

UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL PROTEST
IN MEXICO

by

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ABSTRACT

It is the principal contention of this thesis that the increasing frequency and widening scope of social protest in Mexico over the past decade has been due to the inability of the political structure to mediate the demands of a 'developing'¹ nation. This inability has stemmed from the constraints which capitalist economic development has placed upon the distribution of power and resources within Mexican society.

The first two chapters examine the extent and form of foreign economic penetration since the revolution of 1910 and its effect upon the internal structure of the Mexican economy and socio-economic system. In seeking to determine who have been the beneficiaries of 20th century development the evidence validates Eduardo Galeano's analysis:

" The new type of imperialism does not make its colonies more prosperous, even though it enriches its "enclaves"; it does not alleviate social tensions, but on the contrary sharpens them; it extends poverty and concentrates wealth; it takes over the internal market and the key parts of the productive apparatus; it appropriates progress for itself, determines its direction and fixes its limits; it absorbs credit and directs foreign trade as it pleases; it does not provide capital for development, but instead removes it; it encourages waste by sending the greatest part of the economic surplus abroad; it denationalises our industry and also the profits that our industry produces. Today in Latin America the system has our veins as open as it did in those distant times when our blood first served the needs of primary accumulation for European capitalist development."²

Chapter 3 discusses the evolution of the political structure since 1910, and shows how the maintenance of centralised political control has assisted the growth of a neo-colonial economy. The mechanisms of co-optation and repression are examined in some detail,

since the balance between these indicates the degree of stability within the political system; examples of social protest provide empirical data for the changing balance.

The final chapter begins with an examination of the role of Mexican students within the context of the Latin American university. Their role is significant in analysing social protest in Mexico; not because they, per se, constitute a serious threat to the status quo, but rather because they can provide the catalyst necessary to unite other groups. Students performed this role in 1968; we see that as the principal reason for the state's repressive acts, and those events as an important marker in the future political development of Mexico.

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To the men, women, and children who were murdered on October 2nd,
1968, in the plaza de las Tres Culturas, Mexico City.

Chapter 1

Mexico and Latin America. Mexico: Model for Capitalist Development ?

" South of your border, my North American friends, lies a continent in revolutionary ferment, a continent that possesses immense wealth and nevertheless lives in a misery and a desolation you have never known and barely imagine. Two hundred million persons live in Latin America. One hundred and forty million of them work virtually as serfs. Seventy million of them are outside the monetary economy. One hundred million are illiterate. One hundred million suffer from endemic diseases. One hundred and forty million are poorly fed."³

Fuentes' impassioned remarks describe well the core contradiction in Latin America: immense wealth hand in hand with correspondingly widespread poverty. Mexico suffers less in this respect than many nations in the hemisphere, and is often regarded as a model for economic progress and political harmony among the Latin nations. However, there has been a growing consciousness that Mexico had a revolution which stopped short of its goals; the essence of the revolution for the people, agrarian reform, was aborted after World War II, and recent years have witnessed a return to concentration of land ownership. The revolutionary ideals proclaimed in the early stages of the revolution have today become political rhetoric devoid of meaning; the reality has seen half the population sharing little or not at all in the benefits of economic growth. Today, economic surplus is channeled out of Mexico or into the hands of the "enclaves" Galeano mentions⁴ -- to the detriment of the needs of the majority.

Politically, Mexico has experienced greater stability over the past 50 years than the majority of Latin American nation-states.

This stability has derived from the ability of the political structure to institute reforms and to neutralise conflicts through use of the mechanisms of co-optation and repression; but this stability has been more apparent than real in recent years. There have been increasing numbers of outbreaks of social protest among peasant, labour, and student groups since the late 1950's -- as the political structure has been unable to contain growing contradictions within the society. The land reform programme which formed the core of social change in the 1930's has steadily turned sour as the trend in land ownership moves toward large-scale private holdings. The inability to survive on small plots with growing numbers of mouths to feed has forced many small landowners from their land -- either to the cities or to become wage-earners once again -- the ideals of 'tierra y libertad' are voiced by peasants embittered by the failure of land reform.

Aside from their common European background, the most significant similarity between Mexico and Latin America is their common relationship to the United States: one of neo-colonialism. Although all these nations have 'independence', such independence becomes meaningless in the light of international economic relations since political autonomy can only be meaningful when accompanied by economic independence. The 'new' imperialism permits political independence, but:

"...political independence, though of the utmost importance, is not enough; the Latin American countries must win economic independence too. And economic independence, in the sense of establishing their own control over their own economic surplus so they can apply it to productive capital investment for the planned economic development of the whole nation involves those far reaching social changes which spell revolution - and socialism."⁵

The terms under which U.S. - Latin American economic relations have been established are ostensibly for the benefit of both partners, under the 'Alliance for Progress'; however, the international division of labour is such that the southern hemisphere is primarily oriented toward primary and extractive industry, the northern toward manufacturing. This structure, together with large U.S. investments in critical areas, had had the effect of creating an almost total dependence on the U.S. market, with correspondingly little control by the Latin Americans. One product of this relationship has been the development and maintenance of a local bourgeoisie operating in the interests of foreign capital:

" Latin America has a dialectically integrated society and economy which today obliges the bourgeoisie - including its most nationalist sectors - to pursue policies which, however much development they may generate for the minority, condemn the majority of Latin Americans to ever-deeper underdevelopment, and the bourgeoisie itself to ever-increasing dependence on and absorption into the metropolis bourgeoisie of the neo-imperialist system."⁶

Underdevelopment is an inevitable consequence of this situation; Ché Guevara has described it as follows:

" A dwarf with an enormous head and a swollen chest is "underdeveloped", inasmuch as his weak legs or short arms do not match the rest of his anatomy. He is the product of an abnormal formation that distorted his development. That is what we really are - we, who are politely referred to as "underdeveloped", but in truth are colonial, semi-colonial, or dependent countries."⁷

Gunder Frank's model of metropolis development at the expense of satellite underdevelopment clearly applies in the case of Mexico; although there exist apparently mitigating factors such as state ownership of the oil industry and the major means of communication,

foreign control over those areas of the economy critical for development has increased since the revolution and places Mexico into the paradigm as an underdeveloped country. Mexico has been unable to break the hold of foreign capital over internal commercial and industrial development -- this failure reflects the inadequacy of the Mexican revolution to achieve one of its main goals -- freedom from outside control. González-Casanova has cogently stated the nature of Mexican dependence today:

" The structure of the foreign market and the structure of foreign investments in and of themselves limit any measure of an economically independent character. The danger of devaluation, of a halt to foreign investment, of a setback in the tourist trade, of a suspension in opportunities for migratory workers, and of a boycott on imports and exports, constitute, in the present phase of the revolutionary cycle, real and effective dangers, which influence political decisions of the government in the struggle for national liberation."⁸

Mexico has often been cited as a model for capitalist development in Latin America by North American politicians and social scientists;⁹ an alternative to the socialist path now pursued by Cuba. However, when the reality of capitalist 'development' is examined, it is found to be less balanced and uniform than its proponents imply.

In the critical area of agrarian reform Mexico has progressed and regressed -- progress being achieved in the early years of the revolution, regression being achieved today. In the pre-revolutionary Porfirian era one percent of the population controlled 97% of the national area, whilst 96% controlled only two percent. Since that time there has been a significant amount of land distribution, yet Stavenhagen was able to write in 1968:

"...the great properties which monopolise lands, waters and most other resources in prejudice of the small cultivators (as often private as ejidal) continue being more the norm than the exception in many parts of the country."¹⁰

For the small land-owner or ejidatario the principal sources of credit are the Banco Nacional de Crédito Agrícola and the Banco Nacional de Crédito Ejidal; loans from these sources have become increasingly difficult to obtain for the small farmer, due to a high rate of loss on small loans.¹¹ The latter stems partly from the lack of economies in small-scale production and partly from the political nature of the Banco Ejidal and the degree of corruption within the bank itself.¹² The political nature of the Bank is demonstrated through its use as a means of social control, particularly in areas of peasant unrest. Patronage and corruption are widespread; the cultural legacy of the mordida benefits least those most in need -- the peasants.

Pressure from large landholdings coupled with the rural population increase have forced many small landowners to lease their land to large landowners, the peasants then often becoming wage-labour on their own land. Legally, no Mexican is permitted more than 100 hectares of irrigated and 200 hectares of unirrigated land; however, like many other constitutional provisions, legalities are flexible. In 1964, for example, 47 years after the land reform law was signed, 106 million hectares remained in private hands, and 71 million (76%) of these were part of private holdings of more than 1000 hectares apiece.¹³ The tremendous advances in land distribution made in the presidencies of Cárdenas and López Mateos are today being slowly whittled away in the interests of capitalist 'agri-business'. Much of the new land

distributed today under the land reform provisions is marginal; without proper credit facilities irrigation and modern machinery are a dream only realised by large-scale landholdings. Early in his election campaign Luis Echeverría Alvarez, PRI candidate for president in 1970, stated that what Mexico needed was a " rural transformation which would provide a secure market among peasants enjoying an ever-rising standard of living."¹⁴ The analysis is correct and the intent admirable, but such a development would require a radical change in the structure of investment and rural credit facilities. Such a transformation, as we shall see later, is less likely to occur today than ever before.

In terms of its Gross National Product (G.N.P.) Mexico is a booming nation. In the decade 1957 - 1967 the G.N.P. grew at the rate of 6.5% annually, but much of this increase has been counter-balanced by the rapid population growth. Industrial development has been costly, since heavy machinery and capital equipment have to be imported from outside -- the U.S.A. for the most part. Although nationalism is voiced loudly by all within the political structure, the continued influx of foreign investment has limited Mexican independence; as Frank has observed:

" Direct foreign investments produce unfavourable effects on the balance of payments, on the integration of the economy, and on the formation of capital. They influence foreign trade unfavourably, encourage monopolistic competition, and displace and subordinate many domestic entrepreneurs."¹⁵

Few have dared to take the necessary steps toward establishing real economic independence for fear of sanctions; certainly such moves as Cardenas' oil expropriation of 1938 would, as it did then, |

result in serious short-run consequences for the economy; the extreme examples of the Dominican Republic (1954) and Cuba (1961) show the possible response of the U.S.A. to attempts at autonomous development. In Mexico foreign control and influence is felt not only in the private sector, but also in the public:

" The dependency of the public sector on financial institutions controlled by the United States is paralleled by the dependence on direct foreign investment in...key Mexican industries. The national policy of "Mexicanisation" of industry has placed nominal control in the hands of nationals, but the technology and a very large proportion of the capital is supplied from outside."¹⁶

As González-Casanova observes above, the drain of capital which results from external control leads to balance of payments problems; over the past twenty years the outflow of exchange on foreign investments has grown to a greater proportion than the investment of new capital; in the process Mexico has clearly become a 'satellite' of the U.S. metropolis, and its continued underdevelopment is a product of this relationship.¹⁷

Frank's observation that:

"...it appears that the political and economic structure that emerged from the Revolution was not really designed to, and does not, permit the large mass of peasants to share in its economic fruits."¹⁸

is a viewpoint shared by many, both within and outside Mexico, and especially among those deprived groups who have seen few real changes in their conditions of life since the revolution. Political leaders in Mexico have done little to cope with the rapid urban expansion, due to population growth within the cities and heavy rural migration. Large slum areas have been created in the cities -- Oscar Lewis has

described the condition of this urban lumpenproletariat and the contradiction within Mexico between wealth and poverty:

" Despite the increased production and the apparent prosperity, the uneven distribution of the growing national wealth has made the disparity between the incomes of the rich and the poor more striking than ever before. And despite some rise in the standard of living for the general population, in 1956 over 60% of the population were still ill-fed, ill-housed, and ill-clothed, 40% were illiterate, and 46% of the nation's children were not going to school."¹⁹

The economy and the changes in the socio-economic structure since the revolution will now be examined more closely, in order to determine the validity of these indictments of progress in Mexican society.

Chapter 2

Social and Economic Change, 1900 - 1970.

1. Agriculture and Land Reform.

The revolution which began in 1910 was essentially a bourgeois revolution, led by the middle classes, but with strong peasant support. It was inspired by an intense hatred of a dictatorship that had left the overwhelming majority of the Mexican people without land, rights, or dignity. The Díaz dictatorship had maintained tight control over the economic and political life of the country, with a tiny minority of the population -- in conjunction with foreigners -- controlling virtually all the resources. The prevailing philosophy of the period was positivism, imported from Europe, which provided a useful rationalisation for the oppression and exploitation of the native population. Porfirio Díaz and his advisors, the científicos, maintained stability with an iron rule and encouraged the entry of foreign capital in the belief that it would be beneficial to Mexico -- it was, but the Mexico it aided excluded the overwhelming majority of Mexicans. By 1910, U.S. investments amounted to more than \$2 billion, more than all the capital in the hands of Mexicans.²⁰ U.S. interests owned three-quarters of Mexico's mineral wealth; British and U.S. capitalists shared ownership of known oil resources between themselves 50:50; the French owned the textile industry, the Spaniards the food industry.²¹

Díaz encouraged the formation of great estates, latifundios, which

accounted for the extreme concentration of land ownership.²²

Because of this, an estimated 95% of rural families were landless, and 88.4% of the total population lived in near-slavery as peons.²³

'Housing' took the form of miserable huts, illiteracy was over 80%, and infant mortality was 30.4%.²⁴

The first fifteen years of the revolution were years of civil war and social upheaval; the earliest signs of stability came with the formulation of the constitution in 1917. The rearrangement of landholdings was initiated in 1915, and has since led to the redistribution of 27.5% of Mexico's land area.²⁵ The main thrust of land distribution was achieved during the administrations of Cárdenas and López Mateos, (1934-40, 1958-64, respectively), when over 34 million hectares of land were distributed. The scope of land distribution disguises several important facts however; that Mexico is essentially a capitalist country and is subject to the logic of capitalism -- a structural arrangement which, in the long-run, operates to eliminate small-scale producers in the interests of economies of scale and efficiency.

The return to pre-revolutionary patterns of land distribution is steadily becoming more apparent. Pablo González-Casanova has noted how the revolutionary cycle has created a new latifundia system through " the accumulation of land and the formation of capitalist agricultural corporations."²⁶ The old relationship of debt-peonage between landowners and peons, by which peons were forced into pseudo-slavery by latifundio owners and their agents, has today been

replaced by a more sophisticated form of exploitation achieving the same ends -- " wage-labour combined with the historical vestiges of peonage."²⁷ Small-scale ejidatarios and small private landholders are also exploited through:

"...high interest rates and through speculation in agricultural products and market control."²⁸

The lack of capital on the part of poor ejidatarios has forced many to lease their land to private interests with the necessary capital. Population increases have led, in a relatively short space of time, to " excessive land division and the "pulverisation" of many ejidos."²⁹ Given these circumstances, often the peasant will move away from his native village, to the U.S. as bracero labour (an alternative terminated in 1965), or to the city slums in the hope of finding employment. For those who remain the frustrations grow, and in recent years there have been many reports of landless peasants moving to unused lands held by large landowners. For example:

" Soldiers under the command of a captain of the 19th cavalry regiment...forcefully broke up a group of 100 peasants and small cattlemen who, with their livestock and belongings, had gone to the border to occupy lands in the 100 kilometer belt of estates belonging to foreigners."³⁰

Foreign ownership of Mexican land is especially bitter to those whose fathers fought a bloody revolution against just that. In recent years the quality of the land distributed has been very poor, often insufficient to subsist upon; the small landholdings are generally of poor quality unirrigated land, while the large holdings tend to be in irrigated and productive areas. Mechanisation in agriculture also pressures the small farmer, since he is unlikely

to be extended credit due to the unprofitability of his enterprise. Both irrigation and mechanisation have largely benefited large-scale holdings producing export crops.

