AN EXAMINATION OF FOUR THEORETICAL

PERSPECTIVES RELATING TO THOUGHT AND

ACTION IN AN EXISTENTIAL CONTEXT:

AND SOME PROPOSALS FOR AN ECLECTIC MODEL

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is concerned with the relationship between thought and action as that relationship is construed in the theoretical perspectives of four thinkers who have addressed themselves to the question of the existential determination of thought and its consequences for social action. The four thinkers are Erving Goffman, Alfred Schutz, Karl Mannheim and Claude Lévi-Strauss.

No attempt is made to treat the entire works of these four thinkers in their systematic context. Instead, a set of four 'vignettes' is presented, in which some of the major arguments in their respective writings are isolated and discussed. These include:- Goffman's concern for the individual and the latter's attempts to sustain self-value; the concepts which Schutz develops concerning the phenomenology of the social world and his argument regarding typification as an intrinsic aspect of the orientation of actors to their situations; Mannheim's examination of the ramifications of social existence in the formulation and re-formulation of thought-structures; and Lévi-Strauss's attempts to generate 'structural' models of the collective thought-

systems of 'primitive' societies.

The first chapter presents a general synopsis
of the four perspectives and points out certain
epistemological linkages between them. The four sub-
sequent chapters treat each perspective individually
and in more depth. The final chapter represents an
attempt to articulate some of the interstitial connect-
ions among these four relatively diverse perspectives.
These connections are reflected in a general philosoph-
ical similarity in dealing with knowledge as a pattern
of communicable ideas. It is argued that it is the
constitution of symbolic constructs, the process whereby
those symbolic constructs are maintained and the manner
in which they find their dissolution, which provides
the key to the relation between thought and action and
between social _stasis_ and social change. Symbolic
concepts arise in the social process and are maintained
or sustained in correspondence with _praxis_. Dissolution
of symbolic concepts is a phenomenon which is accompanied
by reflective effort and occurs as a result of disjunct-
ion between _praxis_ and _theoria_. Concluding comments
deal with the problem of categorization as a function
of human thought, the dilemma of existential thought in
the social milieu, and the paradox of ontological
certainty.

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Introduction

Within recent years, the sociology of knowledge has been developed and extended to cover aspects of social life which did not fall within the rubric of thought of such original proponents of this discipline as Karl Marx and Emile Durkheim. It was the achievement of the latter thinkers (with others) to restore the individual and his thought to the social context in contradistinction to the classical theory of knowledge, inspired by Locke, which detached the knowing subject from the social *milieu*, and yet sought to validate knowledge by an analysis of that subject.

Whilst not explicitly concerned with the philosophical basis of the sociology of knowledge in its present state, this thesis has a concern with the implications of the fact that thought is tied in a continuous relationship to social existence. In this regard, this thesis examines aspects of the work of four thinkers who have addressed themselves to the question of the existential determination of thought and its consequences for social action. These thinkers are Erving Goffman, Alfred Schutz, Karl Mannheim and

Claude Lévi-Strauss.

The thesis deals only with vignettes, as it were, of the writings of these four thinkers and no attempt is made to treat their entire works in their systematic context.

The first chapter outlines, in synoptic form, the perspectives of thought and social existence which are considered generally representative of the theoretical position taken by each thinker. The four subsequent chapters present, in vignette form, an expanded version of these perspectives, coupled with some interpretive criticism. The final chapter represents an attempt to mediate those perspectives in terms of some general propositions concerning the relationship between thought and social action, with particular emphasis on the processes of the constitution, maintenance and dissolution of symbolic concepts, and the practical character of knowledge.

CHAPTER I
A general synopsis of the four perspectives

It is intended in this chapter to present, in synoptic form, the variety of perspectives concerning the relationship between thought and action which are exhibited in the work of Erving Goffman, Alfred Schutz, Karl Mannheim and Claude Lévi-Strauss as a prelude to the individual presentation of vignettes of their work in subsequent chapters.

Each thinker occupies himself with a relatively bounded range of interest. It is not the intention of this, or subsequent chapters, to entertain an exhaustive exegesis of their theoretical positions _in toto_. Comparisons _inter se_ in terms of philosophical and theoretical positions will be offered and specific similarities in their respective approaches to their subject matter will be outlined at the end of this chapter.

In general terms, the range of interest for Goffman is microsociological, but the ramifications of his thesis extend beyond his analysis of particular social situations in the assertions he makes concerning the relationships between interpersonal exchange,

cognition and the awareness of self: Schutz contributes
a set of hypotheses which deal with the processes of
perception in relation to action, the social effect of
the distribution of knowledge and the manner in which
subjective meaning attains objective facticity:
Mannheim offers a number of propositions dealing with
the generic character and derivation of epistemological
forms as evidenced in sub-groups of complex societies:
Levi-Strauss completes the quadrant in his trans-
cultural axioms dealing with implacable patterns
ingrained in the human intellect which are supposedly
responsible for the shape of things built by man as a
cultural being.

The differentiated frames of reference outlined
above have in common a stress on the importance of
cognition and perception in situational contexts as
the basis for the interpretation of motives for action.
They are differentiated in terms of areas of interest,
but to a lesser degree in terms of the philosophical
influences behind their respective paradigms.

The principal focus of interest for Goffman is
the individual.[1] The explicans for Goffman is the
maintenance of a viable identity or self-concept and
the relationship of this human motive to another

problem, namely the articulation of this need by
individuals in their association with each other. The
explicandum for Goffman is derived from a synthesis of
ideas put forward by William James, George H. Mead,
Georg Simmel and Emile Durkheim.

In the general (if relatively recent) tradition
of symbolic interaction theory, Goffman starts with the
individual actor and views larger abstract complexes as
resulting from the interlinkages and interrelations
among a multiplicity of individual actors. Such
complexes cannot be understood without reference to the
importance of symbols as the communicative means used
to express relations among superiors, inferiors and
equals. Concerned as he is with the emergence of
identity and with the importance of recognizing the
significance of different social situations as arenas
for the constitution and potential destruction of
self-value, Goffman places himself at some distance
from the traditional orientation of the sociology of
knowledge, which has tended to define social reality
not so much in terms of individual orientations, but
in terms of the possible emergent properties or
characteristics of human collectivities. In this sense,
he would appear to be more sympathetic towards William
James' notion that the detection of truth requires an

examination of the personal psychology of any individual
who asserts the truth value of his statements - and for
whom truth is a very personal business. Thus, Goffman is
inclined to assume a position perhaps best described as
individual pragmatism, i.e., to the acting individual,
social interaction is that which provides an
expeditious mechanism for producing the sense of primary
value of self as a meaningful object.

However, there is a secondary theme in Goffman's
work which provides a bridge between his interpretation
of the generic basis of self and those interpretations
which stress the importance of collective analysis.
For despite the attention which Goffman gives to the
importance of the manipulation of the symbolic mode of
communication on the part of the individual as he
endeavours to present himself in the most instrumental
fashion, the symbolic mode itself requires co-operative
effort for its sustenance. The point to be made here is
that whilst Goffman is concerned to investigate the
manner in which individuals attempt to differentiate
themselves from the collective representations which
are imputed to their roles,[2] those same individuals
must be aware of the typical response conveyed by the
symbolic character of an action or a series of actions;
and that even the differentiation from such a typical

response must be made in such a way so as to convey
meaning to others. Thus we find that when Goffman moves
from the analysis of discrete situations (which are
presented in order to illustrate the techniques of
interpersonal adjustment and impression management)
and addresses himself to the manner in which different-
iated impressions are sustained over time, he finds
that his socio-psychological approach is not entirely
adequate:

> "An individual's use of a second-
> ary adjustment is inevitably a
> social-psychological matter,
> affording him gratifications he
> might not otherwise obtain. But
> precisely what an individual
> 'gets out of' a practice is per-
> haps not the sociologist's first
> concern. From a sociological
> point of view, the initial quest-
> ion to be asked of a secondary
> adjustment is not what this pract-
> ice brings to the practitioner
> but rather the character of the
> social relations that its acquis-
> ition and maintenance require.
> This constitutes a structural as
> opposed to a consummatory or
> social-psychological point of
> view. Given the individual and
> one of his secondary adjustments,
> we can start with the abstract
> notion of the full set of others
> involved...to consider the char-
> acteristics of this set: its size,
> the nature of the bond that holds
> members in it and the type of
> sanctions that ensure maintenance
> of the system."[3]

This acknowledgement of the importance of
recognizing the structural implications which follow

from the analysis of how individuals attempt to 'manage'
their identities, in adjusting themselves to abnormal
situations, does not mean that Goffman abandons his
theoretical predispositions with respect to the
instrumental function of consciousness in bringing the
individual into a more serene adjustment to the problems
of his existence. This will be discussed further in the
next chapter.

Even the most unorthodox interpretations of
reality (unorthodox here meaning the antithesis of
'official' stereotypes in institutional settings)
requires a system of common meanings which is reflected
in the 'structure' of the group; the symbolic represent-
ation of the acitivies of inmates of institutions,
for example, differs according to the audience before
whom the activity is presented.[4] This suggests that the
system of orientation is not necessarily bound to the
concrete arrangements of which the individual is a
part, but that symbolically defined type-constructs of
reality are developed in terms of different collective
concerns.

Like Goffman, Schutz is interested principally
in the orientation of the individual actor towards the
social world and in the correspondence of inter-
subjective experience. Unlike Goffman, Schutz is more

concerned with the examination of the phenomenological
basis of social action on an abstract level, than with
the description of actual social events in empirical
situations. For Schutz, there are a number of fundament-
al presuppositions which underlie the 'common-sense' of
everyday life. These presuppositions, which include the
certainty of the individual's own self-existence and the
acceptance of reality, also involve the notion that
reality is seen as a unitary, connected world in which
others live as unitary, connected selves. In developing
his concept of the 'natural attitude' of everyday life,
Schutz extends Edmund Husserl's doctrine concerning
the nature of conscious experience to uncover the
processes of ideation and abstraction as functional
features of social interaction.[5] In other words, Schutz
seeks to utilize essentially Cartesian speculation as
to the constitution of thought in an isolated individual
as a springboard for the analysis of interpersonal
relations. Some of the aspects of interpersonal relations,
which in turn have to be located in the social structure,
include characteristic features such as the organizat-
ion and distribution of knowledge, the spatial and
temporal co-ordinates of significant others and the
definition of the biographical situation of individual
actors as they themselves define it.

In expounding his theory of social action
(understood by Schutz as purposive conduct projected
by the actor) Schutz takes the formal sociology of
Max Weber into account in developing his concepts, and
in particular, Weber's insistence that to understand
social action it is necessary to grasp the meaning
which the actor gives to, or bestows upon his action,
to comprehend what the action means to _him_.[6] In adapt-
ing Weber's formal sociology, Schutz lays stress on
the importance of _typification_ as an _a priori_ feature
of mind. This characteristic of conscious activity,
which brings with it associated hypotheses concerning
the type of action directed towards others (as a result
of their apprehension along a continuum of increasing
generality or anonymity) will be the central concern
of the subsequent chapter in this thesis which is
addressed to Schutz's work.

In general, the prime motif of Schutz's
thought is stated by Natanson thus:

> "...a philosophically informed
> sociology cannot avoid a confront-
> ation with epistemologial questions
> and a phenomenologically informed
> sociology begins by locating those
> questions in the taken-for-granted
> world of the natural standpoint.
> Phenomenological description and
> analysis are not in competition

> with empirical procedures. The
> latter consider objects and events
> as realities within reality,
> whereas phenomenology defines
> itself as the discipline of
> 'irrealities'; the fictive unities
> constituted in intentional
> consciousness."[7]

It is possible to recognize a number of common epistemological roots in the work of Goffman and Schutz. In sociology, the principal mentor appears to be Georg Simmel, who asserted that cognitive 'syntheses' are the basis of the social process. In his article dealing with the constitutive problem of social life, Simmel argues that Kant demonstrated that nature was 'synthesized' or created by the human observer; in their immediate givenness, the elements of the world do not have the interdependence which alone makes them intelligible as the unity of nature's laws. Likewise, it is the observer who creates,through categories and explanatory systems, organized unity of the manifold and inherently unorganized sense perceptions, though in society, argues Simmel, every member, being an observer himself, performs this synthesis. Simmel states that

> "(Society)..is directly realized
> by its own elements because these
> elements are themselves conscious
> and synthesizing units. Kant's
> axiom that connection, since it is
> the exclusive product of the subject,
> cannot inhere in things themselves,
> does not apply here. For societal
> connection immediately occurs in the
> 'things' that is the individuals."[8]

Simmel's notion that society exists in the
synthesizing of relations of conscious individuals, in
the reciprocal but usually asymmetrical cognitions and
in the resulting interactions among such conscious
agents, appears to be the common skeleton in Goffman's
and Schutz's respective cupboards. In philosophy, (or
perhaps more correctly philosophical psychology) it
is William James who must take the credit. James'
connection with the phenomenological movement has been
noted by Spiegelberg;[9] the former's theory with respect
to the multiplicity of 'selves' in any one individual's
dealings with the world is clearly reflected in Goffman's
version of role-theory, whilst the suggestions which
James makes concerning the relationship between
'attention' and 'actuality' and the notions of 'sub-
universes' as different modes of symbolic representation
are clearly at the back of Schutz's concept of 'multiple
realities' and the problems of establishing consistency
between such differentiated interpretations of reality.[10]

We turn now to the work of Karl Mannheim,
perhaps the 'grand old man' of the sociology of knowledge.
Taking his cue from Marx's dictum that 'it is not the
consciousness of men that determines their existence, but,
on the contrary, their social existence which determines
their consciousness',[11] Mannheim's concern is to attempt

to comprehend the connections between thought constructs
of sub-collectivities and the ramifications of those
constructs for the political decisions made in a variety
of historical contexts.[12] Mannheim thus argues that a
complex society has many aspects. Like a multi-sided
mirrored globe, society provides different views of
itself depending upon the social location of groups,
and these aspect-structures or world-views imply
appropriately consistent motives and sets of explanations
of reality.

Like Marx, Mannheim views the world as an arena
of struggling social and political forces and seeks to
elucidate the manner in which theoretical formulations
of the world are rooted in the stylistic structure of
thought of particular groups and social classes. In
all such cases, Mannheim recognizes that the ideas of
an individual are a function of the cultural-instituion-
al complex in which he participates. The relevance of
any situation is apprehended in relation to an
existentially determined perspective. The specific area
of concern for the chapter which deals with Mannheim's
work will be his ideas on Weltanschauungen, which, as
collectively derived mental products, or collective
representations of reality, are among the cultural
products found in human society.

The link between Mannheim and the two previous thinkers discussed above is a common emphasis on the pragmatic function of knowledge and the relational character of conscious activity. That is, in the selection of elements of knowledge, perception is always advised by interest; situations define the specific content of reality to be emphasized so that the relevant purposive goal can be attained.

For Goffman, the relevance of the situation is that which informs the individual as to what 'role' is to be performed: for Schutz, the relevance of the situation is that which is determined by the degree of intimacy between persons in terms of the typificatory schema and the articulation of symbolic sub-worlds: for Mannheim, the relevance of the situation is that which determines the political actions and beliefs of members of collectivities in relation to their 'placement' in historical, economic and structural terms.

The work of Lévi-Strauss takes us beyond micro-sociological situations in complex societies, beyond macrosociological interpretations of European history, to a pan-anthropological assessment of the working of mind as a phenomenon intrinsic to all human beings.

Lévi-Strauss involves himself with a wide variety of theoretical concerns in the fields of kinship, culture history, the interpretation of myth and symbol, together with philosophical analyses of the nature of temporal and spatial perception and particularly the phenomenon of communication.[13] Most, if not all of these interests are subsumed under one epistemological umbrella, namely structuralism. In very general terms, the basic tenet of structuralism is that societies and cultures are ordered according to patterns which have been evolved by a process which is most likely to include that of unconscious reasoning. These patterns, in their fundamental reality, may be very different from the apparent and superficial organization of the particular society or culture. The problem which Lévi-Strauss seems most eager to solve, is to unravel the manner in which meaningful action takes place within a complex of social structures. The latter, in toto, always transcend the comprehension of the individual and is thus, by definition, beyond the collective grasp of the community as a whole.

Three principles appear to underlie Lévi-Strauss' structuralist theory: that patterns of human behaviour are codes, with the characteristics of languages, that man has an innate structuring capacity which determines

the limits within which the structure of all types of
social phenomena can be formed, and that relations can
be reduced to binary oppositions.

