis attempts to show how the organizational "products" of an international organization provide a means of studying the structure or "anatomy" of influence within that organization. In the case of the International Telecommunication Union, these products included resolutions of the Plenipotentiary Conference, the Maitland Commission Report, and the proceedings and activities of the Centre for Telecommunications Development. An in-depth study of these documents, supplemented by interviews and secondary source research, has provided more than a chronology of the various initiatives undertaken by the ITU. In fact, it has offered a means of understanding whose interests are embodied in the organization's workload and how these interest groups have been able to influence the ITU's agenda.

From this, one can conclude that an international organization's initiatives must be understood as more than simply efforts to correct a stated problem. Under this surface level of analysis, these organizational products present a reflection of the structure of interests both within and surrounding that organization. Therefore, in order to fully understand the initiatives put forward by an international organization, one must study their context as well as their content. This includes gaining a thorough knowledge of how an international organization is structured and what decision-making mechanisms are in place to govern its output. As cited in Chapter

1, Cox and Jacobsen's *The Anatomy of Influence* provides a good example of a thorough analysis of decision-making mechanisms.[31] The authors' taxonomy divides the decisions of international organizations into seven categories which are then applied to the study of eight international governmental organizations.

Contextualizing an international organization's products also entails identifying which interest groups or stakeholders are both formally and informally represented within the membership of the international organization. For example, international governmental organizations (IGOs) may seek to represent other interest groups within this forum, not simply those of a national government. Finally, an understanding of context requires some knowledge of how these formally and informally recognized stakeholders are able to utilize the mechanisms of the forum to affect its decisions.

Just as studying the structural environment of an organization provides clues to its anatomy of influence, so too does the study of its resolutions, commissions, proposals and other organizational documentation. Here, the researcher must ask how these documents seek to incorporate or balance various interests. How does the framing of "the problem" and "the solution" reflect this? How do mandates and criteria for success suit the interests of individual members and/or the organization as a whole? Such document analysis provides another means of tracking influence within an international organization, complementing the analysis of decision-making mechanisms as presented by Cox and Jacobsen.

This two-pronged approach can be applied to the study of influence in other types of international organizations. It provides a multi-dimensional understanding of both the organization and its policies, resolutions and other initiatives. The technique is especially useful when studying the evolution of an issue over a period of

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[31]Robert W. Cox and Harold K. Jacobsen, *The Anatomy of Influence: Decision Making in International Organizations*, (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974).

time, since shifts in an institution's structure of interests can help to account for changes in its treatment of an issue. Finally, studying both organization and products provides a means of projecting possible future directions for an international organization, based on the established structure of interests.

Even with the research strategy described above, a study of influence within international organizations must go further than simply identifying the various stakeholders involved and how they are able to exert their influence. Besides discussing voting patterns and expert committees, this thesis raises a number of issues related to the study of international organizations which help to provide a better understanding of the dynamics of influence within these forums. These issues, discussed below, also provide a point of departure for further studies of this nature.

One factor which this thesis highlights is the role that an organization's own bureaucracy plays in the influence equation. Internal interests -- not simply those of its membership -- can have an impact on an international organization's agenda. In the case of the CTD, the influence of both the Secretary-General and his staff within the Technical Cooperation Department were significant contributing factors in the eventual outcome of the initiative. The example of the CTD underscores the fact that an international organization is more than just a forum that brings together various national or external interests. In fact, its own bureaucracy has an important stake in these proceedings as well.

This fact is not always recognized or fully explored within the major theories of international organization. The realist and neo-realist traditions, for example, give this point scant attention since the state is their unit of analysis and power is seen as the dominant characteristic of international relations. Within such a paradigm, the international organization is presented more as a stage for state actors, particularly

the superpowers, rather than an autonomous actor.[32] Such studies seek to demonstrate how a particular state has been able to influence the outcome of the international organization through its monetary contributions, personnel within the secretariat or control over voting mechanisms.

Functionalist theories of international organization also tend to overlook the role of the institution's own bureaucracy in influencing its agenda. Within the functionalist paradigm presented in the writings of David Mitrany, the function, problem or task itself suggests the form and extent of international administration within which it is to be tackled.[33] Emphasis is thus placed on how the international organization, while pursuing this function, fosters interrelationships amongst nations. Functionalist theorists do not spend as much time considering how these institutions may seek to pursue their own separate agenda.