Public agricultural credit accounts for only about one third of all agricultural credit, and about half of that is from the Banco Nacional de Crédito Agrícola, lending only to large landowners. What is left, from the Banco Ejidal, tends to go predominantly to the best ejidal lands, thus making it extremely difficult under normal circumstances for small, unproductive lands to obtain any form of credit, other than from extortionate money-lenders. The end result is a vicious circle for the peasant:

" More than 80% of the people are engaged in farming and many of them are so strapped for cash just to survive that they are backsliding to the days of peonage a half a century ago when the peasant was bound to a large estate by perpetual debt."³¹

Capitalist alternatives have been followed in attempting to deal with the 'agrarian problem', solutions which tend to have serious effects for those without power and resources. A recent study of the structure of Mexican agriculture cogently stated the problem:

" Mexico, rather than forming large state farms or cooperatives on good land with government subsidies for machinery and supplies, apparently opted for private development in the agricultural sphere. The result is that the peasants...are either relegated to eking out subsistence on poor land, or forced into moving off the land, thereby flooding the urban job markets."³²

The growth of corporate interests has paralleled the demise of the peasant, not only in land ownership but also in other areas of agricultural production. Machinery, fertilisers, seed, etc., are controlled for the most part by U.S. corporations: e.g., International

Harvester, John Deere and Co., Anderson-Clayton, Purina and Thor. Anderson-Clayton operates a powerful cotton oligopoly in Mexico, as in Brazil and Peru. Many of the large farms controlled by the U.S. interests produce solely for the U.S. luxury foods market, while the native population is often forced to live at subsistence levels. The structure of American 'aid' programmes is neatly integrated with corporate interests by providing technological knowledge and finances for the benefit of U.S. controlled agriculture. ✓

We would agree with Gunder Frank's characterisation of the effects of Mexican land reform measures, although he omits to mention the extent of foreign influence in this area:

" Mexico's agrarian reform was the most far-reaching in Latin America before Cuba's and one which really did incorporate the peasants into national life. Nevertheless, the majority of Mexico's peasants in the ejidos are without resources, while the famed economic growth concentrated in the capital and the seven sparsely settled northern states encourages, here as elsewhere in Latin America, speculative monoculture for export and gains tremendous earnings for the children of the Revolution."³³

2. Industry and Foreign Investment.

The base for industrialisation was created slowly in the 1930's, under Cárdenas' direction, with the emphasis laid upon the use of native, rather than foreign, capital. Cárdenas encouraged public ownership in the major sectors of the economy since he saw this as the means by which the revolutionary goals of democracy and equality could be most effectively achieved. His nationalistic policies, together with the impact of the depression, helped keep foreign investment at a minimum, as may be seen from the diminishing rate of U.S. investment during the 1930's:

Table I: Direct U.S. Investment in Mexico, 1929 - 1940 (millions).

1929	\$ 683
1936	\$ 480
1940	\$ 358

Source: James W. Wilkie, The Mexican Revolution: Federal Expenditure and Social Change since 1910, U. Cal. Press, 1967, p. 265.

The expropriation of 17 British and American oil companies and the resultant creation of Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), the nationalised oil industry, together with a series of provisions for the nationalisation of other sectors, set the stage for the formation of a 'mixed' economy, balanced between public and private investment. The precedent which Cárdenas established, emphasising the use of Mexican capital in both public and private sectors, was discontinued by succeeding presidents and Mexico has suffered as a result -- a

consequence which will become clearer later.

The war had a dual effect upon the Mexican economy and the drive toward industrialisation. It was a period of rapid industrial growth, thus confirming Frank's hypothesis that:

"...the satellites experience their greatest economic development and especially their most classically capitalist industrial development if and when their ties to the metropolis are weakest."³⁴

However, although industrial development proceeded rapidly, there was also an increased flow of foreign investment in the war years, which marked the beginning of a trend toward U.S. dominance in the economy. The war had the negative effects of rapid inflation (prices were doubled in the war years) on the one hand, and of leaving Mexico in a disadvantageous position in terms of its markets on the other: pre-war European markets had virtually disappeared, and by 1945 90% of Mexican exports were to the U.S.

After World War II, President Ávila Camacho introduced a policy of 'Mexicanisation', intended to strengthen the local bourgeoisie and limit the extent of foreign capital in Mexico.

The policy divided industries into four categories:

- " 1. Fields reserved exclusively for the state;
2. Fields reserved for Mexican citizens only;
3. Fields in which foreign capital is limited to 49% interest;
4. Fields in which foreign capital has a free reign."³⁵

In the first category fell the principal public services; Mexico has, under these terms, control over the railroads, oil, road transport companies and some airlines, steel, electricity, and to a certain extent, the mining industry. In these respects Mexico fares well compared to those Latin American nations whose entire economy is

controlled from abroad. The second category includes broadcasting, gas, and automotive transport. The third category includes:

"...insurance bonding, advertising, publishing, the film industry, air maritime, and land transportation within Mexico; the secondary processing of petrochemicals, commercial fishing, food canning and packing, and such industries as rubber, soft drinks, fertilisers, insecticides, basic chemicals, mining, agriculture and livestock raising."³⁶

On the surface such a policy would appear to assure a high degree of economic autonomy to any nation. However, the stipulations entailed under 'Mexicanisation' have been loosely applied; many firms are still completely under foreign control -- Ford, General Motors, General Electric, Admiral Corp., Monsanto Co., Anderson-Clayton, to name a few. The policy was never enforced through legislation -- implementation has rested with government officials who are often ready to meet the needs of foreign interests for their own benefit. When the policy is adhered to there remain many ways through which foreign interests can maintain effective control; the example of Dupont may be cited: 51% of the stock in a recently-built titanium dioxide plant is owned by Mexicans -- but these shares are devoid of voting rights, thus leaving control outside Mexico.

After 1940 and Cárdenas the scale of priorities changed; as Oscar Lewis has described:

" The tempo of social change and land distribution was slowed down appreciably. Industrialisation and increased production became the immediate national goal, and foreign investment was encouraged by the government. " Less attention has been given in recent years as to how the pie is sliced, and more emphasis is put on producing a bigger pie." ³⁷

U.S. investment, by far the largest portion of foreign investment in Mexico since 1940, has constituted an ever-increasing fraction of total investment in new enterprises. The thrust of this investment has changed direction since pre-revolutionary days; today more is aimed at the capture of markets from within, jumping over tariff barriers erected against foreign competition, and thus determining the course of economic development. This change has been accompanied by a change in the direction of investments; part of the 'new imperialism' Magdoff and others have analysed.³⁸ Alfredo Navarrete has detailed these changes for Mexico:

" Cumulative direct foreign investment was worth 17,407 million pesos by the end of 1959. Its structure had undergone profound changes already begun in the 1939-50 period. Whereas transport represented almost 40% of total foreign investment in 1911, it amounted to only 2% in 1959. Mining dropped from 28% to 15%. By contrast, investment in industry mounted 4 to 44%, in commerce from 10 to 16%, in public utilities from 8 to 18%."39

Alemán, even more than Camacho (1940 - 46), encouraged foreign capital to enter Mexico. During his period of office (1946 - 52) Alemán set the country on a course of capitalist development. In the field of agriculture there was an expansion in land irrigation programmes, principally in the northern states, which aided commercial rather than subsistence farming. Alemán achieved these measures through the revision of Article 27 of the constitution: state irrigation now could cover private as well as public interests. Although he developed the public sector through modernising PEMEX, the federal electricity commission (Federal Electricidad), the railroad system and the Central Development Bank (Nacional Financiera), this was

only achieved by means of large loans from the U.S. import-export bank in Washington. Alemán further eroded Mexican economic independence and aided 'integration' into the American corporate empire; as Brandenburg has written:

" Alemán encouraged private investment not only by his vast public spending but also by setting up high protective tariffs, extending tax concessions, and by largely overlooking the 51% Mexican-ownership formula."⁴⁰

Ruiz Cortines (1952 - 58) was initially restrained in allowing this trend to continue, but after 1953 began to encourage outside investment; rising prices and social protest forced an expansion in welfare expenditure, and the devaluation of the peso in 1954 generated an expansion in cotton and coffee exports as well as tourism. Foreign investment continued its upward trend, as is shown below:

Table II: Foreign Investment, 1953 - 58, (millions).

1953	\$ 41.8	1956	\$ 126.4
1954	\$ 93.2	1957	\$ 131.6
1955	\$ 105.4	1958	\$ 100.3

Source: Raymond Vernon, The Dilemma of Mexico's Development, Oxford University Press, 1963.

At first, López Mateos' term experienced a drop in the rate of foreign investment -- due to the weak state of the American economy at the time and López Mateos' claims to be " extreme left-wing " in his policies. The latter statement was later rectified to " left-wing within the constitution " -- a very different matter.

The core contradiction in Mexico's economic development has centred around the growing loss of economic independence which has resulted from the deepening dependence upon foreign capital. Today, although the infrastructure of the economy is mainly state-owned, both the public and private sectors depend for their stability upon U.S. controlled interests. Foreign investments are especially important in critical areas of the economy: mining, iron and steel, chemical products, cotton and automobiles. Furthermore, the 'technology gap' has given the U.S. control over the future path of Mexican development. In the field of manufacturing assembly plants have arrived in large numbers in the northern states, due to the ready availability of cheap labour: peasants driven off their land and high un- and underemployment rates have made Mexico an employer's paradise. The Mexican government has encouraged this trend, since it removes some of the potential causes of social unrest by employing the unemployed; however, manufacturing mainly luxury goods for the American market does little to aid the mass of Mexicans.

Estimates of foreign control in Mexico vary between 20 and 50%,⁴¹ and indirect influences would push the scope of control even higher:

"...even where ownership did not exist, foreign licensing arrangements and technical assistance contracts seemed to give an even broader reach to foreign influence."⁴²

The extent of foreign influence over the market is attested to by the ubiquity of U.S. advertisements:

" Large-scale advertising arrived with recent U.S. investments, and advertisements in newspapers, radio, and television have a decidedly U.S. flavor. The major television programs are sponsored by foreign-controlled companies like Nestle, Coca-Cola,

General Motors, Proctor and Gamble, and Colgate. Only the use of the spanish language and Mexican artists distinguishes the commercials from those in the U.S."⁴³

Up until 1940 Mexico had a favourable trade balance, but during World War II certain essential manufactured goods became unavailable, and industrialisation became a necessity. This, in its turn, led to a need to import capital equipment at a cost which could not be met by the income from exports -- mainly agricultural commodities and minerals. In the 1950's and 1960's prices fell on the world market for raw materials, while the price of manufactured goods rose. This caused a widening trade gap to develop in Mexico which, by 1967, had reached \$ 605 million. The only alternative was to seek loans and encourage foreign capital, a short-run solution to major economic problems. The trade balance was restored, but only at the cost of a further loss in economic independence. Today foreign investors are actively encouraged; the negative effects of such a reliance on foreign capital may be seen below:

Table III: Mexico: Direct Foreign Investments (millions of dollars).

<u>Year</u>	<u>New Investments</u>	<u>Outflow of Exchange on Foreign Investment</u>	<u>Balance</u>
1950	38.0	47.5	- 9.5
1960	62.5	131.0	- 68.5
1964	83.1	185.9	-102.8
1968*	67.9	216.5	-148.6

* Excludes reinvested earnings, as they remained in Mexico.

Source: Banco de Mexico, Review of the Economic Situation of Mexico, November 1968, p. 11.

Total U.S. investment, which constitutes 75% of all foreign investment, has risen since 1939 from \$ 267 million to over \$ 1.2 billion today.⁴⁴ What this amounts to is an increasing relinquishment of autonomy...

"...whether there will be meat in the kitchen is never decided in the kitchen."⁴⁵

...Mexico moves closer to other underdeveloped countries in their 'kitchen' role for the refectory of U.S. imperialism.

Other income to cover the trade gap has been obtained from equally dependent sources: border trade with the U.S. and tourism, which together net over \$ 500 million annually for Mexico.

Public debt to international agencies and foreign governments had, by the end of 1969, reached an estimated \$ 3,300 million.⁴⁶ The payments for external debt servicing have now reached 22% of the Mexican current account earnings. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), in its review at the end of 1969, stated:

" Mexico is having to borrow abroad on a scale that is matched by very few other developing countries and this must be a matter for concern when international capital markets are so tight."⁴⁷

Eduardo Galeano has analysed the consequences of this indebtedness:

" Latin America is now living in what economists call the "debt explosion." It is a vicious circle of strangulation: loans and payments increase, and as a result the payments of amortisations, interests, dividends, and other services also increase. In order to make these payments, new injections of foreign capital that generate deeper obligations are needed, and so on successively."⁴⁸

Lack of foreign exchange will create greater external and internal pressures in the future; at present there are few real solutions forthcoming. The IBRD review had suggestions for solutions: the

implementation of state programmes of birth control, further large-scale agriculture, improved road and rail communications. The 'solutions' suggested are for the IBRD, not for the Mexican people.

The generation of capital through increased exports has been pursued in recent years, but too often the exports are produced by foreign-owned companies, and the profits leave with the exports. Surplus generated in Mexico has increasingly flowed arriba y adelante,⁴⁹ instead of down to where it is needed for balanced development. The obstacles to changing this structure are formidable:

" Mexico could institute meaningful import quotas, restrict the production of luxury goods and initiate a highly progressive tax system. These measures would allow Mexico to protect its foreign exchange position and control its own future. But they would also alienate Mexico's middle sectors and bourgeoisie. And would the U.S. stand by in polite neutrality? Mexico's dependence upon the U.S. makes genuine economic nationalism impossible in anything short of a revolutionary situation."⁵⁰


Even such reformist moves, were they possible in a political and economic structure dominated by bourgeois interests, would undoubtedly bring heavy sanctions from the U.S. and heighten the growing contradictions in Mexico's political economy. We would concur with the conclusions reached in a recent issue of Monthly Review on the effects of such control as has been outlined above:

"...the key to a country's economic development lies in the size and utilisation of its surplus...to the extent that its economy is penetrated by multinational corporations, control over both size and utilisation passes into the hands of others... multinational corporations are the enemy, perhaps not of any development in the host country but at least of any development which conforms to the interests of any class or group other than those who have been denationalised and coopted into the service of foreign capital."⁵¹

3. Class Structure and Income Distribution.

Before the revolution, the class structure of Mexico was classic in its simplicity. Less than one percent of the population owned 97% of the land, and the overwhelming majority of the population lived in abject poverty. Today the class structure has become more complex but the polarisation between the ends of the socio-economic scale remains, and the contrasts are stark and apparent; slums and mansions in Mexico City, U.S.-style supermarkets and life-styles for some, slums and disease for others. Many Mexican families are today relatively worse off than they were before the revolution 50 years ago.

As previously mentioned, the revolution was bourgeois in its leadership, and this direction has had a lasting effect upon the resultant social structure; the development which has been achieved over the past half century has benefited only a small part of the Mexican population -- the middle class and labour aristocracy -- at the expense of the so-called 'marginal sectors.'⁵² The 'participating sector' of the working class stands in a symbiotic relationship to the government: its demands being granted in return for political loyalty; under normal circumstances the 'marginal sectors' can only hope to become participants, since their level of organisation collectively is very low.⁵³ One example of the former relationship in operation was the granting of benefits to unorganised labour under a new labour code passed in late 1969. The move, although inflationary, was a reward for labour loyalty during the student protests of 1968:



the unions refused to back the students in reformist demands that stressed civil rights and social justice.

Below is given one of the more optimistic estimates tracing class and occupational changes since pre-revolutionary times; it has often been cited to show the extent of progress in Mexico:

Table IV: Classes and Occupational Structure, 1895 - 1960.

	<u>1895</u>	<u>1940</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1956</u>	<u>1960</u>
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Upper Class ^a	1.5	2.9	2.0	5.0	6.5
Middle Class ^b	7.8	12.6	25.0	30.0	33.5
Transitional ^c	---	6.5	20.0	20.0	20.0
Popular ^d	90.7	78.0	53.0	45.0	40.0

a. Managerial and professional.

b. Professional, technical, office workers, small tradesmen, artisans.

c. Small tradesmen, semi-skilled artisans, miners, petroleum labour, service employees.

d. Service employees, manual and day labour, agriculturalists, unknown.

Source: Howard F. Cline, Mexico: Revolution to Evolution, 1940-60, Chapter 11.

Cline's data are almost totally misleading. His estimation that 40% of Mexican society is middle or upper class is absurd in a country where the annual per capita income is under \$ 500; Mexican government estimates based on income levels show that no more than 17% of the population could be classified as even near 'middle-class' in 1960, and that the 'popular class' had only been reduced from 91.1% to

82.4% in 1960.⁵⁴

The use of the concept 'middle-class' in the analysis of Latin American societies has been critically examined by Rodolfo Stavenhagen, who shows that it often refers to a statistical aggregate at the middle of the income scale or, alternatively, as:

"...a euphemism for "ruling class". When one speaks of the entrepreneurs, the financiers, and the industrialists in relation to the development of the Latin American countries, reference is made to a class that has the power in the society, that occupies the apex of the social, economic, and political pyramid, and that makes, as such, the overall decisions that affect these countries. In other words, the class in question is in no sense "middle"."⁵⁵

The implicit or explicit identification of the growth of the 'middle-class' as an index of development is similarly misleading, since a large part of the 'middle-class' is employed in the tertiary sector -- in Mexico service industries and tourism.