Lévi-Strauss is quick to point out that although
anthropologists have been concerned with structure in
the past (an in particular Radcliffe-Brown) and have
often approached his own theoretical predispositions,
the empirical and naturalist biases in their work have
forced them to merge the concepts of social structure
and social relations together: this means that
Radcliffe-Brown's structuralism results in a kind of
descriptive morphology and 'social structure appears
in his work to be nothing more than the whole network
of social relations.'[14]   To Lévi-Strauss, on the other
hand, 'social structure' has nothing to do with
empirical reality per se, but with models which are
built up 'after' it.[15]

If patterns of behaviour within a society are
analyzed in terms of communication and exchange, and
then interpreted in terms of levels of subordination,
the whole social fabric can be considered as a network
of different types of orders. Lévi-Strauss argues,

> "The kinship system provides a
> way to order individuals accord-
> ing to certain rules; social
> organization is another way of
> ordering individuals and groups;

social stratifications, whether
economic or political, provide
us with a third type; and all
these orders can themselves be
put in order by showing the kind
of relationship which exists
between them, how they interact
on one another on both the
synchronic and diachronic levels."[16]

The dialectical processes which take place

between these so-called 'orders' are part and parcel

of the substantiation procedures which members of groups

indulge in, in order to validate segments of their

existence. 'Lived-in' orders, for example, must seek

correspondence with 'thought-of' orders; insofar as

'thought-of' orders are expressed in 'lived-in' orders,

the anthropologist is placed in the position of

relating one set of lived-in order with another set of

lived-in order so as to investigate the logical (or

illogical) coherence between them. Lévi-Strauss suggests

that 'thought-of' orders are those of myth and religion

and in more complex societies, the phenomena of

political ideologies.[17]

In the chapter of this thesis which deals with

Lévi-Strauss' work, the central concern will be his

notions dealing with models of communication and exchange

and concomitant structural dialectics.

The influences behind Lévi-Strauss' work are too

broad to cite here. Predominantly, he is indebted to Durkheim and Mauss, but his attitude toward the fictive characteristics of cultural symbols and the possibility of uncovering levels of thought which reveal the inner dynamics or foundation of societies, is of course reflective of his affinity with the work of Freud and Marx. Unlike the latter thinkers, however, who both believed in the need to realize or bring out the mainsprings of action into the daylight of conscious reason as a therapeutic measure, Lévi-Strauss is content to offer analytic propositions from descriptive data.

Some broad common denominators can be found among the four systems of thought outlined above.

Each thinker stresses the creative, intentional and constitutive characteristics of mind as opposed to behavioural, passive or simple reflexive conceptions of it. Each would appear to disavow a mechanistic methodology as an appropriate approach to the study of man and there is little concern to concentrate on the causal nexus between events. Each thinker makes use of a dialectical appraisal of phenomena, either between an individual's interpretation of himself in relation to the symbolic character of his actions; or between an individual and others considered as members of an

abstract category; or between the perspective of an individual in relation to that of the other members of the group of which he is a member and the perspective of other groups; or between the symbolic orders perceived by an individual as facets of the cultural belief system.

We have, then, four relatively distinct but interrelated problem areas as represented in the work of the four contributors to the sociology of knowledge. First, a theory of the social processes which influence the construction of identity and the ramifications of symbolic interaction in terms of identity perpetuity and dissolution; secondly, a theory concerning the socio-cultural processes which shape the construction of reality and the ramifications of a priori categorization functions of mind; thirdly, a theory concerning the effects of modes of reality construction on the social structure particularly with reference to the exercise of power; and fourthly, a theory which deals with the question of how the differentiated modes of reality construction (which are set up to satisfy elemental needs) find their abstract consummation and articulation. As indicated above, the chapters which follow will examine each set of ideas in turn as they are presented by the respective thinkers.

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11) Marx, K., Preface to the Critique of Political Economy, ex Marx, K., and Engels, F., Selected Works, Vol 1. Moscow Publishing House, Moscow, 1962 p. 363

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14) Lévi-Strauss, C., Social Structure, ex Tax, S., ed. Anthropology Today. University of Chicago Press, 1962. p. 339

15) ibid., p. 322

16) ibid., p. 344

17) Lévi-Strauss, C., Structural Anthropology, op. cit., pp. 311 ff.

CHAPTER II

Erving Goffman

As pointed out in the last chapter, Goffman is
concerned with the way in which the individual presents
himself and his activities to others. Goffman's
analysis and description of social interaction is
advised in terms of the means by which people seek to
control the impressions others receive of them. A major
proportion of his work is directed towards an under-
standing of the type of behaviour an individual is
constrained or allowed to exhibit in the presence of
others. The method he employs in this latter enterprise
is microsociological, i.e., the description and eval-
uation of interpersonal events which take place within
a limited span of time and space.

Now although Goffman approaches the social sphere
in terms of the transformational qualities in the
behaviour of the individual, and thus as an exercise
in psychology, he is aware of the net effect on others
of interpersonal communication in social situations
(in terms of moral expectations) and of the dialectical
relationship between individual and social existence.[1]
The illustrative examples he uses in this regard fall
into two broad categories. On the one hand, he examines

what might be called congeries of individuals engaged
in sustaining a focus of cognitive and visual attention
on a joint task (understood in terms of the definition
of the situation) and on the other hand, in the
examination of the social processes which take place
in 'captive' institutions, and in particular, the
'moral career' of the inmates of such institutions
and their attempts to redress the self-abasement which
follows from institutional practices.[2]

Goffman also develops a more universalist thesis,
made explicit in one of a number of early essays, which
pertains to what might be referred to as the abstracted
constitutive principles that surround the evaluation
of the self.[3]   It is this thesis that serves to illust-
rate Goffman's assumption that value judgements, as to
the nature of the self and significant others, are more
than psychological projections brought about by the
manipulation of persons, but are representative of the
moral principles which advise and give meaning to
social acts.

Goffman therefore seeks to clarify the sense in
which the person in 'our urban secular world' is
allotted a kind of sacredness which is displayed and
confirmed through the medium of symbolic actions. He
suggests that rules of conduct carry with them a

double feature for the individual who is subject to
them; first, an obligatory prescription involving
restraint, and secondly, an expectation as to the
reaction of others morally bound by the same rule.
When an act is subject to a rule of conduct, its
improper performance casts a reflection upon the concept-
ion of the self-image of those affected by its infract-
ion.

Goffman is particularly concerned with ceremon-
ial rules, or rules of conduct which have their primary
importance as conventionalized means of communication
by which the individual expresses his character or
conveys his appreciation of the other participants in
the situation. For Goffman, ceremonial activity refers
to a 'component or function of action' and not to
concrete empirical action itself. The basic components
of ceremonial activity, or the two components which
Goffman sees as important to delineate, are those of
deference and demeanour.

Deference functions as a symbolic means of
conveying appreciation to a recipient of this recipient,
or of something of which this recipient is taken as a
symbol, extension, or agent. This activity assumes a
ritualistic character and can be expressed in two fairly

distinct analytical forms, avoidance and presentation.
Goffman argues that avoidance rituals, or those forms
of deference which lead the actor to keep distance from
a recipient, constitute a recognition of the 'ideal
sphere' which lies around the recipient and suggests
that 'any society could be profitably studied as a
system of deferential stand-off arrangements', noting
that there is a correlation between the elaboration
of such taboos and the social level of the participants.
Presentation rituals refer to acts which are performed
by the individual as indications of how he regards his
recipients and how he will treat them in an on-coming
interaction. It may be noted here that Goffman takes
presentation rituals as a starting point for his
major work on interpersonal behaviour.

By demeanour, Goffman refers to the indices
of an individual's deportment which serve to indicate
to those in his presence that he is a person endowed
with certain qualities (both desirable and undesirable).

These two concepts, of deference and demeanour,
are complementary; for the image the individual owes to
others to sustain for himself is not the same image
these others are obliged to maintain of him. Goffman
concludes that the ceremonial rules of a society, such

as deference and demeanour, represent 'opportunities
to affirm the moral order' of society; when institution-
alized, such ceremonial rules facilitate the projection
of a viable 'sacred' self and at the same time under-
score the existential dependency of the individual on
the body social.

In his later work, Goffman concentrates on the
notion that disjunction can occur between a nominal
self and any one of a number of social selves, and also
between the social self as 'presented' in actual
situations and the anticipated behaviour expected by
the others in those situations.[4] The knowing subject
recognizes the processes whereby the social 'me' is
generated, namely out of the responses and recognition
that he receives from others; like Simmel and James,
Goffman appears to uphold the idea that social life
allows for the preservation of a section of an individ-
ual's personality which is, in a sense, 'private
property'. The individual, when thinking, is always
more or less aware of his personal existence, and, as
Simmel argues, there is incessant interaction between
the 'extra social self' and the 'social self.'[5] The
'extra social self' is, of course, a product of the
antecedent social interaction (as the 'I' in Mead's
analysis is necessarily a social product), but Simmel

considers that the extra social self is irreducible
and persists side by side with those segments of person-
ality which engage the individual as a member of various
social groupings.

In The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life,
Goffman employs a dramaturgical perspective in which
the genesis of self is disregarded; the 'private' self,
as an antecedent variable, is linked in an indeterminate
relationship with the 'public self' and Goffman devotes
much of his attention to the 'performer', which, in turn
appears to be analogous with the 'public' or 'social'
self. When he does refer to what might be associated
with the construct of the 'private' self, it is repres-
ented as a relatively Machiavellian predisposition; for
Goffman argues that there is less concern on the part of
the actor to realize certain (moral) standards than to
maintain the impression that these standards are being
realized. Thus although social activity is concerned
with moral matters, 'performers' do not necessarily
have a wholly moral concern with them; as 'performers,'
suggests Goffman, 'we are merchants of morality.'[6]

The 'performance', which is a central construct
in Goffman's theory, is defined as 'all the activity
of a given participant on a given occasion which serves

to influence in any way, any of the other participants.'[7]
Participants in social situations assess or define the
salient action which is appropriate to the prevailing
occasion. To this end, both the actor who enters a
social group and the members of the group require infor-
mation concerning each other. Such information need not
necessarily be of a personal kind, insofar as the
participants can rely on past experience to advise them
that only individuals of 'a particular kind' will be
found in the anticipated social setting. Furthermore, it
is likely that in the course of the activity, specific
facts which would enable the participants to direct their
action more shrewdly are inaccessible in terms of space
and time from the interaction itself. Goffman suggests,
following Thomas, that inference is a constant feature
of all social action and the inferential feature of
social situations brings with it the opportunity to
manipulate the process of the communal activity.[8] This
is where the two-fold character of communicated actions
becomes crucial for the negotiations of social identities
and the negotiation of interactive roles. The double
feature of communication refers to the fact that a
symbolic dimension can be differentiated from the actual
content of communicated acts. Goffman argues,

"The expressiveness of the individ-
ual (and therefore his capacity
to give impressions) appears to

> involve two radically different
> kinds of sign activity; the
> expression that he <u>gives</u> and the
> expression that he <u>gives off</u>."
> [9]

This distinction between the communication of
meaningful information and the elaboration of the
communicative mode (performed for reasons other than
conveying information <u>per se</u>) is of the same order of
difference as James' distinction between 'knowledge of
acquaintance' and 'knowledge about', [10] perhaps best
expressed in the semantic difference between <u>savoir</u>
and <u>connaître</u> or between <u>wissen</u> and <u>kennen</u>.

Goffman concerns himself with investigating the
mechanisms whereby the individual communicates
knowledge about himself. Others in the company of the
individual, being fully aware of the obligations
imposed upon them by the individual's presentation,
are likely to concede that the individual is what he
claims to be (albeit, with reservations, for the
opportunity to check on the authenticity between the
content of information and manner presented always
exists) it may then be said that the individual has
'effectively projected a given definition of the
situation and effectively fostered the understanding
that a given state of affairs obtains.' [11]

The common recognition of a given state of affairs allows for a working concensus to be obtained whereby the participants are agreed (often implicitly) on the degree to which each individual can bring forward issues which are vital to him but which are not immediately important to others. This working concensus involves the reconciliation, on the part of the actor, of the part he would like to play, and the performance which is suited to the occasion; it also requires a compromise between the performance which he feels obligated to present and the ongoing performances of others.

In Znaniecki's view, the real objective social connection among individuals exists when the individuals rise above their own points of view to create a mutuality of experience which did not exist originally; [12] this idea can be linked to the principle of emergence, a 'synthetic event', which is 'creative of real novelty, of some new quality or property of a type that did not exist before the emergence...' and which has causal efficiency in making a difference to the future course of events. [13]

Goffman does not suggest that all 'performances' are created de novo in a conscious sense in all

situations, insofar as the individual can follow
traditional routines with a facility born of custom or
habit. But the implication exists that the working
concensus is fragile and is perpetuated in the face
of potential disruption. The disruption itself is most
likely to occur as a result of inconsistency in
discharging the requirements of appearing to be what
one claims to be; for such claims have a moral character
which is binding on all the participants in the action
situation.

In developing his analysis of individual perform-
ances, Goffman examines the paraphernalia which is
employed as a means to define the situation, and which
functions to influence the observer's perception of the
individual's behaviour.[14] The analysis of performances
also includes reference to characteristic features such
as dramatization, idealization, maintenance of expressive
control, mystification and contrivance.

Perhaps the most fundamental characteristic of
individual 'performances' apart from those outlined
above, is that the performer will, according to the
specific audience to which he performs, attempt to give
the impression that his performance in front of them
represents his typical self, and that he is related to

them in an ideal way. Audience segregation implies
that the individual will conceal his differentiated
performances in front of differentiated audiences and
it is necessary to maintain segregation between those
who view him in varying modes of behaviour.

The segregation of audiences is particularly
pertinent to the successful performance of 'team'
behaviour; such segregation is often achieved by means
of fixed physical barriers between 'backstage' and
'frontstage' regions in which differentiated behaviour
patterns occur. [15] By team, or 'performance team', Goffman
refers to the co-operative activity of a number of per-
formers which appears to fit together in the maintenance
of a given impression before an audience. [16] Goffman out-
lines two basic components of the relationship between
those who constitute a team. The first is that, insofar
as each team-mate is forced to rely on the good conduct
and behaviour of his fellow team-mates, there is
developed a bond of reciprocal dependence which links
team-mates together and which can in fact transcend
the formal or structural cleavages between members of
a social establishment and this provide a source of
cohesion in that establishment.

> "When staff and line statuses tend
> to divide an organization, perform-
> ance teams may tend to integrate the
> divisions." [17]

The second component of the team relationship
is that accomplices in the maintenance of a particular
appearance of things are forced to define one another
as persons 'in the know', i.e., 'as persons before
whom a particular front cannot be maintained.' They
are thus bound together by what is called the 'privilege
of familiarity' which need not be 'something of an
organic kind, slowly developing with the passage of
time spent together' but rather a 'formal' relationship
which is extended to, and accepted by, all newcomers to
the team. [18]

The concept of team performance is carried on,
in a modified form, in a series of essays by Goffman
which deal with life in corrective institutions of
various kinds. In such 'total' institutions, Goffman
finds that there is a 'basic split' between a large
managed group, conveniently called inmates, and the
supervisory staff. Each grouping tends to view the
other in terms of narrow stereotypes, staff seeing
inmates often as being bitter, secretive and untrust-
worthy, whilst inmates see staff as 'condescending,
high-handed, and mean.' [19] In studying these 'captive'
institutions, Goffman examines in detail the
processes whereby individuals express their rejection

of 'official' stereotypes of themselves as imputed to
them, by the behaviour they are expected to enact.
Goffman's argument is that inherent in all claims
made on an individual, especially claims which originate
from positions of power and which seek to regulate even
the most intimate facets of the life-style of individ-
uals, there exists a conception of what the individual's
character must be for these claims to be appropriate.
But within every such establishment, participants
decline, in some way, to accept the 'official' view of
what they should be contributing to and receiving from
the organization. This assertion of individuality
cannot be realized in the complete compliance to
institutional orders, but in actual practice, the
individual does not openly default his obligations.
Instead, argues Goffman,

> "..the individual..holds himself
> off from fully embracing all the
> self-implications of his affil-
> iation, allowing some of this
> disaffection to be seen, even
> while fulfilling his major
> obligations."[20]

Here again, is Goffman's argument that a symb-
olic dimension can be differentiated from the actual
content of a communicated act; in this instance a
deliberate manipulation of the symbolic mode serving
to express 'distance' from the degradation and

humiliation that would otherwise be associated with the
actions that an inmate is forced to perform.

The ability of the actor to blend the concrete
demands of immediate situations with elements derived
from a wider repertoire of internalized attitudes, is
given more systematic treatment in an essay by Goffman
which is addressed to the concept of 'role-distance';
the significant argument in this essay is that role-
performances in complex societies should not be studied
merely as contributory functions in the realization of
a particular social goal, but as potentially problem-
atical behavioural requirements which may, or may not,
allow the individual the chance to co-ordinate his
other social experiences (and associated social identity
or status) into a consistent whole.[21]

In summary, Goffman's work can be construed as
an analysis of the ramifications for individual self-
value which adhere in the symbolic aspect of commun-
icated acts. Actors in social situations attempt to
direct the actual course of the other actors' activities
to mesh with their own projects and they must necessar-
ily admit to some changes on their own part. The images
of the partners, in terms of which an agent arranges
his course of action, are very often built on subtle,

and often easily misread, cues. Since this process is
of great strategic value to each participant, each
tries to control the presentation of such cues to the
other. He will try to present a more or less stylized
image of himself in line with his objectives, his felt
identity, and his situational context. Such attempts at
stylized self-presentation aid in stabilizing the process
of interaction in that they try to link the 'visible
front' which each agent presents to his partner with
the imputation of an underlying and continuing identity.