It is only with the incorporation of political considerations into functionalist theory, as posited by neo-functionalist writers, that this school of international relations writings began to explore the idea of an international organization with some form of autonomous authority. Writers such as Ernst Haas, speculating about the possibilities of a united Europe, believed that political decision-making authority as well as economic functions would be increasingly transferred from national to supranational organizations.[34] Yet here again, a new supranational agenda would be drawn from the collective interests of countries within the region.

Despite a relative lack of emphasis on the role of internal bureaucracy within the literature on international organization, some studies do exist. Robert Cox

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[32]Examples of such studies include John Stoessinger's, *The UN and the Superpowers: China, Russia, and America*, (New York: Random House, 1973); Robert Rigg's, *US/UN: Foreign Policy and International Organization*, (New York: Appleton, Century, Crofts, 1971); and Alvin Rubinstein's, *The Soviets in International Organizations: Changing Policies toward the Developing Countries (1953-1963)*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964).

[33]Paul Taylor, "Functionalism: The Theory of David Mitrany", *International Organization*, Paul Taylor and A.J.R. Groom, eds., (New York: Nichols Publishing Company, 1978), p. 238.

[34]Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe, 2nd ed., (Stanford University Press, 1968), p. 34.

explored the role of the executive head in determining the scope and authority of an international organization.[35] According to Cox, the influence of a secretary-general is not only determined by their ability to manage "foreign" politics, but also to build alliances within the domestic political system. The requisites for such coalition-building include access to important interest groups, an understanding of their goals and perceptions, and an ability to manipulate the organization's actions so that these groups can perceive a common interest with it.

Other studies investigate the activities of secretariats in developing alliances with certain government interests. International secretariats are viewed as both catalysts and as potential members of coalitions, their distinctive resources being information and an aura of international legitimacy. In certain cases, the interests of an organization's bureaucracy contradict those of its secretary-general. James Magee discusses an instance where lower-level bureaucrats within the FAO Secretariat conspired with certain African governments to thwart their director's decision to relocate two offices.[36] In other cases, secretariats have divisions that are widely regarded as fiefdoms of particular governments.[37]

While these and other studies acknowledge an autonomous level of influence amongst an organization's executive staff and bureaucracy, they are not always successful in delineating where these interests become separate from those of particular members. A significant reason for this, as this researcher can attest, is the difficulty in tracing and measuring these internal sources of influence. Their contribution to a particular outcome is not contained within official documentation or even transcripts of conference proceedings. Instead, one must often rely on

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[35]Robert Cox, "The Executive Head: An Essay on Leadership in International Organization", *International Organization*, 23:2, Spring 1969, pp. 205-230.
[36]James Magee, "ECA and the Paradox of African Cooperation", *International Conciliation*, No. 580, November 1970.
[37]See, for example, J.S. Nye, "UNCTAD: Poor Nations' Pressure Group", in Cox and Jacobsen's *Anatomy of Influence*, pp. 334-370.

opinions and word-of-mouth accounts when seeking to assess the impact of this source of influence.

Although, in the opinion of some, this may compromise the objectivity of the research, some effort must be made to include this important source of influence when studying the activities of an international organization. One would have only a partial understanding of the failure of the CTD, for example, if one were to consider only the interests and influence of developing and developed countries in the debate. Clearly, the subtle but powerful resistance of the Secretary-General and the General Secretariat to the project were key factors in its demise. The influence of internal interests, as investigated within this thesis, is therefore crucial to an understanding of other organizations' actions and "products".

The consideration of internal sources of influence must be combined with an understanding of how external interests impact upon the agenda of an international organization. As a forum for managing external interests, the international governmental organization accomplishes this task through two distinct processes: communication and negotiation. Each of these practices is illustrated in the ITU's development assistance debate, as industrialized and developing countries sought to influence the Union's agenda. Examining these two steps can provide clues as to the relative success of other international organizations in managing the conflicting demands of its membership.

First, through its various instruments, the international organization provides a forum for communication amongst the myriad of different interest groups represented in its membership. Even within international governmental organizations like the ITU, these interests extend beyond governments to include business, manufacturing, labour, scientific, technical and economic development groups. The international organization provides these stakeholders with

opportunities to voice their many opinions, concerns, requests and demands. These means of communication include debate at conferences, resolutions passed by administrative councils, and reports published by special commissions sponsored by the international organization. In so doing, both IGOs and INGOs provide a means of structuring debate on a wide variety of issues of importance to a whole spectrum of stakeholders.