A more realistic breakdown of the class structure than Cline's is given below; under this limited classification the class definitions are as follows: upper class: the principal beneficiaries and power holders within the society; middle-class: professionals, small businessmen, white-collar workers, technicians and labour aristocracy; lower class: ejidatarios, private small-holders, landless peasants, unemployed or underemployed urban lumpenproletariat, Indians. These categories reflect the distribution of power and property more than the overlapping categories used in Cline's class definitions and his implications of mobility which stem from using concepts such as 'transitional' class.

Table V: Changes in Class Structure, 1900 - 1960.

	<u>% of total population</u>	
	<u>1900</u>	<u>1960</u>
<u>Total</u>	100.0	100.0
Rural	81.8	60.1
Urban	18.2	39.9
<u>Upper Class</u>	0.6	0.5
Rural	0.4	0.1
Urban	0.2	0.4
<u>Middle Class</u>	8.3	17.1
Rural	6.6	9.9
Urban	1.7	7.2
<u>Lower Class</u>	91.1	82.4
Rural	74.8	50.1
Urban	16.3	32.3

Source: " Clases y Estratos Sociales ", Arturo González-Cosío, in México: Cincuenta años de revolución, Tomo Dos, La vida social, Mexico, D.F., Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1961, p. 55.

Social mobility since the revolution has been limited and of an individual nature, as Robert Scott has noted:

"...in spite of some slight easing of social barriers which accompanies social reform, and notwithstanding Mexico's rapidly expanding economy, there is still relatively little mobility among the socio-economic levels which participate in Mexican politics."⁵⁶

These observations have been confirmed by other writers,⁵⁷ and several have noted the widening of income differentials that has occurred since the early years of the revolution: " the gap has grown in purchasing power and income distribution since 1941 ", Lewis

wrote in 1960.⁵⁸ Inequality appears to be increasing rather than decreasing; Navarrete's study of income distribution in the period 1950 - 57 showed that there had been both an absolute and a relative decline for those with low incomes.⁵⁹ During that period, the income of the richest 20% of families rose from 59.8 to 61.4% of the national income, while the income of the poorest 50% dropped from 18.1 to 15.6%. Much of the increase in per capita income has been in the form of commercial and industrial profits, rather than real income for the people. Inflation has further squeezed the real income of the poor. The only time when these trends were arrested since the revolution was in the 1930's, under Cárdenas' presidency; in 1940 one percent of the population received 40% of the national income (as contrasted with 90% of the national income in 1910), yet by 1955 the inequities were again growing: one percent of the population was receiving 66% of the national income. González-Casanova's data on family incomes serves to reinforce the data given in Table V:

Table VI: Number and % of families by Income Levels and Region, 1961 - 62.

<u>Levels of monthly family income in pesos</u>	<u>% Urban</u>	<u>% Rural</u>	<u>% Total</u>
Under 300	9.68	45.52	26.00
301 - 500	20.60	27.83	23.89
501 - 1000	34.18	18.84	27.19
1001 - 3000	30.14	7.42	19.79
Over 3000	5.39	.40	3.12

Source: Pablo González-Casanova, La democracia en México, Mexico, D.F., Ediciones ERA, 1965, p. 277.

Note: One dollar (U.S.) = 12.5 pesos.

Thus, 77% of Mexican families earned under \$ 80 (U.S.) per month while the top 3% earned over \$ 240 per month -- hardly an affluent level. Despite politicians' claims to the contrary, most of the nation has not shared in the development Mexico has undergone in the past 30 years; the revolution has benefited a small minority -- who constitute a market for imported consumer goods -- to the detriment of the great majority of the Mexican people. The final section of this chapter will further explore the distribution of the 'benefits of development' in the area of welfare.

4. Population and Welfare Trends.

a. Demographic Changes.

Mexico, together with other underdeveloped nations, is experiencing a rapid rate of population growth. The data presented below show the extent of this increase over the past 60 years; they also indicate the degree of urbanisation that has occurred.

Table VII: Total Population, 1900 - 1970, (millions).

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>% Change</u>	<u>Absolute Change</u>
1910	15.2	- 5.9	- 0.9
1921	14.3	+ 16.1	+ 2.3
1930	16.6	+ 18.7	+ 3.1
1940	19.7	+ 31.0	+ 6.1
1950	25.8	+ 35.3	+ 9.1
1960	34.9	+ 38.3	+ 13.4
1970 ^a	48.3		

Source: James W. Wilkie, The Mexican Revolution: Federal Expenditure and Social Change since 1910, U. Calif. Press, 1967, p. 299, adapted.

a. Source: Census data, Mexico, D.F., 1970.

Table VIII: Rural Population, 1900 - 1960, (millions).^a

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>% of Total</u>	<u>% Change</u>	<u>Abs. Change</u>
1910	10.8	71.3	- 3.2	- 0.9

1921 ^b	9.9	69.0		
			- 3.6	+ 1.1
1930	11.0	66.5		
			- 2.4	+ 1.8
1940	12.8	64.9		
			- 11.6	+ 2.0
1950	14.8	57.4		
			- 14.1	+ 2.4
1960	17.2	49.3		

Source: Wilkie, op. cit., pp. 218 - 19, adapted.

a. Rural: communities with less than 2500 persons.

b. For 1921, rural was defined as communities with less than 2000 persons.

Table IX: Urban Population, 1900 - 1970, (millions).

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>% of Total</u>	<u>% Change</u>	<u>Abs. Change</u>
1910	4.4	28.9		
			+ 1.9	0.0
1921 ^a	4.4	30.8		
			+ 2.9	+ 1.2
1930	5.6	33.7		
			+ 1.3	+ 1.3
1940	6.9	35.0		
			+ 10.7	+ 4.1
1950	11.0	45.7		
			+ 5.0	+ 6.7
1960	17.7	50.7		

Source: Wilkie, op. cit., pp. 218 - 19, adapted.

a. For 1921, urban was defined as communities with over 2000 persons, not 2500.

Population growth in Mexico shows an almost logarithmic increase since the late 1930's; coterminous with this growth in the total population has been increasing migration from the rural areas to the cities. The reasons for this migration are twofold. First, there is the 'push'⁶⁰ from the country, due mainly to the pressure on land

which has developed in recent years.⁶¹ This has resulted from a larger population working the same area of land, together with the favouring of capital-intensive, large-scale landholdings against the small landowner. From 1950 to 1960 the number of landless agricultural workers rose from 2.0 to 3.3 million, a majority of Mexico's agrarian work force today. Secondly, there has been the 'pull' from the cities which has had a significant effect:

" In Mexico, as in other underdeveloped countries, the cities are the major providers for industry's needs...to the rural migrants the city offers the hope of better employment opportunities, better educational facilities, greater material conveniences, and a generally higher standard of living."⁶²

During the past decade the population of Mexico City has increased by 48.3%, from 4.8 to 7.0 million;⁶³ an expansion which has been most noticeable in the slums of the Federal District. But the heavy migration rate from the rural areas has not been able to offset the rural population growth, as can be seen from the data presented in Table VIII. Since 1921 the rural population has increased by nearly 10 million.

The overall 'population explosion' may be explained by the spread of public health facilities coupled with an increase in the standard of living; resulting in a lowering of the infant mortality rate⁶⁴ and an extension in life expectancy. We would share Tannenbaum's pessimism with respect to Mexico's inability to cope with its burgeoning population; however, his explanation that it has been due to an " imbalance in industrialisation "⁶⁵ only states the problem -- the cause is rooted in the structural form adopted for industrialisation:

"...the so-called theory of population explosion plays an ever more important role in a false attempt to explain the causes of underdevelopment. In every way it evades the fact that if the population cannot earn a livelihood it is not due to its rapid growth, but to the form of social organisation which is to an ever greater degree incapable of guaranteeing to the population forms and means which can guarantee and improve its standard of living."⁶⁶ ✓

b. Welfare Indices: Employment, Health and Poverty, Education and Illiteracy.

Unemployment and underemployment are major social problems in Mexico, both in urban and rural areas. Although official data indicate a low unemployment rate,⁶⁷ estimates of those underemployed run as high as 60% of the working age population.⁶⁸ In rural regions the incidence of these phenomena stems from the reasons given above;⁶⁹ in urban areas the inability or unwillingness of industry and government to deal with the population growth has taken its toll, most seriously among the younger segments of the population. [In 1964 President Díaz Ordaz called for the creation of 400,000 new jobs a year to meet the demand, yet by 1967 the economy was only producing 180,000.] Today that demand has risen to 500,000. Further industrialisation by means of capital-intensive projects exacerbates this contradiction; as Lewis has observed, [the poor are " paying the cost of the industrial progress of the nation,"⁷⁰ as well as the cost of middle-class consumerism.] The government has recently launched a programme of 'rural industrialisation' in an attempt to raise rural living standards -- whether it will be successful remains to be seen; it constitutes a challenge to American companies that control the animal foodstuffs industry.⁷¹

James Wilkie's index of poverty gives a fair picture of the degree of poverty in Mexico, although at least one writer has disputed his index.⁷² The index is based "on the assumption that all of the seven items under consideration represent relative degrees of nonmodern living."⁷³ The items used are: illiteracy, speaking an Indian language only, living in a rural area, going barefoot, wearing sandals, eating tortillas regularly, lacking sewage disposal facilities.

Table X: Poverty Index, 1910 - 1960.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Poverty Level (%)</u>
1910	56.9
1921	53.1
1930	50.0
1940	46.0
1950	39.4
1960	33.1

Source: Wilkie, op. cit., p. 236.

There are considerable regional differences; in 1960 the poverty level for the south was 51.1%, while in the north in the same year the level was 21.3%. Wilkie's use of federal government statistics casts a certain amount of doubt upon his data, since they tend to underestimate social problems. In rural areas the absolute level of poverty may have grown in recent years, as Padgett has indicated:

" One of the dark sides of Mexican development is that the quantity of the rural population which falls in this marginal category seems to have increased over the past decades."⁷⁴

In urban areas, particularly Mexico City, the growing population has severely pressured existing facilities; a survey issued in 1968 showed that 62% of Mexico City's population lived in substandard dwellings, and another 10% in what was termed " just barely adequate dwellings."⁷⁵ One third of the families in Mexico City are estimated to live in one-room apartments, sharing a courtyard for their cooking, washing, and toilet facilities. Lewis' study of the life of a Mexican family⁷⁶ has described this 'culture of poverty': such conditions breed disease -- the major causes of death in slum areas being malaria, dysentery and pneumonia. ✓

Official statistics on illiteracy show a steady decrease, although there has been an increase in absolute numbers over the past 20 years, due to the inability of educational facilities to keep pace with the high rate of population growth. Literacy is defined among the population by assessing the number with three years or over of 'approved study', but educational facilities in many areas, particularly rural regions, are very poor, and " there is little opportunity to practice whatever reading skills one may have learned in school."⁷⁷ These considerations lead one to doubt the optimism reflected in government pronouncements that illiteracy is today around 30%. The discrepancy can be seen by comparing the two tables given below; on the one hand (Table XI) are the government statistics based on the population answering that it was illiterate; on the other the population according to years of approved study.

Table XI: Illiteracy, 1910 - 1960, Population over 6 years old, (millions).

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>% Change</u>	<u>Absolute Change</u>
1910	9.9	76.9		
1921 ^a	8.8	71.2	- 7.4	- 1.1
1930	9.0	66.6	- 6.5	+ 0.2
1940	9.4	58.0	- 12.9	+ 0.4
1950	8.9	42.5	- 26.7	- 0.5
1960	10.6	37.8	- 11.1	+ 1.7

Source: Wilkie, op. cit., p. 208, adapted.

a. Population over 5 years old.

Table XII: Rural and Urban Population According to Years of Approved Study, 1961 - 62, (%).

<u>Years of Study</u>	<u>Rural</u>	<u>Urban</u>
0 - 3	81.2	29.4
4 - 6	16.3	45.5
7 - 9	1.9	14.8
10-11	0.2	2.9
Over 12	0.4	7.4

Source: Pablo González-Casanova, " Enajenación y conciencia de clases en México ", in Ensayos sobre las clases sociales en México, Mexico, D.F., Editorial Nuestro Tiempo, 1968, p. 166.

The data presented in Table XII also indicate the degree of selectivity that occurs within the educational system; even accepting the government statistics on education, one writer recently observed:

" Among the population above six years of age, 38% are illiterate and 44% of those over 12 years of age have not even had a single year of education. Among those more than 12 years of age, only 19% have completed their primary education, and of those over 15 years of age, only 5% have completed 3 years of secondary training. Thus the pyramid of those having access to higher education is extremely selective, and the selectivity becomes more apparent as one climbs toward the top."⁷⁸

The educational system has developed erratically since the revolution, perhaps the most outstanding achievements being attained in the early years; programmes of rural education initiated under the direction of José Vasconcelos in the 1920's had a substantial effect upon reducing illiteracy. These gains have not been followed through, and the problem of maintaining literacy has not been dealt with. We may compare the situation in Cuba where, during the "Year of Education" in 1961, illiteracy was reduced from 23.6% to 3.9%; as Huberman and Sweezy wrote:

" Never in the history of education anywhere in the world has there been so successful an achievement."⁷⁹

The problem of maintaining literacy in Cuba has been met through the distribution of free reading material: "El placer de leer".⁸⁰

The failure of the Mexican revolution to meet the educational requirements of the Mexican people has not been a result of the 'population explosion'; rather, it has been due to the structure of priorities within the society and the continuing ubiquity of corruption within secondary and higher education. The maintenance of a significant proportion of private institutions in secondary education (over half of all secondary schools are private) has increased the class bias inherent in the educational system. The

' private university ' however, has not been such a widespread phenomenon as compared to other Latin American countries, e.g. Colombia, Argentina, and Chile.

This chapter has given a brief glimpse at what we see as the dominant trends in the socio-economic life of Mexico; the considerations which have emerged as most significant are the failure of the Mexican revolution to achieve its stated goals, the growth of foreign investment and dependence this has led to, and the continued presence of poverty and class privilege.

Chapter 3

1. Political Change, 1900 - 1970.

The political development of Mexico since the revolution can be broadly subdivided into four periods or stages. The first was from 1910 - 25, characterised by violent revolution, counter-revolution, and formulation of the guidelines for the 'new' society -- symbolised by the writing of the constitution in 1916 - 17. During this period an uneasy tension existed; as noted above, the revolution had been the product of a revolt on the part of both the peasants and bourgeoisie, an alliance within which the bourgeois faction emerged as leader after the deaths of Zapata and Villa; it was a bloody period of struggle with over one million lives being lost between 1910 and 1920. The two groups fighting against the reactionary and oppressive nature of Porfirio Díaz' regime were only together in their hatred of Porfirismo, their goals were different. The bourgeois elements were interested in taking over power without a fundamental change in the structure of social relations, while the peasants, coalesced around the charismatic figures of Emiliano Zapata and 'Pancho' Villa, sought social justice and a basic redistribution of the nation's resources. Francisco Madero, the initial leader of the revolutionary forces, symbolised the bourgeois interests -- from a wealthy landowning family in northern Mexico, his prime concern was with changing the personnel in the political structure without resolving the economic inequities. The split in revolutionary goals between these groups soon became apparent: Madero and Zapata became antagonists,

the latter upholding the slogan of tierra y libertad as the goals of the revolution. Madero was assassinated in 1913, and General Huerta assumed the presidency after the coup, only to be driven out and replaced by Carranza who, in the same vein as Madero, attempted to stem the radical demands of the revolution. Together with General Álvaro Obregón, his military aide, Carranza succeeded in holding on to power from 1914 until 1920. Under pressure from Villa and Zapata, Carranza drew up a land reform law in 1915 (Article 27 of the Constitution) which has since, theoretically, served as a basis for the agrarian reform programme of the revolution. Carranza was obliged to come to terms with demands from workers and peasants and the resulting constitution of 1917 was more radical than he intended; the labour legislation was far in advance of that in any other Latin American nation, even before an industrial labour force had really been formed to take advantage of its provisions. Other articles in the constitution separated the Church from the State (Article 130), increased presidential powers, provided for a no re-election clause, and moved toward incorporation of the masses in the political life of the nation. Carranza attempted to disregard the constitution and appoint his own successor; however, Obregón rebelled and was elected president in 1920, to be followed by Elías Calles in 1924.⁸¹ By this time, the revolution was already becoming institutionalised; the form of protest had changed, and the 'Revolutionary Family':

"...began to function as a self-appointed guardian protecting the nation against foreigners, the Mexican against exploitation."⁸²

The second stage, a period of reform from 1925 to 1940, was

dominated by the personalities of Calles and Cárdenas. Calles and his successors began the redistribution of land, developed a sense of nationhood among the people, and inaugurated educational reforms. They put into practice provisions for the control of the reactionary Catholic Church, and raised workers wages. Yet, at the same time, Calles and his 'puppet' presidents, the Callistas, made a mockery of the democratic process through rigged elections, and corruption permeated the fabric of Mexican society.