Every interactive experience which an individual
may have, must thus become incorporated into two
different contexts of meaning which are, in effect, two
different histories which intersect, i.e., the order of
the group and the meaning which the experience has in
terms of its structural context on the one hand, and
the order of personal identity and the significance
and place the experience has in terms of the personal
history of the individual on the other. Every act may
be interpreted and perhaps legitimated in both of
these contexts; to the group and to the self.

Now Goffman's somewhat unorthodox approach to
the study of social life, i.e., unorthodox in terms of

the manner in which theory and illustration are often
conjoined, brings with it a number of methodological
problems. Not the least among these is his reluctance
to define those representative features of action that
demarcate any particular role. As Weber observed,

> "It is necessary to know what a
> 'king' an 'official' an 'entre-
> peneur', a 'procurer' or a
> 'magician' does: that is, what
> kind of typical action, which
> justifies classifying an individ-
> ual in one of these categories,
> is important and relevant for
> an analysis, before it is poss-
> ible to undertake the analysis
> itself."[22]

In his work, <u>Asylums</u>, Goffman approaches this
requirement fairly closely, thus making it possible to
entertain comparative studies of discrete institutions
and the role behaviour which takes place within them:
but his essay on role-distance does not make explicit
what the role-expectations are that the individual
actors take distance <u>from</u>.

Further, the decision to limit his analysis to
the study of interpersonal situations, where the content
of the symbolic mode of communication refers principally
to individual character, mood, deportment, and personal
life-style exhibited in face-to-face relations, precludes
the inclusion of areas of concern which are bigger than

those situations. Thus, for example, for the individual
who is caught up in a wider interaction process with
others as a known category - particularly when the
interaction process is symbolically defined in terms
of abstractions which relate to the exercise of power
or the pursuit of religious ends - the opportunities
to become detached, through the manipulation of the
symbolic mode, ar more rare.

Furthermore, the concentration on small group-
ings engaged in repetitive symbolic-interactional
practices within the quasi-permanent setting of 'social
establishments' results in a tendency to overlook the
symbolic abstractions which adhere in trans-situational
social factors of macrosociological magnitude and
historical depth.

However, Goffman's propositions concerning the
reaction of individuals to the formal expectations that
others have of them and the relevance of those formal
expectations for the constitution of self-value and
interpersonal exchange, represents a worthwhile
addition to the continuing debate concerning the quest-
ion of the nature of the persona in the person and the
person in the persona. By this, is meant the dilemma

posed in a society which is characterized by the
establishment of impersonal role-tasks and yet which
at the same time is characterized by the requirement
to sustain the primary meaningful value of the individ-
ual in a world which contains other, meaningful things.
Goffman does not consider, in any depth, the distinction
between action which is 'role-directed', as it were,
and 'role-free' (except by implication in his work
Asylums): but he does illuminate the fact that whereas
complete commitment to a given role does not allow for
the expression of the full range of personal values,
that without a degree of systematic role-performance
social action is not possible.

Notes to Chapter II

1) In many respects, Goffman's sociology takes a similar direction to that of Alfred Vierkandt. The latter adopted an intermediate position between individualism and universalism in an attempt to combine the formal sociology of Simmel, which studies the relations between individuals, and the sociology of Durkheim, which emphasizes the reality of the whole, sui generis. Vide Aron, R., German Sociology, trans. Bottomore, T.B. and M., Free Press of Glencoe 1964, pp. 19 ff. Also vide Hochstim, P., Alfred Vierkandt. Exposition Press, New York, 1966. In his later works, Goffman's writing appears to reflect the organizing principles which Leopold von Wiese outlined, to facilitate the treatment of human interaction. These principles view all sociological processes as either, 1) associative - or actions of approach toward others and action with others, 2) dissociative - or actions of withdrawal or opposition, 3) a combination of both in some respects. Vide Mihanovich, C.S., The Sociology of Leopold von Wiese, Sociology and Social Research, Vol. 31, No. 3, 1947. pp.172 ff..

2) Goffman, E., Asylums: essays on the social situation of mental patients and other inmates. Anchor Books, Doubleday and Co., New York, 1961

3) Goffman, E., Interaction Ritual: essays on face-to-face behavior. Doubleday and Co. and Aldine Publishing Co., Chicago, 1967. Specif.The Nature of Deference and Demeanour, pp. 47-95

4) Goffman, E., The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Anchor Books, Doubleday and Co., New York, 1959

5) <u>vide</u> Mamelet, A., Sociological Relativism, <u>ex</u> Coser, L.A., ed., <u>Georg Simmel</u>. Prentice-Hall Inc., New Jersey, 1965. p. 72

6) Goffman, E., <u>The Presentation of Self</u>, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 251

7) <u>ibid</u>., p. 15

8) <u>vide</u> also Thomas, W.I., The Definition of the Situation. Reprinted in Manis, J.G., and Meltzer, B.N., <u>Symbolic Interaction</u>. Allyn and Bacon, Boston, 1967. pp. 315-21

9) Goffman, E., <u>The Presentation of Self</u>, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 2

10) <u>vide</u> James, W., <u>Principles of Psychology</u> Vol 1. Henry Holt, New York, 1890. pp. 221-2

11) Goffman, E., <u>The Presentation of Self</u>, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 6

12) <u>vide</u> Znaniecki, F., <u>Social Actions</u>. Farrar Strauss, New York, 1936 p. 121

13) McDougall, W., <u>Modern Materialism and Emergent Evolution</u>. (1934). pp. 120-1; quoted in Nadel, S.F., <u>The Foundations of Social Anthropology</u>. Free Press, Glencoe, 1964. p. 216

14) Goffman, E., <u>The Presentation of Self</u>, <u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 22-76

15) <u>ibid</u>., pp. 106 ff.

16) <u>ibid</u>., pp. 79-105

17) <u>ibid</u>., p. 82

18) <u>ibid</u>., p. 83

19) Goffman, E., <u>Asylums</u>, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 7

20) <u>ibid</u>., p. 174

21) Goffman, E., <u>Encounters</u>: <u>two studies in the sociology of interaction</u>. Bobbs-Merrill Co., Indianapolis, 1961. pp. 85-152

22) Weber, M., <u>The Theory of Social and Economic Organization</u>, trans. Talcott Parsons. Free Press, New York, 1964. p. 107

23) <u>vide</u> Wagner, H.R., Displacement of Scope; a problem of the relationship between small scale and large scale sociological theories, <u>AJS</u>, Vol LXIX, May, 1964 pp. 579-84

24) This debate, of course, goes beyong discussions concerning the methodology of role-theory to encompass questions of ethics and metaphysics. <u>Vide</u>, e.g. Sartre, J-P., <u>Being and Nothingness</u>; <u>an essay on Phenomenological Ontology</u>, trans. Barnes, H., Philosophical Library, New York, 1956: Emmet, D.M., <u>Rules, Roles and Relations</u>, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1966: 'Introduction', Eggan, F., and Gluckman, M., <u>The Relevance of Models for Social Anthropology</u>, ed. Banton, M., A.S.A. Monographs, No. 1., Tavistock Publications, London, 1965. pp. ix-xxxix

CHAPTER III

Alfred Schutz

There is a double purpose in the phenomenological philosophy of Alfred Schutz. On the one hand, he seeks to probe the roots of commonsense reality to outline the constitutive principles which underlie social existence, insofar as they are exhibited in the apprehension of social reality by individual consciousness. On the other hand, he is concerned with the development of methodological propositions which would provide the basis for the exploration of social life in general.

These two aims overlap insofar as many of Schutz's assertions concerning the orientation of the actor to the social world advise his programme with regard to the appropriate manner in which to study social life; but this chapter will not be concerned with analyzing the merits of Schutz's efforts to relate phenomenological concepts to the interpretive sociology of Max Weber as an enterprise in the refinement of the latter's methodology. Rather, it is intended to outline the basic features of Schutz's investigation into the phenomenological constructs embodied in social existence.

First of all, it is pertinent to make some
brief observations as to the aim and scope of
phenomenological investigation. Although no definitive
answer is forthcoming from the advocates of phenomen-
ology as to what constitutes the exact procedure of
this approach, some general characteristics can be
identified. According to Strasser, the primary aim of
phenomenology is to 'lay bare the general and necessary
structures of experience' through a descriptive method
which eschews the method of scientific induction.[1] As a
philosophy, phenomenology differs from most other
philosophies in attempting to interpret all human forms
of existence, including that of pursuing science, 'on
the basis of man's being-in-the-world.'[2]

Thevenaz suggests that the phenomenological
method is descriptive, represents a form of radical
empiricism and can be characterized as the science of
experience.[3] As a method, phenomenology does not concen-
trate exclusively on either the objects of experience or
on the subject of experience but on the 'point of
contact where being and consciousness meet.'[4] There is
thus a general rejection of the kind of explanation
which proceeds from the assumption that man can be
studied as if involved in a series of stimulus-response
patterns. Rather, the individual is seen as a person

caught up in a social world in which his 'actions
define his experience'.[5] and who can be seen not only
as the recipient of a series of disparate impressions
received in a 'mind container', or simply as the recip-
ient of experience given in a particular location, but
as an actor who transforms his experience as a result
of his intentional acts. Intentionality appears to be
a central feature of consciousness for those who adopt
a phenomenological position,[6] and, in a metaphorical
sense, intentionality is described as 'a living mirror
capable of rearranging its images according to its own
criteria and reacting to them in diverse ways.'[7]
When linked with existentialism (and Schutz's work
contains evidence of this linkage) phenomenological
investigation does not adhere rigorously to the pro-
gramme advocated by Husserl, insofar as perception is
not regarded as a product of the individual mind sui
generis, but is advised through the communicative social
milieu. As Spiegelberg suggests, existentialism has
'humanized and socialized' phenomenological investig-
ation.[8]

Phenomenology, then, is not concerned with the
ontological status of particular objects, not even with
hypotheses concerning the history of ideas. This approach
moves explanation into an abstract level with

concomitant problems of bringing it down to earth.
Some of the arguments which follow, however, have been
'fleshed out' with empirical examples in Berger and
Luckmann's work, The Social Construction of Reality.[9]

In order to make Schutz's ideas concerning the
question of social existence explicit, it is necessary
to characterize the general components of the world of
daily life as Schutz sees them. He argues[10] that Man
finds himself at any moment in his daily life in a
'biographically determined situation' within which
he has his position. Position here refers to his place
in the social structure as well as his ideas concerning
the moral and political problems he encounters. This
world, for the individual, is taken for granted by
him as his reality. The objects, facts and events
which the individual encounters and deals with in the
course of his life are experienced as typical i.e., as
'carrying open horizons of anticipated similar exper-
iences.'[11] In the 'natural attitude' of daily life,
individuals are concerned merely with some aspects of
any particular typified object, for in the 'paramount
reality' of the here and now, the interest of the
individual is principally pragmatic: thus every elem-
ent of everyday knowledge has a necessarily equivocal
trait. In this sense, Schutz suggests[12] that to assert

that object S̲ has the characteristic property p in

the form of 'S̲ is p' is an elliptical statement. For

the individual in 'the natural attitude' also recog-

nizes that S̲ is q, r, and t as well. If the individ-

ual asserts that S̲ is p for a particular purpose at

hand, this is not contradictory; for it is possible

to ignore as irrelevant to that purpose the 'q-ness',

'r-ness' and 't-ness' of S̲. Thus says Schutz,

> "...in the natural attitude of
> daily life we are concerned
> merely with certain objects
> standing out over against the
> unquestioned field of pre-
> experienced other objects and
> the result of the selecting
> activity of our mind is to
> determine which particular
> characteristics of such an
> object are individual and
> which typical ones."
> 13

It is the purpose at hand which defines those

elements among others in a situation to be relevant

for that purpose. Any change in the purpose at hand

and the concomitant relevance system, or the shift of

context within which S̲ is of interest, can induce the

individual to become concerned with the q-being of S̲,

its also being 'p' having become irrelevant.

The world about the individual is oriented and

organized for the individual's actions in a spatio-

temporal continuum with the actual 'here and now'

functioning as the centre of a system of co-ordinates
determining the organization of the surrounding field.[14]
As such, the individual's world is encountered as a
hierarchy of zones within actual, potential and rest-
orable reach, within which is the immediately available
sphere of manipulation with its own spatio-temporal
horizons. The concrete situation of an individual is
constituted as an on-going course of typical experiences
of typical objects and events.

But, as Schutz points out,[15] the 'texture of
meaning'is a cultural product and thus has its origin
and institution in human actions. Cultural objects
(including language, social institutions, tools, etc.)
can only be understood by reference to the human activity
from which they originate. In order to deal with the
'constructs' which emerge in common-sense thinking as
a result of the socialization of knowledge, Schutz
considers 1) the reciprocity of perspectives or the
structural socialization of knowledge 2) the social
origin or the genetic socialization of knowledge and
3) the social distribution of knowledge.

In dealing with the first aspect, Schutz
points out that the individual is aware of the differ-
ent relevance which objects have for other individuals

at any specific time or place, not only because of the recognition that others are involved in differentiated projects, but also because of the recognition of variegated biographical histories. But common sense thought transcends the individual differences by virtue of 'two basic idealizations.'[16] The first of these is that the individual assumes that should he change places with another individual engaged in <u>his</u> actions, that the same 'typicality' of things and the same 'distance' from things would logically adhere: the second idealization is that of the congruency of the system of relevances, or the fact that it is possible to ignore unique biographical situations (or at least consider them irrelevant) in dealing with the purpose at hand. Until or unless counter-evidence is presented, it is assumed by ego and alter that common objects and their features are at least empirically identical for both.

> "Thus the general thesis of reciprocal perspectives leads to the apprehension of objects and their aspects actually known by me and potentially known by you as everyone's knowledge. Such knowledge is conceived to be objective and anonymous, i.e., detached from and independent of my and my fellow-man's definition of the situation, our unique biographical circumstances and the actual and potential purposes at hand involved therein."[17]

With regard to the second aspect (the social origin of knowledge) Schutz argues that only a small part of the individual's stock of knowledge at hand originates with the individual; most of it is socially derived. The individual is taught how to define the situation (that is, how to define, in regard to the relative natural aspect of the world, the typical features that prevail in the in-group as the unquestioned but always questionable compass of things taken for granted until further notice); and the individual is taught how typical constructs have to be formed in accordance with the purpose at hand and its system of relevances accepted from the anonymous viewpoint of the in-group (ways of life, recipes for acting and the like). For this socialization, the typifying medium par excellence is the common vernacular, a language of named things and events, primarily, and thus of the typifications and generalizations prevailing in the in-group whose vernacular it is.[18]

The third aspect which Schutz considers is the social distribution of knowledge. Our actual stocks of knowledge differ; some fields are known by acquaintance, others are known in depth and of others we have only a blind belief. Expertise, as such, is manifest in only

a small area. Knowledge is at any moment structured in-
to zones of clarity, distinctiveness, precision
etc. originating in the individual's prevailing
system of relevances and thus is biographically deter-
mined. The knowledge of individual differences is
itself an element of common sense experience; the
individual knows whom he has to consult under typical
circumstances for the amelioration of particular
problems. The individual thus constructs types of the
other's fields of acquaintance and of their scope and
range, being guided by certain relevance structures
experienced in terms of certain typical motives that
lead to typical actions.[19]

The three principal aspects of socialization,
the idealizations belonging thereto and the typificat-
ions constructed by actors on the social scene, are,
for Schutz, the foundation of social interaction.

At this point, it is possible to develop two
relatively distinct theses from the extended analysis
which Schutz makes of the constituent features of
social life. The first is a theory of intersubject-
ivity, which Zaner argues is at the root of Schutz's
work:[20] the second is a structural analysis of the
conceptual 'constructs' employed by members of groups

in concrete historical situations, albeit in an
abstracted sense.

The question of intersubjectivity will now be
dealt with briefly, as it allows for the consideration
of Schutz's assertions dealing with the interlocking
processes of time dimensions, behaviour, attitudes and
motives.

To Schutz, the intersubjective character of the
world in general originates and is continuously
experienced in the We-relation. [21] Now although any
face-to-face confrontation with an other (or Thou)
is the general form in which any particular fellow-
man is experienced in person, the necessarily social
feature of such a confrontation exists only when ego
and alter take into account some specific features of
the consciousness of each other.