This structuring process was illustrated in Chapter 4 of this thesis, when discussing the evolution of the communications development issue. The concept of a new international economic order (NIEO) proposed within the UN General Assembly led to discussions of a new world information order (NWIO) within Unesco. This concept was further refined in the MacBride Commission Report which, in turn, informed the debate at the ITU. With somewhat different participants and interests, the broader issue of communications development was restructured within the Union, focusing on ensuring that developing countries had access to telecommunications technology. Through this communication process, according to Keohane and Nye, international organizations work to define salient issues, decide which issues can be grouped together, and help to determine the policies and priorities of governments and other interest groups.[38]

International bargaining or negotiation is the second process through which an international organization is able to manage external interests. This exercise may involve a number of different strategies, some of which have been explored in previous chapters. These include coalition-building amongst countries with common concerns in order to achieve a voting majority at Plenipotentiary Conferences. With regard to the development assistance issue, bargaining also takes place amongst nation blocs, particularly between North and South. As observers of the ITU will

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[38]R.O. Keohane and J.S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, Second Edition, (Boston: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1989), p. 35.

mention, both groups accept a degree of compromise in their demands in order to ensure the continuing support of their counterparts for the organization's overall agenda. A third form of negotiation and coalition-building takes place between external and internal interests of the organization. Alliances between the Secretary-General and officials of the developing countries, for example, proved to be a considerable obstacle to those wishing to privatize part of the ITU's development assistance activities.

Studying the negotiation process is critical in understanding how influence is exercised within an international organization. This is not a simple process, however, since influence is often exercised in face-to-face encounters between delegates in corridors and back rooms rather than in the General Assembly. While an analysis of the organization's structure and activities may provide some clues, interviews with a variety of organizational participants remains the best means of charting the bargaining process. Other factors, previously mentioned, may also help to gauge the dynamics of an international organization's negotiation processes. These include the nature of an organization's decision-making mechanisms; the degree of interdependence amongst the stakeholders involved; and the nature of an organization's business.

As this study demonstrates, the success with which an international organization manages or coordinates various interests depends in large measure on its constitutional arrangements. These must be flexible enough to allow gradual shifts in its agenda and activities over time. The expansion of the ITU's technical cooperation function was accomplished without extraordinary stress on the institution because it could be done incrementally over the course of several decades. An international organization with rigidly-defined constitutional documents and unwieldy amending formulas may have greater difficulty adopting to changes in its operating environment or incorporating new interests. When such crises arise, the

allegiance of its members may be threatened, ultimately leading to withdrawals. In such situations, the degree of interdependence amongst members and the nature of an organization's business will help to determine the likelihood of such a drastic option.

Another idea that enables us to assess influence within international organizations is the distinction which must be drawn between *influence* and *power*. Cox and Jacobsen describe power in terms of capability. Within the context of the international organization, it refers to the aggregate of political and economic resources that are available to a particular actor.[39] In contrast, influence has a more specific scope. An actor influences another's behaviour in some particular sphere of activity, or issue-area. The relative degree of influence which an actor commands is more likely to be based on their position within an international bureaucracy or their intensity of interest in an issue rather than simply the sum total of resources at their disposal.

The distinction between power and influence is illustrated clearly in the case of the development assistance debate at the ITU. The developing countries were quite successful in influencing the agenda of the organization, passing resolutions and allotting funds to increase its role in telecommunications development. This influence, however, does not necessarily translate into control over the resources necessary for its realization. To a great extent, this power still rests with the nations of the industrialized North. The limited success of the CTD was testament to this fact.

When studying the structure of influence within an international organization, therefore, one must be cognizant of the fact that influence does not necessarily equal power in real terms. In fact, a case can be made that some international

[39]Robert W. Cox and Harold K. Jacobsen, *The Anatomy of Influence*, (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974), p. 4.

organizations provide power holders with a forum to appear responsive to less powerful groups without relinquishing any control over an issue-area. A link between influence and power does exist, however, when actors within an international organization are subject to some form of tangible interdependence. In other words, actors must have a vested interest or stake in the organization's deliberations, and a willingness to be bound by its decisions. Thus, influence is more likely to have direct links with power in an international organization which sets tariffs and trade quotas than in one which studies international cultural policies.

One final issue which should be addressed in this concluding section relates to the interplay between public (i.e. government) and private interests within international governmental organizations (IGOs). In the case of the International Telecommunication Union, this thesis has mainly referred to the interests of developed and developing countries -- implying government as opposed to private sector interests. This is appropriate because the ITU, as an IGO, was formally established by an international treaty between governments and its deliberations continue to be expressed in terms of national interests.