The appointment of Cárdenas as presidential candidate in 1934 was a move on Calles' part to ensure his continued hegemony over the political life of the nation, but the move was soon to backfire. Cárdenas had been an obedient Callista, fighting under General Calles in the revolution; there had been no indication that he would do other than Calles requested during his term of office. However, the first signs that Cárdenas was moving in a new direction came with his handling of the election campaign, a foregone result, when he took it seriously and travelled throughout the country meeting the people, listening to their grievances and problems, and assessing their needs. Upon election Cárdenas worked rapidly to remove Calles from his position of control, by means of reforms in the military (generals were no longer to be attached to one unit), and by strengthening labour and peasant groups to offset military power; Calles was finally isolated and subsequently exiled in 1935. Cárdenas, an Indian by birth, realised that the real strength of the nation lay with its people, and throughout his term held their interests as primary. Redistribution of land into ejidos was perhaps the most

outstanding feature of the years 1934 to 1940, over one third of the people having received land by 1940. In line with article 27 of the constitution, Cárdenas expropriated the oil industry from the British and the Americans, after a strike in which the foreign-owned companies had refused to raise the wages of their workers after state recommendations to that effect.

Scott has usefully characterised the evolution of the official party as passing through essentially three stages: formation and creation of semi-independent local organisations; centralisation through the party bureaucracy; and institutionalisation of the principal interest groups.⁸³ The first stage occurred during the period under review when Calles created the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (P.N.R.), the principal aim of which was to form a national framework for the interests of the ruling elite instead of those of local caudillos. The structure worked for Calles until Cárdenas became president and manipulated the system against Calles. Cárdenas achieved this through the strengthening of the peasant and labour organisations in the party framework, the latter group through the formation of the Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos (C.T.M.) in 1935, under the communist leadership of Lombardo Toledano. Cárdenas himself could not be described as socialist, but he generally supported left-wing moves in his reaction to the poverty and misery of the people; at times strikes were encouraged and popular demands for economic and political power met. The peasants were organised within the Confederación Nacional Campesina (C.N.C.), the most powerful sector of the ruling party under Cárdenas. In December 1937 Cárdenas

dissolved the PNR and formed the Partido Revolucionario Mexicano (P.R.M.); in the same year a third sector was formed for workers in state enterprises, the Confederación Nacional de Organizaciones Popular, (C.N.O.P.). The PRM was " based upon the concept of four distinct segments of politically articulate persons."⁸⁴ The fourth sector was created to serve the interests of the military.

The third stage of the revolution was a time of growing bourgeois economic power and the consolidation of that power through the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (P.R.I.), formed in 1946. Cárdenas' successor, Ávila Camacho, represented a move to the right which has essentially remained unbroken up to the present day. The popular sector of the PRI, CNOP, extended its influence in the party as the new bourgeois -- bureaucrats, professionals and industrialists -- moved into key positions in the economic structure. Alemán became president in 1946, and his term witnessed a further move to the right:

" By the time Miguel Alemán Valdes became president in 1946, the stage was set for an unprecedented expansion in business activity based on an influx of foreign capital and growth of Mexican-owned industrial enterprises. Alemán's free-wheeling, pro-business policy was accompanied by a considerable amount of corruption..."⁸⁵

which evoked a reaction from those who saw Alemán as undermining the ideals of the revolution. Alemán reformed Article 27 of the constitution, which led to corruption and abuse of the land ownership provisions to the benefit of the revolutionary elite. The split that had developed between left and right in Alemán's term led to the appointment of a compromise candidate between Alemánistas and Cárdenistas: Ruiz

Cortines. Cortines, more of administrator than politician, was more conservative than Alemán; the only real political move made in his term was the creation of women's suffrage. It was a period of slow modernisation and attempts were made to compensate for the excesses of Alemán.

The fourth period has been marked by the consolidation of the 'Mexican system' under the leadership of López Mateos and Díaz Ordaz. Although López Mateos declared initially that his presidency would be " extreme left-wing " in its outlook, the structure of the polity and economy that had developed over the previous 18 years were such that this was an unattainable goal to achieve. From the start, López Mateos' administration was forced to use repression. Railroad strikes in 1959 led to the jailing of Demetrio Vallejo and Valentín Campa, communist leaders of the Railroad workers' union. Although the government increased its scope of economic control through the purchase of foreign-owned electricity companies, foreign investment in general was encouraged. The policies followed by both López Mateos and Díaz Ordaz had the effect of disenchanting both left and right, although the balance has clearly been weighted in favour of the right against the weaker left; business organisations have been more successful than workers' groups in forwarding their interests. Today the framework of the PRI appears unable to mediate the demands of the major interest groups; the mechanisms by which these demands have been mediated and controlled will be discussed below.

2. Democracy and the PRI.

The political structure of Mexico may realistically be described as autocratic and semi-totalitarian. There are constitutional provisions for the existence of a multi-party state, but in effect there is only one party, the PRI. Other parties do exist, the most important of these being Partido de Acción Nacional (P.A.N.), Partido Popular Socialista (P.P.S.), and Partido Auténtico Revolucionario Mexicano (P.A.R.M.). PPS was founded in 1949 as a less radical left-wing alternative to communism; PAN was created in 1939 by conservative interests close to the church; PARM is a PRI-based party supporting the PRI wholeheartedly. L. Vincent Padgett sees the role of these parties as one of educating the public and acting as an outside conscience to the PRI; politically they have had little success. None of these parties today challenges the legality of the PRI's political hegemony, although they often accuse the PRI of corrupt electoral practices.⁸⁶ They have become as much a part of the system as the PRI in contemporary Mexico -- in this year's presidential election all parties acted as predicted, and as required by the PRI:

"...the PRI has secured the support for its candidate of the PPS and PARM, minor parties which could attract radical voters if in opposition, leaving angry young men (and women) only the choice of voting for the very right-wing PAN, or of joining the amorphous mass of abstainers."⁸⁷

PAN provided an opposition candidate against Luis Echeverría Alvarez, thus saving the PRI from the embarrassment of having no opposition at the polls.

The PRI, founded as the PNR in 1928, has exercised political control over Mexico since that time, making Mexico the "modern world's most long-lived example of a one-party state."⁸⁸ In its evolution the PRI has come to encompass all the major areas of Mexican life, and three sectors have been formed to represent these areas: CNC, CTM, CNOP -- representing agrarian, labour, and urban middle-class interests respectively. Big business, commercial and industrial interests are represented "through the back door" to the president. The theory behind this structure is similar to the theory of 'political pluralism' espoused in the U.S.A.: "the wings of the PRI resemble Riesman's veto groups"⁸⁹ writes Scott. Theoretically, the sectors balance each other and the PRI acts as an "aggregative mechanism"⁹⁰ to mediate the demands of the sectors. However, like the U.S.A., the theory strays somewhat from the practice:⁹¹

"Mexico's political stability and the political success of the PRI in retaining the support of its lower and middle-class constituent organisations provide fodder for the myth of a balance of interests."⁹²

The army, once part of the PRM under Cárdenas, is now no longer a factor in directly creating political disturbances, but instead functions as an instrument for maintaining control: putting down violent opposition to the state and occasionally strikes. The neutralisation of the army, or rather the return "to its old position behind the throne",⁹³ followed from the professionalisation of the military and, more importantly, its being balanced against labour and peasant organisations.⁹⁴

Control over the electoral process is exercised by the central

government through the Secretaria de Gobernación. This ensures that formal opposition can be kept within acceptable limits. The minimum requirements for the formation of a national political party were raised in 1953, and today the chances of forming a new political party are very slim. Elections at national, state, and municipal levels are 'guided' by the revolutionary elite; the appointment of candidates for all important political offices within the government are determined from above, "...rather than by party members effectively exercising their vote as delegates to the PRI nominating conventions ".⁹⁵

We would in general agree with Brandenburg's observation that:

"...elections, whether internal to the party or external and open to the public, are hardly more than travesties."⁹⁶

The imposition of Felix Sema as governor in Sonora state despite mass protests against his appointment confirms this observation, as does the fact that Luis Echeverría Alvarez has been 'elected' for the first time in his life, a fact which led one analyst to remark that this was "merely a realistic recognition of the relative unimportance of the electoral process in Mexico ".⁹⁷ However, there has been a small amount of evidence recently of loss of control by the PRI in its lower-level elections; in 1967 the PRI lost in municipal elections to PAN in the capitals of Yucutan and Sonora. The loss of these seats heightened the internal split in the PRI between the 'old guard' and the younger, more radical elements, since these events were seen as a vote against the PRI and its popularity.

In the nomination and election of presidents party discipline is

more effective, the PRI nominee being assured office. The mechanisms by which the president 'emerges' are somewhat obscure; the out-going president engages in a process known as auscultación, during which he consults with the leaders of the major interest groups:

" The show begins unfolding when the president (or Family Head) inquires of the Revolutionary Family's inner circle, of vested interests outside the official party, and sometimes the sector leaders inside the official party what their dispositions are..."⁹⁸

Once decided, the candidate is 'uncovered' -- destapó -- by an important political figure; Luis Echeverría Alvarez was proclaimed as presidential nominee by Gómez Villanueva, leader of the CNC, the PRI's peasant sector. From this point onward his election is a formality, although the candidate will use his election campaign to familiarise himself with the problems of different regions and sectors and the people he will have to deal with for the next six years. The campaign also gives the people an opportunity to see or hear the next president in person. The sectors of the PRI and presidential rivals declare their support for the candidate soon after this declaration.

One principle concerning presidential succession has helped to ensure political stability in Mexico: that of no re-election. It has acted as a guard against the despotic and dictatorial tendencies which plague much of Latin America; also it reduces the possibility of a violent electoral campaign. Yet, paradoxically, it has also been a crucial factor in " insuring the continuity of the revolutionary regime in Mexico ",⁹⁹ since rewards " in the form of advancement to higher posts are assured to those who perform distinguished service ".¹⁰⁰

This principle does not by any means prevent the continuation of a political career, since there is circulation by politicos among the hierarchy of elective offices and administrative posts within the PRI. This interchanging of leaders has led one writer to describe the political elite as analogous to:

"...a floating oligarchy rather than an encrusted reef of leaders, each embedded in his particular niche. In Mexico circulation of the elite, not circulation of elites, occurs."¹⁰¹

Membership of the PRI rank-and-file is purely nominal in the majority of cases; the party automatically claims as members all who belong to the sectors of the PRI. Although the rhetoric of the PRI stresses democracy and social equality, the fact is that the mass base of the PRI is manipulated for government interests. The sectors do not exert any financial control over the PRI, rather:

" They appear to be ailing patients, kept alive by frequent transfusions from the government, with all the evils implied by covert governmental subsidies, and more often than not, the captive supporters of the official party and the national President, through the government's intervention in their internal elections."¹⁰²

The peasants, dependent upon the outside market for credit, technical assistance and marketing, are manipulated by the well-organised coterie of the CNC; their political unawareness and unorganised state is exploited for the benefit of the interests of the revolutionary elite. Similarly, the labour unions, many absorbed within the ubiquitous framework of the PRI, are controlled from above through the ministry of labour. Leaders are imposed or selected, and paid for their acquiescence to government demands: the phenomenon of charrismo. Among the more organised unions there is a form of

patron-client relationship: in return for loyalty the government grants social and economic benefits; a case in point was the passing of a new labour code in 1969 -- a reward for silence during the protests of 1968. Internal struggles within the labour movement have weakened its bargaining position in the PRI. The sector of the "organised middle class", CNOP, has moved to a position of dominance within the PRI and in its influence upon the government through the party. Padgett has noted some of the reasons why this has been so:

"...the superior education and the technical training which characterises members of the CNOP places it in a political position which overshadows the mass groups of peasants and labour with their long-established claims upon the revolution."¹⁰³

More generally, having middle and lower class interests represented within the framework of a capitalist political-economic structure inevitably leads to middle-class supremacy.

The 'unrepresented marginal sectors' do not participate in this process. They are outside the PRI for the most part, and lacking political organisation do not normally affect the political life of the nation. The amorphous nature of this lumpenproletariat leaves it open to exploitation and, when resistant, repression.

One important constituent of the glue which holds this structure together is corruption. The payment of bribes and other forms of corruption has often been used to co-opt dissidents and reduce opposition:

"President Obregon spoke of the 'silver cannon-balls' he used against rebellious generals."¹⁰⁴

Although corruption is no longer as serious as in Obregon's or Aleman's

time, it still functions in basically the same manner, compadrazgo being one of its major manifestations.

Business and commercial interests do not make their wishes felt through the party structure; they have direct access to the president through the Confederation of Chambers of Commerce (CONCANACO) and the Confederation of Industrial Chambers of Mexico (CONCAMIN). These direct channels of communication testify to the importance ascribed to these groups. Rather than petitioning the president they stand in a position to bargain over demands.

Although the PRI has been able to mediate sector demands through co-optation and reforms up to now, the situation is changing. Contradictions within Robert Scott's analysis reflect this aspect of the split between the real and ideal in Mexican politics:

"...the Mexican political system is flexible enough to accommodate rapid changes in the socio-economic situation and the new interests pouring fourth."¹⁰⁵

Yet: "...as Mexican society becomes more complex, more specialised, balancing the competing interests becomes more and more difficult and the need for internal discipline more acute."¹⁰⁶

We would also very seriously contest his statement that:

" This new political system (the PRI) is effective because it has developed in such a way that it reflects the needs and attitudes of the largest part of the Mexican people and is flexible enough to adjust to changes in those needs as Mexico's rapidly changing economy and social patterns so demand."¹⁰⁷

The PRI functions more as a control mechanism and as a means of downward communication than as a series of channels through which sector demands can be felt and catered to. Through appointment and co-optation of sector leaders the PRI is able to maintain its political dominance for the 'Revolutionary family'; the reality of

democracy in the PRI has been assessed by one observer:

"...if the " official party had power, Mexico would have become a workers state long ago ", which suggests that control is elsewhere -- he (Brandenburg) says in the revolutionary family -- the elite of the government."108

Furthermore, the PRI's activities are " devoted to turning out the masses to greet candidates, to register those qualified to vote, and to see that they vote for the party's candidates ".¹⁰⁹ The PRI provides a channel for social mobility for some, and thus political involvement may stem from a desire to move up the social scale rather than a desire to be a politico per se.¹¹⁰

The nucleus of political power in Mexico rests in the office of the president. The position and person of El Presidente embodies the cultural legacies of machismo and caudillismo -- he is the leader, the Father of the nation, and is assumed to do no wrong.

" The people expect the President to be all-powerful. Otherwise, why should he be President ? He must be the caudillo. He must be able to do anything at all. And there is no middle ground."111

The structure of politics in Mexico is such that the president is the ultimate source of power internally. From him flow all the major decisions of state, and the Congress and PRI sectors support his requests. The extent of his power is indicated by the rush to support the candidacy of an incoming president and the general prostration of all who seek favours.

" The strength of the Mexican presidency is based in part upon constitutional powers. Included in this field are a broad power of appointment and removal, fiscal powers, the capacity to initiate and veto legislation, and control of the military. Finally, and most important, there is a tradition of presidential supremacy in the grand manner of the colonial viceroy."112

Padgett's statement of the powers of the president succinctly shows

the main areas of his domination, together with the cultural legacy upon which the office is based. His control of the purse is one of the principal means by which political power is exercised; all levels of jurisdiction are dependent upon the executive branch of the federal government for finances. The lack of independent sources of revenue at the state level restricts the political autonomy of governors.