Schutz suggests that,

"In the on-going experiences of the
We-relation I check and revise my
previous knowledge about my
partner and accumulate new knowledge
about him. My experience of a fellow
man in the We-relations thus stands
in a multiple context of meaning:
it is experience of a human being,
it is experience of a typical
actor on the social scene, it is
experience of this particular
fellow-man, and it is experience
of this particular fellow-man in

> this particular situation...
> my experience of the on-going
> phases of my own conscious
> life and my experience of the
> co-ordinated phases of your
> conscious life is unitary;
> experience in the We-relation
> is genuinely shared."[22]

It is in this relationship, where the individual

is able to apprehend the outcome of alter's plans by

witnessing the course of his action, that the normal

propensity of the individual to assign to fellow

human beings a world which corresponds to the world as

the individual experiences it himself, is given

ultimate verification. When, in other words, the 'reach

of my fellow man coincides with mine.'[23]

Now Schutz argues that the individual usually

imputes a set of 'because' and 'in-order-to' motives

to persons to whom action is directed.[24] In this sense,

the in-order-to motive is the projected act, the pre-

phantasied state of affairs to be brought about by the

future action; the 'because' motive, from the point of

view of the actor, refers to his past experiences.[25]

When the actor 'lives in his on-going action' he does

not have in view its 'because' motives. Only when the

action is accomplished, that is, when it has become an

act, does the individual turn back to his past action

as an observer of himself and investigate by what

circumstances he has been determined to do what he did. Schutz states,

> "In using the linguistic form
> 'in-order-to', I am looking
> at the on-going process of
> action which is still in the
> making and appears therefore
> in the time perspective of the
> future. In using the linguistic
> 'because' form for expressing
> a genuine in-order-to relation-
> ship, I am looking at the
> preceding project and the therein
> <u>modo futuri exacti</u> anticipated
> act. The genuine because motive,
> however, involves...the time
> perspective of the past and
> refers to the genesis of the
> projecting itself."[26]

It would appear that the crucial difference between these two modes of motive is the relation which each has to the process of intersubjective interpretation. That is, insofar as the in-order-to motive refers to the attitude of the actor living in the process of his on-going action, it is an essent-ially 'subjective' category and is revealed to the observer only if he asks what meaning the actor bestows on his action. The genuine 'because' motive, however, is an 'objective' category, accessible to the observer, who has to reconstruct from the accomplished act (namely from the state of affairs brought about in the world by the actor's action) the attitude of the actor to his action.[27]

Schutz argues extensively throughout his works
that the world of ego, as an intersubjective social
reality, includes alter egos with different spatial
and temporal characteristics.[28] Predecessors are those
who lived before ego and are known to him through
report. Contemporaries are those who share the same
temporal world as ego. Consociates are those who are
alive at the same time as ego and who also share ego's
spatial segment of the world through face-to-face
relationships. Successors are those who will live
after ego dies, including those who will be born only
after ego is dead. The social world is as much constit-
uted by consciousness of predecessors and successors as
it is by contemporaries and consociates.

Beyond the experience of the individual (or
Thou) in a concrete We-relation, all others, including
contemporaries, are apprehended mediately, by means of
typifications.[29] Only in the face-to-face relation,
however superficial it may be, is alter encountered
as a unique individual, with his own biographically
determined situation. Furthermore, even in the face-to[30]
-face relation of consociates (defined as those with
whom ego shares a community of time and space) the
partners enter into social action only with a part of

their respective personalities (or in terms of social 'roles'). The process of constructing any alter as a performer of social roles plays its part in ego's own self-typification. In defining the role of alter, ego assumes a role himself, and these typifying constructs are often institutionalized in the course of on-going experience. Hand-in-hand with an increase in typification there is to be found an increase in anonymity with respect to others and a decrease therefore in the fullness of the relationship; the individuals are taken by each other as interchangeable, that is, as 'anyone'. The We-relation is thus inversely proportionate to the degree of typification arising through our actions.[31]

As this writer interprets Schutz's thesis, the link between the in-order-to motive and the because motive and the significance of the We-relation is that when ego and alter share in a common project in both a spatial and temporal sense (i.e. as Schutz suggests,[32] when ego and alter 'grow older together') there occurs a synthesis of the in-order-to and the because motives. As pointed out above, the because motive is essentially a reflective product (as is also the Me in Mead's analysis of self)[33] and mutuality of shared experience predisposes an 'unbroken totality' which is less reflective in character.

Zaner's suggestion is that the We-relation is realized when ego refrains from typifying alter's behaviour, or refrains from pre-judging or pre-interpreting his action, but enters the relationship in the sense of being 'open to' or 'fully available' to alter as manifest in a mutual 'tuning-in of reciprocal concern.'[34]

We shall now turn to the consideration of the ancilliary thesis which is developed in Schutz's work and which was referred to above. What has immediately preceded this argument was principally an outline of Schutz's thought on the relationship between intersubjective thought in relation to social structure. What follows is an outline of Schutz's account of the process of constitutive meaning-structures.

Taking his lead from William James' analysis of the sense of reality, Schutz suggests that James' concept of sub-universes provides a philosophically worthwhile approach to the problem of experience and meaning. Now James had suggested that the 'popular mind' conceives of all sub-worlds (such as the world of science, of religion, etc.) more or less disconnectedly, and when dealing with one of them forgets,

for the time being, its relation to the rest.[35]
Further, that with respect to each one of these sub-
worlds, all propositions made within them are
believed through the very fact of being conceived,
unless 'they clash with other propositions believed
at the same time, by affirming that their terms are
the same with the terms of these other propositions.'[36]
Schutz maintains that James' assertion that the sense
of reality can be investigated in terms of a psychology
of belief or disbelief must be amended, so as to treat
it in a more social context.

> "...we prefer to speak instead of
> many sub-universes of reality of
> finite provinces of meaning upon
> each of which we may bestow the
> accent of reality. We speak of
> the provinces of meaning and not
> of sub-universes because it is
> the meaning of our experiences
> and not the ontological structure
> of objects which constitutes
> reality."[37]

Such a set of experiences is called a finite
province of meaning if it shows a 'specific cognitive
style' i.e., that it show certain basic characteristics
which include a specific suspension of doubt, a specif-
ic form of experiencing one's self, a specific form
of sociality and a specific time-perspective.[38] Now
Schutz discusses the 'world of working in standard
time' as one finite province of meaning, indeed a

'paramount' world which stands out over against the
other provinces of meaning principally because of its
pragmatic character. But he also suggests that there
are many others accessible to the individual's intent-
ional life. He offers the world of dreams, the world
of art, the world of religious experience and the
world of scientific contemplation as some examples.[39]

The most significant sub-universe so far as
this thesis is concerned, is that which James would
refer to as 'ideal relations';[40] now Schutz does not
deal with this construct per se, but makes reference
to it within the context of the apprehension of
meaning, or the interpretation of some sign according
to some standard. It is necessary here to digress
briefly to consider Schutz's arguments pertaining to
'signs' in order to make the connection explicit.

For Schutz, the things signs stand for are to
be decided by reference to four types of orders,[41]
discussed below. The different kinds of order by
which objects, facts and events are interpreted can
be characterized by four basic forms of 'appresentat-
ional relations' employed by the actor for transcend-
ing the world within his actual reach, and which will
be outlined first. The four are marks, indications,

signs, and symbols.

The mark, e.g. the notation on the margin of a
book, serves as a subjective reminder for the inter-
preter when some object returns within his reach. The
indication, or that which is frequently subsumed under
the term 'natural sign' e.g., the halo around the moon
which indicates coming rain, or the position of a
needle on the dial of a car which indicates an empty
gas tank. (The sign designates 'objects, facts or events
in the outer world, whose apprehension appresents to
an interpreter cogitations of a fellow man'[42]. The
interpretation of an object, fact or event as a sign
for someone's cogitations does not necessarily mean
that the communicator intended the 'cogitations' to
be interpreted by another party, or that the interpret-
er was intended as the recipient of the cogitations.
Signs run the gamut of language, gesture, etc., and
presuppose a set of common abstractions or standard-
izations to be successfully communicated.

Now the first three of the 'appresentational'
references mentioned above, i.e. marks, indications
and sign, help us to come to terms with transcenden-
cies of the here and now, the other and the other's
world. But they are still nevertheless 'immanent' in

the common-sense world of everyday life. Symbols, how-
ever, represent for Schutz a 'higher form' of appresent-
ational reference which allow for the apprehension of
transcendent phenomena contained in finite provinces
of meaning described as 'sub-universes' earlier. In
the 'higher appresentational form' of symbolic reference
only the appresenting member refers to everyday life,
while the appresented member (or the signatum) is in a
sense non-experiential. Schutz agrees with Jaspers'
definition, parts of which follow here:

> "The main difference between
> meaning within the world and of
> metaphysical meaning consists in
> the criterion of whether in the
> relationship between the image and
> that which it represents the latter
> itself could be apprehended as an
> objectivity, or whether the image
> is an image for something that is
> not accessible in any other way..
> the symbol cannot be interpreted
> except by other symbols...the
> understanding of a symbol does
> not therefore consist in grasping
> its significance in a rational
> way but in experiencing it
> existentially in the symbolic
> intention as this unique refer-
> ence to something transcendent
> that vanishes at the limiting
> point."[43]

Now Schutz argues that the complicated structure
of the symbolic relationship involves four schemes, the
apperceptual, the appresentational, the referential and
the interpretational. [44] It is not necessary here to

outline the philosophical analysis which Schutz
develops to distinguish these schemes: the examples
which he provides are sufficiently explicit for our
purpose. Thus he finds that the <u>interpretational</u>
scheme is the most important in terms of providing
a universe of discourse between interpreters. Follow-
ing Bergson, Schutz suggests that various interpreters
of a symbolic structure may accept the same referential
scheme, yet apply different appresentational schemes
to the apperceptual configuration, as in the history
of sects which develop alternative theses concerning
the consubstantiation of the Trinity, or parties in
political organizations which believe in the basic
law of the country but differ as to its interpretat-
ion.[45] It is also possible that the <u>appresentational</u>
aspect is taken 'as a prototype of order with the
consequence that various referential schemes which are
frequently inconsistent are connected with the same
symbolic structure'; further, it is possible that
the <u>referential</u> scheme, once constituted, becomes
autonomous, i.e., independent of the appresentational
scheme, the latter then seeming merely contingent.

This discussion leads us to Schutz's final
arguments concerning the 'appresentational reference'[46]
of the social world. There are, he states, two such

levels; <u>individual</u> fellow-men are apprehended analog-
ically, but both members are appresented within the
'reality of everyday life'; in contrast, <u>social</u>
<u>collectivities</u> and institutionalized relations are as
such not entities within the province of meaning of
'everyday reality' but constructs of thought which
have their reality in another sub-universe, and likely
in that which James referred to as the sub-universe of
'ideal relations.' Thus, although the social collect-
ivity can be personified,as it were,in the roles of
congressmen or policemen, the signatum exists only
in the abstract symbolic form.

Now the symbolic representations of the We-
relations of various kinds (partnerships, lovers, etc.)
become more discernible the more the relationship is
institutionalized, i.e., the 'home' becomes more than
a dwelling place, the hearth is more than a fireplace,
and the 'neighbourhood' is more than an ecological
concept.[47]

Insofar as the symbolic referents are realizable
as it were, in the face-to-face relations, they are
distinguishable from symbolic referents which cannot
be, i.e., in the sense that a society can itself become
the representative of something beyond itself, as of a

transcending reality.

Now Schutz is not altogether explicit as to
the circumstances under which the apprehension of a
'fellow-man' will fall into one or the other of the
symbolic referentia, but hints that this is dependent
upon the definition of the situation, i.e. what
Garfinkel would refer to as the 'constitutive accent'
for a particular set of events. The constitutive [48]
accent, e.g. of a game, is, in turn, an eclectic term
for the 'constitutive expectancies' or basic rules
which provide a set of boundary conditions within
which each player must make certain decisions and
choices regardless of personal likes and dislikes,
plans and consequences for himself or others, and
whereby each player assumes a norm of reciprocity with
respect to the alternatives binding on each other;
also that players assume that whatever they expect of
each other is perceived and interpreted in the same
way.

The only example of Schutz's application of
his theories concerning the problem of symbolic
appresentation as a reflection of sub-universes (or
provinces of meaning) is in his analysis of the
dialectics between Don Quixote's phantasy-world and

49
that of his travelling companion Sancho Panza.

Finally, mention should be made of the manner in
which Berger and Luckmann treat Schutz's theories. Their
work is divided into two main sections, society being
characterized as an 'objective' and a 'subjective'
reality respectively. It is in the former section where
Schutz's concepts of sub-universes and symbolism are
50
given principal attention. Berger and Luckmann utilize
the latter within the rubric of 'legitimation' which
functions to 'make plausible' the 'first order object-
ivations' that have been 'institutionalized' and they
therefore view the 'symbolic universes' as a kind of
legitimating modi operandi which lead to an integrated
modus vivendi .

Whether this is the only interpretation of the
function, or even the outcome, of the variety of
symbolic universes within a single society can be
disputed, depending upon the a priori assumptions of
the investigator with regard to the actual character
of human society, i.e., whether society is initially
appraised as an arena which is never free from conflict-
ual claims on the part of various segments, or as an
arena in which integration and co-operation are both
the hallmark and the goal of social action. The section

of Berger and Luckmann's work which is addressed to
the 'subjective' facet of society, utilizes Schutz's
work in association with psychological tenets which
tend to portray socialization as a principal feature
of intersubjective life and give emphasis to the
passive mode of acquiring knowledge, particularly as
a characteristic of so-called 'primitive' societies.[51]

What emerges, then, from the phenomenological
philosophy in Schutz's work, is principally a set of
interrelated propositions concerning the 'essential'
nature of social interaction and social thought,
which emphasizes typification (or perceiving the
world and structuring by means of categorical types)
as an intrinsic aspect of the basic orientation of
actors to their situations. All typification would
seem to consist in the pragmatic reduction and equal-
ization of attributes relevant to the particular
purpose at hand for which the type has been formed,
and involves disregarding those individual (and concept-
ual) differences of the typified objects that are not
relevant to such purposes. As noted by Tiryakian,
existential typologies are coming to be treated in
their own right as important revelations of the
fundamental foci of social structure and social
organization.[52] For Schutz, the typifications of

'common-sense' thinking are integral elements of the
concrete <u>Lebenswelt</u> and their structure determines the
social distribution of knowledge and its relativity and
relevance to the particular social environment of a
group in a particular historical situation. It is the
examination of these 'constructs' and their cognitive
style, together with the myriad dialectical patterns
which emerge as a result of living in a world bounded
by such constructs, which Schutz advocates. For him,
the 'legitimate problems...of the so-called sociology
of knowledge' will be tackled most appropriately in
that enterprise.[53]

Notes to Chapter III

1) Strasser, S., <u>Phenomenology and the Human Sciences;</u> <u>a contribution to a new Scientific Ideal</u>. Duquesne University Press, Pittsburgh, 1963. p. 275

2) ibid., p. 277

3) Thevenaz, P., <u>What is Phenomenology? and other</u> <u>essays</u>, trans. Edie, J.M., Courtney, C., and Brockelman, P., ed. Edie, J.M. Quadrangle Books, Chicago, 1962

4) <u>ibid</u>., p. 19

5) Natanson, M., <u>Literature, Philosophy and the Social</u> <u>Sciences, essays in Existentialism and Phenomenology</u> Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1962 p. 42

6) <u>ibid</u>.

7) Romero, F., <u>Theory of Man</u>, trans. Cooper, W.F., University of California Press, Berkeley, 1964. p. 68

8) Spiegelberg, H., <u>The Phenomenological Movement: a</u> <u>historical introduction</u>, <u>Vol 1,</u> Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1965. p. 23

9) Berger, P.L., and Luckmann, T., <u>The Social Constr-</u> <u>uction of Reality</u>, <u>a treatise in the Sociology of</u> <u>Knowledge</u>. Doubleday and Co., New York, 1966

10) Schutz, A., <u>Collected Papers Vol 1, The Problem of</u> <u>Social Reality</u>. ed. Natanson, M., Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1967 p. 9

11) <u>ibid</u>., p.7

12) <u>ibid.</u>, p. 9

13) ibid., pp. 8-9

14) _ibid._, p. 223

15) _ibid._, p. 10

16) _ibid._, p. 16. Also vide ibid., pp. 315-6

17) _ibid._, p. 12

18) _ibid._, pp. 15-16

19) _ibid._, pp. 4-15

20) Zaner, R.M., Theory of Intersubjectivity: Alfred Scutz. _Social Research_ 28: 1961. pp. 71-93

21) Schutz, A., _Collected Papers Vol 11 Studies in Social Theory_, ed. Brodersen, A., Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1964. pp. 24-36

22) _ibid._, p. 30

23) _ibid._, p. 31

24) Schutz, A., _Collected Papers Vol 1. op. cit._, pp. 69 ff.

25) _ibid._, p. 70

26) _ibid._, p. 71

27) _ibid._, pp. 69-71

28) This argument recurs throught Schutz's work. For an extended version, _vide_ Scutz, A., _The Phenomenology of the Social World_, trans. Walsh, G., and Lehnert, F., Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1967. _specif._ Chapter 1V

29) Schutz, A., _Collected Papers, Vol 11, op. cit._, p. 42

30) Schutz, A., _Collected Papers, Vol 1, op. cit._, p. 16

31) Schutz, A., _Collected Papers, Vol 11, op. cit._, pp. 48 ff.

32) Schutz, A., Collected Papers, Vol 1, op. cit.,
p. 16

33) Mead, G.H., Mind, Self and Society: from the
standpoint of a Social Behaviorist, ed. Morris, C.
W., University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1934

34) Zaner, R.M., op. cit., p. 93

35) Schutz, A., Collected Papers, Vol 1, op. cit.,
p. 207

36) James, W., Principles of Psychology Vol 11, quoted
by Schutz in Collected Papers Vol 1, op. cit.,
p. 229

37) Schutz, A., Collected Papers, Vol 1, op. cit.,
p. 230

38) ibid., p. 230-1

39) ibid., p. 232

40) James, W., Principles of Psychology Vol 11.
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41) Schutz, A., Collected Papers, Vol 1. op. cit.,
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42) ibid., p. 320

43) Jaspers, K., Philosophie, Vol 111, Metaphysik,
Chapter 1. Berlin, 1932. p. 16. Ex.Schutz, A.,
Collected Papers, Vol 1, op. cit., pp. 331-2

44) Schutz, A., Collected Papers, Vol 1, op. cit.,
p. 338

45) ibid.,pp. 352 ff.