In many developing countries, telecommunications administrations are operated as government departments, and private sector interests are not a relevant consideration. Yet even in industrialized countries, which possess a strong privately-owned telecommunications industry, there are few sharp differences between public and private interests as expressed at the ITU. This is because the "national interests" voiced by the industrialized countries are developed in concert with their domestic telecommunications industries. For example, Canada's policy position at ITU Conferences has evolved from extensive consultations with the members of Telecom Canada, Teleglobe Canada, and the Canadian telecommunications manufacturing sector. In addition, input into the standards work of the CCIs is essentially that of the telecommunications industry.

Having noted the interchangeability of government and private sector interests within much of the ITU's business, one must be careful not to ignore exceptions to this pattern. Analysis of the CTD as presented in Chapter 5 does identify how conflict between governmental interests in the developing countries and private sector interests in the industrialized world played a significant role in its limited success. This occurred despite a generally favourable reception and cautious support for the CTD on the part of governments in the developed world, who saw some diplomatic value in keeping the Centre alive.

When examining influence in other IGOs, therefore, a researcher must be careful to explore the divergence between the interests of government and those of private industry in a particular country, as these are presented within the IGO. Stated another way, one must guard against the assumption that IGOs are forums for the presentation of unified, "national interests". While this idea is often posited within the realist tradition, a more accurate representation is given in writings which stress the interdependent nature of international relations. As Keohane and Nye point out, relations between countries are characterized by multiple channels which traverse traditional distinctions between public and private; formal and informal.[40] Within this interdependent environment, IGOs can and will incorporate a wider variety of interests than simply those of national governments, whether these interests are formally recognized or not.

Returning to the case of the Centre for Telecommunications Development may provide some clues as to the future of private sector involvement within international governmental organizations like the ITU. Reflecting upon the fate of the CTD, Michael Israel of Teleglobe Canada comments that "the international community may not yet be ready to support the concept of non-governmental institutions playing a leading role in international cooperative efforts, even when such

[40]Keohane and Nye, p. 24-25.

institutions are placed under the umbrella of well-established United Nations agencies".[41]

The reluctance of developing countries to allow control of an IGO's development assistance program to fall to the private sector may indeed be a continuing phenomenon, particularly as these initiatives relate to sensitive areas of political or cultural sovereignty. In the coming years, however, as governments have less money to finance international development, more of this burden may necessarily fall to the private sector. This fact may result in more ventures with a private sector orientation similar to the CTD being launched within the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations. Studying the changing role and influence of private sector interests within these agencies is certainly a topic worthy of further exploration.

[41]Personal correspondence with Mr. Michael Israel, Teleglobe Canada, January 7, 1991.

APPENDIX A

Organizational Structure of the ITU



APPENDIX B

Composition of the Independent Commission for World-Wide Telecommunication Development

Dr Sukhamoy Chakravarty
Chairman, Advisory Council to the Prime Minister
Planning Commission
India

Mr William M. Ellinghaus
Formerly President
American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T)
United States

Mr Abdul Rahman K. Al-Ghunaim (Vice Chairman)
Under Secretary
Ministry of Communications
Kuwait

Dr Koji Kobayashi
Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer
NEC Corporation
Japan

Dr Volkmar Koehler
Parliamentary Secretary of State
to the Federal Minister for Economic Cooperation
Federal Republic of Germany

His Excellency Mr Mohand Laenser
Minister of Posts and Telecommunications
Morrocco

Mr. Louis-Joseph Libois
Chairman, Caisse Nationale des
Télécommunications (CNT)
France

Sir Donald Maitland, GCMG OBE (Chairman)
United Kingdom

His Excellency Mr John S. Malecela, MP (Vice-Chairman)
Minister of Communications, Transport and Works
Tanzania

Dr Manuel Perez Guerrero
Minister of State for International Economic Affairs
Venezuela

His Excellency Mr Jean Ping
Director of the President's Office of the
Republic of Gabon
Gabon

His Excellency Mr Alioune Sene
Ambassador of Senegal in Switzerland and
Permanent Representative of Senegal
to the United Nations Office in Geneva
Senegal

Dr Alexandru Spataru
Head of Applied Electronics Department
Bucharest Politechnical Institute
Romania

His Excellency Mr Achmad Tahir (Vice-Chairman)
Ministry of Tourism, Posts and Telecommunication
Indonesia

Dr Leonid E. Varakin
Rector
All-Union Telecommunication Institute by Correspondence
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications
USSR

His Excellency Mr Armando Vargas Araya (Vice-Chairman)
Minister of Information and Communications
Costa Rica

His Excellency Dr Faisal Zaïdan
Deputy Minister of Telephones
Ministry of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones
Saudi Arabia