Although the tradition of personalismo is still a strong element in presidential power, today the office has become institutionalised, and it is that which confers charisma upon the incumbent; routinisation of charisma, as described by Weber, has occurred.¹¹³ We would agree with Vernon's view of presidential power:

" The Presidents of Mexico have gradually been eased -- or have eased themselves -- into a political strait jacket... In a real sense...the strength of the Mexican President is a mirage."¹¹⁴

Presidential power has been curtailed over the years although the office remains ultimate arbiter; there are constraints operative upon the president which stem primarily from the limits of his economic power -- a situation that has developed since the relinquishment of Mexican economic independence that has deepened since the early 1940's.

Scott's analysis of the Mexican political system and its evolution is informatively inconsistent. He admits that there is a lack of a broad base for the system, that there is an 'overbalance of power' of certain interest groups (government bureaucrats, union leaders, business and industrial interests), and that there are

'pernicious influences' at work in election and nomination procedures. However, he contends that Mexico is 'evolving' toward a western-form liberal democracy. Evidence for this:

" Despite obvious weaknesses in this governing system, it does seem to take into account all of the principal and most active interest groups and associations when the highest public officers are being selected and when major policy questions are being decided."115

And: "...the emerging political system provides suitable machinery to allow the proliferating interests of a plural society to articulate and transmit their demands within the political process...opposition political newspapers not only are tolerated but exist in an environment unsurpassed in Latin America."116

Yet many of the 'principal interest groups', in fact the majority of the population, are unrepresented within the political system; the lower classes are unable, either through lack of resources or suppression, to effectively make their demands heard and their needs acted upon. As regards public participation in the selection of the highest public officers, we would agree with Patricia Richmond's analysis:

" From its (the PRI's) inception it has proved to be the perfect instrument for perpetuating elite control over the distribution of public posts...for institutionalising the traditional practice whereby the populace plays no role in the selection of public representatives."117

Most North American political analysts have viewed the Mexican system through the eyes of liberal academia; in so doing they have emphasised the predominance of democratic processes -- the tolerance of opposition and criticism, freedom of the press, respect for civil liberties, the absence of terrorism or use of the military to maintain stability. As we shall show below, these democratic indices,

rather than increasing in scope, are increasingly being eroded; the tribute given to their existence has often been more of a normative than an empirical analysis of reality in Mexico.

In Mexico there are two Mexicos. One is the world of words and rhetoric, ideals which have been proclaimed since the revolution, the other the actual modus operandi of the politico-economic system. The ability of the PRI to maintain stability in the face of this contradiction has stemmed to a great extent from the efficacy of its propaganda machine. Several observers have commented upon this contradiction:

"...the mass support, or at least the lack of mass antagonism is due in part to the ability of the PRI to have surrounded all of their programs with a revolutionary rhetoric. The radicals and the left-radicals especially, who charge that the official party is no longer revolutionary, is the group that is feeling the weight of suppression."¹¹⁸

" Ideological pronouncements by party officials frequently invoke the democratic norms of popular participation and elective suffrage, however the centralised organisation of the PRI is a product of its elite origin and corresponds to the dominant characteristics of Mexican social relationships rather than to the democratic ideology which plays such a prominent role in the policy pronouncements of the PRI."¹¹⁹

The facade of democracy is also apparent in other spheres of Mexican life; the courts act according to the wishes of the president when the crime is political, such as 'social dissolution' charges (explained later); the press, protected by constitutional guarantees against censorship and owned privately, is also subject to the wishes of the executive. This control is effected by means of a government monopoly over the distribution of newsprint and magazine stock, administered by an official agency, Productora e Importadora de Papel,

S.A., (PIPSA). To papers which print favourable government reports, unlimited credit is extended; if, on the other hand, a story is printed which is critical of presidential policy, PIPSA reminds the paper of its debt or, if not in debt, simply slows down or stops paper deliveries. Another way in which opposition is censored in the press may be shown by the example of the treatment of the magazine Por Que ? during the 1968 student protests. A special issue on the protests had been planned and the government intimidated two printers against printing the issue; when a printer was finally found, the Mayor of Mexico City, Corona del Rosal (ex-president of the PRI) warned the Magazine Vendor's Union against distributing the magazine; finally students sold all 500,000 copies on the streets. It is interesting to note that the editor of the magazine, Menedez Rodriguez, has since been jailed for " financing guerrilla training camps in Tabasco and Chiapas ".¹²⁰ As the New York Times has described the reality of press freedom:

" The Mexican public has grown accustomed to the almost total absence of public debate or criticism of presidential actions or statements."¹²¹

The cracks in the facade of democracy have become increasingly apparent as social protest has escalated; the final section of this chapter will discuss the mechanisms of co-optation and repression in the light of this situation.

3. Social Protest, Co-optation and Repression.

The starting point for this section will be a discussion of Anderson and Cockroft's article on control and co-optation in Mexican politics.¹²² Their thesis consists of a description of " what we believe is the basic and enduring goal-structure of the Mexican political system ",¹²³ together with a " set of structural principles which seem to determine...how the elements in the goal structure are implemented, and what the relations between different groups in the system will be like ".¹²⁴ The goal-structure they postulate and the relations between the goals are shown below:




Figure 1: The goal structure of the Mexican polity. Arrows represent postulated causal relations.

x-----+-----y means the more of x, the more of y.

x----- - -----y means the more of x, the less of y.

Source: Anderson and Cockroft, op. cit., p. 14, adapted.

The argument they advance is that " well organised interest groups exist in Mexico which attempt to promote one or other of the

goals in the goal-structure ",¹²⁵ and that the ruling oligarchy mediates the demands forwarded by these interest groups through the mechanisms of control (repression) or co-optation.

Although we would broadly agree with their analysis of the Mexican polity and the mechanisms by which it operate, there are several points which require further clarification. First, there is the general point that it is dangerous to accept publicly acclaimed goals as being the ends pursued within Mexican society; the previous section of this thesis discussed the contradiction between the revolutionary rhetoric and the actual workings of the Mexican political system. In particular, we would attack Anderson and Cockroft's belief that there is a " well organised interest group " to promote the demands of the mass of the population. There are groups which claim to do this (CNC, CTM), but their internal structure is such that it is mainly the needs of the leaders that are met, not those of the mass of members. Discussion and evidence given above¹²⁶ has shown the degree to which there exists a wide discrepancy between the claims of the revolutionary elite and actual achievements in the field of social welfare. Also, the implication of Anderson and Cockroft's definition of public welfare is such that it does not differentiate to whom the welfare has been given. We would contend that one of the principal components of welfare has in fact been the consumerism of the middle-class; thus the negative causal relationship postulated between public welfare and investment has in part been due to this latter factor, rather than being a necessary attribute of economic development. In this

respect the socialist development of Cuba may be cited, since it has shown how both goals may be maximised coterminously, and that the relationship can be positive rather than negative.¹²⁷ We would concede, however, that Anderson and Cockroft's analysis is concerned with an empirical investigation of Mexican development rather than the possibilities for economic development.

The second point is concerned with an omission from their analysis: the unspecified relationship between Mexicanisation and investment. The structure of investment in Mexico is such that we would hypothesise a negative causal relationship between these goals (unbroken line on figure 1). This hypothesis follows from the analysis of Mexicanisation and foreign investment given above,¹²⁸ and directly contradicts Anderson and Cockroft's remark that:

" Mexico has encouraged foreign capital to invest in Mexico but demands that the majority of shares be under Mexican control."¹²⁹

- a remark that pays further tribute to " the power of the PRI's rhetoric."¹³⁰

In the ensuing discussion we shall attempt to show how, over the past decade, social protest has increased, and how the balance between the mechanisms of control and co-optation has increasingly moved toward the former and away from the latter.

Since 1958, the general trend of social protest that has emerged may be seen as follows: although it is difficult to establish direct indices of social protest, there is general agreement among observers that protest has increased over the past decade or so, and

that the degree of repression has been inversely proportional to the power of the groups protesting. Thus we find examples of peasant protests -- attempts to protect landholdings from the encroachments of large landowners or to obtain land -- and in most cases the use of the police or military to suppress these moves. For example:

" A thousand peasants from the states of Querétaro and Oaxaca invaded neighbouring lands on November 25th (1967), and have refused to give them up, creating a situation in the south which is about to cause bloodshed."¹³¹

Alternatively, we find attempted co-optation -- as in the case of Rubén Jaramillo, a peasant leader in Morelos. Jaramillo's father had fought with Zapata in the revolution and had, together with many other peasants, watched the slowing down of land reform since the time of Cárdenas. When López Mateos became president, Jaramillo was promised a speeding-up of the process; he waited for reform that never came, and in 1961 " with 5000 landless peasants he occupied latifundios and unused plots in Michapa and El Guarín ".¹³² Initially, the Departamento Agrario y Colonización (D.A.A.C.) agreed that their claims were legitimate, but several weeks later they reversed their decision and declared Jaramillo an outlaw for trespassing. He tried to see the president, López Mateos, but was refused audience, and two months later he and his family were murdered by army troops. It was easier to kill the leader of the uprising than to allow the possibility of peasants directly obtaining land -- a move that would alter the principle of elite initiative and open the floodgates of unfulfilled aspirations. John Gerassi has

correctly observed:

"...there can be no doubt that the Jaramillos were killed, on orders from the PRI top, because they represented the Mexican peasants' unfulfilled demands from the revolution."¹³³

Other instances may be cited -- the case of Jacinto López is similar to that of Ruben Jaramillo -- López too was tired of waiting for land grants that never came; the repression which followed in both cases can be clearly ascribed to the unwillingness of the government to meet peasant demands; to meet their demands would have required (under the circumstances) a fundamental change in the structure of Mexican political relations, a change that even the revolution did not effect. Agrarian reform has come to mean the distribution of poor quality land to the peasant and a resurgence of private landholdings on a large scale -- ownership of these lands being often in the hands of officials or ex-officials, as rewards for services performed. The co-optation pattern is applicable at the higher levels of power in Mexican society, but control and repression has too often been used to 'meet' the demands of the lower levels: the 'marginal sectors'. González-Casanova has perceptively commented on this dual standard:

" The cyclical impoverishment of the urban working class, since it participates to some extent in the benefits of development, does not lead to radical forms of struggle; it is granted raises in wages and social allowances at the expense of the unorganised marginal workers...whose resistance is quietly attacked with the maximum of violence known in our society; this violence never provokes the protest reactions heard from the participating sectors of the population when they are the ones affected."¹³⁴

Thus, for some groups, Anderson and Cockroft's hypothesis below is not correct; it cannot be accepted as a general principle applicable

throughout the Mexican political system.

" If co-optation of dissident groups fails, then repression is likely to occur."¹³⁵

This principle is only likely to be true for those groups higher in the hierarchy of power, or with middle-class leadership. The case of the Movimiento de Liberación Nacional (M.L.N.), led by ex-president Cárdenas is instructive in this context. MLN was formed in the 1960's by left-wing groups outside the PRI, but decided to support Díaz Ordaz' candidacy for the presidency in 1964 -- the co-optation succeeded but a splinter group, the Frente Electoral del Pueblo (F.E.P.) attempted to run their own candidate, failed, and had 30 of its members arrested a year later. The hypothesis also held true for the railroad strike of 1959 -- when co-optation failed the military was used to suppress the workers' demands:

" The railroad strike of March 1959 and the repression of the union headed by Vallejo created a climate of social tension never before seen in the country. An attempt was made to place the political responsibility for the railroad strike on the Mexican communist party which fell victim to a wave of persecution. Close to 5000 persons were arrested, the majority of whom were railroad workers. The strikers were forced to return to work and searching without a warrant became an everyday occurrence."¹³⁷

After these events a system of minimum wages and profit-sharing was introduced as a panacea to the workers, but they remained basically insecure due to the threat of the law of 'social dissolution' being used against them again. This law undermines the right of workers to strike and of citizens to protest against the government, since they may at any time be charged with subverting the state.

At the top of the hierarchy, co-optation is used to undermine

dissent, but if the opposition becomes too great, then repression of some form is likely to occur. The death of Carlos Madrazo, former head of the PRI, may have been one such case: Madrazo was killed when his plane exploded in mid-air in June 1969. He had formed many powerful enemies within the power elite through his attempts to reform and democratise the PRI structure and reduce the powers exerted by the PRI's federal and state leaders over the selection of candidates. Such moves were unacceptable in the eyes of the ruling elite, especially since Madrazo was becoming the focal point around which dissent had gathered.

At the level of the rank-and-file of the labour and peasant organisations the guiding principle has been repression by the state, especially toward wildcat strikes and spontaneous land invasions:

"...when the rank-and-file, the campesino, or the non-privileged workers attempt to pressure the very structured organs of the PRI for solutions to what they see as problems in the political system, they meet with ostracism, suppression, or jail."¹³⁸

The general picture which emerges from this analysis is that the distribution of resources and the benefits of development has followed a fairly rigid pattern. In contemporary Mexico the PRI finds itself caught in a contradiction: on the one hand:

" To risk converting the PRI into an effective mass party is no doubt envisioned by the elite as opening a pandora's box of political chaos that still rocks most of Mexico's neighbours to the south."¹³⁹

while on the other hand, unless the PRI does change in the long run into a party in which more participate and the benefits of development are more evenly shared, then Mexico could see political

chaos erupt from the frustration of the masses' unfulfilled aspirations.

Through acceptance of the political system a certain degree of satisfaction has been attained for some groups -- most notable are the middle-class and labour aristocracy -- since the early days of the revolution. The relative political stability of Mexican society over the past 50 years may be attributed to the PRI being able to encompass opposition movements and the 'Revolutionary Family' instituting reforms which have raised the standard of living for some. However, today many more are clamouring for a place in the sun -- a place that cannot be guaranteed given the politico-economic structure that has emerged from the revolution. The tension between the elite and the mass is reflected within the PRI itself, between the 'Young Turks' who wish to see reform, and the 'Old Guard' who control and refuse to bring the structure into line with the ideals of the revolution. The selection of Luis Echeverría Alvarez signifies the continued supremacy of the more conservative elements and a probable reliance on force rather than balance -- Echeverría's ministry was responsible for the repression of the 1968 protests in Mexico City.

The final chapter of the thesis will explore another area of social protest -- the students. In particular, we shall attempt to show why it was inevitable that the government repressed the Movement in 1968, and why the events of 1968 are important for a comprehension of the changes that are taking place in the structure of Mexican society.

Chapter 4

1. The Latin American University.

The most important element to be stressed in discussing the Latin American university is the 'Reform Movement', initiated in Cordoba, Argentina, in 1918. The Reform and its consequences marked the culmination of growing criticism of the role of the university, principally from the Argentinian middle-class. The 'Cordoba Manifiesto' described universities as:

"...the secular refuge of mediocrity, the salary of ignorance, the safe hospital for all intellectual invalids and -- what is even worse -- the place where all forms of tyranny and insensibility found the chair where they could be taught. The universities have thus become faithful mirrors of these decadent societies which offer the sad sight of a senile immobility."¹⁴⁰

The Reform Movement spread throughout the continent, and has had a deep impact upon the structure of universities in Latin America. There are two elements which merit special attention: co-gobierno (co-government, theoretically equal participation by students, faculty, and alumni in the government of the university); autonomia, (autonomy, over the internal structure of the university and its rules and inviolability of the campus).

The concept of co-government developed from the special role accorded youth in Latin America, as uncorrupt and free from materialistic motivations, ideologically buttressed by arielismo.¹⁴¹ Youth, as Max Weber has observed, were assumed to follow an 'ethic of ultimate ends'. Students in particular, being educated youth in uneducated societies, have been accorded and see themselves as voicing the will

of those unable to express it for themselves: the poor, miserable, and oppressed in society...

" Students are not only active proponents of their own group interests, but are often the only articulate agents of protest in societies where the masses are predominantly illiterate and politically unorganised."¹⁴²

A reciprocal relationship exists between the lower classes who look to the students, and the latter who feel they represent the masses' unspoken desires for justice and equality. Kalman Silvert has made a correct sociological analysis of this situation in terms of students' perception of their future situation:

" The conscious acceptance of direct social responsibility by the new university students is an implicit identification of themselves as actual or aspirant members of an expanding elite."¹⁴³

Although the ideal of co-government is still held up by many student leaders, only two countries have experienced this ideal: Brazil and Uruguay. In all others the effective control of the university has remained in the hands of the faculty and administration, or more correctly, as we shall see below, in the hands of the government.