46) ibid., p. 352

47) ibid., p. 354

48) Garfinkel, H., A Conception of an Experiments with
'Trust' as a Condition of Stable Concerted Action.
Unpublished paper, referred to in Cicourel, A.V.,
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New York, 1964. pp. 205-6

49) Schutz, A., Collected Papers, Vol ll, op. cit.,
specif. 'Don Quixote and the problem of reality',
pp. 133-58

50) Berger, P.L., and Luckmann, T., op. cit.,pp. 85-
91

51) ibid., pp. 119 ff.

52) Tiryakian, E., Typological Classification, ex
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Macmillan, New York, 1968 pp. 177-86

53) Schutz, A., Collected Papers, Vol 1, op. cit.,
p. 149

CHAPTER IV

Karl Mannheim

The purpose of this chapter is to outline and examine a number of propositions which Karl Mannheim develops concerning the constitution of thought as a function of social participation.

Mannheim maintains that the sociology of knowledge is concerned with 'the varying ways in which objects present themselves to the subject according to the differences in social settings.'[1] Utilizing a 'general-total-non-evaluative' conception of ideology,[2] Mannheim seeks to determine the manner in which 'social structures come to express themselves in the structure of assertions'[3] and embarks on an empirical study of political thought-models in order to illustrate his thesis.

Now insofar as Mannheim is concerned with the structure and formation of thought in individual minds, it must not be assumed that he conceives of the possibility that the individual can formulate political judgements which are made indepedent of evaluations of the world (made, in turn, by the social groups to which the individual belongs).[4] In this sense,

Mannheim's conception of Man stands in contrast to the stream of thought running from Descartes to Locke to Kant which can be construed as an attempt to extricate the knowing subject from his social-historical context with the consequent attempt to search out the limitations on knowledge within the boundaries of the discrete individual:[5] rather, Mannheim's approach is in the tradition of thought exemplified in the work of Marx, Scheler, Durkheim and Mead, which takes a more dynamic collectivist turn and sees the knowing subject as part and parcel of a creative and determinative institutional process. As Farberman argues,

> "..where the classical approach
> strove to strip away the instit-
> utional biases from mentality,
> so as to uncover its inherent and
> necessary objectivity, the modern
> approach cannot conceive of thought
> as being apart from institutional
> involvement; hence, it is deter-
> mined to search for the composit-
> ion of mentality within the more
> or less resilient social process."[6]

Thus Mannheim's main preoccupation is to discover how thoughts, ideas and 'mental structures' are formed in various historical contexts. What is the meaning behind his theory of the 'social or existential determination of actual thinking'?[7]

Mannheim points out that by 'determination' he

does not mean to imply an automatic cause-effect
sequence; instead, he leaves the 'meaning of deter-
mination open'[8], and suggests that the connection must
be established through empirical investigation. The
criteria he offers in terms of establishing such a
connection as a 'demonstrated fact' are illustrated in
those realms of thought in which it can be shown that,

> "...the process of knowing does not
> actually develop historically in
> accordance with immanent laws, that
> it does not follow only from 'the
> nature of things' or from 'pure
> logical possibilities', and that it
> is not driven by an 'inner dialectic.'
> On the contrary, the emergence and
> the crystallization of actual thought
> is influenced in many decisive points
> by extra-theoretical factors of the
> most diverse sort. These may be called,
> in contradistinction to purely theoret-
> ical factors, existential factors. This
> existential determination of thought
> will also have to be regarded as a
> fact...if the influence of these
> existential factors on the concrete
> content of knowledge is of more than
> mere peripheral importance, if they
> are relevant not only to the genesis
> of ideas, but penetrate into their
> forms and content and if, furthermore,
> they decisively determine the scope
> and the intensity of our experience
> and observation, i.e., that which we
> formerly referred to as the 'perspective'
> of the subject."[9]

Now Merton takes Mannheim to task for being
vague and obscure in his specifications of the type
or mode of relations between social structure and
knowledge, and notes the various terms which Mannheim

uses to refer to this connection. Merton also notes
that Mannheim uses the term 'correspondence' (<u>Entsprech-</u>
<u>ung</u>) to denote these relations. Thus Merton finds that
in deriving certain forms of thought from certain types
of social situations, Mannheim makes a variety of
unintegrated assumptions. Among others, there is the
assumption that there is a direct <u>causation</u> of forms
of thought by social forces; that ideas and forms of
thought are 'in accord with' the interests of the
asserting subjects; that thought is directed by the
formulation of the problem, awareness of which may in
turn be attributed to the social position of the
subject; that certain social structures are pre-req-
uisite to certain forms of thought; that there is an
emanation of one set of ideas from another set,
explained in terms of 'compatibility', 'congruity'
and etc., of <u>Weltanschauungen</u>. [10]

Turning now to an examination of precisely
<u>what</u> phenomena Mannheim attempts to link together, it
is found that the superstructure or 'mode of thought'
itself is a framework of categories which forms the
validational base of an ideological judgement. As
Mandelbaum notes,

> "These categories of social and
> historical knowledge are to be
> understood only by relating them

to the fundamental reality which
determined their emergence; they
are to be understood as an expre-
ssion (_Ausdruck_) of the inter-
relation of thought and the exter-
nal, non-rational, existential
factors which determined it. For
Mannheim this inter-relation is to
be conceived in terms of valuation
and will. These valuations and
volitional elements have, naturally,
no transcendent (non-existential)
referents. Thus the categories of
social and historical understanding
which emerge in the historico-social
process have their whole basis in the
fact than an active, valuing subject
(of somewhat indeterminate nature)
'lives into' an external world. In
this, thought and action are not
wholly disparate; thought and modes
of thinking, are brought within a
larger activist framework."
11

It is these categories through, and by which,

a subject, class or age group apprehends reality which

Mannheim refers to as the 'perspective' or stylistic

structure. Mannheim defines 'perspective' as the

'subject's whole mode of conceiving things as deter-
12
mined by his historical and social setting.' Mannheim

illustrates the notion of perspective by suggesting that

a mathematical statement such as 'twice two equals four'

gives 'no clue as to when, where, and by whom it was
13
formulated', whereas an art form may be dated according

to its style, possible only under given historical

conditions and revealing the characteristics of an

epoch; similarly, it is possible in a work of the
social sciences to say whether it was inspired by the
'historical school' or 'positivism' or 'Marxism' and
from 'what stages in the development of each of these
it dates'. In assertions of this sort, argues Mannheim,
it is possible to speak of an 'infiltration of the
social position' of the investigator into the results
of his study and of the 'situational-relativity'
('Situations-gebundenheit') of the relationship of
these assertions to the underlying reality.[14]

Turning now to the 'infrastructure' which, in
a sense, generates the 'perspective', it is found that
Mannheim does not exhibit clarity in his exposition.
The principal element is the social situation. He
chooses to employ the metaphysical notion of a
'collective unconscious'[15] which he reformulates into
the 'collective purposes of the group',[16] the 'whole
matrix of collective interests',[17] and the 'collective
historical experiences of a group' as the possible
'social ground' upon which the figure is discerned -
very much after the fashion of Gestalt perception
theory. Mannheim argues that class is the most signifi-
cant variable to be taken into account, because 'all
other social groups arise from and are transformed as
parts of the more basic conditions of production and

domination'; but there are also other groups such as
'generations, status groups, sects, occupational groups
schools, etc.' which can provide the existential base. [18]

Mannheim recognizes that an individual has multiple

affiliations with social groups, which aggravates the

problem of discerning the crucial influences in the

thought of the thinking subject; this question is not

clarified, either, in his suggestion that 'workers' are

less broadly affiliated than others:

> "Those who participate in the proc-
> ess of production...(the workers)..
> being bound to a particular class
> and mode of life, have their out-
> looks and activities exclusively
> determined by their specific soc-
> ial situation."
> [19]

In addition to the stylistic structure and

existential conditions, Mannheim refers to a third

element in the ideological judgement. He regards the

stylistic structure as emerging from the interaction

of the subject with the existential reality. The

volitions vary with the nature of the social situation,

but the categories making up the perspective are a

consequence of the volitional responses to the social

situation. Thus he argues,

> "Men living in groups do not merely
> coexist physically as discrete
> individuals. They do not confront
> the objects of the world from the

abstract levels of a contemp-
lating mind as such, nor do
they do so exclusively as
solitary beings. On the contrary
they act with and against one
another in diversely organized
groups, and while doing so they
think with and against one another.
These persons, bound together in
groups, strive in accordance with
the character and position of the
groups to which they belong, to
change the surrounding world of
nature and society or attempt to
maintain it in a given condition."
20

It transpires, then, that the existential

conditions are not non-rational or non-theoretical in

any complete way, for they include the social situation

as a principal element, and the social situation in

turn involves a perspective (which itself is 'non-
21
illusory'). Insofar as it is feasible to talk of the

'penetration' of the perspective by the social process,

it is not a determination of thought by purely non-

theoretic factors. As Taylor points out,

"The penetration is achieved only
through the agency of a subject
who in effecting the penetration
does so on the basis of values,
etc., derived from a past, or
existing social situation. The
rise of a new stylistic structure
is in fact a consequence of the
appraisal of his experience by a
subject on the basis of an already
existing stylistic structure."
22

Taylor goes on to point out that Mannheim's dichotomy of the existential and the theoretic definitely obscures this feature. The presence of a theoretic <u>within</u> the existential is recognized by Mannheim himself in his distinction between 'factual genesis' and 'meaningful genesis':

> "'Social existence' is thus an area of being, or a sphere of existence, of which orthodox ontology which recognizes only the absolute dualism between being devoid of meaning on the one hand and meaning on the other hand takes no account. A genesis of this sort could be characterized by calling it a 'meaningful genesis' (<u>Sinngenesis</u>) as contrasted with a '<u>factual-genesis</u>' (<u>Faktizitätagenesis</u>). If a model of this sort had been kept in mind in stating the relationship between being and meaning, the duality of being and validity would not have been assumed as absolute in epistemology and noology. Instead, there would have been a series of gradations between these two poles, in which such intermediate cases as 'being invested with meaning' and 'being oriented to meaning' would have found a place and been incorporated into the fundamental conception."[23]

Thus, it is possible to arrive at a formulation which resolves the conceptual ambiguities above (involving dialectical relationships between theoretical perspectives, groups, etc.,) which is consistent with the orthodox separation of thought and things by

stating that social existence (in the form of instit-
utions, classes, sects, etc.,) is the process in which
concepts (categories, perspectives, stylistic structures
etc.) are expressed as the life activities of men and
out of which new thought-structures are formed.

In this mode, Mannheim develops a number of
theorems as a way of both illustrating and confirming
his hypotheses. A selection of these theorems are given
here.

Mannheim finds that groups of pre-capitalist
origin, characterized by the prevalence of the 'commun-
al element', may be held together by tradition or
common sentiments alone. Theoretical reflection, in
a political sense, is of secondary importance. Groups
which are not welded together by bonds of community life
but 'which merely occupy similar positions in the social
economic system' can find cohesion only through rigor-
ous theorizing. The Weltanschauung of the latter group
is effective over 'great distances' in contrast to the
sentimental ties, which are effective only within a
limited spatial area. Mannheim insinuates that the
'theorizing' of the spatially dispersed or 'non-organic'
groups necessarily involves a rationalized conception
of history which serves as a socially unifying factor. [24]

At another point in his work, Mannheim puts forward an
argument within the rubric of the theory of knowledge
which can be linked to the preceding hypothesis concern-
ing the development of abstract inter-personal linkage.
The theory he develops, he designates as the social gene-
sis of abstraction. He claims that the idea of a
continuously broadening base of knowledge and of the
integration of various social 'vantage points' into the
process of knowledge, together with the idea of an all-
embracing ontology which is to be sought for, is a
tendency in social and intellectual history closely
connected with 'the processes of group contact and inter
penetration.'[25]

The upshot of this tendency is, at first, a
neutralization of the various conflicting points of
view (i.e. depriving them of an absolute character)
and then secondly, the creation of a more comprehensive
and 'serviceable' basis of vision. Mannheim finds it
interesting that the 'construction of a broader base
is bound up with a higher degree of abstractness' and
'tends in an increasing degree to formalize the phenom-
ena with which we are concerned.' He argues that the
trend towards a higher stage of abstraction is a
correlate of the amalgamation of social groups.

"The corroboration of this
contention is found in the fact
that the capacity for abstraction
among individuals and groups
grows in the measure that they
are parts of heterogeneous groups
and organizations in more inclus-
ive collective units, capable of
absorbing local or otherwise
particular groups."
26

Mannheim constructs 'ideal-types' as a method
of illustrating his existential-thought-form thesis.
These include 'bureaucratic conservatism' in which
the most significant extension is the tendency to
generalize bureaucratic esperience and to overlook
the fact that the realm of administration and of
smoothly functioning order represents only a part of
the total political reality; 27 'historical conservatism',
which Mannheim characterizes among other features as
an outlook which 'relates everything to the decisive
dichotomy between "construction according to plan" and
"allowing things to grow"' with the added assumption
that the social order is natural and proper; 28 'liberal-
democratic bourgeoise thought' which assumes, among
other features, that politics is amenable to satisfact-
ory resolution through discussion; 'socialist-communist
conception' which typically relegates the reciprocal
relations of political action, economics, ideologies,
and class together as a 'single group of problems'; 29

and 'Fascism' which among other features can discern
only the 'unordered'and the 'unrationalized' in the
development of society, the 'structural development
and the integrated framework of society remaining
completely hidden from...view'.[30]

In similar fashion, Mannheim relates four
types of 'utopian mentality' - the Anabaptist chiliast-
ic, the liberal-humanitarian, the conservative and the
socialist-communist - to the social location and
collective purposes of their protagonists.[31]

Thus, in terms of the apprehension of time, for
example, it is found that the Anabaptist chiliastic
characteristic experience is that the 'present becomes
the breach through which what was previously inward
bursts out suddenly, takes hold of the outer world and
transforms it';[32] the liberal humanitarian concept of
time emphasizes the idea of the indeterminate future
which will witness the realization of their ethical
norms, and views with contempt as an 'evil reality'
everything that has become a part of the past or is
part of the present:[33] the conservative time-sense envis-
ages the past as inexorably leading to, and validating
the existing reality and the 'here and now' is experien-
ced as 'the embodiment of the highest values and

34
meanings': the 'socialist-communist' conception of time, which is more complex, distinguishes between the immediate and remote future, whilst emphasizing that the concrete present embraces not only the past but also the latent tendencies of the future.[35]

It may be noted that, apart from pointing out Mannheim's argument that the 'perspective' is 'non-illusory', little reference has been made to the problem of the attainment of validity as a moralistic enterprise, i.e. in the resolution of conflicting perspectives. Rather, attention has been paid to what Taylor refers to as the 'immeasureable worth' of Mannheim's work i.e., the discovery of perspectival knowledge; this conception, which need not necessarily be equated with qualitative knowledge (or valuational concepts) demands that all knowledge be considered as perspectival.[36]

The philosophical problems which follow from the decision to take an existential position as an observer of social life (particularly with respect to the possibility of attaining objective knowledge imputed to the 'intellectuals' in Mannheim's writings) go beyond the scope of this thesis. Suffice to point out that Mannheim attempts to fuse his thesis concern-

ing the situational character of assertions with the
ideal of freeing thought from its anchorage in the
social process; an enterprise which demonstrated his
lingering sympathies with the Marxian recipe for the
resolution of conflict and the construction of a
utopia.[37]

Notes to Chapter IV

1) Mannheim, K., <u>Ideology and Utopia: an introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge</u>, trans. Wirth, L., and Shils, E., Harvest Books, Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., New York, 1936. p.265

2) Mannheim arrives at this conception of ideology through the introduction of three distinctions to the overall Marxian theory of ideology. The first is that between 'special' and 'general' conceptions of ideology. In political battles, the opposing parties have often tried to argue that their respective opponents deal in falsehoods, based on a deliberate attempt to deceive, whilst claiming that there did exist an interpretation which corresponded with the truth (namely their own position based on the 'reality' of the situation). Anyone who acts in this fashion, i.e. by arguing that there is an ideological 'mote' in his opponents' eye, whilst denying the ideological 'beam' in his own, as it were, is operating with the 'special' conception of ideology. However, one who realizes that <u>all</u> thinking, including his own, is an out-growth of certain pre-occupations and volitions, has advanced to the 'general' conception of ideo-logy and has moved from a political to a philosoph-ical point of view. The second dichotomy Mannheim introduces is that between the 'particular' concept-ion, and the 'total' conception of ideology. The 'particular' conception, when indulged in, views only certain of the opponent's assertions as ideo-logical, e.g. statements in an election campaign which can be related in a psychoanalytical fashion to the life-situation of the proclaimer. The adher-

2, cont.) ents of a 'total' conception, in contrast,
view the all-important and all-inclusive categories
of thinking as totally conditioned by substructural
forces of some kind. Finally, a distinction must be
made between the 'evaluative' and the 'non-evaluat-
ive conception of ideology. The evaluative concept
is essentially an adjunct of a political venture,
designed to 'deflate' or 'debunk' the opponent's
arguments: the 'non-evaluative conception of ideo-
logy, on the other hand, is the _modus operandi_
of the scholar, bent on the search for hidden deter-
minants of ideologies for the purposes of under-
standing. _Vide._ Mannheim, K., _op. cit._, pp. 55-94

3) _ibid._, p. 266

4) Mannheim does not meet the issue concerning types
of knowledge specifically or at length in his
writings. As Merton points out, 'knowledge' in
Mannheim's work is regarded so broadly as to
include 'every type of assertion and every mode of
thought from folkloristic maxims to rigorous
positive science' (Merton, R.K., _Social Theory and
Social Structure_. Free Press Glencoe, 1961. p. 497):
The use of the word 'political', in context, is
considered appropriate in view of the particular
investigations which are illustrated here and
which deal almost wholly with eschatologies and
political convictions.