APPENDIX C

Composition of the First Advisory Board of the Centre for Telecommunications Development

Mr John Alvey
Corporate Director and Managing Director
Development and Procurement Engineering Chief
British Telecom
United Kingdom

Mr J. M. Biezen
Managing Director
NEPOSTEL/Netherlands PTT
Netherlands

Dr B. Bjurel
Technical Director, LM Ericsson
Sweden

Mr R. E. Butler (Ex-Officio Senior Vice-Chairman)
Secretary-General
International Telecommunication Union

Mr Jean-Claude Delorme (Chairman of the Advisory Board)
President and Chief Executive Officer
Teleglobe Canada
Canada

Mr A. S. Dlamini
Assistant Director of Telecommunications
Swaziland Posts and Telecommunications
Swaziland

Mr Dietrich Elias
President of the Deutsche Telepost Consulting GmbH
(DETECON)
Federal Republic of Germany

Mr C. Fayard
Chairman, Alcatel-Thomson International
France

Mrs Ana Gotzeva
Director of Research
Telecommunications Research Institute
Bulgaria

Mr K. K. Gunawardana
Director of Telecommunications
Sri Lanka

Dr Marco Jagodic
Head of Research and Development, ISKRA
Yugoslavia

Mr Zouhir Ben Lakhal
General Director for Telecommunications
Ministry of Communications
Tunisia

Mr E. Motine (Observer/Member)
Director of the External Relations Department
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications of the USSR
USSR

Mr A. D. Ntagazwa (Vice-Chairman of the Advisory Board)
Deputy Minister
Ministry of Communications and Works
Tanzania

Mr René Okouya
Director of Telecommunications
Direction générale de l'Office national des posts
et télécommunications
Congo

Mr João Santelli Junior
Vice-President
Victori Internacional
Brazil

Mr Katsumi Soyama
Chairman of the Board
NEC Systems Integration Construction Ltd.
Japan

Mr C. Thompson
President
Barbados External Telecommunications Ltd.
Barbados

Mr Paul H. Vishny
General Counsel
United States Telecommunications Suppliers Association
United States

Mr Liu Yuan
Acting Director of the Department of External Affairs
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications
China

Dr Faizal Zaïdan
Deputy Minister for Telephones
Ministry of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones
Saudi Arabia

APPENDIX D

Composition of the High-Level Review Committee

Mr Sami S. Al-Basheer
Director-General, International Relations
Ministry of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones
Saudi Arabia

Mr Mamadou Ba
Conseiller technique au ministère de l'Information
et des Télécommunications
Mali

Mr Abderrazak Berrada
Ancien membre de l'IFRB
Ministère des Postes et Télécommunications
Morocco

Mr Abdelkrim Boussaid (Vice-Chairman)
Conseiller du ministre chargé des organizations internationales
Ministère des Postes et Télécommunications
Algeria

Mr Léon C. Ciss
Directeur des études et du développement
Société nationale des télécommunications (SONATEL)
Senegal

Mr M. F. Dandato
Posts and Telecommunications Corporation
Zimbabwe

Mr George E. Hams
Senior Executive General Manager
Metropolitan Division
Australia

Mr Poul Hansen
Commissioner on Electronic Media
Denmark

Mr Gerald B. Helman
Senior Advisor to the Under-Secretary of State
for Political Affairs
United States

Mr Arturo Ituassu
Secretario de Assuntos Internacionais
Ministerio de Comunicações
Brazil

Mr Petr S. Kurakov
Head, Central External Relations Department
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications
USSR

Mr N. Morishima
Senior Advisor, Communications Advisory Bureau
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications
Japan

Mr Michael Morris
Director, European Relations
British Telecom International
United Kingdom

Mr J. L. Parapak
President Director
PT Indonesia Satellite Corporation
Indonesia

Mr M. K. Rao
Wireless Advisor to the Government of India
Ministry of Communications
India

Mr Sergio Regueros Swonkin
Secretario General
Ministerio de Communicaciones
Colombia

Mr Ilija Stojanovic
Special Adviser
Community of Yugoslav Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones
Yugoslavia

Mr Michel Toutan
Conseiller
FRANCE TELECOM
France

Mr Heinrich Venhaus
Ministerialdirigent a. D. Bundesministerium für das Post- und Fernmeldewesen
Federal Republic of Germany

Mr Gabriel I. Warren (Chairman)
Director General, International Relations Branch
Department of Communications
Canada

Mr Liu Zhongen
Deputy Director, Department of External Affairs
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications
China

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