Most writers on the subject have seen co-government and autonomy as having led to " the politicisation of the Latin American State university ".¹⁴⁴ Arguments on this subject have often taken on a paradoxical turn, due to the paradoxical nature of the concepts themselves; we would argue that the university was a political institution both before and after the days of the Reform Movement; its politics was different before and involved

acquiescence to the status quo. The politics has changed and the university has become in some cases a sanctuary for opposition groups to the established order, and this has been a consequence of university autonomy in undemocratic societies. In a similar vein, we would contend that violation of academic freedom has not in fact been a consequence of the Reform Movement for, as Polyani has argued:

" Academic freedom is never an isolated phenomenon. It can only exist in a free society; for the principles underlying it are the same on which the most essential liberties of a society as a whole are founded."¹⁴⁵

Both of these ideals of the Reform Movement, co-government and autonomy, have failed to become what their creators intended them to be. Co-government has meant tokenism, and autonomy is incomplete due to government control over the distribution of finances:

"...formal grants of autonomy mean little to institutions still almost wholly dependent upon government for economic support, particularly where part-time teaching staff and weak administrators have neither the incentive nor the means of implementing academic independence."¹⁴⁶

The failure of the Reform Movement to achieve its aims has to a great extent been due to the structure of economic relations between the central government and the university. The lack of academic excellence may be explained by the frugality of the governments in their fund allocations, creating a staff of part-time professors uninterested or unable to pursue an academic career for financial reasons, as well as limited teaching and research facilities for all within the university community.

Much of the literature on the Latin American university reflects the viewpoint that the university has failed as a pedagogical and

research institution as being due to the Reform Movement. For example, a recent survey of research on Latin American university students set the issue in these terms:

" The struggle now is between those who continue to support the traditional goals of autonomy and student power within the university and those who want to see the university modernised and rationalised to be more responsive to the developmental needs of these countries."147

The " developmental needs " begs the question of 'development for whom ?' Development means different things to different groups: for the peasant and slum-dweller the needs are simple: food, housing, sanitation, education. Universities that produce lawyers in great numbers are not geared to these needs. The problem lies elsewhere than the university; as Lipset has noted:

"...it is clear that the extent of political concern among students in different countries is in part a function of the degree of tension in the larger polity."148

The values students acquire and their perception of opportunities for status (in fact the very need for status) are formed by the society outside the university. The university reflects the contradictions of the world outside:

"...it is unrealistic to expect students to eschew politics and embrace a new professionalism based on the needs of a technical revolution so long as they are enmeshed in an outworn and unreformed university system."149

and, we might add, an outworn and unreformed social structure. The Cuban revolution confirms the thesis that the solution to the problems of the university rests outside:

" Cuba is still the only country in Latin America to have brought the university system into line with the needs of a developing economy, and the Cuban assertion that university

reform is impossible without a total social and political revolution has yet to be proved wrong."¹⁵⁰

The Latin American university has been unable to meet the demands generated by the rapid social changes that have taken place in the past 50 years; this inability has been due to the persistence of an outdated university system. The underdevelopment which has developed in these nations is paralleled in the university; pressure from the provinces upon the metropolis due to urbanisation has affected the university and shows no signs of abatement. At root, the structural redistribution of resources in the economy is the necessary step to correct the imbalance which is today placing high pressure upon the urban centres to the detriment of the rural areas. When the needs of development become a euphemism for the needs of the ruling class, underdevelopment proceeds apace for the mass of the population. In education, the university system in Latin America today is:

"...geared to producing the minimal qualifications for entry into professions which the needs of the country no longer demand."¹⁵¹

Governmental attempts to reform the universities and change their scale of priorities have met with little success outside of Cuba. As long as high prestige and high salaries are accorded to the traditional professions in urban areas, then to change the university without changing the social structure

within which it exists can only meet with further failure.

It is within this context that we shall now proceed to look

into the role of students and the effect of their actions upon the wider society.

2. Students and Politics in Latin America.

Students have traditionally been involved in politics in Latin America, at times playing a significant part in the destinies of their nations, as in Guatemala (1944), Venezuela (1958), Cuba (1959), and Bolivia (1964). Besides the special relationship between the university and society and the internal structure of the Latin American university, there are additional reasons which give students the freedom and opportunity to act as a conscience for the acts of political leaders. The power of any organised group in society is enhanced when there are few groups which are organised; this is true for many Latin American countries where political instability has increased the power of such groups, including the students, the church, the military, and the landed aristocracy.

Political activity is increased in Latin America among students when the principal state university is near or in the capital of the country, as in Argentina or Mexico:

" The location of the university in or near a capital encourages political activity because national political organisations and persons are more in the minds of students, and are also more available as foci of thought, agitation and demonstration."¹⁵²

When higher education is centralised in this manner communications within the student body are facilitated -- for example, leafleting from a central point can rapidly disseminate information; furthermore, such an ecological structure facilitates collective action on the part of the students. Large universities, such as the University of Buenos Aires or Universidad Nacional Autónoma Mexicana (U.N.A.M.),

tend to increase alienation among students and, where resources are limited, heighten frustration among students over the quality of education they receive:

" Where there is drastic separation between students and teachers, where faculty must depend on extra-university employment because of low salaries, or where there is a very great number of students per faculty member, students are more likely to engage in radical political activity to express their discontent."¹⁵³

This hypothesis has been borne out by experience in Latin America as well as elsewhere. One of the prime movers of the students in the 'French Revolution' of May 1968 was student discontent at the poor working conditions at the Sorbonne and Nanterre; these intra-university conditions being a product of extra-university structures. Similarly, the examples of Columbia and Berkeley in the U.S., where the first and third conditions of Lipset's statement are true, again validate the hypothesis. This phenomenon is not only confined to the higher reaches of education in Latin America; the same conditions often permeate throughout the entire educational system:

" The roots of political extremism as well as of academic incompetence must be sought in these overcrowded state secondary schools where underpaid and socially undervalued teachers pass on their discontent to their pupils."¹⁵⁴

In underdeveloped nations the university often provides one of the few avenues for social mobility for the lower classes, as well as being a means of status-maintenance for middle-class children. When opportunities are frustrated through high university admissions standards or graduate unemployment, then radical political activity tends to develop; the latter is probably true in both the 'developed' and underdeveloped nations. We would agree with some reservations

to Lipset's observations on this topic; his contention that student revolt stems from 'late adolescent rebellion' is misleading as an explanation for protest:

" The poor employment prospects for university-educated youth in many underdeveloped countries enlarges the reservoir of late adolescent rebellion from which revolutionary politics can draw support."155

But: " The extent to which students will seek and accept such ideological outlets is related to their degree of uncertainty about the future."156

Political involvement in the university may also stem from a desire to achieve political positions outside the university; in Mexico and other Latin American nations student leaders have often become national leaders later in life (e.g. Betancourt of Venezuela).

Ideologically, there has been one current of thought which has had a profound effect upon student politics in Latin America (and, to a lesser extent, Europe and North America) in the past decade. That has been the Cuban revolution and its corollary, fidelismo. Here at last was a dream come true for many on the left in Latin America: students, peasants and workers in an underdeveloped nation struggling against U.S. imperialism and a corrupt dictatorship -- and succeeding in toppling the interests of both to create a socialist revolution -- the first in Latin America. The Cuban revolution radicalised the student movement and gave many intellectuals a raison d'être in promoting class struggle:

" Between 1959 and 1962, fidelismo had captured the imagination of a great number of young people, and provided them with a concrete example of how to seek power and try to solve the problems of underdevelopment, and had unquestionably taken the initiative in student activities in most Latin American countries."157

Other writers have noted the significance of the Cuban revolution and the impact of fidelismo:

" Castro has symbolised independence from American influence, the quick eradication of poverty and ignorance, and the total mobilisation of society in the interests of rapid modernisation."¹⁵⁸

" Fidelismo challenges the structure of the established Latin American universe, its distribution of economic, social, and political power, its accomodation with the Church, its sets of relationships between the person and the world -- in short, its total self-conception."¹⁵⁹

Although the effect of the Cuban revolution has lessened over the past ten years, there can be no doubt that it has had a profound effect upon the path of left-wing politics in Latin America; this effect is particularly significant in the context of the Latin American university -- as Alistair Hennessy has noted in his analysis of student politics in Latin America:

" Radical intellectuals now see themselves as the link between the formless protest of rural revolt and the directed revolution of workers and peasants."¹⁶⁰

The tradition of student activism in Cuba had been most apparent in the 1950's, although it stretches back for at least the past half-century;¹⁶¹ during the 1950's students and intellectuals became guerrilla leaders, following Guevara's and Mao Tse Tung's emphasis on the importance of a rural-based peasant revolution. Many of the non-communist left in Latin America have now defined their revolutionary role in these terms but none have achieved their goals as successfully as Cuba.

3. Student Protest in Mexico, 1960 - 1970.

Mexico conforms to the general pattern outlined above in terms of the structure of its educational system and the role of university students in society. Before looking at the development of the student movement over the past decade an explanation of the structure of the secondary and higher educational system will be given, to aid in understanding these developments.

The secondary school system is binary in its structure, consisting of vocational and preparatory schools (slang: vocas and prepas). Students educated at vocational schools, if successful on entering higher education, go to a technical college or institute. The major centre for technical students is in Mexico City at the Instituto Politécnico Nacional (I.P.N.), currently with an enrollment of 45,000 students. Most of the students at the Politécnico (slang: Poli) come from workers or peasants' families, and it provides the main channel of educational mobility for the sons of these groups. Since 1956 and army intervention at the Poli all technical institutions have become subservient to the Secretariat of Education, and thus have not shared autonomy with the university. Officially, the students at the Poli are represented by the Federación Nacional de Estudiantes Técnicos (F.N.E.T.). Students educated at the prepas are primarily oriented toward liberal arts rather than vocational or technical subjects, and go to the Universidad Nacional Autónoma Mexicana (U.N.A.M.) in Mexico City for higher education. UNAM caters principally to the children of the urban middle and upper-middle

classes, and is the favoured educational institution in terms of fund allocations from the federal government, receiving 3/4 of the budget allocation to higher education. Although UNAM has enjoyed relative autonomy from the state since 1928 it was flagrantly violated in 1968, as we shall examine in detail later.

Although allocations for education have risen steadily in past years, they have been insufficient to maintain a high standard of academic excellence, due to a tremendous expansion in the rate of enrollment. The inadequacy of resources is demonstrated in the generally poor quality of teaching, the overcrowding of schools, and the general lack of facilities for both students and faculty. One writer after the student strike at UNAM in 1966 described the situation at UNAM as follows:

" Undeniable problems abounded at the university. It had a mere \$ 40 million for an immense complex harbouring over 90,000 regular and preparatory students, which is one third of UCLA's revenue, and three times its students. Classes were crowded. Libraries were puny. Only about 1000 professors were on full-time contracts, and even they often deserted the campus for necessary income elsewhere, detailing their classes to assistants. Only about one in fifty students had a scholarship, though one in six was from a working-class or peasant family. Each year about a third dropped out to take jobs. About half failed their final exams partly or completely because they had taken part-time jobs. But these problems were obviously the nation's, not the university's."¹⁶²

Overcrowding plagued not only the institutions of higher education but, as mentioned above, also the secondary schools where shift classes have become necessary to meet the educational demands of a nation where 60% of the population are under the age of 25. Attempts at decentralisation have been unsuccessful; rural migration and urban population growth have severely pressured the urban

educational system. Underdevelopment within the educational system has been a consequence of urban metropolis development at the expense of satellite underdevelopment within Mexico.

In terms of priorities within the university, Mexico shares the general problem of the Latin American university: an over-emphasis and over-enrollment in law and humanitarian subjects with an underemphasis on technical subjects, in a society where development can best be achieved by a reversal of this situation. In 1965 0.3% of the students at UNAM were studying agriculture, while 25% were studying law.¹⁶³ This situation is exacerbated by the loss of graduates to other countries, mainly the U.S.; between 1966 and 1968, for example, 20% of all engineering graduates left Mexico.¹⁶⁴ Furthermore, U.S. foundations do not help, rather they:

"...foster migration to fill their (U.S.) deficiencies in professional areas, thereby creating larger ones in Third World countries."¹⁶⁵

The problem of these inconsistencies does not lie essentially within the university, only the symptoms, since the structure of career opportunities is such that there exist few opportunities for qualified technical workers (e.g. agronomists), and those that do exist are low on the prestige and salary scale, whereas the potential advancement and prestige for lawyers is far greater. Subdivision of the university into rigidly demarcated faculties and schools serves the needs of a rigidly class-structured society, not the developmental needs of the population at large.

The educational system is highly selective in its operation,

class privilege and educational discrimination becoming increasingly apparent as one moves up the educational pyramid. Between 1960 and 1965 for example, of every 1000 children enrolled in primary schools, only 16 attended UNAM or IPN. Much of the wastage in the educational system stems from the inability of students to support themselves while in school and the need to take work in order to support their families.

Over the past ten years, and particularly since the strike at UNAM in 1966, student protest has been on the upswing. After President Kennedy's abortive attempt to invade Cuba at the Bay of Pigs there were numerous protest demonstrations throughout Mexico expressing strong anti-imperialist sentiments and sympathy with the Cubans and their revolution. The first large demonstration (1961), ✓ in which ex-president Lázaro Cárdenas participated, was in support of the pro-Cuban position of the Mexican government -- against the imperialistic policies of the U.S. However, four years later, another equally large demonstration against U.S. imperialism in South-East Asia was met with repression from the police and army. The additional variable which probably changed the government's attitude was provided by the visit of President Johnson to Mexico.

Strikes and protests by students in Morelia (1963) and Puebla (1964) against PRI appointed governors were met by repression in both cases. 1963, termed the " year of student democratic resurgence " ¹⁶⁶ saw the formation of a 'National Association of Democratic Students' as the outcome of a conference of students in the state of Morelia.

However, it was not until 1966 that the student movement really began to organise systematically -- during the student strike at UNAM, when their demands moved outside the local context for the first time:

"...the demands and issues raised by the students themselves increasingly assumed a national dimension, as university reforms came to be viewed as inseparable from the restructuring of Mexican society and politics."¹⁶⁷

The strike at UNAM was apparently caused by attempts on the part of the rector, Ignacio Chávez, to raise admissions standards in the university in order to alleviate the problems of overcrowding; the students reacted since they saw this as a move which would increase the already high degree of selectivity and class-bias within higher education. It is significant to note that the strike began in the faculty of law, and spread from there to other faculties; we would note the relationship between law and the political and economic structure of Mexico, and the employment prospects (which are poor) for law graduates. This latter point would confirm the hypothesis given earlier between radical political activity and uncertainty about the future. Rather than being altruistic on the part of these students, as claimed in the demands, it would appear that they were motivated by factors which affected their own situation. Later evidence has shown that the strike was initiated as an attempt by politicos outside the university to remove Rector Chávez from his position at UNAM.¹⁶⁸ The consequences it had in raising student political consciousness and integrating the student movement were not foreseen by its instigators. The strike lasted three and

one half months, and ended with the beginning of the summer vacation for schools; when school resumed later in the year none of the conditions which had precipitated the strike had been removed, although a new director in the faculty of economics had been appointed. Admission exams were retained, and discussion of basic reforms in university structure were dropped. There is one further point worth noting on the effects of the strike; the way in which it brought the provincial universities into the national student movement:

" The university disturbances in the capital also had a direct spill-over effect, inspiring dissident students in at least 5 provincial universities to strike and agitate on behalf of their own demands."169

1967 witnessed minor skirmishes of different natures, including widespread social protest in Hermosillo (Sonora state) against the PRI by students, peasants, and workers. Siempre !, a left-wing Mexican weekly, described the events as follows:

" When the state of tension brought about by the harshness and inflexibility of structures is expressed in the most advanced regions of the country, the political conflict appears even clearer, even within the official party. Such was the case in Sonora in April 1967 when the people of Hermosillo and other cities decided they would choose the official candidate for governor. There was a strong campaign in favour of various candidates but in the end the nomination did not satisfy the majority of the people in Sonora. Disappointment was acute, and tempers ran high; the protest against the choice of candidate for the PRI became a conflict of such magnitude that the federal government was obliged to make the decision stick by means of the military occupation of the state. The University of Sonora, centre of popular opposition, suffered most inasmuch as the army occupied it. By May the state of Sonora was under military control."170

What is politically significant in this account is the fact that

the federal government was prepared to go to such lengths to maintain its control against popular demands in the state. It would probably not have been difficult to nominate a candidate who was acceptable to the people, but this would have involved coming to terms with popular demands, something the PRI and the revolutionary elite is known only to do on its own terms. Maintenance of the 'principle of authority' is, as Stavenhagen has noted, the prime concern of the authorities:

" When massive movements for the restitution of their rights by the trade unions or syndicates arise (like the railwaymen's strike in 1959, the recent movements of school teachers, doctors, students, etc.) which through their own dynamism exceed the narrow limits of an organisation controlled like those we are considering, then the first concern of the corresponding authorities is to break the movement as such, in the name of the principle of authority, even if later they concede in large measure the demands formulated by the movement. In these cases, appearances are the most important thing: the fact that it should not be apparent that a spontaneous mass movement can succeed outside of the system. The bargaining should be neither open nor public."¹⁷¹ (my emphasis)

The 'principle of authority' and the lack of openness in such relationships as Stavenhagen describes stem from pre-revolutionary cultural patterns established in the colonial era; their continued presence has become an imperative for the maintenance of the Mexican political system. To change these patterns would be to radically change that system.