5) _vide_ Wirth, L., 'Preface', ex. Mannheim, K.,
Ideology and Utopia, op. cit., pp. ix-xxx

6) Farberman, H.A., Mannheim, Cooley and Mead: Toward
a Social Theory of Mentality. _The Sociological
Quarterly_, Vol II No. 1, Winter, 1970. p. 5

7) Mannheim, K., Ideology and Utopia, op. cit.,
p. 267

8) ibid., pp. 267 ff.

9) ibid., pp. 267-8

10) Merton, R.K., Social Theory and Social Structure,
op. cit., pp. 498-501

11) Mandelbaum, M., The Problem of Historical Know-
ledge. Liverbright Corp., New York, 1938 p. 73

12) Mannheim, K., Ideology and Utopia, op. cit., p. 266

13) ibid., p. 272

14) ibid., p. 271-2

15) ibid., pp. 33 ff.

16) ibid., p. 117

17) ibid., p. 269

18) ibid., p. 276

19) ibid., p. 157

20) ibid., pp. 4-5

21) ibid., pp. 84-6

22) Taylor, S., Conceptions of Institutions and the
Theory of Knowledge. Bookman Associates, New York,
1956. p. 79

23) Mannheim, K., Ideology and Utopia, op. cit., p.294

24) ibid., p. 131

25) ibid., pp. 301-2

26) ibid., pp. 301-2

27) ibid., pp. 118-9

28) ibid., pp. 119-22

29) *ibid*., pp. 129-30

30) *ibid*., p. 142

31) *ibid*., pp. 211-63

32) *ibid*., p. 215

33) *ibid*., p. 220

34) *ibid*., p. 233

35) *ibid*., pp. 245-6

36) Taylor, S., *Conceptions of Institutions and* etc., *op. cit*., p. 84

37) For some of the principal arguments relating to the question of the epistemological consequences of Mannheim's 'relationism', *vide*, e.g., Bottomore, T.B., Some Reflections on the Sociology of Knowledge, *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol 7, 1956. pp. 52-8: Natanson, M., Knowledge and Alienation: Some Remarks on Mannheim's Sociology of Knowledge, *ex*. Natanson, M., *Literature, Philosophy and the Social Sciences*. Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1962. pp. 116-7: Mills, C.W., Methodological consequences of the Sociology of Knowledge, *ex* Horowitz, I.L., ed., *Power, Politics and People: The Collected Essays of C. Wright Mills*. Oxford University Press, New York, 1963 pp. 453-68

CHAPTER V

Claude Lévi-Strauss

Of all the four thinkers dealt with in this thesis, it is Lévi-Strauss who sets himself the most ambitious task. His project is to uncover the laws which he believes govern the functioning of the human mind.[1]

The ultimate root of the tree of social life, namely the brain itself, is not Lévi-Strauss's concern; that is the province of the psycho-chemist and the biologist.[2] Nor is Lévi-Strauss interested in the individual as an object of study, preferring instead to deal with mind as represented in collective phenomena, i.e. the products of mind as exhibited in the symbolic constructs of differentiated societies, which he examines by way of a 'structuralist' method.[3]

In his autobiographical work, Lévi-Strauss refers to Rousseau as 'our master and brother'[4] and elsewhere Rousseau, together with Bergson, are credited for the success in reaching the psychological foundations of 'exotic institutions' by a process of internalization.[5] The upshot of the Rousseauian

approach is the demonstration that every human mind
is a 'locus of virtual experience where what goes on
in the minds of men...can be investigated.' To Rousseau,
the improvement in arts and science brings a corruption
of minds rather than enlightenment; he implies that
there is a moral, rational and universal basis to
society which can be obscured by the abuses to which the
social order gives rise.[6] Lévi-Strauss, like Rousseau, is
a romantic in characterizing the Neolithic Age as a time
in which science did not sever Man from the physical
universe. Apart from his sentimentalism, however, Lévi-
Strauss values the pre-scientific epoch as a source of
information from which to discover 'the unshakable
basis' of human society. There is not a 'utopian state
of Nature or a perfect society to be found' in any
cultural matrix which he studies; but it is in the
examination of societies which are analogically parallel
to Neolithic societies (in terms of the development
of scientific knowledge) that Lévi-Strauss considers
it most likely to find the most valuable components
for his theoretical scheme. Such a scheme in turn will
help to disentangle 'what in the nature of Man is
original and what is artificial.'[7]

A fundamental feature of Lévi-Strauss's theory
is the assumption that manifest actions and the beliefs
which sustain them conceal a logical system which can
be approximately ascertained through the development
of abstract models. This axiom, Lévi-Strauss contends,
is common in a number of fields of thought, including
psychoanalysis, physical geography, political sociology
and linguistics. It is clear that the epistemological
basis of his models derive from a synthesis of the
latter two fields.

The Marxian notion that the ideal foundation
of social life, the material infrastructure, is
obscured by the ideological superstructure, finds a
mirror-image in Lévi-Strauss's conception of the
dichotomy between 'conscious' and 'unconscious' models.
The 'conscious models' which Lévi-Strauss finds
operative in societies, function in the same way as
the 'ideological forms' of Marx [8]. Further, the
Marxian idea that transformations take place over
time as a result of the interweaving of praxis and
theoria is taken up by Lévi-Strauss, albeit in a
revised form:

> "If we grant, following Marxian
> thought, that infrastructures and
> superstructures are made up of
> multiple levels and that there are

various types of transformations
from one level to another, it
becomes possible- in the final
analysis, and on the condition
that we disregard content- to
characterize different types of
societies in terms of the types
of transformations which occur
within them. These types of trans-
formations amount to formulas (sic)
showing the number, magnitude,
direction and order of the convol-
utions that must be unraveled, so
to speak, in order to uncover
(logically, not normatively) an
ideal homologous relationship
between the different structural
levels....by replacing a complex
model with a simple model that has
greater logical value, the anthro-
pologist reveals the detours and
manoeuvers, conscious and unconsc-
ious, that each society uses to
resolve its inherent contradictions
- or at any rate to conceal them."
                                    9

The quotation above reveals the degree to which

Lévi-Strauss takes an ambivalent position with respect

to the function of ideas in social life. Like

Durkheim, Lévi-Strauss seems to imply that the ideas

produced in a society represent obstacles which can

stand between the observer and the 'logic' of structur-
                10
al relations.

The same kind of argument, which suggests that

a conscious model has another model which underlies it

and yet which is not given to immediate observation nor

through the <u>theoria</u> of the conscious model itself, is

found in the analytical method of structural linguist-
ics. Linguistic behaviour is that behaviour par excell-
ence which is governed by rules not 'known' to the
actor; in fact, the structural rules of a language are
not 'thought through' by the speaker of a language
when he is engaged in communication. Structural ling-
uists are in an enviable position, according to Lévi-
Strauss. They have been able, by virtue of their
methodology, to enter the world of exact science hither-
to denied the social sciences. They have been able to
reformulate their hypotheses into data which becomes
manipulable to the same degree as the data dealt with
by the mathematician. The structural method in ling-
uistics, Lévi-Strauss believes, will play the same
'renovating role' with respect to the social sciences
that nuclear physics has played for the physical
sciences.[11]

The anthropologists, albeit with certain modi-
fications, should adopt a method analogous in form to
the method used in structural linguistics. What are
the basic principles of this latter method? Lévi-
Strauss pays tribute to the 'illustrious founder of
this sub-discipline'. N. Troubetzkoy, and outlines
the latter's programmatic statements,

. . .

"(Troubetzkoy)...reduced the struct-
ural method to four basic operations.
First, structural linguistics shifts
from the study of conscious linguist-
ic phenomena to study their unconsc-
ious infrastructure; second, it does
not treat terms as independent
entities, taking instead as its basis
of analysis the relations between
terms; third, it introduces the
concept of system - 'Modern phonem-
ics does not merely proclaim that
phonemes are always part of a syst-
em; it shows concrete phonemic systems
and elucidates their structure'-:
finally, structural linguistics aims
at discovering general laws, either
by induction 'or...by logical deduct-
ion, which would give them an absolu-
te character'."
                                    12

In the most general sense, Lévi-Strauss's

structuralism could be characterized as a 'linguistics

of culture'; and it is from linguistics that he derives

the cardinal facets of his theoretical approach. Thus

all cultural phenomena can be regarded as instances

of communications phenomena, governed by rules which

approximate the classificatory principle of binary

opposition as developed in phonology. Structural

linguistics incorporates the notion of exchange as a

tenet of phonemic analysis; wedded to the exchange

theory propounded by Mauss, whom Lévi-Strauss refers
                                    13
to as 'the Newton of Anthropology', the 'symbolic

systems' of a society, e.g. language, kinship, econom-

ics, art etc., are interpreted as instances of exch-
ange relationships or 'structural orders.'[14]

Thus each society is seen as composed of a
variety of more or less interdependent orders of
relationships including, for example, 'women, goods
and services and messages'[15]: such orders differ in the
'materials' which are interrelated and in the ways in
which the same materials are conceived as interrelated.
It is likely that in any one society, each order is a
variant of another, the important variables being the
kinds of materials involved and the dialectical rules
governing the number of possible permutations or
variations.[16] The likelihood of uncovering 'orders'
(such as models of experience in myth and kinship) is
dependent upon the establishment of constituent elem-
ents (akin to phonemes in phonology).[17] In replying to
critics who charge him for attempting to explain the
structure of a society in terms of the structure of
one facet of it (e.g. French society in terms of the
phonemic structures of the French language) Lévi -
Strauss contends that he compares 'structures...
where they may be found' including political ideology,
mythology, art, etiquette and cuisine.[18]

Lévi-Strauss's structural analysis of cuisine will be outlined here in order to demonstrate some of the points made above and also to illustrate yet another argument, i.e. that 'orders' can be compared cross-culturally as well as within the boundaries of a single society (and, in this case, one of the few examples which include facts from European societies).

The constituent elemnts of a national cuisine (which are called 'gustemes') may be organized according to certain structures of opposition and correlation. There are three oppositions to be found which distinguish English from French cuisine. These are the endogenous/exogenous opposition, or national versus exotic ingredients, the central/peripheral opposition, or staple food and its accompaniments: the marked/not marked opposition, or savoury versus bland food. Lévi-Strauss suggests that the upshot of this venture demonstrates that in English cuisine main meals are made from endogenous ingredients, which are bland, and the exotic accompaniments are peripheral to the main meal and strongly marked: conversely, in French cuisine the oppositions of national/exotic foods, staple/accompaniment are not in evidence and the savory/bland opposition can be combined in a meal as well as being peripheral

to it. Other examples of this analytical method in the examination of cuisine which Lévi-Strauss pursues, include the suggestion that 'French <u>hors-d'oeuvres</u> are built around the oppositions maximal transformation/ minimal transformation of the type <u>charcuterie</u>/raw.'; this opposition does not recur in subsequent dishes, whereas in Chinese cuisine such oppositions are suitable for synchronic presentation, i.e. for all parts of the meal, which can be served all at one time.[19] Now although Lévi-Strauss points out that this is a rather 'flimsy' example of his method, he uses it to defend the criticism that his analytical procedures are applicable only to so-called primitive societies. He finds 'nothing absurd' in the idea that once having defined the 'differential structures' in the culinary phenomena of a society, it would be possible to seek the 'transformations' of these structures in another sphere of the cultural <u>milieu</u>, or even in different societies.

> "...if we find these structures to
> be common to several spheres, we
> have the right to conclude that we
> have reached a significant know-
> ledge (sic) of the unconscious
> attitudes of the society or soc-
> ieties under consideration."

It is in the field of kinship analysis and the cross-cultural interpretation of mythologies where

Lévi-Strauss's structural anthropology has aroused
the most interest.

In his earliest work on the subject of kinship,
Lévi-Strauss differentiated between the 'system of
terminology' and the 'system of attitudes' of any
kinship system and attempted to apply his structural
method to the 'system of attitudes'; the problem of
specifying what it is that Ego perceives in his kin-
ship affiliations without resorting to terminological
classifications is resolved by Lévi-Strauss in his
postulate of 'genealogical connections'. Such connect-
ions allow for the incorporation of non-kin into the
categorical model, which in turn may serve as the
underlying model for the organization of social relat-
ions throughout the whole society.[21]

Now Lévi-Strauss suggests that in order to make
the categorical attitudes and genealogical connections
explicit, it is necessary to reduce any kinship system
to its 'constituent elements' and the constituent elem-
ent which is isolated as paramount is the 'atom of
kinshp', i.e., a group consisting of a husband, a
woman, a representative of the group which has given
the woman to the man, and one offspring.[22]

Lévi-Strauss argues,

> "...if we divide all the possible
> behaviour between kin according
> to a simple dichotomy, positive
> and negative behaviour...it can
> be shown that a great many diff-
> erent combinations can be found
> and illustrated by specific ethno-
> graphic observations. When there
> is a positive relationship
> between husband and wife and a
> negative one between brother and
> sister, we note the presence of
> two correlative attitudes:
> positive between father and son,
> negative between maternal uncle
> and nephew..." (and _vice verca_)
>   23

It is in societies where the normative rules
appear to be based on a system of 'cross-cousin marr-
iage' where the elementary structures receive their
'fullest expression'. Without proceeding with an in-
depth outline of Lévi-Strauss's arguments concerning
cross-cousin marriage systems, some of the major
                          24
factors are given below.

Lévi-Strauss isolates a certain type of exchange
of women, defines the social situation under which these
exchanges take place and suggests the structural results
of particular rules of exchange. Marriage which is
prescribed with a member of a class which includes
MoBroDa results in a system where groups always stand in

the same relation to one another and exchanges are always made in the same direction. The matrilateral rule results in a system which Lévi-Strauss refers to as 'generalized exchange': with a patrilateral rule, however, the exchanges are reversed with each generation, a system Lévi-Strauss terms 'discontinuous exchange'. In cases of bilateral cross-cousin marriage, kin groups are paired and they 'swap' women. This system Lévi-Strauss refers to as 'restricted exchange'. Now Lévi-Strauss distinguishes further between bilateral and unilateral forms of cross-cousin marriage and associates the former with 'disharmonic' regimes and the latter with 'harmonic' ones. By 'harmonic' is meant a society in which the rule of residence is the same as the rule of filiation; in 'disharmonic' societies the rules are different. The marriage rule which can link more than two common residence-and-descent groups together in a 'harmonic' society is the unilateral rule, and Lévi-Strauss indicates that the matrilateral rule results in a 'better integration' than the patrilateral rule, which results in a 'closed system' in perpetual disequilibrium.[25]

Now Needham argues that Lévi-Strauss is not seeking any 'final cause' theory in his discussion of marriage rules, neither is he suggesting that his

assessment of the relative 'solidarity' which follows

from the adoption of one rule or the other is a norm-

ative judgement. He states,

> "What Lévi-Strauss is saying, as I
> interpret his argument, is that
> some institutions work more effect-
> ively than others, and that those
> which are less effective are less
> likely to persist." –
> 26

The question which arises here, and which will

be taken up in a more general fashion at the end of

this chapter, is the degree to which the native's

phenomenological interpretation of his situation

becomes dissolved in a series of postulates which

have a particularly Hegelian character. If the attit-

udinal categories are the basic components in the

order of kinship systems, their dissolution must be

accounted for by reference to some 'unconscious'

formulation, which is 'expressed' in structural

relations.

The problem devolves around the question of

whether the semantic categories (in kinship systems)

held by the native are equivalent to the semantic

categories developed by the observer. If they are not,

then whose 'intellect' is at work here? The 'conscious'

intellect of Lévi-Strauss, or the 'unconscious'

intellect of the natives themselves?

Turning now to consider some of the conclusions Lévi-Strauss arrives at in his study of myths, we encounter the crux of the structuralist method. It is with the study of myths that Lévi-Strauss has become increasingly concerned in his latest works.[27]

Lévi-Strauss argues that the meaning of a myth does not lie in the 'isolated elements' which enter into the composition of a myth, but in the way those elements are combined. Further, as language in myth exhibits certain properties (presumably in the same way that poetry is differentiated from discourse, although Lévi-Strauss does not make this comparison) it is possible to isolate these properties which can then be reclassified in terms of 'gross constituent units' or 'mythemes'; 'mythemes', in turn are related not only to subject matter, but to each other. Thus we arrive 'at the very core' of Lévi-Strauss's argument concerning the modal unit which must be isolated, i.e. 'bundles of' the relations between 'mythemes'.[28]

Lévi-Strauss maintains that to generate this unit of analysis is, in effect, to resolve the most problematical feature of myths; their timeless and yet temporally appropriate character.