The Sonora repression was the most violent in this period, although in other areas, notably Morelia and Villahermosa, the army was used to stifle student protest. Peasant protest also met with repression, including the murder of 30 copra workers by the army

in Acapulco on August 20, 1967.¹⁷²

After the chronology of the events of 1968 the final section of this chapter will deal with an analysis of those events; a series of protests that marked the culmination of growing frustrations among students, and which found widespread support among other sectors of the population.

4. Chronology: July 22 - October 12, 1968.

July 22 (Monday)

Street fight between Vocational School No. 5 (Voca No. 5) and their traditional rivals, Preparatory School Isaac Ochoterena.

July 23 (Tuesday)

Renewed street fighting between Voca No. 5 and Prepa Ochoterena students. 200 granaderos invade Voca No. 5 beating students and teachers indiscriminately. One student dead.

July 26 (Friday)

FNET (Federación Nacional de Estudiantes Técnicos), the official student organisation for IPN (Instituto Politécnico Nacional) organises demonstration protesting granaderos' invasion of Voca No. 5 on the 23rd; CNED (Confederación Nacional de Estudiantes Democráticos), a UNAM student group affiliated with the Communist Party, organises separate rally to celebrate anniversary of Castro's 1953 attack on the Moncada barracks. Militants from both rallies are ambushed and beaten by riot police en route to National Palace at the Zócalo. Students disperse and regroup; barricade themselves in UNAM prep schools. Students subsequently repel police by commandeering and setting busses afire. Three day siege of student-controlled prepas commences. By days' end four students dead; hundreds injured and arrested. In separate action, police invade and sack Communist Party office in Mexico City; arrest 76, charging they instigated riots.

July 27 (Saturday)

IPN and UNAM students unite forces for the first time and present initial demands. 2000 students remain barricaded in prepas. Students block streets with commandeered busses; Zócalo traffic at standstill. Students form National Strike Council, Consejo Nacional de Huelga (CNH).

July 29 (Monday) - July 30 (Tuesday)

Attempted student march on U.S. embassy repulsed. Late monday and early tuesday infantry, paratroop riflemen and military police carrying bayoneted rifles and backed by tanks and armoured cars invade occupied prepas (violating university autonomy) and vocas; authorities fire bazooka at building, students retaliate with molotov cocktails. Estimate between 10 and 30 dead; hundreds injured and arrested; many "disappear".

July 31 (Wednesday)

At campus rally, UNAM rector Barros Sierra proposes new demonstrations " if necessary " to protest violated university autonomy.

August 1 (Thursday)

Barros Sierra leads 50 - 80,000 students and teachers from UNAM, IPN, and other Mexico City schools in "mourning" demonstrations.

August 2 (Friday)

Students stage two demonstrations protesting previous day's "official" march led by UNAM rector.

August 5 (Monday)

IPN students organise demonstration (with participation of UNAM, Chapingo and Normales students) numbering approximately 125,000 students. Government-backed FNET tries but fails to take over student movement. Students give government 72 hours to meet demands; threaten national strike.

August 13 (Tuesday)

Teachers Coalition for Democratic Rights leads 200,000 in demonstration at Zócalo denouncing authorities and pressing for six demands.

August 22 (Thursday)

CNH insists upon open and public negotiations between students and government representatives with press, radio and TV coverage in response to government offer for " frank and calm dialogue ".

August 27 (Tuesday) - August 28 (Wednesday)

200,000 - 400,000 march to Zócalo in CNH-led demonstration; large group remains around Presidential Palace during night and is chased from area before dawn by soldiers and riot police.

August 28 (Wednesday)

Government-staged rally utilising unenthusiastic government employees taken over by vast student contingent. Tanks and troops used to disperse demonstrators.

August 29 (Thursday)

Students and slum residents dislodged by soldiers and granaderos

with bayonets as they attempt to storm Plaza of Three Cultures. Masked right-wing terrorists machine-gun Vocational School No. 7; at least two students wounded. Lincoln Gordon flies to Mexico City to address the American Chamber of Commerce.

August 30 (Friday)

Protected by 22 truckloads of troops, President Díaz Ordaz addresses CTM (Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos). CTM leader Arturo Gutierrez assures Díaz Ordaz of workers' "support".

August 31 (Saturday)

New right-wing attacks on Vocational School No. 7.

September 1 (Sunday)

President Díaz Ordaz defends government's position in his fourth annual report to the nation.

September 7 (Saturday)

CNH rejects government's condition for holding "public dialogue" on their demands. Rally at Tlateloco housing project of approximately 25,000.

September 13 (Friday)

CNH stages massive, orderly, " silent demonstration " at Zócalo (approximately 100,000).

September 18 (Wednesday)

UNAM autonomy violated for the first time in forty years as over 5000 army troops invade and seal off campus, taking several thousand prisoners including teachers, staff and parents of students. CNH goes underground.

September 19 (Thursday)

Threats of student sabotage to the Olympic Games follow violation of UNAM autonomy. Student meeting with Interior Minister Echeverría breaks up in disagreement. Students hurl stones at the Ministry of the Interior's windows. In a new wave of repression, police indiscriminately arrest and round-up students and bystanders.

September 20 (Friday)

3000 students battle 1000 riot police outside IPN. 300 students arrested as police invade Zacateco school. Colegio de Mexico machine-gunned by right-wing terrorists. Outbreaks of violence in other university centers.

September 21 (Saturday)

Students hold meeting in Plaza of Three Cultures; granaderos attack with bayonets; residents of adjacent Tlateloco housing project give students refuge and medical aid. Several dead, many injured.

September 22 (Sunday)

UNAM rector Barros Sierra hands in " irrevocable resignation ". At Voca No. 7, students barricade themselves in with 10 busses; thousands of charging soldiers fire tear gas as students retaliate with molotov cocktails. Later Foreign Ministry set afire. Local residents again aid students.

September 23 (Monday)

Violent clashes in Plaza of Three Cultures and Casco de Santo Tomas. Students fight police in jeeps with molotov cocktails and stones; ten to thirty dead, scores wounded and arrested. In south side of city, students are driven back as they rush prison where labor leaders Demetrio Vallejo and Valentín Campa have been held since 1959 on charges of subversion (under article 145).

September 24 (Tuesday)

Day of recovery. Previous night's fighting leaves ten to twenty dead and approximately 100 wounded. Burned out busses and jeeps litter the streets.

September 25 (Wednesday)

UNAM rector Barros Sierra's resignation not accepted by the Board of Directors. Sporadic violence between students and police; one bystander dead.

September 26 (Thursday)

Rector Barros Sierra withdraws resignation stating he will " restore order to the university " and demands " an end to Army intervention of the university ". At Voca No. 7, right-wing terrorists machine-gun buildings and smash student cars.

September 27 (Friday)

Political arrests now estimated at 2000.

October 2 (Saturday)

Soldiers coordinated by plainclothesmen open fire without provocation and charge peaceful student rally at Plaza of Three Cultures. Students and bystanders fleeing to Tlateloco housing project are pursued, shot at, beaten and arrested. Scores massacred.

October 12 (Saturday)

Olympics open. (Scheduled to close on the 27th).

Source: Mexico '68: A Study of Domination and Repression, North American Congress on Latin America, New York, 1968.

5. Olympic Games 1968: Political Catalyst ?

The chronology presented above is intended to provide a framework for the discussion that follows; this section analyses the significance of the developments in Mexico during the latter half of 1968.

The conditions for a student strike had been created long before the disturbances of 1968; the strike at UNAM in 1966 was a prelude to the events and, as we have seen, the conditions out of which the 1966 strike developed had not been changed.¹⁷³ It was only a matter of a spark to set the fire burning once again.

That spark was provided by government actions during late July in 1968, when the granaderos were used to quell intra-student fighting in Mexico City. Within a week the students from UNAM, IPN, and other major schools in Mexico City had joined forces and mobilised themselves against the authorities. The initial use of repression by the government without warning may be explained by their fear of student unrest stirring the waters of discontent during the year of the Olympic Games -- the so-called " Year of Peace ". Rather than curbing the possibility of protest, the government increased the reaction through the use of heavy-handed tactics. By August 27th the movement had reached striking proportions: 300,000 students, their parents, workers, street pedlars and others marched through Mexico City on that day. The escalation of protest was only to be curtailed by the deaths of an estimated three to four hundred persons on the evening of October 2nd, 1968, at the hands

of the army: the 'Tlateloco Massacre'.

The strike demands of the students, made after the formation of the National Strike Council on August 8th, forms the hub around which the events may be interpreted, and their significance analysed. Students had reacted to government repression through the organisation of a National Strike Council (Consejo Nacional de Huelga, CNH), and the presentation of a set of demands to be met: ¹⁷⁴

1. Repeal of Articles 145 and 145 bis of the Penal Code. Passed during World War II to provide a means of dealing with the rise of a fifth column in Mexico, these laws define the crime of " social dissolution ". They provide for sentences of two to twelve years for any Mexican or foreigner who diffuses ideas or programmes of any foreign government that disturb public order or affects Mexico's sovereignty. They also provides sentences of ten to twenty years for any Mexican or foreigner who carries out acts " which prepare materially or morally for the invasion of national territory or the submission to any foreign government ".
2. Freedom for all political prisoners.
3. Dismissal of Generals Luis Cueto Ramirez and Mendiolea, Chief and Deputy Chief of Police in Mexico City respectively.
4. Establishment of the responsibility of the authorities for the acts of repression and vandalism due to the actions of the police, granaderos, and army.
5. Disbandment of the granaderos and dismissal of their chief, General Frias.
6. Compensation for wounded students and the families of students who were killed.

Although the strike had begun initially on the basis of student grievances over the violation of their rights, the political genius of the demands which were presented by the Strike Council rested in the fact that they were not solely student demands. They embraced a far wider constituency, including principally the 'popular sectors' or lower classes who were the most affected by the repressive acts of

the government. Instead of backing down, as no doubt the authorities had hoped the swift use of the club would achieve, the students moved from university issues to general political demands which included a large sector of the population. The demands attacked the gaping contradiction in the Mexican political system, the "institutionalised lie"¹⁷⁵ in Mexican society: the chasm between official party rhetoric and official actions. Furthermore, the manner in which the demands were presented were such as to resist the authorities' use of co-optation of leaders -- the students demanded open and public negotiations. This move took governmental rhetoric at its face value: in response to the government's call for "frank and calm dialogue". The demands were reformist in content, but their manner of presentation and negotiation were revolutionary. Pablo González-Casanova, writing at the height of the conflict, saw these implications:

"If it accepts the dialogue the government will have to inaugurate a new political style, and change the forms of government that have ruled the country since the time of Calles. All this supposes for the government itself a series of risks with regard to the control of the power structure: the PRI, CTM, CNC, etc. The power structure will have to readjust very seriously for a political struggle in which other parties and organisations, both popular and unionised, would play an increasingly important part."¹⁷⁶

Examples given above, such as the gubernatorial elections in Sonora state in 1967, underscore the unwillingness of the ruling elite to institute any form of equal participation in dialogue of a public nature.

In asking for public dialogue, the students thus attacked the 'principle of authority',¹⁷⁷ the assumption that all political

initiative has to rest in the hands of the government, and instead replaced it with the 'principle of public dialogue'.¹⁷⁸ By taking the government at its face value the students caught the authorities in a trap. Salvador Hernández has noted the effects of this demand:

"...the major issue for the CNH's demand for a public dialogue is the attempt to remove the elitism that insulated the masses from the government and further the attempt to renew confidence in the public's ability to influence the decisions of political officials. To accomplish this would mean the undoing of the unidirectional flow of power inherent in the structure of the PRI."¹⁷⁹

The support which the students generated among the general public was remarkable. The strength gained from outside support was a result of their insistence on constitutional guarantees; they were not asking for further privileges for a privileged elite. The demand for the repeal of the law against 'social dissolution' struck a common chord with many workers and peasants who had either had their civil rights infringed by that provision during strikes or protests, or felt scared to express their discontent from the threat of being jailed for 'subversive acts'. Under the law the leaders of the 1959 railroad workers' strike had been jailed -- Demetrio Vallejo and Valentín Campa -- they were still incarcerated at the time of the student protests and had become a cause célèbre over the last decade. The other specifically political demand adopted, freedom for all political prisoners, was directly linked to the 'social dissolution' issue; it was seen as a political crime to be jailed under Article 145 of the Penal Code. The adoption of these demands for constitutional rights met with support

not only among the lower classes; Partido Popular Socialista (PPS) and the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), to the left and right of the PRI, supported student demands to revise the 'social dissolution' legislation.

The contradictions within Mexican society were particularly visible during the year of the Olympic Games; on the one hand the government was attempting to show the world the extent of social progress and democracy Mexico had reached since the revolution, while on the other hand wielding the stick against social protest which denied such progress both in its appearance -- denying the extent of 'democratisation' -- and in its demands for bread and basic rights. Memories of the earlier Díaz and the celebrations of 1910 came to mind for some commentators.¹⁸⁰ The students were not slow to capitalise on such inconsistencies: marchers in the streets carried posters depicting the Olympic rings as smoking grenades, and slogans such as " Mexico will win the Gold Medal for Repression ". The expenditure of nearly \$ 200 million with an income of only \$ 140 million for the entertainment of foreigners angered those who saw the government begrudgingly spend \$ 40 million a year on UNAM; furthermore, ticket prices for the games were beyond the pockets of most of the population, and the government passed a decree prohibiting strikes for the duration of the Games.

Initially at least, the repression of the student movement was probably more a response to the fear that the apparent tranquillity of the nation would be disturbed for the Games. However, as the

movement gained momentum during August, it soon became apparent that this was being used as an excuse for the state not to come to terms with student demands. President Díaz Ordaz, in his annual report to the nation on September 1st, blamed the protests on subversive elements, including foreign agitators, aiming to disrupt the Olympics:

" Different interests...inside and outside the country... of different political ideologies and tendencies, had planned to take advantage of a trivial incident to create major trouble. The aim was to disrupt the Olympics and discredit the country."181

However, the National Strike Council repudiated the president's claims both through their words and actions. At a press conference held on September 2nd, they reaffirmed their position:

" We have been insisting that our movement does not intend to act in any form against the Olympic Games. If our movement interferes with the Olympic Games, it will be the responsibility of the Federal Government, whose obligation it is to find proper solutions to the deep social problems that affect our country."182

The students' distrust of President Díaz Ordaz was increased by the flagrant violation of university autonomy by 5000 army troops only two weeks after his State of the Nation speech, in which he had defended the principle of university autonomy and even offered to extend it to include the Politécnico. The rationalisation given by the authorities upon violation was " to reestablish the internal authority and safeguard the autonomy of the university ", since the latter was apparently being threatened by " alien persons ". The only " alien persons " the students could see were themselves and their professors...

The organisation of the students through the National Strike

Council and, at lower levels the comités de lucha and brigadas was singularly effective. Through this structure they managed to overcome the rigid press censorship of the events and of student interpretations and opinions. As their campaign progressed popular sympathy increased, especially from the lower classes in Mexico City. It was no mistake that the severest repression occurred in those areas where student support was greatest, e.g. Nonoalco. The authorities were certainly afraid of the explosive potential of the slums around this area.¹⁸³ For a short period the dream of the intellectuals as becoming the vanguard of the proletariat looked as if it were becoming a dangerous reality to the government. One writer observed:

" I would suggest that the government struck especially hard at this area because it feared the explosive potential of lower income people, and perhaps believed that the sprawling slums around Nonoalco were ripe for eruption... the vocational students were particularly resentful because they have been programmed into a socio-economic role with relatively fixed limits; one which has few defences in a low wages - rising prices situation. Groups which have lost their traditional expectations in the midst of growing opulence may well experience a 'new awareness of deprivation'."¹⁸⁴

Thus the students acted as a catalytic force in 1968, and this helps to explain why severe repression was used against them; further, the Olympic Games acted as the situational catalyst to bring the contradictions in Mexican society to a head. Students are one group in society which is, as we have seen, relatively free from constraints and least subject to pressures against mobilisation. We may contrast them to the workers and peasants in Mexico who, for the most part, are controlled through the tentacles of the official party.

The Olympic Games provided the fuse, the students the detonator for the protests of 1968. Their call for public dialogue over reformist demands and the support they generated outside the schools developed into a serious threat to the government which, unless the political structure of Mexico was to assume a drastic change in its premises, could only be met by the use of the tactics of ultimate control -- the club and the bullet.

Conclusions.

The social and economic structure that has evolved since the revolution of 1910 is today an unbalanced system within which foreign interests, predominantly U.S., have once again come to dominate the course of Mexico's development. In discussing the structure of foreign investment and the development of the economy since 1910 we sought to show how outside capital has come to play an increasingly important role in the development of Mexican political economy, surpassed only in the pre-revolutionary days of Porfirio Díaz. 'Development' has increasingly come to mean development for the needs of multinational corporations and their representatives, not for the needs of the mass of the Mexican people. These corporations and a 'denationalised'¹⁸⁵ bourgeoisie have been the principal beneficiaries of the progress Mexico has made since the early 1940's. Indices of welfare trends showed the extent to which this progress has been shared among the Mexican people; Frank's convincing argument that the 'development of underdevelopment' has been a result of the growth of multinational corporations gives little hope for a reversal of these trends in the future. The expansion of foreign capital investment in areas crucial for the course of development has led to an unequal distribution of economic surplus, a process which has drained capital away from its utilisation in those areas required for the development of a balanced and independent economy.¹⁸⁶

Through the flow of capital to local and foreign metropolises

the goals of the revolution -- eradication of poverty, erosion of class barriers, equitable distribution of opportunities and resources, creation of a democratic state -- have increasingly become empty words on the lips of politicos alienated from the people. The increase in abstentions in this year's presidential election reflects the growth of this alienation.¹⁸⁷ An over-emphasis on urban-industrial development at the expense of the countryside is apparent through the steady demise of the ejidal system. The growth of large-scale commercial agriculture has paralleled the development of private commercial and industrial enterprises in the cities.

As González-Casanova has written, the poor have been the ones to pay the price of development.¹⁸⁸ But they have also paid the cost of their own continued underdevelopment; Lewis' observation in 1960 that:

" Less attention has been given in recent years as to how the pie is sliced, and more emphasis is put on producing a bigger pie."¹⁸⁹

is still as true ten years later. Rather than eradicating poverty through its development Mexico has experienced an increase in the numbers of those beneath the poverty line; inequality in general appears to be increasing, not decreasing. Affluence has been gained by few -- the fortunate 'participating sectors'.

The centralisation of the political system has been maintained since the revolution, meeting the needs for a centralised economic structure. The hopes for real democratic participation faded steadily after the departure of President Cárdenas in 1940; since

then the political structure has become increasingly rigid, with power concentrated in the executive. Peter Worsley, discussing Franz Fanon's revolutionary theories, described the form of this control:

" The mass party..., becomes either simply a nostalgic purveyor of mythical solidarity and purely symbolic glory, increasingly focussed on the heroic past (the independence struggle), its only relationship to the people that of turning them out on mass "spontaneous" street demonstrations and of ensuring that they toe the party line, whilst the state becomes an instrument of repression and for the multiplication of offices, privileges, and pelf for the elite. The critical, democratic, participatory life of the party branch ceases: the traffic is now one-way -- from the top downwards."190

The 'heroic past' for Mexico is the revolution of 1910, emphasised again and again in murals, political statements, etc.; one example of the mass 'spontaneous' street demonstration was given during 1968 on August 28th, when workers were told to attend a pro-government demonstration; probably the only period when the party approached a 'critical, democratic, participatory life' was during the 1930's. The failure of Mexico to become a truly democratic state is in large part related to the failure of the Mexican revolution; as shown above, the reigns of control were never really out of the hands of the bourgeoisie.

The development of the educational system has reflected the underdevelopment of the society; analogously, educational 'capital' has been centralised in the major urban centres (Mexico City, Monterrey), and attempts to decentralise the structure outside these areas have met with little success; a predictable occurrence in a society where the benefits of development have accrued in the

metropolis. The educational system has been unable to meet the needs of development because it is geared to producing personnel for an underdeveloped society. Within the system of higher education students' frustration with the contradiction between their desires and the realities has produced protests against the 'system' in recent years. Expression of these frustrations is facilitated by the peculiar position of students in the Latin American university. In Mexico, the state bureaucracy has been unable to cope with the growing supply of graduates in certain areas, particularly law, with the result that there has been increased proletarianisation of professionals. The student conflicts with the state have been created through the development of underdevelopment. In contemporary Mexico the 'Revolutionary Family' Frank Brandenburg speaks of finds itself caught on the horns of a dilemma -- sharpened during the protests of 1968. On the one hand, the elite holds power and maintains its definition of reality through the 'principle of authority', for fear of loss of political initiative. On the other hand, pressures for the opening up of the corridors of economic and political power have increased from those groups who have been excluded from the processes of decision-making. The events of 1968 are critical in this context because of their exposure of this contradiction: the government's 'principle of authority' versus the students' 'principle of public dialogue'.

The students articulated their demands in such a way that they coalesced with those of the 'popular classes'. The response was tremendous, as can be seen by the size of the demonstrations in

late August; the students voiced the frustrations that the lower classes felt and the contradictions they saw in their daily lives. Both groups demanded rights, human rights and civil rights; the right to eat expressed in posters: " We are not agitators. Hunger and Hopelessness are the Agitators "; the right to freedom of speech and social justice: demands for the release of Demetrio Vallejo and Valentín Campa -- the railroad workers' leaders who symbolised the lack of social justice. Demands from both groups, students and lower classes, although to a certain extent differing in content, stemmed from their common situation created by the continuation of underdevelopment.

Although the severe repression in the Plaza of Three Cultures has silenced protests since then (attempts organise since that time have been quickly dealt with by the authorities -- afraid of a resurgence of the Movement), the situation that caused the protests of 1968 has not been changed, nor, we would contend, will it change in any basic way until the structure of Mexican political economy is basically and radically changed -- to create a situation within which people participate in the political and economic decisions that affect their lives. Until such change occurs, we would predict that protests will grow in scope and number, and what occurred in 1968 may come to be regarded as the first act in the second Mexican Revolution.

oking paper (C)

FOOTNOTES

1. 'Development' is used advisedly in the thesis, since it has a strong tendency to imply a movement toward an idealised western society, more of a normative than empirical concept.
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4. See Abstract, p. iii.
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6. André Gunder Frank, Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution ?, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969, p. xiii.
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9. See, for example: Robert E. Scott, Mexican Government in Transition, Illinois University Press, 1964; William Benton, The Voice of Latin America, New York: Harper, 1965.
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12. Rhodes, op. cit., p. 67.
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26. Ibid., p. 474.
27. loc. cit.
28. loc. cit.
29. William Glade and Charles Anerson, The Political Economy of Mexico, University of Wisconsin Press, 1963, p. 60.
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31. New York Times, October 3, 1967.
32. North American Congress on Latin America, Mexico '68: A Study of Domination and Repression, New York, 1968, p.32, hereafter referred to as N.A.C.L.A.
33. Frank, 1969, op. cit., p. 272.
34. Ibid., pp. 9 - 10.
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36. loc. cit.
37. Oscar Lewis, "Mexico since Cardenas ", in Richard N. Adams et al., Social Change in Latin America Today, New York: Vintage, 1960,
38. Galeano, op. cit., p. 29.
39. Alfredo Navarrete in Mexico's Recent Economic Growth, Latin American Monographs, No. 10, University of Texas, 1967, p. 127.
40. Frank Brandenburg, The Making of Modern Mexico, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964, p. 105.
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42. Vernon, op. cit., p. 114.
43. Lewis, 1960, op. cit., p. 296.
44. Frank, 1963, op. cit., p. 81.
45. Paul Baran, The Political Economy of Growth, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1957, p. 170.
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48. Galeano, op. cit., p. 38.
49. Luis Echeverría Alvarez' campaign slogan for 1970, literally: 'upward and onward', alternatively: 'up and away'.
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52. González-Casanova's term; we would question the viability of this concept in terms of its implications of mobility; the 'marginal sectors' tend to be participants in the economic structure through their labour, while being non-participants in the products of that labour.
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 58. loc. cit.
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 62. Lewis, 1960, op. cit., p. 289, (my emphasis).
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 69. Chapter 2, Section 1, q.v.
 70. Oscar Lewis, 1961, op. cit., p. xxx.
 71. Latin America, August 16, 1968.

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74. L. V. Padgett, The Mexican Political System, Boston: Houghton, 1966, p. 299.
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77. Rhodes, op. cit., p. 64.
78. Rafael Segovia, " Mexican Politics and the University Crisis ", in Cornelius and Fagen, Political Power in Latin America: 7 Confrontations, 1969.
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80. Ibid., p. 31.
81. For the early period see: Padgett, op. cit.; Scott, op. cit.; Brandenburg, op. cit.; John W. F. Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico: A Chronicle of the Revolution 1919 - 36, Austin: University of Texas Press, 1967.
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 97. Latin America, April 3, 1970.
 98. Brandenburg, op. cit., p. 145.
 99. Needler, op. cit., p. 12.
 100. loc. cit.
 101. Richmond, op. cit., p. 61.
 102. Ibid., p. 238.
 103. Padgett, op. cit., p. 123.
 104. Needler, op. cit., p. 12.
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 106. Ibid., p. 29.
 107. Ibid., p. 106.
 108. Thomas Brosé, " The Party of the Revolution and Reformist Politics in Mexico ", Bulletin of the Latin American Society, (U.K.), No. 11, February 1969, p. 25.
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 112. Padgett, op. cit., p. 145.

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114. Vernon, op. cit., pp. 188 - 89.
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116. Ibid., p. 15.
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123. Ibid., p. 11.
124. loc. cit.
125. Ibid., p. 16.
126. Chapter 2, Sections 3, 4, q.v.
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128. Chapter 2, Section 2, q.v.
129. Alexander and Cockroft, op. cit., p. 13.
130. Brosé, op. cit., p. 25.
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132. John Gerassi, The Great Fear in Latin America, New York: Collier, 1965, p. 106.
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135. Alexander and Cockroft, op. cit., p. 21.

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149. Hennessy, op. cit., p. 119.
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151. Ibid., p. 122.
152. Lipset, op. cit., p. 23.
153. Ibid., pp. 55 - 56.

154. Hennessy, op. cit., p. 123.
155. Seymour M. Lipset, Student Politics, New York: Basic Books, 1967, p. 18.
156. Lipset, in Spencer, op. cit., p. 54.
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159. Kalman Silvert, " The Island and the Continent: Latin American Development and the Challenge of Cuba ", American Universities Field Staff Reports, 8, 14, January 1961, pp. 1 - 2.
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164. N.A.C.L.A., op. cit., p. 44.
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166. Ibid., p. 8.
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171. Cited by Hernández, op. cit.
172. Aguilar, op. cit.
173. Cornelius and Fagen, op. cit., q.v., pp 299 -336.
174. From N.A.C.L.A., op. cit., p. 13.
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176. González-Casanova, cited by Hernández, op. cit., p. 68.
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182. Ibid., pp. 51 - 2.
183. Nonoalco is a state apartment development occupied primarily by middle-class government employees, but surrounded by some of the worst slums in Mexico City; the police are kept permanently busy in this area.
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185. Review Article, Monthly Review, November 1969, op. cit.
186. See: Paul Baran, op. cit.; André Gunder Frank, op. cit., Padilla Aregon, México: Desarrollo con pobreza, Mexico, 1968.
187. From 30% (1964) to 36% (1970) of the electorate.
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189. See Note 37.
190. Peter Worsley, " Revolutionary Theories of Franz Fanon ", Monthly Review, May, 1968.

ABBREVIATIONS

C.N.C.	<u>Confederación Nacional Campesina</u> ; National Peasant Confederation.
C.N.H.	<u>Consejo Nacional de Huelga</u> ; National Strike Council.
C.N.O.P.	<u>Confederación Nacional de Organizaciones Popular</u> ; National Confederation of Popular Organisations.
CONCAMIN	Confederation of Industrial Chambers of Mexico.
CONCANACO	National Confederation of Chambers of Commerce.
C.T.M.	<u>Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos</u> ; Confederation of Mexican Workers.
D.A.A.C.	<u>Departamento Agrario y Colonización</u> ; Department of Agrarian Matters and Colonisation.
F.E.P.	<u>Frente Electoral del Pueblo</u> ; Electoral Front of the People.
F.N.E.T.	<u>Federación Nacional de Estudiantes Técnicos</u> ; National Federation of Technical Students.
I.M.F.	International Monetary Fund.
I.P.N.	<u>Instituto Politécnico Nacional</u> ; National Politechnical Institute.
I.B.R.D.	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
M.L.N.	<u>Movimiento de Liberación Nacional</u> ; Movement for National Liberation.
P.A.N.	<u>Partido de Acción Nacional</u> ; National Action Party.
P.A.R.M.	<u>Partido Auténtico Revolucionario Mexicano</u> ; Party of the Authentic Mexican Revolution.
PEMEX	<u>Petroleos Mexicanos</u> ; State Gasoline Agency.
P.I.P.S.A.	<u>Productora e Importadora de Papel, S. A.</u>
P.N.R.	<u>Partido Nacional Revolucionario</u> ; National Revolutionary Party.
P.P.S.	<u>Partido Popular Socialista</u> ; Popular Socialist Party.

- P.R.I. Partido Revolucionario Institucional; Party of
the Institutionalised Revolution.
- P.R.M. Partido Revolucionario Mexicano; Party of the
Mexican Revolution.
- U.N.A.M. Universidad Nacional Autónoma Mexicana; National
Autonomous University of Mexico.

GLOSSARY

<u>auscultación</u>	(theoretically): the canvassing of preferences in the state and local party machine and in the interest groups of the party.
<u>braceros</u>	'wetbacks': temporary Mexican immigrant labour to the U.S. Arrangement ceased in 1965.
<u>brigadas</u>	task groups of 8 - 15 persons; formed during the 1968 student strike.
<u>caudillos</u>	political bosses; strong-men.
<u>charrismo</u>	government-controlled unions.
<u>científicos</u>	advisors during Porfirio Diaz' time, they followed positivistic philosophy as their creed, and translated it into 'scientific development' for Mexico.
<u>co-gobierno</u>	co-government in the university.
<u>comités de lucha</u>	" committees of struggle " -- organisations at the local level during the 1968 student strike.
<u>compadrazgo</u>	appointment of trusted friends.
<u>destapó</u>	'uncovering' process for a new president.
<u>ejidos</u>	state farm co-operatives.
<u>ejidatarios</u>	workers on the above.
<u>fidelismo</u>	after Fidel Castro of Cuba; support for the Cuban revolution.
<u>grandaderos</u>	unconstitutional riot police.
<u>latifundio</u>	large private estate.
<u>machismo</u>	cultural complex including courage and male chauvinism.
<u>mordida</u>	literally: 'the bite'; institutionalised bribery throughout Mexico, practiced especially by officials.

<u>personalismo</u>	political support given on the basis of personality rather than ideology.
<u>politécnicos</u>	technical schools.
<u>politicos</u>	politicians.
<u>porfirismo</u>	refers to the era of Porfirio Diaz, 1880 - 1910.
<u>prepas</u>	preparatory schools.
<u>Secretaría de Gobernación</u>	Ministry of the Interior.
<u>Tierra y libertad !</u>	Land and Liberty ! Zapata's slogan during the Mexican revolution.
<u>tortillas</u>	staple corn food, similar to a crepe.
<u>vecindad</u>	tenement building.
<u>vocas</u>	vocational schools.

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