He argues,

> "Relations pertaining to the same
> bundle may appear diachronically
> at remote intervals, but when we
> have succeeded in grouping them
> together we have reorganized our
> myth according to a time referent
> of a new nature,...namely a two-
> dimensional time referent which
> is simultaneously diachronic and
> synchronic, and which accordingly
> integrates the characteristics of
> langue on the one hand, and those
> of parole on the other." [29]

The concrete example he gives to accompany this

formal explanation is an analysis of the Oedipus myth.

Lévi-Strauss isolates elements in the narrative which

are related to each other (sexual relations, murder,

the slaying of animals, and physical impediments) and

reformulates these elements into four common features,

i.e., the overrating of blood relations, the under-

rating of blood relations, the denial of the autoch-

thonous origin of man and difficulties in walking and

standing, respectively. The correlations which are

then found between these elements leads Lévi-Strauss

to suggest that,

> "..it (the myth) has to do with the
> inability, for a culture which
> holds the belief that mankind is
> autochthonous..to find a satisfact-
> ory transition between this theory
> and the knowledge that human beings
> are actually born from the union of

man and woman."[30]

He arrives at this conclusion by means of the following logic: the animalistic features of deformed men implies their autochthonous origin; but other aspects of the myth have to do with beasts being slain; similarly, the intrafamilial murders imply underrated evaluations of blood relation; but other aspects of the myth have to do with the care and overconcern for kin. In Lévi-Strauss's terms,

> "The inability to connect two kinds
> of relationships is overcome (or
> rather replaced) by the assertion
> that contradictory relationships
> are identical inasmuch as they
> are both self-contradictory in
> a similar way...by a correlation
> of this type, the overrating of
> blood relations is to the under-
> rating of blood relations as the
> attempt to escape autochthony is
> to the impossibility to succeed
> in it. Although experience contra-
> dicts theory, social life validates
> cosmology by its similarity of
> structure. Hence cosmology is true."[31]

In his work The Savage Mind, Lévi-Strauss investigates systems of thought in so-called primitive societies, and develops his arguments concerning the nature of mythology in conjunction with associated hypothses with respect to the categorizing and trans-formational features of mind.

Utilizing ethnographic material from a wide variety of cultures, Lévi-Strauss attempts to show that the naming of details of variation in the natural environment, among primitive people, goes far beyond any considerations of utility and can <u>in toto</u> be characterized as the 'science of the concrete'. This 'primitive science' functions in the same way as modern science (albeit with reservations concerning its ultimate utility) in organizing the totality of experience into a coherent whole. But unlike the contemporary engineer of the modern world, who is concerned principally with the <u>proper</u> way of resolving abstract problems i.e., within the rubric of consistency and congruity, the primitive is less of an 'ingénieur' than he is a 'bricoleur', who formulates structures of thought from disparate elements, in the same way that a handyman will make a 'thing' from whatever bits and pieces are to hand.[32]

As Caws argues,

> "One of the fundamental theses of <u>La Pensée Sauvage</u> is that the <u>structure is all</u>-important, the material largely irrelevant; it is as if the mind had to busy itself about something of sufficient complexity, but cared very little about the nature... of its components."[33]

Another important theme, which is allied to the notions of transformation and categorization, is that mythic thought represents an attempt to fuse the 'natural' and the 'social' worlds together. Lévi-Strauss takes issue with the so-called 'Naturalist School' who made the mistake of assuming that natural phenomena are what myths seek to explain, when they are, in fact, the medium through which myths try to explain facts which are themselves not of a natural but of a logical order.[34]

In his latest works,[35] Lévi-Strauss couples the notion of isomorphic correspondence between nature and culture with his assumptions concerning the binary mode of classification and communication and also attempts to reduce 'patterns of the discursive accounts to simplified forms' borrowed freely from mathematics and geometry. The ultimate goal of mythology-analysis, according to Lévi-Strauss, is to develop even more sophistication in the methods employed,

> "...only then will it be possible
> to subject myth to a genuine
> logico-mathematical analysis..."[36]

At this point, a major criticism of Lévi-Strauss's enterprise becomes almost self-evident. For

in generating his own objects of study, Lévi-Strauss

moves into a philosophical realm in which the analysis

of the relations between man and man is subordinate

to a logic of aesthetic perception, and Hegelian forms

waltz together with statistical matrices and formulae

from projective geometry. The circularity of explanat-

ion which employs abstracted processes of structural

linguistics to explain myth-logic, and myth-logic to

explain structural processes, suggests that Lévi-

Strauss's philosophy can attain the degree of onanism

which Marx ascribed to all purely philosophical

explanations.[37]

In this regard, much of the criticism which has

been made of Freud's work can be applied to Lévi-Strauss.

As Meehan argues, in criticizing certain of the weakness-

es he finds in Freud's attempts at explanation,

> "In an explanation the conceptual
> framework serves as a linking
> mechanism; events are related and
> explained through the conceptual
> framework...instead of relational
> propositions linking inputs and
> outputs, Freud produced proposit-
> ions that link outputs to hypo-
> thetical constructs. The hypo-
> thetical constructs do not connect
> the phenomena, they account for
> them."[38]

To characterize Lévi-Strauss's structuralism
(which he refers to as a form of 'super-rationalism')[39]
as either idealism, formalism, or a kind of sophist-
icated phenomenology, is to run the risk of being
classified by Lévi-Strauss as just another represent-
ative of the 'public mind' which is prone to confuse
structuralism with other schools of thought.[40]
Structuralism is not idealism, he states, insofar as
it defends the cause of materialism.[41] It is not form-
alism[42] , insofar as 'form defines itself by opposition
to a content which is exterior to it' and structure
has no content, but 'is itself the content' which is
'apprehended in a logical organization conceived as
a property of the real'.[43] Lévi-Strauss has to reject
phenomenology because 'it postulates a continuity
between experience and reality'[44] and that in order to
reach 'reality' experience must be repudiated;
experience may be re-integrated into an 'objective
synthesis', a synthesis in which 'sentimentality plays
no part.'[45] To this, it must be noted that it is the
ideas of objects perceived and their transformation
which represent Lévi-Strauss's stock-in-trade; he
admits himself that in order to explain the nature of

'sociological solutions', appeal must be made to 'form
and not content'; and if structure is itself content,
must it not retain aspects of native experience, or
only the experience _of_ the experience, i.e., Lévi-
Strauss's experience? In which case is it not feasible
to consider that Lévi-Strauss repudiate his _own_
experience?

This foregoing criticism does not seek to
belittle the value of Lévi-Strauss's method as a way
of looking at facts in t_oto_, for his work contains much
which is of value, including many fruitful, if seminal,
hypotheses concerning comparative phenomenology. But it
is clear that much of his work presupposes a determinate
structure to the cosmos which in fact is a product of
his own subjective certainty, rather than a fact amen-
able to corroboration and proof, if indeed probative
at all. When that faith itself is rendered to the
level of hypothesis, his method assumes a more credible
character. Even so, it remains to be seen what utility
his ideas will have as conceptual tools in the hands
of lesser mortals. As Geertz argues,

> "Is Lévi-Strauss writing, as he seems
> to be claiming in the confident pages
> of _La Pensée Sauvage_, a prolegomena to
> all future anthropology? Or is he, like
> some uprooted neolithic intelligence cast
> away on a reservation, shuffling the
> debris of old traditions in a vain attempt
> to revivify a primitive faith whose moral

beauty is still apparent but from
which both relevance and credibil-
ity have long since departed?"
46

Notes to Chapter V

1) Lévi-Strauss, C., <u>The Raw and the Cooked: Intro-
duction to a Science of Mythology I</u>, trans.
Weightman, D. and L., Harper and Row, New York,
1969. "....if the human mind appears to be deter-
mined even in the realm of mythology <u>a fortiori</u>
it must also be determined in all its spheres of
activity.." (p. 10). <u>Vide</u> also Leach, E., Claude
Lévi-Strauss, Anthropologist and Philosopher, ex.
<u>New Left Review</u> No. 34, Nov/Dec 1965. "..Lévi-
Strauss is concerned with nothing less than the
logical ordering of the human mind..." (p. 14)
Notice also the <u>a priori</u> assumptions of Auguste
Comte:- "...thus, if we want to conceive of the
rights of the sociological spirit to supremacy,
we have only to regard all our conceptions...as
so many necessary results of a series of determ-
inate phases,...taking place according to invar-
iable laws, statical and dynamical, which ration-
al observation is competent to disclose..."
Comte, A., <u>Positive Philosophy</u> pp. 793-94 <u>ex.</u>
Simpson, G., ed., <u>Auguste Comte: Sire of Sociol-
ogy; selections from his writings.</u> Crowell and Co.,
New York, 1969. p. 134

2) Lévi-Strauss, C., <u>The Savage Mind</u>. University of
Chicago Press, 1966. p. 257

3) Lévi-Strauss admits that Ricoeur "rightly describes
...my work" in this respect. Ricoeur's relevant
statements are: "A Kantian rather than a Freudian
unconscious, a combinative, categorizing unconsc-
ious..a categorizing system unconcerned with a
thinking subject..homologous with nature; it may

3, cont.) perhaps be nature.." Ricoeur, P., Symbole et
Temporalité. <u>Archivo di Filosofia</u>, Nos. 1-2, Rome,
1963. pp. 9-10

4) Lévi-Strauss, C., <u>Tristes Tropiques</u>, trans Russell,
J., Atheneum Books, New York, 1964. p. 389

5) Lévi-Strauss, C., <u>Totemism</u>, trans. Needham, R.,
Beacon Press, Boston, 1963. p. 103

6) <u>vide</u> Ebenstein, W., <u>Great Political Thinkers</u>. Holt,
Rhinehart and Wilson, New York, 1965. p.434

7) Lévi-Strauss, C., <u>Tristes Tropiques</u>, <u>op. cit.</u>,
p. 391

8) <u>vide</u> Goddard, D., Conceptions of Structure in Lévi-
Strauss and in British Anthropology, <u>ex. Social</u>
<u>Research</u>, Vol 32, No. 4, Dec. 1965. pp. 420-22

9) Lévi-Strauss, C., <u>Structural Anthropology</u>, trans.
Jacobson, C., and Schoepf, B.G., Basic Books Inc.,
New York, 1963. p. 334

10) <u>vide</u> Durkheim, E., <u>The Rules of Sociological</u>
<u>Method</u>, trans Solovay, S.A., and Mueller, J.H.,
ed. Catlin, G.G., Free Press, New York, 1964:
"...we tend to substitute ideas for (things)..
ideas are created to put our actions in harmony
with our environment. Ideas..are like a veil drawn
between the thing and ourselves, concealing them
from us the more succesfully as we think them
more transparent.." (pp. 14-15)

11) Lévi-Strauss, C., <u>Structural Anthropology, op. cit.</u>,
Chapter II

12) <u>ibid.</u>, p. 33

13) <u>ibid.</u>, p. 162

14) <u>ibid.</u>, pp. 83 ff.

15) <u>ibid.</u>, p. 83

16) <u>ibid.</u>, "...thus anthropology considers the whole
social fabric as a network of different types of
orders... the <u>order of orders</u> is not a mere logical
reformulation of phenomena which have been subjected
to analysis. It is the most abstract expression of
the interrelationships between the levels to which
structural analysis can be applied, general enough
to account for the fact that the models must some-
times be the same for societies which are historic-
ally and geographically disparate...by order of
orders, then, I mean the formal properties of the
whole made up of subwholes, each of which corres-
ponds to a given structural level." (pp. 312, 332-
3)

17) <u>ibid.</u>, p. 46, p. 86

18) <u>ibid.</u>, p. 85

19) <u>ibid.</u>, pp. 85-7

20) <u>ibid.</u>, p. 87

21) Lévi-Strauss, C., <u>Les Structures élémentaires de La
Parenté</u>. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris,
1949. <u>Vide</u> also <u>Structural Anthropology, op. cit.</u>,
p. 38

22) Lévi-Strauss, C., <u>Structural Anthropology, op. cit.</u>,
p. 72

23) <u>ibid.</u>, p. 73

24) Lévi-Strauss's work on kinship as an application of
his 'structural method' or, what is often referred
to by others as 'alliance theory', has stimulated

24, cont.) a good deal of controversy. <u>Vide</u> in partic-
ular: Homans, G.C., and Schneider, D.M., <u>Marriage</u>,
<u>Authority and Final causes</u>. The Free Press, Glencoe,
1955; replied to in Needham, R., <u>Structure and</u>
<u>Sentiment</u>. University of Chicago Press,1962; also
for continuing debate on the topic <u>vide</u> Schneider,
D.M., Some Muddles in the Models: or, How the System
really works, <u>ex.</u> <u>The Relevance of Models for</u>
<u>Social Anthropology</u>. A.S.A. Monographs 1, Tavistock
Publications, London, 1965. pp. 25-85: Maybury-
Lewis, D.H.P., Prescriptive Marriage Systems,
<u>Southwestern Journal of Anthropology</u>, Vol 21, No.3,
1965. pp. 218-21; Coult, A.D., The Structuring of
Structure, <u>American Anthropologist</u>, Vol. 68, 1966.
pp. 439-43; Eggan, F., Review of Homans and Schneid-
er, <u>American Sociological Review</u>, Vol. 21, 1956.
pp. 402-3; Gluckman, M., Review of Homans and
Schneider, <u>Man</u>, Vol. 56, 1956. p. 159

25) Lévi-Strauss, C., <u>Les Structures élémentaires</u>..etc.,
<u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 556-8

26) Needham, R., <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 27

27) Lévi-Strauss, C., <u>The Raw and the Cooked</u>..etc.
<u>op. cit.</u> also, <u>Mythologiques II: du Miel aux cendres</u>;
and <u>Mythologiques III: L'origine des manières de</u>
<u>table</u>. Plon, Paris 1965, 1966: also <u>vide</u> 'The Bear
and the Barber', <u>Journal of the Royal Anthropologic-</u>
<u>al Institute</u>, Vol. 93, 1963. pp. 1-11

28) Lévi-Strauss, C., <u>Structural Anthropology, op. cit.</u>,
p. 211

29) <u>ibid.</u>,p. 212

30) <u>ibid</u>., p. 216

31) <u>ibid</u>., p. 216

32) Lévi-Strauss, C., <u>The Savage Mind, op. cit.</u>,
pp. 17-33

33) Caws, P., What is Structuralism? <u>Partisan Review</u>
Vol. 35, No. 1, Winter, 1968. p. 81

34) Lévi-Strauss, C., <u>The Savage Mind, op. cit.</u>, p. 95

35) <u>vide</u>. Note 28 <u>supra</u>

36) Lévi-Strauss, C., <u>The Raw and the Cooked</u>..etc.,
<u>op. cit.</u>, p. 31

37) Marx, K., 'Philosophy is to real life what onanism
is to real love.'

38) Meehan, E.J., <u>Contemporary Political Thought, a</u>
<u>critical study</u>. The Dorsey Press, Illinois, 1967.
p. 239. Also <u>vide</u> Hook, S., Science and Mythology
in Psychoanalysis, <u>ex</u>. Hook, S., ed., <u>Dimensions</u>
<u>of Mind</u>. P.F.Collier Inc., New York, 1961

39) Lévi-Strauss, C., <u>Tristes Tropiques, op. cit.</u>,
p. 61

40) Lévi-Strauss, C., <u>The Raw and the Cooked</u>..etc.,
<u>op. cit.</u>, p. 27

41) <u>ibid</u>., p. 27. It should be noted that Lévi-Strauss
argues that his analysis of Caduveo art and Bororo
kinship organization are 'efforts to interpret
native superstructures based upon dialectical
materialism.' <u>Structural Anthropology, op. cit.</u>,
note No. 31 to Postcript to Chapter XV. pp. 343-4

42) Lévi-Strauss, C., <u>The Raw and the Cooked</u>..etc. <u>op.</u>
<u>cit.</u>,p. 27

43) Attributed to Lévi-Strauss in one of his works
(specific source not stated) by Pouillon, J.,
Essai de définition, Les Temps Modernes, issue
unspecified. Ex. Caws, P., op. cit., p. 81

44) Lévi-Strauss, C., Tristes Tropiques, op. cit.,
p. 62

45) ibid., p. 63. It should be noted, however, that
Lévi-Strauss's work can be considered as phenomen-
ological, in method at least. His argument that
"all facts chould be carefully observed and described
without allowing any theoretical preconceptions to
decide whether some are more important than others..
..", (Structural Anthropology, op. cit., p. 280) is,
as Nodelman points out, the same procedure as adopted
by Husserl, who advocates the requirement to 'put
in brackets' whatever presuppositions may impede the
observer's grasp of the essence of the phenomenon.
"This askesis...this Epoché as Husserl calls it,
is fundamental - though emphatically not final -
to the method of structural analysis practised by
Lévi-Strauss and by the Strukturforschung school":
Nodelman, S., Structural analysis in art and
anthropology. Yale French Studies, Vols. 36-7,
1965-6. p. 92

46) Geertz, C., The Cerebral Savage - On the work of
Claude Lévi-Strauss. Encounter, April, 1967. p. 31

CHAPTER VI

Recapitulation and Conclusions

The last four chapters have illustrated four relatively diverse ways of proceeding with the search for adequate explanations concerning the nature of man's existential relationship to man and nature, with an emphasis on the generic function of mind.

It is the purpose of this chapter to select a number of themes which have an interstitial connection in the work of these four thinkers and to articulate those themes in a generalized fashion. Particular emphasis will be placed on the correspondence between symbolic concepts and action and the 'practical character' of knowledge.

To begin with, it is necessary to elaborate on an argument made in the first chapter with regard to the question of the relevance of the situation. The philosophical position which underlies the four paradigms with respect to cognition (or the gaining and communication of knowledge) is that knowledge in general terms can only mean the 'mapping', metaphorically speaking, of experienced reality by some actor.[1]

Knowledge, when defined as the 'communicable mapping' of some feature of experienced reality, implies that knowledge is relational to that experience; the actor apprehends what he observes in terms of a set of rules that define what is a permissible map. These rules are essentially given by the symbolic structure of the social milieu in which the actor participates. There is no absolute access to what Kant would call a 'thing-in-itself': the character of thought is circumscribed by the actor's frame of reference, the linkage of symbolic systems to the actor's experience, and the designated means of communicating the meaning of his experience to others.

If knowledge as a pattern of communicable ideas is ipso facto a pattern of symbols, it is necessary to outline the general characteristics of the symbol per se and to focus attention on the principal phenomena chosen by the four thinkers to which they ascribe importance as symbolized objects in social life. It is argued that it is the constitution of symbolic constructs, the process whereby those symbolic constructs are maintained, and the manner in which they find their dissolution, which provides the key to the relation between thought and action, and between social

stasis and social change.

For present purposes, the principal character-
istic feature of the symbol is that it is a device
which enables those who employ it to transcend the
immediate ('factual', 'empirical', or 'discursive')
apprehension of objects and persons such that there is
a relatively parsimonious and fized conception of the
intended object or person which is readily conveyed
in communicative acts. It is the symbolic meaning
which is accorded to persons, things and events, which
allows for the construction of a socially shared
world, consisting of known or knowable objects. The
verification and validation of persons as _personae_
(or role takers) and of social groups as legitimate
entities, is attainable only through communicated
symbols.

To Goffman, the communicative symbolic context
of experience is crucial to the realization of what
Goffman takes to be a focal symbolic phenomenon in
itself, i.e., the self. Because the communicated
symbol (the social self as an acting unit) is manip-
ulable, there is created a characteristic distance
between the directly intentional act and the subject-
ive experience of acting. The individual, insofar as

he is always initiating action, takes into consideration the attitudes of others to that action and then revises or alters that action in the light of those attitudes.

It thus appears that reflexivity is an important link between the presentation of the symbolic social self and the purely existential 'I', itself a symbolic construction; the ultimate value of the social self is of a practical nature, in that it provides for the establishment of a working social concensus which is the a priori requirement for the construction of the subjective identity. The adjustment which takes place in response to the anticipated reactions or ongoing reactions of others is not passive, but is the outcome of actively devised strategies employed to maintain the interaction in a way whish also reflects an agreeable or worthwhile subjective self-image. It transpires that the ultimate value of interaction in Goffman's analysis is found in the degree to which it affords the individual the chance to maintain a continuing existential self-symbol, and the dynamic of social action is to be found in the reflexive, or dialectical process which occurs as a result of the search for constancy, predictability and legitimacy in terms of the existential self symbol on the one

hand, and the need to adjust to the social demands of
changing situations on the other. Phenomenological
reflection on the part of the individual leads to the
recognition of the central authority of the social as
the basis of the interpretive order, and the symbolic
constructs inherent in that order. In other words,
the reflexive process itself involves the consideration
of the value of the symbolic social selves employed by
the individual in his interaction with others; further,
it is suggested that the notion of self-value is also
an abstract social construct, which, as a collective
representation, varies between societies.

Once the argument is put forward that the
existential self is a social invention (so that the
symbolic concept of the personal identity assumes the
status of a special kind of being), other observations
follow.

First, it explains the problematic features of
social demands for self-realization, self-improvement
and personal authenticity which characterize the
'urban secular world'; secondly, and more positively,
the symbolic self-identity concept has, like most
symbolic concepts, a practical feature in providing the
mechanism necessary to cope with variegated social

situations and the multiplicity of actions typical of
complex societies. The notion of the self-identity
concept has to be realized before the reflexive process
can take place. If the ultimate goal of the individual
'I' is to seek concordance with any particular social
self or 'Me', it is achieved only in the social <u>milieu</u>
which is marked by compromise, or a neutralization of
perspectives.

Turning now to the deployment and function of
symbolic concepts in social experience as Schutz views
them, it becomes clear that the propensity for typific-
ation on the part of social actors is a reflection of
the demand for object constancy which enables the actor
to perceive things in a stable framework and is an
attribute of consciousness, or mind. In some respects,
typification, when applied to human relationships,
corresponds to a central concept in the work of Marx
and Lukacs, the concept of reification.[2] For Schutz,
however, the tendency on the part of men to see human
relationships in terms of things, the inclination to
transmute the flowing into the static, the relative
into the absolute, does not ultimately result in alien-
ation; rather, typification is regarded as a method of
conceiving the world in a way which facilitates the
solution of problematic situations.

Schutz's thought concerning typification, it
must be emphasized, includes the assertion that both
objects and persons are represented or given as symbol-
ic constructs to the individual, who himself is concern-
ed with the more concrete properties of such constructs
only when he is forced to deal with them as component
parts of some problem situation.

The abstract pattern of typifications dissolves
only when individuals are engaged in a joint task in
which both parties to the action come to 'flesh out'
as it were, their mutual knowledge of each other, in
terms of biography and motives for actions performed.
As Schutz argues,

> "...my experience of the on-going
> phases of my own conscious life and
> my experience of the co-ordinated
> phases of your conscious life is
> unitary; experience in the We-relation
> is genuinely shared."
> 3

The implications of this arrangement, however,
are that joint purpose precludes the possibility of
sheer existential orientation to others, and the
mutuality of shared experience predisposes a moral
commitment which is characteristically less reflective
than other relationships. The symbolic representations

of the We-relations of various kinds, such as
'buddies, lovers, fellow-sufferers' and so on, present
a paradox; for in order to convey the meaning of their
relationship to others, all those engaged in such
relationships must reflect upon them and articulate
their meaning in such a way as to reduce their dimen-
sion to some typification. However, both the typificat-
ions which refer to the face-to-face relationships and
the symbolic constructs which refer to the more endur-
ing institutionalized relations (including the trans-
cendental interpretations of the collectivity itself)
are intrinsic to the conceptual system of a society,
and as such, do not require explicit formulation and
description in the daily exchanges of communication
between the members of that society.

Further, once the conceptual system contains
symbolic constructs with respect to institutionalized
relations, and these relations are made manifest in
the _praxis_ of that society, such reflection as does
take place with respect to their validity is inhibited
by their sacred character.

> "Since institutions express the
> conceptual system, and the latter
> is a society's final statement of
> the world and its meaning, it
> follows that basic institutions are
> held to be sacred. For...the sacred

> is but the fundamental concepts
> of the conceptual system. Finality
> is always sacred."[4]

Thus the symbolic constructs of what might be
called social existententialism[5] are rooted in the
praxis of social acts. The dialectic between praxis
and theoria of the social is analogically similar to
the dialectic between the social self and the private
self in Goffman's analysis of social interaction. The
most problematic situation for the individual, it is
noted, occurs when his acts are symbolically discontin-
uous with his private assessment of himself, (most
significantly in institutions, whose administrative
personnel have an a priori 'typification' of the
character of the inmates).

Now Mannheim's concern with the collective
symbolic representations of social life also reveal
the congruence between thought and action; however,
Mannheim's recourse to the study of Weltanschauungen
of a collectivity of subjects results in an emphasis
on the dialectical relationship between symbolic
representations of one group's collective world of
lived experience vis-a-vis those of another group.

> "But for the country lad who goes
> to the city and adapts himself

> gradually to city life, the rural
> mode of living and thinking ceases
> to be something to be taken for
> granted...he distinguishes now,
> perhaps quite unconsciously,
> between 'rural' and 'urban' modes
> of thought."[6]

Predominantly, Mannheim's interest in the dynamic

aspect of social experience is limited to those orientat-

ions which encompass collective or institutional concerns

of a political nature. It becomes clear that Mannheim

interprets the generation of symbolic concepts as a

function of social purpose. When that purpose assumes

a political character, either in a direction which would

maintain the status quo or in a direction which would

change it, the impetus is found in a source outside

the group itself. It is at this point when the logic of

the symbolic conceptual system of any particular collect-

ivity is either recast into a form which will incorporate

the challenging alternative logic presented to that

collectivity (which implies a higher stage of abstract-

ion), or will become what might be called 'fugitive'.

As Taylor points out,

> "Where two conceptual systems are
> presented to the individual, it will
> be necessary for him to reconcile
> their 'disparities' by some kind of
> philosophic rationalization, or to
> reject one or the other. A third
> alternative is to see each as const-
> ituting its own order of truth. This
> position, since it violates the

notion of the unity of know-
ledge, tends to be unsatis-
factory, unless some way is
discovered of reconciling
these order on some more ult-
imate metaphysical ground."[7]

It would appear that what Mills refers to as
'the situated vocabulary of motives'[8] which arises in
the normal praxis of a particular group, must be
articulated in terms of constituted principles peculiar
to that group and expressed in abstract form, to be
a viable force in any dialectical relationship with
another, alternative set of conceptual or symbolic
categories. The amalgamation takes place as a result
of the mutual recognition of the value of some common
purpose, i.e. both parties find something common to
their experience, a property which is of instrumental
value in the realization of certain ends.

The symbolic concepts of the (largely acephalous)
groups studied by Lévi-Strauss are seen as instrumental
in bringing meaning and hence cognitive consistency to
the natural and social worlds, which are conceived as
a dynamic field in isomorphic correspondence. The
reflexivity which represents the focal point of the
relationship between communication and social inter-
action (as well as the structure of symbolism itself,

in the work of Goffman, Schutz and Mannheim) does not
generate the same kind of revisions in the symbolic
conceptual schemes of such groups as it does for the
individual in the 'urban secular world' or for the
'We'-group, or for the 'communal' group confronted
with the encroachment of gesellschaftlichen forms of
social organization.

Instead, the 'savage mind' appears to 'feed'
on disjunctions which may confront it, incorporating
the immediately given into a scheme of thought which
does not threaten or invalidate the existing order of
symbolic concepts, let alone 'neutralize' them, as
Mannheim expresses it.

> "The savage mind...builds mental
> structures which facilitate an
> understanding of the world in as
> much as they resemble it. In this
> sense savage thought can be
> defined as analogical thought."[9]

The 'sub-universe of ideal relations' is a
universe peopled by sensible or concrete entities,
rather than sheer abstractions, and the constitution
and re-constitution of symbolic concepts such as the
'I' and the 'we' is jeopardized through the commitment
to the concrete.

>"Certainly the properties to which
>the savage mind has access are not
>the same as those which have
>commanded the attention of scientists.
>The physical world is approached
>from opposite ends in the two cases:
>one is supremely concrete, the other
>supremely abstract; one proceeds
>from the angle of sensible qualit-
>ies and the other from that of
>formal properties."
>   10

It was argued above than an understanding of
the processes whereby symbolic constructs are constit-
uted, maintained and dissolved, provides the key to
the relation between thought and action and between
social <u>stasis</u> and social change.

Despite the relatively diverse starting points
for enquiry which are adopted by the four thinkers
dealt with in this thesis, their analyses of the
relationship between thought and action appears to
converge along the following lines:-

In regard to the constitution of symbolic
concepts, whether these be the ultimate value of the
individual, the classification of the natural or social
environment, or the legitimacy of informal or formal
groups, the genesis of such constructs are always the
product of collective experience and never a strictly

individual elaboration.

In regard to the maintenance of symbolic constructs, whether they are the 'team' or 'buddies', the 'community' or myths of human origin, the continued existence of the particular symbolic concept is guaranteed insofar as the correspondence between it and the actions which it reflects is perpetuated. The real is rational and the rational is real in as much as the corresponding action does not bring about ambiguity in the more general sphere of social experience.

In regard to the dissolution of symbolic constructs, it is largely presented as a function of disjunction between praxis and theoria, which in turn forces a reflexive consideration of the more fundamental, legitimating features of thought. The reflexivity is prompted by a judgement made on the basis of some segregated portion or position within the total conceptual scheme, or from an institutional base which is foreign to the original actor but which either convinces him of the advantages to his purpose of the need to revise his symbolic constructs, or, (as in the case of the inmate in the institution) a judgement made on his behalf. The dissolution (and subsequent reformulation)

of symbolic constructs requires ontological scepticism
and the capacity to find value in formal abstractions
of increased scale and scope.

It may be noted that resistance to the revision
of symbolic constructs is a feature of human thought
which is not monopolized by the members of the acepha-
lous societies studied by Lévi-Strauss.

In conclusion, brief reference should be made to
at least three apparently paradoxical features of thought
and action.

The first of these is the tendency of human
thought to conceive of both human and natural phenomena
in typological terms, with the result that taxonomies
of human beings develop which are characterized by a
form of reification and hence partial apprehension. To
anthropomorphize things and to reify (or zoomorphize)
human beings is a tendency which may be a reflection of
the requirement to dominate nature or simply an exten-
sion of the apprehension of species-types in the animal
world; taken to extremes, this tendency precludes the
possibility of understanding anything concerning the
human personality or social experience. A similar
assessment can be made of the attempt to grasp the

meaning of the social in strictly mechanistic or mathematical terms. The qualitative feature of social life may be intangible, but it represents the very stuff of human experience.

The second paradox arises from the decision to become, and to remain, an existential thinker. To reflect on the legitimacy of an act presupposes cognitive constructions of the self, of the group and of the encompassing universe. Such cognitive construct ions arise in the social process; thus the social process itself must be the final arbiter of such acts as are performed by the existential thinker. The social requirement for existential thought would appear to be a form of social organization which would combine an optimum opportunity for free choice, self-expression, mutual accommodation and viable social coexistence. The possibility of attaining this amalgam and the kind of social system and interpretive order necessary to its realization are questions which are not within the scope of this thesis.

The third paradox involves the question of what might be called ontological uncertainty. Social processes and the symbolic constructs which support them represent a human appetite for logical consistency and systematized

predictability. But each thinker in this thesis has
shown the dialectical feature of thought as being
pervasive in perception, even if the resultant synthesis
(as in the case of the societies studied by Lévi-Strauss)
only serves to consolidate, or slightly amend, the
status quo. In societies which have adopted more systematic
and formal techniques of social organization and scientif-
ic experimentation, the development of perspectives is
a result of deliberate reflection and a sceptical eval-
uation of the prevailing order of knowledge and social
organization. Thus insofar as man is condemned to reflect
in the modern world, his actions are merely tentative: he
is forced to build his house of knowledge on sand and to
live in rooms furnished with distorting mirrors.

Notes to Chapter VI

1) This metaphor is also employed by V.G.Childe.
Vide Childe, V.G., Society and Knowledge. Allen
and Unwin, London, 1956.

2) This topic is dealt with in some depth by W. Stark.
Vide Stark, W., The Sociology of Knowledge: an essay
in aid of a deeper understanding of the history of
ideas. The Free Press, Glencoe, 1958. pp. 307-45

3) Schutz, A., Collected Papers, Vol II. Studies in
Social Theory, ed. Broderson, A. Martinus Nijhoff,
The Hague, 1964. p.30

4) Taylor, S., Conceptions of Institutions and the
Theory of Knowledge. Bookman Associates, New York,
1956. p. 115

5) "Existentialism and Durkheim's sociology are in
spirit complementary, not polar, if Durkheim's
perspective is seen as leading to 'social existent-
ialism' and away from a narrower 'individual exist-
entialism' from which no general theory of social
order could be constructed." Tiryakian, E.A.,
Existential Phenomenology and the Sociological
Tradition. American Sociological Review, Vol 30,
No. 5, Oct. 1965. p. 681. Also vide Tiryakian, E.A.,
Sociologism and Existentialism. Prentice-Hall,
Englewood Cliffs, 1962. pp. 151-69

6) Mannheim, K., Ideology and Utopia: an introduction
to the Sociology of Knowledge, trans. Wirth, L., and
Shils, E., Harvest Books, Harcourt, Brace and World
Inc., New York, 1036. p. 281

7) Taylor, S., _op. cit._, p. 108

8) Mills, C.W., Situated Actions and Vocabularies of Motive,_ex_ Horowitz, I.L., ed. _Power, Politics and People_: _The Collected Essays of C. Wright Mills._ Oxford University Press, New York, 1963. pp. 439-52

9) Lévi-Strauss, C., _The Savage Mind._ University of Chicago Press, 1966. p. 263

10) _ibid._, p. 269

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